The Origins of Japan’sModern Forests

ASIAN STUDIES AT HAWAII, NO. 31

The Origins of Japan’sModern Forests
The Case of Akita
Conrad Totman

CENTER FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC STUDIESUNIVERSITY OF HAWAII
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS

Open Access edition funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities / Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Humanities
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For Michiko,
companion of thirty years

Contents

MAPS AND TABLES

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xi

PREFACE

xiii

1

2

3

4

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

1

Identifying the Problem

1

The Geography of Akita’s Forests

5

Forest Users and Uses

7

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

13

The Beginnings of Use

13

A Century of Exploitation: 1600–1700

14

Forest Depletion: The Evidence of Later Decades

18

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

23

Forming a System of Forest Management

24

Regulating, Restricting, and Taxing Forest Use

30

Controlling the Harvest: Logging

32

Controlling the Harvest: Firewood

34

AFFORESTATION

39

Afforestation: The First Century

39

Afforestation and the Tenmei Famine

43

Afforestation after the Tenmei Famine

47

The Results of Afforestation

53

vii

viii

CONTENTSCONCLUSIONS AND LAST REFLECTIONS57

APPENDIXES
1 Trends in Fuel Use

61

2 Han Forests and Fiscal Policy

63

3 A Note on Measurement

66

4 Glossary of Trees

68

5 Character Lists

70

NOTES

73

BIBLIOGRAPHY

81

INDEX

85

Maps
1.

Japan: Places cited in text

2.

Akita han: Valleys and mountain ranges

3.

Akita: Towns and rivers

4.

Early logging sites in Akita

Tables1.

Numbers and yield of trees harvested, 1677–1686

2.

Declining timber production, 1717–1816

3.

Han planting projects, 1807–1832

A1. Charcoal production for government and samurai families in
KubotaA2. Charcoal allotments to samurai householdsixAcknowledgments

I wish to thank the Tokugawa Institute for the History of Forestry(Tokugawa rinseishi kenkyūjo) and its parent institution, the Tokugawa
Reimeikai, for granting me status as a research associate during the academic year 1981–1982. I thank Mr. Tokugawa Yoshichika, head of theReimeikai, for authorizing the appointment and Professor Ōishi Shinzaburō, Director of the Institute, for arranging it. I thank Mr. Tokoro
Mitsuo, former Director of the Institute, for sharing insights on forest
history and Professor Kanai Madoka of the University of Tokyo for introducing me to the Institute. I am particularly grateful to Professor Iioka
Masatake of the Institute for serving so generously and helpfully as acolleague in research and to the many members of the Institute for theirfriendship and generous kindliness. I thank the Japan Foundation forsupporting me during my research in Japan. I am grateful to Ms. Patricia
Vernon for typing the manuscript rapidly and neatly.

xiPreface

Relentlessly we humans ravage the forests of the earth, unwittingly destroying the material foundation upon which our very survival depends.
Too many people are demanding too many products too rapidly from afinite area of fragile woodland whose capacity to produce is limited by
the intractable facts of biology and environment.
Ours is not the first generation to seem bent on accomplishing its
own destruction. The people of early modern Japan at one time seemed
intent on achieving the same dubious objective. Like us, they were arapidly growing population whose rising standard of living demanded
ever more from their land. Like us, they tried to satisfy that escalating
demand from the yield of a realm whose area was fixed and whose resources were inelastic. For us the restraints are technical: it is a long,
long jaunt to the nearest inhabitable planet, and few of us will ever makethe trip. For them the restraints were political: their rulers forbade themto venture beyond their islands. But the results are the same: a relentlessly growing demand that threatens to ravage the land and ruin allthat flourishes on it, human works included.
Improbable as it may seem, somehow during the last three centuries
the threat of elemental ecological catastrophe in Japan was turned
aside. Demand was controlled; exploitation was contained. The land wascared for, rejuvenated, made whole again. Today Japan’s forested beauty
is a joy to all who visit there. How did this come to pass? As we confront
an analogous situation, perhaps we can learn something from the Japanese experience.
The woodlands of Japan vary substantially from north to south, and

xiii

xiv

PREFACEthe patterns of their use and abuse differed from area to area during theEdo, or early modern, period (1600–1868). Nevertheless, the basic characteristics and rhythms of forest history were common to all of Japan(except the sparsely populated northern island of Hokkaidō). It is possible, therefore, to illuminate the general experience by scrutinizing asection of the whole.
The section selected here is Akita, a prefecture of northern Japan
whose forests are among the nation’s most famous. Three considerations make this choice attractive. The topic has clearly delineatedboundaries, largely because the Akita region was a single coherent political unit during the Edo period; the documentation on the early modern
forest situation there is extensive and accessible; finally, and as a consequence of the second factor, Japanese scholars have already publishedexcellent studies on key aspects of Akita forestry. These factors havemade this a relatively convenient area to examine and discuss in the
short compass of this study.

CHAPTER 1

The Problem and
Its Context

Nihon sandaibirin, “the three beautiful forests of Japan,” is a phrase
commonly applied to the lush and extensive forests of the Kiso River valley in central Japan and those of Akita and Aomori prefectures at thenorthern end of the main island of Honshū.1 (Map 1) These forests havenot always been so verdant. About two hundred years ago, the woodlands of Akita were so depleted that the region had to import lumber tomeet its day-to-day building needs. In 1808 Katō Keirin, a forest officialof the region, wrote:
Where there were mixed stands of mature trees in the 1750s, there now is
only brushwood. The areas that had brushwood then have been cut overand now are open hillside. On even inaccessible slopes no large trees remain, and it is difficult to count all the sites left barren by wildfires thathave consumed both brush and timber stock. During the forty-five years
prior to the reform of 1805, nine of every ten timber trees were consumed
along with seven of every ten weed trees.2

Just two hundred years before that, however, Akita had boasted nationally famous, seemingly inexhaustible stands of giant sugi (Cryptomeria japonica) and other species. How such fine forests became so impoverished and how they were subsequently restored to health is a key issue
in Akita’s forest history.
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
The basic rhythm of Akita’s forest history can be outlined quite succinctly. Intensive exploitation began in the 1590s, and by the 1660s

2

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

Map 1 Japan: Places cited in text

overcutting had created shortages of both firewood and timber. To copewith the problem, the government of the area undertook policies ofregulation and restriction, but the situation continued to worsen. In
1712–1713 officials instituted a major forest reform that was in part
designed to strengthen the policies of regulation and restriction; morebasically, it made afforestation a central part of government forest policy
for the first time. Despite this shift in official policy, little tree-planting
was done, and during the eighteenth century timber output continued to
decline sharply and fuel scarcity persisted.
During the 1770s and 1780s widespread crop failure wracked Akita,
along with other parts of Japan, and the resultant Tenmei famine rav-

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

3

aged the region and decimated its population. In following decades
afforestation became widely practiced. New forest regulations issued
during the decade after 1802 promoted tree-planting and sharply tightened government control of forests and forest industries. During subsequent decades large numbers of small-scale, peasant-sponsored planting
projects and other large-scale afforestation projects were undertaken.
As the century advanced, both large and small plantation stands steadily
matured. At the same time, government policies were slowly restoring
naturally seeded stands of sugi to many areas, even at the expense offuel supplies. By the 1850s Akita timber production was rising, buoyedby the steady growth of extensive stands of young sugi and other species(see Appendix 4).
In 1868 the Meiji Restoration brought down the decentralized polityof the preceding 265 years, and shortly afterward the new governmentin Tokyo established direct control over the Akita region. During the1880s, a nationwide reform of the landholding system was implemented,
and in the process most of the timbered regions that the government
and people of Akita had been nurturing during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were converted into national forest. The new regime
regulated woodlands closely, and stands thrived under the managementof professionals who combined the forest expertise of their own heritage with that introduced from Germany. During World War II extreme
overcutting took place. Postwar planting projects restored the forests,
however, and the economic advantages of importing timber have given
the new stands time to grow. Today the mountain woodlands of Akita areagain among the jewels of Japan.
As this brief survey suggests, the problem period in Akita’s forest
history occurred in the years between about 1600 and 1850. Whatfollowed the Meiji Restoration may, for present purposes, be seen
as denouement. Here the task is to explain what brought the great
forests of 1600 to their sorry condition of 1800, and how they were
subsequently restored to excellence. Overcutting is central to the explanation of their decline, certainly, but overcutting by whom and forwhat purposes? And was that the only notable factor, or must others
be taken into account?
One possible explanation of the revival of the forests, as the summary above suggests, is afforestation; natural regeneration is another.
Neither, however, is sufficient. A great deal of tree-planting has been
done in Akita, but much of it has been in localities, notably in the southern part of the prefecture, that lie outside the celebrated forest areas,
which are in north Akita. Much of the finest timber is standing in areas that have no record of nineteenth-century afforestation. Similarly,

4

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

Map 2 Akita han: Valleys and mountain ranges

the notion of natural regeneration as an explanation leaves unresolved
problems. The celebrated stands of north Akita contain primarily sugi,
and just over the border to the north, in Aomori Prefecture, there is little
natural sugi growth. There the indigenous stock is mixed conifer and deciduous broadleafs, and the predominant conifer is hiba, an arborvitae.3
Differences in site, soil, and climate are minimal and afford no natural
explanation for the differences between the conifer stands of Akita and
Aomori. Moreover, the original stands of Akita sugi were found in mixed
forests in the river valleys, whereas the modern stands are purer and ascend well into the mountains, to elevations where the seedlings compete
poorly against rival species. Clearly, human activity has contributed toTHE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

5

the development of the modern sugi stands of Akita, but it has been activity other than simple afforestation. The identification and explanationof that activity will follow an examination of the earlier deterioration of
the forests.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF AKITA’S FORESTS
The forests of Akita are an integral part of the arboreal zone of northeastern Honshū, dominated by mixed conifer and deciduous broadleaf
stands. The principal broadleafs in the zone are buna, kuri, kurumi,
konara, tochi, and keyaki (species of beech, chestnut, walnut, oak, horsechestnut, and zelkova). The principal conifers are hiba, sugi, akamatsu,
momi, and tsuga (species of arborvitae, cryptomeria, pine, fir, and hemlock). In Akita the several species intermingle. Their maximum elevations are about 1500 meters for hiba, 1300 for buna, 1000 for tochi,
akamatsu, and keyaki, and 800 for konara and kuri. Sugi and momi
flourish below 500 meters and tsuga above that elevation.4 As Map 2 indicates, much of Akita is below 500 meters, and only peaks and a few
ridges rise higher than 1000 meters; hence nearly all of the prefectureis accessible to these species.
Map 2 also suggests differences between north and south Akita.
The area of Akita han, the domain of the regional baron (daimyō) who
administered the area during the Edo period, consisted essentially of
two watersheds. The more northerly is that of the Yoneshiro river, which
empties into the Sea of Japan at Noshiro (giving the river its alternative name, Noshiro). The southerly river is the Omono, which debouches
near Akita city (called Kubota before 1871).
The valley systems are dissimilar. Whereas the Yoneshiro drains anarrow sedimentary valley with shallow, successively lower branches,
the Omono drains a much more elaborate valley system whose major
forks are carved to relatively low elevations well before they coalesce.
Even as far inland as Akinomiya, toward the southern edge of the prefecture, the elevation is only 200 meters. Moreover, the mountains of northAkita are less steep than those to the south, which rise abruptly to ridgelines with peaks in the range of 1300 to 1550 meters.
Because of its extensive lowlands, south Akita has supported a substantial agricultural population for many centuries, and much of its original woodland was cut over before the 1580s. North Akita, by contrast,
has been much less developed except along the coast, and axes scarcely
touched its forests before the 1590s. Moreover, its more gently risingmountain slopes have been less susceptible to erosion and more able toregenerate high quality forest cover than the steep slopes to the south.5
Like others along Japan’s western shoreline, the coastal plain of

6

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

Map 3 Akita: Towns and rivers

Akita was formed by a combination of wave action that builds up strips
of offshore sandbar, and inland stream action that deposits silt behindthe sandbars. As a strip of sandbar and shoreward lagoon gradually consolidates, new sandbars begin to take shape, eventually forming new
lagoons, which slowly fill. Repeated again and again, this process hascreated a wide area of undulating sand hills with lower areas of heavier soil interspersed.6 If not carefully handled, this type of terrain caneasily become destabilized. Denuded sand hills become desiccated, andsand from the dunes drifts across cultivated areas, ruining them for cultivation.7 Consequently the health of Akita’s forests has been essential
to the socioeconomic health not only of inland valleys but also of coastal
lowlands.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

7FOREST USERS AND USES
During the Edo period the Akita region was an integral part of the larger
Japanese society. It is useful to examine that society in terms of rulers
and peasants because those who used the forests of Akita did so for themost part as rulers of the realm or as villagers making a living from theland and its usufruct.8
The rulers of the realm were a highly stratified hereditary elite ofsamurai who governed through a decentralized polity commonly called
the bakuhan system. Baku is short for bakufu, the shogunal regime of
the Tokugawa family that was headquartered in Edo (renamed Tokyo in1868). The bakufu administered directly about a fourth of the country,
mostly in central Honshū. The rest of Japan was divided into han, the250-odd domains of daimyō, regional barons who maintained their own
autonomous administrative systems with which to collect taxes and keep
the peace.
Akita han was one such domain, its daimyo family being the Satake.
They moved from Mito in central Japan to the castle at Kubota in 1603
and remained there until 1871. Like other daimyo, Satake centered his
governing apparatus at his headquarters castle. Many daimyo housed
their vassals in their castle town, where they were supported by the
han treasury, but Satake assigned minor fiefs to many of his and hadthem live in the villages. There they supported themselves throughlevies imposed upon the local populace.9 Because of their high status,
compared to villagers, these country samurai (gōshi) were influential
figures in their localities, but they were not Satake’s formal local representatives. Instead he administered his domain through a networkof subordinate officials. District intendants (kōri bugyō) oversaw thevillages, where the bulk of the population lived. The intendants wereprimarily interested in keeping the peace and collecting taxes in theirdistricts and concentrated on agriculture. To administer forests andforest-related activities, Satake appointed a number of forest overseers(mokuzankata). However, because the realms of agriculture and forestry
were deeply entwined, the intendants and the overseers frequently
worked together—or at loggerheads—in the management and exploitation of Akita’s forests.
The peasants in the villages, whose daily production supported
the rulers, were the other major forest users. Their households wereorganized as patrilineages whose members cultivated identified plots of
paddy land and dry fields. They were officially registered as residents ofspecified villages and were further grouped together in neighborhood
units commonly known as goningumi. Principles of mutual responsibility
pervaded the legal system so that members of patrilineages, neighbor-8

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

hood units, and villages were responsible for one another’s conduct.
In the well-founded conviction that the prevention of problems was far
preferable to suffering the consequences of another’s alleged delinquency, the villagers practiced active self-government. This involved
codes of behavior, rules and regulations for the use of village resources,
punishments fitted to the severity of the case, principles and mechanisms of conciliation, and a body of village officials who represented
patrilineages, neighborhood units, and the village as a whole in resolving internal disputes and in dealing with higher authority or outsiders.
This local self-government took place within the framework of the tax,
judicial, and regulatory system of the rulers. That larger system figured
especially heavily in shaping the scope and form of villagers’ use of theforests.
The land that peasants worked and rulers taxed was in theory thatof the emperor, who had entrusted its safekeeping to the shogun. He,in turn, had assigned its governance in Akita to Satake, who appointed
han officials to administer it and assure that village residents managed their affairs properly. In practice country samurai managed someland directly, and some, called iriaichi, was administered communally bypeasant villages. Most of the arable land was held and worked by peasant householders whose rights of cultivation were established by the
inclusion of their names in registers of cadastral surveys that specified
who was responsible for the taxes on what parcels of land.
Initially, use rights on forest land were much more poorly delineatedthan rights to arable land. As long as wood was abundant, villagers
and rulers took what they needed as they needed it from wherever
was convenient. From early in the Edo period, however, felling ended
the abundance and forest use rights became more and more carefully
regulated. In general terms, most forest land near villages was administered as iriaichi by the adjacent village for the use of its members, but
individual householders managed some, mostly wooded plots of under
two hectares apiece.10 In the mountainous interior, the han claimed theforests and placed them under direct official administration. However,
the han usually claimed only the timber, leaving other growth, such asbrush and grass, for peasant use. The forest land arrangements wereincredibly complex, in great part because use rights rather than “ownership” was the issue being clarified. Complexity also arose because thearrangements derived from a continual process of accommodating, almost on a case-by-case basis, the multiple and changing needs of bothrulers and villagers.
In their demands on woodland, rulers and villagers had overlapping
interests, but there also were clear differences of priorities and needs.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

9

The basic uses of the forest were for building materials, fuel, green fertilizer and fodder, water conservation, and land to cultivate.
Building Materials
The demand for building materials was universal: everyone in Akita
needed a roof overhead. However, the rulers were given to monumental
construction and insisted on high-grade lumber, including very large
pieces for use in building castles, mansions, temples, and shrines. In
practice the rulers were heavy users of conifers, especially sugi, bothfor their own construction work and as a product sold to obtain cash
for the treasury. Villagers usually made do with inferior stock of small
dimensions for their homes, outbuildings, tools, bridges, paddy walls,
irrigation dams and ditches, rice-drying racks, and so forth. For these
purposes they generally used the tops and scraps of trees left over fromthe rulers’ logging operations and the broadleaf coppice stands thatflourished near most villages.
Fuel
Similarly universal was the demand for fuel, because Akita has always
been cursed with long, brutally cold winters. Westerly winds from Siberia sweep steadily across the Sea of Japan, bringing dense clouds that
often shut out the sun before depositing snow on the high ranges inland
to the east. Consequently, the demand for fuel was exceptionally high,and the forest provided it in the form of faggots and charcoal. Bothvillagers and samurai burned wood, but samurai were the primary consumers of charcoal.
Akita contained one other major consumer of fuel. Located in thedomain were some of Japan’s best copper mines, along with a few gold,
silver, and lead mines, all of which provided income for the han andemployment for commoners. The smelting of ore consumed immense
quantities of hardwood fuel, and the han set aside large sections of forest as fuel reserves for mine use.11
Green Fertilizer and Fodder
The peasants needed considerable amounts of green fertilizer, which
they made from various materials, notably grass, scrub bamboo, brush,
twigs, and fallen leaves. Sometimes tillers stirred it into fields raw or
semi-decayed; sometimes they burned it and worked it into the soil asash. There are no extensive figures on how much upland was required
to meet the fertilizer needs of the cultivators, but five to ten units offertilizer land per unit of arable land seems general. One analysis oftillage practices in Matsumoto han in central Japan indicates that on av-

10

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

erage the yield of brush and grass from ten to twelve units of upland wasnecessary to provide a single unit of arable land with enough nutrientsto sustain its fertility.12 At such rates, the demand for fertilizer would
have constituted a major burden on the forest areas of Japan, and in fact
scarcity of fertilizer and disputes over fertilizer land were chronic problems in the early modern period.
Similarly, the demand for fodder came primarily from the peasant,the fodder being used to feed agricultural draft animals. In addition,
however, Akita han had a considerable population of cavalry horses, andthey too required fodder. Because arable land was too precious to be
used for fodder or pasture, hill land, waste land, flood plain, and thefringes of fields, roads, paths, and streams—most of which were also
used for growing trees and compost materials—furnished fodder.
Water Conservation
Both rulers and peasants had an interest in conserving water. Forests
maintained for this purpose were so important that scholars sometimes
treat Edo-period forest management as a two-part activity. One part involved stands nurtured for their yield; the other, woodlands maintained
for water control.13 The main purpose of water conservation was toprevent flooding and erosion, which could ravage arable land, paths,
roads, villages, and towns. The destruction of fields could ruin crops
and reduce future production, undermining the tax base and creating
food scarcities, hardship, and unrest. The peasant interest in water
conservation is self-explanatory, as is the rulers’ interest in maintaining the tax base. Why rulers wished to maintain a tranquil populace
may be less obvious. The wish was sustained not only by Confucian
principles of good governance, but also by the knowledge that a disorderly domain might prompt the Tokugawa bakufu to strip the daimyoof his patrimony, so depriving all his vassals of their hereditarily secure
places in life.
Cultivation Lands
The opening of land to cultivation constituted a demand on forests inthe sense that it took out of production land that otherwise would havegrown trees, fodder, or fertilizer materials. It also intensified pressure
on the remaining woodland by sustaining a larger population and hence
greater lumber and fuel needs, and by increasing the need for green fertilizer even as it reduced the area that could produce it. In Akita, forexample, whereas in 1625 there were new paddy fields (shinden) withan assessed productivity of 14,700 koku of rice, by 1684 the comparable

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

11

figure was 126,000 koku.14 That increase constituted approximately a 50
percent expansion of the domain’s total rice output. Since newer fields
tended to come from less fertile sites, this constituted an even greater
increase in the acreage devoted to rice culture.
Beside these five basic uses, the woodlands of Akita produced alarge variety of other products, including bamboo, lacquer, wax, a wide
range of vegetable foods, game animals, and birds.
During the centuries after 1600, the level of demand for some of
the forest products changed. The demand for building timber was greatest during the years from 1590 to 1660, decades in which new castles,
mansions, temples, shrines, cities, and towns sprang up all over Japan.
Thereafter, with so many structures already in place and with population
growth slowing down, construction activity decreased sharply, continuing mostly in response to loss by fire, earthquake, or natural decay.
Similarly, land opening declined sharply after about 1700, in part because most of the reasonably accessible land had already been opened,
and in part because the need for forest and scrub land prompted somerulers and those villagers with sufficient arable land to oppose further opening to tillage.15 The use of green fertilizer probably increased
throughout the Edo period as improved agronomic techniques were disseminated to the populace, but it is likely that the rate of increase eased
after about 1700 as less and less new land came under the plow. Grossfuel use also probably did not increase very rapidly after population
growth slackened off around 1720. As noted in Appendix 1, however, thesamurai expanded their use of charcoal dramatically during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Because kiln operators produced thecharcoal from raw wood by a process of semi-combustion in which heat
was lost to the atmosphere, this expansion in use probably increased
gross demand on the forest, even if it yielded little additional heat forthe consumer.
These several forms of forest use by rulers and villagers constituted
a set of demands on the forest that were not always mutually compatible. In broadest terms, the villagers’ greatest need was for brush land
and fuel wood; the rulers’, for high-grade timber stands. However, a rich
canopy of sugi growth such as the rulers wanted would shade out all
scrub brush and grass; and a villager eagerly slashing away at brushand grass year after year to obtain fertilizer material was unlikely tospare sugi seedlings if offered no incentive to do so. On the other hand,
if the peasant could get no fertilizer, the lord would get no food. And if
the village provided no labor, the rulers would receive no lumber. The
forest policies of rulers and villagers represented a continuous effort toreconcile their several needs and their conflicting and shared interests,

12

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

and to do so within the context of limited natural resources, a dense
population, and a harsh, sometimes erratic, climate. How this complex
process worked itself out, resulting in the destruction and subsequent
recreation of one of Japan’s sandaibirin, is the focus of the next threechapters.

CHAPTER 2

The Evolution of Forest
Exploitation in Akita

Local residents exploited the forests of Akita for centuries before 1600,
but the region’s participation in the national timber market dates fromthe 1590s. For several decades thereafter logging and other use continued at an intense pace, rapidly exhausting the original stands. By theeighteenth century it was clear that exploitation had to be brought under control, but another century was to pass before overcutting finallyceased and the process of forest destruction was reversed.
THE BEGINNINGS OF USE
For centuries before 1590, peasants had opened more and more of Akita’s lowlands to cultivation. They used nearby forest land for firewood,
fodder, fertilizer, and domestic construction and looked upon it as areafor eventual conversion to tillage. As the population of the region grewand larger stretches of valley land were stripped of their forests, it isprobable that peasants near untilled areas also furnished forest products to others, on a barter or sale basis, depending on the era andsituation. During those centuries the lower slopes of the Yoneshiro andOmono river valleys continued to support virgin stands of sugi, keyaki,
and other species, including many trees of great size.
By 1592 the military despot Toyotomi Hideyoshi held sway over
all Japan and was pursuing enterprises that required vast quantities ofhigh-quality timber. Most notably he promoted the construction of gigantic castles and temples and fleets of large ships, both merchantmen fortransporting goods domestically and warships for conquering Korea andChina. Knowing of the excellent sugi of Akita, he placed a vassal gener-

14

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

al named Akita Sanesue in charge of Kubota and its hinterland with thespecific duty of furnishing timber as required. Until Hideyoshi died in
1598, his grandiose projects continued. Sanesue ordered logging crews
to fell the sugi, dress it for shipment, and float it downstream to bulk
carriers that took it southward along the coast to Tsuruga port. From
there it was taken overland by horse to Lake Biwa and thence by boat to
Kyoto and Osaka.16
Hideyoshi’s demands were heavy. In 1595, for example, he called
for 820 six-foot planks of approximately 6 x 18 inch size (see Appendix
3), causing Sanesue to mobilize a corvée force of 1100 peasants, whom
he furnished with tools, provisions, and shelter. Ideally, Sanesue shouldhave had the work done during the winter when villagers had slack
time and when snow on the frozen ground made skidding of logs easy.
Pressed by Hideyoshi, however, he had crews assembled and put to work
during the summer, felling, hewing, and hauling for a seventy-day period
between planting and harvest17 Perhaps it was inefficient, but few people disputed Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s requests.
After Hideyoshi’s death, Sanesue changed the character of his logging. Where he had previously been a dutiful vassal providing service
labor (gun’yaku) to his lord (and getting out enough timber and fuel woodfor his own use in the process), he became a baron marketing lumber asa source of income for his government treasury. He arranged to sell his
timber through merchants from Tsuruga and later Kyoto. Since he wasproducing for a general market, he shipped out less-processed pieces.18
By the time the Satake family moved to Kubota in 1603, extensive
portions of the sugi stands adjacent to the middle reaches of theYoneshiro and Omono rivers had already been harvested. Akita sugi wasalready esteemed in the marketplaces of central Japan, and the logging
activity was being pursued with the aid of merchants as a money-making venture to benefit the han government. Loggers worked in such a
reckless fashion that much waste wood was generated and left for thepeasants who were doing the work. Indeed, a considerable amount of
top wood and rejected material was evidently left to rot in the forests.19
There it recycled some nutrients and provided soil protection and game
habitat, but also, of course, it created a temporary wildfire hazard.
A CENTURY OF EXPLOITATION, 1600–1700
When Satake Yoshinobu moved into the castle at Kubota, he inherited ahealthy realm despite Akita Sanesue’s industrious logging activity. Apparently in conjunction with the move to Kubota, Shibue Masamitsu, oneof Yoshinobu’s senior officials, examined the domain and reported his
findings.

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

15

Map 4 Early logging sites in Akita

When I surveyed the realm, it proved to be a rich land, with mountains,rivers, plains, the ocean, and many rice fields. Unlike those of some otherdomains, these areas are all fertile and all available for use. For generations we shall be free of want.20

During the seventeenth century the Satake rulers and people continued to follow the basic pattern of forest use that had characterized Akita
Sanesue’s final years. From the time of his arrival, Satake pursued logging vigorously, providing some timber for the Tokugawa rulers at Edo,but mostly raising funds for his own use. By the 1630s the han faced
greater fiscal strains, and harvesting intensified. The near stands weregone by then, and cutting was concentrated in the Nagaki river valley

16

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

deep in the northeast corner of the han (Map 4) where great sugi up to
25 feet in circumference were still to be found.21
Fortunately for Satake the hills around the Nagaki rose comparatively gently from a valley floor at approximately 200 meters to ridges
only about 600 meters above sea level. Moreover, the Yoneshiro’s
streamflow was sufficient to float the large split pieces (called hotaki)
that he was getting out. Consequently, large-scale production was still
possible, and as late as the 1670s Satake was still shipping enough timber to Osaka to show a tidy profit. In 1677, for example, he shipped some
100,000 pieces of hotaki (probably about 60 to 70 shiploads) from theport of Noshiro to various destinations, mostly Osaka, but also Edo and anumber of castle towns along both the east and west coasts of northern
Japan.22
As the years passed, the logging activity advanced relentlessly into
the deepest corners of the han, and the evidence of overcutting became
increasing marked. It showed up in many ways: rising costs, the openingof forest preserves to cutting, the search for new stands, attempts to reduce waste, and the use of ever smaller trees.
Logging costs are difficult to determine, but a few suggestive figures
exist. Usually villagers living at the base of a forest did the logging
there. Initially employed as corvée, as the century advanced and timber
supplies became scattered and more distant from villages, they worked
more and more on a hire basis, often hiring on as village units. The han
paid loggers in various ways, with the rates geared to the difficulty of
the area being worked. During the 1670s, for example, pay rates at onesite were set at 23 koku of rice (or equivalent produce or money) per
1000 pieces of hotaki produced near the foot of the mountain; 25 koku
per 1000 for work near the middle of the mountainside; and 27 koku per1000 for logging near the ridgeline. In 1676 a new, less accessible area
was opened to cutting, and the han had to set the pay rate at 30 koku
per 1000 to obtain village cooperation. Whether Satake was able to pass
the added cost along to the market or whether it came out of his annual
profit is unclear.
Two years later the timber supply was so poor that when government officials prepared their logging plan, they proposed to get 15,000
pieces from the area where the cost was 30 koku per thousand, 65,000
pieces from other unrestricted areas, and 20,000 from a forest preserve(tateyama). This was evidently one of the first times that a preserve had
been opened to felling.
The growing scarcity of timber and the resultant quest for new
stands even prodded Satake to end a territorial dispute. For years heand the Nambu family of Morioka han to the east had both laid claim to17

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

Table 1. Numbers and Yield of Trees Harvested, 1677–1686
Year

Number ofTrees Cut

Number of
HotakiNumber ofSections per Tree

1677

1708

50,000

29

1678

1896

50,000

26

1679

2113

50,000

24

1680

2663

70,000

26

1681

2168

60,000

28

1682

1374

30,000

22

1683

1216

30,000

25

1684

2758

50,000

18

1685

2483

50,000

20

1686

5556

80,00014

Source: Iwasaki, Akitaken Noshirogawa, 201.

certain mountain ridges where their domains met. The issue had goneto the bakufu for settlement, and Edo had ordered both to stay out of
the area until they could reach a mutually acceptable compromise. The
hunger for timber finally persuaded han leaders that half a loaf was better than none, and in 1677 officials of the two domains agreed to divide
the area between them. As soon as that settlement was reached, Satake
sent crews in to start harvesting his portion.
As trees grew scarce, measures were taken to use the standing timber more efficiently. Originally, high-quality lumber had been so readily
available that the market price for low-grade stock did not justify getting it out. Large tops and damaged or inferior pieces were left lying.
But as the cost of obtaining good timber rose and the supply dwindled,builders adjusted their standards of excellence, put more of the wood touse, and allowed less to go to waste.23 Moreover, the han tightened up
procedures for floating pieces downstream, to reduce losses in transit.24
By the 1670s, then, costs were rising, areas previously closed to cutting were being entered, new areas were being opened, and waste wasbeing reduced. Despite such efforts, the size of harvested trees kept declining, as Table 1 suggests.
The primeval sugi stands of Akita were rapidly disappearing. In
addition, the supply of fuel wood was dwindling, in part because themore complete use of lumber stock forced people to turn to standing
trees for more of their fuel. In Satake’s early years at Kubota, the han
had obtained some of its firewood in the form of a regular produce tax(komononari) levied on villages. By the 1660s, however, the han had
granted many villages permission to pay the tax in money because fuelwood stands were no longer locally available. Even earlier, in the 1640s,

18

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

firewood was already so scarce that Umezu Tadakuni, a han elder (karō)
famed for his interest in preserving the forests, had recommended thatin areas where low-grade sugi competed with broadleafs, the former
should be cut down so that the latter, which were much superior as fuel,would grow more densely and vigorously. In following decades, as wenote later, the han implemented various measures to cope with the fuelshortage, but as of 1718 the sorry state of both conifers and broadleafs
was still cause for lament.25
Other shortages were also becoming serious. Land opening had
greatly increased the need for compost even as it reduced the acreage
producing grass and scrub brush, and some of the scrub growth that
previously had been left for fertilizer probably was being used as fuel.
Village disputes over grass-cutting rights proliferated, leading in atleast one instance in 1712 to a confrontation among villagers in south
Akita that left one man dead and another seriously wounded.26 Speaking of Akita a century earlier, Shibue Masamitsu had assured his lordthat “for generations we shall be free of want.” By 1700 that was nolonger true.
FOREST DEPLETION: THE EVIDENCE OF LATER DECADES
The pattern of overuse that was so evident during the seventeenth century changed only gradually during the eighteenth. When it changed, it
did so in part because the forests had simply been depleted and had little
more to give; and in part (as chapter 3 will show) because the government and people of Akita gradually devised and applied effective policies
of management and restoration.
Land opening and the resulting need for more fertilizer continued toeat away at forest resources. To maximize access to compost material,
the han encouraged villages to arrange tradeoffs between one another.
It also permitted them to gather materials from controlled han forests(tomeyama), and it allowed some areas of tomeyama to be transferred
to village administration for communal fertilizer use as iriaichi.27
During the eighteenth century the expansion of arable land added tothe demand on forest land in another way. At first tillers formed paddy
fields on flat land near villages, but later they carved out sloping valley
floors and hillsides as prime land became scarce. To form and preserve
the paddy fields and access routes, peasants had to use ever more building material for paths, bridges, wall supports, and irrigation ditches anddams. Moreover, by then the han had prohibited peasant use of conifers,
and tillers had to use other, less rot-resistant wood that required more
frequent replacement. A report of 1809 by a Yoneshiro forest official said

19

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

the rate of timber use for paddy cultivation had increased tenfold sincesome unspecified date.28
In an apparent attempt to protect woodland, the han half-heartedly
reversed its basic land policy. During the seventeenth century it had actively promoted land opening, but during the eighteenth, official notices
began to prohibit the conversion of forest land to cultivation. When peasants doggedly continued trying to increase production, officials issued
admonitions calling on village leaders to report all instances of illegal
land opening, digging up roots, or burning of brush. Some officials, especially district intendants, opposed the new policy and probably undercut
its effectiveness, but the attempts to halt land opening did at least indicate the continuing pressure on forests.29
Evidence of timber and firewood depletion is spotty but persuasive.
Clear statistical series showing trends in timber-production costs are
not available, but scattered figures reveal the impact of extracting woodfrom ever more inaccessible places or sparser, smaller, and poorer-quality trees. In 1713, for example, the cost to the government of harvesting
specific quantities of sugi went from 10 koku of rice to 13 koku, and thecost of hiba from 10 to 14 koku. The reason given to senior han officials
was that the felling was occurring in more distant mountains and villagers had sued the han for higher pay for the work. Their demand hadof necessity been met.30
During the eighteenth century the timber yield continued to decline
in both quality and quantity. Large sugi were not as large: whereas
trunks had measured 6 to 9 feet in circumference at eye level in the
1750s, they measured 5 to 8 feet (or about two feet in diameter) in 1818.
Moreover, the general run of timber had declined enough that the imprecise form of split section known as hotaki was replaced in 1779 bypieces known as sunpō that had to meet specified dimensions but wereat largest only half the size of hotaki.

31

This greater precision in cali-

brating timber may have led to improved accuracy in stand mensurationand marketing, and may have helped to eliminate waste in processing
pieces for final construction use, but it did not overcome the growing
scarcity of mature sugi. As the eighteenth century progressed, more
and more substitution occurred. Timber markets sold less prized speciesof conifers, including nezuko and Aomori todomatsu, as shingles and32

cooperage (koba). Even oak (nara) began to be sold for that use.
No doubt such devices as using smaller trees, accepting inferior
species, and cutting to more precise measure all helped to slow the decline in output, but it was not halted, as Table 2 reveals.
Other evidence paints the same picture. By one estimate official log-

20

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

Table 2. Declining Timber Production, 1717–1816
Year or Period of
Annual Average

Volume Produced inUpper Yoneshiro(cubic meters)

Volume Sent
Out of Han(cubic meters)

1717

15,522

10,361

1734

14,323

3,428

1736

10,584

3,395

1743

10,447

1,456

1747

7,020

2,266

1754

6,463

3,544

1768

6,711

922

1779

4,383

1,105

1789

3,932

—

1806–1810

5,252

1812–1816

3,947

Source: Iwasaki, Akitaken Noshirogawa, 209. See also Murai and Takahashi, “Akita no sugi,”
136–137.

ging output in the 1810s was about 10 percent of what it had been acentury earlier. The export of timber had practically ceased: between
1808 and 1811 timber exports constituted only 5 percent of the total exports from Noshiro, which once had been basically a lumber-handling
port.33
Indeed, the decline in marketable timber was so great that Akita reversed a long-standing trade policy. Like most han governments, it tried
to minimize the entry of outside goods and from early times had prohibited all timber imports. During the eighteenth century, however, as
lumber prices rose, some merchants began surreptitiously bringing inpieces for sale. In 1764 eleven men were caught smuggling wood into
the han. They were arraigned, convicted, and punished with expulsion
from their home villages. In time, however, the economic logic that had
induced men to risk their well-being by smuggling finally overwhelmed
the han. During the nineteenth century, after establishing a lumber
marketing monopoly that assured it the profits of importing, the Akita
government reversed policy and began bringing in lumber. The imports
consisted mostly of shingles and cooperage of sugi, hiba, himekomatsu,
and nezuko from the nearby domains of Morioka and Shinjō.34
Finally there is one valuable piece of literary evidence of forest
despoliation—the report, quoted earlier, that the forest comptroller(mokuzankata gimmiyaku) Katō Keirin wrote in 1808. Katō’s testimony
is biased insofar as he was a strong advocate of firmer government control of forests who was attacking the 1790s policy of delegating moreTHE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

21

authority for forests to villagers and district intendants. Neverthelesshis report does suggest at least some of the forces at work in Akita’s
forests. Writing about a representative section of the upper Yoneshiro
watershed, he said:
The area was designated unjōyama [open to logging for a fee] and managed by merchants (chōnin) who were allowed to market the yield outside
the han. In consequence protected forests were cut off excessively. Much
undergrowth that had survived was cut off, and small-size lumber was
taken out and sold at high prices. Then in the 1780s, with reconstructionof the castle, lumber was cut widely from inaccessible areas in forests
assigned to villages, householders, temples, and shrines, and so timberbecame extremely scarce and prices rose higher and higher. Consequently
experienced logging crews from villages near the mountains competed towork in the forests. From about that time people from more distant placesalso came and began stealing timber to sell, and the cutting became all themore intense, as I reported previously. But still forest officials and patrols
temporized, did not investigate properly, and took no action. The offices offorest officials were abolished and their authority was assigned to the assistants of district intendants, and agricultural officials took charge. Then
villagers went in and cut out young growth for use as spring fertilizer, andeffective control of the forests was lost. Now, when residential construction is pursued in town, the lumber is sold secretly, and if one seller is
uncovered and seized, another takes over. If, however, strong control is
exercised for a while directly at the logging site, in due course the forests
35
will naturally return to their original condition.

The condition of fuel-wood stands may well have become worse thanthat of timber, although the evidence is thin. During the eighteenth century, mine forests were badly overcut, the rulers consumed ever morecharcoal, and the han began exporting fuel to raise money for the treasury.36 As the charcoal market grew, peasants and merchants developed
a more extensive production, transportation, and marketing system,
which facilitated the expansion of fuel-wood harvesting and increased
the numbers of those dependent upon the cutting and hauling activity.
Concurrently, and perhaps as a consequence of this intensified exploitation of dwindling resources, village disputes over access to fuel became
more serious.
Tsukii Tadahiro has reported the quantity of charcoal produced annually for han use during the years 1821–1833, together with the cost of
its production.37 The rate of production varied erratically from year toyear (with the weather, perhaps), ranging from 375,000 to 650,000 kan
in weight. The unit costs varied directly with the yield, rising slightly
as output rose from a low figure of 23.7 mon per kan to a high figure

22

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREST EXPLOITATION IN AKITA

of 25.5 mon per kan. No economies of scale were being realized; onthe contrary, it appears that the more firewood was taken out to makecharcoal, the more costly it was to obtain, probably because of greaterdifficulty in obtaining the additional quantities. That pattern suggeststhat Akita was fully exploiting its fuel-wood forests and that no reservesof growth were accumulating, even in the short run. In 1841 an official
handling han fuel provisions complained that “broadleafs are few andfuel is scarce.”38
Around the year 1600 Akita had been a land rich with resourcesand endowed with some of Japan’s finest forests. By 1700 shortages oftimber and fuel wood were creating social strains. During the following century wood prices rose, quality declined, available timber became
scarce, and illegal lumbering flourished. In all likelihood the more complete use of timber stock and the constant quest for fuel and green
fertilizer had harmful effects on some wildlife habitats, disrupted thecycling of soil nutrients, and promoted soil degradation and erosion, especially in the vicinity of villages and towns. These trends forced the han
to modify basic land policy and to reverse policy on timber imports. And
as chapter 3 will show, it encouraged the development of an elaborate
system of forest control and exploitation. In two centuries the multiple
demands for food, fertilizer, fodder, fuel, and building materials had ravaged one of Japan’s greatest forest areas, and Akita could no longer
meet its own day-to-day timber needs. It was a far cry from a birin.

CHAPTER 3

Coping with
Forest Depletion

The consequences of overcutting valuable timber stands and fuel-wood
resources were predicted long before the event. Before his death in
1614, Shibue Masamitsu, the han elder whose comments on the richnessof Akita’s natural resources were noted earlier, stated clearly his conviction that the forests were critically important to the han.
The treasure of the realm is the treasure of the mountains. When all [thetrees] are cut and gone, however, their value will be nil. Before all is lost,
proper care must be taken. Destitution of the mountains will result in destitution of the realm.39

Shibue’s words fell on deaf ears, and the forests were ravaged.
However, Akita was not alone in its predicament. Throughout Japanthe story was essentially the same.40 Even the chronology of crisis was
similar, largely because the rhythm of demand for lumber—for castles, temples, mansions, urban growth—was everywhere the same. The
forests shared a common fate in part because they became enmeshedin a national timber market that tended to consume the best and least
expensively harvested stands first, wherever they might be found. By
the 1660s timber scarcity was pervasive, and in following decades leaders of domains took more and more remedial measures, establishingfirmer control over woodland so as to reduce abuse, regulate cutting,restrict wood use, control prices, and maximize han benefit from forest
usufruct.
The timing and character of these remedial measures were
widely comparable, partly because forest users faced similar crises

24

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

contemporaneously and in similar socioeconomic contexts. In addition
they were able to benefit from the development of a common silviculture designed to address their problems. Han officials were able
to learn from one another’s experiences because they met in Edo
in conjunction with their lords’ required annual sojourns there (thesankin kōtai or “alternate attendance” system). They also learned of
one another’s problems and policies through the writings and lectures of agronomists and educators and through their dealings withmerchants. In consequence, Akita’s policies and their timing exhibit
a high level of comparability to those of other domains.
In the broadest sense, Akita’s (and Japan’s) forest-preservation policies may be described as evolving from a “negative” phase of control
and denial to a “positive” phase of afforestation. However, the latter did
not displace the former; rather, it supplemented it. In general terms,
the basic patterns of control and denial took shape in Akita during
the seventeenth century, to be later repeatedly modified and gradually expanded.41 Official support for afforestation appeared in the earlyeighteenth century, but tree planting did not really emerge as a major
element in forest policy for another hundred years. By then the “negative” policies had begun to have subtle, long-term effects that wereleading to the widespread regeneration of Akita’s famous forests ofsugi.
FORMING A SYSTEM OF FOREST MANAGEMENTIn Akita, as elsewhere, as long as fuel and timber supplies had remained
ample, forests were largely uncontrolled and scarcely differentiated.
Only a crude functional distinction was drawn between those nearby
woodlands (called satoyama) used by villagers and those (calledmiyama) that were too deep in the mountains for such use.42 During theseventeenth century all that changed, and by the nineteenth, the han
was operating an extremely elaborate forest system. Even as categories
grew clearer and more complex, however, this basic pragmatic distinction between woodlands proximate to villages and those at a distanceremained an important criterion shaping forest management and usage.
At the broadest level the han designated most woodland as lord’s
forest (jikiyama),43 while officially identifying the rest as village forest
land (gōyama) or else land held by a specific householder, temple, or
shrine. As the seventeenth century proceeded, the han further delineated the lord’s forest, designating select areas of high-quality timber as
preserves (tateyama) and closing them to all cutting of particular species, notably sugi and hiba. The government often labeled as tomeyama

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

25

or “controlled forest” those sections of lord’s forest, usually near villages, that had been logged. The objective of this designation was toregulate subsequent use of the areas so that they could revitalize themselves. Ordinarily only residents of adjacent (jimoto) villages could enter
tomeyama to gather fuel, fodder, or fertilizer material. Only they could
obtain permission to cut sugi and hiba in them and then only in returnfor a fee (unjō). Lord’s forests in the interior were known as hirayama,or “ordinary,” “open,” or “uncontrolled” forest. There the han imposed
no restrictions on the cutting of most broadleafs, and after appropriate
officials had been consulted, sugi, hiba, or nezuko might even be takenout. However, the han admonished logging crews operating in hirayama
to be careful not to cut too near the forest preserves.
As the century passed and loggers moved farther inland, the han
converted more and more areas of hirayama to tomeyama. To assure
fuel supplies for the copper mines, and at the same time limit the areas
they harvested, mining forests were delineated and closed to outsiders.
From the 1670s onward, the han placed forests along the border of thehan (and farthest from the most heavily settled areas) under special
administration as sakaiyama, probably to prevent border disputes andsecret cutting by people from neighboring domains. Initially these border forests embraced large areas, but later, as logging pushed close to
the han boundaries, they were narrowed to buffer zones about eighteen
feet wide.44
Besides strengthening control of lord’s forest, the han introduced
measures to restrict felling on village and individual household land.
Officials designated as tomeki, or “controlled trees,” exceptionally finecopses, fine trees, or prized species such as sugi and prohibited theirfelling without permission. The han also began taking over some areas ofvillage forest that had been abused, labeling them tomeyama, and closing them to use.45
As early as the 1630s and increasingly thereafter, the han issued
specific orders requiring tree planting or stand nurturing or prohibiting
logging or woodcutting in specified parcels of land regardless of theirstatus as lord’s, village, or householder land. The lands thus “tagged”(satsu) in a particular fashion were known as satsuyama. Iwasaki Naoto
categorizes the main occasions for tagging in this manner:1.

where reforestation was ordered following logging;2.

where the planting of trees or nurturing of natural-growth seedlings
was required to reforest barren areas;3.

where cutting of growth by adjacent villages was prohibited or fire
protection measures were mandated;

26

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

4.

where a forest was to be formed for a specific purpose, such as furnishing timber for local agricultural, construction, or mining use or
as a future cash crop to be cut and sold during a time of crop failure;5.

where a protection forest was needed for water conservation, riverbank, dike, or sea wall preservation, or avalanche and erosion control.

46

Three examples will illustrate the practice of tagging.47 The first two
are from south Akita and date from the 1640s, when careless land clearing was causing trouble. Both were issued over the name of the han
official, Umezu.
A notice to Saruta village
1645/4/7
The forests of Dojo valley have long been a water source. Understory
growth is not to be cut and removed.
A notice to Mimata village
1648/6/23
The willows on the banks of the [Minase] river, both upstream and down,
were planted for erosion control. Even when bent down, they are not to be
cut.

The third tag dates from 1720. By then land opening had largely stopped
and attention had shifted to protecting timber growth. This example,
which lacks a signature, represents a type common in north Akita.
Among the uncontrolled forests (hirayama) in Iwase village, those of the
Akakura and Wari valleys contain sugi and hiba. Their drainage areas fromsummit to valley mouth are closed henceforth, and not even weed trees(zōki) may be cut there.

Satsuyama were mostly small parcels, and often the initiative fortagging them came from the village, perhaps as a way of avoiding
the conversion of vulnerable or rundown village forest to tomeyama.
Whereas han officials supervised tomeyama, the enforcement ofsatsuyama restrictions was left in the hands of the householder or village.48 Tagging thus gave those villagers who wished to protect or revivea section of forest a helpful governmental sanction without the intrusionof active government control.
In later centuries these patterns of forest organization were elaborated. Akita han designated as tomeyama woodlands near the eightyodd villages that dotted the upper Yoneshiro watershed, most of which
had survived as hirayama until the forest reform of 1712. The han delineated more clearly and recorded more precisely the other categories
of woodland: village, temple, country samurai, and peasant householder

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

27

forest. Tagged forests proliferated, eventually numbering 301 parcels
on lord’s forest land and 977 on village and household land. “Controlled trees” (tomeki) also multiplied. Initially sugi and hiba were theonly species designated as tomeki, but by 1706 the list contained sevenspecies and by the 1750s, nine. By 1800 some seventeen species were
designated tomeki and thus spared the axe.49
The han developed an elaborate system of registers to keep track ofthese regulated forests and trees. During the seventeenth century periodic, usually partial, surveys of Akita’s forest stock were made. The
reform of 1712 established a unified general register (sanchō) in which
the han undertook to maintain an up-to-date record of the numbers andlocations of valuable trees on all han, village, and householder land. In
following years, as woodland was recorded more closely, forest registers
proliferated. The single, all-inclusive sanchō of 1712 was reorganizedperiodically from the 1730s onward, and by the early nineteenth century
the han maintained separate, ponderously titled registers for mature
stands of sugi, newly planted sugi, sugi planted on householder land,
and for trees in other categories. In 1789, for example, the han instructed all villagers to report the numbers of standing plantation sugion their lands and to submit figures on all trees planted, harvested,thinned, or dead since the last report. Then in 1805 new regulations
appeared, ordering that registers be maintained and diagrams (maps)
prepared for both timber and fuel-wood forests. Biennial reports on timber stands on both government and nongovernment lands were requiredof all villages. From 1811 the han required that tree counts be made annually, just before year’s end.50
All this organizing and recording of forests was accompanied by
the development of an administrative structure that reached from han
leaders to villagers and woodcutters. Throughout the Edo period thehan tinkered with its hierarchy of forest officials, beginning with simple
arrangements early in the seventeenth century, elaborating them during
the 1660s and 1670s, and expanding them again from the late eighteenth century.51
From the start of Satake’s rule in Akita, the han placed most of thedomain under the authority of district intendants (kori bugyō). As years
passed, however, it designated several officials mokuzankata or forest
overseers and put them in charge of principal forest areas or activities. The most important area was the Yoneshiro watershed. In 1632,
as logging in the upper Yoneshiro valley intensified, that whole region
was placed under the Noshiro bugyō, or superintendent, and his small
complement of subordinates. His office was located in Noshiro, where
he administered the town and its port activities. Inland, he oversaw the

28

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

forests of the Yoneshiro watershed, all logging there, and the shipmentof timber down the river. The han put him in charge of a series of way
stations (bansho) that were set up along the river to control and tax
timber en route to market. Local forest wardens (yamamori), who wereselected by village officials, exercised the bugyō’s authority at logging
sites. They personally oversaw all felling and other forest work carriedon by members of their village or in woodland near the village.52
Comparable but less centralized administrative practices were applied to the Omono watershed. However, by the eighteenth century the
Omono was yielding very little timber and the upper Yoneshiro became
the focus of han attention.53 In 1722 the han spelled out carefully the
responsibilities of the Noshiro superintendent. He was to supervise theforest wardens, regulate logging on han lands, designate additional controlled forests as needed, oversee the five way stations on the river,watch for illicit lumber dealing, and report all offenders. An enlarged
officialdom executed this expanded body of tasks, but in practice mostenforcement and operational decision-making, as for example on logging
projects, was left in local hands.54
Delegating authority in this way kept administrative expenses down,
but it also undermined the superintendent’s ability to control forest activity. The han addressed the issue at the beginning of the nineteenth
century by again enlarging the superintendent’s staff and his realm ofauthority. Changes were made in 1802, again in 1805 and 1811, andby 1813 a more elaborate bureaucratic structure had been created.
The Noshiro superintendent still supervised the Yoneshiro watershed,
but under him were a series of mokuzankata assisted by comptrollers(gimmiyaku) and more than ten forest supervisors (hayashi toritateyaku)
who were despatched to posts scattered about the watershed. At his
post each supervisor selected an office staff from among locally resident
han vassals (gōshi). The staff in these branch offices had the task ofassuring that forests were inspected, felling supervised, and plantation
stands divided properly between planter and han. They were assisted byabout 100 village officials appointed as forest wardens (yamamori), who
actually constituted the mountain patrols. The wardens oversaw the felling, selling, and dividing of timber, and the other customary forest tasksof gathering brushwood, cutting firewood, and burning land.55
In operational terms, then, the system still depended on villagers for
implementation, but the authorities exercised much closer supervision
than before. As in most things, the rulers treated the villages as units,sending notices to their leaders, and then expecting the villagers to handle affairs as a body. The rulers set up general guidelines on what was
to be done and how, but village members worked out the details, developing their own regulations and procedures.56

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

29

Late in 1805, for example, a senior official of one mountain village
wrote a long memorandum summarizing the village’s recent forest experience. In essence he said that in 1798 the han had designated woodlandin the village as tomeyama, placed a warden in charge, and instructed
the village to patrol it, with leading peasant families overseeing its administration as in the past. But recently the Noshiro superintendent’s
office had taken charge and sent out an investigating team, which had
uncovered evidence of illegal felling and peeling of bark for roofing.
Consequently the village had been ordered to tighten its control: theheads of prominent households were to patrol once every ten days inaccordance with explicit and detailed procedures. Those procedures included instructions on finding a substitute to serve in case one were ill(a popular device for avoiding unpleasant tasks). Patrols were to keep
watch especially for evidence of any tree felling, any cutting or selling ofsugi, or anyone entering the tomeyama carrying a hatchet. Besides thepatrols by prominent villagers, the village forest warden was to makefour additional patrols per month; and other senior villagers, three permonth. To assure that these senior officials performed their duty andthat their authority was recognized, when one went on patrol, he was tohang a wooden tag about his waist as he walked and upon completion of
patrol take it to the home of the next person scheduled for duty.57
In ensuing years the han made various minor modifications in local
forest supervision practices, but the cumulative trend towardbureaucratization continued. Yamamori, the forest wardens, became
more professional, handled heavier responsibilities, and received modest stipends in money, rice, firewood, or timber. By the 1820s Akita wasemploying about 106 yamamori in all.58 The diary of one of them—asometime village official who also operated a dye shop, a yeast shop,
an inn, and a store selling sake and vegetable oil—records that in 1844he spent 68 days traveling about on forest duty, half of them during thewinter. He patrolled five villages, inspected their forests, supervised thesale or division of felled timber, met with local officials to discuss forest
problems, and arranged the provision of charcoal to a copper mine. He
handled 76 pieces of correspondence, such as petitions regarding useof woodland. And he served as a logging supervisor: working out a harvesting project, assembling the workers, handling the disbursement ofwages, and assuring that the project adhered to the felling plan.59
By the nineteenth century the rulers of Akita had erected a scaffolding from which to impose control on the woodlands of the realm. The
basic categorization of forest, as tateyama, tomeyama, or satsuyama,
and the practice of designating tomeki, enabled officials to identify forest sites whose condition they wished to influence. The elaboration of ahierarchy of administrators and the development of detailed forest reg-

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COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

isters made it possible to keep track of those sites and to regulate theiruse. Using this basic system even as they were developing it, the rulersof Akita implemented specific policies designed to regulate, restrict, andtax forest use.
REGULATING, RESTRICTING, AND TAXING FOREST USE
By the nineteenth century Akita had an elaborate system of forest management. Its major objectives were to obtain income for the treasury,
assure necessary wood for the rulers at prices they could afford, andenable the peasants to continue living productive and peaceable lives.
Protection and management of the forests were means to those ends.
Awareness of the infrangible links between forests, farmland, village
vitality, and government finances was evident in the opening statementof the revised forest regulations of 1805.
By special order of the daimyo, the forest system throughout the domain
has been reformed and officials under the magistrates of finance are
hereby notified. As has been mentioned previously, the denuding of forests
ravages paddies and dry fields and causes villages to wither away. Moreover it intensifies extremes in river flow from fierce flooding to conditionsof summer drought [which disrupts irrigation and destroys crops]. To revive denuded forests and to control sharp fluctuations in the prices oflumber, firewood, and charcoal is not a trivial task.60

In pursuit of their task, the managers of Akita’s forest system issued
and attempted to enforce a variety of regulations, restrictions, and forest tax policies. Some of these applied to forest sites, some to routes oftimber transport, and some to consumers of the wood products.
The general controls and restrictions embodied in the tomeki,
tomeyama, and satsuyama policies were key elements in site maintenance. In addition, the han devoted much effort to forest fire control.61
One of the most serious forest problems was wildfire, especially in thehighly flammable areas of grass, brush, and coppice growth that tended
to be near villages. From early times, the han issued notices and instructions on the prevention and control of wildfire, and during theeighteenth century control measures intensified. The 1713 reform ordered villagers to take great care not to damage forests when burningover fields, and to have all villagers participate in the burn to assure thatit be fully controlled. After 1754 all field burning required permits. Fire
control measures eventually came to include these requirements:
Fire-fighting equipment [probably buckets, hoes, and perhaps a supply ofwater and mats for stamping out fires] must be maintained at designatedsites near forested areas.

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

31

All members of the adjacent village must turn out to fight a local fire.
All residents of other villages must assist if a fire spreads.
Mountain villages that burn areas regularly must obtain annual permits.
New areas may be burned off only with a permit from the district intendant.
The local forest warden must be informed of any planned burn and must
be present to supervise it.

In the same spirit, travelers were instructed to report any fires. Regulations forbade forest wardens and their assistants to carry smoking
tobacco or any fire-making apparatus when on patrol. To enforce thevarious requirements, rules specified the punishments to be imposed on
any who might violate rules or cause fires. Restitution was a common
punishment, with clauses specifying the number of seedlings that the
culpable must plant to offset every sizable tree lost to fire.
Besides attempting to manage standing timber, han officials developed policies for overseeing shipment of the harvest. Wheeled roadtransport was undeveloped, and loggers floated almost all timber andmuch firewood and charcoal down the rivers. Consequently control ofrivers was a crucial element in control of the forest.62 Officials at wellplaced way stations, such as the five situated on the Yoneshiro, taxed
pieces of timber and controlled their movement in accordance with explicit regulations. By the nineteenth century, all timber had to carry
official stamps to pass through a station, and officials supervising theharvest affixed their stamp only as authorized. Normally they stamped
only pieces cut from government land under direct han supervision(jikisoma) or those cut by villagers who paid the required fee (unjō).
Other pieces were not stamped and if caught at a way station could
normally be confiscated. Furthermore, the lumbermen and raftsmen
working the pieces downstream had to carry written certificates to show
to officials when they passed the way stations. At the port, the han required those shipping lumber to market to possess approved contracts,bills of lading, and shipping authorizations.
One chronic problem with transport on the Yoneshiro was that whilepieces were floating downstream, a deluge might raise the river so highthat workers could not snare pieces at the landing, and they would floatout to sea and be lost, or at least be lost to the treasury. To reduce suchlosses, during the 1670s, han officials issued four rules on the handlingof floating wood during flood:
Villagers along the river must go to the riverbank and rescue any timberthey see floating by.

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COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

The homesteads of country samurai may be entered to look for lost
[stolen?] timber.
Anyone found guilty of hiding or neglecting to rescue floating timber may
be fined.
Those who do rescue floating pieces or who uncover hidden ones will be
rewarded.

Not content simply to regulate timber stands and transport routes,
Akita han—like all han—issued a host of regulations, restrictions, andhortatory admonitions to discourage the consumption of wood. In 1665,
for example, the government forbade commoners to use sugi and hiba
in house construction. In following years various other notices on wood
use appeared, such as one that encouraged the use of thatch for roofing
and another that promoted the use of bamboo, instead of wood, for chopsticks.63
The basic problem that all these regulations, prohibitions, andrestrictions were attempting to address was that of excessive demandon essentially fixed resources, and at times policy became a matter of diverting resources from one use to another. To reduce demand for roofing
shingles (koba), for example, during the 1810s and 1820s the han urged
people to use thatch. Evidently people tried to do so because demand forthatch rose, and the han found itself being petitioned to permit the conversion of woodland to the growing of miscanthus rush (kaya) for use as
roofing thatch.64
The quest for tax income lay at the heart of much han forest policy.
That fiscal objective was most clearly evident in two of Akita han’s major
forest practices: charging license or user fees for such restricted rights
of forest use as were permitted, and forming a market system to control the sale of forest products. (See Appendix 2.) While important to thehan, neither policy had a major, direct bearing on the decline and revival
of Akita’s forests. Far more critical were policies aimed at direct controlof timber and fuel-wood harvesting.
CONTROLLING THE HARVEST: LOGGINGIn the early seventeenth century, when forest use rights were still undefined, the han simply instructed villages to get out specified amounts oftimber. How and where it was cut did not concern the rulers. In addition villagers did logging of their own. Within a few decades, accessible
timber became increasingly scarce, forest boundaries were delineated,
and the distinctions between household, village, and han lands became
clearer. By the late seventeenth century, with the development of thetomeyama and tomeki policies, han control of logging was tighter. But

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

33

even then, once official approval of a logging project had been given, ora village had contracted to log a portion of han land, officials exercised
little control over the cutting operation itself.65
Predictably, illegal cutting appeared almost as soon as logging wasrestricted. It persisted through the eighteenth century and prompted thehan to issue regulation after regulation and admonition after admonition, and when that did not work, to coopt it by enfranchisement andtaxation.66 Illegal cutting was so tempting, no doubt, because withscarcity, lumber prices rose and logging was profitable. Another reason
appears to be that as timber grew scarce and the han attempted to restore forests, people in the timber industry faced unemployment, which
they did their best to overcome.67
Illegal cutting troubled the han for two reasons. First, it cut into
tax income. Second, it disrupted attempts to develop an orderly system
of forest harvesting.68 As early as the 1680s, the han had begun to develop a crude form of rotation cutting, initially in broadleaf areas, anddecades later in conifer stands. At first, it appears, the han calculated its
need for the year and then examined its forests, identified an area that
could meet the need, and cut it over. The next year it would cut anotherarea, and in subsequent years move on, not returning to the original site
until it had regrown sufficiently. The system was rough and the intervals short at first, but as decades passed, the han regularized practice,
applying a twenty-year rotation cycle in broadleaf fuel-wood areas andlonger cycles in conifer timber stands. By the 1750s rotation cutting was
spreading rapidly in timber land, evidently because most original stands
had been cut off by then and the new conifer growth was generally immature.
Illegal logging continually threatened the maintenance of a rotation
cutting system. Because of its risky and necessarily fugitive character,illicit cutting tended to be hurried, indiscriminate, and careless. Accordingly, in the early nineteenth-century forest reform, the han tried tostamp it out by establishing much fuller direct control over logging operations on han lands. The process of directly controlled logging, jikisoma,
worked in the following manner.69
When a decision had been made to harvest an area, officials would
examine it, delineate its borders, and work out a logging plan. The process of drawing up a logging plan, banyamakuri, provided a strategy
for the immediate cutting project and also fitted it into a longer-term
program of rotation cutting. On the basis of the banyamakuri preparation the forest overseer (mokuzankata) would obtain an estimate of
the cost of cutting and shipping the timber that had been marked for
felling. Then he would publicly announce the project and invite bids

34

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

to harvest. Those woodsmen or wood-cutting villages that wanted thejob would submit their bids, and the mokuzankata would award thecontract. Generally he would not award it to any bidder whose figure
seemed unreasonably low and likely to create future problems.
Once notified that his proposal had been accepted, the bidder would
sign the contract and receive two-thirds of the stipulated fee as an advance. With that sum he would hire workers, set up camp, send in fellers
and their assistants, and start getting the pieces out. In the meantime
officials would have notified all villages downstream that cutting was tobe done and ordered them to watch for floating pieces and, in case offlood, to rescue them.
As work progressed, han representatives, usually yamamori, would
be present to observe the work, examine the felled timber, stamp pieces
for shipment, and prepare a manifest to be carried to officials at way stations and the han timber-storage site. When han officials downstream at
the storage point received the first pieces, they would notify the timberoverseer, and he would pay half the remaining third of the fee to the contractor. The final payment was made when the work was done and thelast pieces received. Then the contractor would settle up with his workmen and find out how much he had profited, if at all.70
By the 1820s han-managed logging was well established, and loggers were cutting most conifers in the major forest areas on some sortof rotation basis, commonly at thirty-year intervals. Within a decade or
two loggers in some areas were practicing rotation cutting so consistently that the han could project stable harvest yields for years in advance,
designating the areas that would yield the quantities required. Moreover, the yield, especially in sugi, was steadily increasing as control of
the forests improved. The trees being felled were rarely old-growth timber and instead were young trees, the products of nurturing in recent
decades. The stands continued to mature and the yield to increase during the rest of the century.71
CONTROLLING THE HARVEST: FIREWOOD
The han’s attempts to regulate lumbering enabled it to impose a considerable degree of periodicity on felling, at least in some areas. The
record on firewood management is much more ambiguous, in some part,no doubt, because firewood cutting was much more difficult to control.
Equally important, villagers had a far more compelling day-to-day needfor fuel than for timber, and they doubtless exerted themselves more vigorously and persuasively to retain access to supplies. In addition, therecord is ambiguous because firewood growth competed for space withtimber, and han policy swung from an early posture of promoting the

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

35

growth of firewood to a later one of sacrificing it to the development ofconifers.
Measures designed to preserve firewood or maximize the han’s access to it—measures that would not have been taken had supplies been
ample—date from the 1660s.72 During that decade the han established
an office to regulate firewood cutting and protect forests in the vicinityof Kubota. It also issued a series of restrictions on wood cutting in that
region, specifying punishments for violators. The han allowed samurai tokeep specified numbers of axes for use but levied license fees on them.
Only a few licensed commoners were allowed to cut wood.
Despite these measures, firewood became scarcer and its price rose.
Because of the scarcity of trees and the limits on cutting, Akita authorities allowed villagers to pay their customary firewood tax in money
rather than kind, as noted earlier. As fuel costs rose, however, the tax
money bought less and less fuel in the market. Evidently unable toincrease the tax rate, the han tried to regulate the supply price by
consolidating its control over fuel production. In 1681 it granted the titleof omakikata, or “charge of firewood,” to an entrepreneur from a village near Kubota and empowered him—using his own capital—to collect,
store, and distribute all fuel for the han government and samurai. The
measure evidently achieved less than its sponsors hoped for, however,and in subsequent decades the han repeatedly modified its fuel-woodmonopoly arrangements, gradually making them more elaborate. Thus,in the formulation of 1811 the han appointed six persons to help theomakikata as inspectors and seven as assistants.
The han also took measures to cope with fuel scarcity in mine
forests.73 In 1668 it imposed limits on the woodcutting activity ofcopper-mine operators and later placed a forest overseer in charge ofthe largest copper-mine forests, those of the mines at Ani (Map 3). During the eighteenth century mine output declined substantially, but mine
forests were already so badly overcut that they could scarcely meet eventhe shrinking fuel demand, and the overseer’s control was strengthened.
In the 1790s officials developed an extensive reform plan to protect
smaller growth in mine forests, to permit the cutting of some conifers
for fuel, and to prohibit slash-and-burn agriculture so that the cleared
areas might again grow fuel wood.
Many han policies designed to control logging also affected fuelwood cutting. The way stations on the rivers and the marketing systemwere both used for managing fuel resources, and the han’s local
representatives employed a kiln-licensing procedure to regulate charcoal production. The following authorization to produce charcoal from a
recently logged area in far south Akita illustrates the practice.

36

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

Re: Four charcoal kilns of
Hikouemon, Shichiuemon,and two other operators
From this date onward for a period of six months the above-named persons are granted sole right to gather [kiln stock] from the cutover forest
areas.
1860/4/18
Nara Ryokuzō
Seki Jūemon74

Despite these measures of control, despite other restrictions on firewood use and sale, and despite improved efficiency in the production
and use of smelting fuel, problems persisted.75 In part the rulers had
only themselves to blame; they consumed ever more charcoal and began
exporting fuel to raise money for the treasury. (See Appendix 1.) In another way as well, the policy of the rulers was contributing to theirfuel problem. As the official who was handling han fuel provisions in1841 said, “because only conifers have been protected over the years,
broadleafs are few and fuel is scarce.”76
The matter deserved attention. During the 1640s, as noted earlier,the han seemed more troubled by fuel shortages than timber scarcity
and had at least considered weeding out inferior sugi from broadleaf
stands. During subsequent decades, logging removed original conifer
stands, and pioneer species, mostly broadleafs, grew up in their place.
As this occurred, the han steadily expanded the areas designated as
tomeyama, or controlled forests, permitting villagers to enter them toget out fuel wood and fertilizer materials in return for unjō payments.
However, it explicitly forbade them to cut controlled trees (tomeki), a
policy first applied to sugi and hiba and later to other species. At thelower elevations of forest where villagers usually obtained fuel, sugi was
the strongest competitor among tomeki and the one that benefitted mostfrom han protection.
Sugi benefitted from the policy because of its growth habits. It
grows somewhat more rapidly than most other desirable conifers andwill grow in deeper shade than most competing broadleafs, though it
flourishes in sunlight and does well on sunny slopes. Because it is hardy
in poor soil, it can grow in more varied sites. However, Akita is near thenorthern limits of its growing range and seedlings tend to start poorly
there, especially at higher elevations. Consequently, if not given someassistance during their first years, sugi seedlings tend to fail when competing with native broadleafs. They survive as twisted understory oflittle value, probably the sort of tree that Umezu Tadakuni had urged
the han to weed out during the 1640s. If given assistance in their early

COPING WITH FOREST DEPLETION

37

years, sugi can surpass and eventually shade out their competitors,
establishing something like a natural monoculture stand.77 The establishment of tomeyama and tomeki policies, together with the practiceof allowing peasants to cut out broadleaf coppice growth, brush, andgrass, had the effect of providing sugi seedlings with just the assistancethey needed, holding down the competition and opening them to sunlight long enough to become solidly established. The more hard pressed
for fuel and fertilizer the peasants became, the farther up the mountainsides they cut, and the greater the acreage they slowly converted to sugi
forest.
This pattern of forest use caused the trend of the seventeenth century—to fell sugi stands and let broadleafs take over—to be slowly
reversed. Areas noted for their firewood production in the late seventeenth century were returning to sugi (usually with an admixture of naraor other trees) by the latter part of the eighteenth century, and the trend
continued thereafter.78
In two centuries Akita’s forest strategies had changed dramatically.
“Negative” policies of regulation and restriction had achieved an elaborate systematization of forest management and use, and went far towardachieving their primary goals of assuring the rulers income and wood.
They also achieved some effective protection of water-conservation
woodlands, substantial control of timber harvesting, and gradual revivalof conifer stands in controlled forests. The price of these accomplishments included extensive restrictions on access to and use of forest
products, a chronic shortage of fuel, scarcity of green fertilizer, and restraints on the opening of land to tillage. Even so, the achievements of“negative” policy were insufficient to assure adequate supplies of timber
for day-to-day construction work. In consequence Akita, like other han,added afforestation to its array of forest protection policies.

CHAPTER 4

Afforestation

Compared to some of the major timber areas of central and southwest
Japan, Akita seems to have undertaken afforestation relatively late. Socioeconomic backwardness due to the region’s geographical isolation
may have been part of the reason; and part may have been the area’s
inhospitability to cuttings, which were the mainstay of sugi afforestationin the southwest, and the comparative difficulty of starting seedlings,
which discouraged efforts until the need was more acute. But perhaps
the primary factor was the richness of the original stands, which enabled
Akita to get by on natural growth for several decades after other regions
had been forced to turn to planting.
Whatever the explanation, there is evidence of only a few planting
efforts during the seventeenth century, and afforestation did not become
explicit han policy until the early eighteenth. Even then, planting did not
become quantitatively significant until near the end of the century. Extensive afforestation appeared in the 1790s and became established asa widely practiced policy of forest restoration during the early decadesof the nineteenth century. Sugi was by far the most popular species, butplanters also set out some matsu, occasional hiba, and scattered broadleafs such as urushi (for lacquer) and tsuki.79
AFFORESTATION: THE FIRST CENTURY, CA. 1670–1770
By the 1660s logging had removed most of the old-growth forests of
the Omono watershed, the Kubota vicinity, the coastal plain, and thelower and middle reaches of the Yoneshiro, leaving them to produce little more than fuel wood. The first notable efforts at afforestation in Akita
occurred in that decade and shortly thereafter.

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AFFORESTATION

For example, during the 1660s a han elder brought acorns from
Kyoto and started a forest of kashiwa (white oak) for the purpose ofdeveloping heavy-duty timber for future use in castle maintenance.
Starting about the same time, a country samurai nurtured (and possibly
planted) a stand of sugi that was used for castle construction in the
1780s. In 1682 willow cuttings were set out along a stretch of the
Omono River as a way to control river bank erosion. Contemporaneously
a villager planted akamatsu (red pine) on an area of waste land andcared for it until the 1710s, when it had developed into a marketable
stand of some 20,000 trees.80
Plantings were also made along the coast, where wave and river action were creating new shoreline that required consolidation and where
overcutting was probably destabilizing dunes. A villager named Kaneko
Hyōzaemon, a resident of Hamada on the coast north of Noshiro, undertook to reclaim ten kilometers of coastline that consisted of drifting
sand. Initially he planted and cared for three varieties of shrubs, but
his seedlings made little progress against the sand. As an experiment
he planted 50 hibiscus and they flourished. He then tried 100 pines andthey too thrived, which presumably encouraged him to press on with the
project.81
As these examples suggest, much of the seventeenth-century planting, like seventeenth-century “tagging,” was aimed at water conservation and erosion control. By century’s end, however, scarcity of timber
was becoming the most pressing issue. A forest census of 1702 called
for enumeration of all major timber species, plus all large trees of otherspecies.82 Perhaps because the results were disheartening, between
1704 and 1710 the han notified villagers that if they planted trees inlord’s forest (jikiyama), they would be allowed to keep 30 percent of
the eventual yield, while the han would receive 70 percent, a division of
usufruct then being applied in southwest Japan. However, the incentiveof this shared-yield forest (or buwakebayashi) arrangement apparently
proved just as inadequate in Akita as it did in the southwest, for there isevidence of only one villager petitioning to plant and being assured 30
percent of the eventual yield.83
Nevertheless, the problem could no longer be ignored. A report of1712 stated that the mountains were bare and contained only small
trees, and shortly afterward the han formulated and announced a major
new policy designed to revitalize woodlands. Forest regulations in 25
clauses were issued that year and, in somewhat modified form, again in
1713. The first clause asserted han authority over all forest land. A few
clauses reiterated old admonitions and prohibitions, but as a whole theregulations revealed a strong new emphasis on afforestation. The relevant clauses were:AFFORESTATION41

A planter may keep half of all the trees, notably sugi, hiba, katsura, kuri,
or matsu, that he plants. Half of any scrub land and newly cutover landthat he plants to other trees will be assigned to him.
Anyone who has planted trees at his own expense should be reported sothat he may be rewarded in proportion to the extent of his achievement.
Willows should be planted along river banks and on flood plains.
Useful trees such as kuri and katsura should be planted. Where soil is pooror scrub brush is already growing, one should plant matsu [which is hardy
enough to survive and compete successfully].
If a village that has land appropriate for forest fails to plant trees there,
persons from nearby villages may do so.
If, after planting, there are complaints from others about the new forest,
the han will settle the matter.
The han will gather sugi and matsu seeds every year and distribute themto villagers.
To protect older seedlings, areas of young forest should not have grass,brush, or young trees cut off.84

These regulations marked a strong and purposeful adoption of a
new and basically “positive” policy of promoting afforestation. In a notice of 1716 the daimyo Satake stated explicitly that establishment of
new stands was the main objective of han forest policy.85
The han retained most existing restrictions, of course, and formulated enforcement procedures for the new negative measures.86 It also
indicated how afforestation was to be pursued. The government advised
villagers to consult together and develop their planting strategy as agroup. Should an individual householder undertake to plant, he was toobtain permission from the appropriate government official if planting inlord’s forest, and from village officials if planting on village land. Planting was not to be done where it would hamper tillage. If planted trees
later became a nuisance to field crops (e.g., when large enough to castshade) the trees were to be removed, though the planter could keep theyield.
Policymakers recognized that it did not suffice simply to stick seedlings in the ground. Without years of aftercare, the yield would be nil.
Accordingly, the new policy required villagers who planted to select twoor three appropriate persons from their group to serve as forest wardens(yamamori). Each would have duty for a year, receive a stipend (fuchi) as
payment for his service, and be responsible for periodically inspecting
the seedlings and assuring that they were properly cared for. An individual planter who was not part of a group was expected to look after his
own handiwork.
It was one thing to legislate a new era, another to make it happen.

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AFFORESTATION

The tree-planting policy seems not to have elicited much village response. Although the 50 percent sharing of usufruct was an improvement over the 30 percent offered a few years earlier, it attracted few
people. The continuing existence of enough standing trees to meetmost peasant timber needs surely reduced the sense of urgency inthe villages. Indeed, some villagers must have opposed the planting of
seedlings that would in a few years shade out their fuel and fertilizer
growth. Moreover, the difficulties of planting intimidated people, andthe costs were prohibitive. Perhaps the root problem, however, was lackof sufficient experience in afforestation to give villagers confidence thatplanting would pay off in thirty or more years.
Doubtless, too, the peasants were not entirely ready to believe
assurances from on high. Year after year of multiplying restrictions andingenious new forms of taxation had given them a healthy skepticism
about the likelihood that the han would honor its promises of the moment in decades to come. The new regulations, with their assertion of
han control of all woodland, only enhanced the distrust. Two forest officials pointed out this problem in a report in 1716.
There has been a big obstacle to planting trees in recent years. Because
conifers became scarce, the sugi and matsu planted by forefathers weresurveyed, noted in the forest register, and set aside solely for han use. The
tiller whose land they were on could not use a single one. Hence today nota single peasant will plant a tree, even around his house.87

The two went on to mention other peasant grievances with han forest
policy, to advise that villagers be allowed to use their woodland more
freely, and to urge that government avoid overly bureaucratic supervision.
Nevertheless, as the eighteenth century progressed, some treeplanting projects were undertaken. Most of the planting was done in
the Omono watershed, where good timber was particularly scarce, buteven there the scope of planting was modest. Commoners started a few
shared-yield forests (buwakebayashi), mostly sugi and matsu, in lord’s
forest land, and by the 1760s some of those stands were being marketed.
Some other plantations that were started as private ventures yielded
timber by the 1780s.88
Shoreline planting also continued.89 The sixth Hyōzaemon of theearlier-noted Kaneko family, for example, planted 200 sugi along thecoast near his village after observing sugi flourishing at another coastal
site. Then, to examine how pine trees were used for shoreline protection,
he traveled south in 1715 to the Echigo area and Kyoto and brought backseed of black pine (kuromatsu, which grows mostly along the coast),

AFFORESTATION

43

which he started in a nursery. In following years he and his successor
continued the shoreline planting.
Between 1713 and 1764, Murai Hikuemon and his son planted some
300,000 pines on the sand hills around Noshiro, and his grandson continued the work in later decades. Similarly, some five kilometers to thesouth, at Asanouchi village, the village official Harada Gōemon became
so alarmed by the encroachment of drifting sand hills during the 1750s
that he undertook to afforest the area. He established seedbeds andstarted several types of trees that he then set out, mostly matsu and sugi
but also half a dozen other species. However, the seedlings did poorly,
very few survived, and he reportedly began experimenting in hopes offinding a workable method of afforesting the 300 hectares of dunes. He
tried implanting turf around trees and erected barricades and coveringsat the dunes’ edge. These methods proved effective, but they limited him
to stabilizing very small areas, so he persuaded the villagers to assist by
setting up seedbeds and helping him with the planting and maintenance.
Thanks to the community effort, the work succeeded, and the area wasstabilized.
Such instances notwithstanding, plantation forests remained rare,widely promoted by neither the general peasantry nor the han government. In its 1712 reform the han promised to distribute seeds, forexample, but it does not appear to have done so very energetically. Finally in the 1750s it modified policy, deciding to furnish seedlings rather
than seed. Because the rearing of seedlings was costly and required unusual expertise, this decision made afforestation a much more promisingventure for ordinary villagers. Before this shift in policy bore fruit, however, a major catastrophe wracked Akita and finally prodded people into
serious efforts at forest rehabilitation.
AFFORESTATION AND THE TENMEI FAMINE
Late in the eighteenth century the forests of Akita were in serious
difficulty. Timber production had dropped to a small fraction of its
seventeenth-century level, and the export of timber had ceased, withcorresponding losses to the Akita exchequer. The drop in output is ameasure of the diminished state of mature conifer forests, and suggeststhat a lot of the han’s forest land had already been cut over and was inprocess of growing a new crop. Much of the new growth consisted ofconifers, particularly sugi, that in due course would benefit the han andits people. In the meantime, for at least a few decades, a large proportion of Akita’s forest land was out of production.
At this time, when large tracts of upland were tied down producing
timber for the future, and when the output of remaining food, fertilizer,

44

AFFORESTATION

and fuel land was being stretched thin to support the people, the rulers,
and their governmental operations, disaster struck in the form of theTenmei famine, one of the worst in Japan’s recorded history. Beginningin the 1770s, misfortune wracked the country. Irregular weather caused
crop failures, and violent volcanic eruptions had severe effects that
added to the harvest shortfall. Epidemics raged, prices fluctuated wildly, riots and vandalism proliferated, and famine and death engulfed
the realm. For Akita the disaster peaked in the mid-1780s, its scopesuggested by these approximate figures for overall han population:
1772—410,000; 1781—320,000; 1786—270,000.90 To the extent thatthey are accurate, these figures testify to a tragedy of the first magnitude. Large numbers died; others fled the han, some temporarily, others
permanently.
The horror of the famine was unforgettably captured in a reportfrom neighboring Tsugaru, where the catastrophe was just as devastating. Late in 1785 a peasant explained some mounds of bleached bones
to an itinerant scholar.
These are the bones of people who starved to death. During the winter andspring of the year before last, these people collapsed in the snow. Some ofthem were still breathing as they lay on the ground. Their bodies blocked
the road for miles and miles, and passersby had to tread around themcarefully. At dusk and at night, one had to be careful not to step on corpses
and snap bones or step into rotting guts. You probably cannot imagine theterrible stench that filled the air. In order to keep from starving to death
we used to catch the horses roaming about, tie ropes around their necks,
bind them to posts, cut into their flesh with swords or knives, cook thebloody meat with some grass, and eat it. We also used to catch chickens
and dogs running around in the open and eat them. When we ran out ofanimals, we stabbed and killed our children, our brothers, or other people
who were on death’s door with some disease, and ate their flesh.91

Not all suffered equally. The blow fell most cruelly on those situatedmost marginally, which probably meant peasant families in villages withthe poorest land, and probably as a corollary, those deepest in the mountains and most closely associated with the forests.
If this be so, then perhaps the horror of the Tenmei famine contributed to the subsequent revival of Akita’s forests by brutally reducing
pressure on them.92 The abandonment of villages and tilled fields would
reduce demand for fertilizer material and paddy-construction wood.
Fewer households would mean reduced fuel demand and fewer building
needs. Fewer homesteads near the forest would likely mean fewer forest
fires, less pressure on the han to allow fuel and fertilizer use of timberland, and less need to fell trees as a means of providing relief employ-

AFFORESTATION

45

ment. In the struggle to survive, desperate villagers may have sold theirlittle parcels of forest land to wealthy neighbors, who were subsequently
able to afforest them, increasing the value of the parcels to themselves.
Less tragically, the famine may have helped the forests by prodding
the han to undertake reforms in forest administration. In hard times
Akita, like other han, commonly lifted restrictions and allowed peasantsto harvest wood and sell it as a way to pay for food. In the extraordinary
years of the Tenmei famine, this permissiveness may have given way
to rout as a despairing leadership struggled to cope with problems beyond its control. There is some evidence that from the late 1760s into
the 1780s the han allowed—or was unable to prevent—excessive cutting
on village lands and considerable harvesting of satsuyama, tomeyama,
and other reserved trees and stands.93 Heavy cutting during the famine
years may have been as central to Katō Keirin’s earlier-quoted complaintof 1808 as was the castle construction that he noted.94 Administrative
rout of those years may have precipitated the lax forest control of the1790s that Katō was excoriating. Even as the famine reduced humanpressure on the forests, it may thus have inflicted further damage onthem, increasing the necessity for a rehabilitation program andstrengthening the hand of officials who favored such a program.
Through its impact on the private lives of the rulers, the famine may
also have fostered greater concern for forest revival. Katō himself hadreason to dread the recurrence of such a calamity. He was born in Kubota in early 1768, into a hereditary vassal family of the Satake. His
mother died when he was born, and he was taken in by a stepmother.
When he was four his father suddenly died, and he succeeded to the family headship with its respectable stipend of 48 koku. Then in 1784, when
he was sixteen, the han was convulsed by famine. An impoverished government could not support him, and he was forced to sell his house andsurrender his family status. Subsequently, his fortunes changed. He regained his former rank in 1790; in following years his situation steadily
improved, and he went on to lead a distinguished career. But he had
good reason to remember that catastrophe in the domain could lead to
failure of han finances, which could easily turn into personal hardship.
Surely that experience helped sustain his later dedication to the reforestation of Akita.95
The famine and its consequences may well have shocked Akita’s rulers as a whole into a recognition that they must do more to rehabilitate
their domain. Although the dating of afforestation activity is not as clear
as one would like, it appears that the vigorous promotion of seedbeds
and afforestation by han-directed labor began about the late 1780s.
Specifically, although the han decided to provide seedlings rather

46

AFFORESTATION

than seed during the 1750s, it was not until some uncertain later date,probably in the mid-1780s, that authorities successfully implemented
the decision. At that time, the han hired a recently retired village official
named Anpō Manuemon, who was known for his skill in seedling culture,and brought him to Kubota to supervise the work. Before he died in 1789
he had overseen the starting of some 100,000 seedlings for the han.96
Another example of post-famine han afforestation activity occurred in
1788–1789, on lord’s forest land in the Takaishi valley of the lower
Yoneshiro watershed, where one forest official supervised the plantingof 5285 tsuki, 206 sugi, 30 kiri, and 14 kuri. Records of that valley continue up to 1807, and indicate that the official repeatedly employed local
labor to set out seedlings, steadily shifting his emphasis from tsuki tosugi. During the 1790s, some 480,000 seedlings were planted at 44 locations on copper-mine forest land. Elsewhere in the Yoneshiro, as well,there was planting from 1794 onward, mostly in lord’s forests, although
the extent and yield are not recorded.97
In the 1780s the han began to display a keen interest in shoreline
consolidation. In 1782 the government gave Kaneko Hyōzaemon a reward of silver for his earlier afforestation efforts, and ten years later, aregular stipend. In 1797 the seventh Hyōzaemon was placed in chargeof shoreline rehabilitation in 15 villages, and he extended his pine-tree
planting to those areas. In 1786 the han ordered Harada Gōemon, whose
dune-stabilizing work south of Noshiro was noted earlier, to handle asimilar project in Numata village some eight kilometers north of theport. For several years he worked with village leaders in that vicinity toestablish pine on a number of barren hills. For his efforts the han rewarded him with a modest but permanent stipend.98
It would be simplistic to point to the Tenmei famine as a sufficient
explanation for the new vitality in afforestation policy. Probably gradualchanges in landholding patterns, which the famine may have abruptly
accelerated, were placing more and more forest land in the hands ofwealthy villagers, encouraging such landholders to make the long-term
investment that private afforestation entailed.99 More generally, the previous decades of work were doubtless beginning to pay off as experience
was diffused and ever more people gained confidence in the techniquesof tree planting. More basically, the new vitality was surely connectedto the contemporary diffusion of horticultural knowledge throughout
the country. From the late seventeenth century onward, a literatureof practical agronomic learning (jikatasho) gradually accumulated andwas widely disseminated throughout Japan. A secondary but significant
theme in that literature was silviculture,100 but the extent of Akita forest officials’ and tree planters’ awareness of it is unclear. However,AFFORESTATION

47

seedbed culture was an important element in the literature,101 and the
han’s decision to establish a seedbed system suggests that by the latter part of the eighteenth century officials there were familiar with thesilviculture literature and found in it inspiration to pursue afforestation
projects. That source of encouragement and useful knowledge, together
with prior experience and the terrible events of the Tenmei famine, as
well as changes in landholding practice, may have been the combinationneeded for the han and landholders to commit themselves to a major
program of afforestation and forest revitalization.
AFFORESTATION AFTER THE TENMEI FAMINE
The dramatic increase in tree planting that dates from about 1800 resulted from the efforts of both the han government and Akita villagers.
The government role consisted primarily of providing guidance, support,
and encouragement; the villagers contributed initiative, labor, and funding. Both provided land.
Akita han’s pursuit of a constructive forest policy required in thefirst instance the presence in key positions of people dedicated to that
end. After the Tenmei catastrophe, Akita’s efforts succeeded partly because from 1781 until 1815 the han was led by an unusually dedicateddaimyo, Satake Yoshimasa, who promoted the revival of Akita’s forestsin the belief that they were crucial to the domain’s well-being. During
the 1810s and 1820s the han’s forest overseers (mokuzankata) proved
to be an equally responsible group. They were not all convinced that
hand-planting was the optimal policy; indeed Katō Keirin argued that
hand-planting was much more costly and less productive than careful
nurturing of naturally seeded stands. Nevertheless the han concluded
that natural seeding was insufficient and hand-planting must be pursued
despite the cost, and Katō and others faithfully promoted the policy.102
Katō’s case merits note because his contribution to Akita reforestation led to his enshrinement there, and in 1918 the Japanese government
awarded him posthumous court rank in recognition of his service. In
1805, when Keirin was 37, the daimyo appointed him comptroller of taxation with the duty of handling forest matters, a task he was to pursue
for nearly thirty years, until his death from illness in the spring of 1834.
During those years he assiduously promoted afforestation on both public
and private lands. He championed the development of woodland mapsthat helped give practical direction to han forestry work and supervised
major planting ventures. One of his most noteworthy projects was implemented in valleys along the coast near Noshiro, where drifting sandwas burying buildings and destroying tea fields. In 1822 Keirin prepareda multi-year afforestation plan for the area, and before his death his

48

AFFORESTATION

crews set out some 768,000 pine seedlings on several hundred hectaresof sand hills.103
The han’s deeper commitment to afforestation was evident in policy
announcements and practices of the early nineteenth century.104 For
example, the new forest regulations of 1805, contrary to 1712 policy, announced that trees should be planted freely, even on grazing land. To
facilitate afforestation, the han would pay the cost of planting, including
the cost of seed or seedlings. As these two clauses suggest, the policy
represented less a new departure than a significant advance in an orientation that had been present since the 1712 reform or even earlier.
Perhaps the most notable measure of that advance was the han’swillingness to underwrite its policies with hard cash. Besides defraying
costs of planting, on occasion the han would reclaim or purchase stands
or land that were threatened or had been neglected and that it wished toprotect or revive. Considering that the han was always financially troubled, this willingness to buy standing timber or even land revealed aheightened evaluation of the forests. The government authorized its forest overseers to purchase householder stands or forest areas under thefollowing circumstances:1.

When a person who has carefully nurtured his forests falls on hardtimes and can find no other suitable buyer for them;

2.

When a holder of land adjoining a large parcel of lord’s forest showsno interest in managing it;

3.

When the planter’s portion of a shared-yield plantation has been cut
off and the han portion is left standing;4.

When a country samurai has acquired a plantation but shows no interest in maintaining it;

5.

When a plantation is jointly owned and the owners quarrel
irreconcilably, making sale of the stand unavoidable;

6.

When a plantation holder petitions to cut young trees and the forest
overseer concludes that purchase is necessary to allow the trees tomature.

105

The han government played a critical role as advocate and expediterof afforestation, but the actual planting required public cooperation.
Consequently the success of the effort depended on the skill with which
the han established incentives that would attract the cooperation of villagers.
The han pursued several policies to encourage village participationin afforestation.106 It liberalized the conditions for planting trees on hanlands, in 1811 changing the yield-sharing or buwakebayashi policy froma 50–50 division to one allowing the planter to keep 70 percent of theyield while the han claimed only 30 percent. In addition, it specified

AFFORESTATION

49

circumstances in which the planter could keep all the timber, such as
when he planted to obtain timber for use in farming or other work or for
major repairs to buildings. The han operated its seedbed system to provide seedlings, gathered and distributed seed, and defrayed the costs ofplanting. It offered rewards, both material and in terms of status symbols, to those who planted or otherwise promoted forests at their own
expense. It furnished technical advice on seedling culture and provided
interest-free loans for planting projects. On those han lands where it
ordered afforestation projects, it paid wages to the planters. Finally, it
made tree-planting a common punishment for violation of forest laws.
Planting was carried out under varied circumstances, but for purposes of analysis, government-sponsored afforestation may be subdivided into han-sponsored planting and shared-yield or buwakebayashi
planting.
Han-Sponsored Planting
Han-sponsored planting projects commonly involved setting out 20,000
seedlings or so, but sometimes many more. Smaller plantings tended tofare better, perhaps because workers set the seedlings out more carefullyor gave them better aftercare.107 The process of han planting essentiallyinvolved contracting the job out to a professional forester and despatching a han official to the site for at least part of the planting activity.
One rather lengthy example will illustrate the practice.108 Near the
beginning of the nineteenth century two contractors undertook a han
planting project in the Takaishi valley. They agreed to perform the task
for a specified fee, using that fee to buy seedlings, obtain other supplies,
and hire labor. One of the men assumed responsibility for providing theseedlings. He obtained some sugi from nearby villages and started somein his own seedbeds. He also purchased some from the Noshiro nursery,
having them lifted, packed, and shipped by horse to the planting site. He
had workers gather some tsuki seedlings from the hills and put them innursery beds for further growth before being set out.
His partner supervised the planting. While it was in progress, an official from the nearby forest supervisor’s office came to verify that thework was being performed and to disburse wages to the laborers who
had prepared the site for planting and who gathered, transported, andset out the seedlings. He paid the contractor his fee for other costs andfurnished funds to cover one year of aftercare. Beyond one year, costs
were to be borne by the contractor, who probably had rights to fuel andfertilizer as compensation.
During 1803 the contractor planted 1000 sugi seedlings purchasedfrom the Noshiro nursery, 585 tsuki from his own seedbed, and 137

50

AFFORESTATION

tsuki gathered from the mountains. He also collected an additional 3500
undersized seedlings that he set into his seedbed to grow for anotheryear or two. The seedlings from Noshiro arrived during the second lunar month, and he started the planting at an unhurried pace during thethird. Eight men participated in the planting, each able to set out about
120–130 seedlings per full day of work. On the fourteenth day of the
fourth month the han official arrived to examine the work and pay themen. Four days later the planting was mostly done, and on the twentyfirst day the official departed for Noshiro.
During the rest of 1803 and 1804 the new stand of seedlings wascared for at han expense. In 1805 the contractor took over the costof cutting out competing growth. That year he also supervised anotherplanting project that included 4470 sugi purchased from a village nursery, plus tsuki seedlings gathered from the mountains. On the twentythird day of the fifth month the han official arrived to supervise; on thetwenty-fifth and twenty-sixth days the contractor’s men planted most of
the seedlings—hurrying perhaps because it was rather late in the season
for planting—and put undersized ones into a seedbed. On the twentysixth the han official left again. During the next four years the pattern
was repeated twice more until the project was completed, totaling over
15,000 sugi and nearly 2000 tsuki.
Shared-Yield Planting
Shared-yield or buwakebayashi planting was found throughout Japan, although the specifics of policy and the words to identify it varied widelyfrom place to place.109 In Akita, where the practice was known by several terms, both villages and the han initiated shared-yield plantings.
When the villagers took the initiative, the village would petition to planta specified site, whether village land or lord’s forest. A han official would
examine the site and, if he approved the proposal, issue a planting warrant that specified the rate of eventual division and admonished thevillagers to care for their planting. When plantings were initiated by thehan, an official would designate the site and then negotiate the contract
with whomever was to do the planting. A few shared-yield plantations
were established following the 1712 reform, but the adoption of an official 70–30 division of the yield in the reforms of 1805 and 1811 gave
great impetus to the practice. Usually the division was made by numberof trees, but it might be determined by tree size or by sale value of thetimber.
In practice the division rate varied greatly, depending on the sizeof the plantation, planting arrangements, and the land possession rights
involved. Often there was a three-way split between planter, han, andAFFORESTATION

51

landholder. In 1814, for example, four men undertook to plant 30,000
sugi on village land. The han claimed 30 percent of the yield, while
the planters were to receive four-fifths of the other 70 percent, andthe village one-fifth. In a different case, a man from one village planted
100,000 sugi in another village over a period of ten years starting in
1817. The han claimed 20 percent, the village was allowed 30 percent,and the planter kept 50 percent.
In southwest Japan some han appear to have manipulated the division to obtain appreciably more than the 30 percent they claimed.
In Akita, however, perhaps because afforestation was a more uncertain
enterprise, the han appears to have had less success in manipulating therates to advantage, and the han share might be as little as 5 or 10 percent. When the government furnished the sugi seedlings, it might claima third or even half of the eventual yield.
When the plantation was mature, the planter might cut first, or thehan might, or the entire stand might be felled and divided. Should theplanter take the initiative, he would request permission to cut from theforest supervisor (hayashi toritateyaku). If only one or two trees wereinvolved, or if they were damaged or burned, the han would vacate its
claim. If only a few good trees were involved, a yamamori would oversee the felling, make the division, and later check to be sure that new
seedlings had been planted on the cleared land. If the harvest involveda larger number of trees, the forest supervisor or other higher authority would have to certify the division. An official would duly note thetransaction in the appropriate forest register, and if the han share wereleft standing, a count would be made and recorded and the adjacent village charged with caring for the trees. The records aimed for precision:in one cutting project in the 1860s, for example, the han received 208
pieces; the planter, 936.
The han had no fixed policy on how large or old trees in plantations
must be before they could be harvested. A notice of 1811 advised thattrees should have a minimal circumference of three feet. In practice,many were felled sooner, especially if a planter or planting village faced
hard times. Plantation trees may have averaged about two feet in circumference, giving them a stand age of approximately 25–35 years.110
Akita han played a critical role in promoting plantation stands, butvillagers were also active in developing them and responded to government encouragement much more positively than had past generations.
One reason was that some villagers wanted to plant but had been deterred in the past by the initial cost, the risk of failure, and the long
period before costs were recovered. In 1812 one peasant wrote that his
fellow villagers had long wanted to plant sugi but were too poor to do

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AFFORESTATION

so. Now, however, the han had furnished both sugi and urushi seedlings,
and the villagers were very grateful to be able to realize their wish atlast.111
Even punitive planting could be seen as opportunity. That same year
members of one village cut down four hiba trees to build a bridge without obtaining official permission. They knew their action was illegal
and that they might be ordered to plant hundreds or even thousandsof seedlings in compensation. Perhaps viewing a good offense as thebest defense, thirty-two of them jointly requested permission to plant a
total of 107,500 sugi as compensation.112 The number proposed is plausible for a multi-year project, but even 7500—which may have been theirserious figure—would have been a creditable one-year planting and ultimately useful to the village.
Some villagers had pursued plantation development quite independently of han encouragement for generations, but the practice seems tohave been sharply accelerated from about 1800. The motives for suchplanting activity varied. For some country samurai it was an expressionof loyal service to their lord. In other cases it reflected an unusuallystrong belief in the social value of afforestation. For some it was a policy
calculated to win han approbation, material reward, and even quasisamurai status (myōji taitō). By the nineteenth century it was often aform of entrepreneurship.
Sometimes the members of a village would plant as a unit, whether
on village communal land (iriaichi) or on han land they afforested ona sharing basis. Most projects on village land were modest, just a few
hectares apiece, because the plots available were small.113
Country samurai or wealthy villagers, usually village officials or resident merchants, initiated much of the planting that was undertaken
locally.114 Such people generally had the requisite wealth, the influence,sometimes the land to plant on, and perhaps businesses that would
profit from the forest crop. The planting was done in various places,
but comparatively infrequently in the inner mountain areas that the hancontrolled. Most commonly local planting was done around homesteads,
near cultivated fields, along roads and rivers, on peasant land in shallow
valleys, or in and around villages. In general villagers would request toplant in nearby lord’s forest only if they lacked other areas.115
Two instances of local initiative will illustrate this sort of afforestation activity.116 Back in the 1590s, when Akita Sanesue was the lord of
Kubota, the original Miura Kichiemon had possessed some twenty hectares of grass-and brush-covered woodland in the village of Kurokawa
fifteen kilometers due north of Kubota on the edge of the coastal plain.
During his lifetime he promoted the growth of naturally seeded broad-AFFORESTATION

53

leafs (kuri, keyaki, and nara) on his land by cutting out competingbrush and grass every year. He is said also to have planted some sugi
seedlings. A few decades later, his grandson, a holder of village office,acquired some eighteen hectares of land whose natural stand he nurtured, and another two where he planted 3000 sugi. In 1689 a local
Akita official placed the fifth Kichiemon in charge of woodland in thevicinity of Kurokawa. With his new authority this Kichiemon promoted
forest improvement by encouraging villagers to practice rotation cutting
and afforestation. Throughout the eighteenth century the Miura family
continued its tradition of forest promotion, and in 1813–1814 a later
Kichiemon supervised the planting of 7000 sugi, which he cared for infollowing years.
Perhaps the most notable instance of entrepreneurial planting wasthat of Konishi Denzuke, who lived near Ōmagari, in the Omono rivervalley.117 From the 1710s onward, he and his descendants planted andnurtured some denuded forest land. By 1841 they had planted enoughsugi on 54 parcels of land to produce a stand estimated at 1,000,000
trees. In that year Denzuke borrowed from the han copper coinage
weighing 1000 kan, interest-free for ten years, and another 100 ryō ofgold, for five years at modest interest, with which to capitalize anotherplanting project. He seems also to have acquired additional parcels ofwoodland, and by 1852 the decades of planting reportedly had established 3,000,000 sugi in stands on 177 sites. These Denzuke harvested
according to a careful program of rotation cutting, obtaining timberfrom 750,000 trees between the 1830s and 1880. In 1882 the stands still
numbered 1,310,000 trees of up to ten feet in circumference at breastheight.
THE RESULTS OF AFFORESTATION
What did these decades of afforestation amount to? Relatively little
planting appears to have been done in the upper Yoneshiro, most having
been undertaken along the coastal plain or in the Omono watershed.118
The Yoneshiro sugi stands appear to have been formed by the longerterm policy of cutting out broadleafs and leaving conifers to grow. But
elsewhere in the han, tree-planting on innumerable small sites andnumerous large ones restored substantial areas to forest production,
mostly as sugi stands. Along the coast notable gains were made in controlling sand dunes.
An integrated set of planting statistics does not exist, to say nothingof overall harvest figures. However, scattered records suggest themagnitude of planting and the scale of the resulting nineteenth-century
forests. We noted the million trees of Konishi Denzuke. Less extreme

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AFFORESTATION

Table 3. Han Planting Projects, 1807–1832
Site
PeriodNumber of
Seedlings

SpeciesVillage

District

1807–1817

120,000

sugi

Nibetsu

Akita

1810–1820

124,884

sugi

Kakunodate

Senboku

1811–1822

560,900

sugi

AnzenjiAkita

1822–1832

679,500

matsu

NoshiroYamamoto

Source: Tsukii, Akita han rinseiseishi, 211.

was the hereditary planting activity of Miura Kichiemon. By 1833 thishad created such an extensive stand that when crop failure and famine
struck the region again, he ordered 3000 sugi ranging in circumference
from six to ten feet felled and sold, donating the proceeds to his impoverished neighbors. In 1882, when a careful count was made, Kichiemon
had plantation and managed forests totaling nearly 70 hectares in 43
parcels growing sugi, kuri, matsu, keyaki, and nara. By count, 15,430
of his trees measured one to eight feet in circumference at breast
height.119
Such stands were in significant degree the product of seedbed maintenance.120 Between 1801 and 1811, for example, the seedbed at Yokote
in southeast Akita reportedly produced 1,366,530 sugi seedlings and28,425 urushi seedlings. Six other han seedbeds were in operation, andthe seven together are said to have produced some 1,000,000 seedlings
per year. Furthermore, as some of the examples have shown, entrepreneurs and villagers also maintained seedbeds, and other seedlings weregathered from natural growth. Planters used seedlings from all thesesources in both han-sponsored and shared-yield projects, and others
were sold or furnished to villagers for voluntary planting. Total seedling
production was great enough that, even at the 10 percent or lower survival rate estimated by one writer in the 1810s, plantation work was
making a promising start toward reforesting Akita.
Most planting projects set out several thousand seedlings over several years.121 However, some were much larger: 80,000 by a village in
1811; 130,000 by another a year later; 100,000 by another village during the 1810s; and 25,000 by a fourth in 1828. Planting by the han was
similarly aggressive and usually on a larger scale, such as Katō Keirin’s
planting of 768,000 pine seedlings on the seashore. Elsewhere during
the 1820s the han supervised the setting out of some 780,000 seedlings
on four mountains of lord’s forest. Han forest overseers supervised several notable planting projects between 1807 and 1832 (Table 3).

AFFORESTATION

55

During the 1830s Japan experienced another decade of crop failure,
hardship, and famine. In Akita, perhaps as a result, afforestation appears to have tapered off sharply. Later, however, by about the late1840s, planting evidently picked up again. By the time daimyo domains
were abolished around 1870, the forests of Akita were reviving, and substantial areas supported healthy stands such as those of Kichiemon and
Denzuke, which, along with the stands of the upper Yoneshiro, earned
Akita its reputation as one of Japan’s sandaibirin.

Conclusions andLast Reflections

This inquiry has sought to answer two basic questions. What reduced
the famous forests of Akita to a state of impoverishment by the late eighteenth century? How were those forests subsequently restored to a stateof excellence? Several factors were involved in both processes.
The great timber stands of sixteenth-century Akita were cut over tosatisfy the demands of a burgeoning national timber market, beginningin the 1590s with the demands of Hideyoshi and continuing with the nationwide construction boom of the seventeenth century. Demand within
Akita also consumed much lumber. In addition, the forests were cut overto provide domestic firewood and charcoal, fuel for the mines of Akita,
and green fertilizer and fodder. Finally, opening land to tillage withdrew
appreciable areas from the production of timber, fuel wood, and fertilizer material, intensifying pressure on remaining woodlands. The initial
cutting of conifer stands was followed by their natural replacement withpioneer and intermediate species that were repeatedly cut over for fueland fertilizer. This practice interrupted the natural process of forest succession and prevented the normal emergence of new climax stands ofsugi, hiba, and other indigenous conifers.
Excessive demand on the woodlands led inexorably to rising prices,
declining supplies, and deteriorating quality in forest products. These
trends in turn prodded the han government to organize, manage, andkeep records of the forest land of Akita. The rulers strove to prevent
wildfire, foster rotation cutting, manage the harvest, regulate and tax
woodland use, and control the disposition and consumption of forest
products.

58

CONCLUSIONS AND LAST REFLECTIONS

Cumulatively these policies may have shaped and slowed exploitation of the forests, but they did not revive them. Revival occurred after
these “negative” policies were supplemented by “positive” policies ofafforestation. Some afforestation was designed for water conservationand erosion control, some for production of marketable timber. Villagers
and entrepreneurs undertook some tree planting, as did the han. The
development of a body of practical silvicultural knowledge facilitated afforestation. And the trauma of the Tenmei famine in the 1780s appears
to have given a decisive impetus to reforesting activity. Thereafter han
officials and commoners engaged separately and in shared-yield forests
in a large number of afforestation projects great and small.
During the nineteenth century plantation stands proliferated. By
then the tomeki and tomeyama policies of forest control had afforded
protection to naturally seeded sugi (and other) seedlings long enoughthat healthy stands of sugi were developing in mixed forests throughout
much han land in the Yoneshiro watershed. These self-sown stands,
together with the plantation stands developed for purposes of water conservation and timber marketing, became the famous forests of modern
Akita.
The tidiness of this summary should not be allowed to obscure theproblems remaining in this topic. Most striking, no doubt, is the questionof how central the Tenmei famine really was to the stimulation of active
afforestation. The issue is important because it stems from the more elemental question of what prompts humans to act at all, and what levelof human disaster must overtake a society before it is moved to confront
its problems.
A corollary issue imbedded in the problem of the famine is that of
how costs and benefits of policy are distributed. At one level it is a social
question of who gets what, and no final assessment of Akita’s forest experience can disregard the question of who gained and who lost in theprocesses of both forest destruction and rehabilitation. At a broader environmental level the question of costs and benefits becomes ultimately
a synecological query regarding what flora and fauna gained or lost in
Akita as human actions in the forest had one or another set of consequences.
Another important problem is the role of merchants and entrepreneurs. In this study I have treated the forces of society as two: government and villagers. Merchants were involved in forest work, however,some of them from the great cities of Ōsaka and Edo. It seems likelythat future scholarship will assign these merchants a more central rolein shaping the Akita forest experience, and such a change in emphasis
will lead to important restatements of motive and achievement.

CONCLUSIONS AND LAST REFLECTIONS

59

A broader question relates to the relative contributions of government and individuals in shaping this history. Akita han legislated mightily, but ultimately was it governmental action or other factors thatproved decisive in both forest destruction and forest revival? In particular, were the efforts of the reformist daimyo Satake Yoshimasa and hisforest officials critical to the post-Tenmei burst of afforestation? Or, considering that well over a century of legislation was enacted before real
improvement of the forests became evident, may it be that the improvement of the nineteenth century occurred not because of the strength ofgovernment but because of its weakness, which allowed landholders to
pursue their interests more securely than before? For Japanese scholars, the issue is important because it feeds directly into assessmentsof the performance of the modern Japanese polity and society. For thebroader scholarly community, the issue relates to present and future
questions of how best to preserve and restore the earth’s deteriorating
forestlands.
The issue of government and individual influence is embodied in the
buwakebayashi system of shared-yield forests, a practice rich in implications. In Tokugawa Japan the legal principle of ownership (as we today
understand it) was from the outset denied in the case of arable land. No
tiller could legally “buy” or “sell” land, although a host of subterfuges
developed to accomplish de facto indefinite alienation of arable land.
Forest land, by contrast, was initially salable, but as the Edo periodadvanced, such sale was increasingly outlawed. Furthermore, as forest
products grew scarce and woodland more precious, forest holders andvillages frequently found themselves entangled in litigation with otherholders or with the han over thorny questions of possession and use
rights. Buwakebayashi agreements provided a mechanism for overcoming these questions and achieving legal transfers of actual land use
rights. These agreements assured planters that they or their descendants would enjoy the fruit of their planting endeavor while providing
the regime with a “tax” income. The practice can be viewed as one thatprovided an institutional framework for reconciling the interests of individual and state (or society). In present times, with the legal principle of
exclusive ownership enjoyed by both individual humans and corporate
entities, the particular mechanism that can reconcile the needs of individual and society may be different, but the need for such reconciliation
is doubtless just as great.
Much of Akita’s entrepreneurial afforestation was done independently of the buwakebayashi system. What factors during the nineteenth century gave these planters a faith in the future that they had lacked inearlier generations? What was their tenure on their land, and how did

60

CONCLUSIONS AND LAST REFLECTIONS

they acquire the land? At what price to whom was this tenure achieved?
Further study may reveal, for example, that the central factor in theemergence of reforestation was the appearance of forest landlordism ona large scale, providing a de facto form of ownership of sufficient strength
to encourage landlords to promote afforestation. And if that is the case,the significance of the Tenmei famine in the history of Akita’s forests may
lie primarily in the extent to which that catastrophe drove starving villagers to alienate their land, leaving the rich richer and the poor poorer. If
so, then the story of Akita forest history brings into focus the fundamental
question of how or whether environmental well-being and social justicecan both be attained.

APPENDIX 1

Trends in Fuel Use

Iwasaki Naoto gave figures on the quantity of charcoal produced for theuse of the government and samurai families resident in Kubota, as givenin the records of the omakikata (Table A1).
Table A1. Charcoal Production for Government and Samurai Families
in Kubota
Periodor YearAverage Annual
Output (in kan)

Percent Increase
Over Base Figure

1806–1810

182,000

100

1811–1815

218,000

120

1816–1820

222,000

122

1821–1825

295,000

162

1826–1830

389,000

214

1869

452,820

249

Source: Iwasaki Naoto, Akitaken Noshirogawa…, 329.

In an apparently unsuccessful attempt to impose some sort of limits on
charcoal use, the han set standards for its allocation, linking them firmly
to a samurai’s hereditary status. One such set of standards was in force
in 1792, but it became unenforceable and a new, sharply expanded set
was issued in 1835. Table A2 is based on figures given by Iwasaki anduses household figures of Tsukii Tadahiro.
Tsukii (82–84) gave comparable figures for both tables, but at one
tenth the magnitude and denominated in hyō. His tables also included a

62

APPENDIX 1

Table A2. Charcoal Allotments to Samurai Households
Annual Charcoal
Allotment (kan)Category of Samurai, by office title or family stipend

Number of 1792
Households

1835

Satake family household

1

200

800

han elders

4

150

600

senior vassals (1000 koku and up)

12

100

380

military captains (300 koku and up)

51

70

280

vassals of 150 koku and up

177

50

210

vassals of 70 koku and up

324

30

160

vassals of 30 koku and up

438

30

130

per diem recipients and under 30 koku

639

20

100

swordsmen not in three elite units

231

10

50

foot soldiers (ashigaru)

1462

10

30

Sources: Iwasaki Naoto, Akitaken Noshirogawa … 328; Tsukii Tadahiro, Akita han rinseiseishi, 85.

few marginal categories. He concluded (86) that in 1835 the samurai of
Akita consumed a total of 2376 racks (tana) of firewood and 307,060 kan
of charcoal. Adding quantities estimated to have been lost in shipment,
he suggested that consumption totaled 3100 tana and 330,000 kan.
Murai Hideo and Takahashi Hideo (140) reported that Akita firstexported fuel to Tsugaru (Hirosaki) han in 1776, selling the han some
16,000 cubic meters of firewood. From the following year onward, Tsugaru became a regular buyer, paying some 400 ryō in gold for specified
amounts of firewood and charcoal. During the nineteenth century salesof both continued, evidently at about the same level. This was not amajor source of income. Whereas the seventeenth-century timber exports had earned some 1000 kan of silver gross and 230–240 kan net,
nineteenth-century fuel income amounted to only about 25 kan (at 1 kan
of silver per 16 ryō of gold, the standard figure), of which only a portion
would be profit.

APPENDIX 2

Han Forests and Fiscal Policy

USER FEES (unjō)Once forest land was designated lord’s forest (jikiyama) of the controlled tomeyama type, han officials could lease or otherwise make areas
accessible for controlled use at designated rates. Such user fees went by
various names, but the most common was unjō. Villagers would pay unjō
in return for permission to collect firewood, make charcoal, gather fodder or fertilizer material, or remove timber for use or marketing. There
were many ways of calibrating unjō: in terms of the numbers of workers
allowed into an area for cutting; the days one was allowed to cut; thenumbers of axes or sickles used; the loads of material removed, or thenumber of pack horses employed. By the 1660s the han’s unjō policies
were fairly well standardized and the fees quite routinely paid and collected (Hattori Ringyō, 160–161). Murai Hideo (Akita, 58–68) examines
closely the evolution of Akita’s forest taxation policy.
As a portion of total han income, unjō was a very minor item. In
the early nineteenth century, for example, 259 villages in six districts ofsouth Akita provided a total in unjō of slightly over 10 kan 500 mommeof silver (about 165 ryō in gold). In the more richly forested districts ofnorth Akita, the tax, calculated in koku, amounted in 1813 to slightly
more than 548 koku (roughly 275 ryō in gold) for 107 villages (Tsukii
Akita, 161–183). The han’s gross annual income may have been equivalent to about 70,000 ryō.
From a villager’s perspective the levy was not insignificant, andpeasant resistance to specific applications of unjō policy persisted. Han
attempts to collect unjō on parcels of land that villagers regarded as

64

APPENDIX 2

communal village land (iriaichi) was one source of disputes over unjō
payments. In 1778, for example, a village in Senboku district received anotice to pay unjō that began:
Unjō land is the lord’s land. However, there are villagers who do notagree that the lord’s land extends beyond evergreens [i.e., tomeki] andtomeyama. Consequently there have been many disputes over forest landin past years. (Murai Akita, 58)

The notice then went on to insist that the villagers must pay the stipulated levies for use of the disputed areas.
Taxation of peasant-harvested timber provided a double boon to thehan. Schematizing a complex system will help explain the matter. In logging directly (jikisoma) its own land in the Yoneshiro watershed, thehan used village labor from adjacent (jimoto) villages. The work was
regarded as corvée duty by the han, but it constituted a form of supplemental employment from the villagers’ perspective, and they would
accept the work, initially in return for costs of living plus rights towaste wood and later for modest—but not unacceptably low—wages.
The pieces they got out were floated down to Noshiro without paying any
transit taxes at the way stations. At Noshiro they were carried to market
by merchants who negotiated marketing contracts with the han. Whenpeasants removed lumber independently, they had to hire labor at whatever was the going rate. Moreover, they paid unjō to get the wood out,transit taxes on the river, and a marketing license fee at Noshiro. These
add-on charges all raised the basic cost of timber production by commoners. In consequence, when the demand for lumber was great enoughthat villagers could get it out, pay the added charges, and still find buyers at Noshiro, the han was able to market its own timber at a handsome
profit, passing some of that profit on to its vassals by providing themwith fuel and lumber at cost. When the market grew slack, han lumber
could undersell that of the peasants, and they would have to stop cutting, which permitted standing timber to keep growing; or they would
cut at reduced advantage, which reduced their own rate of consumption;or they would enlist on jikisoma projects at lower labor rates. Unjō fees
thus provided the han with direct income and also helped buoy up the
profit from jikisoma.
Han TIMBER MARKETSThe fiscal objective of Akita policy was also evident in its control oftimber marketing. As early as the 1590s, rulers in Akita had allowed
merchants to market timber and fuel that was taken out by peasants inreturn for license fees. In various ways the han continued to tax such

HAN FORESTS AND FISCAL POLICY

65

trade throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but control
was difficult to maintain, especially where the goods were portable (fueland shingles) and could bypass the river stations.
During the reform movement of the early nineteenth century, amuch more comprehensive lumber-marketing system was put into operation. Its proponents said it would stabilize supply and demand, regulate
forest harvesting, facilitate distribution of the yield, and assure stabilityof prices. Others noted, perhaps more to the point, that such an arrangement would aid han finances and assure han and samurai adequate
supplies of wood. In the years immediately following 1808, several timber markets (called ozaimokujo and oharaijo) were set up. They handled
the yield of han forests and also bought and marketed the productionof village and household forests. By the 1830s there were nearly thirtysuch markets operating in towns about the han. They gave Satake’s
government control of timber, firewood, and charcoal marketing andalso the sales of sugi and hiba bark and lacquer and wax, all of which
had a variety of uses as well as export value. (Hattori, “Akita senbaisei,”
15–21. Tsukii, Akita, 91–104, quotes pertinent documents.)
Doubtless the organization of Akita’s lumber markets varied fromplace to place, but they followed the same basic pattern. One or moreforest supervisors (hayashi toritateyaku) were in charge, assisted by aclerk, a receiver of goods, a mensurator, a cashier, and warehousemen.
Some of these people were townsmen; others were local people of country samurai rank. The markets were usually open periodically, six days amonth at first and nine days monthly after about 1810. They also would
open for emergency sales, as after a fire or other disaster. Prices were
fixed and were periodically adjusted by the han, depending upon thecost of production.

APPENDIX 3

A Note on Measurement

By happy chance the linear measurements basic to Japanese logging arevery comparable to traditional English measurements.
1 sun ( 寸) = 1.2 inches = 3.03 cm
1 shaku ( 尺) = 0.994 foot = 30.3 cm
6 shaku = 1 ken ( 間) = 1.99 yards = 1.82 m
10 shaku = 1 jō ( 丈) = 3.31 yards = 3.03 m

Accordingly, for stylistic reasons I have translated sun as inches andshaku as feet where no issues of mathematical accuracy were involved.
Kan ( 貫) is a measure of weight (8.27 lb or 3.75 kg) that is thestandard denomination for silver and copper. It is also used to measurequantities of firewood and charcoal. Firewood, however, may also bemeasured by the stack (tana—see below).
Kin ( 斤) is another measure of weight, used for metals and charcoal,equal to 1.32 lb or 0.6 kg. Kin and kan are multiples of the basic unitof weight, the momme. 1 kin equals 160 momme; 1 kan equals 1000
momme.
Tana ( 棚) is a stacked pile of wood of specified dimensions. Tsukii
Tadahiro reported in Akita han rinsei seishi (87) that whereas the modern measure for a tana of firewood is 3 × 6 × 6 shaku (approx. 108 cubicfeet), in Edo-period Akita it was 3 × 10 × 10 shaku (approx. 300 cubicfeet).
The term koku ( 石) may be confusing. It is a measure of volume
most commonly used during the Edo period to designate the putative
yield of rice fields. When used in that way, one koku is equivalent to 5.12

A NOTE ON MEASUREMENT

67

U.S. bushels. That, however, is a koku figure for hulled rice, and it probably denotes the space theoretically filled after milling by the quantityof unhulled rice that would occupy a maritime koku, the measure used
for establishing the size of ships that hauled bulk cargo such as riceand lumber. The maritime koku, and hence the logging koku, is 10 cubic shaku (e.g., 1 × 1 × 10 shaku) (7.9 U.S. bushels), whereas a koku ofhulled rice is about 6 cubic shaku (5.12 U.S. bushels) in volume.
The hyō ( 俵) is a measure of volume. Normally it equals 0.4 koku,
although the Tokugawa bakufu defined it as 0.35 koku for purposes oftax collection.

APPENDIX 4

Glossary of Trees

Japanese name

Latin binomial

English nameakabi 赤檜?

?

akamatsu 赤松

Pinus densiflora

Japanese red pine

Aomori todomatsu
青森椴松

Abies Mariesii

Maries’ fir

羅漢柏
asunarōThujopsis dolabrata

Japanese cedar

buna 橅

Fagus crenata

Siebold’s beech

hiba 檜葉 or 木屠Thujopsis dolabratavar. Hondai Makino

False arbor vitae

himekomatsu 姬小松

Pinus pentaphylla

Japanese white pine

hinoki 檜

Chamaecyparis obtusa

Japanese cypress

hōnoki 朴の木

Magnolia obovata

Silver magnolia

kashiwa 柏 or 檞

Quercus dentata

White oakkatsura 桂

Cercidiphyllum
japonicum

Katsurakeyaki 欅

Zelkova serrata

Zelkovakiri 桐Paulownia tomentosa

Paulownia

konara 小楢

Quercus serrata(Q. glandulifera)

White oakkuri 粟Castanea crenata

Japanese chestnut

kurobi 黑檜

Thuja standishii

Standish arbor vitae

kuromatsu 黑松Pinus Thunbergii

Japanese black pine

kurumi 胡桃(onigurumi)

Juglans Sieboldiana

Japanese walnut

69

GLOSSARY OF TREES

momi 樅

Abies firma

Japanese firnara 楢(prob. konara
or mizunara)

prob. Quercus serrata
or Q. crispulaWhite oaknezuko ねずご(see kurobi)

sugi 杉 or 椙

Cryptomeria japonica

Cryptomeria

tochi 栃 or 橡

Aesculus turbinata

Horse chestnut

tsuga 栂Tsuga diversifolia

Northern Japanese
hemlocktsuki 槻(see keyaki)

urushi 漆

Rhus verniciflua

Varnish tree

yanagi 柳 or 楊

Salix sp.

Willow

Sources: This list is compiled primarily from Kitamura Shirō and Okamoto Shōgo, Gen
shoku Nihon jumoku zukan (Illustrated handbook of Japanese trees and shrubs) (Osaka:
Hoikusha, 1959), 306 pp. A valuable partial listing of trees is Important Trees of Japan,
cited in the bibliography.

APPENDIX 5

Character Lists of
Personal Names,
Place Names,
and Common Nouns

CHARACTER LIST OF SURNAME AND PERSONAL NAMES
Akita Sanesue 秋田実季

Nara Ryokuzō 奈良力藏

Anpō Manuemon 安保万右衛門

Satake Yoshimasa 佐竹義和

Harada Gōemon 原田五右衛門

Satake Yoshinobu 佐竹義宜

Hikouemon 彦右衛門

Seki Jūemon 関重右衛門

Kaneko Hyōzaemon 金子兵左衛門

Shibue Masamitsu 澀江政光

Katō Keirin 加藤景林

Shichiuemon 七右衛門

Konishi Denzuke 小西傳助

Tokugawa 德川

Miura Kichiemon 三浦吉右衛門

Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉

Murai Hikuemon 村井久右衛門

Umezu Tadakuni 梅津忠国

Nambu 南部
CHARACTER LIST OF LESS COMMONLY CITED PLACE NAMES
Akakura 赤倉

Iwase 岩瀨

Akinomiya 秋ノ宮Kakunodate 角館

Ani 阿仁Kubota 久保田

Anzenji 安善寺

Kurokawa 黑川

Asanouchi 淺內

Mimata 三又

Dojo 土助

Minase 皆瀨

Hachirō 八郎

Nagaki 長木

Hamada 濱田

Nibetsu 仁別

Inakawa 稻川Noshiro 能代CHARACTER LISTS OF PERSONAL NAMES, PLACE NAMES, AND COMMON

Numata 沼田

Shinjō 新庒

Oga 男鹿Takaishi 高石Ōmagari 大曲

Tsugaru 津軽

Omono 雄物

Tsuruga 敦賀Ōmori 大森Wari 割Saruta 猿田

Yamamoto 山本

Senboku 仙北

Yoneshiro 米代

Shimokita 下北

Yokote 橫手

CHARACTER LIST OF COMMON NOUNS
ashigaru 足軽kan 貫bansho 番所

kaya 茅bakufu 幕府

banyamakuri 番山繰
birin 美林

bugyō 奉行buwakebayashi 部分林
chōnin 町人

daimyō 大名
fuchi 扶持

fuchimai 扶持米karō 家老ken 間kimoiri 肝煎
kin 斤

koku 石kokudaka 石高

komononari 小物成
kōri bugyō 郡奉行

genboku 原木

makikata 薪方makikata mimawariyaku

gimmiyaku 吟味役

mikanware 蜜柑割

gōshi 鄉士mokuzankata 木山方

gen’ya 原野

makikata tedai 薪方手代

goningumi 五人組

miyama 深山

gōyama 鄉山
gun’yaku 軍役
han 藩

momme 勿myōji taitō 名字帶刀Nihon sandaibirin 日本三大美林

hayashi toritateyaku 林取立役

oharaijo 御払所

hotaki 保太木

ryō 両hirayama 平山hyō 俵iriaichi 入会地

ozaimokujo 御材木所
sakaiyama 境山
sake 酒jikatasho 地方書

sanchō 山帳

jikiyama 直山

sanwakesugi 三分杉

jikisoma 直杣jimoto 地元
jō 丈sankin kōtai 參勤交代
satoyama 里山

satsuyama 札山

71

72

APPENDIX 5

shaku 尺tomeyama 留山

shintan 薪炭

toriwakebayashi 取分林

shinden 新田
sun 寸

sunpō 寸甫

toritatebayashi 取立林
uetatebayashi 植立林
unjō 運上

tachiki 立木

unjōyama 運上山

tateyama 立山

yōzai 用材

tana 棚Tenmei 天明
tomeki 留木

yamamori 山守zōki (zatsuboku) 雜木Notes

NOTE: See Bibliography for complete citations.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

The hinoki of Kiso, the sugi of Akita, and the hiba of Aomori are the principal
species involved in these forests. (See Appendix 4.) In Akita the area is theYoneshiro watershed; in Aomori, the Shimokita and Tsugaru peninsulas.
Murai and Takahashi, 139. “Weed trees” is zōki (zatsuboku) or “miscellaneoustrees,” a term used to denote trees other than those the writer deems noteworthy.
Hiba is also called hinoki asunarō. Historical records commonly refer to thesetrees as hinoki, a cypress that looks extremely similar, and some modern
scholars have continued the practice. However, hinoki does not grow north of
Fukushima, and it is not the tree under discussion here. The character thatis used for writing hinoki is also pronounced hi and is combined with anothercharacter to form the word hiba, and it seems likely that writers of records had
the word hiba, rather than the word hinoki, in mind when they wrote “hi”. Thishi appears as bi in kurobi and akabi.
Endō, 22, 25. Endō does not indicate elevations for sugi, momi, and tsuga. Important Trees of Japan, 17, 21, has information on them. Keyaki is commonly
called tsuki in the sources.
Hattori, Ringyō, 146. Nagamata, 11–12.
Trewartha, 30.
A novel that conveys the power of these coastal dunes is Abe Kobo, Suna no
onna (The Woman in the Dunes) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 158 pp.
There were urban commoners in the towns of the Akita area, it is true, but although they handled and consumed forest products, most of their contact withthe forests was effected through the rulers and peasants.
Imamura, 84–85.
Murai, 69–85, discusses peasant forests (tabayashi), which were primarilyfound in south Akita. Tsutsui, 7, has figures on plot size.

74

NOTES

11.

Iwasaki, 337–338, reports that the copper mines yielded on average some
1,080,000 kilograms of smelted metal annually while producing at their peak
between 1670 and the 1730s. He has calculated that the smelting would haverequired 123,300 cubic meters of standing tree annually, and estimates that
it would have required 309 hectares of forest land per year to produce thatquantity of fuel wood. This rate of use would require a preserve of some 6000
hectares for a harvest cycle of 20 years, or perhaps as much as 12,000 for a
40-year cycle.
Tokoro, 236–237, gives the figures for Matsumoto. He mentioned the five toten units general requirement in a conversation in May 1982.
Murai and Takahashi, 131.
Murai and Takahashi, 131.
One reason the han opposed opening land to tillage was that most of it served
to enrich the country samurai and not the han treasury, whereas the same landin forest was of value. Imamura, 85–86, shows how little the han gained fromland opening.
Hideyoshi had specific uses in mind for the lumber Sanesue was getting out,
and to keep the shipping costs down, he had the pieces processed extensively
at the work site prior to floating them downstream. The logs were peeled andsplit into sections “tangerine style” (mikanware), the section hearts cut out,
and the resulting straight-grained pieces worked into heavy planking of specified dimensions. Mostly they were in 6 or 12 foot lengths, 18 inches in width,and 5 or 6 inches in thickness. Shioya Junji, 50–51; Tokoro, 23. The essay by
Shioya is the principal work on Hideyoshi’s use of Akita lumber.
Tokoro, 26. The dates by the traditional calendar were the first day of the fifth
lunar month to the tenth day of the seventh lunar month, 1595.
The character of Sanesue’s lumber is not clear, but it seems to have included
10-foot logs, which would split into 200 standard-size roofing shingles (koba).
Other pieces were split sections, half, quarter, sixth, or eighth-round, depending on the size of the tree trunk. Because shipping costs to Kyoto were sohigh—approximately half the total cost, it is estimated—Sanesue probably
also had other waste parts, such as the bark, section hearts, and punky,knotty, cracked, or twisted pieces, removed prior to shipment. Shioya Junji, 52;
Iwasaki, 187; Tokoro, 24.
Iwasaki, 259.
Hattori, Ringyō, 146.
Iwasaki, 469. Edo-period Japanese measured trees at eye level, which is about
equivalent to a modern breast-height or 4-foot-6-inch measure.
In his lumber marketing, Satake aimed to gross about 1000 kan of silver
annually, which left him a profit of about 230 to 240 kan per year. Tsukii,
30–31, quotes the pertinent document. Hattori, Ringyō, 147, estimates thatthese 100,000 pieces of hotaki amounted to 180,000 koku [i.e., 50,073 cubic
meters] of standing timber (tachiki). As a rule of thumb, reports Tokoro, 257,
two units of tachiki were required to produce one unit of unprocessed felledtimber (genboku), which in turn yielded a substantially smaller volume of finished lumber (yōzai). If Hattori followed that rule of thumb, he may have comeup with his 180,000 koku of tachiki by estimating the 100,000 pieces of hotaki
at 90,000 koku volume, or nearly one koku apiece (i.e., as pieces nearly equivalent to timbers measuring 1 × 1 × 10 foot dimensions). Hattori assumed that
hotaki, a term used in seventeenth and eighteenth century Japan, were large
pieces formed by splitting logs in half; evidently he envisaged half-round stock

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

NOTES

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

75
of about 8-inch radius and 10-foot length or equivalent; i.e., trees of about
2–3 feet dbh. However, a basic problem surrounds the meaning of the term
hotaki itself. Iwasaki, 187–195, analyzes hotaki carefully and concludes thatthey probably were on average much smaller than reported in the nineteenthcentury sources usually cited (and used by Hattori). He suggests that they
were half round only in the case of small logs, usually being quarter roundor less. Hattori may, therefore, be overestimating the volume of output substantially. Nagamata, 8, confounds the matter further by reporting that the
100,000 pieces, which were a form of genboku, amounted to about 50,000 cubic meters of lumber; thus, Nagamata has roughly doubled Hattori’s estimateof volume, an estimate that may in itself have been equally excessive.
Iwasaki, 26, 186, 259, is the source of the material in the preceding four paragraphs.
Hattori, “Akita han no shinrin riyō seigensaku,” 67. (Henceforth “Akita
seigen.”)Hattori, Ringyō, 148, 159–161. Iwasaki, 249, 279. On pp. 283–332, Iwasaki presents an area-by-area analysis of the condition of broadleafs in the Yoneshiro
watershed.
Murai, 47.
Iwasaki, 243–246. Murai, 15.
Iwasaki, 246.
Hattori, “Akita seigen,” 61–62. For examples of han efforts to control forest
opening, see Tsukii, 10–12, 21. Murai, 46, 55–57, discusses this issue, concluding that in the end han concern with agriculture outweighed its concern forforest protection. See note 15 for one factor cooling han enthusiasm for land
opening.
Hattori, Ringyō, 149–150.
Nagamata, 10. Iwasaki, 187–192. This statement on comparative size of hotaki
and sunpō holds for both Hattori’s and Iwasaki’s definitions of hotaki. Cut toseven-foot lengths, sunpō measured 12 inches exterior face, 6 inches interior
face, and 8 inches on each radial surface. Logs that could not produce sunpō
to these specifications were to be split to 8 × 6 × 4 or 6 × 4 × 3 inch dimensions.
Iwasaki, 215.
Tsukii, 5. Murai and Takahashi, 140.
Nagamata, 20. Iwasaki, 270–271.
Iwasaki, 221.
See Appendix 1 for more detail on fuel use.
Tsukii, 68–69. The table also appears in Iwasaki, 347.
Murai, 36–40. Murai and Takahashi, 146.
Tsukii, 2. Also quoted in Murai and Takahashi, 131.
I discuss this larger topic in “From Exploitation” and “The Forests.” Concerning
the bibliography see my forthcoming essay in Environmental Review (1985).
Iwasaki and Hattori, who were familiar with works on European forest history,
have likened Akita regulatory practices to central European Forstordnung of
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.
This summary of forest categories—which disregards the exceptions to mostgeneralizations—is based primarily on Iwasaki, 27–62. The best study of the
Omono watershed is Murai, which focuses on the vicinity of Akinomiya village
in far south Akita. Tsukii, whose work seems to lack a table of contents, presents documents and details on forest categories on pp. 155–209.

76

NOTES

43.

Documents, and hence many scholars, use the pre-positioned honorific “o” withthese forest terms: ojikiyama, otateyama, otomeyama, and so forth.
Nagamata, 27.
Hattori, “Akita seigen,” 60–61. Tsukii, 246–263, presents documents illustrating han regulation of logging by commoners for home use.
Iwasaki, 34.
Murai, 21–22. It seems likely that this Umezu was Umezu Tadakuni. Saruta
village is now part of Ōmori town; Mimata village, part of Inakawa. Iwase village is in Akita district. These pronunciations of place names are my own. In
his discussion of satsuyama on pp. 21–26, Murai gives a number of other examples.
Murai, 26.
Hattori, “Akita han no buwakebayashi seido,” 17–18 (henceforth “Akita
buwakebayashi”); Hattori, “Akita seigen,” 59–61. Tsukii, 156, 197. Iwasaki,
270. The list of 1706 named sugi, hiba, tsuki, kuri, katsura, kurobi, and akabi.
By the 1750s kurobi had been deleted from the list and matsu, hōnoki, and kiri
added. The list of 1800 included some agricultural trees, such as tea and mulberry, as well as other timber and fuel trees.
Murai, 3–4. Murai and Takahashi, 140–144. Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,”
23–24. Tsukii, 193–195, describes the form of the village tree reports of 1789.
A brief description of Akita forest administration, with supporting documents,
can be found in Tsukii, 29–49. He reproduces documents pertaining to changes
in office appointments, staffing, and functions on pp. 105–149.
Murai and Takahashi, 131. Nagamata. 17. Iwasaki, 71–124, discusses Yoneshiro administration in detail.
Iwasaki, 125–182 examines carefully the forest protection policies in the upper
Yoneshiro region.
Nagamata, 12–14, 17–18.
Murai and Takahashi, 142–144.
Tsutsui, 22–24. Murai and Takahashi, 144. Murai, 27–85, is the most extensive
study of peasant forest use in Akita.
Tsutsui, 19–20.
Tsutsui, 20–22. Murai and Takahashi, 143. Tsukii, 132–140, lists 107 yamamori
assigned to oversee designated forest areas in about 75 villages. Their annual
stipends totaled about 200 fuchimai (400 koku) of rice. On pp. 150–153, Tsukii
quotes documents on yamamori pay.
Murai and Takahashi, 143.
Tsukii, 23.
This information on forest fire control comes from Tsukii, 10; Hattori, “Akita
seigen,” 64; Murai, 44–46; and Yamanouchi, 124–125.
This information on river management is derived from Hattori, “Akita seigen,”
67. On log transport, see my essay, “Logging the Unloggable.”
For other examples of forest consumption and access restrictions, see Iwasaki,
265–267 and Hattori, “Akita seigen,” 62–63.
Iwasaki, 269.
Murai, 13–20. A major argument of Murai is that the role of peasants was
greater and the authority of the han less complete than Iwasaki’s study seems
to suggest. The disagreement is partly academic and partly political: is credit
for forest rejuvenation due the establishment or the toiling masses?
Examples of these measures can be found in Hattori, “Akita han no rinsanbutsu
senbaisei,” 16 (henceforth “Akita senbaisei”) and in Nagamata, 20–21.

44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.

77

NOTES
67.

68.
69.

70.

71.
72.

73.

74.

To elaborate this point, illegal felling was most particularly a problem in the
more densely populated area around Kubota. The reason appears to be thatfrom the early days of the han, before government control of cutting developed, local people established control of wood-cutting activity there. They
retained control thereafter, perhaps because the han was occupied exploiting
the much better forests of the upper Yoneshiro. Eventually the Kubota area
numbered some 21 sawyers, 102 sawyers’ assistants, 9 coopers, 28 coopers’
assistants, 2 people whose specialty was cutting timber to size for cooperage, and 6 professional timber sellers. When the han undertook to control all
felling directly after 1805, and attempted to limit it so as to allow forests tomature, these men kept up their businesses as best they could illegally, cuttingout over a thousand pieces of sugi and several thousand strips of sugi bark
every year. In the upper Yoneshiro watershed, by contrast, the han exercised
substantial control from the time logging began, retained its control thereafter, and thereby prevented the development of an independent community ofwoodsmen. In that area illegal cutting was minimal. Nagamata, 21–22.
Iwasaki, 247–259, discusses the rotation cutting system. Tsukii, passim, cites
documents specifying village forests that were to be cut on a rotation basis.
This description of jikisoma is based on Nagamata, 41–45; Hattori, “Akita
senbaisei,” 19–20. Tsukii, 237–239, also describes han logging briefly and on
pp. 239–245 quotes documents illustrative of logging procedures and record
keeping.
Most logging was done in winter. Heavy pieces were slid downhill on the snow,
or on level areas were pushed to streamside on small, two-runnered, humanpowered sleds. Then the pieces were shoved into the river, where they floated(or slid part way on ice) down to the way station to be checked off. There a portion was usually removed or taxed to pay the cost of maintaining the station.
Some logging was done in summer. Generally the pieces taken out then wereshingles and cooperage (koba), which were light enough to be carried out of
the forest by man or animal. If heavy logging were done in summer, the pieces
would be skidded down to streamside on ways made of brush or small sticks.
If the stream were low, a log dam might be erected to hold back the water fora few hours. Pieces of wood would be piled into the stream bed directly below
the dam, and when it was full, the dam gate would be knocked open and thepieces sent thundering downstream on the flood. Nagamata, 43–45.
Iwasaki, 356–438, methodically discusses this trend in the Yoneshiro watershed.
The material in this and the following paragraph comes from Tsukii, 4,
72–91; Hattori, “Akita senbaisei,” 24; Hattori, “Akita seigen,” 57–58; Iwasaki,
18–19.
Akita’s mining forests are discussed in Tsukii, 49–72 and Iwasaki, passim. On
pp. 334 and 346, Iwasaki indicates the long-term decline in mine production:
YEAR OR PERIODANNUAL COPPER OUTPUT (in kin)

1708
1721
1791–1850
1850–1880

3,600,000
1,400,000
800,000–1,000,000
650,000–750,000

Murai, 42. This piece of forest evidently was a buwakebayashi stand. Tsukii,
173–174, quotes the standard kiln-permission request and approval forms thatwere to be used.

78

NOTES

75.

Hattori, “Akita senbaisei,” 23. Iwasaki, 337, has compiled statistics on thequantities of raw wood and charcoal required to produce 100 kin of crude
copper:YEAR OR PERIOD OFFIREWOOD

CHARCOALANNUAL AVERAGE(CUBIC METERS)
1.5 (est.)
1.7
1.4
?
1.3

(kin)
120 (est.)
135
86
54
57

1670–1730
1791
1799
1821–1833
1834–1844
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.

93.

Murai and Takahashi, 146. They refer to the official simply as an omakikata
yakunin or “firewood office person.”
Iwasaki, 246.
Iwasaki, 329–332, 472–476, 493–498.
Shioya Tsutomo, 507.
Iwasaki, 255, 271–272.
Kyōdo o sōzō seshi hitobito, 29–30. (Henceforth Kyōdo.)Murai and Takahashi, 134. The species mentioned were sugi, hinoki, akabi,
kuromatsu, and tsuki.
Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,” 30. Iwasaki, 272. The term buwakebayashi isa modern scholars’ term to describe a large number of basically similar yieldsharing practices of the Edo period. Shioya Tsutomo’s book is the authoritative
study of the subject. On shared-yield planting in southwest Japan, see also
Morita, 118. Shioya and Sagio, 34–36. Toba, 126.
The 1713 regulations appear in Tsukii, 7–10. Murai and Takahashi, 135–137,
summarize the main points.
Hattori, Ringyō, 150.
These three paragraphs are based on information in Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,” 22–24 and Hattori, Ringyō, 154–155.
Murai and Takahashi, 137–138. Also cited in Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,”21.
Iwasaki, 218, 274. Murai, 29–30. Hattori, Ringyō, 151. Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,” 29–30.
These examples of shoreline planters are gleaned from Kyōdo, 22–24, 29–30,
31–32.
Murai and Takahashi, 139. Even as I revise this paragraph in Tokyo on 20 May
1982, the television news reports that archeologists have just excavated a stripof paddy land and mulberry field covered by fallout from the eruption of Mt.
Asama (135 km northwest of Tokyo) in 1787. The fields, located about 60 km
east of the volcano, near Numata, were buried under almost 2 meters of initially windblown debris.
Hane, 8. The Tenmei famine is discussed in a recent volume, Edo jidai no kikin,
which consists of roundtable discussion and essays by noted scholars.
This attempt to find a causal link between the Tenmei famine and the change
in Akita’s forest experience has a highly tentative character because it isgrounded in plausibility more than persuasive evidence and because it is atheme that Japanese scholars have not, to my knowledge, explored thus far.
Murai, 28, 37–38. In the adjoining small han of Tsugaru, source of Hane’squotation, the famine was even more devastating in relative terms, reportedly

NOTES

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.

107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

115.

79
claiming 100,000 lives in and about 1783. There the han allowed the largescale felling of forests to furnish relief, and subsequently undertook a han-revival program that included active reforestation. Matsuki, 151–152.
The castle construction rebuilt the main enceinte of Kubota castle, which hadburned in 1778, and may have been a public works project undertaken in response to the famine hardship.
Kyōdo, 25.
Murai and Takahashi, 142. Anpō could have started his project from scratch aslate as about 1785–1787, and had seedlings in that quantity by 1789.
Tsutsui, 7–8. Iwasaki, 275. The Takaishi is a branch of the Fujikoto river, whichflows into the lower Yoneshiro from the north at Futatsui.
Kyōdo, 30, 32. Gōemon’s descendants continued the planting tradition he had
established. They also began furnishing tens of thousands of sugi seedlings tothe office of the district intendant for distribution to any who wished to plantthem.
This theme is being explored by several scholars examining forest history inother parts of Japan. Also, see my essay, “Land-Use Patterns.”
Kanō provides concise essays on major Edo-period writers of this silviculturalliterature.
I have adumbrated this matter in the essay, “Forestry in Early Modern Japan,
1650–1850.”
Tsukii, 5. Murai and Takahashi, 141. Shioya Tsutomo, 503.
Kyōdo, 26–28.
These two paragraphs are based on Nagamata, 38 and Murai and Takahashi,
140.
Tsukii, 215, gives no date for this authorization, but it seems to date from theearly nineteenth century. On pp. 216–217, Tsukii lists some instances of purchases of 200 to 120,000 trees. Most were purchases of standing timber andnot of the land itself.
Material in this paragraph is culled from Murai and Takahashi, 141; Nagamata,36, 40–41; Tsutsui, 11; and Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,” 33. Tsukii, 27–28
quotes the brief notice establishing the 70–30 ratio and on pp. 223–228 lists
planters rewarded by the han, mostly in the period 1800–1830.
Nagamata, 38–39.
Tsutsui, 8–10.
This discussion of buwakebayashi uses information from Hattori, Ringyō,
144–145, 151–152; Hattori, “Akita buwakebayashi,” 25–33; Shioya Tsutomo,
508, 511; Murai and Takahashi, 144–145. The names for buwakebayashi in
Akita included uetatebayashi, toritatebayashi, sanwakesugi, and toriwakebayashi. Shioya and Sagio, 35–36, discuss the methods of effecting the 70–30
split in Obi han in south Kyushu.
This stand age is calculated from Tokyo kyōiku daigaku nōgakubu ringakka(comp.), Yield Tables, 2–5.
Hattori, Ringyō, 157.
Murai and Takahashi, 141. The outcome of the petition is not reported.
Tsutsui, 17–18, discusses the size of iriai plots.
Hattori, Ringyō, 157–158, in support of this observation, refers to one recordthat lists as planters 23 samurai, 12 local people of sufficient distinction tohave family names, and 26 others of unknown status.
Murai, 72–73.

80

NOTES

116.

Zōrin kōrōsha jiseki (kyūhan jidai), 3–4. (Henceforth Zōrin.) This biographicalsketch of Miura is typical of those found in the volume and its companion volume on post-1868 Japan.
Zōrin, 5–6.
Tsukii, 217–222, is a table of planters, their sites, dates, and numbers of seedlings.
Zōrin, 5–6.
These seedling figures come from Tsukii, 210; Murai and Takahashi, 142; Hattori, Ringyō, 154. The figure of 1 million per year, which is given by Murai and
Takahashi, may simply be an extrapolation from the figure for Yokote cited by
Tsukii.
The figures in this paragraph are from Murai and Takahashi, 141; Tsutsui, 7.
Tsutsui’s figure of 780,000 appears to be based on the table on pp. 217–222 in
Tsukii. I suspect that the 679,000 seedlings planted at Noshiro are ten years’
worth of Katō’s 11-year planting of 768,000.

117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

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Yūzankaku shuppan 雄山閣出版, 1982.
Endō Yasutarō 遠藤安太郎. (Sanrin shijō yori mitaru) Tōhoku bunka no kenkyū (山林史より觀たる) 東北文化之研究 (A study of Tōhoku culture [viewed from thehistory of its forests]. Tokyo: Nihon sanrinshi kenkyūkai 日本山林史研究会,
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Hane, Mikiso. Peasants, Rebels, & Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan.
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Hattori Marenobu 服部希信. “Akita han no buwakebayashi seido” 秋田藩の部分林制
度 (The shared-forest system of Akita). Keizaishi kenkyū 経済史研究 17(5):15–42 (1937).
——. “Akita han no rinsanbutsu senbaisei” 秋田藩の林產物專壳制 (The forest-products monopoly system of Akita). Keizaishi kenkyū, 18(3): 14–31 (1937).
——. “Akita han no shinrin riyō seigensaku” 秋田藩の森林利用制限策 (Akita domain’s
policy for restricting forest use). Keizaishi kenkyū, 19(5): 53–70 (1938).
——. Ringyō keizai kenkyū 林業 経済研究 (A study of forest economics). Tokyo:
Chikyū shuppan 地球出版, 1967.
Imamura Yoshitaka 今村義孝. Akitaken no rekishi 秋田縣の歷史 (A history of Akita
Prefecture). Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha 山川出版社, 1969.
Important Trees of Japan (Natural Resources Section Report no. 119). Tokyo, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1949.
Iwasaki Naoto 岩崎直人. Akitaken Noshirogawa kami chihō ni okeru sugibayashi noseiritsu narabini kōshin ni kan suru kenkyū秋田縣能代川上地方に於ける杉林の成立 竝 に更新関する研究 (A study of the establishment and rejuvenation of
cryptomeria forests in the upper Noshiro river region of Akita Prefecture).
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Kanō Kyōji 狩野享二. Edo jidai no ringyō shisō 江戶時代の林業思想 (Forestry thoughtin the Edo period). Tokyo: Gannandō , 1967.
Kyōdo o sōzō seshi hitobito 鄉士を創造せし人々(The people who created our villages). Tokyo: Dai Nihon sanrinkai 大日本山林会, 1934.
Matsuki Kan 松木侃. “Tsugara no hiba” 津軽の屠（檜） (The false arbor vitae of Tsugaru). Nihon sangyōshi taikei (3) Tōhoku chihō, 149–159. [See Nihon.]Morita Seiichi 森田誠一. “Higo no ringyō” 服後林業 (The forestry of Higo Province).
Nihon sangyōshi taikei (8) Kyūshū chihō, 106–122.
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勝郡秋 ノ宮 を中心とする 林野所有並 に利用の実態 (An introduction to the studyof Akita woodland history: Actual forest possession and use, in the area of
Akinomiya in Okachi district). Akita, 1959.
Murai Hideo, and Takahashi Hideo 高橋秀夫. “Akita no sugi” 秋田の杉 (The cryptomeria of Akita). Nihon sangyōshi taikei (3) Tōhoku chihō, 130–148. [SeeNihon.]
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Shioya Tsutomo 塩谷勉*****. Buwakebayashi seido no shiteki kenkyū—buwakebayashi yori bunshūrin e no tenkai 部分林制度の史的研究一部分林より分取林への展開 (Historical studies of the shared-forest system: From shared forest to
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Index

Akita Sanesue, 14, 52

goshi. See Country samuraiAnpō Manuemon, 46
Harada Gōemon, 42, 46
banyamakuri. See Logging plan

hayashi toritateyaku. See Forest supervisor

buwakebayashi. See Shared-yield forest

hirayama, 25–26
hotaki, 15–17, 18

Charcoal, 9, 11, 21–22, 34–35, 61–63, 65–66
Communal land (iriaichi), 8, 18, 52, 64

iriaichi. See Communal land

Controlled forest (tomeyama), 18, 24–26,

Iwasaki Naoto, 25, 61

29–29, 31, 35–37, 63
Controlled trees (tomeki), 25–26, 29–29,
31, 35–37

jikisoma, 30, 33–34, 49–50, 64
jikiyama. See Lord’s forest

Country samurai (gōshi), 7, 28, 31, 40, 52, 65
Kaneko Hyōzaemon, 40, 42–42, 46
District intendant (kōri bugyō), 7, 18, 27

Katō Keirin, 1, 20–21, 45, 46–47, 54
Konishi Denzuke, 53

Erosion, 5–6, 9, 22, 26, 29, 40, 42–42, 46

kōri bugyō. See District intendantFertilizer, 9–11, 18, 21, 37, 44, 63

Logging costs, 15, 18–20, 64

Fire, 29–30, 44

Logging plan (banyamakuri), 33

Forest overseer (mokuzankata), 7, 27–28,

Lord’s forest (jikiyama), 24, 40, 63

33–34, 46
Forest preserve (tateyama), 15, 24, 29, 45

Mining, 9, 25–26, 34, 46

Forest register (sanchō), 27, 29–29

Miura Kichiemon, 52–54

Forest supervisor (hayashi toritateyaku),

mokuzankata. See Forest overseer

28, 51, 54, 65

Murai Hikuemon, 42

Forest warden (yamamori), 28–29, 30, 34,
40, 51
Fuel, 9, 11, 17–18, 27, 33–37, 44, 62, 66

Noshiro superintendent, 27–29

86omakikata, 34, 61

INDEX
tateyama. See Forest preserve
Tenmei famine, 2–3, 42–46, 58

Rotation cutting, 33–34, 53

Timber markets, 31, 65
Timber transport, 27–28, 30–31, 34, 64

sakaiyama, 25

tomeki. See Controlled trees

sanchō. See Forest register

tomeyama. See Controlled forest

Satake, 7, 8, 14–17, 27, 40

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 13–14

Satake Yoshimasa, 46, 59

Tsukii Tadahiro, 21, 61

Satake Yoshinobu, 14
satsuyama, 25–26, 29–29, 40, 45

Umezu Tadakuni, 18, 26, 35

Shared-yield forest (buwakebayashi),unjō, 25, 30–31, 35, 63–64

40–42, 47–51, 59–60
Shibue Masamitsu, 14–15, 18, 23
sunpō, 18

yamamori. See Forest warden

About the Author

Conrad Totman, professor of history at Yale University, is the authorof Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600–1843; The Collapse of theTokugawa Bakufu, 1862–1868; Japan before Perry; and Tokugawa
Ieyasu: Shogun.

Asian Studies at Hawaii

No.

1

Bibliography of English Language Sources on Human Ecology, Eastern
Malaysia and Brunei. Compiled by Conrad P. Cotter with the assistance of
Shiro Saito. September 1965. Two parts. (Available only from Paragon Book
Gallery, New York.)No.

2

Economic Factors in Southeast Asian Social Change. Edited by Robert Van
Niel. May 1968. Out of print.

No.

3

East Asian Occasional Papers (1). Edited by Harry J. Lamley. May 1969.

No.

4

East Asian Occasional Papers (2). Edited by Harry J. Lamley. July 1970.

No.

5

A Survey of Historical Source Materials in Java and Manila. Robert Van Niel.
February 1971.

No.

6

Educational Theory in the People’s Republic of China: The Report of Ch’ien
Chung-Jui. Translated by John N. Hawkins. May 1971. Out of print.

No.

7

Hai Jui Dismissed from Office. Wu Han. Translated by C. C. Huang. June
1972.

No.

8

Aspects of Vietnamese History. Edited by Walter F. Vella. March 1973.

No.

9Southeast Asian Literatures in Translation: A Preliminary Bibliography.
Philip N. Jenner. March 1973.

No.

10

Textiles of the Indonesian Archipelago. Garrett and Bronwen Solyom. October 1973. Out of print.

No.

11

British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1917–1937. Albert D.
Moscotti. February 1974.

No.

12

Aspects of Bengali History and Society. Edited by Rachel Van M. Baumer. December 1975.

No.

13

Nanyang Perspective: Chinese Students in Multiracial Singapore. Andrew W.
Lind. June 1974.

No.

14

Political Change in the Philippines: Studies of Local Politics preceding Martial Law. Edited by Benedict J. Kerkvliet. November 1974.

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Essays on South India. Edited by Burton Stein. February 1976.

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16

The Caurāsī Pad of Śrī Hit Harivamś. Charles S. J. White. 1977.

No.

17

An American Teacher in Early Meiji Japan. Edward R. Beauchamp. June
1976.

No.

18

Buddhist and Taoist Studies I. Edited by Michael Saso and David W. Chappell.
1977.

No.

19

Sumatran Contributions to the Development of Indonesian Literature,
1920–1924. Alberta Joy Freidus. 1977.

No.

20

Insulinde: Selected Translations from Dutch Writers of Three Centuries on
the Indonesian Archipelago. Edited by Cornelia N. Moore, 1978.

No.

21

Regents, Reformers, and Revolutionaries: Indonesian Voices of Colonial
Days, Selected Historical Readings, 1899–1949. Translated, edited, and annotated by Greta O. Wilson, 1978.

No.

22

The Politics of Inequality: Competition and Control in an Indian Village.
Miriam Sharma. October 1978.

No.

23

Brokers of Morality: Thai Ethnic Adaptation in a Rural Malaysian Setting.
Louis Golomb. February 1979.

No.

24

Tales of Japanese Justice. Ihara Saikaku. Translated by Thomas M. Kondo
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No.

25

Mandarins, Gunboats, and Power Politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and theInternational Rivalries in Korea. Robert R. Swartout, Jr. March 1980.

No.

26

Nichiren: Selected Writings. Laurel Rasplica Rodd. 1980.

No.

27

Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Chinese Market Town. C. Fred Blake.
1980.

No.

28

The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals. S. Cromwell Crawford. 1982.

No.

29

Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Edited by Victor H. Mair. 1983.

No.

30

Songs of Nepal. Siegfried Lienhard. 1984.

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