Czech-NATO Relations: A Dynamic ProcessJiří Šedivý
Introduction
After 1989, Europe entered a period of complex andmultidimensional transformation. This period has been marked bya structural shift: on the one hand, the regulatory institutions of
the Cold War disintegrated in the East; on the other, the completionof the single market and the establishment of the EU deepened
integration in the West. Therefore, one could say, while thegeopolitical changes have pulled Europe eastwards, its institutional
centre of gravity has shifted westwards. Bridging the gap between
the geopolitical and institutional realities has been the key task
for post-Cold War Europe.
From the very beginning we realized that for us this task
would have two mutually dependent aspects: the domestic one
and the international. In the domestic sphere, Czechoslovakia (andlater the Czech Republic) successfully managed to transform its
political and economic system. Solid foundations of civil society
were laid. Today, the political scene of the Czech Republic seems
to be stable; the overwhelming majority of the population support
democracy and a market economy and, according to public opinion
polls, the curve of the feel-good factor has been rising.*1 Securing
our newly-acquired freedom in the international sphere has been
the core of the second aspect.
Our general aim was clearly defined: to integrate the country
into reliably working western economic, political and security
institutions. As a part of the former Czechoslovak federation webecame a member of the Council of Europe (February 1991) andsigned the Europe Agreement with the EU (December 1991), we
became a member in the NACC (December 1991), we have been

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actively working within the PfP programme. The Czech Republic
became an Associate Partner of WEU (May 1994) and joined theOECD club (December 1995). Our application for EU membershipwas submitted in early 1996. So far it might seem that our "returnto Europe" has been a one way pass. But it has not been.
The Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský, in his dialogue
with President V. Havel, rejected this generally accepted 'one-way'
interpretation of the slogan "return to Europe":... as a unit, Europe ceased to exist the moment we put thefrontiers between the military blocs before the thousand year old
bonds which were derived from our common tradition.
In reaction, Bělohradský put forward the conception of an"eccentric Europe". The development of this situation was causedby the shift of the European geostrategic centre of gravity outside
the Continent as the consequence of the Cold War bipolarity. Thisimplies a "return to Europe" not only be in an East to West
direction but also concentric, from the East and the West! Thus,
as he continued:
We all have been returning to Europe, learning to be
European ... having problems getting used to the fact that Europe
is whole again and that she must be responsible for her unity,
even in military terms.*2
A certain post-Cold War crisis of European integration,
NATO's search for a new raison d'etre in general and for acoherent approach to the new democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe in particular, and, indeed, the inability of Europe to cope
effectively with the new type of crises in the post-bipolar situation,
all these support Bělohradský' s view.
In this essay, I will begin by briefly discussing three aspectsof our search for security in Europe: the development of the Czech
position, the development of NATO's position and the developmentof the Russian position. Following this, I will describe the situationin which the Czech Republic finds itself today.

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The Czech Search for Security: from Collective
Security to Collective Defence*3
After 1989 the new Czechoslovak foreign-policy elites wereamong the strongest proponents of building a new pan-European
security structure in which the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) was to play a key role. The crisisin the Gulf, the Soviet veto over CSCE involvement in Moscow's
dispute with the Baltic Republics at the end of 1990 (which was
followed by military intervention in Lithuania and Latvia in January1991), the crisis in Yugoslavia and the country's veto over a
proposed CSCE conference on it, and, last but not least, theescalation of a general instability in the forme-Soviet territories.
On the one hand, all these events shattered the idea of apan-European collective security system based on the Helsinkiprocess and, on the other, they emphasized the surviving value
and importance of the traditional military dimension of security.
As a result, membership of NATO started being presented as analternative to the vision of a pan-European collective security
system.
One could identify the first signs of the coming shift in our
strategy as early as June 1991. It was during the international
Prague Assembly on a European Confederation when President
Havel simultaneously refused to connect security matters with the
French project of a European confederation and stressed NATOas the possible core of future European security architecture.*4
The definitive break with the idea of pan-European collective
security, which was prevalent in the first years after the velvet
revolution, came with the split of Czechoslovakia. In the first
official foreign-policy document - the Conception of the Foreign
Policy of the Czech Republic (which was presented before
Parliament by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in April 1993), it
was made clear that the strategic goal of the Czech Republicwould be membership of the EU, NATO and the Western European
Union (WEU). Therefore, "we [the Czech Republic] will block
any further institutionalization of the Visegrád group as well as

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any effort to create parallel integrative structures other than the
EC and NATO ... full-fledged membership of NATO is thelong-term and immutable aim" of the country.*5 Since then,membership in NATO has been presented as the sine qua non of
the future of Czech security.
Development of NATO's Position: from Dialogue via
Partnership to Cooperation
The post-1989 challenge which the Alliance has faced ismultidimensional. The question of how to cope with the conditionsof the "new strategic environment" has many facets: theoverwhelmingly static, linear military organization versus the
diffused, sub-limited threats of the post-bipolar world implying'out of area' operations, the calls for a widening of NATO versus
preservation of its political, organizational and operational cohesion(all this even more complicated by the sensitive relations with
Russia), the dilemma of integration versus ře-nationalization of
defence of the Alliance's members and so on.
The complex process of the Alliance's redefinition started in
December 1989 by identifying the decline of the division of Europe
and its consequences for NATO: "Looking to the future we
recognize the outlines of the political architecture of Europe madewhole and free, in the emergence of which we are determined toplay a full part", stated the NAC communique on 14-15 December.
The same document declared the promotion of economic andpolitical reforms in Eastern Europe (besides securing a CFE
agreement) as another of NATO's new roles.*6
The first concrete proposals towards the newly emerging
democracies in the East came at the summit in London in July
1990. The leaders of the NATO countries stated that: "The Atlantic
Community must reach out to the countries in the East" by extending
to them the hand of friendship. The Alliance invited the WTO
countries to "establish regular diplomatic relations with NATO",(which Czechoslovakia did immediately on 31 July).*7
The pace of NATO's "reaching-out to the East" did notJiří Šedivý

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correspond with the growing expectations of the Central Europeans,
especially given the context of the changed atmosphere in 1991.
The provisions outlined in The North Atlantic Cooperation Council[NACC] Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation,
which was adopted by the foreign ministers of the former WTO
countries, the NATO states and the three Baltic states on 20
December 1991 meant further positive steps.*8 In a plan forcooperation, which was issued at the second NACC meeting inMarch 1992, the following areas of "cooperative activity" were
outlined: political and security matters, defence planning andconversion, policy planning consultation, economic and scientificissues, exchange and dissemination of information.*9 Nevertheless,
the Central Europeans increasing demands for security guarantees
were not even hinted at.
During 1993, as the pressure grew from Central Europe toenlarge NATO eastwards, Russia's stance on this matter became
increasingly ambiguous. While the Russian President Boris Yeltsin
reacted calmly to the possibility of NATO enlargement as late as
August 1993, on 30 September he wrote a letter to the leaders of
the United States, France, Germany and Britain warning against
any eastward expansion of the Alliance. Then another sharp reaction
to speculation about NATO enlargement came from Moscow in
the form of an analysis by the director of the Outer Intelligence
Service (former KGB) and the current Foreign Minister of Russia,
Yevgeni Primakov. According to the document, an expansion ofNATO (which was expected by the Russians to happen at theJanuary 1994 NATO summit), would "bring the biggest militarygrouping in the world, with its colossal offensive potential, directly
to the borders of Russia", as Primakov put it at a press conference
on 25 November 1993. This would force Moscow into
"fundamental" military countermeasures and heighten theanti-Western sentiments of Russians.*10
Yeltsin repeated Moscow's warning during his visit to Brussels
in December. The NATO Secretary-General M. Worner assured
him, that a new security architecture in Europe would not be"against or without, but with Russia". But Worner also stressed134

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that NATO leaders would declare their intention to expand theAlliance at the January summit regardless of Russia's objections.*11
The Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) which was
adopted at the January summit in Brussels, prepared conditions
for qualitatively new relations between NATO and countries
seeking membership in the Alliance: For the first time in a NATO
document it was declared that "We expect and would welcome
NATO expansion that would reach out to the democratic states toour East." States participating in the Partnership were invited tosend "permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and aseparate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons". The PfP
Framework Document declared that "each subscribing state willdevelop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme." Thisclause was especially welcomed in the Czech Republic as anindication of the possibility of a multi-speed, approach to the
Alliance.*12
Nevertheless, the Programme offered only consultations "withany active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a
direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or
security". Thus, instead of the most sought after security guaranteesof Article V of the Washington Treaty, de facto only the provisionsof the Article IV of the Washington Treaty were offered to thenew partners of NATO.*13
After his meeting with the US special envoy Madeleine
Albright immediately after the PfP was published, the Czech
Foreign Minister Zieleniec said: "We are fully convinced thisproject opens for us the possibility of becoming a member of thealliance". The Czechs came forward quickly with a concrete offer
to sacrifice their balanced budget projected for 1994 by accepting
a 1 percent deficit in order to finance the local cost of their
participation in the programme. This rhetorical gesture (which
was never later realized) was very positively perceived, especiallyin contrast to Poland's much less enthusiastic reaction.*14 Be thatas it may, with the PfP, NATO - Central European relations
definitively left their rhetorical phase and turned to practicalmatters.

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The Public Perception of NATO in the Czech Republic
The Czech efforts to gain NATO membership may generate
an impression that the Czechs feel gravely endangered. The realsituation however is quite to the contrary. According to public
opinion polls the Czechs fear international and everyday crimemuch more than some sort of military threat.*15 Even Czech
politicians are not able to formulate anything other thanmetaphysical arguments for NATO enlargement: for Defence
Minister V. Holáň NATO membership "is above all a politicalmatter. It presupposes the respect for shared values ...". Similarly,
in many other official statements one cannot find any arguments
other than those stressing the more or less symbolical meaning ofNATO membership for the Czech political elites.*16
The public perception of NATO has gone through a certain
development. While the percentage of those supporting ourwould-be membership in NATO has not changed since 1993 (inNovember 1993 as well as in November 1995 42% of respondents
supported the country's efforts to become a NATO member), thenumber of those opposing this has grown (in 1993 it was 26%, in1994 28%, in early 1995 31% and in November 1995 39% of
respondents did not support Czech efforts to become a NATOmember).*17 The November 1995 results were probably influenced
by the debate over the possibility of deploying of nuclear
weapons on Czech territory if the Czech Republic were to become
a NATO member. This debate was stimulated by the publicationof the Study on NATO Enlargement. In spite of the fact that the
Study states clearly that "there are no prior conditions forstationing troops or nuclear weapons" on the territory of new
members,*18 Czech politicians in a rather redundant debate,
unconditionally supported the possibility of accepting NATO
nuclear weapons on Czech territory.*19
The Possibility of Explicit NATO Enlargement
The Study on NATO Enlargement (published in Brussels, on136

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28 September 1995) has probably been the most important shift
in NATO's position vis-a-vis its eastern neighbours since the PfP
Programme was announced in January 1995. The Study clarifies
the "why and how" of enlargement while still leaving aside thequestion "when". In its 36 pages it explains the goals and principles
of enlargement, the conditions the candidate countries must fulfil
and stresses the continuing role and importance of the NACC and
PfP. And, as the then Secretary General W. Claes put it, at thesame time it is a good "conceptual basis" for "the Alliance itself'.*20
One cannot also overlook a marked effort of the Alliance to"sell" its would-be enlargement to Russia: not only could one
read between the lines of the Study's text a permanent effort toavoid any questions or formulations that might irritate Moscow(this is also evident in comparing the final draft of the Study withits much bolder first draft from the Spring of 1995), but for the
first time a NATO document has appeared simultaneously in
Russian. The absence of specific military commitments should beviewed in the same way. Nevertheless, on leaving NATO
Headquarters after the presentation of the Study, Russian
ambassador Vitaly Churkin considered that "NATO has made alittle effort" [to take into account Russian objections], ... "Russia
is still against the idea" and "this problem" has not been included"in the framework of a global security policy in Europe" as Moscow
would prefer.*21
Development of Russia's (Op)position:
Turbulent Certaintya

The Russian opposition vis-a-vis NATO's eastward
enlargement is de facto a continuation of the Soviet strategy,
which was formulated in the so called Kvitsinski Doctrine.
In spring 1991 the Soviets were renegotiating the bilateraltreaties with their former satellites. Moscow pressed to incorporate
into these treaties a clause, which would have bound the parties inthe treaty, as the then Soviet Deputy Minister Yulii Kvitsinski put
it during The Prague Conference on the Future of European SecurityJiří Šedivý

137

in April 1991, not to participate "in the alliances directed against
either of the parties, and non-provision of their territories,
communications and infrastructures for use by third parties forthe purpose of aggression." The bilateral treaties with the former
Soviet satellites were to have been a basis on which "a new
structure of security, cooperation and good-neighborly relationsin the region" should have been built.*22
Apart from the fact that an almost identical clause wasincorporated in the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939,
the potential for an open interpretation of the provisions proposedby the Soviets made it unacceptable for Czechoslovakia. This
Soviet stratagem was probably a response to the Visegrád
Declaration of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (February1991), which was interpreted by Moscow as a first step by thesecountries towards NATO membership.*23
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia took over the Union's
negative attitude to the possibility of NATO's eastward
enlargement. But in September 1993 a surprising shift in attitude
occurred: during his visit to Poland, President Yeltsin claimed
that "Russia perceives the Polish efforts to integrate in NATOwith understanding". This was widely interpreted as a "green light"
from Moscow.*24 But only several weeks later Moscow changed
its mind. This shift was fully reflected and meticulously formulated
in the already mentioned document issued by the Outer Intelligence
Service in November 1993. The document was Moscow's reaction
to speculations about the possibility of NATO enlargement whichwere growing in the context of the forthcoming NATO summit inBrussels in January 1994. In the document, one can find most of
the arguments and guidelines that Russia has been using as thebasis of its foreign policy up to now.
First, NATO enlargement would, according to the document,
disturb the geostrategic balance in Europe and would put Russia
in an extremely disadvantageous geopolitical position. This would"probably" make it necessary to revaluate all the defence concepts
and operational plans, to restructure and to reallocate militaryforces, and to create new infrastructures. This would also increase

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in military circles, and the growth of anti-western feeling,
consequently endangering the economic and democratic reforms
in Russia.
Second, the document stated that NATO enlargement would
undermine multilateral obligations into which Russia entered alongwith NATO countries. The document explicitly mentioned theConventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) (the revaluation ofwhich Yeltsin proposed back in September 1993). Later, Russia
threatened the possibility of refusing to ratify the START II treaty.
Third, as an alternative, Russia proposed the synchronizationof NATO enlargement with its functional transformation to apolitical institution (which would be in fact a sort of demilitarizationof the Alliance), and with the strengthening of the relationshipbetween NATO and Russia. The result of this alternative process
would be a pan-European collective security system, "something
between NATO on one hand and the CSCE and UN on the other".
One can also find this concept implicit in the Russia's current
proposals for a Common and Comprehensive Security Model forthe 21st Century!15
The Current Situation(1) The Czech Republic
To review all the activities which have been conducted within
the PfP programme is far beyond the scope of this essay. A truly
multidimensional cooperation has developed, concerningtransparency in national defence planning and budgeting,democratic control of defence forces and the development ofcooperative military relations with NATO in the field of joint
planning, training and exercises.*26
There has been an important shift in Prague's foreign policyin the Central European region. While up until mid-1995 the Czech
politicians had almost unanimously claimed that the Czech Republic
was the most suitable country in Central Europe to be the first toenter the Western structures, in July 1995 Prague opened a
diplomatic charm offensive towards Poland. During his visit toJiří Šedivý

139

Warsaw Czech Defence Minister Holán declared that "should
Poland be the first country admitted to NATO this would be
advantageous for Prague". The Czech Republic also offered
Warsaw closer cooperation in standardizing of their military forces
and a common and coordinated approach to NATO. A common
Central Europe air defence project was also discussed.*27
In the meantime, good performance by the Czech Republic's
battalion in UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia opened the way
to the current Czech participation in the IFOR in the frameworkof the operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. Today, the Czech battalion
is deployed in the British sector in Bosnia and fully integrated
into the NATO chain of command. This fact has immensely
stimulated and deepened the cooperation between Prague andBrussels right at the moment when NATO - Central European
relations have entered another phase.
(2) NATO
Despite the relative success of the PfP Programme it did not
fulfil the ultimate aim of some of its participants - i.e. full-fledged
membership of the Alliance. To allay the pressures from Central
Europe, at a NATO ministerial meeting in December 1994 it was
decided "to initiate a process of examination inside the Allianceto determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide thisprocess and the implications of membership" both for NATO
proper and for "interested Partners".*28 The already discussed Studyon NATO Enlargement (published in September 1995) was theresult of this "process of examination".
The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
December 1995 decided to expand the scope of the PfP and declaredthat "in 1996 the enlargement process will consist of threeelements": (1) "intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations"with Partners interested in NATO membership, "building on thefoundations of the enlargement study"; (2) strengthening ties
"between the Alliance and all of the Partners"; (3) "the Alliancewill consider what internal adaptations and other measures arenecessary to ensure that enlargement preserves the effectiveness140

Czech-NATO Relationsof the Alliance".*29 These formulations clearly indicate a real
beginning of the process of enlargement.
In January 1996 the PfP countries were formally invited toparticipate in the dialogue. The parameters of the dialogue proposedby the Alliance stressed the importance of a two way approach to
the dialogue: the interested partners themselves were asked topartially set the agenda of the consultations in the form of"discussion papers" which would be submitted to the Alliance.
They were also asked to comment on the content of the Study on
NATO Enlargement. The dialogue will be basically bilateral (16+1
format) on various levels.*30
At the same time the Alliance will conduct its own reviews,
both internally and of the potential candidates (the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland are the strongers contenders today). Theinterim conclusions of the discussions will be submitted at theNAC ministerial meeting in spring 1996, and the whole review
process will be concluded by the December 1996 NAC meeting.
Despite the optimism of the Central Europeans who expectthat in 1996 the question "who and when" will be answered(President Havel declared this in September 1995),*31 this does
not seem probable. Given the divergences within the Alliance andwithin the respective NATO countries, and given the financial
situation of the Central European countries, and the problems
they will have in achieving compatibility with NATO (material
compatibility, civil-military relations, strategic culture etc.), it ishard to believe that NATO will commit itself by setting a firm
timetable. There are many more questions: what would happen to
those not named in the first wave of candidates? Ukraine and theBaltic Republic are especially concerned about this possibility
which could, in their view, relegate them to an inferior status as abuffer zone at best, or, at worst, push them into Russia's arms.
And, indeed, the situation in Russia still recalls Churchill's
description as: a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".
The process of NATO enlargement goes on anyway. The
Czech Republic submitted her first Discussion Paper in May 1996.
It already deals with a number of very detailed questions concerningJiří Šedivý

141

the future membership: the scope of Czech forces assigned to theintegrated structures, military infrastructure on the territory of the
Czech Republic, and standardization are discussed in the document
in an unprecedented depth. Furthermore, over the last year NATOprovided PfP countries with over 700 of its 800 technicalstandardization agreements.
In July NATO offered those PfP countries which had alreadysigned security agreements (delimiting and regulating the handlingof sensitive information) with NATO its classified defense planningquestionnaire. The release of the defence planning questionnaire
represents just another step in the process of assimilation forprospective new members. By this, NATO's annual assessmentof each Alliance's country military assets and combat readiness
was extended to interested partners potential NATO members.*32(3) Russia
Although the position of Russia may seem to be immutable,
one can detect certain nuances. First, while Moscow generally
opposes NATO expansion, since at least 1994 Russian politicians
have been allowing for a certain margin of compromise: the former
Foreign Minister Kozyrev stressed in November 1994 that Russia
is against "hasty and mass" expansion of NATO (does this meanthat Russia is not against evolutionary enlargement?).*33 In thesame month Vladimir Lukin, the Chairman of the Foreign Policy
Committee of the State Duma (the lower chamber of the RussianParliament) stated that "we are not against the Czech Republic
entering NATO but we are against NATO's structures being
expanded and being drawn near our borders".*34
Instead, Moscow proposed an all-European collective security
structure based on the OSCE (formerly the CSCE until the end of1994) and supported by a structure of bilateral treaties. Moreoverto assure the Central Europeans the Russians offered joint - i.e.
Western and Russian - guarantees.*35 Thus, the recent proposals
for a compromise in the question of NATO enlargement announced
by the new Russian Foreign Minister Primakov (to accept NATOenlargement under the condition that there would be no shift of

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NATO's structures eastward as well as the proposed alternative
way of giving the Central Europeans security assurances by way
of joint Western-Russian joint guarantees*36) are just further
variations on older concepts. One could expect that there will be acertain compromise found, especially given the fact that NATO,in the context of the contemporary security situation in Europe,
does not intend to build new and costly military structures on the
territories of its future members. Thus, a variation of the Norwegian
option - i.e. no foreign troops and no nuclear weapons - could be
expected. The result of the recent presidential elections did notchange or even modify this position.
On the other hand, good relations with Russia are critical for
maintaining stability and security in Europe. Although Russia'scontemporary conventional potential is not overly impressive, thecountry is still equipped with a substantial amount of nuclear
weaponry and related technological know-how. Thus, thecultivation of Russia-NATO relations will continue to be a toppriority. One could even say that there will either be European
security with Russia, or defence without Russia.
Conclusion
This essay was not aimed at painting a comprehensive pictureof the questions which form both the inner and outer context of
the Czech efforts to find a security anchor since 1989. Rather, it
has tried to draw attention to the most important moments in theoverall process as seen from the Czech Republic's standpoint.
Discussion of the complex and important impact of the positionof Ukraine and the Baltic Republics of the former USSR, as wellas the intricacies of the inter-Alliance debates (both among themember states and within the respective member states), and, last
but not least, the impact of the situation in extra-European regions,especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had to be left
aside. One could also argue that too much space was given to
Russia at the expense of other aspects of European security; yetthis fact only reflects the author's perception of Russia'sJiří Šedivý

143

importance. So what can be said in conclusion?
We can safely wrap up our brief discourse by stressing theundisputable fact that there were very few moments in the historyof Europe when a new European system could be formed not as aresult of war and the victors' imposition of peace conditions on
the vanquished, but through positive negotiations and agreement.
The events in the late 1980s created an exceptional situation, inthe context of which Europe has had a historic chance to seek apositive consensus, to extend the Western "security community"(to use Prague born political scientist Karl Deutch's term) eastward
and to establish a space of security, stability and cooperation
excluding war and violence. Both East and West have had problems
facing up to the new and unexpected situation, and both East andWest have had problems with their "return to Europe". But looking
back over the last few years it seems that, although mistakes havenot been avoided, the positive aspects and achievements of the
post-Cold War transition outweigh the negative ones.
Notes
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8

9

Cf. MF Dnes (daily, Prague), 18 September 1995, p. 2.
Lidové noviny (daily, Prague), 14 September 1993. pp. 8-9.
For detailed account of the development see: Šedivý, J., 'From
Dreaming to Realism - Czechoslovak Security Policy since 1989',
Perspectives, No. 4, (Prague winter 1994 / 1995), ss. 61-71.
FMZV, Dokumenty 1991 (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Prague, Documents 1991), pp. 424,445.
FMZV, Dokumenty 1993, pp. 322-323.
Texts of Final Communiques, vol. IV, 1986 - 1990, NATO officeof Information and Press, Brussels, pp. 122-124.
Ibid, pp. 41-44.
'North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue,Partnership and Cooperation, 20 December 1991', M-NACC1(91)1 ll(rev), NATO press Service.
'Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation' (issued
at the NACC meeting, Brussels, 10 March 1992), M-NACC-

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1(92)21, NATO Press Service.
Cf. Perspektivy rasširenia NATO i intěresy Rossii. (Perspectivesof NATO enlargement and Russia's interests), Moscow, 1993.,
International Herald Tribune, 26 November 1993.
11
International Herald Tribune, 10 December 1993.
12'Partnership for Peace' (issued at the NAC summit meeting,Brussels, 10-11 January 1994), M-l(94)2, NATO Press Service.
13
Cf. Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties willconsult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, theterritorial integrity, political independence or security of any of
the Parties is threatened". The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
Facts and Figures, NATO Information Service, Brussels 1989,
p. 376.
14
The International Herald Tribune, 10 January 1994.
15
Cf. MFDnes, 24 February 1994., MFDnes 14 July 1995.
16
Cf. Šedivý, J., 'Známe atlantické hodnoty?', Mezinárodní politika
No. 12, Prague 1995. pp. 10-12.
17
MFDnes, 10 July 1995, MFDnes, 30 November 1995.
18
Atlantic News, No. 2753, vol. 29, Brussels 30 September 1995,
p. 2.
19
Cf. MFDnes, 29 September 1995.
20
Atlantic News, No. 2753, vol. 29, Brussels 30 September 1995,
p.l.
21
Ibid, p. 2.
22
Sherwen N. (ed.), The Prague Conference on the Future ofEuropean Security, (Brussels, 1991), pp. 63-69.
23
Cf. Sharp J. O. M.,'Security Options for Central Europe in the
1990s', In Crawford B. (ed.) The Future of European Security,(Center for German and European Studies, Berkeley, 1992), p.
61.
24
Lidové noviny, 14 November, 27 November 1993.
25'Moscow hints it may breech troop cuts treaty', The Financial
Times, 7. 10.1993.
25 Cf. Memorandum on the Common and Comprehensive Security
Model for Europe of the list Century, distributed at the OSCE
Seminar on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for10Jiří Šedivý

26

27
28

29

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

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the 21st Century, Vienna, 18-19 September 1995.
For more details see: NATO Handbook, Partnership
andCooperation, (NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels
1995).
Cf. MFDnes, 28 July 1995., Lidové Noviny 28 July 1995., MFDnes
18 September 1995.
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, on 1 December 1994, Atlantic News,No. 2676 (Annex), 3 December 1995, p. 2.
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, on 5 December 1995, Final Communique
M-NAC-2(95)118, Brussels, 5 December 1995, p. 5.
Despatch from the Czech Embassy Brussels, 12 February 1996,
No. 1222/96.
MFDnes, 5 September 1995.
Defence News, 8-14 July 1996.
MFDnes, 4 November 1994.
Lidové Noviny, 23 November 1994.
MFDnes, 2 December 1994.
Cf. MFDnes, 12 March 1996, Lidové Noviny, 16 March 1996.