KGRI Working Papers
No. 5

Gray Zone Situations in Japan:
Focusing on Differences in Understanding between
the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard

Version 1.0
March 2019

Masahiro Kihara

Keio University Global Research Institute© Copyright 2019 Masahiro Kihara
Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University

Introduction: Can Gray Zone Situations be Categorized as War?
When considering how to respond to gray zone situations in the security environment, it is extremely
important to theoretically understand the real nature of such gray zone situations. Unless gray zone
situations can be clearly defined, it is impossible to formulate effective countermeasures.
One to bear in mind in terms of a gray zone situation is the standoff between Japan and China in the
East China Sea, including the area around the Senkaku Islands. Since the Japanese government
acquired the ownership rights to the Senkaku Islands 1 in 2012, Chinese government and naval vessels
have intermittently intruded into Japanese waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. In response, Japan
dispatches Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the area, shares information,and carries out warning and surveillance activities.
In Defense of Japan 2018 (Defense White Paper), published by the Ministry of Defense, this is
explained in the following way. “There has been also a tendency towards an increase in andprolongation of so-called gray-zone situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor [wartime]
contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests.” Within that, so-calledgray zone situations are described as a “broad range of situations that are neither pure[ly] peacetime
nor [wartime] contingencies. For example, conflicting assertions between states, etc., over territory,
sovereignty, economic interests including maritime interests, etc., and at the least one party showing
physical presence frequently, or attempting or making changes to the status quo in an area related tothe dispute by using armed organizations or other means to the extent that it does not constitute anarmed attack, in order to appeal a party’s assertion or demand or to force acceptance of it.” 2
On the other hand, there is no definition of gray zone situations in the Japan Coast Guard Report(Japan Coast Guard White Paper), which is published each year by the Japan Coast Guard, 3 and no
mention of awareness concerning any threat relating to gray zone situations as indicated by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, even in interviews with maritime
safety officials, it was revealed that the concept or term “gray zone situations” was not in use within
the Japan Coast Guard.

1

This refers to the three islands Uotsuri-Shima, Minami-Kojima and Kita-Kojima.

2

Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018.
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2018/html/n11100000.html] (Last accessed on
December 5, 2018.)

3

Japan Coast Guard, Japan Coast Guard Report 2001–2017.
[https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/doc/hakkou/report/top.html] (Last accessed on December 5, 2018.)

In the Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival
and Protect its People that was released on July 1, 2014, three basic policies for security framework
development were announced: (1) Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed
Attack, (2) Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community, and (3)Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution. In terms of semantics, (1)Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack is related to “responding togray zone situations, and it is conceivable that this prompted the clarification of the definition of grayzone situations.” However, in the deliberation process in the Diet, etc., these things are not consideredfrom the perspective of both the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard.
So, why is this understanding of gray zone situations not shared with the Japan Coast Guard, which isthe first to respond on the front line in gray zone situations?
In this paper I would like to address the difference in understanding [regarding this matter] between
the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard. In addition to focusing on this issue, I will also
clarify Japan’s perspective on gray zone situations by collating information regarding the gray zone
situations of the US, China and Russia. This will provide us with a new perspective regarding grayzone situations that in the future have the potential to become a major form of international conflict.

1. Research regarding Gray-Zone Situations
Previous research regarding gray zone situations was analyzed from four different perspectives: (1)Definition of terms, (2) approach from a legal perspective, (3) concept development, and (4) overseas
research regarding gray zone situations.

(1) Definition of Terms
In this paper I am going to use “gray zone situations” as this is somewhat broader and is the phrasethat is actually used by the Ministry of Defense and other government institutions. As there is no legal
concept of gray zone situations, as the words themselves indicate, this is a straightforward expression
indicating a wide range of circumstances. Therefore, it is inappropriate to clearly declare whether or
not each individual incident falls into the category of a gray zone situation. 4

4

Reply by Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, 186th Diet, Upper House Committee on Foreign
Affairs and Defense No.10, April 10, 2014.
[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/186/0059/18604100059010a.html] (Last accessed on
December 5, 2018.)2

(2) Approach from a Legal Perspective
In terms of papers written by individuals, the first time that the issue of gray zone situations was raised
was by Security Discussion Group researcher Kazuki Yano. In December 2013, Japan for the firsttime adopted a National Security Strategy in place of the Basic Policy for National Defense, which
was enacted in 1957. In light of this, Yano (2014) points out that although seamless response to grayzone situations is mentioned repeatedly in the National Security Strategy, based on the awareness that
there is almost no mention of problems in defense legislation and how to respond, it does not matter
how much gray zone situations flare up. It is because as long as they are not recognized as a war
contingency, they are a peacetime contingency, and as the Self-Defense Forces are not conferred withthe right of self-defense during peacetime, as long as the existing defense framework is not improved,
it is impossible to respond to gray zone situations. 5 Yano mentions constitutional reform in relation to
the ultimate solution to these problems, taking the position that gray zone situations arise because
there is a legal loophole.
Koichi Morikawa (2016) delineates these so-called “gray-zone situations,” maintaining that “thesegray-zone situations are ‘situations that are not pure[ly] peacetime or [wartime] contingencies’ andinclude not only situations involving ‘infringements that do not amount to an armed attack’ on Japanthat arise against a backdrop of conflicting assertions ‘over territory, sovereignty, economic interests,
etc.,’ but could also be said to include the notion of situations that arise whereby the same kind of
infringement occurs with regard to US forces, etc., which are at present engaged in activities that
contribute to the defense of Japan.” 6 On the other hand, in terms of the definition of gray-zone
situations, it has been pointed out that care is required when certain this definition is applied to“situations that arise against a backdrop of conflicting assertions ‘over territory, sovereignty, economic
interests, etc.” 7
Based on this, consideration is being given to the gray zone situations that are expected to arise withregard to the three items determined in the May 14, 2015 Cabinet Decision: “Responses to Foreign
Naval Vessels Carrying out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that
Does not Fall under Innocent Passage in International Law,” namely, “The Government’s Responses
to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group” and “Responses
to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing

5

Kazuki Yano, "Defense Problems and Countermeasures (through new fundamental policy),"
Security Discussion Group, Anzen Hosho wo Kangaeru, No.709, 2014, p. 3.

6 Koichi Morikawa, "The Reach of Responses to Gray Zone Situations and Their Legal Nature,"
Kokusai Mondai, No.648 (2016), p. 30.
7Ibid. p. 30.

3

Said Acts against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas.” Consequently, from the perspective ofboth international law and Japanese law, while gray zone situations are expected to include a wide
range of situations, one of the characteristics of these situations is that “with the exception of piracy,a response is made at the stage where it cannot be determined whether or not the agent of infringement
is an individual or a state actor or similar organization. Accordingly, maritime security operations andpublic security operations are likely to be of the nature of administrative police activities initiallypremised on the infringement being committed by an individual, even though the possibility that theagent of infringement is a state actor or similar organization cannot be completely excluded at thatstage,” 8 thus referring to administrative police activities.

(3) Research for Concept Development
Based on the notion that awareness of gray zone situations was inadequate, Aihito Yamashita (2017)sought to clarify their characteristics. In response to Morikawa defining “situations that cannot be
handled only with ordinary police capacity” as “gray zone situations,” Yamashita says that there is noreally compelling argument for using this figurative expression for such situations when “action-type
public security operations and maritime security operations have already been developed under the
Self-Defense Forces Law,” 9 and he sought to clarify the reasons for using “gray” rather than “white”
or “black” to describe them.
As a result of analyzing the case of the East China Sea, Yamashita is of the opinion that the gray zone
situation developing in the East China Sea is not the kind of situation referred to by Morikawa usingthat figurative expression, but something confusing and of rather more substance where it is difficult
to distinguish black from white. The reasons that it is gray are that: (1) The waters of the East China
Sea are governed by law enforcement, while the airspace above is protected by the military, meaningthat there are two different bodies in operation. (2) It is difficult to understand or determine whether
the China Coast Guard is, by nature, a law enforcement body or a military organization. (3) It isdifficult to determine in some cases whether the activities of the China Coast Guard constitute theexercise of force under international law.

(4) Research into Gray Zone Situations Overseas
Among earlier research, there are those that point out that gray zone situations are unique to Japan.
On the other hand, on April 24, 2014, at a Japan-US summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe and8

Koichi Morikawa, "The Reach of Responses to Gray Zone Situations and Their Legal Nature,"
Kokusai Mondai, No.648 (2016), pp. 35-36.

9

Aihito Yamashita, “'Gray Zone Situation' Analysis – Case Study: Chinese Operations in the East
China Sea and Japan’s Response," Air Power, No. 4 (2017), p. 90.

4

President Obama, it was verified that the Senkaku Islands come under the scope of operations ofArticle 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty. There are those that are of the opinion that clarifying theposition of Japan and the US with regard to the Senkaku Islands restrains the action of China in the
East China Sea and is effective as a means of dealing with gray zone situations. 10 Understanding theconcept of gray zone situations in the US, which is an important partner in terms of the security ofJapan, is extremely important in order to be able to jointly deal with gray zone situations in thesurrounding Japan.
In terms of the US, a white paper titled The Gray Zone was published by the US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) on September 9, 2015. This report by USSOCOM, which is one of the
Unified Combatant Commands of the US, formed the basis for subsequent US research (in the US)
regarding gray zones. In that report, gray zones were defined as follows: “Gray zone security
challenges, existing short of a formal state of war, present novel complications for U.S. policy andinterests in the 21st century. We have well-developed vocabularies, doctrines and mental models to
describe war and peace, but the numerous gray zone challenges in between defy easy categorization.
For purposes of this paper, gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among andwithin state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They arecharacterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or
uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.” 11
Moreover, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is presented as an example of a case in which each of theUS, Russia and Ukraine interpreted the conflict in different ways, and states that it is important tounderstand the different perspectives of the parties involved in the gray zone. 12This report focuses on the actions of Russia in Eastern Ukraine in relation to the US, but does not
mention the actions of China in the East China Sea.
Michael Mazarr (2015) points out that “Nor does this analysis contend that gray zone tactics are
entirely new. States have been using these kinds of approaches for centuries, in some ways formillennia. Concepts such as political destabilization, support for proxies and militias, information
10

James R. Holmes, “When China Rules the Sea,” Foreign Policy, September 2015.
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/23/when-china-rules-the-sea-navy-xi-jinping-visit/] (Last
accessed on December 5, 2018.)

11

US Special Operations Command White Paper, “The Gray Zone,” September 2015, pp. 1.
[https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf] (Last accessed on December 5,
2018.)

12

U.S. Special Operations Command White Paper, “The Gray Zone,” September 2015, pp. 3–4.
[https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf] (Last accessed on December 5,
2018.)

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campaigns, and much more have been a staple of statecraft since the city states of ancient Greece werevying for influence,” 13 emphasizing the fact that this is a concept that has been around for some time.
On the other hand, he emphasizes that in recent years cyber warfare is one of the nontraditional toolsthat has come to be employed in the gray zone.
Building on the USSOCOM report mentioned above, Mazarr defines the concept of gray zone andassociated terminology, compares them with related theory, and outlines the different means employedby China and Russia according to their degree of intensity. While it can be said that the approach taken
by Russia in Ukraine is far more aggressive and militarized than the approach taken by China in theSouth China Sea, this enables us to understand that there is some degree of overlap between China’s
use of the Chinese Maritime Militia and Russia’s use of paramilitary incursions, which is characteristicof gray zones. By emphasizing different places on the spectrum, both fall into the broad concept ofgray zone strategies.
As the authors of US literature about gray zones have the actions of China in the South China Sea andthe actions of Russia in the Crimea in the back of their minds, their concept of gray zones differs
slightly from Japan’s concept of gray zone situations in the East China Sea, and yet the importanceand degree of urgency in considering how to respond to the threat of gray zones is the same. That is
because the United Nations Charter prohibits armed attacks against other nations in order to achieve
the important UN goal of preventing breaches of the peace. However, as the means employed in thegray zone are not accompanied by the clear use of military strength, this is why they are recognized
as having the potential to cause major problems from an international legal perspective.
Much of the earlier research carried out within Japan discusses the lack of development of laws forresponding to gray zone situations, and there is much research on legal theory regarding issues suchas the balance between the right of self-defense and police authority. Although in the waters
surrounding Japan there are, in fact, many conceivable gray zone situations – infringements that do
not amount to an armed attack – when considering the time frame involved in transition frompeacetime to wartime, it is normal for responsibility for these situations to be passed from the Japan
Coast Guard to the Self-Defense Forces. However, in previous research, there is no consideration of
the response of the Japan Coast Guard to gray zone situations. Because the concept of gray zone
situations does not exist within the Japan Coast Guard, a gap in awareness arises between the Japan
Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Forces, meaning that there is the possibility that it is difficult toinitiate a seamless response.

13

Michael J. Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” The
United States Army War College Press, December 2015, p. ix.

6Figure 1. Chinese and Russian Gray Zone Campaigns

Based on Michael J. Mazarr (2015)

2. The Sophistication of Conflict
In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the Bush administrationsuggested that classical national security theory is outdated due to the benefit of sharing in many fields
such as economic activities and antiterrorism measures. 14
In the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, because China is engaged in aggressive actions that givepriority to Chinese domestic law ahead of international law, it is succeeding in constructing new manmade islands. On the seven landforms, 15 since 2014, rapid and large-scale reclamation 16 has been
carried out. In July 2016, in the final ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the dispute

14

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002.
[https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf] (Last accessed on December 10,
2018.)

15

Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef andSubi Reef.

16

In its “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China” in June 2017, the US Department of Defense pointed out that as of the end of
2015, China expanded the Spratly Islands by 3,200 acres (approx. 13 km2) and completed
reclamation work.

7

regarding the South China Sea brought against China by the Philippines under the United Nations
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for
China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the “nine-dash line” andalso acknowledged the illegal nature of Chinese activities, such as land reclamation. However, China
has made it clear that it has no intention of complying with the ruling, and even now, in addition to
constructing military installations such as batteries, is proceeding with the construction of various
forms of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways and harbors, hangars
and radar installations and is continuing with the militarization of those waters. 17
With regard to this situation, Mazarr (2015) points out that “Step by forceful step, China is laying the
groundwork for a new order in the region that recognizes Beijing’s unquestioned primacy, and for aninternational system whose norms and institutions reflect China’s interests and preferences.” 18
Post-World War Two strategy theorists, such as Thomas C. Schelling (2008), suggested using theconcept of “deterrence and compellence” as a new way to use nuclear weapons. As neither deterrence
nor compellence involve physically violent actions, they are not war. It could be said that large-scale
war has not occurred because this balance is being maintained. Nuclear weapons strike fear into thehearts of people throughout the world, and it is all but impossible to use them.
The fact that large-scale war does not occur does not mean that countries are satisfied with the present
state of affairs. Nations that are planning to change the status quo do not launch a strong attack all at
once, but seek to use strong tools to cross their opponent’s red line without stimulating their opponent,and slowly seek to change the present state in a way that will be beneficial to them. This method
matches the characteristics of the gray zone conflicts mentioned by Mazarr (2015). With this tactic,
the other party is confronted with a fait accompli, and not only does this allow the instigator to takeleadership by seeking the other party’s response, but depending on the response or status of the otherparty, it enables the instigator to back away from or stop the means employed. Although interest ingray zones has become more widespread in recent years, as mentioned in previous research, the useof tactics such as proxies, militias, fifth columnists and permanent denial, etc., are classic examples.
One of the characteristics of a gray zone situation is the potential to achieve a goal by combining thesetactics without revealing militaristic options or taking a high risk.

17Japan Ministry of Defense, White Paper on Defense, 2004.
[http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2018/html/n12302000.html#s12302604] (Last
accessed on December 5, 2018.)

18

Michael J. Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” The
United States Army War College Press, December 2015, p. 1.

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Mazarr (2015) mentions three reasons why attention must be paid to gray zones, which are by nomeans a new tactic. “First, a number of leading aggressive powers – notably China, Russia, and Iran– appear to be making extensive use of these strategies. Second, the cost of major aggression has
become so severe, and economic and social interdependence so powerful, that states with some degreeof aggressive intent arguably will be in the market for alternative ways to achieve their goals. These
realities increase the incentive to use gray zone approaches. Finally, while some gray zone tools havebeen used since ancient times, others – such as cyber weapons, advanced forms of information
campaigns, and elaborate civilian tools of statecraft such as coast guards – are relatively recent andlend growing intensity to these campaigns. For all these reasons, a very old and well-established setof strategic tools has taken on increasing importance.” 19
The use of cyber warfare and information warfare, and other new approaches used in the gray zone,
including the use of energy or trade, are all classical strategy disguised with different technologies.
Previously known as salami slicing tactics, the same kind of concept has come to be referred to today
by some as “hybrid warfare.” Although the US Department of Defense defines conflict where state or
nonstate actors influence related peoples as irregular warfare (IW), the fact that there are various terms
that are similar to irregular warfare (IW), such as unconventional warfare (UW), unrestricted warfare,hybrid warfare, reveals how complicated and complex the security environment has become.
China can also employ the strategy it used in the South China Sea in the East China Sea. Unilateralattempts to change the existing state of affairs against a backdrop of power based on their own
assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order could be said to be an approachthat seeks to achieve goals by causing new conflicts. This ongoing approach by China and Russia
suggests that gray zone strategies may be an important option for states that want to reconstruct the
21st century world order.

3. Resetting the Definition of “Gray Zone Situations”
Collating previous research enables us to see a number of problems. Of special note is the question
posed by this research: “Are gray zone situations war?” Unless we can clarify the root of the issue
then major mistakes can be made.
At this point I would like to clarify the definition of gray zone situations put forward by the Ministryof Defense and the US Special Operations Command.

19 Michael J. Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” The

United States Army War College Press, December 2015, p. 3.

9

“So-called 'gray zone' situations concisely describe a broad range of situations, that is, neither
pure peacetime nor contingencies. For example, conflicting assertions between states, etc., overterritory, sovereignty, economic interests including maritime interests, etc., and at the least one
party showing physical presence frequently, or attempting or making changes to the status quoin an area related to the dispute by using armed organizations or other means to the extent thatit does not constitute an armed attack, in order to appeal a party’s assertion or demand or toforce acceptance of it.”— Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018
“Gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and nonstate actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by
ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about
the relevant policy and legal frameworks.”— US Special Operations Command, The Gray Zone
The definition in Japan lacks a broad perspective, giving the impression that it was written bearing in
mind the threat to the Senkaku Islands. On the other hand, the US definition, if read too broadly,“would embrace practically all international interaction, most of which is directed in some degree ataffecting the actions or view of other countries.” 20 In reality, it is conceivable that China and Russia,
as actors, are unaware that they are using such gray zone means. However, in order for Japan toproperly understand the threat, and formulate effective countermeasures, it is necessary to deepen
understanding regarding gray zone situations. Therefore, using the definition provided by the Ministryof Defense, I have reset the definition of gray zone situations.
“Situations in which complex actions are carried out over the long-term using nonmilitarymeans to achieve political objectives that do not end up in military confrontation.”
Gray-zone situations achieve objectives while avoiding military confrontation. Therefore, mainly
nonmilitary means are used in a complex manner and planned in such a way that they do not cross any
red line that has the possibility of causing a large-scale war. Accordingly, the achievement of longterm objectives is always kept in mind. Taking this into account, it could therefore be said that grayzone situations are not war.
As the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands is always taken into consideration when debating
gray zone situations in Japan, the definition ends up being extremely narrow when compared with
20

International Security Advisory Board, Report of Gray Zone Conflict, January 2017, p. 1.

10

overseas definitions. I will not analyze some of the problems that are raised when considering grayzone situations in Japan.

4. Awareness regarding “Gray-Zone” Situations in Japan(1) Situation Levels
Since January 2009, The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (“the Council”) has met a totalof nine times to consider from a broad perspective the overall framework for the kind of security anddefense capabilities that are needed to protect Japan and its people. At the Council’s ninth meeting
they stated, “When considering the role of defense, although this was formerly discussed based on thebasis of whether it was peacetime or wartime, in the future, as various situations may arise that areneither peacetime nor wartime but fall somewhere in between, it is necessary to be able to respondseamlessly, not just in peacetime or wartime, not limited to black or white [situations], but also grayzone [situations]. 21 ” The report of the Council also stated that, “In the future, not only from theperspective of crisis management but in terms of overall security, a comprehensive approach is
required that includes functions such as defense, foreign relations, policing and economic measures.
In particular, how to respond to gray situations that are somewhere in between peacetime and wartime
will be a major theme for consideration.” 22 This statement brought attention to gray zone situations.
In February 2010, the year following the start of the government led by the Democratic Party of Japan,
the government decided to hold “The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era”
in order to review Japan’s defense policy from the perspective of the Democratic Party of Japan. In
all, a total of nine sessions were held. Although there was no discussion regarding gray zones, in theirreport “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a PeaceCreating Nation” they state: “The following trends can be discerned in the current global security
environment: (1) economic and social globalization which created transnational security challenges
and increased conflicts in the “gray zones” between peace and crisis.” 23 They also reveal an awarenessof the threat of gray zones: “It is not all-out war but disputes over sovereignty, territory, resources,

21

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, Summary of the Proceedings of the 9th
Meeting, May 15, 2009, pp. 2. [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/dai9/gijiyousi.pdf](Last accessed on December 10, 2018.)

22

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report, August 4, 2009, p. 20.
[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/200908houkoku.pdf] (Last accessed on December
10, 2018)

23

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, Japan’s Visions for Future
Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation, 2009, pp.51.
[https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf]

11

and energy “in between peacetime and wartime” that are on the rise. We need to be [adequately] awareof risks that may arise from disputes in these ‘gray zones’ and their potential to provoke confrontation
between major powers beyond the intentions of the countries concerned.” 24
Subsequently, the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept was revealed by the government led by the
Democratic Party of Japan in the Cabinet Decision: National Defense Program Guidelines for FY
2011 and Beyond (hereafter referred to as the “22 Guidelines”). This new concept emphasizes the useof “dynamic deterrence” not only to respond to situations when they occur, but also to deploy defense
forces on a permanent and ongoing basis, focusing on “deployment” with the aim of realizing these
defense capabilities. This was therefore interpreted as meaning that it is necessary to develop dynamic
defense capabilities and maintain spontaneity and continuity in order to cope with the increasing threatof gray zone conflicts that lie between peacetime and wartime contingencies.
Since the policy of building “dynamic defense capabilities” was revealed in the 22 Guidelines, there
has been lively debate regarding gray zone situations in Japan. Sugio Takahashi (2013) pointed out
the difficulty of gray zone-related innovation, stating that research regarding military innovation todate has been divided into peacetime and wartime research, but gray zone-related innovation iscentered around innovation for crisis management, so it is a problem that will take more than the
military sector to solve. 25 To solve this lack of innovation, Takahashi suggests that innovation should
be promoted through the combined efforts of the Ministry of Defense, the Japan Coast Guard, andadministrative bodies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Official Residence of the Prime
Minister.
Ken Jimbo (2017) suggests that awareness regarding “situation levels,” including those in the grayzone, has become a core issue since the release of the 22 Guidelines. 26
In fact, at the time when discussion regarding gray zone situations started, gray zones were understood
to be “situation levels” in between peacetime and wartime.

24

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, Japan’s Visions for Future
Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation, 2009, p. 5.
[https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf]

25

Sugio Takahashi, “Building Dynamic Defense Capabilities” edited by the National Institute for
Defense Studies, “Strategic Management of Defense Capabilities: The Direction of Reform andits Challenges,” 2013, p. 211.

26

Ken Jimbo, “Seamless Security Framework and the Challenge of Escalating Gray Zone
Situations, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, “Reality Check for Security Measures”,
2017, pp. 31-38.

12

(2) Gray Zones in Legislation
On September 11, 2012, the Japanese Government purchased three of the Senkaku Islands that wereprivately owned (Uotsuri-Shima, Kita-Kojima and Minami-Kojima) and nationalized them. On
December 26 of the same year, the Liberal Democratic Party took the control of the government fromthe Democratic Party of Japan and Shinzo Abe became prime minister for the second time.
At the sixth meeting of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security held on
February 4, 2014, Prime Minister Abe stated, “There is now a recognized need for dealing with socalled ‘gray zone’ situations. These situations include cases in which foreign national submarines
navigating underwater intrude into Japan’s territorial waters and continue to navigate the waters,
refusing Japan’s request to leave, or incursions occurring in remote islands or sea areas that are several
hundred kilometers away from the mainland, making it difficult for the police or the Japan Coast
Guard alone to respond quickly. We must carry out a thorough review to see if there are no ‘gaps’ thatneed to be filled in by introducing legislation from the perspective of whether the Self-Defense Forces
have sufficient authority and are able to respond in a timely manner.” 27This statement by Prime Minister Abe suggests that he was aware of the need for legislation that would
enable the Self-Defense Forces to act with sufficient authority in a timely manner to deal with grayzone situations, because the Self-Defense Forces can act only on the basis of the right of self-defense,and gray zone situations fall into an area in which the right of self-defense cannot be applied. Thismeans that he was aware of the existence of gray zones in legislation.
In Japan, although there is a tendency for police authority to be used as a basis for the use of weapons
against a country engaged in military actions, it is unthinkable for normal military to take action on
the basis of police authority. This is because police authority is considered to be something that is
valid and to be exercised within one’s own country and has no validity with regard to international
disputes. 28 In Japan, due to restrictions under the Constitution, the use of arms by the Self-Defense
Forces is forbidden unless the country is under attack, police authority is applied to Self-Defense
Forces actions. Therefore, although the Self-Defense Forces possess equipment that is different fromthat of the Police, during peacetime they can only take action as approved under police authority,

27“Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security”, Summary of Proceedings of
the 6th Meeting, February 4, 2014,[https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai6/gijiyousi.pdf] (Last accessed on 31
December, 2018.)

28

Although there is such a thing as maritime law enforcement on the high seas under internationallaw, other than the Piracy Countermeasures Act, Japan has yet to develop corresponding
legislation.

13

meaning that there is a gray zone that falls outside the scope of police authority to which even the
Self-Defense Forces cannot respond unless the criteria for a war contingency is met.
On the other hand, for other countries, this gray zone does not exist because under their domestic laws
they can exercise the right of self-defense during peacetime. A sovereign nation exercising the rightof self-defense during peacetime is an internationally accepted practice.
Whether or not the Self-Defense Forces should be given the right of self-defense during peacetime
was intensely debated during the course of subsequent discussions concerning peace and securityrelated legislation. However, there was no discussion concerning responding to gray zone situations
by upgrading the capabilities of the Japan Coast Guard.

(3) Hand-off (Deployment) Gray Zones
At the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Councillors held on April 2, 2015, in response
to a question concerning the fact that there was no longer any discussion regarding the developmentof legislation for island defense, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani stated “based on the premise of thedivision of roles between law enforcement agencies and the Self-Defense Forces we are going to
improve the deployment side of things, including streamlining procedures, to ensure that further
damage due to illegal activities does not occur while waiting for deployment orders for public security
and maritime patrol operations, etc., to be issued.” 29
Up to that point, although it was normal for the duties of law enforcement agencies and the SelfDefense Forces to be discussed from a legal perspectives, the statement above revealed awarenessconcerning the need to improve aspects of deployment relating to the hand-off of duties. In otherwords, a hand-off (deployment) gray zone exists.
On May 14, 2015, three cabinet decisions 30 were made with regard to streamlining procedures for
issuing deployment orders for public security and maritime patrol operations. It was to introduce a29

Reply by Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, “189th Diet Session, Budget Committee of the Houseof Councillors, No. 16,” April 2, 2015.
[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/189/0014/18904020014016a.html] (Last accessed on
December 3, 2018.)

30

The three instances were: “The Government’s Responses to Incidents Involving Illegal Landing,etc., on a Remote Island, etc., by an Armed Group,” “Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels
Carrying out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does not
Fall under Innocent Passage in International Law,” and “Responses to Acts of Infringement
When Self-Defense Force Ships, etc., Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts against
Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas.”14system in which cabinet approval can be obtained for cabinet decisions over the phone, meaning thatsome improvements were made in terms of procedures within the scope of existing laws.
With regard to responses to foreign naval vessels carrying out navigation that does not correspond toinnocent passage as found in the three instances in the cabinet decision, as the vessels in question are
foreign naval vessels, this is outside the scope (police authority) of the Japan Coast Guard in the firstplace. As stipulated, such cases are handled by units of the Self-Defense Forces. In the second instanceinvolving acts of infringement against Japanese private vessels, as the prerequisite is that Self-Defense
Force ships, etc., have detected such actions, no effective response has been formulated to deal withthe hand-off (deployment) gray zone that can conceivably arise due to the hand-off process from theJapan Coast Guard to the Self-Defense Forces that has been debated in various councils and the Diet,etc. With regard to the government’s response in cases where armed groups make illegal landings, etc.,
on remote islands, etc., which is considered to be the most likely scenario, as the prerequisite is that
this involves cases where deployment orders for public security or maritime patrol operations are
expected to be issued, no changes have been made to the content of the response but the chain ofcommand has been streamlined.
That is to say, in considering the content of the cabinet decisions, although things were improved interms of procedures, there has been no improvement in terms of deployment, including hand-off.

(4) Responding Institution Gray Zones
Discussions to date have focused on reviewing existing legislation and rectifying inadequacies or gaps,
based on the idea of ensuring “peace and security in Japan amid the severe security environment
surrounding the country, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force,
adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power and thepolitical, economic, and social situations; and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readinessbased on joint operations. Japan will also advance not only the coordination within the government,
but also coordination with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime,
Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an arrayof situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters 31” as stated in the “National
Security Strategy” that was passed by the Cabinet on December 17, 2013.

31

National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation), National Security Council Resolution andCabinet Decision dated December 17, 2013, p. 13.
[https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf] (Last accessed on December 30,
2018.)

15

These concepts were summed up in two new peace and security-related laws that were enacted on
September 19, 2015. However, these laws still do not feature new improvements to legal provisions
for responding to gray zone situations.
This means that the issues pointed out above, such as situation levels, gray zones in legislation andhand-off (deployment) gray zones, have not been addressed.
With regard to the reasons why the three decisions made by the Cabinet ended up improving
procedures, rather than improving legislation as was initially intended, Prime Minister Abe explained
as follows: “As a government, we consider that further improvement is necessary in the way we handle
various illegal activities that are suspected to cause infringement but do not involve armed attack, by
taking appropriate and necessary measures in various fields, including streamlining the procedures for
issuing deployment orders in cases of maintaining peace and public order or conducting maritime
patrol. For the maintenance of peace and order over our territorial land and sea, the Police and theJapan Coast Guard will have the primary responsibility. They have the primary responsibility. The
Self-Defense Forces will, in cases where it is impossible or extremely difficult for the Police to respond,
receive deployment orders for public security and maritime patrol operations, and deal with thesituation by coordinating with law enforcement agencies. On the premise of such basic division ofroles, at this point in time, as we have not come to recognize that there is a need to develop legislation
to cope with cases where no police are available in close proximity or the police are unable to respond
immediately, we are going to consider improving deployment procedures, including streamlining
procedures for issuing deployment orders that are appropriate to each situation, in order to ensure that
there is no increase in the extent of the damage due to illegal activities while protocols for issuing
deployment orders for public security and maritime patrol operations are being followed.” 32
In his explanation, Prime Minister Abe mentioned the development of legislation to cope with cases
where there is no police force in close proximity or where law enforcement agencies are unable torespond immediately. He stated that there is no need for new legislation to deal with the problem of
not having law enforcement agencies in close proximity, which is a new “responding institution grayzone.” Previously in the discussion regarding the development of legislation, there were no conditions,such as no police force in close proximity, etc. When explaining the need to develop legislation, terms,
such as “gray zones in legislation” or “gray zones in hand-off (deployment)” were used. However, inthe end, it was concluded that it is not necessary to develop legislation for cases of responding

32

Reply by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “189th Diet Session, Budget Committee of the House ofCouncillors No. 1,” July 15, 2014[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/186/0014/18607150014001a.html] (Last accessed on
December 3, 2018.)

16

institution gray zones, such as where there is no police force in close proximity or where law
enforcement agencies are unable to respond immediately.
As we can see from the above, other than the three cabinet decisions regarding streamlining
deployment order procedures for public security and maritime patrol operations, etc., in May 2015
and the enactment of security-related laws in September of the same year, no effective measures for
dealing with gray zone situations have been formulated.
Table 2. Gray Zones in Japan

Situation

Peacetime

WartimeLevel

Public Security

Situation
Situations Handled by
Law Enforcement
Agencies

Deployment
Hand-off

Defense Deployment

Gray Zone
Maritime Patrol

Gray Zone

Applied

Police Authority

AuthorityinRight of Defense

Legislation

Responding

Law Enforcement

Institution

Agencies

Responding
Institution Gray

Self-Defense Forces

Zone

Source: Created by the author.

5. The Japan Coast Guard’s Understanding of Gray Zone Situations
I was unable to clearly verify why the Japan Coast Guard does not recognize gray zone situations as
threats. Even in an interview with a Japan Coast Guard officer, I was told that the term “gray zone
situation” is not used within the Japan Coast Guard. However, from the perspective of the Japan Coast
Guard, I can understand to a certain degree why they consider there to be no gray zone up to the point
where public security and maritime patrol operations are handed-off [to the Self-Defense Forces]
because they respond in accordance with the police authority, etc., that is vested in them by the law,17

etc. This may be due to the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, the gap in jurisdiction between the Japan
Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Forces lies outside the jurisdiction of the Japan Coast Guard.
In recent years the Japan Coast Guard is clearly improving every aspect of their operations. However,I assume that such improvements are being made within their organization. The basis of myassumption is the fact that since the annual Meeting of Cabinet Members concerned with theStrengthening of the Maritime Security Framework was first held in December 2016, it has been helda total of three times (December 18, 2017 and December 18, 2018). These meetings were held only
once a year and each meeting lasted about 10 minutes, 33 meaning that they were not for discussing
anything, but rather for the Director General of Maritime Safety Agency to present the annual report
regarding the activities of the Japan Coast Guard to the Prime Minister.
Although I analyzed the officially released training records of the Japan Coast Guard and the Maritime
Self-Defense Force, which are the primary responders to gray zone situations, I was unable to confirm
any record of training that was clearly announced as being specifically for handling gray zone
situations. On the other hand, joint response training for handling suspicious vessels is conducted
about once a year in accordance with the Joint Response Manual Concerning Suspicious Vessels thatwas formulated by the Japan Coast Guard and the Maritime Self-Defense Force.
This joint training is carried out in accordance with the basic concept that “although the Japan Coast
Guard responds primarily to suspicious vessels as an administrator of police authority, in cases where
it is acknowledged to be impossible or extremely difficult for the Japan Coast Guard to deal with suchsituations, a maritime patrol deployment order shall be issued without delay and situations shall be
dealt with jointly by the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard.” 34 Specifically, the response
protocol is: (1) A line of communication is established and maintained to keep all parties informed
right from the initial stage through to the end of action. (2) The Japan Coast Guard deploys necessary
force initially to deal with suspicious vessels, while the Maritime Self-Defense Force provides all
possible cooperation to the Japan Coast Guard at their request, and the situation is handled as a joint
effort prior to the issuance of a maritime patrol deployment order. (3) In cases where a maritime patrol
deployment order has been issued as part of a joint response, the Maritime Self-Defense Force works
together in collaboration with the Japan Coast Guard to detain suspicious vessels.

33

See the website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet for the minutes of the Meeting of
Cabinet Members concerned with the Strengthening of the Maritime Security Framework.
[http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaihotaisei/] (Last accessed on December 30, 2018.)

34

Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2004 (Defense White Paper).
[http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/2004/html/163211.html] (Last accessed on
December 22, 2018.)

18

In July 2015, it was reported that the first joint training for dealing with gray zone situations had been
carried out for Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force personnel, but this too would
appear to be joint training concerning how to deal with suspicious vessels. That is to say, from therecords of the joint training that was carried out it can hardly be said to have been any awareness on
the part of the Japan Coast Guard with regard to gray zone situations.
The front cover of Responding to Gray Zone Situations on the Water and in the Air – Problems andCountermeasures, which was released by the Gray Zone Research Committee of the Nakasone Peace
Institute on June 26, 2018, features vessels of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast
Guard sailing side by side. This photo supplied by the Ministry of Defense gives the impression thatthey are training for gray zone situations. However, from the number “PL21” on the vessel of theJapan Coast Guard, we can see that it is, in fact, the training vessel “Kojima,” which is used by theJapan Coast Guard Academy. As it is hardly likely that a training vessel will join training for grayzone situations, I assume that this photo does not imply that they conducted training for gray zone
situations.
In light of the above, I conclude that no training has been conducted in relation to gray zone situations
as discussed in the Diet. It is conceivable that the reason for this is that the Japan Coast Guard has noawareness of the concept of gray zone situations.

Conclusion
In Japan, “gray zone situations” have been discussed from four different perspectives: (1) Situationlevel, (2) Legislation, (3) Hand-off (deployment) and (4) Responding institutions. This is why there
has been no convergence into policy theory. There has been hardly any debate regarding gray zones
since the establishment of peace and security-related legislation.
As we can see, there is a difference in awareness regarding “gray zones” between the Ministry of
Defense and the Japan Coast Guard, and each of the actors have different views. Therefore, as acountry, it is still difficult for Japan to develop a seamless system for dealing with gray zone situations.
Furthermore, based on this difference in awareness, if situations are handled in the wrong way, thenthere is the danger that Japan may give an opponent a reason to escalate the situation level.
In order to solve this problem, there must be ongoing debate in the government regarding policies forgray zone situations, including legislation. In discussions to date, there were no calls for thedevelopment of legislation, and when a specific example of a gray zone situation was raised, theopinion was voiced that the situations could be dealt with through public security and maritime patrol
operations. With gray zone situations, one of the characteristics is that many different tactics are19

employed, so even if a specific protocol is established on the premise of a specific case, it is necessary
to be aware that that there is still the possibility that a new type of gray zone situation may arise forwhich that protocol is invalid. Consideration needs to be given to developing legislation so that aframework can be developed that enables any foreseen situation to be dealt with simultaneously sothat the Self-Defense Forces do not have to intrude into the domain of the Police.
A state must coordinate the management of complex situations, such as gray zone situations, in a
uniform manner. More specifically, Japan should follow the lead of the National Security Council andestablish a shared understanding regarding gray zone strategies whereby strategies for handlingspecific situations can be formulated and a system developed in which law enforcement agencies areable to handle situations based on the premise that such situations do not amount to military conflict.
One of the facets of this is an integrated approach across different ministries and agencies, including
the improvement of related capabilities.
In conclusion, I believe that the Japan Coast Guard should not turn a blind eye to the presence of grayzone situations, but consider with the Ministry of Defense how to improve deployment methods andequipment and in so doing foster greater mutual understanding. The content of joint training should
also be more practical so that the link between the two organizations can be strengthened, and theyshould continue to strengthen collaboration while together identifying challenges and potential
solutions.

20