Society as an Economic Actor:
The Three Patterns of Institutionalization(Systemic Change in Poland)

Witold Morawski
Epistemologicai Perspective
This essay is based upon actual events in Poland, a country
which serves as an ongoing laboratory for studying the formationof several world-views. In this paper, three particular world-views
will be analyzed more carefully than others, because serious
attempts to institutionalize them have been made since thebeginning of the 1980's up to the middle of the 1990's. First, I
will explain why I am interested in the concepts "society", "theeconomic actor", "three patterns", "systemic change" and "Poland".
Then, I will propose a "schema of institutional analysis" to linkthese concepts into a coherent whole.
First: society. The Solidarity movement, from its inception
in 1980, searched intensely for an alternative social order to themonocratic one. As of the spring of 1980, these attempts also
included economic reforms. The earlier reforms had ended in a
fiasco, thus proving the thesis that the system could not be reformed.
Solidarity's significance has a historical dimension because neverbefore in the history of socialism had society, as a collective
whole, reached such a level of self-organization. This contradicted
the theorem of the totalitarian state (and the dogmatic Marxist
theorem as well), in which the main driving force was the politicalauthorities, and society was treated like plasticine in the hands ofthe elites. It also contradicted the theorem which expounded therole of economic growth and the scientific-technological revolution.
I have in mind the theories of post-industrial society in the Westand the theories of developed socialist society.

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Second: economic actor. In the 80's, there was no significant
opportunity for economic reform. It would have required total
political change, which would have been difficult to achieve without
having first obtained full national sovereignty from USSR
domination. Economic reform did nevertheless begin, but it wasparticular because it became the work of the society, whereas
reform was required to be, first of all, the work of the elites. This
is why it was considered to be a long-term endeavor. Its program
could only be realized collectively. Solidarity, as an institution ofindustrial democracy, was forced to substitute for an institution ofpolitical democracy (Morawski 1991). The strikes by the factory
personnel were connected as much with pay demands andproduction and economic issues as they were with elementary
civil and political rights.
The workers entered into a union with the intelligentsia.
Previously, these two social groups had organized protests
individually: the workers in December 1970, and the intelligentsia
in March 1968. In 1980-81, however, they organized a massive
social movement together. Solidarity became a collectivist
movement. All of the main actors in the 80's were of collectivist
in nature: Solidarity, blue-collar workers from large enterprises,
intelligentsia from different institutions (for example, teachers).
Since 1989, however, there has been no strong tendency for society
to act in a collective form. It appears in the form of an individual
actor: the consumer, the entrepreneur, the private proprietor, theprofessional. This tendency forwards individual actors is the resultof the initiation of systemic reform.
During the 80's, the socio-cultural system, as well as the
economic system, acquired the negative capacity of blocking thepolitical system and became part of the "vicious circle" mechanism,
to use Myrdal's notion for the undeveloped regions (Myrdal 1958).
Social support for the economic reforms allowed for the departureaway from stabilizing economic changes, in favor of restructuring,property transformation (privatization) and adaptation to the world
economy (European). Social support was conditional in character.
The acquiescence to a few economic changes, for ex., privatization,

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sometimes means sliding backward. Perhaps this might again create
the need for collective action. Once again, the possibility formobilization is in the hands of industrial crews of large industrial
enterprises. They do not seem, however, to be as strong as they
were in the 80's (as the case of the Gdańsk shipyards in 1996shows).
Third: three patterns. Systemic change is an intellectual
challenge. The explanation - how the change is made, should bemade and can be made - depends on the value system and themethods by which the changes are realized. Of course, various
resources (material and others) are also important as well as timing.
Regarding values, there is a choice between liberal (for ex. freedom,legal democracy) and democratic values (for ex. egalitarianism,
participatory democracy). The manner in which liberal democracy
functions in the West proves that differences in doctrinal origin
are not necessarily a hindrance to the realization of these different
values. Recently, pessimism has emerged concerning whether
economic competitiveness, social solidarity and individual freedom
will always be compatible (Dahrendorf 1996). In terms of method,
two forms of activity should be distinguished: the imperative modeof action of the elite (often radical), and interactive mode of actionof society on the basis of practical knowledge, usually evolutionary.
In sum, four hypothetical variants emerge: (1)democratic-evolutionary (democratic, socio-democratic), (2)liberal-radical (liberal, neo-liberal), (3) liberal-evolutionary(conservative) and (4) democratic radical (Jacobean, Bolshevik).
Three of these variants have occurred in Poland in acharacteristic sequence. First, in the 80's, the democratic orientation
took shape. The leading values in this orientation were freedom
and egalitarianism (vindictive workers). This, in fact, meantsocio-democracy, though this concept did not appear. In thisorientation, liberal values concerning basic civil rights were also
displayed, but the fundamental elements of a private-market
economy, a minimal state, or rule of law were not yet established.
I use the concept "orientation" because it suggests the openness
and the exploratory character of the position. The
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orientation of the 80's contrasts with the very cohesive neo-liberal"paradigm" which emerged in 1989-1993. This was more an attempt
to implement the prescriptions of Thatcherism or Reaganomics in
Poland rather than the creation of original rules.
As of 1993, compromises were sought because the "shock
therapy" in the name of the neo-liberal dogma, threatened thestandard of living of many segments of society. Hence, there wasa need for "social corrections" to the liberal program. Paradoxically,
the practical realization of these corrections are often accompaniedby conservative values (tradition, continuation of change, relianceon experience), even though the corrections are made by a leftist
coalition government. The fundamental elements of the liberal
reform, though, were retained. I suggest the use of the term
"conservative perspective" to indicate this somewhat imprecise
situation.
Fourth: systemic change. The changes begun in 1989 werequalitatively different from earlier reforms, which were most often
based on organizational changes. Even attempts which wereconsidered successful, such as the Hungarian reform in 1968, orself-governing socialism in Yugoslavia, are difficult to evaluate
positively today. On the other hand, it is difficult to predict whenand how the systemic changes will bring a radical break with thepast, that is, when it will be possible to call it "systemic". This
break is not easy. Polish capitalism is presently more politicalthan liberal in character (Staniszkis 1994). Although there is nosense in presuming the economy to be fully autonomous it isalways partially influenced by the state (Block 1994) - the Polisheconomic system is particularly dependent on the state. Even worse,the quality of the state's influence on the economy raises doubts.
In this situation, it is preferable to refrain from using the term
"revolution". This term will really only make sense when thetransformation becomes a fact. The concept "revolution" hasalready been overused once before. For example, the socialist
revolution proved to be a false attempt at economic modernizationon the basis of central planning, a one-party political system anda collectivist socio-cultural order. Now the time has come to use

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better civilization instruments, such as the market, democracy,
freedom, law, and the world economy. Success appears to beguaranteed, but the degree of uncertainty is still considerable.
Fifth: Poland. State socialism gained its identity gradually.
The system that developed deviated from the Marxist-Leninist
ideological project. Despite similarities, state socialism wasdifferent in Poland from that in the USSR, China or even Romania.
Poland was characterized by a unique "cycle of social protests" inthe years 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980. Such regular protests did
not occur in other countries. The rise of Solidarity was a further
indication of Poland's distinct nature. It could be said that socialism
created its own legacy. This justifies the use of the concept"post-socialism". However, the use of the Homo Sovieticus
concept is dubious because it is clear that the creation of the"socialist man" failed. This was proven by the mass Solidarity
rebellion. Changing people's behavior is difficult, which is why
we should not expect that the institutionalization of new rules
would take less than one or two generations.
Six: schema of institutional analysis. I will begin the analysis
with values, because they indicate the epistemological perspective.
Values co-define the diagnosis of the present time, the past andexpectations for the future. They also indicate the actors who are
to realize the values. The actors can be either collective or individual,
primary or secondary, etc. Defining the space in which they are toact is also important. Usually the public sphere is distinguishedfrom the private sphere, but the three-part schema - state, civilsociety, private sphere - can also be useful. The next issue is themanner of acting: from above versus from below. Ultimately, it isalso worth taking into account the concerns that the representativesof various orientations have. This schema should help in sketching
the mechanisms of the emergence and consolidation of new rules.
The three separate schema link together: people, their values,
methods they use, resources they have, place and time (Wuthnow
1987). If these various elements are well harmonized, we can
expect that the consolidation of rules will follow. It would alsomean the emergence of a new system. The term "paradigm" suggests

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Society as an Economic Actora coherent system of the various above-mentioned elements. In
the case of democratic orientation, there was no such coherence.
In the case of the neo-liberal paradigm, it happened to be only atheoretical coherence, as this paradigm showed its strength in the
United States, but not in Poland. For these reasons, I prefer todiscuss the issue of systemic change in terms of institutional patterns
rather than only various world-views. To concentrate on
world-views may suggest that the answer to the question of whatshould be made can easily lead to the answers - what is made or
can be made. The institutional analysis helps to explain, forexample, why so often it does not happen.
Democratic Orientation
The turning point of systemic change according to thisorientation is the establishment of society as an independent actor.
This occurred in the summer of 1980, when Solidarity arose.
Some, however, hold different opinions about the turning point.
They believe that in the course of events in December 1970 theprotesting workers put forth the idea of free trade unions which
they did not then realize (Laba 1991). This is the so called "workers
interpretation". Others propose that the formation of Komitet
Obrony Robotników (The Committee of Workers' Defense - KOR)
in September of 1976 was the turning point. This is the so called"intelligentsia interpretation" because KOR organized theintelligentsia to assist the repressed Radom workers. KOR was,as one of the people from the opposition writes, "formed in thename of society by 14 people" (W. Kuczyński). This was the firstvisible form of political opposition, which was a very significant
event, but not to be equated with the rise of a mass social movement
which encompassed more than 10 million members.
Solidarity's visions were alternatives to the system of building
from above in the name of Marxist doctrine. The Marxist doctrine
assumes that knowledge of the laws of social development permits
the political and intellectual elite to freely guide society (Lindblom
1977). Solidarity's vision assumed, on the other hand, that a higher

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level of social self-organization could be achieved by means ofinteraction from below. This was a romantic proposition for a"society without authorities". The program of a "self-governing
republic", as an attempt at participatory democracy and a justsociety, appealed to two values which are considered antinomies:
freedom and equality. This suggested a socio-democratic option,although this concept was not used (Bobbio 1996). Freedom wasto be realized not only through the acquisition of various individual
rights by the people (the liberal element), but above all bysocialization of the state through citizen participation in decisions(to amend the etatist system). The obliteration of the border between"state" and "society" was considered both possible and purposeful.
The change was to begin from the construction of a civil society
as an intermediary sphere between the state and the family. Evenearlier, social movements in the West had recognized that stateinterference in the citizen's life, which had been increasing sincethe 1930's, should be supplemented by the direct influence of thecitizens themselves on the state. This was called the crossing of
the border of "institutional politics" (Offe 1995). In Poland, thiswas to allow for the divisions into "we" (society) and "they" (theparty elite, authorities, nomenklatura) to be overcome.
At the center of attention was the workplace. There, the ideaof direct participation of the workers in all decisions was to berealized. Trade unions and employee self-governments were toparticipate not only in decisions concerning work conditions,employment and pay (that would be the realization of theconventional expectation), they were also to participate inproduction and economic decisions, that is, crossing into theprerogatives usually reserved for management alone. Even farther
reaching goal appeared like national sovereignty. Therefore, notonly egalitarian and vindictive aims (such as pay indexing) were
stressed, but also building a new normative order. This visionstrongly mobilized society to fight with the old system.
This vision crystallized in the fall of 1981. At that time, theparliament, after coming to an agreement with Solidarity, passed
a bill on state enterprise and employees councils (Jakubowicz

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1988), and the Solidarity Congress recognized the "self-governing
enterprise" as the central institution of alternative order. This did
not differ at all from self-governing socialism or democraticsocialism. The concern was over a regulated market economy, notabout a private economy. Concern about private economy didn't
appear until the end of the second half of the eighties. A
self-governing multi-sector economy was demanded. In the
Solidarity congress theses, the central values recognized were
those such as egalitarian society, social justice andself-governing enterprise (Tezy 1981). The term socialism did
not appear, but the contents of the slogan were socialist, or rathersocio-democratic. This vision did not differ at all from the party
reformers' ambitions. This was a proposition for a "third road",because on both sides of the ideological barrier there were certain
ideas which were considered valid. Because these propositions
came from outside the party, they played a radical-conflictiverole, although in fact they were moderate. At least at the start,
the desire was to improve the system, not destroy it.
In this vision, society is a collective actor. On the state level,
society acts as a spontaneous social movement. On the work placelevel society acts through trade union or self-government. The
organized employees, particularly in large enterprises, were treated- in poetic terms - as "the salt of the earth". In theoretical language,
they were the seeds of civil society. Our civil society was to beestablished not as the extension of private property interests, as
had historically occurred, but it was to be built initially in state
enterprises. The public sphere was defined in a twofold manner:
first, as the state, which needed to be taken over and controlled bysociety, and second, as the evolutionary construction of civilsociety. It is easy to predict that this civil society could be only an
ethic society because it is difficult to imagine it existing without
private ownership (Morawski 1992). Still, however, in addition to
independent trade unions there were underground publishing houses
as well as assistance to prisoners and the poor. The "void" between
the state and the family was to be filled as quickly as possible.
It was naively assumed that the social movement was toWitold Morawski

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directly establish democracy. It was not defined when and how
this was to take place. This appeared to be a illusion, for things
usually work differently. Democracy requires first, as C. Tilly
writes, the transfer of power from the social movement and theconstruction of public space (Tilly 1993-94). This occurred in
Poland a few years later. In 1989, the entrance of the Solidarity
elite into positions of power occurred by way of an accord withthe old elites and through the institutionalization of representative
democracy as a means of constructing the public sphere. It meant,that, on the one hand, the democratic vision fulfilled an effective
mobilizing function of a radical-conflictive alternative to theexisting system, but on the other hand, the proposed democratic
institutionalization from below could not work and did not work.
One may say it could not work because it over-emphasized thedimension of values and under-emphasized the dimension of
resources necessary to achieve those noble values. The timing
was also not conducive.
Neo-Liberal Paradigm
Since 1989, "society" has ceased to be a subject of socialchange and has become the object of actions of the elites fromabove. This is reflected in the neo-liberal paradigm, the practical
illustration of which is the "shock therapy" strategy. In the liberalvalue system, society is nothing more than a collection of rational
individuals and individual freedom is treated as the highest value.
It is best ensured by a self-regulatory market system, which creates
opportunity for everyone. The liberals think about the politicalsphere in a similar way. This is what "free choice" is about(Friedman 1991). The collectivist system was unable to create
these possibilities. This is why the liberals paid so much attention
to the battle with the state. Not only with the party state, but withthe state as a whole. They want to reduce the state's functions tobeing occupied purely with public goods, such as those which are
not profitable. A "minimal state" signifies for them the removalof one of the barriers which hinders the individual in self-realization.

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They treat the state as external to the economy. They are opposed
to developing its welfare functions because this would increase its
predatory character and prevent it from protecting ownership rights.
The liberal paradigm is measured not only against the oldmono-centric system, but also against the democratic paradigm.
The liberals are concerned with legal democracy and not withparticipatory democracy. In the sequence of changes which socialchange demands, according to the liberals the construction of afree market economy is the first task, and only later will the time
for political democracy, or concern for social issues, come(Balcerowicz 1992). Under the influence of critics, Balcerowicz
withdrew this emphasis, however, writing that "democracy needs
capitalism" (Balcerowicz 1995). For a few liberal dogmatic figuresin Poland, Pinochet is still a hero.
Generally speaking, the liberals understand democracy more
realistically than those who express a democratic orientation. The
liberals preference for representative democracy is not at all
surprising, but their extreme readiness to approve of social
inequality, unemployment or even poverty gives cause for concern.
This conflicts with the practice of modern liberalism in highly
developed economies, where concern for these social issues is
considered a standard obligation of the state and the businessmilieu, although, increasingly more often without practical success.
The liberals keep the idea of "self-governing republic", butthey give it a different content from its incarnation in the democraticorientation. The liberals do not promote employee self-government
at the workplace, but territorial self-government in the place ofresidence instead. The "self-governed enterprise" is for them atype of "Bermuda triangle". They fight trade unions, which they
see as a huge pressure group in the process of the redistribution ofnational income. They fight even more strongly with employee
self-governments which are trespassing into the proprietor's ormanagement's "sacred prerogatives". Pro-self-governingtendencies are, however, still strong among industrial work forces.
The liberals do not like the most popular form of privatization ofstate ownership among the work force, namely that of employee-Witold Morawski

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owned companies (Cichomski, Kulpińska and Morawski 1995).
Of 2,334 privatized enterprises, by 1994 829 of them had chosen
the path of privatization in the form of employee-owned companies(Jarosz 1994:13). They also negatively evaluate the idea ofprivatization through general affranchisement (citizen property)-seeing it as a "socialist deficiency", or as "a way of catching
voters" (Lewandowski 1995).
The liberal vision of the role of society is different from thedemocratic orientation. For liberals, it is not about a battle ofcommunities for the rights for other communities: trade union,
the nation, or the church, as in the democratic orientation. Rather,
it is about the rights of the individual as a consumer, a private
entrepreneur, a professional, etc. The collective actor here is the
middle class, perceived as the main element of civil society. The
liberals see the middle class as the main stabilizers ofsocio-economic life.
The liberals do not only want to supplement the democraticvision. Let us consider the leading value: the freedom of theindividual, which is just as important to those who articulate thedemocratic orientation. With the liberals, freedom does not go
hand in hand with striving for egalitarianism, because they easily
accept social inequality as an unavoidable result of the free market.
Efficiency is more important to them than justice. This is why, forthe liberals, society becomes the concern of the elite. Workers areseen by them as "a large mute force" which should patiently
fulfill the task given to them by the elite (Gardawski, Żukowski1993). With respect to the workers and the peasants, liberals makeconsistent accusations of populism. Admittedly, this tendency is aconstant threat, but it has not yet had been of decisive importancein the practice of our political life. Conversely, the strata accusedof populism are "the silent hero" of systemic changes because
they ensure approval for these changes even though they carry theburdens of systemic change, for ex., in the form of lower standardof living. Though, in the seventh year of transformation, a fairly
high pace of economic growth is beginning to produce positive
fruit, it does not stop the intensification of the pauperization and306

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marginalization process of large social groups (Frieske 1996).
These problems are not the subject of liberal concerns. They arealmost entirely focused on the economy, as though unconsciousof the fact that the costs of exclusive care for the market could bejust as bad as exclusive care for the state (Hayek 1944).
They recognize 1989 as the turning point, because it wasthen that the private market economy was acknowledged as theaim of change. In the democratic orientation the "moral economy"
dominated, with its concern for egalitarianism, paternalism andsolidarity (Tymowski 1993). These principles should, in the opinionof the liberals, be rejected as soon as possible because theystrengthen irrational contradictions against economic reform. This
explains why liberals are not inclined to accept 1980 as the turning
point (it is definitely the turning point for the democraticorientation). Institutions which fight for such an order should also
be rejected or restrained. The liberals do not see, for ex., tradeunions and self-governing work forces as essential institutions in
the process of securing group interests. They are concerned withthe de-articulation of employee interests. They don't realize thatmodern liberal democracy, in the history of capitalism, has worked
out an understanding for different interests and the creation ofregulative institutions for solving conflicts. This is what theAmerican pluralist system is based on. It leaves trade unions thepossibility of making collective agreements and regulating conflicts
on low levels (mediation and arbitration). Theoretically, our liberals
agree to this system because it leaves the effects of the negotiation
to a free game among partners in the market. In practice, however,they strive to eliminate trade unions. Trade unions are weak in
private enterprises, or absent altogether.
They are also opposed to negotiations between representationof various interests. The aim of such negotiations is to forge
partnerships between important actors in the arena of labor relations.
Only moderate liberals consider such solutions desirable. This is
testified to by the so called state enterprise pact proposition. The
liberals ultimately supported this corporatist idea, because they
believed that it could offer politicized trade unions in Poland aWitold Morawski

307share in negotiations at the state level in exchange for an agreement
to accelerate state enterprise privatization.
Furthermore, there is no way that the liberals would agree togive trade unions a full political function. Their role is to cover
the issues of labor and pay conditions. The systemic change is forthe liberals the same as accepting the attitude of "a market friend"
and in no way "a friend of the people". They treat the slogan ofbuilding "capitalism with a human face" as part of the naive
Solidarity "ethos" (Lewandowski 1994). They consider"socialization" to be akin to collectivist ideas that have been used
up, because in fact collectivist ideas legitimize the socialist system.
The privatization idea has replaced the "socialization" idea. Theysuggest that freedom be understood in pragmatic terms as"'freedom' in the face of a specific task. First and above all
freedom for Leszek Balcerowicz ... the freedom to make economic
reforms" (Tischner in: Michnik, Tischner i Zakowski 1995:559).
For the liberals, the border between the private and publicspheres should not be blurred. The citizen should control the publicsphere, but the citizen can not directly participate in the state
decisions. Civil society is important to them, but it does not belong
to the political (state) sphere. As much as the democrats would
like to build a civil society on the grounds of common values, oreven a moral appeal, the liberals accurately feel that the necessary
condition for the establishment of a civil society is, above all, aprivate market economy. The separation of the private spherefrom the political sphere, which they call political society, could,
in their opinion, help to accelerate this process. The state canbecome strong only if it is exclusively occupied with civil andpolitical rights of the citizen. The liberals believe that concern forsocial rights will only burden the state.
In defending the thesis that the less control the state has overthe economy, the more market self-regulation there will be, theliberals do not perceive certain contradictions in their paradigm.
Fighting against the state, in the name of the invisible hand of themarket, they themselves are the visible hand of the state because
in the name of the ideological project of the "capitalism" they

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have realized privatization. Integration with Europe and otherspheres could be added in which the state is permanently present,
although the liberals claim it is useless. In my opinion, the problem
is not so much how much control the state has over the economy,
but the quality of the state regulatory measures in the economy.
One can agree, of course, that the state should be less present in
the real sphere (state property should be limited), but in the sphereof regulation (a distinction made by Janos Kornai) it is present
and always will be present.
The Polish neo-liberals were quickly seen as constructivists(Kowalik 1995). This is an accurate accusation, because they treat
economic reform as an "operation" of the elite, which in one
blow can make the transition from one state of market equilibrium
to another. While remaining exclusively in the sphere of concern
for rational market allocation, the liberals in effect created suchsocial dissatisfaction that the executors of systemic change
themselves were removed from positions of power two to four
years later in democratic elections. Instead of the declared"controlled shock" by the liberals (Balcerowicz 1992), society
recognized that it was "uncontrolled shock". This is proof that inaddition to the rationality of the market, other rationalities too areat work. These other rationalities are the result of interactive
mechanisms in defense of the status quo. In summary, the use of
the neo-liberal paradigm imported from the West (World Bank,
IMF, etc.), back fired on those who implemented it. Using theinstitutional analysis language, one may conclude that the liberals
put so much emphasis on securing various resources and methods
that they neglected somewhat the dimension covering the "habitsof hearts" (values), that is, the mechanisms of socio-cultural
background of systemic change.
Conservative Perspective
In the conservative perspective slowly emerging in Poland,
two issues are at stake:
The first issue is that of distancing themselves from theWitold Morawski

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dogmatic neo-liberals who, in applying "revolutionary" methodsof shock therapy, divide society. The conservative calls the Polishneo-liberal a fanatic modernizer, who "...under threat of imposing
the curse of the Homo Sovieticus, want ... again with a whip
concealed in a boot, to stand on a platform in front of the ignorantmasses and to give it the political parade of correct uniforms on
the road to 'open society'" (Ostrowski 1996:27).
The second issue is that of considering the socio-culturalembeddednes and tacit knowledge. The conservatives represent
defined attitudes toward society and political practice (Scruton1982). The most highly evaluated aspect is the achievement ofsociety, legitimized by tradition or custom, which is its tacitknowledge and possibly even that which results from the courseof events, rather than some new ideas of reason, although they
may have abstract theoretical justifications. The conservatives do
not appreciate systemic change, understood as "capitalism bydesign" (Offe 1992), which became the practice of neo-liberals,
because they reject universal solutions. They are opposed toaccepting the economy as a closed system, and rather view theeconomy as dependent on the political and social context. Systemicchange is a process in which there must be room for trial anderror. There are many paths of development. It is impossible todefine the aim of the changes. This is a perspective of evolutionary,
adaptive changes, which prefers regulative action in place ofstandard neo-classical approaches which are dominated byallocative efficiency (Delorme 1995; Boyer 1995). Niklas Luhmannwrites that the results of having obtained one's desires are,ultimately, the need to adjust to the very changes one has
implemented. (Luhmann 1994:145).
The conservatives are as critical of the "romantic illusions"in the democratic orientation as they are of the constructivist
propositions of the dogmatic neo-liberals. They do not shareassumptions or optimism of the neo-liberals and those in the
democratic orientation. They don't see the possibility of achieving
equality. Hierarchy is, for them, one of the attributes of the socialworld. The most important source of these inequalities is the310

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market, because economic efficiency is the result of unequal reward(the functional requirement). At the same time, they agree tosolutions which de facto increase the chances of easing excessive
distances. They oppose the procedural approach supported byneoliberals, which implies that their own approach stresses thesubstantial aspects. In Poland this has taken the form of a corporate
system, called negotiating. This system belongs to the conservative
tradition when built more from above than from below, as for ex.,in Germany and Austria, and also to the socio-democratic tradition
when built more from below than from above, as for ex., in Sweden.
Conservatists propose a system of organized cooperation between
socio-economic actors. This is not, however, a system of organized
conflict with the aid of procedures, which the neo-liberals propose.
An example of the negotiating mechanism, in which decisions areagreed on, is the Komisja Trójstronna (The Tripartism Commission)of the government, employers and employees (trade unions). Its
effective introduction occurred in 1994. The scope of the activityof the Komisja Trójstronna is broadening, but it is primarily
concerned with pay negotiations. It insures a higher level of conflict
regulation because the number of strikes has begun to decrease(the decrease was also caused by high economic growth). The
corporate system takes context into consideration because it ensurestrade unions activity on the nation-wide level (macro) and theregional level (mezzo), which is part of the Solidarity tradition. It
does not place trade unions only on the enterprise level (micro),as the neo-liberals do. In sum, the corporate system means theintroduction of rules recommended by the International Labour
Organization. Until now, these rules have had positive effects inGermany and Austria.
The realization of freedom in the conservative perspective is
to occur within the realms of local democracy and, more generally,of self-governing society with the use of representative democracy
mechanisms. As far as the state is concerned, the conservatives
recommend using it only when there is no other choice, that is,according to the subsidiarity concept. The values and interests
which are to be realized depend solely on social partners. The

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manners of change are also important to the conservatives, which
they recommend be evolutionary, gradual, slow, agreed upon
between social partners, pragmatic, and based on tacit knowledge.
In effect, conservatists are strong in making good diagnoses,
because they start from "habits of hearts" (rooted in tradition andhistory). Definitely, the main elements of the institutionalization
process (values, methods, resources, etc.) are well harmonized.
The problem, however, is that this process can lead to stagnation.
Liberals and democrats are more action oriented than conservatists.
Concluding Remarks and Summary (Table)
The table 1 summarizes the three paradigms of systemicchange.
Three concluding remarks are necessary. The first concerns
the clarity of the typology. The institutional patterns presented are
exclusive types of intellectual perception and practical action. In
fact, however, they overlap with one another, which, to a certain
degree, proves that the way of thinking about systemic change in
Poland is still pre-paradigmatic in character. This is particularly
true of manners of action.
The second remark concerns the fact that systemic change
persists. Hopes that the effects of the changes in the economy
would occur quickly have disappeared. Even in the political spheremany issues are unsolved, for ex., the absence of a constitution. It
could be acknowledged that the absence of a consolidated
democracy, or more generally, the modernization of the state, is afactor which slows down the progress in the sphere of systemic
economic reforms. This suggests that it is not liberal capitalism
which is taking shape, but political capitalism, in which access topolitical authority leads to the gathering of economic wealth. Thisis the so called "nomenklatura enfranchisement", mainly old fromthe times of the PZR, but also new, for ex., post-Solidarity.
The third remark concerns the lack of rapid progress in thesphere of economic reforms because of socio-cultural barriers.
The values and behavior of Poles could be perceived as relatively

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Table 1Three Institutionalization Patterns in Poland
Dimension Democratic
ValuesLiberal- self-governing republic - freedom of choice for - change and continuity
the individual- freedom and equality- freedom and inequality - freedom and inequality- participatory- representative- neo-corporatism
democracy
democracy- orientation on values- orientation on private - values and interests
interests- self-governed- private enterprise-private and self-governing
enterpriseenterprise (temporary)- regulated market- free market-negotiating mechanism

Diagnoses turning point: 1980
(or:1970,1976)

turning point: 1989

- community- the individual- workers andintelligentsia- the middle class- trade unions- elires

Sphere of- civil society
activity and - socialize state property
method- work place- "third road"

Concerns

turning point: evolutionary

Solidarity is an old social Solidarity is an old / newsocial movement
movement(conventional)

Solidarity is a newsocial movement

ActorsConservative- rule of law- local self-government-place of residence- one best road (exists)- system change- organized conflict(by procedures)"we / they" division

allocation rationality- the individual in thecommunity- three parts:
the state, the group, theindividual- accountable elites- state located in institutions- local self-government- place of residence- many roads: by means oftrial and error- organized cooperation(by negotiations of groupinterest representatives)
adaptation rationality

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313

non-innovative. Earlier I noted that there is only a modestly positive
attitude toward privatization, but it is important to note that althoughemployees prefer to have an employee-owned company or state
enterprise as their place of work, they simultaneously acknowledge
that private property is more effective for the economy as a whole(Cichomski, Kulpińska, Morawski 1995). This prolongs theappearance of new actors on the economic scene. The rational
consumer was born first because the economy was opened to theoutside quickly - and, many feel, to the detriment of Polish interests.
To create a middle class as a holder of financial capital will be
more difficult. Most difficult will be the formation among Polesof individuals' attitudes of a rational and utilitarian orientation.
This is considered the initial condition for the construction of acapitalist economy (Jowitt 1993), although the example of many
Asian countries illustrates that community culture, in which thegroup dominates over the individual, could also be functional for
rapid economic development. In contrast, in Poland
community-oriented attitudes are the source of collectivist
activity for the sake of populist programs.
The conservative perspective is becoming a compromise in
Poland, the achievement of which depends, on the one hand, on
the action of elites with a tendency toward oligarchization (which
has arrived too early) and on the other hand, on the action ofsociety which has unsatisfied material needs and is not ready toagree to solutions which are only temporarily satisfactory. This
constitutes an obstacle for the technocratic tendencies. It does not,however, prevent the country from a strategic drift of the economy
in the direction of a hybrid system, which could prove to be
unfavorable.
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