IEEJ : February 2015. All Rights Reserved.

Changes in U.S. Nuclear Power
Plant Operation & Regulation
1979-Present!
Gail H. Marcus, Sc. D.
Former Deputy Director-General,
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris, France
Former Principal Deputy Director,
Office of Nuclear Energy, DOE

The Institute of Energy Economics, JapanTokyo, February 20, 2015

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Scope of Discussion• How U.S. restored public confidence after TMI• How U.S. improved capacity factors

President Carter at TMI(Source: US Government)

IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15(Source: NEI )2

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Public Confidence in the
U.S. after TMI

TMI. (Source: US Government)

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Recent Public Opinion
Trends in U.S.

(Source: Gallup)

Public opinion remained positive after Fukushima
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Post-TMI Public Opinion in U.S.
• Public opinion has varied over time
• Generally positive today– Limited effects of TMI, especially offsite– Passage of time
– Other concerns—climate change, security ofsupply (interest in renewables, but recognition ofintermittency)– General trust in US regulatory system– Industry and regulatory responses to TMI, otherevents• Anti-nuclear element remains; concerns remain
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Important Contributors to
Public Perception• Strong safety culture• Learning from experience• Continuous improvement• Strong regulator• Industry collaboration & leadership• Positive industry-regulator relationship• Transparency & openness (NRC, industry)• Use of risk-informed regulation
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Strong Safety Culture(NOT “See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil”)

Tōshōgū shrine, Nikkō (Source: David Monniaux)

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Strong Safety Culture: What is it?
"That assembly of characteristics andattitudes in organizations and individuals
which establishes that, as an overriding
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive
the attention warranted by their significance.”
Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meetingon the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG, 1986)

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Importance ofStrong Safety Culture“An accident anywhere is an accident everywhere”• Helps lead to safe, reliable performance• Public acceptance depends critically on publicconfidence that both operators and regulators are
giving priority to safety (i.e., have good safety culture)• Any impression of corruption, complacency, collusion,
carelessness, lying, mismanagement, covering up (byoperators or regulators), etc. erodes publicconfidence
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Characteristics of Strong
Safety Culture• Safety first• Leadership sets example• Leadership doesn’t put other priorities above safety– Such as saving time or money, meeting performance goals• Leadership takes responsibility– Doesn’t sanction “hidden procedures”– Doesn’t try to cover up mistakes to regulator or public

•
•
•
•
•

Entire staff believes they share responsibility for safety
Staff not punished for identifying safety concerns
Questioning attitude is cultivatedCulture of continuous improvement
Emphasis on following rules

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Learning from Experience

TMI-2 (Source: US Government)

Pripyat (Chernobyl site) (Source: VOA, D. Markosian

Fukushima Daiichi(Source: Wikimedia Commons/Digital GlobeIEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Learning from Experience• We can learn a lot from accidents– “When you think you’ve thought of everything, there will
always be something you have not thought of”
Prof. Hatamura, Chairman of Government Committee investigating
Fukushima accident• Both nuclear and non-nuclear accidents and otherincidents may provide lessons• We need to share facts and findings so that everyone
learns• Today, that means internationally as well as
domestically• No one likes to share their weaknesses, but trying tohide them is actually counterproductive
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Examples of Sources of Lessons• Major accidents (Nuclear)– TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima• Other accidents and incidents (Nuclear)– Davis Besse, Browns Ferry• Non-reactor/non-nuclear accidents/
incidents– Ibaraki, WIPP, cyber-security breaches– Lessons are usually more generic– A few may be more directly applicable
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Learning from Experience—
Some Cautions• It means there has already been an accident– It’s better to anticipate if possible• Tendency to overcompensate– US: Overregulation– Japan: Mistaking independence for isolation• Difficulty in resuming normal activities– US: Long delays in new licenses– Japan: Long delays in restarts• Changes may fix one problem, but create others
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Continuous Improvement,(NOT “Mission Accomplished”)

President Bush, San Diego, 2003 (Source: U.S. News)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Importance of Continuous
Improvement
The job is never fully completed• Changes made may not fully or appropriately
address problems• Better options become possible• New issues arise• Standards and expectations increase
Need to keep reviewing and evaluating
performance, looking for further improvements.
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Strong, Competent Regulator

NRC Headquarters (Source: NRC)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Strong, Competent Regulator
Improves public confidence
Gives industry credibility• Characteristics– Puts safety first– Sets high standards– Consistent in review and enforcement– Seeks, considers, and addresses ALL viewpoints• Subscribes to high standards itself– At NRC, embodied in Principles of Good
Regulation
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NRC Principles of Good
Regulation• Independence• Openness• Efficiency• Clarity• Reliability

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Independence
Nothing but the highest possible standards of ethicalperformance and professionalism should influence
regulation. However, independence does not imply
isolation. All available facts and opinions must besought openly from licensees and other interested
members of the public. The many and possibly
conflicting public interests involved must be considered.
Final decisions must be based on objective, unbiased
assessments of all information, and must be
documented with reasons explicitly stated.

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Openness
Nuclear regulation is the public's business, and it
must be transacted publicly and candidly. The publicmust be informed about and have the opportunity toparticipate in the regulatory processes as required bylaw. Open channels of communication must be
maintained with Congress, other government agencies,
licensees, and the public, as well as with theinternational nuclear community.

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Efficiency
The American taxpayer, the rate-paying consumer, andlicensees are all entitled to the best possible
management and administration of regulatory activities.
The highest technical and managerial competence isrequired, and must be a constant agency goal. NRC
must establish means to evaluate and continually
upgrade its regulatory capabilities. Regulatory
activities should be consistent with the degree ofrisk reduction they achieve. Where several effective
alternatives are available, the option which minimizes
the use of resources should be adopted. Regulatory
decisions should be made without undue delay.

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Clarity
Regulations should be coherent, logical, and practical.
There should be a clear nexus between regulations
and agency goals and objectives whether explicitly or
implicitly stated. Agency positions should be readily
understood and easily applied.

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Reliability
Regulations should be based on the best available
knowledge from research and operational experience.
Systems interactions, technological uncertainties, andthe diversity of licensees and regulatory activities mustall be taken into account so that risks are maintained at
an acceptably low level. Once established, regulation
should be perceived to be reliable and not
unjustifiably in a state of transition. Regulatory
actions should always be fully consistent with written
regulations and should be promptly, fairly, anddecisively administered so as to lend stability to the
nuclear operational and planning processes.
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Observations about Independence“Independence does not equal isolation”• Independence is knowing all facts and viewpoints
and reaching one’s own conclusions• Independence means not being unduly influenced
by anyone else—industry, political pressure, or
public opinion• Openness and transparency help demonstrate that
actions are based on independent judgments

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Personnel Practices Contributing to aStrong Regulator• Regulatory issues are highly technical and needdeep technical expertise– NRC has one of the most highly trained andeducated staffs in the US Government• Technical expertise at NRC comes from bothinternal (staff) and independent external sources– Research organizations (such as universities) perform
experiments and run simulations– Advisory committees with independent members review
research, debate findings, and make recommendations– However, regulatory staff can independently assess theresearch results and recommendations, and make final
decisions based on their own understanding
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Industry Collaboration andLeadership

INPO Headquarters (Source: INPO)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Industry Collaboration andLeadership• Operators are responsible for safety• Industry should be proactive• Industry should cooperate to share lessons
learned and improve performance of all– INPO– Owner’s groups– EPRI• Industry should appreciate role of regulator,and engage in constructive dialogue withregulator
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INPO: Mission and Areas ofEffort••“Our mission at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – topromote excellence – in the operation of commercial nuclear
power plants.
We work to achieve our mission by:– Establishing performance objectives, criteria and guidelines
for the nuclear power industry– Conducting regular detailed evaluations of nuclear power
plants– Providing assistance to help nuclear power plants continually
improve their performance”

Note: Areas of effort include plant evaluations, training and accreditation, events
analysis and information exchange, and assistance

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INPO: Values“Our values at INPO are the foundation of allthat we do professionally and personally.
• Excellence – make it better• Perseverance - there is no finish line
• Leadership – make things happen• Relationships – knock down walls andbuild bridges• Integrity – we are what we say and do”
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Positive Industry-Regulator
Relationship

NRC Chairman Marfarlane, INPO CEO Conference 2013
(Source: NRC)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Positive Industry-Regulator
Relationship• NRC and industry have largely shed the “usversus them” attitude• NRC realizes it needs the input from the “boots on
the ground” of the operators• Industry realizes that a strong regulator gives the
public confidence in them
• Of course, there are times the industry still charges
the NRC with over-regulating, and anti-nukes stillcharge that NRC does whatever industry wants• But both parties recognize critical role of other andare committed at the highest levels to open
dialogue
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Industry View on NRC Role
“We need to maintain a strong, credible
regulator”
Marvin S. Fertel, President and CEO, Nuclear Energy
Institute, in Citizens for Nuclear Energy Technology
Awareness Edward Teller Lecture, October 21, 2013

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Transparency and Openness

RIC Conference Announcement, 2015 (Source: NRC)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Transparency and Openness:
Government-wide U.S. Laws
• The U.S. has legal, Government-wide requirements for publicaccess to government activities and decisions– Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)• Requires agencies to provide most material requested by members of
the public– Government in the Sunshine Act• Requires most meetings by agency bodies (like Commissions) to beannounced in advance and open to the public– Exceptions for national security, personnel-related, other• The U.S. has legal, Government-wide requirements to solicit
public input on Government decisions, like rules– Proposed rules must be published in advance– Public must have time to comment– Agency must publish responses to issues raised in comments(addressing what it did to address the comment, or why the issue
doesn’t need to be addressed)
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Transparency and Openness:
U.S. NRC• NRC openness has evolved over time
• NRC used to be insular, and especially cautious
about dealing with industry• NRC now tries to engage with ALL“stakeholders” (interested parties)• Interaction is not one-way; NRC really listens andreacts• Some still say NRC’s interactions aren’t balanced– BUT criticism comes from both ends of spectrum!
• Anti-nukes claim NRC is industry’s “lapdog”• Ardent pro-nukes claim that NRC impedes industry

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Transparency and Openness:
Industry• U.S. industry has discovered that transparency andopenness are important for them as well
– Developing and maintaining dialogue with local
community– Being available and being accurate in discussing
incidents• Openness and transparency do add to the level ofeffort for all parties (industry and regulator)– Must schedule and hold meetings– Regulatory staff may need to travel to meet with public– Must prepare documentation and responses• Openness doesn’t eliminate all criticism, but does
improve credibility
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Observations on Independence
and Openness• It may seem counterintuitive for regulator tomeet with industry while trying to overcome
image of “nuclear village”• However, regulator can only have complete
understanding by looking at issues from allperspectives• It is important that:– Meetings with industry are open and documented– Similar meetings are held with other interested
parties– Decisions of regulators are objective and are
explained in documents available to the public
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Use of Risk-Informed Regulation(Source: NRC)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Use of Risk-Informed Regulation“An airplane that is 100% safe would have somuch equipment on it that it would be too heavy
to fly”• Careful consideration of risk provides guidance forboth operators and regulators• Risk evaluations help identify vulnerabilities and set
priorities• Risk-informed regulation– Assures adequate safety is met– Balances costs and benefits beyond adequate safety– Provides rationale for determining how what safetymeasures are enough, and what are too much
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Quantity versus Quality• Traditional safety approach is “defense in depth”—
several “layers” of safety in case one doesn’t work
• This is still an appropriate approach• HOWEVER, defense in depth also needs diversity– Operator can’t rely completely on more and moreengineered systems– More equipment does not replace the need for othermeasures (ex., training, maintenance, operatingprocedures, emergency procedures)– Added measures can sometimes introduce other risks– Wrong added measures can distract attention andresources from more safety-significant measures andactions– Overemphasis in one area can shortchange other areas
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NRC’s Backfit Rule
• NRC is charged by law with responsibility toassure adequate protection of the public healthand safety• Beyond adequate protection, costs must be
justifiable in terms of safety benefit• This is codified in NRC’s “Backfit Rule” for new
requirements to existing facilities– Adequate protection is always required– Beyond adequate protection, there must be a
substantial increase in public health and safety
justifying the direct and indirect costs of themeasureIEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Capacity Factor Improvements(Source: NEI)IEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Contributing Elements to U.S.
Capacity Factor Improvements• Improvements were based on experience• Continuing changes were made over time as
more experience was gained• Post-TMI actions by NRC and industry
contributed• Improved NRC-licensee relationship probably
contributed
Some of these contributions may be difficult todemonstrate or quantify
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Many Interrelated Contributors
to Improved Capacity Factors
Extended refueling outage intervals
Reduced refueling/maintenance outage durations
Reduced unplanned automatic scrams• Improved maintenance• More on-line maintenance– May reduce both outage frequency and duration• Reduced scrams may reduce need for maintenance• Improved training– May reduce scrams, improve outage performance• Specific measures that allowed longer times between
maintenance shutdowns, such as– Chemistry changes to increase component life
– Improved motor-operated valves
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Possible Post-TMI Contributors• Establishment of INPO
– Disseminates information on operational bestpractices, shares lessons learned– Exert peer pressure on poor performers• Improved training (and other industry initiatives
at least partly motivated by TMI)
• Perhaps on-site resident inspectors, more riskinformed approaches, and other NRC regulatory
initiatives– Ex., Reactor Oversight Process• Improvements in design of plants built after TMIIEEJ, Tokyo, 2/20/15

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Possible Contributions of
NRC-Industry Relationship• During period that capacity factors improved,
NRC and industry relationship also improved• May have facilitated initiatives that improved
performance• Example: Industry-developed guidance
documents– Documents are developed by industry groups as
proposals– Industry provides rationale– NRC reviews carefully before endorsing (or not)– Openness and transparency assure that decisions are
made appropriately• Exchanges between NRC and industry are made public• The NRC review process Is clear, thorough and objective
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Roles and Responsibilities in
Improving Capacity Factors• Industry had significant role in improving capacity factors in
U.S.
– Pressure to improve capacity factors is more financial thansafety• Many improvements resulted from collaborative efforts– EPRI, Owner’s Groups, INPO

• NRC role has been primarily to assure that its regulations
permit operational improvements if safety is not affected– Review regulations in response to industry proposals– Modify regulations as long as safety is maintained• Move to risk-informed regulation may have been a factor– Ex., maintenance rule required licensees to take a riskoriented approach to maintenance– This helped reduce unplanned automatic scrams
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Refueling—Different
Considerations in U.S. and Japan• U.S. nuclear plants typically have longer intervals
between refueling than do Japanese plants, andshorter outages• This contributes to a higher capacity factor• Government requirements may constrain therefueling schedules in Japan• The U.S. does not have similar requirements• In the U.S. refueling intervals were increased byindustry initiatives as experience was gained• Some NRC rules (such as rules for permissible
burnup) may also be contributing factors
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Final Thoughts—on Post TMI &Capacity Factor Discussion• It’s difficult to regain trust once it’s beenlost
• It takes time and consistently improved
performance• Strict adherence to the highest levels of
behavior and performance is necessary• Both the licensee and the regulator musthave a strong safety culture
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Contact : report@tky.ieej.or.jp

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