KGRI Working Papers
No.6

Demographic Power: Tiny Titans, Crumbling Giants,
and the Missing Link Between Population & Power

Version1.0
March 2019

Jonathan Webb 1

Keio University Global Research Institute© Copyright 2019 Jonathan Webb
Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University
1

E-mail: jwebb@sfc.keio.ac.jp

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1. Introduction
By 2050, Japan, once the economic juggernaut of Asia, could see
its population fall below 100 million, from 126 million today, with almost
half of the population being over 60 years of age.1 With Japan at theforefront, the advent of aging, shrinking populations in much of thedeveloped world has exposed a staggering new challenge forinternational security, reigniting a perennial debate on the importance of
population as a source of power in international relations. The
phenomenon’s relevance takes on even greater weight considering its
predicted spread to engulf China, often cited as a potential challenger
to the United States, by the mid 2030s.2 Understanding the role that
population, and demography more broadly, play in the formation ofnational power, and the conduct of foreign policy is critical for thecontinued relevance of security studies in the 21st century, and is thefocus of this paper.
The history of demography in the study of international relations
has a storied pedigree. Rulers and policy makers from antiquity throughthe early 20th century recognized the link between a large populationand great power.3 Yet as realist international relations solidified into anorganized academic discipline in the 20th century, the importance of
population fell into the background, superseded by factors such asalignment and technology. This is in part, a consequence of the lengthof demographic horizons; if the period under scrutiny is such that nation
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs, Population Division (2017). World Population

Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Total population (both sexes combined), Percentage total population (both sexes
combined) by broad age group, Low Fertility (June 2017)
2 United Nations, World Population Prospects. Total population, Percentage by broad age group, Low Fertility
3 Niel Howe and Richard Jackson, “Demography and Geopolitics: Understanding Today’s Debate in its

Historical Context,” in Political Demography:How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security andNational Politics. Ed Jack A. Goldstone, Eric P. Kaufmann, Monica Duﬀy Toft, 37-38 (Oxford New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012)

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Jonathan Webbstates, the principal unit of analysis, are unlikely to see significant
demographic change, it makes sense to treat demography as a set andunchanging condition. It is also a result of the emergence andsubsequent dominance of the Demographic Transition theory in muchof the social sciences.4
A.F.K. Organski’s Power Transition is a pertinent starting point for
discussing an expanded role for demography in international relations.
The theory’s recognition of diﬀerential growth rates between states,
caused by internal changes including population growth, as the primary
driver of changes in the international system, provides a lens throughwhich the importance of demographic factors can be seen. This paperbuilds on Power Transition to develop an original theory of
Demographic Power Construction that explores the impact ofdemographic variables in international relations. This framework is used
to contextualize the aging, populations of the 21st century, outlining theunder-appreciated nature of the threat to global stability.

2. The Demographic Transition Theory & the Declineof Global Fertility
The development of the Demographic Transition Theory and its
ascendance to a place of almost unchallenged dominance within therealm of social science, has had profound global consequences. In
some ways a 20th century reworking of the observations of thedemographic pioneer Thomas Malthus, the Demographic Transition,
essentially states that a successful transition to modernity results in,and requires, societies to transition from high birth rate, high death ratesocieties, to low birth rate, low death rate societies. The theory states
that, typically, mortality falls first, resulting in an expansion of the
4 John C. Caldwell, Demographic Transition Theory. (2006 Springer Netherlands)

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population, and a large youth cohort, before fertility decline catches up,
resulting first in a demographic dividend as the working age population
is maximized, and then in stability as fertility hovers around replacement
rate, and along with mortality remains relatively low. What the
Demographic Transition, and its extensions in economic anddevelopment studies imply then, is that an inability to reign in fertility
leads to overpopulation and underdevelopment, and thus bringing
excess fertility to heel is a critical task of the modern state.
The theory is convincing precisely because it mirrored theexperience of the developed countries at the time of its development,
many of which were still undergoing the demographic dividend phase ofhigh growth, and its observations have largely held true for the
economies that have caught up in the meantime. What was notconsidered at the time, likely due to the population explosion in thedeveloping world post 1950, was the long-term consequences ofcontinuous fertility decline, particularly as fertility rates began to fall well
below replacement in the many of the developed countries.
It is these low fertility rates that are at the heart of 21st century
aging populations, with the decline in most countries able to be traced
to developments in the 1970s. A general consensus on the negative link
between excessive population growth and poverty, along with the
spread of methods for family planning, has led to a significant decline infertility worldwide over the past forty years.
While fertility decline has been worldwide, appearing even in
many of the worlds least developed countries, the experience of the
Asia Pacific has been one of unusually quick decline in every country
except Japan (where the demographic transition began much earlier inthe 20th century). In Japan and Singapore, the birthrate first fell well
below replacement rate after 1975, and has been trending downward
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Jonathan Webbfor the majority of the last 40 years. South Korea and Taiwan underwent
the same experience, with the starting point a decade later in 1985. In
China, the introduction of mandatory family planning that would
eventually become the One Child Policy, saw the country’s birthrate cut
in half during the 1970s, and fall below replacement rate in the early
1990s. Despite growing slower than China, Thailand has also seen its
fertility rates fall below replacement rate at roughly the same rate as
China, while Vietnam has also fallen below replacement rate in recent
years.5
The impact of these decades of below replacement fertility in the
Asia Pacific is already coming into sharp relief. As hinted at in the
introduction, Japan’s population is currently the most aﬀected, having
already began shrinking in 2011. Taiwan is projected to begin shrinking
in 2020, while South Korea, China and Thailand are projected to beshrinking by 2025.6 The crux of the problem however, is not merely thenumerical decline, but that these populations are also rapidly aging.
In Japan, the median age already exceeds 47, with a staggering
1/3 of the population over the age of 60. To put things in perspective,
there are more people over the age of 70 in Japan than there are underpeople under the age of 20. By 2025, the median ages and age
distribution in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan will approach thoseof Japan today, with China reaching similar levels by 2035.7 Under suchcircumstances, the population pyramid of each country will quickly
come to resemble a lopsided inversion of the traditional population“pyramid,” with a myriad of consequences for international security.

5 United Nations, World Population Prospects. Total Fertility, Estimates
6 United Nations, World Population Prospects. Total Population, Estimates, Constant Fertility
7 United Nations, World Population Prospects. Median Age, Estimates, Constant Fertility

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3. Theoretical Foundations for Integrating
Demography into International Relations Analysis
Now that an understanding the Demographic Transition Theory’s
impact has been established, it is necessary to outline the theoreticalfoundations upon which the methodology and conclusions of this work,
which seeks to both quantify and qualify that impact, rests. As stated in
the introduction, this research builds on the power transition theory,
integrating bargaining theory and the concept of techno-economic
paradigms into a unique theory of realist international relations analysis
known as Demographic Power Construction.
Power Transition has two primary points of diﬀerentiation withother realist theories of international relations. First is the explicit
recognition of forms of hierarchy emerging from the realist conceptionof anarchy in international relations. Second is the observation that the
primary source of changes in the balance of power are the result of
diﬀerential economic growth rates. In practice, this means that thestrongest state, in a given geographic area, defines the boundaries of
the regional or international sphere, until they are overtaken by anotherstate growing exponentially faster. The majority of competition then,occurs within the bounds laid out by the dominant powers.
The Power Transition framework thus lays out a compelling
rationale for the “when” and “how” of the occurrence of serious
international conflict, framing it as most likely when a rising state(s),becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. As the risingstate’s power approaches that of the dominant state(s) in the system,
the likelihood of conflict increases. This typically results from a
combination of the following two factors: the rising state, feeling
emboldened may lash out (often prematurely resulting in eventual
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defeat) at a perceived opportunity or slight, while the dominant state
has a need to maintain the existing order, constrain the risingchallenger, and an incentive to strike before it is eclipsed by thechallenger state.
Power transition also has the benefit, for the purposes of thisresearch of having already taken population into account as one of thebase components of power. Population, productivity, and political
capacity are identified as the three main components that make up
power. That said, the power transition program generally does not seek
to represent productivity or political capacity, and instead relies heavily
on GNP as a stand in for capacity in most analysis. Nonetheless, thisprovides a useful starting point for the further integration ofdemographic variables.
Bargaining Theory, more recently introduced into the international
relations literature, has done a complimentary job providing an idea of
the “what” and “why" of the occurrence of international conflict andstate behavior. The fundamental thrust of the argument is that it is not
merely certain distributions of power that make conflict more likely as it
is certain distributions of benefits. States that are satisfied with theirshare of the benefits of the international system, or whose diﬀerenceswith it can be negotiated and resolved, are unlikely to attempt tooverturn the system, even if, theoretically they have the power to do so,
and in the same way, countries whose power is being eclipsed aremuch more likely to allow it to occur peacefully if they feel that any
adjustments that are made by the newly dominant power will still
maintain a distribution beneficial to themselves. Conversely, when acountry perceives its share of the benefits in the system to besignificantly below that of the wealth and power it possesses, and it
feels this is unlikely to be resolved through negotiation, it is likely to
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strike out in an attempt to overturn the system, or at the very least,
make forcible changes to it.8
Finally, stepping outside the realm of international relations,
theories stressing the critical role played by constant change andtechnological advancement in national development have much tocontribute to a demographic study of international relations. In
particular, the theory of the Field and the Forge9, and Techno-Economic
Paradigms10 suggest that it is the very conditions of constant changethat do much to shape both individual and state behavior.
The combination of Power Transition, Bargaining Theory, andtheories of technological change are complementary in illustratinginterstate relations in regard to major power conflict, and thus provide
the following base assumptions for this research:
1. While anarchy and self-help characterize inter-state relations, themost powerful state’s establish hierarchies that supersede anarchy
as the dominant framework in which states typically interact.
2. Changes in, or the replacement of hierarchies, take place due tochanges in the balance of power.
3. Diﬀerential growth rates are the primary source of changes in theinternational balance of power.
4. The dominant state(s) in the system use their position to establish abeneficial distribution of benefits that reinforces their position.

8 David Lake, Jeﬀry Frieden, and Kenneth A. Schultz, World politics : Interests, Interactions, Institutions. (W.W.

Norton, 2013) 84-95
9 John Landers, The Field and the Forge: Population, Production, and Power in the Pre-industrial West. (2005

Oxford University Press)
10 Carlota Pérez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages.

(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002)

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5. States, therefore, are not necessarily locked in a zero sum game ofpower maximization, but instead may seek to maximize theirbenefits within the existing hierarchy.
6. Conflict is most likely when a rising country, particularly one that is alegitimate challenger to the dominant state, feels its share of the
distribution of benefits does not match its perceived power.
7. Since the Industrial Revolution, constant technological change,
culminating in periodic paradigm shifts that redefine human activity,
is a systemic characteristic as omnipresent, if not more so, as
anarchy in interstate relations.
8. Diﬀerential growth rates are thus generally caused by a combinationof: demographic change, technical innovation, and the degree ofadaptation.

4.1. Demography, National Capacity and the“Distribution” of Power
Before preceding further, to say that national power is the force
driving the international system, it is important to define power. For the
purposes of this paper, power is defined as the ability to act or exercise
influence or control to increase the chance of achieving a desired
outcome. This is important because for most works, national power andnational economic and military capacity are often used interchangeably.
Power, however, is not merely about capacity, but about identifying
goals and making the most eﬀective use of available resources toachieve those goals. While certain goals, such as national survival, andsecuring a prominent share of the distribution of benefits may beuniversal, others such as the control of a specific territory, or the spreadof certain ideologies may be unique to individual actors in the system.

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In a simplified model, in which all states have access to unlimited
resources, possess optimal governance, and technology capable ofgainfully and productively employing the entire population, population
size and growth rate, the most basic of demographic variables, could
also be said to be the most basic variables in the formation and growthof power; the scale of capacity deriving from population size, and thediﬀerential growth rate deriving from the diﬀerence in the population
growth rate. The Franco-German rivalry of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries provides the closest approximation of the simplified model,
and is briefly detailed below.

4.2. Franco-German Rivalry and the Simplified
Model of Demographic Power Construction
Graph 1.1 - French & German Population (Thousands)
FranceGermany

70,000FRANCE 1820
GERMANY 1870
31,25039,23160,000GERMANY 1913
50,00065,058FRANCE 1870
GERMANY 1820
38,44024,90540,000FRANCE 1913
30,00041,46320,000
1820
1837
1854
1871
1888
1905
1922
1939
Graph 1.2 - French & German GDP (Millions 1990
International dollars)
FranceGermany

400,000
325,000
250,000
175,000
100,000
25,0001820

FRANCE 1820
35,468GERMANY 1870
72,149GERMANY 1820
26,819FRANCE 1870
72,1001837

GERMANY 1913
237,332

FRANCE 1913
144,489
1854

1871

1888

1905

1922

1939
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The rivalry of France and Germany from the mid 19th to early 20th
century demonstrate how, with all else being “equal,” population growth
can drive economic growth, national capacity, and power. As graph 1.1
and 1.211 demonstrate, population growth and economic growth follow
a very similar trend from 1820 to 1939. This results in France, which
possessed overwhelming force on the European continent in the early
19th century, as evidenced by the Napoleonic Wars, being equaled byGermany at the time of the Franco-Prussian War and German
unification in 1870, and completely overtaken by the advent of the FirstWorld War. This is reflected not only in national economic capacity but
in France’s increasing inability to deal with Germany militarily on its
own.

4.3. Toward an expanded model of Demographic
Power Construction
The problem with the simplified model is that while it can beeﬀective in analyzing two states at similar levels of development, withsimilar access to resources in a vacuum, its explanatory power
decreases the greater the dissimilarity between the units of analysis. In
the international system, dissimilarity is the norm, access to resources
is a source of contention, the quality of governance varies dramatically,
and rapid technological change, the hallmark of the modern era, has asmuch potential to destabilize as it does empower.
To rectify the deficiencies of the simplified model, it is necessary
to examine a broader set of demographic variables from which can beinferred a measure of what might be termed “population quality.” Crude
vital rates (fertility and mortality), along with per capita education, canprovide an important barometer of human capital development, from11 Angus Maddison, World Economy Volume 2: Historical Statistics. (OECD Publishing, 2006)

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which a concept of eﬀective population, that is, the expectedeﬀectiveness of a given population at generating national capacity andtranslating it into political power, can be derived.
Demography’s shaping of the formation of national capacity
however is tied with the development of human capital and is thus not apassive or automatic process. Human capital development is an
ongoing process that shapes and is shaped by the behavior of nation
states. Nation states develop regimes that attempt to shape humancapital development, among the most important of which are theaforementioned education, and modes of interconnectivity otherwise
known as infrastructure. That is, the more interconnected and educateda state’s populace are, the more eﬀective it will be. The integration of aconcept of eﬀective population, that is human capital development, canbe thought of as the expanded model of demographic power
construction, an example of which is given in the section, The RussoJapanese War and the expanded model of demographic power
construction.

4.4. The Russo-Japanese War and the Expanded
Model of Demographic Power Construction
GRAPH 2.2 JAPANESE& RUSSIAN FERTILITY& MORTALITY (PER
1000 PEOPLE)
TABLE 2.1 - JAPANESE & RUSSIAN 60
POPULATION & GDP 1904
45 50.3
Population
GDP (Millions of1904(Thousands) 1990 International $) 30 36.728.7

49.3
32.4
31.1

RU

145,091

178,141

15 20.6

20.8

JP49,40055,770

0
1890

1900

JP Birth

JP Death

RU BirthRU Death

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TABLE 2.3 - JAPANESE & RUSSIAN PERCAPITA COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION
1904

PostalTelegraph

Telephone

Education(Years)JP

26,723

470

765

2.52

RU

12,170

207

288

1.25

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 can be used todemonstrate how expanding the integration of demographic factors toinclude the development of human capital further hones the explanatory
power of the framework, allowing it to demonstrate with clarity why asmaller, less populous nation with a smaller GDP was able to win amajor conflict. Table 2.112 briefly summarizes the population and GDP ofboth countries in the decades preceding the war. Graph 2.213 and Table
2.314 delve into the key aspects of human capital development in thesame time period, demonstrating that, by the time of the war, Japan
had developed a significant human capital advantage that negatedmuch of Russia’s perceived advantages in population and GDP15.

4.5. The Demography of State Behavior
The previous sections demonstrate the applicability ofdemographic factors in the analysis of the formation of national
capacity. However, as stated earlier the likelihood of conflict is rooted asmuch in the motivations and behavior of states as it is the absolutebalance of capacity and power between those states. The following
12 Maddison, World Economy (2006)
13 B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750-2005 Fifth Edition (Palgrave

Macmillan, New York, 2007)14 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics (2007)
15 A full time series comparing the two countries is omitted due to the limited data available on the Russian

Empire.

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sections will thus look at how demography shapes both the distributionof benefits systems, as well as how states respond to the distribution as
well as their own demographic realities.

4.6. Demography and the Distribution of Benefits
Regardless of how a state comes to be the most powerful in agiven system (regional or global), the type of hierarchy and thus thecharacter of the distribution of benefits it seeks to establish is theorized
to be influenced by its demographic characteristics. States with a low
level of demographic pressure, that is states where growth anddevelopment are not inherently limited by a lack of local land or
resources, tend toward open systems that favor the indirect applicationof power, while higher levels of demographic pressure often trend
toward a more openly stratified distribution of benefits.
The British Empire, at its peak in the 19th century for example, hadestablished a system of imperial free trade, in which the advanced
nations of Europe (and later the United States and Japan), with Britain in
the lead, used colonialism and trade to gain access to critical resources
while providing an outlet for surplus population and production. When
United States took over the mantle of free trade following the Second
World War, it sought to jettison the colonial elements as unnecessary
given that, the United States possessed such land and resources thatsurplus population was not a serious concern, and the colonial
ambitions of other powers were costly and incompatible with American
national interest. A similar trend can be seen in the way in which China
managed its sphere of influence in pre-modern Asia.

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4.7. Demographic Power Construction and National
Capacity in 21st century Asia PacificGraph 3.1 - Northeast Asian and US Population
1995-2050 (Millions)
400,000
363,000
326,000
289,000
252,000
215,000
178,000
141,000
104,000
67,00030,000Japan
CN 1995
1,239,940
US 1995
269,659
JP 1995
126,375

KR 1995
45,299Korea (ROK) CN 2035
1,364,222
CN 2015
1,397,029
US 2035
US 2015
346,398
319,929

USA

CN 2050
1,230,644
US 2050
351,389

JP 2015
127,975

JP 2035
113,408

JP 2050
99,199KR 2015
50,593

KR 2035
50,213

KR 2050
45,9301995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
GRAPH 3.2 NORTHEAST ASIAN & US GDP AT
CONSTANT 2010 USD$18,000,000$16,200,000$14,400,000$12,600,000$10,161,013$10,800,000$9,000,000$17,304,984$14,408,094$7,200,000$6,156,329$5,672,307$5,400,000 $5,063,811$10,299,025$3,569,853$3,600,000$1,479,027$1,800,000$543,606$894,708$1,345,946$0
JP CN KR US
JP CN KR US
JP CN KR US
1995
2005
2017

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GRAPH 3.3 NORTHEAST ASIAN AND USCRUDE
BIRTH & DEATH RATES ( PER 1000 PEOPLE)
JP Birth

JP Death

KR Birth

KR Death

JP INVERSION

1990

2000

2010

CN BirthKR
INVERSION

2020

CN Death

US Birth Rate

US Death RateCN
INVERSION

2030

2040

2050

TABLE 3.4 NORTHEAST TABLE 3.5 - NORTHEAST ASIAN & US
ASIAN & US ADULTINTERNET USERS % OF POPULATION
2010

%

2000

2017

US

41.7%

US

43%

76%

Japan

44.8%

Japan

30%

93%

ROK

39%

ROK

45%

93%

China

9.7%

China

2%

53%

Applying demographic Power Construction to the 21st century
Asia Pacific results in a number of interesting observations. China’s
dramatic GDP growth is clearly tied to the leveraging of its large
population.1617 The advantages in human capital development
possessed by the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, andSingapore relative to China and other emerging regional economies are

16 United Nations, World Population Prospects. Total population, Low Fertility
17 The World Bank, World Development Indicators, GDP Constant 2010 USD, 2018

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weakness of China’s human capital development betrays itself. While
China will undoubtedly make strides in this area, its demographic
advantage in the period before its population is projected to begin
declining is perhaps somewhat less than it would otherwise be. The
rapid advance of China’s IT infrastructure by contrast, suggests that
China is well positioned to catch up to many of the advanced
economies, although questions of the quality of access remain relevant
given the restrictions on internet access in China.
The inversion of Japan’s birth and death rates is set to widen sucha degree that deaths will outnumber births by a factor of three, areversal of the rates seen during Japan’s period of high-speed growth.
While Japan will reach this level over a period of roughly 40 years, theonset of the aging related inversion of fertility and mortality in China will
be much more rapid, beginning around 2025, and reaching a similarlevel of inversion to Japan by 2050.
The conclusion of an analysis based on Demographic power
construction would be that while Chinese power has, as its GDP would
suggest, rapidly increased relative to both Japan and the United States.
That said, the diﬀerence in absolute national capacity between China
and Japan is likely overstated, while that between the United States andChina is likely understated. Furthermore, while China may have an initial
window to capitalize on Japanese demographic weakness in the 2020s,
from 2030 onward, China is may well face its own severe demographic
crisis.

18 The World Bank, World Development Indicators, Tertiary Education, Internet Users, 2018

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6. Conclusions
It is sometimes said that “demography is destiny,” andDemographic Power Construction certainly lends credence to thisviewpoint. However demography is not unchangeable, and representsmuch more than just population size. There is no doubt however, thatstates approach to the challenge of population aging will have a direct
and significant influence on their national capacity, the power they areable to project into the international system, and the probability ofconflict.
While the positive demographic outlook of the United States is apotential bright spot, the downward trajectory of Japan, China, andother major powers, pose significant challenges to regional stability.
There is a real risk that China could attempt take advantage of a
weakening regional order if Japanese enfeeblement if it is allowed tocontinue. At the same time, as China’s challenges begin to mount in the2030s, the possibility that it may attempt a radicle change of the statusquo when it feels it has reached its apex is real. Finally, intergenerational
conflict in any of the aging countries, not only Japan and China, could
swell into a force that rapidly alters the policy trajectory of the country
eﬀected, destabilizing the region.
Today’s demography is not necessarily tomorrow’s destiny, but if
steps are not taken to establish a solid demographic foundation, manynations may find their power deflated, and their destiny in the hands ofothers.

7. Policy Implications and Recommendations
Based on the conclusions of this paper, the following areproposed as guidelines for policy making going forward.

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As numerous scholars have noted, the demographic position of
the United States of America relative to that of the other advanced
nations, as well as China, is highly advantageous. With a relatively highlevel of fertility often approaching replacement rate, a steady stream of
immigration, and an abundance of land, the population of the UnitedStates will remain relatively young, as much of the rest of the world
grows old. In spite of this privileged position however, the United States
could squander its advantage if, for example poor policy reduced
fertility or caused immigration to drop precariously. Furthermore, striking
disparities in the levels of human capital development throughout thecountry, and the relatively poor health of much of its population could
negate much of the country’s demographic advantage if not addressedin the years ahead.
On the other end of the spectrum stands Japan, which, of all theadvanced nations, and indeed great powers, faces the most acutedemographic challenge in both the near and long term. While advanced
technology such as AI and robotics, general productivity
advancements, and immigration each have a role to play in maintaining
the forward momentum of Japan’s national capacity, the demographic
nature of the crisis can no longer be ignored. The balancing of Japan’s
demographic ledger through a rise in the country’s total fertility rate, anda commitment to raising its already high level of human development
will be critical to its national security in the coming decades.
Finally, while it is true that the countries with the greatest capacityand motivation to threaten the existing order are likely to be
demographically constrained in the coming decades, if the UnitedStates’ foremost allies are similarly constrained, the result could still bea dangerously unstable distribution of power and benefits in theinternational system. Furthermore, countries undergoing extreme aging
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could experience political and economic instability that could causeinternational upheaval. It is therefore in the interest of the United States
to encourage and assist Japan, Europe, and other allied countries inproactively addressing their demographic diﬃculties.

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Netherlands, 2006)

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Jonathan Webb

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