JOINT TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE

Discussion Paper No. 2008-11
March 2008

Ensuring Hinterland Access
The Role of Port
Authorities
Peter W. DE LANGEN
Erasmus University Rotterdam andPort of Rotterdam Authority
Netherlands

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
positions of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Port of Rotterdam Authority, the OECD or
the International Transport Forum.

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P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

Research Round Table, Paris, 10-11 April 2008
‘Seaport Competition and Hinterland Connections’

ENSURING HINTERLAND ACCESS; THE ROLE OF PORT AUTHORITIES

Rapporteur:Dr. Peter W. de Langenand Erasmus University Rotterdam& Port of Rotterdam Authority1
25 March 2008

Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that port authorities can actively contribute to better
hinterland access. Different types of involvement of the port authority are discussed,
as well as reasons for such involvement.
The analysis is explorative and aims to provide a basis for further discussion. The
analysis applies to landlord port authorities (PAs) with public goals. Landlord port
authorities have become more autonomous and take the initiative for expansion andredevelopment of port infrastructure. The activities of PAs can be classified in four
broad categories: traffic management, customer management, area management
and stakeholder management. PAs traditionally act as landlords but increasingly
operate ‘beyond the landlord’ model.
The main argument for a more active involvement of the PA is the fact thatcoordination in clusters as well as transport chains does not always emerge
spontaneously, for various reasons. More coordination can lead to more efficient
supply chains and more competitive ports. Consequently, PAs have incentives toinvest to improve coordination in port clusters and supply chains.
A more active involvement is especially relevant in hinterland transport, as this is
rapidly becoming the main bottleneck in international door-to-door transport chains.
PAs may contribute to efficient hinterland access by investing in infrastructure andterminals inside the port area, but perhaps also outside this port area. PAs may also
improve hinterland access by setting infrastructure access rules, investing in a port
1This paper is written on a personal title and does not represent the views of Port ofRotterdam Authority or Erasmus University Rotterdam. The paper draws heavily fromvarious previous papers with different co-authors.
Correspondance to: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Port, Transport andRegional Economics, PO box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail:delangen@few.eur.nl

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 20083

community system, by setting conditions in terminal concessions and finally byensuring sufficient competition between firms in all parts of the supply chain. Theseroles of PAs are certainly not relevant in all ports but may provide a challenging
perspective for PAs that wish to explore a more active role to improve hinterland
access.

1. Introduction
In this paper, of a number of theoretical insights is used to explore the role of port
authorities (PAs) in hinterland access. The paper is explorative, rather general andcontains some initial ideas that need further discussion and scrutiny. Discussion andfurther analysis seem very relevant as the pressure on hinterland transport systems
is increasing. Furthermore, in many ports it has become clear that solutions toimprove hinterland access do not emerge spontaneously (either by market forces or
public investments), but may require and active involvement of the PA.
Following this introduction, first, the traditional role of the landlord port authority isbriefly reviewed. Second, a new perspective on the role of PAs, with a focus on theircontribution to improve coordination in port clusters and supply chains is provided.
This is relevant for the subsequent discussion of their role in improving hinterland
access. Third, a brief overview of the existing literature on port hinterlands isprovided. This discussion suggests a number of challenges for improving hinterland
access. Fourth, the involvement of the PA in hinterland transport is discussed indetail. A short concluding section finalises the paper.

2. The role of landlord port authorities
In most ports around the world, a port authority plays a central role. Most of thelargest container ports worldwide are organized according to the landlord model,
where a publicly owned port authority plays a central role (Baird, 2002). Landlord PAs
increasingly operate as autonomous organisations with a commercial focus (see theoverview provided in Brooks and Cullinane, 2007). Figure 1 shows in a stylised way
the increasing autonomy of PAs in a number of countries.

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P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

Figure 1. The increasing autonomy of PAs in a number of countries
1998

Antwerp2005

Hamburg
2001

Canada1988

New Zealand

1999
2001

Western Australia
2005

Rotterdam
1991

PA as public department
with public goals anddirect public influence

PA as public entitywith substantial autonomy
and public goals

Commercialised PA,
indirect public influence
Mainly through shareholding.
Public and commercial goals

UK

Privately owned
PA, no direct
or indirectpublic involvement

PAs generally invest in facilities such as (dredging of) maritime access channels,
breakwaters, berths & quays, sites for terminals, sites for manufacturing & logistics
activities and road and rail infrastructure. PAs provide sites to tenants and port
access to ships. Consequently, the main revenue streams are land rents and portdues.
In general, landlord PAs do not aim for profit maximisation, but have other objectives,
such a maximising throughput, contributing to economic development and enablingtrade (Brooks and Cullinane, 2007). However, many PAs are self-sustaining. Thisimplies PAs need to generate sufficient return on investment to finance newinvestments.
Landlord PAs generally have the planning initiative for expanding or re-developing
the port area and (maritime) infrastructure. Table 1 shows the involvement of the PA
in port planning in four countries.

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 20085

Table 1. Involvement of the PA in port planning
Country/ port
Belgium

The
Netherlands
New
Zealand

CanadaArrangements
The port authority develops port plans that have to beapproved by the Flemish ministry and comply with relevant
regional, national and international regulations. The special
law for ports gives PAs the right to expropriate land, toenable effective port planning.
The PA develops port plans and seeks approval fop thoseplans of the municipal and national government. Expansion
plans have to comply with the relevant regulation.
Public agencies are in charge of port planning, the port
company is responsible for running an efficient port
business. They are clearly stakeholders in the planning
process and provide information on the requirements ofadditional capacity.
The PA develops a land use plan for the port land it
manages. The Ministry of Transport (of the state) is
responsible for major port development initiatives.

These countries have different institutional structures and consequently the PA plays
a somewhat different role. However, in all cases the PAs either have the planning
initiative (Belgium, the Netherlands) or are the main partners in planning initiatives
formally taken by public authorities2 (New Zealand and Canada).
Figure 2 illustrates four core activities of Landlord PAs3. Traffic management is a core
activity of many PAs. The focus of most PAs is on the management of vessel
movements in the port. PAs often are the harbour master in the port area. This
activity may also encompass monitoring and prevention of pollution from ships in theport, as well as the monitoring of the security of ships and cargo.
Area management refers to all activities to develop the port area, such as
construction of road and rail infrastructure in the port area, maintenance of publicareas in the port and planning land use in the port area.
Customer management refers to all contacts with customers, including signing
contracts with new customers, granting concessions to private operators, and (joint)
port marketing.

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An advantage of a system where public, autonomous PAs have the planning initiativeis that they can be given instruments to enable effective port planning that cannot begiven to private firms. In the case private initiative is leading, regulations are required
to ensure the public interests are served. In the UK, such regulations make port
development difficult to realize (Gilman, 1999). Private planning initiatives are only
effective when there is a ‘level playing field’.

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Not all PAs engage in all these activities, but overall these activities do provide a good overall
picture of the involvement of PAs.

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Stakeholder management finally, refers to all activities to ensure the port maintains
its licence to operate. Central are the contacts with stakeholders that directly
influence the attractiveness of the port, e.g. through customs, security & inspection
procedures as well as infrastructure policies.
Figure 2. Four core activities of Landlord PAs4.

Mission: PoR develops in partnership
the World class European port
Core activities
Traffic management-Safe, secure, fast and reliable vessel traffic
management-Partnerships for traffic management on road and rail

Area management-Provide space (to new companies) for growth-Intensify land use-Develop the required (public) transport infrastructure-Secure environmental performance in port area

Customer management-Attract new customers-Create customer satisfaction-Provide value added for customers as‘business partner’

Stakeholder management-Invest in an attractive location climate, in partnershipwith other (public) stakeholders-Influence relevant regulation-Invest to maintain a license to operate

2. The role of PAs in enhancing coordination
The involvement of PAs goes increasingly beyond the traditional landlord model. PAs
do not only lease land and provide safe access to the port, but also actively invest to
improve the efficiency of the transport chain and the competitiveness of the port.
Such investments lead to growth of the two key revenue drivers of port authorities:
land value and port throughput.
The value added of an active role of the PA can be explained by their contribution tomore effective coordination. More coordination is required both in the port cluster andin international transport chains5.
4

Not all PAs engage in all these activities, but overall these activities do provide a good overall
picture of the involvement of PAs.

5

In a previous study, we have used the concept of a ‘hinterland access regime’ toanalyse cooperation to improve hinterland access (see De Langen and Chouly, 2006).

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

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Coordination in port clusters
A ‘port cluster’ consists of all economic activities related to the arrival of ships andcargoes and located in the port region (De Langen, 2004). Although the relevant port
region differs from case to case, it generally includes the primary port area and someadjacent municipalities with relatively much transport and logistics firms. Physicalproximity is a defining characteristic of a cluster. Thus, the port cluster is a more‘localised’ concept than the port hinterland, that may stretch several hundreds (insome cases even thousands) of kilometres inland. Coordination between firms in thecluster (e.g. cargo handling firms, forwarding firms, logistics service providers,transport firms and so on) contributes to the competitiveness of the cluster as awhole. This is explained by the presence of external economies (such as a highquality labour market and knowledge spill-overs) in clusters (Marshall, 1890). These
external economies arise to some extent spontaneously6. Firms and otherorganizations in a cluster also invest to create or enlarge cluster externalities, forinstance by joint investments in the quality of education. Such investments areproblematic because the benefits of such investments cannot be ‘internalized’ by aparticular (group of) firm(s), but spread to all firms in the cluster, regardless of theircontribution to the investments (Schmitz, 1999). Thus, the collective action problem(Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters (De Langen and Visser, 2004). Even whencollective benefits of co-operation exceed (collective) costs, co-operation does not(always) develop spontaneously.
This tendency for insufficient shared investments is relevant for various types ofinvestments, including education, innovation and marketing (see De Langen andVisser, 2004). Because firms in clusters benefit from collective investments andcannot –or at least not perfectly- be excluded from these benefits, these investments
can be considered as ‘collective goods’ (Antonelli, 2000).
Landlord PAs can invest in collective goods for the port cluster and recover costs
from the port users (tenants and shipping lines). Such an arrangement can bebeneficial for the port users, because the collective goods contribute to the quality ofthe port. The PA has incentives to invest in collective goods, since these contribute tohigher land value and more throughput.
Coordination in international transport chains
Five general arguments explain why coordination problems arise in transport chains:
1. The unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of coordination. If one actor
in the chain has to invest (e.g. in ICT systems) while other actors obtain thebenefits, coordination may not arise spontaneously. Gain-sharing mechanismsthat redistribute benefits may fail owing to high transaction costs and the riskof free-rider behaviour.
In such a regime the cooperation between all relevant organisations in the port clusteris center stage. In this paper, we focus specifically on the role of the PA.
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For instance, the availability and quality of labor is relatively high in clusters, because workers
migrate to a cluster to reduce search costs and risks of unemployment. Furthermore, the large
demand for skilled labor provides a basis for a relatively advanced education infrastructure.
P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

2. The lack of resources or willingness to invest on the part of at least one firm in
the transport chain. This issue is especially relevant for coordination problems
involving relatively small firms.
3. Strategic considerations. These can also impede coordination. Firms may bereluctant to improve coordination if competitors would also benefit. Thissituation is likely to arise in a market characterized by fierce competition.
4. The lack of a dominant firm. A firm with supply chain power will have a major
impact on the structure of a transport chain (see e.g. Groothedde, 2005). A
lack of supply chain power reduces coordination.
5. Risk-averse behaviour and a short-term focus of firms in hinterland chains.
Firms that expect the process of establishing better coordination throughcooperation to be time-consuming may be reluctant to put any effort into thisprocess.
These reasons explain why the efforts and investments of firms to improvecoordination are in some cases limited. Firms often concentrate on their own
processes and put less effort into resolving the coordination problems of the chain asa whole. This attitude is more marked if actors expect cooperation to be difficult toachieve. Thus, previous experience in coordination also determines a firm’s attitude.
The PA can contribute to more coordination in transport chains, because more
efficient transport chains lead to more throughput. Figure 3 summarises the reasonsfor a role of the PA in enhancing coordination in port clusters and transport chains.
Figure 3. Tthe role of the PA in coordination in port clusters
and transport chains
PA Revenue drivers

Land value

Port throughput

Better coordination intransport chains
Better coordination in cluster-Labour market-Education-License to operate
Reason for limited coordination
Collective action problem-Data exchange-Interface terminal-hinterland modes-Hinterland networks
Reasons for limited coordination
Unequal distribution of costs & benefits
Short term focus
Free rider problem
Lack of resources
No dominant firm

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 20089

This role of PA is relevant with regard to hinterland access. Before the involvement of
the PA is discussed in more detail (in section 5), first a short overview of relevant
insights with regard to port hinterlands is provided.

3. Port hinterlands
As ports have become links in a global logistics chain (Robinson, 2002), port
competition has moved from competition between ports to competition between
transport chains (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2001). In fact, in most door-to-doortransport chains, the costs of hinterland transport are higher than maritime transport
costs and port costs combined. Most ports mainly serve contestable hinterlands andthus crucially depend on the quality of hinterland transport services. Regions where
one port has a substantial competitive advantage form the captive hinterland of thisport and in general this port handles the vast majority of cargoes to/from theseregions. Contestable hinterlands consist of all regions where there is no single portwith a clear cost advantage. As a consequence, various ports have a share of themarket. For most ports, captive hinterlands have diminished and most ports cannot
rely on cargo from their captive hinterlands. Instead, ports need to competitive incontested hinterlands and consequently firms in ports need to develop strategies tobest serve this hinterland.
The quality of a port’s hinterland access depends on the behaviour of many actors,
including terminal operators, freight forwarders, container operators, and the port
authority. As an illustration of the variety of firms involved in hinterland transport,
figure 4 shows the relevant actors in the rail hinterland chain.

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P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

Figure 4. The relevant actors in the rail hinterland chain

Forwarder(Agent)Container
shipping line

Port

Rail
operator

Container
stevedore

Railway
company

Hinterland
Shipperconsignee
Terminal
operator

Terminal
operatorRoad
haulage

Infra suplier
Actor
Customs

Port authority

Inspection

Container flow
Contract

Source: Van der Horst and De Langen, 2008

Five conditions for efficient hinterland access
Based on the previous overview and relevant literature (such as Robinson, 2002,
Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005 and De Langen and Chouly, 2004), five conditions
for efficient hinterland access of seaports can be identified. First, the transport
infrastructure to the hinterland needs to be sufficiently well developed. Second, thetransport infrastructure needs to be well used efficiently. Third, the transport chainsneeds to be well coordinated, fourth there is an increasing need for a sustainable
hinterland transport system and finally, the services provided by private firms (suchas terminal services, barge services and so on) need to be attractive.

4. The role of PAs in improving hinterland accessFigure 5 shows the five conditions for efficient hinterland access discussed above,and five options for the PA to influence the conditions. Each of these options is
discussed in further detail in the next sections. These options may not be relevant inall cases and are to be regarded as preliminary suggestions, not as policies withproven success.

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 200811

Figure 5. Conditions for efficient hinterland access &options for involvement of the PA

Possible role of PA
Invest in rail &barge terminals
in port & hinterland

Infrastructureaccess rules
for rail and road

Invest in Port
Community
SystemConditions inconcession
contracts

Enable competition& reduceentry barriers

Quality ofhinterland
infrastructure

Efficient utilisationof hinterland
infrastructure

Well coordinatedtransport chain

Sustainability ofhinterland
Transport system

Price & quality ofServices in allparts of supply chain

Components of port hinterland access

5.1 Investments in rail & barge terminals
In many seaports, the PA has to take the initiative for infrastructure expansion
projects in the port area, because other firms or public organisations do not have the
incentives and/or legitimacy to do so. There may be arguments for an active
involvement of PAs in such expansion projects outside the port area as well. The key
argument here is that such investments outside the port area can contributesignificantly to the utilisation of the infrastructure in the port area. Thus, suchinvestments improve port competitiveness. An active involvement of the PA is only
required when such investments do not emerge spontaneously. Private firms may nothave the administrative power to develop planning initiatives (e.g. for dry ports or rail
tracks to the port), while regional authorities in the hinterland may not have incentives
to take the planning initiative for such facilities, because not local residents but
importers, exporters and logistics service providers located outside the region benefit
from such facilities.
Examples of PAs hat have taken the planning initiative outside the port area include:
•
•
•

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The PAs of LA and Long Beach that have been involved from the start in the
Alameda Corridor project, a project to substantially improve the rail
connections from both ports.
Port of Barcelona, that has invested in rail tracks to improve the connection of
the port to the European hinterland.
Port of Rotterdam Authority, that has taken the initiative to develop a containertransferium, located outside the port area, where trucks can deliver containers
for the port. These containers move the final 30 to 50 kilometre by barge, thus
reducing highway traffic.

P. de Langen — Discussion Paper 2008-11 — © OECD/ITF, 2008

These examples suggest that PAs may need to monitor the structure of hinterlandtransport chains and look beyond their boundaries for investments to relieve
bottlenecks and improve efficiency of existing hinterland transport infrastructure.
5.2 Infrastructure access rules
PAs are in most cases involved in and responsible for the development of
infrastructure in the port. In the previous section, we suggested that PAs may need to
become involved in providing capacity outside the port area.
In this section, we suggest that PAs may also have to contribute to the efficientutilisation of hinterland infrastructure. Infrastructure is not by definition usedefficiently. Infrastructure users may not coordinate their activities sufficiently. In manycases such users do not coordinate at all7. Setting rules for infrastructure access may
improve the utilisation of this infrastructure –and thus enhance port competitiveness.
Table 2 shows a number of cases where insufficient coordination leads to a suboptimal utilisation of infrastructure and tentative infrastructure access rules that may
enhance efficiency8. These infrastructure access rules would only allow trucks, trains
and barges to use the infrastructure if they meet certain criteria9. Alternatively, tariffstructures can be devised that provide discounts when these criteria are met, or
penalties when these criteria are not met. All these are forms of infrastructure accessrules.

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This can be explained because an unequal distribution of the costs and benefits, thelack of resources or willingness to invest of at least one relevant firm, strategic
considerations of infrastructure users, a lack of supply chain power (see e.g.
Groothedde, 2005) and risk-averse behaviour and a short-term focus of firms inhinterland chains, (see Van der Horst and De Langen, 2008 for a more detailed
analysis.

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This table is based on Van der Horst and De Langen, 2008). These coordination problems are
not in all ports relevant. In the US, for instance, the large rail operators own most rail tracks
and the issue of access to this infrastructure may be less relevant.
Governments obviously have general infrastructure access rules, e.g. a driving license and a
sufficiently safe vehicle. The argument here is for additional rules aimed to improve efficiencyof the utilisation of infrastructure, sustainability and more coordination in hinterland chains.

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Table 2. Cases of insufficient coordination that reduce utilisationof infrastructure
Coordination problem
Too many calls of barges
with small call sizes per
terminal
Peak load on rail terminals in
ports

Potential solution through infrastructureaccess rules
Only allow barges in the port when they callat a limited number of terminals.
Only allow trains on rail tracks when rail
terminal operator confirms to have capacity
to handle these trains in their allocated slots(real time).
Penalise train operators (substantially) for
not using a track.
Only allow trucks on port access routes
when they have reserved a ´slot´ at theterminal.
Only allow (empty) trucks on the port accessroads outside rush hours.

Unused rail tracks because
of insufficient planning
Peak loads in arrival anddeparture of trucks at deepsea terminal
Peak loads in road transportcauses congestion on theroad infrastructure in port
region area
Insufficient
information Only allow trucks, trains, barges, seagoingexchange of container data ships in port area when they have provided
causes inadequate planning
all necessary information.

These examples show that infrastructure access rules may have benefits with regard
to sustainability, efficient utilisation of infrastructure and a well coordinated transport
chains.
While most PAs set access rules for seagoing vessels (e.g. safety, rules regarding
waste disposal), most PAs are not involved in access rules for trucks, trains andbarges. Such involvement may become desirable when access rules explicitly relate
access to infrastructure with activities in the port. Given the central role of the PA in
the port (e.g. contracts with terminal operators, investments in a port community
system, communication with all relevant stakeholders), partnerships between the PA
and the owners of the infrastructure to design and implement infrastructure accessrules may be appropriate.
5.3 A port community system
An effective port community system may contribute to coordination in transport chain.
In ports, data exchange between a variety of firms is required (Fabbe-Costes et al,2006). For instance, terminal operators can plan better when shipping lines provide
container data. Similar benefits are relevant for forwarding companies and hinterlandtransport companies. In most cases, the same data is useful for a variety of firms, aswell as government organisations such as the customs. A port community system
can provide standards as well as systems for data exchange. As the data of customs

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clearance are an integral part of a logistics EDI system, the inclusion of customs inthe system design is essential (Lee et al, 2000).
The benefits of data exchange are especially relevant in hinterland transport chains.
Whereas maritime transport as well as the port sector is (increasingly) concentrated
and the average firm size is large, many small firms, such as forwarders and trucking
companies are involved in hinterland transport. These firms do often not have theresources and incentives to invest in dedicated data exchange systems.
Consequently, trucks often arrive at terminals without pre-notification, they may arrivewith the wrong information and so on. Similarly, hinterland transport companies may
come to collect containers that are not yet cleared by customs. All these problems
arise due to insufficient data exchange.
Many ports have in one form or another, a port community system. Examples include
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Barcelona and Singapore. In all these cases, the companies in
the port as well as the port authorities are involved. Such investments of PAs may be
expected to increase given the increasing pressure on hinterland infrastructure andthe resulting focus on well coordinated transport chains.
5.4 Conditions in concession contracts
The World Bank infrastructure database (2008) shows that the majority of port
projects from 1990 to 2007 use concessions. In most cases, concessions are granted
for specific terminals. Public port authorities (or occasionally other public agencies)
invest in general port infrastructure and select terminal operating companies for aconcession to operate a terminal and pay a concession fee to the PA. The
responsibility for investments differs between concessions: in some cases the public
PA invests in quays and terminal area, while in other cases the private terminal
operator has to make these investments. Notteboom (2007) rightly argues that
granting concessions and setting the conditions in the concession are key
instruments of port authorities to influence port development.
Such concessions can also contain conditions aimed at improving the hinterlandtransport system. For instance, Port of Rotterdam has included conditions with regard
to the share of barge and rail in the concessions. On top of this, PAs may consider touse concessions to oblige the use of information exchange systems and to secureservice levels for the services to hinterland modes, e.g. on dock loading of trains andloading of barges. Thus, conditions in concessions for terminal operators may be
instruments to improve the sustainability of hinterland, coordination in transport
chains and the utilisation of infrastructure.
5.5 Ensuring competition in transport chains
Finally, the door-to-door transport chain is only competitive if there is sufficientcompetition in all parts of the transport chain. For instance, if a train operator does
not face competition, the overall transport chain becomes more competitive. This is
primarily because firms in chain have market power and will use it to increase prices.
However, competition in the port will also lead to more specialisation and innovation,with benefits for the port as a whole (De Langen and Pallis, 2006).

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The issue of entry barriers is relevant in this respect. Entry barriers in most seaports
are substantial and include economic, regulatory and geographical barriers (DeLangen and Pallis, 2007). In some cases port reform has introduced a limited numberof private port operators but has not lowered entry (and exit) barriers for additionalfirms. Thus, while the scope for private involvement in the provision of port services
has increased substantially, the issue of entry barriers is still relevant.
Lowering entry barriers is desirable because this enhances the contestability ofmarkets, it increases the level of intra-port competition and it enables faster
implementation of new technologies and business models (Geroski et al 1990).
Thus, PAs may need to encourage competition in the port. A policy to reduce entry
barriers may be required. This issue is relevant for hinterland access, especially withregard to rail transport, as the number of competing rail operators is limited in many
seaports. The same may apply for rail and barge terminals in the port.

6. Conclusions
In this paper, the role of port authorities in hinterland access is explored. Landlord
port authorities have become more autonomous and take the initiative for expansion
and redevelopment of port infrastructure. The activities of PAs can be classified infour broad categories: traffic management, customer management, area
management and stakeholder management. PAs traditionally act as landlords but
increasingly operate ‘beyond the landlord’ model. The main argument for a more
active involvement of the PA is the fact that coordination in clusters as well astransport chain does not always emerge spontaneously, for various reasons. Morecoordination can lead to more efficient supply chains and more competitive clusters.
Consequently, PAs have incentives to invest to improve coordination in port clusters
and supply chains.
Such a more active involvement is especially relevant in hinterland transport, as thisis rapidly becoming the main bottleneck in door-to-door chains. PAs may contributeto efficient hinterland access by investing in infrastructure and terminals, inside theport area, but perhaps also outside this port area. PAs may also improve hinterland
access by setting infrastructure access rules, investing in a port community system,by setting conditions in terminal concessions and finally by ensuring sufficientcompetition in all parts of the supply chain. These roles of PAs are certainly not
relevant in all ports but may provide a challenging perspective for PAs that wish to
explore a more active role to improve hinterland access.

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