Studies and Research n°35

Europe and its think tanks :a promise to be fulfilled

An analysis of think tanks specialised in European policy issues
in the enlarged European Union

Directed by Stephen BOUCHERStephen Boucher, author and coordinator
French and American, Stephen is at the moment a consultant in the energy policy field. He
holds an Master in Public Administration from Harvard University and was previously adviser
on European and international affairs for the Belgian Deputy-Prime Minister and Minister fortransport. He has also taught lobbying in Europe as Adjunct Professor at the Institut d'Etudes
Politiques in Paris.

Ben Hobbs, co-author
Ben worked as Parliamentary Researcher for British MP Mark Lazarowicz from 2001 to 2004.
He holds a Masters in European Politics and Policy from the London School of Economics(2000). His special interests include the question of EU reform, comparative aspects ofcontemporary European politics, and the EU’s external policies.

Juliette Ebélé, trainee
Juliette Ebélé graduated in Russian Studies at the Sorbonne University in Paris, and also
completed a post-master degree in translation applied to International Relations (ISTI,
Bruxelles) in French, English and Russian. She is now seeking an international career intranslation and research applied to European and International affairs, with a special focus on
Russia (EU-Russia relations, Russian Foreign Policy).

Charlotte Laigle, trainee
Holding a degree in Translation, ‘English-German’ (ISIT, Paris), and a Dess in Translation
specializing in International Relations (ISTI, Bruxelles), she carried out, during 2004, a ten
week-internship for GreenFacts Foundation. She wants now to work as a translator or a
researcher in the field of international relations, more particularly at the European level.

Michele Poletto, trainee
Born in Milan, Italy, in 1979. Graduated in Social Sciences at the University of Milan and Paris
VII-Denis Diderot in 2002. He has attended the Master in Advanced European Studies at theCollege of Europe, Warsaw Campus (John Locke Promotion, 2003-2004) and he is currently
researcher at the University Institute for European Studies, Universidad Autónoma ofBarcelona.

Diego Cattaneo, traineeThis Italian researcher holds a BA in Law from the University of Bologna and a Master
degree insocial science

from

the

UniversityofLondon; also,hehas recently had

professional experience within the Italian Parliament. He is currently working in London.

aRadoslaw Wegrzyn, trainee
Radoslaw WEGRZYN, graduated from the European Studies Programme, co-organised by the
IEP Paris, from the Warsaw School of Economics and from the Cycle supérieur d’études
européennes from the IEP Paris. He gained some experience in the field of the European
integration, working as a junior lecturer in the Chair of International Organisations of Warsaw
School of Economics; translating the European law texts into Polish it Euroscript Polska anddid an internship in the European Commission Representation in France.

Notre Europe
Notre Europe is an independent research and policy planning group about Europe, its past, its
civilisations, its march towards unification and its future prospects. The group was founded by
Jacques Delors in the fall of 1996. Its team includes researchers from different countries. Asa think tank on European integration, the research group seeks to contribute to the publicdebate on Europe through analysis and by putting forward relevant policy proposals.
Notre Europe participates in the public debate in many ways : by publishing studies and bybringing together external researchers and thinkers to contribute to current research on
European matters. The documents published are aimed at decision makers, academics andjournalists in Europe. All of its output is published on its website. Notre Europe also organises
seminars and conferences, sometimes in collaboration with other organisations and media.
Its President and its board can take a stand on important matters concerning the future of theEuropean Union. The Board administers the association and direct the association’s
publications programme. An International Committee, composed of high level European
personalities, meets once or twice a year to discuss a strategic European issue.

Foreword
It is always interesting to watch the arrival of a word onto the European political and media
scene. That of “think tank” seems to be on the way to establishing itself in the lexicon – somemight say jargon - of European discourse.
Paradoxically, the development of think tanks in Europe has hardly been “thought” about. The
phenomenon itself is relatively new and few studies have concentrated specifically on thesubject. By focusing on the development of think tanks in the 25 member States of theEuropean Union which are interested – exclusively or in large part – in the analysis of EU
institutions and policies, the present survey therefore seeks to explore largely uncharted
research territory.
The exercise was carried out by a team of external researchers led by Stephen Boucher, withthe support of Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, Secretary General of Notre Europe. It is not, of course,
unrelated to Notre Europe’s analysis of what role it may play today. But it goes further thanthat by presenting as in-depth an examination as possible of think tanks working on European
affairs, both from the descriptive angle (which mission, activities, resources ?) and from theanalytical one (which strengths, weaknesses, influences, challenges and future trends ?).
Have the groups that are dedicated to independent research and the formulation of innovative
public policies not become essential cogs in the complex mechanisms which today’s “public
opinion” democracies have become ? Is it not therefore their duty to (re)think how they
operate ?
Is this question not even more relevant for the European Union, criticised for too long for its
lack of appeal to the ordinary citizen, in what has, sometimes too hastily, been dubbed theEuropean « democratic deficit » ?
Do think tanks have a flourishing future ahead of them? Will they be closed circles of influenceor architects of a true European democracy ? How will they reconcile scientific rigour with
communication

requirements ?

How

will

they

respondtothechallenge

of

their

“europeanisation” both in terms of their internal organisation and transnational cooperation ?
These are some of the questions on which Notre Europe wished to shed some light, with theambition to contribute to the development of the sector while allowing further research on thesame topic.
With 10 new members States and the prospect of further enlargement, the European Union isprobably experiencing one of the most challenging transitions in its history. Now more thanever, the EU will need to dip into its “think tanks”.
I believe that this analysis of think tanks will be of interest to both observers and actors of theEuropean construction, those who know that any great project starts with the idea that opens
the way.
Jacques DelorsTable of contents

Executive summary

1

Introduction

2

1 European think tanks : limited knowledge, important stakes

7

1.1 The study of think tanks is recent, especially in Europe

7

1.2 Think tanks are central to the history of European integration

8

1.3 Think tanks’ role in E.U. decision-making and construction processes is potentially

11

2 State of play : an overview of think tanks Europe-focused think tanks in the E.U.

16

importantand E.U. Member States
2.1 General overview
2.1.1 Key facts

16
16

2.1.2 When and why they were created19

2.1.3 Missions

21

2.1.5 Audiences27

2.1.4 Research areas
2.1.6 Activities

24
29

2.1.7 Publications

33

2.1.9 Staff

36

2.1.8 Funding34

2.1.10 Euro-think tanks’ perception of their own work36

2.1.11 Independence, a core value38

2.1.12 Performance measurement

2.2 Country reports

40

43

2.3 Euro-think tank specificities in the new E.U. Member States78

2.4 Provisional conclusion

79

3 The point of view of recipients and observers of think tank work85

3.1 Do decision-makers, journalists and academics find Euro-think tanks useful ?

85

3.2 Provisional conclusion

91

4 Challenges, dilemmas and strategic choices

94

4.1 Threats and opportunities

95

4.2 Dilemmas and strategic choices

98

4.2.1 Independence, academic rigor and the requirements of political influence

4.2.2 Think tanks and the E.U. ‘democratic deficit’: think tanks’ role between public
opinion and political elites

99

103

4.2.3 Developing synergies in a context of increased competition

105

5 Parting thoughts

115

5.1 Possible U.S. lessons for the future of Euro-think tanks

115

5.2 Encouraging the development of think tanks

117

5.3 Suggestions for future research

120

Conclusion

123

Annex 1 : List of Euro-think tanks surveyed

124

Annex 2 : Main European think tank networks encountered

132

Annex 3 : Methodological issues, list of interviews, questionnaires

135

Annex 4 : References

145

Case studies
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Can German foundations be considered think tanks ?

18

The Centre for European Reform, a credible and influential advocacy tank

102

Friends of Europe, a quasi-think tank bridging the E.U. democratic deficit by satellite ?

104

The Lithuanian Free Market Institute evaluates its public image

105

The Centre for Economic Policy Research, Europe’s first ‘Think-Net’

109

Tables :Table 1 : Euro-think tanks

4

Table 2 : Overview of the Euro-oriented think tanks surveyed

17

Table 3 : Euro-specific think tanks, creation periods

20

Figures :Figure 1 : Think tanks’ stated mission (E.U. 25)

22

Figure 2 : Think tanks’ stated mission (former E.U. 25)

23

Figure 3 : Think tanks’ stated mission (new Member States)

23

Figure 4 : Areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on

25

Figure 5 : Neutral – Pro – Anti-E.U. think tanks

27

Figure 6 : Main audiences of 41 think tanks in the U.K., Germany, Italy, Brussels

28

Figure 7 : Types of policy-makers cited by think tanks as a main audience (UK, Germany, Italy)

29

Figure 8 : Principal activities reported by think tanks

30

Executive summaryIdeas and the shapers of ideas have always been central to the European ‘project’.
Potentially, they have an important role to play in the formulation of public policies, indemocratic decision-making, and in providing support to Member States and theEuropean Union’s diplomatic efforts. Yet the groups that seek to generate anddisseminate policy ideas related to the European continent –‘Euro-think tanks’– havenever been studied as a distinct community within the 25 E.U. Member States.

Using nine criteria derived from previous literature, 149 think tanks have been
identified and analysed. 36 are ‘Euro-specific’ organisations that specialise inEuropean policy issues. For the remaining 113, Europe is a significant research area
among other issues.

They employ nearly 3,000 researchers working more or less closely on policies related
to Europe. Communities of researchers working within ‘Euro-think tanks’ areparticularly large in Germany, Austria, Poland, and the U.K. They are relatively
underdeveloped in France and Italy. Only 5 per cent work with E.U. actors from
Brussels, the rest are based in the Member States.

Overall, think tank ‘supply’ is relatively limited, as the sector is somewhat fragmented
and focuses on issues – such as institutional matters – where there is significant
overlap. Certain policy areas – such as the environment – are relatively neglected.
Euro-think tanks’ audience is limited, as well as the range of methods they use.
Organisations that use a mode of operation founded in Anglo-American practice seem
to predominate.

Qualitative interviews confirm that Euro-think tanks, although welcomed by policymakers and observers of the sector, have not yet found their place fully in European
policy-making: the value they add is not perceived clearly, they are seen as
moderately useful, and even sometimes elitist. Overall, they are believed to have alimited impact on policies and public opinion.

Enlargement has not affected Euro-think tanks’ operations much. Academia’s
increasing entrepreneurship throughout Europe, growing competition, both fromwithin and outside the sector, and, most importantly, financial difficulties due toreduced public funding are however reshaping the market.

Euro-think tanks are seeking to meet changes in their operating environment throughmore deliberate fund-raising, networks and cooperation, greater specialisation,
financial transparency, and even performance measurement. Traditional perceptionsof independence and their role vis-à-vis the mass public are challenged.



Yet the sector is also getting stronger as smaller, more specialised and militant
players join the ‘market of ideas’. Actors adapt to new financial imperatives, learn the‘advocacy’ game and how to use the media.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

1Introduction
The European Union as we know it today is, essentially, the result of an intellectual process.
The idea of unifying European countries which had been divided and in conflict throughout
history was born in the mind of a few visionary men and women, promoted by militantorganisations, and implemented by purposeful politicians. Having overcome many obstacles,
the unique and complex European institutional framework that we know today, which governs
most of everyday life for over 450 million citizens, illustrates a process by which a politicalproject emerged from analysis and was translated into reality. Some will even add that thisproject has met its goal of ensuring peace in Europe, and even, despite its drawbacks, ofpromoting the public good. The actions of a small number of experts, academics andprominent intellectuals are therefore at the heart of the integration process.
In this perspective, the history of European construction illustrates the ambition of think tanks
that specialise in European matters. Think tanks are indeed organisations dedicated toresearching and disseminating policy solutions that aim to contribute to the policy-making
process. However, despite a few national studies, what do we know about these groups within
the European Union? Notre Europe, itself an independent research institute based in Paris andcreated by Jacques Delors, has decided to investigate them in the aftermath of theenlargement to 25 Member States. It has therefore asked an outside team to “analyse thinktanks based in the European Union that follow European matters, either think tanks that deal,
even partially, with issues related to the European construction process and that seek toachieve transnational influence, or purely national think tanks which focus their research on
European issues.”
The authors of this report have therefore tried to identify and describe these organisations
rigorously during the months of July, August, and September 2004. Who are they ? What istheir contribution to community construction and decision-making processes ? How do they
operate ? Which are the influential players and what are the factors of influence ? Has
enlargement to 25 Member States affected their role? These are some of the initial questions
which this report has sought to answer.
NINE CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY THINK TANKS
Before sharing the results of our work, what do we actually mean by "think tanks?" This
expression is used and misused, within the think tank sector itself, by the media, and evensometimes by specialists. We have tried in this survey to use a definition that is accurate andcovers all relevant organisations. Our definition is therefore founded on previous academic
work (Weiss, 1992 ; Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998 ; McGann, Weaver, 2000 ; Sherrington,2000 ; Stone, 2000a/b). It includes nine criteria: think tanks are [1] permanent organisations,[2] that specialise in the production of public policy solutions, [3] thanks to in-house staff
dedicated to research. [4] They generate an original production of ideas, analysis and advice,[5] which is meant to be communicated to policy-makers and public opinion (incidentally,
think tanks should therefore have a website). [6] Such organisations are not responsible for2

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledgovernmental activities. [7] They seek, more generally, to maintain their research
independence and not to be committed to particular interests. [8] Their main activity is not totrain nor to grant diplomas. [9] Finally, their implicit or explicit goal is to contribute to the
public good, unlike purely commercial groups.
Our nine criteria : think tanks...

Annex 3 explains how these criteria werechosen. They were applied as rigorously as are permanentpossible, in order to distinguish consistently

 specialise in the production of public policy
solutions

think tanks from related organisations, such as have in-house staff dedicated to researchresearch centres that are primarily academic

 produce ideas, analysis, and advice(e.g. CAP in Munich is included, but not CERI in
behalf of governments (EIPA is not included as put emphasis as their primary aim on
communicating their research to policymakers
and public opinion (and therefore have a
website)a think tank but mentioned as an organisation

 are not responsible for government operations

Paris), organisations that perform activities onthat has similar characteristics), and interest
and pressure groups (the International Crisis
Group in Brussels is not listed, unlike ISIS
Europe).1 On the other hand, we have also
tried to apply these criteria flexibly. This may aim to maintain their research freedom and not
to be beholden to any specific interest
 are not degree granting and training is not theirprimary activity seek, explicitly or implicitly to act in the public
interest

at first seem paradoxical, but is unavoidable:
our criteria remain in part subjective and absolute rigour is not realistic. Omitting a criterion
was sometimes favoured over excluding artificially an important organisation. The Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung (see Section 2.1) is an example of this double requirement of rigour andflexibility, as are several German institutes. Our list, despite the care taken in selecting
organisations, therefore remains partial. It is important however to stress that this list is notmeant to provide a label of « think tank authenticity » to the organisations surveyed, but,
more realistically, to select our population as consistently as possible within a very diverse
sector.2
EURO-THINK TANKS IN THE 25 E.U. MEMBER STATES
Among the 670 'thinking cells’ listed in today’s 25 E.U. Member States by McGann and Weaver
in 2000, this survey focused on those that deal with European affairs in a broad sense. We
shall refer to institutes that analyse political problems related to Europe as a geographic
whole, including international affairs issues, as "Euro-think tanks." We have studied them in
two stages, according to the following distinction, which we will use throughout this report :Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

3

TABLE 1

Euro think tanks‘EURO-SPECIFIC’ RESEARCH CENTERS‘EURO-ORIENTED’ RESEARCH CENTERS

deal primarily with European matters,
 either in general (as does Notre Europe, the Centre
for European Reform in Great Britain or the Centre forEuropean Policy Studies in Brussels)
 or in relation to a sectoral policy (as does IRI in The
Netherlands).

 Europe is a distinct and significant research
programme, studied alongside other issues, as is
the case for many think tanks that specialise ininternational relations (such as the Institute ofInternational Strategic Studies in Lisbon).

Armed with the criteria outlined above, a typology of think tanks is also helpful to analyse thesector, while acknowledging that reality never fits neatly in general categories. Analysts usually
distinguish four categories of think tanks (in particular Weiss, 1992; McGann, Weaver, 2000) :1.

Academic think tanks / universities without
students,

or

what

Weiss

calls

2.

Contract

researchersaresimilarto"analytic

academic think tanks, but differ primarily

organisations", put a premium on high standards

in their sources of funding, which comesof academic research in their staff and production.

essentially

They “examine the entire body of evidence

government agencies.

fromcontractswithavailable, not simply what is consistent withfavoured policy conclusions. In addition, theyhandle their evidence systematically, applying
methods consistently." (Park, 2004)3.

Advocacy

tanks

produce

ideas

and

4.

Political

party

thinks

tanks

"are

recommendations that consistently adhere to aorganised around the issues and platform

particular set of core beliefs or values. "They tendof a political party and are often staffed by

to view their role in the policy making process as

current or former party officials, politicians

winning the war of ideas rather than as aanddisinterested search for the best policies." (Park,

frequently heavily influenced by the needs

2004)

of the party."

party

members.

The

agendaFor practical reasons of time and resources, the survey is limited to the enlarged European
Union. Clearly though, important organisations that exist beyond today’s borders of the E.U.
should be looked at in the future.3 Please note also that this survey, also for practical reasons,does not take into account the many research organisations dedicated to Europe that havebeen created and have disappeared in the past, although such an analysis would most likely
yield interesting lessons for existing bodies. Although limited to existing think tanks dealing
with European policy matters, which headquarters are based in today’s E.U. Member States,
this survey provides, we believe, as useful basis for further research as well as elements ofanalysis that are valid more generally for think tanks in Europe and in the rest of the world.

4

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledisAN EXPLORATORY AND INDEPENDENT SURVEY
The authors are sole responsible for the methodological and content choices made in thisreport. The survey was conducted on behalf of Notre Europe, but in full independence. The
information provided comes from public data provided by the think tanks themselves, inparticular through their websites and annual reports, as well as from individual interviews withrepresentatives from nearly all the organisations analysed. In total, 129 interviews wereconducted throughout Europe, including 87 managers of think tanks, 21 political decisionmakers, 11 academics and 10 journalists (listed in Annex 3). We have provided theopportunity to all the organisations mentioned to check the data published. Nevertheless, it ispossible that some data may have been omitted or may need to be amended, that certainclassification choices will seem debatable, not to mention the fact that part of the information
provided will by nature soon need to be updated. We still hope that this report offers areasonably exhaustive and accurate picture of the sector, albeit exploratory. We invite readers
to share with Notre Europe any amendment they feel is required.
FIVE SECTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY SECTORAL ANALYSIS
The report includes five sections :1. The first puts today’s Euro-think tanks in a historical and theoretical context andunderscores the gap between their potentially very significant role for European
integration and the relative lack of knowledge of their activities.
2. We then give a factual and analytical overview of the Euro-think tank population studied
in order to understand how they work, what topics they research, both horizontally andcountry by country. Annex 1 complements this section by providing a list of the 149 thinktanks surveyed, which detailed description can be found on Notre Europe’s website(www.notre-europe.asso.fr).
3. The viewpoint of the potential recipients of Euro-think tanks’ work as well as observers of
the European policy making process – politicians, journalists and academics – is thenprovided.
4. We subsequently examine Euro-think tanks’ operating environment in order to identify
the main challenges and dilemmas which they currently face.
5. Finally, we outline possible developments for the sector, as well as a few elements offurther research, as our survey could obviously not cover all possible aspects related toour population.

Annex 2 provides an initial overview of think tank networks. Annex 3 provides methodologicalinformation and Annex 4 a list of references. Altogether, these different elements aim to allow
a first structural analysis of the sector, according to the framework provided by Oster (1995).
The objective of this study, which is partly academic and practical in nature, is to allow
European think tank managers, as well as decision-makers and academics interested in such

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled5organisations, to know the sector better. We thus hope to help them identify new ways towork together, to help generate new research projects, and encourage new vocations, as wellas greater dialogue and the spreading of best practices. We thereby also hope to enhance thesector’s contribution to the process of community integration. We indeed believe that thinktanks can contribute to building a more prosperous Europe that innovates and is close to its
citizens.

6

1

These different criteria were checked directly with the organisations surveyed or through their Website. The
table in Annex 1 does not provide all the data collected, which could not be provided in this report for practicalreasons.

2

Several “melting pots of thought” (Féat, 2004) with interesting activities are not covered in our study.
Institutional groups, such as the Scientific Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands (WRR), university
centres, such as the European University Institute in Florence, or those which are only indirectly interested inEuropean questions, like the Fondation Jean Jaures, will nonetheless be mentioned because they havefunctions which are complementary to or in competition with the institutes studied here. We have also
excluded from the study two or three organisations which did not possess a website – a sign of their lack of
capacity to disseminate effectively their research results, one of the two essential elements of think tanks’
work today.

3

For example, the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC) in Bucharest,
the Center for Strategic Studies/21st Century Foundation, also in Bucharest, the Institute for International
Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, or the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The think tanks whichhave chosen to base themselves in Brussels but which have a clear European vocation as opposed to Belgian –such as the European Institute for Asian Studies as opposed to IRRI (the Belgian research institute specialisingin international affairs) – have not been classed as Belgian think tanks, but are considered in a separate
European Union category. We therefore have 26 “country” reports.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

1 European think tanks : limited knowledge, important
stakes

The study of think tanks is a relatively recent discipline, in particular within the European Union. We
draw a parallel here between the academic study of think tanks and their emergence at a European
level (1.1). We then place the study in a historical context (1.2). Finally, we highlight the stakes which
are behind a better understanding of think tanks’ contribution to community decision-making
processes (1.3).

1.1 THE STUDY OF THINK TANKSTANKS IS RECENT, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE
The specific study of independent policy research institutes as political actors is very recent.
Whereas the first book in the United States dedicated specifically to think tanks was published
33 years ago (Dickson, 1971, cited by Stone, 1996), a quick look at our bibliography (Annex3) – as well as references of other studies – shows that nearly everything that has been
published on think tanks is less than eight years of age, apart from isolated studies ofindividual research institutes written in the 1980s.4 A significant proportion of the existing
literature is North American, then British, and focuses therefore on these two geographicalareas, although a few recent publications have made up for this exclusive Anglo-American bias
(Stone, Denham Garnett, 1998; McGann, Weaver, 2000). In any case, if several academics
have investigated think tanks within the European Union (in particular Sherrington, 2000),
and if others have conducted multi-country studies, nobody has yet examined specificallythink tanks that specialise in European matters within the enlarged European Union.
Does this reflect the limited"The lack of attention to think tanks illuminates the biases of social
scientists as much as it reflects the late development and characteristicsof these organisations"influence

of

think

tanks

in

European politics or a lack ofacademicinterest?

Stone(2000a) explains that "the lack of attention to think tanks illuminates the biases of social
scientists as much as it reflects the late development and characteristics of theseorganisations" as think tanks became more visible in the US and Western Europe only after
the mid-1970s, when they became increasingly advocacy and media-oriented. As "theseorganisations were extremely few in number", she adds that specialists had "little cause toaddress these organisations." In the case of Europe, indeed "most of the exclusively EUoriented think tanks only emerged in the 1980s." (Sherrington, 2000) She also contends thatthe difficulty to define and classify think tanks has deterred scholars from accounting for therole of think tanks in politics. However, this argument "is a misconception," replies Stone(1996), who reminds us: "Think tanks have been around for most of this century." Indeed,
several organisations within our sample, such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs
and the Federal Trust in the U.K. were established 85 and 60 years ago respectively. Stoneargues that "what the recent spate of books indicates is that think tanks have beenrediscovered and deemed important" and that "the myth that think tanks are objective andEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled7non-partisan research institutes once lulled many scholars into overlooking their participationin the political sphere."
By contrast, research on the role played by interest groups in the formulation of policies at the
E.U. level is comparatively extensive and diverse (Greenwood 1997; 2003). 5 Similarly, there
has been relatively little research on E.U. think tanks and the role they play in theconstruction of the E.U. compared to the United States. Sherrington (2000), in one of her
several reports on think tanks in the EU, in fact argues that "the extent of think tank activity
at the European Union level has largely been ignored." This survey, although exploratory innature, seeks to contribute to a growing literature on think tanks in line with recent
research 6 :It provides data on recent organisations as well as countries not considered so far.
The approach is comparative, although a rigorous and fully comparative analysis
would require a more systematic look at the political and institutional contexts within
which think tanks operate in each Member State and at the E.U. level.7 The report istherefore also fairly descriptive in nature, as is most of the existing literature on thinktanks in Europe.

Borrowing from the epistemic model, this report also tries to present think tanks inthe wider policy community of European affairs by providing some insights into thinktanks' relations with other European power elites and how they try to influence public
policy at different stages of the policy cycle.

This study also finds its place in the series of recent publications which haveinvestigated the increasingly transnational nature of think tanks’ operations. Whereas
most of the original production focused on think tanks within their national
environment, several recent papers have indeed examined the internationalisation
efforts of think tanks (Stone, 2000a/b; Sherrington, 2000). 8

1.2 THINK TANKS, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HISTORY OF EUROPEANUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The history of European integration is above all a history of ideas. From the original hopes forpost-war European unity shown by resistance fighters in World War II, to Jean Monnet’s idea
for a European Coal and Steel Community, which laid the foundations for the EEC, through to
Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s, the process of integration has always been driven
forward by ideas. Such ideas have been important because often they introduced uniqueexperiments, untested elsewhere in the world. The role of think tanks in this picture is clear.
As promoters of new policy ideas, they have the potential to stimulate debate amongst
European leaders, and publics, about the future shape which the European Union could take.
EXPLAINING POST-WAR THINK TANK GROWTH IN EUROPE
There was a considerable growth in the number of European think tanks in the 20th century.
McGann and Weaver estimated the number in today’s 25 E.U. Member States in 1998 to standat approximately 670. The majority of these were created in the period after World War II.
Since the regime changes in Eastern Europe after 1989 there has been a rapid growth in think
8

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledtank numbers there too. What explains this high level of growth? Of course, a major factor
was the emergence of stable democratic governments in Western Europe in the post-war
period. Think tanks require democracy to function because they need to express their views
freely. Thus, the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Germany, Austria and Italy from 1943
to 1945, the end of dictatorship in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s, and the politicalchanges in Eastern Europe after 1989 allowed think tanks to prosper.
A second important factor is the ever-greater complexity of government in the post-war era.
As the size and functions of the state grew, there was an increasing need for specialist policy
knowledge, which could not always be supplied by traditional civil servants. Think tanks havepartly filled this gap by acting as a source of policy advice to governments. The process of‘contracting out’ of many state functions during the 1980s and 1990s, for example theprivatisation of government agencies, also further increased governments’ dependency on
private and other non-state actors, such as consultants, auditors, think tanks, and otheradvisors, for independent evaluation of policy performance.
A third factor is the increased openness of government in recent decades. More attempts are
now made to engage with civil society groups, for example through consultation exercises atthe policy planning stage. This has increased the chance for think tanks to influence
government thinking. Such a trend has been visible in the Member States and in Brussels,
where the European Commission has pursued an active policy of including civil society andother groups, such as NGOs and think tanks, in decision-making.
THINK TANKS’ EUROPEAN ‘TRANSNATIONALISATION’
The think tanks which were created in the early part of the 20th century were essentiallynational research institutes.9 Their names denoted in many ways an international outlook—for
example, the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Britain (1920) or the Kiel Institute forWorld Economics in Germany (1914)–but their main locus of activity was the nation-state andits place in the world alongside other nation-states. This situation probably pertained for thinktanks until the 1970s. Although there were a small number of ‘regional’ think tanks created in
the years immediately after the war which sought to both examine and promote moves
toward European integration–e.g. Federal Trust (1945),

Institut für europäische Politik(1959), Istituto Affari Internazionali (1965)—very few organisations had developed links which
went beyond their national borders.
In order to explain why European think tanks’ primary research focus and main audiences
became increasingly ‘transnationalised’ from the 1970s onwards, we need to examine twoquestions: the growing importance of international policy-making fora and the growth in E.U.
power and competences.
First, public policy is increasingly being determined by governments acting together withininternational fora, such as the WTO, the UN, the G8, or indeed the E.U. This is one element of
the process of globalisation. Because think tanks generally seek to influence centres ofdecision-making power, as these fora grew in status, it was logical that think tank activities
should have migrated there. Many think tanks now also target international, in addition toEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled9national, decision-makers: i.e. diplomats, national politicians and policy experts working at
this level, and civil servants in supranational or intergovernmental organisations.10 The shift in
focus made by think tanks to this level is of course merely one example of the recent, moregeneral expansion of the international non-profit sector on the international scene, a process
which has led to a similarly rapid growth in NGOs and other lobbying groups operating here.
There

are

also

wider

structural

factors

which

have

facilitatedthisprocessoftransnationalisation. For example, the reduction in journey times and improved transport links
means that people can easily cross borders to attend meetings, seminars and conferences.
The development of information technology has had a major impact too, for example byenabling research and project collaboration to take place via e-mail.
This process of the transnationalisation of think tank work has been more pronounced inEurope than elsewhere because of the development of the European Union. This has createdan environment of multi-level governance where decisions are increasingly taken between—
rather than just by—governments within the E.U. institutions and where there are multiple
opportunities for think tanks seeking to influence decision-makers. This process is best
understood by reference to the impact which external political and economic events havealways had on think tank development in the 20th century—whether at the national or global
level. For example, think tanks studying international affairs first emerged in the 1920s at atime when Europe’s governments were concerned about the stability of the international
order. Think tanks studying global disarmament, peace and strategic questions emerged
during the Cold War. In the UK, free market, ‘advocacy’ think tanks, such as the Institute of
Economic Affairs (1955) and Centre for Policy Studies (1974), grew in importance only when
Britain’s governing elite lost faith in Keynesianism in the 1970s.11 Therefore, likewise for theEuro-specific think tanks, these grew in number only from the mid-1980s onwards as thepower of the European Community grew (and the second category think tanks also began at
this stage to focus much more on European issues). It should come as no surprise that thinktanks studying European and E.U. questions grew in numbers as the European Union’s powers
and competences expanded from the mid-1980s onwards.
There are, however, other factors which explain transnationalisation within the E.U. context.
One is the question of funding. The availability of European funding for think tanks which
engage in research partnerships with think tanks and other organisations across the Union has
driven forward greater collaboration in this sector. (This was reported by think tank directors
and will be explored in Section 4). Another factor is the increased demand by actors in thedomestic political scene, especially governments, for European or internationally oriented
research. This is also pushing them to collaborate more, as it is necessary to have input fromresearchers in other countries for a balanced result. A third reason is competition. Think tanks
can enhance their status within the domestic political scene by engaging with international
policy elites. It wins them respect from government and increases the perception that they
are influential.

10 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledTHE BRUSSELS DECISION-MAKING SCENE : AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THINK TANKS
CEPS, which was founded in 1983, is one of the earliest examples in Brussels of a think tankorienting itself exclusively towards E.U. decision-makers, although there are also examples at
the national level (e.g. IEEP, 1980). The growth in this new type of think tank continued
steadily throughout the 1980s. However, as section 2.1.2 will show, the largest growth in
think tanks working on E.U. issues came in the 1990s, during a period of major institutional
and political reform, and economic and monetary integration. As Sherrington (2000) explains,
the nature of decision-making in Brussels makes it easier for think tanks to operate at a E.U.
level. Because E.U. power structures are diffuse (European Commission, Council of Ministers,
European Parliament), multiple ‘entry points’ exist for think tanks and interest groups wishing
to exert influence on decision-makers. Also, it is part of the Commission’s strategy to makethe process of policy consultation as open and participatory as possible. This ‘neo-pluralist’
approach of actively encouraging interest group participation in policy-making has given thinktanks both greater access to policy-makers, and has legitimised their presence in the Brussels
arena.
EXAMINING THE PAST INFLUENCE OF THINK TANKS AND OTHER POLICY EXPERTS ON E.U. POLICY
Think tanks have certainly had an impact on E.U. policy-making in the past, alongside othergroups of policy experts who have lobbied for change, although the extent of this impact isdifficult to measure. Sherrington (2000), in her analysis of E.U. think tanks, identifies
important cases where such organisations have helped shape future E.U. policy. For example,
the Kangaroo Group, a once influential lobby group ‘set up to promote the four founding
principles of the EU, free movement of goods, services, persons and capital,’ helped build up
momentum for the re-launch of the EC in the 1980s, providing impetus for the 1985 White
Paper on Completion of the Internal Market. Elements of CEPS’ 1988 study on Economic andMonetary Union were included in the Delors Report published the next year. The Forward
Studies Unit – the Commission’s own internal ‘think tank’’ now known as the Group of Policy
Advisers – had a major input into the 1993 White Paper on Industrial Policy. The Belgian
Presidency also used its report on Europe 2000 as the basis for the White Paper on Growth,Competitiveness and Employment, published in 1993.
Of course, out of the three cases listed here, only CEPS is an independent think tank of thetype we will include in our survey. However, the examples do indicate how leading thinktanks, or groups of experts working closely with the Commission, can influence the directionof E.U. policy.

1.3 THINK TANKS’ ROLE IN E.U. DECISION-MAKING AND CONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION PROCESSES IS POTENTIALLYPOTENTIALLY IMPORTANT
Beyond the contribution of specific individuals and interest groups to the construction of a
unified Europe, the specific role of think tanks deserves, we believe, closer examination as
think tanks have a potentially important role to play in helping the formulation of public
policies, in promoting healthy political and democratic practices within Europe, and incontributing to Europe’s intellectual and cultural diplomatic efforts. As the title of the report

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 11

suggests, one of its objectives is indeed to understand whether, and to what extent, Eurothink tanks live up to what can be expected of them.
THINK TANKS’IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IS UNCERTAIN
Before going into the three types of roles just outlined, it is important to stress that it is notpossible to determine with any degree of certainty what impact think tanks have on decisionmaking processes. This is the conclusion which several authors have reached, in contradiction
with think tanks which often include particular cases of supposed influence on the political
agenda and policy alternatives in their annual reports.12
In fact, Abelson (2002) argues in Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public
Policy Institutes, that it is "onerous" and "notoriously difficult" to determine "the extent towhich think tanks have influenced public opinion and public policy." Furthermore, answering
the question "do think tanks matter ?" is even more difficult because of the institutional
differences from one country to another and the diversity of think tanks and strategies used.
Abelson cites two major methodological barriers that prevent us from determining how
influential think tanks may be, the difficulty to measure policy influence and to trace the originof an idea to a particular individual or organisation. He concludes, "It may be more
appropriate to discuss the relevance of think tanks in the policy-making process than to
speculate about how much policy influence they wield."
One can add to this note of caution that, even if academics and think tanks provide on
occasion specific instances of influential activities, cases of misleading analysis or erroneousrecommendations are seldom mentioned, except when they are particularly blatant, as was
the case when several Western think tanks recently tried to demonstrate the urgency of amilitary attack against Iraq.13
THE

DIFFICULTY TO MEASURE

THEIR IMPACT DOES NOTCONTRADICT THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR POTENTIAL

CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES…

Beyond such methodological difficulties, many academic studies have demonstrated thetheoretical relevance of think tanks for democratic and healthy decision making processes. As
aptly captured by Wallace (1998), "think tanks deal in 'soft power'—the term coined by Nye(2000)—in shaping policy agendas, in challenging the language and terminology of publicdebate, in redefining the mental maps of policy-makers. These are all subtle processes, theworkings of which are harder to trace than the direct impact of hard political bargaining, butwhich set the terms within which political bargaining is conducted in modern politicalsystems." McGann, Weaver (2000) in fact list six important roles which think tanks usuallyplay in relation to policy formulation: they carry out "basic research on policy problems andpolicy solutions"; they provide "advice on immediate policy concerns that are being consideredby government officials"; they evaluate government programs, they "serve as facilitators of
issue networks and the exchange of ideas"; they "serve as suppliers of personnel togovernment and as a place for politicians and policy-makers who are out of power to recharge
their batteries"; and they help interpret "policies and current events for the electronic andprint media."

12 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledKingdon (1984) himself highlighted the role played by academics, researchers, andconsultants in promoting new issues onto the agenda, and more importantly, in offering a
range of alternatives to decision-makers. He described in particular how academics andresearchers were essential in laying the groundwork for deregulation in different economic
sectors. What Kingdon also found was that "academics might well affect the alternatives morethan governmental agendas" over the long run. As Wallace (1998) concludes, "new issues
crowd onto the public agenda (…), on which generalist policy-makers must turn to thecontending recommendations of expert advisors before they can grasp the choices to be
made. The political demand for the services, which think tanks can offer is thus likely toincrease further, in all highly developed industrial and post-industrial societies. It is therefore
likely that the supply of institutionalised expertise, packaged in different ways to fit therequirements of political debate and policy-makers will continue to grow in response."… TO A DEMOCRATIC DEBATE …
As highlighted again by McGann and Weaver in Think Tanks and Civil Societies (2000; seealso Smith, 1991), think tanks have the "potential to provide an important element of what is
known as civil society or the third sector," which contribution to democratisation, howeverdifficult to measure, is also widely recognised. McGann and Weaver insist: "It is our contention
that think tanks are an integral part of the civil society and serve as an important catalyst forideas and action in emerging and advanced democracies around the world." Can the very clear
case Greenwood (2003) makes about interest groups' contribution to E.U. decision-making
institutions to help them with devising policies and for "taking issues to the doors of Member
State governments and to everyday citizens" be extended to E.U. think tanks ?
More generally, however uncertain their impact, think tanks presumably contribute to thelivelihood of democratic debates. To use a common expression, they contribute to the‘marketplace for ideas’. In this respect, the greater the number of think tanks, the greater
competition between them and with other institutions responsible for formulating plans andpolitical strategies. This should, in principle, stimulate the intellectual production regarding
public policies. Without determining now what is think tanks’ capacity to renew politicalalternatives and agendas, one can note that most think tanks make explicit their ambition to
innovate intellectually. As Wallace (1998) underlines, think tanks have in principle two
fundamental roles: "the questioning of the conventional wisdom" and "the formulation anddissemination of alternative concepts and policy agendas." Hopefully, think tanks’ desire tochallenge prevailing frameworks, to "think outside the box", to work "at the 'cutting-edge' ofEuropean policy-making" (EPC), to "think ahead for Europe" (CEPS), to encourage politicians
to act boldly14 helps fight political apathy and conformity of ideas that can damage the healthof our democracies. As Sunstein (2003) explains in Why Societies Need Dissent, actors suchas think tanks have, potentially, a crucial role to play in making freedom of speech andthought real and in promoting dissidence and true democracy.
Finally, think tanks' relevance is perhaps further justified by the so-called 'democratic deficit'
between E.U. institutions and E.U. citizens, a common preoccupation in E.U. politics. Without
initiating a detailed discussion of this concept, better described elsewhere (e.g. Baun, 1996;

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 13

Dinan, 1999; McCormick, 2002), the lack of public accountability in the Union clearly affects
the operations of E.U. think tanks that follow European affairs. Many people see the Union as
distant, believe that important decisions are taken behind 'closed doors', and anticipate that
their ability to influence and supervise E.U. institutions will be further threatened by theaccession of ever more Member States and the transfer of further elements of nationalsovereignty to the E.U. level. As we shall see, many think tanks believe they have a role toplay in this area.
… AND TO MEMBER STATES AND THE E.U.’S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
Think tanks’ potential contribution can also be seen in the context of a Union of states basedon negotiation and compromise, and which seek to play a greater international role. A
country’s 'soft power' is, in principle, enhanced if it hosts a thriving think tank sector. Pierre
Lepetit, Executive Director of IFRI in Paris (Institut Français des Relations Internationales)
argues: "An international marketplace of ideas on public policies, where competition is now
intense, is emerging." (Gadault, 2004)15 As the exchange of ideas and political options fromone country to another is presumably facilitated by the same mechanisms that stimulate
globalisation, it is legitimate to speculate that political recommendations also have an
increasing impact beyond their country of origin. Considering the current domination of NorthAmerican think tanks on the international scene, this is a significant issue for the Union and its
Member States.
Generally speaking, think tanks have therefore the potential to engage citizens in varied andconcrete ways in the management of society. They can contribute, at least in theory, to asustainable and democratic community construction process. In fact, this is why one of ourselection criterion is that think tanks should aim to contribute to the public good. It is indeed acommon aspiration of all think tanks, albeit often implicit, as we shall see in Section 2.1.3.16
Last but not least, this perspective warrants, in our opinion, a closer examination of who thinktanks are and how they work, in order to understand whether they in fact live up to theirinherent promise. This is what we shall do in the following section.

4

James Allen Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, New York: The Free
Press, 1991. R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing Work of Think Tanks", in PS: Political Science and Politics, XXII(3), September 1989. Previous studies focused on specific cases, such as D.T. Critchlow, The Brookings
Institution, 1916-52: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society, Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press.
The bulk dates back however essentially to the last decade, e.g. Jeffrey Telgarsky et Makiko Ueno, eds. Think
Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice, Washington DC: The Urban Institute, 1996; Richard
Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter Revolution, 1931-1983, London:
Harper Collins U.K., 1994.

5

Research on interest groups is relatively rich, including sociological analyses (symbolic functions of a group,mobilisation of resources), psychological (what members seek in taking part in political activities, how single
issue groups can motivate members beyond any other issue...), and political (relations between the state andcivil society organisations, and what role groups play in the decision making process).

6

For an overview of studies of think tanks, see Abelson (2002, pp.49-57). He explains how such studies havebeen organised around three schools of thought: elitist, pluralist, and epistemic communities.

7

Sherrington (2000) provides such an E.U.-wide analysis. The articles published in McGann, Weaver (2000) andStone, Denham, Garnett (1998) also put think tanks and their political and institutional context into
perspective.

14 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
8

As Stone stresses: "It is increasingly evident that some think tanks have become global policy actors or, at thevery least, policy informants. Many think tanks are building regional and international networks. While thinktank networks are not new, over the past two decades the scale and density of exchange within these
networks has mounted significantly and extended from North American and European institutes to include amore globally diverse range of organisations." (Stone, 2000a) As we will see, this is indeed an important
aspect of E.U. think tank developments.

9

Day refers to these think tanks as the ‘establishment think tanks’.

10

A good example of a truly transnational organisation is the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1958),
which has offices in London, Washington and Singapore and whose analysis of ‘political-military conflicts’ isaimed at international policy-makers. It members are based in more than 100 countries.

11

This is a typical case of the chicken and egg problem: did these think tanks cause the change in government
policy or did they simply provide ex-post intellectual legitimacy for Thatcher’s policies? The problem is thatthese think tanks would like to claim credit for these changes but it is difficult to assess their impact.

12

Think tanks of course like to take credit for major changes in government policy, such as the one seen in the
UK in the 1980s. However, there is a legitimate debate about whether think tanks’ ideas are actually thecatalyst for policy changes, or whether they simply “piggy-back” on more general changes in the intellectual
climate (cf. for instance Cockett (1994), Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic CounterRevolution 1931-1983, and Denham & Garnett (1988), British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion, on theinfluence of the free-market think tanks in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s). A third way of interpreting theirinfluence – and one which perhaps combines these two positions – is to argue that think tanks play animportant role in changing the “climate of opinion” in national political debates. Exactly how they achieve thisis hard to measure, but could involve coverage in the media of their ideas and politicians reading their work.
Although this process may take many years before it comes to fruition, it may nonetheless be a necessary
precondition for a paradigmatic shift in government policy-making, such as that seen in the UK after 1979.

13

Numerous think tanks point out that their ideas, when they are taken up, are rarely attributed since, according
to them, politicians do not like to admit that they have had to rely on the help of outside researchers for theirideas. As Kingdon emphasizes, the genealogy of a policy idea is difficult to determine.

14

E.g. the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness wants "politicians to be bold and to take more effective
action".

15

Besides, IFRI has coined the term “intellectual diplomacy” to underline its contribution to France’s intellectual
and international political influence. This is also a role highlighted by other research centres. Gaudault (2004),
in support of the sector, argues that “these research institutes specialising in international relations anddefence are an essential part of the diplomatic influence of a country and of its capacity to influence decisions
taken in large international organisations.”

16

Many in fact state explicitly that the wish to contribute to the “general interest of Europe” (e.g. see Website of
the Institut Choiseul in France).

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 15

2 State of play : an overview of Europe-focused think tanks
in the E.U. and E.U. Member States

This section summarises the information collected – presented in detail on Notre Europe’s website first through an overview of the E.U. situation (2.1), then by looking at the situation in individual E.U.
Member States (2.2) and what is specific about the ten new Member States (2.3). We finally draw a few
preliminary conclusions (2.4).

2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATIONSITUATION IN THE EU
The analysis provided in this section is based on the population of think tanks selected for thisreport. It is therefore a snapshot view, based on our own, somewhat subjective criteria. The
Case Study on the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung illustrates how the reality of think tanks that deal
with European policy matters is not straightforward. Although we acknowledge the limitationsof such an exercise and that it is probably impossible to achieve totally uniform collection andpresentation of data, we also believe that the categories and trends identified here will be ofuse to readers.

2.1.1 KEY FACTS
Our survey population of EU-focused think tanks in the 25 member states and in Brussels ispresented in full on Notre Europe’s website. We have looked at 149 think tanks in the E.U.
currently working on European issues. A quarter (36) are ‘Euro-specific’, the remaining 113‘Euro-oriented’ think tanks, as we call them, work on other issues besides Europe.
Table 2 below presents an overview of our findings. Germany has the largest number of thinktanks operating in this sector : 23, including 4 Euro-specific. This reflects the fact that
Germany has more think tanks in general than any other European country, a function of its
population size and its greater think tank “tradition”. It also has some of the largest
organisations with an average of 48.5 researchers per institute. The U.K. comes second with
16 (7 Euro-specific), and third is Austria, with 11 (3 Euro-specific), despite its smaller
population (8.1m). We identified 10 EU/Brussels-based think tanks (7 Euro-specific), which wetreated separately from Belgian organisations. Greece (population 10.6m) has 8 Euro-thinktanks, i.e. more than France (7) and Italy (7). As the country reports indicate, these figures ofcourse do not tell everything (Section 2.2).
Looking at staff figures – with due caution considering their relative lack of precision and thefact that not all recorded researchers always work on European policy issues – it would appear
that Denmark, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Poland have larger-than-average research teams(E.U. average: 18). Euro-specific think tanks, which have appeared mostly in the last 20 years,
tend to be younger than Euro-oriented think tanks. At the other end, countries such as Portugal,
Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have relatively small
teams of researchers. Overall, think tank teams in Brussels are also relatively small.
16 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledTABLE 2

Overview of the Euro-oriented think tanks surveyed
Member State

No. of think

No. Eurospecific‘Euro-think tank’surveyed

think

staff

tanks

tanks

Total number of

Total no.of

researchers

Av. no.
staff

Average no.

Country

permanent in-

population

house

(m)

researchers

identified

Nos. by McGann & Weaver type*aca: academic think tankadv: advocacy tankcon: contract researcher
par: party think tank

EU. Brussels

10

7

175

100

17.5

10

-

4 aca

4 adv

Austria

11

3

348

271

31.5

24.5

8.1

6 aca

5 con

Belgium

2

0

34

19

17

9.5

10.3

2 aca

Cyprus

3

1

68

15

22.5

5

0.78

1 aca

2 adv

Czech Rep.

5

1

97

37 (in 4 TT)

19.5

9

10.3

2 aca

3 adv

1 aca

Denmark

1

0

118

78

118

78

5.3

Estonia4

1

61

22 (in 3 TT)

15

7

1.4

2 adv

2 con

1 con

Finland60

141 (in 5 TT)

72 (5 TT)

28

14.5

5.2

2 aca

France

7

5

145

82

21

12

58.8

1 aca

4 adv

2 con

Germany23

41925 (20 TT)

1065 (22 TT)

96

48.5

82.1

17 aca

1 adv

2 con

Great Britain167

366 (14 TT)

175 (14 TT)

23

11

59.7

5 aca

6 adv

5 con

Greece83143 (5 TT)

Ap. 77 (5 TT)

28.5

15.5

10.6

5 aca

3 adv

2 aca

5

0

140 (4 TT)

90 (4 TT)

35

22.5

10.0

Ireland

2

1

93

42

46.5

21

3.8

Italy

7

0

160

115

23

16.5

57.7

6 aca

1 con

1 con

Latvia

5

1

105

55

21

11

2.3

1 aca

3 adv

1 con

Lithuania

40

69 (3 TT)

48

23

12

3.6

1 aca

1 adv

1 con

Luxembourg

See country reports

0.4

-

Malta

See country reports

0.4-

Netherlands

4

1

90

57

22

14

15.9

2 aca

2 con

Poland

6

0

236

173

39

29

38.7

4 aca

2 adv

2

0

26

18

13

9

10.0

2 aca

5

0

49 (4 TT)

27

12

6.75

5.4

4 aca

Slovenia

1

0

23

17

23

17

2.0

Spain

7

0

155

55 (6 TT)

22

9

39.5

1 con
2 aca

Sweden

5

1

183

74

36.5

15

8.7

E.U. total

149

36

4950 (139 TT)

2784 (140 TT)

31.5

18

453

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 17

71

3 par

3 con
1 adv

Portugal

1 aca/con

4 adv

Hungary

Slovakia*See introduction
for definition of
McGann categories

1 aca/con

1 adv
2 par
1 aca/con
2 aca/adv
37

26

5 par
5 other

CASE STUDY

The case of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung : To what extent can German foundations be considered thinktanks?
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is the SPD’s political foundation (German socialist party). There are seven politicalfoundations in Germany: the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), close to the
CDU, the Hans-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), close to the CSU, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), close to the
FPD, the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (HBS), close to the DGB, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS), linked to the Greens,and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RSL), affiliated to the PDS. The two largest are the FES and the KAS, bothcreated in the 1960s. The two most recent are the HBS (1996) and the RSL (1998).
The activities of the FES can be grouped in three concentric circles : international activities, political training, andscientific research. It also offers a scholarship programme and seminars for German and foreign students andacademics.
Nearly half of the Foundation’s current expenditures are dedicated to international activities. The FES has
operations in developing countries aimed at promoting peace and understanding between nations, and, within
partner countries, at furthering the democratisation of State and social institutions, strengthening civil society,improving political, economic, and social conditions, and enforcing human rights. To this end, the FES has offices
in 70 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East, and Latin America. Furthermore, some 70 associated workers
oversee—with the help of local recruits—political and social development projects. Its international activities alsoseek to promote international dialogue. The FES thus has offices in 33 western and eastern European countries,
CIS countries, as well as the United States and Japan. There the FES promotes dialogue between democratic
forces in order to balance conflicting interests and formulate political options. In order to fulfil its various missions,
it works in cooperation with different partners from civil society (unions, political parties, training and research
institutes, administrations, municipalities).
Political training is the second area of the Foundation’s activities. The objective is to help citizens from theGerman Federal Republic to react to changes in society and thereby to allow them to take part actively andcritically to the political life of their country.
Finally, the FES has research and consulting activities. These are led by its teams of analysts on the economy,
new technologies, employment and social policy, as well as contemporary history. It has a total of 60 permanent
researchers and 40 temporary researchers.
Overall, only 10 to 15 per cent (20 per cent maximum) of its budget is thus allocated to research and analysis
activities similar to other think tanks’ activities. In this third type of activitiy, 20 to 25 per cent, in general, of its
research efforts focus on Europe. The FES is also interested in Germany’s role in the European Union and to theimpact of the E.U. on Germany. It also has research projects on the E.U.’s foreign policy, on central and eastern
Europe, and on the Union’s policy-making process. This share is increasing though, because of the ever greater
importance of the European dimension for topics of interest to the FES. Its various publications, analyses andpolicy options, devised through projects, seminars, conferences and debates, are made available to a wide
audience of political, economic and scientific experts, as well as interested citizens. It is thus common to consider
that the research activities of the FES justify considering it in part as a think tank.
However, it is also important to stress through this example how German political foundations are not just thinktanks. Think tank activities, although performed internally, are in fact secondary for them. The funding theyreceive from federal and regional ministries must be allocated in priority to activities such as political training andthe promotion of democracy in developing countries. Their think tank work should therefore neither be ignored,
nor overestimated.

18 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledIn some countries, we were also able to collect budgetary information. This information
revealed again that Germany is an exception on the European think tank scene : outside
foundations, which budgets are often ten times larger but which spending is not only on thinktank activities, the average budget of German think tanks in our survey was €8.9m. By
comparison, the average budget of Euro-think tanks in other countries is much smaller: forexample, Austria: €2.2m; France: €2.3m; UK: €3.9m; Sweden: €3.3m.17
Finally, the table also presents the numbers of think tanks in each of the four McGann andWeaver categories. Putting each think tank into just one of these categories proved difficult
because many think tanks display the characteristics of several categories. We can see that
overall academic-type think tanks, typical of earlier American tanks such as the Brookings
Institution and the Hoover Institute, seem to dominate. Then come advocacy tanks andcontract researchers. There are few party-affiliated independent research institutes on
European matters. Most countries have a mix of the first three types : academic, advocacy
and contract research. Germany and Spain have a few party think tanks. Countries such as
Germany, Austria and Sweden tend to have higher numbers of academic and contract
research think tanks, and relatively few advocacy tanks. The U.K. and Brussels have larger
numbers of advocacy tanks. This reveals an important difference between the Anglo-American
think tank model – which also seems to have spread to Brussels – which is more typicallyadvocacy-oriented, and the traditional model in continental Europe of an academic-typeresearch institute.
The number of advocacy tanks seems to be increasing though : academic think tanks were on
average created 25 years ago, contract research organisations 23 years ago, and advocacy
tanks 16 years ago. While this average hides large differences, it indicates a trend that, if
confirmed, would be similar to the U.S. situation since the early 1950s, as we shall explore
more fully in Section 4.2.1.

2.1.2 WHY AND WHEN WERE THEY
THEY CREATED ?
The most common reasons cited by the Euro-specific think tanks for their creation in the firstplace are :To help prepare a country for its accession to the E.U.



A government initiative to improve the level of analysis of E.U. policy in a country.



To provide a forum for the analysis of a country’s position within the E.U. (and/or its
relationship with it regional neighbours).

To examine a specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy).

To enhance the quality of debate on European issues.



To create a platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe.

To provide support to European integration (or, more rarely, to oppose it).

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 19



To promote economic reform in the E.U.;

To promote interest from the corporate sector in E.U. political affairs.18

Many think tanks were set up in anticipation of a country’s accession to the EU, or to study acountry’s position within the Union and the impact of E.U. policies on that country. This is best
explained by the fact that all the nationally based institutes, i.e. the majority of thosesurveyed, need a domestic raison d’être and have to be seen as relevant by their own publics
and policy-makers. Therefore they naturally focus on E.U. issues from a domestic
perspective.19 The table below shows the growth in the number of Euro-specific think tanks
created in each decade of the post-war period in the 25 Member States.
The growth seen in the 1980s – 10 new think tanks – was visible for three distinct types of'thinking cells' : (1) new institutes focusing on expanding areas of EC competence (e.g. CEPR,
1983, economic policy ; IEEP, 1980, environmental policy; OSE, 1984, social policy) ;(2) think tanks seeking to join the steadily increasing number of interest groups present inBrussels (e.g. CEPS, 1983) ; and (3) institutes linked to their country’s entry to the EC (e.g.
EKEME, 1980 in Greece; the Institute for European Studies, 20 1989 in Finland).
TABLE 3Euro-specific think tanks : creation periods

DecadeThink tanks established *

1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000-04

1
1
1
2
10
24
6

* i.e. only the first tier of think tanks covered in our survey that are dedicated toEuropean policy issues. Figures only from 1989-90 for New Member States in

Eastern Europe. These figures do not include think tanks which have disappeared,
although where a think tank is the result of a merger of two or more previous
institutes, the former institute – if it was Euro-specific – has been included.

This sudden growth turned into an outright explosion in the 1990s. Three main factors explain
this. First, the democratic transition in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s created an entirely
new political environment, which enabled think tanks there, for the first time since the war, to
set up without fear of hindrance from the state. 21 A second factor was the Nordic and Austrian
accessions in 1995. This provided a spur for new think tanks in these countries which could
explore and explain accession challenges and other E.U. themes, particularly in the immediate
post-accession period (e.g. Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, 1996; SIEPS in
Sweden, 2002). The third, and perhaps most important factor, already mentioned in section
1.2, was the considerable growth in the power and competences of the E.U. At each newstage in the development of the E.U.’s policy competences – the Single European Act (1986)

20 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledleading to the Single Market in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Economic and Monetary
Union, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) – think tanks, along with policy elites and interest
groups, became increasingly interested in E.U. policies. This is clear for instance in France,
where five Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1990s, but also in Britain andGermany.22 The growth in the legislative power of the E.U. also explains the rapid growth inEuro-specific think tanks in Brussels during both the 1990s and early 2000s (five in total23).

2.1.3 MISSIONS
Missions clearly evolve with time. Today (see Figure 1 below), thinks tanks that deal with
European affairs aim to, in order of priority :Promote better policy making through the spread of "best practices", "the practicalapplication of research results", the promotion of "rationality in politics" and "decisions
based on better analysis." CEPS's dedication to "producing sound policy researchleading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today" is an exampleof this type of mission.



Increase the level of awareness and involvement of citizens in politics, by "informing
the public and other actors", "promoting better understanding", "fostering publicdebate", "improving the quality of the debate", "promoting participation of the publicin the policy process", and more generally fostering "discussion." Europe 2020 inFrance or www.policy.lv in Latvia illustrate this type of approach. IFRI in Paris also
wants to "structure the debate on international questions and contribute to the
expansion of an informed and responsible society."Assist policy-makers in their work, usually through contacts with academics, and byproviding a platform, "interface" or forum for discussion with experts, and throughservices such as training. Germany has a relatively larger share of such institutes :"Officially, the Stiftungen's main mission is to engage in what the Germans call'politische Bildungsarbeit', a concept covering a wide range of political training
activities generally targeting 'opinion-formers' and other citizens with an active
political interest." (European Voice, 1998a)

Promote the general interest : a significant share of the organisations surveyed havethe ambition to contribute to "solving society's problems", for instance through "abetter environment," security, peace, and conflict prevention, economic freedom,democracy,development,

multilateralism,orsocialjustice.

The

StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute and the Austrian Sustainable Europe ResearchInstitute, which aims “to develop the concept of environmental space and show ways
to sustainability”, are examples of this type of mission.
Support the E.U. project, in general or in relation to their own country’s integration.



A few specifically mention other communities they wish to cater for, in particular thebusiness community (through contacts with decision-makers), academia (researchoutlet, platform, etc.), and NGOs (information, analysis).
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 21

FIGURE 1

Think tanks stated mission – EU 25

Support the EU
integration
13,7%

Promote better
policy making
24,6%

Promote thegeneral interest
13,7%Increaseawareness andinvolvement of
citizens
22,2%

Provide services toother communities
6%

Provide support
specifically forpolicy makers
19,8%

The previous and following pie charts present the different categories of stated missions. They
do not reflect think tanks' actual research production, but what their claimed ambitions are.
These categories, although somewhat subjective, cover all think tanks' stated missions apartfrom a few exceptions. Clearly some think tanks declare more than one type of mission; wehave counted these accordingly and the figures below do not indicate the relative numbers of
think tanks that have a particular mission, but the relative number of times a particular timeof mission appears in think tanks' public statements.
Several intra-European differences can be identified within this general framework, inparticular a tendency toward more advocacy in the former E.U. 15 than in the Member Statesthat recently joined the Union. In the former E.U. 15, think tanks seek to support decisionmaking in a creative, proactive way, in particular by advocating specific policies or promoting
a particular approach dealing with a specific problem, while think tanks in the new Central andEastern European Member States tend to concentrate more on providing information andoffering practical assistance. Examples of these two trends are the Institute for the Study ofInternational Politics (ISPI) in Italy on the one hand and the Public Policy Centre Providus in
Latvia or the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland, on the other hand. Similarly, research
institutes interpret more often their role as “orienting the action” in Member States with anolder and more diversified think tank population, such as the founding E.U. Member States.
IWG Bonn for instance "tries, through the advice it gives, to orient the public policy choices ina free market direction." Think tanks show a greater inclination toward providing basic
expertise and support for policy-makers in the new Member States that are confronted withthe multiple new challenges of European integration.

22 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

FIGURE 2

Think tanks stated mission – Former EU 15

Support EU
integration
14,5%

Promote better
policy making
24,5%

Promote thegeneral interest
18,3%

Increaseawareness andinvolvement of
citizens
18,3%

Provide support
specifically forpolicy makers
19,1%

Provide services toother communities
5,3%

FIGURE 3

Think tanks stated mission – New Members states

Support EU
integration
8,7%
Promote thegeneral interest
19,6%Promote better
policy making
19,6%Provide support
specifically forpolicy makers
17,4%
Increaseawareness andinvolvement of
citizens
28,2%

Provide services toother communities
6,5%

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 23

2.1.4 POLICY RESEARCH TOPICSTOPICS
Within their broad mission, some 54 per cent of the organisations surveyed are either multidisciplinary think tanks dedicated to Europe without any specific focus (such as Notre Europe
in France or the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels) or multi-issue institutes (i.e.
concentrating on three or more research topics, such as ELIAMEP in Athens or the Instituto
Elcano in Madrid). 46 per cent can be considered single-issue or specialised think tanks, even
within a broad topic, such as E.U. macroeconomic policy in the case of the forthcoming
European Centre for International Economics (EU) or the environment for the Institute forEuropean Environmental Policy (UK).
In order to describe more precisely which research topics E.U. think tanks concentrate on,
fifteen ad hoc categories were defined on the basis of the interviews conducted and theinformation encountered on the think tanks’ websites : 24Constitutional affairs (including Community law, European constitution, process ofEuropean construction)25



Enlargement

External relations and trade policySecurity and defence

Economic, financial and monetary policyEnvironmental policySocial policyDevelopment policy and human rights

Cohesion policy and regional affairsIndustrial policyCultural and educational policyTransport policyInformation society and technological development

Reflection on the respective national role or interests within the community26



Others

At first glance, the topics listed correspond, broadly speaking but with significant differences,to policy areas of the E.U. Those familiar with European 'brain boxes' will be aware thoughthat issues such as foreign policy or security and defence receive far more attention than
could be justified simply in terms of E.U. competencies and legislative activity. Is this a signthat European think tanks go beyond simple policy analysis and seek to provide long-term
policy options for the future of the Union? We do not have an answer to this question, but wehave tried to analyse the relative incidence of every topic by measuring their recurrence

24 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledamong the think tanks surveyed (a more precise analysis would require looking at the actual
production of think tanks rather than simply declared intentions).
The two most important areas of research are economic, financial and monetary policy andexternal relations. They are considered core areas of research by more than 35 per cent and30 per cent of think tanks respectively. Three subjects follow: enlargement (26.3 per cent),
constitutional affairs (23.3 per cent) and national roles (24.8 per cent). A strong focus onnational interests within the E.U. indeed characterises much of E.U. research, which explains
to some extent why over 95 per cent of think tank researchers are based not in Brussels but
in the Member States. Figure 4 below shows the areas of research which European think tanks
declare concentrating on.
FIGURE 4

Areas of research which European think tanks declare concentrating on (%)
50
45
40
35
EU25
Former EU15

30

New member states

25
20
15
10
5

.&
fin
Ec
o.

rs
th
e
O

Ex
te
r

m
on
.

po
l.
na
lr
el
at
io
ns
En
l
ar
N
at
ge
io
m
na
en
lr
t
ol
e/
C
on
in
te
st
re
itu
st
tio
na
Se
la
ffa
cu
irs
rit
y
&
de
fe
ns
e
So
ci
En
a
lp
vi
ro
ol
D
nm
.
ev
en
el
ta
op
lp
C
m
oh
ol
en
.
es
tp
io
o
n
l.
&
&
re
H
R
gi
on
al
af
fa
irs
In
du
st
ria
lp
ol
.
C
ul
tu
I&
re
T
&
Ed
uc
at
io
Tr
n
an
sp
or
tp
ol
.

0

Distinguishing the ten new E.U. member countries from their peers provides further insights.
Clearly, enlargement has been the priority and a major area of concentration (52.5 per cent)for research institutes in acceding Member States, whereas constitutional matters receive far
more attention in the former E.U. 15 (30 per cent). Finally, research into a country's nationalrole and interests within the E.U. is particularly strong in the new Member States, presumably
as a consequence of their efforts to make the most of accession negotiations. It is also very
present in the United Kingdom and Denmark, probably as a sign of their special and separate
status within the Union. This national perspective is also apparent in Spain and Greece.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 25

A third cluster includes Security and Defence (18 per cent), Social Policy (13.5 per cent) and
Environmental policy (12 per cent), without any substantial difference between former andnew Member States, although environmental policy receives more attention in the former 15
E.U. Member States, in particular in Scandinavian countries and Germany. The othercategories follow with decreasing percentages.
Unsurprisingly, geography and history also affect think tanks' priorities. Apart from Europe
and the enlarged European Union, which is obviously of primary interest to all, the UnitedStates and transatlantic relations stand out as a key research issue in France, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands. Russia and neighbouring eastern countries such as Ukraine andBelarus are a priority for Poland and the Baltic States, as well as Finland and Sweden. The
Mediterranean is a key research area for Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. Spain andPortugal also look at relations with Latin America. Finally, the Middle East is a key topic formost think tanks that specialise in security matters. Africa (except for Portuguese institutes)
and Asia on the other hand seem to be less covered.27
Overall, there is a relative concentration of Euro-think tanks' research, reinforced by the factthat academic research is also strong in some think tanks' favourite areas, such as
constitutional matters and foreign affairs. Other fields however, such as competition policy or
external trade issues receive comparatively less attention despite their crucial importance for
E.U. politics. Similarly, many issues for which co-decision applies, and therefore that are
particularly relevant for Members of the European Parliament are the object of relatively little
research by Euro-think tanks, for instance transport, research, and health policy, withexceptions obviously.
NEUTRAL, PRO-, OR ANTI-EU ?
Finally, a question many will have in mind : what is the share of think tanks that are pro-E.U.
integration or Euro-sceptic? In our sample, the majority present a neutral or positive
perspective vis-à-vis the process of E.U. integration, as shown in Figure 5 below. In our
definition, 'pro-EU' think tanks seek to promote and / or facilitate the process of E.U.
integration. This was usually made explicit in the organisation's mission, its statements to us,
or the approach taken in its research. 'Neutral' and 'anti' can be understood by extension.
Traditionally euro-enthusiastic countries such as France, Spain and Italy show the highest
percentages of pro-E.U. institutes. Dutch think tanks also seem to have a generally positive
attitude. A second group of countries, including Belgium, Ireland and Greece, show morebalanced figures, while most of the remaining countries have a more neutral think tankpopulation. Significantly, the only country with a distinct community of anti-European thinktanks seems to be the United Kingdom, although greater (see U.K. country report), theEurosceptic think tanks operate more as lobbying organisations for a particular set ofEurosceptic U.K. politicians and as a result of this the objectivity of their research is seriously
compromised. Perhaps because the interest in community affairs is much more recent in the
new central and eastern European Member States (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Slovenia), positions are less clearly defined. Nevertheless, the general orientation
seems to be rather neutral and overtly anti-E.U. think tanks are absent.

26 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledOverall therefore, it appears that there is a relative congruence of efforts both in terms ofscope of research and in the approach taken by think tanks that focus on E.U. policy issues.
While on average we found that the large majority of think tanks surveyed can be considered
neutral (68 per cent), over 30 per cent show a clear bias in favour of E.U. integration.

FIGURE 5

Neutral – Pro – Anti – EU think tanks (%)

Spain
Italy
Netherlands
FranceBelgium

Eurosceptics

Ireland

Neutral

Pro EUGreeceLithuania
EU (Brussels)
LatviaCyprusGermany
Austria
SwedenEstonia
FinlandDenmark
Portugal
Malta
CEECs
UK
EU average
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2.1.5 AUDIENCES
We asked the think tanks surveyed to identify their main target audiences. Figure 6 below
presents data for think tanks in three key Member States and Brussels. The main target
audience for think tanks in Italy, Germany, U.K. and Brussels appear to be policy-makers (98per cent), followed by the media (61 per cent), the public, including NGOs and civil society
groups (61 per cent), academia (44 per cent), business (34 per cent), and others (15 percent), such as other think tanks and trade unions.
That think tanks should gravitate towards policy-makers is of course no surprise, it is in fact a
key selection criterion. What is more interesting, however, is how clearly think tanks in these
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 27

countries seem to target policy-makers operating in the executive rather than national or E.U.
legislatures. Thus the percentages shown in Figure 7 below indicate that, among the policymakers targeted, greatest attention is given by think tanks in Germany, Italy and the U.K. tonational governments (85 per cent) than to national parliaments and politicians (54 per cent).
Think tanks also target the European Commission with a higher frequency than other E.U.
institutions : 11 out of the 26 think tanks supplying this information cited the European
Commission as an audience.
FIGURE N°6

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in UK, Germany, Italy and Brusselsi(% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)

100
90

Germany
UK

80

Italy
Brussels

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Policy-makers

Media

PublicBusiness

Academia

Other

This presumably illustrates the fact that think tanks generally prefer to intervene in policymaking ‘upstream’, or at the policy initiation stage. They are less interested in scrutiny ofexisting policy, a role traditionally performed by other actors, such as national parliaments
and pressure groups (see Section 2.1.6). The majority of the organisations studied declarethat their priority is influencing policy formation upstream, before the European Commission
drafts Green Papers or legislation, before Parliaments hold hearings and governments tackle
issues. There is a clear bias toward forward-looking policies. Relatively few declare that theyseek to monitor the implementation of policies.28 This seems to indicate that, at least in termsof aspirations, the ambition to introduce new items on the policy agenda and shapeiGermany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut fur Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES,
Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF,
Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI,SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe,
MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).

28 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledalternatives prevails over other types of services to policy-makers and over other audiencessuch as the media.
FIGURE 7

Main audiences of 41 think tanks in the U.K., Germany, Italy and Brussels29(% of think tanks mentioning audience type in interviews)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

National government
EU institutions
National Parliament andMPs
Foreign governments &IGOs
Regional/local government

In addition, it would appear that think tanks have an ambiguous stance when it comes toengaging with the public. Many institutes we surveyed said that public engagement was animportant part of their work; but we often found that in reality such activities were limited inscope. Often a lack of resources was cited as a reason for this. It is no surprise that the bestfunded think tanks, i.e. those in Germany, are also the ones that have the highest level ofengagement with the public. We will come back to this in Section 4.2.2.

2.1.6 ACTIVITIES'Thinking cells' are in the business of analysing policy issues and producing new policy options,but how do Euro-think tanks think? As mentioned before, creativity, innovation, originality,and ‘added value’ are characteristic of an effective think tank in the eyes of the market’s
representatives. This is a tall order in any economic sector. Our survey confirms that Eurothink tanks seek to promote the creation of ideas essentially through the following activities :Academic research : in order to produce added value, managers of think tanks
generally seek to attract researchers with good academic credentials or, when they
are more policy-oriented, researchers that combine an academic ability with a wealthof experience in policy making, including in some cases media work. While the relianceon expertise and formal methodologies of research derived from the social sciences
might seem obvious to people from the think tank sector, one only needs to look at
highly creative sectors such as design, architecture, marketing, art, or advertising torealise that relying to such a large extent on academic research and sectoral expertiseto "think" is indeed very specific.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 29

FIGURE 8

Principal activities reported by think tanks in the EU-15 and the new Member States(% of think tanks citing each activity)

100
90
80

EU-15

10 New Member States

70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Co
nf
ér
en
ce
Ré
s
un
Sé
ion
mi
sa
na
ve
ire
cd
s
es
dé
c
ide
Ac
tiv
ur
s
ité
sd
ec
on
se
il
Co
nf
er
en
ce
Me
s
eti
Se
ng
mi
sw
na
ith
rs
po
lic
y-m
ak
er
s
Co
ns
ult
an
W
cy
or
kin
Pu
g
bli
gr
cl
ou
ec
ps
tu
re
s/m
ee
tin
gs
W
Do
or
ks
cu
ho
m
en
ps
ta
tio
nc
en
tre
Ed
s
uc
at
ion
al
wo
rk

0



Cross-fertilisation and dissemination through working groups, seminars, conferences,and meetings with decision-makers: a key component of think tanks' activities is tobring together people from different horizons.30 This also gives them the opportunity
to propagate their ideas. We found that, in addition to publishing and the media,
seminars and conferences form the backbone of the discussion and dissemination
work for the think tanks interviewed. Indeed conferences are the main source offunding for several think tanks. Over two-thirds of think tanks reported holding
conferences in 2003. Over half reported holding seminars. Of course, the number ofsuch events varies considerably between think tanks, ranging from none to upwardsof a hundred per year for some of the large institutes that do not deal solely with
Europe (e.g. RIIA : 140, IIPW in Hamburg : 130). Euro-specific think tanks, however,typically organise around 20 public events per year. Public lectures and meetings areheld less frequently : slightly under one quarter of think tanks reported putting on
events for the general public, which include discussion forums and guest speakers infront of an open audience. Interestingly, as Figure 8 shows, these events are
significantly more common in the new Member States (reported by 47 per cent of
think tanks there). This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that think tanks in the new
Member States have less contact with government decision-makers and so devote
more of their efforts to a public audience.31

Figure 8 below provides more detail of the type of activities which the think tanks in our
survey are currently engaged in, both in the EU-15 and the new Member States.

30 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

MEETINGS WITH DECISION-MAKERS : after seminars and conferences, this was the third mostreported activity among the EU-15 think tanks (56 per cent). They could include both one-toone meetings with Government ministers and civil servants, and other meetings, such as‘closed-doors’ discussions involving a range of policy experts. This type of activity was only
reported by one in five of the think tanks surveyed in the new Member States.
CONSULTANCY : Many think tanks described an important part of their work as giving ‘advice’,particularly to officials, on different policy matters. Much of this advice is provided through thechannels described above, i.e. seminars, meetings and so forth. However, a sizeable numberof institutes in the survey (29 per cent in the EU-15, 26 per cent in the 10 new Member
States) have gone one step further and are carrying out proper consultancy work for theGovernment, the private sector, or both. This finding is of significance because it shows that agood proportion of think tanks are dependent for their income on other activities besides
research. Consultancy is particularly important for German think tanks, as 'Denkfabriken' offer
a wide range of services to business, including forecasting and survey work. It is also an
important ancillary activity for several organisations in Brussels such as EPC and CEPS. Thisphenomenon raises interesting questions about the future status of think tanks as non-profit
actors without commercial interests, which we will explore further in Section 4.1.1.
PARLIAMENTARYCOMMITTEEHEARINGS :a surprisingly low number of think tanks reported

interacting with national parliaments in committee hearings—just one in ten of the think tanks
in the EU-15 and none in the new Member States. This may reflect the fact that, as discussed
above, think tanks’ main audiences tend to be national executives rather than legislatures.
However, this apparent lack of formal involvement in Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation
does not mean that think tanks do not seek to influence individual MPs and political parties.
They do, but more often through informal channels, for example at events, dinners and otherpolicy meetings. Participation in committee work is however more frequent in Brussels, where
think tanks are often called to contribute to European Parliament committee hearings, whicheven sometimes fund independent research. The absence of research institutes fromcommittee hearings is particularly noticeable in the new Member States. Eastern European
governments, perhaps because of the Soviet political legacy, are not yet fully prepared tointegrate ‘alien’ input in their policy-making process. Civil society is still emerging and its roleis not well defined to date. As a result, in Latvia for instance, "given the fact that policy
making does not always take place in a well-planned, transparent fashion, think tanks often
find themselves reacting to proposals already being examined at a later stage of the policy
process." This is not to say that the think tanks covered do not exert influence in theirnational legislatures. They do, but more through less formal channels, such as meetings withindividual politicians at public events and via the briefing material and updates which they
send politicians on different issues.
THE

OTHER PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES

reported by think tanks in the EU-15 were, in order ofimportance : working groups (27 per cent), research workshops (18 per cent), educational
work (12 per cent), documentation centres (12 per cent), scholarships (11 per cent), theEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 31

training of government and E.U. officials and other professionals (10 per cent), and ‘other’ (9per cent), including book launches, exhibitions, and survey and forecasting work.
Individuals within the think tanks surveyed also often pursue other ‘public engagement’
activities, sometimes on a pro bono basis, for example as experts and speakers at publicconferences and training seminars. This is an informal part of many think tanks' 'public
service' mission. It is also quite common for think tanks – in particular in Scandinavia – tohave a documentation centre where the public can consult books on the think tank’s area ofexpertise.32 However, only about one in eight of think tanks currently offer this facility. A
number of the think tanks surveyed also give scholarships to students (e.g. Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung), young economists (e.g. ODI in Britain), or academics for research on European
questions (SIEPS in Sweden). Some think tanks, particularly the German ones, also run
courses for members of the public interested in particular subjects, while others haveproduced educational material for schools in the past (e.g. The Federal Trust on international
citizenship). A significant share of the think tanks we covered in the survey also provided
places for interns within their organisation.
Overall, it can be observed that European research institutes tend to engage in crossfertilisation efforts more with policy and decision-making elites in their vicinity than with lessconventional types of actors or even the general public (see sections 2.1.5 and 4.2.2).33 Mostof the activities reported, such as seminars, conferences and meetings with decision-makers
are designed to allow think tanks to get their particular message across to a fairly narrowcircle of policy-makers and journalists. Public lectures and other types of engagement with the
public tend to come a poor second, with the exception of the Scandinavian Member States andGermany where this role seems to be taken more seriously. One form of public engagement
which does seem to be growing though are on-line discussion forums (e.g. E.U. Policy
Network’s “EPN Blog” in the UK ; and the objective of Europhilia, the forthcoming French thinktank to organise "weblogs"). These fora are relatively cheap to run and enable a think tank tomarket itself as an open and inclusive organisation.
Quite legitimately, European 'thinking cells' do a lot more than just think. The name createdby a couple of new actors—think and action tanks—is probably more reflective of many
institutes' true nature. This corresponds to the dual mission think tanks have of producing anddisseminating policy alternatives, and is therefore expected. A more surprising fact is that thethink tank managers interviewed rarely had a clear answer when asked what methodologies
their organisations use to stimulate maximum collective creativity, although a handful
mentioned techniques such as scenario planning. This was particularly striking in the case of aprominent French think tank, the representative of which started the interview by insisting on
the fact that true think tanks produce innovative concepts, whereas "fake" think tanks are
more in the "compilation business." To the question "what processes have you put in place topromote the generation of new ideas in your institute," the same manager answered: "This is
an interesting question, I've never thought about it…" This candid respondent, although headof one of the most productive and prestigious French institutes, believes that "few people canproduce new ideas, even we are limited." He attributed this lack of creativity to insufficient

32 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledinvolvement of academics in applied policy research, State authorities' tendency in many
countries to monopolise policy expertise, as well as think tanks' reluctance to recruit former
high civil servants and public officials, unlike U.S. research centres. This lack of circulation"limits the ability to innovate, because cross-fertilisation is not happening."
Beyond this example, other converging signs indicate that the production of innovative policy
perspectives within think tanks as organizations rests essentially on three components :Relatively isolated individuals who are recognised as particularly brilliant in their own
field.

A general process of research that relies mainly on academic research methods andincreasing specialisation.



A method of orchestrated exchange of views within relatively limited communities.

While bearing in mind the many constraints think tanks face in the production of viable policy
alternatives, a valid question therefore is whether Euro-think tanks think or only isolated
individuals within them? Unlike other creative industries such as design, architecture,marketing, art, and advertising, the range of systematic and collective methods to produce
ideas within think tanks and their knowledge communities appears relatively limited.

2.1.7 MAIN PUBLICATION TYPESTYPES
The think tanks we surveyed publish a vast array of material, with each publication type
carrying a different name depending on the think tank. We observed seven main types :Short and topical policy briefings, primarily aimed at politicians and government
officials – and journalists – who have limited time for reading. These are usually
produced in large numbers and often available on-line.

Longer policy papers, called ‘research reports’, ‘research papers’, ‘occasional papers’,‘discussion papers’, ‘booklets’ and ‘pamphlets’, which present the results of researchand give recommendations for future action. These form the core research output formost of the organisations in the survey. The euro-specific think tanks usually produce
these at a rate of 10-20 a year,34 often in a series.



Conference reports and event proceedings, usually published on an ad hoc basis.

Books : if we exclude conference volumes and other larger reports from this category,
the number of books published is actually relatively small. 'Euro-oriented' think tanks
usually publish the most books because they tend to have greater financial resources.
The Euro-specific think tanks on the other hand usually prefer to concentrate on
producing policy papers. If they do publish books, it is often only at a rate of 1-2 per
year.



Journals : most of the journals are published, usually quarterly, by the ‘Euro-oriented’
think tanks (e.g. in the UK, ODI, Chatham House and IISS) although a number are
also published by the Euro-specific think tanks.35

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 33

Opinion pieces and articles which appear in newspapers or on the web only and are
penned by a range of contributors from both inside and outside the think tank.

Newsletters : these tend to be either weekly or monthly, essentially informing
members and other subscribers of events, publications and other relevant policy news.

Much of this material is available from think tanks' websites, for free or for a subscription fee.
It is also used as a ‘tie-in’ to encourage subscribers to join up. Some supply briefing services
to other institutions.36 Publishing research is only the first stage in a strategy to influence
decision-makers. The more successful think tanks have developed sophisticated dissemination
strategies, including press releases and conferences, media appearances and launch events
for publications (see CER Case Study).

2.1.8 FUNDING
The think tanks in our survey are financed from a wide variety of sources, both public andprivate, including the European Commission, foundations, universities, and individual
donations. Funding is usually either for core activities or for specific research projects.
Revenue is also often generated by the think tanks themselves through their own activities,
including fees from events and conferences, training courses, and consultancy work. There isa considerable variance in the types of funding in each country, with broader regional
patterns.
The information presented below is a summary of the findings from the survey related toprincipal funding sources. Readers should note that the percentages given here relate only tothe number of times that a think tank reported a particular funding source and do not indicate
the proportion of funding from each source either for individual think tanks, or for the thinktanks as a whole. The main findings are:


STATE

FUNDING :core funding of think tanks by the State is most common in

Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, France. The
countries where think tanks appear least often dependent on state funding are the UK,
Ireland, the Netherlands and Greece. It is also rare for Brussels-based E.U. thinktanks to receive core state funding. In all, slightly under half of the think tanks
surveyed (48 per cent) receive funding from state authorities. Such funding is ofdiffering types: this can be a line in an individual ministry’s budget (most often acountry’s ministry of foreign affairs, or the ministry of education/research); or moneyfrom a specific central government research fund (for example in Sweden this is afund for policy research on labour markets); or again funding by a state-funded
research council (e.g. the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK); or finallyfrom the regional government level (most common for the German and Spanish thinktanks).


COMMISSION : in the 2004 European Commission budget there was a special budget line
(15 06 01 03) "Grants to European think tanks and organisations advancing the ideaof Europe" with appropriations of €2.4 million, another line (15 06 01 05) for

34 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

"European Think Tanks" with an allocation of €500.000, and one for Notre Europe(€600,000). This represents a total of €3.5 million out of total of almost €20 million
for "dialogue with the citizens." 15 per cent of the think tanks surveyed declared
receiving a share of this allocation for core funding, usually in the form of grants. In
the EU-15 countries, we found twelve such think tanks. These think tanks are all
focused on European policy research and / or the study of international affairs. The
Commission also provides core funding for a number of Brussels-based think tanks,
including CEPS. The core funding that is given by the Commission to research centresin the new Member States is usually support for capacity building, for example
through the Phare programme.37


PRIVATE SECTOR : most common in Britain, Germany, and for the Brussels-based thinktanks, this type of funding is one of the other major sources for Euro-focused thinktanks. 44 per cent reported receiving core funding from the private sector, including
10 per cent from banks. The companies which fund independent policy research arevery often large multi-nationals with a considerable share of their business in the E.U.



FOUNDATION AND TRUST SUPPORT : this is another important source of income. Around one
quarter of think tanks receive money this way, usually for core activities.38



RESEARCH CONTRACTS : a growing proportion of funding comes in the form of money forspecific research projects. The most common funders of these projects are national
andforeigngovernments,

theEuropeanCommission,

privatebusiness,

anduniversities. Project funding is cited as a source of income by nearly 40 per cent of thethink tanks surveyed, although the actual percentage figure could well be higher.


OTHER SOURCES : these include publications sales (typically this is a low proportion of
total revenue, rarely more than 20 per cent), events income, fees for training courses
and consultancy work,39 membership fees, and individual donations. The last category,
donations, is obviously important for many think tanks. However, a more detailed
analysis of think tanks’ accounts—and indeed more openness on their part—would be
required in order to estimate what proportion of funding this represents.

Whether we can talk of a ‘European funding model’ for think tanks is unclear because of thewide variation in funding patterns in each country (see Section 2.2). European think tanks,
like their counterparts in other regions of the world, all seek however to have funding from as
broad a range of sources as possible. It was very rare to find a think tank that relies either
100 per cent on the State or 100 per cent on the corporate sector for its funding. Even incountries where state funding is least expected, for example in Britain, most think tanksreceive a significant amount of government and/or Commission money for research projects.
Funding challenges and its consequences on think tank activity will be analysed in further
detail in Section 4.1.1.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 35

2.1.9 STAFF
The average staff numbers for Euro-think tanks operating in the 25 Member States andBrussels has already been discussed in section 2.1.1. We present here the informationcollected on the profile of think tank researchers (nationalities, professional and academic
backgrounds).
First, Euro-think tank staffs are already very ‘Europeanised’ and, albeit to a lesser extent,internationalised, with many foreign researchers working in think tanks. These researchers aremostly from other European countries but there were also some from further afield,
particularly Russia, the U.S. and Canada. Observing the national origin of staff in three thinktanks demonstrates this point well: at ODI in the UK, researchers come from the UK, Ireland,
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, India and Kenya. In ETUI in Brussels, we foundFrench, German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Belgian, Danish and Dutch researchers. And at SIPRI
in Sweden, the director of the institute is British and is the former U.K. Ambassador to
Finland. There is concern that such mobility does not apply uniformly (e.g. in the case ofFrench researchers, Féat, 2004).
Euro-researchers usually hold either a Master’s degree or a PhD. The more academic-type
think tanks, such as those in Germany and Scandinavia, tend to have a higher proportion ofresearchers with post-doctorates. Indeed, researchers in Denmark must hold by law a PhD if
they want to obtain a permanent research post with a policy institute.40 The advocacy tanks inour study, on the other hand, were more likely to employ researchers with Master’s or first
degrees only. Here the focus is less on academic excellence of a researcher than his or her
ability to repackage an idea and sell it to policy-makers (or ideally both skills!).
Unfortunately our research did not yield detailed figures on how many employees had
previously held posts in government, or indeed how many researchers went from think tanks
back into government. This process of exchange, the so-called ‘revolving doors’ process, is aninteresting phenomenon because it shows the intimacy of the link between think tanks andauthorities in power. What is clear from our survey, however, is that often the policy
entrepreneurs who set up think tanks are themselves politicians, who may be looking for a
way to enhance their own political standing domestically and possibly promote a particularcause.41

2.1.10 EURO-THINK TANKS PERCEPTION OF THEIR OWN WORK
Despite academic efforts to clarify the notion, 'think tanks' are a complex and evolving
concept. We have therefore asked what the managers of European ‘brain boxes’ perceive tobe the main features of their activities and of an effective, credible, and influential
independent research centre. Based upon the results of our research and interviews ofmanagers, the main features that characterise a think tank seem to be dominated by a
traditional model of academic research centres, while evolving toward a more advocacyoriented model :36 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

A strong – but diminishing – emphasis on ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS : think tank directors
insist on the importance of an academic style of publications (books and articles), a
rigorous methodology of research, and staff with a sound background in research orteaching at university level, in particular for senior researchers. We have also comeacross institutes which team includes more policy-oriented researchers (e.g. EPC,
CER, ISIS). The EPC for instance emphasises its primary wish to be politically
influential, to give "the right message, to the right people, at the right time" overacademic-like research. A French observer of the E.U. scene confirmed that thinktanks "are increasingly political."

INDEPENDENCE : as will be analysed in greater detail below, this aspect of their activity
and

their

institutionsisconsideredcrucial,althoughsomeresearch

centresacknowledge that traditional standards of neutrality may impair their capacity tocontribute to decision making processes. As one manager put it, “European thinktanks have very little influence indeed, partly because they are not politicised.”A

minority group of European research institutes argue that being close to politicalcircles and endorsing a clear political stance is a necessary evolution (the Case Studyon the CER below is an illustration of this trend) that does not necessarily imply a lossof independence nor of the capacity of giving sound political advice.


THE PROMOTION OF DEBATE AND THE DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE : this is seen as particularly
important for European issues. As stated by a Czech research institute, "it is better forthe decision making process to know more opinions and views before those in charge
take decisions."42 Visibility, and more specifically media coverage, is also mentioned
as attributes of think tanks, and in particular of the more influential ones.



PROVIDING TIMELY ADDED-VALUE : for many sector leaders, "good" or even simply "real"
think tanks are those capable of producing new policy options that tie in with thecurrent political agenda. A debate emerges regarding the best approach in thisrespect, in particular whether 'thinking cells' should specialise or remain multidisciplinary. A Dutch institute claims for instance: “generalist think tanks are a modelon the way out… As democratic debate in Europe develops, you will need more
specialised expertise (…)”

Managers of multi-issue think tanks, although keen toadvertise the broad range of skill of their staff, agree that a true, quality think tankrequires very specialised researchers that can bring "real added value." Furthermore,
what distinguishes think tanks from their academic peers in university research
centres is their ability to react to new topics very fast. "Speed of reaction is essential
to contribute to the debate, you need to be able to anticipate and react," according to
the founder of a new think tank.43


ACTING AS A PUBLIC SERVICE INSTITUTION : this is a model most often seen in Scandinavian
countries and in Germany.44

BEING INNOVATIVE, AND FORWARD-LOOKING : related to the previous point, think tanks help
deal with emerging issues. A Portuguese director argues that the key task is "toproduce information that anticipates the future needs of decision-makers."45
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 37



PROVIDING A FORUM FOR DEBATE AND NETWORKING ON EUROPEAN ISSUES : the IEA in Dublin, forinstance, sees its role as a facilitator for discussion by bringing together under its roofdifferent actors, Irish politicians, academics and journalists who otherwise might not
meet.46

The emphasis placed on qualities of speed, influence, and networking in parallel with what
appears to be a diminishing emphasis on academic credentials and ideological independence
probably reflect the emerging trend noted earlier towards greater 'advocacy'. We will comeback to this issue and the questions it raises for the sector in Sections 4 and 5.

2.1.11 INDEPENDENCE, A CORE VALUEINDEPENDENCE FROM WHOM AND WHAT ?
For all the ‘Euro-think tanks’ interviewed, independence is perceived both as a core value andan important factor of effectiveness.47 This notion is, however, understood differently bymanagers of think tanks. It essentially rests on three pillars: intellectual, structural andideological.
For most respondents, what counts above all is intellectual independence, which is founded in
traditional notions of scientific research. A university professor and founder of a think tankwhich has gained a solid reputation for the quality of its research insists that what matters isthe ability of researchers to conduct research, to define their own agenda, and to defend
positions independently. If these criteria are fulfilled, then the fact that certain sources offunding are greater than others, or even a bias toward advocacy need not, according to him,
contradict the organisation’s research freedom. A key criterion for many think tanks is in factthat they determine their own agenda. And when the board or other authorities provide
guidance, they insist that independence requires that nobody interferes with researchconclusions. In fact, results of research should be reported independently, even when the
research is conducted on behalf of, or paid for, by an external organisation. The IWE(Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel & europäische Integration) based in Vienna,
always discusses its conclusions with the people who commissioned its research, but stresses
that it "never changes them."
Others insist also on organisational and financial autonomy, which are deemed necessary toprotect a think tank’s intellectual independence. Scholarly and material independence are
therefore distinguished.
HOW IS INDEPENDENCE MAINTAINED ?
Overall, however, there is general agreement on the following key features of independence:The key factor of independence for nearly all think tanks interviewed is the diversity,balance and permanence of sources of funding. The forthcoming European Centre forInternational Economics, which will start its operations in Brussels in the fall of 2004
illustrates for instance this model, as it is currently trying to ensure that the funds
provided by its twelve original participating Member States are matched by a wide

38 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledrange of contributors from the private sector, which will be complemented withpublications and event fees.48 Finding a niche market, through specialised activities or
topics is therefore an important strategy (see Section 4). Several respondents, suchas Notre Europe, also highlighted the need for long-term funding that protects thinktanks against the need to look constantly for new funding. What the ideal mix offunding sources should be varies however according to various think tanks' specificarrangements.49 Interestingly, some think tanks argue that strong links with publicauthorities in fact protect them against the need to seek corporate funding and helps
guarantee their independence.50 Also revealing of this ambiguous relation to funding, a
few contract research outfits, such as MESA 10 in Slovakia, seek to develop separate
consulting activities that help finance research activities.


Most think tanks adopt a legal status that provides protection against outsidepressures.

Asassociations,foundations,"independent","non-profit",

even

or

otherwise,"non-partisan."

they

seek

Independence

explicitly mentioned in their mission statement or statutes.51

istoremainsometimes

No clear pattern

emerges regarding the best type of structure to protect a think tank's independence,
although several indicate that an academic environment is more favourable.
Some have complex decision making "checks and balances" mechanisms designed toensure that the directors and the different stakeholders of a research institute need
the approval of other parties to make decisions, and that the members of the boardsof executives or directors are carefully selected. The diversity of views represented on
their board, the board's role in ensuring intellectual integrity, the ability to cultivatecontacts with different political parties and professional sectors are important toprevent biased research. Several think tanks have a scientific committee.52

Unlike the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW) or ISPI in Milan (Istituto per gli
Studi di Politica Internazionale), few make explicit reference to a "rigorous empiricalmethodology" or claim to "respect academic research criteria" (Observatoire Social
Européen), "objective approach to research without political prejudice", or "academiclike criteria of research." Very few explain on their website whether and how researchis reviewed and how standard criteria of academic research are met, although the
IFO-Institut (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in Munich) explained to us that its
research is "to some extent peer reviewed."A few think tanks explain that it is more generally the quality of their research, their"transparency", "competence," and "good work" that best protect their reputation in
the long run and ensure that they "cannot easily be used." (IRI Europe)53The reputation and prestige of the founders and the current executives of think tanks
also play a role in guaranteeing an image of serious research. For many, it is vital toinclude "personalities beyond suspicion" on the board, as a German think tank put it.
This is particularly emphasised in Italy.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 39



The fact that some think tanks have close links with public institutions (financial ororganisational) are perceived by some as compromising independence and credibility,
although none complained explicitly about decision-makers seeking to influence theirwork. Others however see such institutional links as reinforcing independence. Most, if
not all think tanks perceive themselves as independent in fact, even when they havestrong institutional links (e.g. the European Centre for Social Welfare Training andResearch in Vienna) and depend on limited sources of funding, in some case, a single
public source.54 Many of the U.K. advocacy think tanks which are funded by the
corporate sector argue, however, that the best way of maintaining independence is
not to receive any funding from the State.

Think tank managers feel however that the coordination and validation of their agenda
by institutional partners does not imply control over the intellectual content of theirresearch even when the research program is approved by an academy or the
advocacy group to which think tanks are affiliated (e.g. Friends of the Earth's
Sustainable Europe campaign in the case of the Sustainable Europe Research Institutein Vienna). Partnerships are not seen as affecting think tanks' ability to protect their
independence. Even those that have strong links with political parties, such as some of
the large German Stiftungen are careful to protect their image of independence byinvolving politicians from different sides. The Institut für europäische Politik (IEP) in
Berlin "involves key policymakers in order not to be perceived as one-sided." (see also
Section 2.4).55

Several think tanks expressed how maintaining a research centre's independence is difficult,although "independence has never been an issue so far" for a handful.56 We will take forward
this discussion of independence in Section 4 (regarding the challenges which advocacy,financial pressures, and the proximity with decision-makers present).

2.1.12 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTMEASUREMENT
All the think tanks examined monitor and report their activities in more or less detail on theirwebsites and through annual reports, presumably to promote their activities and guide theirwork. Beyond monitoring, most think tanks are interested in measuring the impact of theiractivities on the European agenda and the alternatives debated, but few have developed
proper means to do so. A manager replied to our questionnaire: "No specific mechanism inplace to measure performance; there is so much competition, a simple test is the ability tosurvive!"
More generally, "performance measurement" is usually limited to the identification of
instances when an organisation's messages have shaped these two aspects of policy making.
As outlined above (Section 2.1.3), the think tanks examined here indeed have a variety of
missions and objectives, which fulfilment is challenging and, furthermore, particularly difficult
to measure. Think tanks that seek to influence policy making usually seek to demonstrate therelevance of their work by identifying particular examples of ideas that have been promotedby the organisation and later debated or enacted by policy-makers. Even though "there

40 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledalways is a difference between the research results and policies approved by the State, thecontribution of a think tank may be observed anyway," according to one of the think tankmanagers interviewed. Many then advertise such purported achievements. An oft-cited
example is CEPS and EMU in 1988 (see section 1.2). Those that seek to disseminate ideas
more widely usually look at media coverage.
The perspective is usually short term, as think tanks hope for a rapid response to their efforts,
although individual respondents insisted that it is necessary to adopt a long run perspective toinfluence the policy making process and public opinion. "Running a think tank is not like a
restaurant where you can display your dishes on the menu and then people walk by anddecide to eat there!" told us the head of a British think tank to illustrate his argument thatchanging minds can take a very long time. In the new Member States, where we were told
repeatedly that think tanks created after the political changes of the 1990s have limited directcontact with public authorities, research institutes find it more difficult to measure theirinfluence on the decision-making process, as their impact can only be largely indirect. Somenevertheless give examples of laws approved on the basis, they believe, of projects developedby their organisation. Besides circumstantial examples, the think tanks surveyed seek tomeasure their impact by looking mainly at :
Membership trends: "if membership increases, it means my work is useful."Attendance figures for conferences and seminars.

Trends in purchases of publications.



Visits and downloads on their websites.57

Media coverage, although very few keep precise figures.

We were unable to obtain more precise detail that would have allowed us to understand what
conclusions think tanks draw from such data, with regard both to opinion change and impact
on policy making. The case study in Sections 4 on the Lithuanian Free Market Institute's
efforts to measure its notoriety is somewhat exceptional. As will be further discussed(Section 5), one has to look beyond the E.U. to find think tanks that have researched andtried to implement more elaborate performance measurement mechanisms.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 41

42 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled2.2. COUNTRY REPORTS
In this section we present the results of our survey by country, in order to give a deeper
understanding of the specific institutional, political, and societal factors shaping Euro-thinktanks' development in each country. All the 25 E.U. Member States are covered in thefollowing order, with a separate report for the E.U. institutes in Brussels :European Union, Brussels

FrancePortugalAustria

GermanySlovakia

The Baltic States

Greece

SloveniaBenelux

Hungary



Spain



Cyprus

Ireland

Sweden

Czech Republic



Italy



United Kingdom

Denmark



Malta



FinlandPolandEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 43

E.U. – BRUSSELS
E.U. THINK TANKS AT THE HEART OF THE EU
It is in Brussels, at the heart of the E.U. policy-making machine, that one finds some of themost influential and renowned transnational think tanks focused on European issues. Brussels
currently hosts ten think tanks that meet all our criteria, including two of its most respected,
CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) and the EPC (European Policy Centre), as well as alarge number of organisations that perform similar functions.
A first group was established in the early days of E.U. integration (such as the European Trade
Union Institute, in 1978, and CEPS, in 1983). Most, including the EPC (1996) are recent. Their
number is likely to increase in the future. Some think tanks were in fact created very recently(e.g. the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness, launched in the summer of 2003).
More are yet to be formally launched (such as Jean Pisani-Ferry’s European Centre forInternational Economics). While some may disappear, more are likely to emerge in the years
to come.
Think tanks in Brussels tend to conform more to an Anglo-American model than their peers in
the Member States. Nearly all are established as independent not-for-profit associations under
Belgian law and offer similar services. Conferences, seminars and taskforces in particular areimportant platforms to network with other actors and discuss policy alternatives. They allow
participants from the private sector to meet and think with individuals from E.U. institutions in
a “neutral environment”, as stressed by CEPS. As such, many in Brussels have members andseek in particular corporate memberships. Their audiences are also largely similar, as they all
aim their work at E.U. decision-makers, first the Commission, increasingly the European
Parliament, then national governments and the media. All have a neutral, or more frequently
pro-European agenda, apart from the Euro-sceptic Centre for the New Europe. All, in one way
or another, have the ambition to help bridge the democratic deficit between the E.U. and its
citizens. All seek to diversify their funding base to preserve their independence and someorganisations in Brussels have very sophisticated funding mechanisms. The EPC and CEPS
have succeeded particularly well in this respect, with relatively large funds stemming frommembership fees, fees for services, contracts, and subsidies. Others have different strategies,
ranging from personal funds and private donations in the case of the Lisbon Council, tosubscriptions from its state and corporate members in the case of the forthcoming European
Centre for International Economics.
However,beyondthese

generalsimilarities,

competitionisstronginBrusselsandorganisations seek to develop a niche market. While the largest think tanks tend to be multidisciplinary, specialisation can be in Euro-think tanks’ areas of research, for instance defence
issues for the International Security Information Service (ISIS Europe), Asia for the European
Institute for Asian Studies, and the “social implications of the building of Europe” for theObservatoire Social Européen. Think tanks also try to offer different approaches to E.U.
matters. The EPC for instance takes pride in being first a “welcome platform for balanced

44 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilleddiscussion” while CEPS seeks to produce “sound policy research” and “achieve high standardsof academic excellence.” They offer different activities, such as the EPC's forums. As a result,
Brussels has a mix of academic, advocacy, and contract research think tanks.
Of course, competition in Brussels is increased by the huge number of organisations that may
not have in-house research teams, but perform functions similar to those of think tanks.
Providing an exhaustive list would be a daunting task. One should however mention wellregarded discussion forums such as Friends of Europe and Forum Europe, and innovative
additions such as The Centre, a hybrid between a think tank and a consultancy created inearly 2004. This type of organisation plays an important role as “incubators of ideas byhosting seminars, round-tables, book-launches, debates and a range of social events” and“instigators of ideas, by collaborating with think tanks, foundations and other thinking
communities around Europe.”58 They also include networks such as TEPSA (Trans-European
Policy Association), EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network), and the European Ideas
Network ("an open pan-European think tank process sponsored by the EPP-ED [conservative]
group, the largest political group in the European Parliament.") Created in 1998, the European
Madariaga Foundation also brings together College of Europe Alumni "to place the research
capacity of the College at the service of the European debate."
Brussels is of course also home to scores of diverse groups that have the capability to produce
policy alternatives. The Commission has its own 'brain box', in the form of the Group of Policy
Advisers, created in 1992 by former President Jacques Delors, not included in our survey
because it is within the structures of the Commission. There are also scores of lobby group /think tank hybrids that contribute to E.U. policy making, such as the European Round Table ofIndustrialists (ERT), the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the International Crisis Group(ICG), the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), and the European
Citizen Action Service (ECAS), to name a few.59 Industry lobby UNICE and trade union lobby
ETUC, while not strictly speaking think tanks, also regularly produce detailed reports on how
they feel the E.U.'s economy and labour markets should evolve.
One should also mention E.U. branches of U.S. think tanks, based in Brussels or around theEU, such as RAND Europe, the East West Institute (EWI), and the Aspen Institute. These arestrong and getting stronger. EWI, which has an office in Brussels, is "an independent, not-forprofit, European-American institution working to address the most dangerous fault lines of the
21st century and to help build fair, prosperous and peaceful civil societies in those areas." It
operates "long-term projects that create trust and understanding and seek to reduce tensions
from Eurasia to the trans-Atlantic region using [its] unique network of private and public
sector leaders in more than 40 nations." RAND Europe, which does essentially contract
research, has no less than 56 full-time researchers in total in Leiden, Cambridge and Berlin
helping "European governments, institutions, and firms with rigorous, impartial analysis of thehardest problems they face."60 The Aspen Institute, with offices in Lyon, Berlin and Rome (andMilan), is especially active in promoting transatlantic and regional relations, examining therole of the home countries in Europe, and addressing important political, economic and ethicalissues.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 45

AUSTRIA
A VARIED LANDSCAPE OF YOUNG THINK TANKS
Austria hosts thirteen think tanks that have a significant interest in European matters. Amongthese, two deal exclusively with the European Union: the Forschungsstelle für institutionellen
Wandel und europäische Integration (IWE-ICE) and the Österreichisches Institut für
europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES), which focuses more specifically on issues related to the
CFSP. Several think tanks were created and specialised in community issues, after Austria
joined the European Union in 1995 and following the transfer of political competencies toBrussels, such the IWE-ICE (created as an independent institute in April 2004) and the ÖIES(established in 1996).
There is also an important international politics institute in Austria, the Österreichisches
Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), which focuses mainly on the E.U.’s development
policies. The Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP) is an applied policy researchorganisation which offers a comparative analysis of current trends within the main politicaland economic institutions in Austria and the Union. Austria also hosts two large economic
research institutes, the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) and the
Wiener Institut für internationale Wirtschaftsvergleich (WIIW), which has a research
programme on European integration. A new think tank recently joined the ranks of these two
economic institutes: Austria-Perspektiv, founded in 2002 to "remedy the lack of long term
analyses and perspectives." According to this research centre, nobody in Austria, neither theparties’ political academies (such as the Renner-Institut, which is close to the SPÖ, andModern Politics, close to the ÖVP),61 nor the social partners takes a long-term perspective.
Austria-Perspektiv argues that the consequences of political decisions have long been underestimated and its objective therefore is to forecast the possible impact of policy decisions.
Finally, the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR)
hosts a think tank dedicated to Europe. It is called EURO: European Developments – Policies
and Politics, and its activities focus, among other things, on enlargement.
Austrian think tanks are essentially funded by the federal and regional governments, to which
can be added some European funding and project work from Ministries. Contracted research is
a common means to diversify Austrian think tanks’ sources of funding. The development of
think tanks in Austria was made easier by the decline of the social partners, which for many
years had monopoly control over governmental consultation. This created a gap which
independent organisations were able to fill. Consultation institutes in the field of economics
created in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung(WIFO),theInstitutfür

HöhereStudien(IHS),

andthe

Europäische

ZentrumfürWohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung, are now bodies which policy-makers are used toconsulting.
Apart from the larger organisations just mentioned, which have teams of at least 20
researchers, most Austrian thinks tanks have very small research staffs, which usually do not
exceed ten people. Contacts with decision-makers are very informal. Whereas in the United

46 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

States the President’s advisors are known and each round of presidential appointments isreported on publicly, the names of political advisers in Austria are generally kept relatively
quiet and discussions regarding political appointments take place behind the scenes. Suchcontacts are sometimes founded on a personal friendship between political advisers anddecision-makers, which could be explained by the relatively small size of the country.
Furthermore, the influence of think tanks is limited by the complexities of the Austrian federal
system. A consensus at the federal level sometimes is blocked by the opposition of the Länder
when these have the final say.
Overall, despite the recent creation of a number of research centres following Austria’s
accession to the E.U. and the fact that the policy-making process today is more flexible,
pluralist and open to outside experts, Austria has relatively few think tanks dealing with
European issues. Because of their size and influence, however, they are still taken seriously bydecision-makers.
It is also worth mentioning an Internet-based quasi-think tank, the Sustainable Europe
Research Institute, established in 1999. Pan-European, its objective is to explore sustainable
development option for Europe. Its unusual structure – a network organisation without any inhouse researchers – is an interesting addition to Austria’s policy-making community, but does
not fully meet our criteria.

THE BALTIC STATESA SOCIETY AND POLITICALPOLITICAL ELITES IN TRANSITION
TRANSITION
Four think tanks meet our criteria in ESTONIA, with only one that is dedicated specifically toEuropean issues (the Institute for European Studies, affiliated to the Audientes University of
Tallinn). Another has a research programme on European integration and enlargement (theEstonian Foreign Policy Institute), the remaining two look at specific European policy issues onan ad hoc basis (the Estonian Institute for Future Studies and the Praxis Centre for Policy
Studies).62
In LATVIA, we identified five Euro-think tanks: the Centre for European and Transition Studies
that focuses exclusively on the European Union ; three other independent research centres(the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of Economics - Academy of
Science, and the Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies - BICEPS) are ‘Eurooriented’ think tanks, and the fifth, policy.lv, is a borderline case: it is an on-line think tankthat regularly looks at European policy issues.
Four think tanks were listed in LITHUANIA : the Institute for International Relations and Political
Science, the Lithuanian Regional Research Institute, the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, andthe Institute of Labour and Social Research. None focuses exclusively on community matters.
The Baltic states have two main types of think tanks: (1) academic think tanks / universities
without students, which are linked to universities, have academic staff, and receive part oftheir funding from universities, while remaining independent (they were often created by aEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 47

small group of academics with a common interest, but they remain separate from theuniversities which host them), and (2) independent centres which emerged spontaneously as
early as 1991, sometimes thanks to governmental initiatives,63 or with the help of foundations,such as the Soros foundation. The latter are often a hybrid of contract researchers andshapers of public opinion. All claim to be independent, without any links to political parties,
even those created by parties.
Most were created in the 1990s, as a direct result of the fall of the Soviet empire, althoughwith local nuances. The think tank community in Lithuania, strengthened by a stronger
tradition of independence and as the country that first freed itself from Soviet control,developed in the early 1990s, while Latvia waited until 2000, probably in part because of its
slower adaptation to the E.U. accession criteria. In the three Baltic States, however, at least
one think tanks had been created by 1991, the official date of their independence. There wasa marked growth in the sector between 1995 and 2000, during the accession negotiations
with the E.U.
Euro-specific think tanks in the Baltic States indeed focus mainly on E.U. enlargement andEuropean integration, at a general level or through country-specific issues (integration process
for their home country, relations with countries outside the E.U., comparison of the three
Baltic States in the run-up to accession, etc.). The other, ‘Euro-oriented’ centres focus on their
specific research areas such as security in the Baltic region, regional cooperation, market
development, economic forecasting, and social and environmental policies, in particular withregard to the adaptation to European norms. This is in part dictated by the many researchcontracts requested by ministries and other official bodies to assist them with the accession
process.
Baltic Euro-think tanks usually have anywhere between a dozen and forty researchers. It is
not unusual to find members of the government sitting on the board of independent research
institutes, sometimes even as researchers. Staffing however is a major issue for think tanks in
the Baltic States, because the pool of potential recruits is small on certain issues, and becauseof the language barrier. Budgetary constraints also prevent further recruitment, andresearchers often perform many administrative tasks, which makes it harder for them toconduct research and organise projects.
Private donations are still very unusual in former communist countries. The think tank sector
therefore has difficulties surviving and accessing funds for long-term projects. Developing adiversified portfolio of funders is therefore essential. Similarly, national budgetary difficulties
prevent adequate funding of research and public financing is limited, except for think tanks
createdby

thegovernment

andgovernment-initiatedstudies.

Foreignfoundations,international organisations, and sometimes foreign governments provide the rest of theirfunding: the Soros Foundation, the European Commission, the World Bank, OECD, thegovernment of Sweden. Think tanks in the Baltic States also cooperate regularly with
Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, helped in this by their geographic, as well as linguistic
and cultural proximity.

48 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

Euro-think tanks in the Baltic States tend to focus on national decision-makers, as all werecreated with the same goal of assisting their national governments with the post-Soviet
transition and the accession to the European Union. The founders of today’s think tanks felt in
the early 1990s that mentalities needed to be adjusted in several areas (governance,
institutional processes, market mechanisms, etc.) where Baltic politicians lacked experience,
because the Soviet era had shaped society and governments so deeply. There was therefore areal need for better policy analysis and scientific expertise, which created new demand forthink tanks. On the other hand, independence from Soviet tutelage and a centralised, eventotalitarian political regime is still less than 15 years old. Civil society and mechanisms of
public consultation and participation are therefore still very recent. Government is perceived
not to be very keen to involve citizens and outside organisations in policy making. Think tanks
that receive public funding often need to resist government attempts to use them for theirown purposes, although things are apparently progressing as governments tend to use thinktanks more and more as independent outside consultants, and try less than in the past to
influence the results of research they finance. In any case, it is clear that the think tank sector
in the Baltic States is emerging and is bound to develop further in the future.

BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG
A WELL-ESTABLISHED AND VARIED
VARIED CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN POLICIESThe Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, geographically and historically at the heart of theEuropean construction process, have six think tanks altogether with a significant interest in
European affairs that meet our criteria. The Netherlands has always been open to the rest of
the world and a supporter of E.U. integration, for historic and geopolitical reasons, whichshows today in the strength of its think tanks specialised in E.U. and wider-European andinternational affairs.
One of the four Dutch think tanks listed, the Cicero Foundation, is a generalist E.U. research
centre, three have specific research portfolios covering international relations, security andparticipatory democracy. Belgium has two relevant think tanks for our survey, one is aninternational relations research centre, and the other is focused on issues of peace andsecurity. Luxembourg has no think tank that matches our criteria, although its Institute ofEuropean and International Studies performs some think tank functions.64

Overall, themajority of Benelux think tanks and the ones described as more influential at the E.U. level,such as the prestigious Clingendael institute, are based in The Netherlands.
Although nearly all are independent, not-for-profit organisations, they paint a diverse
picture.65 Most are not typical of European-focused think tanks though, because of their
specialised interest (e.g. IRI Europe which focuses on “the practice of initiative andreferendum” throughout Europe) and their activities (e.g. Clingendael has important training
activities).66

Founded on average over 20 years ago, most Benelux think tanks are wellestablished, though the latest (IRI Europe) was created as late as 2001. Heavyweightorganisations have a large staff of permanent researchers (e.g. Clingendael, 25), while

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 49

smaller outfits have less than five researchers (e.g. Belgium’s GRIP, the Group for Researchand Information on Peace and Security). Several are very influential and work actively, inparticular Clingendael, the Cicero Foundation, the Centre for European Security Studies, andGRIP, thanks in part to their geographic proximity, both with E.U. institutions and theirnational governments. All seek to get involved in the policy-making process upstream and at
the higher levels of E.U. and national decision-makers.
Benelux think tanks operate in political environments already well endowed with influential
party organisations, government bodies and academic centres. Indeed, other organisations
not listed here perform important work. These include the Alfred Mozer Foundation, which
focuses primarily on Eastern Europe, and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, which has no
in-house research team but provides a useful forum to study questions regarding transatlantic
security issues, NATO and European security. The main Dutch parties have foundations that,on occasion, work on E.U. matters, including the Christian Democrats, the Socialists’ Anne
Vondeling Foundation, the Liberals’ Telders Foundation, and the Democrats 66’s Scientific
Institute.
The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), “an independent think tankfor Dutch government”, writes occasionally about E.U. affairs. EIPA, the European Institute of
Public Administration is an important organisation. Its core mission is not the conduct of
research and it is tied to E.U. institutions, but it nonetheless has a very large research
production.67 The European Cultural Foundation conducts, on and off, influential policy
research on issues related to European culture, notably recently on behalf of the Dutch
presidency of the E.U.68 In Belgium, GEPE (Groupe d'Etudes Politiques Européennes), a
federation of university centres, and ULB and KUL (universities of Brussels and Leuven)complement independent Belgian think tanks' capacity on the E.U.

CYPRUSA STRONG DEMAND DRIVINGDRIVING DEVELOPMENT
We recorded three ‘Euro-think tanks’ in Cyprus, including one specifically dedicated to Europe(the European Institute of Cyprus), and two with at least one significant programme on the
E.U. (the Research and Development Centre – Intercollege and Civilitas Research). Relative tothe size of the country, Cypriot research on Europe is therefore very dynamic.69 Because of its
history, society in Cyprus is highly politicised and informed of national and regional politicaldebates.
The three organisations listed were created in the second half of the 1990s, ahead ofaccession negotiations, which officially started in November 1998. Their research focuseslargely on the division of Cyprus, in particular in the light of the accession of the Greek part to
the European Union and of the poor economic situation of the Turkish side, which contrasts
sharply with the economic boom of the other part and creates tension on the island. In fact,
one week before Cyprus’ accession to the E.U. in May 2004, 75 per cent of Greek voters

50 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledrejected Kofi Annan’s plan for reunification, even though 65 per cent of Turkish votersapproved it.
Cyprus hosts three different types of think tanks: two independent research centres, including
one that is more academic (the RDC is associated to Intercollege, the university with thehighest reputation in Cyprus), and the other that is the result of a joint initiative of the E.U.
and the Republic of Cyprus (the European Institute of Cyprus). The third institute is a private
initiative (Civilitas Research). Despite different origins, all three provide high quality economic,
political and social analyses to national and European decision-makers, both regarding therelations between Cyprus and the Mediterranean region and between Cyprus and the E.U.
Consulting activities are commonplace, both for public and private contractors, even for the
more prestigious centres such as Civilitas Research which has worked for the United Nations,
the Romanian Foreign Ministry, the Economist Intelligence Unit, McKinsey & Co., British
American Tobacco, Lukoil, BBC World and Barclays Bank. Cypriot think tanks are crucial
interlocutors for many outside organisations, because of the specificity of the Cypriot issue, as
well as the island’s peculiar geographic and cultural position.
Cypriot Euro-think tanks are relatively large: they have between 15 and 50 permanent
employees. They are funded essentially through private donations and their own activities.
The Cypriot government and the European Commission fund massively the European Instituteof Cyprus, which hopes to diversify its sources of funding in years to come. All benefit from ahigh degree of independence, as the first two do not depend on any particular donor, and themission of the third institute is to be as objective and neutral as possible.

CZECH REPUBLIC
A YOUNG, GROWING, AND MILITANT COMMUNITYCOMMUNITY
European policy matters are covered by five think tanks in the Czech Republic. Europe is thecore research area for Europeum-Institute for European Policy, while another institute, thePrague Institute for International Relations works on international relations in general, and theremaining three touch on European issues through sectoral policies: the Centre for Economics
and Politics, the Civic Institute, and the Policy Centre for the Promotion of Democracy.
Most Czech think tanks are non-profit organisations and receive the bulk of their financial
resources from private foundations, private sponsors, and private gifts and grants. Some ofthem self-finance part of their work through subscriptions, books, and consulting activities.
Two research institutes also receive part of their funding from the State.
Most are quite young, as they were created after the political changes of the early 1990s. As
the integration process is a very important matter in the Czech Republic, whereEuroscepticism is now running particularly high, the activities of think tanks very often focus
on the preparation of accession, as well as its consequences and the evolution of the legal andpractical situation of the country. Besides, they also cover general and current European
issues, such as the E.U. legal system or E.U. politics, European elections in June 2004, theEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 51

elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty, and the question of the new external border of theUnion and its consequences for ‘3rd pillar’ policies.
Czech think tanks usually have less than 10 full time researchers, although the Prague
Institute for International Relations has nearly 30. Apart from the permanent ones, the thinktanks also often co-operate with external researchers, whose number depends on projects
currently realised.
Most Czech think tanks can be classified as “advocacy tanks.” In most cases, public authorities
at the national level constitute the main target group of Czech think tanks. However, theinstitutions are almost in all cases also interested in co-operating with journalists andinforming society in general. Europeum, the only institution that can be classified as a ‘Eurospecific’ think tank, is particularly interested in university students because of its connection
with Charles University.

DENMARKTHE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF
OF THE DISAPPEARING THINK
THINK TANKS
Only one Danish think tank was included in our survey : the Danish Institute for International
Studies (DIIS), which, according to our definition, is not Euro-specific.
DIIS was formed in January 2003 following the controversial merger in 2002 by the Danish
government of four existing international institutes: the Danish Institute of International
Affairs (DUPI), the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), the Danish Centre for
Genocide and Holocaust Studies, and the Centre for Development Studies. DIIS is now one
half of the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights.70 The move provoked
controversy in Denmark because it was viewed as a political attack by the new right-wing
government on the so-called “taste judgers” who ran these institutes and who had previously
expressed their criticism of the government on various matters, including asylum policy and
the Kosovo conflict. However, it was also no doubt an attempt by the new government to cut
costs in the publicly funded research sector.
DIIS is a publicly funded, sector-specific research institute, similar to others existing in
Denmark such as the National Institute of Social Research (SFI). About two-thirds of its 58m
DKK budget comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other third from different
government ministries or the European Commission for specific projects. It has five main
research departments, one of which is concerned with European policy. 14 out of its 78
researchers work in this department. Its current work includes: the E.U. as international
actor; the relationship between Denmark and the E.U.; and changes in the international
system post-September 11 and consequences for the E.U. DIIS organises on average about
75 seminars and conferences a year.
We were unable to interview the head of DIIS’ European department, so it is difficult toestimate what influence it is currently having on the Danish policy-making scene. However, aformer director of DUPI did say to us that DIIS is still in a process of readjustment following

52 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledthe merger and that its influence has suffered as a result. They said that there is very little
actual policy research currently being done by the department, and that since the merger theDanish Parliament had not officially requested any reports from DIIS on European matters, as
had previously happened with DUPI, for instance on the Danish opt-out from the single
currency. A number of factors explain the low number of think tanks working on European
issues in Denmark:THE LACK OF A CORPORATE FUNDING BASE TO SUPPORT NEW THINK TANK WORK : the currently limited
availability of public funding for think tank activities in Denmark means that new think tanks
have to look elsewhere for potential funding. There is however no real tradition of corporate
sector funding of think tanks in Denmark.71 Therefore, an “ossification” of think tankstructures has arguably taken place, whereby existing government-linked research institutes
have monopolised both research space and government funding in their specific sector (e.g.
DIIS in international affairs, SFI in social policy), but relatively few new think tanks canemerge because of the lack of other financial support mechanisms.72
THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF THE 2002 MERGER : this reduced dramatically the number of think tanks
working on international and European policy issues. For example, the Centre forDevelopment Studies and COPRI had both previously carried out important European work intheir respective sectors prior to the merger. Much of this expertise and research output has
been lost as a result, and it will take time for DIIS to reproduce a similar level of work.73
COMPETITION FROM THE UNIVERSITY SECTOR : there are a number of university centres in Denmarkwith an interest in European policy. An important example is the Centre for European Studies
at the University of Southern Denmark. The Centre, in addition to its Master’s programme,
also produces research of a similar kind to think tanks (e.g. working papers), aimed at asimilar audience (such as the public, business and policy-makers). Such work could also posea challenge to any Euro-specific, academic-style think tank attempting to establish itself inDenmark the future. Another example is EPRU, a university-based policy research body (not athink tank according to our criteria). Founded in 1991 by a group of Danish economists at the
Copenhagen Business School and the University of Copenhagen, EPRU undertakes research oninternational macroeconomic policy issues. One of the motivations for its creation was thechange occurring at the time in the international economy and increasing European economic
integration. Much of its work is relevant to E.U. policy-makers.74

FINLAND
A MODERNCOMMUNITY
UNITY OF EURO-THINK TANKS
MODERN AND VARIED COMM
In 1997, McGann, Weaver (2000) had identified nine think tanks in Finland in different fields.
Three were research centres affiliated to political parties (K.J. Stahlberg Foundation, Labour
Institute for Economic Research, National Coalition Institute). Today, six think tanks (including
five new institutes) examine European policy issues, either very closely (Pan-European
Institute, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, The Research Institute for the Finnish

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 53

Economy - ETLA) or as part of a wider research remit (EVA - Finnish Business and Policy
Forum, Pellervo Economic Research Centre - PTT, Labour Institute for Economic Research).
Finland has a strong think tank tradition. Out of the nine think tanks listed by McGann andWeaver, six had been established between 1945 and 1974 and one before 1945. Among our
six ‘Euro-think tanks’, five date back to the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent (the Pan
European Institute) is more specialised in Europe as a continent, including the E.U. as well as
Eastern Europe (the new Member States) and E.U. neighbouring countries, especially Russia.
Russia is indeed a major area of research for the majority of Finnish think tanks, in particularin the framework of the ‘Northern Dimension’ and Russian relations with the E.U.
Finland has three types of think tanks: academic institutes (Pan-European Institute), private
and completely independent organisations with a clear sectoral focus (international trade,
economics, agriculture/wood, food industry), and one think tank which is affiliated to thesocial-democratic party (the Labour Institute for Economic Research-PSTL, its role is toprovide expertise, mainly economic, to Finnish policy-makers). Finnish think tanks’ audiences
vary largely according to the nature of their research. Besides policy-makers, Finnish thinktanks have many other activities, including providing information to the public, consultancy
services for the private sector, and ad hoc projects such as economic forecasts (PTT, EVA,
ETLA).
Their sources of funding also depend largely on the public they cater for: academic institutes
depend essentially on public subsidies and a share of the funds allocated to the universities
they are affiliated to. More specialised centres are funded more through cooperatives orunions close to their areas of interest. The Finnish Ministry of Education remains a large andregular funder of Finnish think tanks.
Finland’s think tanks are overall characterised by a modern and fairly specific approach toEuropean studies. The discretion of the Finnish government, its relative absence in the fundingof research groups, and the fact that public opinion is very politicised and active (80.2 percent participation rate in the 2000 presidential elections) are also indications of what Finnish
think tanks perceive as the modern nature of their policy making process. Independent
research was long dominated in Northern European countries by institutional think tanks,
established after World War II through national legislation and mainly funded by the State.
They were required to provide objective and non-partisan research in their areas of expertise,with no State interference. This is the case in particular for the Finnish Institute ofInternational Affairs.
Finnish ‘Euro-think tanks’ tend to be largely pro-European, which can be understood in thelight of Finland’s recent accession to the E.U. (January 1995) and strong public support foraccession (57 per cent approval in a referendum conducted at the time).75 According to the
managers of Finnish think tanks, proportional representation in Finland also helps themremain as objective as possible, as it forces broad governmental coalitions: a left-to-rightcoalition included the communists and the conservatives in 1999, another brought together
the social-democrats, the conservatives and the greens after the legislative elections in 2000,
and the Centre Party, which won the legislative elections in 2003 joined forces with the social-

54 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilleddemocrats and a party representing the Swedish minority. Because all political forces have achance to be represented in the government, Finnish think tanks feel that they do not need todevelop particular links with any party.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Urho Kaleva Kekkonen’s policy of developing good contacts with
Finland’s neighbouring countries, led from 1956 to 1981, is still very much alive.

A key

component of Finland’s foreign policy has in fact always been to maintain strict neutrality andgood relations with the USSR. As early as 1991, Finland started developing its relations withformer Soviet republics. This is visible today in the large number of research programmes that
focus on regional collaboration, in particular with the Baltic States.

FRANCEEXPERIENCING ANOTHER REVOLUTION?
Currently, only seven French organisations qualify as think tanks with an explicit focus on
European policy matters, according to the criteria of this survey. Five are Euro-specific thinktanks : Confrontations Europe, which seeks to generate new and more "conflicting" ideas
about Europe by bringing together representatives from different sectors ; Europe 2020,
which seeks to promote greater democracy through prospective studies ; the Fondation
Robert Schuman that strives for the reunification of the European continent ; and Notre
Europe, which acts in "the spirit of a closer European union comprising a common defence anda common currency, respecting community assets, and resting on common policies that
support full employment, competitiveness, and solidarity." The European Union Institute for
Security Studies (EUISS) is a borderline case as it is an autonomous E.U. agency specialised
in security matters.76 The two remaining are international affairs institutes with significant
programmes dedicated to Europe: the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI),
with a broad research portfolio, and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), more
focused on military and defence matters. Many more organisations besides these sevenorganisations perform a similar role in terms of research and policy planning on European
affairs. France also expects to welcome a new generalist Euro-think tank in the autumn of
2004.
Nearly all French E.U. think tanks are organised as non-profit associations under a flexible,
catch-all French statute dating back to 1901, except for two: one is a foundation and theother a European agency. They are all based in Paris. Most are largely dependent on publicfunds, European, but also French. Apart from IFRI, which has experienced recent reductions inpublic funding but is large and well established, few have succeeded in developing sustainableprivate sources of funding. Despite France's long-time intellectual investment in the E.U.
construction process, the seven organisations listed are very recent. Except again for IFRI,
which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary and is considered one of France's first thinktanks created on the Anglo-American model, the remaining six are on average only nine yearsof age.77 French 'boîtes à idées' also tend to be relatively small. In-house research teams
working on European issues usually have less than ten researchers and budgets are fairly

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 55

limited. France does not have Euro-sceptic think tanks. Approximately half in fact advocate
greater E.U. integration and involvement of citizens in E.U. affairs, as will Europhilia, to becreated later this year. The remaining think tanks are more academic in nature.
The impact of France on the E.U. scene is considered insufficient, as highlighted recently by
French Deputy Jacques Floch (2004), by the French Permanent Representation to the E.U.
(Féat, 2004) and by Foreign Affairs Minister Michel Barnier (August 2004). French think tanks
publish too often only in French and not systematically in English or other E.U. languages.
They have developed very close links with their official French interlocutors in French and E.U.
institutions and have strong work programmes with German institutes, but still havedifficulties reaching beyond their traditional networks of influence. They are not very visible in
the E.U. media. One think tank, Confrontations Europe, has a permanent office in Brussels(since May of this year), another, the Fondation Robert Schuman, will follow in Confrontations'step later in 2005. This lack of visibility and presence on the ground explains, according toFrance's PermRep, why French think tanks cannot test and disseminate their ideas aseffectively as their English or German counterparts, even though the seven think tanks
dedicated to E.U. affairs listed represent a significant share of the 70 think tanks identified in
total by McGann and Weaver in 2000.
However, France's "intellectual diplomacy" also relies on a significant number of active
organisations that make a significant contribution to French research and communication
efforts on E.U. policies :Government and E.U. institutional bodies such as the 'Centre d'Analyse et dePrévision', the in-house, official think tank of the foreign affairs ministry.



Recent quasi-think tanks / forums for debate, such as A Gauche, en Europe andEuropartenaires, which are very active in the formation and dissemination of ideas at
a European level, but that do not have an in-house research team.

Influential and active academic centres that touch on European affairs regularly,
including the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales (CERI), the Centre
Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Etudes Stratégiques (CIRPES), theCentre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII); and theInstitut de l'Europe, based at the French business school HEC and managed by former
European Affairs Minister (turned professor) Noëlle Lenoir. These academic centres are
getting increasingly involved, as discussed in Section 4.1.

Many associations, either pro-European, such as the Association Jean Monnet;
Association Française d'Etudes pour l'Union européenne; and Europe et Sociétés; ormore critical, such as anti-world-trade group Attac.

Foundations : the Fondation Jean Jaurès for instance, although not dedicated toEurope, often includes the E.U. dimension in its studies.



Other more generalist think tanks, such as Polemia, the Institut Montaigne, andProméthée (French branch of an international think tank), look at E.U. issues andincreasingly so. They were not included however because Europe is not an explicit

56 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledresearch topic. Two think tanks in the fields of international relations and strategy
studies besides IFRI and FRS generate strong policy research related to European
affairs: IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques), and the Institut
Choiseul.78
Clearly,

put

together,these

different

complementaryresearchbodiessignificantly

counterbalance the relative paucity of French Euro-think tanks. On the other hand, the factthat so many structures, in particular ministerial cabinets, political clubs, national research
institutes, and policy research groups play a similar role to think tanks in the French politicallandscape, also prevents the emergence of strong independent research centres, according to
Fieschi and Gaffney (in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998). Overall, it is assumed that France
does not have a strong think tank culture. Gadault (2004) links this situation to the general
under investment in research in France. According to a French professor of European affairs,
French public authorities, traditionally very centralised, are also not open to outside input. "InFrance," he argues, "everyone believes she or he has all the answers. Bercy [the Finance
Ministry] has its own think tank, and they only trust what they produce internally. Somecountries are more open (…), their bureaucracies tend to think less that they do not needexternal support." Another researcher adds that this is "a cultural problem of French elites."
There are however encouraging signs that this culture is changing. "We understand the
problem fast, although it takes a lot of time to find the solution," observes a French official.
There is increased realisation of the importance of Europe among decision-makers, andyounger generations of students and leaders of the corporate sector are finding their place on
the European and international stage.

GERMANY
AN EXCEPTION ON THE EUROPEAN THINK TANK SCENE
SCENE
The system of think tanks in Germany is characterised by a large number of independent
organisations, which are located outside the structures of government but are nonethelesssupported, financed and sometimes even operated by these same structures. There are about
20 think tanks in Germany which display an interest for European questions and which are
therefore included in this study.
The system of think tanks in Germany is unusual in the European context. The types of thinktank are extremely varied. There are, firstly, a large number of “universities without
students”, which main activity is academic research. This category includes the major
institutes dealing with foreign policy, peace and security issues, such as the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP).
Their mission is international and therefore a large part of their activities relates to Europe.
The SWP and DGAP both have research programmes on the European Union. This is focusedfor SWP on European integration, the E.U.’s external relations and security policy, and for
DGAP on Franco-German relations and Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to SWP, whichmain mission is to advise the Federal Government, DGAP is an independent, non-partisan
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 57

organisation similar to the Council for Foreign Relations in New York and the Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs in London.
Also counted as “universities without students” are the six large economic research institutes(DIW in Berlin (Deutsches Institüt fur Wirtschaftsforschung), IFO-Institut, HWWA in Hamburg(Hamburgischen Welt-Wirtschafts Archiv), RWI in Essen (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut fürWirtschaftsforschung), IFW in Kiel (Institüt für Weltwirtschaft) and IWH in Halle). Their
academic research on Europe focuses on the economic aspects of European integration, withthe exception of RWI, which does not undertake European research. For instance, these
institutes seek to place in a European perspective the results of their research on the German
economy. The financing of these economic think tanks, which comes both from the Federal
and Länder Governments, is a reflection of the federal structure of the country.
There exists moreover another group of think tanks, characteristic of Germany’s politicalstructures: the political foundations or “Stiftungen”. According to Martin Thunert (interview),
they have no real equivalent in any other country, with the possible exception of Austria,
Holland and, to a lesser extent, France. They are essentially “idea laboratories” which defend
particular interests and ideologies. Today there are seven such political foundations, of which
the two main ones are the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (close to the SPD) and the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (close to the CDU). These foundations were established in the 1960s,
except for two which are more recent, the Heinrich Boll Stiftung (1996), linked to the Greens,and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, linked to the left-wing PDS.79 These foundations are very
active abroad, for example one of their main roles is to promote democracy in Africa and Latin
America. Their research work does not in fact represent much more than 20 per cent of their
total activities. They are therefore only “partial” think tanks. They are financed wholly by theState and are linked to the political parties represented in the Bundestag. However, in nosense are they instruments of the party leaderships, nor extensions of parties’ internal
research departments.
Until the 1970s the development of think tanks was closely linked to the needs of the State orof corporatist organisations linked to it. For instance, a number of peace research institutes
were created by Social-Democratic Länder governments, such as the Hessische Stiftung fürFriedens- und Konfliktforschung (HFSK), established in Frankfurt in 1970, and the Institüt fürFriedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH), established in 1971 at Hamburg University.
IFSH concentrates exclusively on the E.U.’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even today,
the Federal and Länder Governments are still the main source of funding and infrastructure
support for the majority of think tanks.
In Germany, large companies also undertake research on future scenarios, or assist in setting
up foundations. The latter in turn hire external bodies (often university research centres) tocarry out studies and forecasting, particularly on European questions. The best known of thesefoundations is the Bertelsmann Stiftung, which includes among its six principal fields ofactivity international relations, and thus Europe. In the 1990s, the Bertelsmann Stiftung cameto be seen as one of the most important of the research organisations receiving private
funding. It had at its disposal even greater resources than the largest of the state-financed

58 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledpolicy institutes. Even though the Bertelsmann Stiftung is above all an organisation which
distributes grants for research, its mode of operation also resembles that of a think tank. It
organises its work on its own initiative, determines its own research priorities, and actively
participates in projects, which it itself initiates. Its activities are both national andinternational, with a particular interest in European integration.
Since Germany has a strong university tradition, we also find a large number of think tanks
linked to universities. Many are affiliated to universities or act within a semi-academic
environment, like the Max Planck Institüt für Gesellschaftsforschung, which conducts researchon different aspects of European integration. In the 1990s, some institutes went further andcreated policy research units at universities, such as the Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) and the Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP), whichmain sponsor is the Bertelsmann Stiftung. One of the most recent university-based thinktanks is the Zentrum für Europäische

Integrationsforschung (ZEI), established in 1995 atBonn University. The German Government gave a large grant so that ZEI could be set up, aspart of a wider policy of compensating Bonn after the Federal capital moved to Berlin.
Although all the German think tanks in this survey were founded after the Second World War,the origins of some of the economic research institutes reach back as far as the Weimar
Republic and even Imperial Germany. For instance, four of the six main economic institutes,
HWWA (created in 1908), IFW (1914), DIW (1925), as well as the RWI (created in 1926, but
not included in our survey because of its purely national focus) were re-launched after the war
but already existed before. Certain political foundations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,also existed before the Nazi period.
German think tanks are not only large in terms of their staff numbers but also in terms of thescope of their activities. Only two think tanks work exclusively on European questions: IEP(Institut fur europaisches Politik) and ZEI. All the others undertake research which is oriented
towards international questions in general, and therefore only one part is on Europe.
We can observe several trends concerning the development of think tanks in Germany. They
are becoming, in general, more and more visible. The transfer of the capital to Berlin has
given think tanks a new audience which did not exist in Bonn. The German media are relying
more than ever on think tanks for expert comment, to the detriment of university professors.
Moreover, private sector actors are increasingly interested in think tanks and are funding
them more than before. The Bertelsmann Stiftung is the main one, but the existence of agroup of smaller foundations enables German research institutes to be no longer dependent
solely on public funds. Think tanks are welcoming in addition a growing number of young,dynamic entrepreneurs who sometimes try to create their own research centres, for example,
the BerlinPolis or the Global Public Policy Initiative. German think tanks are also becoming lessideological and more pragmatic. For instance, the political foundations underline that they do
not support a single point of view or source of ideas in spite of their links with the politicalparties. Finally, policy-makers expect now think tanks not only to produce novel politicalideas, but also a strategy for communicating these ideas to a wider audience. We are
therefore witnessing a coming together of the worlds of consultancy and policy advice.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 59

Germany houses a rich community of think tanks working on European questions, one whichis in many ways atypical in the European context. Despite their links with numerous institutes
across the world and the international scope of their activities, German think tanks are verymuch a product of the German federal and parliamentary system and are deeply anchored in
the national political culture and its structures.

GREECERELEVANT THINK TANKS, READY FOR GLOBALGLOBAL CHALLENGES
According to the most recent study, there are 16 think tanks in Greece (McGann & Weaver,2000). The first ones were created between 1945 and 1974. The end of the military regime of
1967-73 stimulated their development further, as did Greece’s accession to the European
Community in 1981. The main areas of interest for Greek think tanks focused on Europe are
Greece’s future position within the EU, as well as its relations with Turkey and the wider“Hellenistic community”80 (McGann, Weaver, 2000). Even though some think tanks receive
public funding, independent research in the political sphere remains relatively undeveloped
but it is nonetheless rapidly growing. The current state of think tanks in Greece can beconsidered to represent the “first wave” in their development, with the creation of academic,
non-partisan research institutes. Other think tanks are affiliated to political parties, like theInstitute of Strategic and Development Studies Andreas Papandreou established in 1995.
Eight Euro-think tanks have been surveyed in Greece in total: three are interested exclusively
in European questions (Hellenic Center for European Studies – EKEM, Greek Center ofEuropean Studies and Research – EKEME, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy– ELIAMEP); three others concentrate more particularly on economic and legal issues at aninternational and European level (Institute for International Economic Relations, Centre forEuropean Constitutional Law – CECL, and the Centre for International and European Economic
Law – CIEEL); and two target more specific subjects, such as the free market, while also
integrating the European dimension (Research Institute for European and American Studies –RIEAS, Society for Social and Economic Studies – EKOME).
The three Euro-specific think tanks were established in the 1980s to make up for a lack ofexpertise on European questions and to respond to a need for independent research centres(ELIAMEP interview). At the time of Greece’s candidacy for membership of the EC, the publicdebate on Europe was often Manichean and divided between those in favour and those against
integration, with little consideration of the real questions which membership raised. The
research of these institutes is centred on E.U. enlargement and the process of European
integration (the application of Community law by Greek public administration, the impact ofenlargement, etc). Their objective is to propose an evaluation of the future outlook for Greece
within the EU, to respond to the specific needs and interests of policy-makers, and toparticipate in the formulation of national policies.
EKEM operates under the institutional supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs andreceives a regular grant from it. It is therefore only semi-independent. However, even though

60 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledresearch priorities are set by the Ministry, it does not interfere, in theory, in the conduct andresults of EKEM’s work. The other think tanks covered here are, for the most part, of thecontract research type. Moreover, they depend on E.U. or international grants, as well as on
donations from their members (EKEME) and the sale of their publications (ELIAMEP).
Government grants are given only on a one-off basis, within the framework of the work
requested by various ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence). Shaped by a national history
punctuated by instability and political upheavals, it seems logical and legitimate that these
institutions should seek a maximum degree of independence vis-à-vis their government. In
the same way, the geographical position of Greece, located at a crossroads of civilisations andat the centre of many strategic questions (NATO, the Cyprus question, Turkey and theBalkans), could explain the proliferation of research centres focused on legal, economic andstrategic issues (CECL, CIEEL, RIEAS, EKOME).

HUNGARY
FROM FOREIGN DEPENDEN
DEPENDENCYCY TO THE E.U. MARKET : AN ATYPICAL LANDSCALANDSCAPEPE FOR AN EMERGING LEADERLEADER
We have identified five "Euro-oriented" think tanks in Hungary that have a significant andcurrent research activity on Europe, mostly from an economic perspective. Two were founded
pre-1989 : the Institute of Economics (1954) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and theprestigious Institute for World Economics (1973) of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, then acentre of propaganda for Soviet ideology. Three are more recently created, independent
research centres: the ICEG European Center (research and network center) was created in
1998, the Századvég Foundation's Centre for Political Analysis in 1996, and the Foundation for
a Market Economy in 1992.
All five focus on economic issues at a national, regional or international level: economic
developments of Central and Eastern Europe, including all issues related to E.U. accession andeconomic transition, management of key issues for the benefit of Hungary's economy andpublic, analysis of the contemporary market economy and the transformation of the
Hungarian economy, underlying trends and factors behind global and regional economic
developments, and their present and future impact on the Hungarian economy, etc.. As forEuro-oriented research, it is focused on E.U. integration, the enlargement process, and EMU,
in the framework of Hungary's economic and political relations with the E.U. and neighbouring
states.
The ICEG, the Szàzadvég Foundation and the Foundation for a Market Economy are smallorganisations with limited staff (6-7), whereas the two academic think tanks enjoy muchlarger research teams (average of 38 in-house researchers). It is due to their status asacademic or contract research tanks. Indeed, between 45 and 55 per cent of the funding forthe two organisations linked to the Academy of Sciences comes from state institutions, while
the three other think tanks depend on contract research and project funding, which implies amuch more unstable budget, often resulting in smaller structures.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 61

Think tanks in Hungary were usually created by the previous regime. Today, most Hungarian
think tanks are still funded via direct budgetary allocations or contracts for services. They
were also often the early recipients of grants from the European Union's PHARE programme.
However,

Westernfundinghas

increasingly

sought

think

tanks

independent

fromgovernmental institutions. This has proved more difficult than in any other country in theregion, since state funding has continued to be a major financial source. Indeed, mostinfluential thinkers remained in state-financed organisations instead of creating their own
independent, non-profit think tanks. Today, most Hungarian think tanks not associated withgovernment institutions have some form of for-profit activities, contract research andconsulting having become a key part of their work (Kimball, in McGann & Weaver, 2000).
Hungarian think tanks which had secured substantial funds from Western Europe and theUnited States in recent years might be affected by the withdrawal of this support. In fact,according to Kimball, "market forces will no doubt thin the field, but the consulting activities
that have developed in the 1990s will ensure the survival of the most advanced
organisations."
The significant development of Hungarian EU-oriented think tanks in the nineties probably
derives from the fact that Hungary was the first Central European country to join the Councilof Europe (in 1990), as well as the first Central European country to apply for E.U. accession.
Hungary then had a leading role to play in terms of EU-oriented research for the whole region,
all the more since it was selected by the NATO summit of July 1997 to join the Alliance in
1999. Furthermore, the socialist Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy set Hungary's accession to
the E.U. as its main goal in 2002. In this he succeeded, as Hungary was granted the status of
most advanced nation in terms of reforms by the European Commission in 2002, which invited
Hungary to join the E.U. in 2004, all of which provided a favourable environment for thedevelopment of Hungarian ‘Euro-think tanks’. Furthermore. 83.76 per cent of Hungarians
sanctioned their country's adhesion to the E.U. during the referendum on April 2003. It would
be interesting to understand to what extent Hungarian think tanks and other local players
played a role in this successful outcome.81

IRELANDGRADUALLY CATCHING-UP?
Two think tanks in Ireland have been included in our survey: the Institute of European Affairs(IEA) and the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Both have their homes in
Dublin. The IEA is a Euro-specific think tank while ESRI has a research agenda which includes
European affairs.
IEA is the only Euro-specific think tank operating in Ireland. Founded in Dublin in 1991 byformer MEP and Irish Labour Party chair, Brendan Halligan, it provides a forum where Irish
decision-makers can meet and discuss European issues. It is a relatively small organisation
with only 10 full-time members of staff, although it has up to 100 occasional contributors to
its work.82 It compensates for its lack of size by maintaining very close ties to the Irish

62 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledpolitical establishment. For example, it hosts official-type events in partnership with the Irish
government when foreign dignitaries visit Dublin – for example during the Irish Presidency of
the E.U. in the first half of 2004. And it regularly briefs the Irish Parliament on European
matters. Its main audience is domestic and E.U. policy-makers, for example the Taoiseach’s
office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Irish officials working in the European institutions.83
Recent work by the IEA has focused particularly on the Nice Treaty and the Future of Europe
debate.
It has been able to exert influence for two main reasons: firstly, because it operates at thecentre of a fairly small network of policy-makers in Ireland who are regularly dealing with
European affairs. Its co-ordinating role in policy discussion in this sector has enabled it toestablish close personal relationships with key politicians and business people in Ireland, whothemselves rely on the institute as a source of information on Europe. And secondly, its
activities are given good coverage by the Irish media, which the IEA considers to be relatively‘switched on’ to European questions.
ESRI is the other think tank covered in our survey. Established in 1960 with the support of theFord Foundation, ESRI is similar to the old guard, government-linked research institutes foundin Germany, the U.S. and Britain. A large proportion of its work is contract research andconsultancy work for Irish government departments, and also the European Commission andits specialized agencies (including Eurostat and the European Foundation for the Improvementof Living and Working Conditions in Dublin). Its EU-oriented areas of work include its
programmesonlabourmarketsandlabourmigration,industrial

developmentandmacroeconomics. Some of its most influential work in the past has been its provision offrameworks in which to evaluate Structural Fund investments, and on Ireland’s participation in
EMU.
There are also a number of other bodies in Ireland which conduct research on European affairs
but which were not included in our survey (because they did not come under our definition of
an independent think tank, as defined in the introduction). One such body is the Dublin
European Institute (DEI), which is part of University College Dublin. The DEI organises visiting
speakers, research roundtables, and two annual lectures on European themes. It also
participates in Framework V research projects. Another is the National Committee for the
Study of International Affairs, based at the Royal Irish Academy. The committee, whose
members includes the Irish Foreign Minister, university academics, and IEA and ESRI staff, iscurrently in the process of re-organising its structures and intends to increase the amount ofpolicy-relevant research which it does in the future.

Harvey (2001) notes the relatively small number of think tanks in Ireland – just five according
to his estimate.84 One of the reasons for this is the lack of funding available for suchorganisations. There are only small numbers of domestic and foreign trusts supporting thinktank work in the country (Harvey, 2001). There is though some corporate sector funding of
think tanks, most notably for the ESRI and IEA, and this will probably be the most likely
source of funding for new think tanks here in the future.
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 63

ITALYA STRIKING LACK OF EURO-THINK TANKS CONSIDERINGCONSIDERING ITALY'S HISTORIC ROLE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRSConsidering that Italy was one of the "Founding Fathers" of the E.U. project, the absence of asingle think tank that has the word "Europe" or the adjective "European" in its name issurprising.85

Currently, there are six relatively large think tanks in Italy with a significant

interest in European matters: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Istituto per gli Studi di
Politica Internazionale (ISPI); Societa per l’Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI); Centro Studi
Politica Internazionale (CeSPI); Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (CENSIS); Fondazione
Rosselli and other two ones (Centro Einaudi e Istituto di Ricerca Cattaneo) which deal

with Europe as a smaller part of their work. Four are based in Rome, two in Turin,
one in Milan and one in Bologna. They all deal with European issues as an increasingly
relevant part of their work and enlargement has influenced them all. However, as previously
mentioned, none of them focuses exclusively on Europe.
Some are organised as non-profit associations (SIOI, CeSPI), others are private institutes(CENSIS, ISPI); all of them are legally recognised as “persone giuridiche” (including IAI and
Fondazione Rosselli). Almost all of them, apart from CENSIS, receive public support from theGovernment and, in particular, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the size of thesubsidy allocated varies quite heavily from one institute to another. They all stressed the factthat this portion of their sources is slowly but progressively decreasing and that they are
relying more and more on private research contracts or other forms of funding. For example,
ISPI, CeSPI and SIOI organise a well-known range of classes and courses that prepare
students for public exams or for administrative careers. The IAI does the same with one or
two day workshops and seminars. CENSIS is the only one which has always based its
resources on its own forces and its capacity to answer market demand. In this regard, they
are all concerned about a recent trend; they pointed out that if on the one hand, lessdependence on Government funding may enhance the independence of research institutes,
the restriction of public sources also implies that they are forced to rely more on private
contracts, which they view as constraining their independence and research freedom.
Italy has no Euro-sceptic think tank, all welcome the development of the EU, support further
integration and welcome the opportunities that this process offers them: a broader
dissemination of their work, more opportunities for collaboration with other organisations,
universities and research centres. For example, IAI is currently leading a project with otherforeign institutes on the possible consequences of the non-ratification of the Constitutional
Treaty by some Member States.
Several common features of independent Italian research centres deserve to be mentioned.
The first one, as several studies have previously indicated, is the near absence of politicalcommitment (Lucarelli, Radaelli, in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 2003). None of the institutes
interviewed seems politically biased nor wishes to be considered so. They are actually weary
of being perceived as supporting a specific political party or coalition. In fact, it is interesting

64 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledto note how two of the latest and most successful entities in the European policy community—
the so-called “policy clubs”—dedicated more to the promotion of political debate anddiscussion than to produce research on a regular basis (Fondazione Italianieuropei e
Fondazione Liberal) are very openly politically biased. A third club, Limes, is considered more
ideologically neutral.86 It remains to be seen, however, whether they will evolve into proper
think tanks, and, if so, whether they will keep a strong ideological position.
The second common feature is the importance which Italian think tanks give to the prestige of
their founders and to the personal charisma of their current directors. Traditionally, the links
with the academic world have been burdensome. Even today, having a well-known founder orbeing directed by a famous leader is considered as vitally important, almost at the same level
as the quality of their research and the organisation of their activities.
Despite the publicity and debate on European issues generated recently by the “policy clubs”,
the state of Euro-think tanks in Italy today paints a somewhat gloomy picture, in particularcompared to the countries like the U.K. and Germany and considering the absence of a single
institute dedicated to European policy issues (although some like the IAI have large research
programmes on the EU). Although a leading Italian journalist claims that “the problem is not
the lack of think tanks but the lack of popular interest and the self-centredness of many
governments," we believe that the presence of easily recognisable groups of "thinking heads"
supporting government decisions and the opposition would improve Italian policy making andgive greater legitimacy to the political debate.
In fact, the public profile of these institutions is rather low. Consequently, their role aspromoters of public debate needs to be enhanced through increased media coverage. To thisend, some organisations may aspire in the future to a clearer and more institutionalised rolein the policy-making process. Some may even reconsider their traditional ideological neutrality
through more clear-cut positions on important issues.
Other institutions, such as the Fondazione Agnelli, Centro di Ricerca Einaudi, Il Mulino (with its
Istituto di Studi e Ricerche Carlo Cattaneo), and the Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, perform
some of the activities of a think tank, but only look marginally at European issues within
broader research areas (international political economy, Italian public policies, Italian culture
and communities, Italian trade, etc.).

MALTA
MUCH STILL TO BE DONE
There are currently no think tanks in Malta interested specifically in European questions. In
fact, only one think tank was counted there in 1997 (McGann & Weaver, 2000), and that wasa relatively new one. The only organisations which activities can be said to be close to those ofa think tank (using our definition) are two university research institutes, which are part of the
University of Malta: the European Documentation and Research Centre (ERDC) and theFoundation for International Studies. ERDC houses the Malta European Studies Association

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 65

(MESA), which is the Centre’s research body on the E.U. Re-opened in 2001, MESA previously
suffered from a lack of official recognition in Brussels, something which had threatened its
existence. However, in 2002 it received from the European Commission a Jean Monnet Project
grant.87 The absence of think tanks in Malta is not due to a lack of interest in European
questions as the research programmes of the university institutes demonstrates.88 As a
Maltese journalist explains, the small population of the island (c. 400,000) is not particularly
conducive to the development of think tanks. The market of ideas is too small and there is noone either willing or capable of setting up and financing such organisations. Finally, thecurrently very conservative political context leaves little room for really independent research,with most research centres being affiliated to political parties.

POLAND
AN EMERGING CENTRE LIMITEDLIMITED BY FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTSCONSTRAINTS
In this new Member State which can lay claim "to the most developed, independent, anddiverse think tank community in the region," (Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000), six thinktanks have a significant interest in European matters. None works exclusively on European
policy questions however. Two are generalist research centres, four are specialised ineconomic matters.
There are two principal types of think tank organisations in Poland: the older, more
"traditional" ones (e.g. the Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1928) and those created after
the system changes in 1989: Adam Smith Research Centre, Centre for Social and Economic
Research, Centre for International Relations, Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (the only
think tank in Poland with its main office outside Warsaw), Institute of Public Affairs.
The research institutes surveyed focus on general aspects of E.U. integration. Accession to the
E.U. and its consequences have naturally dominated the agenda in recent years. Logically,
their size is usually linked to their age. The older organisations are in most cases much larger:
their research teams exceed 20 to 30 researchers, whereas the younger institutes are muchsmaller, with at the most 20 people, often less than 10 permanent staff. All therefore cooperate extensively with external researchers. All can be classified as advocacy tanks, thoughsome of them have the characteristics of contract researchers.
In most cases, public authorities at the national level constitute the main target group of
Polish think tanks. However, we found that there is often little direct contact between thinktanks and national authorities, which is attributed to decision-makers' unwillingness to cooperate. Some think tanks though host former officials, such as the Centre for Social andEconomic Research which often works for the Polish government thanks to its strong relation
with Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, former minister of finance, deputy prime minister, andcurrently the director of the Central Bank (Przybylski, 2004). Many therefore also target
journalists and Polish society in general to try to influence their target groups. They usuallykeep good and frequent contact with the media, by providing opinions, information and advice

66 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

on current events. "There is therefore a natural interest in approaching and appearing on
television and in newspapers," confirms Przybylski (2004).
The main problems faced by Polish think tanks are financial. They are most commonlyorganised as foundations or non-profit associations, with a significant share of their financial
resources coming from foundations (usually foreign), as well as private sponsors, but it isapparently increasingly difficult to obtain financial assistance from important foreign
foundations. Financing seldom comes from the state, except for a few organisations such as
the Polish Institute of International Affairs. This, according to Przybylski (2004), probably
explains Polish think tanks' freedom to criticise the government.

Many institutes haveconsequently developed contracting capabilities and contracts constitute their main source ofincome.89 European Community money, although available in theory since the introduction of
the Phare programme and more easily accessible since May 1, is usually difficult to obtain, as
the administrative process is long and cumbersome. European funding does not therefore
account for an important part of Polish think tanks’ budget.
Beyond the independent research centres selected here, several organisations provide
valuable services, including the Centre for Eastern Studies. Created in 1990, it is financed
from the state budget and looks at E.U. integration in connection with issues in Central andEastern European countries. The Centre for Political Thought, a forum for public debate, alsoorganises some activities on Polish foreign policy and even has an academic course on E.U.
integration. The Institute of Strategic Studies does some occasional work on E.U. matters, aswell as the Polish Economic Society and, most significantly, the Polish Institute ofInternational Affairs, a State body.90

PORTUGALLESS INFLUENTIAL, BUT COMPLEMENTARY TTHINKHINK TANKS
According to our survey results, Portugal is characterised by a relatively low development of
think tanks, as seems to be the case for the Iberian Peninsula in general. There is still a
relative lack of organisations corresponding to our think tank criteria and the concept of 'thinktanks' itself is often hardly understood. According to Freres et al. (2000), this situation is due
to a "recent experience of democratisation," a "relatively underdeveloped" civil society, and"political systems that are heavily dominated by the central governments” (Freres, Seabra, deMoraes, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). However, an increasing number of organisations
presenting the basic features of think tanks appeared in the 1980s, first thanks to the end ofdictatorship and the beginning of the transition, respectively in 1974 and 1975 in Portugal andSpain, and subsequently thanks to the process of E.U. integration, which, starting in thesecond half of the 1970s, was completed in 1986. As a result, academic-style institutions
dominate today's think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula, with a relative lack of "mature"advocacy think tanks (Day, in McGann, Weaver, 2000).
Moreover, it is difficult to identify Euro-specific think tanks in Portugal (and in fact also in
Spain) that are solely dedicated to E.U. issues. In most cases, the research centres' field ofEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 67

work includes one or several issues within the international relations area, including usually
security, environment, international politics, law and economics. In this framework, relevant
references are regularly made to E.U. policies, further integration, the process of enlargement,
and regional co-operation. Significantly, such references are often related, or evenconditioned, by the desire to identify and promote national interests in Europe and at thesame time promote and improve the image of the centres' own country.
Portuguese, as well as Spanish think tanks do, however, provide a distinctly valuable
complement to other think tanks within the E.U. by offering a strong connection with Latin
America, the Mediterranean area, and in the case of Portugal, Africa. This geographic focus
shapes the research priorities of the organisations taken into consideration. In this respect,
Iberian think tanks not only provide a rich pool of specific knowledge, but they also create aconcrete connection with political, cultural and international organisations active in theseareas.
Portugal is a relative newcomer to the E.U. think tank scene. With only two international thinktanks with an interest in European affairs, out of a total of about twenty-five independent
national research centres, this country represents today a small player on the E.U. think tankscene.
The two organisations analysed here are the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IEEI)
and the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). The former, founded in 1980, is
one of Portugal's first think tanks, while the latter is one of its most recent. Both are private,
independent, non-profit institutions, relatively academic, and roughly similar in size.
They target mainly Portuguese and European decision-makers, as well as the media and civilsociety organisations, through publications, conferences and journals. They depend financiallyon public funding and occasionally initiate research projects on behalf of Portuguese publicauthorities, mostly on matters of E.U. integration and foreign policy. The IEEI and IPRI arereflective of the relatively limited role played by think tanks in Portugal compared to university
institutes.

SLOVAKIA
A NASCENT BUT DETERMINEDDETERMINED GROUP OF CONTRIBUTORSCONTRIBUTORSSlovakia, which "think tank community is by far the most politicised in Central Europe,"(Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000) has five think tanks with a particular interest in European
policy matters. One, the Centre for European Policy, is specialised in European issues,
another, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, is a multi-disciplinary international relations
think tank, the remaining three include Europe as a significant part of their overall activities:
Institute for Public Affairs IVO, the Centre for Economic Development, and the Centre for
Economic and Social Analyses M.E.S.A. 10.
As is generally the case in other new Central European Member States, Slovak think tanks are
non-profit foundations or non-governmental organisations. Usually they receive their financial

68 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledresources from private foundations (very often the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Ford
Foundation) and from private sponsors. Besides, some are partially self-financed by theirconsulting activities, others get part of their finance resources from the State.
Almost all the think tank organisations in the Slovak Republic are young. They were createdafter and as a result of the political changes in the beginning of the 90s. As a result of theprocess of the integration of the Republic into the E.U. structures, their research and otheractivities usually deal with general aspects of E.U. integration, most often the preparations for
integration and the evolution of the legal and practical situation of the country. Besides, theyalso cover current European issues, for instance the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty andthe first European parliamentary elections after enlargement. Slovak think tanks usually haveless than ten full time researchers. Apart from the permanent ones, they often co-operatewith external researchers, whose number depends on projects carried out. Like most otherindependent research centres in new Central European Member States, they can be classified
as “advocacy tanks.”
In most cases, public authorities at the national level are Slovak think tanks' main target
group. They are also interested in co-operating with journalists and informing Slovak society
in general. The last aspect makes the presence in media very important from their point ofview. On the other hand, working through the media, as well as the organising conferences
and seminars and publishing remain the most important ways of influencing their first target
group, as quite often there are no direct contacts between the think tanks and the authorities,
or at least such contacts are not frequent.
As is again the case for other Central Europe Member States, Slovak think tanks' main
problems are financial. As a result of the process of E.U. integration, it is increasingly difficult
to get financial assistance from foreign foundations, as these gradually move their focus ofattention eastwards, to Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet Union and non-E.U.
Republics. On the other hand, the procedures of applying for E.U. grants are long andcomplex.

Consequently,

seekingfinancialresources

elsewherecreates

problemsofindependence. For that reason, some of the interviewed organisations openly refuse Statefunding.

SLOVENIAJOINING THE CLUBDespite the relatively small size of the country (a little under 2 million inhabitants), we found
one think tank in Slovenia that meets our criteria, the Institute of Economic Research,
established in 1995 as a non-governmental organisation. It focuses specifically on economic
issues. It describes itself as an “autonomous non-governmental research organisation with along tradition in the field of macroeconomics and microeconomics analysis.” More recently,
research has been carried out on specific policy issues regarding Europe, for instance thereadiness and the timing of Slovenia's inclusion in the E.U. and EMU.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 69

SPAINRECENT THINK TANKS IN A DEVELOPING SECTOR
SECTOR
As is also visible in Portugal, the think tank scene in the Iberian Peninsula is relatively recent
and underdeveloped in Spain. The representatives of the think tanks whom we interviewed
confirmed this situation, and actually mentioned this lack of think tanks as one of the keyreasons for the creation of their institute. There are indications however from interviews withobservers of the sector that things are evolving and that, despite severe constraints, many
think tanks are seeking to innovate.
We have identified seven independent research institutes in Spain with a significant European
research programme. Five are in the capital Madrid, two in Barcelona. None is ‘Euro-specific’,
the European Union is only one research issue within a wider complex of international topics.
A common feature is the special attention paid to Spanish interests within the European
Union. The majority of the think tanks taken into consideration are organised as private nonprofit associations, except for IEMED (European Institute for the Mediterranean), which is amixed consortium of public and private actors. Nevertheless, most of them receive asubstantial part of public financing at the regional, national or community level. A special caseis the Instituto Elcano, which limits its public contribution to 15 per cent.
All the think tanks analysed were created after 1978, shortly after the death of Franco and theadoption of a new democratic constitution. The majority are therefore recent, and wereformed between 1989 and 2001. Most think tanks were created to encourage a public debate
on international and European issues and Spain's ever-closer integration within the EU, with amarked positive evaluation of such a process. Their resources are usually relatively limited.
Their staff is between 15 and 20 persons, including academics and administrative staff. Elcano
here also is the exception, with more than 40 regular employees and an extended network of
external collaborators.
In terms of audience, all the think tanks surveyed seek to target the general public through awide range of publications. Some are more oriented toward the academic community(CIDOB), while others clearly aspire to influence more the decision-making community (IPAE,
IEMED, Elcano). Moreover, a third clearly show a definite political orientation and therefore
work more closely with certain political groups (Fundación FAES and Fundación Pablo
Iglesias).

All the organisations taken into consideration promote research and releasepublications. Nearly all organise public events, such as conferences and seminars. Two offer
also teaching programmes on a regular basis, mainly in the form of postgraduate studies(FOG, CIDOB), whereas the others (IPAE, IEMED, Elcano) focus on monographic seminars anddirect contact with decision-makers. According to McGann and Weaver categories, two are“Academic Think tanks / Universities without students;” three are borderline, between
academic and advocacy tanks; two focus on contract research in cooperation with publicauthorities. The remaining two are more typical of “Party Think Tanks”, linked to the Peoples’
Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE).

70 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledFinally, it is important to mention the existence of Spanish organisations that have think tanklike activities and exert significant influence. Some University departments develop importantresearch activities on the EU, such as the Fundación Ortega y Gasset (a non profit private
association and well-known cultural foundation with branches in Spain and abroad and does
research on European law, economics, and trade); IDEE (Institute of European studies,
Universidad San Pablo CEU); UNISCI (Research Unit on Security and International
Cooperation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid); and IUEE (University Institute forEuropean Studies, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). Two bank foundations (BBVA and La
Caixa) yield significant influence over the national scientific community. They do not perform
internal research, but sponsor other institutes, offer scholarships and promote publications.
They organise purely non-profit activities that are research and development-oriented. They
use their own financial resources and do not depend therefore on any public institution orpolitical party. Also, we did not include the Instituto para la Política Ambiental Europea (IPAE),
although it contributes to research on European environmental law and policy because it does
not have a website.

SWEDENFACING DOWN THE FUNDI
FUNDINGNG CHALLENGE
Five think tanks in Sweden were included in our survey of Euro-think tanks: one, the Swedish
Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) was Euro-specific, the other four were Eurooriented. These were the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Timbro, and the Centre for Business and Policy
Studies (SNS).91
All the Swedish think tank directors interviewed for the study said that there was not a ‘thinktank tradition’ in Sweden. However, we did find five institutes working on European questions
and this was certainly a higher figure than for their Scandinavian neighbour, Denmark.
SIEPS, the only Euro-specific think tank, was set up in 2002 on the initiative of the Swedish
Government, who believed that there was too little public policy research being conducted in
Sweden on European questions. They therefore sought to remedy this by establishing an
independent research agency charged with looking at European policy. SIEPS is government
funded and its management board includes representatives from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministers Office. It acts as a bridge between theacademic sector and policy-makers and one of its roles is to commission research byacademics into European questions (it gives out grants for this purpose.) However, it also has
an in-house research team of its own (see below).
Two other, larger government-funded research institutes also operate in this sector. These are
SIIA (1938) and SIPRI (1966). Their role differs significantly to that of an advocacy think tankin the British or American mould. For example, in addition to their research, they also fulfil an
important public service function, which includes distributing information to the public via
schools, bookshops and their specialist research libraries, as well as organising a number ofEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 71

public lectures. However, other think tanks in this survey have also developed close ties to
Swedish civil society: for instance, SNS has an impressive grassroots membership base andits local branches – found throughout Sweden and abroad – hold an average of 150 meetingsa year for SNS members.
The history and organisational structures of SIIA and SIPRI are revealing in that they illustrate
the close links which have always existed between think tanks and the Swedish state.92 Both
SIIA and SIPRI were created by Acts of Parliament. Typically, 50 per cent or more of theirfunding comes directly from the state: SIPRI, which was set up in the 1960s in part “tocommemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace”, is an independent foundation andreceives an annual grant from the Swedish Parliament; and SIIA receives funding from theSwedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The government also appoints SIPRI’s governing board
and director. However, both are able to maintain their scholarly independence. SIIA by law
must be politically independent and it is owned by the Swedish Foreign Policy Assembly, a
non-government body composed of journalists, academics and other figures from Swedish
public life. SIPRI also insists that in spite of the aforementioned links, no attempt is made by
the government to influence its research agenda.
Privately funded think tanks are rare in Sweden. There are, however, some examples: SNS, arelatively old think tank founded in 1948 by a group of Swedish businessmen keen to improvethe business community’s understanding of and input to public policy, relies on a mix of public
and private support for it research; and Timbro (1978), an advocacy think tank with a freemarket philosophy, is part of the Free Enterprise Foundation, an organisation financed by the
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.
Regarding their European research, SIEPS produces research on both internal and external
aspects of the European Union and is also interested in the draft Constitution. Both SIPRI and
SIIA conduct important work on European security issues, with a particular focus on the EUNATO relationship. SIIA’s research programmes also cover EU-Russia relations, security andenlargement questions in the Baltic region, and international environmental and trade policy.
SNS’s focus mainly on comparative aspects of economic and business policy in Sweden andthe rest of Europe, while Timbro’s European work is focused on promoting liberal economic
solutions in policy areas such as international trade, CAP and the welfare state.
As to the influence which these institutes exert, this varies according to the different missions
they have. SIPRI’s main audience is the international diplomatic community (particularly inless developed countries) and international civil society. This is illustrated by the fact thatmany of its staff, 90 per cent of its governing board, and the current director are foreigners,
and that the majority of its publications are in English. SIIA, on the other hand, publishes
mainly in Swedish and its work gets a considerable amount of coverage in the national andregional press.93 It sees one of its main roles as transmitting new ideas from abroad on foreign
policy to the Swedish public as a whole. SIEPS is more influential within government circles
and the university sector: for example, it takes part in government consultation exercises andit also is involved in Framework VI research projects with universities both in Sweden andabroad. Finally, SNS, which espouses “reasonable” free market views, also seeks to maintain

72 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

a good dialogue with whichever government is in power in Sweden, regardless of their politicalorientation.
The think tanks interviewed for the survey said that they face a number of important
challenges for the future: the first is the question of funding. The Swedish government has
been keen to limit spending on the established research institutes in recent years. And it has
been encouraging the larger institutes to search for more corporate funding in future.
However, these institutes face difficulties adapting because corporate funders usually have apreference for financing think tanks with an ideology rather than non-partisan bodies such as
themselves, which can appear to outsiders like government agencies. This dilemma has thepotential to threaten the long-term viability and organisational capacity of the larger research
institutes, such as SIIA and SIPRI, particularly if the government decides to cut their budgets
significantly in future.
A second challenge facing the Euro-think tanks is the apparently low level of public interest in
Sweden for European issues. This is indicated by the fact that it was the government who took
the initiative to create a Euro-specific think tank in 2002. Also the media is not always
supportive of these think tanks. For example, one think tank director said: “The poor
knowledge among most journalists means that it is difficult to get across with more nuanced
or subtle views on Europe.”
One of the causes is undoubtedly the deep divide in Sweden between those broadly supportiveof the EU, and those who are hostile to further integration because of fears about a loss ofpolitical and economic sovereignty. As in the UK, this leads the government to adopt acautious stance on European issues, which may have an important impact on the relative
influence of Euro-think tanks. Hence, the same director complained that the Swedish debate
on European issues “is still, almost ten years after the Swedish accession to the [EU]structured along the same old yes/no divide… the legacy of the two referenda held in 1994
(on accession) and 2003 (the euro) is still evident.” He argued that the result of this was “astrong tendency from the government’s side to defend the status quo”. The success of theEurosceptic list in the June European Parliament elections had merely served to reinforce thistendency.
A third challenge comes from the university sector. There are a number of university centres
already carrying out significant work on the EU, for instance the Jean Monnet Centres at theuniversities of Lund and Gothenburg. Swedish universities have traditionally viewed thinktanks as a threat rather than as potential partners. One think tank director hoped that thismight change and there could be more collaboration between the two sectors in future, with agreater exchange of staff and expertise occurring between them.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 73

UNITED KINGDOMTHINK TANKS SHAPED BY TRADITIONAL POLITICALPOLITICAL FAULT LINES ON EUROPE
The survey found 16 Euro-think tanks currently operating in the UK; seven are Europespecific, the remaining nine are Euro-oriented. Many other domestically-oriented think tanks(e.g. Civitas, Centre for Reform, Demos, Fabian Society) do look at the European Union fromtime to time but they are excluded here because their work on Europe tends to be only anoccasional paper or project – for example on the draft Constitution – and not a systematic
treatment of the subject.94 A think tank network called the Stockholm Network is also
included. It is a partnership of free market think tanks with members in the UK, Scandinavia
and France, operated from London (see Annex 2).
Think tanks covered in the survey are usually one of three organisational types: a charity, anon-profit company limited by guarantee, or a registered company. Sometimes they are botha charity and a company limited by guarantee (CLG). The majority are membershiporganisations and have a wide range of both corporate and individual supporters.
Broadly speaking, the second-tier, Euro-oriented think tanks tend to be longer-establishedorganisations than the Euro-specific think tanks, which are a relatively recent phenomenon.
For instance, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) was founded in 1920 and theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. These think tanks were established
to examine questions of foreign policy and nuclear weapons respectively but both now havequite important European programmes - for example IISS has focused recently on thestrategic implications of NATO and E.U. enlargement to Eastern Europe. Another think tankwhich original raison d’être is not the study of the E.U. but which nonetheless does important
European work is the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 1960).
The development of the Euro-specific think tanks in the U.K. mirrors in many ways thedifferent phases in the E.U.’s history. The Federal Trust was created in 1945 at a time when
the debate on the need for a new, unified structure of governance for Europe after the war
was at its height. The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), set up in 1980,
appeared at a time when environmental questions were gaining more political salience inEurope. And the newer Euro-specific think tanks like the Centre for European Reform (as wellas the second-tier Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)) have tended to focus mostly on questions of
E.U. institutional and economic reform (including Britain’s possible entry to the single
currency) – the main political debate in the E.U. in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The Euro-specific think tanks are smaller organisations than the others in the survey, never
having a core staff of more than about 20 people. Budgets are not as large as in the Americanor German think tanks and the emphasis is usually on maintaining a small but dynamic teamof researchers capable of ‘punching above their weight’ and using their good contacts in the
media and government circles to compensate for their small size. The Euro-oriented thinktanks are often much larger organisations: ODI, for instance, has 80 staff and 45 researchers,
RIIA has a staff of 66, and the IISS has a staff of 46 including 25 researchers.

74 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledRegarding transnational structures, only one of the think tanks has a second office in Brussels,that is IEEP, and this was only set up in 2001. IISS – which is one of the few truly global thinktanks, with offices in the U.S. and Singapore – also runs joint events with CEPS in Brussels on
European defence and security issues via its ‘European Security Forum’. This does not meanthat the other think tanks are not focused on Brussels: for example, half of the Centre forEuropean Reform’s (CER) seminars are held in the Belgian capital. But limited funding is a big
constraint for think tanks wanting to expand in this direction.
Wider pressures in the U.K. think tank market shape euro-think tanks’ research activities. The
market is very congested and space for new and original research is limited. Therefore, in
response to this competition the Euro-specific think tanks either carry out general research on
the E.U. (e.g. CER, FPC, Federal Trust) or they develop a particular research ‘niche’ in which
to operate. The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a good example of the latter type: it
operates in the sphere of economic policy research. Founded in 1983, it is different from a
traditional think tank in that it has no in-house researchers. Instead, for its research output it
relies on a loose network of 650 economists based in universities across Europe. Despite being
funded by U.K. bodies, its outlook is therefore essentially international and much of its work is
on macroeconomics at the E.U. level. Other examples of ‘niche’ operators would be the British
Institute of International Comparative Law (E.U. and international law), the European Policy
Forum (regulatory politics), and the IEEP (E.U. environmental policy).
The large number of institutes dealing with defence and strategic studies (at the national andinternational level) has probably also prevented the emergence of any think tank working
exclusively on the European angle of these questions. RIIA, IISS, and the Centre for Defence
Studies at King’s College (the only university-based U.K. think tank in this study) all havesubstantial programmes and/or projects on European defence matters.
As regards funding, none of the think tanks surveyed receive core funding from the State. On
the other hand, many do receive funding for specific projects from government departments
and the European Commission. This includes the Federal Trust, FPC, and IEEP. All the thinktanks in the survey rely on a mix of foundation, corporate support, and private donations fortheir financing. Some of the most important foundations supporting European research are theJoseph Rowntree Trust, the Cadbury Trust and the James Maddison Trust. The Economic andSocial Research Council also finances at least one Euro-specific think tank. Corporate
sponsorship often comes from large US, British, or European multinationals with a proEuropean outlook, such as Unilever, BT, GlaxoSmithKline and Tesco.
Despite an often heavy reliance on corporate funding, all the think tanks maintain that thisdoes not affect their editorial independence. In the view of a number of directors, the key tothis is ensuring a diverse funding base. As one said, “the fact that we have 35 corporate
funders means that if one tried to interfere in any way with what we were doing, we could
simply sack them.” However, while in most cases funders are well aware of the need tomaintain an arms-length relationship with their think tank, many of the think tanks also
accept private money for specific projects. As previously mentioned, the U.K. Government andthe European Commission only give project funding to U.K. think tanks. In both cases a think

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 75

tank is likely to design project at least partly to meet a funder’s requirements. This raises
questions about the long-term research autonomy of British think tanks. In fact, the directorof one think tank even said that he believed that think tanks were becoming increasingly likeconsultancies, “providing unpalatable advice or conclusions so that the government doesn’t
have to”.
The influence which these think tanks have varies according to a number of factors. An
important one is a perceived closeness of a think tank to the Government. For example, both
CER’s views on Europe (pro-European but also in favour of E.U. reform) and FPC’s (proEuropean but with an essentially intergovernmental outlook) match those of the Blair
Government. The origins of both are also closely linked to the rise to power of the New Labour
political elite in the mid- to late 1990s.95 They have therefore been more successful at exerting
influence than the Federal Trust in recent years, whose views on Europe are currently outside
the political mainstream. However, this was not the only factor determining influence. A
successful media strategy, the pragmatism of its policy proposals, and the quality of theresearch output all appeared to be important factors of influence too (see CER case study).
Other think tanks in this field, such as IEEP and ODI, can also be considered influential but
their influence is mainly exerted within a distinct “epistemic” community. In IEEP’s case, thiswould be with the U.K. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, green legislators
in Brussels, and the wider environmental think tank and NGO sector.
Two further observations can be made about the think tank sector in the U.K. of relevance tothis study. The first is the trend toward more coverage of international and European themes.
This is particularly visible in some of the larger, domestic policy think tanks. For example, theInstitute for Public Policy Research is currently in the process of building up a newinternational programme. This could be explained by the increasing Europeanisation of thedomestic policy debate in the UK: more policy sectors are influenced by E.U. legislation than
before and the domestic think tanks are probably adapting their work to reflect this.
Secondly, think tanks are also affected by the polarisation of the political debate on Europe inGreat Britain. The debate in the media and party politics is often of the “pro- or anti-EU”
variety and this limits the potential for think tanks to engage with other political actors in amore nuanced debate on European themes. For example, because of the Government’s
cautious approach in public on questions such as the euro, or the draft Constitution, it has
been hard for think tanks to gain support from the Government for a pro-European policy
platform. This will not, however, prevent pro-European think tanks like the Federal Trust frombacking the new Constitution in the run-up to the referendum planned for next year.96
Eurosceptic organisations now claim they hold the initiative in this debate since theGovernment’s decision in 2003 to postpone any decision on joining the euro until after the
next election. A number of Eurosceptic groups and organisations opposed outright to Britain’s
membership of the E.U. have emerged in recent years on the political scene, often backed byConservative politicians and wealthy businessmen. One such organisation included in our
survey because it has an in-house research capacity is the European Foundation, founded by
Tory MP Bill Cash after the Maastricht Treaty debate.97

76 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledIn addition, some of the domestically oriented, right wing think tanks, such as Civitas, haverecently used the debate on the draft E.U. Constitution to publish papers which are thinlyveiled attacks on the European Union and British membership. The referendum on theConstitution could therefore prove a watershed for the pro-European think tanks because they
may be called upon to rebut more vigorously the claims of the anti-E.U. camp.98

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 77

2.3 SPECIFICITIES OF THINK
THINK TANKS IN THE TEN NEW
NEW MEMBER STATESA key factor specific to think tank expansion in the new Member States has been the lack ofinstitutions that could, until recently, undertake policy research and analysis. Most Central
European think tanks were created after 1989 with foreign support.99 Apart from Malta andCyprus, the great majority of independent research institutes were indeed created after thesystem changes, with only a handful that were in existence prior to 1990 (e.g. the Institute of
Economics of the Academy of Science, Latvia, 1946). The older institutions were generally
government agencies until budget cuts forced them to find alternative sources of funding.
As a result, the majority have less than 20 or even 10 researchers, although a couple havenearly 80 researchers. Research is often not even the only activity for people who work forEuro-think tanks. University professors for instance only dedicate part of their attention tothink tank activities. Research institutes very rarely have the means to open offices outside
their home capital and none is present in Brussels. There is also a smaller proportion of Eurospecific think tanks in the ten new members states, as most are general international affairs
or economic research institutes, though for some with a very strong interest in E.U. affairs
and apparently significant influence in this field.
Most reported that they encounter difficulties in their direct contact with authorities. Many
concentrate on indirect, public-oriented activities. This may be a result of their relative youth,
but also of the authorities’ lack of receptiveness to external advice and expertise. Indeed,"given the absence of independent research institutes during communism, think tanks face
the formidable task of teaching government who they are and how they can help." (Johnson,
1996)
In addition to all European think tanks' financial worries, certain sources of money specific tothis region, such as U.S. and other foreign foundations, have started moving eastwards, toformer USSR and non-E.U. countries (see Kimball, in McGann, Weaver, 2000). Yet think tanks
have not fully succeeded so far in tapping into E.U. sources of funding, as they are learning
the mechanisms and networks required to access such funds. It also appears that publicfunding is less available than in the other 15 E.U. Member States and that private funding is
not yet sufficient. Foreign funders include the European Union, other national governments,and foreign banks, foundations and companies (often from the U.S. and Germany).100
Universities, private businesses, banks, and occasionally foundations from the home country
are another significant source of funding. Many think tanks therefore undertake consultancy
work.
Think tanks in this region tend to focus on issues of direct interest to their governments andcountries, mostly enlargement and general questions of E.U. integration to assist officials andincrease the level of public awareness. Although young, the think tanks monitored display ahealthy network of contacts with their peers around Europe and the world, in particularthrough the organisation of joint events. Think tanks in the Baltic States have been
particularly close to Scandinavian and Finnish organisations, some even receiving material
support from these countries.

78 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

According to Johnson (1996), "despite the numerous challenges facing Central Europe's thinktanks, their capacity to adapt to changing conditions is impressive." The future will likely put
this flexibility to test, with increasing financial pressure.

2.4 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION
RELATIVE
LATIVE TO EUROPE’S NEEDS ?
CONCLUSION : A LACK OF SUPPLY RE
It has been noted elsewhere that, compared to the United States, Europe's think tankcommunity is insufficiently developed (Gadault, 2004). The contrast is particularly strong
when one compares this community with the media and the lobbying industry specialised inEuropean affairs (Féat, 2004). There are more accredited journalists in Brussels than in
Washington and the interest group community in Brussels is at least as large as the number ofcivil servants working for the European Commission (Greenwood, 1997).

Yet, if one pools

together the total capacity of the think tanks surveyed here, we find an approximate total ofresearchers working more or less closely on European policy issues of nearly 3,000.101
Furthermore, it is important to stress again the fact that many organisations complement theactivities of the think tanks listed: universities, networks of university research centres,102
public bodies, etc. Some are mentioned in the country reports above. Many others were notlisted here, such as specialised agencies of the European Union, (e.g. the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions), to name just one
example. These organisations also undertake significant policy research. All would deserve
further analysis than this survey allowed in order to understand fully the contribution of thinktanks to European policy-making in relation to fellow organisations. Think tanks networks,
briefly presented in Annex 2, as well as academic research communities also offer some usefuladditions to the organisations described here.
On the other hand, the new European Union has a population since 1st May 2004 of over 450
million. Its institutions are responsible for drafting many of the laws which matter most today
at the national level. Considering how much is at stake, do European think tanks do a
sufficient amount of “thinking” which contributes to the E.U. decision-making process? And
what measures can be taken to develop further their output? These are the two mainquestions which we will address in the following sections.

17

Not all the think tanks in these countries gave details of their annual budgets. However, a sufficient number
did for us to be able to give an average figure.

18a) Preparing a country for accession: European Institute of Cyprus; Institute for European Studies (Finland);
EKEME (Greece); Center for European and Transition Studies (Latvia) b) Government initiative to improve thelevel of E.U. analysis: IWE-ICE (Austria); EKEM (Greece); SIEPS (Sweden) c) Forum for the analysis of acountry’s position within the EU: ELIAMEP (Greece); IEA (Ireland); European Documentation and ResearchCenter (Malta) d) Examining specific area of E.U. policy (e.g. environmental or social policy): IPAE (Spain);
IEEP (UK); OSE (Brussels) e) Enhancing quality of debate: Europe 2020 (France); Friends of Europe (Brussels)f) New platform for researchers and students to express their views on Europe: EUROPEUM (Czech Republic);g) Supporting European integration: IAI (Italy); Fondation Robert Schuman (France); Polish Robert SchumanFoundation; Federal Trust (UK); Notre Europe (France) h) Opposing further integration: Bruges Group (UK) i)
Economic reform: Lisbon Council (Brussels) j) Interest from the corporate sector: EPC (Brussels).

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 79

...........
19

For example, ELIAMEP in Greece was established in 1988 to examine Greece’s relationship with other states in
the Mediterranean, Balkan and Black Sea regions and the Center for European and Transition Studies in Latvia
was founded in 2000 “to respond to the challenges of E.U. enlargement.”

20

Now part of the Pan-European Institute.

21

Think tank numbers grew rapidly in these states, together with the number of other civil society organisations,
often with support of foreign donors and foundations (e.g. the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, 1991). It
was natural for many of these new think tanks to orient themselves toward European questions because
Europe was of central importance to their country’s security and future economic prosperity. Also, as thesecountries applied to join the E.U. from the mid-1990s onwards, the need for analysis of E.U. policies—and how
their country could adapt to them—grew even further.

22

France: Confrontations Europe (1991); Europartenaires (1994); Europe 2020 (1992); Fondation Robert
Schuman (1991); Notre Europe (1996). Britain : EPF (1992) ; Centre for European Reform (1997) ; Foreign
Policy Centre (1998). Germany: ZEI (1995); Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung(1990)

23

Brussels: Centre for New Europe (1993); EPC (1996); Friends of Europe (1999); Lisbon Council (2003); The
Centre (2004).

24

This is clearly not an exhaustive classification, but it reflects as accurately as possible the complex and diverse
range of research areas covered by the think tanks surveyed (i.e. not individual research products). The list
has been constructed using all the themes defined as core research areas by the single think tanks andsubsequently by aggregating them in this simplified range of categories. The difference between single-issue
and multi-issue organisations must be taken into account here : in the first case the identification of the topic
is easier, whereas in the second it is sometimes necessary to select only a few core subjects within a scope
which at first sight seems to cover the entire European political panorama.

25

This definition of “Constitutional affairs”, in which we have chosen to insert all references to community law
studies and to the process of “European construction” or “deepening” of the Union, is very broad. There isindeed an obvious difference between classical Community law studies, which distinguish between these twocategories and the think tanks analysed which do not make this distinction.

26

We have created this category as certain think tanks refer to the role of their country or their national interests
within the community system. With such a formula, we intend to summarise all references made by thinktanks to measures taken in order to improve the position or the image of their respective country in the E.U.
The Greek Centre of European Studies and Research (EKEME) for instance constantly monitors the Greek
membership of the Union. The Spanish Real Instituto Elcano tries to identify and promote the Spanish position
regarding major international issues; and several Central-Eastern European institutes concentrate on assisting
their governments in overcoming difficulties related to the enlargement.

27

With rare exceptions, such as the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels.

28

Few organisations declared being involved with parliamentary scrutiny of legislation for instance.

29

Germany: IEP, SWP, DGAP, Internationales Institut fur Politik und Wissenschaft, Bertelsmann Stiftung, FES,
Hans-Siedel Stiftung, DIW, IfW, IFO, HWWA, CAP, ZEI, MZES, ZEW (15) - UK: E.U. Policy Network, EPF,
Federal Trust, CER, IEEP, ODI, FPC, Policy Network, RIIA, CEPR, Stockholm Network (11) - Italy: IAI, CeSPI,SIOI, ISPI, CENSIS (5) - Brussels : CEPS, EPC, ETUI, Friends of Europe, OSE, Lisbon Council, ISIS Europe,
MEDEA, EU-Asia Institute (10).

30

CEPS for instance takes pride in providing a meeting place where representatives from the Commission andthe European Parliament can meet corporate members, NGO activists, and others to reflect in a neutral
environment. Such CEPS 'taskforces' are meant to allow ideas to emerge from different fields of activity.

31

The popularity of such events is not surprising as this activity has the value of enabling a franker exchange ofviews between Governments and think tanks than the more formal and open setting of a seminar or
conference and allow think tank researchers to conduct more in-depth discussions.

32

For example at the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights in Copenhagen or at SIPRI’s
library in Solna, near Stockholm.

33

A Commission official argues for instance about think tanks' research and debating activities: "Il y a toujours
les mêmes, on tourne en rond. Il faut par exemple aller parler d'Europe dans les zones d'éducation prioritaire,pas pour faire gadget, mais pour écouter ce qu'ils ont à dire sur l'Europe." A U.K. grassroots activist agrees
that EU-specific think tanks in Great Britain "are influential, but only within the 'Westminster village'."34

One exception was CEPR, which produced 500+ discussion papers per annum.

35

Because of the nature of our study, it is difficult to assess the overall research value of these in-house
journals.

36

E.g. the IEEP in the U.K. provides this for the U.K. Environment Agency.

80 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
37

E.g. Centre for European and Transition Studies, Latvia.

38

Examples of foundations were the Joseph Rowntree Trust in the U.K. and Ireland, and the Ford Foundation andthe Open Society Foundation in Eastern Europe.

39

These activities were particularly important for Italian think tanks.

40

In the DIIS, for example, researchers with only Master’s degrees are employed on temporary contracts lasting
one to two years.

41

E.g. see details in table of Policy Network in UK, IAI in Italy and, in the country reports, Progressivt Centrum in
Denmark.

42

Through various public events. It is also possible to detect a minority of think tanks aware of the influential
role they can have for policy-makers; the Finland Pan European Institute claims that it generates information
on new phenomena “for the use of decision-makers in government and business communities.” Here also thinktanks appear more policy-oriented.

43This is what would distinguish for example the IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales) in Belgiumfrom its more academic peer, the GEPE (Groupe d'Etude des Politiques Européennes).

44

The think tank directors interviewed in Sweden, for example, saw one of their roles as providing certain
services to the public. This could include ensuring public access to their library, publishing part of their work forschool and university students, educational courses, and the organising of meetings of local membershipbranches both across Sweden and abroad.

45

A prominent Dutch institute agrees that a think tank "has to be innovative, to have new ideas and to findsupport for its action on them." Another, talking about two of the most influential tanks in Europe claims that"what we like about them is that they go on unexplored paths, they think about issues that are not on theagenda yet and therefore they influence policy-makers." Such views can be linked to the agenda of the first
advocacy tanks in the United states, where "thinking the unthinkable" was a must after World War II.

46

This networking aspect is much appreciated by an Irish journalist we interviewed, because it gave him accessthrough the think tank to knowledge about the latest policy developments and also to people and organisations
working in politics in different countries. He also believed that think tank events give politicians the chance toengage in debate with an informed audience in a way that is no longer possible in the media (for example, on
television). This dialogue is important for democracy in his view. One of the IEA’s directors believes that thistype of facilitating and mediating role is becoming more important now for many European think tanks. For
example, many of the Brussels think tanks, such as CEPS, also provide this service.

47

Some insist on the need to be independent "of any organisation, movement or private or public institution"(the GRIP in Belgium), others that an organisation should be "in no way dependent on an exclusive public or
private partner", that it should carry out all its research tasks "in a spirit of total academic freedom," (IRRI,
Belgium), and finally others that think tanks should not have political party affiliations (e.g. the Polish Centre
for International Relations). CEPS's website claims its "complete independence to set its own priorities andfreedom from any outside influence."48

Many think tanks, such as ISIS Europe, mentioned to us that they were also in the process of diversifying theirsources of funding.

49

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Berlin, illustrates a dilemma which many other think tanks face. For the FES,
independence "is sometimes a bit difficult because 95 per cent of our money comes from the government, butpart of our deal is that we have to account for the funds we get but do not have to report on what we aregoing to do. We report only after the research has been completed."

50

This view was expressed by the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris (EUISS), a European
Agency totally financed through the E.U. budget. For several German think tanks, being affiliated to auniversity is also a safeguard against party influence. CESS, the Dutch Centre for European Security Studies
similarly "stays away from corporate funding." On the other hand, others such as the Pan-European Institute in
Finland seek to protect their independence by relying mostly on private funds, or argue that contract researchbetter helps them manage their independence. The Centre for European Policy in Slovakia declares that it is "ahighly independent and critical think tank," and therefore refuses money from the State (which it also admits
the government would not want to give it anyway).

51

This is the case for instance for the Prague Institute of International Relations, or the Institut fürFriedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at the University of Hamburg

52

At the SWP in Berlin, all important decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority of the Board of Trustees, which
specific role is to guarantee the SWP's independence. The members of the Board include leading scientists,
economists and other public figures as well as representatives of various federal ministries and parties in the
Bundestag. Those from the “political side” cannot numerically form a two-thirds majority of their own. At the
MZES (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische SozialForschung) at the University of Mannheim, the researchers
submit proposals, which are evaluated by an external scientific advisory board. In the Scandinavian research

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 81

...........
institutes there is often a board or council responsible for overseeing the work of the institute. Such a body isoften composed of a mix of civil servants, academics, journalists and other public figures. Even if thegovernment is present on these boards, the involvement of other actors here usually enables the institute tomaintain an arms-length relationship with the former.
53

The Institut Royal des Relations Internationales in Brussels tries to prevent external pressure by targeting its
research work at a variety of audiences and by always providing sound practical recommendations "so thateven those who may be against what we say can see the practical merits of our research." "Recruiting among
the best researchers" is part of ELIAMEP's strategy in Greece.

54

The EUISS sees itself as the only true E.U. think tank thanks to its official status. In the UK, "perceived
closeness to government” is often clearly stated as an effective way of being influential and effective, not as athreat to the independence and credibility of an institute. The Hellenic Centre for European Studies indicatedthat independence vis-à-vis public authorities was "a matter of good relations. Nobody gives orders, thegovernment asks questions, but does not influence the answer. The government has its priorities, but respects
our independence regarding the results of our analysis."

55

The European Trade Union Institute also collaborates with actors coming from the employers’ side. For
instance, it has worked on joint projects with the Hans Boeckler Foundation, which is a foundation supportedby the Deutsche Gesellschafts Bund (the German Confederation of Industry)

56

The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute described to us how it seeks to maintain a certain distance with the state
which provides a significant share of its budget and commissions studies. The Belgian Institut Royal desRelations Internationales said that preserving independence is "complicated," others that their independenceis "always fragile." For the Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft in Hamburg it is "an everyday
struggle."

57

CEPS (2003 Annual Report) describes an Online Survey it conducted on its homepage between July andDecember 2003. This survey revealed who visits its website (academia : 23 per cent; professional
occupations : 19 per cent; national governments : 16 per cent; research : 15 per cent); their country of origin(the largest group is based in Belgium, followed by the U.K. and the USA); and principal areas of interest(future of Europe; economic policy; wider Europe; and security). "Publications are the most wanted item,
followed by CEPS commentaries and analysis. An additional 13 per cent of CEPS website visitors are on their
way to the CEPS online bookshop to purchase or download publications."

58

Taken from the website of The Centre, which was not included in our list because it does not conduct in-house research.
59

Organisations such as WWF Europe which are sometimes identified as "E.U. think tanks" confirmed to us thatthey do not regard their Brussels office as a think tank, but as a lobbying team that does some research andadvice for the WWF network.

60

There may be other branches of US think tanks in Europe, which were not included in our research.

61

These two institutes are not think tanks according to our criteria, in the sense that they do not havepermanent in-house researchers and do not produce research themselves.

62

Another think tank, the Jaan Tonisson Institute, had initially been included in this survey, but it seems to haveceased all activity in early July 2004.

63

For example, the Ministry for Social Security and Employment, the Supreme Council for the Liberation of
Lithuania, the Soviet politburo which created the Academy of Sciences which the IEAS in Latvia is affiliated to,and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Estonia.

64

The Institute defines itself "perhaps partially" as a think tank. Luxembourg also hosts the Robert SchumanCentre (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman), which focuses mainly on thehistorical study of European integration. Although it conducts research and contributes to knowledge about
Europe, it is therefore not policy-oriented and does not target policy-makers.

65

Dutch think tanks are all foundations (‘stichtingen’), but not in the traditional sense of organisations dedicatedto managing and allocating an endowment fund. This status explains why Dutch think tanks do not havemembers, although they have different options for developing de facto membership.

66

Clingendael is different from the French IFRI, the German DGAP, or the British RIIA in that it has a very
substantial training programme. It even offers a Master’s Programme in International Relations and Diplomacy.
Although one of our nine criteria for a think tank is that it should not be a degree-granting organisation, we
have nonetheless kept Clingendael and EIPA in our list, as excluding them from the Dutch think tank scene
would clearly have been perceived as artificially strict.

67

Created to stimulate cooperation between administrations and administrative training institutes across Member
States, EIPA is supported by the E.U. administrations and the Commission. The institute carries out training
and research on public administration and European policies, and provides a variety of services to theadministrations of the Member States and the candidate countries as well as to the E.U. institutions in support

82 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
of their tasks and responsibilities related to European integration. It defines itself primarily as "a European
instrument for training public officials (...) 'to support the European Union and its Member States and thecountries associated with EIPA by providing relevant and high quality services to develop the capacities ofpublic officials in dealing with E.U. affairs.''68

We have not included the ECF because its research work is not permanent, and it does not have an in-houseresearch team. It does not appear therefore to be primarily a think tank.

69

As the survey is focused on think tanks based in E.U. Member States, organisations not based in the Greek
part of Cyprus were not included.

70

The Danish Institute for Human Rights makes up the other half.

71

Libertas, a free market think tank, and CEPOS, a newly-formed think tank also on the right of the political
spectrum, are the only two think tanks we found which have private sector funding.

72

Cf. Day, p.108, in McGann and Weaver, 2000. The Danish National Research Foundation funds the activities of
30 different research centres in the science and arts field. It currently has a budget of 250m DKK but the only
centre that it funds which conducts European work is EPRU – and their work is just on one narrow area of E.U.
policy, macroeconomics.

73

COPRI was one of the institutes which fought hardest against the merger. It organised an international
coalition of over 300 high-profile academics to oppose it.

74

For instance, it publishes research on institutions and the formation of economic policy; international monetary
economics and European economic integration; and international trade theory and policy. Now based at theInstitute of Economics at Copenhagen University, EPRU is funded by a grant from the Danish National Research
Foundation and two Danish government ministries.74 It currently has a staff of 24. EPRU also co-operates withother foreign institutes in the field of international economics. Its partners include the National Bureau of
Economic Research in the US, CEPR in London, CEPS in Brussels, and the Institut für Höheren Studien in
Vienna. It also receives a large number of academics from abroad as visitors.

75

The country’s excellent rate of economic growth at the end of the 1990s (after the 1990-93 recession) testifies
to the country’s strong desire to join the E.U. Finland was in fact selected in May 1998 to join the Euro.

76

Its research production however is highly regarded and its statute and decision-making structures protect its
independence.

77

More generally, think tanks are a recent phenomenon in France. They appeared timidly in the 1980s and afairly large number was created in recent years: see Le Journal du Management, 2004.

78

The Institute of International and Strategic Relations (www.iris-france.org), created in 1990 with the supportof Pierre Joxe, then Minister of Defence, offers different degrees and training programs, but also has a
research programme, which covers in part E.U. matters (e.g. 8 books out of the past 31 since 2000); The
Institut Choiseul (www.choiseul.info/institut/index.php), besides general research and strategic consulting,"vise aussi à favoriser l'émergence d'une vision européenne des affaires mondiales dans l'espoir de voir l'Union
mener une politique étrangère efficace et cohérente." This institute, created in 1999, already has a budget ofhalf a million euros and a team of 6 permanent and 20 occasional researchers. Its research is focused oninternational relations and economic questions, and it publishes four journals, on geoeconomics, Latin America,
North Africa and the Middle East, and China.

79

Of these seven foundations, we have only retained the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftungand the Hanns Siedel Stiftung. The other four (the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Hans
Boeckler Stiftung and Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung) either do not carry out research on Europe, or do not havean in-house research team (two of the most important criteria for our survey).

80

In 1994, six major Greek research institutes joined the Cyprus Research Institute (KYKEM) and other
Australian, Canadian and U.S. think tanks to create a coordinating committee of research institutes specialised
in Hellenism.

81

Complementary organisations include the Lajos Batthyany Foundation, which research arm does someresearch on E.U. integration. The Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, which works
on behalf of Hungary and international institutional actors to "assist in solving environmental problems inCentral and Eastern Europe." It is a "non-partisan, non-advocacy, non-profit international organisation legally
based on a charter signed by the governments of 28 countries and the European Commission, and on aninternational agreement with the government of Hungary." The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs nolonger seems to be in existence. Its website (a basic criterion for our survey) was not in operation at the timeof this study. For similar reasons, the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies was not included, although it
is known for having conducted research on the European security environment.

82

Although it maintains a large number of projects on European issues: 20

83

IEA has a branch in Brussels comprised of Irish officials working in the E.U.’s institutions. The branch holds
regular events in order to keep these officials informed on broader Irish policy towards the E.U.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 83

...........
84

This goes up to six if we include the Economic and Social Council

85

In fact, we came across the Centro Europa Ricerche (CER), which however does not appear to have a website andseems to have had very few initiatives.

86

See www.italianieuropei.it, www.liberalfondazione.it, www.limesonline.it for further information. Policy clubs are
considered “fora of discussion among like-minded politicians and intellectuals more than organisations producing
research on a regular basis”. (Lucarelli, Radaelli, 2003)

87

The purpose of this grant is to establish a transnational research group to study the integration process and thefuture prospects for the Mediterranean region within the enlarged Union. The project runs for two years, from2002 to 2004.

88

Perhaps this absence reflects the controversy which divided the population and the Government on the questionof Malta’s entry to the E.U. (those opposing entry gained 47.6 per cent of votes, and 31 seats in Parliament;
compared to 51.7 per cent and 34 seats for the pro-European party).

89

A recent law allows citizens to donate 1 per cent of their personal income tax to non-profit, non-governmentalorganisations, but few people are aware of this possibility.

90

See www.osw.waw.pl; www.omp.org.pl/indexang.html; and http://iss.krakow.pl for further information.

91

Three bordeline cases in Sweden were the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) (which has publishedwork recently on topics such as E.U. foreign direct investment flows but which does not appear to have a large
number of publications or indeed a distinct programme on the EU), the Stockholm Environment Institute (whose
research is not EU-focused), and the Bertil Ohlin Institute (a small Liberal Party think tank which does occasionallylook at European questions but does not seem to publish regularly enough on the E.U. to be included).

92

Day (2001) refers to these institutes as ‘establishment’ think tanks because of their longevity and close ties to thestate.

93

On average, 15-20 quotations per month.

94

Other borderline cases in our study were: the Centre for Local Economic Strategies and the Institute of Welsh
Affairs (both had looked in the past at E.U. regional fund spending); the Labour Research Department (which
provides information services to U.K. trade unions, including on E.U. legislation, but which does not appear to be
currently conducting policy research on Europe); and the Eurosceptic, pseudo-think tanks, the Bruges Group and
New Frontiers Foundation.

95

CER was founded by a group which included influential Labour Party advisors, such as David Miliband, David Clark
and Wendy Alexander (Miliband later became an MP and government minister and Alexander an MSP and Scottish
minister). FPC was launched under the patronage of Tony Blair in 1998.

96

In the past the media has preferred the views of other, more ‘objective’ think tanks, such as the National Institutefor Economic and Social Research (NIESR), when reporting on European debates, for example in the one thattook place on the euro.

97

Other groups label themselves think tanks, such as the Bruges Group and New Frontiers Foundation, but because
they are essentially lobbying organisations with no in-house research capacity, they are not included in our list ofEuro-think tanks.

98

Think tanks with a charitable status in the U.K. are however not allowed to engage directly in political
campaigning.

99"Perhaps the strongest impetus was the exodus of often underpaid researchers from academia. (…) Oppositiongroups such as the Solidarity movement in Poland also provided fertile ground for the growth of new institutions
such as the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, arguably that country's premier think tank. As in othercountries, another strong motivation behind the formation of think tanks has been the departure of frustrated or
replaced officials (…). Despite the strength of their convictions, most of Central Europe's think tanks could nothave been established without substantial foreign assistance from grant-making institutions such as CIPE, thePew Charitable trusts, and the MacArthur Foundation in the United States, the German party foundations, and theBritish Know How Fund," (Johnson, 1996), to which one should add the Open Society Institute, which has
massively funded think tanks and brought together research institutes in the region.

100

E.g. Bertelsmann Foundation, Ford Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Soros-Open Society Foundation;
German Marshall Fund of the US; Robert Schuman Foundation.

101

These figures can be compared with, for instance, the 16 researchers at the Center for the United States andEurope of the Brookings Institution, the 6 researchers on Europe of the Cato Institute's foreign policy programme,
the Council on Foreign Relations' 5 experts on Europe, or the RAND Corporation's 56 researchers based in Europe.

102

To mention just one example, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies "bringing together
academics involved in researching Europe with practitioners active in European affairs." www.uaces.org

84 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled3 The point of view of recipients and observers of
think tanks’ work

Although the recipients of Euro-think tanks’ work agree that such work is important in theory, theirperception is often not very positive. A number report that think tanks’ work does not add value, thatthe services think tanks provide lack impact and are rarely used. They are also critical of theirapproach, which is perceived as too technocratic, elitist and lacking transparency (3.1). This harshverdict on the sector by some of those interviewed does not however prevent a regular dialogue withand a varied use of think tanks by their recipients (3.2.4).

In addition to describing the sector of think tanks with an interest in European matters, it isimportant to reach out to think tanks' "user group", i.e. those who are the supposed targets ofthink tanks' efforts, to understand what 'the other side' thinks. 42 qualitative interviews wereconducted with E.U. and national decision-makers, as well as journalists, academics and otheractors specialised in European affairs from civil society, to better understand what contribution
E.U. think tanks make (we could not materially investigate the role played by think tanks
beyond these expert communities). They allow the identification of general trends, which
would require further, more rigorous research.

3.1 DO DECISION-MAKERS, JOURNALISTS AND ACA
ACADEMICS
DEMICS FIND EUROPE-FOCUSED THINK TANKS USEFUL ?
The short answer to this question is "yes, but not uniformly so." The observers of the thinktank market interviewed indeed made four types of remarks. All insisted on the importance ofa healthy think tank sector for E.U. policy-making, while criticising their relative lack ofstrength and ability to provide added-value; sometimes their lack of impact and relevance;
and finally an approach seen as too technocratic and elitist. Their possible contribution to
helping bridge the E.U. 'democratic deficit' is considered at best uncertain.
THINK TANKS : SOURCES OF INNOVATIVE POLICIES AND SOUNDING BOARDSIn theory, policy-makers can use think tanks as sources of innovative policy options and assounding boards for new approaches. In fact, the policy-makers interviewed see their work as
potentially useful, and do in fact use them. Among the roles they identify, officials mention
certain think tanks' ability to engage in 'blue-skies thinking', "new ways of looking at things",
to provide "innovative thinking." Thinking about the medium term, for which administrations
do not always have sufficient capacity, is viewed as particularly helpful. More frequently
though, their main function is perceived as providers of analysis and information, of
networking opportunities, as mediators between the academic and political worlds, and as "afilter and a forum for debate."103 They also have a "socialisation" and a training role forEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 85

national public and elected officials, identified as particularly necessary in the E.U. field, inparticular for new Member States.104
However, these two approaches are used very unevenly from one organisation and country toanother. Whereas the Commission and think tanks are in fairly close contact, other institutions
are much less involved, for instance the European Central Bank or even, to some extent, theEuropean Parliament.105 In countries—such as France—where independent research institutes
are not yet a strong part of the policy-making community, "governments do not ask anythingfrom think tanks, with a few exceptions," argues a respondent. In other countries though,most notably in the UK, but also in Germany (e.g. SWP), the government has developed
strategic links with certain think tanks, which it uses for its own purposes, mainly to test newpolicy ideas at arms-length. According to the author of a French official survey of think tanks,
the new E.U. Member States are starting to realise the benefit of maintaining a dialogue withthink tanks. In Poland, however, Katarzyna Skorzynska, president of the Centre forInternational and Local Government Relations, a Polish think tank (Skorzynska, 2003) recently
blamed her government "for monopolising the debate on issues related to Poland's
preparations for accession, for a lack of openness manifested in [its] aversion to sharing theaccession-related tasks with NGOs, think tanks, and specialised private companies (…).
Making initiatives and presenting them in a convincing way on the E.U. forum is not a taskthat would be beyond Poland's capacities. However, it requires that the government give up
its monopoly on Europe. It requires a partnership-based co-operation with independent thinktanks, as well as efficient administration and diplomacy."

Similarly, an Austrian research

centre told us: "Even the civil servants in the ministries have the feeling that they have tocompete with us. The future strategy of think tanks should be to cooperate more closely withthe public administration, because think tanks can provide other means to tackle policy
issues."
The first quality that decision-makers identify in Euro-think tanks they perceive as useful andinfluential is the quality and objectivity of their proposals, although this should not preclude
them from taking where necessary a political stance. CER, for instance, widely seen as
influential and useful, is systematically associated with "a Blairist approach." (See Section
4.2.1). "Creativity in the ideas proposed and how to communicate them" is also believed to beimportant. To develop such qualities, decision-makers and other recipients look for people
with a reputation, "a diversified panel of people, a representation of different points of view,"
organisational independence from other parties, and finally the ability to work persistently on
issues over the long term.

“Taking initiatives and presenting them in a convincing way… requiresthat the government give up its monopoly on Europe.
It requires a partnership-based co-operation with independent think tanks,
as well as efficient administration and diplomacy."

The media take some copy
from representatives of thinktanks, in particular in the formof op-eds, but do not use
them

as

sourcesofinformation as often as they do with other types of experts. "Think tanks are not people you
usually call up, and they're not freelancers who can write papers for you on specific topics,"

86 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledalthough the "more incisive ones can write features on a particular topic if they are known
specialists." Journalists also perceive the value of think tanks differently. Because of theurgency of media work, journalists told us that they are very interested in analysis andresearch work that saves them time. In this respect, "think tanks are a real plus." Prospective
thinking and conferences are not suited to the way the mass media work, although they dolook for "unusual ideas." They are more appropriate for the specialist press. A Frenchjournalist commented that one-hour breakfast meetings that allow real discussions for a small
number of participants, like the ones organised by the Institut de l'Europe, a quasi-think tank,are particularly useful. Another confirmed that the opportunity to meet and confront ideas
outside the ring of "usual suspects" is very valuable.106 Journalists all told us that they werevery keen to identify experts on particular issues better for future reference. Geographical andphysical proximity is a plus, as evidenced for instance by the close dialogue between the EPC
and European Voice, both of which are based in the same media centre in Brussels. Thereseems to be little transnational consultation of think tank experts by the journalists weinterviewed.
"USEFUL, BUT ONLY MODERATELY SO"
Overall, however, our interviews indicate that, today, thinks tanks with an interest in
European affairs provide limited added value in the eyes of decision-makers, their primarytargets. According to the journalists interviewed, they are not very visible. On the positiveside, this perception reflects more the situation to date than a rejection of think tanks per se.
The need and expectations of potential users of think tanks is not satisfied, they want more
and better think tanks. As summarised by a high-level Commission official, "supply does notmeet demand". "There are a few high quality institutes, but compared to Europe’s economic
and political power, think tank production is not as dense as one might hope." In fact,observers regret the relative scarcity of think tanks, "they lack leverage”, “we need morethink tanks and more capacity to think," in particular compared to what exists in the UnitedStates. Less positively, the respondents were also sceptical of what think tanks offer today :they argue that they provide limited added-value, that few are good and that when they are,it is thanks to individuals within think tanks, particularly gifted members who are capable ofproducing truly innovative ideas, not to organisations as a whole. One academic was also
critical : “You know what they’ll say even before you read it.” 107
As summarised by a particularly critical E.U.

“You know what they’ll say even before you read it.”

official, think tanks are "useful, but only
moderately so." This official added : "Theywaste a lot of my time, they come to seek ideas at the Commission (…) and produce little (…).
Only a handful of people really think, the rest is more compilation (…), they should be more
original." Another confirmed that "there are those who keep repeating the same things, andthose who try to challenge the received wisdom, but I really couldn't tell which is more
important." An observer told us that she was in fact "annoyed" by the rhetoric of those who"pretend that they help bring the E.U. closer to its citizens," while receiving "so much moneyfrom E.U. institutions to feed an elite," whereas in fact "they lack creativity." Even the most

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 87

influential ones noted are "places to meet decision-makers rather than places where original,
innovative ideas are created," added an academic. "Their role is interesting, but theirproduction is weak." Some of the most prominent organisations are criticised as "fake thinktanks" that do more "vulgarisation" and lobbying than produce original ideas. As a result, theCommission is perceived as dominating the intellectual production on E.U. policy mattersaccording to another official, even though its own capacity is not adequate.
On the other hand, the journalists and decision-makers interviewed in some of the Member
States, particularly the U.K. and Ireland, tended to have a more positive view of the(potential) role of think tanks in the European debate. These views are detailed in note 108.
LIMITED IMPACT
A second prominent criticism is think tanks' current lack of impact and even relevance beyond
a limited circle of people and issues. First, our interviews indicate that think tanks' audience isperhaps smaller than it should be. Nearly all potential targets told us that that they are mainly
passive recipients of think tank work, they rarely seek to obtain information or studies directlyfrom think tanks, yet, the latter also reach the ears of the policy-makers we interviewed.
Potentially relevant actors in the European parliament for instance commentated that they
were not the targets of think tank work, but that they learnt occasionally about their workthrough the media and then sought a copy of relevant reports themselves. Several
respondents noted the very "Anglo-Saxon" bias of today's prominent think tanks, which limits
their audience. Others perceive today’s Euro-think tanks as "very national," with teams ofresearchers determined by the nationality of the organisation’s home country. Finally,observers highlighted the fact that very few think tanks based in the Member States have apresence in Brussels, and vice-versa (see Section 4.2).
Furthermore, few are seen as good at communicating. One of the journalists interviewed
summarised in vivid terms his colleagues' general feeling: "Most think tank people are good,but some are too technical, they use too much of the inside lingo, they're anoraks really."
Another confirmed : "There is room for improvement in their communications." Again, the CER
was cited by several observers as one of the few organisations that knows how to handle themedia, whereas another took Notre Europe as an example of research centres that "produce
high quality papers, but which we do not hear about. You really need to do public relations
work." A professor noted: "In stark contrast with the CER, it's impossible to notice the French
and the Germans, not to mention think tanks from other countries." More generally, both
policy-makers and journalists told us that they contact think tanks or seek their publications
far more often than the opposite. Most often they cite the Agence Europe bulletin as the place
where they learn about events and reports.

“MEPs' competencies tend not to be, for instance, at the levelof foreign policy. In this regard, interest groups' contributions tend
to be more appropriate to our work."

Again on the more critical side,some respondents attributed such
limited impact to a relative lack of
relevance.

Severalrespondents

noted that independent research centres deal with matters that too often repeat themselves
and are of limited interest to citizens, in particular institutional issues. This is also where

88 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledpolicy-makers use research institutes more frequently, rather than on issues such as theenvironment or transport where think tanks are relatively absent. Issues related to theConvention, for instance, received paradoxically too much attention. This dynamic leads to"repetition, lately on constitutional matters and transatlantic relations." This is perhaps moststriking for those active in the European Parliament. An analyst there told us : "I do not feelthat this type of reflection, with a few exceptions, is very useful for Members of the European
Parliament, because MEPs' competencies tend not to be, for instance, at the level of foreign
policy. In this regard, interest groups' contributions tend to be more appropriate to our work."
Such views are even stronger at the national level. For example, another E.U. official argued :"German think tanks lately have been thinking mostly about two issues, the reduction of theGerman contribution [to the E.U. budget] and the division of competencies, for which their
proposals have completely failed at the Convention, because in fact their vision is very
inward-looking. It's easy to get very excited at home about a particular idea of Europe, butpolitical concepts are affected by cultural and political contexts (…), you need to prepare theground in other Member States, to test your ideas with European partners."
DEMOCRATIC PLAYERS OR TECHNOCRATIC AND ELITIST?
Some E.U. policy-makers we interviewed also blame think tanks for being too technocratic andelitist, and thereby as not helping bridge the so-called 'E.U. democratic deficit'. Even those
respondents who work with E.U. research institutes, very often see think tanks as "speaking
too much among themselves," as operating in closed circuits, as "too Anglo-Saxon," meaning
too focused on issues defined along UK-centric terms. "They are part of the chatteringclasses," stated dismissively a journalist, "they do not cater for the mass circulation
publication outfits, their target audience is elitist." This criticism is in fact a common theme
among journalists.109 Those we interviewed presented us with a range of views. Most were‘against’ and some were ‘for’ the idea that think tanks play a role in reducing the democratic
deficit.
FOR : a U.K. politician argued that think tanks were important in this respect because, by
publishing material for debate on European questions, they help to meet a widespread publicdemand for more information on European matters (thus partly reducing voters’ ‘information
deficit’ regarding the E.U. institutions). In his view, responding to this would be a key
challenge for think tanks in the future: “If think tanks really want to make an input theyshould be thinking about how to better inform the public [on E.U. matters]. If they have thecapacity and willingness to do that, they can be major players in the democratisation of theE.U.” A journalist also thought that think tanks were important because the networks which
they had built up across Europe helped to connect better national researchers and policymakers in different countries. This is improving the quality and range of the debate on panEuropean themes. Think tanks are also, in his view, an essential “intellectual support
framework” for the “European project’, which ensure that there is at least a measure of publicdebate at this level, in spite of the widespread feeling of disconnection between Europe’s
political elites and its voters.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 89

AGAINST : others are more sceptical about think tanks’ capacities to bridge the democratic gap.
An academic who specialises in E.U. politics felt that in some cases, think tanks could help bywarning decision-makers of problems that could undermine the credibility of E.U. construction.
However, he in fact gave a counter-example when pressed to illustrate his argument. In his
view, too many think tanks focused on the economic aspects of the stability pact during the
clash between France, Germany and the Commission. None of the organisations he knew had
denounced the negative impact such flouting of common policies could have on the public's
confidence in the E.U. construction process in the context of the Convention and enlargement
negotiations. A Commission official felt that the issue of a democratic deficit should be solved
first and foremost by greater involvement of regional, national parliaments and the European
parliament, not think tanks. He insisted that their actions could potentially be damaging,
because they contribute to shaping an image of the E.U. as distant and technocratic. Anotheracademic believes that, because some are too dependent on contract research, certain thinktanks tend to play more the role of 'spin doctors'. In his opinion, they help find and shapearguments to defend certain policies, and by doing so, sometimes "promise miracles" and in
the end risk disappointing citizens yet a bit more when their inflated promises fall through.110
UNDERSTANDING OF THINK TANKS' CONSTRAINTS
On the other hand, our respondents acknowledged that there were systemic reasons for E.U.
think tanks' relative lack of strength. It is, they realise, first a question of resources: "to makeprogress and be more useful, they should attract more people who can think, but it is unusual
to see prominent academics or former political leaders take work inside think tanks, as is thecase in the United States, and they lack the resources to attract them." "These institutes are
not rich enough, they lack visibility, it is therefore very difficult to perceive their added value,
it is difficult to see what they bring," without denying their usefulness. Lack of funds alsomeans that very few national think tanks with an interest in E.U. matters can open an office inBrussels. French EU-focused think tanks for instance are judged as not very influential in
Brussels, "even when they have ideas, because they lack the means to be present and todevelop appropriate communications techniques."
Furthermore, "Lots of people, individually, are excellent, but there is a fundamental problem:
strategic, political thinking and applied research are not sufficiently part of the academic
culture," in contrast with the United States, argued another academic, "it is a question ofculture more than ability." As a result, some decision-makers told us that they in fact turnsometimes to U.S. think tanks and universities.111
Nevertheless, E.U. and national officials all felt that think tanks should not become more
dependent on public funds. According to a German professor and specialist of think tanks, nofunding source should indeed, ideally, represent more than 5 per cent of an independent
research centre's budget.112
To be fair, the criticisms voiced also denoted, in some cases, a lack of knowledge of what
independent research centres actually do. There were three specific instances when prominentand European Commission officials – who are supposed to be well informed – told us that
“nothing” had been produced by think tanks on a particular topic, when in fact a paper had

90 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledrecently been released on the very same issue by prominent think tanks. Do E.U. policymakers neglect Europe-focused think tanks as a source of analysis, information and new
ideas? Or do think tanks fail in their mission? We shall not attempt to resolve these sensitive
questions here. Further investigations would be necessary to go beyond such anecdotal viewsof a reasonably representative but limited section of E.U. decision-makers. Nevertheless, toreaders who feel that criticisms of elitism, lack of relevance and transparency remind them of
the pot calling the kettle black, we answer that further research would probably confirm thepicture which emerges here of unsatisfied expectations.
INCREASING INTEREST FOR THINK TANKS?
Finally, decision-makers in certain countries are waking up to the importance of think tanks,
both among institutional policy-makers and more generally civil society organisations. The
head of a large European international relations research centre believes that "what is new isdecision-makers' desire to take part in a debate." Of course, the situation varies considerablyfrom one country to another. A Commission civil servant told us, for instance, how German
and British officials in Brussels share policy documents with think tanks much more readily
than their French counterparts. Even French authorities, however, which are more generally
considered somewhat less open to think tanks within the sector than other E.U. governments,
are joining the trend. In this perspective, the French PermRep's recent report on French
influence in think tanks dealing with European matters (Féat, 2004) is encouraging. The
problem, comments an observer who knows the E.U. and the U.S. situations well, is that suchinterest might not be backed by ageing political leaders that have been in government for too
long. In France and elsewhere where dialogue between think tanks and policy-makers islacking, this respondent argued: "We need a complete renewal of the policy elites. In the
U.S.A., decision-makers circulate much faster, unlike in France, where you've had the same
politicians for forty years. We need to move faster."
Which independent policy organisations do policy-makers, journalists, academics and otherobservers of the E.U. decision-making process at the moment know and tend to work with ?
In general, they usually cited the same transnational institutes and one or two national groups
closest to them. Based on our interviews, i.e. not on a systematic poll, organisations (not allin our list) that appear most frequently are, in order of decreasing frequency:113 CER (UK),
CEPS (Brussels), EPC (Brussels), EUISS (Paris), IFRI (France), Bertelsmann Foundation(Germany), Brookings Institution (U.S.A.), Chatham House(UK), Friends of Europe(Brussels), SIPRI (Sweden), FRS (France), TEPSA (EU), DGAP (Germany), Clingendael(Netherlands), IEP (Germany), IAI (Italy), and Eliamep (Greece). 114

3.2 PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONINDEPENDENTENDENT POLICY RESEARCHCONCLUSION : BRIDGING THE E.U. 'DEMAND DEFICIT' FOR INDEPRESEARCH
There are many possible reasons why elected and appointed officials at the national and E.U.
level, as outlined in Section 1.3, should in theory work actively with Euro-think tanks. We
listed three types of reasons: think tanks help formulate sound public policies; they cancontribute to a healthy democratic life; and they can be a resource for Member States andE.U. institutions' international 'soft power'. While we have seen how the supply side isEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 91

somewhat insufficient with respect to these ambitious objectives, there is also the perceptionthat decision-makers could encourage dialogue with independent research centres more
actively. There are indications that in countries where demand is lacking, there is an indicationthat think tanks have a role to play.
To encourage this trend, we share the views of think tank specialist Martin Thunert(interview), who places the onus on think tanks and urges them to take the following steps tobridge the gap between them and decision-makers :Think tanks should establish themselves as essential sources of information on key
topics of their choice for decision-makers, be it EU-Russian relations or E.U. climatechange policies. In the future, individual think tanks should become "inescapable"references to which decision-makers around Europe know they can turn to in order toobtain up-to-date information and analysis.

Think tanks need to work more actively through the media in order to cultivate
indirect links with decision-makers. Thunert describes how German media recruit
young journalists that lack expertise on many policy issues. Journalists should also
know whom to call within think tanks.

Think tanks, ideally, should have a presence in Brussels, and at least in their country's
capital (many German think tanks are based outside Berlin).

More generally, independent research centres need to think strategically about theirpositioning in relation to parties, political forces, and advocacy in general.

The following section continues this discussion by addressing in further detail the challenges
and dilemmas which Euro-think tanks face, such as the danger of instrumentalisation by
policy-makers.

103

This interest is substantiated, among other things by the fact that the European Commission, other E.U.
actors, and national authorities do provide significant support, principally in the form of requests for studies,direct funding, and staff on leave. The French Permanent Representation to the E.U. conducted recently its
own study of French E.U. think tanks to understand how to cooperate better with them. Anecdotally, several
decision-makers told us that they might be interested to pursue a career in think tanks in the future.

104

A national official told us, for instance: "We need more than ever greater information and more sophisticatedtools to analyse problems." Think tanks "bring together people who need to meet." Another, in the European
Parliament, described how "many members of Parliament from the new Member States would probably like totake part in these studies, many think 'where could I "think" in Brussels?' Think tanks have the potential tohelp integrate these new Parliamentarians."

105

Certain groups try to contribute to the ECB's thinking and policy-making process, as illustrated by recent
studies by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, a network of economists based in London, which regularlycomments on the bank’s interest rate decisions.

106

Yet another journalist noted that they were a very useful source of information on recent policy developments– particularly for off-the-record briefings, and that, unlike with politicians, journalists could engage with thinktanks on an “equal footing”.

107

This person also added that, like NGOs, think tanks tended to focus on “process over product”. They weremore interested in being invited along to meetings with politicians and feeling part of the ‘inner circle’ than inproducing objective and relevant policy research, which should after all be their main function. One exception
in this person’s mind were the economic think tanks, whose work was often much more objective.

92 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
108

For example, Lord Grenfell, the Chair of the Lords E.U. Select Committee in the U.K. Parliament (the main
Parliamentary committee scrutinizing E.U. policy), said that the think tanks which regularly give evidence totheir Committee as part of an inquiry make a valuable contribution to the Committee’s work. This is especiallythe case when they are able to provide MPs and Peers with specialist expertise on a particular E.U. issue, suchas development aid, foreign policy, and economic and financial affairs, in an objective and well thought-out
fashion. This process of gathering evidence is an important part of the Committee’s work as it gives MPs andPeers the chance to assess the views of bodies and individuals outside Parlliament and it increases thecredibility of the Committee’s reports. Similarly, an Irish journalist saw think tanks as a force for good for avariety of reasons. He believed that they allowed a more informed debate to take place between policy-makers
and experts in a particular policy sector. In his view, such debate was no longer possible on television for
example because it had become progressively “dumbed down” over the years. He also thought that think tanks
helped to “sharpen and focus perceptions of an issue”: even if they were not as good at developing new policy,
think tanks could help focus attention on a specific aspect of current government policy, which mightpreviously have been overlooked.

109

Writing about think tanks, the European Voice (2002) once argued: "There may be an information deficit
elsewhere in the European Union, but its self-styled capital enjoys something of a surplus. Indeed, the only
dilemma facing Brussels' chattering classes is which think tank debate, industry reception or press conference
to attend next."

110

One journalist also argued that it was difficult for think tanks in Brussels to develop independent and useful
viewpoints on the future of the E.U. because they were “part of a system which they are seeking to analyseand understand”. In his view, those organisations which are involved in the integration process (including thinktanks) are also the ones that are likely to be most supportive of this process. The challenge therefore is to findorganisations that are not afraid to think differently and challenge the status quo. In his view this problem iscompounded by the fact that one of the E.U.’s major political actors, the European Commission, is also funding
many of these think tanks. For him, it was no surprise that some of the most influential think tanks were not to
be found in Brussels but instead in the Member State countries, where they had greater distance from (andhence more objectivity on) E.U. matters.

111

This is confirmed by, among others, a senior official in the European Commission, who reported that thecontacts which he and the rest of his service had with American think tanks showed that on the other side of
the Atlantic they have a “vision which is not our own, and we must be careful because if this vision is dominant
it will have an influence on our way of thinking.”

112

An academic stressed this drawback of sponsored research: "think tanks are very interesting organisations,but when they depend too much on research contracts, the risk is that they become too "obliging"("obligeants")."113

Notre Europe was purposefully excluded from this informal poll because of the clear bias generated by the factthat interviewers came from the organisation.

114

Clearly, notoriety, in particular within such a limited sample, should not be confused either with credibility or
influence, in particular as some of the organisations noted here were criticised by the same people who listed
them. It is interesting to note though that few organisations are remembered by our respondents beyond thenational organisations they work with. A more systematic analysis of existing E.U. think tanks' reputations will
be provided by Professor McGann in his forthcoming survey.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 93

4 Challenges, dilemmas and strategic choices
Think tanks that focus on European policy matters within the E.U. operate, broadly speaking, in thesame operating environment, which is constantly changing, be it on the economic or political side. Thissection attempts to understand what threats and opportunities think tanks identify in the short term
(4.1) before examining other sources of potential difficulties that emerge out of our conversations withresearch institutes and observers of the sector (4.2).

4.1 THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIESOPPORTUNITIES
According to the think tanks interviewed, the overwhelming current challenge in theiroperatingenvironmentisfunding,which

generates

problemsofindependence

andcompetition. Enlargement is generally perceived positively or as not affecting activities
significantly, while changes in the academia are broadly welcomed. Few other challenges werementioned.
"WHAT CHALLENGES DO WE FACE? MONEY, MONEY, MONEY !" iFunding is a major and recurring preoccupation for the think tanks interviewed, save only fora small minority. There is little point in us citing here all those who highlighted this difficulty to
us. Although it affects most think tanks in the new Member States, it also appears to affectlarge and small organisations alike across the whole of the E.U. In fact, according to theAustrian Institute for International Affairs, “Most [think tanks] are in a budgetary crisis.”
Sources of funding appear to be insufficient and in decline, whether they are public, private,national or international, donations or contracts. As the Austrian Society for Political Science(OGPW) explains, “Funding sources are more and more limited and concentrated.” Most of thepeople interviewed underline the insufficiency and reduction of public financing, even inGermany and Italy.115 Independent research institutes also complain of a lack of permanencein public funding. Allocations can sometimes be put in doubt by changes of government and ofpolitical priorities, a problem currently being experienced in France by certain well-known
institutes.
The problem is the same for private funding. In Poland, the Centre for International Relations
told us that "it is very difficult to get any financial assistance from the State," and "foreign(American) foundations do not wish to invest in Poland any more, as they move their support
more to the East. Polish business is not very helpful either." Many research institutes find it
difficult to cover a significant share of their expenses through contract work and membershipfees.116 Another major concern regarding private funding is that it is project-based and shortiInterview with the Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft, Hamburg

94 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledterm, whereas think tanks would welcome "on-going", long-term funding, through donations
or multi-year projects.
Funding is not only limited but also is often difficult to access. Many of the organisations
studied complain about the complexity of rules on donations and above all about calls fortender from the European Commission, which discourage many initiatives.117
Another problem reported by many think tanks is the growing tendency for governments tofavour funding only for specific projects rather than for a think tank’s core activities. This has
the potential to damage the long-term viability of think tanks in future because it could
prevent them from investing in organisational capacity, in particular research teams. It could
also force a client-supplier relationship where they would seek to satisfy the needs ofgovernment rather than set their own agenda.
This funding problem logically affects the research capacity of these institutes. In the firstplace, it threatens their independence, a fundamental value for think tanks, as we have seen
earlier.118 Financial constraints limit their capacity to recruit and use their staff adequately.
More fundamentally, according to the Instituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), it affects theircapacity to act: "European think tanks dangerously lack dynamism, there is a problem of poor
renewal of executives within these institutions." According to the European Voice (2003): "Inany case, it probably keeps most of the thinking well within a political box."119
Financial constraints have another effect, which some consider to have a positive effect: they
force these institutes to prove the efficiency of their work and to justify their existence. In
particular, the use of private funding, according to the head of an organization which has
managed to master the system well enough, "keeps think tanks on their toes by having todemonstrate to corporate funders that they are working effectively." One of the six main
German economic research institutes has been encouraged recently to close down after arecent assessment by the Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat). This assessment was also
carried out for the other economic research institutes there.120
But what is the real situation ? To answer this question, a specific research on thedevelopment of think tanks’ budgets and their funding would be needed, an area where
information is not easily accessible. However, as it has been already reported (Gadault, 2004),
the budgets of European think tanks are actually lower than those of their Americancounterparts.121 This situation reflects as well the general picture of R&D spending as apercentage of GDP. This was 50 percent higher in the U.S. than the European average in 2002
and more than three times as high as in the new Member States.122 From this perspective, one
could argue that the independent research institutes in Europe are too dispersed. One can also
note that the European Commission’s spending is relatively small, although it is increasing.123
We shall return to this question of funding in Sections 4.1.1 and 5.2.
ENLARGEMENT : MORE AN OPPORTUNITY THAN A CONSTRAINT
A key factor of change in the operating environment of think tanks in the recent past has
clearly been the accession of ten new Member States to the European Union. Somewhat

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 95

surprisingly however, according to our interviews, it did not significantly affect the Euro-thinktanks’ situation, whether in the old or the new Member States, for three reasons.
1. First, the preparations for enlargement, as well as the enlargement process itself
and its consequences had been on think tanks' agenda for a while. The head of a
research institute in one of the new Member States even claimed: "The topic is not
as urgent as it used to be in the early 1990s." In the new Member States, the majorpart of think tank work had been dedicated to enlargement. Now that accession is areality, the attention given to such issues is anticipated to focus more on practicalmatters of integration within the E.U.
2. Co-operation between former and new Member States also existed before May 1,
2004. Networks such as TEPSA for instance, as well as individual organisations havedeveloped many links with sister organisations in the acceding Member States sinceat least the early 1990s.124
3. To date, accession has not changed significantly the financial situation of think tanks
in the new Member States either, because they benefited from E.U. financial
assistance before enlargement (e.g. through the Phare programme). Besides, thenew possibilities of receiving resources from the Community budget made possible
through accession, usually requires complicated and time-consuming procedures.
They are therefore not considered today as a significant source of funding byresearch centres in the new Member States. On the other hand, others feel that theincreased opportunities for independent research organisations from 10 new
countries to access E.U. funding sources will "increase competition on the funding
market of the European Commission, unlike in the United States where the amountsof money available are huge and increasing."
ACADEMIA'S INCREASING ENTREPRENEURSHIPOne of the factors of success of Anglo-American think tanks highlighted by many respondents
is the relative autonomy of the academic world in which it operates, characterised in part byits independence from public funding, its greater ability to work with private actors, thecirculation of personnel between academia, administration, and think tanks, and moregenerally a greater readiness to engage in applied research. A French think tank manager
observes for instance: "The Anglo-Saxons are better at producing new ideas. Why? Because in
the U.S. and in Great Britain, there is a good interaction between the world of decisionmakers and the academic world, which does not exist in continental Europe." Things arechanging though. Several observers indeed noted in our survey that the sector is catching up
with the Anglo-American trend, i.e. academics who focus on European issues are more
involved in policy work, their research is more driven by news agendas, and they are
increasingly reaching out for partnerships and funding with outside organisations, not unlike
the corporate sector. This is particularly visible in France, which perhaps has more catching up
to do,125 but the same trend is present in other European Member States. Everywhere inEurope academic research institutes tend to work increasingly like independent institutes on

96 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledissues related to Europe, to reach out for partnerships, raise funds, and generally compete on
the same turf for contracts and attention.
Is this an opportunity or a threat for independent research organisations? According to theacademics interviewed, it can be an opportunity for both sides if they retain their specificities.
Such synergies will be allowed if public research is given the means to be independent
through a combination of appropriate long-term public funding, as well as competition andcooperation with think tanks and other organisations on project work. On the other hand,
think tanks face growing competition from universities for E.U. funding for ‘networks of
excellence’ and other research projects under Framework Programme VI (FP6) as they often
do not have the critical mass of researchers, or indeed the finance, that universities enjoy.
Independent research institutes have, therefore, found it very difficult to win bids for FP6
money. Indeed a brief glance at the list of current FP6 projects shows that there are very few
think tanks presently involved.126
OTHER PERCEIVED CHANGES : INCREASED COMPETITION, RECRUITMENT, GLOBALISATION
A few think tanks mentioned other threats : increasing competition (discussed as a strategic
issue in Section 4.2.3), difficulties to recruit (a consequence of funding difficulties), andchanging political contexts.
Increasing competition between think tanks, due to a recent influx of new entrants, wasindeed mentioned by several respondents. These new think tanks are described as "smaller","more flexible", having "greater specialisation on issues", and mostly working on "short-term
projects." Competition is expected to increase as national independent research institutes witha generalist agenda that do not yet study European issues thoroughly are expected to do soincreasingly in the future. A specific challenge at the European level is the difficulty to havesufficient resources to be relevant in the context of an ever-growing European Union. For a
German institute, this factor, in addition to funding problems, signals the possible decline infavour of networks of research centres.127
Competition from new substitutes outside the sector is also increasing. Another German
research centre sees a threat and an opportunity for think tanks in the fact that "politicaldecision making is more and more influenced by external advice not from within ministries but
from private expertise." Competition comes from bodies such as institutional think tanks, inparticular in Germany.128 An Estonian organisation for instance told us: "Reduced publicfinancing is leading to greater competition for contract research from government agencies.
Policy-makers prefer shorter studies, which are not funded as well, and they often create
commissions to conduct studies instead of commissioning a research think tank." With thedisadvantage in some cases that independent think tanks may be unpopular because "verycritical to bureaucratic institutions." Academic research centres are also more actively involvedin contract research and applied policy research. National academic institutes are developingat the EU-level, by recruiting European students and professors, and by networking. The
French CEPII has for instance produced a number of papers that proved influential at theEuropean level.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 97

Overall, there is a feeling that the policy-making environment, in certain areas and certain
countries, is somewhat crowded. Obviously, this increase in the number of actors and theexposure of existing think tanks to other players is strengthened by the fact that "think tank
networks are expanding beyond the borders of nations and regions." Globalisation,
enlargement, and the increasing use of information technology reinforce this trend, by
allowing actors to reach audiences across borders, as is shown by the increase in joint
projects between institutes from various Member States and the active presence of E.U.
branches of large U.S. think tanks.129 "Competition is increasingly international," summarises
an Austrian think tank. This competition is both a fight over limited resources (funding,researchers, etc.), audiences, and ideas.130
A handful of independent research institutes also mentioned their difficulties in attracting
competent researchers because of funding difficulties. The situation seems to vary fromcountry – and probably topic – to country. The same Austrian think tank told us that its "mainchallenge is to have a very good group of very well-trained young researchers." In Latvia,
because of insufficient funding, "leading researchers get tired, [they] cannot afford many
assistants." Even with sufficient funds, the inability to recruit and pay good salaries was
highlighted by one of the largest think tanks, which deplores how the best and brightest prefergoing to the private sector or emigrating to the United States. In addition, some countries
suffer from a lack of interest in E.U. matters.131
Finally, some think tanks deplored the fact that the E.U. political agenda affects their research
capacity. Security issues for instance are prominent at the moment and receive relatively
more funding, while others are somewhat neglected, such as more technical issues. Similarly,transatlantic relations have been the subject of greater attention in the recent past, to thebenefit of think tanks specialised in international relations.

4.2 DILEMMAS AND STRATEGICSTRATEGIC CHOICESHow are think tanks adapting to the development of the environment in which they operate?
In the EU, perhaps more than in other regions, think tanks are facing a number of strategic
dilemmas, which will shape their future efficiency and credibility. We have come acrossessentially three :The preservation of their independence and intellectual credibility in the face of thepossible pre-eminence of advocacy and the growing need for communication andinfluence.



The ambition of think tanks to communicate both with public authorities and thegeneral public, at a time when the European democratic deficit is being criticised.

The issues and methods involved in possible co-operation between think tanks, in thecontext of the growing competition mentioned previously.

98 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled4.2.1 INDEPENDENCE
NDEPENDENCE, ACADEMIC RIGOR AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
It is impossible for us to determine the level of independence with which research is
conducted by the think tanks surveyed, and one has no reason to doubt think tanks' genuine
concern for independence. The importance attached to independence however raises anumber of questions which condition European think tanks' future credibility, some of which
are exacerbated by current trends in the EU, while others are valid for think tanks around theworld. A number of pressures exist which serve to thwart the legitimate aspiration of thinktanks to be scientifically rigorous in their work and independent at the European level. These
include :An apparently growing tension between techniques of influence and advocacy on the
one hand, and intellectual rigour and credibility on the other.



Practical constraints which limit their room for manoeuvre, notably the constantcompetition for grants and contracts mentioned above.

The need to cultivate a certain proximity to political elites.

In the first place, because the number of advocacy tanks is growing and because theenvironment in which they operate requires a greater capacity for communication andinfluence, European think tanks today have to learn to combine academic rigour on the one
hand with advocacy and techniques of persuasion on the other. At a general level, the notionof a strict respect for academic criteria in research, which most of the independent research
institutes in Europe espouse (see Section 2.1), contrasts at first glance with the requirementof influence. Are advocacy and scientific rigour therefore incompatible? And to what level of
independence can European think tanks legitimately aspire today? 132
The different positions currently adopted by European think tanks illustrate the degree towhich think tanks are hesitating between the traditional academic model of research and therealities of a sector where advocacy seems to be gaining ground. The box below on the Centre
for European Reform shows how an advocacy tank can be both credible and influential andrepresent, in the eyes of numerous observers within as well as outside the sector, a model ofthe synthesis between these differing aspirations.133
The recipients of think tanks’ work do not perceive the primacy given to independence in thesame manner. Several observers of the sector point out that it is not absolutely necessary tobe ideologically neutral or academically orthodox in order to be credible. A European journalist
argues that an absolute independence is not crucial in itself: “It doesn’t have to be a problem
as long as you know where people are coming from (…), generally people are reasonably
upfront.” He adds that he has “no evidence that anybody has sold out on account of theirfunding”. His colleagues share his views. Within the framework of this survey, some evenexpressed a wish that think tanks would become more partisan. One of them even insists:“That a think tank has political commitment and values, and takes an identifiable position is agood thing, it stimulates the debate.”134

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 99

More generally, numerous recipients of think tanks’ work state that it is beneficial for them to
be clearly identified with a theme or a cause and to know how to communicate effectively withthe media.135 In addition, one of the academics interviewed believes that influence must beconceived of over the long term. According to him, managers of research institutes must
become true “policy entrepreneurs”, whose efforts respond to current political themes as wellas the political agenda, and are measured over the duration. A good think tank must therefore
ensure that its initial proposals remain relevant in the “after sales” period and that they are
updated according to the opportunities of the moment.
Perhaps"That a think tank has political commitment and values, and takes anidentifiable position is a good thing, it stimulates the debate."theapparent

contradiction between influence
and advocacy on the one handand independence on the other can be explained by the fact that historically at the outset thesector was dominated by organisations of an academic type, but that today this is no longer
an accurate reflection of the state of the sector? Perhaps it corresponds as well to an idealised
vision of the role of the social sciences in politics, one of whose goals is seen as contributing
to the rationalisation of public affairs?136 This search for independence is in any casecomplicated by the material constraints which think tanks face, a source of tension underlinedby virtually everyone working in this sector. We have measured the degree to which diversity
and the balance of funding sources are a guarantee of think tanks’ scholarly independence andhow being inclined toward a more political and advocacy-based approach can compromise
contacts with future funders.137
As a result, "they're all partial to a certain degree," according to a journalist. Without firm
data to confirm this, this respondent felt that "it's possible that there could be some measureof self-censorship going on, a reluctance to criticise things in the institution" among thinktanks financed by the European Commission. Few indeed have a diverse enough and sufficient
stream of funding that they can ignore the desires of their donors, and there is no guaranteethat all donors are equally magnanimous and fair in giving think tanks complete autonomy. In
fact, policy-makers in government have an interest in think tank activity as targets of thinktank influence. In many cases, one can note the clear correlation between think tanks' sourcesof public funding and their primary targets of influence. We are not questioning think tanks'
desire to maintain their independence, nor are we suggesting that public authorities use
funding to influence think tanks, but we are contrasting the emphasis placed on independencewith the realities of advocacy and funding in today's European think tank market. Importantly,
the same dilemmas exist, of course, for think tanks funded by the corporate sector.138
A third source of tension for think tanks is the necessity of cultivating close links with thegovernment of the day, while at the same time maintaining enough distance to ensure theirlong-term credibility. Although CER is perceived as being close to the Labour Party and theBlair Government, it seems nonetheless to have been able to preserve its independence andcredibility. Demos, described by a French journalist as “the faded dream of “Cool Britannia” ”(Le Corre, 2004) has perhaps been less successful at managing this relationship.139 Contracts
with public authorities create as well a risk of “vampirisation”. According to an academic

100 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledspecialising in E.U. affairs : “There is a risk when studies are prepared that they will be biased
because of the results which are expected. One moves then from a think tank approach tothat of “spin doctoring” and media massaging, which perhaps enables one to sell an idea
initially, but will create only disillusion in the long term. There are too many obliging studies at
the European level.”This is a classic dilemma and considered as ordinary by most think tanks, which haveunderstood, like pressure groups, that influence over the long term requires balanced contacts
with different political families. Despite a lack of systematic data, one can eventually note (seeSection 2.1.9) how a fair share of researchers evolves between think tanks and positions as
public or elected officials. Some are on leave from the European Commission or national
governments, others seek public appointments. Without questioning the integrity of theseresearchers, there are doubtless complex loyalties that shape the attitudes and priorities of anumber of researchers in think tanks.
There exists, finally, a danger of instrumentalisation of think tanks by political leaders. Thinktanks are in fact very careful about the risk of losing their independence if they are associatedor financed too much by public authorities (cf. conclusion Section 3).140 In this respect, we cannote politicians’ recent interest in these organisations as evidenced by the study carried out by
the French Permanent Representation in Brussels (Féat, 2004).
The important notion of independence clearly raises difficult questions of definition andimplementation. As the same journalist quoted earlier told us : "How important is it to be
independent? What type of independence counts ?" Faced with a sometimes abstract notion of
independence, we observe the emergence of a vision which is pragmatic and balanced. This is
illustrated by CER, which successfully combines innovation, intellectual rigour, and a capacity
to exert influence through advocacy. This discussion has outlined the conditions which arenecessary for a mutually beneficial co-operation between think tanks and public authorities. If
independent research institutes wish to develop their potential for action in a context ofincreasing competition, they will need to reflect strategically on their positioning.141

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 101

CASE STUDYThe Centre for European Reform, a credible and influential advocacy tank
Today, the CER successfully combines research and the production of influential policy ideas with a certain
proximity to its national government and a clear agenda. Is it an example to be followed? The CER indeed has a
mission, it is "a think tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the future of the European Union." Itprovides a "forum for people with ideas to discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing
Europe." In a country where Euro-scepticism is rampant, the CER "is pro-European but not uncritical." Itsobjectives are in a sense similar to Tony Blair's agenda of reforming Europe by engaging more actively with its
institutions and partners. Like Tony Blair, it has also tried to build a bridge between Europe and the United States.
As The Economist concludes, it "manages to be both Atlanticist and Europhile." It is in fact described as very
closely engaged with the New Labour government. Le Corre (2004) describes how Charles Grant, current Directorof the CER and a "refined Blairist", has the ambition to use the CER to help the U.K. regain its respectability within
the E.U. through conferences and "high quality publications."
According to Le Corre, “CER is characterised by a skilful dosage of specialisation and public communication,
thanks in part to a regular presence in the press.” This is indeed confirmed by the journalists and decision-makers
interviewed who place the CER among the very few E.U. think tanks that add value to current thinking about
European policies. Today, after only six years in operation, the CER is widely acknowledged as "a think tank withan increasingly influential role in the shaping of official policy."142 It is the only think tank which was mentioned innearly all answers to the question "which E.U. think tanks do you believe have influence today," throughout the
E.U. What is the secret behind such success?
"They [CER researchers] can be relied on to say something that is concise and clean," according to a E.U. media
correspondent. Besides the CER's qualities as a reliable source of good quotes for the media, several European
Commission officials cited the CER as one of the only think tanks which "occasionally produces some excellent
papers, even if [we] don't agree with what they say," thanks to a virtuous circle of quality work and quality
researchers, which users are ready to pay for and which gives the CER greater resources and organisational
independence. Another believes that it is its practice of testing ideas before publishing them. Another E.U. official
questions whether it is not in the nature of their proposals to be easily accepted: "At the Centre for European
Reform, they are influential because they are good, that is undeniable, but it is also because they propose things
which are easy to buy in European politics! A priority for the national, liberalism, an avoidance of trouble with theUnited States, and not arguing in favour of more European Union, this is not choosing the path of greatest risk
today." On the other hand, an academic who specialises in E.U. matters argues: "What characterises a good thinktank is the ability to massage its ideas over the long term. In terms of content, the CER is good at disseminating
the main ideas of Blair's policies, because it is persistent."
According to CER staff, six reasons lie behind the organisation's success: (1) the CER is independent from E.U.
institutions which allows it to be more critical; (2) it aims for what is plausible when proposing policy even though it
also tries "to do some 'blue skies' thinking;" (3) its views on Europe are close to those of the current U.K.
government; (4) it seeks to "make its publications readable" and "get presentations right" through "simple
language, but also glossy covers;" (5) it has cultivated a strong team that has been working together for several
years and "enjoys the challenge;" and (6) it knows how to "work the media," which "creates a virtuous circle
because corporate funders equate this with influence and want to fund you more."
The CER is an interesting example of a trend toward smaller think tanks that are privately funded. It gives hope toothers that a presence in Brussels is not a prerequisite to be listened to on European matters. Sector observers
will want to watch its ability to retain the same level of audience the day they are no longer "within the tent."

102 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled4.2.2 THINK TANKS AND THE ‘DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT’ : THINK TANKS’ ROLE BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICPOLITICALAL ELITES
We have examined which audiences think tanks seek to target overall (section 2.1.5) andhave provided elements of information and analysis regarding the role played by E.U. thinktanks in European politics throughout this report. Beyond the factual elements of information
provided so far lies the question of how they and other parties perceive this role, consideringin particular the importance of the notion that a 'democratic deficit' between the institutions of
the E.U. and its citizens exists. As we asked in Section 1.3, do European-focused think tanks
and policy-makers believe that they have a role to play in bridging the E.U. 'democratic
deficit' ?
The former indeed are preoccupied with this issue, which is reflected in how they present
themselves. Many, both in Brussels and in the national capitals – and not just the ones thatare explicitly pro-European – claim that they have a role to play, which they referred tospontaneously in interviews.143 Generally, many think tanks seek to bring together not only
experts and policy-makers, but also the general public. Some aim to provide a place for
dialogue for citizens, policy-makers and experts. Member of the European Parliament Olivier
Duhamel, founder of the forthcoming think tank Europhilia, to be launched in Paris in the fallof 2004, wants to use the media deliberately to reach popular audiences and seek peoples'
views about Europe, including in less favoured environments.144
This trend is also reflected in the large share of think tanks that claim that they target bothpublic opinion and civil society alongside decision-makers and the media. This claim is clearlyvalid concerning "third sector" actors, where cooperation through joint publications,conferences, and other events with NGOs, trade unions, industry representatives, academia,
etc is clearly extensive. It is far less obvious that the research and dissemination efforts ofthink tanks involve, or are targeted toward, the general public. Unlike organisations such as
the European Movement of Friends of Europe (see Case Study) which seek to involve themass public in E.U. affairs, few think tanks organise events that include members of thegeneral public. Even fewer seek to include contributions from members of the public in theirresearch production, as Europe 2020 recently did.145 Finally, think tanks’ mobilisation during
the European Parliamentary elections of June 2004 demonstrates their interest in democratic
participation at the E.U. level. Our survey also revealed a growing number of think tanks thatare interested in comparative European studies of left-right political issues.146
In reality, most think tanks, by nature, focus their efforts and limited resources oncommunicating with policy-makers. In this perspective, policy-makers are quite legitimately
their prime objective (Section 2.1.5). For the large majority of research centres, changing –and even more so, reflecting – people's perceptions is, understandably, either a secondary
objective, albeit important for some, or a strategy to influence their core target, i.e. policymakers. In fact, it could be argued that the criticism by external observers that E.U. thinktanks are "elitist" and "speaking largely to themselves" reflects the gap between reality where
think tanks have limited resources and focus on a small community of E.U. policy-makers andan abstract and more ambitious vision of their work, cultivated by certain actors in theEurope and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 103

industry. There is indeed a contrast between the perception some think tanks have—or wish
to shape—of themselves and their contribution to E.U. politics on the one hand in the debate
over the E.U. 'democratic deficit', and their actual objectives and the reality of their work on
the other hand. Their use of the media helps illustrate this contrast. Take for instance a
Brussels-based think tank which told us that its "main target is the media, in order to shapepublic opinion and the policy agenda," insisting that its "prime target is voters, citizens." This
organisation has indeed published to date a significant number of articles and op-eds, but innewspapers which arguably reach only a well-informed and small share of the E.U.’s 453
million citizens : the Financial Times, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal Europe, Reuters,
Handelsblatt, and other similar titles.

CASE STUDY

Do E.U. think tanks really try to speak toFriends of Europe, a quasi-think tank bridging the E.U.
democratic deficit by satellite?

the masses ? Why such a contrast between

Friends of Europe is an E.U. policy forum which objective
is to "stimulate new thinking on the future of Europe and to
broaden the E.U. debate." Although not included in our
survey because without in-house research capacity, FoE
seeks to provide new ideas and approaches to E.U.
policies. Interestingly, FoE experimented between June 23
and 27, 2004 with an online forum by satellite, "the first
Europe-wide debate on reforming and streamlining the
E.U. institutions and its decision-making mechanisms."
FoE linked citizens from the 28 countries participating in
the Convention through a series of seven high-profile
videoconferences across the continent in partnership withleading think tanks.

actually achieve ? How much is the public

FoE's website reports : "This event, organised inpartnership with the European Commission and TSystems, enjoyed the full support of the Secretariat of theEuropean Convention (…). Convention President Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing and Friends of Europe trustee andConvention Vice-President Jean-Luc Dehaene, both took
part in the debates and answered questions from audience
members around Europe. Advanced satellite technology
allowed groups of four countries to engage in debate at
any one time. The resulting TV quality images werebroadcast daily by Europe by Satellite (EbS) and all
debates could be viewed live on the Internet." FoE
Secretary General Giles Merritt told us: "The result wasquite remarkable, somebody in Lisbon could put aquestion to somebody in Helsinki. This whetted ourappetite. We then launched transatlantic satellite debates,
which occur on a monthly basis. They will likely be picked
up by national TV."elements of information.147

their proclaimed ambitions and what theyaffected

by

think

tanks'

activities

andideas? How much of an impact do they
have in promoting a dialogue on E.U.
issues ? These are very difficult questions
to answer, although the example of the
Lithuanian think tank highlighted in theCase Study below and our discussion of
performance measurement provide someOn the other side of the policy making
fence, we highlighted in Section 3.1 how
the policy-makers and other observers weinterviewed are at best sceptical about
Euro-thinktanks'

capacity

today

to

contribute to E.U. institutions' democratic
challenge. Overall, it is unclear whether
European 'brain boxes' have a role to playin bridging the E.U. 'democratic deficit'.
Which is their natural constituency, or 'usergroup' :policy-makers

only,

or

policy-makers and voters? Is their claim that they
help widen the debate about the E.U. andrepresent citizens' views valid? Should they be encouraged to play a more active role inconnecting with E.U. citizens, within and across national borders ? Our feeling is that this issue
is possibly a distraction from think tanks' core contribution to E.U. policy making and that afuller answer would require further research.

104 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledCASE STUDY

The Lithuanian Free Market Institute measures its reputation amongst the public
If Estonia is often considered the most European of the Baltic States, Lithuania is without doubt the boldest, as arecent public consultation undertaken by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) shows. LFMI was created in1990 in order to promote classic liberal ideas, based on the principals of individual responsibility and freedom,
the free market and the cutting back of the State. This was at a time when Lithuania was not officiallyindependent and was still under Soviet control. Dynamic and innovative, the LFMI works closely with thebusiness world, international financial institutions, opinion-formers, and journalists. Thanks to its innovative
proposals, the media are paying increasing attention to the institute. The institute believes that its work has had apositive impact on people’s lives in Lithuania. It is perceived by at least one famous Lithuanian journalist to be amodel of dynamism.
One of the LFMI’s interesting practices has been the launching of a study aimed at better evaluating theinstitute’s true reputation and the impact of its work within Lithuanian society. As far as we know, such an
exercise has never before been conducted by a think tank in Europe. The study was carried out by TNS Gallupin October 2003 in the form of a survey of a representative cross-section of the population. It found that morethan one-third of Lithuanian citizens know of LFMI. LFMI and its activities are known above all amongst thosemost directly concerned with their work, particularly university academics (80 per cent).
More surprisingly, this study permitted an evaluation of what LFMI represents in the eyes of the public. Besides
the expected answer that it stood for free market ideas, one third of those who had heard of LFMI thought that it
represented the interests of Lithuanian consumers, citizens and business (several answers were possible). 69
per cent of those who knew LFMI had total or partial confidence in the organisation. The majority of those whoknow LFMI were aware that it was a non-governmental and non-profit organisation. It is interesting to note thatnone of the people surveyed considered LFMI to be a political organisation.
This type of survey demonstrates the potential for studying a think tank’s reputation, its credibility and influenceamong the wider public, and helps to identify whether a think tank has met the expectations which it has set itself
in its mission, while keeping in mind that the credibility of such a survey depends to a large extent on themethodology used.
To consult all the results of the survey go to : www.freema.org/About/Survey.phtml

4.2.3 DEVELOPING SYNERGIES IN A CONTEXT OF INCREASING
INCREASING COMPETITION
As noted previously (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), the number of think tanks that specialise inEuropean issues as well as of new substitutes is growing. Because they are - mostly - nonprofit organisations, operating often in different environments but on similar issues,
sometimes with a similar ideological agenda (Section 2.1), European think tanks dedicated toE.U. matters face simultaneously the question of competition and collaboration with theirpeers. Oster (1995) argues : "In the non-profit area (…), in addition to the structural analysis
of how many and what kind of organisations are in the market, in non-profit markets we will
typically also want to know something about the nature of relations among thoseorganisations." This tension between cooperation and competition is indeed likely to shapethink tanks' operations in the coming years. This section seeks to answer more particularly thefollowing two questions :Do the Euro-think tanks analysed consider themselves as peers or competitors andhow real is competition today?

What future strategies could they adopt?

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 105

"THE MORE, THE BETTER…" iOn the one hand, steadily decreasing public funding and a growing number of think tanks
mean greater competition at the national and E.U. levels. E.U. think tanks fight, broadly
speaking, for the same audiences, which capacity to absorb their production is not boundless.
At least on the public side, they compete largely for the same national and E.U. funding
sources. They face the same problem for media attention, with European issues that typicallygenerate little media interest. Logically, the majority of think tanks, as noted in Section 4.1,
perceives competition as an issue. Overall, there is a feeling that "not everybody is going tosurvive, there will be some real changes," as summarised by the head of a large French'thinking cell'. Yet, co-operation is also very much on the agenda. We have seen in Section 2.4
that networks of think tanks have emerged in the recent past and how think tanks initiate
either institutional partnerships or occasional joint initiatives.148
Without clearer data, it is difficult to identify a clear trend toward greater co-operation ormore intense competition, only to confirm that both strategies are present. It is not possible
either at this stage to determine whether the policy-making environment is overcrowded forEuropean think tanks or not. Most complain that their funding base is too narrow, that new
entrants therefore logically present a threat for most, yet many observers concurrently feelthat the community is underdeveloped as mentionned above. This report agrees with anacademic interviewed that "fundamentally, the onus is on think tanks," and more specificallythat:The current coverage of issues is limited, as indicated before. The emergence of Jean
Pisani-Ferry's think tank dedicated to macroeconomic policy issues and his ability todevelop successfully a sound funding base so far is not only testament to his personalqualities, but also to the fact that there is room for development within the sector.



Think tanks need to learn how to develop their funding base. Relying for the most parton public funding, many have not actively sought partnerships beyond traditional
supporters. Some of the think tanks surveyed are leading the way in this regard, anddiscovering that obstacles to private funding are not so much a question of fiscal andregulatory constraints as they previously believed, but more of culture on both sides.



If think tanks are to be better funded, then they must also respond to many of thecriticisms which people make of them today. Section 3 showed how external parties
consider that think tanks are overall not good enough at communicating their workand at producing innovative ideas for which they would be willing to pay more. A
journalist suggested that something simple that research centres should do is send ona regular basis an up-to-date list of experts within think tanks and their fields ofexpertise, which would allow journalists to know whom to call when investigating aparticular issue.149 It can be anticipated that the think tanks that will prosper in theiInterview with the Intercollege, Cyprus

106 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledfuture will be those that succeed in initiating a virtuous circle of quality work,
recruitment of the best researchers, media strategies that promote their work, andtransnational influence.
Despite competitive challenges and the limits of co-operation, Euro-think tanks canfoster greater exchanges. In our interviews, most managers welcomed the entry of
new players onto the market, for its positive effects on quality, because it "keeps thinktanks alive," and because "with more think tanks you raise the general dynamic andthen you can attack the funding problem and companies see it is in their interest to
help." Many however, even among the better-established ones, appeared mistrustfulof think tanks recently created.150 While certainly not the case for all the think tanks,
this negative attitude regarding competition was nonetheless confirmed by the
representatives of a new organisation, who criticise the tendency of some of their“seniors” to call for innovative policies in their research, but not to encourage it intheir own sector. This type of attitude may exist elsewhere (Gadault, 2004), sinceothers are suspected of “wanting the death of [their] competitors”, and being liberals“who love a monopoly”. Some people also condemn in France an “uncomradely stateof mind” – an attitude which probably exists elsewhere – and a “lack of willingness on
the part of French think tanks to work together to publicise better their achievements.
Even if it means continuing and deepening a crisis which they [themselves] aredebating.” (Gadault, 2004)

Therefore, in our view, the perception of competition today is misleading, despite a recent rise in
the number of independent research institutes and the very real challenge of accessing funds.
EMERGING STRATEGIES IN THE FACE OF GROWING COMPETITION
In line with the previous comments, Euro-think tanks today are considering – and for someshould perhaps consider – five main types of strategies to prepare for the future. Think tanks :1. Cultivate private sources of funding strategically and actively.
2. Develop performance measurement tools.
3. Welcome new entrants and develop synergies through networks and cooperation.
4. Consider greater focus and perhaps further specialisation.
5. Develop a better awareness of potential audiences.

DELIBERATE FUND-RAISING : First of all, it is a matter of urgency for think tanks to develop theirfunding base beyond traditional sources, with a proactive strategy. While this is clearly "easier
said than done," few players on the market surveyed here have overcome their cultural
reluctance to engage in this type of activity and have in fact begun such a process, byappointing a development / fundraising manager from the private sector, by developing amarketing strategy, and by approaching the private sector systematically, both corporate andindividual donors for donations rather than project work. This is in the interest of the sector as

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 107

a whole, which is relatively unknown beyond limited policy making communities. In thisperspective, the current mass media’s interest in the think tank sector is an opportunity.
DEVELOP PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TOOLS : Trends in the non-profit sector in the United Statesshow clearly that non-profit organisations, as they seek greater private support, need todemonstrate that they have performance measurement mechanisms in place in order tojustify the funds received and generally monitor their activities. Here also the easy reply
would be "easier said than done." It is indeed, as noted before, very difficult to measure policy
influence. Some organisations might even be reluctant, and legitimately so, to position
themselves as seeking to influence policy or the public one way or another. Measuringperformance does not imply changing an organisation's ethics though. Practical andphilosophical reasons should not prevent Euro-think tanks from developing concrete, simple
tools to monitor and improve the value of their activities with regards to their own mission.
While this issue deserves further, more detailed research, one can note that performance andimpact measurement for think tanks can be attempted, as the following two examples
encouragingly indicate.
Recently, an Estonian institute presented on its website its efforts to measure its
performance.151 This example is not unique. The International Development Research Centre(IDRC), a Canadian public corporation which supports the efforts of researchers fromdeveloping countries in order to create “more healthy, equitable and prosperous” societies,
carries out frequent strategic evaluations of the impact of its research on public policies(Lindquist, 2001).152
DESPITE COMPETITION CHALLENGES, WELCOME NEW ENTRANTS AND DEVELOP SYNERGIES THROUGH NETWORKS
AND CO-OPERATION : The authors of this report agree with Intercollege Cyprus that "the more,

the better." On the E.U. marketplace of ideas and think tanks, there is considerable scope for
new entrants, greater co-operation, and a further co-operation in order to develop synergies
on research topics that attract think tanks' attention most. This is clear from the analysis ofEuro-think tanks' research topics, but also from numerous interviews.
Furthermore, all Euro-think tanks studied, and most acutely 'Euro-specific' institutes, face thesame dilemma, in theory at least: they need to stay close to their target audiences (primarily
national decision-makers), local specialists and journalists, as well as funding sources, while
taking an active part in European debates, accessing sources of information pertaining to E.U.
policies, and sharing their research production with E.U. decision-makers.153 Recent concerns
regarding French Euro-think tanks' absence from Brussels demonstrate the importance of thisquestion. In reality, unlike U.S. federal think tanks, the organisations analysed here operate
simultaneously in two markets – national and EU – that overlap in more complex ways than
the state / federal levels in the United States. More specifically, the question many face iswhether to establish a presence in Brussels, and vice-versa for those based in Brussels, inorder to be relevant at home and beyond their national audiences. Despite the ability to travel
easily within Europe, this is an onerous solution few can afford. Only ten of the organisations
surveyed (approximately) have in fact one or more international offices. Very few, such as theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung, have offices around the world (90 countries).

108 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledCASE STUDYThe Centre for Economic Policy Research, Europe’s first ‘Think-Net’
Founded in 1983, the CEPR is a pan-European network of 650 economists, based in their home
universities and carrying out research, which CEPR then publishes. It is run as a think tank from
London. The staff numbers around 20; all are administrators and there are no in-houseresearchers.
CEPR’s director sees distinct advantages of adopting this organisational structure compared to a
traditionnal think tank. Ideas do not go ‘stale’ as can happen in ordinary think tanks. New input
comes from people who work at the ‘cutting edge’ of their research field in academia. CEPR taps
into this expert knowledge and is able to secure the services of researchers who already have ahigh level of academic credibility. The research agenda of CEPR is very much driven by the
researchers themselves, although there are programme administrators who try to ensure that
research is as policy-relevant as possible. The relationship also brings benefits for the academics
in the network. They get the opportunity for their work to be read by a new and wider audience(policy-makers and the public, via the media). Being affiliated to CEPR can also enhance theirreputation in the academic world. The one disadvantage of this model – which the director also
recognises – is that it is harder to follow-up and respond to policy developments than it would be ina traditional think tank, because of course the contributors are also employed elsewhere.
CEPR disseminates its research in various ways: every year it publishes several hundred
discussion papers and six larger research reports, as well as a bi-monthly newsletter. It organises
research workshops and conferences for a selected audience (on average 50 per year), andlunchtime meetings, which are open to the public and the media (about 20 per year).
CEPR’s influence was probably at a peak during the late 1980s and 1990s, when many of its coreresearch areas like the Single Market and the single currency were high on the political agenda in
Brussels. Now that many of these themes have been ‘done’, it is looking for equally relevant new
avenues to pursue.

The head of one of the top three most successful E.U. think tanks dismisses such co-operationas "a load of baloney." Another sees think tank networks as "a waste of time (…), all we can
expect out of it is a bit of mutual publicity." It is a fact that networks, as well as partnerships,
can all too easily waste time and impose extra administrative burdens with limited returns.
More respondents however were supportive of collaboration. We ourselves argue thatsynergies, either through formal partnerships, ad hoc projects, and networks such as the ones
mentioned in Annex 2, are in fact the way of the future, in particular for smaller organisations
which will have fewer resources in the competition for private funding. This will allow thinktanks to tap into local knowledge, produce recommendations that are easier to implement
across Member States and therefore be more influential. Considering most think tanks'
insistence on "added value", this also makes sense as few institutes and researchers can
specialise enough in specific topics to add such value. The CEPR (see Case Study) believes
that a 'think net,' a different type of structure, has several definite advantages. Informationtechnology tools can help this trend.154
This report aims to foster such co-operation. However, if these networks are to succeed, theyrequire a greater level of institutional support. For example, very few Member State
governments fund them directly. Many think tanks do not have the resources to engage inthese networks and often collaboration with other think tanks exists only on an ad hoc basis.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 109

CONSIDER GREATER FOCUS AND, FOR SOME, FURTHER SPECIALISATION : A related issue to competition is
the question of whether, and to what extent, think tanks should specialise on certain issues.
At the E.U. level, we have stressed the overlap in Euro-think tanks' research efforts (Section
2.1.4). The general perception is that specialisation is a logical strategy and, for some, aconstructive approach. This is already a reality because of funding difficulties. "Finding theright niche" is a matter of priority for most, and each think tank develops its specificity.
According to the a German institute, in a context of competition, "you have to define themarket you compete with, and to get a leading position in that market."Interestingly, both journalists and decision-makers welcome think tanks that have a clear
agenda and a real specialisation (which does not prevent them from rating generalist
organisations such as the Centre for European Reform or the Centre for European Policy
Studies among the most useful). A high-level Commission official argued for instance: "A thinktank cannot specialise in everything. They should specialise more, they tend to be too
scattered. A think tank should have some clear focus to be credible, and to be a little bit
original in the long run.
Faced with these apparently contradictory views, an Italian respondent argued: "Decisionmakers tend to change their agenda at a very fast pace, thus modifying their demands interms of analysis. This means that think tanks need to have a very wide range ofcompetences if they want to play a role and influence policies. Others argue against thedangers of over-specialisation that make the organisation more dependent on its operating
environment and less susceptible to contribute to policy making by bringing together different
perspectives from different fields of research. Specialised expertise also pitches think tanks
against interest groups. Unfortunately they are often incapable of maintaining such astructure." While there is clearly room for multi-disciplinary research centres, Euro-think tanks
may well need to cultivate their focus and perceived strengths. Greater specialisation may well
be not only a matter of carving a comfortable niche market for individual think tanks, but may
become a question of survival.
DEVELOP A BETTER AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL AUDIENCES : This is another area where think tanks canadapt further. Our study has shown that in many cases think tanks are missing theopportunity to improve their links with the public, the national and Brussels-based media, andnational Parliaments. Of course, it will not always be possible for them to reach out to theseaudiences, as their limited resources may prevent them from doing this.

115

Nearly all French think tanks complained that French authorities provide too little support. The renowned
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung said that it was "very much dependent on public funding, which goes down everyday."
The Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale confirmed that in Italy too, "there is a slow but regulardiminution of public funding."

116

The Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science in Latvia struggles for instance with "projects that arecheap and short-term, so they need a lot of [them] to survive."

117

Procedures for research contracts with the Commission are particularly criticised as unnecessarily complex.
The head of a prominent Brussels-based think tank, which no longer participates in calls-for-tender,

110 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
complained vehemently that "the method of the Commission supporting think tanks and many other not-forprofit organizations is, to put it bluntly, crazy, because what's happening is that they're tying organisations up
in red tape. The cost of servicing Commission funding is high and at the other end, some of the money in thefirst place is exceeded several times in the cost of the bureaucracy to manage it." The Centre for International
Relations described how "in Poland, according to the latest legislation, a private person may give 1 per cent of
his or her taxes to finance organisations such as think tanks, but the process is quite complicated and,moreover, people do not always declare their real income... The accession to the European Union offers new
possibilities of financing by the Commission, but there also the procedures are complicated."
118

In Slovakia, the Centre for European Policy warned of the "trade-off between the search for funding andindependence." In Poland, the Foreign Trade Research Institute lamented its "dependence on private sponsors"
as one of its main current challenges.

119

A leading German think tank argues that over-reliance on dwindling public funds "prevents intellectual
brilliance and provocative ideas from emerging." The IAI denounces the fact that cuts in public funding overthe past few years imply that "the institute has to deal with contingent research commissioned by clients andhas less space for general research projects."

120

In Cyprus, Civilitas explained that the quest for funds imposes the "need for think tanks to be able to provetheir direct relevance to policy making and the media. Some think tanks promote themselves in a cynical way,
but they need to prove some real relevance. Do they have a role in society at large?"

121

American institutes indeed have much larger budgets than their European peers, even the largest ones suchas IFRI (2004: approx. €5m) : Brookings Institutions (2004 budget : $32m income), Urban Institute (2003budget : $89 m), and even a more “modest” organisation such as the Center for Strategic and International
Studies at Georgetown University (2004 budget : $22m).

122"In 2001 R&D expenditure as a share of GDP in the E.U. was 1.98 per cent and is estimated at 1.99 per centin 2002, as against 1.95 per cent in 2000. However, the gap with regard to R&D expenditure in Japan (2.98
per cent in 2000) and the United States (2.80 per cent) remained significant. The level reached by the
Acceding Countries was 0.84 per cent in 2001." (Eurostat, 2004)

123

These have increased from €2.759.593 in 2002 to €3.505.000 in 2004, European Commisison Budget, OJEC
23.2.2004

124

Also an Irish think tank reported that they had advised policy-makers and researchers from Eastern Europe,
who visited them prior to their country’s accession to learn about how Ireland had adapted to the requirementsof E.U. membership.

125

Originally pure academic types such as the CERI and the CEPII are still distinct from their think tank peers
such as IFRI and IRIS. There is a realisation among French academics that "Le modèle du statut de chercheurintouchable par son indépendance et le financement public sans obligation de résultat n'est plus possible. La
raison pour laquelle les anglo-saxons ont des think tanks et pas nous, c'est la fonctionnarisation de larecherche, qui a disparue même en Europe de l'Est. Ce modèle est totalement incompatible avec celui des
think tanks." French academics told us that they are increasingly involved in contemporary political debates
and that financing mechanisms are changing, forcing academic centres to do more policy-oriented work, inparticular for the State. "State funding is changing simply because the French education ministry has lessmoney for research and allocates funds no longer on a multi-annual basis but year by year and topic by topic."

126

Cf. for instance www.cordis.lu Part of the problem may lie with the fact that these projects require very
specialised research capabilities, which think tanks often do not possess. Usually, to stand a chance of winninga contract, think tanks need to put in a joint bid with other think tanks. However, even this is not always
enough: the manager of one, fairly influential, think tank network in Brussels said that his network had
decided not to enter a bid during the last funding round because they simply lacked the capacity to do so.

127This view is shared by one of its national peers: "Stronger focus is placed on developing networks ofresearchers co-ordinated by the think tank. There are more and more international and European cooperations for joint studies."

128

Think tanks based in Berlin face growing competition from small outfits. See Section 2.4 for further details on
networks of think tanks. Although a high-level Commission official contradicted this idea by arguing that there
is very little competition at the level of ideas, alleging that think tanks "produce the same papers."– “Advocacy tanks,” born after WW2 in the United States, “are linked to particular ideological groupings ofinterests. (…) They tend to see their role in the policy making process as winning the war of ideas more thanas a disinterested search for the best policies”. They distinguish themselves from previous tanks for theirrelative independence from the academic world, “they are more often than not staffed with non-academics,”
their sources of finance, “draw disproportionately from sources linked to particular interests,” and theirresearch products, “likely to be closer to brief advocacy pieces than to academic tomes” (Abelson, 2002).

129

See Annex 2 for further details on networks of think tanks.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 111

...........
130

Although a high-level Commission official contradicted this idea by arguing that there is very little competitionat the level of ideas, alleging that think tanks "produce the same papers."

131

A sister Austrian organisation believes that students show "a decreasing interest in E.U. affairs, may be
specific to Austria." On the other hand, the founder of one of the largest E.U. think tanks in Brussels argued, "ifyou have money, finding people is not the problem. Finding young, bright people in Brussels is easy." This
director did qualify his statement though by adding: "In Belgium, the tax structure makes it more difficult to
recruit people in their forties, the E.U. salaries take them away."132

Intuitively, independence and intellectual rigour on the one hand, and political action on the other, appear
contradictory. The normal perception is that political engagement by a research institute risks at the very leastharming its image of neutrality and intellectual objectivity. As Smith (1991) highlights in his book about thinktank activists, voters know that factual rigor is not essential to political effectiveness for savvy politicians like
Ronald Reagan. He describes how "facts were true to Reagan if they harmonised with broad political ideals andif they worked, not to build an accurate description of the world, but to guide and shape political perceptions."
Without intellectual independence, we can also think that the range of a think tank’s message will not get
beyond a narrow circle of converts. Park (2004) quotes David Blockstein, a senior scientist with the U.S.
National Council for Science and the Environment, who "recognises that many scientists view even the least
interaction with policy-makers as advocacy, and advocacy as anathema." (Blockstein, 2002) Everybody fears
that the exactness of facts does not mix well with political reality. Political influence, like other forms of
persuasion, means an adaption of one’s message to suit the audience (policy-makers, journalists, specialists,and sometimes the general public). The political calendar is not always compatible either with the pace of
scientific research. One of the fundamental differences between academic research institutes and “thought
reservoirs” is exactly the ability of the latter to react and contribute rapidly to the policy agenda. Political
efficiency, support for a theme and vision, and the adaptation of messages for different publics, shaped by thepolitical agenda, are these ideas opposed to the princips and practices which guarantee the intellectual
credibility of think tanks’ work? Not according to Blockstein, who exhorts "his colleagues to share the fruits of
their knowledge with decision-makers, and in doing so, to overcome their natural shyness and concerns aboutcompromising their credibility." In doing so, he proposes six guidelines to help scientists give credible advice topolicy-makers: "(1) follow the facts and tell the truth; (2) obey the rules of science (have your research peer
reviewed, explain how you arrived at a conclusion, and present the margin of error); (3) present caveats; (4)identify uncertainty; (5) distinguish between uncertainty and guesswork; and (6) avoid hyperbole." These
criteria should also help decision-makers identify credible research. Several managers of academic think tanks
asserted that it was possible in their experience to conduct research oriented towards political action while also
respecting the research criteria suggested by Blockstein. Advocacy and academic rigour are not therefore
incompatible.

133

The Robert Schuman Foundation in France is doing its best to make this synthesis. It works for the unificationof the European continent and positions itself, in a flexible manner, on the centre-right, in continuity with thebeliefs of Robert Schuman, while also carrying out an important amount of research, targeted above all at
politicians, and as independent as possible from external influences. A certain number of think tanks are
therefore doing their best to reconcile in practice the two approaches.

134

At a time when Mr Barroso has promised to lead the European Commission “as a politician and not atechnocrat” (Financial Times, 14 July 2004), and when the French MEP Alain Lamassoure is delighted that “forthe first time, the Council has taken into account the results of the European elections, by choosing a person
who belongs to the winning political party”, some might argue that we are seeing a growing politicisation ofEuropean questions and institutions, which think tanks can participate in. This could allow for debates andpolicy at a level which is more accessible for European citizens. (This vision is nonetheless contested by otherobservers.)

135

The experience of Initiative and Referendum Europe (Amsterdam) and the Lisbon Council for Economic
Competitiveness (Brussels) is perhaps a reflection of this expectation. Both have had up to now an aboveaverage exposure in the media and with policy-makers compared to other think tanks with equivalent
resources. This is attributed to their identification of a specific set of problems, and to the constancy of theirmessage, determined according to different themes in current affairs and types of activities.

136

The advocacy and intellectual independence dilemma is not specific to Europe. In the United States, Park
(2004) highlights how this dilemma has become more prominent with the rise of advocacy tanks, which,although also operating in the same space as policy research organisations, "have consciously rejected thosevery conventions of objectivity in order to become more influential and visible in policy making." The question
she then asks is whether "a think tank derives its influence from its academic credibility" or whether it"becomes influential by renouncing academic credibility in favour of advocacy." She confirms, through a surveyof several leading U.S. think tanks the intuitive conclusion that the answer is in fact "both." She also
concludes in the United States that "academic credibility is not a requirement for one's research to be widely
cited and influential", and yet that "influential think tanks are associated with some sort of credibility which is

112 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled...........
divorced from traditional academic credibility." She concludes that "there is room for both types of think tanks"
and that, overall, credibility may be "understood as a fluid concept in policy making." The notion of credibility
for outside observers of think tanks is indeed perceived very differently.
137

Indeed, those that depend on a single or a limited range of sources of funding, or conduct mainly contract
research most likely face certain constraints. The Institute for Public Policy Research in Great Britain illustrates
how the quest for private contracts can affect the image of independence of a think tank.

138

A larger number of corporate funders does make it easier for a think tank to preserve scholarly independence:for instance, the director of one privately-funded U.K. think tank said that the fact that his organisation had
over 30 different corporate sponsors meant that if any one of these tried to interfere in their research, hewould simply sack them. However, there is also a risk that if a think tank is solely funded by private money, its
activities and output will end up reflecting the interests of business rather than the public as a whole. In fact,
most of the think tanks in this survey funded wholly by business are also those promoting a free market
agenda.

139

This problem has also been experienced in part by the European Policy Forum in the U.K. (a think tankspecialising in regulatory affairs), which was previously close to the Conservative Government but is now muchless influential under Labour. It could also happen to other U.K. think tanks which have previously beenlabelled ‘New Labour’ think tanks.

140

The Hungarian Centre for Economics and Politics claims that despite its links with Vaclav Klaus, they are notconsidered dependent on his party, which they do not hesitate to criticise. The Centre acknowledges howeverthat Mr. Klaus, as the President of the Centre, can influence research and work priorities.

141

Arguably, there is no one model which a think tank can pursue which will ensure complete independence.
Think tanks which depend totally on public funding, in order to escape from corporate influence, will beperceived as being too closely linked to the state (especially as public funding inevitably requires a degree of
public control over how that money is spent in the think tank, for example through the appointment of civil
servants to the governing board). Furthermore, think tanks, such as those in the U.K., which eschew statefunding in favour of 100 per cent support from the private sector will be accused of being too close tobusiness interests. Therefore, the best balance would seem to be the one which many of the successful thinktanks have already adopted: diversifying the funding base to include both private and public sector money(never from a single source), and also seeking long-term support from foundations.

142

According to the Financial Times, quoted by the CER on its website.

143

The recently-created Lisbon Council announces for instance in its mission statement that it seeks to help
"private citizens understand the personal stake they hold in a better, more competitive Europe." Similarly, thecore concern of Europe 2020, based in France, is "to promote the democratisation of the European Union."
While such language seems mostly present in the literature of multi-disciplinary E.U. think tanks, it is also valid
for some that are more specialised. ISIS Europe, in the field of security, claims for example that it "works toincrease transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden participation in E.U. and NATOpolicy-making."

144

Confrontations Europe, based in Paris claims in fact to "have become an interface between society and E.U.
institutions", not unlike the Portuguese Institute of International Relations which key objective is "to link
academic research, decision-makers and civil society."

145

This Paris-based think tank recently published a report, which brings together "the thousands of comments,
criticisms and propositions expressed by the citizens who took part in the Newropeans Democracy Marathon,"a series of one-hundred "debate-conferences" organised in a hundred towns in twenty-five European countries.
Fifteen Fundamental Principles and Reform Proposals for a Democratised Europe in the Coming Decades,
January 2004, available at http://www.europe2020.org/en/partnership/NFELTCP.htm.

146

Examples would be the Policy Network, Centre for New Europe and the Stockholm Network. These
organisations are increasingly focusing on the comparative aspect of many questions, previously discussed
only at the national level, for instance the debate on health care, welfare state, and pension reforms in
Member States, and also the discussion of how centre-left policy-makers can adapt their policies in response to
globalisation.

147

Other think tanks have conducted such polls in the past, e.g. the Adam Smith Research Centre in Warsaw
asked the Institute of Opinion and Market Survey Estimator to analyse its notoriety in April 1998 (based on asample of a few thousand Poles from across the country). The poll indicated that ASRC is recognised by almost
10 percent of the Polish population (cited by NIRA, http://www.nira.go.jp/ice/nwdtt/dat/1178.html).

148

ELIAMEP in Greece in fact identifies a current trend toward greater cooperation and networking between thinktanks across the E.U. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung also believes that "think tank development means morecooperation, to sit together and to see projects we can support, to create a common base."

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 113

...........
149“To receive, for example once a year, a list of this sort which would give me a reserve of people to contact foranswers on specific European matters.”

150

The comments of one of the most important think tanks on the Brussels scene demonstrated, for example,
how some organisations – including the well-established ones who have in principle the least to fear fromcompetition – can be critical of new initiatives and overly sceptical, as if they wanted to discourage the creationof new, independent centres of research. There are however regional differences. All the Italian think tanks
surveyed felt that competition is "not an issue" as there is a lot of collaboration between them, while German
research centres stressed how competitive their relations were, as the density of EU-focused think tanks isgreater in Germany.

151

For further information: Institute for European Studies, http://www.ies.ee

152

Doing its best to overcome the conceptual difficulties of measuring the influence which ideas from research
have on policy, the IDRC worked with Evert Lindquist, a specialist on the policy decision-making process, inorder to take stock of the knowledge and theories concerning the relations between research and its influence(Lindquist, 2001). On this basis, Lindquist concludes not surprisingly: "We should have realistic expectations
about the potential for influence. Ultimately, whether in developed or developing countries, supporting policy
inquiry is an act of faith: we build policy capacity not because we believe that there will be measurable andunambiguous impacts on government policy, but rather, because we believe that having more rather than lesspolicy inquiry is better for furthering dialogue, debate, and the sharing of ideas from elsewhere. The majorityof the ideas or innovations generated will never become policy or will get 'out-competed', for whatever reason,by other ideas or imperatives. Assessing policy influence, then, is typically about carefully discerningintermediate influences, such as expanding capacities of chosen actors and broadening horizons of others thatcomprise a policy network." His analysis describes the types of policy influence which research can hope toachieve and the different approaches which allow one to study this influence. On this basis, he proposes aframework for the strategic evaluation carried out by the IDRC’s Evaluation Unit, which, despite the complexityof the task, does not necessarily lead to a complicated method of measurement. IDRC has notably arrived at
the conclusion that ex post evaluation is not possible, because policy-makers do not tend to reveal where they
have taken their ideas from. Only an ex ante analysis can offer satisfactory results. By following all theinteractions between a think tank and policy-makers (meetings, telephone conversations, etc) and then trying
to analyse the extent to which a civil servant or a politician has changed his/her opinion, one can try to assess
the progress made in relation to the original objectives.

153

A few independent research institutes told us that they do not wish to work outside their national capital.

154

A Cypriot organisation has for instance decided "not to grow indefinitely, but "to keep it small and do as muchas possible on the web in and from Cyprus."

114 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

5 Parting thoughts
This section outlines three types of question that emerge naturally after this overview of the Euro-thinktank sector: can anything be learnt from recent developments in the United States about the future of
the European sector ? (5.1) Can anything be undertaken to encourage Euro-think tanks' development ?
(5.2) What issues might deserve further investigation ? (5.3)

FUTUREURE OF EURO-THINK TANKS
5.1 POSSIBLE U.S. LESSONS FOR THE FUTForecasting the future of Euro-think tanks is not an easy task and not one we will attempt
here, especially as the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty is in doubt in several Member
States and European construction is still a work-in-progress in many respects. However, there
are perhaps lessons to draw from the U.S. situation. We refer here in particular to two
important characteristics of the American research community, its political and tax systems
and the development of advocacy tanks.
THE GROWTH OF U.S. AND EUROPEAN THINK TANKS
The growth in U.S. think tanks has been allowed primarily by the United States' specificinstitutional construction and its tax regime. Because of "the fragmented and decentralised
nature of the American political system," (Abelson, 1998)155 there are many different centresof power needing policy advice. Furthermore, political parties "have not played (in America) as
prominent a role in policy development as they have in other countries." (Stone, 2000). Why?
Because, as McGann and Weaver (2000) put it, "in the United States, political parties function
primarily as campaign vehicles (…), party platforms often vary considerably over time,depending on the position taken by the party’s presidential candidates." Consequently, party
discipline is weak, "politicians are not constrained by the philosophical goals of political
Abelson,parties” (1998) and "members of the Congress formulate many of their own policy

priorities and pursue their agendas with considerable independence." (Stone, 1996) It seems
that there is considerable space for the single policy maker to seek her own political advice
and ideological legitimation, which often happens to come from think tanks. Finally, in the
United States, political parties are not a primary means of elite recruitment for administrative
positions. "Parties are too weak to perform these functions since they are little more thanelectoral coalitions": think tanks can relatively easily fill the gap as 'party-like' institutions andclearing stations for political and administrative appointments. (Gellner, quoted by Stone,1998) Overall, the particular shape of the American political system, fragmented anddecentralised, with weak political parties, has created a wide number of policy fora, ranging
from the various committees and subcommittees of the legislative and executive branches tothe high number of politicians working independently from party ideology that provides
opportunities for policy analysis and professional research. "Think tanks," argues Abelson,"are provided with multiple channels to convey their ideas to several hundred policy-makers."

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 115

A combination of high demand for policy advice with multiple channels of influence explains toa large extent the prominence of U.S. think tanks.
According to Stone (2000a) "in the USA it is not only political factors (…) but also a strong
philanthropic culture and generous tax regimes that encourages the proliferation of thinktanks.” Abelson (in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 1998) and Weiss (1992) both argue that "the(decentralised and fragmented) nature of the American political system" and the presence of"a strong tradition of corporate and individual philanthropy" are clearly among the main
factors characterising American think tanks. The tax system is also an important factor
explaining the prominent role played by think tanks in U.S. policy making.156
Out of these two factors, Europe clearly offers many outlets for think tank research toblossom, which are likely to increase in importance as E.U. integration progresses. As
discussed in Section 2.1.8, funding regimes are undergoing major changes that may bearsome similarities with the U.S. situation and help promote independent policy research in the
future. Possible evidence of this trend can perhaps be identified in the recent advent of what
one might call 'start-up tanks', i.e. independent research centres created by young policy
entrepreneurs with private funding, such as The Lisbon Council in Brussels. The Economist(2004) noted recently this new trend in Germany, where "some keen youngsters" havestarted their own outfits, such as BerlinPolis and the Global Public Policy Institute.
THE RISE OF ADVOCACY TANKS
Advocacy tanks have gained importance in the USA since World War II. Abelson (1998)
explains: "In an environment where think tanks had to compete aggressively to promote theirideas, their priorities began to change: a new generation of tanks emerged." In other words,
the factors of growth of American independent research centres were the pre-conditions to thebirth of many institutes; their large number implied a high level of competition and meant thatthey had to distinguish themselves from one another. In order to achieve this result, "theyrealised that developing effective marketing techniques to enhance their status in the policymaking community had to become their priority," even before providing sound and impartial
advice to policy-makers (Abelson, 1998). This has resulted in a sharp polarisation of theirpolitical and ideological positions. Indeed, the need to be easily recognised and, ultimately, toget research contracts forced them to make their positions sharper and, over time, unique. In
Abelson's view, the law of competition ruling the market also requires specific marketing
techniques.
As noted in Section 4.2.1, many Euro-think tanks may well be confronted with similar
dynamics that will encourage the trend toward advocacy, in particular the reduction ingovernmental funding and therefore think tanks' need to rely more and more on private
sources of funding and research contracts and to appear more focused on specific researchareas and ideological currents.
THREATS – AND A FEW OPPORTUNITIES – ON THE HORIZON
Beyond further growth and an increase in ‘advocacy tanks’, recent changes in the operating
environment of U.S. think tanks should also be watched, as they announce major threats, as

116 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledwell as opportunities, for the European think tank community. They also put the possible
strategies in the face of growing competition outlined above in perspective (Section 4.2.3).
McGann (2004), in a recent survey of 23 of the leading U.S. think tanks, found that “thosetrends that are affecting think tanks are attributable to six overall changes in the environment(…): how think tanks are funded; an increase in partisan politics; technological developments
and the dominance of the Internet; the emergence of an omnipresent media; a proliferation in
the number of think tanks; and the impact of globalisation.” Respondents highlighted major
negative trends in a number of areas, in particular the handling of funding :“Funding has become increasingly short-term and project-specific, rather than longer term,
general institutional support, which has altered the focus and diminished the capacity of many
think tanks. The short-term funds have challenged the independence and innovation of thinktanks (...)” Similarly, “the omnipresent media with its focus on sound bites rather than soundanalysis is driving think tanks to respond to its time and content parameters by producing
quick, pithy analysis that is quotable, and accessible.

The growth of the Internet has

exacerbated the problem of funding, as think tanks increasingly publicize their researchfindings and policy advice online, providing free access to the public, the media, and potential
donors. The independence and objectivity of think tanks is being challenged by an increase inpartisan politics, from which a corresponding rise in partisan organisations and institutions
that produce analysis along partisan lines has been identified.”
McGann found that recent changes “have also provided opportunities for think tanks toadvance their missions. The advent of the 24/7 media and the Internet have helped raise theprofile of think tanks, enabled them to reach a larger more diverse audience and disseminate
their publications more cheaply. The proliferation of organisations has facilitated greater
cooperation between think tanks and other NGO’s at the local, state, and international levels.
This networking allows for the utilisation of new mechanisms to effectively influence policy andto reach larger audiences. Additionally, the impact of globalisation and unexpectedtransnational events such as 9/11 and SARS have ignited a greater interest in international
affairs, foreign policy, and national security, allowing think tanks to increasingly focus on
these issues. All these trends have been brought into greater focus during the 2004
presidential campaign.”
Surely the threats to “the sustainability of think tanks as independent, reliable providers ofsound public policy advice in the future,” the opportunities to advance think tanks’ role inpolicy making, as well as the recommendations of this survey – which was about to be
published as ours was going to press – should be read with care in Europe also.

5.2 ENCOURAGINGNCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OF THINK TANKSThe number and relevance of think tanks in Europe are likely to grow in the future. Can thistrend be encouraged? The Euro-think tanks interviewed indicated two main avenues topromote their development.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 117

First, many expressed their hope that public authorities and other policy-makers better
understand their role in the decision making process. As stated simply by a Cypriot
respondent, "it is important that the E.U. understands that think tanks have a role to play."
For some, such as certain national governments and the European Commission, it will be amatter of improving existing practices; for others, it will be more of a revolution. Former
European Commission President Jacques Delors for instance invites the European Central
Bank, and even the European Parliament to engage more actively with think tanks. Most thinktanks logically also call for greater public and private financial support, in particular at a panEuropean level. The managers of the Euro-think tanks interviewed agreed that "where it is not
yet possible, donations to think tanks should be allowed for tax deduction," and that E.U.
funding procedures should be simpler. "You should give a sum of money to think tanks thatappear to be doing a good job, then audit them periodically to see whether they are spendingthat money well, but you don't waste time on working out whether the 243 conditions havebeen satisfied," argued the head of a Brussels-based organisation. In this regard, the new
Financial Regulation which requires that, as from 2006, all organisations wanting to get a
grant from budget line 15 06 (“Dialogue with Citizens”) will have to go through an official callfor proposals procedure is worrying, considering their complexity.
In contrast, another French think tank manager believes that the process of weaning thinktanks out of public funding is healthy and that it is up to think tanks themselves to matureand look for private sources, as suggested above. The same director argues that the fiscal
regime, at least in France, is now satisfactory, but that think tanks and potential donors have
not yet realised its full potential. He calls for a dramatic culture change on both sides of thedecision-making fence.
With regard to private funding,“The fiscal regime, at least in France, is now satisfactory, but think tanks andpotential donors have not yet realised its full potential. What we needis a dramatic culture change on both sides of the decision-making fence.”

many think tank leaders callforasimplification

of

tax

regimes and donation rules, inorder to help the private sector provide financial support to think tanks. The promotion offoundations is a prominent aspiration. A Baltic think tank manager argues: "Most European
countries are in growing need of private foundations that would be able to raise funds
domestically and that would allocate part of them (among other organisations) to policy thinktanks." There are however large differences between Members States. A French think tank,
the Institut Montaigne (2002; see also Archambault, 2001) showed that there were barely
2.000 foundations in France in 2002, compared with 8.300 in Germany and nearly 9.000 in
Great Britain. The Fondation Hippocrène (2001), in a similar study, made a number ofrecommendations for French authorities which are likely to be applicable elsewhere.157 Bothsides overall argue that while public funding is necessary and more of it is required in certain
countries, over-dependence on public money is unhealthy. Private funding, if forthcoming, canhelp improve the quality of think tank research, under strict conditions of diversity andaccountability in order to ensure that think tanks' research independence is in no way
impaired.

118 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

The creation of a European statute for foundations and associations is also seen as a usefulstep to encourage pan-European work, as funding sources, whether private or public, are stilllargely national. This issue is currently under debate within the European Commission. Such alegal device could possibly solve part of the problems that European foundations are regularly
confronted with, while dealing with transnational activities and international partners. It would
help to “improve cross-border operations for foundations and their funders”; it would generate
new instruments for cooperation between the foundations themselves; and it would establish
equal rights for this kind of organisation in comparison with others, already enjoying
community tutelage.158
We have seen as well the difficulties which think tanks face in maintaining their independence– or more importantly a perception of independence – when they are funded either by theprivate or public sector. Of course, it is very hard for think tanks to be completely free ofexternal influence. One solution however to this dilemma could be for think tanks to be more
open about their funding sources. Many think tanks covered in our survey do publish anannual report, which shows their income and lists their main donors. However, this was by nomeans the case for all of them. By making their funding sources more transparent, thinktanks would not be harming themselves in the long run. It would enable people to see moreclearly where a think tank’s money comes from and then make their own decision about
whether a think tank’s independence is real or not. It would also arguably increase public trust
both in think tanks as political actors and in their research conclusions. Trust is an importantelement in the public’s attitude towards political bodies and think tanks need to recognise this
if they are to dispel a certain public belief that they are elitist, undemocratic, or mere lobbyingorganisations. If a move towards more transparency was combined with a greater degree of
independent and peer review of think tanks’ work, it could also create a climate in which thequality of research in this sector was vastly improved.
Finally, we have seen in the course of the study that Euro-think tanks are increasingly being
expected to form cross-border alliances with other think tanks, as well as a range of otheractors. It has been shown that this enhances both their national and international status andis indeed a requirement for those think tanks wishing to bid for European Union funding. Much
has also been made recently of the building of a single ‘European research area’ in order toenable ‘scientific resources [to] be better deployed to create more jobs and to improve
Europe’s competitiveness’.159 However, the think tank networks that have been set up in the
E.U. to facilitate this aspect of think tanks’ work (see Annex 2) are currently suffering from amajor funding crisis. Most of the funding for these networks tends to be of a short-term
nature and this is drastically limiting the ability of these networks to have an impact in thefield of social science research. Therefore, we believe that a review of the current funding
arrangements for these networks is needed and that Member States, as well as the European
Commission, should be willing to give them greater financial support.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 119

5.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
FUTURE RESEARCH
We hope that this exploratory survey and the many questions it raises will provide a goodplace to start for future research. Because of time constraints, we were not able to investigate
fully the role played by think tanks with an interest in European affairs in E.U. and national
decision-making processes. As we conclude this study, several issues emerge as topics that
could be investigated in further detail, including the ones listed here.
First, for practical reasons, the scope of this survey was limited to think tanks with their
headquarters based in the 25 E.U. Member States. Important organisations based incandidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey), as well as significant U.S.
institutes' European branches were overlooked.160
For similar reasons, we were not in a position to investigate properly independent research
institutes interested in European policy issues that have disappeared in the past. A moreaccurate and exhaustive study would include such organisations. It would be interesting inparticular to understand which think tanks disappeared and what lessons can be learnt fromtheir history.
Think tanks relations with decision-making structures deserve further investigation, in
connection with a more systematic and deeper comparative analysis of their institutional andpolitical environments. An area of interest that we did not investigate for instance is thecirculation of decision-makers between think tanks and other areas of policy making. The
formation of elites in E.U. policy-making and the role played by think tanks in this process is
an important structuring factor that has been only mentioned in passing in this report. A
comparative analysis of individual Member States and trends regarding issues such as therevolving door phenomenon would be interesting.
This survey did not aim either to analyse Euro-think tanks' contribution to policy making.
Beyond their identification and description, it would therefore be interesting to look at theiractual relevance and impact in further detail: what ideas do they actually promote in theirresearch production?
More specifically, there would be great value in investigating performance measurement tools
adapted to the complexities of think tank operations. A place to start could be to use
electronic databases to analyse media coverage for prominent think tanks in relation to someof the issues raised here (as done by Park, 2004 in the U.S. case).
A question in fact this survey does not answer is: "how could E.U. think tanks think better?"
While most think tank managers agree that new ideas and "added value" are defining
characteristics of true think tanks, few could describe to us the methodologies used to enable"think tankers" to produce innovative policies.
More generally, all the issues this report touched on deserve more detailed research. Funding,as we have seen, is a key issue for the future of E.U. think tanks. In order to allow greater
funding to be channelled to research centres around Europe, a more detailed investigation of
their situation, of best practices, and of the regulatory and cultural steps that could be taken

120 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledto allow further development would be useful. Other topics that would deserve further analysis
include think tanks' influence strategies (stage in the policy-making process, audiences, media
relations, etc.) and best practices in terms of transparency and the management of conflicts ofinterest.
Obviously, the picture provided here will soon need to be updated. Developments to watch
include the possible politicisation of E.U. knowledge and the trend toward greater advocacy;
greater interactions with “new” institutions such as the European Central Bank; transnational
collaboration between E.U. institutes and market restructuring in general and its possible
impact on the reshaping of intellectual elites, the formation of political concepts, and thecross-fertilisation of national political agendas; changes in the academic world and theirimpact on independent research institutes.

155

In particular the peculiar separation of powers between legislative and executive “which allows both Congress
and the President to initiate legislation”; the many divisions within the various departments of the executive
itself ; and again, the fragmentation within the Congress where both the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives operate independently when fashioning legislation.

156"The American tax structure encourages the formation of foundations; individual giving creates a massive
source of funding for think tanks and other non-profit organisations." (Stone, 1998) Abelson (1998) agrees
that "corporate financing and tax exemptions for non-profit organisations provide an impetus for policy
entrepreneurs, political leaders and aspiring office holders to create think tanks." In other words, there is in
the US a strong tradition of private sources associated with corporate or individual funding which, combinedwith the favourable classification of think tanks under the Internal Revenue Code, gives American independent
research centres better access to private funds.

157

The Hippocrène Foundation recommended for France a certain number of tax incentives inspired by theGerman, British and Italian situation, which are probably valid either in part or in whole for other Member
States: the exemption from tax of foundations’ income from property; lower tax on the profits of newlycreated foundations, similar to the German model; the removal of the limit on the amount of income fromdonations which is tax deductible; a tax exemption for gifts benefitting these foundations. The foundation also
recommended the simplification of the legal system applying to foundations. Finally, it stressed the need “for a
discussion at the European level about the rights of foundations, and for a decision to be taken once and for all
on a European statute for foundations.” It is worth noting that the European Commission did publish acommunication in June 1997 which focused on this question but that the issue had not progressed any further
since then. Likewise, the proposal for a regulation which would allow the creation of a statute for European
associations and the fiscal issues at stake in donations at a transnational level need to be considered. The
Institut Montaigne (2002) made 25 proposals to develop foundations in France, centred on the modernisationof their legal framework, and on the development of finances which are sufficient and permit autonomy. The
Institut Montaigne concluded more generally as follows : “The State will have to undertake a true psychologicalchange and accept the principle of supporting the development of other actors which can act alongside it withsame objective of the general interest.” Without doubt these analyses, even if they still need to be deepened
within a European perspective, go beyond the mere case of France.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 121

...........
158

In 2002, the European Commission set up a high level group of European company law experts in order toevaluate this question. At the end of the same year the Group concluded that the institution of a European
legal form for foundations was not a short-term priority. Nevertheless, in May 2003 the Commission launched
an action plan “aiming at assessing in depth the feasibility of such a statute” (COM (2003) 284 final). The plan
foresees the completion of a feasibility study for such a European statute by 2006. In June 2004, the European
Foundation Centre released a new proposal referring to the constitution of a European Association Statuteduring its Annual General Assembly, held in Athens. According to the EFC (www.efc.be), a new community
regulation is at present particularly needed, since after the enlargement the number of foundations andassociations with international cooperation links and cross-border activities has been increasing dramatically.
In order to be recognised as a European foundation/association, an organisation should present thecharacteristics of a non-profit institution, dedicated to the public interest. Moreover, it should “carry out
activities in at least two Member States and have a minimum starting capital of 50,000 euros”. The European
foundation would be registered at the community level and the European statute would be complementary tonational law. As far as the financial regime is concerned, the new statute should guarantee “clear and userfriendly” rules regarding tax exemptions and tax incentives for donors. The EFC is organising a conference onJune 4-6, 2005 on foundations in Europe.

159

DG
Research
Communication
Towardsa
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/i23010.htm

160Europeanresearch

area,

COM

(2000)

6

In order to be even more complete, one might wish to look at U.S. and other policy research institutes'
programmes on Europe, for instance the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe.

122 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

Conclusion
Euro-think tanks play a useful role in the process of European integration and for policy-makers in
Europe in general. We have seen throughout this report how they fulfil many of the roles
presented in Section 1, as do their peers elsewhere. They do indeed, to varying degrees, carry out"basic research on policy problems and policy solutions"; they provide "advice on immediate policy
concerns that are being considered by government officials"; they evaluate government programs,
they "serve as facilitators of issue networks and the exchange of ideas"; they "serve as suppliersof personnel to government and as a place for politicians and policy-makers who are out of power
to recharge their batteries"; and they help interpret "policies and current events for the electronic
and print media." They help make European democracy a reality by acting as incubators andfacilitators of ideas.
Yet, we have also seen how the sector as a whole is strong in absolute terms (3,000 researchers
represent nearly a fifth of the total staff employed by the European Commission!), but also
relatively fragmented and isolated in the sense that not all its members are as effective at
disseminating their research as they could be. Existing players face growing competition fromwithin its own ranks and from new entrants, as barriers to entry to the ‘marketplace of ideas’ arerelatively low. There is some overlap of issues. Public funding is decreasing; private funding is not
yet taking its place. Corporate donors and foundations face obstacles to fund independent policy
research at the E.U.-level and the sector itself has grown too dependent on public funding.
Meanwhile, think tanks face new dilemmas, as E.U. politics and think tank activities are becoming
more partisan and they need to fight for media attention. Potential users of their work, decisionmakers, journalists, academics, are not using think tanks to their maximum value. In many
countries, the former still need to learn what a healthy think tank sector can contribute to policymaking and democracy.
While we found many pessimists within and outside the sector, we believe that there areencouraging signs that Euro-think tanks are in fact experiencing the beginnings of a new era.
Decision-makers, both in the public and private sectors, indicate growing signs of interest, both inEurope and in independent policy research, even in very centralised France. The diversification offunding resources may in the future encourage greater research quality and innovation, if thecorporate sector understands that it too should support the public mission services provided bythink tanks, and if think tanks in turn are willing to open themselves up to greater financial
scrutiny. This could in turn lead to greater private funding streams. Academics are also engaging
more with their think tank colleagues and with other areas of applied research. Cooperation andother forms of exchange between think tanks at the E.U. level are increasing. Anglo-American
mastery of media relations techniques is spreading.
The current changes in Euro-think tanks’ environment may cause some casualties in the next few
years, but many in the sector are also confident that, eventually, European think tanks will emerge
stronger. After all, these are the organisations that specialise in analysing trends and drawing
lessons for the future.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 123

ANNEX 1 – LIST OF EURO-THINK TANKS SURVEYEDThe entirety of the data collected and used for the analysis provided could not materially bepresented in printed form. We therefore provide here only a list of the organisations surveyed
and invite readers to consult Notre Europe’s website for a summary of the data collected on
think tanks’ contact details, missions, key activities and publications, teams, budgets, andresearch topics :http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr
The data presented in the on-line table was collected throughout the summer of 2004, bytelephone, by email, and through the organisations' website. The opportunity, which mostseized, was given to all the think tanks surveyed to review the data provided.

THINK TANKS LIST

UE-BRUSSELS :Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Centre for the New Europe (CNE)
European Centre for International Economics (nom provisoire)
European Policy Centre (EPC)
European Trade Union Institute (Institut Syndical Européen) (ETUI)
Lisbon Council for Economic CompetitivenessObservatoire Social Européen
European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)International Security Information Service, Europe - ISIS Europe
Institut Européen de Recherche sur la Coopération Méditerranéenne et Euro-Arabe (MEDEA)

AUSTRIA
Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (EIF)Österreichisches Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES)Europainstitut der WU Wien (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence)
The interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR)
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) Institute for Advanced Studies
Europäisches Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und SozialforschungÖsterreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP)
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW)
Zentrum für angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP)Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO)
Austria Perspektiv (ein Institut der Österreichischen Wirtschaft)

124 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

BELGIUM
Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP)
Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)CYPRUS
European Institute of Cyprus
The Research and Development Center – Intercollege
Civilitas Research

CZECH REPUBLIC
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Policy Center for the Promotion of Democracy
Prague Institute of International Relations
Center for Economics and Politics
Civic Institute

DENMARK
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)ESTONIA
Institute for European Studies
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (EVI)
Praxis Center for Policy Studies
The Estonian Institute for Futures Studies (ETI)

FINLAND
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
ETLA, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy
Pan-European InstituteFinnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA)
Pellervo Economic Research Institute (PTT)
Labour Institute for Economic Research

FRANCE
Confrontations Europe
Europe 2020
Fondation Robert Schuman
Notre Europe
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)
Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 125

GERMANY
Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP)
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) an der Universität Bonn
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) an der Universität Mannheim
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) an der Universität Mannheim
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)
Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP) an der Universität München
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und KonfliktforschungInstitut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH) and der Universität Hamburg
HAUS RISSEN-Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft (Hamburg)
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin)
Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel (IfW)
IFO-Institut
Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) - - Hamburg Institute of International Economics
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
Institut für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (IWG Bonn)
Max-Planck-Institut für GesellschaftsforschungFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung
ASKO-EUROPA-STIFTUNG
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF)

GREECEELIAMEP, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EKEM, Hellenic Center for European Studies
EKEME, Greek Center of European Studies and ResearchInstitute for International and European Economic Relations
Research Institute for European and American Studies
Centre of European Constitutional Law, Themistocles and Dimitris Tsatsos Foundation
Center for International and European Economic Law
Society for Social and Economic Studies (EKOME)HONGARY
Foundation for Market Economy
Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

126 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

Institute of Economics of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IEHAS)
Policy Research Centre of the Századvég Foundation
International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG) European Center

IRELAND
Institute of European Affairs (IEA)
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

ITALY
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali CENSIS
Centro Studi Politica Internazionale (CeSPI)Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI)
Societa' Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI)
Fondazione di ricerca Istituto Carlo Cattaneo
Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi

LATVIA
Centre for European and Transition
Latvian Institute of International Affairs
Institute of Economics, Academy of Science (IEAS)
Baltic International Center for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS)
Centre for Public Policy (PROVIDUS)

LITHUANIA
Institute for International Relations and Political Science
Lithuanian Free Market InstituteLithuanian Regional Research Institute
Institute of Labour and Social Research

NETHERLANDSThe Cicero Foundation (CF)Centre for European Security Studies (CESS)
Initiative Referendum Institute Europe (IRI Europe)
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael

POLAND
Adam Smith Research Centre
Center for International Relations
Center for Social and Economic ResearchInstitute of Public Affairs

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 127

Foreign Trade Research InstituteGdansk Institute for Market Economics

PORTUGAL
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (Institute of International Strategic Studies) - IEEIInstituto Português de Relaçoes Internacionais (Portuguese Institute of International Relations) – IPRISLOVAKIA
Centre for European Policy
Institute for Economic and Social Reforms
Institute for Public Affairs IVO
M.E.S.A. 10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses
Slovak Foreign Policy Association

SLOVENIA
Institute for Economic Research

SPAIN
Asociación de Investigación y Especialización sobre Temas Iberoamericanos (AIETI)
Centro de relaciones internacionales y cooperación internacional (CIDOB)
Fundación Pablo Iglesias
Fundación para el análisis y el estudio social (FAES)
Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE)
Institut europeo de la mediterrània (IEMed)
Real Instituto Elcano

SWEDEN
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS)
Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
TimbroCenter for Business and Policy Studies (SNS)UNITED KINGDOM
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Centre for European Reform (CER)
EU Policy Network (EPN)
European Foundation
Federal Trust for Education and ResearchInstitute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP)The Policy Network

128 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

British Institute of International Comparative Law (BIICL)
Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), King's College London
European Policy Forum (EPF)
Foreign Policy Centre (FPC)
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Royal Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 129

ANNEX 2 – MAIN EUROPEAN THINK TANK NETWORKSNETWORKS ENCOUNTERED
Think tanks do not operate in a vacuum, in particular in the field of European affairs. They
form networks and are surrounded by organisations that perform similar activities. One of thestriking features of the think tanks we studied was the enormous number of links which they
had with think tanks and other organisations both across Europe and in other parts of theworld.161 These links varied enormously both in type and depth (cf. section 1.2 for a discussionof causes of think tank ‘internationalisation’).

THINK TANK LINKS REPOREPORTED
RTED IN THE SURVEY
We encountered different types of relationship :Contact with another think tank, e.g. through meetings or discussions. This allows insome cases the sharing of best practice.162

Joint hosting of an event : this enables a think tank to have access to a new audience
outside its home country. The local ‘partner’ think tank – with its greater knowledge ofthe national political scene – can assist in the organisation of an event abroad. Thenthe first think tank would reciprocate the arrangement for any events organised in its
own country.

Partnership with (an)other think tank(s) for a single research project: This type of ad
hoc collaboration is favoured by many of the think tanks in the survey. It provides theopportunity to incorporate a broader range of perspectives into the research whileallowing think tanks to maintain their independence from other bodies.

Participation in multi-partner, multi-sector research projects and networks: theseusually involve a range of participants, including universities, scientific experts, andother national research bodies, in addition to think tanks. The best example are the‘Networks of Excellence’ funded by the E.U. under the 6th Framework Programme forresearch, although there is a range of other types. It was not clear from ourinterviews with European think tanks how active they are in these networks. The
research content of each network project is usually fairly specialised and it seems that
universities – which have a larger number of specialised researchers – are more
successful at getting funding for them.163 More research is certainly needed tounderstand better think tanks’ participation in such networks. There are one or two
examples of think tanks taking part in other networks, not directly related to the 6th
Framework Programme. For example, FORNET is a new network which shares ideas
among academics and practitioners on different aspects of European foreign policy.164
There is also a large number of think tank networks operating at the European level.
Struyk (2002) has provided a conceptual framework for the discussion of suchnetworks, but essentially they come about when a group of think tanks which sharecommon interests decide to establish a formal network. The network organisation may
or may not have institutionalised structures existing outside the individual think tanks.

130 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

Sharing a joint forum with another think tank to promote a particular policy area: thismay involve a degree of joint funding and also a sharing of personnel. One example
we found is the ‘European Security Forum’ set up recently by CEPS and IISS in
Brussels to enable joint events to be hosted, and joint papers to be written, on
European defence and security matters.165 Another example would be the biannual
conference of directors and representatives of institutes of international affairs(fortunately shortened to CDRILA).



Direct funding by one think tank of another think tank: this is not a common practice
between Euro-think tanks, although there were some examples.166

THINK TANK NETWORKS IN EUROPE
The table below lists some of the main think tank networks which we came across in our
survey. There were also others which seemed important: for example the network ofEuropean environmental policy institutes (whose members are IEEP, IPAE, and Ecologic); thenetwork of directors of Nordic and Baltic institutes; and the biannual meetings of the institutes
of international affairs. However, none of these currently has a website. This list is therefore
not meant to be exhaustive, but to provide an initial overview.
The networks are usually one of two types: either a network which simply brings together
different think tanks but has no independent viewpoint (e.g. EPIN; TEPSA, which was founded
in 1974 and was one of the first such network set up in Europe); or an ‘epistemic’ network,
which groups together institutes of a similar policy outlook and which is usually more
advocacy-oriented. The best example of this latter type in our survey is the Stockholm
Network, a relatively new network of free market think tanks with members in Britain,
Scandinavia, and France with offices in London.
The ones that are most cohesive tend to be the ones which are administered and core-funded
either by a single think tank, or by an external donor (Struyk, 2002). Examples of the morecohesive networks would be TEPSA, which receives E.U. funding and was established on theinitiative of the Federal Trust; EPIN, created at the time of the Convention and hosted and run
by CEPS (CEPS hosts the secretariat of a number of networks167); and the OSI-Related Policy
Centres network in Eastern Europe, funded by the Open Society Institute and run from their
Budapest office. European think tanks may also belong to a global network of research
institutes. One example is the Global ThinkNet, which convenes policy dialogue meetings ofthink tanks and politicians and is administered by the Japan Centre for International
Exchange.
A number of factors arguably limit the impact which networks can have. These include theextra administrative burden which they can create for a think tank participating in the network(for example they may have to organise events or publish papers on behalf of the network);
the lack of a strong ‘corporate’ identity which the network can suffer from; and also theprecariousness of funding arrangements for them, especially if they cannot find a long-term
donor.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 131

Think tanks have also developed other strategies to increase their impact abroad. One is toopen a new office or offices overseas, a trend seen amongst many American think tanks, suchas RAND and the Aspen Institute, but less common among the European ones. We did though
come across a number of Euro-think tanks which had set up branches outside their homecountry, either in Brussels or further afield.168 This enables them to build better links abroadwith new constituencies, such as the European institutions, while still retaining their domestic
base.
Another strategy adopted by think tanks in this respect is to develop a network of researchers
based in different countries and to administer this ‘think net’ from a single office. This is theorganisational form used by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) (See Case
Study). This type of operation has undoubtedly been made easier by the spread of information
technology. Some think tanks, which do not have the organisational capacity for either ofthese strategies, have instead chosen to establish themselves as ‘online only’ think tanks,
such as the recently formed E.U. Policy Network, although whether this will take off as aphenomenon remains uncertain. Finally, there are a number of online discussion forums which
now exist and have a number of similarities to think tanks. One example would be Open
Democracy, an online organisation promoting debate on a range of policy issues. Strictly
speaking though, these are not think tanks because conducting policy research is not theirmain activity.

132 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

MAIN EURO-THINK TANKS NETWORKS ENCOUNTERED *Name/websiteDatefoundedDescription

Geographicalcoverage

Association ofEuropeanConjuncture
Institutes (AIECE)

1957

Promotes exchange ofstatistical andinstitutional information
to encourage economic
development

17 E.U. countries,
Switzerland,
Norway andYugoslavia

1974

Promoting international
research on European
integration

EU

22

Brussels(TEPSA)

1996

Foreign policy research
and analysis of security
issues35 membercountries of EuroMed Partnership(E.U. and North
African states)

45 (includes
university
institutes)

Lisbon(IEEI)

1997

Capacity-building for
East European thinktanks

Eastern Europe

18

Budapest(Open
Society
Institute)

1998

Economic modelling,
forecasting and analysis
leading to E.U. policy
recommendations

Netherlands,
Germany,
Ireland, GB,
France, Italy,
Austria, Finland

9

Berlin (DIW)

2000

International diffusion of
joint research, aiming toincrease publicawareness of theEuropean dimension ofnational economic policy
issuesPromoting pan-European
policy dialogue andresearch

Europe, including
candidatecountries

23

Brussels(CEPS)

28 European
countries,
including all E.U.
member states,
accession andcandidatecountries
UK, France,
Sweden, Brussels

37

Brussels(CEPS)

120

Londonwww.econ.ucl.ac.be/
CONJ/aiece2002/
index.html

TEPSA (Transnational European
Policy Studies
Association)

Number ofmemberinstitutes
43 (some aregovernment
agencies)

Secretariat
Belgium(IRES)

www.tepsa.be

EuroMediterranean
Study Commission(EuroMeSCo)
www.euromesco.net

Centres derecherche liés àl’OSI
lgi.osi.hu/ppi/

European
Forecasting
Research
Association for the
Macroeconomy(EUROFRAME)
www.euroframe.org

ENEPRI
www.enepri.org

European Policy
Institutes Network(EPIN)

2002

www.epin.org

Stockholm
Network
www.stockholmnetwork.org*

Networks

2004 (bienquel’initiative
date de
1997)

with

Network of free market
European think tanks

predominantly

think

tanks

as

members,

based

in

Europe

and

with

a

website.

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 133

...........
161

On the other hand, we were studying think tanks working on international themes and these were probably
more likely to have international links than think tanks working on domestic issues.

162

For example if a new think tank director wishes to learn how an existing think tank operates. Or it is simply toshare ideas. In the latter case, it usually occurres between think tanks holding similar research interests
and/or outlooks, such as international affairs institutes or free market think tanks.

163

Cf. for instance the list of current projects at www.cordis.lu

164

It was set up in January 2003 and is funded by the Commission. It is managed from the London School of
Economics and has other universities involved; one of its principal partners is TEPSA and among its otherpartners are many of the European foreign affairs think tanks. www.fornet.info

165

Cf. www.eusec.org

166

A number the well funded German foundations, including the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, give financial support to new think tanks in Eastern Europe. The Robert Schuman Foundation also
assists sister institutes in the CEECs.

167

ENEPRI (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes), www.enepri.org; ENARPRI (European
Network of Agricultural and Rural Policy Research Institutes), www.enarpri.org; ELISE (European Liberty andSecurity), www.eliseconsortium.org; EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network), www.epin.org; CS (Climate
Strategies), www.climate-strategies.org; ESF (European Security Forum) - run jointly with the IISS, London,
www.eusec.org; ECRI (European Credit Research Institute), www.ecri.be.

168

The only truly ‘trans-national’ European think tanks in this regard found in our survey were: the German party
foundations, such as FES and KAS, which had branches spread all over the world; IISS which has offices in
London, Washington and Singapore and has members in over 100 countries around the world and a significant
presence in Asia; and IEEP, the UK-based environment think tank which opened a Brussels office in 2001.

134 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

ANNEX 3 – METHODOLOGICALETHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONSHOW TO RECOGNISE A THINK TANK: HOW OUR NINE CRITERIA WERE IDENTIFIED
Defining think tanks is not an easy task, considering the diversity of potentially relevantorganisations. We concur with Sherrington (2000) who argues that, "with respect to the EU, it
is futile to strive for one meaning—an exclusive definition simply cannot be applied to EUoriented think tanks given the varying contexts in which E.U. policy is shaped." Indeed, it isour belief that no single definition can fit all groups that are involved in the production anddissemination of information about policy. Wallace and Garnett (1998), as quoted by
Sherrington (2000), also argue: "It makes little sense to define a "think tank" too precisely.
The functions which think tanks fulfil – research relevant to public policy, promotion of publicdebate, the questioning of the conventional wisdom, the formulation and dissemination ofalternative concepts and policy agendas – can be fulfilled in many ways, under different
constraints."
Yet, finding and applying a clear definition is crucial for a rigorous analysis. As the world of
think tanks becomes richer and diverse, it is also bound to be studied and discussed more
often. The term is used ever more vaguely in the media. It is therefore useful to seek a morerefined understanding of what makes think tanks specific in the world of policy formation.
The working definition used here is derived from six flexible criteria initially proposed by Weiss(1992, viii), for what she calls "policy analysis organizations." She states that think tanks 1)
are permanent organizations, 2) are not responsible for the operations of government, 3)
have specialized staff with expertise, 4) are policy oriented, 5) produce analysis and advice, 6)
and put emphasis on communicating their research to policymakers.
In the light of our research and other scholars' contributions, the first criterion is a clear
demarcation between, for instance, temporary research teams and organisations that aim tolast (e.g. committees of experts set up by the European Commission).
The second is trickier though. Weiss’s objective in stating that think tanks are not responsible
for the operations of government is in some cases difficult to apply. Organisations that are
appointed by public officials to undertake research governed by the state's needs, such as
government research agencies are nevertheless excluded. The question of think tanks’autonomy goes beyond their relations with government authorities. On the one hand, Stone,
Denham and Garnett (1998) argue with reason that "the notion that a think tank requires
independence or autonomy from the state in order to be 'free-thinking- is a peculiarly AngloAmerican notion that does not travel well into other cultures" and that, for instance "to talk of
independence as a defining characteristic of think tanks makes little sense in the French
culturalcontext."

What

about

advocacytanks,

forinstance,

which

researchandrecommendations are governed by a predetermined view of the world? They may not apply
scientifically exact methodologies and usually receive more funding from sources favourable totheir agenda. The research of the great majority of EU-focused think tanks in fact is governedby the idea that further integration and enlargement of the European Union is necessary. As

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 135

such, they also serve the interest of various actors, including the Commission and certain
parties that fund them to a large extent. On the other hand, Stone et al. believe, as we do,that think tanks should be able to define their research agenda independently fromgovernment missions, as well as from other actors, be they corporate interests or politicalparties. As they argue, this may be a “relative” autonomy as "such organizations may operate
within government (…) or be attached to a profit-making corporate entity." Essentially though,“these institutes attempt to maintain their research freedom and at least claim not to bebeholden to any specific interest." The idea of "independence", although necessary, clearlyremains elusive.
As explained by Stone (2000, p.156) for instance, "the distinction between an independent
think tank and an official or state-funded think tank is not clear cut. In reality, complete
autonomy and independence for think tanks is illusory. Self-generated research agendas,
financial autonomy, a dispassionate scholarly focus and retaining organisational distance fromofficial forums may bolster intellectual integrity but it also undermines the potential for policy
relevance and input." As she argues, all think tanks are, to some extent, shaped by theirpolitical environment, whether through their tax status, public funding, or because they havebeen created by the government, or have been co-opted by official organisations, are linked
to parties, etc. McGann and Weaver (2000, p.5) advocate pursuing "a middle course",
restricting their study to organisations that have "significant autonomy from government andfrom societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties", while recognizingthat "autonomy is a relative rather than an absolute term, and that the operational definitionof think tanks must differ from region to region." In practice, we have tried to determine how
they preserve their capacity to determine their own research agenda by asking this veryquestion, by looking at statutes and the origins of staff and funding, and generally assessing
the organisations’ ability to work autonomously.
Being “policy oriented”, producing “analysis and advice” and communicating their research arealso core characteristics of think tanks. As stressed by McGann and Weaver (2000), it "is thetransformation of political problems into appropriate public policy solutions" that justifies their
existence. Sherrington (2000) adequately states that think tanks' "primary aim is todisseminate that research as widely as possible with the intention of influencing policy-making
processes," unlike interest groups or public interest NGOs that analyse policies and propose
policy alternatives on an ad hoc basis, but not as their primary activity. In fact, Stone (2000)
sees this as the very essence of think tanks: "Think tanks have one thing in common: theindividuals in them attempt to make academic theories and scientific paradigms policyrelevant." This allows to draw a line, albeit at times blurred, between think tanks andinstitutions that only seek to disseminate ideas, but do not have a research capacity that cancontribute to policy making (such as Forum Europe, A Gauche, en Europe, the Bruges Group,and Friends of Europe). We have also excluded bodies that do not publish or do not have a
website (e.g. Centro Europa Ricerche in Italy). Academic research centres that study policyrelated issues but do not seek to shape policy debates and decision-making processes werealso excluded (there are for instance numerous ‘borderline’ cases in Portugal that have notbeen included for this reason).

136 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledIn this respect, although Weiss includes only policymakers as think tanks’ target, several
authors (Stone, 2000; Sherrington, 2000) include both policy-makers and the public. For
Stone (2000), "the term "think tank" is used here to mean independent (and usually private)
policy research institutes (…) actively seeking to educate or advise policy-makers and the
public through a number of channels." Denham and Garnett (1998) also argue that thinktanks try to influence the climate of opinion and to inform public policy decisions. This, in ourview, is important, as think tanks for the most part produce and market ideas. In other words,
they do not merely seek to produce expertise, but also to propagate their ideas. Although
their ultimate aim is to see their ideas implemented, the general public therefore being astrategic, yet secondary target, we argue that both aspects of think tanks’ operations areequally important.
We also believe that a useful distinction to add to Weiss's original list is that think tanks, assuggested inter alia by Stone, Denham, and Garnett (p.4), are not degree-granting
institutions. This allows drawing a line between purely or primarily academic research outfits(e.g. EUI in Florence) and training institutes (e.g. EIPA in The Netherlands) on the one hand,
and think tanks that may include different types of training in their activities as part of theirwider goals (e.g. Clingendael Institute, also in The Netherlands). Regarding consultancies thatoffer services equivalent to think tanks, the distinguishing factor in our view is that theseoutfits only operate on a commercial basis, however scientific their research practices, while
think tanks operate for a certain view of the public good. Whether as advocacy or academic
think tanks, they perform essentially a public service.
For the sake of completeness, we have chosen not to restrict our research to non-profit
organisations, as proposed by McGann and Weaver (2000), as this would risk eliminating alarge number of relevant organisations in the European context. In fact, this criterion derives
from a North American context, and proves more easily applicable there than in Europe, as
experienced by these authors, considering that not all E.U. Member States allow this type oforganisation. We have not limited ourselves either to multi-disciplinary organisations, buthave included specialised organisations (e.g. IRI Europe in The Netherlands).

LIST OF INTERVIEWS
The following qualitative interviews were conducted in person or by telephone. In a small
number of cases by email (indicated).
POLICY MAKERS
1.

Christine Verger, Secretary General of the socialist group, European Parliament, 14.07.20042.

Maïté Abram, director, European Movement Belgium, 14.07.2004

3.

Sylvie Goulard, Group of Policy Advisors, European Commission, 14.07.2004

4.

Aivar Roop, Director of the European movement in Estonia, 14.07.2004

5.

Marina Féat, Researcher, French Permanent Representation to the European institutions,15.07.2004

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 137

6.

Odile Chenal, Deputy director, European Cultural Foundation, 16.07.2004

7.

Eneko Landaburu, Director general, DG External Relations, European Commission, 19.07.2004

8.

Nicole Gnesotto, Director, EUISS, 19.07.2004

9.

Jacques Delors, President, Notre Europe, 26.07.2004

10. Helle Thorning Schmidt, former Danish MEP, founder of Progressivt Centrum (Danish thinktank), 27.07.04
11. Joachim Bitterlich, former advisor to Helmut Kohl, 11.08.2004
12. Lucy Powell, Campaigns Director, Britain in Europe, 13.08.04
13. François Lamoureux, Director general, DG transport and energy, European Commission,
18.08.2004
14. Lykke Friis, Dansk Industri, 18.08.04
15. Henrik Kröner, Secretary General, European Movement International, 19.08.2004
16. Grégoire Verdeaux, Advisor, Cabinet of Michel Barnier, Foreign Affairs Minister (France),
2.09.2004
17. Hubert Heiss, Head of Unit, Chancellery (Germany), 2.09.2004
18. Pierre Jonckheer, Member of the European Parliament (Belgium), 3.09.2004
19. Juan Ignacio Morro, civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat for European
Affairs (Spain), 7.9.2004
20. Androula Vassiliou, Member of the European Parliament (Cyprus), 27.08 and 8.09.2004
21. Amaya Bloch-Lainé, Director, German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Paris, 9.09.2004
22. Lord Grenfell, Chair, House of Lords EU Select Committee, UK Parliament, 13.09.2004

MEDIA
1.

David Cronin, political correspondent, European Voice, 15.07.2004

2.

Françoise Croigneau, Chief-editor, international affairs, Les Echos, 27.08.2004

3.

Ana Alonso Montes, Spanish journalist, member of the international editorial office of El
Mundo,30.8.2004

4.

Quentin Dickinson, Deputy Director, Radio France, Brussels, 31.08.2004

5.

Martine Dubuisson, journalist, Le Soir (Belgium), 3.09.2004

6.

Anthony Manduca, Associate editor, The Times, Malta, Expert in International Relations andE.U. affairs, 3.09.2004

7.

Aija Lulle, journalist, Neatkariga (Latvian newspaper), 3.09.2004

8.

Erkki Bahovski, journalist, Chief-editor, European affairs, "Postimees" (Estonian daily
newspaper), 6.09.2004

9.

Paul Gillespie, Foreign Policy Editor, Irish Times, 08.09.04

10. Ian Black, former Brussels Correspondent, The Guardian, 13.09.04

138 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

ACADEMICS
1.

Iga Krasnowska, Center for International Relations (Poland), 14.07.2004

2.

Jean Pisani-Ferry, economist, founder of the European Centre for International Economics,
19.07.2004

3.

Renaud Dehousse, Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the European Centre at the Institut
d'Etudes Politiques of Paris, 28.07.2004

4.

Franklin Dehousse, Professor, University of Liège, assessor of the European Studies
department of IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, Belgium), 5.08.2004

5.

Jacques Rupnik, CERI (Centre d'Etude et de Recherches Internationales, France), 19.08.2004

6.

Yves Mény, President of the European University Institute (Florence), 21.08.2004

7.

Simon Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics, Department of Government, LSE,
24.08.04

8.

Martin Thunert, Professor, University of Munich, author of several books on think tanks,169
30.08.2004

9.

Roderick Pace, Director of the European Documentation and Research Center, Malta 1.09.2004

10. Diane Stone, Reader in Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, 3.09.04
11. Josef Braml, Researcher, SWP (Germany),170 7.09.2004

THINK TANKS
1.

Abraamides Lysandros, Director's deputy of the Research & Development Center-Intercollege,
08.07.2004

2.

Radek Spok, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy (Czech Republic), 09.07.2004

3.

Barbara Lippert, Stellvertrete Direktorin, Institut für europäische Politik (IEP), 9.07.2004

4.

Monica Cauchi, Communications officer of the European Documentation and Research Center,09.07.2004

5.

Ludger Künhardt, Director at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), Bonn Universität,
9.07.2004

6.

Mr. Hutter, responsible for the E.U. project, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 12.07.2004

7.

Judas Vorrath, Research and Programme Coordinator, Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF),
12.07.2004

8.

Jürgen Turek, Managing Director, Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (CAP) an derUniversität München, 12.07.2004

9.

Andreas Theophanous, Director of Research & Development Center-Intercollege, 12.07.2004

10. Aksel Kirch, Director of the Institute for European Studies in Estonia, 12.07.2004
11. James Ker-Lindsay, Director of Civilitas Research, 12.07.2004 and 01.09.2004
12. Erik Terk, Director of the Estonian Institute for Futures Studies, 13.07.2004
13. Giles Merritt, Secretary General, Friends of Europe, 13.07.2004
14. Rolf Langhammer, Vice-president of the Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW), 13.07.2004
Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 139

15. Hans-Georg

Ehrhart,Arbeitsgebiete :Internationale

Organisationen,

Konfliktprävention,

Europäische Integration, Osteuropa, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Universityof Hamburg, 13.07.2004
16. Silvia Stiller, Head of Research Programme European Integration and Spatial Development,
Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA), 13.07.2004
17. Andres Kasekamp, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 14.07.2004
18. Marlène Arany, Secretary General, TEPSA, 14.07.2004
19. Karel Lannoo, Chief Executive, Staffan Jerneck, Deputy Director, Centre for European Policy
Studies, 14.07.2004
20. Ann Metter, Executive Director and co-founder, Paul Hofheinz, President and co-founder, Lisbon
Council, 15.07.2004
21. Daniela Manca, Research Fellow, International Security Information Service, Europe, 15.07.2004
22. Graham Mather, Director, European Policy Forum, 15.07.2004
23. Michael Landesmann, Director of Research, Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche(WIIW), 15.07.2004
24. Raita Karnite, Director of the Institute of Economics in Latvia
25. Henrietta Riegler, Senior Researcher for southeastern Europe, Österreichisches Institut fürinternationale Politik (OIIP), 16.07.2004
26. Dr Schmidt, Managing Director, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin),
16.07.2004
27. Joseph Melchior, Assistant Professor / Europaforschung, Österreichisches Gesellschaft fürPolitikwissenschaft (ÖGPW), 16.07.2004
28. Elizabeth Phocas, Deputy Director, ELIAMEP, 16.07.2004
29. Charles Grant, Director, Centre for European Reform, 16.07.2004
30. Brendan Donnelly, Director, Federal Trust, 16.07.2004
31. Thomas Fischer, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 19.07.2004 (mail)32. Dr. Michael Paul, Head, Research Secretariat, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 19.07.2004(mail)
33. Tanja Gewis, Management, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), 19.07.2004
34. Otmar Höll, Director, OIIP Österreichisches Institut für internationale Politik (OIIP), 19.07.2004
35. Leslie Agius, Director of the Foundation of International Studies, 19.07.2004
36. Hynek Opolecky, Policy Center for the Promotion of Democracy (République Tchèque), 20.07.2004
37. Thanos Veremis, Director of EKEME, 20.07.2004
38. Dr Hermann Schmitt – Projektleiter, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische SozialForschung(MZES), 20.07.2004
39. Mrs Bapuly, Researcher-lawyer, Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (IEF), Wien,
20.07.2004
40. Marek Jakoby, M.E.S.A. 10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses, 20.07.2004 67.

140 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled41. Peter Zsapka, Centre for European Policy (Slovaquie), 20.07.2004
42. Anders Mellbourn, Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 21.07.2004
43. Annita Kishi-Manentzou, Director's assistant of the European Institute of Cyprus, 21.07.2004
44. Eckard Bolsinger, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft(Hausrissen), 21.07.2004
45. Dr Helga Haftendorn, Vice-President of the research institute, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige
Politik (DGAP), 21.07.2004
46. Kristina Meskova, Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (Slovaquie), 21.07.2004
47. Jens Rasmussen, Personnel Department, Danish Institute for International Studies, 21.07.2004
48. Harri Lorentz, Research Associate, Pan-European Institute, Finland, 22.07.2004
49. Jan Hrich, The Institute of International Relations-IIR (Czech Republic), 22.07.2004
50. Egle Baroniunaite, Project manager of the Lithuanian Regional Research Institute, 23.07.2004
51. Stephen Yeo, Chief Executive Officer, CEPR, 23.07.2004
52. Robert Dover, Director, E.U. Policy Network, 25.07.2004
53. Ana Pinto, Instituto Português de Relaçoes Internacionais, 26.07.2004
54. Pedro Courela, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, 27.07.2004
55. Pascale Joannin, Director, Fondation Robert Schuman, 27.07.2004
56. Richard Whitman, Head of European Programme, RIIA, 27.07.2004
57. Tatiana Muravska, Director of the Centre for European and Transition Studies, 28.07.2004
58. Jean Nestor, former Secretary General, Notre Europe, 28.07.2004
59. Pilar Tena, Director of institutional relations, Real Instituto Elcano, 29.7.2004
60. Stanley Crossick, Founder, European Policy Centre, 29.07.2004
61. Brona Pinterova, Institute for Public Affairs (Slovaquie), 30.07.2004
62. Michael Meier, Desk officer for Western industrialised countries, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2.08.2004
63. Hans-Werner Sinn, President of CESifo Group, IFO-Institut, 2.08.2004
64. Margriet Drent, Executive Director, Centre for European Security Studies, 3.08.2004
65. Peter van Ham, Deputy Head of Studies, Clingendael Institute, 3.08.2004
66. Sacha Godeschalk, Rand Europe, Leiden, 3.08.2004
67. Bruno Kaufman, Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, 4.08.2004
68. Vita Terauda, Director of the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Latvia, 05.08.2004
69. Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, Director, Institut für Europäische Integrationsforschung (IEF), Wien,
10.08.2004
70. A.D. Papayannides, Member of the Board of EKEME, 10.08.2004 (email)71. Carolina Mateu, Communications officer, IEMED, Spain, 11.8.2004
72. Maria Palsson, Director of Communications, Timbro, 12.08.2004

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 141

73. Ronald J Pohoryles, Chairman & Director, Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research(ICCR), 13.08.2004
74. Atis Lejins, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 17.08.2004
75. Inga Kanasta, Director's assistant of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 17.08.2004
76. Richard Gowan, Head of European Research, FPC, 18.08.2004
77. Tomas Dahlman, Director, SIEPS, 18.08.2004
78. Erich Hochleitner, Director, Österreichische Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik, 20.08.2004
79. Pierre Lepetit, Executive Director, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 25.08.2004
80. Ulrika Stuart, Chief Information Officer, SNS, 27.08.2004
81. Francois Lafond, Deputy Director, Policy Network, 2.09.2004
82. Ms Buggel-Asmus, Information Manager, ETUI, 3.09.2004
83. Roderick Pace, Director of the European Documentation and Research Center, 01.09.2004
84. Pete Glennon, Administrator, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 3.09.2004
85. Jill Donoghue, Research Director, and Pete Glennon, Administrator
86. Philippe Pochet, Director, OSE, 10.09.2004
87. Marco Incerti, Researcher, EPIN/CEPS, 13.09.2004

169

In particular: "Think Tanks in Germany" in Stone, Denham, Garnett, 2003. "Conservative Think Tanks in the
United States and Canada" in: Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Roland Sturm and Dagmar Eberle (eds.): Conservative
Parties and Right-Wing Politics in North America, Opladen (Germany): Leske&Budrich, 2003, 229-254. "Players
Beyond Borders? German Think Tanks as Catalysts of Transnationalisation" in: Global Society, No.2, April
2000, 191-212.

170

Author of Think Tanks vs. "Denkfabriken" ? US and German Policy Research Institutes Coping with andInfluencing Their Environments

142 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

QUESTIONNAIRES
The three following questionnaires were used for interviews with managers of think tanks,
decision-makers and journalists, and academics. Additional questions were asked when theinterviews justified going beyond these initial questions.
THINK TANK MANAGERS
1.

What was the rationale for the creation of your think tank ?

2.

How do you decide your research priorities ?

3.

At what stage of the decision-making process do you usually intervene ? Before: when public
policies are being created; or after, in reaction to proposals that are being examined ?

4.

How do you seek to preserve your independence ?

5.

How would you define a think tank in Europe ?

6.

According to you, what are the key factors that dertermine think tank’s influence ? The key
factors that determine it’s credibility ?

7.

What think tanks do you consider the most influent ?

8.

What current trends are visible in think tank development across Europe ?

9.

What are the main challenges facing think tanks today (competition, funding...) ?

10. What is the impact of E.U. enlargement on your activities? And for other think tanks working
on European affairs ?
11. What are the other think tanks interested in European affairs in your country ?
12. Can you estimate your media-coverage: interviews, TV, press articles/editorials, quotations,etc. ?
13. What is the benefit for you of having links with other think tanks in Europe ?

POLICY-MAKERS
1.

Do you often use think tanks as information sources?

2.

Do you contact them on your own initiative, or do they seek contact with you?

3.

What is your opinion about such contacts: useful/not very useful, why ?

4.

What do you expect from think tanks? What role can they play in the European construction
and integration process?

5.

What are the think tanks you consider influent?

6.

According to you, what are the key factors of influence for a think tank ? Of credibility ?

7.

Would you say that independence from other interests (such as political, ideological, etc.) is an
important factor of credibility for a think tank ?

8.

What are the major trends of think tanks’ development today ?

9.

Would you work for a think tank yourself ? Why ?

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 143

ACADEMICS
1.

Are think tanks important actors of the European construction and decision-making processes?

2.

What role do you think they play ?

3.

Is their contribution to policy making for Europe adequate ?

4.

Could / should anything be done in [relevant Member State] / in the European Union to
encourage the development of think tanks ?

5.

What are the key characteristics of an influential think tank? Of a credible think tank ?

6.

What are the most influential think tanks ? Why ?

7.

What are the current trends of think tank development in [relevant Member State] ? In othercountries ?

8.

What is your opinion about the nature and work of [relevant Member State's] think tanks,
compared, for instance, to the nature and work of U.S. think tanks ?

9.

Are you aware of studies or surveys that deal with think tanks in your country ?

144 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled

ANNEX 4 – REFERENCES
Archambault, Edith, « Foundations in France », in Foundations in Europe, Society,
Management and Law, The Directory of Social Change, Berlin : Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2001

Barnier,Michel,discours

aux

ambassadeurs,

26

août

2004,

consultablesur

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.frBaun, Michael J., An Imperfect Union : The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics ofEuropean Integration, Westview Press, 1996

Blockstein, David, How to Lose Your Political Virginity While Keeping Your Scientific
Credibility, in BioScience, 52 :1 (2002) : pp.91-96



CDRI (Centredestratégiquederecherche

pourl'influenceledéveloppement

politiqueduinternational), Evaluation
CRDI,

consultableà

http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-12182-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, 2001.


Denham, Andrew, et Mark Garnett, British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion,
London : UCL Press, 1998

Dickson, Paul, Think Tanks, New York, NY : Atheneum, 1971

Dinan, Desmond, Ever Closer Union ?, 2nde ed., London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1999



Economist (The), « Pennies for their thoughts » , 2 septembre 2004

EFC (European Foundation Centre), Recommendations on a European statute forfoundations, (2001) consultable sur http://www.efc.beEuropean Voice, Thomas Klau, « Stiftungen Provide a Useful Link » , 9 juillet 1998
(1998a)European Voice, Rory Watson, « Crossing the Business and Political Divide », 9 juillet
1998 (1998b)

European Voice, Craig Winneker, « Guaranteeing your think tank is the '…ing thing' »,15 octobre 2003

European Voice, Gareth Harding, « Why Think Tanks are More than just a Chance for
Schmooze and Free Drinks », 24 janvier 2004

Eurostat, Research and Development Expenditure, News Release, 25 février 2004

Féat, Marina, L'influence française dans les think tanks traitant des questions
européennes, étude réalisée pour la Représentation Permanente de la France auprès
de l'Union européenne, juillet 2004



Floch, Jacques, Rapport N°1594 d'Information sur la Présence et l'Influence de laFrance dans les Institutions Européennes, Assemblée Nationale, 2004 (12 mai),
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/Europe/rap-info/i1594.asp

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 145



Fondation Hippocrène, Développer les Fondations en France, un Impératif Européen,étude réalisée par HEC Junior Conseil, juillet 2001



Gadault, Thierry, « La Grande Misère des Think Tanks Français », in Le Nouvel
Economiste, 26 mars - 1 avril 2004

Greenwood, Justin, Representing Interests in the European Union, London : St.
Martin's Press, 1997

Greenwood, Justin, Interest Representation in the European Union, London : Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003

Harvey, B. “Does Ireland Need More Think Tanks?”, Administration, Vol.49, no.4, hiver
2001-02, pp.89 – 100

Institut Montaigne, 25 propositions pour développer les fondations en France,
novembre 2002

Johnson, Erik C., Central Europe's Think Tanks : A Voice for Reform, in Economic
Reform Today, N°3, 1996 : www.cipe.org

JournalduManagement,

Le,

Annuaire,

Les

Think

Tanks

les

Plus

Influents,

http://management.journaldunet.com/dossiers/040435thinktanks/annuaire/
index.shtml, 2004Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York : Harper
Collins, 1984



Le Corre, Philippe, Tony Blair, Les Rendez-Vous Manqués, Paris : Autrement, 2004



Lindquist, Evert A., Discerning Policy Influence : Framework for a Strategic Evaluationof

IDRC-Supported

Research,

UniversityofVictoria,

1

septembre

2001:

http ://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-12177-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html


McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union : A Concise Introduction,
London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed., 2002



McGann, James G., R. Kent Weaver¸ ed., Think Tanks and Civil Societies, Catalysts for
Ideas and Action, New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers, 2000



McGann, James G., Scholars, Dollars, and Policy Advice, Foreign Policy ResearchInstitute, Philadelphia, 2004



Nielsen, Stephanie, IDRC-Supported Research And Its Influence On Public Policy :Knowledge Utilisation and Public Policy Processes : A Literature Review, IDRC,
décembre 2001

Nye, Joseph, John D. Donahue (ed.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Brookings,
2000



Oster, Sharon M., Strategic Management for Non-profit Organizations, Theory andCases, New York : Oxford University Press, 1995

146 Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilledPark, Sarah S., Idea-Factories or Ideologues? Think Tanks and the Paradox ofCredibility and Influence, essai présenté à la Commission des Diplômes en Etudes
Sociales, Harvard College, mars 2004



Przybylski, Wojciech, Think Tanks in Austria and their Polish Counterparts, Vienne :Académie politique, 2004



Sherrington, Philippa, « Shaping the Policy Agenda : Think Tank Activity in theEuropean Union », in Global Society, Vol.14, No.2, 2000



Skorzynska, Katarzyna, « Monopoly for Europe - Poland Should Fight to Defend thePrinciples of Solidarity and Cohesion », in Polish News Bulletin, 13 nov. 2003



Smith, James Allen, The Idea Brokers : Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy
Elite, New York : The Free Press, 1991



Stone, Diane, Capturing the Political Imagination, Think Tanks and the Policy Process,London : Frank Cass, 1996



Stone, Diane, Andrew Denham, Mark Garnett (eds.), Think Tanks Across Nations. A
Comparative Approach, Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1998



Stone, Diane, « Think Tanks Transnationalisation and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice, andadvocacy », in Global Society, Vol.14, No.2, 2000a



Stone, Diane, « The Changing Think Tank Landscape », in Global Society, Vol.14, No.2,
2000



Stone, Diane, Andrew Denham (eds.), Think Tank Traditions : Policy Analysis AcrossNations; Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas, Manchester : Manchester University
Press, 2004

Struyk, Raymond J., « Management of Transnational Think Tank Networks », inInternational Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol.15, No.4, été 2002



Sunstein, Cass R., Why Societies Need Dissent, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 2003Vaïsse, Justin, « Guide du lecteur des revues de politique étrangère américaines;
Guide des think tanks et instituts de recherche aux Etats Unis », Numéro Spécial,
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, in Bulletin du Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision,
N°70, printemps-été 1998



Wallace, William, « Ideas and Influence », in Stone, Denham, Garnett (eds.), op. cit.

Weiss, Carol, « Helping Government Think », in Organizations for Policy Analysis :Helping Government Think, ed. Carol Weiss, Newbury Park : Sage, 1992

Europe and its think tanks : a promise to be fulfilled 147

Previously published “Studies & Research”
Available on Notre Europe’s website

The Dutch at the helm – navigating on a rough sea. The Netherlands 2004 présidencyof the European Union
Monika Sie Dan Ho, Mendeltje Van Keulen - Available in French and English (june 2004).



A view from outside: the franco-german couple as seen by their partners
Matt Browne, Carlos Closa, Soren Dosenrode, Franciszek Draus, Philippe de Schoutheete,
Jeremy Shapiro – Available in French and English (April 2004).



Leading from behind : Britain and the European constitutional treaty
Anand Menon – Available in French and English (January 2004).



US attitudes towards Europe : a shift of paradigms ?
Timo Behr – Available in French and English (November 2003).

Giving euro-Mediterranean cooperation a breath of fresh air
Bénédicte Suzan – Available in French (October 2003).



Italy and Europe 2003 presidency
Roberto Di Quirico – Available in French, English and Italian (July 2003).

European attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2000-2003 : an analytical survey
Anand Menon and Jonathan Lipkin – Available in French and English (june 2003).

Large and small member states in the European Union: reinventing the balancePaul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaïdis – Available in French and English (May 2003).

Enlargement and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe
Bérénice Picciotto – Available in French and English (May 2003)



The institutional architecture of the European Union : a third Franco-German way?
Renaud Dehousse, Andreas Maurer, Jean Nestor, Jean-Louis Quermonne and Joachim Schild –Available in French and English (April 2003).



A new mechanism of enhanced co-operation for the Enlarged Union
Eric Philippart – Available in French and English (March 2003).



Greece, the European Union and 2003 Presidency
George Pagoulatos – Available in French and English (December 2002).



The question of the European government
Jean-Louis Quermonne – Available in French and English (November 2002).



The European Council
Philippe de Schoutheete and Helen Wallace – Available in French and English (September 2002).

Multilevel government in three Eastern and Central European candidates countries :Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic (1990-2001)
Michal Illner – Available in French and English (June 2002).

The Domestic basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency
Carlos Closa – Available in French, English and Spanish (December 2001).



The Convention of a Charter of Fundamental Rights : a method for the future ?
Florence Deloche-Gaudez – Available in French and English (December 2001).



The federal approach to the European Union or the quest for an unprecedente
European federalism
Dusan Sidjanski – Available in French, English and German (July 2001).



The Belgian Presidency 2001
Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan – Available in French and English (June 2001).

The European debate in Sweden
Olof Petersson – Available in French, English and Swedish (December 2000).

An enlargement unlike the others ... Study of the specific features of the candidate
countries of Central and Eastern Europe
Franciszek Draus – Available in French, English and German (November 2000).

The French and Europe : the state of the European debate at the beginning of theFrench presidency
Jean-Louis Arnaud – Available in French, English and German (July 2000).

Portugal 2000 : the European way
Alvaro de Vasconcelos – Available in French, English and Portuguese (January 2000).

The Finnish debate on the European Union
Esa Stenberg – Available in French, English and Finnish (August1999).

The American Federal Reserve System: functioning and accountability
Axel Krause – Available in French, English and German (April 1999).



Making EMU work
partnership Notre Europe and Centro European Ricerche – Available in French, English, Italianand German (March 1999).

The intellectual debate in Britain on the European Union
Stephen George – Available in French, English and German (October 1998).

Britain and the new European agenda
Centre for European Reform, Lionel Barber – Available in French, English and German (April 1998).

Social Europe, history and current state of play
Jean-Louis Arnaud – Available in French and English (July 1997).



Reinforced cooperation : placebo rather than panacea
Françoise de la Serre and Helen Wallace – Available in French, English and German (September 1997).

The growth deficit and unemployment : the cost of non-cooperation
Pierre-Alain Muet – Available in French, English and German (April 1997).

Study available in French and english on the website http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr© Notre Europe, october 2004
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