Report of
The Japan-US-Asia Dialogue
on“An East Asian Community and the United States”

June 22, 2006 / Toranomon Pastoral
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Pacific Forum CSISThe Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)Preface
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world,
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus. For
this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 24 years in organizing policy‐oriented bilateral
and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.
It is for this reason that GFJ held the Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue “An East Asian Community andthe United States” in Tokyo on 22 June 2006. This report intends to summarize the achievements ofthese discussions between Japanese, U.S. and Asian counterparts. Though the printed version of thereport will be made available to only a restricted number of people such as members and friends of GFJ
and their counterparts from the United States and Asian countries, the full text of the report will beavailable at http://www.gfj.jp/.
The Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue “An East Asian Community and the United States” wassupported by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP), co‐sponsored by GFJ, thePacific Forum CSIS and the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), and was attended by 78
participants including 12 panelists. Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significant
importance related to the future of Japan‐US‐Asia relations. We would like to take this opportunity to
express our gratitude to the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, which generously
supported this Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue.

August 1, 2006
ITO Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan

Table of Contents
1.

Program……………..………………………………………………………………………………….1

2.

Participants List……………………………………………………………...………………………. 2

3.

Biographies of the Panelists…………………………….…………………………………………..4

4.

Outlines of Discussions……………………………………..……………………………………….7

5.

Papers of Keynote Speeches……………………………………………………….……………….9
Opening Remarks by ITO Kenichi………………………….……………………………………….9
SessionⅠ: “An East Asian Community after the First East Asia Summit”(1) JIMBO Ken…………………………………………….………………………..…...................11(2) FUKUSHIMA Akiko……………….…………………………………………….………….....30

SessionⅡ: “An East Asian Community and the United States″(1) Ralph COSSA…………………………………………………………………………………..57(2) Simon TAY…………………………………………………………………...……….……..….76

6.

Minutes of Discussions……………………………………………………………………….….102

7.

An Introduction to GFJ………………………………………………….……………………….114

8.

An Introduction to CEAC……………………………………………….………………………117

9.

An Introduction to Pacific Forum CSIS………………...…………….………………………120

1. Program“The Japan-US-Asia Dialogue:
An East Asian Community and the United States”
June 22, 2006 / Toranomon Pastoral
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ),
the Pacific Forum CSIS and the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
Supported by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)

Thursday June 22, 2006
9:30

Registration

10:00-12:30

Session Ⅰ

Opening Remarks (7 min)Moderator
Paper Presenter A (15 min)Paper Presenter B (15 min)Lead Discussant A (7 min)Lead Discussant B (7 min)Lead Discussant C (7 min)Free Discussions (90 min)12:30-13:30

Break

13:30-16:00

Session Ⅱ

Moderator
Paper Presenter A (15 min)Paper Presenter B (15 min)Lead Discussant A (7 min)Lead Discussant B (7 min)Lead Discussant C (7 min)“Laurel” Toranomon Pastoral, 5th Floor
An East Asian Community after the First East Asia Summit
Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Prof. TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, the University of Tokyo
Dr. JIMBO Ken, Senior Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National
Institute for Research Advancement
Dr. Edy PRASETYONO, Head of Department of International Relations, Centre forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Indonesia)
Dr. Prapat THEPCHATREE, Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Institute of East AsianStudies, Thammasat University (Thailand)
Dr. Charles MORRISON, President, the East-West Center (US)All Participants

An East Asian Community and the United States
Prof. Jae Ho CHUNG, Professor and Chair, Department of International Relations,College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University (Korea)
Mr. Ralph COSSA, President, the Pacific Forum CSIS (US)Mr. Simon TAY, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (Singapore)
Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan, Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies Malaysia (Malaysia)
Prof. TANAKA Akihiko
Dr. Charles MORRISON–Break (5 min) –Free Discussions (90 min)Closing Remarks (2 min)All Participants
Amb. KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ
1

2. Participants List
【Foreign Panelists】
Charles MORRISON

President, the East‐West Center

CHUNG Jae Ho

Professor and Chair, Department of International Relations, College of Social
Sciences, Seoul National University

Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan

Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia

Edy PRASETYONOHead of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

Prapat THEPCHATREE

Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Institute of East Asian Studies, Thammasat
University

Ralph COSSA

President, the Pacific Forum CSIS

Simon TAY

Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs【Japanese Panelists】
FUKUSHIMA Akiko

Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow,
National Institute for Research Advancement

JIMBO Ken

Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations

ITO Kenichi

President, GFJ

KAI Noritake

Governor, GFJ

TANAKA Akihiko

Professor, the University of Tokyo【Participants】
AKAO Nobutoshi

Secretary General, ASEAN‐Japan Centre

ＡＲＡＩ Yoshitami

Chairman of the Board , Systems International Inc.

Alexander BRISTOW

Scholar, Yamato Japan‐British Foundation

Iris CHEN

First Secretary, Singapore Embassy

HAKAMADA Shigeki

Professor, Aoyamagakuin University

HASHIMOTO Hiroshi

Senior Advisor, ITOCHU Corporation

HASHIMOTO Masuo

Senior Advisor, Japan Railway Technical Service

HOSHIYAMA Takashi

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies

IKEO Aiko

Professor, Waseda University

IMAGAWA Yukio

former Ambassador to Cambodia

ＩＮＡ Hisayoshi

Columnist/Editorial Writer, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun

INADA Mitsuhiro

Intellectual Exchange Division, Japan Foundation

ISHIGAKI YasujiVice President, CEACISHIKAWA Masao

Guest Professor, Meikai University

JATUCHATRA Chommai

Research Student, Reitaku University

JIANG Peng

Second Secretary, Embassy of the Peopleʹs Republic of China

KAKIZAWA Koji

former Foreign Minister

KATAHARA Eiichi

Senior Research Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies

KAWATO Akio

Chief Economist, Development Bank of Japan

KIMURA Takayuki

Visiting Professor, International Christian University

KOBORI Shinzo
KOSHIMIZU Yoshihiro

Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies
General Manager, Global Business Division, Hitachi

KUMAGAI Akiko

Cultural Affairs Assistant, US Embassy

KUSE Masahito

Senior Planning Officer, Environmental Strategy Division,
Environmental Policy Bureau, Ministry of Environment

LIM Hock Yuan

Ph.D. Candidate, National University of Malaysia

MANO Teruhiko

Professor, Seigakuin University

MATSUSHIMA Daisuke

Deputy‐Director, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Amy M. MCCALL
NAGAHAMA Junko

Fellow, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Economic Section, US Embassy

NAKAJIMA Tomoyoshi

Associate Senior Economist, Economic Research Institute for North East Asia

NAKASHIMA Miho

Graduate Student, Keio University

NARITA Hironari

Professor, Ohka Gakuen University

OBA Mie

Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science

OGASAWARA Takayuki

Professor, Yamanashigakuin University

OKAWARA Yoshio

President, Institute for International Policy studies

Cesar de PRADO

Visiting Associate, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo

SAEKI Kentaro

Principal Reporter, NHK

SAITO Akira

Chief Officer, Yomiuri Research Institute

SAITO Syoji

former Advisor, Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation

SAKAMOTO Masahiro

Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations

SATHANA
Kashemsanta Na Ayudhya
John SASUYAFirst Secretary, Royal Thai Embassy
Graduate Student, Waseda University

SUGIUCHI Naotoshi

former Ambassador to Rumania

TAJIMA Takashi

Visiting Professor, The Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University

TAKAHASHI Kazuo

Professor, International Christian University

TANABE Haruo

Vice President, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

TAN Chin Tiong

Ambassador, Embassy of Singapore

TERAWAKI Mari

Correspondant, Reuters

TOMIYAMA Yasushi

Commentator, Jiji Press

UCHIDA Tomio

President, Japan Korea Cultural Foundation

UEDA Jihei

Director, Japan Veterans Association

YOSHITOMI Masaru

President and CRO, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

YUSHITA Hiroyuki

Visiting Professor, Kyorin University

WATANABE Takashi

President, Toshiba International Foundation(In Alphabetical order)【The Global Forum of Japan Secretariat】
WATANABE Mayu

Executive Secretary

FUJII Miyuki

Officer in Charge

NORO Naoko

Officer in Charge

NAKAMURA Yumi

Secretarial Staff

Bennet RICHARDSONSecretarial Assistant

NOGUCHI Kohei

Secretarial Assistant【CEAC Secretariat】
FUKUDA Toshio
IMANO Taizo

Executive Secretary
Officer in Charge

OSHIMA Fumi

Officer in Charge

KOGA Kei

Secretarial Assistant

NEZU Yukio

Secretarial Assistant

SACHIHO Takaya

Secretarial Assistant3. Biographies of the Panelists[Foreign Panelists]
Prof. Jae Ho CHUNG

Department of International Relations, College of Social
Sciences, Seoul National University

Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1993. Served as Visiting Senior Fellow, East Asian Institute,
National University of Singapore (2004) and NAPS Fellow, The Brookings Institution (2002–2003).
Concurrently, serves various positions including Advisory Council Member, Ministry of Unification,
Advisory Council Member, National Security Council and KIDA‐Fellow, Korean Institute for Defense
Analysis. He is the Founding Coordinator of the Korean Association of Chinese Political Studies(KACPS). Specializing in Chinese politics, especially center‐province relations and Sino‐Korean
relations.
Mr. Ralph COSSA

President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Served in the United States Air Force (1966‐93), achieving the rank of Colonel, and last serving as
Special Assistant to the Commander‐in‐Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Served previously as Deputy
Director for Strategic Studies, the National Defense Universityʹs Institute for National Strategic Studies.
Concurrently Board Member of the Council on U.S.‐Korean Security Studies and the National
Committee on U.S.‐China Relations (NY), Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies(London) and the Asia Foundationʹs Task Force on Americaʹs Role in Asia. Also, Member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) Experts and Eminent Persons Group and Founding Member of the Steering
Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).
Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan

Chairman and CEO, InstituteInternational Studies Malaysia

ofStrategicandServed in various positions in the government including Director‐General, Department of National
Unity, Under‐Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Director (Analysis) Research Division, Prime
Minister’s Department, Principal Assistant Secretary, National Security Council, and Executive Secretary,
Border Security Committee Malaysia/Thailand. Concurrently Member, National Unity Advisory Panel,
Member, Penang State K‐ICT Council, and Secretariat Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific.
Dr. Charles MORRISON

President, the East‐West Center

Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Serving
as an international chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Founding member of the
U.S. Asia Pacific Council, the U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation and a memberof the U.S. Committee for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific. Served as a chair of the U.S. National
Consortium of APEC Study Centers, a director of the Centerʹs Program on International Economics and4Politics and a former U.S. Senate aide and a research adviser to binational Japan‐U.S. commissions. He
specializes in issues on Asia Pacific international relations U.S. Asia policy and trade policy.
Dr. Edy PRASETYONOHead of Department of International Relations,Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS)

B.A. from University of Indonesia in 1989, and MA and Ph.D. from Birmingham University in 1999 and2001, respectively. Served as a visiting fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) (1991), a
visiting researcher, Australian Defense Studies Center (1993), and a visiting lecturer, Air Force Staff
College (1992‐1997). Concurrently, serving as a member of the Indonesian Committee, Council for
Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a visiting lecturer at the Naval Staff College, Indonesia,
and visiting lecturer of Joint Staff College Indonesia. His research interests include security issues in
Asia Pacific, defense and military studies.
Mr. Simon TAY

Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

LL.B Hons. from National University of Singapore, LL.M from Harvard University, and Fulbright
Scholar at Harvard Law School (1993‐94). Served in various positions including Adviser to theSingapore delegation to the WTO Ministerial meeting in 1999, Senior Member of the Singapore
delegation in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, and Nominated Member of theSingapore Parliament (1997‐2001). Currently serves on a number of international and regional expert
and eminent person panels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum register of eminent persons andexperts, the APEC peer review process on trade, and the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN‐Japan
Centre.
Dr. Prapat THEPCHATREE

Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Institute of East Asian Studies,Thammasat University

B.A. in Political Science (International Affairs) from Thammasat University; M.A. in Political Science(International Relations) from Ohio University; Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) from
University of Georgia. Served positions such as Counsellor, Division 4, East Asian Department, MFA;
Director of Center for International Policy Studies (CIPS), and Associate Dean for Research andDevelopment, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. His research interests are ASEAN,
Thai Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, and International Political Economy.
Also the Vice President of the Association for American Studies in Thailand.

5

[Japanese Panelists]
Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko

Senior Fellow and Director of Policy Studies, National Institute for
Research Advancement (NIRA)

M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and Ph.D. from Osaka
University. Served as Adjunct Professor, Keio University (2000‐02), Visiting Professor, University of British
Columbia (2002‐03), and Visiting Professor, Kuwait University in 2005. Served as members for numerous
committees of the Japanese government including the Defense Strategy Study Group and the Defense
Agency’s Council on Defense Facilities.
Prof. ITO Kenichi

President, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
President, The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and studied at Harvard University. Entered Japanese Foreign
Service in 1960 and served various positions, including embassies in Moscow, Manila, Washington and
Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then until 2006 he was a professor of international
politics at Aoyama‐Gakuin University. He concurrently serves as a founding president of the Japan Forumon International Relations (JFIR), the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and the Council on East Asian
Community(CEAC). He is also a professor emeritus of Aoyama‐ Gakuin University.
Dr. JIMBO Ken

Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations

Ph.D. from Keio University in 2005. Served as Research Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA) (1999‐2003), Director of Research, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) (2003‐04), andExecutive Secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). Concurrently serves as AssistantProfessor at Keio University, Senior Fellow at Keio Research Institute, Advisor on foreign policy at Foreign
Affairs Division, Policy Research Council at Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Adjunct consultant on
foreign policy at Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
Amb. KAI Noritake

Governor, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
First Vice President, The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964. Served various
positions including Director of the First Africa Division, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ambassador to Panama,
Ambassador to Lebanon, Ambassador to Tunisia, Professor at Kagoshima Prefectural College in 2003.
Concurrently, Executive Director of the Japan Forum on International Relations.
Prof. TANAKA Akihiko

Professor, the University of Tokyo

B.A. from the University of Tokyo, Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Served in various
positions including Visiting Professor, Rhur‐Universitaet (1986‐87), Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s
College, Oxford (1994‐95), Member, Asia‐Europe Vision Group (1998‐99), Member, East Asia Vision Group(1999‐2001), Member, Initiative toward Japan‐ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership Discussion
Group (advisory group for Chief Cabinet Secretary) in 2002. His research includes theories of world politics,
contemporary international relations in East Asia, and issues in Japan‐U.S. relations.
(Alphabetical order)6

4．Outlines of Discussions
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) co‐hosted, together with the Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC) and the Pacific Forum CSIS, “Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue: An East Asian
Community and the United States” on 22 June in Tokyo. The Dialogue was attended by 78
participants from Japan, the United States, Korea, Malaysia, Thai, Indonesia, Singapore, etc. An
outline of the discussions follows:

East Asian Community after East Asia Summit (EAS)
At the opening of the Dialogue, ITO Kenichi, President of GFJ said, “Though the UnitedStates is not a part of East Asia geographically, it constitutes a vitally important part of it for economic
and security reasons. Whether an East Asian Community will succeed or fail will depend on therelationship it will develop with the United States. For an East Asian Community to survive it needs
a friendly U.S.”
Session I focused on the theme of “An East Asian Community after the First East Asia
Summit(EAS).” Dr. JIMBO Ken, Research Fellow of JFIR, said in his keynote speech, “Japan and
China had different views on the EAS held in 2005 in terms of its goals, membership and consistency
with ASEAN+3. As a result, both countries avoided seizing an initiative and decided on thecompromise of having ASEAN take the driver’s seat. There still remains the problem of which shouldbe the body that promotes an East Asian Community, the EAS or ASEAN+3.”
Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies of NIRA, said in her keynote speech,“The problem of whether or not to include the United States in an East Asian Community is not as
simple as it looks. An East Asian Community could improve its relationship with the United States bystrengthening its ties with such cooperative mechanisms in the Asia Pacific such as APEC and ARF.”
In response to the keynote speeches, Commentators presented their views as follows: Dr.
Edy PRASETYONO, Head of International Relations of CSIS of Indonesia, said, “The process ofestablishing an East Asian Community will be a lengthy and complicated one. With a discord
between Japan and China, it would be impossible to realize such a Community.” Dr. Prapat
THEPCHATREE, Professor at Thammasat University, said, “The EAS is a forum for dialogue and
7

ASEAN+3 is an important vehicles for creating an East Asian Community.” Dr. Charles MORRISON,
President of the East‐West Center in Hawaii, said, “It would be useful to study the Atlantic
Community as a reference for the relationship between an East Asia Asian Community and theUnited States.”

An East Asian Community and the United States
Session II focused on the theme of “An East Asian Community and the United Sates.” Mr.
Ralph COSSA, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS, said in his keynote speech, “The United States
acknowledges that it is not an East Asian country although it has important interests in East Asia. The
United States does not feel the East Asian Community is a threat, and is not concerned over, or
opposed to, the emergence of the Community. However, the United States is worried about aconfrontation between Pan‐Pacificism and Pan‐Asianism. The attitude of the United States toward an
East Asian Community depends on whether it pursues globally accepted values such as an open
market economy, anti‐terrorism and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
Mr. Simon TAY, Chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs said, “Neither
the blessing nor the support of the United States is necessary for an East Asian Community because
the birth and development of regionalism in East Asia is a natural and neutral phenomena and theUnited States is irrelevant to it. We note that the stance of the United States has not been consistent
towards an East Asian Community.”
In response to the key speeches, Commentators put forward their views as follows: Mr.
JAWHAR Hassan, Chairman of ISIS Malaysia, said, “East Asian countries do not need to be nervous
or worried about the attitude of the United States. It is natural for every region to determine its own
destiny. A confrontation between Pan‐Pacificism and Pan‐Asianism should not cause anxiety because
the players in both movements are overlapping.” Prof. TANAKA Akihiko, Professor of the
University of Tokyo, said “No country in the region, including China, is anti‐U.S. An East Asian
Community and Pan‐Pacificism are consistent with each other. A symbol of bilateral engagement
between East Asian and the United States is important.” Dr. Charles MORRISON said “the UnitedStates has opposed EAEC and AMF in the past. It might be opposed to SCO now.”8

5. Papers of Keynote Speeches
Opening Remarks

Prof. ITO Kenichi
President, Global Forum of Japan

Mr. Ralph Cossa, Prof. Tanaka Akihiko, other distinguished panelists and all otherparticipants in the floor, in my capacity as President of the Global Forum of Japan which is
the host of this meeting, I welcome you all to this meeting, which is open to the public andintended to widen the forum for public policy debates.

Let me report first of all that thepanelists who are either to present a paper or to lead discussions today were all engaged in afull‐day academic debate yesterday on the same topic of “An East Asian Community and theUnited States” as today, which was hosted by the Council on East Asian Community.
Therefore, it will mean that the presentations and debates that will follow today will bemade on the basis of the achievements attained yesterday.

As we look back at the history of the regional integration of “East Asia,” thefinancial crisis of 1997 played a key role in awakening people of the region to the need of aregional approach to solve the problems they faced. Immediately after the crisis in 1980 theintra‐regional trade share was only 34%.

But it was as high as 53% in 2003, which

compared very well with 45% of NAFTA and 60% of EU in the same year.

It cannot bedenied that the institutional framework of ASEAN plus Three(APT) has worked well andsupported this growth of economic integration.

However, the definition of “East Asia” has

never been self‐evident and subject to redefinition.

The first such occasion to reexamine the membership of “East Asia” came in
December 2005 when the first East Asian Summit(EAS) was held in Kuala Lumpur, where, in
addition to the 10(ten) APT member countries, Australia, New Zealand and India were also9

invited. However, the status of those newly invited 3(three) countries was never clear
presumably because it was a reflection of the status of the EAS itself. Originally when the
East Asian Vision Group(EAVG) proposed to convene the EAS, the EAS was understood as
an upgraded version of the APT and a renaming of “APT” to “East Asia.”

But what really

happened was not a renaming of “APT” but a redefining of “East Asia.”

I think the question of the relationship between an East Asian Community and theUnited States is a question both qualitatively and quantitatively different from themembership issue of any other country within or without the region.
it is a life‐and‐death issue for an East Asian Community.

The reason is because

Its economic prosperity depends

on its export to the US market and its security rests on the guarantee provided by the US.
An East Asian Community cannot survive without celebration of the US.
States is not a country in the region.

Yet the United

It cannot be a member of the region for the same

reason that Japan cannot be a member of the NAFTA.

Personally I think the only way tosolve this conundrum is to find some modus operandi which will treat the US with some
sort of special status in an East Asian Community.

Now let me also say a few words on the Global Forum of Japan which is theorganizer of this “Dialogue.”

The Global Forum of Japan is known for its long history ofpolicy‐oriented international exchanges dating back to 1982, when Japanese, Americans,Europeans and Canadians met in Washington and established the then so‐called
Quadrangular Forum.

As the Quadrangular Forum was dissolved in 1991 in the wake ofthe end of the Cold War, it has been active as a national body for policy‐oriented
international exchanges with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world in the name of the
Global Forum of Japan.

Every year we organize three to four what we call “Dialogues.”

This year we already had one with Taiwan in February and will have another with ASEAN in
September.

Welcoming all of you who have participated in this “Dialogue” and hoping a fruitfulexchange of views and opinions among you, let me conclude my opening remarks.
you again.

10

Thank

Session I: “An East Asian Community after the First Asia Summit”

Dr. JIMBO Ken
Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations

Emerging East Asian Community? ‐ Political Process
Introduction
Regionalism and Regionalization in East Asia and wider Asia‐Pacific region haveaccumulated as multi‐layered frameworks of Mega‐regionalism, sub‐regionalism and various
forms of Ad‐hoc multilateralism 1 .

Among various types of regional framework, the recent

trend represents the rise of “East Asia” especially since 1997, the year launching of the ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting.

Although it is relatively a new trend to forge regional cooperation based on

the ASEAN+3 processes, there have already been 48 official Meetings among 17 areas (eg.
finance, trade and investment, labour, health, IT, tourism, education, etc.) come into force under
the framework of 10+3 process 2 .

Based on such accumulative regionalization process, the East

Asian Summit (EAS) launched since December 2005 represents the significant milestone ofcommunity building in East Asia.
Although the term “East Asia” has been given a birth as the political process, its
signified image (signifier) as a region has been varied by observers.

One of the most importantfundamentals of East Asia has been the de facto regionalization represented by the drastic
expansion of intra‐regional exchanges and increased interdependence among countries in theregion, particularly after the late 1990’s.
During the last 10 years, the trade volumes between Japan and China, China and South
Korea, and China and ASEAN have increased by four, eight and six fold respectively.

In thefigure of 2003, the East Asian intra‐regional trade share has marked 53.3% (including Taiwan andHong Kong) while it was only 33.6% in 1980.

The figure exceeded the rate of NAFTA (44.5%)

and getting closer to the rate of EU (60.3%).

Its share of the global GDP accounts for one fifth,

and countries in the region now hold about a half of the world foreign reserves.

Moreover,with the increased trends of horizontal production networks in the manufacturing sectors, East
Asia

has

providedthecross‐border‘integrated

economic

space’ toforge

dynamic

competitiveness.
The functional regionalization in East Asia has facilitated by a growing awareness of
1
2

T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Cornell University Press, 2005)
ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation” http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm
11enormous potential and opportunities of closer regional cooperation on common interests andconcerns.

It is noteworthy that several major incidents after the late 1990s played a role as avital catalyst for foundation of various ASEAN+3 processes.

One is the financial crisis in 1997,

which awakened people of the region to the need of a regional approach to secure their financial
institutions and financial markets.

The other is the rise of asymmetrical threats such

represented by the terrorist attacks on September 11 th 2001, which underscored the importanceof regional cooperation in addressing terrorism and other transnational issues.
In dealing with these events, regional networks of functional cooperation have spreadswiftly in wide‐ranging issues, such as finance (the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond
Market Initiative), various types of Free Trade Agreements, and transnational issues (terrorism,
illicit drug trafficking, sea piracy, trafficking in persons, non‐proliferation and public health), etc.
Although functional cooperation does not automatically define the fixed membership in nature,
ASEAN+3 formats has provided a common divisor as a regularized official process to coverthese functional agendas.
Finally, the regionalization in East Asia as a community building is morecomprehensive process.

The term ‘community’ is again a multifaceted concept of which manyobservers have different images 3 .

Most broad sense of community could be defined as a groupof countries sharing some values in common (shared values), having a sense of giving oneself toanother (attribution), and interact beyond functional bases (comprehensiveness).

If those

dimensions are applied, the record of building bloc process of ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit
could be characterized as a process of community building 4 .

The “Joint Statement on East

Asian Cooperation” agreed at the third ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999 outlined themember countries’ commitment to economic, social and political areas of cooperation and called
for each Ministerial process to engage in the process.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration at theFirst East Asian Summit in December 2005 has also identified the process of “dialogue on broad
strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim ofpromoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia”.
This paper tries to focus on opportunities and obstacles for the East Asian Community
by especially focusing on the political process of ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit.

First, thepaper underscores the framework of analysis, which aims to provide the current trends ofcreating a ‘region’.

Second, the paper analyses the process of the ASEAN+3 and East Asian

Summit to extract the commonality and diversity of the concept of “East Asia”.

Finally, thepaper outlines the current ad‐hoc cooperation mechanism and its possibility to apply in context
of new regionalism.

3

This confusion might further deepen by how the concept is introduced (or translated) in local languages.
For example, the term kyotodai（共同体）in Japanese indicates high degree of adhesion within the groupbundled by consanguinity and ownership, which is more determined concept than the casual ‘group ofpeople sharing (something) in common’.
4
In this regard, areas of cooperation of which ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit cover are morecomprehensively defined than APEC (economic oriented) and ARF (political-security oriented) process.
12

1.

Framework of Analysis:

Nature of “Post”‐ Mega Regionalism

First Wave of Regionalism: Failure in 1960s
The term ‘region’ could be defined in various terms.

In international relations, it

generally indicates the multilateral groupings of neighboring nations.

However, when it comesto the term ‘regionalism’, it rather suggests a functional relation that bundles multiple nations
with their political, economic and cultural inheritance, often based on the advantages
geographical proximity 5 .

If one tries to look into the ‘regionalism’ we need realize that it is the

dynamic concept of geopolitics/economics, which rests between the global governance and thebilateral rational choice of the government.

Thus, ‘Regions’ are fluid and complex mixtures ofphysical, psychological, and behavioral traits that are continually in the process of being
re‐created and redefined 6 .
Historically, after the WWII, it is often said that there have been three waves ofregionalism 7 .

The first wave arose in 1960s, among the members in West Africa, Latin America

and Caribbean States etc.

These regionalisms took form as Free Trade Area, Customers Unionand other trade agreements with taking advantage of the special treatment in the GATT Article
24 th .
It is to our common knowledge that these first waves of regionalism ended in failure(except for the original European Community and EFTA) because of various reasons.

1) there

were no participation of big economies to these regional gathering, 2) these regions tended topursue the import substitution policy, and 3) they rather emphasized the protection of national
industry sectors through preferential trade agreement and strong protectionist policy.

Somelessons learned from the failure of the first wave was that the region pursuing the importsubstitution among small and medium size economy will lose their competitiveness anddecrease its validity, especially the international economy became more interdependent in
1970s 8 .
The Second Wave in 1980s: Premise of ‘Open Regionalism’
The Second Wave, derived from the famous term by Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati, came alongin late 1970s and 80s with the rising of wider regionalism or ‘mega‐regionalism’ based on theprinciple of the ‘open regionalism’ 9 .

Rising East Asian economy and the decline of the5

Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration (Washington DC: The
Brooking Institution, 1996).
6
T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia, p.4; Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds., The Political
Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
7
Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya eds., New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
8
Also, these LDCs pursued attempting such unions sought to allocate industries by bureaucratic
negotiation and to tie trade to such allocations, rather than use trade liberalization and hence prices toguide industry allocation. Ibid, p.28.
9
Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview” in Jaime De Melo and Arvind
Panagariya eds., New Dimensions in Regional Integration, op.cit.
13dominant economic status of the United States (“After Hegemony”: Robert Keohane) had bothpromoted the relative rise of regional groupings such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) and Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) process.
The concept of open regionalism has also been applied to the political and security
cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

Based on the strategic environment after the end of Cold War in

Asia, nearly 20 countries in Asia‐Pacific have agreed to form the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)in 1994 to promote confidence building among nations by increasing exchanges among
officials/non‐officials contacts and transparency of their security policies.
The premise of the open regionalism was based on ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘equality’, wherecountries in the region are, in principle, open to participate in the forum.

The membership of

the regime is based on the existence in the region, not exclusively by its characteristics.
“Engagement” was the core principle for this type of multilateral cooperation by the inclusion of
the states, as the APEC engaged Taiwan and Hong Kong, and ARF successfully engaged China,
Russia, enlarged ASEAN, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
The Third Wave: Rise of Bilateralism/Ad‐hoc Mechanism to form Region
As we entered in the 21 st century, we have now witnessed the new forms of regionalismin Asia, which does not necessarily adhere to this unequivocal inclusive nature.

The emerging

impetus of bilateralism and functionalism ―such as bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) andother functional cooperation― are made up by the capability and the willingness of actors.
Although, most of the existing coalitions have the principles of open memberships and do not
exclude the future participation of non‐member, the tacit assumption of such coalitions of thewilling does not necessary includes the countries that are reluctant to cooperate within theframework.

It virtually leads to the politics of exclusion.

The primary benefit of such coalition of the willing may be; they could evolve
cooperation with like‐minded states to ensure higher level of cooperation.

It could even be

regarded as a counter argument toward ‘inclusive region‐based’ cooperation like the APEC andthe ARF, which recently failed to address vigorous developments for cooperation as long as
participating countries “continue to move at a pace comfortable to all participants and on thebasis of consensus.”

Instead, the coalition of the willing will set up the higher degrees ofcooperation without the interference of external actors, and invite them after the coalition has set
up the agenda.
This paper tries to argue that the current process of ASEAN+3 is more likely to be basedon the networks of such bilateral frameworks and agreements.

Financial Cooperation such as

Chaingmai initiative is the bundle of bilateral swap arrangements; other functional cooperationis also being made through coalitions of the willing.
2.

Development of ASEAN +3 Framework

Financial Cooperation
14

The ASEAN+3 process have been developed by the efforts to recover from the Asiancurrency crisis.

Even today, the most advanced area of cooperation within ASEAN+3 is in thefield of financial cooperation.
Before having the idea of Chaingmai Initiative, Japanʹs initial proposal to create a $100
billion Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was aborted due to opposition from the United States andthe IMF.

Also, China was said to be reluctant to go with the idea.

however, has changed substantially in 1998 as a turning point.

The overall sentiment,

After witnessing currency crises

in Russia and Central America, the U.S. has come round to thinking that it would be morepositive to let Japan play a greater role in financial cooperation in Asia.

China has also realizedthat the stabilization of the global economy, particularly that of the Asian economy, is crucial toits own economic development, and thus has come to support the idea of creating a region‐wideframework for currency stabilization 10 .
As a major step in this direction, the Chiang Mai Initiative, a network of bilateralcurrency swap agreements, was launched in 2000.
as a confidence‐building step.

The Chiang Mai Initiative is also meaningful

It has introduced a crisis prevention mechanism and sent out amessage that Asian countries would join forces in the event of crisis.

Such signaling is quite

important because it discourages to some extent speculative moves by foreign funds andprovides some assurance that a crisis would subside at an early stage even if one occurred.
Beyond the Chaingmai Initiative, ASEAN+3 is currently seeking for establishment of
Asian Bond Market, to fund especially to Small and Medium Enterprises in East Asia to
subsidize the mid and long‐term capital resources.

In addition to the Bond Market Initiative,

there are several ideas are floated to stabilize regional financial and equity market.

Someargues that East Asian countries could shift from the current de facto dollar peg system to a
band, basket and crawling (BBC) regime with each country pegging its currency to a different
currency basket.

For instance, South Korea, which competes with Japan in exports, should

adopt a basket in which the yen carries substantial weight.

The trade volume between the twocountries may not affect rather than their concern on competitiveness in the global market, thatis, in exports to the U.S. and Europe.
Newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are generally in the same situation. They should
peg their currencies more closely to the yen rather than to the dollar so as to avoid negative
impacts from the volatility of dollar‐yen exchange rates. But the yen could dominate a muchsmaller portion of the currency basket for China and other countries that are far behind Japan in
economic development and do not compete with Japan in exports. They can change thecomposition of their currency baskets according to changes in their respective trade structures.
When countries come to have similar trade structures, the precondition for forming an optimum
currency area, they can move into the second stage, which would be to peg their currencies to asingle, common currency basket.

10

Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs,
15

Functional Cooperation
On the functional cooperation, there are wide array of cooperation in progress including
trade and investment, IT, transnational issues, development assistance, energy security,environmental preservation, disaster prevention, food security and health care.

As mentioned

earlier, there are 48 consultative bodies covering 17 areas exist within the ASEAN+3 frameworks
in progress.

What is important here is that the scope of participating countries in suchcooperation is decided flexibly and openly according to the characteristics of each area.
Countries outside the ASEAN+3 frameworks such as Australia, New Zealand, India and theUnited States play important role in the functional cooperation.
Functional approach compared to the institutional approach attempts to create avarious types of community through the promotion of cooperation in individual fields, rather
than building comprehensive institutional and legal frameworks from the outset.

Suchfunctional approach is more likely to promote cooperation in East Asia since East Asia hasenormous diversity and disparities which makes such approach much more appropriate.
The challenges we face today is to how to converge one functional cooperation withanother.

If we promote various types of FTAs (from Economic Partnership Agreement to Early

Harvest‐type FTA) without any coordination, the nest of FTAs contains different types ofstandards which make the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Effect.

It is very important to network thosebilateral bases of cooperation to regional one, with having high standards of cooperation andharmonization of rules and standards.
Other functional fora were added to the ASEAN+3 framework; the Economic Ministers
Meeting was held first in Yangon on 2 May 2000 and has been held annually since then. As Table
indicates, other areas such as labor, agriculture, tourism, energy, and environment are also now
being discussed at the ministerial level.

Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 2003).
16

Table:Scope of ASEAN+3 Cooperation

Area

Year of Establishment

Political and Security

2000

Economic, Trade, and Investment

2000

Finance and Monetary

2000

Agriculture, Fishery, Forestry

2001

Labour2001

Environment

2002

Tourism

2002

Culture and Arts

2003

Energy2004

Health2004

Information Technology and Communications

2004

Social Welfare and Development

2004

Transnational Crime and Counter‐Terrorism

2004

Science and Technology (SOM only)

2001

Youth (SOM only)

2004

Source: This table is slightly modified from that which is presented in the ASEAN Annual Report,
2003‐2004, p. 66, <http://www.aseansec.org/AR05/PR‐Partnership.pdf>.
Political and Security Cooperation
From the mid‐1990s increased support for an East Asian grouping. These included:The inauguration of the Asia‐Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996, which explicitly involved
dialogue between Europe and an ʹAsian sideʹ;

The traumatic impact on many regional economies of the Asian financial crisis from mid
1997, which prompted many regional states to consider the desirability of greater
cooperation to forestall any future crisis and to add greater ʹweightʹ for Asia in relations
with international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund;

APEC’s inability to maintain the momentum towards trade liberalisation it had in the mid
1990s;

A continuing sense that the ongoing development of regional groupings in Europe (theEU) and the Americas (the North American Free Trade Agreement) should beaccompanied by greater East Asian cooperation; and

China’s dynamic economic growth which stimulated a rise in the importance of trade
among the countries of East Asia.

All these developments contributed to the opening up of ʹpolitical spaceʹ for an East Asian
17

grouping 11 .
One of the most significant milestones of the ASEAN+3 political processes is theagreement on ‘Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation’ at the third ASEAN+3 Summit inNovember 1999.

ASEAN+3 leaders have agreed upon the issue areas of economic cooperation,monetary and financial cooperation, social and human resources development, scientific andtechnical

development,

culturalandinformation

areas,

development

cooperation,

political‐security area and transnational issues. should be covered by this process, andmentioned that “political and other fields” are important as follows 12 :・ in the political‐security area, they agreed to continuing dialogue, coordination, andcooperation to increase mutual understanding and trust towards forging lasting
peace and stability in East Asia;
・ in the area of transnational issues, they agreed to strengthen cooperation in
addressing common concerns in this area in East Asia.
Another important development in Manila was the informal breakfast attended by theleaders of China, Japan and South Korea. Within the ASEAN+3 gathering, the ‘+3’ component of
three‐way cooperation was much weaker than the corresponding ASEAN cooperation. In fact,
there had never been a summit among the leaders of the three countries in Northeast Asia. At theinitiative of Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi, the three leaders agreed to have a separate meetingof their own for the first time.
With the third meeting in Manila, ASEAN+3 clearly established a life of its own as a
viable international institution in East Asia. It was determined that its summit would be held
annually; it defined the scope of the group’s activities as being very comprehensive; it createdfunctional ministerial meetings; and it created an advisory panel to consider future directions.
Annual summits, however, have continued to be the focal point for ASEAN+3 cooperation. At
the 2000 Singapore summit, a range of new ideas were raised such as the desirability oftransforming the ASEAN+3 summit into an East Asian Summit and desirable forms of free tradein the region. President Kim Dae Jung proposed the establishment of an East Asia Study Group(EASG) composed of government officials to ‘explore practical ways and means to deepen andexpand the existing cooperation’ among ASEAN+3; it was tasked to ‘assess the recommendationsof the EAVG’ and to ‘explore the idea and implications of an East Asian Summit’. 13
The EAVG presented its report to the ASEAN+3 summit in November 2001 with the
opening statement stating, ‘We, the people of East Asia, aspire to create an East Asian
community of peace, prosperity and progress based on the full development of all peoples in the11

Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’, Asian Survey, v. 42 no. 3,
May - June 2002, pp. 440–455
12
ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation” (28 November 1999).
http://www.aseansec.org/5469.htm
13
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit. (Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002), p. 64.

18

region.’ 14 The goals the EAVG agreed upon to create an East Asian community included:
・ To prevent conflict and promote peace among the nations of East Asia;
・ To promote trade, investment, finance and development in the region;・ To advance human security and well‐being, in particular by facilitating regional
efforts for environmental protection and good governance;
・ To bolster common prosperity by enhancing cooperation in education and humanresources development; and・ To foster the identity of an East Asian community by encouraging active exchanges
and regular dialogues at both the governmental and non‐governmental levels. 15
The report, based on these goals in mind, made 57 concrete recommendations including
22 major recommendations encompassing five areas of cooperation: economic, financial, politicaland security, environment and energy, and social, cultural and education. The most noteworthy
recommendations included:
・ Establishment of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and liberalisation of trade
well ahead of the APEC Bogor Goal;・ Establishment of a self‐help regional facility for financial cooperation;
・ Adoption of a better exchange rate coordination mechanism consistent with bothfinancial stability and economic development.
・ Evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit.
The East Asia Study Group examined all EAVG recommendations and presented its
report to the 2002 Phnom Penh Summit. This was the first substantive government‐level policy
agreement reached within the ASEAN+3 process. The EASG report positively assessed the EAVG
report by saying: ‘It provided East Asian countries with a good compass to show the right
direction towards a bright future of East Asia.’ 16 After examining all EAVG recommendations,
the EASG concluded that 17 of them should be selected as ‘short‐term measures’ to be
implemented, and nine of them should be selected as ‘medium‐term and long‐term measures torequire further studies’ 17 .
The EASG report was significant in the sense that the newly established framework of
ASEAN+3 could agree at all about concrete measures of joint action. However, it revealed its
limitations too; the EASG virtually postponed its judgment on difficult issues by designatingthem as ‘medium‐term and long‐term measures’. For example, the four recommendations of the
EAVG listed above were all categorized as these ‘medium‐term and long‐term measures’ that
required further study. Nonetheless, although limited, the outcomes from the EASG report doshow a willingness to move beyond talk into substantive policy actions.
While officials of the EASG deliberated over various measures in 2001 and 2002, theregional political momentum moved from Seoul and Tokyo to Beijing. President Kim Dae Jung’s
14

Towards and East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress. East Asian Vision
Group Report, 2001. p. 6.
15
Towards and East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress, p. 16.
16
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, p. 13.
19

failure to improve the North‐South relationship after a historic visit to Pyongyang in 2000 led to
declining approval ratings in 2001 and compromised him during the 2002 presidential campaign.
A series of leadership changes deprived Japan of opportunities to shape regional policies. Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi, who was a strong supporter of Japan’s ties with ASEAN+3, was replaced
by Yoshiro Mori after falling ill in April 2000. Mori, unable to improve his popularity, was forced
to resign next spring and Junichiro Koizumi took office in April 2001. Koizumi, thoughimmensely popular when he assumed the prime ministership, was slow to focus on developing
an Asia policy.

Rather his immediate task was to improve relations with the United States andto cooperate with the US and the international community after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
3.

Regional Actors and East Asian Community

ASEAN
In past years, ASEAN strives to become more of a coherent community, through theestablishment of an three ASEAN Community (articulated in the Bali Concord II in 2003) that
constitutes ASEAN Security Community and an ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN
Socio‐Cultural Community.

These reactions are motivated by how ASEAN try to coordinate

two difficult questions: that is to deal within the problems in ASEAN, especially forging tradeand investment through FTAs at the same time to deal with the underdeveloped nations namely
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) through the redistribution polity.

ASEAN

also wanted to lead the process of regionalism in East Asia, by defining its own concept ofcommunity building earlier than any other actors in this region in order to maintain theirposition of “drivers’ seat” in regionalization process.
ASEAN’s recent efforts have also shown just how difficult it is to get these nations – someof which have been closely aligned for over 30 years – to think and act as one, especially in thepolitical and security arena.

Developing a lowest common denominator for security

cooperation among these ten diverse nations is difficult enough.

If current establishedmultilateral community‐building mechanisms, such as the ASEAN, APT, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “gathering of economies” are any
indication of the willingness of East Asian nations (regardless of how the term is defined) toseriously address issues of regional governance, but one should not expect much progress soon.
In building the ASEAN Community, ASEAN Member Countries are now committed todeveloping an ASEAN Charter to provide the constitutional framework for ASEAN.

The

ASEAN Charter, which will be a landmark constitutional document embodying fundamental
principles, goals, objectives and structures of ASEAN cooperation capable of meeting the needsof the ASEAN Community and beyond.

It is noteworthy that the Charter aims to promote

democracy, democratic institutions, human rights, transparency and good governance 18 .
17

The

Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, p. 13.
Christopher Roberts, “The ASEAN Charter: A Crossroads for the Region?” IDSS Commentaries, 1
September 2005. http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Perspective/IDSS602005.pdf
18

20

Charter will include ‘political norms and values’ that would promote transparency andaccountability among members.
China
In the meantime, China, which had long been reluctant and passive to any multilateral
cooperative frameworks, began to take active initiatives to cultivate its relationship with ASEAN
countries. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, at the ASEAN+China summit in November 2000, proposed
to establish an FTA between China and ASEAN countries. 19 In the next year’s summit, Zhu
agreed with his ASEAN counterparts to conclude an FTA between ASEAN and China within ten
years. At the 2002 ASEAN+China summit, China and ASEAN concluded a ‘Framework
Agreement of Comprehensive Economic Cooperation’, which stipulated approaches andmodalities to facilitate economic cooperation including an FTA. This agreement included a
provision to realize trade liberalization immediately in some sectors, known as the ‘Early
Harvest program’. 20 In 2003, China became the first dialogue partner of ASEAN to sign its
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

Since then China has continued to expand the scope anddepth of its cooperation with ASEAN, with a new bilateral dispute resolution mechanism being
agreed upon in 2004 and cooperation in disaster planning and relief operations being
undertaken in 2005. 21
When the idea of an East Asian Community was floated, it becomes more obvious that
China was seeking more than just economic benefits through its approaches to ASEAN.

By

compromising with ASEAN over the South China Sea dispute and China’s accession to the
TAC―ahead of Japan and other nations― was also an important steps to improve political
relations with ASEAN 22 .
U.S.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a speech on the US’s Asia policy on March
19, 2005 at Sophia University in Tokyo.

The “Pacific Community” and “openness and choice”

were the keywords when she outlined the regional architecture.
The future of Asia and the Pacific community will be defined around two great themes‐‐ openness and choice.

Instead of closed societies or economies, instead of spheres ofinfluence, we stand for an open world. Instead of an exclusive club of powers, we standfor a community open to all.

But states must choose. They must choose whether to be apart of that community of openness, accepting the responsibilities that go with it.

The

United States and Japan have already made that choice, and we are honored to have a
19

Based on this decision, an ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation was created; its
report was submitted to the ASEAN+China summit in 2001. See <http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/
asean_chi.pdf>.
20<http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm>.
21
Source: ASEAN-People’s Republic of China, < http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm>.
22
Susumu Yamakage, “The Construction of an East Asian Order and the Limitation of the ASEAN
Model”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.12, No.2, 200521

democratic Japan as a friend.
――Speech by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 23
Prior to that speech, Japan and United States have issued “Joint Statement of theJapan‐US Security Consultative Committee” on February 19 th , with having recognition of
welcoming the “development of various form of regional cooperation” while stressing the“importance of open, inclusive and transparent regional mechanisms” as a bilateral common
strategic objective in the region 24 .

The term “regional cooperation” clearly included the recent

strives for developing East Asian frameworks.

At the Rice speech, however, such embracementof other regional cooperation was not reiterated, but the “Pacific community” was the only
concept when she described the region.
It is still unclear whether the US perceives the East Asian grouping would serve the US
regional interests.

Several in the US, including ex‐Vice Secretary of State Richard Armitage,

openly opposed the idea of East Asian community (and holding of East Asian Summit).
seem to be three concerns were raised.

ThereFirst, the East Asian community would create orincrease the Chinese sphere of influence in the region.

Given that growing economy andpolitical influence of China, building of a regional framework without the US might create
China‐led community, thus to disturb the US engagement in East Asia.
Second, the East Asian community will challenge the flexibility of bilateral“hub‐spokes” systems thus to increase the transaction cost in both security and economic
relations.

Third, the East Asian community might serve as an excuse to delay the democratictransition of authoritarian regimes in the region by introducing an Asian model of governance.
With these factors, the US seems to have rejected to apply the analogy of trans‐Atlantic relations,where NATO and EU play the complementary role.

The logic became more clear when US tries

to emphasize the trans‐Atlantic relations as “community of democracies”, in contrast with thetrans‐Pacific relations.
Japan
Japan had long been reluctant to engage in any kind of bilateral FTAs but seeing the
emergence of increasing complex network of FTAs throughout the world, finally decided to start
seriously focusing on the conclusion of an FTA agreement. The first country Japan with which it
did so was Singapore, which had few sensitive export products to Japan. The negotiations
started in October 2000 and were concluded by January 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi
visited Singapore. In his policy speech delivered in Singapore, Koizumi proposed to create a‘community that acts together and advances together’. 25 In the subsequent summit in Phnom
Penh, ASEAN and Japan issued a ‘Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership’ (CEP), and in the 2003 summit, they concluded a ‘Framework for Comprehensive
23

Condoleeza Rice, “Remarks at Sophia University” (March 19, 2005)
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43655.htm
24“Joint Statement of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee” (February 19, 2005)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm
22Economic Partnership’. As building blocks to establish a Japan‐ASEAN CEP, bilateral FTA
negotiations were started in December 2003 between Japan and Thailand, between Japan and thePhilippines, and between Japan and Malaysia. Japan and South Korea also agreed to startbilateral FTA negotiations in 2003. Since then Japan has also acceded to the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (in 2004) but still remains far behind China in terms of bilateral agreements, treaties
and memoranda with ASEAN.
In 2002 Policy Speech, Prime Minister Koizumi mentioned Australia and New Zealandas potential partners in ‘expanded’ East Asian community, suggested the potential enlargementof the concept of East Asia.

Since Japan has become a late comer, however, in the bilateral FTA

dynamics especially with ASEAN member states, it has been fallen behind to find new coreattachment to develop relations with ASEAN, notably the TAC accession.

Japan’s failure to

make concessions to the ASEAN nations in the course of trade liberalization negotiations has
also slowed the progress of economic partnership 26 .
Japan’s stance towards East Asian Community became clearer when Japanese
government floated the “Issue Paper” at ASEAN+3 Foreign Minister’s Meeting in June 2004 27 .
In the Issue Paper, Japanese government reaffirmed the importance of enhancing regional
cooperation, and analyzed that 1) ASEAN’s leading role in community building, 2) functional
cooperation plays the prominent role, 3) ASEAN+3 should involve other regional actors, and 4)
ASEAN+3 should continue to articulate principles such as openness, transparency, inclusivenessand conformity with global norms and systems 28 .
Japanese government also raised points to clarify regarding the modality of East Asian
Summit in the “Issue Paper”.

Especially, 1) fundamental objective of the East Asian Summit, 2)difference between East Asian Summit and ASEAN+3 Summit, and 3) organization of East Asian
Summit have been repeatedly mentioned in question format.

By laying out these agendas,

Japanese government seek to have the Summit which could be compatible to 1) Japan’s security
commitment with the United States, 2) Japan’s economic engagement in this region and
APEC/WTO process, and 3) promoting openness and inclusiveness of the Summit process.
4.

East Asian Summit and East Asian Community

Political Process of East Asian Summit I: Modality A and A’
Another item on the agenda for East Asian countries is the commencement an East
Asian Summit. The issue, which was virtually put on the shelf after the proposal of EAVG, wasmaterialized by holding the first East Asian Summit in December 2005.

The original idea of

EAS derived from the EAVG proposals, then by EASG as a medium and long term goals.
However, Malaysia, who happened to be the host country of APT in 2005, strongly wanted to25<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html>.
Susumu Yamakage, ibid.
27“Issue Papers provided by the Government of Japan” (25 June, 2004)
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/issue.pdf
26

23

pursue this goal because they had a legacy of EAEC in early 1992, they wanted this concept intheir hands.
In earlier thoughts on East Asian Summit was not conceptualized fully to create a new
regional framework.

Rather, it was more like upgraded version of ASEAN+3 process replacedby renamed as “East Asia”.

But several considerable challenges and political struggles cameacross, before/during the ASEAN+3 Vientianne Summit in 2004.
China has made clear their hope to hold the Second East Asian Summit in 2007, a year
before the Beijing Olympic.

With coordination with Malaysia, both countries tried to set themodality as: 1) East Asian Summit should be held once in two years, 2) ASEAN and non‐ASEAN
countries may host in rotation, 3) its membership will be ASEAN+3 (Modality A).

In

response to the Chinese proposal, Japan raised an additional proposal which tried to transformfrom single Chair to Co‐Chair system comprised of ASEAN and non‐ASEAN countries, andJapan wanted to co‐chair with Malaysia at the first Summit (Modality A’ 29 ) 30 .
As for the membership issue, Beijing – anxious to entrench its influence over and evendominance of this regional forum from the outset – wished to restrict participants to Southeast
and Northeast Asian states (that is, the existing ASEAN+3 members). But Tokyo favored a more
all‐encompassing grouping in which China’s power and influence would implicitly be balancedby the presence of extra‐regional stakeholders, most importantly the United States.
Neither modality A nor A’, however, worked out.

At the ASEAN+3 Vientianne Summit

in 2004, Philippines strongly opposed to both ideas since Philippines were to be scheduled tohost the ASEAN+3 Summit in 2007 (until Myanmar declines its chairmanship in 2006), whichmakes conflict between hosting of ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit at the different venue.
Certainly, Philippines thought that ASEAN+3 process would be diluted and lose the influence asa Chair.
Indonesia, and to some extent, Vietnam and Myanmar opposed to the idea of Modality
A/A’ at the Vientiane Summit, because they thought that the ASEAN could be marginalized in
the East Asian Summit process, since the +3 countries may have stronger influence over it.
They thought that it might be not too wise to create the framework which would lose theASEANʹs grip.

They insisted that the integration process of ASEAN should come first.

Japan was positive but with having certain level of ambivalence about East Asian
Summit.

Her original position was that East Asian groupings should include countries like

28

Ibid.
At the “Issue Paper” proposed by the Japanese government, Japan promoted the “double-track”
approach to invite Australia and New Zealand as a “dialogue partner”. “In this case, an EAS would consistof both a ‘core session’ held by ASEAN+3 alone and an ‘expanded session’ in which both ASEAN+3 andregional partners would participate. In the ‘core session’, ASEAN+3 would discuss key issues related tocommunity building. In the ‘expanded session’, ASEAN+3 would brief the regional partners of their
discussions in the core session. Other wider issues could also be discussed in the ‘expanded session’.
Ideas from experiences in the PMC could be drawn upon in arranging the ‘expanded session’” Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Issue Paper (June 2004)30
On the ground of policy planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that China may have a bigger
bargaining power to obtain the role of Chair, since Japan has already had Japan-ASEAN Special Summit
Meeting in December 2003. Interview with MoFA officials (August 2004).
29

24

Australia and New Zealand, since Japan attach importance of these liberal democracies.

APT

would become a process for further independence of financial cooperation, trade and investment
but if it is upgraded to East Asian Summit, they claimed that countries beyond ASEAN+3 should
be included at least as dialogue partners.
Political Process of East Asian Summit II: Modality B
Then, there were important sea change in spring of 2005 when every country tried toseek for an agreeable modality of the East Asian Summit.

Singapore started to think that India,

who has been claiming to become a member of East Asian Summit, should not be ignored due totheir rapid economic growth.

Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia began proposing that

Australia and New Zealand could be invited with different reasons in their mind.
Singapore and Indonesia, their prosperous neighbors are also in down‐under.

For

For Vietnam, it

might also be beneficial for them to counter‐balance Chinese influence in the region, then to give
ways to introduce resources and funds from multiple nations.
Meanwhile, ASEAN came up to consensus of inviting Australia, New Zealand and India
as full‐fledged members, not as a observer or dialogue partner.

During that process, ASEAN

has created the three criteria for participation for East Asian Summit and floated to other +3
members.

These are, East Asian Summit members should 1) have close relations with ASEAN,

2) be a full‐dialogue partner with ASEAN and 3) be the signatory of the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC) (Modality B).
With the Modality B becoming a least common denominator, the ASEAN once again
became the center of the community building process, and to be expanded in to wider East Asian
Summit process.

The annual meeting of the East Asian Summit shall be organized by the

ASEAN Secretariat in consultation with the other members.

Eventually, ASEAN member states,and other members of the Summit have agreed that ASEAN shall host the annual meetings of theEast Asian Summit, which will be held in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit annual meeting.
Thus, the East Asian Summit will be held under the chairmanship of ASEAN.
The decision to invite Australia and New Zealand as a formal member to the Summit
was part of an attempt by Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam with having a full support, shortly
afterwards by Japan 31 .

The ASEAN countries demanded Australia sign a Treaty of Amity andCooperation as a precondition for being invited.

The Howard government was at first reluctant

to sign the treaty but decided it was a modest concession compared to the benefits of being afounding member of the new summit conference 32 .
31

Australia has gained formal admission into

As stated in the footnote 27, Japan’s position until early 2005 was to invite Australia and New Zealandas ‘dialogue partners’ not as full-fledged members.
32
In a speech on 1 December 2005, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer suggested
that the character and direction of the East Asia Summit may take some time to become apparent but
welcomed the fact that Australia would be an inaugural participant. Mr Downer stated that “This is justthe first meeting and nothing is set in stone. And if there is to be an emergence of an East Asian
community, it will not, in my view, be built around one institution or meeting. An East Asian community
will emerge for practical reasons, not for ideological reasons. APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum,
ASEAN plus three, and the East Asia Summit will all contribute to an open but increasingly integrated
25

the East Asian Summit by acceding to the TAC. Alexandra Downer, Australia’s Foreign Minister,
said it would be keen to participate in the East Asia Summit, although some countries have
opposed its membership. Australia has long baulked at signing the TAC claiming it could
conflict with obligations under its security treaty with the US.

Some Asian countries also

regard Indiaʹs membership of the group as a further balance to China. The Indians havetraditionally not been active in the region because of isolationist economic policies but as a resultof the market opening policy which began fourteen years ago they now want to pursue
engagement with East Asia 33 .
Conclusion: Emergence of Dual Image of East Asian Community: Whither ASEAN+3 or East
Asian Summit?
The 16 participants in the first East Asia Summit

met on 14 December 2005. The

meeting was relatively short (at three hours) and few specific decisions were made: the emphasis
was on developing communication among the members.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Badawi, thechair for the meeting, in his Chairmanʹs Statement described the Summit as a ʹleaders‐ledʹgathering that initiated confidence‐building among the members as a first step towards more
substantial collaboration.
The main issues discussed during the Summit included the need for de‐nuclearization of
the Korean peninsula, terrorism, avian flu, sustainable development, the need for progress in the
Doha round of WTO negotiations and the role which the EAS should play as a complement toexisting cooperation dialogues (including ASEAN+3) in the process of community building in
the region.
The ʹKuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asian Summitʹ indicated that it will be a
ʹforum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest andconcern, and with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asiaʹ.
It affirmed that the East Asian Summit is intended to be an ʹopen, inclusive, transparent andoutward‐looking forum, in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally
recognized values, with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with otherparticipants of the East Asia Summitʹ. The Summit would be ʹconvened regularlyʹ, would be
hosted and chaired by an ASEAN member and would be held ʹback to back with the annual
ASEAN Summitʹ.

The Summit participants issued a specific declaration on avian flu, with acommitment to report all outbreaks rapidly and transparently, and to take steps to ensure thatthe disease does not develop into a form which could be transmitted directly between humans.
The existence of multiple and even competing fora will allow the core group of East
Asian countries to retain the leadership role in driving regional integration.

At the same time,

region…” “The East Asia Summit is only in its very first iteration and will take some time to bed down.
But we can say now that we have a regional architecture that serves Australia's interests well. It is open
and inclusive. It addresses security and economic issues in a practical way and Australia has a very strong
voice in how it develops.” Frank Frost and Ann Rann, “The East Asian Summit: Issues and Outcomes”
Australian Parliamentary Library E-Briefs, 17 January, 2006.
33
David Hale, “The East Asian Summit”, Asia Media, December 12, 2005.
26

it will allow them to accommodate interests from outside the region to a certain extent, thereby
reducing possible misgivings about an East Asian community evolving into an exclusive bloc.
Whether or not the newly launched East Asia Summit will play a central role in regional
integration in the future, its occurrence points to potentially bright prospects for the East Asian
community.

It will be a very different, but possibly even more successful, model of regionalism

from those we have seen so far in other parts of the globe.
A large part of the original rationale for bringing together leaders from across East Asia
was to lay the foundations for an institutionalized, pan‐regional community with both economic
and security dimensions. The precise ambit of such a community, let alone its modus operandi,
is still undefined.

As with the East Asian Summit, greater attention has focused on thecommunity’s potential membership. While India and Japan have continued to favor using theEast Asian Summit, with its wider membership, as the basis for a community, it was clear thatonce the summit’s membership had diversified to include non‐East Asian states, China could
only accept the more exclusive ASEAN+3 as the basis for a regional community.

This Chineseprescription, based essentially on power‐political reasoning, finds some sympathy in states like
Malaysia and Thailand.
While the Kuala Lumpur Declaration at the end of the summit failed to indicate whatpart, if any, the EAS might play in establishing the regional community, informal remarks by thesummit chairman indicated that he did not see Australia, India and New Zealand as future
members of it. Nevertheless, in practical terms these three states are increasingly integratingwith East Asia and possess in Japan a major East Asian ally. Their aim will be to join a regional
community primarily concerned with facilitating trade and investment, and like Japan they will
not want to be part of any grouping that China might attempt to use as a vehicle for regional
domination.

A larger question concerns the extent to which an East Asian community, whether

its membership were inclusive or exclusive, might be able to achieve significant consensus on
economic and security issues given the fundamental rivalries that exist amongst combinations ofmajor players such as China and Japan, and China and India.
Appendix: A
Kuala Lumpur Declaration (East Asian Summit)
SHARING the view that the East Asia Summit could play a significant role incommunity building in this region;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the need to support efforts to build a strong ASEAN
Community which will serve as a solid foundation for our common peace andprosperity;
DO HEREBY DECLARE:FIRST, that we have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad
strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim ofpromoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.
SECOND, that the efforts of the East Asia Summit to promote community building in27

this region will be consistent with and reinforce the realisation of the ASEAN
Community, and will form an integral part of the evolving regional architecture.
THIRD, that the East Asia Summit will be an open, inclusive, transparent andoutward‐looking forum in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally
recognised values with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with theother participants of the East Asia Summit.
FIFTH, that:
Participation will be based on the criteria for participation established by ASEAN;
The East Asia Summit will be convened regularly;
The East Asia Summit will be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN Member Country thatassumes the ASEAN Chairmanship and held back‐to‐back with the annual ASEAN
Summit; andThe modalities of the East Asia Summit will be reviewed by ASEAN and all otherparticipating countries of the East Asia Summit.
Chairman’s Statement (ASEAN+3 Summit)
2. We signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit toreaffirm our commitment to ASEAN Plus Three cooperation, which has achieved
substantial progress in the last eight years. We agreed to continue holding the ASEAN
Plus Three Summit annually in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit to guide andprovide political momentum to East Asian cooperation and community building
efforts.
3. We agreed that the ASEAN Plus Three process will continue to be the main vehicle inachieving that goal, with ASEAN as the driving force, and with the active participationof the ASEAN Plus Three countries, in order to promote shared ownership. We
reiterated our common resolve to realise an East Asian community as a long‐term
objective that would contribute to the maintenance of regional and global peace,security, progress and prosperity
16. We welcomed the convening of the first East Asia Summit (EAS) on 14 December
2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. We shared the views that the EAS should be convened
annually and that the EAS will play a significant role in this region. The EAS will beconsistent with and reinforce ASEAN’s efforts in building the ASEAN Community. We
recognised that the EAS will contribute to the evolving regional architecture. We lookforward to a fruitful deliberation of the EAS.

28

29

Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko
Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Research
Advancement (NIRA)

Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia?
Introduction
Friedberg contends that East Asia is “ripe for rivalry and a place likely to emerge as the“cockpit of great‐power conflict.” １ Does this assertion truly apply? If it does apply, it certainly
applies to the political and security areas. In East Asia, the development of regionalism has been
led by economics, in particular trade, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Regionalizationof economies in East Asia has led regionalism. Regionalism involves the process of institution
creation to promote regional cooperation. Such institutions are designed to deal withtransnational issues faced by countries in the region. In contrast regionalization is a naturalprocess for regional cooperation as has been the case of East Asian economies. According to 2003
statistics, the ratio of intra‐regional trade in East Asia, while lower than that of the European
Union (EU), was higher than North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA’s) in terms ofexports. Deepening trade interdependence has motivated countries in East Asia to either
conclude or negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or more comprehensive versions of
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Region‐wide FTAs or EPAs has also been on the tablefor discussion. Witnessing interconnected financial market at the time of 1997 Asian monetarycrisis, ASEAN+3 has also established initiatives for financial cooperation, including the Chang
Mai Initiative and a proposal for an Asian Bond Market, as described in Chapter Three. These
initiatives were prompted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis when countries learned through theimpact of a crisis in Thailand spreading to other countries in the region. This sent a message how
the final market is regionalized.
However, in the political and security arenas, regional cooperation, not to mention regional
integration, has been identified as a tremendous challenge at best. Sino‐Japanese rivalry andsurging nationalism have often been cited as impediments for regional cooperation.
Regionalization in the political and security areas has surely been limited but has recently beenon the rise on non‐traditional transnational security issues. Meanwhile regionalism in East Asia
has not been promoted consciously enough to lead regionalization of security. The post Cold
War or post‐post Cold War East Asia is still divided, with national security and sovereignty still
strong in the perceptions. East Asia has therefore elements of competitive security that demands
traditional deterrence and crisis response mechanisms against the backdrop of the remaining
flashpoints from the Cold War namely Korean peninsula and Taiwan straits. Moreover, Sino‐US
military confrontation cannot be excluded with the recent build up of Chinese military power
which is reportedly beyond the need for the contingency over Taiwan straits. US Department of30

Defense in its annual report to congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China in its
2006 edition stated that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the UnitedStates and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S.
military advantages.” ２

Moreover with the advent of globalization and trigger by 9.11,

non‐traditional security threats are gaining higher profile than ever before in East Asia which
increases the need for cooperative security and common security approach in the region. In
analyzing East Asia, we need to employ all three theories of international relations, namely
realism that considers balance of power and national confrontations, but also liberalism that tries
to promote security by multilateral institutions as well as constructivism that promotes security
system based not on power but on norms.
In hindsight, the building of a comprehensive East Asian community could not have been a
topic of discussion during the Cold War. The region has long been fragmented and has notshown any signs for cohesion. However, with the end of the Cold War, in part due to the impactof the movement towards further regional integration in Europe, nations in the Asia Pacificregion established the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in November 1989,
incidentally in the same month that the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the Cold War, was dismantled.
Given the success of APEC, in the post Cold War setting the process was expanded beyond theeconomy, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an intergovernmental multilateral security
dialogue process, was launched in 1994. It is worth noting that the regional process establishedin the 1990s took the format of ASEAN+X rather than a pure multilateral form. The most notable
example of this framework was ASEAN+3, the three being Japan, China and South Korea,
created in 1997. The ASEAN+3’s 1999 Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation took theunprecedented and significant step of including transnational political and security issues as
areas of cooperation, in addition to cooperation in the traditional economic field. ３
Despite this statement, however, the legacy of the Cold War still lingers in East Asia, and it
can be argued that the region has a long way to go in building a collective security community.
Since the end of the Second World War, many countries in East Asia have secured their nationaland regional security through bilateral alliances and treaties with the United States, forming theso‐called hub‐and‐spoke architecture. It is phenomenal that these “spokes” have not developed a“wheel” amongst them. During the Cold War spokes remained tied to the hub but not each other.
When it comes to a collective security community, it has been consistently argued it does nothave a substantial meaning if the current East Asian security environment remains and if it does
not involve its hub, the United States in post Cold War and in post‐post Cold War context.
Americans have argued against an East Asia community concept, particularly after theannouncement of the East Asia Summit to be held. For example Richard Armitage expressed his
opposition to the concept of an East Asian community in May 2005 in an interview with the
Asahi Shimbun, asserting that the attempt to build an East Asian community without the UnitedStates would be a serious mistake, and that China is anxious to exclude the United States fromconsultations. ４

Should community building in East Asia progress, the question of US

participation in a community in one form or another must be considered. Since mid‐2005, US
31

opposition to East Asian community building and an East Asia Summit has lessened after it was
decided that India, Australia and New Zealand would be added to the list of participants in the
East Asia Summit, leading the United States to believe that the Summit would no longer be a
China‐centered process. Nonetheless, how to relate with the United States remains an issue forthe discussion and practice of East Asian community building, particularly in the political andsecurity areas.
With regard to East Asian community building, Japan has its share of opponents andproponents, in addition to those who maintain a skeptical position. Opponents of the concept
deny the possibility of creating an East Asian community, even in the area of the economy,
arguing that countries in the region do not share values which would form the basis ofcommunity building and thus are not ready to yield sovereignty for a regional community.
Naoki Tanaka, President of the 21 Century Public Policy Institute in his report to the House ofCouncilors

in

2005

argued

that

East

Asia,

despiteits

growing

economic

regional

interdependence, cannot complete its regional economic network alone; East Asian nations rely
heavily on the United States for absorption of their goods, and an East Asian Economic
community excluding the United States does not make sense. Tanaka considers the Korea‐US
FTA negotiations currently underway as an example of a move that opposes the building of acommunity in East Asia. ５ Taro Yayama, a critic, argues that it is impossible to consider an East
Asian community that includes China, because the Chinese have been indoctrinated by theeducational system to hate Japan. ６ Mineo Nakajima, President of Kokusai Kyoyo University
also argues that East Asia’s political and cultural diversity is too overwhelming to makeeconomic or functional cooperation feasible. Nakajima asserts that China’s continentality,
Korea’s pensularity and Japan’s insularity create cultural and civilizational differences too large
to bridge, making East Asian community building unrealistic. ７
Skeptics, by contrast, agree with building an East Asian Economic community, but havestrong doubts regarding community building beyond the economic areas of trade and finance.
They are strongly skeptical with regard to the feasibility of a political and security community inEast Asia. Toshio Watanabe, President of Takushoku University, also argues that East Asia
community is not possible if China and Korea must institutionalize anti‐Japanese sentiment tosurvive as a cohesive nation, that is for domestic political unity. ８ Watanabe, however, agrees on
merit in East Asia regional free trade area. ９ Noboru Hatakeyama, former Vice Minister of
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, also argues that a community building requires thatmembers share values and are willing to share burdens with other members. Hatakeyama argues
that Japan does not share values with China and South Korea and that an East Asian community
is therefore unfeasible. Hatakeyama though asserts that it is feasible to create an East Asia Free
Trade Agreement (EAFTA) which does not require yielding of sovereignty. １０
On the other hand, proponents of community building, with some degree of caution, see apossibility for community building in East Asia that includes the political and security fields.
Hitoshi Tanaka, former Vice Minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently Senior Fellowof Japan Center for International Exchange, argues for the building of an East Asian community,32

but does not envisage it in the near future. Tanaka observes that Japanese foreign policy is at a
crossroads sixty years after the end of the Second World War, and faces challenges of relative
decline of Japan’s national strength against a background of population decline. Tanaka argues
that in ten to fifteen years the economic and military power of China and India will becomparable to Japan. Although their path towards the future growth may not be smooth, Tanaka
observes there is no doubt that several strong countries will emerge in Asia. In that multipolar
East Asia, Japan would require a stable regional order to survive and community building would
be one of the paths available to the nation. Hitoshi Tanaka also observes that it would be difficult
for East Asia to aim at a value community that shares common values like skeptics but should atfirst aim towards a functional community achieved through functional cooperation. １１ Makoto
Taniguchi, President of Iwate University, argues that community building in East Asia would
contribute not only to the economic development of the region but also to political stability, andthus be of tremendous benefit to Japanese economic development and security. Taniguchi assertsthat the development of an East Asian community into a broader Asian community would
strengthen Asian identity, and this community would be comparable to NAFTA and EU. １２
Yoshihide Soeya, Professor of Keio University, also argues in favor of an East Asian community,and explicitly of a security community. Soeya asserts that this is the ultimate destination of East
Asian community building. When a security community is created in Asia, he argues that it
would absorb the functions of the Japan‐US Security alliance; however, he also argues thatduring the process of community building it would be essential for Asia to be prepared for all
possible security threats. １３ Takashi Shiraishi, Vice President of National Graduate Institute for
Policy Studies (GRIPS), promotes functional cooperation, including cooperation in the area of
non‐traditional security issues, in East Asia and underscores the difference between community
building in East Asia and in Europe. While Europe has built a community in the classic sense,
East Asia is characterized by webs of bilateral relationships; the challenge is how to developthese bilateral relationships into a community, that is web to network. Shiraishi also identifies
that the linkage between an East Asian community and the Japan‐US alliance as a major
challenge in community building.
While there is a consensus across the board that the Japan‐US alliance is essential inmaintaining security from the perspective of traditional security issues, opinions are divided onwhether regional cooperation on non‐traditional security issues including terrorism, piracy andarms, narcotics and human trafficking, energy and environment, and infectious disease canbenefit the region and the United States. １４ Proponents of community building believe that it
would serve as a vehicle for the achievement of regional stability and also as a way for Japan tofield more effective Asia policy, while opponents and skeptics, as indicated above, deny thepossibility of community building beyond the economy.
This chapter examines the prevailing framework for regional cooperation in political andsecurity fields in East Asia, a possible road map for East Asian political/security community
against a background of changing strategic relationships in Asia, a road map for functional
cooperation and functional integration, and a linkage between East Asia and the United States. It
33

concludes by considering the challenges and opportunities for political and security cooperationand conclude with an observation whether or not the diversity of cultures, economies andpolitical systems in the region will enable the establishment of a viable organization in East Asia.
East Asian Political/Security Cooperation: Reality Check
Since the achievement of peace in Cambodia in the early 1990s, there has been no major
war in East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, compared to other parts of the world East Asia
has been relatively stable and free from violent conflicts. Against this backdrop of politicalstability, despite the Asian financial crisis in 1997, East Asian countries have prospered
economically. Smooth economic growth has encouraged stability in the region and vice versa.
However, in the early twenty‐first century East Asia still carries legacy of the Cold Wartime confrontations. It has been suggested that if a Third World War should break out, the first
shot would most likely be heard in East Asia, in particular Northeast Asia. Given the existence ofpotential security risks in the region, is the establishment of a political and security community
feasible?
In the past half a century, peace and stability in the Asia‐Pacific region has been
maintained by a web of bilateral security relations with the United States, forming a
hub‐and‐spoke architecture. These alliance relations, combined with national defense
capabilities, have maintained deterrence and provided for response to potential contingencies in
the region. Since the end of the Cold War bilateral alliances with the United States have evolved
from a focus on a specified threat to a focus on regional security. In the post‐post Cold War era
non‐traditional security threats such as terrorism have surged as a focus in the region. The
bilateral security treaties in East Asia, in addition to their traditional role, have gained a featureof being public goods for regional security.
America’s allies in the region, the “spokes,” did not develop relations among themselves
during the Cold War.

It is only recently in the post Cold War that “spokes” have started to forma partial “wheel,” as illustrated in the TCOG talks and Japan‐Australia‐US trilateral talks. In thearea of military exercises, third countries have started to either participate in or send observers
to bilateral exercises. For example, Team Challenge, held in May 2002 combined bilateral
exercises between the US and Thailand (Cobra Gold), the US and Australia (Tandem Thrust) andthe US and the Philippines (Balikatan); 22 countries sent observers to these exercises. China sent
observers to the Cobra Gold exercises. The background to these multilateral exercises was a 2001
article entitled “From Wheel to Webs: Reconstructing Asia‐Pacific Security Arrangements” byDenis Blair of CINCPAC. １５ The security community proposed by Blair is different from thepluralistic security community proposed by Karl W. Deutsch. １６ The precondition of Deutsch’s
security community is the sharing of common values such as a commitment to freedom anddemocracy. In such a community national conflicts can be solved peacefully without resorting tomilitary force. In contrast, Blair’s proposal was to establish a security community by deepening
bilateral relations and creating a network or web of alliances. His proposal was, however, notfurther pursued due to 9.11. Following 9.11 the United States opted for a coalition of the willing34

in the war against terror, which has provided support for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Another example of the coalition of the willing is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
PSI was proposed by the Bush administration in December 2002 to control the flow of weaponsof mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states andnon‐state actors. President Bush announced the PSI concept during his visit to Poland in May
2003 and called on countries to participate. From Asia, Japan, Australia and Singapore areparticipating in the PSI. In September 2003 Australia hosted the maritime interdiction exercise“Pacific Protector,” and in October 2004 Japan hosted “Team Samurai 04”off Sagami Bay and
Yokosuka Port. Australia, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand
participated in the latter. In PSI, principles are agreed by a series of conferences and exercises are
conducted with an emphasis on preventive interdiction. Participants voluntarily participate in
PSI when they share the objective. This is due to the fact that existing arms control anddisarmament negotiations at the United Nations are based on consensus which often prevents
substantive progress
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
During the Cold War, Asia went through the hot wars such as the Korean War and theVietnam War, and regional security was not addressed. Since the end of the Cold War, against
the backdrop of relative regional stability, regional security has come to be recognized as a viableapproach.
The major considerations from the perspective of regional security are (1) whether or notthreats are specified or unspecified, (2) whether threats are internal or external and (3) whether
security measures are limited to military means or more comprehensive political, diplomatic or
economic means. When threats are specified and external, security must be ensured by militarymeans and by establishing alliances. On the other hand, unspecified internal threats should be
responded to by preventing disputes from escalating into conflicts by means of a national andregional framework. When internal disputes develop into violent conflicts, the national/regionalframework will be used to solve them peacefully. Especially when national governance is failing,
multilateral regional and/or international framework is useful to settle conflicts. Regional
mechanisms can also be effective in curbing and preventing both unspecified internal andexternal threats, i.e. non‐traditional threats. In East Asia today both specified and unspecified aswell as internal and external threats exist which should be addressed by military as well as
cooperative security measures. Thus, in addition to the traditional alliance network, the region
also needs a regional framework to deal with complex non‐traditional security threats.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an example of such a cooperative security framework,
although it does not possess means of coercion. In 1990 when Australia and Canada proposed an
Asian version of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), ASEAN countries
declined the idea on the grounds that the security environments of Asia and Europe weredifferent, and the European security approach therefore did not apply to Asia. However, in 1993
the ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Meeting agreed to create the ARF as a venue to discuss regional
35

security issues. ARF Ministerial Meetings have been held annually since the first in 1994; North
Korea has participated in the ARF since 2000. 23 Asian Pacific countries, or almost the entire
region, and the EU currently participate in the ARF. In 2004, an ARF unit was created in the
ASEAN Secretariat to support ARF activities. In the intervals between the annual Foreign
Ministers Meetings, the ARF holds Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) and Inter‐sessional Group(ISG) meetings.
The ARF is not institutionalized like frameworks for cooperative security in Europe such as
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is still a framework fordiscussion and does not implement actions like election monitoring, protection of minorities andfield missions for peacebuilding as the OSCE does.
At the Second ARF Ministerial Meeting held in 1995 a concept paper was adopted thatindicated a road map of ARF, from phase one of confidence building measures, phase two of
preventive diplomacy and phase three of approaches to conflicts. The ARF today thus functions
as a venue for participants to discuss regional security issues. When the ARF was launched,some regional countries were skeptical with regard to multilateral security dialogue. The ARF
therefore could not take up sensitive issues like the Spratley Islands dispute as an agenda for its
meetings. Over the years, however, the ARF has helped to reduce mistrust and nurture a sense of
mutual assurance among members. After 1997 Asian financial crisis the ARF stalled somewhat,
but has come to take up sensitive issues such as the Korean Peninsula as well as the SpratleyIslands. Although the ARF has developed a dialogue role in the region, its effectiveness has beenquestioned. When it attempted to move from phase one, confidence building measures, to phasetwo, preventive diplomacy, China asserted that there was an overlap between confidencebuilding and preventive diplomacy and the ARF could not agree on moving to the preventive
diplomacy phase. After some difficulties in July 2001 the Eighth ARF ministerial meeting
adopted the Paper on the Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy and the ARF Registerof Experts/Eminent Persons. Due to Chinese pressure owing to its concern on a possible
interference by the ARF members into its domestic affairs under the name of preventive
diplomacy, preventive diplomacy at the ARF was defined as applicable to inter‐state conflicts
and not to intra‐state conflicts. The ARF, however, could not make any significant progress inpreventive diplomacy; it was not able to take effective measures in East Timor after thereferendum for independence, and had to rely initially on multinational forces and subsequently
UN peacekeeping missions. For its peacebuilding, it had to rely on UN mission. In the recent
instability caused by dissatisfied former soldiers in May 2006, East Timor has to ask the dispatchof Australian troops to recover peace and safety.
Although East Asia certainly needs more time before a pluralistic security community canbe created, the ARF and ASEAN+3 despite their shortcomings can in the interim work on
non‐traditional transnational security issues. In Karl Deutsch’s concept of a security community,
the nations of the region must basically trust each other and share common values. East Asia, inconceiving its future collective security community, must start from building trust among
countries in the region. As a roadmap for regional cooperation and for an eventual community
36

building East Asian way, functional cooperation in non‐traditional security fields such ascounter‐terrorism, piracy, energy, environment, infectious disease and drag trafficking would be
productive both for trust building and for practical benefits it would generate. The growing
number of transnational security threats would increasingly demand such cooperation in theregion.
In preparing and planning such cooperation, political/security dialogues are necessary.
When the ARF was created in 1994, opinions were divided as to whether multilateralpolitico‐security dialogues were useful and sustainable. However, multilateral dialogues like the
ARF have come to be recognized not as a substitute but as a supplement to hub‐and‐spoke
alliance relations. The EASR announced by the US Department of Defense in 1995 also
recognized that dialogues do not substitute for alliance relations or forward deployment of theUnited States, but rather supplement them. The 2003 Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book indicatedthat Japanese security policy centers on the nation’s alliance with the United States but also seeks
to strengthen bilateral or multilateral dialogues for the peace and stability of the Asia Pacificregion. However, other than ARF and ASEAN+3, there is no intergovernmental politico‐security
dialogue in the region specifically. What we have are track two dialogues, as described in thefollowing section.
Track Two Dialogues
Dialogues initiated by the private sector, generally think tanks and research institutions,
are termed “track two,” as opposed to “track one” intergovernmental dialogues. Government
officials may, however, participate in track two meetings in a personal capacity. This issometimes referred to as “track one and a half.” At track two meetings, participants can float
new ideas which it is perhaps too early to propose at official intergovernmental meetings, andcan speak their minds in ways that they cannot in official meetings. Track two discussions cantherefore help to trigger intergovernmental dialogues or prepare the groundwork for official
discussions on sensitive and complex issues. Together with scholars, former government officials
play an important role in track two meetings. Regional epistemic communities such as theASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN‐ISIS), the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific (CSCAP) have played an important ideational role in support ofinter‐governmental regional institutions. In the context of East Asian community building, theEast Asia Vision Group (EAVG) established by ASEAN+3 and the Network of East Asian Think
Tanks (NEAT) that was established on the basis of EAVG’s recommendations are good examplesof track two processes.
The number of track two dialogues in the Asia pacific region has increased since the 1990s,
as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 is based on data from the Dialogue and Research Monitor, １７
initially compiled by Canadian universities and subsequently by the Japan Center forInternational Exchange (JCIE). Given that the number of meetings varies depending on how they
are counted, these numbers should not be considered absolute; however, they do give a goodidea of trends of track one and two meetings since the 1990s.
37

Figure 1: Evolution of Politico-Security Dialogues in Asia Pacific Region

210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
34
30
20
10
3
0
1993

196

Track 1
Track 2
149

93

90

85

112

70
81
46

49

49

48
45

20
19
1994

23

1995

18

17

11

10

1996

1997

1998

1999

17
2000

9
2001

2002

2003

2004

Year

Source: Japan Center for International Exchange(JCIE) "Dialogue and Research Monitor Towards Community Building in East Asia"(http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/index.html)

Figure 1 includes a variety of track two processes: bilateral and multilateral, for specified
objectives and for general exchange of views, institutionalized and ad hoc. During the 1990s thenumber of track two meetings in the region peaked at 93, but this figure had declined to 20 in
1999. Because the region had little experience of track two meetings in the preceding decades,
they were initially organized with considerable enthusiasm; however, they were soon criticizedfor excessive growth and a lack of results. Jokes circulated recommending non‐proliferation of
track two meetings, and suggesting that CBM referred to “conference building” rather than“confidence building” measures. The decline in the number of track two meetings was further
influenced by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which deprived track two meetings of funding.
During the same period of time, track one meetings have been fairly constant in terms of thenumber of annual meetings. However, the benefit of track two meetings as a way of deepening
mutual understanding and trust has been recognized; as Figure 1 shows, the number of meetings
has registered a substantial increase since 2000, reaching 196 meetings in 2004. This phenomenal
growth reflects the fact that non‐traditional and human security issues have been taken up at
track two meetings since 9.11. The latest Research and Dialogue Monitor of 2005 observes that“terrorism featured in one quarter of all Track 1 meetings and proved to be the most frequently
dealt with of any single issue…topics such as maritime terrorism, piracy, and cyber crimes wereprevalent, particularly in Track 1, indicating the level of concern about these issues at the
governmental level. Other non‐traditional security issues that were important subjects ofdiscussion included transnational crimes, especially human trafficking, drugs trafficking andarms trafficking.” １８

It is also worth noting that the number of track one meetings, which had

been around ten or twenty at the maximum in the 1990s, grew to 112 in 2004. This is partly due
to meetings convened by ASEAN+3, which can be classified as functional cooperation, １９ as
38

described in the next section. Both track one and two meetings have taken up non‐traditional
security issues which have been increasing with greater regional interdependence and theconcomitant increased flow of people and goods across national borders.
A Road Map for Functional Cooperation in East AsiaThus, because East Asia has not reached the stage of creating a pluralistic security
community in Karl Deutsch’s sense, the region cannot rely on a collective security community toensure regional security. East Asia has to remain dependent on a web of bilateral alliances with
the United States. However, regional security cooperation can play the role of “peacekeeper” inEast Asia. The process can be commenced from cooperation in practical areas, in which
participants share common benefits, i.e. functional cooperation. In other words, given lack oftrust and common threat perceptions, East Asia cannot adopt an institutional approach inpromoting regional cooperation in political and security fields in immediate future. East Asia
can move forward to substantive collaboration on the myriad complex issues In hindsight, thegerm of the European Union, which has reached the stage of developing a common foreign andsecurity policy, was the creation of European Coal and Steel Community, which was nothing but
functional cooperation. In fact, triggered by the financial crisis the region went through in 1997,
ASEAN+3 has embarked on the creation of a network of functional cooperation in the financial
area. The report of the EAVG recommended concrete functional cooperation. These
recommendations were further examined and grouped into short‐term and long‐term goals by
the inter‐governmental East Asia Study Group (EASG). As short‐term measures, the report
recommended strengthening mechanisms for cooperation on non‐traditional security issues andpoverty reduction. As medium‐term and long‐term measures, the report recommended
numerous fields including building a framework for energy policies, strategies and action plans.
Incidentally, among the medium‐term and long‐term measures, the EAVG recommended
promoting the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit into an East Asian Summit. The latter has beenrealized in December 2005 although it was not the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit but thesimultaneous holding of the two Summits. Of the numerous forms of functional cooperation
envisaged by ASEAN+3, the next sections consider cooperation in the areas of counter‐terrorism,
energy, environment and piracy as illustrations.
Counter‐terrorism Cooperation
Terrorism is not a new security threat. Neither it is a particularly new phenomenon toAsia, although the current terrorist threat is clearly different from the secular communist
insurgencies during the Cold War. Moreover, the scale of the 9.11 attacks and the means used inthem drastically increased the perception of the security threat represented by terrorism.
Asia has its own indigenous terrorist groups, for example the MILF in the Philippines
and al‐Jemaah al‐Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. In recent years JI, which declares its goal to be thecreation of a pan‐Southeast Asia Islamic caliphate has been responsible for a series of bomb
attacks in the region including bomb blasts in Bali in October 2002 and October 2005, attack on
39

the J.W.Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 and attack outside the Australian embassy inJakarta in September 2004. Figure 2 shows the number of terrorist attacks in 2005 by region
based on data from the Report on Incidents of Terrorism published by the US National
Counterterrorism Center. The combined figures for East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia arehigher than for the Near East, which had the highest number in 2005.

Figure 2: International Terrorist Attacks by Region (2005)

10,000

8,728

9,000

Dead - 14,602

8,000

Number of Attacks - 11,111

7,000
6,000
5,000

4,230

3,974

4,000

3,017
3,000
2,000
1,000

875

760
253

1,007

851 867780
371

0AfricaEast Asia and Pacific Europe and Eurasia

Near East

South Asia

Western Hemisphere

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) "Report on Incidents of Terrorism 2005"(http://wits.nctc.gov/Reports.do)

After 9.11, the US government launched a war against terror, regarding terrorism as a war.
Although the international community was initially sympathetic with the US, opinion has since
been divided over the attack on Iraq and other aspects of US policy. In Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia
and South Korea have experienced a surge of anti‐Americanism. Nonetheless, by contrast with
Europe, most East Asian governments supported the Bush administration’s war against terror.
Some argued that 9.11 forced the US to take an interest in Asia again, and that terrorism in Asia
can only be controlled by the United States. East Asian governments have been criticized by the
citizens of their nations for their support of the US, but terrorism represents a considerable
threat in the region. Moreover, the attacks in London during the G8 Summit in July 2005 were areminder that international terrorism not only targets specific countries, but also theinfrastructure and values of the civilized world.
Prevention of and countermeasures against transnational terrorism are common interestsof East Asian countries. No country opposes cooperation in the area of counter‐terrorism. In fact,
since 9.11 existing regional frameworks have promoted concrete cooperation in this area. As an
illustration ASEAN on November 4 adopted
Prevention of transnational terrorism is certainly a common interest of East Asian
countries. No country opposes cooperation to counter terrorism. As terrorism is most often
40

transnational in terms of actors and victims, regional cooperation would be effective in addition
to than national measures. In fact, since 9.11 existing regional cooperation frameworks in
Asia‐Pacific have been promoting concrete cooperation to prevent terrorism. As an illustration,
immediately after 9.11, on November 4, 2001, ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Joint Action toCounter Terrorism, which included practical measures, with ASEAN nations agreeing to “review
and strengthen […] national mechanisms to combat terrorism” and to establish “regional
capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries toinvestigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts.” ２０ ASEAN meetings have continued tocondemn terrorist attacks and have suggested numerous regional cooperation initiatives forpreventing and combating terrorism
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, despite its focus on economic
cooperation, also reacted to 9.11 and has taken up international terrorism as an agenda every
year since 2001. On October 21, 2001, APEC leaders, at the strong urging of the United States,
declared their condemnation of and determination to respond to international terrorism. ２１ On
October 26, 2002, APEC leaders announced the Los Cabos Statement on Fighting Terrorism andPromoting Growth, declaring their commitment to blocking the financing of terrorist
organizations, promoting cyber‐security and cooperating in capacity building throughcounter‐terrorism‐related training. ２２ The Los Cabos Statement led to the creation of theCounter‐Terrorism Task Force (CTTF). ２３ On 21 October, 2003, the APEC Leaders’ Statement,
under the heading of “Enhancing Human Security,” declared a commitment to “dismantle, fully
and without delay, transnational terrorist groups that threaten the APEC economies.” Thedeclaration also mentioned the implementation of a Health Security Initiative to “help APEC
prevent and respond to regional health threats, including naturally‐occurring infectious disease
and bio‐terrorism,” in addition to the establishment of a “regional trade and financial security
initiative within the Asian Development Bank to support projects that enhance port security,
combat terrorist finance, and achieve other counter‐terrorism objectives.” ２４ With the campaign
on Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR), APEC has cooperated in countering terrorism fromthe economic perspective through measures that protect cargo, ships, international aviation andpeople in transit and prevent money laundering. In their 18‐19 November 2005 Declaration,
APEC leaders made a commitment to further strengthen their efforts on counter‐terrorism
beyond the economy by dismantling transnational terrorist groups, eliminating the danger
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related
items, and confronting other direct threats to the security of the region. ２５ Previously, when it
was proposed that security be included in the agenda, APEC participants could not reachconsensus as Taiwan, which is not a country, participates in APEC, and some members resisted
the idea of discussing security issues with such a participant. However, since 9.11, APEC hascome to collaborate on the terrorism issue which has significant implications on economic
activities.
The ARF has also condemned and responded to terrorism. The ARF issued “the Statement
on Measures against Terrorist Financing,” making a commitment to freeze terrorist assets,
41

exchange information and outreach and provide technical assistance “in developing andimplementing necessary laws, regulations and policies to combat terrorist financing and money
laundering.” ２６

ARF created the Inter‐sessional Meeting on Counter‐Terrorism andTransnational Crime (ISM on CT‐TC). At the first meeting, held in Karambunai, Sabah, Malaysia
in March 2003, co‐hosted by Malaysia and the United States, the adoption of the ARF Statement
on Cooperative Counter‐Terrorist Actions on Border Security was proposed. In 2004 ARF
ministers adopted the ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International
Terrorism, and agreed to review its implementation every year. ２７
East Asian countries have held numerous meetings on counter‐terrorism issues whichhave contributed to the growth of track one meetings and have held intensive discussions under
existing regional frameworks to combat terrorism since 2001; they have also embarked on
improving law enforcement programs and operations, disrupting terrorist financing, capacity
building on intelligence collection, analysis, distribution and exchange, and the enhancement of
global commitments in the region. In Malaysia the Southeast Asia Regional Centre forCounter‐Terrorism (SEARCCT) has been established to conduct training to counter terrorism.
East Asian countries share a practical interest in preventing and responding to terrorism, due tothe practical benefits of doing so.
Maritime Cooperation: Fighting against Piracy
The Straits of Malacca extends approximately 900 kilometers; 80,000 vessels cross it a year,
including numerous oil tankers transporting crude oil from the Middle East to East Asia. Due tothe economic growth of East Asia, the number of ships crossing the Straits of Malacca has
increased significantly, and the quantity of oil transported is growing every year. According toInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies based in Singapore around 30 percent of world tradeand 50 percent of world energy needs pass through the Straits each year. ２８ However, ships in
the Straits are the targets of pirate attacks. It is also reported that piracy has become more
violent in recent years. Pirates are now armed with stronger weapons such as AK47 assault rifles
and even rocket launchers.

Table 1: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
1998

2000

2002

2003

2004

2005

Malacca Strait

6

112

24

15

35

10

South China Sea

94

140

112

114

86

81

Indian Ocean

25

109

46

77

31

39

East Africa

19

29

14

11

7

22

West Africa

22

33

39

59

43

21

South America

38

41

53

60

40

24

Mediterranean Sea

2

2

3

1

‐

‐

42

Source: International Maritime Organization (IMO)ʺ Report on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships Annual report ʺ, regional analysis of reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships whichwere reported to have been allegedly committed(http://www.imo.org/HOME.html)

In March 2005, the Japanese tug boat Idaten was attacked by pirates during a voyage
through the Straits of Malacca. Its crew were taken hostage, but later returned to Japan. The casesent a message home once again that the Straits of Malacca is prone to piracy.
According to International Maritime Organization (IMO) statistics, the South China Sea
and the Straits of Malacca record a high incidence of piracy, as shown in Table 1. The combined
incidence of piracy in these two areas gives East Asia the highest incidence of piracy in the world.
Because of this high incidence, functional cooperation to combat the problem is alreadyunderway. Thus, due to multilateral strict control measures the number of incidents of piracy
and armed robbery against ships in the Straits of Malacca which reached 112 in 2000 has reduced
to ten in 2005. After Tsunami off Sumatra and Indian Ocean in December 2004, incidence ofpiracy has declined which is reflected in the figures in Table 1. It was analyzed that pirates
themselves were hit by tsunami and could not act. Moreover pirates are afraid of relief ships
which led them to be cautious. However, they have started to be active again because economy
has recovered from Tsunami damage and ships which are targets of piracy have resumed theirvoyage. There is therefore no room for complacency on piracy.
Why are there so many pirates in the region? According to Yoshihiko Yamada of the
Nippon Foundation, when the Kingdom of Malacca became a colony of Portugal in 1511,
Malaccans resisting the colonization fled to islands on the Indonesian side and earned theirliving by fishing. However, seeking more income in addition to fishing and sometimes as
resistance to imperial powers, they became pirates. ２９Pirates have aimed at cargoes and ships themselves in the past. The ships seized havebeen repainted in unpopulated harbors and their names are changed, after which they are usedin acts of piracy. Cargoes are sold on the black market. Petroleum products, particularly refinedgasoline and kerosene, which have high added value, have been specific targets of piracy.
Recently although sea robbery remains to be the most common type of attack, pirates are
increasingly going after kidnap‐for‐ransom. Thus, it is a recent trend to hijack smaller vessels
rather than larger vessels. Since pirates are after ransom, they attack smaller tankers and tug
boats which are slow in their speeds and easier to board and seize than larger boats.
The trigger for regional cooperation against piracy in East Asia was the Alondra Rainbow
incident. This Panama‐registered ship was owned by Imura Kisen in Imabari City, Ehime
Prefecture, Japan. When attacked by pirates in October 1999, the boat was on loan to Tokyo
Senpaku and manned by a Japanese captain and chief engineer and fifteen Filipino crewmen. On
October 22 1999, the ship loaded 7000 tons of aluminum ingots at an Indonesian port anddeparted for Miike port in Fukuoka Prefecture. However, soon after its departure from Indonesia,
contact with the ship was lost. It was attacked by pirates in the Straits of Malacca and the entire
43

crew was forced to board another ship. The Alondra Rainbow was taken to Sarawak, Malaysia,
repainted and given the new name of Global Venture; it was later seized by the Indian coast
guard. The search for the ship and the investigation of the case involved eight countries, clearly
indicating that regional cooperation is absolutely necessary for countering piracy. For example,
when a vessel is in Indonesia’s jurisdiction, the Malaysian authorities cannot pursue it and viceversa, which impedes the pursuit and arrest of pirates. Action against piracy clearly requires
transnational cooperation to be effective and efficient.
Given the need of regional cooperation to deter and respond to piracy, the late JapanesePrime Minister Keizo Obuchi thus proposed an international conference to combat piracy in theregion at the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting on November 28, 1999. In April 2000 his proposal was
realized. Japan hosted the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships involving coast guard agencies and maritime policy authorities in East Asia. The
conference produced an outline of piracy measures for Asian countries to forge partnerships in
implementing. Since then Asia Regional Experts’ Meeting on Piracy has been held every year.
Sovereignty and different national priorities have, however, been obstacles to cooperation,
not allowing “hot pursuit.” In the case of the Idaten, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore havebeen conducting a joint patrol, but the three countries did not share the information that thevessel used by the pirates was a stolen boat. Collaboration after the attack was also reported as
insufficient, due to the complexity of territorial issues in the straits. As it involves sovereignty of
the littoral states, the dispatch of coast guard vessels is decided by each county.
In November 2004 ASEAN, China, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Japan negotiated theRegional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia, which, once ratified, will be a legal framework for regional cooperation. An information
center has also been established in Singapore for sharing of information on piracy. Functional
cooperation is thus already underway against piracy. It is worth noting that anti‐piracy measures
are being promoted not by naval cooperation but by coast guards. Countries that do not possess
coast guards are creating them, as in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Anti‐piracy cooperation,
however, faces the challenge of surmounting the question of jurisdiction among countries in theregion which prevents pursuit and other effective control measures. Pirates are transnational intheir activities and control measures must therefore also be transnational. However, police
agencies and coast guards cannot exercise their powers beyond national borders. Pirates aretaking advantage of these limitations and are escaping.
In addition to piracy there are other potential threats on the sea, including terrorism.
East Asia needs to develop a scheme whereby maritime security including sea lanes ofcommunication (SLOCs) can be ensured without infringing sovereignty and jurisdictional limits.
Maritime security is so closely tied to economic and energy security of East Asia as described in
the following section. Sea lanes of communication constitute the lifeline of East Asian economies
reliant on energy from other regions and on exports to others.

44Energy Cooperation
The need to secure an energy supply has at times acted as a causative factor of war. The
pursuit of oil resources was one of the reasons for Japan’s expansion into Asia and attack on the
Allied powers more than half a century ago. Following the occupation of southern Indochina by
Japanese troops in June 1941, the US, the UK and the Netherlands froze Japanese assets, ensuringthat the nation, which does not possess significant indigenous oil resources, was unable topurchase oil. Japan therefore made plans to gain access to oil resources in Southeast Asia,
leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the seizing of Indonesian oil fields owned by the Dutch
East India Company by Japanese paratroop units. Energy has therefore been directly related tosecurity.
In hindsight, functional cooperation on energy in the form of the creation of the European
Coal and Steel Community after World War II was the commencement of the process ofEuropean integration. The intention behind this initiative was to prevent a third world war bycontrolling coal and steel, which are essential materials for warfare. Energy security was themain agenda during the oil crisis in 1970s, and has once again emerged as a common topic in theregion in the twenty‐first century, against a background of spiraling oil prices. Energy has been
politicized. Some resource rich countries have opted to limit FDI and to nationalize energy
related companies. Some buyers on the other hand have opted to buy up resources overseas.
Energy security has two facets; at the macro level energy security means competition for natural
fossil fuels and is a national security issue with geopolitical and geo‐economic aspects, as
demonstrated by the fact that energy supply can be a factor in causing war and territorial
disputes. At the micro‐level, energy security is a question of how energy supply is secured,
including sea lane security. At the latter level, energy cooperation has been explored since the1990s in Asia, in particular in Northeast Asia. This is due to the fact that energy demand in Asia
has increased significantly due to the phenomenal economic growth of the region. Some former
oil exporters, including China, have become oil importers. Since the 1990s, proposals have been
made for the creation of a Northeast Asian Energy Community, in which resource‐rich countries
like Russia and the Central Asian states and resource‐poor but financially rich andtechnologically advanced countries like Japan and Korea cooperate in a variety of ways,
including the construction of oil and gas pipelines. Energy cooperation has long been identified
as the most promising form of functional cooperation for the region since 1990s, but the
proposals have remained at the stage of discussion. This is because of low crude oil prices in thepast 15 years and competition between oil consuming countries over bilateral trade with oil
producing countries, a situation that has not been conducive to multilateral cooperation in oil
and gas import.
Both the EAVG and the EASG also recommended functional cooperation on energy within
the framework of ASEAN+3. The ASEAN+3 Energy Ministers’ Meeting has been held since 2004.
APEC also organized a working group on energy cooperation and has promoted dialogues
among member countries. With higher oil prices, the oil demand and supply situation in theregion is making energy cooperation more mutually beneficial than ever.
45

Figure 3: Trend of World Primary Energy Consumption

Mtoe
18000

16487
16000

East Asia

14000

World

14404

12194
12000
10579
9951
10000
8628
8000

7156
5458

6000

4684
3936
4000

3158
2343

2679

1716

2000

1169
506

0
1971

1980

1990

2000

2003

2010

2020

2030

Year

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005 Edition , Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005
Edition , and World Energy Outlook 2004
Note: East Asia in the projection of 2010, 2020 and 2030 includes Japan, Korea, China and the following countries according to the OECD's regional definition: Afghanistan,
Bhutan, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vietnam and Vanuatu.

Figure 4: Share of East Asia in World Primary Energy Consumption (2003)

China 13.48%
Japan 4.89%
Korea 1.94%
Indonesia 1.53%
Thailand 0.84%
Malaysia 0.54%
Vietnam 0.42%
the Philippines 0.40%
Singapore 0.21%
Myanmar 0.13%
Brunei 0.03%

others 75.63%

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2002-2003: 2005 Edition, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 20022003: 2005 Edition , and World Energy Outlook 2004

In addition to soaring energy prices, East Asia has more consumers than producers ofprimary energy. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the OECD, world
primary energy consumption will increase by 2.1 percent per annum from 2000 to 2030, as shownin Figure 3. Compared to figures for 1971, Asia’s primary energy consumption has increased
five‐fold while overall world consumption has increased only two‐fold. As shown in Figure 4,
46

Asia’s share of world energy consumption increased from 9.3 percent in 1971 to 24.4 percent in
2003, and is predicted to reach 28.4 percent in 2030. In terms of increase from 1971, Malaysia andThailand have increased their consumption by eight times, Indonesia and Korea by five times,
China by three times and Japan by two times. China now consumes more energy than Japan.
Excluding Japan the increase of primary energy consumption in East Asia due to economic
growth has been phenomenal, greater than that observed in any other region.
Particularly China’s oil consumption has grown due to its economic growth, its low
energy efficiency, increasing automobile ownership and surging petrochemical production. Since
1990 the number of automobiles registered in China has risen roughly twenty‐fold. China is thefastest growing automobile market in the world. With five million car sales in 2004, it is alreadythe world’s third largest car market, and The Economist predicts that it will become the largest
between 2010 and 2015.

Almost all of China’s automobiles will use oil‐based fuels, andvirtually all of the oil required will come from imports. China’s oil consumption passed Japan’sin 2002, and the nation became the second largest consumer in the world after the United States.
According to the IEA forecast, Chinese oil imports will grow from the current 2 million barrels a
day to 10 million barrels a day in 2030. Although China is still the world’s fifth largest oil
producer, continuing to draw on large fields in the northeast, such as Daqing, environmental
and infrastructural problems and the nation’s reluctance to offer incentives for foreign
investment in oil development make it unlikely that China will produce significantly more oil in
future. In addition, again according to IEA statistics, East Asia’s intraregional oil production in2002 was 308 million tons, which represents only 8.4 percent of the world total. It is predictedthat other oil producing nations in the region, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, will reduce
production from 2010 unless they discover new reserves. Indonesia has not conducted new oil
exploration, and had to reduce its gasoline supply by 5 percent in 2005. Declining oil reserves arealso affecting electricity supply in the country.
This imbalance between demand and supply of oil in East Asia may become an Achilles’
heel for economic development and stability of the region. Moreover, East Asia depends heavily
on Middle Eastern oil. According to IEA data, dependence on Middle Eastern oil in 2003 was 87.1
percent for Japan, 79.8 percent for Korea, and 50.9 percent for China. Oil stockpiling is notwell‐developed in East Asia, and if supply from the Middle East should be disrupted for somereason, it may have a major effect on economic activity in the region. In addition, the oil importroute from the Middle East involves a long and dangerous sea route termed an “arc of
instability,” including the Strait of Malacca.
Thus, demand for oil in East Asia is growing and intra‐regional supply is on the decline,
and this may lead to competition over drilling rights for oil and gas, including offshore rights.
The Sino‐Japanese dispute in the East China Sea is one such example. In East Asia, a shortage or
disruption of oil supply would undermine energy security both at the macro and micro level.
East Asia has numerous reasons to identify common interests and promote functional
cooperation in the area of energy.
First and foremost, stable energy supply should be achieved not by competition but by47

cooperation. An oil pipeline from Russia to East Asia, in particular to China, South Korea andJapan, would be an option to consider. It is reported when Russia develops untapped oil and gas
resources particularly in its Far East, the world supply and demand would improve. The region
must also work on geographical diversification of its energy supply. Meanwhile, the region must
make collective efforts to secure sea lanes for the transportation of oil, given its high level ofreliance on Middle Eastern oil.
Secondly the region should also seek improved energy efficiency. Improvement in energy
efficiency is said to be worth a major discovery of a reservoir. China has already implemented
efforts to better energy efficiency. In 1993, China’s energy efficiency was one‐twentieth Japan’s,
but that figure has now been reduced to one‐seventh. In July 2005, China began to introduce
automobile fuel efficiency standards that require new cars to achieve up to two miles more per
gallon. The introduction of a fuel tax is also being considered in China. The nation has also
started to work on the achievement of increased energy efficiency in industry. It is claimed that
increased energy efficiency can reduce consumption in China by 30‐40 percent. Japanesecompanies have started their cooperation to China for example in steel making to improve theirenergy efficiency.
Thirdly, the development of an oil stockpile that can be used in case of emergency bycreating an Asian version of IEA has been proposed. East Asia must diversify its energy supply
towards nuclear power, hydroelectric power and natural gas. There is currently no natural gas
pipeline in the region. Supply of gas by pipeline to Japan, Korea and China from the abundantreserves in Eastern Siberia has been proposed. ３０ This long‐standing proposal now has a greater
economic incentive than ever, given the higher prices of oil. Such transnational pipeline will
have significance not only for energy supply but also for regional security.
Fourthly, the region should also attempt to develop new, alternative and renewableenergies such as nuclear power, solar power, wind power, bio‐fuel etc. Collective development
projects and sharing of information would prevent the duplication of effort in this area.
Numerous regional energy initiatives have been proposed or are currently underway;
ASEAN+3 has launched ASEAN+3 Ministers on Energy Meeting since 2004 with one of theASEAN countries serves as co‐chair in alphabetical order and one of the +3 countries serves as
co‐chair. ASEAN+3 SOM has also launched an annual meeting on energy in 2002 by the Japan’s
proposal to discuss common issues. They have also created Biomass‐Asia Workshop which is anannual event involving Asian countries which use biomass. East Asia would benefit fromcombining these initiatives under a regional framework. Regional cooperation should be linked
to global initiatives, including the Joint Oil Data initiative, in which many Asian countries are
participating. Functional cooperation on energy can offer visible benefits for participants andhas a potential for a good model case for cooperation when designed well. With skyrocketing oil
prices, energy cooperation is more promising than the preceding decade.
Environment Cooperation
The other side of the coin of energy consumption is pollution which is transboundary in48

nature, including global warming and climate change caused by carbon dioxide (CO 2) and othergreenhouse gases. The depletion of biodiversity and the issue of disposal of hazardous materials
also represent environmental problems. Because pollution spreads via air and water, its impact
is not contained by national borders but extends to neighboring countries and entire regions.
Environmental issues thus demand collective measures. Given East Asia’s phenomenal economic
growth, balancing environmental protection and economic growth is an increasingly important
policy agenda. Environmental issues must be approached by global measures but be augmented
by regional measures particularly in East Asia.
The region’s reliance on coal has, for example, produced sulfur dioxide emission causingacid rain, air pollution and smog. China’s increasing coal consumption has increased the load on
the environment which has generated numerous problems for neighboring countries. East Asia
needs to coordinate its environmental policies, take collective steps and establish common
environmental standards to mitigate the problem of pollution in the region.
Being aware that environmental issues have at times led to regional disputes, the EAVG
proposed “the establishment of a comprehensive East Asian environmental cooperative bodywhich includes a dispute settlement mechanism and a regional environmental database” ３１ andalso that “an East Asian Environment Ministers’ Meeting be organized periodically for thecoordination of regional environmental projects.” ３２

While the former has yet to be

implemented, the latter proposal has already been realized. ASEAN+3 Environment Ministers’Meeting was launched in 2002 by the proposal of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on theEnvironment which has been meeting since 1981. The meeting has identified ten priority areas;
namely (1) global environment, (2) forest fires and cross‐border haze, (3) coastal and marine
environment, (4) sustainable forest management, (5) sustainable management of natural parks
and reserves, (6) freshwater resources, (7) environmental education, (7) promotion ofenvironmentally

suitabletechnology

andcleaner

production,

(9)

urban

environment

management and governance, and (10) harmonized monitoring, reporting and database forsustainable development. In addition, the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among
Japan, China and Korea (TEMM) has been held since 2000.
Although these inter‐governmental meetings have not yet produced a joint projects,
awareness of the importance of environmental conservation has increased in East Asia,
prompting the region to work on the reduction of air pollution in particular. With consumptionof fossil fuels projected to increase in future, it will be essential to enhance environmental
standards. As air pollution and acid rain influence health in the short term, the incentives for
adopting the necessary measures are clear, and East Asian nations have already started to
introduce, de‐NO X and de‐SO X equipment.
The effects of global warming, by contrast, are generated over the long term. The
phenomena of desertification and climate change associated with global warming occur so
gradually that they do not motivate actors to take immediate countermeasures. However, CO 2
emissions in East Asia are certainly increasing, and action needs to be taken now to avoid futureenvironmental problems.
49

Figure 5: Trend of World Energy -related CO2 Emissions
MT of CO2

45000
40000

38214

East Asia

35000

33226

World

30000

27817
25597
23906

25000
21324
18659

20000
15000

14662
11829
9771

10000

6898

5798
5000

1827

2833

7659

4273

0
1971

1980

1990

2000

2003

2010

2020

2030

Year

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 1971-2003: 2005 Edition and World Energy Outlook 2004
Note: East Asia in the projection of 2010, 2020 and 2030 includes Japan, Korea, China and the following countries according to the OECD's regional definition:
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar,
New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Vietnam and Vanuatu.

As shown in Figure 5, worldwide energy‐related CO 2 emissions increased approximately
2.5‐fold from 1971 to 2003 while CO 2 emissions in East Asia increased approximately six‐folddue to the region’s high consumption of coal. East Asia’s CO 2 emissions represented 12.5 percentof the world total in 1971, but this figure had increased to 27 percent in 2003.
CO 2 emissions increased approximately 1.5‐fold in Japan, four‐fold in China, five‐fold in
Vietnam, eight‐fold in South Korea and Singapore, ten‐fold in Malaysia and Thailand andtwelve‐fold in Indonesia. It is clear that East Asia must reduce its carbon dioxide emissions tohalt any further degradation of the environment.
The Kyoto Protocol took effect in February 2005. The Protocol was an epoch‐making step
towards mitigating global warming. However, it entails problems. Major CO 2 emitters like theUnited States and China have not ratified the Protocol. Moreover, the Protocol does not oblige
developing countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. Emissions by the countries thathave committed to the Protocol represent only 30 percent of world total CO 2 emissions. Even
when these countries reduce their emissions as required by the Protocol, it will only reduceworld emissions by two percent. This will represent only a marginal improvement.
The Kyoto Protocol provides for three measures to supplement emission reduction efforts
and to achieve reduction targets, namely Joint Implementation, the Clean Development
Mechanism and emissions trading. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers thepossibility of regional cooperation. If East Asia utilizes the CDM and developed countries in theregion cooperate with developing countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, itwould lead to further transfer of environmental technology. Developed countries in return50

would receive CO 2 emission credits that could be used towards the achievement of numericaltargets required by the Kyoto Protocol. As an illustration, if Japan implemented a CDM projectin China, in addition to Japan receiving credit, Chinese emissions of greenhouse gases would be
reduced, thus reducing air pollution. The benefits are mutual.
CDM is a mechanism enabling environmental problems to be ameliorated as economic
development is promoted. However, CDM procedures are cumbersome, and only few projects
have to date been approved. Cooperation will be required to increase the user‐friendliness ofCDM. If more countries can effectively use CDM in global warming measures, it would have apositive influence on post‐Kyoto Protocol framework consultations.
Regional cooperation on the environment in East Asia has mainly been limited toconferences as described above. Moreover, actual cooperation is still at the level of bilateral or
sub‐regional cooperation. Japan for example has concluded a bilateral Agreement of
Cooperation for Environmental Protection with China in 1994 and Japan‐China Environmental
Cooperation for Twenty‐first Century in 1997. The latter has led to action such as to rebuild
model cities for environmental protection namely Chong Quing, Dalian and Guiyang and tobuild a computer network to gather and disseminate environment‐related information.
Southeast Asia has suffered from haze due to forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, leading to
a Southeast Asian action plan on transnational haze pollution And the introduction of regional
monitoring and emergency measures on forest fires.
The Asia‐Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, ３３ involving Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States, is also underway. This was originallyproposed by President Bush to substitute for US non‐ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. This
Partnership involves voluntary practical measures taken by these six countries in the Asia‐Pacificregion to create new investment opportunities, build local capacity and reduce barriers to theintroduction of clean, more efficient technologies. .
Yellow dust is another transboundary pollutant from China, reaching Korea and Japan.
In future, these bilateral and sub‐regional or voluntary environmental initiatives should be
developed into a combined regional framework for environmental cooperation. With post‐Kyoto
Protocol frameworks being considered, it is essential to establish measures for incentives fordeveloping countries to take part in environmental conservation efforts. Environmental issues
should be approached collectively and have the potential to enable viable regional functional
cooperation like in the case of energy cooperation.
Functional Cooperation leading to Functional Integration?
Will these initiatives for functional cooperation on terrorism, energy, environment, piracy
and infectious disease lead to the functional integration of East Asia? Will functional cooperation
lead to functional integration? As described in the preceding section, it seems the region isheading for multiple overlapping schemes for functional cooperation sometimes involving
different members. Skeptics regarding East Asian community building argue that functional
cooperation will not lead to regional community unless the region comes to embrace a common
51vision and values. Nonetheless, it is too early to indicate that functional cooperation will notlead to integration of any sort in East Asia. If East Asia develops a sense of regional partnership
through functional cooperation, it is plausible that the region will express a common politicalwill. Regional collective measures in functional areas would certainly contribute to global issues
as well. For example, against a backdrop of soaring energy prices and increased demand, East
Asia may have more opportunities to influence global energy policy by acting as a region.
East Asia still has flashpoints and is not likely to create a politico‐security community with
substantive unit of power at any time soon. It is impossible for East Asia to substitute the hub
and spoke bilateral alliance architecture with a community, but it can supplement web of alliancestructures. Functional cooperation on political and security would focus mainly on
non‐traditional security issues while the region embraces hard security issues. The purpose ofsuch cooperation would thus be to mitigate political confrontation and to enhance stability inEast Asia, that is, to keep the peace. Whether political and security cooperation in East Asia
leads to community building depends on the region’s future efforts. Very skillful architects are
required to promote political and security cooperation in the region.
This cooperation also needs eventually to be buttressed by common values and visions.
The Policy Report of the CEAC in 2005 states that “ The Community’s ideals must envisage
mutual security within a security community (no‐war community), promote prosperity founded
on a balance between economic competition and cooperation and ensure a community of
progress dedicated to such values as freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.” ３４
Linking East Asia Community with the United States
Promotion of the East Asian community concept has to be considered in terms of its
implications for Japan’s relations with the United States, which represent the basic pillar ofJapanese diplomacy. The alliance was the only realistic security option for Japan during the Cold
War, considering the threat emanating from the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War andthe collapse of the Soviet Union, the necessity for the Japan‐US alliance was questioned. A rapeincident involving American soldiers in Okinawa in June 1995 posed a further question on theneed of the US troops in Japan. However, with the test launch of Nodon missiles by North Korea
and with the Joint Declaration on Japan US security, the alliance has gained new momentum andhas been strengthened. The Japanese government released the new National Defense Planning
Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2004 based on the recommendations of the Council on Security
and Defense Capabilities, the so‐called Araki report. The NDPG stated that the objectives ofJapanese security policy is to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to reduce thechances of any threat arising in various parts of the world in order to prevent it from reaching
Japan. The Guidelines stated that Japan will achieve these objectives through its own defense
preparedness, its alliance with the United States and cooperation with the international
community. Thus, the Japanese government envisions the Japan‐US alliance as a foundation ofits security and defense policy. On its part, the United States has deployed 100,000 troops in the
Far East and 45,000 troops in Japan as a forward deployment. This forward deployment is now
52being reviewed as a part of a transformation of the global deployment of US forces. The alliancehas been serving two purposes; one is defense of Japan and the other is the peace and stability ofAsia‐Pacific. In the Joint Statement of United‐States‐Japan Security Consultative Committee,
so‐called 2+2, issued on May 1, 2006 confirmed this point by stating that “The U.S.‐Japan
Alliance … is the indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the
Asia‐Pacific region.” It also stated that realignment “will lead to a new phase in alliancecooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region.” ３５Some in the United States have argued that the East Asian community concept is aframework to exclude the United States from Asia and an attempt by China to lead regional
integration. In Japan many argue strongly that the presence of the United States is essential forthe stability of East Asia and a community concept without the United Sates is simply laughable.
Others argue that Japan is overly reliant on the United States, and that the creation of regional
communities such as the EU and NAFTA is the trend of the times.
Certainly the United States has been an important market for East Asian countries, whichhave depended on export‐led economic growth. Even in the post‐Cold War and post‐post Cold
War eras, the United States is the stabilizer of a security environment which continues to be
uncertain and unpredictable. As mentioned above, there is an argument to the effect that theJapan‐US alliance should be further enhanced rather than instituting security cooperation in theregion. ３６ The argument should not be a simple discussion of whether to exclude or include theUnited States. One should remember that Europe has the EU for its regional economy and NATOfor its security, the latter of which surely include the United States. Likewise, the regional
economy and security in East Asia should be considered in a flexible manner. East Asia requires
the presence and engagement of the United States. Simultaneously, the alliance network should
not negate functional cooperation in East Asia and in this respect also the United States would incertain areas be an essential partner of East Asian functional cooperation. This approach from
East Asia would help to keep the United States engaged in multilateralism in Asia despite its
orientation towards unilateralism and isolationism.
At the same time, an East Asia community should be an open one. There are otherregional frameworks such as APEC and the ARF. Regional cooperation in East Asia should belinked to these Asia Pacific institutions. In so doing it would be essential to revitalize these
existing regional institutions. The ARF has been in a stalemate, and should be rehabilitated sothat it can be linked to East Asian efforts. This would be the best way to link East Asia and theUnited States. An active linkage would benefit both. It is incumbent upon the United States andEast Asia to revitalize these existing institutions in exploring functional cooperation.
In Concluding
East Asian linkages are still less institutionalized. Yet transboundary non‐traditional
security issues introduced in this Chapter, from counter‐terrorism, piracy, energy toenvironment demands the region to work collectively for their individual and regional benefits.
The region’s emerging connections have, however, hardly displaced national interest and53

national identity if not nationalism. The region has lacked motivations and incentives for ties
across the region. National pull has overwhelmed regional pull. National sentiments remainconspicuously strong. It appears that the achievement of a political and security community inEast Asia represents a more difficult goal than the achievement of an economic community. It
has been argued that the politico‐security area is the Achilles heel of an East Asian community
concept. ３７ In this there is a consensus among commentators, no matter what their position
regarding East Asian community building is.
However, for the peace, stability and prosperity of East Asia, proactive efforts should not
be limited to economic regional integration or regional free trade areas, but should aim at an
eventual comprehensive community or partnership including political and security areas.
ASEAN proposed a Security Community of its own in October 2003 at the time of the ASEAN
Summit. A road map for building a security community is being discussed, but the road hasturned out to be rocky, as exemplified by the aborted agreement for creating peacekeeping forcesin ASEAN. Such efforts should not be limited to Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia should also
work on its own regionalism to balance East Asia perhaps as an extension of Six‐party talks on
North Korean nuclear development to non‐traditional security issues. Energy and environment
cooperation introduced in this Chapter has attracted numerous proposals for sub‐regional
cooperation in Northeast Asia. Security and economy are linked. Peace enhances economic
growth and stability and vice versa. Instead of declaring an East Asian politico‐security
community impossible, functional cooperation on non‐traditional security issues should begiven a chance. Meanwhile, we should explore whether we can extend functional cooperation tocommunity building, with the political objective of creating a community without war. This
would produce by‐products. The vision making would compel Japan and countries in East Asia
to conceive their respective Asia policies. When the immediate Korean Peninsula and Taiwan
Strait issues are settled, an opportunity will emerge to create a collective security community inEast Asia. Functional cooperation can at least pave the ground for such discussion to take placewhen time comes. Furthermore, multilateralism can sometimes ease bilateral frictions andtensions by offering venue for bilateral contacts.
The achievement of a community without war can be a strong common vision for East Asia.
None in the region can disagree to a vision of this sort. Despite many obstacles, it might beworth while to cerate the backbone of an East Asian community by examining the limits andpotential of political and security cooperation in East Asia. Functional cooperation on
non‐traditional security threats introduced in this Chapter can offer experiences for regional
co untries to harvest merits of working together.

54

Session II:“An East Asian Community and the United States”

Mr. Ralph COSSA
President, The Pacific Forum CSIS

East Asian Community and the United States: U.S. View‐‐ One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
In the past 12 months, there has been a great deal of movement surrounding the effort toestablish an East Asia community. I hasten to add, however, that “movement” does notnecessarily or always mean progress.

Not all the movement has been in the forward direction.

Some has been sideways, some even backwards. While it would be unkind to describe theprocess as “one step forward, two steps back,” there certainly has not been any “great leap
forward” either.
The one step forward was the convening of the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) in
Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 and the efforts since then to develop the principles andmodalities that will define the future role and mission of this new multilateral gathering. But, as
continued disputes and confusion over its composition, direction, and relationship to both
broader and more selective existing mechanisms reveal, East Asia community‐building still has along way to go. It is also clear to this author that the EAS will not provide the foundation of an
East Asia community, but rather is more likely to serve as a broader‐based endorsement orvalidation mechanism for a companion East Asian‐only effort. In this respect, the EAS may prove
to be one step backwards rather than toward the establishment of an East Asian community.
Meanwhile, it remains difficult to discuss U.S. attitudes toward East Asia regionalism or
the development of an East Asian community since an East Asian community has yet to really be
defined – much less credibly emerge. Generally speaking, the United States has been an active
partner in many of the institution‐building and/or community‐building efforts that haveemerged in East Asia during the post‐Cold War era, including the two preeminent Asia‐Pacificmultilateral organizations, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “gathering of
economies” which includes (at U.S. instigation) an annual “Leaders Meeting,” and the
security‐oriented, ministerial‐level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
In recent years (unlike the early 1990s), Washington has been generally supportive of –or at least not actively opposed to – even those multilateral organizations in which it was not amember, such as ASEAN Plus Three (A+3), which is comprised of the ten ASEAN countries
55

(Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam) plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. In fact, the Bush administration,
despite its (sometimes‐deserved) reputation for unilateralism elsewhere, has been particularly
supportive of East Asian and broader Asia‐Pacific multilateralism.
Bush administration attitudes may be changing, however. At a minimum, serious
questions are now being raised regarding the nature, intent, and future direction of East Asia
community‐building in general and the EAS in particular, and about the motivation of some ofits key proponents. As noted at this gathering last year, one lingering question, at least from an
American perspective, is the extent of U.S. involvement in East Asia community‐building;should Washington be included as a member, or as an observer, or not at all, in this evolving East
Asia community?

Arguments can be made both pro and con. How and why Washington is

excluded could be as important as whether or not it is invited to participate.
When it comes to the EAS, it is not clear if Washington even desires a seat at the table –getting President Bush to two Asian summits in any given year, especially if scheduled only a
few months apart, would be no mean feat, not to mention the problem of bringing President
Bush into direct contact with the leader of Myanmar, whose legitimacy Washington does notrecognize. Nonetheless, the Bush administration has made it clear that it is interested in learning
more about the composition of the group, the criteria for membership, and most importantly(and still largely undefined) its mission, objectives, and priorities.
To date, the Bush administration has not rejected some form of U.S. involvement in the
EAS. Last year, in the run‐up to the inaugural EAS, I raised a number of questions regarding thenature and intent of the EAS and the broader East Asia community‐building effort. In this paper,
I will revive those questions and provide answers where possible, while highlighting new andremaining questions which still preclude determination of a definitive U.S. position.
Before looking at more recent events, it is helpful to remember how we got to where weare today. As a result, I will first review Washington’s evolving attitude toward multilateral
cooperation and regionalism in East Asia, to ascertain what kind of ultimate response one
should expect from the United States regarding regional attempts to further develop an East
Asian community – with or without Washington’s direct participation. I will provide an
American perspective, not the American perspective. This paper represents my personal views,
while merely speculating about the evolving and future views of the U.S. government, which
remains generally circumspect on the subject.
In the final analysis, much will depend on who leads the East Asian community. WillASEAN remain in the driver’s seat? If so, can 10 drivers steer a steady course? If not, who will
emerge? As the real economic giant in East Asia, one could argue that leadership should go to
Japan. Ironically, a decade ago, when others in the region seemed prepared to accept Japan as theso‐called “lead goose,” Japan was hesitant to assume this role. Today, Tokyo seems more willingto take a leadership role (although this remains debatable). However, “history” issues, many
self‐inflicted, have made it difficult for Japan to emerge from the shadow of its own past, even as56

it seems to be entering into the shadow of the region’s emerging new giant, China. Will China be
the presumptive or defacto leader of this new East Asia Community? If so, will that leadershipbe benign or will it be aimed – or be perceived by the U.S. as being aimed – at limiting or
replacing Washington’s (and Tokyo’s) influence in the region.
It is also important at the onset to put East Asia regionalism into context. No one seems
to be promoting or anticipating a European Union‐type arrangement. Attempts by Indonesia
over the past few years to bind ASEAN more closely together, through the establishment of an
ASEAN Community (comprised of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic
Community, and an ASEAN Socio‐Cultural Community) have shown just how difficult it is to
get these nations – some of which have been closely aligned for over 30 years – to think and act
as one, especially in the security arena. Developing a lowest common denominator for security
cooperation among these ten diverse nations is difficult enough; imagine adding China andJapan to the mix (much less one or both Koreas). If current established multilateralcommunity‐building mechanisms, such as the ASEAN, A+3, the ARF, and APEC are any
indication of the willingness of East Asian nations (regardless of how the term is defined) toseriously address issues of regional governance (and the “interference in one another’s internalaffairs” that true regional governance requires), one should not expect much progress soon.
Most importantly, from a U.S. perspective, will be how an East Asian community relates
to the region’s other multilateral organizations and initiatives – both institutionalize (like the
ARF and APEC) and ad hoc (like the Six‐Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative). Its
relationship to the ARF and APEC in particular will be part of what Assistant Secretary of State
Christopher Hill has referred to as the “Pan‐Asianism vs. Pan‐Pacificism” debate. Another key
factor affecting Washington’s attitude will be the willingness (or lack thereof) of emerging East
Asia mechanisms to adopt global norms, especially in the areas of counter‐terrorism andcounter‐proliferation and the promotion of free and open markets. Will the new East Asia
community reinforce existing multilateral efforts to accomplish these goals or dilute them? Will
it help the states of the region to more effectively address growing transnational challenges . . .
or provide another excuse for avoiding such efforts? These questions and some preliminary
answers will be explored in this paper.

Background
During the Cold War and immediate post‐Cold War era, Washington’s leaders (and mostother regional policy‐makers) viewed the idea of institutionalized East Asia multilateral security
cooperation with a great deal of apprehension and suspicion. In 1991, when then‐JapaneseForeign Minister Nakayama suggested at an ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Conference (PMC)
gathering that a forum be established to discuss regional security issues, his remarks were notwell‐received. The U.S., under President George H.W. Bush, was particularly cool to such an idea.
More comfortable with a one‐on‐one approach to security issues in Asia, U.S. officials at the time
were hesitant to embrace multilateral approaches to addressing security concerns.
As the Cold War faded into history, however, there has been a decided shift in regional
57

attitudes toward, and U.S. support for, multinational security initiatives in Asia. On the U.S. side,
the first clear signal of this shift came in 1993 when then‐Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord identified “a commitment to enhanced multilateral
security dialogue” as one of the incoming Clinton Administrationʹs ten priority policy goals forAsia.
Of equal importance, voices were concurrently being raised within ASEAN calling forthe introduction of security‐related issues into PMC deliberations. One significant example
occurred at the 1992 ASEAN PMC in Manila when a joint statement was issued calling for thepeaceful settlement of territorial disputes involving the Spratly Islands (claimed in whole by
China and Taiwan and in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam). While ASEAN
had been in existence since 1967, it had historically been reluctant to delve into security matters,even amongst its own members, much less with its external dialogue partners.
Regional non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) were also calling for greater
multilateral security dialogue both at the official and NGO level. In 1991‐92, the Honolulu‐based
Pacific Forum CSIS joined forces with the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, the Japan
Institute for International Affairs, and ASEAN ISIS ‐‐ a loose coalition of Southeast Asian
institutes focusing on Asian security and international studies ‐‐ to promote formalized
track‐two (non‐governmental) and official security dialogue. Their leadership led to theestablishment in late 1992/1993 of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP), an NGO focused on multilateral security dialogue and regional confidence building.
The CSCAP founding statement also strongly endorsed the creation of official security dialoguemechanisms.
President Clinton added the icing to the cake in July 1993 when he firmly embraced theconcept of multilateral security dialogue in Asia, calling it one of the four pillars of his vision fora ʺnew Pacific community.ʺ This change in attitude was solidified at the 1993 ASEAN PMC
meeting when the PMC dialogue partners met informally over lunch with representatives from
China, Russia, Vietnam (which was not yet a member of ASEAN), and other PMC observers, totalk about security matters. The group decided that they would reconvene the following year in
the precedent‐setting ASEAN Regional Forum.
President Clinton also proposed and then in the fall of 1993 served as the first host ofwhat has now become an annual APEC Leaders’ Meeting. (APEC itself dates back to 1989.) Whilefocused on broader regional trade issues, this gathering of the region’s heads of state quickly
took on a political and at least quasi‐security role, just by its mere existence. This was thenfollowed by the July 1994 inaugural meeting of the ARF in Bangkok, which again provided aclear signal that attitudes regarding multilateral security dialogue were changing, both in the
United States and throughout Asia.
While instituted during the Clinton era, both the ARF and the APEC Leaders Meeting
have thus far enjoyed strong support from the current U.S. administration as well, witness
President George W. Bush’s willingness to attend the October 2001 Shanghai APEC meeting in
the immediate wake of September 11 th and the presence of Secretary of State Colin Powell at all
58

four ARF meetings held during his tenure in office (something neither of his predecessors could
claim).
While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (deservedly) received widespread criticism
for missing her first ARF meeting in July 2005 – she was ably represented by her Asia‐oriented
deputy, Robert Zoellick – Washington has reaffirmed its commitment to the ARF several times
since then and has sent strong assurances that Dr. Rice will be at the 2006 meeting in Malaysia.
The Bush administration’s early support for East Asian multilateralism was reinforcedin the White House’s September 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States of America(NSS) which expressed the conviction that “multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of
freedom‐loving nations” and further stated that the U.S. would build upon the stability provided
by institutions such as ASEAN and APEC “to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies
to manage change in this dynamic region.”
This was reinforced in the 2006 NSS. Consistent with its theme of promoting freedom
and democracy, it noted that existing institutions like the ARF and APEC can play a “vital role”
when it comes to “the spread of freedom, prosperity, and regional security.” It also noted that“new arrangements, such as the U.S.‐ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, or others that are focusedon problem‐solving and action, like the Six‐Party Talks and the PSI [Proliferation Security
Initiative], can likewise bring together Asian nations to address common challenges.”
In short, the Bush administration has renewed and reinvigorated U.S. interest in the
ARF and APEC and, against some initial regional resistance and criticism, insisted on amultilateral approach, under the Six‐Party Talks, for dealing with the North Korean nuclear
problem. On a somewhat more contentious note, it has also placed a great deal of importance on“ad hoc multilateralism” – the PSI, for example, serves as a primary vehicle in the U.S.‐led global
effort to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. How such “coalitions of thewilling” will interact with standing multilateral mechanisms, or for that matter with
Washington’s traditional bilateral alliances, has yet to be fully determined, however.
Pro‐Multilateralism, with Caveats.

As a general rule, Washington has historically viewed Asia

Pacific multilateral organizations as useful vehicles both for promoting greater political andeconomic cooperation and for enhancing regional security. This support for multilateral
institutions – in the Asia Pacific and globally – has one important caveat, however: No U.S.
administration, be it Republican or Democrat, is likely to allow such institutions to be seen as
substitutes for or as threats to U.S. bilateral alliances and other security arrangements.
This was clearly spelled out in the 2006 NSS: “Asian nations that share our values canjoin us in partnership to strengthen new democracies and promote democratic reforms
throughout the region. This institutional framework, however, must be built upon a foundationof sound bilateral relations with key states in the region.” Like the Clinton administration before
it, the Bush administration does not see bilateral and multilateral efforts as being in tension;
rather, they complement one another. As a general rule, East Asian multilateral organizations areseen as useful tools in pursuing U.S. national security objectives.
59During its first term in office, the George W. Bush administration was also cautiously
supportive of multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN Plus Three and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which do not include the U.S. In its second term, however, theBush administration is starting to cast a more watchful eye, especially on those organizations
established and/or dominated by China, to ensure that these do not represent efforts to diminish
Washington’s (or Tokyo’s) involvement or interests in the region.
This has been especially true since July 2005, when the Beijing (and Moscow)‐driven
SCO (which also involves four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan) called for the U.S. to set a date for the withdrawal of its forces from Central Asia
during a summit meeting in the Kazakhstan capital of Astana. The SCO proclamation called on
the U.S. and its coalition partners to “decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary
infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence” in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – at
the time, the U.S. had roughly 1,000 troops each at airfields in Karshi‐Khanabad in Uzbekistan
and Manas in Kyrgyzstan – “as the active military phase in the anti‐terror operation in
Afghanistan is nearing completion.”
By the end of that month, it became obvious that one of the hosts – Uzbekistan, which
had come under increasing criticism from the U.S. and the international community in general
for its harsh repression of protestors in Andijan in May – was not going to wait for the U.S. to set
its own deadline; on July 29, Uzbekistan gave Washington 180 days to vacate Karshi‐Khanabad.
While this no doubt reflects Uzbek President Islam Karimov displeasure over Washington’s
criticism of his dismal human rights record, it is doubtful it could have occurred without
Moscow and Beijing’s consent, if not active encouragement and support. As a result, this action
has raised serious questions about Beijing’s (and Moscow’s) motives, and resulted in a morewatchful eye being cast on exclusionary East Asia multilateralism.
While the U.S. is still not attempting to actively block or interfere with East Asia
regionalism efforts like the A+3 and SCO that exclude the U.S., it is closely monitoring their
future direction and carefully examining the motives of those who seek to guide them.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration continues to state its clear preference for “inclusive”
Asia‐Pacific regional efforts that include Washington, despite some of the inherent perceived
weaknesses.
A brief examination of Washington’s involvement in and attitude toward the region’s
two premier broader Asia‐Pacific community‐building organizations – the ARF and APEC – may
lend some insight into its view of East Asia regionalism in general.

The ARF: “Very, Very Useful” but Limited
The 25‐member ARF brings together foreign ministers from the ten ASEAN states plus
Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea,
Russia, South Korea, North Korea, New Zealand, and the United States, plus Pakistan (since2004) and most recently (2005) Timor‐Leste, for annual security‐oriented discussions. It received
broad support during the first four years of the George W. Bush administration, being described60

by then‐Secretary of State Powell as “very, very useful” after his first ARF meeting.
As noted earlier, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice missed her first opportunity toparticipate in the ARF when “scheduling conflicts” caused her to miss the July 2005 ministerial
in Vientiane. Laos; an omission that openly raised questions about Washington’s continued
commitment to East Asia regionalism and was deemed “unfortunate” by ASEAN leaders.
However, the presence of her deputy, Robert Zoellick (a highly respected old Asia hand) helped
to assuage these concerns. At a 10+1 side meeting with ASEAN ministers, Zoellick helped toinitiate a US‐ASEAN Enhanced Partnership proposal to deepen U.S. cooperation with the ten
Southeast Asian nations on a broad range of issues.
Various ARF study groups (called Inter‐sessional Support Groups or ISGs) haveprovided a vehicle for the U.S. to move the multilateral process along in areas important toWashington, such as preventive diplomacy, enhanced confidence building, counter‐proliferation,and maritime (including search and rescue) cooperation; all of which help promote greatertransparency and military‐to‐military cooperation. Most importantly, since Sept. 11, 2001, theARF has helped focus regional attention on, and has served as an important vehicle for practicalcooperating in, fighting terrorism.
At the ARF meeting in Jakarta in July 2004, the assembled ARF Ministers repeatedannual pledges to fight terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction through ARF
Statements on “Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism” and a“Statementon

Non‐Proliferation.”

They

also

confirmed

theirintentions

tofurther

institutionalize the ARF process through the establishment of “an ARF Unit” within the ASEAN
Secretariat to serve as a de facto ARF Secretariat, to assist “in carrying out the mandates outlinedin the paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair” and to support the Experts and Eminent
Persons Group.
Annual counter‐terrorism pledges were repeated at the 2005 ARF Meeting in Vientiane,
Laos in July 2005, with China and Brunei agreeing to host an Inter‐sessional Meeting onCounter‐Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The big news coming out of Vientiane was theannouncement that Myanmar would skip its turn, after Malaysia, to chair ASEAN (and hence theARF) in mid‐2006, thus avoiding a confrontation between ASEAN and Washington (among
others), who had pledged to send only low‐level representatives to any ARF meeting hosted by
Myanmar.
Generally speaking, the ARF seems well‐suited to serve as the consolidating andvalidating instrument behind many security initiatives proposed by governments and at
non‐official gatherings, and has become a useful vehicle in the war on terrorism. But, from a U.S.
perspective, its contribution to the regional security order remains somewhat constrained. For
example, Taiwan has not been permitted to participate and the PRC has insisted that ʺinternal
Chinese affairsʺ not be on the agenda, effectively blocking ARF discussion of cross‐Strait
tensions despite their obvious broad regional implications. The Chinese have even beenreluctant to address conflicting claims in the South China Sea at the ARF, insisting instead on
separate talks with ASEAN or with the other claimants on an individual basis.
61

Few expect the ARF to solve the region’s problems or even to move rapidly or
pro‐actively to undertake that mission. The agreement to ʺmove at a pace comfortable to allparticipantsʺ was aimed at tempering the desire of more Western‐oriented members for
immediate results in favor of the ʺevolutionaryʺ approach preferred by the ASEAN states, which
all too often seems to see the process as being as (or more) important as its eventual substantive
products. The Asian preference for ʺnoninterference in internal affairsʺ also has traditionallyplaced some important topics essentially off limits, although this may be changing (witness
ASEAN’s increased willingness to comment on Myanmar ’s domestic politics). Nonetheless, it
seems safe to assume that the evolution of the ARF from a confidence building measures ʺtalkshopʺ to a true preventive diplomacy mechanism (as called for in its 1995 Concept Paper) will bea long and difficult one.

APEC: Cautiously Testing the Security Waters
APEC is first and foremost a “gathering of regional economies” – it is not referred to as
a gathering of states or governments due to the presence in its ranks of Hong Kong and Taiwan.
It started out as an informal dialogue group, growing from an original 12 members (Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, thePhilippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) in 1989 to 15 in 1991 (with the additionof China., Hong Kong, and “Chinese Taipei”) to its current strength of 21, with the addition of
Mexico and Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), Peru, Russia, and Vietnam (1997).
Institutionalization began in February 1993, when the APEC Secretariat was established in
Singapore.
While primarily aimed at managing the effects of growing economic interdependence,
APEC has had an important political and security role as well, especially since the 1993 Seattle
meeting when President Clinton invited the APEC heads of state and government to the first ofwhat have now become regular annual Leaders’ Meetings designed to elevate the importance of
this economic gathering. The Leadersʹ Meetings have become an important vehicle for fostering
political relations in addition to raising the level of economic dialogue and putting pressure on
the regionʹs leaders (and especially the host state) to move the process forward.
APEC’s Evolving Political/Security Role.

The political and even strategic significance of the

Leaders’ Meetings was first underscored in Auckland in 1999, a gathering that was significant
more for what happened outside the APEC venue than inside the meeting. Security issues
dominated the side discussions and the talk in the corridors. Not the least of these was thegrowing (and well‐founded) concern over the deteriorating security situation in East Timor.
The Auckland meeting was fortuitous in that it provided an opportunity for regional leaders,
including President Clinton and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, to work out
arrangements for the Australian‐led multinational peacekeeping mission (INTERFET) that was
subsequently sent to East Timor. Obtaining on‐the‐spot Chinese approval of this effort, madepossible by Indonesia’s reluctant acceptance of the intervention, helped assure UN Security
62

Council authorization of the subsequent UN operation, the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). (It should be noted that neither ASEAN nor the ARF weremajor players in the East Timor crisis, demonstrating their limited utility as crisis response
mechanisms.) This remains the case today, with Malaysia alone among ASEAN providing
military assistance to Timor‐Leste in response to recent cries for help.
In similar fashion, APEC 2001 provided an important vehicle for President Bush to
explain Washington’s war on terrorism to his Asian colleagues and to garner their support. In
addition to the usual annual APEC Leaders’ Declaration, the assembled leaders also issued an
APEC Leaders’ Statement on Counter‐Terrorism ‐‐ the first political document to be issued in
APEC’s 13‐year history ‐‐ which unequivocally condemned the September 11 attack and deemed
it “imperative to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in acomprehensive manner.” This was considered a real victory for President Bush and no doubt
helped to increase APEC’s (or at least the Leaders Meeting’s) relevance in his eyes.
The APEC Shanghai meeting also provided President Bush with his first opportunity tomeet directly with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which helped to end the downward slide inSino‐U.S. relations underway since Bush’s inauguration (and especially after the collision
between a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea in April
2001). The two leaders were able to put the relationship back on track, aided by China’s
willingness to cooperate in the battle against terrorism.
Security matters continue to be discussed at the Leaders Meeting, not to mention at thenumerous side summits that normally accompany this gathering. For example, at the October2003 APEC Leaders Meeting in Bangkok, the final communique referred to cooperation on
combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), while President Bush used theoccasion, and his side meetings with the leaders of South Korea, Japan, and China, to call on
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations, while repeating his offer to provide
Pyongyang with written assurances that the U.S. does not intend to attack North Korea. Similar
efforts took place at the 2004 APEC Leaders Meeting in Santiago, Chile and at the November
2005 APEC meeting in Busan, Korea.
At the Busan Leader’s Meeting, the major focus was on a strong statement in support ofthe critical World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda round slated to takeplace the following month (with little success) in Hong Kong. In addition to other agreements onenergy cooperation, on a roadmap to assess progress on the Bogor Goals of trade liberalization,and on several anti‐terrorism measures, APEC leaders also agreed to establish the “APEC
Initiative on Preparing for and Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic.” (After the tsunami disaster inlate 2004, government leaders became more alert and responsive to the need for a collective
approach to prepare for such cross‐border threats.)
President Bush met jointly with the six ASEAN members of APEC along the sidelines ofthe 2005 APEC Leaders Meeting, in what constituted his first‐ever U.S.‐ASEAN Summit andwhich resulted in a desire, by all concerned, for continued meetings. Discussions are now
underway to make this a regular event. The setting is particularly attractive to Washington since63

Myanmar is not a member of APEC.
As long as APEC provides a useful venue not only for the promotion of free trade but
also for fighting the war on terrorism, we can expect that Washington will continue to be an
active player. However, as with the ARF, it will remain more suited to talking about security
problems than to actually helping to implement solutions. In addition to the usual drawbacks
associated with East Asian multilateralism (as discussed below), APEC has the added “problem”
of including Taiwan. Rather than using this venue as a vehicle for incorporating Taiwanese views
and concerns into the regional security debate in a “non‐governmental” setting, Beijing has tried
to block any substantive security‐oriented activities and to further isolate Taiwan from thedialogue process.

Multilateral Pluses and Minuses
In short, American policymakers generally believe that Asia‐Pacific multilateralorganizations such as the ARF and APEC are useful vehicles both for promoting greater politicaland economic cooperation and for enhancing regional security. While such organizations holdmany promises for Asia, it is important to understand their limits, as well as the opportunities
they present. A comprehensive security arrangement or NATO‐type alliance aimed at containing
or responding to a specified threat simply does not apply to a post‐Cold War Asia. Rather, East
Asia multilateral security mechanisms should be viewed more as confidence building measures
aimed at avoiding or dampening the possibilities of (rather than reacting to) crises or aggression.
Peacekeeping and disaster relief operations and non‐traditional security issues (such as refugee
problems, maritime safety, pollution, and other environmental and safety issues) also seemedwell‐suited to a multilateral approach.

In many instances, the process is as important as the

product.
Efforts that build upon and seek to complement, and not to replace, existing bilateraland ad hoc relationships that already exist in Asia are of particular value from a U.S. perspective.
Any effort that is perceived at undermining U.S. bilateral dealings, and especially those that seek
to diminish or replace America s key bilateral security alliances, are sure to be rejected by
Washington both today and by any future administration.
More generally speaking, Asian multilateral security mechanisms can serve asimportant vehicles for promoting long term peace and stability. They provide a framework forcontinued direct U.S. involvement in regional security matters. They offer a means for Japan,
China, and Russia, among others, to become more actively involved in regional security affairs
in a manner that is non‐threatening to their neighbors. They also provide a forum for exposing
North Korea to regional realities while facilitating bilateral dialogue between the North andSouth Korea, Japan, and the U.S., respectively. They also provide a mechanism for other regional
actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional identity and a spirit of cooperationand confidence building. Since Sept. 11, 2001, they have also become increasingly relevant for
coordinating regional views and efforts in the war on terrorism.
Nonetheless, their utility remains limited, especially in the security arena, for two
64

primary reasons. First, while steps have been taken since the 9‐11 terrorist attacks to put some
operational substance behind cooperative efforts, these organizations still largely remain
dialogue mechanisms which talk about – rather than respond to or deal effectively with –emerging security challenges. And second, Taiwan has been systematically excluded from manyof these mechanisms and one of the region’s greatest security challenges – cross‐Strait relations –has been purposefully kept off the security dialogue agenda at Beijing’s insistence. As long as
these characteristics prevail, the prospects and promises of multilateral security cooperation in
the Asia‐Pacific region, at least from a U.S. perspective, will necessarily be limited.

Ad Hoc Multilateralism: The PSI and Six‐Party Talks
If Washington has only limited confidence in institutionalized multilateral mechanisms(like the ARF, APEC, and the United Nations), it is developing a clear preference for ad hoc or
tailored multilateralism aimed at a specific task or objective and comprised of a “coalition of thewilling.” The multinational force assembled for the war in Iraq provides one example, as does
the aforementioned Proliferation Security Initiative.
Proliferation Security Initiative.

The PSI was first laid out in a speech by President Bush in

May 2003 and formalized at a 11‐nation meeting (involving Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.) in Madrid a month later.
It is “a global initiative with global reach,” under which coalition members have agreed “tomove quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), missiles, and related items.” As such, it is clearly “task‐oriented.” It
represents cooperation for a specific, clearly‐defined purpose, as opposed to dialogue for
dialogue’s sake or in support of more generic objectives. In Sept. 2003, in Paris, the 11 core
participants agreed on a Statement of Interdiction Principles “to establish a more coordinatedand effective basis through which to impede and stop [WMD] shipments . . . consistent withnational legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN
Security Council.”Over 70 nations have expressed support for these principles.

Other major Asia‐Pacific participants beyond the initial PSI core group include Canada,
the Philippines, Russia, and Singapore. Others, like China and South Korea, claim they support
the PSI’s objectives but have refrained from directly participating, in part due to North Korean
objections. PSI participants have conducted numerous air, ground, and (mostly) sea interdiction
exercises to develop and demonstrate its capability to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear
weapons and fissile material. In October 2004, Japan for the first time hosted a PSI interdiction
exercise in Tokyo Bay, involving nine naval and coast guard ships from Australia, France, Japan,
and the U.S., providing yet another example just how deeply involved Tokyo has become inbilateral and multilateral security cooperation. The most recent Asia‐Pacific exercise was hosted
by Australia.
Six‐Party Talks.

The best example of task‐oriented ad hoc multilateral cooperation in65

Northeast Asia is the Six‐Party Talks, established by Washington to deal with the specific issue ofdenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The talks were also intended, and served, tomultilateralize what many initially viewed as a bilateral U.S.‐DPRK problem.
The creation of the six‐party process, in this author’s opinion, may represent one of theBush administration’s finest diplomatic hours. [Please note that I am addressing here the creationof the multilateral process, not its results to date.] This initiative draws from the lessons learned
during the first North Korea nuclear crisis, where – despite close coordination and consultation –Washington was widely perceived as unilaterally cutting a deal with Pyongyang before sticking
Seoul and Tokyo with the bill. While Pyongyang argued for bilateral consultations (and aseparate U.S.‐DPRK non‐aggression pact), Washington rightfully insisted this time thatparticipation by Seoul and Tokyo was “essential.” It also acknowledges the important role that
China, and to a lesser extent Russia, must play if multilateral security guarantees are to be partof the final solution (as most would agree they are). Finally, the Bush administration recognized
and tried to work around Pyongyang’s strategy of trying to play all sides against one another bypresenting different, conflicting messages depending on the audience.
All this is not to argue that the crisis could not have been handled better; it is to say thatthe multilateral approach represents the most logical avenue toward crafting a long‐term
solution that achieves not only Washington’s immediate goal of stopping nuclear proliferation
but also addresses the needs and concerns of North Korea’s immediate neighbors. The concept
calls for working level discussions as well as plenary sessions, in order to dig more deeply into
the problems associated with the nuclear standoff and broader peninsula security issues andconcerns. It also facilitates bilateral discussions within the six‐party framework, thus providing
political cover for direct contact between Washington and Pyongyang.
All of this presumes a resumption of the Talks and the eventual willingness of the DPRK
to honor its commitment to bring about “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner,” as outlined in the Six‐Party Talks Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement, the firstmutually agreed product to result from two years of sporadic meetings in the six‐party
framework. The Joint Statement represented the first real sign oftangible progress in

identifying common principles and objectives. It may yet provide a basis for future progress, if
or when North Korea makes the “strategic decision” to abandon its nuclear weapons programs
and return to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, events since that date suggest that thisdecision has not yet been made by Pyongyang.
The creation of the Six‐Party Talks mechanism provides a framework for broader
Northeast Asia multilateral cooperation in the future. If the Talks eventually succeed, mostparties agree that a more formalized mechanism must evolve in order to implement theagreement, provide necessary security assurances, and monitor compliance, as well as facilitate
whatever aid packages are associated with the final accord. If the Talks fail, some would argue
that there will be an even greater need for some form of institutionalized cooperation in order tomanage the danger posed by a presumed (and self‐confessed) nuclear weapons‐equipped North
Korea, if the other parties are prepared for this level of cooperation. If and how the six‐party
66mechanism transitions into a more institutionalized Northeast Asia forum will help determine
the degree of future security cooperation in this East Asia subregion and Washington’s
involvement in it.

East Asia Summitry: Much Ado About Something?
While Washington focused on ad hoc initiatives and Asia‐Pacific regionalism, the statesof East Asia have continued their community‐building efforts. As noted earlier, in December
2005, Malaysia convened the first East Asia Summit. It should be noted that the EAS was not the
only summit taking place in Kuala Lumpur at that time. ASEAN leaders also met amongst
themselves, with their Plus Three partners, and in individual ASEAN Plus One meetings with
their Australian, New Zealand, and Indian counterparts. This was the second time that Canberra
and Wellington and the third time that New Delhi participated in this conclave. Russian
President Vladimir Putin also appeared on the ASEAN summit scene for the first time,
conducting his first A+1 dialogue. He was also invited to meet with, but not to officially join, theother 16 assembled leaders at the first annual so‐called A+3+3 East Asia Summit.
Whither the EAS?

Was the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) “much ado about nothing,” asmany critics are already claiming, or “a historic event whose future impact is likely to be as
significant as the first [1976] ASEAN summit,” as Barry Desker, head of Singapore’s influential
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, argues? [PacNet 55B, Dec. 23, 2006,“Why the East
Asian Summit Matters”] The answer is: it’s too soon to say.
While it remains unclear just what the EAS will eventually become, an analysis of thefirst meeting makes it fairly clear what it will not be: it will not form the base of themuch‐heralded but still dormant East Asia community. That role appears destined, in thisauthor’s opinion, to remain with the more exclusive ASEAN Plus Three gathering. It is also
highly doubtful that it will, or wants to, pose a threat to U.S. interests.
The EAS host, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, made it abundantly clearthat the ten ASEAN countries and their Plus Three partners constituted the core, noting that
“You are talking about a community of East Asians; I don’t know how the Australians could
regard themselves as East Asians, or the New Zealanders for that matter.” “We are not talking
about members of the community,” Badawi continued, even though Australia, New Zealand, and“our immediate neighbor” India have “common interests in what is happening in the region.”
The architects of East Asia community‐building, he clearly inferred, would all be Asians, with
the A+3 (vice EAS) participants providing the base. While his comments indicated that India
might one day be able to slip its nose into the tent, Australia and New Zealand clearly would not.
A+3 would drive he train (with ASEAN hoping to remain the conductor). The EAS would
provide a vehicle for outsiders to endorse the community‐building effort; it “could play asignificant role,” but would not be an integral part of (much less drive) the process.
For his part, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, while noting that the EAS had“exceeded my expectations,” argued that APEC, rather than the EAS or A+3, should remain “the67

premier body.” APEC, he noted, has the “great advantage” of including the United States. We
would note that it also includes Taiwan (a.k.a., Chinese Taipei) – another “great advantage” – but
excludes several of the lesser developed ASEAN states, including Myanmar (which from
Washington’s perspective may be yet another plus).
The EAS Chairman’s Statement underscored, twice, that ASEAN will be the “driving
force” behind East Asian community‐building. The KL Declaration on the Summit declares that
future meetings “will be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN Member Country . . . and be heldback‐to‐back with the annual ASEAN Summit.” Beijing had suggested that it host the second
round but ASEAN remains as concerned about sharing driving privileges with its othercommunity members as it does allowing outsiders a greater say in the community‐building
process.
The Chairman’s Statement and KL Declaration both acknowledge that building an East
Asia Community is “a long term goal.” First priority will go toward building “a strong ASEAN
Community which will serve as a solid foundation for our common peace and prosperity.” Thisshould make Indonesia happy: Jakarta, which had previously put forth its own proposals forbuilding an ASEAN Community, had believed that pushing for the EAS was premature. Prime
Minister Badawi had been the primary proponent of the EAS, apparently catching Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (among others) by surprise when he pushed for the EAS
at last year’s summit in Vientiane. That was before Australia and New Zealand were added tothe mix, which clearly curbed Badawi’s enthusiasm.
Addressing Washington’s Concerns.

At present, there is little cause for Washington to beconcerned about the EAS. Participants are quick to point out that the United States is welcome tojoin (even if this is a bit disingenuous, since it realized Washington’s stance on the TAC when it
made signing this treaty a precondition for membership). It is not clear that Washington evendesired a seat at the EAS table – getting President Bush to two Asian summits in four weeks
would have been no mean feat. Nonetheless, Washington continues to watch the EAS closely to
see if certain members attempt to move this embryonic organization in a direction that runs
contrary to U.S. interests.
In an apparent attempt to address one of Washington’s potential concerns, the KL
Declaration noted that the EAS would be “an open, inclusive, transparent, and outward‐looking
forum in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognized values.”
Washington’s membership would still require it to accede to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC), something the Bush administration (like its predecessors) has been reluctant
to do. Observer status appears possible, however (and is more likely to be sought byWashington).
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao seemed to be opening the door for this when he noted that
the EAS should “welcome the participation of Russia” and “strengthen contact with the UnitedStates, the European Union, and other countries.” Wen stressed that the EAS would not be“closed, exclusive, or directed against any particular party.” (Secretary Zoellick had warned
68

Beijing that it should not use its participation in multilateral organizations like the EAS to“maneuver toward a predominance of power” or otherwise be seen as deliberately trying toundercut Washington’s influence or interests. Beijing, among others, clearly heard this message.)
Still undefined is how the EAS (or the A+3, for that matter) will interact with broader
regional organizations such as APEC or the ARF. Hopefully, this will be one of the modalities tobe addressed by EAS participants when they next convene in December 2006 in Cebu,
Philippines. As noted at the onset, how the EAS relates to the region’s other multilateralorganizations and initiatives – both institutionalized (like the ARF and APEC) and ad hoc (likethe Six‐Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative) – will also be a key factor affecting
Washington’s attitude, as will its adoption of global norms, especially in the areas ofcounter‐terrorism and counter‐proliferation. Will the EAS (or A+3, for that matter) reinforce or
dilute these efforts? Will it help regional states more effectively address growing transnational
challenges . . . or provide another excuse for avoiding such efforts?
The answers to these questions will help determine Washington’s attitude toward the
EAS and any subsequent East Asian Community. To the extent this new grouping signals its
willingness to coexist with Washington, and is not seen as threatening or attempting toundermine Washington’s bilateral alliances, its own central role in East Asian security affairs, orthe broader Asia‐Pacific regional institutions in which it participates, there is little reason to
expect objections from Washington or a serious effort to discourage or derail this or any otherregional community‐building efforts.
TAC: Why Not Join?

For its part, Washington should begin exploring the possibility of seeking

observer status in the EAS.

It should also be asking itself why it continues to resist acceding to

the TAC. The oft‐stated contention that this would somehow undercut America’s Asian alliances
appears unfounded: two of Washington’s Asian allies – Thailand and the Philippines – arecharter members of ASEAN, while the other three – Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea –have now acceded to the TAC without any perceptible impact on Washington’s network ofbilateral alliances.
As a member of the ARF, Washington has already endorsed the purpose and principlesof the TAC “as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic
instrument for regional confidence‐building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security
cooperation.” Perhaps it’s time to take the next step, in order to demonstrate its commitment toregional

prosperity

andstability

andtounderscore

its

support

for

East

Asia

community‐building.
Is Community‐building Possible? While much attention has been paid to the Bushadministration’s reaction to East Asia community‐building, the biggest threat to this effort comes
not from Washington but from within the “community.” The sad truth is, with or without
Washington’s acquiescence, East Asia community‐building is not going to be easy, given risingnationalism in Japan, China, South Korea, and elsewhere. Even within ASEAN, there are clear
69

differences of opinion regarding the focus and intent of the EAS, especially between Indonesia
and Malaysia. Meanwhile, unless and until Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul can more effectively
channel or control their respective nationalist tendencies, it is difficult to image a true East Asian
community taking shape.
The primary catalyst for today’s tensions has been Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichro’s continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine – he made his 2005 visit on Oct. 17 and is
expected to go again this year before he relinquishes the premiership (perhaps on August 15) –along with lingering disputes over textbook renditions of history. Japanese textbooks have comeunder the most scrutiny, given the approval of one controversial textbook series in particular(which has been adopted by less than one percent of Japan’s public schools), but textbooks inSouth Korea and especially China would also fail most objectivity tests (and we won’t even try to
add North Korean textbooks to this mix).
Prime Minister Koizumi argues that he is merely honoring his campaign pledge tocontinue paying tribute to Japan’s war dead – there are over 2 ½ million souls interred at
Yasukuni, unfortunately including 14 World War Two “Class A” criminals, the source of thecontroversy. But, Mr. Koizumi has also sworn to preserve, protect, and promote Japanesenational security interests, and his continued annual visits to the Shrine are making thisincreasingly impossible to do, at least when it comes to promoting harmony in the immediateneighborhood, much less attempting to create a sense of East Asia community.
Meanwhile, the failure of the U.S. to speak out publicly on this issue, combined with the(correct) impression that the U.S. stands firmly behind Mr. Koizumi and his quest for acceptanceof a greater political and security role in East Asia, has translated into increased ill will against
Washington, especially from its other key East Asia ally, South Korea. President Bush wasquestioned repeatedly during his November 2005 visit to Japan, Korea, and China about hisreaction to the “antagonizing” Yasukuni visits. While he reportedly did discuss the issue with
Koizumi in private, in public, Bush repeatedly ducked the question, responding instead that “Ibelieve a useful role for me, as someone who is friendly with the three leaders involved, is toremind people that it is best to put the past behind and move forward in the future.”
Unfortunately the high profile visits make putting the past behind impossible. [For more on this
topic, see PacNet #53, Dec. 6, 2005, “Yasukuni Shrine: Time to Make a Deal.”]Evolving U.S. Attitudes: Pan‐Asianism vs. Pan‐Pacificism
Until recently, the U.S. has been circumspect regarding the EAS and East Asia
community‐building in general, stating that it reserves judgement on the EAS until its mission
and objectives become clear and that, in principle, it supports more “inclusive” approaches.
However, during a recent visit to Southeast Asia, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian andPacific Affairs Christopher Hill noted that U.S. “engagement with Southeast Asia continues tobroaden and deepen. The dynamism of the region means that our relationship is in a constantstate of evolution, which has given rise to renewed debate and discussion about regional fora,
and whether they should be inclusive or exclusive. Correspondingly, the concept of70

pan‐Asianism vs. pan‐Pacificism has also re‐emerged.”
The U.S. has not objection to East Asia regionalism per se, Hill argued, noting that “it isentirely understandable that Asia is looking to strengthen its own regional institutions, just asother regional groupings in other parts of the world have done the same. This drive is areflection of the remarkable and still growing pattern of intra‐Asian economic and financial
integration, and is not surprising ‐‐ and we welcome it.”
Hill then repeated concerns about the proliferation of multilateral initiatives and thedanger of “meeting fatigue”: “But we need to think hard and clearly about the question of how
we can integrate pan‐Asian and trans‐Pacific fora. We have heard much debate about the East
Asian Summit. Before coming to any conclusions, we need to look at the whole landscape ‐‐ andindeed the seascape ‐‐ of proliferating regional fora ‐‐ ASEAN+3, APEC, ARF, and the EAS ‐‐ todetermine how the pieces can fit better together. The goal should be to achieve synergy andavoid redundancy and duplication.”
Hill also reaffirmed Washington’s concern about how the EAS would relate tobroader‐based multilateral efforts involving the U.S.: “With respect to the East Asia Summit, theU.S. continues to watch with interest how this forum will develop. As I mentioned earlier, APEC
and the ARF are vital components of our relationship with Asia and Southeast Asia. We want tocontinue to work with you to ensure we donʹt dilute the effectiveness of these institutions andthe important cooperation they foster. The United States is and will remain deeply involved in
the transformation of Southeast Asia.”

East Asia Community‐Building: Unanswered Questions
One objective of this paper is to stimulate questions for others to answer, in order tobetter determine if Washington will see this phenomenon as supportive of its national security
interests or designed to threaten or inhibit them. Allow me to end this paper, therefore, with alaundry list of questions (with limited commentary). Many are left over from last year’s CEAC
dialogue.
‐ What are the objectives of Indonesia’s ASEAN Security Community (ASC) proposal and what
are the prospects of ASEAN successfully pursuing this effort? Will the ASC help set a morepositive security agenda for the ARF or for the emerging East Asia community? My guess is that
Washington would welcome a more pro‐active ASEAN that put more emphasis on security
cooperation and joint approaches to security challenges. The ASC emphasis on promoting
democracy and individual rights, if seriously supported and pursued, would also be in keepingwith Washington’s regional and global objectives. Merely paying lip service to these objectives,on the other hand, will reconfirm negative opinions about ASEAN’s seriousness and long‐term
direction.
‐ Is Indonesia prepared to lead ASEAN in developing an ASC and in setting the agenda for the
EAS? Are the other ASEAN members (and especially Malaysia) prepared to follow? Will ASEAN
remain in the A+3 driver’s seat for the ASF, A+3, and emerging EAS? If not, who will lead, and in71

what direction? Can/will Japan step forward and exercise leadership behind the scenes and act
in concert with other friends of Washington (like Singapore and Australia) to ensure that theEAS does not evolve in a manner that runs contrary to U.S. interests?
‐ Is the East Asia Summit the primary vehicle for building and sustaining the East Asia
community? Are the two synonymous? I have already argued that they are not, but thedistinction has yet to be made by the EAS itself. The relationship needs to be better defined,
since there are many competing views of what constitutes East Asia and what vehicles will best
create this sense of community. Since the various multilateral initiatives provide amind‐boggling array of combinations (one even includes Persian Gulf countries), it is getting
more and more difficult even to define East Asia, much less to determine which effort or efforts
are helping to establish the desired sense of community. India’s future role is of particularinterest here.
‐ Who gets to come to the EAS, in what capacity, and by what criteria? The EAS was initiallyenvisioned as part of the A+3 process but appears destined to go beyond these 13 states. Why?
How do the A+3 and EAS differ? What is the EAS mission statement and objectives? (To date,more time has been spent debating about who should join than determining what should be
discussed.)‐ The creation of the EAS, as called for in the A+3 Vision 2020 Plan, was seen by some as an effort
by the larger East Asia powers, like China, Japan, and/or even the ROK, to try to gain increased
control in shaping the agenda, a role up to now largely played by ASEAN. Is the decision that
EAS members have to sign up to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) an effort by
ASEAN to reassert its central role, or just a clever way to keep Washington (among others) out . . .
or both?
‐ Finally, repeating Secretary Hill’s key question, how do members of the East Asian community– whoever they may be – define the relationship between Asia‐only mechanisms such as A+3 andbroader efforts such as the ARF and APEC? Which type efforts will receive pride of place?
Clearly it does not have to be, and is unlikely to be described as “either‐or.” But, where will the
focus and bulk of the effort be?

Will the outcomes and efforts be mutually reinforcing? Will theEast Asia effort help set the stage for and supplement or even advance the broader dialogue orwill it be used as an excuse for inaction?

If the former, how does one create avenues ofinteraction between East Asian and Asia‐Pacific mechanisms to enhance their mutually
supporting roles.?
Until the answers to these questions become clear, it will be difficult to determine theprospects for the creation of a true East Asia community and/or Washington’s receptivity to thiseffort.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [www.pacforum.org], a Honolulu‐based non‐profit
research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He
can be reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com or directly at racpacforum@cs.com.
72

Mr. Simon TAY **Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

An East Asian Community and the United States: A View from ASEAN *Introduction
In December 2005, the first East Asian Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
While this is a new and quite unprecedented event, it is one that has been considerably, andvariously, anticipated and interpreted.
The summit grows from a growing but still nascent sense of regionalism in East Asia, andmay both mark and add to the momentum and strength of this sentiment. The path to this firstsummit has been paved by events in recent years, especially the ASEAN+3 process that has brought
together leaders from the ten ASEAN member states with their counterparts from the three
Northeast states of China, Japan and South Korea. Indeed, the ASEAN+3 process has grownbeyond summitry to provide a framework for initial Asian cooperation on diverse transnational
issues such as finance flows, with the Chiang Mai initiative, and public health in the wake of SARS.
For these 13 states, therefore, the East Asia Summit (EAS) would have represented
something of a logical next step forward from the ASEAN+3 process. But the attendance at the EAS
was not limited to the ASEAN+3 states. It was expanded to include India, and Australia‐New
Zealand. This expansion was quite deliberately decided, and both arises from and reflects back on
the nascent sense of East Asian regionalism and on the relationship of East Asian to the USA.
This is especially when we consider that the ASEAN+3 process will continue in parallel with theEAS.
It is in this context that this paper will consider the prospects for an emerging East Asian
community, and its relations to the USA.
What is driving the nascent and growing sense of East Asian regionalism? To what ends isthe region being driven? What factors in international relations among the states– such as thetriangle of US‐China‐Japan relations, and within ASEAN ‐‐ can shape the regional architecture?
First, I will examine what would appear to be the main factors that have emerged to drive thecurrent and still nascent sense of regionalism in East Asia, postulating some reasons that some may
wish to exclude the USA. Secondly, I will seek to characterize characteristics of the emergent East
Asian regionalism and examine some preferred principles that would allow the most stable and**

LLM (Harvard) LLB Hons (National University of Singapore) serves as Chairman, Singapore
Institute of International Affairs and teaches international law as an associate professor at the
National University of Singapore, and as a visiting professor at Harvard and the Fletcher School .
* Paper for An International Workshop organized by the Council on East Asian Community, Tokyo,
June 2006. Revised from a draft for discussion presented at the 2005 workshop.
73

mutually beneficial relationship of this emergent regionalism. Thirdly, I will suggest how the USA
might best respond to these developments in East Asia, and what Asians should do, both for the
benefit of East Asian regionalism, as well as vis a vis the USA. In so doing, I will glance upon thetriangle of relations between the USA, Japan and China, which is a key to strategic outlooks in the
Asia Pacific, as well as upon the ASEAN.
While ASEAN cannot be considered a major power, the grouping of smaller to medium‐sized states
is something of a hub in much of the regional frameworks. I will both describe this role andconsider if ASEAN can be a positive influence on the emerging East Asian regionalism as a “softpower”.
These discussions are necessarily exploratory, given that the EAS and East Asia’s
regionalism as a whole are a recent phenomena. Positions are still less than fully crystallized.
Views differ from one Asian country to another, and have evolved over time. Additionally, US
attitudes towards East Asia – which will be major drivers, and perhaps even determinative of theprospects of this phenomenon ‐‐ are shifting and often seem ambivalent, especially in relation to
China.
This is, as such, a situation in which what states and leaders decide to do would matter; inwhich human agency is very much at play. Thus while conclusions are not easy, we can hope thatwhat can be explored and considered may be make small contribution in informing the policy
processes in play. The essay does, as such, offer several policy suggestions to Asians, ASEAN andAmericans.
To the Asians, I suggest that we should be prepared to develop closer intra‐Asian
cooperation on issues of common concern, to deal with both regional issues as well as impacts
arising from globalization. However, while we may wish for a rapprochement between China andJapan, this cannot be commanded and there are few signs of a resolution at hand. Without this, I
suggest that East Asians must be prepared to be patient and work for the long term, and through aseries of patchwork and more limited cooperative schemes, rather than expecting a clear regional
vision to be annunciated and agreed shortly. Therefore, for the near and middle term, East Asia
will be more of a framework for cooperation and understanding, rather than a “community”; aword that suggests many more and deeper shared bases and values for coming together.
To ASEAN, I suggest that they must recognize they are presently a hub for East Asia’s
regionalism and must seize this opportunity to contribute to the process positively. ASEAN’s rolemust however be recognized as resulting from a default in relations among the major Asian powers,
and cannot be taken for granted. ASEAN can and should therefore seek to grow into this defaultrole by moving ahead clearly and quite quickly with its ambitions for an ASEAN community, in thefuller sense of that word, “community”. As it does go forward with these ambitions, ASEAN
should also seek to emerge as a “soft power” in Asia, with a positive influence arising from thevalues, norms and institutions that it practices and embodies, as a model for the wider region.
To the Americans, I first suggest that the USA must accept and understand its exclusionfrom the first EAS and many of the emerging East Asian frameworks. Secondly, all EAS states andespecially those who are allies and friends of the USA should seek to ensure that while the EAS74

does not include the USA as a participant, the vital interests that they share with the USA are
sufficiently accounted for and protected. Efforts to convey this to the USA, both as intentions going
into the EAS and as results emerging from it, should be redoubled. To Asians and especially
Americans, I suggest that we need to work to revive relations across the Pacific and indeed take theexisting relationships and institutions to new and higher levels. In this, relations of the USA withstates in Asia must broaden beyond the almost singular focus on the global war against terrorismthat some feel in dealings with Washington DC and rise above the existing base that provided by
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) processes.

Reasons for Regionalism: Neutral or Anti‐Americanism?
Some suggest that regionalism in East Asia is a natural phenomenon that has little to dowith the USA and does not demonstrate anti‐American sentiment. There is considerable truth in
this. Regionalism that brings proximate states together to cooperate is not in opposition to theforces of globalization that link all states more closely together than ever, and especially to the USA
as the primary economic actor and only post Cold war superpower. Regionalism has been acompanion to globalization, and not its opponent. For while globalization connects all states andsocieties more closely, proximate and neighboring states are more closely connected to each otherinter se, than to states which further away and/ or are more different in make up.
Globalization is not a complete and neutral phenomenon in this regard. Simple facts such as thecost of telecommunication and transport demonstrate its incompleteness and unevenness.
Geography and distance have been reduced as determining and primary factors, but neverthelessdo still matter. Cultures and societies too, while being much more open to exchange and influence,
persistently resist homogenization. This is true not only in Asia. It is even more clearly visible inEurope and in North America. Regionalism has arisen and thrived in parallel to, and notnecessarily in conflict with, globalization. In this view therefore, East Asian regionalism is natural,
neutral and indeed long overdue.
Support for this idea of a “neutral” East Asian regionalism is, for example, evidenced byeconomic data. This witnesses both the predominant place of trade and investment between the
USA and Asia, as well as the rapid growth of intra‐Asian economic ties. It does not seem to be aneither/ or situation.
Yet Asia has no strong and enduring history of unity and accepted commonality, whether
in polity, culture, language or religion. The antecedents of East Asian regionalism have been brief
and contested. One such period was in the 15th century, when the Ming Empire of China ruled thewaves and, in the pre‐colonial period, extracted an acceptance of suzerainty from most of the
kingdoms in East and SE Asia.

A second incident was the Japanese co‐prosperity sphere during

WWII. Neither sets a happy precedent for East Asian regionalism. Even within ASEAN, after
nearly four decades of association, national sovereignty has tended to trump integration ineconomics and certainly politics. While this has gathered pace, the ASEAN efforts still do not rival– both in aspiration and even more so in reality – the integration of the European Union. As such,
we may conclude that East Asia has no precedent in regionalism, and only a limited and very
75

recent movement forward in this direction.
Why then East Asia now?
To understand this, I think it is necessary to go beyond the “neutral” factors that I havebriefly canvassed. I would join others in suggesting that less neutral factors are adding to theemergence of an East Asian regionalism that, in some settings and instances, the USA will not beparty.
These factors are, in approximately chronological order: first, attitudes about the USA
during and after the 1997 crisis that swept through Asia; secondly, the failure of APEC; thirdly, theneed for a competent and competitive regionalism in Asia; fourth, the reception of US security
policies, post 9/11; and, fifth, the rise of China and the responses among different Asianneighbours.

During and after the 1997 “Asian” crisis
The economic crisis that started in mid 1997, spread quickly among almost all economies
in East Asia, with little regard to the real differences in their economic fundamentals and little
coordinated response by the countries affected. While the crisis has abated, the sense among somein East Asia is hat the USA could and should have done more. For example, in Thailand and South
Korea (both US allies), negative comparisons were drawn to the level of US assistance to the help
given to Mexico when the NAFTA neighbour was earlier struck by a financial crisis.
The role of international financial institutions (IFI), especially the IMF, was also brought
into question. While there were no better mechanisms that were readily available, Asians havebeen among those who argue that many of the prescriptions were ineffective or indeed
counter‐productive. In the years since the crisis, more have come to share aspects of this view,
including well‐known US‐based economists like Krugman and Stiglitz. Yet efforts at reform andpolicy changes within the IMF and IFIs are still wanting.
Criticisms of the IMF and IFIs, moreover, rebound on the USA as – rightly or otherwise –some perceive that Washington DC sets and controls the agenda for them. To some of these critics
in Asia and elsewhere, the “Washington consensus” is not named innocently for the headquartersof the IMF and World Bank, but bespeak a consensus shared by the powers that be in Washington
DC itself.

The Failure of APEC
While the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process continues, there is somesense that it has in some ways, “failed”. This sense of failure comes from at least two sources.
The first, and probably quite unfair criticism, is that APEC failed to respond to the Asiancrisis. It is fair to point out that APEC was never intended nor intended to serve such a purpose.
But the criticism sticks in some quarters; critics ask that, if little or no response could be made tosuch a crisis, what is the point of APEC?
The second source of criticism over APEC is perhaps a more measured one. This is that the
USA and other major economies have ceased to regard APEC as of being sufficiently important to76

be used as a mechanism for enabling and managing economic cooperation and integrations
between the APEC members. Some would trace this to the impasse between the USA and its close
ally, Japan, over trade liberalization measures. Focus on APEC has diminished, as compared to a
decade ago. Some now believe that, given the present trajectories, there is little prospect ofachieving the APEC Bogor goals by the stated deadlines.
In the wake of these developments, more and more states in Asia and the Pacific havesought to turn to the WTO, only to find delays and faltering there too. Again, impasses relate
mainly to the major economies. Only Japan, India and China would have much influence in the
WTO negotiations and their positions markedly differ. Thus, the effort to move ahead in the WTO
is beyond the influence of many Asian states.
As such, Asians who have tried to find ways forward for economic liberalization haveturned to another avenue: regionalism and sub‐regionalism. While WTO and APEC remain, greaterstock than before is being given to sub‐regional and bilateral economic partnerships and trade
agreements.

Regional agreements include ASEAN’s efforts to implement its FTA (already inforce) and move ahead towards an economic community with fuller integration, and “ASEAN+1”
FTAs with (separately), China, India, South Korea and Australia‐New Zealand. Bilateralagreements also have multiplied , including those concluded between Japan and Singapore, andbeing negotiated with other ASEAN member states like (separately) Thailand, the Philippines, andMalaysia. A “track 2” experts group has begun to talk about an East Asian FTA. Australia and New
Zealand too have not been excluded in this FTA “fever”, with FTAs concluded or in negotiation
with Asian states such as China, Singapore, and Thailand.
In contrast, non‐Asian states have been relatively less active. Exception to this are the
US‐Singapore FTA, and recently proposed European Union‐ASEAN FTA.
Many questions have been raised about the efficiency and efficacy of these bilateral andsub‐regional FTAs in Asia as they relate to business and to the actual creation and liberalization of
trade. It is true that many are complex, while others are superficial, and all are uncoordinated in
respect of their terms so there is no consistency between them. However, in this context, I do not
point to their economic use, but rather as evidencing and influencing broader thoughts about
regionalism among Asians.

A Competent and Competitive Asian Regionalism
In the wake of the Asian crisis, Asians have come in these recent years to better appreciate
their interdependence. This appreciation has gone beyond the question of financial flows that were
implicated in the 1997 crisis.
Other areas such as trade and investment and environmental pollution demonstrate theinterdependencies in the region or sub‐regions of East Asia. Some examples of this are the hazefrom Indonesian fires, the acid rain and yellow dust from China that impacts NE Asia, andunsustainable and often illegal logging in ASEAN countries to meet the demand of Japanese andChinese markets (especially since China has banned domestic logging). Public health concerns over
SARS and Avian Flu have been other manifestations of the negative face of an increasing77

interdependence without sufficient governing structures and regimes.
Even in sensitive areas such as violent political upheaval and gross human rights abuses,
there is a growing awareness and moral interdependency among many of the people of Asia. While
many issues in this area remain off‐limits among Asians, sporadic issues such as the crisis in East
Timor after the vote of free choice in 1998, and current developments in Myanmar have attracted
wide‐spread concern among Asians. Institutionally as well, the ASEAN regional forum, which
includes non‐ASEAN members and covers a wider geographical footprint in Asia, has begun tomove into a phase for developing preventive diplomacy among its members.
In toto, whether in economics, environmental or other fields, Asians now give greater
recognition to the need for cooperation to manage their existing and still growing integration.
Regionalism, is this view, is a process for competently handling globalization and interdependence.
It is also a competitive issue among Asians, given parallel developments in Europe and continued
feeling that the USA, with or without allies and neighbours, has the weight to determine global
matters where its national interest is felt to be involved.
US security policies, Post 9/11
A fourth factor has been the US security policy, post 9/11, and its prosecution of a global
campaign against terrorism. While there was initial support for the USA across Asia, reactions are
not uniform. Some states are staunch US supporters and have been proactive in their own domestic
fight against terrorism. Others have been ambivalent and even reticent in responses, preoccupied
with their own domestic power politics. Criticism and opposition to the US policies has risen.
Polls and surveys point to this trend across Asian societies, especially in the wake of the
US‐led “invasion” of Iraq and the revelation of human rights abuses in Abu Gharib and allegationsof mistreatment at Guatanamo. Criticism of US policies among some quarters also relate also towider issues, such as the question of Palestine and Israel.
Such sentiment is strongest perhaps in Asian countries, such as Indonesia, and Malaysia,
where there are Muslim majorities. Yet it has grown even in societies where Muslims are only aminority or quite absent. Indeed, in some countries like South Korea – without Muslims andhistorically intertwined with and dependent on the USA – sentiments among common people
about the USA have soured. In many cases, this change in attitude to the USA relate to the US
policies not only about terrorism in the global theatre, but its implications in the national and local
spheres. America’s post‐9/11 agenda has complicated existing internal conflicts and insurgencies inSoutheast Asia.
The change in sentiments in Asia towards the USA has paralleled changes in many
European societies. However, it would seem that European criticisms more greatly emphasize
questions of human rights and of the observation of international law.
Indeed, while Asian opinions have shifted about the USA, post‐911, there seems to be aconsiderable difference in the tenor and level of criticism as compared to Europe. Asia states did
not join France and Germany in leading opposition to the U.S.‐led action.
Public opinion is not the chief difference. As in Europe, there is no strong and widespreaddomestic support among the peoples of Asia for American action in Iraq. Indeed, in some societies,78

as noted briefly, anti‐American sentiments have risen sharply.
The majority of Asian states have nevertheless continued to support the USA or at leastmeasure and limit their criticisms and opposition, to varying degrees and in different ways. These
relate to a realist – if not real politick – calculation of the role of the USA in economics and security.
There is a calculation of the costs of openly opposing the Bush administration on post 9/11 issues,
after the admonition that, “either you are for us, or against us”. There are also some benefits to thegovernments in the region. In the American post‐9/11 agenda, Asia has again received Americanattention, and Asian governments have generally been quick to respond to align their interests andagendas to America’s. Equally, most have sought to prevent direct interventions into theirterritories and domestic affairs by cooperating with the United States.
Thus, many Asian governments face an increasing tension between their external commitments to
support the United States and these internal views and demands within their societies and among
their citizens. While some Asians dissent, this realist logic prevails in thinking that it is best to ally
with the United States. Its policies of “benign selfishness” offer the closest match to worldinterest—the desire for free trade, rule of law, free movement of capital and people, as well as
security for persons and property. In this view, stability in Asia may be provided by a hegemonic
power, provided it is relatively benign.
However, the prospect of ensuring that U.S. interest in Asia and the world is indeed
benign and broadly supported has to contend with a number of factors. Chief among these is thatthe post‐9/11 agenda in the USA responds first and most directly to American domestic opinion(some might say, “only”). This means that there will be severe limits to how much influence othercountries, including those in Asia, can have in persuading the US administration in any directionthat is contrary to the views of the American voter. American exceptionalism in treaties andmultilateral settings illustrates the concerns that Asian and other states have about thedependability and benign character of America internationally.
The necessary corollary of this concern is that Asians should find frameworks to depend
less on the USA and also to collectively influence the USA.

The Rise of China
This brings up the fifth factor that bears mention in context of the East Asian community
and the USA: the rise of China. This phenomenon has been long predicted and yet still attracts
controversy in interpretation and prediction.
China of late has done much to assure the world and especially the region of its intentions
for a “peaceful rise”. This has been well received, bar cross‐Straits relations, with an increased
levels of comfort with South Korea and, especially, ASEAN member states. With ASEAN as agrouping, China’s initiative in proposing an FTA and deepening its economic and trade ties havebeen welcome. On the security front, while much remains to be done, the agreement on a Code of
Conduct in the South China Seas and a generally more forthcoming engagement with China in the
ASEAN Regional Forum and other frameworks have lessened the tensions that once marked therelationship, especially after the Mischief Reef episode.
79

Questions of course remain. This is especially in respect of relations between a rising
China and the USA, as the incumbent and pre‐eminent power. Sino‐Japanese relations alsopre‐occupy strategic thinking as well, given both the historical issues and (even more importantly
in my view) the present and forward looking issues of accommodating these two giants in theemerging frameworks for Asian regionalism. For the newer ASEAN members, questions over the
headwaters of the Mekong, that lie in China, will continue and perhaps grow in coming years.
National differences in Asian’s attitudes to China also can be traced to economic
competitiveness and prospects of complementarity, as well as to historical differences. There is, assuch, considerable variation even among the remaining Asians of how we do and should look at
the rise of China (which is worthy of further study).
Notwithstanding this diversity, the rise of China raises two primary issues in the context
of East Asian community and the USA. The first of these issues is the ability to imagine an Asia
that is less centered on the USA, as it is at present. If the predictions of China’s rise prove true,
there could be a rebalancing of the economic center for Asia – which still predominately exports to
the US market and depends quite considerably on cross‐Pacific investment and trade. In politics
and security too, there would be changes, with China’s promises of a “multi‐polar” worldproviding a contrast to the existing arrangements that center on Washington DC as the hub ofvarious bilateral agreements and alliances.
The second of these issues is connected but the different: the need for Asians toproactively pursue ways to engage China and shape its policies towards the rest of Asia. This isespecially important if and when US‐China relations grow more competitive and perhaps tense. If
so, many Asians would like to have the option of having an independent policy towards China,rather being reflexively aligned to the US position. At the same time, some in the USA may beconcerned that such “independence” merely disguises the slip of these Asian states into the orbit ofa China that they do not trust.
This issue took on more life in 2005, as we approached the EAS, and have continued togain pace in some quarters. A number of different constituencies in the USA are raising issues ofcontention with China, such as the revaluation of its currency, the promotion of democracy andcross‐Straits issues and the build up of Chinese military forces. US policies towards China havechanged in tenor from Clinton to Bush, and from early‐term Bush to post 9/11 Bush, swinging
between the poles of “cooperation” and “strategic competitor”. Of late, in statements such as thoseby Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the direction seems to be toward the latter pole of China asa strategic competitor. (I shall survey these concerns slightly more below, in discussing the criticaltriangle of relations in the Asia Pacific between USA, China and Japan.)
Taken together, the five factors surveyed have created a much greater sense of doubt
among Asians about the USA in its global and regional role than existed during the Cold War or its
immediate aftermath. A strongly “anti‐American” sentiment exists but perhaps only among a
minority. Asians in responding to the post Cold War order (disorder) in general and post 9/11 Bushin particular, seem to swing between the poles of fearing that US would ignore us and that US
would intervene unilaterally, at the whims of its domestic audiences. The answer of some East80

Asians ‐‐ that we wanted a sustained, knowledgeable and consultative American engagement –seems an almost impossible wish.
The post 9/11 USA has declined in “soft power” and suasion in Asia, while China hasgained in standing and acceptability: thus, the rise of the Chinese dragon is in parallel with thewounding of the American eagle, in a coincidence that may bring misgivings and perhaps sudden
shifts. Nevertheless, the main driving forces for the sense of East Asian regionalism are not, in myview, anti‐Americanism.
Nor, however, are they completely neutral in my estimate.
There is a growing ambivalence about the USA among more Asians.

This “love‐hate”

attitude finds expression in the now popular adage, “Yankee go home … and take me with you.”
There is an emerging wish for a greater independence and capacity in Asia. More Asians now
believe it is the time that their countries and their region mature and grow beyond the unequal
relationship with and dependency upon the USA, so that Asians can do about what matters most to
Asia.

Versions and Principles of East Asian Regionalism
In surveying the five factors above, I hope that I may not be mistaken to suggest that thisis a single or predominant Asian opinion or perspective on the various issues raised. As I hope has
been clear, there is a great variety among the Asian states and peoples whether we look at Asian
perspectives on the rise of China, the different responses to US actions and policies post 9/11 or thevaried experiences in the Asian crises.
Accordingly, there is no single and agreed vision about the future of East Asia as a region.
There is instead a quite broad and even bewildering range of suggestions of what East Asians canand should do together. Some examples include an East Asian Union, ala Europe, and an Asiancurrency.
I do not wish in this section to canvass the suggestions given to date or to add my own tothe considerable and still growing list. Instead, I would like to list some principles that should, in
my view, guide the evolution of East Asian regionalism and also to suggest broad directions orversions of East Asian regionalism.
From the observations of the driving forces and limits of East Asian regionalism, several
principles may be suggested.

Open and Flexible Caucus
First, it should be an open and flexible caucus, not an exclusive group or bloc. This isespecially given that the United States and other countries may be concerned about being excluded,
and the existing reliance of many in the region on the United States for both security andeconomics. The new East Asian regionalism might therefore serve as a caucus, to discuss and agree
on mutually acceptable positions to bring before larger institutions. Indeed, where positions cannot
be agreed, East Asian states can and should have the latitude after dialogue to take their own
position, and expect that it be understood and respected by its neighbours.
81This way, East Asian regionalism would not detract from Asia Pacific and international
efforts, but serve to make them more effective and representative. More, the East Asian regionalism
can seek out areas of cooperation and begin to build institutional capacity in these areas. In thisregard, the ASEAN+3 and EAS are significant markers and can evolve as primacy mechanisms, butthey should not be the only ones. The evolution of the EAS in terms of the states attending is itself
a marker of openness and flexibility needed to move ahead.
Functionality and Interdependence
Second, East Asian regionalism should have functionality and interdependence, notpolitical fixity, ideology or some easy and false sense of shared civilization. One of the mostconstructive factors is the need to manage and cooperate in the face of integration andglobalization. This emphasizes that the new regionalism should be functional. This will test thetendency to include and exclude members on largely political grounds. An example of this would
be in the field of economic and financial cooperation in the region. This has been emphasized in the
ASEAN+3 process and also in the EAS, with the inclusion of India and the Pacific‐2. If we accept
the ASEAN+3 or newer EAS as a fixed or only structures, then we would exclude importanteconomies such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, in preference to smaller and more isolated economies.
The new regionalism should instead be inclusive, with reference to the function that each member
can bring to the issue.

Leadership by Issues
Thirdly, the leadership in East Asian regionalism should be led by issues, and not by great
powers. If we look at traditional modes of regionalism, central leadership seems critical, as
discussed earlier in the chapter for the need of a benevolent great power. However, without ahistorical reconciliation between China and Japan, this will not be possible in East Asia. The region
lacks a single leader who is acceptable and able. There are suggestions that the small and medium
sized countries, such as South Korea, and ASEAN might therefore lead the region.
They may have a special and larger role to play than expected, but they cannot offer
permanent and strong leadership of the traditional type in the region. East Asian regionalism
therefore might have to look at newer and more limited forms of leadership in the region. This
could be offered by having leaders on different issues. Leadership would arise from the initiativeand interests of different state. This would follow principles of equality more closely than the ideaof ‘great power’ leadership. In this way, the new East Asian regionalism might accord with many of
the aspirations voiced in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific.
It is also important that leadership offered in East Asia be one that is benevolent and takes
into account the interests of all, especially the smaller and weaker states. If some Asians chaff
under US domination (which had been relatively benign and even helpful for many in the Cold
War), they should not come together only to exchange one domination for another.
Coalitions of the Willing
Fourth, the region should be led by coalitions of the willing (although some new term may
be necessary, post‐Iraq). The above principles, in total, suggest that East Asian regionalism and its
82manifestation in the EAS should not be a fixed bloc or union with permanent membership andpermanent leaders. Instead it should be a framework for like minded states to caucus and act incoalition. These coalitions can arise from certain issues or even events. They may then dissolve or
evolve to new issues. As the need arises they would work with existing regional and sub‐regional
institutions.
The idea of the EAS has demonstrated this is extending beyond the geographic definitionof East Asia, to raft together other countries such as Australia and New Zealand and India.. But ofcourse in the created foraof the EAS and A+3, where states are agreed participants, the directionof the grouping as a whole needs to proceed at a pace that all can agree to.

Beyond “Asian Values”
Lastly, in giving voice to regionalism, East Asians should avoid a state‐selected version of“Asian values” and identity, as we witnessed in the early 1990s. This had argued that, in the thenpredicted rise of Asia to equality with Europe and North America, Asians could and would
legitimately differ in questions of democracy and human rights. Asians would as such be
exceptions to what are arguably “universal” aspirations and values. We should recognize that themap of governance in East Asia has changed considerably in the last decade by looking at thedevelopments in the states of the EAS.
In ASEAN, the change in Indonesia post Suharto as tipped the scales to make the grouping
as a whole much more comfortable with the ideas of democracy and human rights. After all, in
addition to the new Indonesian democracy, there are vigorous (if imperfect democracies) in
Thailand and the Philippines and voting democracies in Malaysia and Singapore (albeit withdominant parties in place). The ASEAN efforts about Myanmar/ Burma may not succeed inchanging the regime (and certainly not by ASEAN’s sole efforts), but they do reflect changes in
how ASEAN thinks and seeks to act to promote and protect basic standards of democracy, humanrights and governance.
In North East Asia, South Korea and Japan are established democracies. In the wider East
Asia, democracy is very much part of the national ethos in India, Australia, New Zealand.34
I do not mean to argue here that democracy and human rights can and should be entrenchedwithin what East Asians stand for and collectively should promote. I only mean to argue that
defensive and negative attitudes to these ideals, as seen in the earlier Asian values debate, areunwarranted. From this, my more general argument is that East Asians should not rush into
declaring any agreed, “Asian values”, lest an artificial, state‐led list of such values be foisted on the
project. While interactions will increase among East Asians, there are dangers in tying too tightly
the ideas of interdependence (especially economic interdependence) with values or morals in acommunity. We should distinguish between three uses of the idea of increased unity: as
interdependence and cooperation; as increasing similarity between the states and societies that are
so interdependent and cooperative; and as a consciousness of a shared humanity or culture.

34

I have excluded mention of Taiwan, a democracy, as it did not attend the EAS.
83

East Asians should prefer regional institutions and a growing sense of cooperation andidentification with each other, without exceptionalism. Even as Asians cohere more closely, there
can and should be interactions with international norms and practices. Globalization andregionalization, as such, are running in tandem, and not as an either/ or choice.
Three Models for East Asia
The principles that I have suggested above stand in contrast to others, as a range among
three directions or versions about the possible future of East Asian regionalism. These, for
discussion, can be clustered around three “models”.
The first of these would be an “East Asia adrift”. This is much as existed before theASEAN+3 and EAS processes, and (some might argue) still exists today. While different East Asianstates have considerable strengths in economics, security or other fields, the region as a wholeoffers little synergy and positive interactions. Instead, intra‐East Asia engagements continue
without much function, energy, leadership or high aspiration. The regionalism remains fragile andindeed fractured. In this version, nothing much happens. Or certainly nothing happens that upsetsthat present status quo and the USA as the key actor in East Asian affairs.
On the other end of the range of possibilities for an East Asian future is an “East Asian bloc”. In
this, East Asians would aspire to a much higher degree of integration, perhaps ala the European
Union. However, the East Asian bloc would one that would be closed or even opposed to the USA
and other non‐Asian states. It might also be based on a fixed set of “Asian values” as perceived byleaders and elites, rather than being more open to global influences, and the aspirations of citizens.
In between these two poles, a third possible version is one that can be described as “EastAsian Identity without Exceptionalism”. In this scenario, East Asians develop sufficient processes
and institutions to deal with functional interdependence and better recognize an emerging sense of
institutional identity. Yet these identities, institutions and processes remain open to influences fromother states and from within different societies, and evolve over a longer period, allowing for
adjustments.
Some of the principles underlying these three contrasting versions or directions for East
Asian regionalism are outlined in the following table:

East Asia “Adrift”

East Asia “Identity without

East Asian “Bloc”

Exceptionalism”
Membership

Use

Focus on ASEAN, andEast Asian process, centred

East Asian process,Asia‐Pacific processes.

on ASEAN+3, but open to

closed and even

USA, others in region

opposed to USA and

Dialogueandto global institutions

global institutions.

Function and

Ideologyinterdependence
Leadership

ASEAN‐led (ARF), US or

Issue‐led, including smaller
84

Great power

leader‐less rotationand medium sized powers(APEC)
Organization

Identityleadership andrivalry

Informal, minimal“Coalitions of the willing”,

Consenus for unified,secretariats andwith bilateral, ASEAN andregion wide

non‐binding

ASEAN+1 processes, andagreement

undertakings

growing institutionalization“Pacific Way” with

Interdependence andtension between ASEAN

institutional identity“Asian” Values

and Western approaches

Perceptions about ASEAN+3 have warmed both in Northeast Asia and ASEAN. It has also
made some useful contributions with the financial swops arrangement and with the discussion of
the SARS outbreak; both demonstrating the usefulness of this framework in preparing for future
crisis and even helping deal with present ones. There is some optimism looking forward to the first
EAS, notwithstanding the rise in Sino‐Japanese tensions, and possible friction in the US‐China
relationship.
If East Asian regionalism attempts too much it risks opposition from the USA, which may
feel that it is being left out from developments that might impact its strategic interests. If so, there
are dangers that US allies and friends might defect from East Asian efforts. American pressure istraced by a number of accounts to the failures of the earlier proposal by Malaysia’s Dr Mahathir for
an East Asian Economic Grouping and to the idea of the Asian Monetary Fund, discussed earlier.
Given the importance of the US to many Asian states, including its allies Japan, South Korea,
Thailand and the Philippines, strong US opposition is likely to be fatal to the newer regional efforts
as well.
Even left to themselves, East Asians may prefer not to attempt too much, too quickly. The
region’s historical and on‐going divides prevent such commitment and pace. There has, forexample, been no rapprochement between Japan and China. There are also questions ofdevelopmental divides among the 13 states: the gap between Japan and the Lao PDR, for example,
is as stark a gap as any in the world, and far beyond existing gaps in the European Union.
On the other hand, if East Asian regional efforts attempt too little and too slowly, they risk
failure and a downward trend in perceptions with time and perhaps the passing of new events. As
in the case of APEC, differences of expectations among members and the failure to respond tocrisis may change perceptions from positive to negative.
Between these two dangers, the ASEAN+3 and EAS processes should have to balance different
needs and tread something of a middle ground. East Asian regionalism should also be nimble inorder to progress. In this regard, we should come to see that the ASEAN+3 and EAS will not, of
their own, suffice to bring about an East Asian community. While significant, it is not determinedthat the ASEAN+3 or EAS will be the only or main mechanisms for East Asian cooperation and85

community.
Many other institutions and processes can and perhaps will play a part – and often inways that were not originally imagined.

The EAS may well evolve, to include countries that meetits criteria. Some are already proposing Russia and Pakistan to attend the next EAS. There is
fluidity in the regional frameworks that we have to expect, and something of an alphabet soup of
dialogues and processes. After all, this seems to have been the experience in bringing Europe
together, when many institutions other than the European Union played their part. East Asians willneed to learn more from those European experiences and adapt (not blindly adopt) them to theirown circumstances. There will be a certain experimentalism in East Asian regionalism.

Sketching A Region: From A+3 to EAS …and Beyond?
But even if the frameworks for East Asian regionalism will be experimental, it will still beeasier to describe or predict them than it will be to try to answer a more central question: Will thevarious processes – A+3, EAS or whatever else emerges – be effective? Or will these be
epi‐phenomenal, without significant and sustained impacts on the region?
In this section, I shall briefly trace the steps in moving to add the EAS to the A+3, and then briefly
discuss two underlying factors that can determine the success or failure of East Asian regionalism.
The first and perhaps major determining factor is the triangle of relations between the USA, China
and Japan. The second and less emphasized factor is, I suggest, the development of ASEAN and its
ambitions to become a community.
The original notion of an East Asian Community is traced back to a suggestion by the thenpremier of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammed, in 1990. This suggestion was not however taken up
with enthusiasm. Instead, it was torpedoed. Links across the Pacific were instead preferred, toinclude the USA and other partners in the APEC process.
The A+3 process was then launched in the second half of the 1990s, as the first framework
exclusively among Asian member states. While this started slowly, it was notable for increasing
engagement among the Northeast Asian states, and generating a number of schemes for functional
cooperation among the A+3 states. This also revived the echo of Dr Mahathir’s suggestion, of agrouping among Asians only.
On this basis, some began to consider the A+3 as a basis for beginning a community
among East Asians. A group was appointed by the governments to set out a vision for thiscommunity. ASEAN then agreed to hold the first EAS.
As the first EAS approached, the response from the USA to being excluded from Asian summitryhas been mixed, and has changed over time. For a considerable time, it seemed that Washington
DC did not notice the EAS or did not object to its exclusion. Certainly, the earlier summit meetings
among the A+3 leaders elicited no strong opposition from the USA or request to be included.
Yet more soundings from some in the USA in the run up to the EAS indicate a questioning
and perhaps quarrelsome attitude to its exclusion. This has echoed early positions of the USA
against the East Asian Economic Grouping, mooted by then Malaysian premier, Dr Mahathir
Mohammed, even before the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Community. Some have also
86been reminded of the US objection to the idea of the Asian Monetary Fund, mooted by some inJapan and the region, during the financial and economic crises that arose in 1997‐98. In both cases,
a strong American, “No”, combined with doubts among some Asian states to derail these
initiatives.
Yet, for the EAS, even the allies and closer friends of the USA in the region, such as Japan,
South Korea and Singapore, seem to have agreed that the USA should not be included in the firstsummit. The EAS, unlike the earlier suggestion by Mahathir for an EAEC went ahead. Why?
I suggest this was because of accommodations taken to differentiate the EAS from the A+3
and indeed the earlier EAEC proposal. We should recall that the initial expectation among some
was that the EAS would include only the A+3 member states. The major change expected was not achange in who would attend, but that the EAS could be hosted and chaired by one or another of thethree Northeast Asian states, and not only ASEAN member states (as is the case with A+3). This
would, if adopted, have meant that the NE Asian states would more equal in the process and, given
the greater economic and strategic weight of these states, there would be some danger that the NE
Asian states – China, Japan and South Korea – might come to dominate the EAS.

This was not to be.
Rather than being limited to the A+3 states, the EAS that emerged took the effort toinclude other states. There was considerable discussion on who should or should not attend thefirst EAS. Criteria was discussed and finally agreed to decide on states to be invited to the EAS, in
addition to the ASEAN+3 states. The criteria includes acceptance of the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC), a central agreement on interstate relations among ASEAN states and others
who agree to it, in relation to ASEAN.35
With this, the EAS expanded beyond the ASEAN+3 states and even beyond the geographic
notion of East Asia in including India and the Pacific‐2 of Australia and New Zealand. The EAS has
also agreed that stats to host the future summits will, for the present at least, be confined to the
ASEAN member states.
The EAS that has eventuated has several characteristics that differ from the original ideaof the A+3 evolving to be the EAS, and of course the older idea of Mahathir for an EAEC. The firstcharacteristic is that ASEAN will remain the central hub of the new summit process. For all its
relative weakness, ASEAN is the most acceptable central hub with the region, and the EAS
recognizes and consolidates ASEAN’s role.
A second characteristic is the effect of the wider membership. To those who feared apossible domination by China in tension with US interests, this offers expectations that the new35

Many find the TAC uncontroversial in that it reiterates principles of interstate cooperation andthe peaceful settlement of disputes that are drawn from the UN Charter. Indeed, to some the TAC
has even been criticized as being too bland. Some suggest, however, that the TAC requires
neutrality and may run to counter bilateral defence alliances with the USA or other countries. Thissuggestion is held by some notwithstanding that the Philippines and Thailand, both original TAC
signatories, are US allies.
87

framework would be more balanced since Australia is a close US ally and US‐India ties have grownmuch closer in recent years, and this adds the US allies of Japan, South Korea, Thailand and thePhilippines as well as Singapore (which has a strategic framework with the USA) within thegrouping.
A third characteristic is the decision to make the EAS a process that focuses on leaders,with a minimal of scripting and preparatory work by officials. Even when the leaders met, theformat was a “1+1” allowing only one other person in the main room with the leader. This has
meant that the first EAS has provided a useful and direct exchange among the leaders. It alsomeans that the EAS does not enjoy a fuller bureaucratic system to follow up (or indeed initiate)
proposals. One benefit is that the EAS does not, in this regard, attempt to duplicate the A+3
schemes of functional cooperation that have arisen.
A fourth characteristic of the EAS results from the first three. Given ASEAN leadership,
the broader membership, and the focus on leaders, we should expect that the EAS will move
forward slowly. Indeed, the skeptic may wonder if indeed it will move forward at all.36
In addition to these four characteristics of the EAS itself, there are external factors that will impact
the progress of East Asian regionalism, and our perceptions of this phenomenon. Two key factors
are, first, the great triangle of relations between the USA, China and Japan; and, secondly, thedevelopments within ASEAN.

The Great Triangle
It is not possible for this essay to do justice to the fuller considerations of the great triangleof relations in the Asia Pacific between the USA, China and Japan, or even to any single leg of thistriangle. It is however important to sketch some of the ways in which this triangle impacts on East
Asian regionalism.
Where the triangle is stable, and relations among these three major powers is relatively settled,
East Asian regionalism is unlikely to be seen as a possible threat by the USA, or cause fear of
American exclusion. Conversely, where relations within the triangle are tense, this possibility is
increased. The prospects of East Asian regionalism are therefore affected by changes in the great
triangle.
This is perhaps most clearly seen in the US‐China relationship. This relationship has gone
through various ups and downs during the Bush administration alone. At present, it seems to beheading towards an increased sense of competition and tension. There are economic issues such as
the trade surplus and question of the value of the Yuan. There are security issues such as China’s
rearmament, as strongly raised by US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld, as well as the question ofcross‐straits ties. There are perennial questions about democracy, human rights and standards inenvironmental protection and labour rights. As a whole, some might feel that there is broad, if
strange, coalition of Americans against China: from the union‐friendly freeing the loss of36

Looking forward, some now suggest that countries like Russia and Pakistan should join in the
EAS. This remains to be agreed. If the EAS is expanded to include these states, some fear it may
become (more) unwieldly.
88competitiveness and jobs, to the hawkish right wingers, through to those advocating democracy
and human rights abroad.
On China’s part, there is also a segment who believe that a confrontation with the USA isinevitable over these issues or, more generally, simply because the world has not known thepeaceful co‐existence of two great powers. They see the US structure of alliances – both old as wellas post‐9/11 – as efforts to encircle China, not only in East Asia but also in Central Asia and muchof the world. Such thinkers may therefore be supportive of China’s current “charm offensive” andtalk of its “peaceful rise”. But for them, unlike others, these are not as permanent foreign policy,
but only ways to win friends and political space and time for the time being, as the country grows
and strengthens.
How does this impact the rest of East Asia? Looking at this US‐China leg of the triangle,
some would trace one of the reasons for the inclusion of Australia and India for the EAS, as
compared to the A+3. In the A+3 process itself, we may recall that when the process started, theUSA felt relatively comfortable while it was China that showed some initial resistance. Someamong the Chinese expressed concern that the A+3 process was aimed by the rest of the Asianstates at corralling China, like Lilliputians trying to tie down Gulliver. China’s emphasis, at thatpoint, was to prefer bilateralism in its dealings with Asian states, notably in relation to conflicting
claims with different ASEAN member states over the South China Seas. However, more recently,
China seems to much more comfortable and indeed supportive of the A+3, and has also embraced
intra‐Asian multilateralism. On the still fraught question of the South China Seas, it has supported
a code of conduct among the claimant states. China has conducted a very successful “charm
offensive” and increased its influence among Asian states, including most in ASEAN. Thus China
has warmed to the A+3 process and has come to engage actively and prominently in the framework.
Indeed, its presence in the A+3 has been so strongly felt that some have feared that, again like
Gulliver, China would not just burst the bonds tied by the Lilliputians, but pull them along at theend of the string.
How China responds to the EAS framework remains to be seen. But at present, my readingis that China will go along with the EAS but is expecting that the A+3 will remain the more
important and functional regional framework. This view is also taken in a number of ASEAN
member states, including Malaysia who hosted the EAS and has developed close relations with
China.
The growing regional role and influence of China has impacted another leg of the great
triangle, between China and Japan. Sino‐Japanese relations have remained poor and indeed grown
more tense in recent years. The visits by Japanese premier Koizumi to the Yazakuni shrine, and theprotests in response to the visits, are emblems of this, with violent protests in the streets of China
and a diplomatic impasse to high‐level meetings. Worse, simmering beneath the shrine visits arewider and deeper differences about war time issues, and history books. Looking ahead, the view isbifurcated. On one hand, the economic figures of trade and investment show deep
complementarities between the two economies, for mutual benefit. On the other hand, there
appears to be some danger of a political competition and even conflict, underscored by China’s
89

efforts to strength her military forces and develop its maritime capabilities, in tandem with Japan’s
seeming wish to be a “normal” country with an unabashed military capacity. Nationalism in bothcountries seems to be resurgent and may be of a narrow, nastier type in some quarters.
These difficulties in Sino‐Japanese relations matter a great deal to the project of East Asian
regionalism. East Asian regionalism would gain tremendously if these two Asian giants could
come to a rapprochement, akin to the French‐German partnership that drove European integration.
East Asian regionalism can survive and proceed (albeit with some uncertainty and less pace) if
Sino‐Japanese relations are cool. But if Sino‐Japanese relations turn sharply for the worse – to a
frosty cold or even boiling over – this could disrupt the early beginnings of East Asian regionalism.
In recent years, ASEAN member states have seen a form of positive competition between
the two giants in relation to them, as China and then Japan have come forward to offer FTAs andforms of assistance. But this sense of positive competition may be turning for the worse. When we
look at Japan’s ties to ASEAN member states and to its nearest neighbour, South Korea, we may
have to conclude that Japanese influence in the region seems to have ebbed in a number of respects,
despite its continuing largesse to many of the states in the region.
Given this, Japan seems to have faced something of a choice in its foreign policy priorities:
whether to continue and intensify its efforts to strengthen relations with the rest of Asia, or tore‐prioritise its relations with the USA and a more global role, in tandem with the USA. Whileperhaps the choice is never as stark or clear, there are signs and statements by Japanese leaders thatthey have chosen to re‐prioritise their alliance with the USA. An alliance once described as being
adrift by the well known Japanese commentator, Yoichi Funabashi, has now been celebrated byboth American and Japanese leaders as a key priority.
There are those who expect that, as such, Japan will begin to play a larger role in global
affairs, including peace keeping and the use of its military power. If this characterization ofJapanese policy choices is correct, this has a strong impact on the prospects of an East Asian
regionalism that, while not being anti‐American, is more independent of the USA than it ispresently.

What Can ASEAN Do?
In its near 40 years of existence, ASEAN has had its share of both critics and lovers.
Criticisms mounted especially after the 1997 financial crisis when the grouping was unable tocooperate to address the cross‐border flows that affected so many of its member states, and also
stood to one side on political and security issues, such as the separation of East Timor fromIndonesia. There was a sharp fall in ASEAN’s standing. In the years since, the rise of China now
occupy many more minds than the happenings in ASEAN. So too does India. A visible sign of thiswas the decision by US Secretary of State Rice in 2004 whose first tour of Asia was marked by avisit to India and then to China, leapfrogging over Southeast Asia. In that same year, she skipped
the annual ARF.
In 2006, almost a decade after the crisis, how should we look at ASEAN? Is it a central andinfluential player in Asia and the Pacific, or a powerless, marginal association? Has ASEAN
90

responded to the challenges of these recent years, and what direction do these responses signal forthe grouping?
There was an initial denial in some quarters that ASEAN needed to respond and change tothe challenges of globalization, as revealed in the 1997 crisis and its aftermath. However, more andmore ASEAN leaders and policy‐makers have come to recognize that changes are needed. Changes
are afoot within ASEAN. These will evolve the “ASEAN way” and modes of cooperation among its
member states. Indeed, these changes will, if carried through, transform the grouping. Thesechanges, moreover, are important not only to ASEAN member states and their peoples as“internal” issues to ASEAN. Potentially, these changes will also have “external” consequences, toimpact ASEAN’s standing and its ability to influence the relations among major powers in thewider region.
ASEAN leaders at their summit in 2003 declared their ambition to create an ASEAN
community. This community will feature three pillars – in the spheres of economics, security andsocio‐cultural affairs – that are presently being discussed and defined. The leaders have also
commissioned an eminent persons group (EPG) to consider an ASEAN Charter. These initiatives
have been followed up with discussions and plans among ASEAN officials. There is anunderstanding that grouping must go beyond the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) towards
greater economic integration. ASEAN Defence Ministers met in 2006, for the very first time. The
Charter EPG has met thrice and expects to deliver its report by end 2006.
The ASEAN skeptic can of course point out that these are merely meetings, with no clear
cut deliverables to date. This is true. However, those watching ASEAN more closely may discern a
difference in the level of ambition, and the conception of ASEAN. The agreement to move towards“community” is not banal, but represents a quite radical change in conception for ASEAN, which
for so long was seen and defended as an “association”. The differences between these concepts of“community” and “association” are considerable, and portend fundamental changes in how theASEAN member states cooperate, and to what ends they should cooperate. A new direction has
been set.
The pace in which ASEAN can move in this new direction remains to be seen. Given thediversity of its member states – in economics, political systems, culture and experience with thewider world – it will likely be difficult to move quickly. However, the political will among most
ASEAN member states to make those changes is now higher than it has been before.There is more
effort and thinking about making ASEAN’s workings stronger and more efficient. Issues are being
considered, like the norm of non‐intervention, the weakness of the ASEAN secretariat, and the lackof development assistance and transfers amongst ASEAN member states.
The need for ASEAN to go beyond official circles is also more recognized. Consultation with
non‐governmental organizations, with businesses and with national Parliaments is beginning tochange the circle of voices that guides developments in the region.

Even more, efforts are

beginning to reach out to the wider publics in the member states; to make ASEAN better known tothe peoples.
These internal changes represent a quite radical rethinking about ASEAN; not just by91

intellectuals and observers, but also those who are in power, and advising governments. Before thecrisis, most ASEANists disregarded European models of community building as being unsuitableand unnecessary. Today, there is more interest in learning from other regional experiments, even if
the mandate is to adapt and not to blindly adopt. We should expect that ASEAN will change, more
quickly than in the past, even if not fast enough to satisfy some.
As such developments unfold, ASEAN will move towards what some scholars havetermed, “legalization” – with norms and rules that are agreed and then are monitored forcompliance. This does not necessarily mean that ASEAN will become as institutionalized andlegalistic as some other regional groupings, like the European

Union. Nor will the ASEAN

secretariat and organs be transformed overnight into autonomous bodies like the European
Commission. But these trends in the increased importance of rules, institutions and rule
compliance suggest a marked shift from previous ASEAN habits of informality and having veryminimal institutions. This is important work not only for ASEAN in itself, but for the grouping’s
potential in influencing regional order.
The changes outlined above promise to transform ASEAN internally. They also potentiallyaffect how ASEAN relates to other powers in the wider region. It has been an oft‐declared ambition
for ASEAN to be in the driver’s seat for such relations; this aspiration remains in that place in the
ARF. Doubts however have emerged in the past years of the crisis about the ability and indeed thecredibility of ASEAN in this role. Bilateral ties with the USA have been reinforced. The rise of
China and its influence has also been marked and some believe that it will seek to play a larger andperhaps dominant regional role. Others, looking at the continuing role of Japan and the rise ofIndia, suggest the rise of a concert of powers to accommodate the different Asian powers.
Some believe that, in this context, ASEAN is doomed to be a marginal presence. Yet, while
it is true that ASEAN cannot and does not harbor ambitions to contend for power, ASEAN ispresently a default hub for relations in the region. Looking forward, I would argue that ASEAN
can indeed be a significant player as a “soft power” in the region. This conception of “soft power”,
first developed by Joseph Nye, defines the ability to influence and achieve one’s ends, even without
the raw calculations of military strength and of economic prowess.
ASEAN’s present place as a hub in the region is marked by three phenomena: the free trade
agreements in Asia; the ASEAN+3 process; and the East Asian summit. These are limited to Asianstates and possibly offer the beginnings of a regional order that gives expression to a nascent Asian
regionalism.
The evolution of free trade and economic agreements among Asians is an example of this.
The offer by China to ASEAN for a free trade agreement (FTA) may be seen to be a major impetus
for Japan to go beyond the economic partnership agreement that it concluded with Singapore (theJSEPA), and reach out to some ASEAN member states with bilateral FTAs. After initial agreementswith the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, it is expected that Japan will also negotiate a wider
FTA with ASEAN as a whole. These FTA developments have, in turn, played a part in influencing
South Korea to begin a negotiation with ASEAN. Taken together with ASEAN negotiations with
Australia‐New Zealand, and with India, we may surmise that ASEAN has become a default hub for92

economic relations among the Asian states.
While some or much of this may result from the rivalries between China on one hand, andthe USA, Japan and US surrogates on the other, there are positive aspects of these developments
for both ASEAN, and (arguably) for the wider region. For rather than splitting ASEAN and theregion into two spheres of influence, thus far, these developments have helped East Asia take steps
towards closer economic cooperation and integration – albeit in a patchwork manner, rather than agrand design for community or union. The evolution of the EAS is imprinted by these same factors.
As discussed earlier in this essay, the EAS re‐emphasizes the central position for ASEAN to play inregional order, as a grouping most acceptable to all.
However, ASEAN must recognize the role it currently occupies is a default role. ASEAN is in thecentre not because of its intrinsic and irreducible strength or worth but because there is no otheracceptable actor. In some senses, ASEAN’s main “strength” is its relative weakness and neutrality.
While ASEAN enjoys this hub status, it should avoid choosing between aligning itself with one
major power or another, either broadly or (worse) permanently.
ASEAN should increasing work towards sharing perspectives towards the major powers
and developing common stances in their relations. This is ambitious, given the diversity among
ASEAN member states in their economic, political and cultural outlooks. But steps in this direction
are not impossible; this is especially if we accept that the common points among ASEAN member
states need not be comprehensive to cover all issues in advance, and instead seek to develop themmore organically, in response to new undertakings and events. For example, in the negotiation of
the ASEAN‐China FTA, ASEAN member states are finding that, despite and because of theirdifferences, they do best to sit down together to discuss and understand each other’s positions
before responding to China. Other examples show the possibility and strength of common
agreement on political and security issues: ASEAN’s common stance on China after the Mischief
Reef incident in the early 1990s, and of course, the unity of the then ASEAN member states inpursuing their political campaign against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In like manner,
if ASEAN member states can confer amongst themselves on vital issues concerning the major
powers, on a timely basis, they can similarly seek out shared positions that may well accommodate
their diversity, and better advance their common interests; somewhat akin to a limited form of acommon foreign policy.
In this way, ASEAN should aim to emerge as a “soft power” in the region, whose norms, values
and institutions are admired as being acceptable and indeed something of a model for the region.
Thus far, ASEAN’s relations with the major powers in Asia (and indeed with each other) havepredominantly been viewed through the optic of realism and calculations of power. But this mustchange in the future and be complemented by a greater recognition of the potential role of ASEAN
as a “soft power”,
ASEAN is working towards greater integration among its member states and, in theprocess, reviewing its norms and institutions for cooperation. We must expect that, in a number ofareas, especially concerning ASEAN economic integration, rules and rule enforcement within
ASEAN will be more greatly emphasized than in the past. The institutions of ASEAN, including
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the ASEAN secretariat and the meetings of the senior officials, will also need to be consolidated
and focused to be more efficient and effective. It is critical that ASEAN must emphasize and work
towards ASEAN community, the “internal” goal discussed earlier.
These internal and external changes and challenges intertwine for ASEAN. The role for
ASEAN in the region cannot be predicated on calculations of power. Rather, if ASEAN is toinfluence the region, its contributions and role will be in the nature of developing norms andinstitutions for the wider region. Part of these will inevitably draw from ASEAN norms and modesof cooperation. For example, in the coming together of the EAS, each attending state was required
to have accepted the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This exemplifies the ability and useof having ASEAN serve to guide the regional development in terms of its norms and values.
However, while ASEAN ways may be commended for the wider regional order, theycannot and should not be commanded.

Indeed, ASEAN must recognize that its own modes andnorms are evolving, and remain open to change and improvement. This often reflects the internalchanges within ASEAN member states. For instance, the emphasis that ASEAN has brought to bearon the domestic situation in Myanmar is not merely reflective of the downward trend in thatcountry. It also reflects the upsurge in the ethos of democracy among some other member states,
especially in post‐Suharto Indonesia. This emphasis on democracy would have been unimaginable
in the pre‐crisis ASEAN. It demonstrates how ASEAN is evolving and incorporating new norms
and values into its expectations for its member states and how they are to cooperate with eachother.
Such an evolution stands ASEAN in good stead. The potential contribution of ASEAN lies not intrying to balance power with power in Asia. ASEAN’s potential in influencing the regional orderlies instead in a renewed form of “open regionalism” with norms and values, and the developmentof ASEAN “soft power” in handling its own region and also providing possible models for wider
regional cooperation and order.

How We Should RespondBased on the observations offered above, I shall now turn to some policy recommendations for
those Asians in the EAS, for ASEAN, and for the USA.
The future of East Asian regionalism and community does not lie, however, exclusively within
Asian hands. Given the role of the USA in the region, what it does and how it responds isimportant and indeed critical to the emerging regionalism. There is some sense that East Asian
regionalism has come this far, towards the first EAS, because Washington DC did not notice it, or if
it did, that it was comfortable that its primary interests would not be adversely affected. Otherwise,some believe, that an American “veto” would have been exercised, as it was against Mahathir’s
proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping.
During the ASEAN+3 processes, US suspicion and antagonism was largely avoided. This is due, inpart, to the pre‐existing APEC framework that has not been displaced by the ASEAN+3. Anotherpositive factor was the generally supportive attitude of most East Asian countries to the USA,post‐911, despite the sentiment of some of the peoples of the region. A third factor was that the94

USA seems to have been preoccupied and, if indeed Washington DC’s thinkers considered theprospects of East Asian regionalism, thought it very limited. This appears to be changing with the
EAS. While American interest in East Asia is critical and much wanted, a sense of alarm, andAmerican opposition to the EAS and East Asian community are unwarranted and would becounter productive.
The USA can legitimately rely on its allies and friends in the region to ensure that its/ theirvital interests are not compromised by whatever might happen at the EAS. Indeed, all of East Asia
would be well served if such bilateral dialogues between the USA and its Asian allies like Japan,
Australia, Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines, and other close friends like Singapore,
would be energized and directed towards a dialogue on the EAS and underlying issues and factors
in East Asian regionalism. In this, I would hope that Asian perspectives on the five factors that thispaper has surveyed might be conveyed to the USA. This is especially as regards different andvaried Asian perspectives on the rise of China, and on America’s policies, post 9/11.
We should however have caution over what might be called, “excessive bilateralism” inwhich one or more US allies and friends would be seen (or see themselves) as surrogates to protect
any and all US interests to the point that it might up‐end the East Asian efforts at going forward.
One sign of such “excessive bilateralism” has been the suggestion that the US will engage inmilitary training with Japan and Australia, which some have regarded as a warming up of apotential alliance to counter and contain China. To be a useful friend to the USA in Asia, thesestates will have to realize that they must be in and of Asia, as much as to be a US friend.
Having said what I hope the USA will not do, what positive suggestions can be offered? Given myargument that the ASEAN+3 and EAS cannot be the only mechanisms, I would point to thepossibilities of increasing and deepening US engagement with East Asians in different fora. Twoexisting processes that deserve greater attention and effort are APEC and the ASEAN Post
Ministerial Dialogue with the USA.
In asking that we relook at APEC, we should be reminded that APEC itself initiallyrepresented a change in US policies. In the 1990s, there was a policy shift for the US, through then
Secretary of State Baker, to express support for a new Asia Pacific architecture, which would
comprise a framework for economic integration, a commitment to democratization, and arevamped defense structure for the region. The Clinton administration embraced the concept ofmultilateral security dialogue as one of the four pillows of the ‘new Pacific community’, andexpressed support for several potential areas of dialogue including APEC.
There were several considerations that contributed to Washington’s appraisal of policies
and APEC, but none was more important than the prediction that US power could no longer
perform the coordinating role characteristic of the Cold War period. The assessment by many inthis period was that the two traditional pillars of American predominance in Asia – the American
wallet in the form of its markets and overall financial presence, and the US security muscle from its
bilateral alliances and military bases – were both diminishing assets.
This possibility has thus far remained unproven. Indeed, the past decade seems to havegone in the opposite direction, with the USA emerging as the pre‐eminent power.
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Nevertheless, I would argue that APEC needs to be re‐energized as an overarching
relationship with Pacific Asia (ASEAN, Northeast Asia, the Pacific‐2 of Australia and New Zealandand India). This would be a good forum to address trans‐Pacific issues, to place China‐US relations
in a broader context, and also to serve as a safety net in the event that, as was earlier predicted,
traditional sources of American influence – of its economic wallet and its security muscle – should
wane. APEC’s broad agenda of cooperation can also be useful for the USA to demonstrate a muchbroader engagement with Asia, beyond the sometimes singular focus on terrorism and security.
Some have already suggested that the USA needs to be more mindful of public relations
and perceptions in East Asia. I would go further to suggest that a real dialogue about US policies
and their communication is needed, to guard against unintended consequences and the continued
reduction of their “soft power” to influence and persuade, and serve as an example to be admiredand emulated.
In re‐looking at the ASEAN‐US post ministerial conference, Americans sometimes wonder
why they should bother at all with a grouping of ten smaller to middle sized countries. Terrorism
post 9/11 has provided something of an answer and reason for American attention to the region.
But terrorism is also proving a narrow lens that obscures as much as it reveals.
One thing that seems to have been obscured is the relative importance of ASEAN in East
Asian regionalism. In addition to the ASEAN+3 process, it should be noted that ASEAN is the hub
for trade and economic ties. There are also separate spokes under negotiation to link it to China,
Australia‐New Zealand, and India, as well as discussions of links to Japan and to South Korea.
Much of this has been possible not because of ASEAN’s strength – whether economic or in terms of
security. Rather, it has been because of ASEAN’s political acceptability in providing a relatively
neutral and positive hub to many different states in Asia.
Additionally, Some ASEAN member states like Singapore and Thailand have also shown
themselves to be capable of taking initiative through bilateral agreements and then helping steer
the rest of ASEAN in the same direction. ASEAN’s own integrative efforts towards an economic
community, and with security and socio‐cultural communities coming after, also bear mention.
In this regard, it would serve the USA well to engage ASEAN more fully and in morerounded perspectives as a means of remaining engaged and vital to East Asian developments. A
free trade agreement with more ASEAN member states or with ASEAN as a whole would be one
policy option. At present, the USA has only concluded an FTA with Singapore.
Another suggestion would be to have an ASEAN‐US summit, regularly if not annually.
China, Japan and others in East Asia already have such arrangements with ASEAN. I havepreviously suggested that, in part, this can be achieved on the sidelines of the APEC Summit asseven out of the 10 ASEAN member states attend the APEC Summit (from the US point of view, it
is politically significant that Myanmar/ Burma is not one of them). This eventuated in 2005, in themonths before the EAS. At the very least, this practice should be continued, with the prospect of afull summit for the future.
In sum, to the Americans, I would make the following suggestions. First, the USA must
accept and understand its exclusion from the first EAS and many of the emerging East Asian
96

frameworks. Secondly, all EAS states and especially those who are allies and friends of the USA
should seek to ensure that while the EAS does not include the USA as a participant, the vitalinterests that they share with the USA are sufficiently accounted for and protected. Efforts toconvey this to the USA, both as intentions going into the EAS and as results emerging from it,should be redoubled. To Asians and especially Americans, I suggest that we need to work to revive
relations across the Pacific and indeed take the existing relationships and institutions to new andhigher levels. In this, relations of the USA with states in Asia must broaden beyond the almost
singular focus on the global war against terrorism that some feel in dealings with Washington DC
and rise above the existing base that provided by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) processes.
It is not however only the USA to whom I would offer policy suggestions in proceedingwith East Asian regionalism. Asians and ASEAN too have responsibilities to undertake.
To the Asians, I suggest that we should be prepared to develop closer intra‐Asian
cooperation on issues of common concern, to deal with both regional issues as well as impacts
arising from globalization. However, while we may wish for a rapprochement between China andJapan, this cannot be commanded and there are few signs of a resolution at hand. Without this, I
suggest that East Asians must be prepared to be patient and work for the long term, and through aseries of patchwork and more limited cooperative schemes, rather than expecting a clear regional
vision to be annunciated and agreed shortly.
Therefore, for the near and middle term, East Asia will be more of a framework forcooperation and understanding, rather than a “community”; a word that suggests many more anddeeper shared bases and values for coming together. East Asians will need a vision of their future,
but they will also need pragmatism and patience in their efforts to achieve those visions.
Practically applied, East Asians may well have to accept that major “hard security” issues such as
the cross Straits issue and North Korea will be beyond East Asians for the present and foreseeable
future, and be slower and more diffident in approaching issues of political and security concerns.
East Asians may wish instead to focus on issues of functional cooperation and economic
agreements. These are of no lesser importance in many ways. Indeed, given different conceptionsof security, if East Asians can cooperate effectively on issues such as preventing a new financial
crisis or pandemics, and dealing with major natural disasters like the Tsunami and the earthquake
in Java, these are arguably contributions that will benefit ordinary Asians in ways that are asimportant (if not more so) than the hard security issues.

If East Asians wish for more ambition,

their attention and cooperation in the middle term might turn to issues such as Myanmar – which
would centrally involve India and China alongside ASEAN – or Timor Leste.
To ASEAN, I suggest that they must recognize they are presently a hub for East Asia’s regionalism
and must seize this opportunity to contribute to the process positively. ASEAN’s role musthowever be recognized as resulting from a default in relations among the major Asian powers, andcannot be taken for granted. ASEAN can and should therefore seek to grow into this default role bymoving ahead clearly and quite quickly with its ambitions for an ASEAN community, in the fuller
sense of that word, “community”.
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As it does go forward with these ambitions, ASEAN should also seek to emerge as a “softpower” in Asia, with a positive influence arising from the values, norms and institutions that itpractices and embodies, as a model for the wider region. The ASEAN processes and institutions,and the ASEAN Regional Forum, must be strengthened accordingly. ASEAN member states mustalso continue to strengthen their habits of dialogue on issues on which they will face differences
and seek to find more common positions and indeed policies in respect of important issues in theirrelations with the major powers. The national interests of each ASEAN member state does not need
to be abandoned, but skilful diplomacy and some degree of restraint will be needed to bring
ASEAN closer together and make it more effective in the wider region.
Conclusion: Visions, Contingencies and Assurances
Some hanker for a longer‐term vision or roadmap for East Asian regionalism. This is notnotwithstanding the fact that an East Asian Vision Group, formed by experts and eminent persons,has concluded its work some years ago with a broad report. Like Europe, they hope for politiciansand others to give regular affirmation to an ideal of union, of community, or some other form ofdeeper association and integration in the region.
There are very real limits to a realism that is bereft of ideals and broader visions andvalues. Yet I would argue that ideals, visions and values in East Asia should be more appropriately
developed over the longer term, rather than concocted here and now by governments or theirsurrogates.
There are doubts, contestation and differences among East Asian members that I havetouched upon and that cannot be wished away. Given this, if we were to attempt another vision,
the vision would in some ways be captive to these differences. As such, rather than a vision thatmight unify the governments and peoples of the region, it may instead divide them.
A hasty declaration of visions, values and ideals for East Asian regionalism may also unnecessarily
upset relations with the USA. This is not just an issue for those in the region who are friends andallies of the USA, but also for those whose relations remain in balance, or are in flux.
For much that is happening in East Asian regionalism is necessarily contingent andcontested. This is not only the situation within and among Asians, with different histories,
priorities and hopes. The sense of contingency and contestation is also present when we think, as
we must, of the relations between a more institutionalized East Asian process and identity and theUSA, which has been for so long and is still in many respects the predominant pillar of the region,even if it is not physically part of it.
What we should therefore seek to offer in the near term, over the next few years, is not a
new vision of East Asia or a categorical decision about Asia‐American relations. Assurances
instead should be offered.
These assurances relate to the principles for East Asian regionalism that should be
preferred – such as its openness and functionality – as well as to the willingness and even fondwish to broaden and deepen engagement with the USA in parallel to East Asian regionalism.
Such assurances do not of course settle things for the long term. However, I hope that if
given and taken, such assurances would allow the emerging and still nascent sense of East Asian
98

regionalism to go forward with an America that is not watching as an outsider in alarm or
opposition, nor ignoring these developments. Rather, with these assurances, Asians can hope foran America that is fully engaged and watchful with both anticipation and awareness that if things
go right, East Asian regionalism can better serve both Asia and US engagements in Asia.

Selected References•

Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of South East Asia, Oxford
University Press, 2000.

•

Lowell Dittmer, “East Asia in the New Era in World Politics”, World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1(Oct. 2002), p. 52•

Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional
Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

•

Rosemary Foot et al (eds.) Order and Justice in International Relations, Oxford University
Press, 2003.

•

Funston, J. (1998), ASEAN:

Out of its Depth. In Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.20 No.1

(April).
•J. Garofono, “Power, Institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Asian Survey 42(3)(May/ June 2002), p.502‐521.

•

Goldstein, Judith, et al (eds.) Legalization and World Politics, MIT Press, 2001•

JCIE, Cross Sectoral Partnerships in Enhancing Human Security, Third Intellectual Dialogue
on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, JCIE 2000.

•

Victor Mallet, “Introduction: A Miracle that Went Sour”, in the Trouble with Tigers, 1998,
p.1‐23.

•

Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (London: Oxford University press, 2002).

•

TV Paul and John Hall (eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics,
Cambridge University press, 1999.

•

Peter Preston, “Reading the Asian Crisis: History, Culture and Institutional Truths”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20 No.3, Dec 1998, p.241‐260.

•

Ruggie, J. (1993). Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. In J. Ruggie (ed.),Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York:
Columbia University Press.

•

Simon SC Tay, Hadi Soesastro and Jesus Estanislao (editors) Reinventing ASEAN, ISEAS
2001.
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•

Simon SC Tay (editor), “Sketching Regional Futures: Pacific Asia in 2022”, JCIE 2004.

•

Simon SC Tay, “ASEAN and East Asia; A New Regionalism?” in Reinventing ASEAN(ISEAS, 2001), p.206‐225.

•

See Simon SC Tay, Asia, America and Global Governance, published in Global Governance(Winter 2003)•

Simon SC Tay, A More Insecure World: Conflicting Perspectives, Security Dialogue, Vol 36(3): 402‐404, Sage publications, 2005.

•

Tay, S. (1996), Human Rights, Culture and the Singapore Example. McGill Law Journal,
Vol.41 No.4 (August).

•

Tay, Simon, “Asia and the United States After 9/11: Primacy and Partnership across the
Pacific”, in the Fletcher Forum on International Affairs, Vol. 28:1 Winter 2004, at p. 113‐132.

•

Walt, S. (1987), The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

•

Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison‐Wesley
Publishing Company.

１

Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security
18, 3 Winter 1993; 5-33.
２
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2006, 1.
３
ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation,” 28 November 1999,
http://www.aseansec.org/2051.htm.
４“Higashiajia Kyodotai ni Hantai [My Opposition to East Asian Community],” Asahi Shimbun, May 1,
2005.
５Naoki Tanaka, http://www.21ppi.org/japanese/hitokoto/tanaka215.html
６
Taro Yayama, “Chugoku no Higashiajia Kyodotai Sakubo ni noruna [Don’t Play Along with China’s
Schemes for East Asian Community],” Sankei Shimbun,December 22, 2005
７
Mineo Nakajima, “Higashiajia Kyodotai ha Genjituron nanoka?” Sankei Shimbun, August 1, 2005.
８
Toshio Watanabe, “Higashi ajia kyodotai ha seiritsu suruka [Can East Asia community be built?]” in
Nihon no Higashi Ajia Senryaku [ Japan’s Policy towards East Asian Economic Integration, Toyo
Keizai Shinposha, 2005, 207.
９Ibid., 218
１０Noboru Hatakeyama, “Higashiajia Kyodotai no Genso wo Suteyo [Give up the Fantasy of East
Asian Community],” Chuokoron, September 2005, 154-161.
１１
Hitoshi Tanaka, “21seiki Nihongaiko no Senryakuteki Kadai [Strategic Issues for 21st Century
Japanese Diplomacy],” Gaiko Forum, No.207, (October 2005), 8-13.
１２
Makoto Taniguchi, “Kikiteki Ajia Gaiko wo Ikani Tatenaosuka [How Will We Remake Asian
Diplomacy?],” Chuo Koron,, 2006 April, 314.
１３
Yoshihide Soeya, “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai Tenbo to Kadai: Kyuukyoku wa Anzen Hosho Kyodotai[East Asian Community: Problems and Prospects – A Security Community is the Ultimate Goal],”Nihon Keizai Shimbun,, November 28, 2005.
１４
Takashi Shiraishi, “ASEAN Jiku ni Tenkai [Evolution of East Asian Community around ASEAN],”
Yomiuri Shimbun, September 4, 2005.
１５
Denis C.Blair and John T.Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security100Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly, vol.24, no.1, Winter 2001.
１６
Karl W. Deutcsh, Sidney A.Burrell, Robert A.Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichteman, Raymond
E.Lindgren, Francis L.Loewenheim, Richard W.Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957,
１７
Prior to 1999 the data on dialogues was compiled initially by the University of Toronto andsubsequently by the University of British Columbia.
１８Japan Center for International Exchange, Dialogue and Research Monitor: Towards Community
Building in East Asia, Vol 3 July-December 2004, iv.
１９“Database on the Functional Cooperation Progressing in the ASEAN+3 and Other Regional
Frameworks in East Asia,” compiled by Government of Japan in June 2005 shows 48 regionalframeworks by ASEAN+3 for functional cooperation.
２０
ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm
２１
APEC secretariat, 2001 APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: Meeting New Challenges in the New
Century, Shanghai, China, 21 October 2001,
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2001.html
２２
APEC secretariat, 2002 APEC Leaders’ Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth,
Los Cabos, Mexico, 26 October 2002,
http://www.apec.org/leaders_declarations/2002/statement_on_fighting.html
２３
APEC secretariat, APEC Leaders Issue Counter-Terrorism Statements,
http://www.apec.org/apec/news_media/2002_media_releases/261002_mex_leader
２４
APEC secretariat, APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the
Future, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 October 2003,
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2003.html
２５
APEC secretariat, APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting Busan Declaration, Busan, Korea, 18-19
November 2005, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/leaders_declarations/2005.html
２６
ASEAN secretariat, ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing, Bandar Seri Begawan,
30 July 2002, http://www.aseansec.org/12004.htm
２７
ASEAN secretariat, ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Strengthening Transport Security
Against International Terrorism, Jakarta, 2 July 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16250.htm
２８
Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, “Safety and Security in the Malacca andSingapore Straits: An Agenda for Action,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Policy Paper, May
2006, 8.
２９
Yoshihiko Yamada, Umi no Terorizumu [Maritime Terrorism], PHP Shinsho, 2003, 158-163.
３０
http://nagpf.org
３１
East Asia Vision Group Report 2001, Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace,
Prosperity and Progress Paragraph 73.,
３２
ibid., paragraph 74.
３３
The White House, ”Fact Sheet: President Bush and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2005/07/20050727-11.html
３４
The Council on East Asia Community(CEAC), Policy Report “The State of the Concept of East
Asian Community and Japan’s Strategic Response thereto,” August, 2005, 7
３５
United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document, “Joint Statement,” May 1, 2006.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0605.html
３６
Toshio Watanabe, “Higashi ajia kyodotai ha seiritsu suruka [Can East Asia community be built?]” in
Nihon no Higashi Ajia Senryaku [ Japan’s Policy towards East Asian Economic Integration, Toyo
Keizai Shinposha,218
３７Masahiro Kohara, Higashi Ajia Kyodotai [The East Asian Community], Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2005,
248

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6. Minutes of Discussions
Session I: An East Asian Community after the First East Asian Summit
Opening Remarks

Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Professor Ito Kenichi welcomed the participants to “The Japan‐US‐Asia Dialogue: An East
Asian Community and the United States.” He noted that in looking back at the history of regional
integration of East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 played a key role in awakening the people of theregion to the need for a regional approach to solve the problems they face.
Immediately after the crisis, East Asia’s interregional trade share was only 34 percent. It
reached as high as 53 percent in 2003, which can be compared very well with the 45 percent rate of
NAFTA and the 60 percent rate of the EU the same year. It cannot be denied that the institutionalframework of ASEAN+3 has worked very well and supported this growth of economic integration.
However, the definition of “East Asia” has never been self‐evident and has been subject to redefinition.
The first occasion to reexamine the membership of East Asia came in December 2005 when thefirst East Asian Summit (EAS) was held in Kuala Lumpur. In addition to the ASEAN+3 memberspresent at the meeting, Australia, New Zealand, and India were also invited. However, the status of
those three countries was never clear, presumably because it was a reflection of the status of the EAS
itself.
The question of the relationship between an East Asian Community (EAC) and the US is aquestion both quantitatively and qualitatively different from the membership issue of any other country
within or outside the region. The reason is because it is a life‐and‐death issue for the EAC. Its economic
prosperity depends on exports to the US market and it security rests on the guarantee provided by the
US. Yet, the US is not a country in the region. It cannot be a member of the region for the same reason
that Japan cannot be a member of NAFTA. The only way to solve this conundrum is to find a modus
operandi that will treat the US with some sort of special status in an East Asian Community.

Moderator

Prof. TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, the University of Tokyo

Professor Tanaka Akihiko explained that the morning session, “An East Asian Community
after the First East Asia Summit,” would focus on the current state of the region following the first East
Asian Summit in December 2005. He then invited Dr. Jimbo to begin the paper presentations.

102

Paper Presenter A

Dr. JINBO Ken, Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on
International Relations (JFIR)

Dr. Jimbo Ken noted that the idea of an East Asian Community has captured many Japaneseand East Asian audiences, provoking a wide debate over its possibility and viability. Particularobservers do not always recognize the concepts of East Asia or an East Asian Community. Althoughthese concepts are still dynamic processes in the making, there are several aspects to them that must berecognized as common. For example, although the geographical boundaries of East Asia have been set
for many years, East Asia as a political process is a quite new phenomenon, no more than two or three
decades old.
Following the Cold War, the Asia‐Pacific concept has developed in a wave of regionalism. It is
important to note that East Asia has been given a rise by various types of regionalism, including
sub‐regionalism, ad hoc regionalism, and ad‐hoc regionalism. One of the most important fundamentals
of East Asia has been the de facto regionalism brought about by interregional economic integration.
During the last 10 years, trade volumes in East Asia have increased by substantial amounts. In 2003, theinterregional trade share marked 53.3 percent (including Taiwan and Hong Kong), up from 33.6 percent
in 1980. With increased trends of horizontal production networks in the manufacturing sectors, East
Asia has provided the cross‐border “integrated space” to forge dynamic competitiveness.
Functional regionalization in East Asia has been facilitated by a growing awareness ofenormous potential and opportunities of closer regional cooperation and common interests andconcerns, including free trade, financial cooperation and transnational agreements. Such functional
regionalization does not define a fixed relationship for the region.
Finally, we are now seeing the processing of regionalization in East Asia as a community
building. The broadest sense of community could be defined as a group of countries sharing somevalues in common, having a sense of giving oneself to another, and interacting beyond functional bases.
Given such a basis, what we have been experiencing through the EAS shows an interesting track recordof where we are in terms of community building. The EAS was initially regarded as a long termmeasure, but with the strong initiative of the Malaysian government, this idea more quickly came toforce.
The EAS did not create a concrete framework to proceed. Several challenges came acrossduring the EAS. The first unique proposal came from China, which claimed that the EAS should beheld every two years and that ASEAN and non‐ASEAN countries should host the summit in rotation.
Japan, for its part, proposed a co‐chair system with ASEAN and non‐ASEAN participation. Japan also
advocated a broader membership in the EAS to include Australia and the US. However, neither China
nor Japan’s ideas were adopted.
In spring 2005, ASEAN on the initiative of Singapore came up with the consensus of inviting
Australia, New Zealand, and India to the EAS as full partners. ASEAN has created three criteria forparticipation in the EAS: 1) close relations with ASEAN, 2) full dialogue partnership with ASEAN, and1033) a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Whether or not the EAS plays a central role inregional integration in the future, the summit points to potentially bright prospects for regional
integration in East Asia.

Paper Presenter B

Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow,
National Institute for Research Advancement

Dr. Fukushima Akiko remarked that after the first EAS, some observers indicated that theconcept of an East Asian community might fade away, as the summit had, contrary to expectations,failed to discuss a practical path towards, and a modus operandi for, such a regional community.
With respect to East Asian community building, Japan has its share of opponents andproponents, in addition to those who maintain a skeptical position. Opponents of the concept deny thepossibility of creating an EAC even in the area of the economy, arguing that the countries that make up
the region do not share values which would form a basis for community building and, are thus notready to yield sovereignty for a regional community. Proponents, with some degree of caution, see apossibility for building an East Asian community, that includes the political and security fields. The
building of such a community may be necessary for the region’s stability.
Some observers argue that East Asia is rife with rivalry and that it will emerge as a theater for
great power rivalry. Because of these rivalries, globalization, and the de facto regionalization of tradeand non‐traditional security threats, Dr. Fukushima argued that regionalism or regional cooperation isnecessary for East Asia.
An East Asian FTA would certainly bring economic benefits. While there seems to be a broader
consensus on an FTA than political/security cooperation, one issue which must be addressed is how toreconcile current bilateral and regional FTAs with a broader regional initiative. With regard to politicaland security cooperation, East Asia’s security environment is still competitive. There is, thus, aconsensus that the Japan‐US alliance is essential to security. At the same time, transnational security
threats compel the region to promote functional cooperation.
It is noteworthy that APEC has taken up security issues, mainly in respect to terrorism.
ASEAN+3 has addressed security issues and this has been augmented by track 1 and track 2
politico‐security dialogues. In the 1990s, the number of track 2 meetings per year in East Asia peaked at
93 but declined to 20 by the end of the decade, due in part to a lack of results and funding following the1997 Asian financial crisis. However, the number of track 2 dialogues is now increasing.
With respect to functional cooperation, piracy is a shared regional concern which has
prompted the establishment of inter‐governmental cooperation programs. The environment is anotherarea with significant potential for functional cooperation, as is avian flu and other infectious diseases.
Some functional cooperation programs are underway, but these still represent bilateral or sub‐regional
cooperation. It is essential to regionalize functional cooperation; an issue to address is determining the104modalities to make it effective. It is important to ask whether functional cooperation will lead tofunctional integration and eventually to integration or regionalism in Asia. Functional cooperation must
eventually be buttressed by common values and visions for the building of an East Asian community.
To achieve peace and security in Asia, efforts to achieve regionalism are necessary. Process
matters and a roadmap would be useful. Despite the many obstacles, it might be worthwhile toexamine the limits of functional cooperation in a way that would highlight the merits of working
together.

Lead Discussant A

Dr. Edy PRASETYONO, Head of Department of International
Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Dr. Edy Prasetyono commented that there are more questions than answers when talking
about the East Asian Community. In reflecting on the first EAS, there are three points to mention. First,
East Asian community building assumes that the EAS will lead to the establishment of an EAC in the
future. East Asian cooperation should start with functional cooperation. We are in a complex process
and it will be a long‐term undertaking. We do not need to be in a hurry. Like the ASEAN experience, ittakes time to establish a relationship to go forward. Second, during the EAS, ASEAN should remain in
the driving seat in forming an EAC. Some may argue that ASEAN is not a major power so it should not
be in this position. Yet, no other leading East Asian country, such as Japan or China, is trusted to theextent that it can lead the EAC process. Hence, if ASEAN takes the lead, should ASEAN be diluted by
the process of East Asian community building, or should the community building proceed alongside
ASEAN? Third, the future of the EAC depends on political commitments within the countries of theregion.
Dr. Prasetyono then noted that in a meeting with Japan’s ambassador to Indonesia, he was toldthat three criteria for the EAS should be that it is inclusive, not dominated by any power, and havefunctional cooperation.

Lead Discussant B

Dr .Prapat THEPCHATREE, Chair, ASEAN Studies Program, Instituteof East Asian Studies, Thammasat University

Dr. Prapat Thepchatree pointed out that right now there are two forums in East Asia:
ASEAN+3 and the EAS. These two summits are overlapping and the division of labor between themshould be clear. The ASEAN+3 summit should be prioritized as the forum for building an EAC. The
EAS, on the other hand, should be the forum for broad dialogue concerning the region, perhaps
including countries like Australia, the US, Russian, and India.
At present there is no clear idea of the composition of the EAC. Perhaps it should be defined
the way the ASEAN community is defined, namely along three pillars: security community, economic
community, social and cultural community.
105With respect to cooperation, the EAC can expand on existing ASEAN areas of cooperation.
Functionalism should be the key and a building block approach ought to be applied. Perhaps
consideration should be given to creating an East Asian FTA by merging existent bilateral andsub‐regional agreements. Going forward, however, we also must move beyond functionalism andmaybe even be brave enough to be idealistic in moving forward to create an East Asia security
community.

Lead Discussant C

Dr. Charles MORRISON, President, the East‐West Center

Dr. Charles Morrison stated that the EAC is an endeavor to be decided by East Asians. The
European Union, which is driving toward a merging of sovereignty, is not an appropriate model, but
the ʺAtlantic communityʺ may provide useful lessons. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Atlantic
countries fought two world wars, yet in the second half of the 20th century, young people growing up in
France, Germany, the United States, and so forth cannot even imagine their countries in physical conflict,however many differences there may be on specific policy issues. Building this kind of community
is still an aspiration for the Pacific and for East Asia.
What are the challenges? One for the EAC is to define its area since there is no clear
geographic boundary. Another is consistent leadership. It is said that ASEAN is the driver but even
within ASEAN it is difficult to identify a specific leadership with clear commitment to this concept.
Then there is the challenge of substance. Successful communities, whether local and international,
must provide law and order, educate the young in community values, promote prosperity, deal withwelfare problems, handle big challenges (such as avian flu), and connect to outsiders. Without stablestrong domestic societies, states cannot make and keep commitments that are essential to build acommunity.

Free Discussions

All participants

EAC structure
The participants recognized that the processing of creating an EAC would be drawn out.
Concerning the modalities in building an EAC, Ambassador Tajima emphasized that he agreed with Dr.
Prasetyono’s three principles for an EAC, namely 1) no single country should be dominant, 2) it should
be inclusive, 3) it should take functional approach. He also stated that ASEAN should remain the leadplayer at present and that more positive leadership of Japan and China could be expected in the future
after their bilateral relations were improved.
Professor Takahara argued that ASEAN should be the initial driving force toward the creationof the EAC, but that the economic and geographic size of Japan and China require that they both playleading roles in developing the EAC in the future. This position was echoed by many of the participants,of whom some also listed Korea in the group of countries to lead the EAC in the future. Professor Ito, on
the other hand, cautioned that ASEAN might oppose a transfer of leadership to Japan and China, and106

suggested that ASEAN be left in charge of developing the EAC, using the expertise it has gained
through its own integration efforts. Mr. Tay noted that in the case of ASEAN, the member states practicecollective leadership with diverse views.
The participants recognized that an improvement in relations between China and Japan wasan essential precondition for creating an EAC and enabling the two nations to play a leadership role in
the process. Dr. Jimbo expressed regret about the state of tension between Japan and China and pointed
out the while Chinese engagement in East Asia has been rapidly changing, Japan has been unable tocoordinate with China on this issue due to the poor bilateral relations. Dr. Fukushima expressed hopethat relations would improve, as there are signs of improvement in both Japan and China at the politicallevel. In addition, public opinion polls show that on the person‐to‐person level, the Japanese still havepositive attitudes toward the Chinese.
Professor Kimura emphasized that the EAC should not be dominated by any specific country
or group of countries and for that reason, membership in the EAC should be broad and include statessuch as India, Australia and New Zealand, and India. Dr. Thepchatree said there is an implicit
assessment that China will eventually dominate the region, ASEAN+3, and EAC, and as such, countries
are making decisions like a broad EAC to counter China’s perceived eventual dominance. It must berecognized, he stressed, that this is only a theory and that care should be given to learning more about
the Chinese position now and in the future. Finally, Mr. Tay argued for a deliberate approach to creating
the EAC, stating that it would be better to muddle along collecting and formulating views on theprocess instead of acting too quickly even in the face of clear, strong leadership.
EAS structure
Mr. Hashimoto predicted that the EAS would be a good format to see if the ASEAN
experience can be converted across East Asia. Dr. Thepchatree, however, noted that if too muchemphasis is put on the EAS, ASEAN states will lose their common identity and the whole process
might disintegrate, leading to another APEC‐type organization that goes nowhere.
Concerning attendance at the EAS, Ambassador Imagawa pointed out that even with
Australia and New Zealand participation at the event, only one permanent member (China) of the UN
Security Council would be represented. That, he continued, would not be a fair or workablesituation. Reflecting on Cambodiaʹs peace process, attendance of all P5 countries at the ParisInternational Conference on Cambodia (1989‐91) made it successful. Therefore consideration must be
given to inviting other P5 countries such as the US. Russia, France the UK and France must be invited in
the EAS.
Functional cooperation and community building
Ambassador Tajima stated that the prime objective of community building should be tofacilitate the development of this region for overall prosperity against the background of the facts thatinterdependency and common interests among the countries in the region have increased. Dr.
Sakamoto noted that a functional approach to community building is very important, starting first withinformation exchange and then moving in the direction of the institutionalization of information107

exchange. Yet, he continued, as cooperation is very difficult past that point, the most feasible approach
for an EAC would be open regionalism with some degree of institutionalism.
Mr. Tay pointed out that ASEAN is working to develop an economic community, security
community, and social and cultural community, although Mr. Jawhar noted that ASEAN community
building is still a work in progress, a very slow process that requires patience.
Dr. Fukushima stated that it would be best to link functional cooperation in East Asia toinstitutions such as the ARF and APEC, although these bodies need to be revitalized. She added thatfunctional cooperation in non‐traditional security issues can coexist with a network of alliances. Mr.
Hashimoto urged the ASEAN members to start giving consideration to the establishment of an East
Asian FTA or customs union, adding that ASEAN+3 would be a good forum to discuss this issue.
In an effort to improve functional cooperation and community building, Mr. Jawhar statedthat as far as possible, ASEAN member states should keep their bilateral tensions and conflicts outsideof the ASEAN forum. Until recently, he added, ASEAN was apolitical and controversial issues have notbeen pushed so far as to cause an implosion. Mr. Jawhar also added that East Asia cannot expect tobuild a community if the region’s countries are fighting amongst themselves.
Grassroots activities
Many participants recognized the importance of grassroots participation in advancing thedevelopment of the EAC. Failing to involve the grassroots broadly and deeply, it was noted, will invite apublic backlash to community building efforts. In addition, Mr. Arai supported starting a movement tocreate a new private sector organization that would back East Asian community building.
Democracy
Ambassador Tajima stated that there are three aspects among common interests in East Asia,
namely political, economic and social and that democracy is an important element of common values tosupport the common interests. Professor Kimura also emphasized importance of making clear
democracy and human rights as the basic common values of the EAC even though it cannot bereached in immediate future. Dr. Yoshitomi asserted that the democratization of China was one of themost important issues in economic community building in East Asia, while Dr. Jimbo noted that
democracy is very important and the Japanese government recognizes that democratization needs to bepart of the EAC. Dr. Yoshitomi asserted that the democratization of China was one of the mostimportant issues in economic community building in East Asia, while Dr. Jimbo noted that democracy
is very important and the Japanese government recognizes that democratization needs to be part of the
EAC.
Human security
Mr. Hashimoto stated that while community building must be achieved, it is also acontentious issue for an emerging initiative like the EAC to tackle. As such, he proposed that the humansecurity concept be taken as a first step within ASEAN+3 or the EAS. The definition of human security
is not completely set so there is plenty of room for additional discussion, while at the same time, all the108counties agree with the concept of human security. Such an action, he continued, could enlarge East
Asia’s common interest. Dr. Fukushima concurred that it would be a good idea to proceed with humansecurity as an initial building block in East Asian cooperation.

Session II: An East Asian Community and the United States
Moderator

Prof. Jae Ho CHUNG, Professor and Chair, Department of International
Relations, College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University

Professor Jae Ho Chung introduced the afternoon session, “As East Asian Community and theUnited States,” explaining that the focus of the session would be on the perspectives of the US and East
Asia concerning community building in the region. He then invited Mr. Cossa to begin the paper
presentations.

Paper Presenter A

Mr. Ralph COSSA, President, the Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Ralph Cossa stressed that it was very important for people in East Asia to understand US
views toward East Asian multilateralism and for the US also to understand East Asia. This conference
plays a key role in facilitating such understanding.
Some basic facts are that the US has long standing vital interests in East Asia and intends toremain a major player in East Asia. The US is not an East Asian country but it is an Asia‐Pacific concept.
The current Bush administration has been extremely supportive of institutional and ad hoc multilateral
initiatives in East Asia, more so than the last couple years of the Clinton administration.
With respect to the EAS, it is not a threat to the US and at present it is not intended to be athreat to the US. In fact, the EAS’s intent is not clear even to its members at the current time. It is
important to note that the EAS is not synonymous to East Asian community building. The EAS was
supposed to be the “Asianization” of the region, but today there are several key differences in theregional environment to when the concept emerged. One is that China and Korea are not even talking
to Japan. Another is that there are also problems within ASEAN, perhaps due to a lack of consensus
about how to proceed.
US officials are saying that their concern is the debate between pan‐Pacificism andpan‐Asianism, particularly how they interact with broader objectives. Yet, unless EA community
building affects US alliances, Washington will not interfere.

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Paper Presenter B

Mr. Simon TAY, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Simon Tay asserted that East Asian community building is in an unsettled state at this time
but this should not be too much of a concern as East Asia is learning from the process.
US support for East Asian community building is not necessary for the process to continue
successfully. Moreover, depending on the particular visions of the counties involved in the initiative, we
can expect the US position to change as these visions change. A number of factors have changed
ASEAN views towards the US. One was the response of the US and the international community to the
Asian economic crisis. Second is the drift of APEC. Third is the Bush administration’s global war on
terror after 9/11. These factors have contributed to East Asia looking for a way to get along without
being so dependent on the US.
Three models with respect to the contrasting versions or directions of East Asian regionalism
are East Asia “Adrift,” East Asia “Identify without Exceptionalism,” and East Asian “Bloc.” The final
model may be the best one as a means to go forward.
Two issues of international relations that have been undercutting East Asian regionalism are
first, the “great triangle of relations” between Japan, China, and the US, and second, ASEAN is at the
moment a leader by default of the EAS and through its own internal community building this may help
to develop the EAS.
East Asians must be patient in East Asian community building, taking a long‐term view whileliving through a series of patchwork cooperative schemes to advance. We must contribute positively,
not assume default leadership and do nothing more. In addition, the US must understand its exclusionfrom the process and then everyone should work toward making the US feel included through otherinitiatives such as APEC and the ARF. If the US can deal with Asians in a much broader way it will begood for the region.

Lead Discussant A

Dato’ Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan, Chairman and CEO, Institute ofStrategic and International Studies Malaysia

Datoʹ Mohamed Jawhar Hassan stated that there is no cause for much concern about the US
position toward East Asian community building. It is okay for people of a region to decide to build theirown destiny provided there is no ill will toward others. East Asian community building is for thewelfare and interests of the people and states of East Asia and it is not against any other countries. East
Asian cooperation and community building exercises are open and receptive to engagement with the
US and others. ASEAN+3 will be the vehicle for community building and the EAS will be the platform
for dialogue with others. Next, what comes out of this initiative remains to be seen. Next year there will
be a second joint statement of East Asian cooperation and we should look where to go from there.
Pan‐Asianism will not affect pan‐Pacificism. Many of the players involved in pan‐Asianism are110the same players in pan‐Pacificism. In addition, we should give more security functions to the ARF,
where the US is already informed. US engagement is very important and it proceeds on several levels,
namely bilateral and institutional.
We are all part of one community and we all subscribe to global norms. The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization has caused some concern but we should differentiate ourselves from thatgroup. Our focus should be on East Asia instead of central Asia

Lead Discussant B

Prof. TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, the University of Tokyo

Professor Tanaka Akihiko stated an antagonism in East Asia is in no oneʹs interests. The US has
not really lost interest in APEC but the process needs to be reinvigorated. There seems to be some totallack of understanding in the US government on what is going on in East Asia. For the benefit of East
Asia, important Americans need to be kept abreast of what is going on in the region. It was positive thatthe secretary of state used the term “Pacific Community.” It is important to find compatibility between
an Asian community concept and Pacific community concept. In terms of substance, functional areas ofcooperation can in the long run converge. In Japan, a problem is the compartmentalization of decision
making, where bureaucrats between departments and sections lack sufficient communication.
A symbol of US engagement with East Asia is important. Given the fact that the US continues
to attach importance to APEC, with the US president generally attending the annual summit, in cases
where an APEC summit does not take place in Asia, it would be symbolically and functionally
important to invite the US president as a guest to another meeting in Asia such as the EAS.

Lead Discussant C

Dr. Charles MORRISON, President, the East‐West Center

Dr. Charles Morrison stated that the US has no claim to be a member of an East Asian
community on the basis of geography. But it does have many connections and a legitimate interest in
East Asian community building and how that process will affect the United States. Some Asians worry
the US will be automatically opposed to East Asian community building, but there is a strong history
of US support for East Asian integration as well as specific instances of US opposition. It depends on
how the US perceives its interests being affected. For this reason, this dialogue that helps Americans
understand the aspirations and likely outcomes as well as helps Asians understand US interests andsensitivities is very helpful. At some point too, the US may have new initiatives, such as a North
Pacific dialogue, which could be negatively perceived in parts of Asia.

Free Discussions

All participants

US views toward East Asia
Mr. Cossa said that despite the tendency to question the extent of the US’s commitment to East111

Asia, the US should not be seen as an impediment to East Asian community building. He also notedthat one reason the US feels it has little to fear about an EAC is that US officials firmly believe that any
organization or initiative that includes strong US allies such as Japan or Australia would not engage inactivities that are counter to US interests in the region. Ambassador Okawara stated that he was pleased
to hear that the US was not worried about the recent development n terms of regional integration in
East Asia. Dr. Morrison noted that a thaw in Japanese‐Chinese relations could prompt the US to pay
greater attention to the EAS. Mr. Cossa added that the US would be very happy about a thaw inJapan‐China relations.
US‐East Asia communication
Mr. Tay stated that ASEAN must get used to the idea that in going forward, it will have tocommunicate its views with the US and others directly. In addition, the Moderator said that the US
needs to make an effort to understand what East Asians are thinking. With respect to direct US‐ASEAN
communications, Mr. Cossa remarked that President Bush was said to have enjoyed very much his side
meeting with ASEAN leaders at the APEC summit and that he would like to institutionalize thisprocess.
US engagement
Dr. Thepchatree said that the fundamental question is what East Asia should do to engage the
US and to receive support for East Asian community building. The EAS should be the mechanism toengage the US. Hence, one recommendation is that the US becomes a member of the EAS. A second
recommendation is to be careful that the function of ASEAN+3 is gradual, evolutionary, and stresses
regionalism, and that it focuses on economic cooperation and functional cooperation, not putting too
much emphasis on security cooperation. Third is to ensure that no country dominates the EAS. Fourth
is to try to lessen the debate between pan‐Asianism and pan‐Pacificism. Fifth is to cooperate with the US
more in APEC and the ARF. Sixth is that to engage the US in the region, ASEAN‐US dialogue must be
improved. Hence, an ASEAN‐US summit, ASEAN‐US free trade area, and the US signing of the Treatyof Amity and Cooperation are useful measures to pursue.
Security cooperation
Mr. Cossa said that the ARF is the primary vehicle for security policy in Asia while theShangri‐La Dialogue is another security‐related venue in which the US is active. Ambassador Okawara
also noted that after 9/11, the US began to take more interest in expanding the scope of APEC activities,
particularly in respect to terrorism. Mr. Cossa countered, however, that APEC is unlikely to take on alarge security role since China would probably block any such initiatives due to the inclusion of Taiwan
in APEC. Concerning ASEAN, Dr. Thepchatree stated that ASEAN wants good relations with China
and the US. Dr. Thepchatree also recognized that the US remains a hegemonic power but that in otherareas, he said China’s activities and influence was growing.
EAS
Mr. Jawhar stated that the EAS is a means for AEAN+3 to meet with other countries in a spiritof openness and that unless ASEAN did something that was a cause for concern of the world’s major
powers, it need not worry about moving the EAS process forward.
112

Dr. Morrison noted that all organizations start out with much excitement before actions need
to be taken and vested interests begin to make those actions difficult to achieve. Hence, with the EAS, hesaid, the initial excitement over it will eventually be replaced by a more difficult stage of implementing
decisions.
Mr. Tay stated that there is some discussion within ASEAN over whether to invite Russia andPakistan to the EAS. Mr. Jawhar said that as far as he knew, it was unlikely that Russia would be invited
to the next EAS in the Philippines. Ambassador Okawara said that he expected Russia to request an
invitation to the EAS in the Philippines, thus giving Russia de facto membership in the EAS as it would
be the second straight EAS for it to attend. Mr. Cossa stated that should Russia attend the next EAS, Mr.
Bush would still not likely attend. Nevertheless, Mr. Cossa said that the US should ask for observer
status at the summit. What the US will be looking at, he continued, is not who shows up at the EAS, butrather what the EAS mission statement says.
China in East Asia
Mr. Jawhar stated that ASEAN members all have their unique perceptions of China based on
past interactions, but for the most part, ASEAN has a positive constructive view of China. Dr.
Prasetyono recognized that past experiences tend to shape perceptions of other countries. In general, hesaid, perceptions about China have shifted from China as a threat to a much more pragmatic view, andChinaʹs attitudes toward some issues are also changing and it is making efforts to assist its neighbors.
Mr. Cossa cautioned that it is important to separate perception from reality. As an exercise, he said, itwould be interesting to see how much aid Japan, the US, and China has each given to East Asia.
Concerning soft power, Mr. Cossa asked what types of Chinese soft power did ASEAN like. He
suggested that China has been effective in using its hard power softly. Professor Shimizu stated thatwhat Chinese leaders think about doing will have a tremendous impact on the security of East Asia.

Closing Remarks

Amb. KAI Noritake, Governor, GFJ

Ambassador Kai Noritake stated that through this open exchange of views, all the participants
gained a better understanding of the EAC as well as US views toward it. Ambassador Kai thenexpressed his appreciation to the participants for their valuable contributions before closing themeeting.

113

7. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)(1) Introduction【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization andregionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the AsiaPacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such
understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field
ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business, opinion and political leaders both inJapan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there wereexpressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within thiscontext, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to betransmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William Brock, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne Davignon, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward Lumley, as
representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in
September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The
Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular
Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended asa facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions
not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The
Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its
Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, theBoard of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing
bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global
Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be selfgoverning, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in
Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While thesecretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan
Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of Hattori
Ichiro, Okita Saburo, Takeyama Yasuo, Toyoda Shoichiro in 1983, GFJ is currently headed by Okawara Yoshio as Chairman and Ito Kenichi as
President. The membership is composed of 13 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, Mogi Yuzaburo and Toyoda Shoichiro;
80 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, Ito Kenichi, Kai Noritake, Okawara Yoshio, and Shimada Haruo; and 30 Political
Leader Members including the two Governors, Hatoyama Yukio, and Tanigaki Sadakazu. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supportedby the annual membership fees paid by 13 leading Japanese business corporations (with 2 corporations, Toyota Motor Corporation andKikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each and the other 11 corporations contributing 1 share each) as well as by the grants provided by
The Japan Foundation, The Tokyo Club, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Daiwa Bank Foundation for
Asia and Oceania, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, Toshiba International Foundation, etc. Watanabe Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1996, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangularcountries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US,
China, Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, Australia and India, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to theformation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing
policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue”,
GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given
below.
Year Month2002 February

Topic
The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace andProsperity in the Asia-Pacific Region
May
Japan-China Relationship in the world
September Japan and Australia: Perspectives on Cooperationin Asia and PacificNovember Japan and Korea: Working Together for The
Future of East Asia
2003 January
The Japan and ASEAN: Cooperation for Peace andProsperity in the Asia-Pacific Region
April
Entrepreneurship in Asia
OctoberJapan-Taiwan Dialogue: New Situation in AsiaPacific region and Japan-Taiwan Cooperation
2004 JulyA Roadmap towards East Asian Community
September Future Prospect of East Asian Community andJapan-China RelationshipNovember The Japan-U.S. Korea Dialogue: Future of
Korean Peninsula and Japan-U.S.-Korea
Security Cooperation2005 April
The Prospect of East Asian Community andJapan-Korea Cooperation
June
The Prospect for East Asian Community andRegional Cooperation
November Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea
Area and the Role of Japan
2006 February
June

Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan
Relationship
The Japan-US-Asia: An East Asian Community
and the United States

ASEAN ISIS

Co-sponsor

China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
Australian Consortium (Australia)
The Seoul Forum on International Affairs (Korea)
ASEAN ISISThe Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (US)Foundation on International & Cross-Strait Studies (Taiwan)
ASEAN ISIS
China Association for International Friendly Contact (China)
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University(US)･Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies (Korea)

Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative(PCNEACI)
ASEAN ISIS
University of Shizuoka
The Black Sea University Foundation (BSUF)
The International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)
Taiwan International Studies Association (TISA)
Pacific Forum CSIS (US), the Council on East Asian Community(CEAC)

114

(2) Membership List of GFJ(123members)

As of July 1, 2006

【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leaders】(13 Members)[Governors]
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation[Members]
HIRAIWA Gaishi, Advisor, The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
KOBAYASHI Yotaro, Chief Corporate Advisor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
MATSUNO Haruki,Chief Executive Counselor, Member of the Board, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
SAWADA Hideo, Chairman, H.I.S Co.,Ltd.
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
TBD(to be determined), Kajima Corporation【Opinion Leaders】(80Members)[Governors]
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
KAI Noritake, Councilor, The Japan Forum of International Relations Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, Professor, Keio University

In alphabetical order

NAGANO Shigeto, President, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, University of Tokyo
OSANAI Takayuki, Foreign Policy Critic
OWADA Hisashi, Judge, International Court of Justice
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
RYU Ketsu, Professor, Waseda University, & Visiting Scholar, Columbia University
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro,Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
SHIRAISHI Takashi, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUMIDA Nagayoshi, President, The Sankei Shimbun
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, Rikkyo University
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, Press Secretary/Director-General for Press andPublications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANI Masahito, President, National Personnel Authority
TANINO Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to China
UEDA Takako, Professor, International Christian University
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
WAKABAYASHI Masatake, Professor, University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, President, International University
YONEKURA Seiichiro, Professor, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry[Members]【Political Leaders】(30Members)
AKASHI Yasukazu, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press[Governors]
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)AOKI Tamotsu, Professor, Waseda University
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
ASOMURA Kuniaki,Executive Director, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention [Members]
CHUMA Kiyofuku, Journalist
ABE Shinzo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator
AICHI Kazuo, M.H.R. (LDP)
FUKAGAWA Yukiko, Professor, University of Tokyo
AIZAWA Ichiro, M.H.R. (LDP)
GOMI Norio, Professor, Rikkyo Graduate School of Business
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
KISHIDA Fumio, M.H.R. (LDP)
HAMADA Takujiro, Former Member of the House of Councillors
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (DPJ)HANAI Hitoshi, Professor, Reitaku University
KOMIYAMA Yoko, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HARUNA Mikio, Special Correspondent, Kyodo News
MAEHARA Seiji, M.H.R. (DPJ)
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, President, Japan-Australia-New Zealand Society
MASUHARA Yoshitake, M.H.R. (LDP)
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Advisor for Financial Affairs, Keio University
SONODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
TAKEMASA Koichi, M.H.R. (DPJ)
INOGUCHI Takashi, Professor, University of Tokyo
TANAHASHI Yasufumi, M.H.R. (LDP)IOKIBE Makoto, Professor, Kobe University
TSUCHIYA Shinako, M.H.R. (LDP)ITO Eisei, Corporate Auditor, Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd.
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka
ARAKI Kiyohiro, M.H.C. (NK)
JIMBO Ken, Assistant Professor, Keio University
HATA Yuichiro, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KAKIZAWA Koji, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)
KANEKO Kumao, President, Japan Council for Economic Research
KATOH Shuichi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOHNO Masaru, Professor, Waseda University
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)
KOJIMA Atsushi, Corporate Officer, The Yomiuri Shimbun
SUZUKI Kan, M.H.C.(DPJ)
KOJIMA Tomoyuki, Professor, Keio University
TAKANO Hiroshi, M.H.C. (NK)
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
TAKEMI Keizo, M.H.C. (LDP)
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)YANASE Susumu, M.H.C. (DPJ)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
KUMON Shumpei, Senior Executive Director, GLOCOM, International University of Japan 【Executive Secretary】
KUSANO Atsushi, Professor, Keio University
WATANABE Mayu
MANO Teruhiko, Professor under special assignment, Seigakuin University
MATSUMOTO Kenichi, Professor, Reitaku University[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of JapanMIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
Ind.: The Independents
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
LDP:Liberal Democratic Party
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman, J-Wave, Inc.
LL: Liberal League
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
NCP: New Conservative Party
MURATA Koji, Associate Professor, Doshisha University
NK: New Komeito
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
RNP: Reformer's Network Party
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, Senior Advisor, Financial Services Agency
SDP: Social Democratic Party
NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University115

(3) Acknowledgement

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its“Business Leader” members listed below for theirgenerous contributions. Their support is making theactivities of the Forum financially sustainable.

[GFJ Governors] [5 share]
Toyota Motor Corporation
Kikkoman Corporation[GFJ Members] [1 share]
Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Kajima Corporation
Nippon Steel Corporation
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Asahi Glass Co. Ltd.
The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd
Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
H.I.S. Co., Ltd.
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha(In the order of enlistment)

116

8. An Introduction to the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)[Inauguration]
The concept of an “East Asian Community” has been spread quietly but steadily leading to the formation of a gigantic trend in the East Asian
region.
“The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)“ was inaugurated in Japan on May 18, 2004, considerably triggered by thelaunching in 2003
of “The Network of East Asian Think‐Tanks(NEAT)” in Beijing and of “The East Asia Forum(EAF)” in Seoul in
2003. The establishment of CEAC was called for by 10 Think‐Tanks such as the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) andthe Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and 30 scholars such as TANAKA Akihiko, Professor of the University of Tokyo and
YOSHITOMI Masaru, President & Chief Research Officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry. CEAC consists ofrepresentatives from wide‐ranging fields in Japan who are interested in the concept of an “East Asian Community”, including those
who represent businesses corporations such as Nippon Steel Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation, and government agencies
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Growing
momentum for East Asian Community has finally come to take root in Japan whose attitude towards the issue tended to be passive
until recently.

[Organization]
As an all‐Japan intellectual platform covering business, government, and academic leaders, CEAC aims at the strengthening ofintellectual collaboration, the building of intellectual foundation, and the sharing of strategic ideas among them. The membership of
CEAC consists of 12 think‐tank members, 64 individual members and 15 corporate members as of today. CEAC elected NAKASONE
Yasuhiro, former Prime Minister of Japan, as Chairman, and ITO Kenichi, President of JFIR, as President at its Founding Meeting.
CEAC is governed by its “Managing Plenary Meeting” and “Meeting of President and vice‐Presidents.” The “Policy Plenary
Meeting”, which is attended by the members of CEAC, conducts policy‐debate among its members, and produce policy
recommendations as occasions demand.

[Activities]
The activities of CEAC consist of the following four pillars: (1) the Policy Plenary Meeting, (2) the Research and Study, (3) the
Website, and (4) the International Exchange. (1) The “Policy Plenary Meeting” is a forum where the members of CEAC are assembled
to promote policy debate. They met eight times in their first year of activities and adopted a policy report entitled “The State of theConcept of East Asian Community and Japan’s Strategic Response thereto.” (2) The “Research and Study,” mobilizing scholars ofJapan, Asia and the US, organized an international research workshop under the topic of “East Asian Community and Regional
Governance in East Asia” in June 2006. (3) The “Website” is an online network both in Japanese and in English for the purpose of
publicity and enlightenment both within and beyond Japan and is accessible at http://www.ceac.jp/. (4) The “International
Exchange” is a series of programs, which includes the holding in Tokyo of not only “Dialogues on an East Asian Community” with
Korea in April 2005, ASEAN in June 2005 and US and Asia in June 2006, but the 3rd NEAT Annual Conference in August 2005. It also
dispatches its members to conferences held abroad including the NEAT Annual Conferences in Bangkok in 2004 and Kuala Lumpur in
2006.

CEAC 4 Activities

Research
Policy recommendations

1. Policy Plenary Meeting

4. International Exchange

3. Website

Official Process of ASEAN+3
Government of Japan

2. Research & Study

Feedback

ASEAN+3
Summit Meetings
Foreign Ministers’ Meetings
Finance Ministers’ Meetings
Economic Ministers’ Meetings
etc.

[CEAC Secretariat][Address] c/o The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR)
2‐17‐13‐1301 Akasaka, Minato‐ku, Tokyo 107‐0052[Tel]+81‐3‐3584‐2193[Fax] +81‐3‐3505‐4406[E‐mail] ceac@ceac.jp[URL] http://www.ceac.jp/

As of August 1, 2006
117

Acknowledgement

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) is grateful to its “Corporate
Members” listed below for their generous contributions. Their support is making theactivities of the Council financially sustainable.

[Corporate Members]
Arigatou Foundation
Dentsu Inc.
Itogumi Co., Ltd.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Mitsubishi Corporation
Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
Nippon Steel Corporation
OMRON Corporation
ORIX Corporation
Sankyu Inc.
Sanyu Appraisal Corporation
Seiko Epson Corporation
Sumitomo Corporation
The Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
Toyota Motor Corporation(In Alphabetical Order)119

9．Introduction of the Pacific Forum CSIS
Based in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia‐Pacific arm of theCenter for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. founded in 1975, the thrust of the Forumʹs
work is to help develop cooperative policies in the Asia‐Pacific region through debate and analyses
undertaken with the regionʹs leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. The Forumʹs
programs encompass current and emerging issues in political, security, economic/business, and oceans
policy issues. It collaborates with a network of more than 30 research institutes around the Pacific Rim,
drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating its projectsʹ findings and recommendations to opinion
leaders, governments, and publics throughout the region.
An international Board of Governors guides the Pacific Forumʹs work; it is chaired by Brent Scowcroft,former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Forum is funded by grants fromfoundations, corporations, individuals, and governments, the latter providing a small percentage of theforumʹs $1.2 million annual budget. The forumʹs studies are objective and nonpartisan and it does not engage
in classified or proprietary work.
The Pacific Forum staff is dedicated to playing an active role in fostering understanding of the Asia‐Pacificregion in Hawaii, as well as in the broader international community. To this end, the Forum’s senior staff has
participated in public speaking engagements for many community organizations and is regularly involved
in media interviews and discussions both in the U.S. and abroad. In addition, the Pacific Forum enjoys
collaborating with the Japan‐America Society of Hawaii, the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council, the East‐WestCenter, and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, as well as with local educational institutions such as
the University of Hawaii, Hawaii Pacific University, and Brigham Young Hawaii.
The Pacific Forum has various programs and projects such as Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP was founded in 1993 by Pacific Forum and nine other institutes as the firstregion‐wide forum to foster multilateral security dialogue. Other founding institutes are based in Australia,
Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Additional
member committees include Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua
New Guinea, Russia, Vietnam, and the European Union. Taiwan scholars also participate, increasing
CSCAP’s inclusivity. CSCAP members seek to enhance regional security and stability through dialogue,
consultations, and cooperation on concrete policy issues and problems of mutual concern. CSCAP’s research
and analyses support and complement the efforts of regional governments and official multilateral dialoguemechanisms.

Copy Inhibit120

GF-Ⅲ-E-B-0031

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/