Outline of Judgment on Claim for Injunction on
Operation of No. 3 and No. 4 Units at Ohi Nuclear Power Plant
Fukui District Court, May 21 20141

Main Text

1

The Defendant must not operate No. 3 or No. 4 Reactors at the Ohi Nuclear Power

Plant, at 1-1 Aza Yoshimi, Oshima, Ōi-cho, Oi-gun, Fukui Prefecture, in respect of therelationship to each Plaintiff (166 persons living within the 250 km radius of the Ohi
Nuclear Power Plant) listed in the Plaintiff List 1 attachment.

2.

All of the claims of each Plaintiff (23 persons living outside the 250 km radius of the

Ohi Nuclear Power Plant) listed in the Plaintiff List 2 attachment are dismissed.
3.

Costs arising in relation to each Plaintiff in relation to paragraph 2 are to be borneby said Plaintiffs, and the remaining costs are to be borne by the Defendant.

Reasons
1

Introduction

It is appropriate that, if involved in a business whereby severe damage would be caused to
the lives, health, and livelihood of many people should a serious accident occur, anorganization should be expected to provide safety and a high degree of reliability inaccordance with the size and extent of that damage. This is a reasonable social
requirement and, given that personal rights having survival as the basis therefore have thehighest value in all fields of law, be they public or private law, this should be the guiding
principle for the interpretations made in this case.

1 Professional translation of formal summary of ruling from original Japanese for Greenpeace.

Interests relating to the life, body, soul, and lifestyle of an individual are fundamental to theindividuality of each person, and the entirety of these can be considered to be personal
rights. Personal rights are enshrined in the Constitution (Articles 13 and 25), are thefoundation for people’s lives, and under the laws of our country there are no rights thathave greater value. Accordingly, when there is a risk of a tangible violation of afundamental aspect of these personal rights, namely the personal right to protect life andmaintain one’s lifestyle, a claim can be made for an injunction against violating acts on thebasis of these personal rights. Personal rights belong to each individual, but when the formof the violation has the characteristics of simultaneously violating the personal rights ofmany people, it stands to reason that the claim for an injunction there against is strong.

2

Fukushima Nuclear Accident

The Fukushima nuclear accident forced some 150,000 residents to evacuate and at least
60 people, including hospitalized patients, lost their lives in the evacuation process. It iseasy to imagine that many more people have had their lives shortened as a result of theirfamilies being scattered and from having to live in difficult evacuation conditions.
Furthermore, the Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission considered the possibility of
issuing an evacuation advisory for residents in a 250 km radius from the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which is the same scale as the evacuation area for residents
after the Chernobyl disaster.

There are various views about how much damage is done to people’s health by how many
millisieverts of radiation per year, and the size of the recommended evacuation areas
differs depending on which view is taken, but the Ukrainian government and the Republicof Belarus which have continued to face this issue for over 20 years have large evacuation
areas in place even now. Both governments have wanted to repatriate the residents asquickly as possible, and residents have the same strong desire to return home. This is no
doubt no different from our own country. The fact that both these governments
nevertheless had to take the aforementioned measures casts grave doubts on thelegitimacy of an optimistic view of the health problems caused by radioactive material andfrom it the assertion that a minimum evacuation area is sufficient. The figure of 250 km

was merely an estimate made in a time of emergency, but that does not mean that thisfigure can be automatically judged as being excessive.

3

Safety that Should be Required of the Nuclear Power Station in This Matter(1) Safety Required of Nuclear Power Stations
In light of the issues identified in 1 and 2, above, an extremely high level of safety andreliability must be required of nuclear power stations and thorough measures must be
implemented in order to protect citizens from even the remote possibility of the danger
from radioactive materials..

Nuclear power stations fulfill the important social function of producing electricity, however,since the use of nuclear power is limited to peaceful purposes (Atomic Energy Basic Act,
Article 2) and, as a result, the operation of nuclear power plants as one means of
producing electricity is legally associated with freedom of economic activity (Constitution,
Article 22, Clause 1) and has a lower ranking in the Constitution than the central tenet of
personal rights. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine, outside of a large-scale natural
disaster or a war, anything other than an accident at a nuclear power plant that could havethe potential to cause a situation whereby these fundamental rights are extensively
compromised. Even if it is considered too extreme to argue that the very existence of an
economic activity having such danger, even abstractly, is not permitted under theConstitution, it is natural for an injunction against the same to be allowed if the tangible risk
exists, however remotely, of such a situation occurring. This is clear when contrasted toeven claims in respect of the right to petition for the statement of interference or the right topetition for the prevention of interference, on the basis of land ownership, that are
sustained if the fact of interference or the tangible risk of interference is found, without
questioning the circumstances on the infringing party’s side, namely whether or not the
infringing party was negligent and the scale of the disadvantage to the infringing party
incurred as a result of a claim being sustained.

Society would not continue to develop if latent risk were not permitted in new technology,
therefore it is extremely difficult to determine in a court of law the propriety of an injunction

on the implementation of such technology, if the nature of the risk inherent in thetechnology or the scale of the damage that would be caused thereby is unclear. However,when the nature of the risks inherent in the technology and the scale of the damage
caused thereby are established, safety commensurate with the nature of the risk and thescale of the damage is required when the technology is implemented, therefore adetermination needs simply to be made as to whether or not this safety is maintained, andno turmoil arises as to whether or not social development would be hindered if a certain
level of risk is not allowed. The true nature of the risks of nuclear power plant technology
and the scale of the damage caused thereby have become eminently clear as a result of
the Fukushima nuclear accident. The issue of whether or not tangible risk that would leadto such a situation exists, even remotely, at the power plant in question is a matter thatshould be determined in this case and to avoid such a determination, after the Fukushima
nuclear accident, would be to abdicate the most important obligation imposed on the
Court.

(2) Relationship to Examination Based on Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law

The reasoning in (1) derives from the position and reasonableness, etc., of the personal
rights under the legal system of our country, as outlined above, and is not affected by theform or content of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law or other administrative laws andregulations.

Accordingly, even if there is a provision whereby decisions are entrusted to the electricutility with regards to some of the issues related to safety of nuclear power plants under
the new regulatory standards based on the revised Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law,determinations by the Court should extend to such matters also, and should do so, notfrom the perspective of conforming to the new regulatory standards in relation to matterssubject to the new regulatory standards or from the perspective of the appropriateness of
the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s examination of conformance to the new regulatory
standards, but on the basis of the reasoning in (1).

4Special Characteristics of Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear power plant technology has the following special characteristics: namely, because
the total amount of energy generated at a nuclear power plant is enormous, even after aplant has been shut down, nuclear reactors need to be cooled continuously by using
electricity and water; simply losing power for several hours during that time leads to an
accident; and once an accident occurs, it worsens with the passage of time. These
constitute an inherent and intrinsic danger in the case of nuclear power plants that differsfrom most other technologies, where most of the causes of the spread of damage can beremoved by the simple act of stopping operation.

Accordingly, if an earthquake occurs that may lead to facility damage, operation of the
facility must be quickly shut down, the nuclear fuel must continue to be cooled by water, byusing electricity, even after shutdown, and radioactive material must be prevented fromleaking outside the power plant site even under the remote circumstance in which
extraordinary events occur. These three steps of shutdown, cooling and containment needto all be in place before the safety of a nuclear power plant can be ensured. If, forexample, the plant was not able to be stopped, damage and malfunctions caused by evena slight earthquake could lead to a catastrophic accident. Operation of the plant was able
to be stopped during the Fukushima nuclear accident, but cooling was not possible soradioactive material was discharged externally. In addition, in Japan the safety of nuclear
fuel is considered to be ensured only when the fuel is enclosed in five wall layers and themost important wall among these is considered to be the nuclear reactor containment thathas a highly robust structure.

However, the nuclear power plant in this matter has the following defects in the cooling
function and in the encasing structure in the event of an earthquake.

5

Preservation of the Cooling Function(1) Earthquakes Exceeding 1260 gal

Nuclear power stations use a basic system whereby water is circulated by using an
external AC current, for the cooling function after an emergency shutdown as a result of anearthquake. Earthquakes exceeding 1260 gal cause this system to collapse and it is nearly
impossible for emergency equipment or a reserve means to compensate, which leads to ameltdown. The Defendant has admitted that there are almost no effective means that could
be used if an earthquake of this scale were to occur.

It is a well-known fact that the Seismological Society of Japan has never been able topredict the occurrence of an earthquake of this scale. Earthquakes are a phenomenon that
occur deep underground, therefore analysis of the mechanism of their occurrence must
depend on supposition and conjecture, and argument about and verification of hypotheses
must rely on past data because experiments cannot be performed. Earthquakes havecertainly existed since ancient times and are phenomena that occur repeatedly, however
they do not always occur frequently and reliable records are limited to those of recent
times, which means there is very limited past data to rely on. Accordingly, it is essentially
impossible to make a prediction based on reliable scientific evidence that an earthquake
exceeding 1260 gals will not strike the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant. In fact, ① the greatest
magnitude in the past recorded in Japan was 4022 gals during the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku
Earthquake and the figure of 1260 gals is far below this level; ② the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku
Earthquake was an inland crustal earthquake of the type that could occur at Ohi; ③ nosignificant difference is recognized in the frequency of earthquake occurrences between
the Tohoku district which is where this earthquake occurred, the Hokuriku district were the
Ohi Nuclear Power Plant is located or the adjacent Kinki district, and even the known
active faults in the Wakasa region alone are numerous both on land and under the sea;
and ④ given that the concept itself of the largest earthquake ever does not mean thelargest earthquake in the world since history has been recorded, but merely the largest
earthquake in Japan in recent history, the risk exists of an earthquake greater than 1260
gal affecting the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant.

(2) Earthquakes exceeding 700 gals but less than 1260 galsa.

Event tree claimed by Defendant

The Defendant claims to have anticipated the events that would occur if an earthquake ofover 700 gals struck and have corresponding countermeasures in place. The Defendant
has prepared an event tree listing these events and countermeasures, and claims that if
the listed countermeasures are used in sequence, no damage will occur to the reactor
core and no large-scale accident will occur in the case of earthquakes no greater than
1260 gal.

However, in order for these countermeasures listed in the event tree to be truly effective
countermeasures, three aspects must all be in place: firstly, events connected to thecauses of accidents resulting from earthquakes or tsunamis must be examined without fail;secondly, technologically effective countermeasures must be planned for these events;
and thirdly, these technologically effective countermeasures must be able to be
implemented in the event of an earthquake or tsunami.

b.

Events listed in the event tree

Given that, during a serious accident, one event that occurs might lead to a new event or
occurring events might overlap, it is extremely difficult to identify all the events that areconnected to the primary cause of the accident.

c.

Efficacy of Countermeasures Listed in Event Tree

Furthermore, even putting aside the question of whether or not the countermeasures listed
in the event tree for the events are effective measures, the more serious an event is, once
it occurs, employees of the nuclear power station cannot be expected to implement thesemeasures appropriately and promptly amidst the confusion and agitation that such an
event generates. In particular, the difficulty of doing so becomes even more evident in lightof the following facts:

Firstly, the characteristics of earthquakes are such that they have the same probability ofoccurring during the night, when there are fewer employees present, as during the day. In
reality, how well personnel can immediately respond to a sudden crisis situation andwhether or not the chief manager of the plant who serves as the center of the chain ofcommand is on site are clearly significant factors.

Secondly, implementation of countermeasures from the event tree is premised on theability to grasp what events have occurred but grasping the situation is in itself extremely
difficult. The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission has poured energy into the analysis of the earthquake in relation
to the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident and has identified, by analyzing the timeof the earthquake and the time of the tsunami and by interviewing employees, thepossibility, in addition to the issue of external power supply, that damage was caused by
the earthquake prior to the arrival of the tsunami and was directly connected to theaccident. However, the Commission has not reached findings that would substantiate whatkind of damage the earthquake caused at what locations, and what events were caused
thereby. Generally, when an accident occurs, the cause of the accident is investigated,
findings are made, and the safety of the technology is improved on the basis of thoseresults, but in the case of nuclear power plant technology, once a major accident occurs
there is an extremely high likelihood that the cause of the accident will remain unverified
because the accident site cannot be entered, and in the case of the Fukushima nuclear
accident, there is no guarantee that the cause will ever be verified. Similarly, and evenmore so, while an accident is in progress at a nuclear power plant, it is difficult to grasp
what damage has occurred where and what events are being caused thereby.

Thirdly, even if, for argument’s sake, the events that have occurred have been identified, it
can be assumed that there would be an extremely large number of matters that need to be
dealt with, such as damage at multiple locations, at the same time as the loss of external
power supply caused by the earthquake. On the other hand there is little time available
because there is just over five hours between loss of all AC power supply and the start ofdamage to the reactor core, and once damage to the reactor core has started less than
two hours remain until meltdown begins.

Fourthly, some of the measures that need to be implemented are measures that, by theirvery nature, are only implemented out of necessity during an emergency, and do not lendthemselves to regular drills or trial runs.An external power supply is relied on to cool

nuclear reactors during a shutdown, and although water-cooled emergency diesel
generators, air-cooled emergency generators, and vehicle-mounted electricity generators
are said to be in place for emergency situations, there is no possibility of, for example,
performing a test to find whether the air-cooled emergency generators alone can actuallycool the nuclear reactors, because it would be too dangerous to do so.

Fifthly, it is conceivable that the system for the protective measures that should be taken
can itself be damaged by an earthquake. If even only a portion of the emergency water
inlet channel that extends for some hundreds of meters at the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant aredamaged by an earthquake exceeding 700 gals, it can be assumed that all of the watercooled emergency diesel generators that rely on the function of the emergency water inlet
channel would no longer be able to operate. Furthermore, it can be assumed that it would
be impossible or at least extremely difficult to move what can be said to be the last-resortmeans for cooling, the vehicle-mounted generators, because of the backfilled soil sections
having become uneven due to the earthquake.. Using the identified points above as an
example, multiple pieces of equipment could be expected to fail at the same time or insuccession after an earthquake, given the nature of machinery, therefore the provision ofmultiple pieces of preventative equipment cannot be considered to greatly improve safety
in the event of an earthquake.

Sixthly, if a portion of the radioactive material has actually been leaked, that site cannot
even be approached.

Seventhly, there are a limited number of roads that lead to the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant
site, and support from outside the facility cannot be expected.

d.

Reliability of Basic Earthquake Ground Motion

The Defendant claims that when active faults in the vicinity of the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant
are considered on the basis of research results for those active faults, the maximum
number of gals that can be deduced using seismological logic is 700 and it would be
unthinkable for an earthquake greater than 700 gals to occur. Rather than deliberating theappropriateness and accuracy of numerical calculations based on this logic, it is only
natural to attach importance to the fact that earthquakes exceeding the anticipatedearthquake ground motion have occurred five times, at four nuclear power plants at the
fewer than 20 nuclear power plant sites, in the period of less than 10 years since 2005.
The reason for the repeated errors in earthquake prediction is a matter to be resolved
through future scientific research and is not a matter that this Court needs to make afinding on. All these examples serve to show the limits of human capabilities in the face of
natural events such as earthquakes. The earthquake-related assumptions for the nuclear
power plant in this matter have been undertaken on the basis of records of pastearthquakes and on the basis of examination and analysis of nearby active faults infundamentally the same way as the above four nuclear power plants. No basis can befound which would indicate that the Defendant’s earthquake assumptions are the solereliable assumption.

e.

Margin of Safety

The Defendant claims, on the premise that no damage occurred to important safety
facilities at nuclear power plants as a result of the five example earthquakes discussed inthis matter, that because there is a margin of safety or a safety tolerance at nuclear power
plant facilities, even if an earthquake exceeding the basic earthquake ground motion did
occur, no immediate risk of damage to important safety equipment would occur.

According to the overall gist of the pleadings, generally when facilities are being designed,
the design provides a margin that does not simply meet the required standards but
exceeds the standards many times over, because issues of variation in the material quality
for various structures and uncertain elements such as good or bad welding ormaintenance management come into play. However, even if designed in this way, safety ofequipment cannot be guaranteed in the event that the standards are exceeded. Of course
equipment may not be damaged even if a load exceeding the standards is applied, but thismerely means that the uncertain elements referred to above were relatively stable, and is
not the result of safety having been guaranteed.

Accordingly, even if it is established as fact that, for example, in the past nuclear power
generating facilities withstood an earthquakes exceeding the basic earthquake groundmotion, that fact does not provide any basis for the claim that in the future equipment
would not be damaged if an earthquake exceeding the basic earthquake ground motion
were to occur at the Ohi Nuclear Power Plant.

b.

Loss-of-Power-Supply Accidents

The spent nuclear fuel pool in this matter can no longer maintain the submerged state after
less than three days from when AC power supply is completely lost. Even though thedamage resulting would be so great that it would affect the continued existence of ournation, a critical situation would be reached in less than three days after the total loss of
AC power supply,. Such material is being left without being contained within highly robust
equipment, in other words, as it were, in a naked state.

(4) Summation

It must be stated that the measures that are in place have been based not on a view thatthe safety of our citizens should be given priority above all else, but on the view that
serious accidents only occur very infrequently and that the provision of strong equipment
to encase the spent nuclear fuel would incur a colossal expense given that spent nuclear
fuel is created on a daily basis by the operation of the nuclear power plant in this matter.

7

Current Safety at this Nuclear Power Plant

As seen above, from the perspective of protecting personal rights that have as thefoundation therefor the survival of our citizens from the dangers of radioactive material, notonly does doubt remain about whether or not the safety technology and equipment at thisnuclear power plant are flawless, but rather, it must be admitted that said safety
technology and facilities are vulnerable and could only be conceived of based on an
optimistic view for which there is no substantive basis.

8

Other Claims by the Plaintiffs

The Plaintiffs claim risks having a variety of causes, and claim, e.g., that the function for
stopping the plant when an earthquake has occurred is defective at this nuclear power
plant. However, these claims of risk are interpreted as selective claims, therefore no
determination is required in relation to same. The claims on the basis of environmental
rights are also selective, and therefore, similarly, no determination is required in relation to
the veracity of these claims.

The Plaintiffs claim as reasons for an injunction the lack of a decision about where thehigh-level radioactive waste will be disposed, the extremely high risks of said waste, andthe burden of this disposal issue on future generations given that several tens of
thousands of years are required before the risks disappear. In relation to this morally mostserious of issues, namely the responsibility of people of our generation to the people offuture generations, there is doubt that the Court hearing an injunction application on thebasis of the current legal rights of our citizens has the qualifications to determine thisissue, but the finding is that, on the basis of the explanation provided at 7, no
determination is required regarding this..

9

Other Claims by the Defendant

On the other hand, the Defendant claims that the operation of the nuclear power plant inquestion leads to stable power supply and reduced costs, but it is not legally legitimate forthis Court to take part in the argument that compares rights relating to the very survival ofan extremely large number of people to the issue of whether electricity costs are high or
low, or to make a determination about the merits of said argument. There is an argument
about the outflow or loss of national wealth in relation to this cost issue. However, it is theview of this Court that even if a large trade deficit occurred as a result of stopping theoperation of this nuclear power plant, this should not be considered an outflow or loss ofnational wealth. This Court considers national wealth to be the rich land and the people

livelihoods that have taken root there, and that being unable to recover these is the true
loss of national wealth.

Furthermore, the Defendant claims that the operation of the nuclear power plant is
excellent from an environmental perspective because of the contribution to reducing CO2
emissions. However, the environmental contamination incurred if one serious accident
occurs at a nuclear power plant would be horrific and it would be seriously ill-founded touse environmental concerns as the basis for continuing operation of a nuclear power plant,
in light of the largest ever pollution and environmental contamination in the history of ourcountry having been caused by the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident.

10Conclusion

On the basis of the above, the Court rules that there is tangible risk that people (eachPlaintiff listed in the Plaintiff List 1 attachment) living within a 250 km radius of the Ohi
Nuclear Power Plant will have their personal rights directly infringed by the operation of thenuclear power plant in this matter. Therefore, the claims of these Plaintiffs should besustained.

Fukui District Court – Civil Section 2

Presiding Judge:

Hideaki HIGUCHI

Judge:

Akihiiko ISHIDA

Judge:

Yoshiko MIYAKE