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Combating Ransomware

CombatingRansomware

A Comprehensive Framework for Action:
Key Recommendations from theRansomware Task Force
Prepared by the Institute for Security and Technology

Chapter Title

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Combating Ransomware

Contents

Chapter Title

A Note from RTF Co-Chairs
Executive Summary
Introduction
Ransomware as a National Security Threat
Understanding Ransomware
Ransom Payments
Cyber Insurance and Ransomware
The Role of Cryptocurrency
A Global Challenge
The Threat Actors
Existing Efforts to Mitigate Ransomware Attacks

3-4
5-6
7-19
8
11
12
13
14
15
16
18

A Comprehensive Framework for Action:
19-48
Key Recommendations from the Ransomware Task Force eter ransomware attacks through a nationally and
Goal 1: D
internationally coordinated, comprehensive strategy
21
 isrupt the ransomware business model and
Goal 2: D
decrease criminal profits
28
Goal 3: Help organizations prepare for ransomware attacks
35
Goal 4: Respond to ransomware attacks more effectively
42
A Note on Prohibiting Ransom Payments
Conclusion
Summary of Recommendations

49-50
51
52-54

Acknowledgments
Appendices
Appendix A: Cyber Insurance
Appendix B: The Cryptocurrency Payment Process
Appendix C: Proposed Framework for a Public-Private
Operational Ransomware Campaign

55-56
57-72
58-61
62-67

Glossary

73-76

Endnotes

77-81

68-72

Short cut: To go directly to each section in the PDF please click on the section title in the Contents.
This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License (see terms here).

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Combating Ransomware

A Note from the RTF Co-Chairs

A Note from the RTF Co-Chairs
We are honored to present this report from the Ransomware Task Force. This report details acomprehensive strategic framework for tackling the dramatically increasing and evolving threat ofransomware, a widespread form of cybercrime that in just a few years has become a serious national
security threat and a public health and safety concern.
Ransomware is not just financial extortion; it is a crime that transcends business, government,
academic, and geographic boundaries. It has disproportionately impacted the healthcare industry
during the COVID pandemic, and has shut down schools, hospitals, police stations, city governments,
and U.S. military facilities. It is also a crime that funnels both private funds and tax dollars toward
global criminal organizations. The proceeds stolen from victims may be financing illicit activities
ranging from human trafficking to the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Tackling ransomware will not be easy; there is no silver bullet for solving this challenge. Most
ransomware criminals are based in nation-states that are unwilling or unable to prosecute thiscybercrime, and because ransoms are paid through cryptocurrency, they are difficult to trace.
This global challenge demands an “all hands on deck” approach, with support from the highest
levels of government.
Countless people around the world are already working tirelessly to blunt the onslaught ofransomware attacks. But no single entity alone has the requisite resources, skills, capabilities,
or authorities to significantly constrain this global criminal enterprise.
For this reason, we convened the Ransomware Task Force — a team of more than 60 experts
from software companies, cybersecurity vendors, government agencies, non-profits, and academic
institutions — to develop a comprehensive framework for tackling the ransomware threat.
Our goal is not only to help the world better understand ransomware, but to proactively andrelentlessly disrupt the ransomware business model through a series of coordinated actions,many of which can be immediately implemented by industry, government, and civil society. Acting
upon a few of these recommendations will not likely shift the trajectory, but the Task Force isconfident that implementing all of them in coordination, with speed and conviction, will make asignificant difference.
While we have strived to be comprehensive, we acknowledge there will be areas we have notaddressed, or on which we could not come to consensus. Prohibition of payments is the mostprominent example; the Task Force agreed that paying ransoms is detrimental in a number of ways,
but also recognized the challenges inherent in barring payments. Just as we have been grateful tostand on the shoulders of those that came before us, we hope our efforts and investigations will fuelthe thinking and recommendations of those that come after us.

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A Note from the RTF Co-Chairs

Combating Ransomware

We urge all those with the ability to act to do so immediately. The ransomware threat continues toworsen by the day, and the consequences of waiting to respond could be disastrous. More thanmoney is at stake; lives, critical infrastructure, public faith in the legitimacy of our institutions, theeducation system, and in many ways, our very way of life depends on taking action.
As a final note, we would like to offer our sincere thanks to the members of the Ransomware Task
Force, who responded to our call and generously dedicated their time and energy into developing therecommendations included in this report.
The Working Group Co-Chairs of the Ransomware Task Force.

John Davis,
Palo Alto
Networks

Megan Stifel,
Global Cyber
Alliance

Michael Phillips,
Resilience

Kemba Walden,
Microsoft

Jen Ellis,
Rapid7

Chris Painter,
The Global Forumon Cyber ExpertiseFoundation Board

Michael Daniel,
Cyber Threat
Alliance

Philip Reiner,
Institute for Security
and Technology

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Combating Ransomware

Executive Summary

Executive Summary
Ransomware attacks present an urgent national security risk around the world. This evolving formof cybercrime, through which criminals remotely compromise computer systems and demand aransom in return for restoring and/or not exposing data, is economically destructive and leads todangerous real-world consequences that far exceed the costs of the ransom payments alone.
In 2020, thousands of businesses, hospitals, school districts, city governments, and other institutionsin the U.S. and around the world were paralyzed as their digital networks were held hostage bymalicious actors seeking payouts. The immediate physical and business risks posed by ransomware
are compounded by the broader societal impact of the billions of dollars steered into criminal
enterprises, funds that may be used for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humantrafficking, and other virulent global criminal activity.
Despite the gravity of their crimes, the majority of ransomware criminals operate with near-impunity,
based out of jurisdictions that are unable or unwilling to bring them to justice. This problem isexacerbated by financial systems that enable attackers to receive funds without being traced.
Additionally, the barriers to entry into this lucrative criminal enterprise have become shockingly low.
The “ransomware as a service” (RaaS) model, allows criminals without technical sophistication to
conduct ransomware attacks. At the same time, technically knowledgeable criminals are conducting
increasingly sophisticated attacks.
Significant effort has been made to understand and address the ransomware threat, yet attackers
continue to succeed on a broad and troubling scale. To shift these dynamics, the international
community needs a comprehensive approach that influences the behavior of actors on all sides ofthe ecosystem, including deterring and disrupting attackers, shoring up preparation and response of
potential victims, and engaging regulators, law enforcement, and national security experts. We alsoneed international cooperation and adoption of processes, standards, and expectations.
This report outlines a comprehensive framework of actions (48 in total) that government and industry
leaders can pursue to significantly disrupt the ransomware business model and mitigate the impactof these attacks in the immediate and longer terms. These recommendations were collaboratively
developed by the Ransomware Task Force (RTF) — a broad coalition of volunteer experts fromindustry, government, law enforcement, civil society, cybersecurity insurers, and internationalorganizations — to provide a strategic framework for a systemic, global approach to mitigating theransomware problem.
While we have identified some recommendations as priorities, we strongly recommend viewing theentire set of recommendations together, as they are designed to complement, and build on each other.
The strategic framework is organized around four primary goals: to deter ransomware attacks througha nationally and internationally coordinated, comprehensive strategy; to disrupt the business modeland reduce criminal profits; to help organizations prepare for ransomware attacks; and to respond to
ransomware attacks more effectively.

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Combating Ransomware

Executive Summary

Priority recommendations
These priority recommendations are the most foundational and urgent; many of the otherrecommendations were developed to facilitate or strengthen these core actions:1.

Coordinated, international diplomatic and law enforcement efforts must proactively prioritize
ransomware through a comprehensive, resourced strategy, including using a carrot-and-stick
approach to direct nation-states away from providing safe havens to ransomware criminals.

2.

The United States should lead by example and execute a sustained, aggressive, whole ofgovernment, intelligence-driven anti-ransomware campaign, coordinated by the White House.
In the U.S., this must include the establishment of 1) an Interagency Working Group led by the
National Security Council in coordination with the nascent National Cyber Director; 2) an internal
U.S. Government Joint Ransomware Task Force; and 3) a collaborative, private industry-led
informal Ransomware Threat Focus Hub.

3.

Governments should establish Cyber Response and Recovery Funds to support ransomware
response and other cybersecurity activities; mandate that organizations report ransom payments;
and require organizations to consider alternatives before making payments.

4.

An internationally coordinated effort should develop a clear, accessible, and broadly adopted
framework to help organizations prepare for, and respond to, ransomware attacks. In some underresourced and more critical sectors, incentives (such as fine relief and funding) or regulation may
be required to drive adoption.

5.

The cryptocurrency sector that enables ransomware crime should be more closely regulated.
Governments should require cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, and over-the-counter (OTC)
trading “desks” to comply with existing laws, including Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money
Laundering (AML), and Combatting Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws.

The ransomware threat continues to worsen daily. The actions detailed in this report need to beenacted together as soon as possible, and must be coordinated at a national and international levelin order to have the necessary impact. We understand the gravity of this challenge, but we believethat if this framework is implemented in full, the international community could see a decrease in
the volume of these types of attacks in one year’s time. Proposing this framework is merely the
first step, and the real challenge is in implementation. With every recommended action we aimed
to work through the practical implications, and in most cases we present immediately actionable
recommendations. The Co-Chairs of the RTF welcome the opportunity to discuss these findings
and recommendations further to help achieve these goals.

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Introduction

Combating Ransomware

Introduction
Ransomware is a flourishing criminal industry that not only risks the personal and financial
security of individuals, but also threatens national security and human life. Businesses, schools,
governments, hospitals, and nearly every other type of institution are regularly targeted, disrupted,
and held hostage. The problem has steadily grown worse in recent years, and in 2020, nearly
2,400 U.S.-based governments, healthcare facilities, and schools were victims of ransomware,according to the security firm Emsisoft.1 Multiple organizations have issued reports on the costsof ransomware, and while their exact figures vary, all consistently show a steady increase in thenumber of attacks — and damaging economic impact.

21

287

$350

$312,493

Average downtime
due to ransomware
attacks2(Coveware)

Average days it takes
a business to fully
recover from an attack3(Emsisoft)

Victims paid in
ransom in 2020
— a 311% increaseover the prior year4(Chainalysis)

The average payment
in 2020­— a 171%
increase compared
to 20195(Palo Alto Networks)

DAYS

DAYS

MILLION

In 2020, nearly

2,400

U.S.-based governments,
healthcare facilities, and schools
were victims of ransomware

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

Ransomware as a National Security Threat
The costs of ransomware go far beyond the ransom payments themselves. Cybercrime is typicallyseen as a white-collar crime, but while ransomware is profit-driven and “non-violent” in the
traditional sense, that has not stopped ransomware attackers from routinely imperiling lives.

Threats to Critical Infrastructure:
Ransomware attacks have shut down the operations of critical national resources, including militaryfacilities. In 2019, a ransomware attack shut down the operations of a U.S. Coast Guard facility for
30 hours,6 and in February 2020, a ransomware attack on a natural-gas pipeline operator halted
operations for two days.7 Attacks on the energy grid, on a nuclear plant, waste treatment facilities, oron any number of critical assets could have devastating consequences, including human casualties.

Risks to Public Health:Hospitals and other medical centers are a favorite target for ransomware criminals. In 2020, 560
healthcare facilities were hit by ransomware attacks in the U.S. alone.8 These incidents not only costthe victims millions of dollars in recovery, but they also have led to delays in patient treatment, andpossibly loss of life. In September 2020, a ransomware attack led to the failure of computer systems
at Duesseldorf University Clinic, requiring critically ill patients to be relocated to other facilities, andin the United States, an attack caused delays in treatment for cancer patients at the University ofVermont Medical Care and other facilities.9

Societal Impact: Targeting the Health Care Sector
In October 2020, hackers compromised the computer networks of roughly a dozen medical centers
across the United States. These attacks forced the cancelations of surgeries and disruptions inpatient care; the University of Vermont Medical Center (UVM) was forced to furlough or reassign
about 300 employees as the hospital’s networks were taken offline in the midst of the COVID
pandemic, and patients were turned away from scheduled cancer treatments and other medical
procedures. The company’s President and COO estimated the attack would cost roughly $64 million
before systems were fully restored.

“It feels like we are all alone and no one understands
how dire this is,”– UVM Nurse to the New York Times.10
Extensive cyber vulnerabilities across the healthcare industry create potentially lucrative targets
for malicious ransom-seeking actors, driving the significant increase in attacks against healthcare
facilities. Government policy choices regarding ransomware should focus on this critical threat:statistical analysis reveals that ransomware-driven delays in care in these healthcare systems
invariably contributes to a loss of life due to the inability of patients to receive timely care.11 This
illuminates the risk to human life posed by these attacks – and yet the attackers continue toundertake these assaults with near impunity.

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

Diversion of Vital Public Resources:
Ransomware attacks on municipal governments are common. Such attacks not only divert publicresources into illicit economies, but the victims incur costs that far exceed the ransoms alone. For
example, in 2018, the City of Atlanta paid $50,000 in Bitcoin as ransom, but the total cost of therecovery exceeded $2.6 million, as the city was forced to pay for digital forensics, increased staffing,crisis communications, and other costs.12 A ransomware attack similarly debilitated the City ofBaltimore, leading to a range of negative impacts.

Loss of Data/Privacy:
Ransomware criminals are increasingly expanding their attacks to include “double extortion,” whereby
they first demand ransom to de-encrypt an organization’s data, then threaten to release the data on
to the internet unless additional ransom is paid. At the start of 2020, only one major ransomware
group exfiltrated data for a second extortion, but by the end of the year, at least 17 other groups used
this tactic.13 The potential exposure of their data and ensuing legal liability (particularly in countries
with strict data security laws) may be a critical factor in leading some victims to pay the ransom.

Disruption of Schools and Colleges:
The education sector has become a top target: during 2020, nearly 1700 schools, colleges, anduniversities in the United States were impacted by ransomware.14 According to a report by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and theMulti-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), 57% of all reported ransomware
attacks in August and September 2020 were targeted at K–12 schools.15 These attacks not only
disrupt the schools’ operations, but often include threats to leak confidential student data on theinternet.

Societal Impact: Cities Under Siege
In May 2019, a ransomware attack on the City of Baltimore took critical services offline. The cityrefused to pay the ransom, but the recovery lasted several weeks and cost $18.2 million to restore
systems back to their original state.16 Beyond the financial burden on taxpayers and the shutdown ofservices, the city’s inhabitants were no longer able to pay water bills, property taxes, or parking fines.
Some residents who could not pay their bills saw their homes go into foreclosure. Databases tracking
street drugs were knocked offline, people were unable to pay water bills and home sales were
delayed.17 The city’s 911 dispatch system was knocked offline, and emergency calls made during thattime were not recorded. The criminals threatened to publicly release data stolen during the attack
to exert pressure on city officials to pay, in an early example of the “double extortion” tactic that has
since become prevalent.18

Economic Impact:
Ransoms paid by private firms siphon millions of dollars toward criminal enterprise every year. The
total amount paid by ransomware victims increased by 311% in 2020, reaching nearly $350 million
worth of cryptocurrency.19 However, the economic impacts go well beyond the costs of ransoms

9Introduction

Combating Ransomware

alone. Reported ransomware payments do not cover the costs associated with service downtime
and recovery. Total remediation costs are typically several times a ransom payment and are often
large enough to cripple many small businesses. In addition, money that flows to the criminal
networks creates second- and third-order economic effects, since those revenues go on to fundother types of crime.

FIGURE 1 Average ransom in USD

233,817250,000

111,605

84,1162018
Q436,295

2018
Q3

12,76250,000

6,733

100,000

41,198150,000

154,108

178,254200,000

5,974

IST

0
2019
Q1

2019
Q2

2019
Q3

2019
Q4

2020
Q1

2020
Q2

2020
Q3

2020
Q4

From The Coveware Quarterly Ransomware ReportSocietal Impact: K-12 Schools
Ransomware attacks on schools have devastating impacts, including loss of instructional time
and the leakage of sensitive data. In early 2021, a ransomware attack on the Buffalo Public School
system prevented 5,000 students from returning to in-person learning Monday and shut down online
learning for thousands more.20
Such attacks also add to budgetary challenges for already under-resourced districts: when
Mississippi’s Yazoo County School District paid $300,000 as a ransom to recover files encrypted
during a ransomware attack, the cost equaled roughly 1.5% of the district’s annual budget.21
The targeting of schools is not limited to the United States. In March 2021, a ransomware attack left
37,000 students in London and Essex without access to email or coursework. The attack targeted
The Harris Federation, which runs 50 primary and secondary schools in the UK.22 The perpetrators
are suspected to have stolen personal data about the organization, including financial details, andposted it on the dark web.23

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

Understanding Ransomware
Ransomware is a sub-category of malware, a class of software designed to cause harm to acomputer or computer network. CISA defines ransomware as “an ever-evolving form of malware
designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on them unusable.
Malicious actors then demand ransom in exchange for decryption. Ransomware actors often target
and threaten to sell or leak exfiltrated data or authentication information if the ransom is not paid.”24
Ransomware proliferates in diverse ways, including through exploitation of vulnerabilities, as well associal engineering tactics, such as “phishing” emails that deceive employees within an organization
to open attachments that launch the malware that then infects their networks. Once launched, themalware may connect to a command-and-control server to enable the criminals to move laterally
across networks and encrypt and/or exfiltrate the organization’s data. Ransomware victims are
typically prompted with a screen informing them that their data has been encrypted, with instructions
for how to restore their systems by sending payment via cryptocurrency. Not all attacks result indata encryption, but most do: a 2020 survey of 5000 IT managers found that 51% had been hit byransomware in the last year, and the criminals succeeded in encrypting the data in 73% of these
attacks, according to Sophos.25

Example of a ransomware lock screen

Ransomware victims are typically prompted with a screen informing them that their data has been encrypted,
with instructions for how to restore their systems by sending payment via cryptocurrency.

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Introduction

Combating Ransomware

Ransom Payments
A number of factors can influence whether victims agree to pay the ransom demand, including
whether they have cyber insurance, the quality of their data backups, and the estimated costs of thesystem outage. Legal considerations may also come into play: in the United States for example, firmsthat pay ransoms (and their facilitators) may find themselves in violation of regulations imposed by
the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC).26
Surveys of global IT professionals have found that, of the organizations reporting a ransomware
attack, 27% of victims chose to pay the ransom requested, with small variations at the regional levelin terms of the average amounts paid $1.18 million in APAC, $1.06 million at EMEA, and $0.99 million
in the United States).27
Victims may be more likely to pay if they are concerned their data will be made public. As a result, thetheft and threat of public disclosure of sensitive data — a tactic known as “double extortion” or “dataexfiltration” — has become an increasingly common tactic for ransomware attackers, as it intensifies
the pressure on entities already struggling to regain operational capacity and protect sensitive data.

FIGURE 2
Percent of attacks involving data exfiltration
Percent of cases without data exfiltration
Percent of cases with data exfiltration

A 2020 survey by Sophos of5000 IT managers found that

51%

100

75

had been hit by ransomware in the last year

50

Criminals succeeded inencrypting the data in

25

73%

0
2020
Q1

2020
Q2

2020
Q3

2020
Q4

From The Coveware Quarterly Ransomware Reportof these attacks.

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Introduction

Combating Ransomware

Cyber Insurance and Ransomware
The cyber insurance industry sells policies to firms to cover losses in the event of a ransomware attack
or other incident. Cyber insurance policies often include specific coverages for ransomware, including
for business interruption losses, data restoration costs, incident response costs, and for a ransom
payment, if one is made.
Ransomware attacks are the most common reported cyber insurance claim, according to Coalition, acyber insurance firm. In the first half of 2020, Coalition observed a 260% increase in the frequency ofransomware attacks among its policyholders, with the average ransom demand increasing 47% to an
average of $338,669.28
The role of cyber insurance in ransomware is complicated. Some argue that the “backstop” supportof insurance encourages ransomware attackers, as victims may be more likely to pay if their costs
are covered.29 There is evidence that attackers may target companies specifically because they haveinsurance; in an interview, a ransomware criminal affiliated with the prominent syndicate REvil (also known
as Sodinokibi) stated that targeting firms with cyber insurance was “one of the tastiest morsels.”30
On the other hand, more mature insurance providers typically require that their clients adhere to strong baseline
security practices, which can significantly reduce the disruption caused by a ransomware attack. They
also connect victims to recovery experts and law enforcement, and can leverage a variety of market tools,
such as co-insurance, to incentivize security standards and discourage organizations from paying ransoms.
The challenge is that not all cyber insurers are at the same level of sophistication, and some may evenview a lack of security baseline requirements to be a unique selling proposition. Given the prevalence
and cost of ransomware claims, it is rational to expect that the cyber insurance industry will eventuallyadopt security baseline requirements broadly as a standard expectation for insurability. When thisbecomes the status quo, insurers will play a more definitively positive role both in driving adoption of
better cyber hygiene, and in providing an important safety net for victims of attacks. However, it will taketime to achieve this maturity across the industry.
Acknowledging the ways in which cyber insurance may influence or shape organizational behavior
and the ransomware “kill chain”, the insurance-related recommendations in this report are designed toenhance the sector’s role in supporting comprehensive public and private action against ransomware,
while accelerating the cyber insurance market’s maturity, solvency, and expertise. For a more detailed
overview of cyber insurance, see Appendix A.

In thefirst halfof 2020,
Coalitionobserved a260%
with the averageransom demand
increasing

increase in the frequency ofransomware attacks among its
policyholders,

47% $338,669

to an average of

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

The Role of Cryptocurrency
The explosion of ransomware as a lucrative criminal enterprise has been closely tied to the riseof Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, which use distributed ledgers, such as blockchain, to tracktransactions. The use of cryptocurrency adds to the challenge of identifying ransomware criminals,
as payments with these currencies are difficult to attribute to any individual. Often the money does
not flow straight from ransomware victim to criminal; it travels through a multi-step process involving
different financial entities, many of which are novel and are not yet part of standardized, regulated
financial payments markets.
Ransomware criminals typically demand that victims send their ransom payments via Bitcoin,but after receiving the payment in a designated digital “wallet” (software that stores public andprivate keys), the criminals typically obfuscate these funds as quickly as possible to avoid detection
and tracking. Their methods include “chainhopping,” which involves exchanging funds in one
cryptocurrency for another using any of a variety of cryptocurrency exchanges. The funds canbe extremely difficult to trace after they have been exchanged, and to further shield themselves,ransomware actors may use money-mule service providers to set up accounts, or use accounts withfalse or stolen credentials.
Ransomware criminals can also obscure their transactions through cryptocurrency “mixing services,”
which muddy the public ledger by mixing in legitimate traffic with illicit ransomware funds. Somegroups will also demand payments in currencies known as “privacy coins,” such as Monero, thatare designed for privacy and make payments untraceable.31 However, privacy coins have notbeen adopted as widely as might be expected because they are not as liquid as Bitcoin and othercryptocurrencies, and due in part to regulation, this payment method may become increasingly
impractical.
Cryptocurrencies add to the challenge of ransomware because they are considered to be“borderless.” The cryptocurrency community is expressly focused on building a set of technologies
designed to reduce compliance and financial process costs. After obfuscating the extorted funds,
ransomware criminals may either withdraw the funds into hard cash, or because cryptocurrencies
have become increasingly common (and their value has been steadily rising), they may keep theirprofits in cryptocurrency and use them to pay for other illicit activities.
While cryptocurrencies are difficult to trace, blockchain analysis can help interpret public blockchain
ledgers and, with the proper tools, government agencies, cryptocurrency businesses, and financial
institutions can understand which real-world entities transact with each other. Blockchain analytic
companies are able to show that a given transaction took place between two different cryptocurrency
exchanges, for example, or between a cryptocurrency exchange and an illicit entity, such as a
sanctioned individual or organization. With blockchain analysis tools and Know Your Customer (KYC)
information, law enforcement can gain transparency into blockchain activity in ways that are notpossible in traditional finance.
See Appendix B: The Cryptocurrency Payment Process, for a more detailed overview of how
ransomware payments work, including where interventions could occur and how they could
undermine the ransomware business model.

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Combating Ransomware

15

A Global Challenge
Ransomware is a global challenge, as institutions in all sectors around the world are being
increasingly targeted. A single attack can also rapidly spread across borders, intentionally orotherwise: the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack affected 150 countries.32 A survey by security
firm Sophos33 found the nations with the highest percentage of organizations reporting ransomware
attacks in 2020 were India, Brazil, Turkey, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States. However,ransomware attacks occur frequently in Russia, Saudi Arabia, China, and nearly every other nation.34
Reducing the ransomware threat will require global cooperation due to the highly decentralized
nature of cryptocurrency, dispersed nature of the criminal networks involved, the internet’s basic
infrastructure, and the differing legal and regulatory regimes around the world. Ransomware
criminals are able to game the system by moving their operations to where legislation and cybercrime
enforcement are the most lenient. International institutions have begun to tackle this challenge: in
October 2020, for example, finance ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) called upon nations to
implement Financial Action Task Force standards to reduce ransomware and other cybercrime.35
However, more must be done to improve global cooperation, reduce safe havens, align international
standards, and ramp up enforcement.

FIGURE 3 2020/21 Confirmed Organization Ransomware Incidents

United Kingdom
29+ Events

United States
370+ Events

Brazil

9+ Events

Australia
15+ Events

2020/21 Confirmed Organization
Ransomware Incidents
1(log scale)

350+

Sources: Palo Alto Unit 42; Scitum; Cloudian; Black Fog; Recorded Future Incidents include victim organizations with data
published on leak sites or with publicly disclosed ransoms.

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Introduction

Combating Ransomware

16

The Threat Actors
The profitability of ransomware has attracted a diverse set of malicious actors, who have built athriving and evolving criminal ecosystem. While different ransomware attacks may seem similar, they
are often executed by a diverse array of attackers with highly variable motivations. Some areorganized into ransomware “gangs,” which, like other organized crime units, operate in one cohesive
team while developing and executing attacks.
Recent years have seen the rise of the “ransomware as a service” (RaaS) business model. Somenational governments have used ransomware to advance their strategic interests, including evading
sanctions. This diversity of threats increases the complexity of attributing and countering ransomware
attacks and highlights the need for broad pressure along the entire ransomware kill chain.

FIGURE 4 Ransomware “Kill Chain”
PRE-EXPLOIT

Recon

POST-EXPLOIT

Dev/Test

Sales/
Resales

PRE-EVENTInfrastructure
Setup & Ops

Initital
accessRansomware
Live

EVENT

Recovery

POST-EVENT

Source: World Economic Forum’s Partnership against Cybercrime in collaboration with Accenture

Ransomware-as-a-Service
Carrying out a ransomware attack does not require technical sophistication. “Ransomware as aservice” (RaaS) is a business model that provides ransomware capabilities to would-be criminals
who do not have the skills or resources to develop their own malware. In 2020, two-thirds of theransomware attacks analyzed by cybersecurity firm Group-IB were perpetrated by cyber criminals usinga RaaS model.36 This “as a service” model follows similar evolutions in the mainstream software andinfrastructure industries, which have seen success from “software as a service” and “infrastructure as aservice” business models.
In the RaaS model, there are at least two parties who establish a business relationship: the developer andthe affiliate. The developer writes the malicious program that encrypts and potentially steals the victim’s
data. The developer then licenses this malware to the affiliate for a fixed fee or a share of successful
ransom payments. The affiliate executes the attack and collects the ransom, potentially also including
additional business arrangements, like purchasing exploits or using cryptocurrency brokers and washers.

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

In this model, even a non-technical affiliate can successfully execute ransomware attacks by purchasing
the necessary exploits and malware. RaaS can be contrasted with more traditional ransomware gangs,
in which a cohesive team both builds the malware and executes the attack. The Sobinokibi, Phos,
Dharma, and GlobeImposter ransomware variants are all known to operate under the RaaS model.37

The Nation-State Nexus
Of particular interest to the Task Force was the relationship between ransomware and national
governments. Many ransomware criminals operate with impunity, as their countries’ governments
are unwilling or unable to prosecute this form of crime. In other cases, the organizations executing
ransomware attacks may be state-sponsored, and may in fact be helping nations evade economic
sanctions.38 For example, in an April 2021 announcement of new sanctions against Russia, the U.S.
Department of Treasury made a direct connection between Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB)
and ransomware hackers, noting that “to bolster its malicious cyber operations, the FSB cultivatesand co-opts criminal hackers, including the previously designated Evil Corp, enabling them to engage
in disruptive ransomware attacks and phishing campaigns.”39
Proceeds from ransomware may help finance terrorism, human trafficking, or the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.40 For these reasons, direct affiliation between ransomware attacks andgovernments is intentionally shrouded in secrecy, making attribution and accountability challenging.
Countering state-sponsored attackers will require broad application of “carrot and stick” methods andinternational cooperation.

Societal Impact: NotPetya
The 2017 NotPetya attack highlighted how this form of cybercrime can have far-reachingconsequences. The estimated financial losses exceeded $10 billion, but the true scale of the damage
was far greater. Though the attack was not strictly ransomware as it was not motivated by profit,
it did leverage ransomware code, cause the same type of disruptive impact, and present a screen
demanding a ransom.
The attack started in Ukraine, where computer systems at two major airports, bus stations, railways,
the postal service, and media companies were taken hostage. It infected ATM machines andpayment systems, and for the first time after 31 years, the radiation monitors at Chernobyl shut
down, forcing workers in hazmat suits to manually monitor radiation levels.41
The destructive virus was designed to spread, and soon shut down factories in locations as far away
as Tasmania. NotPetya affected Merck’s production of critical vaccines, and the company had to dip
into emergency stockpiles to meet demand. Doctors in Virginia and Pennsylvania were locked out ofpatient records and prescription systems.
Two years after the attack, railway and shipping systems in Ukraine still were not working at full
capacity. Packages that had been lost due to ransomware were still not found, and senior citizens
continued to miss pension payments as their records had been lost.
NotPetya was a stark example of how ransomware attacks can affect the very functioning of asociety, and erode the trust that citizens hold in public institutions.

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Combating Ransomware

Introduction

Existing Efforts to Mitigate Ransomware Attacks
Ransomware is not a new problem. As attacks have increased in prevalence and impact, significant
effort has gone into understanding and addressing the array of associated issues. This includes thedevelopment of technical tools, critical research on attacker groups and trends, best practice guides
for preparation, established threat intel sharing programs, and attack nullification efforts.
The security field has well-known, pre-existing resources for cyber hygiene,42 staff training,43 andsecuring resources.44 Cybersecurity firms can provide network monitoring, anomaly detection,and containment. Incident response teams have been established across government,45 industry,and nonprofits, and at a systemic level, federal funding, information sharing, and public-private
partnerships have been proposed to improve cyber response across organizations.46
Yet adoption of preparedness best practices remains limited, and ransomware attackers continue
to find sectors and elements of society that are woefully underprepared for this style of attack. The
sheer volume of content published on the topic of ransomware is part of the challenge; with somuch information and noise surrounding this threat, time- and resource-constrained organizations
and individuals struggle to identify the most relevant and accurate sources of useful information. In
addition, many guides are reportedly either too simple, too complicated and overwhelming, or not
specific to ransomware. Operational security and IT staff represented in the Task Force reported that
it is a struggle to find guidance that is truly actionable and feels relevant to their needs.
Significant effort remains to address the increasing risks posed by ransomware attacks. The
sheer volume of attacks hitting such a broad range of sectors leaves even private sector security
companies often lacking the capacity to respond to the number of requests for assistance. In
response, federal governments have taken steps to coordinate information sharing and raiseawareness around the risks posed by ransomware: for example, in January 2021, CISA unveiled theReduce the Risk of Ransomware Campaign to encourage public- and private-sector organizations
to implement best practices, tools, and resources that can help them mitigate ransomware risk.47
The U.S. The Dutch National Police, Europol, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab founded an initiative called“No More Ransom”, which provides decryption keys, information on ransomware, and preventative
advice, and has done so for years.48 The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre also provides useful
information and guidelines on how to mitigate ransomware.49 Coordinated global law enforcement
actions have led to isolated successes; in January 2021, for example, a coordinated effort led to thedisruption of the EMOTET botnet, a major component of ransomware criminals’ infrastructure.50
Despite these efforts, ransomware attacks have continued to grow almost unabated, and thecriminals behind them continue to operate with near impunity. What began as a relatively minor
nuisance to people and business is now causing losses in the billions of dollars, and attackers havecontinued to target critical public facilities like schools and hospitals. Solutions have been deployedin an uncoordinated, disjointed manner, with different sectors working on siloed solutions. The
ransomware threat cannot be stopped via piecemeal solutions; it needs the dedicated, coordinatedattention of experts, from policymakers to security engineers to industry leaders.

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A Comprehensive Framework for Action

Combating Ransomware

A Comprehensive Framework for Action:
Key Recommendations from the Ransomware Task ForceRansomware has become too large of a threat for any one entity to address; the scale and magnitudeof this challenge urgently demands coordinated global action. In response, in early 2021, the Institutefor Security and Technology (IST) convened the Ransomware Task Force (RTF), an interdisciplinarygroup of leaders, for a three-month sprint with the goal of producing a comprehensive frameworkof actionable solutions and recommendations to help public- and private-sector leaders reduce thethreats posed by ransomware in the near and long term.
This strategic framework aims to help policymakers and industry leaders take system-level action —through potential legislation, funding new programs, or launching new industry-level collaborations —that will help the international community build resistance, disrupt the ransomware business model,
and develop resilience to the ransomware threat.
The framework is organized around four goals: deter ransomware attacks through a nationallyand internationally coordinated, comprehensive strategy; disrupt the ransomware business modeland reduce criminal profits; help organizations prepare for ransomware attacks; and respond to
ransomware attacks more effectively.
These goals are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. For example, actions to disrupt theransomware payments system will decrease the profitability of ransomware, thereby helping todeter other actors from engaging in this crime. Conversely, without taking the recommended steps
to deter ransomware attackers, disruption will be harder to achieve. In a similar vein, many actions
taken to better prepare organizations for ransomware attacks, such as informing them about therisks, will also improve their ability to respond, while understanding more about how organizations
are responding to ransomware attacks will help improve organizations’ collective preparedness.
Thus, this framework should be considered as a whole, not merely a laundry list of potential
disparate actions.

Recommendations at a glance:
1. D eterRansomware
Attacks

2. D
 isrupt theransomware
business model

3. Help
organizations
prepare4. Respond to
ransomware
attacks
more effectively

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Combating Ransomware

A Comprehensive Framework for Action

A Note on the U.S. Focus and International Application
Ransomware, like our digital world, knows no bounds. All of these recommendations seek toleverage the power of multi-stakeholder collaboration, nationally and globally, to combat a crime thattranscends borders and attacks indiscriminately. Many recommendations, like enforcing complianceon cryptocurrency entities to drive ransomware actors out of business, will be unsuccessful without
international collaboration. A single country’s laws or capabilities will be insufficient to tackle thisglobal threat.
While the Ransomware Task Force involved participants from around the world, the majority ofmembers were based in the United States and were primarily familiar with the U.S. legal and policy
landscape. As a result, and to help ensure our recommendations are specific and actionable, thefindings and recommendations detailed in this report have a decidedly U.S.-focused lens. However,
we believe many of the recommendations can and should also be translated to other jurisdictions.
The effort to combat ransomware will only be successful if carried out through a coordinated,international effort. The following recommendations carry universal themes, like improving
ransomware preparedness in organizations. We encourage agencies and organizations in othernations — including cybersecurity, law enforcement, government and industry leaders — to adapt
these recommendations to their own contexts, and work across borders to coordinate and tackle
what is truly a global challenge.

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Combating Ransomware

A Comprehensive Framework for Action: Goal #1

21

Goal #1
Deter ransomware attacks through anationally and internationally coordinated,comprehensive strategy
The number of actors capable of conducting ransomware attacks is large and growing, and to
curb the growth of this threat in the long-term, steps must be taken to systemically discourage
ransomware attacks. This deterrence must be multilayered and rely on all instruments ofnational power. We propose a coordinated, effectively messaged, relentlessly executed
deterrence campaign directed from the senior-most levels of the U.S. Government in real-time
collaboration with international partners. The actions recommended here are to be directly
supplemented by the disruption activities recommended in Goal #2.

Objective 1.1:

Signal that ransomware is an international diplomatic and enforcement priority
International governments must cooperate more purposefully and publicly to send an
effective signal to ransomware criminals that this form of cybercrime is a diplomatic andlaw enforcement priority. A clear declarative policy will serve as a foundation to otherinternational and national-level efforts.
Action 1.1.1: Issue declarative policy through coordinated international diplomatic statementsthat ransomware is an enforcement priority.
Using existing high-level forums (such as the G7, G7 Finance Ministers, G20, Interpol, Europol, and others51),
senior-level officials and ministers from major nations should agree to one or more joint declarations condemningransomware as a national security concern and/or a threat to critical infrastructure, and commit to pursue
ransomware actors. There are several international52 precedents53 for this declarative policy. This declaration
should outline the steps signatories will mutually agree to take, and include an agreement for each nation to create
a domestic action plan.
Timing: Begin immediately to lay the groundwork; declarations would be issued when the groups meet.
Lead: State Department, National Security Council (NSC), Treasury, Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and Department of Justice, in coordination with international partners.

Action 1.1.2: Establish an international coalition to combat ransomware criminals.
A standing international coalition composed of representatives from key nations is necessary as a conduit
for sharing information and other resources related to the ransomware threat. Such a coalition should include
representatives from law enforcement using successful models like Europol’s Joint Cybercrime Action
Taskforce,54 but also including the intelligence community, and private industry. It should carry out key shared

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22

tasks, such as building a legal case against criminal actors, pursuing targets/groups through pooling resources
and tools, and amplifying takedowns when they happen. This effort would directly coincide with those detailed in
1.1.1 and 1.1.3, but also throughout the actions recommended under Goal #2.
Timing: 3-6 months.

Lead: White House, in coordination with international partners.

Action 1.1.3: Create a global network of ransomware investigation hubs.
The U.S. Government should lead the development of a network of ransomware investigative hubs across theglobe, including by leveraging cyber assistant legal attachés (ALATs) and International Computer Hacking andIntellectual Property (ICHIP) lawyers. The groups within this “team of teams” should be nimble and have accessto specialists in each of the kill chain areas of the ransomware criminal organizations. The hubs should ensure
their investigative priorities and resources are aligned and coordinated. They should foster a culture of information
sharing, be located in diverse geopolitical regions to enable swift sharing of intelligence, and contribute directly tothe coalition recommended above in Action 1.1.2, but also to the actions recommended below in Objective 1.2 andmany of the actions under Goal #2.
Timing: 9-12 months.

Lead: S tate Department, Department of Justice, and international equivalents.

Action 1.1.4: Convey the international priority of collective action on ransomware via sustained
communications by national leaders.
Any international effort will need to include coordinated public communications by national leaders to keep
the spotlight on combating ransomware as a priority and ensure the success of the broader effort. These
communications can take the form of speeches, op-eds, news articles, videos, and other media that draw
attention to ransomware as a problem, promote prevention, and highlight enforcement successes.
Timing: Begin immediately to lay the groundwork; declarations must be issued on an ongoing basis.
Lead: White House, in coordination with international partners.

Objective 1.2:

Advance a comprehensive, whole-of-U.S. government strategy for reducing ransomware
attacks, led by the White House
Ransomware is an urgent threat that demands a “whole-of-government” strategic response.
Within the U.S. Government, establishing structures for cross-agency coordination will be vitalfor tackling the ransomware challenge, and will reduce the lag time in government response.
Leading new joint efforts with industry will also be crucial: no single actor is fully capableof disrupting this threat by themselves, so we must come together to assess the threat andcoordinate activities across authorities and capabilities. Although this recommendationis U.S.-focused, a similar approach should be adopted by other national governments.
Additionally, since ransomware is a cross-border issue, it will be vital for governments to reachout to, and work with, international partners both on a policy and operational level.

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Action 1.2.1: Establish an Interagency Working Group for ransomware.
To ensure this challenge receives sufficient investment of time and resources from the highest levels of the
U.S. federal government, the White House should establish an Interagency Working Group (IWG) dedicated tounderstanding and addressing the ransomware threat at a systemic level, and on an ongoing basis. Doing so will
signal to ransomware actors and international partners that this issue rises above other pressing cybersecurity
priorities. Ideally led through the National Security Council (NSC) in coordination with the new National Cyber
Director (NCD), the Ransomware IWG will serve as a high-level strategic forum for coordinating expertise, shaping
policy, sharing information, and directing action for all stakeholders.
The Ransomware IWG will also help ensure that intragovernmental conflicts can be escalated efficiently throughthe White House policy-coordination and national security decision-making process. The IWG should provide
policy direction and leadership for all U.S. Government actions related to ransomware, which will improve
accountability and help ensure that agencies work together on signaling and deterrence. In addition, the NSC/NCD,
State Department, DHS, DOJ, Treasury, and other relevant members of the IWG should engage international allies
and partners to build a like-minded coalition against ransomware and ensure policy coordination, as called for in
Action 1.1.2.
Timing: Immediate.

Lead: White House and international equivalents.

Action 1.2.2: Establish an operationally focused U.S. government Joint Ransomware Task Force(JRTF) to collaborate with a private-sector Ransomware Threat Focus Hub.
The Interagency Working Group (IWG) described in Action 1.2.1 should direct and oversee the creation of aninternal U.S. government Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF), whose objective is to coordinate an ongoing,
nationwide campaign against ransomware, and identify and pursue opportunities for international cooperation.
The JRTF’s primary function is to identify targets for disruption and takedown, and clearly designate roles andresponsibilities for each. The U.S. government needs this formal interagency structure to avoid uncoordinatedactivity and to break down the stovepipe structure. The JRTF must be empowered to leverage all tools of national
power and should prioritize ransomware threats to critical infrastructure. The JRTF should increase the pace andefficacy of intelligence-driven ransomware infrastructure takedowns, disruptions of ransomware operations, andarrest and prosecution of the people that enable them. A detailed breakdown of a potential structure, roles, andresponsibilities for the JRTF are provided in Appendix C.
The JRTF should collaborate closely with relevant private-sector organizations that can help defend against anddisrupt ransomware operations, such as security vendors, platform providers, telecommunications providers,
information sharing organizations, cybersecurity non-profits, and other capable entities. These private-sector
activities and groupings can continue to operate on an informal and ad hoc basis through the establishment of a
Ransomware Threat Focus Hub (RTFH), which can serve as a central, organizing node for informal networks andcollaboration as part of a collaborative, sustained public-private anti-ransomware campaign. The structure, roles,
and responsibilities of the RTFH are also provided in Appendix C.
Timing: Immediate.

Lead: White House, via the direction of the IWG, in coordination with private industry,
and international equivalents.

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Action 1.2.3: Conduct a sustained, aggressive, public-private collaborative anti-ransomware campaign.
The JRTF should use all tools of national power to sustain an intelligence-driven anti-ransomware campaignthat includes target identification, threat hunting, action planning, execution, and communications. The roles andresponsibilities covered within the JRTF should include, but not be limited to: law enforcement action, diplomaticefforts, economic tools, technical cyber operations, and intelligence operations as appropriate. The campaign andcapabilities utilized should be tailored to target specific vulnerabilities in ransomware groups and their operations
as identified in the intelligence assessments recommended in Actions 1.2.5 and 1.2.6. Coordination of operations,and intelligence sharing that supports those operations, should be streamlined with exceptions to policy asneeded to be most effective in targeting groups on the designated list. This should include sharing and operational
coordination with U.S. government entities, private industry (e.g. cybersecurity companies, service providers, andtrust groups), and a coalition of international partners.
The JRTF should enhance operational coordination with their international counterparts to conduct more,
and more effective, international investigations and take-downs. This would be directly facilitated through theinvestigative hubs recommended in Action 1.1.3. The JRTF should, to the greatest extent possible, operate at theunclassified level, which is essential to enable flexibility, quick reaction times, and the incorporation of essential
partners who are not JRTF members. To make this possible, the U.S. government should follow the lead of its
counterparts in the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Center and dramatically increase the volume of TS/
SCI information made available at the unclassified level, with a singular focus on the ransomware threat.
The JRTF can ensure agreements are in place with designated private-sector partners to allow for field level
coordination, and must coordinate early and frequently with all relevant elements of U.S. departments andagencies, for instance, the NCIJTF and select U.S. Attorney Offices.
Via the private-industry Ransomware Threat Focus Hub (RTFH), as detailed in Appendix C, non-government
participants in these campaigns could include infrastructure providers, platform/OS providers, registrars, endpoint
security companies, threat intelligence firms, content delivery networks (CDNs), network operators, non-profits,
and industry nodes. Engagement, planning, and execution should not be limited to regularly scheduled meetings;
rather, the structure should allow for continuous, responsive, and ad hoc coordination and execution based on
constantly changing events.
Timing: 3-6 months.

Lead: White House, via the direction of the IWG in Action 1.2.1, in coordination withprivate industry, and international equivalents.

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Combating Ransomware

25

FIGURE 5 Proposed Framework for a Public-Private Operational Ransomware Campaign

Ransomware Interagency
Working Group (IWG)
Action 1.2.1
NSC/NCD-led

Joint Ransomware
Task Force (JRTF)

Ransomware
Threat Focus Hub

Action 1.2.2
Interagency Operational Level

Action 1.2.2
Private Sector Facilitator

USG Departments
and Agencies

Existing
Coordination
Group(s)Action 1.2.4: Make ransomware attacks an investigation and prosecution priority, and communicate
this directive internally and to the public.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently formed an internal task force to tackle ransomware and the Acting
Deputy Attorney General issued guidance making ransomware an investigatory priority. The Task Force supports
this focus on ransomware and recommends that senior officials, such as the Attorney General, the Director of theFBI, and/or the Director of the United States Secret Service, sustain this focus at United States Attorney’s Offices(USAOs), FBI field offices, and Secret Service Task Forces to more aggressively pursue cases against ransomware
actors. Consistent with this guidance, USAOs should prioritize ransomware prosecutions and seek harsher
penalties for attacks on critical infrastructure or for attacks that endanger public health and safety.
Legislation should also be considered to make ransomware and other Computer Fraud and Abuse Act offenses
subject to RICO, given the organized crime aspects of these offenses. Additionally, to raise the level of priority andclearly communicate that new status, officials should also pursue asset forfeiture against ransomware actors to
the maximum extent allowed by law and signal their intention to use this tool. This recommendation is expanded
upon further in Actions 2.1.5 and 2.3.3.
Timing: 9-12 months.

Lead: U.S. Department of Justice and Congress, and international equivalents.

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Action 1.2.5: Raise the priority of ransomware within the U.S. Intelligence Community, and designate
it as a national security threat.
The United States must raise the Intelligence Community (IC) collection priority against ransomware actors
so that all necessary resources, capabilities, and authorities can be brought to bear to answer the intelligenceneeds to fulfill the tasks of the IWG and the JRTF. These must include (but are not limited to): signals intelligence(SIGINT) (including computer network operations, or CNO), human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence(IMINT). This elevated prioritization must be accompanied by a reduction in the roadblocks that impede greaterbidirectional sharing of information between the IC, international IC partners, and private industry, in order to fulfill
the intelligence needs of the IWG and the JRTF’s campaigns.
To establish the baseline for target development, the NSC should task an Intelligence Community Assessment(ICA) focused solely on ransomware actors and the criminal-state nexus. The goal of this ICA should be toaccurately capture: the nature of the ransomware threat to national security; identification of actors and groups
who pose the most significant threat (including attribution to individuals involved whenever possible); locations
from where they operate; and the infrastructure, tactics, and techniques they commonly use. The ICA should
also detail vulnerabilities that may exist within each actor group; any relationships between the actors and theirgovernments that could negatively impact law enforcement’s ability to counter the threat; and any intelligence
gaps that would need to be filled to more completely understand this threat.
Based on the findings in the ICA and any other relevant intelligence, the IC should clearly designate ransomware
actors as a national security threat at the level appropriate to the findings, and raise the priority of actively
countering the threat. The designation and priority level should ensure that all tools of national and international
power are brought to bear to counter this threat in an aggressive, effective, but proportional, coordinatedcampaign, as is detailed in 1.2.3.
Timing: 3 months.

Lead: White House to task DNI, coordinate with Five Eyes Partners and international
equivalents.

Action 1.2.6: Develop an international-version of an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on
ransomware actors to support international collaborative anti-ransomware campaigns.
International partners should work together to develop an international Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)on ransomware actors with the same goals described in Action 1.2.5 in order to create a more complete picture of
the global security threat posed by ransomware actors, and to serve as the baseline for coordinated international
efforts. An international ICA will help raise the global intelligence collection priority against ransomware actors sothat all necessary resources can be brought to bear to answer the intelligence needs required to fulfill national andinternational collaborative efforts.
Timing: 3 months.	Lead: White House to task DNI, coordinate with Five Eyes Partners and international
equivalents.

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Objective 1.3:

Substantially reduce safe havens where ransomware actors currently operate with impunity
Many pernicious ransomware actors are given free reign by the nations where they resideand cannot be easily reached by international law enforcement agencies, either because ahost country is actively protecting them, lacks the resources and capabilities to stop them,or does not prioritize the issue. Together with international partners, the U.S. should use
a “carrot and stick” approach to motivate these nations to use all tools of national power— including critical law enforcement action — against the criminals operating within theirborders or within friendly or neighboring countries.
Action 1.3.1: Exert pressure on nations that are complicit or refuse to take action.
Nations should exert pressure on other nations that refuse to take action against ransomware criminals. These
strategies could include economic and trade sanctions; constrain “safe haven” country activity in international
financial markets; using evidence of complicity to “name and shame” them in public forums to disrupt theirfreedom of activity; withholding military or foreign assistance aid; or denying visas to citizens who seek to travelto the United States or other nations. Actions undertaken by the JRTF and the RTFH to disrupt the ransomware
business model should proactively be utilized to contribute to the intended deterrent effect of this sustainedpressure campaign.
Timing: 3 months, ongoing.

Lead: U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.

Action 1.3.2: Incentivize cooperation and proactive action in resource-constrained countries.
Some nations that serve as home bases for ransomware actors may not understand the gravity of this crime,or they may lack sufficient resources to prosecute ransomware criminals. The United States and other nations
should provide training and capacity-building to support these nations’ efforts, and provide direct law enforcement
support, for example through joint law enforcement operations. Providing incentives to private-sector partners inthose nations may also increase these nations’ willingness to cooperate. Establishing ransomware as a priority inbilateral agreements could further bring these nations to the table.
Timing: 30 days and ongoing.

Lead: U.S. Department of Justice and Department of State, and international
equivalents.

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Goal #2
Disrupt the ransomware business modeland decrease criminal profits

Ransomware is overwhelmingly a financially motivated crime, and as long as the profits
outweigh the risks, attacks will continue. To effectively disrupt this threat, government andindustry stakeholders must work collaboratively across borders to reduce the profitability ofthis criminal enterprise and increase the risk of ransomware execution. Governments can takediverse actions to:
1. Disrupt payment systems to make ransomware attacks less profitable;
2. Disrupt the infrastructure used to facilitate attacks; and3.	Disrupt ransomware actors themselves, through criminal prosecution and other tactics.
This must all be done while minimizing harm to the victims of ransomware and not interferingwith their ability to recover their systems.
The flow of money from a victim to a ransomware actor using cryptocurrency is complex.
See Appendix B for a detailed guide on this process, and how entities like cryptocurrency exchanges
fit within this ecosystem.

Objective 2.1:

Disrupt the system that facilitates the payment of ransoms.
Ransomware attacks are profitable because ransom payments are made through the use ofdiverse cryptocurrencies, where payments are difficult to trace and can easily be laundered.
The challenge for governments is to find new ways to get inside the ransomware payments
process. It will be important to set measurable goals to assess progress toward this objective.
Action 2.1.1: Develop new levers for voluntary sharing of cryptocurrency payment indicators.
In addition to the mandatory disclosure of a ransomware payment recommendation in Action 4.2.4, lawmakers
should create incentives to share timely and actionable cryptocurrency payment indicators to enable law
enforcement to prioritize leads and seize ransom payments when possible. This information may include walletaddresses, transaction hashes, and ransom notes. In exchange for this information, victims should be able toreport anonymously, unless a victim is otherwise required to disclose the attack under privacy laws. Congressshould broaden the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 to cover this type of information sharing,
explicitly preserving attorney-client privilege and implementing parameters that limit how this information could
later be used by regulators or as part of civil litigation, to encourage participation.
Timing: 6 to 12 months. Lead: Congress, CISA, and other international equivalents.

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Combating Ransomware

Recentpublicly
available
analyticalreportingestimatesthat

Just 199 deposit
addresses received

80%

An even smallergroup of 25
addresses
accounted for

46%

29

of all funds sent by
ransomware addresses
in 2020

55

With a broader and deeper understanding of the ransomware landscape, law enforcement
would be better equipped to target the most prolific actors.

Cryptocurrency
Exchanges

Cryptocurrency
KiosksOver-the-Counter (OTC)
Trading Desks

Cryptocurrency exchanges
allow users to buy and sell
cryptocurrencies in exchange
for traditional currencies,
as well as convert to othervirtual currencies.
Exchanges act as
middlemen between
buyers and sellers.

Kiosks that sell, buy, andexchange cryptocurrency.
They can be locatedanywhere and look likeATMs. They tend to
charge more thancryptocurrency
exchanges. Kiosks
act as middlemenbetween buyers
and sellers.

Over-the-counter (OTC)
cryptocurrency trading
allows people to buy from orsell to a “desk,” a businessfocused on buying andselling cryptocurrency.
There is thus no
middleman between
the seller and buyer,
and OTC tends tosee larger crypto
purchases and sales.

Action 2.1.2: Require cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, and over-the-counter (OTC) trading“desks” to comply with existing laws.
Lawmakers need to pursue and enforce consistent licensing and registration requirements for cryptocurrency
exchanges, crypto kiosks, and OTC trading desks where criminals “cash out” their cryptocurrency from ransomware
payments. These entities are not consistently compliant with or subject to Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money
Laundering (AML), and Combatting Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws, and those that are subject to those laws do
not consistently report suspicious transactions to law enforcement or other institutions.56 These laws must designate
clear enforcement bodies to penalize non-compliant exchanges, kiosks, and OTC desks.

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Traditional financial institutions that fund these entities should also impose stricter rules. They should pursue
SEC enforcement of cryptocurrency businesses that fail to register as broker-dealers, transfer agents, clearing
agencies, and money service businesses (MSBs), with particular focus on mixing services that obfuscate criminaltransactions with legal traffic.
Timing: 12 months.

Lead: Treasury Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, and otherinternational equivalents.

Action 2.1.3: Incentivize voluntary information sharing between cryptocurrency entities and law
enforcement.
Regulators should incentivize cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, over-the-counter trading desks, andfinancial institutions to increase their reporting of suspicious transactions to federal law enforcement, to facilitate
joint disruptive actions. In the U.S., these entities would use Section 314(b)57 reports and suspicious activity
reports (SARs) to report suspicious transactions to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the
U.S. Treasury Department. In addition, the Department of Treasury should streamline its processes for sharing
SARs with exchanges, blacklisting wallets, and sharing with relevant federal and non-federal entities that may takeother timely disruptive action.
Timing: 12 months.

Lead: U.S. Treasury Department (FinCEN) and international equivalents.

Action 2.1.4: Centralize expertise in cryptocurrency seizure, and scale criminal seizure processes.
Law enforcement action on the basis of ransomware reporting must be swift as criminals strive to quickly
move funds beyond their reach. In the U.S., law enforcement can provide a cryptocurrency exchange witha letter requesting that ransomware funds be frozen at the exchange as proceeds of crime to be seized by
the government. If done in time and with cooperation from the exchange, this can make the identified funds
unavailable to the ransomware actors. This letter must be followed up with a seizure order from an attorney within
the Department of Justice, a process that, at the moment, is scattered across the United States, assigned todifferent investigations, and assigned to attorneys with varying experience drafting these orders.
Key units within the Department of Justice — including the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section(CCIPS), Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Network (CHIPS), National Security Cyber Specialists(NCSC), the National Security Division (NSD), and the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS)— should identify attorneys who are knowledgeable in civil and criminal seizures related to cryptocurrency, andengage them to serve as a focal point for seizure orders across ransomware investigations. This should bepart of the campaign tasked to the JRTF described in Action 1.2.2 or to the recently formed DOJ ransomwarefocused task force. This would dramatically streamline the current process, ensure seizure orders are pursued
expeditiously, and increase the number of seizure orders served, thereby making it more difficult for ransomware
adversaries to convert virtual currency to fiat.
Timing: 6 to 12 months. Lead: U.S. Department of Justice and international equivalents.

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Action 2.1.5: Improve civil recovery and asset
forfeiture processes by kickstarting insurer
subrogation.
For individual ransomware victims, the economics of
pursuing civil remedies against liable actors may not
make sense, given the case may require extensive
factual investigation and innovative legal efforts. To
solve this problem, insurers and reinsurers shouldmeasure and assert their aggregated ransomware
losses and establish a common “war chest”
subrogation fund to evaluate and pursue strategies
aimed at subrogation recoveries, including restitution,
recovery, or civil asset seizures, on behalf of victims
and in conjunction with law enforcement efforts.
Many insurers currently maintain individual subrogation
units, but these do not typically act within the context
of ransomware. This is because insurers may not befamiliar with the novel legal and investigative expertiseneeded to pursue ransomware actors; they may believe
the chances of recovery are unclear, and the cases
may span multiple international jurisdictions where
insurers may not typically pursue subrogation. This
common “war chest” subrogation fund may sit withina consortium (as described in Action 2.1.7) establishedby insurers and reinsurers to properly resource andscale novel efforts to pursue civil recoveries against
liable actors, kickstarting efforts in civil courts to obtainjustice, while pooling the costs associated with any one
case, alleviating concerns about uncertain results.
Timing: 6 to 12 months.
Lead: Domestic and international insurance andreinsurance firms.

A Comprehensive Framework for Action: Goal #2

What is subrogation?
Subrogation refers to an insurer’s assumption of
an insured victim’s rights of recovery after a loss
is covered and paid by the insurer. Subrogation
empowers an insurer to pursue the rights of theinsured to recover the amount of a loss from theparties who are legally liable for it. Subrogation
thus serves to make both victim and insurer“whole” in the event of a civil recovery. For more
information, see Appendix A: Cyber Insurance.

For Further Investigation:
The Tax Enforcement
Opportunity
The IRS and Europol have engaged in efforts to
identify taxpayers who have failed to disclose
income from cryptocurrency, including developing“tax evasion signatures” within cryptocurrencytransactions. In 2021, the IRS’s Office of Fraud
Enforcement announced “Operation Hidden
Treasure,” convening trained IRS criminal
agents and blockchain analysis firms to identify
cryptocurrency-related tax fraud.58 National
and international tax authorities and interested
policymakers should further investigate
opportunities to leverage tax enforcement efforts
like these in the fight against ransomware.

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Action 2.1.6: Launch a public campaign tying ransomware tips to existing anti-money laundering
whistleblower award programs.
In 2012, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched a whistleblower reward program thathas already yielded several billion dollars in penalties that the U.S. would not have otherwise obtained. A public
whistleblower campaign in this vein should be targeted toward geographic regions around the world, and provide
awards for information leading to the identification of individuals involved with developing ransomware, money
laundering of fiat, coding, ransom negotiations, and other roles. In addition to financial awards, such a program
could include non-monetary rewards, such as a path to citizenship. Any reward program should be designed in a
way to protect the anonymity of the reporter of the criminal activity.
Timing: 6 to 12 months.

Lead: The Securities and Exchange Commission and international equivalents.

Action 2.1.7: Establish an insurance-sector consortium to share ransomware loss data andaccelerate best practices around insurance underwriting and risk management.
Insurers and reinsurers should voluntarily establish an industry consortium to aggregate and share anonymized,
pertinent data to support threat-actor disruption, including both payment information (such as wallet addresses,
ransom demands, negotiation outcomes, and transaction hashes) and attack information.
Data sharing at the consortium should also accelerate the maturation of best practices and sustainability of thecyber insurance market, as this data enables further risk modeling and underwriting analysis. This consortium
should improve risk management and resolution strategies so that ransomware is less frequent, less destructive,
and less profitable for the threat actors. It should also enable insurers and reinsurers to establish certainty withlaw enforcement and regulators such as OFAC as to the legality of any payment and as with respect to sanctions.
Finally, the consortium may serve as the home of any common subrogation “war chest” fund for collaboration,
as described in Action 2.1.5. This consortium should also work directly with the JRTF and RTFH as described inactions 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
Timing: 6-12 months (to establish consortium and initial subrogation effort).
Lead: Domestic and international insurance and reinsurance firms.

Objective 2.2:

Target the infrastructure used by ransomware criminals
Ransomware actors rely on infrastructure to carry out their attacks, including servers andnetworks that serve as “command and control” for their attacks. Law enforcement agencies
have opportunities to disrupt ransomware criminals by targeting this infrastructure.
Action 2.2.1: Leverage the global network of ransomware investigation hubs.
The global network of ransomware investigative hubs recommended in Action 1.1.3 (and utilized by the coalition
recommended in 1.1.2 and the JRTF recommended in Action 1.2.2), including leveraging cyber assistant legal
attachés (ALATs) and ICHIP prosecutors, should have access to specialists that are empowered to focus efforts

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on infrastructure aimed at the “left of boom” elements of the criminal business model. This includes, among otherareas, credential theft or other unauthorized access; malware distribution, including the use of malicious domains
and criminal and abusive command and controls; criminal surveillance; and theft of intellectual property.
Timing: 6-12 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal Government and international equivalents.

Action 2.2.2: Clarify lawful defensive measures that private-sector actors can take when countering
ransomware.
Currently, private-industry companies — including but not limited to hosting companies, internet service providers,
and telecommunications companies — are actively working with law enforcement and other industry partners to
disrupt infrastructure associated with ransomware actors. This infrastructure may include malicious servers used
to facilitate or conduct attacks against victims. If a service provider is tipped to malicious infrastructure, it shouldbe able to take action against the infrastructure without fear of legal liability. For example, if a hosting company ismade aware that a customer is conducting attacks from one of the hosting company’s servers, they can typicallyshut down the customer’s service due to a violation of the company’s terms of service. In a less clear scenario,
if a telecommunications company is provided a signature that identifies malicious network traffic and they block
the traffic from transiting their network, thereby disrupting the malicious activity, the company may have somelegal liability.
Congress should ensure private industry can actively block or limit traffic when acting in good faith without
fear of legal liability. Specifically, Congress should modernize the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) andother cybersecurity laws to take into account activities that cybersecurity companies, security researchers,
service providers, and other responsible parties are currently doing “at risk” in gray areas in order to protect theircustomers.
To be clear, this is not advocating for “hacking back,” rather it is focused on decriminalizing practical security
activities necessary to counter modern cybersecurity threats, including against criminal infrastructure like botnets
used in ransomware.
Timing: 12 to 24 months. Lead: U.S. Congress and international equivalents.

Objective 2.3:

Disrupt the threat actors, including ransomware developers, criminal affiliates,
and ransomware variants
Action 2.3.1: Increase government sharing of ransomware intelligence.
The government should increase the sharing of intelligence about ransomware actors with the private andnonprofit sectors, including key data points that specifically lead back to the threat actors. Such information
could include threat actor personas, tradecraft, and attribution (including roles and responsibilities); behavioral
tactics and techniques; and related technical information (i.e., indicators of compromise). Making suchintelligence more broadly available would enable the private sector to protect itself more effectively; better

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coordinate with government entities, such as the JRTF and RTFH in Action 1.2.2; and support governments in
disrupting ransomware activity.
Timing: 6 months and ongoing. 		Lead: Department of Homeland Security and international equivalents.

Action 2.3.2: Create target decks of ransomware developers, criminal affiliates, and ransomware
variants.
To better operationalize and focus resources, the U.S. Government and the security community should work
together to create prioritized target decks for ransomware developers, criminal affiliates, and ransomware variants
based on how much harm they are doing and the breadth of their operations. The core of this effort must focus
on unveiling the threat actors themselves and understanding their organization(s), with the goal of identifying
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to disrupt the threat, using all capabilities available to the private industry andgovernments. This effort should include working more closely with the security community on a routine basis toshare information and coordinate operations, to be facilitated by the JRTF and RTFH described in Action 1.2.2.
Timing: 6 to 12 months. 		

Lead: U.S. Federal Government and international equivalents.

Action 2.3.3: Apply strategies for combating organized crime syndicates to counter ransomware
developers, criminal affiliates, and supporting payment distribution infrastructure.
Ransomware events are not singular, but part of an ongoing campaign of extortion against government andprivate-sector entities. Kill-chain analyses of ransomware organizations reveal a complex network of associatesand entities. These organizations have been established to function as an extortion operation with repeatableoutcomes. The various components of the organization include creators of malware, establishment of
ransomware affiliates, franchise fees or percentage of ransomware payouts to the operation leaders, digital walletcreation, money laundering, using money mules, and more.
Law enforcement should disrupt the ransomware criminal enterprise by using established frameworks thathave been applied successfully to disrupt the activities of the mafia and other criminal organizations. The U.S.
government should leverage the power of the RICO statute, as called for above in Action 1.2.4, to prosecuteransomware criminals. The RICO statute (Title 18 USCS § 1962) serves as a “mafia business tax”, and prohibits
racketeering. RICO investigations provide influential tools to inspire cooperation of members and supporters ofa criminal enterprise, such as enhanced prison terms for any conspirators, and forfeiture and exposure to civil
RICO investigations. If deemed necessary, the federal government should undertake immediate action to ensure
ransomware crimes are predicates for use of the RICO statutes.
Timing: 12 to 24 months. 		

Lead: U.S. Law Enforcement and international equivalents.

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Goal #3
Help organizations prepare forransomware attacks

Any organization can fall victim to ransomware, creating catastrophic disruption for theorganization and those it serves. Yet despite extensive press coverage and content on this
topic, the threat is poorly understood by many public- and private-sector leaders, and the
majority of organizations lack an appropriate level of preparedness to defend against these
attacks. Even firms that have invested in cybersecurity broadly may be unaware of how to
prepare for, and defend specifically against, ransomware attacks, and information available is inmany cases oversimplified or excessively complicated.
The challenge is to increase awareness and build defenses that will be effective both at scaleand over time as the threat evolves. To do this, governments and industry leaders need to better
connect with key audiences, including both the organizational leaders who need to understandthat ransomware is a real and relevant threat to their organization, and also the individuals
in operational roles (such as IT and security professionals) who need guidance on how toprioritize mitigation efforts given limited resources. Support should be customized basedon each organization’s current situation, including to what extent it is already appropriately
informed and whether it has appropriately invested in time and resources.

Objective 3.1:

Support organizations with developing practical operational capabilities
Guides and technological tools to mitigate ransomware are currently available; however,many are insufficient, overly simplified, or too complicated, and the general level of noise
surrounding this problem is confusing and problematic.
Action 3.1.1: Develop a clear, actionable framework for ransomware mitigation, response, and recovery.
Although multiple organizations have published ransomware guides, no single, authoritative source of best practices
exists. The current state of awareness around ransomware is similar to the general environment prior to 2014, whenno compilation of best practices existed for cybersecurity. At that time, the U.S. National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) led a multi-stakeholder process to develop the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity. This framework has been widely adopted by organizations around the world and serves as a foundational
cybersecurity risk management resource.
We have reached a similar point with the ransomware threat. The single most impactful measure that could betaken to help organizations prepare for and respond to ransomware attacks would be to create one internationallyaccepted framework that lays out clear, actionable steps to defend against, and recover from, ransomware.

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Ransomware is a global problem, so governments and private-sector organizations around the world should collaborateon this effort to ensure the framework will work internationally. Efforts taken only in one jurisdiction may be regionallyeffective, but will likely push attackers to focus on different regions; a coordinated international effort will create greater
long-term impact and more effectively disrupt the economics of the cybercrime market. It will also drive greater
adoption in organizations that operate in more than one country.
As far as is practical, the framework should be consistent with existing cybersecurity frameworks, such as International
Standards Organization publications59 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework,60 but it should be specific toransomware. It should build on the work that NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence has already done aspart of the data integrity project and related papers. The framework should clearly identify each recommended action’s
impact, as well as the required investment of time and other resources. It should include multiple layers for different
audiences; similar to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, the top layer would be intended for executive decision makers,
the second and third layers for operational managers, and the fourth layer for front-line implementers.
The ransomware-specific framework should also identify what approaches are most successful in dealing withransomware and why. The framework should identify what constitutes a reasonable due diligence review prior to
payment, consistent with actions 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, which address the creation of ransomware emergency response
authorities and a ransomware response fund.
In addition, industry-specific profiles should be developed to tailor the Ransomware Framework to different industries or
sectors. Creating different profiles for local governments, small- and medium-sized businesses, and large enterprises,
for example, would enable different types of organizations to adapt the framework to their particular situations.
Timing: 12-24 months, and updated yearly thereafter.
Lead: NIST for the US, and international equivalents, with private-sector participation.

Action 3.1.2:
Develop complementary materials to support widespread adoption of the Ransomware Framework.
Additional materials should be developed to accompany the ransomware prevention framework, drawing fromexisting resources, to further articulate how organizations can leverage specific security capabilities, technologies,
and policies to meet the frameworks’ identified best practices. Such materials could include:• Detailed deployment toolkits and guides to assist specific sectors or market segments with applying
the framework;• Mappings to existing popular cybersecurity frameworks, e.g. NIST, ISOs, CIS controls• A ransomware-specific risk assessment tool;• Ransomware reference architectures (such as those developed by NIST’s National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence);• A ransomware killchain;• A checklist to help organizations to hold managed service providers (MSPs) and IT vendors accountable.
Timing: 12-24 months, and updated regularly thereafter.

Lead: NIST for the US, and other international
equivalents.

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Action 3.1.3: Highlight available internet resources to decrease confusion and complexity.
Many decision aids exist to aid organizations preparing for, and responding to, ransomware attacks. While thisvolume of content is designed to help, it can in fact hinder preparedness or response as organizations struggle
to identify the most relevant and actionable guidance for their situation. It is challenging for organizations todetermine which guides can be trusted to provide high-quality, accurate advice. To address these shortcomings,
the Task Force recommends a two-pronged approach.
First, internet search companies could take steps to make sorting through online materials easier. For example,
during the COVID-19 pandemic, internet search companies took steps to highlight credible content related to thepandemic to make it easier to find the most up-to-date and relevant information, and also to minimize the negative
impact of mis- or disinformation. A similar effort focused on ransomware would help IT and security professionals
navigate this highly complex and evolving threat landscape, and quickly identify the most important informationand guidance. Once the Ransomware Framework and complementary materials are published, these would beprioritized on these search pages.
Second, a nonprofit entity, such as the Cybercrime Support Network, should collect and maintain a reference
library of decision aids and best practice guides for responding to a ransomware attack. This step would provide avetted library of material for organizations to draw on to prepare for and/or respond to a ransomware attack.
Timing: 6-12 months for first iteration, and ongoing thereafter.
Lead: For curation, internet search companies. For aggregation, a nonprofit like the Cybercrime Support
Network (CSN) could lead this process in the U.S., together with international partners.

Objective 3.2:

Increase knowledge and prioritization among organizational leaders
There is a stark difference between being aware of ransomware as a threat and having
a real understanding of the dynamics, mitigations, and potential impacts of an attack.
Organizational leaders need greater understanding about the significance and relevance ofthe ransomware threat in order to allocate resources and prioritize focus.
Action 3.2.1: Develop business-level materials oriented toward organizational leaders.
Organizational leaders traditionally see security as niche and highly technical. They need to understandransomware as a whole-organization event, in non-technical, business risk-relevant terms. While the Ransomware
Framework described in Action 3.1.1 has a top layer aimed at executives, additional materials should highlightbusiness needs and risks, and aim toward educating organizational leaders about the threat.
These materials should include a simplified and translated overview of the framework; a ransomware primer
for business leaders; or a checklist for organizational leaders to address with operational staff. They could also
include detailed case studies of real, anonymized attacks related to critical sectors, highlighting how ransomware
attacks occurred and the resulting business impact. Any materials should also consider the regulatory landscape,IST

Combating Ransomwareemphasizing how adhering to preparatory frameworks
can reduce the likelihood of fines or other penalties.
Timing: 6-12 months, with updates yearly as needed.
Lead: CISA or equivalent international government
agency tasked with capacity-building aroundcybersecurity.

Action 3.2.2: Run nationwide, governmentbacked awareness campaigns and tabletop
exercises.
A government-backed awareness campaign will not
only help raise the profile of ransomware as a serious
business issue, but it will also increase the credibility
and need for focus among busy organizational leaders.
This should be coordinated with efforts addressing
operational technical roles. Such a campaign should
leverage appropriate international organizations, stateand local governmental entities, non-profits, andindustry organizations and influencers. It should also
be accompanied by tabletop exercises that provide
opportunities for learning and collaboration.
Additionally, as many organizational leaders rely
on trade or local business networks to learn about
challenges facing organizations in their sector or
region, we recommend engaging these organizationsin awareness campaigns. In the United States,organizations that could be considered include
Chambers of Commerce, the National Associationof Corporate Directors, the Young Presidents’
Organization, and various trade associations. These
organizations may need funding in order to be able totake on a campaign of this significance.
Timing: 12-24 months years, and ongoing for as
long as relevant.
Lead: U.S. Federal government and international
equivalents, appropriate agency leads (e.g.,
Education or Homeland Security or equivalents),
and key nonprofit partners.

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38

A Little Goes a Long Way
Increasing security in a few key areas could
make a significant difference for organizationsin their effort to prepare for ransomware attacks.
Complex security software or complete network
rebuilds may not be necessary. For example,
as SecurityScorecard notes in a recent report,
implementing multi-factor authentication or
adopting password managers can dramatically
improve an organization’s security posture.61
Although any organization, regardless of its
security, can be a target for a ransomware attack,improving baseline security and raising awarenessamong employees can go far in protecting
organizations from attack.

Tabletop Exercises
As part of an awareness-building campaign,
national governments could lead multistakeholder “tabletop exercises” for states, cities,businesses, and international partners. Tabletop
exercises bring together key stakeholders to use
scenarios or simulations of ransomware events,
and could help organizations hone internal andexternal organizational collaboration and response
processes. Such exercises are valuable in helping
organizations understand the importance ofprioritizing ransomware preparedness, as wellas their personal risks and responsibilities aspart of a globally interconnected system. Regularexercises can also help build strong relationships
and facilitate more robust ransomware threat
information-sharing and incident response
collaboration. As an example, the U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security conducts a bi-annual
national cyber exercise called Cyber Storm.

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Objective 3.3:

Update existing, or introduce new, cybersecurity regulations to address ransomware
Regulations and standards related to cybersecurity vary widely, and in most cases do not
specifically address ransomware. Updating regulations and filling gaps with new regulations
will help drive better adoption of ransomware mitigations in core regulated sectors.
For the new regulations proposed below, the government may want to consider amechanism to address how quickly the technology and threat landscapes evolve, comparedto the process for updating laws and regulations. For example, a private- or public-sector
standards body (e.g. NIST, the Center for Internet Security, or a group similar to the Payment
Card Industry Security Council) could set and annually update minimum required standards,
and the law would incorporate this group’s standards.
Action 3.3.1: Update cyber-hygiene regulations and standards.
Existing cybersecurity regulations — such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in
the United States, and the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) in the European Union,
as well as non-regulatory standards such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) — all
set a baseline for cybersecurity in specific regulated sectors where protection of data and essential services
is considered critical. Though some targeted guidance exists,62 many standards do not specifically address
ransomware, despite the significance of this threat. These and other existing cybersecurity regulations andstandards should thus be reviewed and, where necessary, updated to incorporate measures that align with therecommended Ransomware Framework (see Action 3.1.1) to more directly mitigate ransomware attacks
Timing: Dependent on the creation of the Ransomware Framework (Action 3.1.1); likely 12-24 months, withsubsequent iterations in the long term (24+ months).
Lead: State and federal government(s) or equivalent law-making bodies, with support from state/local entities,
think tanks, and nonprofits.

Action 3.3.2: Require local governments to adopt limited baseline security measures.
Ransomware attacks impacting local governments are catastrophic not only for the organizations themselves, but also
for the constituents they serve. Mandating certain behaviors and practices will help local governments better defend
against attacks, and may help them provide enhanced support for small-to-medium-sized businesses operating intheir jurisdiction. In the United States, required measures could include:• Joining the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC);• Signing up for the MS-ISAC’s Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR),63 unless already running acomparable DNS filtering service; and• Signing up for CISA’s infrastructure and web application scanning services.64
Other measures could include the MS-ISAC offering ransomware-specific training and support to cities, though
any additional requirements would likely require funding or financial incentives.

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Timing: 6-12 months, and updated yearly thereafter.
Lead: U.S. Federal Government and international equivalents.

Action 3.3.3:
Require managed service providers to adopt and provide baseline security measures.
Managed service providers (MSPs) often cover the IT and security functions for organizations that cannot invest in
in-house expertise and technologies. MSPs do not commonly provide extensive security coverage or ransomware
mitigations, but doing so would likely create widespread positive impact for small-to-medium-sized organizations.
Baseline security measures for MSPs could include:• Adherence with a cyber-hygiene program (for example, CIS Controls Implementation Group 165 and the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework;66• Mandatory disclosure across the MSP’s customer base if there is a ransomware incident involving the
MSP’s service offering; and• Forming an MSP-ISAC, an information sharing and analysis center specific to this industry.
Note that some funding or financial incentivization may initially be needed to help MSPs develop cybersecurity capabilities.
Timing: 6-12 months.

Lead: U.S. Congress and international equivalent lawmakers.

Objective 3.4:

Financially incentivize adoption of ransomware mitigations
Many organizations are under-invested in cybersecurity and resilience, and may lack theresources to manage the ransomware threat. By providing financial incentives, governments
can help the most vulnerable and resource-constrained organizations tackle this issue. For
some organizations, incentives may be the only means available to prepare for, and defend
against, a ransomware attack.
Action 3.4.1: Highlight ransomware as a priority in existing funding provisions.
Where grants or funding are already offered and may be used for cybersecurity activity, we recommend that theaccompanying language should be updated to highlight ransomware preparedness as a priority for spending and focus.
According to a Third Way paper on U.S. federal grants for cybersecurity,67 eight existing preparedness grants
are available to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, transportation authorities, nonprofits, andprivate entities through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These have recently been changed
to allow recipients to spend funds on cybersecurity, as when FEMA identified cybersecurity as a “priority area” in2018 for the largest DHS preparedness grant, and required fund recipients to spend at least 5% of their funds on
cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. This prioritization and funding expansion should continue across additional
grants and should specifically highlight ransomware preparedness as an urgent priority.
Timing: 3-6 months.

Lead: Relevant fund designation agencies.

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Action 3.4.2: Expand Homeland Security Preparedness Grants to encompass cybersecurity threats.
Under current law, Homeland Security Preparedness Grants focus on terrorism. Given the threat that ransomware
poses to U.S. state, local, tribal, and territorial government entities, expanding this grant program to encompass
cybersecurity threats would provide tremendous benefits. In addition to making SLTTs more resilient to ransomware,these investments will likely improve service delivery as upgrading software and hardware is often the most costeffective security investment an organization can make. As noted in Action 3.4.3, access to these grants should be
conditioned upon demonstrated alignment with the Ransomware Framework after it is developed.
Timing: 6-12 months.

Lead: Department of Homeland Security, working with Congress.

Action 3.4.3: Offer local government, SLTTs, and critical NGOs conditional access to grant fundingfor compliance with the Ransomware Framework.
In 2018, the U.S. Congress’s Help America Vote Act (HAVA) allocated grant funds to help states bolster theirelection security. A similar model, through which states manage the delivery of grant funds to municipalities,
could be employed to provide grants as financial incentives for demonstrated alignment with the Ransomware
Framework. This could help motivate U.S. State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial government entities (SLTTs) to better
prepare for and defend themselves against a ransomware attack. Continued provision of such grants should bebased on clear measures of progress and advancement toward self-reliance. A similar model could be investigatedfor suitability in other countries.
Timing: Dependent on the creation of the Ransomware Framework in Action 3.1.1; likely 12-24 months.
Lead: U.S. Federal government and international equivalents.

Action 3.4.4: Alleviate fines for critical infrastructure entities that align with the Ransomware Framework.
A recent amendment to the HITECH ACT68 requires the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, when
considering whether an entity should be fined for a HIPAA Security Rule-related violation, to consider the extent
to which the entity has demonstrated alignment to an established risk management framework. A similar model
could apply to other regulated critical infrastructure sectors to strongly incentivize adherence to established risk
management frameworks for ransomware prevention.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government and international equivalents.

Action 3.4.5: Investigate tax breaks as an incentive for organizations to adopt secure IT services.
Governments should offer tax breaks or other financial incentives to businesses that meet certain baseline
standards for ransomware preparedness, as laid out in the Ransomware Framework under Action 3.1.1. Such a
program should be structured to ensure long-term self-reliance. Leveraging tax breaks could help drive adoption ofbest practices for preparation for ransomware attacks; however, there are many practical considerations around
who would qualify, whether the savings would offset costs, and how organizations would prove their qualification.
.Timing: 24 months.
Lead: U.S. Federal government and international equivalents.

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Goal #4
Respond to ransomware attacks
more effectively

For victim organizations, a ransomware attack can be a stressful, potentially existential event.
Crucial decisions about how to respond — including whether to pay the ransom — must be
made under intense pressure. Facing the potential threat of losing their data permanently,
organizations may make hurried decisions, particularly if they lack understanding about theramifications of paying a ransom or the full range of alternatives open to them.
In order to improve organizations’ ability to respond to ransomware attacks more effectively,
government and industry leaders should increase the resources and information available
to ransomware victims. At the same time, governments should require organizations to takecertain actions before paying a ransom, including reporting the payment to the government.
Ultimately, increased support for ransomware victims, including improved awareness of legal
requirements prior to payment, will decrease the number of organizations that feel compelledor trapped into paying ransoms.

Objective 4.1:

Increase support for ransomware victims
Ransomware can severely disrupt an organization’s business operations, and remediation
efforts can take a long time. The resulting revenue loss can prove untenable for many
companies, and can be a major crisis for hospitals and other critical infrastructure. Further,for many local governments and small- and medium-sized businesses, the cost of rebuilding
networks to avoid paying the ransom is prohibitively expensive. A platform of support
resources should be established and made available to help ransomware victims with therecovery process.
Action 4.1.1: Create ransomware emergency response authorities.
Ransomware attacks that have widespread, disruptive effects across society often fall outside the scope of
traditional disaster response authorities. To address this gap, national governments should create special
authorities to mitigate the effects of ransomware attacks that have impacts beyond the affected organization.
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission recommended creating the authority to declare a “cyber disaster.”69 The
Ransomware Task Force supports this idea and recommends that it should explicitly cover ransomware incidents.
A cyber-disaster authority would enable federal agencies to assist victim organizations and local governments,
as well as make other resources available, such as incident response support and forensic analysis. Such actions
should be limited to dealing with the immediate crisis and not long-term, ongoing engagement. To enable such

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43“cyber disaster declarations,” Congress could choose to amend the primary law governing natural disaster
response activities, typically referred to as the Stafford Act, to explicitly cover cyber incidents, or it could create a
new, separate authority.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government, and international equivalents.

Action 4.1.2: Create a Ransomware Response Fund to support victims in refusing to makeransomware payments.
While a company might determine that paying a ransom is economically rational, such a decision supports thecriminal enterprise and is rarely in the public interest. To enable more companies to bear the financial cost of
remediation, national governments should create “Cyber Response and Recovery Funds” (CRRFs). In addition
to other goals, a CRRF should cover restoring IT functionality for local governments, critical national functions,or other entities as they recover from a ransomware attack, particularly when those entities lack access toappropriate cyber insurance or when a cyber insurance policy does not cover the event. This approach would
be similar to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, which “provides for a transparent system of shared public
and private compensation for certain insured losses resulting from a certified act of terrorism.” 70 If such funding
were available for ransomware victims, then cost would play a smaller role in an organization’s decision about
whether to pay the ransom. As an incentive to invest in cybersecurity, governments could consider requiring theorganization to cover some portion of the ransom as a “deductible.” Governments could also consider additional
requirements to access the fund, such as demonstrating use of the Ransomware Framework in Action 3.1.1, toraise organizations’ overall level of cybersecurity.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government in consultation with the insurance industry, andinternational equivalents.

Action 4.1.3: Increase government resources available to help the private sector respond to
ransomware attacks.
Many organizations will seek government assistance during a ransomware attack. In the United States, theTreasury Department’s guidance on ransomware payments essentially requires organizations to consult with
the Department if they want to pay the ransom. However, in many countries, agencies cannot fully meet theirmandates with existing resources, nor is it always clear which agency has the responsibility or capability toaddress an inquiry.
Therefore, governments should increase funding for agencies to respond to ransomware-related inquiries so they
can meet demand, through a combination of additional staff and improved technology. In addition, in the U.S.
context, the Department of Homeland Security’s CISA should consider providing a concierge or ombudsman service
for private-sector entities seeking guidance on ransomware-related questions. Under this approach, CISA would not
be responsible for interpreting another agency’s guidance, but it would direct the inquiry to the correct office within
the Federal government. This assistance would facilitate better decision-making within the private sector.
For example, the U.S. Treasury Department has indicated that ransom payments could violate sanctions against
certain individuals or organizations. Treasury’s guidance also indicates that organizations can be held strictly
liable for such payments, which means they can be punished for sanctions violations, even if they were unaware

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44

or unable to determine that the recipient is on a prohibited list. As a result, many organizations will want to knowwhether a potential payment recipient is a sanctioned entity. Given the volume of potential ransomware payments,
the Treasury will likely need additional resources to meet demands from the private sector. Second, inquiries may
not initially go to the Treasury; CISA could ensure that inquiries it receives regarding Treasury guidance get routed
to the correct office.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government, and international equivalents.

Action 4.1.4: Clarify United States Treasury guidance regarding ransomware payments.
In October 2020, the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued
an advisory to companies providing services to ransomware victims. This advisory indicates that OFAC willconsider ransomware payments as a sanctions violation if the recipient is on the Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), another blocked person, or covered by comprehensive country or region
embargoes. Additionally, the advisory states that a violation by a non-U.S. person that causes a U.S. person toviolate any sanctions, or U.S. persons facilitating actions of non-U.S. persons in an effort to avoid U.S. sanctions
regulations, are also prohibited. Finally, the advisory notes that any penalties could be assessed under strict
liability, which means even if an organization did not know that paying the recipient would constitute a sanctions
violation, they can still be held liable for the action.
While this guidance may seem straightforward, Task Force members who have specifically worked within thisregime made the point that identifying payment recipients can prove quite challenging, especially under the shorttimelines of a ransomware attack. Even if an organization asks OFAC whether a particular recipient falls into a
prohibited category or seeks a payment license, OFAC is not resourced to provide answers rapidly enough for acompany facing tight extortion timelines. Experts have identified other unanswered questions with the advisory.
While the Task Force supports Treasury’s goal of reducing payments to criminals and in particular to prohibited
entities, the advisory does not provide sufficient detail to be effective in achieving this outcome.
Therefore, the Task Force recommends that the U.S. Treasury Department issue additional clarifying guidance tosupplement this advisory. This clarifying guidance should address such issues as what constitutes due diligencein determining the payment recipient’s identity, the liability OFAC would assign to each stakeholder, the timeline
and process for obtaining a payment license (should an organization choose to pursue that route), and to what
extent OFAC would consider the harms to people serviced by a ransomware victim in determining whether to granta license, if required. Taking into consideration the OFAC Advisory, as well as the almost simultaneous Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Advisory and the Department of Justice Framework issued in October
2020, OFAC should coordinate with these government counterparts to ensure the clarification considers theirgoals and incorporates them into OFAC’s response to this request for clarification.
Timing: 6-12 months.

Lead: U.S. Treasury Department. During the update process, the Treasury Department should
consult with relevant industry, academia, civil society, and cybersecurity experts.

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45

Objective 4.2:

Increase the quality and volume of information about ransomware incidents
While everyone agrees that ransomware is a significant problem, there is a lack ofreliable, representative data about ransomware’s scope and scale. Further, information
about ongoing ransomware threats does not yet reach as much of the digital ecosystem
as it should – to include both across sectors of private industry or within responsible
governmental departments and agencies. Therefore, improving the quality and volume ofransomware information would enable better deterrence, enhance preparedness, and inform
disruption activities.
Action 4.2.1: Establish a Ransomware Incident Response Network (RIRN).
To increase the flow of ransomware information, a wide array of public and private organizations should formallyagree to share such information rapidly and in standardized formats. To implement this action, the Task Forcerecommends the creation of the Ransomware Incident Response Network (RIRN). The RIRN would serve several
functions, including facilitating receipt and sharing of incident reports, directing organizations to ransomware
incident response services, aggregating data, and sharing or issuing alerts about ongoing threats. Not all entities
within the RIRN would participate in all RIRN functions. For example, some RIRN organizations might not accept
individual incident reports or conduct incident response activities, but they could refer inquiries to another RIRN
organization that would.
RIRN entities engaged in the receipt and sharing of specific incident reports would agree to receive and sharereports using the standard format developed under 4.2.2; adopt a system of unique identifiers to avoid doublecounts while maintaining anonymity; and share the resulting information in an anonymized form with othercyber intelligence organizations and national governments in the network, including law enforcement. RIRN
organizations would also agree to direct reporting entities to available public and private resources, including
incident responders that could assist the entity through the ransomware attack. The RIRN should consider
whether to enable organizations to report anonymously, such that the receiving organization does not know theidentity of the submitter.
Other RIRN functions could include sharing or issuing alerts about ransomware threats in non-technical language.
Such alerts would be designed to engage as broad an audience as possible and to prompt action to counterspecific threats.
The RIRN network should include non-profit organizations, such as the Cybercrime Support Network, Cyber
Readiness Institute, Global Resilience Federation, Global Cyber Alliance, Information Sharing and Analysis
Organizations, and Cyber Threat Alliance; for-profit entities, including cybersecurity vendors, insurance providers,and incident responders; and national government agencies, including law enforcement.
Timing: 12-24 months to reach full operational capability.

Lead: A nonprofit and international equivalents.

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Action 4.2.2: Create a standard format for ransomware incident reporting.
Different organizations require different types of information about ransomware attacks to serve a variety of goals.
Cybersecurity providers need technical data about the malware used in the attack to build protections for othercustomers, while law enforcement may be interested in other information, such as the wallet number and ransom
note. At the same time, reporting can be a significant burden to an organization suffering a ransomware attack.
In order to reduce the burden of ransomware reporting while increasing its utility for recipients, a standard
ransomware incident report format should be developed through a multi-stakeholder process. Any organization
reporting a ransomware incident or reporting on behalf of another organization could use this format. The format
should encompass both non-technical information (such as affected organization type or ransom amount) andtechnical information (such as indicators of compromise). It should also leverage existing formats, such as STIX 71
and the MITRE ATT&CK 72 framework for technical data and suspicious activity reports, to make integration acrossreporting systems as easy as possible. The required fields should be kept to a minimum, but the format should
enable more technically capable reporting entities to include more detailed information. Creating such a standard
format would also make aggregating and anonymizing reports easier.
Timing: 6-12 months.

Lead: A nonprofit, such as the Institute for Security & Technology or the Cyber Threat
Alliance, and international equivalents.

Action 4.2.3: Encourage organizations to report ransomware incidents.
National governments should encourage organizations that experience a ransomware attack to report theincident to the RIRN using the common format. This encouragement could take the form of the “See Something,
Say Something” campaign, and would note the benefits of reporting, the low level of effort required, and theprotections built into the reporting process (for example, that reports can be made anonymously). The government
should use different outreach methods for different parts of the ecosystem, for example, using tailored outreachfor K-12 engagement versus engagement with the manufacturing sector.
Timing: 6-12 months, updated ongoing as needed.
Lead: Government cybersecurity agency or cyber center; DHS CISA in the U.S., with support from relevant
government, industry, academia, civil society ransomware experts to craft the message.

Action 4.2.4: Require organizations and incident response entities to share ransomware payment
information with a national government prior to payment.
In the US, 54 states and territories have breach disclosure laws, and many sectors also have federal reporting
requirements, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (in the financial sector) and Sarbanes-Oxley (for publicly traded
companies). In the European Union, the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive)
requires essential entities to report data breaches. Updating breach disclosure laws to include a ransom payment
disclosure requirement would help increase the understanding of the scope and scale of the crime, allow for better
estimates of the societal impact of these payments, and enable better targeting of disruption activities. Further,requiring ransomware victims to report details about the incident prior to paying the ransom would enable national
governments to take actions such as issuing a freeze letter to cryptocurrency exchanges, as called for in Action
2.1.4. Finally, publishing summaries of the information reported under this requirement will help organizations
understand how preparative measures need to adapt as attacks evolve.

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This mandate should require organizations to report directly to a non-regulatory government agency. In turn,a receiving agency should share the reported information with other appropriate, non-regulatory government
agencies as rapidly as possible and, after appropriate anonymization, to the RIRN. To reduce the burden on
victim organizations, the mandatory report should only encompass limited information, such as ransom date,demand, payment instructions (e.g., wallet number and transaction hashes), and amount, and it should use
the standard reporting format developed through Action 4.2.2. However, the reporting process should allow
organizations to provide additional technical information about the incident when they can, and use insurance
providers or incident response entities to report on their behalf. In order to avoid forcing organizations to
put themselves in potential regulatory jeopardy, the reporting requirement should incorporate limited liability
protections, including that the report cannot form the basis for a regulatory or other enforcement action. Whenenacting this mandate, governments should consider appropriate penalties for organizations that do not comply
with the requirement.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government, and international equivalents.

Objective 4.3:

Require organizations to consider alternatives to paying ransoms
While most leaders oppose the idea of paying ransoms and only reluctantly agree tomake a payment, they may arrive at the decision based on limited information. A common
misperception is that the only alternative to payment is entirely rebuilding the network; that
option might be prohibitively costly or take too long for organizations that have critical services
that need immediate restoration. However, in many cases, viable alternatives exist between
payment and a full network rebuild, such as restoring data from unencrypted shadow copies.
Finally, a small minority of organizations might assume that paying the ransom will be theeasiest path to restoring operations and may not otherwise review their alternatives.
Requiring organizations to analyze options before paying ransoms could enable moreorganizations to choose alternative paths. However, even if governments choose not tomake these recommendations mandatory, they should still be incorporated as best practices
in the Ransomware Framework developed under Action 3.1.1.
Action 4.3.1: Require organizations to review alternatives before making payments.
Although ransomware attackers often try to use time pressure to try to persuade victims to pay, often otheroptions are available. Unencrypted shadow copies of data might be accessible, allowing a victim to recover theirbusiness operations, or a decryption key might exist for that particular ransomware. If ransomware victims have alegal requirement to conduct a due diligence review before making a payment, then they would have the ability topush back on demands for immediate payment. This review would also reveal whether options between payment
and rebuilding the network from scratch are viable. For example, the mandate could require organizations to
consult with initiatives like No More Ransom to determine if their information can be decrypted without paying.
Such reviews should be scaled to the size and criticality of the organization; for SMBs, the review might only
consist of two or three actions. If more organizations actively seek alternatives to payment, fewer will feel

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48compelled to pay. National governments should enact a legal requirement for conducting the review; in the U.S.
context, the private sector should develop what constitutes the due diligence review as part of the cost-benefit
analysis matrix in Action 4.3.3.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: U.S. Federal government and international equivalents.

Action 4.3.2: Require organizations to conduct a cost-benefit assessment prior to making a ransom
payment.
In addition to searching for payment alternatives, organizations should also compare the costs of paying theransom with those of not paying. Given the complexities involved, the costs associated with either option are notnecessarily obvious without analysis. Many costs will be incurred regardless of whether or not an organization
pays the ransom; for example, a company will be liable for breach notification costs regardless of whether theattacker upholds their promise not to further release the data if the ransom is paid. Consequently, such costs
should not factor into the decision. In many cases, the analysis could show that paying the ransom is not in fact
the cheaper option.
The Task Force recommends that national governments require organizations to conduct a cost-benefit analysis
prior to making a ransom payment. Such statutes could also require medium- to large enterprises to document
this cost-benefit analysis prior to making a payment or authorizing their insurance provider to make a payment on
their behalf. Once a standard cost-benefit analysis matrix is developed, as called for in Action 4.3.3, governments
could require the use of the standard matrix to facilitate inter-organization comparisons and data collection.
Timing: 12-24 months Lead.

Lead: U.S. Federal government and international equivalents.

Action 4.3.3: Develop a standard cost-benefit analysis matrix.
As noted in 4.3.2, analyzing the costs associated with a payment decision can prove challenging. Manyorganizations would benefit from having a standard analytic matrix to carry out this task. However, most existing
decision guides do not explicitly tackle this question and clearly lay out the various cost factors. Therefore, theTask Force recommends that the Ransomware Framework called for in Action 3.1.1 specifically include a costbenefit matrix. This matrix should enable organizations to identify the costs associated with not paying comparedto the costs of paying the ransom, as well as which costs to exclude from the analysis because they are incurred ineither case.
Timing: 12-24 months.

Lead: NIST for the US, and international equivalents, with private sector participation

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A Note on Prohibiting Ransomware Payment

A Note on Prohibiting
Ransomware Payments
The question of whether to prohibit payment of ransoms has become increasingly pressing, and wasraised by every working group in the Task Force. The argument in favor of a ransom ban holds thatransomware is primarily motivated by profit, and if the potential for a payout is removed, attackers
will shift away from this tactic. A further argument is that ransom profits are used to fund other, more
pernicious crime, such as human trafficking, child exploitation, terrorism, and creation of weaponsof mass destruction. When viewed with that lens, the case for prohibiting payments is clear.
The challenge comes in determining how to make such a measure practical, as there remains a lackof organizational cybersecurity maturity across sectors, sizes of organization, and geographies.
Ransomware attackers require little risk or effort to launch attacks, so a prohibition on ransom
payments would not necessarily lead them to move into other areas. Rather, they would likely continue
to mount attacks and test the resolve of both victim organizations and their regulatory authorities.
To apply additional pressure, they would target organizations considered more essential to society,such as healthcare providers, local governments, and other custodians of critical infrastructure.
Were a government to take a hardline approach on non-payment, perhaps even offering to shore
up victims in their jurisdiction in some manner, attackers will look for other potential targets before
moving to new sources of revenue. This means they will focus on countries or sectors where
governments have not implemented the same policy or are unable to provide a safety net for victims.
Even in jurisdictions that offer support for critical entities, organizations that do not qualify for this
support may instead pay the ransom without disclosing the incident. This could then open themto further extortion.
As such, any intent to prohibit payments must first consider how to build organizational cybersecurity
maturity, and how to provide an appropriate backstop to enable organizations to weather the initialperiod of extreme testing. Ideally, such an approach would also be coordinated internationally to
avoid giving ransomware attackers other avenues to pursue.
With all these pragmatic considerations in mind, the Ransomware Task Force did not reachconsensus on prohibiting ransom payments, though we do agree that payments should be
discouraged as far as possible. We recognize, though, that some governments may want topursue ransomware payment prohibitions based on their policy judgments. Given the potential
consequences, the Task Force has identified three factors that governments should consider
to reduce the negative impacts of such prohibitions:

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A Note on Prohibiting Ransomware Payment

Factors to Consider before Pursuing aRansomware Payment Prohibition

1

Timeline
Governments and organizations need time to adapt tosuch a dramatic change in the law, so prohibitions cannot
be enacted immediately. For example, governments needtime to set up victim protection and support programs, asdetailed below. Insurance companies need time to update policies toreflect the payment prohibition. The payment facilitator ecosystem would needtime to shut down operations in an orderly fashion. Thus, a prohibition statuteshould establish milestones or conditions that would need to be met before theprohibition would go into effect.

2
Phasing
Prohibitions should be implemented in a phased manner,potentially over a matter of years. Phasing could be based on
sector: for example, a prohibition could be enacted on public
entities before it is extended to the private sector.

3
Victim Protection and Support
To help offset the potential burden on victims,
governments should provide strong protection and support
policies. Examples of such policies include the Cyber Response and Recovery
Fund,73 which could be used to help cover business continuity and remediation
costs for organizations attacked with ransomware; establish rapid response
teams to assist life-line organizations (such as hospitals) to restore functionality
quickly; and provide liability protection for business interruptions caused byrefusing to pay ransoms.

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Conclusion

Conclusion
The Ransomware Task Force developed the recommendations outlined in this report to provide
a multi-pronged approach to countering ransomware, and it will be crucial for organizations
across sectors to work together and act immediately to tackle this challenge. Make no mistake:
reducing the ransomware threat will not be easy, and it will not be accomplished by any individual
government or organization alone; this effort will require coordination, collaboration, and investmentof time and resources.
The persistence of safe harbors and the challenge of tracing transactions through cryptocurrencies,
combined with the complexity of attribution and prosecution, stack the odds in ransomware
criminals’ favor. The old adage that a cybercriminal only has to be lucky once, while a defender
has to be lucky every minute of every day, has never been more true. Without major intervention,
the situation will only get worse as ransomware criminals continue to evolve their tactics and theproliferation of devices through the “internet of things” dramatically expands the attack surface. The
ever-more lucrative ransomware industry will draw in more threat actors, compounding the problem.
Adding to the challenge, victims of ransomware attacks may increasingly worry about reputationalharm and be wary of disclosing details to the public. It is also likely that, as efforts to reduceransomware become more successful, actors may choose to target increasingly critical systems andnetworks, and adopt techniques that are more aggressive in order to combat increased defenses or
payment obstruction techniques.
Yet failing to act is not an option. Allowing the ransomware challenge to go unchecked could havedisastrous consequences. Ransomware actors will only become more malicious, and worsening
attacks will inevitably impact critical infrastructure, including communications, transportation, healthand safety, distribution and logistics, utilities, and other critical infrastructure. Future attacks could
easily combine techniques in ways that cause the infections to spread beyond their intended targets,potentially leading to far-reaching consequences, including loss of life.
The good news is that many of the recommendations outlined in this report may help improveorganizations’ cybersecurity broadly, and lead to the establishment of new collaborations dedicatedto keeping our digital society safe. Indeed, we are still at the dawn of the digital age, and finding new
ways to address ransomware and other cyber threats will have benefits that last for decades to come.

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52

Summary of Recommendations
GOAL #1: 	Deter ransomware attacks through a nationally and internationally coordinated,comprehensive strategy
Objective 1.1:		
Signal that ransomware is an international diplomatic and enforcement priority
Action 1.1.1: 		Issue declarative policy through coordinated international diplomatic declarations that ransomware is anenforcement priority
Action 1.1.2: 		Establish an international coalition to combat ransomware criminals
Action 1.1.3: 		Create a global network of ransomware investigation hubs
Action 1.1.4: 		Convey the international priority of collective action on ransomware via sustained communications by
national-leaders
Objective 1.2: 	 	
Advance a comprehensive, whole-of-U.S. government strategy for reducing ransomware attacks,
led by the White House
Action 1.2.1: 		Establish an Interagency Working Group for ransomware
Action 1.2.2: 		Establish an operationally focused U.S. Government Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) to collaborate
with a private-sector Ransomware Threat Focus Hub
Action 1.2.3: 		Conduct a sustained, aggressive, public-private collaborative anti-ransomware campaign
Action 1.2.4: 		Make ransomware attacks an investigation and prosecution priority, and communicate this directive
internally and to the public
Action 1.2.5: 		Raise the priority of ransomware within the U.S. Intelligence Community, and designate it as a national
security threat
Action 1.2.6:		Develop an international-version of an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on ransomware actors to
support international collaborative anti-ransomware campaigns
Objective 1.3: 		
Substantially reduce safe havens where ransomware actors currently operate with impunity
Action 1.3.1: 		Exert pressure on nations that are complicit or refuse to take action
Action 1.3.2: 		Incentivize cooperation and proactive action in resource-constrained countries

GOAL #2:	Disrupt the ransomware business model and decrease criminal profits
Objective 2.1: 		 Disrupt the system that facilitates the payment of ransoms
Action 2.1.1: 		Develop new levers for voluntary sharing of cryptocurrency payment indicators
Action 2.1.2: 		Require cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, and over-the-counter (OTC) trading “desks” to comply withexisting laws
Action 2.1.3: 		Incentivize voluntary information sharing between cryptocurrency entities and law enforcement
Action 2.1.4: 		Centralize expertise in cryptocurrency seizure, and scale criminal seizure processes
Action 2.1.5: 		Improve civil recovery and asset forfeiture processes by kickstarting insurer subrogation
Action 2.1.6: 		Launch a public campaign tying ransomware tips to existing anti-money laundering whistleblower award
programs
Action 2.1.7: 		Establish an insurance-sector consortium to share ransomware loss data and accelerate best practices
around insurance underwriting and risk management

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Conclusion

Objective 2.2: 		Target the infrastructure used by ransomware criminals
Action 2.2.1: 		Leverage the global network of ransomware investigation hubs
Action 2.2.2: 		Clarify lawful defensive measures that private-sector actors can take when countering ransomware
Objective 2.3: 	 	Disrupt the threat actors, including ransomware developers, criminal affiliates, and ransomware
variants
Action 2.3.1: 		Increase government sharing of ransomware intelligence
Action 2.3.2: 		Create target decks of ransomware developers, criminal affiliates, and ransomware variants
Action 2.3.3: 		Apply strategies for combating organized crime syndicates to counter ransomware developers, criminal
affiliates, and supporting payment distribution infrastructure

GOAL #3: Help organizations prepare for ransomware attacks
Objective 3.1: 	
Support organizations with developing practical operational capabilities
Action 3.1.1: 		Develop a clear, actionable framework for ransomware mitigation, response, and recovery
Action 3.1.2: 		Develop complementary materials to support widespread adoption of the Ransomware Framework
Action 3.1.3: 		Highlight available internet resources to decrease confusion and complexity
Objective 3.2: 	
Increase knowledge and prioritization among organizational leaders
Action 3.2.1: 		

Develop business-level materials oriented toward organizational leaders

Action 3.2.2: 		Run nation-wide, government-backed awareness campaigns and tabletop exercises
Objective 3.3: 	
Update existing, or introduce new, cybersecurity regulations to address ransomware
Action 3.3.1: 		Update cyber hygiene regulations and standards
Action 3.3.2: 		Require local governments to adopt limited baseline security measures
Action 3.3.3: 		Require managed service providers to adopt and provide baseline security measures
Objective 3.4: 	
Financially incentivize adoption of ransomware mitigations
Action 3.4.1: 		Highlight ransomware as a priority in existing funding provisions
Action 3.4.2: 		Expand Homeland Security Preparedness grants to encompass cybersecurity threats
Action 3.4.3: 		Offer local governments, SLTTs, and critical NGOs conditional access to grant funding for compliance with
the Ransomware Framework
Action 3.4.4: 		Alleviate fines for critical infrastructure entities that align with the Ransomware Framework
Action 3.4.5: 		Investigate tax breaks as an incentive for organizations to adopt secure IT services

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Conclusion

Goal #4: Respond to ransomware attacks more effectively
Objective 4.1: 	
Increase support for ransomware victims
Action 4.1.1: 		Create ransomware emergency response authorities
Action 4.1.2: 		Create a Ransomware Response Fund to support victims in refusing to make ransomware payments
Action 4.1.3: 		Increase government resources available to help the private sector respond to ransomware attacks
Action 4.1.4: 		Clarify U.S. Treasury guidance regarding ransomware payments
Objective 4.2: 	
Increase the quality and volume of information about ransomware incidents
Action 4.2.1: 		Establish a Ransomware Incident Response Network (RIRN)
Action 4.2.2: 		Create a standard format for ransomware incident reporting
Action 4.2.3: 		Encourage organizations to report ransomware incidents
Action 4.2.4: 		Require organizations and incident response entities to share ransomware payment information with anational government prior to payment
Objective 4.3: 	
Require organizations to consider alternatives to paying ransoms
Action 4.3.1: 		Require organizations to review alternatives before making payments
Action 4.3.2: 		Require organizations to conduct a cost-benefit assessment prior to making a ransom payment
Action 4.3.3: 		Develop a standard cost-benefit analysis matrix

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Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements
The Institute for Security and Technology is incredibly grateful to the phenomenal group of volunteer
experts that came together to make this effort a success. The communities that operate day in andday out to grapple with challenges like ransomware comprise countless unsung heroes, and we arelucky to have been able to convene such a diverse and expansive group of dedicated professionals.
They graciously shared considerable amounts of their very limited time to provide their expertise andwork through proposed solutions as part of the three-month sprint of the Ransomware Task Force.
All of this took place during a period of significant high-level responsibilities across the industry.
Our effort consisted of four main working groups, with an additional three special projects teams,
supplemented by numerous sub-working groups focused on everything from cryptocurrencies to “pizza
parties” to cyber insurance. The Task Force consisted of members from civil society, private industry(from a range of sectors, including finance, cybersecurity, insurance, healthcare, and high technology),
as well as members of government agencies from the United States and around the world.
We want to say a particular word of thanks to the RTF Working Group Co-Chairs, who poured an
extraordinary amount of time and energy into organizing and leading large groups of experts,
facilitating what were often lively and healthy debates, developing and formulating complicatedrecommendations, and lending their own extensive knowledge to the entire project. Their leadershipelevated the process and this resulting report, and we cannot thank them enough.
We would also like to thank the many members of the Ransomware Task Force and theirorganizations, which afforded them the opportunity during otherwise exceedingly demanding times.
They answered this call to action with dedication and their substantial expertise. We appreciate theresources that each of them brought to the table and the professional connections they have tapped
into in order to move the process along and thoroughly vet our proposed solutions.
Lastly, we would like to thank the many unnamed people outside of the Task Force who answered ourmany questions, discussed ideas, and gave feedback on our recommendations.
We believe the recommendations in this report, if undertaken together and with alacrity, could lead toreal change in the trajectory of this threat. All of this has been made possible by the dedication andcare of this incredible group of people.
On behalf of all of us at the Institute for Security and Technology, a sincere thank you.

Note: RTF Members and Working Group Members volunteered their time, and contributed to thereport in working groups focused on specific problem sets. The resulting suite of recommendationsin this document is a combination of all working group efforts, and each recommendation may notnecessarily reflect the views of every participant.

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Combating Ransomware

RTF Co-Chairs

Megan Stifel, Global Cyber AllianceJohn Davis, Palo Alto Networks
Michael Phillips, Resilience

RTF Working
Group Co-Chairs

John Davis, Palo Alto Networks
Megan Stifel, Global Cyber Alliance
Michael Phillips, Resilience
Kemba Walden, Microsoft
Jen Ellis, Rapid7

RTF Staff

Sarah Powazek, RTF Program Manager,
Institute for Security and Technology
Alexander Riabov, Communications
Manager, IST
Leah Walker, Future Digital Security
Leader Fellow, IST

RTF Membership

Acknowledgements

56

Executive Director
Philip Reiner, Institute for Security
and Technology

Chris Painter, The Global Forum on
Cyber Expertise Foundation Board
Michael Daniel, Cyber Threat Alliance
Philip Reiner, Institute for Security
and Technology

Chuck Kapelke, Writing Support
Kathryn Pledger, Pledger Designs
Emma Hollingsworth, Global Cyber
Alliance

Joel de la Garza, a16z

Andy Thompson, CyberArk

Temi Adebambo, Amazon Web Services

Ari Schwartz, Cybersecurity Coalition

David Forcsey, Aspen DigitalJohn Banghart, Cybersecurity Coalition

Jeff Troy, Aviation ISAC

Ryan Weeks, Datto

Rich Friedberg, Blackbaud

Patrice Drake, Deloitte

Austin Berglas, BlueVoyant

Keith Mularski, Ernst & Young

Lewis Robinson, Center for Internet
Security

Stacy O’Mara, FireEye

Roger Francis, CFC Underwriting
Don Spies, Chainalysis
Pamela Clegg, CipherTrace
Brad Garnett, Cisco
Matt Olney, Cisco
Peter Lefkowitz, Citrix
Bill Siegal, Coveware
James Perry, CrowdStrike
Vineet Kumar, CyberPeace Foundation
Stéphane Duguin, The CyberPeace Institute
Yonatan Striem-Amit, Cybereason
Neil Jenkins, Cyber Threat Alliance

Nick Bennett, FireEye
Jill Fraser, Jefferson County, COMark Orsi, K12 SIX
Kent Landfield, McAfee
Ginny Badanes, Microsoft
Kaja Ciglic, Microsoft
Ping Look, Microsoft
Jennifer Coughlin, Mullen Coughlin LLC
John Guerriero, National Governors
Association
Justin Herring, New York Departmentof Financial Services (NYDFS)
Adrian McCabe, Palo Alto Networks

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Combating Ransomware

RTF Membership

Sam Rubin, Palo Alto Networks
Sean Morgan, Palo Alto Networks
Bob Rudis, Rapid7
Scott King, Rapid7
Tod Beardsley, Rapid7
Allan Liska, Recorded Future
Katie Nickels, Red Canary

Acknowledgements

57

Richard Perlotto, The Shadowserver
Foundation
Beau Woods, Stratigos Security
James Shank, Team Cymru
Michael Garcia, Third Way
Ciaran Martin, University of Oxford
Blavatnik School of Government

Adam Flatley, Redacted

Eleanor Fairford, U.K. National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC)

Davis Hake, Resilience

U.K. National Crime Agency (NCA)

Michael Convertino, Resilience

Bridgette Walsh, U.S. Cybersecurity andInfrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Chris Lynam, Royal Canadian
Mounted Police’s National Cybercrime
Coordination Unit (NC3)
Jeff Bonvie, Royal Canadian Mounted
Police’s National Cybercrime
Coordination Unit (NC3)
Kevin Gronberg, SecurityScorecard

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI)
Jonah Hill, U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
Bobby Chesney, U.T. Austin Strauss
CenterWho We Are
The Institute for Security and Technology designs and advances
solutions to the world’s toughest emerging security threats. As a501(c)(3) non-profit network based in the San Francisco Bay Area,
we are dedicated to advancing solutions to critical national security
challenges. Our goal is to provide the tools and insights needed forcompanies and governments to outpace emerging global security
threats, creating a bridge between technology and policy leaders.

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Combating Ransomware

Appendix A

Appendix A:
Cyber Insurance
Given the insurance sector’s historical role in assessing, managing, pricing, and carrying risks, thecyber insurance industry has been a regular topic of discussion across all of the working groups of the
Ransomware Task Force.

This section provides an overview of the cyber
insurance market and the role it plays in dealing
with ransomware attacks.

Introduction to the Cyber Insurance Market
Many organizations choose to transfer some of their ransomware risk by purchasing insurance. While
there are various types of insurance available that may cover losses associated with ransomware, including
property insurance, kidnap and ransom insurance, and errors and omissions insurance, most insured
ransomware losses are covered by “affirmative” or “stand-alone” cyber insurance. “Affirmative” refers to
explicit cyber coverage within the text of an insurance policy; “stand-alone” refers to a dedicated insurance
policy for cyber risk, instead of cyber coverage available within a policy dedicated to other types of risk.
The first cyber insurance policies were designed to respond to lawsuits arising out of technology errors
and omissions. As the internet developed, organizations digitized their operations, and as states passed
laws related to data breach notification and consumer privacy, cyber insurance firms expanded theircoverage to respond to the associated risks of data breach and business interruption. Today, cyber
insurance has become a standard part of cyber risk management strategies. Many cyber insurers andbrokers offer risk management services, education, and security tools to make their insureds moresecure, in addition to the traditional risk transfer of an insurance policy.
While many insurance companies actively underwrite cyber risks, the market is led by 20 or so large insurersthat write the majority of cyber insurance policies. Less than 15% of organizations globally buy cyber
insurance, including about a third of all large companies in the United States. Internationally, the numberof companies that have cyber insurance tends to be lower. While cyber insurance is growing, it remains
a niche product, and is less than 1% of the size of the greater property and casualty insurance market.74
Cyber insurance policies typically cover legal, forensic, and technical experts to help ransomware victims
take the most effective steps to recover. (See Table 1, Common Components of a Modern Cyber Insurance
Policy.) Insurance concentrates this kind of expertise to help victims best orchestrate their options forrecovery. Policies may indemnify victims for any business interruption losses and defend them against any
liability arising out of the event. Cyber insurance policies typically cover expertise to help a victim restore

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Combating Ransomware59

its computer systems from backups and, in the unfortunate circumstances in which the victim has
decided it is necessary, expertise to handle a ransom negotiation and effectuate an extortion payment.
Cyber insurance policies never require a victim to pay a ransom. Any decision to pay sits with the victim.

TABLE 1: Common Components of a Modern Cyber Insurance Policy
TYPE OF
COVERAGE

PARTY

DETAIL

Incident
Response Costs

First

The cost of responding to a data breach event, including IT forensics, external services, andspecialists that might be employed; internal response costs; legal costs; and costs related torestoring systems to their preexisting condition.
The cost of dealing with and compensating third-party individuals whose information is or
may have been compromised by a data breach event, including notification, compensation,
providing credit-watch services, and other third-party liabilities to affected data subjects.

Data Privacy Liability

Third

Data Recovery Costs

First

The cost of reconstituting data and/or software that have been deleted or corrupted.

Business
Interruption LossFirst

Lost profits or extra expenses incurred due to the unavailability of IT systems or data as aresult of cyber attacks or non-malicious IT failures.

Regulatory Defense

Third

Provides coverage for fines, penalties, and defense costs in the face of regulatory actions
investigating violations of privacy law.

Cyber ExtortionFirst

The cost of extortion response expertise to vet and evaluate all possible options for recovery,
and, if required, negotiate and execute any ransom payment.

Multimedia Liability

Third

Defense costs and civil damages arising from defamation, libel, slander, copyright/trademark
infringement, negligence in publication of any content in electronic or print media, as well as
infringement of the intellectual property of a third party.

Reputational Damage

First

Loss of revenues arising from an increase in customer churn or reduced transaction
volumes that can be directly attributed to the publication of a defined security breach
event.

Network Liability

Third

Third-party liabilities arising from security events occurring within the organization’s IT networkor passing through it in order to attack a third party.

Contingent Business
Interruption LossFirst

Costs of business interruption to the insured resulting from the IT failure of a third party, suchas a supplier, critical vendor, utility, or external IT services provider.

Technology Errors &Omissions Liability

Third

Coverage for third-party claims relating to failure to provide adequate technical service or
technical products and software, including legal costs and expenses of allegations resulting
from a cyber attack, error, or IT failure.

Financial Theftand FraudFirst

The direct financial loss suffered by an organization arising from the use of computers
to commit fraud or theft of money, securities, or other property.

Physical Asset
DamageFirst

First-party loss due to the destruction of hardware or other physical property resulting
from cyber attacks.

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Combating Ransomware

Appendix A

Thousands of organizations have used cyber insurance to recover from ransomware attacks,
including hospitals, cities, and schools, through comprehensive coverage and bringing to bearheavily vetted ransomware response expertise. Each year, cyber insurers pay out hundreds ofmillions of dollars in cyber losses claimed by their insureds, including business income losses, data
recovery costs, and expert fees arising out of ransomware events.75 As ransomware has become
more frequent and destructive, ransomware losses have increased, impacting both insured andinsurer. As a result, a number of insurers have exited the cyber insurance market or reduced their
participation. Firms that remain have invested heavily in their ability to properly assess cyber risk.
With approximately $1 trillion in insurance limits exposed, the cyber insurance market is incentivized
to reduce the risks posed by ransomware.
In the insurance industry, periods of falling premiums, expanding coverage, and loosening
underwriting standards (resulting from increased competition) are referred to as “soft markets,”
whereas periods of rising premiums, coverage restrictions, and heightened underwriting standards(due to increased underwriting losses) are often referred to as “hard markets.” According to multiple
reports, cyber insurance has entered a “hard market” phase.76
In a hard market, the insurance industry can push insured organizations to better manage theirrisk. Competing insurers may do this through rising underwriting standards and risk management
strategies, changes to price, and other innovations that align the insured organization’s incentives
toward risk management and risk transfer. This trend has been seen with respect to perils as
diverse as fire, piracy, hurricane, and kidnap for ransom; in each instance, the insurance sector has
identified and supported risk management practices and technologies that have bent the curveand ameliorated a significant risk, to the mutual benefit of the insured and the insurer. The cyber
insurance market should behave similarly; for example, after the major retail payment card breaches
of 2013 and 2014, the cyber insurance market pushed compliance with PCI-DSS standards, industry
standards promulgated by the payment card industry that establish a base level of payment card
cybersecurity.

In a hard market, the insurance industry can push insuredorganizations to better manage their risk.

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Appendix A

Rising Underwriting Standards in Response to Ransomware
The economics of the cyber insurance industry align with the victims of ransomware. As a result,the industry is incentivized to innovate, evolve, compete, and otherwise increase its expertise toprevent insured ransomware losses. As ransomware losses have accelerated, the cyber insurance
market has adapted.
Improved cyber-defense:
The key adaptation has been investment in underwriting analysis to identify ransomware risk factors
and developing the expertise to help firms secure themselves appropriately against a ransomware
attack. Increased scrutiny of prospective insurance buyers is designed to incentivize firms to makeappropriate security investments and become prepared. To accurately measure a firm’s ransomware
risk, cyber insurers are increasingly deploying supplemental ransomware underwriting applications,enlisting third-party cybersecurity firms to conduct additional assessments, and carrying out externalscans of firms’ web-facing assets. Cyber insurers may deploy in-house security and risk engineeringexpertise to proactively help insured organizations become more resilient in the face of ransomware
risk. A number of cyber insurers and insurance brokerage firms have established or acquired
cybersecurity firms to provide managed threat detection, incident response, or security consulting
services to insureds in advance of a loss.
Market Strategies:
Another adaptation comes from cyber insurers experimenting with different market strategies
to incentivize organizations to increase their cybersecurity to become secure. These strategies
include sublimits (i.e. reduced claim limits) for ransomware-related coverage; co-insurance (thejoint assumption of a risk by the insured and insurer); increases in premium; and other changes or
requirements in the insurance coverage.77 Underwriters may refuse to offer insurance coverage
to organizations that do not first establish an appropriate level of cybersecurity preparedness. For
instance, this may mean that an organization must confirm that it follows a recognized cybersecurity
framework, or that it has deployed multi-factor authentication, or is managing the risks associatedwith remote access to computer networks. While underwriting firms may defer in certain details,
the cyber insurance market is coalescing around certain baseline controls as a prerequisite toinsurability.78 Brokerages and risk management firms have also increased their advisory practices tomove organizations toward greater ransomware preparedness and insurability.
Organizations that lack basic cybersecurity hygiene may be uninsurable, which should spur greater
investment in ransomware defenses. When the market works properly, organizations should be
incentivized to reach an appropriate mix of insurance and security.79
Process changes:
Finally, as a third adaptation, cyber insurance companies have modified many internal processes.
For example, some insurers have established close connections with national and global law
enforcement to facilitate the sharing of data and threat intelligence.80

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Appendix B

Appendix B:
The Cryptocurrency Payment Process
Ransomware payments are typically made in cryptocurrency. As cryptocurrency ownership
records are maintained on the cryptographic ledger of a blockchain, ownership is not easily linked
to identifiable individuals. Often the money does not flow straight from victim to criminal; it travels
through a multi-step process involving different financial entities, each presenting insights into
criminal identities and opportunities for intervention.

This section expounds on this process,identifies many of the key entities involved,
and highlights where interventions could
occur and how they could undermine theransomware business model.

The following is a graphical representation of
the cryptocurrency payments process, andvarious potential points of intervention:

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Combating Ransomware

63

Figure 6 Payment Pathway and Potential Intervention Points
RANSOMWARE PAYMENT PATHWAY

Ransomware encrypts
victim's computer systems

POTENTIAL INTERVENTION POINTSPREPARE AND RESPOND• Prepare. If it cannot prevent the attack, the victim must
consider its recovery options.
• Reporting and Decisionmaking. A victim may engage law
enforcement, incident response firms, and its insurers as it
determines its next steps in response to the attack.

Victim exchanges Fiat Currency
for Cryptocurrency in anticipationof making payment.

CRYPTOCURRENCY “ON-RAMPS”• Response. The victim may negotiate and make the ransom
payment through an incident response firm.
• Payment Method. The victim may rely upon acryptocurrency exchange, OTC trading desk, private kiosk,
or wallet-to-wallet transfer to make the payment.

Victim pays ransom in
Cryptocurrency to the Walletaddress identified in the
Ransomware demand.

Ransom recipient distributes
ransom to administrators andaffiliates of the crime.

• KYC/AML and reporting. Traditional financial institutions
see the details of the victim’s transaction from fiat accounts
to incident response firm or cryptocurrency business.
• KYC/AML and Reporting. The incident response firm,
cryptocurrency business, or victim itself sees the details of
the ransom transaction.
• Investigation. Law enforcement may engage blockchain
analysis firms to investigate parties to cryptocurrencytransactions.

CRYPTOCURRENCY “OFF-RAMPS”• KYC/AML rules may push criminals to low-liquidity exchanges.

Criminals further Obfuscate
Funds through Cryptocurrency
mixing services.

• Law enforcement and victims may pursue the freezing andseizure of ransom payments in the custody of third parties
such as exchanges.
• Mixing services are designed to obscure the identity ofcryptocurrency owners.
• Exchanges can blacklist wallets.

Criminals transfer “MIXED”
Cryptocurrency to Exchanges fortransfer into Foreign Fiat Currency.

• Accelerated information sharing amongst exchanges and law
enforcement can enhance opportunities for justice.

DISRUPTING ORGANIZED CRIME• Disrupt the ransomware criminal enterprise using
established frameworks that have been used successfully
to disrupt the activities of the mafia and other criminalorganizations.

Criminals use proceedsfrom crime.

DETERING RANSOMWARE ACTORSAND THEIR SPONSORS• Deter ransomware actors and their sponsors, hosts, andsupporters through coordinated international action.

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Combating Ransomware

Appendix B

1
Step 1 Victim Response
When a victim is hit with a ransomware attack, they may engage one or more incident response entities
to assist in the process of advising on, and potentially paying, the ransom. These firms include thevictim’s cyber-insurance provider (if they have coverage), law firms, negotiation firms, threat intelligence,and forensic investigators.
Entities like negotiation firms communicate directly with ransomware threat actors and seek to lower
the ransom demand. Other organizations (for example, incident response firms, financial institutions,etc.) may perform due diligence to ensure a payment would not violate sanctions, identify the extent
of applicable insurance coverage, and confirm that there is no publicly available decryption key.
These firms may also assist the victim with deciding whether or not to pay the ransom.

2
Step 2 Ransom Payment
If a victim decides to pay the ransom, either they or an incident response vendor, such as a forensic
investigator or negotiation firm, will need to withdraw funds from a financial institution to purchasethe cryptocurrency. This cryptocurrency is then transferred from the victim’s cryptocurrency wallet, a
digital storage service, facilitated by a cryptocurrency exchange, a private kiosk, or simply a wallet-towallet transfer to a new wallet address provided by the ransomware criminal. These victim-specificaddresses are created by the criminal actors for the purpose of receiving the payments. Oftenthese will have never been used before, to avoid being associated with the threat actor’s previous
activity, and thus cannot be traced until funds are actually deposited into those wallet addressesby the victim. These are generally un-hosted wallets, which means they are not hosted with any
cryptocurrency exchange that handles and monitors transactions.
Cryptocurrencies are outside of any one organization’s control, but their blockchains create public,
permanent records of activity, whether legal or illicit. Blockchain analysis helps interpret publicblockchain ledgers and, with the proper tools, government agencies, cryptocurrency businesses, andfinancial institutions can understand which real-world entities transact with each other. Blockchain
analytic companies, such as Chainalysis and CipherTrace, are able to show that a given transaction took
place between two different cryptocurrency exchanges, or between a cryptocurrency exchange and an
illicit entity, such as a sanctioned individual or organization. With blockchain analysis tools and KnowYour Customer (KYC) information, law enforcement can gain transparency into blockchain activity.
While some illicit actors use privacy coins in an attempt to obfuscate their transactions, this more
untraceable form of cryptocurrency has not been adopted as widely as might be expected because
they are not as liquid as Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Now that many exchanges have delisted
privacy coins following guidance from regulators, this payment method is becoming increasingly
impractical. Cryptocurrency is only useful if you can buy and sell goods and services or cash out into
fiat, and that is much more difficult with privacy coins.

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Appendix B

3
Step 3 Ransomware Fund Obfuscation
After receiving the ransomware payment in the designated digital wallet, the ransomware criminal
often attempts to obfuscate these funds as quickly as possible to avoid detection and tracking. As
noted above, Bitcoin transactions are logged in a public ledger, so without obfuscation, a criminal
cannot withdraw funds into cash without being tracked. One popular method for obfuscation is toroute funds through cryptocurrency mixing services, services that create a series of transactions to
mix one set of funds with another, muddying the public ledger by mixing in legitimate “traffic” with
illicit ransomware funds.

Cryptocurrency mixing services
Cryptocurrency mixing services (often “mixers” or “tumblers”) are commonly used byransomware actors and others engaged in illicit activity. As described above, a blockchain isa record of the source and destination of every transaction. As a result, blockchain analytic
firms can trace cryptocurrency transactions, supporting both law enforcement efforts to
identify criminals and cryptocurrency exchange efforts to screen clients for links to crime.
Ransomware actors use mixers to try to prevent such tracing by making it difficult to
identify the true source of transactions on the blockchain.
Mixers can function in multiple ways, but typically they rely upon a group of people coming
together to pool their cryptocurrency (like bitcoin), with each taking back different bitcoinsof the same value. These different bitcoins they receive will have a different source than theones they submitted for “mixing.” This process is typically managed by a centralized mixing
service, which charges a fee — often between 1-10% of the amount mixed. Some mixing
services take additional steps to complicate and obfuscate the source of funds, includingintermediate trades with privacy coins such as Monero. There are hundreds of mixing
services available on the internet.

Another method for obfuscation is “chainhopping,” exchanging funds in one cryptocurrency
for another. Tracking funds after they switch currencies can be extremely challenging. Thesetransactions can occur at centralized or decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges, which are
discussed further in Step 4, or via atomic swaps and other technical means.

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Appendix B

Combating Ransomware

4

Step 4 Cash out

After obfuscating the funds, ransomware criminals may make use of the cryptocurrency, or withdraw
the funds into cash. There are several methods for cashing out, including over-the -counter trading
desks, crypto kiosks, and exchanges, which are the most prominent. Others include exchanging
bitcoin for gift/debit cards and or alternative coins, such as privacy coins.
As noted below criminals may make use of cryptocurrency funds by paying for infrastructure to
conduct attacks or to pay individuals involved in the criminal organization, such as money launderers
and affiliates. Criminals also rely on OTC traders to convert the virtual currency to fiat. A market
exists for these OTC transactions because Russian businesses operating in China prefer to operate in
Bitcoin to avoid taxes, while criminals operating in Russia prefer cash. Therefore, an OTC trader canconnect these individuals with Russian businesses accepting Bitcoin and criminals receiving cashtransactions inside Russia.

Where do the funds go?

In 2020, cryptocurrency-tracing company
Chainalysis tracked nearly $7 million sent fromransomware-tainted cryptocurrency wallets toother known illicit marketplaces.81 Ransoms
paid by victims may go on to fund other criminal
enterprises that are facilitated online, as has
been detailed in other sections of this report.

Figure 7 Ransomware Wallets Sending toDarknet Marketplaces
86$ MILLIONS

Ransomware criminals may choose to not
immediately withdraw funds into cash fortheir own use. In the ransomware-as-aservice (RaaS) model described earlier in thereport, several criminal affiliates (essentiallycontractors) are involved in the exploitation,
encryption, and ransom demand, all of whom
require payouts. Criminal gangs also may
use cryptocurrency itself to invest in further
malicious infrastructure and services.

4

2

0
2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

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Step 4cont...

Combating Ransomware

Appendix B

Cryptocurrency businesses facilitate the trading of cryptocurrency between buyers and sellers.
Ransomware criminals rely on these businesses to exchange their ransomware proceeds fordifferent cryptocurrencies or for government-issued currencies. As relatively new financial
institutions, these cryptocurrency businesses exist on a spectrum of legitimacy, regulation, andcompliance, and handle varying amounts of transactions with illicit funds. For example, in 2019,
Coinbase published a report identifying that most exchanges are not in compliance with Anti
Money Laundering or Know your Customer procedures.

Cryptocurrency businesses generally fall into one ofthree categories:•

Regulated Cryptocurrency Exchanges: These are legitimate exchanges with high liquiditythat are able to handle a large number of transactions. In the United States, these exchanges
are subject to non-bank financial institution anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, which
require some Know Your Customer (KYC) identification of customers performing largetransactions, among other requirements. Other jurisdictions impose similar KYC and AML
requirements as those in the United States, including the United Kingdom, the European Union,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand.82•

Minimally Regulated Cryptocurrency Exchanges: Located in jurisdictions with lessstringent regulatory obligations than the United States and other members of the G7, these
cryptocurrency exchanges operate with few controls for identifying potential illicit funds. Theseexchanges often serve as one of the preferred services for ransomware criminals to cash out
illicit funds without oversight. These exchanges include Binance and Huobi, which have muchless stringent KYC rules, especially when dealing with OTC traders.

•Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Cryptocurrency Exchanges (also known as Over-the-Counter or
Decentralized Exchanges): Regardless of geographical limits, users can download freelyavailable software or access P2P exchanges to buy and sell cryptocurrency directly with one
another. This avoids the use of a third-party service like a “traditional” exchange, which may
hold user funds in custody, process transactions in fiat currency, and comply with KYC andAML requirements.

•

Over-The-Counter Trading Desks: Some OTC traders, actors that trade cryptocurrency
without an exchange acting as a facilitator or mediator of the trade, provide cryptocurrency
laundering services to ransomware threat actors. Although many OTC traders maintainlegitimate businesses and comply with stringent financial regulations, some do not, and they
provide an important source of liquidity for exchanging ransomware payment.

Tracking payments is difficult due to the variance in standards and enforcement of regulationfor exchanges of different categories, or that operate in different countries. Even using regulated
exchanges, ransomware actors constantly find new ways to remain hidden by using money muleservice providers to set up accounts, or use accounts with false or stolen credentials.

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Appendix C

Appendix C:
Proposed Framework for a Public-Private
Operational Ransomware Campaign
This appendix provides an overview of how theformal, government-led Joint Ransomware Task
Force (JRTF) and the informal Ransomware Threat
Focus Hub (RTFH) could collaborate to conduct anoperational ransomware campaign.

Background
Over the years, many efforts have attempted to formalize the trust networks that are relied on
to keep the internet operating. Some initiatives have been effective without significant formal
structure: the Conficker Working Group, convened by Microsoft in the late 2000s to stop the spreadand impact of the Conficker worm, is often lauded as an early model. More formal joint collaborative
efforts have also been successful: the 2020-2021 takedown of Emotet was an example of a longcollaborative effort between global law enforcement, judicial authorities, and private industry to
seize and disrupt a massive global botnet. More often, though, public-private information security
collaboration occurs primarily when there is a crisis, as was the case with the Cyber Unified
Coordination Group (UCG), which the U.S. Government convened in 2021 to focus on the Hafnium
case involving vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Servers.
What remains elusive is a standing mechanism for convening operationally focused, sustained,public-private campaigns that are coordinated via formal and informal nodes, and that allow for
both the formal requirements needed by government and the informal requirements needed byindustry. Much has already been written about potential solutions for launching such an initiative,
including Jay Healey’s 2018 article on Cyber Incident Collaboration Organizations, 83 recent work by
the Aspen Institute,84 and recommended solutions from the World Economic Forum’s Partnership
Against Cybercrime.85 Ransomware presents a unique opportunity to test new approaches, and theRansomware Task Force provides below a proposed framework for consideration.

Objective
Use operational collaboration to increase the scope, scale, pace, and efficacy of intelligence-driven
takedowns and disruption of ransomware operations and the infrastructure and people that enable them.

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Appendix C

Assumptions
Ransomware actors are intelligently taking advantage of the seams between law enforcement
and private-sector cooperation mechanisms, and between governmental and private-sector legal
authorities. They also move with such alacrity that existing structures cannot respond fast enoughto disrupt their activities on a sustained, rapid, and concerted basis.
Existing mechanisms are working to address the problem, but they are siloed in various agencies andnot leveraging the full authorities and capabilities of all government agencies. They also do not routinely
incorporate private-sector action, nor do they scale to compete with the agility of the criminals.
This public-private operational collaboration mechanism should include actors and organizations
that are involved in the full gamut of defending against and disrupting ransomware operations. No
single actor or entity is fully capable of disrupting this threat by itself, so public and private actors
must come together to assess the threat and coordinate activities across authorities and capabilities.

Private-sector participants must recognizethat not all government actions will be sharedor coordinated with non-government actors
due to security concerns or to protect sources
and methods.

Government participants must recognize thatprivate-sector participants may need to takeactions quickly to protect their customers
and fulfill contractual agreements, and may
not always be able to coordinate actions withthe government.

A natural governmental response to this collaboration requirement is to create some kind of formal
structure. However, a formal private-public Joint Ransomware Task Force would likely hinder privatesector participation. Past experience has shown that private-sector participants are more likely toshare information with the government and take actions to defend their customers in coordination
with government through existing informal and indirect channels. The U.S. Government, on the other
hand, needs formality to function in a joint way; moreover, the need for public accountability requires
the government to adhere to formal rules and structures. Departments and agencies, especially thosewith competing equities, are more likely to work only within their lane of authorities and capabilities
unless they are required and incentivized to work with each other.
Thus a formal government task force paired with existing formal and informal private-sector groups
in the short-term would build trust and work to develop some early wins. Over time, a combination offormal and informal private-sector structures should develop to interface with the government’s Joint
Ransomware Task Force (JRTF), working toward a 24/7 operational collaboration mechanism for a
public-private anti-ransomware campaign.
Ransomware disruptions will almost always be law enforcement operations at their core. But inorder to truly disrupt ransomware actors, we must also consider non-law enforcement options andcapabilities that can improve defenses, impose costs, or more fully disrupt ransomware operations.
In terms of the intelligence needed for such operations, the government and various private-sector
organizations need each other.

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Appendix C

Over time, a combination of formal andinformal private sector structures should
develop to interface with the government’s
Joint Ransomware Task Force, working
towards a 24/7 operational collaboration
mechanism for a public-private antiransomware campaign.

•

Private-sector cybersecurity providers are often best positioned to capture indicators ofcompromise and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the malicious actors todevelop protections for their customers and understand active campaigns.

•

Cryptocurrency exchanges and analysis firms are best positioned to understandthe flow of ransomware payments.

•

Government agencies, especially in law enforcement and the Intelligence Community, arebest positioned to identify the individuals behind the activity.

•

All of these intelligence perspectives must be shared, combined, and understood in order todevelop the best possible disruption options.

U.S. Government personnel working with the private sector in a given campaign must be
empowered and incentivized by their leadership to engage with the private sector and takeaction based on what they learn. They should also anticipate the needs of private-sector
partners and share information that will lead to disruptions.
To achieve this increased level of operational collaboration, the Ransomware Task Forcerecommends the following:

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Appendix C

Recommendations
1. The U.S. Government should establish the Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) consisting ofrepresentatives from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA; the FBI; UnitedStates Secret Service; the Intelligence Community; U.S. Cyber Command; the Departments ofTreasury, Justice, and State; the Office of the National Cyber Director; and other departments
and agencies as appropriate. The JRTF’s mission should be to prioritize ransomware disruption
operations and leverage the intelligence-driven disruption planning process to increase the paceand efficacy of ransomware takedowns and disruption. The Departments of Homeland Security,
Justice, and Defense should jointly provide the resources needed to establish and operate theTask Force, such as office space, IT infrastructure, and other supplies. The Task Force should
coordinate closely with the Joint Cyber Planning Office in CISA, the National Cyber Investigative
Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), and other inter-agency cyber-related groups. The NSC-led Interagency
Working Group recommended in 1.2.1 of the main RTF report would provide direction, priorities,
and oversee the JRTF. The goals of the JRTF should be to:• Prioritize intelligence-driven operations to disrupt specific ransomware actors;•	Incentivize and empower government agencies and personnel to participate in joint
operations in the interagency and with private-sector partners and take action; and• Anticipate the needs and requests of the private sector
	The Administration could create such a Task Force through executive action, just as the Bush
Administration created the NCIJTF through National Security Policy Directive-54/Homeland
Security Policy Directive-23. The JRTF could be a stand-alone entity, or as U.S. government cyberorganizations continue to mature and evolve, it could be folded into an existing organization, suchas the Joint Cyber Planning Office, the National Cyber Director’s office, or the NCIJTF.
2. An existing non-profit organization should establish a private-sector Ransomware Threat Focus
Hub. The participants should include cybersecurity providers, non-profit sharing organizations,cyber threat intelligence firms, threat intelligence researchers and contractors, incident response
firms, managed security service providers, telecommunications companies, major platform owners/
operators, and hosting providers. The Hub would facilitate and coordinate sustained private-sector
actions against an agreed-upon target list, in coordination with the JRTF. The hosting non-profit
organization, such as an information-sharing and analysis organization (ISAO), would provide spacefor information sharing and operational collaboration between participants.86 Formal and informal
coordination could occur within this Hub, and the Hub would encourage informal and formal groups
to work together in tandem. Informal groups would continue to work and collaborate as they dotoday, while the formal layer would focus on long-term, permanent arrangements with the U.S. orother governments.
The RTF recommends the following general tasks for the JRTF and the RTFH:

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Proposed JRTF Tasks
1. Establish a “target list” of the top 10
ransomware threats, in consultation withthe private-sector hub, updated on an
ongoing basis, to:

4. Enable the private sector to tip and cue
law enforcement, network defenders,intelligence community, and, where
necessary, U.S. military action.

a. Identify and prioritize targets forthreat cells, focused on specificransomware actors/conglomerates;
b. Identify a timeline for the operation;
andc. Identify metrics for success.

5. Collect, share, and analyze ransomware
trends to inform campaigns.

2. Disrupt criminal actors, associatedinfrastructure, and their finances.
3. Enable private-sector representatives
to move against ransomware actors andinfrastructure with rapid legal authority(e.g. court orders) when necessary totake required actions.

6. Create “after action reports” that identify
successes and failures in an operation
to improve subsequent operations.
7. Use non-traditional tools, such as
information and influence operations,through online forums or a dedicatedweb portal

Proposed Ransomware Threat Focus Hub Tasks:
1. Provide input to the JRTF’s top 10
target list.
2. Take synchronized actions against
criminal actors, associatedinfrastructure, and financial operations,based on participants’ legal authority.
3. Enable government-sector
representatives to target and disrupt
ransomware actors and infrastructure
more rapidly.

4. Collect, share, and analyze ransomware
trends to inform counter-ransomware
campaigns.
5. Create “after action reports” from theprivate-sector point of view that identify
successes and failures in each operation
to improve subsequent operations.
6. Use non-traditional tools, such as
information and influence operations, via
online forums, a dedicated web portal, orother means.

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Glossary

Glossary
AG

Attorney General

ALATs

Assistant Legal Attachés

APAC

Asia-PacificAtomic Swaps

A smart contract technique that allows the quick exchange of two different
cryptocurrencies, running on distinct blockchain networks, without using
centralized intermediaries.

AML

Anti-Money Laundering

CCIPS

Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

CDNs

Content Delivery Networks

Centralized
Cryptocurrency
Exchange (CEX)

Online platforms that are used to buy and sell cryptocurrencies. They are themost common means that investors use to buy and sell cryptocurrency holdings.
Most of the control over your account remains in the hands of the third party thatruns the exchange

CFAA

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

CFT

Combatting Financing of Terrorism

CHIPS

Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Network

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

CNO

Computer Network Operations

CRRFs

Cyber Response and Recovery Funds

CSN

Cybercrime Support Network

Cyber Kill Chain

A series of steps that trace the stages of a cyberattack from the earlyreconnaissance stages to the exfiltration of data. The steps are as follows:
1. R econnaissance: The observation stage: attackers typically assess thesituation from the outside in to identify both targets and tactics for the attack.
2. Intrusion: Based on what the attackers discovered in the reconnaissancephase, they are able to get into the systems: often leveraging malware or
security vulnerabilities.
3. Exploitation: The act of exploiting vulnerabilities, and delivering malicious
code onto the system.
4. P
 rivilege Escalation: Attackers often need more privileges on a system to get
access to more data and permissions. For this, they need to escalate theirprivileges, often to an Admin.

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Glossary

5. L ateral Movement: Once in the system, attackers can move laterally toother systems and accounts in order to gain more leverage, whether higher
permissions, more data, or greater access to systems.
6. O bfuscation / Anti-forensics: In order to successfully pull off a cyberattack,attackers need to cover their tracks; during this stage, they often lay false
trails, compromise data, and clear logs to confuse and/or slow down any
forensics team.
7. Denial of Service: Disruption of normal access for users and systems,in order to stop the attack from being monitored, tracked, or blocked.
8. E xfiltration: The extraction stage: getting data out of the compromised system.
Decentralized
Cryptocurrency
Exchange (DEX)

A peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplace that connects cryptocurrency buyers andsellers. A user remains in control of their private keys when transacting on a DEX
platform.

DFIR

Digital Forensics/Incident Response

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DNS

Denial of Service

DSAR

Data Subjection Access Request

EMEA

Europe, the Middle East, and Africa

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Fiat

Government-issued currency that is not backed by a commodity such as gold;
often has government regulations.

FinCEN

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FSB

Federal Security Service

HAVA

Help America Vote Act

HIPAA

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

HITECH ACT

Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act

HSMs

Hardware Security Models

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

ICAIntelligence Community Assessment

ICHIP

International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

IOS

Indicators of Compromise

IRS

Internal Revenue Service

ISAC

Information Sharing and Analysis Center

ISAO

Information Sharing and Analysis Organization

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Glossary

IWG

Interagency Working GroupJCPO

Joint Cyber Planning Office

JRTF

Joint Ransomware Task Force

KYC

Know Your Customer

Know Your
Customer (KYC)
Information

A standard in the investment industry that ensures investment advisors know
detailed information about their clients’ risk tolerance, investment knowledge,
and financial position. Sharing KYC information on blockchain would enablefinancial institutions to deliver better compliance outcomes, increase efficiency,
and improve customer experience. Information includes name, date of birth,address, bills, etc.

MDBR

Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting

Money Mule
Someone who transfers or moves illegally acquired money on behalf of someone
Service Providers else. Criminals recruit money mules to help launder proceeds derived from online
scams and frauds or crimes.
MS-ISAC

Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center

MSB

Money Service Businesses

MSP

Managed Service Providers

MSSP

Managed Security Services Providers

MXs

Mail Exchangers

NAIC

National Association of Insurance Commissioners

NCD

National Cyber Director

NCIJTF

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task ForceNCSC

National Cyber Security Centre

NDAA

National Defense Authorization Act

NIS Directive

Network and Information Security Directive

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NSC

National Security Council

NSD

National Security Division

OFAC

Office of Foreign Assets Controls

OFE

Office of Fraud Enforcement

OTC

Over the counter

PCI DSS

Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

Privacy Coins

A class of cryptocurrencies that power private and anonymous blockchaintransactions by obscuring their origin and destination.

RAAS

Ransomware as a Service, a business model used by ransomware developers, inwhich they lease ransomware variants in the same way that legitimate softwaredevelopers lease software as a service (SaaS) products.

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Glossary

RCE

Remote Code Execution

RICO

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

RIR

Ransomware Incident Report (proposed)

RIRN

Ransomware Incident Response Network (proposed)

RTF

Ransomware Task Force

RTFH

Ransomware Threat Focus Hub (proposed)

SARs

Suspicious Activity Reports

SDN List

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Person List

SEC

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

SLTTs

U.S. State, local, tribal, and territorial government entities

Trust Group

Communities of security professionals who collaborate between chains of trust.
Trust Groups’ missions often include maintaining integrity and security of the internet,
developing and sharing information, and encouraging and promoting security.

TS/SCITop Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information

TTP

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UCG

Cyber Unified Coordination Group

USAOs

United States Attorney’s Office

USIC

United States Intelligence Community

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Endnotes

Endnotes
1. E
 msisoft Malware Lab, “The State of Ransomware in the US: Report and Statistics 2020,” January 18, 2021, Emisoft Blog,
https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/37314/the-state-of-ransomware-in-the-us-report-and-statistics-2020/
2.	Coveware, “Ransomware Payments Fall as Fewer Companies Pay Data Exfiltration Extortion Demands,” February 1,
2021. https://www.coveware.com/blog/ransomware-marketplace-report-q4-2020
3.	Emsisoft Malware Lab, “The State of Ransomware in the US: Report and Statistics 2020,” January 18, 2021, Emisoft Blog,
https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/37314/the-state-of-ransomware-in-the-us-report-and-statistics-2020/
4.	Chainalysis Team, “Ransomware Skyrocketed in 2020, But There May Be Fewer Culprits Than You Think,” excerpt
from the Chainalysis 2021 Crypto Crime Report, January 26, 2021, https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/ransomwareecosystem-crypto-crime-2021
5.	Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks, “Ransomware Threat Assessments: A Companion to the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat
Report,” March 17, 2021, https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ransomware-threat-assessments.
6.	Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, “Marine Safety Information Bulletin: Cyberattack Impacts MTSA Facility Operations,”
December 2019. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/MSIB/2019/MSIB_10_19.pdf
7.	Rundle, James and Nash, Kim S. “Ransomware Attack Exposes Poor Energy-Sector Cybersecurity,” Wall Street
Journal, February 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ransomware-attack-exposes-poor-energy-sectorcybersecurity-11582540200.
8.	Emsisoft Malware Lab, “The State of Ransomware in the US: Report and Statistics 2020,” January 18, 2021, Emisoft Blog,
https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/37314/the-state-of-ransomware-in-the-us-report-and-statistics-2020/
9.	Eddy, Melissa and Perlroth, Nicole. “Cyber Attack Suspected in German Woman’s Death,” New York Times, September 18,
2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/world/europe/cyber-attack-germany-ransomeware-death.html.
10.	Barry, Ellen and Perlroth, Nicole. “Patients of a Vermont Hospital Are Left ‘in the Dark’ After a Cyberattack,” November 26,
2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/26/us/hospital-cyber-attack.html.
11.	Krebs, Brian. “Study: Ransomware, Data Breaches at Hospitals tied to Uptick in Fatal Heart Attacks,” KrebsOnSecurity,
November 7, 2019, https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/11/study-ransomware-data-breaches-at-hospitals-tied-to-uptickin-fatal-heart-attacks/.
12.	Hay Newman, Lily. “Atlanta Spent $2.6M to Recover From a $52,000 Ransomware Scare,” Wired. April 23, 2018.
https://www.wired.com/story/atlanta-spent-26m-recover-from-ransomware-scare/
13.	Coble, Sarah. “MAZE Exfiltration Tactic Widely Adopted,” Infosecurity Magazine. Accessed April 2, 2021.
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/maze-exfiltration-tactic-widely/.
14.	Emsisoft Malware Lab, “The State of Ransomware in the US: Report and Statistics 2020,” January 18, 2021, Emisoft Blog,
https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/37314/the-state-of-ransomware-in-the-us-report-and-statistics-2020/15.	C ybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Cyber Actors Target K-12 Distance Learning Education to Cause
Disruptions and Steal Data,” December 10, 2020. https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-345a
16.	Associated Press. “Baltimore: Ransomware Attack Will Cost at Least $18M,” May 30, 2019.
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/baltimore-ransomware-attack-will-cost-at-least-18m/159464/
17.	Chokshi, Niraj. “Hackers Are Holding Baltimore Hostage: How They Struck and What’s Next,”New York Times, May 22,
2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/baltimore-ransomware.html
18.	Freed, Benjamin. “Baltimore ransomware attack was early attempt at data extortion, new report shows,” StateScoop,
September 25, 2020. https://statescoop.com/baltimore-ransomware-crowdstrike-extortion/
19.	Chainalysis Team, “Ransomware Skyrocketed in 2020, But There May Be Fewer Culprits Than You Think,” January 26,
2021. Exerpt from Chainalysis 2021 Crypto Crime Report. https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/ransomware-ecosystemcrypto-crime-2021

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Endnotes

20.	Buckley, Eileen. “Ransomware attack shutdown all Buffalo school learning,” The Rebound Buffalo, March 15, 2021.
https://www.wkbw.com/rebound/state-of-education/ransomware-attack-shutdown-all-buffalo-school-learning
21.	Coble, Sarah. “Cyber-Attack on Mississippi Schools Costs $300,000,” InfoSecurity Magazine, Accessed on April 10, 2021.
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberattack-on-mississippi-schools/
22.	Palmer, Danny. “A highly sophisticated ransomware attack leaves 36,000 students without email,” ZDNet, March 30,
2021. https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-highly-sophisticated-ransomware-attack-leaves-36000-students-without-email/23.	Weston, Sabina. “Evidence suggests REvil behind Harris Federation ransomware attack,” ITPro, April 9, 2021. https://www.itpro.com/security/ransomware/359161/evidence-suggests-revil-behind-harris-federation-ransomware-attack
24.	C ybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Ransomware Guidance and Resources,” https://www.cisa.gov/
ransomware
25.	Sophos, “The State of Ransomware 2020,” May 2020. http://i.crn.com/sites/default/files/ckfinderimages/userfiles/
images/crn/pdf/sophos-the-state-of-ransomware-2020-wp.pdf
26.	United States Department of Treasury, “Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments,”
October 1, 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ofac_ransomware_advisory_10012020_1.pdf
27.	Sentonas, Michael. “2020 Global Security Attitude Survey: How Organizations Fear Cyberattacks Will Impact Their Digital
Transformation and Future Growth,” CrowdStrike Blog, November 17, 2020. https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/globalsecurity-attitude-survey-takeaways-202028.	C yber Florida, “The Connection Between Ransomware and Cyber Insurance Claims in 2020,” October 20, 2020, Cyber
Florida, https://cyberflorida.org/best-practices/the-connection-between-ransomware-and-cyber-insurance-claimsin-2020/29.	Dudley, Renee. “The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are Fueling a Rise in Ransomware Attacks,”
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurance-companies-are-fueling-a-rise-inransomware-attacks
30.	Smilyanets, Dmitry. “‘I scrounged through the trash heaps… now I’m a millionaire:’ An interview with REvil’s Unknown,”
The Record. March 16, 2021. https://therecord.media/i-scrounged-through-the-trash-heaps-now-im-a-millionaire-aninterview-with-revils-unknown/
31.	Freedman, Linn F. “Sodinokibi Hackers Switch Payment Mechanism to Monero,” National Law Review, April 16, 2020.
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sodinokibi-hackers-switch-payment-mechanism-to-monero
32.	Reuters, “Cyber attack hits 200,000 in at least 150 countries: Europol,” May 14, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/uscyber-attack-europol/cyber-attack-hits-200000-in-at-least-150-countries-europol-idUSKCN18A0FX
33.	Sophos, “The State of Ransomware 2020,” May 2020. http://i.crn.com/sites/default/files/ckfinderimages/userfiles/
images/crn/pdf/sophos-the-state-of-ransomware-2020-wp.pdf
34. Check Point. Live Cyber Threat Map. https://threatmap.checkpoint.com/
35.	Khan, Abdullah. “G7 finance ministers urge countries to adopt FATF standards against cybercrime,” S&P Global Market
Intelligence, Oct.13, 2020. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/g7finance-ministers-urge-countries-to-adopt-fatf-standards-against-cybercrime-60717238
36.	Skulkin, Oleg; Rezvukhin, Roman; Rogachev, Semyon, “Ransomware Uncovered 2020/2021,” Group IB, March 2021,
https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/ransomware-2021.html
37.	Midler, Marisa. “Ransomware as a Service Threats,” Carnegie Mellon Univesrity Software Engineering Institute Blog.
October 5, 2020. https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/ransomware-as-a-service-raas-threats/. See also Kost, Edward,“What is Ransomware as a Service (RaaS)? The dangerous threat to world security,” UpGuard Blog, March 5, 2021.
https://www.upguard.com/blog/what-is-ransomware-as-a-service
38.	United States Department of the Treasury, “DPRK Cyber Threat Advisory: Guidance on the North Korean Cyber Threat,”
April 15, 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_cyber_threat_advisory_20200415.pdf
39.	United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russia with Sweeping New Sanctions Authority,” Press
Release, April 15, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0127
40.	G7, “Ransomware Annex to G7 Statement,” October 13, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7Ransomware-Annex-10132020_Final.pdf

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Endnotes

41.	Details about the NotPetya ransomware attack from: Perlroth, Nicole. This is How They Tell Me the World Ends, New
York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021; and Greenberg, Andy. Sandworm, 2019. New York: Penguin Random House.
42. See, for example, Center for Internet Security, “CIS Controls,” https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/.
43.	See, for example, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Small Business Cybersecurity Corner:
Training,” https://www.nist.gov/itl/smallbusinesscyber/training
44. Ibid45.	C ybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Cyber Incident Response,” https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-incidentresponse46.	Testimony from Donna F. Dodson, Chief Cybersecurity Advisor, National Institute of Standards and Technology, UnitedStates Department of Commerce, “Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships to Reduce Cyber Risks to Our Nation’s
Critical Infrastructure,” https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/strengthening-public-private-partnerships-reduce-cyberrisks-our-nations-critical
47.	C ybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “CISA Launches Campaign to Reduce the Risk of Ransomware,”Press Release, January 21, 2021. https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/21/cisa-launches-campaign-reduce-riskransomware
48. For more about “No More Ransom,” see https://www.nomoreransom.org.
49.	National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), “Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks,” February 13, 2020.
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware-and-ransomware-attacks
50.	Europol, “World’s Most Dangerous Malware EMOTET Disrupted Through Global Action,” Press Release, January 27, 2021.
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/world%E2%80%99s-most-dangerous-malware-emotet-disruptedthrough-global-action
51.	O ther potential forums include the Five Eyes LE Group, Five Eyes AG Group, Tech Accord (PS), Global Banking
Associations, Electronic Banking Group, European Banking Federation, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, World Economic Forum, and Ottawa F5 - AU.
52.	Five Country Ministerial, “Five Country Ministerial Statement Regarding the Threat of Ransomware,” April 7/8,
2021. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-04/Five%20Country%20Ministerial%20Statement%20
Regarding%20the%20Threat%20of%20Ransomware.pdf
53.	In October 2020, finance ministers from the Group of Seven called upon nations to implement Financial Action Task
Force standards to reduce ransomware and other cyber crime. See Khan, Abdullah. “G7 finance ministers urge countries
to adopt FATF standards against cybercrime,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, Oct.13, 2020. https://www.spglobal.
com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/g7-finance-ministers-urge-countries-to-adopt-fatfstandards-against-cybercrime-60717238
54.	See Europol, “Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce,” https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/
joint-cybercrime-action-taskforce.
55.	Chainalysis Team, “Ransomware Skyrocketed in 2020, But There May Be Fewer Culprits Than You Think,” excerpt
from the Chainalysis 2021 Crypto Crime Report, January 26, 2021, https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/ransomwareecosystem-crypto-crime-2021
56.	The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has proposed a rule to tighten compliance around convertible
virtual currencies and digital assets. See Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,“Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets,”
https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2020-28437.pdf
57.	See U.S. Department of Treasury, “Section 314(b) Fact Sheet,” https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/
shared/314bfactsheet.pdf
58.	Versprille, Allyson. “IRS’s ‘Operation Hidden Treasure’ Focusing on Crypto Fraud,” Bloomberg Tax, March 5, 2021.
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/irss-operation-hidden-treasure-focusing-on-crypto-fraud
59. See the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), https://www.iso.org/publication-list.html
60.	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Cybersecurity Framework,” https://www.nist.gov/
cyberframework

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Endnotes

61.	SecurityScorecard identified 10 security issues more prevalent in ransomware victims than other organizations; ifcompanies addressed these issues they could lower their risk of a successful ransomware attack. See Peng, Tishun
Peng and Sohval, Bob. “Organizations with Diligent Cybersecurity Less Likely to Fall Victim to Costly Ransomware,” April
15, 2021. https://securityscorecard.com/blog/organizations-with-diligent-cybersecurity-practices-less-likely-to-fallvictim-to-costly-ransomware-attacks
62.	See, for example, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), “Ransomware Fact Sheet,” https://www.hhs.
gov/sites/default/files/RansomwareFactSheet.pdf
63.	Center for Internet Security, Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR), https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac/
services/mdbr/
64.	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Cyber Hygiene Services,” https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services
65.	Center for Internet Security, CIS Controls V7.1 Implementation Groups,
https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/cis-controls-v-7-1-implementation-groups/
66.	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Cybersecurity Framework,” https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
67.	Garcia, Michael. “Follow the Money: Few Federal Grants are Used to Fight Cybercrime,” Third Way, February 16, 2021.
https://www.thirdway.org/report/follow-the-money-few-federal-grants-are-used-to-fight-cybercrime
68.	See “H.R.7898 - To amend the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act to require theSecretary of Health and Human Services to consider certain recognized security practices of covered entities andbusiness associates when making certain determinations, and for other purposes,” https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7898/text?r=2&s=1
69.	United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission, March 2020. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL_
dZ30QyjFqFkkf10MxIXJGT4yv/view
70.	U.S. Department of Treasury, “Terrorism Risk Insurance Program,” https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialmarkets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/federal-insurance-office/terrorism-risk-insurance-program
71. For more about the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™), see https://stixproject.github.io/.
72. For more on the MITRE ATT&CK® Framework, see https://attack.mitre.org.
73.	Congressional bill S. 4226 (116th): Assessing a Cyber State of Distress Act of 2020. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/116/s4226/summary
74.	Memorandum from Matthews, Denise, Director, Data Coordination and Statistical Analysis National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the Center for Insurance Policy and Research. “Report on the Cybersecurity Insurance
and Identity Theft Coverage Supplement,” December 4, 2020. https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/
Cyber_Supplement_2019_Report_Final_1.pdf
75.	Marsh JLT Specialty, “Setting the Record Straight on Cyber Insurance,” https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/setting-the-record-straight-on-cyber-insurance.html
76.	See, for example, “Aon’s E&O | Cyber Insurance Snapshot,” https://www.aon.com/cyber-solutions/wp-content/uploads/
Aon-errors-and-omissions-cyber-insurance-snapshot.pdf; “Cyber may never experience another soft market: Gallagher
Re,” Intelligent Insurer, April 14, 2021, https://www.intelligentinsurer.com/news/cyber-may-never-experience-anothersoft-market-gallagher-re-25350; 2021 Cyber Insurance Market Conditions Report, https://www.ajg.com/us/news-andinsights/2021/jan/2021-cyber-insurance-market-report.
77.	Hewitt Jones, John. “Cyber insurers tighten controls as ransomware pain increases,” Inside P&C, September 28, 2020,
https://insuranceinsider.com/p-and-c/articles/135862/cyber-insurers-tighten-controls-as-ransomware-pain-increases
78.	See, for example, Doernberg, John, “Ransomware Causes Cyber Insurers to Raise the Bar,” Gallagher, https://www.ajg.
com/us/news-and-insights/2021/apr/cyber-insurance-fight-against-ransomware.
79.	S tudies addressing how cyber insurance may shape an organization’s cybersecurity decision-making include:
Romanosky, Sasha, Ablon, Lillian, Kuehn, Andreas, and Jones, Therese. “Content analysis of cyber insurance policies:
how do carriers price cyber risk?” Journal of Cybersecurity, February 27, 2019, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/
article/5/1/tyz002/5366419; Harrison, Richard and Herr, Trey (editors). “Cyber Insecurity: Navigating the Perils of the
Next Information Age,” https://www.cyberinsecuritybook.org/; Sullivan, James and Nurse, Jason RC. “Cyber Security
Incentives and the Role of Cyber Insurance,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies andUniversity of Kent. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/246_ei_cyber_insurance_final_web_version.pdf

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Combating Ransomware

Endnotes

80.	See, for example, Stone, Jeff. “FBI turns to insurers to grasp the full reach of ransomware,” Cyberscoop, March 30, 2020,
https://www.cyberscoop.com/ransomware-fbi-insurance-companies-data/; Lyngaas, Sean. “Inside the FBI’s quiet‘ransomware summit,” Cyberscoop, November 16, 2019, https://www.cyberscoop.com/fbi-ransomware-summit/
81.	Chainalysis Team, “Ransomware Skyrocketed in 2020, But There May Be Fewer Culprits Than You Think,” excerpt
from the Chainalysis 2021 Crypto Crime Report, January 26, 2021, https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/ransomwareecosystem-crypto-crime-2021
82.	Protiviti , “Guide to US Anti-Money Laundering Requirements, Frequently Asked Questions, Sixth edition https://www.
protiviti.com/sites/default/files/united_states/insights/guide-to-us-aml-requirements-6thedition-protiviti_0.pdf
83.	Healey, Jason. “Innovation on cyber collaboration: Leverage at scale,” Atlantic Council, May 3, 2018, https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/innovation-on-cyber-collaboration-leverage-at-scale/84.	Aspen Cybersecurity Group, “An Operational Collaboration Framework,” November 8, 2018, https://www.aspeninstitute.
org/publications/an-operational-collaboration-framework/85.	World Economic Forum, “Partnership Against Cybercrime: Insight Report,” November 2020, http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_Partnership_against_Cybercrime_report_2020.pdf
86.	C ybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations,”
https://www.cisa.gov/information-sharing-and-analysis-organizations-isaos

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