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Comments on the papers of Joenniemi and Nagayo
Hiroshi Momose
Prof. Joenniemi's fascinating discussion really promotes ourunderstanding of the problem of Karelian territory ceded byFinland, and Finland's policy toward it. I would like to make acomplementary comment on it from a historical point of view,
and also raise one question.
Prof. Joenniemi's paper is an interesting attempt to draw
general conclusions from Finland's experiences with her
territorial dispute. Each country has its own unique experiences,which usually prevent others from drawing easy lessons from it.
However, world historical development often brings aboutconditions or a momentum which contribute to a generalizationof those experiences.
Finland has every claim to her lost territories, particularly
those on the Karelian Peninsula. It was in 1323 that the Swedish
Kingdom and Novgorad Russia divided Karelia into two parts bydrawing a border along the Karelian Ithmus. The line continued
to exist throughout the centuries up to 1940 except somedecades when the whole Karelian Ithmus had been under
Russian rule. "Historical reasons" are usually dubious
particularly in territorial disputes, because they can soon turninto a chicken and egg debate. But Finland's claim to her former
territories is apparently different. Even Mr. Zhirinovsky once
admitted that Viborg should go back to Finland.
If there has ever been any reason for Russia to keep controlof the Finnish ceced territory, it is purely a military and strategic
one. Marshal C. G. Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander in
Chief during the interwar period, confesses in his memoirs thatthe old borderline on the Karelian Ithmus was too close to
Leningrad, the "second Capital" of the Soviet Union of that time.
At any stage of history after the end of the Winter War (theFinnish-Soviet War of 1939-40 begun by the Soviet Union
demanding an exchange of territories), the Soviet leaders never280

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expressed a will to give the former Finnish territory back to Finland. Instead,they had the idea of compensating to Finland by allowing her to use the Saimaa
Canal connecting Finnish inland lakes with the Baltic Sea so that Finns mightexport timbers abroad, though the idea was only formally proposed by theSoviet Government in 1955.
" The Karelian problem really meant a problem of security for Finland. Toward
the end of the Continuation War in 1944,
Yrjo Ruutu, the first Finnish specialist of international politics, came up
with the idea of keeping the Finnish territories that had once been ceded to theSoviet Union by concluding a special alliance with the Soviet Union. This idea
was not considered in the truce negotiations, and remained unconsideredthroughout subsequent years, because both Presudent Mannerheim and hissuccessor J. K. Paasikivi regarded it as dangerous for Finland. The idea of thespecial alliance itself was used as a counterproposal in the Finnish-Soviet
negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assitance (the FCMA Treaty) on 6 April,
1948. In other words, Finland secured her own position as an independent stateby sacrificing her former territories.
Behind the above-mentioned Finnish stance toward the Karelian problem
lies the Finnish line of foreign policy formed as the result of an agonizing
reappraisal of her prewar idanpolitiikka [eastern policy]. Through the bitterexperiences of the Second World War, Finland apparently realized that she
could not survive only by hoping for a peaceful life, and that she could only
ensure her own security by assuring her big neighbor's security. This ideaof guaranteeing one's own security by guaranteeing the security of an
unfriendly neighbor was generalized later into the concept of common security.
However, this idea, which might have reminded one of the Danish-German
policy of "friendly neutrality", had hardly been appreciated up to that time. On thecontrary, the postwar Finnish eastern policy was so often tapped by thelabel of "Finlandization" by Western commentators of general world

Comments281affairs.
It was only after the beginning of a structual change of international
relations leading to the end of the Cold War that there appeared conditions for a
new appraisal and, therefore, the generalization of Finland's stance toward theKarelian problem. A harbinger was the principle of the Helsinki process thatrecognized the political geography of postwar Europe to be the basis for peaceand stability, though it never denied the possibility for peaceful change.
Finland's entry into the EU, which located Finland at the periphery of an
integrated Europe neighboring Russia was another important catalyst, since theEuropean Union, which will most likely include former East European nations
carrying grudges and fears derived from their experiences with Stalinist Russia,
will need the creation of friendship and cooperation between both sides of theeastern boundary. Finland's borderland policy [lahialuepolitiikka], as thedevelopment of her original stance toward the territorial question, willcontribute considerably directly or indirectly to this through the presentation ofa model.
My question to Prof. Joenniemi is concerned with his own prospect for thecoming concept of Karelia. What will happen, if the movement to "unite"
develops instead of the movement to "divide"? In books and articles you havewritten, you have mentioned the interesting fact that old patterns of pre-modern
European map with overlapping regions have now been revived in parallel withthe borderlines of national states. Karelia had once been an entity consisting of
the Karelians born out of Finno-Ugric ethnic groups on the northern coast of
the Lake Ladoga, increasingly occupying a broader space around the lake. It wasdivided into Swedish (Finnish) and East Karelias by the Treaty of Schlusselburg,
as mentioned above, and consisted of three different Karelias: East Karelia,
ceded Karelia [luovutettu Karjala] and remaining the part of Karelia as Finnishterritory. If there is cross-border cooperation between Finland and Russia,
particularly between the Finnish and Russian local autonomous bodies, those
threeKarelias will have increasingly
closer282

Commentsrelations. What will happen, then? Do you think, Prof. Joenniemi, that the conceptof a Karelian region will again arise in spite of the current political geography?
I wonder if I might also make a comment on Prof. Nagayo's informative
paper balancing my above comments, because I am far from being a specialist offormer East European countries. He describes in detail how a water control project
was born between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, how the design for cooperation
came to a standstill and how a glimmer of hope for the future has appeared onlyrecently. Both Slovakia and Hungary are now aware of the need for cooperation,even in order to join the EU, because the EU would not like to be involved inlocal conflicts through its enlargement towards the East. The EU itself now
needs regional cooperations between former East European countries. I would
like to know Prof. Nagayo's prospect for subregional cooperation in theCarpathean region, or the Danubean region at most. I am particularly
concerned with the question of how to interprete the recent improvements inrelations between, in this case, Slovakia and Hungary.
The historical records of former East European countries in regional
cooperation reminds me of a Buddhist tradition. One day, Buddha in Paradise
was overlooking hell, where a man was struggling to get out. Buddha ordered aspider to hang down a thread to rescue the man. He grasped at the thread, andbegan to climb up. But, half on the way he looked down to see thousands ofsufferers grasping the thread. Shocked at the scene, he cried: "Hands off! yourascals." At that moment, the thread broke, and the man fell headlong backdown into Hell. Indeed, the small states in the Danubian Basin rivalled eachother for the favors of Western Powers in the interwar period, and the WesternPowers would not have been able to laugh at this story. The IndustrializedPowers were not Buddha, but they took advantage of Small States' rivalries tofish in troubled waters.
Former East European States' rivalries had historically been conditioned
under such circumstances. In the center-periphery relationship in Europe, theindustrialized Western Europe has

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been destined to take responsibility for that. It is only natural that aninstitutionalized Western Europe should have given advice and help to East
European victims in their struggle to rid themselves of the yokes of their
historical legacies. The alternative to rivalry is [sub]regional cooperation. Theirroad to regional cooperation is very rocky, even if the leaders of former Eastern
Europe were aware of the necessity of cooperation. Prof. Nagayo seems toappreciate Slovakian and Hungarian steps to regional cooperation, however
weak they may be. While it is understandable that Prof. Nagayo has a highopinion of Slovakian and Hungarian trust in the decisions of theInternational Court of Justice, the institution is not always persuasive in its
decisions, as its recent judgment on the use of nuclear weapons. What isimportant are bottom-up moves among the indigenous peoples. [Comments tothe Chairperson]
I don't think Prof. Joenniemi is a "minority," because I join with him in thediscussion on a "Europe of regions." The words a "Europe of regions" was usedby German Foreign Minister Genscher at the time when CBSS (the Council ofBaltic Sea States) was formed in 1992, and the word "region" in this case means"subregion" working under upper regional cooperation, in this case, theEuropean Union. When we are talking about a "Europe of regions," we should
be aware of the stratified structure appearing in contemporary Europe. There
are the European Union, the "nation states" and different subregions. A
subregional cooperation is a very loose one, but it still plays an intermediate role
between the upper region (the EU) and local institutions including states andlocal autonomous bodies. Subregional cooperations are increasing inimportance in contemporary Europe. [On Ito's Comments to Rudka and Hirose]
I think the metaphar of Mt. Fuji (p. 226) is misleading. The name"subregion" is temporary and for convenience. It is difficult to explain theconcept of subregion with a Euclidian drawing on the blackboard. The subregion
is not fastened to the284

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upper region. It is a little bit more flexible. The EU itself needs, for instance, Baltic
Sea cooperations. The evidence is the fact that the EU has participated in theCBSS.