AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 218

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

09 September 2015

Editorial Committee:
Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GUIDELINESFOR JAPAN-US DEFENSE
COOPERATION AND JAPAN’S DEFENSELEGISLATION IN 2015

Yoji Koda

Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIA・ The Guideline improves JDSF-US Forces
cooperation by establishing a standing Alliance
Coordination Mechanism and considers many
new security challenges such as C4ISR andCyber.
・ The Defense Bills are attempts to realize newdefense initiatives to meet demanding
requirements and will open the way toenhanced JSDF-USF bilateral operations.
・ These initiatives will lead Japan toward afunctioning and robust security posture to better
cope with complicated international situations.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

PrefaceOn 27 April 2015, the new Japan-US Defense Guideline (The Guideline)
was finalized and approved by the relevant Japanese and American ministers
and secretaries. At the same time, new defense legislation (“Defense Bills”)
remains under deliberation in the Japanese Diet’s House of Councilors as ofAugust this year. The Defense Bills are expected to be approved by the end of
the current Diet session in mid-September, and to be enacted thereafter.
The Guideline and the Defense Bills will open an “ever-closed door,” andwill lead Japan toward a functioning and robust security posture to better copewith complicated international situations.

The Guideline- Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)
There are many new initiatives that will improve and enhance JSDF-USForces (USF) cooperation. The most important among them is the establishmentof a standing ACM. Yes, there were some ACM-like organizations before, but
most of them were ad hoc or based on case-by-case situations. Since the natureof our alliance is dynamic and complex in order to handle various international
challenges and threats, our two governments and militaries have to make thealliance more realistic and flexible. In order to establish a real functioning
bilateral security posture, continuous coordination between the two sides isessential. In this context, the new ACM will surely be a key to futureenhancement. This brings our bilateral alliance up to NATO’s level, where allnecessary coordination is maintained on a 24/7 basis.
- No Geographical Constraints
Next is the basic tenet of Japan-US defense cooperation that eliminates
all geographical constraints. It is crystal clear that, in theory, any military shouldbe able to operate in any area on this planet in order to protect its own country ornational interests. Of course, in the actual execution of operations, an objective
area such as “the region surrounding Japan” will be set for practical purposes.
However, when taking into account the global nature of Japan’s nationalinterests and the operational characteristics of our alliance partner’s forces, the

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

attempt by the Government of Japan (GOJ) to remove the geographicallimitations should be viewed positively. This will provide the GOJ with more
flexibility to make vital security decisions.
- For the Future
There are many other new security initiatives in the Guideline besides theabove two, such as C4ISR and Cyber, but many of them have already been
mentioned in various defense forums, so I will not discuss them here.
That said, though, there is some room for future improvement. First is thefact that, although practical tenets are incorporated into the Guideline, its main
focus seems to over-emphasize Japanese territorial defense. Another feature ofthe defense of Japan, which guarantees Japan’s economic survival and the safe
arrival of USF reinforcements in this area, remains ambiguous. It is also unclear
whether strategic mission sharing and force posture between the JSDF and USF,i.e., “Shield and Spear”, will be firmly maintained or not.
A second area of concern is the weak consideration given to China’s Anti
Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy. It is appropriate not to single out China or
A2AD but, since the two are the main causes of regional instability, the Guideline
should have incorporated some provisions regarding China and A2AD.

The Defense Bills- Non-Constitutional Initiatives
The GOJ has launched challenging legislative attempts to realize new
defense initiatives that will meet demanding requirements and improve Japan’s
future security environment.
Nonetheless, the scope of the change that the GOJ is trying to introduce
is not as radical as has been widely reported in the Japanese and international
media. Some newspapers in Japan report about it as if the GOJ is seeking to
make a thoroughgoing change to the long-familiar policy of “Individual Self
Defense (I-Self Defense) only” and fully introduce “Collective Self Defense(C-Self Defense)”; however, in reality, this is not true.
There are several new initiatives in the GOJ Defense Bills that havenothing to do with C-Self Defense, but simply expand the scope and range of the

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

JSDF’s operations while remaining within the current security framework, inorder to better contribute to the international community.
The non-Constitutional initiatives, which are only applicable to JSDF
operations in peacetime, include:(1) protection of Japanese citizens overseas,(2) protection of USF military equipment,(3) participation in non-UN-led international peace keeping efforts and otherrelated operations.
Another significant issue is logistic support provided by the JSDF toforeign forces - both US and others - who are engaged in military operations not
involving a direct attack on Japan but where there is also great potential of aserious impact on the safety and security of Japan.
- New Legislation
Last but not least, one noteworthy initiative is new standing legislation to
enable the GOJ to deploy the JSDF for international peace maintenance efforts
and operations during contingencies. Due to an absence of related standinglaws, the GOJ has had to pass new legislation to cope with each crisis situation,
thereby deploying the JSDF in a case-by-case and ad hoc manner. This newlegislation will enable the GOJ to dispatch the JSDF to participate in international
security efforts far more effectively and promptly than before.
- A Constitutional Initiative: C-Self Defense
A key issue in the Defense Bills is the right of Japan to pursue both I-SelfDefense and C-Self Defense under situations and conditions defined by the UN
Charter. The most important prerequisite to employ force in this framework isbased on a dynamic occurrence of security incidents, such as: (1) a direct armed
attack against Japan or (2) an armed attack against a nation with close relations
to Japan, such as the US. With regard to the latter case, there must be a clear
indication of danger that an attack on friendly forces could eventually jeopardize
Japanese lives and could overturn the universal right of human beings to pursue
their freedom and welfare.
In this regard, realistic cases for the JSDF to exercise C-Self Defense will
be fairly limited in general. However, what is important for Japan and the US is

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

the fact that the right to exercise C-Self Defense, even in a limited manner, will
open the way to much more enhanced and robust JSDF-USF bilateraloperations. In this context, a key to the real enhancement of bilateral operations
under the new security policy umbrella will be the GOJ’s sound evaluation ofeach situation in order to then authorize the JSDF to exercise C-Self Defense ornot.
- For the Future
After the enactment of the Defense Bills, the JSDF could be viewed as apartly-completed ship, and there is still much to be built and improved upon such as gray-zone scenarios, the limited use of C-Self Defense, the highthreshold to authorize I-Self Defense, and many others. In parallel with theJSDF’s accumulation of operational experience, the GOJ should take necessary
corrective actions.

SummaryThere are still some outstanding issues regarding the Guideline and theDefense Bills. However, the GOJ’s two significant defense policy initiatives will
surely send the right signals to potential adversaries, and will help Japan and theUS develop new and functional deterrence towards them.

Yoji Koda is former Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, and retired fromJMSDF at a rank of Vice Admiral in August 2008. He is currently serving as anadvisor to National Security Secretariat of GOJ.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary5