Ways of Managing Border Disputes in
Present-Day Europe: The
Karelian Question

Pertti Joenniemi
An European Border
The Karelian question is neither a major theme on the European
agenda, nor does it constitute a pressing one in current
Finnish-Russian relations. After having been dormant for decades,
it came alive in the beginning of the 1990s, with the demise ofSoviet Union, the re-unification of Germany and the restoration of
the independence of the Baltic republics. There was intense
discussion surrounding the question for some years, but it now
appears to be in decline as the states have been reluctant to engage
themselves in talks on restitution of those parts Karelia ceded to
the Soviet Union in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
The question remains mainly of interest to Finnish civil society
at least if judged on traditional grounds. There are no decisive
breakthroughs in sight and the issue hence pertains, in a broader
perspective, "to the unknown backwoods between St.Petersburg
and the Kola Peninsula" (Eskelinen, 1994:172). Internationally
the issue has attracted little interest and is not known to any
broader public.*1
However, my purpose here is to go beyond such a traditional
perspective. Instead of contributing to a further peripheralization,
the aim is one of highlighting some aspects of the issue that linkit with essential aspects of current European development. It isclaimed that the Karelian question is very much alive, although
not in the way expected, if it is studied in the context of thechanging meaning of borders and territoriality in Europe. It provides
insight into the development of Finnish as well as Russian foreignPertti Joenniemi

239

forced to cede to the Soviet Union after the Second World War.
These areas, constituting some 10-15 percent of Finland's prewar
economy, and the population of some 420,000 people that migrated
to Finland from the ceded areas, is what Finns usually have inmind when referring to the Karelian question.*2
Different Parts of Karelia*3

The White Sea

RussiaSt. Petersburg

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Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

After the Finnish-Russian war, ending in 1944, the cededarea was first incorporated into the Finnish-Karelian Soviet
Republic. The northern part around Lake Ladoga still remains
part of the Republic, but some years later the southern part consistingof the Karelian Isthmus was transferred to the Leningrad Region(Oblast). Strong measures of russification took place for example
in the form of changing the names of the various places and cities
in the region.
As the pre-war population by and large left the annexedparts of Karelia for Finland, people from various parts of theSoviet Union, especially from Belorus and Ukraine as well asother regions that had suffered most from the war, moved to thearea during the late 1940s and the 1950s. However, the region
remained sparsely populated and peripheral to the Soviet Union.
Out of an overall population of some 800.000 inhabitants in thewhole Karelian Republic, only one-tenth are now of Karelian or
Finnish descent (Laine, 1994:24; Oksa and Varis, 1994).
On the Soviet side the reasons for the annexation were above
all security-oriented, but reflected also a Russian tradition ofcentralism as well as a fear of foreign influences in the borderareas. The war-time experiences were interpreted as speaking fora larger in-between zone and a need of adding distance between
the sensitive and vulnerable region of Leningrad and Finland,
Scandinavia as well as the West in general. In particular, the areas
bordering to Finland became military buffer zones and remainedlargely unpopulated (cf. Forsberg, 1995:206-207). Hence also thenew, post-war border of some 700 kilometres between Finlandand Soviet Union had a very statist and security-oriented character.
Moreover, it had a system-character in the sense of drawing a line
between ideologically opposed social systems. It separated theentities from each other, thereby providing exclusive spaces, anda rather unequivocal territorial ordering into the "inside" and"outside" in a Europe of rather clearcut divisions. Anssi Paasi(1995:248) argues that the policies pursued were those of deliberate
peripheralisation, de-nationalisation and separating the region fromits previous history.

Pertti Joenniemi

241

Signs of Change
For decades the former Finnish Karelia, divided between the
Karelian Republic and the Leningrad Oblast, remained rather
isolated and had mainly the function of an outpost against external
threats. The city of Vyborg, located close to Leningrad and beinga transit town for traffic to and from Finland, was to some extent
an exception, but even there the contacts remained modest. Finland
was not really interested in changing this state of affairs. AlthoughFinland's trade with the Soviet Union was extensive, there was alack of contact with the neighbouring regions at the eastern border.
The interaction was restricted to Finnish purchases of timber forthe pulp industry located in the eastern part of Finland and theconstruction of the mining town of Kostamus by Finnish
entrepreneurs (Eskelinen and Varis, 1994).
This state of affairs changed to some extent during the yearsof perestroika and glasnost in the 1980s. At the beginning of the
1980s Vyborg was opened up to tourism and in the late 1980seven visits to the countryside of the Karelian Republic werepermitted, considerably increasing the number of visitors,
especially Finns. Local entities such as the Finnish border-town
of Lappeenranta engaged themselves somewhat more actively intransborder relations. Plans emerged on the Soviet side for special
economic zones, and the Vyborg region was singled out as one of
the candidates (Dörrenbäher, 1991; Kosonen, 1991). If
implemented on a larger scale, such ideas would have significantly
changed the nature of the border and the border region. However,
implementation turned out to be problematic as well as
time-consuming, and so far the concrete consequences haveboiled down to very little. The ideas turned out to be controversial
on the Russian side, and it has been difficult to agree upon a
distribution of the benefits between the local players and the central
authorities. On the Finnish side a recession in the economy took
the wind from the sails of the enterprise, and simultaneously
opened up possibilities of investing in and cooperating withother, more developed and technologically advanced regions
such as those of242

Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

St. Petersburg and Murmansk. Some interest was, however, directed
towards Vyborg, this considerably changing its nature. The factthat Vyborg is the town in Russia closest to a Western country
now shapes its daily life and gives it a rather special character,
resembling to some extent the one it had during its earlier history(Forsberg, 1995:208; Kosonen, 1994).
The demise of the Cold War in particular entailed an end ofmany of the dynamics peripheralizing the Karelian Republic in
Soviet politics. The Republic, downgraded and renamed theAutonomous Republic of Karelia in 1956, declared sovereignty inNovember 1991. It was thereby following similar acts by someother autonomous areas that aimed at improving their situation
and bolstering their position vis-à-vis the centre. The benefits ofsovereignty have remained modest, although a special status was
granted already in 1991. The notion of sovereignty is devoid of
any profound dissident or separatist features, and has mainly
implied an increased influence on decision-making pertaining to
the use of natural resources, taxation, currency incomes andenvironmental issues. The central authorities have played it rather
softly, and the Karelian Republic has received rights to maketreaties with third powers when these were not in conflict with
Russian law. The Republic thus enhanced its position as to politics,
identity and to a certain extent autonomy.
The aspiration for a less marginalized position also led to theestablishment of a foreign ministry, headed by influential
politicians, within the administration of the Karelian Republic.
There is some substance to this, as the Karelian Republic has
become a member of the Barents Regional Council, a body that
promotes transnational cooperation and channels local initiatives,in the context of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). Likewise,
the Republic has taken an active part in various forms of cooperation
around the Baltic Sea open to regional interest groups.
The Debate over the Karelian Question
The loss of Karelia was so traumatic for Finland that thePertti Joenniemi

243

issue was certainly not fully settled with the Peace Treaty ofParis. The various Finnish post-war political leaderships all had
hopes that the question could be taken up with the Soviet leaders
at some proper juncture, although they refrained from raising theissue publicly and did not encourage public discussion. The returnin 1955 of the naval base of Porkkala, located outside Helsinki,
kept the hopes high, and so did the leasing of the Saimaa Canal in
the Vyborg region to Finland in 1960. President Kekkonen thoughtthat the Finnish recognition of the German Democratic Republic
could potentially bring Vyborg back (Forsberg, 1995:212). Therewas, however, considerable resistance on the Soviet side to touchupon the Karelian question, and particularly during the Brezhnev
era the Soviet position remained quite uncompromising.
This did not change in any profound way with the emerging
of detente and the various efforts to tackle some of the issues that
the Second World War left unsettled. It rather seems that Finland
accepted in the 1970s a closing of the issue in unhesitatingly
approving the pledges of the CSCE document which denounced
the right of making territorial claims.
However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union put thequestion back on the agenda, at least in the Finnish civic
discussion.*4 If the Baltic countries could regain their independence
and Germany could become unified, what would prevent a
restitution of the ceded Karelia to Finland? As there was no longer
a conflict between opposed social systems and the border did not
demarcate a profound difference between western freedom andeastern totalitarianism, what would prevent a redemption fromtaking place?
These arguments were raised in a number of interventions
coming mainly from those who had been evacuated from Karelia
and belonging to the Karelian Association. It was felt that finallythe moment was there. Initially the support for these claims of
re-drawing the border was considerable. According to polls taken
in 1991, a third of Finns supported negotiations with the Soviet
Union over the return of the ceded Karelia.*5
Those advocating a redemption often used moral arguments.

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Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

Their claim has been that because of historical justice as well as
cultural values, the pre-war borders should be reinstituted andKarelia returned to Finland. Articles proliferated in the press,
questions were raised in Parliament, and the Karelian Association,
representing the will of those having immigrated to Finland,announced itself ready to prepare a proposal concerning future
relations with Karelia. The chairman of the movement presented
a plan of his own according to which the Finnish Karelia should
receive an autonomous status similar to that of the Aland Islands,a group of islands located between Finland and Sweden in theBaltic Sea.
Some critical voices were raised as well. It was feared thatthe opening of the Karelian question would have a negative
influence on the relationship between Finland and Russia.
Moreover, it was pointed out that the making of territorial claims
would be detrimental to the conduct of international relations bystrengthening a move towards bringing up various injustices thatwere receding into the past. It was feared that by increasing thesignificance of the various territorial disputes, one could destabilize
the European system.*6
The return of Karelia was opposed also for economic, politicaland social reasons. It has been known that the ceded region, andthe Karelian Republic in general, has been experiencing economic
hardship. A restitution could hence become very costly and demandhuge investments (the sum of some $ 20 billion has been mentioned).
Moreover, it could endanger Finnish membership of the European
Union if the impression developed that there was an open borderdispute with Russia, and a restitution could imply that Finland
would get a Russian-speaking minority of some 300,000 people
within its borders.
It was also argued that military-strategic reasons went against
any alterations of the border. General Gustav Hägglund, Head of
the General Staff, was of the view that Karelia should not be
accepted into Finland "even if it was offered on a golden plate".*7
He emphasized the strategic value of the Karelian Isthmus to theRussians and the possible dangers of not understanding the logic

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245

of the Russian thinking concerning their security.
Views of the Political Leadership
The Finnish President, Government and leading politicians
have not shown much enthusiasm for the return of Karelia. The
option of initiating negotiations has been kept open, although it
has not been pushed or made use of in any formal manner. In
contrast to the views held by broad segments of the public, theleadership did not view the end of the Cold War and the fallingapart of the Soviet Union as a "window of opportunity" and an
invitation to raise the question.
President Koivisto (1981-1993) assumed, although notresisting a civic discussion on the matter, a quite reserved attitude
by stressing that the question had been resolved in three peace
treaties in 1940, 1944 and 1947. "The issue has been settled", hestated adding, however, that too extreme claims might foreclose
the option of waging a dialogue.*8 Koivisto's successor, President
Ahtisaari (1994-), has stated that he has not buried the issue, butwill not actively pursue it in not wishing to cause strains in
Finnish-Russian relations. The issue can, in his view, be
discussed, but it requires that also the Russian side assumes a
preparedness to engage oneself in such discussions.*9
FinlandandRussiaconcludedin1992
aneighbourhood-agreement that, besides leaving out any
commitments to cooperation in the sphere of defence contained ina previous treaty with the Soviet Union, also defined the status of
the border. In the preceding negotiations (then still between
Finland and the Soviet Union) on a new basic agreement, theSoviet side tried to formulate a statement on the finality on thecommon border. The Finnish side did not want to have any
separate statement on borders. A compromise was reached as
Finland wished to refrain from the impression that it had someplans in the future to return to the question, and as a result theagreement includes an article on the borders, but does so in aquite vague manner.*10
The article prescribes that Finland and Russia preserve their

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Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

common border as a border of good neighbourhood according to
the principles of the CSCE Final Act and respect each others
territorial integrity (cf. Blomberg, 1992). According to the Finnish
interpretation this leaves open the possibility of changing the border,
whereas the Russians have interpreted it more strictly, i.e. theagreement confirms the finality of the border (Forsberg, 1995:213).
Finland stresses that borders can be renegotiated and changed
peacefully with the consent of the parties concerned. This line has
been exemplified by that minor changes in borders have been
agreed upon for between Finland and Sweden.
In the view of Jaakko Blomberg (1996), Director General of
the Foreign Ministry, "the choice of wording underlines the aimof changing the nature of the border from a dividing to a unifyingone". Hence he testifies to a certain strategy of de-bordering andindicates that the very thinking in Finnish foreign policy concerningborders has changed. His interpretation is validated by a numberof clauses in the agreement that aim at providing a legal framework
for the cooperation in the neighbouring areas and encourage directcross-border contacts between regional and local authorities.
The impression of a conceptual change has been strengthened
by Ilmari Susiluoto (1994), Senior Research Fellow at the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. He argues that the agreement implies that after
70 years of isolation and iron-curtain mentality, possibilities forgenuine cooperation have now been opened up, based on
geographical proximity and natural human interests on the regional
level. Susiluoto depicts the change as a historical turning point.
However, it could also be viewed as a return to the past as theborder is now less of a symbol through which both thecontradistinction between Finland and Russia as well as theirdependence on each other is expressed. There is a certain
de-politization of the border taking place allowing for morepluralistic understandings - resembling those that historically havebeen quite favourable Kaleria - of political space to unfold.
Obviously Finland felt itself under pressure to make moves
prior to the beginning of negotiations on entering the European
Union. These negotiations would have been complicated, it wasPertti Joenniemi

247

thought, with the existence of defence policy commitments oropen border disputes with Russia.*11 There are no indications of
the EU having raised the issue, but the Finnish interpretation of
the EU-logic has been that borders should be stable and not subject
to conflicts. Finland's concern was presumably not just restricted
to the negotiations on accession. The border issue provided an
opportunity to engage oneself in Europe-making, with Finland as
a potential EU-member influencing EU's eastern border, andthereby also the conditions for the future relationship between theEuropean Union and Russia.
It therefore seems that both the concern for good relations
with Russia and the need of complying with the understanding
prevailing within the EU, pushed Finland in the direction of
downgrading and re-interpreting the Karelian question. These two
viewpoints - the traditional statist and geopolitical logic, and theone underlying European integration - had a parallel impact,
although they differ considerably from each other.
The policy pursued more recently hence seems to be basedon the assumption that aiming at restitution is neither realistic,
taking into account the prevailing circumstances, nor is it warranted
as there are other, more favourable options available. There is areluctance to raise any territorial claims as such claims are taken
to be tantamount to the undermining of international treaties andagreements. Instead of a redemption Finland opts for a policy of
circumscription. Jaakko Blomberg (1996) summarized the line
taken as follows: "Finland has based the policy pursued in thecontext of the CSCE / OSCE on the understanding that preserving
peace and stability in Europe requires a respect of the borders thatemerged after the war. Such a respect implies that all the statesshould refrain from making territorial claims. What is at issue
here is one of the basic pillars of the international order".
However, the policy is not merely one of keeping the borderas it is. There is also a positive goal involved in the sense ofaiming at reducing the obstacles resulting from existing borders.
Blomberg corroborates this by stating that "the line chosen is oneof supporting exchange and cooperation between neighbouring

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Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

regions". The aspiration is not one of status quo, or one of re-drawingof borders in the sphere of "high politics" but making room for"low politics" that make the Finnish-Russian border more passable,
porous and furnish it with a multifaced character. With thesepolicies a barrier functions less than it used to do as a sluice-gate
at a fixed geographical point and assumes a far more cooperative
character.
Moreover, also "high policy" aspirations are now seen as
gaining from cooperation among neighbouring regions as evidenced
by the Finnish Governments report to the Parliament on security
policy (1995:25). It is observed that growing contacts between
citizens, extended opportunities for action by NGOs, new economic
collaboration and lively interaction across the common frontier
have all meant that the opportunities offered by social reforms in
Russia and the effects of instability in that country have an
immediate impact on Finland. "The new situation has made possible
cooperation in neighbouring areas that allow Finland to give
concrete support for economic and political reforms in Russia andto work in cooperation with Russia in resolving and preventing
common problems that could endanger stability".*12
Russian Views
Over time, no major changes have occurred in Russian
attitudes towards the Karelian question. There has been concerns
about its reopening, and hence the option of adjusting and redrawing the border in any formal way has been categoricallydismissed. Changes in the location of borders have been regarded
as dangerous and therefore politically impossible to execute.
However, this line has not prevented Russia from adopting a
positive attitude towards policies regarding "low-policy"
cooperation in border regions. For example the Karelian Republic
has been allowed considerable liberties in this regard.
The rejectionist view, according to which there is no Karelian
question, has grown a bit softer in recent years. Foreign Minister
Kozyrev and President Yeltsin both stated in 1992 that there existed

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249

no issue concerning borders and no territorial claims between
Finland and Russia (Forsberg 1995:216). Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin and Lukin, the Chairman of the Committee of
Foreign Affairs of the Duma, both reiterated these views in 1994,
referring at the same time to the enlargement of the cooperationof neighbouring districts and the establishment of free-economy
areas (The Karelian Association, 1996:47).
More recently Russian political leaders have been somewhat
more forthcoming and ready to make at least symbolic concessions
on the Karelian question even though talks on border shifts havebeen strictly avoided. Increased understanding has been shownfor the wish of Finnish Karelians to discuss the issue, visit their
homeland and raise cultural monuments there. In May 1994
President Yeltsin for the first time acknowledged, responding toquestions from journalists during President Ahtisaari's visit to
Moscow, that the annexation of Finnish Karelia was an aggressiveact of Stalin's policy.*13Juri Derjabin, Russia's ambassador to
Finland, has met with groups advocating a return of Finnish Karelia,
and has stated publicly that the decline of Vyborg is somethingthat Russia should be ashamed of.*14
In 1996 it seems that the heat surrounding the Karelian question
during the first half of the decade has largely run out, and there islittle interest on either side to return to the issue again in terms ofaltering the border. Russia stays with its reserved attitude, andhence the issue is blocked in terms of restitution as Finland has
pledged not to make any moves without the consent of Russia.
The decline of the issue as one pertaining to a re-drawing ofborders seems to have encouraged a discussion on the transparencyof the border in question, and the initiation of various projects
that would lower it. In particular, the leadership of the Karelian
Republic has been active in this regard. Their persistence has
contributed to the emergence on the Finnish side of a debate on
the value of engaging oneself in active cooperation. There has
been pondering on the existence of profitable targets for investment,
effective ways of tackling environmental hazards, questions
pertaining to growing immigration or issues pertaining to the spread

250

Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europeof organized crime. So far this debate has had only a modest
concrete impact, although Finns have the most extensive contacts
with the Karelian Republic compared with any other foreign
presence.
Future Options
The first part of the 1990s brought about, due to there-emergence of the Karelian question, an extensive discussion
on the nature of the Finnish-Russian border. The traditional
statist logic still influenced the debate to a considerable degree. It
coloured the thinking of those advocating a restitution as well thatof the opponents (cf. Joenniemi, 1996). However, a different,
more societal, cooperative and less territorially fixed thinking
also emerged. This has been strengthened by developments ofintegration with the border between Finland and Russia turning
into an external border of the EU. The changes are quite obvious
in the case of Finnish thinking but have also, to a degree, influenced
the line pursued by Russia.
The various dynamics that have contributed to theperipheralization of the Finnish-Russian border, and provided the
Karelian question features of a statist border dispute, have declined
in importance. With the European, integration-oriented andinclusive logic getting stronger, the way of perceiving the issues
involved has gradually changed. The debate has assumed a different
character in benefitting from a kind of "civilization" of borders in
the current Europe. Instead of dividing, the border agreed upon in
the Peace Treaty of 1947 increasingly groups Finland and Russia
together. A previous boundary of mutual division transforms intoa frontier. There is less peripheralization and with the endeavoursof making increasing use of the resources of the border-region,
the previously very statist border is well on its way of assuming a
new, trans-statist meaning.
In other words, a process of de-bordering is also at work in
Finnish-Russian relations. The strategies applied work aroundborders, thus initiating a formation that transcends the previous

Pertti Joenniemi251

territorially defined space along the border without leading to
new territorial demarcations.
The new logic has come in with considerable force. It appears
to be so powerful that changes can be discerned even in the
publications of the Karelian Association. In the beginning of the
1990s the Association focused almost exclusively on a restitutionof the ceded area, whereas the more recent statements devoteconsiderable attention to the option of introducing varioustransborder schemes of cooperation. Instead of shifting the borderin a formal sense, the effort is now much more one of lowering itin order to make space for an intense network of crossbordercontacts.
The most recent programme of the Association (1996:50)
states that "Finland's membership of the European Union offers
additional possibilities of cooperation of neighbouring districts, inthe field of economy as well as culture". It is further observedthat the development of St. Petersburg and the Karelian Republic
have become more important than before as regards the Karelian
question, and it is noted that the growth of significance of St.
Petersburg adds to incentives for crossborder cooperation.
"Emphasizing Finland's role as both a bridge between Russia andthe European Union and an active cooperation of neighbouring
areas, constitutes current Karelian policy". It is remarked "thatthe more we are positively involved with the ceded Karelia andthe Karelian Republic, the more natural seems the presence of theFinnish population and its return to the native districts in ceded
Karelia". In other words, the previous insistence on statist measuresof restitution now runs parallel with emphasing a domesticationand socialization of the border through various forms of "lowpolicy" cooperation.
The moral connotations as well as divisions into "we" and"they" with clear-cut territorial delineations seem to be in decline,
and provide space for more functional arguments to take over.
This is to say that a foundational change has taken place as theimplementation of the EU-approach is now seen as providing a

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way of making progress in regard to the Karelian question. Although
there is still a broad variety of options to regain the ceded areas in
the discussion, these ranging from buying it entirely or partially,leasing it or providing the region with partial autonomy in themanner of the autonomy of the Aland Islands, most discussion
has been devoted to the idea that the areas with a Karelian
background on the Russian and Finnish side of the present bordershould be turned into a region of transborder cooperation. Formulas
should be adopted similar to those applied in the border-regions
between Germany and Austria, Germany and Holland, or Germany
and Poland. The various parts of Karelia should, according to the
new thinking, remain part of the present states. There is no needto alter borders in a statist sense, but instead of dividing, theborder should invite cooperation and unity.
The implementation of such a cooperative strategy wouldemphasize the importance of local groups, and in many cases the
Karelians themselves. Moreover, it would invite the EU to assume
an active role in the shaping of one of its main borders, for example
by utilizing the various funds and programmes for transbordercooperation (Tacis, Interreg). There would be a role for the states
as well, but not in the sense of changing statist borders and making
territorial adjustments. States are relegated to a supportive roleinstead of being the decisive players. It has been demanded, forexample, that the Finnish Government prepares a Karelia-programin the context of advancing cooperation between neighbouring
regions and in the Baltic Sea region at large. The states should
remain in the background, allow other actors to assume a central
position and refrain from implementing and returning to a strict
territorial logic demanding unambiguous borders.
This is to say that the Karelian question shows considerable
signs of transformation. It appears to move from an unresolved
territorial issue, adjusting a border felt to be highly unjust, to an
opportunity and resource with European connotations.
Undoubtedly, the new thinking has to become stronger in order toreally yield results. It is still in its initial phase, and there has so
far been little implementation and active interaction as comparedPertti Joenniemi

253

to many other transborder regions in current-day Europe.
However, the new ideas are here, and are probably here tostay. They have already achieved a relatively firm base in thepolicies pursued by Finland and the Finnish debate, and enjoy
some support in Russia as indicated by the efforts to establish
economic free-zones and the many proposals for cooperation
emerging from the Karelian Republic. Moreover, the EU is taking
a few first steps in coming to grips with its new eastern border.
Presumably this latter factor will, in the future, be rather important.
With a certain de-territorialization of politics there will presumably
be a downgrading of many of the previous concerns which lean
towards a traditional statist approach to borders and territorial
issues.
Moreover, the new spatial dynamics will call for solutions
that could re-furnish Karelia with its historical role as a 'third'with some subjectivity of its own in an increasingly pluralistic
Europe. This still remains in the future, and is far from certain,
but in any case the territorial determinants of social life and politicalprocesses appear to be on their way to becoming less strict, auguring
well for a return of the Karelian question in a manner beyond
restitution and an adjustment of statist borders.
Notes
It seems that for example the inaccuracies in a report on the
Karelian region carried by the Economist in January 1993
indirectly illustrate the peripheral nature of the region.
On the Russian side Karelia is equated with the Karelian Republic,
which is in turn, in the older Finnish usage of language, hasconnotationsofEastern
Karelia.
These
different
conceptualizations and ways of reading the issue
cause
considerable confusion in the debate.
The illustration has been published by the Karelian Association,
The Karelian Issue, Helsinki 1996, p. 4.
A summary of the discussion has been presented by a study
group established by the Karelian Association, see Karjala-

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Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

työryhmän raportti 31.1. 1995. The report is mainly based on a
study carried out by Arja Kuittinen. See Arja Kuittinen,
Neuvostoliiton
hajoaminen
käynnisti
vilkkaan
Karjala-keskustelun lehdistössä. Keskustelua Karjalasta.
Karjalan Liitto, Helsinki 1993, pp. 22-26.
Over time a decline in support seems to have taken place. Polls
carried out in December 1995 indicated that only 17 percent of
the respondents supported an opening of the question on
governmental level while 80 percent took the view that the Finnish
government should not take any initiatives. See Helsingin
Sanomat, December 27, 1995.
See Karjala-työryhmän raportti 31. 1. 1995, Karjalan Liitto,
Helsinki 1995, pp. 47-55.
An interview with General Hägglund, then Chief of Staff and
now Commader of the Armed Forces, in Keskisuomalainen, March
29,1992. In Dagens Nyheter (March 6,1992) Hägglund explained
his way of arguing by stating that it would be unwise forgeostrategic reasons to push the Finnish border back towards St.
Petersburg. This is so as the value of this region for Russia in
defensive terms has increased over the recent years. Such a move,
if implemented, would transform Finland into Russia's zone offorward defence and consequently the Russian military leadershipwould prepare plans to take territorial advantage of Finland inview of a crisis. For a broader analyses on the geopoliticalreasoning, see Penttilä, 1993.
President Koivisto has included a chapter on the Karelian questionin his book "Historian tekijät (The Makers of History)", pp.
455-458. The issue came up already during Koivisto's visit toJapan in 1987. It became obvious then that the Finnish andJapanese attitudes to ceded regions were different, with Finland
pursuing a much more restrictive policy. The two issues are notfully comparable as the Karelian question is regulated by statist
agreement, whereas that of the Northern Territories has more
openness in this regard (cf. Ishiwatari, 1995). The matter wastouched upon also in the context of Prime Minister Nakasone's
visit to Finland in 1988. The Japanese leadership hoped for aPertti Joenniemi

9
10

11

12

13

255

more active stance, and perhaps some support for its own posture, but
to no avail. In 1989 President Koivisto signalled to Moscow that
Finland would not raise the Karelian question even if the Soviet
Union would make concessions to Japan regarding the Northern
territories. See, Suomen Kuvalehti, December, No. 49, 1995, p. 18.
Finland's policy has obviously been one of dislinkage and has been
based on the avoidance of multilateralization.
These views have been put forward in interviews in Demari,January 24, 1994 and Ilta-Sanomat, April 9, 1994.
See the statement of Undersecretary of State, Jaakko Blomberg,
in Suomen Kuvalehti, December, No. 49, 1995, p. 20. The
newspaper itself concludes that Finland was perhaps too muchin a rush in accepting negotiations on a neighbourhood-agreement.
"According to established view in the Foreign Ministry theprevious Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid would
have expired by itself without any negotiations. Hence there wasno need to cede Karelia again for a second time as a price to be
paid for getting rid of the FCM-Treaty".
Measures were taken to dismiss any impressions of that there
existed a border dispute. Hence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
gave an order to its embassies, in January 1993 on the eve of the
EU-negotiations, not to display and distribute copies of a particularissue of the Finnish Defence Review. The paper contained acritical article on the Karelian question written by Martti Valkonen,
a Finnish journalist posted as a correspondent in Moscow.
The increasing conceptual clarity and interest in transbordercooperation has so far not yielded any impressive results. On thecontrary, Eskelinen and Varis (1994) label the situation as
somewhat chaotic as to the organization of cooperation, and thisgoes for both the Finnish and the Russian side. Investments havebeen modest and it seems that other regions such as the Barents
or St. Petersburg regions attract much more interest leaving theceded Karelia in a peripheral position. However, it is important
to note that is no longer the border as such that disencourages
investments or other forms of cooperation.
See Helsingin Sanomat, May 19, 1994.

256

Ways of Managing Border Disputes in Present-Day Europe

14Interview with Ambassador Juri Derjabin, Helsingin
Sanomat, March 4, 1992.

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