A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea’s Provocations
David S. Maxwell
Associate Director of Center for Security Studies
Georgetown University
Abstract
This article argues that to deal with North Korean provocations, theAlliance must take a holistic strategic approach to the entire North
Korean problem. As long as the Kim family regime continues a strategic
approach focused on regime survival, reunification of the peninsula
under its control, attaining recognition as a nuclear power and trying to
remove US forces from the peninsula, it will continue to use
provocations as part of its strategy while oppressing its people andconducting illicit activities around the world. The Alliance has taken apiecemeal or stovepipe approach to the complex problems posed by
North Korea with various organizations and senior officials responsible
for a specific portfolio with no apparent effective synchronization among
them. All activities of the Alliance must be focused on achieving an
overall end state that is in concert with the 2009 Joint Vision Statement
emphasizing peaceful reunification and ultimately answering the socalled “Korea Question” that the 1953 Armistice said must be answered.
By synchronizing ways and means toward this end, the Alliance caneffectively deal with provocations while working to shape the conditions
necessary for reunification. However, it must be understood that thefoundation for the Alliance strategy rests upon readiness of the combined
military forces.
Keywords: Korea, Reunification, Provocation, Strategy, Armistice,
Human Rights, Readiness, 2009 Joint Vision Statement
There is a desire for a strategy among policy makers to break the socalled “cycle of provocation” that is perpetrated by the Kim family
regime (KFR) in North Korea.1 There can be no doubt that North
Korean provocations have been many, problematic, and deadly over the
past six decades. However, as this article will argue, the provocation
cycle cannot be viewed in a vacuum or as a stand-alone problem.
Provocations conducted by the North are a symptom of a larger problem,

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namely the nature and very existence of the Kim family regime, and,thus, regardless of the course of action applied to try to deter
provocations, whether through coercion or co-option, such a course ofaction is unlikely to achieve the desired effects unless it is part of aholistic over-arching strategy to deal with the sixty year old “Korea
Question.”2
This article will briefly examine the historical background of North
Korean provocations and address the rationale and objectives for North
Korea. Then it will look at the provocation problem within the larger
context of the Korea Question and finally propose some steps forconsideration as part of an overall strategy for the Korean Peninsula that
may result in effects on the cycle of provocation.
In addition, throughout the paper alliance policies, actions, andorganizations will be critically examined with the objective of showingthat to be effective in dealing with the Kim family regime and its threats
and challenges, these must be orchestrated in such a way as to achieve
strategic objectives and that stovepipe approaches to the various
problems posed by the KFR will not succeed and actually may help theregime to achieve its strategic objectives at least in the near term.
There is an obvious question in regards to any claim that North
Korean provocations can be deterred: Is it possible to deter North
Korean provocations? Can military, diplomatic, political or economic
efforts be expected to prevent further provocations and break the
provocation cycle? The short answer is no. No actions by the ROK-US
Alliance, China or the international community are likely to cause thenorth to forfeit a key pillar of its strategy, which is to conduct
provocations to gain political and economic concessions. The only way
to deal with North Korean provocations is as part of a larger strategy that
addresses the root of the problem: as long as the Kim Family Regime isin power it will persist in conducting provocations. It just cannot afford
to give them up.
The Problem
The problem on the Korean Peninsula is that the Kim Family Regime
is recalcitrant and does not and will not function as member of theinternational community. It has not negotiated in good faith in the last
sixty and is unlikely to do so in the future. The reason for this lies in its
strategic view of itself and it place in the region and the world. First andforemost it has a single vital national interest: Survival of the Kim

70 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

Family Regime is paramount to all else. Every decision and action of theregime must be viewed through a lens that sees this focus on regime
survival.
The strategic aim of the regime is reunification of the peninsula
under the control of the north. Successful execution of its campaign plan
to reunify the Peninsula is seen as the best guarantor of regime survival.
The north also believes that it is threatened by the ROK, US, and Japanand therefore must develop the military capabilities that will both deterand defend while at the same time provide capabilities to support
provocation and ultimately the execution of its military campaign plan toreunify the peninsula by force. This also provides the justification for its
so-called “Military First” policy, which prioritizes regime support to themilitary, thus depriving the people of resources.
Because of its belief that it is surrounded and threatened by hostilenations and because of its Juche philosophy, which provides theideological foundation for the regime, the KFR has a strong desire to beviewed as powerful and able to stand up to the threats from theinternational community. This manifests itself in the development of its
nuclear and missile programs that not only support its concept ofdeterrence and defense but also serves to bring respect for and fear of theregime, stated simply; it relies on no one for its defense but only on thestrength of its own military.3
There is one condition that the KFR seeks to achieve that it believes
will provide success in realizing its strategic aim and protection of its
vital national interest and that is the removal of United States forces fromthe Korean Peninsula. In the north’s military calculation, this will
provide the north with the correlation of forces that will allow it todominate the peninsula when it executes its military campaign, or, shortof that, will provide it with the power to coerce the South to achieve
regime objectives.
Historical Context for Provocations
The north has conducted provocations to gain political and economic
concessions since its inception with the only interruption to its patternfrom 1950-1953 when it launched its invasion of the South. Prior to andafter the war, it is has used provocations. The general public is familiar
with many of the sensational ones such as the seizure of the USNS
Pueblo and the attempted infiltration of Seoul to attack the Blue House(President’s residence) in the 1960’s.4 President Park Chung-hee’s wife

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71was assassinated in 1974 and in the Demilitarized Zone truce village of
Panmunjom, two American Soldiers were killed in a “vicious andunprovoked murder” in 1976.5
In the 1980’s there were two major terrorist attacks perpetrated by
the north. In 1983 the South Korean administration was attacked in abombing in Rangoon, Burma, and then, in 1987, a Korean Airlines flight
was blown up off the coast of Burma killing 115 people.6 Throughout
the 1990s and into the 21st Century the north’s nuclear and missile
programs emerged with subsequent provocations from exposure of the
program and test launches and detonations.7
The above provocations are just some of the more notable ones.
There have been many more, and these range from the fiery rhetoric of
the propagandists threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” tooverland and maritime infiltrations to direct fire engagements on the
Demilitarized Zone and naval battles in the West Sea. Although the2010 artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking by torpedo
from a North Korean submarine of the ROK Navy vessel Choenan seem
unusual to those unfamiliar with the history of the Korean security
situation they are really simply a continuation of the pattern of six
decades of provocations. Even the latest threats against South Koreanpress outlets are not new. Similar threats have been issued in the 1990’s
and 2000 with the television station KBS (1997) and the newspaper
Choson Ibo threatened (1997 and 2000).8
Moreover, North Korea has conducted provocations on a global
scale. In addition to the 1983 Rangoon bombing they have conductedassassinations and kidnappings in Japan, Hong Kong, Canada, in Africa
and Europe. It is important to be aware of the global operations
capability of the Kim Family Regime as this present an obvious threat
but also an opportunity for the alliance and the international community
as well as the global network can be targeted using host nation
intelligence and law enforcement to neutralize these capabilities.
Furthermore, what a survey of provocations shows is that while there
appear to be a wide range of types of provocations the same generalcategories of provocations are often repeated over time though specifictactics and techniques may be adjusted. A study of the history of
provocations can provide some idea of the types of provocations that canbe expected in the future.
As an example, the regime’s provocation strategy has evolved andwill continue to evolve even as lessons of the past provide a prologue for

72 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

the future. The north is employing cyber capabilities that of course did
not exist when Kim Il-sung was alive, and these include various forms ofcomputer network attack as evidenced by the recent attack against the
Jong Ang Ilbo newspaper.9 These types of attacks as well as variations
on them should be expected. Another recent development is the attackon the global positioning system capabilities at Incheon Airport. As
technology evolves the regime can be expected to exploit as it seeks out
vulnerabilities in the ROK as well as around the world. It may only be amatter of time before the regime begins to attacks infrastructure such as
power generation and financial systems both in the ROK andinternationally.
Lastly and perhaps counter-intuitively to some, the north uses thesuffering and starvation of its own people as form of provocation. The
regime will exploit the non-governmental organizations and donor
nations who seek to relieve suffering. The suffering is real and ongoingand caused by the policy and political choices made by the Kim Family
Regime. However, they exploit the knowledge by NGOs of thissuffering in the hopes that the international community will pressure the
ROK and others to provide food aid which is often at least partiallydiverted for other regime needs or at least allows the regime to divert
internal resources as external support is provided to marginal population
areas.
Why Does North Korea Conduct Provocations?
Although it is difficult to ascertain definitively why the north
conducts specific types of provocations when they do it is likely that
there are three main objectives for conducting provocations. As alreadystated the overarching reason is to gain political and economic
concessions. At its most basic level provocations have been used toinfluence negotiations, to both bring parties to the table or as an excuse
to scrap agreements the regime does not like. At the same time, they
have been used to influence organizations and nations both to start andstop food aid. Before, during, and after negotiations the regime has the
provocation tool ready to employ if it believes it will influence thesituation in its favor.
The second reason for provocations is to ensure tensions remain highso that it can continue to justify its “military first” policy. Some may
question the wisdom of deliberately increasing the potential of external
threats by these actions; however, it is these threats that mobilize theInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XVII, No. 1

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people and keep them united behind the military and the party in thename of protecting the great Socialist Workers paradise. The external
threats enhance the legitimacy of the regime particularly as it gives theappearance of standing up to the superpowers of the world in defense of
the party and the nation.
The third reason that may be viewed as related to the second is formaintaining the loyal support of the elite members in the core of theregime to include the senior military leadership. The employment of themilitary and intelligence services in provocations provide the elite
leaders with enhanced credibility and the opportunity to demonstrateloyalty to the Kim Family Regime.
These three broad objectives for provocations are critically importantto the regime and its survival. It is unlikely that they could be achieved
without the use of provocations therefore it is unlikely that any actions
short of direct military action by the ROK-US alliance or other actions
by the Chinese and the international community to include diplomaticand economic sanctions will cause the regime to give up this very useful
tool which again, remains a key tool contributing to regime survival.
There is a fourth use for provocations that is especially important for2012 and that is to attempt to influence the elections in the South. The
April failed ballistic missile test launch could be interpreted to not only
break the February 29, 2012 so called “Leap Day” agreement in which
the north was to receive relatively minor food aid (240,000 tons of
nutritional biscuits for children) but also as an attempt to influence theSouth Korean legislative elections. Surely the regime desires a ROK
government dominated by a progressive party that would return to aSunshine Policy like posture that would provide aid to the north withouta required quid pro quo. An argument could be made that the food aid
provided during the decade of the Sunshine Policy actually sustained thenorth by providing it with the resources that it could not provide its
people. While the Sunshine Policy can be judged a success for the north,it should be considered an abject failure for the South because during theentire time, the north not only developed its nuclear and missile
capabilities it continued to conduct provocations to include missile
launches, a nuclear test and naval engagements in the West Sea. The
recent threats to reveal information about conservative ROK candidates
for president illustrate the north’s intent to influence the elections.10
However, the April missile test may have backfired for the north as
the conservative party maintained a slim majority in the legislature. The

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question is how will the north use provocations to influence the outcomeof the December 2012 ROK Presidential election because it is in theregime’s interest that a progressive leader be elected.
The Other Problems
While the popular media and many political figures focus on
provocations because they make news, there are other problems that stemfrom North Korea and they must be considered as well when dealing
when developing plans for deterring and responding to provocations.
The first of these is the worst-case scenario of the resumption of
hostilities by the north and the devastation in Seoul and the surrounding
areas that would be caused by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).
This is the number one threat that the ROK-US alliance faces and one forwhich South Korean and U.S. military forces must prepare. Deterrence
has been successful for sixty years but it could fail at any time andtherefore defense of the Republic of Korea must be the number one
mission for the military instrument of power. Any use of alliancemilitary forces for anything other than deterrence and defense must be
carefully considered.
In addition to provocations is the problem of the north’s nuclear andmissile delivery programs.
Although tests of each constituteprovocations they pose problems beyond that due to their obvious use inwartime. These programs are also a source of hard currency for the
regime as they are proliferated to other regimes seeking thesecapabilities. Therefore nuclear and missile programs constitute not only
a provocation threat but also a wartime problem, a proliferation problem
and they make a contribution to regime survival.
The NKPA asymmetric warfare capabilities are also problematic.
The largest special operations force in the world is in the north, which
seems logical since the legitimacy of the regime rests on the myth ofanti-Japanese partisan warfare with Kim Il-sung as the great guerrillafighter who liberated the peninsula. Other investments in asymmetriccapabilities include but are not limited to the full range of missile
capabilities, weapons of mass destruction to include chemical andbiological agents, and infiltration capabilities (air and maritime surface
and sub-surface) and cyber warfare. These capabilities are clearly dual
use – many are effective for provocations and they have direct
application to the wartime campaign plan to reunify the peninsula.

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Proliferation alone is a significant problem, so much so the U.S. took
the lead in establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to
counter this threat.11 However, combined with and somewhat related toproliferation are the myriad illicit activities that the north conducts
around the world, from money laundering and counterfeiting to the
manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, as well as thecounterfeiting of other things as drugs and cigarettes. These activities
not only affect national currencies (primarily the US) but can also impact
economies as well.
There are two other problems that concern the ROK-US alliance andthe international community in North Korea. These are the massive
human rights violations that have been perpetrated against its population
for decades. Arguably with its Songbun structure12 and its massive prison
system, an unbelievable amount of suffering has been inflicted on the
North Korean people most likely on a scale that far surpasses anythingthat has happened under Nazi domination in Europe, in the Balkans, or in
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge reign. At the same time, the rank
and file population has suffered immensely from lack of adequate foodwith starvation occurring on a nationwide basis since the famine of the
1990’s. The international community has worked to mitigate the foodshortages as well as call attention to the human rights violations but these
problems persist and will likely continue as long as the Kim Family
Regime remains in power.
The purpose of looking at the other problems in addition to
provocation is to show that strategists and policy makers must take aholistic view of the problems and cannot look at one problem without
consider its relationship to others. If the dots were to be analyzed indetailed and connected one would find that all lead to one organization in
North Korea – the Kim Family Regime. Every problem that exists inNorth Korea is a result of how the regime views and protects its vitalinterests. The decisions that has made have resulted in the provocationand other problems that the ROK-US alliance and international
community face.
However, rarely has a holistic policy and strategic approach been
applied, rather approaches have been piecemeal, with courses of action
developed to address problems singly. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the desire to stop the provocation cycle, but it applies just as wellto the other problems outlined above, particularly the nuclear program,
humanitarian assistance, and proliferation.

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Piecemeal and Stovepipe Approaches to Provocations and Other
Problems
Certainly each of the problems outlined above are difficult anddangerous. Taken as a single and whole problem it is extremelycomplex. Normally when dealing with such complexity it makes sense
to break the problem down into manageable parts. This brings to mind
the old adage: “How do you eat an elephant? One bite at a time.” Theapproach to North Korea taken by the ROK-US Alliance and theinternational community has been to try to solve each part alone. This isevident in the myriad organizations and initiatives that have developed
over time that deal with different aspects of the “Korean Question.” Thefollowing short survey will illustrate some of the more prominentagencies and activities.
The combined military forces of the alliance oversee the security
situation. The Military Committee, which essentially consists of themilitary half of the National Command Authority for both nations,provides the strategic direction and guidance for planning andemployment of the Combined Forces Command. The mission of the
CFC is to deter aggression and if deterrence fails to defend the ROK and
defeat the NKPA.
The United Nations Command (UNC) and the Military ArmisticeCommission are responsible for maintaining the demilitarized zone andfor investigating violations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement by eitherside. The UNC also has a war fighting function as well is the sixteen
contributing or other nations will commit troops to the defense of the
ROK in the event of a resumption of hostilities.
The most notable organization and initiative is the Six Party Talksconsisting of the ROK, China, Russia, Japan, the U.S. and North Korea.
A U.S. Special Envoy has responsibility for the American participationin these talks and the coordination that surrounds them. Its primary
focus is on the north’s nuclear program though it has not met in six party
session since 2009 because of the north’s continue provocative actions
and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.
There are myriad international organizations that look at the foodcrisis in the north from the UN and the World Food Program toindividual donor nations and their aid agencies. However, the longrunning food shortages that are a result of the regime’s poor economic
decisions over time that are exacerbated by climate conditions andInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XVII, No. 1

77

weather have resulted in what is known as donor fatigue. The lack oftransparency and cooperation in food distribution by the north also
contributes to donor fatigue. In the United States, the U.S. Agency forInternational Development is the lead for providing humanitarianassistance and food aid when a decision is made to make contributions.
The human rights problem in the north is severe and well
documented. Again, there are multiple international organizations that
focus on the human rights atrocities that are being perpetrated in thenorth every day and have been for the past six decades. In the U. S. an
office of the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights has been
established with the responsibility to work these issues with international
community and to engage with North Korea to try to solve these
problems.
From an economic perspective the ROK and U.S. have recently
concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for which the U.S. Trade
Representative has overall responsibility.
The United Nations has also established a panel of experts to monitor
and assess the effectiveness sanctions implemented by UN Security
council resolutions on North Korea in response to the north’s nuclear andmissile programs and proliferation activities.
Finally there is the ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee(EDPC) established in 2010 to develop concrete and effective measures
to deter North Korea. 13
What this short survey shows is that there are a number oforganizations that deal with various parts of the challenges on the Korean
Peninsula, some that are led by very high ranking professionals (e.g.
Ambassadors and General Officers) with specific portfolios. Given thecomplex nature of the very important and dangerous problems posed by
North Korea, it appears to make sense to address these separately inorder to simplify understanding of the problems and facilitate execution.
However, from the perspective of an integrated strategic approach thismay be counterproductive and play to one of the only strengths of the
Kim Family Regime and that is its ability to play various international
actors against each other in order to gain political and economic
concessions. Rather than a piecemeal and stovepipe approach to the
problems perhaps there needs to be a unifying strategic vision toorchestrate the development, integration and execution of a coherent
holistic strategy. Such a vision would provide focus for the agencies andallow them to assess the efficacy their actions with the question: Does

78 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

this course of action support attainment of the end state established in theunifying strategic vision.
Foundation for Strategy and Policy
Fortunately there does exist such a strategic vision for the alliance.
In June 2009 Presidents Lee and Obama established the Joint Vision
Statement and included in it is this key paragraph, which provides theessence of the vision the two nations have for the outcome on the Korean
peninsula.
Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all
people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on
the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on theprinciples of free democracy and a market economy. We will
work together to achieve the complete and verifiable eliminationof North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, and to promoterespect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean
people. (emphasis added)
Of course the desire is for peaceful reunification. However, while
Korea can and will eventually achieve reunification, whether it isthrough peaceful means is really a function of how the Kim Family
Regime evolves or how it faces future crises such as the threat ofcollapse. But the words of vision statement are really key for organizing
the policy and strategy for solving the long standing “Korea Question”
once and for all. It provides the vision for the organizing principle thatshould shape all negotiations, plans, and actions concerning the Korean
peninsula by both nations with the following question being continuallyasked of each organization and action that is focused on or contributes to
Korea:How does this organization or action support achieving the joint
vision of a reunified Korean Peninsula?
If there is not a positive answer to that question then the organizationor activity or policy must be considered in light of that. An organizationor activity that does not make a positive contribution to reunification
may still of course have value for other functions but when it comes todealing with Korea this question must guide organizations and activities.

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From the 2009 Joint Vision Statement an end state may be craftedthat could provide the foundation for both policy development and theend state for a strategy. Such an end state could be described this way:
A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear
peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.14
An overarching end state is useful for ensuring that all agencies
actions are synchronized to directly or indirectly support its attainment.
However, as already stated, different agencies have different focus in
their portfolios and this can lead to disjointed efforts, confusing policy,
and plans that are at odds with others and sometimes counterproductive.
Just two examples of the lack of support for the two President’s joint
vision can illustrate the lack of coherent Korea policy and strategy.
On January 5, 2012 the President signed he Defense Strategic
Guidance document to provide guidance for DOD planning andultimately budgeting. Despite the emphasis of this document as well as
follow-up documents and amplifying speeches on a rebalance of strategy
to focus more on Asia, Korea receives little mention. In fact Korea ismentioned in one sentence:
Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula
by effectively working with allies and other regional states todeter and defend against provocation from North Korea, whichis actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.15
The counter to this is that the Defense Strategic Guidance is focusedon broader issues than just the Korean Peninsula but an interpretation ofthis sentence can be that the U.S. of the US is solely on provocations andthe nuclear programs and success in those two areas will result in peaceon the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately as has been discussed there are
additional serious problems that need to be addressed as well. Since thisdocument functions to provide strategic guidance for defense planningand given that Korean warrants a mention already, the guidance should
reiterate what has already been stated in the Joint Vision Statement of2009 which provides the end state that will resolve the Korea Question
once and for all, e.g., reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The failure
to emphasize this important point can confuse planners and allow the
U.S. half of the alliance to lose focus on what has been directed by thetwo Presidents.

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Although the guidance stresses that “we will maintain peace on the
Korea Peninsula” the specific verbiage of deterrence and defense issolely focused on provocations and not on North Korea’s threat of attack.
Clearly it is the desire of the alliance not to be on the receiving end of
provocations both for security and political reasons. However, it must be
remembered that provocations are a tool of the regime and while there
has been loss of blood and treasure due to the north’s provocations, they
are not the most dangerous threat. The focus of the alliance security
forces must first and foremost be on deterring attack from the north and
if deterrence fails be capable of destroying the NKPA and defeating theregime. Provocations cannot be the main effort for deterrence anddefense otherwise the alliance could become vulnerable to the worst-casethreat.
The second example occurred in June 2012 with the recent 2+2 talks
with the leaders of the diplomatic and defense establishments of both
Korea and the U.S. The Joint Statement on June 14, 2012 made no
mention of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The leaders of bothnations’ diplomatic and military instruments of power discussed nearly
all the critical issues concerning the alliance, the full range of the threats
posed by North Korea, as well as global cooperation between the twopartners.16 Again, the lack of emphasis on reunification undercuts the2009 Joint Vision Statement and can confuse planners and lead toinconsistent, unsynchronized actions among various agencies.
Although the respective National Security Staffs that work for each
President are charged with orchestrating and synchronizing policy andstrategy for the U.S. the appointment of ambassador level special envoys(Six Party Talks and Human Rights) as well as the establishment ofcommittees and working groups for separate issues serve to hinder thedevelopment and execution of unified policies and strategies thattranscend the issues.
Another way to organize the U.S. policy making and strategic
decision making process could be to appoint a single official of
Ambassador rank with a staff to form a North Korea Strategy Group inorder to integrate and synchronize US strategy across the issues that havebeen identified in this paper. Furthermore if the Korea President would
appoint a similar official and form a like group together these two could
form a Combined North Korea Strategy Group that would work toorchestrate the alliance policies, plans and actions.17 Rather than having
separate stovepipe organizations reporting to various agencies andInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XVII, No. 1

81departments within the executive branch, these strategy groups would
report to and work for the Presidents through their respective National
Security Staffs. It is critical that there be an organization established toprovide unity of effort and to be able to analyze and assess the effects ofpolicies and actions across the spectrum of challenges from North Korea.
Most importantly it would have the mandate to work to resolve the“Korea Question” and in all its work would be able to assess the value ofplans and policies by asking the key question:
How does this organization or action support achieving the joint
vision of a reunified Korean Peninsula?
Dealing with Provocations as part of an Overall Alliance Strategy
As noted, the focus of the US is mainly on the Kim Family Regime’s
nuclear program and its provocations. These are just two of the complex
challenges faced by the alliance. The remainder of this paper will
outline some considerations for a strategic approach to the complex anddangerous challenges posed by the Kim Family Regime by looking firstat the long term desired end state and then at some of the ways that willassist in resolving the “Korea Question” and reaching the end stateenvisioned by the two Presidents.
In any strategic approach there must be an understanding of the
problem. Even though it has only touched on some of the highlights, thispaper has identified the major problems posed by the north and sought tolay the foundation for situational understanding.
From thisunderstanding a number of assumptions can be made to assist in planningand to take the place of facts that cannot be proven.
Assumptions
The first assumption is that the Kim Family Regime will notpeacefully reunify with the ROK. Despite multiple proposals over theyears from north and South to form a confederated government and work
toward gradual peaceful reunification, it has demonstrated no willingness
to do so and given that the vital national interest is survival of the Kim
Family Regime it is unlikely to ever work in good faith with the South toachieve reunification. This is one assumption every planner would liketo be proven false because if it is then there will be no need for acontinued strategic plan.
The second assumption is relevant to this paper and a strategic
approach is that the regime will not give up its nuclear program. It has

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proven too valuable in supporting its diplomatic blackmail strategy andfurthermore the regime believes its deterrent value is a key to regime
survival. Should this assumption prove false it is likely to first lead to ade-escalation of tension in the region but ultimately to the collapse of theregime and the resulting complex security issues that collapse will cause.
The third assumption is that the regime will not discontinue
conducting provocations. Again, like the nuclear program, provocations
have proven too beneficial to supporting its vital national interest. As
long as the Kim Family Regime remains in power, it will use
provocations to gain political and economic concessions as well as fordomestic political purpose to raise external tensions in order to justify it
Military First Policy. So far there has been no cost to the regime that has
been high enough to cause it to forgo provocations. A related
assumption is that although the north may not conduct provocations for aperiod of time, particularly if it deems the short term costs of its actions
to be too high, it will likely resume them at the time and in a way thatbest supports their future strategy.
The organization necessary to take on the effort to develop andorchestrate the execution of policy and strategy for the alliance would be
the Combined North Korea Strategy Group. It would develop andoversee implementation of the ways and means to resolve the “Korea
Question” and achieve the ultimate end state:
A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear
peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form ofgovernment determined by the Korean people.
As an example, given the Joint Vision of the two Presidents to work
toward reunification it would establish the overarching security tasks forthe alliance. In priority order these could be:
1. Deter and defend against an attack by the north and maintain theArmistice.
2. Prepare for War and Regime Collapse and Support theReunification process led by the ROK Government
3. Sustain the strength of the Alliance.
4. Conduct transformation and military modernization.
In addition to the key question identified to be answered to assess thepolicies and actions in support of reunification, security plans and actions
would be judged with this prioritized list and the ultimate end state to be

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achieved.
Way and Means Overview
The following is an overview of some of the ways and means that
could be considered by the Combined North Korea Strategy Group. The
focus is on the security aspects with the military and informational
instruments of national power. This is by no means a comprehensive list
but meant to illustrate some of the actions and desired effects of thoseactions to support a comprehensive strategy.
The most critical task is to organize all the agencies that deal with
North Korea and establish a process to integrate and orchestrateactivities. To be effective, this requires a mandate from both Presidents
to ensure their respective National Security Staffs, departments,
ministries, and agencies support this process.
The key to dealing with the Kim Family Regime is to be able toattack its strategy on multiple levels. The Strategy Group must have its
highest priority the development of an attack strategy that undermines
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the regime and supports an influence
campaign that exposes the regime’s strategy and actions both to theinternational community and also exposes it to the Korean people.
An influence campaign such as this would begin to prepare the North
Korean people for ultimate reunification and maintain international anddomestic political support for the alliance when the north conducts the
provocations it can be expected to conduct. Alliance support can besustained if the north’s strategy is understood. Although tactical surprise
may be achieved by the regime when they conduct provocations, anunderstanding of the strategy will prevent the political surprise thatcurrently leads to domestic political tensions. Attacking the regime’s
strategy and exposing it is the foundation for all other actions.
The north must pay a price for its provocations. The costs ofprovocation however need not be in the form of direct military action in
response. Despite the recent statements by President Lee that the ROK
will respond against the regime’s key commands, there are other ways tomake the regime pay for its actions.18 These other ways are opportunities
to undermine the regime and to support efforts leading to reunification.
Although overt military responses may be appropriate in a given
circumstance and could exact a high cost to the north there are otheractions that could be as if not more effective in some cases. As an
example, the north would have paid a high price if it had lost one or more

84 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

submarines while they were deployed in the West or East Seas after it
had attacked and sunk the ROK Navy frigate Cheonan. Employment of
ROK and US anti-submarine warfare capabilities to cause the loss of one
or more North Korean submarines would send a powerful message andhelp to degrade one of their key asymmetric capabilities which would ofcourse contribute to achieving the long term end state by weakening theirmilitary capabilities. Such actions would not have to be publicized andin fact might be better left unpublicized to allow the north to question theeffectiveness of their own submarine fleet.
A response to artillery shelling such as happened in 2010 on
Yoengpyong Island with counter-fire is entirely appropriate. The
destruction of firing systems and command and control facilities with
rapid and accurate fire would not only cause the obvious loss of militarycapabilities but would demonstrate the superiority of the alliance artillery
and counter-fire.
In addition to military responses there are two actions that can haveprofound effects on the regime both from a cost perspective as well as
long term regime survival. It is well known that the financial actions
against Banco Delta Asia had a significant influence on Kim Jong-il andhis money laundering and other illicit activities.19 This was a very small
action on the part of the U.S. and international community but it should
be a lesson in how to make the regime suffer costs for its hostile
activities.
Related to the Banco Delta Asia action, something that has neverbeen pursued is to target the global network of the so-called Department
39, which is the organization responsible for the regime’s global illicit
activities. The members of this network conduct illegal activities andbreak host nation laws on a routine basis but they are rarely if everarrested and prosecuted because they often hide diplomatic credentials.
An aggressive program to enlist the support of nations around the world
could shut down this network. One effect of such actions would be to
cut off the flow of luxury goods to the regime because in addition totrafficking in illicit drugs, counterfeit money, cigarettes, medicine, andthe proliferation of weapons and missile technology in order to gain hardcurrency for the regime, Department 39 ensures that the Kim Family
Regime receives the luxury items it requires to sustain the loyalty of theelite. A sustained interruption of this flow could in effect strangle theregime; cause the loss of support among the elite, and likely lead toregime collapse.

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In addition, this organization must be targeted early so as to prevent
it from being exploited by potential emerging leaders from the second
tier following regime collapse. Such an organization would be critical tofueling a resistance movement to counter the ROK government efforts toreunify the Peninsula following collapse or war. Finally, targeting themembers would provide not only intelligence opportunities but also
potential key communicators that could be employed in North Korea
following conflict or collapse.
The regime’s provocations can cost it in other ways as well. One is
the strengthening of relations between the ROK and other nations. As an
example the increasing threats have led to improved cooperation among
the ROK, Japanese, and US military. During the build-up to the failed
ballistic missile launch in April 2012, the ROK, Japanese, and US Navies
collaborated on ballistic missile tracking and defense. In June 2012 it
was announced that these three navies would conduct operations in theWest Sea.20 The cost to the north is due to provocations military
cooperation among allies and friends in the region is enhanced and thisfurther reduces the regime’s chances of launching a successful attack on
the South.
One of the keys to the KFR’s provocation strategy is to conduct
provocations when it can achieve surprise and when it perceives
weakness in the alliance relationship or military readiness. The case of
the Pyeongyang Island artillery attack is a case in point. It is very likely
the north’s decision was based on the knowledge from its intelligence
network that the ROK artillery were conducting a training exercise on
the southern part of the island and were not in a position to rapidly
respond. The north took advantage of this and killed innocent South
Korean citizens. The ROK military response was slow and hardly
effective in defending the island.
A consideration for planners of military exercises is how to prevent
North Korea from taking advantage of ROK or Alliance exercises inorder to exploit vulnerabilities as military forces are diverted from a
direct deterrence mission. It will well known that the north conducts
extensive intelligence gathering in the South and it should be assumed it
can easily obtain exercise details such as timing and location and units
involved. This information is easily exposed because exercises arescheduled, planned, and coordinated in a very deliberate manner withinitial, mid, and final planning conferences, site surveys and coordination
with local governments and civilians. This is a necessity because the86 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

ROK is an advanced country and ROK and US military forces canoperate and train at will. In modern Korea in an information-dominatedsociety there is no way to keep information based on deliberate planningsecret. In an ideal situation, the military would be able to conduct nonotice training events; however this would likely have a civilian cost thatis too high for the ROK to absorb. Therefore, when conducting exercise
planning, the potential for North Korean provocations should beconsidered. A “red team” might be useful in analyzing the exercise plans
and the correct political situation and determining possible provocations.
With a red team assessment the planning team may be able to makeadjustments to the exercise plan or recommend other measures tomitigate provocations. It is important to understand that the north seeks
to exploit opportunities that can be created if the focus of the units isnarrowly on the training exercise without consideration of what the northmight execute.
However, very visible exercises are also very important in
influencing the regime. As an example, the June 2012 exercises in the
Pocheon that were billed as the largest live fire exercise in Korea had theeffect of causing a significant response from the regime that included
statements denouncing it and saying it would increase its own militarycapabilities.21 Although it is impossible to prevent provocations becausethat decision is made in Pyongyang, actions such as this actually
illustrate the potential costs to the Kim Family Regime.
Readiness is not a Cliché
Although it is thought by many to be a cliché, readiness is the key toalmost everything on the Peninsula and dealing with the “Korea
Question” – readiness reduces the opportunities for the north to conduct
successful provocations – readiness also prepares the force to deal withthe complex challenges of war and collapse. As counterintuitive as it
may seem, military readiness, with demonstrated strength and will, isalso the most important condition that will contribute to diplomacy.
Readiness, particularly when viewed through North Korea eyes, reduces
the options for the regime and provides a visible indicator of the potential
cost to the regime when it conducts provocations. As stated, although
there is no strategy that can completely prevent provocations by the Kim
Family Regime, evidence of potential costs and reduced opportunities
through readiness can decrease the possibility of provocations and may
influence the regime to commit to dialogue with the ROK and U.S. The

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foundation for all Alliance diplomatic actions as well as the resolution ofthe "Korean Question" rests on the readiness of the Alliance. Readinessis a win-win for the Alliance. The north cannot afford to "beef up" theirforces much more as they claim they will do in response to the June 2012
Pocheon live fire exercise.22 In attempting to do so they provide
important intelligence reads of their activities for the alliance andthrough the diversion and expenditure of resources they further weakenthemselves in the long run. The rhetoric should not be allowed tonegatively influence our decision makers because it indicates positiveeffects for the alliance.
Readiness is not only for provocations. However, some havebecome so focused on provocations that the important words ofdeterrence and defense are routinely misapplied only to provocations asin the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Readiness is not only
the foundation that supports effective diplomacy and helps to reduce theopportunities for provocation; it is key to the ultimate challenges to thealliance war and regime collapse. The real focus of readiness of the
Alliance has to be first on deterring war and if deterrence fails or
collapse occurs, defeating the NKPA in whatever form it exists andhelping the ROK government on the path to reunification.
There are numerous areas that require attention especially as thealliance moves through the transformation process to the OPCON
transfer and dissolution of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in
2015. The remainder of the transition period is a vulnerable time for thealliance as independent war fighting capabilities must be established,facilities constructed at new locations and U.S. forces relocated south ofSeoul. Transformation of Alliance military forces is being conducted in
the face of the complex threat to the north. Over the next three years
there is much to be done requiring large amounts of funding. Some of
the critical areas include advanced Command, Control, Communications,and Intelligence and Ballistic Missile Defense and new operational
concepts for integrating U.S. forces in a supporting role to the ROK
forces. Both governments, but the ROK in particular are going to haveto make large investments in their capabilities and in the case of the
ROK developing new ones to compensate for the dissolution of CFC.
There are some areas that may need to be reconsidered from areadiness perspective given the North Korean threat. In a June 2012
article the Chosun Ilbo speculated on a discussion between ROK and
U.S. military officials about the feasibility of not dissolving CFC as

88 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

currently envisioned, keeping it intact and altering the commanding
general from a U.S. commander to a ROK commander. While there arecertainly political considerations in the ROK and U.S. an assessment of
the North Korean view of the dissolution should be considered.23 One
such assessment may be that the north sees this as a successful
culmination of its strategy to split the alliance and weaken its militarycapabilities so that it achieves the correlation of forces it requires for
successful execution of it campaign plan to reunify the peninsula on its
terms. It may see vulnerabilities for exploitation during the transition
process as it considers how sufficient readiness can be maintained during
the period. It is likely planning provocations even now as it expects tofind these vulnerabilities in the coming years.
The alliance has taken some measures to mitigate thesevulnerabilities and increase readiness during this critical period. The
ROK and U.S. are working to improved combined missile defense,24
though there is one shortfall not addressed. The ROK needs to purchase
the PAC 3 and SM 3 missiles to have a true ballistic missile defense
capability. Additionally, halting the movement of the US 210th Fire
Brigade from moving south will significantly increase the counter-firecapability and defense of Seoul.25 Finally, the command has requested
redeployment of US attack helicopters to the peninsula.26 These are all
actions that enhance readiness and send a powerful message to the KFR
that can aid in deterring provocations as well as provide capabilities towill win the war or successfully negotiate the complexities of regime
collapse.
While there the above show the possibility of redeploying U.S. assets
to the peninsula it is recognized that the U.S. is facing severe fiscal
constraints that will impact its military. One of the ways underdiscussions to potentially reduce costs is to reduce the numbers ofpermanently stationed overseas troops and move to a more rotational
construct such as what is underway with the U.S. Marines in Australia.
The U.S. could deploy ground maneuver forces on a rotational basis
while leaving other assets permanently stationed such as artillery andArmy and Air Force aircraft.
Rotating ground combat forces could provide a number of benefits ifthey are employed creatively. Although not related directly to rotational
forces there is one initiative that could benefit from both rotational units
and a new mission focus for U.S. forces. Discussions are underway toform more integrated or combined ROK-US frontline units.27 If US

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ground combat forces were rotated on a 6 month or 1 year basis they
could be integrated with frontline ROK ground combat units for training
and also for a new mission which would be a variation on a US
traditional mission that ended in 1993: US combat patrols in the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Up until 1993 there was a U.S. sector of the
DMZ around the truce village of Panmunjom that was patrolled by U.S.
combat forces from the 2d Infantry Division. However, in order toimprove interoperability, build relationships among ROK and US forces,
as well as send a powerful message of alliance resolve to the Kim Family
Regime, rotating U.S. forces could be integrated with the frontline ROK
divisions in various alternating locations. This would provide U.S.
forces with a combat mission focus and small unit operational experiencethat is being lost with the end of the Iraq war and the drawdown in
Afghanistan. Such a mission would be good for morale of U.S. troops
and would sustain the small unit combat skills necessary to operate
across the spectrum of conflict.
Conclusion
The problem on the Korean peninsula has little chance of being
resolved as long as the Kim Family Regime remains in power. It is
unlikely to change due to the nature of the regime and is even moreunlikely to seek peaceful reunification that would threaten its existence.
It has continually demonstrated that it will not negotiate in good faith andit will never give up its nuclear program. If those assumptions areproved wrong then there is a chance that there could be peacefulreunification and the Joint Vision of Presidents Lee and Obama could be
realized.
However, if the assumptions become fact then the Alliance faces adaunting challenge in the future because some form of conflict is likely,from a high intensity war through the complex challenges of collapse
resistance to reunification. Before peaceful reunification, war or regime
collapse occurs it is likely that the north will continue to conduct
provocations to gain political and economic concessions in order toattempt to ensure regime survival.
To deal with the complex situation on the Peninsula there is one
overriding condition that is necessary for diplomatic as well as military
success and the ability to reach the desire end state of reunification: A
strong ROK-U.S. Alliance. The strength Alliance must be sustained inorder to deter war, defend against, provocation or attack, and overcome

90 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

the resistance and the humanitarian crisis that will occur as the ROK
government ultimately resolves the “Korea Question.”
Furthermore, the ROK and U.S. governments cannot become
preoccupied with stovepipe or single issues. It has to look at theinterrelationship of all problems that emanate from North Korea from thenuclear and missile programs and proliferation, illicit activities,
provocations and propaganda, starvation and human rights and deal withthe entire problem and orchestrate all activities so as to remain focus on
the end state. To do this it needs an overarching structure that allows
orchestration, provides strategic and unified policy focus and thendevelops and implements way and means that can be effectively
employed. This organization must maintain the Joint Vision ofreunification and ask the key question to assess all actions:
How does this organization or action support achieving the joint
vision of a reunified Korean Peninsula?
A reunified Korea is the only way to reach long-term peace andstability on the Korean Peninsula. If it can be reached peacefully it willsave tremendous amounts of blood and treasure. But if it cannot bereached without conflict it will take a strategy to get from here there.
Notes:
1

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is popularly but
unofficially known by its geographic designation in the north, as is the Republicof Korea (ROK) in the south.
2

The phrase “Korea question” is derived from the 1953 Armistice Agreement,
Section IV, paragraph 60, which states: “In order to insure the peacefulsettlement of the Korean question [emphasis added], the military Commandersof both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concernedon both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement issigned and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of bothsides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle throughnegotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, thepeaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” (http://www.intellnet.org/
resources/korean_war_docs/armistic.htm). The Korea question refers to a final
political solution as to how the people of Korea will chose to govern themselves.
3

Han S Park, ed. North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 15 in which Han S. Park describes Juche as
theology. See also the Korea military newspaper “Kuk Pang Ilbo” editorial on

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15 March 1999, p. 6. Chuje’s (Juche) basic concept is this: “Man rules allthings; man decides all things.” “The Kim Il Song Chuche ideology is based onthese precepts: In ideology Chuche (autonomy); in politics, self-reliance; in
economics, independence; and in National Security: self-defense.” See also
Mattes Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington: Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994), p. 324., “Kim Il Sung’s
application of Marxism-Leninism to North Korean culture and serves as afundamental tenet of the national ideology. “Based on autonomy and selfreliance, chuch’e has been popularized since 1955 as an official guideline forindependence in politics, economics, national defense and foreign policy.”
4

Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions 1950-2007,”(Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL 30004) April 20,
2007, p. CRS-4. This report is the most comprehensive chronology of known
North Korean provocations through 2007.
5

Ibid., p. CRS-6.

6

Ibid., p. CRS-8 and 10.
Ibid., p, CRS-17 and 32.

78

Ibid., p. 15 and 21.

9

http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2954
278&cloc=joongangdaily|home|newslist1.
10

Kim Jong-un Gave Direct Orders to Interfere in S.Korean Polls,” ChosunIlbo, June 13, 2012, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/13/
2012061301573.html
11

U.S., Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” http://www.
state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.
12

Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun - North Korea’s Social
Classification System, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
Washington, DC, June 2012.
13

Joint Communiqué, The 42d US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,
October 8, 2010, Washington, D.C., http://www.defense.gov/news/d201010083
usrok.pdf
14David S. Maxwell, “Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean
Peninsula,” thesis, National War College, Washington, DC, April 2004, p. 14.
15

Department of Defense, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” Washington, DC,
January 5, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

92 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013

16

“Joint Statement of the 2012 United States - Republic of Korea Foreign andDefense,” Washington, DC, June 14, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2012/06/192333.htm.
17

Maxwell, p. 89-94.

18

Chosun Ilbo, “Seoul Practices Striking N.Korean Command Posts,” June 12,2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/12/2012061201136.
Html.
19

Donald Greenlees and David Lague, “Trail Led to Macao as Focus of North
KoreanCorruption,”
New
York
Times,
April
13,
2007
http://www.nytimes..com/2007/04/13/world/asia/13macao.html?_r=5&ref=asia&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slog&oref=log
in.
20

Department of Defense, “United States, Republic of Korea and Japanese
Naval Exercises Announced,” June 13, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=15367.
21“N. Korea warns over South Korea-U.S. drill” United Press International,
June 18, 2012 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/06/18/NKorea-warns-over-South-Korea-US-drill/UPI-13261340040197/#ixzz1yE9IY
W4R.
22

N. Korea sees US arms buildup, vows to bolster defences,” Bangkok Post,
June 18, 2012 http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/news/298575/n-korea-sees-usarms-buildup-vows-to-bolster-defences.
23“USFK Suggests Keeping Combined Forces Command,” Chosun Ilbo, June
14, 2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/14/201206140
0652.html. OPCON transfer has always been a misnomer and this article is oneof the first to allude to it. It has really all about the dissolution of the war
fighting HQ, the Combined Forces Command. This transformation has been
gradually taking place in the face of the continuous threat of War or Regime
Collapse – both of which require an effective and unified allied response.
24“Seoul, Washington to Combine Missile Defense,” Chosun Ilbo, June 18,
2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/18/2012061800501.
Html.
25

“USFK Wants to Keep Artillery Brigade North of Seoul,” Chosun Ilbo, June18, 2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/15/201206150
0652.html.

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26

“U.S. to deploy more attack helicopters, missile assets in S. Korea, ” Yonhap,
June 12, 2012 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/12/90/
0301000000AEN20120612003000315F.HTML.
27“S. Korea, U.S. Seek To Transform Front-Line American Unit Into Joint
Forces,” Yonhap, June 15, 2012, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/15/0301000000AEN20120615001751315.HTML,94 International Journal of Korean Studies  Spring 2013