“Importance of world’s sharing the lessons of theaccident and utilising them to enhance safety

WANO actions after Fukushima"

Jacques Regaldo, Chairman of WANO
The 46th JAIF Annual Conference – Tokyo, April 24 2013

Summary of the Presentation
1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
2. WANO after Fukushima : Safety assessments
3. WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
4. International cooperation
5. Conclusion2

Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
T.M.I.

INPO (1979)+ modifications mainly in western Europe

Chernobyl

WANO (1989)+ modifications mainly in Russia & Europe3

CE4

Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
T.M.I.

INPO + modifications in western Europe

Chernobyl

WANO + modifications in Russia & EuropeFukushima

IAEA action Plan
WANO BGM Decisions
Reaction in Japan& nuclear international community
5

Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
26 months after Fukushima
 Public trust strongly shaken
 Reviews of global nuclear fleet performed in most of thecountries (stress tests)
 Many decisions enhancing global nuclear safety, including: Upgrading safety procedures & equipment
 Setting up rapid response forces (mitigation)
 Reviewing nuclear safety organisations
Aggressive programmes to build new units (Asia) but also
phasing out of nuclear power (Germany) Situation in Japan:
 48 units are still shutdown NRA (New regulation expected for July 2013)
 JANSI6

Summary of the Presentation
1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
2. WANO after Fukushima : Safety assessments
3. WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
4. International cooperation
5. Conclusion

7

WANO after Fukushima: Safety assessments
WANO issued a first SOER 6 days after Fukushima

WANO will soon issue a fourth SOER on
organisational and human performance issues
8WANO after Fukushima: Safety assessments
All WANO members responded to SOERs. WANO analysed theanswers, issued reports, made recommendations. Some aremandatory and are checked during Peer-Reviews.

9Summary of the Presentation
1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
2. WANO after Fukushima : Safety assessments
3. WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
4. International cooperation
5. Conclusion

10

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
WANO set up a “Post Fukushima Commission”
with 15 CEO members.
5 recommendations have been approved by theBoard and unanimously adopted by the General
Assembly during the Shenzhen Biennial GeneralMeeting
These recommendations drive WANO to thefollowing evolutions
11

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Expand the scope of WANO
Mitigation & Emergency Preparedness
Design : Periodic safety re‐assessment & permanent
improvement process
Spent Fuel Pools & dry storage on sites

12

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Improve the Event Response Strategy

Severe accident management
Emergency organisation in cooperation with the IAEA& INPOReal time event communication

13

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Increase the Credibility
Quality & scope of Peer Reviews
Corporate PR within 6 years
Frequency of PR from 6 to 4 years
Assessment of the plants (grade)14

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Increase the Visibility & Transparency
Overall communication strategy
WANO Year‐End Reports
WANO Centres Year‐End Reports
Transparency within WANO
Transparency with the Public

15

WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Increase the Consistency

Assessment of 4 Regional centres & WANO London
OfficeEquivalency of reviews (with IAEA,INPO & JANSI, ...
evaluations)16WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
Increase WANO Resources
In 1989 : 120 staff (<0,3 / unit)
In 2010, after Delhi : 150 staff (0,35 / unit)
In 2014 / 2015 : >400 staff (0,85 / unit)
In parallel : increase of quality of reviewers &team leaders17Summary of the Presentation
1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
2. WANO after Fukushima : Safety assessments
3. WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
4. International cooperation
5. Conclusion

18

International Cooperation
17/09/12 MoU between the IAEA and WANO

19

International Cooperation
 Revised IAEA – WANO MoU signed September 17
 MoU calls for cooperation in several important areas: Exchange of peer reviewers
 Performance indicators
 Coordination in the scheduling of OSART missions and peer reviews
 Exchange of some information
 WANO access to IAEA events database IAEA access to SOER recommendations

 Coordination meetings twice each year Coordination during future serious events

 Cooperation with INSAG
 WANO is a participant at all INSAG meeting WANO plans to work closely with INSAG on an IAEA Fukushima report Participation of WANO in the ITAG (International Technical Advisory Group)
20

International Cooperation
FEPC

Lessons learned

information

WANO

Governts(1) : Multinational Design Evaluation Programme

JANSI

Cooperation

JAIF

Lessons learned

REGIONAL&NATIONAL
LEVEL

oversight

CNEA (2)O.E.

INTERNATIONAL
LEVELOversight

Credible Safety Authority

Harmonisation

IAEA

Benchmarking

Harmonisation

INRA
MDEP (1)WENRA

Nal Reg

INPO

Cooperation

WNA
NEI …

Operators(2) : China Nuclear Energy Association

21

Summary of the Presentation
1. Nuclear Industry Evolution / WANO
2. WANO after Fukushima : Safety assessments
3. WANO after Fukushima : Renewed WANO
4. International cooperation
5. Conclusion

22

Conclusion
Risks remain!
 Risk of loss of public trust
 Risk of loss of trust of nuclear workers
 Risk of isolationism of some operators
 Risk of complacency & over-confidence ofsome operators
23

Conclusion
Safety is necessary to recover trust
Operators have individual & collective responsibility
Safety is only as strong as the weakest operator
WANO has a vital role to play in addition with otherorganisations
24

Conclusion
World landscape has changed
Worldwide energy mix has changed
Nuclear energy acceptance has changed
WANO must adapt
Moscow 1989  Moscow 201325

Conclusion

Internal cooperation is an absolute necessity in thefuture
CEOs’ involvement is a key factor to enhance nuclear
safety company-wide

26

Conclusion
International Cooperation
IAEA, INPO, JANSI, ...
Open mind to learn from each other& avoid isolation

High level of Safety27

Conclusion
CEO Responsibility / involvement
Send adequate & skilled Resources to both WANO &JANSI
Efficient programmes (Peer Reviews, Technical Support
Missions, Operating Experience...) performed byskilled Experts & Engineers
A better use of these programmes toimprove Safety28

Conclusion
Strengthened support from WANO to the JNOs
Long term shut down & Restart reviews in Japan
Reinforcement of WANO Tokyo Centre workforce
including additional experts from other Regions
WANO participation to the JANSI International
Advisory Group and Technical Review Group29

Conclusion
Nuclear acceptance shaken by Fukushima
Credibility of Operators, responsible for safety
Skills & Transparency, no over-confidence
Credibility of Regulators :IndependenceInternational cooperation :No isolation, no complacency
High level of Safety :recover the public trust !
30

Conclusion
We all rely on each other to improve safety!

http://www.wano.info31