Russia and the Enlargement of NATO

Vitaly Zhurkin
International political confrontation over NATO'senlargement to the East constitutes, by all standards, the largest
conflict in relations between the new Russia, which emerged on
8 December 1991 as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, and the West, the Atlantic alliance and major Westernpowers. Political leaders on both sides of this conflict stress thatit should not be allowed to develop into a new edition of theCold war, and they are undertaking pragmatic steps to prevent
such a development. Still, the conflict exists. It poisons thesituation in Europe, sa well as. It cloudaing prospects for thedevelopment of partnership and cooperation.
It seems that both the reasons for and driving tendencies
behind the disagreements over NATO's enlargement lie both in
the past and in the present. Thus it is logical to start with theirprehistory.
The system of international relations which took shape inEurope and the Trans-Atlantic area in general in the first decade
after the Second World War (often called the Yalta or
Yalta-Potsdam system) was based on countervailing of two
opposing military-political coalitions - NATO created in 1949
and the Warsaw treaty organization or the Warsaw pactestablished in 1955. Direct military conflict between them would
almost automatically lead to a Third World War with all
its apocalyptical consequences. Both sides learned, in thecourse of a series of sharp crises in the late 1940s and early
1950s, how to avoid armed conflict. Moreover, the outlines of asystem which could help manage this uneasy but stable truce
were created, eventually leading to the Conference Organization
on security and cooperation in Europe.

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Russia and the Enlargement of NATOThis organization rather superficially covered up thefundamental division of Europe which was constantly renewing
the Cold war. One military-political bloc justified the existenceof the other. This abnormal model, though it created stability foralmost half a century, was critically viewed by those in Russia
who thought of reforms and democracy.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was inevitably coupledand even preceded by the collapse of the Warsaw pact which
was officially disbanded on 1 July 1991 on the insistence of its
members who were eager to get rid of Soviet domination. In thenew Russia, which had started along the difficult and tortuous
road of economic reforming and political democratization, there
was a widespread belief that the disappearance of the Warsaw
pact made the further existence of NATO unnecessary. It wasexpected that a NATO without an opponent which justified its
existence would fade away. This expectation proved naive.
For the sake of justice it should be recognized that theNATO leaders at first started moving towards a rrapjfofmationof the Alliance. In the London declaration on the Transformed
North Atlantic Alliance (6 July 1990) NATO proclaimed its
desire to cooperate with CSCE in search of a larger security
framework for Europe. In the Rome summit (7-8 November1991) a new strategic concept of the Alliance was adopted andthe North Atlantic Cooperation Council was created to enhancecooperation and stability in Europe. Later, since 10 January
199*4 the Partnership for Peace program of cooperation withNATO's non-members was proclaimed with the same purpose.
It seemed that the division of Europe, which was a scourge fortwo generations of Europeans, started to give way to a newEurope, undivided and free.
Such hopes were encouraged by a number of summits andother highly authoritative forums which unconditionallyproclaimed the end of the division of Europe, the indivisibilityof security and the search for common responses to thechallenges of the future. This set of new ideas was solemnlyannounced by leaders of states and governments in the Charter

Vitaly Zhurkin153of Paris for a new Europe (21 November 1990), the Declarationof the Helsinki Summit (10 July 1992) and many otherinternational documents.
These decisions were not merely confined to statements.
When practical problems emerged they were solved in thespirit of these declarations. For instance, in the major documenton the unification of Germany (a Treaty on the final settlementwith respect to Germany, signed in Moscow on 12 September1990), both Germanics, France, Great Britain, the United States
and the Soviet Union agreed (article 5), that after the Soviet
forces were withdrawn from the territory of the former DDR,
German forces belonging to NATO would be allowed to staythere but without nuclear weapons carriers. Simultaneously,
they treaty declared that "foreign armed forces and nuclear
weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part ofGermany or deployed there" .*lIt was clearly recognized that NATO's Eastern border wasfinalized and frozen, and the alliance would continue toconcentrate on its internal transformation. Only taking into
consideration this prehistory one should judge the shock which
the Russian society felt when on 1 December 1994 the decision
to start preparations to the enlargement of NATO to the East
was taken by the North Atlantic Council. It was a psychologicaland political shock which quickly started to develop into afeeling that Russia was being betrayed by the same leaders andnations that it was just about to join (in a democraticcivilization).
This sharp turn was one of the inexplicable paradoxes ofpost-Cold war history. For several years before it happened, it
seemed that the new Russia's growing relations with Europeanand North American nations and institutions was an impressive
example of partnership between East and West so unlike therelationships which existed between the West and the Soviet
Union. A series of summit meetings, Russia's role in theunification of Germany, Russia's admittance to the G-7
dialogue and many other events had augered a rosey future. At

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Russia and the Enlargement of NATO

least that was the impression of many in Russia.
The irony of history is that a conflict arose exactly in thearea of international relations. It succeeded in pushing to thebackground Russia's potential problems in the East, theconflicts in the South in which it is directly involved, and eventhose difficulties and complications in its relations with theoutside world which developed because of the massive use ofmilitary force in Chechnya.
The enlargement of NATO has a complex knot of mutualrecriminations, and it appears that it will not be easy to untie
this knot. In this conflict it seems that practically all, theadvantages are with NATO. The nations of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) are knocking at NATO's doors. No country,
including Russia, has the power of veto over their desires andactions. Russia herself is in economic and political crisis,though election of a national president, in the first generalelection in her thousand years of histiry, may at least lead to thegrowth of political stability.
Both sides should carefully weigh all the possibleconsequences, but the larger responsibility lies with NATO as
the stronger side, even though both sides have committed
mistakes in the process of the development of the conflict.
The prevailing opinion in Russia is that NATO was and is
the driving force in this conflict. The process of NATO'stransformation and adjustment to the new post-Cold war
realities has slowed down rather early in the 1990s. It seemedthat the NATO leaders concluded that all the major internal
problems of the Alliance were solved and that the emphasis
could be transferred to relations with the nations of CEE. The
Partnership for Peace program, which could be a constructive
long-term compromise, was, rather hastily, partly supplemented
and partly replaced by efforts aimed at formal enlargement ofNATO. Russia, taken by surprise, resisted.
The above does not mean that Russia herself wasblameless. Statements in early 1990s about special interests in
the CEE area, though later discontinued, gave rise to fears andVitaly Zhurkin

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suspicions about Russia's intentions. The war in Chechnya has
also strengthened the position of supporters of NATO'senlargement in the CEE countries.
In the dispute surrounding the question of enlargement
NATO plays the assertive role, with Russia trying to protect
herself. Naturally, the right to join or not join political andmilitary alliances is the inherent right of any sovereign state,whih is not to be vetoed by any other state. But, at the sametime equally inherent is the right of any state to protect its
interests by political means especially if it perceives a threat tothose interests and its security.
The overwhelming majority of Russians share such aperception, and it is appraised by Russian society asmultifacetal. Some of them lead to external potential dangers,
the others - to internal dangers.
The fear of the external threat emerged because,
irrespective of the intentions and rationale of supporters ofNATO's expansion, it may, and most probably will, eventuallylead to a new division of Europe. It creates a traumatic
apprehension in Russian society. Overcoming the division ofEurope was one of the greatest achievements of the post-Coldwar era. At least this was how it was interpreted in Russia.
Now the spectre of a new division of Europe due toNATO's enlargement is begining to loom quickly arisin. This
new division will have a new border, shifted further to the East
than the border of the old Cold war division of Europe; the Iron
Curtain. Moreover, Russia will stay beyond this new borderweakened economically and politically. Naturally it considers
this new situation to be very uncomfortable, and a threat to its
security and interests.
The most damaging aspect of such a threat is the approachof NATO's military structures towards Russia's borders. Thesestructures may not only be conventional but nuclear as well.
When in August-December 1994 the Working group on NATOenlargement created by the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA)
approached a number of national delegations to the NAA with a

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Russia and the Enlargement of NATO

series of questions concerning the attitude of their states tovarious aspects of NATO's enlargement, some of them (theCzech Republic and Estonia most explicitly) confirmed in one
way or an other the readiness of their countries not only tostation non-indigenous forces but to deploy foreign nuclear
weapons on their territories.*2 Only Latvia pointed out that it isbound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.*3
Thus the enlargement of NATO will constitute a threat not
only to Russia or any other particular country. If pursued
vigorously it may threaten the existing international treaties(and not NPT alone) thus leading to violations of thefoundations of European and global security.
The damaging intenal influence on Russia of NATO's
enlargement is also quite worrying. It is and will be eagerly
exploited by ultra nationalistic forces in their struggle against
domestic reforms and policies of international cooperation. Thisstruggle may finally lead to domestic destabilization and even arather radical transformation of the economic, foreign anddefense policies of modern Russia. The repercussions of suchdevelopments are quite obvious.
The advocates of an expanded NATO provide a number ofrationales and explanations justifying such an approach tocontemporary European security and political problems. A
noticeable place among them is occupied by the interpretationof such an enlargement as a precautionary measure. NATO in
this scenario should act as a military alliance against Russia incase of chaos, turmoil or other events there which may lead to acrisis in its relations with the West. The trouble with such arationale is that due to the negative influence of NATO'senlargement on Russia's domestic development it may becomea self-fulfilling prophecy.
What is the way out of the uneasy situation created byNATO's desire to enlarge? It should be sought on the basis ofnegotiations and political dialogue, though such an approach
would demand a lot of eflbrt, with emotions and disagreements
are running high.

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The starting point for such a search may be found in theoften expressed desire by both sides not to allow the situation
to slide down to the resunption of the Cold war.
So far as Russia is concerned, its political leaders andexperts are continuously putting forward practical proposals
aimed at solving the problem, (although, frankly speaking not
all of them are well thought of). Among them is the idea of
Russia joining the political organization of NATO, creating aneutral non-nuclear zone of security in Central, Southern andNorthern Europe etc.
More realistically, however, was the idea of new members
joining only the political structures of NATO and avoiding
participation in its military structures. Along the same lines theproposal of a series of mutual guarantees by NATO and Russiaof the security of CEE states was repeatedly put forward byRussia. It later conceded that if these states need only NATO's
guarantees it would be their right and Russia would not resist.
There was particular insistance that any compromise shouldexclude the possibility of NATO's military structuresapproaching Russia.
NATO was rather lazy in exploving the practical proposalsof the compromises concerned. Though the alliance was careful
not to force the issue of enlargement in the period preceding
the presidential elections in Russia, some new steps weremarked in the process of the internal transformation of theorganization. After several years of discussion anddisagreements the Berlin session of the North Atlantic Council(3 June 1996) finally took the decision to start implementing theconcept of a Common joint task forces (CJTF) which - if andwhen implemented - may signify a serious step towards the"Europeanization" of NATO.
At the same time a considerable number of Westernpolitical and security analysts are undertaking major efforts totry to develop compromise models of special relations to beestablished between NATO and Russia, with the likely
inclusion of a particular treaty codifying the interrelationship,

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Russia and the Enlargement of NATOthe overarching bilateral structures, etc. Among the proposals
were: a NATO-Russian forum; a full-blown multidimensional
institution, with a Council of ministers; a Military committee; a
Nuclear planning group; an Arms control working group; and aParliamentary contact group.*4 The Secretary General of NATOand his Russian counterpart would act as chief coordinating
officers. Naturally, all these ideas should be carefully weighted
and positively analyzed.
Inevitably, it will need time to take into consideration theenormity of the problems and the acuteness of thedisagreements. But all sides agree that if and when the NATOstarts to be enlarged, it will be a complex and long process. Itwill demand careful negotiations, a very thorough appraisal offinancial, organizational and other problems and consequences,
ratification in the parliaments, etc.
NATO politicians and officers continually stress that
Russia's interests should be taken into consideration. If thisdesire is genuine it needs careful, hasty interaction.
Many political figures and experts expressed the opinion
that the successfully developing interaction between Russia andits Western partners in IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a
vivid practical example for future and larger scale forms ofcooperation. Unfortunately, this successful example has been
too short. It is necessary to have more such possibilities for athoughtful examination of the essence and details of thedeveloping experience and the format and ways for its future
implementation. In other words, patience and time, time andpatience: these are the obvious and necessary conditions fordeveloping a successful outcome.
Notes
1

SIPRI Yearbook 1991, p.613.

2NAA. Defense and Security Committee. The Enlargement of theAlliance. Brussels, 1995, pp. 27, 34, 35,47
Ibid., p. 49

3

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Christoph Bertram. Europe in the Balance. Securing thePeace Won in the Cold war. Washington, 1995, pp. 36-37