AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security(Secretariat)

Editor:No. 167

Akio Watanabe

13 December 2012

Editorial Board:

THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE DOMESTICPOLITICS AND JAPAN’S PATH AHEAD

Hideki Asari
Masashi Nishihara
Taizo Yakushiji

Online Publisher:
Yoshiji Nogami
President, JIIA

Katsuyuki Yakushiji
Several times a year the Japanese Diet holds a party
leaders’ debate modeled on the UK’s “QuestionTime.” Each occasion sees the prime minister andthe leaders of the opposition parties exchanging
criticisms amidst loud heckling from onlooking MPs. It
has become a ritual that does nothing but waste time.
The party leaders’ debate of November 14, however,
was different. As planned, Shinzo Abe, President of
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), called for an
early dissolution of the House of Representatives byPrime Minister (and head of the Democratic Party ofJapan [DPJ]) Yoshihiko Noda.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Everyone had expected the prime minister to offer some vague justification for
postponing the dissolution. Instead, Prime Minister Noda proposed reducing thenumber of seats in the National Diet and then bluntly added, “Let’s just cut to thechase. We will dissolve the Diet on the 16th.”
In an instant the heckling stopped and the committee chamber became
hushed. Never had a prime minister announced a specific date for dissolution ina statement to the Diet. The opposition members were naturally flummoxed, asindeed was the ruling party leadership. Abe was unable to hide his shock, andhis subsequent remarks trailed off into meaninglessness.
The Japanese media conduct frequent public opinion polls. The latest
poll shows support for the Noda administration down to about 20% and that for
the DPJ in the low teens, less than half that for the LDP. If this holds true into thegeneral elections, the DPJ will seemingly suffer a major defeat as the LDP
reclaims power as the dominant party. No Diet member welcomes an election inwhich he/she is certain of a loss. There was overwhelming opposition todissolution and general elections within the DPJ, of course, and Prime Minister
Noda had been expected to hold off dissolving the Diet until next year.
Turning the opposition parties’ demands for an early dissolution against
them, though, Prime Minister Noda countered by insisting on conditions such asa reduction in the number of Diet seats as he announced the dissolution. It wascolorful turnabout theater. Many of the viewers watching the party leaders’debate on television began rethinking their assessments of Prime Minister
Noda’s leadership ability, and some of them may even switch their support to theDPJ. This is how effective the “bombshell” was.
There are undoubtedly several reasons for the prime minister’s
determination to dissolve the Diet before year’s end.
Since becoming prime minister in autumn of last year, Noda has been
primarily focused on raising the consumption tax. Japan has a cumulative debt ofapproximately 1000 trillion yen, more than twice its GDP. This is far greater eventhat European countries such as Greece and Italy who have been thrown into
fiscal crisis. Should its profligate public spending continue unabated, Japan will

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ultimately find itself confronting the specter of fiscal collapse. An increase in theconsumption tax was essential to avoid this.
A bill to increase the consumption tax was passed in August. The tax
rate is to be raised in two stages, from the present 5% to 8% in April 2014 andthen to 10% in October 2015. This rise is not set in stone but rather conditioned
on “an upturn in economic conditions.” The Japanese economy remains sluggish,and additional appropriations for economic stimulus measures and smooth
implementation of the fiscal 2013 budget will be necessary to satisfy thiscondition. If dissolution is postponed, however, resistance from the opposition
parties will become fiercer, budget deliberations will stall, and ultimately theconsumption tax rate may not be raised. To ensure trouble-free implementationof economic stimulus measures and an increase in the consumption tax, Prime
Minister Noda has committed to dissolution and general elections in which hefaces a strong likelihood of losing power.
He also appears set on rebuilding the DPJ. The DPJ secured 300 seatsin the 2009 general elections to become the ruling party. In reality, though, theDPJ is little more than a political party that attracts the critical “anti-LDP crowd,”
and the more seats it has gained, the weaker its party unity has become, withnumerous intra-party disputes breaking out over personnel and policies. Prime
Minister Noda is prepared to offer a general election campaign pledge onparticipation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, a stance thathas generated strong opposition within the DPJ. In doing so, Noda is apparentlyseeking to rebuild the DPJ by encouraging Diet members locked into old politicalways and conservative policies to leave the party and bringing in members
abiding by the party line, even if their overall numbers decline somewhat. While
the DPJ’s seat count might fall substantially in the next general elections, theparty’s “blunting course” could over the medium to long term garner public
support and allow the party to grow again and form a new government.
Voting and tallying for the general elections are to take place on
December 16.

It is highly likely that the LDP will become the dominant party

and return to power.

Having lost its majority in the House of Councilors, it willprobably have to form a coalition with other parties to create a stable

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government even if it does gain a majority in the House of Representatives. The
New Komeito might be a potent coalition partner, but in certain scenarios it could
choose to team up in some way with the DPJ. The outcome of the elections will
determine which parties will join up in a coalition.
A new dimension to the upcoming general elections is the large numberof LDP and DPJ defectors as well as prefectural governors who have created
new political parties in the run-up to these elections. An all-time high of twelve
parties have fielded candidates. This upsurge in the number of political parties
can be attributed to the fact that, over the past few years, defectors from the LDP
and DPJ have thrown their support behind well-known governors or other figuresand formed new political parties to ensure their own political survival. This has
been made possible by an electoral system featuring a combination ofsingle-seat constituencies and proportional representation. While candidates
from minor parties might find it nearly impossible to defeat DPJ or LDP rivals insingle-seatconstituencies,

they

do

standachance

atwinninginproportional-representation constituencies. Hence, many political parties havebeen created in the hope of scoring victories in proportional-representation
constituencies. These minor parties are running election campaigns focusedsolely on specific policies popular with the public – opposing consumption tax
hikes or advocating a no-nuke energy policy, for instance – and they offer nooverarching platform for national governance as a whole. In other words, theminor parties springing up one after the other display a distinctly "electoral
mutual aid society" character in seeking to gain seats despite their small size,
and it seems unlikely that they will win many seats.
It might be hoped that Japanese politics will settle down after the generalelections and allow the focus to swing from politics to policy, but the situation is
not so simple. In 2013, there are House of Councilors elections scheduled in July,and Diet debates among the various parties will no doubt heat up as theseelections draw closer. A ready policy consensus would only serve to benefit theruling party, so widespread and unproductive dickering is an undeniable
possibility. In other words, Japan has a political calendar that will make it difficult
to avoid introverted political wrangling even after the general elections.

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2013 will be an important year for the international community, one inwhich new administrations will take office in certain key countries – including theUS, China, and South Korea – and pursue their own foreign policies. Wrangling
over the rise of China in particular is expected to intensify within the internationalcommunity.

As it seeks to secure its development as a maritime nation, China

will no doubt pursue assertive and even aggressive policies not just on its
territorial issues with Japan but on numerous other political, economic andmilitary matters. The US in making its pivot toward Asia will counter China
through economic and military policy. The US can also be expected to request
TPP participation and greater security cooperation from Japan.
Whether the Japanese government will be able in 2013 to respondflexibly to such developments in the international community is an importantconcern. Japan’s presence in the international community can likely be restored
if an effectively functioning coalition government can actively address domestic
and foreign policy issues. On the other hand, if a new administration is swayedby domestic politics because of an unstable base, it will not have much leeway to
devote effort to foreign affairs. In this sense, the December general elections areof significance for both Japan and for the peace and stability of NortheastAsia.

Prof. Katsuyuki Yakushiji teaches at Toyo University. He is also an adjunctfellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

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