International Society of East Asian Philosophy
2019 Conference
East Asian Philosophy: Past, Present and Future

Surugadai Campus, Meiji University
1-1 Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301, Japan

Program and Abstracts(as of December 13, 2019)
Individual papers: 20 minutes for presentation and 10 minutes for discussion
Organized panels: the moderators will manage time allocation

共催：科研費基盤研究（Ｃ）「戦前東アジアにおける哲学：日本の植民地支配の観点から」(19K00117)

後援：明治大学国際連携本部

Direction to Surugadai Campus

1Surugadai Campus Map2

December 14, 2019 (Day 1)
Time

Content

08:00-08:30

Registration

Venue
Room 1163
16F
Liberty
Tower

Opening Ceremony………………………………………………………………………
Opening remarks

08:30-09:00

Speaker: SHINO Yoshinobu
Chair of the Organizing Committee ISEAP Conference 2019 andProfessor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University
Moderator: ISHIHARA Yuko
Management Committee Member of ISEAP and Assistant Professor,
Ritsumeikan University
Photo-taking

Room 1163
16F
LibertyTower

Keynote Speech I………………………………………………………………………

09:00-10:10

Speaker: LIN Chen-Kuo
Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi
University“Emptiness and Karmic Secularity”
Moderator: KAKIUCHI Keiko
Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University

10:10-10:25

Coffee break

Room 1162

3

Time

Content

Venue

Session 1A
Moderator: Daniel CANARIS, Sun Yat-sen University
Different Understandings of Sentence within Yogācāra Buddhism

10:25-11:55

CHOI Seongho, University of Munich
Hakanashi, Mujo and beyond: On Karaki Junzo’s Theory ofImpermanence
CHEUNG Ching-yuen, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Is Sino-Japanese Comparative political philosophy possible?
-- a case study on the idea of Revolution (革命)Room 1163
16F
Liberty
Tower

WANG Xiaolin, City University of Hong Kong
11:55-13:15

Lunch

Time

Content

Venue

Session 1B: Organized Panel

10:25-11:55

Moral
Psychology
andConfucianism

Moderator: Rika DUNLAP, University of Guam
The Confucian Philosophy of The As-if World:
The Moral Narrative of Ancestors, Spirits, and Tianin the Analects
Rika DUNLAP, University of Guam
Gratitude Without Debts
George TSAI, University of Hawaii, Mānoa
Shameless Bullies and Shameless Heroes:a Discussion of Shame’s Communal Moral Value

Room 1073
7F
Liberty
Tower

Jing HU, Concordia University
11:55-13:15

Lunch

4

Time

Content

Venue

Session 1C

10:25-11:25

Moderator: Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA, Linfield College
The Fullness of Nature: Overcoming Subjectivism in Watsuji’s
Theory of Fūdo
Room 1075
7F
David JOHNSON, Boston College
Liberty
内田周平と世界初の『中国哲学史』
Tower
曹峰（CAO Feng）, 中国人民大学哲学院

11:25-13:15

Lunch

5

Time

Content

Venue

Session 2A
Moderator: Yi CHEN, Bond University
Movements without thinking in the moment:
the implications of skilled performance in the Zhuangzi
13:15-14:45

Foong-Ee PONG, Soochow University
Nishida Kitarō as a classical Confucian moral philosopher:
Reconfiguring “the actualization of personality”
LAM Wing-keung, Dokkyo University《論語》仁論的年代歸屬

Room 1163
16F
LibertyTower

李貴生 (LEE Kwai Sang), The Education University of Hong Kong

14:45-15:00

Coffee BreakRoom 1162

Time

Content

Venue

Session 2B: Organized Panel
Moderator: Myeong-seok KIM, Yonsei University
Reason and Moral Motivation in Mozi

13:15-14:45

Reason,Emotion, andMoral
Agency in
Ancient
China

Myeong-seok KIM, Yonsei University
Self-Deception in Mengzi 5A2:
On the Permissible Case of Incontinence and the“Happy Case of Action Failure”
Joonho LEE, University of Utah
How Can Li (禮) Transform an Agent into a ‘Truly’
Moral Person in Xunzi?:
Inducing Respect (敬) by Performing Li in the Flesh

Room 1073
7F
LibertyTower

Jihyun HWANG, Yonsei University
14:45-15:00

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

6

Time

Content

Venue

Session 2C
Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University
The Kyoto School and the Problem of Philosophical Modernism

13:15-14:45

Hans Peter LIEDERBACH,
Kwansei Gakuin University
Reconsidering the “Human” from the Perspective of Confucianism:
Interpretive Resemblance between Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun, and Roger T.
Ames

Room 1075
7F
LibertyTower

TATEBE Ryohei, University of Tokyo
The Role of the Supernatural in Japanese Confucianism
NG Wai Ming, Chinese University of Hong Kong
14:45-15:00

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

7

Time

Content

Venue

Session 3A
Moderator: Yōsuke TAKEHANA, Otani University
Shun’s 舜 Ascension to the Throne:
Various Interpretations

15:00-16:30

Youngsun BACK, Sungkyunkwan University
Mozi’s Pantheism and Berkeley Theism:
Dissolving (Or Not) the Tension between
Consequentialism and Divine Command Theory

Room 1163
16F
Liberty
Tower

Michael James HEMMINGSEN,
University of Guam
Absolute nothingness and self-identity
Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN, Kyoto University
16:30-16:45

Coffee BreakRoom 1162

Time

Content

Venue

Session 3B: Organized Panel
Moderator: Rafal K STEPIEN, Heidelberg University
Nāgārjuna and the Twelve Gates Treatise (十二門論):
Towards a Chinese Madhyamaka Philosophy

15:00-16:30

Ontology,
Epistemology,
Language:
East Asian
Madhyamaka
Perspectives

Rafal K STEPIEN, Heidelberg University
Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language:
A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective
Chien-hsing HO, Academia Sinica
Being a Mādhyamika Means More Than Just
Arguing with Opponents:
Purbuchok and Mikyüo Dorje on Experience andEpistemic Instruments

Room 1073
7F
Liberty
Tower

John C. POWERS, Deakin University
16:30-16:45

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

8

Time

Content

Venue

Session 3C
Moderator: Sharon SMALL, East China Normal University
Mediating the Self, Experiencing the Dream in the Zhuangzi andInception
15:00-16:30

Chloe Yuchen YAN, Harvard University
A Study on the Images of Guan Yu (關羽) and Gan Ji (于吉) inehon tsūzoku sangokushi (絵本通俗三国志)

Room 1075
7F
Liberty
Tower

William Wai Kim LEE, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Flowing Body, Ubiquitous Mind: Toward an Aesthetics of Qi
MITSUMATSU Yukio, Meiji University
16:30-16:45

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

9

Time

Content

Venue

Session 4B: Organized Panel
Moderator: Jeffrey RIEGEL, University of Sydney andUniversity of California, Berkeley
Xunzi on Shadows

16:45-18:15

New
Perspectives
on Xunzi

Kuan-yun HUANG, City University of Hong Kong
The Regulatory Relation between qin qin 親親 and li
禮 in Xunzi’s Thought
Doil KIM, Sungkyunkwan University
Xunzi and the Classics

Room 1073
7F
LibertyTower

Lee-moi PHAM, Academia Sinica
Huaxing 化性 in the Xunzi:
The Problem of Backsliding
Winnie SUNG, Nanyang Technological University
18:30-20:30

Reception Party

Café
Pensée1F
AcademyCommonTime

Content

Venue

Session 4C

16:45-17:45

Moderator: Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa
Knowing (zhī, 知) as ‘Connecting’ (jiē, 接):Discussions of Perceptual Knowledge in Early Chinese Philosophy
Room 1075
7F
Dennis SCHILLING, Renmin University of China
Liberty
The Mystery about the Beginning and Astonishment of Existence:
Tower
comparing Kuki Shuzo and several Western Thoughts
OKINAGA Takashi, Teikyo University

18:30-20:30

Reception Party

Café
Pensée1F
AcademyCommonDecember 15, 2019 (Day 2)
TimeContent

Venue
10

08:30-09:00

Registration

Room 1083
8F
LibertyTower

Keynote Speech II…………………………………………………………………

09:00-10:10

Speaker: Edward SLINGERLAND
Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of British
Columbia“The Future of East Asian Philosophy: Engaging with Other
Disciplines and the Digital Humanities”

Room 1083
8F
Liberty
Tower

Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu
Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University
10:10-10:25

Coffee break

Room 1081

11

Time

Content

Venue

Session 5A
Moderator: Foong-Ee PONG, Soochow University
The Supreme Self-Regarding Virtue:
Mengzi’s Flood-like Qi and Hume’s Greatness of Mind"
10:25-11:55

Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa
Nishida’s and Mou Zongsan’s view of the Logical Genesis
ASAKURA Tomomi, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies
Chinese philosophy in France:
From its beginnings to recent debates

Room 1073
7F
LibertyTower

ZHANG Yijing, Sun Yat-sen University
11:55-13:20

Lunch

Time

Content

Venue

Session 5B
Moderator: Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN, Kyoto University
Nishida on "time": remarks from Wittgenstein

10:25-11:55

Florencia Andrea DI ROCCO VALDECANTOS, Keio University
The Self as Another Person:
Some readings and questions in the genre of “personal account”(zizhuan 自傳) in the Chinese Tradition
Stéphane Feuillas（飛颺）, University Paris-Diderot
Decentering the State and Envisioning Democratic Socialism:
Zhang Dongsun’s Philosophy of Socialism in 1920’s China

Room 1074
7F
Liberty
Tower

Soonyi LEE, Mercy College
11:55-13:20

Lunch

12

Time

Content

Venue

Session 5C: Organized Panel

10:25-11:55

Oneness,
Lingering,andConstancy:
Three
Approaches
to Daoist
Cultivation

Moderator: Thomas MICHAEL, Beijing Normal University
Cultivating the One in Fanwu liuxing andHuangdi Sijing
Sharon SMALL, East China Normal University
The Lingering Dao in the Excavated Versions of
the Laozi

Room 1083
8F
Liberty
Tower

Thomas MICHAEL, Beijing Normal University
Constancy as Balance in a Dynamic Universe
Livia KOHN, Boston University

11:55-13:20

Lunch

Time

Content

Venue

Session 5D: Organized Panel

10:25-11:55

Proposing
New
Perspectiveson“Intercorpor
eality” from
East-Asian
Philosophical Viewpoint

Moderator KONO Tetsuya, Rikkyo University
The Concept of Ma and Maai in Zeami and
Munenori Yagyu
KONO Tetsuya, Rikkyo University
The Embodiment of the “Mind” in Neo-Confucianism

ITO Takayuki,
International Research Center for Japanese Studies
Intercorporeality and Aida:
An alternative view of social understanding

Room 1085
8F
LibertyTower

TANAKA Shogo, Tokai University
Individuality and Sociality of the Subject
in Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji
INUTSUKA Yū, University of Tokyo
11:55-13:20

Lunch

13

Time

Content

Venue

Keynote Speech III…………………………………………………………………

13:20-14:30

Speaker: GODA Masato
Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University“Toward an East Asian ‘Grammatology’”

Room 1083
8F
Liberty
Tower

Moderator CHAN Kang
Professor, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
14:30-14:45

Coffee break

Room 1081

Time

Content

Venue

Session 6A

14:45-16:15

Taiwanese
Philoshophy
in theJapanseeColonial
PeriodModerator: SHINO Yoshinobu, Meiji University
曾景來「善惡根源論」的佛教倫理學義蘊嚴瑋泓, 東海大學哲學系
Lin Maosheng’s Philosophy of Education and its
Background

SHINO Yoshinobu, Meiji University論曾天從「真理自體的純粹形相」

Room 1073
7F
LibertyTower

黃文宏，國立清華大學哲學研究所

16:15-16:30

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

14

Time

Content

Venue

Session 6B

14:45-15:45

Moderator: Michael James HEMMINGSEN, University of Guam
A Different Kind of Authenticity:
The Kyoto School’s View of the Self and the Importance of Selftransformation
Room 1074
7F
Lehel BALOGH, Hokkaido University
LibertyTower
Watsuji’s Practical Philosophy as a Virtue Ethics
Yōsuke TAKEHANA, Ōtani University

16:15-16:30

Coffee BreakRoom 1071

Time

Content

Venue

Session 6C
Moderator: Ellie Hua WANG, National Chengchi University
Ritual and Confucian Shame
14:45-16:15

Ellie Hua WANG, National Chengchi University
Moral Extension and Human Vocation in Fichte and Confucianism
Plato TSE, National Chengchi University
再探韓非道論

Room 1083
8F
Liberty
Tower

CHAN Kang, National Chengchi University
16:15-16:30

Coffee BreakRoom 1081

15

Time

Content

Venue

Session 6D: Organized Panel

14:45-16:15

16:15-16:30

JapaneseThought(Miki,
Watsuji, andMaruyama)as
Encounteredin thePhilippines:
On
Translation,
Nation, andCritiqueModerator: KAZASHI Nobuo, Dalian University of Technology
Miki Kiyoshi in the Philippines:
Toward a Radical Transformation of “Concrete
Philosophy”
KAZASHI Nobuo, Dalian University of Technology
Watsuji’s Ethics from Filipino Eyes:
Two Tensions in the Good Life
Anton Luis SEVILLA, Kyushu University
Maruyama Masao in the Philippine Context:
Moving Past World War II

Room 1085
8F
Liberty
Tower

Karen Connie ABALOS-Orendain,
University of the Philippines
Respondent:
ODAGIRI Takushi, Kanazawa University

Coffee BreakRoom 1081

16

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Content

Venue

Session 7A
Moderator: Winnie SUNG, Nanyang Technological University
中国古代における「仁」概念の展開

16:30-18:30

佐藤將之, 台灣大学哲学系
Family Rituals in Contemporary Korea and PhilosophicalImplications

WANG Hwa Yeong, Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies andEast Asian Philosophy
Scaling the Wonder of Satoyama

Room 1073
7F
LibertyTower

Yi CHEN, Bond University
Time

Content

Venue

Session 7B: Organized Panel
Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University
The Monk, the Swordsman and the Freediver–A
Comparative Analysis of Skilled Performance

16:30-18:30

Skilled
Performanceand East
Asian
Wisdom
Traditions

Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA, Linfield College‘Becoming the thing’: Nishida Kitarō on acting-intuition

Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University
Mindfulness and Flow: A phenomenological study
Erol COPELJ, Monash University

Room 1074
7F
Liberty
Tower

Skilled Interactions and Natural Movements in Japanese Puppetry

Haruka OKUI, Doshisha University“Doing excellent” without knowing what to do:
A Japanese Zen Buddhist critique of intellectualism
Katsunori MIYAHARA, University of Wollongong

17

Time

Content

Venue

Session 7C: Organized Panel

16:30-18:30

In theinterstices of"religion"and"philosophy":
The
introduction
andreception ofWesterncategories
and thoughts
in imperial
and modern
China

Moderator: Giulia FALATO, University of Oxford
Ethics as a strategy for cultural accommodation in
Ruggieri’s Tianzhu shilu 天主實錄 (True Record of
the Lord of Heaven)
Daniel CANARIS, Sun Yat-sen University
Integrating European moral philosophy to Chinese
traditional practices: the cases of Li Jiugong
李九功’s Lixiu yijian 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror forencouraging cultivation) and Han Lin 韓霖’s Duoshu
鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell)
Giulia FALATO, University of Oxford
Protestant Invention of Chinese Religion(s) in the
Nineteenth Century

Room 1083
8F
LibertyTower

Wei Leong TAY, University of Oxford
Immanuel Kant’s influence on modern Chinese
philosophy
Timon GATTA, Sapienza University of RomeTime

Content

Venue

Session 7D
Moderator: Soonyi LEE, Mercy College
Beyond Reciprocity:
The Golden Rule in Christianity and Mohism
16:30-18:30

Joseph Emmanuel STA. MARIA, Ateneo De Manila University
Kyokutei Bakin and Romance of the Three Kingdoms
DING Yiruo, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Zen kōan Analysis: Past, Present, and Future

Room 1085
8F
Liberty
Tower

Eiji SUHARA, Arizona State University

18

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Content

Venue

Closing Ceremony
ISEAP ahead:
SHINO Yoshinobu
Editor-in-Chief, The Journal of East Asian Philosophy and Professor,
School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University
18:35-18:50

Closing remarks:
GODA Masato
Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University

Room 1083
8F
Liberty
Tower

Moderator:
ISHIHARA Yuko
Management Committee Member of ISEAP and Assistant Professor,
Ristumeikan University

19Keynote speeches
December 14, 2019 (Day 1, 0900-1010, Room 1163, 16/F)
Moderator: KAKIUCHI Keiko (Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University)
Emptiness and Karmic Secularity
LIN Chen-Kuo
Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
Abstract
Inspired by Charles Taylor’s and Jürgen Habermas’ recent reflections on the issue of secularity,
this talk attempts to bring the Buddhist thinking into a dialogue and take an alternative pathother than the transcendentalist philosophy of subjectivity. While the latter has been wellelaborated in modern Neo-Confucianism and the Kyoto School, which can be characterized as
taking an up-bound path to disclose the sacred realm, this talk rather propose a down-boundpath to return to the secular. The up-bound path is guided by the metaphysical principle oftranscendence qua immanence, which often brings the secular under thesupervision/suppression of the transcendent and therefore fails to fairly recognize the pluralityof the secular. By contrast, the down-bound path is taken to draw more attention to the secular
as the open-ended life-world. With this idea in mind, this talk will examine the Buddhist notionof secularity and argue that a reverse form of classification of teachings (Ch. panjiao, Jp.
kyōhan), which is different from the teleological dialectics as seen in the traditional methods ofpanjiao/kyōhan, will be more applicable for coping with the pressing situations in our age
without sacrificing the insight of emptiness.

20December 15, 2019 (Day 2, 0900-1010, Room 1083, 16/F)
Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu (Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University)
The Future of East Asian Philosophy:
Engaging with Other Disciplines and the Digital Humanities
Edward SLINGERLAND
Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia
Abstract
It is commonly claimed that mind-body dualism is entirely foreign to China—or “the East”
more generally. This talk will explore how engaging with the cognitive sciences and digital
humanities undermines claims such as this, and more broadly can help us to do our work as
scholars of comparative philosophy. Embracing an embodied view of human cognition gets us
beyond strong social constructivism and its accompanying cultural essentialism. In addition,
new tools from the science and digital humanities can, in combination with traditionalarchaeological and textual evidence, allow us to more accurately and rigorously assess claims
about the philosophical and religious historical record. Specifically, I will focus on novel
large-scale textual analysis techniques, online databases for sharing scholarly knowledge, andwork in contemporary evolutionary anthropology and cognitive science relevant to the mindbody issue. I will conclude by considering how early Chinese views of mind-body relations
do, in fact, differ from some modern Western conceptions, and how taking a more reasonable
view of cultural differences can allow us to genuinely learn from other cultures.

December 15, 2019 (Day 2, 1320-1430, Room 1083, 16/F)
Moderator: CHAN Kang (Professor, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi
University)
Toward an Archipelagic Rhythmo-Grammatology of ‘‘East-Asia’’
GODA Masato
Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University
Abstract
Having decided to establish the International Society of East Asian Philosophy (ISEAP), a
problem that we have to tackle sooner or later is the discourse, “East Asia Cooperative
Community” （東亜協同体）and ‘‘Asian nationalism’’ addressed by Miki Kiyoshi (18971945) for instance, and Takeuchi Yoshimi respectively in the 1930s. These problematic
notions are without doubt related to the War that ironically framed with the term, Pacific, as
well as the identification of we ourselves or others as Japanese. Without knowing how “EastAsia” has been constructed, it is absolutely difficult to set up an academic consortium like
ISEAP. In doing so, I would like to further develop my thought on ‘‘archipelago’’, ‘‘rhythm’’and ‘‘gramma’’ by looking into the genealogy of “East Asia”. On top of that, I would also liketo explore the possibility of having a new perspective toward “East Asia” in line with theworks of Edouard Glissant (1928-2011) [archipelagic thinking], Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)[grammatology, rhythmology] and Kyuyo Ishikawa (1945-) [Kanji and Asia].

21

Individual Papers and Organized Panels
Dec. 14, 2019 (Day 1)
Section 1A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Daniel CANARIS, Sun Yat-sen University

Paper I
Different Understandings of Sentence within Yogācāra Buddhism
CHOI Seongho, University of Munich
Abstract
Keng (2018) published an article “How do we understand the meaning of a sentence Under the
Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of theSeventh Century” in the Journal of Indian Philosophy. Investigating the commentaries of theChinese Buddhist text Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論), he explained how each Chinese Yogācāra
commentator had understood the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence.
I will explain that these various interpretations of the Chinese commentators were based on
Xuanzang’s understanding of the Sanskrit word pada. This Sanskrit word means basically “aninflected word”, that is, a word with a nominal declension or a verbal conjugation. However, insome Sanskrit Buddhist texts such as the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and so on, pada is defined as
sentence (vākya). I will suggest a possible explanation where this definition came from. Then I
will show that this word is difficult to translate into other languages but was translated inpossible ways in each region. For example, in Tibet this word was translated as tshig whichmeans basically “a word”, but in China Xuanzang translated it as jù (句) which means basically“a phrase or sentence”. Finally, it will be shown that these different translations led different
philosophical interpretations about the nature of sentence. I hope that my presentation will show
how the difference of languages can lead different philosophical discussion in each region under
the name of Buddhism.
Research Interests
Yogācāra Buddhism and philosophy of language

22

Paper II
Hakanashi, Mujo and beyond: On Karaki Junzo’s Theory of Impermanence
CHEUNG Ching-yuen
Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Karaki Junzo 唐木順三 (1904-1980) was a former professor at Meiji University. In his work
Mujo 無常 (1964), Karaki discusses different notions of impermanence. In classical Japanese
literature, such as Mayfly Diary 蜻蛉日記, hakanashi is the word to express the feeling of
uncertainty. Later, this feeling is associated with Buddhist doctrine of mujo, which suggests
all conditional things are impermanent. Karaki did not satisfy with this textbook definition ofimpermanence, and tried to examine a deeper meaning of mujo in Japanese poems written by
Shinkei 心敬 (1406-1475), Sogi 宗祇 (1421-1502) and Basho 芭蕉 (1644-1694). Karaki
further develops a metaphysis of impermanence through his interpretation on Japanese
Buddhist philosophy, especially on Dogen 道元 (1200-1253). In this paper, I will try to
discuss Karaki’s theory of impermanence and its contemporary significance.
Research Interest
Japanese philosophy
Paper IIIIs Sino-Japanese Comparative political philosophy possible?
-- a case study on the idea of Revolution (革命)WANG Xiaolin
Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong
Abstract
One of the most unique points of Japanese Tennoism is the rejection of the idea of
Revolution, Kakumei 革命, in contrast with China in particular. The Tenno family in Japan
has long been the center of the Japanese political system; So far, studies have explored thereasons why Japan did not accept the idea of Revolution. However, the oldest Japanese
historical documents of Kojiki and Nihonshoki also deserve scholarly attention in this regard:
they not only provide more solid sources to support the hypotheses hitherto advanced by thesestudies, but can also suggest further possibilities regarding the background of the rejection of
Revolution. While analyzing the influence of Chinese Wefts Texts on the two books andrelated documents, this paper will demonstrate a new perspective on understanding thehistorical background of this significant political as well as philosophical phenomenon.

23Section 1B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Rika DUNLAP
Organized Panel:
Moral Psychology and Confucianism
Panel Abstract
Moral psychology is an emerging area of ethics, in which human action and thought are
discussed and analyzed through an interdisciplinary engagement with the related fields of
psychology and cognitive sciences. Many contemporary scholars of Confucianism welcome
this trend, for their canonical texts, including the Analects, Mengzi, and Xunzi are not only
compatible with but also helpful in understanding the empirical findings on moral cognition.
This panel focuses on these various implications of Confucian moral psychology with the aim
to contribute to the research on the ethical implications of our psychological make-up.
The first presentation by Rika Dunlap examines the ethical implications of Michael Puett’s
metaethical theory of the Confucian as-if world. Puett offers a revision of Confucian rituals
and develops a metaethical theory that resembles Blackburn’s projectivist theory ofnormativity. Dunlap focuses on the ethical implications of this revision and asks if thisrevision can be Confucian in spirit. The second presentation by George Tsai asks why early
Confucian texts lack an elaborate theory on the debt of gratitude, given that the relationships
are the foundation of moral practices in Confucianism. By highlighting this peculiar absenceof debts of gratitude, Tsai offers an explanation for it. The third presentation by Jing Hu
problematizes the idea of shame, which is characterized as a mark of a virtuous character inthe Mengzi. Insofar as shame is often considered harmful, Hu focuses on the productive (andunproductive) ways in which shame can be used to reflect on the collective moral boundaries.
Paper IThe Confucian Philosophy of The As-if World:
The Moral Narrative of Ancestors, Spirits, and Tian in the Analects
Rika DUNLAP
University of Guam
Abstract
In this presentation, I examine Michael Puett’s theory of the as-if world by situating it incontemporary metaethical theories. Through an analysis of Blackburn’s projectivism and
McDowell’s response to non-cognitivism, I argue that there are two different accounts of theas-if interpretations of the Analects 3.12: One is the projectivist account of the as-if world, inwhich one engages in a moral narrative of ancestors as if moral claims were truth-apt (butthey are not), and the other is the agnostic account of the as-if world, in which one engages ina moral narrative as if these metaphysical claims of ancestors could be true without knowing
how. I argue that Confucius in the Analects engages in the latter, and Puett in To Become a
God agrees with my assessment that Confucius has the latter conception of the as-if world thatspirits could exit. However, in his recent work on the philosophy of as-if, Puett seems to offera projectivist interpretation by arguing that sensibilities are the source of normativity.
Through an analysis of Blackburn’s projectivism and McDowell’s response to noncognitivism, I argue that Puett’s metaethical theory, if it is a version of projectivism, faces
two main problems: the junzi attitude problem (and the phenomenological issue therein) and24

the absolute conception problem, both of which, I assert, may be resolved with a cognitivist
approach to the sensibility theory of metaethics.
Research Interests
Ethics, applied ethics, Japanese philosophy, and Confucianism
Paper II
Gratitude Without Debts
George TSAI
University of Hawaii, Mānoa
Abstract
I explore the role and significance of gratitude in Classical Chinese ethical thought. In
particular, I examine the implications of the fact that, although gratitude has an important
place in the philosophical thought and writings of the Early Confucian ethical tradition (e.g.,in the discussions of Confucius and Mencius of how one should relate to one’s parents), thenotion of debt of gratitude (or a duty or obligation of gratitude) is virtually absent in these
discussions. This absence presents an interesting contrast with conceptions of gratitude in theWestern ethical tradition. In the history of Western philosophy, we find versions of the notionof duty of gratitude in Seneca and Kant. More recently, contemporary analytic moral
philosophers have also developed the idea.
Given, then, that (1) the Confucians place significant ethical importance on the notion andpractice of gratitude, and (2) the Confucians think we have duties to certain others (e.g., to ourparents), it’s puzzling why (3) the Confucians did not think we have duties of gratitude toanyone (say, to our parents). In my paper, I offer an explanation.
Research Interests
Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Psychology, and Chinese Philosophy
Paper III
Shameless Bullies and Shameless Heroes:a Discussion of Shame’s Communal Moral Value
Jing HU
Concordia University
Abstract
This article discusses shame’s function in Mencian philosophy and modern society in general.
Shame is known as a destructive emotion because it targets vulnerable objects (e.g.
marginalized groups of people, minorities, members of LGBTQ community, disabledcommunity and victims of sexual harassment). In Confucian philosophy, shame and shame
related vocabularies such as xiu (羞), chi (恥), and wu (惡) are considered essential for
morality. In Mencian philosophy, the heart of xiu wu (羞惡之心) is one of the four hearts thatground human inclinations towards moral growth. It is a curious phenomenon that shame isconsidered both instrumental and foundational to morality in Mencian philosophy, given theabove-mentioned dilemma. I explore shame’s function and discusses the seemingly25conflicting perspectives on shame in this paper. Through considering shame’s function on
both the individual who experiences shame and other members of the community, including
those who witnesses, hears about, anticipates, situations that could bring about shame, I
analyze shame’s function in making members of the community reflect on their collective
moral boundaries. In certain cases, shame is an economical and essential tool to makeindividuals conform to certain standards. Shame can also be devastating—some argues that it
corrupts the person’s sense of agency through self-doubting and denying, and through theparalyzing social pressure. I argue that we should be aware of this type of shame and seek
methods to rescue individuals in situations alike.
Research Interests
Moral psychology, moral emotions, Confucianism, and Mencius (Mengzi)

26

Section 1C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA, Linfield College
Paper IThe Fullness of Nature: Overcoming Subjectivism in Watsuji’s Theory of Fūdo
David JOHNSON
Department of Philosophy, Boston College
Abstract
In this talk I focus on an important problem in Watsuji’s theory of fūdo. Self and natureform a unitary whole in fūdo, but they are so closely identified with one another in self
understanding and disclosure that it is difficult to maintain them together in this unity without
reducing one side to the other. In particular, too forceful an emphasis on the way in which
cultural modes of disclosure always mediate what appears as nature threatens to reduce ourexperience of nature to our cultural forms of making sense of and displaying it.
The fact that it is we who disclose nature seems to entail a certain relativism andsubjectivism about the content of this experience. I argue that these problems can be largely
avoided by drawing on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty to show the ways in which self
and nature are ontologically continuous with, and belong to, one another. Here, my subjectivity
both “gives” me the natural world, and is always already something given in and continuouswith it. Because we are part of and belong to the very nature we encounter and disclose,
experiencing self and experienced nature must be seen as two aspects of the same phenomenon.
In this regard it becomes possible to understand our culturally mediated experience andexpression of nature as the self disclosure of nature, rather than as a process of subjective
construal or projection.
Research Interests
Comparative philosophy, hermeneutics and phenomenology, and the Kyoto School
Paper II
内田周平と世界初の『中国哲学史』
曹峰（CAO Feng）
中国人民大学哲学院
論文概要
今まで、史上始めての『中国哲学史』の作者である內田周平への評価があまり高くなかった。なぜなら、この十九世紀末に書かれた書物はそれほど「哲學」的ではないためである。だが、改めて內田氏の学問及び当時「哲學」の代表である井上哲
次郎への批判を検討してみると、今日內田氏を再評価する必要があると思われる。
まず、內田氏の宋代理学研究に真知があり、また、井上哲次郎への批判に合理性がある。したがって內田氏の漢学立場を堅守することに対して、簡単に保守的な行為と認定するのはよくない。內田氏の生涯を通して、私たちが十九世紀末期から二十世紀初期まで日本の中国哲学研究の特別な発展経過を見ることができる。
研究分野

27

中国古代思想史、中国出土資料、日本の漢学28Section 2A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1315-1445)
Moderator: Yi CHEN, Bond University
Paper I
Movements without thinking in the moment:
the implications of skilled performance in the Zhuangzi
Foong-Ee PONG
Department of Philosophy, Soochow University
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explore the implications of skilled performance in the Zhuangzi.
What can we learn from the effortless and highly effective movements performed by the craft
masters? How can we attain a particular body like the craft masters? I argue that the body ofcraft masters operates as a “plural self,” as opposed to the “monadic self,” that manifest what
I called embodied dominance of human actions. Embodied dominance enables a person to act
through mutual cooperation with others not in the social world alone but also in the whole
embodied system in the world. It is the opposite of heart-mind dominance (namely chengxin
成心 in the Zhuangzi.) Through disregard one’s heart-mind dominance, one resorts to thebody which has its root in the interactive embodied system. In other words, when operating on
the basis of a plural self, one is able to exploit environmental resources thereby chance ofachievement is increased. The stories of craft master imply the ideal way of living that is toget ourselves involved in order to create order through mutual cooperation: the order of life isflowing within our relationships with others awaits to be rhythmised.
Research Interest
DaoismPaper II
Nishida Kitarō as a classical Confucian moral philosopher:
Reconfiguring “the actualization of personality”
LAM Wing-keung
Faculty of International Liberal Arts, Dokkyo University
kevin@dokkyo.ac.jp
Abstract
This paper attempts to propose that Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870-1945) is a classicalConfucian moral philosopher, with a focus on the notion, “the actualization of personality 人
格実現説”. Nishida employed a number of Confucian ideas like sincerity 誠, the union ofknowledge, feeling and volition 知情意の統一, to criticize a number of “Western” moral
theories, including, but not limited to, utilitarianism 快楽説 and authority theory 権力説.
Moreover, this paper is not intended to demonstrate Nishida’s moral philosophy as a
Confucian-Western interchange, but rather to argue that Nishida is indeed a classicalConfucian moral philosopher, who shed new lights on classical Confucian moral discourse. In
the following lines, our discussions include, first, why and how Nishida is connected withclassical Confucian moral philosophy? Second, in what way does Nishida reconfigure and29contribute to classical Confucian moral philosophy? Third, what lessons Nishida can offer toclassical Confucian moral philosophy or moral philosophy itself?
Research Interests
Japanese philosophy, Chinese philosophy and transcultural philosophy
Paper III《論語》仁論的年代歸屬
李貴生 (LEE Kwai Sang)
香港教育大學文學及文化學系(Department of Literature and Cultural Studies, The Education University of Hong Kong)
Abstract
今本《論語》的來歷和定型問題一直引起熱烈的討論，催生出各式各樣的「層累說」(accretion theory)。隨著近年中國早期文本研究的深化，學界普遍意識到漢人在古書形
成過程中所扮演的重要角色，個別學者甚至因而聲稱《論語》是漢代的產物，建議把它置入漢代的語境中。把《論語》視為西漢時期的典籍，其代價是否定了思想史上公認的先秦兩漢儒學系譜。針對這種意見，本文擬以《論語》「仁」論為軸心，考察此一觀念與西漢學術的差異，試圖通過仁論的異質性，逆向地反證它應屬前漢時代的產
物，為《論語》年代歸屬的討論及上古儒學史的書寫提供可行的解決方案。
Research Interests
中國學術研究範式、《論語》研究、傳統學術文化(Paradigm Shift of Chinese Scholarship, Studies of the Analects, Traditional Chinese Culture)30Section 2B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1315-1445)
Moderator: Myeong-seok KIM, Yonsei University
Organized Panel:
Reason, Emotion and Moral Agency in Ancient China
Panel Abstract
In this panel, we deal with a set of important philosophical issues in ancient Chinese moral
philosophy and moral psychology. The presenters talk about Mozi, Mengzi, and Xunzi
respectively, and each discusses one of the following topics: (1) the relationship between reason
or reasoning and moral motivation in Mozi, (2) the problem of self-deception and happy caseof akrasia in Mengzi, and (3) the question of how to cultivate truly moral agents in Xunzi. Each
presenter tries to provide a thorough and critical review of the important previous scholarshipon their topics and suggest alternative solutions to or alternative ways of thinking about theseissues.
Paper I
Reason and Moral Motivation in Mozi
Myeong-seok KIM
Department of Philosophy, Yonsei University
Abstract
In this presentation, I critically review Chris Fraser’s claim that the ancient Chinese thinkers
had a very different conception of logic or argumentation and agency from that in the West.
Specifically, he argues that the ancient Chinese thinkers formulated their conception of logic
and agency mainly around the concept of bian (辯, discrimination), and this involves further
claims such as that (1) the ancient Chinese thinkers had no concept of sentence or proposition,(2) they did not engage in logical argumentation in its proper sense, and (3) reason or rationality
was not highly valued in ancient China for normative evaluation of actions because they viewed
action primarily as a skillful activity of applying models or rules to their everyday situations
based on the proper performance of bian rather than as a result of a practical argument ordeliberation. However, I show that most of these claims are largely mistaken or overstated, andtextually ill-supported. I alternatively argue that (1) the early Chinese thinkers were quite
competent in articulating their ideas in clear forms of propositions and sentences, (2) Mozi’s
reasoning process consists of premises and a conclusion arranged in such a way that the truthof the premises is transferred to the conclusion in a legitimate logical sense, and that (3) Mozi
provides various forms of arguments that are partly intended to give his audience opportunities
to evaluate competing options available to them rationally and choose for themselves the most
reasonable or correct type of action in particular situations. And I also argue that moral
judgment in Mozi has an “internal” or conceptual connection with moral action.
Research Interests
Ancient Chinese philosophy, ethics, moral psychology, theories of emotion31

Paper II
Self-Deception in Mengzi 5A2:
On the Permissible Case of Incontinence and the “Happy Case of Action Failure”
Joonho LEE
University of Utah
Abstract
This essay aims to clarify the problems of incontinent moral agents, specifically Shun 舜 who
offered hospitality to his brother Xiang 象 while knowing Xiang’s murderous intention towardhimself in Mengzi 5A2. Regarding Shun, Mengzi 孟子 states that “a nobleman can be deceived
by what fits with rightness (junzi ke qi yi qifang 君子可欺以其方).” Previous scholars, such as
Jeong-Keun Shin, seem to interpret that Shùn was never deceived, in that he is a perfect moral
agent. However, interpretations of this kind cannot provide a consistent understanding of thepassage as they ignore the notion of the “deceived nobleman” in Mengzi’s statement. To
account for both the story of Shun and Mengzi’s statement, we have to acknowledge that Shunwas deceived while knowing about Xiang’s intention. This poses two problems. First, Shun’s
state of “being deceived while knowing the relevant facts” seems paradoxical. Second, thenotion that a perfect moral agent—i.e. Shun—can be deceived is problematic. Regarding theformer, I propose that Shun’s “being deceived while knowing” can be understood as a selfdeceiving state caused by his incontinent love for his brother. As for the latter, I argue that
Mengzi regards Shun’s case as permissible since his incontinence—the major cause of his selfdeception—befits his morally crucial beliefs, and that this makes him a perfect moral agent.
This story seems to reflect Mengzi’s sui generis way of describing perfect moral agents—
namely, introducing cases where perfect moral agents act incontinently or deceive
themselves—to show how their moral inclinations or desires work.
Research interests
Ancient Chinese philosophy, problem of akrasia, metaethics, virtue ethics
Paper III
How Can Li (禮) Transform an Agent into a ‘Truly’ Moral Person in Xunzi?:
Inducing Respect (敬) by Performing Li in the Flesh
Jihyun HWANG
Department of Philosophy, Yonsei University
Abstract
The aim of this study is to delineate the function of li in Xunzi. It is widely accepted that li
plays a crucial role in Xunzi. Specifically, I intend to suggest a new interpretation of Xunzi’sview on how li can transform an agent into a ‘truly’ moral person who attains proper inner states.
David Wong has made a good point that li in Xunzi can transform an agent by working on her
natural feelings such as grief and remembrance. He argues that Xunzi’s point is that li is highly
effective in shaping and channeling natural feelings that have no original moral contents, while
Mengzi holds that such natural feelings are directed toward the moral. I accept Wong’s ideathat li’s mechanism of moral transformation is deeply related to emotion. However, I disagreewith his contention that Mengzi and Xunzi have different opinions about natural feelings such32

as grief, considering that Mengzi and Xunzi show no discrepancy concerning grief andmourning rituals. The possibility that I want to explore in this study is that the key to moraltransformation by li is to develop respect (敬). I will argue that respect is best regarded as akind of artificial emotion in Xunzi in that it is hard to be attained without additional measures,
namely, performing li in the flesh. Furthermore, I will show that my interpretation can help tounderstand the Xunzi as a more consistent and plausible text.
Research Interests
Ancient Chinese philosophy, moral psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics

33

Section 2C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1315-1445)
Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University
Paper IThe Kyoto School and the Problem of Philosophical Modernism
Hans Peter LIEDERBACH
School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract
An influential strand in current research on Japanese philosophy rests on the assumption that
Western philosophy has reached an impasse, accompanied by a sense of exhaustion, which it
can overcome only by a radical transformation, that is by opening up to insights generated by
the tradition of Japanese thought, especially by the Kyoto school commencing with Nishida
Kitarô. While I deeply sympathize with the purpose behind this assumption, that is the projectof fostering cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, I disagree with its theoreticalpresuppositions, namely Heidegger’s and Nishitani’s critique of philosophical modernism. To
corroborate my disagreement, I provide a critical examination of Heidegger’s concept of“History of Being” and its appropriation by Nishitani and his disciples, before I offer analternative view on the possible significance of Kyoto school philosophy for the project ofcross-cultural dialogue in the context of philosophical modernism. Therefore, I argue, the very
concept of modernism has to be transformed. For this purpose, I suggest that we take into
account the notion of “multiple modernities,” which has come to the fore in the wake of the
new millennium. Although this notion was developed by social scientists, it has significant
bearings on the concept of philosophical modernism, which, in turn, will make it necessary
for us to alter our view on how Kyoto school philosophers tried to make sense of the modern
project.
Research Interests
Kyoto School philosophy, continental philosophy, philosophical modernism
Paper II
Reconsidering the “Human” from the Perspective of Confucianism: Interpretive
Resemblance between Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun, and Roger T. AmesTATEBE Ryohei
Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo
Abstract
How do we think about the “human”? The purpose of this paper is to discuss and reconsider
the meaning of “human” from the perspective of Chinise philosophy, especially from
Confucianism. For the first step, I focused on the view of Roger, T Ames who has madesignificant contributions to the study of Chinese and comparative philosophy. In his opinion,
when we think the “human”, it’s wrong to make the question in ancient greece style like “whatis a human ‘being’?”. He claimed that it’s more properly to make the question in Confucianism
style like “in what way does a person ‘become’ consummately human?”. It means that hedenyed to understand the “human” in essentialist way.
After analysing the view of Roger, T Ames, in this paper, I summoned famous Qing scholars
Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jiao Xun (1763-1820) as interlocutors. Both scholars criticized the34

Neo-Confucianism, and they were highly evaluated as Mencius interpreters. For them, theessentialist image of “human” which were understood through the terms such as “理 li” and“性 xing” in Neo-Confucianism is an object of critisism, and developed the claim that all“human” is worthwhile to changing, in the so-called “性 善 xingshan” argument. Here I
recognized the interperetive resemblanse between Roger, T Ames, Dai Zhen and Jiao Xun.
Therefore, this paper reconsiders the “human” through considering theree scholars’commonalities and their differences.
Research Interests
Chinese philosophy and Confucianism in Qing dynasty
Paper IIIThe Role of the Supernatural in Japanese Confucianism
NG Wai Ming
Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
According to the Lun Yu (Analects), “the topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies,
force, disorder and gods.” Many people believe that Confucianism is a humanistic or thisworldly philosophy that cares less about the supernatural. This is indeed a misconception.
The harmony between heaven and human is the ultimate principle in Confucianism andhuman ethics can never be separated from the spirits. The supernatural is an important force
behind the establishment of human relationships. Confucian scholars in China and Japan had
a big appetite for supernatural issues. They wrote about them extensively to expound
Confucian ideas. This study examines the role of the supernatural in the making ofConfucianism in Japan from textual and comparative perspectives.
Research Interests
Tokugawa intellectual history and Japan-China cultural relations

35

Section 3A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1500-1630)
Moderator: Yosuke TAKEHANA, Otani University
Paper I
Shun’s 舜 Ascension to the Throne: Various Interpretations
Youngsun BACK
College of Confucian Studies and Eastern Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University
Abstract
This paper examines the story of Shun’s 舜 ascension to the throne. This story has drawn
considerable attention throughout Chinese history because of its significance with regard topolitical succession. However, in this paper, I shed lights on a different dimension of thestory: its relevance to the issue of contingency. I investigate four texts, two excavated and two
transmitted: “Failure and Success Depend on Times” (Qiongda yi shi 窮達以時), “The Wayof Yao and Shun” (Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道), the Mencius, and the Xunzi, examining how
notions such as Heaven (tian 天), timing (shi 時), and fate (ming 命) are employed in thesetexts. I uses these texts to showcase different ways of thinking about areas over which they
believe humans lack control, and examine why they offer different interpretations of the same
event of Shun’s ascension and the kinds of moral and political lessons they try to draw fromthis. The analysis and comparison of these texts will provide us a direction for research on theissue of contingency.
Paper II
Mozi’s Pantheism and Berkeley Theism: Dissolving (Or Not) the Tension between
Consequentialism and Divine Command Theory
Michael James HEMMINGSENDivision of Humanities, University of Guam
Abstract
Mozi and George Berkeley are philosophers that are not often put into contrast. However,there are certain similarities between Mozi and Berkeley’s metaphysical views that give riseto an apparent tension between consequentialism and divine command theory in both of theirphilosophical systems. Specifically, this tension is a result of the absence of an appearancereality distinction in their systems, and a lack of interest in establishing any kind of “essence”
of morality, with the result that both Mozi and Berkeley believe that we can take moral
guidance (though only guidance) from the natural world. Since their concern is therefore withnature as a measuring stick for morality, the issue of whether morality is ultimately groundedin divine will or in benefit becomes a secondary consideration. Hence, they do not clearly
identify whether their moral philosophies should be fundamentally taken as divine commandtheories or as a kind of consequentialism, and this gives rise to the tension between these two
positions in their philosophical systems. In this paper, I argue that though both Mozi andBerkeley appear to have this tension – and that they appear to have this tension for similarreasons – in fact Mozi’s pantheistic understanding of nature provides Mohists with resources
for dissolving the tension that are not available to Berkeley’s theism. Hence, the tension
between divine command theory and utilitarianism is merely apparent in Mozi, but a genuine
problem for Berkeley.

36

Research Interests
Social and political philosophy and ethics, with a particular focus on deliberative democracy,
critical theory and comparative philosophy.
Paper III
Absolute nothingness and self-identity
Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN
Philosophy Department, Kyoto University
Abstract
It is uncontentious that Nishida Kitarô's thought developed into a mature and self-contained
philosophy upon the publication of Basho (1926), where he developed the concept of"absolute nothingness" (絶対無). There is, however, very little consensus regarding the
logical and metaphysical details of "absolute nothingness." As it stands, we find even lessagreement about how the concept relates to Nishida's later philosophy.
The aim of this paper is twofold. In the first part, I will clarify Nishida's metaphysicalassumptions regarding the nature of true reality and thence reconstruct the necessary logicalsteps involved in his conception of "absolute nothingness" as the indeterminate ground of all
being. In the second part, I will argue that the radicality of Nishida's metaphysics lies in his
rejection of the law of identity, which posits self-identity as a criterion of existence. That is, I
will claim that Nishida had to negate the self-identity of absolute nothingness in order toexplain how the indeterminate ground can determine the being of all entities.
Research Interests
Meiji-period philosophy, Kyôto School, Nishida Kitarô, British Idealism, Pragmatism,
Metaphysics

37Section 3B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1500-1630)
Moderator: Rafal K STEPIEN, Heidelberg University
Organized Panel:
Ontology, Epistemology, Language: East Asian Madhyamaka Perspectives
Panel Abstract
This panel seeks to advance the study of East Asian Buddhist philosophy, and particularly thatof the Chinese Madhyamaka/Sanlun (三論) school. Deliberately wide-ranging in scope both
topically and temporally, the panel addresses several important developments of Buddhist
ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of language in China. As a whole, it seeks to augment
the slew of recent research in Buddhist philosophy through study of specifically East Asiandevelopments, be these couched within originally Indic texts, Chinese innovations, or Tibetan
commentarial disputes.
The panel begins with a study of the metaphysical positions espoused in the Twelve Gates
Treatise (Dvādaśamukhaśāstra/十二門論) traditionally attributed to the Madhyamaka founderNāgārjuna (龍樹) and extant only in the Classical Chinese of Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什). This
paper provides a critical exposition of the ideas and arguments deployed in a work of major
importance for the history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. The second paper develops on thisaccount by studying how the premier Chinese Sanlun exponents Sengzhao (僧肇) and Jizang( 吉 藏 ) link metaphysics to philosophy of language by embedding their systematic,
Madhyamaka-based conception of the provisionality of language within an ontologicalconception of indeterminacy termed ontic indeterminacy. The final paper then relates defensesof Gelukpa Madhyamaka anti-foundationalist metaphysics by Purbuchok Ngawang Jampa andthe 8th Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé to epistemological concerns, in terms of the use of both epistemic
instruments (pramāṇa) and meditative experience in grounding claims to knowledge.
Paper I
Nāgārjuna and the Twelve Gates Treatise (十二門論):
Towards a Chinese Madhyamaka Philosophy
Rafal K STEPIEN
Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies
Heidelberg University
Abstract
The Twelve Gates Treatise (Dvādaśamukhaśāstra/十二門論) is traditionally attributed to
Nāgārjuna (龍樹 c. 150-250), founder of the Madhyamaka school basic to all Mahāyāna
Buddhist philosophy. Together with the Middle Treatise (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā/中論) alsoof Nāgārjuna and the Hundred Verse Treatise (Śatakaśastra/百論) of Āryadeva (提婆 3rdcentury), it is one of the three core texts of the Sanlun (i.e. Three Treatise: 三論) school, theChinese development of Indian Madhyamaka, and consequently exerted a pivotal yet understudied influence on the entire subsequent history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. The text
examines concepts fundamental to Buddhist philosophy such as causation, conditionality,
existence, identity, impermanence, and origination – all as seen through the lens of universal

38emptiness. Although no longer extant in the original Sanskrit, the work remains available in theClassical Chinese translation of Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什 344-413).
This paper has two aims. Firstly, it is concerned to expound the metaphysical positions espoused
within the text and assess the coherence and cogency of certain arguments presented in supportof them therein. Secondly, it aims to situate the Twelve Gates Treatise within the broader
currents of Madhyamaka philosophy by critically evaluating its attribution to Nāgārjuna basedon the philosophical relationship between this treatise and other texts undisputedly authored byhim. The paper thus provides both a critical exposition of a major work of Chinese Buddhist
philosophy and a preliminary analysis of its place in Indo-Chinese Buddhist intellectual history.
Paper II
Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language:
A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective
Chien-hsing HO
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy
Academia Sinica, Taiwan
Abstract
Sengzhao (374?−414 CE) and Jizang (549−623 CE), two leading Chinese Madhyamaka
thinkers of Sanlun Buddhism, propound the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness but tend tounderstand the concept of emptiness to mean the absence of determinate nature and form. Using
Chinese Madhyamaka thought as a basis, I have reconstructed an ontological conception ofindeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which involves the thesis that all things areindeterminate with respect to the ways they are.
Significantly, OI makes sense only given a particular understanding and use of language.
Basically, for the Chinese Mādhyamikas, language is provisional in the sense that the use of an
expression to refer to a given thing does not predicate of that thing any determinate feature insuch a way as to make it conclusively determinable.
In this paper, I discuss Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s views on the provisionality of language topresent a systematic, Madhyamaka-based conception of language. For this purpose, I also
examine their use of nonimplicative negation in contrast to implicative negation and seek toanalyze Jizang’s use of the catuṣkoṭi (positive and negative tetralemmas) in relation to classicallogic.

39

Paper III
Being a Mādhyamika Means More Than Just Arguing with Opponents:
Purbuchok and Mikyüo Dorje on Experience and Epistemic Instruments
John C. POWERS
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation
Deakin University, Australia
Abstract
My presentation will focus on the responses of Purbuchok Ngawang Jampa (Phur bu lcog Ngag
dbang byams pa, 1682–1762) and the 8th Karmapa, Mikyö Dorjé (Mi bskyod rdo rje, 1507–1554), to Daktsang's (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) presentation of
Madhyamaka. These are two of the most significant philosophical responses to Daktsang's
arguments. Both emphasize the centrality of meditative experience for proper application of
Madhyamaka methodology, but they have radically divergent perspectives.
Purbuchok develops a system of Madhyamaka that can incorporate the use of epistemic
instruments (tshad ma; Skt. pramāṇa) without succumbing to the errors of foundationalism thatDaktsang sees in the Gelukpa approach. Purbuchok presents a nuanced (but still problematic)
interpretation that provides a coherentist reading of Tsongkhapa: it is possible to take an“anthropological” approach to epistemic instruments and the judgements they warrant, simply
describing how valid deployment of pramāṇas leads to successful activity and reproducible
results. While this may rescue Gelukpa Madhyamaka from some of the most significant
implications of Daktsang’s rebuttal, it also leads to the problem of relativism encountered bycontemporary coherentist epistemologies. Mikyö Dorje presents a radical interpretation of
Candrakīrti, according to which a Mādhyamika, qua Mādhyamika, takes no position
whatsoever and only refutes opponents with reductio arguments. My presentation will discuss
the philosophical implications of their philosophical moves and the extent to which they aresuccessful.

40Section 3C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1500-1630)
Moderator: Sharon SMALL, East China Normal University
Paper IMediating the Self, Experiencing the Dream in the Zhuangzi and Inception
Chloe Yuchen YAN
Regional Studies East Asia Program, Harvard -Yenching Fellow, Harvard University
Abstract
This article explores the experiential conceptions of the self in the 4th century BCE Chinese
text of Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream and a 2010 science fiction film Inception by Christopher
Nolan. Central to both texts is the metaphysical understanding of the self within the multilayered dream-reality space. Yet often ignored is the very media form of such conceptual
structure, its own precondition. By engaging with media philosophies as a new theoreticalgrounding and a concrete methodology for this study of comparative thought, this article
situates the metaphysical understanding of dream and reality in the human sensory andconceptual experience, beyond the philosophical content.
From Zhuangzi’s metaphorical language in print media to Nolan’s audiovisualcinematograph, the philosophical concepts of abstract ideas such as “the self” and “the other”,
dream and reality, are embodied differently. More important is the simultaneous realizationand loss of “the self” from the spectator’s perspective through the sensory simulation of filmic
media. Taking this contemporary notion of spectatorship, we can thus return to Zhuangzi’s
metaphorical language as a medium that mediates and extends the reader’s cognitive
comprehension and reasoning into the abstract concepts within the text. The discussion of theself and the other is therefore no longer refined to the realm of the narrator of the dream, thedreamer, and the butterfly. But the dynamic between the text and human cognition entails
another experiential notion of the self in a reality mediated by the very medium of Zhuangzi’s
philosophy.
Research Interests
Media philosophy and theory, film aesthetics, and history of urban space, with a focus on East
Asian contexts
Paper II
A Study on the Images of Guan Yu (關羽) and Gan Ji (于吉) inehon tsūzoku sangokushi (絵本通俗三国志)
William Wai Kim LEE
Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
This study is to investigate the shintoization of The Romance of Three Kingdoms (三囯演義)by reviewing of images of two characters, Guan Yu and Gan Ji in ehon tsūzoku
sangokushi. (絵本通俗三国志) It is an illustration book published in 1840, that visualized thethree kingdoms story based on Tsuzoku Sangokushi (通俗三囯志), the first translation of The
Romance of Three Kingdoms in Edo period. Guan Yu is customarily portrayed as a general,
while Gan Ji is a taoist priest. Despite their different images in the three kingdoms’ story, they41

have been depicted with the image of Japanese-style ghost, known as Yurei (幽靈). In Ukiyoe(浮世絵) and Kusazōshi (草双紙), illustrated literature of Edo period, ghosts are often
characteristic by disheveled hair, white or pale blue robe, limp hands, nearly transparent, andlack of lower body. By contrasting the ghost images of Guan Yu and Gan Ji with those
illustrations found in Kusazohi, this study explains how the depiction of ghost images ofGuan Yi and Gan Ji transforms The Romance of Three Kingdoms into a localized revenge
story during Edo period.
Research Interests
The Shintoization of the romance of Three Kingdoms in Edo Period, illustrations invernacular literatures of Edo period, Yokai and Yurei in Ukiyo-e printings
Paper III
Flowing Body, Ubiquitous Mind: Toward an Aesthetics of Qi
MITSUMATSU Yukio
School of Information and Communication/Arts and Letters, Meiji University
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to explore the ontological foundation of qi (気) theory and its
potentialities toward aesthetics in broader sense, through comparative studies with recent
philosophical panpsychism, and with animist ontology newly reinvestigated in contemporary
anthropology.
In order to set about this inquiry, I will take up the corpus of philosopher/sinologist andcomposer ISHIDA Hidemi (1950-2017), whose historico-theoretical research had focused on
the realm around qi concept as East Asian medical thought.
Besides working as an academic, Ishida had written substantial œuvre of music, in which
we can discern mise-en-abîme relations between composition and “logical” operation whose
system probably being derived, along with the hypotheses formulated by science historian
YAMADA Keiji (1932- ), from the structure found in yunqi theory (運気論) and its
archetypal gua (卦) system in Yijing (『易経』); the music has been executed and annotated,for example, by his quasi-collaborating pianist/composer TAKAHASHI Yuji (1938- ).
While these trans-disciplinary practices have proceeded in an experimental manner, recent
ontological animism in anthropology seems to suggest the way to reinscribe the mode of qi as
breathing of the Earth that flows throughout human and more-than-human bodies, while
posthuman panpsychism would articulate the nature of this vital force as non-organic
becoming, or wuhua (物化) by using Zhuangzi’s term, i.e. self-other transformations with
their necessary distinction (fen, 分), like music where the zone of indiscernibility between
human and nonhuman sound will appear.
Research Interests
Philosophy (Comparative Philosophy, Ontology, Vitalism, Deconstruction), Art andLiterature (Aesthetics, Poetics, Contemporary Arts)

42

Section 4B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1645-1815)
Moderator: Jeffrey RIEGEL, University of Sydney and University of California, Berkeley
Organized Panel:
New Perspectives on Xunzi
Panel Abstract
As someone who lived close to the end of the Warring States period, Xunzi was one of theleading intellectual figures of the day, someone who was knowledgeable about history, theritual institutions, the classics, and all the major intellectual currents of his time. This panel
proposes a close re-examination of his intellectual thought from a variety of novel andrefreshing perspectives. In the papers by Kuan-yun HUANG (City University of Hong Kong)and Lee-moi PHAM (Academia Sinica), passages from Xunzi will be reread in the light of
newly unearthed manuscripts from the Warring States. In the papers by Doil KIM(Sungkyunkwan University) and Winnie SUNG (Nanyang Technological University), aspectsof Xunzi’s philosophy will be subject to fresh critical analysis. Such collective effort, it ishoped, will result in the much-needed reevaluation of Xunzi, his place in Early Chinese
thought, and his legacy. The panel will be chaired by Jeffrey Riegel (University of California,
Berkeley), translator of the Lüshi chunqiu and Mozi, and author of an extensive review on a
recent translation of the Xunzi.
Paper I
Xunzi on Shadows
Kuan-yun HUANGCity University of Hong Kong
Abstract
One of Xunzi’s most intriguing passages is a fable about a man haunted by his own shadow,
recorded in the chapter “Jie bi” 解蔽 (Dispelling blindness). Who is this man? Why does
Xunzi disapprove of him? What are the issues at stake? Reading Xunzi side by side with a
newly unearthed manuscript, the “Fan wu liu xing” 凡物流形 (All things flow into form) now
at the Shanghai Museum, I will show that Xunzi’s fable is a direct criticism against a view
prevalent during the Warring States: the mind has multiple constituents, and its unity isachieved only through the isolation of an innermost core that is free from external
distractions.
Paper IIThe Regulatory Relation between qin qin 親親 and li 禮 in Xunzi’s Thought
Doil KIM
Sungkyunkwan University
Abstract
This paper explores the issue of how qin qin 親親, namely particularistic affection, is to be
regulated in Xunzi’s thought in comparison with Mengzi’s 孟子 thought. As is well known,
Mengzi emphasizes the importance of moral extension (kuochong 擴充), namely the43

application of universal love, such as ce yin zhi xin 惻隱之心, to a broader range of people tothe extent that one can love and protect all within the four seas (sihai 四海). Simultaneously,
however, Mengzi advocates particularist affection for those who stand in special relationships,
such as one’s own family. Moreover, if universal love and particularist affection conflict witheach other, Mengzi seems to assign priority to the latter. However, unless one should
somehow regulate one’s particularist affection to a certain degree, one would be unable toextend universal love to many more people properly, far from loving all within the four seas.
Unfortunately, Mengzi does not treat this issue seriously.
On the other hand, Xunzi thinks that one’s particularist affection should be regulated basicallyby li 禮, the Confucian formal rules of conduct. Xunzi draws the distinction between humans
and other animals by pointing to a particular capacity for discrimination (bian 辨) thatpertains only to humans. For him, only humans can have a more developed capacity todiscriminate among more subtle distinctions, so that they can have more sophisticated modesof responsiveness, such as special love for one’s own father (fuzi zhi qin 父子之親). In
addition, Xunzi makes it clear that the capacity for discrimination should be regulated by li inthe sense that li functions as the standards for various kinds of distinction that cover all humanrelations. For this reason, from the viewpoint of Xunzi, it is reasonable to say thatparticularistic affection should basically be regulated by li. This paper explores what exactly
this regulatory relation between qin qin and li implies in Xunzi’s thought.
Paper IIIXunzi and the Classics
Lee-moi PHAM
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica
Abstract
The background for this paper is the assumptions, concerns, rhetorical strategies, evenconclusions shared by Warring States authors in their discussions about the classics. It begins
with a survey of several ancient accounts that attempt to situate the classics in a historicalnarrative, including the newly excavated text “Xing zi ming chu” 性自命出 (Human naturearises from mandate). By a careful analysis of passages from Xunzi, the study will show that
this erudite thinker from the late Warring States made an effort to synthesize the various
positions on the classics, offering what is in the end a comprehensive program for their study.
Paper IV
Huaxing 化性 in the Xunzi: The Problem of Backsliding
Winnie SUNG
Nanyang Technological University
Abstract
This paper examines what it means for one’s nature to be transformed (huaxing 化性) for
Xunzi. In the literature, there are plenty of discussions of Xunzi’s thought that our
problematic human nature (xing 性) can be transformed and also of the question how suchtransformation is possible. A question that is less often raised is whether it is possible for one
44

to backslide to her original problematic state even if one’s nature has been transformed. How
we answer this question turns on the nature of transformation that Xunzi has in mind. Is it
like a caterpillar transforming to a butterfly, or a piece of stone into jade, or a lump of clay
into a statue, or a derelict grassland into an orderly mown lawn? In the first section, I will
examine textual evidence and argue that backsliding is possible for Xunzi. That said, it isunclear in what way one might backslide. In the second and third sections, I consider threepossible ways in which one can backslide and the implications they each have over our
understanding of Xunzi. In the fourth section, I will argue for one reading that takes
transformation to be akin to derelict grassland transforming to mown lawn. This reading canmake better sense of Xunzi’s general view on cultivation and his claim that human nature has
problematic tendency.

45

Section 4C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1645-1745)
Moderator: Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa
Paper I
Knowing (zhī, 知) as ‘Connecting’ (jiē, 接):Discussions of Perceptual Knowledge in Early Chinese Philosophy
Dennis SCHILLING
Department of Chinese Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China
Abstract
This paper aims to discuss the conceptual pattern of ‘connecting’ (jiē, 接) used in the Mohist
Canon as well in the Xún zǐ to describe what ‘knowing’ (zhī, 知) is or how is it possible that
we do know. ‘Knowing as connecting’ appears in epistemological, psychological,
anthropological and ethical contexts. Bringing these different perspectives in a comprehensive
picture together, the paper relates this conceptual pattern to questions like “what is
knowing”—taking ‘connecting’ as a description for knowing—, “how do we know?”—taking‘connecting’ as the procedure of knowing—, and “how does knowing defines our life?” —taking ‘connecting’ as a biological modus given to human and animal life.
The paper starts with a brief explanation why jiē (接) should be understood as‘connecting’ rather than ‘receiving’, and how ‘connecting’ is considered to be related to sense
perception. As sensual faculties ‘connect’ with their sensual objects, the heart or the faculty ofknowing becomes ‘connected’ with the objects of the outer world. Subsequently, theepistemological and psychological descriptions of knowing as connecting will be discussed.
Since different kinds of knowing are distinguished according to their reliability, reliability
provides a means to distinguish specific features of knowing as connecting. Furthermore,since ‘knowing’ is related to life in general, and ‘knowing as connecting’ yields living beingsto act in a specific way looking for desirable goods to fulfill their drives, ‘knowing as
connecting’ refers to questions in moral epistemology and psychology.
Paper II
The Mystery about the Beginning and Astonishment of Existence:comparing Kuki Shuzo and several Western Thoughts
OKINAGA Takashi
Department of Japanese Culture, Faculty of Letters, Teikyo University
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the thoughts of Japanese and western philosophers on themetaphysical question about the beginning of the universe. The mystery of the beginning of
the universe is brought out when we reach a limit point which is situated at the initial event ofa causal series and whose cause we can no longer explain, after inspecting that series.
However, even when we notice a mystery that there is an event without an identifiable
cause, a certain linear form of causes is required for such a mystical event to be noticed. This
form is the very condition of that mystical event, although it is already a certain conceptualform. And there is no cause from where such a form itself has been appeared.

46

So, in the first section, we examine the “Separated Chance (離接的偶然)”, which Kuki
regarded as the chance of the creation of the universe. Then we investigate Kuki’s method of
dealing with the mystery brought about from such a linear, causal series.
Next, in the 2nd section, we focus on Whitehead’s “Principle of Limitation” as a thought
dealing with the origin of the causal series itself. Because, this very series makes the creation
mystical.
Then, in the 3rd section, we investigate Bergson’s “dureé pure” as an example of the origin
itself of such a series, and confirm the groundlessness of this “dureé”.
Research Interests
Pragmatism (especially William James), metaphysics, modern Japanese philosophy, scienceand religion

47

Dec. 15, 2019 (Day 2)
Section 5A (Room 1073, 7/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Foong-Ee PONG, Soochow University
Paper IThe Supreme Self-Regarding Virtue:
Mengzi’s Flood-like Qi and Hume’s Greatness of Mind"
Dobin CHOI
Department of Philosophy, The University of Iowa
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Mengzi’s and Hume’s identical moral foundation of sentimentmakes them envisage the supreme self-regarding virtues, developed from a proper moral
sentiment toward the self. Both philosophers believe that our concentration on sentiment
either develops or determines virtue. In general, sentiments are projected to intentional
objects, and virtues are considered as agents’ moral characters. Thus, the main objects ofagents’ virtue-related sentiment are the character traits of themselves and others. As moral
agents, we contemplate our ingrained characters, which would also arouse sentiments ofapproval or disapproval. Simply put, we feel shame and pride toward ourselves. If we eschew
what is shameful and encourage what is proud, our character traits would be developed to be
virtuous. For both Mengzi and Hume, this process of self-regulation is a method for
cultivating self-regarding virtues. Mengzi’s righteousness stems from the heart of shame anddisdain, while Hume’s passion of pride, when properly regulated by reflective thinking,advances to virtue. Hume sees that when the instances of “well-regulated pride” areaccumulated in the self, we can achieve the greatness of mind. This supreme virtue reminds usof Mencius’s pride in nourishing the flood-like qi, only nurtured through one’s continuous
accumulation of yi (集義). I argue that these self-regarding virtues comprise the distinctive
features of both philosophers’ sentiment-based accounts of virtue, ultimately founded upon
the natural constitution of the human mind.
Research Interests
Comparative Philosophy, Ethics, and Early Modern Philosophy
Paper II
Nishida’s and Mou Zongsan’s view of the Logical Genesis
ASAKURA Tomomi
Kobe City University of Foreign Studies
Abstract
This presentation analyzes the logical genesis or the generation of logic from an East Asian
perspective by comparing the theories of logical positing—in other words, the deduction of
categories—by Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan. It is well-known that these philosophersdeveloped their own views on logic by regarding volition as the ground for the act ofconsciousness and seeing the subjective-objective opposition as the product of our free will in48

a manner similar to the post-Kantians. Nishida investigates the way logical forms andconstitutive categories are produced from the self-determination of nothing as the limit ofreality and its concrete origin. Mou’s view, on the other hand, heavily draws on the analytic
tradition to reformulate the Kantian theory of the primacy of practical reason, which strikingly
differs from Nishida’s so-called irrationalism. I shall show why these different approaches tothe logical genesis nevertheless converge to the theory of intellectual intuition that leads to therevived interest in East Asian Buddhism.
Paper III
Chinese philosophy in France: From its beginnings to recent debates
ZHANG Yijing
Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University
Abstract
The theme of this paper has in part been inspired by recent developments in Francophone
Sinology. Since the publication of J.-F. Billeter’s Contre François Jullien (2006), French
speaking Sinologists seemed to have collectively rejected comparative philosophy which
treats China as the Other (altérité) of the West. It is debatable, however, whether scholars
trained in Western humanities can avoid comparatism or Eurocentric reference points in theirinterpretation of Chinese philosophy.
To explain this phenomenon, I trace the history and development of studies on
Chinese philosophy in France from its beginnings in the seventeenth century until the presentday, underlining the shift from comparatism to anti-comparatism and analyzing someinconsistencies between the methodological claims of Sinologists and their actual practices.
Firstly, when Jesuit missionaries translated Confucian texts into Latin and tried to establish
similarities between the Confucianism and Christianity, their translation resulted in theperception of China as an “other” among European philosophers. Secondly, while rejecting
comparatism and the view that there are no abstract concepts in Chinese thinking, somecontemporary French Sinologists emphasize the relationship between Chinese thinking andthe form of life (mode de vie). Nevertheless, the empirical dimension of the latter is precisely
one of the reasons for the statement on the absence of abstract thinking in China. Finally,some anti-comparatist Sinologists unwittingly use Western concepts and perspectives in theirtranslation or research without realizing that this use is a kind of comparatism.
Research Interests
Greek-Chinese comparative philosophy, translation and reception of Western/Chinese
philosophy in China/Europe, hermeneutics and translation studies

49Section 5B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN, Kyoto University
Paper I
Nishida on "time": remarks from Wittgenstein
Florencia Andrea DI ROCCO VALDECANTOS
Global Research Center for Logic and Sensibility
Faculty of Letters, Keio University
Abstract
This lecture inquiries Nishida's presentation of the nature of "time", in his rudimentary theory"Expressive activity” (表現作用, 1925), edited as an essay in From That Which Acts to That
Which Sees (働くものから見るものへ), at a "grammatical level". It inquiries if Nishida's
position is an example of what Wittgenstein calls "the myth of the specious present" (moretechnically, the "instantaneous solipsism"): the idea that only the experience of the present
moment is real ("Nur die Erfahrung des gegenwärtigen Augenblicks hat Realität",
Philosophische Bemerkungen, §54).
While in the first sections, Nishida seems to defend a realism of time, relying on the factthat "substantial nature constitutes a mechanistic unity, on the basis of each element's being
allotropic" (tr. W. Haver, 2012, even if the original text austerely claims that "物質的自然は
各 要 素 の が 同 質 的 と な る こ と に よ っ て 機 械 的 統 一 を 完 成 す る の で あ る "), henevertheless later argues a clear indissociability between "acting" (働く) and “time" (時間), ina standpoint which remains close, to some extent, to a pragmatic approach, as sketched by
Wittgenstein after Tractatus.
We would try to show how despite some similarities, Nishida adds an exigence to "time",
more technically, to "personal time" : its "successivity" claims its "unrepeatability", a feature
which seems not to rely on a language-game rule. To conclude, we will try to understand if
Nishida's "theological" remarks can lead us out from the myth of the present.
Research Interests
Philosophy of language and logic
Paper IIThe Self as Another Person:
Some readings and questions in the genre of “personal account” (zizhuan 自傳) in the
Chinese Tradition
Stéphane Feuillas 飛颺
Department of Asian Studies, University Paris-Diderot
East Asian Civilisations Research Centre - CRCAO
Abstract
A lot of studies have been devoted to the expression and constitution of the self in the Chinese
tradition, about his vanishing, his emerging position or his progressive self-assessment in theprocess of the cultivation of one’s person. But very rarely has a special tradition that begins in
the 4th century onwards until the very beginning of the 20th century been mobilized and a set oftexts been read in that respect, namely the so-called zizhuan 自傳 or “personal account” written50

by scholars expressing some major aspirations and commitment without resorting to the first
person but instead engaging the description and assertiveness of oneself in and through thegrammatical third person.
The aim of this paper is therefore to present and study some major texts of this textual
tradition including the famous Wuliu xiansheng zhuan 五柳先生傳 written by Tao Yuanming
陶淵明 (365-427), texts by Lu Guimeng 陸龜蒙 (?-881), by Liu Yuxi 劉禹錫 (772-842), by
Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) and other Song and Ming Dynasties scholars in order to ask
thess simple but puzzling questions: what does it make to the self to choose to express oneself
in the construction of a persona in the third person; to what extent the inner part of the self
should be in a way fictitious and fictional ? How are we to understand the split between the selfand his double? Centered around those issues, the paper will nevertheless carefully take into
account in this inquiry the very condition of speech of each time and dynasty.
Research Topics
In the continuity of our Ph.D thesis on the links between nature and morality in the thought of
Zhang Zai (1020-1078), I expanded the scope of my work to the modalities of "philosophical"reflection in the eleventh century. The studies focused on discourse strategies developed atthat time to state, in a context strongly codified, new theses, and more particularly on the links
between thought and literature at that time. It is within this framework that I directed seminars
on the expression of the ideal in commemorative texts (ji 記), the reading of the Classic of
Change under the Northern Song and the various forms of Song poetry. The ultimate goal isto reconfigure the expression of thought under the Northern Song, to redefine "writing" (wen)at this time and to show how the so-called literary texts constitute the place of anotherproblematization of philosophical that does not account for the more stereotypical writings(comments, briefs, short treatises). The case of Su Dongpo (1037-1101) was particularly
studied and has given rise to several publications. It allowed to put in light different problems:
the notion of image, the role of figures hexagrammatic approaches, the original approaches toself-cultivation, the nature of the debates theoretical. These different themes have since been
the subject of partial studies using of text as diverse as the comments by diagrams of the
Changes under the Song, the invention of divinatory book like Qianxu 潛虛 [The latent Void]of Sima Guang (1019-1086).
Paper III
Decentering the State and Envisioning Democratic Socialism: Zhang Dongsun’s
Philosophy of Socialism in 1920’s China
Soonyi LEE
Department of Humanities, Mercy College
Abstract
This paper explores the global circulation of pluralist philosophies of socialism after the GreatWar by examining how the Chinese philosopher and journalist Zhang Dongsun advocatedguild socialism in 1920s China. As he reflected on the global catastrophe of the Great War,
Zhang criticized the wartime alliance between capitalism and the state and engaged with the
postwar theory of socialist pluralism espoused by British thinkers such as G. D. H. Cole andHarold Laski. Based upon their faith in the autonomy of associations freely formed bycitizens, pluralists advocated the devolution of power and administrative capacity toautonomous functional bodies. By analyzing The Study of Socialism, a magazine supplement
to China Times, which Zhang founded in September 1921, my paper illuminates how Zhang
51

proposed guild socialism as a decentralized, democratic form of socialism. Just as British
thinkers presented their pluralist theory in opposition to Fabian collectivism, Zhang’s
advocacy of guild socialism was in reaction to the collectivist arguments of MarxistLeninism, whose influence was rapidly growing in China during this time. Departing fromconventional approaches to Chinese intellectual history, which focus on China’s reception of“advanced” Western ideas, my paper concentrates on the synchronicity of British and Chineseversions of guild socialism and argues that Chinese philosophy of guild socialism formed partof a worldwide postwar critique of state power and mounted a challenge to the Marxist theoryof the dictatorship of the proletariat.

52Section 5C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: Thomas MICHAEL, Beijing Normal University
Organized Panel:
Oneness, Lingering, and Constancy:
Three Approaches to Daoist Cultivation
Panel Abstract
Over the last two decades, the modern study of Daoism has begun to break new ground andgain a much wider academic recognition than at any time in the past. This is due to a varietyof reasons, including the growing number of ancient Chinese excavated texts that speak
directly to the formative stages of Daoism, the coming together with Daoism of thephilosophical trends and methodologies from Continental Philosophy, and a deepening
familiarity of the religiously based roles and functions of bodily practices. This panel,“Oneness, Lingering, and Constancy: Three Approaches to Daoist Cultivation,” presents anexperimental attempt to demonstrate the continuity of all three approaches (philological,
philosophical, and physiological) from the earliest origins of Daoism to its full display in theSong Dynasty. Unlike many other world religious or philosophical traditions, Daoism isprimarily distinguished by the priority it gives to cultivation, and the three papers of this panel
attempt to situate each of their individual topics and concerns (philological, philosophical, andphysiological) within the wider rubrics of what can be considered “Daoist cultivation.” This isdone in the effort to further develop the modern study of Daoism by exploring these three
separate but very much related regions of its practice and deployment.
Paper I
Cultivating the One in Fanwu liuxing and Huangdi Sijing
Sharon SMALL
School of Philosophy, East China Normal University
Abstract
Excavated materials from Mawangdui and the cache of manuscripts held in the ShanghaiMuseum show us that the notion of “one” or “oneness” held a significant position in early
Daoist theories of cosmic generation, political conduct, and perhaps most importantly—
bodily practices. Unlike its later developments, bodily practices in early Daoism were notproposed for seeking longevity or a better and healthier life, but rather for the purpose ofgaining true knowledge. True knowledge is none other than knowledge of Dao—something
we can attain by grasping its oneness. Thus, the term “one” in the Fanwu liuxing 凡物流形
becomes the core notion of the text which does not only instruct us to “examine oneness” (chayi 察一), “attain oneness” (deyi 得一), and “guard oneness” (shou yi 守一) but also tells usthat oneness is the beginning of the cosmos and the basis for all existence. The Huangdi Sijing黃帝四經 employs a similar terminology of “grasping the one” (zhi yi 執一) to provide an
epistemological basis for its political purposes. The ruler then can only rule if he perceives
oneness. Based on these two texts, this paper offers an exploration into the methods of bodily
cultivation that bring about knowledge of “oneness,” as well as the significance of knowing
the “one” and its necessity for proper political conduct.

53

Paper II
The Lingering Dao in the Excavated Versions of the Laozi
Thomas MICHAEL
School of Philosophy. Beijing Normal University
Abstract
When the Han Emperor Liu Heng 劉恒 assumed the throne in 179 BCE, the term heng 恒
became prohibited. In the case of the Laozi, this necessitated that a different character be
substituted for it, and thus did the text have its every use of heng 恒 changed to chang 常. It
took over two thousand years for it to be finally discovered that the term chang did not hold anatural place in every instance of its use in the Laozi. Even today, although heng and chang
are different characters, many scholars continue to assume that they are synonyms for eachother, and the 1973 discovery of the Mawangdui versions of the Laozi, followed by the 1993
discovery of the Guodian versions of the Laozi, have not produced adequate understandingsof what was at stake in this substitution. Noting the slew of other ancient Daoist excavatedtexts that also give the term heng a prominent role, this paper offers a deeper exploration of
the ancient uses of the two terms, and it attempts to uncover an earlier set of meanings
pertaining to the Laozi that cohere around the meaning of heng as “lingering” with particularrespect to characterizations of the Dao, and chang as “constant regularity” with particularrespect to the cultivated body.
Paper III
Constancy as Balance in a Dynamic Universe
Livia KOHN
Department of Religion, Boston University
Abstract
The idea of constancy implies steadiness, permanence, and stability. The Chinese universe
being one of never-ceasing, ongoing dynamic change, there is little room for it other than as acharacteristic of Dao before cosmic unfolding. Still, constancy is important and plays a majorrole in Daoist thought, only it is envisioned in terms of the balance, harmony, or homeostasis
of varying forces of change—notably yin and yang as well as the sun and the moon, key
factors that structure space and time. While it is the natural tendency of these forces togravitate toward constancy as balance, human beings have to make concerted efforts to match
this, leading to extensive sets of practices and organized systems of self-cultivation. The goal
is to attain a level of constancy co-equal with heaven and earth, which will afford ongoingtransformation and eternal life. Focusing on Song-dynasty documents on internal alchemy,
this presentation will outline the Daoist understanding of dynamic change and describe somecore practices. It will link these with psychological concepts of a set point of humanhappiness and the understanding in neuroscience that the brain to always balances any
activities or tendencies that go beyond its basic homeostasis.

54Section 5D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1025-1155)
Moderator: KONO Tetsuya, Rikkyo University
Organized Panel:
Proposing New Perspectives on “Intercorporeality” from East-Asian PhilosophicalViewpoint
Panel Abstract
The notion of embodiment is playing a growing role in various areas of contemporary
philosophy, as well as in other related fields such as cognitive science, robotics, and clinicalpsychology. In the past two decades, this new trend based on the notion of embodiment haveproposed innovative perspectives that could reform classical Western dualistic thinking on therelation between mind and body, such as “extended mind”(Clark, Chalmers, Wilson, and so on),“radical embodiment theory” (Chemero), “enactivism”(Noe, Thompson), and so on. These newideas clearly have a common, similar perspective on the mind-body relationship as that of EastAsian philosophy. Some of the researchers have been deeply influenced especially by Buddhist
thoughts. However, these new ideas in contemporary philosophy have been rarely applied tothe domain of interpersonal relationship, intersubjectivity, caring, and so on without some
exceptions (Gallagher, Miyahara, Kono, Fuchs). In this panel, we shall propose a newperspective of “intercorporeality,” or embodied interpersonal relationship from East-Asian
philosophical viewpoint. We never intend to merely introduce and interpret classical notions
and theories of Eastern thought, but to integrate Eastern thoughts with contemporary theories
in philosophy, psychology and other empirical research. The goal of this panel, accordingly, is
to contribute to the further elucidation of the concept of embodiment and the theoreticaldevelopment on intercorporeality, in innovating these concepts from East-Asian philosophicalperspectives.
Paper IThe Concept of Ma and Maai in Zeami and Munenori Yagyu
KONO Tetsuya
Department of Education, Rikkyo University
Abstract
In this presentation, I shall to try to clarify from the standpoint of contemporary phenomenology,
the essential features of the phenomenon of ma (間) and maai (間合い). I shall delineate theircultural and philosophical implications by interpreting and comparing the treatises of Noh by
Motokiyo Zeami and the book of swordsmanship by Munenori Yagyu. Munenori has been alegendry swordsman and one of the founders of the Yagyu Shinkage-ryu style of sword in theearly era Edo. Under the influence of Zeami, Munenori stressed the importance to seize the“musical” cadence between his action and that of the opponent. Both Zeami and Munenori
pointed out that there are three musical momenta relating to ma: one is duration or indivisible
movement, another is beat, and third is rhythm. Ma is the musical distance that prepares theadvent of the future. It is a phenomenon which cannot grasped by a dualistic conceptualizationof object and subject; it is a phenomenon of temporalization which brings a future event andmakes the present the past. Ma is an intersubjective occasion that provides us with an empty
and silent place in order to encounter the other. Finally, I shall conclude that ma is finallydefined as enduring power or indivisible movement of life whose essence resides in musicality;
indivisible movement of life articulates itself as rhythms. Maai is an encounter of a power oflife with that of the other.
55

Research interests
Philosophy and Ethics
Paper IIThe Embodiment of the “Mind” in Neo-Confucianism
ITO Takayuki
International Research Center for Japanese Studies
Abstract
In research on China’s pre-modern thought to date, we typically see Chu Hsi’s（朱熹；朱子）
thought understood as prioritizing “principle”, and the teachings of Wang Yang-ming（王守仁；陽明）as giving more weight to “mind”. From here the shift or development from Chu
Hsi’s teaching towards Wang Yang-ming is located within a historical process towards
modernity. Regardless of if they take a negative or affirmative stance, the understanding of
Wang Yang-ming’s teaching as being a kind of idealist philosophy of the “mind” has been quite
dominant. In other words, what is common here is lack of appreciation for a practical“embodiment” which both of these schools of thought equally took as a premise and concern.
In fact, what they saw as essential was the practice of “ritual”, which made possible thereciprocal mediation of the other, guaranteeing the objectivity of the training itself. Given thisis so, they could hardly neglect the “body” of each individual as that place where “ritual” iscarried out. Thus “mind” is not originally something which easily fits with the Cartesiandualism of modern Western philosophy with its “inner” and “outer”, “subjective” and“objective”, “mind” and “body”. Rather, it is much closer to concepts deployed in the theories
of embodiment of contemporary philosophy. We need to give consideration to the fact that
“ritual”, while subsuming desire, is originally that which governs the embodied self. That it isin fact a being-for-others, an intersubjective social mechanism.
Research Interests
Chinese Philosophy, History of Pre-modern Chinese thought, Cultural Interaction in East Asia
Paper III
Intercorporeality and Aida: An alternative view of social understanding
TANAKA Shogo
Center for Liberal Arts, Tokai University
Abstract
Intercorporeality is a potentially resonant relation between one’s own body and that of another.
It is important to note that in the background to this notion lies the so-called “problem of otherminds.” When Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) writes, “everything happens as if the other person’s
intention inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body” (p. 191), he refers to thecorporeally intertwined dimension between the self and the other, which fundamentallytransforms the problem of other mind. It is a common experience, for example, that we cannot
help yawning when we see someone else yawn. That is, perceiving the other’s action prompts
the same action in the self or its possibility, and conversely, the self’s action prompts the sameaction or its possibility in the other’s body. In this regard, intercorporeality is the primary route56

of social understanding, in which the other person never appears as Cartesian mind hidden
behind its body. In this presentation, I would like to further elaborate the theoretical
implications of intercorporeality by connecting it with Bin Kimura’s notion of aida (Kimura,2005). Although both notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual
aspects of social understanding, aida rather focuses on the autonomous process that emerges
through embodied interactions between self and other(s). When the intersubjective aida
maintains its autonomy, it operates in an auto-productive manner. Through ongoing embodied
interactions, the process itself implies the subsequent phase, and the interactants implicitly
know what is expected in the situation. This means that aida involves its own normativity,
through which the participants are able to develop detailed and nuanced social understanding
with each other.
Research interests
Phenomenology, mind-body theory, cognitive science
Paper IV
Individuality and Sociality of the Subject in Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji
INUTSUKA Yū
Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to compare Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji Tetsurō’s understanding of thesubject in relation to social interaction. Against the idea of atomic individual, both philosophers
point out two moments of the subject, individuality and sociality. Merleau-Ponty calls them“the generality and the individuality of the subject, subjectivity qualified and pure” (1945, p.
514). In his texts, we can find his rather negative evaluation towards our social nature. We
inevitably characterize each other and behave “as” a wife, a friend, a French, and so forth. This
characterization may be considered as “violence” that denies individuals’ freedom. In contrast,
Watsuji sees that the twofold characteristics of subjective human existence (shutaiteki ningensonzai), individuality and sociality, are the source of human ethics as they enable our trust
relationship. Based on a subjective “betweenness” (aidagara, human relationship), we caninteract even among strangers. The core of Watsuji’s ethics is his understanding of the natureof human action (kōi) which cannot be explained by mere physical movement nor unilateralintentionality but an expression of subjective betweenness by objective bodies. A comparisonof these two philosophers gives us a better understanding of our sociality and its positive andnegative aspects.
Research Interests
Modern Japanese philosophy, environmental philosophy and phenomenology

57Section 6A (Room 1083, 8/F, 1445-1615)
Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu, Meiji Universtiy
Organized Panel:Taiwanese Philosophy in the Japanese Colonial Period
In recent years, two remarkable results are published on Taiwanese philosophy in the Japanesecolonial period. One is Existential Engagement: Philosophy in Taiwan, the Japanese Era (存在交渉：日治時期的臺灣哲學, 2016), edited by Hung Tzu-Wei, and another is Enlightenment
and Rebellion: 100 years of Taiwanese Philosophy (啓蒙與反叛：臺灣哲學的百年浪潮, 2019)edited by Hung Tzu-Wei and Deng Duen-Min. This panel aims to explore further study along
this line of research. In particular, three panelists pick up three Taiwanese thinkers who lived
under the Japanese rule and had experience to have studied in Japan. This panel will show not
only their transcultural background, but also the depth and the diversity of Taiwanesephilosophy at that period.
Paper I
曾景來「善惡根源論」的佛教倫理學義蘊嚴瑋泓
東海大學哲學系
摘要
曾景來（1902-1977）乃臺灣於戰前時期第一位具有大學學歷的佛教知識份子。他 1920
開始留學日本，並於 1928 年以〈阿含の佛陀觀〉為題的畢業論文畢業於駒澤大學，是戰前臺灣佛教重要人物之一，也是此時期臺灣佛教哲學的領航者。本篇論文將分析曾景來「善惡根源論」的思想與論證，指出他的佛教倫理觀乃受到不同哲學思想的啟發，
其中包含了緣起論、佛性論、王陽明的心性論、康德的最高善以及忽滑谷快天的禪學思想。最後，本文將論述曾景來善惡觀對於佛教倫理學的探究有什麼樣的啟發性意義。

Paper II
Lin Maosheng’s Philosophy of Education and its background
SHINO Yoshinobu
School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University
Abstract
Lin Maosheng ( 林 茂 生 , 1887-1947), a Taiwanese philosopher, after having studied
Yangmingism at Tokyo imperial university, got Ph. D at Columbia University in 1929. The titleof his doctoral dissertation is “Public Education in Formosa under the Japanese Administration”.
His study on education is quite largely influenced by J. Dewey and seems to have little
connection with his former study on Yangmingism. However, education has been one of major
topics of Confucianism, and it is worth comparing his philosophy of education with traditional
Confucianism. This paper attempts to reread his doctoral thesis from the view point of
Confucianism, especially of Yangmingism.

58

Research Interests
Chinese philosophy and Japanese philosophy
Paper III論曾天從「真理自體的純粹形相」
黃文宏
國立清華大學哲學研究所
摘要
曾天從（1910-2007）是台灣日治時期主要的哲學家之一，然而其哲學仍然為我們今日
的哲學界所遺忘。在本論文中，我們將重心置於其主要的哲學著作（出版於 1937 年的《真理原理論》）。在這本著作中，曾天從開啓了一個真理論的領域，並且創造出一種關於真理原理的理論來作為其哲學體系的基礎。因而要了解並評價其對哲學的貢獻，
我們有必要了解其對真理原理的解明。在筆者看來，曾天從的整個哲學的事業皆集中
在這個論題的釐清上。然而由於純粹現實學的體系仍然是未完成的，這一點讓曾天從
哲學的洞見、以及許多哲學的概念仍然處於晦暗之中。在本文中，我們將集中在真理
自體的領域，致力釐清真理自體的純粹形相。筆者在本論文的目標在透過釐清其概念、強化其論證方式，以解明曾天從對哲學的洞見。

On Zeng, Tianzong's "The Pure Eidos of Truth-in-itself"
Abstract
Zeng Tianzong（1910-2007） is one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in Japanese ruled
period, whose philosophy is still forgotten in our philosophical circle. In this article I will put
my focus on his main philosophical work, "Theory of the Principle of Truth" (published in1937), in which he opens an alethiological area and cerates a theory of the principle of truth,
which serves as a basis for his own philosophical system. Therefore to understand and evaluate
his contribution to philosophy, it is important to know his explication of the principle of truth.
It is the author’s view that his entire philosophical career served to enlighten this thesis. But hisplan is still unfinished, which makes some of his creative thoughts and philosophical concepts
still in obscure. In this article I will focus on the area of "Truth-in-itself" and clarify its "PureEidos". This is the main area of turth which unifies the entire reality. My primary aim in thisarticle is to shed light on Zeng's insight, through explicating his concepts and reinforcing hisarguments.
Research Interests
Phenomenology

59Section 6B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1445-1545)
Moderator: Michael James HEMMINGSEN, University of Guam
Paper IA Different Kind of Authenticity:
The Kyoto School’s View of the Self and the Importance of Self-transformation
Lehel BALOGH
Department of Ethics, Hokkaido University
Abstract
Authenticity as an ethical ideal–as well as a general non-moral objective towards which themodern self is being directed–has been featuring increasingly prominently in western societies
during the past two centuries, despite the salient fact that no one really knows what authenticity
means. Standard characterizations of this highly elusive notion refer us habitually to thedivergent ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, albeit the contemporary
usage of the term seems to have more in common with the descriptions of self-actualization andself-realization emblematic of the existentialist-humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers andAbraham Maslow. Whereas the definition of authenticity is far from clear-cut and lucid, it is,nevertheless, evident that it supports the individual to become more affirmative of its own self.
Authenticity appears both as a theoretical principle and as a practical ideal that encourages the
expansion of the self, while, at the same time, emphasizes the autonomous and self-reliant
quality of those people who have “truly become” themselves. But is this the only viable accountthat can be conceived of authenticity? Isn’t there a differing interpretation out there, a different
kind of authenticity, which could challenge the established understanding of this concept? The
philosophies of Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime and Nishitani Keiji hold the key to this inquiry.
In my paper I propose to investigate how the Kyoto School philosophers’ reflections on the selfand self-transformation, emptiness and nothingness could offer a feasible–and possibly
preferable– alternative to the customary interpretation of authenticity as self-enlargement.
Research Interests
Asian philosophies (Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism); comparative philosophy and ethics;
comparative religions; environmental philosophy and ethics; existential philosophy; Japanesephilosophy (Nishida, Tanabe, Nishitani); phenomenology; philosophy of psychiatry andpsychotherapy; religious philosophy
Paper II
Watsuji’s Practical Philosophy as a Virtue Ethics
Yōsuke TAKEHANA
Ōtani University
Abstract
As is symbolized by the fact that Nishida named his maiden work An Inquiry into the Good
because he considered the puzzle of life as the ultimate question of philosophy, practicalphilosophies in modern Japan has a feature as virtue ethics. For it claims that not the action
itself but the actor of it, in other words, not how to act but how to live matters in moral
problems. Among many practical philosophies in modern Japan, the ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō(和辻哲郎, 1889-1960) has the highest affinity to virtue ethics. Watsuji evaluates the60

communal relationships or the roles (in his term, Aidagara 間柄) in the communities where
we live and considers each person as sharping its own personality through it, as MacIntyre
does. In this presentation, we attempt to interpret Watsuji’s moral philosophy as a virtue
ethics focusing on the similarity between Watsuji and MacIntyre, and point out that Watsuji’s
notion trust (信頼) is of crucial importance when trying to understand his practical philosophy
as a virtue ethics. The fusion of fact and norm in his ethics, which is often criticized as thefallacy of confusing the totally distinguished phases, should be regarded rather as its
prominence if we pay attention to the concept of trust from the perspective of virtue ethics. In
his opinion, the trust is what is required to be justified or fulfilled (in this sense, the trust is
nothing but a norm) and simultaneously what has formed our individuality through theexperiences of struggling to justify it (in this sense, it acquires the character of fact). To use
MacIntyre’s concept, we cannot narrate our own stories in the communities without the trust.
Research Interests
Modern Japanese philosophy, especially philosophy of Kyoto School, continental philosophy,
virtue Ethics, philosophy of death61Section 6C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1445-1615)
Moderator: Ellie Hua WANG, National Chengchi University
Paper I
Ritual and Confucian Shame
Ellie Hua WANG
Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
Abstract
Ritual practices and shame both play important roles in Confucianism and in the Chinese culture
in general. Early Confucians, starting from Confucius, already stress the relation between the
two. However, there has been a criticism that the emphasis on the role of ritual renders
Confucian shame an “external”, “outward-looking” attitude, and thus not satisfying the moral
ideal of autonomy and inferior to “inward-looking” attitudes such as guilt. In this paper, I
address this criticism by first attending to replies made by Roetz and Shun. I then point out mydissatisfaction with Roetz’s “autonomy interpretation” and Seok and Geaney’s “tactileinterpretation” of Shun’s view on Confucian shame, and develop my own interpretation, theAgent-Contact view, with attention to Confucian texts, including the Analects, the Mencius, theXunzi, and the Book of Rites. I argue that Confucian shame is a cultivated virtue throughlearning and ritual practices. It results from a feeling of lack with regard to agency throughcontact with otherness, which includes other people and the world as a whole. The fact that theearly Confucians think that we are (and should be) able to feel shame in this way tells us theirnotion of the self, and how it can (and should) relate to the world through cultivation.
Understood in this way, one opposition to Confucian shame is not pride, but a form of reverence(jin 敬).
Research Interests
Chinese philosophy, moral psychology, ethics and value theory
Paper II
Moral Extension and Human Vocation in Fichte and Confucianism
Plato TSE
Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
Abstract
Mencius’ notion of moral extension is key to his ethical view and moral psychology. It is themental process by which one recognizes the ethically relevant similarity shared by different
persons and on this basis treats them and reacts to them equally. Moral feeling and individual
effort are its subjective conditions; satisfaction of physical needs and freedom from the fear of
violence are its objective conditions. The practice of moral extension shall lead to the harmonyof social order and relationships as well as the cultivation of one’s human disposition.
In this paper, I argue that some transcendental reasoning is implicit in Confucianism
when individual cultivation is laid down as the basis for the well governance of a state. Moralextension, and along with it the cultivation of moral feeling, is the necessary condition for
individual cultivation. From a transcendental perspective, Fichte’s view on feeling and ideal as
the a priori fundamental basis of intuition could offer useful resources for systematicorganization in the Confucian moral psychology. Conversely, from a Confucian perspective,
62

one may find in Fichte’s Lectures on the Vocation of Scholar an important supplement to the
Confucian conception of human roles. It is part of the human disposition to strive to know, andfrom those who are enlightened we seek to learn. In this light, ‘scholar’ (der Gelehrte) takes ona more general sense and means more than just a profession – it is a non-familial human role in
the universal pursuit of cognitive extension.
Research Interests
German idealism, transcendental philosophy, philosophy of mind and metaphysics
Paper III再探韓非道論詹 康
政治大學哲學系
摘要
中國哲學史的研究對於韓非有個罕見的「歧視」，那就是很多學者以爲他沒有道論
可談，主要原因大概是一種相沿成習的偏見。
至於承認韓非有道論的學者，對其道論的詮釋非常分歧，大略有以下幾種解說：
一、君術；「道生法」。二、規律。三、生成說，與生成加規律說。四、自然總體加生成說。五、本體（形而上學而非宇宙論）。六、氣論。七、模糊、不詳的解說。
蔣重躍 2013 年《古代中國人關於事物本體的發現：「稽」字的哲學之旅》是近年關
於韓非道論的力作，此文將關鍵擺在「稽」字，是至爲正確的做法。可是蔣重躍的解釋不合於韓非的原文，因此不能令人滿意。
我們根據現代工具書《漢語大字典》與《故訓匯纂》可以查出「稽」字的所有詞
義，再審酌韓非關於「道之情」的說法，提出道應是無，而「稽」字採用合、同義，
可以讀通韓非關於道、物、理的相關原文。
韓非以無爲道，成爲其修養論與統御術的基礎，道與德、氣的關係也可因此而說明
得更清楚。

63

Section 6D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1445-1615)
Moderator: KAZASHI Nobuo, Dalian University of Technology
Organized Panel:
Japanese Thought (Miki, Watsuji, and Maruyama)
as Encountered in the Philippines: On Translation, Nation, and Critique
Panel Abstract
The Philippines is not usually included in the East Asia region, but it was part of the “Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” from 1940 till Japan’s defeat. For that reason, it would provide
a unique perspective on Japanese thought to reflect not only on Japanese involvements in thearea during the war but also on some burgeoning philosophical exchanges between Filipino
scholars and Japanese thought regarding the questions of translation, nation, and critique, inparticular.
In this regard, philosopher Miki Kiyoshi is of great significance because of his ten-monthstay in the Philippines as a correspondent staff of the Japanese Army in 1942; his encounter
with the local people and the reality of the war exerted such decisive influences on him that he
was forced to reconsider the basic orientation and ideas of his philosophy from the ground up.
Thus, first we look at the significance of Miki’s experience in the Philippines for his lastthinking and some possible effects it could have had on post-war Japanese thought if he had
survived without dying as a political prisoner in 1945. Then, two Filipino scholars will present
their reading of some central texts by Watsuji Tetsuro and Maruyama Masao together withstudents’ reactions they received when they taught about these thinkers in the Philippines. It is
hoped that this session will become an occasion to shed new light on the significance ofJapanese thought in the East Asian contexts from an angle not so much explored till today.
Discussion is to be initiated by some questions and comments by Odagiri Takushi, who has
been working on a variety of subjects related to Japanese thought.
Paper I
Miki Kiyoshi in the Philippines:
Toward a Radical Transformation of “Concrete Philosophy”
KAZASHI Nobuo
Department of Philosophy, Dalian University of Technology
Abstract
Miki Kiyoshi aimed to form a “concrete philosophy” that can engage adequately with theconcrete realities of the historical world; the key concepts he employed for that purpose were“dialectics of pathos and logos,” “logic of imagination,” “neo-humanism,” “social body,” etc.
Through his experiences in the Philippines, however, he came to fully realize that his thinking
in these terms was far from “concrete” particularly in the face of the harsh reality of the war;
most of the philosophical thinking going on in Japan then, including his own, turned out nothing
more than an abstract “idealism in the rear.”Since Miki had to die a tragic death in late September in 1945 while still held as a politicalprisoner, we cannot know what sort of “new logic” he could have created if he had lived on into
the post-war years. But some essays and talks he left after returning from the Philippines give
us some clues to it.
Thus, first I will delineate the impacts of Miki’s Filipino days on his thinking and the new
direction it was heading for. (Cf. HIRAKO Tomonaga, “Miki Kiyoshi and Japan’s Occupation64

of the Philippines” in Miki Kiyoshi as a Legacy, 2008; in Japanese) Then, I shall try to bring
into light some contemporary significance his philosophical trajectory can have in reference tothe discussion of technology, fiction, and emotion in Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow(2017) by Yuval Noah Harari.
Paper II
Watsuji’s Ethics from Filipino Eyes: Two Tensions in the Good Life
Anton Luis SEVILLA
Graduate School of Human-Environmental Sciences, Kyushu University
Abstract
Drawing from my experience of teaching Watsuji Tetsurô at the Ateneo de Manila University,
as well as growing literature on Philippine values (as in Manuel B. Dy, Jr., Values in Philippine
Culture and Education), I find that Watsuji’s view of human being and becoming can be deeply
relevant, not just as a way to understand exotic Japan, but as a way for people in the Philippines
to come to terms with their own ethical lives. I focus on the notion of tension (or “negation”)
in Watsuji’s ethics, and show how two tensions seem to manifest in the Philippines. The firsttension is between individuality and community, which can be traced philosophically to thetension between western, liberal ideas, and with Philippine ideas of “fellows, kapwa” andConfucian influences. The second tension is between the subjective/internal and theobjective/practical aspects of life, which can be partially traced to spiritual aspects of life vs.
the economic demands of a developing country. I discuss these tensions by drawing from bothphilosophical ideas, and snapshots of issues raised by students in class. I end with a brief
discussion of the educational possibilities of Watsuji in countries like the Philippines.
Paper III
Maruyama Masao in the Philippine Context: Moving Past World War II
Karen Connie ABALOS-Orendain
Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines
Abstract
Maruyama Masao can be appreciated by Filipino philosophy scholars in two conceptuallydifferent but politically related ways. First, as a critical assessor of the sentiments and thoughtsof the Japanese people in relation to WWII. Second, as an academic who articulated the sociopolitical challenges facing Asian societies in the wake of modernity.
The former looks to the past. Introducing Maruyama’s perspective on Japan’s politicalsystem and its policies, which he claims to have influenced Japanese thought and behavior, may
possibly shed light on the continued ponderings of Filipinos on the horrors brought about by
the Second World War. In particular, his idea of yokuatsu-ijo (抑圧移譲; transfer of oppression)
may prove illuminating.
The latter is situated in the present and the future. Like Japan, the Philippines struggles
politically. The internal conflicts besetting the structures and thoughts of its people are partly
due to a lack of objective framework. Not that the Philippines does not have any homegrown
matrices but, in the grander scheme of political modernity, Maruyama has concepts that canhelp contextualize the problems of a nation forced to become one under the watchful eye of the
West.
65

These two approaches towards Maruyama’s work shows his relevance in contemporary
political philosophy. Despite the fact that only some of his major works are available in English,
he still has the potential to be a philosophical and political bridge to other Asian nations.
ODAGIRI Takushi (Respondent)
Institute of Liberal Arts and Science, Kanazawa University
Research Interests of the panel’s members
Modern and contemporary Japanese philosophy, comparative philosophy, peace studies,
philosophy of education, educational anthropology, socio-political philosophy,
cosmopolitanism, applied Ethics on immigration and international Law.

66

Section 7A (Room 1073, 7/F, 1630-1830)
Moderator: Winnie SUNG, Nanyang Technological University
Paper I
中国古代における「仁」概念の展開佐藤將之
台灣大学哲学系
Abstract『論語』の徳目における核心概念であり、孔子が提唱したとされる「仁」は、儒教思想を理解する上で、長らくもっとも重要な概念と見なされてきた。しかし、そうした理解の前提にあったものは、『論語』の内容（少なくとも「仁」に関連した言説）が孔子の思想を代表しているという前提であり、近年、『郭店楚簡』など、多数の戦国楚簡の発掘によって、その用例の絶対年代が比較的信頼できる文献群が増加したことによって、「仁」概念が、当時の儒家思想において、必ずしも『論語』で取り上げられているほど核心的な位置にはない状況も分かってきている。本報告
は、そうした現状を踏まえ、戦国楚簡思想文献における「仁」字とそれをめぐる言説の用例を精査し、その理解と論語の「仁」の用例との比較考察を行い、戦国時代
初期から中期にいたる「仁」概念の展開の状況をより当時の実態に即して明らかにして生きたい。
＊論文は原則、中国語で作成し、口頭発表は、状況により英語、中国語、韓国語及び日本語に対応します。
Research Interests
中國思想史、儒家思想、荀子、東亞政治哲學等
Paper II
Family Rituals in Contemporary Korea and Philosophical Implications
WANG Hwa Yeong
Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy,
Sungkyunkwan University
Abstract
This paper examines the current revival of rituals in Korea, focusing on family rituals, and its
philosophical implications. Since its publication, Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals has impacted on
people’s lives in East Asian Confucian societies. The Family Rituals re-established agnaticprinciples and the principles have imprinted an androcentric twist in not only in social
practices but also on cosmological principles. Confucian family rituals prevailed gendered
cosmology in Chosŏn Korea. Contemporary Korean society pertains the gendered cosmology
of Confucian family rituals. The current research, however, lacks philosophical examinationof contemporary practice, the revival of traditional forms, and their underlying meanings.
Amongst the scarce sources, most research studies China. The paper explores the Confucianfamily rituals, remaining and revived, in the name of tradition, in contemporary Korea.

67

Through this paper, I will attempt to survey the contemporary practices of family rituals in
Korea and reveal the underlying philosophy.
Research Interests
Confucian philosophy, Asian and comparative philosophy, feminist philosophy
Paper III

Scaling the Wonder of Satoyama
Yi CHEN
Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University
Abstract“Imagine a realm, where the season’s rhythms rule. Where centuries of agriculture and fishinghave reshaped the land. Yet where people and nature remain in harmony.” 1 This is David
Attenborough’s dream of Satoyama 里山,2 a sustainable way of humane life in Japan’s rural
foothills.
As much as the Satoyama realizes an innate human dream, as striking is its unassuming
everydayness –– there is nothing spectacular, but every individual act is based upon a
tradition of care –– and that care reflects back from the landscape to us: a single drop of water
becomes significant, one falling leaf captures our attention, every tadpole is a miracle,
cherished for its contribution to a man-nature system that is worshiped with reverence andgratitude. Masters of the Japanese arts often emphasize action that flows without intention. In
Satoyama, such flow shapes a landscape. Centuries of experience beget a mode of cultivating
the land that is balanced between mindful care and self-evident naturalness. Fishing andfarming go hand in hand in a seasonal rhythm, yet with confident moderation, woodland thatis both used and cultivated with a long-term plan that spans generations, every detail arises
from the obvious: the place, the environment, the inhabitants, whether human, animal orplant, and time. But can such paradise of sustainability scale in a globalized society that has toconfront crises –climate change, mass extinctions, an exploding population and an everincreasing economic and technological gap?
Attenborough’s narration of the BBC’s Satoyama documentary does not only treat us tospectacular views from a distance, but also the small details on a fisherman’s plate. We may
meet Sangoro Tanaka, who is joined by his wife in an annual ritual to offer a plate with twolive fish, fresh vegetables and other local delicacies at the family shrine, in sincere gratitude
for nature’s abundance and generosity. Such ritual is certainly an expression of Japanese
Shintoism. However, the two live fish, although a small detail, resonates with a remark of
Confucius in the Analects when the Master noticed that one of his disciples “wanted todispense with the sacrifice of a living sheep”,3 and he said to him, “[...] You value the sheep –– I value ritual propriety (li)” (Analects 3.17).

1

See David Attenborough’s BBC program: “Satoyama, Japan’s Secret Water Garden” (2008):
https://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTg3MTI4NjU2.html?spm=a2h0k.11417342.soresults.dtitle. Retrieved May 92019.
2
In Japanese, it means “villages where mountains give way to plains”, see the link ibid.
3
See the translation in Ames, Roger and Henry Rosemont Jr. (1999). The Analects of Confucius: A
Philosophical Translation. New York, U.S.A.: The Random House Publishing Group, p. 86.

68

Contrary to Buddhist doctrines that prohibit killing, the two live fish on Sangoro’s sacrificial
plate mark Satoyama not as a pastoral idyll of “intact” nature, nor established upon
extinguishing nature’s needs, nor upon external regulations. Rather, what we find is Lǐ 禮,
propriety, in its truest sense: based upon an empowered individual, acting in assured respect,offering trust through ritual and engaging the recipient of the offering in an expression ofharmony, zusammen musizieren,4 playing music together through listening. Shintoemphasizes a pervasive web of animate spirits of nature and human beings alike, theConfucian concept Lǐ 禮 derives such relationships from individual agency. In this sense, theSatoyama represents what is already within us, and as the number of individuals grows, as
their needs grow, this agency, based on the simple principles of respect and care may scalewith them, no matter how far from the Gifu mountains or the hills of Saitama.
Research Interests
Confucian philosophy, Japanese aesthetics, phenomenology; comparative literatures,philosophy of comparison

4This is derived from the philosophy of the celebrated Italian conductor Claudio Abbado (1933-2014), whoused the German phrase “zusammen musizieren” (literally: making music together) to describe an ideal oforganizing a group of individuals into a unit that is able to perform in perfect harmony, at the highest level.

69Section 7B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1630-1830)
Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University
Organized Panel:
Skilled Performance and East Asian Wisdom Traditions
Panel Abstract
Drawing on insights from the various sources in the East Asian traditions from past to present,
the panel hopes to shed light on the question of what it means to be “skilled” in specific contexts
and what it may mean to be “skilled” in general. With good reason, recent discussions on thenature of skilled performance have moved away from the simple dichotomy of a self-conscious
and intellectual act, on the one hand, and an automatic and dumb act, on the other hand. We
have come to see that any adequate account must do justice to the distinct kind of “mindfulness"that is involved in skilled performance. As the expert swordsman engages in a duel, for example,
the conceptual mind may not be in play, but a certain kind of acute awareness is certainly taking
effect. Even when a person does not feel like she is the one doing the activity, this kind of“effortless” performance is still far from mindless coping. A few scholars have picked up on
the apparent similarity between these descriptions and some of the ideas in the East Asian
wisdom traditions, notably Zen Buddhism. For example, Krein and Ilundáin-Agurruza provide
a comparative analysis of the phenomenon of mushin in relation to flow states. This panel aims
at furthering this discussion on the relation between skilled performance and East Asian wisdom
traditions. Participants bring together various perspectives ranging from early Mahayana
Buddhism and Zen Buddhism to martial arts, Japanese performance art, and the Kyoto School
tradition.
Paper IThe Monk, the Swordsman and the Freediver–A Comparative Analysis of Skilled
Performance
Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA
Department of Philosophy, Linfield College
Abstract
Behold the following: a Sōtō Zen monk resolutely committed to shikantaza; an early Edo period
samurai deadly deft in swordfights; and a freediver who playfully plunges dozens of meters
deep into the ocean. In the face of it, we would be hard pressed to find meaningful similarities
or informative differences among these. Yet, the premise of the presentation is, precisely, thatby bringing such disparate pursuits together there are illuminating connections and revealing
disparities to be found among them. The connecting thread is highly skilled performance.
Under such premise then, the comparison is carried out in light of Dōgen, whose ideas
legitimize philosophically the soteriological role of praxis. Of special relevance is munen –interpreted in Dogen’s work as without-thinking, particularly when operationalized as mushinin the context of an embodied practice and performance that, in exemplary cases, results inimprovisational and responsive virtuosity. Keen commentators of Dōgen’s work help
contextualize its phenomenological application to dynamic performances beyond Zen
Buddhism. Of note is that very interesting convergences and divergences come to the fore in
relation to contemporary views on embodied cognition, specifically, enactive and situatedstances in the context of high performance in sports, and martial and performing arts.

70

The result is that Zen, swordsmanship, and freediving – as concrete stand-ins for
Buddhist practice, martial arts, and risk sports – afford a comparative and revealing analysis of“mentality,” embodiment, and skilled performance across East and West philosophicaltraditions.
Research Interests
Comparative philosophy, Japanese philosophy, phenomenology and philosophy ofsport/performance
Paper II
‘Becoming the thing’: Nishida Kitarō on acting-intuition
Yuko ISHIHARA
College of Global Liberal Arts, Ritsumeikan University
Abstract“Acting-intuition” ( 行 為 的 直 観 , otherwise translated as “action-oriented intuition” and“enactive intuition) was a key concept in Nishida Kitarō’s thought from the mid-1930s. Acting
and intuition are usually understood as two opposing ways human beings relate to theenvironment. Action involves some kind of active principle such as our will whereas intuitionor seeing is a passive reception of the surrounding. Nishida, however, took these terms to be
co-implicative; acting entails seeing and seeing entails acting. According to Nishida, this coimplicative relation between acting and seeing applies globally to human interactions in theworld, from our perception of objects to artistic creation and the formation of scientificknowledge. But what is particularly interesting is that for Nishida, acting-intuition was
something that could be cultivated such that in the process, we let go of our subjective coloringsand see and act according to the way things are just as they are in themselves. In Nishida’s
words, we come to “see as the thing, act as the thing”. In this paper, I explore this cultivational
aspect of acting-intuition that culminates in one’s ‘becoming the thing’ by examining thefollowing two claims Nishida makes: namely that acting-intuition is a “form of jikaku (自覚,
self-awareness)” and that “when the self becomes self-aware, the world becomes self-aware.”
The former claim will help us understand acting-intuition as being cultivational since “jikaku”
for Nishida denotes the dynamic movement of self-understanding whereby one ultimately
comes to realize the absolute no-thingness of our being. The latter claim will challenge us tounderstand how ‘becoming the thing’ implies “the world becoming self-aware.”Research Interests
Kyoto School tradition, phenomenology and comparative philosophy

71

Paper III
Mindfulness and Flow: A phenomenological study
Erol COPELJ
Department of Philosophy, Monash University
Abstract
This is a question frequently heard in contemporary discussion of mindfulness: is mindfulness
identical to, or an example of a, “flow experience”, extraordinary states of mind that highperforming athletes, and others, sometimes talk to us about? I will aim to show that mindfulness,the mental attitude that the Buddha of the Pali Cannon admonished us to nurture, is neither
identical to nor it is a kind of flow experience.
To set the stage, I will begin by explicating an idea that will be familiar to mostphenomenologists; the idea that there is an experience of possibilities. Two kinds of possibilities
will play a key role in this talk. The first are projects: the possible states of the world that comeinto being through human beings, such as the possibility of writing this abstract, or of going fora stroll in the park. I contrast projects with ‘thingly possibilities’, the kind of possibilities thatare intrinsic to the phenomena themselves.
On this basis, I develop a description of mindfulness as the feeling of being tuned-in tothingly possibilities (and being tuned out of projects). But there is also another form of
mindfulness, the feeling of being tuned in to one’s present projects (and being tuned out of
one’s absent projects). This latter kind of mindfulness opens up the possibility of narrowing
down the horizon of one’s present projects to a single project, in which one then becomesabsorbed. To nurture this possibility is to nurture a kind of concentration. And, I think, this iswhat people have in mind when they speak of “flow experience”. If that is right, then not onlyis flow not the right kind of mindfulness, it is not mindfulness at all, it is a kind of concentration.
Research Interests
Phenomenology and Buddhism
Paper IV
Skilled Interactions and Natural Movements in Japanese Puppetry
Haruka OKUI
Department of Social Studies, Doshisha University
Abstract
This paper examines how a traditional skilled performance of Japanese Bunraku puppetry
performs natural movements on stage. The notion of nature in East Asian philosophical contexts,
especially with regard to traditional body practices, evokes a sense of tension with “skilled”
works; the “natural” is often a result of artificial skills. Although Kleist (1810) depicted the“perfect beauty” of the marionette’s movements regarding physical law without any artificial
intentions, the Bunraku puppeteers are careful to never eliminate the importance of thoroughskill. In this case the puppeteer’s sophisticated skill conceals the skill itself; the audiences aretreated to the illusion that the puppets are functioning by themselves on stage—not attached toany puppeteers’ works. Recent phenomenological perspectives regarding performativeawareness or body schema have contributed toward creating relatively accurate descriptions forthis contradictive system. This paper utilizes interview and observation data from Bunraku
puppetry to describe the entangled manipulation system in which three puppeteers manipulate72

a single puppet together. Second, it elucidates the puppeteers’ experiences of manipulating thepuppet’s body and interacting with each other according to their respective given roles. Third,
it considers the relationship between their skills and the natural movements their puppets
produce on stage. Using puppetry as an example of phenomenological description, this paper
illuminates not only this particular practice but also the dynamics of our bodies, which canenliven our “being-in-the-world.”
Research Interests
Philosophy of Education, Phenomenology, Performing Arts
Paper V
“Doing excellent” without knowing what to do:
A Japanese Zen Buddhist critique of intellectualism
Katsunori MIYAHARA
School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong
Abstract
This talk aims to develop a cross-cultural critique of intellectualist accounts of skilled
performance drawing on insights from the Japanese Dō tradition. I start by describing theintellectualist view. Thanks to Gilbert Ryle, many think that skilled performance relies on nonpropositional knowledge-how. However, intellectualists contend that knowledge-how is a
species of knowledge-that; hence, expert skilled performance always relies on propositional
knowledge. I then introduce an alternative to intellectualism: a Zen Buddhist account developedin the Japanese Dō tradition. The Japanese account considers skilled performance at its best as
dependent on the mind of no-mind（無心, Mushin）, an empty state of mind that contains
nothing. This poses a challenge to intellectualism: One cannot attain an empty state of mind
while entertaining a proposition; thus, from this perspective, intellectualists are unable toaccount for peak performances of skilled experts. Next, I consider a possible response from theintellectualists: They might attempt to accommodate the Japanese account by regarding it as
only dealing with the surface phenomenology of skilled performances; the intellectualist
account complements it by plugging in a metaphysical account of their real nature. I call thisthe superficiality response. Finally, I offer a series of objections to the superficiality response.
The objections concern the intellectualist’s ability to account for some characters of skilled
performance as depicted in the Japanese account, namely, its specificity, normativity, and thesignificance of emotional attunement.
Research Interests
Phenomenology, Pragmatism, Japanese Philosophy, Enactivism

73

Section 7C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1630-1830)
Moderator: Giulia FALATO, University of Oxford
Organized Panel:
In the interstices of "religion" and "philosophy":
The introduction and reception of Western categories and thoughts in imperial andmodern China
Panel Abstract
Philosophy and religion are the main pillars upon which the intellectual dialogue between China
and the West has been based over the past three centuries. These categories were usedinterchangeably for a long period of time as part of the introduction of Western knowledge into
China until the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Chinese and Western societies
became secularised. Drawing on four chronologically ordered case studies, this panel will
provide a diachronic account of how these two disciplines were entangled, how they were
exploited by different western actors and received by Chinese interlocutors. In particular, Dr
Canaris and Dr Falato’s papers will look at the dawn of sino-western philosophical dialogue(16th-17th centuries). Dr Canaris will discuss Michele Ruggieri S.J.’s contribution (1543-1607)
to the creation of an ethical concordance between two intellectually discrepant traditions, while
Dr Falato will analyse how the Jesuit teachings were received and integrated into local
Confucian practices. Mr Tay will focus on the 19th century’s protestant missionaries, theirinterpretation of Chinese religion(s) and how its alleged materialism was used in contrast to
Christian spiritualism. Finally, Dr Gatta’s contribution will analyse the reception and impact ofwestern philosophy, specifically of Kant’s doctrine, on 20th century intellectuals. Ultimately,
the purpose of this panel is to highlight the epistemological and ontological gaps between
Chinese and Western civilizations and the role philosophy and religion played in building abridge across those conceptual spaces.
Paper I
Ethics as a strategy for cultural accommodation in Ruggieri’s Tianzhu shilu 天主實錄
(True Record of the Lord of Heaven)
Daniel CANARIS
Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University
Abstract
When the Jesuits first arrived in China in the twilight of the Ming dynasty, they quickly realisedthat the missionary strategies employed in other fields such as India and the Americas would
not be effective in China. Rather than impose Christianity by force or treat the Chinese as
unlettered savages, the Jesuits sought to dialogue between the intellectual traditions of East andWest by accommodating Confucian doctrines and rituals to Christianity. This missionary
strategy has long been eponymous with Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), though its roots lie in theJesuit experience in Japan and the insights of Ricci’s long neglected forebear in China, Michele
Ruggieri (1543-1607). This paper will look more closely at the inception of the China mission
by examining the first European work printed in Chinese, Ruggieri’s Tianzhu shilu 天主實錄
(True Record of the Lord of Heaven). In particular, it will explore Ruggieri’s hesitancies about
constructing a rational concordance between disparate intellectual traditions. Instead, Ruggieri
appealed to shared ethical perspectives that in his view were not culturally contingent but
74

universally valid. He portrayed his missionary activity as the fulfilment of Confucian norms,
even stressing that many Christian moral precepts were highly valued in China and in someinstances more perfectly practised than in war-ravaged Europe. As a conclusion, this paper willconsider the legacy of the Tianzhu shilu in Ricci’s more famous Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義 (TheTrue Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) and the tensions between their respective missionary
approaches.
Research Interests
Philosophy of the Italian Enlightenment, Giambattista Vico, Reception and image of China inearly modern Europe, Jesuit China mission
Paper II
Integrating European moral philosophy to Chinese traditional practices: the cases of Li
Jiugong 李九功’s Lixiu yijian 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror for encouraging cultivation) and Han
Lin 韓霖’s Duoshu 鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell)
Giulia FALATO
China Centre, University of Oxford
Abstract
During the 17th century, 470 works on religious and philosophical topics were composed byWestern missionaries in China and by Chinese converts. In an attempt to present European
moral philosophy in a way that was compatible with Confucianism, the authors emphasised
aspects that the two traditions had in common and aptly blended core precepts in the Chinese
cultural milieu. Among the literary productions that contributed to the introduction of European
knowledge to the late-Ming/early-Qing literati, a particular genre stands out: “wisdom
literature”. This comprised literary works that emphasised moral teachings over Christianthemes and were similar to the widely popular shanshu 善書 (moral books). This contribution
will investigate the reception of European moral philosophy and its integration with traditional
Chinese practices by focusing on two relevant publications as case studies: Han Lin 韓霖’s
(1601-1644) Duoshu 鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell), which was published in Shanxi in
1641; and Li Jiugong 李九功’s (d. 1681) Lixiu yijian 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror for encouraging
cultivation), which was published in Fujian around 1645. Despite displaying differences in theirformat, style and aim, these two texts demonstrate how Western philosophical precepts could
be applied to everyday practices of moral cultivation and used to reinforce core Confucianvalues such as humanity ‘ren 仁’ or filial piety ‘xiao 孝’. They also provide an interesting
insight into how missionary publications and moral precepts circulated among different
communities.
Research Interests
History of sino-western cultural relations, Jesuit China mission, Introduction and reception ofWestern moral philosophy in late-Ming/early-Qing, modern Chinese lexicography

75

Paper III
Protestant Invention of Chinese Religion(s) in the Nineteenth Century
Wei Leong TAY
Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford
Abstract
The term “religion” has recently been undergoing critical analysis and historicization byscholars. Religion is not a transhistorical and universal phenomena, but a unique product ofWestern/Christian history, which was globalized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries byWestern empires and missionary societies. Protestant missionaries were instrumental intranslating the native Chinese traditions of Ru, Shi 釋 and Dao 道 into Confucianism,
Buddhism, and Daoism. To nineteenth century westerners, religion was an a priori knowledge
and all nations, even primitive ones, had religion. However, Protestant Christianity is the only
universal and true religion. The essence of religion is defined by Protestantism as inner piety
and beliefs and Protestant missionaries were motivated to study Chinese religion(s) to decode
the “Chinese mind” and facilitate the religious conversion of the natives and comprehension ofChinese culture. This paper examines Protestant missionary construction of Chinese religion(s)as “materialistic.” The materialism of Chinese religious beliefs contrasted unfavourably to thespiritualism of Christianity. The Chinese thinking was deemed as fixated on the concrete andunable to derive the metaphysical and spiritual truths of science and Christianity in the West.
This account for the arrested intellectual development of the Chinese and their rampant
superstitions, and the stagnation of the Chinese civilization in comparison with the West. The
discovery of Chinese religion(s) by the Protestants in the nineteenth century served theEuropean desire to master the strange and exotic Chinese civilization so as to open China up
for the conquest of Western Christianity, commerce, and imperialism.
Research Interests
History of Chinese religions, Chinese nationalism, Chinese intellectual history and religious
thoughts, social history of Chinese rebellion and China’s modern revolution
Paper IV
Immanuel Kant’s influence on modern Chinese philosophy
Timon GATTA
Institute of Oriental Studies, Sapienza University of Rome
Abstract
Immanuel Kant was among the first Western philosophers to be introduced in modern China
and had great influence and impact on the development of contemporary Chinese thought. Fromthe beginning of the 20th century, Kant’s philosophy represented a real challenge for Chinese
thinkers, both in the religious-metaphysical and ethical fields. Kant’s theories regarding theconditions, limitations and possibilities of human knowledge – the main focus of his Critiqueof Pure Reason – were perceived as a “threat” to the legitimacy and validity of Chinese ethicaland philosophical maxims, particularly the Confucian ones. Kant’s ethical system, based on the
categorical imperative, consists of a moral code independent from any sort of religious,
metaphysical, social or political justification. As Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 said: “if Kant is right,
then the very idea of a Chinese philosophy, together with its modern developments, would be
impossible”. Therefore, to ensure the legitimacy and validity of Chinese traditional thought and76theory, many Chinese intellectuals set themselves the objective to “solve” the Kantian issue, inorder to preserve Chinese philosophy from the potentially destructive consequences of Kant’s
criticism. This paper will illustrate how different intellectuals and thinkers in 20th century
China approached Kant’s philosophy and attempted to adapt it to Chinese theoretical patterns
and to use it to modernize Chinese thought. In particular, it will focus on the so-called modern
Neoconfucianism and on prominent intellectuals such as Wang Guowei 王國維, Li Zehou 李
澤厚, and Mou Zongsan.
Research Interests
Modern Chinese philosophical lexicon, Introduction and reception of Western philosophy in
China, Introduction of Kant and German philosophy in China and their influence on modern
Chinese philosophy and Chinese vocabulary

77Section 7D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1630-1830)
Moderator: Soonyi LEE, Mercy College
Paper I
Beyond Reciprocity: The Golden Rule in Christianity and Mohism
Joseph Emmanuel STA. MARIA (Pronounced “Santa Maria”)
Department of Philosophy, Ateneo De Manila University, Philippines
Abstract
I wish to create a rapport between the Christian golden rule and its counterpart from Mohist
philosophy, using Paul Ricoeur’s reading of the aforesaid Christian golden rule as aninterpretive lens. In his article, “The Golden Rule and Religion,” Ricoeur says that the golden
rule operates under the human logic of equivalence and because of this it is susceptible to being
used for selfish ends. This means that someone following the “logic of equivalence”
interpretation of the Golden Rule, might merely do good to another just to be paid back.
However, Ricoeur argues that Christ’s command to love one’s enemies serves as a corrective
to the golden rule by appropriating the aforesaid rule in God’s logic of superabundance. In otherwords, one should no longer practice the rule in order to be paid back but as a response to God’s
excessive generosity. I wish to show that something analogous to this relation between the logicof equivalence and the logic of superabundance exists in the philosophy of the Mozi.
Specifically, according to Carine Defoort, the Mozi’s concept of inclusive care was initially amoral imperative in which one extended care beyond one’s traditional relations of reciprocity
to include others that can also reciprocate one’s care. However, inclusive care eventually
evolved into a more impartial form in which one should extend care to all regardless of theircapacity to reciprocate, in imitation of and gratitude to Heaven and its excessive beneficence.
Research Interests:
Classical Chinese philosophy, Christian philosophy, Ancient Greek philosophy, virtue ethics,
personalism, philosophy of mysticism
Paper II
Kyokutei Bakin and Romance of the Three Kingdoms
DING Yiruo
Department of Japanese Studies
The Chinese University of Hongkong
Abstract
Kyokutei Bakin (1767-1848) was one of the most popular writers in Edo Japan (1603-1868).
Being a lover of Chinese novels, he absorbed elements of Chinese novels into his own writings.
The paper focuses on the relationships between Kyokutei Bakin’s popular writings and the FourGreat Masterpieces in China, namely, The Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, The
Journey to the West, and The Golden Lotus.
The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is the first of the four great stories to be circulated
in the Edo period. Kyokutei Bakin also incorporates the plot and thoughts of the Romances of
the Three Kingdoms in his own novels. He is deeply influenced by its classic ideas.
Its reference to orthodoxy is reflected in the various details of his novels, which can be a
glimpse of Bakin’s understanding of Tokugawa’s dual power. Along with the increasing78

clearness of the position of the imperial power and the Buke regime, Bakins’s reflection may
not be only his personal will, but a trend of thought spread at the end of the Tokugawa
Shogunate period.
This paper begins with his interpretation of orthodoxy which is embodied in the Romanceof the Three Kingdoms. The first is to discuss the imperial orthodoxy from his novels and thesecond is to expound the position of Buke from his points.
Research Interests
The study on Kyokutei Bakin‘s Remake of the Four Great Masterpieces in China issignificant: first, it helps understand the diversity of Edo culture in the lens of Edo literature
and China-Japan cultural exchanges. Second, it shows the domestication of Chinese thought
within the Japanese cultural framework. Kyokutei Bakin’s works not only used elements ofChinese novels, but also borrowed ideas from Chinese Confucianism, Taoism and Buddism.
Third, it demenostrates the intellectual climate in the Kansei era. Even in time of tightening
cultural policy, Edo authors could find space for creative works. Kyokutei Bakin and his
relationship with Chinese novels is an important but little-studied topic. This study will fill in
the academic gap in Sino-Japanese studies.
Paper IIIZen kōan Analysis: Past, Present, and Future
Eiji SUHARA
School of International Letters and Cultures
Arizona State University
Abstract
In the past, Zen kōan have been classified into several different types by scholars: a shocking
method to break the "thinking mode," intentionally paradoxical to lead one to a "great doubt,"
object of meditative focus, expression of an enlightened mind, etc.
However, the above arguments are often proceeded without a skeptical attitude towards theabstract concepts used in kōan. For example, linguistic expressions such as“無 (nothingness)” or “仏性 (buddha nature)” in “Zhaozhou's Dog” kōan can be “understood”
only through various embodied experiences associated with bodily experiences. However,when a practitioner tackles a kōan without a self-reflective awareness of such an insight, itremains a mere “habitual mental activity while attaching to semantic meanings.”
There have been, however, in present academia, initiated by Prof. Slingerland, several
research studies that have tried to resolve the above issue by analyzing East Asian
Philosophical texts while using a conceptual metaphor theory. This work not only follows thepaths of such predecessors and provides different angles to read zen kōan through the lens ofembodied realism, but also reveals a unique feature of kōan that leads the practitioner to an
insight into something "non-referable" by recognizing the limitation of the function of
language through linguistic expressions (which sounds contradictory).
Nevertheless, during the analyses, this work also raises several methodological and theoreticalissues, such as "how can we experience a mentality beyond language-attached embodied
experience we have never had," etc. that need to be investigated in the future.

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過去の研究において禅公案は以下のような様々なカテゴリーに分類されてきた。
“思量”を打ち破るショッキングなきっかけ、その矛盾的構造によって修行者を”大疑団”に導く方法、禅師と弟子の間のコミュニケーションを可能にする道具、修行者を瞑想に導く対象、禅師による悟りの表現など。
しかしながら、これらの議論は公案において使われる抽象的な言語表現に対しての懐疑的態度が見られないままたびたび考察が進められている。例えば”趙州狗子”
公案における”無"や"仏性”などといった表現は様々な身体的受肉経験を基にして始めて”理解”可能になる概念であり、実践者がそのことを省みずに公案に取り組んでも、それはあくまでも”言語に執着した習慣的な”行為に留まる。
その点を補うのがSlingerland教授に始まり東洋哲学のテキストを概念メタファーの観点から分析するいくつかの研究である。この論文では既存のいくつかの研究を参考にしながら方法論として概念メタファーを使用していくつかの禅公案を分析する。
しかし本論のユニークな点は、そうすることによって公案の解釈において今までとは違った視点を提供するという所にとどまらず、言語的表現を使用しながらその限界を認知することによって”志向され得ない”何かに対する洞察をもたらすという禅公案の特徴を明らかにすることにある。
さらに、”どうやって言語を通じた受肉的経験としてではない、今までに経験したことのない精神状態を体験する事が可能なのか”といったような、分析の過程で出てくる方法論的そして理論的問題点について将来的に考察されるべき問題点を挙げる
ことにする。
Research Interests
Analysis of Zen kōan and other East Asian Philosophical texts using a conceptual metaphor
theory and reconsidering East Asian Philosophical concepts from multi-dimensional
perspectives, using plural methodological insights from Japanese scholarship (philology andhistory) and "Western" scholarship (German phenomenology, Philosophy of mind, cognitive
linguistics, and cognitive science).

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