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United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit______________________STEPHEN THALER,
Plaintiff-Appellantv.
KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATESPATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITEDSTATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Defendants-Appellees______________________
2021-2347______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for theEastern District of Virginia in No. 1:20-cv-00903-LMBTCB, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.
______________________
Decided: August 5, 2022______________________RYAN BENJAMIN ABBOTT, Brown, Neri, Smith & Khan,
LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
DENNIS BARGHAAN, JR., Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States
Department of Justice, Alexandria, VA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by JESSICA D. ABER;FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, PETER JOHN SAWERT,Case: 21-2347

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THALER v. VIDALMEREDITH HOPE SCHOENFELD, Office of the Solicitor,
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria,VA.
se.

MITCHELL APPER, Jerusalem, Israel, amicus curiae, pro______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, TARANTO and STARK, CircuitJudges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the question of who, or what, can be
an inventor. Specifically, we are asked to decide if an artificial intelligence (AI) software system can be listed as theinventor on a patent application. At first, it might seemthat resolving this issue would involve an abstract inquiry
into the nature of invention or the rights, if any, of AI systems. In fact, however, we do not need to ponder these metaphysical matters. Instead, our task begins – and ends –with consideration of the applicable definition in the relevant statute.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
undertook the same analysis and concluded that the Patent
Act defines “inventor” as limited to natural persons; thatis, human beings. Accordingly, the PTO denied StephenThaler’s patent applications, which failed to list any human as an inventor. Thaler challenged that conclusion in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
which agreed with the PTO and granted it summary judgment. We, too, conclude that the Patent Act requires an“inventor” to be a natural person and, therefore, affirm.
IThaler represents that he develops and runs AI systems that generate patentable inventions. One such system is his “Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of

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3Unified Science,” which Thaler calls “DABUS.” Thaler has
described DABUS as “a collection of source code or programming and a software program.” Supp. App. at 781.
In July 2019, Thaler sought patent protection for twoof DABUS’ putative inventions by filing two patent applications with the PTO: U.S. Application Nos. 16/524,350(teaching a “Neural Flame”) and 16/524,532 (teaching a“Fractal Container”). 1 He listed DABUS as the sole inventor on both applications. Thaler maintains that he did notcontribute to the conception of these inventions and thatany person having skill in the art could have taken
DABUS’ output and reduced the ideas in the applications
to practice. 2In lieu of an inventor’s last name, Thaler wrote on theapplications that “the invention [was] generated by artificial intelligence.” App. at 28, 69. He also attached several
documents relevant to inventorship. First, to satisfy 35
U.S.C. § 115’s requirement that inventors submit a sworn
oath or declaration when applying for a patent, Thaler
The administrative records for both applications
are materially identical.
2While inventorship involves underlying questionsof fact, see Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., Inc. v. Ono Pharm.
Co., 964 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2691 (2021), for purposes of this litigation the PTO
has not challenged Thaler’s representations, see D. Ct. Dkt.
No. 25, at 11. Accordingly, our analysis must be consistent
with the undisputed facts in the administrative record,drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See
Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United States, 989 F.3d1326, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (discussing when it is appropriate to supplement administrative record and noting “[t]hefocal point for judicial review should be the administrativerecord already in existence”) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
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submitted a statement on DABUS’ behalf. Second, Thaler
provided a supplemental “Statement on Inventorship” explaining that DABUS was “a particular type of connectionist artificial intelligence” called a “Creativity Machine.”App. at 198-203, 483-88. Third, Thaler filed a document
purporting to assign himself all of DABUS’ rights as an inventor.
The PTO concluded both applications lacked a valid inventor and were, hence, incomplete. Accordingly, it sent
Thaler a “Notice to File Missing Parts of Nonprovisional
Application” for each application and requested that Thaler identify valid inventors. In response, Thaler petitioned
the PTO director to vacate the Notices based on his Statements of Inventorship. The PTO denied Thaler’s petitions
on the ground that “a machine does not qualify as an inventor.” App. at 269-71, 548-50. Thaler sought reconsideration, which the PTO denied, explaining again thatinventors on a patent application must be natural persons.
Thaler then pursued judicial review of the PTO’s final
decisions on his petitions, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-704, 706. 3 The parties
agreed to have the District Court adjudicate the challenge
based on the administrative record made before the PTO
and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the Court granted the PTO’s motion
for summary judgment and denied Thaler’s request to reinstate his applications. The District Court concluded thatan “inventor” under the Patent Act must be an “individual”

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. See also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
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5and the plain meaning of “individual” as used in the statuteis a natural person.
Thaler appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295. See Odyssey Logistics & Tech. Corp. v. Iancu, 959
F.3d 1104, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions raising APA claims against PTO regarding patents).
IIWe review grants of summary judgment according to
the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Fourth Circuit. See Supernus Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 913 F.3d 1351,1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In the Fourth Circuit, a district
court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
See id. (citing Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
305 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2002)). Challenges to PTO petition decisions are governed by the APA and pertinent administrative law standards. Thus, we may set aside thejudgment resulting from an administrative adjudication
only if the agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, anabuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance withlaw” or if the agency’s actions are “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706.
“Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that we review
de novo.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC,
973 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
AThe sole issue on appeal is whether an AI software system can be an “inventor” under the Patent Act. In resolving disputes of statutory interpretation, we “begin[] withthe statutory text, and end[] there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176,183 (2004). Here, there is no ambiguity: the Patent Act
requires that inventors must be natural persons; that is,human beings.

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The Patent Act expressly provides that inventors are“individuals.” Since 2011, with the passage of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, the Patent Act has defined an“inventor” as “the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (emphasisadded). The Act similarly defines “joint inventor” and“coinventor” as “any 1 of the individuals who invented ordiscovered the subject matter of a joint invention.” § 100(g)(emphasis added). In describing the statements requiredof an inventor when applying for a patent, the statute consistently refers to inventors and co-inventors as “individuals.” See § 115.
The Patent Act does not define “individual.” However,as the Supreme Court has explained, when used “[a]s anoun, ‘individual’ ordinarily means a human being, a person.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454(2012) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).
This is in accord with “how we use the word in everydayparlance”: “We say ‘the individual went to the store,’ ‘theindividual left the room,’ and ‘the individual took the car,’each time referring unmistakably to a natural person.” Id.
Dictionaries confirm that this is the common understanding of the word. See, e.g., Individual, Oxford English Dictionary (2022) (giving first definition of “individual” as “[a]single human being”); Individual, Dictionary.com (last visited July 11, 2022), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/individual (giving “a single human being, as distinguishedfrom a group” as first definition for “individual”). So, too,
does the Dictionary Act, which provides that legislative useof the words “person” and “whoever” broadly include (“unless the context indicates otherwise”) “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). “With the phrase ‘as well as,’ the definitionmarks ‘individual’ as distinct from the list of artificial entities that precedes it,” showing that Congress understands

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7“individual” to indicate natural persons unless otherwise
noted. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 454.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that, whenused in statutes, the word “individual” refers to human beings unless there is “some indication Congress intended” adifferent reading. Id. at 455 (emphasis omitted). 4 Nothing
in the Patent Act indicates Congress intended to deviate
from the default meaning. To the contrary, the rest of thePatent Act supports the conclusion that “individual” in theAct refers to human beings.
For instance, the Act uses personal pronouns – “himself” and “herself” – to refer to an “individual.” § 115(b)(2).
It does not also use “itself,” which it would have done if
Congress intended to permit non-human inventors. The
Patent Act also requires inventors (unless deceased, incapacitated, or unavailable) to submit an oath or declaration.
See, e.g., id. (requiring oath or declaration from inventor
that “such individual believes himself or herself to be theoriginal inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed
invention in the application”). While we do not decide
whether an AI system can form beliefs, nothing in our record shows that one can, as reflected in the fact that Thaler
submitted the requisite statements himself, purportedly on
DABUS’ behalf.
Thaler directs us to several provisions of the Patent Act
as supposed support for his position that “inventor” should
be broadly read to include AI software, but each fails topersuade. First, Thaler points to the use of “whoever” inWhile Mohamad interpreted a statute other than
the Patent Act, the Court’s reasoning is directly applicablehere. See generally Legal Def. Fund v. Dep’t of Agric., 933
F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that “individual” refers to human beings and not animals, based inpart on Mohamad).
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35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 271. Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any newand useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of thistitle.” As this very section makes clear, however, patents
must satisfy the “conditions and requirements of” Title 35of the U.S. Code, including its definition of “inventor.” Section 271, in setting out what constitutes infringement, repeatedly uses “whoever” to include corporations and othernon-human entities. That non-humans may infringe patents does not tell us anything about whether non-humans
may also be inventors of patents. The question before us
inevitably leads back to the Patent Act’s definition of “inventor,” which uses the word “individual” – and does notuse “whoever.” 5 Furthermore, as we noted already, theDictionary Act establishes that Congress uses “whoever” asa much broader term than “individual.” See 1 U.S.C. § 1.
Second, Thaler contends that AI software programsmust qualify as inventors because otherwise patentability
would depend on “the manner in which the invention wasmade,” in contravention of 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 103 is
not about inventorship. Instead, it provides, in relevant
part, that inventions may still be nonobvious even if they
are discovered during “routine” testing or experimentation.
See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A.
de C.V., 865 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (explainingthat second sentence of § 103 was intended to clarify that“flash of creative genius” is unnecessary for patentability).
This statutory provision relates to how an invention is

While the PTO also initially relied on the use of“whoever” in § 101 of the Patent Act, the PTO has also consistently explained that “individual” is limited to naturalpersons, a position we now uphold.
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made and does not trump a provision that specifically addresses who may be an inventor.
Third, Thaler emphasizes that the term “inventor”
must be interpreted with attention to the “context in whichthat language is used[] and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have undertaken precisely this task. For the reasons explained above,
the Patent Act, when considered in its entirety, confirmsthat “inventors” must be human beings.
BOur holding today that an “inventor” must be a humanbeing is supported by our own precedent. See Univ. of Utah
v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013)(“[I]nventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.”) (emphasis added); Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993)(“[O]nly natural persons can be ‘inventors.’”). While these
opinions addressed different questions – concluding thatneither corporations nor sovereigns can be inventors – ourreasoning did not depend on the fact that institutions arecollective entities. The two cases confirm that the plain
meaning of “inventor” in the Patent Act is limited to natural persons.
CStatutes are often open to multiple reasonable readings. Not so here. This is a case in which the question ofstatutory interpretation begins and ends with the plain
meaning of the text. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.
Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“This Court has explained manytimes over many years, when the meaning of the statute’s
terms is plain, our job is at an end.”). In the Patent Act,
“individuals” – and, thus, “inventors” – are unambiguously
natural persons. Accordingly, we have no need to consider

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additional tools of statutory construction. See Matal v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017) (“[I]nquiry into themeaning of the statute’s text ceases when the statutory
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
We briefly address Thaler’s additional arguments.
Thaler argues that inventions generated by AI shouldbe patentable in order to encourage innovation and public
disclosure. Thaler’s policy arguments are speculative andlack a basis in the text of the Patent Act and in the record.
In any event, the text before us is unambiguous, and wemay not “elevate vague invocations of statutory purpose
over the words Congress chose.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,
142 S. Ct. 1783, 1792-93 (2022). Moreover, we are not confronted today with the question of whether inventions
made by human beings with the assistance of AI are eligible for patent protection.
Thaler invokes the canon of constitutional avoidance.
In Thaler’s view, permitting AI programs to be inventors
would support the constitutional purpose of patents “[t]opromote the progress of science and the useful arts.” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It follows, Thaler continues, thatnot recognizing AI as an inventor undermines such progress, raising potential constitutional concerns we should
be careful to avoid. Thaler is incorrect. The constitutional
provision he cites is a grant of legislative power to Congress; Congress has chosen to act pursuant to that powerby passing the Patent Act. Thaler does not (and cannot)
argue that limiting inventorship to human beings is unconstitutional. Therefore, the canon of constitutional avoidance is simply inapplicable. See Veterans4You LLC v.
United States, 985 F.3d 850, 860-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that this canon may be helpful when there is serious question regarding statute’s constitutionality); see also

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11Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014) (noting thatcanon of constitutional avoidance “has no application in theabsence of . . . ambiguity”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thaler also notes that South Africa has granted patents with DABUS as an inventor. This foreign patent office was not interpreting our Patent Act. Its determination
does not alter our conclusion.
We have considered Thaler’s additional arguments andfind they do not merit discussion.
IVWhen a statute unambiguously and directly answers
the question before us, our analysis does not stray beyond
the plain text. Here, Congress has determined that only anatural person can be an inventor, so AI cannot be. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs shall be assessed against Appellant.