Comments on the papers of Rudka and Hirose
Takayuki ItoDr. Rudka's paper is an excellent survey on recent
developments in sub-regional cooperation, such as the Councilof Baltic Sea States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, theCentral European Initiative, the Vyshegrad Group, the Central
European Free Trade Agreement, inter alia. Dr. Hirose presents asuperb overview of Austria's shifting foreign policy stance from
active neutrality through realistic neutrality to a pro-Westernorientation. It is quite interesting to know how Austria, at thesame time as it leaned toward the West, developed an active
Eastern policy. Austria, so to speak, rediscovered the CEI, a factwhich is also noted by Dr. Rudka.
Dr. Hirose shares with Dr. Rudka a high evaluation of theCEI's role in the European integration process. Dr. Rudka states,"The CEI may prove to be a more significant contributor toEurope's multi-layered integration than had originallyexpected."* Here he, a Pole, slips in what might be consideredsome somewhat derogatory remarks on the Czechs: "Even theCzechs now seem to be more interested."* This is quite
understandable, for the Poles find themselves among those whohave tried hardest to make Central European integration asuccess. In the West much more was expected of the Vishegrad
Group than of the CEI. The Visherad Group was interesting for atleast two reasons: first, it represents the only sub-regional
cooperation that consists of exclusively former Warsaw pact
countries; second, it aimed at cooperation, not only in theeconomic sphere, but also on security matters. But now
Vishegrad is being eclipsed by the CEFTA which is a purely
economic institution, as Dr. Rudka rightly noticed. The onlycountry still interested in Vishegrad is Slovakia. He points outthat "Slovakia has recently become the strongest promoter ofsuch cooperation" # as alternative structures of cooperation to theEU and NATO.

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CommentsI well appreciate that both papers give us rich interesting
information on regionalism in East Central Europe. As I see it,
however, my task as a discussant is to provoke discussions rather
than conduct mutual praising, so I would like to move on to amore critical section of my comment.
It is true that we have here good surveys of relevant events,
but we are left quite at a loss about their significance. In otherwords, there is little analysis. Doubtless there are many new
interesting things in what both speakers have presented us, but, I
must say, they are not so substantially new for us here. What wewould like to know is not that such and such things took place of
which we are more or less informed, but what these things imply,
in other words, an in-depth analysis of the subject-matter.
It is of course an interesting fact that after the Cold War a lotof sub-regional groups popped up in Europe like mushroomsafter the rain. But what does this mean? Dr. Rudka tells us, this is
a product of "world-wide trends toward increased regional
cooperation and integration." Of course, this is true. But it is only
partly true. If the regional integration were a strong trend inEurope today, why were they not immediately admitted into theEU and NATO instead of being forced to set up separate
associations? Why do some countries like Russia seem to be left
out in the cold? Apparently not only "world-wide trends" toward
integration are at work here. How are those countries joining
sub-regional associations related to each other, to the core
nations of the EU and NATO, to the former Soviet Union
countries, and to the rest of the world? In other words, what is thenature of the New European Order, or the "New European
Architecture" as it is called in Dr. Hirose's paper? How does thestructure of this architecture look? We look for answers to thosequestions in the papers, but in vain. Let me try to sketch out myown view just briefly.
Dr. Rudka says, when East Central Europeans rejected theRussians' offer to reform the CMEA, "political factors played adecisive role." Then, disintegrating tendencies made themselves
felt, but these tendencies "were reversed, as soon
as theComments

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understanding of those countries' economic interests dominates
over their short-term political emotions." Thus, in Dr. Rudka's
understanding, economics is most important in promoting
regionalism. Dr. Rudka adds, "Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland had acknowledged very early in their mutual
relationships that their chances for quicker integration with
Western Europe and the world economy as a whole could beenhanced only through progress in their mutual cooperation."
I must raise some objections to this reasoning.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland did not acknowledge atfirst the necessity of regional cooperation as one step toward
integration with Europe and the rest of the world. On the contrary,
they saw it only as a hindrance to integration. They competedagainst each other in the race to join Europe. Only at thesuggestion and under strong pressure of the West did they
proceed to get together to set up regional associations. To put it
more pointedly, it looks as if these associations were imposed by
the West upon the reluctant East and Central Europeans, maybe
as toys for them to play with, as Dr. Rudka hinted in hispresentation. In any event they were imposed by the West. The
political motivations of the West are as clearly at work as those of
the countries concerned. I agree with Dr. Csaba when heemphasizes political rather than economic considerations behindthe enlargements talks, but in a slightly different context. Why
did the West insist that peripheral countries should form
associations of their own instead of joining the EU or NATOdirectly?
We have to understand that a new power bloc emerged
when the Cold War ended: Integrated Europe. The new Europe isdifferent from the Europe that we know from the past: it
constitutes one single whole. The integration process of Europe,
itself one of the consequences of the Cold War confrontation in
the 1950s, did not come to halt, when the Cold War ended; on thecontrary, it is still making further progress. This Europe exhibits astrong attraction to countries lying on its periphery and beyond
its pale, enticing them into its fold. What is the foundation of this224

Commentsorder? Apparently it is not military power as in the Cold War case.
Neither is it primarily economic power. Economic giants haveemerged elsewhere in the world. Europe's share of the world
economy is steadily declining. I believe the foundation of thenew European order is a system of values and norms that areshared by Europeans or people who believe themselves to be
Europeans.
If a certain system of values and norms prevails among
different nations, state sovereignty can no longer have absolutepriority. You do not need military power to maintain peace andorder. You have only to control values and norms that are sharedby member-nations. This reminds me of the old Chinese worldorder.
There was no concept of state sovereignty in East Asia
under the old system. Instead, there was a value system more orless accepted by participating nations. It was supposed that thevalue system was embodied in the "Middle Nation" and shouldbe emulated by "Barbarians." Of course, I do not intend to saythat the same value system and the same distinction between the"Middle Nation" and "Barbarians" exist in Europe today as inold China. Values and norms commonly accepted in Europe
today are those of democracy and the market economy, not
Confucian concepts of "virtues" and "customs." Making adistinction between the "Middle Nation" and "Barbarians"
would be impossible in Europe today. I do suggest, however, that
Europe today resembles East Asia under the old system in thesense that commonly accepted values and norms, not theconcept of state sovereignty, govern international relations.
Interference with internal affairs which used to be considered theworst evil that a European state could allow is an everyday
experience today. Therefore, the Chinese example may help us
to understand how the new European order functions.
If you set the standards of political conduct for a set ofnations, it is quite natural that a differentiation should come about
between those model nations which have little difficulty in living
up to them (since the standards often originate from their own

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countries), and those handicapped or latecomer nations which
try to meet the required standards but not always with success.
Inevitably there emerges a certain hierarchical order among theparticipating nations. Professor Kokubo today made aninteresting indication that there is an idea in the EU of creating agradation among those which are already EU members or strive
to be so. Dr. Rudka rejected it vehemently, and Dr. Csaba joined
him as it seemed to me. But I have to say that such a gradation,such a hierarchical order among member-nations springs fromthe very nature of the value-oriented system, however egalitarian
those values might be. As it is said, all are equal, but some are
more equal than others.
European nations have a long tradition of elaborating andestablishing values and norms for.their governments' conduct on
the basis of multilateral deliberations. Special international
institutions have been created to promote these efforts. Typicalexamples are the Council of Europe and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). There is a networkof bilateral or multilateral agreements and internationalorganizations in Europe, which determines where a given nation
is located in the European hierarchy. The innermost core of theorder consists of those nations which belong to both NATO andthe European Union, primarily France, Germany and GreatBritain. The outermost framework is given by the Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which includes
even non-European countries like Tajikistan or Turkmenistan.
Between these two poles there are many strata which assign each
European nation to some place in the order: regionalorganizations like the Central European Free Trade Agreement(CEFTA), functional organizations like the Council of Europe,organizations auxiliary to some major ones like the North
Atlantic Council for Cooperation (NACC), bilateral agreementswith a European organization like the Association Agreementwith the EU or the Pact on Stability in Europe with the OSCE, andso on. All these intermediate associations and agreements seem
little more than antechambers to the EU and NATO. I call this226

Comments

system as a "hierarchically structured concentric circle ofEuropean states." To put it more graphically, the system looks
like Mt. Fuji with the top not as a sharp peak but as a flat plateau
and with a long, gradually declining mountainside.
The core nations in the European order may be compared tothe "Middle Nation" in the Chinese order, and outer or more
peripheral nations to the "Barbarians." This system is, thoughdiscriminatory, by no means closed or exclusive. What mattersmost is whether the given nation observes common values andnorms, not where they are located. By Chinese tradition, a"Barbarian" is entitled to the Emperor's scepter if he is civilized
enough; conversely, people of the Middle Nation may be
degraded to the status of "Barbarians" if they become
uncivilized. In this sense, the system is open, even cosmopolitan
so long as it is prosperous and confident enough to integrate
peripheral elements. Dr. Heinrich Vogel, Director of the FederalInstitute for International Studies in Cologne, is so confident of
the future of the EU that he once said to me: "European
integration is doomed to success." If this is so, Europe willremain cosmopolitan for a while. The system ceases to be open,
however, when it forfeits dynamics and integrative power.
In Europe today, peripheral nations strive to get as close as
possible to the status of core nations. This is, I believe, what Ms.
Miho Oshima calls "Europeanization." To achieve this objective,
they have to behave correctly and to climb up step by step thehierarchical ladder of international agreements andorganizations. Austria is one of those fortunate nations who havemanaged to get out of the limbo of EFTA countries and finallyjoin the EU. As Dr. Hirose splendidly reported today, it is now
trying to play a pivotal role between the core nations in the Westand its Eastern neighbours associated in the CEI. Peripheral
nations are competing against each other and live in the hope ofbeing eventually admitted into the family of core nations onsome day in the future, but at the same time in fatal fear of being
punished and degraded for a small offence of common values
and norms.

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227In Dr. Rudka's view "CEFTA is just as a transitory
institution to something better." This fits marvelously into myscheme. Regional groups may be characterized as internationalpressure groups. Peripheral nations feel entitled to receive somereward while they behave correctly. They try to put pressure on
European institutions, first of all, on the EU and NATO. The story
Dr. Rudka told us today of the CEI having established its
secretariat with the EBRD in London is quite revealing. It tries toperpetuate its efforts to pump loans out of this European
institution. The concept of "Central Europe" which we discussed
yesterday so excitedly, namely a concept of something locatedbetween the barbarous Russians and the civilized West, also
wonderfully fits into my scheme. So long as this mechanism
works, you do not have to resort to military means to maintainpeace and order.
There are certain limits to expansion of this kind of order. It
cannot help being culturally and often geographically bound, inno matter how universal terms it might try to define itself. TheCouncil of Europe cannot be a Council for other regions of theWorld. It may be true that certain values and norms which go
beyond state borders are binding in Europe, but the rest of theworld still remains governed by the concept of state sovereignty
and principles resulting from it. Russia is located exactly on thecolliding point of the two worlds.
#Editor's note: a quotation from the original version of Rudka's paper.