Slovakia and Hungary:
The Most Complicated Bilateral Relations
in Central Europe:
Focusing on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Problem

Susumu Nagayo
Introduction
It is undeniable that after the collapse of the socialist regimesin Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, bilateral relations between
Slovakia and Hungary, which had been apparently calm during
the previous forty years, have again turned into a grave international
issue. Especially since the formation of the independent Slovak
Republic on January 1, 1993, Slovak-Hungarian relations havebecome sharper and more direct in character, and are now themost complicated bilateral relations in Central Europe.
According to related monographs and articles,
Slovak-Hungarian relations mainly consist of two aspects. One
aspect is composed of various contemporary issues in connection
with the Hungarian minority's rights in Slovakia (e.g. thecontroversies about the official language law in 1990, the law
regarding first names and surnames in 1993, the law on traffic
signs in 1994, the state language law in 1995 etc.). Anotheraspect relates to the huge water management system on the
Danube, well known as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the historicaldevelopment of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros problem and thus tomake clear the complicated structure of Slovak-Hungarian relations.
Historical Background
The history of river improvement on the middle Danube

260

Slovakia and Hungary

dates back to the medieval period. It was in the seventeenth century
that works for the protection of the banks were started
systematically. Since then, joining and reinforcing work on theembankment has been carried out and dredging operations havebeen performed continuously to make ship navigation smoother.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the waterway of the
middle Danube had been regulated to the shape as we see ittoday. However, even such work was not enough to completely
prevent floods. In 1876, 1897, 1899, 1954, and 1965, the Danube
overflowed its banks. As a result of the last flood of 1965, morethan 100 thousand hectares of land came under water in southern
Slovakia, and many villages were destroyed.
After the Second World War, on August 18, 1948, theConvention Concerning the Regime of Navigation on the Danube
was signed in Belgrade by seven then socialist countries (theSoviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Ukraine,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). According to the preamble ofthe convention, its purpose was "to guarantee free navigation on
the Danube river, in agreement with the interests and sovereigntyof the Danubian countries, and to make closer the economical andcultural relations between them and other countries."
It was symptomatic that the second document attached to theconvention was entitled On the Gabcíkovo-Gönyű Area. The
document said that "on the necessity of construction which is
expected to guarantee the normal condition of navigation in the
Gabcíkovo-Gönyű area (from 1821 km to 1791 km), the signatories
agreed to recognize that it suits their general interests to keep thisarea in good navigable condition, and they also agreed to recognizethat the necessary construction for this purpose is far beyond thepowers of the countries concerned along the river, to whom they
have the competence to entrust the construction legally."
As one of several drastic measures to control such unstableriver conditions, a plan was formulated in Hungary, as early as
the beginning of 1940's, to build a comprehensive water
management system in northern Hungary. Based on this idea, aproject for the construction of a big system with a power canal

Susumu Nagayo

261

was studied in the 1950's as a joint undertaking between thesocialist countries of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.*1 "From theearly 1960's, survey, research, and comparative and feasibility
studies were started for the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Hydroelectric
System."*2
The project took concrete form in the 1970's. Preparation
work for the construction was started in 1976. On September 16,
1977, the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System was signed in Budapest
by the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian prime ministers.
According to the treaty, this large-scale project originallyconsisted of two sections. The first (the Gabčíkovo section), which
is located mainly in Slovakian territory, was composed of the
Hrušov-Dunakiliti reservoir, a weir at Dunakiliti, a 25-km-longpower canal, the Gabčíkovo dam with a hydroelectric power stationand two ship-locks, and the deepening of river bed for 20 km.
The second (the Nagymaros section), which is situated in Hungarian
territory, included flood-protection measures, the Nagymaros dam
with a hydroelectric power station and ship locks, and the deepeningof the river bed for 40 km.
The major goals of the construction were:(a) to improve the conditions of navigation by constructing
a power canal;(b) to provide for flood protection by constructing a reservoir
for water coordination; and(c) to obtain electric energy by constructing hydroelectric
power stations.
On the basis of the treaty, the Czechoslovakian side wasobliged to construct a great complex at the village of Gabčíkovo*3
in southern Slovakia, and the Hungarian side was to constructcorresponding works near Nagymaros in the northern part of
Hungary. In 1981, the Hungarian side suspended its share of thework for financial reasons, but construction on Czechoslovakian
territory proceeded as planned.

262

Slovakia and Hungary

Politicization of the Construction Work
From the mid 1980's, the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project
became a target for intense criticism by ecology groups in bothcountries and was characterized as a megalomaniac enterprise
which was sure to bring environmental catastrophe. They madethe project a target of indirect criticism against the socialist regime.
Their criticisms of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros were a criticism of theregime itself. It is significant for the later developments of thisissue (especially for Hungary), that the construction work was
first politicized by dissident groups.
Environmental groups developed a campaign mainly against
the ecological destruction that was believed to be associated withthis project. In Hungary, the activities of the Danube Circle were
supported by a wide range of social groups, and the movement
effectively appealed to international public opinion for support.
This environmental organization played an important role instopping the Hungarian section of the construction work in 1989.
Ecological movements were also organized in Slovakia,
though they operated with less intensity. An example of this was
the publishing in 1987 of the brochure Bratislava / nahlas[Bratislava / aloud] by the ecology group The Slovak Union of
the Protectors of Nature and Country. In this brochure, the authors
calmly pointed out that "the influence of future work on the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros on the quality of the ground water may
pose a threat mainly for the water sources of Rusovce - Ostrovné
lúčky - Mokraď (all Slovakian place names)".*4
After the collapse of the socialist regimes in 1989, the
Hungarian and the Czechoslovakian governments adopted different
ways of dealing with this project.
The Hungarian government decided on May 13, 1989 (still
before the change of government from one monopolized bycommunists to a pluralized one) without previous consultation
with the Czechoslovakian side, to suspend construction at
Nagymaros in their territory for two months on account of ecologicaldestruction. Moreover, on July 20, they also decided to stopSusumu Nagayo

263

construction in their share of the Gabčíkovo section of the project(the weir at Dunakiliti). On October 31, the Hungarian parliament
decided to suspend construction at Nagymaros, and parliament
empowered the government to negotiate a change in the treaty of
1977.
The Czechoslovakian side (especially the Slovakian side), tothe contrary, even after the dramatic changes in the politicallandscape at the end of 1989, insisted on continuing construction
at Gabčíkovo, mainly based on the fact that over 90 percent of theconstruction had been completed prior to the collapse of the socialist
regime (in comparison to Nagymaros where only 10 percent of
the construction was completed).
Realization of a Temporary Solution
There were several rounds of negotiations between the new,post-socialist governments of both countries on the issue, but they
were unable to reach a compromise. On April 10, 1991, the
Hungarian parliament empowered a governmental delegation tonegotiate only over the abrogation of the treaty of 1977 and forrestoration of the original state of the terrain. On July 23, theSlovakian government (and, after two days, the Czechoslovakian
federal government) approved the realization of a temporary
solution (so-called alternative C), and, on November 18, work
was started. They intended to put the Gabčíkovo works into
operation by constructing a structure which would reduce the areaof the reservoir by one-third and by extending the power canal in
Slovakian territory. Instead of a weir at Dunakiliti, which the
Hungarians abandoned, the old river bed of the Danube would bedammed at Čuňovo, where both sides of the river belong to the
Slovak Republic.
A brochure which propagates the standpoint of the Slovakian
construction company, emphasizing economic motives, explains
the reason for choosing the provisional solution as follows: "Ifthere were no technical possibility of putting Gabčíkovo into
operation (...), the Slovakian economy would receive another heavy

264

Slovakia and Hungary

shock, and the shock would be multiplied by the synergetic effectsof the conversion from military oriented industry to a non-militaryone, the effects of privatisation, and the transformation to a freemarket economy."*5 Meanwhile, one foreign observer pointed out
the political and psychological aspects of the issue for Slovakia:"The main motivation for the speedy completion of the Gabčíkovo
dam system seems to be political — that is, a matter of national
independence and pride. The project has become synonymouswith a demonstration of Slovakian strength, will, anddecisiveness."*6
In September 1991, at the conference of Slovak-Hungarian
Forum in Budapest, Rudolf Chmel, a famous Slovakian scholar
and the then Czechoslovak ambassador to Hungary, emphasizing
a complicated psychological moment, pointed out that: "Relations
between Slovaks and Hungarians have been determined and indeed
deformed by national and ethnic squeamishness and feelings of
unfair treatment and historical trauma on both sides. This is true
even in such apparently technocratic issues, as the construction of
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project, which some politicians aretrying to utilize for stimulation of the ethnic emotions (...)"*7
Against the measures taken by the Slovaks, on May 19, 1992,
the Hungarian government announced its decision to annul thetreaty of 1977. The above-mentioned observer says that "the mainargument for the annulment was that the Gabčíkovo dam system,
if finished according to present plans, would cause irreversible
environmental damage to the River Danube and to the surrounding
region.
In spite of such fears, at the end of October 1992, the Slovaks,
based on the provisional solution, were forced to dam up the oldriver bed. As a result, 90-95 percent of water of the Danube
started to flow into the newly-built power canal. Soon afterdamming up the old course of the Danube, the hydroelectric power
station at Gabčíkovo was put into operation, and ship navigation
through the power canal was started. According to the observer,"Hungary had in fact suffered a major foreign policy defeat, since
its efforts to prevent the diversion had failed."*9Susumu Nagayo

265

Points in Dispute
As we saw above, the dispute about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
project has deviated from the original dimension (precedence ofriver improvement of the Danube against, the priority of protecting
the natural environment). It has been transformed into a politicalissue, in which there is a complex intertwining of political anddiplomatic intentions concerning national prestige, national
interests and distorted nationalism in both countries. The issue isfurther complicated by the fact that a mainly Hungarian minority
lives in the greater part of the area in the Slovakian territory forwhich the Gabčíkovo project may have direct influence.
The arguments of a Hungarian ecologist outline the major
problems which might be involved in the project:(a) Geological risks. — Advanced geological surveys ofthe fault lines under the Gabčíkovo reservoir were notsufficient. The anti-earthquake procedures used are not
up to international standards. The existence of a very
dangerous stratum under the reservoir is also confirmed.
We are able to prognosticate in advance about the dangerof a collapse of the dam and corresponding flooding(b) Threat to drinking water. — There are some possibilities
that the operation of the system may destroy the
infiltration function of the old river bed. Therefore,
contaminated mud will accumulate, and it could pollute
important resources of drinking water in Slovakia andalso in Hungary.
(c) Destruction of river ecosystems. — Ground water levels
may sink because of the lowering of the quantity ofwater in the old river bed, and the rich wooded flood
plain (especially the inland delta area around Szigetköz
in northwestern Hungary) may die from lack of water.
Therefore, valuable flora and fauna may be endangered.
These kind of "ecological risks are partly demonstrated and partly
deduced from similar precedents at home and abroad. In short,
we can give advance notice of the dangers. Until now, the266

Slovakia and Hungary

Czechoslovakians have not brought forward any evidence whichargues that these serious dangers may be brought down under

acceptable limits"*10

On the other hand, Július Binder, the chief director of the
Slovakian construction company, which is responsible for theconstruction works at Gabčíkovo, persisted in his opinion, byusing a metaphor: "You are making a mistake, if you think thatthe Danube as it stands is in an ideal condition. The river is sick.
She needs medical treatment. The works are a remedy for the
problems." Binder pointed out the followings as arguments forthe necessity of the project:(a) To prevent the lowering of the river bed. — Because of
the outflow of sand and gravel, the river bed of the
Danube in nearby Bratislava is deeply scooped out.
Therefore, the ground water level is steadily sinking,and the rich wooded flood plain is becoming dry.
Conditions for agriculture are getting worse. If regulationof the water level by the creation of the reservoir isrealized, we will be able to stop this phenomenon.
(b) To improve the operational ability of the river port in
Bratislava. — Owing to the lowering of the water levelon the Danube, the port is out of use for 200 days ayear, which causes a great loss to the Slovak economy.
If regulation of the water level is realized, we can improve
the operational ability of the port.
(c) To facilitate water transport. — The sector between
Gabčíkovo and Nagymaros forms a bottleneck in theriver transportation system of the middle Danube. If thepower canal is opened, we will be able to smooth outtransportation bottlenecks.
Binder's arguments are backed up by so-called realistic
thinking which presupposes existing facts. He says that it
would cost more to abandon construction than to finish it. To
use his words, returning the terrain to its original state (which the
Hungarian side advocates) is out of the question.11

Susumu Nagayo

267

Appeal to the International Court of JusticeUpon dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
and following the formation of the Slovak Republic on January 1,
1993, Slovakia succeeded to the rights and obligations relating to
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project in all aspects. Thence, thedispute over the Danube brought further complications into thealready complicated bilateral relations between Slovakia andHungary. At the same time, both governments always have totake into consideration the fact that "further escalation of theconflict will harm their chances of joining the EC in the future."*12
To solve the dispute rationally, both governments agreed tonegotiations in a tripartite meeting (including representatives of
the European Community) in Brussels and came to the conclusionthat the dispute should be presented to the International Court ofJustice in The Hague. On April 7, 1993, the Special Agreement
for Submission to the International Court of Justice on the
Differences between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak
Republic Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project was
signed in Brussels.
In the preamble of the agreement, which consists of six articles,
both countries officially recognize that "the Parties concerned
have been unable to settle these differences by negotiations" anddesire that "these differences should be settled by theInternational Court of Justice."
In the agreement, the following three questions are presented:(a) "Whether the Republic of Hungary was entitledtosuspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works
on the Nagymaros Project and on part of the Gabčíkovo
Project (...)"(b) "Whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic wasentitled to proceed, in November 1991, to the "provisional
solution" and to put in operation beginning in
October
1992 this system (...)"(c) "What the legal effects are of the notification, on
May
19, 1992, of the termination of the Treaty (of 1977) by

268

Slovakia and Hungary

the Republic of Hungary."
Further, both countries "agree that, pending the final Judgmentof the Court, they will establish and implement a temporary water
management regime for the Danube." The agreement entered into
force on June 28, 1993 by the exchange of instruments ofratification.*13
It will probably take several years for the International Courtof Justice to make a ruling. According to a Slovakian newspaper,
the lawsuit on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros system will be brought
to oral proceedings by the International Court of Justice in thefirst quarter of 1997. In that case it is possible to assume that the
judgment may be passed during the summer of 1997.*14Trend of Public Opinion in Slovakia
The majority of citizens in the Slovak Republic say that it isrealistic to operate the Gabčíkovo project, since, prior to 1989,
construction work was nearly finished. A public opinion poll was
carried out in March 1993 by the liberal institution, the Center forSocial Analyses in Bratislava, in which the following question
was asked: "The dispute about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project
ought to be decided by the International Court of Justice in The
Hague. What do you think about this?". The results were as follows:
All citizens

Slovaks

Hungarians

The work must be implemented to afull extent without regard to theInternational Court of Justice
It is necessary to subordinate to
the judgment of the International
Court of Justice

54

60

14

28

25

56

2

1

10

16
100

14
100

20
100

The construction must be definitively stopped
Other answers. No opinion
Total

Structure (%)

Susumu Nagayo

269

As the figures indicate, the opinions of citizens in Slovakia
about the Gabčíkovo project are not united. A little over half ofthe population as a whole (54 percent) supports operation of the
project without regard to the judgment of the International Courtof Justice. It is symptomatic that the approval rating for this item
among Slovak citizens amounts to 60 percent, while the rate of
approval among ethnic Hungarians measures only 14 percent.
On the other hand, 28 percent of the whole population of the
Slovak Republic, and a quarter of Slovak citizens, insist that theirgovernment should obey the judgment of the International Court.,
As concerns the citizens who are ethnic Hungarians, the majority(56 percent) support this opinion. An extreme viewpoint (to stop
the construction definitively) is supported by just 2 percent of theentire citizenry, but the rate among ethnic Hungarians reaches 10
percent.*15
As mentioned above, the dispute about the Gabčíkovo project
has brought a quarrel not only into bilateral relations between
Slovakia and Hungary but also into the internal relations between
citizens of the Slovak and Hungarian ethnicities in Slovakia.
Report of the International Monitoring Group
Since the start of operation at the end of October 1992 theGabčíkovo system seems to be working smoothly. Soon after thestart, monitoring activities began by the international working
group of the Commission of the European Community. The working
group consists of six independent experts, whose duty is to conduct
a follow-up survey about the influence of the project on the naturalenvironment and to propose several alternatives to the provisional
water transport system.
According to a monitoring report, Determination of influencesof the Gabčíkovo project and recommendations for improvementof the monitoring system, which was published by the working
group on November 2, 1993 in Budapest, the main influences of
the Gabčíkovo project on the natural environment after one yearof operation are:

270

Slovakia and Hungary(a) In comparison with conditions before damming up (atthe end of October 1992), the water level in Bratislava
increased by 1-2 meters, which is equal to the conditionsof forty years earlier.
(b) On some parameters, no substantial changes wereascertained regarding the quality of the surface water.
(c) There is only little information, which allows us topronounce only preliminary and undefinitive conclusions,about the influence of the Gabčíkovo project on
sedimentation and erosion (in the river bed).
(d) The ground water level in Slovak territory has increasedor remained without change. The rising level has occurred
mainly in the upper part (of the Danube) near the reservoir.
This means that the change happened in the part of theterritory most negatively influenced by a long term trendof lower ground water levels. (...) It seems that groundwater levels in Hungary were also increased in areas not
far from the reservoir. In the middle part of Szigetköz,
between Dunakiliti and Ásványráró (both Hungarianvillages), ground water levels have sunk in the territory
near the river.
(e) Generally speaking, no change was ascertained in thequality of the ground water after the damming up of the
Danube.
(f) Due to the rising of ground water levels after the damming
up in the greater part of the Slovak territory, conditions(for agriculture) changed for the better. By someestimates, the demand for irrigation from external sources
was brought down about 25 percent in comparison withconditions before the damming up.
(g) As a result of the changes in ground water level, forests
were positively influenced in Slovakia and negatively in
Hungary.
(h) In 1993, the hydroelectric power station at Gabčíkovo
produced 150-200 GWh of electric power monthly. Thisis equal to 10 percent of the whole consumption of electricSusumu Nagayo

271

energy in Slovakia. (The power station began to operate
permanently on May 17, 1996.)(i) The international navigation of ships through the ship
locks at Gabčíkovo has functioned normally since theopening on November 9, 1992.*16
Accidents at the Gabčíkovo Site
Judging from the contents, the monitoring report of theinternational working group comes to conclusions which areadvantageous to the Slovaks (except (d) and (g) ). Nearly theentire Slovakian mass media was taking the line that the so-called"catastrophic scenario" of the Hungarians has been proved wrong.
But in the first quarter of 1994, two serious accidents happened
in succession at the Gabčíkovo site. First, on February 11, theUkrainian lighter Zernograd, loaded with crude oil (about 80
thousand liters), went aground and sank in one of the two lockchambers. There was substantial oil leakage from the wreck. It issaid that the captain of the lighter (killed in the accident) shouldbe held accountable for this accident. The disposal of the released
oil and the removal of the sunken structure of the lighter took along time, and during this time the works of the lock chambers
were closed.
Moreover, on March 20, one of the concrete doors (500 tons
in weight) at another lock chamber was crushed by water pressure.
Water in the chamber flowed out rapidly, and a tidal wave about
4 meters high was released. Newspapers reported that the qualityof the material comprising the broken door was questionable. The
accident also may have been caused by the pressure of water
which had collected for a long time in another lock chamber
during the removal work of the sunken lighter. Though ships inthe lock were not directly dameged both ship locks became
unusable. Shipping through Gabčíkovo was stopped indefinitely.
(Navigation through the new doors of the left lock chamber began
on January 19, 1995.)
These accidents (especially the second one) shook the public

272

Slovakia and Hungary

confidence of Slovak society in the safety of the Gabčíkovo works.
Taking advantage of these accidents, the Hungarians demandedthat water should be returned to the old river bed in order to use it
again as an international nagivation course. But the Slovaks refused
this demand.
The Bilateral Treaty and Gabčíkovo
As an important step toward historical reconciliation, on March
19, 1995, the Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly
Co-operation between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of
Hungary, consisting of 22 articles, was signed in Paris by theprime ministers of both countries. After heated discussions which
had continued more than one year, the treaty was finally ratified
by the Slovakian parliament on March 26, 1996. In the preambleof the treaty, both countries are convinced, that "the historicalchanges which have taken place in Europe and also in their own
countries offer unique possibilities for the solution of common
problems, following from the development of bilateral relations,in the spirit of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation."In the third article of the treaty both sides confirm that they
respect nonagression of the common boundary between theircountries, and reciprocal territorial integration. They also confirm
that they have no territorial claims on each other and have nointention to raise any in the future. This article is significant
especially for the Slovakian side, for whom the possible repetitionof the traumatic historical experience of November, 1938 (therevision of the southern boundary in favour of Hungary by the
Vienna Settlement) always remains. The article must work for the
Slovakian society as a kind of tranquilizer.
On the other hand, the Hungarian side (including the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia) may positively estimate thefifteenth article of the treaty, where the protection of national
minorities and of their rights and freedoms is determined in detail.
It is important that both countries agree to exercise the standards
and political pledges anchored in the international documents,

Susumu Nagayo

273

such as:(a) the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (November 1994),(b) the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (June 29, 1990),(c) the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United
Nations no. 47/135 on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National, or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities(December 18, 1992),(d) the Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe no. 1201 (1993) to Respect
Individual Human and Civic Rights Including the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National Minorities.*17
According to a public opinion poll which was carried out in
April-May 1995 by the Institution for Research of Public Opinion
at the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava, thespectrum of opinions about the signature of the bilateral treaty
between Slovakia and Hungary was as follows:
All citizens

Slovaks
Hungarians Structure

Fully approve the treaty

26

23

40

Rather approve the treaty

29

31

21

4

4
4
24
14
100

5

Rather don't approve the treaty
Don't approve the treaty at all
No interest
No opinion
Total

4
24
13
100

3
21
10
100

As the figures indicate, 55 (26 + 29) percent of the whole
population of the Slovak Republic, in greater or lesser degrees,
supports the treaty. It is remarkable that the rate of approval among
ethnic Hungarians (40 + 21 = 61 percent) is a little higher thanamong Slovaks (23 + 31 = 54 percent). There are relatively few

274

Slovakia and Hungary

citizens who don't approve the treaty (4 + 4 = 8 percent), but at
the same time it should not go unheeded that almost a quarter of
all citizens of Slovakia (24 percent) have no interest in the issue.
It is interesting from our point of view, that in the seventh placeon the list enumerating the positive aspects of the treaty, we readthe sentence: The treaty is a perspective for solution of the issues
concerned with the Gabčíkovo project.*18
On the whole we should also positively estimate the meaningof this bilateral treaty as an attempt to solve the issues arisingfrom the complex Slovak-Hungarian relations by peaceful legalmeans. The treaty is the result of negotiations and compromise ina positive sense. It is also an attempt to heal the historical traumas
on both sides.
Conclusion
An analysis of the historical development of the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros problem indicates that the roots of thiscomplex situation consist undoubtedly in the politicization of an
originally unpolitical problem. What has made the issue all themore complicated is that the construction work on
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros was first politicized by dissident groups
during the socialist regimes (especially in Hungary). The term
Nagymaros there became a symbol of the disaster which thesocialist regime had brought to their country.
In Slovakia, however, soon after the collapse of the socialist
regimes the name Gabčíkovo began to symbolize the national
pride and prestige of Slovaks. The difference in the strength ofaversion to the heritage of the socialist period in both countries
originates in their different historical circumstances. Of course,
an important role was also played by the undeniable fact that in1989 in the Gabčíkovo section over 90 percent of construction
had been completed, while in the Nagymaros section only 10
percent was completed. These psychological factors prevented
both Slovaks and Hungarians from being able to calmly discuss
the matter.

Susumu Nagayo

275

The appeal to the International Court of Justice in 1993 brought
about a major turning point in the history of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
problem. Both sides found the possibility of solving the complicatedissue by peaceful and legal means through an international
institution. The recent bilateral treaty between both countries also
approves this and guarantees that they will continue in this direction.
If the issue can really be solved in this way, bilateral relations
between Slovakia and Hungary will be released from a historicaltrauma and recrimination. In this way the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
problem offers them unique chance to give an instructive precedent
not only to Central Europe, but also to other parts of the world.
Notes
1

2
3

4

5

6

The description of this part is based on an interview with a
Hungarian scholar, Emil Mosonyi, Kto sa bojí objektívneho
vedeckého názoru? [Who fears objective scientific opinion?],Národná obroda, Bratislava, 28 February, 1994.
Danubius Magnus / Gabčíkovo /. Bratislava 1993.
Gabčíkovo is a village in the distrect of Dunajská Streda insouthern Slovakia. It had the historical Hungarian name Bős. In
1948, the village was renamed Gabčíkovo after a Slovak hero of
the resistance movement during the Second World War, Jozef
Gabčík (1912-1942). According to the national census of 1991,
the village has 4,910 inhabitants, and of these 4,629 (94 percent)belong to the Hungarian ethnic group and 237 (6 percent) are
Slovaks.
Bratislava / nahlas. Bratislava 1987, p. 7. For information about
the activities of The Slovak Union of the Protectors of Nature
and Country (Slovenský zväz ochrancov prírody a krajiny) during
the 1980's, concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project, see
the brochure "Dunaj story". Bratislava 1990.
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project. Standpoint of the Czecho-Slovak
side and answers to questions. Vodohospodárska výstavba
Bratislava, 1992, p. 6.
Okolicsanyi K., Slovak-Hungarian Tension: Bratislava Diverts

276

Slovakia and Hungary

7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16

17

18

the Danube. RFE / RL Research Report, 1992, no. 49, p. 52.
Chmel R., "Nerozumieme si" alebo O potrebe vzájomnej
vnímavosti (aj Slovákov a Maďarov) ["We don't understandeach other" or On the necessity of mutual perception (of Slovaks
and Hungarians)]. Slovensko-mad'arské vzťahy v 20. storočí[Slovak-Hungarian relations in the 20th century]. Bratislava 1992,
p. 10.
Okolicsanyi K., Hungary Cancels Treaty on Danube Dam
Construction. RFE / RL Research Report, 1992, no. 26, p. 46.
Okolicsanyi K., op. cit., 1992, no. 49, p. 54.
See Szabó G., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros: maďarský pohled [aHungarian standpoint]. Listy, Praha 1992, no. 5, pp. 25-28.
See Binder J., Gabčíkovské anomálie. Na domnienky odporcov
vodného diela máme argumenty [Anomalies on Gabčíkovo. We
have arguments about the conjectures of opponents of the project].
Slobodný piatok, Bratislava, 21 August 1992.
Okolicsanyi K., op. cit., 1992, no. 49, p. 49.
Zbierka zákonov Slovenskej republiky [Collected acts of the
Slovak Republic], Bratislava, no. 54 1994, p. 323.
Gabčíkovo bude v Haagu vraj o rok [Gabčíkovo may reach The
Hague in a year]. Národná obroda, Bratislava, 9 February 1996.
Aktuálne problémy Slovenska po rozpade ČSFR marec 1993
(Správa zo sociologického výskumu), Centrum pre sociálnuanalýzu [Current Problems of Slovakia after the Split of theČSFR March 1993. (Report of the Sociological Survey), Center
for Social Analysis], Bratislava 1993, p. 85.
The description of this part is based on the article Zistenia expertov
Európskej únie [Ascertainments by experts of the European
Union]. Národná obroda, Bratislava, 21 February 1994.
Zmluva o dobrom susedstve a priateľskej spolupráci medzi
Slovenskou republikou a Maďarskou republikou [The Treaty on
Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation between the
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary]. Národná obroda,
Bratislava, 27 March 1996.
Názory, Informačný bulletin, Ústav pre výskum verejnej mienky
pri Štatistickom úrade Slovenskej republiky[Opinions,Susumu Nagayo

277

Information bulletin, Institution for Research of Public Opinion at theStatistical Office of the Slovak Republic], 1995, no. 2, pp. 26-2.