Comments on the papers of Joenniemi and Nagayo
Stephen Kotkin
We have been treated to two fascinating presentations, onterritorial issues and cooperation between Finland-Russia andbetween Slovakia-Hungary. Richly detailed, the presentations
do not reach toward larger issues or conclusions. In this shortcomment, I shall briefly review the presentations individually,compare them, and try to set them in a broader framework tofacilitate discussion.
Finland-Russia
As Professor Pertti Joenniemi shows, for some Finns, theUSSR's 1955 return of the Porkkala naval base outsideHelsinki, followed by the 1960 agreement on the Finnish
leasing of the Saima canal in the Vyborg area, raised
expectations (some might say illusions) about the possibility ofa "return" of the border area known loosely as Karelia, which
had been taken by the USSR in 1940 and again in 1944 (I thinkeastern Karelia was first acquired by Peter the Great in 1721
from Sweden in exchange for relinquishing the rest of Finland).
By the 1970s, however, responsible Finnish political leadersdeclared that the Finnish government unequivocally accepted
the status quo on the border with Russia. Although some public
voices in Finland persisted in calling for the redemption ofKarelia, strong warnings were also heard about the possible
harm to Finnish-Russian relations, the economic costs ofreintegrating Karelia into Finland, and most remarkable of all,about Finland's need to take into account the Russian point ofview, particularly regarding the strategic value to Russia of theKarelian isthmus.
Most of this took place before the end of communism andthe dissolution of the Soviet Union. When those momentous
events reoriented Finland's position regarding the European

286

CommentsUnion, Finland readily accepted the uncompromising European
Union position on the inviolability of borders. More than that,instead of reenergizing the Finnish irredentist movement, thenew circumstances following 1989-1991 seem to have induced
Finland into reinterpreting the very nature of its Russian border.
Rather than as a demarcation of territory, the border is coming
to be seen as an opportunity for enhancing transnationalcooperation. This development is extremely exciting, yet a bitvague, as Professor Joenniemi acknowledges.
Professor Joenniemi does not seek to explain why
relinquishing claims to territory forcibly taken by Russia can beseen by Finns as a method for expanding the benefits they
derive from their relations with Russia. Evidently, to him thefact that the Finnish-Russian border should permit new levels ofcooperation seems natural (and desirable). By way ofexplanation, two factors seem to stand out. Firstly, the longstanding role of what might be called "geopolitical realism" inthe relationship between Russia and Finland, which, of course,
was once part of the Russian empire. Secondly, the enticementof joining the European Union and the need, therefore, to abideby all rules and conventions of the EU. In Professor
Joenniemi's paper, the relative importance of these factors
remains unclear, and is perhaps impossible to settle without
recourse to comparative analysis.
Slovakia-Hungary
Professor Susumu Nagayo examines the history of theGabčiko-Nagymaros water management system, originallyproposed in Hungary in the 1940s and begun mutually by
Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary in the 1970s. Eventually, theHungarian side suspended its participation, but the independent
Slovaks continued towards completion, driven by feelings ofnational pride as well as expediency (they were far along). In
Hungary, meanwhile, the project became a lightning rod for
opposition to the regime. Given that the Slovak side of theComments

287

border contains a sizable Hungarian minority population, thestage appeared set for a dramatic, potentially devastating
bilateral confrontation once the constraints imposed by Soviet
domination were removed.
But in Slovakia-Hungary, as in the case of Karelia, eachside agreed to find a mutually acceptable solution, submitting
its views to a binding decision of the International Court ofJustice. As Professor Nagayo argues, each country's behavior
appears to have been driven primarily by the fact that
escalation of the water management conflict would harm its
chances of joining the European Union. To be sure, Slovakia
evidently had much less to lose by agreeing to a third-party
imposed solution. Still, Slovakia also seems to have felt
compelled to behave responsibly in the eyes of the EuropeanUnion. Rather than the revival of historical trauma andrecrimination, Slovakia and Hungary discovered cooperation-an extraordinary development, justifiably highlighted byProfessor Nagayo. Can the same be said for Slovak policy
towards minorities (Hungarians, Ruthenians, Roma), where theSlovaks may feel they are being called on to sacrifice too muchto comply fully with EU strictures?
The meaning of Europe
If we juxtapose the two cases of Finland-Russia andSlovakia-Hungary, we see that the attraction of joining theEuropean Union seems to be an overriding consideration in
diffusing and regulating otherwise dangerous border disputes.
Since the kind of realism that has characterizedFinnish-Russian relations cannot be said to characterize
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the key factor common to bothcases would appear to be the desire to "join Europe."
The contrast with Asia, although beyond the scope of thisconference, is striking. (It can be eye-opening to compare
Finland's approach in border issues with Russia to Japan'sapproach in border issues with Russia.) From the Kurile Islands288

Comments

to the Spratly Islands, there is no commitment in Asia toplacing the goal of overall regional stability above irredentistand nationalist considerations. In short, through comparison
with Asia, the importance of the idea of Europe and of theattraction of joining Europe stand out even more. It's as if amagic wand has been discovered: you want to join Europe,
behave! Here is a seemingly compelling argument, beyond all
the well-known ones, for sustaining the vision of the EuropeanUnion.
Still, many questions arise. What precisely does joining
Europe mean? What does Europe mean? How long will theattraction of joining Europe serve to redefine such borderdisputes? Forever? Until a new conjuncture? In other words, isthe European Union a viable long-term set of institutions, ormerely a dream, an organizing principle with considerable
short-term practical value but ultimately without the possibilityof long-term institutionalization?
Here a parallel set of questions arises regarding the limits
to the Europe Union. Are there natural borders to Europe?
Should there be natural borders to Europe? In some ways, ofcourse, all the talk about Europe, the European Union, and soon, can be seen to be about Europe's eastern boundaries.
Particularly the revival of the notion of Central Europe can beseen as largely a device for defining Europe's easternboundaries. Germany is no longer the eastern fringe of Europe
but once again Europe's center, and the problem of defining
Germany's - and to a lesser extent Austria's - relations withthe small countries immediately to the east is simultaneously aproblem of determining how far the eastern boundary ofEurope will extend.
Everyone knows that Europe has no geographical easternboundary. Indeed Europe is technically not even a continent by
the Europeans' own definition - a body of land surrounded onfour sides by water. Over the centuries the eastern boundary ofEurope, politically and culturally, has been variouslyinterpreted and contested. Such is the case today.

Comments289

Since 1989/91 what we are seeing, obviously, is therecentering of Germany, and along with the recentering ofGermany, something like the reabsorption of the core
Habsburg lands and a part of the old Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth. Muscovy and the Ottoman southeast ofEurope - Byzantium, so to speak - appear to be outside thecharmed circle, even if few people want to say so openly. But
what happens to Europe and European stability if not all
countries that may themselves claim to be part of Europe are"invited in"? We might also ask, what happens to thosecountries allowed in, when they discover that in the best casescenario they have become suppliers of raw materials andintermediate products for a German economy that dominates
their own economies? At present a revival of German politicaldomination seems a highly remote possibility, and there does
seem to be some basis for hoping that the USA and Japan, as
well as perhaps France, can reduce the reliance on Germancapital. Yet one wonders whether short-term solutions to thequestion, What is Europe?, however compelling they seem
now, will become long-term solutions.
The meaning of borders
Here we might consider the sometimes confused
relationship between the European Union and NATO that has
been alluded to throughout this conference. With the frequent
conflation of the Europe and NATO, the United States is viewed
as forming an integral part of Europe, while Russia is not. InAsia, meanwhile there is the United States-Japan relationship.
Thus, we have an Atlantic bloc on one side of Russia, paralleledby a Pacific Rim on the other side of Russia. Russia is
integrated neither into Atlantic/Europe nor into the Asia/Pacific.
Constant appeals for both Europe/Germany and Japan to takegreater initiative in their respective spheres have not so far
reduced the relative weight of the United States in these two
powerful blocs, or the seeming "exclusion" from these blocs of290Comments

Russia.
At the same time, the boundaries of the Atlantic/Europe
bloc have shifted radically to Russia's disfavor even as therelative balance of power in the Asia/Pacific side is rising to alevel competitive, if not superior, to Europe. As a result, Russia
appears sandwiched between two economically superior blocs,
left to mire in its ambiguous relations with the unstable
Turkish/Persian belt on its southern flank. Is this wise? Is it
simply unavoidable? Can we just say tough luck, here's thepayback for centuries of imperialism?
In this context it is instructive to return to the case ofFinland/Karelia and the apparent reinterpretation there of thevery nature of borders. In the Finnish approach to Karelia, dowe have merely the reluctant recognition of Russia as an
unavoidable presence that must be appeased? Or do we truly
have a border as a site and even as a means of enhanced
cooperation? And if so, are the Finnish efforts to engage rather
than exclude Russia sustainable and generalizable?
Interestingly, something similar to what might be called
the Finnish approach to Russia has quietly become the modus
operandi of NATO during the enlargement being implemented
by the eager collaboration of Germany, Poland, and former
Habsburg territories. Russia is invited to participate in as many
NATO discussions and activities as possible, even as NATO isset to expand eastward into the territories of the former Warsaw
Pact. Is this in fact a new form of cooperation similar to what
the Finns propose for Karelia, or merely mediocre public
relations camouflage for the naked power play being
undertaken by the coalition of NATO expansionists? NATO
expansionists insist that their actions are in no way directed atharming Russia, yet in foreign affairs are not perceptions often
more important than supposed intentions? (Anyway, Japanese
consumers who use disposable wooden chopsticks could well
say that they do not intend to denude the world's rain forests.)
Does the expansion of NATO - a military alliance, after all –Comments

291

make any strategic sense? Will the clamor over expansion
simply become little more than the unintended impetus for thekind of complete military overhaul long overdue inside Russia?
"Finlandization" in reverse?
As potentially threatening disputes such as those between
Slovakia and Hungary become manageable through the allureof joining Europe, it would also seem from the current practiceof NATO that the thorny issue of Europe's eastern boundary
can be finessed, for the time being, through a strategy ofsuffusion, rather than the heavy-handed imposition ofimpermeable borders. Whether there is more to the treatment ofRussia than temporary expediency remains to seen, however.
In this regard, if Professor Joenniemi is correct, Finland, which
has the first of what may become several European Union
borders with Russia, might lead the way. The case of the three
Baltic states will be of immense importance.
The expression "Finlandization" arose during the Cold
War to denote the possibility of Soviet bloc countries achieving
near total independence in domestic affairs, while remaining
deferential in foreign policy and security issues toward theUSSR, as Finland had done. Perhaps in the aftermath of thedownfall of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union we are on the verge of a degree of "Finlandization" inreverse, although this potential new Finlandization would be
more a matter of voluntary cooperation than enforced
deference. Only time will tell, yet already one point seems
clear. In the handling of Europe's eastern boundaries, anything
less than an approach parallel to the emerging Finnish
treatment of the Karelian question - permeability rather than
fixed borders - would contradict the spirit of the EuropeanUnion, not to say the European Union's prospects forcontinued existence. As these two papers show, the meaning ofEurope, and the meaning of borders, are closely intertwined.
In closing, let me express a historian's sense of caution.

292

Comments

The former Yugoslavia aside, much has changed in Europe inthe most recent past, especially in regards to the abandonmentof empire-building and territorial aggrandizement, for which wecan all be grateful. But it would be unwise to assume that thepresent situation will continue forever. Remember that thosepresent at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 thought they weresettling the major questions once and for all. The same can besaid of most of those present at the Versailles Peace Treaty
negotiations in 1918-19, or the Yalta conference in 1945. I am
not suggesting that the present situation is comparable to anyof these cases, or that we will see a return of the past. Rather, I
want merely to emphasize that we will see change. History
teaches us that even though no one knows what the future willbring, we can all be assured that the present situation will notlast forever. History also teaches us that most policies areformulated on the basis of satisfying immediate perceived
interests, only to be subjected later to the kind of harsh
judgments that those who study the past are always eager,
retrospectively, to render.