DOWN ON THE SEEDTHE WORLD BANK ENABLESCORPORATE TAKEOVER OF SEEDSDOWN ON THE SEEDTHE WORLD BANK ENABLESCORPORATE TAKEOVER OF SEEDSAcknowledgements
This report was authored by Alice Martin-Prével with support from Frederic Mousseau and Anuradha Mittal. Kevin Hullassisted with copy editing. We are grateful to Haidee Swanby, Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Biodiversity, for her
assistance with the research on Tanzania’s seed law.
The views and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the Oakland Institute alone and do not reflect opinionsof the individuals and organizations that have sponsored and supported the work.
Design: Amymade Graphic Design
Cover photo: Woman carrying millet © Samuel Hauenstein Swan
Publisher: The Oakland Institute is an independent policy think tank bringing fresh ideas and bold action to the most pressing
social, economic, and environmental issues.
Copyright © 2017 by The Oakland InstituteThis text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that thesource is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such uses be registered with them for impact assessment
purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, reuse in other publications, or translation or adaptation, permission must
be secured.
For more information:
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info@oaklandinstitute.org

Executive Summary
In 2013, at the demand of the G8, the World Bank launched
the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) project
to benchmark and score countries on how they facilitate
corporate business in agriculture. The first comprehensive
EBA report was released in January 2016. The report provided
a detailed vision of the regulatory reforms, which, according
to the Bank, are needed to create “thriving” agricultural
sectors, and rated the agricultural policies of 40 countries.1
Among several categories of indicators (Finance, Transport,
Fertilizer, etc.), the EBA includes a sub-indicator which
evaluates seed regulations. Seed systems are complex andvary from country to country. However, over the past few
decades, Western corporations and governments havemade a global push to standardize seed laws and promoteindustrial seeds, often known as “improved” seeds. The EBA
is the latest initiative aimed at promoting corporate-led seedproduction – the mantra being that this will help increase
agricultural yields and feed a growing world population.
The EBA dictates so called “good practices” to regulate seedsystems, and then scores countries on how well they apply
and implement its prescriptions. These “good practices,”
focused on facilitating private companies’ production
and marketing of seeds, include: improving, accelerating,and minimizing the costs of procedures to release andcertify industrial seeds; and “incentivizing” private seedproduction by adopting intellectual property right (IPR)
frameworks to allow corporations to profit from their seeds’
sale and usage.
Despite the Bank’s claim that granting property rights to
private seed developers will spur innovation, there is noconclusive evidence that the adoption of IPR frameworks
leads to an increase in private investments in seed researchand development.2 The EBA promotes IPR regulations that
conform to the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) Convention, rather thansui generis laws3 adapted to local contexts. The latest
UPOV convention, signed in 1991, prohibits farmers fromexchanging and selling IPR-protected seeds, and restricts
their right to save and propagate protected seeds. The EBA
is already starting to have an impact at the country level. For
instance, in Rwanda, it inspired the design of a new seedordinance that opens the door for the country’s adhesion to
the UPOV Convention.
While the Bank’s reforms do not benefit the majority offarmers, they do assist with the expansion and increased

3

profits of a handful of private companies. Six firms, all basedin the West, currently control over two-thirds of the formal
seed market.4 In recent years, these corporations havescaled up efforts to take control of developing countries’
markets, notably in Africa, where Dupont acquired the South
African seed company Pannar in 2012, Syngenta bought
the Zambian Maize Research Institute (MRI) in 2013, andVilmorin & Cie acquired 30 percent of Zimbabwe’s Seed Co
in 2014.5
While the concentration of the global seed market has asignificant impact on prices6 as well as seed diversity, theEBA not only fails to tackle this issue, it also remains blind
to other flaws of corporate seed production. For instance,industrial varieties calibrated to pass quality control tests
display high levels of genetic uniformity and are bred with afocus on high-yield properties. This comes at the expense ofother features including an aptitude for intercropping andconservation, nutritional and cooking qualities, and othercharacteristics useful to farmers and consumers. In addition,
private seed companies tend to focus on breeding widelyused crops (corn, soybean, cotton, etc.) to ensure a returnon their investments through massive commercialization.7
The lack of improvement and breeding of other crucial
crops such as legumes, “minor” cereals (e.g. oats, barley,
millet), vegetables, fruits, and more, means farmers havefewer options to diversify their crops.
The replacement of farmers’ seeds with a few uniform
industrial varieties leads to the rapid erosion of global
seed diversity. Following the 1960s Green Revolution, thecultivars of rice available to Filipino farmers dropped fromsome 4,000 varieties to just 3 to 5 “improved” varieties.8 The
same pattern was noticed through other Asian countries aswell as Mexico, ultimately resulting in the loss of traditionalvarieties and seed saving practices, the dependence on
external input providers, and farmer indebtedness.9
The EBA completely ignores farmer-managed seedsystems, which provide 80 to 90 percent of the seeds usedin developing countries and are vital repositories of theworld’s agrobiodiversity.10 This immense bias cannot leadto the creation of sound, inclusive, and sustainable seedpolicies. Farmer-managed seed systems encompass bothon-farm seed saving and farmer-to-farmer exchanges. They
provide a rich diversity of seed, varieties adapted to local
conditions, and ensure cheaper and often more reliable
access to seed than formal systems, which remain weak inmany developing countries. The main international donors

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and the World Bank, however, dismiss these advantages
and view increasing agricultural yields through the adoptionof chemical inputs and industrial seeds as the key to feed
the world. This vision overlooks the true causes of hunger
around the world – lack of access to land, inequality, poverty,
market dynamics, environmental degradation, climatechange, and more.

fairs; and help create communal seed banks to restore
farmers’ seed stocks and safeguard access to seed.13 Finally,
it is possible to improve access to seed by facilitating therelease of diverse and high-performing varieties stored innational genebanks to farmers. Instead, the World Bank’s
EBA encourages states to ease private companies’ – and not
farmers’ – access to genebanks.

Farmer-managed seed systems, while vital to preserve accessto diverse seeds for food security and resilience, do facechallenges. For instance, seeds may not move freely between
farmers (access may depend on social status, kinship, andother cultural norms); seed stocks and exchange networks
may be negatively affected by famines, natural disasters,
and conflicts; and access to varieties with specific features(quality, pest resistance) may be lacking.11 Given the WorldBank dismisses farmer-managed systems, it ignores many
low-cost and effective solutions to address the constraints.
For instance, community-based seed production andparticipatory breeding projects foster the breeding of
locally-adapted crops, improve plant quality and access,and empower farmers to innovate in their own fields.12
Governments can establish policies to support growers
who specialize in the multiplication, production, and sale ofseeds; use extension services to establish farmer-managed
nurseries and seed multiplication operations; revitalize
local seed markets through attracting seed vendors to seed

The World Bank’s one-size-fits-all approach does not help
governments implement solutions adapted to farmers’
needs. This requires direct engagement and collaboration
with rural communities. Farmers should be the primary
stakeholders to be consulted for the design of seed policies,
as they are best suited to identify constraints and needs
regarding access to inputs.
Ignoring the calls of a wide range of experts for bottom-up
seed solutions that benefit the poorest,14 the World Bank’s
agribusiness indicator will foster seed scarcity for the sakeof corporate profit. The Bank fails to provide any evidence
on how the EBA reforms will help feed nine billion people
by 2050. The EBA makes developing countries’ governments
adopt standardized agriculture policies when a true
commitment to end hunger and poverty would necessitatea radically different approach to respect and ensure farmers’
right to seeds.

Introduction
Without seeds, there is no harvest, no food, no life. Aroundthe world, this vital input is made accessible by farmers’
own work to recycle and save seeds from their crops, andthrough farmer-to-farmer gifts, exchanges, and trade.
Farmer-managed seed systems supply on average 80 to
90 percent of the seeds used for agriculture in developing
countries, and play a key role in supporting agricultural
production worldwide.15 In addition, farmer-managed
systems are crucial for preserving agrobiodiversity, foodsecurity, and resilience against climate and economic
shocks. They provide a rich diversity of seeds, including
varieties adapted to specific environmental conditions orwith other characteristics useful to smallholder farmers.16
The main international donors and the World Bank, however,dismiss these advantages. They argue that increasing
agricultural yields through the adoption of chemical

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inputs and industrial seeds (formal sector seeds are also
commonly called “improved” seeds) are key to feeding theworld. This paradigm benefits an exclusive cartel of Westerncompanies that dominates the agricultural inputs market.
Only six multinationals currently control over two-thirds of
all commercial seed sales.17 Greater market concentration
is to be expected in the coming years if major mergers
between agribusiness multinationals are approved by the
US and the EU regulators.18 The pending mergers between
Monsanto and Bayer; Syngenta and ChemChina; and Dow
and Dupont mean that only three mega corporations willcontrol 63 percent of the commercial seed market.19
Two essential instruments are enabling the expansionof large seed companies in developing countries: farmer
outreach and input subsidy programs, which distributeand promote industrial seeds (often with the support of

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bilateral donors);20 and aggressive lobbying for new lawsthat promote private sector seeds over farmer-managed
systems.21 The tools used to impose pro-corporate seedregulations in developing countries include trade treaties,
donor-funded advisory services, and, more recently, theestablishment of benchmarking instruments such as theWorld Bank’s Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA).
Launched in 2013, the EBA aims to foster “policies thatfacilitate doing business in agriculture and increase
the investment attractiveness and competitiveness ofcountries.”22 To achieve this, the World Bank prescribes“regulatory practices” that governments should implement
in various areas of agricultural sectors, including Markets,
Transport, Machinery, Finance, Fertilizer, and Seed.

Countries are then scored on how well they apply and fulfill
the EBA-dictated norms, which are misleadingly presented
as “smart and balanced” policies.23
This Brief looks specifically at the EBA’s Seed sub-indicator,
through which the Bank is promoting reforms to facilitate
the registration and commercialization of industrial
seeds, along with “good practices” to incentivize private
seed research and development through recognition of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) of breeders. The Brief
reviews these reforms and their potential impact on farmers’
access and control over seeds, and examines how the WorldBank’s biased propositions increase the profits of a handfulof private companies instead of promoting farmers’ rights
and protecting agrobiodiversity.

2016 EBA benchmarking topics and seed scores © World Bank Group5

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BOX 1: The EBA, a Doing Business in Agriculture Index
In 2012, the G8 tasked the World Bank with creating a “Doing Business in Agriculture Index,” which would support
its newly launched New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.24 In 2013, the EBA – initially called Benchmarking
the Business of Agriculture (BBA) – was launched with financial support from the US, UK, Danish, and Dutch
governments25 and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.26 An initial pilot survey of 10 countries was published in
November 2014,27 followed by a second publication benchmarking a total of 40 countries in January 2016. The nextreport, planned for release in January 2017, extends EBA coverage to over 60 countries.28
The EBA’s selection of survey countries spans all continents and income levels, but its application is largely directed
at the developing world. Some EBA donors indicate a specific focus on influencing agricultural policymaking in
Africa. Advisors of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are being trained in the use of the EBA,
while the Bank’s staff is reaching out to governments and African institutions to foster acceptance of the project asa tool to improve agricultural policy.29
The EBA, modeled after the World Bank’s Doing Business index, which inspired over 520 business-friendly reforms
between 2003 and 2013,30 is an attempt to gain similar influence in the agricultural sector. The Bank claims that thetool is “generating evidence” on regulations supporting agricultural development,31 however, no scientific data has
been shared to support the EBA’s selection of “good regulatory practices.”
Denouncing the top-down imposition of policies detrimental to farmers and food security, Our Land Our Business, amulti-continental campaign of over 280 organizations, comprised of farmers groups, trade unions, and CSOs, waslaunched in 2014,32 demanding the end of both the EBA and the Doing Business projects.

The EBA’s “Good Practices”
Organize Seed Systems to Benefit Private Companies
A keen supporter of the industry-coopted “New Green
Revolution,” the World Bank considers private sector
seeds as “a key technology for improving agricultural
productivity.” 33 Through the EBA, the Bank asserts the needfor “good regulatory practices” to facilitate the introductionof industrial seeds into agricultural markets.
This is how it works. The Bank encourages governments
to implement reforms to reduce the cost and timenecessary to register industrial seeds, establish a variety
release committee (VRC) to approve industrial seeds
for commercialization, create catalogs to list registeredvarieties, and more.34 The Bank docks points off countries’
EBA scores if these systems aren’t in place and if they do
not meet a number of requirements set by the Bank. For
instance, a lower EBA score is attributed if the VRC exists
but does not meet regularly (the World Bank recommends
that VRCs meet on demand or after each cropping season).
While most rich countries have long established suchprocedures and services, fulfilling these standards requires
substantial public spending from low-income nations. In

6fact, some aspects of the EBA methodology excessively
burden developing countries. For instance, the WorldBank encourages lowering fees to register industrial seeds
and emphasizes the “good performance” of high-income
nations, which have the cheapest registration costs relative
to the national income. Denmark, for example, charges
only 8 percent of its income per capita to register a newseed, and Spain charges 10 percent.35 Relative fees are
generally higher in lower-income countries: Ethiopia, forinstance, charges 89 percent of the income per capita forseed registration procedures. This makes Ethiopia appear
as a bad performer in the Bank’s report, although in hard
figures, Ethiopia’s registration costs are almost ten times
lower than Denmark’s ($489 against $4,641).36 If Ethiopia
were to charge only 8 percent of the income per capita, theregistration fee would be $44. While some would argue
that this scoring methodology reflects the obstacles thatnational companies encounter to register new seeds, theBank cannot ignore that industrial seed development isdominated by multinational companies, who most benefit
from lower costs.

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The domination of multinational seed companies has globally
expanded in recent years. In Africa, for instance, Western
agribusinesses have acquired some of the continent’s largest
and best performing seed companies. Between 2012 and 2014,
US-based Dupont Pioneer bought South Africa’s Pannar Seed,
Swiss seed giant Syngenta acquired Zambia’s Maize ResearchInstitute (MRI), and the French Vilmorin & Cie acquired 30
percent of Zimbabwe’s SeedCo.37 Over the past decade, these
foreign seed companies have made significant investments inseed Research and Development (R&D) programs in Africa.38
The World Bank places corporations at the center of every
aspect of seed systems. For instance, no less than five different
EBA survey questions score the composition of the VRC thatsupervises the introduction of new seed varieties. For a country
to get the best score, it has to give 50 percent or more of the
VRC’s seats to the private sector. The Bank attributes a scoreof zero if all seats are occupied by public actors, for instance,experts from the Ministry of Agriculture or research institutions.
This strong stance to increase private sector representationsuggests a total lack of consideration of farmers, consumers,
and the environment. The EBA methodology accords a country a
maximum score if all VRC members are from the private sector,
even though this raises serious concerns about transparency,
independence, and the competence of the authorities presiding
over the release of new seed varieties.

BOX 2: Corporate Support for the EBA
The World Bank has repeatedly portrayed the
EBA as a pro-poor and pro-farmer initiative, but
it is the large agribusinesses who will benefit
the most from the project. The Bank appealed
to the “expertise” of the largest agrochemical
firms in the world to develop the EBA, including
Bayer, Monsanto, Syngenta, Pioneer, Yara, andKWS.39 The list of “global experts” consulted
by the project does not include a single farmergroup or cooperative, and counts only fivenon-profit organizations: GALVmed, FINCA,
One Acre Fund, the International Fertilizer
Development Center, and the Syngenta
Foundation. 40 The three latter openly promote
the use of industrial seeds and fertilizers.
In response to critics pointing to the lack ofconsultations with the farmers and civil society
organizations,41 the World Bank published arecord of EBA presentations made to various
stakeholders in the UK, the US, and six lowermiddle income countries.42 The Bank is more
discrete about its active participation atindustry-sponsored conferences including
the 2015 International Food and Agribusiness
Management Association Conference,43 2015
Grow Canada Conference,44 2016 Argus FMB’s
Africa Fertilizer,45 and 2016 International
Fertilizer Association Conference.46
Evidencing the EBA’s popularity with large
agribusiness firms, in 2016, the International
Grain Trade Coalition (IGTC), a lobby of large
grain traders, formed a working group to support
the EBA.47 IGTC organized private sector
responses to the EBA surveys and performed
outreach to WTO government representatives
and corporate stakeholders about the
project.48 This is particularly worrying, given
this coalition works to influence pro-GMO
trade and agriculture regulations.49 Far frompromoting the interests of small producers, the
EBA is working to give large corporations anopportunity to influence agricultural policies
worldwide and foster farmers’ dependence on
expensive industrial inputs.

Dupont maize seed in Ethiopia © New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition

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“Incentivize” Private Investments in Seed Sectors
The EBA promotes reforms to “incentivize the private sector
to release new varieties in the country.”50 The Bank, thereby,accords better scores to countries that grant breeders
intellectual property rights over seeds, allow the private
sector to multiply and commercialize local public varieties,
and provide easy access to germplasm conserved in public
genebanks to private companies, among other reforms
supposed to enhance private research and development of
new seed varieties.
The World Bank’s advocacy in favor of property rights forplant breeders is part of a global push for IPR frameworks inagriculture. This movement has been driven by the powerfulseed industry, which increasingly dominates research inplant breeding over publicly funded R&D programs.51 The
granting of IPRs over seeds is done through patent systems,
plant variety protection (PVP) frameworks such as thoseoutlined by the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) Convention, or through sui
generis systems52 elaborated by national legislators.53
The goal of PVP laws is to allow plant breeders to secure
exclusive rights over the varieties they develop, so thatthey may retrieve profit from the commercialization,
reproduction, and use of their varieties by other parties.54
Breeders with exclusive rights may choose to market theirvariety and profit from the sale of seeds, or may license it
to other companies in exchange for a fee. The granting ofsuch breeders’ rights is supposed to reflect the fact thatdeveloping new plant varieties requires investment, since
promoters of PVP laws, like the World Bank, argue that“protecting the property rights of seed developers spurs
further innovation.”55
However, there is no conclusive evidence that IPR laws
will significantly increase private investments in plant
breeding in developing countries.56 In addition, the EBA
upholds UPOV membership as a regulatory paradigm, atthe expense of sui generis legislation that may be better
adapted to local needs. For instance, the 2016 EBA reportpraises Tanzania for becoming “bound by the 1991 UPOVAct in November 2015,” even though it already had a PVP
law in place.57 The Tanzanian PVP legislation stipulates that
farmers can be charged under criminal law – they risk fines
and imprisonment – for using and exchanging protected
seeds without the breeder’s authorization.58 The use of noncertified seeds is also prohibited in Tanzania’s official rice
irrigation schemes.59 Recently, the World Bank indicatedthat both Vietnam60 and Rwanda have used the EBA todesign their new seed ordinances.61 In Rwanda, the newlaw establishing PVP regulations conforms to the UPOV
Convention (see Box 3).62

Cowpea seeds germplasm on display at IITA’s genebank © International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)

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BOX 3: Rwanda’s New Seed Law: EBA-Inspired Framework to Protect and Profit Private Breeders
On April 20, 2016, the Rwandan government promulgated a new seed law (Law No. 0005), 63 which matches
the EBA’s recommendations. The new legislation introduces a PVP framework to protect breeders’ rights
for a period of twenty years.64 The implementation of this new law will put Rwanda on the path to adhere
to UPOV 91,65 a treaty that prohibits farmers from selling and exchanging IPR-protected seeds and restricts
their right to save and propagate protected seeds on their own holdings.66 Following this promulgation, theNetherlands, one of the donors to the EBA project, initiated a training program to educate Rwandans on how
to implement breeders’ rights in conformity with the UPOV guidelines.67
Several other aspects of Law No. 0005 are modeled after regulatory practices promoted by the EBA. For
instance, the law establishes a Committee responsible for the “evaluation, certification and registration ofplant varieties and their withdrawal from the list.”68 The establishment of official variety lists is a key instrument
to outlaw the exchange and sale of farmers’ seeds, which cannot be registered and protected under the
UPOV framework due to their variability (UPOV requires that seeds be proved “distinctive,” “uniform,”and “stable” to be eligible for protection69). Finally, the Rwandan government released a new reduced feeschedule for seed registration and intellectual property services. The EBA scores positively the existence offee schedules for certification activities carried out by the public sector and promotes the reduction of cost
and time of seed registration procedures.70
These reforms do not seek to address the needs of Rwandan farmers, but copy a regulatory model promotedby the seed industry and Western donors as being the one that will attract private investors and enhance seeddevelopment and innovation.71

The Dutch Inspection Service for Horticulture trains Rwandans to implement breeders’ rights in conformity with the UPOV guidelines© Agroberichen / Buitenland9

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Public actors, including parastatal seed companies, research
centers, and universities, also perform conventional
plant breeding. The EBA, however, dismisses public seeddevelopment on the grounds that public investments inagricultural research “have declined in many countries
since 1997.”72 The Bank conceives governments’ role to bethat of passive enablers of private sector breeding activities.
An exception is the maintenance of national genebanks,
which is seen as an essential task for the public sector, sothat private companies may easily access public germplasm
to develop new varieties of seed.73 Public genebanks holdgenetic resources freely collected from farmers’ fields, which
seed multinationals are actively seeking to commoditize.74
Since 2012, a coalition of corporate and institutional
stakeholders has developed the “DivSeek” program, whichaims to sequence and digitize genetic materials held in
genebanks around the world.75 This initiative has beendenounced by farmer groups as patenting and privatizationof public genetic resources.76
While enabling increased corporate grip on public genetic
resources, the World Bank overlooks the pressing need tomake genebank varieties available to farmers. Researchshows that direct collaboration between genebanks andfarmers is highly beneficial. The release of locally-adapted
genebank varieties, for instance, can help farmers accessuseful biological resources to adapt to climate change.77 In
Ethiopia, it was found that over 20 percent of local varieties
perform better than industrial seeds bred specifically fordrought resistance.78 Ethiopia’s genebank is the largest in
Africa, holding 60,000 accessions – i.e. samples of seeds
collected from a particular area.79 Mobilizing such resources

to provide farmers with varieties that produce higher yields atlower costs than drought-resistant hybrids can significantly
enhance smallholders’ livelihoods. Collaboration with
farmers can also help enrich genebank collections with thegenetic diversity cultivated in farmers’ fields.80
Deploying genebanks’ diverse resources widely andincreasing linkage with rural communities helps conserve
agrobiodiversity, improve farmers’ incomes, and address
climate change and food security challenges. However,policy mechanisms often fail to establish genebank-tofarmer connections. In Rajasthan, India, growers havelost access to the traditional pearl millet varieties that
perform best in drier areas.81 Yet over 30,000 traditional
pearl millet accessions are stored in India’s two main
genebanks. Farmers have expressed willingness to pay for
obtaining these varieties at the market prices of hybrids, butgovernment extension services promote the use of hybrids
instead of local varieties.82 The World Bank could encourage
policymakers to establish mechanisms to identify genebank
varieties that outperform industrial seeds, and use extension
services to disseminate them in regions where they arelacking. Instead, the EBA’s narrow regulatory frameworkorchestrates the monopolization of public genetic resources
by private breeders. The maintenance of genebanks requires
significant staff, material, and financial resources, but many
genebanks in the world run on precarious funding andare under staffed.83 While governments continue to bear
the cost of maintaining functional genebanks, the EBA’s“good practices” do not take into account the necessity ofchanneling back a share of private companies’ profits into
the public systems that serve them.

In vitro cultures at Ghana’s national genebank in Bunso © Luigi Guarino

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The Impact of the EBA Reforms
Restricting Farmers’ Right to Seed
The World Bank’s prescriptions on how to regulate seed
sectors maximize private companies’ profits and expand
their markets. This, however, jeopardizes farmers’ access toseed, thus threatening the very basis of our food chain.
UPOV-inspired PVP laws exclude the protection of farmers’varieties,84 and prohibit farmers from selling and exchanging
PVP-protected seeds. Furthermore, the latest UPOV Act,signed in 1991, rendered optional the granting of a “farmer’s
privilege,” previously established in the 1978 Act to allow
growers to save and propagate protected seeds on theirown farms.85 The new convention specifies that the farmer’s
privilege should be granted “within reasonable limits andsubject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of thebreeder,” so as not to curtail breeders’ profits.86 UPOV 91
also extends the duration of breeders’ rights, so that varieties
are now protected for a minimum of 20 years instead of 15.87
In addition to restricting farmers’ right to seeds, IPR systems
can negatively impact access to genetic resources for further
research. UPOV 78 included an additional exemption,
called the “breeder’s exemption,” to preserve free accessto protected seeds for research and breeding purposes.
This clause was restricted by the 1991 Convention.88 Thus
IPRs can become anti-innovation mechanisms, when PVP
regulations or patents become tools to appropriate genetic
resources.89

Beyond IPR-related issues, seed registration and certification
laws like those promoted by the EBA frequently have collateraleffects that extend beyond organizing formal seed sectors.90
Oftentimes, these laws are accompanied by clauses making
the marketing or exchange of non-registered seeds illegal.91
The scope and enforcement of these laws varies acrosscountries, but some lower-middle income nations implement
very restrictive regulations prohibiting both the selling andsharing of non-certified seeds. In Colombia, for instance,
authorities may seize the seed, harvest, or products madefrom harvest; destroy crops; and fine or jail farmers who sellor share non-registered “illegal” seeds.92
The creation of variety catalogs, which the EBA promotes,
is an important instrument to enable such restrictive laws,
as catalog-listed seeds are considered “legal” for marketingand non-listed seeds as “illegal.” The variety register model,
which originated in Germany and was applied regionally withthe creation of the European Common Catalog in 1966,93 is
now being exported to other regional organizations suchas South African Development Community (SADC, with 15
member countries) and Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA, with 19 members).94 In both
COMESA and SADC’s seed catalogs, only maize varieties
developed by Syngenta or Monsanto are listed.95 Regional
catalogs and laws require that seeds traded between countries
correspond to industrial production standards, and renderillegal the trade of farmers’ seeds across borders.96

Excerpt from the SADC regional seed catalogue, which only contains maize varieties manufactured by Monsanto and Syngenta © SADC

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The EBA’s policy prescriptions therefore obstruct farmers’
right to freely reproduce, share, and exchange seeds andlead to the progressive loss of traditional varieties and seedproduction techniques, which are repositories of famers’
proficiency and power. Women farmers, in particular, remain unrecognized stewards and transmitters of traditional
seed saving and selection techniques.97 Women’s control
over their seed supply – mostly provided by their own seedstocks as well as local networks – is crucial for households’
nutrition and resilience to economic shocks and crops failures.98 The 2016 EBA report boasts the addition of a crosscutting “gender” theme,99 but the World Bank’s policy regulations around seeds are particularly detrimental to women.
By lending its support to the seed industry oligopoly, theWorld Bank sets the stage for a private takeover of seeds andinput price surges. In the US, where farmers overwhelmingly
rely on industrial seeds, the price of crop seed has risen
faster than any other input. Between 1990 and 2010, seed
prices more than doubled relative to the price farmers
receive for their crops,100 indicating a disempowermentof farmers in the face of rising market concentration. It istherefore necessary to enact laws that curb the concentrationof seed markets and protect traditional knowledge inorder to prevent the cycle of debt and poverty caused by adependency on expensive inputs.

This carefully cultivated agrobiodiversity helps sustain
communities through times of environmental crisis, rising
population density, and other threats. In Ethiopia’s Gamo
Highlands, traditional practices relying on plant diversity– over 40 varieties of barley and 100 varieties of banana
are cultivated in the region – and active seed exchange
have preserved food security and resilience of local
populations. By contrast, neighboring communities whopractice intensive monocropping on the plateau of Wolaita
experience annual food shortages and decreasing soil
fertility.104 In Papua New Guinea, an average family grows
between 30 and 80 species of food crops.105 Such diversity
ensures nutritious diets and helps farmers endure periodsof drought as well as heavy rains. Papuans’ taro varieties,
for instance, survive prolonged rains, but are negatively
affected by droughts, during which farmers rely on sweet
potato and cassava for food staples.106

Excluding Farmers’ Seeds:
A Flawed Approach to Feeding the World
The World Bank describes the EBA as an attempt to “develop
the business of agriculture” to help meet the world’s
growing food demands, but its approach, largely focusedon increasing agricultural yields, is deeply flawed. Current
estimates indicate that agriculture already produces enoughto feed up to 14 billion people.101 Rather than increasing
yields, the challenge of food insecurity must be addressedby tackling lack of access to land, inequality, poverty, market
dynamics, environmental degradation, climate change, andmore.
Smallholder farmers, who produce 70 percent of the foodconsumed worldwide,102 play a key role in helping meet theworld’s food needs sustainably. Evidence shows that the
productivity of small farms is often higher than that of large
farms, and that smallholders are the best stewards of theirland.103 To maintain yields and healthy ecosystems, smallscale farmers rely on a wide diversity of plant varieties,
which have been selected over many generations for their
quality and suitability to local conditions.

12

In Ethiopia’s Gamo Highlands, traditional agriculture practices
preserve high levels of agrobiodiversity © Leah Samberg

This resilience is lost under Green Revolution’s approaches
based on heavy use of industrial inputs, which cause
tremendous biodiversity losses. Between the 1960s and1980s, the Philippines lost some 4,000 cultivars of rice,
Bangladesh lost 7,000, and Indonesia 15,000. This genetic
wealth was replaced in farmers’ fields by a handful of
hybrid varieties,107 which resulted in loss of traditional seedproduction and saving practices, increased dependence
on external input providers, and farmer indebtedness.108
Worldwide, agrobiodiversity is eroding at an alarming rate
due to climate change, environment degradation, andstandardization of seeds and crops. The UN’s Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 75 percent
of crop diversity has been lost since the 1900s, and thatwww.oaklandinstitute.org

no more than 12 plant species and five animal species now
provide 75 percent of the food consumed worldwide.109
The EBA reforms will further aggravate this trend, as
they confine policymaking to facilitating corporate seedproduction and marketing while ignoring crucial issues
surrounding industrial seed systems. Formal seedregistration and certification tests, indeed, tend to focus
on seeds’ productivity and genetic homogeneity properties.
They therefore incentivize the breeding of uniform and highyielding seeds at the expense of other plant features that
may be useful to farmers (e.g. aptitude for intercroppingand conservation, nutritional and cooking qualities, yieldof secondary products such as fodder or straw, etc.), andultimately result in loss of biodiversity.110 The passing oftests to release conventional seeds requires significant
investment. Consequently, companies tend to focus on
producing varieties that are broadly cultivated (maize, soy,wheat, etc.),111 and have a wide adaptability, to ensure areturn on investment. 112 Private plant breeding therefore
neglects less profitable but nonetheless vital crops (such as

oats, barley, millet, etc.), as well as varieties better adapted to
specific agroecological zones and open-pollinated varietiesthat farmers can recycle from one harvest to the next. 113
Trends of acquisition and mergers in the seed sector
have reinforced these tendencies, as many independentcompanies with specialized portfolios have ceased the
production of seeds with smaller market shares after being
purchased by larger firms.114 Seminis, the world’s largest
vegetable and fruit seed company, progressively acquired
smaller companies in the 2000s before being bought
by Monsanto in 2005.115 In the consolidation process,Seminis discontinued some 2000 varieties it used tocommercialize.116 The abandoned crops were generally
those with unique qualities, bred for niche markets, andthose adapted to complex environments and low use ofchemical inputs.117 Without this diversity, farmers’ ability
to produce sustainably and resist environmental stress isdramatically reduced.

Going Beyond the World Bank’s EBA: Building Seed Systems that Benefit Farmers
The EBA uses misleading language, calling industrial
seeds as “quality seeds” 118 and conveys the perception thatfamers’ seeds are unworthy of policy support.119 This fails torecognize that conventional seed production, whether public
or private, relies on a capital of genetic resources nurtured
by farmers, who are the primary and most indispensablestewards of biodiversity. 120 It is clear that farmer-managed
seed systems do face some challenges. These are often
linked to seed circulation – which may be hampered bycertain social or cultural norms or by seed storage andmanagement constraints – and availability – famines,
natural disasters, and conflicts may deplete local seedstocks, and varieties with specific properties (high-yielding,pest-resistant) may be scarce or unavailable.121 However,solutions exist to enhance the quality and distribution ofseeds within these systems and without relying on corporate
seed production.
Participatory plant breeding approaches, for instance,
promote decentralized collaborations between NGOs,
public actors (for instance national research centers), andrural communities. These initiatives put farmers in thedriver’s seat during the design and implementation ofbreeding work, empower farmers to innovate in their own
fields, and improve plant quality and seed access. The FAO

13

recognizes these initiatives as being better at addressing theneeds of small-scale famers than conventional packages ofindustrial inputs.122 Many successful participatory breeding
programs have been documented, including in Honduras,
Timor Leste, Rwanda, India, and much more.123 In Cameroon,
the World Agroforestry Center identified with farmers theirpreferred species of trees (instead of commercially relevanttimber species, farmers preferred undomesticated native
fruit and fertilizer trees) and helped create farmer-managed
nurseries. The program organized farmer trainings in
genetic selection techniques and domestication of wildtrees. Domesticated tree species were then introduced on
farms to diversify cultures of cash crops (cocoa, coffee).124
Processing and marketing techniques helped commercialize
the products from the native trees such as fruits and nuts.
As farmers’ incomes increased, they reinvested the profits
in the building of roads, bridges, storage warehouses,
irrigation systems, and other infrastructures to benefit thecommunity.125
Such initiatives cannot take off with the World Bank’s onesize-fits-all approach, as it relies on consultation and deep
collaboration with farmers to assess their needs and tailor
solutions to their problems. Yet farmer-managed seedsystems do support successful business models. Some

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growers specialize in the multiplication, production, andsale of seeds,126 and circulate seeds through local networks,
often reaching remote locations and disseminating
valuable information on varieties’ properties and planting
methods.127 In Uganda and DRC, two war-stricken countries,
the organization of seed fairs attracted numerous vendors
and helped restore households’ seed stocks, boost the
local economy, and improve agricultural productivity. 128 In
Zimbabwe, a local seed bank initiative enabled a droughtaffected community to save over 6 tons of seed in just four
years. The seed bank serves as a buffer in times of individual
or community crop failure.129

A seed fair in Democratic Republic of Congo © Alexa Reynolds, ACF DR Congo

Rising environmental and economic challenges requirepolicymakers to support local seed access and help diversify
crop varieties and incomes. In Zambia and Malawi, severe
droughts pushed governments in the 1980s to promotecassava as an alternative to maize, the dominant mono-cropin these countries, which is drought-prone, water-intensive,and heavily reliant on subsidized seeds and fertilizers.
Governments mobilized extension services to diffuse highyielding and pest resistant varieties of cassava, which farmers
could freely reproduce in their fields. These diversification
efforts had positive effects on business (cassava processing
and marketing improved) and food security, particularly forthe poorer and female-headed farm households.130 Thoughrejected by the EBA, public sector plant breeding is more
likely to take into account countries’ and farmers’ needs
and development of crops of less commercial interest(legumes, perennials, open-pollinated crops, etc.).131 This
is in opposition to the “New Green Revolution” doctrine,
which relies on corporate development of drought-resistantmaize and other technological fixes that further undermine
farmers’ self-sufficiency and freedom.
Through the EBA, the World Bank reduces farmers’ roleto that of seed consumers and confines policymaking to
the privatization of seed systems. Yet there are many ways
governments can support the participation of farmers inbreeding and distributing beneficial varieties. The WorldBank continues to ignore the calls of a wide range of experts
and institutions for bottom-up seed solutions benefiting
the poorest132 and remains entrenched in the defense of
corporate interests. This not only jeopardizes the culture
and livelihoods of farmers in developing countries, but also
contradicts the primordial wisdom, which, for millennia,
has pushed humans to nurture, improve, and exchange theearth’s rich resources.

Farmers consult together to select and save a diverse variety of seeds in the banks © USC Canada - Mali

14

www.oaklandinstitute.org

Conclusion
Since the EBA’s inception in 2013, the World Bank and
EBA donors have defended the project as a tool aimed atproviding guidance to policymakers on the best regulatory
practices to support thriving agricultural sectors and“inclusive agricultural transformation.”133 However the
EBA’s “guidance” is heavily skewed in favor of private
agribusinesses, and the project is anything but inclusive ofdeveloping countries’ and farmers’ interests.
With the EBA, the Bank restricts policymaking to encouraging
private development and marketing of industrial seeds
and adopting PVP frameworks. This disproportionatelyfavors private breeders at the expense of farmers’ rightto freely produce, save, and exchange seeds. The EBA’s
narrow regulatory framework is clearly inadequate forcountries where farmer-managed seed systems dominate.
In addition, it remains silent on the shortcomings ofindustrial seed systems, which have negative social impacts(criminalization of farmers’ seeds, indebtedness linked
to the buying of expensive seeds, loss of local knowledge
and culture) and deep environmental flaws (erosion of15

agrobiodiversity, reduced resilience to climate variations,etc.).
Agricultural policies should emanate from national
consultations with farmers and from in-depth analysesof local constraints to ensure efficient, sustainable, andaffordable access to seeds. The Bank’s quick regulatory fixes
will prevent countries from establishing laws that strike afair balance between farmers’ and breeders’ rights, and that
address the need to preserve rapidly eroding agrobiodiversity
as well as the traditions and cultural knowledge associatedwith this diversity.
This Brief shows that, with the EBA, the World Bankis orchestrating the privatization of seed systems anddiscrediting farmers’ seeds for the sake of corporate profit.
This is not consistent with the objective put forward by
the promoters of the EBA to help feed nine billion people
by 2050. To ensure food security of a growing population,access to seeds – the very basis of agriculture – must be
extensively and unconditionally promoted.

www.oaklandinstitute.org

Endnotes
1

World Bank. Enabling the Business of Agriculture. http://eba.worldbank.org/(accessed August 22, 2016).

2

Maskus, K. E. Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics ofIntellectual Property Rights in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 2012; Agriculture and Rural
Development Department. Intellectual Property Rights. Designing Regimes
to Support Plant Breeding in Developing Countries. The World Bank, 2006.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/IPR_ESW.pdf(accessed August 22, 2016); Bishaw, Z. and A.J.G. van Gastel. “Variety
Release and Policy Options.” In Ceccarelli, S.; Guimarães, E.P. and E.
Weltizien (Eds). Plant Breeding and Farmer Participation. Rome: FAO, 2009.
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1070e/i1070e06.pdf (accessed August 22, 2016).

3

Countries develop sui generis plant variety protections to adapt IPR
regulations to their national context. For instance, sui generis laws allow
national legislators to choose the categories of innovations for which theywant to grant breeders rights. See: Dang, R. et al. “Sui Generis Plant Variety
Protection: The Indian Perspective.” American Journal of Economics andBusiness Administration, 1.4 (2009): 303-312.

4

ETC Group. Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play. Dow + DuPont in the
Pocket? Next: Demonsanto? [Communiqué #115], 2015. http://www.etcgroup.
org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/etc_breakbad_23dec15.pdf (accessed
September 7, 2016).

5

Jones, G. The Expansion of The Commercial Seed Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Major Players, Key Issues and Trends. African Center for Biodiversity, 2015.
http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Seed-Sector-Sub-Saharareport.pdf (accessed August 22, 2016).

6

Fuglie, K., Heisey, P., King, J., and D. Schimmelpfennig. Rising Concentrationin Agricultural Input Industries Influences New Farm Technologies. USDA
Economic Research Service, December 2012. http://www.ers.usda.gov/
amber-waves/2012-december/rising-concentration-in-agricultural-inputindustries-influences-new-technologies.aspx#.V9B97z4rJcw (accessed
September 8, 2016).

7

In the US, an industry estimate suggests that, in recent years, nearly halfof all private seed-biotechnology research investments were devoted tothe development of just one crop, corn. See: Heisey, P.W. The Structure of
US Agricultural and Food Research, with an Emphasis on Seed-Biotechnology
Research. USDA Economic Research Service, 2015. http://nabc.cals.cornell.
edu/Publications/Reports/nabc_27/19_Heisey.pdf (accessed October 19,2016).

8

GRAIN and PEAC. From Green to Gene Revolution: How Farmers Lost Controlof the Seeds from Agricultural Modernisation. 2010. https://www.grain.org/
article/entries/4151-from-green-to-gene-revolution-how-farmers-lost-controlof-the-seeds-from-agricultural-modernisation (accessed September 8,2016).

9Ibid.

10 Research estimates vary across countries and crops considered. For
instance, the rate of use of industrial versus farmers’ seed is often higher formaize, due to the promotion of industrial maize seeds through farm input
subsidy programs. However, the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and recent literature reviews confirm the estimate
that, globally, farmers in developing countries source 80-90 percent of
their seeds within farmer-managed seed systems. See: FAO. “What Are
Seed Systems?” Plant Production and Protection Division (AGP). http://
www.fao.org/agriculture/crops/thematic-sitemap/theme/compendium/
tools-guidelines/what-are-seed-systems/en/ (accessed August 22, 2016);
Coomes, O.T. et al. “Farmer seed networks make a limited contribution toagriculture? Four common misconceptions.” Food Policy 56 (2015): 41-50.
11

Coomes, O.T. et al. Op. Cit.; Oakland Institute. Seed Fairs In Post-Conflict
Situations. [Agroecology Case Studies], 2015. http://www.oaklandinstitute.
org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Seed_fairs_DRC_Uganda.pdf (accessed
August 22, 2016).

12 Ojiewo, C.O. et al. Community Seed Production. [Workshop Proceedings],
FAO & ICRISAT, 2015. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4553e.pdf (accessed August30, 2016); Ceccarelli, S.; Guimarães, E.P. and E. Weltizien (Eds). Plant
Breeding and Farmer Participation. Rome: FAO, ICRISAT, ICARDA, 2009.

16

ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/i1070e/i1070e00.pdf (accessed August 22,2016).
13 Oakland Institute. Seed Fairs In Post-Conflict Situations. Op. Cit.; Oakland
Institute. Mulch and Seed Banks: Conservation Farming in Zimbabwe.
[Agroecology Case Studies], 2015. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/
sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Conservation_Agriculture_Zimbabwe.pdf(accessed August 22, 2016).
14 Bellows, A.C. et al (Eds). Keeping Seeds in Peoples’ Hands. Right to Foodand Nutrition Watch, 2016. http://www.righttofoodandnutrition.org/
sites/www.righttofoodandnutrition.org/files/R_t_F_a_N_Watch_2016_
ENG_WEB.pdf (accessed November 28, 2016); Frison, E. et al. The Futureof Food: Seeds of Resilience. A Compendium of Perspectives on Agricultural
Biodiversity from Around the World. Global Alliance for the Future of
Food. http://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FoF_Print_
Compendium_82616_FA.pdf (accessed September 7, 2016).
15 FAO. “What Are Seed Systems?” Op. Cit.; Coomes, O.T. et al. Op. Cit.
16 Karthikeyan, M. and C.S.P. Patil. “Local Seed Systems: For Enhancing
Food Security and Farm Resilience.” Agricultures Network, April 25, 2014.
http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/india/cultivating-farmbiodiversity/local-seeds-systems (accessed August 30, 2016); Ojiewo,
C.O. et al. Op. Cit.; Oakland Institute. Low External Inputs Technologies
and Biodiversity in Ethiopia. [Agroecology Case Studies], 2015. http://
www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Low_Input_
Agriculture_Ethiopia.pdf (accessed August 30, 2016).
17 ETC Group. Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play Dow + DuPont in the
Pocket? Next: Demonsanto? Op. Cit.
18 Plumer, B. “Why the Debate Over the Bayer-Monsanto Deal is so Important
for the Future of Farming.” Vox, September 20, 2016. http://www.vox.
com/2016/9/20/12988616/bayer-monsanto-dupont-dow-agriculturemergers-innovation (accessed November 8, 2016).
19 Ibid; ETC Group. “The Monsanto–Bayer Tie-up Is Just One of Seven;Mega-Mergers and Big Data Domination Threaten Seeds, Food Security.”
September 15, 2016. http://www.etcgroup.org/content/monsanto-bayer-tiejust-one-seven-mega-mergers-and-big-data-domination-threaten-seeds-food(accessed September 23, 2016); ETC Group. “Mega-Mergers in the Global
Agricultural Inputs Sector: Threats to Food Security & Climate Resilience.”[Presentation], UN Committee on World Food Security, September 2015.
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/etcgroup_
agmergers_22oct2015.pptx_.pdf (accessed November 8, 2016).
20 For instance, in 2014, USAID announced a five year long collaboration with
DuPont Pioneer to expand hybrid maize seed adoption programs to reachthousands of smallholders across Africa. USAID has also been working
with Syngenta since 2014 to train Nigerian farmers in the use of agricultural
inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizers. See: USAID. “USAID and
Dupont Announce Commitment to Increase Farmer Productivity andFood and Nutrition Security.” January 23, 2014. https://www.usaid.gov/
news-information/press-releases/jan-23-2014-usaid-and-dupont-announcecommitment-increase-farmer-productivity (accessed August 30, 2016);
Dupont. “Advancing Food Security in Malawi & Ghana.” Action & Innovation.
http://foodsecurity.dupont.com/2014/10/28/advancing-food-security-inmalawi-ghana/ (accessed August 30, 2016); US Embassy in Nigeria. “NewU.S.-Nigeria Partnership In Agriculture to Benefit More Than 500,000
Farmers.” News & Events. http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/pe_08262014pg.
html (accessed August 30, 2016).
21 AFSA and GRAIN. Land and Seed Laws Under Attack. Who is Pushing Changes
in Africa? 2015. https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5121-land-and-seedlaws-under-attack-who-is-pushing-changes-in-africa (accessed August 30,2016).
22 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. The World Bank, January 2016. http://eba.
worldbank.org/~/media/WBG/AgriBusiness/Documents/Reports/2016/
EBA16-Full-Report.pdf (accessed August 22, 2016).
23 World Bank. “About Enabling the Business of Agriculture.” About EBA.
http://eba.worldbank.org/about-us (accessed August 22, 2016).
24 The White House. “Fact Sheet: G-8 action on Food Security and Nutrition.”

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[Press Release], May 18, 2012. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/05/18/fact-sheet-g-8-action-food-security-and-nutrition (accessed
August 18, 2016); New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. “About.”
Commitments. https://new-alliance.org/commitments (accessed August 18,2016).
25 Communications with the Netherlands’ Ministry for Foreign Trade andDevelopment Cooperation and with Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
revealed that the Dutch funding to the EBA ceased in June 2016, while theDanish government has not yet committed to renew funding to the project
after 2016.
26 World Bank. “Enabling the Business of Agriculture. Project Donors &Partners.” About EBA. http://eba.worldbank.org/about-us/donors (accessed
August 22, 2016).
27 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2015. Progress Report.
The World Bank, November 2014. http://eba.worldbank.org/~/media/
WBG/AgriBusiness/Documents/Reports/2015/Enabling-the-Business-ofAgriculture-2015.pdf (accessed November 8, 2016).
28 USAID, Feed the Future. “Your Questions Answered about Enabling theBusiness of Agriculture!” Agrilinks. https://agrilinks.org/blog/your-questionsanswered-about-enabling-business-agriculture (accessed August 22, 2016).
29 DFID, Development Tracker. “Support to the World Bank Project‘Benchmarking the Business of Agriculture.’ (documents).” Developing
Countries, Unspecified. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204123/
documents (accessed August 22, 2016); Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Internal
Grant Committee Meeting. Broadening of the Benchmarking of the Businessof Agriculture.” [Agenda Item n°6], November 18, 2013. http://um.dk/%20
search?q=Broadening%20the%20BBA.%20&filter=0 (accessed August 22,2016).
30 World Bank Group. Doing Business 2014, Understanding Regulation for Smalland Medium-Size Enterprises. The World Bank and International FinanceCorporation, 2013. http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/
Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.
pdf (accessed August 17, 2016).
31 Martin-Prével, A. and F. Mousseau. The Unholy Alliance. Five Western Donors
Shape a Pro-Corporate Agenda for African Agriculture. Oakland Institute, 2016.
http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/unholy-alliance-five-western-donors-shapepro-corporate-agenda-african-agriculture (accessed August 22, 2016).
32 Oakland Institute. “Our Land Our Business Campaign.” Issues: World Bank
Group. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/our-land-our-business (accessed
August 22, 2016).
33 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Jones, G. Op. Cit.
38 Ibid.
39 World Bank. “Local Experts.” Enabling the Business of Agriculture. http://eba.
worldbank.org/local-experts (accessed November 8, 2016).
40 Ibid.
41 Mittal, A. “An Open Letter to World Bank’s EBA Team.” Oakland Institute,
December 1, 2014. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/open-letter-world-bankseba-team (accessed November 9, 2016).

48 IGTC. “IGTC President: Outreach mission in Rome and Geneva.” News.
http://igtcglobal.org/index.php?id=10&tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=111&tx_
news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cH
ash=583b46ad82650d5a44e174c78dab26dd (accessed November 9, 2016);
IGTC. “Newsletter.” June 13, 2016. http://igtcglobal.org/index.php?id=166(accessed November 9, 2016).
49 IGTC was initially formed to defend the agribusiness industry’s interests
within the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In 2015, the giant food company
Cargill indicated: “We support the use of biotechnology in agriculture andresponsible commercialization of GM crops through our participation in theInternational Grain Trade Coalition.” See: Cargill. Cargill @150. Corporate
Responsibility Report, 2015. http://www.cargill.com/ebooks/2015_cr-report/
html/11.html (accessed November 9, 2016).
50 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.
51 De Schutter, O. Seed Policies and The Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity
and Encouraging Innovation. United Nations, General Assembly, 2009. http://
www.farmersrights.org/pdf/RighttoFood-N0942473.pdf (accessed August 22,2016).
52 See footnote 3 for a definition of sui generis laws.
53 De Schutter, O. Op. Cit.
54 UPOV. “Frequently Asked Questions.” About UPOV. http://www.upov.int/
about/en/faq.html (accessed August 22, 2016).
55 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.
56 Maskus, K. E. Op. Cit.; Agriculture and Rural Development Department. Op.
Cit.; Bishaw, Z. and A.J.G. van Gastel. Op. Cit.
57 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.
58 GRAIN and La Via Campesina. Seed Laws that Criminalise Farmers: Resistanceand Fight Back. 2015. https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5142-seed-lawsthat-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback (accessed August 22,2016).
59 Bwire, J. et al. Farmer-Managed Seed Systems in Morogo and Mvomero,
Tanzania: The Disregarded Wealth of Smallholder Farmers. African Center
for Biodiversity, 2016. http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/
Tanzania-Field-Report.pdf (accessed September 23, 2016).
60 Information is lacking on the seed regulation changes implemented in
Vietnam.
61 USAID, Feed the Future. “Your Questions Answered about Enabling theBusiness of Agriculture!” Op. Cit.
62 Agroberichten Buitenland. “Successful Training on Plant Variety Protection
and Breeder’s Rights.” Nieuws & Alerts. http://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.
nl/rwanda/successful-training-on-plant-variety-protection-and-breedersrights-in-rwanda/ (accessed August 22, 2016).
63 Republic of Rwanda. Official Gazette n° Special 20/04/2016. April 2016. http://
media.wix.com/ugd/57dfc5_427744d5bfd041adaed2475010607527.pdf(accessed August 22, 2016).
64 Ibid.

42 World Bank. “Stakeholder Engagement.” Enabling the Business of Agriculture.
http://eba.worldbank.org/how-we-engage (accessed November 9, 2016).

65 Agroberichten Buitenland. Op. Cit.

43 IFAMA. “2015 World Forum Program.” Annual Conference. http://www.ifama.
org/2015-Forum-Program (accessed November 9, 2016).

67 Agroberichten Buitenland. Op. Cit.

44 Grow Canada. “Agriculture Beyond Borders.” Grow Canada Conference
2015. https://growcanadaconference.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/GCprogram.pdf (accessed November 9, 2016).

17

47 IGTC. “World Bank Working Group launched.” News. http://igtcglobal.
org/index.php?id=10&tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=110&tx_news_
pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=d8
2d69947b183130159091dc3edfeffd (accessed November 9, 2016).

66 De Schutter, O. Op. Cit.
68 Republic of Rwanda. Op. Cit.
69 De Schutter, O. Op. Cit.

45 Argus FMB. Africa Fertilizer 2016. http://www.argusmedia.com/~/media/
f8edff16209b4586957e75f47218b613.ashx (accessed November 9, 2016).

70 Theuri, C. “Rwanda Makes Changes to Its IP Laws.” IP Karibu, May 16,
2016. http://www.ipkaribu.com/#!Rwanda-Makes-Changes-to-its-IP-Laws/
cktv/573351660cf284cf213f72c1 (accessed August 22, 2016).

46 IFA. “Innovating in a Challenging Market.” Final Programme, 2016. http://
www.ifa-singapore2016.org/Programme/ConferenceProgramme.aspx(accessed November 9, 2016).

71 Masinjila, N., Jones, G. and H. Swamby. Changing Seed and Plant Variety
Protection Laws in Tanzania. Implications for Farmer-Managed Seed Systems.
African Center for Biodiversity, April 2016. http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/

www.oaklandinstitute.org

uploads/2016/05/Tanzania-Seed-Law-2016-overview.pdf (accessed October
19, 2016).
72 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.
73 Ibid.
74 Kastler, G., Onorati, A. and B. Brac. “Seeds and Peasant Autonomy.” In
Bellows, A.C. et al (Eds). Alternatives and Resistance to Policies that Generate
Hunger. Right to Food and Nutrition Watch, 2013. http://www.fian.org/
fileadmin/media/publications/Watch_2013_eng_WEB_final.pdf (accessed
November 28, 2016).
75 Peschard, K.E. “Farmers’ Rights to Seed: Conflicts in International Legal
Regimes.” In Bellows, A.C. et al (Eds). Keeping Seeds in Peoples’ Hands. Op.
Cit.
76 La Via Campesina. “The Seed Treaty Undermined by the Gangrene of
Biopiracy.” [Press Release], October 15, 2015. https://viacampesina.org/en/
index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/biodiversity-and-genetic-resourcesmainmenu-37/1886-the-seed-treaty-undermined-by-the-gangrene-of-biopiracy(accessed November 28, 2016).

91 Ibid; GRAIN and La Via Campesina. Op. Cit.
92 GRAIN. “Infographic: Seed Laws Around the World. (Database).” Publication.
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5153-infographic-seed-laws-around-theworld (accessed August 22, 2016); Wattnem, T. Op. Cit.
93 Ibid; Kastler, G. Seed Laws in Europe: Locking Farmers Out. GRAIN, 2005.
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/541-seed-laws-in-europe-lockingfarmers-out (accessed August 22, 2016).
94 African Center for Biodiversity. “Harmonisation of Africa’s Seed Laws
Through SADC and COMESA.” [Poster], 2016. http://acbio.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/SADC-COMESA-Eng.pdf (accessed August 22,2016).
95 SADC Seed Center. SADC Seed Varity Catalogue. http://sadcseedcentre.org/
index.php/catalog (accessed August 22, 2016); COMESA. Variety Catalogue
Database. https://varietycatalogue.comesa.int/web/varietycatalogue(accessed August 22, 2016); Jones, G. Op. Cit.
96 Ibid; Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Background Note on Seed
Harmonisation in Africa. (Undated). http://futureoffood.org/pdfs/EDGE_
Background_Note_on_Seed_Harmonisation.pdf (accessed August 31, 2016).

77 Bordoni, P. et al. Climate Change and Indigenous Communities: Strengthening
Adaptability, Resilience, and Innovation. Bioversity International, 2011. http://
agrobiodiversityplatform.org/climatechange/files/2012/10/TCF-Phase-IIFinal-Report_web.pdf (accessed October 19, 2016).

97 Pschorn-Strauss, E. “African Food Sovereignty: Valuing Women and the Seed
They Keep.” In Bellows, A.C. et al (Eds). ). Keeping Seeds in Peoples’ Hands.
Op. Cit.

78 Bioversity International. Seeds for Needs. [Facsheet], undated. http://www.
bioversityinternational.org/fileadmin/user_upload/research/research_
portfolio/Adaptation_to_climate_change/Seeds4Needs_factsheets/Seeds_
for_Needs_Overview_080415.pdf (accessed October 19, 2016).

99 World Bank Group. Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2016. Comparing
Regulatory Good Practices. Op. Cit.

79 Native Seed Network. Glossary. http://www.nativeseednetwork.org/article_
view?id=13 (accessed October 19, 2016).
80 Rabara, R.C. et al. “Phenotypic Diversity of Farmers’ Traditional Rice Varieties
in the Philippines.” Agronomy 4 (2014): 217-241.
81 India is the largest producer of pearl millet worldwide and Rajasthan
produces over half of the country’s output, but the state’s productivity levels
are among the lowest in the nation due to drought and low performanceof hybrids and other “improved” varieties. See: Bonham, C. Improving Food
Security by Linking Genebanks to Farmers Through the Direct Release of Targeted
Landrace Varieties. Hunger Center, 2011. http://www.hungercenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/Improving-Food-Security-by-Linking-Gene-BanksBonham1.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016).

98 Ibid.

100 Fuglie, K., Heisey, P., King, J., and D. Schimmelpfennig. Op. Cit.
101 FAO. Building a common vision for sustainable food and agriculture. Rome,
2014. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3940e.pdf (accessed November 8, 2016).
102 Maass Wolfenson, K.D. Coping With the Food and Agriculture Challenge:
Smallholders’ Agenda. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, July 2013. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/
sustainability_pathways/docs/Coping_with_food_and_agriculture_
challenge__Smallholder_s_agenda_Final.pdf (accessed September 23, 2016).
103 Carletto, C., Savastano, S. and A. Zezza. “Fact or Artifact: The Impact of
Measurement Errors on the Farm Size–Productivity Relationship.” Journal of
Development Economics 103 (2013): 254-261.

82 Ibid.

104 Oakland Institute. Protecting Biodiversity and Traditional Agro-systems in
Ethiopia. [Agroecology Case Studies], 2015. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/
sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/casestudy_biodiversity_Ethiopia_final.pdf(accessed September 7, 2016).

83 Gewin, V. “Crop Gene Banks are Preserving the Future of Agriculture. But
Who’s Preserving Them?” Ensia, May 21, 2015. http://ensia.com/features/
crop-gene-banks-are-preserving-the-future-of-agriculture-but-whospreserving-them/ (accessed August 22, 2016).

105 Mousseau, Frederic. On Our Land: Modern Land Grabs Reversing Independence
in Papua New Guinea. Oakland Institute, 2013. http://www.oaklandinstitute.
org/our-land-modern-land-grabs-reversing-independence-papua-new-guinea(accessed September 7, 2016).

84 This is because farmer varieties do not meet the requirements of uniformity
and stability for formal seed registration and certification procedures. See:
De Schutter, O. Op. Cit.

106 Ibid.

85 Nilsson, M. “The In- and Out-Licensing of Plant Varieties.” In Krattiger,
A. et al (Eds). Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural
Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices. Davis: PIPRA, 2007. http://www.
iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/ch11/ipHandbook-Ch%2011%2003%20
Nilsson%20Plant%20Variety%20Licensing.pdf (accessed August 22, 2016).

107 GRAIN and PEAC. Op. Cit.
108 Ibid.
109 FAO Sustainable Development Department. Op. Cit.
110 Ibid; USC Canada. “Honduras” What We Do. http://usc-canada.org/what-wedo/seeds-of-survival/honduras, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1070e/i1070e06.pdf(accessed August 22, 2016).

86 UPOV. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant.
March 1991. http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/conventions/1991/act1991.
html#_15 (accessed August 30, 2016).

111 In 2009, nearly half of all US private seed-biotechnology research
investments went to the development of corn varieties. See: Heisey, P.W. Op.
Cit.

87 Cullet, P. Plant Variety Protection. [Briefing Paper], IELRC, 2003-2004. http://
www.ielrc.org/content/f0304.htm (accessed September 23, 2016).

112 Midwest Sustainable Agriculture Working Group & the Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition. Op. Cit.

88 APREBES. “UPOV Convention.” Plant Variety Protection. http://www.
apbrebes.org/content/upov-convention (accessed August 22, 2016).

113 Ibid.

89 National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition. “Seeds & Breeds
Summit Proceedings.” [Distilled Summary], October 2014. http://
sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NSAC-Seeds-andBreeds-Proceedings-Summary.pdf (accessed August 22, 2016); Midwest
Sustainable Agriculture Working Group & the Sustainable Agriculture
Coalition. Op. Cit.
90 Wattnem, T. “Seed laws, certification and standardization: outlawing informal
seed systems in the Global South.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 43.1 (2016):
1-18.

114 Ibid.
115 Monsanto. “Monsanto Company to Acquire Seminis Inc., a Leading
Vegetable and Fruit Seed Company.” [Press Release], January 24, 2005.
http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/monsanto-company-acquireseminis-inc-leading-vegetable-and-fruit-seed-company (accessed September
7, 2016); Sligh, M. and L. Lauffer (Eds). Summit Proceedings: Summit on
Seeds and Breeds for 21st Century Agriculture. Rural Advancement Foundation
International, 2004. https://www.leopold.iastate.edu/files/pubs-andpapers/2003-09-summit-proceedings-seeds-breeds-21st-century-agriculture.
pdf (accessed September 7, 2016).

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116 Elton, S. Consumed: Food for a Finite Planet. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2013.
117 Sligh, M. and L. Lauffer (eds). Op. Cit.
118 World Bank. “About Enabling the Business of Agriculture.” Op. Cit.

125 Ibid.

119 Research has shown that widely used arguments to discredit farmers’ seeds
as potentially unsafe and prone to diseases are unfounded. Studies find no
significant differences between quality of farmer seed (in terms of health,absence of contaminants, etc.) and of industrial seed, and no evidence existsthat seed recycling (saving the seeds for sowing at the next crop season)
lowers quality. See: Coomes, O.T. et al. Op. Cit.; Louwaars, N. “Seed Laws:
Biases and Bottlenecks.” GRAIN, 2005. https://www.grain.org/article/
entries/473-seed-laws-biases-and-bottlenecks (accessed August 17, 2016);
Bishaw, Z. and A.J.G. van Gastel. Op. Cit.

126 Mubangizi, E. et al. Uganda Seed Sector Assessment. [Briefing Note] ISSD,
September 2012 http://www.issdseed.org/resource/issd-national-seedsector-assessment-briefing-notes (accessed August 30, 2016); Ojiewo, C.O.,
et al. Op. Cit.; Oakland Institute. Seed Fairs In Post-Conflict Situations. Op. Cit.

120 GRAIN and La Via Campesina. Op. Cit.; Bishaw, Z. and A.J.G. van Gastel. Op.
Cit.

130 Ibid.

121 Coomes, O.T. et al. Op. Cit.; Oakland Institute. Seed Fairs In Post-Conflict
Situations. Op. Cit.
122 Ojiewo, C.O. et al. Op Cit.; Buitati, M. et al. The Law of the Seed. Navdanya
International, 2013. http://www.navdanya.org/attachments/lawofseed.pdf(accessed August 30, 2016).
123 USC Canada. “Honduras” Op. Cit., USC Canada. “Timor Leste.” What
We Do. http://usc-canada.org/what-we-do/seeds-of-survival/timor-leste(accessed August 22, 2016); Bishaw, Z. and A.J.G. van Gastel. Op. Cit.
124 Oakland Institute. The Agricultural and Tree Products Program in Cameroon.

19[Agroecology Case Studies], 2015. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/
oaklandinstitute.org/files/Agroforestry_Cameroon.pdf (accessed September
23, 2016).

127 Ojiewo, C.O. et al. Op. Cit.
128 Ibid.
129 Oakland Institute. Mulch and Seed Banks: Conservation Farming in Zimbabwe.
Op. Cit.
131 Midwest Sustainable Agriculture Working Group & the Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition. Op. Cit.; King, J., Toole, A. and K. Fuglie. The
Complementary Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in U.S. Agricultural
Research and Development. USDA Economic Research Service, 2012. http://
www.nist.gov/tpo/publications/upload/Complementary-Roles-of-the-Publicand-Private-Sectors-in-U-S-Agricultural-RandD.pdf (accessed August 22,2016).
132 Bellows, A.C. et al (Eds). Keeping Seeds in Peoples’ Hands. Op. Cit.; Frison, E.
et al. Op. Cit.
133 Communication with Justine Greening, former Secretary of State, UK
Department for International Development (DFID). April 2, 2016.

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