Towards an Understanding of Carceral Feminism as Neoliberal Biopower1
bySune Sandbeck
York University
sandbeck@yorku.ca
Abstract
The current paper aims to problematize the signifier ‘carceral feminism’, which
has come to designate those varieties of theory and praxis that seek to address
feminist goals through juridical means and, more crucially, the threat ofincarceration (cf. Bernstein 2007; Halley 2008). I begin by surveying some of therecent literature that has identified carceral feminism as a distinct logic within abroader set of liberal feminist strategies focusing on a law and order agenda. My
primary contention is that this literature has largely failed to conceptualize
carcerality in its two-sidedness as both a technology of discipline and a mode ofsocial production; consequently, the carceral approach must be framed as afeminist strategy that is itself embedded within the ascendancy of a unique modeof neoliberal biopower. The latter has served to mark racialized, feminized andimpoverished bodies as abject and remove them from the public sphere, while
simultaneously incorporating them forcibly into a distinct strategy of capital
accumulation within the prison industrial complex. I conclude by troubling the
deployment of the signifier ‘carceral feminism’ and suggest that its contents arestrictly filled by a discursively constituted Other, undermining any claims to an
actually-existing project of carceral feminism as such and evoking, instead, thespectre of an anti- or post-carceral feminism.
Recent literature has claimed to identify a stream of feminism that aims to enforce
feminist goals via a law and order agenda, and which specifically relies on incarceration both aspunishment and deterrent (Bernstein 2007, 2010; Halley 2008). This ‘carceral’ feminism has
been critically appraised as placing the responsibility of the individual at the forefront of its
worldview and contributing to the further production of racialized and feminized bodies as abject
through its legitimization of the prison industrial complex and other carceral regimes. While
accepting some of the extant critiques of feminists who rely on such approaches, the present
paper aims to trouble the signifier ‘carceral feminism’ and locate the deployment of carceralstrategies within the broader trajectory of neoliberalism as a distinct mode of biopower that isrooted in particular material conditions of accumulation and rule. With Foucault (1978; 2003), I
argue that carcerality is part and parcel of a broader set of technologies of power and its uses are
circumscribed by the fundamental historical shift towards the biopolitical regulation of thespecies-body rather than the mere disciplining of the individual body; however, thesedevelopments are tied to a material substratum that grounds carcerality as one element within abroader repertoire of apparatuses and technologies employed under neoliberal conditions ofcapitalist accumulation. What this suggests is that feminists employing carceral strategies are
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Paper presented at the 2012 Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, University ofAlberta. Please do not cite until a final version has been uploaded.

S. Sandbeckparticipating in a particular mode of neoliberal biopower that forms the very condition of
possibility for engaging in praxes that rely upon the law for the fulfillment of certain aims, andthis implicates a much broader array of feminist strategies and practices. Accordingly, I question
whether a carceral feminism can be delineated in actuality, and propose that it might be moreproductive to think of a ‘post-carceral’ feminism. But before these arguments can be expanded
upon, it is necessary to examine in greater detail what the signifier ‘carceral feminism’ attempts
to designate.
Defining Carceral Feminism(s)What is ‘carceral feminism’? Upon first glance, the answer appears to be simple: the term
designates those varieties of feminist theory and praxis that seek to address women’s issues
through juridical means and (the threat of) incarceration. For Bernstein (2007), carceral feminism
describes “the commitment of abolitionist feminist activists to a law and order agenda and…adrift from the welfare state to the carceral state as the enforcement apparatus for feminist goals”(143). Thus, within the context of recent anti-trafficking campaigns in the United States, whichhave seen a convergence in the ideological compasses of certain Christian evangelical groups
and liberal feminists, the term is meant to mark a shift in strategy towards using the threat ofincarceration as a tool for achieving justice and for liberating victims of human trafficking fromtheir perceived ‘slavery’; hence the ‘new’ abolitionism within which carceral feminism isasserted to play a key role.
Borrowing from Bernstein (2007), Halley (2008) employs the term similarly to describe acertain mode of feminist justice-seeking within international humanitarian law (IHL) andinternational criminal law (ICL), which aims to elevate and particularize crimes of sexual
violence through both vertical and horizontal juridical reform. Here, the goal of carceralfeminism is to move sexual violence up the ladder of criminality and impose tougher sentenceson perpetrators, while separating sex crimes out from among other crimes in order to make itpossible for indictment on charges of sexual violence and rape alone. Although Halley is notentirely clear on this point, it would appear that carceral feminism is to be regarded as a subset ofwhat she calls ‘governance feminism’, i.e. “feminism grown up, professionalized, and adept atwielding power for the good of women globally and locally” (79).
However, is it, in fact, theoretically tenable to posit carceral feminism as simply anotherfacet of a broader feminist current that seeks to employ juridical strategies and a (human) rights
discourse to obtain social justice for women? To secure a right means to obtain the juridical
guarantees of a particular freedom, whether in positive or negative form. And, particularly interms of the latter, this inevitably means that those who violate one’s rights should be subject topenalties and sanctions, as an intrinsic form of punishment in response to the violation itself andas a deterrent to others. As such, participating in a praxis that actively demands and securessocial and individual rights necessarily entails one’s implication within a certain carceral modeof justice-seeking. However, we might draw here a distinction based purely on intentionality;
perhaps there is a difference to be found between carcerality as an afterthought to a rights-based
feminist project of social justice, and a carceral feminism that consciously aims to maximize thepunishing and deterring effects of carcerality as the primary means of obtaining some given end.
In this sense, there is typically an important formal distinction to be drawn between a feminismthat agitates for the expansion of women’s rights by engaging in a politics of demand versus one
that seeks to leverage the repressive apparatuses of the state in order to alter or eliminate the kindof behavior that disproportionately harms the interests of women (whether these happen to be
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men or women themselves). Thus, the former aims primarily to increase and enhance positive
liberties for women while the latter acts to secure the sanctity of a certain set of negative liberties
that are regarded as foundational to the sovereignty of the individual.
Both Bernstein (2007; 2010) and Halley (2008) adopt a critical perspective of the carceralfeminist approach and detail its contradictions. For Bernstein – whose rich ethnographic accountof recent anti-trafficking campaigns in the U.S. reveals a disturbing synergy in the goals andactivities of mainstream ‘carceral’ feminists, Christian evangelicals and neoconservative
politicians – the commitment to carcerality as a legitimate tactic to abolish the ‘slavery’ inherent
to sex trafficking has the real (and sadly ironic) effect of landing a disproportionately highnumber of racialized women and men behind bars. The result should not be surprising; asBernstein (2010) shows, the activists within these anti-trafficking campaigns are beholden theirprimarily white and middle-class upbringings, and consequently subscribe to an individualist andsocially conservative ethic of justice-seeking – one that avoids questions surrounding the gender
politics of the family and instead projects its focus towards the behavior of aberrant and abject(read: racialized and poor) individuals in the public sphere.
However, for Halley’s (2008) case study of the carceral approach wielded by thosefeminists agitating for reform of IHL and ICL, the basis for critique is more complex. Certainly,
the subjects engaged in this struggle on the legal front carry certain classed and racialized
backgrounds that inform their belief in the effectiveness of a juridical and carceral approach togender justice. Yet, this should also hardly be surprising given the arena within which they are
engaged politically. Halley sees more fundamental pitfalls that tie into the potential for a carceralapproach to unwittingly serve as a detriment to the designated ‘victims’ of wartime sexual
violence. While some of the hypothesized ‘side-effects’ of enhancing the carceral consequencesof sex crimes are not presented with sufficient theoretical or empirical rigour (e.g. that elevating
and particularizing the status of a crime makes the transgression inherent to it more powerful andpotentially more desirable), the core assertion – that carcerality relies on a codified description of
the unwanted behaviour or act, necessarily dissimulating its existence as a complex ideologicaldiscourse in the world ‘out-there’ and creating a rigidity that will inevitably harm as ‘collateral
damage’ some of the very people the law aims to protect – is a cogent one. No matter how
complex, a juridical regulation cannot possibly encompass all the discursive and ideologicalnuances of a targeted behaviour, interaction or event, and in the case of a carceral approach inwhich the ends being sought are punitive in nature, the glossing over of important contextualconsiderations can result in particularly egregious outcomes, particularly for women whose lived
realities tend to depart significantly from the idealized ‘legal’ subject upon whose behalf the law
purports to operate.
Bernstein and Halley present to us, then, a convincing elucidation of the deficiencies inboth content and form that are inherent to carceral feminism. However, what is lacking in theircritique is a coherent formulation of how exactly carcerality came to constitute the primary logicof this particular current of feminism. There is an undeniable recognition of the fact that we are
speaking of a variant of liberal feminism that places the sovereignty and responsibility of theindividual at the fore, and posits an idealized feminine subjectivity that is white, heterosexual,
middle-class and monogamous, against which all other female bodies are to be seen as criminallyaberrant. Nevertheless, there remains a broader contextual void that requires filling; one thatplaces the rise of carceral feminism within the larger movement of history and locates thecoordinates of its underlying logic vis-à-vis the dominant technologies of governance anddiscipline in the current era. The next section traces the conditions of possibility for a carceral3

S. Sandbeck
feminism to take hold and allow us to locate the latter within the hegemonic regime of what
transnational feminists such as Julia Sudbury (2005) have referred to as a ‘global lockdown’.
Unearthing the Logic of Carcerality
Sudbury (2002; 2005) reveals the intimate connections between global lockdown and therise of neoliberal globalization. With the scaling back of the welfare state during the 1970s and1980s, the expansion of privatization, and the ascendancy of a state ethos of individual
culpability, social conditions – particularly in the U.S., but also increasingly elsewhere aroundthe world – were ripe for the creation of a expansive prison industrial complex (PIC) that both
fed off of and contributed to the establishment of a new carceral regime. Spurred on by the
spurious ‘war on drugs’ and the promise of novel sources of lucrative profit2, the PIC would
extend its reach into marginalized communities across the globe and ensure that a steady streamof bodies would be on hand to fill its newly constructed and privately-funded superprisons. And
as the decline of social welfare eliminated state alleviation of the ‘double-shift’ syndrome, many
women found themselves having to take on precarious labour, often in the informal sector, where
many would inevitably find themselves within the purview of the PIC and, for some, physicallyconfined behind its walls. Thus, in addition to being predominantly racialized and poor, thebodies filling up the private superprisons have become increasingly feminized, and as
Agathangelou, Bassichis and Spira (2008) note, it is precisely these abject subjectivities that arepart of the human surplus upon which neoliberalism projects its technologies of carcerality andlockdown.
LeBaron and Roberts (2010) expand our conception of the neoliberal logic of carcerality
by illustrating that it is neither restricted to the physical space of prisons nor to thosesubjectivities that are disciplined within the broader domain of the PIC proper (i.e. those undersurveillance, on probation, under house arrest, etc.). Individuals and families are ever more
subject to carceral debt relations that are designed to lock borrowers into an inescapable market
dependency and which reinforce gender and racial hierarchies given their disproportionate
impact on women and people of colour. Moreover, the neoliberal-induced shift towards
commodified social reproduction has introduced an entire class of domestic migrant workers to
the carceral confines of global North households, predominantly racialized women that areroutinely subject to abusive and precarious working conditions. Kempadoo (2005) has tied theseprocesses together and revealed how this carceral logic of neoliberalism has manifested itself as
an abiding juridical concern with anti-trafficking that has at its core the intent to control
migratory and work patterns through law enforcement and imprisonment. And like others, she
has identified an overarching tendency to conflate trafficking with prostitution, which has
mobilized anti-prostitution support for carceral approaches to the sex trade under the
aforementioned ‘new abolitionism,’ and which, as the above authors point out, has drawn
carceral feminists into a new moral alliance that tends to regard the criminalization of the sex
trade as a top priority. The result has been to elide the fact that, as she puts it, “migrant women,
defined as ‘trafficked victims,” are more often than not treated as illegal immigrants…andarrested, detained, and deported” (40); to shift public attention away from the largely white, maleclientele of the sex trade towards the ‘criminal menace’ posed by a racialized strata of middlepersons; and to ultimately sustain the illusion that trafficking serves mainly the underground sex
2

In response to the question, “what is the political economy of the prison based on?” Haney (2010) answers
succinctly: “profit” (77). She goes on to discussion the expansive revitalization of prison work programs in the U.S.
under the era of neoliberalism, unfettered by the usual restrictions of minimum wage and benefits.

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trade rather than precarious forms of labour attached more directly to the formal economy. The
new carceral discourse of anti-trafficking thus serves to conceal the intimate connection between
the migratory pressures imposed by neoliberalism and the criminalization of both migrant andsex workers, and is itself symptomatic of the segmented ways in which racialized and feminizedsubjectivities are produced as abject under the regime of neoliberal carcerality.
Carcerality as a Form of (Neoliberal) Biopower
Neoliberal carcerality thus serves not only as a technology of discipline, but as
Agathangelou et al. (2008) point out, as a logic that is foundational to our current mode of social
production, and within which the individual places significant libidinal or affective investments.
The authors note,…global lockdown not only naturalizes but also produces capitalist, racial, gender,
national, and sexual social formations. In this way, global lockdown and its technologies
function as central sites for ontological production, for making subjects on all sides ofprison walls: those who can and must be killed, warehoused, and watched, and those
whose civic duty requires their complicity in the killing. (Agathangelou et al. 2008, 134)
However, while one can wholeheartedly agree with the notion that carcerality has become a
primary site of social production under neoliberalism, and while the insight generated by thisassertion proves edifying if we consider its ‘ontological’ project as one in which carceralfeminists have deposited significant libidinal and political investments, the authors’ emphasis on‘killing’ must be disavowed. As Foucault (1978) has emphasized, the move to modern
technologies of discipline and governmentality was marked by a shift away from the sovereign’sright to kill or inflict death towards the administration of life. Thus, “the ancient right to take life
or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (138). In
concrete terms, this power manifests itself in two forms: first, as a power over the individual
body-as-machine, i.e. as an anatomo-politics of the human body; and secondly, as a power
regulating the species body, or as Foucault famously termed it, a bio-politics of the population.
Combined, these techniques of disciplining, subjugating, regulating and controlling both bodies
and populations constitute a bio-power that signals the end of a sovereignty based on the powerof death, and the transition towards a liberal art of government that has as its primary end the
management of life.
The move away from a preoccupation with disciplinary power to bio-power thus marks ahistorical moment where mastery over living things is split, in the one realm abstracted from theindividual body and extended to life in general as embodied in the idea of the population. Lifeand its mechanisms are subject to explicit calculations that render the couplet knowledge-power
capable of transforming life in general rather than the mere disciplinary imposition of the spectreof death upon the individual body by some sovereign power. Within the new economy ofbiopower, the role of the law fundamentally alters and becomes inscribed within a series ofnormalizing apparatuses that have as their primary goal the correction and regulation of life
rather than the meting out of discipline and punishment; consequently, the law increasingly
becomes a normalizing mechanism itself under the aegis of a technology of power that is centredon life rather than death (Foucault 1978, 144). Sexuality becomes a central object or target ofthese normalizing mechanisms since it lies at the intersection of the disciplining of the body andthe regulation of populations, serving as a “means of access both to the life of the body and the5

S. Sandbecklife of the species” (146). Yet, the impetus to discipline and kill remains, but must find new
avenues to function. For Foucault, it is here that racism intervenes into political systems centredon biopower in order to introduce cleavages into the biological continuum that is the domain oflife, dividing what should live from what should die (Foucault 2003, 254). The murderous
function of the State is thus justified through a division of the human species into subcategories
that designate certain groups as a (biological) threat; racism thereby becomes the precondition
for exercising the function of death within a regime of biopower, which need not constitutekilling as such, but can encompass “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk ofdeath for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (256).
Foucault’s account of the movement towards a society of control founded on biopower iscentral to Hardt and Negri’s (2000) conceptualization of Empire as a new world order constituted
juridically, but grounded in a continuing transformation of the material conditions of rule. Thus,
the historical shift from a disciplinary society to a society of control, which introduces aparadigm of power that is “defined by the technologies that recognize society as the realm of
biopower” (24), is in their account posited as a realization of the tendencies of capitalist
accumulation to explode the mediations of state and civil society and to foster a proliferation ofsubjectivities and potential fields of resistances. While Hardt and Negri tend to focus on thepurely liberatory aspects of these developments, their analysis allows us to ground the
biopolitical in the material conditions of late capitalist accumulation, particularly in its neoliberalform. Within this framework, the move towards a society of control that continues to employ
carceral strategies even as it relies on particular forms of power to regulate, correct, and reform
aberrant behaviour should be related internally to the historical trajectory of capitalist
development, which attempts to produce subjectivities adequate to a particular strategy ofaccumulation under changing conditions of rule and to suppress those ‘difficult’ subjects thatpose a potential threat to the viability of its economy of biopower. As Hardt and Negri point out,
the Foucauldian passage from society of discipline to control parallels the Marxian passage fromthe formal to real subsumption of labour, provided that the latter is “understood as investing not
only the economic or only the cultural dimension of society but rather the social bios itself” (25).
It is in this sense that we can think of the emergence of a distinct neoliberal biopower that isgrounded in the material conditions of accumulation and rule, but which is perpetually in excessof those grounds in its functioning as a mode of social (re)production.
Consequently, we can regard carcerality – in its twofold guise as a technology ofdiscipline and a mode of social production – as a distinct facet of modern bio-power deployed todisallow life among those surplus subjects that cannot be successfully incorporated into formal
regimes of labour under neoliberalism – often, to the point of death. Carcerality, as bio-power,aims to produce these racialized, feminized and impoverished bodies as abject and remove themfrom the public sphere, whilst simultaneously incorporating them forcibly into an alternative
strategy of neoliberal accumulation within the prison industrial complex. This, then, allows us tolocate carceral feminism as a particular strategy of neoliberal bio-power in operation. Under the‘new’ abolitionism described by Bernstein (2007; 2010), the ‘enslaved victim’ of sex trafficking
is presented an ultimatum: finding liberation through formal avenues of commodified labour inthe marketplace, or being subjected to forced liberation through carceral techniques of discipline
and rehabilitation. In either case, the carceral ideal is to foster the production of a living subject
that conforms to the juridical and ethical imperatives of neoliberalism3, whether expressed3

Haney’s (2010) excellent comparison of a women’s prison in Hungary (KFB) and a new-age correctional facility
for mothers in California (Visions) reveals the extent to which the institutional discourses of rehabilitation under

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through the discourse of human rights, citizenship, or the economy. In practice, however, thecarceral feminist project is deeply embedded within a framework of biopower structured by what
Sudbury (2002) has identified as an intersection between neoliberal regimes of accumulation
and racist/patriarchal exploitation; accordingly, a familiar outcome is to lock poor racialized
women (and men) into one of the many kinds of carcerality described above.
Conclusion: Towards Post-Carceral Feminism(s)?
In attempting to define carceral feminism, we have looked at the nominal definitions
provided by the likes of Halley and Bernstein, as well as the historical trajectory under which thelogic of carcerality has served as a foundational element of neoliberal biopower. Still, an
important caveat to take note of is the fact that the signifier ‘carceral feminist’ is strictly filled by
the Other and constitutes an interpellation used by those who are primarily critical of the carcerallogic as applied to gender justice – one would be hardpressed to find an activist that identifies
themselves as a ‘carceral feminist’ in the same manner that the self-identifying ‘neoliberal
economist’ is in short supply. In this sense, the project of carceral feminism does not actuallyexist as such, and can only be said to constitute a floating signifier that aims to capture thecontingent synergistic development of a set of practices and goals pursued by certain feminists intandem with legal reformists, Christian evangelicals, and neoconservatives. In fact, the manner inwhich the signifier ‘carceral feminism’ has been created and deployed points to the spectre of ananti- or post-carceral feminism, defined as those feminists who reject to the carceral logic ofneoliberal biopower and seek to transcend the inherent limitations of a juridical approach togender justice. Ultimately, it is the post-carceral signifier that might be most fruitfully utilized tolink together the diverse approaches that are concerned with the deployment of carcerality as a
strategy for the attainment of feminist ends and that seek to uncover new avenues of liberatory
praxes.

neoliberalism create a climate of individual culpability and personal responsibility for the work of recovery. This is
typically accomplished through the language of addiction: “At Visions, the diagnosis of addiction led the staff tofind ways to shut down any talk of poverty, social inequality, or economic marginalization. Whenever the inmatesraised them, they were accused of avoiding their deeper problems and sidestepping the real work of recovery” (90).
Haney’s critical analysis of the feminist ideals and ‘promise’ of the Visions correctional facility bears important
insights for an institutional account of carceral feminism in practice.

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