Report of
The Third Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogueon“Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area andRole of Japan”

January 26-27, 2010
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

Supported by
The Tokyo ClubThe Japan Foundation

Under the Auspices of
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan
Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Japan
Wider Europe Research Center (WERC), University of Shizuoka

Table of Contents
Ⅰ

Preface………………………………………………………………………………………………1

Ⅱ

Executive Summary

Ⅲ

Ⅳ

1.

Overview.........................................................................................................................................22.

Outline of Discussions......................................................................................................................4

Programs of The Third Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue
1.

Program.........................................................................................................................................62.

Participants List...........................................................................................................................83.

Biographies of the Panelists......................................................................................................10

Text of Keynote Speeches
Session I : ʺStrategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Areaʺ.............................................14
Mithat RENDE.............................................................................................................................14
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.....................................................................................................................19
Session II : ʺChallenges for Economic Development and Energy and Environmental andEnvironmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Areaʺ……………………………………...............29
Mykola KULINICH.....................................................................................................................29
MOTOMURA Masumi.....................................................................................................................33
Session III : ʺFuture Perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area Cooperationʺ.......................................37
HASUMI Yu......................................................................................................................37
Ivan PETKOV.......................................................................................................................44

Ⅴ

Minutes of Discussions………………………………………………..…………………………48

Ⅵ

Appendix
1.

Distributed Materials......................................................................................................................84

2.

An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan........................................................................100

3.

An Introduction to Black Sea Economic Cooperation..............................................................102

Ⅰ Preface
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy‐oriented exchange of views
between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world,
and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus. For
this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 28 years in organizing policy‐oriented bilateral
and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.
It is for this reason that GFJ held the Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue, “Prospects of Changing
Black Sea Area and Role of Japan,” in Tokyo on 26‐27 January 2010. This report intends to summarize
the achievements of these discussions between Japanese and Black Sea Area counterparts. Though theprinted version of the report will be made available to only a restricted number of people such as
members and friends of GFJ and their counterparts from Black Sea Area, the full text of the report will
be available at http://www.gfj.jp/.
The Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue “Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan”
was supported by the Tokyo Club and the Japan Foundation, co‐sponsored by Organization of theBlack Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and organized under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan, Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria inJapan and Wider Europe Research Center (WERC) of the University of Shizuoka.
It was attended by 115 participants including 27 panelists such as Amb. Leonidas
CHRYSANTHOPOULUS, Secretary General of BSEC, Prof. Ioan Mircea PASCU, Member of theEuropean Parliament, Mr. TANIZAKI Yasuaki, Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan and Prof. MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor of the University of Shizuoka.
Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significant importance related to the future ofJapan‐Black Sea Area relations.

March 3, 2010
ITO Kenichi
President
The Global Forum of Japan
1

It is worthy of note that the participants from both sides underlined theimportance of the ʺDialogueʺ as the only channel of communication between Japanand the Black Sea Area either on public or private level. In 2005, with foresight torecognize the strategic importance of the Black Sea Area, we held the 1st ʺDialogue,ʺ
which set a precedent for the cooperative framework with the then unfamiliar
ʺBlack Sea Areaʺ and received unexpected positive public response. Encouraged bythis fact, amid the growing interest in the region among those from various fields inJapan, we held the 2nd ʺDialogueʺ in 2007, in which enlargement of areas ofcooperation including infrastructure development, economic aid, and technicalassistance, etc., was discussed.
And, we can say that this 3rd ʺDialogueʺ should be described as
embodiment of trust between Japan and the Black Sea Area, which has been steadily
fostered through the two ʺDialoguesʺ in the past. For, compared to the twoʺDialogues,ʺ which was somewhat characterized by politeness and reserves, this 3rd
ʺDialogueʺ witnessed a growing frankness in the exchange of views among theparticipants from both of the two sides. For instance, in the ʺDialogue,ʺ theparticipants not only acknowledged the prioritized areas of cooperation between
Japan and the Black Sea Area but also identified the challenges and hurdles to be
overcome for further deepening the cooperative ties between Japan and the BlackSea Area in a fairly realistic manner. Such frank exchange of views should also be
counted among the beauties of this ʺDialogue.ʺ Besides, this 3rd ʺDialogueʺ was, forthe first time, attended by the high‐ranking officials of all the embassies of BSEC
member states which have an embassy in Tokyo.
Assuming a role as mediator between BSEC and Europe, this ʺDialogueʺ
could contribute to enhancing Japanʹs presence as a global player in theinternational community as well as reinforcing the ties between Japan and Europe
and Middle East in an indirect manner. Encouraged by those requests which wehave already received after the 3rd ʺDialogueʺ from participants not only of Japanbut of the Black Sea Area that this ʺDialogueʺ should be continued, it is our sincere
hope that we, making the most of the network established over the past 6 years, willfurther contribute to enhancing Japan‐Black Sea Area cooperation by holding theʺDialoguesʺ on a regular basis.

3

2. Outline of Dicussions
Session I: Strategic Implication of Security in the Black Sea Area
In Session I, on the theme of “Strategic Implication of Security in the BlackSea Area” Ambassador Mithat RENDE, Director General, Economic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey gave the first keynote speech, in which hestated that “In the Black Sea region, there are retained tensions called the “Frozen
Conflicts” which could easily turn to hot wars. In order to secure stability in thisregion, it is necessary to establish a platform for dialogue among the countries in
the region as a means to reduce mistrust and create trustful relations among
themselves. In this regard, BSEC, though now intended as the framework foreconomic cooperation, assumes a heavy responsibility as a coordinator of theinterests among the member states.”
Following that, Dr. MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor of University of
Shizuoka, stated in the second keynote speech, “In the Black Sea region, two
confrontational powers countervail. One is the “revisionist” power of expanding EU
and NATO eastward, thereby making this region an “open region,” and the other is“status quo” power of maintaining the current balance of power in this region,
thereby keeping this region as “closed” as possible. In order for BSEC and the EUʹs
“Black Sea Synergy Initiative” to function well in the future, it is crucial that thiscountervailing power struggle be overcome and this region be situated as part of“Wider Europe.”

Session II: Challenges for the Economic Development
Environmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Area

andEnergyand

In Session II, on the theme of “Challenges for the Economic Development
and Energy and Environmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Area,” Mykola
KULINICH, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan gave the first keynote speech, inwhich he stated that “Success of integration of the Black Sea Area depends upon
how the intra‐regional trade, finance, and energy cooperation should advance.
While disparities in economic development and underground resources hinder the
integration process in the region, this region has a great potential for development
if we turn to its populations, natural resources, and industrial infrastructures.”
After that, Mr. MOTOMURA Masumi, Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas andMetals National Corporation, presented the second keynote speech, mentioning that“As there are several gas pipeline construction projects in this region, severe
4negotiations are taking place among the gas importing countries, exporting
countries and transit countries over the potential courses of the pipelines. Though
tough negotiations are concomitant to business, it is necessary to prevent thoseclashes of interest from turning to political conflicts. The point is that constructionof the pipelines should contribute to the development of entire Black Sea Area.”

Session III: Future perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area Cooperation
In session III, on the theme of ʺFuture perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area
Cooperation,ʺ Dr. HASUMI Yu, Professor at Rissho University, stated the keynote
speech that “EU has of late strengthened its involvement in the Black Sea area andbeen promoting economic and human exchanges and fostering liberalism anddemocracy through several channels, so that this area should evolve to agovernance model based on “open multilateralism.” By way of its “Value Oriented
Diplomacy,” Japan should share with EU the philosophy of cooperation with theBlack Sea Area.”
Following that, Ambassador Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representativeof the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship‐in‐Office, said in his keynote speech, “Withthe accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, the geopolitical situation of theBlack Sea area has drastically changed. BSEC and EU will likely to intensify theircooperative system for the economic development of the region. As U.S. has alreadygained Observer status of BSEC, it has increasingly become involved in this region
especially in the field of energy. It is expected that Japan should also become
Observer of BSEC and enhance cooperation with the Black Sea area in many fields.”

5

Ⅲ Programs of
The Third Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue

1. Program
第3回「日・黒海地域対話」
The THIRD JAPAN-BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE「変化する黒海地域の展望と日本の役割」
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan2010年1月26-27日 / January 26-27, 2010
International House of Japan / 国際文化会館
東京、日本 / Tokyo, Japan
助成 / Supported by
東京倶楽部 / The Tokyo Club
国際交流基金 / The Japan Foundation
共催 / Co-Sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
黒海経済協力機構 / Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
後援 / Under the Auspices of
日本国外務省 / The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
駐日トルコ大使館 / Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan
駐日ブルガリア大使館 / Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Japan
静岡県立大学広域ヨーロッパ研究センター / Wider Europe Research Center (WERC), University of Shizuoka

2010 年 1 月 26 日 （火） / Tuesday, 26 January, 2010
外務大臣政務官主催レセプション

17:30-19:30* 特別招待者のみ/ Welcome Reception hosted by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan *Invitation On

西村智奈美 日本国外務大臣政務官主催開幕レセプション
Welcome Reception hosted by NISHIMURA Chinami, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

2010 年 1 月 27 日 （水） / Wednesday, 27 January, 2010
"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan / 国際文化会館「講堂」
オープニングセッション / Opening Session
9:30-10:00
開会挨拶 （５分間）
Opening Remarks(5min.)
開会挨拶 （５分間）
Opening Remarks(5min.)
開会挨拶 （５分間）
Opening Remarks(5min.)
開会挨拶 （1５分間）
Opening Remarks(15min.)
本会議Ⅰ / Ｓｅｓｓｉｏｎ I

伊藤憲一 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人
ITO Kenichi, President, The Global Forum of Japan
レオニダス・フリサンソプロス ＢＳＥＣ事務総長
Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC
イヴァン・ぺトコフ ブルガリアＢＳＥＣ議長国代表特使 （ＢＳＥＣ議長国）
Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office (on behalf of the
Chairmanship of BSEC)
谷崎泰明 外務省欧州局長
TANIZAKI Yasuaki, Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan「黒海地域における安全保障の戦略的意味」"Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area"

10：00-11:50

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)
コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A(５min.)
コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B(５min.)
コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C(５min.)
コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D(５min.)
自由討議 （45分間）
Free Discussions(45min.)
議長総括（１０分間）
Summarization by
Co-Chairpersons （10min.）

大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人
OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, The Global Forum of Japan
レオニダス・フリサンソプロス ＢＳＥＣ事務総長
Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC
ミシャト・レンデ トルコ外務省経済局長 （トルコ）
Mithat RENDE, Director General, Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)
六鹿茂夫 静岡県立大学教授
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, University of Shizuoka
アウレリアン ネアグ 駐日ルーマニア大使 （ルーマニア）
Aurelian NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)
内藤泰朗 産経エクスプレス副編集長（前産経新聞社モスクワ支局長）
NAITO Yasuo, Deputy Director, "Sankei Express" （former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)
ステファン・フーバー 駐日欧州連合代表部副代表 （欧州委員会）
Stefan HUBER, Deputy Head of Delegation, European Commission
斎藤元秀 杏林大学教授
SAITO Motohide, Professor, Kyorin University
出席者全員
All Participants
大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人
OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, The Global Forum of Japan
レオニダス・フリサンソプロス ＢＳＥＣ事務総長
Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC

6

昼食 / Lunch
11:50-13:00

Lunch Break ／ 昼食休憩

(会議場外で各自でお取り下さい）

本会議Ⅱ /Session II
13:00-14:55「黒海地域の経済発展とエネルギー・環境協力に向けた課題」"Challenges for Economic Development and Energy and Environmental Cooperation in theBlack Sea Area"
東郷和彦 京都産業大学教授
TOGO Kazuhiko, Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)
コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A(５min.)
コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B(５min.)
コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C(５min.)
コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D(５min.)
自由討議（45分間）
Free Discussions(45min.)
議長総括（10分間）
Summarization by
Co-chairpersons （10min.）アルタイ・エフェンディヴ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済協力開発局長 （アゼルバイジャン）
Altai EFENDIEV, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan(Azerbaijan)
ミコラ・クリニチ 駐日ウクライナ大使 （ウクライナ）
Mykola KULINICH, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)
本村真澄 石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構調査グループ主席研究員
MOTOMURA Masumi, Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
廣野 良吉 成蹊大学名誉教授
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
イバン・ムルキッチ 駐日セルビア大使（セルビア）
Ivan MRKIC, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to Japan (Serbia)
石郷岡建 日本大学総合科学研究所教授
ISHIGOOKA Ken, Professor, Nihon Universiry
レバズ・ベシッゼ 駐日グルジア大使 （グルジア）
Revaz BESHIDZE, Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)
出席者全員
All Participants
東郷和彦 京都産業大学教授
TOGO Kazuhiko, Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University
アルタイ・エフェンディヴ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済協力開発局長 （アゼルバイジャン）
Altai EFENDIEV, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan(Azerbaijan)

14：55-15：05

休憩/Break

本会議Ⅲ /Session III「日・黒海地域協力の今後の展望」"Future Perspective of Japan-Black Sea Area Cooperation"

15：05-17：00

共同議長（５分間）
Co-Chairpersons (5min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)基調報告（15分間）
Keynote Speaker(15min.)
コメントA（５分間）
Lead Discussant A(５min.)
コメントB（５分間）
Lead Discussant B(５min.)
コメントC（５分間）
Lead Discussant C(５min.)
コメントD（５分間）
Lead Discussant D(５min.)
コメントE（５分間）
Lead Discussant E(５min.)
自由討議（45分間）
Free Discussions(45min.)
議長総括（10分間）
Summarization by
Co-chairpersons （10min.）村上正泰 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人代行
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Governor, The Global Forum of Japan
ニコラオス・ツァマドス 駐日ギリシャ大使 （ギリシャ）
Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)
蓮見雄 立正大学教授
HASUMI Yu, Professor, Rissho University
イヴァン・ぺトコフ ブルガリアＢＳＥＣ議長国代表特使 （ブルガリア）
Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office (Bulgaria)
ユアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 欧州議会議員・同外交副委員長
Ioan Mircea PASCU, Member of the European Parliament (EP), Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP
海部篤 外務省欧州局中・東欧課長
KAIFU Atsushi, Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
セルゲイ・ゴンチャレンコ ロシア連邦外務省経済協力局次長 （ロシア）Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation (Russia)
廣瀬陽子 静岡県立大学准教授
HIROSE Yoko, Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka
ブヤール・ディダ 駐日アルバニア共和国大使 （アルバニア）
Bujar DIDA, Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Japan (Albania)
出席者全員
All Participants
村上正泰 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人代行
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Governor, The Global Forum of Japan
ニコラオス・ツァマドス 駐日ギリシャ大使 （ギリシャ）
Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)

閉幕夕食会 * 特別招待者のみ / Farewell Dinner *Invitation Only
18:00-20:00

セリム・セルメット・アタジャンル駐日トルコ大使主催閉幕夕食会
Farewell Dinner hosted by Selim Sermet ATACANLI, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Japan7

2. Participants List
【Black Sea Area Panelists】
Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS Secretary General, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

Ivan PETKOVSpecial Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC chairmanship‐in‐Office(on behalf of the Chairmanship of BSEC)

Mithat RENDE
Aurelian NEAGU
Stefan HUBER
Altai EFENDIEV
Mykola KULINICH
Ivan MRKIC
Revaz BESHIDZE
Nikolaos TSAMADOS
Ioan Mircea PASCU
Sergei GONCHARENKO
Bujar DIDA

Director General, Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)
Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)
Deputy Head of Delegation of the European Union to Japan【JAPANESE Panelists】
ITO Kenichi
TANIZAKI Yasuaki
OKAWARA Yoshio
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo
NAITO Yasuo
SAITO Motohide
TOGO Kazuhiko
MURAKAMI Masayasu
MOTOMURA Masumi
HIRONO Ryokichi
ISHIGOOKA Ken
HASUMI Yu
KAIFU Atsushi
HIROSE Yoko

Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)

Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)
Ambassador of Serbia to Japan (Serbia)
Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)
Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)
Member of the European Parliament (EP), Vice‐Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP
Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia
Ambassador of Albania to Japan (Albania)

President, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Chairman, GFJ
Professor, University of Shizuoka
Deputy Director, ʺSankei Expressʺ （former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)
Professor, Kyorin University
Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University
Acting Executive Governor, GFJ
Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Professor, Nihon University
Professor, Rissho University
Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka(In order of appearance)【Participants】
ADACHI Junichi
Dominic AL‐BADRI
Rania ALHAJ ALI
Victor ARKHIPOV
Selim Sermet ATACANLIPolina AVDEEVA
Reza BOORAGHICHIHARA Nobuyoshi
FUJIWARA Hana
Gül DEMİR
FUJIMAKI Hiroyuki
Antoaneta GRIGOROVAHABA Kumiko
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HARADA Koji
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
HIROSE Tetsuya
Azer Tofig Oglu HUSEYNHYODO Shinji
IKEO Aiko
INAGAKI Fumiaki
ISHIKAWA Yohei
Snezana JANKOVIC
KANAMORI Toshiki
KAWAMURA Hiroshi
Burak Ali KARACANKAWATO Akio
KAYA Toshihiko
KINOSHITA Hiroo

Deputy General Manager, Mitsubishi Cooperation
Political Analyst, Political & Economic Section, Delegation of the European Union to Japan
Chargé dʹAffaires a.i, Embassy of Syria in Japan
President, Russian National Committee for the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Ambassador of Turkey to Japan
Expert, General Secretariat (Department), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia
First Secretary, Embassy of Iran in Japan
Deputy Director‐General, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Japanese Studies and Intellectual Exchange Department, The Japan Foundation
Istanbul Representation, The Turkish Daily News
Lecturer, International Education Center, Tokai University
Attaché (Political and Press), Embassy of Bulgaria in Japan
Professor, Aoyama Ｇakuin University
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
Senior Manager, Overseas Subsidiaries Management Division, Kajima corporation
Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Secretary‐General, Central Secretariat Asian‐Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union
Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Japan
Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defenｓe Studies
Professor, Waseda University
Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University
Staff Writer, The Nikkei
First Counselor, Embassy of Serbia in Japan
Graduate Student, Faculty of Law, Keio University
Representative, New Global AmericaCounsellor, Embassy of Turkey in Japan
General Manager, Japan‐World Trends
The Nikkei
Advisor, National Small Business Information Promotion Center

8

KITAMURA Yusuke
Kirill KONSTANTINOVKUDO Hirosi
Thomas LOIDL
MANO Teruhiko
MATSUI Akira
MATSUMOTO Hiroshi
MINAMINO Daisuke
Rovshan MIRZAYEVMOHRI Tadaatsu
NAKAGAWA Juro
NAKANO Hisato
Yuliia NI
Daniela NIKOLOVA
Irina NOSOVAONO Masami
ONODERA Masachika
Teodora PASCU
Ahmed Magdy RASHADSAITO Hiroshi
SAJIMA Naoko
SAKAMOTO Masahiro
SIMIZU Yoshikazu
Nikita SMIRNOVSUGIUCHI Naotoshi
TAKAHASHI Mahiro
TANAKA Daisuke
Tatiana SEDLETSKAYASHIBUTANI Yu
Vera STEFANOVASUGIO Naoya
TAJIMA Takashi
TAKENAKA Akihiro
Diana THIHAN
Lubomir TODOROVTRANG Ho Thu
TSUMORI Shigeru
UDOVIK Violetta
UEMURA Susumu
UENO Kazushi
WATANABE Mayu
YAMAGISHI Aoi
YAMAGUCHI Maki
YAMAMOTO Manabu
YASUDA Yukiko
YASUOKA Takaaki
YOSHIDA Shingo
YOVKOVA SHII Eleonora
Dmitory ZARVOCorrespondent, NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation
Attache, Embassy of Russia in JapanFirst Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Romania
Minister, Embassy of Austria in Japan
former Advisor to the President, The Bank of Tokyo‐Mitsubishi
Visiting Professor, Kyorin University
Senior Executive Director, The International House of Japan
Official, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Third Secretary, Embassy of Azerbaijan in Japan
Senior Coordinator, Fourth Division, Intelligence and Analysis Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Lecturer, Nihon University Graduate School of Business
General Manager, Research & External Relations, Corporate Planning Division, Kikkoman
Acting Head of Trade and Economic Mission, Embassy of Ukraine in Japan
Attache, Embassy of Bulgaria in Japan
Third Secretary, Embassy of Russia in Japan
Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun
Chairman, Onodera & Associates
Diplomatic Attaché, Embassy of Egypt in Japan
Russia and Eurasia Division, Overseas Research Department, Ｊａｐａｎ External Trade
Professor, Senshu University
Vice President, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
Supreme Adviser, KAMAKURA GAYUKAI
Vice‐Counsul, Embassy of Russia in Japan
former Ambassador to Romania
Cabinet Official,Cabinet Office
Official, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Head of Division, Department of Currency and Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia
Research Fellow, Waseda University
Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Bulgaria in Japan
Staff Writer, Foreign News Department, The Mainichi Shimbun
Visiting Professor, Akita International University
Correspondent, NHK International News Department
Third Secretary, the Embassy of Romania in Japan
Ambassador of Bulgaria to Japan
Trainee, Embassy of Germany in Japan
Visiting Professor, Toin University of Yokohama
Research Student, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto Sangyo University
Ground Staff Office, Ministry of Defense
Opinion Leader Governors, GFJ
Official, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
President, Ｍａｒｋｅｔｉｎｇ Consultant
Official, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Honorary Member, Institute for the Study of Social Justice, Sophia University
Staff‐Member, Japan Association for Trade with Russia & NIS (ROTOBO)
Lecturer, Kanda University of International studies
Assistant Defense Attache, Embassy of Russia in Japan（In Alphabetical Order)【Secretariat】
YANO Takuya
NAKAMURA Yumi
KIKUCHI Yona
TAKAHATA Yohei
SUZUKI Izumi
KUSHIDA Ena
ITO Fumiharu
INOUE Syouhei
MIZUTANI Toshihiko
WATANABE Ikumi

Executive Secretary, GFJ
Officer in Charge, GFJ
Officer in Charge, GFJSecretarial Staff, GFJSecretarial Staff,GFJ
Secretarial Assistant, GFJSecretarial Assistant, GFJSecretarial Assistant, GFJSecretarial Assistant, GFJSecretarial Assistant, GFJ

93. Biographies of the Panelists【Black Sea Area Panelists】
Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOSSecretary General, BSEC
Graduated from the Law School of the University of Athens. Joined the Greek Foreign Ministryin 1972. Served as Director of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Minister in charge of EEC Affairs,
Deputy Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, Minister Counsellor in
Beijing, Ambassador of Greece in Yerevan, in Warsaw and in Ottawa, Director General for EU
Affairs, and Director General for Bilateral Economic Relations and Multilateral Economic
Cooperation before assuming the current post in 2006.
Ivan PETKOVSpecial Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC
Chairmanship‐in‐Office (Bulgaria)
Graduated from the Moscow State University of International Relations. Entered the Bulgarian
Foreign Ministry in 1979. Served as Ambassador of Bulgaria in Iran (1992), Pakistan (1995),
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001, Responsible for the Bulgarian
Chairmanship‐in‐Office of the Organization for Security and Co‐operation in Europe (OSCE) in
2004, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the Council of Europe in 2005, Ambassador atlarge on the Black Sea before assuming the current post in 2009.
Mithat RENDE

Director General, Economic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)
Graduated from Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara University. Completed the Post
Graduate Program of the Royal College of Defence Studies London on Security andInternational Relations in 2000. Served as Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in London and
Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)from 1996‐2000. Ambassador of Turkey to the State of Qatar before assuming the current post.
Aurelian NEAGU
Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)
Graduated Academy for Economic Studies in Bucharest in 1983. Entered the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Served various positions including Economist of National Tourism Office
Carpati, Counsellor of the Vice‐Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Counsellor at the
Embassy of Romania in Seoul and Asia, Africa and Middle East Division. Ambassador of
Romania to Singapore.
Stefan HUBER
Deputy Head of Delegation, European Commission
Received M.A. in Law and Political Science from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Entered
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in 1990. Served as Deputy Head of the Austrian Trade
Commission. Entered European Commission Headquarters, Brussels in 1997. Served as
Principal Administrator in Directorate General External Relations (Trade). Nominated as Headof Unit “Social Dialogue” in Directorate General Personnel and Administration in 2002, andHead of Unit “Rights and obligations” in Directorate General External Relations in 2003.
Altay EFENDIEVHead of Economic Cooperation and Development Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)
Received M.S. from Kiev Sate University, Ukraine. Joined the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry in
1992. Served as Economic Counsellor at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in United Kingdom, Head of
Economic Cooperation and Development Department in 2000, Economic Adviser to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2000, Deputy Secretary General of the Permanent International
Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 2004.

10

Mykola KULINICH
Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)
Received Ph.D. in History of International Relations from Kyiv State University in 1982. Served
as Associate Professor at Kyiv University, First Deputy Director at Institute of International
Relations of Kyiv State University, Minister Counsellor at Embassy of Ukraine in Tokyo, Deputy
Director of 5th Territorial Directorate (Asia‐Pacific, Middle East and Africa) at Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Ukraine, Minister Counsellor at Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul, and Rector at
Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine.
Ivan MRKIC
Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to Japan (Serbia)
Graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Belgrade. Employed in the Federal
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in 1978. Served as Minister Counsellor with the Mission of
Yugoslavia to the European Community in Brussels, Chief of the Cabinet of the President of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ambassador to Cyprus, Assistant to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Chief of Bilateral Relations, President of the National Commission of Serbia andMontenegro for the Implementation of the Chemical weapons Convention.
Revaz BESHIDZE
Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)
Received Ph.D. in Geography from Tbilisi State University in 1990. Entered the Georgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996. Held various positions, including Head of Military
Cooperation Division Department for Politico‐Military Affairs, Director of the Department for
Politico‐Military Affairs, Director of the Department for Security Policy and Euro‐Atlantic
Integration, Head of Mission of Georgia to NATO before assuming the current post in 2009.
Nikolaos TSAMADOS
Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)
Received Ph.D. from the Freie Universität Berlin. Entered the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in 1982. Held various positions, including Deputy and acting General Director for Development
Cooperation, Deputy Permanent Representative at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France,
and Director of A5 Directorate for Russia and other C.I.S. countries, before assuming the current
post in 2009.
Ioan Mircea PASCU

Member of the European Parliament (EP),Vice‐Chair of Foreign Affairs Committee of EP
Received Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of Political Sciences, Bucharest in 1980.
Served as various posts including Presidential Counselor (1990‐92), Visiting Senior Research
Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (1992‐1993), State Secretary in Defense
Ministry (1993‐96), Chairman of the Defense Committee in The Chamber of Deputies(1996‐2000), Minister of National Defense of Romania (2000‐2004), Member, Vice‐Chair of theForeign Affairs Ctee since 2007.
Sergei GONCHARENKO

Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)
Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served various positions. Also, served as Chairmanof the Committee of Senior Officials of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperationin 2001 and in 2006, Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Cooperation at the
Barents/Euro‐Arctic Council in 2000‐2001 and in 2006‐2009, and Chairman of the Working
Group on Economic Cooperation at the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 2001‐2002.
Bujar DIDA
Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Japan (Albania)
Received Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Tirana in 1994. Appointed Honorary Consul
General of Japan in Albania (Term Ｉ in 2000, Term Ⅱ in 2006). Head of Department of
Teaching and Career, University “Marin Barleti”, Tirana, Albania in 2006. Professor of Generaland Inorganic Chemistry, Polytechnic University of Tirana, Albania.
(In order of appearance)11

【Japanese Panelists】
ITO Kenichi
President, Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at
Harvard University (1961‐1963). Served as various positions including Director of FirstSoutheast Asian Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University(1984‐2006). Concurrently serves as President of The Japan Forum on International Relations,
President of The Council on East Asian Community, and Professor Emeritus of Aoyama Gakuin
University.
TANIZAKI Yasuaki

Director‐General, European Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1975. Heldvarious positions, including First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Director of First West Europe Division of European and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, Minister at the Embassy of Japan in Germany, Deputy Director‐General of European
Affairs Bureau, and Director‐General of Consular Affairs Bureau.
OKAWARA Yoshio
Chairman, GFJ,
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942.
Served various positions including Director‐General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy
Vice Minister for Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador
to the United States (1980‐1985). Concurrently serving as Special Adviser of Institute forInternational Policy Studies and President of America‐Japan Society, Inc.
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo
Professor, University of Shizuoka
Graduated from Sophia University in 1976. Received M.A. in International Relations from
Sophia University in 1978 and Ph.D. in Law from University of Bucharest in 1985. Served as
Professor at Saitama Women’s Junior College, Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the
London School of Economics and Political Science, and Dean of the Faculty of International
Relations and a Presidential Aid at University of Shizuoka.
NAITO Yasuo

Deputy Director, ʺSankei Expressʺ
(former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)
Graduated from Aoyama Gakuin University. Entered The Sankei Shimbun in 1989. Se Phnom
Penh Bureau Chief in 1993, and Moscow Bureau Chief from 2003‐2008. Won the Prize ofʺGolden Wordʺ in 2005 by Russia’s non‐governmental media organization ʺMedia Soyuzʺ forseries of historical articles ʺOne hundred years after the Russo‐Japan Warʺ. Also served as a
Fullbright Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES), and George
Washington University (GWU) from 2001‐2002.
SAITO Motohide
Professor, Kyorin University
Completed the doctoral course at Keio University in 1977. Received Ph.D. in International
Relations from Columbia University in 1986. Visiting Professor of the Slavic Research Center at
Hokkaido University from 2004‐2006.
TOGO Kazuhiko
Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968. Heldvarious positions on the Soviet Union / Russian Federation until 2002. Ambassador to theNetherlands from 2001‐2002. After retirement from MOFA, taught at the Universities of Leiden,
Princeton, Seoul National and others. Received PhD. from Leiden University in2009.

12

MURAKAMI Masayasu
Acting Executive Governor, GFJ
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1997. Studied at
University of California, San Diego. Served as Vice Consul of the Japanese Consulate‐General in
New York, Deputy Director for Research Division of International Bureau at Ministry of
Finance, Deputy Director for Cabinet Secretariat. Concurrently serving as Acting Executive
Director of JFIR and Acting Vice President of CEAC.
MOTOMURA Masumi
Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
Received M.A. from the University of Tokyo. Entered Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC)
in 1977. Served as Director of Russia and Caspian Division in First Planning Department andthe Chief Researcher of Research and Planning Department at JNOC. Also served as Visiting
Researcher at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies in 2001 and Visiting Professor of the Slavic
Research Center at Hokkaido University in 2005.
HIRONO Ryokichi
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Graduated from Morehouse College in 1954, and received M.A. in Economics from Chicago
University in 1958. Served as Visiting Professor at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
and Professor at Teikyo University. Concurrently serving as Director of the Japan Committee for
UNICEF and Senior Program Advisor of United Nations University.
ISHIGOOKA Ken
Professor, Nihon University
Graduated from Moscow State University (Faculty of Physics, Astronomy) in 1974. Entered
Mainichi Shimbun in 1974. Served as Correspondent in Cairo, Harare, Wien, Moscow and from2002‐2006 as Editorial Writer of Mainichi Shimbun. Also served at Nihon University （Faculty ofInternational Relations）from 2003, Concurrently serving as Professor of Advanced ResearchCenter of Nihon University.
HASUMI Yu
Professor, Rissho University
Received M.A. in Area Studies from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in 1988. Served as
Economist at Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies, Japan Association for Trade with
Russia & NIS, Associate Researcher at Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies, Vice‐chief
Editor at Monthly Journal ‘Russian‐Eurasian Economy’, Director at the European Union Studies
Association‐Japan, Chief of Secretariat at Institute of Eurasian Studies.
KAIFU Atsushi

Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division,
European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988. Heldvarious positions, including First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Principal Deputy Director at the Overseas Establishments Division, Senior Foreign
Policy Coordinator at the Policy Coordination Division of Foreign Policy Bureau.
HIROSE Yoko
Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka
Received M.A. in Law from the University of Tokyo in 1997, and Ph.D. in Media andGovernance from Keio University in 2006. Served as Assistant Professor at Keio University,
Special Researcher at Nagoya University, Associate Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign
Studies. Concurrently serving as Special Researcher at Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido
University.
(In order of appearance)

13

Ⅳ Texts of Keynote Speeches

Session I: “Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area”

Mithat RENDE
Director General, Economic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
Introduction
I would like to start by expressing my most sincere thanks and appreciation to the
Global Forum of Japan for organizing the “Third Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue” andthrough them to all the sponsors and supporters of this important initiative. It is a great
pleasure for me to be here, in the gorgeous city of Tokyo and address this distinguishedaudience.
Turkey and Japan, which are situated on the western and eastern banks of theHistorical Silk Route, share strong bonds of friendship deep‐rooted in history. For Turkey,
Japan represents a successful combination of a great civilization and tradition withremarkable economic and technological achievements. This creates a solid ground for further
developing and diversifying our relations based on mutual understanding and cooperation,in every field.
The recent visit of the Honourable Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Katsuya Okada to
Ankara for the launch of the “2010 Year of Japan in Turkey” and his address at the Second
Turkish Ambassadors’ Conference, on 4 January 2010, are the most recent examples of thesefriendly relations. It was a great privilege for me as one of the Turkish Ambassadors to hear
His Excellency Okada and receive first hand information about the Japanese Foreign Policy
agenda. I fully agree with the “joint declaration” made by our Foreign Ministers stating thatʺthe cooperation between the two countries is strong enough to have a positive impact on the
future of the globe”. In fact Turkey and Japan are, both, members of the G‐20 and
non‐permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus share important
responsibilities for the promotion of peace and prosperity in the world as a whole.
Given these excellent relations, we attach importance to furthering our cooperation
with Japan, in every field, including in the Black Sea context, which is the main subject of our
discussions today.
“Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area”, being the title of this session,
let me start by a brief introduction on the Black Sea Area and later focus on various aspects of
security in the region.
Black Sea Area ‐ General
The Black Sea is a semi‐closed sea with an area of 432.000 square kilometers and 4340
kilometers long coastline. It is an important and strategic Sea having a unique position with
two narrow outlets to the open seas through an inner sea; The Turkish Straits, namely the
Strait of Istanbul, the Strait of Çanakkale and the Sea of Marmara. Turkey lies at theimmediate southern part of the Black Sea having the longest shoreline with 2640 kilometersand exercising jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits via a sui generis regime in accordance with
14

Montreux Convention of 1936 which Japan is also a signatory.
For almost 70 years, this Convention has been functioning effectively. It stipulates thepassage through the Turkish Straits and regulates tonnage, presence and duration of stay of
war ships in the Black Sea.
In fact, the Black Sea, itself, has not been a sea of conflict during the entire period of
the precarious Cold War years, mainly due to the balance carefully established by theMontreux Convention. I would like to recall that the then littoral states were the Soviet Union,
Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, namely one NATO member versus three Warsaw Pactmembers, one of which was the other super power.
With the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area started experiencing a majortransition. Since then, the geo‐strategic portrait of the region has changed. The region has
witnessed the expansion of both NATO and the European Union. Today, the integration of theBlack Sea countries into the Euro‐Atlantic institutions is still underway.
The Black Sea region has always been a priority for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has
been the initiator of many of the existing regional cooperation mechanisms. The Main pillars
of Turkey’s policy towards the region have been inclusiveness and transparency. In otherwords, any action in the region must rely on mutual respect, with a special emphasis on theregional countries’ priorities and needs, and should not exclude anyone. These principles are
deemed crucial as they are the very principles that would ensure the prevention of creating
new dividing lines in the Black Sea region. Social and economic development as well as
effective foundation and maintenance of democratic systems of government and society arealso important elements for peace and stability in the region.
Security Implications in the Black Sea:
There have been a number of studies that have attempted to define the concept of
security. However, as many authors have indicated, security is multi‐dimensional in natureand diverse in practice. This diversity leads to difficulty in providing a single allencompassing definition of security.
Cognizant of this fact, our approach to security is also multi‐dimensional and not
limited to hard security concerns alone. Climate change, for instance, is a global problem also
evolving into a security issue in its own right, with serious implications in many fields.
Epidemic diseases are no longer tragedies that only threaten the less fortunate areas in theworld. The current financial crisis speaks for itself when we look at how badly it affectedeconomies worldwide. Illegal migration, organized crime, energy security, democratization
also stick out as crucial topics that are bound to dominate the regional as well as global
agenda.
However, maritime security in the Black Sea requires a clear distinction. The Black Sea
maritime area is surrounded by 6 littoral states, namely, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia,
Ukraine and Georgia.
The Black Sea region, on the other hand, forms an integral part of the wider area
comprising the Balkans, the Caucasus including the Caspian Sea and beyond, as well as theEastern Mediterranean reaching into the Middle East. The region is at the converging point of
the three major continents and it embodies strategic trade, transport and energy routes ofEurasia. Taking into consideration also is economic and human potential as well as the vast
natural resources, the Black Sea Area, undoubtedly, is very important in terms of global
security.
The challenges faced in the maritime area on one hand and the wider Black Sea areaon the other, are different in nature and scale. The maritime area is relatively immune from15

immediate risks, and the littoral states have been able to develop efficient means to deter
those that may arise in the future. The wider region, instead, involves a number of hot andfrozen conflicts such as Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans‐Dniestria,
energy security issues, and other broader challenges which I mentioned earlier.
The two dimensions of the Black Sea, therefore, do not involve the same actors either.
While the maritime area is, first and foremost, dealt with by the six littorals, the wider BlackSea Area issues may involve some non‐regional actors, in addition to countries surrounding
the Black Sea without necessarily having a coastline.
Turkey’s Black Sea security policy:
The underlying philosophy of Turkey’s Black Sea security policy is in harmony withthe policies and attempts to reach out its neighbours bordering Turkey: We are seeking tobuild a neighbourhood that enjoys lasting peace, stability and economic prosperity.
We have adopted a bold and active strategy to free our relations with our neighbors
from all problems. I can shortly refer it to as “zero problems with our neighbors”. In thiscontext, let me briefly comment on our relations with our neighbors as well as other regional
issues.
We are working to maintain the positive environment that surrounds our relations
with Greece for over a decade. We continue our constructive efforts to this end. I am happy to
say that the problems we once had with Bulgaria are now history. Today Bulgaria is a NATO
ally. Likewise, we enjoy very good relations with other Black Sea littoral states like Romania
and Ukraine. Russia has also evolved into being Turkey’s biggest foreign trade partner. We
fully cooperate with Russia in many fields ranging from construction to energy issues.
The existence of frozen conflicts in the region that I alluded to earlier is a major sourceof concern for Turkey. They should be carefully managed if not resolved. A case in point is the
clashes that have occurred in the summer of 2008 in the Caucasus, situated in Russia’s south
and Turkey’s east. They have clearly demonstrated that the frozen conflicts of the region
could easily lead to war. Mistrust played a pivotal role in the sparking of this conflict. It also
showed, yet again, the need for a dialogue platform that would assist in overcoming mistrustand bring all related parties together.
Turkey took the lead initiative in this issue as well, paving the way for the creation of
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Countries in the region support thisinitiative and hopefully it will create new and constructive dynamics that will assist in thecomprehensive settlement of all Caucasian disputes. We have close cultural and historical ties
with Azerbaijan, which is one of the key countries in its region. Similarly, the level of ourrelations with Georgia is very satisfactory. The world public opinion is closely following therecent bold steps we took towards the normalization of our relations with Armenia. We haveagreed on a series of issues with this country towards normalizing and improving our
relations on the basis of mutual respect. We are working hard to settling the Nagorno
Karabakh issue, one of the most outstanding Caucasian problems.
Building on the security environment created by the Montreux Convention, we arealso aware that while putting into motion the objective of achieving lasting peace, stability
and economic prosperity at the regional level we need to act with our partners in the BlackSea Area. We also recognize that achieving such an objective may be a long and arduous
journey.
In the maritime security domain we launched this journey some 10 years ago.
Through Turkey’s initiative and with the participation of all littoral states the BLACKSEAFOR
came into being. The BLACKSEAFOR has been designed as a mechanism to help building
16

confidence among littoral states through activities jointly carried out on areas such as
humanitarian aid, search and rescue, environmental protection and port visits.
In addition to that, in 2004, the Turkish Navy initiated the Operation Black Sea
Harmony (OBSH) which was designed on the one hand to synchronize the Black Sea’s
security environment with the global efforts against asymmetric risks and threats, and on theother hand, to harmonize the activities conducted in this spirit by different littoral states.
OBSH is also closely affiliated with NATO and complements Operation Active Endeavour
conducted in the Mediterranean. The findings of OBSH are shared with NATO through CC
Mar Naples on a daily basis. NATO Military authorities have recognized the efficiency of thismechanism.
The Establishment of BSEC:
In the Black Sea context there has been a separation between soft and hard security
domains although they are related, inter‐linked and mutually supportive. This separation wasmade for practical reasons, in order not to block cooperation among regional countries withmajor political problems.
After the end of the Cold War, as a confidence building soft security measure, Turkey
took the lead to launch an economic cooperation initiative to help transform the centrally
planned economies of the Soviet era and integrate them into the world economy, so that thepotential of the region could be maximized. Hence, the establishment of the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992. The main idea of this initiative was thatstronger economic cooperation and interdependence among the Black Sea countries will
enhance peace and stability in the region.
BSEC was created specifically to encourage active contribution of all the countries in
the Black Sea Area to the welfare and stability of the region. Today, after almost two decades,
BSEC has reached an institutional maturity, and is now the most established andcomprehensive cooperation organization in the Black Sea Area with a well‐established legal
and procedural framework. It is an important contributor to peace and stability in the region
bringing together all countries of the wider Black Sea region in a spirit of confidence andconstructive cooperation. It is particularly interesting to note that some of the members of
BSEC, which have had conflicting relations with each other in other fora, have demonstrated
a fairly sustainable working relationship within the framework of BSEC.
Despite the difficult times that the region has been going through recently, such as in
the case of the Russian‐Georgian conflict of 2008, BSEC meetings has continued to take place
in a friendly and constructive atmosphere. This has been a clear indication of the commitmentof all the member states to BSEC and to its goals of turning the BSEC Region into a region ofpeace, stability and prosperity through economic cooperation.
The cooperation within BSEC has not reached its true potential yet, particularly
because of the fact that its members have had diverging priorities. However, the interests of
the BSEC Member States have begun to converge in recent years and they are now able todevelop common strategies and approaches on various areas, such as energy, transport andprotection of the environment.
Energy supply security has become one of the most important issues which dominates
the international agenda. In this respect, the wider Black Sea region, where energy producer
countries co‐exist with energy consumer and transit countries, presents us a unique case interms of global energy supply security. This unique position of the Black Sea brings with it
important duties and responsibilities to the countries of the region.
BSEC members possess the world’s largest oil and gas reserves after the Middle East.
17

Russia is the world’s largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. Azerbaijan is another major oil
and gas producing country. BSEC neighbors Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, large producersof oil and gas, depend on BSEC members to export their production to world markets.
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and recently Greece are serving as energy
corridors to Western Europe. Further projects for alternative oil pipelines are in the advancedplanning stage to relieve the Turkish Straits from the heavy tanker traffic which poses a grave
threat to human life and the marine environment.
The ongoing exploration activities, scientific research and newly discovered fields
have demonstrated that the region has a vast potential in hydrocarbon resources both interms of oil and natural gas. There are a number of promising areas for future exploration andproduction. This has been an encouraging development for companies to make newinvestments in the region.
In strategic terms, the region’s proximity to oil and gas resources and to all otherpipeline projects that by‐pass the Turkish Straits makes the Black Sea region even morecrucial for consumer countries as well as international stakeholders such as oil and gas
companies.
In this regard, projects such as Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan, Baku‐Tbilisi‐Erzurum and Blue
Stream, which have already become operational, will definitely enhance regional and global
energy supply security by providing source and route diversification. Likewise, Nabucco andSouth Stream projects will not only have a positive impact on the energy security of the BlackSea region, but will also greatly contribute to the increasing natural gas needs of theEuropean markets.
Let me underline at this point that, in many of these projects we have enjoyed the vital
contributions of the Japanese companies, which we hope will continue also in the future. In
fact, we also wholeheartedly support, the application of Japan for observer status to BSEC,
which is viewed by the international community as an anchor of cooperation in the region.
BSEC‐European Union Interaction:
The EU Commission has been granted observer status within BSEC, during Turkey’s
Chairmanship‐in‐office, in 2007. This has allowed the EU Commission to follow theactivities of the BSEC and the opportunities and potential it offers for a mutually beneficial
and fruitful cooperation between the two organizations.
BSEC and the EU have every reason to engage in closer dialogue and cooperation.
After Greece, with Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU in 2007, there are now three
BSEC Member States, which are at the same time members of the EU. In other words, theEuropean Union has become a littoral of the Black Sea. Among the countries in the region,
Turkey is an accession country while Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia andMoldova are partners of the European Neighborhood Policy within the framework of Eastern
Partnership. The Russian Federation is also a strategic partner of the EU.
Conclusion:
Peace and stability are as much important for each country as they are for regions.
Therefore, from maritime security mechanisms to the establishment of BSEC, in all these
initiatives, Turkey is making every effort to enhancing confidence and strengthening peace
and prosperity in the region and on a wider scale.
In today’s world, engagement has proven to be the most effective mechanism inuniting nations around universal values and interests. Having said so, enhanced cooperation18

in the Black Sea region with the involvement of the EU, Japan and other interested
stakeholders who uphold universal values, such as democracy, peaceful engagement and ruleof law will generate not only economic benefits, but also contribute to the building ofconfidence and stability in the region.
Thank you for your attention.

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo
Professor, University of Shizuoka
Transformation of Relations among the Big Powers over the Black Sea Region
after the Georgian War
1. Increased tension between Russia and the West over the Black Sea Region
The balance of power among the big powers—the EU, NATO, and the US on the one hand,
and Russia on the other—in the Black Sea region has been transformed every two or three
years in the recent past. During 2003 and 2004, it was inclined favorably toward the Western
powers as a result of the EU/NATO enlargements in the spring of 2004, as well as the Rose
and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The EU/NATOenlargement to the Central and East European states caused increased debate within theWestern New Independent States (WNIS) and the southern Caucasus over both the choice
between domestic reform or status‐quo of their regimes and the choice between accession to
the EU/NATO or strengthening relations with Russia. Domestic confrontations over thesechoices, together with unfair parliamentary or presidential elections in Georgia and Ukraine,brought about the Rose and Orange revolutions in the two states. These revolutions, and newpolitical tendencies in Moldova after the Kozak Memorundam (November 2003), caused arevitalization of the GUAM at the Chisinau Summit in 2005 and at the Kiev Summit in 2006.
As a result, the movement towards Brussels in the northern and eastern parts of the Black Sea
region increased.
However, the pendulum began to swing back in 2005. The US had enjoyed unilateralism
after the end of the Cold War, but it began devoting more and more of its energy to the Iraq
issue. The EU failed to adopt a new Constitution, and its internal integration began to decline.
NATO also had serious difficulties with ISAF activities in Afghanistan. In this situation, after
reviewing its foreign policy, Russia adopted a newly assertive one, and regained its power
and influence over its ‘Near Abroad’. Russia implemented economic sanctions against
Georgia and Moldova in 2005, and attempted to raise the price of oil and gas to theinternational standard in 2006. In addition, President Putin severely criticized the West in aspeech in Munich in February 2007, and declared in July 2007 that Russia would suspend the
CFE treaty that December. President Putin’s confident speech at Munich in February 2007
showed clearly that Russia had completely recovered its power in the region, and that it had
also become a powerful, self‐confident power in international politics.
But this new‐found Russian confidence caused relations between Russia andUkraine/Georgia, and between Russia and the West to deteriorate. i The EU under theGerman Presidency during the first half of 2007 advocated the necessity of strengthening the
ENP into the ENP Plus and the creation of the EU’s Central Asia strategy, as well as the19continuation of stable relations with Russia. The EU also held the launch meeting of the BlackSea Synergy in February 2008, through which it started to support regional cooperation in theBlack Sea region, as well as to promote relations between the EU and the region. NATO also
strengthened its eastern policy through the adoption of the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine
in May 2005 and Georgia in September 2006. US President George Bush praised the color
revolutions in Riga and Tbilisi in 2005, while Vice‐President Dick Cheney made a criticalspeech on the insufficiencies of Russian democratic and human rights policies in Vilnius in
May 2006. Thus relations between the US and Russia were set back greatly from the warm
and trusting relations between the two presidents at the Ljubljana summit in 2001.
Just at the time when relations between the West and Russia became tense over the BlackSea region, Japan proclaimed its “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” on 30 November 2006. This
new direction in Japan’s foreign policy, to extend its diplomatic horizon through Eurasia to
Europe from Asia‐Pacific region and to contribute to the stability and peace of Eurasia
including the Black Sea region, seemed to be welcomed and highly appreciated by the Blacksea states as well as the US, the EU, NATO, and the European states.
2. The War in Georgia and Its Impact on Georgia and Russia
In this way, relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia, and between Russia and theWest, became tense during 2005 and 2006. The independence of Kosovo and the declarationof NATO at the Bucharest summit in April 2008 caused relations to further deteriorate. The
Georgia‐Russia confrontation escalated from economic sanctions to politico‐military
dimensions. After the US and the European states had recognized the independence ofKosovo in February 2008, Russia’s Duma declared on the 21st of March that the independenceof South Ossetia and Abkhazia should be recognized as well.ii And during March and May of2008, Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles were flown over the conflict zone.iii In addition,
immediately after the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008 approved that Ukraine andGeorgia would become members of NATO, President Putin issued a presidential order on the
16th of April that relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia would become official.iv This
indicated that Russia had abandoned its official policy of supporting Georgia’s territorial
integrity. After that, Russia increased its military forces in Abkhazia, and repaired the railway
connecting Russia with Abkhazia.v On the other hand, it was rumored that Georgian hawkish
elements were planning to occupy southern part of Abkhazia with military forces.vi Thus asituation was created in which Russia and Georgia might start a war with each other at any
time. And one did start in August 2008.
The impact of the war was quite different on Georgia and on Russia. The war had a very
negative effect on Georgia, while it seems to have contributed to creating a favorable
international environment for Russia. Georgia lost the war, suffered enormous damage, andeven gave Russia the opportunity to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Because of this, Georgia now has only two alternatives: 1) to give up its accession
to the NATO, and so turn towards a pro‐Russia policy in order to negotiate with Russia withthe aim to recover its territorial integrity, or 2) to pursue NATO membership without South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. But neither of these options can be realized without great pains. Thus,
for the time being, the Georgian government will make efforts to recover from the war
damage and to implement the conditions imposed by NATO/EU for accession, such as
democratization, a market economy, etc. At the same time, the Georgian government willattempt to create an international environment which will make it possible to recover its
territorial integrity, while at the same time waiting for the moment that Russia will be obliged
to abandon South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, even by following these policies, itappears that it will be quite difficult for Georgia to secure both objectives – territorial
20

integrity, and accession to NATO. In brief, the war has now made it much more difficult torealize these two objectives.
At the same time, Russia lost credibility in international community by having useddisproportionate military force against Georgia, and was isolated for recognizing theindependence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But this was only a temporary phenomenon.
Viewed from a long‐term perspective, by having sent a clear message to the West during theWar, Russia seems to be creating an international environment favorable to its national
interests. Russia showed the West its firm will to oppose Georgian accession to NATO withuse of military force, and its willingness to sacrifice good relations with the West. This is why
the West froze relations with Russia temporarily, but shortly afterward moved toward arapprochement with Russia through a process of reviewing its relations with the country.
Despite Russia recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia andstrengthening its military forces in these two regions, the US claimed a necessity to “reset” its
relations with Russia, and the EU and the NATO also decided to normalize their relations
with Russia. In addition, new voices have been heard in the West claiming even that Russia
should be included in the European security system.
3. Towards Rapprochement between the West and Russia after the Georgian War(1) “Reset” of relations between the US and Russia
Vice‐President Biden said in his address at Munich on the 7th of February 2009 that “it’stime to press the reset button” on relations with Russia.vii The presidents of both the US andRussia agreed at the meeting on the 1st of April 2009 in London that they would strengthen
cooperation in areas of common interest such as reduction of nuclear weapons,
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, anti‐terrorism, economic stability, the Middle East peace,etc.viii At the Moscow Summit in July 2009, the US and Russia signed a document of Joint
Understanding for a follow‐on treaty to the START1 treaty, as well as an agreement on
military transit to Afghanistan. In addition, both states agreed to organize a presidentialcommittee which will discuss economic development, energy, environment, etc. ix It wasannounced at the end of December 2009 that a follow‐on treaty to the START 1 treaty would
be signed in January 2010.x
In addition, the Obama administration started to tackle the missile defense issue as well,sending a letter to President Medvedev in February 2009. The letter suggested that President
Obama would suspend the deployment of a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe if
Moscow would help stop Iran from developing long‐range weapons.xi President Obama saidin July that he understood Russian sensitivity about the missile defense issue, and made it
clear that his administration was carrying out a comprehensive review of the issue.xii
President Obama declared on the 17th of September 2009 that the US would adopt a gradualand adaptable approach to European missile defense, and that it would no longer deploy
missiles and radar in Central Europe.xiii In this way, the US has promoted its “reset” policy
with Russia.
(2) NATO‐Russia relations
In his declaration of April 16th, 2008, the Secretary General of NATO criticized Russia forestablishing legal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia xiv , and on the 3rd of June
expressed his deep concern over the stationing of several hundred Russian soldiers andrailway army troops in Abkhazia. xv He also urged an immediate stop to militaryconfrontation in Georgia on August 8th. xvi The North Atlantic Council meeting ofambassadors was convened on the 12th of August, and it expressed regret at the Russian use
21

of disproportionate military force in Georgia, urging Russia to respect the territorial integrityof the country.xvii The NAC special Foreign Ministers meeting held on the 19th of August
urged an immediate withdrawal of the Russian army, and announced that the NATO‐Russia
Council would be postponed until Russia adhered to the cease‐fire. It also reconfirmed thesignificance of urgent implementation of the Georgian‐Russian agreement, its support for
Georgian territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, the creation of a
NATO‐Georgian Commission, a follow‐up to the decision made at the NATO Bucharest
summit through its Commission, and several other policies supporting Georgia. xviii In
addition, NATO criticized the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia by Russia as a violation of the UN decision on Georgian territorial integrity andasked Russia to implement the six‐principle agreement.xix
In this way, NATO had maintained a strict stance towards Russia before, during and after
the Georgian War. However, the NATO Ministerial meeting on the 3rd of December 2008
pointed out the significance of relations with Russia, and it decided to adopt ‘a measured andphased approach’. That is to say, NATO decided to reopen relations with Russia at thepolitical level led by the Secretary General as well as through unofficial meetings of the NRC.
xx In addition, it also decided that MAP status would not be offered to Ukraine and Georgia as
both ‘had significant work left to do’.xxi
At the NRC meeting reopened in Corfu on the 27th of June 2009, structural reform of the
NRC was examined, and it was emphasized that the NRC should be an effective andvaluable institution for political dialogue and cooperation.xxii Choosing the Russian issue forhis inauguration speech, the new Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen,emphasized strengthening cooperation with Russia in areas of common interest, making the
NRC a forum for the discussion of security issues and consulting with Russia about the 21
century’s challenges of security towards productive relations with Russia.xxiii Taking into
consideration that the NRC did not function effectively at the time of the war in Georgia, theidea emerged that the NRC should be a forum for political dialogue with Russia at critical
moments. Based on a review of the NRC, the NRC meeting on the 4th of December 2009 agreed
to launch the NRC Work Programs for 2010, a reform of the NRC, and a co‐examination of the
security challenges of the 21 century.xxiv(3) EU‐Russia relations
Once the war in Georgia broke out, France, the presidential state of the EU at that time,
took the initiative to conclude the six‐point agreement between Georgia and Russia. xxv
Furthermore, the EU released one million euros in fast‐track aid to help with urgent
humanitarian needs on August 10th, and offered civil protection support through theMonitor Information Center (MIC).xxvi The extraordinary meeting of the European Council
on September 1st criticized the Russian recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and decided to postpone negotiations on a new partnership cooperation agreementwith Russia until it withdrew its military forces to the position held prior to August 7th.xxvii
In addition, the EU decided on September 15th that it would send a Monitor Mission to
Georgia by October 1st.xxviii
However, on October 13th the Council of the European Union expressed satisfaction withthe completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the adjacent regions of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia.xxix A communication from the Commission to the Council on November 5themphasized the necessity of restarting negotiations on a new strategic partnership agreementwith Russia, which had been postponed since the Georgian war.xxx According to theCommunication, the EU‐Russia summit was held in Nice on the 14th of November 2008. The
EU noted Russia’s fulfillment of the cease‐fire agreement, its withdrawal of troops, the EU22

observer mission to Georgia, the start of negotiations in Geneva, and confirmed thecontinuation of the Partnership agreement negotiations and EU support for the accession of
Russia to the WTO.xxxi Then EU‐Russia summits were held twice, in May and November of2009, in which the two sides discussed bilateral problems such as the impact of the world
economic crisis, the four Common Spaces, trade, human rights, new partnership cooperationagreement negotiations, energy issues, visa issues, Russian accession to the WTO, etc. as wellas international problems such as those in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran and Sri
Lanka.xxxii These meetings produced such outcomes as the signing of the agreement on theenergy ‘Early Warning Mechanism’.xxxiii(4) European Security Treaty
Another new tendency that appeared in the international community after the Georgian
war was the idea to include Russia in a European security system. This was a response by thecommunity to the proposal by Russian President Medvedev regarding a European security
treaty. In several speeches after the Russia‐German summit in June 2008, President
Medvedev talked about the conclusion of a European security treaty, which could offer
equal and reliable security to all states through legally binding agreements.xxxiv According to
his idea, security should be indivisible and cannot be discussed with sacrifice of the others’
security.
Some states such as Germany and France responded affirmatively to the Medvedev
proposal, as the President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkelʹs joint article of February 2009
showed.xxxv This response might have come from the lessons of the Georgian war. The Russian
military attack against Georgia made political elites in Europe realize the necessity ofincluding Russia in the European security system. Firstly, the inclusion of Russia might
contribute to a transformation of Russia from a revisionist state into a status‐quo one for theEuropean security system. Secondly, it also might make it possible to control Russian behavior
within such a system, and to prevent Russia from behaving unilaterally with its militaryforces. Thirdly, the Russian military attack against Georgia made it clear to European politicalelites that they should take Russian opposition to the NATO enlargement seriously. In order tosoften Russia’s firm opposition to the NATO enlargement, they understood that it is essential
to reconcile with Russia and, for this purpose, to include Russia in the European security
system.
4. Obstacles to rapprochement between the West and Russia
Relations between the West and Russia have improved considerably since the war inGeorgia, a time when they were ‘worse and more dangerous than at any time since thebeginning of the 1980s’.xxxvi This is because both the West and Russia realized the necessity ofcooperating in areas of shared interest in a situation both of increased interdependency in a
globalised world and of international economic and financial crisis that began in the autumn
of 2008. However, this raised the problem of whether these cooperative relations limited toshared interests will be able to develop into truly stable and comprehensively cooperative
relations in a variety of areas.
(1) Missile Defense
Unfortunately, we cannot help but recognize the existence of obstacles which lie before therelations between the US and Russia. It is true that the issues of missile defense and nuclear
disarmament have almost been resolved, but the revision of missile defense policy by the US
administration might imply that the Obama administration has set rapprochement with
Russia above the security demands of the Central European states. Poland and the Czech
23

Republic sought the assurance of their defense and security by strengthening bilateralrelations with the US, because NATO’s collective defense role has been reduced by the
expedition of NATO military forces to places out of area and by its increased global
partnerships. Therefore, the political leaders of the Central and East European states sent an
open letter to President Obama attempting to remind US political elites that Russia was still a‘revisionist power’ in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Eurasia.xxxvii Vice‐President
Biden visited Warsaw, Prague and Bucharest in October 2009, and attempted to reassure
these states of the US commitment to Central and Eastern Europe.xxxviii But it is quite unclear
whether his visit had succeeded in reassuring them.
In addition, we should also take into consideration the variety of interests within Europe,
as well as between the US and Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the states of ‘Old Europe’opposed the Bush Plan to deploy defense missiles in Central Europe as it invited Russian
retaliation in the form of missile deployment in Kaliningrad. Some political elites andambassadors of the Balkan EU/NATO member states and Ukraine appreciate the new missile
defense policy of the Obama administration as it will be able to cover Europe as a whole. It is
worth noting that interests concerning missile defense policy are divided within the
EU/NATO member states.
(2) NATO Enlargement
Another obstacle for Russia‐US relations is NATO enlargement. NATO refrained fromgiving MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December
2008 and at the NATO summit in the spring of 2009. However, at the NATO meeting it was
decided that NATO would continue to assist the efforts of Ukraine and Georgia towards
accession to the organization, making use of the NATO‐Ukraine Commission and theNATO‐Georgia Commission (created in August 2008).xxxix They agreed that the criteria foraccession would be implemented through Annual National Programs (ANP) on behalf of
MAP. This was the result of a compromise between the NATO member states supporting
NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia and the states opposing it. These factors indicatethat the NATO enlargement issue has not yet been resolved.
(3) Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
The US and Russia almost reached at the end of 2009 an agreement on nuclear
disarmament after the START1 treaty had expired. However, the issue of the CFE treaty has
not yet been resolved since Russia’s unilateral suspension of it in December 2007. Thus
security based on conventional forces in Europe has remained unstable.
The CFE treaty was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1992. But the international
environment in which the CFE Treaty was adopted and was functioning was radicallytransformed once three former Warsaw Treaty Organization members became members of
the NATO. Thus the CFE Treaty needed to be revised in accordance with the newinternational situation which came about after NATO enlargement. So the Adapted CFE
Treaty was signed in 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE summit. Russia ratified it, but the NATOstates failed to ratify it for the reason that Russia had not implemented the Istanbul
commitment to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. In this situation, Russia
declared in July 2007 that it would suspend the CFE treaty in December of that year if theNATO members did not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. Furthermore, Russia demanded theabolition of the flank restriction between north and south within Russian territory, accessionof the Baltic states to the Adapted CFE Treaty, and a review of the numerical ceilings on arms
deployment in Bulgaria and Rumania, taking into consideration that the US had concluded
agreements with both countries on the use of their military bases.xl
24

(4) European Security Treaty
Russia and the West seem to have quite different expectations of the European security
treaty proposed by President Medvedev since his visit to Germany in July 2008. Russia
expects to participate in the decision‐making process on European security issues, and wants
to influence on them according to its national interests. Furthermore, judging from articles 1,2, 6‐3, 9‐2 and 9‐3 of the draft treaty, Russia appears to be aiming at a reduction in the role ofNATO in European security.
On the other hand, the US and the European states want to promote good and stable
relations with Russia by including Russia in the European security system. They expect thatcooperation with Russia would make it easier to resolve international issues. In addition, they
suppose that engaging Russia in a European security treaty would make it possible to control
Russian unilateral behavior within the security system.
However, there are a variety of views in the West on the relationship between a new
European security treaty and NATO. Some insist that NATO should be open to Russian
accession,xli while others say that the major issues for NATO, such as collective defense andorganizational enlargement, should be decided within the NATO decision‐making processaccording to its own procedure. This is why well‐known political scientist and former US
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski might propose a European security system
which keeps NATO’s security role and current structure, and, at the same time, allows NATOto cooperate with Russia, CSTO and SCO.xlii In fact, this idea on a new European Security isalso advocated by a Russian political scientist with whom the author has spoken to. Russian
experts on international politics have in mind concepts about the European security systemsuch as a collective security system within the OSCE, a new comprehensive collective security
system, a security system composed of NATO and Russia (including current nonmembers ofNATO), etc.xliii(5) Eastern Partnership of the EU
Besides negotiations on a new strategic partnership agreement, Russian accession to the
WTO, the four common spaces, etc., one of the most significant issues for Russia‐EU relations
is the Eastern Partnership inaugurated in May 2009, which targets Ukraine, Moldova, thethree South Caucasian states, and Belarus. Its objectives are said to be to prepare the accession
to the EU of these eastern neighbors, in particular Ukraine, through the conclusion of
association agreements, special agreements on energy, environment, science, transport, visa
facilitation and the creation of a profound and comprehensive free trade area in preparation
for the moment that the EU would be able to enlarge. Thus if the Eastern Partnership
succeeds in strengthening the EU’s relations with these Eastern European states, it isinevitable that Russian isolation will increase. The integration of Ukraine into the Union in
the area of energy has been actively pursued, and it is said that Ukraine is set to become amember of the Energy Community of the Union in the near future. In such a situation,
Ukraineʹs electricity sector would be run according to EU rules. Such an approach of the
Ukraine to the EU can also be seen in the start of negotiations on a profound andcomprehensive free trade area in the spring of 2008, despite Ukraine having fluctuatedbetween joining the Single Economic Area with Russia and accession to the EU until a few
years ago.
5. Status‐quo and revisionism in the Black Sea region
We have discussed relations among the big actors of Wider Europe, but it goes without
saying that these relations are closely correlated with the international relations of the Black25

Sea region. Thus, according to the characteristics of the relations among the big actors, BlackSea international politics have converged into two confrontational tendencies. One is thestatus quo of maintaining the current balance of power in the Black Sea region by keeping theregion as closed as possible, and the other is the revisionism of opening the Black Sea region
to Wider Europe as a whole by strengthening relations with the EU, NATO and the US. This
international structure composed of status quo and revisionism in the Black Sea region can bediscerned not only in the dimension of relations between the Black Sea states, but also in
sub‐national, trans‐national and regional dimensions around the Black Sea region. Thus
sub‐national and trans‐national actors such as political elites, ethnic organizations, religiousorganizations, military organizations, NGOs seeking democracy, enterprises, terrorist
organizations, organized crime syndicates, local entities, etc., in the Black Sea region havepromoted activities supporting the status‐quo or revisionism in the Black Sea region. Thisbi‐polar structure is noticeable in the issues characteristic of the region, such as the frozen
conflicts, democratization, and energy security. This bi‐polar structure has influenced regional
cooperation within the BSEC and through the EU’s Black Sea Synergy as well.
So, how will the transformation of relations among the big actors since the end of the
Georgian war influence Black Sea international politics, and in particular the relations
between status‐quo forces and revisionist forces in national, sub‐national, trans‐national andregional dimensions? And conversely, how will Black Sea international relations in these four
dimensions influence power relations among the big actors in Wider Europe international
relations? And will cooperative relations among the big actors facilitate Black Sea regional
cooperation within the BSEC and through EU’s the Black Sea Synergy? The answers to each ofthese questions remain to be seen.

iAzerbaijan seems to have kept good relations with Russia as well as GUAM. Moldovan
Government under President Voronin moved to rapprochement with Russia since thesummer 2006 and he no more participated in GUAM summit since the 2007 Baku Summit.
ii Russia: Duma Treads Warily Over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester Status,
RFE/RL, March 14, 2008. Russia:Duma Votes To Back Separatist Efforts in Georgia, RFE/RL,
March 22, 2008.
iii Report of UNOMIG on the Incident of 20 April Involving the Dawning of a Georgia
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle over the Zone of Conflict.
iv Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release, The Russian President
Instruction to the Russian Federation Government with Regard to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, 501‐16‐04‐2008.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release, Measures
to Strengthen the Collective CIS Peace Keeping Force in the Georgian‐Abkhaz Zone ofv

Conflict, 588‐29‐04‐2008.
vi Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, International Crisis Group, 5 June 2008,
pp.7‐8.
vii Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, The WhiteHouse, February 7, 2009.
viii The White House Blog, Reset with Russia, April 1, 2009.
ix White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by President Obama andPresident Medvedev of Russia、July 6, 2009.
x RIANOVOSTI, December 21, 2009.
xi The New York Times, March 2 and 3, 2009.

26

xii

White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Transcript of President Obamaʹs Interview with
Novaya Gazeta, July 6, 2009.
xiii White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on US Missile Defense Policy, AʺPhased, Adaptive Approachʺ for Missile Defense in Europe, September 17, 2009.
xiv Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 16 April 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7247.htm?=news
xv NATO Secretary General’s Statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into
Georgia, 02 June 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news=7760.htm?mode=news
xvi Statement by the NATO Secretary General on events in South Ossetia, 08 August 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_37136.htm?mode=news
xvii North Atlantic Council discuss situation in Georgia, 12 August 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43416.htm?mode=news
xviii NATOʹs foreign ministers reiterate their support for Georgia.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43513.htm?mode=news
xix Statement by the Secretary General of NATO on the Russian recognition of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia, 26 August 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43516.htm?mode=news. Statement by the North
Atlantic Council on the Russian recognition on South Ossetia and Abkhajia regions of Georgia,
27 August 2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43517.htm?mode=news
xx Allies send a signal to Russia, 03 December 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_51108.htm?mode=newsxxi Allies discuss relations with Ukraine and Georgia and send a signal to Russia, 03 December
2008. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_46747.htm?mode=newsxxii Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Meeting of the
NATO‐Russia Council, Corfu, Greece 27 June 2009.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_55957.htm
xxiii ʺNATO and Russia: A New Beginningʺ, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 September 2008.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news=7760.htm?mode=news
xxiv NATO and Russia agree to move partnership forward, 04 December 2009.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59970.htm?
xxv Council Conclusion on the situation in Georgia, General Affairs and External Relations
Council, Extraordinary Session, Brussels, 13 August 2008.
xxvi Georgia: EU continues to deploy assistance to the conflict‐stricken area, IP/08/1269,
Brussels, 21 August 2008.
xxvii Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 1 September 2008, Presidency conclusions, 6October 2008, 12594/2/08, REV2.
xxviii Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, welcomes the appointment on
Hansjorg HABER as Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, Brussels, 17 September
2008, S309/08. European Union Monitoring Mission(EUMM) in Georgia, 30 September 2008,
Georgia/02.
xxix Council Conclusions on Georgia/Russia, 2897the External Relations Council meeting,
Luxemburg, 13 October 2008.
xxx Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 5.11.2008, COM(2008) 740 final,
Communication from the Commission to the Council, Review of EU‐Russia relations,
SEC(2008)2786.
xxxi Main results of the EU‐Russia Summit,
http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE‐11_2008/PFUE‐14.11.2008/CR_S...
27

xxxii

EU‐Russia Summit on 21‐22 May in Khabarovsk, IP/09?817, Brussels, 20 May 2009.
Russia raises ambitions ahead of Copenhagen,http://www.se2009.eu/en/meetings_news/2009/11/18/russia_raises_ambitions_ahead_of_cope
nhagenxxxiv President of Russia, “Speech at Serbian National Assembly”, October 20, 2009, ʺDmitry
Medvedev suggested holding a pan‐European summit to launch the process of developing a
new treaty on European security,ʺ ʺSpeech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary
and Civic Leadersʺ, June 5, 2008.
xxxv Security, our joint missionʺ ‐ President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkelʹs joint article in ʺLe
Mondeʺ, Permanent Mission of the Federal republic of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna,
SEC.DEL/31/09. 09 February 2009.
xxxvi “America, Russia and Europe” Address by Michael Mandelbaum at Kennan Institute,
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2008, p.1, http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Michael%20Mandelbaum%20on%20US‐Russia%20Relations.pdf.
xxxvii An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe,
http://wyborcza.pl/2029020,75477,6825987.html.
xxxviii Remarks by Vice President Biden in a Joint Statement with President Kaczynski,
President Palace, Warsaw, Poland, October 21, 2009, The White House, Office of the Vice
President. Remarks by Vice President Biden On America Central Europe and a Partnershipfor the 21st Century, Central University Library, Bucharest, Romania, October 22, 2009, The
White House, Office of the Vice President. Remarks by Vice President Biden in a Joint
Statement with President Basescu, Presidential Palace, Bucharest, Romania, October 22, 2009,
The White House, Office of the Vice President.
Remarks by Vice President Biden in a Joint Statement with Prime Minister Fischer, Prime
Minister Office, Prague, Czech Republic, October 23, 2009, The White House, Office of theVice President.
xxxix “Allies discuss relations with Ukraine and Georgia and send a signal to Russia”, 03
Dec.2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_46747.htm?mode=news.
xl Vladimir Socor, “Russia wants a wholly different treaty on conventional forces in Europe”,
in Eurasia Daily Monitor, volume 4, issues115, June 12, 2007.
xli Gareth Evans and Alain Deletroz, “NATO and Russia”, Reuters: Great Debate, 2 April 2009,http:www.crisisgroup.org/home/index/cfm?id=6042&1=1
xlii Zbigniew Brzezinski, “An Agenda for NATO: Towards a Global Security Web,” in Foreign
Affairs, Volume 88, September/October 2009, No.5, pp.2‐20.
xliii The author conducted interviews with political scientists from MGIMO, IMEMO,
European Institute, US and Canada Institute in Moscow in March 2009.
xxxiii28

Session II: “Challenges for Economic Development and Energy andEnvironmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Area”

Mykola KULINICH
Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan
Addressing the Challenges to Economic Development in the Black Sea Area: aUkraine’s vision
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is an honor for me to have a keynote speech at the Third Japan‐Black Sea Area
Dialogue addressing the issues of economic development in the region. For my country,
Ukraine, Black Sea Region is strategically important in terms of both economic cooperationand national security. The pace of regional integration of BSEC is closely related to theeconomic development of each of the member‐countries as well as interregional trade,financial and energy cooperation.
On the one hand, half of the states in the Black Sea Area are under the process of thepolitical and economic transformation aimed at economic liberalization and reforms. The
differences in the level of economic development, membership status in EU and WTO andsize of the economies put a lot of challenges to economic cooperation within the institutionalframework of the regional organization. On the other hand, BSEC countries with the
population of 330 mil people, rich of national resources, developed industrial base have asignificant potential for developing closer economic ties in many areas, such as energy,
infrastructure, finance, trade, agriculture, tourism and environmental policy.
I would like to note that from November 2007, when the 2nd Japan Black Sea Area
Dialog was held, to April 2008 Ukraine exercised Chairmanship in BSEC. During this time weheld a number of events to promote sectoral cooperation in different areas of economy, forexample, the First BSEC Banking Forum in Kyiv, the First Container Summit in Odessa, anumber of other ministerial meetings on energy, transport, science and technology, education,custom services.
Further, I would like to briefly touch upon challenges to economic development in theBlack Sea Area, which require collective and coordinated actions of the member‐states.
1.
Nowadays the financial economic crisis, which started in September 2008 andadversely affected the global economy, became a new test for the BSEC regional economic
development and cooperation. As a result of capital outflows, falling industrial output anddemand, high unemployment rate, and banks’ liquidity squeeze, the period of high economic
growth in many BSEC countries has ended. Ukraine is not an exception and, unfortunately, isin the list of the countries which suffered the most because of the export dependent economic
structure and weak banking system. Although the damage from the crisis varies from country
to country, the overall impact on the Black Sea Region was very negative. In 2009 it isexpected that the GDP growth rate in Black Sea Area would be ‐6‐7%.
29

The current crisis demonstrated how economically interconnected andinterdependent countries are, and that they cannot tackle the global crisis only on a domestic
level, but must join their efforts and act together to fight with the consequences of the crisisand take measures to prevent a new one.
On an individual basis, national governments used various financial mechanisms to
avoid collapse of banking system and stimulate the economy. Some of the countries,
including Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and others received financial assistance from IMF andother international institutions. While these measures are effective to a certain extent, it isdesirable to develop financial and banking cooperation, which aims at risk reduction andcollective guarantees on the regional level.
In this regard, financial activities of BSEC, especially the Working Group of Banking
and Finance, as a consultation mechanism, and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
require a special attention. I hope that in spite of the crisis the Bank will continue its
participation in large‐scale investment projects contributing into the process of overcoming
the economic instability in the region.
Japan also felt the negative impact of the world economic crisis. But in spite of thisJapan did not turn away its attention from the problems of other countries, but became amajor donor to international financial organizations to help countries in need support theireconomies. I should note that the third IMF tranche to Ukraine in July 2009 was fully coveredby Japan’s additional 100 bln dollars contribution to IMF. I greatly appreciate Japanesefinancial assistance and hope Japan will be able to help BSEC countries stabilize theireconomies not only through IMF, but also through private investments.
2.
Another challenge to the economic development in the Black Sea Area is energy
security and disproportional distribution of energy recourses. Traditionally the region was amajor transit zone with big energy suppliers, such as Russia and Azerbaijan. Thus, energy
cooperation within the region as well as with energy importers outside the region such as the
EU countries, have an important implication for economic development.
BCES Declaration on Cooperation with the EU in the Field of Energy, which wassigned in April 2008 in Kyiv, and the Yerevan Declaration on Energy Cooperation in the BSEC
Region, which was adopted by Energy Ministers in March last year, clearly demonstrated thewill to coordinate energy policy and integrate energy markets of the BSEC countries as wellas the EU. However, consensus on energy strategies of the member countries should be
strengthened by practical implementation of joint projects. Ukraine, as a major transit state
between Europe and Asia, has a strategic interest in energy cooperation within BSEC and
BSEC‐EU frameworks and interested in improving energy transportation infrastructure andmutually beneficial diversification of energy resources.
An important component of energy security and independence of any state isdiversification of energy resources supply and stability of energy resources transit. In theframework ofrealization of the energy policy, aimed at strengthening of the Ukraine’s
position as a reliable partner in energy sphere, my country is actively working on the issues of
establishment of new routes of energy transportation from Caspian and Middle East regions.
For example, During the Third Energy Summit in Kyiv, which was held in May, 2008, thePresident of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko initiated the Concept of the Caspian‐Black Sea‐Baltic
Energy Space in order to provide reliable, transparent and predictable energy supply toEurope. Currently the priority project in the framework of the mentioned concept isestablishment of the Euro‐Asian Transit Corridor.
In the future, the Caspian‐Black Sea‐Baltic Energy Space will help strengthen thetrust between countries in the region and reduce risks over the whole energy chain – from30

energy exploration in Caspian Sea, energy transit via Black Sea to supply on the European
market.
Heavy dependency of the most of the BSEC countries on external supply of oil andgas calls for the need to increase energy efficiency and diversify energy sources. While joint
projects in energy exploration and transportation require political will of the member states tocooperate, realization of energy saving projects could be more viable. In this regard, Japanas a pioneer of advanced technologies and one of the most energy efficient countries could bea strategic partner for BCES countries.
I can give you an example of such cooperation between Ukraine and Japan. For
Ukraine last year marked a breakthrough in implementation of Japanese energy saving
technologies within the framework of “green investment scheme” under the Kyoto protocol.
Rising gas prices and tensions with the major gas supplier, which occurred in the past, madethe Ukrainian government reconsider its energy policy and start to promote usage ofalternative sources of energy and energy saving equipments in communal services, electric
power production, metallurgy, chemical industry and other sectors. Successful
implementation of such advanced technologies is equal to the economic security and growth.
I believe Japan could play an important role in modernizing and “greening” economies of
BSEC countries on a mutually beneficial basis providing investments and technology
transfers.
3. Next, environmental issue is one of the most serious threats to the economic developmentof the Black Sea Area. It includes preservation and management of natural resources in theBlack Sea and Danube River as well addressing the problem of global warming on theregional basis. To find effective solution to ecological problems BSEC states need to join theirefforts in coordinating national environmental strategies and ecological legislation. Key issues
for environmental protection include industrial pollution, pollution of the Black Sea andrivers, waste management especially radioactive waste to name a few. In the case of Ukraine,
we are taking different measures to elimimate the consequences of Chernobyl nuclear
accident. We appreciate the assistance from Japan in this area and hope that Japan, as themost environmentally friendly nation, will help tackle ecological problems in the Black Sea
region.
4.
Formation of BSEC has happened on the intersection of trade and economic systems,
which previously had different economic development concepts. From the very beginning of
BSEC these circumstances conditioned relatively low trade turnover between the countries
with different economic systems, in spite of the diversity of industrial capacity, service sectors
and natural resources.
According to UNDP data, intra‐regional trade is on average small, not exceeding 20%of the total. Currently only Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Rumania, Turkey and Ukraine are themembers of WTO and others are still negotiating their accession to this organization. As for
Ukraine, the major trade partners in the region are only Russia and Turkey.
To increase intraregional trade, the ultimate goal of the BSEC initiative isestablishment of the “free trade zone”, however, it is more a long‐term perspective than ashort‐term goal. The main issue at stake is trade facilitation using various mechanisms such as
reduction of non‐tariffs barriers, implementation of joint economic projects, and participationin regional trade exhibition etc. Last year in October Ukraine hosted a Workshop on Customs
Data Exchange as a step to trade facilitation by reducing waiting time at the borders andcombating fraud and smuggling. I believe that real‐time exchange of information among thecustoms administrations would help both the customs and business to speed up the process31

of clearing of imported and exported goods.
At the current economic situation, when the financial crisis badly hit the regional
economy, it is important that member‐countries do not impose any additional barriers totrade to protect their economies, but follow the international principles of free trade.
Accessible and open market of the BCES countries would make the region more attractive todomestic and foreign investors which will foster private sector development. Furthermore,
open markets will promote trade with the countries outside the Black Sea Area, especiallywith EU, which is the main importer and investor for the BSEC countries.
Geographical proximity to EU and participation of three EU member states in BSEC,
on the one hand, makes EU a main economic partner for the region, but on the other hand,puts in a disadvantage position non‐EU countries. The challenge they have to face is theadaptation of their regulatory standards and product quality to the EU rules.
To develop joint economic projects and promote investment and trade in the region
and with other countries, BSEC Business Council is very instrumental. In many other regionalorganizations close business ties and cross‐countries business network were one of the main
impetuses for further institutional cooperation. In this way, I see the role of the BSEC BusinessCouncil as a collective mechanism for facilitation of partnership between government andbusiness as well as between regional private companies.
Some might argue that new projects are difficult to implement during the financial
crisis. But I would not be so negative. We should think of this crisis as an opportunity torethink the strategy to business cooperation creating opportunities for new projects ininfrastructure, agriculture, energy‐saving, tourism and other areas with the participation ofprivate and public sectors as well as foreign investors. A really important instrument forpractical implementation and financing of projects is BSEC Project Development Fund. One of
the examples of the two regional projects can be the Black Sea Ring Highway and theMotorways of the Sea. Japanese companies are very much welcomed to the Black Sea Area
not only on a country‐to‐country basis but also on a regional basis.
I am also optimistic about the activity of the Black Sea Trade and Investment
Promotion Program (BSTIP), which is a joint project between BSEC Project Development
Fund and the UNDP aimed at promoting intraregional trade and investment.
To conclude, in spite of the economic diversity and different levels of integration to
the global economic system, BSEC countries have common problems which they have to face.
Global crisis, climate change, low level of intraregional trade and investments and energy
security are the main challenges which call for joint efforts and coordinated policy among
member‐states. At the same time, Japan as one of the most advanced economies with vast
economic and financial capacities can make a significant contribution to the development of
the region through its own initiatives as well as through international organizations on amutually beneficial basis.
I hope that the Government of the Prime‐Minister Yukio Hatoyama will also see a lotof opportunities and strengthen the Japanese presence in the Black Sea Area.
Thank you for your attention.

32

MOTOMURA Masumi
Chief Researcher,Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
Energy Flow through the Black Sea Region
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and distinguished participants.
It’s a great honor for me to have an opportunity to give a keynote speech about energy
cooperation in the Back Sea Region.
Today, I would like to focus on the new pipeline projects around the Black Sea, since this
topic has been drawing attention from the governments and energy industries not only in thisregion but also from the rest of the world.
1. Progress of pipeline projects around the Black Sea
Due to potential growth for the future gas demand at around 2% per year in Europe,
several new gas pipeline projects were planned to increase gas supply to the European
market. The first one is named “Nord Stream” or “North Stream” to transport Russian gas
from Vyborg at the Baltic Sea to Greifswald in Germany. There were some concerns about
realization of this pipeline project, since this plan needs consents from the countries
surrounding the Baltic Sea.
Some people fear the growth of influence of Russia over the European gas market andanticipate that “democratic” North European countries would not allow Russian gas to betransported along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. However, most energy experts were predictingthat “Nord Stream” will be surely realized because the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates in article 79 that “All States are entitled to lay submarine
cables and pipelines on the continental shelf” and “The delineation of the course for thelaying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.”
It means the coastal state can say “yes” or “no” only on the individual pipeline route, not on
the pipeline project itself.
The governments of Denmark, Sweden and Finland gave approval for “Nord Stream”
last autumn.
Procurements for this project have been ready for two years and the construction will
start on April first this year.
Nabucco was planned to transport gas to Southern Europe from Azerbaijan and otherCaspian countries or Central Asia. The consortium was established in 2004 by Turkey,
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, and has been trying to achieve commitments forthe gas supply from the Caspian and the Central Asian countries (Fig.1).
On the other hand, Gazprom of Russia and ENI of Italy announced another gas pipeline
project named “South Stream” in June 2007, targeting the Southern European market as well.
This pipeline will start from a Russian port at the Black Sea, crossing the sea bottom, and willreach the Bulgarian coast. In Bulgaria the route diverges into two. The northern route willreach finally Northern Italy and Austria and the southern route will go through Greece, theAdriatic Sea and get to southern Italy.
33

The purpose of this project is obvious. To supply more amounts of gas in a stablemanner from the massive Russian gas fields is the most definite way to compete with
Nabucco and if possible to eliminate its influence.

Fig. 1 Nabucco Pipeline and South Stream
2. Nabucco(1) Developments in 2009
In early 2009, a series of international conferences on the Nabucco project were held on
the basis of a gas supply crunch from Russia to Ukraine and Eastern Europe in January 2009.
Finally, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in July among five transit countries:
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (Fig. 1). However, no progress has been
seen since then. The week point of Nabucco, as is often mentioned, is the lack of enoughsources to supply gas to the pipeline. The second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field offshore
Azerbaijan will produce 16Bm3, however the capacity of Nabucco is 31Bm3. There is somepossibility that the Akkas gas field in the western Iraq (close to Syria), or two gas fields in
Kurdistan will join, however the development of these fields has not yet being achieved.
(2) Transit problem with Turkey
Another problem has been Turkey’s policy. Turkey wants to purchase 15% ofthroughput gas at a discount price and has been negotiating with other partners, whichcaused disharmony among the Nabucco partners. Pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty,
freedom of transport is declared in Article 7. What Turkey is demanding may possibly be
not in accordance with this clause.
(3) Azerbaijan’s choice
Azerbaijan will start gas exports to Russia by reverse flowing of the existing pipeline,
which was used to import gas from Russia until 2005. The planned throughput was only 500
million m3 at first, however this will increase up to 2 billion m3 in 2011. This is a symboliccase to show Azerbaijan’s intention not to rely only on the Turkish route but to retain anothertransportation route.
(4) Change of US policy
Mr. Richard Morningstar, the US envoy to Eurasian Energy, said in the middle of July,when the intergovernmental agreement of Nabucco was signed, that half of the capacity is
open to the third parties of gas producing countries and Russia can supply gas to the
Nabucco pipeline. This is a very important change of policy from the USA, since the USA has
been saying that this pipeline is not only to detour Ukraine but also avoid the gas source ofRussia.

34

Fig. 2 Multiple source for the Nabucco pipeline (website of Nabucco)
We must pay attention to what Nabucco participants really want. If we take a look at thewebsite of Nabucco (Fig.2), surprisingly enough, we will find that they are saying Nabucco
will transport gas from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Egypt and so on. Only politicians say no gas
from Russia. Business people are not interested in overly politicized issues. There are lots ofarrows of gas flow from lots of countries flowing into the Nabucco pipeline
So, a question may be raised. What’s the difference between Nabucco and SouthStream? My answer is that there is no difference and this competition is meaningless. I think
the best way for the both sides is to find a way to merge.
3． South Stream
Slovenia signed the governmental agreement last November and all the transit countries
joined this project. The route has changed several times. Passing through Slovenia, thepipeline runs directly to Italy and a spur will be extended to Austria according to the lasts
plan (Fig.1).
In November, Electricite de France (EdF), a French power company, joined the SouthStream project and will takes 10% share. Gaz de France Suez has already joined the Nord
Stream project. So, this is the second time that a French company has joined a pipeline projectto accept Russian gas. It means France also wants to reserve gas to cope with increasing
demand for gas in the future.
Another surprising thing is that Turkey approved the construction of South Stream
running through the Turkish water of the Black Sea in last August, which Ukraine rejectedbluntly at the very beginning of this project.
That’s an enigma and rather difficult to understand. Turkey is a member of the Nabucco
project and it is obvious that South Stream is a competitor. But still, Turkey might have given
some favor to South Stream instead of remaining as rival. My interpretation is that it is free ofcharge to give the permission of passage in the Black Sea for the government of Turkey but it
may work as a “free pass” or an indulgence for Turkey when South Stream and Nabucco
decide to merge.
On the other hand, Russia is to pay an expensive price to Turkey.
4. Bosporous bypass oil pipeline

35Mr. Putin’s visit to Turkey in August 2009 was the most influential one. 20 documents
were signed and three important agreements about energy were included.
As I mentioned, the first one is Turkey’s approval of passage of South Stream throughthe Turkish water of the Black Sea. The second one is Russian participation in theSamsun‐Ceyhan Bosporous Bypass oil pipeline. This one is also a competitor against theRussian‐led Burgas‐ Alexandroupolis pipeline, which is another Bosporous bypass oil
pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece (Fig. 3).
It is said that the maximum capacity of the Bosporous Strait is around 2.2 million barrels
per day, which is the current level of actual transportation. Now that the oil production in the
Caspian region is souring, demurrage at the entrance of the strait is becoming a big problem.
Russia proposed a detour from Burgas of Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis of Greece andRussia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed in 2007. To oppose that, Turkey and ENI of Italy proposed
the Trans‐Anatolian or Samsun‐Ceyhan pipeline, and the both plans competed to gain
commitment of throughput from oil producing companies. Russia has been predominantsince Russian oil companies have the largest oil exports, while the Turkey‐Italy group could
accept only ENI’s products from Kazakhstan.

But now, Russia seems to have chosen ENI as a partner. It is because theSouth Stream project with ENI became the first priority for Russia.

Fig. 3

Oil pipeline network around the Black Sea

5. Blue Stream‐2
The third one is that Russia and Turkey agreed to construct Blue‐Stream‐2, which willtransport gas to Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. As I mentioned before the Nabucco
Company is looking forward to participation of Russia, however this new project might serve
as a rebuff to Naubucco.
6. Conclusion
Of course, these are all games. Before making investment, all the participants aroundthe Black Sea beat their brains out to possess the better position in the game. We should keep
in mind that those are business tactics and far from political strife. Their goal is to establish agood business model which creates value among all the participants. Stability of the business,mutual benefits, and the prosperity of this region may have the first priority.

36

Session Ⅲ: “Future Perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area Cooperation”

HASUMI Yu
Professor, Rissho University
The Role of Japan in Black Sea Area Cooperation－in comparison with the EU’s Strategy to Black Sea Area－
1. Enlargement of the EU and European Neighbourhood Policy
After the 5‐th enlargement, the EU was confronted with borders of neighbourhoodcountries with different degree of instability. Therefore the EU has major interests in seeing
stability, economic development and better governance in its neighbours. The European
Commission presented European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which covers six easternneighbours and ten Mediterranean partners －Tree Western NIS (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine),
Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt,Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority).
Based on shared values and common interests, ENP is the soft security strategy forchallenges to various issues between ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the EU. ENP is criticised for its
ambiguity, subjective assessment criteria and lacking effective mechanisms to ensure
implementation of reforms without promise of membership.
According to F. Tassinari, it is due to the fact that ENP concerns the conceptual, strategic
and spatial limits of Europe. Neighbourhood countries are meeting place of various culturesand civilisation. At the same time, the EU as ‘integration process’ meets the EU as ‘foreign
actor’ and ‘gravitational power’ meets its ‘normative power’.
Therefore the EU is unsettled in Black Sea region, although it does not come to a standstill
there.
2. Black Sea region as an arena of cooperation between heterogeneous & ‘differentiated’countries
The EU communication, Black Sea Synergy－A New Regional Cooperation, characterizes
Black Sea region as following;“The Black Sea region is a distinct geographical area rich in natural resources andstrategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. With a large
population, the region faces a range of opportunities and challenges for its citizens. The
region is an expanding market with great development potential and an important hub forenergy and transport flows. It is, however, also a region with unresolved frozen conflicts,
with many environmental problems and insufficient border controls thus encouraging illegal
migration and organised crime.”
In fact, Black Sea region comprises a group of heterogeneous countries with difference of37

economic size, institution and integration perspectives (Fig. 1). Although Organisation of theFig.1 Black Sea Region－Key Economic Characteristics (2006)

Source: V. Astrov and P. Havlik, Economic Developments in the Wider Black Sea Region, Wiiw
Research Report 349, September 2008, p.122.
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established in 1992, the present level of regional
economic integration is rather low because of their economic heterogeneity and politicalissues. Although Russia, Turkey and Ukraine as larger markets dominate regional trade, thegeographic trade patterns do not suggest economic integration of Black Sea region.
At the same time, these countries are ‘differentiated’ by the relationship with the EU as
followings;
1) The EU member countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania),
2) The EU candidate (Turkey),3) Four Common Spaces and Strategic partnership (Russia),
4) ENP‐ Black Sea Synergy (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey),‐ Eastern Partnership (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).
3. Gravitation of the EU – an emerging ‘soft’ Empire based on ‘multilateral open regional
governance’
The gravitational power of the EU is produced by ‘Community of institutions’ whichsustains 4 Communities of market, security, values and region (Fig.2). The boundary line of
the EU is fixed by ‘Community of institutions’ based on acquis communautaire. In contrast, theinfluence of market and values can go beyond the boundary. As neighbourhood countries
enjoy ‘Community of market’ and accept the norm of ‘Community of values’ (democracy, ruleof law and market economy) through ENP on joint‐ownership with the EU, there could be
development of social capital for good governance which is something in common with themodel of the EU. Eventually it could contribute to promote ‘Community of security’ of the EU38

itself. In this sense, the EU is characterized as an emerging model of ‘multilateral open
regional governance’. Therefore the EU makes the appearance as a ‘soft’ Empire based on thenormative power and ENP strategy (Fig.3). While the EU depends on the flow of oil & gasfrom neighbourhood countries, the latter were exposed to the flow of neo‐liberal ideology
Fig.2 Gravitation of the EU － an emerging model of ‘multilateral open regional
governance’

Communityof institutions

Communityof security

Communityof market

Gravitationof the EU

Communityof values

Communityof regions©Yu Hasumi

Fig.3 The EU – a ‘soft’ Empire based on the normative power and ENP
Oil & Gas and Immigrants

Neo‐liberal Ideology with shared values
Baltic Sea Region
Programme

Black Sea Synergy©Yu Hasumi

Union for the Mediterranean

39with shared values of the EUbecause of dependence on the EU market (including
immigrants).
We can see the same tendency in the EU’s strategy paper presented in June 2007, EU andCentral Asia － Strategy for a New Partnership, as followings;“With EU enlargement, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European
Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are
moving closer together”. “The EU strongly believes that strengthening the commitment ofCentral Asian States to international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values,
as well as to a market economy will promote security and stability in Central Asia, thus
making the countries of the region reliable partners for the EU with shared common interestsand goals.”
4. Comparison of Black Sea Synergy and Eastern PartnershipAs two Black sea littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU, the European
Commission presented Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative on 11
April 2007. It promotes the concept of regional cooperation (regional process) on local
ownership within the region and on the idea of sectoral partnership (issues of energy, trade,
environment, transport, good governance as well as contacts between local authorities) taking
into account interests of various actors (Table.1).
As the concept of Black Sea Synergy harmonizes that of the BSEC－most inclusive andinstitutionalized regional organisation in the Black Sea area, the EU became an observer in it.
And the first EU‐Black Sea ministerial meeting was held in February 2008. For Russia, theconsensus decision‐making rule of BSEC was attractive as an instrument for retaining control
over the EU’s insertion into the Black Sea process. Turkey was perhaps more motivated byhaving been its political initiator and with Istanbul－the location of its headquarters.
But the EU fails to act as a ‘centre of gravity’ promoting deeper regional integration ofBlack Sea region as a whole. The multilateral cooperation of the Black Sea countries with the
EU is largely confined to sectoral initiatives such as the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport toTable1 Comparison of Black Sea Synergy and Eastern PartnershipBlack Sea Synergy
Eastern Partnership
Azerbaijan,
Belarus*,Geographical
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Armenia,
Scope
Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Russia in the north, Georgia,
ondevelopment
ofArmenia and Azerbaijan in the east *depend
and Turkey in the south
EU‐Belarus relations
Purpose ofDevelopmentofcooperation
Interaction
within the Black Sea Region on Beyond the ENP bringing a lasting
local ownership and also between political message from the EU andthe region as a whole and the EU* on joint ownership in order to*EU: observer‐Organisation of the achieve the objectives of political
Black
Sea
Economic association and economic integration
Cooperation(BSEC)
Type ofBlack Sea wide
EU – 5+1 Eastern countries
interaction
Regional process
Enlargement‐lite
Better coordinating
Bilateral track designed to create a
Dialoguecloser relationship between the EU

Issues40

Region‐wide activities
Sharing experiences and bestpractices
Confidence ‐ building
Setting new legal frameworks in
key sectors

Instruments
Black Sea wide
Existing EU programmes
Programmes of regional relevance(TRACECA,Black Sea Commission,
etc.)Black Sea Partnerships

and each of the countries concernedand on a multilateral trackproviding a new framework wherecommonchallenges
canbeaddressed.

EU – 5+1 Eastern countries
Differentiated
Association
Agreements that will contain legallybinding commitments on regulatory
approximation in trade related areas.
deep and comprehensive free
trade area , Neighbourhood
Economic Community
Tailor-made mobility andsecurity pacts
Tools: Mobility Partnership,
Twinning Projects (TAIEX)
Comprehensive
Institution‐
Building programme (CIB)

Financial
SupportBlack Sea wide
Principle of co‐financing
Community support could beavailable under the national, EU – 5+1 Eastern countries
regional
andcrossborder
EIB and EBRD
programmes of the ENPI
Neighbourhood
Investment
For EU members, the Regional Facility (NIF)
Development Fund
Regional activities of the EBRD,
the EIB
Source: revised table of Y. Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership: Different
Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals, ICBSS, Policy Brief, No.12,
February 2009 9.
Europe (INOGATE), the Transport Corridor Europe‐Caucasus‐Asia (TRACECA), and the
Danube‐Black Sea Environmental Task Force (DANBLAS). As a result, Russia, which haslarger economic size, could potentially serve as an alternative ‘gravity centre’.
After the war between Georgia and Russia, the EU’s suffering from disruptions of gas
supplies as a result of a dispute between Ukraine and Russia, the EU launched Eastern
Partnership on 3 December 2008. Eastern Partnership is different in the basic contents fromBlack Sea Synergy, although complementarity between 2 strategy and other regional andinternational initiatives was pointed out in the paper. Eastern Partnership emphasises thedifferentiation with reference of each partner’s ability and aspiration to the EU. Eastern
Partnership focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profoundintegration with the EU on joint‐ownership between each partner and the EU(for example,
Association Agreements with legally binding commitments on regulatory approximation,
deep and comprehensive free trade area, tailor‐made visa facilitation, Comprehensive
Institution Building programme). Therefore it looks like ‘quasi pre‐accession’ or‘enlargement‐lite’ (See the arrow of Eastern Partnership in Fig.3) .
In the case of Eastern Partnership, there is no reference to the BSEC, no important reference41

to Black Sea Synergy and exclusion of some key countries (e.g. Russia, Turkey), which might
give flexibility to Eastern Partnership from the viewpoint of the EU, but it undermines thespirit of regional cooperation there and it can create new divisions.
5. Ten Commandments of the EU vs. Ten values of East Asians－Implications to ‘value oriented diplomacy” of Japan
Japan’s ‘value oriented diplomacy’ involves placing emphasis on the ‘universal values’ suchas democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Because it isconsistent with common values of the EU, cooperation between Japan and the EU willcontribute to peace and prosperity in Black Sea region.
Nevertheless, we must not overlook the fact that there is the essential difference in the same
Table2 Comparison of values between the EU and East Asians
10 Commandments of the EU
10 Values of East Asians (EAs) Be democratic and respectful of EAs respect education.
human rights and the rule of law.
 EAs respect hard work.
 The four freedoms of movement
 EAs respect saving and frugality.
(goods, services, capital, labour).
 EAs version of a social contract.
 Provide for social cohesion between
 Citizens are expected to motivate
citizens, regions and states.
their children to learn and be Ensuresustainableeconomic
self‐reliant.
 EAs practice national teamwork.
development for the benefit ofGovernment,
businessandfuture generations.
employees work cooperatively. It is Reject nationalism and favour the
relatedto Triple Helix Model.
multiple identities of citizens.
 Assure
federative The press should be free, but it must
multi‐tieract responsibly.
governance.
 Every citizen a stakeholder in the Assure secular governance andcountry.
favour multi‐cultural pluralism.
 EAs want their governments to Promote multilateral order inmaintain a morally environment forinternational affairs.
their children.
 Abstain from threatening or using
 EAs do not believe in extreme forms
force against others without justof individualism. Every individual
cause.
is a member of a society.
 Be open, inclusive and integrative
towards neighbours that adhere to
the above.
10 Commandments form a framework that
10 values form a framework that has
has enabled EU to achieve economic
enabled EA to achieve economic prosperity,prosperity, harmonious relations between
harmonious relations between citizens by decitizens, regions and states by institutional
facto functional economic integration.
integration.
Source: by author with reference of followings; M. Emerson, What values for Europe? Ten
Commandments, CEPS Policy Brief, No.65, Feb. 2005. /P. Dicken, Global Shift mapping
the changing countries of the World Economy, p. 517.

42

word ‐ ‘value’. It is due to historical experiences and cultural backgrounds. For example, M.
Emerson pointed out 10 Commandments of the EU as values for Europe (Table2). Europe canbe open, inclusive and integrative to neighbours only on condition that partners accept
European values on their own initiatives. 10 Commandments form a framework that hasenabled the EU to achieve functional integration that promotes economic prosperity,
harmonious relations between citizens, regions and states by institutional integration.
But functional integration can be achieved without institutional integration, even though it
will need appropriate institutions eventually as the regional integration progresses. In East
Asia, de facto deepening of economic relations is rapidly progressing, whereas institutional
integration is lagging behind. East Asia’s inter‐regional trade ratio reached the level of the
EU’s ratio at the time of the formation of a single market there. P. Dicken indicated 10 valuesof East Asians as a factor of East Asian Miracle. These values may be just personal morality incontrast with social norm of the EU. Nevertheless, taken together, these 10 values form aframework that has enabled East Asian societies to achieve economic prosperity, progress,
harmonious relations between citizens, and law and order with acceptance of diversity andpractical national teamwork. It may be deprived from the culture of Polytheism.
In contrast, the EU’s strategy, especially Eastern Partnership may be based on theconditionality of values derived from Monotheism. In front of Black Sea region, however, theEU does not lose their way, but is unsettled, which is seen in differences between Black Sea
Synergy and Eastern Partnership.
The EU looks like tolerant of different values in the framework of Black Sea Synergy. But,
seeing recent assertive manners of Russia, different from European values, the EU could
hardly be tolerant and returned to the Monotheism in Eastern Partnership.

Concluding remarks
What can we learn from the EU’s strategy to Black Sea region? As already mentioned, EU’s
approach tends to be restricted by conditionality based on shared values. Its characteristics ofthe EU promote institutional integration in Europe. But it is not suitable to the region where
various Gods get together like Black Sea region. Experiences of East Asia including Japansuggest the other possibility of regional integration based on local ownership. Through ODA,
Japan has rich experiences of development by finding the strength inherent in the society
with respect of local ownership and team work between companies, government agencies,
and other institutions like universities and trade associations.
Japan could be a good adviser to the EU which tends to be Euro‐centric even in Black Sea
region by suggesting different multilateral viewpoints. The cooperation between Japan andthe EU with rich experiences of institutional building in Black Sea region will not only
enhance estimate of international contribution of Japan, but also suggest various ideas andinstruments for regional integration in East Asia to Japan.
I would like to emphasise finding and making use of strength inherent in the society, notconditionality for improvement of weakness. Based on both ‘value oriented diplomacy’ and‘acceptance of diversity’, Japan will serve as a good adviser to Black Sea countries for stability
and prosperity because Black Sea region is an arena of coexistence of different values.

43

Ivan PETKOVSpecial Envoy,
Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship‐in‐OfficeBlack Sea Region – Japan: New Developments
Mr. Chairman Ambassador Okawara,
Mr. President Prof. Ito,
Mr. Secretary General of BSEC Ambassador Chrysanthopoulos,
Distinguished Guests,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I deeply appreciate having the honor and the privilege to be a key note speaker at such animportant conference as the Japan – Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue.
It is for the third time that I am coming to Japan and each visit to the Land of the Rising
Sun is even more exciting both professionally and personally.
Today we are here to exchange views on the new developments of the cooperation
between Japan and the Black Sea Area.
I was born on the Black Sea coast. My home city is Varna – they call it the Summer Capitalof Bulgaria. The Black Sea is part of my life and my future is linked to the Black Sea. That is
why I was extremely excited when my Minister appointed me as Ambassador at Large on theBlack Sea and charged me with a new responsibility – to represent the Bulgarian
Chairmanship‐in‐Office of BSEC at the Permanent International Secretariat in Istanbul.
Now before going into the specific aspects of the prospective of the Japan ‐ Black Sea
Cooperation I would like to start by explaining the motto of the Bulgarian Chairmanship,
which reads “Bridging Seas, Energizing Cooperation”. We can apply it to the connection
between Japan and the Black Sea Region. We both have our Sea, we both promote cooperation.
Sea and Cooperation are part of the name of our Organization. These words are the groundwork, the foundation of our activities, while the verbs “to bridge” and “to energize” are its
engine.
Japan is not a new comer to the Black Sea Region. It has always shown interest in thedevelopments in the area. Japanese companies were involved in building the famous bridges
across the Bosphorus, Japanese companies play a leading role in the ongoing construction of
the first tunnel under the sea which will connect Asia with Europe; through the Official
Development Assistance Japan has been helping the development of the Black Sea Coast Ports
by implementing the Bourgas Port Expansion Project and the new container terminals
development project at the ports of Varna and Bourgas in Bulgaria and the rehabilitation of
the port in Constanca in Romania. The metropolitan railway in the capital of my country Sofia
is operating with Japanese financial support and know‐how.
Japanese has shown interest in the work of South‐East European Cooperation Initiative
Regional Center for combating trans border crime in Bucharest; Japan has been actively
involved in the development of some offshore oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea, inthe constructions of Ceylan Oil Pipline linking Caspian Sea oil reserves to the Turkish

44Mediterranean Sea Coast and then on to Europe; The South Caucasus natural gas pipelinefrom Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. The Japanese company Sumitomo has been providing
high quality pipes necessary for the implementation of these projects.
Tokyo has been actively cooperating with other countries in our region and organizations– for instance – since the beginning Japan was a valuable partner in the Stability Pact forSoutheastern Europe, which was recently replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council,
based in Saraevo.
Now what is the actual situation in the Black Sea Area, what has changed since the last
two forums of the Japan – Black Sea Area Dialogue which started in 2005?
Today the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a key geopolitical crossroad, linking
Europe with Central Asia and the Caucasus is ever growing. In times of global financial crisis
the huge economic potential of the area ‐ 20 million sq. km with 330 million people is evenmore attractive and challenging. Just to mention that in 2009, there are countries in the region
whose economic growth rate was 9%.
The latest efforts of the world players to diversify the supply of energy sources are turning
to the Black Sea Region which is an important transit route for Europe and elsewhere. There
are heated discussions about the future of the pipeline projects such as Nabuko, South Stream,
Bourgas – Alexandropulos. AMBO (linking Bourgas on the Black Sea with Vlora at the
Adriatic Sea), TRASEKA, Samsun – Ceyhan oil pipeline and so on.
The three‐year‐old accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union is a major
geopolitical change since already the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea are the borders of theEuropean Union. The European Union itself is going through deep changes. The Lisbon
treaty which recently entered into force provides for the construction of a stronger united andmore powerful European Union capable of playing a key role in international politics. The
presence of EU in the Black Sea Area as one of the major players will be a strong driving force
to further promote the regional cooperation. The European Union is in deep need to upgradeenergy efficiency, develop clean technologies and diversify its sources to grow a competitive,
low carbon economy. The 27‐nation union has set a target to get 20% of its energy fromrenewable resources by 2020, more than double the current share. Brussels also intends toexpand the use of climate friendly technologies. By no coincidence one of the priorities of the
Bulgarian Chairmanship‐in‐Office of BSEC is the intention to draw the European Union’s
attention more actively to the Black Sea Region; the BSEC‐ European Union interaction is
directed towards a pragmatic, project oriented, result‐based cooperation for resolving themost outstanding issues in the economic development of the region and this will inevitably
foster dialogue and mutual understanding. In this light we believe that three directions of theEuropean Union‐BSEC dialogue are essential.
First ‐ the Sectorial Partnerships in the frame of the Black Sea Synergy will be launchedsoon. I am very happy to inform you that during the last EU‐BSEC meeting on the 14
December 2009 the European Commission announced that the partnership on Environment
would be launched on March 16, 2010, while that on Transport will be launched on June 25.
The date of the launching of the Energy partnership will be announced at a later stage. The
aim is to gather financial support for common projects in priority areas of cooperation such as
Energy, Transport and Environment for all interested stakeholders from the BSEC with theactive participation of the three countries which are both BSEC and EU member states –Bulgaria Greece and Romania.
Second ‐ the necessity of effective participation of the European Commission as an
Observer to BSEC and of involving more actively the other EU member states with an
Observer or Sectorial Partner Status to BSEC, namely Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Slovakia, France, The Czech Republic, United Kingdom as well as the Swedish and the45

Spanish Chairmanships‐in‐Office of the EU; andThird ‐ the efforts of strengthening of BSEC‐EU dialogue through meetings in Brussels in
the framework of COEST working party. In this part Bulgaria has proposed to the Swedish
and Spanish Presidencies such BSEC‐EU meetings during our Chairmanship‐in‐Office. The
first meeting already took place and was crowned by success.
Additional asset for the region as a whole is the Strategic Partnership which is being
developed between European Union and the Russian Federation.
Bulgaria believes that the importance of the contacts between the local and regional
authorities in the Black Sea Region should be underlined as well. We believe that the BlackSea – Euro region established in Varna in September 2008 under the auspices of the Council ofEurope in Strasbourg, could contribute for the practical regional economic cooperation.
BSEC’s think‐tank ‐ The International Center for Black Sea Studies has prepared athorough study which gives a deep analysis and explores the perspectives for the cooperation
between EU and BSEC. This guiding document on the future steps is titled Black Sea Regional
Strategy (2010‐2013) ‐ Promoting a region – wide interaction between the BSEC and the EU.
Another important development and an area of global concern, where Japanese interests
coincide with that of the Black Sea Countries, are the security issues.
What are the concrete spheres for cooperation here ‐ expanding cooperation in the areas of
security and stability and to combat organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, money
laundering, illegal traffic of human beings, fight against domestic violence.
Another factor of the changing environment in the modern Black Sea world is the
stepping up of the efforts to render BSEC relevant and adequate to today’s challenges and tounlock the potential for regional cooperation. When working on the calendar of events wewere guided by the following principles: continuity, inclusiveness, and different geometry.
Following the logic of the aforementioned principles we are going to keep on improving thefunctioning of the organization for further increasing its operational activities and its capacity.
We will pursue the project and value‐ added orientation of the working groups, focusing of
the efficiency of the Project Development Fund. Up on our agenda is the development of theregional transport infrastructure. The memoranda of understanding for the coordinateddevelopment of the Black Sea Ring Highway (7,000km) and the development of theMotorways of the sea offer us a legal basis for enhancing the cooperation among us thus
creating new opportunities for sustainable economic development. I am convinced that theparticipation of the Japanese companies in these impressive projects will be highly
appreciated.
In the area of “soft security” measures, we believe that a working visit in the Black Sea
Border Coordination and Information Center in Bourgas will be of interest for all BSEC
member states and not only for the littoral states. The aim is to contribute to strengthening theefficiency of border management.
Very encouraging is the sustaining interest of the United States of America (an Observer toBSEC), to the Black Sea Region. The United States Agency for International Development,
which is an independent federal government agency and the United States Energy Agency, anassociation of public and private energy‐related organizations and government agencies areactively participating in the discussions on the Energy field. Recently they have contributed a
substantial report for the development of the electrical networks interconnection projects in
the Black Sea Region.
A higher level of cooperation was reached in establishing closer ties with other importantorganizations. In 2009 BSEC became a friend of the UN Alliance of Civilizations; aMemorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Permanent International
Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central
46European Initiative – Executive Secretariat is being prepared.
The picture will not be complete if we fail to mention the vast possibilities of cooperation
between Japan and the Black Sea countries in culture, tourism, sport, etc. The importance ofour region is emphasized by the fact that Istanbul is the European Capital of Culture for 2010;2010 is the year of Japan in Turkey. In the Bulgarian Chairmanship’s calendar of events, aplace is reserved for Tourism. We organized in the end of last year a highly successful sessionof the Working group on Tourism. Our region is famous for ancient civilizations, beautiful
country sides, fantastic sunny beaches, brand new ski resorts, rich cuisine and cultural
diversity. For example, in the Archeological museum of my home city Varna one can admire
the oldest processed gold in the world – 6 000 years of age.
The free circulation of people, goods and services in our region, is constantly developing.
A boost in this direction was marked by the recent opening of a new cross‐border check point– the forth between Greece and Bulgaria. There are two big forthcoming sport events in our
Region – Winter Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi on the Black Sea Coast in the RussianFederation and the European Soccer Championship that Poland and Ukraine will organize
jointly in 2012.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The times when the Japanese foreign policy towards the Black Sea Region was cautious
should be over. Faithful to the universal values, such as democracy and market economy
Japan would only benefit if it is even more actively involved in the Black Sea Region, andstrengthens its ties with Brussels and coordinate its approach toward BSEC area. I have heard
Japanese friends say that in the modern world a single country, no matter how powerful andrich, can not survive at the top alone. All we need are serious partners, interdependent andmutually beneficial contacts and fruitful cooperation. The Bulgarian Chairmanship‐in‐Officeshares the opinion that it would be very beneficial to both Japan and the Black Sea Region if
the question of granting an Observer status of Japan to BSEC finds its successful solution in
the near future. As a global player and a leading economic power, a country with a wellknown expertise in environmental matters, water management, pioneer in cutting‐edge
science and technology, institutional renewal and good governance, seismic protection,
impressive track record of inter cultural and inter faith dialogue, Japan could play a vital role
in upgrading peace, stability and cooperation in the Black Sea Area.
Bulgaria supports the objective of Japan to become a permanent member of the UN
Security Council and will do everything it can to realize this goal in order to allow Japan totake the place it deserves in the international arena.
In conclusion I would like to wish success for the cooperation between wider Black Sea
Area – Japan, good luck to the famous sumo wrestlers from the Black sea area – the Bulgarian
Koto‐oshu, the Georgian Kokkai and Tochi‐no‐shin and the Russian Aran, as well as
prosperity for all our friends.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Global Forum of Japan and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for the excellent organization of this prestigious event
and warm hospitality accorded to me and all other participants and guests. Thank you verymuch for your attention.

47

Ⅴ Minutes of Discussions

Opening Session
Opening Remarks

ITO Kenichi, President, Global Forum of Japan

Secretary General Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Ambassador Ivan Petkov, Mr. Tanizaki Yasuaki,
Chairman Okawara Yoshio, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is my greatest pleasure to announce the opening of the Third “Japan‐ Black Sea Area
Dialogue.” When I announced the opening of the First “Dialogue” in November 2005, i.e. five
years ago, few in Japan were aware of the presence, much less the importance, of such an Area
as called the “Black Sea Area.” I had to admit that the Black Sea Area and Japan wereseparated from each other not only by the physical but by the mental distance as well.
However, it is not the case anymore. After having held the two “Japan‐Black Sea Area
Dialogues” in 2005 and 2007, we have first become neighbors and then friends.
On the foundations of the deepening of understanding between Japan and the Black Sea Area as
having been achieved by the two previous “Dialogues,” I would like to expect this Third“Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue” to discuss more concretely on what role Japan can and shouldplay for the peace and prosperity of the Black Sea Area. In the year of 2008 following the year of2007 in which we had the last “Japan‐Black Sea Are Dialogue,” we saw two very serious eventsaffecting the course of our actions. One is the global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, Inc. in September 2008. The magnitude of the crisis is, according to some
economists, unprecedented in the past one hundred years. And the crisis still lingers in many
parts of the world including both Japan and the Black Sea Area. Another is the military conflict
which took place between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Though we, Japanese, areoutsiders of the incident, and are located far away from the place of the conflict, we could not
but have worried about the developments and share a common concern about the incident withthe rest of the world.
Before concluding my opening remarks, on behalf of the Global Forum of Japan, I would like tothank its role as a co‐sponsor, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
for the Tokyo Club and the Japan Foundation for their financial supports and the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan, Embassy of the Republicof Bulgaria in Japan and the University of Shizuoka for all the contributions they made to thesuccess of this “Dialogue.”

Opening Remarks

Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC

Allow me at the outset to thank you, President ITO, for your opening remarks and yourinitiative to host for the third time in Tokyo the Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue. The
Global Forum of Japan, since its creation in 1982, has made important contributions tointernational dialogue and understanding through its activities. The Japan‐Wider Black Sea
Area Dialogue demonstrates the increased interest of Japan to our region, also proved by
Japan’s application to acquire observer status within BSEC.
I am most pleased to inform you that the contacts between BSEC and Japan are developing.

48

Cooperation was initiated in 2009 with the Japanese Development Agency (JICA) and iscurrently underway. Following the discussions between JICA, the energy authorities of Turkey
and the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat, a joint BSEC‐JICA Workshop on Energy
Efficiency is being planned for this year. This will constitute BSEC’s first joint project with Japan.
This workshop will promote exchange of knowledge, best practices and new techniques for the
benefit of the policy makers and experts in the BSEC Member States.
Let me take this opportunity to briefly share with you some of the activities and projects of
BSEC which are of significance of our region: BSEC has two flagship projects in the area oftransport. These are the Black Sea Ring Highway project and the project on the development of
the Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC region. They are related to the development of transport
links in the region. They are expected to do much to foster intra‐BSEC trade, as well as tourism,
infrastructure and transport investments and economic prosperity among the countries of theBlack Sea. Most importantly, they will make a concrete difference in the lives of the people of
the region and bring them closer together.
The Black Sea Ring Highway project envisages a four‐lane ring highway system, approximately
7100 km long, to connect the BSEC Member States with each other. The project on thedevelopment of the Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC region, on the other hand, is aboutstrengthening the maritime links among the ports of the BSEC Member States.
Besides transport, one of the areas where the potential of Black Sea economic cooperation ismost visible is in the area of trade. Currently, intra‐BSEC trade and investments are not at thedesired level. Therefore, various initiatives have been launched within BSEC to contribute to theimprovement of the trade situation. BSEC is also working with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) on this matter.
In addition to the two flagship projects in the area of transport, the Memorandum ofUnderstanding on the Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region, which went
into force in 2006, is another concrete step taken by the BSEC countries to facilitate regional
trade.
Recently, important additional steps are being planned in the area of the facilitation of the roadtransport of goods, which are also expected to contribute to trade relations in the region. Within
this framework, a pilot project on the establishment of a BSEC permit system for the road transitof goods has been prepared. The implementation of this pilot project will start on 16 February
2010, with the participation of seven BSEC Member States. This permit system is expected tofacilitate the work of the road transporters and simplify border crossing procedures in theregion. With this project, BSEC will become the first regional organization to issue such transit
documents.
BSEC is viewed by the international community as an anchor of cooperation in the Black Sea
area today. Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus andCroatia, as well as non‐European countries such as the United States, Egypt, Tunisia and Israel
have Observer status in BSEC. The UK, Hungary, Montenegro, Iran and Jordan, on the other
hand, as well as various regional organizations, have Sectoral Dialogue Partnership status.
The Commission of the European Communities became an Observer in BSEC in 2007. Since
then, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union and of the countries of the wider

49

Black Sea area came together for the first time in Kyiv in 2008, during which the Black Sea
Synergy was launched. Currently, a new period of enhanced relations between BSEC and the
EU is underway. Partnerships on environment and transport within the Black Sea Synergy will
be launched in March and June 2010, respectively. Partnership on energy is being shaped.
In concluding my remarks, I would like to say that BSEC’s activities and projects are growing
and starting to bring about concrete results. BSEC’s relations with other organizations and states
are also developing. Hopefully, with our joint efforts, the ties between Japan and the Black Sea
will be enhanced for the benefit of our peoples and nations.

Opening Remarks
Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian
BSEC Chairmanship‐in‐Office (on behalf of the Chairmanship of BSEC)
On behalf of the Bulgarian Chairmanship‐in‐Office of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation I
would like to welcome you to this distinguished Third Forum of the Japan‐Black Sea Area
Dialogue in the fascinating city of Tokyo.
I am confident that during today’s discussions deep analysis, bright ideas, interesting exchangeof views and wise conclusions will help us clear the picture of the current state of affairs andforesee the future perspectives of the relations between Japan and the Black Sea Region. The
strategic significance of the Black Sea Area is constantly growing and the upgrade of theJapanese involvement in the region will promote the peace, stability and cooperation in thisimportant part of the world.
Special thanks go to the Global Forum of Japan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for
the excellent organization of the Forum and the worm hospitality to all the participants andguests in this prestigious event.
I wish you good luck, tangible results and prosperity for us all.

Opening Remarks

TANIZAKI Yasuaki, Director‐General,
European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

It gives me a great pleasure to speak at the opening of the 3rd Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue.
This Dialogue provides a unique opportunity for Japan and all countries from the wider BlackSea area to get together and discuss such important theme as the changes in the region and therole of Japan. I would like to thank the co‐organizers for their efforts in making such a forum
possible.
Today I am going to speak about Japan’s policy towards the Black Sea area. I will first touchupon why the area is important for all of us, and especially from the Japanese foreign policy
point of view. Then I will move on to explain our actual policy measures along our four main
objectives: realizing the “Sea of Potentials”; enhancing connectivity throughout Eurasia;
consolidation of vibrant society with wide range of participation; and cooperation on common
challenges.
First, why this area is important for the world and for Japan. Let me explain this to you using50

the key terms: “crossroad” and “bridge.”“Crossroad” is a term that best describes the critical importance of the Black Sea area, whichconnects Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as civilizations, peoples andreligions. With the population of 350 million people while being at the crossroads of energy
transportation routes, geopolitical and strategic importance of this area can never beoveremphasized.
Peaceful and prosperous Eurasian continent is a common goal for Japan and all Eurasiancountries. Japan has been actively contributing to this goal through its assistance to the WestBalkans, Central Asia and the Middle East, but it cannot be achieved without peace andprosperity of the Black Sea area, which lies at the crossroads of other regions of Eurasia.
In pursuing further peace and prosperity of the Black Sea area, regional cooperation holds the
key. We know of various frameworks of cooperation in the region, and most notably theOrganization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or BSEC. With the progress seen recently
in the relationship between Armenia and Turkey and other constructive moves in the region,
time is ripe for strengthening regional cooperation.
Now we come to Japan. Last September, right after assuming the primeministership of Japan,
Prime Minister Hatoyama gave a speech at the United Nations General Assembly. There hepronounced the role of Japan as “a bridge between the East and the West,” “between the Orient
and the Occident, between developed and developing countries and between diverse
civilizations.”
The Black Sea area is the precise example of such diversity and complexities he talked about.
BSEC also holds up a strikingly similar motto “Bridging Sea, Energizing Cooperation.” Thisshows why we are ready to play a constructive role in the area and in what way.
Japan has been building close relationship with individual countries in the area as part of ourefforts to expand our diplomatic horizons. This is an important aspect of Japan’s foreign
policy as a key member of the global international community with a matured sense of
responsibility.
The evidence, the recent diplomatic activities of Japan, shows that Japan has been putting
particular emphasis on the relationship with the Black Sea area. Since assuming his office,Foreign Minister Okada has paid visits to Russia and Turkey. In the year 2009 alone, we had thehonor of receiving the President of Bulgaria, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, as well as theForeign Ministers from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and other countries directly connected to,and deeply interested in the Black Sea area like Serbia. I also often visited this region, like mytrip to Romania last summer, to exchange views and explore the possibility for further
cooperation. Japan will continue to expand such bilateral ties, while playing further role infacilitating regional cooperation.
Let me now turn to the second point, that is, Japan’s policy measures towards the Black Sea area.
We have four objectives.
The first objective is to enhance the economic development of the Black Sea area, which is the“Sea of Potentials.”51

In the Greco‐Roman period, the Black Sea was called “Euxeinos Pontos” or a hospitable sea.
Today, it should be called the “Sea of Potentials,” considering the huge potential ofdevelopment that the neighboring countries have. Based on this belief, Japan has been
providing development assistance to expand trade and the movement of people by large‐scale
infrastructure projects. To take a few recent examples, the Port of Constantza‐South in Romania
was reconstructed using Yen Loans so that it can serve larger vessels. Also in Bulgaria, Japan
is to provide Yen Loans to the New Container Terminals Development Project at the Ports of
Varna and Bourgas. An undersea tunnel is now under construction across the Bosporus Straits
to enable faster and safer transport.
Private investment also plays a very important role in the Sea of Potential, which has a market
of 350 million people and rich in energy and mineral resources. Since 2003, the number ofJapanese companies in the area has increased by 50%. I believe such investment brings mutual
benefits to both sides.
The financial and economic crisis that hit the globe did not spare the “Sea of Potentials,” butthere is already a sign of recovery. During the crisis, Japan provided assistance to the countries
such as Ukraine through IMF. To consolidate the recovery, however, what is required is regional
cooperation.
My last point on economic development is that the undiscovered attraction of the Black Sea
should be publicized to the world to attract tourists and investors alike. The Black Sea area,
together with neibouring countries of rich history, beautiful sceneries and delicious food andwine like Greece, Albania or Georgia, can offer splendid destination for Japanese tourists. For
helping this, Japan organized a tourism promotion workshop in 2009 for four countries in thearea. I am convinced that the 2014 Winter Olympic Game in Sochi helps this in a big way.
The second objective is to enhance connectivity throughout Eurasia. When you see Eurasia as awhole, the Black Sea is at the core of the continent. By enhancing connectivity through the BlackSea, the region as a whole will be benefitted. This is the thinking behind Japan’s assistanceprovided to both eastern and western sides of the Sea. On the western side, our assistance
improved a number of ports and harbors as I mentioned already. On the Eastern side, East‐West
Highway Improvement project is under way in Georgia. These projects, together with Japan’s
other infrastructure projects in Central Asia as well as the Trans‐European Corridor 10
Motorway by the EU, will greatly enhance the connectivity throughout Eurasia for the benefitof all.
The third objective is to consolidate vibrant society to which all the social groups actively
participate. Enhancing economic development is important on one hand, but it should coincidewith supporting reform efforts and consolidation towards vibrant society. For this reason, Japan
has been providing active supports to the countries in the area. We have dispatched election
monitors to various countries in the region, where reforms are pursued with vigor. We havebeen supporting the next generation by providing lecturers as well as financial contribution tobring up vibrant society. In this context, we are engaging in the School of Political Studies
projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan in close cooperation with the Council of Europe.
Now I come to the fourth and the last objective of our policy measures towards the Black Sea
area: to cooperate on common challenges. In today’s world, we are faced with common issues

52

of global nature ranging from security issues to environmental issues. The wider Black Sea
area is vibrant with various regional cooperation frameworks, led by BSEC, GUAM, theCommunity of Democratic Choice (CDC), to name a few. There are also issue‐wise fora such as
Blackseafor and Black Sea Harmony on the security issues, and on trans‐border crime,
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Center. We are keen to continue
our dialogues and cooperation on common issues, building on these existing efforts andframeworks.
In summing up my presentation, I would like to reiterate that Japan places priority in overall
foreign policy on cooperation with the Black Sea area. And Japan is ready to be engaged withenhanced dialogue and further concrete cooperation. Wishing that today’s dialogue will be able
to provide creative and forward‐looking ideas to that end, I should like to close my remarks.

Session I ʺStrategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Areaʺ
Co‐Chairperson

OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ

This is the Third Dialogue between the Black Sea region and Japan. It is very significant that wehave had two meetings before, and this is the third meeting, meaning that we know each otherpretty well and we can engage in a very interesting dialogue session. We can expect very
positive and progressive dialogue, on the basis of the results of the meetings in the past. There
are a lot of developments in this area, including such unhappy, situations of military conflict
between Russia and Georgia, nonetheless, as already mentioned by our keynote speakers, we
can expect very promising cooperation between the Black Sea region and Japan.

Co‐Chairperson

Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC

BSEC was launched back in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, at a time regional
cooperation was most needed. Underlining idea was that strong economic cooperation among
the countries of the Black Sea region would enhance the stability and security of the region.
Transport, energy, economic development, education, cultural tourism, science technology areamong the most active fields of cooperation, within the frame work of the organization. In
addition, BSEC is also a platform for political dialogue for its developmental states. It has avaluable potential to contribute indirectly to the political processes of the region throughproviding opportunities for interactions among the member states. As the security situation of
the region has remarkably been ameliorated, the Black Sea area has turned into a region, which
serves as a strategic transport of energy within Eurasia. The quest for the diversification of theenergy sources has been vividly significant in its development, especially after the 9/11 and thewars in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the search for alternative energy resources to those of the
Middle East have started. With the existing plant for oil and gas pipeline projects, the Black Sea
region has become a prime energy supply route. As far as the region’s political significances isconcerned, this region has gained an identity of being Europe’s final opening to the East. After
9/11, the fight against terrorism has also increased the political and strategic significance of theBlack Sea region. Finally, we must acknowledge the frozen conflicts which have recently turned
into active ones, and constitute the main obstacles to enhance cooperation in the region. The
BSEC Charter has to be so amended that we can directly and comprehensively address security

53

issues of the Black Sea area.

Keynote Speaker

Mithat RENDE, Director General, Economic Affairs, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)

The Black Sea is an important and strategic Sea, having a unique position with two narrowoutlets to the open seas through an inner sea. The Black Sea, as such, has not been a sea ofconflict during the Cold War, mainly due to the balance of power which was carefully
established by the Montreux Convention. With the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area
underwent a major transition. The region has witnessed the expansion of both NATO and theEuropean Union. Today, the integration of the Black Sea countries into the Euro‐Atlantic
institutions is still underway.
Our approach to security is multi‐dimensional and not limited to hard security concerns alone.
Climate change, for instance, is a global problem also evolving into a security issue in its own
right, with serious implications in many fields. The current financial crisis speaks for itself when
we look at how badly it affected economies worldwide. The Black Sea region involves a numberof hot and frozen conflicts such as Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia andTrans‐Dniestria, energy security issues, and other broader challenges.
The underlying philosophy of Turkey’s Black Sea security policy is in harmony with the policies
and attempts to reach out its neighbors bordering Turkey. We enjoy very good relations withother Black Sea littoral states like Romania and Ukraine. Russia has also evolved into being
Turkey’s biggest foreign trade partner. We fully cooperate with Russia in many fields ranging
from construction to energy issues.
The existence of frozen conflicts in the region is a major source of concern for Turkey. The
clashes that have occurred in the summer of 2008 in the Caucasus have clearly demonstrated
that the frozen conflicts of the region could easily lead to war. It also showed the need for a
dialogue platform that would assist in overcoming mistrust. This is why Turkey has initiatedthe creation of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and the BLACKSEAFOR. The
latter has been designed as a mechanism to help building confidence among littoral states
through activities jointly carried out in areas such as humanitarian aid, search and rescue, andenvironmental protection. In addition, in 2004, the Turkish Navy initiated the Operation BlackSea Harmony (OBSH) which was designed to synchronize the Black Sea’s security environment
with the global efforts against asymmetric risks and threats.
BSEC has reached an institutional maturity, and is now the most established andcomprehensive cooperation organization in the Black Sea Area. Despite the difficult times thatthe region has been going through recently, such as in the case of the Russian‐Georgian conflictof 2008, BSEC meetings have continued to take place in a friendly and constructive atmosphere.
The cooperation within BSEC has not reached its true potential yet, particularly because of thefact that its members have had diverging priorities. However, the interests of the BSEC Member
States have begun to converge in recent years and they are now able to develop common
strategies and approaches on various areas, such as energy, transport and protection of theenvironment.

54

From an energy security perspective, it is very important to have constant and uninterrupted
flow of energy resources from the producing countries to the consuming countries, for Europe
and the stability of the region as a whole.
BSEC members possess the world’s largest oil and gas reserves after the Middle East. Russia is
the world’s largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. The region has the largest gas reserves in theworld. Therefore, it is important to have these resources be transported via the Black Sea area tothe European markets. In this regards, we have established many pipeline, of some which arestill under on‐going progress.
Turkey is making every effort to enhancing confidence and strengthening peace and prosperityin the region and on a wider scale. In today’s world, engagement has proven to be the mosteffective mechanism in uniting nations around universal values and interests. Having said so,enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea region with the involvement of the EU, Japan and otherinterested stakeholders who uphold universal values, such as democracy, peaceful engagement
and rule of law will generate not only economic benefits, but also contribute to the building ofconfidence and stability in the region.

Keynote Speaker

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, University of Shizuoka

The geo‐strategic features of the Black Sea Region, being situated among the Balkans, theMiddle East, and Central Asia, have increased its strategic significance, especially militarily. As
a result, there has been competition between Russia and the US in increasing military power. In
addition, as the region is situated right on a horizontal line connecting the Mediterranean, theBalkans, and Afghanistan – where NATO has been carrying out military operations – NATOhas been strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea non‐NATO member states through PfP,
PARP, IPAP and the Intensified Dialogue for accession to NATO.
In geo‐economic aspects, the region also has great advantages. As it is located between Europe
and the Caspian Sea–Central Asia, where there are rich reserves of oil and natural gas, the BlackSea Region can become an energy transportation corridor from the Caspian and Central Asia to
Europe. Thus, it is obvious that Russia wants to monopolize this transportation route in order toincrease its profits, whereas Europe and the US want to diversify the route in order to assure
stable transportation of cheaper oil and gas. In addition to the established pipelines, Russia hasconstructed the North Stream and Blue Stream pipelines, and is now attempting to construct
the South Stream gas pipeline. On the other hand, the West has constructed the BTC oil pipeline
and the BTE gas pipeline, and is attempting to construct the Nabucco gas pipeline from the
Caspian region to Austria through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.
The third characteristic feature of the Black Sea region is the geo‐political one. The region issituated “between the great powers” and this has caused instability and underdevelopment in
the region. Due to this historical instability, combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, thenorthern and eastern parts of the Black Sea region have developed soft security issues, such as
human trafficking, organized crime, and so on. Furthermore, the so‐called ‘Frozen Conflicts’issues have taken root in the region as the new independent states of the former Soviet Union
have to struggle with state and national building as well as democratization and the market
economy. Therefore, the EU, which has common borders with the Black Sea region, was forced55

to make efforts to stabilize the region through the ENP, Black Sea Synergy, and the Eastern
Partnership.
In addition, the geo‐political fact that the Black Sea region is situated “between the great
powers” has historically caused a power struggle among the great powers over the Black Sea
region. The great powers have attempted to dominate and to fill any power vacuum in theregion. So, the tug of war between the EU, NATO, and the US on the one hand, and Russia on
the other, has intensified in the Black Sea region.
The final characteristic feature of the region is its diversity. Turkey and Russia are the dominant
actors in the region. Some countries are NATO members, while others are not. Some are EU
members, others are candidates, but for others, future member status has not been promised.
Thus the Black Sea countries have never been united and have never behaved monolithically in
the international arena. However, Black Sea international politics have converged into two
confrontational tendencies of “status quo” and “revisionism”, reflecting the structure of Wider
Europe international politics. This is because the Black Sea region constitutes a sub‐system of
the Wider Europe international system. And this international structure composed of status quo
and revisionism in the Black Sea region can be discerned not only in the dimension of relations
between the Black Sea states, but also in sub‐national, trans‐national and regional dimensions
around the Black Sea region. Therefore, we should take a comprehensive multi‐dimensional
approach to analyzing Black Sea international relations.

Lead Discussant A

Aurelian NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)

The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia reinforced the need to strengthen security inthe most classical way, addressing the so called “hard security” concerns. Debates about
Adapted CFE Treaty, Istanbul commitments, and anti‐missile defense covering the whole
NATO territory, all have important and direct links with the strategic outlook of the Black Sea
region, because this region displays a concentration of ‘frozen’ conflicts. The very existence ofseveral unidentified territories, which are not entirely recognized by the international society, isa threat to stability in the region and in adjacent areas.
Frozen conflicts can be seen as an expression of the intricate realities of the Black Sea area. There
are differing views on how to best deal with frozen conflicts in the region, but the danger ofconflicts unfreezing in a violent way, as was very obvious in the summer of 2008, should makeus more alert on the need for well‐timed solutions. Soft security concerns persist as well, under
the shape of trafficking of counterfeited goods, drugs, weapons, human beings, the existence ofenvironmental threats and manmade disasters.
In order to strengthen security, one must bear in mind the geopolitical competition between the
major actors in the Black Sea Region. While there are objective and historical limitations tocooperation and interaction (between Russia and the West, for example), especially on hard
security issues, there is a significant and largely unexplored potential for cooperation in otherfields, which are more beneficial to communities and governments in the region.
In Romania’s view, the Black Sea region has been, for too long, the missing piece of the puzzle
within the neighborhood policy of the EU. There are objective reasons to explain the lack of56

enthusiasm in Europe about this region in the past, such as the complexity of problems in thearea, since often challenges have largely outweighed the opportunities in the eyes of theWesterners. From this perspective, the Lisbon Treaty and the reform of in the area of EU foreign
policy can bring a substantial change and Romania will actively promote it.
We think that the EU needs to define its security interests in the Black Sea area and based onthese interests, to fully use the existing schemes of regional cooperation, in order to make themproficient tools in supporting the efforts that would promote stability and development at theborders of EU.
This could be done through a range of instruments, among which the Eastern Partnership, theBlack Sea Synergy, specific policies in areas like environment, migration, integrated maritime
policy. The European Security Strategy and its implementation in the future can also play a role,by expressing the concern of member states towards the common threats to stability andsecurity in the Black Sea area.
We should not underestimate their importance of soft security issues. The need for stability,
adoption of democratic values, the need to strengthen economic and energy security; as well as
the partners’ wish to draw closer to the EU call for assistance and guidance from the EU, formutually beneficial joint initiatives, and also for EU openness to responding to the specificneeds and aims of its Eastern neighbours.
For Romania, the Black Sea region is a well‐known, long‐standing foreign policy priority.
Romania’s main goal in the Black Sea area is to promote stability, security and prosperity. This is
not surprising or new, the novelty which we can bring to the issue of regional cooperation relies
in the political approach and in the method to achieve these goals.
1. We stress the importance of regional cooperation, but not any kind of regional cooperation.
2. We think the right way or the beneficial way, for the region, is to have regional cooperation
closely linked to European and Euro‐Atlantic values and processes of cooperation.
The two assumptions are key to our national strategy addressing the Black Sea region. They are
expressed in two different, though related processes: getting EU and NATO more involved andcommitted to cooperation projects in the Black Sea and putting the area and its many complex
realities onto the EU and NATO agendas. This is done in close dialogue and cooperation withall our regional partners. Regional involvement remains a key ingredient for success.
Romania believes that any regional cooperation framework in this area should not only
stimulate relationships within the region, but also encourage links with other areas – Black Sea
is essentially an area of crossroads and this is precisely what might forge its own identity in the
future.
The multiplying cooperation initiatives in the region, as well as reinforcing existing ones, willbolster regional stability and development in each of our countries and in the wider Black Sea
region. This is an integral part of bringing the Black Sea area closer to the EU and the EU closer
to the Black Sea.
To summarize, Romania encourages cooperation in the Black Sea region, based on transparency,
complimentarily, and inclusiveness, through the efficient use of existing initiatives and57

mechanisms, as well as the development of dialogue and cooperation between the countries in
the region and NATO, in compliance with the Bucharest and Strasbourg/Kehi Summit
Declarations regarding the Black Sea region.
In order to promote cooperation in this domain, Romania takes into account the following
principles: a) the necessity to consider and highlight the existing initiatives and formats ofcooperation, avoiding therefore any duplications; b) maintaining an open and inclusive
character of these initiatives, with the possibility to engage ‘third’ countries willing and able toparticipate in the process of Black Sea regional cooperation; c) intensifying cooperation between
countries in the region and international organizations, such as NATO and EU, including
through the use of open and transparent mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation between theregional initiatives and those organizations.

Lead Discussant B

NAITO Yasuo, Deputy Director, ʺSankei Expressʺ
（former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)

It is strange to say that both Japan and the Black Sea region have the territorial dispute with
Russia. For example, in case of Georgia, since the “Five day War against Russia” which
occurred in August 2008, Georgia has completely lost control over its two ethnic separatist
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to the European Union’s report on theconflict, which was published last September, both Georgia and Russia are to be blamed. But as
the consequence of war, Russia has recognized those two Georgia’s small ethnic regions as thesovereign state and became the sponsor of these two regions.
As for Japan, we are having a Northern Territory problem, the “Hopporyodo Mondai” inJapanese, with Soviet‐Russia for almost 65 years. They are the Iturup, Kunashiri, Shikotan and
Habomai islands and the Russians call it South Kuril Island. Stalin’s Soviet Red Army invaded
Japan’s territory soon after Japan has been defeated WWII, regardless of Japan and Soviet
Union’s pact of neutrality at that time. Japan didn’t declare a war against the USSR. Afteroccupying the four islands, Soviet‐Russia expelled all Japanese citizens from the islands andhad Soviet citizens sent to the islands. Russia now insists that these islands are their territory.
Needless to say, Japan and Georgia’s problems are different, historically and in its nature andform, but the consequence is so similar. Such historical fact shows us that the total numbers of“frozen conflicts” around Russia is not decreasing. We cannot expect gradual and stableeconomic growth, without having to resolve the frozen conflicts.
What can we do to tackle with this problem? The answer is not simple. Currently Japan is introuble with US, because Japan’s Democratic Party, the newly elected ruling party, doesn’t want
US military presence in Japan. In addition, Japan is neither politically nor economically stable.
Dialogues as well as applying pressure to Russia at various levels will be needed. The occasion
may take place at G8 summit, UN conference, multilateral government talks, or
non‐government forums. The most important of all would be to continue the talks on this issue
and not forgetting the “frozen conflict”.

58Lead Discussant C

Stefan HUBER, Deputy Head of Delegation,
European Commission

The Black Sea area is important and the EU pays close attention to the region due to its strategic
importance. The involvement of three EU Member States – Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece – notonly gives the EU legitimacy as a direct player, but provides help in organizing theimplementation of the EU’s April 2007 communication on the EU’s regional initiative, namely
the “Black Sea Synergy” (BSS).
The specificity of the BSS lies in its philosophy and its principles of implementation. Therefore,
we need to use as much as possible of the existing or already‐proposed initiatives, whose
objectives Black Sea countries already subscribe to. Moreover, the EU wants to connect andinteract with existing organizational structures like the Black Sea Commission and BSEC.
Regarding the principles of implementation, though we cannot fund investments directly, we
can use resources as seed‐money, to help prepare the projects, and present them to those actors
who are ready to invest in infrastructure in the Black Sea region. This formula has been provensuccessful in other contexts.
But we cannot be the only financiers of these schemes. Partners must be able to contribute as
well. This is why, if partners have interest and can produce credible pipe‐lines of projects, weare planning to establish dedicated funds for those partnerships where investments will be thekey objective, primarily of environment and transport, but also energy and higher education.

Lead Discussant D

SAITO Motohide, Professor, Kyorin University

The Japan‐Black Sea Area Dialogue offers a unique opportunity to exchange views between
Japanese participants and the representatives from the Black Sea littoral states regarding thecurrent state of geo‐political games in the region in which a variety of actors are involved.
Ambassador Mithat Rende clearly illustrated the Turkish viewpoint of the strategic significanceof the Black Sea region as well as Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to promote peace, stability andeconomic prosperity in the region. I have a couple of questions. My first question to him isrelated to the strategic relationship between Turkey and Russia. Turkey has reportedly
constructed strategic partnership with Russia in the economic field. In contrast, Turkey has not
yet constructed strategic partnership with Russia in the political sphere. In my view, this ispartly because the policy of the two nations does not coincide in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Is my judgment accurate? My second question is about Iran’s nuclear and missile development
program. How does Turkey evaluate it?
In Ukraine a presidential election is coming soon. It is necessary to contemplate the geo‐political
implications of Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation under a new administration.
Lastly, taking advantage of my role as a lead discussant, I would like to illustrate the similarities
and dissimilarities between the Black Sea region and the Asia‐Pacific region. The key features
could be summarized as follows:(1) Although the United States is the strongest power in the world, it has faced a variety of59challenges in the Black Sea region and in North East Asia as well(2) In the Black Sea region, Russia is a revisionist power. On the other hand, in the Asia‐Pacificregion, it is a status‐quo oriented nation as is evidenced by its attitude toward the Northern
Territorial issue.
(3) In the Wider Black Sea region, Russia is attempting to weaken or, if possible, to scrap NATO.
In contrast, in the Asia‐Pacific region, it is supportive of the existing US‐Japanese security
system to maintain peace and stability to prevent China from securing regional hegemony.
(4) China, which has been actively its pursuing foreign policy goals in the Asia‐Pacific region
for years, has started to make inroad into the Black Sea area in recent years.

Free Discussions

All Participants

A Japanese participant raised the question why there is no representative of NATO in thisDialogue, for the dialogue closely deals with security cooperation in the region. A
participant from the BSEC responded that while one of the purposes of the Dialogue is todeal with hard security issues in the region, the dialogue focuses more on the soft security
and BESC. Moreover, the role of Japan is expected in the field of soft security in the BlackSea region, so it is understandable why the organizers of the conference have not invited
speakers from NATO. He added that the panel speakers are all from member states ofNATO and that some of the speakers had experiences within NATO, including himself
who started his career in NATO. He commented that he would have personally preferredto have somebody from the Russian Federation and the NATO to hear all the views,
because the Russian Federation, especially, plays a major role in the Black Sea security.
Referring to the Chairman’s remark on characterization of the Black Sea region as Europe’s
final opening to the East, another Japanese participant commented that he has always tried
to conceptualize the region as Asia’s final opening to the West. A Participant from the BSEC
responded that the conceptual aspect raised is fully agreeable and that he believes that it all
depends on different viewpoints. For example, from Istanbul’s perspective, the region isseen as Europe’s final opening to the East, while from a Japanese aspect, it is seen as the
final opening towards the West, due to geographical reasons. He concluded by saying thatthe Black Sea region is located in the middle and that the Black Sea countries are the bridge
between the East and the West.
A Japanese participant asked about the plausibility for Georgia to join NATO and where
the issue stands at present – whether it is off the agenda, or is a long‐term issue that still
remains. He also added that this would be critical in understanding the issue of security of
the region. A participant from the BSEC said that in order to fully comprehend the issue, itis necessary to go back in history ‐ to the agreements between Gorbachev and Reagan. He
said that the agreement was broken by the West because it expanded, even to thosecountries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact, while the agreement was that if Gorbachev,
who kept his part of the promise, agreed on the reunification of Germany under thecondition that the NATO does not expand any further. Therefore, the Russian Federation’s
response is understandable and that the issue still remains. A Japanese participant addedon this issue, by saying that the possibility of Georgia being granted membership to NATOis very unlikely and difficult because in order to join NATO, Georgia needs unanimous60

vote, but as long as France and Germany oppose its entry, it would be impossible. He
concluded by saying that it would be crucial for Georgia to persuade Germany and France.
A Japanese participant asked what the Black Sea countries’ responses were regarding the
US and China’s involvement in military defense. A participant from the BSEC responded
that in regards to the US participation, BSEC views it as a very active observer status – their
participation in BSEC meetings and jointly organized and financed conference in 2008 inenvironmental issues. Back in 2006, the US wanted more military involvement, with an aim
to have their fleets patrol the Black Sea for counter‐terrorism. The region declined the offer
because there were already enough fleets covering the Black Sea area, which cover the
possibility of terrorism and illegal smuggling of weapons and drugs. Furthermore, neither
Russia nor Turkey wanted any more military fleets in the Black Sea at the time and the US
accepted this. Another panelist from the BSEC added that the US now shares the economic
interests, as in the construction of common electrical system. With regard to China’s
involvement, a participant from the BSEC said that China had indicated its intention to do
so. A participant from the BSEC added that China had indicated some interest to cooperatewith BSEC at a meeting held in Moscow; however, since then the Chinese have not madefurther approach. A Japanese panelist added by saying that China has much interest in
improving economic partnership with the Black Sea countries and that it is evident through
China’s financial assistance. He also mentioned that China is currently working on
developing economic relationship with Romania and Hungary and that China is importingarms from Ukraine – but that such movements are not favored by the Russian Federation.

Session II ʺChallenges for Economic Development and Energy
and Environmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Areaʺ
Co‐Chairperson

TOGO Kazuhiko, Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University

Attending this Dialogue, I am reminded of then Prime Minster Hashimoto’s speech, which wasdelivered on July 1997. The speech is usually perceived as Japan’s opening of a new policy
towards the Eurasian continent, which we then called the “silk road” diplomacy. I was thenserving as a Deputy Director‐general of the European Affairs department of MOFA.
Since then, Japan has been strategically interested, first in Central Asia, but then expanded
toward Caspian Sea, Caucasus and the Black Sea and the beyond. I felt that Japan’s interest was
too much accentuated in Central Asia, but now I feel that Japan’s strategic interest of this region,
the Black Sea and the beyond, have not only been kept alive, but developed stronger. I lookforward to very fruitful and constructive discussion.

Co‐Chairperson
Altai EFENDIEV, Head of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)
Azerbaijan is one of the key countries and the leading countries in the region. It has pioneered
important development in the region. This is a great honor and privilege for me to co‐chair this61

session.
I would like to make some remarks in relations to the discussion that took place during theprevious session. This vast, rich area now stands an historic chance to transform into a region ofgreat economic sense, though we cannot say that this has fully developed into an economic
region of integration; it is a very early stage of development. A lot of factors, players, andinterests of players are intersected, so it is not only internal dynamics of region, but is also very
heterogenic‐ having big countries and small countries with different economic affinities.
Questions such as what role we should expect from the regional cooperation, like the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation, and whether its current functions could be considered enough, orwhether we should delegate more power to this leading forces or not are important. I believethat these aspects pose great significance and therefore should be discussed.

Keynote Speaker

Mykola KULINICH, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)

For Ukraine, the Black Sea Region is strategically important in terms of both economic
cooperation and national security. The pace of regional integration of BSEC is closely related tothe economic development of each member‐countries as well as interregional trade, financial
and energy cooperation.
On the one hand, half of the states in the Black Sea Area are under political and economictransformation aimed at economic liberalization and reforms. The differences in the level of
economic development, membership status in EU and WTO and size of the economies put a lotof challenges to economic cooperation within the institutional framework of the regionalorganization. On the other hand, BSEC countries with the population of 330 mil people, rich ofnational resources, developed industrial base have a significant potential for developing closer
economic ties in many areas, such as energy, infrastructure, finance, trade, agriculture, tourism
and environmental policy.
Nowadays the financial economic crisis, which started in September 2008 and adversely
affected the global economy, became a new test for the BSEC regional economic development
and cooperation. As a result of capital outflows, falling industrial output and demand, highunemployment rate, and banks’ liquidity squeeze, the period of high economic growth in many
BSEC countries has ended. Ukraine is not an exception and, unfortunately, is in the list of thecountries which suffered the most because of the export dependent economic structure andweak banking system. Although the damage from the crisis varies from country to country, theoverall impact on the Black Sea Region was very negative. In 2009 it is roughly estimated that
the GDP growth rate in Black Sea Area would be ‐6‐7%.
The current crisis demonstrated how economically interconnected and interdependent
countries are, and that they cannot tackle the global crisis only on a domestic level, but mustjoin their efforts and act together to fight with the consequences of the crisis and take measures
to prevent a new one.
On an individual basis, national governments used various financial mechanisms to avoid
collapse of banking system and stimulate the economy. Some of the countries, including

62

Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and others received financial assistance from IMF and otherinternational institutions. While these measures are effective to a certain extent, it is desirable todevelop financial and banking cooperation, which aims at risk reduction and collective
guarantees on the regional level. In this regard, financial activities of BSEC, especially theWorking Group of Banking and Finance, as a consultation mechanism, and Black Sea Trade andDevelopment Bank require a special attention.
Japan was also affected by the world economic crisis. But in spite of this Japan did not turnaway its attention from the problems of other countries, but became a major donor tointernational financial organizations to help countries in need support their economies. For
example, the third IMF tranche to Ukraine in July 2009 was fully covered by Japan’s additional
100 billon dollars donation to the IMF. Such cooperation through private investments would begreatly appreciated in the region as well.
Another challenge to the economic development in the Black Sea Area is energy security anddisproportional distribution of energy recourses. Traditionally the region was a major transit
zone with big energy suppliers, such as Russia and Azerbaijan. Thus, energy cooperation
within the region as well as with energy importers outside the region such as the EU countries,
have an important implication for economic development.
BCES Declaration on Cooperation with the EU in the Field of Energy, which was signed in April
2008 in Kyiv, and the Yerevan Declaration on Energy Cooperation in the BSEC Region, which
was adopted by Energy Ministers in March last year, clearly demonstrated the will tocoordinate energy policy and integrate energy markets of the BSEC countries as well as the EU.
However, consensus on energy strategies of the member countries should be strengthened bypractical implementation of joint projects. Ukraine, as a major transit state between Europe andAsia, has a strategic interest in energy cooperation within BSEC and BSEC‐EU frameworks andinterested in improving energy transportation infrastructure and mutually beneficial
diversification of energy resources.
In the framework of realization of the energy policy, aimed at strengthening its position as areliable partner in energy sphere, Ukraine is actively working on the establishment of the newroutes of energy transportation from Caspian and Middle East regions. For example, during theThird Energy Summit in Kyiv, which was held in May, 2008, the President of Ukraine Victor
Yushchenko initiated the Concept of the Caspian‐Black Sea‐Baltic Energy Space in order toprovide reliable, transparent and predictable energy supply to Europe. Currently the priority
project in the framework of the mentioned concept is establishment of the Euro‐Asian Transit
Corridor.
In the future, the Caspian‐Black Sea‐Baltic Energy Space will help strengthen the trust between
countries in the region and reduce risks over the whole energy chain – from energy explorationin Caspian Sea, energy transit via Black Sea to supply on the European market.
Heavy dependency of the most of the BSEC countries on external supply of oil and gas calls forthe need to increase energy efficiency and diversify energy sources. While joint projects inenergy exploration and transportation require political will of the member states to cooperate,
realization of energy saving projects could be more viable. In this regard, Japan as a pioneer ofadvanced technologies and one of the most energy efficient countries could be a strategic
partner for BCES countries.

63

For Ukraine last year marked a breakthrough in implementation of Japanese energy saving
technologies within the framework of “green investment scheme” under the Kyoto protocol.
Rising gas prices and tensions with the major gas supplier, which occurred in the past, madethe Ukrainian government reconsider its energy policy and start to promote usage of alternative
sources of energy and energy saving equipments in communal services, electric power
production, metallurgy, chemical industry and other sectors. Successful implementation of such
advanced technologies is equal to the economic security and growth. I believe Japan could play
an important role in modernizing and “greening” economies of BSEC countries on a mutually
beneficial basis providing investments and technology transfers.
Next, environmental issue is one of the most serious threats to the economic development of theBlack Sea Area. It includes preservation and management of natural resources in the Black Sea
and Danube River as well addressing the problem of global warming on the regional basis. To
find effective solution to ecological problems BSEC states need to join their efforts incoordinating national environmental strategies and ecological legislation. Key issues forenvironmental protection include industrial pollution, pollution of the Black Sea and rivers,
waste management especially radioactive waste to name a few. In the case of Ukraine, we aretaking different measures to eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl nuclear accident. We
appreciate the assistance from Japan in this area and hope that Japan, as the mostenvironmentally friendly nation, will help tackle ecological problems in the Black Sea region.
Formation of BSEC has happened on the intersection of trade and economic systems, which
previously had different economic development concepts. From the very beginning of BSEC
these circumstances conditioned relatively low trade turnover between the countries withdifferent economic systems, in spite of the diversity of industrial capacity, service sectors andnatural resources.
According to UNDP data, intra‐regional trade is on average small, not exceeding 20% of thetotal. Currently only Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Rumania, Turkey and Ukraine are the membersof WTO and others are still negotiating their accession to this organization. As for Ukraine, themajor trade partners in the region are only Russia and Turkey.
To increase intraregional trade, the ultimate goal of the BSEC initiative is establishment of the“free trade zone”, however, it is more of a long‐term perspective than a short‐term goal. The
main issue at stake is trade facilitation using various mechanisms such as reduction ofnon‐tariffs barriers, implementation of joint economic projects, and participation in regional
trade exhibition etc. Last year in October Ukraine hosted a Workshop on Customs Data
Exchange as a step to trade facilitation by reducing waiting time at the borders and combating
fraud and smuggling. I believe that real‐time exchange of information among the customs
administrations would help both the customs and business to speed up the process of clearingof imported and exported goods.
At the current economic difficulties, it is important that member states do not impose any
additional barriers to trade to protect their economies but follow the international principles offree trade. Accessible and open market of the BSEC countries would make the region more
attractive to domestic and foreign investments. Open markets will promote trade with thecountries outside the Black Sea Area, especially with the EU, which is the main importer andinvestor for the BSEC countries.

64

Geographical proximity to EU and participation of three EU member states in BSEC, on the one
hand, makes EU a main economic partner for the region, but on the other hand, puts in a
disadvantage position non‐EU countries. The challenge they have to face is the adaptation of
their regulatory standards and product quality to the EU rules.
To develop joint economic projects and promote investment and trade in the region and withother countries, BSEC Business Council is very instrumental. In many other regionalorganizations close business ties and cross‐countries business network were one of the main
impetuses for further institutional cooperation. In this way, I see the role of the BSEC BusinessCouncil as a collective mechanism for facilitation of partnership between government andbusiness as well as between regional private companies
Some may argue that new projects are difficult to implement during the financial crisis.
However, we should think of this crisis as an opportunity to reconsider the strategy to businesscooperation creating opportunities for new projects in infrastructure, energy‐saving, tourism
and other areas with the participation of private and public sectors. A really important
instrument for practical implementation and financing of projects is BSEC Project Development
Fund. One of the examples of the two regional projects can be the Black Sea Ring Highway andthe Motorways of the Sea. Japanese companies are very much welcomed to the Black Sea Area
not only on a country‐to‐country basis but also on a regional basis.
To conclude, in spite of the economic diversity and different levels of integration to the global
economic system, BSEC countries have common problems which they have to face ‐ global
crisis, climate change, low level of intraregional trade and investments and energy security,
which are the main challenges that call for joint efforts and coordinated policy. At the same time,
Japan, with vast economic and financial capacities, can make a significant contribution to thedevelopment of the region through its own initiatives as well as through internationalorganizations on a mutually beneficial basis.

Keynote Speaker

MOTOMURA Masumi, Chief Researcher, Japan Oil,Gas and Metals National Corporation

Due to potential growth of the future gas demand, several gas pipeline projects were planned toincrease gas supply to the European market. To name first is Nord Stream. Nord Stream was totransport gas from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. There were some concerns about
realization of this project, since this plan needed consents from the countries surrounding theBaltic Sea. On the other hand, many energy experts anticipated that the project would be
realized because the UN Conventions of the Law of Sea stipulates that all states are entitled tolay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of high sea beyond the continental shelf. As theexperts have expected, the government of Denmark, Sweden and Finland approved of the Nord
Stream Pipeline Project last year. The construction is scheduled to start in April this year.
Nabucco transports from Turkey to Austria, aiming for the south European market. It has been
trying to achieve commitments of gas supply from Caspian and Central Asian countries. On theother hand, gas pipeline from Russia and owned equally by Gazprom (Russia) and ENI (Italy),65was announced another gas pipeline project called South Stream, targeting south European
market as well. The purpose of this project is obvious – to supply more amounts of gas from
Russia and compete with Nabucco.
In early 2009, a series of international conference on the Nabucco Project were held on the basisof a gas supply crunch from Russia to Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Finally, an international
government agreement was signed in July among five transit counties: Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, and Austria. However, no progress has been seen since then. The week
point of Nabucco is the lack of enough sources to supply gas to the pipeline. The second phaseof the Shah Deniz field offshore Azerbaijan will produce 16 billion bbl³; however the capacity of
Nabucco is 31 billion bbl³. There is some possibility that the Akas gas field in western Iraq or
two gas fields in Kurds will join; however the development of these fields has yet beenachieved.
Another problem has been Turkey’s policies. Turkey wants to purchase 15% of throughput gas
at a discount price and has been negotiating with other partners, which caused disharmony
among the Nabucco partners. Pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty, freedom of transport is
declared in Article 7. What Turkey is demanding may possibly be not in accordance with thisclause.
Azerbaijan will start gas exports to Russia by reverse flowing of the existing pipeline, which
was used to import gas from Russia until 2005. Its throughput is only 100 million m³, however
this is a symbolic case to show Azerbaijan’s intention not to rely only on the Turkish route but toretain another transportation route.
Change of US policy is also another major factor. Mr. Richard Morningstar, the US envoy toEurasian Energy, said in the middle of July, when the intergovernmental agreement of Nabucco
was signed, that half of the capacity is open to the third parties of gas producing countries andRussia can supply gas to the Nabucco pipeline. This is a very important change of policy fromthe USA, since the USA has been saying that this pipeline is not only to detour Ukraine but also
avoid the gas source of Russia.
We must pay attention to what Nabucco participants really want. If we take a look at thewebsite of Nabucco, surprisingly enough, we will find that they are saying Nabucco willtransport gas from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Egypt. Only politicians say no gas from Russia.
Business people are not interested in overly politicized issues. There are lots of arrows of gas
flow from lots of countries flowing into the Nabucco pipeline. What is the difference between
Nabucco and South Stream? There is no difference and this competition is meaningless. The
best way for the both sides is to find a way to merge.
Slovenia signed the governmental agreement last November and all the transit countries joined
this project. The route has changed several times. Passing through Slovenia, the pipeline runs
directly to Italy and a spur will be extended to Austria. In November, Electricite de France (EdF),
a French power company, joined the South Stream project and will takes 10% share. Gaz deFrance Suez has already joined the Nord Stream project. So, this is the second time that a French
company has joined a pipeline project to accept Russian gas. This means France also wants toreserve gas to cope with increasing demand for gas in the future.
Another surprising thing is that Turkey approved the construction of South Stream running66

through the Turkish water of the Black Sea in August, which Ukraine rejected bluntly at thevery beginning of this project. It is an enigma and rather difficult to understand. Turkey is amember of the Nabucco project and it is obvious that South Stream is a competitor. But still,
Turkey might have given some favor to South Stream instead of remaining as rival. My
interpretation is that it is free of charge to give the permission of passage in the Black Sea for thegovernment of Turkey but it may work as a “free pass” or an indulgence for Turkey when SouthStream and Nabucco decide to merge. On the other hand, Russia is to pay an expensive price toTurkey.
Putin’s visit to Turkey in August 2009 was the most influential one. 20 documents were signed
and three important agreements about energy were included.
As mentioned before, the first one is Turkey’s approval of passage of South Stream through theTurkish water of the Black Sea. The second one is Russian participation in the Samsun‐Ceyhan
Bosporous Bypass oil pipeline. This one is also a competitor against the Russian‐led Burgas‐
Alexandroupolis pipeline, which is another Bosporous bypass oil pipeline through Bulgaria andGreece. It is said that the maximum capacity of the Bosporous Strait is around 1.7 million
barrels per day, which is the current level of actual transportation. Now that the oil productionin the Caspian region is souring, demurrage at the entrance of the strait is becoming a big
problem.
Russia proposed a detour from Burgas of Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis of Greece and Russia,
Bulgaria and Greece agreed in 2007. To oppose that, Turkey and ENI of Italy proposed theTrans‐Anatolian or Samsun‐Ceyhan pipeline, and the both plans competed to gain commitmentof throughput from oil producing companies. Russia has been predominant since Russian oil
companies have the largest oil exports, while the Turkey‐Italy group could accept only ENI’s
products. But now, Russia seems to have chosen ENI as a partner. It is because the South Stream
project became the first priority.
The third one is that Russia and Turkey agreed to construct Blue‐Stream‐2, which will transport
gas to Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. As I mentioned before the Nabucco Company islooking forward to participation of Russia, however this new project might serve as a rebuff toNaubucco.
Of course, these are all games. Before making investment, all the participants around the BlackSea beat their brains out to possess the better position in the game. We should keep in mind thatthose are business tactics and far from political strife. Their goal is to establish a good businessmodel which creates value among all the participants, and stability of the business, mutual
benefits. The prosperity of the region may have the first priority.

Lead Discussant A

HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Association of South East Nations(ASEAN) share many similarities, such as diversity, economic cooperation, and its purpose of
establishment. Since its establishment, the ASEAN has made some achievements in priority
areas, such as trade, investment, finance, energy, transport, telecommunications, andenvironmental cooperation. Thus, it would be useful for the BSEC to learn from the ASEAN
experiences to enhance the institution and region’s further development.

67For any economy, it would be essential to ensure macro‐economic stability through soundmonetary and fiscal policies. Poverty reduction through reorienting investment into
employment expansion in growth sectors is vital. BSEC could focus on improving
resources‐and‐energy conservation and efficiency and increasing use of renewable energy
through domestic tax and financial incentives and assistance to scientific and technologicalinnovations. Finally, empowerment of people through enhancing access to basic educationand health care for all is fundamental lessons that could be learned from the rich experiencesof the ASEAN.
ASEAN had focused on achieving social stability through; a) equitable distribution of income
and wealth among people and between urban and rural areas; b) strengthening government
capacity to ensure effective implementation of sustainable development policies at thenational and local levels; c) promoting decentralization of authority and finance to ensure
effective participation of all groups of stakeholders in national and local decision‐making
processes, with a view to installing government of the people by the people, and for thepeople; and d) reinforcing economic, social and political environments under which humandignity and rights are fully respected and under which the public has a deep confidence intheir own governance institutions.
Equally essential are a) mainstreaming environmental conservation and protection, including
climate change concerns in all development policies at all levels, b) integrating education forsustainable development at all levels of formal and informal education, including communityand corporate education, with a view to enhancing environmental awareness and capability
among all stakeholders, c) promoting partnership with all stakeholders and in particular,
corporations in research and development of environmentally sustainable technology andenhancing the professional capacity of environmental experts with inter‐disciplinary
approach to sustainability.
ASEAN countries, together with other Asian countries, have been committed to : a)implementation of the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security in 2007 and theSingapore Declaration on Climate Change – commitment to common goal of stabilizing
atmospheric GHGS by emphasizing both mitigation and adaptation and b) promoting further
cooperation in economic, energy, environment, social and national security areas.
Cooperation efforts have been intensified by ASEAN and other EAS countries: a) to turn
Asian economic growth sound and sustainable via Chiang Mai Initiative andmultilateralizing the bilateral economic partnership, b) promote energy conservation,
efficiency, and security via formulation of East Asian Common Energy Policy, joint
investigation of establishing Asian Strategic Stockpiling Scheme for Oil for emergency, andorganizing a unified regional market for oil and natural gas, c) arrest environmental
degradation through joint academic research for environmental protection and promotion of
UNU‐led RCEs for reinforcing ESD, and finally and d) stabilizing climate change throughGHG emission mitigation and adaptation measures.

Lead Discussant B

Ivan MRKIC, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia
to Japan (Serbia)

Eighteen years ago, the founders of BSEC rightfully and timely envisaged the necessities and68potential of the countries belonging to the Black Sea region. It is characterized as a meeting
point of nations belonging to diverse cultural and religious backgrounds and civilizations, withvery rich histories, that have been many times intertwined. Those interactions haven’t always
been the fortunate ones. Nevertheless, the course of history has taken all the participating states
into the line of close cooperation, maturity and togetherness.
The fact that the European basin extends to the Black Sea region is, to our minds, of an utmost
importance. Serbia, as a European country, joined BSEC club with enthusiasm, optimism andtrue devotion. We wholeheartedly share the provisions and goals of the Charter of BSEC andwish to contribute to the common aim.
In the last year’s closing months Serbia has made progress on its way to becoming thefull‐fledged member of the European Union, which is the central and the highest foreign policy
priority of my government. We continue our walk to that membership with steadiness and highhopes, guided by our conviction that we may play a role in the expansion and promotion ofEU’s values and wellbeing. We are also very pleased that the EU Commission has obtained an
observer status within BSEC.
The EU has developed a program, “Black Sea Synergy”, with a number of concrete initiatives
looking at areas like transport, energy, the environment, maritime management, fisheries,
migration, and the fight against organized crime, the information society and cultural
cooperation. The EU has also established a new cross‐border cooperation programme involving
local authorities in the countries around the Black Sea, and supporting the activities of civilsociety organizations.
We are of the view that BSEC – EU Synergy is the proper format and in some ways an essential
prerequisite for the joint and coordinated efforts in furthering the development, peace andstability in the area. Serbia associates itself with this future oriented programme. In particular,transport and energy should be pointed out as fields of greatest potential for cooperation.
Serbia shares the prevailing view that BSEC should primarily be project‐oriented. The more thisapproach is realized and materialized ‐ the better achievements and prospects of the region. At
this point, it is worth mentioning that Memoranda on the Black Sea Ring Highway and theMotorways of the Sea have been signed in Belgrade in 2007. The Republic of Serbia, withCorridor 10 as its main traffic route, is interested in further engagement on these projects and ininterconnecting its own transport infrastructure with the region as one of the preconditions forthe enhancement of all forms of cooperation.
Environmental projects in the Danube River – Black Sea Basin are another field of cooperationof extreme value and importance. Nowhere on Earth have such improvements of water quality
and ecosystem been observed, in a large river and adjacent sea, as in the Danube River/BlackSea system over the last decade. As a result of Basin countries efforts, nitrogen emissions havedecreased about 20% and phosphorus almost 50% in the Danube Basin/Black Sea in the last 15
years.
Finally, Serbia has devoted to international law and regional stability. Recently, it has set ahistorical example by resorting to political and diplomatic means in the case of the unilateraldeclaration of independence of Albanian minority in Kosovo, which could have ignited a new
turmoil in the Balkans. We are looking forward to the decision of the International Court of69

Justice in the Hague on the basis of which we shall be furthering our cause and sovereign andinalienable rights.

Lead Discussant C

ISHIGOOKA Ken, Professor, Nihon University

What is the purpose of the Black Sea Area Cooperation? What is the core idea of the Black Sea
Area Cooperation? What is the meaning of the Black Sea Area Cooperation for the member
countries?
It appears that most of the member states are not so eager about the integration of the Black Sea
Area. The impression we receive is that these states are much more eager to be integrated to theEuropean Commission rather than the BSEC. For example, during the presidential election in
Ukraine, the subject of the BSEC was not very popular and not so much discussed. It seems thatrather Turkey and Romania are much more eager in taking a leading action toward the BSEC,
but the rest are not. In the Black Sea Area, there are lots of confrontation and competitions
among
members,such
asRussia‐Georgia,
Russia‐Ukraine,
Turkey‐Bulgaria,
Turkey‐Armenia‐Azerbaijan, etc.
What kind of relations do you see between Black Sea Area Cooperation and EU? What kind of
relations between Black Sea Area Cooperation and Russia?
After the collapse of the USSR, in the former Eastern European area there had a huge power
vacuum. Soon after, various forms of integration took place. This shows a journey for the region
to find its identity after the Cold War. If we have dividing lines amongst the states, then the
future integration of the region would be very weak.
How do you see Black Sea Area Cooperation in a changing world system or order? Namely, if
G2 dominated the world system in the near future, what kind of role or status could be seen for
the Black Sea Area?
As China is growing at a rapid pace, its potential to become future dominant power cannot beignored. Thus, the Black Sea Are would be a bridging area for Russia and China and the West.

Lead Discussant D

Revaz BESHIDZE, Ambassador of Georgia to Japan(Georgia)

The importance of the Black Sea Region has increased significantly in recent period. Its strategic
location, rich natural and human resources as well as its transit potential makes Black Sea
Region a solid market and an attractive area for investments. Wide and deep regional
cooperation will be instrumental in fully utilizing the existing assets and taking advantage ofthe potential to boost economic prosperity region‐wide.
However, regional cooperation is not an easy task. Among others, opening borders to people
and goods, deepening trade relations, constructing transport networks and energy
infrastructure are complex issues that sometimes do not coincide with countries’ interests.
Nonetheless, regional cooperation is not an option but a necessity for the Black Sea region.

70

To underscore that BSEC, being the most structured regional organization, should promote theeconomic interests of its Member States via expanding exports to foreign markets, facilitating
the flow of labor and services, and attracting foreign investments. Such measures are important
to cope with the challenges of the ongoing financial crisis.
As one of the founding members, Georgia is committed to supporting the BSEC. Georgia hassignificantly reduced tariff rates and non‐tariff barriers for imports from the Member States andimproved conditions for cargo shipment through our territory. Moreover, Georgia has
harmonized technical norms and standards in the field of transport policy and simplified
customs and border crossing procedures, in order to ensure free movement of all kinds ofgoods as a basic condition for deepening trade in the region. We have signed Free Trade
Agreements with some Member States.
Japan is increasing its involvement in the Black Sea region and the Third Japan‐Black Sea Area
Dialogue is a clear demonstration of it. Japan and the countries of the wider Black Sea area haveshared interested on whole array of issues, such as security, trade and economic relations, andothers. Easing the movement of people is a necessary element of deepened cooperation. Thus,
gradual facilitation of the procedures for visas will promote development of trade andeconomic relations between the countries of the Black Sea region and Japan. In this regard acooperative strategy should have economic and trade liberalization as a central element in theagenda. Furthermore, participation of Japan’s private sector and capital in the economy of theBlack Sea countries would foster cooperation and would be mutually beneficial.
Given the importance of the Black Sea region in terms of rich energy resources andtransportations routs, there is a good opportunity for Japan to be actively involved financiallyand technically in the alternative energy and transportation projects. Japan has shown mucheconomic support, which has promoted economic development efforts, in the process ofdeveloping market economy in Georgia.
We highly appreciate the commitment of Japan to allocate 200 million US Dollars for Georgia
for 2008‐2010 in order to minimize the consequences of Russian aggression to Georgia. Georgia
has recently signed loan agreement with Japan, in which JICA will extend to Georgia
17,722,000,000 Yen for the East‐West Highway Improvement Project.
The objective of the Project is to strengthen transport system in western portion of the East‐West
Corridor in Georgia and thereby contributing to economic development.
To achieve high level of cooperation with Japan, EU, US, and others, the BSEC Member Statesshould be committed to developing relations within the region. Regrettably, we are not making
the most of the potential and exploiting the opportunities to ensure stability and security in thearea. By pursuing the short‐term interests of individual countries, we create obstacles thathinder the long‐term development of our region. The particular unfriendliness of a certain
member stands out and cannot go unnoticed.
Since 2006, the Russian Federation, in contradiction to the BSEC founding principles,unilaterally closed borders, introduced full trade embargo and fixed a political price for energy
resources for Georgia. These actions were undoubtedly aimed at obliterating the Georgian
economy. However, these measures brought no results to those who had destructive
intentions thanks to our hard work and cooperation with neighbors as well as friends

71worldwide, we managed to diversify our exports, ensure our energy supply and continue our
economic reforms.
In August 2008, we witnessed Russia’s large scale military aggression against Georgia and thesubsequent occupation and recognition of the non‐existent so called “independence” of mycountry’s inalienable territories, where ethnic cleansing continues and where human rights arebeing gravely violated on daily bases. These actions indubitably constitute a grave violation ofnorms and principles of international law and step of the main goals and objectives of BSEC.
Even though we disagree with some of its findings, the Tagliavini report provides enoughevidence and facts to confirm all Georgian claims. In particular, the report makes clear that theAugust 7‐8 events were just an episode of a longer cycle of provocations, inter alia, by Russianside. Report confirms that ethnic cleansing against Georgians took place and that the Russian
allegation of genocide is a total nonsense. Report also unveils Russia’s illegal activities in the
period leading to the war and confirms that Russia has breached international law when
attacking Georgia. According to the Commission, recognition of the respective occupied regions
is a violation of international law and the decision on recognition by Russia or other countries iscompletely illegal. Meanwhile, today, the Russian occupation of Georgia continues, in breach ofinternational law and of the Six‐Point Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008. Russia is, in fact,
continuing pursuing its plan of annexing Georgia’s occupied territories.
The presence of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions has been unilaterally blocked by Russia,
which has refused to allow safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees; meanwhile, thehuman rights of those still living in Russian‐occupied territories are constantly violated.
Russian aggression against Georgia points out to the significance of diversifying Europe’s oil
and gas supplies and ensuring Europe’s energy security. In this regard, close cooperation andbalance of interests between energy producer, transit and consumer countries is an essential
element of sustainable development.
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey play a key role in transportation of oil and gas from East toWest through energy transit projects of global relevance, such as the Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceihan,
Baku‐Tbilisi‐Supsa and Baku‐Tbilisi‐Erzerum pipelines. It is vital to continue further
development of major international pipelines to deliver oil and gas from the Caspian region andCentral Asia to the European consumers by means of “Nabucco”, “White Stream”,“Trans‐Caspian Pipeline” and other forthcoming alternative energy projects being among them.
We welcome the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement for Construction of the Nabucco
gas pipeline in Ankara on July 13, 2009. This makes the prospect of construction of this vital
pipeline irreversible and assured. Georgia is also involved in the “Euro‐Asian Oil
Transportation Corridor” project (EAOTC) that will further contribute to energy security bycreating a reliable route for transportation of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian region toEurope via Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. Given the strategic location of
the Black Sea region, there are many opportunities for developing cooperation in the sphere oftransport.
Georgia continues its policy of close regional cooperation. Construction of Baku‐Tbilisi‐Kars,
which is a new railway route connecting Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, will have a great
positive regional impact. Realization of this project will attract new freight flow from China andKazakhstan, using Georgian and Turkish railway systems with further continuation to Western72

Europe. In early stages, the carrying capacity of the new railway line will be 5 million ton per
year.
The liberalization of the road transport traffic and development of transport infrastructure is thepriority direction. Georgia is striving to conclude relevant agreements with its neighbors.
Georgia has vested high resource in infrastructure improvement. The transport infrastructure inGeorgia is developing rapidly. Investments in the sphere of reconstruction and construction of
highways have increased significantly over the past years. At present, the works are underwayin Georgia to construct and reconstruct the roads from Turkey to Georgia with total length of 55km.
It is planned to construct a new logistical center near Tbilisi, which will connect the railway,
road and air transport routes and will be the linking element between the Black Sea ports of Poti
and Batumi, and the Caspian region. The oil terminal in Kulevi is being put into operation andis intended to transport Caspian oil to Europe. Its carrying capacity in the early stages will be 7
million tons per year. (In 2008 1.4 million tons of bulked cargo was overloaded in the port).
What hinder these positive efforts are the unresolved territorial problems that are the main
obstacles to successful regional cooperation and realization of economic projects. Our main
point is simple: We are not using the conflict to delay reforms. Rather, we are taking the Russian
aggression as a reminder of the need to continue result‐oriented liberal economic reforms, andto further develop our democracy and state institutions.
In August 2009 Georgia was granted Sovereign B+ by the Fitch Ratings and according to the
Doing Business 2010, Georgia moved to 11th place in terms of Ease of Doing Business.
According to the Transparency International, Georgia is the top country in the post‐soviet
region (except the Baltic States) in terms of fighting corruption. According to the Index of
Economic Freedom 2010, Georgia moved foreword by 6 positions, and currently holds 26th
place amongst 183 nations. At the same time, creation of Free Industrial Zones (Poti, Kutaisi)
offers to investors the most favorable conditions for starting and operating business. These facts
are strong incentives for potential investors to be more actively involved in the economy ofGeorgia.
Georgia believes that any multilateral or regional organization should place the universal
values and principles of international law at the cornerstone of cooperation. Thus, the principleof respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Member States, within
the internationally recognized borders, must be the main obligation for states to ensure forfruitful multilateral economic cooperation.

Free Discussions

All Participants

A participant from the BSEC posed a question on the capability of separating business andpolitics, especially on natural resource‐related business projects. He said that all theseenergy‐related projects started out with some sort of political agenda, capitalizing on the needsof energy and therefore has been started as political projects, which seems to continue to havedynamics of their own. For example, Nord Stream aims to target Germany, Blue Stream hastargeted Turkey, and South Stream set as rival project to Nabucco – and you can notice the73political dimension of these projects. Like what the railways meant during the First World War,pipelines today tell us that they are leading towards countries which are targeted. He asked
what would be the source of supply for South Stream. A Japanese panelist responded to thisquestion. He said that although the participant from the BSEC had said that business andpolitics could not be separated, he thinks that it is natural for a market to be created if there areresources and demands at one place and another. For example, in case of the United States–pipeline that connects Chicago and Pennsylvania, people did not ask politicians to make build
a pipeline, but it was created due to the demand of the market. He commented that in case ofgas pipelines in Eurasia region, because it involves a number of different countries, it becomesan international issue, in which all the government would have to cooperate together. He
concluded by saying that business came first, then politics so that we should not over‐criticize
the issue (some other participants agreed with his comments). Finally, in regards to the question
raised by the participants from the BSEC, he answered that the source of South Stream would
be Russia since it has plenty of resources.
A participant from the BSEC commented on the feasibility of BSEC to succeed as regional
governance system having the EU as its role model. He said that the EU has been started sometime ago, by states who have fought against each other during the Second World War, but that it
has proven to be a great success, although it took some time, determination, and devotion of theworld class leaders. He believes that the Black Sea region is on the right track to this success, butthat it would have to gain confidence, trust, and understanding through projects. He said thatJapan’s role would be vital in this because it could contribute to the realization of important
joint projects – building infrastructures, pipelines, and highways. It would be necessary tomaintain trust and willingness to cooperate even at times of difficulty among the nations. He
concluded by saying that he is a true believer of the Black Sea region’s economic cooperation.
A Japanese participant asked if the BSEC could play the very important role of ensuring the
supply of natural gas, legally and technically, from the suppliers (c.f. Russia) to the consumers(c.f. EU countries) even at times of conflicts between the two parties. A participant from the
BSEC responded that although the BSEC has the potential to develop into a successful authority,
but at current stage, he does not think that it is in such position to have superiority overresources.

Session IIIʺ Future Perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area Cooperationʺ
Co‐Chairperson

MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Governor, GFJ

The theme of this session is the “Future Perspective of Japan‐Black Sea Area Cooperation”.
Based on our intensive discussion at the previous sessions, we will look for concrete ways toadvance Japan‐ Black Sea economic cooperation.

Co‐Chairperson

Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)

The Ambassador, Co‐Chair with Mr. Murakami, summarized the 3rd session and also gave thefloor to the various speakers and public. He also made a series of remarks following the74participants’ interventions.
One of them was made by His Excellency after a very interesting thesis by one of the keynote
speakers who explained that differences between Japan (& the East in general) and the West, arepartly based on the religious – monotheism / polytheism culture that exists there. This,obviously, does not concern Greece, having in mind Greek mythology and the Gods of the
Olymp.

Keynote Speaker

HASUMI Yu, Professor, Rissho University

Based on the evaluation of three key concepts – acceptance of diversity, tolerance for different“values”, and local ownership, the European Union (EU) appears rather unsettled in the BlackSea Region (BSR), which stands as an arena of coexistence of different values.
The EU has continuously been expanding and had enlargement in 2004 and 2007, in which in
the former was enlargement to the neighbors in the East and the South and the latter to the BSR.
The Black Sea Region has been a very unstable region, with diverse issues and conflicts. Thus,
the EU has major interest in stabilizing the economy and governance of the region. The
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is in relevance to the soft security challenges between‘in’ and ‘out’ of the EU. The ENP is based on shared values and common interests, which aregood governance, prosperity, stability, and market economy. However, the problem arises fromthe EU’s “differentiation” of the “neighbors”. For example, the Black Sea Region is torn into
EU’s (potential) candidate countries, and ENP countries and non‐ENP states, such as Russia.
The ENP has been criticized for its ambiguity, subjective assessment criteria and lacking
effective mechanisms without promise of membership. In other words, the ENP is theconceptual, strategic and spatial limits of Europe. “Neighbors” is meeting place of various
cultures and civilizations, but the EU’s ‘integration process’ is being seen as ‘foreign actor’ andits ‘gravitational power’ faces ‘normative power’, thus, appearing unsettled in the region.
The Black Sea Region is an arena of regional cooperation between heterogeneous anddifferentiated countries. The BSR is rich in natural resource and is strategically located at thejunction of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, it is a hub for energy andtransport flows. On the other hand, there remain unsolved frozen conflicts, environmental
problems, and insufficient border controls. The Black Sea Region consists of a group ofheterogeneous countries, with varying economy sizes and institutions, and integration. At thesame time, it is also a group of “differentiated” group by the EU. For example, while Greece,
Bulgaria, and Romania are EU members, Turkey remains as a candidate; Russia as Four
Common Spaces and Strategic Partnership; ENP: Black Sea Synergy (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey), and Eastern Partnership(Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan).
The gravitation of the EU can be seen as an emerging model of multilateral‐open regional
governance. EU is a ‘soft’ empire based on normative power and ENP – flow of oil and gas from
European neighbouring countries (EN) to the EU; flow of immigrants from EN to the EU; flowof neo‐liberal ideology with shared values from the EU to EN, and there are little relations
between ENP countries which depend on the EU market. So does this mean that there is no75

hope of regional cooperation amongst the ENP countries?
It appears that there are essential differences in the same word “values” between the EU andthe East Asians. The Ten Commandments of the EU is that of 10 values from a framework thathas enabled the EU to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious relations between citizen,
regions, and states by institutional integration. Whereas for the East Asians, 10 values form aframework that has enabled EA to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious relations between
citizens, by de facto functional economic integration.
To concludes, the EU looks like tolerant of different values in Black Sea Synergy (BSS) incontrast with Eastern Partnership (EaP). In addition, the EU is unsettled in the BSR, which isevident in the difference between BSS and EaP. Thus, Euro‐centric manner‐like EaP is notsuitable to the BSR.
Cooperation between Japan and the EU will contribute to peace and prosperity in the BSR,
because Japan’s ‘value‐oriented diplomacy’ is consistent with values of the EU; however, onemust not overlook the essential difference in the same word ‘values’. Tolerance of different
values and acceptance of diversity are pre‐condition for regional cooperation on local
ownership.
Finally, Japan role would not be limited to only conditionality for improvement of weakness,but also finding and making use of strength in the society. Japan would be a good advisor to the
EU by suggesting different multilateral viewpoints based on experiences in East Asia. Japan
would also be a good advisor to the BSR, based on both value oriented diplomacy andacceptance of diversity, because the BSR is an arena of coexistence of different values.

Keynote Speaker
Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy,
Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship‐in‐Office (Bulgaria)
Before going into the specific aspects of the prospective of the Japan ‐ Black Sea Cooperation I
would like to start by explaining the motto of the Bulgarian Chairmanship, which reads“Bridging Seas, Energizing Cooperation”. We can apply it to the connection between Japan and
the Black Sea Region. We both have our Sea, we both promote cooperation. Sea andCooperation are part of the name of our Organization. These words are the ground work, thefoundation of our activities, while the verbs “to bridge” and “to energize” are its engine.
Japan has always shown interest in the developments in the region. Japanese companies wereinvolved in building the famous bridges across the Bosphorus, Japanese companies play aleading role in the ongoing construction of the first tunnel under the sea which will connect
Asia with Europe; through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Japan has been helping
the development of the Black Sea Coast Ports by implementing the Bourgas Port Expansion
Project and the new container terminals development project at the ports of Varna and Bourgas
in Bulgaria and the rehabilitation of the port in Constanca in Romania. The metropolitan
railway in the capital of my country Sofia is operating with Japanese financial support andknow‐how.
Japanese has shown interest in the work of South‐East European Cooperation Initiative76

Regional Center for combating trans border crime in Bucharest; Japan has been actively
involved in the development of some offshore oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea, inthe constructions of Ceylan Oil Pipline linking Caspian Sea oil reserves to the Turkish
Mediterranean Sea Coast and then on to Europe; The South Caucasus natural gas pipeline from
Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. The Japanese company Sumitomo has been providing highquality pipes necessary for the implementation of these projects. Tokyo has been actively
cooperating with the region and organizations. For instance, Japan was a valuable partner in the
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.
The strategic importance of the Black Sea as a key geopolitical crossroad, linking Europe with
Central Asia and the Caucasus is ever growing. In times of global financial crisis the hugeeconomic potential of the area is even more attractive and challenging.
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU is a major geopolitical change since the Baltic
Sea and the Black Sea already borders of the EU. The EU itself is going through dynamicchanges. The Lisbon Treaty has recently entered into force provides for the construction of amore united and powerful EU capable of playing a key role in international politics. The
presence of EU in the Black Sea Area as one of the major players will be a driving force tofurther promote cooperation. The EU is in deep need to upgrade energy efficiency, develop
clean technologies and diversify its sources to grow a competitive, low carbon economy. The
27‐nation union has set a target to get 20% of its energy from renewable resources by 2020, morethan double the current share. The BSEC‐ EU interaction is directed towards a pragmatic,
project oriented, result‐based cooperation for resolving the most outstanding issues in theeconomic development of the region.
First ‐ the Sectoral Partnerships in the frame of the Black Sea Synergy will be launched soon. On
14 December 2009, the European Commission announced that the partnership on Environment
would be launched on 2010 March, while the Transport will be launched on June. The aim is togather financial support for joint projects in priority areas of cooperation such as energy,transport and environment for all interested stakeholders from the BSEC with the active
participation Bulgaria Greece and Romania.
Second ‐ the necessity of effective participation of the European Commission as an Observer to
BSEC and of involving more actively the other EU member states with an Observer or Sectoral
Partner Status to BSEC, namely Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, France, The Czech
Republic, UK as well as the Swedish and the Spanish Chairmanships‐in‐Office (CIO) of the EU;
Third ‐ the efforts of strengthening of BSEC‐EU dialogue through meetings in Brussels in theframework of COEST working party. Bulgaria has proposed to the Swedish and Spanish
Presidencies such BSEC‐EU meetings. The first meeting already took place and was crowned bysuccess. Additional asset for the region as a whole is the strategic partnership which is being
developed between European Union and the Russian Federation.
Bulgaria believes that the importance of the contacts between the local and regional authorities
in the Black Sea Region should be underlined. We believe that the Black Sea – Euro region could
contribute for the practical regional economic cooperation. BSEC’s think‐tank ‐ The
International Center for Black Sea Studies has prepared a thorough study which gives a deep
analysis and explores the perspectives for the cooperation between EU and BSEC.

77

Another important development and an area of global concern are the security issues. The
concrete spheres for cooperation here ‐ expanding cooperation in the areas of security andstability and to combat organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, money laundering, illegal
traffic of human beings, and fight against domestic violence.
The modern Black Sea world is the stepping up of the efforts to render the BSEC relevant andadequate to today’s challenges and to unlock the potential for regional cooperation. Following
the logic of the principles ‐ Continuity, inclusiveness, and different geometry, we are going to
improve the function of the organization, its capacity, and pursue value‐ added orientation of
the working groups. Upon our agenda is the development of the regional transport
infrastructure. The memoranda of understanding for the coordinated development of the BlackSea Ring Highway and the Motorways of the sea offer us a legal basis for enhancing thecooperation among us.
In the area of “soft security”, we believe that a working visit in the Black Sea Border
Coordination and Information Center in Bourgas will be of interest for all BSEC member states
and not only for the littoral states.
Very encouraging is the sustaining interest of the U.S. (an Observer to BSEC) to the Black Sea
Region. The U.S Agency for International Development, which is an independent federal
government agency and the U.S Energy Agency, an association of public and privateenergy‐related organizations and agencies are actively participating in the discussions on theenergy field. Recently they have contributed a substantial report for the development of theelectrical networks interconnection projects in the Black Sea Region.
A higher level of cooperation was reached in establishing closer ties with other importantorganizations. In 2009 BSEC became a friend of the UN Alliance of Civilizations; aMemorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Permanent International
Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central
European Initiative – Executive Secretariat is being prepared.
The picture will not be complete if we fail to mention the vast possibilities of cooperation
between Japan and the Black Sea countries in culture, tourism, and sport. We organized in theend of last year a highly successful session of the Working group on Tourism. Our region isfamous for ancient civilizations, beautiful countryside, sunny beaches, ski resorts, rich cuisineand cultural diversity.
The free circulation of people, goods and services in our region, is constantly developing. There
are two big forthcoming sport events in our region – Winter Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi on
the Black Sea Coast in the Russian Federation and the European Soccer Championship that
Poland and Ukraine will organize jointly in 2012.
The times when the Japanese foreign policy towards the Black Sea Region was cautious shouldbe over. Faithful to the universal values, such as democracy and market economy Japan would
only benefit from its active involvement in the region. We all need are interdependent andmutually beneficial contacts and fruitful cooperation. The Bulgarian CIO shares the opinion that
it would be very beneficial to both Japan and the Black Sea Region if the question of granting an
Observer status of Japan to BSEC finds its successful solution. As a global player and a leading
economic power, a country with a well known expertise in environmental matters, water78

management, pioneer in cutting‐edge science and technology, good governance, seismic
protection, impressive track record of inter cultural and inter faith dialogue, Japan could play avital role in upgrading peace, stability and cooperation in the Black Sea Area.
Bulgaria supports the objective of Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security
Council and will do everything it can to realize this goal in order to allow Japan to take theplace it deserves in the international arena.

Lead Discussant A

Ioan Mircea PASCU, Member of the European Parliament (EP),Vice‐Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP

The source of European Neighborhood Policy should be found in the “security strategy” of theEU. When one speaks of the EU “strategy” towards the Black Sea, one can do it only generically,
because the EU has not elaborated a “strategy” as such, but only a “synergy”, which is stressing
the bridging role of the Black Sea to other areas to which the EU has elaborated a proper“strategy” Indeed, the author has noticed correctly the lack of integrating traditions in the area,
given the intersection of so many interests of both the great powers in the region and of outside
powers for a long time.
When comparing the Black Sea “Synergy” with the Eastern Partnership, we should be awarethat the former is an approach which, therefore, is inevitably integrative, while the latter is an
instrument which, in turn, is inevitably differentiating. Russia and Turkey are not part of theEastern Partnership because the former is a “strategic” partner of the EU and the latter is a“candidate”; therefore they belong to different “boxes”. Western Balkans, for instance, which
will eventually be integrated into the EU, are not part of the Neighborhood Policy.
Professor Hasumi is correct when he sees the cooperation between Japan and the EU as acontribution to peace and prosperity in the area, only that the two actors have rather different
philosophies on international politics. As for the report between functional and institutional
integration, if the two can be dissociated in East Asia, I am afraid that is not possible in the BlackSea Area; there, the institutional integration is the main incentive. True that, as the author notes,
due to the complexities of the area, the EU is rather hesitant in fully approaching the Black Sea
Area.

Lead Discussant B
KAIFU Atsushi, Director, Central and South Eastern
Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japan adopts 4 policies towards the Black‐Sea area : i) Considering the Black Sea as “Sea ofPotentials” and providing the Black‐Sea region with ODA to promote its economic
development ii) Improving infrastructure of the region with a view to increase connectivity
throughout the Eurasian continent; iii) Consolidating a vibrant society to which all the socialgroups actively participate in Black‐Sea region; iv) Tacking common global issues andchallenges with the Black‐Sea neibouring countries.
The important point is how to implement these policies. Although we face difficulties in
executing the policies, the Black‐Sea neighbouring countries needs to maintain transparency,

79

exercise ownerships and possess an open, forward‐looking willings to promote regional
cooperation.

Lead Discussant C
Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of
Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)
The Russian Federation fully supports development of economic cooperation in the Black Sea
region. The BSEC is the only full‐fledged structured international economic organization in theBlack Sea Region, which contributes to enhancement of multilateral economic cooperation. The
organization has considerable potential and real aspects for implementation of mutually
beneficial projects – in the fields of transport, energy, trade, others.
Implementation of two memoranda in the sphere of transport – on the Black Sea Ring Highway
and on the Motorways of the Sea, provided BSEC with a wide range of prospects andopportunities for cooperation in the transport field. Another project beneficial for all BSEC
Member States, proposed by the Russian Federation, is the project on development ofinterconnections of electricity networks in the region and integration into the Trans‐European
energy networks.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, which is considered to be the financial pillar of the
BSEC, has remained operative even at times of global financial crisis and now continues togrant credits. Furthermore, we see today the permanent development of BSEC‐EU interaction.
Several documents related to this cooperation are actively discussed in BSEC; common
principles on establishment of the BSEC‐EU sectoral partnerships have already been agreed.
Finally, the Russian National Committee on the BSEC, which coordinates participation of
Russian business and academic communities in the BSEC, has been very brisk. Few months ago,
Mr. Victor ARKHIPOV has been elected as the President of the Committee. Now the Committee
renders assistance to the Russian non‐governmental organizations on establishing cooperation
with partners in BSEC Member States.

Lead Discussant D

HIROSE Yoko, Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka

It is very useful to learn the European experiments and cooperate with EU making use ofJapanese strong points for Japan – Black Sea area Cooperation. We should continue to makeefforts to supply economic and technical aids of many fields for Black Sea Area.
Firstly, we should cooperate deeper in the energy and environment. Japan is not resource richcountry and energy problem is always serious, so the cooperation with Black Sea area in theenergy field would be important for Japanese strategic aspect. In addition, there are manyenvironmental problems in the Black Sea area and Japan has good skills of ecology and has
been instructing for some countries in the Black Sea area.
Secondly, Japan should provide economic aids for Black Sea area to enable to attain economic
independence and maintain sustainable developments. To achieve this, not only that of80

governmental‐level, but also cooperations at various levels, such as private sectors, schools,
NGOs, and individual, is necessary. The exchange in the private sector, such as studying abroadin Japan, sending Japanese specialists, and promoting tourism is effective. Japan should makeefforts to create sustainable good industry including joint venture to produce plenty of
employments in the Black Sea area.
Thirdly, Japan should contribute to the peace in the Black Sea area. There are many conflicts andfrozen conflicts in the Black Sea area and such conflicts violate people’s stable life anddevelopment seriously. Because Japan is not an official mediator of the peace processes in theBlack Sea area, it is difficult for Japan to mediate them from its historical and geopolitical
position; however Japan can contribute to peace. At first, Japan should contribute to improve
quality of life in the Black Sea Area, by creating new business and jobs. The stability is the mostfundamental factor for the peace. In addition, peace process can be promoted by 2‐track
diplomacy, in other words, peace building would be promoted not only by the governmental
level, but also by the private and unofficial level. Such attempts would be done with the smaller
level’s cooperation between Japan and Black Sea area.

Lead Discussant E

Bujar DIDA, Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Japan(Albania)

This third dialogue on the format Japan and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) offersa concrete possibility that interested parties could know better the activities and bilateralinterests, in order that the long time cooperation already established, would be enhanced
further in the future.
For the Republic of Albania, strengthening of the regional cooperation and enhancing
neighborhood cooperation are key points of the priorities of the Albania foreign policy.
On this context, The Republic of Albania is committed for the intensive cooperation on theframe of the BSEC, where Albania is the co‐foundation country from June 1992.
The increase of the affectivity of the BSEC would be one of the directions of the Japan‐Black Sea
Area Cooperation. “Guidelines for the increase of the effectiveness of the BSEC Organization” isprepared already at the BSEC meeting of, in Tirana on 23 October 2008. But the reform of thestructure of BSEC is continuing and Japan could provide more on this term as an observer
participant of the BSEC. Indeed on the second dialogue , “The Japan‐Wider Black Sea Area
Dialogue” held on November 27‐28, 2005, Japan has provided very useful input.
The sector cooperation and enhancement of the cooperation are vital in the priority fields suchis energy and transport. Albania has been supportive of all the regional initiatives fordeveloping the infrastructure for oil and natural gas transportation from the Caspian andCentral Asia to the Central Europe and the Black Sea Ring Highway. Japan, which has thebilateral relations with all the BSEC countries, is a leader on the energy matters, including thegreen energy, efficiency increase on the fuel combustion, and is very well structured on the
direct investments on this field and transport. Thus, Japan’s engagement on these priorities of
BSEC countries could be the direct input.
Cooperation between the BSEC and European Union (EU) would be finalized through the81generation of the financed projects on the bilateral interests of both sides. The enhancement ofcooperation BSEC‐EU would make the financing instruments of the Black Sea Synergy feasible.
The increase of the role of “observer” countries in the BSEC, especially in the Fund of Project
Development and the activities of the Working Groups would improve the efficiency of theoperation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation through the financial mechanisms.

Free Discussions

All Participants

A participant from the BSEC shared his opinion on the EU and its strategic partnerships with
the Black Sea countries and Eastern partnership. He said that the EU should have made one
strategy which would combine the elements of both the Black Sea synergy and Eastern
partnership. This would have made more sense, be practical and made things much easier for
all the parties included. To analyze why the two were not combined, the possibility of
consumer’s value comparison could be considered. He also said that he personally favors East
Asian pact over EU because so far the Eastern partners have been practical in terms of value
implementation and have shown results, whereas the EU, their ten commandments for example,
only half of their values have been achieved.
Another participant from the BSEC said that the common energy policy within the EU would
be difficult to achieve because the member states all have their own energy policies. It would
take some time before the EU members would come to an agreement. Regarding thepartnership between the EU and Black Sea region, he believes that it would depend on the EU’s
opt for a global definition – whether it chooses to remain as regional soft power or global power.
A Japanese participant responded that since Japan and the EU share similar views and agenda
towards the Black Sea region, they could seek global partnership.
A Black Sea region partnership asked in what ways Japan could be involved with BSEC
financially, since it cannot participate in alternative way due to some sensitive issues (such as
regional historical issues with its neighbors). A Japanese participant responded that somepossible participation methods on Japanese part, in financial aspect, are to make us of Japan’s
ODA budget and resources of private sectors. For example, once the JICA receives concrete
project proposal, ODA could be provided to finance the project. And in case of finances fromprivate sector would require business negotiation – trade companies and energy sector ‐interms of business opportunities in the Black Sea region.
A Japanese participant asked if Japan was going to be involved with BSEC as an observer state,
like that of EU. A participant responded that the Japanese government has already registered its
interest for the observer position; however, BSEC has offered another way of participation (notthe main entrance way as an observer state) due to sensitive reasons and that the Japanese
government is considering the option.
A Japanese participant asked what the merits of US forces in the Black Sea region, such as
Bulgaria and Romania, were. A participant from the BSEC responded that the US force is not
fully active in the region and that the Romanian military is merely sharing the military facilities
for the Americans to come and train with Romanian soldiers. He said that the merits were that
the Americans were providing investments to military facilities, while only temporarily using
the facility in the region.

82

A Japanese participant said that Japan has been very enthusiastic to develop regional
co‐operational organization in the Asia region since the 1960s, such as the Asian Development
Bank and ASEAN; however, due to its neighboring states being weary of the possibility ofJapan’s hidden agenda behind these proposals, they did not seek to take upon leadership inthese organizations. Therefore, in regards to Japan’s participation in BSEC, Japan should be
careful and be respectful to the BSEC members and seek bilateral partnership. Moreover, Japan
should seek to work with EU, when helping BSEC projects, because EU is already highly
involved in BSEC projects.

83

Ⅵ Appendix

1. Distributed Materials(1) Mithat RENDE

Turkey and Japan

Third JapanJapan-Black Sea Area Dialogue

At the Western and the Eastern Banksof the Silk Road

Prospects of Changing Wider Black Sea Area
and the Role of Japan“Strategic Implications of Security
in the Black Sea Area”
Tokyo, 27 January 2010
By

Ambassador Mithat Rende
Director General, Economic Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
2

1

The World as a Whole

Historical Silk Road

TURKEY

4

3

EURASIA

The Black Sea

5

6

TURKISH STRAITSThe Black Sea and theTurkish Straits

Total Length of Turkish Straits : 164 NM- The Black Sea:
Sea: a semisemi-closed sea- 432.000 square kilometers
kilometers of area
- 4340 kilometers long coastline- Two narrow outlets through an inner sea

Black Sea

17 NM
110 NM- The Turkish Straits:
Straits:
The Strait of Istanbul
The Strait of Çanakkale- The Sea of Marmara

37 NM

Aegean
Sea

7

8

9

84

The Legal Regime /Montreux
Convention(1936))(1936
Third JapanSea Area
Dialogue
Japan-BlackThe narrowest point of Istanbul Strait

Regulates
passage
Prospectsof Changing Wider Black Sea Area
Merchant vessels:enjoy freedom of passage
and the Role of Japan
War vessels: subject to some restrictions“Strategic Implications of Security
tonage limitationsin the Black Sea Area”
durationTokyo,of stayin theBlack Sea
27 January
2010
Diligently implemented by Turkey
By• Impartial implementation
Ambassador Mithat Rende• Revised regulationss (1998)
regulation
Director
General, Economic Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey• Vessel Traffic
System (VTS) (2003)

M/T Superlady, 271 m supertanker,
laden, North-South passage

Aşiyan698 mKandilli

1
9

10

13

Tanker Traffic Throughthe Strait of Istanbul

A very sharp turn at Yeniköy• 1996: 60 million ton/per
ton/per annum• 2008
2008: 160 million ton/per
ton/per annum
80oYeniköy

• 1996: 4,4,000 tankers• 2008
2008: 10,000
10,000 tankers
11

12

15

Safety of Navigation at Risk

Oil Transportation through theTurkish Straits

Collision & Fire

• Peculiarities : Narrow and sharp turns, rapidlychanging hydro morphological conditions• Safety of navigation at risk

• Istanbul at risk
• Oil tankers
Other tankers and vessels carrying
hazardous cargo
13

1979 M/V Evriali collision with M/T Independenta in the Istanbul Strait

Turkey’Turkey’s Policy Towards the Region

14

Turkey’Turkey’s Security Concept- Inclusiveness- Transparency- Mutual respect- Emphasis on the priorities of the Region- Prevention of new dividing lines- Broad definition of Security- MultiMulti-dimensional and comprehensive- Maritime Area security- Security of the Wider Black Sea Area

- Not limited to hard security- Focus on challenges and assymetric threats- Terrorism- İllegal migration- Economic and Financial Crisis- Climate change- Epidemic diseases

15

16

85

Hard Security Mechanisms

The Black Sea- Black Sea Maritime Area
- 6 littoral countries- Turkey- Russia- Ukraine- Romania- Bulgaria- Georgia- Wider Black Sea Area
- The Balkans, the Caucasus including the Caspian Sea
andbeyond, as well as the Eastern Meditertanean
17reaching into
the Middle East

18

Hard Security Mechanisms
Initiated by Turkey

Turkey’Turkey’s Black Sea Security Policy- The BLACKSEAFOR- Confidence building mechanism- Humanitarian aid- Search and rescue- Environmental protection- Port visits- Consolidation of peace, stability and prosperity- Enhancing economic cooperation and free trade- Zero problems with the neighbours- Comprehensive settlement of frozen conflicts- Operation Black Sea Harmony- The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform- Contributing to global efforts against assymetricthreats- Harmonize activities by littoral states
20- Closely affiliated with NATO19

Black Sea Cooperation Organization(BSEC)- An economic cooperation initiative- Initiated by Turkey, established in 1992
- The most inclusive and fullfull-fledged organization in
the Black Sea- Institutional maturity- Secretariat in Istanbul- Up to 18 Working Groups, covering areasfrom transport, energy, environment,
culture,education to disaster management
to illegal
migration and organized crime.

Black Sea Transport Routes

21

22

Energy Supply Security and the Role of theBlack Sea Region

Black Sea Ring Highway- The passage of Oil tankersthough the Turkish
Straits- Major Pipeline Projects- BTC- BTE Natural Gas Pipeline- Blue Stream- BakuBaku-Supsa Oil Pipeline- TengizTengiz-Novorossisk- Samsun Ceyhan- South Stream- Nabucco

23

86

24

N

-W

es

t

Black Sea Energy Transit Routes
uc

Ga
s

ab

ia
n

Extensive
Exploration
Activities

Bl

ue

a
re
St

m

SCP

NATURAL GAS
LNG

Ceyhan Energy Center
LN

G

lg
(A

eria

+N

r ia
i ge

)
CEYHAN ENERGY CENTER
Refinery, Petrochemical,
LNG Liquefaction Plants• TURKEY Î BETWEEN THE RESOURCES AND THE MARKET• TURKEY CAN PROVIDE SECURE, COST EFFICIENT FLOW OFOIL AND GAS THROUGH PIPELINES

25

BakuBaku-TbilisiTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)

BTC

Nabucco

Ira

nia
nG
as

TransCaspian
Turkmenian
Gas

Kerkuk - Ceyhan

Iraqi GasEgyp
Gas tian
Arab
Ga s
PL

SO

I TG

Samsun- Ceyhan

ITGI

RE

OIL

Gas to Israel

UR

CE

CO

S

N

SU
M

Silivri Underground
Natural Gas Storage
Facility

Ru

ss

ER
S

co

Natural Gas
Production

26

Diversification of Natural Gas Pipeline Routes and Sources

ACGŞah Deniz- 1776 km of length- Second longest oil pipeline in the world- First byby-pass pipeline- A success story

27

28

TURKEYURKEY-BULGARIABULGARIA--ROMANYROMANY-HUNGARYHUNGARY-AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA(NABUCCO) NATURAL GAS PIPELINE PROJECT

An alternative route for the exportation of Iraqi gas

Transportation of Oil and Gas toWestern Markets

Capacity :25.5 - 31 bcm/year(900.5-1094.7
billion cf)
Planned start ofoperation: 2012
CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PIPELINE

All source countries
are potential providers

GERMAN COMPANY“RWE”
RWE” JOINED THE
PROJECT AS THE
SIXTH PARTNER AS
OF 5 February 2008

OIL
NATURAL GAS
LNG

29

87

30

(2) MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo

1. Ge0‐strategic characteristic s(1) Among Balkan, Middle East and Central Asia
→Competition between the US and Russia for increasing military power
and military cooperation(2) Mediterranean ~ Balkan ~ Central Asia ~ Afghanistan→a strategically significant region for NATO
2. Geo‐economic characteristic
Europe ~ the Caspian Sea ~ Central Asia
→ competition for energy transport corridor
3. Geo‐politics between the Powers(1) triple transformation (democratization, market economy, state and nationbuildings) in former republics of the USSR
→ frozen conflicts; democratization etc.
(2) power struggle among the big powers over the Black Sea region→ tug of war between NATO, the EU , the US and Russia in the Black Sea region
4. Diversity of the region
Dominant regional powers = Turkey and Russia
NATO members/ non‐members
EU members/ non‐members
Balkan, WNIS(Western New Independent States), Caucasus

Prof. Shigeo Mutsushika
Director, Wider Europe Research Center
Graduate School of International Relations
University of Shizuoka
1Black Sea Fleet in Crimea (Ukraine) ~2017
Novorossisk(Russia)
Gyumri base (Armenia)y Qabalra (Gabala) rader base (Azerbaijan)y Batumi, Akhalkalaki( under Georgian control, 2007)
Vaziani (under Georgian control, 2001)
Gudauta(Abkhazia; disbanded in 2007)
Russian PKF (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)＊Plan to construct Russian naval base in Ochamchire (Abkhazia) in 2010(?)
y Transnistria (Moldova)
y ＊2008.8 War in GeorgiayRussia: Black Sea Fleet (from Sevastopol and Novorossisk)y
US: warship, the USS McFaul, USS Mount Whitney to Poti(＊Other CIS states)y Hantsavichy (Gantsevichi) rader base (Belarus)y Sary Shagan rader base and the others (Kazakhstan)y Kant air base ( Kyrgyzstan)3y Dushanbe, Kulyab, Kurgan‐Tyube (Tajikistan)

2

y
y
y

y Incirlik base in Turkey (from the beginning of 1950s’)y Mihail Kogalniceanu base, Babadag training center, Cincu

and Samardan (ranges) in Romania (2005.12)
y Bezmer air base, Graf Ignatievo airfield, Novo Selo range,

Burgas (storage facilities) in Bulgaria (2006.4.28)
y Military training by the US (Georgia)
y Azerbaijan (ISAF: 2007.3～)
cf. Negotiation on the use of military base by the US in 2005y US missile defense and radar installations (Poland and Czech)
cf. it was reviewed by Obama administration
4

1. Ge0‐strategic characteristic s(1) Among Balkan, Middle East and Central Asia
→Competition between the US and Russia for increasing military power
and military cooperation(2) Mediterranean ~ Balkan ~ Central Asia ~ Afghanistan→a strategically significant region for NATO
2. Geo‐economic characteristic
Europe ~ the Caspian Sea ~ Central Asia
→ competition for energy transport corridor
3. Geo‐politics between the Powers(1) triple transformation (democratization, market economy, state and nationbuildings) in former republics of the USSR
→ frozen conflicts; democratization etc.
(2) power struggle among the big powers over the Black Sea region→ tug of war between NATO, the EU , the US and Russia in the Black Sea region
4. Diversity of the region
Dominant regional powers = Turkey and Russia
NATO members/ non‐members
EU members/ non‐members
Balkan, WNIS(Western New Independent States), Caucasus<US demand>y Ratification of the CFE treaty by the West on condition ofwithdrawal of Russian army from Moldova and Georgiay Deployment of defense missiles in Central Europey US use of military bases in Bulgaria and Rumania<Russian demand>y Suspension of the CFE treaty by Russia in December 2007
y Linkage of Kosovo with ‘frozen conflicts’ in Transnistria, South
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno‐Karabakhy Accession of the Baltic states to the Adapted CFE Treaty
y Abolition of the flank restriction between north and south
within Russian territory by the CFE Treatyy A review of the numerical ceilings on arms deployment in
Bulgaria and Rumania within the Adapted CFE Treaty
5

1. Ge0‐strategic characteristic s(1) Among Balkan, Middle East and Central Asia
→Competition between the US and Russia for increasing military power
and military cooperation(2) Mediterranean ~ Balkan ~ Central Asia ~ Afghanistan→a strategically significant region for NATO
2. Geo‐economic characteristic
Europe ~ the Caspian Sea ~ Central Asia
→ competition for energy transport corridor
3. Geo‐politics between the Powers(1) triple transformation (democratization, market economy, state and nationbuildings) in former republics of the USSR
→ frozen conflicts; democratization etc.
(2) power struggle among the big powers over the Black Sea region→ tug of war between NATO, the EU , the US and Russia in the Black Sea region
4. Diversity of the region
Dominant regional powers = Turkey and Russia
NATO members/ non‐members
EU members/ non‐members
Balkan, WNIS(Western New Independent States), Caucasus

Energy transport route

an
ane
err
dit
Me

Soft Security

Enlarged Europe（Enlargement of
the EU/ NATO）

al～B

Central Asia
Black Sea Areakan

Export of
Democracy
Line
ity
Secur
Middle East
7

88

6

8

9

10

1. Ge0‐strategic characteristic s(1) Among Balkan, Middle East and Central Asia
→Competition between the US and Russia for increasing military power
and military cooperation(2) Mediterranean ~ Balkan ~ Central Asia ~ Afghanistan→a strategically significant region for NATO
2. Geo‐economic characteristic
Europe ~ the Caspian Sea ~ Central Asia
→ competition for energy transport corridor
3. Geo‐politics between the Powers(1) triple transformation (democratization, market economy, state and nationbuildings) in former republics of the USSR
→ frozen conflicts; democratization etc.
(2) power struggle among the big powers over the Black Sea region→ tug of war between NATO, the EU , the US and Russia in the Black Sea region
4. Diversity of the region
Dominant regional powers = Turkey and Russia
NATO members/ non‐members
EU members/ non‐members
Balkan, WNIS(Western New Independent States), Caucasus

11

1. Ge0‐strategic characteristic s(1) Among Balkan, Middle East and Central Asia
→Competition between the US and Russia for increasing military power
and military cooperation(2) Mediterranean ~ Balkan ~ Central Asia ~ Afghanistan→a strategically significant region for NATO
2. Geo‐economic characteristic
Europe ~ the Caspian Sea ~ Central Asia
→ competition for energy transport corridor
3. Geo‐politics between the Powers(1) triple transformation (democratization, market economy, state and nationbuildings) in former republics of the USSR
→ frozen conflicts; democratization etc.
(2) power struggle among the big powers over the Black Sea region→ tug of war between NATO, the EU , the US and Russia in the Black Sea region
4. Diversity of the region
Dominant regional powers = Turkey and Russia
NATO members/ non‐members
EU members/ non‐members
Balkan, WNIS(Western New Independent States), Caucasus

13＜Two main tendencies: Status‐Quo vs Revisionism＞＜Level of Analysis＞①Wider Europe international②Regional (Black Sea)
③National④Sub‐national⑤Transnational – vertical & horizontal linkage
Sub‐national, national, Black Sea region, Wider Europe＊Transnational Actors:
Political elite, nationalist organizations, religious 0ganizations,NGOs, enterprises, terrorist organizations, sub‐national regions, etc.
＜Issues＞①Energy②Democracy③Frozen Conflicts④ Military competition between the US and Russia

y 2003~2004

EU/NATO Enlargements, Rose/Orange revolutions,y 2005~2007

US/EU/NATO had its own problems:

12

14‘Kozak Memorandum’, revitalization of the GUAM
Iraq; EU Constitution, Enlargement fatigue,
Afghanistan, internal instability in Ukraine and Georgia
Russia’s assertive foreign policy→Confrontation‘energy war’, Missile defense, CFE Treaty, Kosovo etc.

y 2008War in Georgia

y 2009~present Rapprochement between the West and Russia:
Review of Missile Defense policy; follow‐on treaty to
the START, NATO‐Russia relations, EU‐Russia relations,a new European Security Treaty

15

89

16

(3) MOTOMURA Masumi

0

Nabucco Pipeline and South Stream

1

The THIRD JAPAN-BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE

Energy Flow throughthe Black Sea Region

Jan. 27, 2010
Masumi Motomura (JOGMEC)

1UNCLOS Article79

2

Multiple source for the Nabucco pipeline

3

Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf• 1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables
and pipelines on the continental shelf, in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
• 3. The delineation of the course for the laying ofsuch pipelines on the continental shelf is subject
to the consent of the coastal State.
(website of Nabucco)

Oil pipeline network around the Black Sea

490

(4) HIRONO Ryokichi

CONTENTS
THE BLACK SEA AREA: ECONOMIC,
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN
THE 2010s: COMPARISONS WITH ASEAN

Ｉntroduction
１．From Confusion to Recovery in the Black Sea
Area during the Last Two Decades
2. Regional Cooperation: BSEC and ASEAN
1) Population and GDP
2) Intra-regional Trade and Investment
3) Energy Issues4）Environmental Sustainability
3． Some Suggestions on National and Regional
Policies to deal with these Three Major Issues

The 3rd Japan-Black Sea Area DialogueatInternational House, Tokyo
Ryokichi Hirono
Professor Emeritus
Seikei University
27 January, 2010

2

1

Introduction
1) Many thanks for the sincere appreciation by the Ukraine
Ambassador His Excellency Dr. Lulinich for the Japanesecooperation, both official and private, to member countriesof the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, as well as for his
encouraging remarks for the potentials of Japan’s futurecooperation with BSEC ;2) Since ASEAN, Association of South East Nations, had hadsome achievements in those priority areas such as trade,investment, financial, energy, transport,
telecommunications and environmental cooperation, it
might be useful to the participants from the BSEC
countries that the major focus of my comments thismorning be given to some lessons to be lernt from theASEAN experiences and Japanese involvement in theprocess.
3

1．
FROM CONFUSION TO
RECOVERY IN THE
BLACK SEA AREA
4

1A. Economic Growth
1960-2009
1960-70

70-80

80-90

Dvlping
5.2
EAP
6.2
China
3.7
SA
4.7
CEE/CAn.a.
Armanian.aAzerbaijan
n.aBulgarian.aGeorgian.a
Kazakhstann.aRomanian.a
Russian Federation
Turkeyn.a
Ukraine
n.a
Japan
8.9
6.6
EU
World
4.9

5.8
7.2
5.5
3.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
6.8

3.4
8.0
9.5
5.6
4.2 *
n.a
n.a
3.4*
n.a
n.a
6.1*
4.3*
n.a
n.a
4.1

2.2

3.4

90-00

2000-07

1B. Country and Regional
Shares of the World GDP

08

09

n.a.
6.4
9.0
5.8
5.6
6.8
10.8
n.a.
4.0
2.4
n.a.
5.6
n.a.
7.4
- 0.7

n.a.
5.6
10.1
n.a.
- 6.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a
n.a.
1.8

1.5

0.7

-2.7

3.0

2.4

2.8

3.6
7.2
10.3
5.6
- 6,2*
n.a.
n.a.
-13.0*
n.a.
n.a.
-15.0*-20.0*
n.a.
n.a.
1.3

6.2
8.9
10.2
7.3
6.1
12.7
17.2
5.7
8.3
10.0
6.1
6.6
5.9
7.6
1.6

2.2

1.5

3.2

2.6

1950

Sources: World Bank, WDR 1972, 1982, 1992, 2002 & ２００9； PECC, State of the Region 2007-2008;
OECD, Economic Outlook 82, 2008．
Notes: Figures are for Germany prior to 2008 and those for 2008 and 2009 are for the EU’s average.
* - Figures are for 1983 and 1993.

1960

Dvlping14.0
16.0
EAP
4.0
4.2
China 1.3
1.9
SA
1.8
1.9
India 1.2
1.3
EE
3.8
4.2
CA 11.2
11.4
Armenia*n.a.
Romanian.a.
Russian Federation
Turkeyn.a.
Ukrainen.a.
Japan 1.2
1.7
Germany 3.5
2.9
USA
43.7
20.4
World＊1,100 2,472

5

1970

1980

18.0
4.8
1.7
2.0
0.8
4.9
11.6
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.7
2.5
13.3
7,328

18.0
6.2
2.5
1.9
1.4
4.8
11.0
n.a.
n.a.
11.0
n.a.
n.a.
9.9
7.1
24.7
10,674

1990

2000

17.0
20.9
7.0
7.4
2.5
3.5
2.0
2.2
1.5
1.5
2.8
1.9
7.7
6.0
Ins.
Ins.
n.a.
n.a.
7.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
16.3
14.9
7.3
6.0
28.2
31.5
19,328 30,971

2007

26.0
8.2
6.0
2.6
2.2
1.7
6.5
Ins.
0.3
2.4
1.2
0.26
8.1
6.1
25.4
48,245

Source: World Bank, ibid;
Note:* - Including Azerbaujan, Bulgaria, Georgia, ＊ US Billion $.

6

2A. BSEC and ASEAN: BASIC DATA,
2007
BSEC
ASEAN
1992
1967
8
5 -> 6 ->10
Jakarta, Indonesia
Ankara, Turkey
Consensus or Majority Consensus
Heads of State Summit HSS
Sectoral Meetings
Sectoral Meetings
Major External
Greater BSECASEAN Plus Three
Cooperation
CIS
East Asian Summit
Mechanisms
Shanghai Cooperation APEC
Population, 2007
262 million
567 million
GDP, 2007
US$2,204,232 million US$1,271,966 million
Merchandise Exports, 2007 US$581,897 million US$822,344 million
Merchandise Imports, 2007 US$ 567,780 million US$771,134 million
FDI Net Inflows, 2006 US$92,772 million
US$50,454 million
Source: World Bank, WDR 2009.
Establishment
Membership
Secretariat
Decision-making
Major Organs

2.
REGIONAL
COOPERATION: BSEC
AND ASEAN

8

7

91

2B1 BSEC: Intra-regional Trade,
2000-05

2B2 ASEAN: Intra-regional Trade,
2000-05
Countries
Total Trade as % GDP Intra-regional trade as %TT
Brunei
96.2
73.2= 33.4 +25.1+ 3.5+ 11.2
Cambodia
144.5
37.8= 24,8 + 2.5+ 8.2+ 2.3
Indonesia
56.9
50.1= 18.2 +14.6+ 9.3+ 8.0
Lao, PDR
76.2
75.5= 65.1 + 1.2+ 8.4+ 0.8
Malaysia
217.8
50.1= 25.4 +10.8+ 9.5+ 4.4
Myanmar
38.6
61.8= 35.9 + 4.1+19.0+ 2.8
Philippines
94.0
43.7= 15.6 +15.0+ 8.4+ 4.7
Singapore
473.5
47.2= 26.1 + 6.8+10.5+ 3.8
Thailand
143.5
47.3= 18.1 +16.4+ 9.8+ 3.0
Vietnam
150.3
52.3= 23.5 +10.8+12.0+ 6.0
ASEAN
138.8
48.2= 22.8 +11.2+ 9.9+ 4.3
Sources: World Bank, WDR 2009 & ASEAN-Japan Center, Statistical
Pocketbook, 2007. １１

Countries
Trade as % GDP Intra-regional trade as % TT
Armenia
43.9
35.9
Azerbaijan
111.3
26.7
Bulgaria
147.0
25.5
Georgia
89.9
39.4
Romania
78.5
18.7
Russian Federation 55.1
33.1
Turkey64.1
9.3
Ukraine
97.3
40.6
BSEC
52.2
n.a.
Source: World Bank, WDR 2009.
910

2C1 BSEC: Foreign Direct Investment
and ODA, 1990 & 2005

2C2 ASEAN: Foreign Direct
Investment and ODA, 1990 & 2005
Countries

FDI as % GDP
ODA as % of GDP
1990
2005
1990
2005
Brunei
0.2
2.4
0.1
0
Cambodia
ins.
6.1
3.7
8.7
Indonesia
1.0
1.8
1.5
9.9
Lao, PDR
0.7
1.0
17.2
10.3
Malaysia
5.3
3.0
1.1
ins.
Myanmar
8.1
2.3
n.a.
2.3
Philippines
1.2
1.1
2.9
0.6
Singapore
15.1
17.2
ins.
0
Thailand
2.9
2.6
0.9
-0.1
Vietnam
2.8
3.7
2.8
3.6
ASEAN
3.7
3.5
n.a.
4.5
Sources: United Nations Development Programme, Human Dedvelopment
Report 2009 & ASEAN-Japan Center, Statistical Pocketbook, 2007.

Countries

FDI as % GDP
ODA as % of GDP
1990
2005
1990
2005
Armenia
81.4
5.3
n.a.
3.9
Azerbaijan
ins.
13.4
n.a.
1.8
Bulgaria
ins.
9.8
n.a.
n.a.
Georgia
n.a.
7.0
n.a.
4.8
Romania
ins.
6.7
n.a.
n.a.
Russian Federation n.a.
2.0
irrl.
Irrl.
Turkey
0.5
2.7
0.8
0.1
Ukraine
ins.
9.4
n.a.
0.5
BSEC
52.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 2009.
11

12

2D1
BSEC: Electricity Consumption,
Energy Efficiency and Forest Losses, 19902005
Countries

Electricity
per capita2004
Armenia
1,744
Azerbaijan
2,796
Bulgaria
4,582
Georgia
1,577
Romania
2,548
Russian Federation 6,425
Turkey2,122Ukraine
3,727

GDP/kg oe
2004
5.6
2.5
3.0
4.1
4.5
2.0
6.2
2.0

2D2
ASEAN: Electricity Consumption,
Energy Efficiency and Forest Losses, 19902005

Forest area
a.a.change
-1.2
n.a.
0.6
n.a.
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.2

Countries
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao, PDR
Malaysia
MyanmarPhilippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 2009.

2E1 BSEC: Energy Supply andSources, 2005
Primary energy Coal
supply (mt. oe)
Armenia
2.6
0.0
Azerbaijan
13.8
0.0
Bulgaria
20.1
34.6
Georgia
3.2
0.5
Romania
38.3
22.7
Russian Federation 646.7 16.0
Turkey85.2
26.4
Ukraine
143.2
26.0

Oil

NG

HSWG

16.6
38.6
24.6
25.3
24,6
20.6
35.1
10.3

52.3
6.0
58.7
1.9
14.0
2.0
33.5 17.0
36.4 4.7
54.1
2.4
26.7
5.6
47.1
0.7

Forest area
a.a.change
-0.7
-1.3
-1.6
-0.6
-0.3
-1.2
-2.2
0.0
-0.6
2.5

Sources: United Nations Development Programme, Human
Dedvelopment Report 2009.

13

Countries

Electricity
GDP/kg oe
per capita2004
2004
8,842
n.a.
10
n.a.
476
4.1
126
n.a.
3,196
n.a.
129
n.a.
677
7.9
8,685
4.4
2,020
4.9
560
4.2

14

2E2 ASEAN: Energy Supply andSources, 2005
Countries

BW

NE

ins.
ins.
3.7
20.1
8.5
1.1
6.3
0.2

27.7
0.0
24.3
0.0
3.8
6.1
0.0
16.1

Primary energy Coal
supply (mt. oe)
Brunei2.6
0.0
Cambodia
4.8
0.0
Indonesia
179.5
14.2
Lao, PDR
n.a.
n.a.
Malaysia
61.3
9.6
Myanmar14.7
0.6
Philippines
44.7
13.6
Singapore
30.1
ins.
Thailand
100.0
11.2
Vietnam
51.3
15.8

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 2009.

Oil

NG

HSWG BW

NE

29.7
26.6
36.6
n.a.
43.3
13.7
35.4
80.3
45.5
24.3

69.8
0.0
17.1
n.a.
41.8
14.4
5.9
19.7
25.9
9.6

0.0
0.1
3.7
n.a.
0.8
1.8
20.7
0.0
0.5
3.6

0.0
0.0
0.0
n.a.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.7
73.2
28.5
n.a.
4.5
69.6
24.4
0.0
16.5
46.7

Sources: United Nations Development Programme, Human Dedvelopment
Report 2009.
16

15

92

2F1 BSEC: CO2 Emission, 2004

2F2 ASEAN: CO2 Emission, 2004

Countries CO2 emission Share of Per Capita ktCO2/kt. Oe
mt.
World total
ton

ktCO2/$million

Armenia
3.6
ins. 1.2
Azerbaijan 31.3
0.1
3.8
Bulgaria
42.5
0.1
5.5
Georgia
3.9
ins. 0.8
Romania
90.4
0.3
4.2
Russian Federation 1,524.1 5.3 10.6
Turkey
226.0
0.8
3.2
Ukraine
329.8
1.1
7.0

0.31
1.06
0.72
0.32
0.54
1.17
0.45
1.18

1.71
2.42
2.25
1.38
2.34
2.38
2.76
2.35

Countries CO2 emission Share of Per Capita ktCO2/kt. Oe ktCO2/$mil.
mt.
World Total ton
Brunei
8.8
ins.
24.0
3.27
n.a.
Cambodia
0.5
ins.
ins.
n.a.
0.02
Indonesia
378.0
1.3
1.7
2.17
0.53
Lao, PDR
1.3
ins.
0.2
n.a.
0.13
Malaysia
177.5
0.6
7.5
3.13
0.76
Myanmar
9.8
ins.
0.2
0.69
n.a.
Philippines
80.5
0.3
1.0
1.82
0.22
Singapore
52.2
0.2
12.3
2.04
0.48
Thailand
267.9
0.9
4.2
2.76
0.56
Vietnam
98.6
0.3
1.2
1.96
0.47
Sources: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 2009.

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 2009.
17

18

2G1 Perceived Risks to Economic
Growth in Asia

2.3F. Impact of Climate Change, 21stCentury, 2.4~6.4 C

Low Moderate

Seriousoz Increase in Drought, causing Shortage of Fresh Water and inparticular Drinking Water,z Decline in Crop Production and Farm Productivity,
z Increase in Forest Fire,z Increase in Human Casualties and Physical Damages due to
Storms and Floods.
z Ecological Changes due to Weakened Ocean UnderCurrents,z Widespread Disappearance of Beaches and Coastal
Swamps and Partial Loss of Small Island Developing
Countries (SIDCs) under Rising Sea Level due to Melting
Icebergs,
z Higher Risks of Tropical and Infectious Diseases in
Temperate Zones, andz Increase of Biodiversity Loss20
Source: IPCC, The 4th Report, 2007.

Very Ser.

High energy prices
12 (12) 28 (24)42 (38) 18 (22)
Water pollution & shortage
28 (17) 35 (27)30 (37) 6 (15)Global warming
35 (22) 29 (25)
26 (28) 10 (22)Failure of the Doha Round
28 (22) 33 (35)
24 (25) 12 (13)Protectionism
26 (24) 38 (31)29 (34) 6 ( 8)
Terrorists
21 (27) 33 (31)
26 (26) 8 (11)
Sharp decline in asset markets 31 (22) 37 (39)
23 (24) 6 ( 8)Natural disaster34 (30) 34 (32)
24 (24) 5 ( 9)Current account imbalance
30 (22) 38 (40)
21 (22) 6 ( 7)
Avian flu and other pandemics 33 (30) 32 (27)
17 (20) 6 ( 7)
Proliferation of preferential TAs 40 (22) 36 (39)
18 (20) 4 ( 5)Source: PECC, State of the Region, 2007-08, Table 2, pp.45-46.
Notes: Respondents to the above survey taken in 2007 were: 107 businessmen, 68
government officials, 166 academics and researchers, 14 media persons, 5civil society representatives and 22 others. Of these 382 respondents, 228 arefrom Asia. Figures are for the next 1-2 years, whereas those in brackets for 319
5 years or longer.

3.1 Mainstreaming Economic/Energy
Sustainability in National
Government Policies

3.

NATIONAL and
REGIONAL POLICIESTO DEAL WITH
THE THREE MAJOR
ISSUES : LESSONSFROM ASEAN

a)
b)

c)

d)
21

Ensuring Macro-economic Stability through Sound
Monetary and Fiscal Policies;
Poverty Reduction through Reorienting Investment into
Agriculture and for Productivity Increase and
Employment Expansion in Growth Sectors;
Improving Resources and Energy Conservation andEfficiency and Increasing use of Renewable Energy
through Domestic Deregulation and Scientific andTechnological Innovations; andEmpowerment of People through Basic Education and
Health for All.
22

3.3 Mainstreaming Environmental
Sustainability in All Government
Policies

3.2 Mainstreaming Social
Sustainability in National and Local
Government Policiesa)a) Achieving Social Stability through Equitable Distribution ofIncome and Wealth among People and between Urban and
Rural Areas;b) Strengthening Government Capacity to Ensure Effective
Implementation of Sustainable Development Policies at the
National and Local Levels;c) Promoting Decentralization of Authority to Ensure Effective
Participation of All Groups of Stakeholders in National andLocal Decision-making Processes, with a view to installing
Government of the People, by the People and for the
People; andd) Reinforcing Economic, Social and Political Environments
under which Human Dignity and Human Rights are fully
Respected and under which the Public has a Deep
23
Confidence in their own Governance Institutions.

b)
c)

d)

93

Mainstreaming Environmental Conservation & Protection
including Climate Change Concerns in All Development
Policies at the National, Local and Corporate Levels;
Strengthening Government Capacity at National andLocal Levels to Effectively Implement Environmentally
Sustainable Development Policies and Legislation;
Integrating Education for Sustainable Development(ESD) at all Levels of Formal and Informal Education
including Community and Corporate Education, with aview to Enhancing Environmental Awareness andCapability among all Stakeholders; andPromoting Partnership with All Stakeholders and inparticular Corporations in Research and Development ofEnvironmentally Sustainable Technology and Enhancing
the Professional Capacity of Environmental Experts with
24
Inter-disciplinary Approach to Sustainability.

3.4 Perceived Impediments andChallenges Facing Regional
Cooperation in Asia
A(%)
Uncertain legal environments
36
Poor intellectual property rights protection41
Poor corporate governance39
Lack of physical infrastructure
37
Barriers to investment
34
Security and political concerns
29
Lack of mutual recognition of standards 34
Proliferation of bilateral PTAs
33
Restrictions on the movement of capital 32
Restrictions on the movement of labour 27

3.5 Promoting Regional Cooperation
for Enhancing Sustainability in Asia
1) Implementing the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy
Security agreed at the Second EAS in January, 2007, the Joint
Ministerial Statement of the First EAS Energy Ministers
Meeting in August, 2007 and the Singapore Declaration on
Climate Change, Energy and Environment at the Third EAS in
November, 2007 and the follow-up joint statements issued by
EAS Summit meetings in 2008 and 2009,● Commitment to common goal of stabilizing atmospheric
GHGs by emphasizing both mitigation (halving the global
GHG emission by 2050) and adaptation;● More positive participation in the post-Kyoto (2013~)
consensus-building process for decision at COP16 in Mexico
in 2010 on the basis of the Principle of Common but
26
Differentiated Responsibilities and Capabilities);

B(%) Total(%)
25
61
20
61
20
59
18
55
13
47
17
46
12
46
9
42
9
41
10
37

Source: PECC, op. cit., Table 5, p.49.
Note: A – Significant impediments; B – Very significant impediments.

25●Setting in 2009 national energy efficiency target, based on
the Cebu Declaration, of improving 20 % above the current
level by 2020;●Implementing the collective goal of reforestation of 15
million hectares by 2020;
2) Promoting further cooperation in Economic, Energy,
Environment, Social and National Security areas to:i) Turn Asian economic growth sound and sustainable,● through Chiang Mai Initiative, and● multilateralizing the bilateral Economic Partnership
Agreements with ASEAN countries;ii) Promote energy conservation, efficiency and security,● through the formulation of an East Asian Common Energy
Policy covering all aspect of energy exploration, development,
consumption, conservation, efficiency and security including
energy pricing policies reflecting the environmental cost;● implementing Kuala Lumpur Declaration that recommend 27
among others further action on existing energy conservation

efforts such as energy audits and inspections, minimum energy
consumption efficiency standards for common household
electric and electronic appliances, public education on energy
conservation and efficiency, energy-efficiency labelling
programmes, joint development and transfer of energy
conservation technology and know-how;● through joint Investigation into the possibility of establishing
Asian Strategic Stockpiling Scheme for Oil for emergency;● organizing a unified regional market for oil and natural gas;
● through joint exploration for oil and natural gas reserves inthe seabed both inside and outside the region; and● through the extension of the Trans ASEAN Gas Pipeline andthe ASEAN Power Grid to all member countries;iii) Arrest environmental degradation, e.g.,● Southeast Asian Disaster Relief Centre to provide
humanitarian assistance and handle environmental disasters;
28● regional agreements to address trans-boundary environment

problems of air, river and marine pollution;● joint academic research for environmental protection,● given the adverse impact of climate change on the sea leveland other ecological conditions and their consequences on the
habitat particularly of the poor in the region, mainstreaming
adaptation measures into national and regional development
plans should also be given a top priority not only by way ofremoving institutional, informational and participation barriersin each country but establishing a regional adaptation fundcollected by levy on carbon-intensive products and services;● utmost efforts be made by all stakeholders to maximize
co-developmental benefits of climate policies. Exploiting thepotentials of the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) andenhancing the efficiency of its approval process are crucial aswell as sound material recycling;● to facilitate mitigation, quantitative targets of carbon
intensity at the regional level could be introduced based on athorough analysis of the past trend and future projections of 30
GHG emission;● promoting UNU-led RCEs for reinforcing ESD,
● China-Japan Environmental Protection Centre as one of

the effective platforms for promoting environmental protectionin the region;● Japan-led Asian Partnership Programme for Environmental
Experts Development; and● through effective implementation of the Bali Action Plan;iv) Stabilizing climate change through GHG emission
mitigation and adaptation measures,● given the scarcity and rising prices of fossil fuel and othernatural resources, the mitigation of GHG emission throughimproving energy efficiency and the promotion of clean
renewable energy sources should be given a top priority informulating regional cooperation in climate change ;29

Finally, some questions to
Ambassador Kulinich● The scope of CDM may be expanded for regional projects
under non-UNFCCC regime, if accompanied by significant
technology components and effective enforcement mechanism
for reducing GHG emission;● Japan-initiated sectoral approach for climate change
mitigation, if carefully designed and managed transparently by
specifically assigned independent body, can be an effectivemeans with equity to all participants to achieve either nationally,
regionally or globally agreed quantitative targets for GHG
emission reduction;● Joint R&D efforts by both exporters and importers ofenvironmentally friendly technologies would facilitate
technology transfer, if coupled with a flexible IPR regime
providing green subsidies or preferential tax treatment.
v) promote education, health and people movement, e.g., APT
ministerial consensus; and vi) enhance mutual trust andconfidence building among people, e.g., ARF statements. 31

1)

2)

3)

94

You mentioned in your paper some steps have beentaken by BSEC and its member states to reduce theadverse impact of the recent global financial andeconomic crisis. What have been some major concretemeasures taken since 2007-08 ?
Also, you mentioned some steps taken by BSEC forenergy efficiency, diversification of energy resources,
renewable energy, as well as for environmental
protection and expansion of intra-BSEC trade andinvestment. Could you clarify what concrete measures
have been taken by BSEC in these priority areas ?
Some BSEC member countries are energy producers
and critical exporters to neighbouring and EU countries.
Given the recent use of energy supply as one of thepolitical weapons, what sort of regional agreement, if any,32
has been installed by BSEC ?

(5) ISHIGOOKA Ken『The Third Japan－
Black Sea Area Dialogue』

Session Ⅱ:「Challenges for Economic Development
and Energy and Environmental
Cooperation in the Black Sea Area」(第三回日・黒海地域対話)（黒海地域の経済発展とエネルギー・環境協力に向けた課題）「Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area
and Role of Japan」(変化する黒海地域の展望と日本の役割)

COMMENTS ：by KEN ISHIGOOKA( Nihon University )2

1• < No2>:黒海地域とＥＵ、ロシア• What kind of relations do you see
between Black Sea Area
Cooperation and EU（European
Union）.
• What kind of relations between
Black Sea Area Cooperation andRussia.

• <No1>: 黒海地域協力の目的• What is the purpose of Black Sea
Area Cooperation?
• What is the core idea of Black Sea
Area Cooperation?
• What is the meaning of Black Sea
for member countries?

43• No3: 変化する世界の中の黒海地域• How do you see Black Sea Area
Cooperation in a changing world
system or order?
• Namely if G2 （China=UnitedStates）dominated world system iscoming in the near future, whatkind of role or status do you seefor Black Sea Area?
595

(6) HASUMI Yu©Hasumi Yu

3 key words

The Role of Japanin Black Sea Area Cooperation• 3 key words;–Acceptance of diversity–Tolerance for different ‘values’–Local ownership－in comparison with
the EU’s Strategy to Black Sea Area－

HASUMI Yu
Professor,
Rissho University• The EU looks like unsettled in Black Sea
Region which is an arena of coexistenceof different ‘values’.

THE THIRD JAPAN‐BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE“Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan”
January 26‐27, 2010
Lecture Hall of the International House of JapanTokyo, Japan1©Hasumi Yu

2

Beyond the Enlargement of the EU• Enlargement in 2004
Neighbours in the East and in theSouth• Enlargement in 2007
Black Sea region

1.
Enlargement of the EU
andEuropean Neighbourhood Policy©Hasumi Yu• ENP(European Neighbourhood Policy) ,including Southern Caucasus andexcluding Russia(four common spaces).

3©Hasumi Yu

4‘Differentiated’ Neighbours of the EU

ENP as Soft Security Strategy

ＥＵ• ENP is the Soft Security for challenges
between ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the EU.

CandidatePotential candidate
EFTA / EEA• ENP is based on shared values andcommon Interests(Good governance, prosperity, stability
and market economy).
• But Neighbours are ‘differentiated’
by the EU.
©Hasumi Yu

ENP
WNIS
Caucasus
Mediterranean
Russia(not in ENP)

Black Sea region
5

6©Hasumi Yu

ENP-the conceptual, strategic
a n d s p a t i a l l i m i t s o f E u ro p eLimits of ENP• ENP is criticised for• Neighbours are meeting place of various
cultures and civilisation.

– its ambiguity, subjective assessment
criteria• The EU as ‘Integration process’ meets the
EU as ‘foreign actor’.

– and lacking effective mechanisms• The EU as ‘gravitational power’ meets its‘normative power’.

– without promise of membership.
©Hasumi Yu

The EU is unsettled in Black Sea region.
©Hasumi Yu

7

96

8

Black Sea region
as an arena of cooperation• Black Sea region – area
– rich in natural resources,– strategically located at the junction ofEurope, Central Asia and the Middle East,with– hub for energy and transport flows,– unsolved frozen conflicts,– environmental problems,– insufficient border controls.

2.

Black Sea region as an arena ofcooperation between
heterogeneous & ‘differentiated’countries©Hasumi Yu

910©Hasumi Yu

Black Sea region – a group of‘differentiated’ by the EU

Black Sea Region－a group ofh e te r o g e n eo u s c o u n tr i es

• Black Sea countries - ‘differentiated’ by the
relationship with the EU;

In 2006– The EU member countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania),– The EU candidate (Turkey),– Four Common Spaces and Strategic partnership (Russia),– ENP• Black Sea Synergy (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova,
Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey),• Eastern Partnership (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan).
Source: V. Astrov and P. Havlik, Economic Developments in the Wider Black Sea Region, Wiiw Research
Report 349, September 2008, p.122.

©Hasumi Yu

11©Hasumi Yu

12

Gravitation of the EU - An emerging modelof mu ltilate ral-open regional governanceCo mmu nityof institutions

3.
Gravitation of the EU

Community

Co mmu ni t yof securityof market

An emerging ‘soft’ Empire based on‘multilateral open regional governance’

Gravitationof the EU

Communityof values

Communityof regions©Yu Hasumi©Hasumi Yu

Oil & Gas and Immigrants©Hasumi Yu

13

14

EU as a ‘soft’ Empire based on
normative power and ENP

Neo-liberal Ideology with shared values

Baltic Sea Region
Programme• Flow of oil & gas from ENP countries to the EU.
• Flow of immigrants from ENP countries to the EU.
• Flow of Neo-liberal Ideology with shared values from the
EU to ENP.

Ea
ste
rn
Pa
rtn
ers
hip

• There is little relations between ENP countries which
depend on the EU market.

Black Sea Synergy

Union for the Mediterranean

No hope of regional cooperation
16
between ENP countries? ©Hasumi Yu

15©Yu Hasumi

97Black Sea Synergy vs. Eastern Partnership
Issues4.
Comparison of Black Sea Synergy
and Eastern Partnership©Hasumi Yu

Black Sea Synergy

Eastern Partnership

GeographicalScopeBlack Sea wide
- including EU members,
Turkey and Russia

EU-5+1 Eastern countries-except for EU members, Turkey
and Russia

Interaction

Local ownershipwithin Black Sea region

Joint ownership
between the EU and partners

On sectral partnership(energy, trade ,environment,
transport, good governance)

Differentiated Association
Agreements with reference ofeach partner’s ability andaspiration to the EU

Relationshipwith BSEC

BSS harmonizes with BSEC.
The EU-an observer.

EaP has no reference to BSEC.

Type ofinteraction

Regional process

Enlargement-lite
Quasi pre-accession

Source: revised table of Y. Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity,
Complementarity or Confusing Signals, ICBSS, Policy Brief, No.12, February 2009 9.
18©Hasumi Yu

17

10 Commandments of the EU
 Be democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.
 The four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, labour).
 Provide for social cohesion between citizens, regions and states.
 Ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of
future generations.
 Reject nationalism and favour the multiple identity of citizens.
 Assure federative multi-tier governance.
 Assure secular governance and favour multi-cultural pluralism.
 Promote multilateral order in international affairs.
 Abstain from threatening or using force against others without justcause.

5.
Ten Commandments of the EU
vs. Ten values of East Asians
Implications to‘value oriented diplomacy” of Japan

 Be open, inclusive and integrative towards neighbours thatadhere to the above.
Source: M. Emerson, What values for Europe? Ten Commandments, CEPS Policy Brief, No.65, Feb. 2005.

©Hasumi Yu

19

10 values of East Asians

Different 10 values andintegrationEU EAs respect education.
 EAs respect hard work.
 EAs respect saving and frugality.
 EAs version of a social contract.
 Citizens are expected to motivate their children to learn and be
self-reliant.
 The press should be free, but it must act responsibly.
 Every citizen a stakeholder in the country.
 EAs want their governments to maintain a morally environment for
their children.
 EAs do not believe in extreme forms of individualism. Every
individual is a member of a society.

10values form a framework that has enabled EU
to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious
relations between citizens, regions and statesby institutional integration.

EAs
10 values form a framework that has enabled EA
to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious
relations between citizens
by de facto functional economic integration.

 EAs practice national teamwork. Government, business andemployees work cooperatively. It is related to Triple Helix Model.
Source: P. Dicken, Global Shift mapping the changing countries of the World Economy, p. 517.

©Hasumi Yu

22©Hasumi Yu

Concluding remarks

Intra-regional trade ratio of each region
EU: Intra-regional market
integration completed

EU: Euro introduced%

EU: Euro intorduced

70• Limits of the EU Strategy

65

ASEAN: CEPT commences

60
55
50
45

ASEAN: CEPT commences
EU: Agree to form
single market

40• ‘values’ –same or different?

NAFTA enters into force
NAFTA enter into force

35
30
1980

1982

1984

1986

1988
East Asia

1990

1992
EU15

1994
EU25

1996

1998

2000

2002 years

NAFTA• The role of Japan
Notes: East Asia includes Japan, China, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and ASEAN10. The export andimport data for each country and region based on Taiwan is for 1989 - 2003. However, theexport and import data for Taiwan based on each country and region is for 1983 - 2003.
23
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Economy and Trade
2005, p. 437.

©Hasumi Yu

9824

Limits of the EU Strategy‘values’- same or different ?
• Cooperation between Japan and the EU willcontribute to peace and prosperity in Black Sea
region, because Japan’s ‘value oriented diplomacy’is consistent with ‘values’ of the EU.

• The EU looks like tolerant of different values
in BSS in contrast with EaP.
• In Black Sea region, the EU is unsettled,which is seen in differences between BSS
and EaP.

• But we must not overlook the essential differencein the same word ‘values’.
• Tolerance of different ‘values’ and acceptance ofdiversity are pre-condition for regional cooperation
on local ownership.

• Euro-centric manner like EaP is not suitable
to Black Sea region where various Gods
get together.
©Hasumi Yu©Hasumi Yu

25

The role of Japan• Not only conditionality for improvement of weakness, butalso finding and making use of strength in the society.
• Japan – a good adviser to the EU by suggesting different
multilateral viewpoints based on experiences in East Asia.

Thank you for your attention.

• Japan – a good adviser to Black Sea region, based on both
‘value oriented diplomacy’ and ‘acceptance of diversity’.
• Because Black Sea region is an arena of coexistence ofdifferent ‘values’.
©Hasumi Yu©Hasumi Yu

27

99

28

26

2. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)（1）Introduction【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism arebecoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at bothgovernmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global
Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security toeconomy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart
countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concernsthat the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that torevitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of theparticipating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice
President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took
the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of theeconomic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the Americanand Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above,
The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out
to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, thegravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its
Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board ofTrustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues
with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was
reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any
other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage inand promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan
Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originallyestablished as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA
Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 11
Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 16 Diet Members including the three Governors,
KOIKE Yuriko, HIRONAKA Wakako, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 85 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, SHIMADA Haruo,
OKAWARA Yoshio, ITO Kenichi and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the Supporters’
Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese
corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shareseach) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club,The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. YANO Takuya serves as Executive Secretary.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries forthe purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN
countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to theformation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing
policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in
principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of “Dialogues” and its overseas co-sponsors in last six years is given below.
Year Month

Topic

Co-sponsor

2005 April
June
November

The Prospect of East Asian Community andJapan-Korea Cooperation
The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation
Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area
and the Role of Japan
Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan Relationship
An East Asian Community and the United States
Prospect for Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership after the First
East Asia Summit
The China-Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental Issues

Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Korea)
ASEAN-ISIS
University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University Foundation (Romania), The
International Center for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)

US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration
Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World
Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan
Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues of the 21stCentury: In Pursuit of Recycling Society

National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
ASEAN-ISIS
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)

2006 February
June
September2007 January

June
July
November
2008 January
June
July
September2009 April
June
September2010 January
February

Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
The Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community
ASEAN-ISIS

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China), Energy
Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission (China),
The Japan Forum on International Relations
The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era
ASEAN-ISIS
Japan and Black Sea Area in the Rapidly Changing World
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Embassy of Turkey,
University of Shizuoka
An East Asian Community and the US
The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)Cooperation in Environment and Energy
The Council on East Asian Community，The East Asian Institute of National
University of Singapore(Singapore)
Japan -China Relations Entering A New Stage
Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (China)
Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement on ASEAN-ISIS
East Asia Cooperation100(2) Membership List of The Global Forum of Japan
As of January 13, 2010

In alphabetical order【Chairman】
OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies【President】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
【Business Leader Governors】
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation【Diet Member Governors】
HIRONAKA Wakako, Member of the House of Councillors. (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, Member of the House of Representatives. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)【Opinion Leader Governors】
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
WATANABE Mayu, Director of Administration, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------【Business Leader Members】(11 Members)
HANDA Haruhisa, Chairman, Worldwide Support for Development
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, Director, Kajima Corporation
KATSUMATA Tsunehisa, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company.
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.
TANAKA Tatsuo, Vice President, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.
YAMAMOTO Tadahito, President and Representative Director, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation( T B D), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation【Diet Member Members】(16 Members)
ASAO Keiichiro, (YP)
HATOYAMA Yukio, M.H.R. (DPJ)HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)KITAGAMI Keiro, M.H.R. (DPJ)
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)
NAGASHIMA Akihisa, M.H.R. (DPJ)
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)
OGUSHI Hiroshi, M.H.R. (DPJ)
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)
YAMAGUCHI Tsuyosi, M.H.R. (DPJ)
FUJITA Yukihisa, (DPJ)HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)NAITO Masamitsu, M.H.C. (DPJ)SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)

JIMBO Ken, Associate Professor, Keio University
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy
KAWAI Masahiro, Dean and CEO, Asian Development Bank Institute
KAWAI Masao, Guest Professor, Hakuo University
KIMURA Takayuki, Guest Professor, International Christian University
KINOSHITA Hiroo, Advisor, National Small Business & Information Promotion Center
KOGURE Masayoshi, former Professor, Toyo University
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University
MANO Teruhiko, former Advisor to the President, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman and CEO, Miyoshi Networks Co., Ltd.
MORI Toshimitsu, former Ambassador to Kazakhstan
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, The University of Shizuoka
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, President, The American Studies Foundation
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers
OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University
OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, Meiji University
OHYA Eiko, Journalist
SAITO Akira, President, Yomiuri Nippon Symphony Orchestra Tokyo
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University
SAKAMOTO Masahiro, Vice-president, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
SAJIMA Naoko, Professor, Senshu University
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
SHIMIZU Yoshikazu, Supreme Advisor, Kamakura Gayukai
SHIRAISHI Takashi, Guest Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University
SUDO Shigeru, Director, Energy and Environment Program, International Development Center of JapanSUZUKI Keisuke, former Member of the House of Representatives
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist
TAIDA Hideya, Member of the board of trustees, Akita International University
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Akita International University
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo
TAKAHASHI Kazuo,Guest Professor, International Christian University
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, President and CEO, Japan International Broadcasting
TAKEUCHI Yukio, Justice, Supreme Court of Japan
TAKEMI Keizo, Professor, Tokai University
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, The University of TokyoTANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University
TANINO Sakutaro, former Ambassador to China
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University
UTSUMI Yoshio, former Secretary General, International Telecommunication Union
WATANABE Mayu, Director of Administration, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc
YAMANAKA Akiko, former Member of the House of Representatives
YAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo
YAMAZAWA Ippei, Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University
YOSHITOMI Masaru, Special Advisor, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry
YUSHITA Hiroyuki, Guest Professor, Kyorin University【Opinion Leader Members】(85Members)
AICHI Kazuo, Chairman, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, International House of JapanAOKI Tamotsu, Contract Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University
ASOMURA Kuniaki, Professor, North Asia University
CHINO Keiko, Columnist, The Sankei Shimbun【Supporters’ Club Members】(15 Members)
FUKUSHIMA Teruhiko, Professor, National Defense Academy of JapanASAO Keiichiro, AKASHI Yasushi (5 Unit Members), and others (13 members)
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University【Executive Secretary】
HARUNA Mikio, Professor, Graduate School of Nagoya University
YANO Takuya
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, Duputy Chairman, Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of JapanHATTORI Kenji, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press
LDP:Liberal Democratic PartyHIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
NK: New Komeito
YP: Your Party
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
HONDA Masaru, Senior Staff Writer Political News Department, The Asahi Shimbun
ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Director, Tokyo Gakugei University
IKEO Aiko, Professor, Waseda University
IMAGAWA Yukio, former Ambassador to Cambodia
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper
INOGUCHI Takashi, President, University of Niigata Prefecture
ITO Eisei, former Member of the House of Representatives
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
ITO Tsuyoshi, Professor, Meiji University
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, Professor, University of Virginia
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka

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3. An Introduction to Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
About BSECOn 25 June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in
Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement, giving birth to the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC).
It came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic
initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, ensuring peace,stability and prosperity, and encouraging friendly and good‐neighborly relations in the Black Sea
region.
In March 1994, the BSEC Headquarters—the Permanent International Secretariat of theOrganization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC PERMIS)—was established in Istanbul.
With the entry into the force of its Charter on 1 May 1999, BSEC acquired international legal
identity and was transformed into a full‐fledged regional economic organization:
ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION. With the accession of
Serbia in April 2004, the organization’s Member States increased to twelve.

Facts about the BSEC Region■ BSEC covers a geography encompassing the territories of the Black Sea littoral States, theBalkans and the Caucasus with an area of nearly 20 million square kilometers. The BSEC
region is located on two continents.
■ BSEC represents a region of approximately 350 million people with a foreign trade capacity ofover USD 300 billion annually.
■ Next to the Persian Gulf region, it is the second‐largest source of source of oil and natural gas
along with its rich proven reserves of minerals and metals.
■ It is becoming Europe’s major transport and energy transfer corridor.

BSEC Economic Agenda
BSEC Economic Agenda for the future towards a more consolidated, effective and viable BSEC
partnership:I.
Acceleration of effective multilateral economic cooperation and attainment of sustainable
development
II. Cooperation in the field of institutional renewal and governanceIII. Soft security measures in the framework of multilateral economic cooperation
IV. BSEC: towards the mature partnership, common, endeavor and shared values
V. External relations of the BSEC organization
Related Bodies and Affiliated Centers : Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation(PABSEC), BSEC Business Council (BSECBC), Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB),International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical
Data and Economic Information
Sectoral Dialogue Partnership : Black Sea International Shipowners Association (BINSA), Black & Azov
Seas Ports Association (BASPA), Union of Road Transport Association in the Black Sea, Economic
Cooperation Region (BSEC‐URTA), Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers (BRASS),
Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCC), International Network for SMEs (INSME)

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