Central Europe: Regional
Cooperation and Beyond

Andrzej Rudka
Introduction
The process of disintegration of political and economic
relations among Central and East European countries*1, whichstarted in late 1980s, is fully understandable for many reasons.
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon)
was created in the 'cold war' era for predominantly political motives
and since the very beginning it lacked the proper economic
mechanisms to enable it to work efficiently. So, as soon as theweakening international position of the former Soviet Union
allowed COMECON member countries to leave the institution
promoting artificial integration, which was forcefully created andpolitically and economically dominated by the former Soviet Union,
they eagerly did so and rushed towards the West (Western Europe
and the European Community, in particular). The forty-sixth sessionof CMEA, held on 28 June 1991 in Budapest, decided to disband
the organization within 90 days. Irrespective of the official dateof its dissolution, the CMEA practically ceased to function inearly 1990, a consequence of the failure of bilateral and multilateralefforts to reform it and the decision of individual countries to go
their own way.
At the same time, however, the pace and even more theextent of this runaway process were not fully justified on purely
economic terms. It took place against the pattern of often historicallyestablished natural ties among Central and East European countries(CEECs), usually further strengthened during the forty plus yearsof that inefficient, but anyway existing economic cooperation.
This process was also entirely unique in the recent international

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environment. It ran precisely against the growing world-wide trends
toward increased regional cooperation and integration, alreadyembracing practically the entire Western Europe (with the creationof the European Economic Area (EEA), i.e., common market forindustrial products covering EU and EFTA countries), North
America (with the North American Free Trade Association,
including the United States, Canada, and Mexico), large parts ofSouth-East Asia, and even - after so many disappointments withprevious efforts - South America and Africa.
Therefore, it was quite reasonable to argue that the processof quick disintegration of political and economic ties among atleast some Central and East European countries would be rather
short-lived. In entirely different political and economic conditions,the process has been gradually reversed as soon as the understandingof those countries' economic (and political) interests dominates
over their short-term political (and national) emotions.
Sub-Regional Initiatives
Since the failed attempts at reforming the CMEA in the late1980s, there have not been any serious plans to revive economic
cooperation among the Central and East European countries on aregional basis, i.e., covering all the countries of the region (besides,of course, a few unrealistic Russian offers which were not treatedwith any enthusiasm in Central and Eastern Europe). Politicalfactors played a decisive role in rejecting or even contemplating
any such steps.
However, pre-existing differences in the economic andpolitical developments of individual countries in the region were
not the most crucial factor distinguishing the countries. More
important were both the timing of bold political and economic
reforms and each country's resolve in and pace of implementing
those reforms. Differences in these respects resulted in initially
identifying a group of first-tier reformers (Czechoslovakia, (and,after the split, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, andPoland) and those belonging to the second-tier group (BulgariaAndrzej Rudka

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and Romania, but also Albania). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
created a new group of reformers after re-gaining their
independence in late 1991. Slovenia joined the group of CEECs
in 1992, after escaping from the chaos of former Yugoslavia.
Lately, the picture has become more complicated as the reforms
by some of those newcomers have moved much faster (in Estonia
or Slovenia, for example) than in the others, while some of thefirst-tier countries (Slovakia, in particular) have slowed down
their reform drive (primarily in political terms). Anyway, it is
impossible to reject the notion that the most important factor
behind all initiatives towards integration on the sub-regional basis
has so far been the geographical proximity of the countries involved.
Practically every country in the region is involved in at least
one of sub-regional groupings created after the revolutionarychanges in Central and Eastern Europe of the late 1980s and early
1990s. Some of them (Poland, in particular) belong to almost allof the newly established entities in the region. Those groupings
range from the Council of Baltic Sea States in the North, throughthe Visegrad Group and Central European Free Trade Area
(CEFTA), to the Central European Initiative (CEI), and finally to
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in the South. Mostof them have as their main goal the strengthening of mutual
economic cooperation with the partners, but not necessarily as the
only one (democratization or security issues are also present insome of them). All these organizations / institutions havecontributed to a relatively new phenomenon in the Central andEastern Europe of the early 1990s - the creation of a multi-layered
integration network in this part of Europe. Though still relatively
weak and not effective enough, it contributes to the deepening ofinter-state and cross-border cooperation.
In some of those groupings, countries of Central and Eastern
Europe are not the only members and sometimes not even thedominant ones (first of all in the Council of Baltic See States andin the Black Sea Economic Cooperation). In others, they either
dominate the agenda (Central European Initiative) or are their
exclusive members (Visegrad Group and CEFTA).

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The Council of Baltic Sea States was created in 1992 andincludes eleven countries of the region. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland (also Russia) are very active members of that relatively
loose institution. The most recent (May 1996) summit of theCouncil (at the heads of government level) in Visby, Sweden
gave a new and interesting impetus to its functioning. 'Via Baltica',
investments in infrastructure to transport energy and gas, as wellas fighting with international organized crime dominated the agendaof the summit. All participants supported the aspirations of theBaltic states and Poland to join the European Union.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established onJune 25, 1992 at the meeting of the heads of states in Istanbul (itwas initiated by Turkey in 1990). Among eleven co-founders
were: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine (Poland, Israel,
Egypt, Slovakia, Tunisia, Italy, and Austria later got the status ofobservers). It was defined not as an organization, but rather as aforum (or a movement) with a rotating chairmanship exercised by
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating countries.
The highest decision-making organ of the BSEC is the Meetingof the MFAs, Seven such meetings have taken place so far, thelast one in Bucharest in April 1996. In 1993 a Parliamentary
Assembly of the BSEC was established. The main purpose of the
BSEC is the promotion of economic cooperation in the Black Sea
region, and on this basis the consolidation of peace and stability
in the region. The priority has been given to cooperation in suchareas as transport and communication, energy, banks and financing,trade and industrial development, exchange of economic andcommercial information, agriculture, ecology, health care, scienceand technology, and tourism. Specific branch programs weredeveloped and eighteen permanent Working Groups created todeal with those issues. The contribution of the BSEC to regional
cooperation and security is enhanced by the practice of involvementin the cooperation of local authorities, NGOs and professionalgroups.
Though both of the above-mentioned integrational efforts

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have already achieved some successes, the most important
integration groupings from the point of view of strengthening
cooperation among the Central and East European countries, are:the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group, and CEFTA.
Central European Initiative
The Central European Initiative is a regional organization
made up of fifteen member-states with a total population of 239
million. The member-states are: Albania, Austria, Belarus,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Ukraine. Five of those countries (Albania,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine) became full members
on June 1, 1996 (previously they had the status of Associate
Members). Moldova is expected to join the CEI in November.
Bavaria participates in several Working Groups, but there are no
known plans for it to become a member.
The CEI grew out of a more modest body - a sub-regionalorganization called the Alpe-Adria Working Group which was set
up in Venice at Italy's initiative in 1987 to deal with the problems
in the frontier regions of Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. In theearly 1990s Hungary's two western regions joined Alpe-Adria
At a meeting in Budapest in November 1989 Alpe-Adria ceased
to be a loose grouping of border regions and became an associationof states aiming to play a political role in a dramatically changing
Europe. Each country agreed to take responsibility for one area ofcooperation: Austria for environment, Italy for roads and railways,
Yugoslavia for communications and the media, and Hungary forculture. In May 1990, at a meeting of foreign ministers of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia in Vienna,
Czechoslovakia was officially accepted as a member of the
Quadrilaterale, which thereupon became known as the Pentagonale
Group. Participants agreed to hold the first summit in Venice inAugust 1990. Poland joined in July 1991, bringing the number up
to six.

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In November 1991 the group was renamed the Central
European Initiative. Yugoslavia's membership was suspended in
January 1992, following its breakup and the diplomatic recognitionby the European Union and other governments of Croatia andSlovenia as independent states. Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia andSlovenia became members in July 1992, the Czech Republic andSlovakia (following Czechoslovakia's dissolution) in January 1993
and Macedonia in July 1993. Extension of membership to othercountries was discussed at the summit meeting in Trieste in July
1994 and as a result of that Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania
and Ukraine became members of the CEI in 1996.
A regular pattern of high-level meetings has been established,with annual summit meetings and meetings of foreign ministers
at least twice a year. Regular meetings of officials take place in
16 Working Groups. Each Working Group is coordinated by adifferent country(s), for example transport WG is coordinated by
Italy, energy and culture by the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
science and technology, civil protection and disaster management
by Italy, environment, statistics, tourism as well as information
by Austria, small and medium-size enterprises as well as migration
by Hungary, agriculture by Poland, telecommunications by Austria(pro tempore for Yugoslavia).
In contrast to the Alpe-Adria, the emphasis in the CEI is onpractical cooperation. The organization is regarded as a forum for
identifying the needs of its member-states, organizing political
dialogue, formulating joint decisions and exchanging experiences.
Its primary objective is to promote cooperation in, for example,
infrastructure projects and in science and technology, but working
within a number of international bodies.
Representatives from the Council of Europe, the European
Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Danube
Commission, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Councilof Baltic Sea States, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) attended a CEI summit for the firsttime in July 1992. This meeting decided that the CEI would
establish a secretariat at EBRD headquarters in London. That

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secretariat became operational in January 1993.
A total of 115 CEI projects were in progress in 1992 foundedby the EBRD to the tune of ECU 1 billion. At the July 1994
summit in Trieste it was announced that the bank had underwritten
guarantees for CEI projects to the value of ECU 400 million andwas ready to finance further projects. The same summit also agreed
to create in future a free trade zone within the CEI to be coordinatedwith the work of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).
Visegrad GroupThough this partially contradicted their long yearning for
full independence and sovereignty, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland had acknowledged very early in their mutual relationshipsthat their chances for quicker integration with Western Europe
and the world economy as a whole could only be enhanced througha progress of mutual cooperation. Pretty soon it became obviousthat they could be more attractive to foreign investors through thecreation of a larger (65 million consumers) open market for Western
firms. They could and should gain stronger support frominternational financial institutions, and they should also be able tocount on additional Western assistance for their common economic,
ecological, infrastructure and other projects. Working together
they can much faster and more easily adjust their economies,
especially their industries, to European standards and regulations,and generally prepare themselves for participation in the West
European integration process, which, of course, remains theirprimary strategic goal. Such cooperation may also help thesecountries to strengthen their emerging democracies and to overcome
their ethnic or national antagonisms (witness the relations between
Hungary and Slovakia).
In the case of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, theinitially very difficult process of their political cooperation andeconomic re-integration on new political and economic principles
had already started in 1990. The initial summit meeting of theirleaders took place in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia in April 1990.

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The next one (regarded as a milestone in the rapprochement between
the three countries) occurred in Visegrad, Hungary in February
1991, hence the initial name of the group the 'Visegrad Triangle.'
Initially their cooperation concentrated mainly on politicaland security aspects, especially concerning their external relations(in view of the then dangerously disintegrating former Soviet
Union). It was the Cracow declaration of October 1991 that opened
the way for closer cooperation in economic terms by startingnegotiations on the creation of a free trade area between the threeand finally, after the split of Czechoslovakia, four of them.
However, at the same time, other aspects of cooperation within
the 'Visegrad Group' have almost ceased to exist, so much sothat in practice many experts express their doubts if the Visegrad
process is still alive.
Nonetheless, there are some new factors which might help torevive the concept of 'Visegrad' as a framework for sub-regional
cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, Slovakia
has recently become the strongest promoter of such cooperation
reaching beyond purely trade or economic relations. Facing
growing isolation by the West, as a result of its questionableinternal politics, the Slovak government has been trying (thoughrather unsuccessfully) to encourage its partners to extend theirmutual cooperation to political and security fields. This might be
explained as an attempt by Slovak leaders to develop alternative
structures of cooperation in case Slovakia is not included in thefirst wave of EU (and NATO) enlargement. On the other hand,possible increase of the area of sub-regional cooperation on suchcountries as Ukraine might provide an additional impetus to otherthan economic forms of cooperation.
CEFTA
On December 21, 1992 the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Hungary and Poland signed in Cracow, Poland a free trade area
agreement which constituted the climax of over a year of difficult
negotiations within the 'Visegrad Triangle.' Symbolically, it was

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the first international agreement signed separately by the two
newly independent states - the Czech Republic and Slovakia-which emerged officially on January 1, 1993 from the former
Czechoslovakia. This all happened not long after final dissolutionof CMEA and the Warsaw Pact (mid-1991) which had forcibly
tied together these and other countries of Eastern Europe for mostof the post-WW II period. All these apparently contradictory
developments, disintegration and re-integration activities
undertaken almost at the same time, exemplify the often divergent
and very complicated political and economic processes going on
in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism in
1989.
The December 1992 agreement among the four countries,
officially called the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA),
was modeled after the Association Agreements signed in December
1991 by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland with the European
Community (the Czech Republic and Slovakia signed separately
re-negotiated agreements with the EC in October 1993). However,while the Association Agreements are asymmetric in terms of
their mutual liberalization steps (favoring the Central European
countries) CEFTA is an agreement among a group of equal partners.
It originally provided for a gradual elimination of tariffs in tradeof most industrial goods among the four countries over the next
eight years, starting on March 1, 1993. In the spring of 1994 theshortening of that period in principal to five years (to go alongwith similar liberalization moves in their trade with the European
Union) was negotiated in Prague. Customs duties for a range ofless processed industrial products (which comprise roughly
one-third of their mutual trade) were eliminated entirely on
March 1, 1993. Duties for most other industrial goods will be
gradually reduced from 1995 by one-third and will completely
disappear in 1997. Duties for some sensitive products(beginning with automobiles) are being gradually phased out
between 1995 and 2001 and only agricultural trade was initiallyto remain almost untouched. Nonetheless, even in this mostsensitive area commitments were made in 1995 to lower tariffs
from the beginning

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of 1996 and make further efforts to liberalize trade in that area assoon as possible. According to Polish experts, these moves havedecreased the level of effective protection of trade in the area ofagricultural products by fifty percent.
In general, the present tariffs in trade on most industrial
products among the four countries match those in their trade with
the European Union, as envisioned in their Association Agreements.
Nonetheless, as tariff levels have gone down, non-tariff barriers
have grown in importance both in relative and nominal terms.
CEFTA member countries have not only tried to keep their existing
non-tariff restrictions on trade, but sometimes even impose newones (i.e., import surcharges, additional border duties and taxes,etc.) Recent negotiations among CEFTA members and the numberof exceptions show that at least some of them want to keep those
restrictions as long as possible. It is especially difficult to accept
this in case of countries like Poland, which has almost permanent
trade deficit with most of its partners. The mechanism of more
active balancing of mutual trade among CEFTA members has not
yet been worked out.
CEFTA agreement brings tangible benefits to all of its member
countries. First of all, it gradually reversed the trend to reducemutual trade, which began after the collapse of CMEA, and wasfurther pronounced by the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union and, ironically, by the signing of the Association
Agreements, which gave Central European countries easier accessto EC markets. These expectations were not confirmed until 1994
and 1995 when mutual trade among those countries was growing
fairly quickly (as a result of this the share of their mutual trade in
their total trade turnover has recently slightly increased, after asudden drop in the early 1990s, to a level of 5-8 percent, dependingon the country).
According to most analysts, including those from the West,the signing of the trade deal is also an essential step on Central
Europe's way toward membership in the European Union. This isbeing more and more strongly pointed out by the European
Commission, not always to the liking of all CEFTA countries.

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There are real fears among politicians and experts in Central andEastern Europe that the EU, while delaying the process of bringing
Central Europeans into West European integration, may be using
mutual cooperation among those countries to further that goal (bypreoccupying them with mutual cooperation and diverting theirattention away from the EU).
CEFTA is not a closed grouping. On September 11, 1995
ministers of foreign affairs gathered at the summit in Brno signed
an additional protocol amending the original CEFTA agreement
and allowing other countries of the region to join it only if theysucceed in their drive towards market-oriented economic reforms
and fulfill a few other conditions. First of all, they have to bemembers of the World Trade Organization what in fact meansthat they have to abide by all the internationally accepted standardsof trade. The second condition is for all potential members tohave signed Association Agreements with the European Union.
This is so as not to complicate future negotiations of CEFTA
members with the EU on accession. The third condition is to signbilateral trade agreements with all CEFTA members andconsequently - the fourth and a very formal condition - to sign amultilateral free trade area agreement. Slovenia was the first
non-Visegrad country to join CEFTA on January 1, 1996.
Informal applications to join CEFTA have already been
received from Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania.
Whatever the positive consequences the creation of a free
trade area among the Central European countries will have forfacilitating their transition to a market economy and to a common
Europe, it is obvious that CEFTA alone will not be sufficient tosignificantly increase the level of their economic cooperation. To
achieve that goal, which does not as yet seem to be accepted by
the Central European countries, the process should be supplemented
by other elements as has been the case with the integration of theEuropean Community since the late 1950s. Even in that case,however, the initial phase of the integration process has proved tobe very complex, full of conflicts and has taken longer thanoriginally expected. The scope and intensity of those conflicts are

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usually directly proportional to the number of integrating countries,
differences in the initial degree of economic development among
them and its average level. As the first aspect is less relevant
here, the second one may have become more meaningful since
January 1, 1993 (at least temporarily) as the breakdown ofCzechoslovakia increased the disparity between the most and theleast developed countries of the region. And, needless to say, on
the whole Central Europe is not yet a highly developed area.
First of all, it is worth stating that liberalization of trade
among the four countries does not yet mean, and, at least until theend of this century, will not mean real free trade among them. It
will be gradually liberalized and, considering the experience of
the European Community, especially with agriculture, it may not
be fully in place by 2000. Even before that, however, one can
expect various difficulties with the implementation of the CEFTA
agreement.
One of them is the intrinsic problem of free trade areas, i.e.,the cumbersome process of the practical implementation of therules of origin to differentiate products originating in member
countries (and thus traded without restrictions) from those imported
irom the third countries, xt is not a L»ig proulem in a customs
union where all the member countries have the same external
trade policy, but it creates a lot of difficulties and administrative
work in the case of a free trade area, where each country sets its
own trade policy in relation to outsiders. Discussion on the rulesof origin constituted a large part of all negotiations leading to
CEFTA (as well as Association Agreements with the EC and free
trade agreements with EFTA) and they form dominant portionsof the negotiated agreement. The application of those regulations
also requires a lot of work and is time-consuming in theimplementation phase.
A more specific problem concerns free trade in raw materials,
especially in the energy sector. Government subsidies to this sector
are still in place in most of our countries and this complicates theprocess of freeing mutual trade. In order to eliminate or at least
lessen that burden, the countries of the region should develop aAndrzej Rudka

205

common energy system. However, to achieve that goal a common
energy policy should be worked out. But so far, even their national
policies in that respect are not fully in place. An alternative andpreferable solution would be, of course, their faster integration
into the West European energy system, which may come in the
not so distant future.
The question of continued subsidies to state-owned enterprises
further complicates the liberalization of trade as each country in
the region experiences a different pace and scope of the privatization
process. Continued differences in economic structures (between
private and state-owned sectors), combined with freer trade, canlead to subsidizing consumption in other countries. Therefore, thediversity of privatization mixes in different countries will probably
cause tensions through different long term approaches to subsidies.
Another important difference among the CEFTA countries
concerns their monetary and fiscal policies. All countries are atvarious stages of their economic reforms in that respect and we
can expect some asymmetry to continue in the foreseeable future.
It is possible that while inflation rates in some countries will
gradually decrease, in others they may just begin to rise, threatening
their exports. In such a case, any coordination of their exchange
rate policies may be impossible and excessive fluctuations ofmutual exchange rates may exacerbate trade problems. In thecase of a serious devaluation of one of the currencies and without
tariffs in mutual trade, there may be no way to prevent an inflow
of cheap imports other than to introduce additional non-tariff
restrictions. That would mean, however, creating additional
tensions on the road to closer economic integration among the
CEFTA countries.
One has also to remember that future integration of the Central
European countries into the European economy will have also amonetary aspect. This will probably mean a lengthy transition
period in view of substantial differences in economic structure
and the inflationary environment in the Central European countries.
They simply require a relatively long period of adjustment andthe need to secure realistic exchange rates and a solidly
based

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convertibility of their currencies.
Nevertheless, in comparison to the West, structural differencesand differences in price structure among the CEFTA group are
not so big. Thus, some elements of mutual convertibility of theircurrencies can be arranged more easily and it might support thesuccessful implementation of the CEFTA agreement and evenattract more foreign investment. At the same time it would enable
capital flow among the CEFTA countries, thus mutuallystrengthening their restructuring process and economic growth.
This should also be accompanied by the gradual liberalization of
the labor movement (so far, it is very limited and exists only inbordering regions).
The lack of sufficient coordination of their external economic
policies may be yet another source of complication in the smoothfunctioning of the CEFTA agreement. The creation of afully-fledged customs union is, of course, not a goal of CEFTA,
but some kind of cooperation in formulating their external
economic policy seems desirable. It will probably take place
more naturally in case of their relations with the EU (and EFT A)
as they proceed with the process of gradual economic integration
with Western Europe.
In this context, one can argue that the creation of a small
secretariat to coordinate those and other efforts of CEFTA countries
would be desirable and helpful. This is, however, what most of
CEFTA countries do not want to do. From the very beginning ofthat cooperation, the issue of not institutionalizing in any way thecooperation among countries of the region has been very high on
the agenda and, irrespective of recent efforts to change that(especially on the side of Slovakia), it will rather stay this way.
Various working committees consisting of respective countries'
ministries seem to be able to cope with most of the problems
arising in the process.
Addressing some of the above-mentioned problems, CEFTA
countries conducted in 1995 a discussion on the enlargement of
CEFTA cooperation to other economic areas, practically in linewith the decisions of their Association Agreements with theAndrzej Rudka

207

European Union. It was decided that the Czech Republic would
lead in preparation for the liberalization of trade in services andPoland would address the issue of the transfer of capital. At thesummit in Brno, Poland also suggested starting work on freeing
the movement of labor force. However, this last proposal has not
yet been accepted by other partners.
The question about the future of CEFTA is a genuine one. If
all its members have as their primary goal joining the European
Union, it is obvious that they treat CEFTA only as a 'transitory'
institution to something better. However, if the number of members
grows over time and, in a few years time covers most of thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe which have Association
Agreements with the EU, CEFTA may last for quite a while. It is
obvious that not all Associated Countries will join the EU at thesame time and for some of them it may take many years. In sucha case CEFTA may remain a viable option for them, as is still thecase with EFTA for those countries which decided not to join the
EU. There is no doubt, however, that as soon as first-tier CEFTA
members start leaving it for the EU, the importance of CEFTA
will begin to diminish (as it is with EFTA today). This is especiallylikely, as practically all current members of CEFTA are the primary
candidates to join the EU in the first wave in a few years time.
Conclusions
The multi-layered integration process in Central and Eastern
Europe started in the early 1990s has been a new and interesting
phenomenon in the region. The many sub-regional integrationgroupings, and we have not discussed the numerous instances ofcross-border cooperation, create a network of ties that alreadybenefit their members or will do that in the near future. Thesebenefits reach far beyond purely economic (still limited in scope)
aspects and gradually increase the political and security stability
in the region.
Thus, this new trend has already brought fairly positive results,
even though most countries of the region look towards theEuropean

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Union and engage themselves in mutual cooperation only to theextent which does not complicate their current or future relations
with the EU. On the other hand, there is also a growing conviction
among them that successful cooperation within the region may
not thwart the process of their integration into the European andworld economic, political and security structures; on the contrary
it may make it easier.
Note
1 There exist some differences in defining Central or Central East
European countries (CEECs). For the purpose of this paper theterm CEECs includes ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe
associated with the European Union (EU). It means Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Nonetheless, it is becoming
more and more often to treat them as Central Europe (for example,
in European Commission's terminology).

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