Comments on the papers of Rudka and Hirose
Miho Oshima
First, I would like to comment on Rudka's paper, which is ageneral explanation of sub-regional cooperation in Central
Europe and its meaning. He is a specialist on SEFTA, and I
should admit that from the economic point of view, SEFTA isbeyond my knowledge. But the only thing I can say is that I
wonder if SEFTA can be called sub-regional cooperation. Prof.
Rudka said SEFTA resembles EFTA, but I think it is difficult tosay EFTA is sub-regional cooperation. Taking the examples ofSweden and Finland, who are now members of the EU, they left
EFTA but still play active roles in Barents Sea cooperation andother sub-regional cooperation. Anyway, as my field is not
Eastern Europe, but Northern Europe, I will comment on
sub-regional cooperation in general.
To begin, Prof. Rudka says that after the short-lived processof quick disintegration of political and economic ties amongsome Central and Eastern European Countries, to compensate forthese ties, other new initiatives have come into being, namelysub-regional initiatives. This explanation is true but not new,because this trend already attracted Western European'sattention, a few years ago. Of course I do not intend to criticize
him on this point, rather my interest is why people in Eastern
Europe are making much of sub-regional cooperation now. It
seems to me that this tendency has something to do with today'ssituation in Eastern Europe. Now Poland is taking the lead
toward the EU, and also taking the initiative in sub-regionalcooperation. Would Prof. Rudka explain the current Polish rolein sub-regional cooperation, which he did not referred to at all?
The second question I have is about sub-regional
cooperation from a comparative perspective. Actually, at the last
symposium of the Slavic Research Center I was asked the samekind of questions by Prof. Hayashi. As Prof. Rudka has pointed
out,
sub-regional
cooperationingeneralhas
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Commentscharacteristics. First, is its loosely organized framework which isin striking contrast to that of the EU. The EU has a very firmorganization and rock-solid laws but, on the contrary,sub-regional cooperation has only a secretariat, and sometimes
does not have even that. But secondly, sub-regional cooperation
has a multi-layered or multi-dimensional cooperative network,and as Prof. Rudka points out, this network contributes to thedeepening of inter-state and cross-border cooperation. In theBaltic Sea cooperation, for example, it is said that nobody grasps
the whole of these cross-border organizations or activities. Thisis only possible when sub-regional cooperation has nostate-oriented, top-down organization such as the EU has.
Thirdly, the main concern of sub-regional cooperation is practicalactivities, that is utility, including environment, communication,energy, media, small and medium-sized enterprises, education,agriculture, science and technology, and so on, as Prof. Hirose
points out. But of course there are differences. For example
Barents Region cooperation, which unfortunately Prof. Rudka
does not refer to, but in my understanding is a uniquecooperation, was initiated because of environmental concerns,
not only on a commercial basis, but also on a military basis, andwas later characterized by cooperative activities, which
contributed to Comprehensive Security in a broader sense.
Fourthly, sub-regional cooperation is not an entity in itself. It only
exists in a relationships with other larger forms of cooperation,
especially in the process of Europeanization and the EU. Even
environmental policy, which is often considered to beindependent, is inevitably included in the EU's policy. It is often
said that the EU environment policy has a stronger integrative
element and also is connected with its European domestic
market. In the Treaty of Roma, Paragraph 130r says that
protection of the environment should be a component of otherareas of Community policy. But because of EU policy, it isbelieved that sub-regional cooperation is an important step
toward Europeanization. This tendency is often pointed out for
Baltic Sea Cooperation, and therefore many researchers call it
the "Baltic Sea Model".

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This explanation is rather Scandinavian-oriented, I have toadmit. But at the same time, different types of sub-regional
cooperations share common general characteristics and they are
moving in the same direction. If you agree, please compare theEastern European case with other cases, according to these fourpoints.
Next I would like to comment on Prof. Hirose's paper, but
first, I want to make two points clear. In Europe even today, it isimportant to consider small power politics, especialy when mostpeople are interested only in the big powers, which have strong
influences on the EU or NATO. International politics in Europe is
not so simple and in small power politics we can find many
interesting factors which may change the traditional frameworkof international politics. Also in "regionalized Europe", we can't
ignore any of the EU, NATO or sub-regional cooperation. The
term "sub-region" is somewhat controversial, but it was used in
FAO's report in 1989. Now, in the nineties, people tend to use
this term not only about European regional cooperation, but also
about Asian, South American and African regional co-operation.
In this respect, Hirose's paper is interesting because hegives us an opportunity to consider the relationships between thefuture of small power politics and regional cooperation. But, atthe same time, I dare to say that in Hirose's paper, Austrian
foreign policy and Central European Initiative have nothing to dowith each other. If the title is correct, I can't help but think that hispaper is split into two parts. So the only question I can ask him isabout his title*, that is, what kind of relationships are there
between Austria and the Central European Initiative? Pleaseanswer not only in terms of the Austrian government, but also as
you understand it.
Concerning this question I would like to point out twothings. First, to my understanding, if we think about the future ofneutral states, which are faced with major problems now, we cando this in comparison with the other European neutral states. By
way of example, we can refer to Finland and Sweden. Thesecountries, now as members of the EU, border on Russia on the232

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north, which is a rather important fact. Since the end of the Cold
War, it is more crucial for a neutral power to consider its
relationship with Russia than its relationship with Eastern Europe.
Both Finland and Sweden, like Austria, are not declaring theabandonment of neutrality, and do not belong to the WEU. But
Finland and Sweden are paying special attention not only to theirmultilateral policies but also to their bilateral policies with Russia.
For example, Finland decided on a financial aid plan for Russian
environmental problems this year, and Sweden aids Russia
economically, too. That means that both these countries aremaking much of their future relationships with Russia, laying thecornerstone for their neutrality. The Finnish and Swedish
neutralities are characterized by their flexibility, in each sense,and because of this they are different from the Austrian policy.
But I think the relationship with Russia is one important factor forneutrality*1.
Secondly, if you relate small power politics to sub-regionalcooperation, you have to clarify the relation between highpolitics and low politics, because small power politics is a trial inwhich small powers can apply balancing strategies to protect
their security in the central system of rivalling great powers, but
sub-regional cooperation concentrates not on security issues, but
on practical issues, as Prof. Hirose and also Prof. Rudka point out.
Note
1 Regarding this point Prof. Ueta said to me, "What is themeaning of neutrality now? As for as the aid policy toward
Russia, we can say it is EU's policy". Because I didn't havetime to answer at the symposium, I am adding some words tothis question. CD According to the Finnish and Swedish
governments, neutrality means non-aligment. (2) Even if theEU decides to aid Russia, we cannot say that all of the EU
members' policies are decided by the EU. There is sufficientroom for each country's own policy.

Comments#Editor's note: the original title of Hirose's paper was " Austria and the Central
European Initiative" .

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