Enlargement of NATO Eastwards
and Slovak Security
Ivo Samson
Security Categorization of Central (Eastern) Europe
NATO's enlargement eastwards remains the coveted goalof Central Eastern European and especially of Central European
countries*1 in the second half of the nineties. The generally
expected American "hands off Europe" strategy puts theforeign policies of post-Communist countries in a risky position
vis-á-vis Russia. Some of these countries, however, are more
inclined to adapt to the American neo-isolationism than others.
Without the USA following traditional American interests in
Europe, it will be extremely difficult for small post-Communist
countries to preserve full independence facing the economic
great power Germany on one side and the political and military
great power Russia on the other side.*2 To escape from danger
by looking for NATO-membership seems to be the only logicaland reasonable step to undertake.
Officially, all statements of Central Europe's governmentsin the first half of 1996 have confirmed integration into western
economic and defence sructures as final objectives of theirdiplomatic activities.*3 The countries of Central Europe, ofcourse, think that they are more entitled to be in the first roundof the widely announced enlargement, be it for proclaimed
cultural, historical, geographic, geopolitical and geostrategic, orfor economic and political reasons. To assess the entry chancesof Central European countries, great emphasis will be laid inthis paper on security Issues.
From a Central Eastern European and particularly Central
European point of view, three post-Communist scenarios
remain possible. They are not so much actual political realities

104

Enlargement of NATOas theoretical derivations of an ongoing political andideological struggle among different power groups within
Central Eastern European societies. Yet, the characteristicfeature of Central Eastern European politics is exactly thisstruggle underlying all political events. The scenarios seem tobe the following:a) Assimilation to the ruling western paradigm. In
thiscase the focus is on liberal values and human rights,
as well as democratic principles. Any deviation fromthem or retardation in their implementation represents
nothing more than unwanted compromises due to thebackward character and the lost opportunities of thesesocieties.*4
WithinCentralEuropeancountries
Slovakia is less able than others tofollow thisparadigm.
b) Creating an independent national paradigm. In
thiscase the focus is on the reemergence of the nationstate, the primacy of national (ethnic) values
andhistorical heritage. It emphasizes the uniqueness of anation and considers the acceptance of certain liberalvalues only as an unwanted compromise. Slovakia
providesasplendidexampleof suchavalueorientation, mixed partly with the third perspective (c).
c) Mixed paradigm. The focus is on how to pair the two
previous paradigms. Democratic values and humanrights are supported but liberal and market principles
are considered as threats to the national
heritage.
Thus,thestandardizing
effectsof theWesternparadigm are opposed. This paradigm is to be foundin all Central Eastern European
societies
andisprojected in security thinking.
One has to admit that the security goals of all these four orfive countries are incompatible. In security matters their various
desired outcomes are so divergent that effective cooperation

Ivo Samaon

105

must seem a priori impossible, except in the economic sphere.
Bringing the Central European countries to one bloc following
one identical global orientation resembling that of
EFTA-countries in the last decade before entering the EU
is unrealistic. By considering several variables we can devise aschema of nothing better than several two-bloc conceptions
within the Visegrád / CEFTA group, furnishing proof of mutualinconsistencies that exclude the possibility of a full "blocadmission" to NATO (and/or EU / WEU):*5a) Poland-Hungary (affinities): these two countries form acohesive two-member bloc that is tightly bound byeconomic, foreign policy and historical orientation(traditionally strong agriculture, recently formed postCommunist, i. e. socialist governments
preserving,
however, a permanent NATO-orientaton,"special
relations" to Germany, jointly shared bad experience
with Russian / Soviet influence harking back deeply
into the 19-th century and a deeply-rooted distrust ofthe
Russians
thatiswidespread
among
the
population). Hungary's foreign policy has been, under
the post-Communist government, even more
antiRussian than that of Poland.*6b) Czech Republic-Hungary(affinities):
These
two
countries can display some recently forged political
ties. Although they are burdened with disputes about
ethnic issues from Czechoslovak times, the liberalpolitical cultures of Czechs and Hungarians
drew
nearer during the seventies and eighties due to liberalminded dissent in both countries. After the division ofCzecho-Slovakia political relations can befurtherdeveloped
withouttheformerCzechoslovakHungarian
memories.
These
went
over
to
contemporary Slovak-Hungarian relations.
What isimportant, there don't exist any recent historicallybased conflicts between Czechs and Hungarians.

106

Enlargement of NATOc) Poland-Czech Republic (affinities): relations between
these two countries document a great measure ofunderstanding in the past. In spite of possible Polish(nationalist) claims on tiny parts of Czech territory,*7
Poland
is
for
the
Czech
Republic
the
only
indispensable partner in Central Europe owing
toPoland's importancefor theWest,especiallyforGermany. That's why Czech-Polish relations
havebegun to be extremely friendly since 1995. The Czech
Republic needs the geopolitical significance of Poland
and Poland needs the economic high repute of the
Czech Republic. As a team, these two countries could
be the first to reach full NATO-membership.*8d) Slovakia-Czech Republic (affinities): Bothcountries
realized a peaceful division of a common state and, ina long term perspective, remain connected in many
ways, in particular economically. Czech politics havepreserved a somewhat paternalistic, although careful,attitude to Slovakia due also to the large number of
ethnic Slovaks living in the Czech Republic.*9 Owing
to contemporary deficiencies in Slovak
domestic
policy and to difficulties Slovakia can expect in its
strivings for entering the EU and/or NATO, the Czech
Republic can appear as the only"Western"allyunselfishly
supporting
Slovakia's
admissiontoWestern integration structures. Both countries
still
confront similar transformation problems but each ofthem in its own way.*10 Today some problems still
exist of an economic character (division of the former
common property), resulting from the differing levelsof the two economies. Certain problems also remain in
settling mutual claims and debts. The
remainingquestions are being worked on intensively, and thereisastrongdesireinbothcountries
toreach
agreements.*11

Ivo Samaon

107e) Slovenia-Czech Republic (affinities):
therelations
between these two geographically distant countries*12
are of an economic and cultural nature. Economically,both are the most dynamic CEFTA-members
andculturally, Czechs and Slovenes are obviously
themost ethnically related West Slavic nations in culturaland ethnolinguistic terms.*13 As candidates for EUmembership(EUmeaning
in
thiscontext
predominantly
the
CSFP-common
security
andforeign policy) the Czech Republic and Slovenia areleading countries.
f) Slovakia-Hungary (inconsistencies):
therelations
between these two countries disturb the
accepted
image of the Visegrád group. Both countries remain
ethnically estranged due to historical memories andcurrent political disputes about international issues.*14
Slovak-Hungarian relations represent a varietyofCentral Eastern European conflicts as a whole. Central
Europe represents only a part of the post-Communist
world and in the sense of a possible full-membershipin NATO better chances have been
assigned,
unfortunately, to others.*15
The lack of transparency and of an unambiguousorientation of Slovakia derives from specific features of its
development. Orientation strategies are unstable-they haveproceeded very quickly and Slovakia can be regarded as hardly
amenable to concrete typologizing among the post-Marxist
states.*16 According to the level of accomplished transformation,of domestic political development and of transformation
processes of Central Eastern European economies we candifferentiate among:1) The former communist countries that have alreadypassed the crucial point in both domestic, and foreign
policy,aswell
aseconomy.
The
countries that

108

Enlargement of NATOrepresent this group already have a political systemstable and strong enough to accommodate evensignificant shifts of political orientation withingovernments. They can allow the classical right-left
shifts on the domestic political scene without raising
doubts about the sincerity of their security
orientations. We speak about the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Slovakia, which
logically belongs to this group, too, has become
somewhat isolated in the last two years due todevelopments in domestic policy. Both the European
Union and NATO responded with severe criticism.
Even the OSCE has expressed doubts aboutdevelopments in Slovakia throughout the first half of
1996/172) The former post-Communist countries that havenotreached political stability and are still fightingforeconomic
macro-stabilization.
These
countries
experience security handicaps owing to large ethnic
minorities of their own living abroad or to ethnic
minorities living on their territory. We have in mind
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The domestic policyof these countries is developing in asomewhatturbulent and incalculable way despite
formally
correct, democratically performed election procedures.
3) The remaining post-Communist countries (post-Soviet
and post-Yugoslav), forming a complicatedandheterogenous group that can be divided into sveral
sub-groups:a) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuaniab) Russia, Belorussia, Ukrainec) The three post-Soviet Republics of the Caucasusd) Moldovae) The four post-Soviet islamic Central Asian countriesf) Kazakhstan (a "nuclear power" with an ethicallydim future)

Ivo Samaon

109g) Serbia, Croatia, Macedoniah) Bosnia (differing from other post-Yugoslav countries
by a culturally divergent foreign policy(Islamic
links)
Slovakia's position differs from the third group listed asone. On the basis of excellent macro-economic results in thelast two years Slovakia belongs to the first group (1), while
domestic political development put it in the second group (2), in
particular with Albania and Romania, but also with some of thethird group (namely with Serbia and Croatia), Slovakia's foreign
policy resembles that of Bulgaria, group (2).*18
Security Policy: Starting Point and Prospects
The Slovaks have had to confront a much more
complicated situation than prevailed at the time of common
security planning within the framework of the former
Czechoslovakia. Although Slovakia is not threatened withimminent armed attack, economic coercion and/or politicalpressure is conceivable and Slovakia has to balance national
security interests and a secure political and economic
coexistence with its direct or indirect neighbours so that thesociety can pursue its development. According to the Defence
Doctrine of the Slovak Republic,*19 national security is
guaranteed when, in the opinion of the national leadership,
there does not exist any threat of a military attack or use offorce or coercion in any form whatsoever. Hidden security
threats are not taken into consideration explicitly, although the
key structural components of national security mention also
political, economic, social, geographic, environmental anddemographic aspects, besides purely military security.
Compared with the former Czechoslovak militaryconception of defence and the current Czech defence strategy,
Slovakia finds itself in a much more sensitive position. The still
existing Czechoslovakia behaved in a very anti-Soviet manner

110

Enlargement of NATOin 1990, whereas the federal Slovak government*20 did not sharesuch a strong anti-Russian orientation. For the former
Czechoslovakia this orientation was easily explainable by thetrauma of 1968 and the first step was to negotiate thewithdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory(from Slovak territory first), which they entered unlawfully andby force during the WTO invasion in August 1968.*21 The
Soviets wanted to establish a new basis for their presence inCzechoslovakia, which was to coincide with the intending
remodelling of the WTO as announced by the Soviet president
Gorbachev in Malta already in December 1989. The WTO wasto have been reformed along the lines of NATO, to become an
instrument for political dialogue with the West. The
Czechoslovak side succeeded in restricting this question to abilateral negotiation and the "Agreement on the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory" was signed.*22 The
last Soviet soldier left the country in Summer 1991. During thattime Czechoslovakia pursued a very rigid anti-WTO policy. At
the consultative meeting in Budapest in February 1990,
Czechoslovakia was the only country which rejected the Soviet
proposal to create a permanent secretariat of the WTO. The
country's representatives declared a clear objective: to remove
the Czechoslovak army from the authority of the Joint
Command, which was in the hands of the Soviets, and instead
to strenghten the political dimension of the Pact as a temporaryconsultative body. This meant the rejection of the old bloc
concept of European security. All this contributed to the final
dissolution of the WTO, but the orientation of Czechoslovak
foreign policy in security matters experienced a reorientation in
Slovakia after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia itself.
Owing to the break-up of Czechoslovakia*23 two successor
states came in to existence in Europe facing brand-new security
problems. A number of problems arose especially for Slovakia,
which had "shifted" much more to the East and lost common
borders with NATO as an acknowledged guarantor of peace
after 1989.*24 Slovakia was left alone with its frontiers on theIvo Samaon

111

unstable CIS region and Hungary, with which it has serious
historical controversies. The feet of the dissolution ofCzechoslovakia seemed to run contrary to the general trend of
the European political and military integration. This brought the
new security position of Slovakia to the foreground and put
new questions as to the Slovak security orientation in the future.
The division of Czechoslovakia has changed not only thegeopolitical position of its successor states, but also that of all
Central Europe. We can summarize the changed position ofboth successor states as follows:a) The geopolitical center of gravity of the new Slovak
Republic shifted eastward, whereas the geopoliticalcenterof gravityof theCzech
Republic
shiftedwestward.
b) The geostrategic assymetry of Slovakia vis-á-vis theformerSovietspace
deepened,
whereasthegeostrategic assymetry of Czequia deepened, too, visa-vis Germany, which has been, however, considereda reliable neighbor.
c) Whereas the Czech Republic was cut off from the"Carpathian arcof instability"andgained(in
Slovakia) a "buffer" between itself and the territory of
the CIS, Slovakia became tied to this territory without
the previous (between
1989-1992) Czech
securitybackground. The Slovak attempts to persuade
theCzechs to form a military union with Slovakia after thedivision failed.
d) Thesubregional
assymetryinCentralEuropeincreased
with
Polandbecomingasubregional
geostrategic power.
In Slovakia, there arose the necessity to redefine theforeign policy of the new state, which was conceptualized in
the realist terms of "national interest". There was a marked
effort of the new Slovak elites to define themselves negatively

112

Enlargement of NATO

vis-a-vis the previous federal or domestic foreign policymakers, who were at the same time their rivals in the elections.
The problems of conceptions concerning military strategy anddefence acquired a quite new dimension, because Slovakia's
identity in Czechoslovakia had been felt suppressed and unlike
Czequia Slovakia began to develop without any tradition of astate of its own. The philosophy of defence of the Slovak
Republic consists in looking for answers to the crucial question:
what is necessary and what is possible to do for guaranteeing
the country's security in the critical period after the bipolarworld ceased to exist and the involuntarily received guarantees
given by the WTO*25 disappeared. Security risks for Central
Europe have not been as fundamental as they have been forsouth-eastern Europe but they do exist, and will remain aproblem until a security integration in any vital alliance has
been reached.
One can localize the principal dilemma of Slovak security
policy. This dilemma involves two irreconcilable contradictions:
economic crises and traditional military thought.*26 From thispresumption we can develop rationalizations of the possibilities
for choices in security policy-making and planning. The second
presumption is the answer to the question what specific security
problems a small state like Slovakia could face and what are thechoices Slovakia can opt for. First, becoming a member of asecurity alliance or coalition. Because in the near future fullNATO membership seems to be a purely illusionary idea
(joining another alliance, e.g. accepting Ukrainian offers toserve as a nuclear umbrella for Central Eastern European
countries has been refused decidedly)*27 and Slovakia, although
not exposed to a direct military threat, lives, nonetheless, in asecurity vacuum, the country can take the second choice: toprovide for its own defence. It means either a variant of armed
neutrality (this variant is, however, for Slovakia as expensive asother models), or a variant of neutrality meaning a position
between two blocs*28 that is completely unrealistic at present.
Third, a renewed non-conventional thinking. It meanstheIvo Samaon

113

evaluation of defence expenses and stressing saving (economy)
and the so called synergic effects (multiplication of militaryconsequences, military-strategic effects). According to thisphilosophy the only efficient conception is the so called
defensive model of defence*29 that follows the national interestsof Slovakia excluding the priority role of the army in security
policy.
In considering the new military strategic conception of
defence for Slovakia one has to take into account the fact thatthe contemporary security system in Europe does not foresee
an early integration of postcommunist countries into
institutionalized European defence structures, as documented
by the PFP program. The second factor that exerts a big
influence on the new conception of military strategy ensues
from the unique position of Slovakia in the Carpathian basin
and in the Danube curve. Although geopolitical priorities havechanged substantially since world war II, Slovak military
analysts still underline the historical significance of the
Carpathian basin and the Danube stream for economic, socialand military-political development of those countries that havebeen situated in this European region, where during the lastcenturies and decades huge state-forming movements ofall-European importance were taking place (the formation of
Czequia and Slovakia being the last example). The significanceof this territory, including the territory of Slovakia as animportant geopolitical factor at the intersection of important
communication directions North-South and East-West,
increased after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in all
aspects: politically, economically, militarily.
The military strategic conception of Slovak security
policy-making and planning can be accomplished only by aradical re-orientation of both military and political thinking, andof strategic-operational considerations that take into accountsecurity risks and imaginable military conflicts. During thethree-year existence of independent Slovakia three types of
military conflicts have been theoretically possible:

114

Enlargement of NATO

1) A strategic defence against an armed aggression on alarge scale. The Slovak Republic could be directly
attacked or Slovakia could serve as an operational
space of contending powers with other aims. Because
Slovak territory is, vis-á-vis the supposed superiorityof a big power practically undefendable,
Slovakpolicy-planning can reckon only with a preventive
deterrent effect of its army. The goal is onlytodemostrate the decision to defend its territory until
possible foreign help becomes available.
2) A large-scale
conflict(e.g.
theBalkanwar
or,theoretically, a North-South conflict), where the armed
forces should be able to lead a defence operation inorder to localize and neutralize the conflict and topreserve the territorial integrity of the country.
3) A neutralization of internal unrest caused by ethnic
tensions and bearing the danger of intervention byother states.
From the supposed types of conflicts it is clear that it isunrealistic to follow the traditional models of defence-planningin such a small country as Slovakia. A real alternative can beseen in the above mentioned economic and effective defence
conception ("defensive model of defence") based on thepresumption that the new strategic conception foresees an armythat is able to deter the aggressor by threatening to inflict heavy
damage. This defensive model of defense is preferred, because
due to the economic transformation and to the difficulties of thetransition period the Slovak Republic is visibly not capable ofbearing the expenses for building traditional armed forces of
the coalition type. With NATO membership out of sight (in thiscase, in cooperation with NATO members and regional
newcomers the expenses would be sustainable) the defensivemodel of defence is very attractive for Slovakia.

Ivo Samaon

115

The Scope of Change
The reorientation of military-strategic thinking made itnecessary to realize a principal rebuilding of the armed forces,
the reduction of their numbers according to earlier obligations
in curved by Czechoslovakia*30 (the reduction of both army
personnel and armaments was reached in 1995), a new
dislocation and technical modernization. The reality given by
the division of federal property of the former Czechoslovakia
and by special agreements in the sphere of the armed forces left
Slovakia three possible variants of solving the problem ofchange whose necessity became evident.
1) The "classical reduction" of the army. This method
would mean the reduction of manpower by preserving
the traditional strategic principles of defence based on
the already existing militaryandarming-technicalstructure of the armed forces. The realization of thisvariant would have entailed extraordinary costs (90%of expenses
would
swallow theplainexistencial
consumption). No means would have been left for themodernization of the armed forces. This variant, which
was taken into consideration
as a choiceat thebeginning of independence, mirrors the thinking of
the classical Soviet school (specificgeostrategic
features are neglected). Although this model has had
several defenders in Slovakia, the impossibilitytoreach compatibility with NATO in this way has beenquite obvious.
2) The "considerably reduced" armed forces. It means
only a more drastic realization of the first variant (as tothereductionofmanpower).
The
arming,organizational and logistic structure of thearmedforces would be preserved, too. No principle reform of
the armed forces has been foreseen and the traditional
conventional military thinking has beenpreserved.

116

Enlargement of NATOThis model would also not be persuasive enough to bring
Slovakia into the member states of NATO. 3) The greatest
chance has been accorded to the third variant-the"unconventional, extremely reduced army". It means aslightly stronger reduction of manpower than the second
variant foresees and an adoption of a quite new strategic
conception of the "defensive model of defence". The
advantages of this model lie with saving finances, does
not hinder the economic activity of the state andalthough a hypothetical aggressor may find it easier tobe successful in an attack, it also transmits the
non-aggressive posture of the country. At the same time,
defensive striking power remains high. This model
represents a trend in postcommunist countries and we candiscover it elsewhere.*31 The army consists of mobile
forces having at their disposal modern arms. Quality
replaces quantity. The main difficulty in introducing thismodel is represented by the necessity of adopting a new
philosophy of military thinking that entails a replacementof old officers and traditional army personnel. It means
also that civilian experts are accepted into the army andbring new, not purely military aspects to security
theories.
Defining the search of new models for security
policy-making and policy-planning in Slovakia leads to acomparatively simple conclusion that in the sphere of security
policy the only thing to do is to look for new answers to oldquestions. It is clear that a defence self-sufficiency of Slovakia
in military matters is an illusion and is not realizableeconomically. The adoption of a non-conventional defensivemodel can display several substantial military, political andeconomic advantages. First, it signals to the western defence
Alliance that the Slovak armed forces are able to get rid of
thinking in old categories and to create an effective defence

IvoSamaon

117

model anticipating the future security structure of Europe.
Second, through its economy it leaves available the meansneeded for overcoming the economic unstability of the country.
Fourth, it forms a starting point for building a modern,long-term and complex security policy.
The compatibility of the Slovak armed forces with a NATO/ West European disposition has several aspects. One of them,obviously the most difficult, is the compatibility of military
thinking, the change of philosophy. This change can be broughabout only by active personal contacts with NATO / WEU
reality and by a consequent personal re-building of the armed
forces, by adding people who have not been linked to theprevious WTO period. The contacts with western armed forces
are very useful. Slovak peacekeeping activities are relatively
modest, but considerably more active than, say, Czech
peacekeeping activities. Preparations for Slovak peacekeeping
are in full progress, however (as a rule, on the territory of former
Yugoslavia). Besides this, Slovakia keeps a military mission in
the NATO HQ in Brussels and cooperates closely, especiallywith the USA, which finances the reform program for the
Slovak army and has launched education programs for Slovak
army officers in the USA. During 1995 Slovak soldiers havetaken part in several peacekeeping trainings in the Central
European region and in the West. For 1996 the establishment ofa special Office for Military and Security Assistance has beenplanned.*32
Another problem Slovakia experiences can be found in thematter of common speech, i. e. in terminological compatibility.
The traditional terminological instruments that are still used in
the Slovak armed forces have very often their origin in theterminology of the WTO. The problem becomes evenexacerbated, because among NATO members there does notexist concord about many principal terms concerning security:
strategic interests, security, security policy (grand strategy,
national security strategy in the USA), military strategy, military
doctrine, etc. Among the American, French and German terms

118

Enlargement of NATO

we find several differences in meaning and Slovakia has to lookfor equivalents that correspond to Slovak specific conditions.
After much considerations, the term "military doctrine" wasrejected in favor of "defence doctrine". There still exixts aslight confusion about the proper meaning of "security". In the
Anglo-Saxon countries and especially in the USA, "security" isa synonym for a defence of long-term values and is seen as ameans for reaching goals in relation to other countries andinternational organizations. In this way one creates a condition,
under which the vital interests of the people and of the state canbe defended against exterior and interior danger. It does notmatter if this danger bears a real, a potential or a hypotheticalcharacter.*33 In the case of Slovakia, however, security can't beguaranteed the moment the country is attacked and Slovakia
can reckon only with potential enemies relying on prevention
and deterrence only (this could be elaborated with several
examples).
Another important issue is the compatibility of arms,
armaments. In this case Slovakia can display quite good resultsthat have their root in the fact that the heavy armament industry
was concentrated in Slovakia in communist times, although inthe second half of the eighties and especially in the euphoria
following the change in 1989 production was drasticallyreduced. So the former Czechoslovakia, historically among the
WTO's chief arms producers, reduced arms output to about one
tenth of pre-1989 levels in 1990. After the split ofCzechoslovakia Slovak arms executives and government
officials made it clear that the industry would be given a second
chance. Slovakia succeeded in modernizing the arms industry
and gaining new markets in the course of 1993-1995.*34 In lightof the collapse of the WTO as well as the failure of Soviet-typed
arms in the Gulf war, the traditional market for Slovak weapons
like the Soviet-designed T-72 was almost lost. Now it is the
Slovak objective to raise the production of arms to at least 25
per cent of 1989 capacity within a few years*35-still far from thelevels of the
1980s, when Czechoslovakia (in fact
Slovakia)

Ivo Samaon

119ranked seventh among the world's arms exporters. The former
quantity should be replaced by quality that corresponds towestern arms. Topping Slovakia's list of military goods is the
newly designed howitzer called "Zuzana" firing
NATO-standard ammunition, which military experts believe
to be possibly the first of its kind intended for westernmarkets. Slovakia has also modernized*36 its classic T-72 tankin the form of the T-72 M2, which is also on the market.
According to experts there are an estimated 8 000 T-72 tanks in
use around the world. So the modernization of the Slovak arms
industry contributes to the compatibility of the Slovak Army with
NATO armed forces and has been a frequent theme fordiscussions with western military officials during 1995.*37 The
Slovak arms industry, according to official statements, canproduce all modern weapon systems necessary for the world.
Membership in NATO depends mainly on five basic criteria
Slovakia has to meet:-completing the democratic transformationof the society, free market economy, civil control of the army,compatibility of the Slovak Army with NATO armed forces,
and friendly relations with neighbours.
According to the assesment of the American Minister ofDefence in September 1995, Slovakia reached the best results inthe third and fourth points.*38
During a visit to Slovakia in September 1995, J.
Shalikashvili, indicated that it is the Czech Army that is themost advanced in transformation and arms compatibility andkeeps the most mature contacts with the US armed forces.
Nevertheless, both armies (i.e. Czech and Slovak) are in the"foreground".*39 Here we can discover the first signs ofdifferentiation that was absent in statements made by NATO
officials one or two years ago.
In spite of all these positive facts, Slovakia is still
considered to experience severe shortcomings on other points
that are seen as crucial conditions for full NATO membership.
Due to domestic political developments that differ from theclassical left-right modelinmost of theWest
European

120

Enlargement of NATOcountries and in the other CEFTA members, Slovakia has been
often regarded as the weakest spot in the regional Central
European mosaic. Since the beginning of Slovak independence
Slovak diplomacy has tried, with varied success, to disperse
doubts about Slovakia's integration backwardness. The divisionof Czechoslovakia made it necessary to re-evaluate theprincipal pro-NATO federal policy and the first months of
independence witnessed a slight confusion as to security
orientation. NATO began to discuss seriously the Visegrád
proposals no sooner than in 1993 and had to find out that it was
not prepared to swallow such a huge enlargement (taking
Visegrád as a bloc) of four countries that numbered around 65
million inhabitants (such an enlargement is unparalled in
NATO history). There was first the need to adapt NATO to
post-bipolar reality and one had to take into account the opinion
and possible objections raised by Russia. The discussions about
eventual NATO membership became heated in Slovakia in
January 1993, because the idea of neutrality found strong
support in the country at the beginning of independence.
Slovakia's decision to establish an independent state was,besides other reasons, caused also by rejection of the radical
westernization plans of the Czechs in economic reform andstrongly pro-western foreign policy. In the first half of 1993
public discussion turned on the question of either
NATO-integration or neutrality, although any analysis based onreal politics left only the first alternative as rational. Membershipin the first broad post-cold alliance-NACC-did not pretend toradiate any semblance of security prospects and was felt as
unsufficient. The setting up of NACC was understood as aplatform for NATO to launch a dialogue with the former
adversaries, not as a waiting room for NATO membership. Yet,
to be put on a level with Central Asian countries, where civil
war raged at that time, induced the Visegrád countries to look
for a different security posture. The Visegrád bloc wanted, ofcourse, to be seen differently even from countries like Bulgaria
and Romania, which had been raised to the same level at the

IvoSamaon

121

Copenhagen summit of the EU in summer 1993.
It was in the half of 1993 that Slovak foreign policy took apro-western course. On the domestic political scene in the firstmonths of 1993 the pro-eastern versus pro-western tug of war
ended in the purge of the Foreign Minister,*40 whose diplomatic
activities betrayed strong pro-NATO inclinations. His
successor,*41 however, continued the orientation of Slovak
security policy toward NATO, leading to the visit of the Slovak
president to NATO HQ and an official application for NATOmembership at the end of 1994.*42 This security and foreign
policy orientation led to another crisis and resulted again in thepurge of Foreign Minister, in a government crisis and inpremature parliamentary elections in October/November 1994.
In between, the new Foreign Minister in the temporary
government*43 steered to a NATO integration course as well.
Despite the permanent domestic policy crisis with regard tochanging foreign ministers, Slovak NATO policy was assuming
more positive features during 1993 and 1994. Already in March
1993 a NATO delegation paid a four-day visit to Slovakia andin June J. Shalikashvili arrived in Bratislava to be informed
about the Slovak will to cooperate closely with NATO. He
recommended a closer military cooperation including
peacekeeping tasks. As Slovakia's top priority he mentioned
improving military education and offered an educational centre
for language training to members of the Slovak Army. At thattime he refiised to concede that Slovakia was behind otherVisegrád countries.*44 The official presentation of the Slovak
application to join NATO by the president of Slovakia can beseen as the culmination of the pro-NATO development of
Slovakia. At that time the PFP program was not yet decided
upon and the president expressed the hope that the January
summit would offer the Visegrád countries "formal assistancemembership" with the right to consult NATO if they thought
their security was endangered, as well as an assurance of
eventual full membership. The PFP program failed to offer even"soft guarantees" like these.

122

Enlargement of NATOThe Slovak government*45 signed the PFP program in
February 1994 as the seventh country and without thereservations the other Visegrád countries expressed.*46 A more
direct approach of NATO toward membership would havebrought a dilemma for Slovak foreign policy in its friendly
relations to Russia. It is because of the desire for good relations
both with Russia and with NATO that disputes have broken out
among the Slovak public during 1995, doubting the sincerity ofofficial Slovak declarations toward NATO-integration.
To reaffirm the efforts of Slovakia to join NATO, all Slovak
governments, including the present one, have repeatedly
pledged allegiance to this intention since 1993 and officially,
there have been no doubts about this issue.*47 Despite this fact,
since 1993 several statements made by western politicians, andviews expressed in articles published in the western press, haveceased to mention Slovakia as a first-round candidate foradmission to both NATO and the EU. Slovakia has been manytimes omitted from the preferential list, because the country has
not been regarded as folly stable, especially in terms ofdomestic policy. The reservations of western countries turn on
the methods used in domestic policy and on the alleged
shortcomings in minorities' policy.*48 The Slovak politicalrepresentation has undertaken a series of diplomatic steps toclarify the situation, especially in connection with the latest
criticism from the EU.
According to the latest statements of leading westernpoliticians, the eastern enlargement of NATO will be decided in
the first months of the next year (1997).*49 The invitations to"some Central Eastern European countries" should be sent in1997 and final admission to NATO should take place at the
50-th anniversary of NATO is founding, i.e. in March 1997. If
Slovakia wants to preserve a real chance of NATO-admission, it
will have to persuade the western countries of its ability to
behave as an unproblematic NATO-member. In the first place,
Slovakia will have to disperse doubts about democratic
shortcomings. The purges in some ministries in August 1996*50

Ivo Samaon

123

will hardly be sufficient for appealing to NATO. Slovakia is still
accused of following a double-faced foreign policy and of
showing large-scale differences between declarations and realpolitical actions.*51 In summer 1996 pessimism about admission
chances has been further strengthened in Slovakia and the
Slovak political representation seems to be preparing the
population for a western refusal and is now trying to stress therisks of a NATO-membership (an alleged deployment of
nuclear weapons on Slovak territory, military costs ofintegration, etc.).*52
Notes
In using the problematic term "Central Europe" I mean,
generally, the countries of the Visegrád group or, as the casemay be, of the CEFTA, see. Samson, I.: The Linguistical
Concept of Central Europe, in: History and Politics, Slovak
Academic Press, Bratislava 1994.
After the end of the bipolar world there arose an increased
difficulty with the typology of powers (world powers, super
powers, great powers, nuclear powers, regional and/or
subregional powers) Countries like Ukraine and Kazakhstan
became nuclear powers overnight, but they have not had any
chance to become " great powers".
In the Slovak case these goals have been recently confirmed
during the negotiations between representatives of the Russianand Slovak Committees for Defence and Security (of bothparliaments) in Bratislava on 6-8 May 1996, see in: Sme:, May
15,1996.
Weidenfeld, W., Janning, J.: Europe in Global Change,
Guetersloh 1993, p. 186.
The "bloc approach" vis-á-vis EU and NATO was at the basisof the original Visegrád Three. Soon Poland and Hungary (in1991) and finally the Czech Republic (following the
Copenhagen Summit in July 1993) ceased to cooperate withthe other member-countries. Poland and Hungary returned to
the
group
immediately,
the
Czech
Republic
remained

124

Enlargement of NATO

6

7

8

9
10
11
12
13

14

15

"stubborn" until 1996, following a "solo" trip toWestern economic and security structures.
Zellner, W., Dunay, P.: The Foreign Policy of Hungary in theFirstYearofHorn'sGovernment{m German), in: Suedosteuropa,
No. 44/95, pp. 654-655.
A problem arose concerning the Tesm region in the north ofSilesia. Generally, however, the Versailles (St. Germain) Treaty(fixing the frontiers after World War I) would be endangered.
On the goals of Polish foreign policy in the sphere of security
and the affinities to the Czech Republic, see: Bartoshewski, W.:
Polish Security Policy, in: Perspectives, Prague 1995 (Summer
issue), pp. 5-7.
With approximately 300 000 members the Slovaks form by far
the most numerous ethnic minority in the Czech Republic.
Both Countries to Europe, each on its Own (in Slovak), in:Mosty,
No. 30/95.
Bombk,S., Samson, I.: Security for Europe (forthcoming, N. Y.
1996), Chapter 11 (Slovakia).
Seperated in the most direct and natural way by Austria.
Décsy, G.: The Linguistic Structure of Europe (inGerman),Hamburg 1973.
The
Gabcíkovo-Nagyamaros
controversy
that
has
been
delivered to the International Court in the Hague is only one ofthem. Much more dangerous have been the accusations madeby the Slovaks of Hungarians' hurting the air
space of
Slovakia, lasting and potential feuds about Slovak cultural
goods allegedly withheld by Hungary, and the overall general
distrust. See also in: Renner, H., Samson, I.: The Hungarian
Minority in Slovakia (in Dutch), in: Internationale Spectator(the Netherlands), October 1992.
Slovakia has been recently, again, omitted from the first-roundcandidate list presented by the Republican Party of the USA
that has proposed limiting the enlargement of NATO in the near
future to only three countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. See in: Sme, May 5,1996. Slovakia, however, canblock the admission of Hungary by its own incapability toIvo Samaon

16
17
18

19

20
21
22
23

24

25
26
27

28

29

30

125

become a full-member.
Gabal, I.: Five Years after. The Post-Communist World. Crisis or
Evolution? In: Perspectives,No. 5 /1995, Prague, pp. 47-48.
The criticism of the high commisioner of the OSCE Max van er
Stoel see in: Domino Efekt No. 21 /96.
Pantev, P.:
Security for South Eastern Europe:
Bulgaria.
Conference paper (free to quote), Munich, September 1995.
Intentionally, it was decided to avoid " military doctrine". The"Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic" was approved by
the Slovak Parliament in June 30, 1994.
Czechoslovakia had after January 1, 1969, when it became afederation, three governments: federal, Czech and Slovak.
The negotiations started on 15 January 1990.
Signed in Moscow in February 22, 1990.
Accomplished bya legal and peaceful way
throughthedecision of the federal Parliament and valid since December 31,
1992-January 1,1993.
The considerably shortened frontier with neutral Austria does
not represent an equivalent to a NATO frontier despite the factthat since January 1,1995 Austria has been member of the EU.
Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
Robejsek, P.: "Defence without Army..." (in Czech), Prague
1992, p. 29.
What is meant are several Ukrainian initiatives, the most famousof them being the so called Krawchuk Initiative from 1993.
According to the treaty with Russia (1994) Ukraine will give up
its nuclear weapons no sooner than in 2000.
At the very beginning of the Slovak independence and even
before, this choice found expression in the theory of "bridge
between East and West", see e.g. in: Fabian, J.: "Inthe
CrossroadsofGeopolitics"(in
Slovak),in:"Slovenské
pohlady" 4 /1991, Bratislava 1991, pp. 28-33.
Kulasík K., Kulasik P.: "Security and Defence
Policy of
Slovakia"(in
Slovak),in:" Medzinárodné
otázky"(International Issues) 1-2/1993, Bratislava 1993, p. 51.
CFE (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) from126

Enlargement of NATO

31
32
33
34

35

36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47

48

1990.
Zachariás, K.: " Variants of an Reduced Army", Prague 1992.
See in: " Národná obroda", 19 Sept. 1995.
" National Security Strategy of USA", Washington 1993, 13 pp.
According to the former Deputy Defence Minister Andrej Sobol(in office until the beginning of 1995) "we do not want to be
known as the gun suppliers of Europe, we just want to supply
our citizens with jobs... It is a strategic fight for the arms market
out there, and every tactics and means is fair game. We will dowhat the rest of the world does". See the Interview
for" Reuters", Bratislava, 24 November, 1994.
The
former Defence
Minister Pavol
Kanis
to"Reuter",
Bratislava, 24 November 1994.
In the arms industrial complex ZTS Martin in Central Slovakia.
Defence Minister Ján Sitek with the British Defence Minister
Malcolm Rifkind on 15 February 1995, see in:"Národnáobroda", 16 February 1995 and with the US Defence Minister
William Perry on 18 September 1995, see in: "Sme",
19
September 1995.
William Perry on 18 September 1995, see in: "Pravda", 19.
September 1995.
See in: " Sme", 28 September 1995.
Milan Knazko, removed from office in March, 1993.
Jozef Moravcik.
On 4 November, 1994.
Eduard Kukan in the government led by the former Foreign
Minister Jozef Moravcik.
TASR, 22 June 1993.
On 9 February 1994 by prime minister Vladimir Meciar.
See e.g. the joint Czech-Polish declaration after the
PFPapproval by NATO foreign ministers ,CTK, 9 December 1993.
Seein:"DocumentsonForeign
Policyofthe
SlovakRepublic", MFA of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava 1993 and1994.
Since the end of 1994 the Slovak government has received two
demarches on behalf of EU (November 1994 and OctoberIvo Samaon

49

50
51

52

127

1995) and one on bahalf of the USA.
The statements made by the German chancellor Helmuth Kohl
during his visit in Moscow in August 1996 and by
theSecretary General of NATO Javier Solana in September 1996.
See in Pravda, 19. September 1996.
Including the replacement of the Minister of Interior and theMinister of Foreign Affairs.
Slovakia has had to swallow severe criticism even by extremely
friendly nations. Serving as an example is the statement of theAustrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky, who sees " two faces of
Slovakia. One that is friendly disposed to the EU and anotherthat looks different". Zajac, P.: Two faces of Slovakia ("Dvetváře Slovenska" ), in: Domino efekt 24 / 96.
The anti-NATO speech of the Slovak prime minister Vladimir
Meciar in: Štulajter, I.: Two faces ("Dve tváře"), in: RFE / RL
16. 9. 1996.