Western Europe and the Future of NATO

Yoko Iwama
This paper deals with the transformation of NATO from aWestern European point of view with special emphasis on theenlargement problem. The enlargement problem has become thedominating issue of European security for the last several years.
But it should be born in mind that enlargement is only a part ofthe process of transformation which is taking place inside NATO.
NATO enlargement is not the enlargement of NATO of 1989.
When NATO expands, as is expected sometime around the turnof the century, it will be a different NATO. An expanding NATOof the Cold War type would be too costly, both in terms of money
and political cost. In fact, expanding the Cold War type of NATOis unlikely to be sustainable as a policy.*1
For the expected enlargement to occur smoothly, NATO needs
to change. For NATO to change, it is, among other things, necessary
to find a right balance between the Americans and the Europeans.
This is why the leadership of Western European countries become
crucially important, both for the future of NATO and the processof enlargement.
The North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting on 3 June
1996 in Berlin took a major step towards adapting the Alliancefor the 21st Century. Berlin was an appropriate place for this newstep, since this was the city which suffered gravely under theCold War division, and which will regain more and more inimportance, if and only if the Continent succeeds in overcoming
its division in the coming century. If Europe does not succeed inthis endeavor, Berlin will remain a sad and hollow Metropolis at
the periphery of what once was "the prosperous West".
In Berlin, NATO stated its main purpose as "peace and security
in the Euro-Atlantic area", and once again made it clear that it162

Western Europe and the Future of NATOwas undertaking new roles in changing circumstances in addition
to its traditional mission of collective defence.*2 An essential partof the Alliance's adaptation to fulfill this purpose was stated to be"to build a European Security and Defence Identity within
NATO".*3 Important in this respect was the impetus given to thecompletion of CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) concept.
Although the fundamental decisions concerning CJTF were taken
at the 1994 Brussels Summit and internal studies have beenproceeding ever since then, new emphasis has been given to thisconcept recently, especially since the return of France to the
Alliance's military structure.
1996-1997 will be an appropriate time to firmly establish
this concept within the Alliance and clear out ways in which theAmericans and Europeans want to manage their relationships inside
NATO in the future, since there is a very practical need for such asolution in post-IFOR operations. But even if there were no suchpractical needs, Western Europeans would need to find ways totake up more responsibility within the Alliance in order that the
Alliance remain viable well into the 21st century. Only whensuch transformation is conducted successfully, will NATO be able
to persuade the Russians that its enlargement will benefit Russia
as well. The traditionalists may wish to stay within the known
boundaries of the good old Alliance, but the transformation process
has long started and it is no longer possible to reverse it. The
important thing is not to lose the sense of purpose and direction.
NATO's Adaptation to the Post-Cold War World andEnlargement Debate
The process of adaptating the Alliance structures to thepost-Cold War World began in 1990 at the NATO Summit
meeting in London with the "London Declaration on a
Transformed North Atlantic Alliance". In fact, this would havebeen better named "Declaration on a Transforming Alliance",
since it was only the very beginning of a long process, which isstill continuing after 6 years. The declaration at that time did notmean much more than

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the determination of NATO to stay relevant to the security situationsof Europe, even after the end of the Cold War.*4 The subsequent
New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991,
reflected its perceptions on the changing security environment.
Although reaffirming the defensive nature of the Alliance, it placed
dialogue and co-operation alongside collective defence as
instruments for preserving peace. The document reflects thetransitional nature of the Strategic Concept and also thecomplexities of the new strategic environment.*5 Unlike former
concepts such as forward defense and flexible response, the New
Strategic Concept is not clear cut. It is rather a document showing
the direction of the transformation of NATO, and reflects
uncertainty within the Alliance itself.
At the end of the Cold War, the expectations of many
Europeans were that the then CSCE ( present day OSCE) would
play a central role for the security of Europe, and Europeans
would be able to look after themselves without much help fromthe Americans and the Cold War tainted NATO. They were all
too happy with the possibility to be able to determine their own
fate, after being dependent on the Americans for decades. Not
surprisingly, NATO was at pains to find a new role for itself, inorder not to become a relic of the past.*6 The first effort to castaway the old shell was the "out-of-area" debate. It was said that
NATO must go "out-of-area" or "out-of-business" and a consensus
was quick to develop that NATO must take up missions also in
the area outside those covered by collective defense.
With the beginning of the Yugoslavian Crisis, the attentionof the Europeans once more turned to NATO. The EU, draggedby the Germans, proceeded with the early recognition of Croatia
and Slovenia, and was unable to stop the further fracturing anddisintegration of what once used to be Yugoslavia. CSCE was not
an organization capable of quickly responding to such a crisis. In
addition, the situation in the area that used to be the USSR wasanother source of disquiet. When NATO set up NACC (North
Atlantic Cooperation Council) with the former Warsaw Pactcountries on December 20, 1991 according to the Rome decisions,

164

Western Europe and the Future of NATOthe USSR was still intact, but it disappeared the next day. NACC
decided to take up its work with the separate countries thatsucceeded these regions, but in itself, NACC was not seen as
sufficient to contain the inherent instability of these regions.
It is wholly understandable, that the Central and Eastern
European countries were disquieted by these developments andgrabbed the very first chance to raise a claim to enter the seemingly
almighty Atlantic Alliance. This chance was offered when the
Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw in August 1993.
Answering questions, Yeltsin alluded that Poland was now an
independent country and did not require Moscow's approval toenter the Alliance. He repeated the same message in Prague.*7
This message was picked up without delay by the Central
and Eastern Europeans themselves, and also by the then Secretary
General, Manfred Worner. At the 35th Annual Conference of
IISS, Worner gave a speech entitled "NATO's Role in a Changing
Europe". Worner stated that one of the main roles of NATO in
the future should be to project stability eastward, and he supported
the idea of an eastward expansion of NATO.*8 Another figure to
support the eastward expansion at this initial stage was the German
Defence Minister Volker Riihe.*9
It was no coincidence that these two prominent supporters ofNATO expansion were Germans. Being exposed by its geographicallocation to the eastern winds, Germany remains forever sensitive
to the goings on of its eastern neighbors. Social and economic
instability in these countries will pour over the borders into theeastern part of Germany. Germany will have to pay dearly if
Europe fails in its efforts to project stability and prosperity
eastwards. To block social consequences at its borders would be
simply impossible. Erecting a new wall from within to block theentrance of social disquiet coming from the East would be too
grotesque an undertaking after the experience of Berlin Wall.
Hence, Germany became a supporter of an eastward expansionof the EU, as a means to extend democracy and market reform.
The Eastern Enlargement of NATO followed the same logic. At
the same time, enlargement seemed to offer a new "raison d'etre"

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for the Alliance which seemed somewhat uncertain about itself
after the fulfillment of its initial mission.
However, Germany's geographical positioning also meant
heightened sensitivities to Russian demands. The Russians, whogave the first impetus to start the whole debate, soon changed
their attitude and decided that they were adamantly against any
expansion of NATO. This coincided with a period of extreme
turbulence in Russian politics (culminating in the bombing of theRussian White House in October 1993 and the RussianParliamentary election with its Zhirinovsky fever in December
1993) and the re-nationalization of Russian foreign policy. For awhile Russia's foreign policy after the collapse of Communist
empire had been incredibly Western oriented. But this was toogood to last over a long period. It was inevitable that a country as
great as Russia should have its own interests, and given the internalsituation, some degree of nationalism was due to reappear in its
foreign policy. But the change was shocking because of its
suddenness, and it intensified the desire of the CEE countries forearly entrance into NATO.
By the time the Russians changed their attitude, theenlargement debate had already started and it was no longer possible
to stop it. Those who backed the enlargement, with Manfred Wornerat the front, were generally in favor of radically transforming theAlliance to match the new security environment. They recognized
there was danger in change, but thought that staying still was noalternative. Those who were against, were above all afraid of
provoking the Russians, and they also feared that NATO's
effectiveness for collective defense may suffer when it became
too watered down.*10
At the beginning, the Russian objection was felt to be analmost insurmountable obstacle. For a while, the enlargement
problem dominated the debate about the future of NATO. But
step by step, NATO groped its way towards finding a solution
which would satisfy the Central and Eastern Europeans withoutalienating the Russians. And through this process, NATO began
to refocus on the meaning of its transformation.

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Western Europe and the Future of NATO

Brussels Summit and PfP
A temporary solution was found at the January 1994 Brussels
Summit. The Clinton administration wished to give hope to theCentral and Eastern Europeans without alienating the Russians.
Therefore, they did not close the door to anybody, but in themeantime, offered a "Partnership for Peace" to pursue a bilateralrelationship with NATO, "beyond dialogue and cooperation toforge a real partnership". All CSCE and NACC countries wereinvited to join the new programme going "beyond dialogue andcooperation to forge a real partnership".*11 NATO reaffirmed that,as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Allianceremained open to the membership of other European states, but
the candidates were asked to first sign up the PfP framework
document and pursue further intensification of bilateral relationshipbefore accession talks could be started.
Consequently, 27 countries joined the Partnership for Peace
Programme, of which 16 has already developed an Individual
Partnership Programme with NATO. These included former neutral
countries like Sweden, Finland and Austria. Those countries
wishing to enter the Alliance were of course among the very firstto sign up, but there were other states who did not consider
membership but wished to forge closer ties with NATO. Although
PfP was designed in response to the enlargement problem, it turned
out to have quite a mixture of relationships.
It soon became apparent that it was impossible to treat all
CSCE and NACC countries on a equal footing. The potential
candidate countries for enlargement would be content with nothing
short of real membership. There were other states who had nointerest in becoming NATO members but it was Russia in particularthat refused to be treated like all the others. After procrastinating
for several months, she finally signed the PfP programme on 22
June 1994. But during these several months, Russia succeeded inconvincing NATO members, that Russia "has unique and important
contributions to make, commensurate with is weight andresponsibility as a major European, international and nuclear

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power".*12 Since then, Russia and NATO have been developing abilateral relationship outside the PfP framework.
In fact, by 1995, it was becoming clear that all the relationshipsthat were bundled into the PfP programme at the Brussels Summit
needed to be sorted out into three categories. One was the actual
enlargement by taking up new member countries; the second wasthe Partnership for Peace programme involving both potential
members and those countries which were not directly interested
in membership but wished to develop close cooperation with
NATO; and the last was a special relationship between Russia
and NATO.*13
Despite initially being seen as a 'policy for postponement',
PfP developed into a framework encompassing substantial activities
hitherto unknown in other security arrangements. It will continue
to be useful as an instrument to conduct joint actions with European
countries which are otherwise are not associated with NATO.
For the potential member countries, PfP is surely useful inintensifying the ties with NATO in order to facilitate early
accession. But the NATO enlargement process is now likely toproceed separately from the PfP framework. This is becoming
even clearer since the completion of "Study on NATO
Enlargement" in September 1995.
This study carefully avoided the question of "when" and"who" and concentrated on "how" and "why". But by repeating
so many times the commitment to let several Central and Eastern
Europeans in, NATO would suffer a grave loss of credibility if itwere to back down from its words now. The time needed tocomplete the study on enlargement has been used to form a broadconsensus inside alliance. Above all, the Clinton Administration's
resolve concerning NATO expansion seems to have been solidified
in this period, and there now exists a strong consensus thatenlargement is desirable and will happen.
In fact, with a slight softening of the Russian position recently,
it seems quite probable that several Central Europeans would
enter the Alliance sometime around the turn of the century,
presumably on condition that no nuclear weapons are to be stationed

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Western Europe and the Future of NATOin these countries and that no foreign troops would be stationed
permanently (they will certainly enter several times a year inorder to take part in joint exercises). Russian Foreign Minister
Primakov is alleged to have said in Berlin on 1 June 96 at a
"16+1" meeting , that Russia has no objection in principle toNATO expansion, but that expansion of the military structures of"infrastructure" close to its borders was unacceptable.
These conditions are not to be considered discriminating,since the changed security environment simply does not require
the massive concentration of troops and nuclear weapons of Cold
War times. In fact, NATO Secretary General Janvier Solana has
been quoted as saying that NATO has cut its nuclear forces in
Europe by 80% since the end of the Cold War, "we no longer
have nuclear missiles in Europe; we have no intention of reversingthat trend," it is "not true" that NATO is planning to deploy
nuclear weapons in the East after its enlargement.*14 A recent
issue of NATO Review has made public that all ground-launchedsystems and all nuclear weapons for surface ships have been
removed from Europe and the only remaining land-based nuclear
weapons are bombs for dual-capable aircraft. It stated that NATOjudges that "its current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable
future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance,and "there are no plans to change the nuclear posture of the
Alliance upon enlargement".*15 This statement was no doubt madein response to the above-mentioned Russian reactions. NATO nolonger relies heavily on nuclear deterrence as in the Cold War
days, although it is wrong to think nuclear deterrence no longer
plays any role. The change in nuclear strategy is also a part of thetransformation of NATO. For many of its new tasks in enhancing
the stability of Euro-Atlantic area, nuclear weapons would playhardly any role. Together with collective defense, nuclear strategy
can be considered to have been put in "back pocket" for the time
being. This can be cited as another evidence that NATO has infact transformed. If it would reassure the Russians, then NATOshould consider putting this into some form of agreement.
It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that Russia has

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security interests in developments beyond its western borders.
This is not to say that Russia would be admitted a veto, but theWest has an interest in trying to obtain Russian acceptance of its
policies as far as possible.
14 countries are reported to have taken part in the individual
dialogue that NATO offers to interested countries in view ofenlargement, of which 10 have submitted their "discussion papers".
There is not much point in speculating how many of these would
succeed in jumping in to the Alliance. The first few should not be
so difficult to decide, so long as the dialogue with the Russians
keeps on going well. Finding a solution for the Baltic countries
would be a much more delicate task, but need not be daunting.*16
Much will depend on what kind of relationship develops between
NATO and Russia (which will certainly depend very much on
what kind of Russia emerges in the 21st century), and how muchinternal transformation occurs inside NATO.
Russia / NATO Relationship
Much has occurred between Russia and NATO in these 2
years. After the acceptance of the PfP Framework document by
Russia in June 1994, Russia and NATO agreed on an Individual
Partnership Programme under PfP, and a document called "Areasof Pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO / Russia Dialogue andCooperation" at a meeting in Noordwijk on 31 May 1995.*17 At
the same time, they agreed to sign a "political Framework for
NATO-Russia Relations". A draft proposal document was handed
over to Ambassador Churkin on 26 September 1995. When NATO
Secretary General Janvier Solana visited Russia in March 1996,
he called upon the Russians to continue the work of developing apolitical framework. On this occasion, a Memorandum ofUnderstanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster
Preparedness was signed between NATO and the Ministry of theRussian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Eliminationof Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM).
Thus Russia and NATO had been working steadily on

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Western Europe and the Future of NATOstrengthening their ties, and the "16+1" formula had become aregular basis for consultation. But still, the Russian attitudeconcerning NATO enlargement remained very stiff. And because
1996 was an election year, the West tried to avoid making this anelection issue.
The situation in Bosnia seems to have done much to help
melt the icy attitude that existed, especially on the Russian sides.
When the Dayton Peace agreement over Bosnia was reached,
Russia, as a great power, could not afford to stand idly by. It
decided to take part in IFOR, and for this purpose, it was forced
to develop a habit of cooperating on day to day basis with NATO.
On 13 March 96, Russia's participation agreement in IFOR was
finalized, and formalized through the exchange of letters at NATO
Headquarters between Russian and Atlantic Alliance
representatives.
Russia's Participation Document governs military cooperation
between the two partners, practical, financial and legal questions,as well as the question of the political control of IFOR operations.
The Document provides for regular consultations, according to
the formula of the "16+1" meetings (i.e. the Alliance Council
with Russia). Russia has some 1600 Soldiers in North eastern
Bosnia, within the multinational division under American
Command.
Since the start of IFOR operations, the relationship between
NATO and Russia seems to have changed for the better, in spiteof the sensitive period preceding the Russian presidential election.
In March, NATO and Russia reached agreement in principle on
Russia sending a permanent representative to SHAPE Headquarters
near Mons. NATO is hoping that Russia will also be represented
at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, where the partners have awing reserved for Russia in order to have more intensive, day to
day contacts.
It was presumably the cumulation of all these efforts, that
led to the above-mentioned softening of the Russian attitude towards
the enlargement problem.*18 The West should keep up its effort tobroaden the ties between NATO and Russia, so the suspicion held

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on the Russian side about the Alliance will keep on diminishing.
Of course no one can be sure that the opinion inside Russia would
not take an abrupt turn for the worse. But at present, the Russians
seem to be at least willing to continue the dialogue concerning
enlargement. Russian opinion will depend very much on how
much internal reform goes on inside the Alliance. The on-goingtransformation of NATO, especially its efforts to strengthen the
ESDI, should also help the Yeltsin administration in convincing
Russian public opinion, that NATO is in fact changing and its
enlargement need not necessarily be a threat to Russian security.
NATO, Bosnia, and Europe
Another concept adopted at the Brussels Summit was theconcept of CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force). This was conceived
as a means of strengthening the European Security and Defence
Identity within the Alliance, by making NATO assets available tooperations which may not involve the Americans. Nobody wasquite sure at that time what this would actually look like, andalthough the importance of developing this concept was repeatedtime and again as the member countries met, the substance wasslow to develop. Whereas the PfP developed quickly into a gigantic
undertaking, the CJTF moved out of focus for a while, althoughinternal studies continued.
It was again Bosnia, and the comeback of France to the
Atlantic Alliance, which suddenly brought this concept back on
the agenda. France's relationship to the Atlantic Alliance had
never been an easy one, and France had dissociated itself fromthe NATO military structure since the 1960s.*19 Continuing thisstance gradually lost its meaning as NATO evolved since the endof the Cold War, and France took part in the actual military
operations in former Yugoslavia. The change in France's attitude
towards the Atlantic alliance had been gradually developing since
the end of the Cold War, but a truly new impetus for therapprochement between France and NATO had to wait for a new
government. This occurred at last when President Chirac succeeded

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Western Europe and the Future of NATOFrancois Mitterand as president.
In December 1995, at the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, France announced that she would resume her role inappropriate NATO military bodies which do not encroach on her
sovereignty. Henceforth, France has fully resumed her involvementin the Military Committee, is participating in the Council of Defence
Ministers, and is intensifying working relations with other military
bodies. This was a consequence of a long period of policy shift,
but was given new impetus by the Chirac administration, and thedevelopments in Bosnia.*20
Deciding to become more active in the NATO military
structure, France has also demanded more internal reform, to reflect
her views about NATO. She wishes the political militarydecision-making procedures reviewed on two levels; bringing
together the defence ministers within the Council; andstrengthening the role of the Military Committee. France's desire
to see a much stronger European Security and Defence Identity isa long established one. For a while after the end of the Cold War,
she tried to establish a degree of European independence
concerning security outside NATO, but through experience, she
has learned that it would be much wiser to do this inside theAtlantic cooperation framework.
In the long run, it is known that France hopes to see EU and
WEU combined in some way to become the center of European
decision-making concerning defence and security. But this willneed to happen in agreement with the Americans, utilizing
necessary resources of NATO whenever desirable.*21 There may
be operations in Europe which the U. S. supports in principle but
does not wish to participate in. Hence, the NATO command
structure needs to become flexible enough in order to be able tofunction in a "European mode" from time to time. This is where
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept becomes important.
The actual experience in Bosnia already points to the need ofsuch a structure*22 As the end of 1996 and the final date of IFOR
operation draws near, NATO will be forced to decide, what it will
leave behind in 1997. If the elections in the autumn go reasonably
well, then there will be no need to maintain the present 60,000

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strong force after IFOR mandate runs out. What will be needed
would probably be a relatively small force to cooperate in policing
and reconstruction. This will be an appropriate chance to launch
the first CJTF, since machinery can best be adapted to needs
when actually used, and this is also true about military machinery.
Besides, giving a boost to the ESDI at the end of the century willbode well for the building of a more equal Atlantic partnership inthe 21st century.
The North Atlantic Council's decision at the Berlin Council
meeting has pointed in the right direction. It has committed itself
to the completion of the CJTF concept, setting up the PCG (Policy
Coordination Group) to formulate political and military guidelines
with regard to CJTFs. It asked the Military Committee to continue
its work on the Long-Term Study concerning command structure
better suited to current and future security situations. Also, though
the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear PlanningGroup(NPG) met on 13 June without France, it was shortly
afterwards followed by "North Atlantic Council in Defence Minister
Session" with French participation. This meeting was greeted as a"historic event".*23
If the present French endeavors concerning ESDI are to
succeed, it is not enough for France alone to lead. It is also
important that Germany stands by her side to lead together. Despitesome worries after the end of Kohl-Mitterand era, the relationshipbetween France and Germany seems to be going sufficiently well.
Germany is still very unsure of how big a role it wishes to play inthe security field in the coming century, but it has already taken
its first very cautious steps, sending some 4000 soldiers for the
first time since the Second World War into Bosnia on 23 January
1996 (these forces are stationed mainly in Croatia). Although its
record of cooperation in peace-keeping has been long, by sending
forces to IFOR, Bonn has shown a political willingness to be an
active and leading member of NATO.*24
Chancellor Kohl sent a personal message indicating in which
direction Germany wants the Alliance to develop, by personally
opening the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 4 June in174

Western Europe and the Future of NATO

Berlin. He did not forget to stress the special interest Germany
has to its east, by mentioning that Germany had 350, 000 refugees
from the Yugoslavian Civil War and that German taxpayers spentsome 10 billion D-Mark on these people.*25
Germany cannot afford to displease either the Central
Europeans or the Russians. By taking such a stance, it risks being
mistrusted by all sides. But one must have understanding for her
difficult position, being in the middle of a continent with aproblem-laden past to live with. Helmut Kohl pleaded for apartnership and cooperation agreement with Russia, maybe somekind of a "charter" to be drawn up to form the nucleus of the
security architecture in Europe. At the same time, he warned
that the enlargement question should not be made an election
issue, and hinted that he expected a decision to be taken in 1997.
As the Europeans gain in weight within the Alliance, theGermans will need to learn to take up more responsibility andfrom time to time provide leadership. But it will be in theinterests of the Alliance that this proceeds in a cautious andbalanced manner, rather than a sudden jump to the leadership. It istherefore all the more welcome that France has resumed its role in
the Alliance. And in order for the Franco-German leadership tofunction, it is essential that the vision of a united Europe be kept
alive and active.
Although Britain has provided substantial forces in Bosnia,
she has played rather an intermediary role concerning thetransformation of NATO. This comes partly from her empiricist
tradition and partly from the lack of clear cut European policy.*26
Building ESDI is not an integrationist policy, but it is closely
connected with the development of a Common Security and
Defence Policy inside the EU, and also with the development of
WEU. Hence, if Britain wishes to play a larger role in thetransformation process, it will need to share the convictions ofParis and Bonn concerning a united Europe. Of course, this is not
to play down the significance of the intermediary role she can anddoes play between the continental Europeans and the U.S.

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A New Start from Berlin
When one recalls in present day Europe what was proposedin the Europe of late 1950s in the name of disengagement, theparallels and differences are striking. It may be useful to recall
what the alternatives to the Cold War were imagined to be in theheyday of East-West tensions, and compare it with what the people
are aiming at now. The ideas proposed at that time by proponents
such as Adam Rapacki, Hugh Gaitskell, or George F. Kennan
were composed of several or all of the following components:(a)withdrawal of Soviet and American and other foreign troops
from a zone embracing the two Germanys or beyond;(b) arms reduction, limitation, and control in such a zone
(very often, nuclear control had an important meaning);(c) a political settlement unifying Germany and determining
the restrictions, if any, upon her armament and upon her politicalcommitments;(d) some guarantee by the United States, the Soviet Union,and other powers of these three components.
These proposals were aimed at regaining the unity andautonomy of Europe, and eventually to overcome the Cold War
division.*27
Many of these components already exist in present day Europe,
as a result of the unfolding of events after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall. The military machinery of the former Soviet Union
no longer exists, the threat from Russia is only potential at thisstage. In Europe, Western forces in general have been considerably
reduced since the Cold War. United Germany exists as a fait
accomplit, whether one likes it or not. Nuclear weapons no longer
play a dominant role in the strategy of NATO. In fact, there is akind of a nuclear-restricted zone emerging in Central Europe as aresult of disarmament and voluntary reductions.
Of course the difference between disengagement proposals
and the situation today is also as striking as the similarities. The
West has obtained a united Germany within NATO, with thecontinuance of an American presence in the middle of Europe.

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Western Europe and the Future of NATO

The West, with the acceptance of the Russians, has thereby chosen
to preserve the essential features of the security structure of
post-Second World War Europe that provided stability for four
decades. It is important that one does not lose sight of this fact.
The enlargement strategy connects with this tradition and tries toextend stability further eastward.
But one must also not forget the concerns that the proponents
of disengagement ideas had; namely that it was unnatural for
Europe to remain divided and deprived of its own political will
between the American and the Russian world. That is why whenenlargement happens, it must happen in a way which would
strengthen the European Security and Defence Identity within the
Alliance. Pushing forward the ESDI at the same time as enlargement
may also help to alleviate Russian fears about enlargement. It ishighly desirable that fundamental decisions about CJTF be taken
later this year, before discussions about "who" and "when" ofenlargement begin in 1997. Such decisions will undoubtedly
reinforce the strength of the Alliance by allowing for more flexibility
and thereby giving more satisfaction to both Europeans andAmericans. The Russians will have concrete evidence to showthat NATO is serious about its transformation.
Europe of today has the necessary preconditions to allow asolid and independent European identity within the Atlantic
framework. What is needed now is the political will to bringabout necessary cooperation and coherence among the European
states, and also the determination to maintain economic
competitiveness in order to sustain these efforts, in this way Europe
can regain its unity and political entity that was lost after theSecond World War.
This is a daring vision, but a necessary one, if one wishes to
see the Atlantic Partnership to continue into the next century,
since the NATO of the Cold War, with the predominance of theAmericans, would not stand much chance of lasting beyond thenext decade or so. In order to survive over a longer period, evenin the absence of an overwhelming threat as in the former days ofSoviet danger, the partnership needs to be placed on a more equal

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and balanced footing. Of course, care must be taken that the
U.S.A. does not become too disentangled that it retreats back into
isolation. But it will not be realistic to expect that the UnitedStates will always take part in all the operations on an equal
footing with the Europeans, especially when non-article 5
operations become the main area of NATO activities as expected.
The Americans are more likely to intervene at a decisive moment,such as in ending the Bosnian war, and let the Europeans takecare of the rest.
The Leadership of the main European countries, especially
France and Germany, would be essential. What role the United
Kingdom wishes to play remains to be seen, since her European
policy remains very divided, but it is certainly desirable for London
to join Bonn and Paris in the leadership role.
None of the tasks mentioned above will be easy to attain.
But it is up to the Western Europeans to decide what kind of
future they wish to have. They have responsibility for themselves,
and also for the whole Continent. This sounds a little condescending
in tone-is that the effect you are aiming at?
Notes
If the traditional collective security aspect of NATO is emphasized,
expanding NATO becomes logically more difficult. See Michael
E. Brown, "The Flawed logic of NATO Expansion", Survival,
vo, 37, no. 1, Spring 1995,; Stephen J. Cimbala, "NATOEnlargement and Russia", Strategic Review, Spring 1996.
However, it is most likely that for the forseeable future, NATO's
main activities would be those which do not fall under Article
5's collective defense mandate. As Stanley Sloan rightly points
out, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been put in the"back pocket". Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond
Collective Defense. McNair Paper 46, December 1995 (Institutefor National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
Washington, D. C.) Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of
the North Atlantic

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Council, Paragraph 4, 7. NATo Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July
1996).
Ibid., paragraph 5.
NATO Review, vol. 38, No. 4 (August 1990).
NATO Review, vol. 39, No. 6 (December 1991).
See for example, Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe",
Survival, vol. 32, n. 2 (March / April, 1990); Manfred Worner,"Die Atlantische Allianz in den Neunziger Jahren". EuropaArchiv, Folge3/1991.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26. August 1993, 27. Auguat
1993.
International Herald Tribune, 11-12 September 1993; Flora
Lewis, "NATO: A New Mission Await in the East", International
Herald Tribune 18-19 September 1993; Manfred Worner,"NATO's Role in Changing Europe", Adelphi Paper 284 (Thecontent has been altered from the initial speech in September).
Volker Riihe, "Adapting the Alliance in the face of greatchallenges", NATO Review, Vol. 41, No. 6 (December 1993).
For his recent views, see, "Die Neue NATO', Speech held at
John Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies /American Institute for Contemporary German Studies on 30 April
1996 in Washington, Bulletin (Presse- und Informationsamt der
Bundesregierung), Nr. 34, 2. Mai 1996.
For an analysis of the debate, see Yoko Iwama, "Partnership for
Peace:NATO Saisei ha seikou suruka?" (Paper presented for the
Fellowship Programme of Research Institute for Peace andSecurity, 1994, Tokyo). See also, Takako Ueta, "Kitataiseiyou
jouyaku kikou no Touhou kakudai mondai", Kokusaihou gaiko
zasshi, Vol. 94, no. 3 (1995), for an analysis of the enlargement
problem.
Partnership for Peace: Invitation; Partnership for
Peace:
Framework Document, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 1 (February1994).
Summary of the discussions between the Council and Mr.
Kozyrev. 22 June 1994. NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August1994).

Yoko Iwama

13

14
15
16
17
18

19

20

21

179

See for example Robert E. Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of a strategy
for projecting stability into Central Europe", NATO Review, vol.43
no. 3 (May 1995). Nick Williams, Partnership for Peace:
Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?", Survival, vol. 38, no. 1,
Spring 1996) takes the view that PfP is a "framework that
accommodates several different purposes and is flexible enoughto futher those purposes simultaneously".
Atlantic News, 22 May 1996.
Facts on NATO's Nuclear Posture, NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 4(July 1996).
See Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurik, "NATO Enlargement
and the Baltic States", Survival, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996).
NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 4 (July 1995).
The news from Moscow is still very contradictory and cannot be
stated clearly. Primakov insisted after the Berlin meeting that hehad been misquoted. The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
vol. XLVIII, No. 23, July 3, 1996, pp. 11-13. In this interview,
he repeated that "NATO's military infrastructure must not moveany closer to our territory", but the singling out of this element
indicates that "there is a certain space within which an accord ispossible". Despite maintaining a hardline appearance, Russia
seems to be willing to strike some sort of a compromise. See
also Thomas L. Friedman, "Russian Hints at Compromise on
Larger NATO", International Herald Tribune, Thursday, July25, 1996.
On this subject, see Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant
Ally.France and Atlantic Securitry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981); Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea ofFrance: French Security Policy and the Gaullist
Legacy(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
See for example, Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationshipwith NATO", Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996; Charles
Millon, "France and the renewal of the Atlantic Alliance", NATO
Review, vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1996).
That the Europeans decided to pursue their Security Identity
inside NATO should be seen as a sign that they admitted their

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22
23
24

25
26

27

reliance on the U. S. Hence, there is not much fear of U. S. andWestern Europe becoming decoupled as a consequence of ESDI
developments. See "Allies look impotent without U. S., NATOsays", International Herald Tribune, July 30, 1996. Of course,
the European security scene can only be considered inconjunction with other security organizations like WEU, OSCE
and Council of Europe. See Karstens D. Voigt, "Die
Osterweiterung der NATO" and Peter Schlotter, "Die Miihen
der stillen Diplomatie. Konfliktpravention und
Krisenmanagement durch die OSZE", in Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, B5 / 96. On the relationship between enlargement
and realignment of European security framework, refer to Takako
Ueta, "Kitataiseiyou jouyaku kikou no Touhou kakudai mondai",pp. 72-77.
Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory
and Practice", Survival, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996).
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers
Session on 13 th June, 1996, Final Communique, Paragraph 1.
The special issue of SAIS Review, vol. XV (Fall 1995) titled'The New Germany in the New Europe' provides interesting
essays concerning this issue. In the introduction, David P. Calleo
points out that "the absence in our essays of any serious practical
discussion of eastern policy or military engagements is disturbing.
It should perhaps remind us of just how much the prosperous
West Germany of the Cold War was shielded from theresponsibility for difficult choices." Ibid., p, 21.
Tagung des Nordatlantischen Kooperationsrat, Ansprache desBundeskanzlers, Bulletin, Nr. 47, 12. Juni 1996.
Sir John Goulden emphasizes the "practical" nature of Britain's
approach, that they "start with the reality, the real challenges,
and work out institutional conclusions from there." Sir John
Goulden, "The WEU's role in the new strategic environment",
NATO Review, vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1996)
See for example, Robert Osgood, NATO. The Entangling Alliance(University of Chicago Press, 1962).