Central European Discourses
from Historical Perspective

Taku Shinohara

I
The concept, "Central Europe", seems to have slowly takenroot not only in journalism, but also in general usage in the last
five or six years without being exactly defined. There are evenmany cultural, economic, political and social organisations andcorporations which have this word in their name so as to claim aconnection with the imaginary heritage of Central Europe, each intheir own arbitrary way. It is only recently, from the 1980's, that
we have accepted the concept "Central Europe", after it experienced
a surprising "revival" in the discussions among dissidents andintellectuals in exile from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and to alesser degree, Poland; surprising since it had been reduced tomerely "a meteorological term" since the Second World War andalmost completely forgotten.*1 It is more than symptomatic thatsuch words as myth, legacy, visionary, and dream appeared sooften in the titles of works dealing with "Central Europe": fromthis one may recognise the extreme vagueness of the thing itself.
For some "Central Europe" has a certain character, appearance
and atmosphere: they can describe its concrete outline, even statethat this or that region would belong to Central Europe or not.
But others identify Central Europe with the most valuable cultural
product of our century. In this case, Central Europe extends itself
to such a degree that it becomes an abstract notion.*2 Some present
Central Europe as cultural identity. For Milan Kundéra, it is a"culture or fate"*3, and for György Konrád, "to be a Central
European, it is an attitude, a Weltanschauung, an aesthetic
sensibility for the complicated, multi-lingualism view".*4

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Central European Discourses

Whether Central Europe may be defined concretely or
abstractly, one can criticise it from every point of view. Since thediscussion about Central Europe tends to be about seeking its
absent community and its lost possibilities in the past, one of thethemes of Central European discourse is composed of references
to certain historical "traditions".*5 By confronting this discourseof Central Europe with the present and historical "reality" of"Central Europe" or mentioning the total destruction of Central
Europe, during and after the second World War, one could simply
declare that Central Europe does not exist and is only an imaginary
construction.*6
The purpose of this small paper is not to present an adequate
definition of Central Europe (if any exists!), nor to entzaubern
and to demolish the "myth of Central Europe." Attempting thedefinition of Central Europe is given up here from the very
beginning because once we intend to define what it is, we should
be involved in a never-ending circle of struggles for the Central
Europe. For Central Europe is actually an ideology, a wholecomplex of ideas of a desirable form of national existence for any
given preriod and self-criticism for the future, as is any national
history.*7 We will examine various discourses about Central Europe
expounded since the second half of the last century, and analyse
their function and structure in their given historical context sothat we may understand the position and meaning of Central Europe
today. The question is not, whether Central Europe is visionary ora reality. It is visionary and at the same time, or perhaps becauseof this, it is a reality. So the question becomes, how does itfunction in reality.*8II
Needless to say, the term Central Europe is closely connectedwith an imperialistic version of the German Mitteleuropa. In fact,even in the German speaking milieu, the usage of the word
Mitteleuropa became popular only after the First World War,when Mitteleuropa was eagerly debated in German political circles

Taku Shinohara

31

in relation to the German aims during the war and her plans for a
post-war European order. It is only after the First World War that
we can find this word in encyclopaedias, and the definitions,
often deliberately bedecked with a sober geographical description,
explicitly or implicitly show the origin of the word: German Drangnach Osten.*9
Besides the German Mitteleuropa, there exists another streamof Central European discourse which was more often referred toand cited in the 1980's, even if the term Central Europe hadalmost never been used in this context till then. From Palacký's
famous letter to Frankfurt to Masaryk's Nová Evropa (NewEurope), Central Europe has always been a region with a uniqueplurality where small nations could be guaranteed equal rights toexist and to develop their own identity.*10 Palacký's letter to German
Nationalversammlung (its Fifty Committee) in Frankfurt has been
often cited in Central European discussion not only because someof his sentences sound like a fatal prophecy (e.g. about the expansionof the Russian "universal monarchy", and those which stressed
the necessity of the existence of the Habsburg monarchy for
European stability, such as "For the salvation of Europe, Vienna
may not fall to a provincial town"), but rather, because it formulated
the rights of national existence historically and philosophicallyand presented accordingly desirable forms for the existence ofsmall nations for the first time in modern Czech history. After
stating the independence of the Bohemian crown and theindividuality and uniqueness of Czechs whose existence as a nation
beside Germany was, at that time, only a glimmer in the mind of
most German liberals and radical democrats (cf. Engels' notorious
passage about geschichtslose Völker)*11 he formulated the politicalrole of the Habsburg monarchy as a bastion which should protect
the existence of small nations against the Russian universal
monarchy. He saw in this plan the historical mission of the Habsburgmonarchy to ensure the various nations natural equal rights, which
would be realised by its transformation into a federal constitutionalmonarchy. In his later article, "The Idea of the Austrian State",
Palacký emphasised that every nation and nationality (národnost,

32

Central European Discourses

here in a sense of Kulturnation whose core is built from its common
language) had his own individuality and was a moral and juridical
person.*12 It is more explicitly expressed here that nations underthe Habsburg Monarchy are conceived analogically as citizens ina civil society and thus, just as citizens should be secured individual
civil rights in a civil society, so should nations and nationalities
under the Monarchy. For Palacký, "the principle of nationality"(zásada národnosti) is the leading motive of the age because theidea of nationality played as important a role as religions did in
the 16th. and 17th. centuries,*13 and, because civil rights had been
generally recognised since the end of the 18th. century, so rights
of nationality should be recoguised in the 19th. century. "Theprinciple of nationality" has a more profound sense: the progressof modern civilisation caused global centralisation. But "thatmysterious spirit also assumed among the eternal laws the law ofpolarity, so that balance might be kept in the world, and unilateral
direction might not upset the world from its prescribed course".
So here evolved "the principle of nationality" in reaction andresistance to global centralisation.*14
In Palacký's conception, national aspirations are not merely
an expression of Czech individuality but also an expression of thedevelopment of European civilisation towards a pluralistic civilsociety. In his scheme, the Austrian Monarchy would have a raisond'être only if it assured its nationalities equal rights of development.
On the other hand, the emerging modern Czech nation and its
political program needed a broader platform for its existence anda more general philosophical basis, just as Baroque patriotism
had universal Catholicism as its back-bone.*15 If we find a forerunnerof Central European ideas in his ideal of the Austrian Monarchy,
we can confirm not only that basic motives of Central European
ideas of the 1980's were already conceived here in more or lessmature forms, but also that discourse about Central Europe had
only come into being when modern national programs began toshape its essential and integral parts. So diversity and plurality are
not characteristics of Central Europe. On the contrary, the notionof national individuality needed Central European ideas: when

Taku Shinohara

33

modern national societies began to form, their invented uniqueness
was perceived as national identity, on which basis they then claimed
diversity and plurality one after another. So, Central European
discourse appeared to give emerging nations a framework ofexistence and even legitimise their existence.*16
III
Even if Palacký's idea of the Austrian Monarchy was the
prototype of the Central Europe alternative to German Mitteleuropa,
we can find similar statements about the federal constitution ofCentral Europe in a representative protagonist of German
Mitteleuropa, Friedrich Naumann. During the First World War,when Mitteleuropa-discussion got "a new, actual quality" (W.
Mommsen), Naumann's concept of Mitteleuropa belonged to liberalversions of the post-war plan, when compared with moreimperialistic ones or traditional annexationists.*17 In fact, Naumann
sympathised with the idea of a common Central European identity,
generously recognised the cultural variety of nationalities and waseven ready to offer them cultural autonomy. But besides his evident
aims to establish a German-Austro-Hungarian alliance to keep
German hegemony in south-eastern Europe, Naumann's premises
are completely different from Palacký's. He begins his argumentwith the assumption that total war made independent existence
impossible for smaller nations and made it necessary and inevitableto establish der mitteleuropäische Bund. Under the pressure of
total war, "all of historical particularism" was destined to disappear,and from this disappearance of particularism there would appear aCentral European spirit.*18 While Palacký supposed centralisationand centrifugal tendencies both as fundamental driving forces ofmodern civilisation and, as we have seen above, constructed his
ideas wholly on the basis of "decentralizace", i.e., a centrifugal
tendency of which the most important expression is "the principleof nationality", Naumann regarded universalisation as the main
component of his Mitteleuropa. Here is a deep split between theirpositions. This is reflected in the fact that Naumann never34

Central European Discourses

recognised the political individuality of various national societies
in the Monarchy. He insisted on keeping the Austro-Hungarian
constitution based on Ausgleich, which in fact turned out to be astumbling-block for the Monarchy.*19 That's why, though someprominent figures of the Czech political scene, especially the Czech
Social Democrat, Bohumil Šmeral, were interested in Naumann's
Mitteleuropa, and Naumann himself supported them in publishingseveral articles in German Reich, their co-operation crashed atlast.*20
We should have compared Naumann's Mitteleuropa, not to
Palackýs Idea, but to his contemporary Masaryk's Nová Evropa.
Even if Masaryk regarded himself as an authentic successor to
Palacký's ideal, which he thought had become deformed in thenational struggles since the 1880's, was Masaryk actully a direct
successor to the pioneer of Central European ideas?*21
What should have been strange to Palacký was Masaryk's
Messianic Czech history, even though it was mainly based on
Palacký's concepts. At the turn of the century, when Masaryk
published two sequel titles, Česká otázka and Naše nynějiší krize,
there broke out a serious dispute about the, so-called, sense ofCzech history (Spor о smysl českých dějin) which has in essence
continued right up to the present day.*22
The points of dispute are crucial to the very existence of the
Czech nation: Is there any real sense of czech history? If so, what
is it? For Masaryk, what gives Czech history a sense and integrity
is a metaphysical, almost mystic notion of hunianita (humanity)
expressed in the zenith of Czech history, the Hussite Revolution.
Czech history is signified by realising the mission it inheritedfrom the Hussites. The Age of National Renaissance (národníobrození) is characterised directly through the heritage of the Czech
Reformation, and Masaryk conceived this heritage as a base uponwhich a democratic, tolerant and fair Czech civil society was tobe founded. The problem is whether Czech national history could
be constructed based on such a religious mission, and whether the"National Renaissance" in the 19th. century could be deduced
from the historically completely different ideas of the middle-age

Taku Shinohara

35

Gothic spiritual world. Masaryk identified the modern Czech nation
with his eternal category of the Czech nation which should benever degenerated and exist beyond history. Even if Masaryk
conceived the idea of humanita in the context of European
civilisation, he assigned to the Czech nation such an extreme
individuality that its existence would by itself have a universal
meaning.
As an eminent historian of the positivist school, Josef Pekař
had to criticise Masaryk's conception of Czech history. He rejected
Masaryk's metaphysical "meaning of Czech history", andemphasised that not only the social and economic but also theintellectual and spiritual life of Czechs from the middle-ages up
to the modern era had been dependent on contemporary European
developments, first and foremost German ones, and Czech society
had been built by the interaction of various components. So, the"National Renaissance" was not a "revival" of ideas stated in the
Hussite Revolution, but grew from Baroque culture, Enlightenment
and German Romanticism.*23 Thus Pekař affirmed expressively
that Czech society was an organic part of the West.
Masaryk had not been an adherent of the break-up of the
Habsburg monarchy before the First World War, and had a long,complicated way to go to his Nová Evropa which was ademocratised international society of equal and free democratised
nations. When he came to this idea, he maintained that thesenations of Nová Evropa should be fully independent and every
one of them should be a democratised civil society composed ofequal and free individual citizens. This ideal construction
corresponds to his earlier conception of the Czech nation. Here,the analogy between individual citizens in a civil society andnations in Europe reached its consistent logical conclusion.
While Masaryk elaborated Nová Evropa, Pekař remained aloyal monarchist-federalist. In his reaction to Wilson's 14 ArticlesPekař defended the principle of federalisation of the Monarchy,
remembering Palacký's idea of the Austrian state.*24 Besides theirpositions in the given political situation, each of their conceptionsof Czech national history was reflected in, and even determined36

Central European Discourses

their view of new a European order.
IV
After the end of the First World War, when both German
Mitteleuropa and Central European federalisation were ruined,
and successor states as nation-states (in reality multi-national)
were consolidated, visions of Central Europe became a marginal
matter and almost disappeared from the scene.*25 Only among
German expansionists adhering to geopolitics, the German missionof civilisation and the rights of Volksdeutsche outside the Reich,
did Central Europe survive to become the selfish concept ofLebensraum, and thus became the most profound antagonist of
the Versaille system.*26 After a short revival during the Second
World War when Beneš' Czechoslovak and Sikorski's Polish exile
governments negotiated in vain to establish a Central European(con-) federation, the idea of Central Europe vanished until the
1980's.
In the 1980's, Central Europe arose from dissidents or
intellectuals in exile from Socialist Europe. Central Europe wasan intellectual and cultural alternative to the division of Europe
and Soviet domination. Hence it was clear to them that any isolated
national political resistance to the regime would have had nochance. After the failures of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in
Czechoslovakia and 1980 / 81 in Poland, they intended to defeat
the regime morally and culturally and overcome the status quo inthe long-term by creating, or in their subjective vision, revitalising
a common cultural Central European identity and tradition.*27 The
leading motif was a democratic, tolerant and free civil society
within the multi-cultural, pluralistic "tradition" of Central Europe
where various groups of the population co-existed while keeping
their own identity. The lost possibility in the past became thealternative for the future.*28
This emphasis on pluralism implied the distance of dissidents
to political activities against the regime. In fact some dissidents,
like V. Havel or Gy. Konrád explicitly rejected politics in a narrow

Taku Shinohara37

sense of the word. The principle of pluralism was reflected in theform of their civil movements, such as Charta 77. This pluralism
corresponded to the highly valued concepts of multi-culturalism
and multi-lingualism in Central European discourse, and, as thepluralism of the civil movements stood in radical opposition to
the totalitarianism of the communist regime, so did themulti-culturalism of Central Europe to Soviet universalism, toremember Palacký's term. Their cultural discourses of Central
Europe were therefore consciously highly political. The
ideological structure of discourse on Central Europe reminds usthat the concept of national existence as an individuality isconnected to the idea of civil society in the 19th. century.
What is Central European multi-culturalism or pluralism, then?
German Mitteleuropa sometimes generously tolerated the existenceof disparate cultures and languages in various national societies,
and now, several German or Austrian historians are beginning to
re-evaluate Naumann or dynastic Coudenhove-Kalergi in thecontext of Central European discussion since the 1980's, finding
certain favourable reactions among intellectuals of other lands.*29
But Naumann's liberal-imperialistic concept of Mitteleuropa did
not correspond to the contemporary development when nations
were built to elaborate their own self-consciousness which was
expressed, in the Czech case, first by Palacký and later by Masaryk.
The "other Central Europe", represented in this paper by Palacký
and Masaryk, was a vision of how a nation could exist as ahistorical and political individuality. Thus without recognition ofnational existence as an individuality, Central European pluralism
had not been possible. What should make Naumann's Mitteleuropa
more contradictory to the pluralism of Central European ideas in
the 1980's is the lack of any mention of civil society as its ideologicalcomponent. When Naumann is positively referred to in thediscussion, there must be a basic misunderstanding of the ideal
construction of pluralism or multi-cultrualism. Cultural diversity
is not simply national pluralism by itself.
It is problematic, whether national identity, in the sense ofKulturnation (cultural nation) and the principle of civil society38

Central European Discourses

can find themselves in harmony. Jürgen Harbermas set
Verfassungpatriotismus, patriotism to democratic constitution to
the Kulturnation. The problem is that loyalty to a particularity
often finds itself in contradiction to a general loyalty to the principleof civil society. The Central European discussion simply avoids
this basic contradiction through referring to the multi-cultural,pluralistic "tradition" of Central Europe. According to it
multi-culturalism has simply been realised in Central Europe.
Without any argumentation, it has always existed. It is said, thatmulticultural sensitivity is an important characteristic ofCentral European Menschentyps. György Konrád stated at one
conference in November 1993 that Central Europe had been, wasand would be a reality, it had existed just as the Danube had
existed.*30 He said, that every keen tourist could perceive thecommon atmosphere of Central European cities. When we thinkof his aesthetic and ethical definition of Central Europe during the
1980's this statement seems like a tourist pamphlet advertisesing an"attractive Central Europe". If Vienna, Budapest, Prague,
Czernowitz (Černovcy), Lvov and other cities have a common
atmosphere and style, that is only because these cities
underwent their process of a modernisation under a common
ruler; the Habsburg monarchy. The modernisation determined thebasic appearance of these cities through representative buildings,
railway-stations, hotels, cafés, bourgeois apartment-houses andso on.
If it is true that this region had been full of colourful cultural,religious and linguistic diversity, it destroyed itself and becamemonotonous and the goal of pluralism has never been realised. So
one could not naively believe in a pluralistic, multi-cultural traditionof Central Europe. Referring to the past, multi-cultural "tradition"
can only be realised in the future. Some see the basis of theself-destruction of Central Europe in its deformed modernisation,
economic backwardness, political radicalism and twisted
nation-building process; in short, in its failure to establish anormal civil society which is legal, democratic and tolerant andsupported by a stable middle-class, i.e., in its Sonderweg.*31
Central Europe was an expression of an acute desire for a

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39

particular form of existence; the civil society. But besides thequestion of whether a normal civil society actually exists, it mustbe suspected that a civil society can be a premise for multi-cultural
co-existence. Historically, modern civil societies, which has beenrealised in the form of nations, whether "deformed" or "normal",needed their existential project; Central Europe. This has beentrue in the 19th. century, during the First World War and also in
the 1980's. It was only after modern civil society as nation had
been invented and become conscious of its national character thatthe concept of a pluralistic, multi-cultural Central Europe wasborn. Central European discourses are just political visions seeking
desirable forms of national existence. Thus, it seems paradoxicalat the end of the 20th. century, after national identity turned to be
more detrimental than beneficial, to appeal to the concept of Central
Europe in order to overcome nationalism.*32
The extreme desire for cultural identity can be reversed,
becoming a scepticism towards one's own existence. Once one
rejects political vision, vision for further existence, the "diversity"of Central Europe can cause a sense of fragility, uncertainty and a
scepticism towards consistent existence. Even Kundera, an eager
adherent of the Messianic Central Europe, expresses existential
uncertainty towards Central Europe, when he sees the destiny ofCentral Europe in its Jewry: "the Jews in the twentieth century
were the principal cosmopolitan, integrating element in Central
Europe: they were its intellectual cement, a condensed version ofits spirit, creators of its spiritual unity ... in their destiny the fateof Central Europe seems to be concentrated, reflected, and tohave found its symbolic image."*33
Central European instability results from its diversity and its
ambivalence. Central Europe is defined only passively as somethingthat is always moving between East and West.*34 Josef Kroutvor
writes: "History brings rhythm to time, but it is this that sleepy,
dusty, seedy Central Europe, its tiny relations lack. Ordinarinessis the master of the situation ... Unhistoricalness (nedějinost) is
not non-historicalness (bezdějinost). Central European
unhistoricalness (středoevropská nedějinost) finds itself between

40Central European Discourses

the Western history and the Eastern non-historicalness (mezizápadními dějinami a východní nedějiností), between a dynamic
principle of history and a static principle of history".*35 He meansthat a "history" does not have to make sense here, and that inCentral Europe history is a grotesque heap of absurd incidents ofeveryday life, as in the novels of Kafka, Hašek and Musil. Such acultural Central Europe by itself stands clearly in contrast to thepolitical version of Central Europe.
After the end of the Cold War, some of the adherents of theCentral European idea enthusiastically urged its revival and they
believed in its political, cultural and perhaps economical possibility.
But this kind of enthusiasm cooled down in a short time asnationalism and chauvinism began to threaten the area, especiallyas civil war broke out in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, as theintegration of some of former socialist countries into the European
structures arrived on the agenda, more prosaic problems became
predominant over the poetic ideals that had been expressed in theCentral European discussions during the 1980's. It is paradoxical,
or maybe logical that Central European discussions are losing
their actuality, as Central Europe is appearing in a concrete form,
such as the various regional and local co-operations and so on.
That is because Central European discussion since the beginningof 1980's was essentially "European discussion", i.e., it had astrong orientation towards the West in its essence. Thus today,
Central Europe seems to be in a transition process to the anotherworld, to Europe, merely a "waiting room" for entrance into theWest. It contains only negative or passive meanings in this sense.
So long as Central Europe was only a possibility, it was an object
many people zealously talked about. As "Central Europe" isbecoming a reality, that is, the region which was emancipatedfrom the East but is not yet and for the time being will not be
accepted into the West,*36 it has lost its actuality.
The fact that Central Europe remains now an intellectual
challenge which appeals to the civil society shows that it is not aconcept of historical substance, but an idea for change, a subjective
self-portrait for a desirable future. The problem is the prosaic

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41

reality that legitimised the notion, Central Europe, and the banalreference to its "tradition".
Notes
1

2
3
4

5

6

7

8

'The (European) continent was simplified there, where the largest
changes proceeded in the last two hundred years, that is, inCentral Europe. Originality of this particular, storm, tragic andvital sub-continent was today reduced nearly to zero - the concept
remains yet in meteorology, otherwise Central Europe is only apoint of contact between the two social systems, their frontiers."
Jan Křen, Konfliktní společenství.Češi a Němci 1780-1918, Praha,
1990, p. 7.
Otto Urban, "Evropanství a střední Evropa v historické
retrospektivě", Historický obzor, X., 1994., p. 227.
Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe", The New
York Review of Books, April 26, 1984, p. 35.
György Konrád, "Der Traum von Mitteleuropa", in: E. Busek /G. Wilflinger (Hrsg.), Aufbruch nach Mitteleuropa.
Rekonstruktion eines versunkenen Kontinents, Wien, 1986.
As T. G. Ash correctly pointed out, Central European ideas of
the 1980's contain an almost mystical historicism. And, as we
will see below, it is not only a matter of 1980's. Timothy Garton
Ash, "Does Central Europe Exist?", New York Review of Books,
October 9, 1986, p. 46.
S o d o e s R . J a w o r s k i . R u d ol f J a w o r s k i , "Di e a kt u e l l e
Mitteleuropadiskussion in historischer Perspektive", Historische
Zeitschrift, Bd. 247 / 3, pp. 540-543.
Ideological characteristic of the regional concept of Central
Europe, see, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Mitteleuropa, Politik und Kultur.
Festrede zur Eröffnung des Internationalen Brucknerfestes '89
Linz an derDonau, Linz, 1989.
Contrary to the interwar period, when Central Europe was quite
out of the question among historians, in the discussion of the
1980's, where intellectuals played the main notes, historians,
such as Jenő Szűcs, Péter Hanák, Iván Berend, Jan Křen, etc.,

42Central European Discourses

9

10

11

contributed to a greatly to developing further discussion about
Central Europe.
For example, Mayers Lexikon (7. Aufl., Leipzig, 1924-30), whose
preceding edition did not contain a single headword ofMitteleuropa, defines three dimension of Mitteleuropa: Germanic
Mitteleuropa, Mitteleuropa in a wider (mainly geographical) sense
and political Mitteleuropa. If Germanic Mitteleuropa is assigned
to the regions until recently governed by the German and Habsburg
empires, then Mitteleuropa in a wider sense meant implicitly theregions supposed to be under German political, economical,
cultural, or historical influence. It doesn't concern three different
concepts of the definition, but one hierarchically arranged concept.
Masarykův slovník naučný (Praha, 1925-33) was very aware of
the origin of this word: it spends only a few lines on a geographicaldefinition, and explains střední Evropa basically as various
versions of German concepts of her Machtssphäre from Friedrich
List to Friedrich Naumann.
After referring to Palacký, Kundera writes: "Central Europe longed
to be a condensed version of Europe itself in all its culturalvariety, a small arch-European Europe, a reduced model of Europe
made up of nations conceived according to one rule: the greatest
variety within the smallest space." Kundéra, op. cit., p. 33.
The fact that Palacký proclaims himself as "a Bohemian of Slavic
tribe (Ich bin ein Böhme slawischen Stammes)" reflects the
obscurity of the notion of the Czech nation. Czech national
intellectuals preferred böhmisch and Böhme to tchechisch andTschechisch in German because the latter implied that the Czech
speaking population in the Bohemian Lands was only an "ethnic
group" as a part of the German nation cut off from the historical
tradition of Bohemian Kingdom; and this was perceived as adiscrimination. Jiří Kořalka, Die Tschechen im Habsburger Reichund in Europa. 1815-1914. Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge
der neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage inden böhmischen Ländern, Wien / München, 1991, pp. 51-75.
Such a confusing situation about the notion of the Czech nation
continued up to the Jahrhundertswende, when Masaryk publishedTaku Shinohara

12

13

14
15

16

43

the "Czech Question" (Česká otázka), and brought the Czech
national question into a different dimension.
He distinguished národ and národnost in this Idea státu
rakouského: "Historical fact that initially every nation had its
own government and it was thus that inter-state rights and international rights (právo mezistátní a mezinárodní) have been
considered for centuries as identical. But progress of global
centralisation and decentralisation have long since caused thenotions "state" (stát) and "nation" (národ) to cease to be identical... Recently, the terms "nation" and "nationality" (národ andnárodnost, according to Palacký, nation and nationalité) havebeen supposed to mean another thing ... We use these words
correctly in its genetic and original sense, mainly in regard to
linguistic differences. Feeling, consciousness and validity of theprinciple of nationality (zásada národnosti) in a sense mentioned
above develops and grows all over the civilised world in ourtime". Palacký, Fratnišek, "Idea státu rakouského", in: Františka
Palackého Spisy drobné, dil I., ed. by Bohuš Rieger, Praha,
1898, pp. 218-219.
"What the idea of church and religion meant in the 16th. and17th. is the idea of nationality in our century". Palacký, "O
centralisaci a národní rovnoprávnosti v Rakousku", ibid., p. 113.
"Idea státu rakouského", p. 219.
Here must be noted that Palacký's program of a federal,
constitutional Austrian monarchy is often misunderstood andincorrectly entitled "Austroslawismus". See, Otto Urban, "Dertschechische Austroslavismus nach dem österreich-ungarischen
Ausgleich", in: A. Moritsch (ed.), Der Austroslavismus. Ein
verfrühtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas,
Wien /Köln /Weimar, 1996.
By the way, the establishment of German Reich as a subjectively
German national state in 1871 meant for Germans therenouncement both of the liberal national concept of greater
Germany from the year of 1848 and of dynastic universal conceptof the empire of 70 million, thus the end of German counter-partto Palacký.

44

Central European Discourses

17

18

19
20

21

22

23

See, Wolfgang Mommsen, "Die Mitteleuropaidee undMitteleuropaplanungen im Deutschen Reich vor und während
des Ersten Weltkrieges", in: Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen, pp. 3-25.
"Hier soll aller geschichtliche Partikularismus im Drange desWeltkrieges soweit verwischt werden, daß er die Einheitsidee
verträgt. Das ist die Forderung der Stunde, das ist die Aufgabe
dieser Monate. Die Geschichte will im Donner der Kanonen
darüber mit uns reden: an uns aber ist es, ob wir hören wollen ...
Es fragt sich, ob die Gemeinsamkeit des Krieges ein Zufall odereine Notwendigkeit ist. Wir behaupten das letztere ... Der Krieg
wurde zum Schöpfer einer mitteleuropäischen Seele, die zeitiger
da zu sein anfängt als die Ausgestaltung der zu ihr gehörigen
greifbaren Formen. Von dieser Seele wollen wir sprechen undihre Formen wollen wir suchen. Alle Mitkämpfer des Weltkrieges
fühlen unmittelbar, daß in der gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen
Zeit keine kleinen und mittleren Mächte mehr große Politik
machen können. Unsere Quantitätsbegriffe haben sich gewaltigverándert ... Darum ist heute der mitteleuropaische Bund kein
Zufall, sondern eine Notwendigkeit." Friedrich Naumann,
Mitteleuropa, in: Friedrich Naumann, Werke, (ed.) Th. Schieder,Köln, 1964, Vol. 4., pp. 491-493. (Originalausgabe, Berlin, 1915)
ibid., pp. 747-749.
See, Jiří Kořalka, "Anpassung oder Widerstand? Zu dentschechischen Reaktionen auf die deutsche Mitteleuropaidee vor
und nach dem Jahre 1914", in: Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen, pp.
25-38.
In his serial articles published in 1897-98, Masaryk analysed Pklack
ý's idea and deducted from his political and historical philosophy
his own theories, while criticising Palacký's political practices.
See, T.G.Masaryk, Palackého idea národa českého, Praha, 1926.
Тоmáš G. Masaryk, Česká otázka. Snahya tužbynárodního obrození,
Praha, 1895. idem., Noše nynější krize. Pád strany staročeske a
počátkové směrů nových, Praha, 1895. Both of them were newly
published in one volume in Prague 1990.
Josef Pekař "Smysl českých dějin", in: Josef Pekař, О smyslučeských dějin, Praha, 1990, pp. 383-405, esp., pp. 394-398. (theTaku Shinohara

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25

26
27
28
29

30
31

32

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article was first published in 1929)
Josef Pekař, "Poselství Wilsonovo a české memorandum z roku
1870" (from: Národní politika, February, 1918), in: Josef Pekař,Na cestě k samostatnosti. ed. by J. Hanzal, Praha, 1993, pp.
31-34.
Central European visions, various attempts of regional cooperation and federalisation had no real chance of being realisedin the inter-war period. See, Jan Křen, "Das Integrationsproblem
in Ost-Mitteleuropa zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen", in:Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen, pp. 153-164.
Jacques Le Rider, La Mitteleuropa, Paris, 1994, pp. 99-103.
Jacque Rupnik, Jiná Evropa, Praha, 1992, p. 14. (based on revised
French edition: Une autre Europe, Paris, 1990)
Ash, op. cit., p. 52
What distinguishes the Central European discussion of the 1980's
from its prototypes within the Central European conception up
to the First World War is the strong orientation to the West andthe organic integration of Germany into it. That is why Naumann's
and other versions of German Mitteleuropa have sometimes been
wrongly referred to in Central European discussion. For Kundera,
Central Europe is essentially the West. (Central Europe is theWest "kidnapped, displaced".) See, Martin Schulze-Wessel, "Die
Mitte liegt westwärts. Mitteleuropa in tschechischer Diskussion",in: Bohemia, 29 (1988). But orientation towards the West has
always been one of the most remarkable characteristics of Central
European discourse and it can be said that the ideal constructionof "Central" is in essence asymmetrical.
György Konrád, "Starý most", in: Střední Evropa. Revue prostředoevropskou kulturu a politiku, No. 37 (2 / 1994), pp. 46-51.
See, Iván T. Berend, The Crisis Zone of Europe: An Interpretationof East-Central European History in the First Half of the TwentiethCentury, Cambridge, 1986, Jan Křen, "Diskuse о střední Evropě
- historicky nahlížená", in: Křen, Historické proměny Češství,
Praha, 1992.
M. Rutschky writes ironically but correctly: "Gerade die dicht
aus Bildungswissen gewebten Arbeiten von Claudio Magris

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Central European Discourses

33

34

35
36

lehren, daß die Konzepte von Kultur und Identität sind, die den
Bürgerkrieg so verlockend machen, weil es kein besseres Mittel
gibt, sich der eigenen kulturellen Identität als eines vital
Unverzichtbaren zu versichern ... Gleichwohl, ich behaupte, wasden postsozialistischen Gesellschaften noch fehlt, ist die Einsicht
in die Unvermeidlichkeit von Entfremdung und Identitatsverlust.
Sie haben die lebensnotwendige Dosis an Nihilismus noch nicht
intus.", Michael Rutschky, "Mitteleuropa. Rückblick auf eine
kurzfristige Utopie", in: Merkur 519 (No. 6 / Vol. 46, 1992), p.
193.
Kundera, op.cit., p. 35. More correctly, he should have written
about the assimilated Jews that "were ... the integrating element
in Central Europe." Hobsbawm doubted if it was worth discussing
the idea of "Central Europe" after the Holocaust, the complete
destruction of its Jewry. Hobsbawm, op. cit.
The most comprehensive historical reflection in this sense is:Jenő Szűcs, Die drei hlstorischen Regionen Europas, Frankfurt,
1994 2 (Originalausgabe: Vázlat Európa három történeti
régiójáról, Budapest, 1983.)
Josef Kroutvor, 'Potíže střední Evropy: anekdota a dějiny", in:
Kroutvor., Potíze s dějinami, Praha, 1990, p. 66.
Miroslav Kusý, "Do které Evropy patříme?", Lidové noviny,
March 29, 1996.