CIGS Special Seminar

Catastrophic Disasters:Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges
Speaker: Arnold M. Howitt
Executive Director, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation
Faculty Co-Director, Program on Crisis Leadership (PCL)
Harvard Kennedy School

July 23, 2012
Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)
Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo©2012 CIGS
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the author.

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Program
1. Welcome remarks:
Michio Suzuki, Secretary-General, CIGS

2. Introduction: Revisiting the Tohoku Crises
Jun Kurihara, Research Director, CIGS

3. Catastrophic Disasters:
Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges
Arnold M. Howitt

4. Q&A
Moderator: Jun Kurihara

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Today’s Topics
Emergency preparedness in most countries concentrates
on risks that can be anticipated because of direct
experience, events elsewhere, formal risk analyses, orscenario development.

But how can society more effectively prepare for novel
threats or events that either have not been seen before(e.g., emergent infectious disease, undiscovered seismicfaults), or arise at a scale that far exceeds expectations(Hurricane Katrina, the March 11 earthquake/tsunami),
or involve simultaneous disasters that together posenovel challenges (earthquake, tsunami, nuclearaccident)?

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Latest Book edited by Dr. Howitt(with his colleague H. B. Leonard)
Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies, CQ Press, 2009

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies, CQ Press, 2009
Table of Contents

Part I. Prepared for the Worst? The Dilemmas of Crisis Management
1. Hurricane Katrina
2. SARS in Toronto

Part II. Structuring Crisis Response
3. The 1992 Los Angeles Riots
4. The Baltimore Tunnel Fire of 2001
5. The 9/11 Pentagon Emergency

Part III. Adapting to Novelty
6. The Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida
7. The 2003 San Diego Firestorm
8. The Anthrax Crisis and the U.S. Postal Service
9. Wal-Mart’s Response to Hurricane Katrina

Part IV. Improving Performance in Crisis: Dealing with Novelty and Cognitive Bias
10. The Forest Service and Transitional Fires
11. CDC Develops Its ‘Team B’Part V. Anticipating Disaster: Event Planning
12. Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games
13. Protecting the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999
14. The Seattle Millennium Security Threat
15. Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention

Conclusion: High Performance in Emergencies: Two Modes of Operation

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Asia Public Policy Forum: Disaster Management in Asia
May 13-15, 2012
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

Program
Session 1: Disaster Management and Public Policy in Asia
Session 2A: Disaster Preparedness and Capacity-Building
Session 2B: Emergency Response in Landscape-Scale Disasters
Session 3A: Coordinating Humanitarian Relief: National Responses and International
Organizations and NGOs
Session 3B: Innovations in Disaster Recovery
Session 4A: Enhancing the Role of Civil Society in Disaster Preparedness and Response
Session 4B: Looking Forward Insights from Ongoing Disaster Recovery
Session 5A: Business and Disaster Preparedness: BCP and Beyond
Session 5B: Disaster Management and Climate Change

Session 6A: The Risks of Infrastructure and Technology Failures
Session 6B: Disaster Resilience and Mental Health

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Crisis: A Typology
A Typology of Collective Stress Situations
Global/National
SuddenNuclear war
Enemy Invasion
Economic crash
Rebellion

Regional
Earthquake
Major flood
Nuclearmeltdown
Hurricane

Segmental
Ethnic massacre
Corporate layoff
plant
Expropriation
ofproperty of a class

Local
TornadoExplosion
Ghetto riot
Plant closing

Depression
EpidemicGradual Environmental decay
Government
breakdown

FamineDrought
Price collapse
Land exhaustion

DeclineofAborigines dying offindustry
Obsolete occupation
Environmental
Group discrimination
pollution
Addictions to harmful
Land sinking
substances
Coal seam fire

PovertydiseaseChronic Endemic
Wartime bombing
Colonialism

Backward regions
Endemic disease
Civil war

Enslavement
Slum, ghettoClass discrimination
High crime areas
Persecution
Gender discrimination

mainSource: the author’s modification and rearrangement of a table in Allen H. Barton’s article, “Disaster and Collective
Stress,” in What Is A Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, edited by Ronald W. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli, 2005.

CIGS Special Seminar “Catastrophic Disasters: Confronting Novel Preparedness Challenges”

Multi-Agency Coordination Challenges
TypesChallenges

Organization

Clear and effective leadership
Adequate multi-agency response procedure
Clear and reasonable role and responsibility of each agency
Clear coordination principle of conflicting goals

Information
Management

Adequate Knowledge/information management
Clear common operational picture

Communication

Clear common communication structure
Communication of accurate, consistent, and complete information
Communication with an appropriate intervalSituation Awareness

Entire membership of coordinating agency
Adequate common situation awareness
Adequate understanding of each agency’s role, capability, and resources

Equipment

Adequate and compatible communications technology
Common level of sophisticated equipment

Cultural Issues

Compatible procedures
Adequate understanding of each agency’s organizational culture

Training

Sufficient multi-agency training exercise
Each agency’s working experience with other agencies

Source: the author’s modification and rearrangement of a table in the article of Paul Salmon et al., “Coordination during
Multi-agency Emergency Response: Issues and Solutions,” Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April2011).

Revisiting the Tohoku Crises
Material Presented at a Seminar at Harvard Kennedy School just after the “3/11”

Letters from Quake-hit Japan— Stories Unfolding amidst Tragedies —Material prepared forDisaster Managementin Asia Seminar Series“Japan in Crisis:
Exploring the Consequencesof a Cascading Disaster”

March 22, 2011
Harvard Kennedy School

Minami-sanriku, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Kyodo News, via AP)

Jun KURIHARA
Senior Fellow, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School
Research Director, Canon Institute for Global Studies, Tokyo
Note: The crisis in Japan is still ongoing. Therefore, it
should be noted some of data in this presentation areEmails: Jun_Kurihara@hks.harvard.edu
tentative and subject to revision afterwards.

Slide No. 10

Letters from Quake-hit Japan— Stories Unfolding amidst Tragedies —A Tentative Assessment of the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake
1．Disaster Diagnoses (Tentative)
Series of huge earthquakes, tsunamis, and resultant blackouts . . .

2. Disaster Responses amidst Cascading Disasters
Disaster responses during the first TWO hours after the earthquake

3．Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Disaster Management
Organizational structure of Japan and the case of Fukushima I NPP

4．Evaluations (Tentative)
Preparedness, responses, recovery, communications and globalization

Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School

Mar. 10
Mar. 111.1. Trembling EarthQuakes between
Mar. 10 and 16

Number of Quakes:
M≥7: 4; 7>M≥6: 43
Mar. 12Source: The Economist,
March 11, 2011

Mar. 13Mar. 14Mar. 15
Mar. 16

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA)

6:24 off Sanriku Coast
14:46 off Sanriku Coast
15:06 off Sanriku Coast
15:15 off Ibaragi Coast
15:26 off Sanriku Coast
16:15 off Fukushima Coast
16:29 off Sanriku Coast
17:19 off Ibaragi Coast
17:47 off Fukushima Coast
20:37 off Iwate Coast
0:13 off Ibaragi Coast
3:59 Niigata-Chuetsu
4:03 off Sanriku Coast
4:47 off Akita Coast
5:11 off Sanriku Coast
10:46 off Fukushima Coast
22:15 off Fukushima Coast
23:43 off Iwate Coast
7:13 off Fukushima Coast
8:25 off Miyagi Coast
8:25 off Miyagi Coast
10:26 off Ibaragi Coast
20:37 off Fukushima Coast
14:02 off Ibaragi Coast
15:13 off Fukushima Coast
18:50 off Fukushima Coast
22:31 Eastern Shizuoka
0:24 off Sanriku Coast
12:52 off East Cost of Chiba

Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School

6.6
9.0
7.0
7.4
7.2
6.8
6.6
6.7
6.0
6.4
6.6
6.6
6.2
6.4
6.1
6.4
6.0
6.1
6.0
6.2
6.2
6.4
6.0
6.2
6.3
6.3
6.0
6.0
6.0

1.2. Lethal Danger Is NOT Quakes BUT Tsunamis

Slide No. 12All Nuclear Power Plants
Withstood Quakes,but . . . .

JASDF Matsushima Air Base, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Kyodo)

Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Kyodo)
Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbun)
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School1.3. Blackouts, and Lack of Fuels, Water, and . . . .

Mar. 11Mar. 12Mar. 13Mar. 14Mar. 15
Mar. 16Mar. 17Slide No. 13

No. of Houses Suffering Blackouts, Unit: Million
Time Tokyo Electric Tohoku ElectricNotes
15:30
4.05
4.40
20:00
3.94
4.38
22:00
3.44
4.40
0:00
2.58
4:00
1.62
Tokyo: 05:00
1.44
4.40
Kanagawa and Shizuoka: 0
6:00
1.24
4.40
Saitama and Yamanashi: 0
7:00
1.77
4.40
Gunma: 0
10:00
1.00
4.11
21:00
0.45
2.30
15:00
0.26
1.58
16:00
0.07
0.97
Chiba and Tochigi: 0
14:00
0.05
0.76
(Ibaragi: 5,100)
22:00
0.03
0.48
(Ibaragi: 2,561)
19:00
0.36

Note: The size of the largest blackout in the Tokyo metropolitan area in recent years is the case of August 14, 2006, when 1.26 million houses suffered the blackout.
Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Tohoku Electric Power Company
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School1.4. Unfolding Tragedies and Spreading Fears of Nuclear Disasters
Rising Death Toll

Radiation, as of Mar. 22 19:00; Unit: μSv.

Isolated inMiss- InEvacuAkita: 0.035
Deathinacing jured
ees
cessible
areas
Yamataga: 0.095
3/14 4,227 8,194 2,282 16,150 429,180
3/17 5,692 9,508 2,409 16,160 389,870 Niigata: 0.046
3/19 7,348 10,847 2,603
22 366,858
3/20 8,133 12,272 2,612 4,140 362,887
3/21 8,649 13,261 2,644
337,300 Utsunomiya,
3/22 9,080 13,565 2,675
268,510 Tochigi: 0.148
Radiation Level, Unit: μSv.
Satitama: 0.114
Chest X-Ray Test: 50
Tokyo: 0.054
Tokyo-New York round trip: 200
Abdominal X-Ray Test: 600
Chigasaki,
Chest CT Scan: 6,900
Maximum Acceptable Level per year: 80,000 Kanagawa:
0.138
Higher Risk of Cancer: 100,000
Source: Author’s compilation based on statistics published by various organizations

Sapporo,Hokkaido: 0.028
Aomori: 0.022
Morioka,
Iwate: 0.033
Fukushima I NPP
367.90(Peak: 11,930 (3/15))
Mito,
Ibaragi:0.378
NaritaAirportIchihara,Chiba: 0.106

Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School2.1. Emergency Responses: (1) Timeline: First 50 Minutes Slide No. 15
14:46 Quake off Sanriku Coast M9.0
14:46 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the Japanese counterpart of theU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), establishes an emergency headquarters
14:49 Fire and Disaster Mgmt Agency (FDMA), through J-Alert, a satellite warningsystem, warns 37 local governments against huge tsumamis
14:50 Prime Minister's Official Residence sets up an emergency team, aiming at (1)damage assessment, (2) ensuring the safety of people, (3) recovery of infrastructure,and (4) providing of accurate information
15:06 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.0
15:14 Central Disaster Mgmt Council is established
15:15 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.4
15:15 Tsunami 3.2m Ofunato, Iwate
15:21 Tsunami 4.1m Kamaishi, Iwate
15:21 Tsunami 4.0m Miyako, Iwate
15:21 Bank of Japan (BOJ) sets up a disaster mgmt team
15:26 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.2
15:27 Prime Minister orders the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to make a maximumeffort for disaster response
15:30 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) makes its first announcement: Allreactors of nuclear power plants (NPPs), found automatically shut down; it also
reports blackout of 4.05 million houses
Source: Author’s compilation from various materials

Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School2.2. Emergency Responses: (2) Timeline: Next 70 Minutes Slide No. 16
15:37 Gov't convenes the 1st Central Disaster Mgmt Council
15:42 TEPCO reports to NISA about malfunctioning of Fukushima I NPP's Reactor Nos.
1, 2, and 315:50 Tsunami 7.3m at Soma, Miyagi
15:57 Quake off Ibaragi Coast M6.1
16:00 Gov't convenes the 2nd Central Disaster Mgmt Council
16:00 NISA initiates an emergency headquarters to collect information on 55 nuclear
reactors in Japan
16:15 Quake off Fukushima M6.7
16:29 Quake off Sanriku M6.6
16:30 TEPCO makes its second announcement: All NPPs are under control but 7 thermal
power plants have been closed
16:36 TEPCO reports NISA about malfunctioning of the emergency cooling systems ofFukushima I NPP's Reactor Nos. 1 and 2
16:36 Prime Minister's Official Residence sets up an emergency headquarters
16:45 TEPCO reports to NISA about malfunctioning of Fukushima I NPP's Reactor No. 2

Source: Author’s compilation from various materials

Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School3.1. Nuclear Emergency Responses
at Fukushima I NPP

amidst Continuing
Quakes and Tsunamis

No. 1: 3/11 15:42
Tohoku Electric
Onagawa NPP
MiyagiPrefecture

Fukushima
Prefecture

TEPCO
Fukushima I NPP

19:03: Nuclear Emergency
3/11Hydrogen Explosions
14:46
M9.0 No. 2: 3/11 15:42 3/12 15:36: No. 1PacificOcean
TEPCO
Fukushima II NPP

Evacuation
3/11 20:50: 2km (1.2 mi.)3/12 01:45: 3km (2.4 mi.)3/12 05:44: 10km (6.2 mi.)3/12 18:25: 20km (12.4 mi.)3/14 11:01: No. 3Explosion and Fire
3/15 06:10: No. 2
3/15 09:38: No. 4
No. 3: 3/11 15:42

No. 4: 3/15 09:38

Cooling reactors withseawater and boron
3/12 20:20: No. 1
3/13 13:12: No. 3
3/14 16:34: No. 2

3/12 07:45: Nuclear Emergency
Evacuation (Fukushima II NPP)
3/12 07:45: 3km; 17:39: 10km

Source: Author’s compilation based on materials published by Prime Minister’s Official Residence
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School3.2. Nuclear Emergency Responses
Situation at Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)

Slide No. 18

Time to Examine the “Myth” about Nuclear Power Safety

1．Disaster Preparedness
Difficulty of predicting tsunami impacts on NPPs
Cooling system: Brittleness of the triple safety system—Power lines and generators

2. Disaster Responses
Recovery operations amidst earthquakes and tsunami warnings
Inevitable human errors
Disruption of communications and evacuation
Difficulty of handling simultaneously occurring crises (Fukushima I and II)

3．Disaster Recovery

Long way to restore “trust” and to scrap “safely” Fukushima I
Difficulty of restoring activities in radiation contaminated areas

4．Evaluations (Tentative)
Disaster preparedness: Structural strength of NPPs, Redesigning contingency plans
Importance of communications: Intra- and inter-organizational, and public
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School

Slide No. 19
4.1. Evaluations (Tentative)
1．Disaster Preparedness: Effectiveness and Efficiency Are of Great Essence

Redesigning contingency plans regarding, e.g., rolling blackouts,
metropolitan commuters, hospitals, and elderly people

2. Disaster Responses: Resources Are Limited and Speed Is of Great Essence
Assessment and prioritization of simultaneously occurring crises
Sophistication of organizational structure for optimum division of labor

3．Disaster Recovery: A Pile of Uncertainties

Fiscal strength of Japan’s economy
Restoration of global supply chain networks
Legal consideration of the reconstructionof tsunami-hit areas
Resuscitation of quake-hit
communities and social capital

4．Evaluations: Time to Think Seriously
Disaster preparedness:
Structural strength of NPPs
Implications of globalization:
Information travels fast and forcefully like tsumami

Source: Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)

Importance of communications (accountability & transparency):
domestic and global
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School4.2. Implications of Globalization: Photos and Fears Travel Fast on the Globe

Disaster Management Center, Minami Sanriku, Miyagi, (Source: Kyodo)
Fukushima I NPP (Source: New York Times/AFP)

Tokyo (Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbun)

Fukushima Prefecture (Source: New York Times/Asahi Shimbun/European Pressphoto Agency)
Jun KURIHARA, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School