12024 Taiwan Presidential Election
Information Manipulation AI
Observation Report

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
2

Forword by Taiwan AI Labs Founder Ethan Tu
Taiwan is among the countries most severely affectedby external information manipulation globally. For along time, numerous troll accounts have been
generating non-existent volumes of discourse online tosway the political leanings of the populace and, througha deluge of messages, drown out ordinary speech,
impacting individuals' freedom of expression.
In response to these extensive coordinated operations,Taiwan AI Labs has utilized large language models overthe past two years to comprehend billions of social
media activities, uncovering over thirty thousand troll
groups and understanding the content and strategies ofthese accounts across more than two million issues.
This approach aims to reveal the objectives andpatterns behind these manipulation campaigns.
With the growing global demand for understanding
information operations, international partners haveshown interest in this service. Taiwan AI Labs has
further developed its technical capabilities into the
Infodemic platform, providing a comprehensive andreal-time tool for non-technical partners to grasp
domestic and international information manipulation
scenarios as a strategy for digital literacy development.
In 2024, many countries will conduct elections, with
Taiwan being the first democratic nation to do so andthe first to use AI technology to monitor election-related
information operations. Taiwan AI Labs hopes to sharethe lessons learned from its experiences withinformation manipulation and the generative AI threatsobserved in Taiwan with other democratic nations. The
goal is for Taiwan to start with itself, establishingtechnological ethics legislation to "protect digital rights"
rather than controlling freedom of speech throughcontent censorship.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Table of Contents
Forword by Taiwan AI Labs Founder Ethan Tu...................................................................................................... 2
Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................................... 3
Glossary..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Executive Summary.................................................................................................................................................. 7
Introduction............................................................................................................................................................... 7
Methodology.............................................................................................................................................................. 7
Building Similarity Nodes Between User Accounts...............................................................................................8
User Feature Construction............................................................................................................................. 8
User Behaviour Features......................................................................................................................... 8
Co-occurrence Features.......................................................................................................................... 9User Clustering...............................................................................................................................................9
User Similarity Evaluation........................................................................................................................ 9User Clustering........................................................................................................................................ 9Group Analysis............................................................................................................................................... 9Opinion Clustering................................................................................................................................... 9
Stance Detection and Narrative Summary.............................................................................................10
Data Coverage......................................................................................................................................................... 10
Major Timeline and Most Representable Battlefields.......................................................................................... 11
January to April 2023: U.S.-Taiwan Diplomacy...................................................................................................12
Taiwan President Visiting US....................................................................................................................... 12
May and June 2023: Defense Budget and Biological Warfare........................................................................... 15
Taiwan Military Budget and Service............................................................................................................. 15
Discredit Military Aid as Biological Warfare.................................................................................................. 18
July and August 2023: Housing and Land Disputes........................................................................................... 21
Housing Justice and Illegal Construction..................................................................................................... 21
September and October 2023: Egg Shortage.................................................................................................... 24
Food Security and Egg Shortage................................................................................................................. 24
November and December 2023: The KMT-TPP Collaboration...........................................................................28
The KMT-TPP Collaboration and Breaking up............................................................................................. 28
January 2024: National Alerts and U.S. Delegation Visits.................................................................................. 31
National Alert & Japan Earthquake.............................................................................................................. 32
U.S. Visits Taiwan Showing Support for Democracy.................................................................................... 35
Main Troll Groups....................................................................................................................................................38
Troll Group: Facebook #61009.....................................................................................................................38
Abnormal Behaviors...............................................................................................................................39
Operated Stories....................................................................................................................................39
Targets of Troll Activities........................................................................................................................ 40
Troll Group: Facebook #61019.....................................................................................................................40
Abnormal Behaviors...............................................................................................................................41
Operated Stories....................................................................................................................................41
Targets of Troll Activities........................................................................................................................ 43
Troll Group: PTT #60004..............................................................................................................................43
Abnormal Behaviors...............................................................................................................................43
Operated Stories....................................................................................................................................44
Targets of Troll Activities........................................................................................................................ 45

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Troll Group: PTT #60021..............................................................................................................................45
Abnormal Behaviors...............................................................................................................................46
Operated Stories....................................................................................................................................47
Targets of Troll Activities........................................................................................................................ 48
Key Learning from Taiwan Presidential Elections............................................................................................... 48
Learning 1: Generative AI Caused Debunking Hell............................................................................................ 48
Learning 2: A Few Dominant Troll Groups were Leading Media Framing.......................................................... 51
Learning 3: Main Troll Groups are not Native to Taiwan.....................................................................................53
Learning 4: Trolls Echo PRC State-affiliated Media............................................................................................55
Learning 5: Trolls Influenced Users in Scale...................................................................................................... 57
Learning 6: PRC State Platform Has National Interest....................................................................................... 58
Learning 7: PRC State Platform Chose President.............................................................................................. 59
Learning 8: Trolls Led the KMT-TPP Collaboration Opinions............................................................................. 60
Learning 9: Trolls Deep Rooted in Communities................................................................................................ 61
Learning 10: Flooding Short Videos is The Trending Mean................................................................................64
DISARM Techniques Used by Troll Groups.......................................................................................................... 66
The Infodemic Platform.......................................................................................................................................... 67
References............................................................................................................................................................... 69

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Glossary
Term

Explanation

Troll AccountTaiwan AI Labs employs large language models to analyze accounts on social media
platforms, identifying accounts that frequently comment on the same posts together,indicating coordinated behavior. These accounts exhibit long-term similarities in theircommenting patterns, suggesting they are not controlled by natural persons but are likely
automated or manipulated, thus termed “Troll Accounts.”

Troll Group

When Troll Accounts show long-term similarities in commenting patterns and signals,
they are grouped into a “Troll Group.” These groups can be analyzed for the events they
participate in and the targets they manipulate, providing insights into the political forces
they may serve.

Event

When an event occurs, it generates extensive news coverage and social media
discussions, including posts and videos. Taiwan AI Labs uses large language models toorganize these reactions into an “Event,” facilitating the observation of social media
manipulation related to the event.

Story

Events can develop over time, linking many related events into a continuous narrative.
Through classification with large language models, these interconnected events can beorganized into a “Story,” summarizing the coordinated manipulation and related news
across a prolonged period for each story, allowing for the observation of long-term
collaborative operations.

Media Volume

Media Volume refers to the amount of media presence, calculated by the number of news
reports.

(PRC)
State-affiliatedMedia(PRC) State-affiliated Media denotes media outlets whose content is controlled orcensored by the government of the People's Republic of China.

Community
VolumeCommunity Volume represents the volume on social media platforms, encompassing thetotal number of comments observed from both troll accounts and regular accounts.

Troll Volume

Troll Volume pertains to the volume of comments made by troll accounts.

User Behavior
FeaturesAnalysis of social media data reveals a series of columns that represent user behavior
features, such as the ‘destination of user interactions’ (post_id or video_id), the ‘time ofuser actions’, and the ‘domain of shared links by users’, among others. These data aresubsequently utilized for user clustering.

Co-occurrence
FeaturesCo-occurrence features aim to identify users who frequently engage with the same topics
or respond to the same articles, appearing together in the same context to create afabricated volume, a common characteristic of troll accounts. Through this method, we
can identify troll accounts and cluster them into troll groups.

User Clustering

Taiwan AI Labs analyzes the relationship between pairs of accounts based on a series ofsignals and assigns a score. If the score exceeds a certain threshold, a connection isestablished. If multiple accounts are connected, they are clustered into a troll group.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Group Analysis

Taiwan AI Labs uses Taiwan LLaMa, a large language model pre-trained in Taiwanesedialects, to classify the comments and opinions of troll groups, identifying their main
narratives and analyzing the primary information manipulated by troll groups and theirunderlying intentions.

Topic Engagement

Taiwan AI Labs employs large language models to analyze community platform posts
and comments related to news, identifying traces of message manipulation by troll
groups. This clarifies which topics troll groups participate in and manipulate discussions
on.

Operation Methods

Taiwan AI Labs utilizes the DISARM Framework to analyze the methods and intentions
behind the information operations conducted by troll groups.

Leverage Existing
Narratives

Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of atarget audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information isunderstood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is notconsistent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective
campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly
effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes andmeta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplification practices.

Reframe Context

Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its
intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames anevent in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about
its intentions.

Flooding theInformation Space

Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtags with excessive
volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing
points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect.

Trolls Amplify andManipulate

Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sock puppets
operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/rightbinary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting
real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier toamplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate wherever there's
a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are to be politicized).

Comment or Reply
on Content

Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator
controls).

Manipulate
Platform Algorithm

Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that
intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see:Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its
content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy.
For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that theplatform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes
the content on user timelines.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Executive Summary
During the tumultuous period surrounding Taiwan's presidential election, an extensive research endeavor unveiled
a nuanced landscape of digital manipulation and misinformation. At the heart of this investigation lay the pervasive
influence of generative technology, which emerged as a potent tool for shaping the informational battleground.
Textual misinformation, propelled by the capabilities of generative algorithms, assumed a central role, challenging
traditional debunking methodologies and rendering them less effective in the face of evolving manipulation tactics.
This shift underscored the pressing need to adapt information verification strategies to contend with thesophisticated mechanisms employed in modern disinformation campaigns.
Amidst the cacophony of digital discourse, a select cadre of troll groups emerged as influential arbiters of media
framing, transcending mere mischief to exert substantial sway over public opinion. Contrary to initial assumptions,these groups were revealed to be non-native to Taiwan, operating with remarkable agility across linguistic andcultural boundaries. Their strategic maneuvers, characterized by narrative manipulation and geopolitical intrigue,
underscored the transnational nature of contemporary information warfare and its implications for democratic
processes. As the election approached, their influence surged, casting a pervasive shadow over the democratic
landscape and underscoring the need for heightened vigilance against external interference.
Furthermore, collaborative efforts between mainstream entities and official media channels served to amplify thereach and impact of manipulated narratives. The alignment of these groups with state-supported agendas,
particularly evident on Chinese-owned social media platforms, underscored the symbiotic relationship between
information manipulation and political influence. Within this complex ecosystem, the emergence of short videos asa prevalent medium for cognitive manipulation added another layer of complexity, blurring the lines between fact
and fiction in the digital realm. Thus, within the context of Taiwan's presidential election, the convergence oftechnological innovation, geopolitical maneuvering, and media manipulation underscored the multifaceted
challenges confronting modern democracies in safeguarding the integrity of public discourse.

Introduction
In 2024, many countries held elections, and Taiwan emerged as a benchmark for the impact of foreign information
operations worldwide. As the first democratic country to conduct elections in 2024 and the pioneer in using AI
technology to observe information manipulation during the election. Taiwan AI Labs hopes to share Taiwan's
experiences and lessons in dealing with information manipulation, along with the threats of generative AI, withother democratic nations.
Taiwan AI Labs, by observing and analyzing the coordinated behavior of troll accounts on social media platforms,
identifies these accounts and groups them into troll groups. Utilizing large language models and AI, we developed
the Infodemic platform to not only reveal the activities of these troll groups but also to delve deeper into theabnormal behaviors behind these accounts.
During this presidential election period, Taiwan AI Labs conducts weekly analyses of online anomalies using theInfodemic platform, inviting scholars and experts to discuss and share insights derived from our analyses. This
report compiles the key findings from our organized data.

Methodology
Taiwan AI Labs uses our analytical platform “Infordemic” for investigating information operations toward multiplesocial media platforms. The detailed algorithm information is below.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Building Similarity Nodes Between User Accounts

Graph 1: An overview of the coordinated behavior analysis pipeline
Graph 1 illustrates the analysis pipeline of this report, consisting of three components:●●●

User Features Construction: We analyze and quantify the behavioral characteristics of a given user andtransform the user features as user vectors.
User Clustering: Leveraging the user vectors, we build a network of related users and apply a community
detection algorithm to identify highly correlated user groups,and categorize them as collaborative entities
for further analysis.
Group Analysis: We delve into the operational strategies of these collaborative groups, examining aspects
such as the topics they engage with, their operation methods, and their tendencies to support or oppose
specific entities.

In the subsequent sections, we will provide detailed explanations of each of these components.

User Feature Construction
To capture user information on social forums effectively, we propose two feature sets:

User Behaviour Features
Data preparation for user behavior features is a critical step in extracting meaningful insights from the given
dataset, which encompasses a wide range of information related to social posts (or videos) and user interactions.
We collected a broad spectrum of raw social data, which was then transformed into a series of columns
representing user behavior features, such as the ‘destination of user interactions’ (post_id or video_id), the ‘time ofuser actions’, and the ‘domain of shared links by users’, and so forth. These user behavior features will be furthertransformed and organized for use in user similarity evaluation and clustering.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Co-occurrence Features
The purpose of co-occurrence features is to identify users who frequently engage with the same topics or respondto the same articles. We employ Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) to quantify co-occurrence features
among users.
NMF is a mathematical technique used for data analysis and dimensionality reduction by decomposing a given
matrix into two or more matrices in a way that all elements in these matrices are non-negative.
Specifically, to construct the features for M users and N posts, we build an M * N dimensional relationship matrix torecord each user's engagement with various posts. Subsequently, we apply NMF to decompose this matrix, andwe utilize the obtained user vectors as co-occurrence features for each user.

User Clustering
User Similarity Evaluation
After completing the construction of user features, our next step involves evaluating the coordinated relationships
between users. For behavioral features, we compare various behaviors between user pairs and normalize thecomparison result to a range between 0 and 1. For instance, concerning user activity times, we record the activity
times for each user within a week as a 7x24-dimensional matrix. We then calculate the cosine similarity between
pairs of users based on their activity times. In the case of co-occurrence features, we use cosine similarity toassess the similarity between co-occurring vectors of users.
By computing the cosine of the inclination between these vectors, we can deduce the level of similarity between
user response or their actions. This tactic is notably useful in the study of social media, where it permits thecollection of users according to common behavior patterns.[3] Users who have analogous cosine similarity
demonstrate a highly coordinated pattern of behavior.

User Clustering
After constructing pairwise similarities among users based on their respective features, for user pairs with asimilarity exceeding a predefined threshold, we establish an edge between them, thereby creating a user network.
Subsequently, we applied Infomap for clustering of this network. Infomap is an algorithm for identifying community
structures within networks using the information flow. The detected community in this network would be consideredas troll groups, in the following sections.

Group Analysis
Opinion Clustering
To efficiently understand the narratives proposed by each user group, we employed a text-cluster grouping
technique on comments posted by troll groups. Specifically, we leveraged a pre-trained text encoder to convert
each comment into vectors and applied a hierarchical clustering algorithm to cluster relevant posts into the samegroup, which would be used in the following analysis.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Stance Detection and Narrative Summary
Large Pretrained Language Models have demonstrated its utility in extracting entities mentioned within textual
content while simultaneously providing relevant explanations. [5] This capability contributes to the comprehensionof pivotal elements within the discourse, particularly in understanding how comments and evaluations impact theseidentified entities.
In this report, we use Taiwan LLaMa for text analysis. Taiwan LLaMa is a large language model pre-trained onnative Taiwanese language corpus. After evaluation, it has shown remarkable proficiency in understanding
Traditional Chinese, and it excels in identifying and comprehending Taiwan-related topics and entities. To be more
specific, we leverage Taiwan LLaMa to extract vital topics, entities, and organizational names from each comment.
Furthermore, we request it to assess the comment author's stance on these entities, categorizing them as either
positive, neutral, or negative. This process is applied to all opinion clusters.
Finally, we would calculate the percentage of each main topic/entity mentioned in the opinion group, thepercentage of positive/negative sentiment associated with each topic/entity, and generate summaries for each
opinion cluster using LLM for facilitating data analysts in grasping the overall picture of the event efficiently.

Data Coverage
AI Labs utilized its proprietary Infodemic platform to analyze the recent Taiwan presidential election. The Infodemic
analyzed both domestic and international events, drawing data from major news outlets, Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, TikTok, and Taiwan's community platform PTT, analyzing a total of 8.49 million news articles, 99.3 million
social media posts, and 2.2 billion comments on social media platforms, observing 682.68 thousand videos. Usinglarge language models (LLMs) for analysis, AI Labs organized 2.2 million events from news and social media
posts, identifying 31.27 thousand troll groups.

News
ArticlesSocial Posts

Social Comments

Social Videos

EventsTroll Groups

8.49 M

99.3 M

2.2 B

682.68 K hr

2.2 M

31.27 K

Table 1: Analyzed data quantity by Infodemic (from https://infodemic.cc)
During the period of the Taiwan presidential election covered in this report, specifically from January 1, 2023, toJanuary 12, 2024, AI Labs examined data across Facebook, PTT, YouTube, and TikTok. The Infodemic platform
consolidated 48,511 events and 279,746 news articles, with a social media volume reaching 45,062,322. Out of
this, 1.62% or 14,354 instances were recognized as coordinated manipulation efforts.
Taiwan AI Labs utilized the Taiwan LLaMa model, which was trained using approximately 50 billion tokens. During
the analysis period, it analyzed a total of around 4.7 billion tokens.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll
Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

48,411

279,746

8,038(2.87%)

14,35445,062,322

731,383(1.62%)

Table 2: Analyzed data quantity during the period of the Taiwan presidential election (from https://infodemic.cc)
The events analyzed by the Infodemic platform are presented in a BeeSwarm Plot, as shown in Graph 2. It reveals
that from January to April 2023, there were no significant battlefields, but as the election date approached, thenumber of battlefields increased significantly after May, along with a clear rise in volume. Compared to the period
from January to April 2023, the volume of significant events noticeably increased on the eve of the January 2024
election.

* Each circle represents an event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 2: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc)

Major Timeline and Most Representable Battlefields
Taiwan AI Labs, through its Infodemic platform, conducted monthly analyses to identify key events from early 2023
to January 13, 2024, before the Taiwan presidential election. During January to April 2023, the discussion was
relatively low-key, with the most notable event being President Tsai Ing-wen's meeting with U.S. House Speaker
Kevin McCarthy at the Reagan Library. Between May and June, the focus shifted to Taiwan's defense military
budget and the false report by United Daily News about Taiwan developing biological weapons. The period of July

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
12

to August was dominated by discussions on housing justice and the controversy over Lai Ching-te's ancestral
home being an illegal construction. In September and October, the shortage of eggs leading to political turmoil andthe resignation of Agriculture Minister Chen Chi-chung became the central topic. November and December saw
intense discussions on the failed KMT and TPP alliance. In January 2024, China's rocket launch, triggering anational alert in Taiwan, and the earthquake in Japan became hot topics. Post-election, the visit by U.S. officials to
Taiwan to congratulate the successful election became a key focus of manipulation.

January to April 2023: U.S.-Taiwan Diplomacy
From January to April 2023, the election-related issues were relatively subdued, with the most significant event
being President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the United States. Active operations began to ramp up in May, with anincreasing number of battlefronts emerging.

Taiwan President Visiting US
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

186

1,147

35 (3.05%)

2,275

112,357

17,559 (15.63%)

Table 3: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)
President Tsai Ing-wen embarked on the ”Journey of Democracy and Shared Prosperity” on March 29. The
itinerary included transits in New York and Los Angeles, with state visits to Guatemala and Belize, two diplomaticallies. She was scheduled to meet U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the trip back to Taiwan on April 7,
completing a 10-day and 9-night journey.
In the lead-up to President Tsai’s visit, U.S.-China relations had become increasingly strained over issues like theRussia-Ukraine war and China’s spy balloon incursion into U.S. airspace. President Tsai’s transit through the U.S.
during her state visits could potentially escalate tensions further.
On April 5, 2023, President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. House Speaker McCarthy at the Reagan Presidential
Library in California. China subsequently issued a statement on April 6, expressing opposition and strong
condemnation, and announced on April 8 that it would conduct ”Combat Readiness Patrols around Taiwan” andthe ”Joint Sword” exercises from April 8 to 10.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
13* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 3: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-03-28 08:45
2023-03-30 06:42

Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the Wall Street Journal:
US-China relations will be tested again

52,636

10,201(14.71%)2023-03-29 23:09
2023-03-31 01:09

Tsai Ing-wen confirms transiting through New
York and Los Angeles on special plane

49,8709,785(14.11%)2023-03-28 07:40
2023-03-30 06:43

Taoyuan Baboon Shot Dead Body Transferred
to Beishi Zoo for Examination

36,1438,398(12.11%)2023-03-30 04:44
2023-03-30 09:58

President Tsai visits China for the first time in 3
years to fight for diplomacy-China Vision News
Network

39,755

6,991(10.08%)2023-03-30 04:44”Journey of Democracy Partners for Common

21,161

5,385 (7.77%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
142023-03-30 11:30

Prosperity” starts today President Tsai Ing-wen
gives a speech

Table 4: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)

Graph 4: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61019

17.62%

17.62%

Facebook #61009

14.78%

32.40%PTT #60001

2.78%

35.19%PTT #60004

2.13%

37.82%

Facebook #61096

2.09%

39.95%

Table 5: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Graph 5: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2ba2b3814c7)

May and June 2023: Defense Budget and Biological Warfare
In May and June 2023, discussions around military aid and related issues began to ferment. U.S. President Biden
expressed support for Taiwan’s defense in May, during which numerous troll accounts were observed stoking
tensions in U.S.-Taiwan relations and spreading conspiracy theories about the U.S. In June, discussions revolved
around Taiwan’s military budget, with both Taiwan and the U.S. being subject to influence operations aimed atclouding public perception. The South China Sea Working Conference also emerged as a major battleground.

Taiwan Military Budget and Service
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC)
State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

330

3,403

0 (0.00%)

1,264

203,752

5,569 (2.73%)

Table 6: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)
The Ministry of Education proposed a ‘3+1’ scheme, allowing conscripts to complete university education in three
years followed by one year of military service, making the issue of conscription a focal point in recent political
discourse among various party candidates.
KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih stated that if elected, he plans to reduce mandatory military service to fourmonths. On the other hand, Ko Wen-je argued that reducing the service period to four months would make combat
training impractical. Ko explicitly stated that Taiwan’s military equipment and personnel organization should be
adjusted in line with the national defense strategy, advocating for an increase in defense spending to 3% of GDP
and an enhancement of training content.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
16* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 6: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-07-03 11:46
2023-07-05 10:10

Ko Wen-Je calls defense budget to account for
3% of GDP, really in danger ”Taiwan can only
save itself”

62,794

6,162(33.27%)2023-07-04 12:38
2023-07-04 12:38

Criticizing the DPP’s ruling on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, ”events will change.” Hou Youyi
supports the 1992 Consensus of the Constitution

7,982

1,360 (7.34%)

2023-07-03 10:25
2023-07-05 08:48

Green approval is friendly: the Constitution of the
Republic of China has no concept of the 1992
Consensus

12,4381,097 (5.92%)

2023-07-05 02:41
2023-07-05 02:41

Hou Yu-ih throws away restarting the core and
Dai Weishan satirizes: Scared by the old polls?
The chair can steal the core and cannot berestarted

5,606

507
(2.74%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
172023-07-05 04:52
2023-07-05 04:52

Guo Taiming’s hen with chicks is huge Hou Youyi
accepts Zhao Shaokang’s exclusive interview
and throws ”Constitution 1992” can compete?

493(2.66%)

5,232

Table 7 : Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)

Graph 7: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61009

15.21

15.21

Facebook #61019

7.86

23.07

Facebook #61007

3.27

26.34

Facebook #61017

3.00

29.34

Facebook #61769

2.30

31.63

Table 8: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
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Graph 8: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s2a21c7bc7b7)

Discredit Military Aid as Biological Warfare
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC)
State-affiliated Media (%)

Troll
Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

28

308

0

54

54,29983 (0.15%)

Table 9: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)
On July 10, the United Daily News reported an event held on June 23, 2022, chaired by then-Premier Su
Tseng-chang, about a South China Sea Working Conference. The report mentioned a U.S. request for Taiwan’s
Ministry of Defense to invest in the construction of a new P4 laboratory, secretly establishing capabilities fordeveloping biological warfare agents. On July 12, the paper also published records of the alleged meeting.
The Presidential Office, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. side all issued statements
refuting these claims. They highlighted that the wording in the meeting record was uncharacteristic of Taiwanese
government documents and emphasized that no such meeting ever took place, labeling it as classic
misinformation. The Presidential Office also reminded that in recent years, China has frequently manipulated
information through fabricated documents, repeatedly accusing other countries of developing biological warfare
agents to manipulate international opinion.
Presidential Office spokesperson Lin Yu-chan stated on July 10 that Taiwan, adhering to international conventions
and humanitarian principles, has never and will not have any plans to develop biological warfare agents. The
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) also responded on the same day, noting that the U.S. was one of the firstsignatories of the Biological Weapons Convention, which explicitly prohibits the development of biological weapons
and forbids assisting or encouraging any entity to produce or acquire them.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
19

On July 12, the Executive Yuan also refuted the news, pointing out that there was no such meeting on the reported
date and that numerous inaccuracies in the meeting record indicated clear fabrication, urging an immediate
correction of the false information.
In response, the United Daily News issued a statement, asserting that it had fulfilled its verification duties before
publication, inquiring and balancing the report with responses from relevant units, and urged the government torespect media freedom and the public’s right to know.

* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 9: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-07-16 03:13
2023-07-16 03:13

Fast News/Refuting US request for Taiwan to
manufacture ”biochemical weapons” Zheng
Wencan refers to ”Chinese media information
warfare” and calls for improved defense
capabilities123

46 (21.00%)

2023-07-11 07:06
2023-07-13 05:06

Presidential Palace: False reports on”development of biological warfare agents” arebeing manipulated by PRC state-affiliated
media

1,739

33 (15.07%)2023-07-10 03:44

It is rumored that the United States wants

1,178

33 (15.07%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election202023-07-12 00:58

Taiwan to develop ”biological warfare agents”?
The Ministry of Defense responded

2023-07-13 04:23
2023-07-14 21:30

The government clarifies the false informationof ”biological warfare agent” United Daily News
statement: it has been verified before
publication

46,99024 (10.96%)2023-07-11 13:01
2023-07-11 13:01

The United States wants me to develop
biological warfare agents? He warned: Bush Jr.
used this excuse to fight Iraq969

21 (9.59%)

Table 10: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)Graph 10: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61007

18.18%

18.18%

Facebook #61019

16.88%

35.06%

Facebook #61009

9.09%

44.16%

Facebook #61017

9.09%

53.25%

Facebook #61769

6.49%

59.74%

Table 11: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
21

Graph 11: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sfd4b91da98a)July and August 2023: Housing and Land Disputes
During July and August 2023, significant and influential battlegrounds emerged more densely, focusing on housing
justice and illegal construction, which directly impact and are of utmost importance to the public.

Housing Justice and Illegal Construction
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

117

1,277

0 (0.00%)

1,453

130,856

10,974 (8.39%)

Table 12: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)
The residence of the DPP’s presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, located in Wanli District, New Taipei City, wasexposed as an illegal construction. Following an on-site inspection on the 6th, the New Taipei City Government
issued a press release stating: ”Upon examination, the land in question indeed falls under mining territory... andappears to be an illegal construction dating back before June 25, 2009.”
Lai Ching-te clarified that the enforcement of the regional plan for building control in the northern region began in
February 1981. In other words, the existence of that house does not violate the requirements of the regional
planning control, and ”there is no so-called issue of legality or illegality in construction.”
According to the investigation, the land registration for Lai’s family home in the Jiatou section, Zhongwan Village,
Wanli District, New Taipei City, shows land plot number 63-13. The complainant pointed out that the building is
unregistered and that the land, being ”mining land in a hillside and soil conservation area,” could not be approved

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
22

for residential use. Moreover, the site is outside the urban plan, thus violating the ”Regional Planning Act.” The
New Taipei City Construction Bureau should legally issue fines as per regulations.

* Each circle represents an event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 12: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-09-07 00:06
2023-09-09 02:43

Lai Ching-te Wanli hometown was certified as”illegal construction”! New Taipei City
Government on-site survey: It is indeed amining land

62,6436,443(36.92%)2023-09-08 09:50
2023-09-08 09:50

The illegal construction and smear incident washandled properly ”Lai Ching-te’s voicerebounded”

14,0531,890(10.83%)2023-09-16 04:00
2023-09-18 01:51

Lai Ching-te’s hometown was questioned about
illegal construction, Lai Jingban retorted: The
Ministry of Economic Affairs pointed out that it
is no longer a reserved area for mining areas

17,943

1,699 (9.74%)

2023-09-07 20:10

The Bureau of Mines determined the current

10,3201,397 (8.01%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
232023-09-07 20:10

2023-09-09 03:33
2023-09-10 12:28

situation, saying that there is no mining fact in
Wanli
Lai Ching-te’s hometown illegally builds andferments Tong Ziwei: It is not good to discuss it
during the election

12,875

1,213 (6.95%)

Table 13: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)

Graph 13: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
24

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

PTT #60004

4.53%

4.53%

PTT #60018

3.89%

8.42%

PTT #60021

3.54%

11.96%PTT #60103

3.41%

15.37%PTT #60233

2.22%

17.60%

Table 14: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)

Graph 14: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sd17a3d11a57)

September and October 2023: Egg Shortage
The egg shortage and food safety issue became a successful campaign for troll groups. Three weeks of intense
focus and attacks led to the resignation of the then-Minister of Agriculture, Chi-Chung Chen.

Food Security and Egg Shortage
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC)
State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

141

2,131

4 (0.19%)

1,792

186,720

13,800 (7.39%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
25

Table 15: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)
Taiwanese media reported that in January to July of this year, the egg importer ‘Chao Si’, established only on
September 5 last year with a capital of just NT$500,000, imported 88.14 million eggs from Brazil. Despite being thesmallest in capital, their import volume accounted for over 60% of the 140 million eggs imported under thegovernment project, receiving government subsidies worth over a hundred million. This raised suspicions from the
opposition; Taipei City Council members from the KMT and the Legislative Yuan’s party group filed complaints
against Chi-Chung Chen for alleged favoritism towards specific manufacturers.
Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Chen Junji, responded that the special egg import project was executed by the
Department of Agriculture through the Central Livestock Association, appointing importers to buy eggs at the ‘Cost,
Insurance, and Freight’ (CIF) price, and then selling them at the average domestic price in Taiwan. The
government absorbed the difference between CIF and local prices, including tariffs, business taxes, and customs
fees, which was not a subsidy to the manufacturers.
Chen Junji emphasized that Chao Si had channels to import eggs from Brazil and a track record of exporting eggs
from Japan to Taiwan. They could provide Brazilian official health and quarantine certificates, reasonable CIF
prices, and complete orders by the end of March, meeting the Department of Agriculture’s four major criteria for
egg importers.
However, the imported egg incident still sparked controversies, particularly around food safety. Ultimately, on
September 19, Minister of Agriculture Chi-Chung Chen resigned.

* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
26

Graph 15: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-09-20 07:47
2023-09-22 05:49

Taichung 2 Liquid Egg Factory Involved in”Imported Fake Domestic Production” Ministryof Agriculture Apologizes: The Livestock
Association has misperception

64,5574,515(27.91%)2023-09-18 09:58
2023-09-20 08:13

Kaohsiung ”to be destroyed imported eggs”
nearly 10 million Health Bureau soldiers divided
into three-way inspection results revealed

43,4443,162(19.55%)2023-09-29 09:29
2023-10-01 06:37

Famous Forum ”Hsieh Kuo-an / Egg Incident
Spreads DPP Election

14,463

1,247 (7.71%)

2023-09-27 01:52
2023-09-28 07:17

Chen Chien-jen: The photo of the stinky egg isfalse news and has been asked to investigate
by the Criminal Police Department

3,099

512 (3.17%)2023-09-30 10:25
2023-09-30 10:25

People who opened black eggs were checked
for water meters? Legislator 1 reason to shout”not green terror” online scolding

4,145

495 (3.06%)

Table 16: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
27

Graph 16: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61009

4.90%

4.90%

PTT #60001

4.83%

9.74%

PTT #60021

3.93%

13.66%

Facebook #61019

3.30%

16.96%

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
28

PTT #60004

2.51%

19.47%

Table 17: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)

Graph 17: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s5e9a003956b)

November and December 2023: The KMT-TPP Collaboration
The pre-election battlefield focused on the KMT and TPP collaboration. Troll groups attempted to facilitate thisalliance through attacks, but it turned out to be a failed operation as the collaboration did not materialize.
Subsequently, these groups shifted their stance, attacking other candidates. This tactic did not resemble theoperations of local Taiwanese PR firms, suggesting possible intervention by foreign entities, unclear to both the
KMT and TPP.

The KMT-TPP Collaboration and Breaking up
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

141

2,131

4 (0.19%)

1,792

186,720

13,800 (7.39%)

Table 18: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)
On the 15th, the KMT and TPP held a joint political consultation meeting to discuss a partnership for thepresidential election. Although they reached a six-point consensus, there was internal dissent within the TPP,
including accusations of betrayal against their presidential candidate, Ko Wen-je, who reportedly broke down intears during an internal meeting on the 16th. Disputes continued, particularly over concessions in poll percentages.
Eventually, on the 23rd, former President Ma Ying-jeou, KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih, TPP candidate Ko
Wen-je, and independent candidate Terry Gou, founder of Foxconn, met at the Grand Hyatt Hotel. The meeting
was tense and confrontational, ending in a disagreement, leading to the collapse of the KMT-TPP collaboration.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
29* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 18: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-11-22 04:10
2023-11-24 07:15

Newsletter / Blue and White Combined
Breaking the Game? The KMT will hold its
regular meeting on the morning of 11 / 24 andis expected to announce the candidate for Hou
Yu-ih’s deputy

153,397

5,456 (9.69%)

2023-11-23 19:41
2023-11-25 17:37

Hou Yu-yi’s partner Chao Shao-kang ran for
Chang Shan-cheng: A very good candidate
makes the blue camp more united

201,340

3,853 (6.84%)

2023-11-24 12:39
2023-11-24 16:10

The KMT does not accept Ke Wen-che’s
platform Yu Shu-hui: Definitely cooperate withthe strategic decision

101,199

2,388 (4.24%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election30

2023-11-23 09:53
2023-11-23 19:49

Before the blue and white ”key meeting,” Ke
Guo’s ”Jun Yue camped” was the design of thetime tool Hou was present

30,066

1,604 (2.85%)

2023-11-23 20:05
2023-11-24 23:41

Why did Hou Yu-yi disclose Ke Wen-che’s text
message? She revealed that she confirmed 2things: One shot to death

216,318

1,573 (2.79%)

Table 19 : Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)

Graph 19: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
31

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61009

7.25%

7.25%

PTT #60004

3.97%

11.22%

Facebook #61019

3.40%

14.61%PTT #60001

3.22%

17.83%PTT #60002

2.44%

20.28%

Table 20: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)

Graph 20: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/s54130176485)

January 2024: National Alerts and U.S. Delegation Visits
Leading up to the January 2024 elections, the most significant events were an earthquake in Japan and thenational alert issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. In the pre-election period, there was a clear focus
on specific issues aimed at influencing the Taiwanese presidential election. Approximately half of the troll accounts
disappeared after the election, resuming operations only after a U.S. delegation visited Taiwan.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
32

National Alert & Japan Earthquake
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

3787

7 (0.89%)

1,226

253,0034,186 (1.65%)

Table 21: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)
On January 9th, around 3:03 PM, China conducted a satellite launch mission at the Xichang Satellite LaunchCenter in Sichuan, using a Long March series carrier rocket. The rocket’s trajectory passed over southern Taiwan,
triggering continuous national alerts throughout the island.
The KMT questioned why the Ministry of National Defense issued alerts, arguing that the Chinese satellite launch
posed no harm to Taiwan. The Ministry explained that the alerts were issued due to the detected rocket trajectory
deviating from expectations, passing over southern Taiwan, thus necessitating the national alerts to inform andcaution the public.

* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 21: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
33

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2024-01-09 00:00
2024-01-10 22:00

China’s satellite launch involves inter-election?
Office of the President: Political attempts canbe ruled out
1,325

250,091

4,034(96.16%)2024-01-09 20:28
2024-01-09 21:13

The latest / auxiliary election speech ”Nationalsiren sounded” Tsai Ing-wen appeased the
public: The president is here

3,041

161 (3.84%)

2024-01-09 21:53
2024-01-09 21:53

Taiwan announces mainland rocket track map:
Deviates from course and passes over Taitungin Tainan

199

0 (0.00%)

Table 22: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
34

Graph 22: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

PTT #60001

4.51%

4.51%

Facebook #61009

4.11%

8.62%

PTT #60011

3.39%

12.01%

Facebook #61017

3.16%

15.17%

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
35

PTT #60004

2.72%

17.89%

Table 23: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)Graph 23: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sb51fda96ea9)

U.S. Visits Taiwan Showing Support for Democracy
EventsMedia
Volume(PRC) State-affiliatedMedia (%)

Troll Accounts

Community
VolumeTroll Volume (%)

38

324

11 (3.40%)

911

196,308

1,744 (0.89%)

Table 24: Analyzed data quantity for these events (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)
Following the conclusion of the presidential election, a bipartisan delegation from the United States arrived in
Taiwan on January 14th. On the 15th, they visited the Presidential Office to meet with President Tsai Ing-wen. In
addition to congratulating Taiwan on the successful completion of the election, they reaffirmed the unwavering
support of the United States for Taiwan.
Former U.S. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster expressed gratitude for President Tsai’s warm welcome andconveyed congratulations on behalf of the American people to President Tsai and the people of Taiwan. He
applauded Taiwan for smoothly conducting the presidential and legislative elections on January 13th. Vice
President Lai Ching-te emphasized that in the face of rapidly changing global dynamics, Taiwan remains steadfast
in defending democracy and peace. Through a stable and pragmatic approach, Taiwan has deepened cooperation
with democratic partners, including the United States, earning widespread international support and trust.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
36* Each circle represents a event related to this manipulated story** The size of each circle defined by the sum of the social discussion of that event*** The darker the circle is, the higher the proportion of troll comments in the event
Graph 24: Events overview by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2024-01-13 20:41
2024-01-15 18:27

Meeting with the US delegation Lai Ching-te:
On the basis of Tsai Ing-wen Ying-wen, we willcontinue to defend the peace and stability of
the Taiwan Strait

110,008

1,055(47.33%)2024-01-13 20:58
2024-01-13 20:58

Ke Wen-che: Next time we will definitely beable to govern and win back the country

40,208302 (13.55%)

2024-01-13 21:48
2024-01-13 21:48

Wu Se’s Viewpoint ”Across Eight Years ofCurse! Green’s continuation of the regime has
new implications for the international
community and cross-strait relations

14,305302 (13.55%)

2024-01-13 21:53
2024-01-14 01:48

The DPP’s Yilan County Presidential Legislator
is a win-win situation, only 2.75 percentage
points away ”vote without division”

11,022130 (5.83%)

2024-01-13 21:25

2024 Presidential Election Voting Results / The

6,081

113 (5.07%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election37

2024-01-13 21:25

DPP’s new trend legislator seats lost sharply
Hsu Chiao-hsin: The goal is to pull down Lai
Ching-te in four years

Table 25: Top 5 operated stories (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)

Graph 25: Troll Group Activities (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
38

Troll Group

Volume Proportion

VolumeCumulative Proportion

Facebook #61009

15.87%

15.87%

Facebook #61019

8.41%

24.28%

Facebook #61017

6.31%

30.59%PTT #60001

2.76%

33.35%

Facebook #61096

2.22%

35.58%

Table 26: Top 5 Active Troll Groups (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)

Graph 26: Target Entities of Troll Group Operations (from https://infodemic.cc/en/story/sf2a16283e36)

Main Troll Groups
During the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Election, Taiwan AI Labs observed unusual activity from four troll groups.
These groups generated significant noise and manipulation on both Facebook and PTT platforms, echoing
narratives from Chinese state media. We believe the behavior of these four troll groups is not typical and warrants
further investigation. Below is a summary of information related to these troll groups.

Troll Group: Facebook #61009
Facebook #61009, observed by AI Labs, is the most active troll group on Facebook, with 439 accounts
participating in 4,840 stories.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
39

Troll Accounts

Operated stories

Target entities

439

5,370

2,236

Table 27: Summary of Facebook #61009 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61009)

Abnormal Behaviors
Facebook troll group #61009 began its activity in the week of July 31, 2023, exhibiting a significantly higher volume
of comments compared to average users.

Operated Stories
Facebook troll group #61009 is actively involved in topics related to the Taiwan presidential election, with the five
most recent events they engaged in also relating to the KMT-TPP collaboration issue. Politically, this groupprimarily focuses on attacking Ko Wen-je, the KMT, and the DPP.

Graph 27: Operated stories of Facebook #61009 by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61009)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
40

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-11-22 00:00
2023-11-24 15:28

Newsletter / KMT-TPP Collaboration Breaking
the Game? The KMT will hold its regularmeeting on the morning of 11 / 24 and is
expected to announce the candidate for Hou
Yu-ih’s deputy

810,254

14,707(1.82%)

2023-11-15 10:18
2023-11-20 10:23

Blue and white are out of harmony? Ko
Wen-che shouted: Continue to fight to the end
as the TPP presidential candidate!

727,578

16,146(2.22%)

2023-12-30 16:27
2024-01-02 04:10

Emphasizing that the Constitution of the
Republic of China is not a risk Tsai Ing-wen:
Link with the 1992 Consensus is101,224

3,515 (3.47%)

2023-11-16 02:39
2023-11-20 10:19

Presidential and Legislative Elections
Registration From Today Chu Li-lun: Blue andWhite are only short of the door

445,1698,669 (1.95%)

2024-01-03 21:35
2024-01-03 21:35

Hot Taiwanese girls fight back against
opposition party Tsai Ing-wen: I don’t have bigmoney or debt to keep children andgrandchildren

6,703

1,027
(15.32%)

Table 28: Top 5 operated stories of Facebook #61009 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61009)

Targets of Troll Activities

Graph 28: Troll activity targets of Facebook #61009 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61009)

Troll Group: Facebook #61019
Facebook #61019 is the second most active troll group on the Facebook platform observed by AI Labs, with 170
accounts and participation in 4,804 stories.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
41

Troll Accounts

Operated stories

Target entities

170

5,763

2,834

Table 29: Summary of Facebook #61019 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61019)

Abnormal Behaviors
Facebook troll group #61019 began its activity in the week of July 31, 2023, showing a significantly higher volume
of comments compared to average users, and it repeatedly posts a large number of comments under the same
article.

Operated Stories
Facebook troll group #61019 actively engages in topics related to the Taiwan presidential election. Among the five
most recent events they participated in, four are related to the KMT-TPP collaboration issue. Politically, this groupprimarily targets the KMT, Ko Wen-je, and Tsai Ing-wen.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
42

Graph 29: Operated stories of Facebook #61019 by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61019)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-12-30 16:27
2024-01-02 04:10

Emphasizing that the Constitution of the
Republic of China is not a risk Tsai Ing-wen:
Link with the 1992 Consensus is101,224

3,515 (3.47%)

2023-11-16 02:39
2023-11-20 10:19

Presidential and Legislative Elections
Registration From Today Chu Li-lun: Blue andWhite are only short of the door

445,1698,669 (1.95%)

2024-01-06 20:25
2024-01-07 00:09

Observation / Super weekend Lai Ching-te’senergy explosion rushed to 7 games in a row!
Strong support for young people

80,7952,360 (2.92%)

2023-11-15 10:18
2023-11-20 10:23

Blue and white are out of harmony? Ko
Wen-che shouted: Continue to fight to the end
as the TPP presidential candidate!

749,672

16,156(2.16%)

2023-11-22 00:00
2023-11-24 15:28

Newsletter / Blue and White Combined
Breaking the Game? The KMT will hold its
regular meeting on the morning of 11 / 24 andis expected to announce the candidate for Hou
Yu-ih’s deputy

837,617

14,731(1.76%)

Table 30: Top 5 operated stories of Facebook #61019 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61019)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
43

Targets of Troll Activities

Graph 30: Troll activity targets of Facebook #61019 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/61019)

Troll Group: PTT #60004
PTT #60004 is one of the most active troll groups on the PTT platform, comprising 156 accounts and participatingin 7,876 stories.
Troll Accounts

Operated stories

Target entities

156

7,944

1,080

Table 31: Summary of PTT #60004 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60004)

Abnormal Behaviors
During the observation period starting in November, the PTT troll group #60004 has consistently remained active.
Their operational hours coincide with standard working hours, with activity observed from 9 AM to 5 PM, Monday
to Friday, and additional activity on Saturdays around noon. In relation to the number of comments, this groupconsistently exceeds the engagement levels of regular users.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
44

Operated Stories
The primary focus of PTT troll group #60004 has been on the presidential election, with the five most actively
manipulated recent events relating to the KMT-TPP collaboration issues involving the KMT and the TPP.

Graph 31: Operated stories of PTT #60004 by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60004)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-11-22 00:00
2023-11-24 15:28

Newsletter / Blue and White Combined
Breaking the Game? The KMT will hold its
regular meeting on the morning of 11 / 24 andis expected to announce the candidate for Hou
Yu-ih’s deputy

837,617

14,731(1.76%)

2023-11-15 10:18

Blue and white are out of harmony? Ko Wen-je

749,672

16,156

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
452023-11-20 10:23

shouted: Continue to fight to the end as the
TPP presidential candidate!

(2.16%)

2023-11-10 12:43
2023-11-18 08:18

Why didn’t you insist on “political party
support”? Hou Yu-ih made a clear statement372,266

9,578 (2.57%)

2023-11-16 02:39
2023-11-20 10:19

Presidential and Legislative Elections
Registration From Today Chu Li-lun: Blue andWhite are only short of the door

456,217

8,673 (1.90%)

2023-11-21 16:33
2023-11-22 19:38

Gou Ke Hou’s three-person dialogue exposed!
Hou Yu-ih called when Terry Gou and Ko
Wen-je ate dinner... They asked Gou to be afather-in-law

159,510

4,462 (2.80%)

Table 32: Top 5 operated stories of PTT #60004 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60004)

Targets of Troll Activities

Graph 32: Troll activity targets of PTT #60004 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60004)

Troll Group: PTT #60021
PTT #60021 is one of the most active troll groups on the PTT platform, comprising 20 accounts and participating in
4,380 stories.
Troll Accounts

Operated stories

Target entities

20

3,379

594

Table 33: Summary of PTT #60021 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60021)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
46

Abnormal Behaviors
During the observation period commencing in November, PTT troll group #60021 has displayed consistent activity.
Their active hours are concentrated around noon from Tuesday to Friday.In terms of the number of comments andrepeated comments, this group far exceeds the activity of regular users. Additionally, they strategically enter
threads early to promote posts, ensuring the narratives they want to manipulate are more visible.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
47

Operated Stories
The primary focus of PTT troll group #60021 has been on the presidential election, with the five most actively
manipulated recent events relating to the KMT-TPP collaboration issues involving the KMT and the TPP.

Graph 33: Operated stories of PTT #60021 by timeline (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60021)

Event time (UTC+8)

Title

Community
volumeTroll volume(%)

2023-11-15 10:18
2023-11-20 10:23

Blue and white are out of harmony? Ko Wen-je
shouted: Continue to fight to the end as the
TPP presidential candidate!

749,672

16,156(2.16%)

2023-11-22 00:00
2023-11-24 15:28

Newsletter / Blue and White Combined
Breaking the Game? The KMT will hold its
regular meeting on the morning of 11 / 24 and

837,617

14,731(1.76%)

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
48

is expected to announce the candidate for Hou
Yu-ih’s deputy
2023-11-10 12:43
2023-11-18 08:18

Why didn’t you insist on “political party
support”? Hou Yu-ih made a clear statement372,266

9,578 (2.57%)

2023-11-15 15:42
2023-11-22 15:35

Ko Wen-je blasted “Let 6%” is too ridiculous!
Hou Yu-ih: Shoulder to bear

283,3857,789 (2.75%)

2023-11-16 02:39
2023-11-20 10:19

Presidential and Legislative Elections
Registration From Today Chu Li-lun: Blue andWhite are only short of the door

456,217

8,673 (1.90%)

Table 34: Top 5 operated stories of PTT #60021 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60021)

Targets of Troll Activities

Graph 34: Troll activity targets of PTT #60021 (from https://infodemic.cc/collab/60021)

Key Learning from Taiwan Presidential Elections
Based on observations during the Taiwan Presidential Election period, Taiwan AI Labs has compiled 10 key
learnings, including the application of AI in information operations, abnormal troll groups likely controlled byexternal forces, and the impact of short video trends. AI Labs believes these trends and insights can offer valuablelessons for other democratic nations.

Learning 1: Generative AI Caused Debunking HellIn the top 200 videos most shared by Facebook troll groups, 3.5% of the videos are suspected to be generatedusing Text-to-Speech (TTS) technology combined with AI automation.
We have observed instances of information manipulation using AI-generated images, videos, and audio. In the
future, such manipulations will increasingly resemble real human output, requiring AI-based detection methods fordifferentiation.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
49

Information operations have evolved beyond merely spreading rumors; they now involve disseminating informationthat alters the narrative framework, thereby influencing the audience’s perceptions and feelings about facts. The
main challenge currently faced by fact-checking is not outright false information, but rather misleading messages
that are a mix of truth and falsehood. Through a large volume of asymmetric propaganda, these messages
diminish the effectiveness of efforts to debunk them. Through the mass generation of audio, video, and text, thesetactics can overwhelm fact-checking organizations, trapping them in a verification loop, allowing unverified
information to influence more people.
Utilizing AI technology to generate text and short videos will likely see greater usage than producing deep fakevideos or images. Although the text itself may not be falsified, asymmetric propaganda can significantly influence
public sentiment.
Take the egg shortage incident as an example; a small amount of misinformation about egg scarcity led people tohoard eggs unnecessarily. The rapid creation of new battlegrounds for fact-checking, known as ‘Debunking Hell’,renders official attempts at debunking effectively futile. Such a scenario overwhelms the capacity to correct
misinformation, diminishing the impact of official clarifications.
We have observed instances like the so-called ”Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen,” where scandalous videos are
AI-generated and uploaded through troll accounts to influence elections. Although this tactic exists, its
effectiveness has been limited.

Graph 35: A large number of videos related to “The Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen”
After data verification and analysis, it was found that most YouTube accounts were created between January 5th
and January 8th, and they uploaded only videos related to the “The Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen.” These videos
and accounts have since been taken down.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
50

Graph 36: Concentration in the creation of YouTube accounts
We have also noticed videos using text scripts as material, combined with generated voices and backgrounds,
particularly during diplomatic issues like the ”Hamas-Israel Conflict.”

Graph 37: Videos generated by AI from the same script, each with unique variations.
Beyond the creation of audio and video content, AI is also employed to generate avatars for fake accounts, as
demonstrated in the examples below. These avatars, produced by AI, share common features such as identical
positioning of eyes and mouth, along with blurred backgrounds. Additionally, studies have revealed instances on
Twitter where accounts use content generated by ChatGPT for manipulation purposes.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
51

Graph 38: AI-generated avatars featuring consistent eye and mouth positions, and characteristically blurred
backgrounds
The advantage of AI generation lies in its convenience for mass production and dissemination. Without fabricating
fake news, merely altering the narrative framework can rapidly generate a vast amount of content, plunging
fact-checking organizations into a verification quagmire and impacting the audience’s stance and perspective on
the facts.

Learning 2: A Few Dominant Troll Groups were Leading Media Framing
AI Labs conducted an analysis of troll group comments on presidential candidates’ Facebook pages from
September 1, 2023, to January 10, 2024. The analysis revealed that Tsai Ing-wen’s Facebook page experienced
the highest volume of troll group comments, accounting for 30.62% of the total. Lai Ching-te followed with 9.50%,
Ko Wen-je at 2.90%, and Hou Yu-ih at 2.33%.
Facebook Fanpage

Proportion of Troll Volume

Tsai Ing-wen

29.51%Lai Ching-te

8.22%

Ko Wen-je

2.85%

Hou Yu-ih

2.22%

Table 35: Proportion of Troll Volume under Current President and Presidential Candidate Facebook Fan Pages

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
52

Further examination of the primary operating troll groups on these pages showed that Facebook #61019 andFacebook #61009 were the leading groups in activity on the pages of Tsai Ing-wen, Lai Ching-te, and Hou Yu-ih.
The activity on Tsai Ing-wen’s page accounted for the highest proportion at 83.02%, followed by Lai Ching-te with
70.98%, and Hou Yu-ih at 50.92%. On Ko Wen-je’s page, Facebook #61019 was ranked fourth, yet the combined
activity of #61019 and #61009 still represented 41.47%.
Tsai Ing-wen
Troll Group

Proportion of Troll Volume

Cumulative Proportion of Troll
Volume#6101948.44%

48.44%#6100934.58%

83.02%#61096

5.86%

88.88%#61053

4.5%

93.38%#61145

1.23%

94.61%Lai Ching-te
Troll Group

Proportion of Troll Volume

Cumulative Proportion of Troll
Volume#6100940.39%

40.39%#6101930.59%

70.98%#61096

9.55%

80.53%#61053

4.03%

84.56%#669072.36%

86.92%

Ko Wen-je
Troll Group

Proportion of Troll Volume

Cumulative Proportion of Troll
Volume#6100932.15%

32.15%#6244313.34%

45.49%#61063

9.77%

55.26%#610199.32%

64.58%#61981

7.56%

72.14%Hou Yu-ih
Troll Group

Proportion of Troll Volume

Cumulative Proportion of Troll
Volume#6100928.02%

28.02%#6101922.9%50.92%#610637.02%

57.94%#620686.17%

64.11%#61981

4.07%

68.18%

Table 36: Proportion of Troll Groups’ Activity Volume under Current President and Presidential Candidate
Facebook Fan Pages

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
53

Overall, the collective activity from just 626 accounts belonging to the troll groups Facebook #61009 and Facebook#61019 constituted 45.71% of the total activity related to presidential election issues during this period.

Group

Troll Volume Proportion

Troll Volume Cumulative
Proportion#6100925.72%

25.72%#6101919.99%

45.71%#61063

4.58%

50.29%#61096

4.37%

54.66%#61017

4.16%

58.82%

Table 37: Top 5 troll groups most actively participating in presidential election topics on Facebook

Learning 3: Main Troll Groups are not Native to Taiwan
The troll groups have been observed engaging in bilingual attacks, targeting both Taiwan and the United States
simultaneously. For instance, the focal operative group on Facebook, known as 61019, concurrently manipulates
domestic events in Taiwan and incidents in the United States.
Following Biden’s announcement on April 14, 2023, regarding his intention to seek re-election in 2024, this troll
group intensified its influence operations. They criticized the U.S. government’s diplomatic strategies in English,
while simultaneously attacking President Tsai Ing-wen in Mandarin Chinese over the previous Thesis Gate
controversy. This approach aimed to question her legitimate leadership position and foster distrust in her
presidency.
From July 2023 onwards, the focus shifted to manipulating the Taiwan presidential election. The group targeted
specific political party candidates for president and vice president, aiming to impact the credibility of that party.

Graph 39: The activity curve of Facebook #61009 in operations related to Taiwan and America.
In addition to simultaneously addressing domestic and overseas issues, there is another behavioral patternsuggesting that these troll groups do not belong to Taiwan. These troll groups attack all political parties andcandidates simultaneously. Such behavior leads to intensified discussions, preventing peaceful discourse andInformation Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election54

causing confusion in discussions. Observations on the four main social platforms show that among the top 100
groups, 18% engage in coordinated attacks on candidates from all three major parties on PTT, and 9% on
Facebook. This behavior aims to create opposition and polarize society by attacking all sides.

Platform

Percentage of Troll Groups Engaging in Polarizing
Operations

PTT

18%

Facebook

9%

Youtube3%

TikTok

1%

Table 38: Proportion of troll groups in the top 100 on various platforms that criticize all positions, employing
polarizing tactics
Taking the example of the false news about a naval officer’s body found at sea circulating on social media, Taiwan
AI Labs noticed a significant number of account thefts on Taiwanese social media platforms. By encouraging theaffected users to report these incidents, it was evident that there was systematic account theft happening on social
media. Further investigations revealed that this was achieved through exploiting backdoor vulnerabilities in
Chinese networking equipment, using implanted VPNs as a springboard to post articles on social media.
Considering the scale and sophistication of these operations, it appears unlikely to be the work of domestic PR
firms in Taiwan; the complexity and reach of these activities exceed the capabilities typically associated with local
PR organizations.

Graph 40: Case study of hacking into networking devices to post on PTT

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
55

Learning 4: Trolls Echo PRC State-affiliated MediaWe have observed that some major troll groups echo the discourse of PRC state-affiliated media. From September
to December, the echoed narratives are as follows: China Military Threat (25%), US Is Bringing Taiwan to War(14.3%), Stopping ECFA Impacts Taiwan (10.7%), Taiwan Belongs to China (12.5%), Taiwan’s Economic Situation
Worsens (5%), Taiwan’s Curriculum Is Removing China (3.5%), Taiwan Has Inadequate Weapons (2.8%), No Egg,
No Electricity, and No Workers (2.3%), Universities Are Going Out of Business (0.7%), and DPP Is a Bad Ruling
Party (0.6%). In the main troll group narratives, FB #61009 is 42.6% similar, FB #61019 is 37.2% similar, PTT#60021 is 51% similar, and PTT #60004 is 36.5% similar.

Group

Proportion of Narratives Consistent with PRC
State-affiliated Media

Facebook #61009

42.6%

Facebook #61019

37.2%

PTT #60021

51%

PTT #60004

36.5%

Table 39: Troll groups echoing the stance of PRC state-affiliated media.
From September to December 2023, Facebook #61009 had the highest similarity with PRC state-affiliated media
narratives among Facebook troll groups (42.6%), accounting for 26.5% of the group’s coordinated comments.
During this period, the group consistently echoed PRC state-affiliated media in discussions on topics such as”Taiwan being pushed towards military danger,” ”US indifference to the lives of Taiwanese people,” ”Thetermination of ECFA affecting Taiwan’s economy,” ”Shortages in eggs, electricity, and labor,” and ”Poor governanceunder the DPP.” As the elections approached, the similarity of Facebook #61009’s narratives with PRC
state-affiliated media increased, mainly focusing on intimidating Taiwan with war rhetoric and attacking educationand economic issues.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
56

Graph 41: Narratives of Facebook #61009 closely aligned with PRC state-affiliated media

Facebook #61019, from September to December 2023, was the second most similar to PRC state-affiliated media
narratives among Facebook troll groups (37.2%), contributing to 19.2% of the group’s coordinated comments. In
this period, it continued to echo PRC state-affiliated media in three main themes: ”Taiwan being pushed towards
military danger,” ”Pessimistic outlook on Taiwan’s economy,” and ”Poor governance under the DPP.” By December,the group began to additionally attack livelihood and economic issues.

Graph 42: Narratives of Facebook #61019 closely aligned with PRC state-affiliated media
As the elections drew closer, PTT #60021 increased its alignment with PRC state-affiliated media narratives (3.8%of the group’s coordinated comments), consistently echoing PRC state-affiliated media from September toDecember on ”Taiwan being pushed towards military danger,” ”Pessimistic outlook on Taiwan’s economy,” and”Poor governance under the DPP.” The main narrative in November was focused on intimidating Taiwan with war
rhetoric, but shifted towards attacking education and economic issues around December.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
57

Graph 43: Narratives of PTT #60021 closely aligned with PRC state-affiliated media
PTT #60004 also showed an increase in narratives aligned with PRC state-affiliated media as the election
approached (3.1% of the group’s coordinated comments), consistently reflecting PRC state-affiliated media’s focus
on ”Taiwan being pushed towards military danger,” ”Pessimistic outlook on Taiwan’s economy,” and ”Poor
governance under the DPP.” The group’s narratives primarily targeted Taiwan’s economy, education, and attacked
the DPP.

Graph 44: Narratives of PTT #60004 closely aligned with PRC state-affiliated media

Learning 5: Trolls Influenced Users in Scale
During the period from March to June, the main troll groups focused primarily on domestic politics andTaiwan-related international events (such as the McCarthyist incident, spy balloon incident, and the diplomatic
break with Honduras), gradually influencing regular users and sparking increased discussion. From June toAugust, discussion intensity further escalated due to issues like the KMT primary. Subsequently, during theInformation Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
58

high-profile events of Terry Gou’s petition in October and the KMT-TPP collaboration discussions in November,there was a further boost in discussion intensity.

Graph 45: Trend of normalized troll volume and general user volume on Facebook
From the chart below, it’s observable that between March and May, troll groups were able to generate discussionsat an average rate of 7.5 times that of regular users. However, as the date of the election approached, theinfluence of these groups increased, driving discussions at an average rate of 15 times that of ordinary users.
Eventually, just before the election, this rate escalated to 25 times the discussion level compared to regular users.

Graph 46: Trend of the ratio of general user volume to troll volume on Facebook.

Learning 6: PRC State Platform Has National Interest
The Chinese-owned platform TikTok predominantly targets Taiwan (53%), the United States (25%), and Japan(17%) in its operations against countries. The attacks on the United States are primarily focused on President
Biden’s announcement on April 14, 2023, regarding his intention to seek re-election in 2024. The troll groupintensifies its influence operations, spreading conspiracy theories and criticizing the U.S. government’s diplomatic
strategies. In July of the same year, the group actively involved itself in the Taiwan presidential election,
propagating the narrative that Lai Ching-te is a pro-Taiwan independence figure. On another front, in August of thesame year, the troll group attacked Japan, specifically highlighting the Fukushima nuclear wastewater issue.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
59* Each point represents the total obtained by subtracting the negative quantity
from the positive quantity for the respective entity in that month** This signifies the total obtained by ‘Entity[+] – Entity[–]’Graph 47: Trends in the manipulation of country-related content on TikTok
Manipulated Entity

Percentage

Taiwan [–]48%

American [–]29%

Japan [–]

17%

China [–]

6%

Manipulated Entity

Percentage

China [＋]

67%

Taiwan [＋]22%Japan [＋]

7%

American [＋]4%* ‘[–]’ signifies negative manipulation, while ‘[＋]’ indicates positive manipulation
Table 40: Country targets and their proportions in manipulated TikTok content

Learning 7: PRC State Platform Chose President
Compared to other platforms, the Chinese-owned platform TikTok has shown concentrated support for Ko Wen-je(62%) and Hou Yu-ih (27%) in the context of Taiwan’s presidential election. In terms of attacks, the focus has beenon Lai Ching-te (61%), Ko Wen-je (28%), and Terry Guo (7%).

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election60* Each point represents the total obtained by subtracting the negative quantity
from the positive quantity for the respective entity in that month** This signifies the total obtained by Entity[+] – Entity[–]
Graph 48: The trend changes in the operations of key figures in the presidential election on TikTok

Manipulated Entity

Percentage

Manipulated Entity

Percentage

Ko Wen-je [＋]62%

Lai Ching-te [–]61%

Hou Yu-ih [＋]27%

Ko Wen-je [–]28%

Terry Guo [＋]10%

Terry Guo [–]7%

Lai Ching-te [＋]1%

Hou Yu-ih [–]3%* ‘[–]’ signifies negative manipulation, while ‘[＋]’ indicates positive manipulation
Table 41: Party targets and their proportions in manipulated TikTok content

Learning 8: Trolls Led the KMT-TPP Collaboration Opinions
Since the KMT officially announced the nomination of Hou Yu-ih to represent the party in the 2024 Republic ofChina presidential election on May 17, AI Labs has detected an upward trend in troll operational activities on
TikTok. The troll group initially engaged in issues related to Taiwan-U.S. relations, national policies, andsubsequently intervened in domestic presidential election affairs.
During the period of intense discussion on the KMT-TPP collaboration, the troll group worked to amplify Ko
Wen-je’s presence and undermine the credibility of specific political parties, prompting strategic shifts within the
KMT-TPP collaboration. After the alliance’s disruption, the group altered its strategy from boosting Ko Wen-je’s
influence to supporting the KMT’s governance.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election61* ‘[–]’ signifies negative manipulation, while ‘[＋]’ indicates positive manipulation
Graph 49: Trends in the manipulation of party-related content on TikTok

Learning 9: Trolls Deep Rooted in Communities
AI Labs’ investigation has revealed that among the top 10 targeted groups where Facebook troll groups
predominantly share links. AI Labs categorize the groups often sharing content from troll groups into four types:
Echo Chamber Groups, which primarily consist of content with similar political viewpoints; Local Community
Groups, operated by individuals from various regions in Taiwan and mainly focusing on local current affairs;
Special Interest Groups, related to specific areas such as discussions on human resource agencies; andAudiovisual Entertainment Groups, primarily centered around audio-visual content, but where troll groups also
share political topics.
AI Labs found the groups like ”The Commoners are Boss (庶民大頭家),” ”I Support the Recall of the ‘Legislator
Who Supports Pork Imports with Ractopamine (割萊委我+1),” ”One Belt, One Road Countries’ Chinese Forum (一带一路沿线国家华人论坛) ,” and ”Learning from the great leader Mao Zedong (一代伟人毛泽东 向毛泽东学习)”attract regular users by sharing entertaining short videos. These troll groups then share political content withinthese groups to influence users’ political inclinations. This strategy is estimated to have impacted approximately
385,000 users.

Facebook Group

Number ofMembers

Categories

Supporting the CTI News Group, advocating for significant news andrevelations (力挺中天新聞社團，支持大新聞大爆卦)

11.5k

Echo
ChamberGroupsInformation Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
62

The Friends of the Labor Intermediaries Association (人力仲介之友會)

14.7k

Specialized
Interest
GroupsChanghua People, Changhua Matters (彰化人彰化事)

37.6k

Local
Community
GroupsPenghu Takeoff Network (澎湖起飛網)

7.2k

Local
Community
Groups

Keelung Renewal (基隆革新)

7.5k

Local
Community
GroupsThe Commoners are Boss (庶民大頭家)

5.5k

Echo
ChamberGroupsI Support the Recall of the ‘Legislator Who Supports Pork Imports with
Ractopamine (割萊委我+1)

3.4k

AudiovisualEntertainment Groups

One Belt, One Road Countries’ Chinese Forum (一带一路沿线国家华人论坛)

14.1k

Echo
ChamberGroupsWe, the Chinese, Should Have Patriotism! If You are Bright, the Motherland
Won’t be in the Dark! (咱们中国人，要有爱国心！你若是光明，祖国不黑暗！)

4.3k

Echo
ChamberGroupsLearning from the great leader Mao Zedong (一代伟人毛泽东 向毛泽东学习)

15.5k

Echo
ChamberGroupsTable 42: Top 10 Facebook Groups with the Most Shared Links by Troll Groups

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
63

Graph 50: Cases on Facebook groups where short videos are initially used to attract general users, followed bypolitical information to influence their political perceptions
Among these, there is a group with a name that appears Taiwanese, ”I Support the Recall of the Legislator Who
Supports Pork Imports with Ractopamine.” The avatars of two of its administrators were changed on the same day,their activity feeds are empty, and they have many foreign individuals in their friends list. We believe this group wasestablished using fake accounts.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
64

Graph 51: Anomalies in the Profiles of Two Administrators of the “I Support the Recall of the ‘Legislator Who
Supports Pork Imports with Ractopamine (割萊委我+1)” Group – Identical Profile Picture Upload Times andForeign Friends

Learning 10: Flooding Short Videos is The Trending Mean
Previously, online cognitive operations involved troll groups repeatedly echoing narratives or attacking using the
5D’s propaganda strategy1 of political propaganda. However, this year, with the rise of short-form videos, thesegroups have begun promoting and recommending such content, manipulating algorithms to make these videos
more easily recommended.
Jung-Chin Shen, an Associate Professor at York University in Canada, noted in a Facebook post on June 6, 2023,
that on the Douyin, Chinese version of the TikTok, multiple accounts systematically propagated fictional videos of
warfare in Israel and the Middle East. These videos claimed that 'Israel had been steadily retreating for two months
in an ongoing conflict with the Middle East.' Subsequently, on October 7, 2023, following a surprise attack by
Hamas on Israel, the warfare between Israel and Hamas, which was manipulated on Douyin, became a reality.

1

5D’s propaganda strategy (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide):
https://inventory.adt.ac/wiki/The_5D%27s_(dismiss,_distort,_distract,_dismay,_divide)Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
65

Graph 52: In June 2023, Jung-Chin Shen discovered the presence of fictional depictions of war in Israel on the
Douyin platform. Image source: Jung-Chin Shen's Facebook.
Notably, the primary troll group, Facebook #61009, demonstrated an average sharing rate of 6.24% for videos from
YouTube and TikTok platforms before the election, which surged to 16% closer to the election. This behavior
resulted in a total of 1,833 videos achieving a cumulative view count of 376,945,178.

Graph 53: Proportion of YouTube and TikTok links shared by Facebook #61009
The brevity of short-form videos makes them suitable for widespread dissemination but lacks sufficient length forcomprehensive discussion. This leads to the circulation of decontextualized narratives, easily misleading viewers
and listeners.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
66

DISARM Techniques Used by Troll Groups
Regarding the DISARM framework2 from NATO, the researcher found that troll group operations on Facebook,YouTube, PTT, and TikTok were divided into two phases: Prepare and Execute.
The execution phase of DISARM is more easily observable. AI Labs noted on the YouTube platform that troll
groups extensively repeat comments under media videos to guide discussion trends (T0049 Flooding theinformation space, T0023.001 Reframe context) or comment early to enhance video interaction and influence thealgorithm (T0121 Manipulate platform algorithm). As a result, we have added these tactics to our observations on
YouTube. Similar strategies were observed from troll groups on Facebook and PTT also engagement in guiding
discussion directions through comments (T0023.001 Reframe context), flooding discussion spaces with repetitive
comments (T0049 Flooding the information space), and posting early to increase the likelihood of content being
seen or algorithmically recommended (T0121 Manipulate platform algorithm). Therefore, we believe that on thefour platforms of Facebook, YouTube, PTT, and TikTok, it is essential to study existing narratives (T003 Leverage
existing Narratives) during the Prepare phase to facilitate subsequent comment operations (T0116 Comment or
Reply on Content, T0116 Trolls amplify and manipulate)

Phase
PrepareExecuteTacticFacebook

YoutubePTT

Tiktok

T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives

◯

◯

◯

◯

T0023.001 Reframe Context

◎

◎

◎

T0049 Flooding the Information Space

◎

◎

◎

T0049.001 Trolls Amplify and Manipulate

◎

◯

◎

◯

T0116 Comment or Reply on Content

◎

◎

◎

◎

T0121 Manipulate Platform Algorithm

◎

◯

◯

◯ indicates observed manipulative behaviors that align with this Tactic.
◎ signifies observed manipulative behaviors that very closely match this Tactic.
Table 43: DISARM Tactics used on each platform

2

DISARM Disinformation Analysis and Risk Management is an open-source framework designed to describe and understandthe behavior parts of FIMI/disinformation. It sets out best practices for fighting disinformation through sharing data & analysis
and can inform effective action. The Framework has been developed, drawing on global cybersecurity best practices.
https://www.disarm.foundation/

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
67

The Infodemic Platform
During the pandemic, Taiwan AI Labs collaborated internationally to develop trustworthy and responsible AI in
healthcare while addressing the global challenge of misinformation related to the pandemic. Working with global
partners, we established mechanisms to detect such activities. Taiwan AI Labs initially used AI to observe andunderstand the behavior of various accounts, identifying coordinated activities to detect synchronized accounts.
Troll accounts are defined as a group of accounts not operated by genuine users. These could be accounts
publishing specific content as per official directives, or those controlled programmatically or through PR firms,
disseminating particular narratives in a non-organic, organized manner. By leveraging generative technologies andlarge language models (LLMs), Taiwan AI Labs analyzed billions of social media activities to unearth over 30,000
troll groups, understanding the content and patterns of their operations across more than two million topics. This
helps to uncover the targets, methods, and possible motives behind these operations.
With the growing global demand for insights into information manipulation, international partners expressedinterest in this service. Taiwan AI Labs further developed its capabilities into the Infodemic platform, providing
real-time and comprehensive understanding of both domestic and international information manipulation for
non-technical partners. This aids in developing digital literacy and response strategies. In recent years, Taiwan AI
Labs has continued to use the Infodemic platform to observe coordinated behaviors on major Taiwanese social
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, X (Twitter), TikTok, and PTT. It employs LLMs to comprehend the targets
and patterns of information manipulation attacks the responses of mainstream media. It timely records thebattlefields of information warfare participated in by troll groups, along with their potential impacts.

Graph 54: Overview of the data analysis process flow on the Infodemic platform.
Approximately two months before the election, weekly closed-door meetings were held to reveal observed online
information manipulation. These sessions facilitated exchanges with domestic and international scholars andexperts. Post-election, the observations from the previous year were shared with international media, diplomatic
personnel in Taiwan, NGOs, and academic institutions, aiming to enhance public media literacy and build cognitive
resilience.

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
68

Information Manipulation by Troll Groups on Taiwan Presidential Election
69

References●●●

This report used data and tools in https://infodemic.cc
How does the system work https://infodemic.cc/en/faq
DISARM Disinformation Analysis and Risk Management is an open-source framework designed fordescribing and understanding the behavior parts of FIMI/disinformation. It sets out best practices forfighting disinformation through sharing data & analysis, and can inform effective action. The Frameworkhas been developed, drawing on global cybersecurity best practices. https://www.disarm.foundation/