Remarks to the 46th Annual
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Conference
William D. Magwood, IV
Commissioner
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Delivered by Televideo
April 25, 2013

It is a pleasure to address you this morning and to offer to you my personal perspective as aCommissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on some of the issues that will no
doubt dominate the discussions this week.

First, I provide my sincere appreciation to theorganizers of the 46th annual JAIF conference for your invitation to speak to you today.
I wish that I could be with you in person, but it is a very busy week for the NRC, including apublic meeting to discuss the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster and the responses
to those events that the NRC has taken over the last two years. In the United States, interest inthese matters —from Congress, from our licensees, and from the general public—remains veryhigh.
Interest around the world also remains very high. The NRC meets often with nuclear safety
regulators from many countries, and the global response to Fukushima continues to dominate
those discussions. We have found that many of our colleagues around the world have takenactions very similar to what we have done in the United States.

The understanding about

Fukushima and the responses necessary has been very consistent across the globe. This is very
encouraging.
It's very difficult to believe that it's already been two years since the Fukushima disaster. A lot ofwork has been done across the globe on this issue. In the United States, we have worked very
hard to understand the accident and to devise a set of responses to assure public health andsafety.
The NRC divided its activities into a variety of tiers, the most important being Tier One activities
that need to be implemented very soon.

For example, the Commission has ordered thereevaluation of all external hazards for each nuclear power plant. The agency has also devised a
new rulemaking to enhance our station blackout rules. Further, the Commission has orderedmitigating strategies for each nuclear power plant to respond to beyond-design basis events andhas required the installation of reliable hardened vents on BWR reactors with Mark I and Mark II
containments.
The Commission also required new spent fuel pool instrumentation and the coordination ofemergency procedures. Finally, we've required that each plant be able to have the staffing andcommunications infrastructure necessary to respond to multi-unit events.
These are all based on the lessons of Fukushima. Because we concluded that these actions arenecessary for safety, we expect that they will be implemented relatively soon, generally over thenext two refueling cycles. However, there will be some activities that will take a bit longer.
While all these activities are important, I only have time to highlight two. First, let me talk about thereevaluation of external hazards. I think this is the most important aspect of the Fukushima
lessons learned. If your plant is not prepared for the external hazards facing it, you always run therisk of not being able to recover from a severe accident. Based on the location of the plant, it must
be ready for the natural hazards presented by its site—including tsunamis, earthquakes, floods,
and a wide range of other events.
In the United States, seismic and flooding present the most significant external hazards for many ofour plants. Therefore, the NRC has focused on those hazards first. Our licensees have alreadycompleted walkdowns to assure that their plants comply with existing requirements, and any
shortfalls identified are being corrected. Licensees are also reevaluating seismic and flooding
hazards facing their sites based on the latest scientific information. They will submit reports toNRC over the next year.
Other evaluations will follow. Extreme storm events will be at the top of the list of upcoming
evaluations, with temperature excursions and other natural hazards to follow. All these evaluationswill be done over time. Because these are beyond-design basis incidents, the agency has allowed
more time for licensees to complete the evaluations.
Another area I'd like to highlight is the mitigating strategies for beyond-design basis events. The
NRC’s strategy with this modifies our “B.5.b” requirements to assure that on-site portableequipment is available to respond to a large site-wide disaster that disables installed equipment.
Many people have asked: "Would B.5.b equipment have protected the Fukushima plant?" In myview, it might have. But one important follow-on question is "Would the B.5.b equipment havesurvived the tsunami?"So as result of the lessons of Fukushima, the NRC is requiring that B.5.b-style equipment bedeployed on site in sufficient numbers to respond to multi-unit events, and that it be either
protected or distributed on-site so as to survive a site-wide disaster. This equipment—which isprimarily comprised of generators, pumps and supporting equipment—must be deployed at all ofU.S. plants.
While we have made this requirement as specific as we thought was necessary, we were careful tomake these requirements performance-based, which means we were not so prescriptive thatlicensees' hands were tied. As a result, licensees at each plant site had the flexibility to come up
with their own approach.
The industry has developed an approach known as the “FLEX” initiative. The FLEX initiative goesbeyond the NRC requirements.

FLEX not only provides for on-site equipment, such as theportable pumps and generators I've described, but also provides that equipment from across thecountry, located at each nuclear power plant site, will be able to be relocated and provided to any
other plant within 24 hours of an emergency. FLEX also provides that additional equipment will belocated in two regional centers: one in Memphis, Tennessee, the other in Phoenix, Arizona.
Already, over 300 pieces of safety equipment has been purchased and deployed at U.S. nuclear
power plants. This equipment uses standardized fittings so that equipment located at one plant or
at one regional center can be used at any of our plants in the United States. With proceduralized
use of onsite equipment and offsite resources, this approach establishes a layered defense indepth strategy that provides a greater level of protection than had been anticipated by the NRC
requirements.
This, I think, shows the value of performance-based regulation.

Using a performance-based

approach, the NRC has been able to design a process that allows licensees to develop strategies
that best fit each site and allows industry to apply its creativity and understanding of the situation ateach plant to best respond to our requirements.
This performance-based approach requires a great deal of conversation between the regulator andits licensees. When the NRC first issued the requirements, the staff sat down with licensees anddiscussed what safety enhancements were necessary. Licensees gained a clear understanding
about NRC’s expectations and then proceeded to develop the FLEX initiative, and then presented
it to the NRC as an option. Staff then engaged with industry in public meetings and many otherdiscussions to understand and improve on the industry option before approving the FLEXapproach.
This requires a great deal of dialogue. Such dialogue is a vital aspect of how we do business.
NRC Commissioners, such as myself, for example, meet regularly with licensee management. I
also visit nuclear power plants quite regularly. I visited 15 plants just in the last year and a half.
Visiting plants gives me, as an NRC Commissioner, a greater understanding of the challenges
being faced by the industry and how our requirements are being applied.
NRC staff also talk continuously with our licensees. NRC staff meets both in public and, whennecessary, in private with NRC licensees, and when in private they discuss technical details thatare proprietary in nature to ensure licensees understand how to meet NRC requirements. Staff
understands that if a private discussion becomes substantive, a written record of that discussion
must be produced and made available to the public to ensure the public may participate in theregulatory process.
This provides for a great deal of communication between licensee and regulator. This doesn'tmean that our rules are being written in secret; it simply means that we sometimes exchange
information that is not publicly available to enhance the understanding of both sides. This process
has been very important to assist us in developing regulatory requirements related to both security
and nuclear safety.
Now, people often ask us about the situation in Japan. First, let me say that I think it's very
important to emphasize that the Fukushima accident happened in Japan. Because the accident
was a very traumatic experience for the Japanese people, it's no surprise that the Japanese
regulator would take a very aggressive approach to improve safety.
I think the situation is very analogous to what happened in the United States after 9/11. After 9/11,
the NRC required security to be enhanced at nuclear power plant sites to make them, essentially,armed camps. This goes beyond what most countries require, but it's a response to an event that
happened in the United States.
Also, for many of you who travel to the United States, you know that you still have to take yourshoes off when you go to a U.S. airport. That's not something that's required in most countries, but
it is required in the U.S. because the 9/11 terrorist attack happened here.

Similarly, Fukushima happened in Japan, so it's no surprise the NRA—the new Japanese
regulator—is taking a very aggressive approach to safety. I don't think it's inappropriate for them tobe conservative. I think that Chairman Tanaka and his colleagues are working very hard to provide
appropriate safety rules to enhance Japanese nuclear safety. The Commissioners of the NRA
understand that having a strong, credible regulator is a prerequisite to having a safe and successful
nuclear power industry in Japan.
Over time, I believe the NRA will develop the types of practices and procedures that are similar towhat we have in the United States. In particular, I think they will develop the ability to engage more
directly with their licensees to discuss complex issues. I think this will be very important forsuccessful and effective regulation.
Let me emphasize that engagement does not mean that regulators must compromise on nuclear
safety issues. It simply means that the regulators are willing to listen, willing to understand, andwilling to communicate with industry before making regulatory decisions. The FLEX initiative
shows what can result from that kind of engagement: safety is enhanced.
I also think that the success of nuclear safety in Japan will require the industry to learn and fully
absorb the lessons of Fukushima. In the U.S., after the Three Mile Island accident, industry
learned the importance of pursuing excellence in operations and devoted itself to achieving thatexcellence. As a part of that, they created the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), which
has been a tremendous success in helping U.S. nuclear power plants achieve a high level ofoperational excellence.
I hope that the new JANSI organization in Japan proves to be equally successful. JANSI isworking today to set Japan's nuclear operators on a course toward improved safety culture. The
success of this effort is absolutely essential if there is to be a future for nuclear energy in Japan.
With a strong regulator that's willing to listen and an industry with an improved safety culture, I
believe that Japan can have a successful nuclear power industry.
Earlier this month, I visited the Hamaoka Nuclear Plant, for which I thank the staff andmanagement of Chubu Electric Power. At that facility, I saw first-hand how committed Japan'snuclear operators are to responding to the challenges presented by the Fukushima disaster.
I think this is a very promising example. While I know there's considerable debate about many
issues, I don't believe that the goals of industry and regulators in Japan are as far apart as some

people believe. Dialogue and trust will resolve many issues and provide for the best safety and thebest future for the people of Japan.
I thank you for your attention today, and I wish you a very successful 46th annual JAIF Conference.