Comments on the papers of Zhurkin and Iwama
Takako Ueta
Firstly, I would like to comment on Prof. Zhurkin's paper,
which reflects the Russian position vis-a-vis NATO enlargement.
My experience in Brussels and in the OSCE has made me
familiar with NATO transformation, its enlargement and Russian
attitudes. When I attended the CSCE Stockholm Foreign
Ministerial Council in December 1992, Foreign Minister Kozylev
made his famous "Shock therapy" speech. Then, in December
1994 in the CSCE Budapest Summit, I listened to carefully
President Yeltsin's "Cold Peace" speech.
Despite NATO's information activities, it seems that Russia
has not yet changed its view on NATO and sticks to the image of
the Cold-War NATO. Even during the Cold War period, NATOwas a defensive alliance and never launched an attack against theWarsaw Pact countries. In nature, a collective defence institution
does not need a clearly identified enemy. Risk ismulti-dimentional and multi-faceted. On the Continent ofEurope, due to its unique history of war and peace for centuries,
Europeans have been keen on their security interests. Without
an enemy, it is legitimate to organize a collective defence.
I wonder when the Russian military will change its
zero-sum game thinking which is firmly based on balance ofpower theory. For them, NATO enlargement to the East probably
means Russia's loss. NATO's approach is not based on thisthinking. From the outset, enlargement was not encouraged byNATO member countries. NATO member states have beenreactive. NATO member countries pressed former Warsaw Pactcountries not to raise the membership issue. NATO refused toput it in its official agenda until autumn 1993 mainly due to a lackof internal consensus and Russian reaction. However, NATOcould not postpone it forever in view of the interests which had
been shown by Central and East European countries.
The starting point of NATO enlargement is to include

182

Comments

Russia in a wider Euro-Atlantic security structure. For that
purpose, NATO has undertaken various cooperative measuresfor Russia. A recent CFE review conference showed that the West
took Russian security interests into account. It will be ammended
in the case of NATO enlargement. The real issue seems to bewhether Russia would respond to NATO's offer or not.
Prof. Zhurkin wrote that NATO was rather lazy so far aspractical proposals of compromises were concerned. Officially,
NATO is not in a position to work out compromises of its
enlargement. However, in the framework of the PFP, NATO haslaunched various proposals in order to enhance cooperation withRussia. However, as recent as last week, Russia continues towithhold most military cooperation from NATO and this haslasted for more than two years. Besides participating in selected
military exercises and sending officers to NATO military courses,
Russia has not really implemented the PFP individualprogramme. NATO has been waiting for the Russian revised IPP
since the end of 1994. The NATO Berlin document last June
reiterated its proposal which is to achieve a political framework
for NATO-Russia relations, elaborating basic principles forsecurity cooperation as well as for the development of permanentmechanisms for political consultations, which were proposed byNATO last September. NATO still awaits word from Moscow. In
this regard, Mrs. Iwama's paper did not refer to the Russian
reaction, which is misleading to the discussion. Only, 16+1consultations between NATO and Russia on an ad-hoc basis
have been held.
I will move on to the second point. Russia proposed the"security model for the 21st century" in Budapest OSCE summit
and the West accepted this diplomatic exercise. Since then, theWest has been looking forward to listening to a new concrete
Russian proposal and ideas. The security model proposal inDecember 1994 was believed to be launched by Russia in order
to counter NATO enlargement. Relative to that, except for a
proposal on an economic component, Russia has reiterated itslong-standing idea of enhancing and strengthening OSCE, forComments

183

example, the treaty-based OSCE, the OSCE executive council
and so on, which has not gained support by other participants.
The Russian presidential election is over. Russian
diplomacy is expected to be activated in the coming months. In
building a new Euro-Atlantic security structure, constructive
Russian participation is crucial. My last question to Prof. Zhurkinconcerns the influence of NATO enlargement on Russian policy
toward China. Will Russia play a China card in order tocounter-balance the pressure in the Western part of its territory?
I will now move on to Mrs. Iwama's paper. NATO is acomplex issue. When a scholar conducts research, it is necessary
to cover the national positions of at least the major NATOcountries. I find that NATO documents are the most difficult
diplomatic documents since they always reflect heavycompromise among member-states. Furthermore, European
security issues are far more complex than NATO. It is necessary
to take into account all of the actors, including the major powers,and European and trans-Atlantic institutions since theseinstitutions are highly inter-locked. In the case of NATOenlargement, the OSCE should be taken into carefulconsideration. If you are interested in the European Security andDefence Identity(ESDI), the evolution of the EU and the WEU
and the current IGC should be examined carefully.
Mrs. Iwama's paper failed to do so. The UK's role in NATOis significant since among NATO European countries, Franceand the UK can conduct significant military operations, forexample, the UNPROFOR and the IFOR. In her paper, anemotional criticism against the UK is found only in the context ofthe EU and no analysis was done in the context of NATO. Thispapaer also failed to explain some basic concepts, for example
the ESDI, the CJTF(Combined Joint Task Forces), and the NATO"out of area," which is misleading to readers who are not familiar
with NATO. Furthermore, it offers an insufficient description ofNATO-Russian relations. NATO documents, including the Berlin
Ministerial communique, have repeated that NATO preserve thecapability for collective defence. "Politically, the missionof

184

Comments

collective defence co-exists uneasily with NATO's intention toexpand to the east." (CRS Issue Brief. Paul E.Gallis, "NATO:Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance," June 7, 1996,
Washington, D.C, p. 13.) For this reason, NATO member-states
have sought to reassure Russia.
Since the end of the East-West military confrontation,
NATO has tried to adapt itself to the new security environment.
The purpose of this adaptation effort is to ensure the Alliance'smilitary effectiveness. The US-made concept, the CJTF, is a partof this whole adaptation effort. Since the Brussels NATO summit,
NATO member-states have worked without interruption for theimplimentation of the CJTF. As the Alliance priority has beenenlargement and there has been disagreement between the USand France on the CJTF, the Alliance has not been able to reachan agreement. Experts find nothing new in the Berlincommunique since it was a "framework agreement" and it
needed to be implemented.
In the Berlin communique of the NATO ministerial Council,
there is no mention of the word "pillar." Pillar thinking
represents "European pillar" and "North American pillar." This
communique avoided using the word "pillar" and repeated theidea of building "a European Security and Defence Identity
within NATO." The CJTF framework agreement in Berlin
resulted in consolidation of the WEU as an inter-governmental
institution which highly reflects the UK positions. This outcome
is also closely linked to the negotiation in the framework of theInter-Governmental Conference of the EU. In Berlin, the UK
immediately supported the French position on the CJTF. For
practical reasons, the UK attaches importance to a militaryeffective solution.
When one deals with NATO, it is also necessary to pay
attention to the trans-Atlantic link. Regrettably,this paper did not
explain how German security policy has attached importance tothe trans-Atlantic link as well as to the "Bonn-Paris Axis." NoEuropean NATO countries, including France, want to see USdisengagement. France wants to keep the US military presenceComments

185

as long as possible. For Americans, in the case of militarycontingency, they want to be involved and be informed from theoutset. In their view, it is difficult to imagine any CJTF operation
which involves no Americans. US Under-Secretary of Defence
for policy, Mr. Slocombe, explained the concept of the CJTF inhis speech at the Atlantic Council on June 14: "CJTF is by nomeans only a device for distinctively European-led operations.
The US would expect to be fully involved in such CJTF
operations - and these may well include non-members ofNATO." A possible exception would be a WEU-led peacekeeping mission in Africa or a WEU rescue operation for theirnationals who are involved in civil war outside Europe. The CJTF
is not only designed for crisis management, but also for collective
defence which is exclusively assigned to NATO.
Finally, I do not understand Mrs. Iwama's argument about
prompt implementation of the CJTF concept in the context ofNATO enlargement. If she were a Russian, I would fully
understand this political message, since the development of theESDI might decouple the US from Europe. However, in reality,
NATO countries will make every effort to avoid disengagement.
No Central and East European countries are interested in US
withdrawal from Europe. France attaches importance to theimplementation of the CJTF, which is one condition for France toreturn to the integrated NATO military structure, and it is not verymuch in favour of enlargement. However, other countries are toseparate the CJTF from enlargement since they do not want tosee enlargement taken as hostage. A military expert explains thatthe full implementation of the CJTF concept will take place afterat least a few years of intense work in NATO. The CJTF
implementation means that this idea is translated into military
structures and procedures which are under review. What heexpects is an intermediate report in December. This is why thefinal communique of the North Atlantic Council Defence
Minister meeting, issued June 13 requested the Council to reporton progress in December. It is not necessary to implement theCJTF before the end of the IFOR mandate. Post-IFOR operation

186

Comments

can be done without it as IFOR operation is done without theCJTF. If the CJTF defence planning is decided in advance, it isbetter, and it enables swift military operations. However, in thecase of post-IFOR, they have time for military planning.
There are many articles and studies on European security
issues which are written by well-informed experts andpractitioners. In order to write a scholary paper, it is necessary tocover these works.