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Monday, Sept. 24, 2007. Since 2002, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
has designated Burma a “country of particular concern” for systematic, ongoing, and egregious violationsof the right to thought, conscience, and religion or belief. (AP Photo)

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A N N UA L R E PO R T
OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMCOMMISSIONERS
Abraham Cooper
Chair
Frederick A. Davie
Vice ChairDavid Curry
Susie Gelman
Mohamed Magid
Stephen Schneck
Nury Turkel
Eric UelandFrank Wolf
Erin D. Singshinsuk
Executive Director

M AY 2 0 2 4

PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Senior Strategic Advisor
Jamie Staley, Acting Director of Research and Policy
Danielle Ashbahian, Chief of Public Affairs
Mingzhi Chen, Acting Supervisory Policy Advisor
Thomas Kraemer, Chief Administrative Officer
Scott Weiner, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Michael Ardovino, Policy Analyst
Susan Bishai, Policy Analyst
Mollie Blum, Researcher
Patrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst
Sema Hasan, Policy Analyst
Veronica McCarthy, Public Affairs Associate
Hilary Miller, Researcher
Nora Morton, Operations Specialist
Dylan Schexnaydre, Researcher
Luke Wilson, Researcher

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview

1

About this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
USCIRF’s 2024 CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act

5

Key Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
Recommendations to the Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Recommendations to Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Key Developments in 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

Countries Recommended for Designation asCountries of Particular Concern (CPCs)

14

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Azerbaijan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
Nicaragua. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Turkmenistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50

Countries Recommended for theState Department’s Special Watch List (SWL)

52

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
Malaysia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
Sri Lanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72

Key Global Developments

75

Transnational Repression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Laws Restricting Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
Attacks against Religious Sites in Armed Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
Risks to Religious Minorities during Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
Rise of Antisemitism and Anti-Muslim Hatred. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Other Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
Religious Freedom Concerns for Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78

Key USCIRF Recommendations Implemented in 2023

81

Designating the Worst Violators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience (RPOCs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
Implementation of Executive Order 13926 - Advancing International Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . .  82
Congressional Action Promoting Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
Refugee Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83

Appendix 1 Commissioner Biographies

85

Appendix 2 Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List

87

Appendix 3 Highlights of USCIRF’s Public Activities in 2023

95

2024 ANNUAL REPORTINTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEWO

ctober 27, 2023 marked the 25th anniversary of the enacthumanitarian crisis impacting all Sudanese. Over the years, USCIRF
ment of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). This
also has recognized improvements but continues to have ongoinglandmark law made promoting the internationally guaranconcerns and has seen backsliding in other countries, including Egypt,teed right to freedom of religion or belief a priority in U.S. foreign
India, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
policy. IRFA mandates that U.S. policy includes condemning violaTwenty-five years after IRFA’s passage, various state and nonstatetions of religious freedom abroad and assisting foreign governments
actors continue to perpetrate or tolerate severe religious persecuto protect this fundamental human right. It established the U.S.
tion. Governments enforce laws and policies to restrict or punish
Department of State’s Ambassador at Large and Office for Internapeaceful religious activity and expression, to impose official religious
tional Religious Freedom and the U.S. Commission on International
interpretations, or to discriminate on the basis of religion. Societal
Religious Freedom (USCIRF),
actors, including individuals,
required monitoring and annual
mobs, and violent groups, often
reporting, delineated consepurporting to act in the name ofquences for the worst violators,
religion, target those they deem
In honor of this important anniversary,and incorporated religious freethe religious other. Derogatory
dom concerns into U.S. bilateraland dangerous rhetoric against
the cover of this year’s Annual Report—
and multilateral diplomacy, promembers of religious groups,
USCIRF’s 25th such report—is a collage ofgrams, training, and refugee
including from government
cover images from previous
and asylum policies.
officials and religious leaders,
USCIRF Annual Reports . . . documenting both
In honor of this importantheightens intolerance and cananniversary, the cover of thisprovoke violence. In too many
the persecution and the progress that USCIRF
year’s Annual Report—USCIRF’s
countries, individuals and comhas seen in countries around the globe.
25th such report— is a collage
munities continue to suffer forof cover images from previous
their religious beliefs, activity,
USCIRF Annual Reports. Thoseor identity or for their religious
covers, and the underlying
freedom advocacy. Those indireports, have documented both the persecution and the progress thatviduals and communities are why IRFA was enacted. They are also
USCIRF has seen in countries around the globe over the past quarter
why the U.S. government’s efforts to promote freedom of religion or
century of carrying out its mandate. Unfortunately, some egregious sitbelief for all—in partnership with like-minded governments, parliauations have remained constant or even worsened during this period,
mentarians, and nongovernmental organizations—remain essential
and several countries with periods of notable progress have regressed.
today and in the future.
Yet at the same time, there have been many important successes.
USCIRF’s first annual report, issued in May 2000, focused priAbout This Reportmarily on China, Russia, and Sudan. Today, the governments of China
Created by IRFA, USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. govand Russia remain among the world’s worst violators of their people’s
ernment advisory body, separate from the State Department, that
religious freedom, as well as among the most active perpetrators ofmonitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy
cross-border repression and other malign activities abroad, including
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Conin the United States. Indeed, Chinese authorities’ repression of Uyghur
gress. USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its
and other Turkic Muslims has reached such extremes that the U.S.
authorizing legislation and the standards in the Universal Declaration
government recognized it as genocide and crimes against humanityof Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil andin 2021. The two other recent situations that the United States has
Political Rights (ICCPR), and other international documents. USCIRF’s
recognized as genocide and crimes against humanity also targetedmandate and annual reports are different from, and complementary
religious minority groups whose persecution USCIRF has long been
to, the mandate and annual reports of the State Department’s Office
documenting and decrying—Yazidis, Christians, and Shi’a Muslimsof International Religious Freedom.
in Iraq and Rohingya Muslims in Burma. In all three cases, regrettaUSCIRF’s 2024 Annual Report assesses religious freedom viobly, justice for the survivors and accountability for the perpetrators
lations and progress in 28 countries during calendar year 2023 andremain elusive to date. By contrast, Sudan saw real religious freedom
makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findimprovements during the period of civilian-led transitional rule that
ings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on abegan in 2019. However, the 2021 military coup and subsequent
year’s research by USCIRF, including travel, hearings, meetings, andcivil war in 2023 have jeopardized that progress and resulted in a

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

1

I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D OV E R V I E W

briefings, and they are approved by a majority vote of Commissionegregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and ongoers. IRFA expressly provides each Commissioner the right to include
ing, systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).
in the annual report a statement with his or her own individual or
To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate
dissenting views. Various Commissioners have done so many times
group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freeover the years, either to elaborate on or disagree with some aspect
dom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity thatof the report. This year, several Commissioners included individual
exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside
or dissenting views in the chapters on the implementation of IRFA,
the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence
Azerbaijan, and China.
in pursuit of its objectives.”
The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first,
The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities
those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should desigthat, in USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it isnate as Countries of Particularintended to focus U.S. policyConcern (CPCs) under IRFA,
makers’ attention on the worst
and second, those that USCIRF
violators of religious freedom
recommends the State Departglobally. The fact that a counThe Annual Report highlights the countries
ment should place on its Special
try or nonstate group is not
Watch List (SWL). The reportcovered in this report does notand entities that, in USCIRF’s view, merit
also includes USCIRF’s recommean it did not violate religious
CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended
mendations of nonstate actors
freedom during the reporting
to focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on thefor designation by the State
year. It only means that based
worst violators of religious freedom globally.
Department as Entities of Paron the information available toticular Concern (EPCs) under
USCIRF, the conditions during
IRFA. In addition, the reportthat year did not, in USCIRF’s
analyzes the U.S. government’sview, meet the high threshimplementation of IRFA during the reporting year and provides recold—the perpetration or toleration of particularly severe or severeommendations to bolster overall U.S. efforts to advance freedom
violations of religious freedom—required to recommend the countryof religion or belief abroad. It also includes a section discussing key
or nonstate group for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In the case oftrends and developments in religious freedom globally during thea nonstate group, it also could mean that the group did not meet
reporting period, including in countries that are not recommended
other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant politicalfor CPC or SWL status. This year, that section covers topics including
power and territorial control.
transnational repression, laws restricting religious freedom, attacks
USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom
against religious sites in areas of armed conflict, risks to religious
conditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief
minorities during elections, the rise of antisemitism and anti-Muslim
perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered
hatred, religious freedom concerns in Europe, and religious freedom
in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety ofconcerns for refugees. Finally, the report’s last section highlights key
countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.
USCIRF recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented
since USCIRF’s previous annual report.
USCIRF’s 2024 CPC, SWL, AND EPC
In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freeRecommendations
dom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably
For 2024, based on religious freedom conditions in 2023, USCIRF
to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, andrecommends that the State Department:
religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected underinternational human rights law.
■
Redesignate as CPCs the following 12 countries: Burma, China,

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC
Recommendations
IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages inor tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It
defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom.
Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom
mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges;(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of theright to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statutedoes not specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, inmaking SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations
that meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and

2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;
■

■
■

■

Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries:
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Nigeria, and Vietnam;
Maintain on the SWL the following country: Algeria;
Include on the SWL the following 10 countries: Egypt, Indonesia,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey,
and Uzbekistan;
Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors:
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), theHouthis, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), Islamic Statein West Africa Province (ISWAP) (also referred to as ISIS-West
Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

These recommendations reflect several changes from the 2023
Annual Report. This year, USCIRF is recommending for the first timethat Azerbaijan be designated as a CPC. Having recommended the

I N T RO D U C T I O N A N D OV E R V I E W

country for SWL status since 2020 and included it on USCIRF’s Tier 2 for
The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, continued toserious concerns there for many years prior to that, USCIRF’s 2022 andundermine religious freedom in Yemen throughout 2023. The group2023 Annual Reports noted increasing religious freedom violations byparticularly targeted the rights of women and girls by imposing a mahthe government of Azerbaijanram (male escort) requirement,
in 2021 and 2022. Regrettably,
while also enforcing gender
this trend continued during
segregation in public spaces,
2023, leading USCIRF to conincluding at the country’s largNonstate actors in conflict with theclude that the CPC standard
est educational institution,
Syrian regime continue to perpetrate
had now been met. In addition,
Sana’a University. Jewish prisparticularly severe violations there.
based on heightened religious
oner of conscience Libi Marhabi
repression by the government
remained in Houthi detentionof Kyrgyzstan in 2023, USCIRF is
despite a court order for his
recommending that country forrelease. Houthi leaders continSWL status for the first time. For Syria, given that the government’s
ued to promote explicitly antisemitic propaganda by deliberately
violations of religious freedom have evolved to become more politicalconflating Israeli policy and Judaism. In May, Houthi gunmen raided
and administrative in nature in recent years, including in 2023, USCIRF
a peaceful Baha’i gathering in Sana’a, detaining 17 Yemeni Baha’is
is now recommending that country for SWL placement for severe
and subjecting them to forced religious education. Five of the 17
religious freedom violations, rather than CPC designation. However,individuals remain detained, and those released were forced to sign
nonstate actors in conflict with the Syrian regime continue to perpestatements as a condition for release. The Houthis continued to harass,
trate particularly severe violations there. Finally, in this Annual Report,
detain, and torture Yemeni Christians, particularly converts from Islam.
USCIRF is not recommending the Central African Republic (CAR) for
Only a few thousand Christians remained in the country, with many
SWL placement, based on a lack of reported incidents in 2023 thatleaving Yemen altogether to escape persecution.
would meet the severe violations standard.
Islamist insurgent groups IS Sahel and JNIM continued attacks
The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation
across several African countries in 2023, including Burkina Faso,
for each country are described in the relevant country chapters ofMali, and Niger, often in the context of weak state security. Experts
this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for
estimate that insurgent activity killed more than 1,700 citizens inBoko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and forthe region, particularly in areas bordering Mali. In Mali, unidentified
HTS in the Syria chapter.
violent insurgents threatened the Christian community in Douna, forFor al-Shabaab, the Houthis, IS Sahel, and JNIM, the EPC recombidding worshipers from gathering and praying in churches, ringing
mendations are based on the following conditions:bells, or playing musical instruments. In Douna, insurgents also often
In 2023, the violent Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab wasdemanded Christians convert to Islam and threatened violence if
active in the Horn of Africa region and maintained its campaign inpeople refused. In August 2023, IS Sahel insurgents started applying
Somalia with constant battles against technologically advanced govhudud punishments (those fixed within Shari’a) including stoning andernment forces and their allies for control of territory. The groupsevering limbs as sentences for those they perceive as breaking laws
declared it would kill any professed Christians, including through thein Gao and northeast Mali. In doing so, insurgents imposed religious
use of suicide bombings, making any public religious practice unsafe.
interpretations of existing laws that now restrict freedom of religion
In January, al-Shabaab operatives bombed the main mosque in Buulaor belief. In Niger in June, 69 families left their homes after insurgentsburte, killing 18, with some victims still inside the building. The groupthreatened them with death if they refused conversion to Islam in aalso has very active cells in Kenya.
village near the Burkina Faso border.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

3

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTKey Findings

severe violations of religious freedom. USCIRF recommended seven
In 2023, the 25th anniversary year of the International Religiousof those eight entities for such designation.
Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), the Joseph R. Biden administration
Throughout the year, the Biden administration imposed Global
maintained its support for many initiatives related to international
Magnitsky Act sanctions on religious freedom violators, including
religious freedom (IRF).
Taliban officials responsible for religiously inspired human rights
In December, the U.S. Department of State designated 12
abuses committed against women and girls and Chinese officials
countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under IRFA
responsible for violations against Uyghur and other Muslim groups
for engaging in or toleratingin the Xinjiang region. The
particularly severe violations
Global Magnitsky Act givesof religious freedom. USCIRF
the U.S. government authority
expres sed disappointment
to issue visa bans and asset
Throughout the year,that India and Nigeria were notfreezes against foreign persons
designated as CPCs, despite
involved in “gross violations
the Biden administration imposed
the violations in both countries
of internationally recognized
Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on
meeting the legal standard. The
human rights,” including violareligious freedom violators,
State Department reimposed
tions of the right to freedom ofexisting sanctions on eight ofreligion or belief. In addition,
including Taliban officials responsible
the 12 countries it designatedthe State Department launched
for religiously inspired human rights abuses
as CPCs and issued waivers on
the Without Just Cause Politicalcommitted against women and girls andtaking any action against the
Prisoners Initiative to advoChinese officials responsible forremaining four. USCIRF has longcate for the release of politicalcalled on administrations toprisoners, including religious
violations against Uyghur and otherrefrain from issuing waivers andprisoners of conscience.
Muslim groups in the Xinjiang region.
relying exclusively on existing
In September, President
sanctions to hold CPCs accountBiden maintained the heightable. The State Department
ened admissions cap forplaced five countries on its Sperefugees at 125,000 for fiscal
cial Watch List (SWL) for severe religious freedom violations, includingyear (FY) 2024 and designated certain populations for priority conAzerbaijan for the first time. USCIRF had been recommending Azersideration as refugees, including multiple groups fleeing religious
baijan for placement on the SWL since 2020, the first year it beganpersecution. Also in September, the United States Citizenshiprecommending countries for inclusion on the State Department’s
and Immigration Services (USCIS) extended temporary protected
SWL. Between 2013 and 2019, USCIRF included Azerbaijan in its own
status for Afghan nationals living in the United States. In DecemTier 2 category of countries with serious religious freedom concerns.
ber, USCIS extended the reregistration period for extensions ofFinally, the State Department designated eight Entities of Particular
temporary protected status for Nicaraguan nationals living in theConcern (EPCs), which are nonstate actors that engage in particularly
United States.

2023 STATE DEPARTMENT DESIGNATIONSCPC Designations

Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, andTurkmenistan

SWL Countries

Algeria, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Comoros, and Vietnam

EPC Designations

Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Houthis, ISIS-Sahel (formerly known as Islamic State inGreater Sahara), the Islamic State in West Africa, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and the Taliban

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

5

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION
■

■

■

■

Lift the waiver on the four CPC-designated countries—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation and review U.S. policy tomake changes that impose meaningful consequences and encourage positive change;
Increase the use of the Global Magnitsky
Act and other human rights-related financial and visa authorities to impose asset
freezes and/or visa bans on individuals
and entities for severe religious freedom
violations, citing specific abuses, and coordinate with other countries with similar
sanctions regimes on such targeted sanctions whenever possible;
Advocate for the release of religious
prisoners of conscience, including those
documented in USCIRF’s Frank R. Wolf
Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims Listin multilateral fora and in bilateral meetings with relevant governments;

Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA), theInternational Contact Group on Freedomof Religion or Belief, and intergovernmental organizations such as the United
Nations (UN), the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) toadvance religious freedom;■■■

Maintain U.S. leadership and engagement in the International Religious

Appoint a well-qualified individual asSpecial Adviser to the President on IRF on
the National Security Council (NSC) andprovide them with the financial resources
and staff needed to fulfill their mandate as
outlined in IRFA;
Continue to strengthen the mechanismsof the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program(USRAP) to increase the ability to meet
the admissions ceiling for refugees in
FY 2024 and prioritize resettlement forsurvivors of the most egregious forms of
religious persecution;

quality and oversight of the initial processing of noncitizens, improving detention
conditions, and appointing a high-level
official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS);■■■

Address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited
Removal, including by enhancing the

Allocate greater funding to programs that
support civil society and human rights
defenders in exile who document andmonitor religious freedom violations incountries where civil society is repressed;
Form a joint State Department and U.S.
Agency for International Development(USAID) task force to develop and implement a strategy to address communal
violence severely impacting religious
communities in countries that the State
Department designates as CPCs or placeson the SWL; andPerform an assessment on foreign governments’ transnational repression as it
relates to religious freedom, including
analysis of how to improve U.S. government policy and U.S. collaboration withallies to prevent and counter transnationaltargeting of religious communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS■■As individual members of Congress,
advocate for IRF by sponsoring religious
prisoners of conscience through the
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s(TLHRC) Defending Freedoms Project, collaborating with the International Panel ofParliamentarians for Freedom of Religion orBelief, and joining task forces or caucusessuch as the U.S. House of Representatives
or U.S. Senate Bipartisan Task Force for
Combating Antisemitism, the House IRF
Caucus, or the Ahmadiyya Muslim Caucus;
Participate in congressional delegations
to countries USCIRF recommends for designation as CPCs or placement on the SWL
to assess conditions for persons of all faiths
and beliefs as well as nonbelievers, raise
religious freedom issues, and press for the
release of religious prisoners of conscience;

6 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

■

■

■

Convene public hearings to receive thetestimony of officials from the State
Department, USAID, the Departmentof Defense, and other relevant agencies
regarding their respective assessments
of international religious freedom issues
and the actions their agencies are taking
to implement USCIRF recommendations;
Request that the Government Accountability Office conduct an accounting of
all U.S. foreign assistance provided tocountries that the State Department designates as CPCs or places on the SWL;
For countries the State Department designates as CPCs or places on the SWL,
condition U.S. security assistance on
improvements in religious freedom conditions in those countries;

■

■

■

Permanently reauthorize the bipartisan
Lautenberg Amendment to allow individuals legally residing in the United States tofacilitate the resettlement of persecuted
religious minority groups from their countries of residence to the United States;
Suppor t policie s in the bipar tis an
Transnational Repression Policy Act tostrengthen U.S. efforts to counter foreign
governments’ transnational repression on
the basis of religion or belief; andIntroduce and pass legislation thatprohibits any person from receiving
compensation for lobbying on behalf of
foreign governments of countries that theState Department designates as CPCs—
such as China or Saudia Arabia—or placeson the SWL.

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

Legal Framework

2016 Global Magnitsky Act allows the president, who has delegatedthese authorities to the secretaries of the treasury and state, toIRFA, as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedeny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S.-based assets of any foreigner
dom Act of 2016, seeks to make religious freedom a higher priority inresponsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations
U.S. foreign policy through a range of mechanisms and tools. Theseof internationally protected
include governmental instituhuman rights” against someone
tions (USCIRF as an independent
seeking to expose illegal govlegislative branch agency requirernment activity or to exercise
IRFA includes religious freedom as an
ing regular reauthorization, theor defend internationally proambassador at large and theelement of U.S. foreign assistance,
tected rights. Executive Order
State Department’s IRF Office,culturalexchange,andinternational(E.O.) 13818, issued in Decemand a special adviser on theber 2017 to implement andbroadcasting
programs
andWhite House NSC staff); ongobuild on the Global Magnitsky
ing monitoring and annual
requires training on religious freedom
Act, authorizes visa bans andreports on international reliand religious persecution for State
asset freezes against foreign
gious freedom violations; thepersons involved in “serious
Department
foreignservice
officers
imposition of consequences forhuman rights abuse,” providing
andU.S.
immigration
officials.
the worst violators; and making
an even more expansive basis
publicly available Freedom offor targeted sanctions.
Religion or Belief (FoRB) victims
In addition, Section 7031(c)targeted due to their religion orof the State Department’s FY
belief. The consequences set forth in IRFA consist of CPC designations
2023 annual appropriations (P.L. 117-328) requires the secretary ofand related actions, placement on the State Department’s SWL, thestate to make foreign officials and their immediate family members
ability to bar entry to the United States of foreign officials responsible
ineligible for U.S. entry if there is credible evidence that such individfor particularly severe religious freedom violations, and EPC designauals have been involved in “a gross violation of human rights.” Unlike
tions for nonstate actors.
the visa ineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, visa bans under this
IRFA includes religious freedom as an element of U.S. foreign
provision may be announced publicly.
assistance, cultural exchange, and international broadcasting programs
and requires training on religious freedom and religious persecution
for State Department foreign service officers and U.S. immigration
Key Developments in 2023
officials. Further, it includes provisions on U.S. refugee and asylum
Key U.S. Government IRF Positions
policy. It also specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral organiAmbassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad
zations as an avenue for advancing religious freedom abroad. IRFA is
Hussain continued implementing his mandate through public speeches
centered on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
and meetings, including with the nongovernmental organization (NGO)or belief as recognized in international law and as articulated in the
IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. In addition, Ambassador
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
Hussain traveled to Mauritania, Germany, Israel and the West Bank,on Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments andQatar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, and Czechia to meet with
regional agreements.
governmental officials and faith communities to advance religious
For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history,
freedom and combat religious intolerance, including antisemitism andand its implementation, see USCIRF’s Factsheet: IRFA.
anti-Muslim hatred.
Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah E.
religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, such as
Lipstadt traveled to Poland, Spain, Tunisia, Morocco, the United Arab
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Countability, and Divestment Act
Emirates, Israel twice, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, Italy,(CISADA, P.L.111-195). More broadly, the permanently reauthorized

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Press Release: USCIRF Calls for Congressional Hearing after State Department Fails to Designate Nigeria and India as Countries ofParticular Concern■ Podcast: Shortcomings of the State Department’s CPC Designations■ Factsheet: Marking 25 Years of IRFA
■ Event: The First 25 Years: IRFA Accomplishments and Next Steps■ Hearing: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion or Belief■ Policy Update: Countering China’s Techno-Authoritarianism, Transnational Repression, and Malign Political Influence■ Compendiums: Anti-Conversion Laws and Blasphemy Laws
■ Factsheet: African Traditional and Indigenous Religions■ Special Reports: Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America, The Bureaucratization of Religion in Southeast
Asia, and A Retrospective: 25th Anniversary of the International Religious Freedom Act■

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

7

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

France, Germany, and Canada. During 2023, Special Envoy Lipstadt
Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List such as Gulshan Abbas,
also spoke twice at the UN in New York on combating antisemiRolando Álvarez, Ekpar Asat, and Go Sherab Gyatso.
tism, issued two joint statements in the wake of Hamas’s October
7 terrorist attack, and addressed the Forum of Special Envoys andMalign Foreign Influence
Coordinators Combating Antisemitism at the UN Educational, ScienThe Lobbying Disclosure Act and the Foreign Agent Registrationtific, and Cultural Organization. The Office of the Special Envoy also
Act of 1938 regulate the employment of lobbyists by malign forreleased a report on policies, programs, and actions across the globe
eign actors. This regulatory
to combat antisemitism. Special
framework does not prevent
Envoy Lipstadt’s efforts camelobbyis t s from working on
amid a surge of antisemitism
behalf of foreign adversaries
in Europe, including a reported
The State Department did not designate
who engage in gross violations
quadrupling of antisemitic acts
Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, orof human rights. As such, forin France.
eign adversaries such as China
In 2023, Under Secretary
Vietnam as CPCs in 2023 despite
and Iran can legally attempt tofor Civilian Security, DemocUSCIRF’s recommendations and thepromote their interests or influracy, and Human Rights Uzra
State Department’s own reporting
ence U.S. government policy on
Zeya, who also ser ves conhuman rights and internationalon the particularly severe religious freedom
currently as the U.S. Special
religious freedom issues. In
Coordinator for Tibetan
violations in those countries.
2023, a bipartisan group of senIssues, spoke at a Rohingya
ators introduced the Disclosing
Genocide Remembrance Day
Foreign Influence in Lobbying
event, highlighted the Chinese
Act, which would require regisgovernment’s arbitrary impristered lobbyists to disclose any foreign countries or political parties
onment of Tibetan monk Go Sherab Gyatso, and delivered remarksthat are involved in the direction, planning, supervision, or control
at a side event at the IRFBA Ministerial Conference on the Chineseof a lobbyist’s activities. The Senate passed the Disclosing Foreign
government’s religious freedom violations in Tibet.
Influence in Lobbying Act; the House did not vote on the Act.
No member of Congress reintroduced the bipartisan Stop
Lack of CPC Designations for Afghanistan, India, Nigeria,
Helping Adversaries Manipulate Everything Act (SHAME Act), which
Syria, and Vietnam
would prohibit lobbyists from receiving compensation from countries
The State Department did not designate Afghanistan, India, Nigeria,
designated as foreign adversaries by the U.S. Department of ComSyria, or Vietnam as CPCs in 2023 despite USCIRF’s recommendations
merce. Most of the designated countries, which include China, Cuba,
and the State Department’s own reporting on the particularly severe
Iran, North Korea, and Russia, engage in particularly severe religious
religious freedom violations in those countries. USCIRF has recomfreedom violations and other egregious human rights abuses. The
mended CPC status for Afghanistan since 2022, India since 2020,
SHAME Act would considerably strengthen the existing regulatory
Nigeria since 2009, Syria since 2014, and Vietnam since 2002, and it
framework around lobbying on behalf of foreign governments.
issued a statement criticizing the State Department’s omissions. The
State Department did, however, place Vietnam on its SWL and desigMultilateral Engagement
nate the Taliban as an EPC.
The State Department continued to serve as the Secretariat of theInternational Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). During the
New Designation for Azerbaijan
year, IRFBA made multicountry statements, including on combating
The State Department accepted USCIRF’s recommendation to place
antisemitism, the persecution of Christians worldwide, and Chinese
Azerbaijan on its SWL. USCIRF has made this recommendation sincereligious prisoner of conscience Wang Yi. In addition, the U.S. govern2020, the first year it began recommending countries for placement
ment cosponsored a UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution
on the SWL. Previously, USCIRF had reported on Azerbaijan in its
on freedom of religion or belief.
own Tier 2 category of countries with serious religious freedom conIn 2023, the United States served the second year of a threecerns between 2013 and 2019. The State Department failed to placeyear term as a member of the UNHRC. The U.S. government
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, andcosponsored a resolution on freedom of religion or belief and held
Uzbekistan on its SWL, despite USCIRF recommendations.
a side event on combating antisemitism worldwide. The U.S. government also joined a multicountry statement condemning Iran for
its religiously motivated persecution of women and girls, delivered
Without Just Cause Political Prisoners Initiative
a statement speaking out against blasphemy laws, and supported
On January 11, 2023, the State Department launched the Without Just
resolutions mandating investigations into human rights violations in
Cause Political Prisoners Initiative, which seeks to raise internationalIran, Syria, Nicaragua, Ukraine, Eritrea, Belarus, Burma, and Afghanawareness and advocate for the release of political prisoners. The
istan. At the UN Security Council, the U.S. government supported
initiative includes diplomatic engagement in Washington, DC, andtwo resolutions condemning the Taliban’s religiously motivatedby U.S. embassies abroad. Some of those individuals featured arepersecution of women and girls.
religious prisoners of conscience included in USCIRF’s Frank R. Wolf

8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

Individual Violators

strategic religious engagement policy to boost USAID’s collaboration
During 2023, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials
with religious communities to improve development and humanitarianfor particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section
assistance outcomes.
212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision
added by IRFA. However, the U.S. government continued its use of
Refugee Resettlement
other accountability tools to deny U.S. visas or block the U.S.-based
Under USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees
assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses.
the United States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA,
In 2023, the total number of individuals and entities sancreligious persecution should be considered in this determination. In
tioned under the Global Magnitsky Act and its related E.O. 13818
September 2022, the Biden administration maintained the annual
rose to 681. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed Global
refugee ceiling at 125,000 for FY 2023. For FY 2023, the Biden adminMagnitsky Act sanctions on Taliban officials for religious-inspired
istration designated certain populations for priority consideration
human rights abuses committed against women and girls and on
as refugees—including Turkic Muslim refugees who are nationals or
Chinese officials responsible for violations against Muslim groups
habitual residents of the People’s Republic of China, Rohingya refuin the Xinjiang region.
gees who are nationals or habitual residents of Burma, and Iraqi and
The U.S. government also used non-Global Magnitsky Act tools
Syrian nationals who are members of a religious or ethnic minority
to hold violators accountable. Pursuant to E.O. 13851, the Treasurygroup. In December 2022, the President reauthorized the Lautenberg
Department sanctioned Nicaraguan judicial officials responsible
Amendment for FY 2023. The
for stripping citizenship fromamendment is a family reuniwrongfully exiled religious
fication program providing aleaders and for unjustly imprislegal path for resettlement for
oning Bishop Rolando Álvarez.
Throughout 2023, the Biden administration
religious minorities from Iran
In January, March, April, June,
collaborated with religious communities andand from former Soviet Union
and September, pursuant tofunded humanitarian aid for religious groups
countries who are fleeing govE.O. 13553, E.O. 13846, andernment persecution. Despite
E.O. 13224, the Treasury Departtargeted for persecution or genocide
these steps, only 60,014 refment sanctioned Iranian officials
and programs to promote religious freedom,ugees were admitted to thefor their 2022 crackdown on
tolerance, and pluralism.
United States in FY 2023.
d e m o n s t r a to r s p ro t e s t i n g
In September 2023, theMahsa Zhina Amini’s death inWhite House announced that it
police custody for wearing an
was maintaining the admission“improper hijab” and for theirceiling at 125,000 for FY 2024. For FY 2024, the Biden administration
continued rights violations against women and girls. In addition,
designated certain members of religious minority groups in Eurasia,
the Treasury Department sanctioned individuals and entities conthe Baltics, and Iran for priority consideration pursuant to the Lautnected to the Burmese military—which the State Department in 2022
enberg Amendment. The Lautenberg Amendment was reauthorized
determined committed genocide against Rohingya Muslims—on
in March 2024. In December, at the Global Refugee Forum, the U.S.
the two-year anniversary of the military’s coup d’état, pursuant togovernment announced new pledges, including increasing the resetE.O. 14014.
tlement of Rohingya to the United States.

Programs
IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs authorizing U.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal
protections and cultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY
2023, the State Department was required to make funds available
for international religious freedom programs. During 2023, theState Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
issued requests for proposals to advance religious freedom and/or
provide protection to religious minority groups in Tibet and Mongolia as well as requests for proposals to monitor and document
religious freedom violations globally.
Throughout 2023, the Biden administration collaborated withreligious communities and funded humanitarian aid for religious groups
targeted for persecution or genocide and programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. In February, USAID convened
a roundtable discussion with faith-based organizations working indevelopment and humanitarian assistance. In July, USAID announced$74 million in additional humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations in Burma, Bangladesh, and the surrounding region, including theRohingya. In September, USAID announced the launch of its first-everAsylum Seekers in Expedited Removal
As authorized by IRFA, USCIRF examined the U.S. government’s treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, the process that allows
DHS officers to quickly deport—without immigration court hearings—noncitizens who arrive at U.S. ports of entry or cross the borderwithout proper documents unless they can establish a credible fear of
persecution or torture. USCIRF has long monitored the subject, including in comprehensive reports released in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016that document major problems successive administrations have notaddressed. Specifically, USCIRF found that DHS officials often fail tofollow required procedures to identify asylum seekers and refer themfor credible fear determinations; that they detain asylum seekers ininappropriate, prison-like conditions; and that funding disparities anda lack of high-level oversight hamper the complicated, multiagency
process. These flaws raise serious concerns that the United States iserroneously returning asylum seekers to countries where they could
face persecution or torture in violation of both U.S. and international
law—a risk that Expedited Removal has only exacerbated. In May,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement announced changes that

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

9

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

may allow families seeking asylum in Expedited Removal proceedings
to access alternatives to detention while awaiting the processing of
their claim.

Notable Congressional Efforts to Promote Religious
Freedom Abroad
In 2023, Congress continued its own IRF promotion efforts. The House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) held multiple hearings or events on
religious freedom conditions abroad, including on Chinese religious
prisoner of conscience Gao Zhisheng, the crisis facing women and girls
in Afghanistan, the dire state of religious freedom around the world,the Nicaraguan government’s severe persecution of the Catholic
Church, and several on antisemitism in intergovernmental organizations and in Europe. The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission(TLHRC) held a hearing on human rights in Burma in the aftermath ofthe military coup d’état. The Congressional-Executive Commission
on China held hearings on preventing forced assimilation in Tibet,

10 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

implementing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, countering
China’s transnational repression, and Uyghur forced labor. The SelectCommittee on the Chinese Communist Party held a hearing on the
Uyghur genocide. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held ahearing on transnational repression.
In addition, members of Congress advocated for religious prisoners and other prisoners of conscience through the TLHRC’s Defending
Freedom Project. Members also participated in numerous USCIRF
hearings or events, including on religious freedom and women’s
rights in Iran, the religious freedom implications of Russia’s invasionof Ukraine, transnational repression of freedom of religion or belief,
deteriorating religious freedom conditions in Cuba, religious freedom
conditions in Vietnam, the 25th anniversary of IRFA, and the launch of
USCIRF’s 2023 Annual Report. Finally, members of Congress sent theadministration multiple letters supporting USCIRF’s policy recommendations, and the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution
condemning Iran’s state-sponsored persecution of the Baha’i religious
minority group.

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

Commissioner dissent on IRFA Implementation by
Commissioner Eric Ueland
USCIRF’s work is critical in holding violators of religious freedom toaccount, and demanding religious freedom for all be as respected asother human rights. On the welcome day USCIRF and the many fighting for international religious freedom succeed, there will no longer
be the need for programs by the United States to provide succor andrefuge to those whose freedom of religion is under threat.
Until then, America’s generosity towards refugees who suffer
religious freedom violations has been consistent across multiple
administrations, providing an option to those whose religious freedom is extinguished, restricted, or threatened. I believe lower thanrecommended levels for religious refugees along with a rigorous
review process deliver optimal results to those with religious freedom
needs who flee oppression, suppression, relocation, revocation, terror,
imprisonment, torture, or looming death. These refugees come to theUnited States free to practice their faith without fear or favor under
our Constitution and laws.
The United States should work to expand the number of countries
who can, if they choose, adopt religiously based refugee admittanceprograms, so more countries provide refuge to those fleeing in theface of threats to their religious freedom. Well-grounded religiously
based refugee programs in other countries would meet the need ofadvancing religious freedom opportunities around the globe, andprotect those whose religious freedom is threatened. In key bilateralrelationships, it would be worthy work on behalf of religious freedom
to diplomatize this priority.

Additional view on IRFA Implementation by
Vice Chair Frederick A. Davie, andCommissioners Susie Gelman, Mohamed Magid,
and Stephen Schneck
USCIRF has a commendable track record of recommending a strong
and robust refugee program. The importance of USCIRF's recommendation that the Biden administration continue to strengthen
the mechanisms of this program to increase the ability to meet theadmissions ceiling for refugees, along with prioritizing survivors ofegregious religious persecution, cannot be overstated.
The United States has long been a leader in the resettlementof refugees from abroad, including victims of religious persecution.
While USCIRF's focus is on individuals and groups being persecutedfor their religion or belief, we strongly believe that the United States
must also continue to resettle those fleeing persecution on all of thegrounds recognized by U.S. and international law. Protecting refugees
and giving them hope for the future is a core tenet of the UnitedStates' history and values.
Unlike the previous administration, the Biden administration
has returned the United States to a global leadership role on refugee
resettlement. We also strongly support the United States and its
partners continuing their generous humanitarian aid to the vast andgrowing number of refugees and internally displaced people aroundthe globe. Given the scale of today's world crises, it is crucial that theadministration continue to work with other countries to expand theirown resettlement programs.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

11

2024 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Afghanistan

Eritrea

North Korea

TurkmenistanAzerbaijan

India

Pakistan

Vietnam

Burma

Iran

RussiaChina

Nicaragua

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Nigeria

Tajikistan■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES
Algeria

Iraq

Malaysia

TurkeyEgypt

Kazakhstan

Sri Lanka

Uzbekistan

Indonesia

Kyrgyzstan

Syria

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

13

AFGHANISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan continued todeteriorate under Taliban rule. De facto Taliban authorities continued to enforce a strict interpretation of Shari’a, violating freedomof religion or belief for all Afghans holding a different interpretationof Islam and for members of religious minority groups. The Taliban
expanded and enforced dozens of edicts and decrees based on
their religious interpretation to restrict Afghans’ movement, dress,
employment, and education, disproportionately impacting religious
minorities as well as women and girls.
Under the Taliban, the Ministry for Propagation of Virtue andPrevention of Vice (MPVPV) harshly enforced this interpretation of
Shari’a. Throughout the year, Taliban officials conducted hundredsof public floggings and detainments across the country after finding
individuals guilty of offenses deemed illicit or immoral, without due
process. They detained a number of journalists, women’s rights
activists, and religious minorities. In October 2023, Taliban authorities released French-Afghan journalist Mortaza Behboudi after 284
days in jail. Behboudi, who is Hazara Shi’a, was held on charges of
espionage. The same month, after detaining him for seven months,
the Taliban released Matiullah Wesa, an outspoken advocate forthe education of Afghan girls. Prior to his arrest, Wesa had repeatedly called on the Taliban to reverse its decree barring girls frompursuing education beyond sixth grade. In December, the Taliban
announced that it would allow girls of all ages to attend Islamic
schools (madrassas), 13,500 of which are government controlled andemploy teachers approved by the Taliban’s Ministry of Education.
The Taliban continued to enforce restrictions on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the country. In addition
to prohibiting employment of Afghan women, the Taliban in September detained 18 NGO workers, accusing them of promoting
Christianity. Under Taliban rule, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians face
severe restrictions, including on their dress and appearance, andhave been prohibited from celebrating their religious holidays
publicly. In March, the Taliban’s Religious Affairs Ministry directed
imams throughout the country to instruct Afghans to refrain fromcelebrating Nowruz, claiming the holiday is against Shari’a.
Shi’a Muslims also continued to face harassment, violence, andinterference with their right to worship. In February 2023, a governor
in Badakhshan issued a letter prohibiting marriages between Shi’aand Sunni Muslims. The Taliban additionally banned the teaching of
the Shi’a Jafari school of jurisprudence, forcing private universities toremove all religious books that do not conform to the Sunni Hanafi
school of jurisprudence. The Talban declared April 21 as Eid al-Fitr
and instructed police to force Shi’a Muslims to break their fast at
vehicle checkpoints. In July, citing security concerns, Afghanistan’s
Council of Shi’a Scholars published a declaration advising mourners
to limit their activities marking Muharram, the first month of theIslamic calendar. The declaration called on mourners to refrain fromstreet processions during Ashura, where Shi’a Muslims commemorate the death of Imam Hussain. The same month, Taliban members
prevented Shi’a residents from publicly celebrating Eid al-Adha.
According to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
several Shi’a clerics were killed in targeted attacks throughout October, November, and December.
Increased attacks by terrorist groups, including the IslamicState Khorasan (ISIS-K) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
continued to threaten Afghanistan’s religious minorities and thecountry’s overall stability. While ISIS-K attacks throughout the year
focused primarily on Taliban members, terrorists also targeted
Afghanistan’s Shi’a communities, including Hazaras. In October,an attack on the largest Shi’a mosque in Baghlan resulted in thedeath of 17 worshipers. In November, an explosion in a Shi’a Hazara
majority neighborhood near Kabul killed seven people; ISIS later
claimed responsibility for the attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Afghanistan under the de facto
rule of the Taliban as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
E xpand the existing Priorit y 2 (P-2)
designation granting U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP) access forcertain Afghan nationals and their family
members to explicitly include Afghan

religious minorities at extreme risk ofreligious persecution;■■

Integrate protections for freedom of religion or belief into all potential dialogue
with the Taliban, continue to clearly andpublicly condemn ongoing and severe
atrocities committed by the Taliban and
ISIS-K, and emphasize to Taliban leadership the close relationship between
religious freedom and overall security; andImpose targeted sanc tions on Taliban of ficials responsible for severe

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■Issue Update: Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan

14 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4v iolation s of religiou s f reed om byfreezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry into the United
St ates under human right s-related
financial and visa authorities— citing
specific religious freedom violations—and coordinate with allies to impose
similar sanctions.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Create by law a P-2 designation for members of religious groups at extreme risk ofpersecution by the Taliban.

In August 2021, the Taliban returned to power after two decades.
Despite attempts to project a more moderate stance, it has imposeda strict interpretation of Islamic law that purposefully undermines
the human rights of women and religious and ethnic minorities,
including their right to religious freedom. The country’s population
is estimated at 39.2 million and is composed of a wide range of ethnic
groups, including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, andBalochs. The country is 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 percent Sunni
and 10–15 percent Shi’a) and less than 0.3 percent other religions.
Many religious minorities fled Afghanistan following the Taliban’s
2021 takeover, but small communities of Christians, Ahmadiyya
Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs remain. An estimated 50 Hindus were in
Afghanistan in 2021, while eight Sikhs and fewer than 10,000 Christians remained in 2023, despite the Taliban’s previous claim that no
Christians are present in the country. The Taliban considers Afghans
who convert from Islam to Christianity as “apostates” and as such
subject to the death penalty.
The Taliban has rejected Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution, viewing
it as “insufficiently” Islamic and failing to recognize God’s commands
as the basis for law and policy. While the Taliban has not introduced
a formal written constitution for Afghanistan, reports indicate thedrafting process is “ongoing.” In the absence of a constitution, theTaliban has professed that its interpretation of Shari’a and the Qur’an
are the basis for law in the country.
In July 2023, a new law dissolved the Office of the State Secretary
General and put in its place the Directorate General of Supervision
and Pursuit of Decrees, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of edicts in both public and private institutions. The newlaw also granted the Taliban’s Supreme Leader total authority tooversee the “correct” implementation of laws, rules, and decrees. In
September, Taliban officials announced their establishment of ulema
shuras (councils) throughout all 34 provinces, none of which included
representation from Shi’a Muslims or women.

Restrictions on Women
In 2023, the Taliban established, expanded, and implemented aseries of edicts and decrees to further restrict the rights of Afghan
women and girls in society, including their dress, movement, accessto education, and employment. In April, the Taliban prevented
Afghan women from reporting to work at the United Nations (UN),expanding its 2022 decrees forbidding women from working in
offices or for NGOs. In March, UN experts released a statement
calling for schools to reopen for girls across Afghanistan and forthe lifting of restrictions on female educators, stating that the
Taliban has “no justification to deny the right to education, on any
grounds, including religion or tradition.” Secondary schools forgirls remained closed. However, in August, the Taliban barred 100

Afghan girls from leaving for the United Arab Emirates to complete
their university education. In October, the Kandahar religious police
mandated to women’s madrassas that the only acceptable form ofhijab is the burqa.
These edicts have had severe impacts on women in Afghanistan.
In March 2023, the Taliban announced that under its interpretationof Shari’a, women’s divorces were invalid. This decree, coupled withthe elimination of domestic violence shelters throughout the country,
leaves Afghan women susceptible to abusive or harmful marriages. In
December, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that
the Taliban detains women to “protect” them from gender-based discrimination. The Taliban also arbitrarily detained women throughout
the year for participating in peaceful protests against its restrictive
policies, such as the education ban and the closure of beauty salons.
The absence of women’s participation in the workforce and in education has had direct consequences in the distribution of humanitarian
aid and increased the risk of poverty and child marriage.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2023, key issues for U.S. policymakers included refugee resettlement
and the relocation of Afghans who worked for the U.S. government,
NGOs, or media outlets. U.S. policy also focused on addressing protection of women’s rights. In March 2023, the U.S. Department of State’s
special representative for Afghanistan joined a multilateral statementwith relevant special envoys condemning the Taliban’s human rights violations, including against religious minorities. The statement expressed
concern and called for the immediate reversal of the restrictive bans on
education and employment for women.
While the United States does not recognize the de facto Taliban
authorities as the official government of Afghanistan, several U.S.
delegations have participated in conversations with Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar. In April, the U.S. special representative
for Afghanistan met with Afghan civil society and political leaders,journalists, and human rights activists to discuss current challenges
in the country. The same month, U.S. officials participated in a UNorganized meeting in Doha focused on potential ways to engage
with the Taliban on key human rights issues, including women’s andgirls’ rights, minority rights, and inclusive governance. In December,the U.S. mission to the UN voted in favor of a Security Council resolution calling for the creation of a UN special envoy for Afghanistan
to increase engagement with Taliban officials. In fiscal year 2023, theU.S. government obligated $812 million for programs in Afghanistan.
In December, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued targeted sanctions against Taliban officials Fariduddin Mahmood andKhalid Hanafi for repressing the rights of Afghan women and girls. On
December 29, 2023, the State Department redesignated the Taliban
as an entity of particular concern (EPC) for particularly severe religious
freedom violations.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )15

AFGHANISTAN

BackgroundAZERBAIJANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan trended negatively. The government continued to enforce its 2009 law On
Freedom of Religious Beliefs, which required the registration ofreligious groups to operate legally and engage in worship, mandated the official review and approval of religious literature andother materials, and restricted who could engage in “religious
propaganda” or missionary activity, among other limitations. In
keeping with the previous year, the government yet again refused
to register any non-Muslim religious community despite continued
efforts by Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses to obtain
official registration. The government only reported registering two
mosques during the year.
Authorities continued to exert pressure on Muslims related totheir religious activities, and they surveilled, fined, detained, andarrested those considered to have violated Azerbaijan’s religious
regulations. In January and February 2023, courts fined four Muslim men on administrative charges for “illegally involv[ing] minors
in the performance of religious rituals” after they brought theirchildren to a shopping mall to participate in a religious celebration.
Authorities subsequently arrested one of the four men on questionable drug trafficking charges. The Muslim Unity Movement(Müsəlman Birliyi Hərəkatı) or MUM—a Shi’a Muslim group that has
opposed the government’s control of religious practice—continued
to experience harassment and persecution that many human rights
defenders characterized as politically motivated. Over the course of
the year, police detained the group’s members, placed them underadministrative arrest, and subjected those who were detained or
imprisoned to physical and psychological pressure. In several cases,
MUM members claimed that authorities beat and tortured them.
Following an armed attack in January on the Azerbaijani Embassyin Tehran, Iran, authorities conducted arrests across the country
to counter alleged acts of espionage, efforts to overthrow thegovernment, and drug trafficking. While officials asserted that theindividuals arrested in these sweeps sought to establish a theocratic

state, human rights defenders contended that many were wrongly
detained in likely connection to their criticism of the government’s
religious policies. At the end of the year, a nongovernmental organization identified 183 persons as “peaceful believers” unjustly
imprisoned in Azerbaijan due to their religious beliefs or activities,
which marked a significant increase in that number compared tothe preceding year.
Jehovah’s Witnesses still could not perform an alternative
civilian service in place of carrying out mandatory military service, despite the provision of such an option in the country’s
constitution. In some instances, Jehovah’s Witnesses experienced
retaliation for attempting to exercise their right to conscientiously
object in accordance with their religious beliefs. In June, theSupreme Court dismissed the appeal of Seymur Mammadov,whose nine-month prison sentence had been converted to a oneyear suspended sentence the previous year. Relevant government
bodies refused to issue passports to other Jehovah’s Witnesses or
imposed on them exit bans because they had failed to complete
their military service.
The government continued to pose a threat to religious sites
in and around the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. In May, the chairman of the official State Committee for Work on Religious Affairs
Mubariz Gurbanli urged Armenian Apostolic priests to leave theDadivank Monastery located in the Kalbajar region, falsely claiming that they had no ties to the religious site. Although a United
Nations mission to the city of Khankendi in October concluded
that it “saw no damage … to cultural or religious structures,” otherorganizations remained concerned by the potential for damage ordestruction in the region. In November 2023, Caucasus Heritage
Watch (CHW), a research initiative supported by Cornell University,
reported damage to the historical Meghretsots Holy Mother of
God Church in Shusha. That same month, CHW released satellite
imagery that indicated probable damage to two Armenian cemeteries also in Shusha.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Azerbaijan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Work with the government of Azerbaijan
to revise the 2009 religion law, as mostrecently amended in 2022, to comply withinternational human rights standards andto bring it into conformity with recommendations made in 2012 by the Councilof Europe’s Venice Commission and the■■Assist the Azerbaijani government, in collaboration with international partners, todevelop an alternative civilian service andpermit conscientious objection in line with
its constitution and pursuant to its commitment made to the Council of Europe
and obligations under international humanrights law; andAllocate funding to the U.S. Agency
for International Development and U.S.
Embassy in Baku to restore, preserve,

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■Country Update: State Control of Religion in AzerbaijanFrank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Azerbaijan

16 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

and protec t places of worship andother religiou s or c ultural site s in
Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
territories.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise concerns, through public hearingsand other actions, about Azerbaijan’s religious freedom and broader human rights
abuses, including treatment of the MUM,
directly with the Azerbaijani Embassy andother government officials and advocate
for the release of all religious prisonersof conscience.

Azerbaijan has an estimated population of approximately 10.4 million.
Nearly 96 percent of the population identify as Muslim, split between
65 percent who identify as Shi’a Muslim and 35 percent who identify as
Sunni Muslim. The remaining four percent of the population consists ofatheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Catholics, Georgian Orthodox,
members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, Protestants, and Russian Orthodox.
The constitution characterizes Azerbaijan as a secular state and stipulates a separation between the state and religion. Nonetheless, thegovernment continued to play an active role in the management andoversight of religious activities throughout the country and subjectedvirtually all religious practice to strict state control. Throughout theyear, various officials misleadingly sought to promote Azerbaijan as a“model of state-religion relations.”
The government maintained and utilized a problematic conceptualization of the term “extremism,” often levying charges of extremist
activity against political opponents and those who dissented againstor criticized the government. In July 2023, police arrested scholar
Gubad Ibadoghlu on fictitious allegations that included the possession of religious “extremist” materials. In March 2023, the Venice
Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
expressed concern in a joint opinion that Azerbaijan abused suchconcepts to “restrict the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedomof religion or belief, expression, association, and peaceful assembly.”

Crackdown on Muslims
The government routinely harassed, fined, surveilled, detained,
arrested, and imprisoned Shi’a Muslims related to their religious
activities and religious activism. Law enforcement agencies in particular targeted individuals affiliated with the MUM. The group reported
that police detained or arrested dozens of its members, many ofwhom received brief sentences of administrative arrest. In March
2023, a court sentenced MUM member Mahir Azimov to four years inprison on charges of drug trafficking. In November, the same court
sentenced MUM member Etibar Ismailov to nearly 10 years in prisonon the basis of similar accusations. Other MUM members claimed that
authorities subjected them to torture and “psychological pressure”
while in custody. In July, guards reportedly beat MUM member Jeyhun
Balashov, while in September, police allegedly tortured and threatened MUM member Agali Yakhyaev with sexual assault. In February
2023, the European Court for Human Rights awarded compensation
to eight individuals with links to the group who experienced ill treatment while in custody that authorities failed to investigate.
In December, the Union for the Freedom for Political Prisonersof Azerbaijan documented 183 individuals as “peaceful believers”
wrongly imprisoned in connection with their religious beliefs, activities,

or activism. Many of the individuals included on that list were detainedin early 2023 in mass arrests that the government carried out aspart of a campaign to foil supposed espionage, treason, and drugrelated crimes. However, observers claimed that authorities arrested
numerous religious activists in those sweeps, with one stating thathe “presume[d] that there are innocent people among the detainees,
who were only practicing their religion, and perhaps criticized thegovernment’s policy regarding religious freedoms.” Additionally, in
March, Sabuhi Salimov of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan died in court
after carrying out a hunger strike. In early 2023, another prisoner andleader of the Islamic Party, Movsum Samadov, was released after hecompleted his 12-year prison sentence.

Threats to Religious Sites
International observers remained concerned by the potential forthe damage or destruction of religious sites located in and around
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian Apostolic priests expressed fears that
the Azerbaijani government would specifically target their community’s religious heritage throughout the region.

Key U.S. Policy
The subject of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan monopolized much of the U.S.-Azerbaijan bilateral relationship during the year,
as the U.S. government continued to seek a convening and mediatingrole between the two countries. Throughout the year, Secretary ofState Antony J. Blinken spoke with President Ilham Aliyev on multiple
occasions concerning the reopening of the Lachin corridor and theurgency of allowing humanitarian access to Nagorno-Karabakh. The
U.S. Department of State also hosted both countries’ foreign ministers
as part of ongoing peace negotiations.
The U.S. government continued to highlight concerns for humanrights in Azerbaijan. In February, the State Department spokesperson
called for the expeditious release of Azerbaijani activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev and all other persons wrongfully imprisoned. In March 2023, officials
from the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom(IRF) visited Azerbaijan. At the Warsaw Human Dimension Conferencein October, the principal deputy to the ambassador at large for IRF criticized Azerbaijan, describing it as a place where “religious observanceis tightly regulated by the government, and state persecution has continued against some non-state-aligned religious communities, including
both Shi’a and Sunni Muslim communities.” During Azerbaijan’s Universal Periodic Review, the United States once again called on Azerbaijan
to “immediately release all persons incarcerated for exercising their
human rights and remove undue restrictions on … religious activists,” among others. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated$23 million for programs in Azerbaijan. On December 29, 2023, theState Department placed Azerbaijan on its Special Watch List for severe
violations of religious freedom.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )17

AZERBAIJAN

BackgroundCommissioner dissent on Azerbaijan by
Chair Abraham Cooper and Commissioners
Susie Gelman, Mohamed Magid, and Nury Turkel
USCIRF has and does acknowledge religious freedom violations in
Azerbaijan, along with violations by many other nations. It is important that issues related to freedom of religion or belief must be raised
and addressed.
Last year, the U.S. Department of State listed Azerbaijan on its
Special Watch List (SWL) for the first time. Through various discussions
with officials at the State Department, they made it clear that in theirassessment conditions in Azerbaijan are not at the level of a Countryof Particular Concern (CPC). We too believe the conditions previously
and currently under review and scrutiny do not rise to the level of
CPC. For someone who has traveled multiple times to the region, we
agree with the State Department’s analysis and strongly disagree with
USCIRF’s ill-advised recommendation.

18 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

BURMA
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Burma continued to
decline significantly. Since its February 2021 coup, the country’s
military—known as the Tatmadaw—has attempted to rule thecountry through the State Administration Council (SAC) under theleadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The SAC has reliedon assistance from abroad, importing approximately $1 billion in
weapons, the majority from Russia and China. Throughout theyear, the SAC continued to pursue what the United Nations (UN)Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar describedas “increasingly brazen” war crimes in its attempt to quell thedisparate opposition forces, including through the increasing use
of airstrikes. Since 2021, such tactics have destroyed nearly 200
religious buildings across Burma, including 85 churches in Chin
State and 40 Buddhist monasteries, a nunnery, six churches, andthree mosques in Sagaing. In 2023, the Tatmadaw continued totarget, occupy, and destroy more houses of worship, particularly
those belonging to minority religious communities. In November,the army bombed and then occupied Christ the King Cathedral in
Kayah State. These tactics mirror previous reporting on the army’s
occupation of Baptist churches in Chin State.
Throughout 2023, the SAC continued its attempts to link its
legitimacy to Buddhism, including through printing new currency to
showcase its sponsorship of Theravada Buddhism. In July, the SAC
finished construction on a giant seated Buddha. The project wassupervised by Senior General Hlaing and cost around $26.7 million,
which the government financed amid a deteriorating economy. In
August, authorities arrested a Swiss movie director and 13 Burmese
actors on blasphemy charges for producing a film that allegedly
insulted the virtue of Buddhist monks. The military’s sponsorshipof Buddhism has not prevented the SAC in 2023 from attacking
monasteries or killing Buddhist monks. Evidence suggests thatmembers of the Bamar Buddhist majority have largely abandoned
support for the Tatmadaw.

As of the end of 2023, hundreds of thousands of people wereinternally displaced in Burma, including over 100,000 people in
Christian-majority Kayah State. Rohingya refugees from Burmalocated in Bangladesh continued to face an uncertain future. In
October, officials from the SAC traveled to Bangladesh as part ofa pilot repatriation scheme brokered by China. While Rohingya
families in refugee camps wish to return to their homeland, theongoing conflict and absence of guarantees of safety remained apersistent concern. The SAC continues to block humanitarian aid
to all vulnerable populations, including those displaced.
International efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights
abuses and atrocities within Burma continued in 2023, including in
the case of The Gambia vs. Myanmar at the International Court ofJustice (ICJ). In November, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, theNetherlands, and the United Kingdom filed a joint declaration ofintervention in support of The Gambia. The Maldives filed a separate
declaration to intervene in support of The Gambia. This case would
officially determine, according to international law, whether the
Burmese authorities committed acts of genocide against Rohingya
in 2017. In March 2022, the United States determined unilaterallythat the Burmese authorities committed genocide against Rohingya
and has provided evidence in support to The Gambia.
The National Unity Government (NUG), a prodemocracy
opposition organization that has attempted to organize the various ethnic armies and resistance movements, continued to pledge
respect for international human rights standards following a returnto democracy. This includes reiterating its commitment to abolishthe 1982 citizenship law that excludes Rohingya from citizenship, as
well as any other local laws used to discriminate against Rohingya.
Human rights activists continued to raise the need for a federal
system of government in Burma to better empower ethnic and religious minorities at the local and state level as a means for securing
religious freedom and other related human rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■of 2022, and prioritize religious freedom
issues such as voluntary repatriation andrestored citizenship for the Rohingya community as a prerequisite for recognition
and/or ongoing and substantial engagement; andRedesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Engage with the prodemocracy Burmese opposition, including the NUG, aswell as ethnic organizations as outlinedin the Burma Unified through Rigorous
Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act)■Work with the governments of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, andThailand to assist Rohingya and otherrefugee communities from Burma, including by identifying solutions within Cox’s

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESEvent: Rising Authoritarianism in ASEAN Member States
Hearing: Two Years after the Coup: Religious Freedom in a Contested Burma■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Burma■■

20 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Bazar to fully scale up livelihood and skills
training programs for adults and youthand providing curriculum to ensure aquality education for all children within
Cox’s Bazar.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold hearings on implementation of
the BURMA Act, including justice andaccountability mechanisms for Rohingya
and other persecuted religious minorities.

Burma’s population consists of Buddhists (87.9 percent), Christians(6.2 percent), Muslims (4.3 percent), Animists (0.8 percent), and Hindus (0.5 percent). Although the constitution treats Buddhism as thede facto state religion while recognizing Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism, non-Buddhist religious and ethnic minorities facelongstanding persecution. In 2015, Burma passed race and religion
laws with the support of hardline Buddhist nationalist groups such as
the Ma Ba Tha. These laws regulate religious conversion, marriage,
and births; they also restrict the religious freedom of non-Buddhists,
particularly Muslims.

Rohingya and Other Refugees andDisplaced Peoples
The Tatmadaw’s violent repression of Burma’s ethnic and religious
minorities, including its 2017 genocide against Rohingya, has led totheir mass displacement. In January 2023, a military-backed court
sentenced 112 Rohingya to jail for traveling without documents within
Burma. Over 18 million Burmese, constituting a third of the total
population, require humanitarian aid due to the conflict. The SAC
has restricted access to and coopted the flow of humanitarian aid
and particularly targeted religious organizations that have become
the primary source of aid to vulnerable, disconnected communities.
The situation for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladeshremains dire. In March, a fire in the camps destroyed almost 2,000
shelters, leaving 12,000 Rohingya refugees homeless. Additionally,
throughout 2023, thousands of Rohingya risked their lives attempting
to leave the refugee camps. In November, Indonesian authorities andresidents of Aceh repeatedly refused entry to around 200 Rohingya
refugees who had traveled from Bangladesh. By December, some
1,500 Rohingya arrived in Aceh, including 465 children. By the endof December, hundreds were still stranded at sea, as Indonesia andMalaysia refused them entry. Once ashore, conditions for Rohingya
in Malaysia and Indonesia are not stable. For example, in Malaysia,
Rohingya girls have been forced into risky marriages in order for themand their families to raise money to survive. In Indonesia, anti-refugeeprotesters stormed a shelter temporarily housing Rohingya, demanding their deportation.

International Efforts toward Accountability
In January, Burmese activists and 16 alleged victims of abuse filed acriminal complaint through universal jurisdiction in Germany against
the SAC’s generals for instigating genocide against Rohingya Muslims
and other atrocities. In June, an Argentine court heard testimony in acase concerning allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity committed by Burmese officials against Rohingya Muslims. In
October, relatives of victims of alleged war crimes committed by the
Burmese army filed a criminal complaint in the Philippines naming
Senior General Hlaing, eight other military commanders, and a stateminister as responsible for attacks that occurred against Christians.
These cases are occurring simultaneously as the ICJ and the International Criminal Court pursue allegations concerning human rights
abuses, including religious freedom violations, perpetrated by the
Burmese authorities against the predominantly Muslim Rohingya.
In March, Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, noted the expanding humanitarian emergency in Burma,
observing that persons belonging to ethnic or religious minorities
bore the brunt of the conflict. In August, 13 of the 15 UN Security
Council members released a joint statement reiterating support
for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) efforts toresolve the conflict in Burma, as well as highlighting the demandsof Resolution 2669.

Key U.S. Policy
Throughout 2023, the BURMA Act, as included in the 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act, continued to guide the United States’
engagement with Burma, and in particular with opposition andresistance forces. In February, President Joseph R. Biden extended
Executive Order 14014, declaring the Tatmadaw as a national
emergency threat to the United States for another year. The U.S.
government led efforts with international partners to sanction the
SAC. In January, the United States coordinated with Canada and theUnited Kingdom to sanction several agencies within Burma, including
the Union Election Commission and the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). MOGE is a primary source of revenue for the SAC, andthe January sanctions were the United States’ first against the stateenergy company. In October, the U.S. government further sanctioned
MOGE. Throughout 2023, the United States continued to sanction
individuals and agencies of the SAC and to level targeted sanctions
against jet fuel suppliers.
In July, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled toIndonesia to urge ASEAN foreign ministers to take tougher action
in response to the conflict in Burma. In September, Vice President
Kamala Harris attended the U.S.-ASEAN Summit where she discussed
the situation in Burma with ASEAN members. In September, Acting
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Erin Barclay noted in a congressional
hearing that since the 2021 coup, the U.S. Department of State has
provided financial assistance to over 1,000 human rights defenders
and activists in Burma and provided The Gambia with information inits pursuit of justice and accountability at the ICJ. In fiscal year 2023,
the U.S. government obligated $233 million for programs in Burma.
The United States has contributed $2.1 billion to the humanitarian
response to the Rohingya refugee crisis.
In December, the U.S. government committed to expanding thenumber of Rohingya resettled in the United States. On December 29,
2023, the State Department redesignated Burma as a CPC under IRFA
and reimposed as the relevant presidential action existing ongoing
restrictions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1, pursuant to Section 402(c)(5).

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )

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BURMA

BackgroundCHINAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in China deteriorated. The
government intensified the implementation of its multifaceted“sinicization of religion” policy, demanding that all major religious
groups obey the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its ideology
and policies. Sinicization requires groups to follow the CCP’s Marxist
interpretation of religion, including by altering religious scripturesand doctrines to conform to that interpretation. Authorities demolished and forcibly modified Christian churches and Muslim mosquesbecause of architectural features they deemed “foreign.” In the
ethnoreligious minority regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, sinicizationentailed forced assimilation of local populations that threatened
their religious and cultural identities. In September, the government
implemented its new Measures for the Management of Religious
Activity Venues, further restricting religious freedom.
During the year, top CCP officials Xi Jinping and Wang Huning
vowed to strengthen repressive policies and continue sinicizing
Islam in Xinjiang. Authorities continued to detain and imprison
Uyghurs. According to reports, some became critically ill in custody
while others died in prison or shortly after release. The government
continued to subject Uyghurs to forced labor, including in prisons.
Authorities heavily surveilled and prevented Uyghurs from fasting
during Ramadan and rebranded Xinjiang as a tourist destination.
The government also increased its repression of Hui Muslims acrossseveral provinces, subjecting them to similar mistreatments experienced by Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.
The government intensified its suppression and sinicization of
Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities increased surveillance and security
measures on Tibetan Buddhists, restricting their peaceful religious
activities, arresting and imprisoning them for engaging in suchactivities and possessing the Dalai Lama’s portraits or teachings,
and placing them in “political re-education” camps to prevent
self-immolation. Some Tibetan Buddhist monks died in prison. The

government separated one million Tibetan children from parents,
putting them in state-run boarding schools to forcibly assimilate
them. Some local authorities banned parents from teaching religion
to Tibetan children. The government controlled the ordination of
Tibetan monks and reiterated its intent to interfere in the Dalai
Lama’s reincarnation and appoint his successor.
Despite the Vatican-China agreement on bishop appointments, in April the government installed a bishop without Vatican
approval. Authorities continued to forcibly disappear and convict
underground Catholic priests—including Bishop Augustine Cui Tai
and Joseph Yang Xiaoming—who refused to join the state-controlled Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.
Persecution of Protestant house church Christians intensified. The government continued its nationwide crackdown on
house churches, detaining, arresting, and sentencing independent
Protestants on security and criminal charges. Authorities tortured
Christians held in secret detention centers and prisons. Authorities
in Henan Province required Protestants to register on a government“smart-religion” app to attend worship services. Authorities also
continued to persecute ethnic minority Protestants, such as Miao,
Lisu, and Nu Christians.
The government continued its persecution of Falun Gong
and the Church of Almighty God (CAG), often using “anti-cult”
provisions under Article 300 of China’s Criminal Law. In 2023, Falun
Gong sources documented 6,514 cases of harassment and arrest,
1,190 prison sentences, and 209 deaths because of persecution.
Across China, authorities arrested and tortured thousands of CAG
members, some of whom reportedly died due to abuses.
The government engages in sophisticated and comprehensive
campaigns of transnational repression, using a wide array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to attempt to silence those it
views as threats, such as Uyghurs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Continue imposing sanctions, in coordination with partners, to target Chinese
officials and entities responsible for severe
religious freedom violations, especiallywithin the CCP’s United Front Work
Department and the public security andstate security apparatus;
Work with like-minded par tners toaddress China’s technology-enabled

22 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

religious freedom and other humanrights violations by strengthening theeffectiveness of existing export control
regimes—including by establishing a formal, binding, multilateral export control
regime—countering China’s economic
coercion, reducing economic and tradedependence on China, and diversifying
supply chains;■

Expand the network of countries thatabide by U.S.-led technology governance regimes that respect and protect
religious freedom and other related
human rights, including rules governing
the development and use of AI systems

and other emerging critical technologies; and■Work in close coordination with international partners to exchange intelligenceand to continue prosecuting those engaging in transnational repression against
religious minorities on behalf of the Chinese government.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Ban foreign lobbying by agents representing the Chinese government and its
state-affiliated commercial entities that
undermine religious freedom and related
human rights.

China is officially an atheist state. China’s religious regulations andpolicies explicitly require state-controlled religious organizations to
be loyal to the CCP and to serve its political objectives and interests.
Of China’s estimated 1.4 billion people, approximately 18 percent
are Buddhist, including Tibetan Buddhists; five percent are Christian;and two percent are Muslim. Other significant religious traditions
include Taoism, Falun Gong, and folk religion practices.

International Accountability in the United Nations
In March 2023, the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights expressed concern over the Chinese government’s use of forced labor and restriction and criminalization ofreligious practices in Xinjiang. The committee also noted China’s sinicization and forced assimilation policy imposed on Tibetan children andits destruction of religious sites in Xinjiang and Tibet. In April, six UN
special rapporteurs expressed concern that China’s “labor transfer”
and “vocational training” programs in Tibet could lead to forced laborand that Tibetans placed in such programs are “discouraged fromexpressing their religious identity,” violating international law. Theyurged China to dismantle its “discriminatory ideas and practices.”
In September, three UN special rapporteurs raised grave concerns over China’s forced assimilation of Uyghur children in state-run
boarding schools, leading to “a loss of connection with their families and communities” and undermining “their ties to their cultural,religious and linguistic identities.” Also in September, the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called on China to take“strong remedial action” in Xinjiang, per his office’s recommendations. Following China’s election to the UN Human Rights Council(2024–2026) in October, 51 countries delivered a joint statement at
the UN Third Committee, urging China to end its human rights andreligious freedom violations in Xinjiang.

Religious Freedom in Hong Kong
According to a Hong Kong Watch report, religious freedom in Hong
Kong is slowly being undermined. Chinese and Hong Kong authorities
continued to implement the draconian National Security Law, which
severely restricts related human rights such as the freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and press. This increased political pressure
has led to self-censorship among Hong Kong’s religious leaders andclosures of some religious groups. In 2023, Catholic religious freedom
advocate and democracy activist Jimmy Lai remained imprisoned insolitary confinement.

Transnational Repression and Malign Influence
The Chinese government engages in transnational repression against
diaspora religious communities with ties to China, including in the
United States. During 2023, the U.S. government prosecuted individuals who engaged in these illegal activities on behalf of the Chinese
government. In April, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested andcharged Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping in connection with operating
an illegal Chinese overseas police station in New York City. Lu has
a history of engaging in transnational repression on behalf of theChinese government, targeting religious groups and dissidents on
U.S. soil. In May, the Justice Department charged John Chen and Lin
Feng for furthering the Chinese government’s transnational repression
against Falun Gong practitioners in the United States. The Chinese
government’s malign political influence campaigns, particularly its
lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress, represent a particularly insidiousform of political influence, aimed at shaping federal policymaking tofurther the Chinese government’s interests and goals.

Key U.S. Policy
In August, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions on
Chinese officials involved in the forced assimilation of more than one
million Tibetan children in state-run boarding schools. In September,the U.S. Department of Homeland Security restricted the importsof three Xinjiang companies, pursuant to the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act (P.L. 117-78). Also in August, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden signed an executive order prohibiting certain
U.S. investment in China and other countries of concern in the sensitivetechnology sectors of semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum
information technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI). In October,
the Biden administration updated and strengthened existing export
controls rules to more effectively ban exports of high-end chips usedin AI for human rights violations and military applications.
In November, President Biden met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in California and raised concerns regarding China’s human rights
abuses, including in Xinjiang—which the administration affirmed as
genocide and crimes against humanity—Tibet, and Hong Kong. In
December, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Chinese
officials Gao Qi and Hu Lianhe for their connection to ongoing serious
human rights abuses in Xinjiang, pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights
Policy Act (P.L. 116-145). On December 29, 2023, the State Department
redesignated China as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed existing
restrictions on exports of crime control or detection instruments orequipment to China. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated approximately $12 million in assistance for programs in China.
In February, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) introduced theStop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023 (H.R.1154), which passed
the U.S. House of Representatives in March. In April, Senator Marco
Rubio (R-FL) and Representative Young Kim (R-CA) introduced the
Uyghur Policy Act of 2023 (S.1252/H.R.2766) to support the humanrights—including freedom of religion or belief—of Uyghurs andother minority groups in Xinjiang. In July, Representative Jennifer
Wexton (D-VA) introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act(H.R.4840), requiring publicly traded companies to review and disclose all information about links between their products and Uyghurforced labor in Xinjiang. In October, Representative Mark Alford(R-MO) introduced the Combatting the Persecution of Religious
Groups in China Act (H.R.6069).

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESPolicy Update: Countering China’s Techno-Authoritarianism, Transnational Repression, and Malign Political Influence
Op-Ed: Congress Must Act to Stop the China Lobby■ Hearing: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion or Belief■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: China■■

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CHINA

BackgroundAdditional View on China by
Chair Abraham Cooper, Vice Chair Frederick A.
Davie, and Commissioners David Curry, Susie
Gelman, Mohamed Magid, Stephen Schneck, Eric
Ueland, and Frank Wolf

Additional view on China by
Chair Abraham Cooper, Vice Chair Frederick A.
Davie, and Commissioners David Curry, Susie
Gelman, Mohamed Magid, Stephen Schneck,
Nury Turkel, Eric Ueland, and Frank Wolf

Religious communities are suffering under Chinese Communist
oppression. We have seen Chinese officials target anyone advancing
religious freedom and human rights for persecuted religious andethnic groups, in particular Uyghurs. USCIRF has experienced thisfirst-hand, as Chinese authorities sanctioned seven USCIRF Commissioners in 2021, including current Commissioner Nury A. Turkel. It ispart of an alarming pattern of Chinese transnational repression against
American citizens serving the U.S. Government that requires urgent
attention and action. Not only have Chinese officials attempted to
intimidate individuals directly, but Chinese security officials also regularly harassed and intimidated family members as a form of retaliation.
The government of a world power does not have the right tothreaten anyone advocating for religious freedom and human rights.
There must be consequences for the trampling of anyone’s fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief.
As a friend and admirer of the people of China, we promise tocontinue to lend our voices, on behalf of all suffering religious communities, and to continue to raise, on a humanitarian basis, Mr. Turkel’s
mother’s case, at every opportunity.
The Chinese government should allow this ailing, elderly woman
to travel to the United States to see her children and grandchildren.
It is our hope that such gestures will encourage the Chinese government to allow all of its population to be able to freely practice theirreligion in the future.

It is imperative to ban lobbying for the Chinese government, its
state-affiliated commercial entities, and their interests while thegovernment continues its egregious acts of religious persecution.
These harsh actions impact every faith group in China with leadersof the Catholic Church and Protestant house churches imprisoned
and even “disappeared.”
Cultural genocide devastates Tibet where Buddhist monks diein prison. Physical genocide ravages Uyghur Muslims, with millions in
detention camps and children taken from their parents. Organs are
harvested from Falun Gong and Uyghurs, some while still alive. Hong
Kong represses Christians, including 92-year-old Cardinal Zen.
China’s influence spreads worldwide. China supports Iran, which
provided training and weapons for the attacks on Israel by Hamas andthey supply arms to Hezbollah and the Houthis.
China aids Russia in its war on Ukraine and supports North Korea,
one of the world’s worst religious persecutors. China supports both Nicaragua and Cuba where Christians are being aggressively persecuted.
Concerns are rising over China threatening to attack Taiwan,
which many experts believe may lead to direct U.S. involvement andthe loss of American military lives.
Amidst all of this, the words of 18th-century British parliamentarian William Wilberforce about the evils of the slave trade come tomind: “You may choose to look the other way, but you can never say
again that you do not know.”
Congress cannot look the other way. For the good of our country
and religious freedom worldwide, Congress must ban lobbying for the
Chinese government and its interests.

24 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

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CUBA
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Cuba remained extremely
poor. The government maintained an oppressive legal framework that severely restricted peaceful religious activity, regularly
harassed religious leaders and worshipers, and continued to wrongfully imprison individuals for their peaceful religious activity.
In May 2023, the Cuban government approved the Social
Communication Law, which codifies broad prohibitions on peaceful expression, including religious expression that is critical of thegovernment. The legislation expands the government’s alreadyextensive authority to target individuals freely expressing theirreligious convictions. For example, the amended Cuban Penal Codecriminalizes “contempt,” “public disorder,” and “resistance,” eachof which may be used to punish the activities of religious leaders
and worshipers perceived to be critical of the government. In addition, Decree Law 370 threatens independent journalists reportingon religious freedom with criminal charges and fines.
Throughout 2023, the Office of Religious Affairs (ORA)
continued to regulate and control religious institutions. The Law
of Associations requires religious organizations to apply to the
Ministry of Justice, where the ORA is housed, for registration.
Membership or association with an unregistered religious groupis a crime and, despite existing criteria, registration decisions areoften arbitrary and discriminatory. The ORA also exercises arbitrary
control over the affairs of registered religious organizations andrequires permission for virtually any activity other than regular worship services. Religious leaders and groups that are unregisteredor conduct unsanctioned religious activity are subject to interrogation, detention, threats of prison sentences on false charges, andconfiscation of property.
The government draws on its vast domestic security and surveillance apparatus to harass and intimidate religious leaders andworshipers, including through the Department of State Security,
the National Revolutionary Police, and the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution. For example, Cuban authorities regularly
and arbitrarily prevented individuals from peacefully gathering
at religious sites and events. In January 2023, the government
prohibited mothers of political prisoners from attending church
to pray for their release. In March, police beat and detained acouple on their way to church after alleging that the couple wasgoing to “take communion against communism.” In June, policeprevented a journalist from attending the funeral mass of a priest
whose remains had been transferred to the cathedral of Santiago
de Cuba. In October, Cuban authorities detained two pastors
who were scheduled to attend an event on the right to freedomof religion or belief. Additionally, authorities pressured individuals
whose religious expressions ran afoul of government orthodoxy.
In May, a professor threatened a university student with expulsion
after the student refused to sign a document committing himself to
Cuba’s governing ideology for reasons of religious conscience. And
in September, police interrogated a young man who disseminatedreligiously inspired videos online and pressured him to refrain fromspeaking critically about the government.
Religious prisoners of conscience remain arbitrarily imprisoned for peacefully following their religious convictions. For
example, Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, the pastor and leader of theMonte de Sion Independent Church, has been in prison since 2021
for his peaceful participation in the protests on July 11, 2021. Twins
Lisdani Rodríguez Isaac and Lisdiani Rodríguez Isaac, members of
the Free Yorubas, an independent religious group, also remain
imprisoned for their peaceful participation in the July 11 protests.
The authorities denied the twins’ application for transfer to alower-security prison.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Cuba as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Urge Cuban authorities to extend an
official invitation for unrestricted visits to
USCIRF, the U.S. Ambassador at Large forInternational Religious Freedom, and theUnited Nations (UN) Special Rapporteuron freedom of religion or belief; and■Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban government agencies and officials responsible
for severe violations of religious freedom—including the ORA, the Department ofState Security, the National Revolutionary
Police, and the Committees for the Defenseof the Revolution—by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry to

the United States under human rights-related financial and visa authorities.
The U.S. Congress should:■

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESHearing: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba
Special Report: Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America■ Event: USCIRF Conversation on Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Cuba■■

26 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4Highlight religious freedom concerns in
Cuba through hearings and letters andby advocating for the release of religious
prisoners of conscience such as Lisdiani
Rodríguez Isaac, Lisdani Rodríguez Isaac,
Donaida Pérez Paseiro, Loreto Hernández
García, and Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo.

CUBA

Background

Adherents of Afro-Cuban Religions

While there are no independent sources on Cuba’s religious
demographics, estimates indicate that 60 percent of the country’s
population of 11 million identify as Catholic. Approximately 40
percent identify as unaffiliated or another religion, such as Anglican, Buddhist, Jehovah’s Witness, Methodist, Moravian, Muslim,
Quaker, Seventh-day Adventist, or members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. An estimated 70 percent of Cubans
observe one or more Santería or other religious practices basedin African tradition.
Cuba is a one-party system under the ruling Cuban Communist
Party, with no independent judiciary. The state tightly controls religious institutions through the ORA. All religious organizations must
apply for registration with the ORA. Association with or membershipin an unregistered religious organization is a crime, and the ORA often
arbitrarily denies applications for registration despite existing criteria.
Even when the ORA approves a religious organization’s application, it
exercises arbitrary control over their affairs and requires permission forvirtually any activity other than worship services. In December 2022,
the amended Cuban penal code came into force. Article 272 of thepenal code criminalizes any religiously inspired actions that oppose“the objectives of education” or the “duty” to “work,” “defend thehomeland,” and “revere [Cuba’s] symbols or anything else establishedby the constitution.” In 2019, the government adopted a new constitution that changed the country’s religious freedom protections. The
constitution includes language that purports to protect the right tofreedom of religion or belief, including through government recognition, respect, and guarantee of religious liberty. However, in reality
the constitution allows for severe limitations on religious freedom.
For example, the constitution’s protections for the right to freedomof religion or belief may be overridden by any piece of legislation inforce in Cuba.

Estimates indicate that approximately 70 percent of Cubans observe
one or more religious practices based in an African tradition. As Christian Solidarity Worldwide has reported, Cuban authorities increasingly
harassed and intimidated members of Afro-Cuban religious groups in
2023 as part of a broader crackdown on civil society. This harassment
and intimidation often involved threatening practitioners with severe
consequences if they peacefully practiced their religious beliefs. For
example, in August, Cuban authorities interrogated an individual at his
home regarding an Afro-Cuban religious ceremony he was planningto hold in honor of one of his children. The authorities warned theindividual that continuing with the ceremony would result in him being
summoned to the police station for a statement. Also in August, an individual planning to peacefully host an Afro-Cuban religious activity in his
home was ordered to cancel it. The authorities expressed concern thatthe religious activity would encourage counter-revolutionary actions.
The Cuban government continued to arbitrarily hold Afro-Cuban
religious leaders in prison. In 2023, President of the unregistered Free
Yoruba Association of Cuba, Donaida Pérez Paseiro, and her husband,
Loreto Hernández García, remained in prison after being charged with“public disorder,” “disobedience,” “spreading the epidemic,” and“incitement.” Hernández García suffers from several health conditions
and in August 2023 reportedly experienced a heart attack. In addition
to medical neglect, Hernández García has been held incommunicado
and placed in a punishment cell. Prison officials have subjected family
members visiting them to humiliating treatment, including forcing
visitors to strip naked prior to exiting.

Ladies in WhiteThe Ladies in White is an organization of wives and relatives of dissidents imprisoned in 2003. Cuban authorities actively surveil andviolently detain members of the Ladies in White and prevent themfrom attending religious services on Sundays.
The Cuban regime has aggressively targeted the leader of the
movement, Berta Soler. In May 2023, Soler and her husband Ángel
Moya were arrested as they left the headquarters of the Ladies inWhite. Similar arrests of Soler and Moya occurred in September andOctober. Throughout the year, the Cuban regime also detained andarrested members of the Ladies in White. In July, a police operation
across several provinces in Cuba resulted in the arrest of 17 members of the Ladies in White. Another wave of detentions occurredin November when 12 members were arrested and prevented from
attending religious services.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S. government’s strained relations with Cuba continued into
2023. Despite this, U.S. government officials continued to raise religious freedom concerns at intergovernmental forums. In April, theU.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States delivered
remarks at an event on violations of fundamental freedoms in Cuba.
In July, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called for the releaseof all political prisoners in Cuba, some of whom are religious prisonersof conscience profiled in USCIRF’s Victims List who continue to bepersecuted for their role in peacefully expressing their views during
the protests on July 11, 2021. In November, the U.S. government madea statement during Cuba’s Universal Periodic Review recommendingthat the Cuban authorities cease arbitrarily detaining persons seeking
to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
religious actors. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated$9.5 million for programs in Cuba.
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedCuba as a CPC under IRFA for particularly severe violations of religious
freedom and reimposed the ongoing restrictions referenced in 31 CFR
515.201 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.

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ERITREAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea remained extremely
poor. The government continued to systematically detain individuals for their religious beliefs, including minors. The government
did not register any new religious organizations, and individuals
practicing faiths other than the four officially recognized by the government faced intimidation and prosecution by Eritrean authorities.
The Eritrean government recognizes only Eritrean Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim as religious identities. Without formal
registration, authorities deny faith groups their freedom of religion
or belief and prohibit them from building or owning houses of worship or engaging in religious practices such as praying in groups.
Members of officially recognized religions also faced restrictions
and government backlash for practicing their faith.
Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience in Eritrea areparticularly poor. First-hand accounts describe physical abuse, sexual
violence, and torture as systematic and ongoing practices. Officials
reportedly often denied prisoners medical treatment, and many havedied due to severe human rights abuses. Additionally, prison authorities pressured arrested individuals to renounce their faith and banned
praying aloud, singing, preaching, and possessing religious books.
Throughout the year, the Eritrean government particularly
targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses. As of December, 36 members of thecommunity remained in prison. The prisoners face unsanitary anddecrepit facilities where they experience violence and intimidation.
The government punished families of those who evade military
service by evicting them from their homes and denying them foodand other basic necessities, especially for women and children.
In March 2023, the Eritrean government released nine Christian prisoners, most of whom served sentences of more than nine
years. These included four from Mai Serwa prison and five in the
town of Assab, including house church pastor Abenet Yemane. In
August, the government released 13 unidentified prisoners that had
each completed a 10-year sentence. In April, founder and leaderof Meserete Kristos Church Pastor Tesfay Sevoum died in Mai
Serwa prison five days after authorities took him to Dembe Sembe
hospital in Asmara for treatment. His body remained unburied for
10 days, in violation of his religious requirements. The government
also arrested 44 Orthodox monks in April, all vocal supporters of
Abune Antonios, the Eritrean Church patriarch who died in 2022.
Authorities later released them. In February, an Orthodox monk andsupporter of Abune, Yeneta Israel, died violently in his monastery inwhat authorities declared a suicide. The state did not pursue further
investigation. The Eritrean government continues to hold more than
500 Christians in prison due to their religious identity, including
103 students arrested in the capital Asmara during a singing andrecording session for social media.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Reestablish the 2021 arms embargo
referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as the
CPC designation’s corresponding presidential action;
Reimpose targeted sanctions on Eritrean
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious

freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights-related
financial and visa authorities, citing specificreligious freedom violations;■■

Engage with the Eritrean government to
end religious persecution of unregisteredreligious communities, grant full citizenship rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses, andrelease the remaining detainees held on
account of their religious activities; andEncourage the Eritrean government
to ex tend an of f icial invitation for

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Factsheet: Religious Freedom Concerns in the Horn of Africa
Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Eritrea■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Eritrea■■

28 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

unrestricted visits by USCIRF, the United
Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on thesituation of human rights in Eritrea, theUN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, and the International
Red Cross.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Highlight religious freedom issues in
Eritrea through advocacy for religious
prisoners of conscience, legislation, hearings, briefings, delegations, and otheractivities.

Eritrea has a population of 6.3 million people. Approximately 50
percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, 30 percent are Eritrean
Orthodox, and 13 percent are Catholic. Faiths comprising less than
five percent of the population include Protestants, Seventh-day
Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Hindus, and Baha’is.
Approximately two percent of the population follow traditional indigenous religions. The government continues to allow the only known
Jew in the country to maintain a historic synagogue in Asmara.
The Eritrean constitution nominally protects citizens’ rights tofreedom of religion or belief. The law and constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience,and belief and the freedom to practice any religion and to change
one’s religion. However, the government regularly violates these rights
in practice. Proclamation No. 73 of 1995 permits the government toexert full control over religious activities in the country.
Eritrea’s geostrategic position by the Red Sea makes it an enticing partner for several influential countries, including Ethiopia, Russia,
and China, with Moscow prioritizing sea trade routes and a base ofoperations. In 2020, Eritrean military units joined Ethiopian troops
to combat the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray
region of Ethiopia. The conflict in Tigray partly reflected groups
with often overlapping ethnic and religious identities attacking one
another, making the cause of the hostilities more difficult to pinpoint.
A November 2022 truce ended the violence.
In March 2023, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) urged
the Eritrean government to uphold the right to freedom of religion
or belief and to guarantee related freedoms of expression, peacefulassembly, and association. UNHRC members called upon the government to release all those detained based solely on their religion
or belief. The Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights statedthat the human rights situation in Eritrea is dire and shows no signsof improvement, with credible reports of torture, arbitrary detention,
inhumane detention conditions, and enforced disappearances. The
government uses many such abuses to target religious minorities
in particular.
In October, several religious organizations submitted a joint
report on Eritrea to the UNHRC ahead of the Eritrea’s 2024 Universal
Periodic Review. The report urged the Eritrean government to ratify
UN Conventions related to freedom of religion or belief, including theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the Covenantagainst Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment. The report also encourages permitting religious communities to register in accordance with international law, immediately
releasing prisoners currently detained for their religious beliefs andpractices and putting an end to detention based on religion, andinviting UN working groups to the country to assist in complying withinternational law.

Forced Conscription
Eritreans between the ages of 18 and 50 must serve in the military for
18 months. Authorities grant exemptions only to pregnant womenand people with a physical disability. The government imprisons
those who refuse to serve, including those whose refusal is basedon religious belief. The Eritrean government uses military draft
mobilization drives called giffas, especially in or near larger cities.
In 2023, Eritrean authorities continued to round up and forcibly
conscript individuals, including older men. Young people forced into
the military are often made to serve far longer than their 18 monthsof mandatory service. Authorities have increasingly targeted thefamilies of those who sought to evade military service, enforcing
severe penalties on family members.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
In 2023, conditions for religious minorities were particularly egregious.
At least 500 Christians faced extremely long prison sentences andharsh prison conditions. These prisoners include evangelicals Haile
Naizghe and Kiflu Gebremeskel, both imprisoned since 2004 becauseof their association with a network of banned churches.
As of the end of the reporting period, the Eritrean government
was holding 36 Jehovah’s Witnesses in prison. It justifies these detentions on Jehovah’s Witnesses’ refusal to serve in the military, imposing
egregiously long sentences on community members who conscientiously object on religious grounds. Jehovah’s Witnesses report thatthe government also continues to deny citizenship to members of
the community and refuses to meet with representatives to discussthese concerns. Some of the prisoners include 81-year-old Jehovah’s
Witness Tesfazion Gebremichael, in prison for more than 12 years;
Yonatan Yonas for 18 years; Yosief Fessehaye for 17 years; and SamuelGirmay for 14 years.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S. government has limited diplomatic relations with Eritrea, but
U.S. diplomats continued to raise issues of human rights and freedomof religion or belief in official conversations with Asmara. However,the U.S. government is attempting to build stronger ties with Eritreathat would lessen the country’s isolation and deny a foothold to U.S.
competitors in the region. In this light, the United States supported
regional efforts such as Eritrea’s June readmission into the East Africa
bloc (IGAD) after a 16-year absence.
In March 2023, the U.S. government renewed sanctions imposedin 2021 under Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon andimplements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
One of those sanctioned, Filipos Woldeyohannes, is currently the chiefof staff of the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). Under his leadership, the
EDF arrested and tortured Eritreans who fled military service in theircountry, including religious conscientious objectors.
In April 2023, the Eritrean government released a letter concerning broader U.S. foreign policy initiatives with the Afwerki regime. The
letter called the initiatives a “Policy of Unremitting Hostility towards
Eritrea.” It noted further that the use of sanctions and punitive designations against the Eritrean government “waxes eloquent on humanrights to vilify Eritrea in the most wicked terms and the document
exists to advance [U.S.] perceived global interests at the expense ofa sovereign nation.”
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedEritrea as a CPC under IRFA under the existing ongoing restrictions andsanctions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1, pursuant to Section 402(c)(5) of theact, for perpetrating particularly severe violations of religious freedom.

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ERITREA

BackgroundINDIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in India continued to deteriorate. The government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
reinforced discriminatory nationalist policies, perpetuated hatefulrhetoric, and failed to address communal violence disproportionately affecting Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Dalits, Jews, and Adivasis(indigenous peoples). Continued enforcement of the Unlawful
Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), Foreign Contribution Regulation
Act (FCRA), Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and anti-conversion
and cow slaughter laws resulted in the arbitrary detention, monitoring, and targeting of religious minorities and those advocatingon their behalf.
Both news media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
reporting on religious minorities were subjected to strict monitoring under FCRA regulations. In February 2023, India’s Ministry ofHome Affairs suspended the FCRA license of the Centre for Policy
Research, an NGO dedicated to reporting on social issues andstate capacity, including discrimination against religious and ethnic
minorities. Similarly, authorities raided the offices and homes of
NewsClick journalists, including Teesta Setalvad for her reportingon anti-Muslim violence during the 2002 Gujarat riots.
In 2023, NGOs reported 687 incidents of violence against
Christians, who continued to be detained under various state-levelanti-conversion laws. In January, Hindu mobs attacked Christians in Chhattisgarh in eastern India, destroying and vandalizing
churches and attempting to “reconvert” individuals to Hinduism.
An estimated 30 people were beaten for refusing to renounce theirfaith. The same month, two Christians were detained without bail,accused of forcibly converting individuals of Scheduled Tribes and
Scheduled Castes.
In June 2023, more than 500 churches and two synagogues
were destroyed and over 70,000 people displaced during clashes
in Manipur State. Home Minister Amit Shah received widespread
criticism, including by United Nations (UN) experts, for his delayed
response to the violence. Similarly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi

faced a vote of no confidence for his administration’s lack of
response to the ongoing conflict. In August, India’s Supreme Court
called for an investigation of the violence, arguing that police had“lost control over the situation.”
In December, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the government’s 2019 revocation of Article 370, dissolving special status andautonomy to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Indian authorities continued to detain and harass Kashmiri journalists, religious leaders, and human rights defenders. Journalist Irfan
Mehraj was arrested in March for his reporting on marginalized
religious minorities.
Throughout the year, violence against Muslims and theirplaces of worship continued. Several mosques were destroyed
under police presence and vigilantes attacked Muslims under
the guise of protecting cows from slaughter, deemed illegal in 18
states. In Haryana’s predominantly Muslim Nuh district, communal violence erupted following a Hindu procession in July, whereparticipants carrying swords chanted anti-Muslim slogans. A
Muslim tomb and mosque were torched, resulting in the death ofat least seven individuals, including Imam Mohammad Hafiz. The
violence was in part initiated by “Monu Manesar,” a well-known
cow vigilante accused of murdering two Muslim men in January
for allegedly transporting cattle. Manesar, who has garneredsupport from the BJP, publicly called for individuals to participate
in the Hindu procession. The same day, an Indian railway guard
killed three Muslim men inside a train to Mumbai. The perpetrator
reportedly asked the victims their names, which indicated theirreligious identity, before killing them.
Indian authorities also increasingly engaged in acts oftransnational repression targeting religious minorities abroad.
In September, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau alleged
Indian authorities’ involvement in the killing of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, which was followed by a plot to kill
Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the United States in November.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate India as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations ofreligious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on individuals
and entities responsible for severe violations of religious freedom by freezing
those individuals’ assets and/or barring
their entry into the United States underhuman rights-related financial and visa
authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;

30 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

■

■

■

Incorporate religious freedom priorities
into bilateral and multilateral forums andagreements, such as the ministerial of
the Quadrilateral;
Encourage the U.S. Embassy and consulates to strengthen engagement withreligious communities, local officials, andlaw enforcement and to facilitate meetings
with prisoners of conscience and humanrights defenders; andEncourage review by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) to ensure that international recommendations to prevent

terrorist financing are not misused byIndian authorities to detain religious minorities and those advocating on their behalf.
The U.S. Congress should:■■

Raise religious freedom and issues affecting religious minorities in India throughhearings, briefings, letters, delegations,and other activities; andCondition financial assistance and arms
sales to India on improved religious freedom conditions and include measures for
additional review and reporting.

India is the world’s most populated country, with an estimated 1.4
billion people. The majority of its population is Hindu (79.8 percent)with minority Muslim (14.2 percent), Christian (2.3 percent), and Sikh
(1.7 percent) communities. Smaller religious groups include Buddhists,
Jains, Baha’is, Zoroastrians (Parsis), and an estimated 6,000 Jews.
India’s constitution establishes a secular and democratic state, with
Article 25 granting freedom of conscience to all. Section 295 of India’s
Penal Code criminalizes the destruction or damage of houses of worship. In 2023, the Indian government introduced three bills to reformthe country’s criminal code, which could target religious minorities by
expanding police powers for “preventative action” and punishments
for acts of terrorism.

Violence against Religious Minorities in Manipur
In May, clashes between tribal Kuki and Meitei communities erupted inIndia’s northeastern state of Manipur. Violence began after Manipur’sHigh Court requested that the state government consider providing
Scheduled Tribe status to the majority Hindu Meitei people, granting
them expanded access to certain benefits. Manipur’s minority Chrisitan Kuki community protested that the move would weaken theirpolitical and economic status.
Months of ongoing violence resulted in the destruction of
thousands of homes, targeted attacks on places of worship, andthe displacement of over 70,000 individuals. Approximately 400
churches belonging to both Meiteis and Kukis were destroyed, andmany others looted, illustrating a clear religious dimension to an ethnic conflict. Reports indicated that two synagogues belonging to the
Bnei Menashe community were damaged. Acts of sexual violence,
including gang rape targeting Kuki women by Meitei men, were
widely reported and articulated in an August letter by UN special
rapporteurs. UN experts further expressed concern about the roleof hate speech and disinformation in inciting violence against the
Kuki population. Eyewitness accounts indicate that Hindu nationalist
officials pressured Meitei Christian leaders to renounce their faith andobserve the indigenous Meitei religion, Sanamahism.
Citizens accused the central government and Manipur policeof failing to protect places of worship or dispel communal violence.
Prior to the outbreak of violence in May, authorities destroyed threechurches in Imphal, claiming they were illegal. Following clashes inMay, Union Home Minister Amit Shah stated that law enforcement
had executed 40 members of the Kuki community deemed as terrorists—charges that Kukis dispute.

Anti-Conversion Laws
While India’s constitution protects the right to publicly share one’s
faith, 13 out of India’s 28 states continued to enforce anti-conversion

laws in 2023. Such laws make it difficult for people to convert from
Hinduism to another religion and use broad language that leads tothe targeting of religious minorities. In January, the state of Himachal
Pradesh enacted an amendment to its Freedom of Religion Act, redefining “mass conversion” as involving two or more people and barring
members of Scheduled Tribes and Schedule Castes from obtaining
certain benefits if they choose to convert from Hinduism. Throughout
2023, a number of religious minorities were detained under state-levelanti-conversion laws. In Chhattisgarh, where a third of the population
identifies as Adivasi and less than two percent Christian, 13 pastors
were arrested for allegedly forcing Adivasis to convert to Christianity.
In Uttar Pradesh, as of May 2023, over 855 people were reported tohave been detained under charges of illegal conversion since thepromulgation of the state’s anti-conversion law in 2020.
Anti-conversion laws increasingly included provisions designed
to prevent interfaith marriages and so-called “love jihad.” “Lovejihad” is a derogatory term used to describe the alleged occurrenceof Muslim men marrying Hindu women for the purpose of conversion.
In June, the state government of Maharashtra created a 13-member
panel to “investigate” interfaith marriages. Additionally, the Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP), a right-wing Hindu nationalist group, launcheda national 11-day “awareness campaign” claiming that interfaith marriage was a form of forced religious conversion.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and India continued to maintain strong bilateralties in 2023. In March, the U.S. Senate confirmed Eric Garcetti as the
U.S. Ambassador to India, filling the post after 20 months of vacancy.
In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated $130 million forprograms in India.
In June, President Joseph R. Biden hosted Prime Minister Modi
for a state visit, where he addressed a joint session of Congress forthe second time during his tenure. In a joint press conference, Prime
Minister Modi failed to answer a question about his government’s
treatment of religious minorities. In September, President Biden traveled to India for the G20 summit, during which he reportedly raised
issues of human rights in private meetings with Prime Minister Modi.
In November, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin visited India for diplomatic
dialogue on defense cooperation. The same month, the U.S. Department of Justice released an indictment against an Indian government
employee for his alleged involvement in the attempted assassinationof a Sikh activist on U.S. soil. U.S. officials announced their expectations of the Indian government to conduct a full investigation into theaccusations. In a December hearing, members of the U.S. Congressreiterated concern about India’s involvement in acts of transnational
repression. Also in December, the U.S. Department of State failed todesignate India as a CPC despite major religious freedom concerns.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESIssue Update: India’s State-Level Anti-Conversion Laws
Hearing: Advancing Religious Freedom within the U.S.- India Bilateral Relationship■ Podcast: Violence against Tribal Christians in Manipur, India■ Press Release: USCIRF Deeply Concerned by India’s Transnational Repression against Religious Minorities■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: India■■

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31

INDIA

BackgroundIRAN
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Iran remained extremely
poor. Protests against mandatory hijab laws and other restrictions
on freedom of religion or belief continued despite security forces’
violent repression. Officials systematically harassed, arrested,detained, sexually assaulted, raped, and tortured protesters, including minors. In March, the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,Javaid Rehman, said the government’s treatment of protesters may
constitute crimes against humanity. During the year, Iran executedat least eight protesters on religiously grounded charges. In May,
the government executed two men on blasphemy charges. In
November, it executed five men in cities including Karaj, Ahvaz, andZahedan on religiously grounded charges, including “corruption on
Earth” and “enmity against God.”In September, Iran’s parliament approved the Bill to Protect the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab,
which the Expediency Council amended in December. The law
expands the scope of prohibited religious practice and expression. Authorities escalated enforcement of mandatory hijab laws
throughout 2023, increasing surveillance and secretly funding a“morality guard” to harass uncovered women. In November, UN
experts called for an independent investigation into the deathof 16-year-old Armita Geravand, who was beaten into a comaon the Tehran metro, reportedly by security forces, for wearing
improper hijab and later died. The government also failed tothoroughly investigate a series of reported gas attacks on girls’

schools and repressed protests by families calling for investigations. Security forces arrested celebrities for voicing opposition toreligiously based government restrictions on gender minorities.
In October, authorities rearrested lawyer Nasrin Soutudeh, who
advocated for Iranian women opposing hijab laws. Following mistreatment in prison, she was released on bail in November. Zahra
Sedighi-Hamadani fled Iran in December after being released onbail in March. She was sentenced to death in 2022 for “corruption
on Earth” and “promoting homosexuality.”
Security forces violently repressed weekly Sunni Muslim
protests following Friday prayers and arrested scores of Sunni
religious leaders in Zahedan. The government also continued
its campaign against Baha’is, arresting scores of people andsentencing several to lengthy prison terms. Iran resentenced
several members of the Yaran-e-Iran (Friends of Iran) in 2023 to
years in prison, including Afif Naimi, Enayatollah Naeimi, andJamaloddin Khanjani.
Iran’s government also continued repressive action abroad,including the harassment of religious dissidents and targetingof Jewish sites. In March, Greece arrested and charged two men
connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) whoplanned to attack a Chabad house and kosher restaurant in Athens.
In June, Cyprus thwarted an IRGC plan to attack Jews and Israelis.
In November, Israeli and Brazilian authorities thwarted an attack
directed and financed by Iran and executed by Hizbullah on Jewish
and Israeli targets in Brazil.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Iranian government agencies and officials responsible
for severe violations of religious freedom
by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry into the UnitedStates under human rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specificreligious freedom violations;■■Continue to issue clarifications of generaland specific sanctions licenses, expedite the processing of general license
applications, and continue issuing new
general licenses that facilitate financial
and technological support for Iranians
asserting their freedom of religion or
belief through peaceful demonstrations
and labor strikes; andWork with members of the International
Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance andother international associations to stem
the flow of surveillance technology andweapons platforms used to suppress

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in IranFactsheet: SGBV against Religious Freedom Protesters in Iran■ Hearing: Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights in Iran■ Hearing: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion or Belief■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Iran■■

32 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

lawful religious expression in Iran, support the UN Fact-Finding Mission to Iran,and support a Security Council referral of
the situation in Iran to the International
Criminal Court for investigation of crimes
against humanity against those asserting
freedom of religion or belief.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Permanently reauthorize and exercise
oversight to ensure implementation of
the bipartisan Lautenberg Amendment,
which aids persecuted Iranian religious
minorities seeking refugee status in the
United States.

IRAN

Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic, authoritarian state withrestricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent of the populationare Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 5–10 percent. Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, including the Baha’i faith,
Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. While the Jaafari school of
Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends respect tothe five major Sunni schools and recognizes some Christians, Jews, andZoroastrians as protected minorities. Five of the parliament’s 290 seats
are reserved for the recognized religious minorities—two for Armenian
Christians and one each for Assyrian/Chaldean Christians, Jews, andZoroastrians. There are two Hindu temples, and Buddhism has historic
influences. Iran is home to several other religious groups that face persecution, including Mandeans, Yarsanis, nonbelievers, and spiritualist
movements such as Erfan-e Halgheh.

Baha’isIn 2023, authorities conducted individual and mass arrests of Baha’isacross Iran, taking them to undisclosed locations and imposing excessively long prison sentences. Iranian security officials beat and brutalized
Baha’is during raids and searches of private homes. In November,
Iranian security forces arrested scores of Baha’is in cities including
Hamadan, Mehrshahr, Yazd, Karaj, Alborz, and Tehran. The government
has targeted Baha’i women in particular, including 10 arrested in Isfahanin October. Approximately two-thirds of Iranian Baha’i prisoners are
women, including Mahvash Sabet and Fariba Kamalabadi, membersof Iran’s former Baha’i leadership (Yaran-e-Iran). Both are serving adecade in prison after having previously served an identical sentencein the early 2010s. Authorities also targeted Baha’i cemeteries in Arak,
Alborz, and Golestan. Local municipalities seized and confiscated Baha’iland, restricted Baha’i access to burial grounds, and declared intentions
to sell Baha’i-owned property exclusively to Muslims.

Sunni Muslims
Between January and April 2023, Iran arrested several Sunni religious leaders on whom courts ultimately imposed egregiously longsentences. In January, the Urmia Special Court for Clergy sentenced
cleric Yunes Nokhah to nearly five years in prison on charges including
blasphemy, and the Hamedan Special Court for Clergy sentenced clericSeifallah Hosseini to 17 years in prison, 74 lashes, and two years of exile.
The government repeatedly targeted Zahedan’s Sunni prayer leader
Molavi Abdolhamid Ismailzahi, who has called for greater religious
freedom. Iran escalated the targeting of Sunni clerics ahead of the
one-year anniversary of a violently repressed protest following Friday
prayers in Zahedan in October 2022. In August, security forces arrested
Fathi Mohammad Naqshabandi in Rask. In September, the KermanshahSpecial Court for Clergy sentenced Hadi Ahmadi to six months inprison for “propaganda against the state.” In December, Iran detained
Sunni prayer leaders Hassan Amini and Mohiuddin Mohammadzadeh
in West Azerbaijan Province.

Christians
Iran released several Christians from Evin Prison in early 2023 but
continued to target Christians on the basis of their religion. Between
June and July, security forces arrested at least 69 Christians across 11

cities. In February, Iran’s Supreme Court ruled that Armenian Christian house church leader Joseph Shahbazian should be retried on
accusations including “promoting Zionist Christianity.” His sentence
was reduced in May from 10 years to two. Authorities pardoned andreleased him from prison in September. In May, the Tehran Appeals
Court acquitted Homayoun Zhaveh and Sara Ahmadi, who were serving prison sentences related to house-church membership. In July, Iran
relocated Pastor Abdolreza Ali Haghnejad from a prison near his familyin Rasht to a facility over 800 miles away in Minab. Haghnejad is serving
a six-year sentence for “propagating Christianity.” That same month,a court summoned Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani to appear on charges
of undermining state security but took no further action following his
official rejection of the charge in court.

Other Religious Minorities
Iran continued to repress Gonabadi Sufis and target members of thecommunity abroad. In January, a court sentenced Mohsen Afrouz
to a year in prison for “propaganda against the regime.” Security
officials released Abbas Deghan from Evin Prison that same month,
but two people went missing and were presumed arrested following
a ceremony celebrating his release. In April, a Karaj court sentenced
Hamid Gharehassanlou to 15 years in prison and his wife Farzaneh tofive following their participation in a memorial protest for 23-year-old
Hadis Najafi. Gharehassanlou originally faced a death sentence andsustained serious injuries after being beaten in prison. In October,security officers arrested Arash Moradi in Kashan. In December, theTehran Revolutionary Court sentenced him to a six-year sentence.
Iran’s government reportedly coerced Jewish communities toprotest Israel’s military operation in Gaza following the October 7
Hamas terrorist attacks.
In June, IRGC intelligence forces in Karaj arrested and tortured
Abolfazl Pour-Hosseini, a follower of the Erfan-e-Halgheh movement.
The Karaj Revolutionary Court sentenced him to three years in prison
and a two-year suspended imprisonment.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S. government raised religious freedom concerns in Iran consistently throughout 2023. In August, Iran released five U.S. prisoners in
exchange for access to $6 billion in Iranian assets frozen in South Korea
for humanitarian use. In November, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed H.R. 5961 to block Iranian access to these funds. That samemonth, the United States conducted strikes on Iranian-backed militias
responsible for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
Following the October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel, Deputy
National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer stated that Iran was “broadly
complicit” in the attacks. Later that month, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury sanctioned Hamas members supported by Iran, including Mahmoud Khaled Zahhar, who has threatened “violence against
Jewish civilians” in interviews. In January 2023, the Joseph R. Biden
administration sanctioned Iranian officials responsible for repressing
peaceful expression of religious views and surveillance of religious sites
in the United States. In 2023, the U.S. Congress introduced H.R. 589
and several bipartisan resolutions related to religious freedom in Iran.
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedIran as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed existing ongoing sanctions.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )33

NICARAGUAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua worsened
significantly. The government of President Daniel Ortega
and Vice President Rosario Murillo intensified its efforts toarbitrarily arrest, imprison, and expel Catholic clergymen andlaypeople. The government also canceled the legal status of
Catholic organizations, confiscated their property, and harassed
and intimidated worshipers.
The Nicaraguan government used spurious charges such as
spreading “false news” and “conspiracy to undermine national
integrity” to justify its arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and exile ofactual or perceived members of the Catholic Church. In February
2023, the government sentenced Bishop Rolando Álvarez to 26
years in prison and stripped him of his citizenship in retaliation forhis criticism of government actions, including during his homilies
and sermons. It also expelled 222 political prisoners to the UnitedStates and stripped them of their citizenship, including religious
prisoners of conscience such as Father Oscar Benavidez, who
regularly preached against government abuses, and seminarian
Darvin Leiva, who was initially placed under house arrest with
Bishop Álvarez. In August, journalist Victor Ticay was sentenced
to eight years in prison for recording and posting online a banned
Easter celebration in Nandaime. In October, the government
expelled arbitrarily detained clergymen to the Vatican, includingÁlvaro Toledo, who spoke out about the wrongful imprisonment ofpriests, and Osman José Amador Guillén, who prayed for BishopÁlvarez in his homilies. In December, Bishop Isidro Mora wasarrested after asking congregants to pray for Bishop Álvarez
during Mass.

The Ortega-Murillo regime continued to systematically target
religious organizations it viewed as opponents, particularly Catholiccharitable and educational organizations. In March, the government
canceled the legal status of John Paul II University and Caritas Nicaragua, a Catholic charitable organization. In May, the government
canceled the legal status of the Immaculate Conception Catholic
University in Managua, a formation center for seminarians, and theSanta Luisa de Marillac Technical Institute, a school run by nuns.
The Ortega-Murillo regime’s thinly veiled pretext for these andother cancelations was the organizations’ alleged failures to comply
with bureaucratic regulations or alleged voluntary dissolutions. In
the case of the Jesuit-run University of Central America, however,
the government shuttered the institution after baselessly alleging
that it was involved in terrorism. In many cases the government
also confiscated the property of these organizations. For example,
the government confiscated the University of Central America’s
assets, announced its intention to establish a state university in its
place, and evicted Jesuits living near the campus. In October, thegovernment canceled the legal status and ordered the confiscationof property belonging to the Company of Franciscan Friars Minor.
The ongoing harassment of worshipers took many forms.
Uniformed and plain clothes government agents intimidated clergy
and parishioners by conspicuously monitoring religious services.
The Ortega-Murillo regime banned the public observance ofCatholic traditions such as street processions during Holy Week.
President Ortega and Vice President Murillo also used disparaging language to demonize the Catholic Church, referring to it as a“mafia” and calling priests “representatives of the devil.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Nicaragua as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government agencies and officials
responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom by freezing
those individuals’ assets and/or barring
their entry into the United States underhuman rights-related financial and visa

authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and■Support the work of the United Nations(UN) group of human rights experts on
Nicaragua to investigate religious freedom violations in Nicaragua and identify
those perpetrating them.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Advocate for religious prisoners of conscience, including those profiled on the
Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief
Victims List, through letters, congressionaldelegations, floor speeches, and briefings;
and■Support legislation, such as the Restoring
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Nicaragua Act of 2024, which expands the legal
grounds for sanctions against religious
freedom violators and mandates that the
U.S. government oppose international
financial institutions’ extension of assistance to Nicaragua unless the assistanceaddresses basic human needs or promotes democracy.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Press Release: USCIRF Condemns Nicaragua’s 26-Year Prison Sentence for Bishop Rolando Álvarez
Press Release: USCIRF Condemns Nicaragua’s Expulsion of Arbitrarily Detained Priests■ Special Report: Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America■ Event: USCIRF Conversation on Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Nicaragua■■

34 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

President Ortega is the head of state and government of Nicaragua.
He and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, exercise
authoritarian control over the government and the electoral process.
Nicaragua is embroiled in a social and political crisis that started after
the government’s repression of peaceful protests in April 2018. The
Ortega-Murillo administration began persecuting the Catholic Church
after it provided sanctuary to demonstrators and individual clergy
voiced opposition to the government’s human rights abuses, eventhough Nicaragua’s constitution states that all people, individually orcollectively, have the right to express their religious beliefs in private
or in public, through worship, practices, and teaching. Government
actors and pro-Ortega groups have engaged in increasingly repressive retaliatory measures against the Catholic Church. In March, theUN group of experts on Nicaragua stated that the widespread violations amount to crimes against humanity.
Catholics account for about 43 percent of the population; Evangelical Protestants comprise 41 percent; religious believers without
any affiliation 14 percent; and Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Muslims,
nonbelievers, and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints and the Moravian Lutheran Church together two percent.

Persecution of Clergymen and Laypeople
The Nicaraguan government’s persecution, imprisonment, andmistreatment of Bishop Álvarez was illustrative of its crackdown on
Catholic clergymen and laypeople across the country. In April, it arbitrarily expelled two nuns running a nursing home. In July, it expelled an
additional group of nuns responsible for running a Catholic charitableorganization called the Sisters Poor of Jesus Christ. In October, thegovernment expelled a group of clergymen to the Vatican. Some ofthose expelled, such as Jaime Iván Montesinos Sauceda, had beendetained since May. In November, the government sentenced two former Catholic university students, Adela Tercero and Gabriela Morales,
to imprisonment on dubious drug trafficking charges.
The Ortega-Murillo regime ended this year of persecution of
the Catholic Church with an intense crackdown during the Christmas
season. On December 20, police arrested Bishop Isidro Mora after heoffered prayers for Bishop Álvarez during Mass. Two seminarians whoreportedly attended the Mass, Tony Palacios and Alester Sáenz, werealso detained. On Christmas Eve, the government sentenced six former employees of the Catholic charity Caritas in the Diocese of Estelí
to six years’ imprisonment on dubious money laundering charges.
Between December 26 and 31, the government arbitrarily arrested
many additional clergymen—particularly those who have criticized thereligious freedom and human rights conditions in Nicaragua—suchas Father Pablo Villafranca, Father Silvio Fonseca, and Father MiguelMántica. Amid this wave of arrests and imprisonments, Vice President
Murillo launched an invective against clergy, calling them “representatives of the devil.” The Nicaraguan police also warned priests againstorganizing traditional posadas (outdoor Nativity scenes). In January2024, many of the clergy arrested during the Christmas crackdown
were exiled to the Vatican.

Government Closure of Catholic Organizations
President Ortega’s attempt to excise Catholic organizations from
Nicaragua heightened in 2023. Catholic educational institutions

such as the John Paul II Catholic University, the Immaculate Conception Catholic University of the Archdiocese of Managua, theSanta Luisa de Marillac Technical Institute, and the Jesuit-run University of Central America were all shuttered on a variety of dubious
charges, including money laundering and terrorism. In addition, theNicaraguan government closed Catholic charitable organizations
such as the Sisters Poor of Jesus Christ and Caritas. Following
these closures, the government often seized the organizations’assets and property. The government also amended Law 89, theAutonomy Law of Higher Education Institutions, and Law 582,
the General Education Law, to formally strip all higher education
institutions—including shuttered Catholic universities—of theirautonomy and to bring them under the control of the government’s
National Council of Universities.

Key U.S. Policy
In February 2023, the Joseph R. Biden administration negotiated the release of 222 political prisoners from Nicaragua to theUnited States. Among those released were religious prisoners ofconscience. The U.S. government continued to impose robust sanctions against Nicaraguan officials responsible for religious freedom
violations. In April, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Officeof Foreign Assets Control, pursuant to Executive Order 13851,
sanctioned three judicial officials responsible for stripping Nicaraguan citizenship from clergymen and for falsely convicting BishopÁlvarez for treason, undermining national integrity, and spreading
false news. In July and December, U.S. Secretary of State Antony
J. Blinken transmitted reports identifying Nicaraguan officials whoare ineligible for visas and admission to the United States becauseof their work to confiscate the property of, retaliate against, andstrip citizenship from critics of the Ortega-Murillo administration,
as required by Section 353(b) of the Northern Triangle Enhanced
Engagement Act, as amended. In August, the U.S. Department ofState imposed visa restrictions on 100 municipal officials involved inclosing civil society organizations, including the Jesuit-run University of Central America, and detaining human rights and religious
freedom advocates pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10309.
In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated $27 million forprograms in Nicaragua.
The U.S. Congress took significant steps in 2023 to highlightthe particularly severe religious freedom violations occurring in
Nicaragua, including through hearings, letters, and legislation suchas the Nicaragua Prisoner Support Act. In January 2024, the Restoring Sovereignty and Human Rights in Nicaragua Act of 2024 wasintroduced. The legislation would provide for sanctions against
religious freedom violators by reauthorizing and amending the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act of 2018 and the Reinforcing
Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of
2021. The legislation also would mandate U.S. government support
for the UN group of human rights experts on Nicaragua, which iscomprehensively investigating religious freedom and human rights
violations in the country.
On December 29, 2023, the State Department redesignated Nicaragua as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed the ongoing restrictions
referenced in Section 5 of the Nicaragua Investment Conditionality
Act of 2018.

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NICARAGUA

Background

NIGERIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained
extremely poor. Violence across Nigeria impacted freedom of
religion or belief as the government failed to prevent attacks
against faith-based organizations or worshipers, with some accusing it of fomenting such attacks. Nigerian government officials
were often slow to react to information about possible attacks or
to respond after attacks occurred. In some cases, those impacted
by violence directly criticized a lack of government accountability
and called for further steps to protect religious freedom. Boththe police and army drew criticism for not stemming the activitiesof violent insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic Statein West Africa (ISWAP), and Fulani gangs that often worked incollaboration with them.
Those states where violence was most prevalent include
Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Adamawa, and Benue. Additionally, multiple attacks during the year targeted religious leaders.
For example, in January 2023, bandits killed Father Isaac Achiof the Minna Diocese, while others shot and injured assistantparish priest Father Collins Omeh at the Saints Peter and Paul
Church in the Paikoro region. In May 2023, insurgents in Benue
State killed pastor Dominic Dajo of St. Peter Catholic Church andhis wife. In Nasarawa State, Fulani herders killed pastor Daniel
Danbeki of the Evangelical Church Winning All, along with hiswife and 41 others.

In Yobe State, Boko Haram insurgents killed at least 37 people
in February 2023 and killed another 40 people in October. In May,
the Nigerian army rescued two women Boko Haram had kidnappedin 2014 from a Chibok secondary school. In November, Boko Haramkilled 15 farmers in the Muslim-majority Borno State and at least 10
Christians in Taraba State.
In 2023, the government detained individuals accused of
blasphemy and often failed to hold accountable perpetrators ofviolence related to blasphemy allegations. The Nigerian penal
code includes a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment for acts
“persons consider as a public insult on their religion, with the intention that they should consider the act such an insult.” Twelve statesin northern Nigeria have implemented Shari’a legal frameworks
since 1999. In May, a Sokoto State magistrate released two suspects arrested for the May 2022 mob murder of Christian Deborah
Samuel for alleged blasphemy, eliminating any accountability forher death. In June, a mob in Sokoto State stoned to death Usman
Buda after he made a remark misunderstood as a slur against theProphet Muhammad. At least five prisoners remain in state custodyon blasphemy charges, including humanist Mubarak Bala and Sufi
Muslim Yahaya Sharif–Aminu. At a November 27 hearing in a Bauchi
State high court, a judge rejected Christian Rhoda Jatau’s appeal
that the court dismiss the blasphemy charges against her; however,on December 10, a Bauchi court judge released her on bail.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Redesignate Boko Haram and ISWAP as“entities of particular concern,” or EPCs,
for engaging in systematic, ongoing, andegregious violations of religious freedom,
as defined by IRFA;■■

Appoint a special envoy for Nigeria andthe Lake Chad Basin to maximize U.S.
diplomatic efforts to address religious
freedom violations and atrocity risk inNigeria and the Lake Chad Basin; andDiplomatically, financially, and administratively support Nigerian civil society
organizations to coordinate a national
dialogue on implementing United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHCR) Resolution
16/18 and to promote religious freedom
while safeguarding freedom of expression.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESEvent: Religious Freedom in the Sahel Region of Africa
Factsheet: African Traditional and Indigenous Religions■ Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria■ Issue Update: Abuses against Fulani Muslim Civilians■ Op-Ed: U.S.-Nigeria policy must prioritize religious freedom■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Nigeria■■

36 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

The U.S. Congress should:■■

Revitalize the bipartisan caucus on Nigeria
to place due focus on religious freedom
and other related human rights challenges
in addition to security and crimes against
humanity and atrocity risk in Nigeria; andRequest that the Government Accountability Of fice (GAO) investigate theeffectiveness of U.S. assistance to Nigeria
in achieving religious freedom objectives
in the country.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with around 231 million
people. Approximately 46 percent of the population are Christian,and roughly 46 percent are Muslim. About eight percent of Nigerians
practice African traditional religions. Other communities, including
Baha’is, Buddhists, Hindus, and atheists, make up less than one percent of the population.
Nigeria’s 1999 constitution protects freedom of religion or belief
and prohibits the government from establishing an official religion.
The constitution recognizes Shari’a courts for noncriminal proceedings, but state laws do not theoretically compel participation in them.
Nigeria again saw historically reoccurring electoral violence during the
February 2023 election of Bola Tinubu as national president.
Twelve northern states utilize Shari’a criminal and family codes
alongside civil and customary laws. The Shari’a codes prohibit blasphemy and other offenses based on Islamic law as interpreted by eachstate’s high court. Shari’a courts utilize a special penal code, including
for serious criminal offenses, specifying punishments such as caning,
amputation, and stoning. In November, a Kano Shari’a court sentenced
eight men to 10 lashes each and a fine for wearing women’s attire at
a wedding in violation of Islamic moral standards. Although Nigerian
Shari’a penal codes do not criminalize apostasy, converts can be atrisk. In August, an 18-year-old Christian convert successfully secured
a court order protecting her from members of her family who threatened to kill her for leaving Islam.

Violence Impacting Religious Freedom
The government, at both the federal and state levels, continued totolerate egregious criminal activity and violence by armed groups thattargeted religious communities and negatively impacted religious
freedom. The specific perpetrators of and motivation behind individual attacks are often difficult to verify. Nigerian Christian leaders
typically blame armed Fulani herders for attacks that are ethnoreligious in nature. It is also difficult to verify precise numbers of victims,
with different sources providing varying estimates. For example, areport by the Nigerian nongovernmental organization Intersociety
claimed that violent insurgent groups and armed gangs, along with
Nigerian government forces, accounted for 8,222 Christian deaths
across Nigeria in 2023. Another report asserted that in 2023, extremists in Benue State killed 414 people from predominantly Christiancommunities while injuring, raping, or kidnapping 100 more. Others
reported that between May and June 2023, violent groups killed 450
Christians in three northeastern states.
In June, violent actors in Plateau State reportedly killed at least
29 people, including several Christians, and later in the month killed
19 villagers, including Christians in Jos South and Mangu. In September, bandits in Kaduna State attempted to kidnap a priest andthen set fire to his home, killing Catholic seminarian Na’aman Danlami. In November, armed gunmen reportedly killed one person
and kidnapped at least 150 people in Zamfara State for ransom. In
Plateau State, assailants attacked Christian villages killing over 190
people the weekend before Christmas, including Baptist minister
Solomon Gushe and his family. Intersociety claimed that the coordinated Christmas week massacre was so deadly because of collusion
between armed groups and government officials.

Muslim leaders have criticized the Nigerian government for thelack of response to the violence. In January, a bomb blast killed atleast 50 Islamic cattle herders in the north. The state has also at times
issued policies broadly targeting innocent Fulani Muslims.
Threats against the nonreligious in Nigeria are common, andatheists face challenges, especially in the northern states. Atheistsin Nigeria have been subject to attack, arrest, and murder for “blaspheming Islam.” It is also reported that “life as a nonbeliever in Nigeria
is also difficult for women, who already are severely underrepresented
in government and other key sectors.”

Counterinsurgency Campaign
In 2023, the Nigerian government, ISWAP, and Boko Haram continued
to wage operations against one another in the Lake Chad region,
resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians. In July, ISWAP assailants
killed 25 Muslim Fulani herders in Borno State. In November, over 60
people died during a Lake Chad battle between the insurgent groups.
Also in November, ISWAP forces killed 17 people, including Christian
farmers and herders in Yobe State after they refused to pay a tax.
In December, a military drone meant to target insurgents killed 85
Muslims at a religious celebration in Kaduna State.

Traditional Religions
In Ilorin, ethnic Yorùbá organizers of the popular annual Isese festival
protested against the harassment of traditional religion practitioners
and government complicity by canceling the event. The International
Council for Ifa Religion (ICIR) subsequently asserted that harassmentof indigenous practices and the state’s inaction were in violation of
Nigeria’s constitution. In July, ICIR wrote a letter to incoming President
Tinubu protesting any consideration of an official state religion.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and Nigeria maintained a strong bilateral relationshipin 2023. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated $911 million
for aid programs in Nigeria. In February, U.S. Assistant Secretary ofState for African Affairs Molly Phee traveled to Abuja to discuss thecountry’s upcoming presidential election. In August, Assistant Secretary Phee visited Nigeria to discuss U.S. support for the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In December, she met
with leaders in Abuja to address the ongoing political turmoil with
regional leaders gathered for the ECOWAS Heads of State Summit.
In January 2023, members of Congress introduced H.Res. 82 calling for the U.S. Department of State to designate Nigeria as a CPC andfor President Joseph R. Biden to appoint a special envoy for Nigeria
and the Lake Chad Region, in line with USCIRF’s recommendations. In
June, several members of Congress wrote to the president of Nigeria
advocating for the release of Mubarak Bala. As of December 31, 2023,
the Senate had yet to confirm the Biden administration’s nominee forambassador to Nigeria, Richard Mills, Jr.
On December 29, 2023, the State Department designated BokoHaram and ISWAP as EPCs. However, it did not designate Nigeria asa CPC for engaging in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, despite documentation of such violations in its own reportingon the country.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )37

NIGERIA

Background

NORTH KOREAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in North Korea remained
among the worst in the world. Protestant Christians continued tobe especially vulnerable to persecution. According to a 2023 South
Korean government report, the North Korean government regards
Christians as “counter-revolutionaries” and “traitors”—which arepolitical crimes—who must be eliminated. Possessing a Bible, practicing the faith, and simply being a Christian could lead to severe
punishment, including torture, forced labor, imprisonment, andexecution. In April 2023, authorities in Tongam village, South Pyongan Province, arrested a group of five Christians for their religious
activities and confiscated dozens of Bibles. The Christians reportedly
refused to renounce their faith and disclose the Bibles’ origin.
The government has intensified persecution of North Korean
citizens who practice “superstitious activities” such as shamanismand fortune telling, which are classified as “unsocialist behaviors.”
Authorities criminalize and crack down on these religious activities,
and practitioners can be executed by firing squad or sentenced toa maximum 10-year imprisonment in addition to forced labor andadministrative penalties. Information on religious freedom conditions
for practitioners of other religious traditions in North Korea—such as
Buddhism, Catholicism, and Chondoism—remains severely limited.
The overarching ideological and enforcement framework for
restricting religious freedom remained in force. North Korea’s ruling

ideology, known as Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, forbids competing
ideologies—including religious ones—and treats religion as anexistential threat. The country’s most fundamental legal document,
known as the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic
Leadership System, requires absolute loyalty and obedience to theteachings of North Korean leaders. The Ten Principles contradict
the rights and freedoms enshrined in international law and in the
country’s own constitution, which nominally grants religious freedom. The ruling Workers’ Party of Korea actively enforces the Ten
Principles at all levels of government and across society, monitorsand controls religious belief and activities, and systematically denies
North Korean citizens the right to religious freedom.
North Korea’s discriminatory songbun system classifies
citizens based on their perceived loyalty to the state. Religious
practitioners belong to the “hostile” class and are consideredenemies of the state, deserving “discrimination, punishment, isolation, and even execution.” The government attempts to provide
an illusion of freedom of religion to the outside world throughstate-controlled religious sites and organizations, which include
the Buddhist Federation, the Korean Christian Federation, and the
Korean Catholic Association. In reality, religious freedom remains
nonexistent as authorities actively and systematically target andpersecute religious groups and adherents.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate North Korea as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Integrate security and human rights ascomplementary objectives in broader U.S.
policy toward—and in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with—North Korea;■■

Impose targeted and broad sanctions—
including coordinated, multilateralsanctions with international partners—asappropriate for religious freedom violations in North Korea and consider lifting
certain sanctions in return for concrete
progress on religious freedom and related
human rights; andrefugees—especially those with religious
ties—to the country through China andrelevant Southeast Asian countries.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Reauthorize the North Korean Human
Right s Reauthorization Ac t of 2023
(H.R.3012/S.584).

Coordinate closely with South Korea toensure the safe passage of North Korean

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■Special Report: Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and the Right to Freedom of Religion, Thought, and Conscience in North Korea
Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: North Korea

38 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom
conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated.
Historically, North Koreans followed Buddhism and an indigenous
syncretic religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion of the
Heavenly Way). The country was also home to a sizeable Christiancommunity before the Korean War (1950–1953), with Pyongyang
known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” but successive crackdowns haveshrunk the Christian population to an estimated two percent of thetotal population. Shamanism and traditional folk religion practices,such as fortunetelling, are also prevalent.

North Korean Defectors and Refugees
Defectors and refugees from North Korea are primary sources of information about religious freedom conditions in the country. In recent
years, however, the number of North Koreans arriving in South Korea
has decreased significantly due to tightened security along the borders
between China and North Korea as well as between China and Southeast
Asian countries. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification,
only 196 North Koreans defected to South Korea in 2023—one of thelowest numbers in over 20 years.
The Chinese government views all North Korean refugees
as illegal economic migrants and repatriates them if discovered,disregarding their risk of persecution upon return and violating its
international obligations. North Korean refugees in China who engage
in religious activities and have contact with Christian missionaries andnongovernmental organization workers—who play an instrumentalrole in helping the refugees escape—face severe punishment whenrepatriated to North Korea. In 2023, Chinese authorities held roughly
2,000 North Korean refugees in detention centers and repatriated as
many as 600 of them in October, with more facing imminent repatriation. North Korean refugees caught by authorities in Southeast Asian
countries, such as Vietnam, also risk deportation to China and thenrepatriation to North Korea. The U.S. and South Korean governments
have repeatedly raised this issue with China and urged the country
to stop forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees. In addition to
China, North Korea also engages in transnational repression, such as
abduction and forced repatriation, against its own citizens and foreign
nationals in other countries.

International Accountability in the United Nations
In March, United Nations (UN) experts, the United States, and other
Western countries held a UN Security Council meeting on North
Korean human rights, including the right to freedom of religion.
During the meeting, a senior official in the Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights and the UN special rapporteur onhuman rights in North Korea underscored the links between North
Korea’s dire human rights situation and international peace and security. China and Russia blocked the United States from broadcasting
the meeting. In August, the United States led a UN Security Council

meeting on the human rights situation in North Korea, which China
and Russia publicly opposed. Afterward, U.S. Ambassador to the
UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield delivered a joint statement on behalfof 52 countries and the European Union, calling attention to North
Korea’s human rights violations and urging more UN member states
to highlight linkages between the country’s human rights abuses andinternational peace and security.
In April, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted aresolution condemning “the long-standing and ongoing systematic,
widespread and gross human rights violations and other human rights
abuses committed” in North Korea. It expressed grave concerns
over North Korea’s persecution of individuals on the basis of religion
or belief; denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience,and religion, including the right to adopt a religion or belief; anddiscrimination based on the songbun system, which classifies and discriminates against people based on religion and other considerations.
The UNHRC also called on the North Korean government to ensure
the right to thought, conscience, and religion or belief. In December,the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning North
Korea’s “long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread andgross violations of human rights.” The resolution also highlighted
concern about China’s forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees,
which violates the principle of nonrefoulment.

Key U.S. Policy
There was little to no change in U.S.-North Korea relations in 2023,
and the North Korean government again rejected offers of the UnitedStates and allies for dialogue and diplomacy. In August, U.S. President
Joseph R. Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met and formed a new trilateral
security partnership at Camp David. The leaders also committed tostrengthening cooperation on promoting respect for human rights
in North Korea and reestablishing dialogue with the country with nopreconditions. On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of Stateredesignated and reimposed the existing, ongoing restrictions towhich the country is already subject under Sections 402 and 409 of
the Trade Act of 1974.
In July, the U.S. Senate confirmed Julie Turner as the special
envoy for North Korean human rights issues. In October, Special
Envoy Turner traveled to Seoul to meet with her South Korean
government counterparts, civil society groups, and North Korean
defectors. She reiterated the U.S. government’s commitment to workwith South Korea and the international community on promoting
human rights in North Korea and to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations. In March, Senator Marco Rubio(R-FL) introduced the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization
Act of 2023 (S.584). In April, Representative Young Kim (R-CA) and
Representative Ami Bera (D-CA) introduced the House version of thebill (H.R.3012). Both chambers of Congress took no further action on
the measure during the year.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )39

NORTH KOREA

BackgroundPAKISTAN
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Pakistan continued todeteriorate. Religious minorities were targeted for their beliefs,
including accusations of blasphemy, and were subject to mob
violence, lynchings, and forced conversions. Attacks on and desecration of places of worship also occurred frequently throughout
the year. While the government made some positive reforms,
including approving a new curriculum making Islamic studies noncompulsory for religious minorities, proposed amendments toPakistan’s blasphemy law risk further escalating persecution against
Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims.
Blasphemy cases and associated mob violence remained asubstantial threat to religious freedom. In the runup to national
elections, political parties leveraged blasphemy laws for political
gain. In January 2023, the National Assembly, the lower house ofparliament, unanimously passed an amendment to strengthen
punishment under the country’s blasphemy law. In February, at least
50 men stormed a police station in Punjab to kidnap and lynch aMuslim man, Muhammad Waris, accused of desecrating the Qur’an.
In August, a mob of hundreds attacked the Christian communityof Jaranwala, Pakistan, damaging dozens of churches and homes
following accusations of blasphemy. In September, a month ofprotests and clashes began in Gilgit-Baltistan after a Shi’a cleric
was accused of making blasphemous statements.
Terrorist attacks targeting religious minorities and placesof worship significantly increased in 2023. In January, a suicide
bomber attacked a mosque in Peshawar, killing at least 100, thecountry’s most deadly terrorist attack in recent years. In June,the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for killing a Sikh man
in northwestern Peshawar, claiming he belonged to a “polytheistic” Sikh sect. In September, suicide bombings targeted two
mosques in Balochistan as congregants assembled to celebrate
the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. Increasing terrorist attacks
prompted authorities to justify the expulsion of 1.3 million Afghan
refugees, including minority Shi’a Hazara and Christian communities. The office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for
Human Rights emphasized that these religious communities “willbe at grave risk” of human rights violations by Afghanistan’s defacto Taliban authorities. Estimates indicate that 500,000 Afghan
refugees were deported after the October 1st deadline.
Throughout the year, religious minorities, including Hindus,
Sikhs, Christians, and Ahmadiyya Muslims, faced increased levels of harassment and violence. In total in 2023, three Sikhs were
killed by vigilantes or as targets of terrorist attacks. In January, UN
human rights experts expressed concern at the reported increasein forced conversions of Christian and Hindu girls in Pakistan. In July,
vigilantes attacked a Hindu temple in Sindh following the news thata Pakistani Muslim woman had married a Hindu man in India. Additionally, the Ahmadiyya community recorded three dozen attacks
on their places of worship throughout 2023, including vandalism,
often with police complicity. These actions occurred despite a 2023
court ruling prohibiting the alteration of or damage to mosquesbuilt before 1984. Ahmadiyya Muslims also continued to face physical threats. In April, an Ahmadiyya lawyer was assaulted in court
for using the religious prefix “Syed.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Pakistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;
Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights-related
financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and■Enter into a binding agreement, under
Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the Pakistani
government to encourage substantial
steps to address religious freedom violations with benchmarks, including but notlimited to:■■articles criminalizing perjury and false
accusations;■■

Release blasphemy prisoners and otherindividuals imprisoned for their religion
or beliefs;
Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiy ya laws; until such repeal, enac treforms to make blasphemy a bailable
offense, require evidence by accusers, ensure proper investigation bysenior police officials, allow authorities to dismiss unfounded accusations,and enforce exis ting penal code

Remove requirements for self-identi f ic atio n of relig io n o n id e nti t y
documents; andHold accountable individuals who incite
or participate in vigilante violence, targeted killings, forced conversions, andother religiously based crimes.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Incorporate religious freedom concerns
into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Pakistan
bilateral relationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations andadvocate for the release of religious prisoners of conscience in Pakistan.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESIssue Update: Assessing Blasphemy and Related Laws on Religious Freedom in Pakistan
Press Statement: USCIRF Concerned by Pakistan’s Expulsion of Refugees and Attacks against Ahmadiyya Muslims■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Pakistan■■

40 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Pakistan’s population is 96.3 percent Muslim (85–90 percent Sunni,
10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.2 percent Ahmadiyya) with smaller populations of Hindus (1.6 percent); Christians (1.6 percent); and Sikhs,
Buddhists, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians (<1.0 percent). Pakistan wasestablished as an Islamic Republic in 1956, granting special status
to Islam and constitutionally establishing Islam as the state religion.
The constitution nominally protects religious freedom by prohibiting
faith-based discrimination and guaranteeing the right to religious
practices. Additionally, 10 seats are reserved for religious minorities
in the National Assembly, four in the Senate, and 23 in four provincial
assemblies. However, a 1974 constitutional amendment declares
Ahmadis non-Muslims, excluding them from representation.

Qur’an or Hadith, displaying Qur’anic text, sharing their faith, printing or obtaining material related to their faith, or calling their placesof worship “mosques.”
In a July letter, representatives from the Lahore High Court Bar
Association (LHCBA) asked the Punjab Home Department to prevent
the Ahmadiyya community from performing animal sacrifices on Eid
al-Adha. That same month, three Ahmadis were arrested and charged
under Section 298-C with “hurting Muslim sentiment” for sacrificing
animals inside their homes on Eid. A total of five First Instance Reports(FIRs) were filed against Ahmadis. These charges stand in contrast toa 2022 judgment by the Supreme Court, which ruled that obstructing“non-Muslims” from practicing their religion within their places ofworship is against the constitution.

Pending Amendment to Blasphemy Law

Attacks against Places of Worship

In January 2023, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously passed anamendment to the country’s blasphemy law. Introduced by a memberof the religious political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, the private member’s
bill would expand punishable offenses and offer harsher punishments
for blasphemy. Currently, individuals can be charged with blasphemy
for using derogatory remarks against Muslim holy personages (Section
295-A), defiling or desecrating the Qur’an (Section 295-B), or insulting
the Prophet Muhammad (Section 295-C). Those accused of blasphemy often face lengthy prison sentences on death row and solitaryconfinement. Blasphemy allegations are also used to settle personal
vendettas, with no punishment for those who offer false accusations
or perpetrate vigilante violence.
The proposed amendment seeks to expand and strengthen
punishments for condescending remarks against “holy persons,”
including the Prophet Muhammad’s family, wives, and companions
and the four caliphs. It seeks to increase the possible punishment torange anywhere from a minimum sentence of three years and a fine
up to life imprisonment—while simultaneously making the offense
nonbailable. In August, the Senate passed the bill.

In 2023, Pakistan’s Hindu and Ahmadiyya communities faced increased
attacks against their places of worship. In September, the Lahore High
Court ruled that Ahmadiyya mosques built before 1984 cannot be
destroyed or altered. Despite this decision, several structures havebeen vandalized and threatened, including an April attack against
the Ahmadiyya mosque in Ghooghiat, Punjab. Vigilantes demolishedseveral minarets of the mosque, which is over a century old, in thepresence of police. Similarly, in May, a mob of 150 people vandalized
an Ahmadiyya mosque in Halqa Rehman, destroying four minarets. In
December, members of Punjab’s Hindu community claimed that two
Hindu temples were converted into mosques.

Violence against Christians
In August 2023, a mob of hundreds of individuals attacked the Christian community of Jaranwala, damaging at least 24 churches, raiding
homes, and desecrating a cemetery. The attack occurred after two
Christians were accused of committing blasphemy by desecrating a
Qur’an. Following the accusations, members of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik
Pakistan (TLP) made public announcements from mosques for individuals to gather in Jaranwala. Reports indicate the mob was composedof Muslims from outside Jaranwala and that violence lasted for 10hours without police intervention. As of November 2023, not all damaged churches had been repaired. Despite authorities arresting close
to 200 people involved in the attack, reporting indicates that fear
among the Christian community persists, particularly among smallerchurches that are unable to provide sufficient protection.

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws
Articles 298(b) and 298(c) of Pakistan’s Penal Code prohibit Ahmadis
from identifying as Muslim, forcing them to sign a declaration
swearing they are non-Muslim to obtain the right to vote or receive
national identification cards. They are prohibited from citing the

Key U.S. Policy
The United States has considered Pakistan’s stability and security apriority for U.S. foreign policy. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government
obligated $150 million for programs in Pakistan. In 2023, the U.S.
government continued to raise religious freedom concerns in the
country. Throughout the year, U.S. government officials, including
U.S. Ambassador Donald Blome and U.S. Secretary of State Antony
J. Blinken, condemned terrorist attacks against worshipers and religious minorities. In October, Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain traveled to Pakistan where he
met with representatives from Jaranwala’s Christian community andgovernment officials, including the foreign minister.
Pakistan’s caretaker government was formed in mid-Augustunder the leadership of Senator Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar. In September,
Kakar visited the United States to attend the 78th UN General Assembly. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Populations,Refugees, and Migration Julieta Noyes visited Pakistan following
the caretaker government’s announcement that it would deport
undocumented Afghan refugees. In December, Pakistan Army Chief
Asim Munir traveled to Washington, DC, for meetings with the U.S.
secretary of defense, the secretary of state, and the White House’snational security advisor.
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignated Pakistan as a CPC for its systematic, ongoing, and egregious
religious freedom violations. Consistent with prior years, however, theState Department issued a national interest waiver absolving Pakistanof liability to sanctions or other penalties that otherwise accompany
the CPC designation.

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PAKISTAN

BackgroundRUSSIA
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in the Russian Federation
remained severe as authorities targeted members of religious
minorities on spurious charges related to their peaceful religious
activities. Muslims, including Crimean Tatars detained in Russian-occupied Crimea, faced unsubstantiated terrorism charges
for possessing religious materials and meeting together to discuss
religion as alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Human rights
organization Memorial reported in December that at least 335 people were in prison, faced prosecution, or were under investigation
for such alleged affiliations; of these prisoners, 128 had received
prison sentences between 10 and 15 years, and 115 had received
sentences of 15 years or more. In June, a court sentenced Crimean
Tatar activist Ansar Osmanov to 20 years in prison on charges
related to possessing religious literature and organizing religious
meetings. In February 2023, Crimean Tatar Dzhemil Gafarov diedin prison after officials refused to transfer him to a hospital. Imprisoned Muslims reported experiencing torture, medical neglect,
forced beard shavings, the confiscation of religious materials,
prayer bans, and pork-filled food.
Since the Supreme Court declared Jehovah’s Witnesses“extremist” in 2017, law enforcement has subjected the group to
more than 2,000 home searches and opened criminal cases against
nearly 800 members. In April 2023, a court fined four Jehovah’s
Witnesses $24,095 (2,195,000 rubles) for gathering. In November,a court sentenced Yevgeny Bushev to seven years’ imprisonment
after he discussed his religious beliefs with an undercover agent.
At the end of the year, nearly 150 Jehovah’s Witnesses remained
under house arrest or in pretrial detention or prison.
The government prosecuted several individuals on chargesof blasphemy, including persons perceived to have insulted Islam.
In May, authorities arrested 19-year-old Nikita Zhuravel after heallegedly burned a Qur’an and mocked Muslims on video. Chechen
leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s 15-year-old son Adam Kadyrov beat Zhuravel after he was transferred to a detention center in Chechnya.

Federal officials refused to investigate the beating, despite theexistence of video evidence, and Adam subsequently received
nearly a dozen awards for “defending” faith and traditional values.
The Ministry of Justice waged a relentless campaign against
civil society organizations that report on religious freedom issues.
In April 2023, a court liquidated the SOVA Center for Information
and Analysis, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that monitors
religious freedom violations in Russia and Crimea. Human rights
activists similarly faced criminal prosecution in connection with
their work. In May, a court sentenced Bakhrom Khamroev, a lawyer
who defended Muslims charged in HT cases, to 14 years in prison.
In 2023, state retaliation against those who spoke out against
Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine using religious language
or on moral grounds continued at startling heights. The government declared the Supreme Lama of Kalmykia and representativeof the Dalai Lama in Russia Telo Tulku Rinpoche and the Chief
Rabbi of Moscow Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt as “foreign agents”
for openly opposing Russia’s invasion. In March 2023, a court sentenced Orthodox Christian Mikhail Simonov to seven years in prison
for an antiwar social media post that invoked God.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been an increasein antisemitic rhetoric by government officials. In 2023, officials
failed to adequately address rising domestic antisemitism following
several alarming incidents, including a mob attack at a Dagestan
airport targeting “refugees from Israel.” Russia also continued toseverely curtail religious freedom in the parts of Ukraine that it
invaded and occupied. In Russian-occupied territories, de facto
authorities banned religious groups, raided houses of worship, anddisappeared religious leaders. Russian artillery damaged Ukrainian
religious sites, including the Orthodox Transfiguration Cathedral
in Odesa. By December, the United Nations (UN) Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization verified damage to at least
125 religious sites, although other organizations reported damage
to approximately 630 sites since the war began in February 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Russia as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Russian
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights-related
financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and■Allocate greater funding to programs
supporting civil society and independent
media that report uncensored information, counter Russian disinformation andantisemitism, and monitor and document
religious freedom and related humanrights violations in Russia.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESHearing: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for Religious Freedom
Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Russia’s Closure of the SOVA Center■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in the Russian Federation■ Issue Update: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Russia■■

42 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

The U.S. Congress should:■

Engage with repressed religious communities in Russia and occupied Ukraine andraise ongoing religious freedom issues
through hearings, meetings, letters, congressional delegation trips abroad, andother actions for community representatives to inform the U.S. government and/or public of existing conditions.

According to a 2022 poll by the independent Levada Center, 71
percent of Russia’s population identify as Orthodox Christian, five
percent as Muslim, and 15 percent as having no religious faith. Several other religious groups each constitute one percent or less of the
population, including Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, Baha’is, Falun Gong practitioners,
Scientologists, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Tengrists, members of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, and followers of indigenous religions. Russia’s 1997
religion law considers Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as“traditional” religions. Over time, the Russian government has granted
special recognition and privileges to the Russian Orthodox Church of
the Moscow Patriarchate.
In 2023, Russia increased the penalties for violating criminal andadministrative code articles commonly used against religious minorities, dissidents, and human rights defenders. President Vladimir Putinsigned legislation that increased the penalties for “discrediting” thearmed forces, deprived the acquired citizenship of those convictedof collaborating with an “undesirable organization,” and criminalizedworking with unregistered NGOs. In December, the Supreme Court
recognized a so-called “international LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender] movement” as an “extremist organization” for inciting“social and religious hatred.”

Religious Minorities
The government harassed, discriminated against, detained, fined,
deported, and imprisoned members of religious minorities becauseof their religious identities, activities, and affiliations.
Individuals and communities incurred fines for so-called “illegal
missionary activities” for possessing unlabeled religious materials
or engaging in unregistered religious activities as a foreigner. Law
enforcement searched the homes and meeting places of Falun Gong
practitioners and members of the spiritual movement Allya Ayat. Similarly, security forces raided mosques to force Muslim migrant men to
enlist in the military. In June, a Moscow court sentenced six followersof Muslim theologian Said Nursi to as many as six and a half years inprison for gathering to read religious literature.
In July, a court sentenced two Protestant pastors to three and ahalf years’ imprisonment for affiliating with the banned “undesirable”
New Generation Evangelical Christian Church. During the year, theProsecutor General’s Office also banned the Transformation Center
Church International and the religious group AllatRa as “undesirable.”
In August, a St. Petersburg court sentenced Church of Scientology
leader Ivan Matsitsky to six and a half years in prison and fined fourothers $44,858 (4,100,000 rubles) for their work with the church. Matsitsky was released on time served.
Also in August, police in St. Petersburg handed over to Chechen
security forces Seda Suleimanova, who had fled Chechnya out of fearher family may kill her for being “insufficiently religious.” In November,an Ulyanovsk court fined and sentenced Said Abdelrazek to one anda half years in prison for “offending religious feelings” after he desecrated a Qur’an on video. By the end of the year, courts sentenced
at least four men to prison over their refusal to serve in the militaryon religious grounds.

Crackdown on Russian Civil Society and Dissent
The Russian government often took legal action to suppress independent media and human rights organizations that monitor and reporton violations of freedom of religion or belief. Law enforcement raided
the homes and offices of Memorial activists, and courts imposed heftyfines on several of Memorial’s branches. During the year, authorities
closed the Moscow Helsinki Group, designated SK SOS Crisis Groupa “foreign agent,” and declared Meduza, Novaya Gazeta Europe,and CrimeaSOS “undesirable.” Police fined and sometimes detained
religious leaders and individuals who expressed their religiously
grounded opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In August, a St.
Petersburg court sentenced Orthodox hieromonk Ioann Kurmoyarov
to three years’ imprisonment for posting videos condemning theinvasion in religious terms.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
De facto authorities in the parts of Ukraine that Russia occupied
rigorously persecuted religious minorities in 2023. In Crimea, Russianauthorities fabricated terrorism allegations to incarcerate predominantly Muslim Crimean Tatars who opposed Russian occupation.
In May, Russian authorities in Crimea seized the Orthodox Churchof Ukraine’s (OCU) Cathedral of Saints Volodymyr and Olha. In the
Zaporizhzhia region, Russian authorities banned the Ukrainian Greek
Catholic Church and closed OCU, Roman Catholic, and Baptist
churches. At the end of the year, the whereabouts of several priests
whom Russian forces had detained—including Greek Catholic priests
Ivan Levitsky and Bohdan Geleta, OCU priests Khrystofor Khrimli andAndriy Chuy, and Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) priest Kostiantyn
Maksimov—remained unknown.
High-ranking Russian officials and state media also engaged in
Holocaust distortion and antisemitism to justify the country’s 2022
invasion of Ukraine. President Putin referred to Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “disgrace to the Jewish people” andaccused the West of putting an “ethnic Jew” in charge to cover up
Ukraine’s “anti-human nature.”

Key U.S. Policy
The United States imposed additional rounds of sanctions against Russian individuals and entities supporting the war effort and engaging
in human rights violations. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S.
Mission to the UN highlighted the Russian government’s antisemitic
rhetoric and gross religious freedom abuses. On December 29, 2023,
the State Department redesignated Russia as a CPC under IRFA andreimposed existing ongoing sanctions.

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RUSSIA

Background

SAUDI ARABIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGS

R

eligious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remained poor in
2023 despite some improvements. Power is highly centralized
within the Al Saud ruling family. The ruling monarch, King
Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud, holds the title “Custodian of the
Two Holy Mosques.” The King’s son, Crown Prince Mohammedbin Salman, is prime minister. Public non-Muslim worship and theconstruction of houses of worship other than mosques remainprohibited. However, the government permitted a visiting Israelidelegation to hold Sukkot services in a Riyadh hotel in October.
Shi’a Muslims face systematic discrimination in employment andgovernment mistreatment. Ahead of Saudi Arabia’s United Nations(UN) Universal Periodic Review in January 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary killings expressed
concern over the Supreme Court’s upholding of a death sentence
for Abdullah al-Derazi, a Shi’a man arrested in 2014 for crimes he
was alleged to have committed as a minor.
In recent years, the Saudi government has made changes tothe male guardianship system, a set of laws and regulations rooted
in the government’s official interpretation of Islam and imposed on
women regardless of their religious beliefs. The government has
also begun to codify aspects of its religiously grounded penal code,
making these punishments more standardized and transparent. In
February 2023, the governor of Mecca Governorate approved plans
for a committee to reconcile disputes over qisas crimes (a religious
category of crimes for which retaliatory punishment is permitted).
The Kingdom has permitted gender mixing and relaxed religious
dress codes at specific nightlife and music events. A May study of
Saudi textbooks noted “further progress and improvement” withregard to the removal of religiously intolerant content, while notingthat some such content still remained, including passages using
religious interpretations to equate homosexuality and atheism withterrorist ideology.

The Saudi government continues to issue egregious prison
sentences for those expressing dissenting religious views on social
media. In March, the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) resentenced
Salma al-Shehab to 27 years in prison—a reduction from 34—over
tweets supporting activists peacefully challenging the guardianship system. That same month, al-Shehab and other activists
undertook a three-and-a-half-week hunger strike to protest theirdetention conditions. In June, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention expressed concern over the use of antiterrorism andcybercrime laws to target al-Shehab—whose cybercrime charges
were dropped in March 2023—and activist Nourah al-Qahtani. The
SCC charged al-Qahtani for possessing a banned book by jailed
dissident religious scholar Salman al-Ouda. In October, the UN
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that al-Ouda’s
detention was arbitrary. In August, the SCC sentenced Mohammed
al-Ghamdi to death after holding him incommunicado in solitaryconfinement for four months and charging him with “supporting aterrorist ideology” over tweets calling for the release of religious
clerics. Regarding this decision, the crown prince told a U.S. journalist in September, “I cannot tell a judge [to] … ignore the law….
But do we have bad laws? Yes. We are changing that.” Al-Ghamdi’s
brother Saeed is a United Kingdom-based religious scholar anddissident, indicating that the sentence is part of the broader Saudi
campaign of transnational repression of those who challenge theofficial interpretation of Islam. In July, a court sentenced Malik
al-Dowaish, son of cleric Sulaiman al-Dowaish, to 27 years in prison
after he posted a video inquiring about his father’s mistreatment.
During a USCIRF visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2024, government officials asked Chair Rabbi Abraham Cooper to remove
his kippah at the Diriyah UNESCO World Heritage Site and for allother times when out in public. After being escorted from the site,
the USCIRF delegation truncated the trip.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■

Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “countryof particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation; and■Identify legal options for penalizing U.S.
companies complicit in the Saudi government’s religious freedom violations,
including those enabling elec tronic
surveillance of cellular phones, emails,social media accounts, and the private
messages of religious minorities and religious dissidents.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold public hearings to amplify bipartisan concerns over religious freedom
violations in Saudi Arabia, including theprolonged detention of religious prisonersof conscience, and work with like-mindedparliamentarians in other countries toadvocate for them and other prisoners ofconscience to be released.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESHearing: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion or Belief
Issue Brief: Personal Status and Family Law in the Middle East and North Africa■ Press Statement: USCIRF Leaves Saudi Arabia After Government Official Insisted Chair to Remove Kippah■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Saudi Arabia■■

44 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Out of 34 million Saudis, 85–90 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 10–15
percent are Shi’a Muslim. An estimated 38 percent of the population
are expatriates, including at least two million Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, practitioners of folk religions, and the unaffiliated. Under
Saudi law, the constitution is the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of
the Prophet), and the judicial system enforces an official interpretation of Shari’a as informed by Hanbali jurisprudence. Apostasy andblasphemy are both capital crimes. Same-sex relations are legallypunishable by death, but the government has conducted no suchexecutions in recent years.

clothing defying religious notions of modesty while permitting morelenient requirements for foreign female performance artists.

Religious Guardianship
Saudi women have benefited from recent legal reforms but continue
to face restrictions on their religious freedom. Many activists who
advocated for now-implemented changes to these laws were arrested
and—in some cases—subjected to harassment, sexual assault, andabuse in prison. Several women punished for religious expression onsocial media wrote in support of reforms to the guardianship system
and activists who have advocated for its abolition.

Shi’a Muslim Discrimination

Transnational Repression

Shi’a Muslims face discrimination in housing, employment, and the
judiciary and lack access to senior positions in the government and military. The government continues to prosecute those involved in 2011protests against religious discrimination in the predominantly Shi’a
Eastern Province. In March, a court sentenced Shi’a activist Mariam
Al Qisoom to a 25-year prison sentence and subsequent travel ban. In
June, authorities arrested Shi’a Bahraini cleric Sheikh Jamil al-Baqari
for posting a social media video in which he recited a prayer for thedeliverance of Imam Mahdi. Official religious interpretations in Saudi
Arabia oppose venerating religious figures.

Outside its borders, Saudi Arabia continues to pursue religious dissidents. It also imposes punishments, including travel and media bans,on family members of religious dissidents living abroad to encourage
self-censorship. Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, whose sister is a U.S. citizen
and critic of Saudi policy, remains jailed on a 20-year sentence forsatirizing religious officials. Loujain al-Hathloul, an activist against
the religious guardianship system, remains unable to leave Saudi
Arabia despite her travel ban expiring in 2023, likely related to hersister Lina’s activism. In March 2023, USCIRF expressed concern andthe U.S. Department of State said it was “studying” indications of
Saudi government involvement in the repatriation under duress andsubsequent suicide of Eden Knight. A 23-year-old Saudi citizen, Knight
flew to Saudi Arabia from the United States in December 2022 despite
a fear of religiously grounded persecution on the basis of gender. In
text messages, she explicitly cited her religious beliefs as the source of
this fear. She committed suicide in March 2023 after being subjected
to familial abuse and fearing her attempt to obtain a new passport
via the governmental Absher app would result in a notification being
sent to her father.

Social Media Crackdowns
The Saudi government actively surveilles social media. It has arrested
citizens over their peaceful religious expression, accusing them ofoffenses including sending material that may “harm public order andreligious values.” These include “explicitly denying the Qur’an,” “contempt for the teachings of the Islamic religion,” and “opposition to theprovisions of Islamic Shari’a.” In January, Riyadh police arrested four
people for posting a dancing video on TikTok and referred them to
the Public Prosecutor for violating the Law on Information Crimes andPublic Morals. They were later released. In September, the General
Authority for Media Regulation summoned a female blogger overa tweet deemed “insulting to the Prophet of Islam and his wife.” In
March, Sheikh Imad al-Mubayed disappeared after posting a video
on Twitter criticizing the government’s interpretation of Islam, which
he later recanted. He posted a video later that month claiming he hadfound refuge in a “safe country.”
In January, the Riyadh Criminal Court heard charges againstsocial media influencer Manahel al-Otaibi. They included publishingcontent related to abolishing the guardianship system that allegedly
violated “public morals,” supporting activists who oppose guardianship, and dressing “improperly” according to religiously grounded
guidelines. The court transferred the case to the SCC, where al-Otaibi
faced charges under the 2017 counterterrorism law. In July, the SCC
postponed her scheduled court hearing without setting a new date. In
September, she alleged physical and psychological abuse during her
ongoing detention at Malaz Prison, including unjust solitary confinement. al-Otaibi was held incommunicado from November 5 throughthe end of the reporting period. Manahel’s sister Fouz, who wascharged with similar crimes, is outside Saudi Arabia and posted avideo in August criticizing the targeting of Saudi women for wearing

U.S. Policy
The United States continued close security coordination with Saudi
Arabia on regional security issues, including discussions of defense
guarantees. This coordination continued following the outbreakof conflict in Israel and Gaza in October. In March, the U.S. Senate
confirmed Michael Ratney as ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Thatsame month, Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Mike Lee (R-UT)
introduced a privileged resolution that would require the Joseph R.
Biden administration to issue a report on Saudi Arabia’s human rights
record. In August, Senator Murphy tweeted expressing concern for
Mohammed al-Ghamdi. In October, Saudi Defense Minister Khalidbin Salman met with senior U.S. officials during a visit to Washington,
DC. Also in October, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to
Saudi Arabia and met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister
Mohammed bin Salman and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan
to coordinate a response to the conflict between Israel and Hamas
in the Gaza Strip. In FY 2023, the U.S. government obligated over
$112,000 in foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. On December 29,
2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignated Saudi Arabia as a
CPC under IRFA but reimposed the longstanding waiver on taking
any presidential action as a consequence of the designation.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )45

SAUDI ARABIA

BackgroundTAJIKISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan remained direas the government continued to restrict and penalize the religious
activity of its citizens, including those living abroad. Under thelaw on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (religionlaw), the government prohibits unregistered religious activity, limits
religious education, restricts the import and distribution of religious
materials, and maintains discriminatory requirements for registering mosques and appointing Muslim clergy, among other actions.
As in years prior, the Tajik government retaliated against persons
who violated the religion law, punishing them with imprisonment,
torture, fines, and harassment. While this repression impacted all
religious groups, authorities particularly targeted Muslims. Notably,
the government increasingly directed such actions against Ismaili
Shi’a Muslims during the year.
In line with the “extremism law,” the government maintained a list of arbitrarily defined “extremist” organizations,which included peaceful religious and political organizations.
The government banned Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2007, and in
August the Supreme Court rejected an appeal to reverse thatban. Officials also harassed Jehovah’s Witnesses for their religious activities. For example, authorities interrogated Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Sughd region and Dushanbe about fellow Jehovah’s
Witnesses. In June, two women were detained overnight andfined $311 (3,400 somonis) on charges of “inciting religious
hatred” for sharing their religious beliefs. In May, Jehovah’s Witness Shamil Khakimov completed his sentence and was released.
Khakimov was wrongfully imprisoned in 2019 for his peacefulreligious activities and suffered medical neglect throughout his
time in prison.
The government routinely accused individuals of “extremism”
for dissenting against or criticizing Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s administration, and it similarly banned the activities of groups
such as the religiously based Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) as “extremist.” As part of its efforts to suppress thesegroups, the government engaged in transnational repression toforcibly return their members living abroad to Tajikistan, in part bysubmitting fraudulent “Red Notices” to the International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL). In January 2023, the German government deported Abdullo Shamsiddin, the son of an IRPT founder,
to Tajikistan where he received a seven-year prison sentence on
sedition charges for reportedly liking a social media post. Also in
January, the Tajik government requested that Belarusian authorities
deport former Group-24 member Nizomiddin Nasriddinov partly
due to his alleged online engagement with IRPT content. A court
later sentenced him to eight and a half years in prison on charges
of attempting to forcibly change Tajikistan’s constitutional order.
In August, 63-year-old Jaloliddin Makhmudov died while serving aprison sentence in Tajikistan for his affiliation with the IRPT.
Authorities reportedly closed down or destroyed themosques of communities that did not provide enough enlisted
men for the military. In Isfara city, authorities closed a mosqueduring Ramadan to coerce military conscriptions. In October,
authorities destroyed a mosque in Vahdat city, reportedly
because not enough men volunteered for the military.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;
Condition U.S. security assistance tothe Tajik government on 1) reform of the2009 religion law improving conditions
for freedom of religion or belief, and 2)
mandated religious freedom training
for Tajik officials, including education

release individuals imprisoned in Tajikistan for their peaceful religious activities
or religious affiliations; and allow international observers to monitor conditionsin Tajik prisons.

about the benefits of religious freedom
for countering and preventing violent
extremism;■■

Impose targeted sanctions on Tajik government agencies and officials responsible
for severe violations of religious freedom
by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry into the UnitedStates under human rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specificreligious freedom violations; andPress the Tajik government at the highest
levels to account for the whereabouts ofall prisoners of conscience; immediately

The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise Tajikistan’s transnational repression
with counterparts in the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) and press member states to takemeasures to ensure that individuals seeking asylum due to religious persecution
and facing unfounded accusations of
extremism are not subject to deportation.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: The Repression of Religious Freedom in Authoritarian Tajikistan
Hearing: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan: Policy Options for a Country of Particular Concern■ Press Release: USCIRF Welcomes Tajikistan’s Release of Shamil Khakimov and Calls for U.S. Policy Action■ Op-Ed: Will Tajikistan Meaningfully Engage on Religious Freedom?
■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Tajikistan■■

46 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Around 90 percent of Tajikistan’s population is Muslim, with the majority adhering to Hanafi Sunni Islam. Around four percent are ethnically
Pamiri, adhere to Ismaili Shi’a Islam, and reside in Gorno Badakhshan
Autonomous Region (commonly known as GBAO). The remainderof the population includes Christian denominations, such as Russian
Orthodox, Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Other religious communities include Jews, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians.
In 2023, the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on freedomof religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, and on minority issues, Fernandde Varennes, separately visited Tajikistan and noted several religious
freedom violations impacting all religious groups, including specifictargeting of Ismaili Shi’a Muslims, a stringent registration process
for all religious organizations, and bans on women from attending
mosque and all those under 18 from engaging in religious activity.

State Targeting of Sunni Muslims
The Tajik government continued to target individuals who deviatedfrom the state’s preferred interpretation of Islam. Authorities often
justified the penalization of peaceful religious activities as a means toprevent “extremism,” a broadly defined term arbitrarily used to repress
those that the government views as threatening to its authority.
In 2023, authorities accused independent Muslims of adhering
to Salafism, which the government has banned as an “extremist”
movement and characterized as a “direct threat to society.” In March,authorities sentenced imam Mukhammadi Mukhammarov to eight
years in prison on extremism charges for allegedly teaching Islam toa group of 12 Muslims, but also likely due to his affiliation with the“Salafi movement.” His students were similarly sentenced to up to 10
years in prison. In April, a Khatlon region court sentenced imam Abdulhannon Usmonov to six years in prison on charges of participating in abanned extremist organization and obstructing his daughter’s education. Authorities initially arrested Usmonov for disrupting a wedding,but the prosecutor’s office later found that Usmonov watched anddistributed “extremist” “Salafi movement” materials online. USCIRF’s
Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List includes other Muslims who
remained in prison in Tajikistan on falsified extremism charges for theirpeaceful religious activities.
The government continued to retain the right to approve theappointment of imams and targeted unsanctioned imams. In October,
the Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations,and Ceremonies (CRA) warned that an unauthorized imam in Hisar city
provided funeral services instead of the state-appointed imam andannounced an investigation into whether this individual “degraded
the dignity of the dead body.” In November, the CRA announced it
was investigating an individual who reportedly addressed a mosque
congregation in the absence of the state-appointed imam.
In early 2023, Islamic bookstores in Dushanbe reopened after
authorities had forcibly closed them in late 2022 for printing and/or

importing religious materials without state approval. However, thereopened bookstores allegedly are no longer permitted to sell thesame Islamic books.
Tajik officials also continued to monitor and penalize religious
activity through use of the “traditions law,” which prohibits “excessive” religious ceremonies and rituals. For example, in January 2023,
the Vahdat city court fined an individual an unknown amount forproviding food at a religious ceremony.

Crackdown on Shi’a Muslims
In 2023, authorities further restricted Ismaili Shi’a religious activity in
GBAO. In an effort to curtail the influence of their spiritual leader, theAga Khan, the government nationalized Aga Khan Foundation social
service facilities, such as the Aga Khan Lyceum, and upheld a decision
to nationalize the University of Central Asia. Security officials also
harassed and threatened instructors for teaching “Ethics and Knowledge” courses, which included information about Islam and Ismailism.
In a January 2023 meeting with local elders, authorities announced
that it was prohibited to study at the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, hang portraits of the Aga Khan, and hold group prayers in private
homes, even though there is only one operating Ismaili prayer house in
GBAO. At least two individuals were fined without a court hearing for
hosting prayers in their homes in January and February.
In April 2023, President Rahmon signed into law a decree banning funeral rites for those killed in “anti-terrorist operations,” which it
has violently enforced. Activists said the decree is intended to punish
the families of protesters in GBAO who were killed by military forces.
Families of the deceased were forbidden from knowing the burial
locations of their loved ones or erecting gravestones. In May, authorities tortured the relative of an individual killed during the protests for
placing their loved one’s name on a gravestone.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States continued to partner with the Tajik government
to address regional security concerns, like terrorism and narcotics
trafficking, and provided over $60 million for programs in Tajikistan
in 2023. In February, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with
Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin. In September, President
Rahmon met with President Joseph R. Biden under the auspices of
the C5+1 Presidential Summit. Along with the other Central Asianleaders, President Rahmon signed onto a joint statement that passingly
mentioned human rights. In December, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) wrote a letter
to President Rahmon urging him to respect human rights in Tajikistan
and stop practicing transnational repression.
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedTajikistan as a CPC under IRFA, although it also maintained a waiveron imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required in theimportant national interest of the United States.”U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )47

TAJIKISTAN

BackgroundTURKMENISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained
poor. The government maintained strict control over all aspectsof religious life and prosecuted individuals who did not adhere
to it. Authorities routinely targeted devout, peaceful Muslims as“extremist” because of their appearance, possession of unapproved religious materials, or disciplined religious practice. The
government perceived such forms of religiosity as foreign anddivergent from its conceptions of traditional Turkmen religious
practice. Police and officials from the Ministry of National Security reportedly interrogated Muslim women—particularly those
who went to mosque, wore hijab, or prayed with tasbih (Islamic
prayer beads)—and searched their phones to determine if they
belonged to “radical” religious groups. Police in Dashoguz reportedly detained “en masse” men with beards—a sign of religiosity formany Muslim men—and forced them to shave at police stations. In a
separate instance, a man was blocked from boarding his flight until
he shaved his beard. In August, police in Turkmenbashi and otherregions raided Muslim homes, seizing religious literature. That samemonth, law enforcement reportedly detained an elderly Muslim
man for teaching Islam to dozens of children without state approval.
Muslim prisoners of conscience remained jailed under unsubstantiated national security pretenses for engaging in peacefulreligious activities. USCIRF has identified at least nine prisoners—
though this number is suspected to be greater—serving between
12 and 15 years in prison for a range of reasons connected to theexercise of their freedom of religion or belief. In a positive development, Turkmen officials provided USCIRF with information about thelatest whereabouts and statuses of these nine prisoners. Concerns
remained, however, about the wellbeing of such prisoners given thenotoriously inhumane living conditions of prisons in Turkmenistan,especially Ovadan-Depe Prison, where allegations of torture, medical
neglect, and enforced disappearance persisted.
Turkmenistan targeted its Muslim citizens living abroad. In
August, Russian authorities deported Turkmen Muslim Ashyrbay
Bekiev to Turkmenistan in violation of a 2017 European Court of
Human Rights decision to suspend his extradition. Turkmen officials
placed Bekiev, who had lived in Russia since 2009, on the country’s
wanted list in 2015 after accusing him of promoting Islamic extremism to other Turkmen citizens in Russia. In October, a Turkmen court
reportedly sentenced Bekiev to 23 years in prison. Earlier in the year,
Russian officials also detained Bekiev’s brother Tachmyrat Bekiev in
St. Petersburg.
Exiled Turkmen activists claimed that the state retaliatedagainst their family members living in Turkmenistan. Hamida
Babajanova alleged that in April 2023, Ashgabat airport officials
prohibited her mother Yakutjan Babajanova from boarding a plane
to Saudi Arabia to go on Umra. At the time, authorities provided
no explanation to Babajanova, despite her having all the required
paperwork. Babajanova was eventually allowed to travel fivemonths later. Moreover, people applying to go on Hajj reportedly
must prove they have no relatives with criminal records or pay a
bribe to falsify such records.
The government has still not allowed Jehovah’s Witnesses toregister, nor has it provided an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. While authorities in the past have imprisoned
Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to serve in the military, no Jehovah’s
Witnesses were imprisoned in 2023. However, Jehovah’s Witnesses
reported nearly a dozen instances in which police briefly detained,
questioned, or ordered Jehovah’s Witnesses not to share their beliefs
with others.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “countryof particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;
Take presidential action to limit security
assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22) to hold the government of
Turkmenistan accountable for its particularly severe violations of religious freedom;■■

Impose targeted sanctions on Turkmenistan government agencies and officials
responsible for severe violations ofreligious freedom by freezing thoseindividuals’ assets and/or barring theirentry into the United States under humanrights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom
violations;
Encourage Turkmen authorities to extend
an official invitation for an unrestrictedvisit by the United Nations (UN) Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief; andKEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Turkmenistan

48 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4■

Raise religious freedom and other humanrights concerns with Turkmen counterparts, including at C5+1 meetings, andurge the government of Turkmenistan toprovide an acceptable civilian alternative
to military service.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise ongoing religious freedom issues
through hearings, meetings, letters, congressional delegation trips abroad, andother actions for community representatives to inform the U.S. government and/or public of existing conditions.

Turkmenistan has an estimated population of 5.6 million. According to
the U.S. government, 89 percent of the population is Muslim (mostly
Sunni); nine percent is Eastern Orthodox, which largely means either
Russian Orthodox or Armenian Apostolic; and the remaining two
percent includes small communities of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Shi’aMuslims, Baha’is, Roman Catholics, members of the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Protestants, and Jews.
Turkmenistan remains one of the world’s most repressive countries, making documenting religious freedom violations challenging.
The state has deprived its citizens of virtually all political and civil rights
and imprisoned civil society activists for their work and perceived
criticism of authorities. Turkmenistan ranks at the bottom for press
freedom, as no independent media exists within the country, andjournalists risk criminal prosecution and other forms of retribution for
their work. Turkmen citizens, furthermore, faced significant obstacles
communicating with the outside world. The government has blocked
foreign media, social media, and messaging websites and rendered
unblocked websites practically useless due to internet speeds thatwere among the slowest in the world. Turkmens living abroad risked
deportation or retaliation against their families members who remainedin Turkmenistan if they criticized the Turkmen government or raised
concerns about human rights.

Legal Framework for Controlling Religious Activity
While Turkmenistan’s 2016 religion law established the country asa secular state and guaranteed the right to freedom of religion, it
ultimately provides the government a comprehensive legal basis tosystematically restrict religious activities. Only registered religiousorganizations are legally allowed to practice. In order to register,religious groups must submit an application to the State Commission
on Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation of Religious Information Resources (SCROEERIR), which oversees all religious affairs
in Turkmenistan. During the review process, SCROEERIR determines
if a religious group’s goals and activities “contradict Turkmenistan’s
constitution.” This vague standard allows the government to denyregistration to religious groups on an arbitrary basis. Furthermore,religious organizations must acquiesce to SCROEERIR’s all-encompassing power to regulate a community’s religious affairs, including
the appointment of religious leaders, the importation and publicationof religious literature, and building houses of worship.
Recognized religious communities must reregister every three
years and are prohibited from receiving foreign financial support,
conducting religious education and worship in private, and wearing
religious garb, with the exception of government-approved clergy. The
government forbids unregistered religious organizations from engaging
in religious activities, producing or distributing religious materials, proselytizing, and gathering for religious services, even in private residences.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
Documenting arrests of religious prisoners of conscience in 2023
proved difficult due to Turkmenistan’s vast repression. However,

several Muslims sentenced in years prior because of their peacefulreligious activities remained in prison throughout the year. Authorities leveraged vague accusations of inciting religious enmity or
attempting to violently change the constitutional order, prosecuting
individuals in trials that lacked any semblance of transparency or due
process. In 2013, authorities arrested and sentenced Bahram Saparovto 15 years in prison for organizing unregistered religious meetings
to teach about Islam at the homes of his followers. After his initialsentencing, prison authorities brought additional charges against
Saparov, resulting in two additional 15-year sentences that he is serving concurrently with his first. He is now expected to be released in
2031. Authorities arrested approximately 20 others from his religious
community as well, but many of their sentences remain unknown.
In 2017, Turkmen authorities arrested and sentenced Myratdurdy
Shamyradow, Meret Owezow, Ahmet Mammetdurdyyew, Begejik
Begejikow, and Jumanazar Hojambetow to 12 years in prison eachfor studying the works of Muslim theologian Said Nursi.
Muslims who exercise their right to practice or discuss theirreligion when living outside of Turkmenistan have faced imprisonment for those religious activities upon returning home. In 2016,
Turkmen authorities arrested and sentenced Annamurad Atdaev
to 15 years in prison after he returned to Turkmenistan from Egypt
where he had been studying at al-Azhar University. In 2018, Turkmen authorities detained and sentenced both Kemal Saparov andKakadjan Halbaev to 15 years in prison for possessing religious
materials and discussing religious topics with other Turkmens livingin St. Petersburg, Russia.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States engaged with the government of Turkmenistan ona range of issues, including border and regional security, economic
cooperation, and efforts to curb methane emissions. In April 2023,
U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Turkmen Foreign
Minister Rashid Meredov to discuss the bilateral relationship. In September, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden met with Turkmen President
Serdar Berdimuhamedow among other Central Asian heads of state
at a C5+1 meeting on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
In November, the U.S. Department of State announced the launchof Business 5+1 to promote economic security and development
between the United States, Turkmenistan, and other Central Asianstates. During Turkmenistan’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN,
the United States commended Turkmenistan for its efforts to workwith Jehovah’s Witnesses on a mutually agreeable alternative civilian
service. However, it also recommended Turkmenistan address its vast
repression of civil society and provide greater transparency concerning prisoners and the prison system. In FY 2023, the U.S. government
obligated around $3.2 million for programs in Turkmenistan.
On December 29, 2023, the State Department redesignatedTurkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA, although it also maintained awaiver on imposing any related sanctions on the country “as requiredin the important national interest of the United States,” which it hasdone since 2014.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )49

TURKMENISTAN

BackgroundVIETNAM
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom violations in Vietnam remained relatively the same as last year. Authorities continued to persecuteindependent religious communities—many of which officials
designate as “strange, false, or heretical” religions—that did notcomply with state control. The government maintained state-controlled alternatives—such as the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha, Cao Dai
1997 Sect, Hoa Hao Administration Council, and the Evangelical
Church of Vietnam-South—and pressured independent groups tojoin them. Authorities interfered in the appointment of religious
leaders, confiscated religious artifacts, and restricted access tohouses of worship.
Authorities continued to persecute ethnoreligious minority
groups, such as Montagnard and Hmong Protestants, Khmer Krom
Buddhists, and Hmong adherents of Duong Van Minh. Authorities
actively restrict independent Montagnard Protestants’ religious
activities, forcing them to renounce their faith and arresting andsentencing them on charges of “undermining national unity” and“abusing democratic freedoms.” Authorities pressured Hmongand Montagnard Protestants to join state-controlled Protestantreligious organizations, surveilled them, and prevented their accessto churches. Following the June attack on local government offices
in Dak Lak Province that killed nine people, civil society groups
raised concerns that the government would use this incident toextend persecution of the local Montagnard Christian community.
Authorities deployed security and military forces to the Central
Highlands and detained, charged, and convicted 100 ethnic minorities in January 2024 after the reporting period.
In 2023, the government implemented Directive 78 to “eradicate the Duong Van Minh sect.” During its trip in May 2023,
USCIRF saw videos allegedly showing authorities forcing members of Duong Van Minh to renounce their faith. Authorities also
forced ethnic minorities to use Vietnamese, as opposed to theirown ethnic minority languages, in religious worship and literature.
In November, nonuniformed Vietnamese authorities disrupted a
Khmer language class at a Khmer Krom Buddhist temple, attacking
the abbot and two Buddhist followers. Reports from independent
religious groups noted that the government restricts the importof religious literature printed in certain Hmong alphabets to theCentral Highlands.
Despite the Vatican-Vietnam agreement on appointing theresident papal representative in Vietnam in 2023, Vietnamese
Catholics expressed concern that the government will maintaincontrol over Catholic leaders, including during religious services.
The government also continued to harass Catholic priests, includingin ethnic minority areas. In April, authorities in Kon Tum Province
prevented a Catholic priest from conducting religious activities. In
August, authorities prevented two Hmong Catholic priests frompublicly holding religious services.
The government pressured the independent Cao Dai, Unified
Buddhist Church of Vietnam, and Hoa Hao Buddhists to join theirstate-controlled counterparts, preventing them from practicing
their faith freely. Authorities seized religious properties and gavethem to state-controlled religious groups. In December, authorities
in An Giang Province banned Hoa Hao Buddhists from celebrating
their founder’s birthday.
The government continued to persecute other religious movements, preventing Falun Gong practitioners from disseminating
religious materials and forcing members of the unregistered World
Mission Society Church of God and San Su Khe To to renounce theirfaith. In early 2023, authorities in Long An Province summoned twoof the five lawyers defending Peng Lei Buddhists who were sentenced in 2022 and accused them of “abusing democratic freedoms
to infringe on the interests of the state.” In June, three of the fivelawyers fled to the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

including by making registration only necessary to maintain a legal personality;

Designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);■Engage with the Vietnamese governmentand relevant academic and civil society
stakeholders to encourage amendments
to the 2018 Law on Belief and Religion
and its implementing decrees to comply
with international human rights standards,■

Assess whether Vietnam has violated theterms of the 2005 U.S.-Vietnam binding
agreement and hold Vietnam accountable
for religious freedom violations as a member of the United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHRC);
Press Vietnam to allow relevant United
Nations (UN) special procedures and staff
from the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights unfettered access to the

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Vietnam
Hearing: Vietnam: Challenges and Opportunities for Religious Freedom■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Vietnam■■

50 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

country to monitor and investigate religious freedom and other human rights
violations; and■Direct the U.S. Mission in Vietnam tohighlight and monitor the conditions ofreligious prisoners of conscience and toadvocate for their wellbeing in prison andfor their release.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Support legislative efforts to improve religious freedom in Vietnam, including theVietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 3172).

Vietnam’s constitution states that citizens “can follow any religion orfollow none” and that “all religions are equal before the law.” It also
mandates respect and protection for freedom of belief and religion.
However, government authorities continue to monitor all religious
activity closely, often harassing, detaining, or otherwise preventing
unregistered faith communities from exercising their fundamental
right to religious freedom. Of Vietnam’s population of approximately
100 million, around 86.3 percent identify as nonreligious, 6.1 percent
as Catholic, 5.8 percent as Buddhist, one percent as Protestant, and
0.8 percent as adherents of other religions. As of August, Vietnam
recognized 46 religious organizations and 16 religions.

Enforcement of the 2018 Law on Belief andReligion and Policy Development
Vietnam’s 2018 Law on Belief and Religion restricts religious freedom
and requires religious groups to register with the government inorder to function legally. Additionally, religious groups must registerand receive approval for all activities for the coming year. Throughout 2023, authorities used this law to shut down religious servicesof unregistered independent groups. Groups wishing to register
continued to experience difficulty, and many unregistered groups
complained that authorities have rejected or ignored their registration
applications without explanation.
Enforcement of the 2018 Law on Belief and Religion is plaguedby uneven and inconsistent application throughout the country. Whilereligious groups experience relatively greater freedom in urban areas,
regardless of their registration or recognition status, serious challenges are pervasive in rural areas and provinces with significant ethnic
minority communities, such as those in the Central Highlands and An
Giang Province. As of December 2023, the Vietnamese government
had not released drafts of the law’s two implementing decrees, which
would clarify how the government interprets and enforces it.
In March, Vietnam’s Government Committee for Religious
Affairs released a “white book” on religious policies—its first such
document in 16 years—to detail the state of religious communities
within Vietnam as well as governmental attitudes and current laws
on religious freedom. However, reports from independent religious
groups indicate that this document fails to reflect the government’s
persistent violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief andthat it instead demonstrates how the country’s trajectory is similar to
China in terms of its regulation and control of religion.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience remained dire in
2023, despite some high-profile releases. In April, the UN special rapporteurs on arbitrary detention requested a response from Vietnam

on Y Khiu Nie and Y Si Eban, who were detained in part due to their
participation in the Southeast Asia Freedom of Religion or Belief Conference in November 2022. In May, authorities arrested Nay Y Blang,a member of the Central Highlands Evangelical Church of Christ, forallegedly proselytizing and organizing illegal religious activities. In
July, authorities arrested Khmer Krom Buddhists Danh Minh Quang
and Thach Cuong—with whom USCIRF had met during its May visit
to Vietnam—and in August they arrested To Hoang Chuong, charging
all three for violating Article 331 of the Vietnam Criminal Code. In
August, authorities in An Giang Province arrested Nguyen Hoang
Nam, a member of the independent Hoa Hao Buddhist Church, forposts on social media, charging him with disturbing public order andundermining religious and national unity. In September, a court in
Gia Lai Province sentenced religious freedom advocate Rian Thih toeight years’ imprisonment for “undermining unity policy,” a chargeauthorities often use to suppress religious freedom activists in ethnic
minority communities. In a positive development, the government in
September released Hoa Hao Buddhist and religious freedom advocate Nguyen Bac Truyen, who was serving an 11-year sentence while
suffering from health conditions. It also released An Dan Dai Dao Buddhist Le Duc Dong, who completed his 12-year sentence in February.

Key U.S. Policy
In April 2023, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden celebrated 28 years of diplomatic relations and 10 years of comprehensive
partnership with Vietnam, noting human rights as a feature in thegrowing bilateral relationship in addition to other areas of mutual
concern, such as security cooperation and climate issues. Also in April,
U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken visited Vietnam and held apress conference to celebrate U.S.-Vietnam relations, emphasizing
human rights as a core feature in the ongoing dialogue between thetwo countries. In September, President Biden visited Vietnam andsigned a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the country. The
Biden administration released a statement underscoring the importance of bilateral cooperation to advance human rights and enhancing
commitment to meaningful human rights dialogue, including on freedom of religion or belief. In November, the United States hosted the27th U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogue in Washington, DC.
In May, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) reintroduced the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 3172), which prioritizes the protectionof human rights and the development of the rule of law in bilateralrelations between the United States and Vietnam.
On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State maintained
Vietnam on the Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom, pursuant to IRFA. In fiscal year 2023,
the U.S. government obligated approximately $174 million for programs in Vietnam.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )51

VIETNAM

BackgroundALGERIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Algeria remained poor,
with major impacts on Christians and Muslim minority communities. Authorities continued to close churches and prosecuteindividuals on religion-based charges, including blasphemy,proselytization, and unauthorized worship. The government also
continued to deny religious minority groups, specifically the Evangelical Protestant Association (EPA), authorization to worshipcollectively as stipulated under the law.
Algerian law regulates the manifestation of religion or belief
through various legal mechanisms penalizing unregistered religious
activity and expression. While the constitution grants the rightto freedom of religion or belief, the government limits the free
expression and practice of belief through the enforcement of lawsthat favor a particular interpretation of Islam and restrict other religious activities. Algeria’s penal and information codes criminalize
blasphemy and proselytization. Punishments include imprisonment
for up to five years and a fine up to $7,500 (one million dinars).
In 2023, the Algerian government brought religiously grounded
blasphemy and proselytization charges against several individuals,
including Christians, Muslims, and freethinkers. In November, anindividual in Bejaia was charged with blasphemy for social media
posts and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $370
(50,000 dinars). In February, a court sentenced two employees ofa Christian broadcast company to two months’ imprisonment for“the production, storing, or distribution of printed documents,
audio-visual materials, or using any other support or means with theintention of agitating/shaking the faith of a Muslim.” After serving
suspended prison terms, they were released with a lifelong ban frompracticing Christian activities. In May, authorities raided the homeof a Tizi Ghenif pastor, seizing his computer and subjecting him to
multiple rounds of interrogation. In November, the pastor and fourother unnamed Evangelical worshipers from the same church weresentenced and fined for “inciting Muslims to change their religion”
and “agitating the faith of Muslims,” among other unauthorized worship charges. In March, a Bejaia court dissolved the nongovernmental
Cultural Association of Aokas for “shaking the faith” in its distributionof various Christian-themed materials.
In 2023, 11 EPA churches were either forcibly closed or voluntarily shuttered their doors due to fears of government targeting,raising the total number to at least 41 since 2017. The few remaining open churches operate in a severely limited way. At least 10
Christians face ongoing court cases on religious-based charges,
including EPA Vice President Pastor Youssef Ourahmane, whosecase is illustrative of the government’s ongoing targeting of senior
EPA leaders. EPA clergy and members continue to face government
surveillance, property searches, confiscation of worship materials,
and interrogations without pretense.
Since 2016, the government has repeatedly rejected theauthorization forms of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community to register as a religious association under law. As of late 2023, over 30
members are currently serving prison sentences ranging from six
months to three years on charges such as unauthorized worship,
distribution of religious materials, proselytization, and harming
the safety and unity of the country. Five unnamed members are
currently serving multiyear prison sentences. Worshipers of the
Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light have also reportedly been
subject to online monitoring and followed by plainclothes police.
With no operational synagogue left in Algeria, ritual observance for the roughly 200 practicing members of its Jewish
community remains a challenge. Since the start of the Israel-Hamas
war, government ministers and the largely state-run media havepromoted antisemitic tropes, such as using defamatory and false
language to describe Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as “genocidal Zionist aggression.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Maintain Algeria on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Encourage Algeria to continue multilateral engagement, including with theInternational Religious Freedom or Belief
Alliance and United Nations (UN) expert
delegations, to address religious freedom concerns;■■

Condition financial and technical support
to the Algerian government on addressing violations of religious freedom,including decriminalizing blasphemy andproselytization, registering the EPA andthe Ahmadiyya community as religiousorganizations, and reopening closed
churches; andDirect U.S. Embassy officials to attend
and observe court proceedings on blasphemy charges or cases related to houses

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESSpecial Report: Anti-Conversion Laws Compendium
Special Report: Blasphemy Law Compendium■ Podcast: The State of Religious Freedom in Algeria■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Algeria■■

52

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

of worship to emphasize the U.S. government’s concerns about such cases.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Continue to raise the implementation of
blasphemy laws and closure of housesof worship with the U.S. Department ofState and relevant Algerian counterparts
to ensure religious freedom concerns areincorporated into the U.S.-Algeria bilateral relationship.

Algeria is home to nearly 45 million people, approximately 99 percentof whom are Sunni Muslim. The remaining one percent of the population includes Jews; nonbelievers; Ahmadiyya, Shi’a, and other Muslim
minorities; and Christians (including Roman Catholics, Seventh-day
Adventists, Methodists, Evangelicals, Lutherans, the Reformed
Church, and Egyptian Coptic Christians). Algeria’s constitution establishes Islam as the official state religion. With national elections set totake place in 2024, the Algerian government has continued to crack
down on civil society and repress peaceful protests.
Algeria’s criminal code censors publications by prohibiting
content “contrary to Islamic morals.” Ordinance 06-03 requires all
non-Muslim organizations to register with the Minister for Non-Muslim
Affairs to conduct activities and establish places of worship. The registration process has been opaque and poorly implemented, creating
legal uncertainty for some non-Muslim religious communities andallowing the government to repress and prosecute religious minorities. Ordinance 06-03 also criminalizes proselytization by non-Muslims,
with punishments of up to five years in prison and a maximum fine ofroughly $7,500 (one million dinars). A new information law that cameinto effect in August 2023 requires all media activities to respect “theMuslim religion, Islam in the national context” and “the moral andcultural values of the nation.”

Restrictions on Christians
Christians, particularly members and institutions affiliated with
the EPA, faced significant religious freedom restrictions in 2023.
Authorities continued to withhold Christian worship materials from
distribution at a port and rejected repeated attempts by the EPA toformally register as a religious association. Security officials continued
to forcibly close EPA churches across Tizi Ouzou, interrogate church
leaders, raid members’ homes, and seize worship materials. In November, EPA Vice President Pastor Youssef Ourahmane was sentenced
to one year in prison and fined $725 (100,000 dinars) for holding anunauthorized gathering of Christian families in an unregistered church.
In January, authorities shuttered a Methodist church in Larbaa
Nath Iraten, forcing members to worship in private. In October, a Tizi
Ouzou court sentenced the pastor of a Methodist church in Oucaif
to two months in prison. In July, an Algiers appeals court confirmeda three-year prison sentence and fine against Christian convert andactivist Slimane Bouhafs on multiple charges, including “belonging toa terrorist organization,” “receiving funds from abroad for the purposeof political propaganda,” and “conspiracy.”
Despite ongoing violations in 2023, positive developments
included the release of Christian convert Hamid Soudad and an
unnamed Ahmadiyya Muslim man as part of President Abdelmadjid
Tebboune’s general amnesty in July. Authorities also dismissed thecase against Dr. Said Djabelkhir, an Islamic scholar previously charged
with blasphemy. The government allowed the Catholic community
to air holiday programs on public radio, granted citizenship to the
Catholic Archbishop in March, and offered to help renovate the SacréCœur Cathedral in Algiers. In November, a high administrative court

removed the seals from seven Evangelical churches in Tizi Ouzou andBajaia; however, they remain inoperable, lacking permission from the
National Commission for Non-Muslim Worship.

Restrictions on Muslim Minorities
Non-Sunni Muslims continued to face significant pressures in 2023.
Some of the 230 remaining members of Algeria’s Ahmadiyya Muslim
community reportedly have been subject to government surveillanceand passport seizures. Efforts to formally register the community
remain stalled on the government’s precondition that Ahmadiyya
Muslims renounce their identity as Muslims. Legal repression against
members remains systematic and widespread, with over 50 cases
against individuals from 26 provincial courts still pending in theSupreme Court. Members have been sentenced for multiple alleged
offenses, including unauthorized worship, unlicensed fundraising,undermining national unity, and “desecrating the Qur’an.”
The estimated 50 members of the Ahmadi Religion of Peace andLight faced major obstacles. In May, authorities launched an investigation into Othmane Mouchal for “mocking Islam.” In November, police
searched for the whereabouts of Redouane Foufa, a community leader
previously imprisoned for “participation in an unauthorized group”
and “denigrating Islam.” A government fatwa remains in effect, calling
Ahmadis a “misguided group” of heretics “out of the Islamic faith”
who “should be condemned and punished according to the law.”
While the religious decree was ruled by a local court, it extends to all
Ahmadiyya Muslims throughout Algeria. It not only forbids Ahmadis
from publicly discussing a 2022 Bejaia court prosecution against members but also has imposed a severe economic strain on the community
by calling for the suspension of all Ahmadi commercial activities.
Furthermore, the religious decree has reinforced an already harshsocial stigma on Ahmadis, forcing members to conceal their religious
identity and worship in private for fear of targeting or harassment.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States is one of Algeria’s top trading partners, and professional exchanges play a valuable role in strengthening the bilateral law
enforcement and security partnership at both the senior and working
levels. In August 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met
with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf. In fiscal year 2023, theU.S. government obligated $3 million for programs in Algeria. The
U.S. Department of State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative has
supported the work of Algeria’s civil society through trainings.
Several U.S. officials visited Algeria in 2023, including Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Michelle
Sison. Topics of discussion included human rights and religious freedom concerns as well as stabilization and development assistance.
U.S. Ambassador to Algeria Elizabeth Aubin continued to elevatereligious freedom as an Embassy priority by engaging with civil society
and Algerian officials. On December 29, 2023, the State Department
maintained Algeria on its Special Watch List for severe violations ofreligious freedom.

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BackgroundEGYPT
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Egypt remained consistent with past years. The government gave selective attention toreligious diversity and tolerance, but freedom of religion or belief
throughout the country did not substantially increase.
Government-enacted or -tolerated restrictions on membersof religious minority groups, theological dissenters, nonbelievers,
and their advocates remained entrenched. The government maintained severe legal restrictions on freedom of religion or belief,such as longstanding bans on Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha’isand enforcement of the criminal blasphemy statute through detention or imprisonment. In July, an emergency state security court
sentenced Coptic advocate Patrick Zaki to three years in prison,
prompting USCIRF and congressional members to call for his release
and resulting in a subsequent presidential pardon. In September,the Ministry of Education announced a new ban on Muslim female
pupils wearing the niqab, or religious face veil, in classrooms during
the 2023–2024 academic year.
In May and June, a Cabinet-appointed committee approved
two larger-than-average batches of church legalization permits
pursuant to the 2016 Church Construction Law. While the law has
created a legal pathway for Christian worship sites to achieve status
as churches, it has reinforced an inherently discriminatory system,with separate requirements for Christians and no application eligibility at all for other religious minorities, such as Baha’is and Shi’aMuslims. Further, some local communities continued to respondwith violence to Christian congregations’ submission of applications
to repair or build churches. For example, in September, villagers
looted and set fire to a residential construction site for Copts in
Abu-Qurqas, Minya, and in December, rioters in Samalout, Minya,
violently attacked Copts attempting to construct a church undera new legal permit.

While larger-scale violent attacks on religious minorities,
especially Copts, did not return to previously high levels, individual
incidences of anti-Coptic violence—such as physical attacks on
Copts in the workplace—persisted. Against the backdrop of Egypt’s
intensifying economic crisis, community liaisons in rural Upper Egypt
described an increase in exploitation of women based on their religion, such as lenders pressuring resource-limited Christian widows
to convert to Islam in exchange for debt forgiveness. In January2023, vandals defaced mosaics of the baby Jesus, Virgin Mary, andSaint Joseph at the Convent of the Holy Virgin in Assiut, following
the governorate’s recent restoration of the site to promote tourism.
Although the dwindling Jewish community reported adequate
protection by state security forces earlier in the year, the conflict
triggered by Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack on Israel contributed to a rise in anti-Jewish sentiment in Egypt. In October, street
protesters in Cairo reportedly chanted a slogan evoking a historical massacre of Jews. In December, Cairo’s Jewish community
canceled public Hanukkah celebrations, citing security concerns.
Amid these and other conditions limiting religious freedom,
the government of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi also maintained
initiatives to increase public awareness of some types of religious
diversity. For example, the Ministry of Education removed somematerial teaching intolerance toward Christians and Jews fromthe textbooks of additional grade levels and added references
to interreligious cooperation. However, upper grade textbooks
awaiting revision still contained religiously prejudicial content,
and the courses of all grades remained religionized in favor of thegovernment’s interpretation of Sunni Islam. On a positive note,
beginning in August, government officials inaugurated three completed restoration projects for Coptic Orthodox Christian statuary
and historic Jewish houses of worship.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Egypt on the Special Watch List forengaging in or tolerating severe violationsof religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); and■Raise religious freedom, including thecases of religious prisoners of conscience,in U.S.-Egypt bilateral engagement byencouraging Egypt to:

■

■

■

Formally recognize Baha’is, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and non-Sunni Muslims;
Propose universal “houses of worship”
legislation with regulations for the

Align local authorities with national-level
policy to phase out the use of customaryreconciliation councils to resolve incidents
of violence against religious minorities;
Repeal Article 98(f) of the Criminal
Code, which punishes “ridiculing or
insulting a heavenly religion or a sectfollowing it,” and until that is accomplished, limit the conditions under which

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Staff Visit: Cairo and Alexandria in May 2023
Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Egypt■ Issue Brief: Personal Status and Family Law in the Middle East and North Africa■ Special Report: Anti-Conversion Laws Compendium■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Egypt■■

54

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

the law is applied and allow charged
individuals to post bail; andconstruction, repair, and registrationof houses of worship consistent for
all religions;■

Implement independent oversight andappeals mechanisms for travel bans andfrozen assets of released prisoners ofconscience.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S.
assistance to Egypt and continue to set conditions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
requiring specified improvements in religious freedom among other human rights.

Under Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution, Islam is the state religion, withthe “principles of Shari’a” constituting the primary source of legislation. Although Article 64 purportedly provides for “absolute” freedomof belief, followers of only the three “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) have a formal legal basis to publicly practicereligion and build places of worship. Since the 1960s, the government
has continued to deny legal recognition to Jehovah’s Witnesses andBaha’is, subjecting them and other unrecognized religious minorities
to a bureaucratic limbo affecting numerous aspects of daily life, suchas marriage licenses and cemetery allotments.
Egypt’s population is approximately 109.5 million, an estimated90 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims. Shi’a, Qur’anist, and othernon-Sunni Muslims comprise less than one percent. Egypt’s Christians
account for at least 10 percent of the population, constituting thelargest Christian minority in the Middle East and North Africa. The
majority of Christians are Copts (indigenous Egyptian Christians),
with over 90 percent belonging to the traditional Coptic Orthodox
Church; a minority subscribe to Coptic Evangelical Protestantism,
Coptic Catholicism, and some smaller denominations. Baha’is may
number between 1,000 and 2,000 and Jehovah’s Witnesses up to
1,500. Local and international Jewish organizations reported that the
Jewish population—which in the 1940s numbered over 80,000—haddeclined to fewer than 10 people.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and the Judiciary
Authorities’ enforcement of several laws—including cybercrime andcounterterrorism laws, a criminal blasphemy statute, and a law against“spreading false news”—continue to pose severe and systematicthreats to religious freedom. The courts and state security continued
to hold in prolonged detention without trial individuals accused ofbreaching provision 98(f) of the criminal code, which outlaws “insulting the heavenly religions,” or blasphemy. In 2023, courts invokedlaw 98(f), sometimes in combination with other charges, to renew thedetention of Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Khalifa for blasphemy anddesecration of religious symbols and Nour Fayez Ibrahim Gerges, who
had created a Facebook platform for potential converts to Christianity. State security forces also continued the two-year-long detention
without trial of Abdulbaqi Saeed Abdo. The Yemeni asylum seeker’s
publicizing of his conversion to Christianity puts him at risk not only in
his country of origin—to which Egyptian authorities may deport him—
but also in Egyptian prison, where he is forced to hide his religion fromfellow inmates for fear of attacks. In July, an emergency state security
court sentenced Patrick Zaki, a human rights researcher, to three years
in prison for publishing an editorial on discrimination he and other
Copts had faced. USCIRF expressed concern over the sentencing
at a public hearing before the U.S. Congress, and the following day,President El-Sisi pardoned Zaki, leading to his immediate release.

Minority rights lawyers reported an alarming lack of transparency
and consistency in the judicial system, with Egyptian courts making
several rulings that negatively affected religious minority communities.
In January, the Court of Cassation rejected two appeals brought by
Souad Thabet, a Coptic woman in her 70s contesting the acquittal ofthree Muslim male defendants who in 2016 allegedly stripped, beat,and dragged her through the street in reprisal for her son’s purported
relationship with a Muslim woman. The outcome may have resulted
in part from other Coptic victims of the same series of hate crimes
succumbing to tacit pressure to participate in an extrajudicial “reconciliation council,” which led to them retracting their testimonies against thealleged perpetrators in those cases. Such reconciliation councils remain
in use in rural areas, sometimes with the tolerance or active support oflocal authorities and often putting victims from minority backgrounds
at further disadvantage. Although the formal judicial process has presented its own obstacles to justice for the victims of anti-Coptic terrorist
attacks and potential hate crimes, in 2023 some courts—including theSupreme State Security Court and the Court of Cassation, the highest
tribunal in the country—departed from customary leniency toward
religious-majority defendants, instead convicting and issuing severe
sentences, including the death penalty, to Muslim assailants.
Throughout the year, the government deliberated potentialchanges to laws affecting marriage, divorce, inheritance, and othercritical personal status matters that vary for each of the major religious communities in Egypt. The Judicial Committee of the Houseof Representatives reviewed drafts and new proposed amendments
submitted by a variety of interlocutors, including Muslim and Christian religious institutions. Adoption laws attracted further scrutiny inthe ongoing case of the child “Shenouda” after a court returned him
to his Christian foster parents, who may remain ineligible for formal
adoption according to Egypt’s prevailing interpretations of Shari’a.

Key U.S. Policy
International attention on the strategic partnership between the
United States and Egypt increased following Hamas’s October 7 attack
on Israel and Israel’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
met several times with President El-Sisi and other officials on U.S.-Egyptian interests to alleviate conflict-related humanitarian crises and secure
peace in the region. Some organizations criticized the international
community’s potential post-October 7 strengthening of ties with
Egypt, pointing to the country’s unresolved human rights violations.
The U.S. Congress debated the $1.3 billion annual FMF, whichconstituted the majority of the assistance package to Egypt, anddiscussed potential additional conditions on future aid to address
Egypt’s human rights issues. Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) pledged in September towithhold the maximum amount of FMF over Egypt’s failure to meet
Congress’s human rights-related conditions.

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EGYPT

BackgroundINDONESIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, Indonesia’s religious freedom conditions remained poor.
The country maintains several regulations that either constitute blasphemy laws or effectively function as such: Presidential
Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965, Criminal Code Article 156(a), and Law
No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (known as
the ITE law) Articles 27(3) and 28(2). Blasphemy, hate speech, andother religious freedom violations were further codified in Indonesia’s new criminal code (known as RUU KUHP) Chapter VII, which
was signed into law on January 2, 2023, by President Joko Widodo(Jokowi) to be implemented in 2026. In February 2024, after thereporting period, Indonesia held presidential elections. Observers
noted the three leading candidates have troubling human rights
records. Additionally, President Jokowi maneuvered to have hisson placed as the vice presidential candidate alongside Prabowo
Subianto—the presumptive winner as of February 2024—likely as
an attempt to ensure the continuation of his policies and his rolein politics.
Throughout the year, the 2006 Joint Decree on Houses ofWorship continued to enable ongoing and systematic violations ofreligious freedom against minority religious communities. Unrecognized houses of worship are more vulnerable to closure by theauthorities. In February 2023, authorities in Bogor, West Java,
disbanded the worship service of a Pentecostal church, stating it
did not have a permit to hold services. The law also enables local
actors and authorities to block or slow the construction of newhouses of worship. Houses of worship in rural locations continued to be particularly vulnerable to social hostility and attacks. In
August, around 30 people in Riau Islands Province blocked a churchcommunity from gathering and then severely damaged anotherchurch under construction. In Padang, West Sumatra Province, amachete-wielding man threatened a gathering at a house church.
In a positive development, in April, authorities in Bogor permitted a

Christian church to open after a 15-year dispute. In June, authorities
in Pinang, Riau Islands Province, finally permitted the local Catholiccommunity to open a new church after a 33-year struggle, despite
Catholicism’s status as an official religion.
The government promotes Pancasila, an ideology that comprises five principles, one of which— monotheism—pertains toreligion. Its promotion of this ideology extends only to officiallyrecognized religions and does not include indigenous religious
communities or nontheists. As a result, members of unrecognized
religions face legal hurdles in acquiring government jobs andhaving their marriages officially recognized. Throughout 2023,
members of indigenous faith communities continued to push forgovernment recognition of their religions and for the ability to label
their religious identity on official identification cards. In a positive
development after the reporting period, the government added aseventh category of recognized religions to the cards, kepercayaan(belief), for smaller religious groups that are not part of the othersix recognized religions.
In 2023, 73 hijab mandates remained in effect throughout thecountry, particularly in the educational system. In some cases, theauthorities prevented students who do not comply from attending class and did not address incidences of bullying by teachersand other students. In August 2023, the National Commission on
Violence against Women held a hearing to gather information on
the country’s mandatory hijab regulations. At the hearing, two
Christian men with daughters noted that non-Muslim female students were not exempt from the regulations, and others testified
that Muslim students with a different interpretation of Islam arealso forced to comply.
In 2023, Indonesia held the chairmanship of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and made some efforts in
expanding the conversation on religious freedom.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Indonesia on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Work with the Indonesian government torepeal or amend existing laws to comply
with international human rights standards
specific to freedom of religion or belief,

including Chapter VII of the Criminal Code(RUU KUHP), blasphemy laws, and Indonesia’s ITE law—for example, eliminating
the requirement set forth in the 2006 Joint
Decree on Houses of Worship mandatingthat faith groups obtain signatures frommembers of other religious communities toreceive approval for constructing a houseof worship; andKEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESEvent: Rising Authoritarianism in ASEAN Member StatesSpecial Report: The Bureaucratization of Religion in Southeast Asia
■ Country Update: Legal Impediments to Religious Freedom in Indonesia■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Indonesia

■
■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024■

Incorporate training on international religious freedom standards into the bilateral
partnership.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over religious freedom
violations, including to advocate for the
release of religious prisoners of consciencein Indonesia.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country.
Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of the country’s 267 million citizens,with around 99 percent identifying as Sunni, less than one percent
identifying as Shi’a, and 0.2 percent identifying as Ahmadiyya
Muslim. Protestant Christians comprise seven percent of the population, Roman Catholics 2.9 percent, and Hindus 1.7 percent, and
0.9 percent identify with other minority religions such as Buddhism
and Confucianism.
Indonesia has a long tradition of religious pluralism, and thegovernment promotes tolerance and religious freedom through religious literacy and education. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees
the independence of each resident to embrace religion and worshipaccording to their respective religions and beliefs.” During 2023, theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
partnered with an Indonesian organization to train religious leadersfor promoting peacebuilding narratives. Religious literacy is also a key
component of Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy to rehabilitate
and reintegrate former terrorists. The threat of violent extremism
from designated terrorist organizations like Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
persists, particularly for Christians perceived to be proselytizing.
Throughout 2023, Indonesia continued to experience decentralization and greater autocratization that contributed to a generaldecline in human rights, including religious freedom. Meanwhile, thecountry experienced accelerated economic growth and expanded its
engagement on human rights in the UN. In 2023, Indonesia held theASEAN chairmanship and made some efforts in expanding the conversation on religious freedom. However, under Indonesia’s leadership,
ASEAN continues to be ineffective in providing an effective regional
approach to the situation in Burma and in coordinating humanitarianefforts to aid the predominantly Muslim Rohingya fleeing violence
and religious persecution there. Moreover, Indonesia repeatedly
prevented Rohingya refugees from landing in Aceh Province.

Blasphemy and the New Criminal CodeIn 2023, the government investigated and, in some cases, prosecuted blasphemy allegations made by individuals and organizations.
In March, social media influencer Lina Lutfiawati posted a video of
herself saying an Islamic prayer before eating a meal that included
pork. The Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI) lodged blasphemy charges
against her. In September, Lutfiawati was sentenced to a two-year
imprisonment and fined approximately $16,000 (250 million rupiah).
In West Java, authorities charged the head of an Islamic school, Panji
Gumilang, with blasphemy for his religious teachings after he hadtaught students that men and women should be allowed to prayalongside each other and that women should be allowed to become
preachers. In November, the Indramayu District Court held its firstsession on Gumilang’s trial.
Indonesia’s new criminal code could expand human rights violations when implemented in 2026. Chapter VII consists of six articles
on “Crimes against Religion, Belief, and Religious/Belief Life.” Article
300 criminalizes any person who publicly “commits an act of hostility,
makes a statement of hate or hostility, or incites hostility, violence, or

discrimination against a religion, belief, classes of people or groups
on the basis of religion or belief.” When implemented, this article
could further criminalize blasphemy. Article 301 effectively expands
and further codifies the ITE Law Article 28(2) to permit blasphemy
allegations made on the basis of a person’s social media and online
presence. Article 302 criminalizes incitement toward apostasy. Articles
303–305 criminalize disturbances or attacks on religious services,
houses of worship, and hate speech directed at religious leaders.

Expansion of Provincial Laws Impacting
Religious Freedom
The central government currently exempts Aceh Province from certain
national laws and permits its own implementation of a Shari’a-based
legal system enforced through a religious police force. Laws include
mandating that women wear hijabs and banning them from straddlingmotorcycles, among other restrictions, regardless of an individual’sfaith or personal choice. In August, Aceh further implemented laws
based on its state-sponsored interpretation of Islam by banning men
and women from appearing together in public unless they are family
members or married.
Government officials and politicians throughout Indonesia
increasingly engaged in rhetoric and passed local laws and regulations citing Islamic values that target or ostracize religious, gender,and sexual minorities. In January, the mayor of Medan, North Sumatra,
declared the city “LGBT-free” [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender] inan effort to appeal to certain religious actors. In West Java, politicians
inspired by the MUI and other similar religious organizations promulgated municipal- and regency-level laws that used language around“morality” and religion to exclude minorities from the public space.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and Indonesia maintain strong bilateral ties throughtheir Strategic Partnership. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government
obligated $210 million for programs in Indonesia.
In February 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
expressed the administration’s concerns over Indonesia’s criminal
code. In September, Vice President Kamala Harris joined leadersof ASEAN for the annual U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. Someobservers noted that the absence of President Joseph R. Biden
may have been interpreted negatively by ASEAN leaders, especiallyIndonesia as the chair. In April, Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) led abicameral congressional delegation to Indonesia to discuss bilateralrelations and multilateral engagement with ASEAN, including on
human rights.
In October, the United Sates and Indonesia held their first Senior
Officials’ Foreign Policy and Defense Dialogue between diplomaticand military counterparts, which included reaffirming their commitment to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. In
November, President Biden hosted President Jokowi at the WhiteHouse to discuss shared values of democracy and pluralism but did
not publicly mention religious freedom. Also in November, President
Biden nominated Kamala Lakhdhir as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.

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BackgroundIRAQ
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Iraq remained precarious for religious minorities. Both the Iraqi Federal Government(IFG) and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government(KRG) made some overtures toward the country’s diverse religious
communities. However, Iraqis of many faith backgrounds, especiallyreligious minorities, faced ongoing political marginalization by thegovernment as well as abuse by both government-affiliated andnonstate actors. The IFG and KRG’s continued failure to resolve
longstanding jurisdictional disputes over certain northern territories created a power vacuum filled by armed groups, including the
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), defensive Yazidi fighters andYazidis groomed into PMF service, and remnants of the IslamicState of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The IFG’s lack of ability or will to curb the increasing powerof PMF units remained among the most significant threats to religious freedom. In 2023, several of these largely Shi’a Muslim andsometimes Iran-backed militias expanded their influence among top
officials in Baghdad and within communities throughout the country.
Early in the year, Kataib Babiliyoun, a nominally Christian PMF brigade supported by the Shi’a majority of southern Iraq, accelerated
its campaign to control Christian properties in the Nineveh Plains
region of the north. In March, members of the indigenous Chaldean,
Assyrian, and Syriac churches staged protests in Al-Hamdaniya toresist this takeover. PMF brigades around the country also asserted
their power via harassment, physical abuse, detention, extortion,and checkpoint interrogation of religious minorities.
Although Iraq’s parliament took some initiatives to advancehuman rights, such as introducing a draft law against enforced disappearance, it also considered laws that might curtail freedom of
religion or belief. The draft Freedom of Expression and Cybercrimes

bills contained vague language that prosecutors could use against
atheists, Shi’a Muslim theological dissenters, Sunni Muslims, otherreligious minorities, women, and sexual and gender minorities fordefaming religious sects or leaders or expressing opinions deemed
contrary to “public morals” or “public order.”Like their IFG counterparts, leaders in the Kurdistan Regionof Iraq (KRI) took some steps in support of religious minorities. For
example, in June, the U.S. Consulate in Erbil praised the KRI government’s efforts to find and rescue the estimated 2,700 Iraqi Yazidi
girls and women kidnapped by ISIS who are still missing. However,
Christian residents of the KRI decried authorities’ refusal to settle
claims for confiscated properties, threats to prosecute a blasphemy
complaint against a clergy member in Duhok, and tolerance or
use of militia checkpoints to harass and restrict the movements ofChristians near Alqosh.
At year’s end, the IFG’s implementation of the Yazidi Survivors
Law was still inadequate, and the 2020 United Nations (UN)brokered agreement between the IFG and KRG to stabilize Yazidis’
homelands in Sinjar remained essentially unfulfilled. Some Yazidi
survivors of ISIS’s 2014 genocide raised their children in displacement camps for fear of returning to an area ruled by competing
militias, subject to Turkey’s periodic military strikes, and lacking
crucial infrastructure and employment prospects. In April 2023, asocial media campaign spread hate speech against Yazidis, seeking to incite violence against them. The IFG’s 2023 budget law
established a reconstruction fund of $38 million for Sinjar and the
Nineveh Plains but faced criticism for failing to apportion adequate
amounts. Religious minorities continued to cite the perilous security situation as a key reason for their internal displacement andreluctant emigration.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Include Iraq on the Special Watch List forengaging in or tolerating severe violationsof religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on PMF and othermilitia units or leaders responsible for severe
violations of religious freedom by freezing
those individuals’ assets and/or barring theirentry into the United States under humanrights-related financial and visa authorities,
citing specific religious freedom violations;
Assist Iraq with building institutional
capacit y to safeguard vulnerable

religious minority communities by creating or improving independent oversightmechanisms for PMF and other militias
and by integrating religiously affiliatedmilitias; and■Use diplomatic channels to encourage the
IFG and KRG to help kidnapped and displaced Yazidi genocide survivors return andreintegrate into Iraqi society; to resolve
conflicts over disputed areas per Article
140 of the Iraqi constitution while including all religious and ethnic minorities; tocomprehensively implement the Sinjar

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Iraq
Hearing: Religious Minorities and Governance in Iraq
■ Press Statement: USCIRF Commemorates the Ninth Anniversary of the Yazidi Genocide■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Iraq

■

■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

Agreement with full inclusion of the Yazidi
community; and to conduct a nationaland regional dialogue on potential constitutional and statutory reforms to more
effectively protect religious freedom andensure religious communities’ politicalrepresentation.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise religious freedom concerns in Iraq
through hearings, letters, and delegations
and by linking development funding to
Iraqi officials delivering on their promises
to religious minority communities.

IRAQ

Background
Article 2 of the federal constitution establishes Islam as the official
religion and affirms “the full religious rights to freedom of belief andreligious practice.” However, personal status laws restrict conversion from Islam, prohibit Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim
men, and reclassify Christian minors as Muslim if a parent converts
to Islam. A 1970s-era ban on the Baha’i religion remained in place, as
did statutes criminalizing blasphemy. Some Evangelical Christians inboth IFG areas and the KRI reported each government’s intoleranceof perceived proselytizing activities and refusal to officially recognize
their denominations.
Out of an estimated population of 41 million, 95–98 percent of
Iraqis are Muslim, with Shi’as constituting 61–64 percent and Sunnis
29–34 percent. Christians of all denominations, including Chaldean
and other Catholics, the Assyrian Church of the East, Syriac Orthodox,
and Evangelical Protestants, together comprise about one percent of
the population. The Jewish community of Iraq is virtually nonexistentfollowing decades of government discrimination and expulsion.
The KRI and other territories in the north are home to several
indigenous religious and ethnic groups, including Christians, Yazidis,
Kaka’is, Sabaean Mandeans, Turkmen, and Shabaks. Minority communities include internally displaced persons (IDPs) from elsewhere in theregion or greater Iraq. Some religious minorities voiced apprehension
over the IFG’s closure of IDP camps and aim of reintegrating not only
IDPs from vulnerable religious groups but also IDPs with family connections to ISIS fighters who committed atrocities against minorities.

Political Representation of Religious Communities
Entrenched sectarianism jeopardized relations among ethnoreligious
political groups, including Iran-linked Shi’a Muslim parties and theirShi’a rivals, Sunni Muslim politicians of both Arab and Kurdish background, and religious minority groups with few allotted parliamentary
quota seats. In November 2023, the Federal Supreme Court ruled
to end the parliamentary speakership of Mohammed Al-Halbousi,
the highest Sunni Muslim Arab officeholder in Iraq. The decision
prompted Sunni concerns of renewed political marginalization. In
March 2023, Christian politicians objected to the reactivation of a2016 ban on the sale, import, or production of alcohol, restricting
the livelihoods and religious practice of primarily Christian and Yazidi
communities. A civil society coalition announced efforts to secure parliamentary support for a proposed Law to Protect Religious Freedom
and Prevent Discrimination.
Iraq’s Provincial Council political quota system reserves 10 totalseats for Christian, Sabean-Mandaean, Faili Kurd, Yazidi, and Shabak
blocs or “components.” In December 2023, each group participatedin long-awaited provincial elections. Christian community members
expressed alarm that Rayan al-Kildani—a U.S.-designated human rights
abuser for his brigade’s past “persecution of religious minorities”—ledthe political arm of Kataib Babiliyoun to a “clean sweep” of the four
Christian quota seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Basra. The

wins reflected that people of any religious background may vote forcandidates filling religious quota seats. By exploiting these loopholes
in Iraq’s election laws, al-Kildani’s party coopted the four seats intended
to remedy the inadequate representation of Iraq’s Christian community.
In February 2024, after the reporting period, the Supreme Court of the
IFG issued a ruling that would eliminate religious minority quota seatsin the Kurdish parliamentary system.
In July 2023, the IFG revoked the administrative authority of thepatriarch of the Chaldean Catholic Church, Cardinal Louis Raphaël
Sako, stripping him of his custodianship of Christian endowments. In
November, the Supreme Court dismissed Cardinal Sako’s complaint
over President Abdul Latif Rashid’s revocation. Reports indicate President Rashid made his decision under advice from al-Kildani. Christianadvocates characterized as a double blow Cardinal Sako’s loss of
power and deficiencies in the government’s response to a fatal wedding reception fire in Al-Hamdaniya in September. Some Christian
residents, survivors of ISIS who had attempted to rebuild communities
in the Nineveh Plains, cited the two incidents as examples of Christians’ lack of political agency and motivating factors in their intention
to permanently emigrate from Iraq.

Key U.S. Policy
The Joseph R. Biden administration maintained its strategic relationship with Iraq, highlighting security and economic development aspriorities. In August 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense and the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense led the inaugural U.S.-Iraq Joint Security
Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, DC, where they “reaffirm[ed]their commitment to security cooperation and shared interest in
regional stability.” Top U.S. and Iraqi officials met several times in
2023, including during U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s visit
to Iraq in November.
Throughout the year, the United States announced sanctions
against nonstate and state-affiliated actors in Iraq who committed
human rights abuses, including religious freedom violations. In June,
the U.S. Department of State designated several ISIS leaders involvedin funding and operations in Iraq and who had perpetrated sexual
violence against Yazidi women and girls as Specially DesignatedGlobal Terrorists.
In the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 attacks, Iraqi nonstate
actors with support from Iran conducted drone strikes and otherattacks on U.S. targets in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries. In
November, the U.S. Departments of State and the Treasury concurrently designated PMF brigade Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) andindividuals affiliated with the Iran-aligned Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) as
Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
In fiscal year 2023, the United States obligated $360 million forprograms in Iraq. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded programs throughout the year, such as aseries of 45 videos preserving Yazidi heritage and the inaugurationof a memorial commemorating the Yazidi genocide.

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KAZAKHSTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan did not
improve as the government continued to enforce a religion law
that restricted the activities of all religious groups and penalized
individuals from groups considered “nontraditional.”
In May, a USCIRF delegation visited Kazakhstan to assess thereligious freedom situation and meet with government officials,
religious communities, human rights defenders, and other membersof civil society. The visit confirmed that the Kazakh government continued to violate Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as Kazakhs tried to exercise their faith. For example, authorities continued to penalize unauthorized but peaceful religious
activities—such as leading prayers, maintaining prayer rooms,
and distributing religious materials—through prison sentences,fines, and the imposition of exit bans. As in years past, Muslims
faced restrictions on practices such as studying religion abroador wearing religious clothing in schools. Government surveillance
and intimidation of all religious groups created fear of arbitrary
punishment for religious activity and led some unregistered groups
not to seek official registration, as mandated by law, for concern offurther unwanted government attention. In addition, members ofthe media reported they felt pressured to self-censor their journalism related to religious freedom issues.
At least seven religious prisoners of conscience, all of whom
are Muslim, remained imprisoned in Kazakhstan under unjust sentences for their peaceful, online religious activity. In 2023, three
men imprisoned for their participation in a WhatsApp group on
Islam, Nazim Abdrakhmanov, Bolatbek Nurgaliyev, and Samat
Adilov, were released. However, this development came almost
two years after the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention called for their release in September 2021. Two men fromthat group remained in prison at the end of 2023.
In May 2023, a district conscription office forcibly recruited
Jehovah’s Witness Daniil Smal despite his conscientious objection

on religious grounds. In August, Smal filed an administrative claim
to the Military Court of the Almaty Garrison. After Smal spentmonths in detention, the court ruled that his conscription was illegal
and released him.
The government also penalized religious activities in retaliation for public activism. As reported in May 2023, authorities
interfered in the construction of a mosque after one of the key
planners of the construction, Zhandos Saduakasov, advocated forfree and fair elections.
Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Kazakh
activists who oppose the genocide of Uyghurs and other ethnic
Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, China. In December 2023, Kazakh policeprevented those protesting the detainment of their relatives in
Xinjiang from approaching the Chinese consulate in Almaty. Ethnic
Kazakhs who fled oppression in China faced intimidation campaigns by alleged Chinese Communist Party (CCP) security forcesin Kazakhstan, which at times included physical assault. Many ofthese individuals still live in legal limbo with refugee status, as the
Kazakh government refused requests for citizenship or travel to athird country. Moreover, the government enforced an informal rulethat prohibited Uyghur imams and others from leading prayers or
giving sermons in Uyghur and languages other than Kazakh.
In response to an October 2023 parliamentary inquiry “onthe issue of religion,” then Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov raised
potential reforms to the set of legislation regulating religion. Suchreforms included restrictions on religious head coverings in public,
further regulation of the distribution of religious materials, and theintroduction of additional legal concepts that could have broad,negative repercussions, such as “destructive religious movements”
and “religious radicals.” By early 2024, these provisions, among
other restrictive measures, were included in fully formulated draft
amendments to the religion law that were to be considered inparliament.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

including repealing or amending registration requirements, ending all expert
mandatory review of religious materials,
and removing or reducing administrativefines for religious activities; andInclude Kazakhstan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Engage with the government of Kazakhstan to further revise the 2011 religion
law, as amended in 2021, and otherrelevant legislation to comply withinternational human rights standards,■

Call for Kazakhstan to release all those
imprisoned due to their religious activities
or beliefs immediately, permit all incarcerated individuals to practice their religion,and investigate and cease all torture.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCommission Delegation Visit: Astana and Almaty in May 2023
Issue Update: Prosecuting Online Religious Activity in Kazakhstan■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Kazakhstan

■

■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

The U.S. Congress should:■

Condition granting Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status to Kazakhstan related
to any decision to repeal Section 402 of
the Trade Act of 1974 (also known as theJackson-Vanik amendment) on meaningful improvement to freedom of religion
or belief, including removing exit bans on
individuals penalized for their peaceful religious activities.

According to a 2021 census, more than 69 percent of Kazakhs adhere
to Islam, with most identifying as Hanafi Sunni Muslims. Smaller Muslim groups in Kazakhstan include Shi’a, Sufi, and Ahmadiyya Muslims.
Seventeen percent of the population identify as Christian, most ofwhom are Russian Orthodox but who also include Catholics, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Other religious groups in Kazakhstan
include Jews, Baha’is, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Buddhists, and Scientologists. There is also a small percentage
of individuals who prefer not to share their religious affiliation or who
identify as atheist.
While the constitution characterizes Kazakhstan as a secularstate, it also recognizes certain religions—such as Hanafi Sunni Islamand Russian Orthodox Christianity—as traditional to Kazakhstan. The
government considers other religious groups and those who subscribe
to a different interpretation of “traditional” religions, particularly
Islam, to be nontraditional. Authorities are more likely to target members of these groups related to their religious activity.

enforce at most schools, both public and private. Prior to the first dayof school, many parents expressed concern about whether schools
would permit their daughters to wear a hijab to class. There werereports that school directors were initially pressured to enforce thehijab ban under threat of termination. As a result, some students
were reportedly expelled from school, and Ministry of Education
officials threatened to punish parents who allowed their children toattend school with a hijab. Government officials from the Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Culture and Information have maintainedthat schools should prohibit religious clothing on their premises.
At the same time, the government has generally downplayed thescope of the issue, despite reports from human rights activists thatover 13,000 girls in Kazakhstan would like to wear a hijab to school.
The debate has led some government officials and politicians tocall for the government to strengthen the religion law to better
address the threat of rising “extremism,” a phenomenon they partly
correlate with the increasing number of young people wearing
religious clothing.

Administrative Fines

Key U.S. Policy

In 2023, authorities increasingly fined people for their peacefulreligious activities. During the year, there were over 160 cases ofadministrative fines for such activities, compared to about 140 casesin 2022.
According to the 2011 religion law, only registered religious
associations may request to hold religious activities outside of
their registered place of worship. Individuals and groups that haveattempted to engage in unregistered religious activities, like maintaining an unregistered prayer room, have faced fines. For example,
in February, the Kordai District Court fined the owner of a café 50monthly financial indicators (MFIs)—equivalent to an average monthly
wage of $380 (172,500 tenge)—for operating an unauthorized prayer
room. In a case in March, the Shymkent City Court fined the owner ofan unregistered prayer hall 50 MFIs. During the Islamic holy month of
Ramadan, the Shymkent City Court fined another individual 50 MFIs
for leading Tarawih prayers at a deregistered mosque.
Individuals were also penalized for attempting to import and distribute religious literature without state authorization. At the Shymkent
airport in February, officials fined an individual for attempting to travelwith 24 religious books. At the Turkestan airport in March, officials fineda traveler for attempting to import 77 religious books. Also, in the cityof Shymkent, officials fined a woman in October for selling religious
literature in a gift shop. In July, officials fined a Jehovah’s Witness for
distributing religious materials at a café in eastern Kazakhstan.

U.S. and Kazakh officials continued to prioritize security, trade, andgood governance in bilateral relations. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S.
government obligated $20 million for programs in Kazakhstan. In February, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken visited Astana to meetwith senior Kazakh officials and to participate in the C5+1 Ministerial
with officials from each Central Asian state to strengthen bilateralrelationships and reaffirm U.S. security support to the region. In September, President Joseph R. Biden met with President Kassym-Jomart
Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders under the auspices of theC5+1 Presidential Summit to discuss security and economic matters.
Following the summit, all participants signed the C5+1 Joint Leaders’Statement, which included, among other things, an affirmation of theircommitment to human rights. In November, U.S. Assistant Secretary ofState for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled to Astana
for the fifth annual U.S.-Kazakhstan Enhanced Strategic Partnership
Dialogue (ESPD). During the ESPD, U.S. officials reaffirmed support for
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and discussed shared priorities that included
human rights and U.S. support for the implementation of President
Tokayev’s reform plans.
In May, Representative Jimmy Panetta (D-CA) introduced H.R.
3611, which would authorize permanent NTR status with Kazakhstan
through the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade
Act. The Jackson-Vanik amendment restricted free trade between
the United States and the Soviet Union (and afterward its successor
states) due to the latter’s restriction on the free emigration of Jews.
The president has repeatedly certified Kazakhstan as compliant with
the Trade Act’s freedom of emigration requirements and granted conditional NTR status on a biannual basis after submitting the required
reports to Congress.

Restrictions on Religious Clothing
A 2014 Ministry of Education decree bars students from wearing
religious clothing to school, an order that the state has continued to

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BackgroundKYRGYZSTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Kyrgyzstan worsened as
authorities increasingly enforced long-existing restrictive legislation regulating religion. Authorities rigorously penalized religious
practices, including online religious expression, collective religious
worship and studies, and, relatedly, the possession of unauthorized
religious materials.
Authorities have particularly targeted Muslims who practice aform of Islam that deviates from the state’s preferred interpretation.
The government often penalized such individuals for their peacefulreligious activities and labeled them and their beliefs as “extremist,” foreign, or nontraditional. During the year, the government
maintained a list of “extremist” groups, which included peacefulreligious organizations, and detained alleged members under theguise of combating “extremism,” a concept vaguely defined in Kyrgyz law. Authorities also conducted a mass inspection of religious
institutions and ultimately fined, suspended the activities of, andclosed hundreds of mosques and madrasas across the country. In
one case, three men who criticized these government actions wereplaced in pretrial detention on charges of “inciting religious enmity,”
accused of belonging to the banned religious group Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Throughout the year, government officials also targeted
and penalized non-Muslims, including Catholics, Protestants,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and devotees of the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), for their religious activity.
Authorities fined individuals for participation in prayer services,closed churches, prevented the import of religious materials, anddenied certain religious groups registration or intimidated othersfrom even attempting to apply. Sources continued to report thatmembers of certain religious groups were reluctant to report religiously based hate crimes for fear of government retaliation or
non-response.
In July, a court sentenced Aytbek Tynaliyev, a Protestant
Christian, to six months in prison for “inciting religious enmity”
through his online activity. In social media posts, Tynaliyev shared

his religious beliefs and criticized official religious policies, which,according to authorities, insulted Islam. Tynaliyev was releasedin September after completing his sentence. Authorities had
previously targeted Tynaliyev for his online activities criticizing
the government’s religious policies. In another case, authorities
detained Arstanbek Abdyldaev for “inciting religious enmity” inDecember. According to officials from the State Committee for
National Security (SCNS), Abdyldaev owned books and brochures
and authored social media pages that contained calls for religious
hatred. In such materials, Abdyldaev called himself a “new God”
and a “savior” and criticized other religions. On January 5, 2024,
Abdyldaev reportedly killed himself while in detainment, although
the circumstances around his death remain unconfirmed.
In November, a member of parliament proposed a draft law to
ban face coverings and long beards under penalty of a fine or community service to maintain “the rules of public security.” The samemonth, the chairman of the SCNS compared those who engage in“religious fanaticism” with individuals who “wear different clothes,”claiming that they collectively differed from the “traditional Islamic
religion practiced by our forefathers.” In response to the proposedlaw, the Council of Scholars of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, under the
Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan (SAMK), statedthat “it is appropriate for each person to dress in accordance withthe customs of the state in which they live.”
Also in November, the official State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA) introduced to parliament a new draft religion
law that, if passed, would further restrict and securitize peacefulreligious practices. In December, the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief, on freedom of peacefulassembly and association, on minority issues, and on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism expressed their concerns regarding the draft
legislation in a joint letter to President Sadyr Japarov, urging his
government to comply with international human rights law.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Include Kyrgyzstan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Raise religious freedom conditions with
the Kyrgyz government, such as at C5+1
meetings and other bilateral engagements;
Condition U.S. aid on meaningful government efforts to improve religious freedom

conditions, including amendments to thereligion law, investigation, and punishmentof those who commit religiously based
hate crimes, and increased transparency
regarding security measures taken against
individuals belonging to religious groups
unjustly labeled as “extremist”; and■Work with the government of Kyrgyzstan
to revise the 2008 religion law and otherrelevant legislation to comply with international human rights standards and urge

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■62Country Update: Religious Freedom Landscape in Kyrgyzstan

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

the government to seek a legal opinion
on the draft religion law from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutionsand Human Rights.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise religious freedom concerns with the
Kyrgyz government through hearings, letters, and congressional delegation trips
abroad.

Since the beginning of President Japarov’s presidency, the Kyrgyz
government has rapidly eroded existing democratic mechanisms
and increasingly enforced legislation regulating religion that violates
the rights of all religious groups, especially Muslims. The 2008 law“About Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations in the Kyrgyz
Republic” prohibits unregistered religious activity, mandates burdensome registration processes to engage in religious activity, restricts
religious materials, and requires religious organizations to submit
periodic activity reports. A draft religion law proposed in November
2023 would additionally require religious organizations to reregister
every five years, introduce a tiered registration system, affirm that
the SAMK is the spiritual governing body of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan,mandate the registration of prayer rooms, and ban religiously oriented
political parties.
Of a population of about six million people, approximately 90
percent of individuals identify as Muslim, with most adhering to Hanafi
Sunni Islam and one percent adhering to Shi’a Islam. The non-Muslim
population is composed of Christians, who make up seven percentof the population. About 40 percent of Christians identify as Russian
Orthodox. Other Christian groups include Catholics, Baptists, andJehovah’s Witnesses. The remaining three percent of the population
includes Jews, Buddhists, Baha’is, ISKCON members, and Tengrinists.

Crackdown on Independent Muslims
In 2023, Kyrgyz authorities dramatically expanded a campaign targeting independent Muslims by conducting mass inspections of mosquesand arresting those who allegedly belonged to organizations that the
government had arbitrarily labeled as “extremist.” For example, the
SCNS reported arresting at least 23 alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir members
and at least 16 alleged Yakyn Inkar members between January andJune 2023, surpassing the total reported arrests in 2022. Authorities
often only pointed to the possession of “extremist” religious materials
to justify such detainments. Per SCNS reports, some individuals in
detention renounced their beliefs after speaking with officials, whileothers did so on video, warning others not to succumb to the same
beliefs. It is unclear how long these individuals remained detained,
as officials are often reluctant to share information about “extremism”-related cases due to purported national security concerns. In
June, the Manas District Court sentenced a man to two years in prison
for owning “extremist” religious materials and attempting to purchaseadditional religious materials.
Beginning in May, the government began an interdepartmental
mass inspection of Islamic institutions throughout Kyrgyzstan. According to June reports, officials found 60 illegal Islamic institutions in
Jalal-Abad region. In July, officials investigated and suspended theactivities of 39 mosques and 21 madrasas in Osh region, imposing
fines on 39 institutions. In August, officials began an investigationin Bishkek and issued fines against religious institutions that totaled
close to $1,791 (160,000 soms) in Sverdlov district alone for violating“sanitary standards.” Also in August, officials investigated 192 Islamic

institutions in Talas region and found that 172 violated registration
requirements, safety standards, and/or sanitation standards. At theend of the year, officials were still expected to inspect Islamic institutions in Chui. In October, authorities arrested and placed in pretrial
detention three individuals who criticized the closure of their mosqueon video, accusing them of “inciting religious enmity.”

The Status of Non-Muslims
The Kyrgyz government also penalized the peaceful religious activities
of non-Muslims. In March 2023, authorities raided religious services
at St. Nicholas Catholic Church in Talas region based on accusations
that two foreign nuns were illegally preaching. The authorities blockedchurchgoers from leaving the building until the nuns signed a document that stated their guilt, and they fined each nun $98 (8,733 soms)
for violating the religion law. Authorities similarly raided a registered
Protestant church and fined foreign churchgoers for engaging in“illegal missionary activity.” Additionally, authorities closed several
Protestant institutions in Chui region and Bishkek during the year due
to alleged building standards violations.
In June, authorities raided an ISKCON wedding rehearsal andfined the host $84 (7,500 soms). Officials also canceled the visas ofIndian students who participated in the event. Authorities have continuously denied ISKCON devotees registration as a religious group. In a
July meeting with the SCRA, authorities told ISKCON representatives
that they needed to follow the requirements of the religion law andgather 200 adult founders to register. However, devotees are reluctant
to provide the personal information required to become a founder forfear of state retaliation.
Jehovah’s Witnesses likewise have faced government restrictions
on their religious practices. In addition to an ongoing refusal to grant
local-level registration, authorities this year denied Jehovah’s Witnesses’ request to import a faith-based children’s book.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2023, the United States engaged with Kyrgyzstan to support its sovereignty and ensure compliance with international sanctions instituted
against Russia, providing about $49 million or programs in Kyrgyzstan. During the reporting period, high-level officials from the U.S.
Department of State, including Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs
Donald Lu, met with Kyrgyz officials to discuss security and economic
issues and sometimes human rights. In September, President Joseph
R. Biden met with President Japarov and other Central Asian leaderson the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly for theC5+1 Presidential Summit. A resulting joint statement only passingly
mentioned the countries’ “commitment to protecting human rights.”
In August, then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) sent a letter to President Japarov,calling on Kyrgyzstan to uphold international sanctions against Russia
and to respect human rights.

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BackgroundMALAYSIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia remained poor.
Federal and state governments continued to compel Muslim
citizens to obey government-approved interpretations of Sunni
Islam according to Shafi’i jurisprudence. The government requires
all citizens to register their religion on their official identification
card known as MyKad, which the Ministry of Home Affairs oversees. MyKad states whether an individual is Muslim and encrypts
their registered religious identity in the card’s chip. Policing religion through MyKad, federal and state governments enforce theofficial interpretation of Islam and its dual legal system for all
Muslim citizens.
Article 160 of the constitution mandates registering all ethnic Malays as Muslim. Through the enforcement of this article,
the Shari’a legal system (known domestically as Syariah) prevents Malays and other registered Muslims from exercising theirrights to pursue their own religious interpretation and identity.
Domestically, the Shari’a system maintains strong support amonga majority of Muslims.
The Shari’a courts enable the phenomenon of unilateral conversions—when a parent converts to Islam and then also converts
their child or children. Through such conversions, child custody
becomes a matter decided by the Shari’a courts, where nonMuslims do not have legal standing. In July 2023, a Malaysian
woman, Loh Siew Hong, took the issues of child custody and unilateral conversion to court. Following divorce, Loh, a non-Muslim,
spent three years searching for her children, who were taken by
their father. The father had unilaterally converted their children to
Islam to prevent Loh from gaining custody. At the end of 2023, thiscase had not been resolved.
Throughout 2023, political observers expressed concernsthat the slim-majority unity coalition led by Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim could break apart, giving way to the rule of Perikitan Nasional, an ethnoreligious nationalist coalition. By the end of 2023,

this unity government rule appeared to remain stable. This stability
may be in part the result of Prime Minister Ibrahim’s attempts toentice Malay Muslim votes from Islamist parties through initiatives
such as increased funding for Islamic schools and a commitment
to increase the “criminal powers” of the Shari’a courts—which theroyal Conference of Rulers supported.
Malaysia’s Penal Code Sections 298 and 298A criminalize
blasphemy, and government authorities use Section 233 of theCommunications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) as a blasphemy
law as well. At least five states criminalize apostasy with fines,
imprisonment, or detention in a “rehabilitation” center. In August
2023, after a lengthy court process, the federal High Court rejected
a woman’s bid to switch her official religious identity from Muslim
to Christian following her divorce from a Muslim man.
Federal and state religious affairs departments continued totake an active approach to managing the internal affairs of Muslims
and those legally defined as Muslims according to their MyKad. In
February, a Hindu family took the Selangor State Islamic department (MAIS) to court in order to bury a deceased member in a
Hindu cemetery. MAIS had previously determined the deceased
member had converted to Islam. In March, the Court of Appeal
rejected a challenge to MAIS’s 2014 fatwa labeling the Islamic
women’s rights group Sisters in Islam as deviant.
Throughout 2023, the government continued to withhold the2019 Special Taskforce’s report examining cases of enforced disappearances, including Pastor Raymond Koh, Amri Che Mat, andothers. Malaysian security forces and religious affairs departments
likely targeted these individuals, at least in part, for their religious
identity and practices. On December 11, the Court of Appeal
moved to review the classified report by the Special Taskforce as it
relates to the disappearance of Amri Che Mat. On December 14,
wife of Pastor Koh, Susanna Liew, testified in High Court to compel
the police to reveal his whereabouts.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

freedom—including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the 1951 Covenant
on Refugees—to regulate the Malaysian
government’s obligations to refugees andasylum seekers; andInclude Malaysia on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to
the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA);
Raise at ever y oppor tunit y with the
Malaysian government that it should ratify international treaties on human rightsthat directly or indirectly impact religious■

Prioritize raising religious freedom concerns, including releasing the Special

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESEvent: Rising Authoritarianism in ASEAN Member StatesSpecial Report: The Bureaucratization of Religion in Southeast Asia
■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Malaysia■■

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Taskforce’s report investigating cases ofenforced disappearances, in all bilateralengagement with Malaysia.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise Malaysia’s ongoing religious freedom concerns in all engagement, hearings,
meetings, letters, congressional delegation
trips abroad, and other actions.

Malaysia is a pluralistic society. Around 63.5 percent of the population identify as Muslim, the vast majority of whom adhere tostate-sponsored Sunni Islam. Buddhists comprise 18.7 percent; 9.1
percent are Christian; 6.1 percent are Hindu; 0.9 percent practiceConfucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions; andabout 1.8 percent identify with no religion. Although Malaysia wasfounded as a secular state, Article 3 of the 1957 Constitution places
Islam—interpreted as Sunni Islam—as the federation’s official religion. Article 11(4) provides that federal and state law “may control
or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or beliefs among
persons professing the religion of Islam.”

MALAYSIA

Background

Ethnic, Religious, and Gender Issues andSexual Minorities

Following the 2022 elections and the rise of the Malaysian Islamic
Party (PAS), which won the most seats of any individual party but
was locked out of the governing coalition, growing ethnoreligious
nationalism remains a concern throughout Malaysia. In February
2023, youth supporters of PAS in Terengganu marched purportedly
in support of militant Islam. PAS continued to use social media, suchas TikTok, to appeal to supporters for elections in August. Observers
have noted that PAS and other political leaders have used TikTok to
spread hate speech directed at ethnic and religious minorities. In
PAS-controlled states, Shari’a systems police moral issues such as
dress codes and adultery.

State religious departments take an active role to expand andpreserve the official Islamic identity of individuals and society. In
February, the Perlis Islamic Religious and Malay Customs Council(MAIP) attempted to intervene in the case of the religious identityof Loh Siew Hong’s children in Family High Court to maintain Islamic
religious instruction, despite the individual wishes of the three children
and Loh to not enroll in religious classes. In October, the High Court
rejected MAIP’s attempt. In March, MAIS declared Muslims could notparticipate in activities or visit non-Muslim houses of worship, noting
the authorities could punish violators with up to one-year imprisonment or a fine of approximately $2,000 (10,000 ringgit).
The role of religious departments in advancing the official
Islamic identity can negatively affect the rights of ethnic and religious
minorities as well as Muslim members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community. Throughout
2023, Malaysian authorities continued to use the legal system in thename of defending Islam to prosecute businesses and to police social
media use. In August, a representative of the government describedbeing queer as “a perverted lifestyle” that went against the teachings of Islam to justify the detention of eight Ahmadiyya Muslim
protesters who were campaigning for LGBTQI+ rights. In November,
Johor State announced it would open the country’s first permanent“rehabilitation center” for individuals found guilty in Shari’a court ofsame-sex relations in order to assist “deviant” people to “get backon the right path.”

Dual Legal System and State Control of Muslims

Key U.S. Policy

Malaysia’s dual legal system acts to propagate and protect official
interpretations of Islam. A 2022 lawsuit filed in Kelantan challenged
20 provisions introduced in the Kelantan Shariah Criminal Code (I)Enactment 2019. The provisions criminalize certain behaviors for
Muslims through the Shari’a system, including premarital pregnancy,
giving away a Muslim child to non-Muslims, intoxication, and sodomy.
During 2023, around 300 nongovernmental organizations acting
through the “Save Shariah Movement” submitted a memorandumin support of Kelantan and its Shariah Criminal Code. Outside thereporting period in February 2024, the Federal Court ruled in favor of
the lawsuit and declared the 16 Shari’a laws in question as “void andinvalid” for intruding on federal authority.
Women and girls remained particularly vulnerable in Malaysia’s
dual legal system. In November 2023, the Kelantan state government
reported that 533 underage married couples were recorded in Kelantan over the last four years. Consent of a Shari’a court enables Muslim
families to bypass the minimum age requirement of 16 years and to
marry underage girls.
In May, the Malaysian government withdrew its appeal—initiallyfiled in 2021—against a High Court ruling permitting non-Muslims to
use the word “Allah.”

The United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and thetwo countries maintain strong bilateral ties. In September, the U.S.
Navy concluded its annual multinational humanitarian assistanceand disaster relief preparedness mission in Malaysia, where it held
nursing and veterinary training for local nurses and students. In fiscal
year 2023, the U.S. government obligated $6 million in assistance forprograms in Malaysia.
In October, U.S. Ambassador at Large to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, Cindy Dyer, visited Malaysia to meet with local
stakeholders, including the government, to discuss human trafficking.
Malaysia hosts at least 186,490 refugees and asylum seekers originating from Burma, a significant number of whom are fleeing in part fromviolence targeting their ethnic and religious communities and many ofwhom are vulnerable to or have been victims of human trafficking. In
November, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden appointed
Edgard Kagan as the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia.
Through the International Visiting Leadership Program and theYoung Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the United States hosts
leaders from Malaysia in programs that often include religious freedom issues. The United States is actively engaged with civil society in
Malaysia to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism.

Rising Islamic Fundamentalism and Its
Mainstreaming throughout Malaysia

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SRI LANKAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Sri Lanka continued to
decline. Throughout the year, the government continued toharass and threaten religious minorities and at times deny themaccess to their places of worship. Christian communities continued
to face obstacles in registering churches. The government also useddiscriminatory legislation to target, monitor, and detain religious
minorities. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) has been criticizedfor its broad powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals, particularly Muslim citizens, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks.
Independent experts at the United Nations (UN) and human rights
groups expressed concern over a new terrorism bill, stating that
it fails to address flaws in existing legislation, including a vague
definition of terrorism and limited judicial oversight.
Throughout 2023, the Sri Lankan government shrank religious
freedom by continuing to arbitrarily detain individuals under the
PTA and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) Act. Enacted in 2007, the ICCPR Act is designed to incorporate the international treaty into law, but authorities widely use
it to restrict religious freedom and limit freedom of expression. In
January, Youtuber Sepal Amarasinghe was arrested and remanded
for his allegedly derogatory comments about the Sacred Tooth
Relic of the Lord Buddha. In May, stand-up comedian Nathasha
Edirisooriya was arrested under the ICCPR Act for making a joke
allegedly insulting Buddhism and Christianity. Following her arrest,
the Minister of Buddhist, Religious, and Cultural Affairs said he
intended to submit a draft bill to prevent distortion of religion,
arguing that no individual has the right to offend any religion.
President Ranil Wickremesinghe additionally called for the establishment of a special police unit to combat “religious disharmony.”
During the year, the Department of Archeology, in coordination with Buddhist clergy and local authorities, continued
to expropriate land from Hindus and Muslims in the Northernand Eastern provinces for the construction of Buddhist sites. In
March, Buddhist monks, representatives from the Department ofArcheology, and Sri Lankan security forces attempted to install a
Buddhist statue in Trincomalee, threatening to shoot Tamil andMuslim protesters if they disrupted the process. In July, Judge
T. Saravanarajah ordered the eviction of Buddhist monks from a
Tamil Hindu temple in Kurunthurmalai after they prevented Hindu
worshipers from gathering. In September, the Department ofArcheology violated a 2022 court order issued by Saravanarajah,which halted the construction of a Buddhist temple at the Hindu
site. Subsequently, citing threats to his life for presiding over thesecases, Saravanarajah resigned and reportedly fled the country.
In several instances, authorities failed to address tensions andviolence instigated by Buddhist monks towards religious minorities. In August, for example, a Buddhist monk led approximately 50
Sinhala men armed with knives and swords to intimidate journalists
and an interfaith group in Batticaloa. The group harassed a Hindu
priest, two Catholic priests, and one Muslim scholar, and attacked
the Hindu priest. The same month, a group of Buddhist monks
in Trincomalee stormed a district committee meeting, violently
threatening the Governor of the Eastern District if he failed toreverse an order to halt the construction of a new Buddhist temple in the Tamil-majority district. The Minister of Buddha Sasana
similarly expressed dissatisfaction with the Governor’s order but
argued the situation should be left up to the courts.
In October, the government published the Online Safety
Bill, which experts argue could exacerbate the targeting anddetention of minority religious communities. The bill seeks toestablish an Online Safety Commission, with broad powers todetermine whether an online statement is “false […] threatening,alarming or distressing.” The bill mandates that any individual who“voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged
in […] religious worship or religious ceremonies” can face up to
three years in prison. It further criminalizes the publication ofstatements intended to harm or “outrage” religious feelings or
insult religious beliefs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Sri Lanka on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Direct U.S. Embassy officials to urge the
Sri Lankan government to repeal or significantly reform the PTA, such that it requires

a higher threshold of evidence for charges
and a definition of “terrorism” that complies with international standards; and■Advocate for the full implementation of UN
Human Rights Council Resolution 51/1 topromote reconciliation, accountability, andreligious freedom in Sri Lanka.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCommission Delegation Visit: Colombo, Trincomalee, and Jaffna in October 2023
Special Report: Anti-Conversion Laws Compendium■ Special Report: Blasphemy Law Compendium■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Sri Lanka■■

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The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise ongoing religious freedom issues
through hearings, meetings, letters, andcongressional delegations to the country
to better incorporate religious freedom
concerns into U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka.

Surveillance and Detention of Religious Minorities

Sri Lanka is a democratic republic under the leadership of President
Ranil Wickremesinghe. The constitution recognizes four religions:
Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity. While the constitution
recognizes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, Article 9offers Buddhism the “foremost place” in society and requires thegovernment to “protect and foster the Buddha Sasana.”
Sri Lanka’s population is an estimated 23.3 million, which is bothreligiously and ethnically diverse. Buddhists compose approximately
70 percent of the population, followed by Hindus at 12.6 percent,Muslims (mostly Sunni) at 9.7 percent, Roman Catholics at 6.1 percent, Protestant and other Christian denominations at 1.3 percent,and “other” religions at 0.05 percent. Most Sri Lankans are Sinhaleseand adhere to Buddhism. Tamils are the second largest ethnic group
and are primarily Hindu with a significant Christian minority. The next
smallest ethnic group is referred to as Sri Lankan Moors, who aremostly Muslim. Ahmadiyya and Sufi Muslims, Indian Tamils, and othersmall ethnic groups also reside in the country.

Surveillance, intimidation, and detention of religious minorities
continued in 2023, under the premise of national security concerns. As of August 2023, 21 detainees were on remand under the
PTA, and 25 individuals were serving prison terms on terrorism
charges. In April, three detainees, who had been held in pretrial
detention for 14 years, were released after determining that theirconfessions had been coerced. In June, human rights organizations
and international lawyer associations expressed concerns about
witness intimidation and coercion in PTA trials, specifically Hejaaz
Hizbullah, who was detained for 20 months before being charged
and ultimately granted bail in 2022. In March, the government
proposed the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which introduced somepositive reforms, including improved access to bail; however, it
still contains a broad definition of terrorism, which human rights
groups fear could result in continued arbitrary detention of religious minorities. In December 2023, the ATA remained underfurther review, leaving the PTA in effect.
In January 2023, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the Bureau
of Rehabilitation Bill. While this bill focuses primarily on rehabilitating “drug-dependent persons,” it mandates the “rehabilitation” ofindividuals deemed part of “violent extremist groups” or individuals
engaged in “extreme or disruptive acts of sabotage.” Human rights
groups expressed concerns that it could be broadly applied to “rehabilitate” individuals, including religious minority communities, arrested
but not convicted of a crime.
Human rights groups continued to report authorities monitoring expression on social media. In November, however, the Sri
Lankan Supreme Court determined that Section 3 of the ICCPR Act
should not be interpreted as criminalizing blasphemy, including in
online contexts. It cited the case of Ramzy Razik, a Muslim man
who was detained for five months without charges in 2020 for
writing a Facebook post expressing his views of challenges facedby Muslim communities.

Land Disputes and Places of Worship
Under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Department of Archeology
collaborated with the Ministry of Defense’s Task Force for Archeological Heritage Management to identify cultural sites across the country.
In the Northern and Eastern provinces, authorities have used thismandate to expropriate Hindu and Muslim land for the constructionof Buddhist sites. In 2023, Tamil political parties reported increased
attacks and vandalism against Hindu temples and damage to statues.
A 2023 report identified 37 cases in the north and east in which the
Department of Archeology attempted to construct Buddhist temples
on Tamil land, despite the lack of Buddhist populations in those locations. Human rights groups additionally report as many as 68 instancesof land disputes in Batticaloa, as of September 2023. In July, President
Wickremesinghe instructed officials to prioritize and expedite theconstruction of Buddhist temples and cultural sites, including theAnuradhapura Sacred Site Development Plan and Maha Viharaya
Development Plan in the Northern Province. In his remarks, Wickremesinghe identified Sri Lanka as a “Buddhist nation,” and emphasized
the “national importance” of completing the Maha Viharaya (temple).
According to civil society organizations, police and military personnel fail to address land disputes or to intervene in instances oftension between Buddhist clergy and religious minorities. In October,a Buddhist monk led a Sinhalese procession to install a Buddhist
statue on disputed land in Batticaloa. At the order of President Wickremesinghe, police removed the statue, after which Buddhist monk
Ampitiye Sumanaratna threatened to kill Tamils. No action was taken
by authorities against Sumanaratna. In January, high-ranking Buddhist
monks requested President Wickremesinghe not to remove security
personnel assigned to monitor locations identified by the Archeology
Department as Buddhist religious sites in the north and east. The
letter highlighted the role of the military in “safeguarding and maintaining important places of Buddhist worship.”

Key U.S. Policy
U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka has historically focused on democracybuilding and post-civil war transitional justice. In FY 2023, the U.S.
government provided $78 million for programs in Sri Lanka. In April,the U.S. Department of State leveled sanctions against Wasantha
Karannagoda, Governor of the North Western Province, for humanrights abuses during his time as a Naval Commander. In a September
letter to U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, 12 members ofCongress condemned Sri Lanka’s violation of international humanrights law and democratic principles. In November, U.S. Ambassador
to Sri Lanka Julie Chung condemned the continued use of the PTA
to target peaceful protesters. In December, members of Congress
introduced a bipartisan resolution urging increased transparency
and investigations of human rights abuses, including against religious minority groups.

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BackgroundSYRIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Syria remained poor,
though many of the worst violations occurred in areas under thecontrol of nonstate entities. While the government of President
Bashar al-Assad committed a range of other human rights abuses,
its violations of freedom of religion or belief were generally politicaland administrative in nature. Nonstate entities in conflict with theAssad government, including the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and several Turkish-supported
Syrian Islamist opposition groups (TSOs), were the primary driversof severe religious freedom violations in Syria.
In the 70 percent of territory under the Assad government’s
control, political threats to religious freedom included continuing
favoritism toward members of the president’s Alawi Muslim community and pursuing bureaucratic control of Sunni Muslim religious
authority. The government continued to style itself as a protectorof religious minorities, although some faith communities diverged
from their longstanding acquiescence to the Alawi Muslim-dominated administration. For a second year, Druze in the southern cityof Suweida staged antiregime protests, this time with more visible
support from prominent Druze religious leaders such as Sheikh Hikmat Hajri. In government-controlled parts of the Hama governoratein the west, authorities did not adequately address social hostilities
against religious minorities or the apparent religious dimensions ofsome crimes. For example, community liaisons reported that theAugust killing of a young Christian man in Hama occurred after his
assailants professed outrage that a Christian had attempted tobreak up their street fight. In a December speech, President Assadfalsely claimed there was no evidence that six million Jews weremurdered during the Holocaust.
Parts of northern Syria remained among the last territories stillin the hands of rebel groups opposed to the Assad regime. These
included TSOs as well as HTS, the de facto governors of Idlib in thenorthwest and whose Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) administers the territory. In 2023, HTS continued its campaign to erase its
former ties to al-Qaeda and reposition itself as a state-like administrative regime that acknowledges religious diversity. The grouppublicized its tolerance of the first Christian liturgy celebrated in
Idlib in over a decade and pledged to redistribute property it had
confiscated from Christians and Druze. However, HTS continued
to impose its interpretation of Sunni Islam on both Muslim andnon-Muslim residents of Idlib. In August, the SSG invoked its interpretation of Shari’a in new rules for Idlib’s schools, and HTS security
forces continued their arbitrary and unlawful detention of humanrights advocates and private individuals critical of HTS’s “rule or
religious doctrine.”
In Kurdish-majority areas in the north and east outside ofrebel control, the Autonomous Administration of North andEast Syria (AANES), supported by its Syrian Democratic Forces(SDF), continued to highlight religious freedom as a governing principle. The SDF led missions to locate and rescue Yazidi
women and girls whom ISIS kidnapped from Iraq as part of its
2014 genocide. Almost 2,700 women and girls remained missing,with an unidentified number presumed still in Syrian detainee
camps and ISIS enclaves.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Include Syria on the Special Watch List forengaging in or tolerating severe violationsof religious freedom, pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Redesignate HTS as an “entity of particularconcern,” or EPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations ofreligious freedom, as defined by IRFA;
Impose targeted sanctions on additional
Syrian government agencies and officials,
HTS principals, and the leadership of TSOs
responsible for violations of religious■

Support religious freedom in Syria by: 1)
fully implementing General License No. 22
in areas the AANES governs and encouraging the inclusion of the AANES in apolitical solution to the Syrian conflict; 2)assisting the efforts of local partners toascertain the whereabouts of kidnapped

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESSpecial Report: Anti-Conversion Laws Compendium
Special Report: Blasphemy Law Compendium■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham■■

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and missing Yazidi women and girls; and (3)taking diplomatic action in multilateral fora
to facilitate the flow of humanitarian andreconstruction aid and ensure its effective
disbursement to vulnerable communities,
including religious minorities.

freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights-related
financial and visa authorities, citing specificreligious freedom violations; andThe U.S. Congress should:■

Raise religious freedom and issues affecting religious minorities in Syria-related
legislation and in hearings, meetings,
letters, congressional delegation trips
abroad, and other actions.

SYRIA

Background
Under Article 3 of Syria’s constitution, the president must be Muslim,
and Islamic jurisprudence is a major source of legislation. Although
the constitution provides for respect toward all religions and protection of different religious communities, the government has wide
latitude to limit religious rituals if they appear to “prejudice publicorder.” Bans on Jehovah’s Witnesses remain in place, and otherlaws prohibit interfaith marriage and the conversion of Muslims toother religions.
Thirteen years of violent conflict have shaped Syria’s current
population through mass internal displacement and dispersal of
refugees throughout the world. The population of 22.9 million isestimated at 87 percent Muslim, of whom 74 percent are Sunni, with
Alawi, Ismaili, and Shi’a Muslims together constituting 13 percent.
Druze are approximately three percent of the population. Estimatesof Christians—believed to have fallen to between 2.5 and 10 percent—and Yazidis were obscured by these groups’ displacement
and emigration and the government’s forced classification of the
Yazidi religion as a sect of Islam. The Jewish population is now
nonexistent, reflecting decades of government persecution andforced emigration.

Threats to Religious Freedom in Non-Regime Areas
The Assad government continued its partnerships with Russia and Iranto renew its offensive against nonstate entities in areas outside regime
control. Observers reported that regime and allied forces’ attacks
on civilian areas affected some houses of worship. On February 6,
2023, two high-magnitude earthquakes decimated large areas of thesame region, which is home to religious minority communities. The
Assad regime allegedly mismanaged and embezzled external aid toearthquake victims, and advocates for religious minorities expressed
concern over potentially discriminatory distribution of aid.
Turkey posed one of the most significant threats to religious
freedom in Syria via its occupation of territory and its military strikes
in and near AANES jurisdictions, in pursuit of what the Turkish government termed Kurdish terrorists. Beginning on October 5, 2023, Turkish
forces intensified their attacks on civilian infrastructure in Hasakah,
Raqqa, and Aleppo. Human rights advocates reported patterns of
Turkish shelling, drones, and airstrikes targeting communities withreligious minority populations. Factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian
National Army (SNA) destroyed mosques in Afrin and bulldozed
the Yazidi shine of Chal Khaneh and other religious monuments andcemeteries. The Turkish government’s permissive stance toward
the brutality of these TSOs against civilian populations and theirtargeting of religious minorities—such as confiscating property andforcing at least two Yazidis in Afrin to convert to Islam—rendered

Turkish-controlled areas among the least secure and most damaging
to religious freedom in Syria.

Key U.S. Policy
While the Arab League readmitted Syria in May 2023 after more thana decade of suspension, the United States avoided normalization ofrelations with Syria. In May and September, Congress introduced thebipartisan Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, which would bar
the United States from recognizing any government led by Bashar alAssad and allow for additional sanctions, reinforcing and expanding
the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. In August, U.S. lawmakers visited rebel-held northwest Syria in what was U.S. politicians’ firstpublicly reported trip to the country in six years.
The United States suppor ted regional stabilit y via an
ongoing counterterrorism program and implementation of the USCIRFrecommended General License No. 22, which authorizes U.S. economic activity in areas controlled by the AANES. Throughout theyear, Iran-linked attacks on U.S. military targets increased, sometimes
prompting U.S. retaliatory strikes and intensifying following Hamas’s
October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the resulting conflict in Gaza.
The United States continued to designate terrorists with links
to Syria and maintained its robust sanctions program against Syria
and related individual actors, pursuant to the Caesar Act and various
executive orders. In April, the U.S. Department of State designated aleader of Hurras al-Din (HaD), which shares HTS’s roots as an al-Qaeda
affiliate, as a global terrorist, citing his group’s responsibility for “violence targeting members of religious minority groups.” In May, theU.S. Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the government of Turkey, applied joint sanctions on potential fundraisers formilitant groups, including HTS. In August, the Treasury Department
announced sanctions against TSOs with records of serious humanrights abuses.
In June, the State Department welcomed the initiation of legal
proceedings by Canada and the Netherlands at the International
Court of Justice to “hold Syria accountable for the reported tortureof thousands of individuals at the hands of the Assad regime.” Thatsame month, the United States announced $920 million in additional
humanitarian assistance for Syria, the largest aid package to date.
The allotment, expanded in response to the February earthquakes,
brought U.S. humanitarian assistance to $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2023
and almost $16.9 billion since the 2011 onset of the civil war.
On December 29, 2023, the State Department renewed its
designation of HTS as an EPC under IRFA, in alignment with USCIRF’s
recommendation. However, it did not designate Syria as a Countryof Particular Concern (CPC) or place it on the Special Watch List forparticularly severe or severe violations of religious freedom.

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n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Turkey remained largely
the same as in the previous year, although government officials
increasingly engaged in rhetoric that targeted or ostracized religious minorities. The Turkish government continued to deny legal
status to religious communities, refused to recognize the places ofworship of certain religious minorities, and prohibited the reopeningof the Theological School of Halki and other religious educational
institutions crucial to the continued existence of several religious
traditions in the country. The government also did not recognize
the right to conscientious objection and fined some individuals who
refused to carry out compulsory military service due to their beliefs.
Alevis, who make up Turkey’s largest religious minority community, continued to lack official recognition and faced widespread
discrimination. Many Alevis viewed government overtures—suchas President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s late 2022 announcementof the creation of a state-run Alevi-Bektaşi Culture and Cemevi
Directorate—as either a political gesture to gain votes ahead ofelections or an effort to co-opt and assimilate Alevism. In the courseof campaigning, President Erdoğan lashed out at main opposition
party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had released on social media
a video in which he discussed his own identity as an Alevi. Alevis,
along with members of other religious minority communities, continued to object to religion courses required for students grades
four through 12 that disproportionately focused on Sunni Islam.
The Turkish government detained individuals throughout theyear for allegedly insulting Islam and in some cases prosecuted
them for committing blasphemy under Article 216(3) of the Turkish Penal Code. In October 2023, a man received 7.5 months inprison for “insult[ing] the religious values of a section of the public”
when he posted to social media a photo showing alcohol inside amosque. That same month, authorities detained three 16-yearolds on charges of insulting religious values on social media. In

July, police detained and then released a man who purportedly
made fun of namaz (prayer) in a video that he posted to social
media. In yet another case of official censorship, in February, acourt banned theologian İhsan Eliaçık’s translation of the Qur’an
because it “contain[ed] elements that are objectionable in terms of
the fundamental qualities of Islam.” Likewise, in May, the Istanbul
governor for the second year in a row prohibited an event to commemorate the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
Many religious communities remained concerned by instancesof societal violence, intolerant rhetoric, and discrimination. In
November, unknown assailants murdered nonagenarian Syriac
Gevriye Akgüç in the courtyard of his home in the southeastern
province of Mardin. Designated terrorist organizations like theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) reportedly planned to carry out
attacks on churches and synagogues during the year that Turkish
police prevented. In August 2023, the nongovernmental organization Freedom of Belief Initiative (İnanç Özgürlüğü Girişmi) foundthat most religion-based hate crimes in the country targeted Alevis
and Christians, including Armenian Apostolics, Armenian Catholics, and Syriac Orthodox. Members of some religious and ethnic
minority communities who fled persecution in other countries toseek refuge in Turkey remained concerned that Turkish authorities
could deport them.
The year also saw an alarming rise in antisemitism. In October,
local Justice and Development Party (AKP) council member Süleyman Sezen praised Adolf Hitler and spoke of the day when “Jewsare cleansed from the earth.” In the same month, progovernment
media outlets employed antisemitic language, a bookshop in Istanbul posted a sign that said “Jews not allowed,” and an unidentified
vandal graffitied the Etz Hayim Synagogue in Izmir. In December,President Erdoğan also compared Israel’s leadership and military
campaign in Gaza to Hitler and the Nazis.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Turkey on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest levels
for the reopening of the Theological Schoolof Halki (Halki Seminary) and for full compliance with European Court of Human Rights
rulings on freedom of religion or belief; and■Track and comprehensively document in
the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report religious
communities’ efforts to open, regain, renovate, and protect places of worship andother religious sites of spiritual, cultural, or
historical importance; include informationon the vandalization, damage, and destruction of such sites; and work with the Turkish
government to ensure their protection.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■

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Special Report: An Examination of Threats to Religious Sites in Turkey
Event: Threats to Religious Sites in Turkey

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

The U.S. Congress should:■

Incorporate consideration of Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities and broader
human rights issues into its continued
evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey bilateralrelationship, including in the context ofproposed legislation.

The population of Turkey is estimated at approximately 83.5 million.
The overwhelming majority—at slightly more than 99 percent—reportedly identifies as Muslim. Most Muslims in Turkey are Sunni andfollow the Hanafi school of Islamic thought, but this figure includes
Alevis, who number between 10 million and 25 million and constitutethe country’s largest religious minority. There is also a small populationof Shi’a Muslims. The remaining 0.2 percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Bulgarian Orthodox,
Chaldean Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews,
Protestants, Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Syriac Catholics,
Syriac Orthodox, Yazidis, and others.
The constitution describes the country as laik, or secular, andprotects in theory the freedom of conscience, religious belief, andconviction. Nonetheless, the government plays an increasingly activerole in overseeing various aspects of religious affairs through official
bodies such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and theGeneral Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar Generl Müdürlüğü).

Government Promotion of Islam
In 2023, the Turkish government increasingly implemented policies
that sought to privilege and promote its interpretation of Sunni Islamand to discourage attitudes or practices that it characterized as “perversions against moral values.” During the year, the Diyanet began
to move forward with a cooperation protocol it had signed with the
Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sports
to allow Diyanet personnel to educate students on “values,” arrange
meetings with parents, and organize religious events and activities.
Another aspect of the project appointed imams to elementary andsecondary schools to serve as “spiritual counselors,” which many
parents, politicians, and others objected to as violating the constitution. In July, the European Parliament expressed concern with “theincreasing weight of the Islamist agenda in law-making and in many
spheres of the administration, including through an extension of theinfluence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in the education system.” In late November, the government indicated it would
likely further increase the budget of the Diyanet for the following year
by an estimated 151 percent.

Religious Sites
Throughout 2023, several religious communities encountered obstacles related to opening, regaining, and protecting their places ofworship and other religious sites. Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses
in many cases remained unable to secure official recognition for
their churches and Kingdom Halls, respectively, as places of worship.
This lack of status put religious communities that used unrecognizedbuildings for worship at risk of site closures or fines. In July, local
authorities in the central Anatolian city of Konya closed a Kingdom Hallthat had opened a few months earlier after receiving complaints fromneighbors. Other religious communities continued to seek the returnof properties that the government had forcibly expropriated fromthem in preceding decades. Those efforts were often protracted, as
even when the government recognized such properties were wrongly
seized, it did not immediately return them. For instance, although
the Constitutional Court ruled in January that the government had
wrongly registered to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance multiple
properties—including churches and cemeteries—belonging to two
Armenian foundations, foundation representatives nonetheless had
to pursue the return of those properties through other courts.
Some places of worship also received threats or experienced
attacks throughout the year. In early November, a man assaulted the
pastor of a Protestant church during a service in the city of Eskişehir.
Later that month, two individuals broke into the same church, attacked
the pastor and others with him, demanded to know whether thosewithin the church were Jewish or Israeli, and threatened to “set themon fire” if they called the police.
In a positive development, President Erdo ğan in Octoberinaugurated the Mor Ephrem Syriac Orthodox Church in Istanbul,
which is widely considered the first church to be officially constructed in the history of the Turkish Republic. The government alsoannounced it would repair the St. George Greek Orthodox Church
in Antakya after it was damaged by an earthquake.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and Turkey consider each other close allies andpartnered on a range of issues, including defense cooperation,
Euro-Atlantic security, bilateral trade, and continued support for
Ukraine. During the year, high-level representatives met for the fourthand fifth iterations of the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism Dialogue
to discuss—among other subjects—modernizing Turkey’s F-16 fleet,advancing Finland and Sweden’s applications to join the North Atlantic
Treaty Alliance (NATO), and maintaining stability in the Mediterranean. U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to Turkey
in February to express U.S. support for the country in the wake ofdevastating earthquakes and in November to discuss the situation in
Israel following Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack. In FY 2023, theU.S. government obligated over $93 million for programs in Turkey.
Over the course of the year, the U.S. Department of State generally did not publicly raise religious freedom or broader human rights
concerns in Turkey. Although both the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain and the Special Envoy to
Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Ambassador Deborah E. Lipstadt
met with President Erdoğan in September as part of a roundtablediscussion, public reporting did not indicate whether either ambassador raised the Turkish government’s religious freedom violations.
Congress closely followed developments in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship and frequently raised regional geopolitical matters
involving Turkey. As part of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s Defending Freedoms Project, Representative Jamie B. Raskin(D-MD) advocated on behalf of imprisoned opposition politician
Selahattin Demirtaş.

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BackgroundUZBEKISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2023, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended negatively as the government continued to tightly control all aspectsof religious practice and subject Muslims to particularly harshpunishments for their religious activities and expression. The country’s Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations
mandated that religious communities obtain registration to legallyengage in worship and other religious activities, required that agovernment agency review and approve religious literature andrelated materials, and prohibited missionary activity and the private teaching of religion. During the year, the government passed
amendments to the administrative code that penalize the “propaganda” of superiority on religious grounds and wearing clothes thatprevent a person’s identification.
Various government agencies continued to police and censure Muslims for their religious activities. In October 2023, law
enforcement authorities in Tashkent raided and closed several
halal restaurants, reportedly questioning employees about theirreligious beliefs and telling the proprietors that they could reopen
if they agreed to sell alcohol. Throughout the country, mosques also
lowered the volume of the call to prayer, a practice that the government had previously loosened restrictions on to signal its increased
respect for religious freedom. The official Committee on Religious
Affairs (CRA) sought to control media reporting on Islam and in one
instance instructed media outlet Kun.uz to cut or change sections ofa story it had produced on religious matters. In August, the founderof Azon.uz, a popular website that focused on Islam, suddenly andinexplicably announced the closure of the site and its television andradio broadcasting, which many attributed to government pressure.
The government continued to rigorously oversee the performanceof the Hajj and Umra and warned its citizens against undertaking
either pilgrimage “illegally” by traveling with an unauthorized organization. In November, the government additionally restricted theability of minors to perform pilgrimages and allegedly continued
to involve mahallas (local neighborhood committees) to determine
who would be allowed to go on pilgrimage.
The government increasingly detained, arrested, fined, andsentenced Muslims to prison for the illegal dissemination of religious materials or participation in illegal religious organizations.
Authorities particularly targeted young men who had downloaded
or shared songs with alleged “religious extremist” content. In
January, a court sentenced Sardor Rakhmonkulov—whose motherclaimed he experienced torture while in custody—to five years’
imprisonment on extremism-related charges for “distributing religious songs.” In May, another court gave Jahongir Ulugmurodov
three years in prison for posting a song to social media. Both individuals were released from prison later in the year pursuant to court
decisions. In May, a woman received a three-year prison sentence
for “liking” a religious lecture on social media five years prior,which a court decided constituted “distributing” the material toher friends online. A court later changed her sentence to a formof house arrest. Officials with the Ministry of Internal Affairs andthe State Security Service engaged in transnational repression byattempting to forcibly or coercively return citizens living abroad to
Uzbekistan, where they faced criminal extremism charges.
Religious minorities continued to encounter significant obstacles in their ability to practice their religion or beliefs. Protestants
and Jehovah’s Witnesses in many regions remained unable toregister and therefore legally worship due to a burdensome anddiscriminatory registration process. In February, customs officials
detained a Baptist foreign national who attempted to cross the border with numerous unauthorized religious books that they seized
for review. In April, police raided two Baptist churches meeting for
Easter service, detained several church members, and beat andapplied electric shocks to other worshipers.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Uzbekistan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Work with the government of Uzbekistan
to revise the 2021 religion law and otherrelevant legislation to comply with international human rights standards, including
by removing registration requirementson religious communities, permitting thepossession and distribution of religious
literature, and permitting the sharing of
religious beliefs;■■

Press the government of Uzbekistan, at
the highest levels, to immediately releaseindividuals imprisoned for their peacefulreligious activities or religious affiliations
and to treat prisoners humanely and allow
for independent prison monitoring; andAllocate funding for the U.S. Agency
for International Development and U.S.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Press Release: USCIRF Deeply Troubled by Uzbekistan’s Backsliding on Religious Freedom
Event: Evaluating Religious Freedom in Uzbekistan■ Hearing: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion or Belief■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: Uzbekistan■■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2024

Embassy in Tashkent to provide litigation
support to individuals and religious communities prosecuted in connection with
their peaceful religious activities.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Advocate on behalf of individuals imprisoned for their peaceful religious activities
or religious affiliations through letters,
floor speeches, hearings, delegations,and other engagements with or about
Uzbekistan.

The population of Uzbekistan is estimated at approximately 35.8
million people. Different estimates place the percentage of the population that identify as Muslim at between 88 and 96.3 percent. Whilemost Muslims in the country are Hanafi Sunni, there are also small
numbers of Shi’a Muslims. Slightly more than two percent of the
population are Russian Orthodox, and the remaining 1.5 percent are
atheists, Baha’is, Buddhists, members of the International Society of
Krishna Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Roman Catholics,
and Protestants. In September, Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov reportedly asserted that civil servants in the country must choose between
their beliefs and their careers.
During the year, several international observers expressed
concern about the situation for religious freedom in Uzbekistan.
In March 2023, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on
freedom of religion or belief released a report that found the government had only partially implemented many of the recommendations
made in 2018 and failed entirely to implement others. In May, Human
Rights Watch characterized the country as “backsliding on [its] religious freedom promises” and documented widespread violations,
including the continued prosecution of Muslims under overly broad
extremism provisions. In October, the European Parliament adopted
a resolution that called on Uzbekistan to protect the right to freedomof religion, amend its religion law, protect Christian converts, andrelease religious prisoners.

Retaliation for Religious Expression
The government increasingly cracked down on bloggers and others
who expressed their opinion on religious matters publicly or throughsocial media posts. In February, a court fined a man who had criticizeda shop display on social media on the grounds that he had shared
unauthorized religious content. Local officials stated that “people
cannot judge or otherwise interfere with others based on their personal religious and moral views. The action of any person against
this order will be strictly prosecuted in accordance with the law.” In asimilar incident in April, a court sentenced blogger Hojiakbar Nosirov
to 15 days’ administrative arrest on charges of “inciting religious
hatred” after he said in a video that Muslims should not consume
certain brands of yogurt due to their ingredients. In May, former
imam Shavkat Hasan had to pay a fine of nearly $575 (6.6 million so’m)
for discussing religious matters on social media without the CRA’s
permission. During the year, the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan—anominally independent entity responsible for overseeing Islamic
practice in the country—reported firing multiple imams related totheir unapproved commentary.
Relatedly, there were also reports that authorities continued toforcibly shave the beards of men and demand that women wear theirheadscarves a certain way. In September, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty reported that law enforcement conducted a number of raids
throughout Tashkent to detain bearded men, force them to shave, andsubject at least some of them to brief periods of administrative arrest.

Transnational Repression of Muslims
Although the current administration has sought to distance itself fromthe legacy of the previous government under Islam Karimov—which
brutally repressed freedom of religion or belief—it nonetheless continued to pursue individuals who had fled that regime due to religious
persecution. Police and security services have reportedly pressured
and coerced Uzbek Muslims living abroad to return to Uzbekistan, insome cases even promising them that they will not face prosecution
upon their return. In March 2023, a court reduced Alijon Mirganiyev’s
prison sentence he received on religious extremism-related charges
from seven years to six years and six months. He was arrested upon his
return to the country and sentenced in October 2022 despite having
received assurances he would not be detained. In September, France
deported Muhsinjon Ahmedov, who was in the process of seeking asylum given the criminal charges that he faced in Uzbekistan related tohis religious practice. In November, authorities in Uzbekistan arrested
Ahmedov on the allegation that he was involved in “extremism.” In
December, a French court ruled that his deportation was conductedillegally and that French authorities should immediately seek his returnto France.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and Uzbekistan engaged closely on efforts related
to regional security, economic development, people-to-people ties,
and human rights. In fiscal year 2023, the U.S. government obligated$41 million for programs in Uzbekistan. In February 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to Uzbekistan, where he
met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and urged the government
to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. During that
visit, Secretary Blinken asserted that “real progress has been madeon protecting religious freedom” in Uzbekistan and added that theUnited States “supports the full implementation of President Mirziyoyev’s reform agenda. That includes delivering on commitments to
defend religious freedom.” In September, President Joseph R. Biden
met with President Mirziyoyev for the C5+1 Presidential Summit,
which public reporting indicated did not include substantial discussion of human rights. In November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Statefor South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu also visited Uzbekistan
to participate in the U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue.
While in the country, he met with civil society groups working topromote human rights.

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BackgroundKEY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

T

his section highlights some important developments andtrends that impacted religious freedom conditions aroundthe world in 2023, particularly—but not only—in countries
and regions not covered elsewhere in this report. These developments are not exhaustive, and the omission of specific countries orcases is not indicative of a lack of religious freedom violations in
those regions.

The Indian government similarly engaged in increased acts oftransnational repression to target religious minorities living in thediaspora. In addition to allegations of involvement in an assassination
and assassination attempts of Canadian and American Sikh citizens,
Indian government officials facilitated harassment campaigns tosilence dissidents critical of religious freedom conditions in India.
Following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the UnitedStates in June, comments from the head of India’s Bharatiya Janata
Party’s (BJP) Information and Technology Department, Amit Malviya,
Transnational Repression
prompted an online campaign against U.S. Wall Street Journal jourIn addition to perpetrating religious freedom violations within their own
nalist Sabrina Siddiqui for posing a question to Prime Minister Modicountries, several governments engaged in transnational repression toabout religious freedom conditions in the country. The Indian governsilence religious minorities and their advocates abroad. These government also continued to deny entry and cancel overseas citizen of India
ments used intimidation, harassment, and violence to target political(OIC) status to members of the diaspora.
and human rights activists, journalists, and members of religious andTransnational repression also increased in Southeast Asia as
ethnic minority groups living outside their borders. In extreme cases,
governments shared information and tracked down human rights andtactics included detention, reprisals against family members, kidnapreligious freedom activists outside of their borders. In 2023, Associping, and assassinations.
ation of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) governments increasingly
China is the world’s most “prolific,” “sophisticated, compreused digital surveillance software and practices originating fromhensive, and far-reaching” perpetrator of transnational repression,countries such as China and Israel to spy on diaspora communities,
according to Freedom House. In 2023, the Chinese government
including religious minorities.
continued its transnational repression campaigns, targeting diasIn addition, USCIRF received reports confirming that Central
pora ethnic and religious communities with ties to China, including
Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uyghurs, Tibetans, Protestantand Uzbekistan, engaged in
Christians, and Falun Gong
transnational repression topractitioners in countries suchforcibly return their citizens fromas the United States, Japan,
abroad. Tajikistan, one of the“In addition to perpetrating religious freedom
South Korea, and Thailand. For
worst perpetrators of transnaexample, China operates overtional repression, continued toviolations within their own countries,
100 overseas police stations inabuse the International Criminal
several governments engaged in transnational
at least 53 countries. In April
Police Organization (INTERPOL)
repression to silence religious minorities and2023, the U.S. Department of
Red Notice system to target
their advocates abroad.”
Justice arrested and charged
Tajiks living in Europe, including
Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping
Ismaili Shi’a Muslim Pamiris andin connection with operating an
those affiliated with the Islamic
illegal Chinese overseas police
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
station in New York City. Lu has(IRPT), a religiously based polita history of engaging in transnational repression on behalf of theical opposition group. Other major perpetrators of transnational
Chinese government, targeting religious groups and dissidents on
repression against religious communities and religious freedom advoU.S. soil. In May, the Justice Department charged two individuals
cates include Egypt, Iran, Russia, Saudia Arabia, and Turkey.
for furthering the Chinese government’s transnational repression
against Falun Gong practitioners in the United States. Furthermore,
Laws Restricting Religious Freedom
the Chinese government used its economic and geopolitical influence
to pressure foreign countries, including Turkey, Morocco, Thailand,
In 2023, governments across the world retained legislation or are conNepal, and Pakistan, to repatriate Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists,sidering legislation inconsistent with an individual’s right to freedom
and Protestant Christian refugees to China, where they could faceof religion or belief, including blasphemy laws, anti-conversion laws,
severe human rights abuses. In 2023, USCIRF discussed its concerns
and restrictions on religious garb or traditions, such as ritual slaughter.
about China’s transnational repression with U.S. and foreign governBlasphemy laws remain one of the most significant challenges toment officials, including in Japan.
religious freedom by punishing acts or expressions deemed insulting

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or offensive to religious feelings, figures, or symbols with the deathfrom being targeted for destruction or used for military purposes bypenalty, compulsory labor, imprisonment, or fines. In 2023, USCIRF
state or nonstate actors during armed conflict unless strict conditions
identified 96 countries around the world that retain national-level
are met. Despite these protections, houses of worship and religious
blasphemy legislation, a number of which are recommended forsites continued to be utilized to launch attacks, and impermissibly
Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) or Special Watch List (SWL)
targeted and destroyed in armed conflicts around the globe in 2023.
designation. As described in
For example, during the contheir respective chapters, many
flict between Israel and Hamas
countries, such as Pakistan andafter Hamas’s violent terrorist
Nigeria, use blasphemy laws
attack against Israel in October,
Blasphemy laws remain one of theto foment violence toward relia rocket damaged the Convent
most significant challenges togious minorities and to settleof the Missionaries of Charity
religious freedom by punishing acts or
personal vendettas.
in Gaza. Other churches andA number of Europeanmonasteries were damaged
expressions deemed insulting or offensive
states passed and enforced laws
as well. Gaza’s oldest mosque,to religious feelings, figures, or symbols
that restrict expression deemed
the Omari Mosque, waswith the death penalty, compulsory labor,
insulting to religion, in violation
largely destroyed in an airstrike.
of international protections for
Military vehicles have damaged
imprisonment, or fines.
freedom of religion or belief
or destroyed parts of 16 cemeand freedom of expression.
teries in Gaza.
For example, the Danish govAmid fighting in Sudan,
ernment passed a new blasphemy law that bans the inappropriate
mosques and churches were the targets of attacks, raids, and exprotreatment of texts and objects of religious significance and justified its
priation. In May, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked a Coptic
actions in a way that reinforced harmful Muslim stereotypes. In Poland
Christian monastery in Wad Madani. Neighborhood battles between
in June, the Lublin Court of Appeals upheld a 2021 court ruling thatthe army and the RSF also destroyed 12 mosques and killed fiveProtestant Pastor Paweł Chojecki serve eight months of community
civilians. Similarly, in Ethiopia, fighting between separatist groups
service after being found guilty of “offending religious feelings” forand the federal government included attacks on places of worship.
critical comments he made about Catholics and the president. In April,
During a gathering on Christmas morning, for example, a drone
another Polish court found two women guilty of “offending religious
strike hit the grounds of the Full Gospel Church in Baro village offeelings” for participating in an lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
Kombolcha.
queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) rights march with an image depicting
Russia’s ongoing and unlawful invasion of Ukraine resulted in thethe Virgin Mary and Jesus with rainbow haloes. The court fined one
continued destruction of houses of worship and other religious sites.
woman about $500 (2,000 złoty) while sentencing the other woman
Religion on Fire, a Ukrainian project documenting the war’s impacts
to five months of community service.
on religious communities, reported in November at least 495 religious
USCIRF documented 46 countries with one or more national-levelinstitutions and other religious “objects” damaged or destroyed sincelaws that impermissibly restrict an individual’s ability to convert from
Russia’s 2022 invasion, and the Ukrainian nongovernmental organione religion to another or to believe in no religion at all. These laws
zation Institute for Religious Freedom reported at least 630 religious
may limit or prohibit proselytism, interfaith marriage, or an individbuildings damaged or destroyed as of December. In July, the Russian
ual’s ability to change his or her religious affiliation on government
military bombed Odesa’s historic Orthodox Transfiguration Cathedral,
documentation. They may also punish alleged acts of “apostasy”
which is a part of a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Culturalor renunciation of one’s faith. For example, Nepal’s anti-conversion
Organization (UNESCO) world heritage site.
law is enforced in ways to prevent individuals from converting to a
Since seizing power in 2021, the military junta in Burma
disfavored religion.
has destroyed approximately 200 houses of worship and religious
Religious garb restrictions involve government legislation either
sites such as Buddhist monasteries, churches, and mosques duringprohibiting or mandating the wearing of religious attire or symbols.
fighting with opposition forces.
For example, laws in Austria, France, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, among
others, prohibit individuals from wearing religious garb, including theRisks to Religious Minorities during Elections
hijab, burqa, and niqab, in public spaces. In November, the European
In 2023, levels of discrimination, hateful rhetoric, and attacks against
Union (EU) Court of Justice ruled that governments may ban public
religious minorities increased prior to and during elections in a number
employees from wearing religious dress or symbols, such as Islamicof countries. In many instances, religious parties targeted religious
headscarves, in public workplaces in the interest of neutrality. Meanminorities to sow divisions and gather political support while denying
while, the government of Iran and the Taliban mandate individuals toelectoral rights to certain groups. For example, religious minorities
wear religious garb in public. Individuals who violate religious garb
under both the federal and Kurdistan Regional governments of Iraq
laws face punishments such as fines and imprisonment. They may also
expressed alarm over growing threats to their political representation
face brutal treatment, including death, at the hands of the authorities.
in the December 2023 federal provincial elections and February 2024
Kurdistan parliamentary elections.
Attacks against Religious Sites in Armed Conflict
In South and Southeast Asia, governments dominated by ethnic
and religious groups exploited societal divisions for political gains. In
International humanitarian law (also called the law of war or the law
Burma, the military junta’s State Administration Council attemptedof armed conflict) protects places of worship and other religious sites

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K E Y G LO BA L D E V E LO PM E N T S

to legitimize its rule through the sponsorship of Buddhism, and it
the global trend of targeting and scapegoating religious minorities
indefinitely suspended elections in August. In Malaysia, the Malaysian
during elections in 2023, religious communities may be especially
Islamic Party (PAS) campaigned and won certain state legislatures
vulnerable in 2024. If governments fail to uphold their responsibility toduring the 2023 state elections on its commitment to Islamic nationprotect religious minorities, including their equal participation in elecalist tenets and Malay privileges. In Bangladesh, religious minorities
toral processes, religious freedom violations are at risk of escalating.
criticized the ruling Awami League for failing to protect the Ahmadiyya
Muslim community against violent attacks perpetrated by Islamist
Rise of Antisemitism and Anti-Muslim Hatred
party supporters. Prior to Pakistan’s general election in February 2024,
USCIRF observed a disturbing global rise in antisemitism andthe Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) party called for the destrucanti-Muslim hatred during 2023. For example, in France in September,tion of minarets on Ahmadi mosques, used anti-Ahmadi rhetoric,
perpetrators targeted a Jewish student wearing a kippah, threatening
and supported the death penalty in blasphemy cases. Meanwhile,and robbing him while hurling antisemitic insults. Holocaust memorials
India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated groups were
were also desecrated throughout the year in Latvia, the Netherlands,
responsible for increasing levels of hate speech against Muslims andand Sweden. Muslims similarly experienced a rise in hate crimes,
other religious minorities as they began campaigns for forthcoming
particularly against mosques and Muslim community spaces and2024 elections.
women wearing hijabs. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) in
Growing Hindu nationalist sentiment also emerged in the leadup
January 2023, a man on a bus called a woman and her child terrorists
to national assembly elections in Nepal. Members of the Rashtriya
for wearing hijabs and threatened to shoot them. In Germany in May
Prajatana Party (RPP) called for the restoration of a Hindu state and2023, a man attempted to set a Dresden mosque on fire, while inconstitutional monarchy, a sentiment that is gathering support among
France, two mosques were vandalized in Bordeaux in February alongtens of thousands of Nepalis. The RPP claimed that religious converwith a halal butcher shop in Rhône in March. In Belgium in April,sion must be controlled, arguing that religious groups have deceived
perpetrators ransacked the offices of the Collective for Inclusion and
Nepalis into converting to other faiths. In August, September, andAgainst Islamophobia, a nongovernmental organization that combats
October, spates of communal violence perpetrated by Hindu groups
anti-Muslim hatred.
led to government-imposed curfews.
In the aftermath of Hamas’s violent terrorist attack in Israel on
Additionally, continued deferral of nationwide elections in Libya
October 7 and Israel’s military response, expressions of and incidents
prolonged the authority of the interim Tripoli government in western
based on antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred sharply increased, with
Libya and jeopardized freedom of religion or belief throughout theimmediate, serious consequences for members of both communicountry. Tripoli officials used arrest, interrogation, detention, forcedties throughout the world. Jews
confession, and death penalty
were collectively blamed for
sentences against Muslim theothe actions of the Israeli govlogical dissenters, suspected
ernment and Muslims for theatheists, converts from Islam,
A number of European states passed andactions of Hamas, resulting inand both Libyan and foreign
enforced laws that restrict expression
physical assaults, deaths, arson
national Christians accused of
attacks, vandalism of places ofproselytizing. Rival government
deemed insulting to religion, in violation
religious and historical signifiactors in eastern Libya assertedof international protections for freedom ofcance, verbal harassment, andtheir own dominance throughreligion or belief and freedom of expression.
social exclusion. For example,
legislation and enforcement of
perpetrators vandalized andreligiously justified restrictions
set on fire a Jewish cemetery in
on Libyans’ online speech andAustria, branded Jewish homes
other expression unaligned
in France with stars of David, and covered Jewish schools in thewith officials’ interpretations of Islam. Both government-affiliatedUK with red paint. Hundreds of rioters also descended upon the El
security actors and nonstate militias exploited the lack of elections
Hamma synagogue in Tunisia, burning the building, vandalizing theand resulting governance gaps to target religious minorities—espewalls with graffiti, and desecrating the burial site of a historic Jewish
cially vulnerable migrants—for harassment, torture, and kidnapping
leader. Additionally, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries were vandalfor ransom.
ized in Portugal, Spain, and France.
In 2023, antisemitic tropes were weaponized during elections
Several alarming antisemitic incidents were also reported out
in a number of European countries. In Italy, Elly Schlein, who is ofof Russia’s North Caucasus region in October. Unknown persons
Jewish descent, faced a barrage of antisemitism both leading up to
set fire to a Jewish cultural center under construction in Nalchik andand following her election as head of the Democratic Party. Social
wrote “Death to Jews” on the walls. An anti-Israel rally in Cherkessk
media users circulated memes that employed antisemitic tropes, likeresulted in participants calling for the expulsion of Jews from thethe “happy merchant,” and derogatorily described Schlein as a pupregion. In Khasavyurt, a mob demanded to inspect all the guests of
pet of the Soros and Rothchild families, who have long been used asa hotel after rumors online suggested the hotel was housing Israeli
antisemitic symbols of “Jewish power.” Additionally, Hungarian Prime
refugees. In the most disturbing instance, an angry mob of hundreds
Minister Viktor Orban and his political party, Fidesz, continued toof people stormed an airport in Makhachkala, shouting antisemitic diaemploy antisemitic rhetoric referencing the Soros family to gain public
tribes and searching for Jews following false reports that a plane hadfavor during election campaigns and discredit political opposition.
been carrying “Israeli refugees” from the Middle East. While RussianMore than 50 national elections are scheduled in 2024, including
authorities arrested dozens involved in the mob attack, officials failed
several countries recommended for CPC or SWL designation. Given

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K E Y G LO BA L D E V E LO PM E N T S

to condemn the incident as antisemitic and instead falsely accused
Other religious communities in Europe also continued to expeUkraine and Western countries of inciting the attack.
rience hate crimes and discrimination on a societal level during theActs of anti-Muslim hatred also rose following the October 7
reporting period. For example, churches were vandalized in countries
terrorist attack. In Germany, multiple mosques received threatenincluding the Netherlands, France, and Germany. In March, a gunmaning packages that included burnt pages of the Qur’an and feces. A
shot and killed six worshipers at a Jehovah’s Witness hall in Hamburg,
German politician with Kurdish-Syrian heritage also had his windows
Germany, during religious services.
broken and received hate-filled fliers and feces. A pig’s head was
Various countries in the European Union maintained restricleft outside the proposed site of a mosque in the UK, and a mosquetions on religious head coverings, such as the Jewish yarmulke andin France received a written
the Islamic hijab, and prohiarson threat. In France, staff atbitions on ritual slaughter, aa hotel asked a woman wearfoundational practice in both
ing a hijab to leave so as not to
Judaism and Islam. In a posi“scare other customers,” citing
tive development, the Finnish
Various countries in the European Union
concerns due to current events.
government this year rejectedmaintained restrictions on religious headIn positive developments,
attempts to ban ritual slaughter.
coverings, such as the Jewish yarmulke
some European institutions and
In February, the Constitutional
and the Islamic hijab, and prohibitions on
governments worked to address
Committee of the Finnish Parliareligious intolerance during
ment found that a proposed set
ritual slaughter, a foundational practice2023, especially rising antisemof amendments to the animal
in both Judaism and Islam.
itism and anti-Muslim hatred. In
welfare act included a ban on
February, the European Comritual slaughter that violated relimis sion nominated Marion
gious freedom in a manner “notLalisse to fill the vacant position
proportionate to the goal ofof EU Coordinator on combating anti-Muslim hatred. Bulgaria forprotecting animals.” As a result, the government passed the amendthe first time adopted a national action plan to combat antisemitism.
ments to the act in March 2023 without such a provision.
Spain approved a national plan to implement the European Strategy to
Religious freedom conditions in Belarus remained concerning
Combat Antisemitism for 2023–2030. Croatia and Latvia adopted theas the government ramped up its crackdown on religious groups,
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemreligious leaders, and human rights organizations. In addition, in
itism. Additionally, Portugal appointed a National Coordinator of the
December, Belarus’s parliament passed a new religion law that mainEuropean Strategy to Combat Antisemitism and Promote Jewish Life.
tained several problematic provisions of the country’s 2002 religion
law and introduced new requirements and other restrictions that
violate Belarus’s human rights commitments under international law.
Other Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe
The new law—which President Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed in JanDuring the year, several European governments targeted individuals
uary 2024 after the reporting period—will reinforce the government’s
for their peaceful religious expression. In England in March, authorrole in regulating all aspects of religious life and expand its ability toities in Birmingham arrested and launched an investigation against
prosecute any activities, including peaceful expression of religious
Isabel Vaughan-Spruce for silently praying outside an abortion clinic
beliefs, that it perceives as a threat to its control.
within a “buffer zone” where a city council order prohibits protests,
Ukrainian authorities continued to treat the Ukrainian Orthodox
including prayer. By the end of September, the city announced that
Church (UOC)—which is historically and ecclesiastically linked to theit would not charge Vaughan-Spruce. In Finland in November, theMoscow Patriarchate—with suspicion after several of its clergy collabHelsinki Court of Appeals upheld a lower court ruling acquittingorated with Russian intelligence and spread pro-Russian propaganda.
member of Parliament Päivi Räsänen and Bishop Juhana Pohjola
However, some government measures to address these concernsof the Evangelical Lutheran Mission Diocese of Finland on charges
risked imposing collective punishment on the entire religious group,of hate speech against members of the LGBTQI+ community forincluding peaceful, law-abiding citizens. In October, the Ukrainian parexpressing their religious views on sexuality and marriage. As of
liament passed in its first reading draft law 8371, which would ban theJanuary 2024, the state prosecutor was seeking to appeal the rulingactivities of religious organizations “that are affiliated with the centersto the country’s Supreme Court.
of influence of a religious organization, the management center ofFrance continued to target religious minorities it pejoratively
which is located outside of Ukraine in a state that carries out armedlabeled as “sects” or “cults.” In January 2023, the French government
aggression against Ukraine.” While this version of the draft law did notpassed a new law that empowers authorities to use “special techexplicitly impose an outright ban on any particular religious group, itniques” outlined in the criminal code to investigate “sects.” Thoseis clearly intended to target the UOC. USCIRF has urged the Ukrainian
found guilty of exploitation through “sectarian” activities may face up
government to ensure that this legislation complies with international
to $1.06 million (one million euros) in fines and seven years in prison.
standards on freedom of religion or belief and will continue to monitor
In December, the French Senate completed an initial reading of a law
developments on this issue in 2024.
“aimed at strengthening the fight against sectarian aberrations,” which
would create a new criminal offense of “psychological subjugation”
Religious Freedom Concerns for Refugees
and allow the anti-“sect” government organization MIVILUDES (Interministerial Mission of Vigilance and Combat against Sectarian Drifts)
In 2023, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees estito participate in criminal trials as a civil party.
mated that 110 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide and

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K E Y G LO BA L D E V E LO PM E N T S

that 35.3 million of them were refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention
refugees have fled to neighboring Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malayand its 1967 Protocol define a refugee as a person who is outside his
sia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded
The Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan similarly forced many
fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationalreligious minorities to seek refuge in India and Pakistan. In 2023, while
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is
Afghan Hindus and Sikhs reported being able to practice their faith inunable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that counIndia, they also faced harassment and stigmatization from local comtry, or to return there, for fear of persecution. Many of those displaced
munities, according to the Global Federation of Societies for Afghan
face religious persecution or discrimination in their home countries.
Hindus and Sikhs (SAHAS). In October, the Pakistani government
Refugee issues remained particularly concerning in South andbegan forcibly returning undocumented Afghan refugees, posing aSoutheast Asia. The majority of ASEAN member states are not party
serious threat to religious minorities, including Hazara Shi’a Muslims,
to the 1951 Refugee Convention
who have been persecuted by
and 1967 Protocol, resulting
the Taliban.
in refugees often being clasNepal continued to serve
sified as “illegal immigrants.”
as the closest destination for
Given the global trend of targeting and
In June, Cambodia, one of the
Tibetan refugees fleeing persefew ASEAN members who havecution from Chinese authorities
scapegoating religious minorities during
signed the 1951 Convention andengaging in systematic arrests,
elections in 2023, religious communities may
the 1967 Protocol, allegedly
suppression, and punishment
be especially vulnerable in 2024.
pushed all Montagnard Christianof those protesting China’s
communities back to Vietnam
influence in Tibet. The Nepali
following an outbreak of violence
government continued to denyin the border region. Thailand
Tibetan refugees identity cards,
hosts a number of individuals and communities fleeing religious freepreventing them from securing work and educational opportunities
dom violations from the surrounding region, including Burma, China,
in the country and abroad. It enforced this prohibition throughLaos, North Korea, and Vietnam. Reports from civil society working
ongoing surveillance of refugees, including home visits and searches.
with these communities expressed concern that the Thai government
A number of Eritrean Christians have sought refuge in Ethiopia,
coordinates surveillance and potentially extradites individuals who have
Sudan, Egypt and Libya, while others have sought asylum in Israel
fled religious persecution. Additionally, following the Burmese military’s
or crossed the Mediterranean into Europe. Similarly, Christians have2017 attempt at genocide, for example, over one million Rohingya
fled ongoing violence in Nigeria, with some seeking safety in Niger.

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KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONSIMPLEMENTED

T

he International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as
amended, mandates USCIRF to make independent policy
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, andCongress. The recommendations are based on USCIRF’s researchon religious freedom conditions abroad and assessment of U.S.
policy. In addition, USCIRF’s mandate includes tracking the U.S.
government’s implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations andreviewing, to the extent practicable, the effectiveness of such
implemented recommendations in advancing religious freedominternationally. While notable U.S. government actions pursuant to
USCIRF’s recommendations are detailed throughout this report, thissection highlights the key USCIRF recommendations implemented
during 2023. The list, which is not exhaustive, is meant to showcase
the effectiveness of USCIRF’s recommendations. Unless otherwise
noted, the recommendations highlighted here were included in
USCIRF’s 2023 Annual Report.

for their 2022 crackdown on demonstrators protesting
Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death in police custody for wearing an“improper hijab” and for related human rights violations,
including against women and girls.
■■

Designating the Worst Violators■■■

On December 29, 2023, the U.S. Department of State designated
12 countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under
IRFA. USCIRF recommended that the State Department designate each of those countries as CPCs.
Alongside the CPC designations, the State Department placed
five countries on its Special Watch List (SWL) under IRFA. USCIRF
recommended three of these countries—Algeria, Azerbaijan,
and Central African Republic—for such placement. Azerbaijan
was added to the SWL for the first time.

■■

In January, March, April, June, and twice in September, theU.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Iranian officials

In December, the Treasury Department sanctioned Taliban
officials responsible for religiously inspired repression of therights of women and girls in Afghanistan.

USCIRF recommended that the:■At the same time, the State Department also designated eight
nonstate actors as “entities of particular concern,” or EPCs, sevenof which USCIRF recommended for such designation.

USCIRF has consistently called on the U.S. government toincrease the use of human rights-related financial and visa
authorities to impose asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious freedom violations, citing
specific abuses. Over the course of 2023, the U.S. government
issued sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act and other authorities against individuals andentities specifically for religious freedom abuses. Significant
sanctions issued during the year for religious freedom abuses
are listed below.

In August, the State Department imposed visa restrictions
on Chinese officials for their involvement in the forcible
assimilation of more than one million Tibetan children ingovernment-run boarding schools. Among other objectives,
these assimilation policies seek to eliminate religious traditions
prominent in Tibet.

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions■

In April, the Treasury Department sanctioned three Nicaraguan judicial officials responsible for stripping Nicaraguan
citizenship from clergymen and for sentencing Bishop
Rolando Álvarez to 26 years in prison for his criticism of government actions. In August, the State Department imposed
visa restrictions on 100 municipal officials involved in shuttering civic spaces, including the Jesuit-run University ofCentral America, and detaining human rights and religious
freedom advocates.

■

Joseph R. Biden administration maintain the United States’
leadership role in the International Religious Freedom or Belief
Alliance (IRFBA). In 2023, the United States continued to serveas the secretariat for IRFBA. During the year, IRFBA made multicountry statements on combating antisemitism, the persecutionof Christians worldwide, and Chinese religious prisoner of conscience Wang Yi.
U.S. government support international investigations into
religious freedom violations occurring in China and in Iran,
including at the United Nations Human Rights Council(UNHRC). At the UNHRC, the U.S. government delivered astatement referencing the violations the Chinese government
commits against Uyghurs. At the UN Third Committee, theU.S. government joined a multicountry statement on the Chinese government’s persecution of Uyghurs and other Muslim
communities in Xinjiang. At the UNHRC, the U.S. government
delivered multiple statements condemning the Iranian government’s crackdown on protesters following Mahsa Zhina Amini’s
death in police custody and its continued violations against
women and girls.

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K E Y USC I R F R ECO M M E N DAT I O N S I M PL E M E N T E D I N 2023

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government:■■

Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. assistance to Egypt
and continue to withhold a portion of the Foreign Military Financing for specified international religious freedom violations.
Congress conditioned up to $320 million of the $1.3 billion annual
Foreign Military Financing aid package to Egypt on human rights
improvements, including religious freedom. In September, theadministration chose to withhold only $85 million, prompting
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s announcement that it
would block the release of the remaining $235 million to Egypt.

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 –Advancing International Religious Freedom■

Provide financial, administrative, and diplomatic support to theSpecial Criminal Court and other investigations into ethnoreligious targeting and human rights abuses by state actors orstate-backed foreign fighters in the Central African Republic. The
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) continues tofund programs to empower the populations of the Central African Republic to prevent and respond to human rights violations.

USCIRF has called on the Biden administration to continue to
implement the executive order on Advancing International Religious Freedom, signed by then President Donald J. Trump in
June 2020. The executive order included several of USCIRF’s
longstanding recommendations related to the prioritization ofreligious freedom in U.S. foreign policy. This included increasing
related foreign assistance and developing an overall strategy
for promoting religious freedom abroad and country-specificaction plans. In 2023, the Biden administration implemented theexecutive order in the following ways:■■

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience(RPOCs)■

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government strengthen
advocacy on behalf of individuals persecuted on the basis ofreligion. Pursuant to this recommendation, U.S. officials engaged
on RPOC cases around the world.
■

■

■

■

■

In January 2023, the State Department launched the Without
Just Cause Political Prisoners Initiative, which seeks to raiseinternational awareness and advocate for the release of political prisoners. The initiative includes diplomatic engagementin Washington, DC, and by U.S. embassies abroad. Some ofthose individuals featured are RPOCs included in USCIRF’s
Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List such as
Gulshan Abbas, Rolando Álvarez, Ekpar Asat, and Go Sherab
Gyatso.

■USCIRF recommended that Congress highlight internationalreligious freedom issues through legislation, hearings, briefings,
and other actions.
■

In April, the State Department condemned the Burmese government’s sentencing of RPOC Reverend Dr. Hkalam Samson
to six years in prison.

In July, Ambassador Hussain called on Cuban authorities tounconditionally release religious leaders Lorenzo Rosales
Fajardo, Loreto Hernández García, and Donaida Pérez Paseiro.
Also in July, the State Department, members of Congress, and
USCIRF called on the Egyptian government to release religious
prisoner of conscience Patrick George Zaki. Within days, theEgyptian government pardoned and released Zaki.

82 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

USAID continued to advance religious freedom within its priorities and programming, including by launching the agency’s
first-ever strategic religious engagement policy to strengthen
USAID’s collaboration with religious communities to improve
development and humanitarian assistance outcomes.

Congressional Action Promoting Religious Freedom

In February, the U.S. government secured the release of 222
individuals who had been unjustly imprisoned by the government of Nicaragua, including RPOCs.

In May, U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious
Freedom Rashad Hussain called on the Vietnamese government to immediately release Christian leader Nay Y Blang.

The State Department continued to pursue country-specificaction plans, dedicated approximately $20 million to IRFrelated programming, and continued to provide training on
IRF issues to foreign service officers.

■■

Congress held several hearings on international religious
freedom issues. Those hearings included House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearings on the crisis facing women andgirls in Afghanistan, the Nicaraguan government’s severe
persecution of the Catholic Church, and antisemitism in intergovernmental organizations and in Europe. In addition, theCongressional-Executive Commission on China held hearings
on preventing forced assimilation in Tibet, implementing the
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, countering China’s transnational repression, and examining Uyghur forced labor. Also,
the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party held
hearings on the ongoing Uyghur genocide and the Chinese
government’s transnational repression. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held a hearing on transnational repression as well.
Members of Congress introduced resolutions on the
Burmese military’s gross human rights violations; India’s
violations against Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and other religious minorities; Iran’s state-sponsored persecution of the
Baha’i minority; the need to designate Nigeria as a CPC; andSri Lanka’s targeting of religious minorities.
Members of Congress advocated for religious prisoners andother prisoners of conscience through the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission’s Defending Freedom Project.

K E Y USC I R F R ECO M M E N DAT I O N S I M PL E M E N T E D I N 2023

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal■

USCIRF recommended that the Joseph R. Biden administration
address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers
in expedited removal. USCIRF has long monitored the subject,including in comprehensive reports released in 2005, 2007, 2013,
and 2016 that document major problems successive administrations have not addressed. Specifically, USCIRF found that U.S.
Department of Homeland Security officials often fail to follow
required procedures to identify asylum seekers and refer themfor credible fear determinations; that they detain asylum seekers
in inappropriate, prison-like conditions; and that funding disparities and a lack of high-level oversight hamper the complicated,
multiagency process.
■In May, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
announced changes that may allow families seeking asylum
in expedited removal proceedings to access alternatives todetention while awaiting the processing of their claim.

Refugee Resettlement■

USCIRF has consistently recommended that the U.S. government
maintain a robust refugee resettlement program and that victimsof the most severe forms of religious persecution be prioritized.
In September 2023, the Biden administration maintained theannual refugee ceiling at 125,000 for fiscal year 2024. Also in
September, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) extended temporary protected status for Afghan
nationals living in the United States. The administration also
designated members of religious minority groups in Eurasia,
the Baltics, and Iran for priority access. In December, at the
Global Refugee Forum, the U.S. government announced newpledges, including increasing the resettlement of Rohingya to
the United States.

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APPENDIX 1 COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES
Abraham Cooper, Chair

Frederick A. Davie, Vice ChairAPPOINTED BY

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Associate Dean and Director of Global Social
Action for the Simon Wiesenthal Center, aleading Jewish human rights organization.

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Senior Strategic Advisor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City and Senior
Fellow at Interfaith America.

David Curry, Commissioner

Susie Gelman, Commissioner

APPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. President and CEO of Global Christian Relief,
which provides aid and advocacy for those
suffering from religious persecution, particularly those affected by violence for practicing
their Christian faith.

President Joseph R. Biden (D), for a term
expiring in May 2025. Activist and Philanthropist, previously Board Chair of Israel Policy
Forum and past President of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington.

Mohamed Magid, Commissioner

Stephen Schneck, Commissioner

APPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term expiringin May 2024. Executive Religious Director andImam of All Dulles Area Muslim Society Center,
Chairman of International Interfaith Peace Corps,
member of the Muslim Jewish Council, CoPresident of Religions for Peace, and Co-Founderof the Multi-faith Neighbors Network.

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term
expiring in May 2024. Political philosopher
and retired professor from The Catholic University of America. Catholic advocate forsocial justice and serves on the governing
boards of Catholic Climate Covenant andCatholic Mobilizing Network.

Nury Turkel, Commissioner

Eric Ueland, Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), then Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives, for a term
expiring in May 2024. Lawyer, author, humanrights advocate, Senior Fellow at the Hudson
Institute, and Life Member of the Council on
Foreign Relations.

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. Visiting
Fellow at the Heritage Institution, and member of the Board of Advisors at the Center for
Constitutional Liberty at Benedictine College.

Frank Wolf, Commissioner
APPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Retired U.S. Member of Congress, Founderand former Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission.

APPENDIX 1

85

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION
OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Introduction
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as amended
by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016,
requires USCIRF to:make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . listsof persons it determines are imprisoned or detained, havedisappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured, or subjected to forced renunciation of faith for theirreligious activity or religious freedom advocacy by thegovernment of a foreign country that the Commission
recommends for designation as a country of particularconcern [CPC] . . . or by a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends for designation as an entity of particularconcern [EPC].
USCIRF developed the Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion orBelief (FoRB) Victims List—an online public database—to implement
this provision for countries USCIRF recommends for Country of Particular Concern (CPC) or Special Watch List (SWL) status. The list also
includes such victims located in the de facto territories of nonstate
actors that USCIRF recommends for Entity of Particular Concern (EPC)
status, according to the same criteria.

Due to limited resources, USCIRF is unable to identify and document all victims that meet the statutory requirement to be included
on the FoRB Victims List and generally relies on receiving submissions
from outside individuals and organizations. As such, the information
contained in the database does not reflect country, regional, or global
trends. Furthermore, percentages highlighted in this section should
not be used for extrapolation purposes nor interpreted as a particulargroup experiencing greater violations than another or a particularcountry committing violations at a greater rate than others.
To support this project, USCIRF invites those with credible information on FoRB victims to submit information using the Victims List
Intake Form. Additional information about the FoRB Victims List canbe found in USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List Factsheet.

Perpetrators
By the end of 2023, the FoRB Victims List included more than 2,200
individuals targeted by 27 different countries and entities. More than
1,300 victims remain in some form of custody, while more than 600
have been released. The detention status of approximately 300 cases
remains unknown, and nine individuals are listed as deceased after
dying in state custody.

Died in
Custody

Not
Released

Released

Algeria

1

4

Azerbaijan

4

6

1

11

Burma

2

1

2

5

China

520

44

231

795

Cuba

5

3

3

11

1

Perpetrator

Egypt

4

13

36

24

Houthis

1

2

India

26

27

1

Indonesia

5

1

2

Iran

79

251

14
1

8

8

12

21

Malaysia
Nicaragua

61
2
3

2

Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Kazakhstan

18
1

2

Iraq

Total
5

Eritrea
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

Unknown

1

55
8

3

347
2
1
16

4

4
33

APPENDIX 2

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A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Not
Released

Released

Nigeria

5

4

North Korea

3

Perpetrator

Died in
Custody

Unknown

Total
9

8

11

Pakistan

61

25

Russia371

105

Saudi Arabia

43

6

49

1

1

Sri Lanka

6

1

87

1

483

Tajikistan

9

4

13

Turkmenistan

10

21

31

Uzbekistan

49

38

Vietnam

57

9

12

2

80

1,311

618

290

9

2,228

Total

87

The most documented violation on the FoRB Victims List was imprisonment, followed by detention, house arrest, enforced disappearance,
and forced renunciation of faith. USCIRF also documented a case of forced psychiatric treatment and another involving compulsory labor. The
chart below does not reflect whether a victim is in custody or released.

Perpetrator

Imprisonment Detention

House
ArrestEnforced
Disappearance

ForcedRenunciationof Faith

Other

Total

Algeria

5

Azerbaijan

7

4

11

Burma

3

2

5

5

China

572

213

4

Cuba

6

1

4

Egypt

3

60

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS)

2

Houthis

2

1

India

1

53

Indonesia

6

2

198

140

Iraq

18
61
2
3
1

55

9

347

8

2

2
1

15

1

18

15

1
16

Malaysia
Nicaragua

111Islamic State in West
Africa Province (ISWAP)
Kazakhstan

795

15

Eritrea

Iran

6

4

4
33

Nigeria

3

6

9North Korea

8

3

11

Pakistan

31

50

Russia383

57

Saudi Arabia

31

16

Sri Lanka

88 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

1

6
30

11
2

87
2

483
49
1

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Perpetrator

Imprisonment Detention

Tajikistan

12

Turkmenistan

31

Uzbekistan

85

Vietnam
Total

House
ArrestEnforced
Disappearance

ForcedRenunciationof Faith

Other

1

Total
13
31

1

1

71

8

1

1,491

654

51

In addition to these abuses, USCIRF has documented 190 cases
in which torture was reported. Countries and entities accused of
torture included China (77), Uzbekistan (28), Iran (20), Saudi Arabia(18), Russia (16), Vietnam (6), Pakistan (5), Eritrea (3), Azerbaijan (2),Cuba (2), Egypt (2), Houthis (2), Kazakhstan (2), India (2), Tajikistan(2), Turkmenistan (2), and Algeria (1). USCIRF has also documented
144 cases in which medical neglect was reported. Countries andentities accused of medical neglect included Iran (62), China (17),Russia (17), India (14), Saudi Arabia (7), Vietnam (6), Pakistan (5),

87
80
24

6

2

2,228

Egypt (4), Eritrea (4), Houthis (3), Uzbekistan (2), Cuba (1), Nigeria(1), and Tajikistan (1).
Based on the information maintained in the database, the following chart reflects the percentage of individuals imprisoned by country.
Among the violators included in the database, China imprisoned themost FoRB victims, followed by Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Eritrea, India, and Saudi Arabia. Victims from all other countries
and entities each individually constituted one percent or less than one
percent of the victims in the database.

VICTIMS BY PERPETRATOR
Victims by Perpetrator■ 36% China■ 22% Russia■ 15% Iran
■ 8% Other■ 4% Pakistan■ 4% Uzbekistan■ 4% Vietnam■ 3% Eritrea■ 2% India■ 2% Saudi Arabia

APPENDIX 2

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A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Religions and Beliefs
The FoRB Victims List includes individuals with a wide variety of
beliefs and religions, as reflected in the following table.

Religion or Belief

Number of Victims Documented

Adivasi1

Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light

3

Baha’i

166

Bon

1

Buddhist - Hoa Hao

6

Buddhist - Theravada

3

Buddhist - Tibetan

93

Buddhist - Unspecified/Other

32

Christian - Catholic

57

Christian - Church of Almighty God

236

Christian - Jehovah’s Witness

282

Christian - Orthodox

20

Christian - Protestant139

Christian - Unspecified/Other

64

Duong Van Minh

4

ECKist (Eckankar)

1

Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner

3

Falun Gong

217

Hindu

10

Humanist

1

Jewish1

Muslim - Ahmadiyya

20

Muslim - Qur’anist

1

Muslim - Shi’a39

Muslim - Sufi

63

Muslim - Sunni

406

Muslim - Unspecified/Other

232

Santería

5

Scientologist

1

Shaman1

Sikh

1

Yarsani38

Unknown/Unspecified

81

Total

90 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

2,228

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

VICTIMS BY RELIGIONS AND BELIEFS

Victims by Religions and Beliefs■ 18% Sunni■ 16% Other/Unspecified Muslim■ 13% Jehovah's Witness■ 11% Church of Almighty God■ 10% Falun Gong
■ 9% Other/Unspecified/Unknown■ 7% Baha'i■ 6% Other/Unspecified Christian■ 6% Protestant■ 4% Tibetan Buddhist

APPENDIX 2

91

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Nature of Charges
Individuals included on the FoRB Victims List face a range of charges inseveral different legal contexts. USCIRF created groupings for similar
charges to identify how foreign governments and entities justify theincarceration of the individuals included on the FoRB Victims List.
USCIRF’s categories are not mutually exclusive, and individuals areoften included in more than one category based on varying charges
brought against them. While USCIRF excludes from the FoRB Victims
List individuals known to have committed or promoted violence, many
individuals on the list face unsubstantiated accusations of violent
crimes by the foreign government.
USCIRF is in the process of identifying charges for more than aquarter of the victims. Dozens of victims are not facing any charges,
yet they remain imprisoned or have been subjected to other violations
included on the FoRB Victims List that may not involve legal charges,
such as enforced disappearance or forced renunciation of faith.

Nature of Charges Categories

Number of
Individuals Charged

Percentage ofIndividuals Charged

Abuse (Physical, Sexual, Psychological)

1<1%

Aid & Abetment

14

1%

Apostasy

4<1%Arms Trafficking & Illicit Use of Weapons

191%

Assault & Battery

10

<1%

Banned Organization

616

28%

Blasphemy

112

5%

Breach of Privacy & Disclosure

2<1%

Conversion

29

1%

Crimes Involving Minors

5<1%

Criminal Premeditation & Conspiracy

25

1%

Cult

312

14%

2

<1%

Drug Trafficking & Illicit Drug Use

12

1%

Embezzlement & Fraud

20

1%

Defamation

Environmental Crimes

1<1%

Espionage

7<1%

Extremism

306

14%

3

<1%

Fabricating & Destroying Evidence
Filing a False Police Report1<1%Forgery

5<1%

Harboring a Fugitive

5<1%

Hate Speech

110

5%

Illegal Assembly

152

7%

Illegal Business Activity

5<1%

Illegal Migration & Entry/Exit of Country

7<1%

Illicit Financing

65

3%

Immorality

12

1%

Incitement to Commit Crime & Violence

54

2%

92 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Nature of Charges Categories

Number of
Individuals Charged

Percentage ofIndividuals Charged

Insulting Public Officials & Institutions

33

1%

Leaking State Secrets

5<1%

Mercenarism

2<1%

Miscellaneous Religious Crimes

15

1%

Murder & Attempted Murder

28

1%

Negligence

1<1%

Not Applicable76

3%

Public Disorder

118

5%

Refusing & Absconding Military Service

25

1%

Separatism

31

1%

Spreading Propaganda & False or Misleading Ideas,
Information, or Materials

218

10%

Subversion

85

4%

Terrorism

328

15%

Theft & Robbery

4<1%

Threat3<1%

Treason & Sedition

248

11%

Unknown

603

27%

Unlawful Disobedience

51

2%

APPENDIX 2

93

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

The following chart highlights the top 10 most common types of charges for individuals on the FoRB Victims List.

TOP TEN MOST COMMON CHARGES
30
28%
27%

25

20

15

15%

14%

14%
11%
10%

10

7%
5%

5

0

d
wn
Banne
Unkno
n
io
t
a
iz
Organ

m

Terroris

94 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

Cult

ism

Extremn&ing
TreasoSpread a
n
io
nd
it
a
Sed
PropagIllegal
bly
Assem

emy

Blasph5%

Publicer
DisordAPPENDIX 3 HIGHLIGHTS OF
USCIRF’S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN 2023

In addition to releasing an Annual Report by May 1 of each year,
USCIRF produces research and additional information related tointernational religious freedom throughout the year. This includes
work to monitor, report on, and advocate against foreign governmentsthat engage in or tolerate violations of religious freedom or whose
laws and policies permit or condone violations of human rights ofminority groups and other vulnerable communities on the basis ofreligion. This Appendix highlights USCIRF’s events and other materials
from calendar year 2023. USCIRF’s 2023 press releases and statements
and op-eds are available on USCIRF’s website at www.uscirf.gov.
USCIRF’s 2023 Tweets can be found here.

Hearings
■

■

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

January 2023: Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights
in IranFebruary 2023: Two Years after the Coup: Religious Freedom
in a Contested BurmaMarch 2023: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for
Religious Freedom

■
■

■
■

■

■

■
■

January 2023: Religious Freedom amid Iraq’s Political Crisis
February 2023: Religious Freedom Concerns in the Hornof Africa
February 2023: Religious Freedom Concerns in Central Africa■

March 2023: India’s State-Level Anti-Conversion Laws

■

■

■

■

June 2023: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba■

September 2023: Vietnam: Challenges and Opportunities for
Religious Freedom

December 2023: Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in Latin America■

May 2023: Transnational Repression of Freedom of Religion
or Belief
July 2023: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan: Policy Options for aCountry of Particular Concern

November 2023: Threats to Religious Sites in Turkey

Publications

■

■

■

April 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions for Followers ofAfrican Traditional and Indigenous Religions
April 2023: Sexual and Gender Based Violence Against Religious
Freedom Protesters in Iran
April 2023: Abuses against Fulani Muslim Civilians: Religious
Freedom Implications in West and Central Africa
May 2023: USCIRF’s 2023 Annual Report
May 2023: Religious Freedom in Houthi-Controlled Areasof Yemen
June 2023: Religious Freedom for Indigenous Communities in
Latin America
June 2023: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedomin Nigeria
July 2023: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine
July 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in the RussianFederation

September 2023: Advancing Religious Freedom within the
U.S. - India Bilateral Relationship■

December 2023: Religious Minorities and Governance in Iraq■

July 2023: Religious Freedom Concerns in the European Union■

August 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Egypt■

August 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Nepal■

August 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Eritrea

Events■■January 2023: Townhall on Women and International Religious
Freedom
March 2023: Rising Authoritarianism in ASEAN Member States
May 2023: 2023 Annual Report: Key Findings andRecommendations
June 2023: Evaluating Religious Freedom in Uzbekistan
October 2023: The First 25 Years: IRFA Accomplishments andNext Steps
November 2023: Religious Freedom in the Sahel Regionof Africa■■■

August 2023: Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights
in Afghanistan
September 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Vietnam
September 2023: The Bureaucratization of Religion inSoutheast Asia■

September 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Iran■

September 2023: Blasphemy Law Compendium■

September 2023: Blasphemy Legislation Update■

September 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Iraq

APPENDIX 3

95

A PPE N D I X 3 H I G H L I G H T S O F USC I R F 'S PU B L I C AC T I V I T I E S I N 2023

■

■

■
■

■

■

September 2023: Personal Status and Family Law in the Middle
East and North Africa
October 2023: Prosecuting Online Religious Activity in
Kazakhstan
October 2023: Religious Freedom Landscape in Kyrgyzstan
October 2023: 25th Anniversary of the International Religious
Freedom Act
November 2023: Examination of Threats to Religious Sites in
TurkeyNovember 2023: Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Sahel
Region of Africa■

November 2023: Religious Garb Restrictions■

November 2023: Anti-Conversion Laws Compendium■

December 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Belarus■

December 2023: State Control of Religion in Azerbaijan

96 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 4

■

■

■

December 2023: The Repression of Religious Freedom in
Authoritarian Tajikistan
December 2023: Assessing Blasphemy and Related Laws on
Religious Freedom in Pakistan
December 2023: Religious Freedom Conditions in Libya

Spotlight Podcast Episodes■■■

January 2023: Differences Between Religious Tolerance andReligious Freedom
January 2023: State Favored Religions’ Impact on Religious
Freedom
January 2023: USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List: Background and2022 Updates■

February 2023: The State of Religious Freedom in Algeria■

June 2023: Violence Against Tribal Christians in Manipur, India

2 0 2 4U S C I R F

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S■ CO U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R CO N C E R N ■Afghanistan

Eritrea

North Korea

TurkmenistanAzerbaijan

India

Pakistan

Vietnam

Burma

Iran

RussiaChina

Nicaragua

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Nigeria

Tajikistan■ S P E C I A L WAT C H L I S T CO U N T R I E S ■Algeria

Iraq

Malaysia

TurkeyEgypt

Kazakhstan

Sri Lanka

Uzbekistan

Indonesia

Kyrgyzstan

Syria

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714
Washington, DC 20401
Telephone: (202) 523–3240
www.uscirf.gov
Media@USCIRF.gov