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RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTSSingapore | 25 May 2021

Japan’s Weapons Transfers to Southeast Asia: Opportunities andChallenges
Victor Teo*

Riding on the rise of neo-conservatism in Japan, the Abe government decided in 2012 that it was vitalfor Japan to acquire greater autonomy and independence for the sake of its technological sector,
particularly those related to the manufacturing of weapon systems. In this picture, a Japanese Navysailor walks next to a gun on Japan's missile destroyer JS Sazanami during the inauguration of joint
naval exercises with the United States and India in Chennai on July 10, 2017. Picture: Arun Sankar,
AFP.

* Victor Teo is Project Research Fellow at the Beyond The Cold War Project housed at the
University of Cambridge’s Centre for Research in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences.
He was previously Visiting Senior Fellow under the Wang Gungwu Visiting Fellows
Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY•

Japan’s long history of indigenous weapon development and export was curtailed by
Japanese law and the US-Japan alliance after the Second World War.

•Japan’s re-emergence as a weapon exporter is fuelled by desires to increase Japanesecapabilities, counteract China’s rise, hedge against possible future strategic
abandonment by the US, fund next-generation weapon research, and foster Japan’s
global leadership and influence in Southeast Asia.

•

Tokyo’s weapon exports have been more successful through Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) transfers than through commercial deals.

•

Using its ODA to the region, Japan is promoting the transfer of weapon systems, naval
vessels and surveillance planes, particularly to Southeast Asian claimant states in theSouth China Sea.

•

These transfers help raise the naval operational capabilities of the recipient states. But
they are unlikely to deter China sorties into disputed waters and will probably increaserisks of confrontations in regional waters.

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JAPAN’S RE-EMERGENCE AS A WEAPONS EXPORTER
Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan had had a tradition of importing foreign technology andadopting it for her own modernisation.1 This national obsession2 stimulated industrial growthand cultivated technological development, and over time, nurtured the institutions and practices
of indigenisation and diffusion of technology. This enabled Japan to close the capabilities gap
with the West.3 By the 1930s, Japan had built a fleet powerful enough to challenge the US
Navy.4After the Second World War, Japan’s wartime industrial capacity was reoriented wholly
towards domestic economic reconstruction. Due to Cold War exigencies, the United States(US) restored Japan as an important strategic actor, but Washington remained wary about
Japan’s industrial capacity and technological prowess, and kept a close eye on thesedevelopments. By 1967, Japan’s Diet promulgated the Three Principles on Arms Exports,
limiting Japan’s defence exports.5 During the Cold War, Japan’s defence exports were intended
only for the US-Japan alliance during the Korea and Vietnam Wars and for projects subsumed
under the alliance, such as the FSX fighter project6 and items (such as gyroscopes) used in
Patriot missiles.7
In the post-Cold War era, Japan’s defence industry has been beset by the twin problems oflimited demand in Japan due to tight defence budgets, and lack of access to co-development
partners and economies of scale for increasingly expensive weapon systems. The latter was
directly due to the ban on arms transfers (which was removed in 2014).8 Under Abe’s new
doctrine of pro-active pacifism, the Japanese government revised the ‘three principles ontransfer of defence equipment and technology’ in 2014, and promulgated a new Development
Cooperation Charter that gives Japanese Overseas Developmental Assistance (ODA) a‘strategic edge’ in 2015.9 As such, Japan’s ODA, including those to South China Sea (SCS)
claimant states, can now include weapon systems 10 to boost their maritime capacity andsurveillance capabilities.
It is important to note that weapon transfers to Southeast Asian countries from Japan are notnew. Commercial shipping from Japan and other nations has often suffered from piracy attacks
in the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden.11 In this regard, Tokyo has since 2006 provided
aid on an ad hoc basis to certain Southeast Asian states (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines
and Vietnam) to improve their maritime security – mostly using technical cooperation andfunds to build up infrastructure such as ports or the purchase of equipment (communicationequipment, range finders, speedboats, hand thermal imagers, X-ray machines).12 Japan also
extended a loan to Indonesia to purchase three patrol vessels in FY2006 (JP¥1.9 billion), billed
as “civilian items” for the prevention of ‘piracy, maritime terrorism and proliferation of
weapons’.13
Riding on the rise of neo-conservatism in Japan, the Abe government decided in 2012 that itwas vital for Japan to acquire greater autonomy and independence for the sake of its
technological sector, particularly those related to the manufacturing of weapon systems. In
order to revive its domestic defence industry, Japan saw the need for a viable export market toscale up manufacturing to make its products cheaper to domestic and foreign customers. To
that end, it has tried to enter the global arms market by advertising Japan’s submarines (Soryuclass) to Australia and its planes (P-1 and US-2) to Germany, the United Kingdom, New
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Zealand, Greece and France. Within Asia, Japan has tried to transfer weapons and radarsystems to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
There are six reasons why Japan wants to revive her defence industry: (1) Manage the strategic
rise of China; (2) Increase Japan’s strategic independence under the rubric of US-Japan allianceand hedge against possible strategic abandonment by the US; (3) Improve the effectivenessand capability of Japanese forces; (4) Fund next-generation weapon research; (5) Foster
Japan’s global leadership and influence; and (6) Cultivate a politically favourable role forTokyo in Southeast Asia.
JAPAN’S WEAPON TRANSFERS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
Appendix I provides an overview of Japan’s attempts to transfer significant defence systems
to Southeast Asia14 and beyond from 2012, including both successful and unsuccessful deals.
Successful transfers include donations (or items granted outright), assistance (subsidised/cofunded items) and commercial sale of naval vessels, aircraft and radar systems. Japan has also
approached European and Oceania countries to sell limited defence hardware (P-1 AntiSubmarine Warfare [ASW] Aircraft and the US-2 Seaplane), but it has not been very
successful. Most of these countries chose to buy from American firms. Japan’s success lies
overwhelmingly in transferring her used equipment, particularly naval assets to Southeast
Asian states, especially the SCS claimants as detailed below.
The Philippines:15 Under President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), The Philippines saw its
relations with Japan strengthen significantly from 2012 onwards. Tokyo had signed bilateralagreements with Manila even before the Weapon Exports Ban was lifted in 2014.16 In 2013,
under the first phase of the joint Japanese-Philippines Maritime Safety Capability Improvement
Project (MSCIP) designed to strengthen the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Japan provided
Manila with ten Japan-built 44.5 meters multirole response patrol vessels (MMRV), considered
as Parola-class by The Philippines and Bizan-class vessels by Japan. The contract for thesevessels was worth JP¥18.7 billion (US$172 million), 85% of which was funded by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA).17 The Philippine Navy has designated the vessels
for law enforcement, environmental and humanitarian missions, and maritime security
operations and patrol missions.18 The second phase of the MSCIP was signed on 7 February
2020, involving a contract worth JP¥14.55 billion yen (US$132.57 million) with a JP¥7
(US$64.2 million) JICA loan. Tokyo will build two 96-metre Kunigami-class (or Kunisakiclass) patrol ships for the PCG by 2022.19
In 2013, Japan agreed to lease two retired TC-90 surveillance aircraft to The Philippines, andas part of the leasing deal, hosted a training programme at the Tokushima air base to train thePhilippine crew to operate the aircraft. The terms of the deal changed over the course of 20172018, when Japan donated five TC-90 Beecher Turbo-prob aircraft as part of its ODA to help
Manila build its surveillance capacity.20 Japan has used these aircraft since the early 1970s, andonly managed to transfer them officially after the amendment of the export law.
Japan further responded to a Philippine request for used Huey helicopter parts in June 2017.
The deal involved transferring about 40,000 units of different parts of retired JASDF Vietnam
war-era Hueys, worth about JP¥50 million (US$461,000).21 The transferred parts enabled The
Philippines to restore several helicopters back to operational status, thereby ensuring their fullserviceability and readiness. 22 The Philippine Air Force Chief Lt. Gen. Rozzano Briguez
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indicated that spare parts would restore up to a maximum of seven Hueys to full mission
capable status, transport and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance missions of thePhilippine Air Force (PAF).23
The first successful commercial deal for Japan in Southeast Asia was the sale of early warningradar technology to The Philippines. Under a contract between the Philippine Department of
National Defense (DND) and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) in 2018, Manila
purchased four MELCO-manufactured air radar systems as part of the “Cooperation to
Enhance The Philippines’ Capacity in Vigilance and Surveillance” efforts based on JapanPhilippines “Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology”.24 The weapon
system was originally reported to cost between JP¥1 to 2 billion25 but by 2020, the entire
package was stipulated to cost JP¥10 billion (US$92.2 million). Of the four air defence radarsystems, three will be improved versions of the FPS-3 radar system and one will be the TPSP14 air defence system. The former will be deployed in fixed localities to detect incoming
fighter jets or missiles, while the latter will be mounted on a mobile platform (such as a vehicle
or a ship).26
Vietnam: In 2014, Vietnam and Japan elevated their relations to Extensive StrategicPartnership. In 2015, Vietnam took delivery of six second-hand fishery patrol vessels fromJapan as part of a JP¥500 million (US$4.6 million) ODA grant to improve her maritime
security. Japan MSDF ships along with US vessels have been making port calls at Cam Ranh
Bay since 2016.27
In October 2020, Japan announced that it had reached an agreement to export technology andweapons to Vietnam. While its actual details have yet to be announced, Vietnam-Japan
cooperation is focused on maritime security, with Japan offering to export offshore patrol
vessels, maritime patrol craft, radar and surveillance equipment and communications andinformation system. In July 2020, JICA agreed to loan Vietnam JP¥36.6 billion (US$349
million) to finance the procurement of a second batch of six patrol vessels for the Vietnam
Coast Guard (VCG) by 2025.28 Vietnam has also expressed an interest to acquire second-hand
American P3 ASW aircraft from Japan, although Tokyo is keen to sell her more advanced
domestically produced P-1 aircraft to Hanoi too. Purchasing the P1 will help boost Japan’s
ambition as a weapon exporter. It is not clear how far they have progressed on this front.
Indonesia: In 2006, Japan transferred three small patrol vessels to Indonesia’s marine police
to combat piracy and terrorism. Japan announced in February 2020 that Tokyo will donate amaritime patrol vessel Hakurei Maru, a 499-ton purposely built Fishery Surveillance Patrol
Vessel to Indonesia’s Coast Guard. By end-2020, Japan was to have provided an additionalJP¥2.2 billion to upgrade Indonesia’s Coast Guard Fleet but the pandemic has delayed thisfrom happening in 2020. 29 There are reports that Indonesia has expressed an interest in
acquiring ShinMaywa US-2 Seaplane from Japan, but so far there has been no official
confirmation of this.
On 30 March 2021, after a meeting between Indonesian and Japanese Defence and Foreign
Ministers, both sides announced ambitions to work more closely on maritime security.30 Tokyoand Jakarta concluded a tentative US$3.6 billion deal for the purchase of eight Mogami-classstealth frigates worth US$450 million each, four of which are to be delivered by Japan by 20232024, and another four to be built in Indonesia after that. 31 If actualised, these multi-role
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frigates will improve the Indonesian navy’s capability on the high seas. This agreement
however has yet to be officially confirmed by the Japanese or Indonesian authorities.
Thailand: Thailand has reportedly expressed an interest in acquiring ShinMaywa US-2
Seaplane, P-1 ASW planes and Mitsubishi Electric's FPS-3 fix warning and control radarsystems from Japan. However, to date, there has been no successful deal made between thetwo countries.
Malaysia: In November 2016, Japan pledged to donate two Offshore Patrol Vessels from theJapanese Coast Guard to Malaysia, and these were delivered in 2017. There were reports in2017 that Malaysia was interested in acquiring second-hand PC-3 planes from Japan, but thesereports were subsequently denied by Malaysia’s Ministry of Defence.
IMPLICATIONSJapan’s emergence as weapons exporter: Japan faces competition for almost every categoryof weapon export from Western and Asian competitors. While the Japanese items are often
technically more advanced, they are almost invariably costlier.32 Tokyo’s endeavour to becomea more important strategic actor through weapon exports has been more successful throughODA transfers than through commercial deals. The inability or reluctance of most Southeast
Asian states to pay top dollar for Japan’s weapon systems means that sustained exports canonly be possible if Tokyo is prepared to export on terms that most competing global arms
companies cannot afford to offer (i.e. providing them for free, or heavily subsidising them ortransferring the weapons as second-hand equipment).
As a new kid on the block, Japan faces considerable difficulties displacing the US and Russia
as the dominant weapons supplier commercially. The Philippines for instance has imported
weapons from the US, 33 Russia, 34 India, 35 and South Korea. 36 Likewise, Vietnam is asignificant client of Russia, acquiring 78% of her weapons from Russia during the 2010-2018
period.37 South Korea is emerging as a formidable competitor, at least in terms of naval vessels.
Apart from the cost issue, Southeast Asian countries have other considerations too, such as thedesire to develop their domestic defence industrial capacity, and the exigencies of geopolitics.
For instance, the Thai military has opted to acquire Chinese S26T diesel-electric Yuan-classsubmarines instead of the technically more advanced Soryu submarines from Japan, albeit thedeal has been delayed because of budget difficulties.
Enhanced strategic deterrence: The patterns of Japan’s weapon transfers to Southeast Asia
suggest a clear strategic imperative. Tokyo wants to improve the capabilities of Southeast
Asian claimant states in the SCS disputes with China, and prevent those states with tense
relations with the US (such as Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand) from falling further into
China’s strategic orbit. Tokyo has signed agreements with the SCS claimant states (Vietnam
and The Philippines) to assist their maritime needs. These sets of relationships will likely growand hence these states are likely to be “locked” into a de facto (as opposed to a de jure) defence
relationship with Japan for the foreseeable future. Tokyo’s assistance to Indonesia also
provided an alternative at a time when Indonesia-US relations were tense (until 2020) andBeijing was courting Jakarta with defence assistance. Likewise, Japan’s reach-out to Bangkok
stems out of its concern about Thailand tilting too much towards Beijing as Thailand-US
relations remain relatively estranged, since the 2014 coup.38
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While these transfers might be good for Japan and Southeast Asian states to build up deterrence
capabilities against the Chinese navy, there are costs involved. Southeast Asian states risk
becoming proxies in the Sino-Japanese rivalry, i.e. some SCS claimants have now become
defence partners of sorts with Japan, leaning towards Tokyo to “balance” against China, either
overtly or tacitly.
From the Southeast Asian perspective, certainly donations and grants of second-handequipment are welcome. However, they might not want to see ODA assistance loans being
increasingly tied to weapon purchases at the expense of ODA dedicated to infrastructure or incountry public goods investment. While this is still not an overt policy by Japan, it is clear thatthe ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is increasingly linking ODA to Japan’s strategicneeds. Hence, the question is whether weapon-related ODA is necessarily beneficial for theSoutheast Asian country concerned. There are two considerations here: (1) Whether theassistance will greatly enhance the recipient country’s operational capabilities, and (2) Whether
this assistance through weapon exports is made in lieu of other important development-related
ODA. Appendix II shows that Vietnam (36.7%), The Philippines (15.7%) and Indonesia(16.9%) have benefitted from a lion’s share of Japanese ODA since 2014. Excluding the latest
agreement between Indonesia and Japan, the share of funds to subsidise weapons sales toVietnam, The Philippines and Indonesia, expressed as a percentage of JICA’s ODA to
Southeast Asia, is around 17.6%. This is not an insignificant amount, and reflects an additional
avenue whereby Japan can increase her strategic influence in the region.
Reviving Japan’s defence industry: The immediate beneficiaries of Japan’s defence industry
revival would be the Japanese companies involved such as Mitsubishi Electric, Kawasaki,
ShinMaywa and Marine United Corporation. With the necessary government funding, they
will be able to do cutting-edge R&D, build better systems and stay at the forefront of latest
defence technologies. Japan would be able to acquire valuable indigenous capabilities andprestige if their domestic companies are capable of producing advanced weaponry, and becomecompetitive in the international export market. Tokyo’s attempt to export to Australia her Soryu
submarines failed for two reasons: domestic politics related to how the award of the contracts
would affect jobs in Australia and some Australian elites who felt uncomfortable or thoughtthat it was unwise to buy from Japan. Without a substantial export market beyond Southeast
Asia, the revival of Japan’s defence industry might be more difficult than the Japanese
government envisages as production cannot be scaled up sufficiently to achieve the kind ofself-sustaining dynamics that Western and Russian weapons firms enjoy.
Insofar as Southeast Asia is concerned, Tokyo will find it hard to sell arms and weapon systems
without heavily subsidising or donating the sales involved or providing loans for purchase.
While Japan will no doubt find solace in the political support of the Southeast Asian recipientsof Japanese ODA, there is no guarantee that their arms acquisition henceforth would
increasingly or exclusively be from Japan. Russian arms will continue to be attractive becauseof their lower costs and Moscow’s no-strings-attached policy, and American companies havean edge because of Uncle Sam’s patronage.
The upside, however, is that Japan might find it easier to “upgrade” its own defence arsenal asSoutheast Asia will become the prime destination for Japan’s obsolete equipment. The Japan
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) will benefit in the sense that the Japanese government can ask its
domestic industry to construct new weapons to replace the equipment donated out as part ofJapan’s ODA. It might even be plausible that in the future, Japan will apportion increasing
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amounts of ODA funds towards the donation of weapons, and reduce ODA in other categories
to make the programme more sustainable.
Japan’s domestic politics: The main political beneficiaries would be neo-conservative
elements in the LDP. If successful in their efforts to revive the fledging defence industry, they
will gain significant momentum in their political platform of “normalising” 39 Japan going
forward, and will certainly enjoy the support of the military and the industry involved in these
programmes.
Increased militarisation in South China Sea: Southeast Asia has already been seeing an arms
race of sorts prior to these transfers from Japan. From 2006-2017, the competitive arms
acquisition is driven not only by China-threat perceptions, but also by domestic challenges invarious countries related to Islamic fundamentalism, separatist challenges and territorial
grievances. 40 Arms purchases in the region are generally focused on upgrading weapon
systems in the air force and the navy, particularly in Anti-Access/Area Denial and Maritime
Domain Awareness. Japan’s transfers to Southeast Asia are increasingly falling into thiscategory. While the improvement of the capabilities of SCS claimant states might be importantto the balance of power at sea between these states and China, there are considerable risks too.
For one, would such transfers embolden the claimants to take more drastic measures against
perceived Chinese incursions or provocations and lead to an escalation in naval skirmishes? If
that should happen, would it provide a pretext for greater involvement and military presenceby the US?
In the longer term, these dynamics will have repercussions for Sino-Japanese relations as well
as for the dynamics of intra-Southeast Asian relations.

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Appendix I
Record of Japan’s Recent Weapon Donations, Assistance or Commercial Export since2014# Shaded Grey Boxes denote successful weapons transfer deals that have taken place or are inprocess; Unshaded Boxes denote unsuccessful attempts.
## For thoroughness, items transferred before the 2014 Export Ban lift are also included toillustrate the history of Japan’s weaponry transfers to the region over the last two decades.
Japan was in the planning stages to undertake some transfers at the onset of the second Abeadministration (e.g. the leasing of TC90 planes to the Philippines) but had to institute the 2014
Export Weapons Ban lift to legitimise the transfer after the fact.
Item

Transaction Details

Result (shaded if
successful)

Mitsubishi Radar
System3 x FPS-3 Fix warning andcontrol radar and 1 x TPSP14 air defence mobile
system for JP¥10 billion(US$92.9 million)

Originally scheduled fordelivery by May 2020 but
reportedly delayed
because of Covid-19
pandemic

Japan Ground
Self Defense
Force Helicopter(Original Name:
UH-1H “Huey”)
Spare-parts

Donation of 40,000 piecesof parts; Deal isapproximately worthJP¥5.3 billion yen(US$43.6 million).

Reported in August 2017;
Delivered in March 2019

The
10 Patrol Vessels
Philippines (PhilippinedesignatedPalora-class)

Built for PCG by Japan
Marine United Corporation
for JP¥12.7 billion(US$118 million) with 85%(JP¥10.8) funded by Japan
International Cooperation
AgencyShips were launchedbetween October 2016 andAugust 2018.

2 leased in March 2017(and later donatedofficially); 3 others donatedby Japan in March 2018.
This marks the first time adonation of used military
9

Total 5 retired JSDF
aircraft donated to The
Philippines; Pilots andmaintenance crew weretrained initially as part ofthe lease deal. The(Original Japan
Maritime Self
Defense Forcedesignated Bizan
Class Patrol
Craft)
Japan Maritime
Self Defense
Force
TC-90 Aircraft(Original Name:
Beechcraft Model

Enough to restore
approximately 5-7
helicopters

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Vietnam

90 King Air
Twin-Engine
Turboprop
aircraftequipment is made since
the weapon export ban was
lifted in Japan.

Philippines was originally
supposed to pay
USD$28,000 a year tolease them.

94-metre MultiRole Response
Vessels (MRRV)
patrol ships(Japan Maritime
Defense Forces
designate
Kunigami-class ofJapan Coast
Guard)The Philippines
Total

PCG awarded contract to
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries to build two
MRRVs. Contract is worthJP¥14.55 billion$132.57 million.

Status in progress

KawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

Reported in 2018 that Japan Status pendingis keen to export P1 aircraft
to new markets, including
Vietnam

Kawasaki /Lockheed Martin
P-3C AntiSubmarine
Maritime Patrol
Craft

Reported in 2015 that
Vietnam is interested inacquisition of used P-3C
aircraft from the US orfrom Japan

Status pending

Used Patrol
Vessels(Japan Coast
Guard or Former
Japan Maritime
Safety Agency
designatedTsugaru-classpatrol vessel)

Donation of 2 former
Japanese Fisheries Agency
patrol boats and 4 regularcommercial fishing boats
worth JP¥500 million(US$4.6 million)

Vietnam first asked Japanfor patrol boat aid in April
2013. Japan FM Fumio
Kishida visited Vietnam in2014 in the aftermath of
the flare-up over China’s
Haiyang Shiyou 981
deployment in the South
China Sea. Delivered in2015 to the Vietnam
Fisheries Resources
Surveillance Force basedin Hai Phong City

JP¥40.65 billion (excluding
the 5 retired TC90s as theirvalue has not been
stipulated)&
Four JapaneseCommercial
Fishing Boats
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Thailand

Sale of 6
additional
Naval Vessels for
Coast Guard(Japan Coast
Guard designatedAso-class 79
meters long
vessels)
Vietnam Total

JICA to fund 40-year-old
loan of JP¥36.6 billion(US$349 million) to
Vietnam to procure 6
purposely built Naval
vessels for Vietnamese
Coast Guard in October
2025.

Reported July 2020; Janes
has reported that thiswould be a collaboration
between Mitsui and T7 (aMalaysian conglomerate).

Mitsubishi Radar
Systems

Mitsubishi Electric's FPS-3
Fix warning and control
radar (Modified version)

KawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

In June 2016, Japan
Defence Minister Nakatani
visited Bangkok whereThai officials expressedinterest in P1 Patrol Craft.

Tensions in US-Thairelations mean thattransfers between Japanand Thailand are strictly
bilateral. Bangkok had
backtracked on an MOU
on maritime security in
2013; Deal did notmaterialise.

ShinMaywa US-2
Air-sea rescue
Amphibian(Short-takeoff andlanding boatplanes)

In June 2016, Japan
Defence Minister Nakatani
visited Bangkok whereThai officials expressedinterest in US-2 Seaplane.

Deal did not materialise.

ShinMaywa US-2
Air-sea rescue
Amphibian(Short-takeoff andlanding boatplanes)

Indonesia Defence Minister
remarked in 2015 that US-2
was suited for Indonesia’s
geographical conditions.

Status pendingJP¥37.1 billion
Thailand howeverawarded the contract toLeonardo Company tosupply the NATO
Chief of Staff of Japan's Air standard TAR31 DL
Self Defence Force,
Surveillance radar instead.
Yoshiyuki Sugiyama
travelled to Bangkok in
November 2016 tonegotiate this.

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Japan is reportedly
considering to ask
Indonesia to replace India
as US-2 co-producer.

Indonesia

Fishery Patrol
Vessel Hakurei
Maru

Marine Police
Patrol Vessels(*2006)

Mogami-class
Frigates (Built by
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries)

Indonesia
Total
Malaysia

Kawasaki /Lockheed Martin

Reported in February 2020
that the 1993 499-tons
purposely built Fishery
Surveillance Patrol Vessel
to be donated to Indonesia
Coast Guard. This vessel is
not valued.
Japan to provide additionalJP¥2.2 billion (US$20.3
million) to training andmaintenance to combat
illegal fishing after China
and Indonesia clashed overfishery rights in Natuna
Island in January 2020.
Aid to construct 27-metre
bullet proof long vessels
with maximum speed of 30
knots that can carry crew of
10 + 2 prisoners to be madeavailable to Indonesia
Marine Police

Exchange of Notes
signalling handover ofvessel on 14 February
2020. Initial training forIndonesia Coast Guard to
be provided by Japan fromMarch. The vessel was
handed over to Indonesia
in February 2021.

Indonesia requested this in2003 and 2004; Vessels
specially constructed forIndonesia to fight piracy;
Japan government
announced this to be
exception to the Three
Principles on Arms
Export.

A potential US$3.6 deal
that could see Japantransfer up to 8 Mogamiclass frigates to Indonesia
was discussed. Each ofthese cost 450 million each.
4 Mogami class frigates
could be delivered by 20232024 while the other 4
would be manufactured
under license in Indonesia.
JP¥2.2 billion

Details of this deal have
yet to be officiallyconfirmed by either theJapanese or the Indonesian
government but news of
the deal was released bythird-party news sites inMarch and April 2021.

In early May 2017, several
websites reported that

Malaysia Air Force Chiefreported in May 2017 that

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P-3C AntiSubmarine
Warfare (ASW)
Patrol Craft

sources in Japan said that
Malaysia asked for
donation of old P-3C
planes.

Malaysia received no offer
of such donation or offer
of P-3C from Japan.

Offshore Patrol
Boats (OPV)In November 2016, Abe
told visiting PM Najib thatJapan would provide two
patrol vessels for free to
Malaysia.

Transferred from Japanese
Coast Guard in April andJune 2017

Japan competed against
Germany and France in2014 to supply Australia
with
10 Soryu Submarines worth
AU$20 billion (US$18.7
billion)ShinMaywa US-2 Reported in 2018 that
Seaplane
Greece was interested in(Short-takeoff and buying this planelanding boatplanes)
Kawasaki
India purchased eightP-1 Maritime
Boeing P8 planes in 2009
Patrol Aircraft
and these were delivered in
2015; In 2016, India bought
4 more Boeing P8 planes
for delivery to begin in
2020

Lost the bid to French
shipbuilder Direction desConstructions Navales
Services (DCNS) in 2016

ShinMaywa US-2
Air-sea rescue
Amphibian(Short-takeoff andlanding boatplanes)

Discussions started 2010;
India decided not tojointly produce US-2;
renewed push in 2014 but
India has not agreed topurchase the plane as at
2019 (Abe-Modi)
meeting, because ofbudget constraints.

1 x 92m Ojikaclass Patrol
Vessel1 x 87m Nojimaclass Patrol
VesselAustralia

GreeceIndia

MitsubishiKawasaki
Soryu Class (BlueDragon)Attack Class
Submarines

Possible contract US$1.3
billion for Japan to supply
12 units of the US-2 planes
under discussion; In
January 2016, India
reportedly turned down
Abe’s proposal that India
and Japan jointly
manufacture the US-2 plane(last stage assembly done to
reduce cost) and the plane
be marketed collectively as
13

Status unknown

Did not materialise

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India-Japan strategic aid (tobe funded by Japanese
ODA).
Negotiations throughout
2015 for UK Royal Air
Force to acquire P-1

UnitedKingdom

KawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

FranceKawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

Under consideration in2018 to replace its Breguet
Atlantique turboprop antisubmarine aircraft

KawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

Under consideration in2018 to replace its
Lockheed Martin P-3C
Orion planes

KawasakiP-1 Maritime
Patrol Aircraft

Requested technical specs
for consideration in 2016

GermanyNew
ZealandUnitedStates

MH53E

Used F-15

Japan sold parts from 2
decommissioned MH53E
back to the United States
Reported in 2018 that Japanis considering reselling its
F-15 planes to fund F35
purchases and that theUnited States is consideringreselling these planes toSoutheast Asian states.

14

UK chose to purchase US
Boeing P-8 Poseidon
instead
In talks to jointly develop
an ASW plane withGermany; unlikely toacquire since Germany
decided against P-1 in2020.
Decided against P-1 in2020 because it would
take 5 years to become
operationally ready for its
military.
Announced in 2018 thatthey have chosen US
Boeing P8 Poseidon
insteadCompleted in 2015
Reported in October 2019that US Congress has
approved a package to
upgrade 98 of Japan’s
existing 202 F-15 fighter
jets to “Japanese Super
Interceptor
Configuration”. Unclear if
sale of F-15 back to theUnited States is still underconsideration.

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Appendix II
Japan’s ODA Towards Selected Southeast Asian Countries (2014-2020)(Administered by Japan International Cooperation Agency)
SE Asia
Total
361946

Vietnam¥ millions
15561543%

Philippines¥ millions
67295
18.6%

Indonesia¥ millions
54642
15.1%

Myanmar¥ millions
25109
6.9%

Cambodia¥ millions
13587
3.8%

2015-16% of SE Asia ODA

394655

192910
48.9%

36485
9.2%

54194
13.7%

41608
10.5%

15599
4%

2016-17% of SE Asia ODA

356076

185695
52.2%

30368
8.5%

41992
11.8%

30871
8.7%

12219
3.4%

2017-18% of SE Asia ODA

310463114697
36.9%

47413
15.3%

53753
17.3%

34407
11.1%

13047
4.2%

2018-19% of SE Asia ODA

326615

77177
23.6%

60135
18.4%

74307
22.8%

59446
7.8%

17600
5.4%

2019-20% of SE Asia ODA

349317

44922
12.9%

89258
25.6%

75986
21.8%

75897
21.7%

20037
5.7%

Total ODA
2014-20% of SE Asia ODA
2014-2020

2099072

771016330954354874267338

92089

36.7%

15.7%

16.9%

12.7%

4.4%

37100

40650

2200

N/A

N/A

4.8%

12.2%

0.6%

N/A

N/A

2014-15% of SE Asia ODA

Total Value of
Arm Transfers so
far (Derived by
Appendix One Excluding items
which have notbeen quantified
such as donatedships / aircrafts)Value of Arms
Transfer as % of
JICA administeredODA 2014-20

The country value shows total value of JICA programmes in each country including TechnicalCooperation (Training Participants, Experts, Study Teams, Provision of Equipment, JOCV and other
Volunteers and other costs), Finance and Investment Cooperation (disbursement), and Grants in the
stipulated fiscal year. Figures exclude JICA’s cooperation for multiple countries and multiple regions
and organisations. Yearly figures are derived from JICA’s annual reports available here:
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/index.html

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1

The most famous of these Japanese missions abroad is the Iwakura Mission, where Japan sentdelegations to both the US and the Great Britain to learn from the West. For details, see LSE
STICERD Paper, “The Iwakura Mission in Great Britain”, https://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/is/IS349.pdf ;also see James McClain, A Modern History: Japan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), pp 119-182.
2
This success of importing technology and modernising Japan enabled Japan to escape the fate ofcolonialism and emerge as the sole Asian imperial power with her own colonies at the turn of the 20th
century. The period leading up to the First World War provided the most lucrative opportunity forJapan, with the emergence of the first Zaibatsus that helped Japan build up the industrial capacity to
manufacture weapons. The key to successful weapon exports is however not just technological knowhow but also an export market to keep the industry sustainable.
3
Richard Samuels, Rich Nation Strong Army: National Security and the TechnologicalTransformation of Japan (Itaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp 79-129.
4“IJN Imperial Japanese Navy / ( Nihon Kaigun )” Global Security,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ijn.htm.
5This outlined situations where arms exports are prohibited: (i) Communist Bloc Countries; (ii)Countries under UN Arms Embargo resolution; and, (iii) Countries involved in or likely to be
involved in conflicts.
6
See Michael Green, Defense Production, Arming Japan: Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search forAutonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
7
Sebastien Roblin, “Japan Strikes First Arms Export Deal — Can Tokyo Find More Buyers For Its
Pricey Weapons?”, Forbes, 18 November 2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/09/11/japan-strikes-first-arms-export-deal-cantokyo-find-more-buyers-for-its-pricy-weapons/?sh=32d2798c2a5e.
8
Christopher Hughes (2008) Chapter Four: Japan's Military-Industrial Complex, The Adelphi Papers,
Vol 48 Issue 403, pp67-78.
9This paper focuses mainly on Japan defence transfers to Southeast Asia during Prime Minister Abe
and Suga’s tenure. Where relevant, the paper takes into account defence equipment transfers inprevious decades such as those made to Indonesia to assist the fight against piracy in the Straits ofMalacca, as well as in the overall discussion when referring to patterns of Japan’s technology export.
10
I use the phrase “weapon system” to denote the transfer of the various defence items, particularly
aerial or naval vessels. While the transfer usually involves hardware, Japan invariably also provides
training in terms of usage and maintenance to the recipient country involved, hence the phrase implies
that the transfer often extends beyond just hardware, to include expertise and know-how.
11
See Adam Mccauley, The Most Dangerous Waters in the World”, Time Online,
https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/ ; From 1993 to 2013, 41% of the world’s piracy
attacks happened in Southeast Asia.
12
Jun Ishimaru, “Japan’s Cooperation for ASEAN Region in Areas of Maritime Security”, Paper
Presentation ASEAN Regional Forum, https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Annex-7-Japans-ODA-Cooperation-for-the-ASEAN-Region-in-the-Areasof-Maritime-Security-9th-ISM-MS.pdf.
13
Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s weapon-export industry takes its first steps”, East Asia Forum, 30 October
2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/10/30/japans-weapon-export-industry-takes-its-first-steps/.
14
In this context, it is worth mentioning that Japan also offers military training for the maintenanceand handling of equipment that she intends to donate such as planes or naval vessels.
15
It is important, however, to contextualise weapons transfers to The Philippines. Manila has received
weapons from the US (prior to 2016), South Korea (Pohang-Class Corvettes), India (missiles) Russia(assault rifles and trucks) and China (small arms). The Philippines have turned to China and Russia
for arms after its traditional ally, the US refused to stock its military requests. The Chinese offer
involved a donation of US$14 million worth of military hardware to The Philippines, besides a soft
loan for US$500 million in Chinese arms. This is insignificant compared to the United States. Since
2002, the US has provided over US$800 million worth of second-hand small arms, ships and16

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helicopters, and radios, armour vests, night-fighting equipment and coastal radars, peaking at US$82
million of aid in 2015. See Tim Kelly & Nobuhiro Kubo, “Exclusive: Japan seeks Southeast Asia
clout with chopper parts for Philippines military – sources”, Reuters, 10 August 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-philippines-exclusive-idUSKBN1AQ0W3;
Beijing’s weapons offer to the Philippines was tailored mostly for counter-drug operations. See“China offers $14 million arms package to the Philippines: Manila's defense minister”, Reuters, 20
December 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-arms-idUSKBN1490HN.
16This was done with the revision of Article 116-3 of the Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Law.
17
Xavier Vavasseur, “MHI To Build 2 Multi-Role Response Vessels for The Philippine Coast
Guard”, Naval News, 19 Feburary 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/02/mhi-tobuild-2-multi-role-response-vessels-for-the-philippine-coast-guard/.
18“Coast guard acquires 44-meter patrol vessel from Japan”, GMA News Online, 18 August 2016
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/578122/coast-guard-acquires-44-meter-patrolvessel-from-japan/story/.
19
Vavasseur, op. cit.; In addition to transfers of naval assets, since 2015, the JMSDF has held regularinteractions with their Filipino counterparts including cross-training between Japanese forces, thePhilippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard, as both organisations can benefit from combined
training in basic seamanship, damage control from fires and flooding, and marine navigation.
20
Mike Yeo, “Japan to bolster Philippine maritime security with TC-90 aircraft”, Defense News, 30
October 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/10/30/japan-to-bolsterphilippine-maritime-security-with-tc-90-aircraft/.
21
The transferred package included items such as airframe structures, dynamic power control, rotor,
hydraulic, electrical, and instrument systems.
22
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why the New Japan-Philippines Military Helicopter Parts Deal
Matters”, The Diplomat, 30 March 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-the-new-japanphilippines-military-helicopter-parts-deal-matters/.
23
Frances Mangosing, “Philippine Air Force receives Huey spare parts from Japan”, The Inquirer, 19
March 2019, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1097432/philippine-air-force-receives-huey-spare-partsfrom-japan.
24“Transfer of Air Surveillance Data to Philippines”, Embassy of Japan in Philippines, 28 August
2020, https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/11_000001_00188.html.
25
Walter Sim, “Japan wants to sell air defence radar equipment to the Philippines”, The Straits Times,
14 December 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-wants-to-sell-air-defence-radarequipment-to-the-philippines.
26“Mitsubishi wins contract to sell air radar system to Philippines”, The Asahi Shimbun, 26 March
2020, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13247035.
27
Sebastian Strangio, “Japan’s Suga Set to Authorize Arms Sales to Vietnam”, The Diplomat, 15
October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/japans-suga-set-to-authorize-arms-sales-to-vietnam/.
28
Jon Grevatt, “Japan, Vietnam Prepare defence-trade agreement”, Janes Defence News, 15 October
2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/japan-vietnam-prepare-defence-tradeagreement.
29
Dian Septiari, “RI to acquire Japanese patrol ship by years end”, The Jarkarta Post 17 Feb 2020,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/17/ri-acquire-japanese-patrol-ship-year-s-end.html.
30
See, Press Release by the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta, “Second Japan-RI Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Minister of Defense (2+2) Meeting, https://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news21_11.html ;also see Sebastian Strangio, “With an Eye on Beijing, Japan and Indonesia Sign Arms Export
Equipment”, The Diplomat, 31 March 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/with-an-eye-on-beijingjapan-and-indonesia-sign-arms-export-equipment/.
31
Sebastian Strangio, “Japan Could Deliver 8 Cutting-Edge Frigates to Indonesia”, The Diplomat, 8April 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/japan-could-deliver-8-cutting-edge-frigates-toindonesia/.

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32

For instance, in the recent Philippine deal, Japan’s Mitsubishi 4 radar offerings cost the same as fiveradar deals by Lockheed and Israel’s Elta. See Sebastian Roblin, “Japan Strikes First Arms Export
Deal – Can Tokyo Find more Buyers for its Pricey Weapons”, Forbes, 11 September 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/09/11/japan-strikes-first-arms-export-deal-cantokyo-find-more-buyers-for-its-pricy-weapons/?sh=1dff2b712a5e.
33
The US is by far the largest arms donor/supplier to The Philippines. Since 2000, the United States
has donated close to US$1billion ranging from surveillance planes, drones and boats. Relations
between Manila and the West deteriorated over President Duterte’s campaign against drugs whereextrajudicial killings were conducted by security forces in The Philippines, with Washington
suspending a sale of 20,000 rifles to Manila. The Russians and Chinese both made overtures to The
Philippines during Duterte’s term with weapon transfers that would help in the war on drugs, and thefighting in Marawi City against Islamic fundamentalists. In total, Russia and China donated more than
11,000 assault rifles and trucks to Manila. However, the US has recently reaffirmed that it willcontinue selling arms to The Philippines despite the criticisms. Nick Aspinwall, “US to sellPhilippines arms despite no human rights reforms”, Nikkei Asia, 24 Februrary 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/US-to-sell-Philippinesarms-despite-no-human-rights-reforms.
34
Russia has been offering to sell weapons to Southeast Asian states since the mid-1990s. In
particular, Moscow approached The Philippines to sell fighter jets, submarines and helicopters on a
cash or barter basis but has been unsuccessful. Manuel Mogato, “Philippines, Russia sign two militarydeals”, Reuters, 25 Oct 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-russia-defenceidUSKBN1CU1K6; also see Raissa Robles, “Russia offers arms technology to the Philippines with‘no conditions’ as US ties falter”, South China Morning Post, 24 Oct 2019,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3034460/russia-offers-arms-technology-philippinesno-conditions-us-ties.
35
Kiran Sharma, “Philippines set to be first buyer of India-Russia cruise missile”, Nikkei Asia,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Philippines-set-to-be-first-buyer-of-IndiaRussia-cruise-missile.
36
South Korea has exported 12 FA-50 light attack aircraft to Philippines in 2014, and all aircrafts
were delivered by 2017. Ruben Santos, “South Korea completes delivery of FA-50PH squadron”,
Philippines Update, 31 May 2017, https://www.update.ph/2017/05/south-korea-completes-deliveryof-fa-50ph-squadron/17851; South Korea transferred a Pohang Class Corvette to The Philippines in
2019. The ship is now known as BRP Conrado Yap (previously ROKS Chungju) and is widely
acknowledged to be the most heavily armed ship in the Philippine Navy, and brings Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) capabilities to the Philippine Navy. The Philippines Navy will acquire two frigates(BRP Jose Rizal in 2020 and the BRP Antonio Luna in 2021) from ROK’s Hyundai Heavy Industries.
Additionally, Manila is thinking of acquiring two more advance Corvettes from ROK’s HHI, andanticipates the donation of two additional Pohang Class Corvettes. See JC Gottinga, PH to buy 2 navy
corvettes from South Korea, may receive 2 more, Rappler, 24 August 2019.
37
Meaghan Tobin, “From Russia with guns: why is Southeast Asia buying arms from Moscow, not
Washington?”, South China Morning Post, 12 Oct 2019, https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/politics/article/3032608/russia-guns-why-southeast-asia-buying-arms-moscow-not-washington.
38
Zachary Abuza, “America should be realistic about its alliance with Thailand”, War on the Rocks, 2January 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/america-should-be-realistic-about-its-alliance-withthailand/.
39
The process of “normalisation” would essentially revolve around three key policy aspects for neoconservative politicians in Japan: (1) Eroding pacifism through the rehabilitation of the use of militaryforce in Japan; (2) Adapting US-Japan alliance to serve Japan’s needs and globalising Japan’s security
presence; and (3) Revising the Constitution to enable Japan to address the security challenges of the
future. For a more in-depth discussion, see Victor Teo, Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global

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Power: Democratic Resilience and the US-China Challenge (Singapore: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2019),
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6190-6#authorsandaffiliationsbook.
40
Felix Heiduk, “An Arms Race in Southeast Asia?”, German Institute for International and Security
Affairs, August 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/an-arms-race-in-southeast-asia/.

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