Back to Territorial Defense?
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
in the Context of AUKUS andRussia’s War against Ukraine
Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel

Director of the Asia Program, Institut Montaigne*This paper is a part of a series on Europe’s evolving strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific.

Background
France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is “part of the intangible elements of our sovereignty
and our defense and security policy.” This was the message that the French Minister of theArmed Forces Sébastien Lecornu delivered at the Shangri-La Dialogue’s defense diplomacy
summit in Singapore in early June 2022. 1 This speech was the first from a senior French official
after President Macron’s reelection – and the highest-level French statement on Indo-Pacificsecurity since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022.
Historically the first European country to adopt an Indo-Pacific vision, centered on the defenseof the French sovereign territories in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, France has been a strong
advocate of a Europeanized approach. Can France lead Europe to become a more influential
force in the Indo-Pacific? The European Union (EU) adopted in 2021 a “Strategy for
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” but at the cost of a loss of focus. 2 Reaching a common
Sébastien Lecornu, “Shangri-La Dialogue Speech of Sébastien Lecornu, French Minister of the Armed Forces,” Ministry of the Armed
Forces, June 11, 2022, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-presse/discours-autorites/discours-sebastien-lecornu-ministre-armees.
2“Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU strategy for cooperation in the Ind-Pacific,” European
Commission, September 16, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf.
1

2 Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel
European denominator has led to a dilution of the original hard security and maritime law
components of the French approach and established a much broader framework that seeks to be
as inclusive as possible. A broad framework like this is intended to create space and flexibility.
The Australia – United Kingdom – United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership andthe ongoing war in Ukraine have provided a helpful reality check regarding Europe’s statedambitions to contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific. By choosing to inflict considerable
damage to Franco-Australian security cooperation, the Biden administration essentially told thewhole of Europe that it sees little value in a European role in the Indo-Pacific security
environment – complicating French efforts to turn the EU into a significant security player inthat region to a point of no return at a time of immediate Russian military threat against Europe.
EU member states use the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as a broad strategic
guideline to diversify and step up their regional engagement, very often dominated by a legacyof magnetic attraction of the Chinese market. Diversification, in the form of deepened trade andinvestment ties with Indo-Pacific countries, is the best outcome that Europe can realisticallyachieve. How far this process of diversification will go – and whether it will materialize in asignificant European contribution to the infrastructure development needs of the region – willbe the main criteria against which to assess the success or the failure of the EU’s Indo-Pacificstrategy. This means that France will remain in a category of its own in Europe, as an IndoPacific resident power whose actions to defend its national interests contribute with shaping theregional security architecture. However, French leadership plans in Europe need some
expectation management.

The Intangibles Stay
1.65 million French nationals in territories including New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis
and Futuna, Clipperton Island, Reunion Island, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Antarctic
Lands; 10.2 million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the world’s second
largest; 7,000 deployed military personnel, including on French Indian Ocean bases in Djibouti
and the UAE: these are the traditional sovereignty and territorial integrity issues that makeFrance a “resident power” of the Indo-Pacific.

Back to Territorial Defense? France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Context of AUKUS and Russia’s War against
Ukraine 3

Those territories do not face immediate threats. However, territorial disputes generate longterm challenges to the integrity of one million square kilometers of its EEZ. In the Pacific Ocean,Matthew and Hunter Islands, administered by New Caledonia but claimed by neighboring
Vanuatu, generate an EEZ of 350,000 square kilometers. 3 One such example of direct challenge
to French legal rights in the country’s EEZ is a 2004 case in which the French Navy intercepteda Taiwanese fishing boat, which claimed that it was in a fishing zone authorized by thegovernment of Vanuatu. 4 In 2017, France responded to an illegal campaign by Vietnamesefishing boats in the EEZ of New Caledonia, leading to three judicial condemnations inNouméa. 5 In the Indian Ocean, France has a territorial dispute with Madagascar regarding theScattered Islands – four islands which generate 640,000 square kilometers of EEZ for France
in the Mozambique Channel, and that were attached to French overseas territories by a decreeby President Charles de Gaulle in 1960, two months before the independence of Madagascar
from France. 6
Could China support Madagascar and Vanuatu in exchange for access to fishing rights? This is
not entirely a theoretical question. In the Indian Ocean, Paris perceived the short-lived 2019agreement between Madagascar and a Chinese company to grant fishing rights in the island’s
EEZ as a serious challenge for fishing resources management, given the scale of the announced
US$2.7 billion (compared with €6.1 million paid by the EU to Madagascar as part of a 20152018 fishing deal). 7 In the Pacific Ocean, the fishing industry is an area of booming cooperation
between China and Vanuatu. 8 French Polynesia manages its EEZ under a strict fishing
resources protection regime that does not allow fishing activities by foreign vessels. Part ofFrench Polynesia’s EEZ is located within the South Pacific’s tuna belt, which attracts fishing
trawlers from East Asia. According to a 2022 report by the Cour des Comptes, a French supreme
audit institution, the French state monitors foreign vessels fishing tuna in the vicinity of
Polynesia’s EEZ. There was no reported intrusion by foreign vessels, even though 43 percent
Jean-Tenahe Faatau, “Pacifique: Querelle autour des îles Matthew et Hunter en Nouvelle Calédonie (Pacific: Quarrels around Matthew andHunter Islands in New Caledonia),” Outremers 360°, March 13, 2019, https://outremers360.com/politique/pacifique-querelles-autour-desiles-matthew-et-hunter-en-nouvelle-caledonie.
4
Alexandre Dayant, “Not one, but two new points of tension for France in the Pacific,” Lowy Institute, March 19, 2019, https://www.
lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/not-one-two-new-points-tension-france-pacific.
5
Isabelle Peltier, Karine Arroyo, and Brigitte Whaap, “Pêche illégale d’holothuries: les 3 capitaines vietnamiens déférés devant la justice(Illegal sea cucumber fishing: the 3 Vietnamese captains brought to justice),” France Info, January 25, 2017, https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/
nouvellecaledonie/peche-illegale-holothuries-3-capitaines-vietnamiens-deferes-devant-justice-436769.html.
6
Aurora Lartigue, “Les îles Éparses, des confettis au cœur du contentieux franco-malgache (The Scattered Islands, confetti at the heart of theFranco-Malagasy dispute),” RFI, August 8, 2020, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/france/20200808-territoires-disput%C3%A9s-iles-%C3%A9parsesconfettis-contentieux-franco-malgache.
7
Ning Hui, “Madagascar rocked by fishing deal that never was,” China Dialogue Ocean, October 17, 2019, https://chinadialogueocean.net/en/fisheries/10811-madagascar-rocked-by-fishing-deal/.
8
Marc Ati and Zhou Haicheng, “China, Vanuatu embark on new journey together,” China Daily, March 22, 2022, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202203/22/WS6239227da310fd2b29e5265d.html.
3

4 Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel
had Taiwanese registration, 33 percent Chinese registration, nine percent South Korean
registration, and five percent Vanuatuan registration. 9 Cour des Comptes’ audit reportnevertheless recommends improving communication networks between the local fishing fleet,naval forces, and Tahiti’s maritime surveillance hub in order to prevent future threats against
the EEZ.
Given the temporarily weakened surveillance capacity of the French state in those maritime
spaces, the absence of reported illegal fishing in recent years is notable but should not be taken
for granted. A 2022 Senate report compares the current French maritime patrol capacity in its
EEZ to two police cars surveilling the whole French metropolitan territory. 10 In the early 2020s,
the French military is decommissioning old systems and deploying new ones in the Indo-Pacificregion. Falcon 2000 maritime patrol airplanes will replace Falcon 200 in La Réunion, but not
until 2025. Six maritime overseas patrol boats called Patrouilleur Outre-Mer (POM) will
replace the ten P400 of the French Navy deployed in New Caledonia, La Réunion, andPolynesia between 2023 and 2025 – a replacement that creates a temporary capacity gap. The
Senate report on French defense posture in the Indo-Pacific advocates additional POM
deployments and the use of surveillance drones to increase maritime domain awareness in the
French EEZ. To close the gaps in maritime surveillance, France also will need to further
increase satellite coverage. The recent signing of the Trimaran 3 contract between the French
Navy and a consortium of space imagery companies is a step in the right direction. 11 In addition,
space-based maritime surveillance has the potential to emerge as a concrete area of cooperation
between France and the Quad, which announced last May a new satellite-based maritime
domain awareness initiative. 12 The format of French naval assets deployed in the Indo-Pacificregion indicates the absolute priority placed on EEZ maritime security – and enables
contributions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, such as in Tonga after theJanuary 2022 volcano eruption. 13 In the 2030s, the French Navy may deploy a new class of“La gestion et la protection de la zone économique exclusive de Polynésie française (The management and protection of the exclusive
economic zone of French Polynesia),” Cour des Comptes (Court of Audit), February 7, 2022, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/lagestion-et-la-protection-de-la-zone-economique-exclusive-de-polynesie-francaise.
10
Philippe Folliot, Annick Petrus, and Marie-Laure Phinera-Horth, “Les Outre-Mer au cœur de la stratégie maritime nationale, (The overseas
territories at the heart of the national maritime strategy),” Sénat (Senate), February 24, 2022, https://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2021/r21546-notice.html.
11“La Marine française développe ses outils de surveillance de son espace maritime (The French Navy is developing its tools for monitoring
its maritime space),” Le Figaro, June 8, 2021, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/la-marine-francaise-developpe-ses-outils-de-surveillance-deson-espace-maritime-20210608.
12Park Si-soo, “Quad nations unveil satellite-based maritime monitoring initiative,” SpaceNews, May 24, 2022, https://spacenews.com/quadnations-unveil-satellite-based-maritime-monitoring-initiative/.
13“Tsunami aux îles Tonga: la France envoie deux patrouilleurs (Tsunami in Tonga: France deploys two patrol boats),” Le Marin/Ouest
France (The Sailor/West France), January 26, 2022, https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/secteurs-activites/defense/42331-tsunami-aux-iles-tongala-marine-envoie-deux-patrouilleurs-en.
9Back to Territorial Defense? France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Context of AUKUS and Russia’s War against
Ukraine 5

frigates equipped with surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles – a capacity currently lacked by
French naval assets in the Indo-Pacific, which limits their mission options. 14
These national “intangibles” connect to a vision of the international security order. To
paraphrase former Armed Forces Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, challenges to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the South China Sea pose a general
threat to a maritime order based on international law everywhere, from the Arctic Ocean to theIndian Ocean – including to French sovereign maritime rights.

Europeanization Progresses Slowly
During the first half of 2022, France held the rotating presidency of the European Union.
Accelerating the implementation of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy was a stated priority, wasthis achieved? 15 An international context of events was clearly not favorable for France’s goal.
The EU presidency came immediately after AUKUS, through which the Biden administration
undermined French Indo-Pacific leadership in Europe. The formation of AUKUS in September
2021 signaled to EU Member States that the France-Australia security partnership, a pillar of
French engagement in the Indo-Pacific, was essentially an obstacle to be removed for the US
to achieve its own priorities in terms of military balance with China. A few months after the
AUKUS shock, the French EU presidency also saw Russia launch its war of aggression against
Ukraine, completely changing the national security debate in many European capitals.
Despite this context, France successfully raised the strategic profile of the Indo-Pacific in
Europe by hosting in Paris the first Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in
February 2022, in cooperation with the EU’s European External Action Service. Held a day
before the launch of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the forum represented an inflexion point
for France’s policy towards the Indo-Pacific.
Departing from France’s traditional focus on the maritime security order, the forum wasconceived as a political manifesto in favor of multilateral diplomacy. Paris hosted 27 EU
foreign ministers (or their representatives), around 30 from the Indo-Pacific region, andHugo Decis, “France in the Indo-Pacific: Expanded Horizons,” IISS, August 19, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/
08/france-in-the-indo-pacific-expanded-horizons.
15“Recovery, Strength and a Sense of Belonging: Programme for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union,” French
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, January 1, 2022, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/media/qh4cg0qq/
en_programme-pfue-v1-2.pdf.
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6 Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel
representatives of regional organizations from both the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. The
decision not to extend an invitation to China (consistent with France’s previous approach) andthe United States (more surprising) carried a political message: France seeks to lead Europe asa force opposing the transformation of the Indo-Pacific into a space defined by a bipolar USChina rivalry. This coincided with the apparition of the term “third way” in Paris. As the term
evokes the Bandung neutralism of the early Cold War, by reference to the 1955 Asian-African
Conference held in the Indonesian city which led to the creation of the non-aligned movement,
it misled some into thinking that France was calling for a non-aligned Europe. In fact, theMinisterial Forum was consistent with the French thinking regarding Europe having a special
space and added value in offering alternatives to countries in the Indo-Pacific that want to avoid
being locked into a binary choice between China and the United States. 16
But what can Europe really offer? French diplomats described the forum’s political goal asreaching an “Indo-Pacific of concrete actions.” 17 Turning the EU strategy into action at a
multilateral forum is not an easy task, but several achievements deserve to be mentioned. The
decision to open branches of the European Investment Bank in Nairobi, Jakarta, and Suva is aconcrete step to support the implementation of the EU’s infrastructure investment plan (Global
Gateways). 18 The EU’s membership in the North Pacific Fisheries Commission is a step to playa greater role in regional fisheries management; protection of marine ecosystems; and thestruggle against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Finally, announcements
regarding EU Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) and the EU project forEnhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) matter. These two projects may besmall in scale, but they enhance the EU’s profile as a maritime soft security actor, which
promotes regional cooperation dialogues and has a maritime situational awareness offer for
Indo-Pacific states: the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) platform, adopted
already by some maritime law-enforcement agencies – most recently the Philippines. 19
The Ministerial Forum format may become a regular multilateral platform for concluding
Europe and Indo-Pacific deals. While the Swedish EU presidency (first half of 2023) has not
expressed interest in hosting the next convening, Spain may take over during the second half of
16
Mathieu Duchâtel and Roderick Kefferpütz, “Balancing China in the Indo-Pacific, the role of France and Germany,” Institut Montaigne,
February 21, 2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/balancing-china-indo-pacific-role-france-and-germany.
17
Author’s interview with senior French participant, Paris, February 22, 2022.
18“Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” French Presidency of the European Union, press release, February 22, 2022, https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/press-release-forum-for-cooperation-in-the-indopacific/.
19
Raissa Robles, “South China Sea: EU offers encrypted tool to fight maritime security threats in Indo-Pacific,” South China Morning Post,
March 1, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3168788/south-china-sea-eu-offers-encrypted-tool-fight-maritime-security.

Back to Territorial Defense? France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Context of AUKUS and Russia’s War against
Ukraine 7

2023. For now, the current Czech presidency of the European Union already has demonstrated
a willingness to actively support the implementation of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. A HighLevel Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific took place June 13-14 in Prague, in preparation for the
Czech Republic taking over the presidency of the EU during the second half of 2022. The
involvement of NATO as a sponsor of this Prague Dialogue, along with the importance ofbilateral ties with Taiwan for the Czech Republic, deliberately put in the spotlight the questionof authoritarian threat to democratic systems, a political dimension relatively absent from the
French approach to the Indo-Pacific. It suggests that the EU strategy is broad enough for statesto emphasize their own political priorities.
But for all EU Member States, the most concrete stake is to use the strategic guidance of the
Indo-Pacific vision to diversify trade and investment relations away from China and seize theopportunities to play a role to respond to the infrastructure needs of Indo-Pacific states. Table
1 shows how trade with China dwarfs trade volume with India, Japan, and ASEAN for the three
upcoming presidents of the European Union, and three influential strategic players within the
EU (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stocks show adifferent picture. The cumulated stock of EU FDI in Japan, India, Australia, and Singapore
exceeds EU FDI stock in China (including Hong Kong) – 6.4 percent of the total, versus 3.8
percent. Those numbers, however, are incomparable with European FDI stocks in the US andthe UK (respectively 24.3 percent and 21.8 percent of the total) which points to the immense
potential of the Indo-Pacific region to unlock growth for European companies at a time whenpolitical risk and unpredictability are on the rise in China. 20“EU’s net investment position -33% in 2020,” Eurostat, European Commission, February 11, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220210-1.
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8 Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel
Table 1: Comparing the Trade Volume of Key EU Member States with China, India, Japan, and
ASEAN
Poland (2020 data)
Country
China
India
Japan
ASEAN

Total Trade Balance in Billion
USD-28.42-1.194-2.953-3.349

Exports in Billion USD Imports in Billion USD
3.38
31.8
0.666
1.86
0.787
3.74
1.647
4.996
Czech Republic (2020 data)
Country
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
China
2.469
28.3
-25.831
India
0.643
0.919
-0.276
Japan
0.986
3.074
-2.088
1.054
3.011
ASEAN
-1.957
Spain (2020 data)
Country
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
China
9.55
30.3
-20.75
1.4
3.32
India
-1.92
Japan
2.9
2.51
0.39
3.342
8.88
ASEAN
-5.538
Sweden (2020 data)
Country
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
China
0.339
9.02
-8.681
1.02
0.732
India
0.288
Japan
2.48
1.26
1.22
2.816
3.027
ASEAN
-0.211
Denmark (2020 data)
Country
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
China
5.81
7.52
-1.71
0.576
0.725
India
-0.149
Japan
2.26
0.503
1.757
2.406
1.769
ASEAN
0.637
Netherlands (2020 data)
Country
Exports
Imports
Total Trade
China
15.6
64.9
-49.3
2.44
5.58
India
-3.14
Japan
10.2
4.38
5.82
8.788
35.169ASEAN-26.381
Sources: For country to country breakdown, OEC, 2020; for Czech Republic, WIT World Bank,
2019; for ASEAN statistics, EC Europa, 2021.

Back to Territorial Defense? France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Context of AUKUS and Russia’s War against
Ukraine 9

Conclusion
The gap between the French focus on security and the maritime order, and a broader European
focus on stepping up and diversifying engagement, will be a blessing in disguise if it leads all
European countries to play on their strengths in the Indo-Pacific. EU Member States should not
be expected to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific security architecture beyond the smallscale projects carried out by the EU, such as CRIMARIO and Early Warning for Increased
Situational Awareness (EWISA), and some naval deployments to demonstrate theircommitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Which European NATOcountries provide direct military support to the United States as part of a coalition in case of
war in the Indo-Pacific is a completely different question, for which the EU is not particularly
relevant, except to reach common positions at the European Council. Therefore, France should
be expected to remain lonely in its focus on territorial defense. This peculiarity will continue tomake France a credible partner for countries in the region for which a maritime order based on
UNCLOS matters directly and concretely.
Whether the Indo-Pacific will become a sea of opportunities for Europe depends on the capacityof EU Member States, the EU, and European multinational companies to respond to theinfrastructure development needs of the region. Enabling Indo-Pacific partners to remain in thebest position in order to avoid the trap of excessive dependence and the risk of coercion is asolid political idea, but the real political issue today is the question of implementation of actual
projects. There are some positive examples in the area of submarine cables. But examples likethis are too few and not sufficiently visible. Europe needs to prioritize signature projects thatdeliver fast results, in order to demonstrate to the Indo-Pacific region that it can support
infrastructure development plans conceived locally. Multilateralism has a role to play increating a positive dynamic, in generalizing agreements and consensus building in smaller
formats, and also in keeping the focus on broad issues of global governance. While
multilateralism provides a platform to conclude deals and send political messages throughout
the world, it is however definitely not a silver bullet for Europe to make a real difference in the
Indo-Pacific.
Dr. Duchâtel wrote in his personal capacity. The views and interpretations expressed by theauthor are solely his own.

10 Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel

Dr. Mathieu Duchâtel is Director of the Asia Program at Institut
Montaigne since 2019. Before joining the Institute, he was Senior Policy
Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia and China Program at theEuropean Council of Foreign Relations (2015-2018), Senior Researcher
and the Representative in Beijing of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (2011-2015), Research Fellow with Asia Centre in
Paris (2007-2011) and Associate Researcher based in Taipei with Asia
Centre (2004-2007). He has spent a total of nine years in Shanghai(Fudan University), Taipei (National Chengchi University) and Beijing and has been visiting scholar at the
School of International Studies of Peking University in 2011/2012 and the Japan Institute of International
Affairs in 2015. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po,
Paris).
For Institut Montaigne, he recently authored The Weak Links in China's Drive for Semiconductors (January2021), Fighting COVID-19: East Asian Responses to the Pandemic (May 2020, with François Godement andViviana Zhu), and Europe and 5G: the Huawei Case (May 2019, with François Godement).
Other

recentpublications

include Blue

China,

Navigating

theMaritime

Silk

Road

to

Europe (2018), Géopolitique de la Chine, Paris, PUF, Que Sais-Je ? (2017), Pre-empting defeat: In searchof North Korea’s nuclear doctrine (2017), Influence by default: Europe’s impact on military security in East
Asia (2017), China’s Policy in the East China Sea, The Role of Crisis Management Mechanism Negotiations
with Japan (2008-2015) (2016), Terror overseas: understanding China’s evolving counter-terror
strategy (2016), Into Africa: China’s global security shift (2016), Xi’s army: Reform and loyalty in the
PLA (2016), China’s Strong Arm, Protecting Nationals and Assets Abroad, IISS-Routledge (2015).