Contents

Remarks on Epistemology Musicalized
ICIDNOSE, Masaki
The Experience ofDlness and the Phenomenology of Caring
SAKAKIBARA, Tetsuya
Mal et Transcendance - Uvinas et NabertNAKA,Mao
Ober die Nietlschesche Wende in der Mitre der 1870er Jahre
KISm, Takayuki-"Ueber Wahrlleit und Liige im aussennora1isch Sinne" im ZmtrumEuthanasia and -Causal Preemption
YANO, Keisuke
De la pas900 aux passions de I'ame- nouvelles remarques sur l.es Passions de ['dine, § 40 ONISm, Yoshitomo
Fmn tmd Inhalt in der Wesenslogik Hegels
NAKANO, Mal«toDoxa sur le temps : l'apcrie dans le chapitre nde "Essai" de Belp>n
WATANABE, Mal«toBelief as Probability
KANEKO, Yusuke
Le Langage ethique dans la pensee de ~SATO, Kacri
Ideas of Substances in Looke's &say
SHIMAMURA, Hisayuki
Wrttgenstein on meaning and use
OHTANI, Hiroshi
Two Conceptioos of Knowledge: Realistic vs Anti-Realistic
OSADA, Ryo
Locke 00 Essence
NAGAO, Hidesato
God's Design, Causality and Teleology: On Hume's Design AIgument KOBAYASm, Yuko
Aristotle's Repm of the AIgument f<r \bid
MATSWRA, Kazuya
Un autre role de l'«indefini» dans la metaphysique de Descar1es.
OTAKA, HiIdro
A Defense of CriSpin Wright's 'Extmsion-Detennination Approach' SHIMAMURA, SImhei
L' apcrie du Q,gito tacite
TAKAHASm, Wakagi
1'interioriti comme la cause fictive de l'&:art
TEZUKA, Hiroshi
SJIllChakuheorie bei Edmund Husserl. \much 1J.l einer "AUinomenologie der Kommunikation"
YAEGASm, TOOl
Utopia, Myth, and Narrative
YORKE, Cllristqiler
A Note 00 Husserl's 'Philosophy of Calculus'
SAKAMA, Tsuyoshi

Department of Philosophy
Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology
The University ofTokyo
2006

Remarks on Epistemology Musicalized

Masaki ICHINOSE(The University of Tokyo)

1 A Hint from Epistemology Naturalized
Epistemology always matters. People sometimes make a categorical assertion or
firmly declare something. How should we react to that situation? In that case we
couldn't be philosophically thorough without asking 'how do you know that?' It's
applied to, for example, the case that someone proposes a deterministic way of
thinking, which implies that the world is already determined as a causal necessity,
although we human beings can't know all of its details because of the limitation of
our ability. This deterministic idea is so deeply rooted in our mind that the idea istacitly introduced in many phases. One of typical cases in which causal determinism
is simply presupposed is the traditional controversy about free will where it is asked
whether liberty and necessity is compatible or not. However, we ought to ask, 'how
can you know that the world is determined as a causal necessity?

As far as you

yourself admit that we couldn't know all of details because of our limited ability, is it
unknown to us whether the world is determined or not?' How on earth could we, flesh
and blood, claim that even the future of the world is also determined? As far as
epistemological questions are concerned, apart from metaphysics, I can't go alongwith such a sort of arguments as literally declares a deterministic view.
Well, let's turn our attention to an expression, 'know'. What IS 'to know
something'? This is nothing but a notorious difficulty which epistemology has spent a
lot of energy to think about. How can we resolve the difficulty plainly? In this respect,
it is very natural that there arises an idea of clarifying our knowledge in a positive andobjective manner. That's the trend to elucidate the structure of our knowledge invirtue of objectifying our epistemic phenomena. Actually such sort of trend is realized
in present cognitive science, cognitive psychology, or psychometrics to a certain
extent, and also in philosophical arguments about epistemology 'epistemology
naturalized' or 'naturalistic epistemology' which corresponds to that trend has been

developed by some groups of philosophers since Quine. Epistemology naturalized
consists of two basic claims; (1) epistemology is a branch of natural science and (2) toknow is a natural phenomenon (Quine 1969, p.82). Recently even a more radical
viewpoint, namely, an idea to regard knowledge as a natural biological kind is being
proposed (E.g. Boyd 1999). However, this epistemology naturalized isn't exempt
from all difficulties (See Ichinose 2006). How can the epistemology explain
institutional knowledge like, for instance, 'Beckham is a husband of Victoria', asnatural phenomena?

How can it take in the notion of intellectual property which is

intrinsic to the present concept of knowledge? How can knowledge as a natural
biological kind ingest nutrition? Such kinds of difficulties descend on epistemology
naturalized one after another.

2

Knowledge as Voices
However, I don't want to utterly reject epistemology naturalized at all despite

those almost fatal difficulties. Its basic standpoint obviously intends to realize
desirable plainness and clarity in that it takes our knowledge to be some phenomena
or events appearing in the space and time which can be studied from an objective andscientific point of view, in comparison to another type of epistemology such thatappeals to some a priori structure of our knowledge which couldn't be truly
accessible as empirical appearance. But, then, is there such a well-balanced
epistemology that not only accepts that good point of epistemology naturalized but
also avoids its difficulties, and, hopefully, suits the tradition of philosophy?
'Epistemology Musicalized' is nothing but what I have proposed as a candidate ofsuch a well-balanced epistemology. Its idea is quite simple; (a) knowledge or
cognition is made through language (language must be indispensable as long as wefollow such the traditional definition of knowledge as 'a justified TRUE belief'), (b)language (including that in internal speech) is spoken as voices (including internalones), so (c) knowledge or cognition, not metaphorically but literally, has a musicalstructure as voices (no matter what they are from a aesthetic point of view), therefore(d) knowledge or cognition can be studied as a sort of music, and by thinking so we
can clarify what knowledge or cognition actually is. That's an outline of my idea.
What I mean here by 'music' is a voice or a sound (including internal speech)
improvisation ally produced, in particular its aspect of rhythm. That is to say,2

epistemology musicalized is a programme of epistemology which tries to regard, forinstance, such a knowledge that Beckham is a husband of Victoria, as the phonetic
sound or voice (including intemalones), particularly as a temporal series of the sound,i.e. a rhythm, and investigate what is found, or to put it more appropriately, what isheard from such the standpoint.
This programme has a basic idea in common with epistemology naturalized in that
it is based upon sound-phenomena or sound-events appearing in the space and time,
which is why I give the programme a name similar to epistemology naturalized.
Actually epistemology musicalized can comprehend a wide range of epistemic
phenomena like those that are composed of gestures without any physical sound. For
example, when we show feelings of rejection by shaking our head, people who
recognize this virtually put the event in order by linguistically individualizing anddividing into parts the movements of head like, 'she shakes her head in this way, andthen in that way ...... '. Undoubtedly here arises a sort of rhythm, which can beabsorbed into epistemology musicalized.
3 Accidental Improvisationality
Thisepistemology

musicalized

pays

full

attentionto'accidental

improvisationality' in our epistemic activities, which actually permeates an
occurrence of our knowledge, nevertheless is rarely taken up in epistemology.

Thisbecomes the most obvious in our choice of vocabularies to express our knowledge.
Suppose the case that we go to a greengrocery and come to know there is a heap ofaubergines. Then we can express this knowledge in various ways, for example, 'there
is a heap of aubergines', 'there is a heap of eggplants' , or 'there is a heap of dark
purple vegetables whose skins are shiny', etc.

This depends upon our vocabularythat occurs to us by chance the moment we see those vegetables, and obviously thisprocess are impromptu. At least we can surely say that such expressions with such
vocabularies were not planned and intended many hours before. The same thing istrue of our choice of vocabularies between 'TV', 'telly', and 'display' when we cometo know there is a television broadcasting the news in the room and then express suchknowledge. Actually all sorts of knowledge must be permeated by such accidental
improvisationality, in so far as our knowledge is regarded as an actual events or
phenomenon which occurs by means of such linguistic descriptions that we know

3such and such right now.
Unquestionably those improvisational features of our epistemic activities must be
reflected in our ordinary conversation, since certainly exchanges of knowledge orinformation are very important part of our conversation. Improvisational status of ourconversation has already been pointed out by some scholars. For instance, Sawyer
describes this point like this;..... everyday conversation is also a collective improvisation, as jazz musicians
often point out ...... in many everyday situations where no script is specifieddinner conversation, small talk waiting for the bus, gossip in the company
cafeteria - most of us can rise to the occasion and engage in emergent,
improvised behavior (Sawyer 2000, p.184).

I want to assert that this is also a feature of our epistemic activities, and to add that,
therefore, our knowledge is improvisational, and moreover, musical in the sense that
I've explained.
To put it anther way, what epistemology musicalized proposes is nothing but anidea to understand knowledge as some expressions continuous with poems or lyrics.
As a matter of fact, poems or lyrics are obviously filled with accidental
improvisationality at least at that very moment of creating them, and there is no doubt
by definition that poems or lyrics are musical and rhythmic phenomena. Additionally,
operas in classical music often include ordinary conversation as their constituent parts,
so probably this fact also confirms my point that even just a linguistic expression canbe taken to be musical.
However, developing my argument to this stage, another important part is heard.
That is a personality that improvisationally chooses a particular vocabulary every
time knowledge occurs within some grammatical or phonetic restrictions on the
choice of vocabularies, for example, of English. Those personalities to which
accidental improvisationality is ascribed, as it were, are sounding as continuos underknowledge or cognition that epistemology musicalized performs. Then, it is quite
natural in respect of the root of words that this personality introduces the concept of'person'. Thus, it comes to be suggested that 'person' exists at the base of ourknowledge. Obviously it has been a tradition in the history of philosophy since John

4

Locke that an epistemic subject is regarded as a person. Locke's epistemology is sofamous for being based upon his unique concept of 'idea' that his methodology isoften called 'A Way ofIdeas'. Locke simply defines 'idea' as the 'term which, I think,serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man
thinks' (Locke 1975, bk 1. chap. l.sec.8, p.8). But, what actually happens when a man
thinks?

To this Locke answers, 'it being hard to conceive, that anything should think,and not be conscious of it' (Locke 1975, bk2.chap.l.sec.ll, p.llO). That is to say,ideas are established by our consciousness. On the other hand, however,consciousness also establishes our person or personal identity. Locke describes thispoint like this;We must consider what Persons stands for; which, I think, is a thinking
intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it
self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does onlyby that consciousness (Locke 1975, bk2.chap.27.sec.9, p.335).
lf that is the case, we should say that it is a person which is an epistemic subject who
acquires knowledge by being conscious of ideas. As a matter of fact, even apart from
Locke's context, it sounds very natural in our ordinary language to call eachindividual with a unique personality his or her 'person'.

However, those aren't only

reasons for me to bring the concept of person up here.

4 Person and Personare
A point that I want to propose and highlight here is that the English word,'personality' or 'person', is a concept in which a musical significance is inherent.
The word, 'personality' or 'person', as is well known, comes from a Latin word,
persona, which means 'mask', and persona, at least partly, originates from another

Latin verb,persono (whose infinitive ispersonare). According toA Latin Dictionary,persona is 'from per-sono, to sound through, with the second syllable lengthened'(Lewis & Short 1975, p.l355). As is suggested,persono means 'to sound through andthrough, to resound', 'to make a sound', or 'to cry out, call aloud' (Lewis & Short
1975, p.1356). Actually, persona is a combination of two words, i.e. per which means'through' and sonus which means 'sound'. We should notice that, grammatically5speaking, persona is an imperative of personare (See 'persona' in Wiktionary).
Following this circumstance, we should say that the concept of person is originallymusical. For example, A. H. Khan refers to those etymological circumstances about
the concept of person as one of its origins and says;.. .... let us look at the meaning complex for the term " person." The term isderived from the Latin persona, from which semantically subtend two ideasthat form its core meaning.

One of the ideas is suggested by personare,meaning to sound thru, as in the case of the voice of an actor resounding(sonare) through (per) a mask (Khan 2002, p.3).

He points out that another idea characterizing persona is that of personnalite/
substance that is human and even divine or what is one in and of itself (per se una).

In any case, if he is correct in claiming the intrinsic connection between person andpersonare, a mask (persona) that an actor or an actress wears in plays seems to be
used as a sort of loudspeaker.
That musical status of person or persona followed up thus far is also confirmed in
the contemporary discussion about music. Probably, the striking example is found in
Naomi Cumming's book, The Sonic Self.

She, for instance, argues about synthesisof "voice" and "voices" in musical utterance, and asserts;

If a quasi-personal utterance, or "persona," is heard in this combination of signs,
it is now of one whose expressive impulse is offered a degree of containment
by its relationship to broader tonal goals. The "persona" can be apprehended as
a complexly formed yet singular character, whose synthesis as "one" is an
ongoing process in musical time, responsive to new information as it is heard,
and thus mutable in its emergent qualities (Cumming 2000, p.232).

If person or persona is an expressive self in music as Cumming argues, and ourknowledge is thought to be a kind of music, then it is safe to say that the concept of
person is perfectly suitable as an epistemic subject. Obviously this line of thought
conforms not only to my idea of epistemology musicalized but also to a traditional
standpoint of philosophical epistemology.

6term, they exhibit double dissociation, and this requires us to consider language andmusic as separate cognitive domains' (Mithen 2006, p.62). Then, should we simply
abandon the Augustinian concept of music because it's just nonsense and is unable toreflect the fruits of contemporary sciences?
I don't think so. The reason why we think language and music must be
distinguished is simply that by ' music' we mean only classical music like Bach's or
popular music. However, such a way of understanding music isn't absolutely correct.
For a Greek word, 'JiovmXf, from which a contemporary word, 'music' , is derived, isa common origin to both prose or poems and music in a contemporary sense
according to a musicologist, Georgiades (See Georgiades 1954, Kap.2). If so,whatsoever voices, sound, and rhythm participate in must be 'JiovmXr,'. The conceptof music in this traditional sense must be the keynote to accompany the epistemology
musicalized.

6

Question about Meaning
Probably at least two questions will be raised as to my idea of epistemology

musicalized. First, knowledge is supposed not only to be an impromptu sound-event
actually occurring in a particular space and time but also to be universal in a timelesssense, but it seems that epistemology musicalized can't deal with the aspect of
universality in knowledge. This is a reasonable criticism. To this I want to distinguish
two modes of knowledge firstly, namely, 'knowledge in play' which epistemology
musicalized treats and 'knowledge in score' which is an epistemic mode with
universality. For score or sheet music seems to be independent of particular actual
plays or performances.
However, how can we understand musical score or sheet music as such?

How

can we identify the music which the score or the sheet represents? Surely, it's byplaying it in our mind. Otherwise it hasn't yet been music. Actually just a score can't
be music to those who can' t read music. Therefore, my point is that; the very
phenomenon that we regard just a score or written knowledge as being universal must
be taken to be a sort of impromptu sound-event in that we take it to be so here rightnow, so 'knowledge in score' has to be eventually absorbed into 'knowledge in play'.
Perhaps we could compare 'knowledge in score' to a rest in music.
The second question that will be raised as to epistemology musicalized IS

8concerned with the concept of meaning. Is it really possible to explain meanings ofwords that constitute knowledge only by virtue of voice or sound? This question getsto the heart of the matter so straightforwardly that success or failure of the programmeof epistemology musicalized depends upon how I could answer this question. As tothis, first of all, I want to confirm a self-evident point that tone, intonation, pitch, andaccent in our speech have much to do with meaning of the speech. Compare the casethat someone say 'it snows' in a cheerful tone with the case that someone say thesame thing in a flustered tone. Such musical aspects of speech decide its meaning, as
everyone knows well in an ordinary life. Perhaps, we have to investigate how thispoint is corresponding to Austin's speech act theory, particularly whether thosemusical effects could be explained by analogy with locutinary acts or not, but this will
be a future task for me.

In addition, I want to propose an idea that meanings of words can be understood
through sounds of some collaborative speech acts, namely, a function of ourinteraction in the form of ' call and response', in which meanings of words are
regarded as answers to questions, 'what's that?'

This is, as it were, a musicalizationof meanings. Referring to two linguists, Wray and Auer, Mithen suggests that;

They argue that traditional linguistics has neglected to study the rhythms andtempos of verbal interaction -the manner in which we synchronize ourutterance when having a conversation. This is a fundamental and universal
feature of our language use (Mithen 2006, p.12).

If that is the case, we should understand meanings of words by tuning in to such
musical features of those.

7

A Prospect
Reaching this stage, we are ready to clarify the problem about a causal

determinism, to a certain extent, that I mentioned at the beginning of this article. We
need to pay attention to the multilayered dynamic process of occurrence of knowledge.
If someone says 'everything is causally determined', a hearer acquires knowledge thatthe person utters it. But then, the hearer could call the utterance in question by
uttering an interrogative sentence, 'what is "causally determined?''' or 'how do you

9know that?'

Perhaps, the initial utterer responds to that.

Of course, the hearer

comes to know that the utterer responds. However, if the response doesn't make thehearer feel persuaded, or to put it another way along the present context, if the
response doesn't get into the rhythm of the hearer, then their interaction would be outof tune, when knowledge wouldn't be established at least at that time. Still, there is apossibility that those unrhythmical interactions would be a motivation to produce
another utterance in the future, which might lead to another knowledge as anotherutterance.

In any case, it is definitely a very interesting task to scrutinize and try to listen toother applicabilities of epistemology musicalized. I'm now thinking of applying theidea to the problem of how we should understand the law of non-contradiction. Whatis a contradiction? This question is quite important in the contemporary philosophicalscene, as Priest's paraconsistent logic takes the problem of contradiction very
seriously.

Paraconsistent logic suggests a logical system in which everything isn't

necessarily deduced from a contradiction, which is called 'not explosive' (See Priest
2004, pp.24-29). However, in fact, it is still unclear what a contradiction is. For
example, Patrick Grim divides contradictions into four kinds, namely, semantic,
syntactic, pragmatic, and ontological ones (Grim 2004, p.53). Perhaps, contradictions
that conform to the scrutiny from a viewpoint of epistemology musicalized best in hisclassifications may be contradictions in pragmatic sense, since such contradiction isdefined as 'the joint assertion of a proposition and its denial' (Grim 2004, p.53) which
can be interpreted as the definition in terms of actual utterances.
However, I want to ask, ' can't we utter A and not-A simultaneously?, If we accept
epistemology musicalized, such question is inevitable, and the answer to it must be'no, we can't' . But, how about the case in which two people utter those twocontradictory sentences simultaneously? Is that case an example of contradictions?
Yet, in that case, the situation is not impossible but rather very trivial, which sounds
just contradictory to the very impossibility of contradictions. Probably, similar
questions will arise one after another. I am keen to listen to what kind of fruits thoseconsiderations will produce, or what sort of sounds those will play.

10References

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LA MUSIQUE.

Finaert,G. et Thonnard,F.-J. : (Euvres de Saint

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Cumming, N. 2000. The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification. Indiana
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Georgiades, T. G 1954. Musik und Sprache -Das Werden der abendliindischenMusikdargestellt an der Vertonung der Messe. Springer-Verlag.
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11Wiktionary. 2007. http://en.wiktionary.org/wikilpersona

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