Transport Outlook
Meeting the Needs of
9 Billion People

2011

Transport Outlook
Meeting the Needs of
9 Billion People

2011

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM

The International Transport Forum at the OECD is an intergovernmental organisation with52 member countries. It acts as a strategic think tank with the objective of helping shape thetransport policy agenda on a global level and ensuring that it contributes to economic growth,environmental protection, social inclusion and the preservation of human life and well-being. The
International Transport Forum organizes an annual summit of Ministers along with leading
representatives from industry, civil society and academia.
The International Transport Forum was created under a Declaration issued by the Councilof Ministers of the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) at its Ministerial
Session in May 2006 under the legal authority of the Protocol of the ECMT, signed in Brussels
on 17 October 1953, and legal instruments of the OECD.
The Members of the Forum are: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark,Estonia, Finland, France, FYROM, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova,
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and theUnited States.
The International Transport Forum’s Research Centre gathers statistics and conducts cooperative research programmes addressing all modes of transport. Its findings are widely
disseminated and support policymaking in Member countries as well as contributing to theannual summit.

Further information about the International Transport Forum is available atwww.internationaltransportforum.org

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 9
2. TRENDS IN TRANSPORT OVER THE NEXT 40 YEARSA MACROSCOPIC VIEW .................................................................................................... 92.1. Continued but uneven growth of transport demand ................................................... 10
2.2 Evolution of the modal distribution of transport services ............................................ 15
2.3 Transport demand, fuel economy, and CO2-emissions .............................................. 16
3. PEAK CAR TRAVEL IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES? ...................................................... 24
4. TRADE AND FREIGHT TRANSPORT BY SEA AND AIR ................................................ 30
ANNEX: THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM’S GLOBAL TRADE AND
TRANSPORT DATABASE – SHORT DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY TABLES ........... 39© OECD/ITF 20113

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The long term evolution of global transport demand

Mobility to triple
globally.

The world’s population reached 6 billion in 2000 and will be around9 billion in 2050. Coupled with rising incomes this will lead global
mobility to expand strongly through 2050. If infrastructure and energy
prices allow, there will be around 3 to 4 times as much global passenger
mobility (passenger-kilometres travelled) as in 2000 and 2.5 to 3.5 asmuch freight activity, measured in ton-kilometres.

Rapid increase
outside the OECD
region.

Growth will be much stronger outside the OECD region than within it.
OECD passenger-kms are expected to grow around 30 to 40% between
2000 and 2050 and ton-km by 60 to 90%. Outside the OECD region,
passenger-kms could increase by a factor of 5 to 6.5, and ton-kms by afactor of 4 to 5. The high end of these ranges would be reached only if
mobility aspirations in emerging economies mimic those of advanced
economies and if prices and policies accommodate these aspirations.
Full realisation of such a development path may be unlikely but thisillustrates the significant upside risk associated with the lower, baseline
projection. Accounting for population growth, passenger mobility percapita outside the OECD grows three fold in our baseline scenario or
four-fold in the high scenario.
Consequently, like economic mass, the centre of gravity for mobility will
shift to non-OECD economies. In 2000, half of all passenger-kms were
driven in OECD countries. According to our scenarios this declines toaround a fifth in 2050. For ton-kms, the OECD share declines from a half
to around a third.

Car ownershiplevels critical.

Projections this far ahead are fraught with uncertainty. For example, it isunclear to what levels car ownership per capita will rise in emerging
economies. Very high levels, characteristic of the USA, are unlikely;
somewhere between European and Japanese levels is conceivable. The
range between these reference points is large but in either case theshare of car-trips in total passenger mobility seems set to increasestrongly, e.g. from less than 10% at present in China to more than 50%
in 2050.

Peak car travel in advanced economies?
Peaking car travelis a risky
assumption.

© OECD/ITF 2011

Travel by passenger vehicles has not grown much recently in a numberof the highest income economies, or has even declined. The peak car
travel hypothesis holds that this is because of a saturation effect, wheremore income no longer translates into more car travel when incomes arevery high.
5Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

But peak car travel is just one among several potential explanations forthe observed levelling off of car travel, so projections of future car travel
demand should not take peaking for granted.
Other potential explanations include increases of fuel prices anduncertainty over future disposable income. Moreover, rising inequality inthe distribution of incomes has meant that large parts of the population
benefitted little from average growth in income, and this may explain partof the stagnation in travel by car in some countries. For the future,demographics (population size and age structure) as a driver for car
travel demand will be increasingly important.
CO2 Emissions
Doubling fueleconomy tostabilise emissions.

CO2 emissions will rise less strongly than mobility because of improving
fuel economy. By 2050 global emissions from vehicle use might be 2.5 to
3 times as large as they were in 2000.
For emissions from cars and light trucks to remain at the 2010 level,
average fleet fuel economy would need to improve quickly and strongly,
from around 8 l/100km in 2008 to 5 l/100km in 2030 and less than
4 l/100km in 2050.

Fuel economy and fuel tax revenues
Falling fuel tax
revenues.

Expected improvements in fuel economy will lead to reduced
consumption of gasoline in, for example, the USA and OECD Europe(Diesel consumption would first increase and then decline in OECD
Europe).
If fuel tax levels do not change, this means a strong reduction inrevenues from the taxation of transport fuels. This prompts a need forrevising transport tax structures, perhaps in the direction of distancebased charges.
To illustrate the point, a fuel economy improvement that reduces the CO2
emissions of an average diesel car in France from 160g/km to 130g/km
generates enough savings on fuel expenditures for most drivers to makethe investment in more efficient technology worthwhile. But the loss oftax revenue would result in a bad deal for society if the shortfall were to
be made up by additional labour taxes, despite the benefits of lower CO2
emissions.

More km-based
charges.

6

One way to avoid this tax cost is to turn to kilometre-based taxes. Thesecan be designed so that both drivers and taxpayers benefit from
improvement in fuel economy, at least if the kilometre-charging system is
not too expensive to run.

© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

The market for electric vehicles
Limits to subsidies.

To decarbonise transport radically a large proportion of the road vehicle
fleet would have to use alternative energy carriers including electricity,probably with an accompanying change in models of vehicle ownershipand patterns of vehicle use. Part of the strategy for opening up the
possibilities for change is to subsidise the purchase of general purpose
passenger cars by the public. Vehicle manufacturers need to count onsuch subsidy programmes being in place long enough to support
investment in electric technologies.
In the longer term, however, vehicles will have to become competitive
without subsidy, as the cost to public budgets would be excessive if
subsidised electric vehicles were to become a large part of overall car
sales.
At the same time, prices for some of the electric vehicles now on themarket suggest that they are financially advantageous in some highmileage markets, such as delivery vans and taxis, even without
subsidies. Policies to promote uptake through non-financial incentives
and partnerships might make more sense than subsidies in thesemarkets.

The global economy, trade, and freight transport by sea and air
Recoverycharacterised bydownside risks.

The 2008 crisis led to a major disruption of global trade flows. But global
trade has now surpassed pre-crisis volumes and is expected (by the
WTO for example) to return quickly to growth at the pre-crisis rhythm.
The International Transport Forum accepts this as a reasonable
expectation but points to downside risks that are far bigger than upside
potential:

Trade figures
underline the risks.

© OECD/ITF 2011•

The emerging economies are the driver of global economic expansion
post-crisis. But their growth model, notably in China, relies heavily on
exports and on domestic investment. Given weakening of export
demand and reduced availability of near-term investment
opportunities, the Chinese economy may increasingly need to turn toother sources of growth, e.g. domestic household demand.

•

The upward pressure on energy prices and uncertainties related togeo-political events could put a brake on growth.

Data on external trade volumes for the EU and the USA reflect the shift
in global economic mass to emerging economies through thecomposition of trade flows. The data reveal a reduction of trade deficits
between the USA and China, between the USA and the EU and between
Europe and China. But these reductions seem to be more a simple resultof the 2008 shock than a fundamental change or a tendency to“rebalancing” trade. In that sense the trade figures contribute to our viewthat the current recovery is characterised mainly by downside risk.

7

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

1. INTRODUCTION

The International Transport Forum’s Transport Outlook 2011 reviews recent developmentsin the transport sector and discusses future scenarios. It updates the work underlying earlier
editions (2008 through 2010) and extends it in several directions. It is a “focused-Outlook”,
meaning that it does not provide a comprehensive treatment of the transport sector but instead
discusses selected topics. The topics are:
• The development of global transport demand in the very long run – a macroscopic
view (Section 2.1).
• The modal distribution of transport demand (Section 2.2).
• The interaction between transport demand, CO2-emissions, and transport tax
revenues (Section 2.3).
• Peak car travel in advanced economies: permanent or transitory phenomenon?
(Section 3).
• International sea and air freight transport flows: pre- and post-crisis trends (Section 4).

2. TRENDS IN TRANSPORT OVER THE NEXT 40 YEARS – A MACROSCOPIC VIEW

This section presents very long run scenarios for the development of global transportvolumes by region. The world’s population reached 6 billion in 2000 and will be around 9 billion
in 2050. Coupled with rising incomes this will lead global mobility to expand strongly through2050. If infrastructure and energy prices allow, there will be around 3 to 4 times as much global
passenger mobility (passenger-kilometres travelled) as in 2000 and 2.5 to 3.5 as much freightactivity, measured in ton-kilometres.
Our discussion of scenarios focuses on two issues: the evolution of demand by mode andby region (Section 2.1) and the evolution of energy intensity and greenhouse gas emissions(Section 2.2). Our focus is as much on the discussion of possible futures for mobility as on
issues related to energy use.
As in earlier editions of the Outlook, the scenarios are based on the MoMo-model
developed at the International Energy Agency (IEA). The new scenarios are based on the 2011
version of the model whereas earlier editions used the 2008 version. The new model version isbased on broader and more recent data and various model features have been refined. The
projections are based on the latest IEA mid-term and long-term scenarios from the Energy
Technology and World Energy Outlook scenarios.

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Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

2.1.

Continued but uneven growth of transport demand

Figures 1 and 2 plot the expected evolution of global passenger (all modes) and surface
freight activity, in the form of an index. The figures provide a range (blue area), of which thelower end corresponds to the transport base case projection underlying the IEA World Energy
Outlook of 2008, and the upper end incorporates less conservative assumptions regarding thetransport intensity of GDP (see below). The upper and lower scenarios are not intended asformal measures of the uncertainty regarding projections (if they were, they should be much
farther apart). Instead, they illustrate how relatively small changes in underlying assumptions
lead to sizeable differences between scenarios if the period under consideration is longenough. Given that the differences in underlying assumptions reflect different interpretations ofrecent evidence (see the discussion of peak travel below), it is clear that the projections are to
be considered as scenarios that help grasp the long run impact of slow movements in mobility
patterns, and not as predictions of what future is most likely.
Specifically, the lower and upper scenarios differ in assumptions regarding the evolution ofprivate passenger vehicle transport and air passenger transport. For air passenger transport,
the lower end is similar to the IEA World Energy Outlook of 2008. In this scenario, growth is inline with the medium term forecast from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) up to
2015. After 2015, growth slows down, but more so in the OECD than in emerging markets. For
the high growth scenario, growth is the same as in the low growth case up to 2015, in line with
the IATA medium term forecast. After 2015 growth remains at the same level as before in theOECD but is faster in non-OECD emerging markets. Growth accelerates in the longer future for
emerging markets and part of the assumption is further deregulations and more widespread
adoption of open sky agreements. Under this projection traffic grows considerably faster than in
the low growth scenario but remains under the expectations of airplane constructors’ outlooks.
For passenger transport by car and light truck, the lower scenario corresponds to asituation where the per-capita demand for car transport levels off in advanced economies andeven declines in some of them: car ownership per capita reaches saturation levels and usage
per vehicle is constant or declines lightly as there are more cars per household. Once car use
levels off on a per capita basis, changes in aggregate travel demand are driven bydemographics. In addition, there are three distinct orders of magnitude at which car ownershipper capita saturates. They can loosely be described as a North-American, a European, and aJapanese pattern, with the saturation level of ownership highest in North-America and lowest inJapan. The main difference between the upper and lower end of the area depicted in Figure 1
is that ownership saturation levels in emerging economies, including Brazil and China, aresimilar to European levels for the upper end and to Japanese levels for the lower end, reflecting
uncertainty on what pattern these countries will converge to in the coming decades. Anotherfactor, of lesser importance, is the assumption of limited (1% per year or less) continued growthof usage levels in advanced economies in the high scenario versus zero growth in average use
for the low scenario.

10© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 1. Index of global passenger transport activity, 2000 - 2050,
index of pkm (2000 = 100)

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figure 2. Index of global freight transport activity, 2000 - 2050,
index of tkm (2000 = 100)

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

© OECD/ITF 201111

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

For surface freight transport activity (tkm), the low scenario assumes a gradual decline of
the freight intensity of GDP in all regions, while the high scenarios assumes that freight
intensity stays at the 2005 level in all regions through 2050. A declining freight intensity of GDP
could be the consequence of “dematerialisation” of growth, i.e. a proportionally faster increasein those components of GDP that are not particularly freight-intensive, including many services
and IT applications. A constant or increasing freight-intensity might be the consequence ofcontinued globalisation, characterised by geographical fragmentation of supply chains.
Moreover, countries at lower levels of economic development may be embarking upon arelatively freight-intensive growth path, so that in those regions the assumption of declining
intensity is less straightforward than for regions where GDP is already very high.
The picture emerging from Figures 1 and 2 reinforces that of earlier editions of the outlook.
On the global level, we expect high and roughly constant growth rates that lead to a tripling or
quadrupling of global passenger transport volumes by 2050 compared to 2000, while surface
freight activity grows by a factor of 2.6 to 3.5 over the same period. Figures 3 and 4 highlight a
direct consequence of the basic assumptions regarding the relation between economic
development levels as measured by GDP and the development of passenger and freighttransport volumes, namely that the regional distribution of this overall growth is highly uneven.
Specifically, there will be limited growth in OECD economies and very strong growth outside of
the OECD, notably in the emerging economies.
The strong demand increase in the high end scenario is driven to a large extent bycontinued fast growth of passenger mobility in emerging economies, as can be seen from theincrease in the growth rate as of 2035 in Figures 1 and 4. This is most usefully interpreted as
an indication of “where demand would like to go”, in the sense that it is assumed that the carownership and usage patterns in emerging economies emulate those of European economies
in the past. Whether this is a realistic assumption is uncertain, and whether such aspirations
could materialise even if they existed is not straightforward either. For example, fasturbanisation might slow down the growth rate of private vehicle ownership and slow growth in
the use of vehicles even more. Rising energy prices and less accommodating policies thanhave been observed in Europe in the past may also put a check on growth in car use.
Nevertheless, the high growth scenario is not impossible and even in lower growth cases theincrease in non-OECD mobility is strong.
Figure 5 illustrates the consequence for the distribution of global transport flows, with astrong shift of “mobility-mass” to non-OECD countries (for a scenario halfway between the low
and high scenarios). It deserves emphasis that “limited growth” of mobility in the OECD does
not mean “zero growth”, as even in the low scenario passenger mobility in 2050 is expected tobe some 30% higher than it was in 2000, and freight mobility at the lower end is expected to
grow by more than 50% over the same period. While this is the cumulative result of rather
modest annual growth figures, it indicates that the strain on networks as a whole is likely to rise,so that meeting demand while maintaining reasonable service standards will requireconsiderable financial and managerial effort.

12© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 3. Index of OECD passenger and surface freight activity, 2000 - 2050,
index of pkm and tkm (2000 = 100)

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figure 4. Index of non-OECD passenger and surface freight activity, 2000 - 2050,
index of pkm and tkm (2000 = 100)

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

© OECD/ITF 201113

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 5. Distribution of passenger and surface freight mobility in 2000 and 2050:
share of OECD and non-OECD countries (halfway case between
high and low scenarios shown in Figures 1 through 4)
Shares of passenger mobility (pkm),
2000

Shares of passenger mobility (pkm),
2050
OECD
22%

Non‐OECD
46%

OECD
54%

Shares of freight mobility (tkm),
2000

Non‐OECD
78%

Shares of freight mobility (tkm),
2050

OECD
31%
Non‐OECD
48%

OECD
52%

Non‐OECD
69%

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

While mobility growth in the OECD can be expected to be slow and gradual, and evennegative in some countries, Figure 4 shows that it could be very fast outside of the OECD.
Freight volumes could increase by a factor of 4 to 5 compared to 2000 levels, while passenger
mobility could increase 5 to more than 6-fold over the same period. The higher range forpassenger mobility would be obtained if mobility patterns in emerging economies are more akinto those observed in Europe than those seen in Japan. The development of car ownership inlarge economies (e.g. China, Brazil, India) is of particular importance for the future
development of global mobility volumes. The overall picture for non-OECD economies
illustrates how mobility in these countries would change if the relation between economic andpopulation growth in emerging economies is roughly similar1 to patterns observed earlier inadvanced economies. Casual observation of developments and policies in emerging
economies suggest that the assumption of similarity is a reasonable one, as growing wealthtranslates into growing demand for high-quality transport services (including car ownership anduse) and governments by and large adopt an accommodating stance towards the developmentof the demand for personal mobility (as has been true for OECD economies in the past, by andlarge). This means that if growing transport demand is both closely related to enabling
economic growth and to its enjoyment then the prospects for achieving major downwardchanges in trends are slim. Consequently the negative impacts of mobility related to energy use
will have to be managed to a large extent by changing energy use patterns or by mitigating
1. Roughly similar but not necessarily identical. The shift of mobility mass to non-OECD economies willtake place even if economic development in the emerging economies is considerably less transportintensive than in the OECD, as is assumed in the lower end of the ranges shown in Figures 1
through 4.
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Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

adverse consequences. The social costs of other negative impacts, including congestion andair pollution, are as important as greenhouse gas emissions and energy security concerns andthese problems need to be addressed where they emerge, rather than attempting to curb
mobility overall.2
2.2

Evolution of the modal distribution of transport services

Section 2.1 provided an overview of prospects for the future development of mobility,
measured in ton-kilometres for freight and passenger-kilometres for passenger transport. This
Section considers the modal breakdown of that overall evolution, examining the halfway casebetween the low and high scenarios considered before.
Figure 6. Global modal split, 2000 and 2050,
halfway case between high and low scenarios (%)
Passenger transport

Surface FreightSource: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figure 6 summarizes the results for world mobility, and shows that the share of private
passenger vehicles (cars and light trucks) is expected to rise strongly. Air travel for passengers
is the fastest growing segment in absolute terms, but private passenger vehicles clearly remain
the dominant mode. The strongest relative decline is expected for buses (including minibuses),
not least because they are substituted by cars as incomes increase. Tables 1 and 2 provide
regional details for 2005, 2030 and 2050. As can be seen in Table 1, the broad pattern inOECD economies is one of a shift from cars and light trucks towards air travel (the sum ofthese modes is roughly constant within OECD sub-regions), whereas outside the OECD therise of the car is expected to continue throughout the model horizon. The share of air travel
outside of the OECD is not expected to change strongly, but this of course implies a strong
increase in travel volumes. For freight transport, table 3 reveals an expectation of increasing
truck use across the globe (recalling that the freight scenarios are limited to surface modes). As
indicated before, the results in Figure 6 are for an intermediate case, so dependent on the high
2. See e.g. Small and Van Dender, Long run trends in transport demand, fuel price elasticities andimplications of the oil outlook for transport policy, ITF Discussion Paper 2007-16, Paris, 2007.
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Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

scenario in which it is assumed demand for car ownership and use in emerging economies
aspires to and reaches European levels. If that is thought unlikely, then the high scenario andthe intermediate scenario each move closer to the low scenario, where the shift in modal
shares is still large but somewhat more muted.
Table 1. Passenger modal split by region, 2005 – 2030 – 2050,
halfway case between high and low scenarios
2005 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

Car+LT
81
63
56
7
41
22

Air
14
16
13
9
12
6

Rail
1
5
9
15
1
9

Buses
4
13
16
43
43
55

Other
0
3
7
26
4
9

Total
100
100
100
100
100
100

2030 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

72
55
50
53
57
46

24
26
21
12
14
8

1
5
10
9
0
6

3
11
14
14
25
31

0
3
5
12
4
8

100
100
100
100
100
100

2050 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

68
50
44
55
70
64

28
30
28
14
12
7

1
6
11
10
0
4

3
11
13
11
14
18

0
2
4
10
3
6

100
100
100
100
100
100

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Table 2. Freight modal split by region, 2005 – 2030 – 2050,
halfway case between high and low scenarios
TrucksRail

2005 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

40
86
72
25
84
87

60
14
28
75
16
13

2030 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

48
89
77
46
89
91

52
11
23
54
11
9

2050 OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
Latin America
ROW

54
90
81
56
92
94

46
10
19
44
8
6

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

2.3

Transport demand, fuel economy, and CO2-emissions

The high and low scenarios discussed in the previous sections differ only in terms of thegrowth of private passenger vehicle volumes, air passenger traffic, and surface freight volumes.
Figure 7 shows the corresponding evolutions of CO2-emissions from vehicle use, under the16© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

assumption that current and expected fuel economy policies are implemented and that the fleet
is still dominated by internal combustion engines (gasoline and diesel). The remainder of the
LDV fleet is essentially comprised of gasoline/diesel hybrids (including plug-in hybrids). Electricvehicles make little penetration in the fleet by 2050 in this scenario. Fuel consumption of new
LDVs improves along current trends. Total emissions increase by a factor of 2.6 to 3, which isconsiderably slower than the growth of overall mobility, because of the fuel economy
improvements expected to take place over the modelling horizon. Table 3 shows the evolutionof the modal composition of emissions for the halfway case. As a result of the interaction
between the growth paths of the separate modes and the expected technological evolution, theshare of passenger light-duty vehicles (LDVs) rises over time and is around 50% by 2050.
Consequently, efforts to reduce the carbon-intensity of passenger vehicle use will have large
effects on overall CO2 emissions, at least if technological improvements permeate throughout
the global vehicle stock.
Figure 7. Global CO2 emissions from transport vehicle use, index (2000 = 100)

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Table 4. Modal composition of global CO2 emissions from transport vehicle use
Freight + Passenger rail
Buses
Air
Freight trucks
LDVs
2-3 wheelers
Water-borne
Total

2000
2.3
6.3
12.4
23.5
42.5
2.4
10.6
100

2030
1.9
4.3
13.8
23.3
45.2
2.2
9.2
100

2050
1.5
3.0
12.0
21.6
52.1
2.0
7.8
100

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figure 8 illustrates the global average on-road fuel intensity path for light-duty vehicles thatwould be sufficient to maintain light-duty vehicle emissions of CO2 approximately at their 2010
level, and how this compares with the baseline expectation of on-road fuel intensity. A strong
shift in the use of technological potential towards improved fuel economy, or a shift to lesscarbon-intensive forms of transport energy, or a combination of both, will be needed in the near
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Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

future to attain stabilization, and by 2050 fuel intensity on the fleet level will have to be only behalf as large as expected in the baseline scenario.
Figure 8. Average LDV on-road fuel-intensity, baseline and stabilization,
litres gasoline equivalent per 100km

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the consumption paths for gasoline and diesel associated withthe baseline and emission-stabilization scenarios for fuel economy and transport demand
depicted, for the USA and for OECD Europe. The evolution of gasoline and diesel consumption
is highlighted because they are the main fossil fuels used in transportation at present and forthe foreseeable future, and they are an important source of tax revenue in many countries. The
figures show that even in the baseline scenario the gasoline tax base erodes, because oflimited growth of travel demand and improvements in fuel economy. This trend is more
pronounced in the stabilization scenario, where in OECD Europe the fuel tax base in 2050
might be only 1/5 of its size in 2000. The diesel consumption paths show increases or more
limited declines.
The fuel consumption paths are very rough approximations, taking no account of relative
price changes that may occur as absolute and relative demand levels change, nor of potentialchanges in supply conditions and of the transport tax structure. Nevertheless, the scenarios
indicate that in at least some countries fuel consumption is likely to decline, possibly quite
strongly, and even more so when stringent carbon abatement policies are introduced in thetransport sector. While such reductions help reaching environmental objectives and reduce
costs of energy dependence, they also carry a cost in terms of foregone tax revenue. Box 1
illustrates how the tax revenue impact of fuel economy improvements affects the social costbenefit appraisal of such evolutions.

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Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 9. Index of light duty vehicle gasoline and diesel consumption,baseline and stabilization scenarios (2000 = 100): United States

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

Figure 10. Index of light duty vehicle gasoline and diesel consumption,baseline and stabilization scenarios (2000 = 100): OECD Europe

Source: International Transport Forum calculations using MoMo version 2011.

The impact of reduced fossil fuel consumption on fuel tax revenue is one aspect of the
fiscal impact of greenhouse gas mitigation policies in transport. Another issue concerns thesubsidies that may, or may not, be needed for the introduction of alternative technologies.
Many countries, for example, award subsidies for consumers purchasing electric vehicles.
Box 2 illustrates the effect of such subsidies on the private and social viability of electricvehicles, and suggests that the market potential of electric vehicles may be large enough in© OECD/ITF 201119

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion Peoplesome high mileage markets, such as delivery vans and taxis, to be attractive to buyers even
without subsidies. Policies to promote uptake through non-financial incentives and partnerships
might make more sense than subsidies in these markets. In the long term, electric vehicles will
have to become competitive without subsidy, as the cost to public budgets would be excessive
if subsidised electric vehicles were to become a large part of overall car sales.
With carbon-intensive electricity production the appeal of electric vehicles is reduced
strongly (although the European CO2 emissions permit trading system caps CO2 emissions
from power production in Europe) underlining the central importance of low carbon electricity
production to climate change polices, including in the transport sector.

Box 1. Fuel economy and tax revenues – the fiscal cost of reducing fuel consumption
Better fuel economy means lower fuel consumption for the same amount of driving. For
drivers this is beneficial as long as the higher vehicle costs for improved fuel economy do not
outweigh the savings on fuel expenditures. There is an environmental benefit in the form oflower greenhouse gas emissions and for net oil importing countries the reduction in oil
dependence can bring benefits – these are indeed the main impetus behind policy initiatives toboost the fuel economy of new vehicles. There are benefits in terms of other pollutant emissions
but these will be limited because, for light duty vehicles, these emissions are regulated on a perkilometre basis. At constant fuel taxes, lower fuel consumption means lower revenues fromtaxation. This represents a social cost in the sense (a) that tax revenues have a social value and(b) replacing fuel tax revenues by revenues from other taxes may very well increase theeconomic cost (i.e. the efficiency loss) of raising the same amount of revenue.
How do these various factors affect the appeal of policies to improve fuel economy? And is
it a good idea to try to replace fuel taxes, or more broadly transport energy taxes, by taxes ondriving? These questions are addressed by Crist and Van Dender3 in a paper for a 2010
seminar organised by the International Transport Forum with the Korean Transport Institute, of
which some key insights are summarized here. The exercise considers an improvement in fueleconomy from 160g/km to 130g/km, in line with European Union regulation, and investigates
impacts without accounting for the environmental benefit of reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
The impacts on drivers and taxpayers are as follows (in present values):•••

drivers’ fuel expenditures decline by € 450 to € 1 800, the precise sum depending on
how far into the future they look (3 to 15 years);
fuel tax revenues decline by € 1 100 and if the increased efficiency costs ofcompensating lost revenue through taxes with larger efficiency costs (e.g. labour taxes)
is accounted for, the social cost of lost tax revenue rises to € 1 400 per driver (over15 years);
adding these two components, the fuel economy improvement can cost drivers andtaxpayers up to € 950 or generate benefits up to € 730.

If drivers were to respond to lower fuel costs per kilometre by driving a bit more (reboundeffect of 20%), then the maximal cost to drivers and taxpayers reduce € 690 and the maximal

3. Crist P. and K. Van Dender, What does improved fuel economy cost consumers and taxpayers?
Some illustrations, ITF Discussion Paper 2011-16.
20© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

benefit € 970 per driver (over 15 years).
The calculation has abstracted from the cost of the technology, which initially might be
between €1 000 and €2 500. With a cost of around €1 000, the gains for drivers in terms oflower fuel expenditures largely outweigh the technology cost if drivers look far enough into the
future. But when account is taken of the cost of lost fuel tax revenue, the project is no longer
worth it from a social perspective (still abstracting from the benefit of lower CO2-emissions).
Impact of improved fuel economy on fuel expenditures and tax revenues– range between higher and lower bounds

Thus far the illustration indicates that accounting for lost tax revenues and for the cost of
replacing them by other, more costly sources can have a major effect on the social appeal of a
project. But what if a tax on energy consumption in transport were replaced by a tax on transport
activity, i.e. on driving? Introducing a kilometre-tax that maintains transport tax revenues at justthe level obtained before the fuel economy improvement makes improved fuel economy
beneficial to both drivers and taxpayers under all scenarios under this model (before accounting
for technology costs and for reduced emissions). The increase in drivers’ benefits is of course
lower than without the kilometre-tax, but it remains positive, and the project is fiscally neutral bydesign. So, if introducing kilometre-taxes is not too expensive, it should be considered as an
option to replace the slowly eroding fuel tax base. Driving is less elastic than fuel consumption,
so the efficiency costs of taxing driving are likely lower than those of taxing fuel consumption. In
addition, kilometre-taxes are more flexible tools for addressing the main transport externalities,
notably congestion. The use of kilometre-taxes of course does not exclude fuel taxes that
promote the deployment of low carbon alternative fuels. Alternatively the climate change impactof these fuels could be covered via carbon cap and trade schemes.

Box 2. Prospects for electric vehicles.
Using publicly available data for the French market, we compare battery electric vehicles(BEVs) and internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) with similar characteristics so as toprovide an indication of how a typical BEV might compare to its ICE pair from private and social
points of view. Sales prices for several BEVs were announced in 2011 for France. The models
examined here are a four-door sedan, a 5-door compact and a 2-seat van. They will be sold witha monthly battery lease option costing €72-€79 per month. In all cases, the price of the BEV© OECD/ITF 201121

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

excluding batteries is more than the ICE alternative, i.e. diesel models based on the samechassis and offering broadly similar amenity. France, like many other countries, offers apurchase subsidy for BEVs (€5000) which narrows the gap for the sedan and the compact car
and surpasses it for the van, i.e. with the purchase subsidy the electric van is less expensive
than the diesel van.
Assuming typical usage levels for each model type (35 km/day and 365 days per year for the
sedan, 30 km/day and 365 days per year for the compact and 90 km/day and 260 days per year
for the van), we calculate the extra cost of the BEV compared to the ICE over the lifetime of thevehicle from consumer and societal perspective. For consumers, we also provide an estimate of
the added cost of a BEV over the first three years of ownership, arguably in line with consumer
calculations when purchasing a new vehicle. The costs calculated for the consumer include taxes
and subsidies and exclude CO2 and local pollution costs. The costs calculated for society
exclude taxes (which from this point of view are simply a transfer), include the subsidy andinclude CO2 and local pollution costs.
Comparison of three electric and internal combustion engine vehicle pairs.
CO2
CO2
Purchase
Electric
Total Additional Additional Additional
4-doorCO2
cost (€)
Battery Electricity Electricity vehicle intensity of lifetime
mitigation
cost tocost tocost toSedanelectricity useage consumer consumer
with
cost
cost
taxes
subsidycostsociety reduction
35km/day subsidy (€79/month)(g/kWh)
(€)
(€)
(€)
(€/t)
(3 yrs)*(veh. life) (Tonnes)
cost (€) (veh. life)
Electric
22g CO2/km

Diesel117g CO2/km

21300

10540

2990

1115

5000

90

Purchasecost (€)

Pre-tax
cost ofdiesel (€)

Fuel
taxes
(€)

Additional
repaircost (€)

Local
pollution
costs (€)

20500

5910

4091

778

634

35945

4666

2064

12008

17.3

693

31280

CO2
CO2
Purchase
Electric
Total Additional Additional Additional
5-doorCO2
cost (€)
Battery Electricity Electricity vehicle intensity of lifetime
mitigation
cost tocost tocost toCompact
electricity useage consumer consumer
with
cost
cost
taxes
subsidycostsociety reduction
30km/day subsidy (€72/month)(g/kWh)(€)(€)(€)
cost (€) (veh. life)(€/t)(3 yrs)*(veh. life) (Tonnes)
Electric
19g CO2/km

Diesel104g CO2/km

16417

9606

2278

850

5000

90

Purchasecost (€)

Pre-tax
cost ofdiesel (€)

Fuel
taxes
(€)

Additional
repaircost (€)

Local
pollution
costs (€)

15800

4503

3117

778

543

29151

4952

1927

11677

13.2

885

24199

CO2
CO2
Electric
Total Additional Additional Additional
Compact PurchaseCO2
cost (€)
Battery Electricity Electricity vehicle intensity of lifetime
cost tocost tocost tomitigationVanelectricity useage consumer consumer
with
cost
cost
taxes
subsidysociety reduction
cost
90km/day subsidy (€72/month)(g/kWh)(€)(€)(€)(3 yrs)*(veh. life) (Tonnes)(€/t)
cost (€) (veh. life)
Electric
25g CO2/km

Diesel138g CO2/km

16200

9606

6450

2406

5000

90

Purchasecost (€)

Pre-tax
cost ofdiesel (€)

Fuel
taxes
(€)

Additional
repaircost (€)

Local
pollution
costs (€)

16400

12750

8827

778

1161

34662

-4093

-525

6167

37.4

165

38755

* Excluding consideration of resale value.
Source: ITF analysis based on ITF and IEA data.

As can be seen in the table, under baseline assumptions including low carbon electricity
typical of France, the BEV configurations examined here emit 13 to 40 tonnes less CO2 than their
ICE counterparts over their lifetime. However, they cost society €5 000 to €12 000. This amounts
to a marginal abatement cost of approximately €150 to €850 per tonne of CO2, which is at the22© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion Peoplehigh end of the costs of measures to reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.
Results are more nuanced for consumers. A consumer will pay between €4 500 and €5 000
more for a BEV over the vehicle lifetime in the case of a sedan or a compact car. But because ofhigher mileage (and thus avoided diesel costs), a BEV van will cost the user nearly €4 000 lessthan an equivalent ICE over the lifetime of the vehicle, or €700 less over the three-year consumer
perspective period. Under these conditions, one might expect that a market already exists for
BEV vans if potential buyers have confidence in the advertised driving ranges and dealer support
for these vehicles. A niche market also likely exists for “early adopters” of green technology who
are willing to pay more for a BEV sedan or compact car with less range than a comparable ICE.
Sensitivity tests indicate that these results are robust to most plausible changes in parametervalues, including strong decreases in battery costs. Two parameters stand out however; thecarbon intensity of electricity production and the daily travel distance.
Most regions do not have as much low-carbon base-load or marginal electricity generation
capacity as France. Taking a value of 300g CO2/kWh, more consistent with natural gas plants,
and a more extreme value of 850 g CO2/kWh, typical of an EU coal plant, we find the following
results:

Emissionsfrom electricity(g CO2/kWh)

Tailpipe
emissions(g CO2/km)

CO2emissionsavoided[or added]

Cost
per ton CO2
avoided[or added]

Subsidy
per ton CO2
avoided[or added]

ICE Sedan

-

117

-

-

-

BEV Sedan

300

68

10 t

€ 1221

€ 500

850

191

[11 t][€ 1065][€ 455]What stands out is not only that high carbon electricity switches the CO2 balance of thecomparison in favour of the ICE but that under our assumptions society actually pays for
additional CO2 emissions. In many regions considering the deployment of BEVs coal-based
electricity generation is the norm. The rationale for subsidising or otherwise promoting EVs inthese instances is not for direct CO2 mitigation but developing a market for electric vehicles in
anticipation of more low-carbon electricity production. In Europe, where there is a CO2 emissions
permit trading system, any excess emissions from generating electricity for cars will also be
offset by reductions in emissions from other plants subject to emissions trading.
As seen in the case of the BEV van, increasing annual mileage has a significant effect onoverall costs. We can simulate using the BEV sedan as a taxi, travelling 150 kilometres a day on
average for 365 days per year. For current batteries this would require a battery switching
service, the cost of which has not been accounted for here. Otherwise the additional lifetime
costs of the BEV from consumer and societal perspectives are -€15 000 and -€713, respectively– i.e. the BEV saves money in comparison to the ICE for both the owner of the taxi and society
as a whole. In this instance, there is still a case for BEV use even without a subsidy.
These findings suggest that costs for BEVs remain high for consumers and even more so forsociety under typical use scenarios. It also suggests that in those cases where BEVs do alreadycompare favourably to ICEs, non financial incentives and partnerships might make more sensethan subsidies.

© OECD/ITF 201123

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

3. PEAK CAR TRAVEL IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES?

As mentioned in Section 2, the car travel demand scenarios used in the projections
assume that the per capita demand for car travel increases with income, but when incomes arevery high this effect becomes smaller and in the limit it reduces to zero. If car travel demanddoes not increase with income any longer, then per capita demand can be expected to remain
more or less constant if the economy continues to grow and other factors remain unchanged.
Aggregate car travel demand then mainly is a function of changes in the size and structure of
the population. The macroscopic approach used in Section 2 is highly stylized and simplified. In
this Section, we take a brief look at evidence and debates on the changing relation between
incomes and car travel demand.
Figure 11 shows how car and light truck activity (passenger-kilometre) has evolved from1990 through 2009 in a number of advanced economies. As can be seen, growth rates decline
over time and reduce to zero or even negative values in some cases and years. Levelling-off
precedes the crisis as well as the most recent oil price spikes. Since aggregate incomes mostly
increase over time, the time series suggests a weakening response of car and light truck travel
demand to increasing incomes.
Figure 11. Passenger-kilometres by private car and light trucks, 1970 – 2009,index (1990 = 100)
160

150
Germany

140
Australia

130
France120

UnitedKingdom
UnitedStates

110

Japan

100

90

Oil price shockand start ofcrisis80
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: International Transport Forum statistics.

24© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Millard-Ball and Schipper4 present evidence for eight advanced economies that the rate at
which motorized travel (pkm by all motorized modes) increases with per capita GDP declines
over time and has levelled off in the years leading up to the crisis of 2008. For most countries
this levelling off occurs at a per capita GDP between $25,000 and $30,000 (prices of 2000 at
PPP); for the USA the turning point is at $37,000. The picture for per capita car and light truckuse (vkm) is similar, except that it shows declines of car and light truck use in the last years
before the crisis. Car ownership exhibits a similar pattern. These observed patterns can be theresult of a range of explanatory factors including saturation, higher fuel prices, declining rates oftransport infrastructure expansion, ageing, urbanization, macroeconomic shocks, income
inequality, the advent of the online economy, etc. Millard-Ball and Schipper are careful to pointout that the evidence does not allow them to draw definitive conclusions but nevertheless theysee saturation as a plausible and important factor. It also bears reminding that international air
travel is excluded from the analysis, even though air travel is growing fast and is no longer
insignificant on a per capita basis.
Saturation of car travel is defined here as a situation in which additional car travel does not
generate additional benefits for users and therefore travel will no longer increase even if higher
time and money budgets allow it. The concept makes sense, but whether the observed patterns
are (mainly) the result of saturation is far less clear. The issue is of obvious importance for
future projections, as even small deviations from the saturation hypothesis have large impacts
on aggregate demand patterns in the long run (see Section 2). For example, the UK
Department for Transport expects a 30% increase in car traffic between 2010 and 2030.5 The
increase is driven to a large extent by population growth (+16% in the same period) but otherfactors, including higher incomes and lower real costs of driving, matter as well and this means
there is no saturation but just declining responsiveness of travel demand to rising incomes. As
another example, the Dutch mid-term projections6 expect that car mobility will grow faster thanGDP between 2011 and 2015 (whereas it had grown more slowly than GDP between 2006 and2010), if assumptions regarding fuel prices and network management hold true. Furthermore, it
is emphasized that small changes in volumes can have large consequences, notably in termsof congestion. The limited reduction in travel (about 1%) because of the economic crisis in 2009
reduced congestion on the main network by about 10%. The limited increase in travel expected
for the medium term can have equally disproportional effects on congestion levels.
The discussion of peak travel on a per capita basis often takes place at the aggregate or
average driver level. It is useful of course to consider more microscopic evidence, at thehousehold level, as that is where behavioural changes are most accurately observed. Figure 12
shows the evolution over time (1970 through 2009) of an average household’s spending ontransport, for the USA. Figure 13 shows similar information for France, on the basis of total
household spending. In the USA, household vehicle-kilometres travelled decline as of 2004.
Total spending on transport falls in 2007-8, and is much more pronounced for spending on
vehicles than for usage-related expenditures. This is consistent with the aggregate pattern ofreduced spending on durables when consumer confidence falls and expectations are revised
downward.

4. Millard-Ball A. and L. Schipper, Are we reaching peak travel? Trends in passenger transport in eightindustrialized countries, Transport Reviews, 1-22, 2010.
5. Transport Statistics Great Britain, DfT, National Travel Survey, and the National Transport Model.
6. KiM, Verkenning mobiliteit en bereikbaarheid 2011–2015, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat,
October 2010.
© OECD/ITF 201125

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 12. Household spending on transport (at constant prices; right axis) and car
travel (left axis) in the United States 1970-2008

Source: International Transport Forum calculations on US National Household Travel Survey, available at http://nhts.ornl.gov

Figure 13. Household spending on transport (at constant prices; left axis) and pass-km(right axis) in France 1970-2009

Source: Pass-km from International Transport Forum; Spending from OECD Annual National Accounts.

The pattern for vehicle trips is flat since the mid 1990s whereas vehicle miles travelled first
kept rising for a constant number of trips (so average distances increased) and only fell in themost recent period, perhaps because discretionary trips were made shorter in response to26© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

higher fuel prices and/or reduced incomes or income expectations. The pattern for France issimilar overall, except that spending on vehicles, total transport spending, and passengerkilometre do not exhibit the same precipitous drop as in the USA in the most recent years
recorded. The average pattern is thus equally suggestive of saturation as the aggregate data
discussed before. It is also equally inconclusive, in the sense that it is fairly safe to say that therate at which car transport demand and transport expenditures increase with income is on the
decline in the richest countries, but not at all obvious that continued income growth will nolonger lead to more car transport.
Figures 14 and 15 use travel survey information for the US to shed further light on theinteraction between household income and vehicle use. Figure 14 plots vehicle use againsthousehold income, for vehicle surveys from 1995, 2001 and 2009. The vehicle use pattern issimilar in the three survey years, and shows a gradual decline and levelling off of vehicle usewith income. On the one hand, this can be taken to suggest that the aggregate patternobserved in the previous figures is not time specific, so not driven by other factors changing atthat time, but that the pattern truly reflects levelling off because of increased average andaggregate income levels. On the other hand, it suggests that as income levels grow at thelower end of the income distribution, this will still translate into increased travel for thesehouseholds and therefore in the aggregate, as these households clearly have not yet reached
the saturation point. These two competing interpretations are potentially consistent: if average
income growth is distributed very unevenly, with high growth at the high end and limited, zeroor negative growth at the low end (a pattern for which there is some evidence7, and one which
is suggested by the increasing share of rich households’ in total travel that is apparent from
Figure 15), then average income growth does not lead to more travel as the growth accrues
only or mainly to those income classes that have already reached the saturation point. But
then, of course, future growth in car use is contingent on how the proceeds of overall economic
growth are distributed. This highlights that aggregate trends may have little direct bearing on
specific effects and therefore do not necessarily give precise guidance on future transport
policy, including the appeal of transport infrastructure investment and management.
Income is just one of many determinants of the amount of driving. Age is another and thechanging age structure of the population expected for the next decades (an increase in theshare of the elderly in many countries), can be expected to translate into changes in theaggregate amount of driving. Specifically, as Figure 16 shows, driving falls as of age 50,
declining rapidly and continuously thereafter. All else being equal, an older population of thesame size means less driving, a tendency reinforced by an expected decline in the total
population in some countries. But not all is equal, as Figure 16 shows: the reduction in drivingwith age is observed in all three survey years, but the reduction is smaller in more recent
surveys. In other words, the age effect becomes smaller as more recent cohorts are
considered. This trend will weaken the downward pressure of ageing on the demand for driving,
without eliminating it. On the other hand, drivers up to the age of 30 travelled markedly less in2009 than in the other survey years. It is as yet unclear whether this is because of changing
circumstances or changing preferences, but in the latter case the impact on total future driving
may be important.

7. See, for example: Growing income inequality in OECD countries: what drives it and how can policy
tackle it?, OECD Forum on tackling inequality, Paris, May 2, 2011; Transport for Society, ITF
Secretariat Background Paper for the 2011 Summit; Collet R., E. Boucq, J-L. Madre, L. Hivert, Long
term automobile ownership and mileage trends by income class in France, 1975-2008, paper
presented at the 12th WCTR, Lisbon, 2010.
© OECD/ITF 201127

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 14. Average annual vehicle miles per driver by total household income

Source: International Transport Forum calculations on US National Household Travel Survey, available at http://nhts.ornl.gov

Figure 15. Total annual vehicle miles by household income, USA, 1995, 2001, 2009

Source: International Transport Forum calculations on US National Household Travel Survey, available at http://nhts.ornl.gov

28© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 16. Annual vehicle miles per driver by age, USA, 1995, 2001, 2009

Source: International Transport Forum calculations on US National Household Travel Survey, available at http://nhts.ornl.gov

To summarize, the household and driver-level evidence confirms there are reasons to
expect a continued decline in the extent to which higher incomes mean more car travel. At thesame time, it is clear that income growth for lower incomes groups in both high income anddeveloping countries can lead to a further increase of overall car and total travel demand.
Population growth can be expected to translate into more travel growth as well. “Peak travel”
therefore is a plausible hypothesis but far from a certainty. It seems excessively risky to baseprojections in rich countries on an assumption of saturation alone.

© OECD/ITF 201129

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

4. TRADE AND FREIGHT TRANSPORT BY SEA AND AIR

The high growth episode of the world economy that came to an at least temporary end withthe economic crisis of 2008 was characterized by high trade-intensity, with trade growing
considerably faster than output (see Figure 17). Several emerging economies adopted exportlead growth strategies and key developed economies maintained policy frameworks thatallowed consumption and imports to grow quickly. Growth was high and trade developed fast
but in an unbalanced way, with some major economies running large deficits (e.g. the USA anda number of European countries) and others accumulating big surpluses (e.g. China andGermany). The shock of 2008 revealed that some aspects of the global growth dynamic were
unsustainable: some of the wealth in developed economies turned out to be virtual, and thereliance of export-economies on non-domestic demand induced some of them to turn to heavily
investment-oriented domestic spending models once export demand faltered, a strategy that
seems difficult to maintain in the longer run.
Figure 17. Index of world trade volumes and world real GDP, 1991 – 2008, 2000=100

Sources: The Netherlands Central Planning Bureau Trade Monitor; IMF

In the wake of the crisis, recovery is weak and uncertain. It is weak particularly inadvanced economies, where the desire to limit the expansion of public debt and/or concerns
about abilities to repay it lead to low confidence, slow growth and high unemployment. Growthis stronger in emerging economies, but the sustainability of export and investment-orientated
growth strategies is questionable, and transformation to growth driven by domestic household
demand is proving to be difficult. These sources of uncertainty are compounded by concerns
about rising energy costs as well as by geopolitical events and the consequences of natural
disasters.

30© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Despite these uncertainties, however, global trade volumes have now surpassed pre-crisis
levels according to the Trade Monitor published by The Netherlands Central Planning Bureau,
see Figure 18. The post-crisis growth of trade initially was very fast, suggesting a rebound after
the collapse in 2008 and 2009, moderating more recently and conceivably in line with the precrisis trend. The same picture emerges from WTO data and expectations for world export
growth, see Figure 19, which after a post-crisis rebound is expected to align with pre-crisis
trend rates, so that the long run effect of the crisis is a downward shift of the export curve.
While this reconnection with “business as usual” is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of
the uncertainties listed above the downside risks appear to outweigh the upside opportunities.
Figure 18. Index of world trade volumes, January 1991 – February 2011, 2000=100

Source: The Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, Trade Monitor.

Figure 19. Index of world export volumes, 1990 – 2001, 1990 = 100

Source: WTO Secretariat, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres11_e/pr628_e.htm© OECD/ITF 201131

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Trade-intensive growth means transport-intensive growth. The macroeconomic growthstrategies and firms’ efforts to benefit from the lowest factor-prices through geographic
dispersion in their supply chains – which together can be said to constitute globalization – leadto fast growth of transport volumes within and between the world’s major regions. In order tofollow the evolution of trade and in particular transport patterns in the short and medium run,the International Transport Forum has launched a new database, assembling data from a rangeof existing sources. These data lend further support to the view that the recovery is weak,particularly in advanced economies, and uncertain. Figure 20 shows that maritime cargovolumes to and from the EU and the USA, measured in tonnes, had not reached pre-crisis
levels by the end of 2010. Air cargo volumes had more than recovered, but they show anappreciable slowdown in growth near the end of 2010, particularly in the USA.
Figure 20. External trade by sea, percentage change from pre-crisis peak Jun-08(Tonnes, monthly trend, seasonally adjusted)

Dec-10
-5.1

-5.4
-15.9

-16.9

3.3

1.1

Sep-10Dec-10

Feb-09-20.9

15.1
Dec-10Jul-0813.9
Sep-10

USA trade by air-20.5

Apr-09EU 27 trade by air

Jul-08

Sep-10Jul-09Jul-08Dec-10-4.2

Sep-10

USA trade by sea-6.7

Jul-08Jun-09EU 27 trade by sea

Source: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database, IATA.

The remainder of this section reports on the regional structure of trade and transport flows,
focussing on trade between large regional aggregates in 2005, 2007 and 2010.8 It shows how
economic mass and trade flows are growing as well as being redistributed over the globe.

8. Specifically, the database describes EU and USA imports and exports. For the EU the following
regions are considered: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and North America.
For the USA, the regions are Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, North America,
and EU27.
32© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

As indicated above, the 2008 crisis has by and large been overcome, but it can be seen asa marker event for the relative decline of the EU and the USA and the rise of emerging
economies, in particular in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the highly unbalanced growth
pattern observed before and even more so after the crisis seems unsustainable in the long run.
The question for the short and medium run is whether rebalancing will take place gradually, i.e.
accommodated by policy to the extent possible, or through further shocks to the global
economic system. Changing relative costs of production, triggered by changing wages, capitalcosts, and energy prices, can affect trade and transport patterns, with most factors now
pointing in the direction of shorter supply chains rather than continued fragmentation anddispersion.
Table 5 shows how aggregate import and export volumes from and to the EU and the USA
have evolved since 2005. Values are measured in current prices so do not correct for inflation,
but this was low over the observed period. The value figures indicate that exports from the EU
and the US exceeded pre-crisis levels in 2010. This is consistent with the maintained strengthand growth of import demand in emerging economies. Growth is stronger in the USA than inEurope, at least partly as a consequence of the lower cost of the US dollar on international
currency markets.
The picture for imports is different: the 2010 indexes are below the 2005 level for weight,
and in terms of value imports are markedly below exports for the USA. The financial shock in2008 marks the beginning of a global economic crisis, but the slowdown had begun earlier in
the USA, which by December 2007 had already entered a recession. What cannot be seenfrom the table, and is well-known from other sources, is that the value and the weight of imports
to the EU and the USA is higher than the value and weight of exports from these regions in
2005, 2007, and 2010. The difference becomes smaller in 2010, however, reflecting the larger
impact of the crisis and the weaker recovery in the EU and the USA compared to the emerging
economies.
Table 5. Index of the value (current prices) and weight of imports to and exports fromthe EU and the USA, 2005, 2007, 2010 (2005 = 100)

ExportEU, valueEU, weight
US, Value
US, weight
ImportEU, valueEU, weight
US, Value
US, weight

2005

2007

2010

100
100
100
100

117
109
134
121

131
125
153
148

100
100
100
100

126
109
118
96

135
99
117
79

Source: International Transport Forum global trade and transport database.

Air cargo represents a large share of the total value of exports (up to 40% in the EU and up
to 55% in the USA), but this share declined after the crisis, probably as a consequence of the
reduced willingness-to-pay for speed of transportation and a stronger price decline in sea cargo(given the quicker adaptation of capacity to demand in aviation). The share of air cargo in EU
and USA import values is a bit lower (around 28% and 33%, respectively) and has declined in
the EU after the crisis but not in the USA. The share of air cargo in weight moved is much lowerof course, around 1% in exports and even less in imports.
© OECD/ITF 201133

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

The following tends are noteworthy for the EU.
•

In the regional composition of trade and transport volumes, exports measured invalue from the EU mainly go to Asia-Pacific and to North America. Concretely, thevalue of exports by air to Asia-Pacific and North America represents 72% of thetotal value of exports from the EU in 2005 as well as in 2007 and 2010. But thecomposition of this constant share changes, in line with the rising importance of the
Asia-Pacific region: the share of Asia-Pacific in the total increases from 34% in2005 to 39% in 2010, while that of North America declines by 5%-point to reach
33% in 2010. The regional concentration of maritime exports is weaker than that ofexports by air: Asia-Pacific and North America dominate maritime exports from theEU but represent only about 55% of the total, a share that appears to be declining
somewhat in the period considered, and in which the relative importance of the
Asia-Pacific region increases.

•

Looking at tonnes exported from the EU, air exports are dominated by the sametwo regions, but for maritime weights, Africa is ranked highest in 2010. The regional
concentration of weight exported by sea is notably lower than that of weight movedby air and that of values moved by either mode. The weight-measures confirm theoverall picture of the value-measures, except that they show an absolute decline oftonnes exported from the EU to the USA, in the sense that 2010 weights are below
2005 weights for both transport modes.

•

Imports to the EU by air measured in value come mainly from Asia-Pacific andNorth America: the share of those regions combined is about 83% in the three
years considered, a level of concentration considerably higher than found in air
exports. As in other markets, the Asia-Pacific region gains while North America
declines. The regional concentration of imports by sea in value is much weaker andin fact different in the sense that North America shows a quite small share(between 9 and 10%). Instead, the value of EU imports by sea is dominated by
Asia-Pacific and by non-EU European countries.

•

Imports to the EU measured in weight come mainly from Asia-Pacific where air
cargo is concerned, with a share rising from 48.6% in 2005 to 54.4% in 2010. North
America comes second with a share that has declined to 18.6% in 2010. For
maritime weight imported, the regional pattern differs somewhat, with the highest
share coming from other European countries.

Overall, the figures for the EU show a close connection between transport flows and thechanging distribution of economic mass over the world. But the strength of the connection
differs between modes, between value and weight, and to some extent between imports andexports. For air transport, the regional concentration and its evolution over time are very closely
tied to the global distribution of economic mass. For maritime transport, the concentration is
weaker, especially where weights and imports to the EU are concerned.
For the USA the picture is as follows.

34•

The value of exports from the USA is dominated by Europe and Asia Pacific, which
together account for about 79% of air export values and 63% of sea export values.
Contrary to what is observed for the EU, the share of Asia-Pacific does not risevery strongly between 2005 and 2010, although its share is a bit higher in 2010
than it is in 2005.

•

Exports in tonnes go mainly to the same two regions, with shares and evolutions
closely resembling the value shares.
© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People•

Imports to the USA in value terms are dominated by Asia Pacific and Europe as
well. About 51% of imports in value moved by air come from Asia Pacific, and 36%
from Europe. The value of maritime imports comes from Asia Pacific for 49%, ashare increasing somewhat over time, and for 20% from Europe, a share that
seems to be declining slightly.

•

The weight shares reflect the value shares, except for a higher share of imports
coming from Latin America where weight is considered, in particular weight moved
by sea.

The USA figures reflect the large share that Europe and the Asia-Pacific region representof global trade flows (together with the USA itself, of course). One difference with the EU trends
is that the EU shows a clear shift of trade mass towards the Asia-Pacific region between 2005
and 2010, while the change in trade by region is small for the USA. The main observation for
the USA is that weights imported by sea in 2010 are considerably lower than weights imported
in 2005, and this holds for all regions; for imports by air, there are slight increases for somemarkets. Tonnes exported increase for nearly all destinations. This pattern suggest aconsiderable degree of rebalancing between 2005 and 2010, an adaptation that may reflect theseverity of the initial imbalances as much as the speed of rebalancing. The EU shows a more
mixed picture, with declining weights imported from some regions and increasing weights fromothers (notably maritime imports from the USA, an outcome for which the dollar exchange rate
probably is an explanatory factor, especially since exports to the USA show an opposite trend).
Figures 21 and 22 provide further information on the regional composition of trade flows in
weight (tonnes) in 2005 and 2010. Figure 21 shows exports and imports by mode for the EU’s
three main trading partner countries (according to the 2010 ranking); Figure 22 does the samefor the USA.
Figure 21. Exports and imports with the EU’s three main trading countries (2010ranking), 2005 and 2010, tonnes
EU export by air, tonnes

EU import by air, tonnes

1,200,000

1,200,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

800,000

800,000

600,000

600,000

400,000

400,000

200,000

200,000

‐

‐
USA

China

China

Japan

EU export by sea, tonnes

USA

India

EU import by sea, tonnes

100,000,000
90,000,000
80,000,000
70,000,000
60,000,000
50,000,000
40,000,000
30,000,000
20,000,000
10,000,000‐

250000000
200000000
150000000
100000000
50000000
0
USA

TurkeyChina

RussiaNorwayBrazilSource: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database.

© OECD/ITF 201135

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 22. Exports and imports with the USA’s three main trading countries (2010ranking), 2005 and 2010 (tonnes)
USA export by air, tonnes

USA import by air, tonnes

1,200,000

1,200,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

800,000

800,000

600,000

600,000

400,000

400,000

200,000

200,000

‐

‐
China

Japan

United Kingdom

USA export by sea, tonnes

China

GermanyJapan

Venezuela

CanadaUSA import by sea, tonnes

80,000,000

120,000,000

70,000,000

100,000,000

60,000,000
80,000,000

50,000,000
40,000,000

60,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

20,000,000
20,000,000

10,000,000

‐

‐
China

Japan

MexicoMexicoSource: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database.

For the EU, the USA remains the main export market in terms of tonnes moved, either by
sea or by air. But total weights are lower in 2010 than in 2005 for both modes, and exports to
China are rising very quickly, particularly by air. Note that Turkey is the EU’s second destinationin terms of weight moved by sea. Imports by air mainly come from China, and its dominancehas increased sharply between 2005 and 2010. Total weight imported by air from the USA has
declined slightly despite the depreciation of the US dollar versus the Euro. Weights imported bysea come from a different set of countries, determined by oil and raw material flows.
The picture for the USA shows a large deficit in weight moved by air, with export weights
much lower than import weights. The difference does not change strongly between 2005 and2010, in particular where China is concerned, suggesting that rebalancing in weight terms isslow at best. China clearly is the US’s main trading partner by sea and air in weight terms(imports by sea reflect oil and raw material imports).
Figures 23 and 24 repeat the information of Figures 21 and 22, but this time in values
terms. By and large the countries appearing in the top three are the same as in the weightbased rankings, except for imports by sea where weights and values differ strongly. As
Figure 23 shows, the main trading partner for the EU in value terms is the USA, although China
dominates in terms of the value of maritime imports. The relative importance of China clearly
increases in all markets as well. The value of EU exports to the USA exceeds the value ofimports, but with China there is a large deficit. The difference between the value of exports andimports to China is much more pronounced for the US (see Figure 24). More generally, thevalue of both sea and air exports to the three main trading partners is much lower than thevalue of imports from the three main partners. The difference is smaller in 2010 than in 2005,
as export values increase and import values decline in most markets, but like the weight-based
data the values do not indicate a major step towards balanced trade flows.

36© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Figure 23. Exports and imports with the EU’s three main trading countries by sea and air(2010 ranking), 2005 and 2010, current values (thousands of Euros)
EU export by air, Euros

EU import by air, Euros

120,000,000

120,000,000

100,000,000

100,000,000

80,000,000

80,000,000

60,000,000

60,000,000

40,000,000

40,000,000

20,000,000

20,000,000

‐

‐
USA

China

USA

Japan

EU export by sea, Euros

China

Japan

EU import by sea, Euros

250,000,000

180,000,000
160,000,000

200,000,000

140,000,000
120,000,000

150,000,000

100,000,000
80,000,000

100,000,000

60,000,000
40,000,000

50,000,000

20,000,000
‐

‐
USA

China

China

TurkeyRussiaUSA

Source: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database.

Figure 24. Exports and imports with the USA’s three main trading countries by sea andair (2010 ranking), 2005 and 2010, current values (thousands of US dollars)
USA export by air, Dollars

USA import by air, Dollars

120,000,000

120,000,000

100,000,000

100,000,000

80,000,000

80,000,000

60,000,000

60,000,000

40,000,000

40,000,000

20,000,000

20,000,000‐‐
United Kingdom

China

China

Japan

USA export by sea, Dollars

Japan

Germany

USA import by sea, Dollars

200,000,000
180,000,000
160,000,000
140,000,000
120,000,000
100,000,000
80,000,000
60,000,000
40,000,000
20,000,000‐

300,000,000
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
‐
China

Japan

South Korea

China

Japan

Germany

Source: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database.

© OECD/ITF 201137

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

Summing up, the trade and transport data indicate a fairly rapid rebound of trade andtransport levels after the crisis, but toward the end of 2010 the pace of recovery seems to haveslowed down. Such a slowdown should not come as a surprise given the various downside
risks that threaten the world economy and that limit improvements in confidence and inaggregate demand. The crisis accentuates a shift of economic mass from the advanced to theemerging economies, in particular toward China. The rising importance of China and its regionis clearly reflected in the changing geographical composition of trade and transport flows. This
process can be expected to continue over the long run. In the years after the crisis, the strong
Chinese economy has been the locomotive of recovery, and this new role can be expected togain prominence in the future. That is why uncertainties concerning the sustainability of theChinese growth model, which relies heavily on exports and on domestic investment demand,
are a concern not only for China region but for the world economy as a whole.

38© OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People

ANNEX: THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM’S GLOBAL TRADE 4AND
TRANSPORT DATABASE – SHORT DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY TABLES

The International Transport Forum’s Global Trade and Transport Database compiles
directional region and country level information on trade volumes (import/export; values/tonnes)
transported by sea and by air. Data sources include Eurostat, the US Census, The Japanese
Ministry of Finance and the IMF. The database is in Excel format and it is built to allow easy
manipulation, e.g. geographical aggregation and data extraction and to be updated on amonthly basis.
The Database consists of two parts:
The “Total Trade Flows Database”, which summarizes trade volumes in monetary value
between major regions and countries. This database provides summary tables on trade flows
volumes in USD between major countries and regions. Global country pairs level data isavailable should users have particular interests in specific markets. For data consistency
reason among reporting countries, only IMPORT CIF data is recorded. Data come from theInternational Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade.
The “Origin-Destination Trade and Transport Database” which has detailed country-pairlevel directional trade volume statistics by modes of transport reported in monetary units andweight (tones). Three datasets form this part of the database. Each of them is sourced
differently. The European dataset, from Eurostat, tracks directional volumes of trade(import/export) from EU27 to partner countries in monetary value and weight. Goods
transported were recorded by sea and air. In addition to EU27 external trade data, thedatabase also contains country level data for Germany, France, United Kingdom, theNetherlands and Belgium. The United States dataset, from the US Census Bureau, tracks
directional volumes of trade (import/export) from the United States to partner countries inmonetary value and weight. Goods transported were recorded by sea, air and total. The Japandataset, from Japan Customs, Ministry of Finance, contains directional trade statistics
transported by sea and by air between Japan and partner countries. Historical data dates backto year 2000. The dataset contains monthly data from year 2009 onwards while historical datafrom year 2000 to 2008 are quarterly data. The unit is in value (Japanese Yen) only.
The Global Trade and Transport Database complements existing databases by adding
directional trade data on origin-destination level transported by air and by sea in value andweight tonne. It includes data for all countries worldwide. In addition, there are regions and subregions functions which allow users to easily extract aggregated time series data. The database
was built in such a way that users can easily “reassign” the regions/sub-regions to suit specificprojects.
Thus, this database allows users to examine the relation between international trade andmodes of transport on the origin-destination level and the relationship between the values ofgoods transported and its weight. This database allows users to easily track market trends andperformance, identify trade imbalances and market shifts. Updated with the latest available
monthly data and seasonally adjusted, it also allows users to identify possible turning points
and make short term projections.
© OECD/ITF 201139

Table A1. EU and US exports and imports, current values (’ 000s) and weight, 2005, 2007 and 201040

Air
15,079,957
98,969,116
21,752,446
13,949,276
31,051,728
109,114,233
289,916,757

Sea
54,768,180
121,587,765
53,081,875
38,133,481
43,167,279
142,798,180
453,536,760

EURO €
2007
Air
Sea
17,967,398
73,189,694
111,950,485
152,511,127
25,107,469
67,846,764
16,580,723
52,501,310
29,309,002
55,688,373
114,349,764
150,958,563
315,264,840
552,695,832

10,650,677
111,509,156
12,375,237
7,416,162
11,069,155
88,660,078
241,680,467

72,368,572
203,691,560
128,201,705
50,192,007
44,166,719
53,539,932
552,160,495

11,309,414
130,401,485
13,386,004
7,563,460
8,286,047
91,819,186
262,765,596

EU EXPORT
2005

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People – ©OECD/ITF 2011

AfricaAsia Pacific
Europe
LATAM
Middle East
North America
Total
EU IMPORT
AfricaAsia Pacific
Europe
LATAM
Middle East
North America
Total
USA EXPORT

USD $
2007

2005
AfricaAsia Pacific
Europe
LATAM
Middle East
North America
EU27
Total
USA IMPORT
AfricaAsia Pacific
Europe
LATAM
Middle East
North America
EU27
Total

90,170,440
285,668,369
168,683,807
70,991,592
50,033,316
71,389,062
736,936,586

2005
Air
19,805,550
137,637,360
27,909,238
20,970,860
31,636,646
114,366,298
352,325,952

Sea
94,438,546
196,012,323
71,977,809
62,352,822
60,344,622
139,709,941
624,836,063

Air
303,836
1,101,930
476,426
252,199
380,413
1,032,025
3,546,828

10,837,688
145,225,554
13,766,889
12,024,204
7,718,068
90,815,487
280,387,891

97,975,738
314,931,029
182,315,273
72,988,691
53,004,245
70,953,084
792,168,060

296,194
1,732,481
369,570
260,964
148,612758,648
3,566,467

2010

Sea
57,691,825
61,303,082
51,566,145
22,917,037
32,609,771
95,392,222
321,480,082

TONNE
2007
Air
Sea
419,340
67,769,658
1,428,454
66,342,787
452,330
65,682,287
301,502
29,618,887
409,656
35,525,055
1,165,859
85,794,123
4,177,140
350,732,796

247,401,072
341,709
138,023,640 2,276,768
387,690,652
316,985
189,027,462
242,412133,174,048
148,882
77,144,486
816,181
1,172,461,360 4,142,938

2005

2010
Air
445,474
1,704,579
469,995
366,701
541,178
986,050
4,513,975

Sea
99,187,688
86,761,317
74,446,533
34,007,269
39,823,674
66,130,387
400,356,868

247,000,322
445,555
186,514,749 2,161,463
419,363,520
205,959
219,163,659
335,387
119,177,254
84,92689,501,336
737,660
1,280,720,840 3,970,950

211,225,066
135,554,648
407,715,005
193,568,251
115,607,686
98,563,700
1,162,234,356

Tonne
2007

2010

Air
3,278,560
119,133,610
116,566,730
27,135,030
12,584,420
14,264,310
104,073,640
292,962,660

Sea
10,445,080
102,709,670
72,530,540
56,860,170
14,497,330
4,249,460
63,244,580
261,292,250

Air
4,584,780
142,346,540
149,595,170
35,605,880
16,877,770
16,956,840
129,002,420
365,966,980

Sea
17,405,850
138,876,520
106,714,690
82,910,760
23,406,270
5,422,060
91,410,800
374,736,150

Air
5,357,160
157,236,350
153,149,120
42,216,630
16,704,280
17,299,120
128,802,440
391,962,660

Sea
20,557,550
181,777,560
106,048,100
113,624,890
26,092,930
6,086,070
89,080,240
454,187,100

Air
43,7301,037,160
996,730
362,890
101,150
193,760
924,040
2,735,420

Sea
20,088,140
139,285,790
67,100,180
79,948,640
10,371,030
35,452,100
56,267,990
352,245,880

Air
66,3401,220,990
1,238,920
444,540
170,580
220,070
1,136,980
3,361,440

Sea
30,859,180
155,260,280
89,833,210
101,134,270
15,750,960
31,715,380
73,707,570
424,553,280

Air
68,2901,403,050
1,108,340
481,380
159,080
181,730
997,230
3,401,870

Sea
28,990,890
213,573,940
103,878,760
132,452,970
14,444,710
26,963,400
81,017,830
520,304,670

3,915,480
180,668,030
136,891,970
14,686,320
14,476,630
8,470,980
124,228,750
359,109,410

60,607,930
409,615,590
189,218,280
139,347,120
46,618,810
13,997,160
158,776,860
859,404,890

6,390,510
83,963,230
205,711,880
489,624,320
161,773,080
214,233,130
14,394,570
159,510,280
17,853,040
57,235,830
9,129,980
19,208,040
146,803,880
177,853,060
415,253,060 1,023,774,830

4,937,450
225,965,980
160,864,950
27,032,760
16,082,640
9,428,930
142,269,330
444,312,710

79,590,090
480,438,720
191,337,480
149,605,260
57,028,770
20,796,690
149,188,530
978,797,010

23,4301,971,980
1,167,150
664,800
65,95068,3401,079,620
3,961,650

146,417,780
129,888,580
147,987,660
377,499,940
121,541,280
71,803,110
93,364,480
995,138,350

29,0602,098,640
1,312,820
694,830
82,02085,1501,214,410
4,302,520

156,927,740
145,522,760
129,006,820
338,709,290
110,934,660
69,429,730
78,212,880
950,531,000

25,7302,073,210
1,187,020
615,290
65,95043,8601,054,680
4,011,060

130,499,410
113,998,580
117,825,900
271,261,380
93,469,610
56,194,530
60,876,610
783,249,410

Source: ITF Global Trade and Transport database.

Table A2. The EU’s 10 main trading partners in terms of tones moved by mode,
2005 and 2010
Directional Trade Rankings in tonne - Reporting country : EU
2005
2010
Export by air
1 USA
2 Japan
3 China
4 Russia
5 Norway
6 UAE
7 Hong Kong
8 South Korea
9 India
10 Canada

938,427
206,746
199,854
132,403
121,743
116,605
107,937
101,829
94,166
93,570

1 USA
2 China
3 Japan
4 India
5 UAE
6 South Korea
7 Russia
8 Brazil
9 Hong Kong
10 Israel

890,420
568,843
191,902
175,107
160,143
153,792
137,170
127,286
121,247
111,504

Export by sea
1 USA
2 China
3 Turkey
4 Norway
5 Canada
6 Saudi Arabia
7 Morocco
8 Algeria
9 Egypt
10 Japan

86,207,209
17,262,778
16,658,924
15,760,193
9,179,725
8,717,137
8,426,878
8,066,795
6,881,381
6,772,935

1 USA
2 Turkey
3 China
4 Algeria
5 Egypt
6 Norway
7 Saudi Arabia
8 Nigeria
9 Brazil
10 Morocco

57,864,184
31,583,825
30,848,847
15,633,255
14,207,282
13,751,890
12,009,206
11,587,159
11,413,270
11,371,101

Import by air
1 China
2 USA
3 Russia
4 Japan
5 India
6 South Korea
7 Hong Kong
8 Taiwan
9 Thailand
10 Kenya752,101
703,880
254,178
184,480
138,528
109,345
98,53187,143
68,192
66,7771 China
2 USA
3 India
4 Japan
5 Kenya
6 South Korea
7 Switzerland
8 Taiwan
9 Brazil
10 Thailand

1,088,224
685,087
205,523
186,793
147,345
137,168
100,205
92,43680,27669,422

Import by sea
1 Russia
2 Norway
3 Brazil
4 South Africa
5 Saudi Arabia
6 USA
7 Libya
8 Algeria
9 Australia
10 China

196,554,070
124,720,587
98,416,060
61,031,911
57,038,705
51,849,199
48,963,229
44,068,450
40,615,076
38,417,871

1 Russia
2 Norway
3 Brazil
4 USA
5 Libya
6 China
7 Nigeria
8 Colombia
9 Canada
10 Algeria

203,086,905
119,138,129
96,353,762
68,912,730
50,296,133
47,563,634
31,532,528
31,355,027
29,650,657
28,239,838

Source: International Transport Forum Global Trade and Transport database.

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People – ©OECD/ITF 201141

Table A3. The EU’s 10 main trading partners in terms of (thousands of) Euros movedby mode, 2005 and 2010
Directional Trade Rankings in Euro - Reporting country : EU
2005
2010
Export by air
1 USA
2 Japan
3 China
4 UAE
5 Hong Kong
6 India
7 Singapore
8 Canada
9 South Korea
10 Switzerland

100,661,524
18,913,593
13,767,735
12,796,531
11,424,826
11,067,587
8,786,012
8,450,146
8,264,873
7,735,997

1 USA
2 China
3 Japan
4 Hong Kong
5 India
6 South Korea
7 UAE
8 Singapore
9 Switzerland
10 Canada

105,390,526
31,571,464
20,673,620
16,181,414
15,222,939
10,954,253
10,781,815
10,167,199
9,355,808
8,972,583

Export by sea
1 USA
2 China
3 Japan
4 Turkey
5 Canada
6 Norway
7 Australia
8 Mexico
9 Brazil
10 South Africa

129,596,845
30,763,842
21,455,446
15,717,728
13,182,854
12,010,086
11,630,470
10,676,066
10,077,069
10,036,197

1 USA
2 China
3 Turkey
4 Brazil
5 Japan
6 India
7 Canada
8 Australia
9 South Korea
10 Russia

123,452,244
72,043,421
26,257,696
21,431,685
21,061,181
17,429,706
16,232,204
15,969,669
15,652,770
14,586,188

Import by air
1 USA
2 China
3 Japan
4 South Korea
5 Singapore
6 Taiwan
7 Canada
8 Switzerland
9 Malaysia
10 India

82,033,427
34,426,950
17,390,356
11,966,080
11,875,137
7,568,093
6,626,183
6,421,496
5,827,049
5,115,948

1 USA
2 China
3 Japan
4 South Korea
5 Singapore
6 Taiwan
7 Malaysia
8 India
9 Switzerland
10 South Africa

84,365,235
58,956,125
18,940,807
11,773,553
10,930,424
9,294,876
8,815,541
7,977,763
7,507,441
6,560,777

Import by sea
1 China
2 Russia
3 USA
4 Norway
5 Japan
6 Saudi Arabia
7 Brazil
8 Turkey
9 Libya
10 Algeria

90,315,266
52,491,860
45,843,462
40,836,199
33,816,013
18,224,136
17,993,872
16,091,547
15,712,626
13,890,936

1 China
2 Russia
3 USA
4 Norway
5 Japan
6 Brazil
7 Libya
8 India
9 Turkey
10 South Korea

171,113,340
80,664,262
59,622,968
47,345,228
31,335,452
27,405,286
23,024,093
20,776,833
19,835,220
16,805,662

Source: ITF Global Trade and Transport database.
42

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People – ©OECD/ITF 2011

Table A4. The USA’s 10 main trading partners in terms of tonnes moved by mode,
2005 and 2010
Directional Trade Rankings in tonne - Reporting country : USA
2005
2010
Export by air
1 Japan
324,070
1 China
2 United Kingdom
238,260
2 Japan
3 Canada
193,760
3 United Kingdom
4 Germany
175,100
4 Germany
5 China
122,8105 Canada
6 France
108,690
6 South Korea
7 Netherlands
106,860
7 Hong Kong
8 South Korea
100,950
8 Brazil
9 Taiwan
94,1909 Singapore
10 Singapore
87,83010 France
Export by sea
1 Japan
2 Canada
3 China
4 Mexico
5 South Korea
6 Taiwan
7 Brazil
8 Netherlands
9 Spain
10 Italy

46,315,920
35,451,470
34,119,880
21,988,610
16,288,370
12,430,160
9,737,080
8,618,610
7,875,610
7,723,750

Import by air
1 China
2 Japan
3 Germany
4 United Kingdom
5 Italy
6 Colombia
7 France
8 Malaysia
9 Chile10 Taiwan

798,680
328,660
289,730
185,250
145,780
133,730
129,490
121,300
116,650
116,300

Import by sea
1 Venezuela
2 Mexico
3 Saudi Arabia
4 Canada
5 Nigeria
6 China
7 Brazil
8 Colombia
9 Russia
10 Trinidad and Tobago

107,860,090
101,958,730
76,312,460
71,803,110
58,555,580
57,966,270
35,472,010
34,310,250
28,303,770
26,505,600

276,530
258,160
240,870
214,280
181,730
165,540
145,360
135,940
127,310
118,860

1 China
2 Japan
3 Mexico
4 South Korea
5 Canada
6 Brazil
7 Netherlands
8 Turkey
9 Taiwan
10 India

73,347,280
47,568,490
30,830,420
27,102,170
26,963,400
23,735,400
19,271,820
13,432,120
12,655,180
12,421,180

1 China
2 Germany
3 Japan
4 United Kingdom
5 Colombia
6 France
7 Italy
8 India
9 Taiwan
10 South Korea

1,105,960
309,190
253,220
172,940
142,880
132,780
122,200
113,070
104,650
93,6401 Mexico
2 Venezuela
3 Canada
4 Saudi Arabia
5 China
6 Nigeria
7 Russia
8 Colombia
9 Brazil
10 Algeria

76,140,210
65,557,830
56,194,530
54,648,270
53,892,260
50,698,420
39,956,330
34,168,260
28,767,030
23,566,800

Source: ITF Global Trade and Transport database.

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People – ©OECD/ITF 201143

Table A5. The USA’s 10 main trading partners in terms of (thousands of) USD bymode, 2005 and2010
Directional Trade Rankings in USD - Reporting country : USA
2005
2010
Export by air
1 Japan
26,490,790
1 United Kingdom
23,387,260
2 China
2 United Kingdom
3 Germany
19,882,440
3 Japan
4 Netherlands
15,964,560
4 Germany
14,721,690
5 Switzerland
5 France
6 Canada
14,264,310
6 France
7 South Korea
14,162,960
7 Canada
13,068,070
8 Hong Kong
8 China
12,819,670
9 Netherlands
9 Singapore
10 Taiwan
12,089,880
10 Singapore

30,513,790
27,331,670
26,386,740
25,643,500
18,587,790
17,531,280
17,299,120
17,282,260
16,857,320
16,281,230

Export by sea
1 China
2 Japan
3 South Korea
4 Germany
5 United Kingdom
6 Mexico
7 Netherlands
8 Belgium
9 Australia
10 Taiwan

24,288,130
24,046,510
11,843,870
11,619,230
10,814,000
9,333,150
9,268,990
8,946,810
8,617,140
7,958,010

1 China
2 Japan
3 South Korea
4 Brazil
5 Germany
6 Mexico
7 Netherlands
8 United Kingdom
9 Belgium
10 Australia

58,066,400
30,005,070
20,560,380
19,676,490
17,288,840
16,894,130
16,445,220
13,252,040
13,044,350
12,109,260

Import by air
1 China
2 Japan
3 Germany
4 Ireland
5 Malaysia
6 United Kingdom
7 France
8 South Korea
9 Israel
10 Taiwan

54,842,770
34,540,060
24,795,350
23,885,470
23,588,660
20,018,340
15,395,730
14,697,110
13,149,620
12,480,140

1 China
2 Japan
3 Germany
4 Ireland
5 United Kingdom
6 South Korea
7 France
8 Malaysia
9 Israel
10 Taiwan

98,893,810
32,241,440
27,342,340
26,670,920
23,278,230
17,823,150
17,663,730
15,266,440
15,257,160
15,234,840

Import by sea
1 China
2 Japan
3 Germany
4 Venezuela
5 Mexico
6 South Korea
7 Saudi Arabia
8 United Kingdom
9 Nigeria
10 Taiwan

180,354,890
100,205,840
50,342,000
33,763,790
30,894,230
28,312,350
27,048,450
26,989,720
24,008,540
21,204,340

1 China
2 Japan
3 Germany
4 Mexico
5 Venezuela
6 Saudi Arabia
7 Nigeria
8 South Korea
9 Russia
10 United Kingdom

250,729,200
84,704,330
47,891,730
37,457,660
32,706,920
30,752,210
30,462,720
29,998,060
24,399,300
22,669,430

Source: ITF Global Trade and Transport database.

44

Transport Outlook 2011: Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People – ©OECD/ITF 2011

Transport Outlook
Meeting the Needs of 9 Billion People
The world’s population will reach 9 billion by 2050. Meeting theirtransport demands will be challenging. As both population andincomes rise, global passenger mobility and global freight transportvolumes may triple by 2050. The International Transport Forum’s
2011 Outlook examines these trends, exploring the factors that may
drive demand even higher and the limits imposed by infrastructure
capacity, fuel prices and policies to accommodate or limit potentiallyexpolosive growth of car use in rapidly developing countries.
The Outlook traces scenarios for emissions of CO2 from transport andthe impact of policies to improve the fuel economy of conventional
vehicles and promote the use of electric cars, including implications
for fuel tax revenues. Trends in passenger car traffic are given
particular attention, examining evidence for saturation of demandin high income countries.
The report also focuses on future directions for trade, as suggested
by trends in the current economic recovery. A global rebalancing
in the wake of the financial crisis may already be over, withtrade returning to pre-crisis patterns ahead of any longer term
restructuring for economic sustainability.

International Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal
75775 Paris Cedex 16
itf.contact@oecd.org
www.internationaltransportforum.org