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CIGS Professor Yung Chul Park Seminar“CIGS Professor Yung Chul Park Seminar”
Date & time: 27th February 2014 (Thursday) 15:00 - 16:30
Venue: CIGS Meeting RoomAn outline (rev.01) by Professor Yung Chul ParkThe fundamental source of the conflict between Japan on the one hand and China and South Korea
on the other lies in the inevitable rivalry and tension associated with the resurgence of nationalism in
all three countries. The intensification of nationalistic fervor defies construction of a new frameworkfor governance of their bilateral relations that reflects changes in economic and security
environments in Northeast Asia that have taken place over the past three decades.
China considers itself a global power-second only to the US- capable of setting the global agenda. It
demands to be accorded a role commensurate with its power in managing regional as well as global
economic and security affairs. The Chinese public in general and policy makers in particular believethat Japan is engaged in a campaign to contain China’s rise by strengthening its collective selfdefense in alliance with the US and its cooperation with India and other Southeast Asian countries.
China perceives of Japan as challenging its strategic- and perhaps natural - role in East Asia.
Although they should be conscious of potential ramifications of the rise of nationalism, the Chinese
authorities are likely to ignore the rise as benign as long as it helps diffuse the growing discontent
over worsening regional and income disparities and lack of political freedom.
South Korea has labored hard and succeeded in building an open economy -of which size is thefifteenth largest in the world- and a noisy, but working democracy. It considers itself no longer adeveloping economy many Japanese believe it still is. It has become more assertive than before, andwants its voice herd on the global stage. As a trading nation, South Korea is bound to be globalized,
but if the current trend continues, many fear that the nation may risk losing its identity. At the sametime, South Korea’s dependence on China as a trading partner has risen to the point where it could
undermine its political and economic independence.
Many at home abroad believe that China holds the key to two Koreas’ unification. Faced with North
Korea’s relentless threat of a nuclear attack, South Korea can hardly afford to alienate either China orJapan. A confluence of these internal and external developments that has narrowed the space forpursuing independent security and economic policy appears to have made Korean society turn tonationalistic instincts
Japan is coming out of a long period of hibernation of a pacifist state after World War II to put itself
on the global map as a major economic power. In its quest for transforming itself as a normal state,many Japanese conservative political leaders believe that Japan needs to confront and resist for1

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CIGS Professor Yung Chul Park Seminarnational security China’s aggressive pursuit of regional dominance. They have also stiffened theirstand on the bilateral issues that have strained the relations between South Korea and Japan. They
have done so in the belief that South Korea has gone over to the side of China, an insinuation deeply
resented by the South Korean public.
China, South Korea and other Southeast Asian countries realize that the Abe government sees andresponds to the conservative drift of society demanding a transformation of Japan as a normal
country with proper military defense capabilities. By paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine Primeminister Abe is simply sending the message that his administration is determined to reassert Japan’s
proper role under the banner of a stronger Japan. While they have been lodging-and will continue tobe doing- strong protest against the Abe government’s denial of historical events taken place during
WWII, China and South Korea will be content with supporting the international disapproval of theAbe government’s intransigencies, which in their view will undermine Japan’s credibility andinfluence and eventually the quest for creating a stronger Japan.
In view of the conflicting interests and divergent paths they follow in managing their bilateralrelations, it is clear that the three countries cannot easily find the common ground for economic andsecurity cooperation and compromising their different objectives. For this reason, the tension
between Japan on the one hand and China and South Korea on the other will persist for a long time
to come.
Despite the worsening of the conflict in recent years, South Korea has compelling interest in
normalizing its bilateral relations with Japan, which is an important trade partner and a country
South Korea emulates more than any other to catch up with in terms of technological sophisticationand living standards. South Korea has a lot to learn from Japan. The two countries are also themembers of the security alliance with the United States.
In this writer’s personal view, it is more of Japan’s problem than South Korea’s, if the Abeadministration insists on propagating distorted views on its wartime activities and on teaching theyounger generations biased interpretations of history. Japan may decide to strengthen its collective
defense capabilities. If it does, it is a Japan’s domestic political decision. Neither China nor South
Korea has much to say about this. If Japanese politicians wish to continue to visit the Yasukuni
shrine at the risk of inviting the denunciation of the international community, China and South
Korea will continue to protest, but that is about all they can and will do. Furthermore, as far as theterritorial issue is concerned, there is no solution Japan and Korea can agree to. If there is not, thenpolitical leaders of the two countries should act as if there is no territorial issue and turn to otherpressing matters of which resolution will have a far more important bearing on improving thebilateral relations between the two countries.
One urgent matter the two countries need to address is the growing disputes on the wartime comfort
women, which have been blown up out of proportions. Japan must accept the Kono Statement of1993 on the comfort woman and publicly declare that it is the position of the Abe government as afirst step towards discussing modalities of settlement. As far as South Korea is concerned, Japanshould realize that the resolution of the comfort women is a matter of national dignity.
Japan and Korea has a common interest in deterring North Korea from building up its nuclear
weapons program. To this end, the two countries need to consolidate their security alliance with
United States to send a clear message that under no circumstances North Korea be allowed todevelop nuclear weapons. This strategic cooperation will also pave the way for forming an East Asia’s2

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CIGS Professor Yung Chul Park Seminarregional security arrangement in which the two countries together with ASEAN could assume abalancing role in accommodating the rise of China without involving India.
On the economic sphere, Japan and South Korea need to resume negotiations for a bilateral free
trade even before South Korea joins the TPP with the long-term objective of creating a trilateral FTA
among China, Japan and South Korea. The three countries do have political capacity of as well as
economic interest in pursuing a two-track strategy in which they continue on one track as they havein the past to work together to consolidate the existing schemes for regional economic cooperationand integration, while managing other bilateral conflicts on the other track.
Finally, it is in the interest of East Asia that the Abenomics succeeds in restoring Japan’s economicvitality. China is not expected grow in the coming years as fast as it has in the past. Now it is Japan’s
turn to contribute to the region’s growth by enlarging its capacity to imports from and invest in therest of the region. In this regard, the Abe government appears to spend too much of its political
capital on security issues at the expense of promoting the Abenomics. Unless Japan succeeds inreviving the economy and regaining its economic strength, Japan will lose its influence in shaping
new security relations in Northeast Asia no matter what it does in rebuilding its military capabilities.

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