Integration for Seamless Transport

01

Discussion Paper 2012 • 01
John Preston

This document was produced as a Background Paper for the 2012 Summit of theInternational Transport Forum, on Seamless Transport: Making Connections, held from
2-4 May 2012 in Leipzig, Germany. The views expressed in this document do notnecessarily reflect those of the member countries of the International Transport Forum.

Further information about the International Transport Forum is available atwww.internationaltransportforum.org

INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT
Discussion Paper No. 2012-01

John PRESTON
University of Southampton,
United Kingdom
jpreston@soton.ac.uk

April 2012

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM

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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORTTABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................. 3
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................. 5
1.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 52.

DEFINING INTEGRATION ................................................................................ 7

3.

‘OPERATIONALISING’ INTEGRATION .............................................................. 10

4.

APPRAISING INTEGRATION ........................................................................... 13
4.1
4.2

An Appraisal Framework ........................................................................ 13
Evidence Base on the Costs and Benefits of Transport Integration .............. 14

5.

BEHAVIOURAL BARRIERS ............................................................................. 206.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK AND THE EU ............................................ 22

7.

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 23
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4

Short term measures ............................................................................ 23
Medium-term measures ........................................................................ 24
Long-term measures ............................................................................. 25
Final Comments ................................................................................... 25

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 26

Southampton, April 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work was initially based on research two research projects undertaken for theCentre for Cities and the Institution of Civil Engineers in the summer of 2008, andupdated in work for the International Transport Forum in the spring of 2012. However,the conclusions are solely those of the author.

John Preston — Discussion Paper 2012-01 — © OECD/ITF 20123

INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORTABSTRACTThe concept of integrated and seamless transport has wide political support but
framing effective policies that deliver the desired outcome has proved difficult. This paperbuilds on and updates earlier work by the author that attempted to analyse the reasonsfor the relative failure of integrated transport polices with particular reference toexperience in the UK. Four main factors are highlighted. The first relates to the difficulties
that have been faced in defining the integration concept. It is argued that a ladder ofintegration can be a useful tool in framing policy. The second relates to difficulties in‘operationalizing’ the concept and here it is suggested that a ladder of interventions may
also be a useful tool. The third is that there has been a lack of practical evidence on the
success of integrated policies but it is argued that this evidence base is now emerging.
The fourth has been the barriers to behavioural change that integration requires, both forindividuals and institutions. Here advances in economic, social and psychological models
of behaviour are giving new insights into how these barriers may be overcome. The
prospects for the delivery of more integrated and seamless transport, in both the UK and
the European Union, are reviewed with reference to recent policy White Papers.

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of integrated transport has a long pedigree. Its origins at a national
scale in the United Kingdom (UK) can be traced back at least to the 1947 Transport Act
and the creation of the British Transport Commission (BTC) with the objective to secure
the provision of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of
public inland transport and port facilities (Button, 1993, 249). The subsequent fortunesof integrated transport were initially related to political control. Conservative
administrations tended to have little support for the concept – the BTC being abolishedby the Macmillan administration’s 1962 Transport Act. By contrast, Labour
administrations tended to embrace the concept. The Wilson government’s 1968 Transport
Act established Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) and for a time there appeared tobe cross-party support with the Heath government’s 1972 Local Government Act
extending the role of PTAs. Such consensus disappeared for a time with the Thatcher
administrations from 1979 to 1990, with the emphasis on deregulation and privatisation.
However, there were some signs of a consensus re-emerging in the Major administration(1990-97), with the Green Paper, Transport: The Way Forward, acting as a pre-cursor tosubsequent transport policy developments (Cm 3234, 1996)
Integration made a big comeback with the new Labour administration of 1997 andthe 1998 Transport White Paper – A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone issued
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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

by the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR, 1998),
although the more detailed delivery plan had to wait two years until the publication of the
Ten Year Plan (DETR, 2000a). However, a series of events occurred that were toeffectively scupper the Ten Year Plan and the integrated transport policy that
underpinned it. The fuel protests of September 2000 illustrated the power of the roadlobby and the unpopularity of fuel taxation. The Hatfield rail accident of October 2000 led
to a sequence of events that undermined rail finances leading to Railtrack being placed inadministration in October 2001 and being replaced by Network Rail in October 2002. By
early 2003, the Ten Year Plan was effectively dead to be replaced by another Transport
White Paper in 2004. As a result most commentators would agree that New Labour’sIntegrated Transport agenda largely failed (Docherty and Shaw, 2003, 2008). However,it remains an important policy motif under the Conservative Liberal Democrat Coalition
Government elected in May 2010, as reflected by the 2011 Local Transport White Paperof the Department for Transport (DfT, 2011a), albeit with different nomenclature, with anemphasis on sustainability rather than integration.
Policy developments in the UK are mirrored by those in the European Union where
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, articles 74-79, provided for a Common Transport Policy (CTP).
However, progress was slow until 1985 when the European Court of Justice declared thatthe inland transport of passengers and freight should be open to all Community firms,
without discrimination as to nationality or place of establishment. In the same year, theEuropean Commission’s White Paper on the completion of the internal market (and thesubsequent 1986 Single European Market Act) placed transport at the forefront of moves
towards the completion of the single market (CEC, 1985). In 1992 the Commission
published a White Paper on the CTP (EC, 1992), which was adopted by the Transport
Council in June 1993. The White Paper marked an important change in emphasis for the
CTP. Previously the CTP had been aimed at the completion of the internal market by theelimination of artificial regulatory barriers. It now provided a more comprehensive policy
designed to ensure the proper functioning of the Community’s transport systems which
was described as ‘sustainable mobility’.
It also addressed the integration ofenvironmental objectives as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty (which was finally ratified
in 1993). A further White Paper was published in 2001 with the central aim being toachieve modal shift through a more integrated transport system (CEC, 2001). However,there has been little subsequent evidence of modal shift being achieved – although the
mid-term review persevered with the concept of sustainable mobility (CEC, 2006) andthe latest White Paper continues to embrace integration (EC, 2011).
Most people (although not all – for a dissenting voice see Hibbs, 2000) would
support the notion of an integrated transport system. Drawing on and expanding earlier
work by the author (Preston, 2010a, 2010b), this paper explores why integration has
proved so difficult to achieve in practice and attempts to suggest some remedial
measures. Four issues are highlighted. The first is the failure to define the concept – thisis examined in section 2. The second is the failure to operationalise the concept – this is
examined in section 3. The third is the lack of an evidence base on the success of
integrated transport policies. The beginnings of such an evidence base are presented in
section 4. The fourth relates to the barriers, for both individuals and institutions, to the
behavioural change required for transport integration. Some of the economic, social andpsychological models that might explain these barriers and identify tools to overcome
them are discussed in section 5. Recent developments with respect to integration are
reviewed with respect to the United Kingdom and the European Union in section 6, before
some general conclusions are drawn in section 7.

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2. DEFINING INTEGRATION

Integration is a multi-faceted concept that includes a number of factors and amultiplicity of definitions (Potter, 2010, Givoni and Banister, 2010, 5-7). This has led tosome to dismiss it as an obfuscatory device (Glaister, 2002). Others have embraced its
complexity by describing integrated transport as a scalar (Potter and Skinner, 2000) or
by referring to the rungs of an integration ladder (Hull, 2005). For transport these rungs
might include, in approximate ascending order of organisational difficulty (see also
Figure 1, which highlights some examples of UK best practice):
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.

the integration of public transport information.
the physical integration of public transport services
the integration of public transport fares and ticketing.
the integration of infrastructure provision, management and pricing for
public and private transport.
the integration of passenger and freight transport
the integration of (transport) authorities.
the integration between transport measures and land use planning polices.
integration between general transport policies and the transport policies ofthe education, healthcare and social services sectors.
the integration between transport policies and policies for the environment
and for socio-economic development.

These rungs might be distinguished between horizontal integration (which brings
together different aspects of the transport system – steps i to iv) and vertical integration(which brings together transport with other aspects of governance – steps v to vii).
Sustainability might be thought of as being the highest rung of the integration ladder(see George, 2001) and this notion is consistent with the change in nomenclature in the
UK (DfT, 2009a, 2011a).
In practice, the definition of integrated transport varies depending on
disciplinary/theoretical perspectives, for example between engineering, microeconomics,
management and political science viewpoints (NEA et al., 2003). Stylised counterpoints
are provided by the engineering and microeconomics perspectives. The engineering
viewpoint, which is also shared by architects, planners and urban designers, is thatcertain aspects of integration can be based on best practice - see, for example, Creswell,1979, or Rogers, 1999. This best practice can be determined from the use of analytics tooptimise network design (for example, van Nes, 2002).

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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

Figure 1. The Integration Ladder

Integrated &Sustainable
Transport(ix) Integrate with Environmental, Social andEconomic Policy e.g. LSTF
(viii) Integrate with Education, Health and Social
Services e.g. Angus Transport Forum(vii) Integrate Transport and Land-Use e.g. Kent
Thameside(vi) Integrate Transport Authorities e.g.
Merseytravel, Translink (Public), Transport for
London, Transport Scotland (Public & Private)(v) Integrate Passenger and Freight Transport e.g.
Heathrow Airport(iv) Integrate Public and Private Transport e.g.
Cambridge, York(iii) Integrate PT Fares e.g. London(ii) Integrate PT Services e.g. Tyne and Wear(i) Integrate PT Information e.g. West Midlands

Disintegrated &Unsustainable
Transport

8

PT = Public Transport
LSTF = Local Sustainable
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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

The microeconomics perspective sees integration as a response to market failure. It
is the view of integration that has predominated in the UK, but with two distinct
perspectives. A neo-classical perspective is that co-ordination will be provided bycompetition. If consumers value integration, the free market will provide it (Hibbs, opcit.). This was essentially the neo-liberal line adopted by the Thatcher administrations,albeit one modified by the dual emergence of the sustainability paradigm following theBrundtland Report in 1987 and of a green economics that could offer market related
solutions to environmental problems such as traffic pollution (Pearce et al., 1989).
A more Keynesian perspective highlights that transport exhibits a number of market
failures of which the most important are wasteful competition, network failures and thepresence of externalities (particularly related to congestion). With respect to wastefulcompetition it is argued that because transport operators have some monopoly in both
space and time, deregulated markets will exhibit features of monopolistic (taxis) oroligopolistic (buses and trains) competition resulting in too much service being supplied
at too high fares (Evans, 1987, Preston et al., 1999). In extreme cases, deregulated
public transport markets can be characterised by oligopoly or even monopoly – with too
little service at too high fares. This was largely the argument used to regulate roadtransport in the 1930s and to bring public transport under public control, particularly inthe major cities. For public transport, there are benefits from having a network ofservices. The more users there are, the lower the time costs – as more frequent services
will mean lower waiting times, more routes will mean lower walking time and the greater
scope for mixing stopping and express services will lead to lower in-vehicle time. This isreferred to as the Mohring effect (Mohring, 1972) and provides ‘first-best’ arguments for
an integrated public transport system that has lower fares, higher frequencies, smaller
vehicles and higher levels of subsidy than has been the norm in Britain (see, forexample, Nash, 1988). It partly provided the justification for the subsidisation of public
transport that became institutionalised with the 1968 Transport Act. More recently,
externalities have come to the fore. The Ten Year Plan’s focus was on the extent to which
integrated transport could reduce road congestion (DETR, 2000a) but subsequently moreemphasis has been placed on global and local environmental impacts and in particular
the reductions in carbon emissions given the ambitious targets set by the UK’s 2008
Climate Change Act (an 80% reduction in the net carbon account between 1990 and2050).
Theoretical analysis suggests transport integration will not occur autonomously as
free market provision is likely to be affected by service instabilities and schedule
matching (van Reeven, 2003) and, with multiple operators across a number ofjurisdictions, integration of fares, services and information is unlikely to occur(Roumboutsos and Kapros, 2008). Integrated transport requires public intervention. The
conventional approach is through public ownership and control of transport infrastructure
and operations – an approach associated with state socialism, although not exclusively
so. The alternative is through the social regulation of markets – essentially the Third Way
adopted by new Labour and associated with Giddens (2000).
For the purposes of this paper we adopt a microeconomic perspective by defining
transport integration as: the organisational process through which the planning anddelivery of elements of the transport system are brought together, across modes,
sectors, operators and institutions, with the aim of increasing net social benefits (NEA etal, 2003, p17). However, it should be emphasised that, following Pearce et al.(1989) weare using the term net social benefits in its widest sense so that it includes environmental

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impacts, as well as social and economic, thus overcoming the objection of Anderton,2010 that the definition neglects environmental concerns.

3. ‘OPERATIONALISING’ INTEGRATION

In general, progress with integration has been limited. In part, this reflects the factthat the car can, in many instances, provide a seamless journey, in marked contrast to
public transport alternatives. Givoni and Banister (2010) note that progress has been
made in some sectors of the transport market, particularly where they are aligned withcommercial objectives. For example, supply chain management techniques have helped
integrate elements of the freight transport market (Allen et al., 2010), whilst some
airports have developed as intermodal and interconnected hubs. For example, at London
Heathrow the airport operator has provided an express rail link to central London and apersonal rapid transit system to one of the business car parks. For local passenger
transport some progress has been made in the UK at the lower and intermediate rungs ofthe integration ladder, but this has been uneven. For example, devolution has proved afillip to integration, as it has produced institutions such as Transport Scotland andTransport for London with a clear spatial focus (MacKinnon et al., 2008). Devolved
transport authorities are able to set a clear rationale for their policies – e.g. economic
development in Scotland and behaviour change in London.
For other steps of the integration ladder, there have been difficulties in delivering
integration. The reasons for this are manifold but many of them are institutional innature. Outside London, there is limited public control of the bus industry and, despite
the fact that the transport ministry (DfT) retains strong oversight of private rail
operators, local authorities have little input on rail services except in the devolved
administrations (which for national rail includes London, Scotland and Merseyside). PTAs
in the major conurbations lost their co-signatory status on rail franchises in 2005. Some
PTAs have had some successes. Centro (West Midlands) provides high quality integrated
information. Nexus (Tyne and Wear) has been able to integrate bus services with its
Metro rail services at some of its interchanges (e.g. Heworth) but not at others (e.g.
Gateshead). The 2008 Local Transport Act has reformulated PTAs to become Integrated
Transport Authorities (ITAs) with some increased powers and possible extensions injurisdictions, but there were concerns over the extent to which these powers would betaken up (Preston and Spear, 2008) which seem to have been justified by the limited
subsequent developments.
Local Authorities have limited financial powers and have to apply for Treasury (theUK’s Ministry of Finance) approval for all major highway and public transport schemes
above a threshold of £5 million, effectively preventing them from taking their own
transport investment decisions. Partly as a result, commentators have noted thatdelivery of Local Transport Plans is limited compared to better funded alternatives such
Plans de Déplacements Urbains in France (Rye, 2008).
Although local transport authorities can specify socially necessary bus services, these
are typically less than 20% of total vehicle miles. More importantly, councils have little
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power to determine fares, service levels or service quality on the commercial bus
network. They are also required to demonstrate that the support they give to ‘social’services does not negatively impact on the commercial network.
Evidence from
Merseyside (Huang and Preston, 2004) suggested that appropriately specified Quality
Contracts in the city-region would lead to net economic benefits of around £13 million
per annum. Other research suggests that in areas where the market is monopolised –such as the West Midlands and West Yorkshire – reductions in bus fares and increases inservice levels would be economically beneficial (Glaister, 2001).
A further barrier to integration is the fragmented ownership of public transport. The
more positive examples of transport integration – such as Brighton and Cambridge –tend to occur in areas where there is a dominant operator and good working relationships
with local authorities, often forged at an individual level. Some successes have also beenachieved in cities where there are two evenly matched and innovative bus companies asin Edinburgh (First and Lothian Regional Transport), Nottingham (Nottingham City
Transport and Trent Barton) and Oxford (Go-Ahead and Stagecoach).
However, partnership working in many areas has been hampered by the limited
ability of local authorities to deliver bus priority measures. In Greater Manchester, thePTA was responsible for planning public transport, while responsibility for roads rested
with individual local authorities. This situation has only been partially resolved by thecreation of ITAs. Non metropolitan two-tiered authorities face a similar situation – withpublic transport and roads controlled by the County, but parking and traffic policies
largely controlled by the Districts.
Local Authorities lack a financial incentive to provide bus priority infrastructure andoperators are reluctant to enter into any profit sharing type arrangement to help financesuch infrastructure (Preston, 2007). Hence, there have only been a few Statutory Quality
Bus Partnerships (in Dundee, Sheffield and Nottingham) established since the passage ofthe 2000 Transport Act. Despite the encouragement given by the 2005 Transport Act
there have yet to be any Quality Contracts, although the threat does seem to havestimulated Quality Partnerships (van de Velde and Preston, 2012).
There have been some successes further up the integration ladder. For example,
transport and land-use has been integrated around the Fastrack bus rapid transit systemin the regeneration of Kent Thameside, whilst conventional public transport andunconventional transport (such as Demand Responsive Transit) have been integrated in
Angus, rural Scotland. At the highest level, central Government is placing an emphasison the Local Sustainable Transport Fund.
However, there have also been failures, particularly at the upper rungs of theintegration ladder. At the national level, the Department of Environment, Transport andthe Regions (DETR) super ministry was short lived (1997-2001) and key policies such as
the Ten Year Plan and the Multi Modal Studies failed to deliver (Docherty and Shaw,2003). At lower levels of government, Regional Transport Strategies failed to gain any
traction outside of the devolved administration and have been abandoned by the
Coalition Government, whilst Local Areas Agreements and Multi Agency Agreements havestruggled to provide joined-up government. A comparison of integration practices in
Malmo, Sweden, with those in Bristol and Newcastle found a series of implementation
failures in Britain, including duplication of procedures, failures in communication and thelack of clear and resourced responsibilities (Hull, 2005). The British planning process iscostly in terms of time and money, due to the large number of organisations involved
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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

and despite ways to streamline it put forward by the Barker Review of Land Use Planningin 2006. Particular problems exist in integrating transport and land-use at both the local(Wootton and Marsden, 2001) and regional (MVA, 2004) levels. Delivering the solutions
put forward by multi-modal studies required for major projects under transport
investment appraisal guidelines (DETR, 2000b) has floundered on the fact that delivery
agencies are structured on modal lines, particularly the Highways Agency and DfT Rail(previously by the Strategic Rail Authority), and as a result, measures that should haveintegrated transport became fragmented (Goodwin, 2003).
A complicating issue has been the wide range of interventions that might beconsidered in delivering integrated transport. Various taxonomies of these interventions
have been postulated. The European Commission often distinguished between physical(e.g. infrastructure provision), economic (e.g. pricing) and regulatory measures. May(2001) distinguishes between infrastructure provision, infrastructure management,
information provision, land use planning, pricing and marketing (attitudinal andbehavioural) measures.
The recent Transport White Paper in the UK highlights a ladder of interventions (DfT,
2011a, 13). This draws on evidence from public health evaluations (which itself issuggestive of a form of policy integration) and the concept of choice architectures andnudges (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) and is illustrated by Figure 2.
Figure 2. Ladder of Interventions

Source: DfT, 2011a.

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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

In contrast to the ladder of integration, the greatest emphasis has traditionallybeen on the higher rungs of the intervention ladder. Regulation either eliminates
choice (for example by preventing new entry to transport markets) or restricts(for example by vehicle bans). Financial interventions (such as taxes) areusually used as disincentives but can be reframed to act as incentives (such as
differentiated taxes to encourage greener vehicles). Less emphasis has beenplaced on trying to change the default option, enabling choice and on providing
information and education, although this balance is changing.

4. APPRAISING INTEGRATION

There is a need to establish an evidence base on the effectiveness of integrated
transport policies. Given our microeconomic definition, this will require an appraisal
framework to determine net changes in social benefits. This is briefly provided in the next
sub-section before moving on to consider some relevant evidence.
4.1 An Appraisal Framework
An appropriate framework for appraising (ex-ante) and evaluating (ex-post)
integrated transport is provided by the UK’s New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) and theaccompanying web-based transport analysis guidance1. The thrust of this approach isthat transport interventions are measured against five key criteria: Economy,
Accessibility, Safety, Integration and Environment (sometimes referred to as the EASIE
criteria). These are then split into a number of sub-objectives and the results displayedin an appraisal summary table (AST). NATA is in essence a combination of Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment.
A key measure in the NATA is the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) which is simply the
Present Value of Benefits (PVB) divided by the Present Value of Costs (PVC). Where there
are no budget constraints, schemes with a BCR greater than 1 should taken forward, as
they have a net social benefit. However, in reality there are budget constraints andtransport must compete with other sectors for government funding. As a result the DfT
initially suggested a threshold of 1.5 for medium value for money and 2 for high value formoney, although subsequently an additional threshold of 4 was introduced to denotevery high value for money (DfT, 2009b).
This change reflects tightening budget
constraints.

1

www.webtag.org.uk Note that NATA has been subsumed into a wider business case approach
that, alongside the economic case, also considers strategic, financial, management
and commercial aspects (DfT, 2011b).

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4.2 Evidence Base on the Costs and Benefits of Transport Integration
An evidence base on the cost and benefits of integration is needed, or at least on thecosts and benefits of interventions other than road building and enhancements. Thissection builds on earlier work by the author (Preston, 2010b).

4.2.1

The Eddington Transport Study

A useful evidence base is that put together for the Eddington Transport Study(Eddington, 2006, Dodgson, 2009), although a major constraint is that this study tended
to examine individual measures rather than packages of measures. Given that improving
public transport constitutes the first steps of the integration ladder, Table 1 summarises
the appraisal of over 30 public transport schemes, with mean BCRs in the range 2.1 to
2.6, although there are a number of schemes that have BCRs below 1.5. For most ofthese schemes by far the biggest element of benefit is the time saving to users, although
for schemes with dedicated rights of way, time savings to non-users are also important.
Non monetised impacts tend to be small but in general positive. Table 1 also includes
three local road schemes that include public transport (such as bus priority and bus
based park and ride) and other elements (such as pro walking and cycling measures) andare described as integrated transport schemes. These schemes seem to have relatively
high BCRs (mean 4.97) and are worthy of further investigation.
Table 1. Eddington Evidence on Public Transport Integration BCRs.
Type

NumberLocations

Mean

Range

Integrated
Transport
Schemes3

Reading,
Scarborough,w2emms

4.97

2.7 – 7.7

Public Transport
Interchanges

6

Altrincham, Bradford,
Coleshill, Mansfield,
Warrington,
Wolverhampton

2.57

1.0 – 4.8

Light Rapid
Transit6

Coventry, Leeds,
London, Nottingham,South Hampshire

2.10

1.1 - 3.6

Urban Rail

6

Glasgow, London,
York

2.16

1.1 – 3.0

Bus Schemes

13

Bletchley, Bristol,
Cambridge,
Doncaster, Leeds,
Sheffield, Taunton,
Warwick

2.51

1.7 – 4.0

Source: DfT (2006) Data on investment returns from transport schemes considered by
the Eddington study. DfT, London. w2emms = West to East Midlands Multimodal Study.

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Dodgson (2009, Table 2) shows that local road schemes have higher mean BCRs
than public transport schemes - computed as 4.23 for a sample of 48 schemes.
However, in the case of roads it might be argued that the non-monetised impacts areless favourable. For some schemes, a modified VFM (Value for Money) calculation has
been undertaken by the DfT which takes into account these non-monetised impacts andplaces a scheme in one of four qualitative categories 2. There were 43 local roads
schemes for which both BCR and modified VFM calculations were made. For 39, the BCR
and VFM categorisations were the same, for 2 the modified VFM gave a higher category
and for 2 BCR gave a higher category. By contrast, both BCR and the modified VFM
calculations were made for 16 local public transport schemes. For 11 of these schemes,
the categorisations were the same but for 5 cases the modified VFM analysis produced ahigher category. This suggests that at the margins the inclusion of non-monetised
impacts strengthens the case for local public transport compared to roads. However,given Dodgson estimated the mean BCR of the 25 local public transport schemes heexamined as 1.71 compared to 4.23 for local road schemes, there is a large gap to bereconciled. There are other factors that could explain this gap including the treatment ofsmall time savings (which are particularly important for road schemes – if these weretreated as zero then BCRs for local road schemes would reduce), the treatment of tax
revenues (public transport schemes will attract some motorists leading to a reduction intaxation revenue3) and missing impacts (most notably related to social inclusion).

4.2.2

European Evidence

Table 2 includes some BCRs for public transport integration schemes examined inwork for the Directorate General Transport and Energy (DGTREN) of the European
Commission (NEA et al., 2003) and updated using material reported in Givoni andBanister (2010). These schemes have been quantified in slightly different and not strictly
comparable ways but generally include construction and operating costs, revenues, andtime savings. It is apparent that there are relatively few examples where integration
benefits are quantified in BCR terms outside the British Isles (only four of the 10 values
presented). This reflects the dominance of the micro-economics approach in the British
Isles and of engineering approaches to integration in continental Europe.

2
3

Poor, Low, Medium or High.
This was treated as increasing the PVC of a scheme in the Eddington BCR calculations.
NATA Refresh suggests that this should alternatively be treated as a reduction in the PVBof a scheme. For an illustrative public transport scheme examined by Nash and Preston(1991) the former method gives a BCR of 1.25 and the latter a BCR of 1.34 suggesting
the change will tend to benefit public transport schemes.

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Table 2: Public Transport Integrations Schemes
Location
Greater Manchester

Description

BCR

Tariff and Information Integration

2.53

Local Transport Plan 2001/2 –2005/6

4.86
3.71

Major Schemes 2001/2 – 2005/6
West Yorkshire (Cottham,
1985)

Integrated ticketing

5.40

LondonInformation integration

7.67

DublinArea Wide Integration

2.75

Bucharest

Network integration

2.90

Rotterdam

Bus integration with Metroextension

4.10

Netherlands (Koopmans,
2006 in Bakker et al.,
2010)

Electronic Ticketing and Access
Gates

4.34

Paris (Margail and
Auzanett, 1996 in Bakker
et al., 2010)

Park and Ride

1.36 to 3.62 Mean
2.49

Sources: NEA et al., 2003; Givoni and Banister, 2010.
It can be seen that all the schemes listed in Table 2 have BCRs in excess of 2 (with amean of around 4), including network integration in Bucharest, based on a contra-flow
bus lane in the city centre, park and ride in Paris and a Metro extension in Rotterdam.
Indeed, in the case of the latter this permitted large reductions in bus operating costs
and ultimately reductions in bus subsidy which means that this scheme could lead tosavings to Government which in turn could result in a negative BCR because it saved
Government expenditure and the costs were thus negative (i.e. there was a financial
benefit). Other examples of commercial integration include the Jutland Regional andInterregional express bus network in Denmark. This scheme resulted in a 35% increasein patronage and the whole system was reported as being self-financing, with a cost
recovery ratio of 107%4. However, services between the main towns (e.g. Aalborg, Vejle
and Viborg) had a cost recovery ratio of 180%, whereas smaller feeder routes only had acost recovery ratio of 55%. It is unlikely that such cross-subsidy could occur in aderegulated system such as that which exists in Great Britain outside London.

4

Revenue divided by costs

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Table 2 also illustrates the benefits of integrated ticketing and information and ofarea wide integration. The West Yorkshire scheme illustrates the benefits of integrated
ticketing using old technology, whilst the Netherlands study indicates further benefits by
migrating to newer technology. The Dublin scheme, based on the 2001 Platform for
Change document by the Dublin Transportation Office includes a major programme of rail
investments including extensions to the suburban rail (DART) network, on-street trams(Luas) and a segregated, higher capacity light rail network (Metro). In Greater
Manchester, area wide integration was based largely around Quality Bus Corridors andsome extensions to the light rail (Metrolink) system. Appraisal distinguished between
Major Schemes (requiring capital support of over £5 million) and other elements in the
Local Transport Plan, a five year planning document introduced by the 2000 Transport
Act, which sets out local transport strategies and policies, along with an implementation
programme.
It should however be noted that not all economic appraisals are favourable tointegrated measures. For example, a study in the Netherlands found that a land-use
policy based on managed sprawl (BCR 1.56 to 1.87) was more beneficial than one ofincreased densification (BCR of 0.08 to 0.67), although a number of key benefits could
not be monetised (Bakker et al, 2010, 134). The European CIVITAS programmes haveundertaken a number of initiatives to develop local sustainable transport but there havebeen few that have been evaluated through the calculation of a BCR. Piao et al. (2009)
found that a lift sharing scheme in Norwich had a BCR of 4.26, whilst a car club in Malmo
only had a BCR of 0.65, reflecting the much higher set-up and administration costs of thelatter compared to the former.

4.2.3

Other Studies

Further data on the impact of transport integration measures on demand has beencollated in work on Smarter Choices (Cairns et al., 2004). Smarter Choices may be seen
as a combination of softer measures (such as car and lift sharing), promotion andawareness raising (e.g. personalised and corporate travel planning), sustainableinfrastructure (such as new walking and cycling routes) and monitoring and evaluation(IHT, 2009). It has been estimated that a major roll out of these ‘soft’ measures(referred to as a high intensity scenario) could lead to a 21% reduction in peak period
urban traffic (13% off-peak) and a reduction in peak period non-urban traffic of 14%(off-peak 7%), resulting in a nationwide reduction in traffic of 11%. By contrast, a low
intensity scenario, in which present practice is largely continued, would only lead to a 23% reduction in nationwide traffic, increasing to 5% for peak period urban traffic. It isestimated that the public expenditure costs of achieving reduced car use by soft
measures is around 1.5 pence per kilometre, which suggests a BCR of at least 10 (Cairns
et al., 2004,. p v). It should though be noted that it is assumed that these benefits ofcongestion relief are not dissipated by induced traffic, whilst there is also some concernthat the high intensity scenario has failed to take into account the possibility ofdiminishing marginal returns, although this could be offset by complementarities between
measures.
The UK Highways Agency’s Influencing Travel Behaviour (ITB) demonstration
programme that involved area wide travel plans at three major employment sites(Cambridge Science Park, Northampton General Hospital and Whiteley Business Park),
although achieving only modest reductions in car traffic was found to exhibit BCRs in therange of 3.7 to 13 (mean 7.4) (IHT, 2009). Further evidence on smarter choices hascome from the Sustainable Travel Towns project. It was found that in the three
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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

demonstration sites (Darlington, Peterborough and Worcester), between 2004 and 2008,
the number of car driver trips per resident decreased by around 9%, compared to a
decline of around 1% in other similar towns (Sloman et al., 2010). The implied BCR in
the three towns, accounting only for congestion effects, was estimated to be of the orderof 4.5. Including other transport user benefits, health impacts and environmental effects
was believed to broadly double this figure. Similar results appear to have been achievedin the London Borough of Sutton where a Smarter Travel programme reduced car’s modeshare of trips from 58% to 52% between 2006 and 2009 (Smarter Travel Sutton, 2010).
Similarly, quality bus partnerships and community rail partnerships may be seen as
a form of integration by bringing together operators, authorities and the local
community. A review of quality bus partnerships in over 20 locations in Britain indicates
short term patronage increases of 18% (15 months or less) and medium term increasesof 36% (18 months or more) (Sloman, 2003). There is some evidence that Community
Rail Partnerships may have a similar demand impacts to Quality Bus Partnerships. For
example, the Partnership for the Bittern rail line between Norwich and Sheringham(Norfolk, UK) was reported as increasing patronage by 40% over five years, with similareffects emerging for the Wherry Lines between Norwich, Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft(Cairns et al., 2004,. p136).
In contrast to these ‘soft’ measures, there is also a raft of evidence emerging on aparticular ‘hard’ measure in the UK – that of high speed rail. A summary is given by
Preston (2012), which shows that the proposals for High Speed 2 (HS2) seem to haveacceptable BCRs. In March 2010, the BCR for the London – Birmingham HS2 proposal
was estimated at 2.7, including wider economic benefits, although by January 2012, thishad been revised to 1.7, largely due to the economic downturn. As a result of network
effects, extensions to Leeds and Manchester strengthen the economic case. Physicalintegration has been given consideration with the inclusion of stops at Old Oak Common(to link with Crossrail) and at Birmingham International (to link with the Motorway
network) and the proposed construction of a link to High Speed 1 and the Channel
Tunnel. However, the proposed Birmingham terminal is not well linked to the local rail
network, access to Heathrow Airport has still to be determined, whilst for the extended
network it is proposed to serve some conurbations (notably in South Yorkshire and theEast Midlands) by out of town parkways, despite the limited success of such sites in
Korea (Bae, 2010) and elsewhere. Planning and assessment of HS2 has included
consideration of the use of the classic rail capacity released by the scheme but has notincluded detailed consideration of fares and ticketing or access/egress services nor of theextent to which HS2 may attract competition. The planning for HS2 has not been
integrated with wider transport planning. HS2 will not serve the proposed South Midlands
Growth Area, even though the line will pass through it. Moreover, there is somesuggestion that upgrading existing road and rail networks can provide higher BCRs thanHS2 but these options are not being pursued. The impression that is given is that
although some consideration has been given to aspects of integration, planning of HS2 islargely unimodal, as reflected by the creation of High Speed 2 (HS2) Limited in January
2009 as the delivery agency.

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Figure 3. The UK’s HS2 High Speed Rail Project

Source: The Daily Mail.

4.2.4 Evidence on Synergy
Most of the empirical evidence to date is at the lower rungs of the integration ladder.
Insufficient attention has been paid to quantifying synergy – where for example thebenefits of two policy measures, such as policy A (road pricing) and policy B (improved
public transport) are greater than the sum of the individual components. This might bewritten as Ben(A+B)>Ben(A)+Ben(B) (Mayeres et al, 2003). Those empirical studies
that have addressed this issue suggest that this rarely happens in practice but what ismore common is either additionality (Ben(A+B)=Ben(A)+Ben(B)) or complementarity(Ben(A+B)>Ben(A), Ben(A+B) >Ben(B)) (May et al., 2005a). This means that thebenefits of one measure are reinforced by the benefits of another. Furthermore, one
measure may reduce the barriers related to another. For example, on its own roadpricing may not be politically acceptable because of concern over the adverse impact on
low income motorists. However, if combined with public transport improvements
particularly targeted to attract low income motorists, these political and distributional
constraints may be overcome. Conversely, public transport improvements may not be
affordable on their own but may be funded if the revenue from road pricing ishypothecated. May et al. (op cit.) develop an integration matrix that summarises thecomplementarities between infrastructure, management, pricing, land-use, informationand marketing measures. Optimization studies undertaken in Edinburgh suggest that
integrated transport might involve road pricing in the peak, public transport service
increases, public transport fare reductions and some expansion in road capacity. Similar
results have been found for other cities both in the UK (e.g. Leeds) and in continental
Europe (e.g. Oslo, Vienna) (May et al., 2005b). Such results have not though normallyJohn Preston — Discussion Paper 2012-01 — © OECD/ITF 201219

INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

been presented in terms of integrated compared to non integrated transport, although
they could be interpreted as such.

5. BEHAVIOURAL BARRIERSThe difficulties in operationalizing integration relate to institutional and individual
barriers. May and Crass (2007) have identified a range of institutional barriers many ofwhich are apposite to the discussion of UK policy in section 3 above. The barriers include
split or duplicated responsibility, inconsistencies in process, political and public
acceptability, information and skills shortages, financial constraints and legislative andregulatory requirements. However, section 3 also indicates that some progress has been
made in overcoming these institutional barriers.
In many respects, individual barriers have proved more persistent but here too there
have been some important developments in our understandings. Useful insights havebeen provided by the trans-theoretical model of behaviour change that originated withthe work of Prochaska and Di Clemente (1983) that posits six stages: pre-contemplation,
contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance and termination. A transport variant ofsuch a stages of change model is provided by the TAPESTRY project, albeit one withseven stages (TAPESTRY, 2003). The first stage is an awareness of the problem (precontemplation). This stage was achieved in the UK with the emergence of the new
realism in the late 1980s/early 1990s (Goodwin et al., 1991) which recognised thatgrowing congestion, rising environmental degradation and problems of transport-relatedsocial exclusion could not be dealt with by road building alone. The second stage –accepting responsibility (contemplation) – has been more problematic, despite the best
intentions of the 1998 White Paper. At the individual level, surveys indicate strong
preference for individualised transport – which has resulted in a high degree of car
dependency in the UK and a reluctance to use collective transport due to a variety ofreasons including concerns over personal security (Stradling et al., 2000). There ispopular support for integrated transport measures but often on the basis that thesemeasures are used by others.
At an institutional level, central government has failed to accept responsibility insome key areas such as charging for road use. This was delegated to local authorities asa result of the 2000 Transport Act but most local authorities have lacked individual orcollective policy champions to take charging forward, with the notable exception of
London. The green-gold alliance on which Goodwin et al. put much faith, on the basisthat there are a number of transport policies that have both economic and environmental
gains, has largely failed to materialise. The third and fourth steps – perception andevaluation of the options available – are related to preparation. These are arguably thestages at which the EU and the UK are currently located. However, choices (the fifth
step, related to action) have rarely reflected the tenets of integrated transport and as
result individual behaviour remains trapped in a high degree of car dependency. Someexperimental behaviour (step six, related to maintenance) has been assessed, forexample by those involved in personalised travel planning in the Sustainable Travel
Towns. Integrated transport policy remains a long way from establishing habitual
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behaviour at a nationwide scale (step seven – termination), at least in the passenger
sector. TAPESTRY envisages behavioural changes as a linear process but in reality there
will be a degree of circularity punctuated by relapses (see Figure 3). Similarly Smarter
Travel Sutton has been influenced by the diffusion of innovation model (and the role ofearly adopters, late adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards) and the conceptof the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000) and the key role of mavens – information specialists
who tell others about how a new approach works (Smarter Travel Sutton, 2009).
Figure 3. Behavioural Change Models

Sources: TAPESTRY (2003), DfT (2011b).
Developments in behavioural insights provided by approaches such as the stages ofchange model have led to the production of a toolkit (DfT, 2011c). Our starting point,
and one that underpins the BCR calculations in section 4, is a microeconomic approachthat relates to the rational choices model. Although this approach can be adequate for
explaining aggregate policy responses, it is less useful in explaining individual behaviour.
The emerging field of behavioural economics has highlighted issues surrounding loss
aversion, ‘short-termism’, procrastination, overestimation of small probabilities andbounded rationality. It has shown how small adjustments to choice architectures can leadto large changes in behavioural change – the basis of the nudge hypothesis (Thaler andSunstein, 2009). Psychological models such as those associated with Ajzen (1991) andTriandis (1977) emphasise the role of attitudes, social norms, perceived behaviouralcontrol, beliefs, emotions and habit and can highlight the disconnect between intentions
and behaviour. Attitude Behaviour Context (ABC) models also emphasise the role ofenvironmental factors (Stern, 2000). Social practice approaches highlight the interplay
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INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORT

between the individual (skills), the social (images and meaning) and the material (things)(Hargreaves, 2011). Although these developments may seem to be only of academic
relevance, they are affecting policy and contributing to the greater emphasis on the lower
rungs of the ladder of interventions.

6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK AND THE EU

Recent developments in the UK have focussed on local delivery of sustainabletransport, by decentralising economic power (through the creation of Local EnterprisePartnerships and the development of Tax Increment Financing) and land use planning by
introducing competition for Local Sustainable Transport Funds (LSTF) (DfT, 2011a).
Winning LSTF bids focus on a package of hard and soft measures to achieve behaviouralchange. For example, Southampton City Council’s successful LSTF bid combines ‘hard’physical measures to improve the provision for active travel and public transport with
‘softer’ measures related to targeted marketing, including personalised travel planningand corporate travel plans (covering workplaces, schools and transport termini). This is
an attempt to use the range of approaches identified in the ladder of interventions.
The most recent EC Transport White Paper, also published in 2011 (EC, 2011)
focuses on longer distance supranational transport with an emphasis on freight as well as
passenger transport. Of the ten goals for a competitive and resource efficient transportsystem (and there is a concern that the overall aim neglects the social), some five might
be seen to directly relate to transport integration. Four goals are related to optimising theperformance of multimodal logistic chains, including targets for modal shift for freight
movements greater than 300 km, completion of a High Speed Rail network and targets
for rail’s share of medium distance transport, development of a TEN-T core network andplans to connect all core airports and seaports to the rail network. There is also a goal toestablish a framework for a European multimodal transport information, management
and payment system. The focus seems to remain on the upper rungs of the ladder ofintervention. Of the 40 initiative identified in the Annex, some 29 are predominantly
related to regulation of some form or another, five are broadly economic (pricing andfunding), two relate to physical infrastructure and four relate to information (travel,
carbon footprinting, vehicle labelling and eco-driving). The main tool for achieving
integrated urban mobility seems to be a proposal for mandatory Urban Mobility Plans andAudits. Overall, the emphasis seems to remain on physical measures – the cost of EU
infrastructure development to meet transport demand has been estimated to be €1.5
trillion for 2010-30. The era of predict and provide does not yet seem to be over inEurope.

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7. CONCLUSIONSThe progress towards seamless and integrated transport has not been smooth.
Potter (2010) notes that the short-term, non strategic model of competition adopted in
the UK inherently acts against integration. A similar conclusion is reached by SchöllerSchwedes (2010) for the EU where it is argued that the political idea of cooperation has
been overwhelmed by the economic dominance of competition. Pan (2011) notes how
progress towards seamless mobility in Shanghai has been hampered by thecommercialisation of bus operations and how the tensions between commercial and social
objectives are highlighted in an economic downturn. Reduced subsidies have led tohigher fares, whilst the increased imperative of economic development leads to therelaxation of planning restrictions. These are phenomena that have global applicability.
However, this paper has shown that an empirical database is emerging at a
European scale concerning the beneficial elements of integrated transport policy, inparticular concerning the benefits of reducing car dependency. Improvements to public
transport can be shown to be beneficial in terms of a narrow definition of costs andbenefits and the case for such improvements may be strengthened where wider social,economic and environmental effects are taken into account. Schemes which have aparticular focus on integration across modes may have particularly good returns.
Although the precise numbers of much of the evidence presented can be disputed, arelatively uniform picture emerges that transport integration measures can represent
good value for money in benefit cost terms and can lead to substantial reductions in car
travel. This in turn suggests that current levels of integration are sub-optimal and thatthe implementation of integration measures would generally be beneficial.

In Preston (2010a) detailed recommendations for progressing integrated
transport were identified. These have been reviewed in the light of the additional
evidence presented here and some of key message are summarised with respect
to short term, medium term and long term measures. Some overall conclusions
are then provided.
7.1 Short term measures
Recent evidence in the UK suggests quick wins in the short run may be achieved bypolicy packages that focus on both the lower rung of the integration and the intervention
ladders. This includes the promotion of active travel (walking and cycling) and public
transport and the roll out individualised marketing and travel planning programmes. The
Smarter Choices agenda (section 4.3.2) is a key component of integrated transport andshould, along with complementary physical and pricing measures, be pursued withincreased vigour. There is a possibility that for a significant group of travellers moresustainable forms of transport could become the default mode, particularly for shorter
trips.

John Preston — Discussion Paper 2012-01 — © OECD/ITF 201223

INTEGRATION FOR SEAMLESS TRANSPORTThe evidence also suggests that public transport (and particularly bus) could play amuch greater role in the short run. Public transport trips per head are around 430 in
London (including rail) but are only around 110 in the six English PTEs. For urban areas
such as Brighton, Edinburgh, Nottingham and Reading a range of 140-190 trips per head
is found (White, 2008, 15-16). In regional centres in France a range of 100 to 180 isfound, whilst in Germany a range of 250 to 380 can be found (Hass-Klau et al., 2007).
However, the evidence also indicates that competition in the market cannot deliverintegrated transport. Integration can though be delivered if bus operations are procured
by competitive tender (competition for the market), and there are benefits if this takes
place at a route rather than an area level and at frequent intervals, except where
substantial capital investment is required (Preston, 2005). Whilst, it is appropriate thatstrategic functions are provided by public authorities, the allocation of tactical functions
associated with network planning is problematic, as ideally this would involve input fromboth authorities and operators. Methods of contracting out the tactical function ofplanning public transport networks to third party providers might be usefully considered(Preston, 2007).
Public transport fares and ticketing might also be reviewed. Commercial systems
may result in fares that are too high and ticketing that is too complex. Conversely, public
intervention may result in overly simple ticketing, such as the low flat fare in Beijing(Pan, 2011) and the free concessionary travel in the UK (Preston, 2008). Instead,variants of the highly successful network cards in Germany and Switzerland might beconsidered (Fitzroy and Smith, 1994, 1998).
7.2 Medium-term measures
In certain circumstances, the evidence also indicates that new urban rail schemes
have a role to play. However, given the longer planning cycles, infrastructure
improvements can only be delivered in the medium term. The wider development of Sbahn style electrified suburban services might be considered along with the physicalintegration of local rail with other modes including the implementation of the tram/traintechnologies that have been developed in cities such as Kassel and Karlsruhe in Germany(Axhausen and Brandl, 1999).
Medium term measures might also focus on the middle rungs of the integration
ladder. Particular emphasis should be placed on pricing integration, so that both public
and private transport have pay-as-you-go charging that reflects marginal costs, a longstanding aspiration of the EC. Global Positioning Systems, Direct Short Range
Communications, Smartcards and mobile phones may provide technological platforms forsuch integration, although developments seem to be driven by the private sector morethan Governments. The application of information technology should be encouraged, forexample through funding for demonstration projects as it offers further possibilities fortransport integration, including pervasive, multi-modal, real-time information andnavigation and the development of bespoke services such as demand responsive
transport and lift sharing. However, as Smartcards, such as Oyster in London, haveillustrated there are challenges in ensuring that these technologies are interoperable
which can only be met with the development of bodies such as the UK’s ITSO (theIntegrated Transport Smartcard Organisation). At the same time, contactless bank cards
have been developed by the major high street banks for small transactions and appear

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poised to take over from smart cards as a potentially universally interoperable system of
payment for public transport (ITF/KOTI, 2012).
7.3 Long-term measures
Longer term wins might involve the top-rungs of the integration ladder and will
involve changes in governance structures and policy practice to encourage ‘joined up’
government. However, it is likely that such ways of working can not be readily prescribed
but will require flexible arrangements such as cross Departmental working parties. In thewords of Van de Velde: “As optimal coordination is a moving target, owing to technicaland social changes, the institutional design should be flexible enough to accommodate
future needs without repeated legal changes” (Van de Velde, 2005, 133). Megaprojects,
such as High Speed Rail, have long planning horizons. It is tempting, in order to speed
up delivery, to develop a special agency for that purpose (such as HS2 Ltd in the UK) but
this can come at the expense of wider integration.
Integrated policy appraisal across sectors should be developed at a strategic levelwith an emphasis on the key economic, social and environmental objectives. For
example, decisions to centralise health care facilities or introduce competition into theeducation sector should include a revised and streamlined NATA style appraisal that
includes impacts on the transport system. However, at the same time an overly detailed
and burdensome appraisal process should be avoided as this could contribute to paralysis
by analysis.
NEA et al. (2003) have suggested that implementation may be assisted by city
authorities adopting an integration contract (including an integrated network statement),
which users can then hold them accountable for with regular progress reports and clear
key performance indicators (KPIs). This has similarities with the EU’s suggestions for
Mobility Plans and Audits and such measures will also allow yardstick competition as
cities can be easily compared with respect to the degree of integration they haveachieved.
7.4 Final Comments
We have shown that workable definitions of integrated transport now exist.
Substantial evidence on operationalizing the concept and on appraising and evaluating
the results of integrated policy initiatives also now exists, although further systematic
review is required. Advances in the social sciences have given some insight into how
policy can be framed to overcome individual barriers to behavioural change. Smarterchoices have emerged as an important policy development in integrated transportparticularly with respect to progress on the lower rungs of the ladders of integration andintervention. However, important institutional barriers inhibit progress on the upper
rungs of the integration ladder and these will only be overcome with carefully craftedintervention to ensure adequate coordination as transport markets are opened tocompetition. However, with a combination of these bottom-up and top-down approaches,
there seems a possibility that integrated transport can scale new heights.

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