Comments on the papers of Samson and ŠedivýTakako Ueta
I enjoyed Dr. Samson and Mr. Šedivý's papers. These papers
are comprehensive and provide information on NATO enlargement
by two countries.
First of all, I would like to explain the current stage ofenlargement since the NATO issue as a whole is not well-known
in Japan. I returned from Europe ten days ago. Among security
experts and practitioners including NATO, EU and governmental
officials, at this moment, it is commonly understood that, all being
well, a concrete step on enlargement will be taken some time nextyear. One Eurocrat says that the decision will be taken in December.
So, whether NATO will enlarge or not is not a question. NATOwill enlarge. However, even after the official NATO decision of
its enlargement, it will take several years to become a member
because of negotiations and the internal procedures of new members
as well as the ratification process by the present sixteen
member-states.
The experts and practitioners believe that Russia should not
be dissociated from the reconstruction of the European security
structure and the West is working on building a cooperative security
structure for that purpose. Regarding NATO-Russian relations, I
will make comments in the following session.
In January 1994, NATO heads of state reaffirmed that theAlliance remained open to the members of other European countries
and they envisaged the enlargement of the Alliance. Since then,
NATO has been conducting internal preparation including anenlargement study, intensified dialogues with the fifteen interested
PFP countries and so on. Irrespective of Russian opposition, NATOwill enlarge. In a background briefing, a senior defence official of
the US Department of Defence on the NATO Berlin Ministerial
Council remarked: "NATO's got a timetable. I think it's clear
we're not going to speed it up and we're not going to slow itdown. Russians don't have a veto. They can't bargain with NATO148

Comments

on enlargement... NATO has the right to choose for itself its own
members and it will go forward on its own timetable."
Secondly, there is no procedure for application to NATO.
Membership is by invitation only. In the case of the EU, it isnecessary to make an application. A country can announce its
desire to be a member of NATO, but application is not necessary.
I know that Dr. Samson is a well-respected scholar and I
also enjoyed his paper which was presented in the Paris ECPR
session last autumn. Today's paper implies that Slovakia will not
be among the first group of countries which will be invited to joinNATO. Among criteria of membership, I think inter-operability isnot crucial since military aggression is not realistic. As NATO
official papers reiterate, risk is multi-dimentional and multi-faceted.
Even during the cold war period, among NATO member countries,
especially, land-forces have not been fully inter-operable. They
have achieved inter-operablitity and have constructed infrastructures step-by-step. What matters seems to bedemocracy-building. Since its birth, NATO has been a communityof Western democratic values. In this context, respect for andprotection of minorities, and good-neighbourly relations aresignificant.
On page 124-125 of his paper, in note fifteen, Dr. Samson
added that "Slovakia, however, can block the admission of Hungary
by its own incapability to become a full-member." What does thismean? When the OSCE tried to appoint its Secretary-General last
spring, many countries supported a Hungarian candidate. Centraland East European countries blocked it, and now we have anItalian. Traditional rivalry among Central and East Europeancountries is not helpful in their accession to European andtrans-Atlantic institutions. The EU countries used a diplomatic
exercise called "the Stability Pact" for the preparation of accession
by way of promoting good-neighbourly relations andcross-border cooperation. I know all the deficits of this exercise;for example, the border and minority problems in the West werenot envisaged. NATO itself attaches importance to this regionalcooperation. Do Central and East European countries take thismessage seriously? In his remarks, he explained that Hungary
could block Slovak

Comments149

membership in NATO. However, NATO's document, which isentitled "Study on NATO Enlargement" states as follows: "In any
case, it will be important to make clear that the Alliance remains
open to further accessions by countries not among the earliest tobe invited tojóin. A declaration at the time of the first invitation(s)being issued which clearly stated this would both reassure thosecountries that would not be among the first to be invited andreduce the likelihood of some of those countries submitting
unsolicited applications tojóin the Alliance."
My second question to Dr. Samson is about the Slovak strategy
after the announcement of the first invitation. If Slovakia is notallowed in, what measures will be taken in order to enhance its
security? I have attended various CSCE / OSCE meetings sincethe Helsinki summit in 1992. I have the impression that Slovakia
is very active in the OSCE. Will Slovakia use the OSCE for thatpurpose? For example, NATO is examining how to enhance PFP
and NACC for stabilization after the announcement of its firstenlargement. Poland is launching an idea of security enhancement
measures among the Baltic sea states. It includes Russia, andcountries that will not be in the first wave.
My third question is about the recent development between
Poland and Ukraine. Reportedly, these two countries signed abilateral agreement on cooperation and security. Does this influence
Slovak security policy?
I would now like to move to Mr. Šedivý's paper. About twoweeks ago, in Prague, we exchanged views. I have always been
impressed by his extensive knowledge of European security issues
and his clear explanation and logic. This paper traces the evolutionof Czech policy toward NATO in a wider perspective and is agood basis for further discussion. Regarding NATO enlargement,
the Czech Republic is one of the happiest nations. His paper
seems to reflect this optimism.
He pointed out that immediately after the change, theCzechoslovak idea of an all-European collective security system
was shattered by events, such as the Gulf Crisis and so on. From1990 to 1993,1 worked for our Embassy in Brussels and closely150

Comments

followed NATO transformation and the CSCE. Since then, I havebeen a frequent flyer to Europe. In addition to his explanation, Iwould like to point out the US role. From 1989 to 1992, the US
was very much concerned about NATO's future because of theidea of strengthening the CSCE towards a collective security
organization which would make NATO irrelevant. The US had
also been uneasy about the idea of European Security and Defence
Identity. The US tried to limit the role of the CSCE and to keep
NATO as a collective defence organ. It launched a campaign
declaring NATO the only credible cornerstone of stability inEurope. To what extent was this US demarche influential? On
page 131, you refer to President Havel's refusal to accept President
Mitteranďs project, one of whose objectives was to dissociate theUS from European security issue.
My second question is about Czech efforts to stabilize thesituation after the announcement of its invitation. This is the samequestion to Dr. Samson. Two weeks ago, you explained thatPresident Havel was preparing a concrete measure for stability.
Finally, as these papers may invite active discussion, I shallnow stop my comments. Thank you very much for your kindattention.