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Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Vol. 13, No. 2

August 2024

CONTENTS
ArticlesPham Thi Yen

US-Vietnam Defense Diplomacy: Challenges from the Ukraine War.............................................................................................................. (201)Zeng Damei
Inter-Construction Goals: Navigating Thailand’s Digital Economy from a
Duan Haosheng		 Sustainable Development Perspective.............................................. (229)
Hjorleifur R. Jonsson

Thailand’s Plural Identities: Contesting the National Imagination in
Fiction and Ethnography..................................................................... (255)

A Study on Indonesian Sociopolitical Design Objects within theChristophera
Ratnasari Lucius		 Framework of Gesamtkunstwerk...................................................... (287)Imam Santosa
Widjaja Martokusumo
Adhi Nugraha
Chai Skulchokchai

Smirking against Power: Cynicism and Parody in Contemporary
Thai Pro-Democracy Movement (2020–2023).................................. (311)Silpsupa Jaengsawang

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang:
Application of Modern Printing Technologies.................................. (343)Book Reviews
Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim

C. Pierce Salguero. A Global History of Buddhism and Medicine.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. .................................. (385)

JPaul S. Manzanilla

Karen Strassler. Demanding Images: Democracy, Mediation,and the Image-Event in Indonesia. Durham and London:
Duke University Press, 2020. ........................................................... (388)Laura Gibbs

Madoka Fukuoka, ed. Ramayana Theater in Contemporary Southeast
Asia. Singapore: Jenny Stanford Publishing, 2023. ......................... (392)

Tania Murray Li

Sophie Chao. In the Shadow of the Palms: More-Than-Human-Becomings
in West Papua. Durham: Duke University Press, 2022. ................. (395)Anoma P. van der Veere, Florian Schneider, and Catherine Yuk-ping Lo,
Muhammad Asad
Latif		 eds. Public Health in Asia during the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Global Health Governance, Migrant Labour, and International
Health Crises. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022. ..... (398)Matsuda Masahiko

Jamie S. Davidson, ed. Just Another Crisis? The Impact of the COVID-19
Pandemic on Southeast Asia’s Rice Sector. Singapore:
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023. ................................................ (402)Wengki Ariando
Bérénice Bellina, Roger Blench, and Jean-Christophe Galipaud, eds.
Narumon Arunotai		 Sea Nomads of Southeast Asia: From the Past to the Present.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2021. ............................................................ (406)Sinae Hyun

Puangthong Pawakapan. Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal
Security Affairs. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021. ..... (409)

Vincent Pacheco

Josen Masangkay Diaz. Postcolonial Configurations: Dictatorship,
the Racial Cold War, and Filipino America. Durham and London:
Duke University Press, 2023. ........................................................... (413)US-Vietnam Defense Diplomacy: Challenges fromthe Ukraine War
Pham Thi Yen*

This article analyzes activities of defense diplomacy between Vietnam and the US
before the Ukraine war. Based on these, the author assesses the possible impactsof the war on US-Vietnam defense cooperation. By clarifying Vietnam’s stance on
the Ukraine war as well as the benefits that the US enjoys through its relationshipwith Vietnam, the author projects an optimistic view of the prospects of US-Vietnam
relations in general and the two nations’ defense diplomacy in particular. The
article asserts that Russia’s “special military campaign” in Ukraine had short-term
impacts on US-Vietnam relations, but in the long term the United States’ strategicinterest in cooperating with Vietnam remains unchanged. The fact that the US has
actively sanctioned Russia over the Ukraine war does not mean that it has forgotten
China, which has been stepping up its unilateral actions in the Indo-Pacific region,
where the US is also building up its influence. Moreover, the concern that China
may imitate Russia to use force against Taiwan or in the South China Sea will likely
further motivate the US to increase cooperation with Vietnam.
Keywords: US-Vietnam relations, defense diplomacy, Indo-Pacific, Ukraine war,
Vietnam’s perspective, challenges

Introduction
Defense diplomacy—which is sometimes labeled as military diplomacy—has emerged
as one of the most important tools of military art in its attempt to minimize the use offorce, although its precise definition has not yet been agreed upon. Historically, the term
appeared in the last decade of the twentieth century. The 1998 “Strategic Defence
Review,” which defined the scope of operations of the UK armed forces, referred to these
activities as “defense diplomacy” deployed toprovide forces that are responsive to the diverse range of operations conducted by the Ministry of
Defence to dispel dissolving hostilities, building and maintaining trust, and supporting the develop-* Faculty of Oriental Studies, Van Hien University, HungHau Campus: Nguyen Van Linh
Avenue, Southern City Urban Area, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
e-mail: yenpt@vhu.edu.vn
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7717-5472
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 201–228© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_201

201

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Pham Thi Yen

ment of democratically responsible armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution toconflict prevention and resolution. (New Challenges to Defence Diplomacy 1999, 38)

Juan Emilio Cheyre in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (2013) defined defense
diplomacy as “implementation, without coercion [or without urgent international or
national obligations], in peaceful time of defence resources to achieve specific nationaltargets, primarily through relationship with others [defense factors/elements basedabroad]” (Cheyre 2013, 2).
Dhruva Jaishankar defined defense diplomacy at the widest and narrowest levels.
Defense diplomacy, according to its broadest definition, covers almost all outward
military operations. Under a narrower definition, the term refers to military activities
carried out with the sole purpose of diplomacy (Jaishankar 2016, 18). Defense diplomacy
activities can be seen as a variant of soft power, used for such purposes as eliminating
hostility and building and maintaining trust, supporting the development of the armed
forces, and contributing to preventing and resolving conflicts. Although there are manydifferent understandings of the concept, in general the main goal of defense diplomacy
is to implement the state’s security policy, and its mission is to create stable, long-term
international relations in the field of defense (Drab 2018, 59). Ian Storey (2021) perceives
defense diplomacy as a political instrument that can be utilized to serve a multitude ofobjectives, including attempts to expand political, economic, and military influence inforeign countries as well as mitigate the influence of rival nations. Additionally, defense
diplomacy can facilitate comprehension of the security perspectives and military capabilities of other countries, and enhance defense cooperation with friendly nations.
Capacity-building support can also be offered to allies, partners, and friends as part ofthis process (Storey 2021). Accordingly, defense diplomacy activities include arms sales,
combined military exercises, educational exchanges, naval port calls, strategic dialogues,
and participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
Thus, in essence, the connotation of defense diplomacy is close to defense cooperation—which is understood as a general term for the scope of activities carried out by
the Ministry of Defense with allies and other friendly countries to promote international
security. Accordingly, the activities of defense cooperation include (but need not be
confined to) security assistance, industrial cooperation, armaments cooperation, Foreign
Military Sales, training, logistics cooperation, cooperative research and development,
Foreign Comparative Testing, and Host Nation Support (DAU 2023)—which are also
prominent activities of defense diplomacy. However, the difference between these twoconcepts lies in their political connotations. While defense diplomacy emphasizes
peace, defense cooperation does not necessarily do so. For example, in war, certain

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parties may cooperate with each other against one or more other parties.
The Vietnamese government considers defense diplomacy to be a critical task andan important component of its three pillars: Party diplomacy, state diplomacy, andpeople-to-people diplomacy. It strives to protect the country by preventing conflicts
early on and resolving disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, contributing to building a peaceful environment, and strengthening strategic trust withpartners to develop the country (Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam2021). It should be noted that Vietnam has not used the term “defense diplomacy” inofficial documents of the Party and the state. Instead, it uses the phrase “foreign
defense affairs” (đối ngoại quốc phòng) or, more broadly, “defense cooperation” and“defense cooperation relations,” all of which emphasize the peaceful spirit of national
defense. Therefore, many Vietnamese scholars use these concepts interchangeably(Nguyễn Thị Huệ 2023).
The main purpose of this article is to clarify the deployment of defense diplomacy
between Vietnam and the US since 1995, then assess the challenges of the Ukraine
war with regard to US-Vietnam relations in general and defense cooperation between
the two countries in particular. The analysis is conducted based on the perspective ofbalance of power theory and theory of great powers balance. The balance of power
theory helps the author explain why the US has increased its presence in the Indo-Pacificregion, thereby strengthening relations with Vietnam, in the face of China’s strong rise.
Meanwhile, the theory of great powers balance helps to clarify Vietnam’s tendency topromote relations with the US as well as shed light on the country’s caution in the faceof “enthusiasm” from the US.
The article is divided into two parts. The first part goes into the details of defense
diplomacy between Vietnam and the US from 1995 to the present. Part two assesses
the challenges of Vietnam-US relations since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, after
clarifying Vietnam’s position on the war.

I Defense Diplomacy between Vietnam and the US since 1995
The US-Vietnam relationship is a special one in the international political arena. Bothcountries have made incredible efforts to promote cooperation in the spirit of putting
aside the past and looking toward the future. In 2013 the two countries established aComprehensive Partnership, and on September 10, 2023 the relationship was elevatedto a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This event positioned the United States
on an equal footing with China, as both became Comprehensive Strategic Partners of204

Pham Thi Yen

Vietnam, bypassing the level of a Strategic Partnership. The trade turnover between
Vietnam and the US has grown continuously, from US$450 million in 1994 to US$123
billion in 2022 (Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2023). The US is
Vietnam’s second-largest trading partner after China, while Vietnam is among the top
ten trading partners of the US. In terms of foreign direct investment, America is
Vietnam’s 11th biggest investor, with a total of 1,138 projects and accumulative registeredcapital of US$10.28 billion as of end-2021, up 32.8 percent and 4.1 percent from 2017,
respectively (Hong-Kong Nguyen and Pham-Muoi Nguyen 2022). All of these facts
demonstrate the unremitting efforts and increasing trust between the two countries.
In that space, defense diplomacy, although it began more slowly than other areas of therelationship, has gradually been tightened and manifested in many practical activities.
In the first ten years after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the twocountries, defense interactions between them were limited to Vietnam sending officers
to attend seminars of the US Pacific Command; exchanges of high-ranking officials; andcooperation in search and rescue, military medicine, and demining. From that initialfoundation, however, defense diplomacy gradually took on a more prominent role,
contributing to the development of US-Vietnam relations.
I-1 Defense Leaders’ Bilateral Interactions
Bilateral defense communications between Vietnam and the US have been built
through visits by defense leaders of the two sides and three dialogue mechanisms: (1)bilateral defense dialogue chaired by the US Pacific Command, starting in 2005; (2)security-politics-defense dialogue chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the twosides, starting in 2008; and (3) defense policy dialogue chaired by the two Defense
Ministries, starting in 2010. In the early years after the normalization of relations,although there were not many significant activities, a series of reciprocal visits weremade to build the foundation for US-Vietnam defense relations. The first contact was
the visit to Vietnam by the US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacificaffairs, in March 1997. This was followed by a visit to the US by Vietnamese Deputy
Defense Minister Tran Hanh in October 1998, shortly after Deputy Prime Minister andMinister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Manh Cam visited the Pentagon that same month.
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s visit to Vietnam in 2000 began to make adifference as it marked the first visit by a US defense secretary to Vietnam since theVietnam War. This event became even more meaningful since it took place on the eveof President Bill Clinton’s visit to Vietnam, which helped create positive coordination
and bring the two countries’ relations to a new height. Three years later, in 2003,
General Pham Van Tra became the first Vietnamese defense minister to visit the US,

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Table 1 Visits by Defense Leaders from the US and Vietnam
Year

American Leaders to Vietnam

Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam and
Deputy Minister of National Defense Tran
Hanh

1998
(March) 2000

Secretary of Defense William Cohen

2003
2006

Defense Minister General Pham Van Tra
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

2009

Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh2010

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates officiallyvisited Vietnam and attended the first ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM+)

2012

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

2015

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
Defense Minister Ngô Xuân Lịch2017
(January) 2018

Vietnamese Leaders to the US

Secretary of Defense James Mattis(October) 2018 Secretary of Defense James Mattis
2019

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper

2021

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin

Source: Compiled by the author from official Vietnamese sources.

giving a new impetus to defense cooperation between the two countries. On thisoccasion, the leaders of the two Defense Ministries agreed to hold meetings andexchanges at the defense ministerial level every three years on a rotating basis between
the two countries. This was considered a visit of historic significance, symbolizing a
new phase of US-Vietnam relations, in which there were regular meetings andexchanges between defense leaders of the two sides (see Table 1).
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s subsequent visit to the US in 2005 further opened
up the defense relationship between Vietnam and the US. As the first high-ranking
Vietnamese leader to pay an official visit to the US after the war, Prime Minister Phan
Van Khai took an important step when he signed a memorandum for Vietnam to participate in Washington’s international military education and training program. Although
Vietnam later participated only in less sensitive programs (English training), this activity
also helped to strengthen political trust and dialogue, which created an important foundation for the two sides to promote cooperation. Bilateral defense dialogues between
the two countries were started in 2005, chaired by the US Pacific Command (Nguyễn
Đức Toàn 2016, 66).
As agreed in 2003, the defense ministers of Vietnam and the United States alter-206

Pham Thi Yen

nately made reciprocal visits in 2006 and 2009, strengthening the growth momentumof bilateral defense relations. After the 2006 visit to Vietnam by US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, the George W. Bush administration announced a partial relaxationof the ban on the sale of non-lethal defense equipment to Vietnam on December 29,
2006, paving the way for US companies to export some defense goods and services toVietnam (Nguyễn Mại 2008).
In June 2008, on the occasion of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’svisit to Washington, the two countries agreed to hold security-politics-defense dialogues
at the deputy ministerial level. This form of dialogue—which was first held in October
2008 in Washington—became an important annual mechanism for Vietnam and the US
to promote cooperation on security and defense issues. The US-Vietnam defense dialogue took on a more focused direction in 2010, when the two Defense Ministries
agreed to hold a defense policy dialogue at the deputy ministerial level. The objectiveof the dialogue was to help the two Defense Ministries strengthen cooperation, enhancemutual trust and understanding, and contribute to peace and stability in the region.
The defense policy dialogue together with the security-politics-defense dialogue havebecome two strategic dialogue mechanisms in US-Vietnam defense cooperation andare held almost every year.
In 2011, within the framework of the second US-Vietnam defense policy dialogue,
the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on promoting bilateraldefense cooperation (Tuổi Trẻ 2011), which identified five key areas: (1) maritime
security cooperation, (2) search-and-rescue cooperation, (3) peacekeeping operations,(4) humanitarian and disaster relief, and (5) cooperation between defense universities
and research institutes. The memorandum of understanding was a big step: it marked
the first time the two countries officially formed a clear framework for defense cooperation. Although the agreement was only in the form of a memorandum of understanding, with a low level of legal binding, it was a very important milestone. The
mechanism for defense cooperation between Vietnam and the US was elevated to a
Joint Vision Statement during US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit to Vietnam in2015. US-Vietnam defense cooperation then started to be implemented on the basis of
the memorandum of understanding (in 2011) and the Declaration of Joint Vision on
Defense Cooperation (in 2015).
Accordingly, there was a series of activities to tighten defense ties between Vietnam
and the US. Especially from 2010, visits by defense ministers became more frequent,
no longer based on the previous principle of rotating every three years. More significantly, these regular exchanges took place on Washington’s initiative, with the US secretary of defense visiting Vietnam in 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018 (twice), 2019, and 2021. In

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2012, during his visit to Vietnam, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta called at Cam
Ranh port1)—where there was a US military base during the Vietnam War. This event
symbolized the good prospects of US-Vietnam relations, especially in the context of
the US adjusting its policy toward a pivot to Asia in order to contain China.
The two countries’ subsequent actions in the following years demonstrated thebreakthrough growth of US-Vietnam defense relations. In December 2013 US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Vietnam, where he announced that the US intended toprovide new assistance to Vietnam with a value of up to US$18 million; this would startwith personnel training and the provision of five high-speed patrol boats (US Departmentof State 2013). In October 2014 the US partially lifted the arms embargo on Vietnam,
and in May 2016 this ban was officially done away with during President Barack Obama’s
emotional visit to Vietnam.
The progress of US-Vietnam defense cooperation continued to be displayed
through subsequent visits to Vietnam by US defense leaders. In particular, in 2018 US
Defense Secretary James Mattis visited Vietnam twice (in January and October). While
the first trip set the stage for the historic visit of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson
to Da Nang port two months later (March 2018), Mattis’s return to Vietnam for thesecond time in less than a year showed America’s attention to strengthening its partnership with Vietnam. After Mattis, the new US defense secretary, Mark T. Esper,
visited Vietnam in November 2019, reaffirming the US commitment to relations with
Vietnam. During the visit, Esper called for an end to bullying and illegal activities thatwere negatively affecting coastal ASEAN countries, including Vietnam; he asserted
that “such behavior is in stark contrast to the US vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacificin which all countries, large or small, can develop together in peace and stability” (VOV2019). More important, Esper once again emphasized the United States’ support fora strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam that would contribute to international
security and the rule of law. At the same time, he also stressed the importance of thebilateral partnership between Vietnam and the US as well as how this partnership had
contributed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
The messages that Esper conveyed were very meaningful to Vietnam in the context of China bullying Vietnam in the South China Sea. In July 2019, the Chinese ship
Haiyang Dizhi 8 violated Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone to supposedly carry out apetroleum survey and seismic research. China blatantly repeated its illegal action in the1) This was the Cam Ranh International Port, which is a purely civilian-run enterprise—distinct fromthe military base at Cam Ranh Bay, which was used by the United States and Soviet Union/RussianFederation.

208

Pham Thi Yenwaters of Vanguard Bank,2) which was completely within Vietnam’s exclusive economic
zone, as if it wanted to challenge the power of international law. Esper’s statement inthis context therefore showed the United States’ support and sympathy for Vietnam.
The fact that Esper visited Vietnam soon after replacing Mattis also proved America’s
commitment to strengthening relations with Vietnam despite the turnover of personnel
during President Donald Trump’s administration at the time.
I-2 Ship Visits and Naval Exercises
In addition to exchanges between defense leaders, visits by military ships made a great
contribution to the process of strengthening US-Vietnam defense relations. After the
first successful visit by a Vietnamese defense minister to the US—General Pham Van
Tra in 2003—US Navy warships were allowed to visit Vietnam. A week after thehistoric visit by General Pham Van Tra, at noon on November 18, 2003, the US
destroyer USS Vandegrift FFG-48 docked at Saigon port. This was the first visit by an
American naval ship to Vietnam after nearly thirty years, and it was viewed as a symbolof ice-breaking in US-Vietnam relations. Over the following years, many US warships
made friendly visits to Vietnamese ports,3) conducting meaningful civilian exchanges.
For instance, the naval medical ship USNS Mercy visited and treated more than eleventhousand Nha Trang patients in June 2008, and it continued to do the same with thousandsof Quy Nhon people two years later (June 2010). These were not only symbolic activitiesof defense diplomacy; with the practical significance of the visits by US ships, the understanding and trust between the peoples of the two countries were also enhanced.
The significance of American ships in Vietnam was most evident in Cam Ranh Bay.
After Vietnam announced (in 2010) the opening of Cam Ranh to military and civilian shipsof all countries in need, the US became the first partner to make use of this strategic
gulf. In November 2011 the USNS Richard E. Byrd, a dry cargo/ammunition ship of
the 7th Fleet of the US Navy, made a historic visit to Cam Ranh (MarineLink 2011),
marking the first arrival of a US naval ship at Cam Ranh port in more than three decades(since 1975). The USNS Richard E. Byrd remained at Cam Ranh port for seven days
to carry out regular repair and maintenance. The majority of staff on board were civilian
forces, helping to reinforce the peaceful goodwill and cooperation that the two countries
had built. The sight of American ships in Cam Ranh became more frequent after Cam
Ranh international logistics service port came into operation in March 2016. After the2) During the nearly four months from July 3, 2019 to October 24, 2019, the Chinese ship Haiyang
Dizhi 8 entered and left Vietnam’s waters four times.
3) From 2003 to 2016, there were about twenty visits by US warships to Vietnam’s seaports (seeHoàng 2017, 75).

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USS John S. McCain and the submarine USS Frank Cable (AS 40) became the first USNavy ships to visit the strategic port in October 2016, a series of visits were made byother naval vessels. Famous American warships such as the USS Mustin, USNS Fall
River (T-EPF-4), and USS Coronado (LCS 4) showed up in Cam Ranh within a shortperiod of time. Among the major powers that were interested in and visited Cam Ranhinternational logistics service port, the US was the country with the highest number ofvisits (Pham Thi Yen 2021, 41).
There was no record of US warships docking at Cam Ranh port in 2018; however,the visit of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Da Nang port in March 2018 marked
a new turning point in defense diplomacy between Vietnam and the US. An American
aircraft carrier appearing for the first time in Vietnam was an important symbol, atestament to America’s growing interest in the country. In March 2020, exactly two
years after the visit of the USS Carl Vinson, a second US aircraft carrier, USS Theodore
Roosevelt, called at Da Nang port, conducting technical, sports, and community
exchanges in the central coastal city. This was the first event commemorating the 25th
anniversary of US-Vietnam relations.
According to the report by Radio Free Asia on July 5, 2022, the aircraft carrier
USS Ronald Reagan was scheduled to visit Vietnam in the latter half of July (Army
Recognition 2022). However, this plan was scrapped following the crisis that erupted
after the visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives.
In fact, it is reported that the US had been pushing for an annual aircraft carrier visit toVietnam but Vietnam had consistently declined. Vietnam’s reluctance to host frequent
visits by US aircraft carriers stemmed from the potential security implications that may
have had on the country’s relations with China. The regular presence of US aircraft
carriers may have sent unintended messages to China and even been perceived as a
hostile act, thus complicating Vietnam’s efforts to balance its relationships with major
powers and peacefully resolve territorial disputes.
Apart from the visits by US ships, there were joint military exercises for peacefulpurposes by Vietnam and the US. One notable feature of Vietnam’s participation in
joint military exercises with the United States and other countries has been its confinement to training activities. Vietnam engages only in diễn tập (practice/exercise; positive
connotation) rather than tập trận (exercise; negative connotation), in order to avoid
sending messages of taking sides to prevent/counter the other side, which is in line with
its steadfast “Four Nos” policy. Accordingly, joint military exercises between the US
and Vietnam have been conducted since 2010 with an initial focus on non-traditional
security issues of concern to the two countries. On August 8, 2010, the US nuclear
aircraft carrier USS George Washington arrived in international waters off Da Nang and210

Pham Thi Yen

conducted exchange activities with Vietnamese military and government officials. The
two navies then conducted a joint search-and-rescue exercise. In 2011 and 2012, theUSS George Washington continued to welcome delegations of Vietnamese officials andmilitary officers while operating in the South China Sea.
In 2012, Vietnam participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise for the
first time as an observer. Started in the 1970s, RIMPAC is the world’s largest multilateral naval exercise; it is organized by the United States every two years in areas of
Hawaii and Southern California. Vietnam continued to be an observer at RIMPAC 2016,
then in 2018 it sent a force (without warships) to attend for the first time.4) Also, since
2018, Vietnam has participated in Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT)—an annual maritime exercise initiated by the US in 2002 with the original name“Southeast Asian Cooperation against Terrorism.” SEACAT aims to promote commitments on partnership, maritime security, and stability in Southeast Asia. To date,Vietnam has participated in this exercise three times.5) Besides SEACAT, Vietnam
has also cooperated with the US in another form of multilateral exercise in Southeast
Asia, the ASEAN-US maritime exercise. This exercise was held in September 2019
under the agreement signed between ASEAN defense ministers and the US in 2018.
The participation of all ASEAN members (including Vietnam) marked the first timethat the ten ASEAN countries had a simultaneous military presence in the South
China Sea.6) The ASEAN-US exercise—held under the theme of “Enhancing mutual
understanding and combined maritime combat capability”—highlighted the interaction
and coordination between ASEAN and the US in the face of maritime security challenges in the region. This activity demonstrated that ASEAN’s trend toward multilateralism7) was not merely symbolic but also brought value to each member country,
especially Vietnam.
Although ship visits and maritime exercises are symbolic in nature, such continuous4) The US invited Vietnam to participate in RIMPAC 2020, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic Vietnam
and many other countries did not attend. Other ASEAN countries that have participated in thisactivity are Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. China participated
twice in RIMPAC—in 2014 and 2016; since 2018, the US has not invited China to attend.
5) In 2018, 2019, and 2020.
6) Even though the training area is located in the Gulf of Thailand and offshore of Ca Mau (Vietnam),a location that is relatively far from the hotly disputed areas of the South China Sea, the exercise
did not include any drills involving significant combat simulations.
7) Before the exercise with the US in September 2019, ASEAN held three exercises with China: (1)in July 2018, some ASEAN countries and China held a maritime exercise at Changi Naval Base(Singapore); (2) in October 2018, six ASEAN countries and China held joint maritime exercises in
the waters of Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province (China); (3) an exercise between ASEAN (tenmember countries) and China took place in April 2019, in Qingdao (China) (see Pháp luật 2019).

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interaction has fostered the substantial development of Vietnam-US defense relations,especially in the fields of military aid and post-war settlement.
I-3 Defense Trade and Defense Aid
Due to historical factors, Vietnam’s largest partner in defense trade is Russia. Although
the US was the world’s largest arms supplier and Vietnam-US relations have existed
since 1995, defense cooperation between Vietnam and the US in the early years was notnormal. This was because the ban on the sale of weapons (both lethal and non-lethal)
imposed on Vietnam since 1984 had not been lifted. After 2006, when the George W.
Bush administration allowed the sale of non-lethal military equipment to Vietnam (Jordan
et al. 2012, 6), the door to defense trade cooperation between the two countries waspartly opened. Unfortunately, nearly ten years later (in 2014), the promotion of cooperation in defense trade between Vietnam and the US came to a halt because the latter’s
focus shifted to the Middle East in its fight against terrorism. Entering the 2010s, given
the strong rise of China, the US made a “pivot” to Asia in which it reinforced allianceconnections as well as promoted relations with potential partners in the region. The
relationship between Vietnam and the US was strengthened again, creating a foundation
for the prospect of defense trade between the two countries.
Nearly two years after announcing a partial lifting of the ban on the sale of lethal
weapons to Vietnam (October 2014), in May 2016 US President Obama announced acomplete lifting of the ban, which bore many marks of a hostile past. Vietnam-US relations from that moment were officially considered fully normal, which meant Vietnam
had more choices in defense equipment procurement; it also had the opportunity toaccess military equipment with modern technology from the US, which helped to
improve its defense capacity, especially in the field of maritime security.
Cooperation opportunities were created shortly later through defense aid activities.
At the end of 2017, Vietnam received the 3,250-ton Hamilton-class cutter Morgenthau(WHEC 722)8) from the US Coast Guard. This was the first major weapons transferfrom the US to Vietnam, and it helped Vietnam strengthen its maritime law enforcement
capabilities and search-and-rescue capabilities at sea. Next, it was announced during
the visit to Vietnam by US Defense Secretary Esper that a second Hamilton-class Coast
Guard ship would be transferred to Vietnam in 2019 (VOV 2019). The last Hamiltonclass ship of the US Coast Guard, Douglas Munro (WHEC 724), was also declareddecommissioned at the end of March 2021; and according to an unofficial source, thislast ship would also be transferred to Vietnam (Trúc Huỳnh and Yến My 2021)—though
8) In the Vietnam Coast Guard, the Morgenthau is called CSB-8020.

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that has not happened yet. The US Coast Guard has a total of 12 decommissioned
Hamilton-class ships and it has so far transferred or pledged to transport to Bangladesh(two), Bahrain (one), Nigeria (two), the Philippines (three), Sri Lanka (one), and Vietnam(two). If Vietnam receives the Douglas Munro (WHEC 724), it will join the Philippines—
a regional ally of the US—in receiving the maximum number of these large patrol boats.
According to the US State Department, from 2016 to 2019 Vietnam received morethan US$150 million in security assistance from the US Foreign Military Financing
program (US, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 2020), of which more than US$58
million was for supporting the transfer of the two large Hamilton-class patrol ships fromthe US Coast Guard mentioned above. The program also supported the supply of 24
Metal Shark high-speed patrol boats to the Vietnam Coast Guard to improve its maritime
capacity, of which the last six were handed over in May 2020 (Anh Sơn 2021).
Apart from the patrol boats, Vietnam was granted access to unmanned aircraft systems made in the United States. Per the US Department of Defense, Vietnam wasscheduled to receive six ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles with an overall value ofover US$9.7 million (US Department of Defense 2019). It is not known whether thesehave been delivered. Furthermore, the US is scheduled to transport 12 T-6 militarytraining aircraft to Vietnam within the 2024–27 time frame (Tuoi Tre News 2022),
which will aid in enhancing pilot training in the Southeast Asian nation. The T-6 aircraft
program also creates possibilities for cooperation between the two countries in theareas of logistics, flight safety, and aviation medicine, and the US can potentially transfer
other defense equipment to Vietnam. Additionally, Vietnam has registered its pilots toparticipate in the US Air Force training program in the United States. In 2019, Senior
Lieutenant Dang Duc Toai became the first Vietnamese pilot to complete a training
course utilizing T-6 trainer aircraft under the 52-week US Air Force Aviation Leadership
Program. All of these undertakings demonstrate that defense cooperation between
Vietnam and the US is not only symbolic but also practical.
I-4 Cooperation to Resolve War “Legacy” Issues
Another feature of the Vietnam-US defense relationship is resolving the consequencesof the Vietnam War, including mainly the issues of Agent Orange/dioxin and the searchfor soldiers missing in action (MIA). These are legacies left over from the fierce armed
confrontation between Vietnam and the US. Since the normalization of relations, such
issues have been jointly worked on by the two countries, as a testament to the willingness of the two former enemies to ignore the past by facing the past. It is estimatedthat from 1961 to 1971, the US military sprayed about 11 million to 12 million liters ofAgent Orange on the battlefields of Vietnam and about five million Vietnamese people

US-Vietnam Defense Diplomacy

213(from three generations) were infected with this poison (Martin 2012, 1). This is a
deep wound from the past, and strengthening the bilateral relationship will not makemuch sense if the two countries do not focus on healing it.
Starting with Defense Secretary Cohen’s visit to Vietnam in March 2000, the UScommitted to closer cooperation with Vietnam on the Agent Orange issue. In November
2000, on the occasion of President Clinton’s visit to Vietnam, the two sides agreed toestablish a joint research center on the effects of Agent Orange/dioxin (Nguyễn Đức
Toàn 2016, 68–69). In March 2002 the first Vietnam-US scientific conference on Agent
Orange/dioxin was held in Hanoi, with the participation of hundreds of researchers fromthe two countries. A memorandum of understanding was later signed between Vietnam
and the US, in which the two countries agreed to cooperate in research on human healthand future environmental effects from Agent Orange/dioxin as well as establish anadvisory council to monitor the progress of cooperation.
In the following years, the US became more concerned about dealing with theconsequences of Agent Orange/dioxin. In fact, it made practical contributions withfinancial support packages through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the War Victims Fund. In May 2007, US Congress approved abudget of nearly US$3 million to deal with the consequences of dioxin poisoning—related
health care and medical services—at the military base in Da Nang (which was used by
the US as a distribution center for Agent Orange during the war) (Martin 2012). In
addition, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies foundation funded a US$6 million laboratory in Vietnam to enable high-resolution dioxin
analysis. From 2008 to 2012, three USAID partners—East Meets West, Save theChildren, and Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped—provided medical, rehabilitation,and employment support to more than eleven thousand people with disabilities in Da
Nang (Nguyễn Đức Toàn 2016, 70), regardless of the cause of disability.
Along with supporting Agent Orange victims, the US is interested in environmental
cleanup activities in the airport areas that used to be US air bases during the war. In
June 2012, USAID spent US$8.34 million on executing a contract to manage and monitor
pollution treatment projects in Da Nang (Manyin 2014). Later, in July 2013, the US
pledged to continue spending US$84 million on environmental cleanup projects at
airports (Nguyễn Đức Toàn 2016). After completing pollution treatment at Da Nang
airport in 2017, the two countries promoted similar work at Bien Hoa airport. According
to Vietnamese media, the US committed US$300 million for restoring the environment
at Bien Hoa airport and surrounding areas (Tuổi Trẻ 2019). The project was expected
to be completed in ten years and has entered phase 1 after the Air Defense–Air Force(Ministry of National Defense of Vietnam) handed over 37 hectares of airport land

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Pham Thi Yen(Pacer Ivy area) to USAID. According to the agreement signed between USAID and
Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense, phase 1 will last five years, with US$183 million
in funding from the US (USAID 2019). The US efforts to clean up the environment in
airfields that used to be wartime air bases as well as to support Agent Orange victims
have greatly contributed to healing war wounds. This has helped the two countries
move toward a good relationship.
The search for missing soldiers, especially missing American soldiers, from theVietnam War is also one of the outstanding activities of US-Vietnam defense diplomacy.
If the United States’ efforts with regard to Agent Orange/dioxin show its acknowledgmentof responsibility for the painful wounds that it caused in the Vietnam battlefield, when it
comes to searching for missing Americans Vietnam’s cooperation highlights the friendly
spirit of a peace-loving country. No matter what each country’s perspective, the goodwill
on both sides has contributed to bridging the gap and healing the relationship between
the governments and peoples of the two countries.
According to the US State Department, as of November 12, 2010, there were still
1,711 Americans missing in Southeast Asia, of which 1,310 were in Vietnam (US Embassy& Consulate in Vietnam 2020). As of 2015, Vietnam had returned 945 sets of remainsof US soldiers and identified seven hundred (Dương Thúy Hiền 2015). From the reverse
direction, the US also supports the search for Vietnamese people missing in the war.
In September 2010, USAID and Vietnam’s Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social
Affairs agreed on a two-year program under which the US contributed US$1 million to
help Vietnam locate thousands of its soldiers missing from the war. Thanks to financial
resources and information provided by the US, Vietnam has found nearly one thousandcases (there are still about three hundred thousand Vietnamese soldiers missing) (Dương
Thúy Hiền 2015). Speaking in Vietnam in November 2019, US Defense Secretary
Esper reaffirmed the US commitment to solving the MIA problem; he also presented amap of a burial site on a battlefield provided by a US Marine veteran who had fought in
the war (VOV 2019).
In addition to searching for missing soldiers, the US is cooperating with Vietnam to
implement mine clearance projects under the Investigation, Survey, Assessment of
Toxic Effects of Bombs and Mines and Explosives Left Over from the War program.
Using mine detectors and personal protective equipment supplied by the US, the program
has identified three thousand mine-affected areas, cleared 1,354 hectares of land, andremoved twenty-five thousand pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (Nguyễn ThịHằng 2011, 48). Since 1993, the US has contributed more than US$154 million toward
efforts related to UXO in Vietnam, including surveys and demining activities, information
management, risk education, victim support, and capacity building for the Vietnam

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National Mine Action Center (US, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 2020).
The US also pledged to support Vietnam with funding for landmine and coastal
demining projects in 2016–20 and providing resources to carry out scientific and technological research and development programs in mine remedial work in 2016–25 (Lương
Văn Mạnh 2017, 9). The long war of resistance against the French and the Americans
from 1858 to 1975 has led to the land of Vietnam, even in peacetime, being threatenedby explosives left over from the war—mainly UXO, including ball bombs. Demining istherefore an activity of practical significance, helping Vietnamese people stabilize theirlives. The cooperation of the United States with Vietnam in detecting and removing
UXO has contributed significantly to the development of substantive bilateral relations
between the two countries.

II Challenges from Russia-Ukraine War
II-1 Vietnam’s Perspective on the War
The war (which Russia calls a “special military operation”) between Russia and Ukraine,
which began in February 2022, has posed new challenges to international relations.
Although Russia’s main reason for attacking was its perception of being threatened byNATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s determination to join the military bloc,
which was marked by East-West confrontation during the Cold War, its aggression wasstrongly condemned by the international community, especially Western countries. A
wide range of sanctions targeting Russian individuals, banks, businesses, currency
exchanges, bank transfers, exports, and imports were imposed. The United Nations
General Assembly so far has adopted seven resolutions related to the Ukraine war. The
first resolution (March 2, 2022) condemned the “aggression by the Russian Federation
against Ukraine” and called on Russia to immediately withdraw from Ukraine. The
second resolution (March 24, 2022) called on Russia to end its special military operationin Ukraine and called on the international community to increase humanitarian aid to
Ukraine. The third resolution (April 7, 2022) called for suspending Russia’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council. The fourth resolution (October 12, 2022) urged
countries not to recognize Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian territories. The fifth
resolution (November 14, 2022) required Russia to pay reparations for Ukraine, the sixth
resolution (February 23, 2023)—on the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion—called for
an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, while the seventh one (July 11, 2024) demanded
Russia to “urgently withdraw troops and other unauthorized personnel” from Ukraine’sZaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Vietnam abstained from voting on six of the resolu-

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tions (the first two and the last four) and voted against the third resolution.
Vietnam’s voting behavior on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions
reflects its consistent foreign policy mindset—that is, the spirit of independence, peace,and respect for international law rather than taking sides. In fact, Vietnam has always
maintained independence and consistency in its foreign policy, and from the very beginning it has made its point of view clear through a series of statements by state leaders.
Ambassador Dang Hoang Giang, head of the Permanent Delegation of Vietnam to theUN, emphasized:
Vietnam calls on relevant parties to de-escalate tensions, resume dialogues and negotiations
through all channels, in order to reach a lasting solution that takes into account the interests andconcerns of all parties, on basis of international law, especially the principle of sovereignty andterritorial integrity of states. (VOV 2022)

Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang also affirmed:
Vietnam’s current priority is to exercise maximum restraint, stop the use of force to avoid causing
civilian casualties and loss, and resume negotiations on all channels to reach lasting solutions
taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties, in accordance with the Charter of the
UN and the fundamental principles of international law. (Vũ Văn Tự 2022)

Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, during his visit to the US on May 11, 2022, once
again emphasized that Vietnam firmly adhered to a foreign policy of independence andself-reliance, choosing justice instead of choosing sides (TTXVN 2022). Obviously, themessage in these statements was that Vietnam opposed the war, stood for internationallaw, and stood for justice—through which means Vietnam would support any party or
point of view that had legitimacy. The fact that no specific country was named to support
or condemn (as some countries expected) in Vietnam’s view of the Ukraine war wasjust a clever strategy to avoid going against the policy of not siding with one party to
oppose the other and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In
terms of security and defense, Vietnam has transparently persisted in implementing
the “Four Nos” policy,9) in which, except for the fourth “No”—no using force or threatening to use force in international relations—the remaining three “Nos” all represent
Vietnam’s avoidance of choosing sides. Having been a victim of wars of aggression,
Vietnam understands the terrible and persistent long-lasting consequences of war;9) The “Four Nos” include the following: (1) no joining any military alliance, (2) no siding with one
country against another, (3) no giving any other country permission to set up military bases or
use Vietnam’s territory to carry out military activities against other countries, (4) no using force
or threatening to use force in international relations (see Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense
2019, 23).

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217

therefore, it never wants to suffer a war and never wants to engage in war with anyother country. Vietnam has also paid a heavy price for choosing sides in the past, so it
understands the pain of being interfered with and losing its independence and selfcontrol. Hence, its foreign policy prioritizes independence and self-reliance, persistently
fighting to resolve all disputes and disagreements by peaceful means, on the basis ofinternational law. Thus, in the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
Vietnam relies on international law—the ground of “rightness”—to consider, recognize,
evaluate, speak, and act. Certainly in the case of the Ukraine war, some would argue
that standing on the side of “rightness” means being on the side of Ukraine. However,siding with Ukraine contradicts Vietnam’s stance of not siding with one side to fight theother; this is why Vietnam upholds the principle of standing for what is right, what is inaccordance with international law.
Vietnam’s six abstentions and one vote against the resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fully express this point of view. Obviously, these resolutions all carry the
implication of an alignment of nations against Russia—a form of choosing sides that
Vietnam has persistently avoided. Vietnam’s abstentions are thus consistent with its
foreign policy as analyzed. As for the vote against the third resolution, which concerns
the expulsion of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, Vietnam also acted in thespirit of international law and independence. The basis for this against-vote, as
Ambassador Dang Hoang Giang emphasized, was that exchanges and decisions ofinternational agencies and organizations need to comply with their operational processes
and procedures. All discussions and decisions of the UN General Assembly should bebased on verifiable, objective, and transparent information, with the cooperation of
relevant stakeholders and in broad consultation with countries. Originally this resolution
was issued on the basis of accusations that Russia had carried out a “civilian massacre”
in the town of Bucha, though Russia denied the allegation and said that it was a staged
incident (Marchant de Abreu 2022). It was therefore entirely reasonable for Vietnam towant an independent UN investigation before making a decision. Its against-vote wasin that spirit, not in favor of Russia or in the spirit of being dominated by any country.
This behavior also shows that in its foreign relations, Vietnam is independent rather
than neutral in a way that does not distinguish between right and wrong or stand on thesidelines. That response is clearly consistent with international law as well as with
Vietnam’s long-standing foreign policy.
It must be admitted that Vietnam’s behavior in relation to the Ukraine war was also
influenced by other geopolitical factors. Vietnam’s dependence on the Russian defense
industry does not allow it to react too strongly. The dispute between Vietnam andChina in the South China Sea also adds an incentive for Vietnam to think carefully in218

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this regard. Russia remains an important factor in Vietnam’s multilateral policy. It is
not in Vietnam’s interest to see Russia weakened and/or made dependent on China,
and it is definitely not in its interest to provoke Russian retribution. In other words,
Vietnam had interests grounded in realpolitik that prevented it from supporting the seven
UN General Assembly resolutions.
II-2 Challenges from the Ukraine War
Despite such a clear point of view, Vietnam’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war stillcauses subjective inferences—based mainly on the history of the Vietnam-Soviet
alliance—thereby creating challenges for Vietnam’s relations with other countries,
including the United States.
The first challenge is Vietnam’s difficulty building strategic trust with the US.
“Strategic trust” can be understood as sincere trust between parties, for the strategic
benefit of the two (or more) parties. Strategic trust is of particular interest in VietnamUS relations because both countries were once enemies in a large-scale armed war—theVietnam War, which was also seen as a typical proxy war of the Soviet-American
confrontation and beyond, an ideological confrontation between the socialist and capitalist blocs during the Cold War. Since then, the relationship between Vietnam andthe US has grown tremendously in the spirit of respecting differences. However, withdifferent political institutions, strategic trust is needed by both sides to overcome
doubts from the past. With the positive gestures from both nations in recent years, theprospect of strategic trust being built between Vietnam and the US is very promising.
However, the Russia-Ukraine war has created uncertainty for this outlook.
Russia-Ukraine relations were strained by Ukraine’s desire to join NATO, which
was created during the Cold War by the US with the main purpose of providing security
against the Soviet Union. As a result, the Russia-Ukraine war represents not only the
conflict between Russia and Ukraine but also the conflicts of Russia with Europe andthe United States. Meanwhile, Vietnam used to be an ally of the Soviet Union and has
had close relations with Russia since 1991. This makes it easy for many Westerncountries to believe that Vietnam supports Russia. The fact that Vietnam abstained
six times and once voted against the resolutions of the UN General Assembly only
strengthened this view. Due to the nature of Vietnam-Russia relations and the historicalconflict between Russia and the West, such Vietnamese action is likely to be misinterpreted, causing “unnecessary noise,” even creating doubts regarding Vietnam’s perspective on the situation in Ukraine (Lao Động 2022) and thereby affecting the prospectsof good Vietnam-US relations. This argument became even more convincing in May
2022, when the United States, Canada, Australia, and a number of European countries

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signed an article calling on countries outside Europe, including Vietnam, to speak out
against Russia’s violations of human rights and international humanitarian law10) (USEmbassy & Consulate in Vietnam 2022).
The historical tensions between Vietnam and the United States remain a crucial
element of the bilateral relationship. The contrast between their political systems
offers a valuable perspective to examine their past conflicts whenever relevant opportunities appear. And the war in Ukraine has the potential to create that opportunity.
The closeness of Vietnam-Russia relations and the tension between Russia and theUnited States are reminiscent of the triangular relationship between the Soviet Union,
Vietnam, and the United States during the Vietnam War. Because the Soviet Union
used to be Vietnam’s main supporter against the US, during the Russia-Ukraine war it
is difficult for conservatives in the US Congress to avoid the perception that Vietnam
supports Russia. Vietnam’s independent foreign policy has put it in a position of being
innocent but having the evidence stacked against it, as illustrated by the controversial
case of six abstentions and one negative vote in the United Nations General Assembly.
From another perspective, the United States’ suspicion of Vietnam against thebackground of the Ukraine war may potentially affect Vietnam’s faith in the US commitment to bilateral relations. In the final year of the Trump administration, US Secretaryof State Mike Pompeo and other high-ranking officials launched an anti-Chinese Communist Party crusade. This was aimed directly at China, and the criticisms did notcause concern for Vietnam as it perceived them as part of the US-China trade war.
However, the West’s suspicion of Vietnam choosing Russia after the outbreak of the
Ukraine war could potentially raise anxiety for Vietnam; US criticism of the Chinese
Communist Party could potentially be extended to the Communist Party of Vietnam,
especially when China is building a close relationship with Russia. Thus, the Ukraine
war may make it more difficult for Vietnam and the US to build strategic trust. Vietnam’s
apprehension surrounding “peaceful evolution,” which was previously directed mainly
toward the US, gradually shifted toward China. Now there is a concern that this fear
may resurface and once again be directed toward the United States.11) This will affect10) Previously, on March 8, 2022 (after Vietnam abstained from voting on the first resolution of the UN
General Assembly), EU ambassadors along with the ambassadors of Norway, Switzerland, and the
UK in Hanoi signed a memorandum calling on Vietnam to support Ukraine (see Delegation of theEuropean Union to Vietnam 2022).
11) This is evidenced from the political rhetoric in Vietnam regarding “peaceful evolution,” which
identifies new actors as “narrow-minded nationalist countries with expansionist and hegemonic
ideologies” and “countries that disregard international law and blatantly infringe on sovereignty,
deeply interfering in the internal affairs of other countries” (see Trần Đức Tiến and Lưu Mạnh Hùng2022).

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the prospects of improved Vietnam-US relations, especially when it comes to joint
diplomatic and defense activities.
The second challenge is the possibility that the war between Russia and Ukraine
will change the foreign policy trajectory of the US, reducing the latter’s focus on the
Indo-Pacific region and thereby impacting the growth momentum of US-Vietnam relations. Undeniably, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has to some extent diverted the world’s
attention away from the Indo-Pacific region. This war serves as a reminder of theRussian threat to the US and Europe, and it has become a catalyst for NATO to regroupand reaffirm its value after a period of disagreement caused by disparities among thecontributions by its members as well as the existential goals of the alliance. The NATOsummit in June 2022 introduced a new Strategic Concept in which, for the first time inmore than ten years, NATO officially changed its stance toward Russia, moving fromviewing it as a “strategic partner” (in the 2010 Strategic Concept) to seeing it as “thebiggest, the most direct threat”—although it still insisted it did not seek confrontation
with Russia (NATO 2022). Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine has led member states toward greater consensus in defining the “Russian threat.” Meanwhile,
China has also become a formal subject for the first time in NATO’s Strategic Concept
and is seen as a lasting “systemic challenge” to the union. Obviously, NATO members
are interested in the risks posed by both Russia and China. However, unlike the US,
which wants stronger words and actions against China, its traditional allies (France andGermany) want NATO’s words and actions to have “more moderation” (Shalal and
Pamuk 2022). The prime minister of Belgium (where NATO is headquartered),Alexander De Croo, on June 27, 2022 warned: “we will not want to turn our backs on
China as completely as we have turned our backs on Russia” (Zhang and Wan 2022).
The US had to compromise with other NATO members and acknowledge Russia rather
than China as the primary threat. As a result, as part of its NATO responsibilities, theUS must allocate resources to counter the Russian threat rather than focusing solely
on China. In addition, as the EU has to deal with security problems caused by the
Ukraine war, the US is also experiencing difficulty mobilizing power from its allies for
its Indo-Pacific strategy. This has affected the prospects for Vietnam-US cooperation,
causing anxiety in Vietnam that the US will reduce its focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
The third challenge after the outbreak of the Ukraine war is that future VietnamRussia cooperation may become a hindrance to US-Vietnam cooperation. Vietnam is
faced with a dilemma: it has to be careful about buying Russian weapons, because of
sanctions from the West; but on the other hand, it is unable to find a suitable alternative
source of supply. Russia is currently the second-largest arms supplier in the world
and an important source of weapons for China, India, and Vietnam. According to the

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2000 and 2019 Russia sold10.7 billion euros’ worth of defense equipment to Southeast Asian countries, 61 percentof which was exported to Vietnam (Wezeman 2019, 14–15). Since 2000, nearly 80 percent
of Vietnam’s military equipment has been supplied by Russia. Although Vietnam’s
expenditure on arms procurements from Russia decreased from US$1.054 billion in2014 to US$72 million in 2021 (SIPRI 2023),12) during 2017–21 Vietnam was the world’s
fifth-largest importer of Russian weapons (after India, China, Egypt, and Algeria) andthe largest in Southeast Asia.13)
Meanwhile, in 2017 US Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which imposes sanctions against countries that buy
Russian weapons. To date, the United States has applied CAATSA only to China andTurkey, both of which purchased the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia.
In the case of Vietnam, the United States continues to turn a blind eye, due to the former’s
important role in the Indo-Pacific region as well as the increasingly close strategic
relationship between the two countries. Given Vietnam’s geostrategic location andrising status, its military buildup also contributes to the United States’ interest in
preventing China’s expansion in the region. From the US perspective, it would bebetter for Vietnam to buy Russian weapons than to buy Chinese weapons. Also, since
the Ukraine war has raised concerns about the prospect of China imitating Russia touse force against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, the US needs to keep good relations
with Vietnam more than ever.
However, the close relationship between Hanoi and Moscow continues to embarrass the US. Although the US wants to build a strategic partnership with Vietnam, itholds CAATSA as a key tool for punishing Russia (through sanctioning Russian defense
companies and disrupting Russia’s arms sales by threatening countries that buy Russian
weapons). Vietnam-Russia cooperation is therefore likely to “affect US expectations
to make Vietnam a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region” (Carl Thayer, quoted
in Hutt 2022). According to Carl Thayer (2018), in 2018 defense officials from the
Trump administration pressed Vietnam to reduce its dependence on Russian weapons
12) The reason for this reduction is twofold. First, Vietnam has actively diversified its sources ofdefense weaponry supply in order to reduce excessive dependence on Russia. This has been
increasingly emphasized since 2014, when Russia established good relations with China, amidst
China’s illegal placement of the HD 981 oil rig within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Heavy
reliance on Russia for defense procurement raised security concerns for Vietnam, driving it toaccelerate its self-reliance in security. Second, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic forced Vietnam
to cut its overall defense budget to focus on economic recovery, resulting in a reduction of thebudget for purchasing weapons from Russia.
13) Previously, in 2013–17, Vietnam was the third-largest customer of the Russian arms industry (afterIndia and China) (see Fleurant et al. 2018, 2; and SIPRI n.d.).

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and military technology. Washington lobbied Hanoi to buy American weapons instead.
The problem is that although the US lifted the arms embargo against Vietnam in May
2016, its weapons remain unaffordable for Vietnam. Vietnam’s military modernization
has slowed down since 2016, with tighter budgets making it even harder for the country
to buy expensive Western weapons. Vietnam’s spending on weapons purchases
dropped from US$603 million in 2018 to US$95 million in 2022 (SIPRI 2023). Moreover,Vietnam is familiar with Russian/Soviet weapons systems as well as doing business with
Russian partners, which would make it difficult for it to change suppliers if forced to.
It is clear that although the US has so far turned a blind eye to Vietnam’s buying of
Russian weapons, Vietnam’s continuation of military relations with Russia in the current
context is a sensitive subject. This might be the reason that Vietnam’s participation in
the 2022 Army Games14) was interpreted by some as a further indication of its “choosing
Russia” (Thayer 2022). In this context, Vietnam’s continuing cooperation with Russia
needs to be carefully calculated and take into account the US reaction.
It should be noted that Vietnam is engaged in efforts to modernize its national
defense, a plan that was already in progress prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict,as indicated at both the 11th All-Army Party Congress in 2020 (Quân đội nhân dân2020) and the 13th National Party Congress in 2021 (Vũ Cương Quyết 2021). However,given Vietnam’s reliance on Russian weaponry, any change must be gradual, and Vietnam
will require Russia’s assistance to upgrade its current equipment. This situation also
creates an opportunity for Vietnam to engage in defense trade with the United States.
If the US can establish trust and handle the matter delicately (taking into accountVietnam’s need to balance its relationship with China), it could accelerate the modernization of Vietnam’s national defense. In fact, following the conclusion of the Vietnam
International Defense Expo in 2022, several American defense contractors held discussions with officials from the Ministry of National Defense. This could potentially pave
the way for a more substantial defense cooperation partnership between Vietnam andthe US.

14) Russia’s International Military Games, or Army Games, was inaugurated in August 2015 and is anannual event held between July and September. Army Games 2021 had 175 teams from 43 countries
and territories competing in 34 events. Vietnam was an observer at Army Games 2015 and a
regular participant from 2018. In 2021, it participated in 15 events and ended in seventh place. For
the first time, it hosted two competitions (sniper and accident zone). It was one of the 12 coorganizers of Army Games 2022, which was held on August 13–27 and included 36 separate
competitions. Vietnamese military representatives attended the first organizational meeting on
September 2, 2021. At that time, 45 countries indicated their intention to participate. On April 22,2022 Russia announced that 237 teams from 31 countries had confirmed their participation in Army
Games 2022.

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Conclusion
In conclusion, defense diplomacy between Vietnam and the US has taken place in nearly
all areas of defense relations. In the beginning, the two countries focused on lesssensitive issues such as English training and dealing with the aftermath of the Vietnam
War. Following the growth of the bilateral relationship, in the context of increasing
regional security challenges, Vietnam and the US have actively coordinated as well as
jointly established and joined defense cooperation mechanisms at a higher and morediverse level. The current mechanisms are a solid foundation for the prospects ofVietnam-US relations in general and defense diplomacy in particular. However, theUkraine war is likely to pose some challenges to that good outlook. Due to the historical Vietnam-Russia relationship and the traditional Russian-Western confrontation,
Vietnam’s Russia-related foreign activities—regardless of their consistency with
Vietnam’s long-standing foreign policy direction—are likely to be misinterpreted, thereby
affecting the development of Vietnam-US relations. The building of strategic trust
between the two countries is also challenged with the Ukraine war creating a situationthat overlaps in many aspects with the Vietnam War period (the closeness of VietnamSoviet/Russia relations and the Russia-US confrontation).
Nevertheless, it can still be affirmed that the growth momentum of US-Vietnam
relations in general and the defense diplomacy of the two countries remain unchanged.
After all, the strategic interests of the US and Vietnam in the bilateral relationship are
still important enough for the two countries to overcome temporary roadblocks. With
the increasingly fierce US-China competition, Vietnam is a valuable partner for the US
due to its geostrategic position, the history of Vietnam-China relations, and the current
status of disputes between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea. On the Vietnamese side, the US plays a leading role in its balancing policy. Of all the major powersthat are Vietnam’s partners at the comprehensive level (comprehensive partnership) or
higher, only the US has a fully comprehensive and positive relationship with Vietnam.
The US is also the country with the greatest motivation and the highest ability tocounterbalance China’s power. This role of the US becomes more and more meaningful
to Vietnam with China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Dealing with a scheming China—which also understands Vietnam well—requires
Vietnam to be more flexible in its strategy of responding to China. Vietnam’s upgrading
and transition from a “Three Nos” to a “Four Nos”15) policy in 2019 showed its flexibility.
15) The 2004 White Paper on National Defense addressed the concept of the “Four Nos,” but thecontent differs slightly from the version mentioned in the 2019 White Paper on National Defense.
In 2004 Vietnam advocated: (1) no participating in any military alliances; (2) no allowing foreign ↗

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Moreover, Vietnam also publicly explained in the 2019 National Defense White Paper:[D]epending on the development of the situation and specific conditions, Vietnam will consider
developing necessary defense and military relations to an appropriate extent, based on mutual
respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well as fundamental
principles of international law. This cooperation will be mutually beneficial, serving the common
interests of the region and the international community. (Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense
2019, 25)

This interpretation can be extended to mean that, depending on China’s further actions,
Vietnam may have appropriate defense solutions and, under necessary conditions, may
further cooperate on security with the US. These factors are a solid premise to affirm
the good prospects of Vietnam-US defense diplomacy.
Accepted: June 27, 2023

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

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Inter-Construction Goals: Navigating Thailand’s Digital
Economy from a Sustainable Development Perspective
Zeng Damei* and Duan Haosheng**

The digital economy has become a powerful engine for global economic resurgencein the post-pandemic era. As an ASEAN developing country, Thailand greatly values
the digital economy, which facilitates its “Thailand 4.0” Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). By focusing on digitalization trends in Thailand, this article examines
whether new technological trends will have beneficial or detrimental impacts on thesocioeconomic flowering of the Global South in the digital age. The “ConstructiveSustainable Development Theoretical Framework” is formulated by combining
constructivism and the SDGs for conducting analysis. According to empiricalresearch, bridging the digital divide and reducing poverty need to be Thailand’s toppriorities. Therefore, Thai policy instruments should promote equal distributionof socioeconomic resources and close the digital divide, accelerate digital talentcultivation to fill the talent gap, build partnership networks that support transnational governance in cyberspace, promote third-party market cooperation, and share
the reciprocal profits of development.
Keywords: digital economy, digital divide, SDGs, constructivism, Thailand

Introduction
The digital economy is fueling global economic recovery and prosperity. States havestarted working on their digital economies to take advantage of the fourth industrial
revolution, and economists are paying attention to the expansion of digital technology
on the global and regional scales. Southeast Asia is a newly emerging digital market
with incredible consumption potential and increasing importance.
* 曾大妹, School of International Relations, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen
University, No. 422 Siming South Road, Siming District, Xiamen City, Fujian Province, Chinae-mail: 25520190154418@stu.xmu.edu.cn
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5800-9214** 段皓升, The Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy in International Development Studies
Programs (MAIDS-GRID) Program, the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University,
Henri Dunant Rd, Wang Mai, Pathum Wan, Bangkok 10330, Thailand
Corresponding author’s e-mails: dhszero@163.com; 6384313624@student.chula.ac.th
https://orcid.org/0009-0004-6926-3025
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 229–253© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_229

229

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Zeng Damei and Duan Haosheng

To take advantage of the new wave of digitalization, Thailand, ASEAN’s secondlargest economy, is proactively seeking new drivers for stagnant development. For
the last ten years it has been committed to rescuing itself from the “inequality trap”
and the “middle-income trap.” Thailand’s economy saw three development stages overthe past few decades: agricultural “Thailand 1.0,” light-industrial “Thailand 2.0,” andheavy-industrial “Thailand 3.0.” To break out of the past few years’ economic stagnation, the Thai government has launched the “Thailand 4.0” economic growth strategy,
which encourages industrial transformation and a restructuring of the development
model. The main goal of Thailand 4.0 is to develop a high-value-added economy driven
by innovation, technology, and creativity in order to achieve prosperity, security, andsustainable development (Usa 2018). One of the top ten S-curve industries of Thailand
4.0 is the digital sector.1) Digital technology undoubtedly creates attractive opportunities, which makes it one of the integral instruments for achieving Thailand 4.0
and promoting sustainable economic growth. However, whether Thailand’s ambitious
goals will ultimately have the desired effect needs to be further researched.
The worldwide Covid-19 pandemic became a catalyst for the enhancement of thedigital economy in Thailand and accelerated the country’s society-wide digital transformation. Against this backdrop, digital finance, e-commerce, remote learning, andfood distribution quickly grew or developed on Internet-based platforms in order tolower the danger of viral transmission. The diffusion of digital technology has significantly affected Thailand’s industrial structure transformation and socioeconomic recovery. AI has even proliferated into the religious sphere, illustrating how digital technology
has penetrated beyond the financial realm and is now starting to progressively converge
with the requirements of local cultural public goods in Thai society: for instance, theThai virtual monk named Phra Mana went live in January 2022 (Petch 2022). However,under the intertwined influence of Covid-19 and the sustainable development dilemma,
the digital economy has brought unprecedented opportunities and challenges at thesocial, national, and international levels. Public, academic, and policy-making agencies
have all expressed interest in and engaged in discussions about the ongoing digitalization
process.
In general, it is reasonable to acknowledge the admirable accomplishments of1) An S-curve in project management refers to reaching critical mass by investing in innovativetechnology products to reach optimality. Thailand 4.0 borrows this concept to refer to its focus on
industries that will become optimal as innovative technology is invested in. The strategy focuseson ten industries: biofuels and biochemistry, digital economy, healthcare, automated robotics,
aviation and logistics, agriculture and biotechnology, smart electronics, health tourism, nextgeneration self-driving cars, and food processing.

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231

global digitalization. However, any new technology has its pros and cons, and if the
public sector ignores the potential drawbacks of digitalization, it may thwart Thailand’s
efforts to achieve the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Accordingly,
there should be a long-term critical observation of how the expansion of digital technology can serve as a stimulus for the Thai economy and accelerate industrial transformation. From the standpoint of International Development Studies, this discussion
concentrates on the following closely related issues: What opportunities and challenges
will the digital economy present for Thailand in achieving the SDGs at the social, national,
and international levels? How can Thailand effectively take advantage of favorable
trends for progress toward the SDGs?
The analysis examines the advantages and disadvantages of the societal, national,
and international dimensions before elaborating on how the three relate and interact
with one another. The study’s main contribution is connecting the inevitable digitalization trends in Thailand to the SDGs by investigating the potentially beneficial or detrimental impacts of new technological trends on the universal Sustainable Development
Goals of the Global South. This article contends that the inter-constructed or mutually
influential effects at the social, national, and international levels must be taken into
account to ensure the sustainable growth of the digital economy.
This paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction, the section titled“The Thai Digital Economy through Multiple Lenses” briefly profiles the current
research landscape. The methodology and theoretical framework are introduced in“Normative SDGs in the Multilevel Digital Economy of Thailand.” “Assessing the Thai
Digital Economy from a Sustainability Perspective” forms the main body of the article.
The final two sections present strategic recommendations and the conclusion.

The Thai Digital Economy through Multiple Lenses
In terms of research, views on the Thai digital economy may be categorized into twolevels and two schools: the domestic and international levels, and the schools of realism
and neoliberalism.
First, some realists have paid attention to digital industries such as e-commerce,
digital payments, online education, and digital tourism in Thailand and believe that thedigital economy has become a key force in Thailand’s resistance to Covid-19 shocks(Ma’rifat and Sesar 2020; Mi 2020; Song 2020; Li et al. 2022). In the case of Uber’ssuspension, Suebwong Kalawong and Nuntnidhi Bongsebodhidhamma (2017) argued
that Thailand’s patronage and rent-seeking activities might negatively impact the digital

232

Zeng Damei and Duan Haoshengeconomy’s development. However, realists prefer to consider the nexus between thedigital economy and social impacts as a sort of simple unidirectional relationship.
Furthermore, though it is still a domestic-level discussion, a growing body of literature
has shed light on the social impacts of the Thai digital economy’s development. These
impacts include the ways in which small and medium-sized enterprises have adapted
to digital transformation trends, the development of a cashless society, information
leakage, and whether the digital skills of Thai youth match the labor market (Bukht andHeeks 2018; Calderwood and Popova 2019; Suepphong et al. 2021). The realists’ studies
concluded that traditional socioeconomic relations could sometimes impede the improvement of the digital economy, because the latest trending technology inevitably exposes
marginalized groups that cannot adapt to tech trends to wage cuts or unemployment.
When digital technology disrupts the traditional business model, some social groups
inevitably suffer economically. However, Thailand’s digitalization is not only a domestic
problem but is also relevant to sustainable development in the context of complex
international relations. Various bilateral and multilateral mechanisms also influence its
development positively or negatively.
Second, some neoliberalists investigated the state of the digital economy in the
Lancang-Mekong region and ASEAN through the lens of institutionalism. Theyemphasized the roles of Thai digital legislation, 5G application, and official digitalpolicy (Liu 2021; Rhee et al. 2022). Some of them examined the expansion of the digital
economy in the region from a macro perspective, focusing on the promotion of economic progress through regional organizations such as ASEAN and policy coordination
among member countries. Meanwhile, potential challenges such as the digital divide,insufficient cross-border logistics and payment systems, and technical competition
among major powers are viewed as the primary impediments to Southeast Asia’s
digital cooperation (Xu and Wu 2020; Niu et al. 2022). Comparing the digital-economic
policies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Joey
Erh (2021) argues that the policies of the six major ASEAN digital economies lackregional coordination and suggests that ASEAN could take a leadership role by entering
into cooperative agreements with specific countries. Kim Heejin (2019) examined thee-signature laws in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam and concluded that
ASEAN had been essential in regionalizing international standards. Overall, neoliberalstudies recognize the role of institutionalization as key to promoting state actors’ digital
economies in Southeast Asia. However, in the sense of people-oriented sustainable
development, the positive effects of international institutions on state actors depend toa large extent on a benign environment of international cooperation. In other words, alot depends on the degree to which state actors and local society can internalize theThailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

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norms and values of international mechanisms. Meanwhile, the degree of internalization depends on the normative socialization at the local, state, and international levels
as well as the impacts of great-power rivalries.
In a nutshell, research on the subject needs a more dynamic and comprehensive
analytical perspective. In order to elucidate the research questions beyond the materialcentric and institutional-centric philosophies, this article will adopt a constructivist
approach incorporating the concept of sustainable development to carry out an in-depth
analysis.

Normative SDGs in the Multilevel Digital Economy of Thailand
This research employs a qualitative methodology supplemented by documentary analysis and interviews to develop a theoretical framework for analysis.
First, per constructivist consensus, the internalization of norms by state actors is
jointly influenced by the process of mutual socialization between the state actors themselves and others (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1998;
1999). Second, Amitav Acharya (2004) criticizes the “old” constructivist theories as
being based primarily on Western empirical thinking in order to reinterpret the theories
or emphasize existing influencing factors rather than rethinking or constructing theoretical development frameworks based on non-Western cases. The old theories ignore
the mutual socialization processes of localization among domestic societies, state
actors, and the regional and international aspects of development issues. Acharyasuggests that “localization” or “domestic society” is another element that affects state
actors based on the “national-international” or “self-other” binary structure.
Therefore, from the interdisciplinary lens of international relations and International
Development Studies, this paper adopts Acharya’s constructivist theory of normative
localization to investigate the dynamic of development issues in a non-Western developing country. More specifically, this paper examines the developing sustainability ofThailand’s digital economy at three levels—social (domestic/local), national (state), andinternational—and explores their dynamic and inter-constructive nexus. However,unlike Acharya’s purely normative approach to international relations, this study
introduces a consensus, idea, and developing norm broadly accepted worldwide—the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—as an evaluative and normative criterion to conduct the analysis.
SDGs are comprised of 17 goals. They respectively are Goal 1 No Poverty, Goal 2 Zero
Hunger, Goal 3 Good Health and Well-Being, Goal 4 Quality Education, Goal 5 Gender

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Fig. 1 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
Source: United Nations (n.d.)

Equality, Goal 6 Clean Water and Sanitation, Goal 7 Affordable and Clean Energy, Goal
8 Decent Work and Economic Growth, Goal 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure,
Goal 10 Reduced Inequalities, Goal 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities, Goal 12
Responsible Consumption and Production, Goal 13 Climate Action, Goal 14 Life Below
Water, Goal 15 Life On Land, Goal 16 Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, Goal 17
Partnerships for the Goals (Please see in the Fig. 1). International Development Studies
believe that these goals are inter-constructed in achieving sustainable development.
Constructivism emphasizes norm diffusion and internalization, and because SDGs area universal agenda and norm for global sustainable development, internalizing them will
ultimately lead to the implementation of socioeconomic development processes. This
study therefore examines digitalization in Thailand using this globally recognized development norm as an evaluative criterion.
In terms of methodology, qualitative documentary analysis is the primary method
used throughout this paper. The primary documentary data were obtained from policy
documents and reports from Thai official agencies, such as the Ministry of Digital
Economy and Society; Ministry of Industry; and Ministry of Higher Education, Science,
Research, and Innovation. Pertinent evaluation reports from the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the World Bank also provided crucial
supporting data and information. Furthermore, to better understand the internalizationof SDGs in the development of Thailand’s digital economy along with the attitudes ofparticipants in Thai digitalization, other important data from the media news and interviews were collected. The authors also held in-depth discussions with students fromthree Thai universities (Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, and Khon
Kaen University) to better understand how the young generation perceive Thai digi-Thailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

235

Fig. 2 Constructive-Sustainable Development Theoretical Framework
Source: By the authors

talization. Based on the methodology, a “Constructive-Sustainable Development
Theoretical Framework” (Fig. 2) was devised to answer the research questions andformulate practical recommendations for a sustainable digital economy.
This multidimensional study anchors the relevant SDGs on three levels—social,national, and international—as the normative criteria that need to be achieved or internalized for the sustainable development of the Thai digital economy. Given the complexities of digital technology expansion for state actors, the study identifies the impacts
on the three levels based on the SDG criteria. From the aforementioned systematic
analysis, the study ultimately provides targeted recommendations for the sustainablegrowth of the Thai digital economy.

Assessing the Thai Digital Economy from a Sustainability Perspective
Thai Digital Economy Development Status
Compared to other ASEAN developing countries, Thailand has an advanced digital
infrastructure, which is essential for satisfying consumer demand and accelerating
industrial digitalization. Krung Thep Maha Nakhon (Bangkok) has been more eager thanever to use digital technology to foster economic resilience since the start of the Covid19 pandemic. Following are the features of Thailand’s digital infrastructure.
First, the 5G digital infrastructure is the overarching focus for driving the economy
and society toward the Thailand 4.0 era. The government is actively supporting the
5G network infrastructure and related technologies in order to revive socioeconomic
development, which was negatively impacted by the pandemic. Thailand’s three largest
mobile operators (AIS, True, and dtac) and two state-owned telecom companies successfully bid for 5G spectrum at an auction held by the Office of the National Broadcasting
and Telecommunications Commission in February 2020 for a total of 100 billion baht
(Komsan et al. 2020). Then the three major mobile network operators accelerated thedeployment of 5G infrastructure and services. Thailand has deployed 20,000 5G basestations, with 4.3 million 5G users (2.5 times the total number of 5G users in other236

Zeng Damei and Duan Haosheng

ASEAN countries) (Komsan 2021). The Global System for Mobile Communications
Association reports that in the third quarter of 2021, Bangkok was among the top 20
capitals in the world for 5G download speed (McKetta 2021). Thailand’s fixed broadband
download speed in June 2023 was 206.60 Mbps, ranking sixth in the Speedtest Global
Index (Speedtest 2023).
Second, thanks to official policies, the adaptation of market profiles, and consumer
demand, ubiquitous digital technology widely reshaped Thai consumption patterns during
the Covid-19 lockdowns. For instance, there was a boost in e-commerce activity, witha 7 percent increase in new online consumer users in 2021 (Bain & Company 2021, 16).
Zero-contact, high-efficiency, and low-cost digital payments, particularly e-wallets, arerapidly emerging as a reliable form of payment. Furthermore, following the pandemicdriven lockdowns, social media and restaurant takeout/delivery have been incorporated
into daily lives. Besides its traditional uses for networking and entertainment, social
media serves as a significant online shopping channel. And due to the potential risk ofviral transmission when dining in during the pandemic, restaurants adapted to provide
delivery services via digital platforms. During the pandemic lockdowns, food delivery
orders surged on Grab Food, Line Man, Foodpanda, and Uber Eats. Unsurprisingly,
food delivery has become the digital service with the highest penetration rate, with 71
percent of Internet users having ordered food online at least once in their lives (Bain &Company 2021, 52). Gradually, products that were available via delivery services
expanded beyond the food and beverage industry to include cosmetics, daily necessities,
and pharmaceuticals.
Third, Thailand’s adoption of digital technology is closely related to the surging
demand for pandemic prevention and healthcare. The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated
the healthcare sector’s digital transformation. Thai medical institutions’ innovative 5G
medical solutions are committed to improving patient care effectiveness and lowering
the risk of infection. High-tech medical devices enable doctors to communicate andkeep track of patient health through contactless interactions. AIS, Thailand’s leading
5G network provider, invested 100 million baht to create 5G care robots and provide
them to 22 hospitals (Kanokchan 2022). Digital robots can disinfect, deliver medications,serve meals, take patient temperatures, and check vital signs. It is worth mentioningthat Thai laws and regulations governing digital healthcare are constantly being
improved. The Thai Medical Council, Pharmacy Council, and Ministry of Public Healthhave released “Telemedicine Guidelines,” “Telepharmacy Guidelines,” and “Standardsof Telemedicine Service Provided by Medical Facilities” respectively (Peerapan et al.
2022). Thus, digital technology has helped Thailand to achieve SDG 3: ensuring healthy
lives and promoting well-being for people of all ages.

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Digitalization may provide support in overcoming uncertainties and promoting astrong and durable economic recovery in the post-pandemic era. However, opportunities
and challenges coexist, inextricably linked, and interact on the social, national, andinternational levels. Hence, this study will unpack in more detail the compound effectbrought about by the digitalization process and how it relates to Thailand’s accomplishment of the SDGs.
Analysis at the Social Level
Regarding opportunities at the social level, active digital consumers, a supportive business ecosystem, attractive market size, and high Internet penetration rates form a solid
foundation for the sustainable growth of the Thai digital economy.
Thailand is ranked 30th globally and third in Southeast Asia in the World Digital
Competitiveness Ranking 2023, released by the International Management Institute in
Lausanne, Switzerland (The 2023 IMD World Competitiveness Ranking). Thailand’s
Internet economy jumped to $30 billion in 2021 (Bain & Company 2021, 8). The country’s
total population is about 69.88 million, of which active digital consumers aged 15–64
account for about 70.2 percent (United Nations Population Fund 2022). A stable digitalconsumer population means the country can maintain an attractive digital market size.
Thailand is also one of the ASEAN nations with a relatively high Internet penetration
rate and the most active Internet users. There are about 48.59 million users, and eachspends more than eight hours online daily (Kemp 2021).
Thailand’s telecom industry database indicates a 184.97 percent mobile penetration
rate in 2022 (Thailand Telecom Industry 2023b). The country’s digital payments industry has also snowballed, driven primarily by e-commerce and mobile broadband penetration. As a case study of the inclusive development of the Thai digital economy, in
addition to PromptPay from the Central Bank of Thailand, commercial banking giants
such as Kasikornbank, Siam Commercial Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, and Bangkok Bank
have launched digital banking services. Digital payment platforms such as TrueMoney,
Rabbit Line Pay, and Alipay are also active in the Thai consumer market. Data fromrelevant authorities show that digital payments doubled from 2019 to 2021 (Satawasin
et al. 2021). The growth has led to a bright outlook for Thailand’s digital economy, withthe 5G technology ecosystem expected to create 130,000 jobs by 2030 (Phakdeetham
2021a). Digital technology “will boost the GDP of Thailand by 10% or approximately
2.3 trillion baht by 2035” (Phakdeetham 2021b). These figures show the future opportunities for prosperity and economic recovery from the shock of Covid-19. A vibrant andinclusive market and business ecosystem can act as the driving force behind Thailand’s
digital economy.

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Applying SDGs as normative assessment standards, fully utilizing the opportunities
presented by the digital wave will contribute to Thailand’s social-economic development,
thereby benefiting SDG 8: promoting a sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic
growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all.
However, unemployment or income disparities that may result from digital penetration have also inevitably hampered Thailand’s accomplishment of the SDGs. The
digital economy relies more on technology and information resources than traditional
industries, which depend primarily on labor and material resources. The use of digitaltechnology can increase the effectiveness, intelligence, and automation of production
processes, resulting in significant improvement in production effectiveness and quality
while lowering costs. Meanwhile, some traditional industry employees will inevitably
face wage cuts or structural unemployment as a result of disruptive digital penetration.
In addition, the gap between the rich and the poor has relentlessly widened because
low-income groups are not resilient enough to handle technological evolution. In otherwords, digital penetration is not conducive to achieving SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 8(Decent Work and Economic Growth), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).
Acting as a catalyst, the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated Thai digital transformation across industries, a technology trend that may continue in the long term tostimulate economic efficiency. However, the disruption effects of new technology andthe digital divide have also exacerbated income inequality and social tensions. Theremay be an amplified sense of deprivation among low-income groups as a result of platform expansion and the widening income gap between online and offline practitioners
in some established industries. Traditional motorcycle drivers, for instance, wear
numbered orange undershirts to identify themselves and have attracted customers inthe business area under sheltered social relations for a long time. However, with theproliferation and popularity of online taxi platforms in Thailand, the number of traditional motorcycle drivers has decreased by 20 percent—due mainly to competition from
Grab—and they complain that their livelihoods are threatened by “illegal entrants” ononline platforms (Thodsapol 2019). Moreover, tensions and conflicts of interest between
registered riders on online platforms and traditional motorcycle drivers have emerged.
Thai motorcycle drivers complained in interviews that online taxi platforms were stealing jobs that used to be theirs, and this had reduced their income. They decided to use
demonstrations and protests to voice their concerns because they felt strongly deprived.
Their actions did have some results—for example, the Thai Ministry of Transportannounced an extension of sixty days for Grab/GrabBike rider registration (the previously
stated deadline was July 15, 2022); after the publication of the notice, groups of motorcycle and taxi drivers under the Thai Motorcycle Association gathered in front of theThailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

239

Thai Ministry of Transport, burning orange safety vests and blue taxi driver uniforms inprotest. They claimed that the latest notice from the Thai Ministry of Transport seriously
harmed their interests and requested that the policy be withdrawn.
Overall, the winner-takes-all effect of the digital economy model, combined withthe unemployment crisis during the pandemic, exacerbated income differentiation andinequality among social groups. Against the backdrop of the multiple opportunities anddisruptive challenges presented by digital technology, it is particularly important for
the Thai government to respond to the interests of different social groups and to bridgesocial concerns. These challenges also imply that certain social groups might be waryof digitalization trends because their interests are somewhat jeopardized. The proliferation of digital technology has harmed the interests of social groups who cannot adapt
to new trends, and the digital divide and uneven resource distribution could thus leadto or intensify Thailand’s income gap at the social level. The authors argue that intensified new technologies may marginalize certain groups of people, thereby slowing down
the implementation of the SDGs.
Analysis at the National Level
State actors play an active role in the process of norm internalization. Acharya (2004)
argues that local actors’ active reconstruction of foreign norms ultimately aligns foreign
norms with local norms and practices. Regarding opportunities at the national level,
the Thai government has set in place solid policy support to build “Digital Thailand”
and has continued to strengthen its institutionalization framework. The official rhetoricprioritizes digital technology in order to capitalize on opportunities created by the fourthindustrial revolution and transform the export-dependent economic model in order toovercome the inequality and middle-income traps. Therefore, it is accelerating the paceof policy adjustment to make Thailand one of ASEAN’s digital hubs by reorganizing
administrative agencies, enacting laws and regulations, and promoting Thailand 4.0,
which aims to create “Digital Thailand” and ultimately achieve national economic andsocial stability, prosperity, and sustainable development.
The most notable example of policy adjustment is the reorganization and renamingof Thailand’s former Ministry of Information and Communication Technology into the
Ministry of Digital Economy and Society in September 2016. In addition, new agencies
were established, such as the Digital Economy Promotion Agency and the National 5G
Committee. The policy alliances formed on digital economy development issues indicate
the determination of Thai government departments. Thailand has also introduced laws
and regulations regarding digital matters (Wendy 2016). It has enacted the Economic
and Social Digital Development Act (B.E.2560), Personal Data Protection Act (B.E.2562),

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Electronic Transactions Act, Thailand Computer Crime Act, Payment System Act,
Thailand Network Security Law, and other regulations related to digital technology andthe digital economy. In short, by issuing policy initiatives, restructuring institutions,and improving laws and regulations, government agencies are further signaling that thedigital economy is beneficial to the country.
Using the SDGs as normative evaluation criteria, the digital economy assists theThai government in adjusting its institutional settings to be more effective in creating
an efficient, accountable, and inclusive public service sector. The government also
strengthens the laws and rules regarding digital governance and creates a more regulated
digital ecosystem, both of which will contribute to Thailand’s achievement of SDG 16:
this SDG calls for promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development;
providing access to justice for all; and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Alongside the above opportunities, the author noted the following
roadblocks affecting Thailand’s SDGs at the national level.
First, Thailand’s digital divide will be difficult to bridge in a short period. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines the digital
divide as the gap between individuals, households, businesses, and geographical areasat different socioeconomic levels regarding access to information and communications
technology (ICT) and the use of the Internet in various activities. The unbalanced
economy and infrastructure among various regions and groups is the primary cause of
the digital divide. In the context of inequality in economic and communication technology
infrastructure development in Thailand’s rural-urban dichotomy, the development
divide in the digital domain is most visibly manifested in the disparity in digital infrastructure availability between different regions of the country. There is a divide in theuse of digital technologies between Bangkok and the less developed countryside.
Households in underdeveloped rural regions lack adequate and affordable high-speed
Internet. According to the Thailand Telecom Industry database, Thailand’s broadband
penetration rate per capita was 19.36 percent in 2022. Bangkok has a higher percentage
of computer-owning households (42 percent) than other provinces (21 percent in Central
Thailand, 19 percent in the North, 17 percent in the South, and only 14 percent in the
Isan Northeast) (Saowaruj 2020; Thailand Telecom Industry 2023a).
The raging Covid-19 pandemic further amplified the impact of digital divide barriers.
Because of a lack of smartphones or bank accounts, socially marginalized and vulnerable
groups severely impacted by the pandemic were unable to get government assistance.
Some people were even deceived when asking for help because they lacked the necessary
digital knowledge (Paritta 2020). For instance, a UNESCO (Thailand) staff member
stated that “the digital divide was also reflected in the unequal opportunities for Thai

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students to participate in online courses. Schools in the northern and northeastern
mountain areas have lower Internet connectivity than the national average.” In addition,technical obstacles such as power outages, lack of electronic devices, and unstable
Internet signal seriously hinder students’ efficiency in online learning in rural areas.
According to a study by Thailand’s Education Equity Fund, 271,888 of the country’s 1.9
million students who are from low-income or impoverished families do not have accessto computers or the Internet (Porpor 2021). The above analysis shows that the digital
divide in Thailand poses a severe challenge to achieving SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 4(Quality Education), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).
Second, from the standpoint of digital talent cultivation, Thailand suffers from ashortage of digital human capital and a mismatch between labor force skills and market
demand. There is projected to be a shortage of 47 million technology professionals in
Asia-Pacific by 2030, due to the digital transformation of the business and technology
landscape brought on by the fourth industrial revolution (Huawei 2022). In Thailand,booming e-commerce, digital finance, and start-ups have increased demand for workers
with skills in artificial intelligence and machine learning, data analysis, and strategicplanning. The mismatch between the supply and demand of digital talent may become astumbling block to the country’s industrial transformation and digitalization. International
data on digital technology and skills use show that Thai youths and adults have lessadvanced digital skills than the average of OECD countries (Vandeweyer et al. 2020, 9).
Only 54.9 percent of Thai workers, according to the World Economic Forum, possess
the necessary digital skills (World Economic Forum 2020). Education is a structural
factor in the nurturing of digital talent. The challenge for the Thai labor market is that
graduates from higher education institutions often lack the skills that employers arelooking for. There is a mismatch between the competencies required by employers
and graduates, according to an empirical study of the competency gap among Thai IT
students (Veeraporn et al. 2017). The minister of science and technology urged Thai
universities to keep up with technological trends and advance students’ technical anddigital skills, because 70 percent of university students in Thailand major in social
sciences (Chanita 2016, 9). The country needs to urgently address the issue of how tomatch the talents produced by the education system with the labor market demands.
Finally, Thailand faces thorny cybersecurity challenges. There are numerous
cybersecurity risks in the digital age, along with massive data generation, storage, andsharing in the cloud. Phishing, malware, extortion, identity theft, data leakage, andother cybercrimes have unpredictable negative impacts on the information and property
security of individuals, companies, and sovereign countries. Most student interviewees
said they had antivirus software installed on their computers. It appears clear that the242

Zeng Damei and Duan Haoshengproliferation of network security risks is an unavoidable obstacle for the Thai digital
economy. For example, over 120,000 bank customers’ personal or business information
was compromised in July 2018 when the Kasikornbank and Krungthai Bank computer
systems were attacked. Despite no monetary losses, the potential damage was severe(Orathai et al. 2018). Furthermore, in August 2021 a British cybersecurity researcher
discovered that the personal information of 106 million Thai tourists had been freely
accessible since 2011, with a 200GB database containing the full name, gender, passportnumber, and other personal information of each tourist (Coble 2021). Within 24 hours,
the Thai government took protective action against the database breach.
Thailand’s cybersecurity sector needs to improve the relevant hardware configuration. According to the World Bank, the number of secure Internet servers (serversthat use encryption technology in Internet matters) per million people in Thailand in2020 was 1,863, while Singapore’s secure Internet servers were about 68 times that
number (World Bank 2020). The aforementioned cases demonstrate that cybersecurity
threats pose a serious obstacle to SDG 11, which aims to make cities and communities
inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. Since cyber threats are typically nontraditional
security concerns with transnational and covert characteristics, Thailand needs to establish international cybersecurity governance partnerships in order to build harmonious
digital ecosystems.
Analysis at the International Level
In terms of opportunities at the international level, localization of international norms
can enhance the status and prestige of actors (Wolters 2018). Thailand thus actively
creates networks for digital-economic cooperation through bilateral and multilateralchannels. The analysis begins with bilateral collaboration and then goes on to multilateralcollaboration and collaboration with global organizations.
PromptPay, an essential pillar of Thailand’s national electronic payments plan, is
actively developing its cross-border payments business. The first cross-border realtime payment link was established between Thailand’s PromptPay and Singapore’s
PayNow electronic payment platform in April 2021. This partnership increased theeffectiveness of cross-border payments between Thailand and Singapore (Monetary
Authority of Singapore 2021).
With regard to multilateral cooperation, Thailand actively participates in the
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and ASEAN digital economy cooperation. The LMC
countries have deepened their collaboration through forums and seminars. For example,
the 2020 Lancang-Mekong Combating Cybercrime Forum was held in Kunming City,
Yunnan Province, China. The meeting reached a consensus on gradually establishing aThailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

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cooperative mechanism for multilateral crackdown and comprehensive governancealong the Lancang-Mekong basin, enhancing cyberspace governance and regulatory
capacity, strengthening information sharing among countries by taking advantage ofmultilateral platforms, and providing training opportunities for cyber technology
enforcement capabilities (Ren Min Zi Xun 2021). In addition, ASEAN regards the digital
economy as providing an impetus for high-quality development. The Masterplan on
ASEAN Connectivity 2025, AEC Blueprint 2025, and e-ASEAN Framework Agreement
aim to build ASEAN communities into leading, safe, and transformative digital service-,
technology-, and ecosystem-driven digital communities (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations 2021). The Thai government recognizes the positive impact of ASEANwide digital cooperation on sustainable economic growth. At the third ASEAN Digital
Ministers Meeting, Chaiwut Thanakhanamusorn, Thailand’s former minister of digital
economy and society, suggested that an ASEAN committee be formed to concentrateon combating telecom fraud (Bangkok Post February 9, 2023).
Thailand has significant collaborations with global organizations. When it comes
to working with international organizations—such as the United Nations and OECD—
they attach importance to developing the digital economy and encourage coalition
members to strengthen multilateral cooperation in ICT, cybersecurity governance, andother areas. Thailand actively participates in international dialogues on digital economic
policy. For instance, its “Decade of Action, Decade of Innovation” campaign was launched
on June 8, 2021 by the Digital Economy Promotion Agency (depa) in collaboration with
the United Nations Office in Thailand to encourage the use of technology and creative
solutions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals essential to future development(Bovornpong 2021). Using the SDGs as a reference, digital economic cooperation
through multiple international channels will facilitate Thailand’s attainment of SDG 17:
strengthening the means of implementation and revitalizing the Global Partnership for
Sustainable Development.
However, the obvious externalities that characterize the digital economy make itsusceptible to the multiple power dynamics of world politics. International competition
is focused primarily on digital technology, and Thailand’s long-term digital economic
development is susceptible to the international commercial environment. First, thelargest digital businesses are run by high-tech firms that control the most cutting-edge
digital technologies. Over-reliance on large tech firms’ technology and data resources
may exacerbate Thailand’s digital vulnerability, threatening data sovereignty and security. Second, digital technology advantages and digital trade rule-setting are the main
focus of competition among great digital powers. Some nations make an effort to prevent
international cooperation in advanced digital technology.

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As tension and competition intensified, Thailand ran the risk of “picking sides”
when it imported specific digital technologies and products. For example, according
to Reuters, the US launched a 5G technology test bed even as it placed Huawei on acontrolled list and urged its allies to bar Huawei’s 5G technology. Thailand was facedwith an international relations challenge when it chose to enter into a digital technology
partnership with Huawei (Patpicha 2019). As an influential regional economy, Thailand
will find it worthwhile to coordinate its policies with other ASEAN countries. In anutshell, trends in digital economy at the international level present both opportunities
and challenges for Thailand, which could undermine the implementation of SDG 17(Partnerships for the Goals).
Summary and Discussion
Following is a summary of the above section, before coming to the strategic recommendations. The above analysis largely confirms that the digital economy presentsinterrelated opportunities and challenges for Thailand to achieve the normative SDGs
at the social, national, and international levels. In this sense, the opportunities andchallenges are intertwined with one another rather than existing independently. First,
the opportunities presented by the digitalization wave are mutually reinforcing. A
supportive business ecosystem, an attractive market size, and supportive official
policies, for example, are all positive factors that will assist Thailand in relieving theunemployment crisis and recovering the economy (SDG 8) in the post-pandemic era.
The groundwork will also be laid for a global network of digital partnerships throughbilateral and multilateral cooperation channels (SDG 17).
The challenges to the SDGs are also mutually interconnected and have overlapping
effects. For instance, the digital divide interacts with the widening wealth gap in society(SDG 1, SDG 10), implying that unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources, suchas income, is also reflected in digital technology accessibility. Moreover, inequalities
caused by the wealth gap not only undermine the effectiveness of official policy implementation (SDG 16) but also contribute to problems such as human resource deficiency(SDG 8), educational inequality (SDG 4), and the ongoing deterioration of cybersecurity(SDG 11).
Finally, Table 1 demonstrates that SDG 1 and SDG 10 have the highest frequencyof occurrence (both twice) among the challenges posed by the digital economy wave forachieving the SDGs. It is worth noting that the main missions for Thailand in the future
will be poverty reduction and bridging the development gap. All of the foreseeable
spillover effects of challenges generated from digitalization will affect the economic
dynamics. Based on the above analysis, Thailand needs to be aware of the dynamic,

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Table 1 Assessing Thailand’s Digital Economy by SDGs
Level

Opportunities

SDGs

Challenges

SDGs

Social

SDG 8: Decent Work Slowing economic
Digital consumers
SDG 1: No Poverty
and market size, good and Economic Growth recovery, poor
SDG 8: Decent Workperformance of thebusiness environment,
and Economic Growthservice sector,
high Internet penetraSDG 10: Reduced
widening gap between Inequalities
tion raterich and poor

National

Restructuring ofadministrative
agencies, enacting
laws and regulations

SDG 16: Peace,
Justice, and Strong
Institutions

Digital divide, talent SDG 1: No Poverty
scarcity, cybersecurity SDG 4: Quality
Education
SDG 10: Reduced
Inequalities
SDG 11: Sustainable
Cities and Communities

International Bilateral and multilat- SDG 17: Partnerships Digital technology
for the Goals
monopoly, digitaleral cooperationcompetition amongchannelsmajor powers,
ASEAN countries

SDG 17: Partnerships
for the Goals

Note: This table is based on the analysis in Section 4: Assessing the Thai Digital Economy from a Sustainability
Perspective.

mutually influential nexus among the opportunities and challenges at different levels andthat the realization of SDGs at each level will not be independent but interconnected.
This means that the process of promoting or internalizing normative SDGs at one levelshould also take into account the facilitation and improvement effects at other levels.
Ultimately, a comprehensive practice will lead to a sustainable Thai digital economy
model and meet the four objectives of Thailand 4.0: economic prosperity, social wellbeing, raising human values, and environmental protection.

Strategic Recommendations for Thai Digital Economy’s Sustainable
GrowthThe technological revolution is gaining momentum, and global socioeconomic prosperity
is irresistibly shifting toward digitalization. As previously discussed, the Thai digital
economy has the potential for remarkable accomplishments but is also confronted withtricky challenges. Taking advantage of emerging technological trends will be beneficial
for Thailand, where the digital industry is in its early stages, with regard to putting into
practice the UN-promoted norms for sustainable development. Therefore, the following
recommendations are proposed based on the above analysis.
First of all, promoting equal distribution of socioeconomic resources and digital

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inclusion needs to be Thailand’s primary policy priority. The interregional and intergenerational digital divides in Thailand have negatively impacted household income
and children’s education among marginalized social groups. For example, students inunderdeveloped areas could not participate in online classes during the pandemic
because they lacked electronic devices and Internet access. The implementation of
SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) means urgently bridging thedigital divide. Therefore, the research suggests that actions and cooperation for bridging the digital divide should be centered on poverty eradication or reduction. Greater
investment in digital infrastructure is necessary to close the digital divide, with the firststep being to increase telecommunications infrastructure investment in rural areas,
particularly in the country’s mountainous north and Isan. Digital infrastructure can bebuilt by national initiatives, private enterprises, or international cooperation, such as
through the LMC “3 + 5 + X” framework, to strengthen poverty reduction cooperationin the subregion.
Second, the public service sector of Thailand should provide more technical supportand humanistic care for the elderly, disabled, and residents in rural areas who arevulnerable due to the “digital literacy deficit.” Technical assistance can be provided tothese groups through volunteer services and regular training, to help them more easily
adapt to changes in the digital world and enjoy modern conveniences. Developing
specialized software programs/apps to improve the digital service usage of the country’s
digitally underprivileged citizens is also possible.
Third, digital talent cultivation via SDG 4 (Quality Education) is an essential strategy
for tackling Thailand’s tricky issues of poverty, inequality, and employment dilemmas.
Thai authorities need to accelerate digital talent training to fill the talent gap. Talentcultivation is vital for alleviating employment pressure and promoting economic recovery
in order to achieve SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth),
and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). It is also an essential booster for “Digital Thailand.”To begin with, there is strong demand for highly qualified personnel with digital skillsin the labor market as a result of the digital transformation of Thai industries. However,unless the government and educational institutions adapt training and education programs to suit market conditions, graduates may find it difficult to gain employment.
Therefore, it will be good if Thai universities, research institutions, and digital enterprises carry out various forms of digital talent cultivation cooperation projects based on
the strengths of each stakeholder and promote effective interaction between talent,industry, and the public service sector. Market demand-oriented talent cultivation canensure that labor market needs are continuously met. Moreover, cooperation can beenhanced through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic frameworks such as the ASEAN

Thailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

247

Regional Cooperation Program on Technical and Vocational Education and Training or
Lancang-Mekong Vocational Education Cooperation. In short, it would be beneficial
to implement multiple channels of cooperation to address workforce issues that are
impeding the sustainable growth of the digital economy.
Fourth, Thailand’s cybersecurity sector should be more active in building partnershipnetworks and promoting transnational governance in cyberspace. Fighting cybercrimeis becoming increasingly difficult in the globalized world due to radical technologicaladvancements and the ongoing updating of cybercriminals’ attack tactics. Building
partnership networks with regional and global stakeholders is essential to establish
cybersecurity, because cybercrimes are transnational and covert. With regard to bilateral
cooperation, Thailand can promote trust and consensus with ASEAN members, China,
Japan, and other countries on the basis of respecting “digital sovereignty” in the areasof privacy protection, data security, digital taxation, information sharing, and extraditionof criminals, so as to establish a robust transnational cybersecurity ecosystem. In
addition, the existing multilateral cooperation framework should be fully utilized. For
example, multilateral collaboration can be implemented to combat online gambling,
online fraud, and other crimes under the ASEAN Network Security Cooperation
Strategy (2021–25) and the Lancang-Mekong Law Enforcement Security Cooperation
Mechanism. Building bilateral and multilateral partnerships, as mentioned above, canresult in a healthy cyberspace community, which will contribute to achieving the blueprint
outlined in SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities andCommunities).
Lastly, Thailand can promote third-party market cooperation and share the fruits ofreciprocal prosperity with its economic partners. The digital economy represents the
emerging direction of global economic flowering, and digital technology competition has
increased among major powers. Thailand is vulnerable to potential geopolitical risks
when choosing digital technology providers and engaging in cooperation, due to thepoliticization of technology and competition among major powers. Third-party market
cooperation is a viable strategy for achieving sustainable development in order to reduce
the risk of technology politicization. For instance, in recent years there has been atrend of cooperation between China and Japan in the Greater Mekong Subregion, andThailand has taken the initiative to coordinate and participate in collaborative projects
with China and Japan (Zhao 2020). Through trilateral cooperation, Thailand, Japan, andChina can combine their comparative advantages and dispel unwarranted skepticism
while avoiding interest rivalry. The three have jointly outlined their initial vision of
economic cooperation. In April 2019, the Japan External Trade Organization and the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade held a seminar on business248

Zeng Damei and Duan Haosheng

cooperation in third-party markets between China and Japan under the sponsorship ofthe Eastern Economic Corridor Office in Thailand. Representatives of enterprises fromthe three nations held a symposium focusing on critical cooperation areas, includingtransportation and logistics, energy and environment, and smart cities (JETRO 2019).
Third-party market cooperation can effectively mitigate the negative impact of geopolitics
and great-power games on SDG 17 and is therefore a rational choice for establishinghigh-quality economic partnerships.

Conclusion
Based on constructivist theory, this research employs the UN’s SDGs as standards forevaluation and offers an integrated picture of Thai digitalization. More specifically, it
analyzes the symbiosis of opportunities and challenges encountered by the Thai digital
economy at the social, national, and international levels. Our findings contribute to theexisting scholarship by examining how enhancement of the digital economy is entwinedwith the achievement of SDGs in ASEAN developing countries, reflecting the potentiallybeneficial or detrimental impact of newly generated ICT on the Sustainable Development
Goals of the Global South. On the social level, active digital consumers, a supportive
business ecosystem, an attractive market size, and a high Internet penetration rate
form the basis for the digital economy, but the “winner-takes-all” effect combined withan unemployment wave has exacerbated the inequality among social groups. At thenational level, Thai governmental policy support and its ongoing institutionalization
are opportunities for “Digital Thailand.” Still, the digital divide, digital human capital
shortages, and cybersecurity challenges are obstacles that need attention. At the international level, Thailand can create bilateral and multilateral channels for international
cooperation to advance its digital competitiveness. In brief, the Thai government has
played an active role in the country’s digital transformation process. However, in orderto support the SDGs, a set of global development norms set by the UN, it is still necessary to address the disruptive effects of digitalization. Last but not least, Thailand’s
opportunities and challenges in achieving a resilient digital economy are interrelated
and overlapping at the three levels. The analysis further suggests that the main missionsof Thai policy instruments in the future will be poverty reduction and bridging the digital
divide. The authors hope the findings of this study will contribute to understanding thecomplex interplay of global digital reforms and SDGs.
Accepted: August 1, 2023

Thailand’s Sustainable Development of Digital Economy

249

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their detailed, insightful,and valuable suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge the generous guidance from the authors’ advisers,
Prof. Dr. Li Yiping and Asst. Prof. Dr. Pongphisoot Busbarat. The authors would also like to express
their sincere gratitude to the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University, and the MAIDSGRID Program, Chulalongkorn University, as well as Prof. Dr. Zhang Xizhen and Ajarn Dr. Monthinee
Teeramungcalanon from Thammasat University.

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Thailand’s Plural Identities: Contesting the National
Imagination in Fiction and Ethnography
Hjorleifur R. Jonsson*

This article examines notions of national identity and diversity in Thailand during
the twentieth century. It draws on ethnographies, historical fiction, jungle adventure, romance, and official documents to question common notions of Thai identityand of what constitutes socially relevant Thai-language writing. The focus is in parton so-called hill peoples, whom scholarship has generally regarded as irrelevant toan understanding of Thai society. The study suggests a recurring debate among
rival Thai perspectives on society, identity, and inequality. I divide the range ofsocial imaginaries into three groups. Some manifest unambiguous pluralism andinterethnic equivalence. Others express a class-based critique of the harm thatderives from hierarchy and social inequalities. The third view insists on Thai
distinction from and superiority over other peoples. The implications of thischauvinism are often elitist, sometimes racist, and also at times authoritarian. Of
the three views that I identify, the emphasis on pluralism and interethnic equivalence has never received any notice from scholars of Thai society and culture.
Keywords: Thailand, literature, ethnography, pluralism, racism, national
imagination

Thai-language fiction and ethnography manifest local understandings of society anddiversity at particular moments. These works are not policy statements in any direct
sense, but many of them have political implications. For the most part, they are interesting pieces of creative writing that are each very unique. Taken together and situatedhistorically, however, these individual works can be read as clear evidence of considerable
traffic in diverse and contested social visions between Thai intellectuals and the Thai
(reading) public during the twentieth century.
The research behind this study focused on representations of ethnic and otherdiversity in Thai writings during the twentieth century. My examination found a rangeof perspectives on identity and difference, which for analytical purposes I have divided* School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, 900 S Cady Mall
Rm 233, Tempe, Arizona 85287-2402, United Statese-mail: HJonsson@asu.edu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8624-0608
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 255–286© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_255

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into three groups. These different perspectives manifest divergence and debate about
Thai social principles and priorities. One perspective prioritizes hierarchy and inequality,
another critiques hierarchy and inequality as the source of social ills, and a third emphasizes plural belonging and denies any categorical convictions regarding hierarchy, ethnicity,class, gender, language, or any other lines of identity and difference. The three angles,
I suggest, occur not only in fiction or ethnography. Instead, they express pervasive
diversity in Thai notions of society and identity. I assert no Thai uniqueness; any society
may be based on conflicting principles.
Sons of the Forest, a young adult novel by Mala Khamjan (2008 [1982]), gives somesense of the interethnic realities in Thai writing that have been persistently overlookedor ignored.1) The story follows two boys in Thailand’s North, a lowland Northern Thaiboy named Muangkham and a highland Karen boy named Yachi. The two are about 12–14
years old when they get to know each other and become friends. At a boarding schoolin town, they later come up against certain problems. In one episode of bullying at
school, someone calls Yachi a “smelly Yang.” “Yang” is a Northern Thai reference topeople who call themselves Pga k’nyau. They are known as Karen in English andKariang in Central Thai; “smelly Yang” is certainly an offensive slur.2)
In reaction, each boy evokes what he has been taught: the lowland Northern Thai
Muangkham says that according to his father, “You must fight,” while the upland Karenboy Yachi counters that according to his father, “You must endure things.” Yachi follows
up on this with what seems a complete reversal of Thai stereotypes:“You lowlanders refer to yourselves as more advanced than us. Instead of talking through yourproblems like we [Pga k’nyau or highlanders] do, you fight each other. My father says that settlingdifferences through the use of force is the way of animals.” (Mala 2008, 89–90)3)

Thai society and worldview are conventionally understood in terms of a universal
hierarchy where Buddhist Thais are inherently superior to animist (“tribal”) hill peoples,city people are above rural populations, and humans are far above animals (Hanks 1962,1257). From the regular academic angle, Thais are the dominant national majority andKaren the marginalized minority. In this novel, however, highland peoples such as the1) Mala Khamjan was born Jaroen Malarote in the northern province of Chiang Mai in 1952. He isbest known for young adult fiction. As of 2007, Sons of the Forest was in its 13th printing. The author
had by then published 36 books and received 13 awards, mostly national but also one IBBY—anaward from the International Board on Books for Young People. He received the SEA Write Awardin 1991 and was made National Artist in 2014.
2) Yang, Kariang, Karen, and Pga k’nyau imply the same people but from different angles and indifferent languages. There is no neutral or context-free reference to identity.
3) All translations from Thai in this article are my own.

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Karen qualify (from their own perspective but in Thai writing) as human and civilized.
Compared to them, lowland Thais are subhuman brutes, because they use force toresolve their differences. Calling someone an animal (ai-sat or i-sat) is a vulgar insultthat combines disdain and anger. The Karen boy never manifests such an attitude, but
the assessment that he attributes to his father and to his ethnic group is squarelytransgressive and also refreshingly funny.
The late 1970s was a violent time in Thai society. In 1976 a brutal and deadly attackon the Thammasat University campus in downtown Bangkok brought a sudden end to(a few years of) democratic government. A right-wing military government took over,
and all discussion, debate, and even news reporting on the violence was banned except
from the military’s perspective that the perpetrators were Communist vandals who
had threatened national security. There were—and had been—frequent attacks acrossthe country on those advocating for labor rights and democracy. These included assassinations, and it seemed that right-wing vigilante groups had been given a free hand(Anderson 1977; Morell and Chai-anan 1981). Ethnically non-Thai highland settlements
also came under military attack for suspected political subversion. Nobody could publicly
criticize the authoritarian and right-wing violence. The novel Sons of the Forest cameout of this historical moment. It is a relatable and entertaining work of fiction that upends
some standard expectations but does not point an accusatory finger in any alarmist way.
The book does not hammer out any political convictions. Readers can take it any which
way they like.
The story’s ethnic or cultural pluralism and its ability to shift perspectives and see
Thainess from the angle of another identity are somewhat common in Thai writing,though I have not found any recognition of this in studies of fiction or of society. One
reviewer for this journal found my reading overdrawn: This particular novel “by alowland Thai writer [could] surely not [express] the Karen’s own perspective.” This is
an important and debatable point. I do not agree that a Thai writer cannot draw a convincing or credible Karen character, any more than a female writer cannot create credible
male characters or a middle-class writer create credible characters across class lines.
This issue of representation across difference (in writing or otherwise) has to be assessedon a case-by-case basis. It is equally unfounded to assume that no Thai writer can represent a Karen perspective as it would be to assume that all Thai writing about Karen
perspectives or characters is equally realistic or successful. All fiction is teeming withcharacters who do not match their writer’s identity. In the episode that triggered thereviewer’s alarm, the Thai writer used a Karen perspective in order to convey a senseof lowland Thai peoples as subhuman brutes. This was not an attempt at an ethnographic
characterization. It aired, I suggest, a critique of (a) a violent society and (b) the common

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and racist sense of Thai superiority over hill peoples.
In a book on literature and politics in Thailand during 1950–80, the political scientist
Benedict Anderson (1985) called attention, in passing, to the issue of Thai knowledgeof hinterland ethnic minorities. His book contains 13 Thai short stories in translation.
Two of the stories focus on hinterland peoples, one each on Chao Le “sea gypsies” in theSouth and Hmong hill farmers in the North. The two stories manifest historical change:[T]he entry of state and capitalism into the lives of these minorities has simultaneously broughtthem into the field of vision of the Thai intelligentsia, and for the first time into a serious Thai
literature which they themselves are unlikely soon to read. (Anderson 1985, 74)

Anthropology came to Thailand in two ways, both of which manifest American influenceon Thai society. Anthropologists were brought in to study “politically labile” populationsin Thailand’s Northeast, North, and South as part of anti-Communist counterinsurgency
measures. Also, anthropology became a subject
in universities and research institutes . . . One unplanned side-effect [of field studies among the“non-Thai Thai”] was a new sympathy for such minorities among Thai students, and a concomitantawareness of the need for a less narrowly ethnic, and more generously political, conception of
the Thai nation and national identity. The marks of this changing consciousness are visible allover [the two short stories]. (Anderson 1985, 75)

Anderson deserves credit for calling attention to the issue, though his understanding ofThai knowledge about hinterland peoples was not based on familiarity with the subject
matter. During the almost forty years since the book was published, other scholars havenot called attention to or corrected Anderson’s ignorance of the topic. The book has
since been published in Thai translation with additional essays (Anderson 2010). It
shows no indication that Thai scholars have attempted any correction regarding assertions
about Thai knowledge of ethnic diversity. This suggests that we have all been equallyignorant.
Anderson’s book engages with interesting issues that cross academic disciplinarylines between politics, history, anthropology, and literature. Anthropologists have generally confined their research to fieldwork and have not paid much—or any—attention
to literature or other Thai-language writing. Scholars of Thai politics, history, andliterature have in general not shown any particular interest or familiarity with regard
to hill peoples or ethnography. A more grounded understanding of the relevance ofdiversity in Thai society, history, literature, and political life requires interdisciplinary
investigations. My case is intended to encourage and contribute to such efforts.
This study makes no claim to being exhaustive. It insists, however, on the impor-Thailand’s Plural Identities

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tance of a recurring diversity among societal perspectives in Thailand that has, to myknowledge, had little or no recognition in studies of Thai society or history. I looked forimages of diversity in fiction and ethnographic writing in order to comprehend Thai
notions of identity regarding hill peoples. I used to think that there was a particular Thai
perspective on hill tribes. Most studies of Thai society associate Thainess with ethnicchauvinism, authoritarianism, and state control (Reynolds 1993). When I failed to affirm
my expectations, I searched for a different understanding. I was already familiar withsome Thai ethnographic writing, but the juxtaposition with novels and short stories put
these Thai ideas in a new perspective.
The assumption that Thai people have certain ideas about hill peoples or ethnic
minorities implies that these positions are to some extent unproblematic or even fixed.
In the course of my research, my view shifted to the question of how Thai people
imagine their own identity and society in relation to matters of diversity. How does
one study notions of national identity and ethnic frontiers? Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963)
offers one angle in his structural analysis of myths, with the suggestion that one must
include all versions of any particular narrative.4) This is an impossible goal, considering
the tens of thousands of writings that are potentially relevant regarding Thai views on
Thai identity and diversity. However, the ambitious aim can still counter the tendency
to select only examples that best fit one’s analytical expectations and ignore the rest.
This analysis considers Thai ethnographic reporting in relation to fiction from three
periods: the 1930s, 1950s, and 1970s. I also briefly discuss examples from before thetwentieth century, since premodern cases also differ from what is commonly expected.
My study takes each piece of writing, fictional or ethnographic, as an individual entitythat needs to be studied in its particulars (what are the components, how do they differ
and relate, what is the outcome of their interactions?) before it can be compared withother such entities that together make up what I have assembled under the rubric of“Thai writing related to identity and diversity.”
One inspiration for my research focus is the historian O. W. Wolters’s (1982) studyof border poems from fourteenth-century northern Vietnam. He suggested that eachpoem had to be treated as a coherent and unique entity, and that its meaning had to beread from the relations among the components and the social and historical context. The
poets, state officials in an ethnically diverse region near the border with China, were
“witnesses” who expressed their individual understandings of society and history at a
specific moment. They did so for a particular audience and in the spirit of political
4) Lévi-Strauss suggested that myths could be analyzed without any particular knowledge of thesociety, the historical moment, or even the original language in which the story was rendered. My
approach to Thai narratives emphasizes all these elements, so my use of his perspective is selective.

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intervention. My sources are twentieth-century Thai intellectuals of various backgrounds.
Their Thai-language ethnographies, historical fiction, jungle adventure, romance, andofficial documents offer a range of socially relevant writing about identity and difference.
My research question makes them “witnesses” to what could be imagined and expressedin Thailand during the twentieth century.

Pluralism Before 1910
Across island and mainland Southeast Asia and adjacent southern China, trade in forest
products (horns, hides, spices, orchids, beeswax, fragrant wood, etc.; in certain hinterland
areas peoples also mined gold and worked other metals) was an important component oftrans-local and then interregional and international trade for millennia (Cushman 1970;
Dunn 1975; Manguin 2002; Tran 2010). Ayutthaya and Malacca were among the many
Southeast Asian courts that derived significant wealth from such trade. This traderelied on alliances and exchanges linking different environments and peoples, and it
involved marriage relations and the granting of semi-royal titles to hinterland and oceanpeople leaders (Andaya and Andaya 2015). Nothing about Southeast Asian prehistories
suggests that hinterland peoples had ever been isolated or remote from the region’ssocial and political dynamics. Anderson’s notion that capitalism and modernity brought
Chao Le and Hmong peoples out of their previous isolation—and that they were unknown
to various lowland and coastal peoples until Western anthropology and capitalism entered
the scene—draws on (Western and Thai) social theory, particularly the notion that
historical change comes from urban dynamics that transform the otherwise-inert countryside (see Braudel 1972; and Chatthip 1999).
There is considerable indication that pluralism was a customary perspective on thesocial landscape across Southeast Asia and adjacent southern China; multiethnic networks were common (O’Connor 2009; White 2011; Le et al. 2016; Cushman and Jonsson2020). However, each place had its particular networks and dynamics. The court of
Ayutthaya may have been ignorant of the forest people who produced many of the trade
goods that sustained its economy. Ayutthaya was cosmopolitan and multilingual in
relation to trade partners from Java, Japan, Korea, China, India, Persia, and the Malay
Peninsula but ignorant about the people in its hinterland. Other courts, such as Chiang
Mai, Khorat, and Kamphaeng Phet, maintained relations with Lawa, Karen, and otherforest peoples and may have been correspondingly ignorant of Java, Japan, and the othertrade partners of Ayutthaya. In the Ayutthaya-era epic Khun Chang Khun Phaen, one
episode relates how a Siamese couple initiate relations with Lawa people with an exchangeThailand’s Plural Identities

261

of jewelry. Another one shows Lawa and Siamese attending each other’s festivals andyoung people joking and flirting across these ethnic lines (Baker and Pasuk 2010, 386,
485).
The literature scholar Suvanna Kriengkraipetch (1995) studied images of otherness
in Thai poetry around 1800 and found no sign of a stable notion of Thainess or selfhood.
One striking example of pluralism is in a segment of the epic poem “Phra Aphai Mani”
by Sunthon Phu:
[All the enemies in a battle] listened to the teachings of the great [hermit] in order to call a halt to
protracted fighting. After the teaching, which concerned Buddhist ideas, those who listened . . .
explained their understanding in their own way, based on their religious beliefs and the cultural
practices of each group. Sunthon Phu, as a Buddhist himself, did not clarify the meaning of thisteaching, as if wishing to suggest that differences between “us” and “the others” . . . had no needfor set criteria to distinguish each group, permitting one to enjoy the differences and becomeacquainted with each other. (Suvanna 1995, 145)

Thai Field Marshall Jaophraya Surasakmontri wrote about his military missions in the
1880s, when he was involved in fighting against “insurgent” groups in the borderlandsof northern Laos and Vietnam. His account of “various groups of forest people” emphasized identifiable traits such as language, dress, and hairstyle. It showed no sign ofranking people by ethnicity or of insisting on any Thai superiority; there was only aplurality of peoples (Lathi 2015).
King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, r. 1868–1910) wrote a travel poem about the Karen
peoples in Kanchanaburi that did not suggest any ethnic prejudice but rather interestand familiarity. He noted that the Siamese recognized the Karen for their midwiferyskills and herbal medicine (Renard 1980, 104). He also wrote a verse-drama set among
the Koi hunter-gatherers in the far south toward Malaysia (Chulalongkorn 1968 [1906]).
In this, he gave an ethnographic background and noted that both Thai and Malay
peoples valued herbal medicine from the Koi peoples. He also provided a glossary ofdozens of terms from the Koi language and sprinkled the Thai text with these terms.
The mention of the midwifery skills and herbal medicine that were valued and traded
across ethnic lines is indicative of a pluralist tradition, where ethnic difference is maintained in part to cross it with mutually beneficial exchanges. Multilingualism was aregular component of such dynamics.
King Chulalongkorn’s verse-play is not about ethnic difference. Instead, it is a drama
about young lovers who are not allowed to marry because the woman’s parents havedecided on a wealthier suitor for her. At the end of the play, the male rivals have bothbeen killed and the young woman has committed suicide. In my reading, the tragedy
offers (directly or indirectly) a critique of parental overreach, such as was manifest in the

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Thai law that a woman’s parents decided on which man she married (Loos 2006, 138).
King Chulalongkorn could write a drama with Koi characters about contemporary Thaiconcerns (e.g., could a woman marry for love?) because he assumed that peoples were
to some degree equivalent. Nothing in the play asserts Siamese superiority over theKoi or suggests the latter’s deficiency.
The historian Thongchai Winichakul (2000) argues that during 1885–1910, membersof the Siamese elite engaged in nation building in part through an ethnographic project.
He asserts that this project established distinctions through an elite-Siam-ization of
ethnography. Allegedly, the elite established its superiority through an ethno-spatial
hierarchy of the civilized city, the civilizable but rustic countryside, and the strange anduncivilizable ethnic others in the forest and mountains. Thongchai further asserts that
King Chulalongkorn’s verse-play, Ngo pa (Frizzy junglee), was one expression of thisproject. Prior to 1885, supposedly, the Siamese elite and Siamese society were ignorantof the hinterland peoples.
It is possible that some writings by certain members of the Siamese elite express
the views that Thongchai found. But this is far from uniform or obvious in the sources.
There was considerable diversity and debate among the elite on a range of matters.
Prince Damrong, Chulalongkorn’s brother, often expressed ethnic chauvinism in his
writing, but his writings are not representative of the views of the elite in general. My
reading of the report by Jaophraya Surasakmontri, for instance, differs from Thongchai’s
understanding. Some of his entries draw on considerable first-hand familiarity, others
on rather reliable and unprejudiced informants, and yet other entries suggest unreliableand prejudiced gossip about peoples which the Siamese official had no knowledge of.
Thongchai’s study views the Siamese elite as a singular entity with a unified andracist project of nation building and hierarchy. It suggests a critique of the monarchy
and affirms a clear social divide between the elite and the public, both of which aresignificant items in contemporary Thai debates about society and politics. However, I
question the claims regarding Siamese ignorance of ethnically diverse peoples prior to1885, and about the shape of ethnographic knowledge production to boost the elite’s
claims to social superiority during 1885–1910. Thongchai’s article raises important
issues. His case, however, makes it impossible to recognize an indigenous Southeast
Asian tradition of pluralism, including a practical interest in ethnic diversity, that isevident in premodern times and could still be found during 1885–1910, even in writings
by members of the Siamese elite.

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Assertions of Essential Difference
In 1932 a democratic revolution changed Thailand from an absolute monarchy to a
democracy with a constitutional monarchy. A book from 1933 introduced the northern
province of Nan to a national readership. The book has a long chapter on history, written
by a “Mr. Good-Luck Lotus” (Nai Bua Chok-di). He opens by stating that in the past
the land of Nan was a small kingdom and thus it was at various times under the administration of stronger powers that surrounded it: to the west lay Chiang Mai and thenBurma; to the north and east were Sipsongpanna (in Yunnan, China) and Luang Prabang(Laos); to the south were Sukhothai and Ayutthaya:
Whenever Nan was under the administration of either the Ayutthaya or Chiang Mai kingdom thenthere was tranquility and happiness among the citizens, because these kingdoms were governedby justice and kindness. This is very different from the waste and destruction that came with being
under the Burmese administration, when there was much despair among the people. The Burmese
never built anything up, they only destroyed things . . . At times, Nan was also attacked by its
neighbors, such as Phrae, Luang Prabang, and Sipsongpanna. (Nai 1933, 212–213)

Prior to the 1780s, Ayutthaya was the Siamese capital, and Chiang Mai was the predominant kingdom in the North and then the administrative center of the Northern
Division (Monthon Phayap) of the Siamese nation-state. The expression of preferredsubordination to Chiang Mai and Ayutthaya comes across as a declaration of allegianceto the new nation-state.
The chapter on the ethnic groups of Nan is more of a surprise. Siri Phetyaprasert(1933), who represented Nan in the national parliament, writes on the various ethnic
groups in the province.5) There are sections on the lowland Northern Thai population
as well as on the Meo (Hmong), Yao (Mien), Khmu, Thin, (Tai) Lue, and Phi Tong Leuang(Mlabri). The entries on the ethnically non-Thai peoples stress their unfamiliarity:“Seven hundred years ago the Lawa people fled from the Thai into the forests andmountains, and they have had no way to progress” (Siri 1933, 283). Peoples are situatedin terms of “blood,” their supposed racial linkages.
Significantly, the chapter on the peoples of Nan opens with a plea to correct a
misunderstanding about “Lao,” which was a common Bangkok reference to the population in the North: “In truth there are no Lao people in Nan [The Lao people live inFrench Indochina] . . . In general, the lowland population is Thai, of true-Thai flesh and5) I have not yet learned any biographical details of this politician. He credits district governors in
Nan with his knowledge of various ethnic groups, which suggests that he may have been unfamiliar
with the province.

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blood and ancestry.” It continues with a mention of “the period when the Thai fled
southward from the oppression of the Chinese [and split into two groups: northerners
who initially were centered on Chiang Saen, and southerners (the Siamese in the Central
Plains)] at Sawankhalok and beyond . . . The leaders of both groups were true Thai”(Siri 1933, 273, 274).
The Meo and Yao are said to be very similar, and both their origins are in China.
There are White Meo and Black Meo, who differ mainly by dress. “Their important
occupation is opium cultivation, and this activity creates considerable burden for theadministration. [The Meo also grow rice and corn and raise animals.] Their dogs have asilky fur, and the lowland peoples buy lots of dogs from the Meo” (Siri 1933, 278). The
entry on the Yao is much shorter. It mentions some vocabulary, typical dress, weddings,
and that “the position of women is similar to that of slaves” (Siri 1933, 279). The racialemphasis is persistent in the entries: “The Lue are of Thai ancestry, but since ancient
times there has been much mixing of blood with the Lua” (Siri 1933, 281–282).
Siri was conjuring untruths for a national audience with his exaggeration of thealienness of the various ethnically non-Thai peoples in Nan. The exoticization of hill
peoples went hand in hand with the declaration that the lowland population was racially“true-Thai.” In the 1880s the leader of a group of Mien (Yao) and Hmong (Meo) people(most likely a few thousand) negotiated with the king of Nan to settle in the mountainsof his domain (they had earlier had similar relations with valley lords in Laos, Vietnam,
and southern China). They agreed on annual tribute or tax payment, the leader was
given a semi-royal phaya title, and the farmers in five settlements were allowed to growand sell opium to the Royal Opium Monopoly. The Mien leader was well known to theauthorities, and he often visited the city and the palace. He delivered tax every year,
and he became quite wealthy from the proceeds of taxation and opium cultivation.
When France took over neighboring Laos as part of Indochina in 1893, the Bangkok
authorities placed Thai soldiers in garrisons along the border in Nan. The Mien population in Nan sold rice to the military camps (Jonsson 2005, 74–94).
It appears largely unknown nowadays that in the 1920s and 1930s, so-called forestand hill peoples were considered regular members of Thai society. One indication ofthis is an announcement in the State Gazette from January 1927 that extends the period
for collecting taxes in order to accommodate the hill peoples. They had difficulty traveling in the rainy season and the hot season, and thus the tax collection would be extended(Suphayok-Kasem 1927, 603–604). Importantly, the people are referred to as ratsadon
jamphuak Meo, Yao, Musoe, Liso.6) The term ratsadon defines them as “citizens” or the6) I owe my knowledge of this document to Suchon Mallikamarl, who is currently conducting researchon interethnic political history in the National Archives of Thailand.

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265“general public”; there is no indication that members of these ethnic groups wereconsidered alien or somehow outside of society. Nor were they labeled “hill” or “forest”
peoples. During the 1920s, the Thai press favored the term ratsadon in reference to“people as the opposite of rulers” (Baker and Pasuk 2022, 128). The People’s Party, thegroup behind the rebellion that established democracy and ended the absolute monarchy,
referred to itself by this term, as Khana ratsadon.
In early 1927, King Prajadiphok (Rama VII, r. 1925–35) made an official journey bytrain from Bangkok to the north of the country. The governor of Chiang Mai orchestrated
a grand reception that gave Mien, Hmong, Lisu, Karen, and other “hill peoples” important
place. There were parades with floats celebrating each ethnic group, and there weremusic and dance performances by Mien, Hmong, and Lisu peoples. The governor had
hosted a large number of hill peoples for a month prior to the event.
In the National Archives of Thailand, photos from this event show interethnic
mingling among cheerful and interested Hmong, Mien, and Northern Thai audience
members. The photo captions refer to the people as ratsadon (the general public). Thereis every indication that the ethnic diversity of Thai society was seen as a normal thing.
The ratsadon suggests that there was no firm ranking of peoples that would markHmong, Mien, or Karen as in any way less central or less important than the other local
populations. Nothing indicates that hill peoples were being viewed or treated as strange
or as inferior to ethnically Thai peoples. The documentary film from this event suggests
a sense of a plurality of peoples who were not being ranked by ethnic identity (Sadet
Neua 1927).
A fiction film, Kariang Sai-Yoke (The Karen people of Sai Yoke), filmed in Kanchanaburi
Province in 1936, offers further support for Thai pluralism and interethnic parity during
this era. The film is set in a Karen village during New Year, and it combines daily
activities with a staged drama of tension between the two suitors of a Karen maiden.
Most of the actors are Karen villagers playing themselves, but the role of the Karen
woman is played by a Siamese beauty queen, Miss Ayutthaya 1936 (Anake 2003, 146).
This film shows no sign of exoticism or of a ranking of peoples where Thai are superior
to others.
The pluralism that is apparent in various Thai writings from the early twentiethcentury suggests the continuation of a sense of the Thai as just one of many equivalentethnic labels in a diverse region. However, there are some clear signs of an alternative
insistence on an ethnic divide between Thai and others. These views represent simultaneous and rival perspectives on Thai identity and society. Prior to this research, I
had not encountered expressions of Thai national identity as inclusive and diverse.
This Thai material suggests parallels to the inclusive, multiethnic sense of modern

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national identity in Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia. Correspondingly, the apparent emergence of Thai racism and mono-ethnic chauvinism in the 1930s has some parallel withthe situation that developed in Burma around the same time.
Some scholars have suggested that the Thai government used the nationalist label“Thai Islam” (Muslim Thai) to deny Malay identity in the South from the 1940s onward(Jory 2007; Dalrymple et al. 2023, 205–206). Photos in the National Archives from the1927 visit of King Rama VII to Chiang Mai indicate, however, that people were identifying deliberately as Muslims before that time. Some photos show delegations marchingin a parade, with signs declaring their ethnicity. One group holds a printed sign thatsays khaek and a hand-painted banner saying Khana-chat-islam (delegation of Muslim
people). My guess is that the organizers printed the khaek label and that the people
responded by writing their own preferred alternative. As discussed below, khaek is acommon Thai gloss for South Asians, Indians, and Malay peoples that suggests a contrast
to the Thai. “Delegation of Muslim people” asserts belonging and equivalence andclearly counters the otherness implied by khaek.
The above material on identity discourses in Thailand during the 1920s and 1930s
shows clearly that notions of Thai identity as singular, exclusive, and superior to that ofhill peoples coexisted with notions of identity as inclusive and diverse. The notion ofvarious groups of highland peoples as ratsadon that is expressed in a state gazette suggests that at least some agents of the state and national integration were invested in aplural and diverse Thai society rather than being somehow uniformly focused on ethnicchauvinism or on the ranking of peoples through an ethno-spatial hierarchy.

Thai Perspectives during the 1950s
In 1950 Bunchuai Srisawat (2004a [1950]) published the book 30 Peoples of Chiang Rai,
which was in many ways an introduction to the northern province of Chiang Rai for anational readership. The author was a member of the national parliament, representing
Chiang Rai.7) It appears that the ethnographic impulse was triggered in reaction to
Bangkok notions of northerners as “Lao” and a discourse on national credentials interms of pure Thai blood. The people in the province are of three kinds. The bulk arenortherners as well as Thai Yai, Lue, Tai Ya, Indochinese Lao, Karen, and Lawa. There

7) Bunchuai Srisawat (1917–73) was a businessman, politician, and writer, born in Chiang Rai Province.
His travels in that province and in neighboring Burma, China, and Vietnam informed many bookson ethnology that are still popular.

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are also foreigners (chao tang chat, “people from other countries”) and mountain peoples(chao khao) such as Khmu, Khamet, Meo, Yao, Lahu, Akha, Lisu, and Kui (Bunchuai
2004a, 2). The account stresses that the Yao, Meo, Lahu, and others are from othercountries (China, Laos, Burma). The lowland Northern Thai population is “true Thai.
There has been no mixing of blood from other groups . . . The Thai in the Central region[however] have blood mixed with that of other groups” (Bunchuai 2004a, 12). In theancient past, Thai people migrated southward from China and came into conflict with the
Lawa, who were the previous owners of the land. The Thai were victorious in thisencounter (Bunchuai 2004a, 7).
Bunchuai declared that the Mountain Karen (Yang doi) “are filthy, and they do not
like to bathe. They are fond of their family and relatives. They cling to their customary
ways and live in little shacks” (Bunchuai 2004a, 186). The impression he leaves is thatthe more any Karen group (Yang daeng, Yang khao, Yang kaloe) resemble their lowland
Northern Thai neighbors, the cleaner and more civilized they are. This account of thepeoples of Chiang Rai conjured untruths for a national audience as it exoticized theethnically non-Thai population, like the earlier account of Nan Province. The untruths
were most blatant when it came to hill peoples’ sexuality:
The young [Ko, Akha] people meet up in the evenings at the kalalasoe, “the maiden-hugging
grounds,” where there is a bench where they can hug . . . [and if they like each other] they willcontinue and have sexual relations. [The villagers elect a man to serve as deflowerer, khajirada,
who must initiate all the young women in the ways of sexuality. There is also a woman, mida, who
initiates young men in the same way.] If the young people are reluctant to engage in sexual
activity, then the elders must pull them by the hand to the hugging grounds and get them toembrace. (Bunchuai 2004a, 384–392)

The book 30 Peoples of Chiang Rai went through several reprints, with various changes
in the text.8) Bunchuai (2002 [1963]) then produced a different book on “hill tribes ofThailand” that had no content on Thai peoples. However, the exoticization and sexualization of Thailand’s hill peoples continued in much the same form in this book. In
Bunchuai’s (2004b [1954]) book on the Tai Lue in Yunnan, China, there was no sexualization in the accounts of Yao and Akha. However, “The Ko like to eat dog meat. They
trade goods for [dogs] that they then kill and eat all the time. The women dress beautifully. They wear a short skirt, Hawaiian style” (Bunchuai 2004b, 377). The sexualized
racism regarding Thailand’s hill peoples manifested a particular intersection of author,
topic, audience, and historical moment. When the topic was the same (Ko and Yao, or8) Suchon Mallikamarl (personal communication, April 2022) has found four different editions, whichare, however, never identified as such in the title. The 2004 reprint is made from the second edition.

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Akha and Mien peoples, in the context of Thai) but was situated outside of modern
Thailand, the sexualized racism was absent. That is, the sexualization was contingent
on claiming true-Thai credentials for Chiang Rai lowlanders in relation to Bangkok
through the deliberate othering of hill peoples.
The exoticization of the hill peoples in Chiang Rai was not the only ethnic-frontier
imagery available to a national audience in the 1950s. In his historical novel on Kamphaeng
Phet, Thung Maharat (The great ruler’s plains), Malai Chuphinit (under the pen name
Riam Eng) focused on the river-trader Reun, who later became a local leader.9) Early
on, Reun is at a Buddhist temple with his love interest (and future wife), Sutjai. He
mentions to her that the buildings were long dilapidated but then two brothers, Phaya
Taka and Phapo, financed the restoration. “Don’t forget that they are Kariang, notThai,” says Reun (Riam 1975 [1951], 48). The topic later recurs, about the two brothers
restoring the temple to its former glory: “They are not Thai persons, but they love
Thailand and love the Thai people, because it is here that they established themselves,
it is among these people that they found happiness” (Riam 1975, 294).10) Further on in
the novel there is an outbreak of smallpox. An elderly woman mentions that when she
was young, there was another such outbreak. She recalls that the people in a “Kariang
and Meo village had burned their houses to ashes” (Riam 1975, 455). This is the strategy
that Reun then has the people follow. This shows the interethnic familiarity throughwhich the Siamese in Kamphaeng Phet can learn from the neighboring Karen andHmong peoples about responding to a debilitating and deadly epidemic.
In a short story that is also set in Kamphaeng Phet, Malai writes about an elderly
upper-class woman attending the opening of a health station that her late husband
worked on establishing in his lifetime. Her mind drifts to their decades together; sherecalls the brothers Phaya Taka and Phapo and the idea that by establishing a lowland
trading center the “Kariang and Meo hill villagers” would have easier access to trade
goods (Riam 1961, 412). This suggests how certain lowland traders actively contributed
to plural belonging by placing a priority on enabling relations that were of value to theirhighland neighbors.
Karen and Hmong people appear repeatedly around the Thai in this fiction, and thisrepresentation of diversity seems quite deliberate. Malai grew up in Kamphaeng Phet,
9) The story was translated as The Field of the Great (Malai 1996). Malai Chuphinit (1906–63) was ajournalist and writer recognized for his skill with short stories and novels.
10) Phaya Taka was a titled chief, and Phapo was a wealthy trader married to the daughter of the Siamese
subdistrict official. They were important local characters around 1900. Their one-time importanceis celebrated in the National Museum of Kamphaeng Phet. Their posthumous recognition has
everything to do with the novel Thung Maharat, which is recognized as among the greatest of Thai
novels. It places Kamphaeng Phet Province on the national stage.

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where there is a long history of relations between Thai and Karen peoples. By situating
the Kariang and Meo together in these narratives, in the vicinity of the Thai, the author
insists on ethnic diversity as ordinary and important. People were familiar with one
another across ethnic lines, they could learn from each other, and they cultivated good
relations in ways that sustained plural belonging and precluded interethnic conflict anddiscrimination. This fiction directly countered Thai chauvinism such as in Bunchuai’s
assertion that hill peoples were aliens on Thai soil.
Under the pen name of Noi Inthanon, Malai wrote a jungle adventure series in 1955:
Jungle Trails.11) The stories center on three men: the Thai Mr. Sak Suriyan, his Karenmate Ta-Koen (“Old Koen”), and the Thai army captain Reuang Yuthana. Sak is thecentral character and narrator. The series does not romanticize jungle life, but it isnotable for never suggesting the superiority of Thai over Karen or other forest people;
for not depicting forest people as filthy, ignorant, or somehow inferior to the Thai; andnever suggesting that education, urban ways, and Thai Buddhism are superior to theknowledge, behavior, or religion common in forest communities. Each of these elements
is common in the standard chauvinist binary formulation of Thai people as superior tothe hill tribes.
The association of forests with illegality, disorder, filth, backwardness, and wildness
has often been conveyed in scholarship as “the Thai perspective” on forests and forest
people (Davis 1984; Stott 1991; Thongchai 2000, 38; Turton 2000), a claim that I used
to accept. This makes Jungle Trails quite significant in relation to the politics of Thai
culture and society. Sak, the main character, declares near the beginning of one story:
As for myself, I can say this: the forest is the kingdom of my life and the field of my life. Every
year I must leave and seek it out. If I stay for too long in the city then I am like a tree that is in
the wrong place. City life weighs me down and drains my mind. The city and I cannot mix for
too long at a time. It is not peaceful and refreshing like the enlightenment that I derive from theforest and the forest people. (Noi 1990 [1955], Vol. 1, 103)

This work links “civilization” or “enlightenment” (arayatham) with forests and forest
people, which is unusual in Thai writing. Noi’s Sak makes this statement very plainly,
and the attitude rings true for the character in the stories. In one story, Sak has beenhunting when he meets up with Ta-Koen. Before they leave for a trip together, Sak
wants to hold a feast for the Meo people who have been assisting him. He notes, “it is11) The series started as a radio play in 1955 that became very popular. Then the stories were publishedin book form and in 1961 also made into a television drama. The books were published as five
volumes in 1974; I do not know whether that was the original format. I cite from the 14-volume
reissue (of about two hundred pages each) in 2012, which was first published in 1990 and remains
in print.

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in the character of the Meo people to never tell you anything that isn’t true” (Noi 1990,
Vol. 3, 161). This is as far from exoticization as can be. The hill peoples are reliable
and honest, they are an ordinary part of society, and there is collaboration and trust
across ethnic lines. Sak’s feast indicates that he treats the Meo like partners or equals.
In this particular story, a young Karen man gets drunk and begins wielding a torchnear some dry vegetation. A forestry official calls out to him to be careful, otherwise theforest and the villages are at risk. The Karen man says that he does not care: “This is
not my forest. The big people are the owners; what do I have to fear?” The forestry
official, an agent of the state and capitalist expansion, replies:“That is wrong, Maowa. All the people are the owners of this forest, not just the company that has
the license, not just the likes of me who have come here for work. This also belongs to everyone,
Karen and Thai—they are the owners of this forest and of this land. The forest gives shade andlivelihood. Please don’t let it be destroyed.” (Noi 1990, Vol. 3, 183)

Things turn out badly, and the next morning the village headman despairs over the
future: “It’s all gone, the orchards, the hill fields, what will we eat?” Sak replies that
there is taro and tapioca in the ground, there are fish in the rivers and birds in the sky,and lots of game in the forest, so why fear starvation? The two talk this back and forth,and then the Karen leader declares: “I will not forget this; the forest official understands
that all the people are the owners of the forest and of this Thai land” (Noi 1990, Vol. 3,186). This states very clearly that Thailand is not the exclusive domain of ethnicallyThai people. Nothing in this fiction ever associates strangeness with forest or highland
people, or presents them as inferior to Thai.
A different societal and interethnic configuration appears in Lao Khamhom’s (2020[1958]) short story “Phrai Fa” (The lord’s serfs).12) The story is set in a logging camp in
Lamphun Province, near the Ping River. The narrator is Chert, a Thai man. Intha, an
ethnically Khmu elephant keeper (mahout), is central to the story. Intha is in love with
Bua Kham, a young woman from a nearby Northern Thai farming village. Intha has neverbeen to school, and he cannot understand the hierarchical system of Thai society—howsomeone can be considered a lord and be treated differently from other humans. Chert
has no success explaining the logic of this, which would be obvious to any Thai person
12) “Phrai fa” was included (as “Dust Underfoot”) in Damnern Garden’s translation of the short story
collection Fa bo kan (The sky is no hindrance) (Khamsing 1973). Lao Khamhom (1930–) is the
pen name of Khamsing Srinok, who is from Thailand’s Northeast. He has written several collectionsof short stories and one novel. He worked for some time as a journalist and then as an assistantto anthropologists from Cornell University’s Bang Chan research project (near Bangkok) in the
1950s. The short story collection Fa bo kan was for some time on the secondary school curriculum.
Thai assessments of it range from a masterpiece to Communist propaganda (see Platt 2013, 54).

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271(Lao 2020, 33–36). The logging camp receives a visitor, an elite man of royal descent
who is the company owner’s nephew. While the loggers are away in some forest, theelite visitor takes Bua Kham for his pleasure, with the intention of leaving her behindwhen he returns to Bangkok.
Chert learns of the affair and tells the visitor to back off. The elite man takes offensethat a mere commoner is trying to tell him, a Mom Rachawong (his royal rank), how tobehave (Lao 2020, 42–43). Chert insists that it is all about love and human decency(manusyatham, commonly glossed as humanitarianism). The royal person blows off that
notion as nonsense and then adds, “Intha! Since when has that Earholes been as humanas the rest of us? He is a Khmu through and through!” (Lao 2020, 44). During a stormthat night, when the river has swollen with the rain, Intha has his elephant push the hut
where the royal and Bua Kham are sleeping into the river. By the next morning Intha isgone, and the villagers find the two dead bodies and wreckage of the hut washed up on
the river’s banks.13)“Phrai Fa” is a unique and individual story, but it shares a plot structure with somecritical writing from this era that portrays the old order (royalty, the upper class, officialdom) as an obstacle to progress. This old guard kept reform, justice, and humanitarianism at bay. Short stories and novels by writers such as Siburapha and Seni Saowaphong
pitted enthusiastic young people against the agents of privilege and inequality who stoodin the way of a just Thai society (Thak 2018, 57–59). This conflict was never resolved.
It drew on rival views about the implications of hierarchy. The fiction rests on sharp
moral contrasts, and it is in this comparative light that I see the innocent goodness ofIntha, who cannot comprehend the status inequalities of Thai society. Readers willrecognize the elite man as an agent of appropriation and harm.14) As with the fictional
Karen character Yachi from 1982, the fictional Khmu man Intha from 1958 enables a
displaced Thai reflection on Thai society and its problems.
In his scholarly work on relations between Lawa (Lua’) hill peoples and the lowland
Tai population of Chiang Mai, Kraisri Nimmanhaeminda (1965; 1967) called attention to
centuries of political, economic, and religious exchanges and cultural mixing across these
ethnic lines. His work struck some of the same notes as the pluralist fiction that I discuss,
13) The names of the people in the story are somewhat intriguing. Chert is a common name. However,Bua-kham (Golden Lotus) is a somewhat common female name in folktales. Intha refers to the god
Indra. Meanwhile, the royal person is named Paipiin Rachaphreuk (Climber-Royal-Plant), which a
Thai friend suggested means “Royal Monkey” and thus constitutes a thinly veiled mockery.
14) For overviews of social criticism in Thai fiction and the leftist “literature-for-life” tradition, seeManas (1982), Harrison (1994), Ruenruthai (2000), and Thanapol (2011). The class-orientation ofthis discourse tends to leave out the gender-based social critique that was common in works byfemale authors such as Ko Surangkhanang (1994 [1937]).

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and—somewhat similarly—it has generally been ignored.15)

Social Imaginaries in the 1970s
Khajadphai Burutsaphat (1975), a career bureaucrat concerned with national security,
published a book called Hill Tribes in 1975. A second edition followed in 1985, and athird in 1990. The book claims to represent a neutral, learned view on hill peoples. It
notes that opium cultivation and forest destruction are important problems. Hill tribes
are recent immigrants to Thailand and are the source of these problems; their crossingof national borders is a significant security concern. There are chapters on individual
tribes that summarize available knowledge and also draw significantly on Bunchuai’s
generalizations about the promiscuity of highland maidens, the maiden-hugging bench
among the Akha, and the sexual freedom of Yao maidens. The book’s first and second
editions contain a photo of the author on the hugging bench in an Akha village, with his
arm around a teenage Akha girl at night; this was a realm of masculine bravado.16)
Khajadphai’s book suggests that hill people are racially distinct from the Thai, that theircultures stress young people’s sexual liberty, that they are recent immigrants to Thailand,that their traditional ways cause many problems for Thai society, and that things canonly improve to the degree that hill peoples take on Thai ways.
At one point I read this book as presenting the official Thai view on hill tribes.
Now I see it instead as one of several rival perspectives on Thai society. Khajadphai
presents an authoritarian view that is intolerant of Thailand’s diversity. While heborrows from Bunchuai, his concern is different. His subtext is that Thai society isunder threat, and that it is important to obey the directives of the government. The
anthropologist Pinkaew Laungaramsri (1998) has analyzed such “hill tribe discourse”—
how highland people and their ways (shifting cultivation, opium growing, settlement
migration, etc.) were portrayed as constituting “problems” for Thai society that concerned ethnic difference.
15) Kraisri (1912–92) was born in Chiang Mai, in Thailand’s North, to ethnically Chinese parents. They
ran a successful business and sent him abroad for education. He received a BA from the Universityof Pennsylvania in 1932 and an MBA from Harvard University in 1938. Upon returning to Thailand,
he was first a professor at Chulalongkorn University and then worked in government and banking
in Bangkok. However, he later settled in Chiang Mai and established himself as a banker, businessman, and scholar. He sought to bolster northern-ness to counter Bangkok hegemony andCentral Thai chauvinism.
16) The “maiden-hugging grounds” was an idea made up by Bunchuai. However, it was so compellingto some of his male Thai audience that it was staged for a documentary film in 1964, and then theonce-fictional bench became a Thai “fact” that took on a life of its own (see Jonsson 2020).

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If descriptions of hill peoples are a Thai way of engaging with identity, diversity,and society, then the subtext of Khajadphai’s book can be read as an authoritarianmanifesto: People are a problem, and they need to be brought under disciplinary control
through state measures for national security. The common labeling of any agitation
for justice, democracy, and equality as Communist propaganda and a threat, and thelicense to use violence against anyone so labeled, reached a horrifying high point in thedeadly attack in Bangkok in 1976. However, the pattern of political abuse has beenmuch more general (see Subrahmanyan 2021).
Sophak Suwan’s (2016 [1974]) novel Pulakong presents an interesting counter tosuch authoritarian chauvinism.17) The story is set in Patani Province in the Muslim
South. The main character is Suphara (nicknamed Tun), a young Bangkok woman whogoes south as a development volunteer after graduating from Thammasat University.
She settles in the village of Pulakong and negotiates to stay with the family of the school
headmaster. Tun becomes a substitute teacher at the school and learns sufficient Malay
to communicate with others. She insists to the students that they are a Thai people
and that they must love the country as a Thai people: “They simply differ in religion andlanguage. These are just matters of local culture and language; they don’t suggest thatthe people aren’t Thai” (Sophak 2016, 138). “She also told the students to call themselves
Muslim Thai (Thai Islam) instead of using the binary-contrast terms Thai and khaek [acommon term for Malay and Indian peoples]” (Sophak 2016, 185) that would mark themas outsiders and as not Thai.
Given the common use of authoritarianism in relations between government officials
and ordinary villagers, Tun’s inclusive sense of Thai identity and belonging and heranti-authoritarianism stand as a clear alternative:
If we don’t bully the villagers but are instead on friendly terms with them and offer them assistancethe best we can, then they will understand us better and will not believe the propaganda of that
other group [Muslim separatists]. She had previously seen villagers’ fear and intimidation toward
the officials who insist on placing themselves above ordinary people . . . The power of that groupcauses real hardship for any assistance to the countryside . . . She wanted to warn [the officials]
that their actions would play into the hands of their opponents. (Sophak 2016, 268–269)

Before Tun leaves for Bangkok, local people commend her on her work and the way she17) Sophak was born Ramphaiphan Suwannasan in 1944. She studied music therapy in Vienna and wasa Thai pioneer in that field. She has written dozens of novels, many of which have been made into
television dramas. She was made National Artist in 2013. Pulakong was serialized in a magazine
before it was published as a book, and in 1977 the Ministry of Education selected the book forindependent (out-of-classroom) reading for students in secondary school (mathayomsuksa). By all
accounts the story was well known.

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has influenced villagers’ understanding of their belonging:
You have done a good job, teacher, not just with respect to development in the village and subdistrict. You have also made this land belong to the villagers more than before. If they know thatthe place where they stand belongs to them, then they will help protect it. No more will anyone
be able to deceive them that they are being oppressed . . . Where they live is Thai land that belongs
to them, the villagers, as a Thai people. (Sophak 2016, 368)

This suggests an echo of the sentiment expressed in the Jungle Trails adventure story:
this land and this forest belong to the Thai and the Karen together. In Pulakong,southern Muslims are not alien khaek but are as Thai as any other people; they belong
in the country, and the land belongs to them too.
The novel Under the Deep-Blue Sky by Sifa (1977) concerns the Hmong man LiJeng and the Bangkok Thai woman Matsi, who fall in love while at Teacher’s College
in Thailand’s South.18) Li-Jeng is from a Hmong village in the mountains of Chiang Rai
in the North, and he wants to establish a school there so that the Hmong people will
not be inferior to the Thai. He is adamant about being of Hmong ethnicity and Thainationality. When he graduates and wants to move north, Matsi decides that they will
get married. Her father gives his consent, but her mother is in tears and never accepts
that her daughter has married a non-status hill person. She wants her daughter todivorce him and to instead carry a family name that brings status. Correspondingly,
Li-Jeng’s mother never takes to Matsi, but his father is very approving and thinks that
Matsi has sacrificed greatly by leaving the city and the lowlands to live with Li-Jeng in a
mountain village.19)
The novel was published at a time when hill peoples were portrayed as alienimmigrants and the Hmong people in particular were vilified as a Communist threat, as“Red Meo.” Matsi’s parents ask Li-Jeng whether he is a Red or a White Meo. “I am Black
Meo,” he says, adding that there is no such thing as Red Meo. Then he tells them thatthe diversity of Tai/Thai groups is comparable, and it turns out that educated and affluent
urbanites are completely ignorant of ethnic diversity in Thailand and beyond. The text
is sprinkled with Hmong phrases that are translated into Thai in footnotes. It seems a18) The story was serialized in a magazine prior to being printed in book form, and it was later madeinto a film. Sifa (1930–2013) was born Mom Luang Si Fa Ladawan. She was of royal descent: hergreat-grandfather was a son of King Rama III. She became recognized as a writer during hercollege days and went on to write dozens of novels. Sifa received many awards for her books andwas made National Artist in 1996.
19) The female name Matsi is best known from Jatakas (Buddha life-stories) as that of the wife ofPrince Vesandorn, Phra Wet, the then-future Buddha who gave away his wife and children as amanifestation of his extreme generosity. Matsi as the Bangkok-Thai wife of Li-Jeng, a young andmodern Hmong man, may be a gentle joke by a determined Thai pluralist.

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deliberate choice to have Thai readers voice the Hmong language in order to blur thelines between languages. The marriage of Matsi and Li-Jeng expresses a more obvious
blurring of ethnic difference.
Before they get married, Li-Jeng visits the village on his own. He thinks of courtshipin the highlands, that it is a natural thing between women and men, that it is pure andthere is nothing shameful about it. Li-Jeng thinks about Matsi, who was very disapproving of highland ways. He told her:
My group has had these customs for a long time. Your group may think of this as savage practice,as the shameful ways of stupid hill tribes. But I have heard that in Sweden there is the samekind of free sex. In the minds of your [Thai] group they are progressive and have freedom. And
how is this really different? Or is it just that one group is farang (Westerners) while the otheris hill tribe? (Sifa 1977, Vol. 1, 84–85)

This reversal undermines any expectations of Thai superiority over hill peoples. Sifa’s
framing counters the common notion from Bunchuai that hill people are promiscuousand thus inferior to the Thai. In Sifa’s novel, in contrast, this feature is something that
can also be found in Sweden, whose people the Thai see as liberated and progressive.
It becomes possible to see the Thai as clueless and equally behind both hill tribes andthe progressive Europeans.
Li-Jeng is not interested in hook-ups with young village women, unlike his brother.
Sifa does not assume any ethnic stereotypes in her cast of characters. Matsi and Janjong,her Bangkok Thai female friend and classmate, are different people because of different
class backgrounds and also simply as individuals. Li-Jeng is blind to some of the genderinequalities in Hmong culture that outrage Matsi. She, meanwhile, is not yet conversantin the Hmong language despite spending more than a year in the village. Matsi becomes
pregnant and decides to give birth in Bangkok and recover at her old home. Li-Jengrefuses to accompany her there, knowing that he would be in regular conflict and argument with her upper-class parents.
Surachai Janthimathon’s (1997 [1981]) novel, Before the Light of Day, is set among
the Lua’ people of Nan Province and traces their history from about 1940 to 1965.20)
They initially moved in from Laos, fleeing the war. They enjoyed a good reception20) Surachai (1948–) is from Surin Province in Thailand’s Northeast. In the early 1970s he was playing
folk and protest music with friends, and his band, Caravan, became well known. After the violent
suppression of democracy and activism in October of 1976, Surachai (whose musician name is
Nga Caravan) and his bandmates fled to the jungle and joined the Communist Party for several
years. He has written essays and short stories. Before the Light of Day is his only novel, but hismusic has been far more popular and influential than any of his other writing. He was made National
Artist in 2010.

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from the authorities in Nan and received some official assistance. Later, relations went
sour as authoritarianism took over:When those fighting against French imperialism had lit the fires of a brutal war all across Indochina,
the peace-and-quiet-loving inhabitants of forest villages streamed into Thailand like a flock of
crows escaping a forest fire, and they settled near the farthest north of the country. Once safe
from the fires of war, they arrived from all directions to be quickly registered. The District Office
was crowded with people of many ethnic groups. (Surachai 1997, 23)

Once the people were settled, the kamnan (subdistrict official) came to visit them. He
said:
Now listen all, for the improvement of the locality. You are living on royal land. For the makingof fields there is a tax of 7 baht per year. For wood, 20 baht for big trees, mid-size 15 baht, small
ones 5 baht. Tax on making alcohol is 25 baht, cold season tax is 2 baht, constitution tax 2 baht,
tax on selling buffalo 15 baht, selling pigs 20 baht, on teak trees an extra tax—20 baht for small
trees, 50 baht for large trees. The announcements went on and on. It looked like nobody there
could remember it all, but everybody stood stiffly listening to kamnan Thi. He was like the main
actor of some play on stage. (Surachai 1997, 40–41)

Things went from bad to worse for the Lua’ because of abuses and oppression by theThai authorities. All the men were sent away to prison in Thai towns and cities, andthe only remaining hope was that people bringing red cloth would bring justice to theLua’ (Surachai 1997, 136). There had been a Lua’ holy man on the Laos side who carried
a red cloth. The Lua’ people’s access to him was thwarted by the Thai authorities’ bordercontrol. There was, however, hope for a new group of people carrying the red cloth.
Surachai wrote his novel while with the Arts Division of the Communist Party of Thailand(CPT) guerrillas in the jungles of Nan Province, and while taking shelter with Lua’highlanders who had been alienated from any contact with lowland society. In the novel,
the history of the Lua’ predicts how the CPT will carry the hope for the future, throughthe implied match between the Lua’ holy man’s red cloth and the CPT’s red flag. The
innocent goodness of the Lua’ villagers is repeatedly highlighted through the contrast
with the oppressive Thai authorities.21)
A very different witness to ethnic-frontier conditions in Thailand in the mid-1970s

21) The moral-binary setup is common in Thai fiction from this time (see Khammaan 1992 [1978]).
It is also common beyond fiction writing, in the focus on Karen people’s alleged eco-wisdom(Hayami 2006) and in the more general emphasis on “community culture” that imagines traditional
Thai villagers as endangered by the erosive force of modernity and globalization (Yukti 2005). The
most scathing internal critique of the Thai romanticization of village life may be Chart Korbjitti’s(2001 [1981]) novel Kham phiphaksa (The judgment) (see Chusak 2014).

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appears in Thommayanti’s (2019 [1976]) novel Jewel of the Deep Forest.22) The story is
about a Thai man named Songphao and a Karen woman named Miyawaddi. Songphao ishunting in the forest with his friends, and Old-Jan, a Karen man, is guiding him. Old-Jan
is fatally injured by a tiger as he saves Songphao’s life. Before he dies, he asked Songphao
to take care of his daughter, Miyawaddi. Songphao wants to kill the tiger, and though
Miyawaddi doubts his skills, they set off into the jungle. There, however, they comeupon a group of terrorists. Songphao becomes sick, Miyawaddi nurses him, and meanwhile she kills three of the terrorists. Later the authorities defeat the terrorist group,and Songphao is declared a hero. He takes Miyawaddi to live with his parents in Bangkok;
he tells her that the urban jungle will overtake the other jungle, so she would be better
off living with him. An upper-class woman, Wan, is interested in him, but in the end
Songphao and Miyawaddi become a couple.
Miyawaddi returns to her forest-village but then does not want to marry any man in
the village. Songphao goes after her. “Do you love me, Miyawaddi?” he asks when hefinds her. “My father entrusted me to you,” she replies. “You know that if a woman is
entrusted to someone then she must live with that man” (Thommayanti 2019, 470). The
novel says nothing about politics. There is no indication of who or what the terrorists
are; all the reader knows is that they are evil. Nor does the novel try to convey anything
about social life among the Karen villagers when the story begins.
Miyawaddi is a clearly Burmese name that also had currency among Karen peoples.
However, I see no sign in the story that the novelist has paid attention to Karen culture,society, language, or history. Given this lack of familiarity, I think that Thommayanti
simply borrowed from Noi’s Long Phrai series (the radio play or the book version), wherea significant female Karen character has this name (Noi 1990, Vol. 1). In contrast toThommayanti’s token nod to interethnic relations, the novels by Sophak, Sifa, andSurachai describe communities and social life among Thailand’s Malay Muslims, Hmong,and Lua’ peoples with familiarity and interest.
Thommayanti’s novel contains an extended slapstick segment about the difficultyof getting Miyawaddi to wash her hair (Thommayanti 2019, 264–280). The maid ultimately showers her by force. To me, this echoes the racist Thai notion that hill people
do not like to bathe, that they are filthy savages who need Thai intervention. The ending,in which Songphao and Miyawaddi became a couple because they both honor her22) Thommayanti was the pen name of Wimon Siriphaibun (1936–2021). She was a prolific writer, theauthor of over 60 novels and some short story collections. Wimon had strongly right-wing nationalist views and was a minister in the Thanin government (1976–77). She was made National
Artist in 2012. Many of her novels were turned into television dramas, and Jewel of the Deep
Forest was also made into a film.

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father’s decision rather than being in love with each other, fits a certain Thai perspective
on romance and family dynamics. The anthropologist and folklorist Siraporn Nathalang(2000) shows how various folktales and television dramas have been understood differently by members of the Thai audience, depending on how individual people relate tofamily tension and conflict (e.g., between a father-in-law and son-in-law, a wife and herhusband, a woman and her father, and a major wife and minor wife). One implication, shesuggests, is that the “process of listening to and interpreting the folktale [or television
drama] stabilizes real-life conflict situations in the family” (Siraporn 2000, 22). Most
likely, Thommayanti’s book has particular resonance for readers who value a young
woman for following her father’s wishes rather than following her own heart and making
her own life decisions. Of the fiction that I have examined here, this is the only novelthat concludes with the manifestation of a dutiful daughter.23)

Discussion
The Thai writing discussed above shows very clearly a range of simultaneous andalternative indigenous Thai perspectives on society and diversity. In the novels andethnography that I consulted, one perspective assumes Thai identity as plural, inclusive,and diverse. Another perspective assumes that Thai identity is exclusive and singular,
and that ethnic others are inferiors who do not have any claim to belonging in the
country. The third perspective assumes plural identities in Thai society, focuses primarily on class divisions, and depicts the insistence on hierarchy and inequality as sociallyharmful. These three perspectives recur enough times in Thai writing that I view themas credible and meaningful expressions of what Thai people have imagined about theirmodern identity and society.
The sense of multiethnic Thai belonging is perhaps strongest in the books by Malai(as Riam Eng and Noi Inthanon), Sifa, and Sophak—but this sentiment is clear also in theofficial announcement by Suphayok-Kasem in 1927. Calling attention to this perspective23) Herbert Phillips (1987) remarks that Thommayanti’s fiction gets framed as politically inconsequential nam-nao (“stagnant water”) literature by her leftist critics. He suggests that her writing“focuses on the rich inner life of women, not on the outer world of political practice and ideology”(Phillips 1987, 76). In my reading, though, the work is as political as any other. I find the supposed
distinction between inner and outer worlds unconvincing. Because women’s writing in Thailand
often gets bracketed as romance novels of no social or political significance, I insist that there isno commonality between Thommayanti’s novel and the two other “women’s” novels from Sifa
and Sophak. Nothing about the three novels’ content would justify classifying them as the samekind of work.

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on Thailand’s diversity is important, given the apparent academic neglect of the pluralist
understanding of society and identity in Thailand and across Southeast Asia more generally (Jonsson 2014; 2022a; 2022b).
The main emphasis of this study has been to substantiate the sense of pervasive
and persistent diversity in Thai notions of society and identity. That point, however,relates to a more general issue regarding understandings of culture and society. Westernanthropology’s ethnographic mode, associated with Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead,and Clifford Geertz, has since the 1930s played up understandings of culture as uniform
within an ethnic label (as in “the Balinese,” “the Samoans,” and the like).24) Prior tothat, the ethnological perspective of Robert Lowie and many others insisted on diversity
and individual variation in any society (Bargheer 2017). Lowie (1927; 1948) also showedthat any social formation was likely to be based on alternative and contradictory principles. Even the smallest community, he maintained, might rest on the separate principles of territory, kinship, and voluntary associations, which might arrange people indifferent ways and could also lead to clashes. The ethnological focus was relentlesslycomparative, regional, and historical and never took ethnic lines for granted.
The political scientist Kasian Tejapira (2009; 2015) has called attention to a rangeof modern Thai views on society and government among Thai intellectuals. His analysis
of debates concerning government among a rather small group of intellectuals andpoliticians in relation to economic and political crises during 1997–2014 shows repeateddiversity that he sorts into three perspectives: authoritarian, liberal, and communitarian.
This diversity of views is similar to the range of perspectives on society that I havefound in Thai-language ethnographies and fiction, though it is not the same. These varied
perspectives are all equally Thai. Their divergent notions of Thainess are simultaneous,alternative, and at odds.
Thongchai’s (1995) study of trends in Thai writings on Thai history suggests an arc
that goes from Prince Damrong’s royalist nationalism, which celebrated the monarchy
and Buddhism as quintessentially Thai, to a Marxist critique of the premodern sakdina
hierarchy of rank and class, and on to a localist orientation that quietly ignores any focus
on Thainess, hierarchy, or the supposed superiority of Bangkok over other parts of thecountry. My study suggests that a similar range of rival perspectives has long coexistedin Thai discourses and social dynamics rather than being a sequence of steps that is
specific to the writing of Thai history. The celebration of hierarchy, the critique of
hierarchy, and the emphasis on pluralist belonging that denies categorical distinctions
are all equally Thai views that have been simultaneous and at odds.
24) These examples draw on American anthropology; the foundational British anthropology on “theTrobriands,” “the Andamans,” and “the Nuer” points in precisely the same direction.

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The airing of different narratives of history and politics or regarding interethnic
relations does not produce an agreement on these matters. As Siraporn found withconflict narratives in Thai folktales and television dramas, people relate to such narratives
from different and potentially antagonistic perspectives. Engagement with the stories
often reinforces rival notions of identity and diversity and sustains differences that can
produce conflict. The studies by these three Thai scholars resonate with Lowie’s
ethnological perspective: There has never been a single Thai culture or a singular social
ideology. Instead, Thai society is built on alternative principles that can be glossed as
elitism, anti-elitism, and pluralism, which trigger a range of rival representations andagendas that sometimes coexist without problems and occasionally generate violent
conflict.25)
Thongchai (2000, 46) argued that the Siamese elite’s ethno-spatial project wasanchored to the idea of hill people’s strangeness (plaek, pralat). I did not find this idea
characteristic of the ethnographic writing for the period that he focused on. However,this idea helped me make initial sense of Noi’s Jungle Trails and Sifa’s Under the DeepBlue Sky. There is no reference at all to strangeness in these works. Without Thongchai’sanalysis, I might never have made the connection or recognized this as an issue. That,in turn, gave me a perspective on the ethnographic writing by Siri, Bunchuai, andKhajadphai. Each of them emphasized the strangeness of hill peoples. Their works
clearly affirm the connection of certain ethnographic writing and racial hierarchy in theThai project of nation building. This connection appears in certain writings from thedemocratic period after 1932 but is not so obvious in works from before that time.
The 1932 revolution that ended absolute monarchy in Thailand triggered contestations and suppression related to tensions between democracy and hierarchy/monarchy(Ockey 2002; Thak 2007; Sopranzetti 2018). One result was creative ethnographic
reporting that insisted on Thai racial divides, ethnic inequality, and an authoritarian
intolerance of diversity. Most of the fiction and some of the nonfiction that I examined,
however, counters this racialized view of ethnic inequalities and emphasizes instead
plural belonging and the ordinariness of ethnic and other diversity in Thai society. The
novels that I discuss in this article manifest a lively, diverse, and sometimes contentious
discourse on Thai identity and diversity.
My study of national imagination in Thailand during the twentieth century grew outof the recognition that certain novels about interethnic relations from the 1950s and1970s contradicted everything I thought I knew about Thai identity. This pushed me25) Several studies by Richard A. O’Connor (1983; 1995) show the contradictory social principles behindurbanism in Thailand and in Southeast Asia more generally past and present.

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toward an interdisciplinary territory where I had no particular expertise. During myresearch I came to appreciate the ethnological focus of scholars such as Lowie, who wasrelentlessly comparative, historical, and regional and never assumed that ethnic lines
implied coherent societies or predictable politics. Lévi-Strauss’s structural approach alsooffered some guidance, in the suggestion that one must consider all variants of any one
narrative or topic in order to understand it. This obviously impossible goal encourages
an indiscriminate search for source material.
The research project required an interdisciplinary perspective that combined
anthropology, history, literature, politics, and some grounding in social life and the Thai
language. The research questions defined the project and contributed to my selection ofsources. The combination of romance novels, jungle adventure, leftist social realism,
ethnographic reporting, and official documents came about in the process of the research;
it was not something I could know beforehand. The study has an Area Studies bias, interms of both an interdisciplinary focus and an “openness to a variety of nondisciplinary,nonacademic arguments” (Guyer 2004, 501). My disagreement with the findings ofAnderson (1985) and Thongchai (2000) regarding fiction, ethnography, politics, andinterethnic relations in Thai history is in the spirit of collaboration. Research is an
ongoing social enterprise where we learn from one another, including through debate
rooted in separate and diverse knowledge of events, sources, and histories (Guyer 2004,
501–502).
Jane Guyer suggests that an Area Studies focus can help reshape disciplinary academic practices and ideas through research encounters when “we are challenged, criticized, shamed, or inspired by ‘another’ to whom we are absolutely committed to listening”(Guyer 2004, 518). Reading the fiction, ethnography, and other Thai writing haschanged my knowledge of interethnic realities and social imaginations in Thailand.
Taking the writers and their imagery seriously by examining each individual entity inits particulars and then juxtaposing it to a range of others offered suggestions about
how to revise the current academic understanding of Thailand’s national imagination in
the twentieth century.
Accepted: August 1, 2023

Acknowledgments
This study was made possible by a sabbatical leave from Arizona State University. The National
Research Council of Thailand provided a research permit. Kasetsart University kindly provided mewith academic affiliation. Professor Suchon Mallikamarl was helpful and encouraging in ways too many

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to count. Orawan Tungteekaayu shared her take on some of the novels. In early 2022, professors
Chusak Pattarakulvanit, Puckpan Tipayamontri, Suvanna Kriengkraipetch, and Chetana Nagavajara
kindly shared ideas and advice regarding novels, authors, and the big picture. Generous, insightful, andcritical comments from the editor and anonymous reviewers for Southeast Asian Studies helped mesignificantly improve on an earlier version of this material. However, all interpretations expressed inthis article are my own responsibility.

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A Study on Indonesian Sociopolitical Design Objects
within the Framework of Gesamtkunstwerk
Christophera Ratnasari Lucius,* Imam Santosa,** Widjaja Martokusumo,*** andAdhi Nugraha†This article proves how the practical implementation of the Gesamtkunstwerk idea
in design objects in Indonesia can provide sociopolitical value. The framework ofGesamtkunstwerk in this study is contained in two design projects: the architectureof the Indonesian Legislative Building Complex by Soejoedi Wirjoatmodjo and thedesign of museum objects in the Electricity and New Energy Museum by Widagdo.
The literature review leads to two perspectives of Gesamtkunstwerk—the ideas ofWilhelm Richard Wagner and those of the Bauhaus School—with both implemented
together in a design object. Data were collected in April and July 2022 throughfield observations, supported by interviews. The data were analyzed through both
perspectives based on the idea of Gesamtkunstwerk. The results showed that theidea of Gesamtkunstwerk was successfully implemented in the two design projects.
The first project aimed to represent the noble values of Indonesia and demonstrate
the nation’s proficiency in modern technology, while the second aimed to incorporate interdisciplinary knowledge in the presentation of museum objects, creatinga shared experience for visitors. In conclusion, the simultaneous implementationof both Gesamtkunstwerk perspectives—Wagner’s and the Bauhaus—allowed fora surprising amount of meaning in design objects.
Keywords: Bauhaus idea, Gesamtkunstwerk, Wilhelm Richard Wagner,
Soejoedi Wirjoatmodjo, Indonesian Legislative Building Complex,
Widagdo, Electricity and New Energy Museum* Doctoral Program in Visual Art and Design, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl. Ganesha No. 10,
Bandung 40132, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
Corresponding author’s e-mail : 37019008@mahasiswa.itb.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0009-0007-6527-3543** Design and Visual Culture Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl. Ganesha No. 10,
Bandung 40132, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
e-mails: imamz@itb.ac.id; imamz.santosa@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1241-6893*** Architectural Design Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl. Ganesha No. 10,
Bandung 40132, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
e-mail: wmart@itb.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1756-5916†
Human and Industrial Product Design Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl.
Ganesha No. 10, Bandung 40132, Jawa Barat, Indonesia
e-mail : adhinugrahadesign@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0009-0003-6052-9221
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 287–310© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_287

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Introduction
The main purpose of this study is to prove the role of the Gesamtkunstwerk idea (TGKWI)
in the design of two projects in Indonesia. The development of the two projects was
initiated by the government of the Republic of Indonesia in order to present the face ofIndonesia on the international stage. The first project is the Indonesian Legislative
Building Complex, which was designed by the architect Soejoedi Wirjoatmodjo and built
in 1965, during the administration of Soekarno, the first president of the Republic ofIndonesia. The second is the interior and objects of the Electricity and New Energy
Museum, designed by Widagdo and built in 1995, during the rule of Soeharto, the second
president of Indonesia.
According to the principles of Gesamtkunstwerk,1) attempts are made to combine
art forms or designs along with other features. Fátima Pombo (2014) described thecreation of an atmosphere of well-being and fruitful space, literally and metaphorically,
as a total work of art in the productions of the Belgian interior designer Jules Wabbes.
Anatoli Tsampa (2017) demonstrated a transmedial, global, total work of art througha synthesis of media, mythical/archetypal subject matter, social relevance, andphilosophical concerns. Steven Brown and Ellen Dissanayake (2018) highlighted
speech sounds, singing voices, instrumental music, and dance as the main features ofGesamtkunstwerk, which can be found in the aesthetic practice of artwork as a whole
as well as in religious ceremonies. Studies proving the implementation of TGKWI
focus on the perspective of unifying various types of art, designs, or features. This is
the definition of Gesamtkunstwerk: the amalgamation of various art forms, without any
one form dominating (Neumann 1951, 4) but rather all forms making use of one another(Koepnick 2017, 277).
Éric Michaud (2019) described an understanding of the origins of TGKWI fromWilhelm Richard Wagner with two variations. Wagner’s essay on the Gesamtkunstwerk
aesthetic aimed to achieve gemeinsame Kunstwerk der Zukunft, which translates as“future collective artwork” as well as “future communal artwork.” The first is a perspective that emphasizes the collective realization of work by the community, while
the second emphasizes work realized for the people (Michaud 2019, 2).
Previously, two different ways of understanding total design were explained byMark Wigley (1998). Wigley’s explanation of architectural control is relevant to the two
perspectives in understanding the meaning of total design: the first is the implosion of1) For the purposes of this research, the term “Gesamtkunstwerk” is not translated into other languages.

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design, in which design is focused inward on a single intense point; while the second is
the explosion of design, in which the design expands outward to touch every possible
point in the world (Wigley 1998, 1).
This study agrees with the two perspectives for understanding TGKWI as proposedby Michaud and Wigley. A review of the theoretical framework explains these two
perspectives in more detail. According to Wigley and Michaud, TGKWI must be implemented in design objects through “two perspectives from opposite directions”2) at thesame time. The first is the implosion of design (Wigley 1998, 1) or future collective
artworks (Michaud 2019, 3), which is relevant to Wagner’s TGKWI. The second is the
explosion of design (Wigley 1998, 1) or future communal artworks (Michaud 2019, 2),which is relevant to the Bauhaus TGKWI.
The results achieved by the practical implementation of TGKWI through these“two perspectives from opposite directions” will be demonstrated in two design casestudies in Jakarta, Indonesia. The first is the Indonesian Legislative Building Complex,
and the second is the Electricity and New Energy Museum. An analysis of design objects
that encompass sociopolitical values reveals the role of TGKWI in realizing the vision of
two Indonesian presidents to present the character of the Indonesian nation. It is
important to note that the mention of “two perspectives from opposite directions” isnot intended to provide a new definition of TGKWI but merely to reveal the role of
TGKWI ideas in the architectural and design objects in the case studies.

MethodThis study on the implementation of the TGKWI idea in two designs in Indonesia uses
qualitative methods through historical research, case studies, and narrative inquiry.
Since the focus of this study is TGKWI, that is discussed at the outset. Based on
the description by Wigley (1998) and Michaud (2019), historical research through areview of the literature provides “two perspectives from opposite directions” to understand the implementation of TGKWI. On the one hand is the idea of the origin ofGesamtkunstwerk based on Wagner’s perspective; on the other is the idea of modern
Gesamtkunstwerk based on the perspective of the Bauhaus School. “Two perspectives
2) Wigley uses “two concepts of total design” (Wigley 1998, 2), whereas Michaud notes “two elementsof variation for their striking opposition to each other” (Michaud 2019, 2). This study uses the term
“two perspectives from opposite directions” to explain the implementation of the Gesamtkunstwerk
idea. It does not aim to provide a new definition of Gesamtkunstwerk but to underline the differences between the two perspectives.

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from opposite directions” for understanding TGKWI becomes the analytical tool forthe case studies of the two design artifacts in Indonesia.
The first step in this analysis is an overview of Soejoedi’s and Widagdo’s German
educational background, to highlight the influence of Bauhaus ideas on their designs.3)
This is followed by a brief description of the role of the Indonesian government in thedevelopment planning of the two case studies and Soejoedi’s and Widagdo’s involvementin their respective designs.
In design discipline research, design objects function as reported evidence and areused to interpret arguments (Biggs 2002, 20). Objects that are instructional works arecalled artifacts, because they display the structure of actions within cognitive frames(O. F. Smith 2007, 5). Soejoedi’s architectural work being analyzed here is the IndonesianLegislative Building Complex (TILBC), which was built in 1965. This was the first major
project in Indonesia that demonstrated the technological capabilities of Indonesian
experts at the time (Budi et al. 1995, 22). Widagdo’s interior work being analyzed is
the Electricity and New Energy Museum (TEANEM), which was inaugurated in 1995.
The first modern science museum in Indonesia, this is located in Taman Mini Indonesia
Indah (Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park; BIMP), which houses projects that provide
educational value (Suradi et al. 1989, 11).
Robert Yin has stated that the case study approach requires direct observation of
the object along with interviews with associated sources and the designer (Yin 2018, 43).
Therefore, observations were made at TEANEM in April 2022; these focused on thedesign and arrangement of displays of museum objects. Data collection and documentation were done through photography, video shooting, archive collections from themuseum, and 1995 photos owned by Widagdo. Observations at TILBC were made in
July 2022; these focused on observing architectural forms, spatial interior arrangements,
and works of art found throughout the TILBC area. Data collection and documentation
were done through photography, video shooting, and archive collections from the Indonesian Legislative Museum.
The limited literature on Soejoedi’s architectural design concept and Widagdo’s
interior design concept requires a narrative case study approach. This inquiry focuseson the meaning obtained from exploring the experiences and perspectives of the informants (Kim 2016, 215). Data and information on Soejoedi were obtained by interviewing3) This study is part of a research project to identify traces of the Bauhaus in Indonesia. Soejoedi
Wirjoatmodjo and Widagdo were selected as representatives for studying the influence of the
Bauhaus on design practice in Indonesia. Their education in Germany was influenced by figures
who were members of the Bauhaus and Deutscher Werkbund: Kurt Dübbers, Egon Eiermann,
Herbert Hirche, Wilhelm Kreuer, Hannes Neuener, and Hans Scharoun.

The Idea of Gesamtkunstwerk on Indonesian Design Objects291

his assistant, the architect Yuswadi Saliya.4) Data and information on Widagdo’s designer
were obtained through direct interviews with him. The interviews with the two informants were open and guided by questions on the implementation of TGKWI in the twocase studies.

Theoretical Framework: The Idea of Gesamtkunstwerk
According to Wigley (1998) and Michaud (2019), the definition of Gesamtkunstwerk
denotes two different perspectives of the Gesamtkunstwerk idea (TGKWI), which inthis study are referred to as “two perspectives from opposite directions.” The first is
Wagner’s perspective, which is generally taken to be the origin of Gesamtkunstwerk.
The second is Gesamtkunstwerk according to the Bauhaus, which is generally viewed
as the modern version of Gesamtkunstwerk.
The German composer Wagner (1813–83) became a major figure in TGKWI bothmusically and spiritually during the Romantic era (Tsampa 2017, 20). According to
Alfred Neumann (1951, 2), the word “Gesamtkunstwerk” is defined only in Wagner’s(1850) aesthetic essay Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (The artwork of the future).5)
TGKWI according to Wagner means resynthesizing forms of art that are historicallyseparate, such as dance, music, and poetry. Wagner’s TGKWI means a work unit inwhich all parts are integrated evenly (Neumann 1951, 224), mutually utilize one another(Koepnick 2017, 277), and create a completely new meaning (Kultennann 1995, 165).
Wagner’s TGKWI became a model for experiments involving various genres and composite media in Modernism (Koepnick 2017, 274).
A very modern form of TGKWI appears in the Bauhaus School6) (M. W. Smith
4) Yuswadi (b. June 15, 1938) obtained his doctorate in engineering science, majoring in architecture, fromthe Bandung Institute of Technology. He has played an important role in the education and professional development of architects in Indonesia, including being a member of the Council of IndonesianArchitects since 2020. Yuswadi was an assistant to Soejoedi, who was involved in the constructionof the Conefo Project, specifically the construction of the Nusantara V Building or auditorium.
5) Das große Gesammtkunstwerk, das alle Gattungen der Kunst zu umfassen hat, um jede einzelne dieser
Gattungen als Mittel gewissermaßen zu verbrauchen, zu vernichten zu Gunsten der Erreichung desGesamtzwecks aller, nämlich der unbedingten, unmittelbaren Darstellung der vollendeten menschlichen Natur- dieses große Gesammtkunstwerk erkennt (der Geist) nicht als die willkürlich mögliche Tat des Einzelnen,
sondern als das notwendig denkbare gemeinsame Werk der Menschen der Zukunft (Wagner 1850, 32).
6) The Bauhaus was a design school that existed in Germany from 1919 to 1933. It was grounded in
the idea of creating the Gesamtkunstwerk and became known for its approach to combining craft,
art, and technology. The founder of the Bauhaus, Walter Gropius (1883–1969), was the first
director of the school. In April 1928 he was replaced by Hannes Meyer (1889–1954), and in August
1930 Mies van der Rohe (1886–1969) became the third and last Bauhaus director.

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2007, 48; Roberts 2011, 159; Trimingham 2016, 95; Munch 2021, 9). The manifesto for
the founding of the Bauhaus School in 19197) was an invitation from the architect Walter
Gropius (1883–1969) to the members of the Bauhaus to create a Gesamtkunstwerk
cathedral that could restore a divided society (Michaud 2019, 7). Gropius repeatedly
tried to find forms of shared ideas through activities such as collaboration, coordination,collectives, and integration. In the Bauhaus School, Gesamtkunstwerk was developedby the painter Lázló Moholy-Nagy (1895–1946) into the idea of Gesamtwerk, namely,
the synthesis of moments in life to form total life (Moholy-Nagy 1927). Through the ideaof Gesamtwerk, humans explore their senses to find alternative forms of future spaceand become the media that adapt to the nature of modern society (Koepnick 2017, 283).
The term “Gesamtkunstwerk” is generally accepted in German as well as in English
through several translations,8) one of which is “synthesis of the arts.” Since this translation underlines the word “synthesis,” which describes the unifying connection of different elements, this translation of Gesamtkunstwerk is relevant to the present study.
“Synthesis” comes from the Greek word sýnthesis, which means various forms ofknowledge put together to form complete knowledge (Machauer 2009, 14). Based on
this philosophical view, on the one hand synthesis is understood as a unifying activity
and on the other as the whole gained through it (Machauer 2009, 14).
This basic understanding of the word “synthesis” is relevant to Wigley and Michaud’s
explanation of the two perspectives for understanding TGKWI. According to Wigley(1998, 1), the perspective of the architect who organizes various forms points to Wagner
Gesamtkunstwerk while the perspective of the architect who designs all objects points
to Bauhaus Gesamtkunstwerk. According to Michaud (2019, 1), the second perspective—
Bauhaus Gesamtkunstwerk—is a reworking of the first in the Bauhaus School program.
The two TGKWI perspectives are connected, and they must be implemented together
for a design object to be regarded as a Gesamtkunstwerk object.
According to Wagner’s perspective, namely, the collation of different art forms to
produce a single meaning, a Gesamtkunstwerk design object does not show the dominanceof one design form. Wagner’s TGKWI, as manifested in architecture, is the focusing ofdesign inward on a single intense point (Wigley 1998, 1). Wigley calls this the implosionof design, which takes over a space, subjecting every detail, every surface, to an over7) Das Bauhaus erstrebt die Sammlung alles künstlerischen Schaffens zur Einheit, die Wiedervereinigung
aller werkkünstlerischen Disziplinen – Bildhauerei, Malerei, Kunstgewerbe und Handwerk – zu einer
neuen Baukunst als deren unablösliche Bestandteile (Gropius 1919, 3).
8) There are several English translations of the term “Gesamtkunstwerk”: synthesis of the arts
(Machauer 2009, 15; Gabriel 2020, 189); unified work of art (Lægring 2020, 96); total work of art(Vidalis 2002, 50; M. W. Smith 2007, 3; Menninger 2016, 1; Koepnick 2017, 273; Michaud 2019, 3);integrated work of art (Neumann 1951, 222); and others.

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arching vision. Meanwhile, Michaud has defined Wagner’s TGKWI as the collective workof art of the future (Michaud 2019, 3). Michaud’s definition makes a Gesamtkunstwerk
object the embodiment of a collective work of art or communal work. Based on thisdescription, a design object resulting from a synthesis of various scientific disciplines
implements Wagner’s TGKWI if the object can provide a new design meaning for the
benefit of human life.
The second perspective on Gesamtkunstwerk design refers to the Bauhaus idea ofbeing able to meet universal human needs. Bauhaus TGKWI is defined by Wigley as
the expansion of design to touch every possible point in the world (Wigley 1998, 1).
Wigley called this the explosion of design, the ability of an architect to design everythingfrom teaspoon-sized objects to urban planning. Meanwhile, Michaud defines Bauhaus
TGKWI as the communal work of art of the future (Michaud 2019, 3). Michaud’s
definition provides an understanding of a Gesamtkunstwerk object as fulfilling the needsof the public in a homogeneous manner. Based on this description, a design object isconsidered to implement Bauhaus TGKWI if the new meaning given by the object cansatisfy the broadest possible needs of human life.
A design object implements TGKWI practically, because the object is a synthesis ofvarious scientific disciplines that satisfy universal human needs. This is in line with theperspective of the Bauhaus School, which is oriented toward the synthesis of all aspectsof life (Michaud 2019, 10). Referring also to Bauhaus, the practical implementation of
TGKWI includes more modern forms of media, namely, architecture, interior design,
product design, media design, and others. TGKWI provides an aesthetic laboratory forthe reintegration of the auditory, visual, and tactile senses, in which modern subjects
can explore different artistic settings (Koepnick 2017, 278).

Indonesian Legislative Building Complex: Implementation of the Idea ofGesamtkunstwerk by Architect Soejoedi Wirjoatmodjo
Soejoedi (1928–81), the architect of TILBC,9) was a pioneer of modern architecture inIndonesia and set up architecture schools in the nation’s big cities. He was an outstanding representative of a German education, with his work being formalistic, measurable,
and well defined (Yuswadi 2003, 111). In Soejoedi’s artistic approach, form, function,and material came together in geometric compositions (Bagoes 2013, 181). Soejoedi
used two types of aesthetic inspiration to immerse himself in design matters, namely,9) The selection of the Indonesian Legislative Building Complex for this study was approved by sources
who knew Soejoedi during a site survey in July 2022.

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the harmonization of small and large universe targets (Budi 2011, 44). His aesthetic
inspiration came from his interest in Indonesian vernacular architecture along with his
experience in Europe.
Soejoedi graduated from Technische Universität (TU) Berlin in 1960. He returned
to Indonesia in 1961 and became the head of the Department of Architecture at theBandung Institute of Technology (ITB). He laid the foundation for an architectural
education that emphasized the exploration of modern technology in construction andbuilding materials (Bagoes 2013, 181). Soejoedi’s final project at TU Berlin, which was
exhibited in the Department of Architecture at ITB, reflected a mix of Indonesian andPrussian traditions (Yuswadi 2012, 110). The Western ideas in Soejoedi’s architecturaldesign were the result of his educational and apprenticeship experiences in Europe in
1954–61.10)
Soejoedi won an architectural design competition for his TILBC project. TILBC
was originally set up as a political venue to complement the sports complex that was built
in 1962 for the the Fourth Asian Games in Jakarta (Budi et al. 1995, 17). Through a
Presidential Decree dated March 8, 1965, President Soekarno (1901–70), the firstpresident of the Republic of Indonesia, assigned Minister of Public Works and Energy
Soeprajogi to carry out the construction of a project for political activities, namely, theConference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo).11) The Conefo project had to becompleted before the commemoration of the Proclamation of Independence of the
Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1966. The groundbreaking of the first pillar of theConefo project was carried out on April 19, 1965, coinciding with the Celebration of
the Decade of the Asian-African Conference in Jakarta (Budi 2011, 65).
10) In 1951 Soejoedi began his architecture studies at the Bandung Faculty of Engineering, Universityof Indonesia. In 1954–56 he continued his studies at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris with ascholarship from the French government. His architecture education in Indonesia was not recognized by the École des Beaux-Arts, so in 1956 he transferred to the Technische Hogeschool
Delft in the Netherlands and remained there until 1958. Due to tensions between the Dutch andIndonesian governments, in 1958 Soejoedi transferred yet again—this time to Technische Universität
Berlin, where he remained until 1960. In Berlin he studied under Wilhelm Kreuer (1910–84) andKurt Dübbers (1905–87). According to the Dipl.-Ing. Arsitek Exhibition in Jakarta (December 12,
2022–January 13, 2023), Soejoedi did internships in architectural offices during his studies in
Europe: in 1957 he apprenticed at Kraaijvanger Architects in Rotterdam, in 1958 at Kasper in
Freiburg, and in 1960 at Hentrich Petscnigg und Partner in Düsseldorf.
11) At the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961, President Soekarno introduced
the political ideas of Nefos and Oldefos: Nefos (New Emerging Forces) as a force of imperialism
consisting of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America along with socialist countries; Oldefos(Old Established Forces) as a colonial force consisting of Western capitalist countries. Indonesia
also tried to persuade the Non-Aligned countries to create a counter-UN called the Conference of
New Countries (Conefo), which resulted in a rift between Indonesia and the other countries (Agus
2014, 155).

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The Conefo project is one of the monumental projects built by President Soekarno
after the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945. “Monumental project” wasthe term used by President Soekarno to celebrate the independence of the Indonesiannation through architectural works (Yuke 2023). This term encapsulates the ideas ofglory and immortality embodied in the unity of architecture, art, and science. Throughthe 1961–69 Pola Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berencana (Planned universal national
development pattern) policy, President Soekarno prioritized the construction of monumental projects for developing the personality of the Indonesian nation (Bambang 2023).
The Conefo project consisted of several buildings complete with interior and landscaped design areas, all approved by President Soekarno, who had given certain design
specifications: the buildings had to reflect Indonesian personality traits, and they had todisplay the excellence of Indonesian design through their grandeur and ability torespond to modern challenges (Budi et al. 1995, 20). The time constraints for implementing the Conefo project development were overcome by mobilizing resources fromvarious government departments and agencies, private companies, as well as young
workers and students from various universities in Indonesia. The Conefo project, which
was developed by Wahono, chairman of the Indonesian Legislature, was touted as
implementing a spirit of togetherness (Budi et al. 1995, xvi). The collaborative work
between technical and non-technical personnel transformed the project into a field
laboratory that produced technical and management cadres for the future implementationof modern development in Indonesia. The Conefo project was the first large-scalebuilding project in the country (Budi et al. 1995, 22). However, a change in the politicalsituation disrupted the allocation of the facilities. Since May 1968, Conefo has been theofficial place of work and trials of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat dan Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Republik Indonesia (People’s Consultative Assembly and People’s Representative
Council of the Republic of Indonesia) (Budi et al. 1995, 61).
Soejoedi was appointed by the Indonesian government to be the head of theEngineering Planning and Supervision Team. He designed four separate facilities12) for
the Conefo political venue: the Nusantara Building as the main conference building, theNusantara III Building as the secretariat building, the Nusantara IV Building as thebanquet hall, and the Nusantara V Building as the auditorium (Fig. 1). The separationof venues was based also on time considerations, so that construction could be carried12) The names of the existing buildings in the Indonesian Legislative Building Complex reflect thefollowing changes: the main conference building was renamed from Grahatama to Nusantara Building,the secretariat building was renamed from Lokawirasabha to Nusantara III Building, the banquet
hall was renamed from Pustakaloka to Nusantara IV Building, and the auditorium was renamed from
Grahakarana to Nusantara V Building.

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Fig. 1 Model of the Indonesian Legislative Building Complex: (1) Nusantara
Building, (2) Nusantara III Building, (3) Nusantara IV Building, (4) Nusantara
V Building
Source: Budi et al. (1995), reprography

out simultaneously by different contractors (Budi et al. 1995, 23).
The description below shows how Soejoedi implemented the TGKWI idea to realize
President Soekarno’s mandate. Referring to the “two perspectives from opposite directions” of Wagner and Bauhaus, where design objects are a synthesis of various scientificdisciplines that give new meaning and fulfill universal human needs, TGKWI was implemented in the fields of architecture, interiors, and landscape design. The change in thedesignation of facilities from the Conefo project to TILBC in 1968 had no effect on thefunction of each building. Therefore, the analysis of this case study is carried out along
two tracks: as the Conefo project as well as TILBC.
Soejoedi designed the main conference building or Nusantara Building as the mainbuilding in the Conefo project. This was based on the major activities carried out at thebuilding, namely, meetings for making important decisions. On the first floor are fivemeeting rooms—called wacanasabha rooms—with different seating capacities. On thesecond floor is the main conference room, with a capacity of around 1,700 seats, whichis called Grahasabha Paripurna. In keeping with President Soekarno’s stipulations,Soejoedi designed the Nusantara Building to display the personality of the Indonesiannation. Its embodiment in TILBC is the values that must be fulfilled in the sessions of
the Indonesian Legislative Body as a representative of the Indonesian people.
The Nusantara Building is the venue for sessions of the People’s Consultative
Assembly and the People’s Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia. It has

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2a

2b

2c

Fig. 2a The Two-Part Shape of the Domed Roof of the Nusantara Building
Fig. 2b 
The Kesaksian (Testimony) Mural in the Commission II Meeting Room,
Nusantara Building, Second Floor
Fig. 2c 
The Gotong Royong (Mutual cooperation) Relief in the Commission V
Meeting Room, Nusantara Building, Second Floor
Sources: 2a: photo by authors, 2022; 2b and 2c: DPR RI (1990)

a domed roof with two parts, with the edges raised and truncated at a point (Fig. 2a). The
two-part shape of the roof was the result of experiments by Soejoedi and his assistantNurpontjo, and the construction was approved by Sutami (Budi et al. 1995, 43). Saliya(author interview, 2022) stated that there are several interpretations of this form, but
the most appropriate is the “yes or no” opinion symbol. The symbolism of the two opinions shows that there are two attitudes that must be chosen by the representatives of
the Indonesian people for making decisions in the Indonesian Legislative Body sessions.
In the Commission II Meeting Room is a mural titled Kesaksian (Testimony), by the
painter Ahmad Sadeli (1924–87). This mural is made of wall paint and mixed medium(Fig. 2b). The composition is not intended to express any particular illustration orsymbol. In the middle of the mural is a dominant black spot that is similar to the shapeof an eye. Black spots are a manifestation of eyes that look attentively even though theperson does not show himself (DPR RI 1990, 15). The mural is seen as symbolizing thepresence of an invisible supervisor, so that the people’s representatives can be held
accountable to the Indonesian nation for their decisions.
In the Commission V Meeting Room there is a relief titled Gotong Royong (Mutual

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cooperation), which is the work of the sculptor and painter But Muchtar (1930–93).
This relief is made of copperplate material using a welding technique (Fig. 2c). Gotong
Royong shows a group of people holding hands (DPR RI 1990, 19). The human reliefs
are of different heights and sizes, while the sun shape reflects the brightness of life.
The work is seen as a symbol of the need for cooperation to achieve the ideals of theIndonesian state. This collaboration must be carried out by all levels of Indonesiansociety regardless of differences based on ethnicity, religion, and race and relations
between groups.
President Soekarno’s stipulations also covered the exterior layout of the Conefo
project (Budi et al. 1995, 18). The person responsible for designing the outer area was
Slamet Wirasondjaja (1935–2016), assisted by Soelarto, Soemardjan, Wahyudi, andZaini, who supported the monumentality of Soejoedi’s architectural works. The placementof the four buildings in this wide open space gives the impression of monumentalarchitecture. The dominant horizontal planes and lines of the four structures can reducethe monumental impression of the Conefo project requested by President Soekarno.
Slamet Wirasondjaja presented monumental axes in his landscape design to strengthen
the monumental impression (Budi et al. 1995, 47). He realized the monumental axes
through hard and soft landscape designs (Fig. 3a): the former by a row of fountains at

3a

3b

3c

Fig. 3a Designing the Conefo Project LandscapeFig. 3b 
The Batu-Batu Pembangunan Relief on the East Facade of the Nusantara
IV Building
Fig. 3c The Statue with Aesthetic Elements in Front of the Nusantara Building
Sources: 3a: DPR RI (1990), reprography; 3b and 3c: photos by authors, 2022

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the front of the Nusantara Building, and the latter in the form of green elements at theback of the building. The design of other exterior elements was guided by the monumental axes.
On the monumental axis in the front of the Nusantara Building is a statue of anaesthetic element that is also the work of the sculptor and painter But Muchtar. This
statue is made of an iron frame construction covered with copper sheets and embedded
in a concrete foundation (Fig. 3c). The statue is a spatial amplifier to achieve thearchitectural unity of the four masses in TILBC (DPR RI 1990, 14). The sculptural
aesthetic elements are the supporting elements, reinforcing elements, and limiting
elements of the entire TILBC design. The aesthetic elements of the statue represent
the hopes of the Indonesian people in the past, present, and future. The value of spatial
penetration is derived from the shape of the statue, which has volume and space thatis not dense.
The relief on the east facade of the Nusantara IV Building is titled Batu-batu
Pembangunan (Development stone). The relief, made of lightweight concrete, is 63
meters long and 5 meters wide (Fig. 3b). Batu-batu Pembangunan is in the originalform of a traditional jaja pattern arrangement from Bali, which was made as an offering
to God (DPR RI 1990, 15). This pattern, which consists of shapes in a geometricarrangement, describes various aspects of Indonesian people’s lives that together build
the future of the nation.
President Soekarno required the greatness of Indonesian engineering design to be
displayed in the Conefo project (Budi et al. 1995, 20). This demanded an architecturalform that displayed technological advances, new constructions, and new building materials that were able to meet the challenges of the times.
The domed roof of the Nusantara Building consists of two parts whose ends areraised, with the truncated parts meeting at a point. The roof arc structure, with one
meeting point, plunges below the ground surface to ensure its load is distributed evenly(Fig. 4a). The shape of the roof is the result of an experiment to make a pure domeshaped roof mock-up. Experiments through unplanned manual work led to the decision
to produce an architectural work, along with its technological completion. The roof shapeof the Nusantara Building meets the requirement to respond to the challenges of thetimes through the use of new construction and new building materials.
The design of the Nusantara III Building or secretariat building, with a total of nine
floors, has an outer area as a receiving room for the sports venue complex, which lies tothe east of the TILBC area. The sun visor material installed on the western facade of
the building reinforces the impression of a positive outdoor space design presented by
the Nusantara III Building (Fig. 4b), as does the use of new building materials for the300

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4a

4b

4c

Fig. 4a The Roof Arc Structure of the Nusantara Building
Fig. 4b The Nusantara III Building or Secretariat Building
Fig. 4c The Nusantara IV Building or Banquet Hall
Source: Photos by authors, 2022

Nusantara IV Building or banquet hall. The Nusantara IV Building is in the International
Style, namely, a simple and modern volume-over-mass architectural form (Fig. 4c).
The architectural design analysis and design objects explain how Soejoedi implemented TGKWI in the Conefo or TILBC project design. The synthesis between architecture and various design objects in the design of the Nusantara Building produces a
new meaning for the activities carried out by the Legislature, which represents the
expectations of the Indonesian people. The new meaning is that decisions on Indonesia’s
future are based on the character of the Indonesian nation. The Nusantara Building may
be viewed by the national and international public as a symbol of the Indonesian nation’s
character. In this context, the design of the outer spaces strengthens the symbolism of
the Nusantara Building. Thus, TILBC is viewed by the Indonesian people as representing them and by the international community as representing the character of theIndonesian nation.

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301

The above analysis explains how Soejoedi implemented TGKWI to achieve excellence in design works by Indonesian technicians. Experiments with materials produced
new architectural forms that adapted to technological developments. Soejoedi’s demand
for modern technology in the selection of materials for the Conefo project resulted inan International Style development that may be compared with modern buildings in theWestern world.

Electricity and New Energy Museum: Implementation of the Idea ofGesamtkunstwerk by Designer Widagdo
Widagdo (b. May 1, 1934) was the interior designer as well as exhibition designer at
the Electricity and New Energy Museum (TEANEM). His works emphasize honest,
geometric, functional forms and detailed processing (Agus and Yan 2002, 77). Widagdo’s
works have triggered the growth of interior design services in Indonesia. His interior
design of the Indonesian Pavilion at the 1970 Osaka Expo was the starting point for therecognition of Indonesian interior designers (HDII 2004, 12). Widagdo was one of thefounders of the Indonesian interior designers association13) in 1983 and the Indonesian
Design Center in 1995 (Widagdo 2011, 224).
He graduated from the Staatliche Akademie der Bildende Künste Stuttgart in 1964.
After his return to Indonesia, Widagdo taught at the Bandung Institute of Technology’s
Department of Fine Arts from 1966 until he retired in 2004. He said (author interview,2022) that two of his lecturers at Stuttgart were students from the Bauhaus School:
Hannes Neuner (1906–78)14) was a Bauhaus student in 1929 who taught the Basic
Course and selected Widagdo to join his class; Herbert Hirche (1910–2002)15) was a
Bauhaus student in 1930 who taught interior architecture. Widagdo explained that
Hirche’s teaching method was not instructional in nature but left design decisions to13) Indonesian Society of Interior Designers (Himpunan Desainer Interior Indonesia, or HDII) is theagreed-upon name to cover the broad group of interior design fields. The inauguration and first
congress of HDII was held on January 17, 1983, in the Multipurpose Building of the Erasmus Huisin the Netherlands embassy, Jakarta. At the event, Achmad Sadali and Widagdo were appointed to
the HDII Honorary Council.
14) Neuner taught at the Staatliche Akademie der Bildende Künste Stuttgart in 1953–67. He taught
classes in abstract or non-representational direction, interior design and furniture making, andpainting and drawing (Büttner et al. 2011, 207, 211, 254).
15) Hirche was the rector of the Staatliche Akademie der Bildende Künste Stuttgart in 1969–71 andalso taught interior design and furniture making (Wobus 2011). He visited Indonesia, though thevisit was not documented. While writing his memoir from his time as a student at the Bauhaus
School, Hirche was a guest of the Widagdo family in Indonesia (Solichin 2020, 2).

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the subjectivity of his students.
As mentioned earlier, TEANEM is located in the BIMP16) area, Kramat Jati, DKI
Jakarta 13560. BIMP was built under President Soeharto (1921–2008), the second
president of the Republic of Indonesia, and was inaugurated on April 20, 1975. It is amodern ethnographic garden constructed by the Indonesian government in an effort toadvance the Indonesian state (Yulia 2016, 121). BIMP is designed to reflect the diversityof Indonesia’s population and represent Pancasila, the five principles laid down by thestate for political and social order, the philosophy of the Indonesian state (Hitchcock
2005, 45). BIMP is a permanent and modern tool for introducing Indonesia to othernations, so that the outside world ostensibly has a correct understanding of the country(Suradi et al. 1989, 9).
BIMP showcases the culture of each region of Indonesia. A glimpse of Indonesian
culture is displayed in the provincial administrative area, which is equipped with arts,
educational, and recreational facilities. BIMP’s target market is the domestic community,
and its purpose in attracting visitors is to increase their sense of national pride while
adding scientific treasures. BIMP is a counterbalance to Indonesia’s economic development and is directed at the development of projects in the mental-spiritual field (Suradi
et al. 1989, 11).
Parmanto, the coordinating officer for development at the Electricity and New
Energy Museum when the observation was carried out in April 2022, stated thatTEANEM was the first modern science museum in Indonesia (author interview, 2022).
TEANEM is one of 18 museums in the BIMP region. As an educational tool complementing BIMP, TEANEM has the duty of being a science ambassador with the goal of building
an energy-efficient Indonesian society. For more than 25 years, TEANEM has been
active in developing scientific understanding of electrical energy among the Indonesian
people. The TEANEM development concept was designed in 1990 by Minister of Minesand Energy Ginanjar Kartasasmita, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries and the hundredth anniversary of Indonesia’s Electricity
Day. Exhibition objects as tangible objects are used by museums to represent certain
intangible concepts (Wood and Latham 2014, 42). Based on this idea, TEANEM presents
a collection of objects that show the development of science and technology with regard16) The Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park, or BIMP) project was initiatedby Siti Hartinah, the wife of President Soeharto, as a recreation area that could depict the greatness
and beauty of Indonesia in miniature. The park has an area of approximately 150 hectares. In thecenter is a lake with some islands representing the territory of the Republic of Indonesia anddepicting its tribes, customs, religions, cultures, flora, and fauna. The purpose behind BIMP wasto showcase the what, who, and how of Indonesia; improve the education and knowledge of Indonesians; as well as foster a sense of national pride.

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Fig. 5 The Plan of the Block of the Electricity and New Energy Museum
Source: Directorate General of Electricity and Energy Development (1992), reprography

to electrical and renewable energy, as well as information on its various applications ineveryday life.
TEANEM occupies two hectares, with a total building area of 6,500 square meters.
The architecture consists of four building masses depicting the shape of an atom with
one proton surrounded by three electrons. The Electricity Pavilion, designed to illustrate
the atomic arrangement of protons, is the central building and is surrounded by threeother buildings: the New Energy Pavilion, the Fossil Energy Pavilion, and the Conventional Energy Pavilion (Fig. 5). Parmanto stated that the construction of the TEANEM
development was directed toward the future, so the Electricity Pavilion and the New
Energy Pavilion were built first (author interview, 2022). Based on the April 2022
observations of the research team, the TEANEM development includes the two buildings.
The basic concept behind the TEANEM design is to provide a comprehensive
demonstration of electrical energy (LAPI-ITB 1993, 1) that can provide a correct understanding of the theory and basic principles of electricity, convey an overview of the
production and distribution of electrical energy, and show the use of electricity for industrial purposes and daily household needs. A comprehensive demonstration of scienceand technology with regard to electrical energy requires the simultaneous involvement

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of several disciplines. The best strategy is to have interdisciplinary teams, thus increasing the possibility of multidimensional decision making (Pekarik et al. 2014, 18). For
this reason, TEANEM formed a team of experts from the fields of electricity, physics,
education, visual communication design, display product design, and museum interior
design (LAPI-ITB 1993, 3). The team designed objects that could be displayed in themuseum to explain the principles of electrical energy. The objects embody a synthesisof concepts from various scientific disciplines and provide a new experience when
visiting TEANEM.
The description below shows how Widagdo implemented the idea of Gesamtkunstwerk
to realize President Soeharto’s mandate. Referring to the “two perspectives from
opposite directions” of TGKWI from Wagner and Bauhaus, where design objects embody
a synthesis of various scientific disciplines in order to satisfy universal human needs, theimplementation of TGKWI in designing the interior and museum objects of TEANEM
are described below.
The main purpose of a visit to TEANEM is to learn about scientific and technologicaldevelopments in the rapidly progressing field of electrical and renewable energy. This
information is shared by each museum object through educational methods that are
informative but not analytical, popular but not scientifically deep, and recreational but do
not demand reasoning (LAPI-ITB 1993, 2).
TEANEM shares information on the science and technology of potential sources ofgeothermal energy and their use in everyday life (Fig. 6). Decisions on display objects

Fig. 6 Museum Objects That Explain the Potential Sources of Geothermal Energy
and Their Use in Everyday Life (photo by Widagdo, 1995)

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Fig. 7 
A Museum Display That Explains the Potential Sources of Solar Energy
and Its Use in Everyday Life (photo by authors, 2022)

and visitor experiences are made by a team of experts in electricity, education, productdesign, visual communication design, and interior design.
TEANEM also uses a team of experts to share knowledge about the potential
sources of solar energy and its use in everyday life: electricity experts weigh in on thepotential conversion of solar energy into electrical energy; education experts formulate
informative, recreational, and popular ways to educate visitors about the use of solar
energy sources; product designers design models of solar energy sources; and visualcommunication designers put information into a two-dimensional display so that visitors’
attention is focused on information about potential solar energy sources. The interior
designer combines the inputs from the various experts to devise a display object for
TEANEM (Fig. 7).
Knowledge about the electric power system is conveyed to visitors through displays
showing the generation, high-voltage transmission, and medium-voltage distributionof electrical energy (LAPI-ITB 1993, 6). The expert team’s input was realized by theinterior designer as follows: The knowledge object is a compilation of data on a map of
the electric power system in Indonesia which displays power plants in two-dimensional
media, high-voltage transmission information, and information on the consumption ofelectricity in Indonesia (Fig. 8). The object provides information on where electricalenergy is produced, where it comes from, and where it is used. Visitors gain knowledge
through direct interaction with objects, such as lights that can be turned on in the animatedmap of the electric power system. This TEANEM object is equipped with several other306

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Fig. 8 
Display on Electric Power Systems Showing the Generation of Electrical
Energy, High-Voltage Transmission, and Medium-Voltage Distribution(photo by authors, 2022)

elements to support knowledge about the production and distribution of electrical energy
in Indonesia.
Technology for the production and distribution of electrical energy is also demonstrated in the form of artificial objects. Such TEANEM objects provide information
about the location of power plants, which must be far from the load center, whereproblems are caused by differences in geographical conditions. From such museum
objects, visitors learn that hydroelectric power plants are always located far from consumers, while electric steam power plants are located far from cities in order to avoid
dust pollution. The model object displays are focused primarily on details of the substation, based on the application of the theory of converting electrical energy into electricity
through a transformer.
The analysis of some of the teaching aids above explains the way in which Widagdo
implemented TGKWI in designing objects for TEANEM. With reference to the “twoperspectives from opposite directions,” on the one hand the definition of TGKWI is asynthesis of knowledge from experts in the fields of electricity, education, product design,visual communication design, and interior design who gave birth to new meanings ofobjects containing knowledge about electrical and renewable energy. On the other hand,the understanding of TGKWI through informative, recreational, and popular methods inthe form of objects at TEANEM gives Indonesians knowledge of electrical and renewableenergy, which can help them use such energy wisely.

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Conclusion
It is very possible that when Soejoedi Wirjoatmodjo designed the architecture of TILBC
and Widagdo designed objects for TEANEM, they did not announce that they had
implemented TGKWI. However, since the design projects incorporate cross-disciplines,
it is certain that the two case studies can be referred to as TGKWI. This is because thesynthesis of various disciplines has been identified as the implementation of TGKWI.
This practice is, of course, an outcome of Soejoedi’s and Widagdo’s German educational
background, where the idea of modern Gesamtkunstwerk is synonymous with Bauhaus.
TILBC is a Gesamtkunstwerk design object. Its synthesis is presented through its
architectural form, its various types of artwork that complement the inside and outsideof the building, as well as its landscape arrangement. The synthesis gives architecture
a new meaning to express the noble values of the Indonesian nation, which are represented by the various activities of Indonesians around the world.
All the museum objects in TEANEM are Gesamtkunstwerk design objects. Eachmuseum object is a synthesis of interdisciplinary knowledge, a realization of concepts
from electricity, physics, education, visual communication, display design, and interior
museum design. This synthesis is aimed at ensuring that knowledge about the use ofelectrical energy resonates with all types of visitors, that it raises awareness and concern
such that Indonesia becomes known for its energy efficiency.
The above analysis of the architectural design of TILBC and the interior design
and museum objects of TEANEM has shown the role of TGKWI in presenting the faceof the nation that two presidents of the Republic of Indonesia wanted to convey on theworld stage. TILBC displays the political policies that affect the lives of Indonesian
people and the ability of Indonesian experts to master modern technology, while
TEANEM displays the mastery and utilization of electrical energy science and technology
by Indonesians.
Within this framework, it has been underlined that TGKWI must be implemented
with “two perspectives from opposite directions.” TGKWI according to Wagner’s
definition aims at giving new meaning to design objects through the synthesis of various
scientific disciplines. However, as a design object that is owned by the public, its newmeaning must also be provided to the public; this aspect refers to TGKWI according to
the Bauhaus definition. Implementing two TGKWIs simultaneously allows for a surprising number of meanings in design objects. This study offers ideas for various
experiments with TGKWI through the many design forms or features available.
Accepted: August 17, 2023

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Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Widagdo and Yuswadi Saliya for sharing their expertise on various aspectsof Bauhaus ideas.

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Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, pp. 121–165. Wiesbaden: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3658-11605-7_4.
Yuswadi Saliya. 2012. Pagi Hari dan Lekang Siang Seorang Sujudi [Morning and afternoon of Soejoedi].
In Tegang Bentang. Seratus Tahun Perspektif Arsitektural di Indonesia [Stretching the landscape:One hundred years of architectural perspective in Indonesia], edited by Pusat Dokumentasi
Arsitektur Indonesia [Indonesian Center for Architecture Documentation], pp. 108–111. Jakarta:
Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
―. 2003. Perjalanan Malam Hari: Kumpulan Pilihan Tulisan karya Yuswadi Saliya [Night’s
journey: Selected writings]. Bandung: Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia Jawa Barat and Lembaga Sejarah
Arsitektur Indonesia.
Online sources
Bambang Eryudhawan. 2023. Arsitektur. Alat Membangun Jiwa Bangsa [Architecture: tool to build thespirit of the nation]. Webinar Papers. Jakarta: Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia [Indonesian Institute ofArchitects].
Yuke Ardhiati. 2023. Arsitektur Modern Indonesia Era Bung Karno [Indonesian modern architectureduring the Sukarno era]. Webinar Papers. Jakarta: Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia [Indonesian Instituteof Architects]. https://asrinesia.com/legacy-arsitektur-di-era-bung-karno/, accessed August 24, 2023.

Correction
This article was published on August 22, 2024 and amended on August 28, 2024 because the earlier version misidentified Pavin
Chachavalpongpun as “an exiled anti-monarchy academic” and Somsak Jeamteerasakul as “another exiled antimonarchy
activist-scholar” (page 323). Both Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Somsak Jeamteerasakul are exiled pro-monarchical-reformcritic scholars. A corrigendum note is published for the printed version.

Smirking against Power: Cynicism and Parodyin Contemporary Thai Pro-Democracy Movement(2020–2023)
Chai Skulchokchai*The 2020–23 wave of protests in Thailand forever changed the country’s politicallandscape. While stemming from and inspired by the 2011 protests, its ability toundermine the hegemony of form and the eternal state of Thailand remains
unmatched. People no longer act as if everything is normal but have started toacknowledge the underlying problems. Through parodies and cynicism, they expose
the fragility of the eternal state. The Internet has made it easier for subversive actsto spread. To evade censorship, subversive acts use metaphorical and paradoxicalparody as a tool to disguise messages as innocuous. Thailand has experienced
turbulence in the past decades with the interregnum crisis. People who believedin the regime have become ta sawang (disillusioned)—but with the draconian lèsemajesté law, they have no way to voice their dissent except through cynicism andparody.
Keywords: cynicism, hegemony of form, online activism, parody, Thailand

Introduction
On August 25, 2020, the Royalist Marketplace Facebook group—a parody of the royalist
movement in Thailand, with more than one million members—was ordered to be disbandedby the Thai government under the Computer Act, which deals with the disseminationof false information. The group’s founder quickly announced plans to create anotherRoyalist Marketplace, to demonstrate that no matter how many groups were closed,
another would always be set up.
It is said that dictators have no sense of humor. Academically speaking, authoritarianregimes and their variants do not tolerate humor well. The study of humor and cynicism* ชััย สกุุลโชคชััย, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Ghent University, Campus UFO –Technicum, Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41, Gent, 9000, Belgium; Faculty of Historical and Cultural
Studies, University of Vienna, Universitätsring 1, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: Chaiyo1999@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5158-6422
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 311–341© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_311

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is well developed in studies of the former Soviet bloc and came to attention again during
the Arab Spring uprising, which began in 2010 (Popovic and Joksic 2013; Damir-Geilsdorf
and Milich 2020). Humor is used as a tool used to degrade the opposition. However, it
has not been as widely studied as the use of technology and various aspects of social
cleavage in the context of Thailand’s 18-year-long political turmoil. The continued protests in Thailand since 2020 are part of a greater resistance to the authoritarian regime.
Thais are not only famous for their smiles and hospitality but have also become famous
for their disapproval of repression through cynical humor and satire.
Thailand was under a decades-long political crisis that many attribute to the interregnum (possibly since 2006, 2014–23) between the reigns of King Rama IX (1927–2016,r. 1946–2016) and King Rama X (b. 1952, r. 2016–present), when the royal institutions
lost considerable political and cultural hegemony (Hewison 2019). To preserve thestatus quo, there were two coups and a civilian massacre during the 2010 Thai military
crackdown (Ferrara 2019). Like Antonio Gramsci’s quote “the old is dying and the new
cannot be born in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear,” the Thai
ancien régime is deteriorating rapidly but trying to prevent the new with government
suppression of public expression. During the interregnum the “morbid symptoms”
showed up; and under government suppression, several people became ta sawang, or“disillusioned.” Many blamed the king or his close confidants for Thailand’s ongoing
political crisis (Sopranzetti 2018). Nevertheless, people are still constrained by thestate’s ironclad censorship and suppression. To circumvent the abusive litigation, theyexpress their subversion through cynical jokes, satire, and parody. The initial widespread
circulation of such acts of subversion occurred in May 2011, the first anniversary of the2010 Thai military crackdown. Subversion became popular again in 2020, when the
public reached their breaking point after eight years of dictatorship, with the help ofsocial networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Despite the popular youth movement’s
early success, it took a hiatus in late 2021 after a series of failed attempts to force thegovernment to dissolve the parliament. The movement almost died out while thispaper was being written, for reasons that will be discussed later. Therefore, it isimportant to understand why the movement began and what it has achieved throughvarious theoretical lenses.

Methods and Positionality
The scale of the 2020 protest and its contribution to Thailand’s democratization isdebatable. However, this work focuses on the method of resistance rather than theSmirking against Power313

movement’s outcome. Most of the physical protests discussed below were chosenbecause I was directly involved in them as an observer and could capture the zeitgeist.
As for the online cases, they were selected for the scale of reaction from the royalists.
Although some of the protests discussed below were small and had minimal effect, they
were selected because of their creativity. Obviously, the jokes discussed in this paper
are viewed from the perspective of this author—a middle-class observer of urban demonstrations. The jokes are open to interpretation, and therefore my interpretations are
not absolute. There were several social classes that participated in the demonstrations.
From Kanokrat Lertchoosakul’s (2021a) research, the most popular subaltern group
was Thalugaz (Breakthrough Gas). They were rather violent, using Ping-Pong bombs
and firecrackers against police. Their anti-establishment tactics were not hidden
behind a humorous front, which most protests were—especially during the Din Daeng
Triangle clash.

Brief History of Recent Political Developments in Thailand
King Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great, or King Rama IX, was the longest-reigning monarchin Thai history. He began his reign as a symbolic leader with no real authority in the
military government (Asa 2019). He then became a junior partner in successive
regimes: the infamous Sarit’s despotic paternalism era and the Thanom-Praphas era(Asa 2019). Although it is debatable whether he sided with the people in the 1973
uprising against Thanom-Praphas and the 1992 Black May uprising against Suchinda
Kraprayoon, he strategically positioned himself away from the military. All of this helped
him consolidate power through the “Bhumibol Consensus” after the 1992 Black May
uprising (Asa 2019). There was an implicit consensus in the top echelons of Thai
society to consider him as the leader and adjudicator of any issues (McCargo 2005).
From then on, he became the most powerful person in Thailand, being able to intervene
in all affairs through his proxies, a system dubbed the “network monarchy” (McCargo
2005). By the time of the diamond jubilee (sixty years) of his reign in 2006, he owned
the hegemony of form. People paid respects to His Majesty without a second thought
despite the superficial value of such acts: praying at the temple on his birthday, wearing
a yellow shirt on Monday (his birth day), and celebrating Father (of the Nation) Day inschools and government bureaus. On the sixtieth anniversary of his enthronement,
more than 500,000 people gathered at the Royal Plaza for a royal audience (Faulder
2016). The eternal state was perfect: people believed and wished that King Rama IX’s
reign would last forever, even though his health had been declining. Later in 2006, a314

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political crisis began with the coup d’état against Thaksin Shinawatra, an elected prime
minister, on the pretext of Thaksin’s corruption and a political deadlock. Before thecoup, the pro-monarchy “Yellow Shirts” demanded that the king appoint a new prime
minister, which was legally impossible (Pasuk and Baker 2009). The coup was ineffective
because it failed to eradicate Thaksin’s influence in Thai politics, and his supporters
united under the banner of the “Red Shirts” in 2007. The Thaksin-affiliated party won
the next election in 2008, only to be ousted by a judicial coup through a constitutional
court. Before the case came before the constitutional court, the Yellow Shirts stormed
Government House and Bangkok’s two airports. In one of the clashes with police,
Angkhana Radappanyawut or Nong Bo, a Yellow Shirt protester, was killed (Khorapin2018). The queen attended her funeral, which implicitly showed that the monarchy
was aligned with the pro-royal, anti-government masses (Khorapin 2018). That day,
October 13, was marked as the “day of disillusionment” for many people when the event
was discussed on the Fah Deaw Kan Same Sky web board (Khorapin 2018). After the
judicial coup, the leader of the opposition, Abhisit Vejjajiva, took office with support
from the military and some of the semi-loyal government coalition who had turned
against Thaksin’s government. The Red Shirts came from the North, Northeast, andprovinces around Bangkok to demand that the parliament be dissolved. Instead, Abhisit
allegedly ordered a crackdown that resulted in at least 98 deaths in Bangkok (Phasuk2020). This led many to become disillusioned with the monarch, who was apparently
aware of the crackdown but chose not to intervene.
The first anniversary of the crackdown in 2011 was the first time that royal hegem­
ony was challenged through parodies and cynicism. While no one talked about the
royal family, the graffiti on a burnt building showed the people’s disillusionment. Fromthen, Article 112 (the lèse-majesté law) became more frequently used to suppress
anti-monarchy acts. This led to the development of more sophisticated methods ofsubversion.
Abhisit soon dissolved the parliament and called for an election. The Thaksinaffiliated party again won the election, only to be ousted by another coup in 2014 byGeneral Prayut Chan-o-cha when the government was blamed for dividing the nation.
The coup is believed to have been staged by the royalists to consolidate the successionof King Rama X or King Vajiralongkorn (Pavin 2020). Once King Rama IX passed awayin 2016, the new king, Vajiralongkorn, expanded his privileges by assigning two regiments of the Royal Thai Army as his personal armed force and changing the law to allow
him to reside abroad without appointing a regent (Deutsche Welle 2017; Reuters 2019).
The king is known to prefer living in Germany and to have a passion for the military.
Those two privileges gave him greater influence, with taxpayer money, which generated

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much discontent among young people (BBC 2020). After the coup leader, Prayut,
called and won the 2016 general election, progressive movements continued to be
repressed. The anti-military, pro-democracy Future Forward Party, which was the
younger generation’s favorite during the 2016 election, was dissolved in early 2020
after being accused of violating election regulations on its source of income (BBC Thai
2020). The court ruling instigated mass protests, which were soon brought to an end by
the outbreak of Covid-19. The government took advantage of the emergency to ordersocial-distancing protocols that halted any political movements (Kurlantzick 2020).
Later that year Wanchalerm Satsaksit, a pro-democracy activist-in-exile, was allegedly
abducted and disappeared. The news sparked public outrage and waves of protest
despite the pandemic’s emergency decree (Wright and Praithongyaem 2020). The maindifferences between the youth movements in 2020 and the Red Shirt movement against
Abhisit in 2010 were the former’s widespread use of social networks and young age ofprotesters (middle school to university students). The young urban middle-class protesters in 2020 were a contrast from the “urbanised villagers” of the Red Shirts of theThaksin era (Naruemon and McCargo 2011). The youths used creative protest tactics
that may have been learned from abroad, such as pop culture, jokes, and transnational
pleas, rather than physical confrontation and disruption like the Red Shirt protest—
although the youths did see the Red Shirt movement as an act of heroism.
Even though King Vajiralongkorn was made crown prince in 1972, he was overshadowed by his father’s accomplishments. King Bhumibol had had ample time tocreate his support base before gaining real power, unlike King Vajiralongkorn, who
was crowned when he was 64 years old without any prior loyal support base. King
Vajiralongkorn dismissed most of his father’s advisers, replacing them with his own(Bangkok Post 2016), and although the network monarchy he inherited still functions,
he has lost some support. Scandals about his mistresses have also tainted his reputation
as an unflawed royal (Handley 2014). For example, his ex-consort Yuvadhida wasinvolved in a drug trade (Handley 2014). Such incidents have dealt a blow to the king’s
charisma and legitimacy. Monogamy and respect for elders are important Thai social
norms. Many people who were loyal to Rama IX changed their minds about the monarchy after King Vajiralongkorn came to power. King Vajiralongkorn is trying to replace
his charisma with fear based on rumors that he ordered the forced disappearance ofmany dissenters and his “installation of discipline” program among his semi-loyal
servants (Pavin 2022).

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The State of Anti-Royalism and the 2019 Wave of Protests in Thailand
Thongchai Winichakul (2014) believed that Thai society was in a state of denial about
the “two elephants in the room”: the intervention of the monarchy in Thai politics andthe silencing of anti-monarchy sentiment by the superstructure. Although Thai society
has modernized superficially, mentally many still reside in a state of denial, refusing to
see the obvious suppression of free speech. An important argument from Thongchai(2014) is the Thai belief in Dhammaracha occult (worship of the king who has themystical power to satisfy with his good deeds). This belief elevates the king as therepresentation of virtue, and thus he wields absolute power over the country. The
belief is still popular among older generations of Thais but is in decline among younger
generations. However, this belief is one of the keys to understanding how groundbreaking the 2019 protests were, as youths refused to believe in Dhammaracha occult.
Thongchai discussed the extent of hyper-royalism in Thailand: “First, it is the permeation of royalism in everyday life and the increased demand for the expression of loyalty
to the monarchy. Extravagant public displays of royal symbols and platitudes areencouraged and found everywhere” (Thongchai 2019, 289). He added another crucial
characteristic of hyper-royalism: exaggeration and exaltation of the king’s work andachievement, together with tight control of public discourse through a repressive state
apparatus and civil society. As a result, people feel compelled to participate in insincere
acts to escape the state’s wrath (Thongchai 2019).
Khorapin Phuaphansawat (2018) tracked down the ideological shifts among Thais
from 2006, as early as the aftermath of the 2006 coup when the Red Shirts were formed.
The Red Shirts identified themselves as phrai or commoners/serfs pitched against theammat or aristocrats. The early target of the Red Shirts was Prem Tinsulanonda, whomthey identified as the leader of the ammat. Khorapin (2017) employed Alexei Yurchak’sconcepts of stiob and hegemony of form, which this paper uses too—though in a different
context and time frame.
To understand the force of anti-royalism, one has to first understand the dynamics
of royalism. Duncan McCargo (2005) proposed the concept of a “network monarchy”
headed by the king. The network works because everyone accepts the king as the
adjudicator, and the king uses his privy council members as his proxies. Eugénie
Mérieau (2016) has suggested that the Thai constitutional court operates according to
the monarch’s will. The court also acts as a surrogate to preserve the king’s hegemony
and interests. Thus, the state does not operate on its own. It is controlled by a higher
political entity—the monarchy. This phenomenon may also be referred to as the deepstate.

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McCargo (2021) also wrote about youth protests in Thailand. The break fromprevious generations is stark from their radically different understanding of how power
works in Thai society. Generation Z protesters call into question taboo topics in Thai
society. But McCargo concluded that Generation Z protesters do not constitute a
disruptor dilemma since their impact is too insignificant to change the system. However,the people’s attitude toward the monarchy has changed. Kanokrat (2021a) interviewed
150 school students and 150 university students about their motivations for protesting.
She concluded that youth protests against the education system—a part of the authoritarian institutions and influenced by the monarchy—can result in change as the goalis more reachable for youths. This conclusion might contradict the definition of Mérieau’s
deep state, as Kanokrat’s (2021b) research showed that even though everyone knows
about the existence of the network monarchy, the concept of the state within a state canstill be applied. Even Nidhi Eawsriwong (2017) suggested that the Thai state is a“shallow state” since there is no hidden controller behind the scenes.

Theoretical Background: Cynicism and Parody
Simulation and pretense, which describes the act of make-believe, has a long history
in the study of anthropology. From Karl Marx to Yurchak, the study of simulation andpretense has grown tremendously. The phenomenon is closely connected to cynicism,
which refers to rationalizing beliefs to conform to one’s viewpoint—usually in thecontext of skepticism toward the state, in the Steinmüller sense (2014). But for Hans
Steinmüller, a cynical stance intended to undermine the state is ineffective as the state
can operate normally in a cynical society. Explaining such a phenomenon facilitates
our understanding of how the state tolerates cynicism in private spaces and how itcreates an eternal state that allows minimal change. The best description of the eternal
state is Yurchak’s book title Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: everythingappears perfect and unchangeable until people start to doubt the status quo. Sometimes
an eternal state is understood in colloquial Thai as “Frozen Thailand,” which originatedfrom a proposal in 2012 to stop all political activities for five years, maintaining thestatus quo while fixing problems (Apichart 2012). However, the truth is that simulationand pretense, which are not uncommon in an authoritarian state, make the state vulnerable to small and sudden changes. In the past few decades, change began with thedownfall of the Soviet Union, followed by the dot-com boom and smartphones, which
increased the ability of cynicism to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Althoughauthoritarian regimes are weakened by technological progress, some authoritarian

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Chai Skulchokchaisocieties like North Korea are still able to maintain the eternal state by limiting freedom.
Though such eternal states are believed to be forever, they are actually fragile andprone to collapse at any time, as was seen in the Arab Spring and several disruptions inHong Kong and Thailand.
Simulation and pretense were not understood as political practices in the past,
because it was believed that people could not conceal their thoughts and acts. This
was the idea of rule as “total control,” as observed from Marx’s false consciousness
and Gramsci’s hegemony. Marx’s false consciousness is based on the idea that thesuperstructure uses infrastructure to create a systematic misrepresentation of dominantsocial relations, to obscure the realities of subordination and exploitation (Marx andEngels 2017). Gramsci’s hegemony is about total control politically, economically, andculturally through the normalization of the dominant worldview (Wacharapon 2018). The
goal is to manufacture consent among people as well as urging them to actively show
their consent. Simulation and pretense were introduced as forms of political practicein James C. Scott’s (1987) Weapons of the Weak, a study on peasants in Southeast Asia.
It explains the impossibility of openly and successfully opposing the dominant power
given the overwhelming power advantage of the state. As a result, peasants choose toresist in quieter ways such as false compliance and foot-dragging (Scott 1987). However,this line of thinking assumes that people are resisting the system, as opposed to Marxand Gramsci’s belief in total state control. Yurchak (2003) developed an alternative tothis dichotomy: His idea is that there are people who know about the problems withthe system but still serve the system, actively reproducing consent while not believing
in it. This contradictory performance may be observed through many examples, suchas a student who preaches about the decadence of the West in public but enjoys rockmusic in private without seeing the contradiction. Thus, Yurchak’s idea goes beyond
simulation and pretense, which actors are conscious of doing, to the realm of the subconscious. The realm of the subconscious is why simulation and pretense is related tohegemony—it is about ingrained habits. Yet the paradox is that the actors, despiteknowing the problem, still follow ingrained habits (Sloterdijk 1987, cited in Steinmüller
2014). Hence, simulation and pretense is also about hegemony of form (of practice).
Actions are performed not only for their face value but also for practical reasons(Steinmüller 2010). Thus, we see different states of simulation and pretense—from
their absence to their being used as weapons of the weak and part of the hegemony ofform.
Over time simulation and pretense developed into cynicism—a distrust of thesystem, making fun of it, and looking down on it. Nevertheless, passive aggression isfeeble in the eyes of the state, and the fear of social sanction still outweighs people’sSmirking against Power319

intention to go against the system. The base arguments for cynicism and Weapons of
the Weak are different. Weapons of the Weak views every action as resistance, while
cynicism views action as a well-calculated habit focusing on the trade-off if people do notcomply with the state, which they are very dependent on (Steinmüller 2010).
Simulation and pretense, hegemony of form, and cynicism show that there can bediscrepancies between thoughts and actions. These are coping mechanisms often foundin authoritarian regimes (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Yurchak 2003; Steinmüller 2015). People
do what they have to, from attending meetings and passing meaningless resolutions toattending their leader’s funeral pretending to cry (Mbembe 1992; Yurchak 2003; 2013).
Such actions become routine, as the government constantly directs people to join state
ceremonies such as national days and parades (Mbembe 1992; Yurchak 2013). Nationalism may even become banal when people unconsciously perform patriotic gestures indaily life (Billig 1999). Such acts are pushed by the state to condition the people according to its own agenda.
The hyper-royalism in Thailand parallels what happened in late socialism in theSoviet bloc in the 1960s–1980s (Yurchak 2013). Constant public expressions of loyalty
became meaningless acts performed in order to avoid public sanction. Exaggerationand exaltation were used to portray the leader as perfect. Such obligations do not comefrom state sanctions alone. Although Thailand has laws on royal defamation (Article112) and sedition (Article 116) that foster a climate of fear, the conservative civil society
also contributes by suppressing critics of the monarchy. Thus, the country fits in with
Yurchak’s (2013) condition of the hegemony of form. On the other hand, gossip aboutroyalty is widespread in Thailand. The conclusion is that hegemony of form is about
culture as well as totalitarianism.
As mentioned above, simulation and pretense are especially important in modern
life. Cynics use pretense and simulation to evade censure (Sloterdijk 1987, cited in
Steinmüller 2014)—not due to fear but due to common sense, since not participatingin performative acts could take a toll on their social status. Achille Mbembe (1992)
suggests that participating in public events such as oath-taking and medal ceremonies isnecessary for individuals to have a respectable social status regardless of their beliefs.
Lisa Wedeen (1998) suggests it is important for people to act “as if” they believe insomething even if they are skeptical. She gives the example of a soldier in Syria who
defied his superior officer by talking about his dream, which was different from the othersoldiers’ dreams. By giving an alternative interpretation, he also stopped demonstrating
active consent to the state’s absolute control. His not having the same dream as theothers was a crime worthy of punishment despite its triviality. This case study shows
there can be serious consequences for defiance, which makes most people choose to do

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nothing despite questioning the system. Acts of defiance like the soldier’s matter,because language can be used to create social change. Hollow actions may be foundedon cynicism, but scripted words burrowed within conversations hold power in real life.
People act with cynicism but speak as if they believe the official narrative. Repetitive
dialogue can generate even more state control. Hence, performativity is a state tool tofabricate a reality in people’s minds, while cynicism creates a small safe space for people
to express their doubts.
Parodying and joking is a tool for expressing cynicism. Since it can be taken lightly,
it is what the state fears most—it can spread quickly and undermine the state’s legitimacy
in a short time. Since language can affect our worldview, the use of parody can alter
perceptions. As a result, when the hegemon becomes an object of absurdity, it is easierto undermine its legitimacy.

Hegemony of Form at Its Finest
Thailand’s hegemony was consolidated after May 1992 by the “Bhumibol Consensus”
with the support of the ruling elites (McCargo 2005). The hegemony of form has beendeveloped ever since. From 2006 it became normalized for everyone to wear a yellow
shirt on Mondays to celebrate the king’s birth day. The “sufficiency economy” philosophy
credited to the late King Bhumibol became both state policy and practice by the people.
Irrespective of social class, this economic principle was supposed to be a part of every
individual’s spending practices—though in reality it was not that common. During themourning period for King Rama IX in 2016, those not wearing black faced public shameand risked physical abuse (Masina 2016). Discussions about the appropriateness of thelèse-majesté law have always been taboo as they show disrespect for the king, an
indication of how ingrained the hegemony of form is in Thailand.
King Rama X ascended to the throne in December 2016. He is alleged to be a
playboy with many mistresses whom he mistreats (Economist 2019). This rumor has
fostered cynicism, as the king having mistresses goes against Thai as well as modern
ethics. However, disapproval is expressed mostly in private, with inside jokes like “Ihave only one father” (which means only my biological father is my true father, not theking—the national father) or “When is Mother’s Day again?” (Since Thailand’s Mother’s
Day is on “the queen’s” birthday, this joke implies that the current king has more than
one queen). The traditional role of the king is to be a respected, paternal figure. However, since King Rama X’s promiscuous lifestyle does not foster such an image, increasing doubts are cast on his royal status and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the public continued

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to praise the new king until the youth protests of 2020 (McCargo 2021). At the beginningof King Rama X’s reign everyone performed the traditional rituals, such as standing up
when the royal anthem was played in cinemas and calling him a father figure. Changecame with the student movement in 2020, which called for a reform of the monarchy. The
Internet played a major role in the protests. A video titled “A Clip at the Pool,” widely
circulated on YouTube and Twitter, allegedly depicted the former royal consort, Srirasmi,celebrating the king’s dog’s birthday wearing only a G-string (Ramboisan4somchai2011). Rumors about this were already circulating, but things came into the open withthe video. Images of the king’s maltreatment of his mistress and his former princess alsocame to light, generating even more cynicism. However, no one was prepared for themagnitude of the 2020 protests.

The First Instance of the Great Subversion
Following the crackdown on the Red Shirt protest in 2010, the Thai government organizeda “Big Cleaning Day,” which would remove all the evidence of state crime (Cod 2020).
The political situation stabilized the following year. The first anniversary of the crackdown in 2011 drew large crowds even though the Red Shirts were still viewed as theenemy of the people. To everyone’s surprise, the ruins of the Central World department
store were found to have been decorated with anti-monarchy graffiti, the most prominentof which showed Hitler blinded in one eye with the caption “The blind who cannot
smile”—a reference to King Rama IX being blind in one eye and one of his biographies
being titled The King Never Smiles (Ünaldi 2016). It directly accused the king of having
ordered the violent crackdown. Many messages in the graffiti were about King Rama
IX’s sufficiency economy, such as “Tha di jing prathet charoen kwa ni” (If that was done,
our country would be thriving) and “Mi pen lan, tae hai ku phophiang” (You have millions[of baht] but still made us stingy) (Ünaldi 2016). Such messages challenged the notionthat a sufficiency economy was the universal solution to problems and highlighted theking’s status as the world’s richest monarch—a fact often disregarded by citizens due tothe humble way in which he was represented. Another message in the graffiti was the
widely circulated term krasun praratchatan (royally given bullet). This too implied thatthe crackdown was an order from the king (Ünaldi 2016).
At the Ratchaprasong intersection during the first anniversary of the 2010 Red
Shirt massacre, an unknown individual put up a banner saying “Gu mai roo gu puey”(I don’t know, I am sick) (Somsak 2011). “Gu mai roo gu mao” (I don’t know, I was drunk)is a common excuse for denying responsibility for acts committed while someone is322

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drunk. It is connected to “Yaa tue kon baa, yaa waa kon mao” (Do not hold grudges
against crazy people, and do not judge drunk people), which is a way to lessen theaccountability of those whose senses are compromised. In a similar vein, being sickshould exempt one from blame. At the time, King Rama IX was hospitalized. On that
pretext, he should have been exempted from responsibility for his inaction. According
to traditional beliefs, all Thais are children of the king, and a father should not abandon
his own in the face of harm. Nevertheless, it is possible that the king chose not to preventthe 2010 massacre, like on October 6, 1976, when more than one hundred Thammasat
University students were massacred.
The Faiyen band released their first album in 2011, just before the first commemoration of the crackdown. They had released their songs earlier but became more
popular after the crackdown. Their most famous song is Loong Somchai, Pa Somchit(Uncle Somchai and Aunt Somchit), a parody of the Thai monarch. Somchai and Somchit
are common names in Thailand (Khorapin 2017). The song tells the story of a broken
family: the son and daughter’s failing relationship, the aunt’s gambling addiction andfinancial mismanagement, and the uncle’s hospitalization. This greatly resembled thestate of the royal family. Another song, Ngua Yod Deaw (Single drop of sweat), parodies
the famous photo of King Bhumibol perspiring while commanding officials during a tour
to “develop” Thailand. Via the photo, the song deromanticizes King Bhumibol’s role inhelping the country. The lyrics instead give credit to the farmer who does the actual
work, implying that the king should not claim the country as his. The song exposes theglorification of the king’s image as meaningless. Faiyen’s most radical song is Krai Ka
Ror 8 (Who killed King Rama VIII?). This touches on the taboo subject of who killed
King Rama VIII. It mentions the questions being asked, with no one able to give a definite
answer, and ends with a young boy replying—but only a bleat comes out, suggesting thatthe supposed murderers were scapegoats. The death of King Rama VIII was mysterious
and the investigations inconclusive. Three of his aides-de-camp were blamed and sentenced to death. However, many suspect that the murderer was King Rama IX (King2011). Once people became brave enough to discuss this sensitive subject, the long-lived
legitimacy of King Rama IX was finally challenged.
From 2006 to 2020, many activists-in-exile set up channels on YouTube or posted
commentaries on Same Sky web boards such as Lung Sanam Luang, DJ Soonho, andChuphong Theethuan. These commentaries were about gossip from the palace. “Canned
Fish Factory” by “Grandma Hi” is another example of gossip and subversion preparing
Thais for change. There were 199 weekly online publications of this story, which does
contain some facts, from 2009 on a Same Sky web board narrating the situation of theroyal family (Sirimalee 2022). After the 2014 coup, many of the activists-in-exile wereSmirking against Power323

allegedly forced disappeared. Their sound bites, however, survived and enjoyed greater
popularity during the 2020 wave of protests, which prompted more young people toquestion the royal institution.

Online and Real-Life Subversion
In 2011 social media was not as widely used as in 2020. Most of the protesters in 2011were also of a different generation (Generation X or Y). During the early stages of theCovid-19 pandemic, protesters came to fear the state of emergency. With widespreadlayoffs, the unemployed turned to freelancing and selling products online. One way to
expand target customers was through educational networks. For example, Chula
Marketplace was a trendy Facebook group for Chulalongkorn University alumni, students,and staff to sell their products. Later, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an exiled pro-monarchicalreform academic, created another similarly named Facebook group—Royalist Marketplace—to mock the trend of marketplaces. Contrary to what its name suggests, Royalist
Marketplace does not advocate for royal privilege. It is a discussion board for Pavin’s
followers, democracy sympathizers, and more radical republicans (Schaffar 2021). The
group became a safe space to criticize and make fun of the monarchy. With increasing
discontent over the expansion of royal privilege and government mismanagement,
more people joined the group and it grew to over two million members, making it one of
the world’s largest Facebook groups. The name “Royalist Marketplace” cannot betaken at face value as the group sells nothing; its name is a mask for ridiculing themonarchy. This became one of the biggest inside jokes in Thailand. Pavin was given themock royal name Somdej Phra Nangjao Pavinsuda Phraphanpee Luang (Queen Dowager
Pavinsuda) and a royal coat of arms. Somsak Jeamteerasakul, another exiled promonarchical-reform critic activist-scholar, was given the title Somdej Phra Jeamklao
Chao Yuu Hua (King Jeam) as can be observed in Fig. 1.
On Twitter, hashtags can intensify public opinion. Hashtags such as#WhyDoWeNeedAKing were used more than 1.2 million times in 24 hours on March
21–22, 2020, showing the public’s attitude toward the king’s abandoning the country
during the Covid-19 pandemic (Reuters 2020). Hashtags such as #RoyalMotorcadeand #IslandShutdown also showed the people’s discontent with the monarchy:#RoyalMotorcade was a complaint about unplanned road closures causing traffic disruptions just because a member of the royal family wanted to travel. Another role ofhashtags, together with the Facebook group, was to rally people to protest. Hashtags
such as #15OctoberGoToRatchaprasong—to display protesters’ strength through324

Chai SkulchokchaiFig. 1 A Banner from the #ThammasatWillNotTolerate Protest on August 10, 2020
Projects the Image of Pavin and Somsak against a Gold Background, Usually
Reserved for the Royal Family. Pavin and Somsak Also Have Their Coat ofArms. The Writing on the Banner Is “Duay Kao Duay Kang-om Moo Krata”(With Rice, Curry, and Pork Barbecue), a Parody of “Duay Klao Duay Kramom
Kor Decha” (With the Top of My Forehead Paying Respects).
Source: Prachatai (2020)

numbers—reached 68,000 posts within minutes on October 15, 2020 (Cod 2020).
However, online subversion alone was not enough to bring about regime change;
real-life mobilization was needed. From the Royalist Marketplace banner to the imageof Pavin in royal uniform, there were frequent signs of resistance at gatherings andpolitical events—even at Thammasat University’s graduation ceremony, which wasattended by the king. Anti-monarchists gave Pavin the title of queen dowager, ranked
above Queen Suthida and Royal Consort Sineenat.
The power of hashtag activism transformed tweets into real-life activism. Two instances
will be discussed here: the mobilization of #CastPatronusCharmProtectingDemocracy
and People’s Runway. The first hashtag event was inspired by the iconic Patronus
Charm from the Harry Potter franchise. The charm was used against “He Who Must
Not Be Named,” an alias of “Lord Voldemort.” Lord Voldemort was none other thanthe monarch, whose name cannot be uttered in a negative way. The creative theme
represented the younger generation who participated in this protest. Not long after that,
People’s Runway was organized on Silom Road, Bangkok’s financial hub. Intended tomock the lavish spending of Princess Sirivannavari on her fashion brand and runway
events, the event took place on the same day as the release of the princess’s new wintercollection. Its iconic photo portrayed a woman in Thai national costume walking on a red
carpet, similar to Queen Suthida walking to the Grand Palace, while the king described
Thailand as the “Land of Compromise.” Traditionally, Thai national costumes wereSmirking against Power

325

designed and promoted by Queen Dowager Sirikit. Wearing them symbolized loyalty
to the monarchy. On the surface, People’s Runway demonstrated loyalty, but its true
intent was to mock Queen Suthida and Princess Sirivannavari. Both cases show how
protesters avoided directly calling out the monarchy, instead doing so under the guise of
a fictional character or a show of loyalty. Although the People’s Runway leader was
charged under Article 112, the district court put aside the matter by claiming that it
fell under the criminal court’s jurisdiction (Anonymous 2022a). However, the person
dressed as Queen Suthida was sentenced to two years in prison (Anonymous 2022b).
Another example of subversion by innuendo is the “Mom Dew Diary” Facebook
page. Mom Dew is a transgender woman who looks like Queen Dowager Sirikit. Using
the word “Mom” (The Honorable) to pretend she has royal lineage, she imitates theway Queen Dowager Sirikit talks and dresses. Her cover photo shows her aiming a gunin a shooting range, similar to a famous photo of Queen Dowager Sirikit. She often visits
places with her attendant to support (democratically aligned) people. Traditionally,wearing a royal-designed Thai dress signifies that one is upholding national values,
which include loyalty to the monarch. Parodying acts of patriotism and Queen Dowager
Sirikit has become one of Mom Dew’s most iconic aspects. In late 2022 she started a
TV program called News from Mom Dew Page, a parody of News from the Palace, whichis broadcast every day at 8 a.m. With a marching song and a news anchor’s voice reading
the introduction, it is similar to News from the Palace.
Parit Chiwarak, one of the leaders of the resistance, wore a crop top (inspired bya photo of the king in Munich) to Siam Paragon, which is partly owned by King Rama X’ssister Princess Sirindhorn, to mock the king by copying his infamous fashion choices.
He was immediately charged under the lèse-majesté law. In another case, he performeda Choi song in public under the alias of “Khai Nui.”1) The lyrics were about two womenfighting over a man. Viewers could immediately recognize that Khai Nui was a parodic
version of Queen Suthida, as her nickname is Nui and the dress Parit wore was very
obvious. The fight between Queen Suthida and Royal Consort Sineenart is a topic ofgossip among Thai people, but previously no one vocalized it.

The Royalist Reasons
Before the protests started, Pavin and Somsak, together with many academics andactivists, were labeled as “nation haters” for wanting to abolish the monarchy. Many of1) A Choi song is a kind of folk song originating from the central part of Thailand. Normally it is sungby two or three singers. It frequently uses puns and double meanings to make fun of something.

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Chai Skulchokchai

them, including Pavin, explained that they were also “royalists” who cared, that theywanted to transform the monarchy to make it more resilient to change and adapt to thepresent-day world. They by no means wanted a republican Thailand. Therefore,
Royalist Marketplace may not be a parody but indeed a genuine effort to improve themonarchy by pointing out its weaknesses.

Transnational Parodies
In 2020, at the peak of the youth protest, an insignificant Twitter post showing
cityscapes from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand and referring to Hong Kongas a country sparked a Twitter war between China and Thailand. The person who posted
was the girlfriend of a Thai actor who had Chinese audiences. The actor retweeted thepost, which led to his Chinese audience demanding that he apologize for calling Hong
Kong a country rather than a territory (Buchanan 2020). Soon after, Chinese Twittertrolls joined in and a Twitter war erupted. Many Chinese trolls tweeted derogatory
statements about Thailand, such as “The Thai government sucks” and “Your king isugly.” They found that Thai young adults already hated their government and questioned
their king. As a result, not only did the Chinese Twitter trolls fail to insult Thais, but
Thai Twitter accounts used the Chinese trolls’ posts to criticize Thailand instead—something that confused even the angry Chinese. This roundabout criticism helped
the Thais to avoid risking jail time of three to 15 years.
Some Thais countered Chinese trolls with memes undermining Chinese cultural
hegemony by pointing out its oppressive nature. By mentioning the Tiananmen Squaremassacre and Winnie the Pooh, Thais put Chinese trolls in an uncomfortable situation,
since such references are heavily censored in China. The adverse outcome for China
from this Twitter war was pan-Asian solidarity against China’s authoritarianism and infavor of democracy. The Milk Tea Alliance was formed by Thais, Hongkongers, andTaiwanese, followed by people from the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and India asa coalition for democracy (Barron 2020; Salam 2022). This greatly benefited the Thaiyouth movement as its democratic agenda gained international publicity. The practiceof Thais taking the help of foreigners to question their own country became so normalizedthat a Malaysian model even asked Thais to roast the Malaysian government in exchange
for Malaysians roasting the Thai monarchy—a way for both sides to avoid getting into
legal trouble observable in Fig. 2.

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327

Fig. 2 This Post Illustrates Transnational Cooperation
between Thais and Indonesians in Criticizing Each
Other’s Government to Avoid Being Prosecuted.
Source: @_nsyakinah (2022)

The Change“No God, No King, Only Human,” a quote from the BioShock video games, was displayedon Ratchaprasong SkyWalk during the 2020 protests and chanted by young protesters
at the Pathumwan intersection. It indicated the people’s loss of faith in religion and the
king as an agent of positive change. Parody and cynicism weaken authoritarian regimes
by exposing their flaws and mocking them under the guise of loyalty. Though it is not
sufficient to topple a regime, satire can increase the cost of repression to a point that it
is no longer worth the trouble, which may prompt a regime to reconsider its position.
Demonstrations in Thailand have led to tremendous changes. People are bolder inspeaking about the royal family in public, and reverence for the monarch has decreased.
One example is discussions on the amendment and appropriateness of Article 112,
previously a taboo topic, which every political party discussed openly during the 2023
election. Royal sayings became something to mock and change, such as “Duay klao

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Chai Skulchokchai

duay kramom kor decha” (With the top of my forehead paying respects) to “Duay kao
duay kang-om moo krata” (With rice, curry, and pork barbecue). An abbreviation of
SPCR, or “Song phra charoen” (May the monarch prosper), was trivialized to “Thappee
cha rueng” (The rice paddle is falling).
The decreased reverence for the monarch is not merely superficial. Every graduation
ceremony in Thailand is traditionally presided over by a member of the royal family.
This is one of the few chances to get close to royalty in Thailand and usually counts as
an opportunity of a lifetime. However, after King Rama IX died, fewer students beganattending graduation ceremonies. The number dropped further after the start of the
youth movement, with campaigns urging people not to attend. The Thammasat University
graduation ceremony is always presided over by the king. In 2020, of the 7,756 graduating students only 3,280—or 42.29 percent—attended the graduation rehearsal, arequirement for attending the main ceremony (Isranews 2020). Attendance hadalready fallen from 70 percent to 50 percent in prior years, reflecting the monarch’s
drop in popularity among the younger generation (Isranews 2020). Instead, people
printed out life-size models of three academics-in-exile—Pavin, Somsak, and Puey
Ungphakorn—dressed as royals and received their degrees from the models instead
as can be observable Fig. 3.
Many businesses joined in the protests to boost their sales, demonstrating thatthe younger generations are now the target audiences of businesses. In 2022 Thai
Vietjet Air announced an April Fool’s promotion of a flight from Nan Province to Munich
for 1,010 baht, reflecting the country’s ten reigns (ManagerOnline 2022). Nan is thebirthplace of Royal Consort Sineenart, and Munich is the king’s favorite luxury vacation
destination. Lazada, one of Thailand’s largest e-commerce platforms, issued a May 5 or
5.5 promotional video featuring Aniwat, a transgender woman, sitting in a wheelchairwith an unusual neck position (BBC Thai 2022). The video was a caricature of Princess
Chulabhorn, who often uses a wheelchair and has a distinctive posture. Both cases led
to a public outcry from royalists demanding that the government take action. The video
was even accused of mocking the disabled. Lazada was threatened with being charged
under Article 112, and the army prohibited deliveries from the company (Hoskins 2022)—
though as of this writing no legal action has been taken. Nevertheless, the cases
showed that parodic sentiments had spread from the individual to the corporate level,reflecting the general perception of a legitimacy crisis with the royal family. Acts thatwere once meaningless displays for revering the monarch have become acts usedagainst hegemony.
Salim is a word to describe conservative urban-educated middle-class baby boomers
who support traditional establishments such as the monarchy and the use of military

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329

Fig. 3 Life-Size Printout of Highly Respected People from Thammasat University on
the Occasion of the 2020 Graduation Ceremony
Source: Freetupandit (2020)

force. As such, they distrust any elements that pose a threat to their core values, suchas the Thaksin government and a more liberal democratic system. Since this generation
are now adults, they are convinced they are more qualified and morally superior when it
comes to judging politics (Faris 2011). Though salim were once the main determiners
of government stability, the word has regressed to becoming a derogatory identifier
for people who prefer authoritarian governance. Kwai daeng (Red buffalo), once a term
for uneducated provincial people who protested against the salim and their system,
became a symbol of pride as society began seeing their cause as pro-democracy. The
commemoration of the 1976 massacre, which had come to be regarded as obsolete by the
public, gained interest among young people as it represented the democratic movementthat had been suppressed by the military. None of this would have happened if not
through the use of social networks to spread information, mock the regime, and display
cynicism. Similarly, the Siamese Revolution of 1932, once viewed as a premature

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Chai Skulchokchaitransformation to democracy, became a symbol of improvement for commoners.

Breaking with the Past
Waso Vandenhaute (2021) has discussed in detail how Thais have lost faith in “Thai-styledemocracy.” Thai-style democracy and its belief in “goodman politics,” supported bymany royal speeches, originated from Dhammaracha occult and King Rama IX’s speechin which he said Thais could not prevent bad people from politics but could select goodpeople to prevent bad people from governing the country (Bhumibol 1969). As hyperroyalism intensified from 1992, King Rama IX represented the ultimate “goodman”
since he practiced Dhammaracha precepts well. His guiding influence in Thai politics
gave birth to “guided democracy,” in which he guided his nation using goodmen. This
strategy was successful in helping the economy prosper under the Prem Tinsulanonda
government.
Prayut’s coup and government were welcomed initially because of his appeal as agood and loyal man. Nevertheless, his regime lost support due to its mismanagement
and inability to improve the country’s economy. The death of King Rama IX and scandalsof King Rama X had a ripple effect that lessened the junta’s legitimacy, since the monarchy
and junta were viewed as being aligned. The goodness of the royal institution, which
supports the government’s legitimacy, became questionable. With that came the realization that guided democracy or Thai-style democracy was not working anymore—what
had been viewed as beneficial was actually contributing to people’s despair politically,
economically, and mentally. Consequently, many chose to distance themselves from thepast, from good and moral politics. The state’s emphasis on virtue and goodness
became so intense that these qualities became objects of absurdity. Parodies andmockery of the monarch became a way for people to cope with reality, similar to stiob in
the Socialist bloc during late socialism. The fact is that no matter how strong hegemonyof form is, subversion will eventually find a way to bypass it. The irony of this type of
regularity (where everything looks normal and people still perform meaningless activities, so there is no warning of change) is that the authoritarian system works withalmost no direct resistance—a peaceful society. Nonetheless, since this system is notaccustomed to change, it is also structurally fragile. The direct effect of laughter stemming from despair and anger is the delegitimization of the royal institution by convincing
people to take it lightly (although the Thai government takes it very seriously). As aresult, when there is an attempt at change, the system cannot adapt and maintain thestatus quo since people are already prepared for the change.

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Dictators Have No Sense of Humor
As stated by Yurchak (2003) and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002), small acts of subversion are
allowed in the private sphere as a way for people to express their discontent. For thestate, such acts in public must be prevented at all costs, apart from the few “acceptable”
parodies in stiob. With traditional media in decline, the focus has shifted to new media
and education. Thailand’s army established the Information Operations Unit to combat
subversion in the online world, while the new preschool curriculum forces children tolearn about King Rama X—mostly about his virtues, such as being the wise patriarchof the nation and a unifying figure (Thailand, Ministry of Education 2018; Wongsapan
2022). However, the intensity of royal propaganda led to an increasing number ofdemonstrations by middle-school students advocating for a propaganda-free curriculum.
In 2020 a constitutional amendment was proposed to abolish the authority of thesenate to vote for the prime minister. Ultimately rejected, this was a petition by the
ILaw Project and received more than 100,000 signatures, double the original target.
The reason for the proposal was that senators were handpicked by the junta, giving
General Prayut the advantage to be elected as prime minister. A crowd rallied to theparliament at Kiakkai to pressure the senate to accept the amendment because theywanted a democratic system in which the prime minister could be chosen (indirectly) by
the people. During deliberations, the parliament was heavily guarded by fully equippedriot police. The People’s Party 2020 group rallied the people to confront the police. The
protesters claimed to have an army (the masses) and navy (represented by floating
rubber ducks) by their side. They brought rubber ducks to the Chaophraya River,behind the parliament. In the ensuing confrontation, the police deployed a high-pressurechemical water gun and the protesters used the rubber ducks as a shield. Rubber ducks,
which are a protest symbol in Serbia, Kosovo, and Russia, are becoming a symbol of themasses in Thailand. Within a few days, the police banned a wholesale store in Bangkok
from selling rubber ducks. The rubber ducks were called Kromluang Kiakkai Ratsadorn
Boriruk, or “Prince Protector of People at Kiakkai.” In subsequent protests, these rubber
ducks became an icon. An anonymous Facebook user started selling “Royally given
duck calendars,” mocking the tradition of distributing calendars with photos of the royalfamily. The court jailed the seller for two years for selling something indirectly mocking
King Rama X.
Sanctions against parodies and subversion came slow but firm. Many protest
leaders were charged with lèse-majesté and accusations of sedition. Although most of
the charges were eventually dismissed, the accused were ordered to be jailed without
bail while awaiting the court’s decision because the charges fell under national security.

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Chai Skulchokchai

In retaliation, many went on hunger strike to demand the right to bail. Many of themwere not sui juris. The longest hunger strike lasted 64 days (Standard Team 2022).
There were at least 15 cases of hunger strikes from 2021 to 2022 (Admin28 2022). Allof this reflects the lengths to which both the state and youths were willing to go. While
the state imposed sanctions to prevent anyone from undermining its authority, including
through mockery, youths became more desperate. To protest against the regime andthe abuse of legal power, they upped the stakes by going on dry fasts as a last resort.
On January 16, 2023, Orawan (Bam) and Thantawan (Tawan) announced theirhunger strike against injustice, calling on the court to allow political prisoners to file forbail (Online Reporters 2023). They decided to go on hunger strike after the court canceled
their friends’ bail. Bam and Tawan found themselves pushed into a corner. With the
movement’s strength greatly weakened by despair, the chances of their being imprisoned
while awaiting trial were now higher than before. They refused bail and used theirbodies and lives as a final weapon against injustice; they had nothing left to lose. Afternearly two months, the court finally heard their pleas and granted bail to 13 of their 16
fellow protesters who were on trial (Online Reporters 2023). On March 11, 2023, Bamand Tawan announced that they would stop their hunger strike as they could not survive
much longer and their close confidant had asked them to stop (Online Reporters 2023).
Some of their demands were met. They still urge the masses to continue fighting alongwith them.

From Laughter to Symbols
It was clear that various types of violence—from tear gas to high-pressure chemical
water canon—used by the state could undermine morale. Consequently, the movement
had to adopt new tactics. Symbols became a handy tool, replacing laughter with something more serious and more representative of the struggle of the masses. The use of
the Hunger Games’ three-finger salute was the first symbol used to represent the
movement’s three demands. The rubber duck was introduced later as a mascot of the
movement and a mockery of the state—a mere plastic toy turned into a security threat.
Bam and Tawan’s dry-fasting strikes were a symbol of nonviolent campaigns against
the broken legal system. On March 29, 2023, a member of Taluwang (Penetrate the
Palace), one of the many protesting groups, painted the wall of the Grand Palace with ananarchist symbol and a crossed-out number 112 (Khaosod English 2023). That man,along with his camerawoman, was apprehended on site by the police. To quote theanonymous artist Banksy, “Graffiti is one of the few tools you have if you have almostSmirking against Power333

nothing.” The man who defaced the palace wall had almost nothing: he was a child of a
CD vendor during the Red Shirt protest and had had to escape the bloody government
crackdown. He was clearly a working-class person who had already experienced trauma
and had nothing much left to lose (Khaosod English 2023). As for the camerawoman,at 15 she was the youngest person to be charged under Section 112 (Admin20 2023).
She defied the court’s authority and the entire procedure by turning her back to thejudge during the hearing (Admin20 2023). Within a day, similar graffiti was found acrossBangkok. The Grand Palace wall was swiftly repainted the day it was defaced, and thenext day there were mounted police patrolling the area. Posters showing the crossed-out
number 112 by Commoner publishing house were taken down by undercover police
without notification to the publishing house (Natthapol and Kittiya 2023). All theseincidents demonstrated the fragile state of the hegemony of form. Every small act ofdefiance was met with an exaggerated reaction from the state. These reactions createdfriction that seemed absurd to the people and displayed the vulnerability of the state.

Conclusion
Posts with statements such as “You will see what you never saw” are frequently put
up by Charnvit Kasetsiri, a renowned Thai historian. Thailand has been mired in apolitical crisis for almost two decades, during which time many of the “old” have declined
while the “new” have grown up. However, in order to understand why “you will see
what you never saw,” one has to understand the condition Thailand has been in forseveral years. There was hyper-royalism throughout the reign of King Rama IX andcontinuing into the reign of King Rama X. However, it intensified when the king had
more power. As a result, at one point the state of hegemony in Thailand was similar tothat of the late socialist Soviet bloc, as every act was reduced to face value and people
performed meaningless acts in order to fit in. That was how the people were made tobelieve that things would stay the same forever. The eternal state ended when thereign was subjected to the differences between the two kings.
Cynicism and performativity have played an important role in creating and sustaining nations, especially in authoritarian societies. They are part of what Michael Herzfeld(2005) calls “cultural intimacy” by being part of the community of complicity. Simulationand pretense are means of cynicism and performativity in that they conceal people’strue thinking and motives in order to save them from prosecution. When hegemony ofform is imperfect and the eternal state is undermined, people start to question the systemand protest against oppression, seeking more creative ways.

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Thailand joined the third wave of democratization in the 1990s. However, the attempt
was unsuccessful because of the coup in 2006. From the 1990s to 2006, hegemony ofform was developed until the eternal state was achieved. The loss of hegemony became
visible during the final phase of King Rama IX’s reign and surfaced a few years into
King Rama X’s. However, the cracks had begun long before, with many scandals about
the royal family being discussed privately.
The proclaimed neutrality of the royal institution was disproved when the institution
sided with the anti-government Yellow Shirts. With the violent crackdown on the Red
Shirts by the military, many people became disillusioned about the neutrality of the royal
institution. Anti-monarchy graffiti was found in the ruins of the Central World department
store, and the Faiyen band released satirical songs questioning royal propaganda. The
songs challenged the Dhammaracha precepts even before the widespread use of social
media.
The 2020 wave of protests had unprecedentedly young participants who wereconcerned about their future. Royalist Marketplace was created on Facebook andbecame popular among this demographic. On Twitter, there were hashtags attracting
people to join the movement. Information on flash protests spread through these platforms.
Such actions led to cultural change. Many people who would have been happy to receive
their university degree from the royal family opted out and instead received it from aparodic figure of someone they respected. In protests and daily life, the use of innuendo
became more common. This was not only in the real world but also in the safe haven of
the digital world. The Twitter clash between Thai and Chinese netizens is one exampleof Thai netizens using others to indirectly ridicule their royal institution. With fewer
people showing respect to the royalty through their words and actions, the cost ofrepression increased—but not enough for the government to give in. The corporate
world also exploited this trend, which prompted the army to take action. The word
salim, once used with pride for those who opposed the elected government, has become
something many people prefer to forget, while kwai daeng, once a derogatory term for
Red Shirts, has become a source of pride.
One characteristic of Thai politics is the yearning for a morally superior person toplace on a pedestal. However, mismanagement of the royal institution has tainted its
image. The government’s intense hyper-royalism propaganda became so absurd after apoint that people began responding with laughter.
The younger generation like to use Twitter. The social platform creates an illusionof masses of people, as retweets and comments perpetuate the fabricated reality of
onsite political engagement. Though Twitter was used to rally people to protests, thenumber of people present was much lower than the number of tweets. The affectSmirking against Power

335

generated by the illusion and empowerment of Twitter—fear and anger—also played ahuge role. Fear discouraged some people from joining the protest movement, whileanger helped to radicalize others. Police brutality and the risk of severe punishment led
many people to contribute financially rather than showing up. Feeling alienated, protest
leaders resorted to more risky methods. This was the case with Tawan and Bam, whowent on a dry fast to demand their friends’ right to bail. The government also arrested
and charged children as young as 15 years with lèse-majesté.
With the government becoming more violent, cynicism could not protect the masses
anymore. More people were charged with lèse-majesté for creating parodies, so the
movement began using symbols instead. From the Hunger Games’ three-finger saluteto the anarchist graffiti at the Grand Palace, protests became more subjective, yeteveryone understood their meaning. For radicalized participants, turning their backs
to the judge and not uttering a word was an act of opposing the Thai judicial system andits nontransparent treatment.
This study continues the long tradition of studies of satire and cynicism from latesocialism to the Arab Spring uprising. It shows the digitization of resistance by Internet
users who learned from the past and from other movements such as the one in HongKong. However, the government also learned about those movements. With symbols
and protests inspired by popular culture, it is complicated for the authorities to explain
why certain jokes are offensive and a national threat. This demonstrates the fragility ofthe eternal state, which the establishment is fighting to protect.
Accepted: August 21, 2023

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. David Malitz for introducing me to the world of satire, Dr. Ivan Rajkovic forpushing me to initiate this project, and Dr. Jeroen Adam, who has always supported my work. I also
appreciate the feedback from two anonymous reviewers, which improved this work tremendously.

References@_nsyakinah. 2022. offer for indonesians: please roast our power figures more and in return we will
roast your government so neither of us go to jail 🤝 thailand can join in too and we’ll talk shit about
your monarchy. Twitter. https://twitter.com/_nsyakinah/status/1581669772348964865?ref_src=
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Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang
Prabang: Application of Modern Printing Technologies*
Silpsupa Jaengsawang**

Printing technologies that arrived in Laos with French colonialism (1893–1945)
facilitated the Lao manuscript culture by introducing new writing tools and writing
support. When storing and categorizing manuscripts in a repository, librarians
began using new technologies such as writing tools and paper labels as well as the
Roman alphabet to encode pronunciations for vernacular titles of anisong manuscripts.
Monk-preachers began using pen to correct sermonic texts written on palm leaves.
Affiliation markers in the precolonial as well as colonial periods were written
mostly in the modern script, since monastic lay assistants—who were sometimes
responsible for transporting and storing manuscripts in the monastic library—were
illiterate in the Dhamma script. Since the modern Lao script was available inmodern printing machines, there was a gradual decrease in the use of the traditional
Dhamma script. The modern Lao script was thus used to compensate for thedwindling knowledge of the Dhamma script and to accommodate those who could
not read the traditional script but were still part of the manuscript culture.
Keywords: printing, transformation, Lao manuscripts, manuscript culture,anisong, colonialism

I Introduction
After King Saisetthathilat (1534–71) moved the capital of the Lao kingdom of Lan Sang
from Siang Thòng to Vientiane in the mid-sixteenth century, Siang Thòng remained a* The research for this article was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German
Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy–EXC 2176 “Understanding Written
Artefacts: Material, Interaction and Transmission in Manuscript Cultures,” project no. 390893796.
The research was conducted within the scope of the Centre for the Study of Manuscript
Cultures (CSMC) at Universität Hamburg.
** Centre for the Study of Manuscript Cultures (CSMC), Universität Hamburg, Warburgstraße
26, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: silpsupa.jaengsawang@uni-hamburg.de
https://orcid.org/0009-0006-3284-3936
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 343–383© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

DOI: 10.20495/seas.13.2_343

343

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

center of Lao Buddhism.1) It was renamed Luang Prabang in honor of the Phra Bangstatue, which had become Laos’s precious Buddha symbol. In the early eighteenth
century Laos was split into three kingdoms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak.
Each claimed to be the successor state of Lan Sang, and all were forced to recognize
Siamese suzerainty in 1778. Following the failed uprising by King Anuvong of Vientianein 1826–28 (in which Champasak—but not Luang Prabang—participated), Vientiane andChampasak became fully incorporated into the Siamese kingdom while Luang Prabangremained a vassal state. Hence, after 1893, when Siam ceded all territories on the leftbank of the Mekong River to France, only Luang Prabang became a French protectorate
while the rest of Laos became part of the French colony. This explains why Lao Buddhism
was influenced by Siamese traditions even though Lao Buddhist practices depended
upon local traditions (Khamvone 2015, 5). The French barely intervened in Buddhist
activities in Luang Prabang, focusing instead on the restoration of Vientiane, which had
been devastated by Siamese troops. Francis Garnier (1885, 286, cited in Ladwig 2018,100) reported that the first French missions between 1866 and 1868 found Vientiane
in ruins. Buddhist sermons were still part of daily life, which contributed to the commissioning of religious texts inscribed in palm-leaf manuscripts by laypeople. The Laomanuscript culture continued despite the French administration, which lasted approximately fifty years (1893–1945 with a brief interregnum in which Laos was a Japanesepuppet state).2)
Western technologies were applied to Lao manuscript production from the latenineteenth century and resulted in, for instance, typewritten palm-leaf manuscripts
unique to Luang Prabang. The existence of several typewritten copies of palm-leaf
manuscripts suggests an effort to preserve religious texts, particularly under the manuscript-copying projects led by Sathu Nyai Khamchan Virachitto (1920–2007).3) Whilereligious texts recorded in the manuscripts were preserved using this new method,
Dhamma script literacy4) gradually declined as typewriters had the modern Lao1) After the kingdom was invaded first by the Siamese and then by the Burmese during the sixteenth
century, in 1563 King Saisetthathilat moved the capital from Luang Prabang to Vientiane. Vientiane
was more centrally situated with respect to the Lao territories and more easily defensible against
Burmese attack (Stuart-Fox 1986, 8).
2) Based on the Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts (DLLM) collection at the National Library of Laos,the earliest known palm-leaf manuscript from Laos is a Pali canon titled Parivan, written in 1520
during the reign of King Phothisalat (Code: 06018504078-00, National Museum, Luang Prabang).
3) Sathu Nyai Khamchan Virachitto served as an abbot for sixty years, developed close relations withthe highest-ranking individuals of the Lao sangha hierarchy, and rose to senior positions within thesangha. A huge corpus of documents and artifacts was left behind after his death (Khamvone 2015,
vi–vii).
4) For the spread of the Dhamma script in the Upper and Middle Mekong region, see Grabowsky (2011).

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

345

script.5) In the late twentieth century, manuscripts written in the Lao variant of the
Dhamma script could only be produced by hand, on mulberry and industrial paper.6)
Inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in December 1995, the town of Luang
Prabang has a long religious and political history, with a mixture of indigenous andEuropean—notably French—cultures.7) The use of palm leaf, mulberry paper, andindustrial paper was steadily associated with new printing technologies that arrived
there in the late nineteenth century. This article discusses manuscript transformations
due to the application of new technologies in Luang Prabang. It also touches on the
purposes behind and the results from encounters with modernity in Lao manuscript
culture in the late nineteenth century. This study argues that French colonialism had agreater influence on the Lao manuscript culture than any other factor. After providing
general information on the Lao manuscript culture and anisong manuscripts, this paper
outlines the social and cultural setting of Luang Prabang in the late nineteenth century.
The manuscripts discussed date from the French colonial period to the present. The useof new printing technologies is discussed next. The four key factors heuristic tool andparacontent are the core methodologies applied in this study.
Note on Quotations from Manuscripts
Since the manuscripts used as primary sources for this research were written in either
the Dhamma or the modern Lao script, quotations are necessarily presented differently.
Those from manuscripts written/typewritten in the modern Lao script are simply presented
in that script, while texts written in Lao Dhamma (i.e., the Lao variant of the Dhamma
script) have been transcribed into the modern Thai script, largely preserving theorthography of the original. Thus, readers familiar with modern Thai might better
apprehend the English translations. I consider this approach—despite its shortcomings—
more appropriate than transcribing the text into modern Lao (due to the script’s limited
number of consonants) or using a Lao Dhamma font.

5) The availability of the modern Lao script in typewriters helped monks and novices who were
illiterate in the Lao Dhamma script, enabling them to study texts without having to learn a new
script (Bounleuth 2016, 246–247).
6) For example, BAD-13-2-093 Anisong thawai kathin (Rewards derived from participation in the
Kathin festival) and BAD-21-2-004 Salòng than dòk mai (Rewards derived from the donation of
flowers).
7) Despite the transfer of the royal capital to Vientiane, Luang Prabang has retained its rich cultural
heritage, with the highest density of monasteries in Laos and perhaps the whole of Southeast Asia.
Since the mid-fourteenth century it has been the main pillar of Lao Buddhism (Khamvone andGrabowsky 2017, 1).

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II General Information on Anisong Manuscripts
The impact of French colonialism on Lao Buddhist manuscript culture along with technological innovations in writing and composition is manifold. Some genres of texts
reveal more nuanced perspectives on the changes than others. Anisong manuscripts’
popularity, their position in the manuscript corpus as a whole, and their social relevanceand ritualistic use are considered here. This previously under-researched genre of Lao
Buddhist texts deals with the rewards obtained from meritorious deeds.
In the Buddhist social context, where meritorious benefits derived from praiseworthy activities are hard to measure, concrete manifestations referring particularly to
the Buddha matter. The liturgical culture of delivering anisong sermons has been
passed down for centuries. The ritual of delivering these sermons assures practitionersof blissful consequences acquired through religious ceremonies and rituals and assuresthem that no meritorious deed goes unrewarded:
The outcomes and effects of this ritual engagement are people broadly subsumed under one
notion—merit—in Lao called boun (from Pali puñña). Any ritual event conducted in temples isfirst and foremost labelled boun, which besides religious merit then refers to the event itself, also
in the sense of a collective party. (Ladwig 2021, 26–27)

Anisong is the Lao (and Thai) pronunciation of the Pali word ānisaṃsa, meaning“rewards,” “benefits,” “advantages,” or “results of positive deeds” corresponding to
puñña in Pali. Anisong also represents a textual genre and a type of sermon declaring
the benefits derived from meritorious acts.
Another terminological alternative for anisong sermons/texts is the Khmer wordsòng or its variant salòng. Sòng or salòng (chlòng ឆ្លល ង, ສອງ/ສະຫຼຼ ອງ), corresponding tochalòng (ฉลอง, “to celebrate”) in Thai, is a derivative of the Khmer verb chlòng, meaning“to cross,” “to inaugurate,” “to dedicate,” “to celebrate,” and “to spread” (Grabowsky
2017, 416). The sermons are called salòng or thet salòng (ເທດສະຫຼຼ ອງ) in Laos andanisong sermons or thet anisong (เทศน์์อานิิ สงส์์) in the historical region of Lan Na, inThailand’s north. The term anisong (Th: thet anisong เทศน์์อานิิสงส์์) in Northern Thailand
signifies “the announcement of rewards,” while salòng or sòng (Lao: thet salòng ເທດສະຫຼຼ ອງ) in Laos signifies “the announcement of completion”:
Anisong is derived from Pali ānisaṃsa which means “benefit, advantage, good result.” In the
Buddhist context Anisong or Salòng (Lao, from Khmer: chlaṅ, “to dedicate,” “to celebrate”)—often
contrasted to Sòng—are used for homiletic purposes, such as performing sermons and preaching.
Those texts, generally rather short (rarely containing more than twenty folios), describe therewards in terms of merit, or literally the “advantage” which a believer may expect from a par-

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

347

ticular religious deed. (Grabowsky 2017, 416)

Sometimes salòng is defined as “gratuity” or “benefits.” Silpsupa Jaengsawang (2022,
66–67) discusses a manuscript containing five texts (BAD-13-1-0157, 1944 CE)8) from
Luang Prabang that was partly written with blue pen in the modern Lao script to introduce
the Anisong hask sin sermon. In a colophon added later, salòng is defined as “gratuity”
for one’s religious faith (ฉลองศรััทธา) and “benefits” (ประโยชน์์) one may gain from meritmaking or listening to the Dhamma. For the second case, instead of Anisong haksa sin
or Salòng/Sòng haksa sin, the sermon title is Payot haeng kan haksa sin: the term
anisong or salòng or sòng is replaced by payot haeng kan,9) meaning “benefits derived
from the activity of.” Accordingly, the two mentions of salòng in the newly written
introduction define anisong as “gratuity” and “benefits” resulting from meritorious deeds.
The new introduction is quoted below, with the key words related to anisong/salòng/sòng
underlined:บััดนี้้� จัักแสดงพระธรรมเทศนา เพื่่�อสลองศรััทธา ประดัับสติิปััญญาของท่่านสาธุุชน ผู้้�มีีกุุศลจิิตมาบำำ�เพ็็ญกุุศลบุุญราศีีใน
พระพุุทธศาสนา เพื่่�อสั่่�งสมบุุญบารมีีในตนให้้หลายยิ่่ง� ขึ้้�นไป เพราะการเฮ็็ดบุุญไว้้นี้้� มีีแต่่เพิ่่�มพููนความสุุ ขให้้แก่่ตนตลอดเวลา
ตรงกัันข้้ามกัับการเฮ็็ดบาปหยาบช้้า ยิ่่ง� เฮ็็ดหลาย ก็็ยิ่่ง� นำำ�ความทุุกข์์ลำ�บำ ากให้้แก่่ตนทั้้�งในปััจจุุบันั และอนาคต พระธรรมเทศนา
ที่่�จะนำำ�มาแสดงนี้้�มีีชื่่�อว่่า ประโยชน์์แห่่งการรัักษาศีีล ตามคาถาบาลีีที่่�ได้้อัญั เชิิญไว้้เบื้้�องต้้นว่่า สีี เลนะ สุุ คะติิง ยัันติิ แปลความ
ว่่า บุุคคลจะไปสู่่�สุุคติิ ก็็เพราะมีีศีลี เป็็ นที่่�รักั ษา จะได้้โภคสมบััติมิ าก็็เพราะมีีศีลี จะมีีวาสนาถึึงพระนิิพพานก็็เพราะมีีศีลี เป็็ นหลัักปฏิิบัติั ิ

Now the Dhamma sermon will be delivered as remuneration for your religious faith (gratuity) inorder to promote the wisdom of devotees (you) who virtuously make merit for Buddhism for the
purpose of higher meritorious accumulation; because merit-making always increases happiness.
[Merit-making] is contrary to sinful deeds; [namely,] the more sinful deeds one does, the moregrief one experiences in both present and future times. The following Dhamma sermon is titled
Benefits of Precept Observance, which is in accordance with the introductory Pali expression as
sīlena sugatiṃ yanti, [literally] meaning “With precept observance, one is destined to rest inpeace.” Property and enlightenment are also derived from the following precepts. (BAP, code:
BAD-13-1-0157, folio 8 [recto], Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang, 1944 CE)

Titles of anisong texts in Lao manuscripts are mostly preceded by the word salòng orsòng: for example, Salòng cedi sai (Rewards derived from [building] sand stupas), Sòngfang tham (Rewards derived from listening to the Dhamma), Salòng khamphi (Rewards
derived from copying religious books). Thet salòng or salòng sermons are apparently
associated with “dedicating” and “celebrating,” because they are delivered to mark a8) The five texts are Sòng dòk mai thup thian (Rewards derived from the donation of flowers, incense
sticks, and candles), Sòng haksa sin (Rewards derived from precept observance), Sòng fang tham(Rewards derived from listening to the Dhamma), Sòng phao phi (Rewards derived from the participation in funerals), and Sòng maha wetsantara chadok (Rewards derived from listening to
Vessantara Jātaka).
9) Kan (การ), meaning “action” or “activity,” is a prefix used for nominalizing verbs.

348

Silpsupa Jaengsawang

completion of merit-making—to acknowledge, celebrate, and value donors’ meritorious
deeds: “The public act of lauding itself is in Laos called saloong (‘to celebrate the outcome of the meritorious deed’) and the donors have variously been described as having
prestige or being worthy of veneration” (Ladwig 2008, 91).
In a sermonic ritual the monk usually holds an anisong manuscript while reading thetext. However, sometimes monks improvise an anisong sermon or recite one by heart
while holding another type of manuscript. An anisong sermon is delivered during or
after a merit-making activity in a monastery’s main ordination hall,10) at a layperson’shouse where a meritorious event is held, or even outdoors where a monastic object
donated by local people has been installed (Silpsupa 2022, 103–106). The sermon isdelivered in public and therefore “witnessed” by all participants, especially by thepreaching monk who approves the successful merit and delivers the sermon to explainor “affirm” the forthcoming rewards.
Anisong liturgical texts have been copied and transmitted on several kinds of writing
support, from palm-leaf manuscripts to mulberry paper and industrial paper. The earliest
dated Lao anisong manuscript is titled Salòng paeng pham (Rewards derived from theconstruction of pavilions) and is from Attapü Province. The manuscript, made of palm
leaves, was written in 1652 (DLLM, code: 17010106001-11). The most recent Lao
anisong manuscript, dated 2016, is made of industrial paper (a blank notebook). TitledAnisong lai pae fai (Rewards derived from the donation of light floating vessels), it isfrom Luang Prabang (DREAMSEA, code: DS 0056 00645). Compared to anisong manuscripts from Northern Thailand, those in Laos are made of a wider variety of writing
support, writing tools and substances, and bookbinding materials, thanks to the adventof new printing technologies.
Anisong manuscripts have been found in many places in the Upper and Middle
Mekong region—the Dhamma script’s cultural domain, which includes Northern Thailand,
large parts of Northeastern Thailand, Laos, the eastern parts of Myanmar’s Shan State,and southwestern Yunnan. Luang Prabang has the most manuscripts in Laos because of
its role as a center of Buddhist education, supported by royal patronage until 1975, andits monastic schools that were operated without French involvement or even the Frenchlanguage/curriculum. Most lay and ordained students in Laos studied at monastic schools
10) Due to the main Buddha image housed within, ordination halls are frequently used for delivering
anisong sermons in which lay audiences sit silently on the floor facing the grand Buddha image,while the preaching monk sits on an elevated chair or pulpit, facing the audience. Thus, the laity
listen to anisong sermons before the main Buddha image; it is as if the Buddha image “witnesses”
their meritorious deeds and “blesses” them through the medium of the preaching monk. Monastic
halls in which anisong sermons are delivered have a sacred aura (Silpsupa 2022, 324).

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

349(McDaniel 2008, 39). Luang Namtha Province, bordering China and Myanmar, has thegreatest variety of writing support: palm leaf, mulberry paper, and industrial paper.

III Luang Prabang Manuscript Culture in the Late Nineteenth Century
Although the French were not literate in the Dhamma script, they were involved in the
manuscript culture. In 1900–53, for instance, they collected manuscripts from monastic
libraries in Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Champasak, and Khammuan and deposited themin royal offices, libraries, and central monasteries. In doing so, they were able to learn
about Laos’s history and culture in their effort to colonize, consolidate the population,and monopolize power. Many manuscripts were never returned to their original monasteries (Bouakhay 2008, 62–63), and some ended up in unintended temples, as recordedin their colophons.11) French efforts to rule Laos through building a harmonious andreligion-friendly environment included the revival and patronage of Buddhism, withscholars from the École française d’Extrême-Orient (French School of the Far East)
becoming engaged in historical and textual studies of the religion (Ladwig 2018, 104).
French colonialists aimed to incorporate Laos into French Indochina in order to use
Lao territory, economically and strategically, for increased access to Vietnam and China(Stuart-Fox 1995, 111–112). They supported the construction and renovation of religious
buildings, including That Luang (Laos’s most important Buddhist relic shrine) and Vat
Si Saket, because they realized the power of the sangha over Buddhist rulers and theemotional appeal of their actions for the Lao. This was a strategic colonial plan of
initiating statecraft and moving from assimilation to association (Ladwig 2018). Thus,
religious manuscripts continued to be produced and circulated among local monasteries.
The colonial period brought challenges for Buddhism, with Vientiane being destroyed
by Siam in 1828, Luang Prabang having to pay tribute to Siam, and large parts of Laoscoming under French rule (Khamvone 2015). But during this period Lao people reinforced their Buddhist identity. They commissioned a large number of manuscripts andpromoted Lao as the national language, which caused considerable conflict during the1940s between Lao elites, led by Cao Maha Uparat Petcharat, and French officials, led
by Charles Rocher, the French director of public education in Vientiane. The Lao elites11) Manuscripts have two main uses: cultic and discursive, depending on whether the text of a manuscript is involved. In a cultic use, to iconically or symbolically signify certain meanings, manuscripts
are treated as “objects” in “seen” and/or “unseen mode.” Manuscripts are discursively used
when their texts are dealt with in three modes: composition, display, and storage (Griffiths 1999,
22–28; Veidlinger 2007, 5–7).

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declined the French proposal to use the Roman alphabet for book printing, thus protecting the country’s writing tradition, inherited manuscripts, and indigenous customs.
The Lao elites’ success against the French represented “intellectual liberation” from“intellectual colonization” (Bouakhay 2008, 74–75). At the opening ceremony for the
newly rebuilt manuscript library in Vientiane, a head of the Lao sangha gave a speechreferring to Lao manuscripts as “Dhamma” manuscripts written by the Lao, in order toclarify that the French were responsible merely for the building that housed the manuscripts, not for the production of the manuscripts (McDaniel 2008). Thus, the Lao
accepted religious support from the French but under limited conditions.
The French supported architectural innovation and the rebuilding of Buddhist
monasteries (Ladwig 2018, 99). Fig. 1 illustrates the unique phenomenon of Lao
Buddhism during colonial times. In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries Frenchcolonialism spread over and outside Laos. As shown in the gray shaded area, Lao
Buddhism featured a combination of French influences and indigenous beliefs. It wastrapped by the positive and negative effects of colonialism and Western influence, thereby
remaining in the “gray zone,” where indigenous traditions and a foreign power tolerated
and negotiated with each other. Buddhism in other French colonies—represented by
the white-colored parts of the diagram—had slightly different practices, depending on
the people and history of the countries.
In its half-century under French colonialism, Laos absorbed the influence of Westernmodernity on the local manuscript culture:

Fig. 1 
Unique Situation of Buddhism in Laos during the
French Colonial Period (1893–1945)
Source: Silpsupa Jaengsawang

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

351

Anisong texts were also produced according to the traditional way of making manuscripts in the
Buddhist circle of Luang Prabang. When the city was influenced by Western civilization in thetwentieth century, it became possible for Buddhist scholars and scribes who had access to modern
publications to employ modern techniques of writing for manuscript production. (Bounleuth andGrabowsky 2016, 250)

Typewriters were used to inscribe texts on palm leaf during 1960–90 by monks who had
the required skills (Bounleuth 2016, 247).12) The sole surviving typewriter used fortyping palm-leaf manuscripts, made of iron and weighing about 20 kg, is in the monastic
library at Vat Suvanna Khili (Fig. 2). Characterized by the special length of theplaten—26 cm—the typewriter, with its 29 cm roll, was suitable for typing palm-leaf
manuscripts, which were generally longer than normal paper. A white piece of paper
attached to the platen reads (in English): “This typewriter, Achan Khamvone brought itfrom the Buddhist primary school Vat Mano13) to the Buddhist Archive on 26 March 2014
for preservation.” “Achan Khamvone” or Dr Khamvone Boulyaphonh is the director of
the Buddhist Archive of Luang Prabang, whose head office is in Vat Suvanna Khili. Partly
hidden behind the white paper, the phrase “ຫ້້ ອງການສຶຶ ກສາ [room of education]” waslightly inked on the platen in the modern Lao script before the typewriter was moved to
Vat Suvanna Khili.
Because typewriters were used and donated among sangha communities in Luang
Prabang monasteries, monks and novices were the only people who had access to them.
12) The advent of typewriters in Laos was followed by photographic cameras. In 1840, during theperiod of Siamese suzerainty over the Lao lands, photographic technology was invented in France.
Europeans soon introduced cameras and printing technologies in Bangkok, evidenced by King
Mongkut of Siam (r. 1851–68) being photographed as early as the mid-1850s. Gifts were regularly
exchanged between the kings of Siam and Luang Prabang, and it is likely that cameras and film,
soon after their arrival in Siam, came to the court of Luang Prabang. Lao princes, monks, andofficials went to Bangkok for their studies and might have also brought back cameras to Luang
Prabang. We may assume that by the late 1870s photography was being practiced in the town’smonasteries. The presence of photographs from the 1890s in the Buddhist Archive of Photography’s
collection coincides historically with the arrival of French rule in 1893 (Berger 2015, 99).
13) One of the previous abbots founded Vat Mano or Vat Manorom, Luang Prabang’s first and only
monastic elementary school, in 1960. Due to the Laotian Civil War (1959–75), he was forced tomigrate from Houne District (Müang Hun) in Udomsai, northwestern Laos, to Luang Prabang inlate 1960. His students followed him there, and he set up a new school. There were fifty to sixty
novice students in the school’s early years. After Laos came under the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party in 1975, the Communist government reorganized and intervened in the sangha community
and monasteries. It opened a road through Vat Manorom, dividing the monastery in two. One of
the rooms that had been occupied by the French was renovated by the monastery and used as aclassroom. As of 2022, although the number of novices was below the minimum of thirty students
required for classification as a school, the monastery was trying to keep the school active for its
heritage value (Khamvone Boulyaphonh, phone interview, December 24, 2022).

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Fig. 2 
Typewriter for Typing Palm-Leaf Manuscripts (photo by
Silpsupa Jaengsawang, Vat Suvanna Khili, Luang Prabang,
August 24, 2022)

Fig. 3 Typewritten Colophon, Panya barami (Rewards Derived from Following the Thirty Perfections)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), BAD-13-1-0760, Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang, 1963 CE

Fig. 3 shows the first dated hybrid palm-leaf manuscript with handwritten and typewritten
text (Silpsupa and Grabowsky 2023, 115). The manuscript is titled Panya barami(Rewards derived from following the Thirty Perfections). The colophon is newly typed,
marking 2506 BE (1963 CE) as the year of production.
Not only were colophons written with a typewriter, in a number of palm-leaf manuscripts even texts were written with a typewriter. For example, a 1984 palm-leaf
manuscript titled Anisong bun wan koet (Rewards derived from merit-making on birthdays) from Luang Prabang (see Fig. 4) was typed, though its cover folio was decoratively
handwritten with blue and red ink. Typewritten manuscripts were produced under the
Buddhist dissemination project of religious text preservation led by Sathu Nyai Khamchan
Virachitto, the abbot of Vat Saen Sukharam. Between the 1940s and 1960s, he sponsoredand donated hundreds of manuscripts to his monastery. He also asked monks (e.g.,
Sathu Phò Phan of Vat Hat Siao), novices, and laypeople to copy manuscript texts
brought from neighboring countries (Khamvone 2015, 225). The availability of themodern Lao script on typewriters had two contrasting results: the decline of Dhamma
script literacy and an increased accessibility to religious texts among non-Dhamma script
communities. However, typewriters did not completely replace the Dhamma script—the
latter was still used for handwriting texts and corrections and taking notes.

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

353

Fig. 4 
Typewritten Manuscript Anisong bun wan koet (Rewards Derived from Merit-Making on Birthdays)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), BAD-19-1-0137, Vat Siang Muan, Luang Prabang, 1984 CE

The tradition of dedicating religious books or manuscripts to a monastery preserved
handwriting habits: sponsors wrote their own names, names of family members, andnames of merit recipients—usually their dead relatives—in handwritten, typewritten, oreven printed manuscripts. Modern printing technology can replace the process oftransmitting texts, but the tradition of manuscript donation is irreplaceable (Silpsupa
2022, 173). The example in Fig. 4 is excerpted from the typewritten Anisong bun wan
koet, made of palm leaves and aligned in three columns. Anisong manuscripts from
Northern Thailand were less influenced by modern printing technologies and tend topreserve local traditional styles (Silpsupa 2022, 172).
White correction fluid is widely found in manuscripts from Luang Prabang; theearliest evidence of dated manuscripts applying correction fluid is Nangsü ha mü hai müdi (Book of calculation for [in]auspicious days). The manuscript, from 1908, is made ofmulberry paper in the leporello style (see Fig. 5). White correction fluid is frequently
used, and new text and corrections have been handwritten.
Easier accessibility to industrial paper was accompanied by the use of ballpoint
pens, which were used on palm-leaf and mulberry paper manuscripts for corrections oreven for writing text. Paper was bound in various ways: gluing and folding multiple
sheets to form a concertina-like folded book, using metal staples to form a whirlwind
book, or using strong string at the top margin. The last technique is similar to stab

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Fig. 5 
Mulberry Paper Manuscript with White Correction
Fluid: Nangsü ha mü hai mü di (Book of Calculation
for [In]Auspicious Days)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), BAD-13-2042, Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang, 1908 CE

bookbinding.14) In many cases anisong manuscripts were written in blank school notebooks especially manufactured by Sawang Kanphim (Silpsupa 2022, 199–200). The
notebooks are still in use and found in the library of Vat Ong Tü in Vientiane (Silpsupa
2022, 93). Since December 1975, when the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party came to
power, anisong manuscripts have been less monitored by the government, due to a lackof Dhamma script literacy. Compared to the era of French colonialism, anisong manuscripts drastically decreased in number under the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party(Silpsupa 2022, 185–186), and religious activities were partly controlled and shaped
according to Communist orientations: “Monks were constantly informed that Buddhism14) Stab bookbinding is characterized by a thread stitch with many variations depending on the book’s
size, the materials, and the local binding tradition. A thread is pulled through stabbed holes on one
side of a book, which then becomes a spine. Traditional Asian books bound in this way are usuallylighter than leporello and loose-leaf books due to the properties of the paper used to make theirleaves (Helman-Ważny et al. 2021, 142).

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355

and socialism were congruent and complementary since both promoted equality, communal sharing, and the objective of ending suffering” (McDaniel 2008, 59).
One important case study was the collectivist religious event of building a temple
in February 2019, hosted by a successful businesswoman in Vientiane (Ladwig 2021).
Participants from different social backgrounds and both urban and rural areas madedonations to join the construction campaign. However, the event seemed to have abusiness angle, because it included advertising and branding for a company. Merit was
believed to be distributed among the participants, who treated one another as equals.
However, in the end the businesswoman’s family name was inscribed on the new temple
gate and the “artificial” space of a stratification-free collective ritual quickly evaporated(Ladwig 2021, 12–38). Such “invented” and romanticized egalitarian strategies allow
feudalists to exploit and convince laypeople to donate their labor for religious pursuitsin exchange for merit (Khamtan 1976, 18; Ladwig and Rathie 2020, cited in Ladwig
2021, 34). Phoumi Vongvichit, the minister of religion in Laos after the revolution,argued that the new Lao Buddhism should promote solidarity and donations should begiven by people from all strata of society (Vongvichit 1995, cited in Ladwig 2021, 34–35).

IV Application of New Technologies to the Lao Manuscript Culture
Three Oxford University Press dictionaries give similar definitions of “technology”:
the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes (Wehmeier 2005, 1576–
1577); developed machinery and equipment (Stevenson 2010, 1826); and a branch of
applied science knowledge (Turnbull 2010, 1589–1590). In general, with the applicationof new technologies, the quality and quantity of products are improved, time taken is
reduced, and human labor requirements are reduced. New printing technologies were
initially beneficial to religion and education in Laos, as these fields employed suchtechnologies the most (Hindman 1991, 3).
Thanks to the living tradition of anisong sermons, manuscripts have been revisedby contemporary users for purposes ranging from aiding in chanting to updating thecontents, improving some chanting words with respect to the audience, adding a new
salutation, and even reproducing a new anisong manuscript for inexperienced preachingmonks. Due to their active use, anisong manuscripts have been changed using modern
tools—to the modern Lao script and foreign languages. The French arrival gave monks
and novices access to new technologies, as explained in the context of Venerable Sathu
Nyai Khamchan Virachitto’s manuscript collection:

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Together with the manuscripts, a great number of various modern publications and printed
materials—such as books, magazines, newspapers and documents—were found in Pha Khamchan’sabode. This indicates that the Venerable Abbot himself might have had access to different typesof such modern publications. This may have been the case for the other monks, novices, and lay
Buddhist scholars. Anyone who was able to write the Dhamma script on palm-leaf might use similar“modern” techniques in his writings. Not only did some anisong texts found in Pha Khamchan’sabode develop “modern” structures and contents, but the layout of such anisong manuscripts was
influenced by features of modern printing technology as well. (Bounleuth 2015c, 259)

IV-1 Writing Tools, Writing Materials, and Modern Lao Script
Traditional palm-leaf manuscripts were inscribed with a stylus or pin-topped pencil. A
dark substance such as lamp oil was applied on the inscribed surface to expose the textual
traces engraved by the stylus. Ink, ballpoint pens, and pencils gradually came to be used
not only in mulberry and industrial paper manuscripts but also in palm-leaf manuscripts.
Additions and corrections often appear to have been made by ballpoint pen to avoid
blurring by re-darkening processes.
White correction fluid was convenient and popular for deleting words and replacing
them with new words written by pen or even typewriter.15) The author (Silpsupa 2022)
has highlighted a remarkable example of new writing on a spot covered by white correction fluid in a palm-leaf manuscript titled Sòng Sapphathung (Rewards derived fromthe donation of all kinds of religious flags) (BAD-13-1-0387, 1910 CE). Correction fluid“concealed” the inscribed traces of mistakes, so that dark resin would not remain in
the inscribed traces while the surface was being coated (Silpsupa 2022, 350–351).
Computer printing is the most recent technology for facilitating the production ofanisong and non-anisong texts. One example of a hybrid printed-handwritten anisongmanuscript is Anisong sang pha tai pidok (อานิิสงส์์สร้้างพระไตรปิิ ฎก Rewards derived fromcopying the Buddhist canon, n.d.). The manuscript is made of paper and was printed bycomputer, with three columns and a running head resembling the modern format ofprinted books. The manuscript cover was also produced by computer, with the logo of
the institution and a decorative title. The names of sponsors and merit recipients are
handwritten.
With typewriters and computer printers featuring the modern Lao script,16) thisscript replaced the Dhamma script, which could only be written by hand. In the late15) The use of typewriters required a special technique to “soften” palm leaves so they could beflexibly adjusted. The preparation of typewritten palm-leaf manuscripts is thus different from the
preparation of traditional palm-leaf manuscripts (Bounleuth 2016, 246).
16) Like the modern Lao script, the modern Thai script was employed in Lao manuscript culture andinfluenced by new printing technologies during the second half of the twentieth century (Bounleuth
and Grabowsky 2016, 6).

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357

nineteenth century the Dhamma script was not widely installed in typing machines,
although it was first used in the 1890s by the American Presbyterian Mission Press in
Chiang Mai (Anonymous 1890, 115–116, cited in Dao 2022, 88). Modern and foreign
characters could be used in Luang Prabang manuscripts due to Lao people’s exposure toforeign influences. Increasing numbers of anisong manuscripts were therefore producedwith new kinds of writing machines, which allowed preaching monks who were newly
ordained or less experienced in the Dhamma script as well as laypeople to use typed orprinted manuscripts. Mass-produced manuscripts had blank spaces for adding personal
details: sponsors’ names, recipients’ names, colophons, or wishes. Such handwritten
entries made some manuscripts unique.17)
Colophons appear to include more entries in the modern Lao script than the main
texts. According to Bounleuth Sengsoulin (2015c, 255), due to their short length—
usually fewer than 15 folios—anisong manuscripts were popular for newly ordainedmonks and novices to practice reading and copying the Dhamma script. Apart from themodel texts written in Pali, mostly in the Dhamma script, student monks were supposed
to write colophons with various wishes18) and were sometimes allowed to write in the
more familiar modern Lao script. Colophons are thus found in several scripts.
IV-2 Roman Alphabet and Foreign Languages
The Roman alphabet was most frequently used by librarians for categorizing and organizing manuscripts on shelves, especially in the case of anisong manuscripts at the National
Library of Laos in Vientiane. Added in the first or second folio, the manuscript titles
were spelled in the Roman script, with the Thai-Lao pronunciations provided. This wasintended to help foreigners catalogue the manuscripts and shows the involvement ofWesterners in Lao manuscript libraries. A striking example is the aforementioned caseof the French gathering manuscripts for their own cultural and historical investigation
into Laos along with other projects.19) According to Harald Hundius (2009), 3,678
17) Featuring interrelated content and physical elements, handwritten manuscripts are unique: “Suchinterplay between content and physical characteristics is by no means limited to hand-written books(or alternative formats). In contrast to printed books, however, each manuscript is a unicum whichreflects the choices, preferences, requirements, skills and errors of individual producers, users andowners” (Wimmer et al. 2015, 2).
18) Colophons of manuscripts found in Venerable Khamchan’s abode contain the names and personal
backgrounds of scribes (phu chan) and sponsors/donors (phu sang), their desires and moods, anddates of manuscript completion (Bounleuth and Grabowsky 2016, 13). In some cases there isinformation on the occasions for which the manuscripts were produced and the production processes. Relationships among scribes, sponsors, donors, and users are also included.
19) The École française d’Extrême-Orient played an important role in rematerializing Lao Buddhism
as a governmental strategy.

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manuscripts from 94 monasteries in nine provinces were surveyed by Lao and Frenchscholars in 1970–73:
A notable initiative is the work of the Chanthabouly Buddhist Council, under the leadership of Chao
Phetsarat, which asked abbots throughout the country to submit lists of their manuscript holdings
between 1934 and 1936.
Work on the EFEO [École française d’Extrême-Orient] inventory, plus research and analysis
of manuscripts, followed in the 1950s and 1960s by Henri Deydier, Pierre-Bernard Lafont, andCharles Archaimbault. An Inventaire des Manuscrits des Pagodes du Laos (Lafont 1965), buildingon the previous work of French scholars, was conducted under the leadership of Pierre-Bernard
Lafont in 1959 and covered altogether 83 monasteries: 13 in Luang Prabang, 25 in Vientiane, and
45 in Champasak. (Hundius 2009, 21)

Not only did Western technology permeate the written language, but French words werealso used in manuscripts from Luang Prabang. French words are written in the Dhamma
script in modern Lao orthography and appear in the colophons of some anisong manuscripts (see Section V-1). Sathu Nyai Khamchan Virachitto headed several Buddhist
missions and helped in the transmission of Buddhist texts from palm-leaf manuscripts.
He was knowledgeable in French (Khamvone 2015, 46) as well as Lü and Pali (phoneinterview with Khamvone Boulyaphonh, August 31, 2023).

IV-3 Paper and Ink Stamps
The most widespread use of new technologies was in the manufacture of labels: thesewere made of various new materials, including paper, glued paper (stickers), and ink

Fig. 6 Palm-Leaf Manuscripts with Inked Stamps and White Sticker
01012906004-05, n.d.: Salòng phasat phüng (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Beeswax Castles)
01012906005-01, 1901 CE: Salòng umong (Rewards Derived from the Construction of Chapels)
01012906006-07, n.d.: Sòng thammat (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Pulpits)
Source: Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts, National Library of Laos (n.d.)Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang359

stamps. Ready-to-use stickers were mass-produced in different shapes, indicating their
popular usage and the development of the industrial paper business. Ink stamps weremade of wood or rubber and engraved with institute logos. Red and blue were the mostcommon ink colors. Fig. 6 shows examples from three palm-leaf manuscripts at the
National Library; red and blue stamps appear in their first folios. The white label in thelast picture is on the right-side margin that bears the beginning of the text. The label
indicates the code “554,” the title Sòng thammat (Rewards derived from the donationof pulpits), and the number of fascicles—“1 fascicle”—in the bundle.

V Manuscript Transformations in Luang Prabang
Anisong manuscripts appear to have been most strikingly influenced by new printing
technologies, according to the survey by Bounleuth (2015c, 250) on manuscripts kept in
the abode (kuti) of Pha Sathu Nyai Khamchan Virachitto. For instance, a palm-leaf
manuscript titled Salòng khao phan kòn (Rewards derived from the donation of one
thousand rice balls) (BAD-13-1-0685, 1985 CE) was written with a typewriter and ink;a palm-leaf manuscript titled Sòng pathip hüan fai (Rewards derived from the donationof light floating vessels) (BAD-13-1-0714, n.d.) was revised with ink by later users;
the colophon of a palm-leaf manuscript titled Anisong katham bun taeng ngan (Rewards
derived from merit-making at wedding ceremonies) (BAD-22-1-0899, 1997 CE) was
written in blue ink. Blank school notebooks became popular for writing anisongmanuscripts: for instance, Sòng pha nam fon (Rewards derived from the donation ofmonk robes in the rainy season) (DS 0056 00643, n.d.) and Anisong thung (Rewards
derived from the donation of all kinds of religious flags) (DS 0056 00644, 2012 CE).
Anisong preaching is a living tradition, and anisong manuscripts are still produced,
with new technologies being adopted. The transformation of Luang Prabang’s manuscript culture is relevant for the following six purposes: production, librarians’ work,
editions and revisions, affiliation and ownership statements, dedication rituals, andBuddhisization.
V-1 Production
New printing technologies are important for producing anisong manuscripts as both texts
and objects. As mentioned above, the breakthrough project of manuscript reproduction
led by Venerable Khamchan Virachitto in the late twentieth century was associated withmodern printing. Anisong manuscripts came to be reproduced easily and quickly, in
unlimited quantities. Printing houses manufactured paper, published books, produced

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blank notebooks, and printed manuscripts in the pothi shape20) using paper. Mulberry
paper and industrial paper were popularly used for printing pothi-shaped leporellomanuscripts known as lan thiam (ลานเทีียม), literally, “artificial palm-leaf manuscripts”(they resembled traditional palm-leaf manuscripts). The manuscripts had blank spaces
for filling in the names of manuscript donors (phu sang ผู้้�สร้้าง) and deceased persons towhom the merit derived from donation was transferred. This practice reveals thesurviving tradition of offering religious books to monasteries and the common belief in
meritorious dedication to the dead. Traditions and beliefs remain alive even with therise of modern printing technology (Silpsupa 2022, 116).
During my 2018 research trip to Phrae Province, I found lan thiam manuscripts at
a supermarket near the provincial temple Wat Sung Men. The temple is known to be
the largest repository of palm-leaf manuscripts. The manuscripts were, interestingly,
placed near the bottom of the shelves, even though they were intended for donation to
the monastery. I found that disrespectful because religious manuscripts are normallyplaced at an elevation. For the business owner, however, the manuscripts were simply
commodities. Customers could buy them, write their names, and dedicate them to amonastery.
This case study reveals two dimensions of the transformation of manuscript culture.
First, the relationships and statuses of manuscript commissioners and production
agents21) have changed. Compared to the traditional commissioning and dedicating of
anisong manuscripts to monasteries, “scribes” have become “factories” of printed orlan thiam manuscripts, and “sponsors” have become “customers.” The traditional meritreciprocal relationship between scribes and sponsors has been replaced by a demandsupply or market-centered relationship, and the special aura that manuscripts take onin rituals has been weakened through the demand-supply circuit. Printed manuscripts
are mass-produced and traded as normal products in the market; they are elevated tosacred objects only after being ritually dedicated to a monastery. Thus, spatial or
20) Pothi manuscripts are oblong, and their text is read by flipping upward. Giovanni Ciotti (2021, 866)
explains pothi as an umbrella term for any manuscript made of a stack of folios in landscape format
that are prepared for writing and possibly illuminations and which are flipped upward rather thansideways. The term is preferred to its Sanskrit etymological antecedent pustaka, or pustikā, or toalternative terms in other languages, since it is widely understood by scholars working on manuscripts from Central, South, and Southeast Asia.
21) Production agents and production practices are included under “production,” one of the four key
factors in the heuristic tool for comparative studies of manuscripts from different manuscript
cultures. The tool was established in 2015 by a group of scholars led by Hanna Wimmer from theCentre for the Study of Manuscript Cultures. The four key factors are production, use, setting, andpatterns. Production agents can be people or institutes, either a group or a single person (Wimmer
et al. 2015, 2–3).

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environmental changes transform them from commercial products to sacred objects.
The micro-settings22) of the two locations (supermarket and monastery) determine therole of the manuscript. A book is a carrier of two relationships: between the book andits makers, and the book and its readers (Davis 1975, 92, cited in Hindman 1991, 3).
Books are thus characterized by commercial and social factors, corresponding to two
broad approaches in the sociology of literature. This study explains that literature isconcerned with man’s social world, his adaptation to it, and his desire to change it(Laurenson and Swingewood 1972, 12) and that literature exists in its own sociology.
The first and more popular approach adopts the documentary aspect of literature, arguingthat it provides a mirror of the age. The second approach emphasizes the production
aspect, especially the social situation of the writer (Laurenson and Swingewood 1972,7–17).
Figs. 7 and 8 show hybrid productions combining new technologies (typewriters
and computer printers) with handwriting.
The cover folio, containing the manuscript title, is handwritten in modern black
ink to resemble printed books in which titles tend to be enlarged and aligned in the
middle. The title is flanked on the left by the usage purpose, “Anisong liturgical text forreligious merit-making occasions,” and on the right by the sponsor and his affiliation,“Pha Khamchan Virachitta Thera, affiliated with Vat Saen Sukharam in Luang Prabang.”
The title folio is handwritten in the modern Lao script, like the text, which is typewritten

Fig. 7 Hybrid Typewritten-Handwritten ManuscriptSalòng khao phan kòn (Rewards Derived from the Donation of One Thousand Rice Balls)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), BAD-13-1-0685 (1985 CE), Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

22) Also part of the four key factors of the heuristic tool, micro-setting and macro-setting are subdivisions of “setting”: “The spatial setting applies to a very specific, ‘micro’-setting (a lectern/a bookshrine or, one step up, a scriptorium/a library), as well as the ‘macro’-setting (a monastery/a city/aregion)” (Wimmer et al. 2015, 6).

362Silpsupa Jaengsawang

Fig. 8 
Hybrid Printed-Handwritten Manuscript Anisong sang pra tai pidok (Rewards Derived from
Copying the Buddhist Canon)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), BAD-13-2-033 (n.d.), Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

in that script. The text is set in three columns to be read sequentially rather than in
one column as in the case of handwritten palm-leaf manuscripts. The title and foliation
orders are typewritten vertically on the left margins of the recto sides (black box, Fig.
7), influenced by the modern templates of printed books. This is different from handwritten palm-leaf manuscripts, in which foliation is generally on the verso side.
The manuscript in Fig. 8 is made of paper and computer-printed in the modern
Lao script. The first picture shows a small paper cover for holding the manuscript inorder, while the second shows the cover page. On the cover page the centralized title
is enlarged and curved, followed by a statement showing the usage purpose: “[thismanuscript text is] for liturgical uses on great merit-making occasions and at otherspecial events.” There are emblems in the left and right margins: the left one is a
Buddha image in a locket-like frame; the right one is the national emblem of the Lao
Kingdom, a triple-headed elephant under a tiered umbrella.23) The left-side emblem is23) The old Lao Kingdom was named Lan Chang, literally, “Land of a Million Elephants.” Elephantsthus symbolize the national identity.

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363

identical to that on the paper cover, which is flanked by the title (left) and source of text
(right).
The third picture shows the beginning of the text, which is—unlike in handwritten
palm-leaf manuscripts—preceded by a colophon. The colophon dominates the first pageand has blank spaces to be filled in with sponsors’ names (two boxes in the third element)(ທອງວັັນ ສຸໍ ເນັຸ ຕະພົູ ກທຸຸ ກຄົ່� ສະຫະຮັັຖອະເມຮິ້ ອມຄອບຄົິ ກາ ຮັັຖຄາລີີ ຟໍັ ຽົ ມ ພ້ົ ວ ແລະລູົ ນ ຢູ່
�ທີ່່ ເມື່� ນຽນ Thòngwan Sutaphrom and his/her family who live in Union City, Californiaື ອງຢູ່
in the US) and merit recipients’ names (ແມ່່ �່ ຊື່ສາວຄຳຳ�ພັັນ His/her mother named
Khamphan). Providing a colophon at the beginning of the manuscript allows a recipientmonk to navigate the names of sponsors to be announced in dedicational rituals, which
is traditionally followed by a water-pouring act (kruat nam)24) (see Silpsupa 2022, 351).
The tradition of writing colophons at the end of the main text was perhaps unfamiliar
among laypeople because monks and novices were mostly responsible for manuscript
production and therefore knew where the colophons were. Colophons at the end of
the text could be unintentionally overlooked, and manuscript donors could miss fillingin their names. Hence, placing the colophon at the beginning made the donation act
more visible—future readers and users could see the sponsors’ names at first glance.
In the last picture of Fig. 8 the box in the last element shows the names of those
who participated in the manuscript’s production by composing the text from other sources(Master Monk Suwat Paphaso), transcribing and translating the text into the Lao language
and script (Monk Wòn Varapañño), and printing and checking the manuscript (Khampòn
Phothirat). While the work of the production team (scribal task) is shown throughprinting, the work of the dedication team (sponsoring task) is shown through handwriting,which eventually results in a codex unicum and creates an original. Dedicated manuscripts can thus be donated individually to one monastery. As the scribal tasks in thiscase included translation and consultation of other sources, this printed manuscript
was not merely a copy like traditional handwritten manuscripts. Rather, the production
team adapted the text in order to serve market demand. Such a scribal practice issomewhat innovative and leads to language change: “Observing language change overtime, we can see that scribes are both active agents of change but also have a morepassive role when—perhaps unknowingly and unintentionally—documenting variation
or developmental tendencies and patterns in language” (Wagner et al. 2013, 3).
24) In the kruat nam ritual, donors in the same group touch one another in a chain together with thewater-pouring donor, with the belief that merit can be shared. After the monk finishes the blessing,
the water is poured on a tree root, as it is believed that merit can be further transmitted anddedicated to the dead via the ground or the Earth Goddess (Th: mae thòrani, แม่่ธรณีี ). The act isanimistic, contagious, indirect, and positive (see Silpsupa 2022, 64).

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Fig. 9 Manuscripts with French Words in Colophons(Top) BAD-22-1-0910, 1968 CE: Sòng cedi (Rewards Derived from the Construction of Pagodas)(Middle) BAD-22-1-0934, 1967 CE: Salòng hò pha (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Cloth)(Bottom) BAD-22-1-0936, 1968 CE: Sòng cedi (Rewards Derived from the Construction of Pagodas)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang

Because computerization allows for the production of several copies, many people
besides sponsors and scribes are involved in textual corrections and visual design, as
shown by the list of people and their tasks in Fig. 8. Traditional manuscripts requireprecision and writing expertise from monks, while modern manuscripts require skillful
typing and proofreading from lay technicians. The collaboration between sangha and laity
is similar to the commissioning of handwritten palm-leaf manuscripts, though experts
are required for more elaborate tasks:
By changing their work and their writing, it [print] forced the writer, the scholar, and the teacher—the standard literary roles—to redefine themselves, and if it did not entirely create it, it noticeably
increased the importance and the number of critics, editors, bibliographers, and literary historians.
(Kernan 1987, 4)

French text occasionally shows up in colophons. The scribe of the manuscripts in Fig. 9
was a monk named Phui Thiracitto (ผุุย ถิิระจิิตโต),25) who sponsored Anisong bun wan
koet, the aforementioned anisong palm-leaf manuscript typewritten by a monk named
Cinna Thammo (จิินนะธััมโม).26) Thiracitto was familiar with commissioning typewritten
palm-leaf manuscripts and with other modern—namely, French—influences. Fig. 9shows the colophons of three handwritten manuscripts, with French words for years
and months.
The three French month names, in the boxes in each element, are written in the25) Phra Phui Thiracitto (1925–2005), a great intellectual monk and abbot of Vat Maha That, exclusively
used manuscripts kept in his abode (Grabowsky 2019, 136).
26) Anisong bun wan koet (BAD-19-1-0137) is kept at Vat Siang Muan, Luang Prabang.

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Dhamma script and orthography and indicate the pronunciations of nowòn (novembre),chòngwiye (janvier), and desòm (décembre). In the first picture nowòn is in parentheses,
followed by the vernacular term “November,” while the French words in the next two
pictures replace the vernacular words for January and December, implying that themonastic scribal community was familiar with the French language—or even Frenchpeople. Venerable Khamchan Virachitto’s personal letters contain both English andFrench words: “They (i.e., personal letters) were written in various languages such asLao, Thai, English and French, and in various scripts such as old Lao (pre-1975), modern
Lao (post-1975), Tham-Lao, Thai, and Latin” (Khamvone 2015, 161). The use of Frenchshows communications and interrelationships between the Lao and the French, as well
as French influences on Laos, especially on Lao manuscript culture:
It is not unusual for scribes to mix the orthographic systems (Lao: labop akkhalavithi or lak khianthuai) of both scripts, and in some instances, we find idiosyncrasies, reflecting particular multilingual and multi-ethnic cultural environments the scribes were exposed to. (Bounleuth andGrabowsky 2016, 7)

V-2 Librarians’ Tasks
Librarians used new technologies for identifying and cataloguing manuscripts in archival
storage. Individual fascicles of anisong manuscripts are identified by their titles, codes,
and textual genre labels with inked stamps and paper stickers. These identifiers wereadded after the manuscripts were moved from their original repositories to be restored
at the National Library, where they were catalogued and digitized for online access.
Roman numerals and the Latin alphabet were used for the titles, revealing the participation of Westerners in librarians’ work.
When the National Library (Fig. 10) was made a repository of manuscripts, categorization aids were devised to indicate textual genres, mark dates of manuscript acquisition, identify fascicle orders, and add tables of contents. Cataloguing facilitates the digitization of manuscripts. Begun in January 2012, digitization was completed throughcollaboration with the University of Passau and Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer
Kulturbesitz and funded by the German Research Foundation and German Federal
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (National Library of Laos, n.d.).
With manuscripts sourced from several repositories, the National Library required
international financial and collaborative support to systematize registration codes,
shelves, and online access. Coding phrases newly written on the manuscript pages oron glued white paper have different handwriting styles, scripts, and languages.
Fig. 11 shows a round paper sticker made and attached by a librarian on the verso

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

Fig. 10 
Manuscript Bookshelves in the National Library of Laos (photo by
Silpsupa Jaengsawang, March 15, 2017)

Fig. 11 Paper Sticker Used for Cataloguing
01012906006-04, 1870 CE: Sòng thung lek (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Religious Iron
Flags)
Source: Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts, National Library of Laos (n.d.)side of the last folio for cataloguing purposes. On it in blue ink is written “206” (code),Sòng thung lek (manuscript title), and “1 fascicle” (number of fascicles). The numbers
206 and 1 are written in Roman numerals and the words Sòng thung lek and fascicle inthe modern Lao script. Instead of the Dhamma script, which was understood by only alimited group, librarians used the modern script and Roman numerals. Through the useTransformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

367

Fig. 12 Notation on the Date of Manuscript Acquisition
06011406004-09, 1847 CE: Sòng pha sangkat lòng (Rewards Derived from Merit-Making at Traditional
New Year Festivals)
Source: Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts, Vat Mai Suvanna Phumaram, Luang Prabang

of a non-Dhamma script and modern writing/printing materials, anisong manuscripts
written in the Dhamma script gained a wider audience.
In Fig. 12 the gray-highlighted writing in the last folio reads “ໜັັງສື້ ເອາມາແຕ່່ື ໄດ້ວັັນ�ທີ່່ 12 ເດືື ອນ 9 1938” (This manuscript was given on the 12th day of the ninth monthin the year 1938). The date is written according to the Common Era, with the ninth
month referring to September and not to the ninth month of the Lao lunar calendar(August). According to its colophon in the following quote, the manuscript was written
in 1847 by a monk from Vat Sop Sikkharam before it was, almost a century later, forwarded to its current location, Vat Mai Suvanna Phumaram:จุุลศัักราชได้้พันั ๒ ร้้อย ๙ ตััว ปีี เปิิ กสััน วัันอาทิิตย์์ เดืือน ๑๑ ขึ้้�นค่ำำ�� ๑ รจนาแล้้วยามกองดึึก หมายมีีเจ้้าหม่่อมพ่่อมั่่�น วััดสบ เป็็ นมููลศรััทธา ได้้สร้้างธรรมปิิ ฏกะผููกนี้้�ไว้้กับั ศาสนาเท่่า ๕ พัันวััสสา ขอให้้อานิิสงส์์ส่่วนบุุญอัันนี้้� ไปค้ำำ��ชููพ่อ่ แม่่ลูกู เมีียแห่่งข้้าพเจ้้า
ผู้้�ที่่�จุุติิไปสู่่�ปรโลกภายหน้้านั้้�นแด ก็็ข้า้ เทอญ นิิพฺฺพา นิิพฺฺพา ปรมํํ โหนฺฺ ตุุ[The writing of this manuscript was finished] in 1209 CS (1847), a poek san year, on a Sunday, on
the first waxing-moon day of the 11th [lunar] month,27) at the time of the evening drum (19:30–
21:00). Cao Mòm Phò (father-aged monk) Man from Vat Sop [Sikkharam] was the principal
initiator who sponsored the production of this Piṭaka religious manuscript to ensure the continuation of the five-thousand-year Buddhist era. May this merit support my parents, my wife,and my children who passed away and entered the other world. Nibbā nibbā paramaṃ sukkhaṃ
hontu.

The notation was written as a new layer of affiliation (see Section V-4) with ballpoint
pen in the modern Lao script, with Arabic numerals and the year of the Common Era.
This implies either that the librarian of Vat Mai Suvanna Phumaram was more familiar27) The date corresponds to 1209 Asvina 1 = Sunday, October 10, 1847. However, CS 1209 was amoeng mao year. The nearest poek san year was CS 1210.

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang(Front)(Back)(Edge)

Fig. 13 
A Piece of Palm Leaf and Cloth Sewn to Strengthen Bookbinding and Edges (photos by Silpsupa
Jaengsawang, February 21, 2017; February 24, 2017)with modern and Western scripts or that the librarian wrote the notation for future
librarians who may be inexperienced in the Dhamma script. The librarians’ work in thetwo examples above can assist users illiterate in the Dhamma script.
V-3 Editions and Revisions
The third purpose of using new technologies was for editing and revising manuscripts,
for both texts and objects/leaves. In sermonic practices, aids such as pronunciation
markers and pause markers were added. Scriptural learning (Lao: hian thet hian sutຮຽນເທດຮຽນສູູ ດ, literally “learning preaching and learning sermons”) is an importanttask (Lao: thit-thang nathi ທິ້ າ�ທີ່່ )28) of the Lao Buddhist sangha, as defined byິ ດທາງໜ້
the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Organization in 2007 (Bounleuth 2015a, 51). Monks arethus required to devote themselves to supporting basic pedagogy.
The text of a manuscript is not shown to the audience during a sermon, and anumber of manuscripts are filled with corrections made in ink. Inscribing manuscripts
is a one-way process in which no stroke can be undone, especially in the case of writing
tools that leave permanent traces, e.g., inked handwriting and traces of engravings.
Mistakes cannot be corrected without affecting adjacent words, worsening surface
texture, and reducing legibility. White correction fluid was commonly applied to manuscript surfaces to correct mistakes. Ink and ballpoint pens were used to write additions,delete mistakes, emphasize faded traces, provide a statement for organizing folios, andmark replacement positions. New writing and correction tools saved scribes time: scribes
no longer had to discard wrongly written folios and start afresh. In the case of palm-leaf
manuscripts, a small piece of palm leaf or cloth was sewn with yarn to fix fragile spots
but not to make textual corrections (Fig. 13).
In Figs. 14 and 15 revisions were made with blue ballpoint pen: faded spots were28) Examples of monks’ tasks are: (1) administering the sangha, (2) educating the sangha, (3) disseminating the Dhamma and moral codes, (4) meditating, (5) managing public facilities, and (6)improving foreign relations (Bounleuth 2015a, 49).

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Fig. 14 Corrections with Blue Ballpoint Pen
BAD-13-1-0714, n.d.: Sòng pathip hüan fai (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Light Floating
Vessels)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Fig. 15 Deletion of Lines and Sentences with Blue Ballpoint Pen
BAD-22-1-0181, n.d.: Sòng sim (Rewards Derived from the Construction of Ordination Halls)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Maha That, Luang Prabangemphasized, unwanted words were deleted or marked for deletion, and new words wereadded to replace unwanted ones. In Fig. 15 unwanted sentences were framed to bedeleted and marked “discard” (�ບໍ່່ ເອົົ າ) and “delete this row” (ແຖວນີ້້� ເອົົ າອອກ) in themodern Lao script. It is not unusual for anisong manuscripts to have corrections, eventhe most organized ones. Especially in the late twentieth century, manuscripts wereregarded as utilitarian objects for scientific studies rather than sacred objects that it was
sinful to interfere with; correctness of spelling was considered more important than thesacredness of the Dhamma script (Bounleuth 2015b, 213–214). Revisions made by later
users are considered acceptable as long as the texts have not deteriorated and are stillout of the audience’s sight. Since some colophons have scribal statements openly
inviting users to correct mistakes, revisions are not regarded as sinful but as helpful, as
in the following example:เจ้้าหม่่อมหมั้้�นได้้สร้้างสองทุุงเหล็็กไว้้กับั ศาสนาโคตมะเจ้้า ๕๐๐๐ วััสสา ขอให้้ได้้ดังั คำำ�มักั คำำ�ปรารถนาสู่่�เยิิงสู่่�ประการก็็ข้า้ เทอญตััวหนัังสืื อบ่่งามเท่่าใดแล้้ว อายเจ้้าหม่่อมอายจััว ตกผิิดเหลืือผิิดให้้คอยพิิจารณาหาใส่่ ได้้เน้้อ

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

Fig. 16 Indication of a Wrong Folio
01012906006-04, n.d.: Sòng thung lek (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Religious Iron Flags)
Source: Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts, National Library of Laos, Vientiane

Cao Mòm (monk) Man sponsored this manuscript titled Sòng thung lek to ensure the continuationof the five-thousand-year Buddhist era. May all my wishes be fulfilled. It is embarrassing [if]monks and novices [see this manuscript, because] my handwriting is not elaborate. [You areallowed to] correct missing parts and mistakes. (Sòng thung lek [Rewards derived from the donationof religious iron flags], code: BAD-22-1-0366, Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang, n.d.)

In Fig. 16, according to the comment in the gray box—“ໃບນີ້້�ບ່່ ແມ່່ ນ ເຈົ້ິ ດ”້� າຂອງໃສ່່ ຜິ(This folio is wrong; the owner put the wrong one)—a blue ballpoint pen has been used
to delete the mistaken folio. The comment is written in the modern Lao script invernacular, indicating a folio wrongly allocated. This wrong folio likely belongs to a
Jātaka story, as it mentions a Bodhisatta (Buddha-to-be).
V-4 Affiliation and Ownership Statements
Affiliation and ownership statements are reflected through a new layer of affiliation
notes written in ink or ballpoint pen. The new layer reflects the tradition of manuscripts
being circulated among local temples. Secular and even religious manuscripts werelimited in number due to the lack of Dhamma script literacy, which was restricted to (ex-)
monks and (ex-)novices. It was thus quite common for a sermonic manuscript to beavailable at only one monastery. Since circulating manuscripts could get lost, affiliationand ownership statements (monasteries and monks) were added to remind users toreturn the manuscripts to their original owners after use. As affiliation/ownershipstatements are not found in every extant manuscript, those with new entries may beconsidered to have been particularly popular: if a manuscript had not been borrowed often
by other monasteries, an ownership statement would not have been added.
The newly added affiliations shown in the gray boxes in Figs. 17 and 18 read “[Thismanuscript] belongs to Monk Phui” and “Vat [temple] Pa Fang,” respectively. Both

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371

Fig. 17 Affiliation Monk
BAD-22-1-0913, 1975 CE: Salòng thung lek (Rewards Derived from the Donation of Religious Iron
Flags)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang

Fig. 18 Affiliation Monastery
BAD-15-1-0031, n.d.: A compilation of anisong texts
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Pak Khan, Luang Prabang

ownership statements are written in blue pen in vernacular in the modern Lao script,
at the end of the text. Monk Phui or Sathu Nyai Phui Thirachitta Maha Thela (1925–
2005) was the abbot of Vat Maha That (Grabowsky 2019, 136); the manuscript in Fig. 17
is thus marked with his name as the affiliation or principal authority. This manuscript’s
colophon also mentions his name as the sponsor and scribe.29) In the example in Fig. 18,
the affiliation “Vat [temple] Pa Fang” was added in the last folio of the manuscript
fascicle even though, according to its code preceded with “BAD-15,” its current monastic
archive is Vat Pak Khan. The manuscript was sponsored by a couple and donated to Vat
Pa Phai, according to its short colophon: “มููลศรััทธาทิิดยา ผััวเมีียสร้้างแล ป่่ าไผ่่” (The principal
sponsors [of this manuscript] were Thit [ex-monk] Ya and his wife. [The manuscript was
donated to a temple] named Pa Phai). The manuscript’s journey thus commenced at Pa
Phai Monastery through the donation of the sponsors, traveled to Pa Fang Monastery,and eventually reached Pak Khan Monastery. The three monasteries are close to one
another. Manuscripts were ordinarily circulated within a local community, with village
monasteries having limited numbers of liturgical or educational manuscripts. Monastic
libraries functioned as local or public ones. Manuscripts are thus held by either monasteries or individuals, and ownership is not static (Bounleuth and Grabowsky 2016, 12).
29) พุุทธศัักราช ๒๕๑๘ ปีี รัับเหม้้า เดืือน ๑๑ ขึ้้�น ๕ ค่ำำ�� วัันศุุกร์์ ยามแถเที่่�ยง หมายมีีพระผุุย ถิิรจิิตฺฺโตภิิกฺฺขุุ เจ้้าอธิิ การวััดพระมหาธาตุุ

ราชบวรวิิหาร และเจ้้าคณะตาแสง วััดธาตุุ กำำ�แพงนครหลวงพระบาง เป็็ นเจ้้าศรััทธาสร้้างและเขีียน

[The writing of this manuscript was finished in] 2518 BE [1975], a hap mao year, on the fifth waxingmoon day of the 11th [lunar] month, on a Friday, at the time of the late morning horn (9:00–10:30).
[The manuscript was] sponsored and inscribed by Phra [Monk] Phui Thiracitto Bhikkhu, the abbot
of Vat Phra Maha That Ratchabòvoravihan [Vat Maha That] and the head of the monastic subdistrict
affiliated with Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang.

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

A number of colophons in anisong manuscripts include reminders that borrowed manuscripts need to be returned to their home affiliations.
V-5 Dedication Rituals
Since the dedication of manuscripts to a monastery requires a short religious ritual foranumodanā or a celebration of merit-making,30) a number of manuscripts have the namesof sponsors to be announced at the ritual. There are two kinds of donation: original donation and re-donation. Originally donated manuscripts were never donated elsewhere
after being produced. Re-donated manuscripts were donated to a monastery before being
circulated or “allowing” the names of new donors to be written. New donors can offer
money to support monastic tasks such as repairing a monastic library, funding monkscribes, and providing funds for monastic education. People still believe in merit gained
through sustaining the Dhamma and the next Buddha Metteyya after the end of thecurrent five-thousand-year Buddhist era.31) The use of modern ink pen for writing redonation statements reflects the living tradition of religious manuscripts being donatedto monasteries. Re-donated manuscripts are viewed as multilayered manuscripts32) as
they contain representations of different donation authorities.
Fig. 19 shows a statement of manuscript donation newly written with blue pen in
the modern Lao script: “ໜັັງສືຸ ກຜັັວສາວຈັັນ” (This manuscript [belongs to] Siangື ຊຽງສຸ
[ex-novice] Suk [who is] the husband of Sao [Miss] Can). The names of the sponsors
also appear at the end of the text, as shown in the gray box reading “Ban [village] Bak
30) Short verse recitations bless donors (anumodanā) without explaining the content of the text. They
are different from anisong sermons, in which monks read out texts written in Pali and vernacularso that the audience can understand. Another difference is in the length of the two: while anumodanā
verses last less than one minute, anisong sermons last about twenty minutes and are more structured and serious. Nicolas Sihlé explains anumodanā as an expression of thanks or rejoicing foralms or donations. Often described as “blessings,” anumodanā verses aim at granting liberationfrom the cycle of birth and rebirth and contain wishes for happiness, well-being, protection from
misfortune, and fulfillment of the donor’s desires (Sihlé 2015, 363).
31) “The earliest of these inscriptions is the ‘Nakhon Chum’ inscription dated 1356, during the reignof King Lithai. The inscription refers to the prophecy of the gradual disappearance of the Buddhist
religion. The prophecy in fact was of some antiquity, usually being attributed to the fifth century
Sinhalese commentator Buddhaghosa. It predicts five major disappearances to take place within
five thousand years of the Buddha’s death: that of the Tripitaka or sacred Buddhist scriptures, propermonastic conduct, the achievement of enlightenment and nirvana, the institution of the monkhood,and finally the Buddha’s relics. The final extinction of the Buddhist religion would be followed bya dark age in which the people, lacking a moral teaching to guide their actions, would commit sinsand be condemned to rebirth in hell” (Jory 1996, 11).
32) Multilayered written artifacts have various formatting practices: adding or deleting contents or evencombining written artifacts, such as codicological units, in a composite (Centre for the Study ofManuscript Cultures 2023).

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Fig. 19 Statement of Original Donation
BAD-22-1-0440, n.d.: Sòng anisong pitaka (Rewards Derived from Copying the Buddhist Canon)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang

Fig. 20 Statements of Original Donation and Re-donation
BAD-13-1-0155, n.d.: Panya barami (Rewards Derived from Following the Thirty Perfections)
Source: Buddhist Archive of Photography (BAP), Vat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Lüng, Siang [ex-novice] Suk [and] Sao [Miss] Can,” which was inscribed with a stylus in
the Dhamma script before the new text was written. The only occasion where sponsors
are addressed is a dedication ritual in which a recipient monk announces the names ofdonors when praising their meritorious deeds. The paracontent33) in the manuscript
provides barely any traces, probably why the sponsors’ names are repeated in themodern Lao script. However, the position of the last folio leads to speculation on the
purpose of the new writing. It was likely an aid for a recipient monk who was moderately
skilled in the Dhamma script but responsible for holding a dedication ritual in which thesponsors’ names had to be announced. The names were therefore written in the modern
Lao script in the last folio or back cover, which was easily visible.
Fig. 20 shows the first folio of a palm-leaf manuscript containing a colophon.
Unlike this example, colophons in anisong manuscripts were normally at the end of the
text. This photograph shows original donation and re-donation. The initial colophon
was inscribed in the Dhamma script with a stylus and mentions “[A]Can [teacher] Suk”
and his family, who lived in the United States (black box). Framed in the gray rectangles,
the names “Thao [Mr.] Thòng Wan” and “Thao [Mr.] Can Pheng” were newly addedin the modern Lao script with blue pen, obviously showing the re-donation of thismanuscript by the two new donors to gain shared merit from dedicating the manuscript.
Re-donated manuscripts can thus contain several donor names. Like the example inFig. 19, the modern Lao script may have aided a recipient monk inexperienced in the
Dhamma script in a dedication ritual.
33) Paracontent is a set of visual signs (writing, images, marks) in a manuscript in addition to the corecontent and serves three functions: structuring, commenting, and documenting. Paracontent canbe part of the original production or a later addition (Ciotti et al. 2018, 1).

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V-6 Buddhisization
Like in other regions whose manuscript cultures were transformed through new printing
technologies and writing tools, manuscripts as objects in Laos were influenced bymodernity in the postcolonial period. Particularly in Luang Prabang, however, anisongmanuscripts were regarded as texts in the contemporary cultural context. They werecreated for actual events and to Buddhisize secular34) or non-Buddhist rituals—such as
birthdays and marriages—as evidenced by the extant anisong manuscripts. Anisong, as
studied by Gregory Kourilsky and Patrice Ladwig (2017–18), is regarded as a case of
hybrid writing, a genre composed in Pali and vernacular languages to link vernacular
writings to local customs:
A review of existing manuscripts in Laos reveals that while the most ancient manuscripts available(sixteenth century) are Pali texts, vernacular language writings progressively replaced Pali to suchan extent that from the nineteenth century onwards, the vast majority of texts is actually written
in Lao, but interspersed with Pali fragments, sentences or words. These hybrid writings belong
to specific categories such as nissaya, vohāra, sap, anisong (P. ānisaṃsa), sutmon (P. sutta-manta),gāthā, nithan, (P. nidāna), tamnan (“chronicles”), and so forth. Actually, Pali (or, to a lesser extent,
Sanskrit) scriptures are used as a “tool box” of notions, concepts and technical terms, whose main
purpose is to connect vernacular writings and local customs to what Steven Collins has aptly termed
the “Pali imaginaire.” (Kourilsky and Ladwig 2017–18, 200–201)

Formerly non-Buddhist rituals were elevated to Buddhist ones by inviting a (chapter of)monk(s) to give an anisong sermon explaining meritorious rewards. Among otherdefinitions given by various scholars, Justin McDaniel defines anisong and salòng, which
also deal with non-monastic rituals, as follows: “Ānisong (ānisaṃsa) are ‘blessings’
that honor gifts made to the sangha and are often preludes to honor other Buddhist
texts. Xalǭng (Chalong) are ‘celebratory’ texts used to describe and instruct, often, nonmonastic rituals” (McDaniel 2009, 130). Manuscripts concerning birthdays and weddings
did not originate from Buddhism, because birth and marriage, as part of the cycle ofbirth and rebirth, are contrary to Buddhism’s ultimate goal of enlightenment (nibbāna).
To Buddhisize these secular ceremonies, anisong manuscripts were composed from34) The terms “religious” and “secular” originated in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, the former
defining the communal life of Christian monks and the latter the world beyond monastic communities.
With the diversity of religious beliefs and behaviors making it difficult to provide universal definitions, applying these terms to non-Western cultures and societies is sometimes misleading andinappropriate. In general, there is a separation between the church and state that during some periods
developed into inclusive and exclusive secularism. The former is an adapted coexistence of thestate and church, while the latter has a clear-cut division between the two (Kettell 2019). The
general understanding is that “religious” and “secular” are opposites: the former aimed at gaining
ultimate goals (e.g., eternal peace, immortality, celestial rebirth) under the guidance of prophetsand the latter unrelated to goals taught by prophets. This is the interpretation applied in this paper.

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

375

several (non-)canonical sources and associated with the teachings of the Buddha sothat audiences at anisong sermons could be convinced the Buddha’s teachings could beapplied to their everyday lives.
Although the two main duties of Buddhist monks were—and still are—scripturallearning and meditation training, monks were invited to give blessings, hold religious
sessions, and add a sacred element to nonreligious ceremonies (Bounleuth 2015a, 44;
Bounleuth and Grabowsky 2016, 3). The Buddhist sangha held a privileged position in
traditional Lao society and was in times of political crisis even able to intervene insecular matters (Grabowsky 2007, 137). There was a reciprocal relationship betweenmonks and laypeople: “while a vat (temple-monastery) determines the identity of acommunity, the members of that community have the obligation to maintain the vat”
(Khamvone and Grabowsky 2017, 19). Buddhisization of secular ceremonies was a
result of mutual agreement between the sangha and the laity who promoted activities
that were unrelated to the goal of nibbāna but not sinful. Buddhism does not prohibit
secular life, and the Buddha even delivered teachings for those who were not part ofthe monkhood, e.g., Iddipāda (Paths of accomplishment),35) Brahmavihāra (Sublime
states of mind),36) Saṅgahavatthu (Bases of social solidarity).37)
Anisong manuscripts containing sermonic texts to Buddhisize secular rituals andceremonies and even other profane matters have been discovered in Luang Prabang:
Anisong taeng ngan lü kin dòng (Rewards derived from merit-making at wedding
ceremonies), Anisong tham bun wan koet (Rewards derived from merit-making on
birthdays),38) among others.39) Ten anisong manuscripts concerning birth and marriage35) There are four paths of accomplishment: will (chanda), effort (viriya), dedication (citta), andexamination (vīmaṁsā) (Payutto 2012, 160).
36) There are four sublime states of mind: loving-kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), sympatheticjoy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā) (Payutto 2012, 124).
37) There are four bases of social solidarity: generosity (dāna), kindly speech (piyavācā), useful conduct(atthacariyā), and participation and proper behavior in all circumstances (samānattatā) (Payutto
2012, 143).
38) Source: DLLM, code: 06011406005-15, Vat Mai Suvanna Phumaram, Luang Prabang, 1973 CE.
Anisong manuscripts on rewards derived from merit-making on birthdays are hardly found, sincebirth is part of the cycle of rebirth, which is contrary to the goal of nibbāna. Birthday celebrations
are thus secular events. Even though there are only a few manuscripts, a number of clues show
their frequent use as shared objects at birthday sermons, reflecting the popularity of merit-making
at birthday ceremonies (see Silpsupa 2022, 70–71).
39) For example, Anisong kratham bun taeng ngan (Rewards derived from merit-making at wedding
ceremonies) (Source: BAP, code: BAD-22-1-0899, Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang, 1997 CE);
Anisong taeng ngan bao sao (Rewards derived from merit-making at wedding ceremonies) (Source:
BAP, code: BAD-22-1-0923, Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang, 1975 CE); Anisong katham bun taengngan (Rewards derived from merit-making at wedding ceremonies) (Source: BAP, code: BAD-221-0467, Vat Maha That, Luang Prabang, 1997 CE).

376

Silpsupa Jaengsawang(1952–98) have been discovered in Luang Prabang. Nine of them were donated bymonks, implying monks’ openness to Buddhisizing secular rituals by giving anisongsermons. Within the expansion of the anisong preaching tradition, secular activities
contributing to beneficial outcomes are valued as merit-making:This “Buddhization” of formerly non-Buddhist rites and rituals is best reflected in Anisong texts
which are generally known under the terms Salòng or Sòng in Lao. . . . More surprisingly, collections of manuscripts also include titles referring to non-Buddhist rituals, such as marriage ceremony (Anisong taeng ngan) in which monks are not supposed to intervene in this region of Southeast Asia. In truth, Anisong could be seen as a paradigm of the principle of what we might call
“Buddhization by means of text,” that is, the legitimization of a given practice by its written record
with a sacred script (the Dhamma script) on a sacred object (the manuscript). In this way, any local
custom may become unquestionably “Buddhist” if it is included as a subject in an Anisong.
(Bounleuth and Grabowsky 2016, 3)

One example is a manuscript titled Anisong salòng taeng ngan lü kin dòng (Rewards
derived from merit-making at wedding ceremonies), which is combined with another text
titled Anisong thawai pha pa (Rewards derived from the donation of monk robes) to makea multi-text manuscript,40) from Vat Mai Suvanna Phumaram. The text pertains to two
types of marriage in India: awaha,41) which is performed at the husband’s house and thecouple live in the husband’s house; and wiwaha,42) which is performed at the wife’shouse and the couple live in the wife’s house. It explains what the wealthy man (setthi)
Thananchai taught his devout and generous daughter Nang Wisakha (Visākhā),43) the ten
proper habits of a good wife and how to cherish married life. The manuscript was usedin wedding ceremonies to teach couples how to keep the family peaceful and happy,
even though marriage was not regarded as a way to enlightenment. With hopes for abright future, luck, and propitiousness during life transitions or rites of passage, ceremonies could be Buddhisized by making merit, offering alms to monks, and invitingmonks to pray and give blessings. This was often accompanied by an anisong sermon.
40) The manuscript is coded 06011406004-17 and was written in 1962, on the first waning-moon dayof the third lunar month, at 14:00, by the Supreme Patriarch and Pha (monk) Wandi from Vat Pha
Khom.
41) The Thai Royal Institute defines awaha (noun) as “taking a woman to live [in one’s house].” In the
awahamongkhon marriage, common in northern India, the groom takes the bride to live in his house(Thai Royal Institute 2013, 1410).
42) The Thai Royal Institute defines wiwaha (noun) as “taking [someone] out.” In the wiwahamongkhon
marriage, common in southern India, the groom is taken to live in the bride’s house. In Thailand
marriage is called wiwaha, no matter where the bride and groom live (Thai Royal Institute 2013,
1124–1125).
43) Visākhā attained the initial stage of sainthood immediately after first hearing the Dhamma from the
Buddha (Buddha Dharma Education Association and BuddhaNet 2008).

Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

377

Evidently, Buddhisizing anisong manuscripts reflects the harmonious coexistence of
non-Buddhist activities in the Buddhist context and the reciprocal relations between thesangha and laity, who, as long as they are not sinful, support one another.

VI Conclusion
During the period of French colonialism, the relationship between Lao people and their
French administrators influenced the use of the vernacular language as well as manuscript culture in Laos. New printing technologies introduced by the French affectedthe Lao manuscript culture in the following four ways. First, projects pertaining to thedissemination of Buddhist teachings were supported by new writing tools and writing
support for mass production. New printing technologies helped monks and novices topropagate the Buddha’s teachings. Second, the librarians’ tasks of storing and categorizing manuscripts in a repository used the new technologies of writing tools, paperlabels, and especially the Roman alphabet to encode pronunciations for vernacular titlesof anisong manuscripts; this reflected the participation of foreigners. Third, delivering asermon requires familiarity with the recorded text; monk-preachers thus took time topractice and in the process marked and corrected texts written on palm leaves by using
pens. Due to this, the original texts inscribed with a stylus look completely different
from the text added in ink. Lastly, affiliation markers were written mostly in the modern
script, reflecting the illiteracy in the Dhamma script of the monastic lay assistants who
sometimes transported and stored manuscripts in monastic libraries.
There were four kinds of actors involved in the use of new technologies: sponsors,
scribes, monks, and librarians. The modern Lao script was accompanied by new technologies, with a gradual decrease in the use of the Dhamma script. The modern Lao
script was used to compensate for the dwindling knowledge of the Dhamma script andto accommodate those who could not read the script but were still part of the manuscript
culture.
Accepted: October 2, 2023

Acknowledgements
With the attentive and helpful support of several people, the quality of this paper was greatly improved.
First, I would like to thank Professor Dr. Volker Grabowsky, the principal investigator of my research
project, who carefully read and commented on the paper. He tirelessly responded to my questions

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

and guided me on the direction the paper should take. Second, I would like to express my greatest
gratitude to the anonymous reviewers who spent their precious time on reading, evaluating, and giving
constructive feedback and comments. They gave me new insights on relevant issues and ideas. The
additional sources they recommended gave me a better understanding of the social context during thecase-study period.

References
Manuscripts์ ราย; สลองปราสาทผึ้้�ง; สลองปราสาทผึ้้�ง; สลองปราสาทผึ้้�ง [A compilation
01012906004-05. รวมอานิิสงส์์: สลองพระเจดีีย์ท
of anisong texts: Salòng pha cedi sai rewards derived from building sand stupas; Salòng phasat phüng
rewards derived from the donation of beeswax castles; Salòng phasat phüng rewards derived fromthe donation of beeswax castles; Salòng phasat phüng rewards derived from the donation of beeswax
castles]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 24 folios; n.d.
01012906005-01. รวมอานิิสงส์์: สลองอุุมง; สลองอุุมง; สลองอุุมง [A compilation of anisong texts: Salòng umong
rewards derived from the construction of chapels; Salòng umong rewards derived from the construction of chapels; Salòng umong rewards derived from the construction of chapels]. Palm-leaf
manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 48 folios; CS 1263 (1901 CE).
01012906006-04. รวมอานิิ สงส์์: สองทุุงเหล็็ก; สองทุุงเหล็็ก; สองทุุงเหล็็ก; สองทุุงเหล็็ก; สองทุุงเหล็็ก; สองทุุงเหล็็ก [Acompilation of anisong texts: Sòng thung lek rewards derived from the donation of religious ironflags; Sòng thung lek rewards derived from the donation of religious iron flags; Sòng thung lek rewards
derived from the donation of religious iron flags; Sòng thung lek rewards derived from the donationof religious iron flags; Sòng thung lek rewards derived from the donation of religious iron flags;Sòng thung lek rewards derived from the donation of religious iron flags]. Palm-leaf manuscript;
languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham Lao and modern Lao; 27 folios; CS 1232 (1870 CE).
01012906006-07. รวมอานิิสงส์์: สองวิิด; สองธรรมาสน์์ [A compilation of anisong texts: Sòng wit rewards derived
from the construction of public toilets; Sòng thammat rewards derived from the donation of pulpits].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 13 folios; n.d.
06011406004-09. สองพระสัังกาดล่่อง [Sòng pha sangkat lòng Rewards derived from merit-making attraditional New Year festivals]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao;
13 folios; CS 1209 (1847 CE).
06011406004-17. รวมอานิิสงส์์: อานิิสงส์์สลองแต่่งงาน; อานิิสงส์์ถวายผ้้าป่่ าบัังสุุ กุลุ [A compilation of anisong texts:
Anisong salòng taeng ngan rewards derived from merit-making at wedding ceremonies; Anisong
thawai pha pa bangsukun rewards derived from the donation of monk robes]. Palm-leaf manuscript;
languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 15 folios; CS 1324 (1962 CE).
06011406005-15. อานิิสงส์์ทำ�ำ บุุญวัันเกิิด Anisong tham bun wan koet [Rewards derived from merit-making
on birthdays]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 7 folios; CS 1335
(1973 CE).
06018504078-00. ปะริิ วาร Parivāra [Palivan epitome of the Vinaya]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages:
Pali; script: Tham Lao; 22 folios; CS 882 (1520 CE).
17010106001-11. สลองแปงผาม Salòng paeng pham [Rewards derived from the construction of pavilions].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 11 folios; CS 1014 (1652 CE).
BAD-13-1-0155. ปัั ญญาบารมีี Panya barami [Rewards derived from following the Thirty Perfections].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 8 folios; n.d.
BAD-13-1-0157. รวมอานิิสงส์์: สองดอกไม้้ธููปเทีียน; สองรัักษาศีีล; สองฟัังธรรม; สองเผาผีี; สองมหาเวสสัันตระชาดก [A com-Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

379

pilation of anisong texts: Sòng dònk mai thup thian rewards derived from the donation of flowers,
incense sticks, and candles; Sòng haksa sin rewards derived from precept observance; Sòng fangtham rewards derived from listening to the Dhamma; Sòng phao phi rewards derived from theparticipation in funerals; Sòng maha wetsantara chadok rewards derived from listening to Vessantara
Jātaka]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 40 folios; CS 1306 (1944
CE).
BAD-13-1-0387. สองสรรพทุุง Sòng sapphathung [Rewards derived from the donation of all kinds ofreligious flags]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 6 folios; CS 1272
(1910 CE).
BAD-13-1-0685. สลองข้้าวพัันก้้อน Salòng khao phan kòn [Rewards derived from the donation of one
thousand rice balls]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: modern Lao; 6 folios;
CS 1344 (1985 CE).
BAD-13-1-0714. สองประทีีปเรืื อนไฟ Sòng pathip hüan fai [Rewards derived from the donation of lightfloating vessels]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 8 folios; n.d.
BAD-13-1-0760. ปัั ญญาบารมีี Panya barami [Rewards derived from following the Thirty Perfections].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham Lao and modern Lao; 6 folios; CS1325 (1963 CE).
BAD-13-2-033. อานิิสงส์์สร้้างพระไตรปิิ ฎก Anisong sang pha tai pidok [Rewards derived from copying theBuddhist canon]. Mulberry paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: modern Lao; 6 sides;
n.d.
BAD-13-2-042. หนัังสืื อหามื้้�อร้้ายมื้้�อดีี Nangsü ha mü hai mü di [Book of calculation for (in)auspicious days].
Mulberry paper manuscript; language: Lao; script: Lao Buhan; 80 sides; CS 1270 (1908 CE).
BAD-13-2-093. อานิิสงส์์ถวายกฐิิน Anisong thawai kathin [Rewards derived from participation in the Kathin
festival]. Mulberry paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 21 sides; n.d.
BAD-15-1-0031. รวมอานิิ สงส์์: สองอุุมง; สองหอกลอง; สองหีี บหนังั สืื อ [A compilation of anisong texts: Sòngumong rewards derived from the construction of chapels; Sòng hò kòng rewards derived from theconstruction of drum shelters; Sòng hip nangsü rewards derived from the donation of book chests].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 30 folios; n.d.
ุ วัันเกิิด Anisong bun wan koet [Rewards derived from merit-making on birthdays].
BAD-19-1-0137. อานิิสงส์์บุญ
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: modern Lao; 9 folios; CS 1346 (1984 CE).
BAD-21-2-004. สลองทานดอกไม้้ Salòng than dòk mai [Rewards derived from the donation of flowers].
Mulberry paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 10 folios; CS 1357 (1995
CE).
BAD-22-1-0181. สองสิิ ม Sòng sim [Rewards derived from the construction of ordination halls]. Palm-leaf
manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 11 folios; n.d.
BAD-22-1-0366. สองทุุงเหล็็ก Sòng thung lek [Rewards derived from the donation of religious iron flags].
Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 5 folios; CS 1288 (1926 CE).
BAD-22-1-0440. สองอานิิ สงส์์ปิิฏกะ Sòng anisong pitaka [Rewards derived from copying the Buddhist
canon]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 6 folios; n.d.
BAD-22-1-0467. อานิิสงส์์กระทำำ�บุุญแต่่งงาน Anisong katham bun taeng ngan [Rewards derived from meritmaking at wedding ceremonies]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham
Lao and modern Lao; 10 folios; CS 1359 (1997 CE).
BAD-22-1-0899. อานิิสงส์์กระทำำ�บุุญแต่่งงาน Anisong katham bun taeng ngan [Rewards derived from meritmaking at wedding ceremonies]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham
Lao and modern Lao; 8 folios; CS 1359 (1997 CE).
BAD-22-1-0910. สลองเจดีีย์ ์ Sòng cedi [Rewards derived from the construction of pagodas]. Palm-leaf
manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 9 folios; CS 1330 (1968 CE).

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Silpsupa Jaengsawang

BAD-22-1-0913. สลองทุุงเหล็็ก Salòng thung lek [Rewards derived from the donation of religious ironflags]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 7 folios; CS 1337 (1975
CE).
BAD-22-1-0923. อานิิสงส์์แต่่งงานบ่่าวสาว Anisong taeng ngan bao sao [Rewards derived from merit-making
at wedding ceremonies]. Palm-leaf manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 16 folios;
CS 1337 (1975 CE).
BAD-22-1-0934. สลองห่่ อผ้้า Salòng hò pha [Rewards derived from the donation of cloth]. Palm-leaf
manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 11 folios; CS 1329 (1967 CE).
BAD-22-1-0936. สองเจดีีย์ ์ Sòng cedi [Rewards derived from the construction of pagodas]. Palm-leaf
manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; script: Tham Lao; 9 folios; CS 1330 (1968 CE).
DS 0056 00643. สองผ้้าน้ำำ��ฝน Sòng pha nam fon [Rewards derived from the donation of monk robes in therainy season]. Industrial paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham Lao and modern
Lao; 20 sides; n.d.
DS 0056 00644. อานิิสงส์์ทุุง Anisong thung [Rewards derived from the donation of all kinds of religious
flags]. Industrial paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham Lao and modern Lao;
32 sides; CS 1374 (2012 CE).
DS 0056 00645. อานิิสงส์์ไหลแปไฟ Anisong lai pae fai [Rewards derived from the donation of light floating
vessels]. Industrial paper manuscript; languages: Lao and Pali; scripts: Tham Lao and modern Lao;
40 sides; CS 1378 (2016 CE).
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―. 2008. From Revolution to Reform: Ethics, Gift Giving and Sangha-State Relationships in Lao
Buddhism. PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge.
Ladwig, Patrice and Rathie, Martin. 2020. Lao Buddhism and Faith in the Revolution: The Life andCareer of Maha Khamtan Thepbuali (1919–2019) in the Context of Buddhist Socialist Movements.
Bulletin de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient 106: 403–431. https://www.persee.fr/doc/befeo_03361519_2020_num_106_1_6340, accessed March 27, 2024.
Laurenson, Diana T. and Swingewood, Alan. 1972. The Sociology of Literature. New York: Schocken
Books.
McDaniel, Justin Thomas. 2009. Two Buddhist Librarians: The Proximate Mechanisms of Northern
Thai Buddhist History. In Buddhist Manuscript Cultures: Knowledge, Ritual, and Art, edited by
Stephen C. Berkwitz, Juliane Schober, and Claudia Brown, pp. 124–139. New York: Routledge.
―. 2008. Gathering Leaves and Lifting Words: Histories of Buddhist Monastic Education in Laosand Thailand. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
National Library of Laos. n.d. Digital Library of Lao Manuscripts. CrossAsia. https://digital.crossasia.
org/digital-library-of-lao-manuscripts/?lang=en, accessed March 12, 2024.
Payutto, P. A. 2012. Dictionary of Buddhism. Bangkok: Museum for Sustainable Buddhism.
Sihlé, Nicolas. 2015. Towards a Comparative Anthropology of the Buddhist Gift (and Other Transfers).
In Religion Compass, edited by Tamara Sonn and Scott Noegel, Vol. 9, pp. 352–385. New York:
Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1111/rec3.12185.
Silpsupa Jaengsawang. 2022. Relationship between Anisong Manuscripts and Rituals: A Comparative
Study of the Lan Na and Lao Traditions. Segnitz: Zenos-Verlag.
Silpsupa Jaengsawang and Grabowsky, Volker. 2023. Hybrid Production of Anisong Manuscripts inLuang Prabang. Journal of the Siam Society 111(1): 111–142. https://so06.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/
pub_jss/article/view/264583, accessed March 17, 2024.
Stevenson, Angus, ed. 2010. Oxford Dictionary of English. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Stuart-Fox, Martin. 1995. The French in Laos 1887–1945. Modern Asian Studies 29(1): 111–139.
―. 1986. Laos: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.
Thai Royal Institute. 2013. Royal Institute Dictionary. Bangkok: Nanmeebooks.
Turnbull, Joanna, ed. 2010. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. Eighth Edition. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Veidlinger, Daniel, M. 2007. Spreading the Dhamma: Writing, Orality, and Textual Transmission in
Buddhist Northern Thailand. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
Wagner, Esther-Miriam; Outhwaith, Ben; and Beinhoff, Bettina, eds. 2013. Scribes as Agents of Language
Change. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Wehmeier, Sally, ed. 2005. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. Seventh Edition. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Wimmer, Hanna; Bondarev, Dmitry; Karolewski, Janina; and Lorusso, Vito. 2015. A Heuristic Tool for
the Comparative Study of Manuscripts from Different Manuscript Cultures. CSMC Occasional Paper
No. 3. Hamburg: Centre for the Study of Manuscript Cultures. https://www.csmc.uni-hamburg.de/Transformations of Anisong Manuscripts in Luang Prabang

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publications/occasional-papers/files/csmc-occasional-paper-3-wimmer-et-al.pdf, accessed March
17, 2024.
Thai and Lao Sources
Bouakhay Phengphachanh บััวไข เพ็็งพระจัันทร์์ . 2008. Kann fün fu khamphi bai lan lao nai yuk ananikhom
farang set การฟื้้� นฟููคัมั ภีีร์์ใบลานลาวในยุุคอาณานิิคมฝรั่่�งเศส [The revitalization of Lao palm-leaf manuscripts
during French colonialism]. In Warasan sangkhom lum nam khong วารสารสัังคมลุ่่�มน้ำำ��โขง [Journal of
Mekong societies], edited by Maniemai Thongyou มณีี มัยั ทองอยู่่� and Dararat Mettariganond ดารารััตน์์
เมตตาริิ กานนท์์. Khon Kaen: Center for Research on Plurality in the Mekong Region 4(3): 57–81.
Khamtan Thepbuali ຄຳຳ�ຕັັນ ເທພບົ
ີ . 1976. Pha song lao lae kan patiwat ພະສົິ ວັັດົ ວລີົ ງລາວແລະການປະຕິ
[The Lao monk and revolution]. Vientiane: n.p.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Global History of Buddhism and Medicine
C. Pierce Salguero
New York: Columbia University Press, 2022.
In her review of C. Pierce Salguero’s 2014 book Translating Buddhist Medicine in Medieval
China, Janet Gyatso observed: “There has been a small explosion in the study of Buddhist
medicine in the last several years” (Gyatso 2017, 96). This boom has since expanded even further,
being felt primarily in the fields of Asian medicine and Buddhist studies. It has become increasingly
clear to people within the field that the time has come to “leave the ghetto,” to quote a remark by
Gyatso on another occasion1)—that the subject of Buddhist medicine is relevant beyond its own
confines. It is relevant also for historians of medicine, for historians of Asia, and for historians ingeneral. Hence the need, and the huge challenge, to provide a general history of Buddhist medicine,something that A Global History of Buddhism and Medicine set out to accomplish. And it has
definitely succeeded.
If there is anyone who is up to this momentous task, it is Salguero. He has spearheaded
many endeavors related to Buddhist medicine for almost two decades. The present book is, inmany respects, an outcome of several of these initiatives.
Salguero has written extensively on Chinese Buddhist medicine and Thai medicine, edited
two monumental collections of premodern and modern primary sources on Buddhist medicine,and set up a Facebook discussion group. He started the Blue Beryl podcast (Salguero 2022) andis also the editor-in-chief of Asian Medicine: Journal of the International Association for the Study ofTraditional Asian Medicine (formerly Asian Medicine: Tradition and Modernity). There are other
undertakings to his credit, but for lack of space these will suffice to give the overall picture.
Spearheading the above efforts has meant, first, that Salguero has for quite some time probed
and written about the tricky question of what “Buddhist medicine” might mean, and indeed how
difficult it is to define. Buddhist medicine is not really a field in any static, potentially comfortingmanner, but rather—as Salguero himself has defined it in several of his publications—a “moving
1) Janet Gyatso, opening address to the 11th seminar of the International Association of Tibetan
Studies, Bonn University, August 2006.
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2024, pp. 385–416© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

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target.” There is no potential comfort in ever knowing the field, since one can never even define
it, let alone cover it. But one can probe it and explore its multiple facets, and this is precisely what
Salguero has been doing. He is a pioneer, sufficiently content to dwell in uncharted territory.
Scholarship aside, the ubiquity of the fascination with mindfulness in today’s world is reason
enough for a need for a history of Buddhism and medicine that is academically rich, readable by ageneral audience, as well as useful for teaching. And so, as Salguero states in his introduction,
the primary motivation of his book is to situate this contemporary fascination within the long,multifaceted history of the myriad ways in which Buddhism and medicine have intertwined.
The field of Buddhist medicine—if we zoom out to observe where this “moving target” isroaming—covers nearly two and a half millennia and most of the inhabited world. To be sure, thefocus is predominantly on Asia, but in the modern period it has extended also to Europe andNorth America. In any case, the breadth of the field is enough to keep an army of scholars busy
for a long time.
Salguero realized early on that compiling a history of Buddhist medicine on his own would be
impossible, that it would have to be a collective endeavor. And so, a decade or so ago, he took on
the momentous task, working together with a few dozen people. A major part of the process
involved enlisting a host of scholars to translate and introduce a breathtaking collection of primarysources from the entire expanse of the Buddhist world dealing with medicine, health, and healing(broadly conceived) in the premodern age (Salguero 2017) and the modern age (Salguero 2020).
The 2017 anthology included 62 contributions from leading scholars across the fields of Buddhology
and Asian medicine in an impressive linguistic variety: Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese, Pāli,
Khmer, Thai, Burmese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Mongolian. The 2020 anthology, again withleading scholars but shorter with 35 chapters, was also remarkably varied in both its geographicalexpanse and its types of sources: it started with Buddhist monastic physicians’ encounters with
Jesuits in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Japan and ended with “Conversations about
Buddhism and Health Care in Multiethnic Philadelphia.” Both anthologies followed a similar
format: each chapter included a text (or interview, sometimes a few short texts), preceded by an
introduction contextualizing the source and followed by a short list of suggested readings.
From the outset, Salguero envisaged the project as a trilogy: the two anthologies, with theirbreathtaking wealth of material, would serve as the basis for the volume under review here,
which is a general overview of the topic. A Global History of Buddhism and Medicine is thus thethird part of the three-stage project. Building on the two books that he edited, Salguero has woven
an effective and readable synthesis of a wealth of primary and secondary sources covering theentire Buddhist world. The outcome is a history of almost two and a half millennia of links between
Buddhism and medicine in Asia, Europe, and North America, a very much needed and readable
introduction to the field. It is essential reading for anyone interested in Buddhism, the history of
medicine, or both. The breadth of the book makes it useful for both students and scholars.

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387

Salguero provides plenty of food for thought on the complex question of what we might call
Buddhist medicine, a discussion that continues previous ones by him and others. While the book’s
title avoids the impossible-to-define “Buddhist medicine,” the book itself begins with a succinct
discussion of the term, its problematics and usefulness.
The first part of the book provides an overview of the relevant doctrines and practices as foundin the three divisions of Buddhism, termed here as Nikāya, Mahāyāna, and Tantric Buddhism.
Salguero masterfully presents the essence of these three contexts in an accessible way, suitableeven for those with no background in Buddhism, and provides the backdrop for the topics discussed
in the second part of the book. The second part is devoted to the myriad forms of transformation
undergone by the ideas and practices discussed in the first part. The author frames this part ofthe volume under the rubrics of circulations, translations, localizations, and modernizations. He
eloquently steers us through both the macro-level processes and micro-level examples. We get aclear sense of what Buddhist medical networks consisted of and the multiple ways in whichknowledge moved. In the chapter devoted to translations, Salguero discusses the key texts thatwere translated and adapted across the Buddhist world, and how through this tracing of the
movement of texts across time and space—observing not just straight-up translations but also
cultural translations and adaptations—we are able to understand the ways in which people understood and practiced Buddhist medicine. The author then moves on to the specifics of some aspects
in his discussion on domestications, displacements, and “translocations”—cases where ideas
originating from India planted seeds that grew into Buddhist-related and culturally specific medical
traditions. He has chosen two case studies within this overall category: Tibet and Southeast Asia,
each having its own trajectory of development.
The last two chapters, “Modernizations” and “Contemporary Buddhist Medicine,” bring us
to the present. The historical background and the analysis of key themes discussed up to this point
serve as a strong base for these two fascinating chapters. These chapters help the reader appreciate and reflect on contemporary Buddhist medicine, mostly likely to be found in a local clinic orschool, no matter where one is.
So when, for example, Salguero discusses both the enthusiasm and the backlash of mindfulness
in the “Contemporary Buddhist Medicine” chapter, and more generally the links between Buddhism
and biomedicine of our time, it is thanks to the principles, histories, and analyses that he has
dealt with up to this point that we can understand these links as yet more cases of the complex
multidirectional processes “entangled in complex feedback loops” (p. 167) that the book has
discussed throughout.
Salguero points out that while “the history of Buddhist medicine in previous historical periods
is enormously complex,” the contemporary ocean of practice, with its “fractal swirl of currents andcounter currents,” is even more chaotic (p. 174).
The author provides plenty of food for thought on how Buddhism and medicine have interacted

388Book Reviews

and how they continue to do so. This overall theme is relevant not only in the history of Buddhism
and medicine but also in the more general questions of relationships between religions andmedicine, questions that have been discussed more at length with regard to other religions—primarily Christianity, but also Islam and to a lesser extent Judaism. In this sense, too, this book
is important as it brings the discussion of Buddhism and medicine within the playing fields of
relevant mainstream disciplines where Buddhism and medicine are still not sufficiently known,taught, and researched. With this excellent volume at hand, we are in a much better position tohope that Buddhism and medicine will become better known in contexts and disciplines where
they are not yet well known.
Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim
Goldsmiths, University of London; Princeton IAS
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9806-4461
References
Gyatso, Janet. 2017. Review of Translating Buddhist Medicine in Medieval China by C. Pierce Salguero.
History of Religions 57(1): 96–99. https://doi.org/10.1086/692319.
Salguero, C. Pierce, ed. 2020. Buddhism and Medicine: An Anthology of Modern and Contemporary
Sources. New York: Columbia University Press.
―, ed. 2017. Buddhism and Medicine: An Anthology of Premodern Sources. New York: Columbia
University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/salg17994.
Salguero, Pierce. 2022. Blue Beryl. Buzzsprout. https://blueberyl.buzzsprout.com/, accessed November
20, 2023.

Demanding Images: Democracy, Mediation, and the Image-Eventin Indonesia
Karen Strassler
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2020.
It took a decade for Karen Strassler to come up with her second and much-awaited book. Indeed,
it could have taken much longer to do the ethnographic fieldwork, converse with a whole gamut ofsources, and finally put together a monograph that sustains her analysis of the productive work ofimages in contemporary Indonesia. Demanding Images is a fascinating study that younger scholars
can only aspire to do. The author introduces the concept of the “image-event” or “a politicalprocess set in motion when a specific image or set of images erupts onto and intervenes in asocial field, becoming a focal point of discursive and affective engagement across diverse publics”(p. 8) to help us analyze Indonesian visual culture in the wake of Suharto’s downfall.

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Benedict Anderson remarked that the mass medium of print enables the creation of the nation
when it conjures communities, when people of the same polity imagine others as fellow subjects
in the nation. Strassler broadens this continuing imagination by exploring images existing in the
public sphere: photographs, videos, money, street art, graffiti, banners, posters, and digital media.
As both cause and consequence, images are demanded by certain situations as they also demand
the creation of different kinds of order for the people that produce and consume them. In otherwords, images neither simply exist nor are created: they happen and make things happen.
Strassler calls attention to “ludic” images instead of the “evidentiary” mode of documentary
images such as photographs. Ludic images “deploy remediation, repurposing, and reworking to
generate new constellations of truth and modalities of revelation on the surface of the image”(p. 24), which are suggestive of the pleasurable, conservative, redemptive, and revolutionary
functions of images, depending on one’s manner and purpose of using them. Yet there is somethingthat exceeds the intentionality of the image-maker and user. There are possibilities of reversal
and an opening to new ends. After reeling from three decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia is
experiencing an exponential proliferation of images in its public sphere, at once a testament toinitiatives beyond what was once the center, which is the state, and part of the worldwide technological and artistic innovations in crafting images.
The author begins by discussing the doctoring of the rupiah, the country’s currency, in theaftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 2008 that devastated the economy and led to Suharto’s
resignation. Suharto’s images resurfaced as a man hiding in shame, asking the public whether
times had been better during his three-decade rule. In response, people manipulated Suharto’s
face on printed currency as the image of money became the focal point for criticizing the New
Order regime, which had delivered rapid economic growth but collapsed under the weight offiscal mismanagement and cronyism. Arrested students attended law court hearings using pictures of Suharto’s face as masks, demanding that he appear instead and be accountable. The
abundance of counterfeit money, called aspal (a combination of aslu or “authentic” and palsu or“false”)—issued by the state bank, no less—exposed the corruption that lay at the heart ofIndonesian politics. Counterfeit money also served as a platform for evoking nostalgia for the
Sukarno era as a counterweight to the Suharto period, when Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s
daughter, appeared on fake currency. The politician Megawati also had authoritarian tendenciesof her own, though, and her short-lived presidency failed to deliver on the promises of democracy.
Strassler deepens the anthropological conceptions of the face as a mask, the fetish of money andpower, and examinations of appearances: the malevolent force hiding behind the mask andimages, the Javanese pleasure in appearances, and the prowess (and cowardice) and strongman’srule centrality (and its decentralization and deterritorialization) in the archipelago.
While photography became pivotal as a document for witnessing history during the Reformasi
and as a play in the satirical exposition of corrupt regimes, it became fodder for misogynistic and390

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racist attitudes when its presence and—especially—its absence became a defining ground for
adjudicating the rape cases of ethnic Chinese women in the heady days of Suharto’s ouster. Since
the prosecution of crime relies on proof, for which photography provides the supreme objective
and impartial form, the disinclination on the part of Indonesian Chinese women to present documentation of their sexual abuse highlights the question of the authenticity of both their violationand their status as Indonesians. Here, what Strassler calls “the dream of transparency” (p. 68)
grapples with “forced visibility” (p. 73), and national pride staves off the “international gaze”(p. 79). The possibility of photographic falsification, “conjur[ing] specters of obscurity andmanipulation” (pp. 80–81), not only belies transparency but also discloses the gendered dimensionsof violence in what was supposedly a democratizing society. Indonesian Chinese women are
victimized anew by this obsession with transparency that works against them: Who would want
to be stigmatized and retraumatized by photos of one’s violation? It is telling that the bodily
violations of Indonesian Chinese suggest their persistent marginalization from the Indonesian bodypolitic. The author does not include pictures in this second chapter, so as to avoid replicating theviolence of the visual on silenced subjects.
The third chapter shows leading political figures embroiled in sex scandals that could not bedenied because of the authenticating evidence of videos and photos. At a time when citizens are
finally cherishing the production and circulation of images beyond state control, it is the lurid sidethat (expectedly) animates the public and produces a productive relationship between democracy
and morality. Self-proclaimed telematics expert Roy Suryo’s role is pivotal in unmasking pornography, though his expertise is questioned by hardline Islamic groups that support the politicians.
It is also through publicity that porn stars have tried to make amends or correct public perception
by public displays of piety. The following chapter delves into the controversy generated by thePinkswing Park exhibit showing naked celebrities. Usually, artworks attract a limited audience,
being enclosed in galleries and museums that tend to alienate the populace who must spend timeand money and may not know much about art. Yet this time around, the policing gaze of political
Islam thrust the image into the public sphere and subjected the exhibit to a moral campaign thatradicalized adherents of political Islam. The Indonesian art world and its secular middle-classchampions, in turn (and unfortunately), responded by segregating artistic production from religious
interpretation, saying that the artworks’ value should be appraised by the keen eyes of artists,
critics, and curators.
The last chapter, “Street Signs,” is particularly absorbing as it analyzes the people’s appropriation of public spaces through street art. Dominated by state and private interests simultaneously announcing and advertising their control and soliciting support, urban inscriptions by guerrillastreet artists testify to the reclamation of the commons. However, the same spaces are being
repossessed by government agents who are out to fabricate overwhelming support for extrajudicial
acts of punishing criminals. And here is where the possibility (or threat) of reversal to moreBook Reviews391

authoritarian times portends both residual and emerging repressions and dares artists and citizens
to be bolder in critiquing and wrestling state power. In 2013, street artists called for justice for thehuman rights activist Munir, who had been assassinated in 2004, and yet the same spaces of
mediation are now being reconquered by evil forces most likely guilty of present-day violations.
This is coupled with Yogyakartan natives’ rebuke of “outsiders” who use the city as a canvas forsocial critique, revealing the other kinds of social boundaries regnant in the country. While thebanner-posting operation was surreptitiously carried out by the military immediately after theprison-killing operation, the presence of banners in public places conceals right-wing and counterrevolutionary violence insofar as it proclaims public approval from authors hiding in anonymity.
Banners proclaiming support as if it was coming from the public demonstrate the manipulationof the people and uncover the tendentious character of actually existing democracy. This “as if”
quality is central to images as it unwraps artifice, (un)truth, play, potentiality, and redemption.
Strassler’s conclusion draws our attention to the most explicit demonstration of public visibility of the contemporary moment: the selfie. Belying accusations that backing for the popular
candidate (and by now twice elected and outgoing president) Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was fake orexaggerated, supporters flooded social media with selfies of their attendance at campaign rallies,
even demonstrating the technical details that indexed the mammoth crowd. As a self-madeentrepreneur and political figure with no ties to the New Order regime, Jokowi also embodies the“dream of transparency” in fighting the lies and fakery of his electoral opponent, Prabowo Subianto,
the dictator Suharto’s former son-in-law and himself a military general involved in the murdercase of Reformasi activists. Although selfie-taking demonstrates a very active kind of selfproduced visibility using the benefits of technology, group selfies by middle-class participants atelectoral campaign rallies also show the limits of democracy: this is not substantive democracy—
a democracy of civil freedoms, human rights, and material equality—but electoral (and to someextent) elite (because elitist) democracy, congenial to neoliberal self-fashioning that includes
insofar as it excludes many others. “Neoliberal volunteerism” that calls for a “mental revolution”(pp. 236–237) is far removed from the structural transformation that revolutions desire. Admiringthemselves and relishing the technology through which they produce themselves, the middle
classes and educated people also tend to look down on others and brand them as susceptible to
fake news and disinformation, the unworthy subjects of democracy.
It is expected that the relatively open political climate of the last two and a half decades will
result in the full flowering of image production and contending ideas in the marketplace of
democracy. Yet this marketplace is something that is presumed—not a given, and maybe notthe ideal. As more and more people gain the knowledge and creativity to craft images, there is atendency for image creation and reception to be monopolized by “people who know” instead ofbeing fully exercised and enjoyed by the “people from below.” The former aggressively remediate
our understanding of the world, limiting our capacity for changing it. There is the gatekeeping of392Book Reviews

democratization, its subjection to problematically nationalist, elitist, religious, partisan, conservative, and even right-wing and counterrevolutionary pursuits. Who has the right to say anddetermine what democracy is and what determines its course? The authenticity expert? The
religious cleric? Art curators and critics? Government bureaucrats? Old elites seeping into newpolitics, displaying their revanchism in the public sphere? Strassler’s book is a perceptive studyof the visual in a time of neoliberal democracy, and we hold our breath for more of her work.
JPaul S. Manzanilla
The Integrative Center for Humanities Innovation,
Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University

Ramayana Theater in Contemporary Southeast Asia
Madoka Fukuoka, ed.
Singapore: Jenny Stanford Publishing, 2023.
Ramayana Theater in Contemporary Southeast Asia provides an introduction to Ramayana performances across contemporary Southeast Asia, with chapters on Cambodia (Sam-Ang Sam on a rangeof Khmer art forms inspired by the Reamker), Thailand (Hinata Shinsuke on Khon masked danceand Hiramatsu Hideki on Ramayana-inspired films by Chaiyo Studio), Indonesia (Umeda Hideharu
on Wayang puppet theater in Bali and Fukuoka Madoka on Sendratari dance drama in Java), Singapore(Takemura Yoshiaki on dance performance in the Indian diaspora community of Singapore), andJapan (Fukuoka Shota on Ramayana displays at the National Museum of Ethnology in Japan).
Each of the contributors has taken care to make their work accessible to non-specialists, so
the book should be of interest not only to Ramayana scholars but also to scholars working inSoutheast Asian media studies more generally. While the title refers to Ramayana “theater,” thechapters actually cover a wide range of performance media including dance, song, film, animation,
comic books—what the editor calls “dramatic art forms”—along with other visual arts as well as
cultural practices such as astrology. For readers unfamiliar with the Indian Ramayana, there is anappendix with a summary of Valmiki’s Sanskrit Ramayana, which is an important point of reference
for all the performance traditions discussed in the book.
The chapters are written such that they can be read independently. This results in someredundancy, as historical background about the Ramayana is provided repeatedly. However, eachtime the writers present the specific literary and performance history in a way that is most relevantto their own national context, providing a kind of crash course in the many centuries of Ramayana
literature and performances throughout Southeast Asia.
Because the chapters are introductory overviews, they do not engage in detailed critical orBook Reviews393

theoretical analysis, although they do provide hints about the approaches that would be most
relevant within each context. For example, globalization and cultural heritage preservation areimportant themes in Sam-Ang Sam’s chapter about Khmer arts both in Cambodia and in the
Cambodian diaspora. Government cultural policies play a key role in Takemura Yoshiaki’s chapter
about the Singapore government’s involvement in Ramayana preservation efforts and also in
Fukuoka Shota’s chapter about the evolving presentation of Ramayana-related materials at the
National Museum of Ethnology in Japan. Tourism culture and “tourist gaze” is another recurrent
theme, as in Umeda Hideharu’s discussion of Kecak performances in Bali which date back to the
1930s and Fukuoka Madoka’s chapter on Sendratari dance drama in Java.
Each chapter references the political contexts that shaped the meaning of the Ramayana in
different places at different times throughout Southeast Asia. In her introduction to the book,
Fukuoka Madoka discusses Suharto’s support for Ramayana puppet theater performances during
the economic crisis in Indonesia in the late 1990s. Hiramatsu Hideki situates Chaiyo Studio’s
Hanuman vs. 7 Ultraman in the context of strained Japanese-Thai relations in the early 1970s,
with the Thai hero Hanuman fighting side by side with Ultraman, a Japanese hero, retelling astory from the Thai Ramakien in the tokusatsu style of Japanese film. Writing about Ramayana
theater in Cambodia, Sam-Ang Sam discusses the teaching of traditional arts to the second generationof Khmer-Americans whose parents fled the Khmer Rouge regime. Hinata Shinsuke discusses
more recent events, describing tensions between Thailand and Cambodia regarding the origin andownership of Ramayana performance traditions in light of the 2018 UNESCO decision to include
Ramayana art forms from both Thailand and Cambodia on the Intangible Cultural Heritage list.
Several studies in the book demonstrate how media such as film and comic books have popularized elite performance art forms to reach new audiences. New technologies also play a role.
For example, Takemura Yoshiaki looks at how Facebook can make performances available to global
audiences, as with Singapore’s Indian Heritage Center’s CultureFest 2020 (Digital Edition)—a“festival focused on the richness of Indian arts, culture, and heritage as seen through the lens of
the Ramayana” (p. 125)—which reached well over a million people in Singapore and beyond via
Facebook.
The book itself takes advantage of a new technology platform as well: thanks to the power ofYouTube, it is possible to enjoy three brand-new Ramayana performances by Indonesian artists thatwere commissioned as part of this project. These commissioned artworks are accessible at theeditor’s YouTube channel via QR codes and URLs supplied in the book. The descriptions of theseartworks appear in the final part of the book, along with supplementary materials from the artists:• Didik Nini Thowok, an internationally renowned cross-gender dancer, plays the role of Hanuman’s
lover, Urang Rayung, in a new performance that he created, inspired by both Indonesian andCambodian sources.
• Nanang Ananto Wicaksono, a “post-traditional” shadow puppet artist and animator, has created394Book Reviews

a new animated film that depicts Rama’s despair when he loses Sita despite his victory overRavana.
• Ken Steven, a choral music composer, uses both song and dance to tell the story of Sita’s trial
by fire, with a chorus of performers from Voice of Bali (who also have their own YouTube
channel).

These three works of art provide a kind of portal through which one can see many of the themes
discussed in the chapters come to life in actual performance. For example, consider the theme ofgender, which is central to the plot tensions of the Ramayana story. Didik Nini Thowok wears amask when he dances, with exquisite beauty, as the sea goddess, and then in the book he is seen
posing for a photograph after the performance, holding the mask in his hands—what does that
juxtaposition tell us about gender as performance? In Nanang Ananto Wicaksono’s animated film,
the character of Ravana appears in traditional wayang style, but then his heads begin to multiply:
one pops up out of his head, and then another, and then the heads start popping out of other partsof his body until one sees the ten heads of Ravana, although depicted emerging from his body in a
way that is different from any traditional style of representation. Then those heads separate
from Ravana’s body and participate independently in the fight with Rama, a visual drama that is
possible only through the new medium of animated film. It is a perfect example of the blending ofold and new which is a recurrent theme in the chapters of the book. So too with globalizationand disparate cultural influences: just listen to the unexpected harmonies of Ken Steven’s Sinta
Obong that are used to depict the traditional drama of Sita’s trial by fire (pati obong); one can evensee how the harmonies are arranged, because Steven’s musical score is also included in the book.
In addition to the artworks commissioned for the book, one of the chapters—“Death of
Kumbhakarna: Interpretation of the Story by Dalang of Balinese Wayang”—comes from an
ethnomusicologist, Umeda, who is also a Japanese dalang puppeteer. Thus, his scholarship is
informed by his own experience as a performer of the Kumbhakarna story, based on a script helearned in the 1990s from I Nyoman Sumandi, a puppeteer from Tunjuk, Tabanan in Bali.
Each chapter is accompanied by a detailed bibliography for both primary sources and secondary
scholarship. While the focus of the chapters is on performance traditions, there is also much useful
information regarding written Ramayana traditions; for example, Hinata’s chapter on Khon performance in Thailand includes a detailed account of the Ramakien textual tradition, and Fukuoka
Shota’s chapter on the Ramayana in Japan provides a fascinating version of the Ramayana story
from the Hobutsushu, a twelfth-century Japanese Buddhist text. The religious diversity of Southeast
Asia is another important theme throughout the book, including both the Buddhist elements invarious Southeast Asian Ramayana traditions and Islamic elements in Indonesia.
In sum, this volume is a welcome addition to what might be called the “many Ramayanas”
genre that began with Paula Richman’s edited volume Many Ramayanas: The Diversity of a Narrative
Tradition in South Asia (University of California Press, 1991), which included A. K. Ramanujan’s

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1987 essay “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation.”Thanks to Fukuoka Madoka and her collaborators, the many Ramayanas of Southeast Asia havenow been made more accessible not just to scholars and specialists but also to a general audienceof all readers who want to learn more about one of the world’s greatest epic traditions.
Laura Gibbs
University of Oklahoma (retired); LauraGibbs.net

In the Shadow of the Palms: More-Than-Human-Becomings in West Papua
Sophie Chao
Durham: Duke University Press, 2022.
Nausea. Anger. Grief. With these three words, Sophie Chao introduces the reader to the feelings
that overwhelm her whenever she drives through the vast, monotonous fields of monocrop oil
palm that blanket Marind lands in West Papua. Two years after I first read Chao’s book, I am still
viscerally affected by her powerful portrayals of Marind communities and the devastation towhich they have been subjected. They make me shudder.
Nausea. Chao’s poetic and poignant style of writing enables the reader to feel revulsion at
the destruction of Marind lifeworlds, which comprise human and more-than-human kin, mostespecially the generous, nurturing sago palm. Marind people are also nauseous: they retch withthe fumes of agricultural chemicals and choking smoke from corporate forest clearing. They
recoiled when Chao offered to show them drone footage of the surrounding plantations: the sightof tens of thousands of hectares of decimated forest was too distressing. Anger. Chao explores
the corporate greed and the false promises of development and jobs that government officials rollout to justify the ruin that plantations cause. Marind people are angry, but they must be careful
about expressing anger in a context of repression and retribution. Grief. Chao clarifies that what
has been lost is gone forever. Marind people know there is no way to reconstitute their multispecies
lifeworlds or the memories, stories, and dreams that anchored them to particular landscapes andevents. They survive, but they are not healthy: shorn of access to sago palms and the plants andanimals that sustained them, they eat white rice and instant noodles, if they can afford them.
Cassowaries that belong in the forest wander into hamlets confused and lost, unsure where they
are supposed to be. Dreams are nightmares that bring no rest. Skin dries up and loses its shine.
Rivers cease to flow. Everything is out of kilter.
Together with Pujo Semedi, I have studied West Kalimantan’s oil palm plantation zone andthe particular form of domination to which customary communities are subjected when their landis occupied by corporations (Li and Semedi 2021). The violence we witnessed in West Kalimantan

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was mainly “infrastructural”: once community forests and farms have been flattened by bulldozers
and a plantation is installed, the violence is built into the landscape and there is little further needfor guns and guards. Yet in West Papua, as Chao explains, arrests, beatings, and mysterious disappearances are ongoing; the military and police are directly and continuously involved in surveillanceand patrols; plantation roads are guarded by men with guns; and activists and researchers are
exposed to attack. For Marind people, crossing a plantation to get to remnant patches of sago
forest is a dangerous venture. Everything is company property. Like the lost cassowary, Marind
people struggle to figure out where they are supposed to be in a hostile landscape that has noplace for them.
Tragically, the desolate world Chao describes is the future: almost all the land in Sumatra andKalimantan that is suited for oil palm has already been licensed to oil palm corporations—22 million
hectares thus far, a third of Indonesia’s farmland. Now the corporations are fixated on Papua as
the new frontier. Much of the land in Papua is peatland and swamp forest, quite unsuited for oil
palm, but corporations owned by multinationals and Indonesian tycoons are taking it anyway—more
than 3 million hectares thus far—backed by government officials who are paid for issuing plantation
licenses (Varkkey 2012; Transformasi untuk Keadilan Indonesia [TuK] 2018; Chain Reaction
Research 2019). Hence, money will still flow, contractors will contract, forests will be felled, androads will be built even if not a single palm is planted.
In the government’s eyes, as Chao shows, Marind people are primitives and their dependence
on the forests is evidence of their backwardness. Their success in sustaining themselves forcountless generations with knowledge and skill count for nothing since they do not produce formarkets and furnish no profits for middlemen or payoffs to government officials. According toIndonesia’s land law, Marind people have no legal right to their customary land—they are mere
squatters on the state-claimed forest. Hence, from a government perspective, taking over theirlands and forests has no cost—and as for the people, they are, in the words of the anthropologist
Clifford Geertz, “like mosquitos,” a nuisance to be flicked out of the way (Geertz 1963, 110).
Corporations and their government allies make no provisions for how Marind people andother customary landholders will sustain themselves once their land and forest is gone. The
prospect of plantation jobs is hollow since most jobs go to migrants, and many Marind hesitate towork for corporations that have wreaked such devastation. But sustaining themselves in the old
way is increasingly difficult: plantation corporations do not just occupy some of the land, they occupy
all of it; and when multiple plantations are located side by side, they leave no space for customary
landholders to survive. Rather, plantations “creep right up to the edge of the villages, encroachingon sago groves, hunting zones, sacred graveyards, and ceremonial sites” (p. 20). Marind people
cannot move away to avoid oil palms; they are forced to live in their shadow.
As the map in Fig. 1 shows, in the district of Merauke, where Chao focused her research, oilpalm plantation concessions (white lines), industrial timber plantation concessions (white dashes),

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Fig. 1 Merauke District, West Papua
Source: Nusantara Atlas (2022)

and logging concessions (dotted lines) have taken control over huge areas, excluding previous land
users and land uses in the name of corporate-led development.
Chao brings to her writing two sensibilities: that of an activist researching the dispossessory
dynamics of oil palm expansion across the Southeast Asian region (Colchester and Chao 2011),
and that of an anthropologist steeped in contemporary theorizing around multispecies being andcritiques of the residual coloniality of anthropology. This book demonstrates both sensibilities,
but its tone is set by the second: it is the words, practices, and analyses of Chao’s Marind interlocutors and their entanglement with multispecies kin, living and dead, that direct the narrative.
The author explains how she designed her fieldwork in collaboration with her Marind hosts,
respecting their decisions about what she should write about and how they wanted their lives
and struggles to be represented. The book is based on 18 months of fieldwork, much of it spent
with Marind families in the sago groves. It was during these ventures that Chao learned how
Marind people live, work, play, recall histories and adventures, and map out their worlds throughstories and relationships. The subject matter could easily lend itself to exoticism, but there is no
trace of it in Chao’s careful prose. Nor does Chao succumb to the temptation to end the bookwith a redemptive twist—as if Marind peoples’ survivance somehow outweighs the devastationand the reader can relax. Chao notes that she is still haunted by everything she experienced, andI am still haunted by her writing. It is an exceptional book on all counts—theoretically astute,ethnographically rigorous, and above all profoundly moving.

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Book Reviews

Tania Murray Li
University of Toronto
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3360-8146
References
Chain Reaction Research. 2019. 28 Percent of Indonesia’s Palm Oil Landbank Is Stranded. Chain
Reaction Research - Sustainability Risk Analysis. https://chainreactionresearch.com/report/28percent-of-indonesias-palm-oil-landbank-is-stranded/, accessed April 22, 2024.
Colchester, Marcus and Chao, Sophie, eds. 2011. Oil Palm Expansion in South East Asia: Trends and
Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forest Peoples
Programme and Sawit Watch.
Geertz, Clifford. 1963. Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Li, Tania Murray and Semedi, Pujo. 2021. Plantation Life: Corporate Occupation in Indonesia’s Oil
Palm Zone. Durham: Duke University Press.
Nusantara Atlas. 2022. Atlas of Deforestation and Industrial Plantations in Indonesia. Nusantara Atlas.
https://map.nusantara-atlas.org/?s=c3bd3baead6b67739d0a1a3e882e7d87, accessed April 22, 2024.
Transformasi untuk Keadilan Indonesia(TuK). 2018. Tycoons in the Indonesian Palm Oil. TuK Indonesia.
https://www.tuk.or.id/2019/03/tycoon-in-the-indonesian-palm-oil/?lang=en, accessed April 22,
2024.
Varkkey, Helena. 2012. Patronage Politics as a Driver of Economic Regionalisation: The Indonesian
Oil Palm Sector and Transboundary Haze. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(3): 314–329. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-8373.2012.01493.x.

Public Health in Asia during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Global Health
Governance, Migrant Labour, and International Health Crises
Anoma P. van der Veere, Florian Schneider, and Catherine Yuk-ping Lo, eds.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022.
Global Health and South Asia in a Time of Crisis: A Short Review
Introduction
Even though the Covid-19 pandemic may soon be behind us, researchers will be occupied foryears trying to better understand its causes and how to handle the complex issues it brought up(Ali et al. 2024). Choosing the right actions required to address public health concerns in an effective
manner while preserving confidence in public authority will be one of the challenges facing
policymakers going forward (Aslam and Gunaratna 2022). In that regard Public Health in Asia during
the COVID-19 Pandemic is relevant and provides some guidance, though it leaves certain significant
holes unfilled. The chapters in this edited volume provide an extensive study of the worldwide

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public health crisis that has plagued the world since January 2020, as well as how labor migration—a crucial component of the global political economy—complicated the virus’s spread. However,the selection of case studies feature examples that are too distinct from one another to produce
workable policy recommendations. And some of the important players have been left out of thedebate on migrant labor despite its being recognized as a crucial aspect of global health governance.

Theme and Goals of the Book
The editors’ main contention is that because Asia is a diverse continent, its nations responded tothe pandemic in a variety of ways. However, the inclusion of Malaysia and Indonesia raises
concerns about the exclusion of other significant nations such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and
the Philippines, all of which rank among the top ten sending countries in the world for migrantarrivals. The book would have benefited from these nations’ perspectives since it claims to be a
discussion on transnational labor migration in connection with public health in Asia. These additions would undoubtedly have resulted in a longer book, though simply one chapter per nation
would not have provided enough room for all crucial concerns. The briefness of the book’s chapters,
which provides limited opportunity for policy prescription and analysis, is another drawback.
Despite its drawbacks, the book clarifies that East Asian nations were prompt in their pandemic
response. Thankfully, none of the writers have adopted the clumsy defense that the success of
East Asian regimes may be explained by a common Confucian history and the presumed greater
willingness of inhabitants to submit to rulers. Instead, the chapters emphasize the various aspectsof state capacity that are either enabled or hindered by a small number of crucial policy decisions.
As is sometimes the case with edited volumes with several contributors, the writings in thiscollection offer a range of viewpoints on the same subject. With the notable exception of the threecoeditors, who are qualified to conduct research on global health, public policy, and politicalcommunication in East Asia, the majority of the contributors are experts on migration studies in
the region. They have produced concise, factual chapters that include a surprising number ofcurrent online references. The editors’ lack of expertise in migration studies may account for why
only two of the four essays in the section on transnational migration truly address the issue.

Covid-19 and Global South Challenges
The volume’s best chapters are the first three, which provide a global background for the initiatives
by Asian governments. In the first chapter, Satoh Haruko points out that China has not been able
to establish itself as a serious competitor to the United States for global leadership in spite of its
economic expansion in the early stages of the pandemic. According to Koga Kei, the competition
between China and the United States has shown both countries that they would be better off

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learning from each other than depending on outside superpowers. This has given the nations of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations a valuable chance. In their examination of the long-term
effects of SARS’s unexpected spread across Asia two decades ago, Ishikawa Yumi and Kohara Mikidiscover that scientific collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) lessened the
public’s mistrust of governments in the wake of the pandemic. Significant details are added to thestory in the next four chapters. I wish there had been a chapter on the ways in which South Asiansocieties handled Covid-19 under the most challenging conditions, including widespread poverty
and constrained state capacity. Surprisingly, these societies fared better than many much wealthiernations.
In response to the argument that China had an excessive influence on the WHO’s decision
making during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, Gong Xue and Li Xirui contend that
China’s contribution to the organization was insufficient for it to have undue influence. They goon to say that China’s health diplomacy backfired and that its fragmented and illiberal governancehindered it from responding to the pandemic in a timely and effective manner. In his chapter,
Brendan Howe contends that despite the major powers’ challenges in managing the pandemic,
middle-sized nations like South Korea took advantage of the opportunity to excel internationallyby closely following the WHO’s guidelines, and they did so rather well. Catherine Yuk-ping Lo’scase study of Taiwan reveals an even more startling paradox: despite being shut out from the global
community due to pressure from China, Taiwan managed to limit the impact of the pandemic.
Taiwan made the case for its involvement in the WHO by taking required actions prior to theglobal organization declaring the outbreak as a public health emergency of international concern(PHEIC). Anoma van der Veere argues in his chapter that Japan’s suspicion of the WHO stemmed
from the organization’s perceived over-deference to China, a perception that was reinforced by
the WHO’s delay in issuing the declaration of a PHEIC. The main lesson to be learned from thesefour chapters is that even if the WHO’s reputation was severely damaged by mistrust stemmingfrom the acts of major powers, it could still support global governance through cooperative efforts
amongst smaller nations.
The volume’s third section discusses domestic Covid-19 reaction strategies. In their chapter,
Nurliana Kamaruddin and Zokhri Idris note the value of a competent civil service in maintaining
national unity in Malaysia in times of political unrest. They also observe that the pandemic madepolitical authorities aware of the need to consider migrant workers’ rights in order to balance thegoals of economic expansion, political stability, and health security. The Korean government’s
acceptance of multilateralism and collaboration with the WHO in response to Covid-19 is discussed
by Kim Eun Mee and Song Jisun, with the important caveat that the public lacks faith in the WHO.
Nguyen Anh Tuyet observes that prior to the WHO issuing its Covid-19 warning, Vietnam, like
Taiwan, took early steps to restrict movements across its border with China. The nation’s relative
success in containing the spread of the disease may be attributed to this early intervention,

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401

though worries about the sustainability of this achievement will persist given the underfunding forthe care of vulnerable groups such as the elderly. Studying the relationship between the state andsociety in Vietnam during the pandemic, Mirjam Le and Franziska Nicolaisen note that mobilizing
the populace through nationalist appeals guaranteed adherence to public measures to contain the
pandemic and strengthened the regime’s legitimacy. However, they come to the same conclusion
as Nguyen, noting that these gains were undermined by a lack of transparency and inadequate
care for economically vulnerable populations. This section’s value is diminished by the choice ofcase studies: two chapters focus on the same nation (Vietnam), and the other nations (Malaysia
and South Korea) are so dissimilar that it is hard to draw any meaningful conclusions about thebest ways to handle a health emergency like Covid-19.
The book’s fourth section is even less successful: just two of the four chapters fulfill thepromise made to explore how the pandemic affected international migration and the world economy.
Lo emphasizes the degree to which China’s Covid-19 containment measures compromised theChinese Communist Party’s (CCP) performative legitimacy and the extent to which the nation’s
confinement threatened to undermine Li Keqiang’s proposed “dual circulation strategy” for economic
growth. The strategy called for a greater reliance on domestic consumption and a decreased
reliance on exports. The Covid-19 pandemic caused significant losses in international migration,a subject that is not addressed in this chapter. The problem of international migration is tackled
head on in the second and fourth chapters. Liu Mei-Chun draws attention to the vulnerability of
Taiwan’s public health system stemming from a lack of health coverage for migrant live-in caregiversof senior patients. She advises that the gap needs to be closed in order to limit the outbreak andprotect the general public’s health. Shibata Saori notes that the WHO’s and national governments’attempts to offer guidance on public health were impacted by the socioeconomic structures invarious nations. The different versions of capitalism that exist in many nations affected thesenations’ ability to manage public health during the Covid-19 epidemic. Sylvia Yazid examines
sending nations on the other side of the labor migration spectrum. She notes that Indonesia needs
to address both the danger of transmission posed by workers returning home and the domestic
pandemic situation at the same time.

Concluding Thoughts
In summary, though this is a valuable collection of writings, the imbalance in case studies is oneof its shortcomings. One chapter per country would have been plenty. An additional chapter on
any of the nations discussed would have been insufficient to make up for the knowledge that
could have been gleaned from the experiences of other significant Asian nations that surprised
everyone by much being less affected by the pandemic than could have been anticipated given
their circumstances.

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It would have been good to hear about the policies of Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh,
India, and Pakistan. These five nations, each in their own unique manner, produced outstanding
outcomes (Ryan 2020). When it comes to the number of fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants, Taiwan,
South Korea, and the three heavily populated South Asian nations performed better than Japan,
and the Philippines’ death toll was almost identical to Japan’s. These nations did not see the same
death rates as wealthier Western European nations despite their comparatively low public investment in healthcare.
Muhammad Asad Latif
Department of Islamic Studies, Islamia University Bahawalpur
http://orcid.org/0009-0006-9378-9953
References
Ali, Manhal; Akhtar, Rakib; and Islam, Mohammad Tarikul, eds. 2024. COVID-19 in South Asia: Society,
Economics and Politics. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003477563.
Aslam, Mohd Mizan and Gunaratna, Rohan, eds. 2022. COVID-19 in South, West, and Southeast Asia:
Risk and Response in the Early Phase. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003291909.
Ryan, J. Michael, ed. 2020. COVID-19, Volume 1: Global Pandemic, Societal Responses, Ideological
Solutions. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003142089.

Just Another Crisis? The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Southeast
Asia’s Rice Sector
Jamie S. Davidson, ed.
Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023.
Nearly all fields of social science have analyzed the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Just Another Crisis? focuses on the pandemic’s impact on the agricultural sector in Southeast
Asia. This edited volume is based on the academic products of an online seminar held during
the pandemic, in December 2021, by the National University of Singapore. The editor and thecontributors, who attended the seminar, are experts on food, agricultural policy, and economics
from research institutes in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. As
indicated by its subtitle—The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Southeast Asia’s Rice Sector—
the book sets out to evaluate the pandemic’s impact on the rice sector in Southeast Asia. The
significant worldwide negative impacts of the pandemic on the industry and service sectors can beeasily imagined. However, a novel conclusion of this book is that the pandemic did not cause aserious rice crisis in Southeast Asia, although it did have other negative effects, such as a widening

Book Reviews403

of the inequity gap and increased food insecurity among people experiencing poverty. It is suggested that one of the main reasons for this outcome is that, even though unpredictable ecologicalfactors naturally influence agricultural production in Southeast Asia, the region had good rice
harvests during the period due to favorable weather conditions. The damage from and social
reactions to the pandemic were more severe and restrictive in urban areas, affecting urban
economies more than rural areas and agriculture. Furthermore, as reported in Chapter 4, rural
areas absorbed urban workers who were unemployed due to the pandemic, which potentiallymitigated the negative impact (this point is discussed further below).
Given the pandemic’s mild impact on the rice sector, the authors did not find any significant
agricultural policy reform in Southeast Asian countries during the period. The findings might bea bit removed from those expected at the initial stage of this research project; however, the authors
immediately discovered another space for their academic work. They paid attention to important
policies set up before the pandemic in each country’s rice sector, carefully examined their subsequent developments during the pandemic, and elaborated on the expected directions in the
post-pandemic period. As a result, this book covers not only the impact of the pandemic on therice sector but also a broader review of rice policies, a review of the historical background, and ananalysis of long-term national policies. The authors have ties to policymakers in each country,
which allowed them to closely examine the details of the cases while considering the national
context. The profound knowledge and experience of the authors make this book a valuable
contribution.
Chapter 1, by Jamie S. Davidson, the book’s editor, lies at the core of the work. It provides a
general background and concisely presents the volume’s major findings. This chapter is also the
hub for the following five chapters, providing insightful summaries of them. Chapters 2 to 6 deal
with the detailed cases of five Southeast Asian countries, which may be classified into three types
based on their international supply and demand for rice: the importer countries of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, which despite their substantial rice production regularly import
the commodity to help meet domestic demand; the pure importer, Singapore, whose position is
exceptional in Southeast Asia; and the big exporter, Thailand, which has long produced a significant
surplus of rice. The case studies are valuable records of dynamics in the agricultural sector(especially rice policies) during the pandemic, a historic worldwide crisis, providing specific hints
to researchers and policymakers in the region to be ready for the next crisis.
The different types of Southeast Asian countries are united with regard to the political significance of rice. Even though the relative importance of agriculture in their national economies
has steadily decreased, their rice-related policies—with respect to international trade, pricecontrols, subsidies, and so on—have been prioritized. The conventional framework addresses
the old but unsettled dilemmas of producer or consumer, rural or urban, and agriculture or otherindustries; these are closely related to debates on national food security and the mitigation of

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Book Reviews

economic disparity (poverty alleviation)—in other words, the “production versus livelihood”
framework referred to in Chapter 1. Vested interests also come into play.
Chapter 2, by Fatimah Mohamed Arshad, reveals the historical development of Malaysia’s
rice policy by analyzing the subsectors from input to consumer over an extended period, including
previous rice price crises. Arshad points out problems with the government’s strong commitment,such as monopolized rice imports and centralized distribution of agricultural input.
In the Philippines, the liberalization of rice imports was enacted before the pandemic. Chapter
3, by Roehlano M. Briones and Isabel B. Espineli, explains that the policy resulted in cheaper prices
in the domestic rice market, suggesting that prices stabilized under the policy even though Vietnam,a major rice exporter, temporarily suspended exports during the pandemic. Consumers in thePhilippines would have welcomed the situation, but support for domestic producers was necessary.
Liberalization in the rice sector was a controversial issue and, according to Briones and Espineli,
could have caused political instability.
Chapter 4, by Bustanul Arifin, deals with the case of Indonesia, including a discussion of
government intervention in the rice sector. Interestingly, it reports that the growth of the agricultural sector during the pandemic partially contributed to Indonesia’s riding out the recession,
although the country suffered a high death rate and negative economic impact. Compared with
the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, the impact of the pandemic was lesssevere, at least in the Indonesian rice sector, and the latter may be said to have been “just anothercrisis.”In Thailand also, rice is an issue according to the conventional framework, but in the context
of an exporter. Chapter 5, by Thanapan Laiprakobsup and Manthana Noksawak, finds that the
government has historically controlled domestic prices and taxed rice farmers. The authors
examine the recently implemented subsidy program and the income guarantee policy to support
producers. A large number of farmers could be an important political actor in democracy in general.
The chapter finds that rice farmers have been left behind in Thailand, recently as well as during
the pandemic.
Singapore’s food security is guaranteed by economic liberalism; thus, this was the country
whose food sector was most affected by the pandemic. Chapter 6, by Jose Ma. Luis Montesclaros
and Paul S. Teng, finds that Singapore paid more attention to its national food security after the
pandemic, learning from the experiences of Vietnam’s rice export restriction during the pandemic
and the previous global food price crisis in the 2000s. The authors insist on the necessity of animport diversification strategy.
While this volume highlights the commercial aspects of rice production and distribution,
especially in the international market, rice has another aspect as an staple subsistence crop in
Southeast Asia. It is important in Southeast Asia at the household level as well as the national
level. It is consumed extensively by rural residents, and the amount required for domestic

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405

consumption is much larger than the amount exported and imported—although the ratio of therural population to the urban population and the share of rice in household expenditure (as shownin the table on p. 12) have decreased in recent years. The impact of the pandemic on the rice (oragricultural) sector in Southeast Asia might have been softened by the subsistence nature of rice
farming in the region.
Meaningful socioeconomic relations between rural and urban areas in Southeast Asia emerged
during the pandemic. Chapter 4 points out that in Indonesia, many urban laborers who temporarily
lost their jobs returned to rural areas and engaged in the agricultural sector during the Asian
Financial Crisis in the late 1990s as well as during the pandemic. The author refers to this as the“ruralization phenomenon” (p. 106). Such functioning of rural areas and agriculture as a safety net
during an economic crisis has been observed widely in Southeast Asia. Rural villages in Northeast
Thailand absorbed unemployed urban laborers from Bangkok during the Asian Financial Crisis(Sukaesinee et al. 2004) as well as the financial crisis in the late 2000s (Tomita et al. 2018); thesame phenomenon seems to have occurred also during the pandemic. In Myanmar also, many
international migrants to Thailand and Malaysia returned to their villages during the pandemic.
Takahashi Akio (2020) found an economic shift from non-farm to farm work within rural villages
during the pandemic in Myanmar, referring to it as “re-agrarianization” and pointing out theimportant role of agriculture as a fallback sector during a crisis. Many urban workers in Southeast
Asia have the option to return to rural areas, where the cost of living is cheaper, and to work inagriculture if they choose. The pandemic shed light on the enduring rural–urban social bonds,
which have existed for a long time and continue to exist even in contemporary Southeast Asia,
where de-agrarianization has taken place. This could be an indication of society’s resilience toshocks such as the pandemic, supported by the subsistence aspect of agriculture.
Matsuda Masahiko 松田正彦
College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University
https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6305-5203
References
Sukaesinee Subhadhira; Suchint Simarks; and Somjai Srila. 2004. The Economic Crisis and Rural
Households in Thailand: Impact and Response. Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 42(1):46–59. https://doi.org/10.20495/tak.42.1_46.
Takahashi Akio 髙橋昭雄. 2020. Myanma ni okeru “shingata korona kiki” to murabito tachi ミャンマー
における「新型コロナ危機」と村人たち [“COVID-19 crisis” and rural people in Myanmar].
Myanmar Economic and Management Institute. July. http://japanmyanmar.or.jp/memi.html, accessed
December 6, 2023.
Tomita Shinsuke; Lopez, Mario Ivan; and Kono Yasuyuki. 2018. The Role of Small-Scale Farming inFamilial Care: Reducing Work Risks Stemming from the Market Economy in Northeast Thailand.
International Journal of Social Quality 8(1): 88–109. https://doi.org/10.3167/IJSQ.2018.080106.

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Book Reviews

Sea Nomads of Southeast Asia: From the Past to the Present
Bérénice Bellina, Roger Blench, and Jean-Christophe Galipaud, eds.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2021.
Sea Nomads of Southeast Asia: From the Past to the Present offers a fresh perspective on sea nomadrelated issues by presenting, linking, and formulating new insights through a multidisciplinary lens.
The book’s contributors, who previously focused on different research areas, bring a broader
perspective to studying maritime culture, history, archeology, and area studies related to sea
nomads. Their research findings, fused into one cohesive volume, shed light on the sea nomads
of Southeast Asia and highlight the importance of further exploring this topic.
This book delves into the nuanced issues faced by the Sama-Bajau, Orang Laut, and Moken/
Moklen communities within their local contexts. Through case studies spanning Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Myanmar and some that mention sea nomads in the Philippines, readers are presented
with ethnographic and longitudinal data critically analyzed through various approaches and methodologies. The volume covers topics ranging from history and archeology to diaspora, genome,
language, and intercultural trading across its 14 chapters.
This book is the second synthetic research project on sea nomads in Southeast Asia. The
first research book on them was written by David E. Sopher (1965), an edited version of his PhD
dissertation. Sopher used the literature review method to present the relationship and single
identity of sea nomads in insular Southeast Asia. He profiled the general information of each sea
nomad group through a single lens as a cultural geographer. However, since his research method
was based on armchair philosophizing, details and grassroots issues regarding sea nomads were
not considered in his book, titled The Sea Nomads. However, Sea Nomads of Southeast Asia
highlights diverse aspect of sea nomads, such as their nomadic nature, cultural time frame, language,
and history. One minor limitation of this book is that it uses data and issues irrelevant to thecomplexities of sea nomads in the contemporary world (even though the subtitle of the volume is
From the Past to the Present)—for example, differences and differentiations within subgroups andemerging challenges such as land title issues, borders, nationalities, massive tourism development,
conservation agenda, and climate change. In addition, it seems that the writing style for eachchapter uses an ethnographic approach rather than action research. As the world is fast evolving,
action research is urgently needed for sea nomads to increase their self-determination, increase
their rights to resources, improve their livelihoods, and deal with other development alternatives.
As outlined in the book, a multidisciplinary approach is one of the keys to tackling developmental challenges, acknowledging the sea nomads’ marine transboundary activities, and protecting
their historical pledges. The contributors have dedicated their efforts to illuminating the uniqueobstacles faced by sea nomads, aiming to increase awareness and inspire action. By examining theintersection of various issues, the contributors have underscored the importance of sea nomads

Book Reviews407

within the broader context of development and maritime culture in insular Southeast Asia. Chapter
11 in particular, by Ayesha Pamela Rogers and Richard Engelhardt, offers valuable insights into
resilience and adaptive capacity that can inform co-management programs involving sea nomads
and other stakeholders. Such knowledge is essential for navigating contemporary developments
in marine resource governance.
This book offers a comprehensive exploration of nomadism from prehistory to modern times,
including the Holocene and the transition to the Anthropocene. Despite extensive research onsea nomads, there is still much to be uncovered, as the identification and interpretation of thesecommunities are multifaceted. The contributors to this volume have made several attempts totrace the evolution of sea nomadism through archeological records and modern genetics, as
explained in Chapter 7 by Pradiptajati Kusuma et al. However, sea nomad communities have faceda particular bias due to a lack of cultural remains, leading to their archeological invisibility.
Examining their cultural beliefs and movements is rudimentary to understanding sea nomadism.
Cynthia Chou’s analysis in Chapter 5 offers a fascinating look at the ontology and cultural pledgesof the Orang Suku Laut, including their movements and mapping. Such a critical analysis isinvaluable for gaining a deeper understanding of sea nomadism.
Unfortunately, the demographic data provided in this volume is not up to date. For instance,
there are two identical maps (Maps 1.1 and 6.1) with different titles, both of which use old data
and do not detail the present locations of sea nomads. In the case of Thailand, neither Map 1.1
nor Map 6.1 shows the Urak Lawoi (Orang Laut). The contributors may have assumed Urak Lawoi
to be part of the Moken/Moklen group, whereas actually they are a different subgroup of sea
nomads. Nagatsu Kazufumi (Chapter 14) has mapped the Sama-Bajau diaspora in the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia (Map 14.3). However, the data is neither up to date (a data source from2000 has been used) nor valid, due to the division of villages and changing names. One example
of outdated data in the map is the Sama-Bajau population in Wakatobi Regency, Southeast Sulawesi
Province (for further details, see Ariando and Narumon 2022). Mola Bajau, Wakatobi Regency,
now has five villages while earlier it had only two. Likewise, the data on Orang Laut in Chou’schapter (Map 5.1) is out of date. There have been some changes in the village names and locations
in Batam, Rempang, and Galang Island.
In Chapter 1 (pp. 16–21) the editors provide a comprehensive overview of the interrelated
topics highlighted in the book, from the past to the present. However, upon closer examination,certain chapters only touch on some aspects of sea nomad communities, while others appear unrelated
to the broader topic. It is worth noting that the chapters represent sea nomadism from different
perspectives, particularly when it comes to intercultural relations. Some contributors explore thesubject through the lens of intercultural trading and archeology, focusing on Austronesian groups
or other missions. Topics in their chapters include, for example, the maritime Silk Road; interisland exchange and language in Tetun-Terik, East Timor; the history of trading between insular408Book Reviews

and mainland Southeast Asia; as well as maritime archeology in the South China Sea.
Apart from historical documentation, a new form of post-positivist research has made significant
progress in addressing the current issues faced by sea nomads in Southeast Asia. Issues thatintersect with the study of sea nomads include institutional complexity in marine governance(Ariando et al. 2023), marine collaborative management (Ariando and Narumon 2022), systematic
local knowledge and development alternatives (Narumon 2017), marine resources and fishingpractices (Stacey 2007), and even the challenges faced by sea nomads during the Covid-19 pandemic(Wianti and McWilliam 2023). Although some current issues are briefly mentioned in the book,they are not explored in depth.
Overall, the chapters in this volume are not entirely interconnected, so readers may selectively
concentrate on those that interest them most. The book would have benefited from explanationsof information written in sea nomads’ local languages. This would have helped general readers tobetter understand their way of life. The book could also benefit from the inclusion of sea nomads’
folklore and tales as researched by local historians to connect the past, present, and future.
Additionally, greater consistency in the use of Bajau and Bajaw terminology is needed in Chapter 7.
One particularly noteworthy sentence in the book is: “a significant portion of Southeast Asian
history may need to be revised to include sea nomads” (p. 22). This concise statement encapsulates
the book’s significance and makes it a valuable research resource. We sincerely appreciate theauthors and editors for their exceptional work, and we are confident that this book will offer crucial
insights for future endeavors. Its historical records are of particular value in the study of sea
nomads and mark a significant addition to the existing knowledge about this group of people inSoutheast Asia. We encourage continued research, collaboration, and cultural exchange on sea
nomads in the region propelled by this remarkable contribution.
Wengki Ariando
Center of Excellence on Migration and Development, Asian Research Center for Migration,
Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7244-8475
Narumon Arunotai นฤมล อรุุ โณทััย
Research Unit on Indigenous Peoples and Development Alternatives,
Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University
https://orcid.org/0009-0002-2998-2514
References
Ariando, Wengki and Narumon Arunotai. 2022. The Bajau as a Left-Behind Group in the Context of
Coastal and Marine Co-management System in Indonesia. Journal of Marine and Island Cultures

Book Reviews409

11(1): 260–278. https://doi.org/10.21463/jmic.2022.11.1.18.
Ariando, Wengki; Manan, Abdul; Coulson, Jonthon; and Narumon Arunotai. 2023. Institutional Complexity around Locally Managed Marine Area: A Situation Analysis of “the Bajau” Sea Oriented Communities in Wakatobi. International Journal of Conservation Science 13(2): 731–752. https://doi.
org/10.36868/IJCS.2023.02.24.
Narumon Arunotai. 2017. “Hopeless at Sea, Landless on Shore”: Contextualising the Sea Nomads’
Dilemma in Thailand. In AAS Working Papers in Social Anthropology (Vol. 31), edited by Eva-Maria
Knoll, pp. 1–27. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1553/wpsa31.
Sopher, David Edward. 1965. The Sea Nomads: A Study Based on the Literature of the Maritime Boat
People of Southeast Asia. Singapore: Memoirs of the National Museum.
Stacey, Natasha. 2007. Boats to Burn: Bajo Fishing Activity in the Australian Fishing Zone. Canberra:
ANU E Press.
Wianti, Nur Isiyana and McWilliam, Andrew. 2023. Sama Bajo Resilience in the Time of COVID.
Oceania 93(2): 179–190. https://doi.org/10.1002/ocea.5368.

Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal Security Affairs
Puangthong Pawakapan
Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021.
All of the Thai rulers’ traditional rivals—Burmese, Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese—were demilitarized by being subjected to European colonialism. As a result, the “modern Thai” army (and navy)
had no serious external defense function, and indeed virtually never fought except against“domestic” forces (compare Japan!). The Thai military was mainly a means for internal royalist
consolidation; it was, in addition, an emblem of modernity for the outside world. (Anderson 1978,
202–204)

In his controversial account of Thai studies, titled “Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai
Studies,” Benedict Anderson (1978) pointed out why and how the modern Thai military’s deep
penetration into the domestic political arena was understudied. Thanks to the scholars who heeded
his critique, there gradually emerged studies focusing on the political role of the Thai military,
particularly its role in the modernization and democratization processes in Thailand.
The importance and contribution that Puangthong Pawakapan’s Infiltrating Society makes toThai studies should be understood in this context. Before the early 1980s, the Thai military’s
political role and its active involvement in Thailand’s nation-building processes under the influenceof the popular monarchy were rarely studied. In the “post-counterinsurgency” era from the 1980s,
there was a brief uptick in studies on the political role of the Thai military. Yet, as the author
astutely points out, most of these studies did not pay sufficient attention to the ways in which theThai military, with substantial aid from the palace, strived to control civil society through its
nebulous “civil affairs projects (kitchakan phonlaruean).” Infiltrating Society’s revelation of the
deep permeation of the military in civil society in the cities and rural areas completes the puzzle,

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something that many scholars in Thai studies have long awaited.
Infiltrating Society’s main arguments on the role of the Thai military throughout the counterinsurgency (1960s–1980s) and post-counterinsurgency (1980s to present) can be summarized
in the following three thematic statements. First, the US-led anticommunist counterinsurgency
projects during the Cold War that modernized and expanded the role of the military in Thai
politics and society and also endowed the monarchy with the role of political legitimizer prepared
the ground for the military to continue playing the role of security force and leader of socioeconomic
development in the post-Cold War period. An in-depth analysis of the background of Thailand’scounterinsurgency operations led by the Thai monarchy, Thai military, and United States can befound in Chapter 2. This chapter also sets the context for how the concept of the “political offensive(kanmueang nam kanthahan)” enabled the military to expand its role in the sociopolitical spherefrom the 1980s to the present day. The author stresses that the military’s extended counterinsurgency operations helped to create an intimate relationship between the monarchy and themilitary that provided legitimacy for the latter, helping it to extend its control over the whole ofcivil society. The author notes that the military’s engagement in socioeconomic development“benefitted the military and its traditional allies, allowing them to establish and expand politicalcontrol over society” (p. 59).
Second, at every turning point in Thai political history, the military revamped and expanded
its role as the guardian of the nation through its increased involvement in socioeconomic development projects and propagation of Thai-style democracy, where the monarch acted as the head ofstate. This is extensively discussed in Chapter 3, which begins with an elaborate explanation of
how the “development for security (yutthaphatthana)” concept continued to be modified to further
the cause of the military. In the discussion of the post-counterinsurgency “development for
security” projects, the author delves into military-led projects like Isan Khiao (Green Isan), whichbegan in 1987, and Mulnithi anurak pa roi to 5 changwat (the Five Provinces Bordering Forest
Presentation Foundation) in 1992. The succeeding military regime led by General Prayut Chano-cha similarly devised a forest master plan after the 2014 coup, and its maltreatment of smallscale peasants continued.
It is noteworthy that this chapter points out that the evolving role of the monarch as thedevelopment king paralleled the expansion of the military’s development programs in rural andurban areas: “The definition of development for security in the king’s speech slipped from defeating
communism to ‘a war on poverty’” (p. 70). From the Cold War era, the military and royalist elites
relied on King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who garnered massive support and loyalty from the populace
as their political legitimizer. King Bhumibol’s concern for the Thai people’s well-being, especiallyamid the economic crisis in 1997, gave birth to one of the most widely celebrated philosophies,“sufficiency economy (setthakit phophiang).” The author argues that the promotion of this philosophy by the military and the ruling elites was to demonstrate the highest moral authority of theBook Reviews

411

monarch in sharp contrast to “short-sighted policymakers and politicians” (p. 85), thereby undermining the “legitimacy of politicians and electoral politics” (p. 89). The military and ruling elites’
anxiety about the king’s declining health ultimately led them to make the security of the monarchy“the top priority of internal security policy” (p. 53).
The third schematic statement is that despite the military’s attempts at controlling andsuppressing civil society’s challenges to authoritarian rule, its innate limitations of reliance on
royal charisma and nonprofessionalism in development policies resulted in civil society’s profound
distrust toward the Thai military. Detailed accounts of mass organizations mobilized by the militaryand its political arm, Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), in Chapters 4 and 5 elucidate
the goal and impacts of the military-led political offensives during and after the counterinsurgency
era. Based on these analyses, the author questions the widely accepted interpretation of Prime
Ministerial Orders No. 66/2523 in 1980 and 65/2525 in 1982. According to the author, the “state
victory of the CPT [Communist Party of Thailand]” (p. 15) is not only misleading but also deceiving. There is “no proof that the army was successful in enforcing its political offensive at the groundlevel at all” (p. 112). Yet, the success of the two orders has been propagated to legitimize “themilitary’s role in the socio-political arena in the post-counterinsurgency period” (p. 112).
The author’s reassessment of the two orders highlights the limited impact, if not failure, of
the Thai military’s “political offensive.” Signs of failure were evident from the beginning of thecounterinsurgency era, as the lack of knowledge and enthusiasm to pursue political means among
armed circles caused concern for the military architects themselves (p. 107). As it turned out,
the military leaders did not trust Thai citizens despite their own emphasis on “people participation”
in their political offensive strategies. Citizens were portrayed “as being too ignorant and easily
misled by dangerous organizations or self-serving politicians” (p. 116). The most salient exampleof the military’s misuse of the counterinsurgency strategy is its violent crackdown on civilian
protesters and students at Thammasat University on October 6, 1976.
Through its response to the overextension of military rule and its conceptualization of theThai military’s role in society, Infiltrating Society demonstrates both the scholarly vigors andpersonal courage and, more important, undying desire for the democratization of Thailand, which
this reviewer admires greatly. This reviewer would like to express her deepest gratitude for theauthor’s detailed, carefully thought out, and sharp critique of the relationship between the Thai
military and monarchy. The reviewer would go so far as to say that it will be difficult to find anothersuch bold account by a Thai scholar on Thai military politics in the near future.
Impressed by the author’s insights, this reviewer became more curious about the author’s
perception of the origin and nature of the so-called Thai counterinsurgency era and the Thai
military’s perception of it. Among Thai scholars, especially in security studies, it has been assumed
that the historical event that marks the beginning of the so-called Thai counterinsurgency era is
the “Gun Firing Day (wan siang puen tek)” on August 7, 1965, when an armed group of Communists

412Book Reviews

attacked the police station in Nakhon Phanom Province. The year 1965 was indeed a turning
point, and the establishment of ISOC in that year clearly shows the military’s increased interestin pursuing anticommunist counterinsurgency strategies. If we trace the history further, signs ofincreased Communist activities in the Thai border areas of the North and Northeast were foundfrom the early 1960s, and the Thai military and monarchy certainly did not take too lightly theintelligence on subversive activities from Thai and US security organizations. In particular, whenthe International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was declared in July 1962, the Viet Minh’s
involvement in Lao affairs increased visibly, alongside that of the US government, which came toweigh in more on covert operations. These evolving regional and international developments
prompted the Thai military to become keener on a “political offensive,” which was in essence the“civilian counterinsurgency” strategies exemplified through building strategic hamlets in South
Vietnam. Is it possible to find an earlier historical event that could be considered the beginning of
the Thai counterinsurgency era?
Defining the “counterinsurgency era” also demands additional research on how the meaning
and role of “counterinsurgency” have been understood and put into use by the Thai military.
For instance, Saiyud Kerdpol, the founder of the civilian-police-military (CPM) concept, wasexposed to different types of wars from the 1940s until he attended the US Army Infantry Advanced
Course at Fort Benning in the mid-1950s and was involved in a clandestine US-backed operationin Laos in the 1960s. All these experiences should have had a considerable influence on architecting the CPM. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Saiyud’s concept of counterinsurgency was
not always welcomed by the Thai military, as discussed in the book, leading the reader to wonder
what other concepts of counterinsurgency circulated within the military. This reviewer believes
that supplementary accounts of the meaning and role of counterinsurgency as perceived by theThai military will not only enhance the reader’s understanding of the counterinsurgency era andits continuation in the post-Cold War era but also invite more critical scholarship on the “internal
security affairs” that have been dominated by the Thai military and its allies for over half a century.
Sinae Hyun
Institute for East Asian Studies, Sogang University
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8265-9233
References
Anderson, Benedict. 1978. Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies. In The Study ofThailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics,
History, and Political Science, edited by Eliezer B. Ayal, pp. 193–257. Athens: Ohio University
Center for International Studies.

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413

Postcolonial Configurations: Dictatorship, the Racial Cold War,and Filipino America
Josen Masangkay Diaz
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2023.
Josen Masangkay Diaz’s book is a timely intervention on issues of Filipino identity vis-à-vis thePhilippine diaspora, postcolonial specificity, and authoritarian history. Indeed, Bongbong Marcos’s
victory in the 2022 elections necessitates cutting-edge scholarship on the New Society’s aesthetic
regime and its legacies of violence. Postcolonial Configurations emphasizes the centrality ofFilipino American history in Philippine studies by juxtaposing representative cultural texts alongside the discourses of Marcos’s New Society and the US empire. In each of the four chapters, Diazuses what she calls “postcolonial configuration” as a lens to unravel the cultural, racial, and political
relationship between the Philippines and the United States (p. 8). She uses an interdisciplinary
approach in mapping out this configuration through an eclectic examination of policy reports,
newspapers, and magazines. These include documents from the National Commission on theRole of Filipino Women, the National Housing Authority, and the World Bank.
Diaz also interrogates how the conjugal dictatorship’s discourse fits within the broader geopolitical configuration that resulted from the Cold War. Thus, the author proposes unravelingpostcolonial configurations by analyzing works such as Empire of Memory (1990, Eric Gamalinda),
Insiang (1976, dir. Lino Brocka), and “Teacher, It’s Nice to Meet You, Too” (1985, Ruby Ibañez).
For Diaz, the simultaneous location and dislocation of these configurations can potentially “forge
other critiques and imaginations” (p. 26) that extend the subjectivity of Filipino America. These
postcolonial configurations reveal how the Marcos regime was inextricably entangled with the
hypocrisy of US liberalism, which enabled authoritarianism in Asia in order to contain Communism
in the region.
The first chapter, “The Fictions of National Culture,” explores the “underlying politicalinvestments of the Cold War cultural exchange” between the United States and the Philippines(p. 29). Diaz begins by contextualizing Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society campaign, which
envisioned a United States built on freedom, multiculturalism, and racial justice. The fabricationof this “national culture” allowed the US empire to “supply a discourse for employing racial pluralism
and national progress” (p. 32). Diaz reads the 1966 Manila Summit (centered on the Vietnam War)as a place that enabled the transnational exchange of national cultures in service to foreign policy.
In the summit, First Lady Imelda Marcos and the Bayanihan dance troupe employed “national
culture” to integrate “state fictions . . . within cohesive narratives of global cooperation” (p. 35).
Diaz argues that Marcos similarly constructed a national culture that reconfigured the Philippine
postcolonial condition, which in turn helped legitimize the use of martial law as a way to “manage
economic and political crises” (p. 38). Thus, the construction of the US-funded Cultural Center of414Book Reviews

the Philippines allowed the regime to rehabilitate national culture in its image. Diaz then reads
Eric Gamalinda’s Empire of Memory, a novel centered on two officers from Marcos’s censorship
department (Agency for the Scientific Investigation of the Absurd). The protagonists of the novel
are tasked to create a new history for the Marcoses. Diaz uses this novel “to reconsider national
culture as a configuration of empire and authoritarian statecraft” (p. 29). She argues that thenovel’s distortion of history unmakes the fictional constructs of national culture in the New Society.
By challenging the “historical coherence of Filipino subjectivity” (p. 56), the novel “defamiliarize[s]any one configuration of Filipino America” (p. 57).
The second chapter focuses on another postcolonial configuration, this one made up of thebalikbayan (returnee), squatter communities, and the state policies of the Marcos dictatorship.
The author examines Floy Quintos’s article in Balikbayan Magazine to unmake the “strangely
innocent” figure of the balikbayan, arguing that the figure is intertwined with a “Cold War discourseof postcolonial raciality” as embodied by US immigration law (p. 64). Diaz makes the case that the
Marcos regime created an economic and masculine configuration of the balikbayan that renderedinvisible the role of women in that very configuration (p. 68). Diaz also analyzes how Ferdinand
Marcos’s management of Philippine Airlines and the reconstruction of Manila International Airport(MIA) regulated the mobility of the Philippine diaspora. The regime was able to harness thereturnees’ economic potential while limiting their exposure to the dismal urban conditions ofManila. While MIA allowed the regime to isolate new arrivals from the urban squalor of Manila,
its construction necessitated the displacement of squatter communities. The regime’s rhetoricand policies deemed these communities as a hurdle in the goal to transform Manila into the Cityof Man. Thus, as Diaz writes, the “mandates that governed both the balikbayan and the squatter
used transnational mobility to define the structure of the Filipino polity” (p. 78). Diaz makes thecase that the squatter communities during the Marcos dictatorship “point to the historical andpolitical circumstances” that “made legible the configuration of the balikbayan” (p. 83). Toward
the end, she contends that the present historical moment in both the US and the Philippines speaks“to the incapacity” of the balikbayan configuration to “address the multiple forms of marginalizationand subjugation enabled by Cold War conflict and its attendant transnational alliances” (p. 84).
Chapter 3 focuses on the New Filipina, a configuration constructed by the dictatorship. This
figure is an “important compromise” between Western and Filipino feminism that simultaneously
valorizes agency and the natural role of women as homemakers (p. 85). This configuration sought
to integrate women into the New Society’s narrative of progress and development. What it created
was a culture of labor export built on a narrative of “Life giving labor” as valorized by Imelda Marcos(p. 92). The figure of the New Filipina is also a configuration shaped by the wider Cold War andits ensuing politics. The Marcos regime drew from a wider transnational discourse on human rights
to simultaneously contain the subjectivity of Filipino women in the name of global capital. Thus,
Diaz closely analyzes Lino Brocka’s Insiang, a social realist film that articulates the universality ofBook Reviews

415

gendered suffering. She argues that the “cinematic juxtaposition between beauty and violence inthe film illustrates the extent” to which the regime “structured Filipina women’s suitability fortransnational circulation and labor” (p. 105). Thus, the film shows that the “New Filipina is not apromise of empowerment but an overdetermination of Filipina women’s being” (p. 109).
In the next chapter, Diaz analyzes a configuration that consists of Filipino “raciality” (p. 114),
US Cold War liberal discourse, and international humanitarianism. She argues that the dictatorship“cultivated a discourse of race and gender grounded in the ‘ultimate ideology’ of humanism” thatfurther enabled “the regime’s state of exception” (p. 114). Diaz examines the role of the Philippine
Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) in allowing the Marcos regime to “better position itself
within the demands of Cold War politics” (p. 119). The PRPC became a transit point that allowed
the US to justify its liberal agenda through refugee rehabilitation. The Marcos regime, informedby its own conceptualization of “human potential,” employed Filipino English teachers to takepart in humanitarian work that would help Vietnamese refugees (pp. 125–126). The postcolonialsubject thus became a tool for the US empire to “facilitate the refugee’s transition into modernity”(p. 133). The author then presents a letter written by Rudy Ibañez as a manifestation of how the
US empire “overdetermined” the figure of the refugee. The letter is written from the point ofview of a refugee named Sombath and is addressed to a teacher. Diaz argues that the text tries toundo the “overdetermination of liberal rehabilitation and postcolonial subjectivity pronounced by
the PRPC” (p. 136). Diaz concludes her book with a reading of R. Zamora Linmark’s poem titled“What Some Are Saying about the Body” (p. 145). She writes that the poem articulates the “theparadox of Marcosian logic,” which demands “that the balance of power must be suspended topreserve the sanctity of liberal governance” (p. 145). The poem’s multiple narrators (or masses)“gestures toward another kind of people power” that draws from a force that is “not predetermined”(p. 153).
Postcolonial Configurations sets out to unmake dominant perceptions of Filipino America andmakes an invaluable theoretical contribution toward that goal. The book is driven by the spirit of
Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben, who have collectively
critiqued the paradoxes of democratic state power and the biopolitical and aesthetic regimes it
has engendered in the West. Diaz follows a similar line of thought in her inquiry that allows areconfiguration of the Philippine postcolonial condition within the wider ambit of Cold War geopolitics,
the global diaspora, and US liberal hypocrisy. The urgency of such forays cannot be understatedas vestiges of the New Society continue to endure in the present. Diaz provides an astute analysisof archival, theoretical, cultural, and literary material that becomes a configuration in itself; theinterdisciplinary approach she utilizes allows an engagement that is not possible if one is methodologically bound. Her seamless analysis allows her to propose ways to potentially unmake theconfigurations she writes about. Of note are the second and fourth chapters, which convincingly
highlight the role of the oft-ignored displaced communities in the legitimization of Marcos’s regime.

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Thinking in terms of configurations is indeed an insightful way to confront the Marcos dictatorship.
However, the author’s engagement with Filipino texts would benefit from further contextualization.
It might be useful to indicate in the first chapter that Reynaldo Ileto’s Pasyon and Revolution:
Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910 focuses on the Tagalog regions of the Philippines
rather than the entire country. While empirical and economic concerns are outside the main scopeof the book being reviewed here, the use of economic concepts and terms such as “transnational
finance” (p. 38) would benefit from further elaboration. Regardless, Diaz’s incisive work will be
invaluable to scholars working on the Marcos regime and its political, social, and aesthetic legacies.
Scholars working on postcolonialism and cultural studies will also find Diaz’s theoretical contribution
very rewarding.
Vincent Pacheco
Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of California-Berkeley
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1812-5528