chien-hsing ho

THE FINGER POINTING TOWARD THE MOON:A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESEBUDDHIST THOUGHT OF REFERENCE
I. Prologue
Ludwig Wittgenstein reminds us that a pain-sensation word like
“pain” functions as a replacement for our primitive, natural painbehavior such as crying, moaning, etc., that the sentence “I am in pain”
does not describe the speaker’s inner pain-sensation, but rather
expresses it in the way pain-behavior like crying does.1 Similarly, ademonstrative word like “this” and “that” may be considered a substitute for people’s primitive gestures of pointing to something with afinger, such that the word points to the object intended by the speakerin the way a pointing finger does.2 A demonstrative may not correctly
pinpoint its perceptibly present referent, and the latter may turn out
to be an illusion. Yet the point for us is that the hearer of the word
must be aware that the word points to something beyond itself andthe thing can only be known in light of the concrete situation context
related to the speaker and the hearer.
The same, indeed, can be said with regard to indexicals like “now,”“here,” and “I” and even to such general words as “snow,” “coffee,”and so forth. Just as consciousness is generally intentional, so the useof language is typically significative, with the signifier pointing, in a
concrete context, to the signified. Incidentally, the Chinese language
itself encodes the kinship between the pointing finger and the significative character of language. A number of its terms for expressing the) (denotation),”referential function of language, such as “zhiwei () (reference),” “zhishi () (indication)” and “yizhi“zhishe () (signification),” all involve the use of the word “zhi ( )((finger).”
One can use words to signify or point to speakable things, whereassome thinkers have attempted to use words to refer to things ineffable. But can we meaningfully refer to an ineffable thing by a word
like “unsayable”?3 By using the word “unsayable” for the thing we, it
CHIEN-HSING HO, Associate Professor, Institute of Religious Studies, Nanhua University. Specialties: Buddhist epistemology, Eastern philosophy of language, philosophy of
religion. E-mail: dao.vani@gmail.com© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

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chien-hsing hoseems, inevitably make it sayable: The unsayable thing is sayable by
the word “unsayable.” To escape this predicament, should the knowerof the ineffable reality just remain in silence? But then, others would
not know anything about the reality. If X is unspeakable, what realdifference is there between saying “X is undifferentiated and yetcomplete” and saying “X is chocolaty, with a floral scent”? After all,the two sentences seem equally inappropriate with respect to theineffable X.4 Even if the knower manages to say something about the
ineffable, the hearer’s understanding may turn out to be misunderstanding, as she may take the ineffable just as what is dictated by thewords. In case the hearer could not follow, would the knower not
speak in vain?
In Mahayana Buddhist texts, the transcendental truth or reality andthe mystical experience intuiting it are often said to be ineffable aswell as unthinkable, well beyond the reach of human concepts andwords. If so, how should we treat the teaching in the Buddhist sutras?
Here some Buddhist texts resort to the famous simile of a moon) for figuratively explaining
pointing finger (zhiyue zhiyu) (the nature of the teaching and the related misunderstanding:
The teaching in the sutras is like a moon-pointing finger; on seeing
the moon, one knows that what is marked as such (by the finger) isafter all not the moon. The various speeches by all Tathagatas for
instructing the Bodhisattvas are to be taken likewise.5
The Buddha told Ananda, “You still listen to the Dharma with aconditioned mind; as the Dharma then becomes conditioned too, you
do not attain the Dharma-nature. It is like when a person points withhis finger toward the moon to show it to another, the latter should
follow the finger to see the moon. If the second person looks on thefinger as the moon, he misses not only the moon but the finger also.
Why? Because he mistakes the pointing finger for the bright moon.”6

For example, a child does not know what the moon is, so an adultpoints with her finger toward the moon to mark it. Yet, the childlooks on the finger as the moon and fails to catch the purport of theadult’s gesture. This simile has “the moon” for the ineffable transcendental truth of Buddhism, “a moon-pointing finger” (biaoyue zhizhi)) for the language used to express the truth, while one’s(
taking the language as capable of dictating the truth is likened to themistake of taking the finger for the moon. The simile of a moonpointing finger received much attention in Chinese Buddhism and isvirtually the root simile in Chinese Buddhist discourses on the referential function of scriptural language.
This essay is an attempt to shed light on how the Chinese Buddhist
understands the way language refers to an ineffable reality. For thispurpose, I shall inquire into the linguistic thoughts of Sengzhao

chinese buddhist thought of reference161() (374–414 CE) and Jizang () (549–623 CE), the two leading
Chinese Madhyamaka thinkers, and discuss the implications of thesimile for an in-depth philosophical analysis of the Buddhist thoughtof linguistic reference.7 Since space is limited, I shall not attend to any
thought of reference specific to other Chinese Buddhist schools like), Huayan (), and Chan Buddhism (). With our
Tiantai (discussion centering on references of the “moon-pointing” type, thesole expressive mode concerning us here is one that is termed “indication.” The expressive mode of indication can broadly cover suchlinguistic modes as affirmation, negation, and figurative expression(simile and metaphor), insofar as their use implies the indicative
function to be explained below. And the therapeutic function of language, highly valued in Buddhism, will then be bypassed. Though
there is in Chinese Buddhism no systematic doctrine of linguistic
reference, it is hoped that our interpretive analysis will disclose aclear picture of the Chinese Buddhist––especially the Chinese
Madhyamaka—thought of reference.

II. Simile of a Moon-Pointing Finger
As is well known, Indian Mahayana Buddhism stresses the limited
and even illusory nature of language. The related views somewhat
shape the linguistic thought of Chinese Buddhism, while the Daoist) represents another key source of influence.
text Zhuangzi (Basically, given its notion of nonduality between ti ( ) (substance)and yong ( ) (function), mainstream Chinese philosophy tends
toward viewing the transcendental (the universal principle-way) andthe phenomenal (the particular thing-events) as subtly permeatingeach other to form a dynamic organic whole. As a result, though thelimitation of language was still recognized, Chinese Buddhist thinkers
did not so much emphasize the illusory character of language as
highlight its value in leading one to realize the transcendental Real.8
We now direct our attention to Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s philosophyof language as well as the implications of the simile of a moonpointing finger to bring out a significant aspect of the Chinese
Buddhist thought regarding linguistic reference. The two earlier
quotations about the simile come from the Perfect Enlightenment
Sutra and the Suramgama Sutra, both presumably written in China.
The Lankavatara Sutra, composed in India around the fourth and fifth
centuries, has a verse that reads: “Just as a fool, on seeing a moonpointing finger, looks at the finger but not the moon, so one who
is attached to words does not see the Real.” In addition, both theMeditation Concentration Sutra and the Mahaprajnaparamita Sastra

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contain similar similes and ideas,9 although parts of the two texts
might not have been written in India.The simile, on the whole, was notwidely employed by Indian Buddhists. Nevertheless, in view of therelationship between the Chinese word “zhi” and linguistic reference,10 it is not surprising to see the simile often cited in Chinese
Buddhism.
In spite of its frequent occurrence in Chinese Buddhist texts, thesimile of a moon-pointing finger is interpreted quite in the same way,though the authors may differ on what the “moon” stands for. Thereis then no need for extensive use of quotations. The following eluci) (780–841 CE) should suffice to show thedation by Zongmi (general Chinese Buddhist understanding of the simile:[The Perfect Enlightenment Sutra says:] “The teaching in the sutras
is like a moon-pointing finger; on seeing the moon, one knows thatwhat is marked as such (by the finger) is after all not the moon.”
Indeed, the use of words and images (xiang1) ( ) is meant (for thehearer/reader) to get the intention. Lack of words and images makes
for confusion, while attachment to them leads to delusive views of
the truth. And so the Sutra resorts to “a moon-pointing finger” figuratively to express the teaching. It means to say: seeing the moonrequires the point of a finger; realizing the mind-heart counts on theteaching of the Buddha. One sees the moon by dint of the finger andforgets the finger on seeing the moon; one expresses the mind-heartby dint of the teaching and forgets the teaching on realizing themind-heart. One misses the true moon by fixing on the finger andmisses the original mind-heart with attachment to the teaching. As
the intention is to let one realize the Real and forget the words, theSutra says “is after all not the moon.”11

In view of this quotation and other related comments, I set forth six
theses to make explicit the linguistic-philosophic thinking pertinent tothe simile:
T1: Words in no way correspond with the ineffable Real and cannot
say or properly express the Real.
T2: Words can point toward the Real by means of the forms meantor properly expressed by them.
T3: The forms are different from the Real and so are to be negated.
T4: One who takes the forms for the Real not only misunderstands
the Real but also is ignorant of the function of language.
T5: The forgetting of words and their forms can dissolve theentanglement of language and thought and even lead to an intuitive experience of the Real.
T6: The intuition of the Real depends upon extra-linguistic factors
as well as language.
Meanwhile, we recall the conundrum noted in the beginning of
this essay. Can we say of something that it is unsayable without

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contradicting ourselves? By using the word “unsayable” for an
unsayable thing, we seem to render it sayable such that the thing isboth sayable and unsayable. Put differently, in order to set a limit tolanguage, we would have to find both sides of the limit speakableand so the unspeakable would turn out to be speakable! Given theapparent self-contradiction involved, a number of modern scholars
have questioned the reasonableness of raising an ineffability thesis.
Graham Priest, in contrast, claims that although linguistic reference
to things ineffable results in self-contradiction, the contradiction
actually has its cause in the nature of reality, a nature that is ina certain sense contradictory.12 Is there then no escape from thecontradiction?
Before accounting for the six theses, let us first see how Sengzhao
and Jizang comprehend the relationship between names/words andreality. Like Nagarjuna (ca. 150–250 CE), the founder of the Indian
Madhyamaka School, before him, Sengzhao opposes the claim that aname must name a real entity and also rejects the view that names
correspond with realities:
If one uses a thing(-name) to designate a thing, what is thus designated can be called a thing. If one uses a thing(-name) to designate a
non-thing, the non-thing, though thus designated, is not a thing.
Therefore, a thing does not become real by being given a name, anda name does not refer to a reality by designating a thing.13
If one looks for a thing through a name, the thing has no reality
matching the name. If one looks for a name through a thing, the namehas no efficacy to obtain the thing. A thing that has no reality matching a name is not a (real) thing. A name that has no efficacy to obtaina thing is not a (non-provisional) name. Thus, a name does not matcha reality and a reality does not match a name; with no correspondence between names and realities, where do the myriad things
exist?14

A rabbit has the name “rabbit” and is a conventionally real thing. By
contrast, though a unicorn has the name “unicorn,” it does not thereby
become conventionally real. On the whole, the first quotation stresses
that a thing does not become real by having a name, and a name does
not refer to a reality by naming a thing. Hence, the meaningfulness ofa name in no way rests on its referring to some extra-linguistic actuality. This goes against what we may call the “no name without anentity named” claim. The second quotation points out that a thing
conventionally referred to by a name has no reality to match thename, while the name has no efficacy to denote a real thing. Apartfrom regarding names and things as empty, this passage repudiates theview that names correspond with realities.
Sengzhao also appeals to the relativity and interdependence ofwords to show that things designated by names are empty and unreal.

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One refers to a near thing by the word “this” and refers to a distantthing by the word “that”; on the contrary, a person at a distance refers
to “this” thing by “that” and “that” thing by “this.” In reality, things do
not have fixed names and the items one grasps through names are notreal either. Things only appear to be real on account of the use of theirnames, whereas their true state is neither existence nor nonexistence.15 Such not-existent, not-nonexistent things can still be designated by words like “existence” and “nonexistence,” though one must
know that these words are solely provisional. To say the word “existence” is to make explicit not-nonexistence by a provisional use of“existence”; to say the word “nonexistence” is to make explicit notexistence by a provisional use of “nonexistence.”16
On the other hand, the emptiness of names also implies an interpenetration between names such that the use of the word “existence”
for a thing does not preclude the thing’s being named by the word
“nonexistence,” and vice versa. Jizang goes one step further, claimingthat to say the word “existence” is to make explicit not-existence by
a provisional use of “existence,” and to say the word “nonexistence”
is to make explicit not-nonexistence by a provisional use of “nonexistence.”17 The overall purpose is to undercut a substantialist viewpoint of meaning and reference that tends to posit distinctive,
word-correlated, but actually unreal entities. Such a move is advisable
if we are not to be ensnared by language into futile construction andattachment.
Indeed, names as provisional words are neither real nor in correspondence with reality, and one cannot use them to describe theReal.18 Moreover, in Sengzhao’s view, the Real is subtle, obscure,profound, without shape and form (xiang2) ( ), yet, “speech arises
from names, a name arises by means of a form, while a form arises
owing to its apprehension (by the intellect); lack of a form means lackof a name, and without names there is no speech.”19 Hence, the formless Real is inaccessible to language. Here the notion of form virtually
serves as the basis for the application of a word. The Real, being
formless, has no apprehensible form and ultimately cannot bedenoted by a name,20 nor spoken of in language. Similarly, Jizang’s
nondual principle (li) ( ) of the middle-way is formless, nameless,conceptually unfixable, and beyond the limitation of words, whichmeans that the principle cannot properly be expressed by words. Thisis the aforesaid thesis T1.
In an essay tackling the topic of ineffability, it is important to clarify
to what extent words mean, semantically represent, or properly
express their objects. However, neither Sengzhao nor Jizang explicitly
elaborate on this issue. Instead, the following passage from theZhuangzi may be relevant and worth our attention:

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Before we can speak of coarse or fine, however, there must be someform. If a thing has no form, then numbers cannot express its dimensions, and if it cannot be encompassed, then numbers cannot express
its size. We can use words to talk about the coarseness of things andwe can use our minds to visualize the fineness of things. But whatwords cannot describe and the mind cannot succeed in visualizing—
this has nothing to do with coarseness or fineness.21

This passage distinguishes between the coarse and fine aspects of asensible thing, which is always “formed.” The aspect that can be meantor properly expressed by words, or that one can use words to talkabout, is the coarse aspect of a thing. This aspect roughly accounts forour cognition of resemblance among things of the same class and isapprehended by common people’s nonabstract, vague thought indaily life. On the other hand, the fine aspect is basically the particularor “fine-grained” aspect of a thing. Properly speaking, this aspect
cannot be described by words. Still it may be reached by the mind
through visualization. For example, if someone tells me what theblooming hydrangea in her yard looks like, her words may arouse in
my mind a vivid image of the plant. Here I can use my past sense
experience of a blooming hydrangea to visualize the fine aspect of theplant in a way another person cannot if he has never seen it before.
Thus, the fine aspect of a thing may broadly be reached not by thesemantic operation of words themselves but by the mind, by virtue ofword-aroused nonsemantic factors such as vivid remembrance of pastsense experience.
Strictly speaking, words only mean or properly express the coarse
aspect of a thing. This aspect alone can in a strict sense be reached by
the semantic operation of words themselves: It is the semantic correlate, the meant as such, of words. However, in a loose sense the fine
aspect may also be considered speakable; some would even claim that
this aspect can be properly expressed by a demonstrative word like“this” or “that.” Though this distinction between the coarse and fine
aspects is based on the Zhuangzi, it seems pertinent to our present
subject as it helps to delimit the reach of language. Now, when Sengzhao and Jizang speak of the formlessness of the Real, by “form”(xiang2) they generally mean the intellectually apprehensible andbroadly speakable appearance of a thing, and so we can take such aform to cover both the coarse and the fine aspects.
Just like Zhuangzi’s formless Dao, Sengzhao’s supreme truth, being
formless and nameless, is beyond the reach of language. Nevertheless,he is well aware of the significance of using words to point toward theunspeakable:
The nameless Dharma cannot be spoken of in language. But, thoughbeyond the reach of words, it cannot be transmitted without the use

166chien-hsing ho
of words, and so the sages (shengren) (ever having spoken.22) speak all day without

Similarly, according to Jizang, although the Dharma is intrinsicallyformless and nameless, the sages resort to provisional teachings offorms and names to enable sentient beings to realize the formless and) and thenameless. He contends that the supreme truth (zhendi) () in Nagarjuna’s doctrine of twofold truth
mundane truth (sudi) (are not two ontologically distinct truths, but rather two kinds of expedient teaching intended to reveal the nondual principle of the middleway, which is neither supreme nor mundane:
The reason for taking the middle-way to be the substance (ti) of thetwo truths is that the two truths are meant to make explicit thenon-dual principle. As when one points toward the moon with afinger, his intention is not of the finger, but to let others see the moon,so also with the teaching of the twofold truth. The two truths aremeant to make explicit the non-dual; the intention is not of duality,
but to let others get at the non-dual. This is why we take the non-dual(principle) to be the substance of the two truths.23

Jizang deepens the Mahayana Buddhist middle-way insight of nonabidingness and nonacquisitiveness. On the one hand, the Real transcends all relative forms and names, residing in the word-forgetting) state. On the otherand thought-ceasing (yanwang lüjue) (hand, speech and nonspeech being nondual, the Real can still be
intimated through names and speech. Even if language cannot point ator describe the ineffable Real, it can yet point toward or indicate it.
This is the basic import of thesis T2, though its contents need to beelucidated with respect to our simile.
The simile of a moon-pointing finger uses “the moon” to represent
the ineffable Real, while “the moon-pointing finger” stands for the
scriptural words used to express the Real, and the moon-pointing
function of the finger would be the expressive function of the words.
The finger bears no resemblance to the moon and by no means tells
the tale of the moon. It just tells the direction for seeing the moon.
Now, by following the direction thus told, one knows the rough location (as marked by the finger) of the moon as well as how to see it,24
though, surely, it is through the eyes, not the finger, that one sees themoon. In a free interpretation of the simile, the direction amounts tothe form that Sengzhao and Jizang ascribe to sensible things but not
to the Real, and the rough location of the moon would be the imposition of the form on the Real. In the case of words expressing sensible
things, the form would cover the coarse and fine aspects of the things.
But in the case of words used to express the Real, it is just an unreal
conceptual or imaginative construct. The words used to refer to theReal only tell their correlated forms, not the Real. However, when thechinese buddhist thought of reference

167

forms are superimposed onto the Real, the words thereby indirectly
make known the Real. We may, using the word “indicate” as a technical term, say: The words say or tell the forms and so, with the forms
being imposed onto the Real, indicate the Real such that one comprehends that the Real is such and such as meant by the words. The
concerned relations may be illustrated as in Figure 1:
indicate

say
words

imposition
forms

……

the Real

Figure 1

An indication is an indirect expression. It does not really say orreach its intended referent.25 It contains two distinguishable phases
within its expressive operation: the “say” phase and the “imposition”
phase. Words as denoters only tell––as the operation of the firstphase––the forms as denotees; but they are also indicators capable ofindicating the ineffable Real as the indicatee. This is done through theimposition of the forms onto the Real, which constitutes the operationof the second phase. Whatever expression––a word, a phrase, asentence––that functions in this way is an expression with the indicative function and will be called an indication in this essay.
As mentioned before, in the simile one’s mistaking scriptural
language as capable of dictating the Real is likened to the mistakeof taking the finger for the moon. The forms and their impositions
are imaginative constructs correlated with the words concerned andso can be subsumed under the broader category of language. The
mistake of looking on the language as the Real, then, consists intaking the Real to be what we normally understand by the words or intaking the forms and impositions to be what the Real actually is.
A simile, to be sure, is just a simile and the above analysis may not
fully reflect the views of the Buddhist thinkers employing it. But our
main concern here is about the possibility of using words to refer to an
unsayable reality. Can we noncontradictorily express the ineffable
Real? The way out of the alleged impasse lies in the imposition-cumnegation method involved in the operation of indication construed
here. In the operation the forms are superimposed onto the Real so as
to present it as such and such as meant by the words. Thus, the hearer
knows the Real to be, say, ineffable, emptiness, neither supreme nor
mundane, and so on. Without the imposition what is said by the words

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chien-hsing howould be totally irrelevant to the Real and nothing about the Real
could be known. On the other hand, the forms so imposed onto theReal are unreal impositions. So this act of imposition as well as theimposed forms must at the same time be negated. Without the negation the Real would erroneously be taken as bearing the imposed
forms and would consequently become sayable. Indeed, the imposition and its negation must go hand in hand: They are but two sides ofthe same coin. Through the imposition and its negation the hearer
comes to have a dim, residual apprehension of the Real. As a result,even if we cannot noncontradictorily speak the unspeakable, we canstill noncontradictorily indicate it.26
Now, if an “X is ineffable” sentence is indicative in nature, there
would be no real contradiction, as Graham Priest and others have
tried to show, except perhaps this apparent but unreal contradiction:
S1: One cannot descriptively express the ineffable.
S2: One can indicatively express the ineffable.
\ The ineffable is both expressible and inexpressible.

Though indescribable, the ineffable can be indicated and an indication
does not directly refer to the ineffable. As descriptions, the sentences“X is undifferentiated and yet complete” and “X is chocolaty, with afloral scent” are indistinguishable in relation to the ineffable X. As
indications, however, if X is Laozi’s ineffable Dao, “X is undifferentiated and yet complete” would be a good fit, whereas “X is chocolaty,with a floral scent” can be the right choice if X is Wittgenstein’s aroma
of coffee, although the latter is not wholly indescribable.27
Since the Real is not accessible by language and thought, the forms
meant by words, being distinct from but imposed onto the Real, need
to be negated. This is stated in thesis T3. For Sengzhao, one must not
take words at their face value to determine their significance. This canmean whatever form one imposes onto the Real must be negated. If“the Real is emptiness” is uttered, one must know that the Real does
not bear the emptiness-form matching the word “emptiness.” If “theReal is not existence, not nonexistence” is uttered, one must knowthat the Real bears neither the not-existence form nor the notnonexistence form corresponding respectively to the phrases “notexistence” and “not nonexistence.”28
Likewise, Jizang frequently notes that his speech in terms of names
and forms with regard to the nameless and formless is provisional oreven forced; this suggests the presence of imposition and its negation.
His Dao-revealing interpretation of word meaning may be said toimply the notion of the negation of superimposition.29
The imposition-cum-negation method here involved, meanwhile, isonly implied, not explicitly stated. An explicitly stated imposition-

chinese buddhist thought of reference169

cum-negation would be a self-erasing kind of speech known as), which consists of first stating a literal orsuishuo suisao (figurative attribution and then explicitly denying the attribution. For
example, one first says “X is P, Q, R” and then says “X is not P, Q, R”
or “X is not speakable.” The Buddha preached the Dharma for fortynine years but did not utter a word; his disciple Subuti spoke about thesupreme wisdom all day and said he had spoken about nothing. The
speech pointing toward the ineffable always stands negated, implicitly
or explicitly.
If the speech of the ineffable does not necessarily imply selfcontradiction, would the contradiction lie in the imposition-cumnegation method? The contradiction here, if any, is also apparent, nota strict “P and not P.” The method implies that the imposition placed
onto the ineffable is only an imposition, not a real attribution. Thus,
the negation concerned negates any attempt to turn the imposition
into a real attribution. It rather makes known the true character of theimposition. Analogously, the succeeding negative expression in a selferasing speech denies the reality-matching character of the preceding
attributive expression, while manifesting its indicative character. An
imposition is both revealing and occluding, and its negation serves toreduce the extent of the occlusion.
Now, regarding the puzzle of setting a limit to language, the borderline between the speakable and the unspeakable may be likened
to the horizon: This side of the “horizon” consists of things within thereach of language, whereas the other side constitutes the realm of theunspeakable. We can only point toward (indicate) the far side of oursemantic horizon, though we can point out (speak) things within thehorizon. Obviously, the cognition of this horizon does not demand ourpointing out both sides of the limit, so there is no error in speaking theunspeakable. Just as we can point toward the far side of our visible
horizon, so we should be able to gesture toward the unspeakable, of
which we may have only slight knowledge.
In interpreting the simile of a moon-pointing finger, one may
claim that the scriptural language tells absolutely nothing about theReal, that the function of the language simply consists noncognitively in guiding religious discipline, in curing illness and untying
knots, or even in evoking some “awakening” experience. The therapeutic function of language is highly valued in Chinese Buddhism.
Scriptural sayings are said to be timely medicines for curing intellectual illness, rather than to describe reality or transmit knowledge
about it. And it is ponderous to speak of truth and falsity in application to therapeutic sentences.
Jizang also has something noteworthy to say about the therapeuticfunction of language. However, we must not neglect the indicative

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chien-hsing hofunction of language. Chinese Buddhist thinkers generally affirm ametaphysical truth/reality interwoven with sensible things and use
expressions like “suchness,” “Dao,” “the nameless and formless
Dharma” to refer to it. We then thus understand the simile: Just as amoon-pointing finger does not by itself tell us the look of the moon, so
scriptural language does not reach the Real itself. Just as the finger
tells us the rough location of the moon, so there is a farfetchedsemblance between the imposition and the Real, somewhat like thatbetween a scene vividly seen and a watercolor of the scene. Because
an indication can transmit knowledge about the Real, it is not ponderous to speak of truth and falsity in application to it––just as if themoon is in the western sky, the gesture of pointing westward could becorrect, while others would be erroneous.
Language is endowed with the descriptive cognitive function ofmatching or representing realities. It is also used noncognitively to
guide behavior, to arouse the hearer’s feelings, to give an order, tomake a request, and so forth.Yet, indication differs from both of them.
It is not noncognitive, for it is meant to transmit knowledge about
reality. It is not narrowly cognitive, because it has a specific nonrepresentational function. If someone mistakes the imposed forms for
the Real, holding only a representational view of (cognitive) language, he, as said in thesis T4, not only misunderstands the Real, but
is also ignorant of the (indicative) function of language. Of course, if
one lumps indication together with noncognitive linguistic uses, one is
likewise ignorant of the function. Incidentally, if the hearer knows thefunctioning of the indicative expression used by the speaker, she isunlikely to take the ineffable just as what is dictated by the words, andthe speaker would not speak in vain.
The negation of superimposition occurs on a conceptual plane. The
negation is a conceptual negation. Now, if we merely negate conceptual impositions by means of words and concepts, we are still stuck
within the confines of words and concepts, and may even foster
attachment to the negation. To escape from the bondage of language
and thought, then, we must practically forget the words used and theircorrelated forms/impositions. Only thus could the linguistic and conceptual knots be untied. The above quotation from Zongmi includes
the phrase “forgets the finger on seeing the moon.” The Buddhist
notion of forgetting the finger on seeing the moon probably originatesfrom Zhuangzi’s fish-trap allegory:
The fish-trap exists because of the fish; on getting the fish one forgets
the trap. The rabbit-snare exists because of the rabbit; on getting the
rabbit one forgets the snare. Words exist because of the intention; on
getting the intention one forgets the words (wangyan) (). How
can I find a word-forgetting person to have words with him?30

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We must note that forgetting words greatly differs from forsaking
words. For, (i) one needs to use words before forgetting them; (ii) afterforgetting words one can still recall and continue to use them; (iii) one
can have words with a word-forgetting person, but not a wordforsaking one. The forgetting of words does not mean to abandon
words, but to dissolve the linguistic and conceptual entanglement
resulting from the use of words. It forms the basis of Zhuangzi’s). If theparadoxical notion of speaking nonspeech (yan wuyan) (ineffable Real exists beyond our semantic horizon, the forgetting canhelp to untie the linguistic knots and even lead one beyond the horizon
to intuit the Real in itself. This is roughly the meaning of thesis T5.
A moon-pointing finger only tells the approximate location of themoon, the hearer has to turn and raise her head to see the moon withher own eyes. Similarly, the intuition of the Real requires the presenceof extra-linguistic factors. As mentioned before, the fine aspect of athing may be reached by virtue of word-aroused nonsemantic factors.
For a direct experience of the Real, apart from the indirect knowing bywords, the hearer needs to forget the words to realize the Real with adeep, quiescent mind-heart. This, to be sure, depends upon the hearer’s
level. Such is the meaning of thesis T6. In the phrase “not existence, notnonexistence,” for instance, one should not only conceptually negate
the not-existence and not-nonexistence forms, but should practicallyforget the phrase and the forms to realize the principle that is neither
existence nor nonexistence.31 The forgetting of words by no means
ensures the realization of the Real. But the forgetting that brings on therealization is basically concomitant with the act of realization.
Word-forgetting is not an integral part of the indicative use oflanguage, but can be seen to supplement it. A word-forgetting person
time and again forgets the words used, negatively to dissolve thelinguistic and conceptual knots and positively to realize the ineffable
Real. Here we see the difference between word-forgetting andsilence: Unlike silence, word-forgetting is generally right adjacent tothe use of words. The forgetting that brings on the realization of theReal only arises due to the use of words, and so a sage “does not takethe finger as the moon but also does not get rid of the finger to see themoon.”32 The notion of word-forgetting shows language to be an
important direct factor assisting the intuition of the Real. Significantly,
this and the relevant notion of speaking nonspeech may have influenced the Chinese Buddhist thinkers to have a more positive attitude
toward language than their Indian predecessors, who would tend tovalue silence over speech.
Given his philosophy of the middle way and the notion of wordforgetting, Jizang can then state both that “the nondual is speechless”
and that “speech is just the nondual”:

172

chien-hsing ho
Question: . . . the nondual principle is speechless, whereas the teaching responding to things is a speech; that is, the speechless principle
admits no speech, while the verbal teaching excludes speechlessness.
Then, as the principle is right opposite to the teaching, how can it get
the name “nondual”? Answer: You only know that the nondual is
speechless, but do not realize that speech is just the nondual. . . . So,
speaking while being speechless, though one speaks, one really has no
speech; imaging while being imageless, though one images, one really
forms no image. As there is concordance, whence comes the alleged
opposition?33

Of course, this view is anticipated by the paradoxical passage from theZhuangzi: “If one speaks nonspeech, one speaks all one’s life long
without having spoken, and one does not speak all one’s life long
without having not spoken.”34 Here “speaking nonspeech” roughly
corresponds to “speaking while being speechless, though one speaks,
one really has no speech.”
In the Buddhist context this can mean: (i) One responds to whatever comes with a quiescent mind-heart and speaks just as the occasion arises; (ii) one’s speech turns out to be self-emptying indication;(iii) a Buddhist sage forgets his speech, having no attachment to it,
while a layman may try to forget his speech in order to realize thenondual. All this perhaps accounts for the claim that “speech is justthe nondual.” The nondual principle, truly, is correlated with silence,but it is not the same as silence. Although sacred silence sounds likethunder, silently showing the profound, indivisible nature of the Real,
it is after all a way of expression with its own limitations. Moreover, if
one overvalues silence, separating silence and speech, one is rather indanger of fostering attachment to silence.

III. Epilogue
Many scholars of Chinese philosophy of language have averred thatthe chief function of Chinese philosophic language lies in practicallyguiding behavior or dissolving attachment, not in representing or
describing the external world. In Chinese Buddhism, too, language’s
pragmatic function of curing intellectual illness is more emphasizedthan its cognitive function of describing the world. Nevertheless, theindicative function of language examined in this essay is neither
cognitively representational nor noncognitive, nonreferential. When
Sengzhao says, “The Dao of nirvana, indeed, goes beyond the realmsof existence and nonexistence and evades the paths of words andimages,”35 his main intention is not to guide religious discipline or cureintellectual illness, nor to describe the Real. One needs to transcendchinese buddhist thought of reference173

the duality between semantic representation and pragmatic linguistic
usage to attend to the middle way indication.
As we are here mainly concerned with the difference between
indication and representational expression, let us illustrate the difference with the two figures:
realitylanguage

represents

realityindicates
language

Figure 2

Figure 3

In Figure 2 language directly represents reality. Besides, our mind’s“eye” can simultaneously look at language, the representing function
and reality. This may strengthen the belief in the correspondence
between language and reality.
By contrast, we can explain Figure 3 as follows:
1. Language as an indicator can, like a moon-pointing finger, point
toward some ineffable reality as the indicatee.
2. The indicator bears no correspondence to the indicatee, and one
cannot simultaneously look at the indicator, the indicating function and the indicatee.
3. An understanding of the language requires one to integratewords, meanings, images, and related contextual factors toattend to the reality.36
4. Whatever forms the hearer or reader imposes on the reality
present the latter as such and such a reality.
5. On grounds of the ineffability of the reality, the impositions haveto be negated and even forgotten.
Apart from the supreme reality, the fine aspects of things and events,
the sage’s intentions, one’s deep-lying feelings, all these are in varied
degrees ineffable. So, the notion of indication has a wide range offields of application.
Partially owing to the influence of the Chinese language as an
ideograph, ancient Chinese thinkers generally declined to set language apart from, and over against, reality. This expresses itself in two
attitudes toward language: (i) The thinkers rather unanimously dismissed the “no name without an entity named” claim; (ii) they generally did not favor forsaking language to rest in sheer silence. The
early Wittgenstein asks his readers to throw away his ladder of propo-

174chien-hsing hositions and pass over the ineffable in silence.37 Indian Mahayana
Buddhism denies language from the standpoint of wisdom and reaffirms it under the attitude of compassion,38 yet wisdom and compassion are here mutually different. Chinese Buddhism, on the contrary,tends to transcend and affirm language on the same ground, theground of nonduality of ti and yong. If we in our worldly life cannot
escape from the omnipresence of language, then the best thing to dowould be to use language without being used by language. In thisconnection, the simile of a moon-pointing finger as construed above
may just have pointed out the right way.
NANHUA UNIVERSITY
Chiayi, Taiwan

Endnotes
A Chinese draft of this essay was read at the conference “Chinese Philosophy in Analytical Perspectives,” the Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University,Taipei,
July 2005, while its English draft was presented at the conference “Themes in Buddhist
Literature,” the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, April
2006. I should like to thank the following scholars for their suggestions: Professors Robert
Gimello, Chen-kuo Lin, Koichi Shinohara, Drs. Kuo-ching Huang, Ulrich Timme Kragh,and Yuan-tse Lin. I am also grateful to the reviewers of Journal of Chinese Philosophy for
their critical comments.
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed.
(Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 75–76.
2. Here the substitution is not complete: while using the word “this” or “that” for an
object, one may still perform the gesture of pointing to the object with a finger.
However, the use of the word “pain” may also be accompanied by such pain-behavior
as moaning, sob, and frown.
3. I shall use the words “ineffable,” “unsayable,” and “unspeakable” interchangeably.
4. Keith E. Yandell has claimed that if a given mystical experience is really ineffable, itwould absurdly follow that any description is equidistant from the experience withany other. See his “Some Varieties of Ineffability,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1975): 167–79.
(The
5. Dafangguang Yuanjue Xiuduoluo Liaoyi Jing
Perfect Enlightenment Sutra), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu andKaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 17:917a27–29.
6. Da Foding Rulai Miyin Xiuzheng Liaoyi Zhupusa Wanxing Shoulengyan Jing
(The Suramgama Sutra), in Taishō
Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo
Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 19:111a8–11. Both this Sutra and the Perfect Enlightenment
Sutra, it is widely believed, were originally written in China, but this would not affectthe main line of our argumentation.
7. Thus, this essay approaches our main issue concerning the Chinese Buddhist thoughtof reference in two directions: a discussion of the Chinese Madhyamaka views oflanguage and an analysis of the simile of a moon-pointing finger. The two, so to speak,
respectively constitute the horizontal and vertical axes of this essay. The connection
between the two directions would become clearer as we move on.
8. Throughout this essay, I use “the Real” as a handy term for the ineffable truth,
principle, way, or reality intended by the concerned Buddhist thinker(s).

chinese buddhist thought of reference

175

9. Dasheng Ru Lengqie Jing
(The Lankavatara Sutra), in Taishō
Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo(The
Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 16:620a15–16; Zuochan Sanmei Jing
Meditation Concentration Sutra), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu
and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 15:284a8–13;(The Mahaprajnaparamita Sastra), in Taishō Shinshū
Dazhidu Lun
Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai,
1924–32), 25:726a1–4.
10. In pre-Buddhist Chinese texts, the word “zhi” already meant designation, signification, or the like, for instance, “the knower . . . sets up names to designate (zhi) the), Xunzi Jishi(Taipei: Student
reals” (Xunzi), in Li Di-Sheng (Book, 1984), chap. 22, 512.
11. Zongmi,
Dafangguang
Yuanjue
Xiuduoluo
Liaoyi
Jing
Lüeshu(A Concise Commentary on the Perfect Enlightenment Sutra), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku
Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 39:555c10–16. Incidentally, as thenotion of image is rather complicated, I shall refrain from discussing it here and leave
it for future investigation.
12. Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 233, 294–95. His reason for upholding the contradictoriness of reality is that
there are certain contradictory statements about limits, that are true, and that reality
is such renders those statements true.
(The Treatise of Sengzhao), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō,
13. Sengzhao, Zhaolun
ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32),
45:152a24–26.
14. Ibid., 152c20–23. The phrase “a name has no efficacy to obtain a thing, and a thing has(A
no reality matching a name” is found in Jizang’s Dasheng Xuanlun
Treatise on the Profound Teaching of the Mahayana), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed.
Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32),
45:16c27–28.
15. Sengzhao, Zhaolun, 152c24–28. Sengzhao then reaches the Madhyamaka conclusion:“Thus we know that things are not real; they have long been provisional names.”
Sengzhao’s argument here is rather problematic, though he has other more
Madhyamaka ways for showing the unreality of things. In any case, we are concerned
here with his linguistic thought, not with the soundness of his arguments.
16. Ibid., 152c12–14.
(The Meaning of the Two Truths), in Taishō Shinshū
17. See his Erdi Yi
Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai,
1924–32), 45:112b27–28: “Though (the dharmas are) not existence, they are, for thesake of sentient beings, tentatively expressed by the word ‘existence’ in order to show
not-existence. . . .” Among Jizang’s four types of interpretation of word meaning,
this type of interpretation is called a Dao-revealing interpretation (xiandao shi)).
(
18. If a word semantically represents or corresponds to its referential object, then, let us
say, the word says, denotes, or properly expresses the object. The word expresses theobject as it truly is. If words forming a sentence semantically represent its referential
object or state of affairs, then we take the words to say, tell, describe, or properly
express the latter.
19. Sengzhao, Zhaolun, 159b20–21.
20. Ibid., 154a16–17: “The intellect apprehends a form by knowing the knowable object
and so is termed ‘knowing.’ The supreme truth is intrinsically formless, how can the(Atrue intellect know it?” See also, Sengzhao’s Zhu Weimojie Jing
Commentary on the Vimalakirtinirdesa Sutra), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed.
Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32),
38:411a17–18: “The arising of the intellect occurs within the confines of forms; as the) by the intellect.”dharmakaya is formless, it is not to be reached (suo ji) (21. Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York:), ed., Zhuangzi
Columbia University Press, 1968), 178; cf. Guo Qing-Fan (176

chien-hsing ho

Jishi(Taipei: Wanjuan Lou, 1993), 572. The word here translated as“form” is “xing ( ),” not “xiang2”; however, both words are alike in meaning the
cognizable and broadly speakable appearance of a sensible thing. In the Zhaolun
they are occasionally taken to be synonyms. Incidentally, I refer to the Zhuangzi
several times because of its influence on the Chinese Buddhist thought oflanguage.
22. Sengzhao, Zhaolun, 153c24–26. This implies that the Dharma is unspeakable and yet
linguistically transmittable.
23. Jizang, Erdi Yi, 108b22–25. For Jizang’s other references to the simile of a moonpointing finger, see Erdi Yi, 90a–b. As Jizang’s own doctrine of twofold truth is rather
complicated, its details must be omitted here. For a lucid exposition of the doctrine,
see Ming-wood Liu, Madhyamaka Thought in China (Leiden/New York/Cologne:
E. J. Brill, 1994), 135–52.
) writes in the Dahui Pujue Chanshi Yulu
24. The Chan master Huiri ((The Teaching Record of Chan Master Dahui Pujue), in
Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo:
Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 47:811a3–5: “The hand is initially irrelevant to themoon, yet by knowing what the hand points to, one knows the location of themoon.” For Dahui’s own interpretation of the simile, refer to the same text, p. 895b.
25. In a number of Chinese Buddhist texts, the Real is said to be beyond the reach (suoji) of intellect, language, or words and images.This qualification is involved in many anineffability thesis.
26. For further discussions on this issue, including responses to some modern scholars’
criticisms of an ineffability thesis, refer to my article “Saying the Unsayable,” Philosophy East and West 56 (2006): 409–27. Incidentally, some scholars have attempted new,
) to save Laozi thedaring interpretations of the opening verse of the text Laozi (philosopher from the charge of self-contradiction; for instance, Bo Mou, “Ultimate
Concern and Language Engagement: A Reexamination of the Opening Message of
the Dao-De-Jing,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27 (2000): 429–39. Such an approachis not quite needed. For, there may be no real contradiction in the verse and Laozi is,alas, just one of a great many thinkers who offered an ineffability thesis and then faced
the charge.
27. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 134: “Describe the aroma of coffee––Whycan’t it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking?” In our view,the coarse aspect of the aroma is describable in the strict sense of the term, while inthe same sense the fine aspect is indescribable.
28. This suggests that a negative expression can function as an indication. Cf. Sengzhao,
Zhaolun, 156b25–29:) is to say it is not existence ( fei shi
To say it is not-existence ( fei you) (), but not that it is non-existence (shi fei you) ().To sayyou) (
it is not-nonexistence is to say it is not nonexistence, but not that it isnon-nonexistence. Not-existence is not non-existence, and notnonexistence is not non-nonexistence. Hence, Subuti spoke about thesupreme wisdom all day and said he had spoken nothing.
Here, “is not existence” resembles a sentence negation of the form “x is not P,”
whereas “is nonexistence” expresses a predicate negation of the form “x is non-P.”
29. According to this interpretation, to say the word “middle” is to make explicit notmiddle, and the word “nonexistence” has as its meaning not-nonexistence. Refer to(The Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises), in
Jizang, Sanlun Xuanyi
Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe (Tokyo:
Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 45:14b2–5, and Erdi Yi, 95bc. By the same token, to say“ineffable” is to make explicit not-ineffable and to have as its meaning the negationof the imposed ineffable-form. This interpretation has another dimension that I
should leave out here.
30. Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 944; cf. Watson, Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 302.
31. Cf. Sengzhao, Zhaolun, 159b7–9. Jizang also makes use of the term “word-forgetting”(wangyan); he even characterizes his nondual principle with the phrase “wordforgetting and thought-ceasing.”

chinese buddhist thought of reference

177

32. Yongming Yanshou (), Zongjing Lu(The Record of the Mirror of
Orthodoxy), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku
Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 48:428c2–3.This is not meant to playdown religious discipline; after all, one who is meditatively well-practiced is in a better
position than others to forget words and intuit the Real.
(A Treatise on the Profound Teaching of
33. Jizang, Jingming Xuanlun
Vimalakirti), in Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku
Watanabe (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kai, 1924–32), 38:856b22–c3. Cf. Sengzhao, Zhu
Weimojie Jing, 347b7–9: “Nonspeech does not mean having no speech. It means
emptying what is spoken. . . . By emptying what is spoken, one speaks all day without
having spoken.”
34. Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 949; cf. Watson, Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 304.
35. Sengzhao, Zhaolun, 158c19–20.
36. For the notion of integration I have here in mind, refer to Michael Polanyi and Harry
Prosch, Meaning (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 40–42, 69–70.
37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1974), 74.
38. Cf. Gadjin Nagao, Madhyamika and Yogacara, ed. and trans. Leslie S. Kawamura(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 41–46.