AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 202

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

5 August 2014

Editorial Committee:
Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima

IRAQ AT A CROSSROAD AND JAPAN’S
ROLE

Futoshi Matsumoto

Editor & Online Publisher:
Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIA

A century-old border has begun to melt rapidly inthe quicksand of the Fertile Crescent. TheSykes-Picot Agreement that had defined themodern Middle East has been shattered by the“Islamic State of Iraq and Sham” (ISIS) and a newborder is apparently being drawn.
Iraq is dramatically slipping further towarda potential break-up as a nation-state with ISIS’encroachment toward Baghdad. The country is on
the verge of disintegrating into three parts
reflecting its religious and ethnic divisions:“Shiistan”, “Sunnistan” and “Kurdistan,” if I may
name them accordingly.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and shouldnot be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies or those of the organization to which the author
belongs.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Three reasons nurtured this current trend.
First, prolonged turmoil in Syria leads to the emergence of ungoverned
space in the northwestern border of Syria, where ISIS has come to rulerelentlessly.
Second, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki chose a path of authoritarian
governance and exacerbated existing tensions both with Kurds and Sunnis.
Third, we should not forget the clandestine work of former Baathists ledby Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, former vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council
and close confident of former President Saddam Hussein. They have come tocollaborate with members of ISIS to take over Iraq as a whole.
Thus it is only natural that the Iraqi central government under Nuri
al-Maliki was obliged to take a resolute stand against the nexus of ISIS andformer Baathists. However, al-Maliki’s concentration of power among Shiites or,more precisely among his own men, particularly since the general election in2010 has alienated all segments of Iraqi society except his own group.
As a result, his current fight against ISIS and former Baathists cannot
attract any substantial support within Iraq unless al-Maliki seriously considers
resigning as prime minister.

His battle now seems very solitary as “al-Fitnaal-Taifiya”, or sectarian strife in Iraq, deeply divides the society.
Meanwhile, Kurds in the north have taken a step forward toward de facto
independence, particularly after having achieved their long-dreamt goal ofsafeguarding Kirkuk. The recent popular referendum in Crimea must haveprovided the Kurdistan government with a roadmap for its independence.
Given the moderate stability and peace being enjoyed by Iraqi Kurds, it israther inconceivable to totally deny them a right to self-determination. Regionalcountries may also expect the Kurdistan government to function as a temporary
buffer state against any violence spilling over into their territories.
Clearly the fundamental question that faces us is whether Iraq as amodern nation-state will evaporate sooner or later. It is too early to judge the fateof Iraq because the following two factors, one domestic and another external,
are gradually changing the regional dynamics in favor of a unified Iraq.

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

First, the built-in social mechanisms in Iraqi society continue to prevail. A
deeply-rooted social fabric that binds different religious and ethnic affiliations ismore resilient than some may think. Ironically, the harsh authoritarian rule of theformer President Saddam Hussein also strengthened Iraqi nationalism in a way.
Second, the US and Iran, former adversaries in Iraq, now look to eachother more as partners for the sake of Iraq. This external factor ultimately favors
a stable and united Iraq rather than an unstable and disintegrated one. Tworegional hegemons now agree to support Iraq. Russia is also counted as astaunch supporter of Iraq because of its hatred of radical Islamists, including
Chechen jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq. Even the Syrian government has
begun to closely cooperate with Iraq without hesitation. Simply put it, nobody
wants to lose Iraq any further.
With ISIS declaring its own “Caliphate” by establishing the “Islamic State”
and dropping “Iraq and Sham” from its original name at the end of June, the tide
has finally changed more than one month after the takeover of Mosul.
Iraq and Syria have at last been turned into a fierce battlefield between
two clearly different camps. The protagonists and antagonists in this serious
game have finally become clear: modernity versus pre-modernity. It was notcoincidental to see the beginning of small clashes between the “Islamic State”
and Sunnis in the north of Iraq.
The longer their rule in parts of Iraq, the less will be the success of themarriage of convenience between the “Islamic State” and the Baathists due totheir different outlooks and ideologies. Hardcore nationalists such as theBaathists never trust Islamic jihadists. This weakness will definitely lead thejihadists to failure in the end. Besides, even the Saudis will not allow the jihadists
to monopolize Islamic legitimacy any further.
Meanwhile, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s recent call to Iraqi politicians for a
unified government, together with the Sadrists’ insistence on the resignation ofal-Maliki in late June, added more pressure on Nuri al-Maliki to form a more
inclusive government. Most likely against the will of al-Maliki, the Iraqi
government will be restructured sooner or later before the scheduled date for thesecond parliamentary session on August 12.

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Lastly, Kurds may be prevented from achieving an ultimate independence
as long as their export of oil depends on the will of Turkey who may not wish an
independent Kurd state as its neighbor. However, the Kurdistan regional
government may achieve more autonomy possibly under the “confederated”
Iraq.
Japan should not stand idle, watching this radical development from thesidelines as someone else’s problem. The stability of the vast oil-rich area of theMiddle East depends ultimately on the fate of Iraq.
Moreover, it is Iraqis themselves who desire Japan’s lasting engagementin Iraq, having a close affinity with Japan due to nostalgia about their pastbusiness relations during Iraq’s modernization in the 1970s and 1980s. It is avery promising country, with the potential of increasing its oil exports up to 6
million barrels per day in the near future. A number of major projects for theproduction and export of natural resources are already underway by Japanesecontractors.
Let us never forget: Japan is closely linked to Iraq’s modernity itself. If
Iraqis are fighting against diabolical pre-modernity, Japan is better positioned
than any other country to offer its version of ““oriental” modernity” to Iraqis who
suffer from this dire struggle.
Japan has been a major stakeholder in the reconstruction of Iraq eversince the end of the Iraq War. Our commitment to the future of Iraq was mademore than a decade ago with our blood. So much has been achieved by so few
who were so brave. Once again it is high time to reaffirm Japan’s continued
support to the unification of Iraq and to demonstrate Japan’s diplomatic integrity
toward the Middle East.

Futoshi MATSUMOTO is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International
Policy Studies (IIPS) and the former director of the Intelligence and Analysis Service(IAS) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

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