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Chai Skulchokchai

Smirking against Power: Cynicism and Parody in Contemporary Thai
Pro-Democracy Movement (2020–2023)
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 311-341.

How to Cite:
Skulchokchai, Chai. Smirking against Power: Cynicism and Parody inContemporary Thai Pro-Democracy Movement (2020–2023). Southeast AsianStudies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 311-341. DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_311.
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Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

Correction
This article was published on August 22, 2024 and amended on August 28, 2024 because the earlier version misidentified Pavin
Chachavalpongpun as “an exiled anti-monarchy academic” and Somsak Jeamteerasakul as “another exiled antimonarchy
activist-scholar” (page 323). Both Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Somsak Jeamteerasakul are exiled pro-monarchical-reformcritic scholars. A corrigendum note is published for the printed version.

Smirking against Power: Cynicism and Parodyin Contemporary Thai Pro-Democracy Movement(2020–2023)
Chai Skulchokchai*The 2020–23 wave of protests in Thailand forever changed the country’s politicallandscape. While stemming from and inspired by the 2011 protests, its ability toundermine the hegemony of form and the eternal state of Thailand remains
unmatched. People no longer act as if everything is normal but have started toacknowledge the underlying problems. Through parodies and cynicism, they expose
the fragility of the eternal state. The Internet has made it easier for subversive actsto spread. To evade censorship, subversive acts use metaphorical and paradoxicalparody as a tool to disguise messages as innocuous. Thailand has experienced
turbulence in the past decades with the interregnum crisis. People who believedin the regime have become ta sawang (disillusioned)—but with the draconian lèsemajesté law, they have no way to voice their dissent except through cynicism andparody.
Keywords: cynicism, hegemony of form, online activism, parody, Thailand

Introduction
On August 25, 2020, the Royalist Marketplace Facebook group—a parody of the royalist
movement in Thailand, with more than one million members—was ordered to be disbandedby the Thai government under the Computer Act, which deals with the disseminationof false information. The group’s founder quickly announced plans to create anotherRoyalist Marketplace, to demonstrate that no matter how many groups were closed,
another would always be set up.
It is said that dictators have no sense of humor. Academically speaking, authoritarianregimes and their variants do not tolerate humor well. The study of humor and cynicism* ชััย สกุุลโชคชััย, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Ghent University, Campus UFO –Technicum, Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41, Gent, 9000, Belgium; Faculty of Historical and Cultural
Studies, University of Vienna, Universitätsring 1, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: Chaiyo1999@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5158-6422
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 311–341© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_311

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is well developed in studies of the former Soviet bloc and came to attention again during
the Arab Spring uprising, which began in 2010 (Popovic and Joksic 2013; Damir-Geilsdorf
and Milich 2020). Humor is used as a tool used to degrade the opposition. However, it
has not been as widely studied as the use of technology and various aspects of social
cleavage in the context of Thailand’s 18-year-long political turmoil. The continued protests in Thailand since 2020 are part of a greater resistance to the authoritarian regime.
Thais are not only famous for their smiles and hospitality but have also become famous
for their disapproval of repression through cynical humor and satire.
Thailand was under a decades-long political crisis that many attribute to the interregnum (possibly since 2006, 2014–23) between the reigns of King Rama IX (1927–2016,r. 1946–2016) and King Rama X (b. 1952, r. 2016–present), when the royal institutions
lost considerable political and cultural hegemony (Hewison 2019). To preserve thestatus quo, there were two coups and a civilian massacre during the 2010 Thai military
crackdown (Ferrara 2019). Like Antonio Gramsci’s quote “the old is dying and the new
cannot be born in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear,” the Thai
ancien régime is deteriorating rapidly but trying to prevent the new with government
suppression of public expression. During the interregnum the “morbid symptoms”
showed up; and under government suppression, several people became ta sawang, or“disillusioned.” Many blamed the king or his close confidants for Thailand’s ongoing
political crisis (Sopranzetti 2018). Nevertheless, people are still constrained by thestate’s ironclad censorship and suppression. To circumvent the abusive litigation, theyexpress their subversion through cynical jokes, satire, and parody. The initial widespread
circulation of such acts of subversion occurred in May 2011, the first anniversary of the2010 Thai military crackdown. Subversion became popular again in 2020, when the
public reached their breaking point after eight years of dictatorship, with the help ofsocial networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Despite the popular youth movement’s
early success, it took a hiatus in late 2021 after a series of failed attempts to force thegovernment to dissolve the parliament. The movement almost died out while thispaper was being written, for reasons that will be discussed later. Therefore, it isimportant to understand why the movement began and what it has achieved throughvarious theoretical lenses.

Methods and Positionality
The scale of the 2020 protest and its contribution to Thailand’s democratization isdebatable. However, this work focuses on the method of resistance rather than theSmirking against Power313

movement’s outcome. Most of the physical protests discussed below were chosenbecause I was directly involved in them as an observer and could capture the zeitgeist.
As for the online cases, they were selected for the scale of reaction from the royalists.
Although some of the protests discussed below were small and had minimal effect, they
were selected because of their creativity. Obviously, the jokes discussed in this paper
are viewed from the perspective of this author—a middle-class observer of urban demonstrations. The jokes are open to interpretation, and therefore my interpretations are
not absolute. There were several social classes that participated in the demonstrations.
From Kanokrat Lertchoosakul’s (2021a) research, the most popular subaltern group
was Thalugaz (Breakthrough Gas). They were rather violent, using Ping-Pong bombs
and firecrackers against police. Their anti-establishment tactics were not hidden
behind a humorous front, which most protests were—especially during the Din Daeng
Triangle clash.

Brief History of Recent Political Developments in Thailand
King Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great, or King Rama IX, was the longest-reigning monarchin Thai history. He began his reign as a symbolic leader with no real authority in the
military government (Asa 2019). He then became a junior partner in successive
regimes: the infamous Sarit’s despotic paternalism era and the Thanom-Praphas era(Asa 2019). Although it is debatable whether he sided with the people in the 1973
uprising against Thanom-Praphas and the 1992 Black May uprising against Suchinda
Kraprayoon, he strategically positioned himself away from the military. All of this helped
him consolidate power through the “Bhumibol Consensus” after the 1992 Black May
uprising (Asa 2019). There was an implicit consensus in the top echelons of Thai
society to consider him as the leader and adjudicator of any issues (McCargo 2005).
From then on, he became the most powerful person in Thailand, being able to intervene
in all affairs through his proxies, a system dubbed the “network monarchy” (McCargo
2005). By the time of the diamond jubilee (sixty years) of his reign in 2006, he owned
the hegemony of form. People paid respects to His Majesty without a second thought
despite the superficial value of such acts: praying at the temple on his birthday, wearing
a yellow shirt on Monday (his birth day), and celebrating Father (of the Nation) Day inschools and government bureaus. On the sixtieth anniversary of his enthronement,
more than 500,000 people gathered at the Royal Plaza for a royal audience (Faulder
2016). The eternal state was perfect: people believed and wished that King Rama IX’s
reign would last forever, even though his health had been declining. Later in 2006, a314

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political crisis began with the coup d’état against Thaksin Shinawatra, an elected prime
minister, on the pretext of Thaksin’s corruption and a political deadlock. Before thecoup, the pro-monarchy “Yellow Shirts” demanded that the king appoint a new prime
minister, which was legally impossible (Pasuk and Baker 2009). The coup was ineffective
because it failed to eradicate Thaksin’s influence in Thai politics, and his supporters
united under the banner of the “Red Shirts” in 2007. The Thaksin-affiliated party won
the next election in 2008, only to be ousted by a judicial coup through a constitutional
court. Before the case came before the constitutional court, the Yellow Shirts stormed
Government House and Bangkok’s two airports. In one of the clashes with police,
Angkhana Radappanyawut or Nong Bo, a Yellow Shirt protester, was killed (Khorapin2018). The queen attended her funeral, which implicitly showed that the monarchy
was aligned with the pro-royal, anti-government masses (Khorapin 2018). That day,
October 13, was marked as the “day of disillusionment” for many people when the event
was discussed on the Fah Deaw Kan Same Sky web board (Khorapin 2018). After the
judicial coup, the leader of the opposition, Abhisit Vejjajiva, took office with support
from the military and some of the semi-loyal government coalition who had turned
against Thaksin’s government. The Red Shirts came from the North, Northeast, andprovinces around Bangkok to demand that the parliament be dissolved. Instead, Abhisit
allegedly ordered a crackdown that resulted in at least 98 deaths in Bangkok (Phasuk2020). This led many to become disillusioned with the monarch, who was apparently
aware of the crackdown but chose not to intervene.
The first anniversary of the crackdown in 2011 was the first time that royal hegem­
ony was challenged through parodies and cynicism. While no one talked about the
royal family, the graffiti on a burnt building showed the people’s disillusionment. Fromthen, Article 112 (the lèse-majesté law) became more frequently used to suppress
anti-monarchy acts. This led to the development of more sophisticated methods ofsubversion.
Abhisit soon dissolved the parliament and called for an election. The Thaksinaffiliated party again won the election, only to be ousted by another coup in 2014 byGeneral Prayut Chan-o-cha when the government was blamed for dividing the nation.
The coup is believed to have been staged by the royalists to consolidate the successionof King Rama X or King Vajiralongkorn (Pavin 2020). Once King Rama IX passed awayin 2016, the new king, Vajiralongkorn, expanded his privileges by assigning two regiments of the Royal Thai Army as his personal armed force and changing the law to allow
him to reside abroad without appointing a regent (Deutsche Welle 2017; Reuters 2019).
The king is known to prefer living in Germany and to have a passion for the military.
Those two privileges gave him greater influence, with taxpayer money, which generated

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much discontent among young people (BBC 2020). After the coup leader, Prayut,
called and won the 2016 general election, progressive movements continued to be
repressed. The anti-military, pro-democracy Future Forward Party, which was the
younger generation’s favorite during the 2016 election, was dissolved in early 2020
after being accused of violating election regulations on its source of income (BBC Thai
2020). The court ruling instigated mass protests, which were soon brought to an end by
the outbreak of Covid-19. The government took advantage of the emergency to ordersocial-distancing protocols that halted any political movements (Kurlantzick 2020).
Later that year Wanchalerm Satsaksit, a pro-democracy activist-in-exile, was allegedly
abducted and disappeared. The news sparked public outrage and waves of protest
despite the pandemic’s emergency decree (Wright and Praithongyaem 2020). The maindifferences between the youth movements in 2020 and the Red Shirt movement against
Abhisit in 2010 were the former’s widespread use of social networks and young age ofprotesters (middle school to university students). The young urban middle-class protesters in 2020 were a contrast from the “urbanised villagers” of the Red Shirts of theThaksin era (Naruemon and McCargo 2011). The youths used creative protest tactics
that may have been learned from abroad, such as pop culture, jokes, and transnational
pleas, rather than physical confrontation and disruption like the Red Shirt protest—
although the youths did see the Red Shirt movement as an act of heroism.
Even though King Vajiralongkorn was made crown prince in 1972, he was overshadowed by his father’s accomplishments. King Bhumibol had had ample time tocreate his support base before gaining real power, unlike King Vajiralongkorn, who
was crowned when he was 64 years old without any prior loyal support base. King
Vajiralongkorn dismissed most of his father’s advisers, replacing them with his own(Bangkok Post 2016), and although the network monarchy he inherited still functions,
he has lost some support. Scandals about his mistresses have also tainted his reputation
as an unflawed royal (Handley 2014). For example, his ex-consort Yuvadhida wasinvolved in a drug trade (Handley 2014). Such incidents have dealt a blow to the king’s
charisma and legitimacy. Monogamy and respect for elders are important Thai social
norms. Many people who were loyal to Rama IX changed their minds about the monarchy after King Vajiralongkorn came to power. King Vajiralongkorn is trying to replace
his charisma with fear based on rumors that he ordered the forced disappearance ofmany dissenters and his “installation of discipline” program among his semi-loyal
servants (Pavin 2022).

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The State of Anti-Royalism and the 2019 Wave of Protests in Thailand
Thongchai Winichakul (2014) believed that Thai society was in a state of denial about
the “two elephants in the room”: the intervention of the monarchy in Thai politics andthe silencing of anti-monarchy sentiment by the superstructure. Although Thai society
has modernized superficially, mentally many still reside in a state of denial, refusing to
see the obvious suppression of free speech. An important argument from Thongchai(2014) is the Thai belief in Dhammaracha occult (worship of the king who has themystical power to satisfy with his good deeds). This belief elevates the king as therepresentation of virtue, and thus he wields absolute power over the country. The
belief is still popular among older generations of Thais but is in decline among younger
generations. However, this belief is one of the keys to understanding how groundbreaking the 2019 protests were, as youths refused to believe in Dhammaracha occult.
Thongchai discussed the extent of hyper-royalism in Thailand: “First, it is the permeation of royalism in everyday life and the increased demand for the expression of loyalty
to the monarchy. Extravagant public displays of royal symbols and platitudes areencouraged and found everywhere” (Thongchai 2019, 289). He added another crucial
characteristic of hyper-royalism: exaggeration and exaltation of the king’s work andachievement, together with tight control of public discourse through a repressive state
apparatus and civil society. As a result, people feel compelled to participate in insincere
acts to escape the state’s wrath (Thongchai 2019).
Khorapin Phuaphansawat (2018) tracked down the ideological shifts among Thais
from 2006, as early as the aftermath of the 2006 coup when the Red Shirts were formed.
The Red Shirts identified themselves as phrai or commoners/serfs pitched against theammat or aristocrats. The early target of the Red Shirts was Prem Tinsulanonda, whomthey identified as the leader of the ammat. Khorapin (2017) employed Alexei Yurchak’sconcepts of stiob and hegemony of form, which this paper uses too—though in a different
context and time frame.
To understand the force of anti-royalism, one has to first understand the dynamics
of royalism. Duncan McCargo (2005) proposed the concept of a “network monarchy”
headed by the king. The network works because everyone accepts the king as the
adjudicator, and the king uses his privy council members as his proxies. Eugénie
Mérieau (2016) has suggested that the Thai constitutional court operates according to
the monarch’s will. The court also acts as a surrogate to preserve the king’s hegemony
and interests. Thus, the state does not operate on its own. It is controlled by a higher
political entity—the monarchy. This phenomenon may also be referred to as the deepstate.

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317

McCargo (2021) also wrote about youth protests in Thailand. The break fromprevious generations is stark from their radically different understanding of how power
works in Thai society. Generation Z protesters call into question taboo topics in Thai
society. But McCargo concluded that Generation Z protesters do not constitute a
disruptor dilemma since their impact is too insignificant to change the system. However,the people’s attitude toward the monarchy has changed. Kanokrat (2021a) interviewed
150 school students and 150 university students about their motivations for protesting.
She concluded that youth protests against the education system—a part of the authoritarian institutions and influenced by the monarchy—can result in change as the goalis more reachable for youths. This conclusion might contradict the definition of Mérieau’s
deep state, as Kanokrat’s (2021b) research showed that even though everyone knows
about the existence of the network monarchy, the concept of the state within a state canstill be applied. Even Nidhi Eawsriwong (2017) suggested that the Thai state is a“shallow state” since there is no hidden controller behind the scenes.

Theoretical Background: Cynicism and Parody
Simulation and pretense, which describes the act of make-believe, has a long history
in the study of anthropology. From Karl Marx to Yurchak, the study of simulation andpretense has grown tremendously. The phenomenon is closely connected to cynicism,
which refers to rationalizing beliefs to conform to one’s viewpoint—usually in thecontext of skepticism toward the state, in the Steinmüller sense (2014). But for Hans
Steinmüller, a cynical stance intended to undermine the state is ineffective as the state
can operate normally in a cynical society. Explaining such a phenomenon facilitates
our understanding of how the state tolerates cynicism in private spaces and how itcreates an eternal state that allows minimal change. The best description of the eternal
state is Yurchak’s book title Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: everythingappears perfect and unchangeable until people start to doubt the status quo. Sometimes
an eternal state is understood in colloquial Thai as “Frozen Thailand,” which originatedfrom a proposal in 2012 to stop all political activities for five years, maintaining thestatus quo while fixing problems (Apichart 2012). However, the truth is that simulationand pretense, which are not uncommon in an authoritarian state, make the state vulnerable to small and sudden changes. In the past few decades, change began with thedownfall of the Soviet Union, followed by the dot-com boom and smartphones, which
increased the ability of cynicism to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Althoughauthoritarian regimes are weakened by technological progress, some authoritarian

318

Chai Skulchokchaisocieties like North Korea are still able to maintain the eternal state by limiting freedom.
Though such eternal states are believed to be forever, they are actually fragile andprone to collapse at any time, as was seen in the Arab Spring and several disruptions inHong Kong and Thailand.
Simulation and pretense were not understood as political practices in the past,
because it was believed that people could not conceal their thoughts and acts. This
was the idea of rule as “total control,” as observed from Marx’s false consciousness
and Gramsci’s hegemony. Marx’s false consciousness is based on the idea that thesuperstructure uses infrastructure to create a systematic misrepresentation of dominantsocial relations, to obscure the realities of subordination and exploitation (Marx andEngels 2017). Gramsci’s hegemony is about total control politically, economically, andculturally through the normalization of the dominant worldview (Wacharapon 2018). The
goal is to manufacture consent among people as well as urging them to actively show
their consent. Simulation and pretense were introduced as forms of political practicein James C. Scott’s (1987) Weapons of the Weak, a study on peasants in Southeast Asia.
It explains the impossibility of openly and successfully opposing the dominant power
given the overwhelming power advantage of the state. As a result, peasants choose toresist in quieter ways such as false compliance and foot-dragging (Scott 1987). However,this line of thinking assumes that people are resisting the system, as opposed to Marxand Gramsci’s belief in total state control. Yurchak (2003) developed an alternative tothis dichotomy: His idea is that there are people who know about the problems withthe system but still serve the system, actively reproducing consent while not believing
in it. This contradictory performance may be observed through many examples, suchas a student who preaches about the decadence of the West in public but enjoys rockmusic in private without seeing the contradiction. Thus, Yurchak’s idea goes beyond
simulation and pretense, which actors are conscious of doing, to the realm of the subconscious. The realm of the subconscious is why simulation and pretense is related tohegemony—it is about ingrained habits. Yet the paradox is that the actors, despiteknowing the problem, still follow ingrained habits (Sloterdijk 1987, cited in Steinmüller
2014). Hence, simulation and pretense is also about hegemony of form (of practice).
Actions are performed not only for their face value but also for practical reasons(Steinmüller 2010). Thus, we see different states of simulation and pretense—from
their absence to their being used as weapons of the weak and part of the hegemony ofform.
Over time simulation and pretense developed into cynicism—a distrust of thesystem, making fun of it, and looking down on it. Nevertheless, passive aggression isfeeble in the eyes of the state, and the fear of social sanction still outweighs people’sSmirking against Power319

intention to go against the system. The base arguments for cynicism and Weapons of
the Weak are different. Weapons of the Weak views every action as resistance, while
cynicism views action as a well-calculated habit focusing on the trade-off if people do notcomply with the state, which they are very dependent on (Steinmüller 2010).
Simulation and pretense, hegemony of form, and cynicism show that there can bediscrepancies between thoughts and actions. These are coping mechanisms often foundin authoritarian regimes (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Yurchak 2003; Steinmüller 2015). People
do what they have to, from attending meetings and passing meaningless resolutions toattending their leader’s funeral pretending to cry (Mbembe 1992; Yurchak 2003; 2013).
Such actions become routine, as the government constantly directs people to join state
ceremonies such as national days and parades (Mbembe 1992; Yurchak 2013). Nationalism may even become banal when people unconsciously perform patriotic gestures indaily life (Billig 1999). Such acts are pushed by the state to condition the people according to its own agenda.
The hyper-royalism in Thailand parallels what happened in late socialism in theSoviet bloc in the 1960s–1980s (Yurchak 2013). Constant public expressions of loyalty
became meaningless acts performed in order to avoid public sanction. Exaggerationand exaltation were used to portray the leader as perfect. Such obligations do not comefrom state sanctions alone. Although Thailand has laws on royal defamation (Article112) and sedition (Article 116) that foster a climate of fear, the conservative civil society
also contributes by suppressing critics of the monarchy. Thus, the country fits in with
Yurchak’s (2013) condition of the hegemony of form. On the other hand, gossip aboutroyalty is widespread in Thailand. The conclusion is that hegemony of form is about
culture as well as totalitarianism.
As mentioned above, simulation and pretense are especially important in modern
life. Cynics use pretense and simulation to evade censure (Sloterdijk 1987, cited in
Steinmüller 2014)—not due to fear but due to common sense, since not participatingin performative acts could take a toll on their social status. Achille Mbembe (1992)
suggests that participating in public events such as oath-taking and medal ceremonies isnecessary for individuals to have a respectable social status regardless of their beliefs.
Lisa Wedeen (1998) suggests it is important for people to act “as if” they believe insomething even if they are skeptical. She gives the example of a soldier in Syria who
defied his superior officer by talking about his dream, which was different from the othersoldiers’ dreams. By giving an alternative interpretation, he also stopped demonstrating
active consent to the state’s absolute control. His not having the same dream as theothers was a crime worthy of punishment despite its triviality. This case study shows
there can be serious consequences for defiance, which makes most people choose to do

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nothing despite questioning the system. Acts of defiance like the soldier’s matter,because language can be used to create social change. Hollow actions may be foundedon cynicism, but scripted words burrowed within conversations hold power in real life.
People act with cynicism but speak as if they believe the official narrative. Repetitive
dialogue can generate even more state control. Hence, performativity is a state tool tofabricate a reality in people’s minds, while cynicism creates a small safe space for people
to express their doubts.
Parodying and joking is a tool for expressing cynicism. Since it can be taken lightly,
it is what the state fears most—it can spread quickly and undermine the state’s legitimacy
in a short time. Since language can affect our worldview, the use of parody can alter
perceptions. As a result, when the hegemon becomes an object of absurdity, it is easierto undermine its legitimacy.

Hegemony of Form at Its Finest
Thailand’s hegemony was consolidated after May 1992 by the “Bhumibol Consensus”
with the support of the ruling elites (McCargo 2005). The hegemony of form has beendeveloped ever since. From 2006 it became normalized for everyone to wear a yellow
shirt on Mondays to celebrate the king’s birth day. The “sufficiency economy” philosophy
credited to the late King Bhumibol became both state policy and practice by the people.
Irrespective of social class, this economic principle was supposed to be a part of every
individual’s spending practices—though in reality it was not that common. During themourning period for King Rama IX in 2016, those not wearing black faced public shameand risked physical abuse (Masina 2016). Discussions about the appropriateness of thelèse-majesté law have always been taboo as they show disrespect for the king, an
indication of how ingrained the hegemony of form is in Thailand.
King Rama X ascended to the throne in December 2016. He is alleged to be a
playboy with many mistresses whom he mistreats (Economist 2019). This rumor has
fostered cynicism, as the king having mistresses goes against Thai as well as modern
ethics. However, disapproval is expressed mostly in private, with inside jokes like “Ihave only one father” (which means only my biological father is my true father, not theking—the national father) or “When is Mother’s Day again?” (Since Thailand’s Mother’s
Day is on “the queen’s” birthday, this joke implies that the current king has more than
one queen). The traditional role of the king is to be a respected, paternal figure. However, since King Rama X’s promiscuous lifestyle does not foster such an image, increasing doubts are cast on his royal status and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the public continued

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to praise the new king until the youth protests of 2020 (McCargo 2021). At the beginningof King Rama X’s reign everyone performed the traditional rituals, such as standing up
when the royal anthem was played in cinemas and calling him a father figure. Changecame with the student movement in 2020, which called for a reform of the monarchy. The
Internet played a major role in the protests. A video titled “A Clip at the Pool,” widely
circulated on YouTube and Twitter, allegedly depicted the former royal consort, Srirasmi,celebrating the king’s dog’s birthday wearing only a G-string (Ramboisan4somchai2011). Rumors about this were already circulating, but things came into the open withthe video. Images of the king’s maltreatment of his mistress and his former princess alsocame to light, generating even more cynicism. However, no one was prepared for themagnitude of the 2020 protests.

The First Instance of the Great Subversion
Following the crackdown on the Red Shirt protest in 2010, the Thai government organizeda “Big Cleaning Day,” which would remove all the evidence of state crime (Cod 2020).
The political situation stabilized the following year. The first anniversary of the crackdown in 2011 drew large crowds even though the Red Shirts were still viewed as theenemy of the people. To everyone’s surprise, the ruins of the Central World department
store were found to have been decorated with anti-monarchy graffiti, the most prominentof which showed Hitler blinded in one eye with the caption “The blind who cannot
smile”—a reference to King Rama IX being blind in one eye and one of his biographies
being titled The King Never Smiles (Ünaldi 2016). It directly accused the king of having
ordered the violent crackdown. Many messages in the graffiti were about King Rama
IX’s sufficiency economy, such as “Tha di jing prathet charoen kwa ni” (If that was done,
our country would be thriving) and “Mi pen lan, tae hai ku phophiang” (You have millions[of baht] but still made us stingy) (Ünaldi 2016). Such messages challenged the notionthat a sufficiency economy was the universal solution to problems and highlighted theking’s status as the world’s richest monarch—a fact often disregarded by citizens due tothe humble way in which he was represented. Another message in the graffiti was the
widely circulated term krasun praratchatan (royally given bullet). This too implied thatthe crackdown was an order from the king (Ünaldi 2016).
At the Ratchaprasong intersection during the first anniversary of the 2010 Red
Shirt massacre, an unknown individual put up a banner saying “Gu mai roo gu puey”(I don’t know, I am sick) (Somsak 2011). “Gu mai roo gu mao” (I don’t know, I was drunk)is a common excuse for denying responsibility for acts committed while someone is322

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drunk. It is connected to “Yaa tue kon baa, yaa waa kon mao” (Do not hold grudges
against crazy people, and do not judge drunk people), which is a way to lessen theaccountability of those whose senses are compromised. In a similar vein, being sickshould exempt one from blame. At the time, King Rama IX was hospitalized. On that
pretext, he should have been exempted from responsibility for his inaction. According
to traditional beliefs, all Thais are children of the king, and a father should not abandon
his own in the face of harm. Nevertheless, it is possible that the king chose not to preventthe 2010 massacre, like on October 6, 1976, when more than one hundred Thammasat
University students were massacred.
The Faiyen band released their first album in 2011, just before the first commemoration of the crackdown. They had released their songs earlier but became more
popular after the crackdown. Their most famous song is Loong Somchai, Pa Somchit(Uncle Somchai and Aunt Somchit), a parody of the Thai monarch. Somchai and Somchit
are common names in Thailand (Khorapin 2017). The song tells the story of a broken
family: the son and daughter’s failing relationship, the aunt’s gambling addiction andfinancial mismanagement, and the uncle’s hospitalization. This greatly resembled thestate of the royal family. Another song, Ngua Yod Deaw (Single drop of sweat), parodies
the famous photo of King Bhumibol perspiring while commanding officials during a tour
to “develop” Thailand. Via the photo, the song deromanticizes King Bhumibol’s role inhelping the country. The lyrics instead give credit to the farmer who does the actual
work, implying that the king should not claim the country as his. The song exposes theglorification of the king’s image as meaningless. Faiyen’s most radical song is Krai Ka
Ror 8 (Who killed King Rama VIII?). This touches on the taboo subject of who killed
King Rama VIII. It mentions the questions being asked, with no one able to give a definite
answer, and ends with a young boy replying—but only a bleat comes out, suggesting thatthe supposed murderers were scapegoats. The death of King Rama VIII was mysterious
and the investigations inconclusive. Three of his aides-de-camp were blamed and sentenced to death. However, many suspect that the murderer was King Rama IX (King2011). Once people became brave enough to discuss this sensitive subject, the long-lived
legitimacy of King Rama IX was finally challenged.
From 2006 to 2020, many activists-in-exile set up channels on YouTube or posted
commentaries on Same Sky web boards such as Lung Sanam Luang, DJ Soonho, andChuphong Theethuan. These commentaries were about gossip from the palace. “Canned
Fish Factory” by “Grandma Hi” is another example of gossip and subversion preparing
Thais for change. There were 199 weekly online publications of this story, which does
contain some facts, from 2009 on a Same Sky web board narrating the situation of theroyal family (Sirimalee 2022). After the 2014 coup, many of the activists-in-exile wereSmirking against Power323

allegedly forced disappeared. Their sound bites, however, survived and enjoyed greater
popularity during the 2020 wave of protests, which prompted more young people toquestion the royal institution.

Online and Real-Life Subversion
In 2011 social media was not as widely used as in 2020. Most of the protesters in 2011were also of a different generation (Generation X or Y). During the early stages of theCovid-19 pandemic, protesters came to fear the state of emergency. With widespreadlayoffs, the unemployed turned to freelancing and selling products online. One way to
expand target customers was through educational networks. For example, Chula
Marketplace was a trendy Facebook group for Chulalongkorn University alumni, students,and staff to sell their products. Later, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an exiled pro-monarchicalreform academic, created another similarly named Facebook group—Royalist Marketplace—to mock the trend of marketplaces. Contrary to what its name suggests, Royalist
Marketplace does not advocate for royal privilege. It is a discussion board for Pavin’s
followers, democracy sympathizers, and more radical republicans (Schaffar 2021). The
group became a safe space to criticize and make fun of the monarchy. With increasing
discontent over the expansion of royal privilege and government mismanagement,
more people joined the group and it grew to over two million members, making it one of
the world’s largest Facebook groups. The name “Royalist Marketplace” cannot betaken at face value as the group sells nothing; its name is a mask for ridiculing themonarchy. This became one of the biggest inside jokes in Thailand. Pavin was given themock royal name Somdej Phra Nangjao Pavinsuda Phraphanpee Luang (Queen Dowager
Pavinsuda) and a royal coat of arms. Somsak Jeamteerasakul, another exiled promonarchical-reform critic activist-scholar, was given the title Somdej Phra Jeamklao
Chao Yuu Hua (King Jeam) as can be observed in Fig. 1.
On Twitter, hashtags can intensify public opinion. Hashtags such as#WhyDoWeNeedAKing were used more than 1.2 million times in 24 hours on March
21–22, 2020, showing the public’s attitude toward the king’s abandoning the country
during the Covid-19 pandemic (Reuters 2020). Hashtags such as #RoyalMotorcadeand #IslandShutdown also showed the people’s discontent with the monarchy:#RoyalMotorcade was a complaint about unplanned road closures causing traffic disruptions just because a member of the royal family wanted to travel. Another role ofhashtags, together with the Facebook group, was to rally people to protest. Hashtags
such as #15OctoberGoToRatchaprasong—to display protesters’ strength through324

Chai SkulchokchaiFig. 1 A Banner from the #ThammasatWillNotTolerate Protest on August 10, 2020
Projects the Image of Pavin and Somsak against a Gold Background, Usually
Reserved for the Royal Family. Pavin and Somsak Also Have Their Coat ofArms. The Writing on the Banner Is “Duay Kao Duay Kang-om Moo Krata”(With Rice, Curry, and Pork Barbecue), a Parody of “Duay Klao Duay Kramom
Kor Decha” (With the Top of My Forehead Paying Respects).
Source: Prachatai (2020)

numbers—reached 68,000 posts within minutes on October 15, 2020 (Cod 2020).
However, online subversion alone was not enough to bring about regime change;
real-life mobilization was needed. From the Royalist Marketplace banner to the imageof Pavin in royal uniform, there were frequent signs of resistance at gatherings andpolitical events—even at Thammasat University’s graduation ceremony, which wasattended by the king. Anti-monarchists gave Pavin the title of queen dowager, ranked
above Queen Suthida and Royal Consort Sineenat.
The power of hashtag activism transformed tweets into real-life activism. Two instances
will be discussed here: the mobilization of #CastPatronusCharmProtectingDemocracy
and People’s Runway. The first hashtag event was inspired by the iconic Patronus
Charm from the Harry Potter franchise. The charm was used against “He Who Must
Not Be Named,” an alias of “Lord Voldemort.” Lord Voldemort was none other thanthe monarch, whose name cannot be uttered in a negative way. The creative theme
represented the younger generation who participated in this protest. Not long after that,
People’s Runway was organized on Silom Road, Bangkok’s financial hub. Intended tomock the lavish spending of Princess Sirivannavari on her fashion brand and runway
events, the event took place on the same day as the release of the princess’s new wintercollection. Its iconic photo portrayed a woman in Thai national costume walking on a red
carpet, similar to Queen Suthida walking to the Grand Palace, while the king described
Thailand as the “Land of Compromise.” Traditionally, Thai national costumes wereSmirking against Power

325

designed and promoted by Queen Dowager Sirikit. Wearing them symbolized loyalty
to the monarchy. On the surface, People’s Runway demonstrated loyalty, but its true
intent was to mock Queen Suthida and Princess Sirivannavari. Both cases show how
protesters avoided directly calling out the monarchy, instead doing so under the guise of
a fictional character or a show of loyalty. Although the People’s Runway leader was
charged under Article 112, the district court put aside the matter by claiming that it
fell under the criminal court’s jurisdiction (Anonymous 2022a). However, the person
dressed as Queen Suthida was sentenced to two years in prison (Anonymous 2022b).
Another example of subversion by innuendo is the “Mom Dew Diary” Facebook
page. Mom Dew is a transgender woman who looks like Queen Dowager Sirikit. Using
the word “Mom” (The Honorable) to pretend she has royal lineage, she imitates theway Queen Dowager Sirikit talks and dresses. Her cover photo shows her aiming a gunin a shooting range, similar to a famous photo of Queen Dowager Sirikit. She often visits
places with her attendant to support (democratically aligned) people. Traditionally,wearing a royal-designed Thai dress signifies that one is upholding national values,
which include loyalty to the monarch. Parodying acts of patriotism and Queen Dowager
Sirikit has become one of Mom Dew’s most iconic aspects. In late 2022 she started a
TV program called News from Mom Dew Page, a parody of News from the Palace, whichis broadcast every day at 8 a.m. With a marching song and a news anchor’s voice reading
the introduction, it is similar to News from the Palace.
Parit Chiwarak, one of the leaders of the resistance, wore a crop top (inspired bya photo of the king in Munich) to Siam Paragon, which is partly owned by King Rama X’ssister Princess Sirindhorn, to mock the king by copying his infamous fashion choices.
He was immediately charged under the lèse-majesté law. In another case, he performeda Choi song in public under the alias of “Khai Nui.”1) The lyrics were about two womenfighting over a man. Viewers could immediately recognize that Khai Nui was a parodic
version of Queen Suthida, as her nickname is Nui and the dress Parit wore was very
obvious. The fight between Queen Suthida and Royal Consort Sineenart is a topic ofgossip among Thai people, but previously no one vocalized it.

The Royalist Reasons
Before the protests started, Pavin and Somsak, together with many academics andactivists, were labeled as “nation haters” for wanting to abolish the monarchy. Many of1) A Choi song is a kind of folk song originating from the central part of Thailand. Normally it is sungby two or three singers. It frequently uses puns and double meanings to make fun of something.

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Chai Skulchokchai

them, including Pavin, explained that they were also “royalists” who cared, that theywanted to transform the monarchy to make it more resilient to change and adapt to thepresent-day world. They by no means wanted a republican Thailand. Therefore,
Royalist Marketplace may not be a parody but indeed a genuine effort to improve themonarchy by pointing out its weaknesses.

Transnational Parodies
In 2020, at the peak of the youth protest, an insignificant Twitter post showing
cityscapes from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand and referring to Hong Kongas a country sparked a Twitter war between China and Thailand. The person who posted
was the girlfriend of a Thai actor who had Chinese audiences. The actor retweeted thepost, which led to his Chinese audience demanding that he apologize for calling Hong
Kong a country rather than a territory (Buchanan 2020). Soon after, Chinese Twittertrolls joined in and a Twitter war erupted. Many Chinese trolls tweeted derogatory
statements about Thailand, such as “The Thai government sucks” and “Your king isugly.” They found that Thai young adults already hated their government and questioned
their king. As a result, not only did the Chinese Twitter trolls fail to insult Thais, but
Thai Twitter accounts used the Chinese trolls’ posts to criticize Thailand instead—something that confused even the angry Chinese. This roundabout criticism helped
the Thais to avoid risking jail time of three to 15 years.
Some Thais countered Chinese trolls with memes undermining Chinese cultural
hegemony by pointing out its oppressive nature. By mentioning the Tiananmen Squaremassacre and Winnie the Pooh, Thais put Chinese trolls in an uncomfortable situation,
since such references are heavily censored in China. The adverse outcome for China
from this Twitter war was pan-Asian solidarity against China’s authoritarianism and infavor of democracy. The Milk Tea Alliance was formed by Thais, Hongkongers, andTaiwanese, followed by people from the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and India asa coalition for democracy (Barron 2020; Salam 2022). This greatly benefited the Thaiyouth movement as its democratic agenda gained international publicity. The practiceof Thais taking the help of foreigners to question their own country became so normalizedthat a Malaysian model even asked Thais to roast the Malaysian government in exchange
for Malaysians roasting the Thai monarchy—a way for both sides to avoid getting into
legal trouble observable in Fig. 2.

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Fig. 2 This Post Illustrates Transnational Cooperation
between Thais and Indonesians in Criticizing Each
Other’s Government to Avoid Being Prosecuted.
Source: @_nsyakinah (2022)

The Change“No God, No King, Only Human,” a quote from the BioShock video games, was displayedon Ratchaprasong SkyWalk during the 2020 protests and chanted by young protesters
at the Pathumwan intersection. It indicated the people’s loss of faith in religion and the
king as an agent of positive change. Parody and cynicism weaken authoritarian regimes
by exposing their flaws and mocking them under the guise of loyalty. Though it is not
sufficient to topple a regime, satire can increase the cost of repression to a point that it
is no longer worth the trouble, which may prompt a regime to reconsider its position.
Demonstrations in Thailand have led to tremendous changes. People are bolder inspeaking about the royal family in public, and reverence for the monarch has decreased.
One example is discussions on the amendment and appropriateness of Article 112,
previously a taboo topic, which every political party discussed openly during the 2023
election. Royal sayings became something to mock and change, such as “Duay klao

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Chai Skulchokchai

duay kramom kor decha” (With the top of my forehead paying respects) to “Duay kao
duay kang-om moo krata” (With rice, curry, and pork barbecue). An abbreviation of
SPCR, or “Song phra charoen” (May the monarch prosper), was trivialized to “Thappee
cha rueng” (The rice paddle is falling).
The decreased reverence for the monarch is not merely superficial. Every graduation
ceremony in Thailand is traditionally presided over by a member of the royal family.
This is one of the few chances to get close to royalty in Thailand and usually counts as
an opportunity of a lifetime. However, after King Rama IX died, fewer students beganattending graduation ceremonies. The number dropped further after the start of the
youth movement, with campaigns urging people not to attend. The Thammasat University
graduation ceremony is always presided over by the king. In 2020, of the 7,756 graduating students only 3,280—or 42.29 percent—attended the graduation rehearsal, arequirement for attending the main ceremony (Isranews 2020). Attendance hadalready fallen from 70 percent to 50 percent in prior years, reflecting the monarch’s
drop in popularity among the younger generation (Isranews 2020). Instead, people
printed out life-size models of three academics-in-exile—Pavin, Somsak, and Puey
Ungphakorn—dressed as royals and received their degrees from the models instead
as can be observable Fig. 3.
Many businesses joined in the protests to boost their sales, demonstrating thatthe younger generations are now the target audiences of businesses. In 2022 Thai
Vietjet Air announced an April Fool’s promotion of a flight from Nan Province to Munich
for 1,010 baht, reflecting the country’s ten reigns (ManagerOnline 2022). Nan is thebirthplace of Royal Consort Sineenart, and Munich is the king’s favorite luxury vacation
destination. Lazada, one of Thailand’s largest e-commerce platforms, issued a May 5 or
5.5 promotional video featuring Aniwat, a transgender woman, sitting in a wheelchairwith an unusual neck position (BBC Thai 2022). The video was a caricature of Princess
Chulabhorn, who often uses a wheelchair and has a distinctive posture. Both cases led
to a public outcry from royalists demanding that the government take action. The video
was even accused of mocking the disabled. Lazada was threatened with being charged
under Article 112, and the army prohibited deliveries from the company (Hoskins 2022)—
though as of this writing no legal action has been taken. Nevertheless, the cases
showed that parodic sentiments had spread from the individual to the corporate level,reflecting the general perception of a legitimacy crisis with the royal family. Acts thatwere once meaningless displays for revering the monarch have become acts usedagainst hegemony.
Salim is a word to describe conservative urban-educated middle-class baby boomers
who support traditional establishments such as the monarchy and the use of military

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329

Fig. 3 Life-Size Printout of Highly Respected People from Thammasat University on
the Occasion of the 2020 Graduation Ceremony
Source: Freetupandit (2020)

force. As such, they distrust any elements that pose a threat to their core values, suchas the Thaksin government and a more liberal democratic system. Since this generation
are now adults, they are convinced they are more qualified and morally superior when it
comes to judging politics (Faris 2011). Though salim were once the main determiners
of government stability, the word has regressed to becoming a derogatory identifier
for people who prefer authoritarian governance. Kwai daeng (Red buffalo), once a term
for uneducated provincial people who protested against the salim and their system,
became a symbol of pride as society began seeing their cause as pro-democracy. The
commemoration of the 1976 massacre, which had come to be regarded as obsolete by the
public, gained interest among young people as it represented the democratic movementthat had been suppressed by the military. None of this would have happened if not
through the use of social networks to spread information, mock the regime, and display
cynicism. Similarly, the Siamese Revolution of 1932, once viewed as a premature

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Chai Skulchokchaitransformation to democracy, became a symbol of improvement for commoners.

Breaking with the Past
Waso Vandenhaute (2021) has discussed in detail how Thais have lost faith in “Thai-styledemocracy.” Thai-style democracy and its belief in “goodman politics,” supported bymany royal speeches, originated from Dhammaracha occult and King Rama IX’s speechin which he said Thais could not prevent bad people from politics but could select goodpeople to prevent bad people from governing the country (Bhumibol 1969). As hyperroyalism intensified from 1992, King Rama IX represented the ultimate “goodman”
since he practiced Dhammaracha precepts well. His guiding influence in Thai politics
gave birth to “guided democracy,” in which he guided his nation using goodmen. This
strategy was successful in helping the economy prosper under the Prem Tinsulanonda
government.
Prayut’s coup and government were welcomed initially because of his appeal as agood and loyal man. Nevertheless, his regime lost support due to its mismanagement
and inability to improve the country’s economy. The death of King Rama IX and scandalsof King Rama X had a ripple effect that lessened the junta’s legitimacy, since the monarchy
and junta were viewed as being aligned. The goodness of the royal institution, which
supports the government’s legitimacy, became questionable. With that came the realization that guided democracy or Thai-style democracy was not working anymore—what
had been viewed as beneficial was actually contributing to people’s despair politically,
economically, and mentally. Consequently, many chose to distance themselves from thepast, from good and moral politics. The state’s emphasis on virtue and goodness
became so intense that these qualities became objects of absurdity. Parodies andmockery of the monarch became a way for people to cope with reality, similar to stiob in
the Socialist bloc during late socialism. The fact is that no matter how strong hegemonyof form is, subversion will eventually find a way to bypass it. The irony of this type of
regularity (where everything looks normal and people still perform meaningless activities, so there is no warning of change) is that the authoritarian system works withalmost no direct resistance—a peaceful society. Nonetheless, since this system is notaccustomed to change, it is also structurally fragile. The direct effect of laughter stemming from despair and anger is the delegitimization of the royal institution by convincing
people to take it lightly (although the Thai government takes it very seriously). As aresult, when there is an attempt at change, the system cannot adapt and maintain thestatus quo since people are already prepared for the change.

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Dictators Have No Sense of Humor
As stated by Yurchak (2003) and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002), small acts of subversion are
allowed in the private sphere as a way for people to express their discontent. For thestate, such acts in public must be prevented at all costs, apart from the few “acceptable”
parodies in stiob. With traditional media in decline, the focus has shifted to new media
and education. Thailand’s army established the Information Operations Unit to combat
subversion in the online world, while the new preschool curriculum forces children tolearn about King Rama X—mostly about his virtues, such as being the wise patriarchof the nation and a unifying figure (Thailand, Ministry of Education 2018; Wongsapan
2022). However, the intensity of royal propaganda led to an increasing number ofdemonstrations by middle-school students advocating for a propaganda-free curriculum.
In 2020 a constitutional amendment was proposed to abolish the authority of thesenate to vote for the prime minister. Ultimately rejected, this was a petition by the
ILaw Project and received more than 100,000 signatures, double the original target.
The reason for the proposal was that senators were handpicked by the junta, giving
General Prayut the advantage to be elected as prime minister. A crowd rallied to theparliament at Kiakkai to pressure the senate to accept the amendment because theywanted a democratic system in which the prime minister could be chosen (indirectly) by
the people. During deliberations, the parliament was heavily guarded by fully equippedriot police. The People’s Party 2020 group rallied the people to confront the police. The
protesters claimed to have an army (the masses) and navy (represented by floating
rubber ducks) by their side. They brought rubber ducks to the Chaophraya River,behind the parliament. In the ensuing confrontation, the police deployed a high-pressurechemical water gun and the protesters used the rubber ducks as a shield. Rubber ducks,
which are a protest symbol in Serbia, Kosovo, and Russia, are becoming a symbol of themasses in Thailand. Within a few days, the police banned a wholesale store in Bangkok
from selling rubber ducks. The rubber ducks were called Kromluang Kiakkai Ratsadorn
Boriruk, or “Prince Protector of People at Kiakkai.” In subsequent protests, these rubber
ducks became an icon. An anonymous Facebook user started selling “Royally given
duck calendars,” mocking the tradition of distributing calendars with photos of the royalfamily. The court jailed the seller for two years for selling something indirectly mocking
King Rama X.
Sanctions against parodies and subversion came slow but firm. Many protest
leaders were charged with lèse-majesté and accusations of sedition. Although most of
the charges were eventually dismissed, the accused were ordered to be jailed without
bail while awaiting the court’s decision because the charges fell under national security.

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Chai Skulchokchai

In retaliation, many went on hunger strike to demand the right to bail. Many of themwere not sui juris. The longest hunger strike lasted 64 days (Standard Team 2022).
There were at least 15 cases of hunger strikes from 2021 to 2022 (Admin28 2022). Allof this reflects the lengths to which both the state and youths were willing to go. While
the state imposed sanctions to prevent anyone from undermining its authority, including
through mockery, youths became more desperate. To protest against the regime andthe abuse of legal power, they upped the stakes by going on dry fasts as a last resort.
On January 16, 2023, Orawan (Bam) and Thantawan (Tawan) announced theirhunger strike against injustice, calling on the court to allow political prisoners to file forbail (Online Reporters 2023). They decided to go on hunger strike after the court canceled
their friends’ bail. Bam and Tawan found themselves pushed into a corner. With the
movement’s strength greatly weakened by despair, the chances of their being imprisoned
while awaiting trial were now higher than before. They refused bail and used theirbodies and lives as a final weapon against injustice; they had nothing left to lose. Afternearly two months, the court finally heard their pleas and granted bail to 13 of their 16
fellow protesters who were on trial (Online Reporters 2023). On March 11, 2023, Bamand Tawan announced that they would stop their hunger strike as they could not survive
much longer and their close confidant had asked them to stop (Online Reporters 2023).
Some of their demands were met. They still urge the masses to continue fighting alongwith them.

From Laughter to Symbols
It was clear that various types of violence—from tear gas to high-pressure chemical
water canon—used by the state could undermine morale. Consequently, the movement
had to adopt new tactics. Symbols became a handy tool, replacing laughter with something more serious and more representative of the struggle of the masses. The use of
the Hunger Games’ three-finger salute was the first symbol used to represent the
movement’s three demands. The rubber duck was introduced later as a mascot of the
movement and a mockery of the state—a mere plastic toy turned into a security threat.
Bam and Tawan’s dry-fasting strikes were a symbol of nonviolent campaigns against
the broken legal system. On March 29, 2023, a member of Taluwang (Penetrate the
Palace), one of the many protesting groups, painted the wall of the Grand Palace with ananarchist symbol and a crossed-out number 112 (Khaosod English 2023). That man,along with his camerawoman, was apprehended on site by the police. To quote theanonymous artist Banksy, “Graffiti is one of the few tools you have if you have almostSmirking against Power333

nothing.” The man who defaced the palace wall had almost nothing: he was a child of a
CD vendor during the Red Shirt protest and had had to escape the bloody government
crackdown. He was clearly a working-class person who had already experienced trauma
and had nothing much left to lose (Khaosod English 2023). As for the camerawoman,at 15 she was the youngest person to be charged under Section 112 (Admin20 2023).
She defied the court’s authority and the entire procedure by turning her back to thejudge during the hearing (Admin20 2023). Within a day, similar graffiti was found acrossBangkok. The Grand Palace wall was swiftly repainted the day it was defaced, and thenext day there were mounted police patrolling the area. Posters showing the crossed-out
number 112 by Commoner publishing house were taken down by undercover police
without notification to the publishing house (Natthapol and Kittiya 2023). All theseincidents demonstrated the fragile state of the hegemony of form. Every small act ofdefiance was met with an exaggerated reaction from the state. These reactions createdfriction that seemed absurd to the people and displayed the vulnerability of the state.

Conclusion
Posts with statements such as “You will see what you never saw” are frequently put
up by Charnvit Kasetsiri, a renowned Thai historian. Thailand has been mired in apolitical crisis for almost two decades, during which time many of the “old” have declined
while the “new” have grown up. However, in order to understand why “you will see
what you never saw,” one has to understand the condition Thailand has been in forseveral years. There was hyper-royalism throughout the reign of King Rama IX andcontinuing into the reign of King Rama X. However, it intensified when the king had
more power. As a result, at one point the state of hegemony in Thailand was similar tothat of the late socialist Soviet bloc, as every act was reduced to face value and people
performed meaningless acts in order to fit in. That was how the people were made tobelieve that things would stay the same forever. The eternal state ended when thereign was subjected to the differences between the two kings.
Cynicism and performativity have played an important role in creating and sustaining nations, especially in authoritarian societies. They are part of what Michael Herzfeld(2005) calls “cultural intimacy” by being part of the community of complicity. Simulationand pretense are means of cynicism and performativity in that they conceal people’strue thinking and motives in order to save them from prosecution. When hegemony ofform is imperfect and the eternal state is undermined, people start to question the systemand protest against oppression, seeking more creative ways.

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Thailand joined the third wave of democratization in the 1990s. However, the attempt
was unsuccessful because of the coup in 2006. From the 1990s to 2006, hegemony ofform was developed until the eternal state was achieved. The loss of hegemony became
visible during the final phase of King Rama IX’s reign and surfaced a few years into
King Rama X’s. However, the cracks had begun long before, with many scandals about
the royal family being discussed privately.
The proclaimed neutrality of the royal institution was disproved when the institution
sided with the anti-government Yellow Shirts. With the violent crackdown on the Red
Shirts by the military, many people became disillusioned about the neutrality of the royal
institution. Anti-monarchy graffiti was found in the ruins of the Central World department
store, and the Faiyen band released satirical songs questioning royal propaganda. The
songs challenged the Dhammaracha precepts even before the widespread use of social
media.
The 2020 wave of protests had unprecedentedly young participants who wereconcerned about their future. Royalist Marketplace was created on Facebook andbecame popular among this demographic. On Twitter, there were hashtags attracting
people to join the movement. Information on flash protests spread through these platforms.
Such actions led to cultural change. Many people who would have been happy to receive
their university degree from the royal family opted out and instead received it from aparodic figure of someone they respected. In protests and daily life, the use of innuendo
became more common. This was not only in the real world but also in the safe haven of
the digital world. The Twitter clash between Thai and Chinese netizens is one exampleof Thai netizens using others to indirectly ridicule their royal institution. With fewer
people showing respect to the royalty through their words and actions, the cost ofrepression increased—but not enough for the government to give in. The corporate
world also exploited this trend, which prompted the army to take action. The word
salim, once used with pride for those who opposed the elected government, has become
something many people prefer to forget, while kwai daeng, once a derogatory term for
Red Shirts, has become a source of pride.
One characteristic of Thai politics is the yearning for a morally superior person toplace on a pedestal. However, mismanagement of the royal institution has tainted its
image. The government’s intense hyper-royalism propaganda became so absurd after apoint that people began responding with laughter.
The younger generation like to use Twitter. The social platform creates an illusionof masses of people, as retweets and comments perpetuate the fabricated reality of
onsite political engagement. Though Twitter was used to rally people to protests, thenumber of people present was much lower than the number of tweets. The affectSmirking against Power

335

generated by the illusion and empowerment of Twitter—fear and anger—also played ahuge role. Fear discouraged some people from joining the protest movement, whileanger helped to radicalize others. Police brutality and the risk of severe punishment led
many people to contribute financially rather than showing up. Feeling alienated, protest
leaders resorted to more risky methods. This was the case with Tawan and Bam, whowent on a dry fast to demand their friends’ right to bail. The government also arrested
and charged children as young as 15 years with lèse-majesté.
With the government becoming more violent, cynicism could not protect the masses
anymore. More people were charged with lèse-majesté for creating parodies, so the
movement began using symbols instead. From the Hunger Games’ three-finger saluteto the anarchist graffiti at the Grand Palace, protests became more subjective, yeteveryone understood their meaning. For radicalized participants, turning their backs
to the judge and not uttering a word was an act of opposing the Thai judicial system andits nontransparent treatment.
This study continues the long tradition of studies of satire and cynicism from latesocialism to the Arab Spring uprising. It shows the digitization of resistance by Internet
users who learned from the past and from other movements such as the one in HongKong. However, the government also learned about those movements. With symbols
and protests inspired by popular culture, it is complicated for the authorities to explain
why certain jokes are offensive and a national threat. This demonstrates the fragility ofthe eternal state, which the establishment is fighting to protect.
Accepted: August 21, 2023

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. David Malitz for introducing me to the world of satire, Dr. Ivan Rajkovic forpushing me to initiate this project, and Dr. Jeroen Adam, who has always supported my work. I also
appreciate the feedback from two anonymous reviewers, which improved this work tremendously.

References@_nsyakinah. 2022. offer for indonesians: please roast our power figures more and in return we will
roast your government so neither of us go to jail 🤝 thailand can join in too and we’ll talk shit about
your monarchy. Twitter. https://twitter.com/_nsyakinah/status/1581669772348964865?ref_src=
twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1581669772348964865%7Ctwgr%5E
67878687e1c77bd6e6753e16b2ebb820fbf78173%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F

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