Military liquidators in liquidation of the consequences of Chornobyl NPP
accident: myths and realities
Yuriy Skaletsky, OlegNasvit
Institute of the National Security Problems,National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine

Twenty years have passed after the Chornobyl accident, but its consequences are so immense thateven now some facts are still not sufficiently investigated and being a subject for analysis by specialists onradiation protection and emergency response. In this article we will present the available information andour considerations concerning advisability and results of many thousands of military contingents that wereinvolved in liquidation of the Chornobyl NPP accident consequences (LAC).
Some historical information on military involvement into LAC works
Since 1986 the participants of LAC mission were termed “liquidators” in abbreviation form. Then
this expression migrated to mass-media and later on to scientific publications. Military liquidators
mustered from reserve sometimes are termed “partisans”. Overwhelming majority of liquidators wascomprised of such “partisans”.
When the Chornobyl accident happened in 1986, the National (State) system of prevention andresponse for man-caused emergency situations was not established in USSR [1]. Independently
establishments and departments formed response systems for emergency conditions at their best.
Missile Forces of strategic destination and Naval Forces armed by nuclear armaments and defence
technology with transport nuclear power units had object and territorial systems of prevention andresponse for emergency. But these classes of Military Forces (MF) were not involved in liquidation of
Chornobyl NPP accident consequences.
In case of a crash of spacecraft with nuclear power unit, a system was planned to be organised ona scale of all MF. 122 mobile detachment of special destination subordinated to Armed Forces General
Staff (Headquarters) and extraordinary joint detachments, formed from chemical, radiation and biologicaldefence units in each territorial command and Naval Forces, would be involved in this system.
It was cosidered that MF, including units of Civil Defence (CD), which were subordinated to
Ministry of Defence at the time of accident, were technically, organisationally and psychologically readyfor operation in conditions of nuclear war. These circumstenses and high mobilisation abilities of MF
made themselves involving into emergency works from the first hours after the Chornobyl accident.
In the afternoon of April 26 the first mobile group of Kyiv Civil Defence regiment arrived at theaccident site. By the order of Commander of General Staff (Headquarters) of Military Forces, 122 mobile
detachment of special destination from the region of Volga River and an extraordinary joint chemical
detachment of Kyiv command began to relocate to the ChNPP accident area in the morning of April 27.
Those were forces assigned and trained for liquidation of crash consequences of aircraft with nuclear
power unit on board.
On April 27 the Air Forces helicopters became to perform reconnaissance flights around ChNPP
with the aim of radiation survey and working-off the means for dropping loads into the reactor core. Local(civilian) population together with military personnel of the garrison ‘Chornobyl-2’ that was deployed at
10 kilometers to the south-west from ChNPP long before the catastrophe were involved in loading thehelicopters with sand and other materials. Chemical service of this garrison performed in the morning- 91 -

April 26 (5.00 – 10.30 a.m.) the first radiation survey along the road Chornobyl – Prypyat, inside the city
Prypyat, the river harbor, the railstation and around the industrial base of ChNPP and destroyed reactor.
From April 29 the loading of the helicopters were performed by detached battalion of civil
defense special protection. Military medical subdivisions provide medical assistance to the population
who were evacuated from the 30-km zone from the very beginning.
From the very beginning after the accident, Military units were engaged in implemetation of themost urgent, difficult and dangerous measures on the site. However, later on the governmental leadershipbegan to task irresponsible and absolutely impossible missions of decontamination of the 30-km zone(including Prypyat town) and re-evacuation by early 1987 of the evacuated inhabitants . It caused thecommitment of many thousands military contingent to the zone of radioactive contamination. Fig.1
illustrates the dynamics of the cumulative number of military liquidators and the strength of Chornobyl
Forces overall the period of MF participation in consequences liquidation.
By the middle of August 1986, the strength of the Chornobyl military contingent amounted to 40
thousand persons. But, considering the unfeasibility of decontamination of settlements located in the 30km zone, the quick withdrawal of forces from the accident site has begun. By the end of 1986 the number
was reduced to a half. During 8 months of 1986, about 100 thousand military took part in LAC.
During 1987, the quantity of soldiers continued to decrease and at the end of the year it was about
13 thousand. The total number of military involved this year mounted to 120 thousands. Next year in 1988,
the quantity of Chornobyl contingent went up to 20 thousands and during the year the overall number ofliquidators was about 80 thousands.
Mobilisation of large-scale army contingent to LAC was due both to the large scale of tasks posed
to MF and predominance of manual labor along with required promptness in liquidation actions. The
construction of the protective fence around the 30-km zone was a striking example. This fence of 200 km
length was set in 13 days only (from 8.06 till 20.06.86), which involved 7.3 thousand military for hard
manual work [3]. But, according to the opinion of specialists, this work could be done by 5 times lessmilitary personell if it had been better planned and provided with necessary equipment.
In general, MF were charged withn the following tasks:• сovering of crater of the destroyed power-unit (reactor);

45

1
2

250

30

200
150
100

15

Strength, thsd

Total number, thsd

300

025.04.86

25.04.87

24.04.88

24.04.89

24.04.90

Time

Fig. 1. Dynamics of the total number (cumulative total) of military liquidators (1) and strength ofChornobyl forces (2) during the period of military forces participation in LAC.

- 92 -

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

continious radiation survey;
decontamination of industrial area and NPP premises;
decontamination of settlements, roads;
special treatment (decontamination) of the vehicles;
fencing in the exclusion zone;
provision of the industrial zone functioning (concrete-mixing plants, communications,loading/unloading works);
construction of water-protective structures;construction of radioactive waste disposal and temporary storage places for debris ofdestroyed reactor and other radioactive wastes, etc.

According to official data, the total amount of military liquidators during all the period of LAC amounted
to 239.3 thousands [2]. Reservists (“partisans”) formed the absolute majority, and the number of otherpersonnel amounted to 17 thousands only, including career servicemen and soldiers of service for the
fixed period. As a matter of fact, the absolute majority of military liquidators were not military men. They
were civilians dressed in military uniform, who were neither physically nor mentally prepared toadequately tackle LAC missions. Some of them, especially in the initial period of LAC works, were
deployed in the Chornobyl zone without special training, others were trained for a short time. But neither
mustered reservists, nor their trainers could imagine real situation in the Chornobyl zone before being
there.
The substantial problem for military subdivisions during the first weeks after the catastrophe was
the rapid increase of their number under the condition of constantly changing radiation situation.
Consequently, some military units found themselved in areas with gamma-ray dose rate of 50 mRh/h andhigher. In search of cleaner areas, some units changed their dislocation up to three times – a major
physical and psychological challenge for the servicemen in addition to their unjustified exposure toradiation.
The % fraction of the strength of different branches and provision units of Chornobyl forces ispresented in Table 1.
Table 1.
The % fraction of the strength of different branches and provision units of Chornobyl forces.
Subdivisions of MF branches and provision units in
Chornobyl forces
ChemicalEngineers
Civil defence
Rear forces
Technical provision
Administration and others

Proportion, %40 – 44
28 – 32
6–8
6 - 10
7-9
4-6

Arrangements for military liquidators dose control.
Already since the first days following the Chernobyl NPP accident, it became evident, that MD
Order № 285 dated 08.12.1983 [4] merely outlines a system of radiological protection of military men anddosimetric monitoring in case of radiation emergencies. For such a system to function effectively, dozens
of regulatory and guidance documents had to be prepared and a wide range of arrangements made.
The unprecedented scale of the Chernobyl Disaster, difficulties in forecasting the scope of work to
mitigate its consequences were the main reason for a debate within General Staff between the Military- 93 -

Medicine Service Command, who insisted on setting peacetime norms (25 rem), and the Head of the
Radiation, Chemical Biological Protection Department, who proposed wartime personnel exposure norms(50 rem) as the basis [2, 5].
However, even with such an uncertainty in exposure limits in the first post-accident days,
Radiological Protection Service (RPS) and Dosimetric Monitoring (DM) within the LAC units did
function. Thus, the KMD Air Force Commander – 1 May 1986 [6], and later on the KMD Commander– 4
May 1986 [7] issue orders on RPS arrangements in the subordinate military units involved in LAC. Theseorders establish exposure limits for military servicemen throughout LAC: 24 rem for Air Forceservicemen and 25 rem for the rest of military liquidators.
Therefore, RPS including DM, was organized within all units arriving at the wrecked ChNPP area
and getting under command by the KMD Force Commander already since the first days of their stay in theaccident area. It is primarily indicated by the high level of provision of military liquidators with dosimetricmonitoring data during that period in the State Chernobyl Registry [8].
It is worth mentioning, however, that the first post-accident activities of the military radiologicalprotection services did not catch up with the situation as it developed, and regulatory requirements were
not fully met. Particularly, already as of 1 May 1986 (issue date of the KMD Air Force Commander
Order), the strength of units involved in the accident area activities almost reached 600 persons, including
up to 100 representatives of KMD Air Force units, and as of 4 May (issue date of the KMD Commander
Order) it was already a multi-thousand military contingent that participated in the emergency activities. In
violation of i. 35 of MD Order № 285 dated 08.12.1983 [4] personnel were involved in ACL withoutorders authorizing work under high exposure doses, the first order of this kind was only issued on 1 May.
The permissible dose limit debate lingered until 21 May 1986. The normative uncertainty withrespect to external exposure doses resulted during the first post-accident weeks in the exposure of 52
servicemen of Special-Purpose Chemical Force Unit 122 directly subordinated to Department Head of the
RCB Protection Force, to doses of up to 72 rem [2, 9]. Meanwhile, the personnel of the military units
subordinated to KMD, who carried out radiation reconnaissance missions of comparable radiologicalhazard or even more hazardous ones (flights over the wrecked unit), were exposed to much lower doses(Table 2). This Table demonstrates a dependence of the average military liquidator dose during the firstmonth of liquidation activities on the set dose limits.
Table 2.
Doses of radiation to military units staff members participated in LAC in April-May 1986№
Units
SampleDose
Confines of dose
size,
limits,intervals, Rempersons
Rem
Min
max
1
Chemical Force Unit 122
38
50
40
72
2
KMD Consolidated Chemical Unit
25
25
25
30.9
3
KMD Air Force
31
24
13.5
29

Averagedose, Rem54.2±1.3
26.7±0.2
21.6±0.4

The permissible dose limit uncertainty was ended by MD Order №110 dated 21 May 1986 [10],which set the dose limit for all military servicemen at 25 rem. Item 3 of this Order provides for using“group” and estimated “group” dose assessment methods along with individual dosimetry. In addition, thepermissible daily dose of 2 R [11] is introduced to prevent mass exposure of liquidators to major doses in
the accident area. This measure made it virtually impossible to use common military dosimetry equipment
to monitor exposure doses of military liquidators (Table 3).

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Table 3.
№
за/п
1
2
3
4
5

Precise characteristics of domestic common military dosimetry equipment
Type
Range of measurement
Possibility of automated reading ofdata
Means of military dosimetric controlИД – І (ID-I)
20 - 500 rem
absentДКП - 50 А (DKP-50A)
2 - 50 R
absentMeans of individual dosimetric control
ДК - 0,2 (DK-0.2)
10 - 200 mR
absentИД- ІІ (ID-II)
10 – 1500 rem
absentДП - 70 М (DP-70M)
50 - 800 R
absentIn addition, another 30 various regulatory and guidance documents were developed [12, 13, 14],which detailed specific provisions for radiological protection of military liquidators.
In spite of all instructions for implementation of individual dosymetric control in liquidators units
with the use of individual dosimeters, such kind of control was not implemented. Thus the group method(one individual dosimeter in a group) and group-calculated method (dose evaluation is made for militarygroup taking in account the dose rate of gamma-ray at the working place and working hours) prevailed in
Chornobyl forces. According to of some authors [15] the errors of these methods were 250% and 500%,
respectively.
The execution of decontamination of the Unit #3 roof in the period from 19.09 till 2.10.1986 could
be the only exception. In these works, besides the calculation method, the obligatory operational control ofradiation dose for participants was put into practice using dosimeter ДКП-50 А (DKP-50A) [16, 17]. In
total 3,026 militaries took part in this work. I.e., taking into account that the total number of militaryliquidators amount to about 300 thousands, we should conclude that only about 1% of liquidators werereally provided with instrumental dosimetric control, but not 14% as was mentioned by V.V.Chumak [8].
It should be noted, however, that the organization of ChNPP Unit 3 decontamination work also
gave an example of failing to meet the Order-established norms: in defiance of all the then existing orders,the one time exposure dose limit of 20 rem was established for participants of ChNPP Unit 3
decontamination work by the Guidance For Work Organization And Performance [18], which was not
introduced by any order. And because military man were involved, who had already been exposed to somedoses, in certain cases the total dose exceeded 25 rem.
Another attempt to organise the day-to-day dosimetric control of almost all military liquidators
using dosimeter ДПГ-03 (DPG-03) was made at the end of 1989 –beginning of 1990, and also failed.
The liquidator contingent with reliable doses can not be expanded by individuals from groups
where doses were monitored by the «group» method, since servicemen who wore ID were constantly
replaced. Therefore, total individual exposure doses for military liquidators, identified based on individual
dosimeters are virtually missing.
It should also be borne in mind that the estimated “group” dose assessment would normally use
the military roentgenometer-radiometer DP-5, while the “group” assessment method– the DP-50А
dosimeter. Both devices were calibrated in Roentgens, accordingly, the records in the ACL military unit
exposure logs were also made in Roentgens. However, when filling out Registry questionnaires, instead of
Roentgens, the same value but in rem was entered automatically, without factoring in the conversion rateof 0.67–0.71, which also contributed to overestimating the official dose records (ODR).

- 95 -

Therefore, on the one hand, military liquidators are best provided with official dose records [8],while on the other hand – there are serious doubts about the quality of those dose values because of the
predominance of the “group” and estimated “group” methods of their assessment. A major effort to verify
those doses would be needed if we were to use the data on the exposure of military men in
epidemiological studies [8, 15].
Veryfication of radiation doses to military liquidators
The first stage of verification addresses the objectivity issue of dosimetric monitoring. A whole
series of verification methods to deal with available dosimetry information has been proposed, thepredominant majority of which are based on variation statistical methods.
Due to monitoring of the doses with near-permissible values, the distribution of doses around theboundary value becomes normal. The so-called hybrid lognormal distribution (combination oflogarhithmically normal and normal distribution) gives a good reflection of data observed in many of suchcases [18].
The attempts to clarify the dosimetric monitoring objectivity situation in the LAC Units that weknow of were made based on a statistical analysis of too generalized information [15, 19], or using
insufficiently accurate database of the All-Army Registry [20] without considering the organization
specifics of service, work and dosimetric monitoring in those units.
The irregular distribution of military liquidator exposure doses, being generally limited within arange of 10–25 rem, led some authors to conclude that the main source of distorted dosimetry informationin Chornobyl Registrys are the relevant Services of MD units [15, 19]. These authors believe that therange of activities performed by MD units was very wide and only a portion of it was related to exposure
to significant individual doses. In other words, a wide range of tasks to deal with must correspond to awide enough and smooth distribution of individual doses.
To clarify this issue, we have analyzed the military liquidator exposure doses for various LAC
activities, which differed in principle by nature of activity and health conditions. The outcome of thisanalysis for May 1986 - May 1987 is given in Table 4 and Figures 2–6.
Table 4.
№
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Average radiation doses to personnel of different units
Name of the unit and branch
Sample size,
Region ofWork character
persons
operation
Detached
Mechanised
4704
ChNPP
DecontamiRegiment (DMR) of Civil
nationDefence
Military
Construction
3489
ChNPP,
DecontamiBattalion (MCB), sappers
10-km zone
nation,construction
Gas Defence Brigade (GDB),
2465
ChNPP,
DecontamiChemical Forces
10-km and 30- nation
km zones
Rear and technical provision
2158
30-km
zone Rear technicalunits
and outside itprovision
817
Operational
Group
1164
30-km zone
Management(OG), management body- 96 -

Averagedose, cSv
22,57±0,10
20,02±0,08
20,08±0,15
7,82±0,91
9,23±0,60

The Table 4 data indicate that the average military liquidator exposure doses are determined by
the area and nature of LAC activities performed. Specifically, the average doses are much lower for units
that did not performed work directly at the ChNPP industrial site. Maximum doses are observed in CD,
chemical and engineering units; much lower ones in administrative units; and minimum ones in logistics
units.

1983

2000
1517
1500
1000

5-7,5

7,5-10

46

44

158

17,5-2035

229

15-17,544

12,5-1540

10-12,5

52

2,5-5

556

500

0-2,5

Number, persons

2500

25 andmore

22,5-25

20-22,50Dose, cSv

Fig. 2. Distribution of radiation doses to military personnel of detached mechanised
regiment in period since May 1986 to May 1987 (n=4704).
1783

1500
1000

739

10-12,565

43
25 andmore

7,5-1031

22,5-25150

20-22,589

17,5-2034

15-17,5

29

5-7,5

0

45

2,5-5

500

12,5-15

481

0-2,5

Number, persons

2000

Dose, cSv

Fig. 3. Distribution of radiation doses to personnel of military building battalion inperiod since May 1986 to May 1987 (n=3489).
917

800
499

414
142

76
25 andmore

15-17,5

12,5-1573

22,5-25209

98
10-12,57,5-10

34
5-7,5

0

162

44
2,5-5

200

20-22,5400

17,5-20

600

0-2,5

Number, persons

1000

Dose, cSv

Fig. 4. Distribution of radiation doses to military personnel of 25 gas defence brigade
in period since May 1986 to May 1987 (n=2465).
- 97 -

Accordingly, the exposure dose values for SMR and MEB, which worked under the mostradiologically hazardous conditions, are skewed towards the permissible dose limit of 25 cSv (Fig. 2, 3).
Because various CPB units were both onsite at ChNPP and at various distances from it, the exposure dose
distribution for this part of liquidators has a somewhat different nature, but most doses still are placedaround 25 cSv (Fig. 4).
In the opinion of some authors [8], that we share, such an irregular distribution of doses for CD,
chemical and engineering units resulted from a stringent dose management rather than total falsification.
Therefore, the major doubts held by some authors as to objectivity of dosimetric monitoring in LAC units
are primarily due to these researchers’ insufficient awareness of the organization of dosimetric monitoring
and activities of this liquidator contingent. Yet one cannot totally dismiss facts of dose falsification, nor
the possibility of unmonitored exposure of a certain part of liquidators to doses significantly exceeding thepermissible ones [9].
It should be taken into account that a monetary compensation adding up to 5 monthly
remuneration rates was provided for exposure to a dose of 25 cSv and above. In other words, there was asignificant material “interest” in receiving a dose of 25 cSv and higher. Once the dose limit was set at 10

Number, persons

350

312

280
210

162

155

140

94

88

76

156
65

42

70

14
25 andmore

20-25

17,5-20

15-17,5

12,5-15

10-12,57,5-10

5-7,5

2,5-5

0-2,5

0

Dose, cSv

Fig.5. Distribution of radiation doses to military personnel of 817 OG in period since May 1986
to May 1987 (n=1164).
500

452

Number, persons

404
375

336
276

250

206
90

125

76

60

68

48

16
25 andmore

22,5-25

20-22,517,5-20

15-17,5

12,5-15

10-12,57,5-10

5-7,5

2,5-5

0-2,5

0

Dose, cSv

Fig. 6. Distribution of radiation doses to military personnel of rear and technical provision units
in period since 22.06.1986 to 08.08.1987 (n=2158).
- 98 -

cSv, cases of reaching the dose limit became singular, and cases of exceeding 10 cSv went virtuallyunrecorded, which can support our assumption. It should be noted, however, that cases of modifying
exposure doses for social reasons had place among liquidators from other ministries and agencies [8].
For OG 817 and especially for the logistic units that worked under more favorable conditions interms of radiation exposure than the aforementioned ACL units, the exposure dose distribution is close tologarithmically normal (Fig. 5, 6).
Therefore, the exposure dose value and the nature of dose distribution in military liquidators are
generally consistent with the nature of LAC activities and exposure conditions. But, in general summaries
the dose distribution specifics in serviceman of LAC units, which worked under safer radiologicalconditions, is offset by the data on exposure doses in the more numerous CD, chemical and engineering
forces.
Another step in dose verification is to establish a ratio between officially recorded (obtained via
the “group” and estimated “group” methods) and specific reference military liquidator exposure doses,
which objectively reflect the real situation.
As reference ones, we will use 2,447 records for military liquidator exposure doses measured withthermoluminescent dosimeters, courtesy of the archives of Kombinat Production Association (eventuallytransformed into RPA Prypyat).
Based on these data we have calculated the average doses received by servicemen for two weeks(basic term of wearing a dosimeter), total exposure doses were calculated for 12 weeks – a duration of
military liquidator stay in the ChNPP area that is also a conservative enough assumption.
A comparison of doses calculated based on measurement and official dose records (ODR) in thesame contingents is shown on Table 5. The Table 5 data indicate that ODR exceed the doses obtained
through individual dosimeters, by an excess of 4.5 times in1988 and more than twice – in 1989 and 1990.
Table 5.
The ratio between calculated and measured by individual TLD doses for military liquidators№
Year Average dose obtained by Average dose measured by individual Ratio between
estimated andз/пestimation method,ers DPG-03, cSv/number of persons
measured
cSv/number of persons inin group dosimet.
exposure doses
group
For 2 weeks
For 3 months
1
1988
5.56 ± 0.97/7502
0.2± 0.05/68
1.2
4.63
2
1989
3.12 ± 0.12/5862
0.22±0.03/568
1.32
2.36
3
1990
4.94 ± 0.22/2748
0.36±0.03/1811
2.16
2.29
Also noteworthy is the ratio between projected (estimated) and actually measured with ID of the
RMP 50А type exposure doses of the military men who decontaminated the ChNPP Unit 3 roof. Table 6
provides literature [17, 20] and archive data on the exposure doses of this contingent. Again we see thatthe projected (estimated) dose in average is twice that actually obtained.
When analyzing other archive materials, we found evidences of dose overstating aimed on preterm exemption from military training [22], as well as methodic problems of different kind [23, 24]. By
the way, cases in which the group method gave precise values were quite rare, and dosimeters Д-2Р (D-2R,
desined for use in nuclear industry, being a kind of ionisation chamber) used in this method in theconditions of hard beta-radiation overstated the dose no less than twice.
I.e. the analysis of radiation doses of large contingents of military liquidators showed that ODR noless than twice overstated the really received radiation doses.
Table 6.
- 99 -

The ratio between calculated and measured by individual dosimeters doses for military liquidators
participated in decontamination works on the roof of Power Unit #3.
Average dose by
Average dose
Number ofindividualRatio
by calculation№
Date of work
liquidators,
dosimeter
method, R
persons
meterage, R
1
28.07.86
8
1
0.4
2.5
2
19-20.09.86
133
20
8.5
2.35
3
21.09.86
307
20
10
2.0
4
22-23.09.86
953
20
9
2.22
5
24.09.86
376
20
10.6
1.89
6
26.09.86
270
20
13
1.54
7
27.09.86
300
20
16.2
1.23
8
14.10.86
30
20
8.26
2.42
9
15.10.86
16
20
9.9
2.02
10
16.10.86
28
20
10.29
1.84
Total
2421
2.07
Morbid and mortal events of military liquidators during performance of LAC works
The data on pre-term dismissal of military servants of SMR and CPB units for the reason of healthproblems are presented in Table 7. First of all, it should be mentioned that these data are not fully
consistent with the realities and are insufficient for well-grounded conclusions. In particular, it is unlikelythat the aforementioned units should have had more cases of dismissals for health considerations in 1987
than in 1986. Yet these data are quite enough to state that in a predominant majority of liquidators
dismissed for health considerations, their exposure doses and duration of stay in the accident area weresignificantly less than in their colleagues who had no health concerns.
In a predominant majority of liquidators exposure doses were at the level where they had justsome likelihood of physiological deviations unrelated to health dysfunctions. The opinion that radiologicalfactors made a very insignificant contribution to deterioration of liquidators' health can be attested by thefact that two out of three liquidators deceased were recorded on the third and fifth day of their stay in thewrecked ChNPP area, and the duration of stay of the third deceased was also within average for their unit.
The main cause of death in all these cases was acute cardiovascular deficiency.
In some orders issued by military unit commanders we find records on other lethal cases amongliquidators, but no summary information available on this issue. Therefore, we can provide but very roughestimates of total lethality by extrapolating the ratio of the number of SMR serviceman and number ofdeaths among them onto the total number of liquidators. Since the total number of persons who served in
SMR in January – June 1987 was about 2–3 thousands, then the total death-toll for the contingent of 300
thousands could have been about 300–450 cases.
The Chornobyl Military Force Commander Order № 5 dated 29 January 1990 [26] indicates thatin a majority of military units no in-depth medical examinations are conducted, resulting in cases of latediagnostics of ailments, up to lethal ones (private К. – shower & laundry detachment, praporshchik D. –military trade unit 960, private S. – military detachment 63279 etc.). And that happened in 1990, when the
military liquidator exposure dose did not exceed 5 rem.

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Table 7
Dismissals, exposure doses and duration of stay in the accident area for servicemen of SMR and CPB
during 1.05.1986 through 31.12.1987
Year
Work
Exposure dose, cSv
Average duration of
Number of liquidators
periodperiods of staying indismissed for health
Chornobyl zone
considerations
DMR
GDB
DMR
GDB
DMR
GDB
April- May
23.23±0.2 18.4±0.4
28.9±0.6
21.6±0.8- ???
1*(7)/(25)1986
June22.17±0.4 14.3±0.6
55.7±0.529.3±0.4
1
1*(36)/(2.5)
August1*(28)/(14)September- 23.1±0.2
24.3±0.3
57.3±0.3
41.7±2.2
1
DecemberJanuary22.1±0.19 18.1±0.5
69.6±0.769.1±1.9
1**(53)1987
June
1**(3)
1**(5)
1*(53)
July10.7±0.28 9.3±0.2
72.1±1.2.
54.1±1.5
1*(20)
1*(39)/(4.8)
December
1*(21)
1*(51)/(7.02)
1*(30)/(0.2)
1*(49)/(6.0)
1*(47)/(4.3)
1*(39)/(8.8)
1*(71)/(3.7)
1*(35)/(5.5)
1*(44)/(9.1)
1*(35)/(5.7)
1*(69)/(8.9)
Total during 19861014
and 1987* in parenthesis duration of period of staying, days (numerator) and radiation dose, cSv (denominator);** liquidators died in Chornobyl zone, in parenthesis duration of period of staying in the zone.
Researchers of the morbidity problem detected no essential connection between availability ofliquidator complaints and duration of their stay in the accident area, as well as the location and nature ofrecovery activities [27]. The Table 8 data can also confirm that it was other factors rather than theradiological one that was the cause of liquidator health condition deterioration.
Table 8.
Dismissals and exposure doses for military liquidators of the first and third sectors during 20.12.1986
through 30.03.1987
Number of
Average dose for
Average dose for№ Subordination
dismissed for health dismissals for healthliquidators in
Periodconsiderations
considerations, cSv
1986–1987, cSv
Sector 1
20.12.861(Blorussian84
2.39±0.13
5.7±0.3
16.03.87
Command)
Sector 3
03.01.872(Prycarpathian23
9.57±1.29
15.17±2.330.03.87
Command)- 101 -

The exposure doses for military liquidators of the first and third sectors who were dismissed for
health considerations did not exceed the average for the whole sectors and those levels that could
theoretically cause changes in their health condition.
In our opinion, the sudden conscription with a drastic change of habitual living and working
conditions, frequent relocations in the accident area provoked a major strain of adaptive mechanisms andtransition of certain body parts and systems, primarily the cardiovascular one, to a critical functioning
mode. It was what induced the aggravation of chronic diseases and sometimes – emergence of criticalconditions and lethal cases. The radiation factor is seen from the exposure doses available to have been
one of the least significant one.
As a results of a large number of liquidators dismissed for health considerations, people developed
a belief that recovery work at ChNPP was extremely dangerous, hence the liquidator contingent grew,which intensified the psycho-social consequences of the accident.
Conclusions
1. The State’s unpreparedness for action in emergencies; charging the Armed Forces with unfeasible tasks;
predominance of manual labour in LAC; use of DM methods that overestimated dose by about twice;imperfect system of medical selection of reservists drafted for a training assembly for LAC, –that
altogether unreasonably enlarged the liquidator contingent, increased LAC costs and intensified thesocio-psychological consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster.
2. The system of radiation safety and security of the Chernobyl Military Force, whatever its shortcomings
may have been, has prevented military servicemen from being massively exposed to doses capable ofinflicting radiation injuries.
3. The exposure doses and duration of stay in the accident area of military liquidators who were dismissed
for health considerations or died during their stay in the accident area were notably lower and shorter
than average for the unit where they served.
4. Scientific attention should be paid also to the influence of non-radiation factors (such as stress etc.) on
the health state of military liquidators during their recovery works and in long-term aspects.
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