Disclaimer
This report was compiled by an ADRC visiting researcher (VR) from ADRC
member countries.
The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of
the ADRC. The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon the maps in the report also do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the ADRC.

Rustam Safaraliyev
ADRC
FY 2014

1)
2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

Climate and disaster profile of Azerbaijan Republic and Japan
Legal Framework and Basic Laws For Disaster Regulations inJapan
Outline of Disaster Management System of Japan and Disaster
ManagementgPlanningg
Outline of Designated National and Local Administrative Organs,
Public Corporations and Voluntary Organizations Responsible forDisaster Management in Japan
Japan.
The Great Hanshin –Awaji Earthquake as a Turning Point of
Improvement of Disaster Management System of Japan as awhole and Disaster Management System of Hyogo Prefecture
Conclusion

Disaster Profile of Azerbaijan Republic (Floods)
Azerbaijan is susceptible to heavy
flooding because of its topography and thewater-relatedld fluctuations
fl
i
i
in
the
h
C
Caspiani
Sea.Territory of Azerbaijan Republic is includedin the list of areas, where floods and inundations
are observed mostly along the world.
Appearance of floods in Great and Little
Caucasus mountain ranges which cover almost
half of countrywide territory, occurs more
intensively. Most floods and inundations happen
in uplands of South slope of Great Caucasus andNakhichevan AR. Heavy showers on the territoryof Azerbaijan Republic often lead to floods withdamages and human casualties.
casualties A substantial
part of central Azerbaijan could be flooded incase of damage to the Mingechevir water
reservoir in the west. Landslides caused by
h
heavy
rains
i
and
d undergrounddd water are alsolcommon case for Azerbaijan.
.

Disaster Profile of Azerbaijan Republic (Landslides)
One of the main reason of landslides inrural regions of Azerbaijan is semi-nomadic
animal husbandry
The number of areas in Azerbaijan which
are prone to landslides has increased byfour times in the past 24 years andcomprises 400 that cover the areas ofapproximately 6,000
6 000 square kilometers.
kilometers
Landslides in Azerbaijan are frequently
occurring in Shamakhi-Ismayilli, GubaKhachmaz
regionsandAbsheronpeninsula.
ilLandslides are usually reported in spring
and autumn in Azerbaijan
However landslide zones have became
However,more active in Azerbaijan since October,because of a drought in the summer
months, and emergence of new cracks inthe earthearth'ss surface and heavy rainfall In
November, prolonged rains have triggered
several landslides in the southern region of
the country.

Disaster Profile ofAzerbaijan Republic(Seismicity)
As a part of the
AlpinefoldedsystemAzerbaijan
territory
characterized as very highseismic activity.
Azerbaijan lies ina region with moderate tovery high seismic hazard.
Amagnitude
6.3
earthquake in the Baku
region in November 2000
killed 31 people, affected
3,294 others and incurred areported economic loss of$10 million.

Disaster Profile of Azerbaijan Republic(Mud volcanoes and drought areas)
Mud volcanoes are spreading within the
Republic of Azerbaijan. There are over 220 mud
volcanoes in Azerbaijan (Absheron Peninsula,
Peninsula
Gobustan, southeast Shirvan plain, Samur-Davachi
plain terrane, both Absheron and Baku Archipelago.
Their height varies in the range from 20 to 400m.
Besides onshore mud volcanoes there are buried
volcanoes and offshore mud volcanoes. There areover 140 offshore mud volcanoes within the Caspian
Sea.
Drought is a natural climatic feature of
the region and occurs time by time in specificperiods. Azerbaijan has been severely affected by
the drought that has stricken many countries in
Asia the Near East and parts of Europe
Central Asia,
during the spring 2000. The most affected farmers
were those cultivating plots located at the tail end of
irrigation canals. The fisheries sector has also been
severely affected by the low water levels in therivers and reservoirs due to the drought.
In Azerbaijan 3 mln. ha are exposed todesertinisation out of which anthropogenic
ddesertisationi i amounts 12 thousandhd km²
k ² mostly
l due
d to
demolition of incorrect irrigation system

Disaster Statisticsof Azerbaijan
Republic for last 20
yearsEconomic Losses ofA
Azerbaijanb ij RepublicRbli
due to Disasters

Disaster Profile of Japan
Unfavorable
geographical,
topographical and meteorological conditions of
the country have made it one of the mostdisaster p
prone countries in the world. Althoughg
its territory accounts merely for the 0,25 % of theplanet’s land area, Japan is subject to about 20,5
% earthquakes with the magnitude 6 or more and
7 % the world’s active volcanoes is located on its
territory. The most frequent natural hazards inJapan are earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons,volcano eruptions, floods and landslides.
Occasional torrential rains and heavy snows areanother challenge for the country. The highnumber of earthquakes, tsunamis and active
volcanoes are the conditioned by the fact that
territory of Japan forms the part Circum-PacificSeismic Belt which is sometimes called as Pacific
Ring of Fire. Japan located at the junction of 4
tectonic plates- Eurasian Plate, North American
Plate, Pacific Plate and Philippine Sea –which isthe cause of high seismicity of its territory.
Tsunamis are triggered by strong earthquakes at
ocean bottom or huge landslides in the vicinity of
the coast.

Disaster Profile of
Japan
Japan
Rivers in Japan are short andsteep and flow rapidly andviolently.
i l l A great amount off
rain falls on the Japanesearchipelago during the rainyseason (heavy rains of June
and July) and typhoonseasons; and during periodsof intensive rainfall,
rainfall even asmall stream that usually runs
low may become a raging
torrent
torrent.
MoreoverMoreover,combination of such factors as
steep mountains, fast-flowing
e s, uunstables ab e a
and
d so
soft
rivers,ground, rainy climate andfrequent earthquakes often
lead
to
such
sediment
disasters as debris flows,
landslides and slope failures.

Hyogo Prefecture
Disaster Profile
With the territory of
8,396 km2
Hyogo
prefecturehasthepopulationl ti
off 5,595,052(for the March 2011). Thevery peculiar for thisregion hazards types
arefollowings:
Flood,
Earthquake,q
Land
Slide,
Storm
Surge, and Tsunami

Disaster Management System in Japan, 3 laws has beenenacted to regulate disaster response activities at national level: 1)
year 2)) Fire Services Act -1948 yyear 3)) Flood
Disaster Relief Act - 1947 y
Control Act – 1949 year - the numbers of the laws regulating otherphases of disaster management are following: 7 Basic Acts; 18 withregard to Disaster Prevention and Preparedness; 23 Disaster
Recovery and Reconstruction and Financial Measures .
Adopted in 1961 the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act(DCBA) is considered to be the turning point in the history of modern
disaster management system of Japan,
Japan The DCBA covers all phasesof disaster management and stipulates establishment of disastermanagement councils at three levels: national – Central Disaster
Management Council; Prefectural – Local Disaster Management
Cil andd Municipal
M i i l DisasterDiMC
il as wellll asCouncilManagement
Councils
defines organization and duties of these councils and defines
conditions for establishment of headquarters for disaster control incase of emergency
Disaster Relief Act – The purpose of the law is to provide
essential emergency relief in the event of a disaster through thepof local ggovernments, non-governmentalgorganizations,gcooperationsuch as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so
as to protect the disaster victims and maintain social order.

River and Flood Management in Japan is regulated based on the River Act and Flood Control Act
respectively. The River Act, besides setting the basic rules for river administration defines major flood
prevention measures whereas the purpose of the Flood Control Act, aka, Flood Fighting Law is to watch for
and gguard againstgwater-related disasters caused byy floods or storm surges
g and mitigategdamageg in orderto maintain public safety. According to the River Act, the rivers in Japan are classified into 2 groups: Class A
and Class B. And also there are independent rivers which are managed either by municipalities or cities
In the event that a disaster has occurred or is likely to occur because of a flood, storm surge, etc. and it isdeemed necessary in order to prevent or mitigate such disaster, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport andd Tourismi
may directditheh prefecturalfl governor who
h performs
fpart off theh management off aClass A river in a designated section or the management of a Class B river to take necessary measures.
Flood fighting and preparedness are regulated under the Flood Fighting Act and Specified Urban River
Inundation Prevention Act.
According to Flood Control Act the municipalities assumes the primary and full responsibility for floodfighting activities within their respective territories. The following flood mitigation measures are conductedbased on the Flood Control Act: Patrol of river, Mobilization of flood-fighting and fire-fighting organizations, Ordering residents to evacuate, Reporting and publishing water levels and reporting levee breaches
The
e Act
c p
plays
ays a
an important
po a roleo e in thee reduction
educ o oof flood
ood dadamage.
age. It has
as pprovisionso s o s go
governingeg thee following
o ogmatters.
1. Flood forecast to guide evacuation, etc. (jointly issued by a river administrator and theJapan Meteorological Agency).
2 Flood fighting warning to guide flood fighting activities (issued by a river administrator).
2.
administrator)
3. Public announcement by a river administrator of flood prone areas along each major river andpreparation of a hazard map by each municipality based on the assumed flood prone areClassifications of rivers in Japan

According to law some of some of Class A and Class B rivers aremonitored by Hyogo Prefecture Land Management Bureau Public
Works Department RiverClass C rivers are monitored and measured by Municipalities

Class A rivers are measured and monitored byy Ministry
y of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Natural disasters andi limplementation
i off
laws
In Japan,Japan the disastermanagement system has
beendevelopedandstrengthened
following
the bitter experiences oflarge-scale disasters andaccidents

Outline of Disaster
Management system
of Japan and Disaster
Management
Planning
Disaster managementin Japan consists of 3-layered
system – national, prefecturaland municipal layers.
layers
According to DCBA
Disaster Management Councils
are established at each leveland each council is responsible
for the implementation of alldisaster management related
i
d
i
h i
issuesunder
itsauthority.
Disaster Management
Councils established ateach level and each council is
responsiblefortheimplementation of all disastermanagement related issues
under its authority

Central Disaster Management Council
consists of the prime minister, who is thechairperson, Minister of State for Disaster
Management , all ministers, heads of major
public institutions and experts.. The Council’sfunctions include the following:* Create and promote the implementation of the
Basic Disaster Management Plan
* Create and promote the implementation ofplans for emergency measures in the event of adisaster* Deliberate important matters related todisaster preparedness in response to inquiries
from the Prime Minister or Minister of State forDisaster Management (basic policies on disastermanagement, overall coordination of disastermanagement measures, proclaiming emergency
situation and others), etc.
* Provide full report on important items
concerning disaster management to the Prime
Minister and Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Mission of Cabinet Office - Alongwith a series of reforms of the central
government system in 2001, the post of Ministerof State for Disaster Management was newly
established to integrate and coordinate disaster
reduction policies and measures of ministries
and agencies.
agencies In the Cabinet Office,
Office which is
responsible for securing cooperation andcollaboration among related governmentorganizations in wide-ranging issues, theDirector-General for Disaster Management is
mandated to undertake basic disastermanagement policies and response to largescale disasters, as well as conduct overall
coordination.

Disaster Management Planning and actors of disaster management system
Disaster management planning in Japan is implemented at threelevels:1. Basic Disaster Management Plan is prepared by the Central Disaster
Management Council and basis plan for disaster management
activities. The plan must be based on Disaster Countermeasure BasicAct. The structure of it is as shown in the figure below:
2. Disaster Management Operation Plan is made by each designatedgovernment organization and designated public corporation based on
the Basic Disaster Management Plan and should provide measures tobe undertaken for disaster prevention pertaining to the business of adesignated administrative organ
3. Local Disaster Management Plan (prefectural, city, town or village) is
made byyp
prefectural and municipal
p disaster managementgcouncils,
subject to local circumstances and based on Basic Disaster
Management Plan.
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act outlines the main actors of
disaster management system of the country
Designated administrative organs which mean administrative organsof the State defined under the National Government Organization Act(Act No. 120, 1948) and which to be designated by the Prime Minister.
Designated local administrative organs means branch offices ofdesignated administrative organs in the prefectures and other local
administrative organs of the State designated by the Prime Minister.
D i
Designatedt d public
bli corporationstimeans public
bli corporations
ti
such
h as
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), the Bank of Japan, theJapanese Red Cross Society, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) and othercorporations engaged in power, gas, transportation, communicationand other public utility work, all designated by the Prime Minister.
Designated local public corporations means administrators of otherpublic corporations operating in the area of a prefecture and engaged
in power, gas, transportation, communication and other public utility
work, all designated by the governor of the prefecture concerned.

THE MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT AND
TOURISMThe MLIT conducts disaster management policy atnational as well as prefectural level in relation to floodand sediment disasters as well as town developmentwith regard to safety for both natural and technologicaldisasters. Alongside with other phases of emergency
management the ministry also actively involved in
response phase and to this end Disaster Prevention
Center was established.
established Disaster Prevention Centerestablished in the MLIT performs the following functions• Mobilizing
leaders, staff members and related
departmentpmembers• Observing
anddistributing
meteorologicalinformation, site images, etc.
• Collecting
and sharing information (integrating
damage information)• Exchanging information with ministers' offices, otherministries and agencies, local departments, etc.
• Providing information to the public• Regional assistance, assistance to local governments• In case of the large-scale disasters MLIT renders
assistanceito localll governments

Disaster Prevention CenterIn order to minimize victims to the less possible
extent, flood forecast centers (provisional name)have been established in regional development
bureaus to improve risk management measures inin,for example, monitoring floods and providing
information to municipal governments, the mass
media, etc. Flood forecast centers are to perform
such tasks as climate change monitoring, flood risk
evaluation and the development of an advanced
flood prediction system. To the end following
activities are implemented:
Collection of point data (e.g. rainfall amounts, waterlevels and water quality)
R i observation
Rain
b
i by
b groundd gauges andd telemetrylsystem – the data obtained by telemeters areconsolidated in one site, such as a regional bureau
and a prefectural office, through the linking station.
Then, they are sent to each office to update the realti
time
flood
fl d prediction
di ti calculations.
l l tiCollection of area data (rainfall amounts)
Radar rain gauges have been installed at 26
locations throughout the country. The information of
11-km
km mesh resolution is updated every half an hour
and available on the Internet.
Collection of image data.
CCTV Network - Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport, Regional Development Bureaus and River
Offi
Officeshavehreal-timel tiaccess tto 3,900 CCTV imagesiavailable on IP (Internet protocol) network. CCTV
images are used for developing disaster control
plans.
ydevelopedp byy individualRiver information systems
regional development bureaus have been
integrated into a national river information system.
Regional development bureaus can customize thesystem according to their requirements.

JAPAN METEOROLOCICAL AGENCY

JMA is semi-autonomous agency of the
MLIT. Besides,
MLIT
Besides function as central weather
service agency of Japan, the agency has
established comprehensive surveillance
and awareness providing mechanism withregardd to earthquake,hktyphoonhanddvolcano hazards.
Weather Analysis and Prediction
JMA monitors weather conditions 24 hours
a day and issues Emergency Warnings,
Warnings and Advisories to mitigate theeffects of possible natural disasters andallowll
preparationsti
f otherforth disasters
di
t
th
they
may trigger. The Agency also issues
weather forecasts based on observationand numerical weather prediction (NMP)
Numerical Weather Prediction
Future weather is predicted by calculating
using a numerical weather prediction
model on a supercomputer.
supercomputer
Weather maps and Monitoring
Forecasters use various weather maps todetermine future weather conditions andmonitor changes in weather conditions
such as torrential rain, tornadoes andthunderstorms.

JAPAN METEOROLOCICAL AGENCY
Information for Severe Weather Preparedness
JMA issues messages in order to mitigate possible issues such as
damage from storm/flooding,storm/flooding debris flow and slope failure causedby tropical or extra-tropical cyclones and fronts. The messages issued
as:Emergency Warnings/Warnings/ Advisories
Bulletins/ Bulletins on Exceptionally Heavy Downpours
Bulletins are issued to alert the public to weather conditions before
Warning/Advisories are issued.
Flood Warnings and Advisories for designated rivers
JMA issues Flood warnings and Advisories for designated rivers withinformation on water levels or flow rates in collaboration withnational and prefectural river authorities
Along with above mentioned messages JMA issues Hazardous Wind
Watch, Information on debris flow, slope failure and other hazards,
Radar/ Raingauge-Analyzed Precipitation and Very-Short Range
Forecasts of Precipitation and Newscasts (Precipitation, Thunder andTornado)Observation Network of JMA
JMA operates an array of networks involving surface based
observation and the use of meteorological satellites to monitor theatmosphere around the clock. The results are made available to the
public and related users.
Upper-airUpper
air observation
Upper-air observation is performed via radiosonde and wind prolifer
observation networks
Satellite Observation
Obtain the clear picture of typhoons over ocean areas and otherglobal atmosphericgpconditions
Radar observation
20 Doppler weather radars are used to observe rainfall/snowfall
intensity nationwide altogether with providing the information on
the movement of thunderclouds
Surface weather Observation
A total of 160 JMA weather stations, including Local Meteorological
Offices , across the country routinely collect data on variables suchas surface pressure, temperature, humidity, wind, precipitation,sunshine duration, snow depth visibility and current weather
conditions

Activity of JMA
Monitoring of the Global Environment
JMA carries out observation and monitoring to environmental issues such as global
warming and ozone layer depletion as well as prediction of global warming
warming, andmakes the result public.
JMA monitors:
 Along with Japan’s Ministry of Defense observe greenhouse gases in seawater Extreme climate events around the world and related phenomena such as El Nino
and La Nina
 Atmospheric environment
 The oceans ( water temperature, salinity, carbon dioxide) Global environment observation network
MeteorologicalMtl i l Information
I f
ti forf Aviation
A i ti andd Maritime
M iti
SafetyS f t
 JMA provides aviation and maritime operators with specialized information tomeet their specific needs. It includes
 Monitoring at Aerodromes Monitoring of Airspace IssuanceI
off M
Marinei WarningsWiandd WaveW
Forecast
F
ChartsCh
Monitoring of Earthquakes, Tsunamis and Volcanoes
JMA monitors real-time data from around 1,500 seismometers and around 4,300 seismic
intensity meters, tsunami observation facilities (around 80 tide gauges and 36 offshoret
d iinstrumentstt suchh as seismometers,ittilt tdwater-pressuregauges)) andtiltmeters,
GPS andother tools installed near 110 active volcanoes around the clock and issue a range ofdisasters mitigation information.
JMA provides daily forecasts/one-week forecasts (information on weather, winds,
coastal ocean waves, maximum/minimum temperatures and probabilities ofprecipitation)p
p) covering
gp
periods up
p to two daysy /up
p to seven days
y ahead. Theyy include
Distribution Forecasts and Three-Hours Forecasts.
Seasonal Forecasts (average temperature, precipitation amounts, sunshine durations
and snowfall) totals for the next one to several months are also provided by JMA
Early Warning Information on Extreme Weather
y Warningg Information on Extreme Weather everyy Mondayy and
JMA issues Early
Thursday when a high probability of extreme seven-day average temperatures orvery heavy snowfall is predicted

Observation Network of JMA

Interaction of JMA with other organization indisaster management area

In order to limit the extent of damage caused bynatural disasters and support the prompt
execution of related activities, JMA provides
didisastert mitigation
iti ti informationi fti throughthh variousichannels to government disaster management
agencies, local governments, the media and the
public. JMA often provide the disaster mitigation
information along with other governmental body
(MLIT).
MLIT informs, jointly with the Director-General of
JMA for a class A river (excluding designatedJMA,
sections), the prefectural governors concerned water level or discharge if the possibility offlooding is deemed high or water level or discharge, or the flood hazard
area and the flood water depth if flooding has
already occurred.
It is JMA which designed and apply Earthquake
Early Warning System after the Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake. EEW provide advance notice of
estimated seismic intensities and expected arrivalti
times
off principal
i i l motion
ti justj t after
ft an earthquakethkoccursFIRE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCY

The Fire Defense Organization Law prescribes that
the FDMA conducts research, formulates plans, etc,
g fire service systemsyin order to strengthengconcerning
the fire defense capabilities of municipalities. it
provides municipalities with advice, guidance andrecommendations concerning their fire service
organizations and activities. Below are the mainaffairs under the jurisdiction of the FDMA:
Planning and formulation of the overall fire service
systemGuidance for and assistance in strengthening fireservice facilities
Research
concerning fire service science andtechnology
Training for fire service personnel and officers in thevolunteer fire corps
Advice, guidance and recommendations regarding
prefectural and municipal fire services
Requests
for assistance measure duringqg an
emergency
Planning, formulation and coordination in relation
to disaster prevention measures taken by local
governments

Firefighting agencies in Japan comprise of regularfire prevention services such as fire defense
headquarters and fire department, and the nonconventional volunteer fire corps. Both theseorganizationsareestablished
bl h d
under
d
the
h
responsibility of regional municipalities that arecontrolled under the jurisdiction of municipality
mayorsVolunteer fire corps and Emergency fire response team of FDMA

Volunteer fire corps operates in every town and city oftheh country, EveryE
memberb off theh volunteerl
fi corpsfire
has their own regular job, but are active days or night
protecting their own town by themselves. While they
are involved in firefighting activities, they are also
therehto protect theh lives,li
physicalh i l beingb i
andd properties
iof local residents from natural disasters such as
earthquakes, wind and water damage through rescue
efforts, warning patrols and evacuation guidance. Even
when
h
th
there
i no disasterisdit present,t volunteer
l t
fi corps
fireorganizes numerous community-based activities
designed to improve fire and disaster prevention
capabilities, Female volunteer fire corps participates inareas thatth t havehb
been
predominantly
d itl female-oriented,
f
l
i t d
including home visits to early people for fire
prevention, and holding fire prevention classes at
kindergartens and elementary schools.
The FDMA works with local disaster prevention groups
such as voluntary disaster prevention organizations
and in-house fire fighting team of companies for thepromotion of initiatives that contribute to the local
community. These include improving the quality of
personnel serving to prevent disasters in regional
areas, rejuvenating voluntary disaster prevention
organizations and enhance danger management
training, andd increasing disasterd
prevention awarenesswithin companies.
.

Emergency Fire Response Team of FDMA
Emergency Fire Response Teams was founded in 1995, after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake and institutionalized by the Fire Defense Organization Law
Law.
Emergency Fire Response Team of FDMA operates in the case of large-scale disasters
when firefighting organizations cannot cope alone, EFRT is elite emergency rescue
teams of the FDMA, It supervise municipal teams and manage their activities and incase of necessity deploys teams swiftly to disaster areas using helicopters and othervehicles in order to gain a better understanding of disaster conditions,conditions contacting andliaising with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, and providing instructions
and support to local firefighting teams. Since 2004 The Team’s Head has the authority
to mobilize and control firefighting teams in the event of a large-scale disaster or
accident. The FDMA controls all aspects of management, from obtaining real-time
information on the disaster to instructing Emergency Fire Response Teams to mobilize
mobilize.
Below the structure of Emergency Response Fire Teams is described:
9Firefighting Teams: Assist in putting out fires to prevent the spread of flames
during large-scale fires.
9
Rescue Teams: Ensure preparation of equipment used for advanced rescue, searchf persons requiringfori i rescuingi andd assisti t ini rescue efforts.
ff t
9Emergency Teams: Ensure preparation of equipment used for high-levelemergencies and assist in emergency activities
9
Logistical Support Teams: Assist in required transport and resupply using vehicles
equipped with water supply systems to support the activities of each team.
9
Special Disaster Teams: Firefighting teams for responding to special types ofdisasters, including poisonous substances and major toxic spills.
9Special Equipment Teams: Firefighting teams for responding to special equipment,
including those required by teams for rescues in flooded areas and carrying water toremote areas.
9
Air Squadrons: Firefighting activities conducted using fire protection helicopters
9Marine Squadrons: Firefighting activities conducted using fireboats
Rescue activities that firefighting organizations are involved with range from fires,
traffic c accidents, flooding and natural disasters, extending to special types ofdidisastersthath iinclude
l d terrorist
i attacks.
k At
A the
h hearthoff thesehrescue efforts
ff
are Rescue
R
Teams, comprising of experts that have received special education and training onlife-saving and rescue techniques, various types of rescue equipment, and rescue
vehicles Response Teams assist themJapan Coast Guard
Alike the JMA, Japan Coast Guard (the JCG) is the external organof the MLIT. The main responsibilities of JCG in terms of disaster
preparednessdandd marine
i searchh andd rescue iinclude:
l d
Search and Rescue: (Rescue from Capsized Vessel, Ice
Breaking, Catch by Helicopter, Utilizing the Japanese Ship
Reporting System (JASREP))
Prevention of Accident :( Prevention of Marine Leisure Accidents
Marine Leisure Events Information Service Room
Protection of Marine Environment: (Chase of Oil
Discharging Vessel, Fire Fighting Operation for Blazing Tanker,
Derelict Ship Countermeasure, Oil Pollution Response

Disaster preparedness and marine search and rescue– it is the responsibility of JCG to conduct search and rescue
operation once accident such as boat/vessel involved accidents
occur. It responds promptly by deploying of mobile rescue
personnel skilled at descending from helicopters and bring people
back up, scuba diving, and providing emergency first aid
treatment. The JCG also works together with other public andprivate rescue organizations including police and fire departments
to cover the vast areas of sea that surround Japan. It is important
h the
h JCG
Gb
ifi d as soon as possible
ibl whenh trouble
bl occurs inithat
be notified
seas far from land. For that reason, the JCG operates a maritime
accident reporting service 24 hours a day by radio based on the
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). Reports ofincidents and accidents and requestsq
for help
p can also q
quicklyy be
made to the JCG when the need arises by dialing 118 on a mobile
or onboard phone.
To respond to such maritime disasters as large-scale
oil spills, the discharge of hazardous and noxious substances, andshipboardhi bd fires,fitheth JCG hhas stationedt ti
d fire-fighting
fi fi hti ships
hi andddisaster mitigation equipment around the country. The JCG also
works for maritime disaster prevention by conducting exerciseswith private-sector disaster prevention organizations in Japan andoverseas.

Maritime Disaster Prevention Center

Established in 1976 Maritime Disaster
Prevention
P
iC
Center(MDPC)MDPC isi theh onlyl legitimate
l ii
organization set forth by the Law to carry out
prevention and elimination operation to responsewith any Oils ( crude oil, heavy oil, lubricating oil
andd etc as wellll as gasoline,likkerosene,li h oil,light
il oilil
refuse and refined products and HNS (Hazardous
and Noxious Substances (HNS) includes Nonpersistent oil and Noxious liquid substance.) spill
i id t including
incidents,i l dimarineifi fighting,fire
fi htiassociated
i t dwith shipboard disasters of HNS tankers along theJapanese coastal line,
In the event that an HNS spill incident
actually occurs or is anticipated, MDPC will
immediately respond to the incident site at therequest of the captain or ships owner, and takeinitial pollution prevention and elimination
measures including putting out the fire or
preventing the spread of the fire, or any otheractions against potential danger.

Self Defense Forces
The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of the SelfDefenseDfForcesF
Law
L
off 1954, requiring
i i units
it tot respondd tot callsll
for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting,earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons, rescues, andreinforcement of embankments and levees in the event offlooding. The SDF conducts a variety of disaster relief operations
in collaboration with municipal governments when disasters
such as natural disasters occur in any part of the country, by
engaging in the search and rescue of disaster victims or missing
ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment,
preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting
personnel and goods.
SDF are deployed only upon the request of prefectural
governor. Municipal mayors can ask prefectural governors torequest a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event thatmayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural
governor, they can inform the Minister of Defense, or those
designated by the Minister of the disaster conditions. Aftergovernors the Minister of Defense
receiving such requests from governors,
or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately
dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation.
Under circumstances of particular urgency (from the Kobequlessons)) when there is no time to wait for a request,
qu ,earthquake
the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may
authorize an exceptional dispatch (discretionary dispatch).
However in the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, it took a lot oftime to dispatch SDF units as governments of Hyogo Prefecture andK b City
Kobe
Ci could
ld not collectllandd analyzeldamaged
information.
i fiMUNICIPAL LEVEL VOLUNTARY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMSVOLUNTARY FIREFIGHTING CORPS,CORPS, SUIBO
SUIBO--DAN – VOLUNTARY FLOOD FIGHTING TEAMS
Likewise the fire departments and stations, volunteer fire
corps in Japan also are organized by municipalities. The
fire corps are independent from the fire departments andfire stations and there are no top-down relationships
between these two. However, in cases of where the fire
corps are called out in emergencies, they must follow theorders of the chief of the fire department or fire station.
For the volunteer fire corps,
corps the basic rule is one corps in
one municipality
SUIBO-DAN – VOLUNTARY FLOOD FIGHTING TEAMS Voluntary flood fighting teams, known as “suibo-dan”
play important role in flood fighting system of Japan.
Japan
These teams are usually established within themunicipalities in the vicinity areas of rivers. The membersof “suibo-dan” normally engaged in different jobs but are
patrolling,
g watchingg out and leveealso involved in p
protection works in close coordination with riveradministrators and other related organizations during
floods. During periods without flooding, they still conduct
patrols and inspection of levees, provisions for floodfi h i warehouses
fighting
h
and
d for
f communicationi i facilities,
f ili id ill
drillsand other activities in preparation for a flood. As of 2009
there were about 900 000 voluntary flood fightersnationwide.

(BOKOMI) - Kobe’s Community –Based Disaster Prevention
Organization
BOKOMI – BOKOMI are community based elementary school district based disasterpreventioniorganizations.
i i
Si
Since
1995, basedbd on thehlessons learned from the Great East HanshinAwaji Earthquake, all of the districts of Kobe city
– 191 ddistricts
s c s havea e esestablishedab s ed BOKOMIs.
O O s.
BOKOMI organization comprises of firstly, it local
government organizations including the local city
office and the local fire station, together with
l
local
l
residents
id t
associations,i ti
women’s’
associations, elderly associations, voluntary fire
corps and etc. The equipment and materials
needed for the activities are pprovided byy the local
government and storehouses installed in local
parks, in preparation for emergencies. In normal
times BOKOMI conducts various emergency drill
programs suchh as on howht use thetoth provided
id dequipment and materials (for ex. Water fire
extinguishers, powder fire extinguishers), rescue
drills, evacuation drills, information transmission
drills, flood control drills and etc and conduct
school disaster prevention education.

DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMSDisaster Medical Assistance Teams are specialized and trained medical aid teams which operate
during large-scale disasters. DMAT system was established in 2005 based on the lessons of Great
Hanshin Awaji Earthquake. DMATs are defined as “mobile, trained medical teams that can be
rapidly deployed during the acute phase of a disaster (within 48 hours). “DMAT Team Member
Training Course
Course” is conducted at the National Hospital Organization
Organization’ss Disaster Medical Center (anindependent administrative agency) for certification of DMAT personnel. DMAT member are
specialized to render medical assistance and treatment during the acute phases of disasters as wellas transferring casualties to safe areas.
Functioning of DMAT are based on the agreements between prefectural governments and medical
establishments and DMATs are deployed only upon the request of government of disaster affected
prefecture.

JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TEAMS – JMAT

Purpose‐ To provide medical assistance at hospitals and clinics in thedis st ‐ ff t d areass ((anddisaster‐affected
d to provide
o id theth ongoingo oi medical
di ltreatment that needed to be continued even before the disasteroccurred)‐ To provide medical treatment at evacuation sites and first‐aid
centers.
The physicians write their on-the-spot judgments down on these cards
and give to patients in evacuation shelters and other locations so thatthey can be connected later treatment and used by takeover
caregivers. Over 230 such teams are currently organized.
Dispatch of JMAT
When a disaster strikes, the JMA moves into action to dispatch
physicians with various areas of expertise to affected areas alongwith pharmacists, nurses, other health professionals andadministrative staff. Once dispatched, the main activities of JMAT
involve providing medical care and health management at first-aid
stations and shelters and offering medical assistance for local
hospitals and clinics in disaster areas to support the continuation ofpre-disaster medical services. JMAT is also responsible for providing
public health management at shelters, clarifying medical needs,
identifying locations where medical support is not available andmaking rounds in such areas and so on
Composition of JMATA JMAT typically consists of one physician, two nurses and one
coordinate
di t staff
t ff member.
b However,H
teamtcomposition
iti should
h ld beb
flexible in response to the situations at hand based on staff
availability and local needs, both in terms of professions and staff
numbers.

JAPANESE RED CROSS SOCIETYTh JRCS hasTheha well-organizedll
i d disasterdi
response regime,iwith 488 response teams throughout the country with 6,844 medical
relief personnel registered as standard. Each team consists of six
personnel: a doctor, a head nurse, two nurses, and two administrators.
p
The organization is also involved in rescue operations following
transportation accidents, such as airplane and train crashes, andindustrial disasters, such as gas explosions.
These disaster relief activities are conducted as a mission of
the Red Cross under the Japanese Red Cross Law and its statutes. In
addition, the JRCS is designated as a “Designated Public Corporation”
by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Disaster Relief Act,andd is
i required
i d tot co-operate
t withith theth GovernmentGt tot offerff
reliefli fassistance in times of disaster. The contents of such assistance areprovided for under an agreement with the Minister of Health, Laborand Welfare.
The domestic disaster relief activities of the JRCS are as follows:・Medical relief and psychological care・Storage and distribution of relief goods
・Provision of blood products
・Collection and distribution of voluntary donations
Activities by Red Cross volunteers include collection of information, firstaid,
id provisioni i
off hoth t meals,
l tracingt iservices,ittransportation
t ti
and
d
distribution of relief goods, and caring for those who evacuate to
shelters.

BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The BRI is
Th
i actively
i l involvedi
l d ini response
measures taken in immediate aftermathof earthquakes, as well as in long termmeasures. As
A tot immediatei
di t measures,the BRI conducts preliminary damage
assessments of buildings just after anearthquake hit the area thereby
defining which buildings is still can be
exploited which are not. Having
completed assessment of each building
BRI specialist attach an special sticker onwhatenablesone
todefinevulnerability level of a building. The
measure helps to avoid future human
injury and loss as well as identify
possible evacuations spots.
pp
As to thelong term measures the BRI is main
institute who conducts research forg seismic resistant buildings
g andbuilding
seismic retrofitting of buildings.

BRI disaster response – building assessment

NHK – JAPAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
As one of the public corporations designated for disastermanagement under the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act, NHK
plays the key role in disaster broadcasting and emergency
warning Small quakes detected the JMA before strong
warning.
earthquake occurs, automatically redirected to NHK within a few
seconds, (moreover, NHK has installed seismic intensity meters at
73 locations countrywide) what enables it to issue public alert
promptly and provide necessary information regarding themagnitude and precise location of the earthquake as well as
tsunami information nationwide. Emergency Warning System(EWS) is carried out only in special emergency cases such as largescale tsunami and earthquake warnings or based on the requestof governors and mayors. In striving to alert as many people aspossible, the EWS switches on TV sets and radios – 4 TV channels
and 3 radio channels belong to NHK - automatically. The test
transmission is conducted every month and emergency drills held
every day by NHK. To ensure quick and live broadcasting fromdisaster hit areas NHK owns 14 helicopters – which are equippedwith necessary devices for live broadcasting – stationed at 12
locations and 460 remote controlled cameras installed countrywide.
countrywide
In addition, the official web-page of NHK also provides disasterand weather information and enables watching two channels –General TV and NHK World TV - online.

Case Study: Osaka Gas Engineering Co., Crisis
Management System.
Osaka Gas basically has the below three disaster prevention
measures for earthquakes. Each consists of training and drills
with hardware and software.
Emergency measures:
Seismometer
In order to determine whether damage has been caused byearthquakes or not and quickly estimate the extent of thatdamage gas companies in Japan use
damage,se seismometers that canmeasure structural damages of pipeline. The seismometers
are tied into an automatic shutoff system that triggers underhigh earthquake intensity.
Shut-off system
Safety is ensured in areas heavily damaged by earthquakes
by stopping city gas supply.
The intelligent gas meters installed at each customer’s location
automatically shut off at 200 (gal). Furthermore, low pressure
gas supply is automatically shut off in earthquakes capable ofdamaging pipelines and structures by an automatic shut-off
system installed at medium pressure governor B. Moreover, in
extreme cases (widespread damage), city gas supply can be
shut off remotely from the Central Control Center and Back-Up
Center.
In-house radio network
In order to smoothly produce and supply city gas, Osaka Gas
remotely monitors and controls city gas supply 24-hours a day
by radio network that works by radio waves and satellite.
Back-UpBack
Up CenterTo ensure customers absolute safety and convenience in theiruse of city gas, it is necessary to remotely monitor and control
city gas supply at all times, and, in the event of an earthquake,collect damage information and operate the system fromremote.
remoteTsunami warning broadcasting by NHK

INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
JAPAN DISASTER RELIEF TEAM (JDR)
In the case large-scale disaster inforeign countries JDR join emergency relief
operations upon the request of thegovernment of the disaster-affecteddisaster affected country
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Dispatch is carried out by JICA based on
Disaster Relief Team Law within theframework of its Disaster Relief Program.
ProgramThere are four types of JDR teams.
In order to facilitate the rapid supply ofrelief items they should be procured andappropriately stockpiled in advance at
locations as close as possible to disasterareas.
JICA has warehouses in four
locations worldwide, namely Germany(Frankfurt), Singapore, the United States(Miami) and South Africa (Johannesburg).
Eight priority goods are stockpiled at thesefour locations—tents, sleeping pads, plastic
sheeting (tarpaulins), blankets, portablewater containers (plastic jerry cans), watertanks
tanks,
water
purifiers
andelectric
generators.

The Great Hanshin earthquake, or Kobe earthquake or Southern Hyogo Earthquake occurredon Tuesday, January 17, 1995, at 05:46 in the southern part of Hyōgo Prefecture .
The Earthquake had 3 main characteristics that features it
The earthquake focal point was directly under an urban area
This quake was recorded at Level 7, the first observed earthquake at this level
There were big vertical motions in addition to horizontal motions in some areas

More than 500, 000 houses and buildings were partially or completely destroyed. The slow startpand lack of emergency
gy managementgincreased the human andof the search and rescue operations
property damage. The redundancy of the water supply systems and quick recovery of electric power
contributed to the stabilization of the regional society in spite of the massive damage.
The hypocenter of the earthquake was located about 20km southwest of downtown Kobe City between
the northeast tip of Awaji Island and the mainland was focused about 13.2 km under the northeast tip of
Awaji Island and had a Japan Meteorological Agency magnitude of 7,2.
72
Kobe area had historically suffered mostly from typhoons and heavy rainfall. In 1896 , 1903 , 1905

, 1910 , 1932 , 1935 , 1938 , 1945 , 1961 ,and 1967 ,Kobe suffered sediment disaster due to heavy rainfall. The mostdevastating was that occurred in 1933 during which debris flows that accompanied flood in killed 616
people. Therefore, for the residents and local governments sediment flew had posed a main source threat
area The same does not refer to earthquakes.
earthquakes The organs designated forin terms of disaster in this area.
disaster management in particularly for disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation don’t even taken
into account the possibility of major earthquake. No emergency management plans had been elaborated
during a major earthquake close to this densely populated urban area.
The violent tremor lasted 20 seconds or less, but 101,233 houses were completely destroyed and
about
b
the
h same numberbsemi-destroyed.
idd The
Th oldld woodendhhouseswithi h heavyhtiled
il d roofs
f collapsed,lldblocking the streets and obstructing rescue and relief activities. Reinforced concrete buildings built
according to the old construction code were also damaged

Among the places that suffered the most from the earthquake was Kobe port. Kobe has a 130yyear
tradition as an international p
port, and ranks as the sixth largest
g
cargo
g p
port in the world, it handled
about 40 million tons of international container Damage to the port facilities include the severe collapseof 239 berths, The estimated cost of the damage was 1.4 trillion yen.

Main features of the Earthquake (reasons of high number of deathtoll)
The earthquake struck an aging society

More than half of the dead were over 60 years
old, most of whom lived in old wooden houses in thedensely populated areas of the inner city of Kobe.
Kobe
Traditional style Japanese houses have very heavy tileroofs in order to resist the strong winds that
accompany typhoons, The Kobe area had notexperienced a major earthquake for more than one
thousand years, and the local governments andresidents in this area had no experience of anearthquake with an epicenter close to Kobe (in this one
the distance between the epicenter and city center was
only
l 20km)k ) InspectionIti doctors
d ti
inspected
t d 2,416 bodies
b di anddestimated the death time. 92% of victims were deadwithin fifteen minutes after the quake.

The earthquake struck a region with a rapidly
aging population.
population When old wooden houses collapsed,
collapsed
many senior citizens died under the ruins of theirhouses or furniture 86.6% of victims were dead in theirown houses.
In other words,
words most of the deaths in thisearthquake were caused by the collapse of old
Japanese houses. And half of those people were oversixty since the elderly tend to live on the ground floorg stairs. There were manyy ppatients
to avoid climbing
suffering from acute renal failure and crush syndromethat 6 had been rescued from fallen buildings orfurniture and admitted to hospital.

Rescued people
On the first 3 days 96% of a total rescued were saved(on the first day, there were 486 survivors, on the second 129, andon the third 89).
These three days are called the "golden seventy-two
hours" for rescue, and this disaster proved it correct. In Kobe,fi department
firedworkersk
rescuedd 1,888 people
l over a periodi d off
two weeks, but only 733 of them survived. Neighbor s’ help andcooperation are very important just after an earthquake. In thisevent, many university students living in dormitories and other
young
y
gp
peoplep took active pparts in rescue operationsp. The trend

through the end of bubble economy of early 1990s was theresiding of the young families on the outskirts of the big cities,
Kobe including, because of the very high land costs in big
Japanese cities. In the inner city, older people who have lived
for more than twenty to thirty years in cheap rented housescannot move elsewhere because of expensive house andcomminuting costs. Therefore vulnerability to natural disasters
has increased year by year.

Many
y buildings
g and houses were crushed, therefore it
was very difficult for fire fighters and rescue teams to act at
accident scenes. Because fire fighters and rescue teams usuallyuse destructing tools, such as an engine cutter, a chain saw andso on and there were not enough, it was very difficult to
conduct such operations.
operations
Especially at the accident scenes of crushed buildings
it was necessary to utilize crane trucks, shovel cars and so on.
But construction companies had also damages and there weremany traffic jams, therefore it took much time for those trucks
to reachh accident
idscenes.

Initial response to the disaster and weakness of the disastermanagement system
In Kobe City only 291 firefighters out of about 2,000
were on duty, Policemen on night duty numbered about 300.
Therefore, at the time of disaster only about 600 officers wereimmediately available. Despite of the fact that due to theearthquake many poles bearing electric and telephone lines were
earthquake,broken and, the buildings and facilities of NTT (Nippo Telephone
and Telegram) were partially damaged the emergency number, 119,received quite a few number of calls . Switchboard capacity also
was not sufficient to handle the great increasing calls. At the timeq122000 telephonepcircuits were disrupted.
pTheof the earthquake,

ambulances carried about 400 injured people daily to hospitals
applying the maximum carrying capacity of the ambulances while
the total number of ambulances available at Kobe fire department
was 15.
y a fire was one million squareq
The area devastated bymeters through the total number of fires was 176, and the numberof houses and buildings burned down was 7,453. Fortunately, onJanuary 17th and 18th, there was no or very little wind as Nagata
Ward had many chemical shoe companies, most of which were
small or tiny enterprises occupying narrow areas and some of theirchemical products could have contributed to enlargement of thefires. The Hanshin Expressway and JR-West Railway played
important roles as fire break zones, fire engines and crews thatcame from other cities and towns, encountered some problems:
traffic jams in damaged areas delayed early arrival, many of the
fi
fire
h d
hydrants
t and
d the
th watert
supplyl systemstwere broken,b kcollapsed houses and buildings covered the roads and stopped
traffic, and ambulances from nearby cities and towns could notcome to the damaged areas due to the lack of working
arrangements among local governments. Consequently theincreasing of firefighters was fractal.
fractal On January 17th, 800 firemen
arrived and on the 20th (after 4 days) 2,400 were present. Such a
gradual increase was not good for the early attempts at firefighting.

Fire fighting during the disaster response
The reason why so many fires broke out during the early morning
is not clear. Osaka Gas Company supplies city gas (LNG) to this area, and about

70% of the residences were equipped with gas meters which would automaticallystop the gas flow at the time of an earthquake, Less than 10% of the residences,
however ,were using gas at the time, therefore, these devices only partly
contributed to reducing the occurrence of fire. Due to electric power failure at 5:46,
on January 17, the streets were very dark without streetlights, and it was difficult
to move or act. In order to rescue victims under the collapsed houses, someneighbors used matches and lighters which may have caused fires due to gas
leaks at broken pipelines with low pressure. There was quick restoration ofelectric power by Kansai Electric Company, which also may have generated fires
owing to short circuits or overheated heaters. The switching on of electric
applianceslibyb fallenf ll furniturefior collapsedlld houseshalso
l was a maini cause.
Reasons for this wide range of burnt area are:Most of the fire hydrants were useless, because fire hydrants areon the same lines as water supply pipes, which were heavily damaged.
Due to many fallen buildings and wooden houses blocking the roads, it was
impossible for fire trucks to get very close to the fire scenes. Since the fire fightersand trucks could not gain access and just close off a small area to fight a fire,
bigger and bigger areas were needed to be able to gain control of a fire.
It was difficult to create ditches or fire breaks to prevent fires from spreading
Failures in conducting rescue operations (extracting from the rubbles)
Many buildings and houses were crushed, therefore it was very difficult for firefighters and rescue teams to act at accident scenes. Because fire fighters andrescue teams usually use destructing tools, such as an engine cutter, a chain saw
and so on and there were not enough, it was very difficult to conduct suchoperations.
operations

Right after the earthquake occurred, many injured people
gathered to fire stations. Fire stations made temporary first-aid stations andambulance crew members assigned priorities of care, “triage”. People who
needed more intensive care were transferred to hospitals.
But several medical institutions in Kobe were damaged. Most of the hospitals
and clinics could not accept patients, because electricity and water service were
stoppedBuilding Damage
Fully collapsed and half ruined houses in Hyogo
Prefecture respectively totaled 92,877 and 99,829 (as of April
24, 1995). After the 1978 Miyagiken-Oki earthquake disasternew, seismic building and structure codes were enacted,
Buildings erected in accordance with the new code sufferedlittle damage, whereas damage to older ones was severe.
The downtown Sannomiya area had many old concretebuildings that included Kobe City Hall, Kobe West Civic
Hospital,p , the Daimaru and Sogo
g departmentpstores,, and the
Hyogo Police Station. Many of these public buildings wereseverely damaged. This is one reason why the official
response to the earthquake was late.
Expensive land costs have stopped public works
projects within the inner city: During the bubble economyof the late 1980s through early 1990s, land costs increased
sharply year by year. Every bank lent much money tobusinesses land owners, and individual s. During that time,
it was very difficult to buy land for infrastructure
construction or the redevelopment of urban area. No
redundancy or fail-safe systems were adopted. The
expansion of urban areas was too large. The total balanceof urban activity and life have never discussed
macroscopically, The socially weak, such as the old, poor

people ,and the physically handicapped ,were left alone
inside the inner city to inhabit told, jerry- built wooden
houses densely distributed and surrounded by narrow
streets many small factories and residential houses being
streets,
located together.

Lifeline Damages and Recovery
As is known the Hanshin area is densely urban area The
Hanshin Expressway ( highway), three railways (the JRWest, Hankyu, and Hanshin) were disrupted in many
places except for Route 2. Other forms of mass transit;
two subway lines ,two monorails serving the Port andRokko islands and two local railways also were
disrupted due to collapsed tunnels, piers, and bridges.
The Sanyo Shinkansen railway also was heavily
damaged (elevated girders were broken at eight places
and inside the Rokko tunnel the concrete lining waspartially stripped off.) The JR-West reopened on 1 April

and the Sanyo Shinkansen on 10 April. The Hankyu andyrespectivelypy were restored toHanshin railways
operation on 12 and 26 June, Damage to elevatedhighways was particularly serious, which not only
prevented traffic on the highways themselves but also
on the streets beneath them. Three hundred andeighteen bridges collapsed and roads were severely
damaged
in
9,408
place
Railways were damaged in more than 90 places.'
Millions of people were thus deprived of theirmeans of mass transportation.
transportation The elevated Shinkansen(bullet train) railway, which runs at a speed of up to 250300 km/hr, was also damaged. If the earthquake had
occurred one hour later, several trains would have been
derailed and crashed off the elevated railways, causing
thousands more dead and injured.

1) Gas: Highg p
pressure p
pipelinespsuffered no damage
g and middle ppressure lines were repairedpbyyJanuary 31, whereas low pressure lines were completely destroyed. On January 17, the gas supply
was cut off to 857,000 residences and on February 17 only 295,OOO residences had the use of gas. Bylate March, the figure had increased to more than 98%. Slow recovery mainly was due to having tocheck each house and the intrusion of water that leaked from highg ppressure water supply
pp y ppipelinesp
into the broken gas pipelines.
Some 9,700 of engineers were engaged in gas line repairs.
2) Electric power: In Japan, electric power usually is supplied by wires strung from poles In the caseof collapsed houses and buildings it was not necessary to supply electric power quickly so theengineers cut many useless electric wires. This is one of reasons for the quick restoration ofelectrical power. Straight after the earthquake about 916,000 residences was blacked out. After theearthquake, 4,700 electrical engineers worked on repairs and the restoration of power.
3)) Telephones
T l h
and
d means off communications:
i ti
O JanuaryOnJ17, as a result
lt off theth earthquakethk aboutb t
285,000 telephone circuits were out of order. Until January 20, about 4,000 telephone linemen were
engaged in restoration work, after that about 7,000 NTT employees were active in repair work thateventually led to complete restoration of service by January 31. The Kobe Fire Department had justinstalled an advanced
ad anced computerized
comp teri ed dispatch systems stem with
ith video
ideo monitors in December 1994.
1994 But
B t onJanuary 17, 1995, it was not yet operational and was not used during the disaster operations. Fire
departments had their own radio systems, but could not communicate with other departments.
Communications capability proved very limited in the first critical hours following the earthquake.
Thesehconditions
di iprovedd overwhelming
h l i
f
for
the
h Kobeb Firei
Department, whichhi h hadh d primaryi

responsibility for emergency response, with a total of 11 fire stations in the city, 176 engines, and 305
personnel on duty when the earthquake occurred. Three of the 11 stations were damaged in theearthquake, and even with emergency call-out procedures, only 663 personnel were able to reportf dutyfordwithini hi theh firstfi
two hours.
hTh actuall destructionThedi
was beyondbd any training
i iscenarioi forfmunicipal emergency response.

4) Water supply: The water supply was cut off to 1,355,600 cubic meters. The average daily supply rate

g from underground.
g
A total of 2,090 p
public andwas 1,363,000 cubic meters, 13% of the water coming
private water company engineers cooperated in this restoration work. The length of pipeline worked
on was 7,685 km, of which 3,921km was in Kobe City.

5) Waste-water: Kobe City has 43 water treatment plants, one sludge center, 3,315km of waste water
pipes, and 484 km of rainwater pipes. Due to the earthquake, 1,147 places in the waste water pipes and267 places in the rain water pipes were damaged. Typical types of damage were the rising, sinking,and position gaps of 810 manholes. Immediately after the big shock, the tapped water supply in mostof the downtown Kobe area stopped. Sewage channels were broken down. In some places, morethan 3000 people were in very congested dirty areas. People could not use the toilet and somerefugees became sick because the situation was so desperate. They ate very little and drank almost

o
g a
and
d weree e eexhausted.
aus ed In thee night-time,ge, thee ssituation
ua o gogot worse.
o se People
eop e trieded too manage
a age
nothing
without going to excrete because they were afraid to disturb other people's sleep by getting up andfinding their way across the very congested floor to the toilet.
People made great efforts to provide toilet facilities. On the basis of this experience, theKobe city government has now prepared a type of portable toilet that can be placed on the top of amanhole Initially the Kobe authorities estimated that 300 of them would be enough,manhole.
enough but in fact needed
3000 toilets, one for every 60-100 people. It was erroneous assessment of the essential humanitarian
supplies as a part of insufficient disaster preparedness made by Hyogo prefecture in general andKobe city authorities in particular.

For the collection and disposal of waste, a tank lorry with a vacuum pump was mosteffective. It sucks up waste in an air tight condition without spilling a drop.
effective
drop Kobe eventually had 19
tank lorries operational and additional lorries came from other prefectures. Luckily enough there
were not outbreaks of epidemic and infectious diseases. Respiratory infections such as influenza
started to spread to a certain extent but were limited to small-scale epidemics.

Each municipal government or public health sector had to prepare and stock clean, easy-tohandlehdl portable
bl toilets
ilwith
i h a goodd disposaldil system items
if emergency use. In
for
I the
h shelters,
h la gooddmanagement system had to be established.

Providing Shelter
After theAfh earthquake,hk more thanh300,000 people took refuge in schools, city halls,
community centers and other public buildings
private tents in parks, school play grounds,
and open spaces along roads. In mostdamaged areas, there was little public open
space. Space for construction was available
only
l in
i rurall areas. PeopleP
l wanted
d to live
li in
i a

temporary housing area with neighbors who
lived in the same areas before the disaster
whereas housing selection was independentof this condition. Moreover, older people

needed helpers and volunteers, and at the
shelters, such assistance was readily
available,
il bl TheTh volunteersl t
t t l d more than
totaledth
one million, and they came from all overJapan, Many university students gathered in
the damagedgareas,, As the Japanesep
Red
Cross does not systematically organize suchvolunteers, their training and registration
were became important problems.

Lack of coordination and communication
For more than four hours, neither the Hyogo
Prefectural Government nor the National Fire Defense Agency
in Tokyo had a clear picture of the degree of destruction andddamagei Kobeinb . Constrained
i d fromfactionib thebyh existing
i i
l
law

until a request for assistance had been received from the Cityof Kobe, these governmental agencies did not enter the

response system until more than four hours after the initialshock. In further irony, existing law kept the dogs from the

French Search and Rescue team in quarantine,
quarantine not allowing
them to enter response operations until the fourth day after
the earthquake when they extricated dead bodies, instead ofliving people.
Especiallydamaging
was
the
lack
of
communication between the public agencies and the private
utility companies. Osaka Gas Company, a private company
and owner of the ruptured gas lines that were fueling the fires,
was apparently not in communication with the city
departments. Only after reviewing the data from their own

seismic monitoring devices at approximately 11:00 a.m. on
January 17, 1995, did the
h company's Policy
li Group decided id to closel
off five of the fifty-five blocks of their 50,000 km. distribution
system. The company began to shut off the gas in criticallydamaged areas at 11:30 a.m., and completed the task about
11:50 a.m., six hours after the main shock occurred.
Th
The
gap inii finformationti
andd communicationi ti
regardingdiemergency medical services was even more severe. For the
first 12 hours following the earthquake on January 17, 1995, theEmergency Medical Division, Ministry of Health in Tokyo had
little to no information regarding the conditions and need for
medical services in the disaster area.
area On January 23,
23 1995,
1995 sixdays after the earthquake, an Emergency Operations Center
was established in Kobe with the assistance of the national
Ministry of Health.
Interesting fact was the active role of the
yamaguchigumi, the Japanese mafia, in the organization anddistribution of disaster relief, in apparent cooperation withlocal governmental officials.

Problems of emergency care
Overwhelming casualties
As so many houseshwere destroyeddd andd personstrapped all at the same time, with numerous fires
breaking out, the emergency calls to the local fire
departments overwhelmed their capacity. In spite of the

maximum efforts of rescue personnel, paramedics andambulance crews, it was impossible to respond to
every call. In some places people had to dig out buried
ffamily
il membersbor friends
f i d almostlwith
i h theirh i barebhands. On-site triage of the casualties by professional
rescue and ambulance workers was almost impossible.
Many mildly and severely injured patients andeven dead bodies were rushed by family members orneighbors to hospitals in the disaster area, which werethemselves variously damaged and in a state ofgenerall confusion.
f i
I was also
It
l
cold
ld andd darkd k ini thehhospitals, which had no electricity, gas or water supply.

There was also a shortage of medical resources (sterile
ae a) aandd humanu a resources
esou ces (p(physicians,
ys c a s, nurses,
u ses,
material)
clerical personnel) in the hospitals, especially in the firstsix hours after the disaster.

Problems of emergency care
Damage toDt medical
di l ffacilities
iliti
Damage to medical facilities was a serious problem. Out of the 180

hospitals in the disaster area, four were completely destroyed and 110 sufferedserious structural damage. The 1,809 clinics in the area were similarly affected.
Most of the sophisticatedp
medical equipment,q psuch as magneticgresonance
imaging apparatuses, computed tomography, X-ray angiography apparatuses
and chemical autoanalysers, was damaged and unserviceable.
In Kobe City Central Hospital, which is the core hospital in Kobe, watertanks on the roof were damaged and water poured down into the wards. The
lack of water resulted in the breakdown of the water-cooled
water cooled home power
plant. The hospital electricity supply thus stopped completely about 30 min
after the earthquake.
Apart from structural damage and damage to hospital equipment, thereduced presence of hospital personnel also decreased hospital functionality.
The attendance rate of personnel in hospitals on the first day of disaster was
58.4% for physicians, 35.0% for dentists, 44.2% for nurses, and 3 1.0% for clericalstaff. In the first hours, when the hospitals in the disaster area were extremely
busy, less than 50% of personnel were able to attend their hospitals. Despite theawareness of Japan to earthquakes the hospitals might have not been
properlyl PreparedPd The
Th causes off reduceddd medical
di l servicesiwere as follows;
f ll
cutt

of water supply, interrupted telecommunication, cut off gas supply, shortage of
medical and assistant staff, destroyed facilities or equipment, electricity
blackout, shortage of drugs and other medical supplies such as intra-venous
solutions or local anesthetic ran out on the first evening.

First-aid centers or stations were set up for primary medical care, andwere manned twenty-four hours per day by medical and assistant staff. At
one stage there were one hundred and sixty centers in operation. It waspossible to observe at the stage many teams dispatched from variousorganizations to support medical services such other cities or prefectures，theSelf-Defense Force Japan Red Cross Society, Universities and public hospitals,
Doctors Associations, and volunteer groups.

Problems of Emergency Care
Breakdown of telecommunication systems and lack of the information
Telephone lines were damaged or overloaded, with the result that this form ofcommunication between hospitals was difficult in the first two or three days. The
hospitals were not equipped with any form of radio communication system. On thefirst day, most of the medical personnel in the disaster area did not know that thehospitals in Osaka,
Osaka only 20-25 km from the disaster area,
area had suffered no damage.
damage TVnews programs did not give any information about the chaos in the hospitals or about
undamaged hospitals.
Traffic congestionp
destruction of streets, highways,gy bridges
g and railways
y caused severe
The widespreadtraffic problems. Within an hour of the tremor every practicable road in the disasterarea was full of cars with people leaving the area or on their way to visit family
members to ascertain their safety -some even on their way to work. It was notuncommon to take several hours to drive 10 km. These conditions delayed themobilization of relief teams from neighboring areas and complicated thetransportation of casualties.
Disproportionate number of patients in relation to medical facilities available
Although the hospitals in the central disaster area were extremely crowded, very few
poutside the disaster area which had suffered no
casualties were taken to hospitals
damage. For example, small to medium-sized private hospitals in Nishinomiya (south,
west and north), which have 150 to 190 beds, were overwhelmed with more than 1,000
patients each on the first day. On the contrary, only about 60 patients presented at the
Hyogo Medical College Hospital, which has about 1,000 beds and is located not many
kilometers from the severely damaged area.
area
Delay in transportation of patients between hospitals
Because of the traffic congestion and the lack of appropriate information exchange
between medical facilities, the transport of severely injured patients from damagedp
to unaffected hospitalsp
was somewhat delayed.
yWhen the severity
y of thehospitals
damage in Kobe was reported on TV news programs, most of the tertiary emergency
centers in Osaka prepared beds to receive large numbers of casualties. But in the firsttwelve hours only three patients were transferred to these emergency centers.

Health problems of the displaced persons
At the peak point of the disaster, more than 310,000 persons
were evacuated from their homes to temporary accommodation centers,such as schools, gymnasiums and other public buildings. There was noelectricity, water or gas supply for several days and even weeks in these
temporary shelters.
h l
Mi iMinimum
supplies
li off food,f d clothes
l h andd blankets
bl k
were
soon provided, but sanitary conditions in such circumstances were far
from perfect. The earthquake occurred in the coldest season of the year,
and many persons caught cold while living in the shelters. In the earlystages most clinics were closed and could not provide primary health careservices for evacuees.
Countless numbers of volunteer medical relief teams fortunately came tothe area from all over Japan and provided medical services for several
weeks and months. Some 90% of private medical practitioners were
however able to reopenp their clinics within six weeks,, thus restoring
g localmedical services.
National and local government agencies began to provide
temporary dwellings in March for those who had lost their homes. As itwas difficult to find sufficient vacant land for all these temporary houses,
they tended to be built at some considerable distance from theearthquake area. Many displaced persons thus lost touch with the originalcommunity with which they were acquainted.
The disruption for weeks and months of vital public services
such as water supply, electricity, city gas, sewerage, garbage collection,
telephonel hservicesiandd public
bli transport maded people's
l
lives
li
in
i the
h urbanbarea intolerable. Disaster response plans defined at the level of national
and local government did not at first function properly because the coreorganization (city government and prefecture government) failed torespond in the early phase. Lack of information and the breakdown of
telecommunication systems led to disorganization of the disaster
response. Medical services were also disrupted.

Delay of Self Defense Force response
The Governmental response to the great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake saw a delay in the dispatch and use of
Self Defense Force in disaster areas. That was probably also
the factor of huge casualties and injured of the disaster. Thisdisappointing fact was attributable to 2 main factors.
factors The
first and primary one : according the Article 83 of the SelfDefense Forces law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls
for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in firefighting earthquake disasters,
fighting,
disasters searches for missing people
persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments andlevees in the event of flooding. But SDF are deployed only
upon the request of prefectural governor. Municipal mayors
can ask prefectural governor to request a disaster relief
dispatch by the SDF. But due to the fact that the telephonelines were out of order during the first day in large areas of
the region, while others were overloaded local officials
failed to connect with army official and request theassistance. As a result the tardiness of SDF disaster response
was for more than 4 hours that in its turn cost lives ofhundreds trapped under debris
The second one:
one delay was stipulated thenexisting relatively strong anti-military sentiment among the
local leaders for deployment of JSDF for relief activities.

Lessons learnt from disaster and Improvement of thewhole cycle of disaster management
After the Earthquake the whole system ofdisaster managementgof the prefecturepand as thedisaster exposed the disaster management
system of Japan need drastically modifying. Thechanges in the structure
structure, interconnection
methodology, synergy in all phases of disastermanagement between all actors including
governmental and nonnon-governmental
governmental structures
mostly but not only related to filling the gaps
detecting during the coping with the Kobe
E hkEarthquake.
We can figuratively specify theamendments and establishments that were
implemented in disaster management system of
the country as well as prefecture as changes indisaster preparedness,preparedness changes related todisaster mitigation and changes in disasterrecovery

Changes in Disaster Preparedness and Mitigationa) Conducting
C d i off Drills
D ill on Emergency
E
Management
M
Joint
J i disasterdimanagement drills
Practical drills on Disaster management tailored to thecharacteristics of the area are methodically conducted with the participationof local residents suchs ch as voluntaryol ntar disaster response organizationsorgani ations withith
the aim of enhancing the awareness of citizens regarding disasterprevention, improving voluntary disaster response capabilities andstrengthening cooperation among related organizations to raise the level of
preparedness for typhoons, earthquakes and other disasters.
b) Emergency drills held at schools
More than once a year, evacuation drills are held with the assumption ofearthquake or fire disaster occurrences at all of elementary and junior highprefecture. At schools, disaster managementgsupplementaryppyschools in the pmaterials compiled by the Hyogo Board of Education are used in disaster
preparedness classes as a part of school curriculum.
c) Drills conducted on administration office level
Emergency drills are also planned and implemented at the district
administration office level, aiming to improve disaster management
capabilities throughout the prefecture. Approx.80 officials at the Disaster
Management and Planning Bureau and the Disaster Response Bureau takepart in Disaster Imaging Game twice a year. Also, approximately 50 regularpersonnel residing in the standby accommodation take part in emergency
drills four times a yearD) Oil complex emergency drills
Drills are annually carried out to improve and strengthen the disastermanagement system’s capability to respond to a disaster at an oil complex

Changes in Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation
1.17 memorial” local emergency drills
Local residents such as voluntary disaster response organizationsorganizations, elementary
schools and junior high schools are encouraged to participate in emergency
drills , especially during Disaster Reduction Month that fall on January around
17 January - Hyogo Safety Day Earthquake prediction ( so-called “ 1.17
memorial” local emergency drills)
Community-based
Community
based Specific Disaster Prevention Education and Training of
Teachers in Hyogo Prefecture
Applying the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, disasterprevention education related not only to earthquakes but to all kinds ofnatural disasters is promoted in Hyogo prefecture.
Along with the allocation of ten disaster prevention education specialists (oneto each education office), disaster prevention teachers with specialized
knowledge are systematically and continuously trained.
Workshops in disaster prevention education are also held for regularteachers. It includes followings:• Master plan for disaster prevention education in schools and annual
teaching plan
• Efforts to utilize the time set aside for general studies and utilization ofdisaster prevention education supplementary reader,“1.17 shall never be
forgotten ” learning resources and community resources• Enhancement of practical evacuation drills tailored to the characteristics ofthe area• Improvement of mental health care
• Cooperation among different types of school and cooperation between
schools and families, the local community and related organizations
In addition Emergency and Rescue Team by school staff in Hyogo (ＥＡＲ
ＴＨ) - the team consists of teachers with specialist knowledge of disasterprevention and practical response skills was formed in 2000, April 1. The teamis comprised of 150 school personnel and other members as of FY 2011. Alongwith providing support for rehabilitation of schools in afflicted areas andmental health care for children affected by disaster,
disaster the team members areoften dispatched to provide drills or give lectures in disaster prevention tocommunities.

The bitter lesson of the Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake brought about to revise andmake amendments to then existing legislation and disaster management plans. The
below mentioned amendments could be referred to improvement of disaster
preparednesspp
and disaster mitigationg
Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the following measures
are in place.
Revision of laws and plans(i) Amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act Revisions¾ Enhancing and strengthening the functions and operations of government disastermanagement headquarters by relaxing the conditions for establishing the
Headquarters for Urgent Disaster Management led by the Prime Minister¾ Establishing the On-site
On site Disaster Management Headquarters as a legal entity¾ Local government disaster management has been strengthened by allowing mayors
to call upon prefectural governors to ask for the aid of the Self-Defense Forces.
(ii) Revision of the Basic Disaster Management Plan and the Local Disaster Management
Plan¾ The earthquake section of the Basic Disaster Management Plan, the most important
plan in the disaster management sector, was completely revised.
¾ In addition, the comprehensive plans for local areas (the Local Disaster Management
Pl ) were alsoPlan)l revisedi d ini eachh prefecturef t
ini light
li ht off theth completel t revisioni i off theth Basic
B i
Disaster Management Plan. As of April 20 04, 2, 390 municipal governments (76.5 percent of
the whole) had completed their revisions.
(iii) The Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
Th llaw (The
The
Th A
Act C
Concerning
i SupportS
ffor Reconstructing
R
i Livelihoods
Li lih d off Disaster
Di
Victims)
Vi i
on funding victims of natural disasters by the local Government in order to rebuild
livelihood was passed and implemented in 1998.

Kobe city Disaster Management Plan
Case study: Kobe city Disaster Management Plan
This is a plan made by Kobe City Disaster management Council. The plan wasrevised entirely in 1996 based on the experiences incurred at the time of the Kobe
Earthquake. Therefore the plan is one of the most detailed plans in Japanesemunicipal disaster management plans as the lessons learnt from Kobe Earthquake
were condensed in the plan
Securing lifelines(i) Electricity
After the Great Hanshin - Awaji Earthquake, 44 electrical fires broke out. Public
servicei announcement surging
i peoplel to turn off
ff circuit
i i breakersbkbeforeb fevacuatingiare being implemented, but circuit breakers need to be constructed such that they
will remain off even after electricity is restored until a confirmation button is pushed.
(ii) Gas
For city gas, microcomputer- equipped meters that shut off when an earthquake issensed have been required since the Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake. They
functioned effectively during the Chuetsu Earthquake, preventing secondary
damage.
iii WaterW(iii)
Many water pipes have been weakened by the use of asbestos-cement materials or
have been in place more than 20 years, so pipe connections joints do not withstandearthquakes well. The Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake caused about 900,000 homes,
mainl in Kobe,
mainlyKobe to lose water
ate service.
se ice Currently,
C entl waterlines
ate lines area e being madeearthquake resistant with ductile cast-iron pipes with earthquake - resistant joints,
steel pipes, polyethylene pipes, and so on.
(iv) Sewers
S
Sewageffacilities
iliti suchh as treatmentttt plants,
l t pumping
i stations,t ti
andd pipelines
i li
constructed since the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake are generally earthquake
resistant. For joints, very elastic and watertight expanding and flexible joints areused,Passing of Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act, partial revision of the BuildingStandards Law, Urban Planning Law
Passing the Act for Promotion of the Earthquake Proof Retrofit of Buildings(Earthq ake Retrofitting Promotion Act)
(Earthquake
Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Japan’s Diet passed the Act for Promotionof the Earthquake Proof Retrofit of Buildings (Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act) in December 1995 towork towards early retrofitting of buildings that don’t meet earthquake-resistant codes. Owners ofdesignated buildings (schools, hospitals, theaters, department stores, offices, and other buildings of atlleast
t threethstoriest i andd 1,000 m2 wherehmany people
l gather)th mustt carry outt earthquakethk - resistancei tinspections and, if necessary, carry out earthquake retrofitting. Ordinary homes are not included. In 2004,
therefore, parts of the Building Standards Law and the Urban Planning Law were revised in order toensure the safety of building and proper urban disaster management.
Partial revision of the Building Standards Law (ensuring building safety)¾Enhancement and strengthening of the reporting and inspection systems for buildings¾Issuing of directives to upgrade dangerous substandard buildings¾Strengthened penalties (corporate tax penalties for not complying with directives to perform upgrades),etc.
¾Countermeasures for earthquakes and major fires in crowded urban areas
areas, etc.
etc
¾According to new rules of revised Building Standards Law newly erected residential houses andconstruction should meet the requirement of earthquake resistant, seismic isolation and vibration
suppressio
Partial revision of the Urban Planning Law
In order to strengthen measures for homes and buildings with insufficient earthquake resistance,
designated buildings must undergo earthquake inspection and retrofitting within specified periods.
Making homes and buildings earthquake resistant
The cost of earthquake retrofitting for single family homes varies by the size of the house and the amountg ¥2 million per
p home.
of work needed, but it averages
Since the Great Hanshin - Awaji Earthquake, the support system for earthquake inspection and retrofitting
has been implemented once in 2 or 3 years.
Establishment of Global Assessment of Earthquake Countermeasures and Reconstruction Overall
Verification and recommendations
Five years after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Japanese and foreign inspectors madevarious proposals regarding emergency relief, aid for victims, and reconstructions measures. The
proposals were made in the framework of the Global Assessment of Earthquake Countermeasures thatwas conducted in 1999, five years after the great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. An overall verification
resulted in more than 460 proposals on 54 topics in 6 areas.

Establishment of new institutes, committees and designation of new post
Establishment of Scientific Research institutes for elaboration and implementation ofDisaster Reduction Policy
Japan’s environmental and geological circumstances make it highly susceptibility tonatural disasters. And, as is clear from its history of such disasters, inherent in Japan isthe possibility of another large-scale disaster capable of severe damage over a large
geographical area. Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution has been

established in order to transmit the experiences and lessons of the Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake to future generations so as to contribute both domestically andabroad to ameliorating damage inflicted by disasters, and to convey respect for thevalue of life and the importance of harmonious coexistence to the rest of the world
Designation of a special post in Disaster Management System of Hyogo Prefecture andestablishment of new actors in disaster management system of Hyogo prefecture
Hyogo Prefecture created the special post of Japan’s first Superintendent of Emergency
Management.
the Disaster Management Planning Bureau and the Disaster Response Bureau were
p 2005. The superintendentp
serves as the chief officer who assists
established on 1 April
the governor with the prefecture’s crisis management following the 1995 earthquake.
The Superintendent oversees approximately 90 personnel at the Disaster Management& Planning Bureau and the Disaster Response Bureau engaged in disaster
preparedness , disaster response, as well as restoration and reconstruction after
disasters.
disasters
Chief Officer for Crisis Management an Office for Crisis Management
It is one of the most important lessons of the Kobe Earthquake for a local government
to respond just after disasters. The position of “Chief Officer for crises management”
gwere newly
y established in 2002. The Chief Officer
and the office for crises management
for Crises management is in charge responding for not only natural disasters but also
man-made disaster such as large accident disasters or terrorism disasters. In absenceof the Mayor or in regard to matters specified by the Mayor, the Chief Officer for Crises
management can direct all the staff of the government of Kobe City in place of themayor.
mayor

Budget assigned for disaster risk reduction
The Hyogo prefecture secures a budget both for construction and programs suchas developing rivers and coastal areas, and maintaining the disastermanagement information system as well as the disaster-relief system
Improvement of seismic observation network.
For earthquake observation according to set forth in August 1997 “Basic
Earthquakes Survey and Observation Plan”
Plan a system that covers the wholecountry in order to centralize and process data to the Japan Meteorological
Agency was prepared. This is a highly-sensitive broadband seismic observation
network covers the entire country with a high degree of accuracy consisting of
set up terrestrial high –sensitivity
sensitivity seismographs (seismographs that detect verysmall vibrations that cannot be sensed by human beings) in 1,228 location andconnected to JMA
The prefectures begin transmission of seismic intensity data within four minutes
after an earthquake
earthquake. Transmission from all observatories is to be completed
within nine minutes.
Releasing the earthquake and tsunami warning bulletins
The Japan Meteorological Agency began testing earthquake warning bulletins
in February 2004. Currently, bulletins are being provided to about 140
organizations, including national disaster management agencies, local
governments, universities, schools, and the private sector.
Hazard maps
Hazard maps are intended to keep disaster damage to a minimum. A long withclearly depicting expected damage zones and degrees of damage on maps,
they present evacuation information such as shelters and danger zones in aneasy-to-understandyformat.
Most hazard maps created and published to date indicate schools, community
centers, and other evacuation points, but few show escape routes or designatedevacuation routes.

Seismic
S
i i observationbi
network

Early Estimation System and an Emergency Measures Support System.
Disaster Information System
JMA and local governments
developed seismic intensity observation
points with seismographs. There are about
3,000 observation points nationwide. Basedon the information from those observation
points, the government developed Early
Estimation System and Emergency Measure
Support System.
After
the
earthquake
earthquake,thegovernment first estimates the damage suchas number of deaths, injured, collapsed
housesandsoon.
Then the government estimates
the needs of support in terms of materials,
manpower for rescue and rehabilitation,
hospital beds, evacuation camps etc. The
estimation system is based on population,
informationbuilding structure information,
groundconditions, time of occurrence and survey of
persons using transport.
Damage caused to buildings isestimatedes
a ed accoaccordingd g too seseismic
s c intensitiese s es foroeach 1-km mesh, building conditions andground conditions. Further distribution ofseismic intensity is obtained based on datafrom observatories.
Based on this damage estimation,
the level of need for support is calculated bycomputer.

Adoption of JJ-Alert System, improvement of sediment disasters
countermeasures, storm surge measures and flood control
measures
Ad
Adoption
i off J-Alert
J Al
SystemS
J-Alert is a nationwide satellite (Superbird –B2 communication satellite)
based warning system designed to quickly inform the public of various
threats It launched in February 2007 and allows authorities to quickly
broadcast alerts to local media and to citizens directly via a systemof loudspeakers. It takes about 1 second to inform local officials, andbetween 4 and 20 seconds to dispatch the message to citizens.
All warnings, except for severe weather warnings, are broadcast in fivelanguages: Japanese, English, Mandarin, Korean and Portuguese (Japanh a smallhasll Chinese,
Chi
K
Koreanandd BrazilianB
ilipopulation).
l i
Th severe weatherThehwarnings are only broadcast in Japanese. Information related toearthquake early warning, (hypocenter, magnitude, intensity, precaution totsunami), tsunami, volcano eruption as well as military threats (ballistic
g air assault, attack to nuclear pplant, large
g scale ofmissile launching,terrorism are able to be transmitted by this system.
Improvement of sediment disasters countermeasures and storm surge
measuresRiver development projects are undertaken by Hyogo prefecture with theassumptioni
off a heavyhrain
i levelll thathoccurs once every one to fivefi
decades. The River Improvement Plan Review Committee established inconformity with the River Law conducts adequate analysis on disaster risk
management. In order to counteract floods flood control measures forpg channels such as broadening
g rivers and elevatingg embankments,
improvingare now underway. At the same time, flood-controlling reservoirs for
temporarily storing precipitation are being built. In addition, efforts are
made to perfect its flood and storm surge control measures by establishingdrainage pumping stations where deemed necessary. Hyogo prefecture istaking measures against storm surges by developing coastal areas thatcan withstand the highest sea levels aw well as undertakes flood control
measures by improving rivers with the assumption of a heavy rain level
that
occur
once
every
one
to
five
decades.

J-Alert System

Improvement of Disaster response system. Establishment of Disastermedical center
Establishment of Disaster Medical Centers throughout whole Japan andparticularly in Hyogo prefecture
The Prefectural Government had established the Disaster Medical
Center named Hyogo Emergency Medical Center at August 1 in 2003.
Hyogo Emergency Medical Center was designated as a Disasterpin Hyogoy g Prefecture) equipped
q pp withmedical center (main core hospitalteaching function to train EMS (Emergent Medical Services) crews, andstock of EMS supplies (stockpiling drugs and other medical supplies) for
emergency delivery.
Functions of the Hyogo Emergency Medical Center is as following
Everyday duties
 Offer
Off rescue andd emergency treatment as a rescue andd emergency
medical center.
 Operate a doctor car service.
 Receive patients brought by helicopter.
 Manage and operate the emergency information center.
 Implement courses, research, and training.
Duties during disaster Operate a disaster emergency information and instruction center.
 Receive patients from the disaster area.
 Dispatch
spa c relief
e e workers
o e s
15 hospitals are designated as DMC in Hyogo prefecture. Main Disastermedical Center is Hyogo Emergency Medical Center. 2-3 doctors arenominated as Disaster Medical Coordinators Medical Coordinators ineach DMC.
Training seminars of personnel are held several times a year
545 hospitals were designated as DMCs strategically located core
hospitals in each region, retaining and training medical and assistantstaff. Practical manuals have also been prepared for the improvement
off disasterdit relatedl t d medical
di l care.
Location of hospitals designated as DMC in Hyogo prefecture

Information Control Center
A disaster-related medical information network has
been establishedbt bli h d ini orderdt collect
toll t andd disseminatedii t medical
di linformation in the situation of disaster
The Disaster-related Medical Information Center isestablished to distribute medical information and to issue
Instructions to medical institutions and ambulance services.
Thi isThis
i a wide-reachingidhitelecommunicationli i
network,k
including high-speed dedicated ground or satellite lines, in order
to increase the response speed in disasters. This can also be used
as an emergency medical network during normal period.
This information and control system links Hyogo
Prefectural Government with medical institutes,
institutes core hospitals.
hospitals
Regional medical information centers, fire departments and theDisaster-related Medical Information Center through high-speed
dedicated digital, satellite, or public lines. The authorities haveconstructed a system which in normal situations can be used forexchanging information, in the situation of a disaster ，it will
support prompt and exact emergency delivery
As a main disaster and emergency information
center for Hyogo prefecture, the information and instruction
center uses the internet to provide emergency medical
information to fire stations, medical agencies,gand it also
provides information regarding medical agencies to theresidents of the prefecture. During a disaster, the center collects
information about the stricken area and patients received by thevarious medical agencies concerned, and then pass thisinformation on to related organizations. Also, together with thellocal
l medical
di l informationi fticenterst
andd emergency hospitalsh
it lspecified for each secondary health care medical area, the center
works with the fire fighting organizations, related to medical
treatment, volunteers, etc, to secure disaster emergency medical
treatment.

Emergency core hospitals in Hyogo. Anti
Anti--seismic water storage tanks
There are ten regional areas in Hyogo prefecture.
Strategically located Core hospitals were established forprovidingpg emergency
gy medical services to regionalgareas in
Hyogo prefecture. There are 15 core hospitals (4, Kobe,2,
Tajima and Nakaharima,1,rest of each regions). They are theregional bases for treatment of patients in a disaster, having
earthquake-proof buildings, large storage facilities forkkeeping
i
d
drugs
and
d otherth
medicaldi l supplies,
li
l
large
water
t
storage tanks, and electrical power generators. .These
hospitals have a duty to retain and train emergency medical
and assistant staff, and to dispatch first-aid teams to disasterarea
aea in thee ssituation
ua o oof ddisaster.
sas eInstallations of Anti- Seismic Water Storage Tanks
In areas affected by Kobe Earthquake, fire brokeout at the same time in 54 locations just after the earthquake.
But the situation far exceeded the city’s
y fire-fightinggg capacity.
pyThere was no water at fire hydrants because pipes had
cracked. In addition the distance between mountain Rokko
and the sea is very narrow. Most of the rivers in Kobe arevery short and have a rapid and few streams. Therefore riverwater
t was insufficienti
ffi i t forf firefighting
fi fi hti att thatth t time.
ti
From the lesson of the earthquake Kobe Municipal
Government installed 250 anti-seismic water tanks which store
100 tons water in parks, schools and so on.

Phoenix Disaster Management System
I
Installationll i andd utilization
ili i off Phoenix
Phi Disaster
Di
Management
M
SystemS

Phoenix Disaster Management System is a comprehensive disasterprevention information system that can quickly respond to earthquakes andotherh any kindki d off disaster,
di
b
based
d on theh lessonsloff theh GreatG
H
Hanshinhi AwajiA
ji
Earthquake. This system has functions including the collection and provision ofdisaster and meteorological information, damage prediction, and theestimationti ti
off supply
l andd demand,dd andd it helps
h l
an initial
i iti l rapid
id andd accuratetemergency response to be carried out. This is a complete system built by
employing internet technology (web technologies) across the board. The
system supports decisions made by the Emergency Relief Headquarters,
Headquarters
providing damage predictions, disaster flash reports, a display of disastersituation map, and more, in addition to providing meteorological information.
For the prefectural residents,
residents it provides information related to disasterprevention on a web site. In order to share disaster related information, thesystem have set up terminals for disaster prevention at prefectural agencies,
municipalities, fire departments, police headquarters, police stations, Fire andDisaster Management Agency, Self-Defense Forces and other relevantorganizations and related agencies.

Phoenix Disaster Management System
Ph
Phoenix
i Di
Disaster Management
M
SystemS
at theh timei
off an earthquake:hk
If there is an earthquake with a seismic intensity of three or more (on the Japanesepscale) within the pprefecture, the systemycalls forattention by displaying blinking pop-ups, together with a sound The System collects earthquake intensity information from theseismic intensity meters set up at 96 locations within the prefecture (Seismic intensity information network) If the System observes an earthquake of a seismic intensity of fouror more (on the Japanese scale), it estimates the damage per 500x500
m cell, based on geological and other ground–related information on
the ground and display the results on a map and a list
 When an earthquake occurs, all municipal disaster-preventionrelated organizations and others report, as their first notification, thedamage situation regarding the offices and in the vicinity of theofficesffi
using
i a simple
i l YES-NOYES NO fform.
 As well as the state of prefectural measures, the system displays ingeneral the following: the damage situation of each region (fatalities,
housing damage, and fires); the state of the establishment of an
Emergency Relief Headquarters; requests from municipalities; and thestate of prefectural responses to the disaster Where required, the actual situation of the disaster is ascertainedin real time, using
g on Heli-Tele images
g and other sources of
information.
Phoenix Disaster Management System
During times of non-emergency
The System issues latest alert and update alarm
statust tIssues satellite images
Carry outs monitoring and makes wave
predictionIssues the Map of water level status

Keeps a record of water level graph andbroadcasts river camera images
The urban situation is ascertained using images
from high-altitude cameras installed at fire
p
(Kobe
City,
y
AmagasakigCity,ydepartments
Nishinomiya City, Ashiya City, Akashi City,
Kakogawa City, Takasago City, Himeji City) and at
Shiso City Hall.
The
h system deliversd lididisasterpreventionianddmeteorological information as well as disasterrelated information to prefectural residents.

The below mentioned information accumulates by the Phoenix Disaster
Management System and transmit to Hyogo Disaster Management Center: Earthquake information (Hyogo Prefecture seismic intensity information
network)
 Meteorological data( Kobe Marine Observatory) West Japan ADESS (theAutomated Data Editing and Switching System) Local Meteorological Information (Operators transmitting
meteorological information)
 Information on rainfall and water level (Hyogo Prefecture River
Information System, Hyogo Prefecture landslide disaster information provision system)
 High altitude camera image information( Fire Departments andheadquarters, Kobe City, Amagasaki City, Nishinomiya City, Ashiya City,
Akashi City, Kakogawa City, Takasago City, Himeji City, Shiso City Hall
 Tsunami observation camera (Minami Awaji City (Aman)) Heli-Tele image information (Hyogo Prefecture Heli-Tele System) Systems related to disaster prevention (Hyogo Prefecture wide-areadisaster information systemyon emergency
gy medical care, Hyogoy g Prefectureroad information, Hyogo Prefecture hazard map, Hyogo Prefecture
maritime disaster prevention information, Hyogo Prefecture notification
system for flood danger and other information, etc.

Establishment of “Hyogo Disaster Management Center”
Based on the lessons learnt from Great HanshinHanshin
Awaji Earthquake and in order to collect accurate
information immediately after disaster Hyogo prefecture
prepared “Hyogo
Hyogo Disaster Management Center
Center” on 22 ofAugust 2000. It is the first municipally–owned facility
dedicated to disaster control, particularly in Hyogo
prefecture area. It serves as central base forpreparedness and information collection. The Center
functions as the base for rescue activities, utilizing the
Phoenix Disaster Managementg
Systemyfor disaster
related information collection, damage assessment andemergency measures.
It locates in the building that can withstand a 7
level earthquake on the Japanese scale. The Center fully
equipped with facilities for disaster management. This
Center secures exclusive work spacep
for relatedorganizations including the Self-Defense Force, thepolice, fire-fighting authorities, and lifeline companies
and media

Establishment of Emergency Relief
Headquarters Control RoomThe room serves as the central base for disaster management
activities. Desks are arranged in horse shoe shape so that the Chief ofHeadquarters, namely Governor of Hyogo Prefecture and the otherdesignated members can actively discuss.
discuss This room is equipped with
Phoenix Disaster Management System.
Night duty room
This center utilizes a 24-hour watching and prompt response
system to prepare against disaster even in day and night as a disaster.may occur anytime. Staff stands by in the Center all day throughout theyear
Broadcasting room
Broadcasting equipment is installed in this room to provide
information directly to local residents in the prefecture when a disasteroccurs. Emergency broadcast is delivered through an AM radio station
Network control room
Information and communication devices are installed in thisroom, including the server, Phoenix Disaster Management System, radio
communication devices that utilize satellite communication networks.
networks
The devises are protected from seismic vibration by a base-isolated
floor.

Formation of Regional Emergency Management Bases
Based on the experiences and lessons learned fromthe Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Hyogo Prefecture
established six regional emergency management bases within
Hyogo which will serve as centers for storing,
Hyogo,
storing collecting anddistributing relief supplies and equipment, and as bases for
assembling and mobilizing emergency relief workers.
Function of Regional Emergency Management Bases
S o geStorage
Storage of relief supplies for victims (blankets, emergency foodsupplies, etc.) and rescue equipment (engine cutters, chain saws,
etc.)ppCollection and distribution of supplies
In the event of a large-scale disaster, the bases become
transport centers for collecting relief supplies sent from all overthe country and distributing them to the affected areas.
Assembly and mobilization of relief workers
The bases become centers for emergency relief activities,
dispatching workers from other areas to aid rescue activities
and restoration work in the afflicted areas.

Regionalg
EmergencygyManagement BasesHyogo Prefectural Miki Emergency Management Base (functions during
disaster and normal times)
Hyogo Prefectural Miki Emergency Management Base consist of the “Learning andTraining
i iZone” (52 ha)handd “DisasteriManagement Parkk Zone” (202 ha).
hTheh Baseprovides disaster training and education for citizens as well as functions as a sports andrecreational center. But in the event of a major disaster, it serves as a prefecture-wide
emergency management base.
During a disaster:In the event of major disaster,
disaster Miki Emergency Management Base will ensure thesmooth distribution of relief supplies in cooperation with regional emergency
management bases both within the prefecture and in the Kansai region. It will also
serve as an operation base for emergency relief workers, and implement quick andeffective disaster response measures
At normal times - Learning and Training Zone:
 Disaster education for citizens: Provides hands-on learning and training for citizens toraise awareness of disaster risk reduction.
Holds the Hyogo Disaster Management Leader Training Course which includes lectures,
exercises and emergency drills, with the aim of fostering leaders of voluntary disasters
response groups.
H
Hyogo
P f
Prefecture
Fi fi h i
Firefighting
A dAcademyprovidesid training
i i
f firefightersforfi fi handd volunteerlfire company members so that they can respond to complex and diverse disasters
 Improvement of disaster response abilities of relief workers : Provides various typesof emergency drills at the rubble rescue training facility from fire departments, thepolice, self-defense forces, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams ( DMATs) and the Japan
Disaster Relief Team
 3-D Full-Scale Earthquake Testing Facility (E-Defense)
Using the world’s largest shaking table, an actual size building is shaken to the same
degree as it would be during a high-intensity earthquake to study the destruction
process. Experiments are performed by shaking a real-size 6-story structure andsimulating the tremors that occurred in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

Hyogo Prefectural Miki Emergency Management
Base (functions during normal times)
At normal times – Disaster Management Park Zone

Promotiono o o ofo sports/recreational
spo s e e oactivities
es - Equipped
qu ppe with various
ous
sports/recreational facilities, taking
Storage of relief supplies and equipment- Under the stands of theathletics stadium, there is a stockpile warehouse which stores relief
supplies
li suchh as food,f d blankets
bl k t andd tents,t t as wellll as relief
li f
equipment such as life-saving systems( packaged equipment for
self-defense forces) and generators

Development of disaster recovery system of Hyogo prefecture after
the Great Hanshin
Hanshin--Awaji Earthquake

Establishment and execution ofreconstruction plans
With theth aimi
off achieving
hi ith prethe
quake level reconstruction after theGreat Hanshin
Hanshin-Awaji
Awaji Earthquake inJanuary 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake Reconstruction Plan (period:
1995 – 2005; budget: 17 trillion yen) was
formulated and executed with thecollaborationll bti
off public
bli administrationd i i t ti
and local residents that mainly relate torestoration of housing,housing infrastructure andindustry

Development of disaster recovery system of Hyogo prefecture after
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake :Urban:Urban redevelopment support
the Great Hanshinproject, Earthquake insurance
Urban redevelopment support project

Hyogo Prefecture promoted the Urban Redevelopment
Support Project to dispatch advisors and consultants to local
community
i groups off affectedff
d areas andd support urbanbredevelopment activities of them.
Earthquake insurance
Th G
The
Governmentt off H
Hyogo prefecture
f t
along
l
with
ith private
i t sectortcompanies established an earthquake insurance system andjointly operate.

Being one of the most disaster prone areas in Japan Hyogo
prefecture has developed sophisticated and all-embracing disastermanagement system. The disaster management system in Hyogo
Prefecture has been heavily influenced by unfavorable geographicalposition, as well as, meteorological,pg
and topographicalp g pconditions andvarious large-scale disasters have been driving force of new changes andenhancements to it. Current disaster management of the prefecture has
been formed during the last 50-60 years but significantly modified for thellast
20 years. Rapid
id developmentdl
off theh country duringd i
thishi period
i denabled it to make considerable investments on DMS and integrate latest
technological achievements of the country to it.
Th existing
i i
di
H
P f
The
disastermanagement system off Hyogo
Prefecture,
although, has been form during relatively short time period put in placesophisticated mechanism which enables the prefecture to mobilize forces
and resources and respond in a comprehensive manner any large-scalelarge scaledisasters promptly, considerably decreasing damage and loss. Although,complicated at first glance, comprehensively elaborated coordination
enablese
es too relevant
eebodieso es takee concerted
o e e actionso s what increases
e ses
efficiency of whole system.