2003. 8

Determinants of Small Business Loan Approval:

Evidence from Japanese Survey after 1997 Financial Crisis
Kenji Kutsuna
Marc CowlingDeterminants of Small Business Loan Approval:
Evidence from Japanese Survey after 1997 Financial Crisis
Kenji Kutsuna*,1 and Marc Cowling2
Abstract
We examine the determinants of small business loan approval under the credit squeezes after 1997

financial crisis in Japan. Owualah (2002, Japan and the World Economy) demonstrates that advantage

usually conferred by long-standing banking relationship and main bank ties upon firms to favored

access to bank credits is no longer guaranteed. We find that the probability of loan approval is

positively associated with employment size of small businesses, loan requests made to governmental

financial institutions for small businesses, and for investment in fixed assets. We also find that theloan request in 1998 is negatively associated with the probability of loan approval. Furthermore,regarding small business-bank relationship, companies that have seriously considered switching banks

in the past three years have lower loan approval rates.

JEL classification: G21

Keywords: Small business; Loan approval; Borrowing constraints; Financial crisis* E-mail address: kutsuna@rose.rokkodai.kobe-u.ac.jp
1 Dr. Kenji Kutsuna is Associate Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business
Administration, Kobe University.
2 Dr. Marc Cowling is Research Fellow at the Foundation for Entrepreneurial Management, London
Business School.
1Determinants of Small Business Loan Approval:
Evidence from Japanese Survey after 1997 Financial Crisis

1. Introduction
The accessibility to a bank loan is crucial for small businesses. For existing conventional small

businesses, the main financing source for working and development capital is a bank loan (Ministry of

Finance, 2000; ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 2000). The significant

constraints on bank financing are widely perceived due to informational asymmetry between small

businesses and banks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In particular, availability of a bank loan in itself has

deteriorated under the recessionary macroeconomic conditions (Buck et al., 1991; Cowling, 1997).

However, the analysis on determinants of loan availability for small businesses has not been fully

executed, in contrast to the massive amount of research concerning the ‘terms’ of a small business loan(i.e. price of credit and collateral) that have been accumulated (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger andUdell, 1990, 1995; Leeth and Scott, 1989; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Blackwell and Winters, 1997;

Athavale and Edmister, 1999; Cowling, 1999a, 1999b).

The environment in which Japanese banks operate has become more competitive withrespect to small business financing since the early 1970s. This coincided with a gradual increase inpressure to improve the quality of their lending services to small businesses. However, constraints on2

lending to small businesses and service gaps have long been criticized by small business managers andacademics alike (Kawaguchi, 1974; Kutsuna, 1997). Under the severe macroeconomic conditions in

the 1990s, particularly after the financial crisis in November 1997, the availability of bank loans is the

focal point for small businesses.

The explicit purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of small business loan

approval under the credit squeezes after 1997 financial crisis in Japan. The rest of this paper isorganized as follows: First, we review the previous research in the US and the UK. Second, we present

the data source used and the descriptive statistics of our sample firms. Third, after the definition ofvariables used in the regression analysis is presented, we provide evidence using logit regressions

based on these data. Lastly, we summarize our findings and suggest further research.

2. Previous research
Buck et al. (1991) in the US3 and Cowling (1997) in the UK4 analyze the determinants of small
business loan approval. Buck et al. (1991) report that 6-22% of small businesses are denied loans,based on the data for three surveys conducted in 1980, 1982 and 1984. Cowling (1997) reports that

3 Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine the determinants of the small firm’s debt ratio in relation to theavailability of credit.
4 The biannual research by the ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge
reported refusal rates of 17.1% in 1991-93, 14.6% in 1994-95, 16.5% in 1995-97, and 9.8% in 1997-99,
respectively.
3

12.8% of loan requests were turned down by banks, based on the data collected from an Association of

British Chambers of Commerce survey. Both Buck et al. (1991) and Cowling (1997) ask not “if you

made an application last year, were you turned down?” but “what happened to your most recent loan

application?”

Buck et al. (1991) in the US show that business age is positively related to the loan approvalprobability. This indicates that young businesses have a higher likelihood of loan denial than maturebusinesses. Because the information gap with firms is larger in respect to early stage companies thanto older companies with a long track record, older firms will have a higher probability of making a

successful loan request (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cressy, 1996).

Also, they note that the probability of loan approval is smaller if the application was made ata large bank. The information gap with small firms will be more acute in national banks than inregionally-based, smaller banks. According to Bannock and Doran (1991) and Binks et al. (1991),

smaller regionally-based banks have a much closer relationship with their small business customers

than larger national banks.

Furthermore, Buck et al. (1991) indicate that above the 65% debt/equity threshold theprobability of loan denial increases. However, in their study, the type of business organization (legal

status) and industrial sectors that small businesses operate did not affect loan approval probabilities.

Although Buck et al. (1991) do not explicitly examine growth in their regression analysis, it is4expected that small businesses with growing business activity (e.g. increasing sales revenue) will havea higher probability of loan approval according to Binks et al.(1993) and Cowling and Sugden(1993)5.
Cowling (1997) in the UK found that the probability of making a successful loan request is

positively associated with the amount of funding required, a scale effect. He also shows that loans forinvestment in fixed assets had higher approval rates. He interprets this as a signaling effect, in thesense that investment in fixed capital stock implies a longer-term commitment to the industry ormarketplace.

Regarding the timing of the loan request, he examines the effect of 1990 and 1991 time
dummies and indicates that the latter time dummy is negatively significantly related6.
Cowling (1997) also considers the effect of small business-bank relationship on loan

approval. As pointed out in Petersen and Rajan (1994), it is anticipated that a closer relationshipbetween bank and borrower will result in an increased probability of a loan request. But, thisrelationship was not confirmed by the data. The recent research concerning the Japanese small

5 In terms of sales revenue, Binks et al. (1993), analyzing the information gap by sales revenue ofsmall business customers, found evidence that there is a general pattern of smaller firms being lesssatisfied with bank services than larger firms. Cowling and Sugden (1993) also examine bankperformance by sales revenue of firms and concluded that the smallest category of small firms needs
greater support from their banks than is currently being provided.
6 In the UK, the economy began its downward spiral into recession during 1990, but the actual troughwas in 1991.
5

business finance by Owualah (2002) pointed out that rejection of a loan request has become a common

phenomenon for both old and new customers or main bank and non-main bank customers alike.

Although Storey (1994) argues that limited liability gives a small firm credibility, Cowling(1997) and Buck et al. (1991) find no legal status or industry effects on loan approval. Furthermore,because the information gap is greater in small companies than in large companies (Berger and Udell,1998), larger firms will have a higher probability of loan approval. Despite this, Cowling (1997)

found no such relationship.

3. Data and descriptive statistics of sample firms
To examine the determinants of small business loan approval, we use the evidence from a random

sample of Japanese small businesses collected from a postal survey conducted by the local

government office in August 1998. The questionnaire was posted to 4,835 manufacturing firms

located in Yao City, one of the small business district areas in Japan as are Ota and Higashi Osaka(Whittaker, 1997). The survey collects a variety of information about Japanese small businessactivities including financing from banks, together with information on the characteristics of small

firms. Out of 553 respondents (response rate is 11.4%), the following 259 firms are excluded in thesample: (1) 36 firms with over 300 employees; (2) 217 firms that did not fully respond to the questions

concerning the detail of bank borrowing; (3) 6 firms that responded that there was still no final

6

decision on the loan application. Thus, total data on 294 small and medium-sized manufacturing firms

in Yao City is analyzed. Only manufacturing firms with fewer than 300 employees are included in our

sample. As shown in Table 1, we need to note that our sample firms are relatively larger than the

distribution of all establishments in Yao as indicated by 1999 Establishment and Enterprise Census ofJapan.

[Insert Table 1 & Table 2 about here]

The descriptive statistics of 294 sample firms are shown in Table 2. Age: the sample mean is

33 years, ranging from 3 to 96. Net capital: as for the amount of net capital, the sample mean is 19.35

million Yen (median is 10.00 million Yen). The number of firms with a net capital of more than 30

million Yen is only 21 out of 238 (8.8%). Employment: as for the employment size, the sample meanis 20 employees, ranging from 1 to 260 (median is 9 employees). The number of firms that employ

fewer than 5 people dominated (36.1% of our sample firms). Net sales: the sample mean is 431

million Yen, ranging from 0.8 to 7,836 million Yen (median net sales is 120 million Yen) Respondents

to the question concerning the sales trends for recent years showed that only 19.3% firms achieved net

sales growth under the 1990s’ severe macroeconomic conditions in Japan: sharply increasing 8 firms(2.8%); gradually increasing 48 firms (16.6%); stable 61 firms (21.0%); gradually decreasing 87 firms7(30.0%); sharply decreasing 86 firms (29.7%). Legal status: regarding the legal status of the firm,

although not shown in the table, 71 (24.2%) and 4 (1.4%) out of 293 firms are sole proprietorship andpartnership (called goumei-gaisya in Japan), respectively.

[Insert Figure 1, Figure 2, & Figure 3 about here]

Loan Request: The survey asks the most recent loan requested in line with Buck et al. (1991)

and Cowling (1997). In 1998, 40.0% of firms sought a bank loan. A further 25.5% did so in 1997.

Aside from the tiny proportion (0.7%) that had never sought a bank loan, the remainder had done so

prior to 1996. As regards the timing of the loan request, we should note that in 1998 Japanese banks

had decreased total amounts of loans outstanding relative to the previous year for the first time, as

shown in Figure 1. In addition, according to the Bank of Japan Short-term Economic Survey offinancial position for small manufacturing enterprises, Diffusion Index (%) of “Easy” minus “Tight”

has sharply deteriorated after 1998 (see Figure 2). Also, the survey of lending attitude of financial

institutions for small manufacturing enterprises, Diffusion Index of “Accommodative” minus“Severe” has sharply deteriorated after 1998 (see Figure 3). Due to the financial crisis in November

1997 (bankruptcies of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Sanyo Securities, and Yamaichi Securities),

Japanese banks’ attitude toward small business lending should have turned to be more negative since81998.

For the most part firms sought either medium-longer term loans, 65.9% (Loans on Deeds),

or shorter-term loans and discounts (Loans on Bills and Bills Discounted), 28.4%. Very few firms

sought either a new overdraft facility, 3.5% or an extension to an existing facility, 1.4%. In Japan,

overdraft facility is not a popular borrowing method in contrast to the US and the UK. Also, collateralis a powerful tool that allows financial institutions to offer credit on favorable terms to small

businesses. Collateral may also reduce the cost of intermediation because a financial institution may

be able to assess the value of pledged assets better than it can assess the value of the business as anon-going concern (Berger and Udell, 1998). Asked whether the property is owned by your firm or not,164 out of 288 firms (56.9%) responded that they owned the property.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Table 3 shows the type of banks from which small firms requested loans. For the most partfirms sought loans from either City Banks (larger national banks), 28.5%, or Shinkin Banks(regionally based small banks), 34.0%. Also, 16.8% of sample firms sought governmental financial

institutions for SMEs (National Finance Corporation, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business,and Shoko Chukin Bank). As pointed out by Storey (1999), some firms may not apply because they9

expect to be rejected (i.e. Discouraged Borrowers). However, we are sure that Discouraged Borrowers

do not fit in to our analysis, based on the Japanese context of a high ratio of bank borrowing for microand small firms (over 40% to total assets), and the historically important role of public financial

institutions for micro and small firms.

Small Business-Bank Relationship: Petersen and Rajan (1994) shows that borrowing frommultiple lenders reduces the availability of credit with regard to the benefit of building close ties withan institutional creditor. As to the question whether you use more than one bank in the course of yourbusiness or not, 65 out of 285 firms (22.8%) responded that they depend on the sole bank. 220 firms(77.2%) use more than one bank. In relation to firm size, the survey indicates that 45 (69.2%) out of

65 firms with less than 10 employees depend on one bank.

Furthermore, asked if you have ever seriously considered changing your main bank toanother bank in the last three years, 72 out of 284 firms (25.4%) have considered changing the present

main bank. 212 firms (74.6%) have not considered it. As the reasons for not considering it, 85 firms

answered that they were satisfied with their current bank. Sixty-nine firms answered that there werepossible repercussions from their current bank. Fifty-six firms said there are no real differences

between banks. Forty-one firms never considered it. Only 6 firms said the present main bank is onlybank in the locality.

10[Insert Table 4 about here]

Small firms were asked about their main banks’ performance on the nine bankcharacteristics. Table 4 summarized the evaluation of nine bank services by two sub-groups (one isfirms that have seriously considered changing the present main bank, another is firms that have notconsidered it). On the nine bank characteristics, firms that have seriously considered changing theirpresent main banks in the last three years (Group B) rated the present main banks’ performance as bad/ very bad, compared with firms that have not considered changing their present main banks in the last

three years (Group A).

Loan Approval: we find that some 11.9% (35 out of 294 firms) of loan requests by small

businesses were turned down by banks. This evidence is basically consistent with Buck et al. (1991)

in the US and Cowling (1997) and CBRC (1996, 1998, 2000) in the UK.

4. Selection of variables and Regression results
In this section, analysis is conducted within a multivariate framework in which a logit model is fitted

where the dependent variable [LA] equals 1 if the most recent loan request was approved by the bankand 0 if it was rejected by the bank. We estimate a logistic regression of the following form:
Loan approval by the bank [LA: 1, 0] = β0 + β1 firm-specific factors + β2 bank and loan-specific11

factors + β3 small business-bank relationship factors + β4 macroeconomic condition-related factors+εThe dependent and independent variables entering the regressions are as follows: The

independent variables are in four groups (firm-specific factors, bank and loan-specific factors, small

business-bank relationship factors, and macroeconomic condition-related factors). Based on the

results of the previous researches and the Japanese macroeconomic conditions we introduced in theprevious section, the expected sign of each variable is also indicated in parentheses. Unfortunately,
data concerning the amounts of loans requested7 and capital structure of small firms (e.g. debt /equity) are not available from the survey.

[Dependent variable]

LA: If the most recent loan request was approved by the bank=1, rejected=0.

[Independent variable](1) Firm-specific factors

LEGAL: if firm had limited liability status=1, otherwise=0. (+ / ?)LN(AGE): Log of firm age. (+)

LN(EMPLOY): log of number of employees. (+)

SALESGTH: if the sales revenue is increasing for recent years=1, otherwise=0. (+)

7 In this survey, we can only use the data for the amounts of loans ‘approved’.
12

PROPERTY: if land is owned by small business manager=1, otherwise=0. (+)(2) Bank and loan-specific factors

SBANK: if customer sought funds from private financial institutions for small businesses (i.e.

Regional Banks 2, Shinkin Banks, and Credit Cooperatives)=1, otherwise=0. (+)

PBANK: if customer sought funds from governmental financial institutions for SMEs (i.e. National

Finance Corporation, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, and Shoko Chukin Bank)=1,

otherwise=0. (+)

FA: If loan was for investment in fixed assets (Loans on Deeds)=1, otherwise=0. (+)(3) Small business-bank relationship factors

TWOBANKS: if small firm depends for finance on a single financial institution=1, otherwise=0. (+)

BKCHG: if small firm has seriously considered the changing of its main bank for the last three

years=1, otherwise=0. (-)(4) Macroeconomic condition-related factors

T1998: Dummy variable if the year in which the loan was requested is 1998=1, otherwise=0. (-)[Insert Table 5 about here]

Correlation coefficients for 11 independent variables are indicated in Table 5. As expected, correlation13

coefficients between LEGAL and LN(EMPLOY) and between LN(AGE) and PROPERTY are highwith coefficients of –0.486 and 0.440, respectively.

In Table 6 we report the results of logistic regressions about the probability that the mostrecent loan requested has been approved.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

All eleven explanatory variables were included in the model.

The model is highly

significant. Five explanatory variables were statistically significant at the 0.1 level. First, the sign on

the LN(EMPLOY) coefficient is positive, suggesting that companies with fewer employees reported

significantly lower probability of loan approval. Second, the sign on the PBANK coefficient is

positive. This indicates that companies that sought funds from governmental financial institutions for

SMEs generally reported higher probability of loan approval. Third, FA is also positively associatedwith loan approval at the 5% level.

Loan for investment in fixed assets generally reported

significantly higher possibility of approval. Fourth, the negative sign on the BKCHG coefficientindicates that companies that have seriously considered changing their main bank in the last three

years reported significantly lower probability of loan approval. Fifth, the sign on the time variable

T1998 coefficient is statistically negative at the 10% significance level. All signs on these five14

variables are consistent with our a priori predictions.

Legal status does not affect the likelihood of loan approval as Buck et al. (1991) and

Cowling (1997). Business age is not significantly related to the loan approval probability, although thesign on the LN(AGE) coefficient is positive. The sign on the TWOBANKS coefficient is not

significant, in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1994), which shows that borrowing from multiple

lenders reduces the availability of credit.

5. Concluding remarks and further researchThis paper has examined the determinants of small business loan approval, based on the Japanesesurvey data conducted in 1998. The results indicate that there were five key factors. Evidence fromJapanese small manufacturing companies’ data shows that loan approval is positively related to(employment) size of small businesses, loan request to governmental financial institutions for small

businesses, and loan request for investment in fixed assets. Also, concerning small business-bankrelationships, firms that have seriously considered changing their main bank in the last three years

reported significantly lower probability of loan approval. We indicated that firms that have seriously

considered changing their main bank were not satisfied with the present bank services. The closenessof the small firm and the bank relationship affects the increased availability of the loan. Regarding themacroeconomic conditions, the Japanese economy began its downward spiral into severe recession in15

1998 after the financial crisis in November 1997. Loan applications in 1998 reported a significantly

higher probability of being turned down.

Finally, despite the fact that we have established a series of important and interestingfindings concerning the determinants of small business loan approval, there are many unansweredquestions. Another potentially interesting avenue of research is the comparison of the lending

activities of private financial institutions (banks) and governmental financial institutions for SMEs

under the active debate on the raison d’être of public financial institutions in Japan. Also, we mayneed further analysis about the terms of loans approved in addition to the availability of loans, because

banks may switch from ‘quantity’ to ‘quality’ lending during credit crunches brought on by

unfavorable macroeconomic conditions.

[2003.3.27 646]
Acknowledgement
We thank David Storey (Warwick Business School) for helpful comments.

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19

Table 1 Distribution of establishments in Yao (1999 Census and our sample)
Number of persons engaged
1999 Census
Our sample
No.
%
No.
%
1-4
2,318
51.2%
88
29.9%
5-9
1,079
23.8%
70
23.8%
10-19
603
13.3%
62
21.1%
20-29
231
5.1%
25
8.5%
30296
6.5%
49
16.7%
Total
4,527 100.0%
294
100.0%
Based on 1999 Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan .

Table 2 Discriptive statistics of sample firms
MeanMedianS.D.
Min.
Age (year)
33
30
19
3
Net Capital ('0000 Yen)
1,935
1,000
7,990
100
Employee (person)
20
9
33
1
Net Sales ('0000 Yen)
43,09512,00095,99580
Number of sample firms=294.

Table 3 Type of banks from which small firms requested loans
Type of banks
No.
Private Banks
241
City Banks
83
Regional Banks
43
Regional Banks Ⅱ
11Shinkin Banks
99
Credit Cooperatives
5
Governmental Financial Institutions for SMEs
50
National Finance Corporation
26
Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business18
Shoko Chukin Bank
5
Other
1
Obs.
291
Number of sample firms=294.

20

Max.

%
82.8
28.5
14.8
3.8
34.0
1.7
17.2
8.9
6.2
1.7
0.3
100.0

96
118,815260
783,600

Obs.
278
238
294
286

Table 4 Performance of present main bank on nine characteristics
1. Knows you and your businessvery good
good
normalbadvery bad
No.
20
53
97
8
7
Group A
%
10.8
28.6
52.4
4.3
3.8
No.
8
13
30
10
7
Group B
%
11.8
19.1
44.1
14.7
10.3
normalbadvery bad
2. Provides business advice
very good
goodGroup A
No.
6
21
110
24
18
%
3.4
11.7
61.5
13.4
10.1
No.
1
2
36
8
19
Group B
%
1.5
3.0
54.5
12.1
28.8
normalbadvery bad
3. Offers financevery good
good
No.
18
48
98
7
8
Group A
%
10.1
26.8
54.7
3.9
4.5
No.
7
7
29
15
9
Group B
%
10.4
10.4
43.3
22.4
13.4
normalbadvery bad
4. Continuity of staff
very good
goodGroup A
No.
16
40
97
18
9
%
8.9
22.2
53.9
10.0
5.0
Group B
No.
3
10
32
11
11
%
4.5
14.9
47.8
16.4
16.4
normalbadvery bad
5. Industrial knowledge
very good
goodGroup A
No.
5
19
107
32
15
%
2.8
10.7
60.1
18.0
8.4
No.
1
3
30
15
19
Group B
%
1.5
4.4
44.1
22.1
27.9
normalbadvery bad
6. Speed of decision/service
very good
good
No.
25
46
87
17
7
Group A
%
13.7
25.3
47.8
9.3
3.8
No.
6
9
27
15
10
Group B
%
9.0
13.4
40.3
22.4
14.9
normalbadvery bad
7. Wide range of services
very good
goodGroup A
No.
5
26
109
30
11
%
2.8
14.4
60.2
16.6
6.1
No.
1
4
28
20
13
Group B
%
1.5
6.1
42.4
30.3
19.7
normalbadvery bad
8. Knowledge of local market
very good
good
No.
4
24
106
30
11
Group A
%
2.3
13.7
60.6
17.1
6.3
No.
1
1
31
17
14
Group B
%
1.6
1.6
48.4
26.6
21.9
normalbadvery bad
9. Introduction of suppliers and customers
very good
goodGroup A
No.
5
15
87
40
28
%
2.9
8.6
49.7
22.9
16.0
No.
1
1
28
15
22
Group B
%
1.5
1.5
41.8
22.4
32.8
Group A: firms that have not considered changing their present main banks in the last three years
Group B: firms that have seriously considered changing their present main banks in the last three years

21

total
185
100.0
68
100.0
total
179
100.0
66
100.0
total
179
100.0
67
100.0
total
180
100.0
67
100.0
total
178
100.0
68
100.0
total
182
100.0
67
100.0
total
181
100.0
66
100.0
total
175
100.0
64
100.0
total
175
100.0
67
100.0

Table 5 Correlation coefficients matrix(1)(1) LEGAL
1(2) LN(AGE)-0.124(3) LN(EMPLOY)-0.486(4) SALESGTH-0.185(5) PROPERTY-0.116(6) SBANK
0.166(7) PBANK-0.003(8) FA
0.059(9) TWOBANKS-0.155(10) BKCHG-0.125(11) T1998-0.141

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1
0.270
-0.1300.440-0.2170.022-0.0110.103-0.116
0.015

1
0.267
0.292
-0.243-0.048-0.041
0.143
0.075
0.143

1
-0.007-0.004-0.107-0.148-0.032
0.124
0.093

1
-0.167
0.018
0.087
0.017
-0.049-0.0461-0.364-0.155-0.054-0.051
0.112

1
0.131
0.037
0.000
-0.0281-0.003-0.130-0.128

1
0.084
0.109

1
0.076

22

(11)

1

Table 6 Logit analysis of small business loan approval
Dependent Variable = Loan Approval [1, 0]
Independent Variable
Coeff.
S.E.
Wald
LEGAL
-0.6360.575
1.224
LN(AGE)
0.078
0.401
0.038
LN(EMPLOY)
0.574
0.296
3.751
SALESGTH
0.210
0.609
0.118
PROPERTY-0.324
0.509
0.406
SBANK
0.016
0.486
0.001
PBANK
2.318
1.159
4.001
0.763
0.457
2.787
FA
TWOBANKS-0.181
0.552
0.107
BKCHG
-1.7950.484
13.762
T1998-0.8360.479
3.046
Constant
1.403
1.484
0.894
LL(-2)
138.446
Nagelkerke R2
0.261
34.464Chi-square
P-value
0.000
Obs.
240
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

23

P-value
0.269
0.846
0.053*
0.731
0.524
0.973
0.045**
0.095*
0.743
0.000***
0.081*
0.345

4000000

7000003500000

6000003000000

5000002500000

4000002000000

3000001500000

2000001000000

100000500000

0

98

96

94

92

90

88

86

84

82

80

-100000

78

19
76

0

100 Million Yen

100 Million Yen

Figure 1 Small Business Lending by Japanese Banks 19761998

Year
Loans and Discounts Outstanding

Amounts Increased(Note) Figure 1 indicates small business loans and discounts outstanding by City Banks,
Regional Banks, Regional Banks 2, Trust Banks, and Long-term Credit Banks. There is
not a continuity between the figures before and after 1995, due to the change of thedefinition of loans and discounts outstanding.
(Source) Japanese Bankers Association.

24

Figure 2 Bank of Japan Short-term Economic Survey of financial position
for small manufacturing enterprises
15

5

2001

2000

2000

1999

1998

1997

1997

1996

1995

1994

1994

1993

1992

1991

1991

1990

1989

1988

1988

1987

1986

-5

1985

0
1985

D.I. (Diffusion Index)

10

-10
-15
-20
-25
-30

year
Diffusion Index (%) of “Easy” minus “Tight”

Figure 3 Bank of Japan Short-term Economic Survey of lending attitude offinancial institutions for small manufacturing enterprises
40

D.I. (Diffusion Index)

30

20

10

0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
-10

-20

-30

year

Diffusion Index of “Accommodative” minus “Severe”

25Discussion Paper
No.
2002・1

AuthorNobuyuki Isagawa

2002・2

Nobuyuki Isagawa

2002・3Mahito Okura

2002・4

Elmer Sterken
Ichiro Tokutsu
Mahito Okura
Mahito Okura
Nobuyuki Isagawa
Koji Okubayashi
Toshinori Takashina

2002・5
2002・6
2002・7
2002・8

2002・9Hajime Shimizu

2002・10 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002･11

Nobuyuki Isagawa

2002･12Kenji Kutsuna
Richard Smith

2002・13 Kunio Miyashita
2002・14 Hajime Shimizu
2002・15 Hajime Shimizu
2002・16 Koji Okubayashi
2002・17 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Shuji Uranishi
2002・18 Kazuhisa Otogawa
2002・19 Atsuo Takenaka
2002・20 Tsuneo Nakano

2002・21 Tsuneo Nakano
2002・22 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Shuji Uranishi
2002・23 Atsushi Takao
Mahito Okura
2002・24 Fumitoshi Mizutani
2002・25 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Takuya Urakami
Yasuyuki
Miyahara
2002・26
2002・27 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002・28 Mitsutoshi Hirano

Title
Cross Holding of Shares, Unwinding Cross Holding of
Shares, and Managerial
Entrenchment
A Theory of Stock Price Behavior following Repurchase
Announcements
An Equilibrium Analysis of the Insurance Market
with Vertical Differentiation
What are the determinants of the number of bankrelations of Japanese firms?
Review Article：Adverse Selection in Insurance Market
Welfare Effect of Firm Size in Insurance Market
Does Investment Horison Affect Investment Strategy ?
Research Report of Careers and Employment Process ofWorkers over 60 years old :a Case of a Japnaese
Manufacturing Company
On the Existence of Tax Equilibrium : Incomplete Market
with Capital Income Tax
Cost of Financial Distress and Debt Restructuring :Debt Forgiveness and Equity-for-Debt Swap
Open-Market Repurchase Announcements, Actual
Repurchases, and Stock Price Behavior in Inefficient
Markets―revised version of No.2001･36―
Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methodsof IPO Issuance?
Evidence and Implications from Japan
International Logistics and Modal Choice
Incomplete markets with capital income tax and public
goods
On the possibility of Pareto improving of tax-equilibrium
China-Japan Comparison of Work Organization
The Post Office vs. Parcel Delivery Companies:
Competition Effects on Costs and Productivity―revised version of No.2001･33―
Earnings Forecast and Earnings Management of JapaneseInitial Public Offerings Firms
The Classification of Foreign R&D Units
The Dutch East India Company and its Corporate
Governance―revised version of No.2000･40―
The British East India Company and its Corporate
Governance
Privatization Effects on TFP Growth and Capital
Adjustments
Some Notes on the Privatization of Postal Life Insurancein JapanPrivately Owned Railways’ Cost Function, Organization
Size and Ownership
A Private-Public Comaprison of Bus Service Operators
Principal-Multiagent Relationships with Costly
Monitoring
Unwinding of Cross Shareholding under Managerial
Entrenchment
Contingency Model for Personnel Grading System―Issues on Design and Management for Qualification
System and Job Grading System―

Date(in Japanese)

1／ 2002(in Japanese)

1／ 20022／20023／2002(in Japanese)(in Japanese)(in Japnaese)

3／20023／20023／20024／2002(in Japnaese)

4／2002(in Japnaese)

4／20025／20025／2002(in Japnaese)(in Japnaese)

6／20026／20026／20027／20027／20028／2002(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

8／20028／2002(in Japanese)

8／20028／2002(in Japanese)

9／20029／20029／2002
10／2002
10／2002(in Japanese)

11／2002

Discussion Paper
No.
Author
2002・29 Atsushi Takao
2002・30 Yasuhiro Shimizu
2002・31 Hideki Murakami

2002・32 Atsushi Takao

2002・33 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002・34 Takuji Hara
2003・1 Katsuhiko Kokubu
2003・2 Kazuhiro Tanaka
Fumitoshi Mizutani
2003・3
Shuji Uranishi
Yang Jia Yin
2003・4
Koji Okubayashi
2003・5

Mitsutoshi Hirano

2003・6

Kazuhisa Otogawa

2003・7

Nobuyuki Isagawa
Tadayasu Yamashita

2003・8Kenji Kutsuna
Marc Cowling

Title
On the Emergency Effect of the late FUKUZAWA,
Yukichi in Introducing of Modern Insurance into Japan
Amortization of Intangible Assets before Newark
Morning Ledger
An Economic Analysis of Duopolistic Competition
between Gulliver and Dwarf airlines:
The case of Japanese Domestic Air Markets
Simulation Model to Consider the Penetration of Modern
Insurance in Japan −Confirmation of Emergence andPhase Transition of New Japanese Risk-Bearing System
by Evolutional Economics
Mutual Shareholding and Unwinding of Mutual
Shareholding as Stockpile for Business Recovery
TLOs in Japan in the life science area : present and future
Environmental Accounting for Corporate Management
Embeddedness and Entrenchment of Managers
The Effects of Privatization on TFP Growth and Capital
Adjustments
Labour Turnover of Japan-Affiliated Companies inShanghai
Generation and Resolution of Asymmetric Information in
Human Resource Management –In the Cases of Job
Rotation in Two Retailers in JapanMarket Liquidity around Quarterly Earnings
Announcements
Lender’s Risk Incentive and Borrower’s Risk Incentive
Determinants of Small Business Loan Approval:
Evidence from Japanese Survey after 1997 Financial
Crisis(in Japanese)Date
11／2002(in Japanese)

11／2002
11／2002(in Japanese)

12／2002

12／2002(in Japanese)(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

12／2002
1／20032／20032／2003(in Japanese)

3／2003(in Japanese)

3／20033／2003(in Japanese)

3／20033／2003