FORESIGHTA GLOSSARY

FORESIGHT:A GLOSSARY
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC FUTURES&CIVIL SERVICE COLLEGE, SINGAPORE

Centre for Strategic Futures
Public Service Division
Prime Minister’s Office
100 High Street #07-00
The Treasury
Singapore 179434
Website: www.csf.sg

Civil Service College, Singapore
31 North Buona Vista Road
Singapore 275983
Website: www.cscollege.gov.sg

All rights reserved.This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any formor by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording
or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented,
without written permission from the publisher.

CONTENTS
Introduction
Foreword

4
5

A–D
Agent-based Modelling
Back-casting
Black Swan
Causal Layered Analysis
Cognitive Bias
Cognitive DissonanceComplexity
Crisis Management
Crowd-sourcing
Cross-Cutting Issues
Cynefin Framework
Delphi Method
Design Thinking
Drivers / Driving Forces

7
7
10
12
13
14
14
16
17
17
18
19
20
21

E–M
Early Warning System
Emergence
Emerging Strategic Issues
Environmental Scanning
Experimentation
Forecasting
Foresight
Futures
Futures Competency Framework
Game Theory
Horizon Scanning
InterdependenceManagement by Discovery
Morphological Analysis

23
23
24
26
27
27
27
28
28
28
29
29
29
30

N–S
Narrative Inquiry
Non-linearity
Path Dependency
Policy Game
Pre-Mortem
Prototyping
Red-Teaming
Resilience
Retrospective Coherence
Risk
Risk Management
Risk Register
Sandbox
Scenario Planning
Scenario Planning Plus
Sense-Making
Sentiment Analysis
Signposts
Simulation
Singapore Foresight Week
STEEP Analysis
Strategic Futures Network
Strategic Planning
Stress-testing
SWOT Analysis
Systems Thinking
U –W
Unknown Unknowns
Whole-of-Government
Whole-of-Government Integrated
Risk Management
Wicked Problem
Wildcards
Wind-tunnelling

33
33
33
34
34
34
35
35
36
36
37
37
37
38
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42
42
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43
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48

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INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the Singapore Public Service’s futures community!
In the course of your work, you may encounter terms and concepts that may
be unfamiliar to you. We have prepared this glossary as a guide to some of
the common terms used by our foresight practitioners. Each entry provides adefinition and overview of a concept or term, along with resources providing
further information.
This glossary is not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, it is a starting point
to help you better understand foresight and futures work in Singapore’s public
sector. To find out more about the concepts, tools or processes defined in thisglossary and how they have been used in Singapore, please contact the Centre
for Strategic Futures.
This glossary is jointly published by the Centre for Strategic Futures andthe Civil Service College, with an inter-agency editorial team comprising (inalphabetical order):Noel BAY
Audrey HO
KAY Chew Lin
Gerald KOH
KWA Chin Lum
LEE Seng Teck
LEONG Ming Wei
Joan MOH
Eleanor NG
Sandra NG
Sheila NG
Premarani SOMASUNDRAMTAN Chee Seng
Codey TAN
Peter YEW
With guidance from Mr Peter Ho, Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures andSenior Fellow, Civil Service College.

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

FOREWORD
The ability to learn (and change) faster than your competitor
may be the only advantage of the future.
Arie de Geus, former head of Shell’s Strategic Planning GroupTo thrive, Singapore needs every advantage we can muster as a small country
in a complex environment. Understanding how the world around us can change
gives us the latitude to prepare, to take advantage of the opportunities that may
arise, as well as to make contingency plans to mitigate possible threats to ourwell-being.
As our foresight efforts mature, we are learning to apply a wide range of foresighttools and methods to policy, and have developed a working understanding of
how foresight and an appreciation of complexity can help us think about the
future better. With the growing futures community in the Government, we now
also have better mechanisms to derive whole-of-government insights into
complex issues, and translate foresight to strategy.
This foresight glossary is a guide to the concepts and terms commonly used in
the Singapore Government foresight space. It is an important effort at ensuringthat as a community, we speak the same language, and understand the context
in which we use some of these terms. But it is not the last word on these, andI urge you to take this glossary as the start of your own learning journey inforesight, as you explore the workings and applications of various frameworks
and methods. It is only then that we can continue to deepen our understandingof foresight, and build upon our existing knowledge.
Ultimately, futures work is about identifying and considering possibilities,
and there is no fixed way of approaching it. It is up to agencies to create theflexibility in their policies so that Singapore is able to respond to what is beyond
the horizon. I hope that this glossary will help you in this effort of harnessing
insights from foresight to guide your agency’s work.
I also hope to see contributions from more agencies in future editions of thisglossary, as the Singapore Government’s foresight expertise grows.

Peter Ho
Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures andSenior Fellow, Civil Service College5A ­– D

AGENT-BASED MODELLINGBACK-CASTINGBLACK SWAN
CAUSAL LAYERED ANALYSISCOGNITIVE BIAS
COGNITIVE DISSONANCECOMPLEXITYCRISIS MANAGEMENTCROWD-SOURCINGCROSS-CUTTING ISSUESCYNEFIN FRAMEWORK
DELPHI METHODDESIGN THINKING
DRIVERS / DRIVING FORCES

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

AGENT-BASED MODELLING (ABM)
A method of simulating complex systems. It features a number of autonomous“agents” which are each programmed to make decisions according to certain
pre-defined rules. The resulting interactions can give rise to emergent patterns
that might not have been obvious when considering each of the agents in
isolation. Agents can be animate or inanimate, e.g., people, financial institutions,or the environment.
ABM is most useful in situations that involve the interaction of multiple“behavioural” or “human” entities. It helps to simulate the effects of individual
actions on a system as a whole. It can help to account for the fact that humanindividuals behave in ways that are not entirely rational or consistent, and which
are subject to cognitive biases.
As with any simulation, the utility of ABM is limited by the granularity andaccuracy of its programmed rules. These rules can be improved, e.g., throughconsultations with experts. As a tool, ABM is most useful in uncovering
a range of likely outcomes — including thresholds of risk and boundaries ofconfidence — rather than predicting specific outcomes with certainty.
Reference
1. Nigel Gilbert, “Agent-Based Models”, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/17239_Chapter_1.pdf, lastaccessed Aug 2014.
Further Reading
1. See the Artificial World for Forecasting (Dream Valley) Project, by the International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/researchProjects/DreamValley.en.html, last accessed Aug 2014.

BACK-CASTING
A facilitation method designed to help translate scenarios to strategies. It usually
begins with a visioning process, where participants are encouraged to describe
elements of a future scenario. Working backwards from that future scenario tothe present day, back-casting involves fleshing out the steps needed to arrive at
the scenario. For example, if in 2015, one were envisioning the future in 2020,
discussants would be invited to consider first what the situation in 2020 mightlook like, and then describe the causal factors that led to the realities in 2020 bymoving backwards from 2020 to 2015.
Back-casting is useful in engaging groups that are more focused on tangible
outcomes, since it provides an opportunity to translate scenarios to operationalor concrete strategies. Back-casting can also help to stress-test visionstatements, i.e., back-casting from a preferred future can help groups determine
the feasibility of certain strategic thrusts and shed light on potential tensions
and trade-offs en-route to that preferred future.
The following diagrams on page 8 illustrate some other applicationsof back-casting:
7

PRESENT

FUTUREMISSING STEPS
can be uncovered if we question the cause-effectrelationships in our back-casted narrative. Thesemissing steps could be crucial milestones to help
validate the emergence of the scenario.

Missing
step

Starting
point

Waypoint

Waypoint

Final
Scenario

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
may not be immediately obvious if we are too
focused on a singular narrative or trajectory. They
are nevertheless important to uncover, as they may
impede progress towards the scenario.

Unintended
consequence

Starting
point

Waypoint

Waypoint

Final
Scenario

CRITICAL NODES
have an impact on multiple trajectories. If they
are not reached, the scenario in question may
not arise.
Waypoint

Waypoint

Starting
point

Final
Scenario

Criticalnode

Waypoint

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

Integrated back-casting is a methodology developed by the National Security
Research Centre that applies back-casting to generate pathway maps of thefeared or undesired outcomes from a set of pre-defined driving forces. As theintegrated back-casting process approaches the starting point, pre-defined
driving forces are linked to causal nodes that reflect current reality. This gives
each pathway map a sense of how current developments line up with the driving
forces that are believed to shape the future.
A Master Pathway Map (MPM) is derived from integrating all the pathway maps
into a single map, which then forms the basis of a monitoring framework. By
monitoring current developments with reference to the MPM, critical challenges
can be anticipated, and appropriate intervention points for further policy
research and action can be identified.

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

BLACK SWAN
A rare, large-impact, hard-to-predict and discontinuous event beyond therealm of normal expectations. Taking reference from how people believed thatall swans were white up to the discovery of black swans in Australia, “Black
Swans” illustrate the fragility of human knowledge, and the weakness of apurely empirical approach to preparing for the future.
The discovery of the Internet and the September 11 attacks, both of which have
had a paradigm-shifting impact on the status quo, are commonly cited examplesof Black Swans.
As the world becomes more complex and volatile, our tendency to be surprisedby Black Swans will increase, because it will become progressively harder topick up weak signals and identify outliers ahead of time. The human tendency
is also to look for explanations for Black Swans after they have occurred; while
comforting in the short term, this tendency to seek coherence in hindsight might
blind us to future threats.
The concept of the Black Swan has inspired many variants, some of which arecaptured below:

GREY
SWAN

DIRTY-WHITE
SWAN

RED
SWAN

DRAGONKING

Inventor of term

Inventor of term

Inventor of term

Inventor of term

Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Scott Ryrie

Gordon Woo

Didier Sornette et al.

Definition

Definition

Definition

Definition

Similar to a Black
Swan, except that theevent is predictable toa certain degree, i.e.,some warning signs
are observable.

Unlike a Black Swan,the event is only
surprising because
cognitive biases (e.g.,wilful blindness) blindobservers to it.

Unlike a Black Swan,the event is a redherring and is not
actually impactful.

Unlike a Black Swan, which appears to come out of nowhere,
dragon kings are large extreme
events which exhibit different
characteristics from similarsmaller-scale events. This isdue to the emergent propertiesof complex systems.

ExamplesExamplesExamplesExamplesExtreme weather events,
e.g., earthquakes.

Brisbane floods: Mayor of
Queensland’s flood-devastated Lockyer Valley neglectedevacuation plans

Y2K bug
Mad cow disease

Financial bubbles

References
1. “Futurist’s Guide to Birdwatching”, http://www.futuresgroupsg.com/content/3309/attachment/swans/, last accessed Sep 2013.
2. Peter Ho, “Governance at the Leading Edge: Black Swans, Wild Cards, and Wicked Problems”, Ethos 4 (April 2008). https://www.
cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Ethos/Issue%204%20Apr%202008/Pages/Governance-at-the-Leading-Edge-Black-Swans-Wild-Cards-andWicked-Problems.aspx, last accessed Jul 2014.
Further Reading
1. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable Fragility (New York: Random House LLC, 2010).
11

CAUSAL LAYERED ANALYSIS (CLA)
A sense-making tool designed to help uncover the underlying issues
beneath observable events and trends. It is commonly described asa process of uncovering the story beneath the tip of the iceberg.
CLA begins with identifying an obvious and superficial
phenomenon (litany), analysing the cause of the phenomenon(systemic perspective) and then unravelling the deeper
ideological assumptions (worldview). These assumptions
can help uncover the unconscious emotive aspects of
the issue (myth/metaphor). Through this process, CLA
expands the issue from the short to the long term and fromreality to the imaginative or emotive dimension.
Employing CLA in a facilitated discussion can help reveal
alternative interpretations of an issue arising from different
worldviews or myths held by people. CLA can also help toidentify tensions between these different perspectives, andallow for discussions on alternative realities or futures that take
into account different stakeholders’ views.

Level

Description

Key Question

ExamplesLitanyHeadlines
Problems
IssuesWhat am I experiencing right now?

Enrichmentclasses for young
children

Systemic

Social,economic,
cultural,political,
historicalfactors

What caused this?

Academic
qualifications arevaluedWorldview

Narratives
that support
the litany
and system

What intellectual justifications can I
make to explain this?

Everything is acompetition

Myth/
Metaphor

Deepstories andcollective
archetypes

What deep convictions do I have about
how society should function?

“There is no freelunch”;“Dog-eat-dog
world”

References
1. Sohail Inayatullah, “Causal Layered Analysis: Unveiling and Transforming the Future”,
http://www.cgee.org.br/atividades/redirKori/3323, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. Centre for Strategic Futures, “Causal Layered Analysis Project: An Inter-agency Project to Explore
the Socio-economic Aspirations of Singaporeans”, http://www.psd.gov.sg/content/dam/psd_web/
csf_web/resources/Causal%20Layered%20Analysis%20Project%20Report%20(final).pdf, lastaccessed Aug 2014.

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

COGNITIVE BIAS
Psychological tendencies that result in systematic errors in the way humanbeings receive, process, retain or recall information, or make inferences,judgements and predictions.
Many cognitive biases result from the heuristics or mental shortcuts that humanbeings unconsciously use to process information. These heuristics are generally
useful in making simple daily decisions. In more complex situations, however,they can lead to an overestimation or underestimation of actual odds.
It is especially important for decision-makers in government to be aware ofsome cognitive biases:
Definition

ExampleRecencyeffect/availability
heuristic

The tendency to assess the probabilityof events by the ease with which
examples come to mind.

The risk of a terrorist attack on the US was underrated
prior to the events of September 11 and overrated soonafter those events.

Confirmation
bias

The tendency to look for or interpret
information in a way that confirms
one’s preconceptions.

Intelligence information was interpreted in the runup to the 2003 Iraq War to support policymakers’
conviction that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Groupthink

The tendency to believe something
because many others do so, e.g., in
hierarchical organisations that emphasise
conflict avoidance and harmony.

In the lead up to the Challenger space shuttle disasterin 1986, individual engineers had identified risks, but
downplayed them to avoid coming into conflict with
NASA management.

Hyperbolic
discounting

The tendency to underestimate future
costs and benefits relative to immediate
ones, or to overestimate the costs ofimmediate actions relative to their
future benefits.

Most of us do not put aside enough money for
retirement healthcare as we tend to overestimate theimmediate costs and underestimate the future costsof healthcare, as well as the future benefits of taking
out insurance today.

Status quobias

The tendency to stick to the “default
setting” or the option that is consistent
with past precedent.

In the early 1990s, citizens in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania were offered two options for their car
insurance: an expensive option giving them full rightto sue, and a cheaper option with restricted rights tosue. In New Jersey, the cheaper option was the default
and most citizens selected it. Only a minority chose
this cheaper option in Pennsylvania, where the more
expensive option was the default.

Further Reading
1. Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgement andChoice” (Dec 2002), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/
kahnemann-lecture.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011).
3. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” inScience, Vol. 185, 1974. Reproduced as appendix A in Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow.
4. Richard J. Heuer, Jr, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (New York: Novinka Books, 2006).
5. Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simon, The Invisible Gorilla: How Our Intuitions Deceive Us(New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2009).
6. Donald Low (ed.), Behavioural Economics and Policy Design: Examples from Singapore(Singapore: World Scientific and Civil Service College, 2012).

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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
The psychological discomfort a person feels at the discrepancy between
his existing beliefs and new information or views he is confronted with that
contradict those beliefs. Since it is difficult to hold two opposing ideas in one’s
mind at the same time, individuals tend to reduce their cognitive dissonanceby denying or devaluing the new information or views that they are confronted
with, or by rationalising their own views. They may cast doubt on the credibilityof the source of such new information or views, or dismiss them as insufficientgrounds to disprove their preconceived ideas. They may also subtly adjust theirown position to reduce the dissonance between that and incoming information.
In the policy context, decision-makers could devalue inconvenient truths about
ground sentiments by insisting that they constitute the views of a vocal minority
and may not reflect those of the silent majority. The futurist therefore has tomake a convincing case for new information or views that contradict decisionmakers’ preconceptions. It is vital that organisations consider an issue frommultiple angles, and not just the most comfortable or preferred perspective, inorder to ensure that their strategies are more resilient.
Further Reading
1. Margaret Heffernan, Wilful Blindness: Why We Ignore the Obvious at Our Peril(London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2011).

COMPLEXITY
A phenomenon involving multiple components in a dense network ofinteractions or relationships, where cause-effect relationships are not clear,stable or predictably repeatable.
Complex systems are often self-organising; they exhibit new patterns andbehaviours that cannot be predicted beforehand or by examining the component
parts of the system, but which can only be discerned and understood after thefact and usually cannot be replicated. The occurrence of these new patterns andbehaviours is known as emergence.
Complex systems are also characterised by non-linearity, i.e., where changes are
random and/or discontinuous, and do not follow a gradual and orderly pattern.
As a result, cause-effect relations between the various components are difficult
to establish in a complex system (See Cynefin Framework).
The increasing complexity of the operating environment for government has
been associated with large-scale disruptions in recent times, such as the SARS
outbreak (2003) and global financial crisis (2008-2009).
One key lesson for policymakers arising from complexity is that the past is nota good predictor of the future. While it is possible to retrospectively discern
patterns between events and trends in a complex system, it is unwise forpolicymakers to base their plans entirely on extrapolations from history. Even
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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

though interactions in a complex system might make logical sense in hindsight,
there is no certainty that the sequence of interactions leading up to a particularoutcome has been fully understood, or can be replicated in the future.

ASPECTS OF COMPLEXITY

SOCIAL COMPLEXITY

EMERGENCE

refers to the extent of consensus that may
exist among a group working on a solution
based on different assumptions, values,
rationales, and objectives. There is an inverse
relation between consensus and social
complexity: where there is low consensus
among stakeholders, social complexity ishigh. In such circumstances, imposing topdown solutions is likely to fail, since those
involved in implementing the solution may
have different or even competing interests.
Social complexity is often manifested inwicked problems such as climate change.

(also known as generative complexity or
aggregation) refers to the phenomenon
where the interactions within the system andwith the environment create new outcomesin an unpredictable manner. For instance,
economies exhibit emergent phenomena:an economic system as a whole shows
distinctive characteristics that cannot be
extrapolated from the traits of individuals or
firms in the economy interacting with one
another.

COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMSDYNAMIC COMPLEXITY

specifically have the capacity to learn fromexperience and adapt to new scenarios. They
are able to self-organise in order to adapt
to changes, and develop strategies which inretrospect are coherent. For instance, societies
are complex adaptive systems, with norms andpractices that constantly evolve in responseto the interactions and experiences of theirconstituent members.

refers to situations where causality
is subtle and effects over time areunclear. For example, the relationshipbetween demographic change andthe challenges it poses to a city isdifficult to fully characterise. There may
be additional factors that have notbeen identified, such as technologicalchanges or workforce policies.

References
1. Gianni Zappala (2011), “Solving Complex Social Problems”, https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/Home/Blog.
aspx?defaultblog=https://blog.csi.edu.au/2011/06/solving-complex-social-problems/, last accessed
Oct 2013.
2. Elena Olmedo, “Complexity and Chaos in Organisations: Complex Management.” International
Journal of Complexity in Leadership and Management 1:1 (2010). See, referenced within article,
Pavard and Dugdale (2000) and Snowden and Boone (2007).
3. Adam Kahane, Solving Tough Problems: An Open Way of Talking, Listening, and Creating New
Realities (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004).
Further Reading
1. Peter Ho, “Governing for the Future: What Governments Can Do” (Sept 2012), http://www.rsis.edu.
sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP248.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The process by which an organisation deals with a major event that threatens
to harm the organisation, its stakeholders, or the general public. The study ofcrisis management originated with the large scale industrial and environmental
disasters of the 1980s.
Three elements are common to a crisis: (i) a threat to the organisation, (ii) theelement of surprise, and (iii) a short decision time. In a crisis, it is extremely
important for decisions to be made quickly, sometimes in the absence ofcomplete information.
At the national level, the Singapore Government has in place a crisis
management system designed to prepare for and respond to a wide variety ofhazards, including terrorist attacks, major accidents and other home front crisesthat could affect Singapore.
Reference
1. ASIS International, “Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness, and Continuity Management
Systems”, http://www.ndsu.edu/fileadmin/emgt/ASIS_SPC.1-2009_Item_No._1842.pdf, lastaccessed Aug 2014.

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

CROWD-SOURCINGThe process of canvassing for views and ideas across a broad spectrum ofpeople, drawing upon the idea of cognitive diversity, where a group contains avariety of ways of thinking. This can help to overcome the cognitive biases andblind spots of any particular individual or team.
Crowd-sourcing is particularly important for the work of a foresight unit ingovernment. Institutionalised practices and norms of analysis can limit the ability
to pick up weak signals or reveal the “unknown unknowns” that lie just beyond
the horizon. Deliberately canvassing views from individuals and organisations
perceived to be peripheral or “fringe” to the work of government is one way togather fresh insights and stress-test entrenched perspectives.

Cognitive
Diversity

Gather fresh insights and stress-test
entrenched perspectives

Properly applied, crowd-sourcing can be a powerful content-generation tool.
However, indiscriminate crowd-sourcing, as is sometimes the case with social
media, can result in the spread of misinformation or panic, especially when
individuals blindly reinforce each other’s assumptions in an information cascade.
An example of crowd-sourcing in foresight is FutureCoast (www.futurecoast.
org). This is a collaborative storytelling game where members of the public are
invited to imagine what life would be like in a world affected by climate change.
They contribute stories through voicemails, which other participants can thenaccess and build on.
Reference
1. James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Random House LLC, 2005).
Further Reading
1. Scott E Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools,
and Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
Issues that, in the context of government, do not fall neatly within the purview ofa single agency. To consider and address such issues, a Whole-Of-Government(WOG) approach is necessary.
See Whole-Of-Government (WOG)17

CYNEFIN FRAMEWORKA sense-making and decision-making tool to help decision-makers analyse andevaluate issues, determine their significance, and take appropriate follow-up
action. The framework classifies issues into four types — simple, complicated,complex and chaotic — with each type requiring distinct responses.

COMPLEX
Probe

Sense

COMPLICATED
RespondSense

Because complex contexts are in
constant flux, cause-effect relationships
cannot be determined ex ante. This is therealm of “unknown unknowns”, where
we understand why things happen only
in retrospect.
Problem-solving in a complex space thus
requires a degree of experimentation
and a tolerance for failure.

AnalyseRespondComplicated contexts, unlike simple ones,
may contain multiple right answers. Though
clear cause-effect relationships exist, noteveryone can see them.
This is the realm of “known unknowns”,
where the understanding of the situationis unevenly distributed, and where expert
knowledge may be required.

DISORDER
CHAOTICAct

Sense

SIMPLE
Respond

In a chaotic context, searching for the“right answers” is pointless.
This is the realm of “unknowables”,
where cause-effect relationships havebeen so destabilised that they have no
discernible pattern. The only sensible
response is to act first, move out of
the chaotic space, and establish order.

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Sense

Categorise

Respond

Simple contexts are characterised by stability
and clear cause-effect relationships that areeasily discernible.
This is the realm of “known knowns”, whereproblems are readily resolved through bestpractices and standard operating procedures.

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

The Cynefin Framework includes two additional concepts:•

A region of “disorder” that lies outside these four quadrants, where thecategorisation of the issue is unknown.

•

A “cliff” between the simple and chaotic quadrants, which serves as areminder that issues that seem simple can quickly become chaotic if weare not alert to early warning signs. This cliff serves as a reminder thatcomplacency and blind adherence to standard operating procedures can tip
an organisation into crisis.

References
1. Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex
and complicated world”, IBM Systems Journal 42:3 (2003), http://alumni.media.mit.edu/~brooks/
storybiz/kurtz.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. David J. Snowden, Cognitive Edge: The Cynefin Framework, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=N7oz366X0-8, last accessed Aug 2014.
3. David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making (Nov 2007),
http://hbr.org/2007/11/a-leaders-framework-for-decision-making/, last accessed Aug 2014.

DELPHI METHOD
A method of crowd-sourcing inputs that involves two or more rounds ofconsultations with a group of experts. After each round, a facilitator circulates
an anonymised summary of the group’s responses to the previous round’squestions.The members of the group then respond to the new set of information,
revising their previous answers, if necessary. The underlying philosophy here isthat, over time, the group will converge towards the “correct” answer, or at least
arrive at a working consensus on the issues discussed.
The Delphi Method is most useful as a tool to facilitate discussions within agroup that cannot readily meet face-to-face or has not yet built the level ofrapport and familiarity required for an uninhibited discussion. It also helps tocreate a safe space for individuals to share their views that may run counter to
expectations of their professional roles.

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DESIGN THINKING
An approach to problem-solving that takes the end-user’s experience as thestarting point in developing the solution. Instead of focusing only on the purely
rational parameters of a given situation, design thinking recognises that there isbound to be some messiness and unpredictability in the way situations develop
and the way people respond to those situations.
Design thinking methodologies support problem-solving by helping to foster amore accurate and nuanced understanding of different groups of stakeholders
or end-users. Some examples of these approaches include ethnographic-based
research, interactive and immersive workshop formats and rapid prototyping.
Design thinking is particularly useful in complex or uncertain environments,
where constantly evolving circumstances make it difficult to define problems
precisely. Instead of focusing on pinning down all the parameters of a problem
before embarking on a solution, design thinking advocates a more iterative
approach, allowing the facts of a problem to be uncovered progressively, with
prototype solutions that can be continually improved.
In the context of governance, design thinking can help policymakers (i)better understand issues which concern the public and (ii) craft policies andprogrammes that connect better with members of the public and respond totheir needs more meaningfully.
Further Reading
1. Tim Brown (2009), Change by Design (HarperCollins e-books, 2014).
2. Christian Bason (2013), Public Managers as Innovators: In Search of Design Attitude,
http://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Ethos/Ethos%20Issue%2012%20June%202013/Pages/
Public%20Managers%20as%20Innovators%20In%20Search%20of%20Design%20Attitude.
aspx#sthash.uHcjOaMj.dpuf, last accessed Aug 2014.
3. June Gwee (2010), Redesigning the Service Experience, http://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/
ethos/Issue%208%20Aug%202010/Pages/Redesigning-the-Service-Experience.aspx#sthash.
quFwbtu0.dpuf, last accessed Aug 2014.

20

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

DRIVERS / DRIVING FORCES
Significant trends, observable in the present, which are expected to continue toaffect the future, e.g., the rise of China.
A distinction is typically made between driving forces that are “predetermined”
and those that are “critical uncertainties”.
•“Predetermined” driving forces are likely to remain stable and predictable.
For example, because demographics take a long time to shift, China’s ageing
population is likely to be a predetermined element across multiple possible
development trajectories.

•“Critical uncertainties” are driving forces for which a range of plausible
future trajectories exists. For example, as China gradually opens its doors
to trade with other countries, its own growth trajectory will increasingly besubject to the uncertainty and volatility of the international economy. This
uncertainty prevents us from saying definitively that China’s economic
growth will follow any one trajectory.

In the context of Singapore’s national scenarios, driving forces represent the“top issues” that cut across multiple scenarios. Driving forces are compiled
through multiple rounds of interviews with key stakeholders, to ensure that the
scenarios as a whole address the key concerns of each group. The insights fromthese interviews are then clustered together into broadly-defined driving forces,
which contain both predetermined elements and critical uncertainties.
Further Reading
1. Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company(New York: Random House LLC, 1996).

21

E–M

EARLY WARNING SYSTEMEMERGENCE
EMERGING STRATEGIC ISSUESENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING
EXPERIMENTATIONFORECASTINGFORESIGHT
FUTURES
FUTURES COMPETENCY FRAMEWORKGAME THEORYHORIZON SCANNING
INTERDEPENDENCE
MANAGEMENT BY DISCOVERY
MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

22

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
A system established to track indicators identified as warning signs that possible
future trends or events are imminent. A good early warning system should:•

Be easily tracked on a regular basis;•

Give sufficient advance warning so that action can be taken before the timewindow expires for making use of the opportunity or addressing the threat.

The Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Programme Office hasdeveloped the Issues-to-Indicators Process. The process aims to examine
emerging issues by developing future scenarios, to draw out implications andindicators for monitoring.
See Signposts

EMERGENCE
See Complexity

23

EMERGING STRATEGIC ISSUES (ESIs)
Issues that could pose institutional surprises and are plausible. They
have implications that have not yet been fully accounted for, and there issufficient evidence that they may occur in future. They are “strategic” as theconsequences they generate cut across multiple domains of public policy.

ESIs can arise for several reasons. They can:24•

Develop as the result of an acceleration of existing phenomena.
A recent example is the phenomenon that Chris Anderson, former editor ofWired magazine, has called “Freenomics”: “Free” goods and services may
involve those that are intended to encourage the sales of related products(e.g., razors requiring the purchase of razor blades), those that attract revenue
through advertisements, or those that serve to promote a premium version(e.g., digital content or television programmes). While the concept of “free”
goods and services has always existed, its rapid spread to new industries
and markets can cause a shift in pricing paradigms. New classes of free
goods and services may emerge, reshaping the underlying economics ofentire industries.

•

Arise as second or third order effects of existing phenomena.
For instance, accelerating technological change and industry structuring maylead to some jobs becoming obsolete, pushing more workers to undergo
retraining and mid-career changes. This may cause some careers to take on
a roller-coaster path instead of a more traditional upward wage trajectory
over the course of a working lifespan. In turn, this may make it harder tosustain traditional priorities such as home ownership and raising children.

•

Arise as the combination of two or more existing phenomena.
For instance, with greater social diversity (including transnational migrationand mixed marriages) and economic empowerment (enabling more diverse
life experiences), Singaporeans no longer necessarily identify themselveswith a singular ethnicity, religion or class. This means that they are also lesslikely to see their interests as being adequately represented by the leadersof a particular community or group, making societal consensus harder toachieve.

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYFILTERING PROCESS- Drawn from the ESI 2.0 Exercise done by the Centre for Strategic
Futures

300+ IDEAS

IS THERE INSTITUTIONALSURPRISE?
WHAT IS THE
EVIDENCE?
WHAT IS THE
IMPACT ON
PUBLIC POLICY?

48 TOP ISSUES
Within the Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF), ideas for ESIs are identified
through interviews with experts, workshops with academics, and inter-agency
discussions.
By evaluating the extent of each element — institutional surprise, plausibility,
and impact on public policy — CSF then filters a wide span of ideas down to ashortlist of top issues.
See also Wildcards
Further Reading
1. Bernard Toh, “Emerging Strategic Issues and Wildcards”, https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/
Pages/Emerging-Strategic-Issues-and-Wildcards.aspx, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. CSF Annual Report 2012, http://www.psd.gov.sg/content/dam/psd_web/csf_web/resources/
CSF%20Annual%20Report%202012.pdf.

25

ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING
The systematic process of picking up weak signals and trends to identify andmonitor driving forces, potential discontinuities and emerging issues from
regular scanning of diverse information sources. It is sometimes referred to as“horizon scanning”.

OBJECTIVE
To systematically pick up weak signals and trends to identify and monitor
potential discontinuities and emerging issues.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Understand the focus of Environment Scanning
Determine Techniques and Tools for scanning
Develop Search Strategies to increase relevance
Identify Sources to triangulate data
Report and Communicate Findings

Source: Image by the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), Singapore

26

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

EXPERIMENTATION
An empirical process that seeks to test and validate competing hypotheses.
Experimentation is a key feature of navigating complex environments. This isbecause the results and ramifications of any action within a complex systemcannot be fully determined ex ante, due to the constantly evolving web ofinterdependencies between the system’s different elements and actors.
In the context of governance, experimentation and related processes suchas rapid prototyping can help policymakers better anticipate the future. For
instance, the controlled testing of different policy options can help policymakers
better gauge how citizens might respond.
See Prototyping

FORECASTING
A process for making justified statements on future events, based on quantitative
analysis and modelling.
Quantitative analysis and modelling can be combined with sensitivity analysis
to establish a range of possible trajectories.
Forecasts are entirely extrapolative in nature, e.g., the Ministry of Trade andIndustry’s economic forecasts.

FORESIGHT
The ability to consider and plan for the future.
See Futures

27

FUTURES
A concept that indicates the presence of possible alternatives that might happen,
and the need to consider them.
See Foresight

FUTURES COMPETENCY FRAMEWORKA framework, developed jointly by the Centre for Strategic Futures and the
National Security Coordination Secretariat in 2012 to set out the functional
competencies required of foresight/futures practitioners in the Singapore
Government. It establishes behavioural indicators across 12 competencies in
the following areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Information gathering and distilling
Critical thinking to develop insights
Knowledge of futures methodologies
Developing new futures methodologies
Training and facilitation
Networking
Domain knowledge
Policy thinking
Engaging and partnering
Consulting
Creative communication
Project management

The Futures Competency Framework should be viewed as an overlay to existing
performance management frameworks such as the AIM Model used by theSingapore Public Service. It can serve as a tool for supervisors in relevant
departments to guide staff development.

GAME THEORY
Game theory is a study of strategic decision-making, i.e., situations where two
or more players (or agents) have to make decisions, and the way things turnout for each player may depend on the other player or players’ choices. Game
theory examines the strategies that a group of decision makers will converge on
as they try to maximise their own payoffs.
Game theory may be used to analyse the behaviours of agents and the stabilityof the outcomes in agent-based modelling or other simulations.

28FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYHORIZON SCANNING
See Environmental scanning

INTERDEPENDENCE
The phenomenon where different factors within a system affect and are affectedby one another.
When challenges are interdependent, an improvement in one makes it easier toaddress others and, vice versa, deterioration in one makes it harder to address
others.
References
1. Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore J. Gordon, and Elizabeth Florescu, “State of the Future”, The Millennium
Project (Washington DC: United Nations, 2007).
2. Strategic Thinking and RAHS, Singapore, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Cebrowski/
Docs/Rasmussen-docs/Singapore%20RAHS.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.

MANAGEMENT BY DISCOVERY
A management style that emphasises the importance of continual reframing andadaptation. It builds on the traditional approach of Management by Objectives,
which is based on the assumption that a project’s objectives can be clearly
defined in advance and will remain fixed throughout the project’s course.
While Management by Objectives introduces meaningful structure to the
problem-solving process, it is less suited to leadership in complex and
unpredictable environments, where goals and objectives tend to be emergent
rather than well-defined. Under these conditions, neither the goals nor the path
towards achieving those goals can be readily determined ahead of time.
With the Management by Discovery approach, managers need to recognisethat details about a goal might only emerge in the course of a project. Goals
themselves might also shift as a result of actions taken. Appropriate responses
may include (i) conducting probes to sense changes in the environment, (ii)revising or reframing goals to better suit these changed circumstances, (iii)
conducting experiments to test out new solutions and approaches, and (iv)building up organisational resilience to recover more quickly from failures.
Reference
1. Noel Bay, Management by Discovery, https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Pages/
Management-by-Discovery.aspx, last accessed Aug 2014.

29

MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
A method for exploring all the possible solutions to a multi-dimensional
problem. In the context of foresight work, morphological analysis can be used
as a tool to generate alternative scenarios or strategies.
It is most suited for multi-dimensional problems with many variables, where
systems maps and simulation do not function well. Using a cross-consistency
matrix, as seen below, the process of morphological analysis can help an analyst
focus on more plausible solutions through the systematic elimination of illogicalsolution combinations.

30

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

Geographic
priority

Functional
priorities

Size andcrammingNew
construction

Maintenance

Generalphilosophy

Metropoles

All socio-tech

Large,

With newMore

All get samefunctions

not crammed

construction

frequent

sheltermaintenancequality

Current levels

All take same

Cities+50,000

Tech support

Large andsystems

crammedCompensation

Suburbs andcountryside

Humanitarian

Small, not

New only foraims

crammeddefence build-up

No
geo-priority

Residential

Small andrisk

No maintenance

Priority: key
personnel

Priority: Needy

crammedThe six categories in the first row of the table above – Geographic priority,
Functional priorities, Size and cramming, etc – show the different dimensions of
the problem, i.e., the relevant issues involved. The cells below are the possible
states of existence for each category. The combination of medium green boxes
describes how possible elements can coherently co-exist within a single state.
In the case of developing scenarios, the categories in the top row can be replacedwith key drivers, and the other cells with the possible ways each key driver canexist in the future.
Reference
1. General Morphological Analysis, http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html, last accessed Aug 2014.

31

N–S

NARRATIVE INQUIRYNON-LINEARITY
PATH DEPENDENCY
POLICY GAME
PRE-MORTEM
PROTOTYPING
RED-TEAMINGRESILIENCERETROSPECTIVE COHERENCERISKRISK MANAGEMENTRISK REGISTERSANDBOXSCENARIO PLANNING
SCENARIO PLANNING PLUS
SENSE-MAKINGSENTIMENT ANALYSISSIGNPOSTS
SIMULATIONSINGAPORE FORESIGHT WEEKSTEEP ANALYSISSTRATEGIC FUTURES NETWORKSTRATEGIC PLANNING
STRESS-TESTING
SWOT ANALYSISSYSTEMS THINKING

32

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYNARRATIVE INQUIRY
A sense-making process that helps analysts identify key patterns, weak signals
and key perspectives. These may surface from the narratives provided byparticipants through activities such as interviews.
Further Reading
1. Larry Browning and Theirry Boudes, “The Use of Narrative to Understand and Respond toComplexity”, E:CO 7:3-4 (2005), http://cognitive-edge.com/uploads/articles/51_Browning_Boudes_
on_Weick_and_Snowden.pdf, last accessed Jul 2014.

NON-LINEARITY
See Complexity

PATH DEPENDENCY
The tendency to stick to past practice even if newer and more efficient practices
are available. This could be due to “sunk costs”, i.e., the resources that havealready been committed to a particular option, as a result of which it would not
be cost-effective to make a switch. Cognitive biases can also give rise to pathdependency. For example, being risk-averse can lead to a preference for the
status quo or “tried and tested” solutions.

A

B

Path dependency can narrow the range of available policy options and force
policymakers into making sub-optimal decisions. For example, it is difficult forSingapore to increase its MRT capacity in the short run because the rail technology
already in place can only be stretched so far. Because of the constraints imposedby path dependency, policymakers should ensure that all policy alternatives are
rigorously considered, and that contingency plans allow for a sufficient degreeof flexibility, especially in situations where existing policies fail or are likely tolead down a trajectory to failure.
Further Reading
1. Stephen E. Margolis and S. J. Leibowitz, “Path Dependence”, http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/
palgrave/palpd.html, last accessed Aug 2014.

33

POLICY GAME
An interactive activity or exercise that can take the form of asimulation, card game or board game. Policy games are set
up to examine policy or to explore the landscape, by putting“players” through immersive experiences that help deepen
understanding of the different interactions in a complex
system. They are primarily focused on stakeholder interests
or understanding the dynamics that influence policy-related
decisions on different levels.
The policy gaming process is conceptually similar to wargamingin the military context. It seeks to allow the players to rehearse thedecisions that they might have to make in actual situations undertime pressure.
Policy games help to create awareness of interdependencies atthe systems level and to make complexities explicit. They enrichand add nuance to the policy-making process by emphasising theaffective aspects of society that cannot be readily described throughrational analysis. They can also change behaviour by engaging theperson wholly: cognitively, affectively and behaviourally.

PRE-MORTEM
See Stress-testing

PROTOTYPINGThe process of creating models (for objects) or early sketches of a policy. Thiscan help to test ideas and spot potential problems so that subsequent prototypes
come closer to addressing the issues at hand.

34

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

RED-TEAMING
See Stress-testing

RESILIENCE
The measure of a system’s ability to recover from a disruption or disturbance.
This recovery need not take the form of a return to the status quo; resilientsystems may cope with strategic shock by transforming themselves to adapt
to new realities. At the national level, resilience refers to the ability of a nation
to bounce back quickly in the aftermath of a crisis with its social fabric intact. It
is the collective ability of institutions, society, physical infrastructure, and value
systems to recover from a national crisis, integrate the lessons learned, andadapt to the post-crisis environment.
Conceptually, resilience is the corollary to the traditional security doctrine ofresistance, where a system’s responses tend to be top-down, and focussed on
strategies to mitigate or prevent threats. However, as threats become more
multi-dimensional and amorphous, it is hard for any single actor to cover allbases, or for any strategy to succeed all of the time. Security strategies centred
on resilience recognise that occasional failures are inevitable, and seek todevelop the capacity to recover from those failures.
A resilient strategy takes into account not just government actions, but also
“soft” factors such as individual and community mindsets. As such, while
resilience can be assessed in threat-specific or domain-specific terms, e.g., asociety may be resilient to a terrorist attack but not a pandemic, there are also
cross-cutting indicators of resilience, such as national pride, social cohesion ortrust in the government.
Reference
1. Peter Ho, “Governing for the Future: What Governments Can Do” (Sept 2012), http://www.rsis.edu.
sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP248.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014. Shaping Tomorrow: Practical
Foresight Guide, http://www.shapingtomorrow.com/media-centre/pf-complete.pdf, last accessed
Aug 2014.

35

RETROSPECTIVE COHERENCE
The idea that a current situation always makes sense in hindsight. However,being able to explain the current state of affairs does not mean we are operating
in a knowable world. In a complex system, even if we were to start again andmake the same decisions, we cannot be sure that we will end up in the same
situation.
Governments that do not grasp retrospective coherence will often dangerously
assume that the lessons of history are enough to guide them into the futurewhen this may not be true. For example, the 9/11 Commission Report identified
a series of operational opportunities when the US government could have acted
on the information it possessed, and thus foiled the terrorists’ plans. However,the significance of the information held was only clear after 9/11 had occurred.
The factors that led to 9/11 may also not be repeated in the future.
References
1. Peter Ho, “Governing for the Future: What Governments Can Do” (Sept 2012), http://www.rsis.edu.
sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP248.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. Peter Ho, “Governments Must Thrive in a Complex World” (Aug 2012), http://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/blogs/new-atlanticist/governments-must-thrive-in-complex-world, last accessed Aug 2014.

RISK
In the Singapore Government context, risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty
on objectives. Risks can be distinguished in different ways:
Risk Events versus Risk Issues
A risk event is an acute and discrete occurrence, whereas a risk issue is a
development or trend that evolves over time. For example, extreme cold
weather in North America caused by the unexpected breakdown of the polar
vortex is an example of a discrete risk event, while shifts in weather patterns due
to climate change constitute a risk issue.
Enterprise Risk and Strategic Risk
Enterprise risks have an effect on an agency’s objectives and include both
operational risks, i.e., risks that stem from the agencies’ day-to-day operations
and services and strategic risks, i.e., risks that would result in a failure to achieve
the agency’s mission and vision.
At the Whole-of-Government level, strategic risks refer to the threats to
Singapore’s national objectives. These often involve cross-cutting issues andrequire a focus on the inter-connections between risks.
Reference
1. Handout from Roy Rimington, Enterprise Risk Management (Advanced Course),
Civil Service College.

36

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYRISK MANAGEMENT
Coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk.
(See also WOG-IRM.)
A risk management process is the systematic application of management
policies, procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting,establishing the context, and identifying, analysing treating, monitoring andreviewing risk.
Reference
1. Handout from Roy Rimington, Enterprise Risk Management (Advanced Course), Civil Service
College.

RISK REGISTER
A reference document that consolidates identified risks, including threat andhazard events that individuals or organisations may be concerned about, oftenwith the aim of stimulating resource prioritisation, contingency planning andcapability development. A threat event is an event resulting from malicious manmade acts that can cause harm. A hazard event is a non-malicious occurrence,
man-made or natural, with potential negative consequences.

SANDBOX
Sandbox is a working-level meeting convened by the Centre for Strategic
Futures involving members of other foresight and strategic planning agencies
in government.
Good foresight work requires the free exchange of information across multiple
levels of the hierarchy, not just at the senior levels. Platforms such as Sandbox
help to build networks and trust within the government foresight community
by providing a safe space for officers to share their learning from completed
projects or solicit feedback on current projects.

37

SCENARIO PLANNING
A process that generates a group of plausible stories about the future. These canthen be used to aid long-term planning. Well-written scenarios combine rigorous
forecasts with immersive storytelling elements to bring possible futures to life.
In so doing, they can help inspire readers to take action in a way that more
“traditional” methods of communication might not.
The traditional scenario planning methodology, pioneered by Royal Dutch Shell,emphasises that scenarios are not intended to present definitive predictions
about the future. Rather, scenarios help to articulate the risks and opportunities
present in a range of plausible futures, and serve as a discussion tool to stimulate
debate about strategies to shape the future.
Scenario planning can also be seen as a change management tool -- specifically,
a way to sensitise the participants in the process to indicators of change andto the unpredictability and volatility of the future. They can help cultivate a“contingency mindset” and build the capacity to react quickly when the needarises.
Adam Kahane, who facilitated the Mont Fleur scenarios in South Africa inthe 1990s, suggests an alternative scenario planning methodology, which heterms transformative scenario planning. This constructs scenarios “not only
to understand the future, but also to influence it”, and is an adaptation of
Shell’s scenario planning methodology. In transformative scenario planning,organisations and participants are not merely reactive players which shouldbe “sensitised to signals of change” and “adapt to the changing external
environment”. Instead, they are seen as transformative agents who must forge
a consensus on their desired future and the strategy for achieving this desired
future together.
The Singapore Government produces a set of National Scenarios every three
to five years to spark discussion and fresh thinking about issues related toSingapore’s future. The National Scenarios are complemented by Focused
Scenarios, which are in-depth studies into specific topics, such as climatechange or new media.
Further Reading
1. Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New York:
Currency Doubleday, 1996).
2. Adam Kahane, Transformative Scenario Planning: Working Together to Change the World (SanFrancisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012).

38

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYSCENARIO PLANNING PLUS (SP+)
A toolkit put together by the Centre for Strategic Futures and the Risk
Assessment and Horizon Scanning Programme Office (RPO, then Horizon
Scanning Centre) in 2009 to complement and enhance the use of scenario
planning methodology in government. It enhances the Singapore
Government’s ability to manage discontinuities and respond to dynamicchange. Called “Foresight to Strategy” in RPO, it has been an important
guiding framework that has helped RPO to develop its suite of foresightdevelopment and engagement tools since 2004.
While the SP+ toolkit is presented as a cycle, with one step leading to the next,
it is important to note that the steps do not have to be applied in sequence orin a fixed direction — foresight work is frequently experimental and iterativeand it is not uncommon for steps to be revisited within a single project. It
is also not necessary for all the steps to be deployed in any given foresightproject.
The SP+ toolkit is targeted at six key areas:•

Defining focus: Tools to evaluate the significance of particular trends
and issues, in order to determine priority areas for the organisation, e.g.,
Cynefin Framework.

•

Environmental scanning: Tools to engage stakeholder
groups and surface new insights, e.g., Delphi Method.

•

Sense-making: Tools to relate these new
insights to the organisation, e.g., bycategorising, visualising or prioritising these
insights for particular stakeholders.

•Developing possible futures: Tools
to generate scenario narratives, e.g.,morphological analysis.

•

Designing strategies: Tools to develop and test
strategies and action plans to help the organisation
attain its desired futures or avoid feared ones, e.g.,
back-casting, stress-testing.

•Monitoring: Tools to determine the organisation’s progress towards
particular futures, e.g., through the identification and monitoring ofindicators, signposts and milestones.

39

SENSE-MAKING
The process of clarifying and articulating an organisation’s understandingof complex situations in order to build situational awareness and sharedunderstanding within the organisation. It supports decision-making by
establishing an understanding of the interconnections between various
elements and actors within a complex system.
Sense-making typically begins with sensing processes, e.g., crowd-sourcing.
The feedback gathered from various sensors and stakeholders forms the basis
for analysis.
While it is impossible to fully map the interconnections within a complex systembecause complex systems constantly evolve, sense-making is neverthelessuseful in reducing uncertainty within the operating environment and keeping
potential risks below acceptable thresholds.
Reference
1. Dave Snowden, “What is Sense-Making?”, http://cognitive-edge.com/blog/entry/3840/what-is-sensemaking/, last accessed Aug 2014.

SENTIMENT ANALYSISThe use of natural language processing, computational linguistics and text
analytics to identify and extract subjective information in source materials.
Generally speaking, it aims to determine the attitude of a speaker or a writer withrespect to a particular topic. The attitude may be their judgment or evaluation,
their mood, or the emotional effect the author wishes to have on the reader.
The first step in determining the tone of a document is to break up the document
into its basic parts of speech (part-of-speech or POS tagging). POS tagging is amature technology that identifies all the structural elements of a document orsentence, including verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs. The tool then identifies
the emotive phrases within a document and scores these phrases (–1 to +1, formost negative to most positive). It then combines them to discern the overallsentiment of the sentence.
Sentiment analysis is commonly applied in the private sector to track andunderstand perceptions of an organisation or brand.
Reference
1. Bo Pang and Lillian Lee, “Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis”, http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/llee/opinion-mining-sentiment-analysis-survey.html, last accessed Aug 2014.

40

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

SIGNPOSTS
Indicators that mark milestones or “waypoints” between a given future and thepresent day. They can take the form of discrete events or thresholds, but they
can also be much more loosely defined, such as trends or patterns.
Signposts are useful because it is easier to visualise the future if the path towards
it is broken up into familiar or manageable blocks of time, i.e., months or years,
instead of decades. In the context of foresight work, signposts help to gauge theextent to which a particular scenario has materialised. In this, they can help to
update decision-makers’ thinking as new information becomes available andkeep the organisation responsive to changes in the environment.
See also Early Warning System

41

SIMULATION
Representations of real or hypothetical processes, mechanisms or systems.
Through these structured processes, stakeholders can “play out” scenarios thatsimulate possible real world environments of interest, typically for the purposeof analysis or education.

SINGAPORE FORESIGHT WEEKA week-long series of foresight-related events, organised every 18 to 24 months
in Singapore, which currently includes the following:•

The International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium by
the National Security Coordination Secretariat•

The Foresight Conference by the Centre for Strategic Futures•

The Complexity workshop by the Nanyang Technological University

Such events are an important platform in Singapore’s foresight landscape as
they serve as a seedbed for fresh thinking and collaboration, in line with thecore foresight philosophy of canvassing widely for new insights. They also help
to keep Singapore at the forefront of futures thinking globally.

42

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYSTEEP ANALYSIS
A framework for a holistic scan of the external environment for factors, fromvarious domains, that an agency needs to take into consideration in its decisionmaking. STEEP stands for:•Social factors include social and cultural values, and demographics.

•

Technological factors include R & D activity, new horizons and research, andthe rate and extent of technological change.

•

Economic factors include items such as economic growth, interest rates,
inflation and international trade.

•

Ecological/Environmental factors include aspects such as weather andclimate as well as energy and fuel.

•

Political factors include a government’s policy focus as well as movementson the political scene, e.g., change of power among political parties. This canalso include legal and regulatory factors.

Similar frameworks include STEEPLED (adding Legal, Ethics and Demographic
factors) and STEER (Socio-cultural, Technological, Economic, Ecological andRegulatory factors).

STRATEGIC FUTURES NETWORK (SFN)
A committee in the Singapore Public Service which provides guidance andoversight on foresight-related issues, the building of futures-related capabilities
and capacities within the public service, and Whole-of-Government risks.
The SFN seeks to build high-level oversight of long-term trends and issues
with an impact on the government’s work. The committee is chaired by the
Head of Civil Service, and committee members include Deputy Secretary-level
representatives from Ministries and Statutory Boards.

43

STRATEGIC PLANNING
The process of determining and articulating what goals are to be achieved in themedium to long term, where the nature of the operating environment is subject
to change, as well as how to reach these goals.
Strategic planning contrasts with operations planning, which seeks to maximise
an organisation’s efficiency within near-term constraints, without considering
how things might change in the longer term. In the context of government,
strategic planning seeks to develop action plans stretching across budget (andeven electoral) cycles.
Strategic planning has a foresight element, such as scanning the horizon forpotential opportunities and risks and determining how these might affect thedirection of the organisation. However, sound strategic planning should also
involve many other activities and processes, ranging from crowd-sourcing frommultiple stakeholders and synthesising diverse views into coherent narratives,to communicating and championing organisational directions once they are
determined.
Strategic planning also has a human resource or organisation development
function. If communicated well, strategy can help to align different parts of anorganisation and generate a shared sense of purpose and identity.

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

STRESS-TESTING
A method of identifying weaknesses or flaws in existing policies.
This can help decision-makers assess and evaluate the robustnessof their policies by identifying potential breaking points andinstances of failure along possible policy trajectories.
Stress-testing can help establish whether existing thresholds offailure are robust and sufficiently acceptable by painting a pictureof how bad things could get and identifying breaking and tipping
points for the policy in question. It can also help to sensitise
decision-makers to early indicators of failure or potential stresspoints down the road.
Stress-testing can take several forms, such as “red-teaming” ofmilitary tactics in the armed forces (i.e., getting a team to takethe perspective of the “enemy”), sensitivity analyses (studying
how changes in various factors will affect the system), or “premorteming” (assuming the strategy has already failed andanalysing the causal factors for this). In the Singapore government,
stress-testing has been piloted in several inter-agency projects asa means of systematising the review of established policies andpolicy paradigms.

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SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Holding the policy parameters constant and changing the external environment,
how might the policy fail under plausible scenarios of the future? Where are thecritical failure points along the trajectory? What drivers of change will cause thepolicy to fail?

PolicyX1

PolicyX

FailurePoint

FailurePoint

PolicyX2

TodayPolicyX3

Holding the policy parameters constant, what might be the gaps or unintended
consequences of the policy under different plausible scenarios of the future?

Ideal situation Policy X continues
to address 95% of
the issue

PolicyX

Today - Policy X
addresses 95% of
the issue

FailurePoint

FailurePoint

Scenario A - Policy
X can only mitigate
60% of the problem

Scenario B Policy X has
created perverse
incentives

References
1. Gary Klein, “Performing a Project Premortem”, http://hbr.org/2007/09/performing-a-projectpremortem/ar/1, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. Adrian Taylor and Cory Costanzo, Foresight to Strategy (Trainers Handbook) (RAHS Programme
Office, 2010).

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

SWOT ANALYSIS
A tool typically deployed in planning or facilitated discussions that helps
to surface the Strengths and Weaknesses of an organisation and theOpportunities and Threats that it faces. The SWOT framework distinguishes
between elements that are internal to the organisation (Strengths andWeaknesses) and those that are external to the organisation (Opportunities andThreats).
SWOT is a good way of visualising and mapping out key success factors andvulnerabilities for the organisation. It is particularly useful in encouraging
discussants to consider the flip side of their preferred discussion frame, e.g.,balancing an inward-looking discussion with the broader external context.

STRENGTHSSWEAKNESSESOPPORTUNITIESOTHREATS

EXTERNAL ORIGIN INTERNAL ORIGIN(attributes of the organisation)

HARMFUL

to achieving the objective(attributes of the environment)

HELPFUL

to achieving the objective

W
T

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SYSTEMS THINKING
An analytical approach that takes into account the full range of interactions
between different elements in a system. This is different from traditional
analyses, which tend to focus on particular elements or a limited range ofinteractions in isolation of the system as a whole.
Systems thinking can yield surprising insights and uncover new policy options,especially when the elements in a particular situation are dynamic, i.e., theychange over time, or are influenced by the external environment and otherelements that may not be immediately obvious to an observer.
While it is impossible to comprehensively map out all the elements andinteractions in any given system, systems thinking can nevertheless help decisionmakers appreciate the “big picture” and the linkages between the different
sections of the system that they oversee. This can help foster collaboration andshared understanding between different parts of an organisation.
Systems thinking also allows policymakers to pick out cause-effect relationships
and how they manifest across an entire system, e.g., balancing loops andreinforcing loops. These are useful ways to visually communicate the causeeffect relationships within the system in consideration:48

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYSYSTEMS ARCHETYPE — SUCCESS TO THE SUCCESSFUL
Imagine that Tom and Jane are equivalent in terms of their abilities. Given thesame amount of resources, they will produce the same results. Tom and Janework in a company where their manager allocates resources based on relative
performance. The underlying philosophy here is meritocracy. The organisation
rewards performance.
Now imagine that Tom goes through a bad patch one year. The manager
responds by allocating fewer resources to him that year. Yet, even though Tom
bounces back to his same level of ability as before, his performance never quite
recovers. Why?

RESOURCESTO TOM+RESOURCESTO JANE

MANAGER ALLOCATESRESOURCES TO JANE
INSTEAD OF TOM–

Negative
reinforcing loop
(vicious cycle)

–

TOM’S
SUCCESS–+

JANE’S
SUCCESS+

Positive
reinforcing loop
(virtuous cycle)

Taken together, these two reinforcing loops illustrate the problem of self-fulfilling
prophecies. What the manager does not realise is that because of his allocation
system, he has unwittingly created a situation where his one-time assessmentof Tom will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy where Tom repeatedly appears
less capable. This archetype describes how small differences or random factors
can lead to one actor being hugely more successful than others, helping to
explain effects such as how success in the school system leads to success laterin life.

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U–W

UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT INTEGRATEDRISK MANAGEMENTWICKED PROBLEMWILDCARDS
WIND-TUNNELLING

50

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARYUNKNOWN UNKNOWNS
Issues which have not yet been surfaced to the organisation and are blind spots.
The phrase “unknown unknowns” was used by then US Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld in a press briefing in 2002 to explain that, despite intelligenceagencies’ best efforts, it was often not possible to get a complete picture of asituation, and that it was important to acknowledge that there would be gaps inknowledge and unrecognised blind spots..
The following table maps out the conceptual distinction between “knowns” and“unknowns”:

Knowledge

What is myorganisation’s
relationship withthis issue?

“Unknown”

Meta-knowledge“Known”

Does anyone out there know about this issue?
“Knowns”“Unknowns”

Known knowns

Known unknowns

Issue is on the organisation’sradar, and there currently
exists a working
understanding of the issue andits impact on the organisation

Organisation recognisesthat this issue is a current blind spot

Unknown knowns

Unknown unknowns“Wilful blindness” – cognitive
biases have blinded theorganisation to the existenceor significance of the issue

Issue whose existence is unknown
to the organisation, or whose
relevance, impact or significance has
been underestimated because of thelack of knowledge

Information asymmetries –knowledge may be out there,
but there is uneven awarenessof it within the organisation

In the ideal scenario, theorganisation makes an effort to study
it further and estimate its impact

Donald Rumsfeld: “... there are somany unknown unknowns. There
are things we do not know we don’t
know.”

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WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT (WOG)
A term used in the Singapore Government to describe a networked approachto governance, where officers in different parts of government are able toovercome intra-government differences, e.g., differences in individual agency
priorities and tackle problems as a coherent and coordinated whole.
“Joined-up government” is a similar concept and has been used in instances
to refer not just to a government that is internally integrated but also integrated
with broader societal actors.
In a complex world, governments will increasingly face problems that cut
across multiple policy domains. For example, modern-day terrorism is amulti-dimensional threat that requires not only collaboration between security
agencies, but also social agencies with oversight of issues affecting local
communities.
This is not to say that agencies should no longer be responsible for specificissues or develop specialised expertise in particular domains. Rather, WOG isabout optimising policy-making at the national level rather than the agency level,
recognising that certain compromises will have to be made across agencies in
the pursuit of broader government- or national-level objectives.
References
1. Peter Ho, “Governing for the Future: What Governments Can Do” (Sept 2012), http://www.rsis.edu.
sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP248.pdf, last accessed Aug 2014.
2. Lim Siong Guan, Many Agencies, One Government, speech at 2004 Commonwealth Association for
Public Administration Conference.

52

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT INTEGRATED RISKMANAGEMENT (WOG-IRM)
The Singapore Government’s risk governance framework. It focuses on strategicrisks that affect more than one agency, e.g., unanticipated changes in theoperating environment, and interconnections among risks, such as how one risk
facing an agency can have spill-over effects on other agencies.
With this approach, national-level risks are assessed in a Whole-of-Government
process involving all Ministries and key agencies.This process prioritises different
kinds of risk, identifies risk owners, and pinpoints gaps in risk governance.
WOG-IRM prevents the fragmentation of risk perception and response in agovernment comprising many agencies. Ultimately, it seeks to build a common
culture of risk awareness and communication across all of government.

WOG-IRM FRAMEWORKIDENTIFICATIONMONITORINGCOMMUNICATION& ACCEPTANCEASSESSMENT& APPRAISALMOBILISATION& BEHAVIOURALCHANGES

53

WICKED PROBLEM
A problem which has no simple solution because the precise nature of the
problem cannot readily be defined. Wicked problems are commonly foundwithin complex environments, where constantly evolving interdependencies
make it difficult to define problems precisely. (Here, “wicked” is used in thesense of “complex” or “challenging”, as opposed to “ethically deplorable”.)
One example of a wicked problem is climate change. There is no single ordefinitive solution. Individual solutions aren’t categorically correct or incorrect,
but better or worse, depending on the context and who is evaluating thesolution. As demonstrated by the continuing debate on climate change, wicked
problems typically involve multiple stakeholders, each of whom will approach
the issue with different interests, values and biases.
There is no way to determine whether a solution has completely or conclusively
solved a wicked problem. After a solution has been implemented, complex
interdependencies are likely to result in impacts that cannot be fully appreciatedex ante, not only because they take time to emerge, but because there is adegree of unpredictability to how different impacts interact with one another.
Reference
1. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, http://www.uctc.net/
mwebber/Rittel+Webber+Dilemmas+General_Theory_of_Planning.pdf, accessed Aug 2014.

WILDCARDS
Low probability, high impact opportunities and threats that would be disruptive
should they occur, but for which there may not be any evidence today that they
will eventually happen, e.g., an asteroid from space striking a large population
centre on Earth.
See also Black Swans and Emerging Strategic Issues (ESIs)

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FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY

WIND-TUNNELLING
A means of assessing the robustness of strategies in multiple scenarios, as partof the scenarios-to-strategies effort.
Wind-tunnelling is a term borrowed from aerodynamic research. It refers toa tool used to study the effects of air moving past airframes to find the weak
points. Likewise, the robustness of a strategy is assessed by placing it in eachscenario to see which of the strategies holds up best in all the scenarios.

Strategies for
scenario A

Strategies for
scenario B

Wind-tunnellingis the processof determining
which strategies
are robust
under all the
scenarios underconsideration.
Strategies for
scenario C

Strategies for
scenario D

55

56

FORESIGHT: A GLOSSARY
What is a “black swan”? What are “wicked problems”?
The work of imagining, anticipating and planning forthe future has acquired a language of its own. This
Foresight Glossary is a guide to the concepts, tools
and methodologies commonly used in the Singapore
Government foresight space. Each entry provides adefinition and overview of a concept or term, alongwith a listing of resources for further information.

About Us
The Centre for Strategic Futures is part of the Strategic Policy Office in
the Public Service Division. It builds capacity for futures thinking acrossGovernment, and focuses on issues of strategic importance.
The Civil Service College (CSC) Singapore is a statutory board under the
Public Service Division with a mission to develop people for a first-class
Public Service. As the public sector’s core institution for training, learning,
research and staff development, CSC builds strategic capacity in governance,
leadership, public administration and management for a networked
government in Singapore.