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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was commissioned by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as the principal substantive
and whole-of-organization contribution of IOM to the 2023 Sustainable Development Goals Summit (SDG Summit).
The principal author is Elisa Mosler Vidal and the drafting process was steered by the Migration and Sustainable
Development Division (Department of Peace and Development Coordination), under Cécile Riallant, with theactive support of Daniel Silva y Poveda, Tulika Gangopadhya and Joanne Irvine. Special thanks go to Ugochi Daniels,
IOM Deputy Director General for Operations for her guidance.
Data modelling for this report was undertaken by researchers of the University of Oxford’s Centre on Migration,
Policy and Society (COMPAS); the World Data Lab WDL GmbH and of the IOM Regional Office for Central,
North America and the Caribbean. It also involved colleagues in the IOM Regional Offices for South-Eastern
Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Acknowledgements

Special appreciation also goes to IOM colleagues in Headquarters, regional offices and country offices who
contributed their relevant expertise for the development and review of this report.

iii

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... VII

INTRODUCTION: HUMAN MOBILITY AND THE 2030 AGENDA............................................................................................................................ 2

ACCELERATION ACTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................................................................................. 5

1. Extend social protection and universal health coverage to all
migrants, to reduce inequalities and vulnerabilities and enable
their active participation in and contribution to societies ............................................................................................................................................ 8

2. Reduce remittance costs and leverage different types of
diaspora contributions to boost sustainable development
finance, trade systems and global value chains .................................................................................................................................................................. 11

3. Weave human mobility into development and urban planning,
to increase social cohesion and boost development for all ..................................................................................................................................... 14

4. Develop safe and regular migration pathways, invest
in skills development and facilitate mutual recognitionof qualifications, to meet the needs of changing labour
markets and divergent demographic trends ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17

5. Reduce the digital access gap for people on the move, to improve
integration and unlock innovative and green entrepreneurship ............................................................................................................................ 20

6. Integrate human mobility into national adaptation and climatechange response plans, and invest in preparedness and loss anddamages provisions, to forge impactful climate and peace action........................................................................................................................ 23

LOOKING AHEAD .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27

ANNEX 1: IOM’s recent support and flagship initiatives under the Acceleration Actions ............................................................................. 30

ENDNOTES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 33

Contents

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 42v

After participating in a three-day photography
training workshop in Abidjan, Côte d‘Ivoire, six young
photographers put their new skills into into practice byattending reintegration and recreation activities organized
by IOM for returnees and community members.
© IOM 2019 / Mohamed Aly Diabaté

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the midway point of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), the world faces a crossroads.
The promise to Leave No One Behind and achieve the SDGs is in stark peril, as development progress is reversing
under the combined impacts of the climate emergency, conflicts, economic downturns and uneven pandemic
recovery. Progress on only 12 per cent of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) targets is on track, progresson 50 per cent is weak and insufficient, and progress has stalled or reversed on more than 30 per cent, with
developing countries and the world’s most vulnerable bearing the brunt of this.i Moreover, our ways of working tomeet the SDGs are inadequate. The SDG funding gap in developing countries is estimated at USD 3.9 trillionii anddespite major steps taken to support SDG implementation, including the Decade of Action and United Nations
development system (UNDS) reform, there is an urgent need to do more and take radical action.
Today’s sobering picture of reversing SDG progress is a clarion call to redouble efforts to leave no one behind andovercome the triple planetary crisis – and to utilize every available solution to achieve this. This generation has the
mandate to address unprecedented global challenges with all possible levers. Human mobility is one such lever andin fact, none of today’s challenges, from climate change to conflict, can be tackled effectively without considering
human mobility. While migrants are often among the furthest left behind, they simultaneously push forward
development, well-being and growth for people and planet. Human mobility is already a force for progress that theinternational community must leverage to help reach the SDGs. Well-managed human mobility is key to achieving
the 2030 Agenda. Mobility must be integrated across development, humanitarian and many other efforts, whichbring alive various mobility-development links. Whichever way it is looked at, human mobility is part of the solution
to rescue the SDGs.

This report showcases how, with the right action, human mobility can help achieve the SDGs, and support
development beyond 2030. It presents related evidence under six Acceleration Actions, presenting potential
benefits of policy action through analysis from the IOM Regional Office for Central, North America and the
Caribbean, the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS, University of Oxford), and World Data Lab
WDL GmbH. It also provides examples of successful initiatives, and recommendations on how to move forward.
The driving force behind these Actions is connection. They are relevant to policy areas which often operate
separately, bringing new connections for the consideration of policymakers. This is reflected in the mix of SDGs
each Action supports; many are not often seen in the same sentence. The Actions also aim to connect countries
and communities. They are universally relevant, giving a role to play to countries in all regions, in receiving andsending countries of migration, across income levels. They are in line with the six transitions identified by the
UNSDG – climate, biodiversity and pollution, energy, food systems, education, jobs and social protection, and digitalconnectivity. Finally, they knit together several cross-cutting elements of mobility and development policy, whichmust be connected to all interventions.

Executive Summary

Human mobility trends are increasingly complex, driven and impacted by major global transformations. Time andagain, around the world people on the move have revitalised and brought development gains to sectors and areasthat policy sometimes struggles to reach. Managed well, mobility can be a cornerstone of sustainable development,
prosperity, and progress; it can benefit communities of origin and destination, as migration is linked to poverty
reduction, innovation and entrepreneurship, investment and other mechanisms for progress. Human mobility is an
integral part of the 2030 Agenda, which recognises several of its links to sustainable development and recognizes
it is not possible to leave no one behind without considering migrants. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly andRegular Migration also builds on the 2030 Agenda and acknowledges through a comprehensive agenda how, if
managed effectively, mobility can help spur progress.

VIIAcceleration Actions
for Development
1. Extend social protection and universal healthcoverage to all migrants, to reduce inequalities andvulnerabilities and enable their active participationin and contribution to societies.
Social protection and universal health coverage (UHC)
are fundamental to resilient and inclusive societies, andkey to meeting the SDGs. However, migrants tend toenjoy less social protection and health coverage thannatives. Expanding access would reduce inequalities
and maximize migrants’ contributions to societies.
In Colombia, migrants are 39 percentage points
less likely to be affiliated with a health programme
than Colombians, and more likely to face several
job-related vulnerabilities. Migrants affiliated with ahealth programme are less likely to face these issues,suggesting that extending access helps boost migrantwell-being and participation in society.
2. Reduce remittance costs and leverage different
types of diaspora contributions to boost sustainable
development finance, trade systems and global value
chains.

Executive Summary

Through remittances, knowledge transfer and manyother mechanisms, human mobility stimulates
development financing, trade and Global Value Chains(GVCs). The world needs ambitious plans to financesustainable development, and new strategies tosupport trade systems and transnational supply chains;
managed effectively, mobility can be a building blockfor these plans.

VIII

A decrease of remittance transaction costs by 5
percentage points could lead to an extra USD 6.88
billion being sent to Low- and Middle-Income Countries(LMICs) per year, and USD 560 million to small island
developing States (SIDS). By 2030, this could mean an
extra USD 41.25 billion sent to LMICs, and USD 3.36
billion to SIDS.
Migration can support trade by boosting international

exports. Across Central America, North America andthe Caribbean, a 1 per cent rise in migrant stock in acountry is associated with a 0.23 per cent increase inexports on average. This is equivalent to an estimatedincrease of USD 7,751 in exports per additionalmigrant.
3. Weave human mobility into development andurban planning, to increase social cohesion andboost development for all.
Today 41 per cent of citizens around the world feelthat their sense of social cohesion is weak. While
taking a whole-of-society approach to policy andincluding everyone‘s voices in policy is critical, migrants’
inclusion to date is patchy. Integrating migrants andhuman mobility across development planning has thepotential to strengthen policies and boost cohesion,
creating more effective plans.
This is especially relevant in cities – 5 billion people will
live in urban areas by 2050, displacement is increasingly
urban, and city infrastructure will need to adapt
accordingly; and as 65 per cent of SDG targets arelinked to local government activity. Acting on mobilitydevelopment links requires close collaboration
between national and local levels. Empowering local
leaders and working directly with communities, cities
and rural governments creates development solutions
that work on the ground in real time.
In the Republic of Moldova, a project connecting
communities with diaspora via hometown associations,extended basic services and job creation for all in
local communities. In Iraq, when crafting local peaceagreements between returning IDPs and their homecommunities, IDP representation enabled negotiations
that would otherwise have been impossible.
4. Develop safe and regular migration pathways,
invest in skills development and facilitate mutual
recognition of qualifications, to meet the needs ofchanging labour markets and divergent demographic
trends.
While migrants bring in-demand skills to destination
communities, many still work in jobs unsuited to theirqualifications. Improving recognition of migrants’ skills
would benefit migrants and societies alike. Meanwhile,
economic and demographic trends evolve fast; betterlabour mobility and skills development policies canequip countries to face these changes effectively toboost growth.
By 2030 the 15-64-year-old population in OECDeconomies will decrease by -0.6 per cent; without
migrants, this rate would be -4 per cent. Increasing
current annual migration flows to compensate forthis deficit would add USD 90 billion to GDP. By
2030, migrants will contribute an estimated USD 500
billion to OECD economies; around the same as the
GDP of Austria.
5. Reduce the digital access gap for people on themove, to improve integration and unlock innovativeand green entrepreneurship.
Many mobile populations face poor digital access,limiting their inclusion in many aspects. Digitalinequalities also hold migrants’ entrepreneurship back;migration is linked to innovation and self-employment.
Closing the digital divide would not only decrease
inequalities but allow more migrant-led innovation toflourish.
In Kenya, there is a digital and financial divide: migrants

are 19 percentage points less likely to have a bankaccount than Kenyan-born. Migrants who use theinternet daily are 38 percentage points more likely tohave a bank account, suggesting that improving migrants’digital access and financial inclusion could help unlock
their contributions. In the United Kingdom, migrants
are 8 percentage points more likely than the UK-born
to want to open a business. Increasing digital inclusion
could help further boost their entrepreneurship;
migrants with higher internet use are more likely to be
self-employed.
6. Integrate human mobility into national adaptationand climate change response plans, and invest in
preparedness and loss and damages provisions, toforge impactful climate and peace action.
The links between climate change, conflict and humanmobility, while complex, are key to sustainable action.
However, mobility is not integrated consistently acrossrelevant policy frameworks and processes. Integrating
mobility considerations is integral to peace and climatechange policy, and can save lives and aid development.
Out of selected pairs of countries that were affectedby the same climate change-related disasters, those
who had included human mobility in their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) tended to havelower related disaster costs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Executive Summary

Acceleration Actions linked with SDGs

IX

Looking Ahead
This generation is equipped with unprecedented
knowledge, technologies and resources, and “breaking
through to a better future” demands use of this majoradvantage. Today there is growing evidence about
how if managed effectively, mobility benefit individuals,
families, communities and societies around the world.
As the world redoubles its efforts to leave no one
behind and overcome the triple planetary crisis, every
available solution must be leveraged. Mainstreaming
human mobility considerations into development
plans must gather speed to respond to these and takeadvantage of the opportunities migrants bring. This
document offers a glimpse of the possible along six
Acceleration Actions. What else can be done so thatmobility supports our shared aims for people andplanet?
›.
›Executive Summary›

X

Double down on all global commitments andconsider how human mobility can support them.
We have the blueprints for transformation: the2030 Agenda, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Sendai
Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Paris
Agreement and others. It is fundamental to achieve
progress on these, integrating human mobility
considerations throughout, and developing links
between them.
Commit to and implement mobility-centred
frameworks. The Secretary General’s Action
Agenda on Internal Displacement can transformthe way displacement crises are approached. The
Global Compact for Migration offers a 360-degreecomprehensive framework of good migration
governance that must be implemented; this will
also propel forward the 2030 Agenda.
Weave human mobility into the new Rescue
Plan for People and Planet. Human mobility mustbe part of action under each pillar of the plan.
In particular, it can play a key role in innovative
development financing moving forward andaddress the SDG funding gap; mobility-driven
financing mechanisms can complement the United
Nations SDG Stimulus Plan.

›

End misinformation and political manipulationof human mobility. Migration has been simplified,stigmatized and politicized around the world. This
must change, to stop unjust scapegoating and clear
the road ahead for transformative change, whichcannot be effective without a fundamental shift in
migration-related narratives.

Leveraging human mobility for progress has key
implications for how development is done. Mobility has
links across humanitarian, development, peace and manyother dimensions; insights from across these must be
called on. Change requires collaboration across sectors
and areas of expertise and greater collaboration acrossthe humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN).
Strong international cooperation is also key. The
political economy of migration governance is complex
and, still too often, zero sum. Mobility links different
geographies; its policy responses do too. The needsof countries are more likely to be met if considered
together – collective gains reward collaboration on
migration governance.
Not only does the 2030 Agenda remain possible andessential, but we must think ahead to do more. The
SDG Summit Declaration can reignite global SDG
commitment and advance the role of human mobility
as part of an urgent strategy to achieve shared aims.
But beyond this, how can mobility support Our
Common Agenda and the 2024 Summit of the Future?
Now is the time to collectively ask and answer thesequestions.
Put very simply, the world we want will not be achieved
without considering safe, orderly and regular humanmobility. We can acknowledge this and channel mobility
to help achieve shared objectives; transformativechange is within reach.

Shelter construction underway at
Bakassi IDP Camp in Nigeria.
© IOM 2016 / Muse Mohammed

INTRODUCTION: HUMAN
MOBILITY AND THE 2030 AGENDA

Introduction

There are over 281 million international migrants today,and human mobility trends are increasingly complex,
driven and impacted by major global transformations.
For example, COVID-19 radically altered movements
around the world, climate-related displacement
continues to rise, and the mobility effects of widereaching digitalization
There are over 281
are
only
just
iii
starting to unfold.
million international
Further, commonly
migrants today
used categories of
migrants have shifted and overlapped as, for example,
the distinction between voluntary and forced migration
does not always capture the intricacies of actual
mobility.iv While trends have evolved fast, the overall
proportion of international migrants to the total global
population – around 3.6%v – has not changed muchover time. It is clear that human mobility is a constant,and part of the world’s economic, social and cultural
architecture.

2

Managed well, human mobility can be a cornerstoneof sustainable development, prosperity and progress.
The 2030 Agenda itself is built on this understanding.
Migrant workers, remittances, human trafficking,the global health workforce, international students,
migration governance – these and other topics areincluded in the 2030 Agenda.vi Further, it is not possible
to leave no one behind without considering all migrants.
Mobility is an integral component of the Sustainable
Development Goals, woven across Goals and targets.
This acknowledges the migration–development nexus,
which can be defined as “the totality of mechanisms
through which migration and development dynamics
affect each other”.vii While the nexus is complex, today
we know more about it than before. Mobility can benefit
communities of origin, where it is linked to poverty
reduction, increased innovation and entrepreneurship,
and investment in businesses and human capital. These
impacts are realized through different mechanisms,
for example as migrants transfer knowledge, skills, ormoney – in 2022, estimated remittances sent to low

and middle-income countries were USD 647 billion.viii
Mobility can also benefit communities of destination, as
migrants buoy specific labour markets, lead to greater
productivity and contribute to countries’ fiscal budgets.
For example, every additional 1 per cent of immigration
could boost GDP growth in destination countries
by 2 per cent,ix and eliminating mobility restrictions
could increase world GDP
by 11.5–12.5 per cent.x Every additional
1 per cent of
Finally, migrants themselves
immigration
stand to benefit socially,
could boost
economically and otherwise
from moving. Mobility
GDP growthoffers individuals potentiallyin destination
significant increases in wellcountries by
being and income, with
2 per centgains often much larger thanthose from development interventions.xi For example,
after moving to a developed country, migrants fromthe poorest countries experienced a 15-fold increase
in income, doubling of school enrolment rates, and16-fold reduction in child mortality.xii In some cases,
a “triple-win” dynamic is at play: a virtuous cycle
where migrants, communities of origin and destination
simultaneously benefit from migration.
However, the benefits of human mobility are notguaranteed. Mobility can also pose challenges, withnegative effects on specific sectors of the economy,
labour force, or society that bring fresh policy
problems.xiii These challenges can pertain tocommunities of origin, for example where excess
emigration from a specific locality or of those witha specific skillset may cause issues. Likewise, there
may be challenges for communities of destination;for example, if substantial additional resources areneeded to support the education and integration ofsome migrants. Migrants could face negative effects
themselves, as migration often entails high personal
costs and significant risk. Since 2014, more than 57,000
deaths of migrants on migratory routes have beenrecorded.xiv Migrant workers around the world often

undertake dangerous work, and overall migration
remains far from safe. These negative outcomes fromhuman mobility are avoidable; they occur most often
when policy choices and stakeholder preferences are
misaligned,xv and when existing development solutions
are not applied.
None of the major challenges facing people andplanet today can be tackled effectively without
considering human mobility. The climate emergency isaccelerating, adding to existing multiple crises in various
countries around the world, while violent conflict andpoverty continue. Many societies are highly unequal anddivided, and the lingering effects of the pandemic have
weakened social cohesion. Public budgets are limited
and face imminent further constraints. Meanwhile,
demographic trends, the world of work and global
digital capacities are changing fast. Human mobility islinked to all of these complexities – and needs to be
hardwired in their solutions. For example, disasters,
climate change and environmental degradation willcontinue to contribute to large-scale population
movements. Meanwhile, human mobility impacts theenvironment, ecosystems, and the availability of natural
resources, meaning that if managed well, it could also
be a form of adaptation to environmental stressors.
While populations in many countries are contracting,those in many least-developed countries (LDCs) arebooming. Young people entering the workforce may

not have the skills needed in the global labour market,
leading to increased competition for workers. This
challenge could be partially addressed with sustained
investment in well-managed skills development andmobility programmes; in this way, rapid demographic
change is making migration increasingly necessary forcountries.xvi
As knowledge on certain dimensions of mobility has
ripened – including why people migrate, what effects
this may have, and what can shape these outcomes– policy is catching up with what we know. Asidefrom the 2030 Agenda, some global-level frameworks
have acknowledged the links between mobility anddevelopment, notably the Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration (see Box 1). Multiple
international legal frameworks underline universal
rights and the need to include migrants – crucial toleaving no one behind. At today‘s critical juncture
when global stakeholders are urgently seeking solutions
to meet the 2030 Agenda, these frameworks canand must guide action. Implementing these can help
mobilize a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development with collaboration across levels, sectors
and geographies. Further, it is crucial to ask how humanmobility directly contributes to other international
processes – for example, the Paris Agreement, Our
Common Agenda, various efforts to support SIDS,
and many others – and take action on these links.

The Global Compact for Migration is rooted in the 2030 Agenda, and fundamental to discussions on how
to leverage mobility for development. It aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievementof SDGs, and enable migrants to enrich societies through their human, economic and social capital.xvii The
Global Compact acknowledges that addressing human mobility effectively requires coherent and wideranging responses. The International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), aiming to review progress madeagainst the Compact, also reviews SDG-mobility progress. In the 2022 IMRF Progress Declaration, statescommitted to doubling down on implementing the comprehensive agenda. The Compact guides actors on
good migration governance, serving as a blueprint for action on mobility and sustainable development that
directly contributes to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda. The United Nations system is committed tosupporting the implementation, follow-up and review of the Global Compact, and to this end, establisheda Network on Migration to ensure system-wide support to countries. The Global Compact provides in themobility-development debate with a very concrete “how”: a plan and toolbox to move forwards with.

Introduction

Box 1: The Global Compact for Migration, SDGs and migration governance for development

3

Introduction

Mobility dynamics are not just shaped by migration
policies, but also by policies in other areas – fromagriculture to urban design and public health –that may not seem directly related to migration.
For example, trade policies can impact livelihoods ina local area, later increasing emigration flows.xviii To
effectively manage human mobility for development,
all relevant policies need to be aligned in terms ofpolicy coherence. Decisions to move are influenced
by contextual and interconnected factors and shapedby sustainable development, impacts of climate change
and environmental degradation, peace and security, andmigration pathways. A systems approach is therefore
needed to address drivers, linking humanitarian,development and peace considerations. In practice,
however, many policies do not take a systems approachor consider interlinkages, targeting individual mobility
drivers instead,xix often with counterproductive results.
There is a need to join up the dots across areas of policy
making – similar to how gender and climate change are
now recognised as cross-cutting issues – and empower
more policymakers and other stakeholders to “speak
migration”.

4This applies not only across policy domains, but also
across levels of governance, and between countries.
Acting on mobility-development links requires close
collaboration between national and local levels.
Empowering local leaders and working directly with
communities, cities and rural governments creates
development solutions that work on the ground inreal time, crucial to implementing what may otherwise
seem abstract ideas. Further, mobility and development
policy requires strong cooperation across countries.
People cross borders and affect different countries
simultaneously; however, a real sense of mutuality
in international cooperation on migration is often
missing. The universal lens of the SDGs facilitates thedevelopment connections of mobility in countries oforigin, transit and destination, for example, allowing
policymakers in high-income countries to not only
consider them an instrument of bilateral cooperation,
but also desirable in domestic policies. This will goa long way to increase the impact of policies acrossthe board. To leverage the opportunities that humanmobility brings, public mindsets need to change. Still
too often, myths dominate. Often human mobility issensationalized and migrants dehumanised. It can bedifficult to communicate nuance and change mindsets,
particularly in bumpy political waters. However,
if mobility is to be harnessed for development inneighbourhoods, cities and countries around theworld, and if truly we mean to leave no one behind,migrants cannot remain scapegoats that provide shortterm political fodder. While it dates from 2015, howmigration is treated in the 2030 Agenda represents
a progressive understanding of human mobility that,
almost ten years later, seems sadly unrecognized innational politics. This must change.
What can be done? There is no need to reinvent thewheel; the 2030 Agenda and the Global Compact for
Migration must be implemented. Doing this would
bring us closer to achieving our shared goals for 2030,
as well as leverage the links between mobility anddevelopment. Moreover, mobility in all of its forms
must be integrated across development, humanitarianand many other efforts, including by following theaction recommended in this document. Doing thiswould bring alive various mobility-development links,
and surely enough, help achieve the 2030 Agenda.
Whichever way it is looked at, human mobility is partof the solution to rescue the SDGs. The upcoming
SDG Summit marks a halfway point to 2030; the full
spectrum of human mobility must be incorporated into
discussions and outcomes, including key commitments
to accelerate the contribution of human mobility todevelopment, in this most urgent Decade of Action.
With the right tools, human mobility can help fulfil
the aspirations of those on the move, those whostay behind, and the societies they join.xx Whilemobility is already recognized as a key part of the2030 Agenda; this document outlines steps to act on
this commitment, and provides practical suggestions
for policy interventions to achieve transformation.
Put simply, the 2030 Agenda cannot be achieved
without weaving human mobility into our responses.
Comprehensively considering how migrants can
support the world’s road map ahead to save people
and planet is not only the right thing to do, but thesmart thing to do. This is ambitious, transformational
and wholly possible.

ACCELERATION ACTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Acceleration Actions are initiatives proposed by IOM
to accelerate SDG implementation in this Decadeof Action. They leverage how mobility can support
sustainable development to push forward achievement
on a wide variety of Goals. Addressing the interlinked
nature of the 2030 Agenda, together they address
drivers to end poverty, protect the planet, ensurethat all people enjoy peace and prosperity and muchmore. For each Action, governments, individually or inpartnership, can build on existing innovative practices.
The driving force behind these Actions is connection.
They are relevant to policy areas which often

operate separately, bringing new connections for theconsideration of policymakers. This is reflected in themix of SDGs each Action supports; many are notoften seen in the same sentence. The Actions also
aim to connect countries and communities. They are
universally relevant, giving a role to play to countries
in all regions, across income levels. Finally, they knit
together several cross-cutting elements of mobility
and development policy, which must be connected
to all interventions (see Box 2). Acknowledging thesemutually reinforcing connections through policy would
be transformative, allowing mobility to act as anaccelerator to advance the 2030 Agenda.

Box 2: Gender, youth and data: crucial to transformative action
Gender affects every stage of the migration process, shaping the motives, consequences and experiencesof migration for all individuals, from men to women, boys, girls and persons identifying as lesbian, gay,bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people. Further, it interacts with human mobility’s impacts ondevelopment. For example, while the majority of those trafficked for sexual exploitation have historically
been women, the proportion of male victims is rising.xxi

Moreover, addressing the intersection of migration and gender can support development outcomes. For
example, gender parity for labour force participation reversed in 2020, while labour participation rates of
migrant women are higher than for non-migrant women, and migrant domestic workers can help nonmigrant women enter or re-enter the labour force.xxiii Further, women labour migrants tend to remit ahigher proportion of their incomes, sending money more regularly and for longer periods of time.xxiv Using
gender analysis can help develop more durable responses to environmental migration.xxv While addressing
the needs of all genders is key to enhancing the benefits of mobility, only 69 per cent out of 111 countries
have mechanisms to ensure migration policies are gender-responsive.xxvi This proportion should increase fast;
the sooner a gender-responsive lens is used in migration governance, the sooner the world will collectively
reach the SDGs.

There are 1.8 billion young people aged between 10 and 24, the largest youth generation in history, and 90
per cent of these live in developing countries.xxvii

Acceleration Actions for Development

Using a gender-responsive perspective in all aspects of migration governance is more crucial today thanever, with violence against women and many other inequalities on the rise.xxii To truly leave no one behind,
there is a need to work towards gender equality among migrants, address gender-based violence andvulnerabilities during migration processes and remain gender-responsive throughout action. Further, it is key
to use intersectional approaches to consider where gender interacts with other factors like age or disability
to shape individuals’ experiences.

5

The educational and other needs of this group are not all being met: if current trends continue, 300 million
children or youth who attend school will not be able to read and write by 2030.xxviii These and other trends
intersect with migration. Around 11 per cent of international migrants are aged 15 to 24xix and younger
migrants are pivotal to how human mobility contributes to development; approximately one in ten migrant
workers in 2019 was 15 to 24 years old.xxx How young people navigate their transition into adulthood is
critical for the progress of people and planet,xxxi and higher numbers than ever go through this transition as
migrants, or are affected by mobility in other ways, such as by having an emigrant parent, or as potential,
would-be migrants themselves.
Provided with the opportunities to reach their potential, young people can not only help drive innovation,
development, peace and security, but support well-managed human mobility. To do so, it is critical to include
supporting young people’s well-being and empowerment through access to decent work, skills development,
and services in rural and urban areas-and including migrant youth throughout these efforts. Migrant youth
may have different additional needs, for example specific training or educational opportunities.
With the right tools at their disposal, youth can transform action to accelerate SDG achievement. However,their agency to do this is not a given, as youth remain almost invisible in policymaking and decision-making.
xxxii
To change this, the international community must support the expansion and strengthening of youth
participation in decision-making at all levels, and focus on the concerns of future generations, including throughthe Summit of the Future and Pact for Future Generations. Only by engaging and partnering with youth will
the world be able to achieve peace, security, justice, climate resilience and sustainable development;xxxiii andmigrant youth are a key part of the puzzle.

There has been impressive progress on data on human mobility in recent years; there are new methodologies
to measure migrant recruitment costs, migration governance and many other topics.xxxiv So, what does theofficial data on migration in the SDGs tell us?xxxv

Indicator 10.7.2
In 2021, 63 per cent of 138 countries had a wide range of policies to facilitate orderly,
safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people.

Acceleration Actions for Development

Indicator 10.7.3.

6

IOM recorded 54,127 deaths on migratory routes worldwide since 2015, and 6,878 in
2022. However, this figure is based on recorded deaths and the actual number is likely
much higher.
Indicator 10.7.4.
The number of people displaced from their countries due to war, conflict, persecution,
human rights violations and public disorder was 32 million people in 2022, and the ratioof refugees to every 100,000 people was 398.

Despite these useful data points, overall the evidence base on migration and development is patchy. Migrants
are often invisible in official SDG data – in 2022, the global SDG database disaggregated only one indicatorby migratory status – and on average, only 55% of countries report on SDG migration indicators.xxxvi Poor
data is not limited to migration; while progress has been made in improving wider SDG data, there are still
significant gaps in geographic coverage, timeliness, and disaggregation. For example, for 9 of the 17 SDGs,
only around half of the total 193 countries or areas have internationally comparable data since 2015.xxxvii
Closing data gaps is a priority for the UN system, and mobility data must be integrated in efforts to do this.
Much better information on mobility and its links to development is needed to support action. For example,
age- and gender- disaggregated data are critical to leave no migrant behind, and stronger data around climate
events can help actors anticipate which populations may be at risk, and mitigate fallout as far as possible.
There are innovative examples to build on: the COVID-19 pandemic has been linked to data innovation, newdata partnerships, and increased use of big data to understand mobility dynamics.xxxviii

In Bangladesh, IOM implements
participatory approaches such as
Communicating with Communities
to ensure communities are put at thecentre of the response.
© IOM 2016 / Amanda Nero

1

Extend social protection and universal health coverage to all migrants, toreduce inequalities and vulnerabilities and enable their active participationin and contribution to societies

Acceleration Actions for Development

Social protection and universal health coverage(UHC) are fundamental building blocks of resilientand inclusive societies, and key to meeting the SDGs.
However, many people on the move have little or noaccess to either,xxxix leading to precarious situations anda limited ability to contribute to origin and destination
communities. The pandemic highlighted the vital
importance of social protection and health coverage. In
its aftermath, there is a need to rethink how to designand deliver assistance more inclusively. Extending social
protection and health coverage to migrants could drive
progress on SDGs 1, 3, 5, 10 and 17.

8What do we know?

Even if migrants are entitled to social protection or
health coverage, in practice take-up can be low given
practical, administrative or other barriers. Somesubgroups face particular issues despite facing higher
risks, such as refugees, IDPs, short-term migrants,
informal workers and those in irregular situations.xliv
Gender is an additional factor impacting access; forexample, only 43 per cent of 163 countries provide
social protection for domestic workers, and of those
only 14 per cent to migrant domestic workers, a groupoften facing barriers.xlv While there is universal healthcare coverage in Thailand as well as several initiatives
to access “hard-to-reach” migrants, approximately
800,000 irregular migrants remain uncovered.xlvi

Migrants tend to enjoy less social protection andhealth coverage. Only 30 per cent of 144 Bilateral
Labour Agreements (BLAs) and Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoUs) on migration include social
security provisions, including for health care.xl Due todifferent restrictions, many migrants have no accessto social protection;
Approximately 22
approximately
22
per cent of labour
per cent of labour
migrants are notmigrants are notcovered and 55 percovered and 55
cent cannot transfer
per cent cannot
their benefits home ortransfer theirto another country,xli
benefits home orleading to poorer healthto another country
outcomes.
Despiteseveral international legal instruments recognizing
the right to health for everyone, migrants have thesame access to health services as nationals in half of
84 countries surveyed in a study, while in 37 per centequal access is contingent on migrants’ legal status.xlii

Expanding access would help reduce inequalities.
Migrants are often at higher risk of poverty andpoorer health outcomes, in part due to the conditions
surrounding their migration process.xlvii Across theEuropean Union, 25 per
Across thecent of the foreign-born
versus 16 per cent of the European Union,
25 per cent of
native born live below
the foreign-born
the poverty line, andmigrants face challenges
versus 16 per
in occupational health cent of the native
worldwide.xlviii Adjustingborn live below
social protection andthe poverty line
health coverage to serve
migrants can help reduce poverty, improve health andeducation outcomes, boost integration and is linked
to greater social inclusion and cohesion.xlix This can bedone by expanding eligibility and tackling barriers. In
practice, many migrants depend on informal support
mechanismsl – while these should not substitute formal
protection measures, programmes could leveragesome aspects of these, such as migrants’ networks.
This would maximize migrants’ participation andcontributions. As many countries scale back social
spending in response to fiscal pressures, it is key toremember that migrants often help sustain thesesystems. Migrants tend to contribute more in taxes
and social contributions than they receive.li In
Switzerland, halving migration would cause the nationalsocial security system to go bankrupt by 2027.lii In
Portugal, migrants’ social security contributions areproportionally greater than those from non-migrants,

and reached 1.3 billion Euros in 2021.liii Limiting welfare
and health spending could have negative effects;
restricting asylum seeker and refugee health-careaccess leads to higher long-term costs, while extending
primary care brings savings.liv Health-care access canincrease employment, earnings and productivity,lv andequal access is linked to growth. Moving forward,
there is a need to consider how these topics interact
with other issues, such as climate change, mobility
drivers and rural transformation.lvi For example, social
protection can be embedded into climate, shocks anddisplacement responses to improve outcomes.lvii

What could be the impact?

Extending health system access to migrants could help reduce a range ofvulnerabilities, facilitating their full participation and contributions to society.

In Colombia, migrants often have lower access tohealth care compared to natives;1 migrants are 39
percentage points less likely to be affiliated with ahealth programme than Colombians.

Migrants also faced greater vulnerabilities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
being 5 percentage points more likely to have had problems finding food orcleaning products and 3 percentage points more likely to have lost their job orsource of income as a result of the pandemic compared to Colombians.

There is a link between migrants’ health system affiliation and vulnerability related
to the pandemic. Migrants who are affiliated are 4 percentage points less likely
to have problems finding food or cleaning products as a result of the pandemic,
and 2 percentage points less likely to lose their job or source of income becauseof the pandemic.

Acceleration Actions for Development

This overlaps with other inequalities migrants face. Migrants in employment are 35
percentage points less likely to have the right to severance pay; 32 percentage
points less likely to have the right to paid leave for vacations, and 31 percentage
points less likely to have the right to paid sick leave compared to Colombians.

1 Analysis based on data from 2023 from the Colombian Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH).

9

What has been done?
In Sri Lanka, the Ministry of Health introduced amandatory social protection plan for all residence
visa applicants. Under the Health Protection Plan,
applicants undergo a health assessment, and residence
visa holders are entitled to a health check-up andseveral health benefits including emergency care,primary outpatient care and treatment for diseases
identified in the assessment.lviii
In Ukraine, IOM implements a range of mental healthand psychosocial support (MHPSS) activities that
support people, including IDPs, returnees, thirdcountry nationals and host communities, to regain asense of safety and human security, encourages thecreation or reactivation of social networks, helps deal
with past and ongoing stressors, and strengthens
overall resilience of individuals affected by the war.

Acceleration Actions for Development

What can be done to get there?

10›

Provide universal access for all migrants to safe,
quality and affordable health services, medicinesand continuity of care, to achieve universal
health coverage; incorporate the health needsof people on the move in policies, strategies andplans; strengthen the capacity of health systems
and enhance vertical coherence to ensure they
are inclusive, equitable, resilient, and migrationsensitive; ensure migrants have access to financial
risk protection, such as insurance coverage, toprevent excessive health expenditures.

›

Extendinclusive
andnon-discriminatory
national social protection systems, including
social protection floors for all migrants; develop
frameworks, policies and practices to remove
obstacles to social protection; and leverageinnovative informal social protection schemes ascomplements to formal social protection whereappropriate and feasible.

›

Conclude bilateral and multilateral social security
agreements and bilateral labour migrationagreements along key migration corridors andwithin regional groupings.

›

During crisis and post-crisis (e.g. pandemics,
disasters), strengthen coordination between
national, subnational and local/community
authorities to enhance accessibility of social
protection and health care for all; work closely withhumanitarian actors to ensure transition measuresfrom cash-based systems towards sustainablesocial protection systems.

Reduce remittance costs and leverage different types of diaspora
contributions to boost sustainable development finance, trade systems
and global value chains

The world urgently needs ambitious and creativeplans to finance sustainable development. It would
take less than 1 per cent of global finance to fill the
SDG funding gap,lix and human mobility can help
provide solutions to do this. Meanwhile, the human,financial and other capital which diaspora members
contribute can support trade systems and global value
chains (GVCs), which in turn play a key role in trade,inclusive growth and job creation around the world. If
managed effectively, migrants’ knowledge transfer andmany other contributions can help boost trade andGVCs, leveraging these for progress. Human mobility
can strengthen both GVCs and development financing
to help achieve SDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10 and 17.

What do we know?
Remittances finance sustainable development. In
2022, remittances to developing countries reached
USD 647 billion,lx representing the largest sourceof external finance flows to low-and middle-income
countries (LMICs) other than China, at about threetimes the volume of official
development
assistance.
In 2022,
Moreover, informal transfers
remittances
may range between 280–600
to developing
billion US dollars.lxi While somecountries
economic effects of thesetransfers are debated, they reached USD
647 billion
have undeniably supported
global development: without
remittances, the proportion of the poor would be 4
per cent higher in Nepal, 5 per cent higher in Ghana,
5–7 per cent higher in Cambodia, 10 per centhigher in Bangladesh, 11 per cent higher in Uganda
and 12 per cent higher in El Salvador.lxii Remittances

can bring educational, health and other benefits andsupport productive investments.lxiii Further, they help
stabilize macroeconomic volatility by financing current
account deficits, and act as insurance during crises orafter disasters.lxiv They can also present a useful sourceof foreign currency and assets in countries’ Balanceof Payments. However, they remain expensive. The
average cost of sending USD 200 of remittances
was 6.3 per cent in 2022, over double the SDG targetof 3 per cent.lxv While these private funds cannot
replace public spending, reducing remittance costs
would increase their volume to directly help financedevelopment in origin countries.
Diasporas boost trade systems and development
financing. Through the human capital thatdiasporas bring, mobility stimulates trade byremoving informational, communication and culturalbarriers.lxvi Migrants’ knowledge can increase tradein goods and services by improving market access,increasing demand and lowering transactions costs asthey help connect firms with buyers overseas.lxvii For
example, African diasporas play a key role promoting
regional exports.lxviii Diasporas also use their humanand financial capital to support origin countries’
productivity. For example, through skills and technology
transfer, trade and entrepreneurship, diasporas fromthe Republic of Korea led to increases in domestic
income. Diasporas also provide knowledge for manyof India’s high-value inventions.lxix Further, migrants cancatalyse foreign direct investment and development incapital markets, by diversifying the investor base andintroducing new financial products and sources offunding.lxx Policy can help boost outcomes; in 2019,
remittances received in countries with an agency for
emigration and diaspora policies were on average

Acceleration Actions for Development

2

117.3 per cent of GDP, and 3.3 per cent for those
without such an agency.lxxi
Regular migration pathways are central to Global
Value Chains (GVCs). Labour mobility is integral toGVCs, as foreign workers are associated with higherquality products, more trade, and more effective global
value chains.lxxii Migrants can help countries advancein GVCs.lxxiii Often this occurs thanks to migrants’transnational knowledge that helps establish crossborder supply chain linkages. For instance, a 10 per
cent increase in migrant workers raises a company’s
probability of sourcing inputs from their origin

countries by 0.2 per cent.lxxiv Migration pathways thatare safe and regular, especially when they are linked
to labour markets, are crucial to meaningful GVC
participation. To enable this, policies pertaining tolabour mobility, education and skills development needto align; for example, training investment cannot boost
GVC performance if policies do not attract foreign
students.lxxv Promoting intraregional skills mobility
could improve sub-Saharan Africa’s integration in
manufacturing GVCs. Furthermore, public–private
collaboration can help integrate labour standards
across GVCs and establish new skills partnerships thatconsider market needs.lxxvi

What could be the impact?

Decreasing the cost of sending remittances could considerably boost amounts ofmoney sent.
On average, a decrease in the cost of remittances by 1 percentage point isassociated with a 0.21 per cent increase in the total amount of remittances
received in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).2 In small island developing
States (SIDS) – which face structural issues in securing predictable and sustainablefinancing for development – a decrease in the cost of remittances by 1 percentage
point is associated with a 0.50 per cent increase in the total amount of remittances
received.

Acceleration Actions for Development

If the current cost of remittances decreased by 5 percentage points, bringing it closer to the SDG target of
3 per cent on average across corridors, this would mean in practice an extra USD 6.88 billion being sent
to households in LMICs per year. For SIDS, this would mean an extra USD 560 million. By 2030, thiswould add up to an additional USD 41.25 billion received in LMICs and USD 3.36 billion in SIDS.3

12

In many countries, remittances make up a significant proportion of GDP, and they are regularly used byreceiving individuals and families to help cover needs such as those related to health or education. While
remittances remain private flows and should not substitute government interventions, they form one partof the ecosystem of financing for development.
Migration can support trade by boosting international exports. Across Central America, North America andthe Caribbean, a 1 per cent rise in migrant stock in a country is associated with a 0.23 per cent increasein exports on average.4 This is equivalent to an estimated increase of USD 7,751 in exports per additionalmigrant.

2 Analysis based on data from Remittances Prices Worldwide (RPW) and KNOMAD, latest data available from 2021 and 2022, as of July 2023.
3 If costs were reduced from 2024–2029, inclusive.
4 Analysis based on migration and trade data over 1990–2020, from the CEPII Gravity Database, IMF DOTS and UN DESA.

What has been done?
In 2021, the Government of Mali adopted the Strategy
to Promote Productive Investment by the Malian
Diaspora. This aims to engage the human, economic
and financial capital of the diaspora in the developmentof Mali, including by providing information to potential
diaspora investors.lxxvii
In the Republic of Moldova, IOM convenes a multiyear joint programme to be implemented with UNDP,
UNICEF and WHO that will leverage the positive
impacts of migration on development, by strengthening
capacities of public authorities. This involves unlocking
the potential of diaspora members in areas fromtelemedicine and the justice sector to innovation andpublic finance.

agency responsible for emigration and diaspora
policies.
›

Establish an enabling environment to reduce thecosts of remittances in line with SDG target 10.c;including through policy and regulatory frameworks;
promoting innovation and competition of nonbank service providers; and working with industry
stakeholders to scale innovative solutions for
remittances.

›

Adopt multi-stakeholder strategies to strengthen
migrant worker protection across production andservices, including for small and medium-sizedenterprises.

IOM invests in programmes, instruments and platforms
that proactively engage diaspora to become investors
in the peace and development of their communities oforigin; and that transfer and connect knowledge andhuman capital for innovation in local development andentrepreneurship in countries of origin. For instance,
the Mobi-TRE initiative implemented in regions ofTunisia characterized by high unemployment, leverages
investments from members of the Tunisian diaspora
based in Italy for business and jobs creation that canstabilize disadvantaged communities: 60 per cent of the
newly created jobs thus far are for workers between
the ages of 18 and 30, and a majority of whom (76 percent) are women.

›

Address barriers to free movement to boost bothcross-border and regional trade of goods andservices, and local and regional value chains.

›

Build programmes that proactively engage diaspora
members to become investors in peace anddevelopment of their origin communities; direct
remittances to productive investment; and transfer
knowledge for innovation and entrepreneurship incountries of origin, in particular to support thegreen transition; to achieve all of these actions,consider establishing a dedicated government

Acceleration Actions for Development

What can be done to get there?

13

3

Weave human mobility into development and urban planning, to increasesocial cohesion and boost development for all

Today 41 per cent of citizens around the world feelthat their sense of social cohesion is weak.lxxviii Whencohesion is threatened, taking a whole-of-society
approach to development and including everyone‘s
voices and priorities is critical. Further, listening
to migrants’ voices would help improve cohesion,
combating negative perception of migration. This isespecially relevant in cities – 5 billion people will livein urban areas by 2050, displacement is increasingly
urban, and city infrastructure will need to adapt
accordingly.lxxix Including migrants and mobility indecision-making can boost cohesion and effectivenessof development interventions, in line with the New
Urban Agenda. Finally, it is key to remember that local
solutions lead to national change. Working closely withmunicipal and rural governments and upscaling whatworks already well in those communities is crucial tosustainable interventions. Integrating human mobility indevelopment planning could drive progress on SDGs 2,
4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 17.

Acceleration Actions for Development

What do we know?

14

Migrants’ integration in politics and policy efforts
is patchy. Political participation and representation of
migrants tends to be low, and in fact migrants haveno right to vote in at least 31 countries out of 56
studied.lxxx In two out of three OECD countries,
migrants are less likely to
Migrants
join voluntary organizations
than non-migrants.lxxxi Some have no rightto vote incountries integrate mobility
considerations into policy
at least 31
planning. For example, 33 countries out
out of 89 countries studied of 56 studied
formally engage membersof diaspora in development policy, and migrants
are regularly consulted by governments in 12 outof 56 countries studied.lxxxii However, this does notalways entail meaningful participation-consultations
sometimes involve only surface-level input or hold little
benefit for migrants.lxxxiii
Including migrant voices boosts cohesion andstrengthens policies. Migrant participation andconsultation on policies that affect them can strengthen
integration and inclusion, boosting cohesion.lxxxiv In
addition, the effectiveness of policies can improvewith the participation of different segments ofsociety.lxxxv Migrants can introduce new informationthat policymakers were not aware of to support
programmes, and may be more likely to comply
with policies over which they feel ownership.lxxxvi For
example, in 1992 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico
negotiated an agreement between both countries that
could not have been secured otherwise. Not including
migrants can be risky; for example, the relatively low
uptake of jobs provided by the 2016 Jordan Compact
is linked to a lack of refugee consultations, which
would have revealed that many jobs offered were
far from refugees’ homes.lxxxviii Migrant voices can bemeaningfully included through councils at nationalor city level, and transnational city networks canshare related experiences. Greater co-design andco-ownership of policies would boost outcomes;
for example, seven NGO partners helped manage
Canada’s labour mobility pathway, connecting refugees
and employers.lxxxix
Considering human mobility creates more effective
development plans. 29 out of 92 countries studiedaligned their national migration strategy with national

development strategies.xc Countries are increasingly
integrating migration considerations into development
planning. Examples of this can be seen in the Republicof Moldova, Mozambique and the Philippines.xci Whilemobility is most often woven into plans throughfocus on remittances or diaspora engagement, infact, migration interacts with many other topics suchas food securityxcii and income. Integrating mobility
considerations into programmes across development
topics is vital to their success. This is especially true
in urban areas, since cities are at the front line ofmobility dynamics and responses; 65 per cent of
SDG targets are linked to local government activity.xciii
Acting on mobility-development links requires close
collaboration between national and local levels. Using
participatory approaches can support displacement
responses in cities, and integrating urban migrants’perspectives into policy is linked with more effective,
sustainable and legitimate solutions. For example,
working with displaced communities when upgrading
informal settlements in Medellín enabled safer living
conditions.xciv

What could be the impact?

Including the voices of diaspora members pays off.
In the Republic of Moldova, a UNDP project to mainstream human mobility into development boosted
efforts to extend basic services and job creation in local communities.xcv New partnerships were createdbetween village residents, members of the diaspora, local government and hometown associations, toimprove water quality, invest in rural tourism businesses, provide direct support during the COVID-19
pandemic, and much more.
As a result, at least 300,000 people benefited from improved local basic services,and 180 private sector beneficiaries benefited from financial and technicalsupport. Approximately 700 jobs were created at the local level.

Including the voices of displaced populations pays off.

It found that a failure to include IDPs directly in LPA negotiations potentially
undermined sustainability of IDP return, and the inclusion of women, youth
and civil society contributed to the sustainability of returns. Meanwhile, indirect
representation of IDPs, through tribal leadership, enabled negotiations to occur thatwould otherwise have been impossible.
Including displaced persons in peacebuilding and development plans could not only
help ensure the 1.2 million current IDPs in Iraq, and the more than 100 million
forcibly displaced globally, are not left behind, but also support efforts to build
cohesive societies.

Acceleration Actions for Development

Between 2015 and 2020, communities across Iraq signed local peace agreements (LPAs) to set the foundations
for peaceful relations between IDPs and their ‘home’ communities. One study explored eight such LPAs.xcvi

15

What has been done?
Malta created an Inter-Ministerial Committee andForum on Integration Opportunities to encourage
migrant participation in decision-making. Portugal
created a Council for Migration, partially composedof representatives from migrant communities andmigrant-focused organizations, to participate inpolicymaking.xcvii

Acceleration Actions for Development

The joint IOM-UNDP Global Programme on Making
Migration Work for Sustainable Development (M4SD),
has pioneered a methodology to mainstream migration
for policy coherence since 2008. The programme
contributes to over 30 SDG targets and indicators,
including by empowering governments to integrate
human mobility into more than 21 national and local
policies. It follows an innovative policy-into-practicemodel, helping translate these policies into concrete
communities initiatives. It is implemented in Bangladesh,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, the Republic ofMoldova, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, andTunisia.

16

The Mayors Mechanism co-steered by IOM, United
Cities and Local Government and the Mayors
Mechanism Council was established in 2018. It is aprime model of a partnership and collaboration space,forging links between States, cities and local/regional
governments as well as civil society, the private sector,
the United Nations system and other international andregional organizations. In 2022, the Mayors Mechanism
launched a Call to Local Action for Migrants andRefugees in partnership with the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which invites
local and regional governments to share knowledge,
create partnerships and upscale good practices insupport of the Compacts to continue to engage
local authorities as essential partners in the quest forsustainable development inclusive of mobility.

What can be done to get there?
›

Holistically address the needs of communities byintegrating mobility considerations across multiple
sectors of community life, including health,employment, housing, education and more.

›

Empower local leaders; allow communities andgovernments to decide their own solutions; buildfrom existing good practices in communities,
scaling up and co-financing services and community
organizations so that they can have bigger impact.

›

Create new spaces for sectors and levels ofgovernment to exchange and collaborate in to help
ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence;create similar spaces that include migrants andlocal residents across communities.

›

Prioritize funding and support for communities
co-creating new solutions to social cohesion,
peace and development challenges with migrants;
work with the media, private sector, educational
institutions and community centres to create
bridges within and across communities.

Develop safe and regular migration pathways, invest in skills development
and facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications, to meet the needs ofchanging labour markets and divergent demographic trends

Migrants bring with them skills that are in demand indestination communities, supporting sectors where
labour is in short supply. Nevertheless, today many
migrants work in jobs unsuited to their level ofqualifications and experience,xcviii and despite shortages
in specific skills around the world, education, training
and mobility policies are not always responsive to these.
Investing in smarter skills development and facilitating
recognition of migrants’ skills could drive progress on
SDGs 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16 and 17.

What do we know?
Effective skills and mobility policies sustain
productive labour markets. Skills training that matches
job requirements improves productivity and growth.
This means that as labour markets become increasingly
global, there is a dual need to invest in skills that are
in demand domestically and globallyxcix and craft
mobility programmes that support their circulation.
These actions support destination countries: highlabour shortages can cost businesses more than 1
trillion USD a year.c Conversely, they also contributeto origin communities, as the emigration of educatedworkers is linked to
The proportion“brain gain”ci – increasedof youth notrates of those who are
in education,highly skilled. Policies
employment or
are needed to fill in thegaps; the proportion of training (NEET) is
youth not in education, at an all-time highemployment or trainingof 23.5 per cent
(NEET) is at an all-timehigh of 23.5 per cent,cii and there are already significant
skills gaps related to the green transition, which
could create 24 million jobs by 2030.ciii Skills mobility

partnerships that invest in vocational training can offer
a quadruple win in this context, improving migrant’s
skills, helping employers and destination countries
meet skill shortages, and contributing to development
in origin countries.civ
Migrants’ skills are often not formally recognized;changing this would benefit all. The average
overqualification rate of native-born workers in theEuropean Union is 21 per cent; it is 33 per cent for
the foreign-born.cv In the European Union, almost 60
per cent of employed tertiary-educated refugees
are overqualified for their jobs, more than twice
the level of the native-born.cvi This costs migrants
and destination communities alike, and migrants’contributions are larger when they can work at levelof their experience. Overqualified workers face lower
wages and job satisfaction, poorer mental health andare linked to higher turnover.cvii Improving recognitionof qualifications enhances efficiency, facilitates theflow of goods and services, decreases skills wastage
and attracts skilled migrants.cviii After qualification
recognition reforms in Australia, the rate of migrantnurses employed in their field rose from 41 per cent to66 per cent from 1996 to 2006–2011, that of migrantdoctors from 41 to 57 per cent, and that of migrantengineers from 17 to 29 per cent.cix In Sweden, formal
degree recognition made migrants 4.4 per cent more
likely to be employed and increased their wages.cx
Better skills development and recognition can equipcountries for diverse demographic changes. By 2050,
older persons will outnumber children under five,youth and adolescents,cxi and demand for health-care
workers will increase to create a potential shortfall of
15 million workers by 2030.cxii As migrants are alreadyAcceleration Actions for Development

417

the backbone of many countries’ health systems,
mobility of health-care workers can ease the burden ofelderly care and support ageing economies. Similarly,
skills development policies will be pivotal for Africa
to leverage its approaching “demographic dividend,”a relative increase in the working-age population thatoffers significant opportunity for accelerated growthand for which accelerated human capital investment
and job creation is needed. Moving forward, countries
can better match global labour supply and demand
by investing in the development of their most needed
skills and creating corresponding legal pathways for
migrants.

What could be the impact?

Across countries, migrants already cushion the challenges of several demographic
changes and contribute to economic growth.
It has been projected that the 15-64-year-old population in OECD economies
will decrease by -0.6 per cent between 2023 and 2030.cxiv Without migrants, inother words halting all migration flows to OECD countries until then, the population
would instead decrease by 4 per cent.

Increasing current annual migration flows to OECD countries by 16.5 per centwould fully compensate for the projected demographic deficit. Doing this would
lead to additional growth of 0.2 per cent in OECD countries by 2030, adding USD
90 billion to GDP.5 By 2030, migrants will contribute an estimated USD 500
billion to OECD economies; around the same as the GDP of Austria.

What has been done?

Acceleration Actions for Development

In Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada (IRCC) works with provincial governments, theprivate sector and civil society to estimate local labourdemand. There are programmes to attract migrants
with specific skills, managed through an electronic
selection system.cxv

18

IOM’s (PROMISE) programme in Cambodia, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Thailand
works to bring labour migration and skills development
issues together. For example, it implements a range ofskills training initiatives, in partnership with national
skills certification bodies and employers. In India, theeMigrate portal helps connect labour demand andsupply, and protects labour emigrants. Overseas
employers dealing with Emigration Check Required(ECR) countries6 can post their labour needs on theplatform, allowing accredited recruitment companies
to facilitate migrant placement. It provides model work
contracts, links to Grievance Portals and more.
The Joint Programme on Labour Migration
Governance for Development and Integration (JLMP)
is implemented by the African Union Commission,
the International Labour Organization (ILO), andthe Economic Commission for Africa, together with
IOM. Within this framework, IOM is actively exploring
innovative legal pathways, such as the Skills Mobility
Partnerships. One of the key objectives of JLMP is
to ensure that migrant workers, both in formal and5 Analysis based on migration flow data from OECD Migration Database, 2000–2020, population from IIASA/Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital,
GDP data from the World Bank, spending data from World Data Lab-World Data Pro, and capital stock from Penn World Table.
6 ECR countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

informal sectors, enjoy safe and secure working
conditions, have access to portable social protection,and benefit from mutual recognition of their skills andqualifications. The programme takes a comprehensive
and integrated approach to skills development andlabour mobility, departing from traditional approaches
that primarily focus on the interests of destination
countries. Instead, it emphasizes the importance ofconsidering the development needs of countries oforigin.
The Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM) on
labour migration governance brings together key
government and private sector stakeholders from
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,through the support of IOM. It aims to support theconvergence and alignment of national skills classification,
standardization and recognition systems, as well as
engage in inter-State cooperation on their recognitionand legal certification. The RCM includes relevant
government representatives such as the Ministries ofLabour, Social Affairs, Internal Affairs, representatives ofthe private sector; technical and vocational educationand training institutions, representatives of State
recruitment agencies and private recruitment agencies,
employers’ representatives, civil society and advocates
for the rights of migrant workers.

looking solution that is centred around cooperativeskills development and the building of meaningful
partnerships between migrants, States, employers,
training and education institutions and civil society
in origin and destination communities to share thebenefits of labour mobility.
›

Strengthen capacities of institutions to collect andanalyse data from administrative and other sources
for labour market and mobility analysis; invest in
mapping of skills gaps.

›

Facilitate the sustainable reintegration of returning
migrants into community life by providing themwith equal access to social protection and services,
vocational trainings, employment opportunities anddecent work, recognition of skills acquired abroad,and financial services. This is done to build upon
their entrepreneurship, skills and human capitalas active members of society and contributors ofsustainable development upon return.

›Support and convene relevant public and private
stakeholders, including government actors, tradeunions, migrant associations and non-governmentalorganizations, employers and others to create
and implement market-driven skills development
policies that improve employability while meeting
aspirations of people on the move, and distributerelevant costs among stakeholders.

›

Support convergence and alignment of national
skills classification, standardization and recognition
systems, moving towards common skill taxonomies
and harmonization templates, and engage ininternational cooperation on their recognition.

›

Scale up and replicate innovative tools such as the
skills mobility partnerships model as a forward-

Acceleration Actions for Development

What can be done to get there?

19

5

Reduce the digital access gap for people on the move, to improve
integration and unlock innovative and green entrepreneurship

In a world where the new face of inequality is digital,
many migrant populations face limited digital access.
At the same time, migrants are more likely to beentrepreneurs. Closing the digital divide would not
only decrease inequalities, but allow more migrant-led
innovation to flourish. Governments and businesses
have not focused enough on how migrants can
support a low-carbon future;cxvi boosting digitalizationand migrants’ entrepreneurship could present an
opportunity to help address climate change. Reducing
the digital access gap could drive progress on SDGs 4,
8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 17.

Acceleration Actions for Development

What do we know?

20

Migration is linked to innovation andentrepreneurship. Migrants are disproportionately
represented among inventors and in most countries,and self-employment is higher for migrants than for
natives.cxvii Non-nationals make up a disproportionate
share of patent submissions – 38.5 per cent in the
United Kingdom, 40.2 per cent in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, 55.7 per cent in the United States,and 87.3 per cent in Canada – and 36 per cent ofhigh-tech companies are founded by migrants.cxviii
Migrants’ diverse skill sets, knowledge, and experiences
can boost innovation and productivity in firms,cxix andremittances and return migration are often linked
to entrepreneurship.cxx In some cases, migrants’innovations support the green transition; for example,
in Israel the water treatment sector was developed
partially thanks to technology and knowledge transferfrom the diaspora.cxxi
Digital inequalities hold migrants’ entrepreneurshipback. Mobile populations often have lower access todigital technologies.cxii For example, almost 60 million
refugees and IDPs do not have reliable internet andmobile connectivity, and refugees are 50 per centless likely to have an internet-enabled phone than
the general population.cxiii In the United States,
approximately 5 per cent of those who speak English
at home have no computer experience, and this rateis almost 21 per cent for migrants who do not speak
English at home.cxxiv This can be due to cost, digital
literacy and other reasons, with some subgroups, suchas those who have recently
Almostarrived,facingadditional
60 million
barriers.cxxv Lack of digital
refugees andaccess is linked to isolation,cxxvi
and decreased training and
IDPs do not
cxxviieducation
participation.
have reliable
Reducing the digital accessinternet
gap is vital to enable migrant
and mobile
inclusion and integration, as it
connectivity
facilitates access to information
on basic needs such as housing, employment, educationand health, access to social networks, government
e-services, language training and many forms of digitallearning as well as job-seeking opportunities.cxviii Digitalcooperation discussions should place greater focus on
people on the move.cxxix
Increasing
digitalization
can
drive
green
entrepreneurship.
Digitalizationcan
expandentrepreneurial financing options, particularly for thosewith poor access to formal finance. For example, in
China access to digital finance increased migrants’propensity towards entrepreneurship.cxxx Digitalizationof remittances can help migrants save more, and higher
savings are linked to migrant entrepreneurship.cxxxi For
example, MobileRemit, a mobile remittances channel

in seven African countries, links migrants to services toboost financial inclusion and entrepreneurship.cxxxii The
green transition will require changes across industries
and occupations, and for this to happen, innovationis needed. Digital policies can encourage migrants’entrepreneurship to accelerate the transition andsupport climate action. By supporting migrants in thismanner across destination, origin and return countries,

migrants could help make the green transition more
inclusive geographically. Finally, the rise of teleworking
brings not only productivity gains and reduced CO2
emissions, but new opportunities for workers acrossborders.cxxxiii Policy must respond to these changes,
leveraging benefits to workers, employers, communities
and the environment.cxxxiv

What could be the impact?

Improving migrants’ digital access and financial inclusion, two building blocks ofentrepreneurship, could help unlock their contributions to society.

In Kenya, there is a digital divide – migrants are 4 percentage point less likely
to have a smartphone than Kenyan-born – as well as a financial access gap –migrants are 19 percentage points less likely to have a bank account.8 These
inequalities are sometimes linked; migrants are 20 percentage points less likely touse mobile phones for financial transactions than Kenyan-born. Increasing migrants’digital access could boost financial inclusion; migrants who use the internet on a daily
basis are 38 percentage points more likely to have a bank account than those who
use the internet less frequently. Further, Migrants who use the internet on a daily
basis are 31 percentage points more likely to use a mobile phone for financialtransactions than those who use the internet less frequently.

7 Analysis based on data from 2020–2022 from the United Kingdom survey Understanding Society.
8 Analysis based on data from 2022 from the Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).

Acceleration Actions for Development

In the United Kingdom migrants are 8 percentage points more likely than the
UK-born to want to open a business during the next year.7 Migrants’ selfemployment is often linked to their digital access; migrants with a mobile phone
are 7 percentage points more likely to be self-employed. Increasing digital inclusion
could help boost migrants’ entrepreneurship; one percentage point increase inmigrants’ rate of daily internet use is associated with a 4 percentage point increasein the likelihood of being self-employed.

21

What has been done?
Uruguay’s regulations on migration are publicly
available in user-friendly way, through a specialized
government website. It contains step-by-step guidanceon the migration process, a handbook for returning
nationals, information on how to access public health,education and legal services, and job-seeking andlanguage resources.cxxxv
The Resilience Innovation Facility, also known as FabLab, was established by IOM and other partners as
a space for young innovators in Gaziantep, a major
refugee-hosting province in Türkiye. In the Gaziantep
University campus, the space is open-door andprovides free access to digital tools, equipment andtechnology, as well as mentorship and courses oninnovation, design-thinking and problem-solving.
To broaden the usage of digital platforms and tools
for safe, orderly and regular migration, the program
Hola America seeks to promote social innovations
focused on migration, in order to offer better solutions
to the problems encountered by different migrant
and refugee communities in Latin America. It enables
civil society and private sector partners to showcase
their novel approaches and receive seed funding tofurther develop their business plans for enhancedsocial impact, systems change and sustainability forsolutions executed or expanded in Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, andVenezuela.

Acceleration Actions for Development

What can be done to get there?

22›

Ensure that migrants and displaced persons areincluded in digital cooperation discussions andspecifically accounted for in global efforts tomeasure digital inclusion.

›

Facilitate more inclusive and quality education for
hard-to-reach migrants by leveraging digital tools
for early childhood development, formal schooling,
non-formal education programmes, vocational
training, technical education, language training andlifelong learning.

›

Broaden the use of digital platforms and tools toaccess information and guidance on safe, orderly
and regular mobility opportunities, for example
explaining entry and admission requirements;
as well as tools that encourage engagement of
diaspora members.

›

Use technology to simplify and streamline
international mobility and entry procedures, while
upholding the principle of non-discrimination,
respecting the right to privacy and protecting
personal data.

Integrate human mobility into national adaptation and climate change
response plans, and invest in preparedness and loss and damages
provisions, to forge impactful climate and peace action

Climate change and conflict are existential threats to
SDG progress. One quarter of humanity lives in a
conflict-affected area, and there were 31.8 million new
internal displacements due to weather-related events in
2022.cxxxvi These and other affected populations are athigh risk of being left behind. The links between climatechange, conflict and mobility are complex; acting onthese can save lives and aid development, in line with
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Sendai
framework for Action for Disaster Risk Reduction,and the New Agenda for Peace. Integrating humanmobility across humanitarian, peace and development
plans could drive progress on SDGs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15,
16 and 17.

What do we know?
Policy coherence is crucial to managing climatechange, conflict and human mobility. Comprehensive
solutions are needed, including in emergency andpost-crisis displacement contexts, that embed strong
links among humanitarian, peace and security, anddevelopment assistance. Such links lay the foundations
for durable solutions, lasting peace and sustainable
development. The same goes for climate change, as its
indirect effects on human mobility are highly complex,
and addressing these requires coherent policy acrosssectors. For example, climate change-related declines
in agricultural productivity can trigger rural–urban
migration, leading to increased pressures on cities
and labour markets.cxxxvii Adapting to these changes
requires aligning laws, strategies and plans acrosspolicy domains (including climate change, disaster risk
reduction and others). Further, health systems suffer
shocks as they face the direct and indirect effects ofclimate change, and are crucial to determining migrantwell-being.cxxxviii Moving forward, the resilience of
health systems in the context of climate change andmobility must be considered.
However, there is limited integration of humanmobility in relevant frameworks. Populations on
the move are, to varying degrees, considered in highlevel peace, climate change and other processes. For
example, the New Agenda for Peace recognizes thatconflict is a key driver of displacement and highlights
the vulnerabilities of displaced people. However, whilemobility is increasingly included in climate change policies
and frameworks, this is done unevenly. While 33 of
the 40 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) submitted
to the UNFCCC mention one or more forms ofhuman mobility, mobility-related terms are not used
coherently and most plans ignore how mobility canhelp enhance adaptation (such as through pastoralism,
labourmigrationorplannedrelocation).cxxix
Out of 165
Out of 165 Intended
IntendedNationally
Determined
NationallyContributions, only 34
Determined(20%) refer to humanContributions,mobility.cxl Out of 156
only 34 (20%)
countries that submitted
refer to humanrevisedor
updatedmobility
Nationally
Determined
Contributions (NDCs) in
2020–2022, only 61 (39%) refer to mobility and only
some propose concrete interventions.cxli 34 out of 92
countries have a national disaster risk reduction (DRR)
strategy with provisions on displacement impacts.cxlii
Despite its relevance, mobility is still omitted fromcertain key documents, including SDG 13 and financing
agreements such as the Green Climate Fund.cxliii

Acceleration Actions for Development

623

Integrating mobility considerations is integral topeace and climate change action. Most of today’s
major challenges to peace and prosperity – frominequality to terrorism to climate change – areinterlinked, meaning that their solutions must be
cross-sectoral. In turn, human mobility must be
systematically included across plans. DRR saves money
and lives – each DRR dollar spent reduces damages
by six dollarscxliv – and will become more importantas climate events increase. To ensure minimal lossof lives due to disasters, early warning systems mustensure universal coverage, including migrants. Doing
this may require special considerations, as many
migrants live in hazard-prone areas and could be thefirst and worst affected; for example, the number ofprojected earthquake casualties in Türkiye increased
from 1 to 26 per cent when accounting for Syrian
refugees.cxlv Moving forward, climate-change related
global frameworks and planning need to recognize
and integrate different forms of human mobility. For
example, the establishment of the Santiago Network
for Loss and Damage institutional arrangements
decision is a step forward in strengthening solutions
for human mobility in the context of climate change. In
the same way, solutions to conflict and insecurity must
include people on the move to help sustain peace, andsecure longer lasting and more inclusive development
outcomes.

What could be the impact?

Does including human mobility in a country’s NDC have any effect on disastercosts?9
Kenya and Somalia experienced the same drought event in 2020. Kenya mentions
mobility in its NDC, while Somalia does not. Damages-per-people-affected werelower in Kenya (USD 63 per affected) than in Somalia (USD 158 per affected).
Fiji and Tonga experienced the same cyclone in 2020. Fiji’s NDC contains mobility
provisions, while Tonga’s only includes mentions. Damages-per-affected for Fiji weremuch lower (USD 82 per affected) than for Tonga (USD 5,000 per affected).

Acceleration Actions for Development

Bangladesh and India experienced the same cyclone in 2020. Bangladesh mentions
mobility in its NDCs while India does not. Damages-per-people-affected were lower
in Bangladesh (USD 652 per affected) than in Somalia (USD 848 per affected).

24

The Dominican Republic and the United States experienced the same cyclone in2020. The Dominican Republic mentions relocation in its NDCs, while the UnitedStates does not. Damages-per-people-affected were lower in the former (USD
33,347 per affected) than in the latter (USD 970,094 per affected).

When they were affected by the same climate change-related disaster, countries who had integrated humanmobility in their NDCs had lower related disaster costs. Note that these country pairs have different
contexts and cannot be directly compared.

9 These figures are descriptive only, and do not show a statistically significant relationship between a country’s mobility integration in NDCs and disaster costs. Data used is fromthe International Disaster Database (EM-DAT, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) and SLYCAN Trust (2022).

›In 2018, the Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management
Commission released a Humanitarian and Disaster
Resilience Plan, addressing the displacement impact
of disasters, climate change and conflict. The Planfocuses on IDPs and contains detailed displacement
considerations, including providing emergency
protection services.cxlvi

Provide solutions for people to move, including
regular migration pathways from climate
vulnerable and disaster-prone areas, while
facilitating livelihoods and return and reintegration
after crises; as a last resort option, develop rightsbased and participatory frameworks so people
can move.

›

Promote and roll out durable solutions fordisplacement such as initiatives that grant, expedite,or waive visas and other entry requirements,
including through private sponsorships and family
reunification; implement non-return policies
to ensure migrants are not returned to origin
countries experiencing disasters and violent
conflict.

In Somalia IOM, UNEP and the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) work together tobreak the climate-conflict cycle and foster a sense ofunity among the war-weary communities.

What can be done to get there?
›

Integrate human mobility across national andinternational frameworks, policies and planson climate change, adaptation, disaster risk
reduction and development and build capacities of
stakeholders to do this.

›Strengthen systems to prevent and respond to
future crises, including through risk assessmentsthat factor in future climate change impacts to
inform mobility programming for preparedness,
conflict prevention and resolution, disasterrisk reduction and climate change adaptation;
develop urban development plans that prepare
for mobility; increase bilateral and IFI investments
in foresight, early warning, climate adaptation,
conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

›

Facilitate the participation of all types of migrants
in peace dialogue and processes as well as actions
regarding climate change adaptation, mitigationand losses and damages – including across COPs
and relevant for SIDS and other countries – byincluding experts, migrants and their families inassessments and consultations, and their direct
input into documents.

Acceleration Actions for Development

What has been done?

25Happy migrated from Malawi to South
Africa in search for better opportunities
to sustain her family.
© IOM 2022 / Jerry De Mars

26

LOOKING AHEAD
We often hear about migration’s “development
potential”. This document, however, shows that weare no longer talking about a hypothetical – humanmobility is already a force for progress that theinternational community must leverage to help reach
the SDGs. Well-managed human mobility is key toachieving the 2030 Agenda, both for SDG 10.7 onorderly, safe, regular and responsible mobility, as well
as more broadly across other Goals.

development, this document offers a glimpse of thepossible.

Today’s sobering picture of reversing SDG progress
is a clarion call to redouble efforts to leave no one
behind and overcome the triple planetary crisis –and to utilize every available solution to achieve this.
Meanwhile, as human mobility dynamics continue to
evolve in tandem with global trends, it has become
clear that we cannot properly respond to any of ourchallenges without considering them across policy
and programming. While migrants are often among
the furthest left behind, vulnerable because of abuse,
exploitation, discrimination or intersecting inequalities,
they simultaneously push forward development, wellbeing and growth for people and planet in myriad ways.

›

Double down on existing human mobility,
sustainable development and other global
commitments. We have the blueprints needed fortransformation: the 2030 Agenda, Addis Ababa
Action Agenda, Sendai Framework on Disaster
Risk Reduction, the Paris Agreement and manyothers. It is fundamental to achieve progress onthese, while including mobile populations andintegrating human mobility considerations acrossthese, thereby creating long-lasting solutions
to global challenges. Concretely, countries canstrengthen the links among all of these frameworks,
for example by developing integrated actions plansand deepening ties between review forums.

›

Commit to and implement mobility-centric
frameworks, in particular the Global Compact for
Migration. The Secretary General’s Action Agenda
on Internal Displacement can transform the way
displacement crises are resolved, prevented andaddressed, and how humanitarian support for thosemost in need is delivered. The Global Compact for
Migration offers a 360-degree vision, ten guiding
principles and 23 objectives, commitments andactions. This provides a robust and internationallyagreed framework of good migration governance;
as a comprehensive blueprint for action, it iscentral to leverage migration for response andrecovery efforts and accelerate migration-related
SDG implementation.cxlviii Following the Global
Compact‘s guiding principles in the development
and implementation of migration laws, policies andpractices will help achieve and solidify progress.

Looking Ahead

Our solutions must evolve as rapidly as the world
does. It has been pointed out that this generation isequipped with unprecedented knowledge, technologies
and resources, and that “breaking through to a better
future” demands use of this major advantage.cxlvii
This rings especially true when it comes to humanmobility. Today there is a growing evidence about how,
if managed effectively, mobility can bring benefits toindividuals, families, communities and societies aroundthe world. With the world now at such an existential
crossroads, there is little justification not to act on
it. Mainstreaming human mobility considerations
into development must gather speed to respond to
global threats and take advantage of the opportunities
migrants bring; with the right levers, doing so can leadto systemic change. For example, as climate mobility
rises, expanded legal pathways will be crucial as partof a broader response. By delineating several mutually
reinforcing areas of action to accelerate sustainable

We have seen how six Acceleration Actions canleverage human mobility for sustainable development
and explored operational insights on how to do thiseffectively. What else can concretely be done so thatmobility supports our shared aims for people andplanet?

27

Looking Ahead

For example, it is critical to take a whole-ofgovernment and whole-of-society approach, andensure policies and programmes are rights-based,
evidence-based, people-centred and genderresponsive, to boost policy coherence and improvemigration governance at all levels.

28›

Weave human mobility into the new Rescue
Plan for People and Planet. To fast-track SDG
implementation, countries will come together
around a Rescue Plan with three fronts ofaction: equipping governance and institutions
for sustainable and inclusive transformation,prioritizing policies and investments that havemultiplier effects across the goals, and securing
a surge in SDG financing and an enabling global
environment for developing countries. Human
mobility must be part of action under each ofthese pillars. In particular, it can play a key role ininnovative development financing moving forward.
To address the SDG funding gap, all possible levers
need to be used – from trade to new financial
products and philanthropy – and populations on
the move already play a large and growing role inmany of these. In this way, mobility-driven financing
mechanisms can complement the United Nations
SDG Stimulus Plan.

›

End misinformation and political manipulation ofhuman mobility. Different types of migration havebeen simplified, stigmatized and politicized aroundthe world. We regularly hear that migrants lead tolower wages, fewer jobs, heavy burdens on public
services, lower social cohesion, and increased
crime. In reality, these perceptions are often
overblown or factually incorrect. This situationmust change, not only to spare migrants unjust
scapegoating, but to clear the road ahead fortransformative change. Categorically, the action thisdocument proposes cannot be effective without afundamental shift in migration-related narratives.
It is critical for actors within and across countries
to work together to communicate facts, sharepeople-centred stories, meaningfully engage withthe roots of individuals’ fears, and create bridges
across communities. Participatory communication
campaigns and media awareness training can help;

the frameworks above can also guide actors at
different levels in doing this.
Effectively leveraging human mobility for progress has
key implications for how development is done; businessas usual is simply not good enough. A holistic approachis needed. Within countries, migration policymaking isoften undertaken by different ministries and agencies
in siloes, with mixed results. However, human mobility
has links across humanitarian, development, peace andmany other dimensions. This means that it requires theinsights of human rights experts, diaspora members,
labour economists, lawyers, business owners, climate
scientists, gender specialists, sociologists, behaviouralscientists and many, many others. We have the power
to build off of what we now know to create a better
environment for mobility to boost development, but
this requires collaboration from actors across sectors
and areas of expertise. Further, meeting people’s
immediate humanitarian needs while both reducing
risk and vulnerability and building development
solutions requires effective collaboration across thehumanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN).
New conversations are needed to combine different
skill sets and bodies of experience to create solutions.
This is exciting rather than onerous: precisely because
human mobility cuts across so many areas, theopportunities to leverage its positives are rich and holdhigh potential for innovation.
Aside from cross-sectoral teamwork, strong
international cooperation is needed. The political
economy of migration governance is complex and, still
too often, zero sum. Policies, usually set unilaterally,
tend to have the interests of one country in mind.
For example, while destination countries often aim tosolve specific skills shortages, origin countries may beworried about the rights of their labour emigrants. By
definition, human mobility links different geographies;
we often forget that its policy responses do so as
well. No country can address the challenges andopportunities of human mobility alone. As we alreadyknow is the case for sustainable development, theneeds of countries are more likely to be met if they
are considered together – collective gains reward
collaboration on migration governance.

Not only does the 2030 Agenda remain possible andessential, but we must think ahead to do more. The
SDG Summit Declaration can reignite global SDG
commitment and advance the role of human mobility
as part of an urgent strategy to reduce inequality,
respond to the climate crisis, and much more. But
beyond this, how can mobility support Our Common
Agenda and the 2024 Summit of the Future?

as real catalysts for change rather than ring hollow.
Collectively, humanity can overcome huge issues andachieve incredible progress; it remains completely
within our capacity to govern human mobility in a waythat benefits people and planet. Everyone has a role toplay in thinking boldly and creatively about the future
we want, and how to link sustainable development,
peace, security, climate change and human mobility.

The Acceleration Actions identified above in thisreport are aligned to the six transitions identified by the
UNSDG – climate, biodiversity and pollution, energy,
food systems, education, jobs and social protection,and digital connectivity – so efforts to meet the
Actions also support transition action. Today there isa chance to make international commitments that act

Put very simply, the world we want will not be
achieved without considering safe, orderly and regularhuman mobility. There is now an unprecedented
chance to acknowledge this and channel mobility tohelp achieve shared objectives. It is too late to waste
this opportunity – and transformative change is withinreach.

After floods, caused by torrential rains and thebursting of the banks of the Limpopo River inMozambique, that led to significant displacement,
IOM distributed shelter toolkits, as well as solar
kits with cell phone chargers and lights to reduce
security risks in the new relocation sites.
© IOM 2013

ANNEX 1: IOM’S RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS
UNDER THE ACCELERATION ACTIONS
Acceleration Action 1: Recent achievements
IOM works for comprehensive and sustainable
solutions that link humanitarian cash assistance withsocial protection systems, livelihood support andother development programmes: in 2022, 2.67 million
beneficiaries were reached through Cash Based
Initiatives (CBI).
Since 2020, IOM provided 13,491,987 primary
health-care consultations to migrants in countries inemergency and transition contexts. In the year 2022
only, IOM responded to 112 disease outbreaks suchas polio, measles and Ebola and supported vaccination
activities for 3 million hard-to-reach mobile
populations, IDPs, refugees and host communities.
In 2022, IOM engaged in 81 countries to address
inequalities and discriminatory access to services
or disadvantages that drive displacement and unsafe
migration; and led initiatives in 92 countries
that included youth as primary stakeholders or
beneficiaries and covering all the priority areas of theUnited Nations Youth Strategy.
Acceleration Action 2: Recent achievements

Annex 1

IOM works to enhance the flexibility and accessibilityof regular migration pathways. This includes a strong
focus on information-sharing on existing migration
pathway: over 6.3 million migrants were reachedwith information on how to access regular migration
pathways in 2022.

30

In 2022, IOM co-hosted the first Global Diaspora
Summit which was attended by over 700 participantsfrom governments, diaspora organizations andother partners. The Summit resulted in the Dublin
Declaration and a plan of action to support strategic

engagement with diaspora organizations. And in thelast year only, IOM engaged in initiatives with diaspora
groups and diaspora investment organizations inover 60 countries.
Acceleration Action 3: Recent achievements
In 2022 only, IOM’s migration policy experience andexpertise informed the development or revisionof 86 migration policies and/or laws. Further, IOM
directly engaged in 51 countries, supporting national
governments’ efforts to refine or mainstream
migration into development or sectoral policy
across an increasingly broad array of thematic areas,such as social protection, health, employment and theenvironment.
In 2022, 7,751 government institutions and 564 local
actors were supported in ensuring the inclusion of
migrants and/or displacement affected populations inpolicy processes that support cohesive communities
and sustainable rural and urban development.
Globally, IOM partners with a range of civil society
entities. During 2022, 135 IOM country offices
partnered with national NGOs, 94 with academia andresearch institutes, and 79 with migrant associations
or diaspora groups, including on awareness-raising
campaigns to counter xenophobia and discrimination,
reaching 3,802,436 individuals.
Acceleration Action 4: Recent achievements
IOM’s partnership with the Department of Skill
Development of the Ministry of Labour of Thailand,
which works to integrate migrants into national
skills training initiative, led 163,620 migrant workers
benefiting from skills training in 2022 in that countryonly.

In 2022, over 900 government authorities in 34
countries participated in training to support
them to better design and implement strategies toprotect migrant workers during recruitment andacross the migration continuum. In partnership with
the Sustainable Hospitality Alliance, IOM launched a
new global initiative to promote ethical recruitmentin the hospitality and tourism industry called IRIS:
Ethical Tourism. The initiative has had an impact on
the policies of six major global brands, trained over
230 industry leaders from eight brands, and has led
to the implementation of relevant policies in over
15,000 properties globally.
Acceleration Action 5: Recent achievements
In 2022, IOM established 154 initiatives in 61
countries to enhance migrants’ access to legal identity
and close the legal identity gap.
Overall use of and engagement with the Migration
Network Hub – a virtual meeting space where
governments, stakeholders and experts can accessand share migration-related information and services– grew during the year. During Migration Week 2022,
the Hub received more than 30,000 web page views.
Acceleration Action 6: Recent achievements
In 2022, 51 IOM country offices produced researchin diverse contexts to support integrating humanmobility into National Adaptation Plans; 43 engaged
in policy support; 23 in climate change adaptation
activities; and 21 in mitigation activities.
In 2022, IOM reached 1,522,660 people in 80
countries with activities in the following thematic
areas: community stabilization; durable solutions;peacebuilding and peace preservation; disasterrisk reduction; disarmament, demobilization andreintegration; preventing violent extremism; restoring
housing, land and property rights; reparations andhumanitarian support to victims of human rights
violations.
In 2022, 5,728 government officials were supported
by IOM in the development of tools, systems andstrategies to identify and/or address drivers of conflict.

An IOM mental health and psychosocial
support counsellor leads a session witha woman.
© IOM 2023 / Léo Torréton

Emergency preparedness training
including CCCM, emergency shelter
management, fire safety. Humanitarianprinciples applied to emergency response.
© IOM 2019 / Akil Blanchard

ENDNOTES
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Clemens M.A., C. E. Montenegro and
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OECD,

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McAuliffe, M. and A. Triandafyllidou (eds.),
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iv

See World Bank, World Development Report2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies World
Bank, 2023. Along with mobility dynamics,
corresponding concepts and definitions have
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types of movements, this report refers to“human mobility” rather than migration. Thisis a wide-ranging term that covers the full
spectrum of movements of persons, includinginternational migration, internal migration, anddisplacement (Sironi, A. C., Bauloz and M.
Emmanuel (eds.), Glossary on Migration, IOM,
2019), taking an inclusive approach when
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v

UN DESA, International Migrant Stock 2020,
2021.

vi

See IOM, Migration and the 2030 Agenda: A
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vii

J. Carling, Thirty-six migration nexuses, andcounting, jorgencarling.org, 2017.

viii

xii

World Bank Migration and Development: A
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xiii

Ibid.

xiv

IOM, Missing Migrants Project data, IOM, n.d.

xv

World Bank, 2023.

xvi

Ibid.

xvii

United Nations Network on Migration,

Implementing the Global Compact for
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Nations Network on Migration, 2023.
xviii

IMF, World Economic Outlook: The Great
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between migration management, development
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Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2021.

Ratha, D., S. Plaza, E. J. Kim, V. Chandra, N.
Kurasha, and B. Pradhan, Migration andDevelopment Brief 38: Remittances Remain
Resilient But Are Slowing, KNOMAD–World
Bank, 2023.
ix

Experimental vs. Non-Experimental Measuresof the Income Gains from Migration, IZA
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xix

Czaika, M. and M. Godin, Qualitative

Comparative Analysis for migration anddevelopment research, MIGNEX Background
Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo,2019.

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xx

xxi

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xxii

United Nations, 2023a.

xxiii

Ibid.; ILO, ILO Global Estimates on International
Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology– Third edition, ILO, 2021.

xxiv

xxv

xxvi

Hennebry, J., J. Holliday and M. Moniruzzaman,
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IOM, IOM OUTLOOK ON MIGRATION,
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UN DESA, IOM and OECD, SDG indicator
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policies to facilitate orderly, safe, regular andresponsible migration and mobility of people,
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xxvii

xxviii

UNESCO, Setting commitments: national
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xxix

UN DESA, International Migration Report2017 (ST/ESA/SER.A/403), UN DESA, 2017.

xxx

ILO, 2021.

xxxi

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xxxiii

United Nations, 2018.

xxxiv

Mosler Vidal, E. and F. Laczko (eds.), Migrationand the SDGs: Measuring Progress – An
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xxxv

UNSD, SDG Database, n.d. Note thatcomparable global data is not yet available forindicator 10.7.1: Recruitment cost borne byemployee as a proportion of yearly income
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xxxvi

IOM, How Countries Manage Migration Data:
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xxxvii United Nations, 2023a.
xxxviii IOM, Harnessing Data Innovation for Migration
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Mosca, D.T., J. Vearey, M. Orcutt and A.B.
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34

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xlii

IOM, Migration Governance Indicators Dataand the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
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xlix

THROUGH SOCIAL PROTECTION Reporton the World Social Situation, UN DESA,
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UN-Women, Leaving no one behind: Accessto social protection for all migrant women,
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xlvii

OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013,
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xlviiiOECD/EC, Indicators of Immigrant Integration
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and

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U. Trummer, S. Novak-Zezula, A-T. Renner
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IOM, 2016.

Endnotes

xliii

35

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EuropeanCommission,
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Koczan, Z., G. Peri, M. Pinat and D. Rozhkov,
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lvi

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39; Bharadwaj, R., S. Hazra, M. Reddy, S.
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lvii

lviii

IOM, 2022.

lix

Global Outlook on Financing
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Ratha et al., 2023.

lxi

Fernandes, D., R. Gravesteijn and A. Aneja,

Approaches to evaluating and estimating
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lxiv

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Adams, R.H. and J. Page, “Do International
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36

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World Bank, Remittances Prices Worldwide
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lxvi

Javorcik, B.S., Ç. Özden, M. Spatareanu and
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lxxiiiOECD, Perspectives on Global Development
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lxxviiIOM, 2022.

lxxviii

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lxxxi

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lxxxiiIOM, 2022; MIPEX, 2020.

lxxxiii

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xciiiOECD, OECD toolkit for a territorial
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