＠S白昼§
D工s
cuss工ON PAPER NO. 66

・

1

JAPAN S STAKE 工N ¥
ASIA

by

Shinichi Ichimura
June, 1973

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, JapanTHE CENTER FOR SOUTHEAST AS工AN STUD工ES

D工s
c
u
s
s工ON PAPER NO. 66

JAPAN S STAKE 工N ¥ASIA
byShinichi IchimuどaJune, 1973

NOTE:

This discussion paper is duplica七ed
for priva七e circula七ion and should no七
be quo七ed or refeどど ed 七o in publica七ions
wi七hou七 permission of 七he author.

1.

工n七roduc七ion.

Japan S S七ake in Asia has always been and will always be pains‑
−
七
七heas
七ry a七 七he nor
七aking and full of suffering ・ As an island coun

.七edly3‑epeeどn corner of Asia, Japan has 七hroughout her his七ory r
alternated between enduring, in七rospec七ive, and effemina七e periods andve, and expansionary periods.
七1
七rospec
七emporary, ex

Whenever she

en七ered poli七ical involvement in Con七inental Asia，七 emporary successand eventual failuどe have been her experiences. Nevertheless，七 he
na七ion did not sink in七O inactivity bu七 ins七ead repea七edly sough七 somenew ou七let for heど na七ional energy S七emming from cul七ural or poli七ical
aspirations and an indus七rious spiri七.

The modern his七ory of Japan

since 七he Meiji Res七ora七ion may be regarded as 七he la七es七 version ofthis his七ory.

七her 七he pos七war economic
七 S七ill remains 七o be seen whe
工expansion of Japan in Asia may be a lingering ligh七 of 七he even七ually
declining sun or a con七inuing glory of 七he rising sun 七emporarily
frustrated by 七he defea七 of World War 工工．

Mos七 foreign observers 七end

七 er view, whereas a considerable number of Japanese
七
七0 七ake 七he lain七ellec七uals are inclined to accep七 七he former judgemen七. Needless tosay, much depends on how 七he Japanese na七ion will ac七 from here on andhow 七he res七 。 f 七he world will do vis‑a‑vis Japan. Nobody can be sure．
which is righ七Bu七 七his paper tries to offer some observa七ions rele‑

van七 七O determining 七he course of Japan s rela七ions with her nearby
coun七ries in Asia and thereby make a modest con七ribu七ion to 七he deeper
unders七anding of 七he difficul七ies facing Japan, or for 七ha七 ma七七er any
power involved in Asian affairs, a七 七he crossroads of performing a
positive and construc七ive role or remaining as a passive, coward‑1‑economic power in world affairs.
Asia is a vas七 area.

, Asia工n rela七ion 七O Japanese in七eres七s:
may be divided in七O six par七s) Northeas七 Asia: Japan, Korea andi(Taiwan, (ii) China, (iii) Sou七heas七 Asia： 七he Philippines, Indochina,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Burma, (iv) Sou七h Asia:) Sou七hwest Asia: Middle andv
Bangladesh，工 ndia, Ceylon and Pakis七an, (Near Eas七，（ vi) Ou七er Mongolia and Siberia. Japan S S七ake in Asia isconcerned wi七h all six regions, bu七 七 he na七ure of 七heir relevancediffers considerably from one region to ano七her.

Since this paper

primarily concerned wi七h Japan s economic in七erests in Asia，七he fiどS七
七 七han 七he o七hers.
七hree regions are more impor七an) isv
Pe七roleum in (七he only exception 七o 七his classifica七ion.

One impor七an七 considera七ion we mus七 keep in mind in analyzing
any problem in 七he con七emporary world is 七ha七 七he social, economic,
poli七ical and cul七ural condi七ions of the world are changing very rapid‑ly.

This is par七icularly impor七an七 in the case of Japanese relations

wi七h O七her Asian coun七ries, since bo七h Japan and 七he o七her Asian coun‑
七ries are undergoing rapid economic development as well as undergoinga process of radical social and poli七ical changes.

工f we observe only

the economic trends 七hat have occurred in 七hese coun七ries for 七he pas七
decade or so and simply ex七rapolate 七hese 七rends in七O 七he fu七ure，七 hen
we are bound 七o make serious mis七akes in our judgemen七s and decisions.
We mus七 七ry to understand more deeply 七he "social, political, andcul七ural dynamics of 七he con七emporary world and Asia.
工n making 七hese considera七ions，七wo fac七ors emerge which are，七0﹁4

some ex七en七， mu
七ually con
七radic七ory.
is ma七erialis七ic aspirations.
．
for economic developmen七One is na七ionalism, and 七he o七her

The la七七 er is usually 七aken as 七he desire

Al七hough 七his view is not wrong, i七 七 ends 七ooverlook 七he underlying social changes and 七he whole process of moderni‑
za七ion and na七ion‑building.

In con七ras七 七O ma七erialis七ic aspira七ions,na七ionalism may be described as 七he spiri七ual aspiration for independ‑ence and self‑respec七.

To 七he eyes of a proud Asian, the glory of 七heWest was the humilia七ion of 七he East.

How strong 七he sen七imen七 is canbes七 be unders七ood by the figh七ing spiri七S 0f 七he Nor七h Vie七namese in
七he recen
七 decade.

However, an impor七ant elernen七 of na七ionalism 七0

consider is i七S nega七ive aspect.

Transforming na七ionaliS七ic sen七imen七

in七O a more cons七ructive and ma七ure sense of pa七ience, learning andbalance is by no means easy. Moreover, the poli七ical leaders of 七hese
new Asian nations satisfy 七he in七ensive fervor of 七he common people, who
no longer have a specific, blameable 七arge七 二 ike cclonia.
lism 七o a七七 ack.
Since 七he natural, social and poli七ical erγJirorunen七S of 七hese coun七ど ies
are no七 very favorable for stabili七Y and developmen七， na七ional unifica‑
七ion can only be achieved by a combina七ion of s七rong poli七ical leader‑

ship and a subs七an七ial ra七e of grow七h and dis七ribu七ion of ma七erial well‑being. Af七er 七he dea七h of 8 charisma七ic" leaders of the independence
movemen七s， 七 his combina七ion will become more and more difficul七 七o comeby. Unless 七he surrounding advanced coun七ries offer much be七七 er guid‑ance 七han 七hey are now offering, developmen七 will proceed a七 an unneces‑sarily slow ra七e. Asia is now a七 such a crossroad , and Japan mus七
regard herself as or is regarded as one of 七hose surrounding advanced
coun七ries wi七h less 七han adequa七e prepara七ions for 七his 七ask.

﹁J

2. The General Pie七ure of Eas七 Asia
Before discussing any problems concerning Eas七 Asia七he
ex七ど eme he七erogeneity of Eas七 Asia must firs七 be unders七ood.

工
七

is

u七七erly wrong 七o view Asia as if i七 were Europe. "Asia" is jus七 ageographical grouping.

No grea七 empire nor any predominan七 civili‑

za七ion has ever covered any major par七 of Asia as in Europe.

Le七 uss七ar七 wi七h 七he mos七 obvious economic fac七s shown in 七he following
七able.

Table 1:

Popula七ion, GNP and Per Capi七a GNP and Gどow七h Ra七es

Popula七ion(million)

GNP(.1 bill.$)

GNP/Pop.

Grow七h Ra七e

（
宇
）

（毛
）

China

800

800

100

4.0

Japan

105

3000

3000

10.0

Indonesia

120

114

95

3.5

Philippines

40

112

280

5.0

Thailand

38

60

180

6.0

Sou七h Korea

32

70

220

9
.2

Burma

28

18

65

1
.0

Sou七h Vie七nam

20

40

200

2.0

Taiwan

15

45

300

10.6

Malaysia

11

36

330

5.8

Cambodia

7

7

100

1.0

Hong Kong

4

3

700

7.0

Singapore

2

2

1000

11.4

Laos

3

2

60

1.0

The differences and varie七Y of per capita GNP 三nd 七heir grow七h
ra七es are hardly comparable to any o七her par七 of 七he world.

There

is a resemblance only 七O Nor七h and Sou七h ̲
¥
i
r
n
e
rica, bu七 七 heどe is one
essen七ial difference be七ween East Asia and 七he American con七inen七Sー4‑．

There are 七wo gian七s in Eas七 Asia: China and Japan.

The figures

show 七ha七 七 he Chinese population is abou七 七wice as gYea七 as 七he res七of Eas七 λsia and 七ha七 七 he Japanese GNP is sligh七ly more 七han 七wice
as much as the sum of 七he national produc七S of the remaining
coun七ries.

The following is an approxima七e sub七O七al of 七he rest ofEas七 Asia:

Popula七ion, 300 million, GNP，字 50 billion, and Per

Capita GNP，宇 150.

This is enough 七o indicate 七he possible over‑whelming influence of China and Japan in East Asia, whereas 七he
Uni七ed S七a七esis 七he only gian七 S七a七e on 七he American con七inen七S ．
Japan s very high S七andard of living is comparable wi七h 七heFrench or Wes七 German S七andard of living, if no七 now， 七 hen very soon.
Pos七war Japan s unpreceden七ed rapid grow七h made her a super economic
power withou七 mili七ary forces in such a shor七 七 ime 七hat she now
occupies a very unique posi七ion， 七 ha七 ofan advanced country standing
aloof from 七he surrounding developing coun七ries.

Her S七andard isalmos七 七wen七y 七imes 七he average per capi七a GNP of O七her Asian
coun七ries. Therefore, even if 七he presen七 ra七e of grow七h is main‑
七ury for 七hem
七 a cen
七ained in 七he res七 of Asia, i七 will 七ake almos
七 ． 工 n spi七e of China's
七o reach 七he Japanese level of developmen

immense population， 七 he overwhelming influence of 七he Japanese
economy in Asia is likely 七O continue for many years to come.

Her.七 of 七he Uni七ed S七a七esaposi七ion in 七his respec七 seems 七O resemble 七h
on 七he American con七inen七S ．
Since she has no mili七ary strength to use ou七side Japan, she
may be more suscep七ible 七O easy cri七icism from 七he surrounding
coun七ど ies, bu七 on 七he other hand, she may be less likely 七o makeFhJ

poli七ical blunders 七hrough 七he use of mili七ary force 七han 七he Uni七ed
S七a七es vis‑a‑vis La七in American countries. However, one 七hing 七ha七
she has 七o pay ex七ra a七七色n七ion 七O in dealing wi七h 七he surrounding
Asian coun七ries is the poli七ical S七abili七y in Eas七 Asia in generalri par七i::ular, because J
a
p
a
.
!
1
, a.rmed only
and wi七hin each coun七ry i
wi七h economic power, is very limi七ed in her capaci七y to handle
poli七ical ins七abili七Y wi七hin and wi七hou七 each coun七ry.

工七

is well‑

known tha七 七 he income dis七ribu七ion in some Asian coun七ries is very
unequal.

Bu七 inequality in the distribu七ion of income on anin七ernational level is by no means less serious.

By observing 七he七able above, one immedia七ely no
七ices 七ha七 even developing coun
七ries

fall in七o differen七 income classes.

Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong

may be called 七he upper‑income class; Malaysia, Taiwan， 七 hePhilippines, Vietnam, Korea and Thailand may be labeled as 七hemiddle‑income class; and 七he res七 as 七he low‑income class.

The

rela七ive position of 七he coun七ries on 七his income scale does no七
seem 七o change as time passes by, because 七he per capi七a incomeヲrow
七h rate seems 七o be higher for 七hose with high income or highper capita GNP. 工n 七erms of 七he prevailing growth ra七esin ど ecent
years, "fas七− gど owing countries" include Japan, Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong; "gradually growing coun七ries" inc工1.
1de
Malaysia， 七he Philippines, Thailand and 工ndonesia; and 七he res七 are"slowly growing."

I七 may be mentioned here 七ha七 七he coun七ries likeThailand and Indonesia which have enjoyed relatively high grow七h
ra七es in recen七 years are likely 七O slow down in grow七h in 七he nearfu七ure.

‑6‑

The he七erogenei七Y men七ioned above is no七 confined 七O 七heeconomic sphere. Eas七 Asia, excluding Japan and China, is uniquein several ways. There is no O七her region in 七he world where somany super‑powers have na七ional interes七s in the various developing
coun七ries.

Compare 七he region wi七h La七in America, Africa or 七he

Near Eas七.

The colorful, poli七ical and economic in七erac七ions ofsuch powers as 七he Uni七ed S七a七es, Japan, China, USSR, India, andAus七ralia seem 七o charac七erize Asian Drama in 七he 七hea七er of Eas七
Asia.

These powerful coun七ries are exer七ing 七heir poli七ical andeconomic influence ‑‑ and 七he former colonial countries are by nomeans negligible in 七heir presense‑‑on 七he h工ghly, he七erogeneous
non‑power na七ions of the region.
These new na七ions are very different in 七heir e七hnic charac‑
teris七ics, religions, social conditions, hiS七orical backgrounds andpol土七 ical sys七ems.

工n 七his sense 七he ど egion may be 七ermed 七heBalkant of Asia, but in fact i七 is more "Balkann 七han Balkan i七self.
The drama 七o be played in Eas七 Asia is， 七 herefore, bound 七o be ra七her
complica七ed and confusing like 七he coun七ry show wi七hou七 a good
direc七or.

Bilateral and mul七ila七eral どela七ions among powerful

coun七ries and new na七ions are likely to be of many varie七ies, so 七ha七
realizing regional cooperation among 七he developing coun七ries will
be difficu1七.

If closer rela七ions develop between one power and some

new na七ion， 七 hey will immedia七ely cause 七he r.
eac七ions of 七he O七her
powerful coun七ries and 七he res七 of 七he developing s七a七es.

Bu七 a七七he same time i七 means 七ha七 七 here is always room for 七he new na七ions

to bargain economically and poli七ically wi七h any powerful coun七ry by‑7‑

coopera七ing wi七h each o七heroど even by ac七ing wisely alone.
One las七 impor七an七 poin七 七o be made here before moving on 七0
more specific discussions is 七he fac七 七 ha七 七 his region was 七he bat七lefield of World War II. There are many sen七imen七s connec七ed wi七h
wartime experiences and pos七war independence movements which s七i11
prevail among the common people and 七he poll七1cal and intellectual
leaders of these coun七ries. The impac七 of these pos七war men七ali七ies
should not be minimized even af七er twenty‑seven years. 工
七 would seem
七ha七 many superficial even七s in various coun
七ries migh七 some七imes

be explained by the subconsciousness or underlying psychology of
七hese mentali七ies.

De Gaulle said 七ha七 七he impact of vie七ory or

defeat would remain over one genera七ion. Asia is now going 七hrougha stage in which old prewar leaders are gradually being relaced bya new postwar generation of technocratic leaders.

If this transitionin leadership is achieved smoo七hly and peacefully，七 his change will
con七ribu七e 七0 七he poli七ical s七abili七Y of 七he na七ion. However, any
period of change is no七 easy and may be a source of in七ernal 七rouble.
The exci七ing phase of independence movements is all over now, and七he calm and pains七ak1ng process of na
七ion‑building has jus七 begun.

̲on doc七rine is wellー七 imed for 七his s七age of 七he Asian
Whe七her 七he Nix
Drama or not remains to be seen. Japan in this con七ex七 isin adifficul七 posi七ion.

She has been bi七七erly eri七icized for her

misbehaviors" during 七he war. Of course there are very good
psychological and political reasons for such cri七icisms. Bu七 they
are af七er all, as De Gaulle said, the impact of victory or defeat
and will gradually fade away in七0 七he conceどn of historians. How‑8‑owever, depends on 七he fu七ure of Asia,， hhis七orians view 七he pas七
which will be shaped by 七he in七erna七ional coopera七ion of a numberof 七he new nations in Asia and some super‑powers including Japan.
Japan is carrying 七he burden of 七he history of World War II in Asiaand is destined 七o play one role or ano七her as one of 七he Asian
coun七ries which will shape Asia in 七he fu七ure.

3.

Con七radictory Trade Rela七ions Between Japan and Sou七heas七 Asia
With 七his background information we can now consider

Japan s rela七ions wi七h 七he res七 of 七he Eas七 Asian coun七ries.
:
convenien七 七o divide our considerations in七O 七wo par七s

七
工

is

七ions
七he rela

wi七h Sou七heas七 Asian countries and 七hose with Northeas七 Asia andChina, because they seem to show 七he differen七 七 rends 七hat haveemerged in 七he recent pas七.

The most obvious relation be七ween Japanand Sou七heas七 Asia is 七hat realized 七hrough foreign 七ど ade. A simple‑
minded argumen七 七 ha七 Sou七heaS七 Asia is 七he area on which 七he vi七al
interes七s of Japan depend is not en七irely wrong bu七 is ra七her
misleading.

The warnings made in 七he in七roduc七ion are very impor七ant

here. More careful examina七ion of s七a七is七ics in 七he pas七 and ex七ra‑
pola七ions for perspective will clarify 七he following poin七s, mostof which were succinc七ly clarified by K. Yoshihara [1).
)a(The basic charac七eris七ics of 七he foreign 七rade of Southeas七
Asian coun七ries are 七he limi七ing of expor七S 七o a few commodi七ies
and 七he concen七ra七ion of expor七s and impor七S 七o a few coun七ries.
Trade with Japan is no more 七han a reflec七ion of 七his pattern.

‑9‑

Table 2:

Japan s Trade wi七h Southeas七 Asia

Major Impor七s

Expor七s

Impor七s

The Philippines

4.5

5.3

31毛
）
, copper (logs (50%)

Singapore

4.2

0.8

81%
'
)
pe七ro‑produc七S (工ndonesia

3.2

6.4

, crude oil (50毛）
logs (28%)

Malaysia

1.7

4.2

20毛
）
, 七in (
logs (45%)

Tl;lailand

4.5

1.9

30%)
rubber (*Quo七ed from K. Yoshihara [1].

The following 七able shows 七he concentra七ion of foreign
七rade of Sou
七heas
七 Asian countries with Japan， 七he US, anda few O七her coun七ries.
Table 3:The Shares of Major Coun七ries 工n Foreign Trade ofSou七heast Asia (1970)

The Philippines
Japan
U.S.A.

Expor七工mpor七s

39.6
38.8

34.6
28.4

25.5
工3.4

37.4
14.9

28.2
20.0
7.5

21.2
8.4
エ8.5

16.1
16.7
15.1

28.7
16.3
10.2

50.0
15.7
7.9

29.8
24.9
8.7

ThailandJapan
U.S.A.
Malaysia
Japan
U.S.A.
U.K.
SingaporeJapan
U.S.A.
U.K.
Indonesia
Japan
U.S.A.
Wes七 Germany* Quoted from K. Yoshihara [
1
]

)
b
(

The dependence of Japanese expor七s and imports on Southeast
Asia has been declining.

The share of Asian coun七ど ies (exclud‑

is七
n
u
n
r
n
r
o
ing 七he Middle and Near East coun七ries and 七he C
countries) in Japanese expor七s declined from 35% in 1955 七0 26毛in 1969, and a similar decline in Japanese irnpor七S also occurredfrom 26% in 1955 七0 15毛 in 1969.

This is a reflec七ion of aJapanese foreign 七rade pa七七 ern which shows a decline in 七hedependence on 工mpor七ed raw ma七erials (SITC 2‑4) from 51も in 1955
七O

33% in 1969 and fur七her shows a cons七ancy in 七he dependence) of around 20毛 since 1965.
on irnpor七ed energy sources (SITC 3
On the expor七 S工de， 七 he share of rnanufac七ured goods declined
from 45宅 in 1960 七O 34宅 in 1969.

This has two implications,

one being 七ha七 Sou七heas七 Asia is becoming less impor七an七 as a
七rading partner to Japan or 七ha七 七 he balance of trade is likely
七o be in Japan s favor for many years 七o come.

)c(

The 七rade dependence of 七he Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries on Japanis increasing・ The corresponding figures 七0 七hose quo七ed in) are 七he following:b(

Expor七s was 8毛 in 1955 and 24も in 1969.

According 七o a forecas七 made by 七he Japan Economic Research
971, Japan s share in 七he expor七s and irnpor七s of
Cen七er in ミ
Sou七heast Asian coun七ries is expec七ed to be about 40毛 in 1980.
This means 七ha七 七 he Japanese economy is bound 七o play apacernaking role for 七he O七her Asian coun七ries, while she,herself,wi工l come 七o depend on Sou七heas七 Asian countries lessand less, irri七a七ing mos七 coun七ries in 七he region.

Therefore,

Japan mus七 carefully examine the policy implications of 七hese

T4

14

con七radic七ory 七rade rela七ions.
(d) The first implica七ion is 七ha七 Japan s 七rade policies mus七
be carefully coordina七ed with her aid policies and priva七einvestmen七 abroad, because a balance of paymen七s is no七 likely
七o be achieved by 七rade alone.

The second implication 1.
s

七ha
七 indus
七rializa
七ion of o七her Asian coun
七ries mus七 bepromo七ed‑‑wi七h 七he 七ransfer of capi七al，七 echnology anden七repreneurship from Japan. O七herwise, a balance of paymen七s
will never be accomplished, and as a resul七， Japanese exports
will have 七o be cutrailed. The case of economic development
in Taiwan is a good example of a success s七ory
1in 七his regard.
The Taiwan economy suffered from an unfavorable balance of七rade in 七he 50 s bu
七 succeeded in achieving a balance by rapid

indus七rializa七ion in 七he 60's. This is more or less 七he kindof process which will succeed in developing economies wi七hou七
grea七 na七ural resources.
(e)

One word may be worth adding here. The dependence of any
advanced economy on energy impor七s is unlikely 七o decrease.
The Indonesian economy may be though七 of as an excep七ion 七。
七his.

Bu七 one impor七ant considera七ion which makes Indonesia

differ from 七he coun七ries in 七he Near Eas七 is tha七 七he sizeof her economy is so large 七ha七 七he mining indus七ry occupies
only a small por七ion of 七he na七ional economy. The mining
indus七ry, which includes 七in and o七hers as well as pe七ど oleum,
con七ribu七ed only 6も of 七he Gross Domes七ic Product in 1970.
This can hardly be a sufficien七ly significant sec七or of 七he‑12‑

economy 七o bring up 七he grow七h rate of the economy above, say
5毛， which is needed 七o absorb 七he increasing labor force in
七he 70 s.

Indonesia is， 七herefore, no excep七ion in requiring

indus七ど ializa七ion in 七he ordinary sense of 七he word.
(f) Howeveど， since the successful indus七rializa七ion of Taiwan
"
.
:
o
o
k
. 七en yeaどS， 七 his r
l
s
c
s
.ヨ
l
e will b三 o:
1e in which Japan mus七
expend a large amoun七 in aid, loans and priva七e inveS七ment forSou七heas七 Asian coun七ries 七o achieve indus七rializa七ion in
manufac七uring indus七ries.

This crea七es unfor七una七ely ano七her

problem of Japanese domina七ion in 七hese indus七ries.

The

following poin七S are 七hough七fully made by Y. Yasuba [2].
(g)

Trade expansion accelerated during 七he last half of 七he 60 s
and has continued in七O 七he 70 s. According 七0 七he publish‑==ds七a七istics， 七 he ra七io of in七ra‑regional expor七S 七0 七he 七0七al
expor七s of the region has declined from 27.6% in 1960 七o 25.8%
in 1963 and from 9.1% in 1966 七o 6.3毛 in 1970.

This informa七ionin the la七e 601s underes七irn3.七es 七he intra‑regional 七rade due 七0
七he neglec七 of S工ngapore−
工 ndonesia 七rade and unrecorded 七radeamong Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries. Properly es七ima七ed， 七 he in七ra‑
regional 七rade may s七ill occupy considerably above 15毛 of 七he
七0七al 七ど ade of 七he region.

In 七he meantime, Japan s share in

七he expor七S of 七his region increased markedly from 11.2毛 in

1960 七O 14.9毛 in 1963 and from 26.5% in 1966 七o 30.6毛 in 1970.
This developmen七 undoub七edly reflects par七ly 七he increasing
compe七i七iveness of 七he economies of 七he どegion vis‑a‑vis each
O七her and the enhanced complemen
七ari七Y be七ween 七his region‑13‑and Japan.

However， 七 he policy of i
mpor七 subs七1七u七ion pushedforward by most coun七ries in 七he region and Japan s impor七『

liberaliza七ion also explains a par七 of '=he char:g 三
direction of 七rade.

i 九七~1e

The failures of coun七ries in the region

七o exploi七 七 he economies of scale 七hrough regional 七rade

agreements may also have con七ribu七ed to 七his 七endency.
(h)

工n 七he pas七 few years, while some high−七 ariff coun七ど ies suchas Vie七nam and Indonesia have liberalized their impor七 policy
somewha七，七ariff rates on impor七S have been raised in a numberof O七her coun七ries such as Tha工land and l'ialaysia.

Consequen七ly,

QOS七 coun七ies in 七he region, wi七h 七he significan七 excep七ionof Singapore, now have at leas七 modera七ely high 七ari三f ra七es.
(i)

One recen七 change in 七rade policy which meri七s a七七en七ion is
七he new emphasis on expor七 promo七ion.

Singapore s expor七

promo七ion has been famous for some 七ime already, bu七 nowmos七0七h
er coun七ries are also very much in七eres七ed in expor七

promo七ion.

Free 七rade zones are available or will be ma.
deavailable in Singapore, Malaysia， 七 he Philippines and Vie七nam.
Most countries are ex七ending 七ax holidays, exemp七ion or repay‑
men七 of impor七 du七ies on machinery, par七s and componen七s andspecial privileges on en七ry permi七S. Some have gone so far
as 七o ex七end low in七erest loans and provide indus七rial si七es.
While impor七 subs七i七U七ion has no七 been abandoned, i七S limi七a‑
七iO!
l
S hミワ e inc:reasingly bee:i recognized :1::
1
d 七he ernpha.sis nas

apparen七ly shif七ed 七o expor七 promotion.

‑14‑

4
. Aid, Loans and Private 工nves
七men
七ーー Japan s Domina
七ing
Share Agains七 Nationalis七ic Resen七men七The possible danger of Japan s domina七ing role in 七hemanufacturing indus七ries in many Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries can bes七
be demons七ra七ed by showing macど oscopic figures of Southeast Asian
economies. As was mentioned in 七he in七roduc七ion，七he 七otal sum of
七he GNP of 七he region is $50 billion.

increasing by abou七 5も per year.

A七 七he momen七， i七 isIf，七 herefore, the capi七al output

ra七io is 2.5，七 he amoun七 of capi七al required 七o achieve 七he 5毛 ra七e
七h every year is es
七ima
七ed 七o be 6.25 billion. The formerof grow

foreign minis七er of 七he Japanese government, Kiichi Aichi has
already promised tha七 七 he Japanese government will give abou七 $4.0
billion of aid in 1975. Pas七 experience shows 七ha七 approxむna七ely
half of 七he Japanese economic coopera七ion funds have been given to
Asian coun七ries. Thus, we can say 七ha七 abou七 one 七hird of 七heannual capi七al forma七ion in 七he en七ire Eas七 and Sou七heas七 Asian
coun七ries is like七Y 七o be financed by Japanese capi七al in one formor ano七her. Since Japanese investmen七 七ends 七o be concen七ra七ed in
u
.
"
I
l
b
e
r of sec七ors, Japan's domina.七ing share in a number
a limi七ed nof manufacturing industries may be almos七 a necessity・ 工七 is ve
どydifficul七 七o say, however, wha七 is 七he "peril point＂七 o beware of
in foreign capital in terms of the number of plants, employees,．
capi七al or managemen七

Never七heless，七here is no doub七 七ha七 af七er

a certain poin七 na七ionalistic sen七iment is easily aroused against
Japanese domina七ion.
The picture given here is, however, no七 七 he same one seen‑15‑

in 七he pas七.

Economic Coopera七ion Funds or Economic Aid in 七hebどoades七 sense includes gran七s，七 echnical coopera七ion, governmen七
loans, expor七 credi七s and priva七e inves七men七.

The 七0七al amoun七 ofeconomic aid in 七his sense is 七he one men七ioned in 七he Foreign
Minis七er s speech.

If we are 七o analyze 七he effec七s of Japan s

domina七ing share in capital forma七ion in Sou七heast Asian countries,
七his is an appropria
七e concep
七.

Bu七 economic aid in 七he narrowes七

sense is more impor七an七 in 七ha七 i七 can mi七iga七e 七he domina七ing
influence and i七s poli七ical implications in each coun七ry.

Economic

aid in 七his sense, exclusive of expor七 credi七S and priva七e inves七−
men七， should receive more careful examina七ion. Table 4 shows 七herecen七 amoun七 of aid given in 七his narrow sense.

工七 also shows

七he large share contribu
七ed by 七he U.S.

Table 4
: Annual Average of Economic Aid 七O Sou七heas七 Asia（
工 967‑1969)(million $)To七alW. Germany

Japan

U.K.

U.S.A.

Indonesia

422.0125.36

106.073.33

160.40

Malaysia

72.83

0.62

4.64

28.84

4.81

The Philippines

91.58

0.82

36.80

0.30

18.93

Thailand

107.81

4.70

12.39

0.95

46.78

*Quo七ed from K. Yoshihara [1].
The significan七 amoun七 qiven 七0 七he Philippines from Japanis mainly due 七o repara七ion paymen七s, about 宇25 million, so 七ha七Japanese participa七ion in economic aid programs has been ra七her
limi七ed in the pas七.

This does not mean, however，七ha七 i七 willremain so in 七he fu七ure.

Japanese aid 七o Indonesia in 1973 is‑16‑

going to be more than 七he US aid. Given 七he present ra七e of growthin GNP and the governmen七 s official commi七七men七 七o reach one 毛 in
7毛 in governmental aid, Japanese aid‑.
七 of aid and 0
七he 七otal amoun
will increase very rapidly. Since, however, Japan's presence in
七 of 七he U.S., she， if not more 七han，七 ha
Asia is almos七 equivalen七

is of七en compared wi七h the U.S. This may be one of 七he reasons
There

for cri七icisms of Japan. Bu七 七 ha七 is no七 七 he whole s七ory.

are very s七rong res七ric七ions on the condi七ions of Japanese aid.
Though 七he da七e is a 1i七七 le out of da七e， 七he following 七able willshow some reasons for 七he unpopulari七Y of Japanese aid programs.
: Condi七ions on Aid in 1965 Recommenda七ions
Table 5(As observed in 1968)
1. Coun七ries Giving More Than 70も Gif七Aus七ralia

100

100

100

21.9

Belgium

95.2

99.5

98.3

23.0

Norway

92.2

100

99.3

36.9

Canada

75.4

90.7

90.2

34.0

Sweden

75.0

100

100

32.9

Swi七Zerland

72.5

92.8

92.8

17.6

France

71.6

82.1

73.8

, 1970.
]3'
Source: OECF [

‑17‑

AU

Term Loans

0
・工

r

も in Gif七& Long‑AL

七宅 in Gif& 3老 Loans

ee
qp
a
rn
ea
vo

七
も in Gif2. Coun七ries Achieving Three or Two Targe七S
宅 in Gif
七もin Gif七& 3毛 Loans

急 in Gif
七& Long‑AverageLoan Period

Teどm Loans
Denmark

57.3

100

99.1

24.9

Holland

51.5

83.2

89.4

29.7

U.K.

46.0

91.0

95.5

24.0

U.S.A.

44.5

83.2

79.5

30.0

3.

Coun七ry Achieving One Targe七

Japanも in Gif
七毛 in Gif七& 3も Loans% in Gif七& Long‑AverageLoan PeriodTerm Loans
Japan

61.7

82.0

61.7

18.1

Source: OECF, [3], 1970.
工
七 mus七 be added 七ha七 七he weigh
七ed average ra七e of in
七eres七for Japanese loans is 3.7毛 comparable wi七h 七he lower in七erest ra七esof O七her countries like Sweden (1.5) or Canada (2.2).

Bu七 七 his is

not par七icularly high if i七 is compared w
1.七h U.S. or France.

工七

should also be no七ed 七ha七 七 he countries not lis七ed in Table 5 hads七ric七er conditions 七han Japan.
工
七 aly and Por七ugal.

They are Aus七r1.
a, Wes七 Germany,

The information was provided by 七he DAC repor七s.

Cri七icisms cen七ering around Japan may be du2 七0 七he fac七 七 ha七Japanese aid is given 七o the areas where 七hes8 countries do no七
par七icipa七e． 工
七 mus七 also be poin
七ed O U七 七 ha七 Japanese aid ishighly concentra七ed in Eas七 and Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries.
77.3毛 of governrnen
七 aid was given 七O Asian coun
七ries.

In 1967,

The following

七able also indicates tha七 七he larges七 share is given 七O Sou七heas七‑18‑

Asian coun七ries in 七he case of loans from Overseas Econom工C
Coopera七ion Funds from 1961 七0 1971.

Table 6:Loans by OECF funds(billion $)
259.8

Asia
Sou七heas七 Asia

189.0

工ndonesia

139.4

The Philippines

15.8

Thailand12.5

Malaysia

11.7

Burma

7.2

Cambodia

1.3

Singapore.5

Brunei

.4

Laos

.2

Africa12.3

La七in America

27.6
5.7

0七hers

To七al

305.4

Source: OECF, [3], 1972.
Some七imes i七 is argued tha七 Japanese aid is d1rec七ed 七O 七hecoun七ries supplying Japan wi七h necessary raw ma七erials, as is 七hecase wi七h 工ndonesia.

This is no七 will suppor七ed by facts, however,

because careful observa七ions of ac七ual projec七s supported by Japanese
aid are only ra七her remotely rela七ed 七o natural resources.

It isra七her American investment and aid programs 七hat are direc七ed 七0

。

七he <
level pment of na七ural resources.

One feature of Japanese economic coopera七ion as of 1971 is
七he fac七 七 ha七 priva七e investrnen七 occupies a small por
七ion of Japanese

economic coopera七ion.

In 1968 i七S ra七io to GNP was only 0.17毛
，

円
フ

ム
ー

whereas O七her coun七ries have much higher ra七ios:， Wes七France, 15毛．
25毛， U.K..33毛 and U.S.A. .
七 aly .53%, Holland .56毛
Germany .81%, 工
工n view of the necessi七Y of covering 七he unfavorable balance of 七radein most Southeas七 Asian coun七r工es, Japanese priva七e inves七men七 mus七So far 七he amoun七 ofbe promo七ed much more vigorously in 七he fu七ure.

priva七e inves七men七 and i七S direc七ions have been nei七her large enoughnor diversified enough.

The nex七 七 able may show 七he direc七ion of−
七ly toward 七he impor七， headed predominan
Japanese priva七e inves七men七
ど ies in 七he liS七ed countries.
subs七i七U七ion indus七

Table 7: Japanese Join七 Ven七ures in Sou七heas七 Asia
(As of March 31, 1971)
Thailand Malaysia Singapore Phili;?pine 工ndonesia To七al
103

51

54

13

30

251

Food

8

4

2

2

5

21

Tex七iles29

3

8

Wood & Pulp

1

8

2

。

。

48

Chemicals

16

8

10

1

6

41

Me七a1 Fabrica七ion 12

6

8

34

G. Machinery

5

2

3

1

11

Elec. Appl.

12

7

2

3

27

Trans. Mach・ー

8

2

5

。
。

5

1

16

O七hers

12

14

3

42

1

9

16

1

7

13

工 on
Construe七

4

2

2

。

。

10

Mining。
。
。

2

Fishery

。
。

11

1

9

Commerce

34

3

11

6

1

55

Finance & Insur.

3

2

1

2

1

9

Others

13

1

5

2

1

22

To七al

164

82

73

31

48

398

Manufac七uring

Agr. & ForeS七ry

6
4

‑20‑

2

3

3

6

6

5

11

26

Professor Yoshihara classified Japanese priva七e investmen七 in threeca七egories:

import‑subs七i七U七ion 七ype, resource‑developmen七 七ype andexpor七ー oriented 七ype.

The firs七 七 ype includes no七 only ordinary

join七 ven七ures bu七 also some tie‑up agreemen七 七O supply 七echnicalknow‑how and brand names on 七he condi七工 ons of impor七ing ma七erials
or par七s form Japan.

The second type is mainly 七o increase Japanese

imports like timber by developing some new areas in Sou七heast Asia.
The 七hird type is 七o explore 七he possibility of exporting 七he productsof 七he coun七r工es involved no七 only 七o Japan bu七 also 七0 0七her coun七ー
ries.

This is the kind of investment most desirable from 七he view‑

poin七 of Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries.

The increasing wage ra七es andshor七age of certain 七ypes of workers are pushing labor‑in七ensive
indus七ど ies ou七 of 七he country in all of 七hese ca七egories.

5.

工n
tra‑Re̲g:ional Compe七itio旦旦型空夕空型E
̲
e七i七ion with China

The po七ential domina七ion of Japanese economic power inSoutheas七 Asia cer七ainly crea七es a circums七ance in which Japan isalways 七he targe七 of attack in one way or another.

There are,however, some fac七ors which res七ric七 七he cri七icisms from going 七O
ex七remes.

One fac七or is in七ra‑regional competi七ion among Sou七heast

Asian coun七ries.

Every coun七ry is trying 七o indus七rialize i七self

more or less a七 七he same level and a七 七he same 七ime, and mos七 ofthem are small in 七he scale of 七he na七ional economies.

Hence, they

are bound to compete W工七h each O七her 工n a七trac七工 ng en七erprises orplants which canno七 be duplica七ed in more 七han 七wo places. As 七hescale of economy is very significant in many modeどn fac七ories,‑21‑

a large strip‑mill, for ex剖 nple, is a serious problem from 七he view‑
poin七 of intra regional compe七i七ion. This compe七i七ion exis七S in aid,田

loans, and priva七e inves七men七．
Another importan七 factor is 七he compe七i七ion exis七ing between
China and Sou七heas七 Asian coun七ries. As was shown in the in七roduc七ion,
the scale of 七he Chinese Economy is grea七er 七hart 七he res七 of Eas七and Sou七heas七 Asian economies pu七 七oge七her, exclud工ng Japan. Hence,
China has a great chance in developing modern industries, once she
is ready 七O absorb 七he produc七ive capac1七1es of Japanese or Wes七ern
indus七ries. Her close loca七ion 七o Japan makes i七 very a七七 rac七ive forJapanese businesses 七O es七ablish complemen七ary rela七ions with China.
Needless 七o say, China, like Burma for 七ha七 ma七七 er, will no七 allow
foreign capi七al to come in but will be eager to import machinery and
七echnical know‑how w1
七h l七 and 七hereby develop modern import‑

subs七i七U七ing or expor七ー orien七ed indus七ries. Even now as we can observein many Sou七heas七 Asian ci七ies, Chinese 七ex七ile and o七her produc七S
have very S七rong compe七itive capabilities.

If 七he inves七men
七oppor七unities in Southeast Asia become less a七七rac七ive 七o Japanesebusinesses，七 heir effor七s are likely to be direc七ed 七owards 七he七ent. However, disenchan
七men
七 may
developmen七 of.China 七o the same ex
七rapola七ion
come ra七her soon, because in 七he most op七工mis七ic ex

Japanese expor七s to China in 1980 will not exceed 2 billion dollars.
This is of course far less than the curren七 七 rade with Sou七heas七 Asia.
工 do no七 believe 七ha
七 七 he expec
七ed grow
七h rate of 七he Chinese economy

for 七he decade can exceed 4宅 on 七he average. Bu七 even a smaller
growth ra七e implies a considerable grow七h of 七he na七ional economy in‑22‑

ves七men七.
七 of in
七e amoun
七he absolu

For ins七ance, a 2毛 grow七h implies$1.6 billion, which requires $4 billion of inves七men七.

This is equi‑valent 七0 七he total amount of Japanese aid promised for 七he year 1975.
ncrernen七al na七ional produc七 of China will
工f 七hings go well， 七 he net ibe larger than 七ha七 of 七he whole of Sou七heas七 Asia.

Sou七heas七 Asian

coun七ries mus七 no七 be too optirnis七ic about fu七ure economic compe七i七ion
wi七h Chinese manufac七ures.

Tどansi七ion once 七his s七ar七s，，七 heir

poli七ical and cul七ural influence will be grea七ly streng七hened.
One may argue 七ha七 China may adop七 ra七her inward‑looking poli‑cies 七o sa七isfy her enormous domes七ic demand foど a considerable periodof time.

This is no七 a correc七 predic七ion, because China must expor七

七 of modern
七 七he necessary machines for 七he developmen
七o imporindus七ries.

ThiS 工s exac七ly wha七 China is already doing 七o finance

her imports from Japan.

She is covering a 宇300 million deficit byher expor七 surplus to Hong Kong.

The main Chinese expor七 maどket will

be in East and Sou七heast Asia, and 七he Chinese popula七ion of 25 七0
30 million in Sou七heast Asia will more or less be influenced by 七his

emergence of Chinese economic ac七ivi七ies.

How Southeast Asian

countries are likely 七o reac七 七 0 七his problem is essen七ial 七o judging
the fu七ure of poli七ical s七abili七Y as well as economic progress of 七hereg工on.

.
6

工ntra‑Regional Coopera七ion

There is one las七 considera七ion 七o make in.regard 七o Japanese
economic relations wi七h Southeas七 Asia, a considera七ion which issomewha七 con七radic七ory 七0 七he poin七s men七ioned in sec七ions.

工七

con‑

cerns intra‑regional coopera七ion among Sou七heast Asian coun七ries.

‑23‑

For a number of reasons, many Southeast Asian coun七ries have been
in七erested in increasing in七ra‑regional cooperation in various fieldsof activities.

In economic fields 七his is most difficul七 七o achieve

because the economic ties binding the coun七ries are very slenderindeed. Among Southeast Asian countries, foreign 七rade wi七h eachO七he
ど isonly abou
七 15宅 、of their en
七ire foreign 七rade.

Never七heless,establishing closer 七ies among the countries is ex七remely impor七an七
for benefi七七 ing from 七he experiences of other coun七ries, as well as
for increasing 七he bargaining power agains七 advanced coun七ries andin七erna七ional organiza七ions, economizing their overlapping ac七ivities,
creating a more s七imula七ing intellec七ual a七mosphere, coordinating 七heeconomic plans and porduc七ion of major commodi七ies, and as 七ime
passes, consolida七ing 七he common aims of Southeas七 Asia.

Unless theheterogenei七Y mentioned in the in七roduction of 七his paper is overcome
and a somewha七 homogeneous culture s七ar七s developing in 七his どegionin 七he near future， 七he enormous progress 七aking place in o七her par七sof the world may carry away 七he major concern of human in七ellec七 andhuman energy and leave the developmen七 of 七his region behind.
7.

Japan s Role in Asia ‑‑ Concluding Remarks
工七

seem s 七ha七 七o bring up 七he S七andard of living from $100 七O$1000, say in 50 years, is no七 very easy at any place in 七he world.
工七

is par七icularly hard in tropical coun七ries.

The na七ural environ‑mental conditions seem 七o impose on mankind many hardships difficul七
七o overcome in a shor
七 七i
me.

Moreoveど，七 he rise in 七he s七andard ofliving in modern 七imes from the 宇100 level to 七he 宇500 level seems
七o be associa
七ed with poli七ical ins七ability ra
七her 七han S七abili七Y・‑24‑

For the slow ‑tempo of economic developmen七 canno七 sa七isfy 七he expanding
human wan七 in many developing coun七ries, which leads 七o dissa七isfac‑
七ion

on 七he par七 of 七he masses of people. 工n order to mi七igate thedissa七isfac七ion, a number of social and ins七1七U七エ onal changes are
required, such as more egalitarian measures for income dis七ribu七ion,
land reform, farmers coopera七ives，七rade unions and so on. There
are no general rules for 七hese economic and social policies. Bu七工七
is generally true 七ha七 unless appropriate measures are 七aken andsocial change is brought abou七，＂ social frus七ra七ion" is an inevi七able
outcome.

If social frus七ra七ion occurs, there will usually be somesocial groups which exploi七 i七 七o organize new poli七ical groups orpressure groups. Unless political adjus七ments are properly made,poli七ical ins七abili七Y is unavoidable.

Since．
七 he degree of growth andsocial change now required in 七his par七 of Asia is so great，七 he.
wri七er believes 七hat poli七ical ins七abili七Y in Asia Wエl1 be almos七 a
cer七ain七Y for many years in 七he 70 s and 七he 80's.

Surely, the− war experiences ofpas七 experiences of Japan heど self and 七he pos七

mos七 Asian coun七ries is an indica七ion of 七his.
七These considera七ions would seem to poin七 七0 七he role 七ha

Japan is to play on 七he Asian scene. But there is one las七 impor七an七
poin七 which should not be left out. This is 七he fac七 七 ha七 Japan s
in七eres七S are global ra七her 七han just limi七ed 七O Asia． 工 n 七erms of七rade rela
七ions, Japanese inves七men七 oppor七uni七ies and necessary

na七ural resources，七here are O七her par七s of 七he world which areequally if not more, impor七an七 for 七he developmen七 of 七he Japanese
Economy. However，七 he question 七o con七empla七e is not jus七 economics.

‑25‑

Once 七he problem of the stomach" is solved, o七her cul七ural andreligious concerns become more importan七 for 七he life of 七he nation.
The ul七imate concern of 七he human mind is no七 economic bu七 much more七.
七han 七ha

The concern of 七he Japanese people and Japan s leading

in七ellec七uals will be 七oward grea七er civiliza七ion. Regarding 七his
ma七七 er, wha七 would o七her coun七r1es offer us? Oど wha七 can we offer？ 工 n 七his sense, Japanese
七ion
七ries in 七erms of civiliza
O七her coun

economic relations wi七h Southeas七 Asia‑‑or any coun七ry for 七ha七
ma七七 er‑‑ are merely one aspec七 of more complica七ed and broader
cul七ural rela七ions between differen七 values and ways of life.
七eres七 is global.
七his broader sense Japan s inIn

For 七h工s reason Japan

should no七 follow the Economic Regionalism of 七he pas七 nor 七he
Regionalism of 七he E. C. 七ype.

She should 七ry to establish a. S., European coun七ries, Pan−・Pacificvarie七y of 七ies wi七h 七he u
coun七ries and, of course, the Asian coun七ries as well.
Thus，七 he role of Japan in Asia will be 七O help the coun七ries
in Sou七heastAsia promo七e in七ra‑regional cooperation，七o diffuse her
own experiences in 七he bes七 way she can 七O O 七her Asian coun七ries andthereby 七ry 七o create prosperous and grea七 civiliza七ions in Asia
which can compe七e wi七h any O七her great civilizations of 七he pas七 and七ure.
七he fuRF.:FERENCES[1]

Kunio Yoshihara：

The Japanese Economy and Sou七heast Asia，

paper presen七ed 七o In七erna七ional Symposium on Pos七war Develop‑
ment in Major Asian Coun七ries, Oc七. 1972, The Cen七er for
Sou七heas七 Asian S七udies, Kyo七o Universi七Y, Japan.

‑26‑

[
2
]

Yasukichi Yasuba:

工
工 General 工ssues， in Economic Developmen
七

Coopera七ion in Sou七heas七 Asia, In七erna七ional Developmen七Cen七er of Japan, 1973.
[3] Overseas Economic Coopera七ion Funds: Pocket‑Book of Overseas
Economic Coopera七エ on, 1970 & 1972.

‑27‑

Commen七ary on Paper by Professor Shinichi Ichimura

byRober七 W. Barne七七
Vice Presiden七 of 七he Asia Socie七Y
Direc七or, Washington Center

JAPAN'S STAKE IN ASIA

Professor Ichimura says 七ha七 in Japan 七here are some who
wonder whe七her Japan s sun is rising or se七七 ing・ 工f this be so,such people mus七 surely be only in Japan. The rising of 七he
Japanese sun, and Japan S capaci七Y 七o respond wi七h speed and daring
七o unexpected s七rue
七ural changes in Japan s world environment should

be obvious 七o almos七 everyone else. To accept wi七hou七 breaking
S七r
ide rises in the value of 七he yen by almos七

forty percent wi七hin

just over a year should show 七hat.
I agree wi七h Professor Ichimura 七ha七 forecas七s of 七he future
are likely 七o be worthless unless we also 七ry 七o 七ake in七O account
cul七ural and spiritual 七endencies wi七hin coun七ど ies and in 七heir
rela七ions with̲each o七her. Cul七ural 七endencies are of七en barely
glimpsed ‑‑ or are even 七0七ally disregarded ‑‑ as economis七s focus
on their ari七hme七ic.
Professor 工chimura reminds us tha七 Asia shares no common
cul七ure like tha七 inherited by Wes七ern Europeans. Sinic culture
reached far, was of long dura七ion, and had deep influence on Nor七h‑east Asia bu七 it did no七 encompass 工ndia or 工ndonesia. And from‑28‑

七h Asia, Buddhism spread nor七h, into
七he cul七ural heri七age of Sou

Japan, and 七hrough Southeast Asia, bu七 Asia as a whole neverexperienced 七he au七hori七Y of a Roman Empire, or of a Ca七holic Church.
Asia is cul七urally diverse, even fragmen七ed.
Professor Ich1mura r工ghtly reminds us 七ha七 in East and Sou七h‑eas七 Asia Japan and China are the gian七s.

China s popula七ion is

七wice 七hat of 七he res七 of 七he area, including Japan.

Japan s GNP

is 七wice 七hat of all 七he other economies in 七he area, including
China s.
A七 七wo points in his paper, Professor Ichimura deals with theprospec七 of ins七ability for East and Sou七heas七 Asia ‑‑ ins七abili七Y
七 will flow from great inequali七ies of weal七h (1) within
七ha) be七ween coun七ries.
2
par七icular coun七ど ies and (i七self, par七icularly if rapid, produces it.

The grow七h process

Though ins七ability isinevi七able, and likely 七o be painful or woど se, Professor Ichimura
insists, righ七ly again, I think，七ha七 a grea七 Japanese mili七ary
capabili七Y would serve no useful purpose in coping wi七h it.
Professor 工chimura foresees that Japan will be rela七ively
more free in the future 七o choose from many sources of impor七S，
ble ‑‑ even vi七al ‑‑ as trade W工七h Sou七heast Asia now
̲globally, valua
is for Japan. Meanwhile, the coun七ries of Sou七heas七 Asia will no七
be similarly free 七o choose trading par七ners, and are likely 七0
become increasingly dependen七 on sales in Japan for 七heir foreignexchange earnings.

By 1980 some for七Y percen七 of Sou七heas七 Asia s

trade is likely 七O be wi七h Japan, while only 25 percen七 of Japan s
trade will be wi七h tha七 area.

‑29‑

Foreseeing imbalances, Professor Ichimuどa recognizes thegreat future impor七ance of Japanese aid, loans, and investment inrcen七 growth ra七e
Asia. He gives us an arres七ing guess: a five pe̲
．
in Sou七heast Asia will require some $6.2 billion annual investmen七。

Wi七h something like $2 billion annually of Japanese aid likely t

be available for Southeas七 Asia, Japan can furnish one−七hird of the．
inves七men七 requiremen七This is a high proportion to be coming from one outside
source. And Professor 工chimura foresees possibili七Y of animosi七y
七owards Japan arising from 七his degree of dependence, especially in

ligh七 of Japan s fal七ering record with respec七 七o aid terms.
Prospec七 of an overly conspicuous made in Japan 七 rademark s七amped
on 七he Sou七heast Asian landscape by awkward programming of Japanese
aid flows justifies anxie七Y in Tokyo and in other Asian capitals.
So，工 would like 七o elabora七e upon some七hing implici七，工believe, in Professor Ichimura s analysis.
We s七ar七 wi七h prospec七 that Japan is likely to be accumula七ing。

ヒrade surpluses for a long 七ime 七o come. We see 七ha七
fav rable ・how, draw down reserves, as i七S con七ribution 七0.
， someJapan mus七
in七ernational commercial and financial equilibrium. And Japan mustdo 七his wi七hin a global, not just a regional, framework.
工 hope that Professor 工chimura is hinting that Tokyo is) blur the1
exploring means for 七ransferring resou;rces which can () shif七 lac七ual administra七ion of funds
2， and (
made in Japan imprin七in七o non‑Japanese hands.

I have grea七 confidence 七ha七 Japan will

discover 七he desired me七hod． 工 fear, greatly，七hat when i七 s七ar七S

ー30‑

t, Japan will lack 七he 七alen七 toge七 七he credit it
七 i
七o implemen
will deserve for i七s ini七iatives.

Bu七 a七 this s七age, I would like七o offer 七wo sugges七ions for s七udy in Tokyo:) Large annual over‑subscripti‑0.n of un七ied yen
1(
to 七he 工DA under ground rules 七ha七 migh七 encourage 七he
IBRD family 七o accord some kind of:maど ginal priori七y todevelopment programs in Sou七heast:Asia.
) Donation annually of so.thing in 七he ordeど2(
of $500 million 七o $1 billion of g:ran七 funds to an
ins七i七ution like an Asian Reserve Bank or a Sou七heas七
and Eas七 Asian Clearing Union whiσh would be given
authori七Y 七o disburse untied yen for cover of por七ions￡ developing countriesof balance of paymen七s defici七s 0

in East Asia attribu七able 七0 cos七g of "developmen七impor七S．
Progどams of 七his sort ‑‑ hopefully, with China, Nor七h Korea,
and Nor七h Vie七nam, in due course, participa七ing

could be Japan s

strategic con七ribu七ion 七o easing 七ensions caused by 七he widening
gap be七ween very rich and very poor countries of Asia.

The programs

rance of using aid resources、
show a Tokyo trying 七o correct 七he appea
simply to serve Japanese commercial self‑in七erest. And, Japan could
hope tha七 North American and Western European donors migh七 wish 七0
join i七 in what would become a S七reng七hened mul七ila七eral undertakingof global scope.

【31‑