An Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA)
Publication

CO-EDITED BY:

OMKAR BHOLE AND RATISH MEHTA

ORCA SPECIAL ISSUE 4
MAY 2024

SPECIAL ISSUE 4

India’s Soft Push for Power inSouth Asia: Shaping A
Favourable Tomorrow

Co-editors: Omkar Bhole & Ratish Mehta

SPECIAL ISSUE 4“India’s Soft Push for Power in South Asia: Shaping A Favourable Tomorrow” is a Special Issue
published by Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA).
ORCA is a New Delhi NCR-based non-partisan research institution that publishes policy-oriented
research on China and Asia. As one of the only think-tanks in India focusing on analysing
domestic Chinese politics and policy-making, ORCA adds to international research on topics
pertaining to new Sinology.
Reproduction of this issue is only approved with permission and with source acknowledgment.
Any correspondence asking for reprint/recarry of the issue should be emailed or mailed to theaddress given below.

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An output by: Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA), Delhi NCR, India whichfunctions under the ambit of ORCASIA OPC PVT LTD.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgementsi

List of Contributorsii

Abbreviationsvi

List of Exhibits

ix

Introduction
India's Soft Power Future in South Asia: China, Culture, Cooperation and Beyond
Ratish Mehta

2

I. Push for Soft Power: Strengthening Existing Tools
1. Paradigm of Democratic Values as a Soft Power Metric in India-Maldives Ties
Shreya Upadhyay and Vivek Mishra

11

2. Growing Developmental Partnership in India-Bangladesh Relations
Sreeradha Datta

18

3. Building Institutional Linkages Through Buddhism: India’s Soft Power Strategy in
00Nepal & Sri Lanka
Mihir Shekhar Bhonsale

25

II. Prioritizing a People-Centric Approach
4. The Soft Power of Education: An Investment Multiplier in India-Nepal Relations
Rahul Karan Reddy

34

5. A Case for the Afghan Diaspora in Enhancing India’s Soft Power
Monish Tourangbam and Swati Sinha

41

6. The Role of Human Resource Development in India-Bhutan Relations
Debasish Nandy

47

TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. Ideating New Soft Power Strategies
7. Exploring New Avenues for India’s Soft Power Outreach in Myanmar
Cchavi Vasisht

55

8. Prospects of Multi-Track Diplomacy in India-Pakistan Relations
Zainab Akhter

61

9. The Potential of India’s Digital Diplomacy as a Soft Power Measure in South Asia
Muhsin Puthan Purayil

67

Summing Up

Paving the Future for India’s Soft Power in South Asia: Strengthening ‘Brand India’Omkar Bhole

76

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The objective of this publication is to bring together emerging and talented Indian academics andanalysts of international relations to produce insightful assessments of India’s Soft Power
diplomacy in South Asia. It is critically important for New Delhi to consolidate its Soft Powerstrategies in its immediate neighborhood with a swift hand. This Special Issue ideates
implementable measures for effective utilization of New Delhi’s goodwill in the region to shapefavorable outcomes in the coming years.
We would like to thank ORCA’s Director Ms. Eerishika Pankaj for her invaluable guidance inbringing this publication to fruition. This project would not have been completed without her
relentless support. The entire ORCA team has also supported this publication from start to finish
and played an invaluable role in enhancing its quality.
We would like to thank our colleagues at Team ORCA - Mr. Rahul Karan Reddy and Ms. Ahana
Roy - for their assistance in providing valuable feedback from time to time and help in designing
this publication. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Nehantha Sathesh, Ms.
Aadya Menon and Mr. Shourjyadipta Roy who while interning with ORCA aided in datacollection for the Special Issue.
A special word of thanks to the contributors who submitted chapters despite their demanding
schedules. Their valuable expertise on India’s Soft Power in South Asian countries, shared in thisIssue, will greatly enhance the academic discourse on the topic. The crucial insights andrecommendations provided in this publication hold long-term durability for Indian policymakers
and will aid in positively enhancing New Delhi’s overall neighbourhood policy.
Best,

Omkar Bhole
Co-editor

Ratish Mehta
Co-editor| Page i

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
CO-EDITORS
Omkar Bhole is a Senior Research Associate at the Organisation for Research on China and Asia
(ORCA). He has studied Chinese language up to HSK4 and completed Masters in China Studies
from Somaiya University, Mumbai. He has previously worked as a Chinese language instructor in
Mumbai and Pune. His research interests are India’s neighbourhood policy, China’s foreign policy inSouth Asia, economic transformation and current dynamics of Chinese economy and its domestic
politics. He was previously associated with the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS) and What China
Reads. He has also presented papers at several conferences on China. Omkar is currently working onunderstanding China’s Digital Yuan initiative and its implications for South Asian region including
India. He can be reached at obhole96@gmail.com and @bhole_omkar on Twitter.
Ratish Mehta is a Research Associate at the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA).
He is a postgraduate in Global Studies from Ambedkar University, Delhi and works on gauging
India’s regional and global political interests. His area of focus include understanding the value ofnarratives, rhetoric and ideology in State and non-State interactions, deconstructing politicalnarratives in Global Affairs as well as focusing on India’s Foreign Policy interests in the Global
South and South Asia. He was previously associated with The Pranab Mukherjee Foundation and has
worked on projects such as Indo-Sino Relations, History of the Constituent Assembly of India andthe Evolution of Democratic Institutions in India. His forthcoming projects at ORCA include Tracing
India’s Path as the Voice of the Global South and Deconstructing Beijing’s ‘Global’ Narratives.

CONTRIBUTORSCchavi Vasisht is a Research Associate at Vivekananda International Foundation. She has been
awarded her PhD in the Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi. She has been awarded the UGC NET Senior Research Fellowship to
pursue her research work. She completed a Master of Philosophy from the Centre for South AsianStudies and a Master of Arts in Sociology from the same university. For the past three years, She has
had a keen interest in Myanmar and have published articles and commentaries on the same.
Debasish Nandy (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science as well as
the Coordinator of the Centre for Studies of South and South-East Asian Societies at Kazi Nazrul
University, Asansol, West Bengal, India. He is a Visiting Faculty Member in the Department of
Foreign Area Studies at Tajik National University, Dushanbe, Tajikistan. In 2022, Dr. Nandy served
the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh as the Visiting Faculty.
He| Page ii

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He was the visiting faculty at the Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, Frankfurt, Germany. Dr.
Nandy was the Adjunct Faculty at the National Institute of Technology (NIT), Durgapur. Dr. Nandy
is a Visiting Fellow at the Osaka School of International Public Diplomacy, Osaka University, Japan.
Mihir Shekhar Bhonsale is an Assistant Policy Analyst at CUTS International, a global think andaction tank. He is a policy wonk, researcher, and consultant and has previously worked with theStrategic Studies Program of Observer Research Foundation. Mihir has extensive reporting andeditorial experience with print and digital media, writing on issues of international affairs andgeopolitics, diplomacy and defence, and strategy. He has also published research on the Sino- Indian
border, Bhutan’s transition to Democracy and its bilateral relations, India’s Soft Power Outreach toSoutheast Asia, the Rohingya Crisis and India- Myanmar Relations, trade and connectivity initiatives
in BBIN and BIMSTEC sub-regions.
Monish Tourangbam is the Honorary Director of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies(KIIPS). Formerly, he was an Associate Professor at Amity University, Noida and a Senior AssistantProfessor at Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal. He was also an Associate Fellow at
the ORF, New Delhi and the Associate Editor of the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. He was a
Visiting Faculty at the University of Cincinnati, Ohio and a SAV Visiting Fellow at the Stimson
Center, Washington D.C. He has been a part of a number of Track II Dialogues and conferences oninternational security issues. He holds an M.Phil and Ph.D from the School of International Studies,
JNU. He also delivers lectures on Diplomacy at the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi.
Muhsin Puthan Purayil is a visiting faculty at Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE) in
Bangalore. He recently submitted his PhD in Political Science, focusing on India’s public diplomacy,
at the University of Hyderabad. His research interests include public diplomacy, politicalcommunication, migration, South Asia, and India’s foreign policies with major powers. His work has
been published in various reputable journals, including Comparative Strategy, Israel Affairs, Global
Change, Peace & Security, Asian Affairs, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), the Columbia
Journal of International Affairs (JIA), the Journal of Migration Affairs, and The Diplomat.
Rahul Karan Reddy is Senior Research Associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia
(ORCA). He works on domestic Chinese politics and trade, producing data-driven research in theform of reports, dashboards and digital media. He is the author of ‘Islands on the Rocks’, amonograph about the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute between China and Japan. Rahul waspreviously a research analyst at the Chennai Center for China Studies (C3S). He is the creator of the
India-China Trade dashboard and the Chinese Provincial Development Indicators dashboard. His
work has been published in The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, ISDP & Tokyo Review, among others.
He can be reached via email on rahulkaran.reddy@gmail.com & @RahulKaranRedd1 on Twitter.
Shreya Upadhyay is currently Deputy Director, Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies. Her
research interests include disaster public policy in the Indo-Pacific, climate change, role of the US in
Indo-Pacific, India-US relations, and security aspects in the region. She was an Assistant Professor at| Page iii

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Christ University, Bangalore and at the University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun. She
has been a visiting faculty at Symbiosis School of International Studies, Symbiosis University and
Flame University, Pune. In the past she has worked at several think tanks including the Takshashila
Institution, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Dr
Shreya was a Fulbright-Nehru scholar at American University, Washington D.C. Shreya has
published in several SCOPUS, peer-reviewed journals and book chapters. She has writtencommentaries for several newspapers and websites. She is a mother of two and loves reading in her
free time.
Sreeradha Datta teaches International Affairs, at O.P Jindal Global University presently. She isalso a non-resident Senior Fellow with Institute of South Asian Studies, National University ofSingapore. Her latest edited volume ‘Bangladesh on a New Journey: Moving Beyond Regional
Identity’ was launched globally recently. Her other publications include, ‘Act East Policy andNortheast India’ and an edited ‘BIMSTEC: The Journey and Way Ahead’ and co-edited,‘Bangladesh at 50: Development and Challenges.’ That apart, she has written ‘Caretaking
Democracy: Political Process in Bangladesh, 2006-08’, ‘Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy’, ‘The
Northeast Complexities and its Determinants’, and edited ‘Changing Security Dynamics in South
East Asia.’ She has also published over 160 articles in journals, edited volumes, newspapers andacademic websites.
Swati Sinha is a Doctoral Research Scholar at the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA),
O.P. Jindal Global University, and explores the intersectional divides within Afghan society. Swati
is a Programme Officer at the Ananta Centre, New Delhi, where her focus area is India andNeighbourhood. Her broader research interests lie in Security Studies, International Relations
theories, and Peace & Conflict Studies. Previously, her experience includes working as a Research
Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi, and internships with the IndianCouncil of World Affairs and MMAJ Academy of International Studies, JMI. Swati holds a
Master’s degree in Geopolitics and International Relations from MAHE, and has contributed toscholarly publications through book chapters and journal papers.
Vivek Mishra is a Fellow at the ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme in New Delhi. His researchinterests include America in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions,particularly the role of the US in security in South Asia, Indo-US defence relations, and the Indian
defence sector. He also studies security and geopolitical aspects of Indian foreign policy closely. He
is Adjunct Faculty at OP Jindal Global University in Sonipat, Haryana. He was also a Visiting
Faculty at FLAME University, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Symbiosis University,
Pune and Rashtriya Raksha University, Gujrat. Dr. Mishra has served as the Deputy Director(Hony), Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies, and been a Fulbright-Nehru Doctoral Research
Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War & Peace, School of International Public Affairs, Columbia
University.

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Zainab Akhter (Ph.D.) is a Researcher at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies &Analyses (MP-IDSA). She has a PhD in International Relations from the School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Zainab was earlier a Research Officer with theInstitute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS). She was selected for the India-Pakistan Legislative
Fellowship 2017 by the US Government and was placed as the India Legislative Fellow at Hudson
Institute, a think tank based in Washington DC. Her areas of research interest are Soft Power,
Cultural Diplomacy, India-Pakistan relations, CBMs, people-to-people diplomacy, Gilgit-Baltistan
and Ladakh.

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ABBREVIATIONSAI - Artificial Intelligence
AII - Australia-India Institute
AICTE - All India Council for Technical Education
AIIMS - All India Institute of Medical Sciences
AISHE - All-India Survey on Higher Education
AL - Awami League
ASEAN - Association for South East Asian Nations
B.Sc. - Bachelor of Science
B2B - Bharat to Bhutan
BDS - Bachelor of Dental Surgery
BIMSTEC - Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BNP- Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BRI - Belt and Road Initiative
CAA - Citizen Amendment Act
CASM - Centre for the Analysis of Social MediaCCP - Chinese Communist Party
CPC - Communist Party of China
CEPA - Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CII - Confederation of Indian Industry
CUNPK - Centre for UN Peacekeeping
COINEX - COVID-19 Information Exchange Platform
DAHE - Department of Adult and Higher Education
DDI - Digital Diplomacy Index
EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone
FFGS - Flash Flood Guidance System
FTA - Free Trade Agreement
G20 - Group of 20
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GNH - Gross National Happiness
GoI - Government of India
HADR - Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IBC - International Buddhist Confederation
ICCR - Indian Council for Cultural Relations
IIM - Indian Institute of Management
IIRS - Indian Institute of Remote Sensing
IIT - Indian Institute of Technology
ILD - International Liaison Department| Page vi

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IMCEITS - India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INR - Indian Rupee
IOR - Indian Ocean Region
IORA - Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPKF- India’s Peace Keeping Force
ISRO - Indian Space Research Organization
ITEC - Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
KM - Kilometers
KRCL - Konkan Railway Corporation Limited
LDT - Lumbini Development Trust
LLB - Bachelor of Legislative Law
LoC - Line of Credit
LPG - Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MBBS - Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery
MDB - Multilateral Development BankMEA - Ministry of External Affairs
MICELT - Myanmar-India Centre for English Language Training
MIEDC - Myanmar-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre
MNDF - Maldivian National Defence ForceMoU - Memorandum of Understanding
MTD - Multi-Track Diplomacy
MTT - Mobile Training Teams
NCP - Nepal Communist Party
NDA - National Defence Academy
NEP - New Education Policy
NEST - New and Emerging Strategic Technologies
NFP - Neighbourhood First Policy
NGO - Non-Government Organisation
NRSC - National Remote Sensing Centre
NWCC - Nehru–Wangchuck Cultural Centre
ODA - Official Development Assistance
OIC - Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PACT - Partnerships for Accelerating Clinical Trials
PD - Public Diplomacy
PGIMER - Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research
PIPFPD - Pakistan India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy
PLA - People’s Liberation Army
PM - Prime Minister
RO - Reverse Osmosis
SAARC - South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAC - Space Applications Centre
SAGAR - Security and Growth for All in the Region| Page vii

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SBI - State Bank of India
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDP - Small Development Project
TCS - Tata Consultancy Services
TISS - Tata Institute of Social Sciences
TKK - Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa
UN - United Nations
UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
UNWFP - United Nations World Food Programme
UPI- Unified Payments Interface
U.S. - United States
USD - US Dollars
UTF - Uthuru Thila Falhu
WISCOMP - Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace
WTO - World Trade Organisation| Page viii

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LIST OF EXHIBITS
Figure 1: Digital Diplomacy Index Ranking 2023

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Figure 2: Foreign Students in India from Neighbouring Countries 2021-22

78

Figure 3: Share of South Asian Countries in India’s Total Foreign Aid

80

Table 1: India’s Supply of COVID Vaccines to Neighbouring Countries

81

Table 2: ICCR Cultural Centres in South Asian Countries

83| Page ix

INTRODUCTION

11

India’s Soft Power Future in South Asia: China,
Culture, Cooperation and Beyond
Ratish Mehta‘The real test of foreign policy is in the handling of neighbours’ – Manmohan Singh1‘A nation’s destiny is linked to its neighbourhood’– Narendra Modi2
From all of independent India’s foreign policy lexicons, ‘neighbourhood diplomacy’ stands as
one of the few constants that has distinctively featured in New Delhi’s diplomatic parlance.
Beginning with a series of ‘Treaty of Friendships’ in 1950s to the Gujral Doctrine in late 1990s,
subsequently leading to the Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP) in the 21st century, South Asia’scentrality in Indian foreign policy has been paramount.3 New Delhi, as a regional heavyweight,
not only occupies more than two-thirds of the total subcontinent area, but also constitutes overthree-fourths of South Asian population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).4 Historically too,
India’s socio-cultural affinity with the region has consequently led to the exercise of its cultural
soft power in pursuit of cementing an influential position. Thus, the primacy attached to its
immediate neighbourhood by successive leaderships across party lines, seems only pertinent.
The traditional definition of the term Soft Power as defined by Joseph Nye relies on three pillars- culture, political values and foreign policy – aimed at obtaining desired outcomes without
coercion or payment. 5 With regards to India in South Asia, from Buddhism in Nepal andBhutan to linguistic connections in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and so on, New Delhi’s soft
power in the neighbourhood has, historically, relied upon cultural instruments to advance its
regional influence.
A common understanding among Foreign Policy analysts has been the importance of securing
an influential position in the nation’s neighbourhood before it seeks to transition into becoming
a global power.6 New Delhi’s ascendence globally, since Independence, in this regard has been
contingent to its role and influence in South Asia. Owing to its historical linkages coupled withits material contributions, New Delhi instinctively also assumes the leadership of the region7;
at times translating into becoming the first responder to regional challenges. From disaster
relief measures in Nepal, Afghanistan and Bhutan during devastating earthquakes and floods,
to supplying indigenous vaccines and humanitarian aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, crisis
management in the form of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) too issteadily becoming an essential feature of New Delhi’s modern-day Soft Power strategy in theregion.
Complexities facing India’s Soft Power Approach in South Asia
New Delhi’s outreach in South Asia has also met with its share of considerable scepticism
among recipients, leading to questions about India’s interests and intentions. First, with2

emerging regional identities and expanding socio-political aspirations among South Asian
countries, New Delhi’s engagements have been perceived to be ‘big brotherly’ in its approach
as well as one that inculcates characteristics of a regional hegemon.8 India’s South Asian policy
since 1947 has also been identified by scholars as one that relied, for decades, upon bilateraldynamics instead of prioritising regional interests.9 The use of hard power through the 1960’s
up until the late 1980’s had created negative perceptions against New Delhi’s role andresponsibilities in South Asia. From its use of military force in the liberation of then East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to the deployment of India’s Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri
Lanka’s civil war, New Delhi’s regional interests were largely driven by its security
considerations as well as its assumed position as the regional heavyweight. The consequencesof some of these hard power strategies, in the form of discontent among South Asian partners,
obligated New Delhi to pivot its regional course of action. This shift resulted in thedevelopment of the Gujral Doctrine that, at least in its approach, proposed a broader
neighbourhood policy articulating non-reciprocity instead of solely focusing on bilateralinterests.10
Secondly, domestic political narratives and internal policies such as the Citizen Amendment
Act (CAA) have, as some scholars believe, in some sense turned out to be counterproductive
for New Delhi’s perception in the region leading to further questions of its assumed
leadership.11 Thirdly, its inability to meet the expectations of its neighbourhood’s development
trajectory12 have also attracted criticism with recipients pointing out India’s lack of coordinatedapproach in fulfilling regional aspirations.13 However, even though New Delhi’s contribution
to the region has been considerable, keeping in mind its own capacity and capabilities, it has
significantly lagged behind in projecting and marketing its efforts. These intrinsic concerns
coupled with increasing Chinese interests in the region have all the more complicated New
Delhi’s regional dynamics.
The China question in India’s push for power in South Asia
Using its economic and capacity-building prowess, Beijing offers countries in South Asia theability to counter-balance Indian influence that had previously been unparalleled for decades.
Although beneficial to some extent for the overall material development of the region, Chinese
inroads have the potential to cast a heavy shadow over New Delhi’s regional and global
objectives. Beijing's growing hard power strategies, through infrastructure development andmilitary assistance, is also supplemented by its proactive soft power approach that has
cultivated proportional dividends for it in the region. The promotion of soft power instruments
ranging from humanitarian and development assistance to education partnerships and Buddhist
diplomacy, has enabled Beijing to utilise a range of measures for strategic gains. For instance,
during China’s Humanitarian assistance after the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) refused foreign military responders, including the U.S. access to its
areas of operations by cordoning off the response sector as sovereign territory for the durationof disaster relief.14 This not only granted the PLA exclusive access to the region but allowed it
to project relief measures as solely Beijing’s efforts, instead of one led by coalition ofinternational partners.
3

Moreover, Beijing’s Party-to-Party relations in South Asia have expanded significantly in thepast decade. The Party’s International Liaison Department (ILD), responsible for interactingwith political parties internationally, has signed agreements as well as increased its
engagements with key stakeholders in Nepal 15 , Bangladesh 16 and Sri Lanka. 17 These
agreements have invariably resulted in economic and political advantages such as the direct
involvement of the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a peacemaker between two differing
factions of the then ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) in Nepal.18 In Sri Lanka, the close
affiliation of the CPC with the Rajapaksa regime was well understood to have benefitted
Beijing’s regional economic ambitions too. The growing affinity of the Party across ideologies
has also allowed its country-specific policies to remain flexible; regardless of the political party
in power. Beijing’s perception among political elites in South Asian countries has by and large
remained positive.
These factors however are only an addendum when compared to Beijing’s growing economic
stakes within the region. Economic cooperation in terms of bilateral trade between China andthe seven South Asian countries, along with Myanmar, has seen exponential growth withoverall trade amounting to almost USD 74 billion in 2023 from USD 54.7 billion in 2015.19
China’s development diplomacy through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia has
furthered Beijing’s perception as a partner invested in the development of the region. Fromhighways to dams and everything in between, China’s hard infrastructure development
assistance in the form of grants and loans has significantly elevated its perception in the region.
Wining hearts and minds through New Approaches in India’s Soft PowerSuch emerging challenges not only complicate the nature of the regional dynamics for New
Delhi, but also warrant India’s attention in the form of substantial efforts through soft power
instruments. Irrespective of Chinese engagements in South Asia, New Delhi requires asignificant re-orientation of its perception as well as policies in the region. Moreover, given thewide gap persisting in the capabilities and capacity of the two Himalayan giants, Soft Power,
as a means to cultivate influence, becomes all the more important in the region that has for
centuries associated itself with India as the prime-mover. The functioning of soft power
mechanisms may not necessarily produce measurable returns, but it does assist in pacifying
negative perceptions and cultivates a favourable environment for fulfilling India’s regional aswell as global interests.
Given the developmental aspirations of South Asian countries, non-conventional measures ofSoft Power which go beyond the traditional definition also becomes an important part of acountry’s foreign policy. Non-conventional soft power tools can be defined as measures
deployed by a country which are not necessarily based on its historical and cultural linkages,
but rather depend on extending newer expertise achieved in different fields. From cooperationin the field of science20 such as in the space sector to assisting countries in improving humanresources through training and scholarships, New Delhi’s approach to such non-conventional
means has seen some progress in recent years. In contrast to conventional soft power measures
such as culture, language and religion, these measures closely align with developmental
aspirations of recipient countries. For instance, one true marker of New Delhi’s intent to utilise
4its capabilities for larger regional purposes was seen during the GSAT-9 satellite launch in2017 by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).21 Funded completely by the Indian
government, the satellite launch was initiated to serve the needs of the South Asian countries
aiding their telecommunication and broadcasting services. Furthermore, by enhancing its focus
on exporting technological advancements such as India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI)22
to other countries or providing skill development training to foreign diplomats,23 New Delhi
will be emphasising upon people-oriented non-conventional soft power instruments that caterto the needs of people. This will not only leave a positive impression upon the people of theregion but will also help fulfil their developmental aspirations. However, efforts such as theseneed to be amplified in terms of strategy, in order to convert this assistance into tangible soft
power influences.
The utility of non-conventional methods in enhancing New Delhi’s soft power in the region
also relies heavily upon its ability to present itself as a reliable partner. With timely completionof commitments along with comprehensive strategies that do not rely on ad-hoc measures, New
Delhi’s contemporary as well as a forward looking ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ will do muchgood by enhancing its overall perception of being a reliable partner.
A secondary but no less important facet of re-imagining and re-orienting India’s soft power
outlook in South Asia inculcates the need to craft fresh narratives of its role and responsibilities
in the region. Perception in foreign policy practice plays a pivotal role in advancing a nationstate’s interest. 24 Through effective narratives, the perception of a country determines theextent to which a specific policy and decision is perceived. India’s perception among state
actors in the South Asian region has generally oscillated between being a responsible leader,
to an authoritative neighbour. Moreover, the emergence of a challenger to New Delhi’s positionin the region has only intensified the need to step up its efforts in the neighbourhood.
Even though it invariably competes with Beijing in this space in specific instances, New Delhi
must ensure that it is playing the long game within the realm of its rhetoric, and not letting
short-term political gains pre-empt its larger strategic interests. For instance, New Delhi’s
objection to Chinese involvement in Nepali projects25 as a precursor to buying electricity from
Nepali power plants only deviates from the larger narrative India should ideally be projecting.
Instead, India must present itself as an alternative to Chinese investments by bringing in viable
partners through Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) and third country cooperation
partnerships with the likes of Japan and U.S.26 By doing so, rhetorically, New Delhi will haveprojected that irrespective of Chinese investments, its priority rests in the overall developmentof the region.
Therefore, the narrative in South Asia regarding New Delhi’s role must pursue a people-centric
approach, instead of increasingly pursuing an approach that counters Beijing’s inroads.
Moreover, its rhetorical approach in these instances must also ensure that local sentiments aswell as the socio-political aspirations of smaller states in the neighbourhood are taken into
consideration while it crafts its regional foreign policy narratives.

5Under these circumstances, India’s stronger soft power appeal along with a positive perception
can allow it to contribute not only in the comprehensive development of the region but moreso, safeguard its regional interests. Thus, as India continues to deploy hard power tactics inSouth Asia as per its capacity and requirements of a receptive nation, its soft power strategy
also becomes equally important to supplement these approaches in the coming years.
Objectives of the Special Issue
With regards to India’s relations with South Asian countries, a significant amount of research
has already been conducted on enhancing India’s hard power in its neighbourhood throughseveral measures. However, scholarship on India’s soft power strategy in South Asia lags
behind in adequately assessing the potential of Soft Power and its complex dynamics. Several
studies have raised doubts regarding the effectiveness of India’s soft power strategy as its
efforts have not been able to yield expected outcomes. 27 Similarly, scholars from recipient
countries have also flagged the lack of coordinated efforts from New Delhi as one of the crucial
reasons behind the gap in efforts and outcomes. 28 These changing dynamics of theneighbourhood requires New Delhi to re-strategize its overall South Asian policy; Soft Power
here emerges as an essential component.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, the Special Issue seeks to address the tripartite gap between
efforts, projection and outcomes of India’s soft power strategy in South Asia. Furthermore, theobjective of the Special Issue is to ideate a restructuring of India’s soft power outreach in South
Asia within the context of rising Chinese engagement and growing socio-political aspirationsof neighbouring countries. Each chapter in the issue envisions and addresses the future of an
existing or an emerging tool of soft power that New Delhi could utilise better to elevate its
perception among regional players. Although each chapter has been written keeping in mind alist of various soft power measures deployed by New Delhi over the years; the chapters ingeneral assess one specific tool that has maximum potential to mutually benefit the interests ofboth the recipient states and India.
The chapters are divided into three sections, with each section discussing a specific facet of
New Delhi’s soft power diplomacy. The first section focuses on strengthening threefundamental instruments of India’s Soft Power and their effectiveness in shaping the future ofIndian interests in the region. The first chapter co-authored by Shreya Upadhyay and Vivek
Mishra discusses the merits and future of democratic value in India-Maldives ties. The bilateralrelationship has seen some substantial challenges in the past few months, yet the chapter
explicates how India’s democratic values remain the best metric in establishing its synergetic
influence in Maldives. The second chapter by Sreeradha Datta explores the potential ofdevelopment assistance in India-Bangladesh ties as a Soft Power measure in order to elevate
New Delhi’s perception among the youth of Bangladesh. The chapter by Mihir Shekhar
Bhonsale examines the possibilities of India establishing institutional linkages in Nepal and Sri
Lanka to promote Buddhism as a soft power measure more effectively. The article also argues
for a pronounced role of Indian private entities, as well as cultural and religious organizations
in a bid to bolster New Delhi’s soft power appeal.

6

The second section of the Issue details the importance and greater need for a people-centric
approach in India’s soft power strategy in South Asia. The chapter by Rahul Karan Reddy
examines the Soft Power of Education in India-Nepal relations and discusses the significanceof catering to the aspirations of young Nepali students for India’s continued centrality in
Nepal’s development-led future. The chapter by Monish Tourangbam and Swati Sinha
examines the case of Afghan diaspora in enhancing India’s soft power in light of the challenges
posed by the Taliban takeover and argue that the well-being of the people of Afghanistan mustremain a core objective of India’s soft power approach. Debasish Nandy’s chapter discusses
the role of India’s assistance in Bhutan’s human resource development with specific emphasison capacity building as a critical soft power instrument in Bhutan’s comprehensive
development.
The third section ideates newer course of actions for India’s soft power strategy. With growing
developmental aspirations of the region, the section assesses and ideates specific instrumentsof New Delhi’s Soft Power that have enormous potential to elevate its role and perception in
the region. Cchavi Vasisht’s chapter considers the scope of new avenues in India's soft power
diplomacy in Myanmar. The paper argues that India’s cultural and trade ties foster great
potential and must be leveraged to promote democracy, education and economic development
through bilateral engagements. Zainab Akhter’s paper highlights the role of Multitrack
Diplomacy in pursuit of fostering peace between India and Pakistan beyond the realm of thestate and advocates for the importance of civil society groups. The final paper by Muhsin
Purayil analyses India’s comprehensive role in leading the digital transformation in South Asia.
The paper assesses the nuanced landscape of India’s digital diplomacy, mapping its
engagements, challenges, and the transformative role it can play in fostering its soft power.
The concluding chapter by Mr. Omkar Bhole serves as that binding thread that brings forth key
recommendations from chapters in the Special Issue and beyond. The chapters in the issue
serve multiple purposes including advancing the scholarly debate surrounding Soft Power,
India in South Asia and the depth and bounds of its Soft Power in the region.
A core objective while ideating the Special Issue was to bring together a document that would
recommend implementable measures and outline strategies that New Delhi can adopt tostrengthen its overall Soft Power appeal in South Asia. With this objective in mind, the edited
issue is also intended as a policy document for India’s policymakers aiming to provide practicalmeasures that can be utilised to maximise New Delhi’s overall position in South Asia.
ENDNOTES
1

V. P. Haran, “Challenges in India's Neighbourhood Policy”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
July
14,
2017,
https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lecturesdetail.htm?674#:~:text=This%20policy%20priority%20holds%20true,in%20the%20handling%20of%20neighbor
s

7

2

“English rendering of the Statement by Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi at the General Debate of the 69th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)”, Press Information Bureau, September 27, 2014,
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=110091
3

Saroj Kumar Aryal and Simant Shankar Bharti, “Evolution of ‘India’s Neighbourhood First Policy Since
Independence”, Society, Vol. 60, February 6, 2023, 224–232, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-023-00819-y
4Partha Ghosh, “An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region”. Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 20 (1), May
2013, 100–120, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2013.788336
5

Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 616, March 2008, 94–109, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996
6

C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Four Dimensions.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 2 (1), 2007, 8–
14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45340641
7

Madhavi Bhasin, “India’s Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?” Indian Foreign
Affairs Journal, Vol. 3 (4), 2008, 72–88, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45340757
8

Md Mahmudul Hoque, “The Image Crisis of India as a Development Partner in South Asia: A Regional
Development Perspective”, International Journal of Science and Research, Vol. 7 (3), 2018, 191-195,
https://philarchive.org/rec/HOQTIC
9Christian Wagner, “From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India’s South
Asia Policy”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, March 2005, https://hasp.ub.uniheidelberg.de/journals/hdpapers/article/view/2194
10

Manoj Kumar Mishra, “Soft and Hard Power in India’s Foreign Policy.” World Affairs: The Journal ofInternational Issues, Vol. 20 (2), 2016, 34–45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505276.
11

Kamal Uddin Mazumder, “Citizenship Amendment Act: Implications for Bangladesh and other South AsianCountries”,
AustralianInstituteofInternational
Affairs,
April
4,
2024,
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/citizenship-amendment-act-implications-forbangladesh-and-other-south-asian-countries/ ; Rushali Saha, “The ‘anti-neighbour’ rhetoric inherent in CAA will
cost India dearly”, South Asia Journal, February 3, 2020, https://southasiajournal.net/the-anti-neighbourrhetoric-inherent-in-caa-will-cost-india-dearly/
12

S Y Surendra Kumar, "The Limits of India’s Soft Power in South Asia." Journal of Contemporary Politics, March
27, 2023, 15-25, https://jcp.bujournals.com/articles/the-limits-of-indias-soft-power-in-south-asia
13

See Note 8.

14

Matthew Southerland, “The Chinese Military's Role in Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief:
Contributions and Concerns”, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 11, 2019,https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinese-militarys-role-overseas-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-reliefcontributions
15

Rastriya Samachar Samiti, “NCP And CPC Sign MoU Establishing Brotherly Ties”, The Himalayan Times,
September 24, 2019, https://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/mou-signed-between-ncp-ncp-and-cpcestablishing-bilateral-ties
16

Fazlur Rahman Raju, “Awami League, Communist Party of China ink MoU”, Dhaka Times, March 22, 2019,https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/172050/awami-league-communist-party-of-chinaink-mou

8

17

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, “The Communist Party of China and Its Political Influence in Sri Lanka under the
Gotabaya Rajapaksa Regime”, In ‘How China Engages South Asia: Themes, Partners and Tools’, ed. Constantino
Xavier and Jabin Jacob, Centre for Social and Economic Progress, May 3, 2023, 67-83,
https://csep.org/reports/the-communist-party-of-china-and-its-political-influence-in-sri-lanka-under-thegotabaya-rajapaksa-regime/
18

Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury, “The Political Crisis in Nepal and China’s Policy of Non-Interference”, Centre for Air
Power Studies, January 8, 2021, https://capsindia.org/the-political-crisis-in-nepal-and-chinas-policy-of-noninterference/
19

Customs statistics, General Administration
http://stats.customs.gov.cn/indexEnofCustomsofPeople's

Republicof

China,

20

Pooja Raghav et al., "India's Science Diplomacy in South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges." Turkish Online
Journal of Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12 (6), 2021, https://www.tojqi.net/index.php/journal/article/view/3298
21

Elizabeth Roche, “India launches first South Asia satellite GSAT-9”, LiveMint, May 5, 2017.
https://www.livemint.com/Science/22j5cj3JH3H3wa5RpqFqHJ/India-launches-first-South-Asia-satelliteGSAT9.html
22“UPI payment services launched in Sri Lanka, Mauritius; PM describes it as 'special day”, Press Trust of India,
February 12, 2024, https://www.ptinews.com/story/national/upi-payment-services-launched-in-sri-lankamauritius-pm-describes-it-as-special-day-/1285838
23“Videsh Sewa”, Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
Vol. 10, April -June 2021, ssifs.mea.gov.in/? pdf13125?000
24

Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson. "Narrative power: How storytelling shapes East Asian international
politics", Cambridge
ReviewofInternational
Affairs,
Vol. 32(4),
2019,
387-406,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623498
25

Prithvi Man Shrestha, “No China involvement is India’s caveat for buying power from Nepali plants”, The
Kathmandu Post, January 20, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/money/2022/01/20/no-china-involvement-isindia-s-caveat-for-buying-power-from-nepali-plants
26

Constantino Xavier, “Converting Convergence into Cooperation: The United States and India in South Asia.”
Asia Policy, Vol. 14 (1), 2019, 19–50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26642262 ; Rahul Karan Reddy, “India, Japan,
And the Strategic Role Of Infrastructure”, Organisation for Research on China and Asia, October 27, 2023,
https://orcasia.org/article/461/india-japan-and-the-strategic-role-of-infrastructure27

Rohan Mukherjee, “The False Promise of India's Soft Power”, International Studies Association Annual
Convention, San Francisco, April 5, 2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246839 ; Also
see Note 11.
28

Suraj Paneru, "India’s Shift to Soft Power in Nepal: A Case Study of the Borderland City of Birgunj." In ‘Border
Urbanism: Transdisciplinary Perspectives’, ed. Quazi Mahtab Zaman and Greg G. Hall Perspectives, Springer
International Publishing, March 2023, 197-211, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06604-7_11

9

PART IPUSH FOR SOFT POWER:
STRENGTHENING EXISTING
TOOLS

11

1. Paradigm of Democratic Values as a Soft Power
Metric in India-Maldives Ties
Shreya Upadhyay and Vivek Mishra
Politics in Maldives has taken a swing with the shift in political dispensation as the new
Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu is seen to be favouring China over India. India andMaldives have shared close ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links steepedin antiquity for centuries. However, as the new government takes shape in Malé, India mustremain focused on playing the long game rather than seeking short-term gains. Among the key
ingredients of India’s soft power in Asia, particularly in South Asia, is its structural democratic
outreach - one that comes without coercion. Banking on its democratic credentials for a timely
outreach could reposition India’s influence.
Meanwhile, resting its bilateral ties with Maldives on the plank of democratic values will be
the best metric for gauging its soft power. Even though the current Muizzu government seems
unfavourably disposed against India, India should let Maldives learn the lesson of a Chinese
embrace.1 Maldives’ recent decisions to not use the Dornier aircraft provided by India to airlift
a critical 14 year old boy and its insinuation towards India that it cannot be “bullied” arereflective of the Muizzu’s pro-China tilt only growing more obvious.2 Above all, the changeof tone in the new Maldivian government may be on the back of a debt-restructuring promiseby China.3 However, as geopolitics would have it, Maldives cannot change its geography andit would serve well to take a lead from the Sri Lankan economic crisis.
In 1990, Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ in a Foreign Policy article ‘Soft Power’4
which, at the time, had remained a poorly studied international relations phenomenon. He
defined soft power as the use of persuasion or attraction rather than coercion to achieve one’s
objectives/ outcomes. This power rests on the attractiveness of one’s culture, political values
and foreign policy. In India’s case, it draws its soft power from its culture, civilization, nonviolence, democracy and pluralism which can be leveraged to be a Vishwa guru.5 Democracy
particularly adds to India’s key advantages as it connects to other countries through sharedpolitical beliefs and values. According to data provided by the Pew Research Center, 57
percent of countries with populations of 500,000 and above were democracies at the end of
2017.6 Maldives falls within the democratic arc of India which extends throughout South Asia,
particularly in the Indian Ocean. Adding to that are India’s policies like the Act East Policy
and the Neighbourhood First Policy which have a significant soft power aspect for the region.
India has focused on establishing a peaceful, collaborative and synergetic co-development with
its neighbors in the region on aspects of economics, connectivity, technology, research andeducation among others.
India-Maldives Relations
India-Maldives ties are hinged on two main planks: a cultural connection through diaspora andan Indian Ocean continuum linked by a common vision of regional peace and security. What11

makes the ties truly distinct is that the bilateral relationship compacts like internal development
and regional security that straddle a core pillar of values-led soft power. The significance of
this approach has been foregrounded in the country more recently by a contrasting approach
utilised by China which masquerades its regional security objectives as development agendas.
However, by prioritizing a net-security-provider role in the region and an inclusive approach
led by its Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision India has carved a policy
space in the Indian Ocean which naturally binds Maldives with India.
Soft power is an important paradigm of its relations with Maldives. A large civilisational state
like India which is a stable anchor of democracy, peace and security in the Indian Ocean
naturally extends value-based aspirations among smaller states. However, this has stemmed
from a naturalized outgrowth of its connectivity and development ambitions rather than an
imposed constrict by a regional hegemon.
India’s pro-democracy ideas have also shaped its relations with Maldives. According to Nye,soft power rests on one’s culture, political values and foreign policy. As the world’s largest
democracy, India is described as a soft power hub not as a promoter of democracy but in somecases as providing democracy assistance/support. Even in the absence of an official foreign
policy, India expects to lead by example of its domestic commitment to democratic values. It
offers help when requested. A clear example of this is Operation Cactus (1988) in response to
Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s request for intervention during an attempted
coup.7 Even in 2012, India supported democratically elected Mohammad Nasheed.
Notably, India was among the first to recognize Maldives after its independence in 1965 andto establish diplomatic relations with the country. India has constantly provided economic
support and capacity-building assistance to Maldives. India has provided extensive economic
aid and has participated in bilateral programmes for the development of infrastructure, health,telecommunications and labour resources. In 1995, India established the Indira Gandhi
Memorial Hospital in the capital city of Malé which has now emerged as the most advanced
hospital in Maldives. The State Bank of India (SBI) has played a vital role in the economic
development of Maldives since February 1974 by providing loan assistance for promotion ofisland resorts, export of marine products, and business enterprises. Taj Group of India runs Taj
Exotica Resort & Spa and Vivanta Coral Reef Resort in Maldives. India has helped Maldivesin renovating the Malé International Airport, has signed Memorandum of Understanding(MOUs) and planning new initiatives in the fields of renewable energy, education, health andwaste management.
The Government of India, in 2022, announced credit line worth USD100 million along withsupport for other developmental projects.8 India has also been providing Maldives with defence
training and equipment requirements. 9 In 2004, India helped address shortage of water in
Maldives after a fire destroyed the biggest water treatment plant. India, at the time, dispatchedplaneloads of drinking water and sent two naval warships; the INS Sukanya and the INS Vivek
that remained berthed off Malé harbor to purify water through Reverse Osmosis (RO)systems.10 New Delhi’s quick response during the 2004 Tsunami and the 2014 water crisis in
Malé, along with previous instances in 1988, showcases India's proximity and ability to aid
Maldives during distress. These events establish India as the go-to ally for Maldives,
12

acknowledged by both the government and the people. New Delhi realizes that the entire region
needs to be developed simultaneously for the larger good and collective human security. Recent
actions, such as dispatching 30,000 measles vaccine doses in January 2020, and sending morethan 3 lakhs COVID-19 vaccines in the first three months of 2021 have solidified India's
reputation as the foremost responder in times of crisis for Maldives.11
Wax and Wane
Unfortunately, India’s influence in Maldives has waxed and waned and it has remained captive
to the political dispensation in Maldives. In the past, India has faced several setbacks in its
Maldives policy. The GMR group debacle, Maldives declining India’s invitation to join the
MILAN naval exercises, and Maldives rejecting India’s gift of military helicopters are just a
few instances. This was the time when China managed to gain a foothold in Maldives withlarge infrastructure deals and free trade agreements. China even warned India to not interfere
in Maldives’ domestic politics when Yameen declared a state of emergency in February 2018
in defiance of a Supreme Court order to release political prisoners. Chinese-state-run tabloid
Global Times warned in an op-ed that if India one-sidedly sends troops to Maldives, China willtake action to stop New Delhi.12
Solih’s coming to power in 2018 led to India re-emerging as a reliable ally of Maldives. Thiswas evident from the fact that Prime Minister Modi attended the inauguration ceremony of the
new Maldivian President in 2018. The Solih government stuck to the ‘India First’ Policy. India
made a development-led approach a priority with the focus not only on the government but
also on the outreach to the people. In 2017, India announced a financial assistance package of
USD 1.4 billion which included eight infrastructure projects under the USD 800 million Lineof Credit (LoC).13 Several of these projects are already under execution.
During Solih’s official visit to India in 2022, several infrastructure and connectivity projects,
as well as MoUs on disaster management, cyber security, capacity building etc. were inked.
India has also been working closely with the Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) toorganize joint Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) patrols, anti-narcotic operations, gifting of
hardware, Search and Rescue and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
exercises, adventure camps, sailing regatta, etc. India has also offered to depute Mobile
Training Teams (MTT) based on MNDF requirements and to train MNDF personnel for UN
peace-keeping operations at Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK).14 New Delhi also worked
on High Impact Community Development Projects such as installing streetlights in Kondey(Gaaf Alif Atoll) and a volleyball court in Kanditheemu (Shaviyani Atoll). From medicaid,
maritime connectivity and tourism to clinching the Presidency at the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA), India has been of assistance to Maldives. The two countries have also
signed the Uthuru Thila Falhu harbour development deal with the aim of developing MNDF’s
Coast Guard Harbour.
Yet Chinese economic ties during Solih’s government continued to stay resilient despite initialpledges to re-evaluate trade agreements with China and efforts to alleviate Maldivian debt toBeijing. Nonetheless, the Solih government showed reticence to sign an Free Trade Agreement(FTA) with China. On the other hand, the current Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu had
13asked India to remove its military personnel from the island by March 15, 2024 as part of the‘India out’ campaign.15
Another campaign - “Save Addu” - has been used since 2021 to protest against theestablishment of the Indian consulate in Addu City. 16 In 2024, the two countries had adiplomatic standoff after three ministers in the Maldivian government made juvenile remarks
on social media regarding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep.17
Additionally, Muizzu is courting investors and trying to deepen bilateral relations with Beijing.
Maldives’ Importance for India
For India, Maldives is important to strengthen its leverage over the Indian Ocean Rim states,
especially in the wake of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that can potentially beinimical to India’s security interests in the region. Moreover, political stability in theneighborhood remains important for India, especially as more than 29000 Indians18 and 70 odd
Indian armed forces personnel were present in Maldives. Despite Indian presence on the island
historically, recent political changes have depicted that immediate political concerns for somepolitical factions within, may have trumped its value-based partnerships. The most recent
elections in Maldives have shown that anti-India campaigns and fake news against Indian
military presence may have ensured the victory of Mohammed Muizzu, apart from otherfactors.19 That should, however, be no indication that the political wheel of fortune for India
will not turn again.
At the geopolitical level, the Maldivian president’s decision to choose Turkey as his first state
visit indicates that Maldives wants to diversify its options away from India’s orbit. Maldives'
President’s recently concluded 5-day visit to China aimed at high-level engagement in various
fields, strengthen collaboration on international and multilateral affairs, and work towards a
China-Maldives community with a shared future. This is the first time a Maldivian President
has chosen China before India for the overseas visit. New Delhi has remained suspicious of
Beijing’s economic and friendly cooperation with the South Asian states. For India, the needof the hour is to keep the current Maldivian administration engaged with continued assistanceand capacity building.
Maldives’ initial policy scramble under Muizzu indicates a two-pronged approach that seeks
to balance between Chinese investments in Maldives to propel its growth and Turkey’s
embrace to consolidate global solidarity based on Islamism. This could help Maldives findnewer markets in the Eurasian region and gain a grounding in organizations such as theOrganization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).20 These changes are hardly strategic from Malé’sstandpoint as it has little to gain in the long term either through lopsided funding from China
or a political revival that goes against its political grain. Maldives remains a democratic country
positioned in the heart of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) where its primary concerns in thelong term should be an integration in the Indo-Pacific supply chains, capacity building with thehelp of regional partners like India, and fighting climate change, particularly because it faces
grave climate predictions.21

14

India’s Policy Orientation with MaldivesIndia’s relationship with Maldives till now has remained largely on an upward trajectorybarring recent setbacks. Yet, the Muizzu government is unlikely to be overly hostile to India.
The two countries are working together to find a workable solution regarding the Indian
military presence in the country.
While India’s experience with democracy is seventy-five years, democracy in Maldives is still
evolving. In this regard, India has a lot to offer to Maldives. For a democratic India, the soft
power lies in extending more people-led development initiatives. These will go a long way inresonating with all the Maldivians regardless of political affiliation. India needs to build deep
pockets of trust to overcome seeds of suspicion that have been planted by various political andinterest groups in that country. India should explore joint projects that provide employment
and development opportunities to local Maldivians. India’s status as a favored partner ofMaldives stems from the fact that Indian economic assistance is not aimed at creating a debt
trap, like China’s economic engagements.
Furthermore, the Maldivian economy depends substantially on tourism. In 2023, Indian tourists
were the largest group to visit Maldives. Maldives relies on India for food, infrastructure andtechnology. The recent controversy led to Indian businesses asking to boycott Maldives
movement. This, if happens, will have a huge impact on the nation’s GDP. However, Indianpolicy makers are pragmatic in their approach. There is an understanding that smaller countries
like Maldives will do their best to leverage the rivalries among greater powers.
For India, Maldives’ location in the Indian Ocean littoral is of immense importance. There is
the presence of seabed minerals — rare earth metals and other critical minerals - around
Maldives that are the backbone for sustainable energy. Deep-sea mining of these minerals
requires a stable, peaceful maritime environment for which New Delhi will have to leverage
the island nation in building a stable security architecture in the IOR. India has taken steps inthis regard- gifting a fast patrol boat, a landing craft assault ship, in addition to large-scaletraining of the Maldivian coast guard is a step in the right direction.22 India is also building
Maldives’ disaster management capacity to deal with issues of climate change and oil spills.
One of the prerequisites for soft power extension is that it needs constant engagement, mostimportantly, without any obvious expectation of gain. In Maldives, India should continue its
engagement without any obvious expectation through the Muizzu government. India’s
engagement of Maldives should look for alternate mechanisms even if its small militarypresence in the region has ended. A full-spectrum engagement of Maldives from a marketeconomy approach could open new vistas between India and Maldives and would likely
transcend the narrow lens of geopolitics associated with India’s approach to Maldives.
India is using soft power, military cooperation, as well as economic ties to build bipartisan
support while respecting sovereignty, maintaining sustainability and focusing on a peopleoriented approach. For this, the Indian efforts in Maldives will have to touch and impact the
maximum number of lives through its fresh initiatives, investments and trust. Maldives may
seem like it is veering away into the orbit of China or now Turkey under president Muizzu, but
the quintessential advantage that India has over both these countries is its functional democratic
15

setup. In that, there is a convergence between New Delhi and Malé. Therein lies the synergy
between India and Maldives which India should capitalize on.

ENDNOTES

1Harsh V Pant, “India Should Let Maldives Learn The Cost Of A Chinese Embrace,” Observer Research
Foundation, January 17, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-should-let-maldives-learn-the-costof-a-chinese-embrace
2

Adarsh Kumar Gupta, “Sick Maldivian teen dies after President Mohammed Muizzu refused India's plane
services: Report”, The Hindustan Times, January 21, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/sickmaldivian-teen-dies-after-president-mohammed-muizzu-refused-indias-plane-services-report101705810862369.html
3

Press Trust of India, “China agrees to consider restructuring of loans to Maldives: President Muizzu”, Indian
Express, January 14, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-restructuring-loans-maldivespresident-muizzu
4

Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 80, Autumn 1990, 153-171, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580

5Kate Sullivan Estrada, “What Is A Vishwaguru? Indian Civilizational Pedagogy as A Transformative Global
Imperative”, International Affairs, Vol. 99 (2), March 6, 2023, 433-455, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac318
6

Drew Desilver, “Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic”, Pew
Research Center, May 14, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/05/14/more-than-half-ofcountries-are-democratic/
7“Operation Cactus: How Indian Troops Went To Maldives And Helped Quell A Coup”, The Times of India,
February 7, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/operation-cactus-how-indian-troopswent-to-maldives-and-helped-quell-a-coup/articleshow/62816787.cms
8

N Sathiya Moorthy, “India-Maldives ties: Extending Additional Credit Lines”, Observer Research Foundation,
October 4, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-maldives-ties-extending-additional-credit-lines
9

Samim Aktar and Sabyasachi Pailan, “India-Maldives Relations: Its flux through decades”, Journal of Emerging
Technologies
andInnovative
Research,
Vol.
9
(3),
March
2022,
497-503,https://www.jetir.org/papers/JETIR2203060.pdf
10Press Trust of India, “Maldives Battles Water Crisis With India's Help”, NDTV, December 6, 2014,
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/maldives-battles-water-crisis-with-indias-help-709413
11

Geeta Mohan, “Bhutan, Maldives First Among 6 Recipients of Covid Vaccine From India,” India Today, January
20, 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/coronavirus-outbreak/story/bhutan-maldives-first-among-6-recipientsof-covid-vaccine-from-india-1760843-2021-01-20
12

Atul Aneja, “China Will ‘Take Action’ If India Sends Troops To Maldives: Global Times”, The Hindu, February
13, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-will-take-action-if-india-sends-troops-to-maldivesglobal-times/article61483314.ece
13

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “India is Maldives' durable & enduring partner for decades”, The Economic Times,
December 1, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-is-maldives-durable-enduringpartner-for-16

decades/articleshow/105662772.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cp
pst
14“India-MaldivesBilateral
Relations”,
MinistryofExternal
https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Maldives.pdf

Affairs,

June

2023,

15

Neha Banka, “Explained: What Is Behind The ‘India Out’ Campaign In The Maldives?”, The Indian Express, July20, 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/the-maldives-india-out-campaign-explained-7396314/
16

Ali Faaiq, “2023 Presidential Election Is Where We Defeat India: Yameen”, The Times of Addu, November 5,
2022, https://timesofaddu.com/2022/11/05/2023-presidential-election-is-where-we-defeat-india-yameen/
17

Sayantani Biswas, “Maldives govt suspends 3 ministers after ‘derogatory’ remarks on PM Modi amid
Lakshadweep visit”, Mint, January 7, 2024, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/maldives-suspendsmariyam-shiuna-malsha-and-hassan-zihan-over-derogatory-remarks-on-india-pm-modi-lakshadweep-visit11704627894668.html#:~:text=The%20Maldives%20government%20suspended%20three,local%20media%20
Atoll%20Times%20reported.
18

Press Trust of India, “Indians Safe in Maldives”, The Hindu, February
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indians-safe-in-maldives/article2882232.ece

11,

2012,

19

Saad Hasan, “Why Do Some Maldivians Want The ‘Indian Military Out’?”, TRT World, 2022,
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-do-some-maldivians-want-the-indian-military-out-51899
20

See Note 1.

21

Tristan McConnell, “The Maldives Is Being Swallowed By The Sea. Can It Adapt?”, National Geographic, January
20, 2022, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/the-maldives-is-being-swallowed-by-thesea-can-it-adapt
22

Radhey Tambi, “India Can’t Afford to Lose Maldives Again”, The Diplomat, May 5, 2023,
https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/india-cant-afford-to-lose-maldives-again/17

2. Growing Developmental Partnership in IndiaBangladesh Relations
Sreeradha Datta
Bangladesh’s remarkable journey began in 1971 through a turbulent political struggle that
graduated into lower-middle-income country in five decades overcoming a weak fledgling
economy. With increasing salience of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh’s growth story and its
geographic location has led to its emergence as an important South Asian nation. More so, forIndia, Bangladesh has emerged as a critical partner in the region. Given the Indo-Bangladesh
land borders of over 4000 km, the basis for bilateral engagement is also a strong reflection of
not only the common geography, but also the sub-continental history that has lent the twoneighbours with a unique social and cultural connection. In the past, even when state of official
bilateral engagements was uneven, the people-to-people connect that covers cultural andcommercial ties has flourished over the years.
While the state-to-state ties have grown stronger in recent decades, the number of Bangladeshis
coming to India for medical tourism has burgeoned. However, the previous emotional connect
the neighbours shared, stemming from the history of the liberation war, has been diluted. While
music, poetry and cultural icons like Rabindranath Tagore and Nazrul Islam had brought thepeople on two sides together traditionally, today’s youths on both sides have discovered greaterinterests and affinity beyond each other. But on another level, the recent bilateral initiatives
that includes cross-border transport initiatives are slowly transforming the regional geopoliticaland geo-economic landscape, heralding a new development trajectory for the entire South
Asian region.
Ebbs and Flows in Bilateral Ties
While Indo-Bangladesh bilateral ties are much celebrated today, this was not always the case.
India’s support for the War of Liberation and the friendship between then Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman lent the bilateral ties a special tone.
However, the assassination of Bangladesh’s first prime minister Mujib in 1975 followed bymilitary control over state affairs drove the neighbours apart towards a distanced and detachedengagement. This phase also saw Bangladesh under its military leaders consolidate its ties withother powers, including China that became its trusted ally. Economic support, infrastructuraldevelopment and defence ties dominated growing China-Bangladesh relations. This and otherfactors like the moving away of a generation that bonded over common history and also
political developments in India and Bangladesh led to dilution of Indian influence. While ageneration that relate to Indian culture and the historical tradition continues to exist in
Bangladesh, the younger generations have found many other areas of interest beyond India as
its prime ally. For instance, the number of students scholarships to India has increased 1 along18

with the overall increase in number of Bangladeshi students going abroad.i Given the rather
one-sided election that took place in early 2024, the youth resentment towards India has
upscaled with several quit India events and programs being organized.2
The government-level ties between India and Bangladesh re-strengthened with Awami League(AL) leader Sheikh Hasina returning to power with a landslide victory in December 2008. The
breakthrough witnessed a large number of bilateral agreements signed in 2010 and
subsequently followed up over the next few years.3 This turnaround was possible as Dhaka
understood and addressed the core security concerns that India had vis-à-vis Bangladesh,leading to India offering its first line of credit of USD 1 billion in 2010 which grew over the
next decade to USD 7.8 billion.4 But what is most significant was the recognition in India that
Bangladesh held a far greater importance beyond the security considerations and Dhaka would
ably partner India in it seeking a larger regional and global role. India realized Bangladesh’s
developmental aspirations which paved the way for India’s development diplomacy in early
2000s. In recognition of these aspirations, bilateral agreements and credit line initiatives werestarted. The cooperative framework that emerged between the two neighbours, included an
economic architecture consisting of cross border infrastructure facilities, energy trade and reexamining the bilateral trade that would grow multifold in the subsequent years.5
India’s invitation to Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to attend the G20 summit(September 2023) with seven other leaders reflect the positive Indo-Bangladeshi ties. Certainly,
a recognition by India of Bangladesh’s development goals and providing it a platform before
other developed and developing countries to present its case. While the neighbours always
shared strong social, cultural and political ties, India and Bangladesh’s developmental
cooperation has included defence cooperation too. During Prime Minister Hasina’s 2017 visit
to India, the two countries signed a series of agreements and Memorandums of Understanding(MoUs) in areas of defence cooperation, including an MoU between India’s Defence Services
Staff College and Dhaka’s Defence Services Command and MoU for extending a line of credit
worth USD 500 million for the purchase of defence equipment and held the fifth Annual
Defence Dialogue on August 28, 2023.6
All these aspects have acted as force-multiplier to the strong people-to-people ties that always
existed between the two neighbours. For a variety of reasons, this connection, however, has
waned in the recent past. The government-to-government ties have increased and while India
does issue the highest number of visas to Bangladeshi citizens for medical purposes, theemotional connect that existed between India and Bangladesh is difficult to feel now given thechanging political milieu over the decades. While during the birth of Bangladesh, India playeda critical role which had led to deepening of bilateral ties, over the years, Bangladesh
consolidated its ties with several other neighbours and extra regional powers. The primacy ofIndia naturally diluted and the close proximity that existed during Indira Gandhi and Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman’s period reduced with change of guard in Dhaka. The return of multipartyi

The total of 52,799 Bangladeshi students went abroad for study in 2023, with the highest number of 8,524
students going to the US, followed by 6,586 to the UK, 5,835 to Canada, 5,714 to Malaysia, 5,046 to Germany,
4,987 to Australia, 2,082 to Japan, 2,606 to India, 1,202 to the Korea republic, and 1,190 to Saudi Arabia

19democracy in Bangladesh restored some aspects of the bilateral ties. However, as explained
earlier, post-2010 and signing of joint communique, India and Bangladesh have been able tostrengthen their partnership spanning almost every bilateral sector.
Era of developmental partnership
The bilateral developmental partnership has covered cross border transport, from road,railways, coast and port facilities to energy trade, economic and trade agreements.
Physical connectivity
The bilateral developmental partnership was reinvigorated post the agreement (2010) on
improving connectivity network in Bangladesh. It included the supply of locomotives andpassenger coaches; the rehabilitation of the Saidpur railway workshop; procurement of buses
and dredging projects, establishing state-run standards and testing institute facilities in
Bangladesh by India and more importantly setting up a power grid between India and
Bangladesh.7 The new railway connections between Haldibari–Chilahati was reopened in 2020
and the recent rail line from Akhaura to Agartala (the 7.9km) as well Khulna-Mongla Port line
(64 kms) all which will be contributing to the efficient cross-border movements that existed in
the pre-1965 period. The two sides also operationalized the Agreement on the use of the
Chattogram and Mongla Ports. India and Bangladesh created history in the region with the firstland and air transshipment trade being initiated in 2020.8 The multimodal transport corridor
has been a new aspect of the growing economic and trading ties.9
Energy Trade
Interestingly, the first tangible takeaway of the 2010 agreement was the bilateral energy trade
which has grown multifold since the first Palatana project built in Tripura. India is now selling
1,1650 MW of electricity to Bangladesh 10 which has become a priority sector for thegovernment, given its domestic shortfall. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) terminal set up
in Chittagong in 2016 makes it possible not only for Bangladesh to receive the gas but also
facilitates the supply of LPG to north-eastern Indian states including Tripura. The recently
opened India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline11, funded entirely by India, will transport highspeed diesel from the Numaligarh Refinery Limited in Assam to 16 districts in northern
Bangladesh's Rajshahi and Rangpur divisions. Similarly, the Maitree Super Thermal Power
Project in Rampal, Bangladesh which is a 50:50 joint venture along with the Payra Power
Plant in Pataukhali are the latest to join the bilateral energy basket.12 With India building a
regional grid for energy trade to start between Bangladesh, Nepal and India, the future ofenergy cooperation looks robust in the region. The region will see the development of energy
trade integration initiated by India and the benefits of energy trade are likely to bring in an eraof greater prosperity in the neighbourhood.
Trade and Commerce
A significant development was also made in terms of the cooperation on digital payment
infrastructure. 13 This will boost bilateral trade along with the ongoing negotiations on theComprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), covering trade in goods, services,20and protecting and promoting investment. The bilateral trade is poised to go over USD 18
billion recorded a year ago, a marked improvement from the USD 1 billion it enjoyed nearly
two decades ago.14
Through much of these developmental projects, Bangladesh is increasingly playing a criticalrole in many of India’s foreign policy outreaches, including India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ and‘Act East Policy’ by agreeing to Indian demand for transit through Bangladesh’s borders,enabling easy access to India’s Northeast region. That apart, Dhaka’s support to Indian efforts
to reenergise other subregional initiatives like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association(IORA) are much appreciated in India. Bangladesh has also expressed desire to join India’stransport corridor to Southeast Asia.15
Domestic Dissonance
While high-level meetings are periodically held between India and Bangladesh and Indian
External Affairs Minister was recently in Dhaka (May 2023), the MOU signed on the renewalof the Cultural Exchange Program between India and Bangladesh for 2023-2025 will further
enhance the people-to-people connect. But over the past few years, the domestic dissonance in
Bangladesh has cast its shadow on these ties. The last two elections held in Bangladesh (2014& 2018) have been far from multiparty democratic, and the evident opposition repression has
been on the rise. 16 A palpable perception that India extends support to the incumbent
government has not made India very popular. As the results of 12th parliamentary elections
held in January 2024 show, despite the appearances by the Awami League, it has been one forthe ‘"the rule of the AL, for the AL and by the AL" once again.17 And India’s continued support
to Sheikh Hasina under these circumstances has created misgivings from certain sections in
Bangladesh about Delhi.18
For years, the domestic mood in Dhaka had not allowed India to play a comprehensive role intheir growth and development which drastically changed with Sheikh Hasina’s coming topower. But the visible Indian proximity with Awami league has its own consequences for India.
Given the slew of developmental projects that have been initiated bilaterally by India in SouthAsia, the un-integrated regional landscape will hopefully see the region maximizing its
economic potential with Bangladesh contributing to it substantially.
While the cooperative framework has certainly brought many tangibles to the people on bothsides, a certain section of Bangladesh has begun to view India rather critically given thedomestic developments.
Way Forward for India
The present looming economic crises in Bangladesh has pointed to not only deep fiscal
mismanagement but also severe levels of corruption that has plagued the polity. The highinflation and soaring food prices, along with prolonged protests by the ready-made garment
industry workers has made life difficult for the common people. India’s role in providing easyloans and in supporting some of the required infrastructure projects may perhaps help
Bangladesh tide over difficulties. There is bound to be greater goodwill for India if it is seen
21

standing by Bangladesh during its difficult times. However, given the domestic politicaldivisiveness that exists in Bangladesh, India is seen as working with Sheikh Hasina andconsequently not the entire country.19 This gap in perception needs to be addressed by India
urgently.
However, the latest election has buttressed the perception. Given the long rule of PM Hasina
since 2008, India’s engagement with the non-Awami groups and political parties have been
marginal in the past years. The other large political party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),
being in political wilderness in the last three decades, has never enjoyed a good working
relationship with India. Indeed, India’s relations with Bangladesh had plummeted during BNP
period 2001-2006 making it a very difficult phase in the bilateral ties. The memories ofviolence, terror attacks, anti-India positions have been too strong for India to overcome. The
limited tolerance for any ideas and opinions that offer different perspectives, or contrarianviews has been brutally stifled. The prolonged situation has only added to wider criticism of
India and a growing clamour for China given its flexible mechanisms is evident. China’s public
posturing in support of the Awami League government has increased, however its ability towork with all the political parties is well documented.20 India’s previous bitter experience with
BNP cannot continue to colour its ties with any non-Awami party. So, while India has spent
substantial funds and efforts to increase its outreach to Bangladesh, Indian ability to navigate
the Bangladesh polity remains restricted. It will need to exhibit larger outreach to a larger
political dispensation. The proposed economic zones –Kushtia’s Berhamara, Mirsharai at
Chittagong and Mongla – has not seen any positive response from Indian investors. This has
been because the investment environment in Bangladesh has been seen as a problem due towhich foreign direct investment has never been very substantial in Bangladesh.
Arguably, no elected government will be able to overturn the dividends that India’s cooperation
has brought to Bangladesh, however its close proximity with one ruling political party has led
to a stymied perception of India and its cooperative model needs to be addressed. The recent
one-sided elections have let forth another round of anti-India sentiment spewing from
Bangladesh, but both India and Bangladesh as neighbours have no choice but to coexist
together and while India will have to consider the opinion of the larger masses in Bangladesh,similarly, Bangladesh will have to recognize the benefits of engaging with India.
Apart from the cultural and social ties, the economic ties have grown immensely in the recent
decades and the signing of the trade agreement that is under discussion will also enable tangible
benefits to both sides. India’s soft power has always been crucial to its engagement with theneighbours but with time and changing mindset of the youths in the region and especially in
Bangladesh, their interest lies in the real tangible takeaways and that will be evident when theeconomic and commercial ties between the two become stronger. The new generation
Bangladeshis will need to understand the difference between the support India lends to themas against the policies that are pursued by China. While China seems rather attractive for
Bangladesh for a variety of reasons, the recent example of Sri Lanka and the debt crisis issue
should be a wake-up call to all in the region. Bangladesh can ignore the risk only at its own
cost. India will continue to be one of the better options to engage with and India will need toacknowledge Bangladesh’s role in its own regional plan. Building on the existing bilateral22

infrastructure will enable the two neighbours to remain positively engaged. They have to focus
on the economic dividends without being lost in the political tirade that is typical of the region.

ENDNOTES

1

Solamain Salman, “Bangladeshi students fall behind neighbours”, New Age Bangladesh, October 12, 2023,
https://www.newagebd.net/article/214826/bangladeshi-students-fall-behind-neighbours
2

Pinak Chakraborty, “Why anti-India sentiments are growing in Bangladesh”, Times of India, November 23, 2023,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/why-anti-india-sentiments-are-growing-inbangladesh/articleshow/105434644.cms?from=mdr
3

Sreeradha Datta, “All-Time High' Relations Herald Greater Regional Integration in India - Bangladesh Relations:
Scaling Newer Heights”, Indian Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10 (3), July - September 2015, 226-231,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45341044
4

ET Bureau, “India gives $1 bn credit to Dhaka”, The Economic Times, January 12, 2010,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-gives-1-bn-credit-todhaka/articleshow/5435141.cms
5Sreeradha Datta, “Bangladesh the Much-Coveted Neighbour”, Institute of South Asian Studies National
University of Singapore, ISAS Insights 634, August 4, 2020, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/634.pdf
6

PIB Delhi, “India & Bangladesh hold the fifth Annual Defence Dialogue in Dhaka”, Press Information Bureau,
August 28, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1952947
7

Rezaul H Laskar, “Nepal, India, Bangladesh power trade agreement in ‘final stage’, says envoy”, Hindustan
Times, September 28, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nepal-india-bangladesh-powertrade-agreement-in-final-stage-says-envoy-101695910839318.html
8Sreeradha Datta, “Bangladesh: Leveraging its Locational Advantage”, Vivekananda International Foundation,
January 11, 2019, https://www.vifindia.org/2019/january/11/bangladesh-leveraging-its-locational-advantage
9

Ibid.

10

PTI, “Adani Power starts supplying power to Bangladesh from its Jharkhand plant, The Economic Times, June
26,
2023,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/adani-power-starts-supplyingpower-to-bangladesh-from-its-jharkhandplant/articleshow/101286867.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
11

PIB Delhi, “PM Narendra Modi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina jointly inaugurated the IndiaBangladesh
Friendship
Pipeline”,
Press
Information
Bureau,
March
18,
2023,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1908377
12

Syed Raiyan Amir, “The Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: Evolving Bangladesh-India Energy Partnership”,
The Geopolitics, November 7, 2023, https://thegeopolitics.com/the-maitree-super-thermal-power-projectevolving-bangladesh-india-energy-partnership/#google_vignette
13

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Bangladesh sign MoU on smoother cross-border payment transactions”, The
Economic Times, September 9, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-bangladeshsign-mou-on-smoother-cross-border-payment-

23

transactions/articleshow/103517972.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst“দ্বিপাদ্বিক সম্পর্কের সংদ্বিপ্ত দ্বিিরণ" [Dbipākṣika samparkēra saṅkṣipta bibaraṇa](Overview of Bilateral
Relations),High
CommissionofIndia
Dhaka,
https://www.hcidhaka.gov.in/pages?id=eyJpdiI6IkFESTJUM3NvTW5PVkc5R1Nub290T2c9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiUDV
PRE5RcTlNTEF1b3d3ZEVcL2VWeXc9PSIsIm1hYyI6ImRkMzE1NmRlYmM4ZDA3ODNhNmVmZTY4NjU2OWM2YzY
yMTgzMTYxNjJkNzE1MGZjNWY0Y2Y0MzgxMmUzMWQzNmUifQ==&subid=eyJpdiI6InhQSHA1OUFwV01KcmJj
MVllODJLWUE9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoicHoxS2hWOVlMSFJUTHA2b25CMlwvM0E9PSIsIm1hYyI6IjBjOWMyYzI5ZjIyOW
M4YzI5M2NhZGEyZjA4ODYzOGM1ZTc1ZDExZDBiMTdjMDIzYzY3MDQ5OWFlMGZhZTNlOGMifQ==
14

15

Sreeradha Datta, “Bangladesh on a New Journey, Going beyond Regional Identities”, Bloomsbury, New Delhi,
2024.
16

Sreeradha Datta, “Dhakacracy”, The Telegraph, June 4, 2023, https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/whenbangladesh-goes-to-the-polls-in-a-few-months-will-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-be-able-to-serve-up-acredible-stage-for-democracy/cid/1942146
17

Aasha Mehreen Amin, “Of the AL, for the AL, and by the AL”, The Daily Star, December 22, 2023,
https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/road-elections-2023-24/news/the-al-the-al-and-the-al-3500361
18

Syful Islam, “India Out' campaign heats up in Bangladesh after lopsided election”, Nikkei Asia, January 26,2024,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-Out-campaign-heats-up-in-Bangladeshafter-lopsided-election
19

Anuttama Banerji, “Opposition Protests in Bangladesh Threaten Bilateral Relations with India”, South Asian
Voices, February 13, 2023, https://southasianvoices.org/opposition-protests-in-bangladesh-threaten-bilateralrelations-with-india/
20

Sreeradha Datta, “Bangladesh's Relations with China and India: A Comparative Study”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.
32 (5), 2008, 755-772, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802309134

24

3. Building
Institutional
Linkages
Through
Buddhism: India's Soft Power Strategy in Nepal &Sri Lanka
Mihir Shekhar Bhonsale
Soft power, as described by Joseph S Nye, is the ability to influence others through attraction
rather than coercion or payment.1 India’s soft power lies in sources such as the attractivenessof its diverse culture, India’s political currency of being the world's largest democracy, andBollywood.
India hosted the Global Buddhist Summit in New Delhi on April 20-21, 2023 which saw theparticipation of 171 delegates from over 30 countries.2 The two-day event organised by India’s
Union Ministry of Culture and International Buddhist Confederation (IBC) was inaugurated byPrime Minister Narendra Modi. Besides speaking on Buddha’s path as a solution for ending
war, PM Modi said that it is the expansion of Buddhism that binds humanity in one thread.
The Indian Prime Minister was invoking the power of Buddhism that binds nations and billions
of people together, emphasising India’s strategy of leveraging that potential to promote its soft
power across these nations. Estimates put the total population of Buddhists to be 488 million,
representing 7 percent of the total world population.3 Among South Asian countries, Bhutan(75 percent) and Sri Lanka (71 percent) have the maximum concentration of Buddhists. In
Nepal, Buddhism had 9 percent of followers, second after Hinduism (81.3 percent) as per 2011
census.4 Meanwhile, Buddhists comprise just 0.7 percent of India’s total population.5 Given
the strength and influence of Buddhism in these South Asian nations, invoking the soft powerof Buddhism has become important in India’s 21st century diplomacy.
Both structural and superstructural changes in India’s neighbourhood led the latter to realignits neighbourhood policy and adopt new strategies to maintain its sphere of influence. However,India is not alone in the quest for soft power, as it is challenged by China’s forays into South
Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Thus, competition has ensued in South Asia, further
problematizing India’s soft power strategy - its assumptions and manifestations.
China, which boasts half of the world’s Buddhist population, has reckoned with the importanceof Buddhist diplomacy.6 It has sponsored Buddhist conferences in the past and has also forgedpeople-to-people connections through the exhibition of Buddha’s tooth relics. Moreover,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a testimony to forging cultural relations within Asian
Silk Route. South Asia has increasingly featured in Beijing’s cultural diplomacy. India’s latentconsideration of tapping its spiritual power for bolstering relations in its neighbourhood was,in part, at the nudge of Beijing.
This article discusses the need and relevance of institutional linkages for India’s soft power
through Buddhism, particularly with regards to Nepal and Sri Lanka. It argues that India is
uniquely placed in terms of soft power to leverage its Buddhist heritage by building suchinstitutional linkages.

25Buddhist Institutions in India
Institutions played a central role in the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia. Buddha himself
formed the first institution for the propagation of Buddhism by establishing the ‘Sangha’ or themonastic community. Institutional patronage was evident in Buddhism’s cultural contact with
far and wide lands such as Mauryan Emperor Ashoka (304-232 BCE) who spread Buddhism
through his emissaries.7 In the same vein, kings of the Pala dynasty are celebrated for upholding
the last bastion of Buddhism in early medieval India.
Educational Institutions such as the Nalanda University of India and Takshashila served as
centres for scholarly learning and practice of Buddhism for followers across the world. The
colonial British state played a quintessential role in the institutionalisation of archaeology
which gave Buddhism that, until then, was based on the study of manuscripts and texts, withphysical and material remains associated with the life of Buddha.
Modern-day states such as Bhutan, Thailand and Cambodia's role as a patron and protector of
Buddhism demonstrates Buddhism’s prominent role in state affairs. Therefore, institutional
linkages and state patronage become essential for sustaining not just the people-to-people
linkages but also state-to-state relations.
However, post-independent India had shied away from offering state patronage to any religion
under ‘Secular nationalist’ ideology of previous governments.8 Till warming up to the Chinesechallenge, India’s patronage of Buddhism was largely limited to ad-hoc measures andsymbolism such as the Dhamma Chakra wheel on the Indian national flag and the government
seal.
The ruling political dispensation in India for nearly six decades since 1947 viewed Buddhism
as an international currency to gain international traction and sustain the label of non-violenceand pacifism. However, till the turn of the century, one of the most sacred places for Buddhists,such as Bodh Gaya in Bihar where Buddha attained enlightenment, languished in obscurity andneglect. The inclusion of the Mahabodhi Temple inscription at Bodh Gaya as a UNESCOWorld Heritage site in 2002 was a defining moment for Bodh Gaya and only thereon, the town
came into the global spotlight.9
Buddhist philosophy in India in the middle and late 20th century had mostly had an inward
journey- the revivalist legacy of B.R. Ambedkar who employed Buddhist philosophy withsocial programs, and fourteenth Dalai Lama offered new interpretations of Dhamma to suit theneeds and to face challenges posed in modern society. Ambedkar founded the Buddhist Societyof India as an institution for the spread of the social and moral teachings of Buddha. This
organisation had its roots in the first conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists held in
the year in 1954 and headquartered in Bangkok. 10 The advent of the 21st century saw theforming of the International Buddhist Confederation in 2010 to host large-scale international
Buddhist conferences on Indian soil.11
Attaining a spiritual footprint in Nepal’s Lumbini
Lumbini, as the birthplace of Gautam Buddha, has a unique place in South Asia’s civilisational
history. Lumbini, which is strategically located close to the Indo-Nepal border, is one of thefour most revered shrines by Buddhists. The other three places are situated in India - BodhGaya, Sarnath, and Kushinagar, which have formed the Buddhist Circuit in India. The central
26

attraction of Lumbini is the Mayadevi Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage Site at the centre
surrounded by monasteries built by countries around the globe. Presently, there are 29
monasteries in the Monastic Zone, including five Theravada Buddhist monasteries- Royal Thai
Monastery, Mahabodi Society Temple of India, Myanmar Golden Temple, Nepal, Sri Lankan
Monastery as well as 14 monasteries of Mahayana traditions that include Japan, Vietnam,
Singapore, and China.
India was only represented by the Mahabodi Society Temple whose headquarters is in India,
but its founder Angarika Dharmapala was of Sri Lankan origin. So, the country lacked adistinctly Indian monastical representation in Lumbini.
Although, India only had a library in Lumbini Development complex, and no temples, thislacuna was filled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Lumbini in May 2022.
PM Modi, along with Prime Minister of Nepal Sher Bahadur Deuba, carried out the
groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the India International Centre for Buddhist
Culture and Heritage in the Lumbini Monastic Zone.12
The Centre will be constructed by the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC) on land
allocated by the Lumbini Development Trust (LDT). The building of this monastery, once
completed, will help New Delhi gain a foothold in the spiritual life in Lumbini. India is theland where Buddha attained enlightenment and this is revered by both Theravada and
Mahayana traditions of Buddhism as the fountainhead of all traditions. India's unique positionin terms of being the host of Buddhist scholarly learning for many centuries was also
showcased at the groundbreaking of the India International Centre in Lumbini, where
ceremonial rituals were performed in all three major traditions of Buddhism- Theravada,
Mahayana, and Vajrayana.13
Through this International Centre, India plans to build a world-class modern facility welcoming
pilgrims and tourists from all over the world to enjoy the essence of the spiritual aspects of
Buddhism. This move came after India and Nepal began to jointly promote the Buddhist tourist
circuit. The Indian Railways in 2018 launched a Buddhist circuit covering various pilgrimage
places across Nepal and India including Lumbini, Bodh Gaya, Nalanda, Rajgir, Varanasi,
Sarnath, and Kushinagar.14
The Buddhist circuit attracts tourists from across the globe. Sarnath, where Buddha turned theWheel of Law, received the highest number of foreign tourist visits between 2015 and 2018
followed by Gaya, and Bodh Gaya. The data from 2015-2018 suggests that Buddhist sites
contribute a considerable share (6.46 percent) of the nationwide foreign tourist visits in the
country. Lumbini in Nepal was the most visited pilgrimage destination by foreigners in Nepal.15
During PM Modi’s visit to Lumbini, India and Nepal also agreed in principle to establish sistercity relations between Lumbini and Kushinagar, connecting the Buddha’s birthplace and theplace of his death.16
The role of Buddhism, as a deliberate driver of diplomacy in Indo-Nepal ties, is also importantconsidering Beijing’s inroads in Nepal. China is building the Trans-Himalayan Railway andhas also proposed a rail line from Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini, thereby increasing Beijing’s
flow of pilgrims into Nepal and thus increasing its influence in Lumbini and Nepal.17
India’s attention to Lumbini may help consolidate its soft power in Nepal and throughout Asia
by not just rekindling age-old civilisational and kinship ties with Kathmandu but also by
27

promoting a joint Indo-Nepal Buddhist tourist circuit as an attraction for tourists worldwide.
However, for this endeavour to fructify, a multi-pronged approach focusing on productenhancement, bettering connectivity, and creative promotion and marketing of products isrequired. The transnational nature of the Buddhist circuit necessitates a greater level ofcoordination between India and Nepal. Lumbini, Buddha’s birthplace, is an inalienable part ofthe circuit following the life story of Buddha. Improving connectivity between Lumbini andother destinations in the transnational circuit is important.
Nepal is of immense geostrategic importance to New Delhi and boosting relations with
Kathmandu will help preserve India’s strategic interests vis-à-vis China which is investingheavily in South Asian nations. Beijing’s economic prowess is owing to the formidable backingof the Chinese state. To counter this, New Delhi's strategy has been to build institutional
linkages through Buddhism with the support of the Union Government and institutions like
IBC.
Influencing Sri Lanka’s Buddhist clergy
Buddhism in Sri Lanka has an umbilical cord with India. Chroniclers believe that Buddhism
was introduced by Arahat Mahinda, the son of Ashoka, who came to Sri Lanka from India in
247 B.C. He converted King Devanampiya-Tiss who in turn converted his kingdom.18
Maha Bodhi Society was a pioneer in renewing the historical and religious links between India
and Sri Lanka in the twentieth-century post-colonial phase of bilateral relations. It is inrecognition of these binding symbiotic ties that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, visited
the Mahabodhi Society during his visit to Sri Lanka in March 2015.19
Buddhism is the majority religion in Sri Lanka and the Buddhist clergy have been among theisland nation’s most powerful sections. India has nurtured the bond of Buddhism with the
Buddhist-Sinhala majority with a strategic purpose. This balances New Delhi’s interests in Sri
Lanka of protecting Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority interests while also cementing its ties with the
Buddhist majority.
Among New Delhi’s soft power outreach, a USD 15 million grant to Sri Lanka in 2020 for theprotection and promotion of Buddhist ties has been a major contributor. 20 This one-of-kindgrant by India was to be utilized for the construction or renovation of Buddhist monasteries,
education of young monks, strengthening engagement of Buddhist scholars and clergy between
India and Sri Lanka, development of Buddhist heritage museums, cultural exchanges,
archaeological cooperation, and reciprocal exposition of Buddha’s relics. The range ofactivities that would be undertaken through the grant is indicative of the range of India’s soft
power engagement with Sri Lanka through Buddhism.
An important aspect of India’s soft power diplomacy is the people-to-people connections thatit has fostered over the years through facilitating their trips to Buddhist places in India. To markthe inauguration of the Kushinagar International Airport on Abhidhamma Day on October 20th,2021, a 123-member delegation from Sri Lanka was invited and a Holy-relic entourage wasalso exhibited on this occasion. Prime Minister Modi, on the occasion, also handed over holyrobes to the monks known in Buddhism as Kathin Chivara Dana.21
Promotion of the Buddhist Circuit of India in Sri Lanka featured prominently in the India-Sri
Lanka Economic Partnership Vision that was adopted by the two countries during Sri Lankan
28

President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s official visit to New Delhi in July 2023.22 Under the peopleto-people connectivity decisions made jointly by the two countries, they decided to promoteawareness and popularize India’s Buddhist circuit, and Ramayana trail as well as ancient placesof Buddhist, Hindu and other religious worship in Sri Lanka for enhancing tourism.23
Developing relations with Sri Lanka’s Buddhist clergy has been the objective of Beijing’s
outreach to the island country as well. Through cementing relations with Sri Lankan monks
and tapping the Buddhist connection, Beijing hopes to get influential Sinhala monks to speakout in favor of Beijing. Through this outreach, China hopes to quell any resistance from the
Buddhist leadership in Sri Lanka to China’s policies and coercion in Tibet. This was evident
when China did all it could to avert the visit of the Dalai Lama to Sri Lanka.24
China’s Buddhist outreach threatens to dampen New Delhi’s interests in the island country.
The fourteenth Dalai Lama’s contribution to India’s interpretation of ‘Dhamma’ is Beijing’s
nemesis as far as the narrative in Tibet is concerned. Beijing’s Anti-Dalai Lama stance is theconfrontation with India’s interpretation of 'Dhamma’ contributed by the Dalai Lama to Indian
Buddhism. The dual use of Buddhism as a tool to push forward its geopolitical andgeoeconomic ambitions in the South Asian region complicates this quest for building its soft
power through Buddhism.
Way Forward for India
India’s soft power strategy or the lack of it is guided by a lack of coordination and paucity offunds, as per a Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs Report. 25 Whilecoordination woes have been addressed to some extent, the gap in funding soft power initiatives
between India and China is large. Chinese Confucious Institutes spend USD 10 billion a year,
while the entire budget with ICCR taken together is INR 300-400 Crores.26 More efforts need
to be taken at the level of private organizations and religious institutions to promote soft power
as it is not possible for the government alone to sustain the country’s soft power projection.
Religious organizations, preachers, and practitioners need to come forward to forge overseas
partnerships with their counterparts. The government will count on the support and help ofprivate entities to help the strategy of building institutional linkages based on Buddhism.
The Buddhist tourist circuit needs more development and promotion of unique products to caterto luxury tourists. Currently, the Buddhist Circuit is popular among budget tourists only.27
Thus, offering diverse products such as wellness and spirituality may help attract luxury
tourists as well. This requires private investment to match public investments to drive up thedemand and improve the quality of experience of tourists.
One of the ways of boosting the image of India through Buddhism is through cinema andpopular culture. The Indian film industry could produce films painting India as a Land of
Buddha’s Enlightenment and thereby build India’s soft power throughout the world. This soft
power projection was successfully done by Beijing through Hollywood. Chinese are known tohave financed Hollywood films, buying theatre chains.28 China's financial ties with Hollywood
grant the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) significant sway over American studios,
dictating content in films like Disney's 'Mulan' remake, where even the script was vetted by theCentral Propaganda Department.29

29

Beijing’s soft power projection, exemplified by alterations in movies like 'Robocop' and 'Red
Dawn', showcases Beijing's successful manipulation of Hollywood narratives to align with its
geopolitical goals.
Fund constraints are always going to impact India’s soft power strategy, but through cinema,
India’s soft power strategy can be boosted without being heavily dependent on government
support.

ENDNOTES

1

Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, In ‘Public Diplomacy in a Changing World’, Ed. Geoffrey
Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, Vol. 616, April 2008, 94-109, https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/public-diplomacyin-a-changing-world/book233156#contents
2

The Hindu Bureau, “India to host two-day international Buddhist conference”, The Hindu, April 18, 2023,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-to-host-two-day-international-buddhistconference/article66747923.ece
3“The Global Religious Landscape - Buddhists”, Pew Research Center, December 18, 2012,https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-buddhist/4“Nepal Profile”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, https://mofa.gov.np/nepal-profile-updated/

5

Ministry of Home Affairs, “RGI releases Census 2011 data on Population by Religious Communities”, Press
Information Bureau, August 25, 2015, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=126326
6

See Note 3.

7Bill Price, “History’s Greatest Decisions and the people who made them”, Chartwell Books, 2017,https://books.google.co.in/books?id=mL1GDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA45&lpg=PA45&dq=mauryan+emperor+ashoka+(
304232)+sent+emissaries+to+spread+buddhism&source=bl&ots=vTgIrpBQbd&sig=ACfU3U34AJKMpvuW97X4LHX
MiCSUP1f6Fw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj5j7y1q9GFAxW5V2wGHVO1CT44FBDoAXoECAIQAw#v=onepage&q=mauryan%20emperor%20ashoka%20(304232)%20sent%20emissaries%20to%20spread%20buddhism&f=false
8

Milan Vaishnav, “Religious Nationalism and India’s Future”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April
4, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/religious-nationalism-and-india-s-future-pub-78703
9

Manish Sinha, “The Rebirth Of Bodh Gaya: Buddhism and the Making of a World Heritage Site”, India-Seminar,
https://www.india-seminar.com/2021/745/13%20Books.htm
10“About The Buddhist Society of India”, The Buddhist Society of India, https://tbsoi.org.in/Home

11“Background”, International Buddhist Confederation, https://www.ibcworld.org/background.php

12“Visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Lumbini, Nepal (May 16, 2022)”, Ministry of External Affairs,
GovernmentofIndia,
May
12,
2022,
https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/35298/Visit+of+Prime+Minister+Shri+Narendra+Modi+to+Lumbini+Nepal+May+16+2022
13

PIB Delhi, “Shilanyaas of India International Centre for Buddhist Culture and Heritage in Lumbini, Nepal”, Press
Information Bureau, May 16, 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1825705

30

14

Devanjana Nag, “IRCTC Buddhist Circuit Tourist Train: Explore Destinations like Gaya, Nalanda, Lumbini in
Luxury; See Details.” Financial Express, June 14, 2019, www.financialexpress.com/business/railways-irctcbuddhist-circuit-tourist-train-explore-destinations-like-gaya-nalanda-lumbini-in-luxury-see-details-1607374/
15“Lumbini's Tourist Landscape Transforms In 2023: Tourist Arrivals Surge By 10.5%”, Lumbini Development
Trust, https://lumbinidevtrust.gov.np/en/home/news/details/343
16

PIB Delhi, “Visit of Prime Minister to Lumbini, Nepal (May 16, 2022)” Press Information Bureau, May 16, 2022,
pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1825819
17

Anil Giri, “At upcoming talks, Nepal and China to discuss Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini railways”, The
Kathmandu Post, November 23, 2019, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/11/23/at-upcoming-talksnepal-and-china-to-discuss-kathmandu-pokhara-lumbini-railways
18

Dodamgoda Sumanasara Thera, “The Arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka”, Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences- University of Sri Jayewardenepura, June 2, 2022,
http://fhss.sjp.ac.lk/publicationcommittee/2022/06/02/the-arrival-of-buddhism-in-sri-lanka/
19

ANI, “PM Modi offers alms at Mahabodhi society in Colombo”, Business Standard, March 13, 2015,
https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/pm-modi-offers-alms-at-mahabodhi-society-incolombo-115031300294_1.html
20“India-Sri Lanka Cultural Relations”, High Commission of India - Colombo, Sri Lanka, July 1, 2021,
www.hcicolombo.gov.in/pages?id=eyJpdiI6Im5MVUxmVG83QVM4cFFwUG5GVWw0bmc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiSlRK
cW8rS1J5cXA5b2FBOVlaekU3dz09IiwibWFjIjoiODgwNjg3NDU0ZTgxYTYxN2JhM2YwZmFiZGNhZGU0MTliYTc5N
ThhMTMwYTA2ZTAwZGM1YTc3MjI1ZjU0MmJmNiJ9&subid=eyJpdiI6ImhTRTQ4T3BkbWlqeGJyc3VnMUtVZGc9
PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiYWlqOUxha3dhekFvN2RiOFNEenBqQT09IiwibWFjIjoiNjFmM2ZjZDQzY2M0ZTE5MDJlYzVmZGY
3NTBkOWM5M2IwMWZmMWE0YjI5MTViNzIxOWEyMTEwN2JlMjBmMzNkNSJ9
21

PIB Delhi, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Inaugurate Kushinagar International Airport On 20th October2021”,
Press
Information
Bureau,October
18,2021,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1764675
22”Promoting Connectivity, Catalysing Prosperity: India-Sri Lanka Economic Partnership Vision”, Ministry ofExternal Affairs, Government of India, July 21, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visitdetail.htm?36864/Promoting+Connectivity+Catalysing+Prosperity+IndiaSri+Lanka+Economic+Partnership+Visi
on
23

Ibid.

24

Sudha Ramchandran, “China’s Panicked Reaction to Sri Lanka’s Invitation to the Dalai Lama’, The Diplomat,
February 1, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/chinas-panicked-reaction-to-sri-lankas-invitation-to-thedalai-lama/
25

Shashank Mattoo, “Lack of funding, coordination hurt India’s soft power strategy, says panel”, Mint,
December 12, 2022, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/lack-of-funding-coordination-hurt-india-s-softpower-strategy-says-panel-11670852058957.html
26“China is spending billions to make the world love it”, The Economist, March 23, 2017,https://www.economist.com/china/2017/03/23/china-is-spending-billions-to-make-the-world-love-it
27

International Finance Corporation, “Investing in the Buddhist Circuit: Enhancing the Spiritual, Environmental,
Social, and Economic Value of the Places Visited by the Buddha in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, India.” World Bank
Group e-Library, March 2, 2017, https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/26096

31

28

Tim Doescher, “How China Is Taking Control of Hollywood”, The Heritage Foundation, December 14, 2018,https://www.heritage.org/asia/heritage-explains/how-china-taking-control-hollywood
29

Bill Gertz, “Hollywood spreading China propaganda: Report”, Washington Times, March 1, 2023,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/mar/1/hollywood-spreading-china-propaganda-report/

32

PART IIPRIORITIZING A PEOPLECENTRIC APPROACH

25

4. The Soft Power of Education: An Investment
Multiplier in India-Nepal Relations
Rahul Karan Reddy
The depth and range of India’s development assistance to Nepal presents several opportunities
for cultivating soft power. Outreach in the education sector is a particularly potent vector ofbuilding positive associations and favourable impressions of India. The education sector in
Nepal has received around 12 percent of total Official Development Assistance (ODA)
extended by India in 2017, which increased to just over 20 percent of total ODA by 2021.1 The
returns on increased investments into Nepal’s education sector for India’s soft power potential
are multifaceted and dynamic: it has the effect of cultivating positive perceptions of IndiaNepal relations among the youth of Nepal. Moreover, it multiplies the effect of development
aid by enhancing the quality of human resources, and thus boosts India’s image as Nepal’s
primary development partner. India was Nepal’s second largest ODA partner by country in2023, indicating India’s relevance to Nepal’s development. Shaping this perception of India,
among young Nepalis via education, is vital for India’s continued centrality in Nepal’s
development future.
India’s outreach to Nepal’s education sector takes three forms: support for infrastructure likeclassrooms, busses etc, scholarships and financial support for higher education and exchange
programs. Perhaps the most effective mechanism of India’s outreach in the education sector
has been the Small Development Project (SDP) scheme. Nearly 50 percent of the funds for the
SDP scheme have been spent on the education sector.2 The SDP has facilitated the completionof over 128 projects in the education sector since the inception of the scheme in 2003,
accounting for 63 percent of all projects.3 The simplicity of SDP design was diminished in2017, when the central government in Nepal curtailed powers of the Indian embassy in
Kathmandu to directly fund projects in Nepal. 4 Although the regulatory adjustment was achallenge to India’s soft power capabilities, New Delhi succeeded in convincing Kathmandu
to allow India to provide direct grants for projects. Moreover, the budget for each SDP wasincreased from Rs. 50 million to Rs. 240 million in December 2023, creating the space toexplore new avenues of strengthening Nepal’s education sector.5 Retaining the design of the
SDP scheme has preserved a successful template for demand-driven and performance-based
schemes. Continuing its implementation and taking advantage of its expanded scale is crucial
for cultivating India’s soft power via Nepal’s education sector.
Expanding Educational Interaction and Exchange: India as a Preferred Destination
Nearly one-third of all foreign students in India are from Nepal; In 2021-22, around 13,000
Nepali students came to India for higher education, accounting for 28 percent of all foreign
students.6 There are on average, around 65,000 Nepali students in India at any time, nearly 10
times more than the number of Nepali students in China. 7 India has traditionally been thepreferred destination for young Nepalis to access education opportunities, and continues toremain prominent in that regard. In 2016, India was the second most preferred education
34

destination, after Australia, for Nepali students to pursue tertiary education. But by 2022, Japan
overtook India as the second most preferred destination for Nepalis pursuing tertiary
education.8 To preserve India’s primacy as the preferred destination for higher education in
Nepal, greater investments into India-Nepal education exchanges are necessary.9 This could beundertaken by concentrating efforts in education exchange programs.
Education opportunities for students and teachers in Nepal and India can be significantly
expanded. A study by Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) found that over 60 percent ofinternational students in India are enrolled in just 10 out of the 274 universities that reported
having international students. 10 Given the concentration of Nepali students in a few Indian
universities in Karnataka, Punjab, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, increasing the number ofuniversities that Nepali students can access is a positive first step. 11 In this regard, provisions
relating to foreign students in the New Education Policy (NEP) are a welcome move. The
provision to increase the number of supernumerary seats by 25 percent will increase the intake
of foreign students at the undergraduate and post graduate level, which is likely to benefit
Nepali students given their numbers in India’s education sector.12 But simply increasing thenumber of seats for foreign students only leverages the push factors that affect the decision of
Nepali students, not necessarily the pull factors.13 Indian Universities will also have to enhancetheir appeal and appear as lucrative alternatives for Nepali students, compared to Westerneducation institutions.
Indian Universities could also explore expansion of study abroad programs, which havetypically been oriented to Western universities. Initiating study abroad or student exchange
programs with universities in Nepal can expand the extent of people-to-people ties between
India and Nepal. These opportunities are likely to make the study abroad experience moreaccessible to students in India, given the lower costs of studying and living in Nepal for Indians.
Conversely, greater numbers of students in Nepal can avail the benefits of Indian education
through semester-abroad programs. Moreover, given India and Nepal’s shared cultural
heritage, leveraging the cultural and social ties in the pursuit of developing deeper educational
linkages is possible. This can mean establishing more Nepal studies centres within universities
and academic institutions in India, which will produce academics studying Nepal. Presently,
there are three main places in India where social science research on Nepal is conducted –Banaras Hindu University, Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Jaipur.14 Increasing
the number of such centres is likely to incentivise more students and academics in Nepal tofocus on India and pursue employment in Indian institutions. Overall, the soft power potentialof such educational exchanges is significant for India’s ability to project a positive andconstructive image, which can echo across generations.
Additionally, the India-Nepal bilateral relationship is built on robust cultural heritage andpeople-to-people ties that offer several opportunities to enhance India’s soft power in Nepal.
For instance, traditional modes of education like gurukul schools and Sanskrit language studies
can be invigorated to cultivate unique soft power capacities. Recently, Indian and Nepalesescholars at the Nepal-India International Sanskrit Conclave in Kathmandu proposed to hold anInternational Sanskrit Conference annually, which would also include the establishment of a35

study centre for conducting in-depth research and publication of Sanskrit scriptures. 15
Supporting such ventures would greatly enhance India’s image as custodian of Himalayan
cultures, Buddhism and Sanskrit. The proposed study centre would research nearly five lakh
unpublished Sanskrit manuscripts preserved at Nepal’s Department of Archaeology, which
would enrich the depth of India-Nepal cultural connections and contemporary relations.
Technical Assistance and Education
Given the role India plays in Nepal’s overall development, technical education in specificsectors is greatly sought after and a highly underutilised channel of education linkages. India
is ranked 11th in the list of largest providers of Technical Assistance to Nepal, providing only
USD 0.2 million in 2022. Of India’s total ODA disbursed to Nepal in 2022 (USD 59 million),technical assistance accounted only for 0.33 percent.16 In comparison to India’s ODA profile,multilateral agencies practice a much more balanced outreach framework.
Technical assistance greatly enhances the channels via which educational and training could
be extended to form linkages in the development sector. For example, Nepal lacks the humanresources to operate trains and has employed Indian workers from the Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited (KRCL).17 India has repeatedly promised to build capacity by training
workers who work at the Nepal Railways. However, the workers in Nepal Railways aretemporary workers and as a result, Nepal is unable to send workers for training. The lack oftrained railway engineers has impaired the functioning of the Kurtha-Bijalapura cross-borderrailway, which blunts the impact of cross-border trade facilitation initiatives between India and
Nepal. Addressing this shortcoming through greater investments into offering technicaleducation to Nepalese workers is necessary to unlock not just the potential of education-based
soft power but also maximise the soft power impact of overall development outreach.
The growing number of training positions available for Nepal under the Indian Technical andEconomic Cooperation (ITEC) initiative is a positive sign. More than 440 slots were madeavailable to Nepal in 2023, the highest ever, providing training for administrators, railway
officials, agriculturalists and parliamentary officials. 18 An emerging area of focus withintechnical cooperation is engineering, specifically hydro engineering. Given India and Nepal’s
expanding cooperation in the domain of hydroelectricity, there is likely to be a large demandfor engineers in the domain of hydrology and water resource management. Addressing thisdemand by providing more slots for hydrology-related engineering students within the ITEC
framework can generate dividends for both sides. Technical training can also be targeted atteachers in Nepal, who make direct contributions to the availability and quality of education in
Nepal. So far, Indian initiatives to train teachers below the K-12 level in Nepal are largely
undertaken by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These efforts can be supplemented
by initiatives from institutions like the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) andTechnical Teachers Training Institutes.
The groundwork to establish technical education institutions in Nepal has already been laid by
India, and can be further built up. The Manmohan Memorial Polytechnic, which wasestablished in 2009 is one of the best institutes in Nepal and provides vocational courses in the36

engineering stream. The Nepal Bharat Maitri Polytechnic at Hetauda is another example oftechnical institutes that have been supported by Indian faculty, finance and know-how. 19
Supporting and developing technical education institutions can be undertaken more extensively
by private Indian universities too. A wider push by Indian universities to establish campuses in
Nepal will augment government efforts to make education more accessible and available. For
instance, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras has proposed the establishment of acampus in Nepal and Tanzania.20 While the campus in Tanzania has been operational for sometime now, its progress has been stalled in Nepal. Given the significance of Nepal to India’s
regional interests in South Asia, expanding Indian educational enterprises in Nepal ought to be
incentivised by the Indian government.
Enhancing Visibility and Promoting Viability
A simple and elegant way of enhancing the visibility of India’s assistance to Nepal’s education
sector is by marking its outreach with an emblem, motif or logo. Emblems and logos give
development outreach the appearance of being part of a clearly coordinated and unified
diplomatic strategy. For instance, China’s aid efforts are largely visible in Kathmandu, wheremost of its outreach is concentrated. Given India’s expansive footprint in Nepal’s education
sector in particular, wider inclusion of an emblem on school buildings and other infrastructure
will promote India’s contribution to developing quality human resources in Nepal.21 Althoughemblems of India’s assistance have been included on busses, ambulances and police vehicles
etc, they could also be included more widely on the numerous schools and other buildings thatIndia finances in districts across Nepal.
A very visible example of India’s soft power in Kathmandu is the India-Nepal Friendship
Library. Established in 1956, the library has for decades met the educational and culturalrequirements of students and academics interested in India. The library was the first foreign
library in Nepal and used to attract over 1,000 people per day in the 1980’s.22 Although thelibrary is packed with students and academics studying Hindi and Sanskrit, some withaspirations of studying in Indian universities, the number of daily visitors has dwindled toaround 300. The library could be expanded to include more floors and books, and possibly
establish more such libraries could be established outside the capital city as well. Given China’s
own initiative, Panda Book Corner, in multiple schools across Kathmandu, India could explore
the possibility of building a signature library network under one unified banner that
demonstrates New Delhi’s commitment to the education of Nepal’s youth.23 Moreover, theNational Knowledge Network promised by India, has been extended to countries in South Asia,
but Nepal does not appear to be part of the Network. 24 The expansion of such education
facilities financed or built by India in Nepal will support a positive association with India andeducation.
Conclusion
Enhancing India’s education sector outreach in Nepal for maximisation of soft power potential
is possible with a few basic modifications to India’s existing diplomatic strategy. In addition
to the measures and ideas proposed above, New Delhi could consider widening the dispersion
of education sector outreach. A handful of districts in Nepal currently receive the majority of37

aid for education from India. Although India has initiated at least one education project in every
district of Nepal, widening the dispersal of education aid could enlarge India’s image as
development partner across the multiple linguistic, ethnic and social groups in Nepal. Thisadjustment could also be mirrored by a similar approach to selecting project partners in Nepal
that provide education opportunities to underprivileged social groups. Additionally, New Delhi
could align its outreach with the School Sector Development Plan of Nepal (2022/23 –2031/32) to tailor its efforts to support the objectives of national development. These
adjustments could have the effect of further refining India’s soft power in Nepal.
Overall, the soft power of India’s education sector outreach has the potential to elevate its
bargaining power and cultivate diplomatic and political goodwill. Crucially, efforts to project
India as a reliable development partner invested in Nepal’s growth can not only repair, but also
elevate New Delhi’s image in Nepal. By positioning India as a primary destination for
education services, the most visible and significant provider of education facilities and an agentof human development for prosperity, New Delhi benefits from being the primary actor in
Nepal’s development future and also a beneficiary of positive and stable bilateral relations at
the political and people-to-people level.
ENDNOTES

1Ministry of Finance, “Nepal Development Partner Profile Book”, International Economic Cooperation
Coordination
Division,
MinistryofFinance,
Governmentof
Nepal,
2022,
pp14,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/1667454524_Donor%20Profile.pdf
2

Embassy of India, Kathmandu, “Being Together Growing Together”, Embassy of India, Kathmandu, 2008,https://www.indembkathmandu.gov.in/docs/nepal.pdf
3

Tanu Goyal, “The role and changing paradigm of India's Assistance to Nepal: Case of the education sector”,
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), Working Paper No. 377,
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/203711/1/1667880640.pdf
4IANS, “Nepal brings India's small project grants under regulatory regime”, The Quint, July 10, 2018,https://www.thequint.com/hotwire-text/nepal-brings-india-s-small-project-grants-under-regulatoryregime#read-more
5

Anil Giri, “India for hiking budget for each small project in Nepal to Rs.240 million”, The Kathmandu Post,
December 6, 2023, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2023/12/06/india-for-hiking-budget-for-each-smallproject-in-nepal-to-rs240million#:~:text=At%20a%20time%20when%20China%20and%20the%20US,from%20the%20current%20Rs50%
20million%20to%20Rs240%20million
6

Hindustan Times Education Desk, “AISHE report: 46k foreign students enrolled in India, majority in UG courses”,
Hindustan Times, January 26, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/education/news/aishe-report-46kforeign-students-enrolled-in-india-majority-in-ug-courses-101706263981928.html
7

Akhilesh Upadhyay, “Nepali Students in China: A Source of Soft Power for Beijing?”, Centre for Social andEconomic Progress, May 3, 2023, https://csep.org/reports/nepali-students-in-china-a-source-of-soft-power-forbeijing/38

8Institute for Statistics, “Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students”, UNESCO, https://uis.unesco.org/en/uisstudent-flow
9Constantino Xavier, Aakashi Chaba & Geetika Dang, “Is India Still The Neighbourhood’s Education Hub?”,
Brookings Institution India Centre, New Delhi, March 2020, pp 8, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Is-India-still-the-neighbourhood%E2%80%99s-education-hub-1.pdf
10Kavita A. Sharma, “Internationalisation of Higher Education: An Aspect of India’s Foreign Relations”, In ‘Trends
in Internationalization of Higher Education in India’, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) & Association of Indian
Universities(AIU),
45-58,
https://ciihighereducation.in/pdf/reportsfeed/Trends%20in%20Inter%20Higher%20Education.pdf
11

Press Trust of India, “India gets maximum foreign students from Nepal, Karnataka favourite for higher
education”,
The
EconomicTimes,
September
24,
2019,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/education/india-gets-maximum-foreign-studentsfrom-nepal-karnataka-favourite-for-higher-education-hrd-ministry-data/articleshow/71273415.cms?from=mdr
12

University Grants Commission, “Guidelines for Admission and Supernumerary seats of International Students
in Undergraduate and Postgraduate Programmes in Higher Educational Institutions in India”, Ministry of
Education, Government of India, September 30, 2022, https://www.ugc.gov.in/pdfnews/2145333_Guidelinesfor-Admssion-and-Supernumerary-seats-of-International_001.pdf
13

Shuriah Niazi, “25% extra places, No Entrance Exams for Foreign Students”, University World News, September
8, 2022, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220908135611809
14

Pratyoush Onta, “Nepal, India and Area Studies”, Himal South Asian, January 1, 2002,
https://www.himalmag.com/comment/nepal-india-and-area-studies
15

Press Trust of India, “Nepal-India Sanskrit Scholars Propose Annual International Conference, Study Centre”,
Times of India, April 1, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/nepal-india-sanskritscholars-propose-annual-international-conference-study-centre/articleshow/108932856.cms
16

Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, “Development Cooperation Report 2021/22”, International
Economic Cooperation Coordination Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2023, pp 77,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/1701128326_DCR%20Report%202022R.pdf
17

Prithvi Man Shrestha, “Nepal aims to expand railway network but lacks essential staff”, Kathmandu Times,
January 25, 2024, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/01/25/nepal-aims-to-expand-railway-networkbut-lacks-essential-staff
18

News on AIR, “59th ITEC Day Celebrated In Kathmandu To Recognise Strides Made In India-Nepal CapacityBuilding Partnership”, All India Radio, March 23, 2024, https://newsonair.gov.in/59th-itec-day-celebrated-inkathmandu-to-recognise-strides-made-in-india-nepal-capacity-buildingpartnership/#:~:text=In%20the%20year%202023%2D2024,Hydrology%2C%20Irrigation%20Water%20Manage
ment%20etc
19

Rachana Koirala, “Foreign Aid in Nepal: A Case Study of India”, Central Department of Economics, Tribhuvan
University Central Library, 2019, pp 56, https://elibrary.tucl.edu.np/handle/123456789/16851
20

Shuriah Niazi, “Sri Lanka campus is latest in IIT internationalisation drive”, University World News, January 19,
2024, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20240119140015596
21

Rahul Karan Reddy, “A Survey of Public Opinion in Nepal: India And China in Competition”, Organisation for
Research on China and Asia, August 3, 2023, https://orcasia.org/article/376/a-survey-of-public-opinion-innepal-india-and-china-in-competition

39

22

Dil Bahadur Basnet, “Historical Glimpses Of Nepal Bharat Library”, Spotlight Nepal, March 23, 2018,https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2018/03/23/historical-glimpses-nepal-bharat-library/23

Huaxia, “China launches Panda Book Corner Library Project in Nepali Schools”, December 8, 2018, Xinhua
News, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/08/c_137659198.htm
24

Cchavi Vasisht, “Can SAARC be revived?”, Hindustan Times, Marchhttps://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-insight/international-affairs/can-saarc-be-revived101710497543499.html

40

15,

2024,

5. A Case for the Afghan Diaspora in Enhancing
India’s Soft Power
Monish Tourangbam and Swati Sinha
In recent times, soft power has undoubtedly emerged to become an inevitable constituent of acountry’s foreign policy toolkit. The lexicon of international relations, too, has begun torecognise the reliability of using the elements of political and cultural values besides the
traditional means of using hard power to influence the behaviour of other states and non-state
actors. It is not to suggest that the efficacy of military power as a tool of statecraft has waned
significantly. A state, in order to function and navigate its way in a complex geopolitical andgeo-economic environment, would require a combination of many forms of power, and in that
pursuit, the use of non-military or non-coercive means has become imperative.1 A country like
India that aspires to become a global leader by projecting inclusiveness and non-aggressivenessas primary undercurrents of international affairs will need to leverage its vast array ofcivilizational soft power resources, to help steer regional and global cooperation.
Particularly in its neighbourhood, the influence of India’s soft power has been organic throughhistorical, cultural and people-to-people ties. However, how New Delhi manoeuvres its policies
in lieu of its national interest and the preservation of goodwill among the people of its region
is a task cut out. In the case of South Asia, India’s development assistance to a war-torn
Afghanistan in the last two decades and its policy, characterized by a people-centric approach,has been noteworthy. The Taliban takeover and the ongoing uncertainties have posed serious
challenges and limitations to maintaining continuity and taking the next steps in India’s ties
with the people of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, New Delhi remains steadfast and committed toputting the Afghan people first and foremost while negotiating the new complexities in
Afghanistan. This includes the well-being and progress of the sizeable Afghan diaspora in
India.
Afghan Migration to India: Causes and Consequences
The migration of Afghans is not a new phenomenon and is attributed to almost half a century
of conflict inflicted on the country leading to voluntary and involuntary displacement of its
population. Employment, education and, the desire for a better life are reasons for voluntary
migration and only account for a small percentage (elitist) of the Afghan diaspora. Whereas
most of the migration (involuntarily) has been caused by years of conflict and has become aprominent element of Afghanistan’s modern history.2 The political instability in Afghanistan
has been at the heart of South Asia’s security environment and the recent Taliban takeover
amidst the hasty withdrawal of the United States has unleashed a new phase of uncertainty anda humanitarian crisis. Beyond the state-to-state official relationship or the lack of it due tochanging political dispensations in Afghanistan, the socio-cultural ties between India andAfghanistan have been deep and the people-to-people interactions have seen a continuity, albeit
coupled with challenges. Therefore, India’s soft power in Afghanistan is linked to the goodwill
obtained through centuries of proximity to the people, also immortalized by Nobel Laureate
Rabindranath Tagore in Kabuliwallah.3
41
25

In modern times, India has witnessed various phases of the Afghan refugee movement(triggered initially by political instability in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in 1979)
and then due to beginning of the Taliban regime in 1996. More than 1.6 million Afghans havefled the country since 2021, bringing the total number of Afghans in neighbouring countries to
8.2 million - accounting for one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world.”4
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are
currently 19,388 Afghan refugees in India excluding Afghan students and former Afghan
military personnel.5
Moreover, after the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, India’s extended support towards
the Afghan people and government solidified in the post-conflict state-building efforts andvarious people-centric development initiatives. New Delhi had invested in the pursuit of an‘Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled’ transition and emerged as one of thebiggest civilian donors in the war-torn country. Since 2001, in post-Taliban Afghanistan, India
committed nearly 3 billion USD towards humanitarian assistance, infrastructure development
and rebuilding governance capacity with a special focus on human resource development.6
The goodwill that India as a country and Indians had developed among Afghans was wellknown and well recognized on both sides. The most significant, among other efforts, has beenbuilding institutional capacities and advancement of knowledge exchange offered by the IndianCouncil for Cultural Relations (ICCR).7 Secondly, India has a long history of training Afghan
administrative and defence personnel at the National Defence Academy (NDA). Moreover,infrastructural support in the form of dams, hospitals, electricity grids, amongst otherinitiatives, were overwhelmingly welcomed as long-term and sustainable assistance to thepeople of Afghanistan.8
Although the geopolitical environment did pose challenges for India’s exercise of its soft powerin Afghanistan, the positive arc in the relationship has been undeniable.9 It is therefore essential
to leverage the favourable aspects of this relationship based on mutual trust and friendship.
Certainly, the return of the Taliban regime in 2021 has disrupted the nature of the partnershipthat had emerged between New Delhi and Kabul, which focuses on the growth anddevelopment of the Afghan people. However, such constraints and limitations should nothinder the human-centric approach to India’s ties with Afghanistan. In this context, the paper
attempts to highlight the state of affairs for the Afghan diaspora in the aftermath of the U.S.
withdrawal and the subsequent Taliban takeover and assess the case for enhancing India’s soft
power potential, by working for the interest of the Afghan diaspora, while navigating its
pragmatic goals in the current political dynamics of Afghanistan.
State of Afghan Diaspora in the Aftermath of U.S. Withdrawal
The Afghan refugee crisis has intensified around the world after the U.S. withdrew fromAfghanistan. Currently, Afghanistan’s displacement crisis is the third largest in the world.10
The further consolidation of power by the Taliban has only added to the already worsened
atmosphere. However, this unfolding humanitarian crisis is not a new phenomenon in a country
like Afghanistan, which has continued to face challenges posed by both internal and external
forces, to the detriment of the Afghan populace. For instance, over the last four decades in42which Afghanistan has faced some conflict or instability, “an estimated 28.3 million Afghans- two-thirds of the population, including women and girls - are in need of humanitarian andprotection assistance.”11 The ongoing challenges faced by Afghan refugees are the highest withpeople facing acute hunger, which falls under the emergency level. There are 15.5 million
Afghans facing food insecurity, while 2.7 million are in danger of starvation—the depletion isdue to restrictions on working women.12
The crisis classifies as an emergency, calling for immediate action as the given situation
happens to be a step away from famine. Years of conflict, recurrent drought, and the COVID19 pandemic have contributed to high levels of food insecurity in Afghanistan. Additionally,
the Afghan conflict has left a huge impact on the women and children who are out of school—a major setback to the hard-earned human rights and other societal progress made in the past
decade or so. The resultant scale of the humanitarian crisis is truly a matter of concern not onlyin the neighbourhood but also for the international community as a whole. Repeateddisplacements have caused disruptions and the conflict has led Afghans to move out of their
homeland in search of safe havens in their neighbouring states including India.
Exploring India’s Potential Soft Power Approach
India has direct stakes in Afghanistan in terms of infrastructural investment and humanitarianaid. India has continued its support to the Afghans in the form of humanitarian aid, wheat, andmedicine shipments. According to figures reported last year, these supplies include 47,500
metric tonnes of wheat to United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) centres acrossAfghanistan, 1,100 units of female hygiene kits, blankets and medical assistance to United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Kabul and various other items under medical
aid.13 As a result, ensuring the well-being of the Afghan people is a rational pursuit of India’s
foreign policy, in general, and the projection of its benevolent influence in its immediate andextended neighbourhood. What transpires in terms of internal political convulsions in
Afghanistan, and the strategic designs of external players there, might be beyond India’s
control, but the enviable goodwill that India and Indians have generated among the people ofAfghanistan and its diaspora through its development-oriented and human-centric policies isworth cementing. India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar recently commented that an Indian
technical team had been sent to Afghanistan to essentially “monitor the situation” and see how
India could “support the people of Afghanistan.” According to him, India’s focus currently in
Afghanistan is less political, and more on helping the Afghan people.14
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, India’s Foreign Minister
Jaishankar had commented that India’s immediate concern was ensuring security in
Afghanistan arising from its concerns for the Afghan people. Unsurprisingly, the Taliban
seizing power in Afghanistan and the resultant displacement of Afghans in the past two years
has posed inherent challenges to India’s outreach to the Afghan people. India’s no-recognitionand no-endorsement policy towards the Taliban while engaging technically shows New Delhi’s
intent to find pragmatic traction with the Taliban, with the purpose of eventually finding ways
to assist the Afghan people inside and outside Afghanistan.15

43

At the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) briefing in September 2023, Ambassador
Ruchira Kamboj, India’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations reaffirmed thecountry’s dedicated support to the people of Afghanistan. 16 The permanent closure of
Afghanistan’s Embassy in New Delhi, for several reasons best known to the policymakers, hasraised many speculations.17 However, drawing upon India’s historical and civilizational ties
with the Afghan people, India is committed to supporting Afghanistan steadfastly.
Education stands out in any soft power approach and previously it has worked favourably for
India in building trust and good relations with Afghanistan. Given the current restrictions
imposed by the Taliban on banning women’s education and other rights, India has opened
scholarships for Afghan students. To further support Afghan students, and as a capacitybuilding initiative, the ICCR has offered 1000 more scholarships for Undergraduate andPostgraduate courses for 2023-24.18 Presently, the courses offered to Afghan students in India
are comprehensive, ranging from Science and Technology to Humanities. Under thisscholarship from ICCR, courses will be held online, and it will present an opportunity for
Afghan students amidst the challenges posed by the Taliban restricting education. In the
coming times, more streamlining and customization of courses offered to Afghan students may
be undertaken for the benefit of their employability, and commensurate with the requirementsof a digital era.
Furthermore, political analysts in India are of the view that negotiations with regional partners
could have a positive impact on the situation in Afghanistan, furthering the protection of the
Afghan diaspora in India and other countries.19 The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan andthe Taliban’s continued repression of women and girls are the issues that are of utmost concern
and must be brought up as leveraging points during any negotiation (formal and informal) with
the Taliban regime. The international community including India has maintained a pragmatic
approach towards dealing with the Taliban.20 However, they must respond to the elements of
Afghan society, urgently engage with the international community and show adequate
responses to calls for basic standards of human rights and the pursuit of an inclusive
Afghanistan. India can take up the issue of constructive engagement of the Afghan diaspora innation building efforts during consultations at several platforms and relevant regionalorganizations.
Conclusion
The strength of India’s soft power in Afghanistan lies in the goodwill that it managed togenerate through its historical and cultural linkages as well as the kind of civilian assistance it
provided during the reconstruction post-2001. The connection that India has had over the years,
developed with the people of Afghanistan, is the envy of many other countries. Despite thepolitical and security upheavals in Afghanistan, India has been sheltering the Afghan diaspora
and has expressed the intention to focus on helping the people of Afghanistan irrespective of
the inherent challenges. India’s challenge will lie in navigating and managing its engagementwith diverse sections of this diaspora for the development and progress of the Afghan people.
Undertaking and achieving such a diplomatic tightrope walk while simultaneously engaging
with the Taliban in Kabul for pragmatic reasons will be a daunting task for Indian diplomacy.
The immense contribution that the diaspora can make to the future of Afghanistan can only be
44

ignored at the expense of the country’s inclusive growth and development. Last but not least,as limited as they might be, by broadening its engagements with like-minded regional actors,
India will be able to contribute towards finding a common ground for Afghanistan’s future andfurther enhancing its own soft power.

ENDNOTES

1

JosephNye,“SoftPower”,
Foreign
Policy
no.
80,
1990,
153-171,https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/page/joseph_nye_soft_power_journal.pdf2

Mirwais Balkhi, “The Constructive and Destructive Role of Afghanistan’s Diaspora”, Wilson Center, September
18, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/constructive-and-destructive-role-afghanistans-diaspora
3

Christopher Finnigan, “The Kabuliwala represents a dilemma between the state and migratory history of theworld - Shah Mahmoud Hanifi”, London School of Economics, October 29, 2018,https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/10/29/the-kabuliwala-represents-a-dilemma-between-the-territorialethos-of-the-nation-state-and-the-migratory-history-of-the-world-professor-shah-mahmoud-hanifi/
4“Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained”, United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), July 18, 2023,
https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/#Displaced
5

Shivangi Seth and Stuti Bhatnagar, “Uncertain Haven: Afghan Refugees in India”, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute - The Strategist, March 23, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/uncertain-haven-afghan-refugeesin-india/
6

Rakesh Sood, “Redefining India’s role in Afghanistan”, Observer Research Foundation, November 27, 2021,
https://www.orfonline.org/research/redefining-indias-role-in-afghanistan ; ANI, “India invested more than $3
billion in Afghanistan: MoS Muraleedharan”, Business Standard, February 5, 2022, https://www.businessstandard.com/article/current-affairs/india-invested-more-than-3-billion-in-afghanistan-mos-muraleedharan122020500307_1.html
7

Chayanika Saxena, “India’s developmental partnership in Afghanistan: Here to stay or to go?”, Observer
Research Foundation, October 7, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-developmentalpartnership-in-afghanistan-here-to-stay-or-to-go
8

Rani D. Mullen, “India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development Assistance by Emerging Donors to ConflictAffected Countries”, Stimson Center, August 2017, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/fileattachments/India%20in%20Afghanistan%20Understanding%20Development%20Assistance%20by%20Emergi
ng%20Donors%20to%20Conflict-Affected%20Countries_0.pdf
9Abdul Rahman Rahmani, “India’s soft power is very effective in Afghanistan”, Hindustan Times, January 25,
2019,https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-s-soft-power-is-very-effective-in-afghanistan/story1db4KfSkgoQYO7xM08LaVP.html
10Thon John Majok, “Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis: The Plight of Afghan Refugees”, Wilson Center, August 29,
2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/audio/ongoing-humanitarian-crisis-plight-afghan-refugees

45

11

See Note 4

12

Suhasini Haider, “Worldview with Suhasini Haider | 2 years of Taliban | Is India and the world enabling theirregime?”, The Hindu, August 18, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/worldview-withsuhasini-haidar-2-years-of-taliban-is-india-and-the-world-enabling-their-regime/article67209979.ece
13

Sayantani Biswas, “India continues wheat, medical aid in Afghanistan, shipments routed via Iran’s Chabahar
port: Report”, Mint, August 18, 2023, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-continues-wheat-medicalaid-in-afghanistan-shipments-routed-via-irans-chabahar-port-report-11692377654398.html
14

Asian News International, “India's focus right now in Afghanistan is more on helping Afghan people, lesspolitical: Jaishankar”, Times of India, June 8, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indias-focus-rightnow-in-afghanistan-is-more-on-helping-afghan-people-less-politicaljaishankar/articleshow/100848773.cms?from=mdr
15

Sushant Sareen, “India’s outreach to the Taliban: Engage, don’t endorse”, Observer Research Foundation, June
8, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-outreach-to-the-taliban
16

Asian News International, “Will Continue to Raise Voice In Support of Afghanistan: India At UN”, NDTV World,
September
27,
2023,
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/will-continue-to-raise-voice-in-support-ofafghanistan-india-at-un-4427364
17

Alka Jain, “Why Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi has ceased its operations? Explained”, The Mint, October
1,2023,
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/why-afghanistan-embassy-in-new-delhi-has-ceased-itsoperations-explained-11696141542320.html
18

Fidel Rahmati, “India offers 1,000 scholarships to Afghan students for 2023-24”, The Khaama Press News
Agency, September 17, 2023, https://www.khaama.com/india-offers-1000-scholarships-to-afghan-studentsfor-202324/#:~:text=India%20remains%20steadfast%20in%20its,helping%20hand%20to%20Afghan%20nationals
19

Imran Danish, “West to Visit Japan, UAE, India to Discuss Afghanistan: State Dept”, Tolo News, December 1,
2022, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-180996
20

Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Afghanistan’s Future Depends on Taliban’s Engagement with World,
But Restrictions on Women Signal Lack of International Commitments, Briefer Warns Security Council”, United
Nations, September 27, 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15038.doc.htm

46

6. The Role of Human Resource Development inIndia-Bhutan Relations
Debasish Nandy
Being a landlocked country with difficult topographical and climate conditions, Bhutan has
long been facing the challenge of limited economic growth and unemployment. While thecountry’s universal education and healthcare policies have improved the quality of the
population and increased the labor force, a mismatch in the job market’s demand and supply
continues to prevail. Bhutan’s economy is largely labour-driven. However, due to a lack of
educational facilities and infrastructure, Bhutanese youths have begun to move abroad. Since
2021, around 11,000 Bhutanese students have gone to Australia in search of a better future. 1
Here, India, as a part of its generous neighborhood policy, can play a crucial role by providing
more attention to the capacity building of Bhutanese youths, to make human resources of
Bhutan more productive and prevent ‘brain drain’ from Bhutan. 2 The flow of Bhutanese
students to India can be beneficial as approximately 4,000 students hailing from Bhutan havetaken the initiative to independently fund their undergraduate studies in various Indian
universities.3 In 2023, 18 percent of the Bhutanese students were studying abroad.4 The flowof the Bhutanese students in India will enhance people-to-people contact and these educatedBhutanese students will lead Bhutan in the near future and they can cultivate a pro-India
approach. Educational engagements would help to change perception among the people. This
paper attempts to explore the role of human resource development in the India-Bhutan
relationship.
India’s Public Diplomacy with Bhutan
The objective of public diplomacy is to enhance and leverage the soft power of a nation for its
own benefit.5 Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes byattraction rather than coercion or payment. 6 India utilizes public diplomacy to promote its
cultural images, ideas, values, goods, and practices abroad, aiming to achieve political andeconomic objectives, enhance national pride, and national security. India's cultural identity isa crucial tool for expressing its image and identity, and its interactions with other Asian
countries have always had a strong cultural component.7 India has employed public diplomacy
as a tactic to reduce barriers to its ascent to great power status, and it employs various strategies
to carry out public diplomacy in Bhutan, including strong cultural exchanges and personal
relationships.8
India has a long history of providing humanitarian relief to its neighbors, particularly Bhutan.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, India sent medical supplies and financial support to
Bhutan to combat the pandemic's economic effects. As a part of the ‘vaccine diplomacy’,
Bhutan received over 1,50,000 dosages of COVID-vaccines from India.9
A Background of India-Bhutan Relations

47
25

Bhutan has maintained a long-standing cultural and religious relationship with India since
many centuries. Bhutan was under the protection of the British during their rule, and in 1910,
the Bhutanese King and British India signed the Treaty of Punakha. India's involvement in
Bhutan's affairs continued with the establishment of the Political Officer of India in Sikkim,
who also oversaw India's relations with Bhutan for a significant period. In 1949, the "Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation" was signed, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister ofIndia at the time adopted a supportive foreign policy towards Bhutan.
Full diplomatic relations between Bhutan and India were solidified in 1971, with India playing
a crucial role in securing Bhutan's admission to the United Nations General Assembly in thesame year. Since the late 1950s, the Bhutanese king has strived to establish Bhutan's
independence from India, rather than relying too heavily on its support. India, on the other
hand, has consistently supported Bhutan's democratic endeavors. Over the years, there havebeen significant high-level visits between the two nations. In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, during his first term, made Bhutan the destination of his inaugural foreign trip as part ofthe "Neighbourhood First Policy." Similarly, in January 2024, Prime Minister Tshering, upon
his election, made his first international call to India, highlighting the importance of therelationship.
Bhutanese Students in Indian Institutions
According to the Centre for Bhutan Studies & Gross National Happiness (GNH) Research, thedomain that contributes the least to the value of GNH in Bhutan is education.10 This fact raises
concerns in a country that places significant importance on education. The delayed approval of
the National Education Policy was identified by participants as one of the primary reasons forthe perception among the Bhutanese people that education's contribution to GNH is
insufficient. The examination and evaluation of all Bhutanese policies to ensure alignment with
GNH is the responsibility of the GNH Commission Secretariat. Tobden and Ham, in theirrecent study, argued that the approval process delay of the National Education Policy in Bhutan
has resulted in a lack of clear direction for teachers in the country. 11 Due to such failures indomestic policy, Bhutan needs India’s assistance in this regard.
India has been assisting and cooperating with Bhutan by offering many scholarships andfellowships in various sectors. Cultural exchange programs are also going on between the twocountries to enhance mutual understanding. Undoubtedly, the cultural exchange programs
between India and Bhutan enable the Bhutanese students to gather information about various
education opportunities in India. India has the potential to provide assistance to Bhutan in theareas of education and skill enhancement through the implementation of training programs
aimed at enhancing the professional capabilities of Bhutanese workers. Additionally, India can
extend scholarships to students from Bhutan, thereby enabling them to pursue their educational
aspirations.
A pivotal element in maintaining the cultural bonds between Bhutan and India is the NehruWangchuck Cultural Centre, which operates under the umbrella of Indian Council for Cultural
Relations (ICCR).12 Bhutan is treated as an important neighbour in India’s “NeighbourhoodFirst Policy.” 13 As a prominent neighbouring country, India has always been the prime48

destination for Bhutanese Students. Before the COVID-19, pandemic, approximately 4,000
Bhutanese students are believed to be financing their undergraduate studies at Indian
universities independently.14 India is currently providing a total of 90 fully funded scholarships
in various professional fields, such as Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS),
engineering, Bachelor of Legislative Law (LLB), Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) in Nursing, B.Sc.
(Agriculture), Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS), and others, to deserving Bhutanese students.
Furthermore, India annually offers a significant number of fully financed postgraduate
scholarships to Bhutanese students, allowing them to pursue their chosen field of study.
A decade ago, Bhutanese students constituted 7 percent of the total international student
population in India.15 In the past decade, a considerable number of Bhutanese individuals havechosen to depart from their homeland and embark on international journeys for various reasons.
Notably, Australia has emerged as a favored destination among many Bhutanese citizens,
offering lucrative opportunities to amass wealth and acquire real estate, alongside Canada,
China and select Middle Eastern nations.16 The relative decline in the number of Bhutanese
students choosing to study in India indicates the decline of India’s importance as an education
destination for them. To address this issue, New Delhi has recently implemented several
strategies to promote India as an attractive choice for Bhutanese students, in response to asteady decline in enrollment over the past decade and the growing popularity of Australia as
an alternative destination. The Union Ministry of Education's All-India Survey on Higher
Education (AISHE) data reveals a decrease in the number of Bhutanese students pursuing
higher education in India, dropping from 2,468 in the academic year 2012–13 to 1,827 in 2020–
21.17
India also provides an Ambassadorial Scholarship to Bhutanese students. In the context of theaforementioned information, it has been officially declared by the Indian Embassy that
Bhutanese students who are currently pursuing their education in Indian institutions, anduniversities will be granted the prestigious Ambassador's Scholarship for the academic year2022-2023.18 The Ambassador's Scholarship has been awarded to a total of 1058 Bhutanese
students who have successfully met the eligibility criteria set forth by the program. This number
reflects an increase of 59 students in comparison to the previous fiscal year, 2021-2022.19 India
also provides twenty fully-funded ICCR scholarships to students from Bhutan each year. Thesestudents are admitted to reputed Indian engineering institutes as part of this program. The
Department of Adult and Higher Education (DAHE), Ministry of Education, RGoB,
recommends the Government of India to offer scholarships based on the students' Class XII
merit rating. In 2020, during his visit to Bhutan, Prime Minister Modi announced that theannual value of the "Nehru-Wangchuck Scholarship" would be increased to Rs. 2 crores.20
Capacity Building Measures Towards Bhutanese People
India has taken several measures for the capacity-building of Bhutanese students. In 2023, theIndian government had arranged a training Programme Scheme for Bhutanese students. Every
year, India provides 300 training slots under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation(ITEC) program. For the up-gradation of Bhutanese students in administrative and technicalfields, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) had shown interest to invest Rs. 10,000 crores to49

develop an “Economic City” in Bhutan. 21 Under this scheme, the trainee is provided withairfare, tuition fees, accommodation, and allowance by the Government of India (GoI). Indian
education is highly favored by Bhutanese students, which forms the foundation for strong
bilateral relations between the two countries.22
In September 2023, to enhance good governance, Bhutanese officials underwent remotesensing technology training provided by experts from Indian Space Research Organization(ISRO). 23 The objective of this training program was to equip the officials with technicalknowledge on the potential applications of remote sensing for the benefit of the Bhutanese
population. Consequently, Bhutan can now leverage the capabilities of remote sensing due totraining with ISRO. The month of September 2023 witnessed the visit of ISRO experts to
Thimpu, where they shared their technical expertise on the utilization of remote sensing
applications to assist the people of Bhutan.24 The training program, spanning five days, wasattended by officials from the Royal Government of Bhutan and was led by specialists fromthe Indian Institute of Remote Sensing (IIRS), the Space Applications Centre (SAC), and the
National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC). This initiative is considered as a very effective toolfor India’s soft diplomacy to Bhutan. India also helps the Bhutanese government personnel inadministrative capacity-building. In February 2023, the government of Bhutan sent five civil
servants for an induction program. Both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding(MoU), whereby India agreed to provide training to the Bhutanese selected civil servants by
the veteran Indian Revenue Officers.25
The Role of Civil Society and Soft Power
Improving the bilateral relationship between Bhutan and India can be significantly enhancedby the involvement of civil society. In the past few years, Bhutanese citizens expressed anegative opinion of Indians due to various reasons, including the removal of petroleum productsubsidies26 and India's failure to provide Bhutan with the COVID-19 vaccine on time.27 India's
civil society has been providing support to Bhutan since its democratic transition in 2008.28 In
contrast, Bhutan lacks a well-established civil society, which has hindered the establishment ofa satisfactory level of connection between the civil societies of the two nations. Both countries
have taken numerous initiatives to improve cultural connectedness, such as the establishment
of "The India-Bhutan Foundation" during His Majesty's visit to India in August 2003. The
primary objective of the India-Bhutan Foundation is to enhance and strengthen interpersonaldialogues in various domains including scientific and technical research, education, culture,and environmental conservation. The "Nehru–Wangchuck Cultural Centre" (NWCC) is
another active participant in organizing cultural interaction between the two nations. Thiscenter hosts various cultural programs throughout the year, including training in yoga, tabla,
and Indian classical music, to promote India's rich cultural legacy. The NWCC also plays anactive role in hosting lectures and other cultural and educational events. The Indian diaspora
residing in Bhutan, which primarily works in the construction and hydroelectric power sectors,
is also actively involved in strengthening the cultural ties between the two nations.
In 2022, India made the decision to grant approval for the export of 10,000 metric tonnes ofsugar and 5,000 metric tonnes of wheat to Bhutan, in response to Thimphu's requests. 29
50However, in order to prioritize the nation's food security, India temporarily suspended thedelivery of these two commodities. In July 2013, India ceased its provision of cooking gas andparaffin subsidies to Bhutan, resulting in a significant increase in the costs of these fuels within
Bhutan. While the motive behind India's action remains undisclosed, there is a speculation that
it is an endeavor to penalize the Bhutanese government for its alleged collaboration with
China.30 Bhutan has contemplated that India's decision to discontinue subsidizing Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) and paraffin may have been a diplomatic maneuver.31
Conclusion
Bhutan, like other landlocked nations, relies heavily on its neighboring countries, particularly
India. However, in the past few years, similar to its South Asian counterparts, Bhutan is actively
striving to reduce its dependence on India and establish its own distinct identity through theestablishment of diplomatic and economic relations with various nations. This raises thequestion of whether India's hesitant yet generous approach is responsible for the changing
attitudes of the Bhutanese towards India, and whether it can be considered a diplomatic failure
on India's part. In this regard, India must handle its diplomatic relations effectively and prevent
China from interfering with Bhutan for managing its affairs. India must continue its benevolent
policy of developing Bhutan's human resources. India needs to emphasize on human resource
development of Bhutan. Through human resource development of the Bhutanese students,
India would be able to create pro-Indian educated Bhutanese youths who will lead Bhutan in
the coming years.
Some policy recommendations can be offered to strengthen India’s ‘soft power’ diplomacy
with Bhutan. India is committed to broadening its partnership with Bhutan beyond the realmsof hydropower and the strategic alliance in the Himalayan region, as demonstrated by the
implementation of the "Bharat to Bhutan" (B2B) policy.32 Education can play crucial role in
the realm of soft power diplomacy, with Bhutan. The potential of higher education to utilize
globalization as a means to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance cross-cultural dialogue.
India can give more possible options to the Bhutanese students to study in India. The
Bhutanese students can be part of the Indian "knowledge societies". Now, India can pull the
Bhutanese students to study in India which significantly can contribute in ‘knowledge
economy’. The presence of conventional resources such as yoga, Ayurveda, food, films, andTelevision in India cannot be denied. India also possesses alternative soft power assets that
could serve as effective tools for soft power diplomacy. These include Information
Technology, medical tourism, disaster management assistance and the successful launch ofsatellites and providing technical expertise to Bhutan. These non-traditional resources have thepotential to enhance India's influence and promote its values and interests on the global stage.

ENDNOTES
1

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, “Assessing Bhutan’s migration trends and policies”, Observer Research
Foundation, March 31, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/assessing-bhutans-migration-trendsand-policies/

51

2

Tobgay, Yedzin, “The Paradox of Bhutan’s Australian Dream”, The Diplomat, October 19, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/the-paradox-of-bhutans-australian-dream/
3

Dipak Kurmi, “The Vibrant Relationship Between India and Bhutan”, Energy Central, November 13, 2023,
https://energycentral.com/news/vibrant-relationship-between-india-and-bhutan
4Prema Choki, “18% of students studying overseas and each household has 2.7 phones”, The Bhutanese. July 1,
2023, https://thebhutanese.bt/18-of-students-studying-overseas-and-each-household-has-2-7-phones/5

Ian Hall, “India’s New Public Diplomacy Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action”, Asian Survey, Vol.
52 (6), November-December 2012, 1089–1110, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1089
6

Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science, Vol. 616, March 31, 2023, 94-109, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996
7

Daya Kishan Thussu, “Communicating India’s soft power: Buddha to Bollywood”, Palgrave Macmillan New York,
October 25, 2013.
8

Arijit Mazumdar, “India’s Public Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century: Components, Objectives andChallenges”, India Quarterly, Vol. 76 (1), 2020, 24–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901188
9

Indrani Bagchi , “India to supply Covid vaccines to six nations; Maldives, Bhutan to be First Recipients”, The
Timesof
India,
January19,2021,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/80351100.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
10“A compass towards a just and harmonious society: 2015 GNH survey report”, Center for Bhutan Studies &GNH Research, 2016, https://bhutanstudies.org.bt/publicationFiles/2015-Survey-Results.pdf
11

Jamba Tobden and Miriam Ham, “Gross national happiness and challenges for education in Bhutan:
Perspectives of policy experts”, The International Education Journal, Vol. 21 (2), 2022,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365687214_Gross_national_happiness_and_challenges_for_educa
tion_in_Bhutan_Perspectives_of_policy_experts
12

Preethi Amaresh, “India’s Educational and Cultural Cooperation with SAARC countries”, Diplomatist,
December 3, 2020, https://diplomatist.com/2020/12/03/indias-educational-and-cultural-cooperation-withsaarc-countries/
13

Arpon Sarki, “India–Bhutan Relations: Paradiplomacy, Domestic Considerations and New Delhi’s Prerogative”,
World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, Vol. 23 (4), October-December 2019, 138–151,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48566203
14

Debasish Nandy, “Revisiting India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: Since 1991 to Present Day”, Avenel Press,
Kolkata, 2020.
15

Mint Mumbai, “India Woos Bhutanese Students, Youth”, MAGZTER, April 8, 2023,
https://www.magzter.com/stories/newspaper/Mint-Mumbai/INDIA-WOOS-BHUTANESE-STUDENTS-YOUTH
16“More Bhutanese leaving the country and going abroad”, Business Bhutan, March 22, 2022,
https://businessbhutan.bt/more-bhutanese-leaving-the-country-and-going-abroad/17

Department of Higher Education, “All India Survey of Higher Education (AISHE) 2020-21”, Government of India,
September 2022, https://ruralindiaonline.org/en/library/resource/all-india-survey-of-higher-education-aishe2020-21/

52

18

“Online Application for Ambassador's Scholarship 2023-24 (13 October 2023)”, Bussiness Standard, October
13, 2023, https://www.publicnow.com/view/8534202FA881726C9CE6C0C439871CEF2B333841
19

Ibid.

20

HT Correspondent, “Deeply touched by Bhutan PM’s gesture, PM Narendra Modi tweets his response”,
Hindustan Times, June 16, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modi-visit-tobhutan-pm-modi-arrives-in-bhutan-for-2-day-visit-hydro-power-trade-on-agenda/story88b12qkliMRTNpgOZ93GdP.html
21“TCS to advise Bhutan on PSUs”, Business Standard, February 5, 2013, https://www.businessstandard.com/article/technology/tcs-to-advise-bhutan-on-psus-108031701024_1.html
22Mihir Bhonsale, “Bhutan: Education in India”, Observer Research Foundation, March 13, 2015,
https://www.orfonline.org/research/bhutan-education-inindia#:~:text=Role%20of%20higher%20education%20has,these%20are%20benefiting%20from%20scholarships
23

Aditya Madanapalle, “ISRO is training officials in Bhutan in remote sensing applications for better
governance”, News Nine, September 12, 2023, https://www.news9live.com/science/isro-is-training-officials-inbhutan-in-remote-sensing-applications-for-better-governance-2283398
24

Ibid.

25

“Bhutan sends 5 civil servants for IRS training in India”, Asian News International, February 12, 2023,
https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/bhutan-sends-5-civil-servants-for-irs-training-inindia20230212163408/
26

Dhurba Rizal, “Bhutan-India Relations: The Shifting Bhutanese Perceptions and Geopolitical Gambit”, In ‘India
in South Asia: Challenges and Management’, Ed. Amit Ranjan, Springer, Singapore, May 12, 2019, 153-171,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_10
27“India in greater need for Covid vaccines, will not exert pressure for supply of doses: Bhutan”, Mint, May 22,
2021, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-requires-more-covid-vaccines-will-not-exert-pressure-forsupply-bhutan-11621693513156.html
28

Constantino Xavier, “Bhutan’s Democratic Transition and Ties to India”, The Brookings Institution, July 8, 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bhutans-democratic-transition-and-ties-to-india/
29

PTI, “Army Chief meets Bhutan King in Thimphu; focus on boosting enduring strategic ties”, The New Indian
Express, July 31, 2022, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/Jul/31/army-chief-meets-bhutanking-in-thimphu-focus-on-boosting-enduring-strategic-ties-2482693.html
30“India ends subsidy on kerosene, LPG supply to Bhutan”, India Today, July 6 2013,https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/india-ends-subsidy-on-kerosene-lpg-supply-to-bhutan-1693352013-07-05
31

Tenzing Lamsang, “Ministry of External Affairs of India ‘advised’ IOC to withdraw LGP and Kerosene subsidies
to Bhutan”, The Bhutanese, March 7, 2013, https://thebhutanese.bt/ministry-of-external-affairs-of-indiaadvised-ioc-to-withdraw-lgp-and-kerosene-subsidies-to-bhutan/
32

Debasish Nandy and Naha Alik, “India’s ‘soft power’ play with BIMSTEC nations: observing education
diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy”, Journal of Historical Archeology & Anthropological Science, Vol. 7(2), May 3, 2022, 39‒45, https://medcraveonline.com/JHAAS/JHAAS-07-00253.pdf

53

PART IIIIDEATING NEW SOFT POWER
STRATEGIES

54

7. Exploring New Avenues for India’s Soft Power
Outreach in Myanmar
Cchavi Vasisht
In the 21st century, soft power has emerged, or better to say has re-emerged as an effective
manifestation of diplomacy. Soft power is defined as “the ability to get what you want throughattraction rather than coercion or payments”. 1 Joseph S. Nye’s reflections on soft power
describe soft power as non-coercive and persuasive forms of interaction between states.2 Softpower, in its conventional definition, is a broad concept that can include everything from theway a country treats the civil rights of its citizens to its mass media, its national language,
culture, film industry, even its cuisine, etc. In international politics, the resources that produce
soft power arise from the values an organisation or country expresses in its culture and language
as well as developmental and people-to-people projects that set examples by creating a positive
public perception of other countries. For centuries, states have attempted to use soft power intheir international relations and this has again become a centre of attention in contemporary
period.3 This paper focuses on the key aspects of soft power diplomacy employed by India andthe newer avenues which can be explored further. Here, we are looking at Myanmar as a casestudy.
India-Myanmar Relations Over Years
India and Myanmar share 1643 km of land and maritime border and have a long history ofcultural and trade ties that go back centuries. Primarily, the relations between the two nations
have been shaped owing to their geographical proximity as well as shared history. Theirpolitical and economic relations were guided by a common colonial legacy due to close
association between freedom leaders of both countries. However, under post-independent
successive military governments in Myanmar, its political, trade and people-to-people relations
with India suffered. Bilateral relations started to recover with the initiation of India’s Look East
policy under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. This was cemented by the ‘friendship’ projects
such as the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa (TKK) road and other capacity-building and connectivity
projects, as well as official Lines of Credit for government development projects including
railways, power transmission, industries, etc.4
With the formation of Myanmar Constitution in 2008 and a shift to democratic transition in
2010, India in 2014, with its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy’ made an attempt to energise andre-brand India’s 1991 ‘Look East’ policy into an ‘Act East’ policy towards the Association forSouth East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These bilateral ties were strengthened with frequent highlevel visits from both sides. The joint visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary and Army Chief in2020 is a pointer to an enhanced and upgraded relationship that can potentially lift the IndiaMyanmar relationship into a higher trajectory, including in the area of trade and investment.

55

The land and maritime boundary between the two nations provides the platform for evolving
ethnic, cultural and religious ties. The presence of the Indian community in Myanmar can betraced back to the mid-19th century with the advent of British rule in Lower Burma in 1852. A
large number of the Indian community (nearly 150,000) lived there. In recent years, various
estimates suggest that the Indian Diaspora in Myanmar constitutes about 4 percent of the total
population in Myanmar. 5 The presence of Indian communities has helped the two sides
continue to share close cultural and religious ties. Especially across the border, ethnic
communities share close kinship ties, which have also led to sharing of food and lifestyle habits.
This community closeness gives way for enhancing both land and air connectivity. India is
working on the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project and the India-MyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway Project for connecting northeast India with Myanmar andThailand. There are direct flights as well, connecting Yangon to Kolkata6 and Chennai.7
Similarly, India’s religious roots are shared deeply across the entire region. The religious ties
between the two sides are cemented due to the spread of Buddhism in both countries. The
Indian government is involved with the restoration and conservation of ancient pagodas in
Myanmar that had suffered damage due to severe earthquakes in 2016. 8 Additionally,
performances by Indian cultural troupes in Myanmar have been organised on a regular basis
since 1997.
Engagement in Myanmar’s Human Resource Development
Besides sharing close social and cultural ties, India has also invested in capacity building
programmes in Myanmar, especially for the young generation, since the 2010s. India has
supported Myanmar by establishing higher education and research institutions, such as the
Myanmar Institute of Information Technology, the Advanced Centre for Agricultural Researchand Education, the Myanmar-India Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills,
and the India-Myanmar Industrial Training Centres. These institutions have proven highly
successful in enhancing Myanmar's capabilities in these specific areas. Notably, an IndiaMyanmar Industrial Training Centre has been established by HMT(I) in Myanmar’s Pakkoku
with support from the Government of India, and a second centre is under development inMyingyan. 9 Furthermore, the Myanmar-India Centre for English Language (MICELT), theMyanmar-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre (MIEDC), and the India-Myanmar
Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) are all currently
operational. 10 Additionally, India is providing training in fields like conservation andarchaeology, the judiciary, and the English language.
A look at the 2022 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) showed that India
offered customised courses for capacity building for participants from Myanmar, such as the
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) courses which were moved to an online
mode of learning.11 These included courses in diverse areas including English language, data
analytics, gender inclusive governance, courses for educational administrators, Buddhism,
COVID-related subjects and parliamentary studies. 30 participants received training in India
in various paramedical courses 2022. Additionally, 19 Myanmar nationals are undergoing a56

Master’s programme in Social Work at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in
Mumbai.12
Furthermore, India has also provided humanitarian support and functioned as a first responder
during natural disasters. India offered assistance during the tsunami in 2004 and Nargis cyclone
in 2008 under Operation Sahayata.13 Even during the COVID-19 crisis, India provided key
medical supplies to Myanmar. Myanmar also signed an agreement with the Serum Institute ofIndia to procure COVID-19 vaccines.14 In May 2023, when Cyclone Mocha struck the westernpart of the country, India launched “Operation Karuna”.15 Three ships, namely Indian Naval
Ships Shivalik, Kamorta, and Savitri, arrived in Yangon with emergency relief materials suchas food supplies, tents, essential medicines, water pumps, portable generators, clothes, andhygiene items.16
Avenues for India’s Soft Power Outlook
Against this backdrop, one could suggest that there are three major areas in which India canenhance its soft power diplomacy. Firstly, it is restoration and smooth functioning of
democracy. Second, boosting soft infrastructure for people-centric development. Here, one
could focus on developing common centres of interest such as religious circuits. Following thedevelopment of soft infrastructure, a boost should be given to the diasporic movement for
education and employment opportunities in India.
The first avenue which can be explored is with regard to India being the largest democracy inthe world. The cordial civil and military relations as well as relations between centre and states
lay the foundation for the smooth functioning of democracy. Myanmar transitioned todemocracy in the 2010s following the incorporation of the 2008 Constitution. In 2021,
however, the military again captured political power and overthrew the civilian government.
Though elections are promised, the probability of holding them anytime soon is uncertain. Still,
India can cooperate with Myanmar in holding the elections again sooner as well as ensure
coordination between the centre and states, majorly the Ethnic Armed Organisations in
Myanmar. The military leaders have already reached out to China and Russia for the same.17
Additionally, India can also exchange its knowledge on federalism and good governancemeasures. Recently, the Myanmar minister of immigration and population, U Myint Kyaing,
visited India to learn about the Aadhaar Unique Identity system.18 Such efforts can be boosted
in future as well.
Secondly, India has had strong educational relations with Myanmar since the colonial era. For
instance, India’s Bengal Engineering College could further boost India-Myanmar close
cooperation in terms of linking the workforce. India’s development assistance in setting up
institutions for higher learning and research, as stated earlier, had been a great success inbuilding Myanmar’s capacities in those areas.
India may further explore possibilities of setting up vocational training institutes incollaboration with institutes in Myanmar, to equip the existing workforce to harness theopportunities and potential of the growing manufacturing hubs and supply chains present in57

the country. During the 2020 visit of the then Indian Army Chief General Manoj Naravane andForeign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the two sides also discussed new initiatives like theupgradation of Yamethin Women’s Police Academy, Basic Technical Training School and the
Myanmar Institute of Information Technology and vocational training programmes for the
youth in the state of Rakhine.19
The Government of Myanmar is also embarking upon several programmes to encourage thedevelopment of the manufacturing sector, along with raising agricultural productivity. Indian
investors may seize the opportunities arising in the manufacturing sector of Myanmar inindustries like 2-wheelers and 3-wheelers, cement, furniture, FMCG products, assembling andmanufacturing of agro-machineries, pharmaceuticals and cotton yarn manufacturing. Taking
example from the pharmaceutical sector, many Indian generic brands have already set up theirpresence in Myanmar.20 Similarly, other Indian pharmaceutical manufacturing companies havea scope to expand their production base by setting up units in Myanmar.
Another avenue that needs attention to further deepen our engagements is integrating our
North-Eastern states’ economy with Myanmar’s border states. The two sides across the bordershare close cultural and ethnic ties, which can be leveraged for strengthening economic ties.
This would create a win-win situation for both countries. India needs to seriously look at theNorthEast region more as a gateway to bigger markets across the border rather than a consumer
market. There is an urgent need to improve the necessary border infrastructure at trading points
to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between India and Myanmar. Major
infrastructure facilities required include the development of a land port with a modern
warehousing facility, food testing facility, IT and telecom support, regular power supply,
weighbridge, and development of connecting roads and bridges. This will set the base forfurther cooperation in the field of connectivity and infrastructure. The similarities in terms offood, clothing, art and literature, music and dance and lifestyles across borders can be further
examined which can create avenues to boost India’s soft power.
Finally, the presence of the Indian community in Myanmar can boost close cultural andreligious ties between the two nations.21 In this backdrop, the Modi government’s initiative of“Buddhist Circuit” could also be extended to Myanmar.22 Recently, Myanmar and Cambodia
signed a memorandum of understanding to boost the flow of national and third-country tourists
to the temples of Angkor in Siem Reap and to the ancient city of Bagan in Myanmar. 23
Similarly, India could look to connect Buddhist sites which are part of Buddhist circuit, i.e.,
Bodh Gaya in Bihar state, Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh), and Amaravati (Andhra Pradesh) with
Buddhist sites in Myanmar such as Shwedagon Pagoda, Kyauk Htat Gyi Pagoda, Yangon, andmany more. Myanmar can also become a gateway to extend this initiative to other South East
Asian countries. The ground for the same was laid during the international seminar on
Buddhism held in 2016 at Sarnath and Bodhgaya, in which representatives of South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and ASEAN members, including Myanmar,
participated.24 Even direct flights have been initiated between Indian cities and Myanmar toboost connectivity and people to people ties, the most recent example being of direct flight58

between Chennai and Yangon.25 A push to tourism could also be boosted by creating awarenessand interest about historical sites of both countries.
Conclusion
Myanmar is India’s eastern neighbour sharing a land and maritime boundary of over 1600 kms.
India’s security and development of the northeast is in many ways dependent on its relationshipwith Myanmar. Myanmar also acts as a gateway to South-East Asian countries; however, onemust not limit our understanding to these regional outlooks. The stability and outreach to
Myanmar in terms of soft power will not only boost close cultural and people to people ties,
but also ensure that the two nations can build stronger economic and bilateral ties in the coming
times. Given the current instability in Myanmar, India has a lot to offer in these times of crisis.
The historical and geographical closeness must be cemented with deeper social, cultural,religious and geopolitical ties.

ENDNOTES

1

Joseph Nye, “Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept”, Palgrave Commun 3, 17008, 2017,https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms20178#citeas
2

Ibid.

3

H. H. S. Viswanathan, “India’s Soft Power Diplomacy”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
September 4, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?850
4“India-Myanmar - Bilateral Brief”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 2022,
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Myanmar22Nov.pdf
5Medha Chaturvedi, “Indian Migrants in Myanmar: Emerging Trends and Challenges”, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, 2015, https://mea.gov.in/images/pdf/Indian-Migrants-Myanmar.pdf
6

See Note 4.

7

Press Trust of India, “Myanmar Airways International launches Chennai-Yangon direct flights”, The Economic
Times,
May7,2023,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/aviation/myanmar-airways-international-launches-chennai-yangon-directflights/articleshow/100050258.cms?from=mdr
8

See Note 4.

9“Training institutions set up in MYANMAR with INDIAN assistance”, Consulate General of India, Mandalay,
Myanmar, https://www.cgimandalay.gov.in/page/training-institutions/
10

Ibid.

11

“AnnualReport2022”,
MinistryofExternal
Affairs,
Governmentof
https://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/36286_MEA_Annual_Report_2022_English_web.pdf
12

Ibid.

59

India,

13

Saneet Chakradeo, “Neighbourhood first responder: India’s humanitarian aid and relief”, Center for Social andEconomic
Progress,
https://csep.org/policy-brief/neighbourhood-first-responder-indias-humanitarianassistance-and-disaster-relief/
14

Zaw Zaw Htwe, “Myanmar Signs up to buy India’s COVID-10 vaccine”, The Irrawaddy, December 28, 2020,
https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/myanmar-covid-19/myanmar-signs-buy-indias-covid-19-vaccine.html
15News Service Division, “India hands over humanitarian assistance as Mocha cyclone death toll in Myanmar
reaches 145”, Akashvani, May 19, 2023, https://newsonair.gov.in/News?title=India-hands-over-humanitarianassistance-as-Mocha-cyclone-death-toll-in-Myanmar-reaches-145&id=461165
16

Ibid.

17

“Two Myanmar Junta Election Officials on Separate Visits to China, Russia,” The Irrawaddy, September 12,
2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/two-myanmar-junta-election-officials-on-separate-visits-tochina-russia.html
18

Nirupama Subramanian, “Sanctioned Myanmar Minister Visited India to Study Aadhaar”, The Wire, August 8,
2023, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/sanctioned-myanmar-ministers-visited-india-to-study-aadhaar
19

Media Center, “Visit of Chief of Army Staff and Foreign Secretary to Myanmar (October 4-5, 2020)”, MinistryofExternal
AffairsofIndia,
October
5,2020,
https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/33092/Visit+of+Chief+of+Army+Staff+and+Foreign+Secretary+to+Myanmar+October+45+20
20
20

Jane Wan, “Report from Myanmar”, BioPharm International, Vol. 26, October 1, 2023, pp 10,
https://www.biopharminternational.com/view/report-myanmar-0
21

Rajiv Bhatia, “India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours”, Routledge, New Delhi, 2016.

22“The Buddhist Circuit: A Program for the Development of the Buddhist Circuit in South Asia”, World Bank
Group,
Washington,
D.C.,
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/387491563440124268/the-buddhist-circuit-a-program-for-the-development-of-thebuddhist-circuit-in-south-asia
23

Khmer Times, “Cambodia, Myanmar to promote ancient temples”, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2017,https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1364523/cambodia-myanmar-sign-tourism-deal-to-promote-ancienttemples
24“M/o Tourism Organizes ‘5th International Buddhist Conclave’ in Varanasi-Sarnath from 2nd to 6th October
2016”, Pree Information Bureau, October 01, 2016, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151333
25

See Note 7.

60

8. Prospects of Multi-Track Diplomacy in IndiaPakistan Relations
Zainab Akhter
India and Pakistan, the two nuclear armed neighbours, marked the 76th anniversary of their
independence from British rule last August. Four wars, nuclear weapons, border issues and therelentless hostility of the two neighbours over the issue of Kashmir has added to the strategic
challenge for New Delhi and Islamabad. Amidst these challenging times, there have been somemoments of hope between the two nuclear neighbours.
Over these tumultuous and strained periods of bilateral relationship between India andPakistan, a diverse set of civil society groups worked in the background to establish longlasting peace, cooperation and reconciliation. At the government level too, repeated efforts
have been made to improve the bilateral relations including back-channel diplomacy.1 India,
keeping with its Neighbourhood First Policy seeks normal neighbourly relations with Pakistan
and is committed to address any issues bilaterally and peacefully, keeping with the Shimla
Agreement and Lahore Declaration.2 But these efforts are often overshadowed, and hostility
takes over whenever India and Pakistan hit a bump in the bilateral relationship. It is due to thiscomplicated nature of the relationship that the power corridors in New Delhi and Islamabad
mostly choose to over emphasize on hard power to defend their respective national security. It
is in such times that an alternative tool of diplomacy is sought to resolve issues and narrow
down chances of war hysteria. When there is securitization of diplomacy, multi-track
diplomacy (MTD) has the effect of opening doors of dialogue by invoking soft power, peaceand culture. The purpose of MTD is not to undermine the importance of official politicalnegotiations, but only to provide an alternative route that could supplement those negotiations.
Joseph Nye defined soft power as the ability of nations to obtain ends through the means of
attraction rather than coercion or payments which arise due to the attractiveness of a country’s
culture, political ideals and policies.3 Culture has since evolved as one of the most importantcomponents of soft power. In contemporary times, it is not coercive diplomacy that isappreciated by people around the world, but the cultural linkages of a country that are gaining
more influence. The shared history, culture and geography of India and Pakistan can play avital role in normalizing the relationship if the governments of both countries decide to makesome policy shifts, and focus on introducing MTD as one of the tools of confidence building
measures. This paper explores the utility of multitrack diplomacy and examines possibilities
and challenges of this approach in peace building between India and Pakistan.
Efficacy of Multi-track Diplomacy
Multi-track diplomacy allows for ‘a complex web of approaches, roles, strategies and activities
employed by diverse actors at different stages of conflict development, conflict resolution andpost-conflict peace-building’.4 It focuses on ‘a plurality of approaches and actors’ beyond theclique of diplomats and politicians, based on the assumption that ‘there are several unique ways
to help conflictants find common ground and citizens can use their own “vocation and location”
61within a society to promote peace and security’.5 In the case of India and Pakistan, given thecomplicated nature of relations, the plurality of approaches and actors is exactly what is neededin building peace. This approach effectively keeps channels of communication open when
official diplomatic relations plummet. The efficacy and significance of MTD in fostering peacebeyond the realm of the state, has regained interest among security analysts and experts to study
this approach and its role in India-Pakistan relations. The importance of moving beyond
isolated political negotiations to include multilayered actors is to break down biases andprejudices that have been built and sustained over a number of years. One such effort to bringpeace was the Shimla agreement of 19726 that basically laid out the principles which would
govern the future of bilateral relations between the two countries and ensued steps which were
to be taken in order to ensure the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.
India and Pakistan are also members of international organizations and groupings such as theSouth Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) that seek to provide a platform for countries to resolve issues and conflicts
through dialogue and communication. The eight-member SAARC is the only importantregional institution where both India and Pakistan are members. “Largely viewed as a ‘failure’in promoting regional cooperation, the inability to make progress is, in turn, attributed to theunending hostility between India and Pakistan”.7 But inter-governmental initiatives tend to takea backseat whenever there is escalation of conflict on the border followed by strained relations.
There is lots of hope from the SCO since it is a China-led organization. In addition to being aplatform where the rivalry between New Delhi and Islamabad continues, the SCO also provides
opportunities for the development of relations between the two countries from time to time.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit to India to attend the SCO in May
2023 is also important in this respect.
Thus, at times when track one diplomacy faces its own unique problems, the significance ofmultitrack diplomacy becomes imperative because a peace deal or a joint statement signed by
the leaders of the two countries might be inadequate, or rejected by Indians and Pakistanis in
an environment of animosity.
Peace and multitrack experts 8 have argued that MTD has played a vital role in stable andcontinuous interaction between the states, ensuring communications even during periods ofcrisis and has also aided in finding common positive-sum solutions for both sides. These
initiatives are great measures to alleviate misconceptions about each other. The civil societies
of India and Pakistan play an elaborate role in the process of establishing peace and good
relations between the two countries, however, there is a need at the government level toencourage and recognize these initiatives.
India and Pakistan have never ceased to talk about peace. Successive Indian prime ministers
and generations of leaders in India, and often in Pakistan, have sought to resolve disputes,
reconcile differences and establish durable peace. For, beyond the rhetoric, there is an acuteawareness that no country’s destiny is immune from its relationships with neighbours”. 9 As
India’s former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, once rightly pointed out that “we canchange our friends but not our neighbours”. Beyond the state, at the people-to-people level
there is a desire for peace and reconciliation and a natural affinity to connect on the basis of a62

shared history and culture. Therefore, in the course of time, numerous civil society-led
initiatives have emerged for promoting peace and friendship between India and Pakistan.
The process of multi-track diplomacy between the two nations first started in the 1990’s with
“Neemrana dialogue” at the Neemrana fort of Rajasthan in 1990. 10 It was majorly aninteraction between the former diplomats, military personnel, journalists, NGO workers andacademics from India and Pakistan with an official backing from respective foreign ministers.
In the wake of declining relations post-terrorist attacks and subsequent surgical strikes, thedialogue was revived in 2018, led by former diplomat Vivek Katju on the Indian side, while
the Pakistani side included former minister Javed Jabbar, among others.
Initiatives like Pakistan India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) has
achieved progress in opening Rajasthan rail links, easing visa regimes, releasing fishermen
from prisons, intervening in water treaty issues, encouraging cultural and sporting exchanges,
facilitating multiple visits of people from all walks of life and initiating trade operations in
Punjab & Kashmir borders. In 2023, PIPFPD in collaboration with South Asian Solidarity
Collective (SASC) launched Zuva, a trimester journal for cross-border conversations, which
was followed by an online discussion on the challenges in India-Pakistan relations involving
various artists, writers, filmmakers and other civil society representatives from different walksof life from both sides.11 According to the creators, Zuva provides a forum for the people ofIndia and Pakistan to voice their diverse perspectives, concerns, aspirations for peace andprogress in the region.12 Initiatives such as the Chaophraya Dialogue13 which is an Indo-Pak
Track-II initiative jointly undertaken by the Jinnah Institute and Australia India Institute (AII)
running since 2008 have also helped in reducing war hysteria in both nations. Workshops by
Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace works (WISCOMP) have been
conducting regular interactions by tapping into ideas of cultural peace.14 These civil society
groups and their initiatives for building peace between India and Pakistan are now appreciated
all around the world and slowly creating a niche for themselves in the policy-making circles of
the two nations and peacebuilding bodies. They have changed the dynamics of India-Pakistan
relations to a great extent and now are labelled as important stakeholders in the peacebuilding
processes.
Current Scenario
In the last decade, multitrack diplomacy between India and Pakistan has a hit a roadblock,resulting in a lull in the peace building process. The current hostilities are mostly enmeshed indomestic politics on both sides of the border and have become an instrument of politicalmobilization. The cross-border movement of people has reduced. Since 2014, a chain of events
has seen the governments give up even the semblance of bilateral discourse: they have ended
all direct trade, travel by rail, bus and air, denied visas to each other’s artists, musicians andwriters, stopping all but religious pilgrimage exchanges as well as shunned the composite
bilateral dialogue between officials. Since 2019, they have dispensed with HighCommissioners and all political contacts altogether.15 The entertainment industry in India has
shut out actors from Pakistan. Zee had discontinued airing Pakistani serials after the 2016 Uri
attack, which initially became an instant hit, and later, Zindagi channel banned Pakistani showsin India. Not a single theater group crossed the border in the last few years to showcase their63

plays in India. In the past, Tehrik-e-Niswan and Ajoka theater groups from Pakistan opened
their shows to a full house and standing ovations. However, the quest for peace is always there
and some kind of diplomacy takes place even if that means behind closed doors.
In May 2023, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari arrived in India to attend aforeign ministers’ summit of the SCO, becoming the first senior leader from the neighbouring
country to visit India in almost twelve years. Alongside the official delegation, also came agroup of senior Pakistani journalists who covered the visit and were very active on social media
platforms, sharing bits from the visit. A famous Pakistani biker and vlogger, Abrar Hassan,
travelled all the way to India and showed glimpses of India 16 on his bike that garnerednumerous views and positive reviews from both sides of the border. Hassan completed his'friendship tour' in 30 days and covered 7,000 km. The biker shared several videos of different
meetups in cities including Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, Mumbai, Kerala and more. The vlogger
documented his journey on his Youtube channel, WildLens by Abrar.
The cricket diplomacy got a boost this year when Pakistan team travelled to India to take partin the World Cup. The manner in which the team was received by cricket fans at the Hyderabad
airport and at the hotel was overwhelming17, indicating that people want peace and normal
relations with Pakistan. The cherry on top is that India and Pakistan decided to keep the
Kartarpur Corridor open for pilgrimage. They agreed to set up the border crossing linking
Gurudwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur Dera Baba Nanak shrine in India’s Gurdaspur district.
Besides, Urdu poetry and ghazals from Pakistan and shows like Coke Studio, MTv. Unplugged
have a wide fan following in both countries. Therefore, soft power can be a potent tool forbrining harmonious relations and peace between India and Pakistan. Multitrack diplomacy canplay a crucial role in building bridges between the two nations. People-to-people contact,
cultural exchanges, and educational initiatives can promote understanding and empathy.
Conclusion
While the road to reconciliation between India and Pakistan may be challenging, it is not
impossible. The New Year brings new hope that the time is right for India and Pakistan to focus
on confidence-building measures to resume diplomatic and trade ties. With a new government
in Pakistan led by PML-N, and Shehbaz Sharif as Prime Minster, some analysts are cautiously
optimistic about the possibility of a renewed attempt by the two governments to improve ties,
in large part because of the history that the Sharifs share with Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and his Bhartiya Janata Party. Prime Minster Narendra Modi took to X (previously
twitter) congratulating Shehbaz Sharif for becoming Pakistan’s 24th Prime Minster. Sharif also
responded to the message positively, which is read as a hint about the prospect of a detente
between the neighbours that have barely functional diplomatic relations. But any significant
bilateral engagement will have to wait till India is done with its elections.
The newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif acknowledged that Pakistan is
at a critical point. However, it cannot transform itself unless it revises its approach andrelationship with its neighbours, particularly with India.18 Pakistan has desired normalization,
but as an equal partner, and regards Kashmir as the defining issue for peace and friendship,especially after the abrogation of article 370 of the Indian constitution in 2019. India, for its
64part, rejects these assumptions. For India, there is neither the compulsion nor an incentive tonormalize relations with Pakistan in the immediate future. For now, India is quite comfortablewith what Prof. Mohan has termed as “minimalism in its relations with Pakistan”.19 Courtingan economic disaster, the compulsion may now be Pakistan’s to normalize relations with India,
or to have some form of economic cooperation to say the least.20 India and Pakistan have toplan for the long term and could think in terms of coming together to form partnerships inseveral areas of mutual interest and concern. To begin with, revive engagements through
SAARC, open the border for movement of people and exchange of art and theater.
There is no magic wand to clear the mist of misunderstanding within days. It is imperative thatthe managers of our future respond to the overwhelming demand of the people for peace. Thereis a realization in India and Pakistan that it is better to keep the back channels open despite thedifferences and suspension of talks. It is true that political decisions are going to be taken at
the Track one level, but it is imperative to recognize that multi-track diplomacy can help
develop an environment conducive for positive outcomes. Deep-rooted prejudices and biases
between India and Pakistan cannot be solved within the framework of official dialogues. The
only solution is a multi-layered dialogue between the people of both nations. A conflict that is
affecting not just a few government officials, but two entire countries will have to involve entire
populations of the two countries as well and this can only be achieved through moreinteractions at people-to-people level. At this juncture, it might not be too foolhardy for India
and Pakistan to think out of the so-called security box and conceive creative ways of solving
this enduring conflict. An idea that seems fanciful now might create conditions for a peace thatwill not only be meaningful but also lasting. By prioritizing diplomacy, economic cooperationand people-to-people engagement, these two neighbours can work towards a more peacefuland prosperous South Asia, benefiting their people and the entire region. The journey may bechallenging, but the potential rewards are worth every effort.

ENDNOTES

1

Muhammad Sajjad Malik, “Track II diplomacy & its impact on Pakistan India peace process”, Institute ofStrategic Studies Islamabad, June 26, 2014, https://issi.org.pk/track-ii-diplomacy-and-its-impact-on-pakistanindia-peace-process/2“India Pakistan Relations”, High Commission of India in Pakistan, October 15, 2019,https://www.india.org.pk/pages.php?id=16#:~:text=India%20has%20followed%20a%20consistent,any%2C%20
bilaterally%20and%20peacefully%20in
3Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, Volume 80, 1990, 153-171, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580

4

Manjrika Sewak, “Multi-track Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable
Security”, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, New Delhi and Colombo, 2021.
5

Ibid.

6

K. N. Bakshi, “Simla Agreement (1972): From Military Victory to a Diplomatic Defeat?”, Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal, Vol. 2 (3), July-September 2007, 105-119, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45340665

65

7

K. Yhome, “India-Pakistan tensions: Is there a role for SAARC”, Observer Research Foundation, March 2, 2019,https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-pakistan-tension-is-there-role-for-saarc-48690
8

Samir Ahmad, “Track Two Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: Peace Negotiations & Initiatives”, Routledge,2023,
https://www.routledge.com/Track-Two-Diplomacy-Between-India-and-Pakistan-Peace-Negotiationsand-Initiatives/Ahmad/p/book/9781032594026
9

Satinder Kumar Lambah, “In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations under Six Prime Ministers”, Penguin
Viking, 2023.
10

Lt Gen Prakash, Katoch, “Neemrana Dialogue Resumed - what are the payoffs?”, Indian Defence Review, May
10, 2018, https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/neemrana-dialogue-resumed-what-are-the-payoffs/
11

Neel Kamal, “Peace organisations launch journal for cross border conversations between India and Pakistan”,
The Times of India, June 18, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/peace-organisations-launchjournal-for-cross-border-conversations-between-india-and-pakistan/articleshow/101080929.cms
12

Ibid.

13

Bashir Ali Abbas, “India-Pakistan Dialogue: Past Trends & Future Prospects”, The Diplomat, October 22, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/india-pakistan-dialogue-past-trends-and-future-prospects/
14

Michele Bornstein et al., “Civil Societies: Empowering Peace Constituencies in India and Pakistan”, School ofInternational
andPublicAffairs,
Spring2015,
https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/migrated/migrated/documents/US%2520State%2520Dept%2520CapstoneReport-Final-5.17.pdf
15Suhasini Haidar, “From the trenches: India, Pakistan relations through the prison of diplomacy”, The Hindu,
January, 25, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/books/from-the-trenches-india-pakistan-relations-through-theprism-of-diplomacy/article67772897.ece
16Anjali Thakur, “Pakistani Vloggers Bike tour of India is winning hearts across borders”, NDTV, June, 14, 2023,
https://www.ndtv.com/feature/pakistani-vloggers-bike-tour-of-india-is-winning-hearts-across-borders4117292
17

V. V. Subrahmanyam, “Pakistan cricket team arrives in India after seven years”, The Hindu, September 27,
2023, https://www.thehindu.com/sport/cricket/pakistan-cricket-team-arrives-in-india-after-seven-years-tightsecurity-in-hyderabad-ahead-of-warm-up-matches/article67354358.ece
18

Abid Hussain, “Most Vexing test: Can Pakistan’s Sharifs revive talks with India’s Modi?”, Al Jazeera, March 9,2024,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/9/most-vexing-test-can-pakistans-sharifs-revive-talks-withindias-modi
19

C Raja Mohan, “After General Qamar Jawed Bajwa: prospects for India-Pakistan Relations”, Institute for South
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, December 14, 2022. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/aftergeneral-qamar-jawed-bajwa-prospects-for-india-pakistan-relations/
20

Ibid.

66

9. The Potential of India’s Digital Diplomacy as a SoftPower Measure in South Asia
Muhsin Puthan Purayil
As technology seamlessly facilitates global connectivity, it simultaneously plays a pivotal role
in redefining diplomatic strategies on a global scale. Digital diplomacy represents thetransformative influence on diplomatic practices arising from the intersection of digitaltechnology and diplomacy. It encompasses the broader concept of digitalization of diplomatic
practices, essentially referring to the integration and utilization of digital technologies in the
conduct of foreign affairs.1
Two interconnected aspects shape the foundation of digital diplomacy. Firstly, information isdisseminated rapidly and in real-time through various digital channels, transforming thelandscape of public opinion. It spreads quickly on platforms like Twitter, Facebook andInstagram, not only domestically but also extends beyond borders. Political leaders,
government officials and citizens sharing their perspectives, instantly influence public
perception. Secondly, the diverse portrayals of a nation by the media significantly impact its
global perception. Varied narratives can shape public opinion and influence the international
community’s understanding of a country’s values, policies and overall identity, necessitating
nations to respond swiftly and adapt to manage and shape the narrative surrounding theirpolicies and actions. In navigating and influencing these dynamics, digital diplomacy emerges
as a critical component of a country’s soft power strategy.
India, poised as a prominent global player, has recognized the transformative potential of
employing digital tools to enhance its soft power. Through a purposeful integration of digital
tools, India aims to deftly navigate the complexities of global affairs, positioning itself as atechnologically adept and diplomatically savvy force on the world stage. However, India’s soft
power influence is significantly tested by China’s increasing political and diplomatic
dominance in the evolving global arena, particularly in South Asia. China shaping the narrativearound its infrastructure projects, is a case in point. Recently, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal
declared on Twitter that the Pokhara project comes under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
which created confusion among Nepali officials.2 By framing the Pokhara project within thecontext of the BRI, China seeks to potentially garner support or shape the discourse around thesuccess of China’s infrastructure projects in South Asia.
In 2018, Chinese diplomats reportedly employed 301 diplomatic Twitter accounts to promote
Beijing’s policies on a global scale, highlighting China’s proactive digital diplomacy efforts. 3
A 2022 report by Carl Miller, Co-Founder of The Centre for the Analysis of Social Media(CASM) Technologies, revealed that employing a multi-lingual approach, China distributed
over 100,000 messages on platforms like Facebook and Twitter, utilizing channels such as 393
Confucius Institutes, diplomats, Chinese Consular Officials and social media accounts of theChinese Foreign Ministry.4

67

In this context, this paper delves into the nuanced landscape of India’s digital diplomacy,
exploring its current standing and future trajectory within the evolving global landscape,specifically focusing on South Asia.
Mapping India’s Digital Diplomacy
India has utilized various technologies and digital platforms in its diplomatic efforts to achieve
foreign policy objectives. This includes fostering communication, shaping narratives, staying
connected with and supporting the Indian diaspora as well as extending assistance and support
during emergencies and relief work. While certain initiatives are explicitly targeted at South
Asian nations, others demonstrate a more expansive scope, concurrently engaging andproviding benefits to countries across the region. Notably, as per the Digital Diplomacy Index(DDI), which assesses the global online influence of each G20 country on a scale of 0 to 10,
India is currently ranked third.
Figure 1: Digital Diplomacy Index Ranking 20235

To begin with, the creation of the Public Diplomacy (PD) Division by the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) in 2006 significantly bolstered India’s utilization of soft power. The
instrumental communication tool of digital media, encompassing social media, has played apivotal role. Social media has also been employed to counter narratives detrimental to India’s
interests. The inception of the MEA in the realm of social media dates back to 2010, when the@IndianDiplomacy Twitter account was first established, marking a crucial turning point in68the MEA’s approach to public engagement through digital channels. Shortly after that, the@MEAIndia Official account was established in 2011.
At present, the Ministry of External Affairs maintains a presence on various platforms,
including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn, Flickr, Google+ channel andSoundcloud. In a bid to expand its digital footprint, the MEA launched the MEA App in 2013,
becoming the first mobile application introduced by any ministry in the Indian government.
Described as a “single-window source of all information related to the Ministry’s citizencentric services and outreach activities,” the app is aimed not only at the domestic public but
also at the broader Indian diaspora who can serve as informal ambassadors, playing a role inshaping perceptions about India. Additionally, India has implemented e-Visa and e-Visa-onarrival services, allowing foreign nationals to apply for visas online. Travelers can also apply
for visas at Indian airports upon arrival. Presently, the e-Visa scheme encompasses 166
countries and territories.6
Further, India actively employs cultural diplomacy in the digital sphere by strategicallyutilising online social networking platforms. These platforms serve as conduits for showcasing
Indian arts, traditions, and innovations. Particularly noteworthy are video-sharing platforms
like YouTube, which enable the global presentation of Indian dance, music, and cinematic
accomplishments that transcend geographical constraints. In 2015, India initiated the Ek Bharat
Shreshtha Bharat (loosely translated as “United India Distinguished India”) which includes adigital platform that highlights the richness and diversity of India’s cultural traditions. 7
Similarly, launched in 2016 with the aim of building a comprehensive digital library of all
Indian languages, the Bharatavani project, through the introduction of an online portal andAndroid App, signifies India’s dedication to preserving and promoting its linguistic legacy andshowcasing its significant strides.8
In addition, the MEA, in 2019, launched Performance Dashboard which serves as a tool for
tracking government performance and informing citizens, diaspora, and foreigners about the
Ministry’s services. The Performance Smart Board within the dashboard focuses on 20 key
indicators across five clusters: citizen services, trade & commerce, development partnership,
international engagement, and diaspora engagement.9
Moreover, India’s digital diplomacy has also emphasized connectivity and disastermanagement as additional focal areas. India deploys digital platforms to facilitate prompt
information sharing and coordination in response to natural disasters or emergencies within theSouth Asia region. In 2020, India introduced the South Asian Flash Flood Guidance System(FFGS), designed to assist disaster management teams and governments in formulating timely
evacuation plans for impending flooding events.10 In the same year, the MEA formed the New
and Emerging Strategic Technologies (NEST) division, marking a significant development.
This division now serves as a focal point within the MEA for addressing issues related to newand emerging technologies in the formulation of India’s foreign policy. It plays a crucial rolein negotiations that safeguard the country’s interests across various multilateral platforms,
including the G20, United Nations (UN), and World Trade Organization (WTO).1169

Likewise, the COVID-19 pandemic is a noteworthy example of India employing proactive
digital measures for crisis response and humanitarian assistance. This approach facilitated theswift mobilization of pandemic preparedness efforts. Prime Minister Modi took the initiative
to convene a virtual summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) during the pandemic. In assuming the organizational helm of the SAARC summit,
Prime Minister Modi manifested a humanitarian overture, accentuating the imperative ofsolidarity and concerted action amid crises. This contributed to building goodwill andshowcased India’s commitment to regional diplomacy and leadership.
Additionally, India launched the SAARC COVID-19 Information Exchange Platform(COINEX) for member countries, promoting information sharing on the evolving pandemic.12
India also extended support through an IT-enabled disease surveillance system, the Integrated
Disease Surveillance Portal, and offered online training to enhance clinical capabilities under
the PACT program (Partnerships for Accelerating Clinical Trials).13 Besides, as part of the
ITEC program, India provided e-training to medical professionals in collaboration withinstitutions such as All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and Post Graduate Instituteof Medical Education and Research (PGIMER), alongside specialized training in Bengali
conducted by AIIMS, Bhubaneswar, for participants from Bangladesh.14
Challenges, Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
While India’s digital diplomacy has made strides, there are inherent constraints andinefficiencies that warrant improvement. The imperative for the evolution of India’s digital
diplomacy in this regard is underscored by the necessity to not only rigorously engage with amore expansive array of issues and geopolitical events from a communicative standpoint but
also to surmount existing constraints. The Indian government still needs to expand media
outreach to counter negative narratives against India and influence public opinion positively
and utilize digital platforms for effective storytelling that highlights India’s contributions andstrengths vis-a-vis the countries in the region.
A prevalent challenge for India revolves around the negative perception of Delhi as a regionalhegemon, raising concerns about its potential impact on the sovereignty of neighbouring
countries. The term “regional hegemon” signifies a dominant power in a specific geographic
area. This perception has recently manifested in anti-India online campaigns and movements,
such as the #BackOffIndia and #GoBackIndia campaigns in Nepal, the #IndiaOut campaign in
the Maldives, and similar movements launched by opposition parties in Bangladesh.15
In response, the Indian government may regularly share positive stories highlighting peopleto-people connections between India and countries in South Asia. This includes personal
anecdotes, success stories, or profiles of individuals who have positively contributed to therelationship between the two countries. Also, while highlighting the positive impact of India’s
diplomatic efforts on the ground, it needs to showcase stories of individuals from neighbouring
countries who have benefited from mutual collaboration. To foster transparency andresponsiveness, India may launch interactive digital campaigns that allow the public toparticipate in discussions or express their concerns. These initiatives can be launched in
multiple South Asian languages to ensure accessibility to a diverse audience, while also70

tailoring the content to address concerns specific to each country, reinforcing the message thatIndia respects the sovereignty and autonomy of its neighbours.
Further, it seems that the effectiveness of digital diplomacy through India’s PD Division isnotably constrained and falls short of its full potential. Curiously, while active on Twitter andYouTube by the name ‘@IndianDiplomacy,’ the official account of India’s public diplomacy
is yet to have a Facebook page. However, the Twitter handle predominantly emphasizes
cultural relations and soft power engagement, appearing to remain extraordinarily passive in
addressing crucial geopolitical events, say, India’s role during the COVID-19 pandemic andthe Voice of the Global South Summit 2022. The platform could be more proactive incommunicating India’s foreign aid efforts and disseminating positive messages from India.
Likewise, it is observed that India’s PD division focuses on broadcasting official statements
and projecting various aspects of governance rather than a more dynamic and engaging online
presence. This unidirectional approach can limit the depth of audience engagement, missing
opportunities for constructive dialogue and responsiveness to public inquiries. In this regard,
reviving and integrating the #AsktheSpokesperson initiative within the @IndianDiplomacy isa viable and potentially beneficial strategy. By reactivating this initiative, the public diplomacy
division could create a platform for more interactive and engaging communication.
Another avenue for the expansion of digital diplomacy lies in the realm of online education.
India can harness educational initiatives, such as e-learning platforms and webinars, to provide
accessible and high-quality education. Collaboration with educational institutions in the region
could involve offering joint programs and certifications with the support of full or partial
scholarships for online courses. This would be particularly beneficial in fields contributing toregional development, such as renewable energy and environmental studies, IT and computerscience, public health, agricultural sciences, sustainable farming, and urban planning anddevelopment. The Indian government could collaborate with public and private institutions
such as Indian Institute of Management (IIM)s, and Indian Institute of Technology (IIT)s to
promote online mentorship programs, connecting experienced professionals and academics
from India with individuals in South Asian countries. Such an initiative would promotementorship, knowledge exchange and networking, enhancing education standards andfostering positive perceptions of India. Some students may emerge as future leaders, akin to
distinguished alumni like BP Koirala (former Prime Minister of Nepal), Hamid Karzai (expresident of Afghanistan), and Aung San Suu Kyi (former State Counsellor of Myanmar). Thisway, India could utilize its premier institutions to counter China's growing influence inattracting South Asian students, as evidenced by a 2020 report indicating a preference for
Chinese education among South Asian students, potentially shaping future regional
leadership.16
Besides, recognizing the pivotal role that digital infrastructure plays in shaping a nation’s
online diplomatic effectiveness and projecting digital prowess globally, it becomes imperativefor India to focus on enhancing its cybersecurity as a critical area for improvement. Presently,
India ranks among the most vulnerable nations globally to cyberattacks, despite the burgeoning
growth of the cybersecurity industry. In recent years, there has been a notable increase in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructures in sectors such as power, banking, aviation, telecom,
71disaster management, and oil and energy. Notably, in 2019, a significant incident occurred
when one of India’s largest nuclear reactors in Kudankulam experienced a malware attack,breaching the plant’s firewalls and compromising data and information security.17
Ineffective handling of cyber-attacks can influence both domestic and international perceptionsof a country’s cybersecurity capabilities, preparedness, and commitment to addressing cyberthreats. Poor cybersecurity framework can also impact India’s aspirations to become an
important global actor in the digital economy through digital payments.
Finally, in navigating the evolving landscape of digital diplomacy, where Artificial Intelligence(AI) is poised to play a pivotal role, India has the potential to cultivate a distinct South Asianvision for AI governance. Taking inspiration from Ireland’s model, which includes theappointment of a specialized AI Ambassador, India could implement similar strategies. 18 The
significance of appointing an AI Ambassador lies in its potential to shape India’s uniqueapproach to guiding AI governance, involving activities such as advocacy, facilitatinginternational collaboration, and representing India in global AI forums.
Crucially, to underscore India’s commitment to a South Asian vision, the country could extend
its representation to other South Asian nations in technology related forums, championing theirinterests and perspectives in these international forums. Through such collaboration, India not
only strengthens its regional standing but also contributes to the collective advancement ofSouth Asian nations in the AI landscape, fostering a profound sense of regional cooperation.
Conclusion
It is evident that India’s strategic adoption of digital diplomacy not only underscores its
commitment to technological progress but also emphasizes the intricate relationship between
technology and the evolving dynamics of international relations. However, in this dynamic
scenario, what should shape India’s public diplomacy decisions going forward is of paramountimportance. While India’s digital diplomacy engagements within South Asia offer a hopeful
pathway for projecting soft power, effectively addressing ongoing challenges from China
requires India to embrace a disciplined, robust, and meticulous approach. This involves
stepping up its digital infrastructure, fostering innovation and adoption, and implementing
continuous assessment measures.

ENDNOTES

1Ilan Manor, “The digitalization of public diplomacy”,
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-04405-3
2Palgrave

Macmillan,

2019,

pp

14,

Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in Nepal, @PRCSpoxNepal Twitter, December 31, 2022,
https://twitter.com/PRCSpoxNepal/status/1609131435771990018

72

3

Manish Kumar Jha, “Digital diplomacy and cyber diplomacy swing the world of geopolitics”, Financial Express,
January30,2023,
https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-digital-diplomacy-and-cyberdiplomacy-swing-the-world-of-geopolitics-2964054/
4Carl Miller, “China’s Digital Diplomacy”, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, March 01, 2022,
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/chinas-digital-diplomacy/
5“Digital Diplomacy Index”, Reputation Squad, August 11, 2023, https://digital-diplomacy-index.com/index/

6“Eligible Country for Indian e-Visa in 2024”, India eVisa, https://india-e-visas.com/eligible-country-indian-visa/

7

National Informatics Centre, “Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat”, Government of India,
https://www.mygov.in/campaigns/ebsb/#:~:text=The%20initiative%20'Ek%20Bharat%20Shreshtha,anniversar
y%20of%20Sardar%20Vallabhbhai%20Patel.
8

Ministry of Human Resource Development, “Union HRD minister launches Bharatavani portal”, Press
Information Bureau, May 25, 2016, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145676
9“MEA
Performance
Dashboard”,
https://hci.gov.in/nicosia/?8385?005

High

CommissionofIndia,

Nicosia,

Cyprus,10

Ministry of Earth Sciences, “India Meteorological Department Commissions Flash Flood Guidance Services forSouth
Asia”,
Press
Information
Bureau,October
23,
2020,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1667043
11

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “MEA sets up emerging technologies division”, The Economic Times, January 02,
2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/mea-sets-up-emerging-technologiesdivision/articleshow/73063773.cms?from=mdr
12

Press Information Bureau (Research Unit), “South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) A
milestone in the institutionalization of regional cooperation in South Asia” Press Information Bureau, December
08, 2022, https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2022/dec/doc2022128141701.pdf
13Media Center, “Supply of Indian manufactured vaccines to neighbouring and key partner countries”, Ministryof External Affairs, Government of India, January 19, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/33399/Supply_of_Indian_manufactured_vaccines_to_neighbouring_and_key_partner_countries
14

Smruti S. Pattanaik, “COVID-19 pandemic and India’s regional diplomacy.” South Asian Survey, Vol. 28 (1),2021, 92-110, https://doi.org/10.1177/0971523121999293
15

Rishi Gupta, “Fault lines persist in India–Nepal relations”, East Asia Forum, July 31, 2023,
https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/31/fault-lines-persist-in-india-nepal-relations/;
Palki
Sharma,“Bangladesh’s Opposition Launches “India Out” Campaign”, Firstpost, January 18, 2024,
https://www.firstpost.com/vantage/bangladeshs-opposition-launches-india-out-campaign-vantage-with-palkisharma-37442
16Constantino Xavier and Aakshi Chaba, “China is the new hub for South Asian students”, Hindustan Times,
March
12,
2020,
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/china-is-the-new-hub-for-south-asianstudents/story-ab5ugWNnxaOeSUR8nnRnEN.html

73

17

Utpal Bhaskar, “India confirms malware attacks in Kudankulam nuclear power plant”, Livemint, November 20,
2019, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-confirms-malware-attack-at-kudankulam-nuclear-powerplant-11574262777163.html
18

Jenny Darmody, “AI Ambassador: Ireland could ‘take the lead’ in ethical AI”, Siliconrepublic, February 13, 2023,
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/ai-ambassador-patricia-scanlon-chatgpt-ethical-ai

74

SUMMING UP

75

Paving the Future for India’s Soft Power in SouthAsia: Strengthening ‘Brand India’Omkar Bhole
India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ approach has been an integral part of its foreign policy since
independence. This has manifested through adoption of both hard and soft power measures toenhance India’s goodwill and develop the region at the same time. India has experienced boththe successes and failures of deploying hard power in the past, necessitated by India’s security
concerns in South Asia. Many of these concerns have exacerbated in the last few years with
China’s growing inroads in the security and economic architecture of the South Asian region.
China’s hard power tactics have been supplemented by its increasing adoption of soft power
measures in South Asian countries through promotion of cultural aspects like Buddhism,
language as well as by influencing institutions ranging from media to civil society and so on.
Through these measures, it aims to shape the narrative and policies in its favour in South Asian
countries.
India, on the other hand, enjoys civilisational connection with South Asia and thus, has a wider
range of soft power tools than China. It includes both cultural or conventional aspects such as
language, religion, music and more, as well as non-cultural or non-conventional tools likeeducation, public diplomacy, technological support, capacity building, humanitarian assistanceand development partnership among many others. India’ soft power efforts in South Asia canbe further categorized into passive gestures such as inviting heads of South Asian countries forthe swearing-in ceremony of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 20141 as well as proactive measures like launching a communication satellite for the entire region2 using India’s
advancements in space sector or even providing humanitarian assistance during natural
disasters. Beyond multilateral engagements, India has also effectively utilized its soft power atbilateral level (as elucidated in chapters of this special issue) using both conventional and nonconventional tools. Such efforts, especially with regards to non-conventional tools, have not
only improved India’s image in these countries, but it has also allowed India to actively
contribute in the development of neighbouring countries and thereby, strengthening ‘Brand
India’.
‘Brand India’, particularly with regards to India’s soft power in South Asia, has four mainfeatures that characterizes India’s approach to leveraging its soft power in the neighbourhood.
These features include – historical and cultural connections with the region, people-centric
approach to helping other countries, non-reciprocity and demand-driven/needs-driven
development assistance. While most of these features are already incorporated in India’s soft
power strategy in South Asia, these are sometimes not well recognized by recipient countries
which creates gaps in India’s efforts and its perception across the region. Thus, recalibration ofIndia’s soft power strategy in the neighbourhood needs to include focus on strengthening this
distinct ‘Brand India’ which can help India to earn optimum benefits for its efforts.

76

Headwinds for India’s Soft Power Influence
Despite such efforts at multiple levels, India faces challenges in reaping benefits of deploying
its soft power, as also inferred by the Global Soft Power Index in which India specifically lags
behind with regards to building a positive reputation.3 Although the same report mentions thatIndia enjoys higher familiarity and influence in the neighbourhood, gaps in its image building
are quite evident from recent ‘India out’ campaigns in Maldives and Bangladesh which affectIndia’s overall neighbourhood diplomacy.4
Another challenge for India’s effective implementation of soft power is its lacuna inmaintaining cordial relations with all political parties and stakeholders in neighbouring
countries that has largely restricted India from reaping optimum benefits for its efforts. For
instance, a recent spat between Indian government and Muizzu government in Maldives overwithdrawal of Indian forces 5 or failure to secure cordial relations with the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) in the past shows that India still needs to effectively use its soft power
resources to create more robust perception of India that will not be reliant on who runs thegovernment in neighbouring countries.
To achieve this, people-centric approach to India’s soft power strategy needs to be prioritized.
India has been actively supporting capacity building and human resource development indifferent sectors in its neighbouring countries for many years. Furthermore, India’s
development diplomacy has also focused on fulfilling people’s aspirations in these countries
by providing foreign aid as well as participated in direct engagements in construction ofdevelopment projects. However, these efforts need to be streamlined and their ad hoc nature
be reduced.
Key Takeaways from the Special Issue
Due to the vast diversity of India’s soft power tools, chapters in this Special Issue are able tocover only certain facets that can be effectively utilized in select countries. These Chapters
analyse certain soft power tools that can be effectively utilized in respective neighbouring
countries. However, it is true that all soft power tools will not be equally effective in all
countries. For instance, effectiveness of education exchanges as well as tourism as soft power
tools will be very limited with regards to Pakistan as people-to-people connections have been
restricted as a result of a trickle-down effect with respect to severed government-level ties.
Thus, Zainab notes in her chapter that multi-track diplomacy that includes dialogue amongst
former government officials, academicians, media personnel and more can play a crucial role
as one of the key confidence building measures and avoid the widening of trust deficit during
periods of crises at the political level. This will also allow political leadership to move beyond
general rhetoric and make real attempts at normalizing bilateral relations with people’s support.
Myanmar is another country where India currently faces challenges in maintaining effective
government-level communication and ensuring its security interests are protected due toexisting political turmoil. 6 Given the collapse of democracy in Myanmar, Cchavi Vasisht
argues that India needs to play an active role in re-establishing democracy in Myanmar. This
will aid Myanmar’s return to normalcy while allowing India to gain goodwill amongst
77

Myanmar’s public as well as new political leaders. In this regard, the example of Maldives isa success story to a great extent for India’s quest to promote democracy and bring politicalstability. Despite recent backlash that India had to face in Maldives owing to President
Muizzu’s seemingly pro-China stance, Shreya Upadhyay and Vivek Mishra call for India toprioritize long-term gains and continue to build bipartisan support. Since the establishment of
democracy in 2008 in Maldives, democratic processes have been streamlined such as theregular and peaceful conduct of competitive elections. Despite momentary setback in IndiaMaldives ties, India can continue to play a positive role in strengthening democratic set up in
Maldives which focuses on addressing people’s concerns.7 Thus, India’s position as a strong
functioning democracy and its willingness to help other countries in setting up a similar system
has a strong soft power value amongst relatively younger South Asian democracies.
Discussions in the chapters of this Special Issue argue along five key pillars of India’s soft
power strategy listed below, which can be adopted in all neighbouring countries in the coming
years, while keeping bilateral dynamics in mind.
Building Capacities and Empowering Human Resources
India’s potential to enhance its soft power appeal in South Asia can be arguably best attributed
to its initiatives for capacity building in neighbouring countries. The range of India’s capacity
building measures varies from education sector to disaster mitigation and involves
manifestation of India’s people-centric approach in its soft power strategy. In the education
sector, India historically has been a centre of learning for students from neighbouring countries
engaged in diverse fields of study. This tradition is continued in the contemporary times as isevident from the fact that nearly 50 percent of foreign students studying in India come fromneighbouring countries (Figure 2). Furthermore, scholarship slots released by ICCR are also
dominated by South Asian countries as dedicated scholarships are awarded to young students
from neighbouring countries for courses ranging from undergraduate to Ph.D. level.8
Figure 2: Foreign Students in India from Neighbouring Countries 2021-229

Afghanistan

3151
656

2606
28 (Pakistan)
1562
299

Sri Lanka

Bangladesh
Pakistan
Bhutan

25406
13126

Myanmar
Nepal
Maldives

44(Maldives)

Other

78

Moreover, some of the top leaders in neighbouring countries like Hamid Karzai (Afghanistan),
Sheikh Hasina (Bangladesh), Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck (Bhutan) and more, havestudied in India for several years, and consequently, India had relatively better relations withcountries when these leaders were at the helm. Thus, India’s education system holds
tremendous appeal as a soft power measure to inculcate goodwill in the region.
Besides hosting student diaspora from neighbouring countries, India’s also conducts extensive
education outreach in these countries. Rahul Karan Reddy’s chapter elucidates efficacy ofIndia’s assistance in Nepal’s education sector which involves a diverse range of activities frombuilding education infrastructure to educational exchanges. Similar activities are carried out inother countries in the region as well which bolsters India’s goodwill amongst the youth.
Moreover, there is an urgent need to encourage setting up a robust network of dedicated India
Studies centres across universities in South Asia which will allow young students to study
various facets about India which will help to build more trust and alleviate negative
perceptions. Currently, there are few such institutes like Centre for Contemporary IndianStudies (University of Colombo), Swami Vivekanand Cultural Centre (Kathmandu), Indian
Cultural Centre (Maldives) and more, working to promote knowledge on India. A coordinatedapproach is missing in promoting such centres and their work. The role of Delhi-based South
Asian University can be crucial in this by being a nodal hub for India’s educational exchanges
with South Asian countries. Inclusion of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives inIndia’s National Knowledge Network is a right step in strengthening India’s position as
education hub in South Asia,10 provided remaining South Asian countries are also included in
the near future.
Besides building capacities in formal education sector, India’s role in offering professional
training is also highly significant vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. This has been quite evident
in the case of Bhutan as highlighted by Debasish Nandy in his chapter. He notes that India hasoffered several scholarships for young Bhutanese students for professional courses. This has
also been true for other South Asian countries as many young students look at India as aprospective education hub due to relatively superior quality of higher education in the country.
He further highlights that India’s premier institutions like IIT, 11 AICTE and AIIMS 12 also
conduct professional training for young and mid-level professionals from South Asian
countries. Similarly, India also offers training to government officials in various governanceactivities ranging from diplomacy to even emerging technologies in governance, digital
payments, space applications and so on. Bolstering such initiatives to ensure greater
participation of South Asian countries can go a long way in guaranteeing India’s presence indeveloping neighbouring countries and promises to be an effective soft power tool.
Development Assistance as a Force Multiplier
India, as the largest economy in South Asia equipped with vast resources, has always played
the role of providing development assistance of all kinds. In fact, every year, India makes
budgetary provisions to offer foreign aid to South Asian countries that helps these countries tofulfil their developmental needs such as health, education, infrastructure development and soon. Analysis of India’s total foreign aid given to all countries in the past five years reveal that79

South Asian countries dominate India’s foreign aid allocations (Figure 3). The growth in South
Asia’s share in the last three years further highlights the importance of South Asia in India’s
development diplomacy.
Amongst South Asian countries, Bhutan enjoys the largest share of India’s foreign aid with theallocation of Rs. 2068.56 crore in the latest 2024-25 budget, followed by Nepal (Rs. 700 crore),
Maldives (Rs. 600 crore), Myanmar (Rs. 250 crore), Afghanistan (Rs. 200 crore), Bangladesh(Rs. 120 crore) and Sri Lanka (Rs. 75 crore). 13 This ‘non-conditional’ and ‘needs-driven’
development assistance helps India to bolster its image in neighbouring countries14 as well as
to counter China’s growing economic inflows in the region. As a result, India has strengthened
its position as the largest development partner of countries like Bhutan and Bangladesh15 andthus, boasts its image as the primary responder to the developmental needs of these countries.
Figure 3: Share of South Asian Countries in India’s Total Foreign Aid16
86.00
84.00
82.00
80.00
78.00
76.00

74.00
72.00
70.00
2024-252023-242022-232021-222020-21

Similarly, India’s Lines of Credit (LoC) to its neighbouring countries have also increased
fourfold between 2014 to 2022 and has reached over USD 14.7 billion.17 Out of this, almost
USD 8 billion has been offered to Bangladesh which has enormously helped Bangladesh’s
economic development. The benefits for India from such extensive assistance are well laid out
by Sreeradha Datta, in her chapter, that details various development projects in Bangladesh
where India’s engagement has been evident. She argues that India has an opportunity tostrengthen its goodwill amongst Bangladeshi citizens by helping Bangladesh in post-COVID
financial tensions. Other neighbouring countries are also struggling with similar concerns
where India can increase its foreign aid in different forms like soft loans, grants and more to
improve its reputation as a preferred economic partner. India has already successfully exhibited
such generosity by providing a bailout package of USD 4 billion to Sri Lanka while helping
Sri Lanka to secure International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans in 2023. 18 Such efforts arerecognized by both the political class and common people in South Asian countries as it helps
improve people’s standard of living. Thus, India has leveraged its influential position in global
institutions for the benefit of neighbouring countries and continues to accumulate soft power
through its development diplomacy.
Helping Hand During Disasters
India has traditionally acted as a crisis manager for South Asian countries. Be it naturalcalamities like earthquakes, floods, cyclones or manmade disasters such as wars or political
80turmoil, India has always lent a helping hand in all possible ways. India’s humanitarian anddisaster relief assistance is not only limited to the bilateral level but has also gone throughmultilateral arrangements. As a part of these measures, Indian government has time and again
also given refuge to affected communities, most striking example being that of Afghanistani
diaspora in India. As the chapter by Monish Tourangbam and Swati Sinha highlights, India hashelped nearly 20,000 Afghan refugees with regards to human resource development which isa significant manifestation of India’s people-centric approach in conduct of its foreign policy.
Such humanitarian assistance has also been extended to several affected communities inneighbouring countries that have found a safe refuge in India. As a result, this has become amajor source for expanding India’s soft power appeal in the neighbourhood.
Besides this, India’s vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19 has immensely helped South Asian
countries in fighting this global crisis. Other than selling vaccines at commercial rates andthrough global initiatives like COVAX,19 a large part of these vaccines was also given as grants
which was immensely appreciated by neighbouring countries.
Table 1: India’s Supply of COVID Vaccines to Neighbouring Countries (As on June 15,2023)20
Country

GrantsAfghanistan
Bangladesh
BhutanMaldives
MyanmarNepal
Sri Lanka

10000
33,00,000
5,50,000
2,00,000
37,00,000
11,12,000
5,00,000

Commercial sale

COVAX

Total

1,50,00,800

4680
97,82,000

14680
2,80,82,800
5,50,000
3,12,000
2,12,00,000
94,99,000
12,64,000

1,00,000
1,75,00,000
20,00,000
5,00,000

12,00063,87,000
2,64,000

With regards to natural disasters, India has provided all necessary assistance, including bothmaterial and financial support. As a result of all these efforts, despite the growing challenge by
China in this domain, India takes pride in being the “first responder” during crises situations,recognized by several countries, thereby enhancing India’s brand value.
India’s climate diplomacy is another subset of its larger disaster mitigation assistance as it has
been active in providing technical as well as knowledge support with regards to fighting against
climate change. In fact, as a part of multilateral efforts, India had set up the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Climate Change Fund in 2010 along withother measures to develop capacity and build mitigation strategies.21 However, these measures
have not been implemented optimally owing to dysfunctions within SAARC, leaving a major
gap in India’s climate diplomacy. Thus, India must take a lead in reviving this fund outside theambit of the SAARC framework which can urgently fill some gaps in South Asia’s climatechange fight. Similarly, India’s progress in space technology and renewable energy can also beleveraged to minimize impact of climate change in South Asia.
Marketing a ‘Brand India’ Narrative81

India’s public diplomacy division under Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is responsible forengaging with non-state agencies such as think tanks, non-government organisations (NGOs)
and universities to shape public opinion in other countries in India’s favour. In the past few
years, India’s public diplomacy has been assisted by digital media which has substantially
improved its reach and coverage. Media platforms like Twitter and YouTube have not only
helped improve digital governance in India, but have also boosted India’s image and reputationin other countries.
In fact, Indian government has already recognized the potential of digital platforms inpropagating its messages and ideas in neighbouring countries. From simple gestures likewishing citizens in neighbouring countries on festivities to important diplomatic activities likeholding a virtual summit of SAARC countries to sharing resources amidst COVID pandemic,22
India’s digital diplomacy has covered a wide range of activities to bolster both governmentlevel as well as people-to-people ties. Muhsin Purayil’s chapter highlights that India’s digital
diplomacy has also expanded to providing disaster mitigation, introducing digital payment
systems, showcasing Indian art and culture through digital media and offering education andtraining. However, he also notes that India still lags behind in countering negative narratives
conducted online in countries like Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh amongst others. Moreover,in the absence of a robust digital governance regime in South Asian countries including India,
digital diplomacy can be a double-edged sword due to threats like deep fake videos and piracy.
Indian efforts, thus far, have allowed India to curate a distinct ‘Brand India’. Thus, Indian
government needs to expand the scope of digital diplomacy beyond official information andinclude aspects like personal stories and interactive sessions with citizens from neighbouring
countries, to improve India’s goodwill amongst general masses. Given the importance of theneighbourhood, India needs a separate digital diplomacy strategy for South Asia. This willallow India to curate a more nuanced content for South Asia that includes more regional
elements considering India’s shared history with the region. Moreover, India’s digital
diplomacy in South Asia needs to move beyond official circles and must include academicians,
media professionals, businesspersons as well as digital influencers from all South Asian
countries which can promote goodwill of India across the region.
Beyond digital diplomacy, improving visibility of India’s on-ground efforts in neighbouring
countries is also necessary. For instance, as Mr. Rahul Karan Reddy suggests in his paper,
inclusion of an emblem or motif on projects completed with Indian assistance in neighbouring
countries can improve India’s public outreach multifold. As he further notes, it will also project
these initiatives as a part of larger coordinated strategy rather than ad-hoc measures. Suchchanges can prove to be a gamechanger for enhancing India’s soft power appeal as it will help
India to effectively transform its developmental efforts into strengthening ‘Brand India’ thatwill be more influential and alleviate negative perceptions against India.
Leveraging Civilizational Connect
India already has Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), working since 1950 to promote
India’s cultural soft power tools like music, dance and so on. However, similar umbrella
institutions are not present with regards to other soft power tools deployed by India. For82

instance, India needs to set up an umbrella institution that promotes Indian languages acrossSouth Asian countries that will help India realize considerable influence. China has attempted
to do the same through its Confucius Institutes that it has managed to popularize in countries
like Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. India must take advantage on this front as Indian regional
languages like Hindi, Bengali or Tamil are historically popular in some of the neighbouring
countries. This needs to be further leveraged by India to not only counter growing influence ofChinese language, but also to improve people-to-people connections more effectively. The
Chinese have been fairly successful in promoting their own language by adding an
employability factor to it; knowing Mandarin opens up new job opportunities in China andbeyond, which motivates people in other countries. India also needs to create extensive job
opportunities around its regional languages to leverage its potential as a soft power measure.
Similar to this, India also needs to recalibrate its strategies with regards to leveraging Buddhism
as a soft power tool. As Mihir Bhonsale argues in his paper, need for institutionalization withregards to promotion of Buddhism has been bridged to some extent through organizations suchas the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC). However, a parliamentary committee on
external affairs noted in its 2022 report on India’s soft power and cultural diplomacy that lackof coordinated approach among different agencies has inhibited effective implementation ofIndia’s cultural soft power tools.23 This has been true not only with regards to Buddhism, butother cultural tools like dance, music, art crafts and so on. ICCR has set up cultural centres inall South Asian countries to promote Indian cultural tools largely performing arts (Table 2).
However, it only has a partial impact with regards to cultivating soft power as the recipients inthese countries have limited participation. Thus, India needs to promote training of these art
forms in a standardized manner. In this regard, Gandharva Mahavidyalaya which conducts
exams for different classical dances and music can play a crucial role as it already has foreign
centres in countries like Canada, Qatar, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and more, but
not in any neighbouring countries.24 Thus, it must establish its centres in South Asian countries
at the earliest with the help of ICCR, which will help to standardize these art forms and attract
more people towards pursuing these arts. Similar steps can be taken with respect to other art
forms as well which can offer global recognition to learners and open more employment
opportunities.
Table 2: ICCR Cultural Centres in South Asian Countries25
Country
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
BhutanMaldives
MyanmarNepal
Sri Lanka

CentreSwami Vivekananda Cultural Centre
Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre
Nehru-Wangchuck Cultural Centre
Indian Cultural Centre
Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre
Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre
Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre

83

Location
Kabul
Dhaka
ThimphuMale
YangonKathmandu
ColomboEstablished in
September 2007
March 2010
September 2010
July 2011
December 2021
2008
1998

Another effective utilization of India’s cultural heritage to enhance its soft power appeal canbe through boosting tourism. The concept of creating Buddhist circuit that links Buddhist
places in India as well as in neighbouring countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka is a welcome stepin this direction. Medical tourism is another important avenue for India to attract more tourists
from neighbouring countries.26 Thus, India needs to adopt a multi-pronged strategy to leverage
India’s position as the hub for both cultural and medical tourism.27
Conclusion
Different soft power tools of India, acting at the same time in different countries, makes aneffective narrative of ‘Brand India’. India has been deploying its soft power in neighbouring
countries for centuries. However, the need for making coordinated and focused efforts haveexacerbated in the last few years owing to China’s challenge, changing dynamics andaspirations of recipient countries. India will certainly face a diverse set of challenges in its
immediate neighbourhood in the coming years. However, effective soft power strategy willallow India to minimize these challenges as it would create a conducive atmosphere for India
to protect its interests. Effective implementation – that includes coordinated and focused efforts– of these measures will strengthen ‘Brand India’ that will be pivotal in creating a favourable
tomorrow for India’s foreign policy in the neighbourhood.

ENDNOTES

1

TNN, “8 world leaders who got Narendra Modi's invitation for swearing in”, The Times of India, May 23, 2014,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/35524046.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
2

Amitabh Sinha, “South Asian diplomacy lifts off on 2230-kg ISRO satellite GSAT-9”, The Indian Express, May 6,2017,https://indianexpress.com/article/india/isro-gsat-9-satellite-launch-propels-modi-govts-satellitediplomacy-in-the-neighbourhood-4642042/
3“Global Soft Power Index: India’s Ranking Slips from 28th to 29th Position”, The Wire, March 8, 2024,
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/global-soft-power-index-indias-ranking-slips-from-28th-to-29th-position
4

Meera Srinivasan, “The ‘India Out’ campaign in the Maldives”, The Hindu, December 27, 2021,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/the-india-out-campaign-in-the-maldives/article38046584.ece ;Syful Islam, “India Out campaign heats up in Bangladesh after lopsided election”, Nikkei Asia, January 26, 2024,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-Out-campaign-heats-up-in-Bangladesh-afterlopsided-election
5

Urmika Deb, “Maldives walks a diplomatic tightrope with India”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute – The
Strategist, January 31, 2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/maldives-walks-a-diplomatic-tightrope-withindia/
6

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India requires to open multiple channels to safeguard Myanmar interests”, The
Economic Times, May 1, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-requires-to-openmultiple-channels-to-safeguard-myanmar-interests/articleshow/109744031.cms?from=mdr

84

7

PTI, “India helped in restoration of democracy in Maldives: Maumoon Abdul Gayoom”, The Economic Times,
October28,
2018,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-helped-inrestoration-of-democracy-in-maldives-maumoon-abdul-gayoom/articleshow/66400995.cms?from=mdr
8“AnnualReport2022-23”,
IndianCouncilfor
CulturalRelations,pphttps://www.iccr.gov.in/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/2024-02/English%20AR%202022-231%20%281%29.pdf

150,

9

"All India Survey on Higher Education 2021-22", Ministry of Education, Government of India,
https://aishe.gov.in/aishe/viewDocument.action?documentId=353
10“National
Knowledge
Network”,
https://www.nic.in/servicecontents/nkn/

National

Informatics

Centre,October

30,

2023,

11

“Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay offers scholarships for Bangladeshi students”, High Commission ofIndia,
Dhaka,
Bangladesh,
September
24,
2014,
https://hcidhaka.gov.in/press?id=eyJpdiI6IjR6UmwyOUtBUmJFMWoyNlBNaE02a1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiUXVWdk
Q5VzJxK0haVDdQMTQ3b2lTUT09IiwibWFjIjoiYTE1OWU1MzY3Mjk3NWUyNzFiYWM4N2Q2ZWQxNDQzNDg0Y2
EyNDFlMzI0NzM1NjkxZWE2NGU4ZDRjMzVhMTQ5YSJ9
12Rajesh Mishra, “Nepali students at AIIMS deprived of monthly stipend”, The Kathmandu Post, May 3, 2023,
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2023/05/03/nepali-students-at-aiims-deprived-of-monthly-stipend
13

Ibid.

14

Swati Prabhu, “Budget 2023: Amrit Kaal for development diplomacy?”, Observer Research Foundation,
February 3, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/budget-2023-amrit-kaal-for-developmentdiplomacy
15

Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India is proud to be the biggest development partner of Bangladesh: PM”, The Hindu,
November 1, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-modi-sheikh-hasina-jointly-inaugurate-railpower-sector-projects-between-india-bangladesh/article67483705.ece
16“Notes on Demands for Grants, 2024-25”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe29.pdf ; “Notes on Demands for Grants, 2021-22”, Ministry ofExternal Affairs, Government of India, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2021-22/doc/eb/sbe28.pdf
17Yeshi Seli, “India's Lines of Credit to neighbours increased more than fourfold since 2014 to $14.7 billion”, The
New Indian Express, March 9, 2022, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/Mar/09/indias-lines-ofcredit-to-neighbours-increased-more-than-fourfold-since-2014-to-147-billion-2428131.html
18Dishha Bagchi, “IMF bailout only became possible due to Indian support, says Sri Lankan envoy Moragoda”,
The Print, June 27, 2023, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/imf-bailout-only-became-possible-due-to-indiansupport-says-sri-lankan-envoy-moragoda/1644514/
19“Vaccine Supply”, Ministry of External
https://www.mea.gov.in/vaccine-supply.htm
20

Affairs,

GovernmentofIndia,

June

15,

2023,

Ibid.

21

PTI, “India announces SAARC Climate Change Fund”, The Hindu, November 28, 2021,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-announces-SAARC-climate-change-fund/article16373139.ece

85

22

Press Release, “The Leaders of the Member States of SAARC held a Video Conference to discuss measures tocontain the spread of COVID-19 in the region”, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, March 16,2020,
https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/press-release/283-pres-release-the-leaders-of-the-memberstates-of-the-south-asian-association-for-regional-cooperation-saarc-held-a-video-conference-on-15-march2020-to-discuss-measures-to-contain-the-spread-of-covid-19-in-the-region
23

Committee on External Affairs, “India’s Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy: Prospects & Limitations”, Lok
Sabha
Secretariat,
New
Delhi,
August2022,
https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/17_External_Affairs_16.pdf
24“Worldwide Centres”, Akhil Bharatiya Gandharva Mahavidyalaya Mandal, https://abgmvm.org/centers/

25

See Note 8.

26

Strategic Investment Research Unit, “Rise of Medical Tourism in India”, Invest India, September 12, 2022,
https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/rise-medical-tourism-india
27

See Note 23.

86

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