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Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance:
An Examination of Structural Linkages in the
Security Relationship
Jeffrey W. HornungISBN 978-0-692-03669-3

90000>

9 780692 036693

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

MANAGING THE
U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

MANAGING THE
U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
AN EXAMINATION OF
STRUCTURAL LINKAGES IN THE
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
Jeﬀrey W. Hornung

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA is a 501(c)3 non-profit located in Washington, D.C.,
involved in U.S.-Japan relations, providing conf erences and seminars, think tank analysis,
people-to-people exchanges and coordination of high-level dialogue between the two countries
through our in-house and collaborative programs.
ISBN 978-0-692-03669-3
Printed in the United States of America© 2019, 2017 by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Sasakawa USA does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views
expressed herein are the authors’ own and do not necessarily re ect the views of Sasakawa
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without permission in writing from Sasakawa USA. Please direct inquiries to:
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Contents
Abbreviations.............................................................................................vi
Preface. ...................................................................................................... ..viii
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................ 3
Structures ................................................................................................... 7
United States: Policy .................................................................................. 8
Japan: Policy ............................................................................................. 11
Japan: Self-Defense Forces .................................................................... 24
United States: Armed Forces................................................................... 28
Structural Interactions ............................................................................. 35
Findings .................................................................................................... 53
Challenges in Peacetime Situations ....................................................... 57
Challenges in Crisis and Conflict Situations........................................... 63
Recommendations ................................................................................... 66
Conclusions .............................................................................................. 74
Appendix A: Research Methodology ....................................................... 75
Appendix B: Unworkable Options to Deal with Multiplicity of U.S.
Operational Actors ................................................................................... 78
Appendix C: Unworkable Changes to U.S. Forces, Japan ...................... 80
About the Author ................................................................................... 82

Abbreviations
ACG
ACG-D

Alliance CooperationGroup
ACG-Director

ACG-DG

ACG-Director General

ACG-ESACG-Executive
Secretariat
Alliance Coordination
Mechanism
Air Force

ACM
AF

AMM
AOR

Alliance Management
Meeting
Area of Responsibility

ARFOR

Army Forces

ASD APSA

Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian andPaci c Security Aﬀairs
Air Self-Defense Force
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations
Air Staﬀ Oﬃce

ASDF

ASEAN
ASO

ATLA
ATOP
BCM
BJOCC
BLC
BOCC
C7F

CCC
CCC-A
CCC-G

Acquisition, Technology& Logistics Agency
Alliance Transformation
Oversight Panel
Bilateral Coordination
Mechanism
Bilateral Joint Operations
Coordination Center
Bureau of Local
Cooperation
Bilateral Operations
Coordination Center
Commander, 7th Fleet
Component Coordination
CenterComponent Coordination
Center-Air
Component Coordination
Center-Ground

CCC-M
CENTRIX-J

CinCSDFLTCOCOM
COS-JSO

Component Coordination
Center-Maritime
Combined Enterprise
Regional Information
Exchange-Japan
Commander in Chief
Self-Defense Fleet
Combatant Command

DATT

Chief of Staﬀ-Joint Staﬀ
Oﬃce
Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Defense
Defense Attaché

DDG

Deputy Director General

DG

Director General

DOD

Department of Defense

DOS

Department of State

DPRI

FAO

Defense Policy Review
Initiative
Defense Security
Cooperation Agency
Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian andPaci c Aﬀairs
Foreign Area Oﬃcers

FLO

Foreign Liaison Oﬃcer

FOGO

Flag Oﬃcer/GeneralOﬃcer
Fragmentary Order

DASD

DSCA
EAP A/S

FRAGO
GCC
GOJ

GSDF
GSO

GSOMIAHNS

Ground Central
CommandGovernment of Japan
Ground Self-Defense
ForcesGround Staﬀ Oﬃce
General Security of
Military Information
Agreement
Host Nation Support

ABBREVIATIONS

SDC

vii

Subcommittee for Defense
Cooperation
Self-Defense Forces

IB

Internal Bureau

III MEFJC

III Marine Expeditionary
Force
International Policy
Division
Joint Committee

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ

J-NSC
JSO

Japan's National Security
Council
Joint Staﬀ Oﬃce

JTF

Joint Task ForceSSC

MARFORPAC

U.S. Marine Corps
Forces, Paci c
Mutual Defense
Assistance Oﬃce
Ministry of Defense

TCO

eater Campaign Order

TJFCC
USARJ

eater Joint Force
Component Commanders
U.S. Army, Japan

USARPACU.S. Army Paci c

USFJU.S. Forces, Japan

IPD

MDAO
MOD
MOFA
MSDF
MSO

NAAB
NOFORN

NSS
OPCON

OSD

Ministry of Foreign
AﬀairsMaritime Self-Defense
Force
Maritime Staﬀ Oﬃce
North American Aﬀairs
BureauNo Foreign National
National Security
Secretariat
Operational Control

PACAF

Oﬃce of the Secretary of
DefenseOrganize, Train andEquip
Oﬃce of the Under
Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics
U.S. Paci c Air Forces

PACFLT

U.S. Paci c Fleet

PACOM

U.S. Paci c Command

QDR

Quadrennial Defense
ReportScience and Technology
Forum
Security Consultative
Committee

OTE
OUSD (AT&L)

S&TF
SCC

SDF

SOCOM
SOCPACSOFA
SOPSpecial Operations
CommandSpecial Operations
Command Paci c
Status of Forces
Agreement
Standard Operating
Procedures
Security Subcommittee

USFK

U.S. Forces Korea

US-NSC
VTC

U.S. National Security
CouncilVideo Teleconference

WWII

World War TwoPreface
Back in the spring of 2015, I had the opportunity to visit then-Commander of the Ground SelfDefense Force’s Western Army command in Kyushyu, Lieutenant General Koichiro Bansho(now retired). I was there as part of a research project examining Japan’s burgeoning amphibious
capabilities. In a chance conversation with Lieutenant General Bansho, I asked him who his U.S.
counterparts were, the people with whom he interacted on a daily basis, which begot a long listthat included U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps units throughout Japan and beyond. Intrigued
but wanting more details, I subsequently started to look for published research on the topic,
assuming someone had already published a nuts-and-bolts review of how the U.S.-Japan alliancefunctions on a daily basis. Surprised that none existed to the level of detail I was looking for, I
realized an opportunity existed. Thus began the origins of this report, Managing the U.S.-Japan
Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship. A year later, while
a Fellow for the Security and Foreign Affairs Program at Sasakawa USA, I was fortunate to
finally make my research idea a reality.
Researched and written as a practical reference source for a better understanding of thestructure of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, my intention was to explain the complex nature of
the institutions, offices, and individuals that manage the U.S.-Japan alliance. While there havebeen a few minor changes to organizational charts since this report was first published in April
2017, the primary roles and responsibilities of the organizations, how these organizations
coordinate policies and security-related issues, and where lines of responsibilities interact remain
the same.
Since its initial publication, I have been pleasantly surprised to both hear and see formyself copies and downloads of this report in U.S. commands and defense and diplomatic
offices in Washington, Hawaii, and Japan and read by people directly responsible for the U.S.Japan alliance. That was always my intention. When Sasakawa USA told me they wereinterested in republishing this original version of my 2017 report, I agreed on the necessity, as anunderstanding of this critical alliance remains as true today as it did only a few years ago.
The Indo-Pacific region’s security environment has not improved since this report was
published, making the management of the U.S.-Japan alliance a continuing critical factor in theregion’s security. It is my hope that this report continues to serve a purpose of contributing to abetter understanding of how that important security relationship works.
Jeffrey W. Hornung
The RAND Corporation
November 2019

Introduction
Recent changes on both sides of the Paci c Ocean have helped make the U.S.-Japan alliancethe strongest it has ever been. In the United States, President Barack Obama pursued arebalancing strategy to the Asia-Paci c that signi cantly elevated Japan’s strategic value. In
Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe passed a set of security laws on September 19, 2015, toensure Japan will be able to play a more proactive contribution to peace.1 And on April 27,
2015, the allies released new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Much like theheightened expectations of a more proactive Japan that followed the revised National Defense
Program Guidelines in 2004 and the completion of the Defense Policy Review Initiative with
the United States in 2006, the passage of the security legislation and revision of the Defense
Guidelines has once again raised expectations that the alliance will be more eﬀective andproactive in addressing security issues throughout the Asia-Paci c region and beyond.
is is unlikely to change, even under the Donald Trump administration. Visits by
Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Japan and Prime Minister Abe to the United States in
President Trump’s rst month served to reinforce the positive trajectory of security ties byreiterating past commitments to the alliance. What is more, even if the Obamaadministration’s ‘rebalance’ strategy to the Asia-Paci c is eliminated, or drastically changed,
the Asia-Paci c will remain of crucial consequence to U.S. national security. is is a functionof the region’s economic and security importance. Central to successful U.S. engagement will
be Japan.
Successful engagement, in turn, depends on the eﬀectiveness of structural linkages in
the U.S.-Japan alliance among the institutional actors—both policy and operational—that
communicate and coordinate with one another. If the United States and Japan are notcommunicating and coordinating eﬀectively, their ability to engage the region on military andsecurity issues will be constrained.
Below is an examination of structural linkages in the U.S.-Japan alliance aiming toanswer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication and coordination
optimized for managing alliance relations? It seeks to provide insight into the black box ofbilateral decision-making by examining all the relevant actors in the national security sphere,
how they interact, and any inherent structural challenges that may exist. Following apresentation of key actors in the national security sphere in both Japan and the United States
is a description of how these actors communicate and coordinate with one another. e reportnds that while the existing structures of communication and coordination are generally eﬀective,

1

2:18 am (Japan time).

2

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

they are not optimized for managing alliance relations. Alliance managers face an array ofchallenges. is report divides these challenges into situations of peacetime and crisis andcon ict.
e report concludes with policy recommendations meant to overcome thesechallenges. An overview of the report’s research methodology is presented in Appendix 1.

Background
World economic growth depends heavily on stability in the Asia-Paci c region. Not only do
the economies of the Asia-Paci c drive today’s global economy and are vital to prosperity of
the United States, the region is a vital thruway for global commerce. According to the 2015
Department of Defense’s (DOD) Asia-Paci c Maritime Security Strategy, two-thirds of theworld’s oil shipments transit the region, eight of the world’s ten busiest container ports are in
the region and almost thirty-percent of the world’s maritime trade transits the South China
Sea annually, including approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the UnitedStates.2 Economically, therefore, regional stability is paramount. Just as it has been true forthe past seventy years, preventing regional civil wars and small-scale warfare from threatening
regional peace and stability will depend on a committed U.S. regional presence.
is is particularly true given the region’s three dominant security challenges risk
escalation and con ict. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
technologies is destabilizing as these directly threaten North Korea’s neighbors, U.S. troops
stationed in the region, and in time, the U.S. mainland. China’s rapid military buildup,
coupled with aggressive land reclamation eﬀorts in the South China Sea and overtly
provocative behavior vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, add to regional tensions. A
growing question for the United States is whether China’s growing military might will resultin a reduction of America’s freedom to operate throughout the region. Finally, while concerns
over Russia have largely focused on actions taken by the Russian military in Eastern Europe
to undermine regional security directly or through proxy forces, its actions in East Asia are
increasingly becoming confrontational. In addition to fostering seemingly closer relations with
China in the military sphere, Russia continues to engage in provocative behavior vis-à-vis
Japan over a set of disputed islands while bolstering its naval presence and air defense systems
in the region.
Given these challenges, U.S. military presence in the region will continue to play arole in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security, as it remains the only country able
to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. Yet, as postCold War strategic documents have recognized, the United States cannot manage regional
developments alone. It is necessary “to share the burdens of maintaining global security andprosperity.”3 is is in U.S. interests and the interests of U.S. allies. America’s “closest partners

2

U.S. Department of Defense, Asia-Paci c Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, D.C., 2015),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-081420151300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.
3
Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: February 2015), 3, http://nssarchive.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.

4

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

and allies will remain the cornerstone of [U.S.] international engagement.”4 is is exactly
why the importance of allies has been prioritized in an increasing array of oﬃcial strategies
released by the United States over the past two decades. is includes the 2015 Asia-Paci c
Maritime Security Strategy, every Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) since 2006, 5 andNational Security Strategies issued by every president since the George H.W. Bushadministration.
America’s “alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout
Asia and the Paci c.” 6 One reason is because alliances are force multipliers.
roughmultinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of the actions taken by the United Statesand its allies will always be greater than if they act alone.7 And they will act because alliances’raison d' etre is the defense of common interests. Working in concert enables the UnitedStates to respond more eﬀectively in defense of those interests. Another reason has to do withforward presence. In order to credibly deter potential adversaries, the United States must
maintain its ability to project power in areas in which access and freedom to operate arechallenged.8 Because of the tyranny of distance, eﬀective power projection and sustainment ofmilitary operations, therefore, will continue to depend on forward-deployed and rotationallydeployed forces, capabilities, and assets. us, as has been true in the past, America’s national
security will continue to depend on vibrant alliances.
America’s closest allies “will be, as they always have, other democratic states.” 9Amongst this nite universe, in the Asia-Paci c there is no ally more important than Japan.
Not only is Japan home for approximately 50,000 forward deployed U.S. military personnel,
it also hosts the Navy’s Seventh Fleet and the world’s only forward-stationed Carrier StrikeGroup, the Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), and signi cant Air
Force (AF) assets, including the 18th Wing, the largest combat wing in the U.S. AF. Unlike
U.S. forces that are tethered to South Korea, forces based in Japan are able to be deployedoutside of Japan. Japan complements America’s forces with the region’s most advanced armed
forces coupled, in recent years, by a soft relaxation of legal restrictions to enable its armed
forces to play a greater—albeit still limited—force provider role. Importantly, Japan shares
U.S. goals for the Asia-Paci c region. is is why Japan’s importance to the United States inaddressing regional challenges has grown in recent years and has been speci cally mentioned
in every QDR since 2006, the 2015 National Security Strategy, and the 2015 Asia-Paci c

4

Ibid.
e 1997 and 2001 QDR included allies, but the emphasis was largely how U.S. forces could assure allies anddeter aggression against them. Unlike later QDRs, these were not focusing on what the U.S. and its allies could or
should do in concert.
6
Obama, National Security Strategy, 7.
7Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: May 2010), 41,
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf.
8
U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington,
D.C., January 3, 2012), 4,
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
9
Obama, National Security Strategy, 2015, 19.
5

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

5

Maritime Security Strategy. Together, not only does the U.S.-Japan alliance assure regional
friends and deter potential foes, it improves America’s ability to rapidly act in the region todefeat potential challengers should a situation arise. is makes it crucial to ensure the basic
structures of the U.S.-Japan alliance are robust so that alliance handlers communicate andcoordinate eﬀectively to meet today’s challenges. It is for this reason that a focused
examination of structural linkages is important, as they form the connective communicative
tissue in this critical security relationship.
A study such as this is long overdue. Despite an entire genre of alliance-related
literature focusing on foreign policy and defense issues, there is a paucity focusing on thealliance’s structural linkages. 10 Scholars have instead focused on individual aspects of thealliance and decision-making processes. One group of scholarship focuses on the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MOFA), but these are studies of theindividual organization with no structural analysis to linkages to the United States (let alone
other Japanese agencies).11 Another group examines Japan’s national security infrastructure asa whole but also fails to extend the analysis to linkages with U.S. counterparts.12 A third groupexamines the increasingly powerful nature of the Prime Minister’s oﬃce—particularly in crisis
management—but these works focus largely on the oﬃce’s power vis-à-vis the vast Japanesebureaucracy, only occasionally providing a eeting glimpse into interaction with the UnitedStates13 Still, because of the nature of these studies, those “glimpses” come as case studies ofimportant events but examine only the highest levels of decision-making. In fact, the best
examples available of interaction between the allies are contained in a fourth group of
10

e majority of scholarship focuses on bilateral challenges, strategies, historical developments, or simply theimportance of the alliance. See Shin’ichi Kitaoka and Fumiaki Kubo, eds., Kibō no Nichibei Dōmei [U.S.-Japan
Alliance of Hope] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2016); Akihisa Nagashima, Nichibei Dōmei no Atrashii Sekkeizu[New Blueprint for the U.S.-Japan Alliance], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron-sha, 2004); and Yuki Tatsumi andAndrew Oros, Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications (Washington, D.C.:
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007).
11
On MOFA see Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (New York, NY: Macmillan Press,
1998); Robert Scalapino, ed., e Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1977); and Katsuyuki Yakushiji, Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,2003). On MOD see Harrison Holland, Managing Defense: Japan’s Dilemma (Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, 1988); Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (New York, NY; Routledge, 2009); and Nobuyuki
Nose, Bōeishō [Ministry of Defense] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2012).
12
Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), Chapter 2; Satoshi Morimoto, Nihonno Bōei to Anzen Hosho Seisaku [Japan’s Defense and National Security Policies] (Tokyo: Grafu-sha, 2005); andNaoki Shimomichi, Kore de Ii no Ka Nihon no Gaikō-Bōei [Japan’s Diplomacy and Defense, Is is OK?] (Tokyo:Ōmura Shoten, 2005). One of the best examples is a Stimson Center report by Yuki Tatsumi that examines eachelement of Japan’s national security policy infrastructure in order to assess the capacity that the Japanese
government has to implement its current policy and to identify where structural challenges remain. See Yuki
Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington’s Expectations? (Washington,
D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008).
13
Isao Iijima, Koizumi Kantei Hiroku [Secret Records of Koizumi’s Kantei] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha,
2006); Eda Kenji and Takashi Ryuzaki, Shushō Kantei [Prime Minister’s Oﬃce] (Tokyo; Bungei Shunju, 2002);
and Harukata Takenaka, Shushō Shihai: Nihon Seiji no Henbō [Prime Ministerial Rule: Transformation of Japanese
Politics], (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2006). For an example of a work that oﬀer glimpses into interacting with
the U.S., see Tomohito Shinoda, Kantei Gaikō [Prime Minister Oﬃce Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha,2004) and Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2007).

6

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

scholarship, in-depth works focusing on various events in the history of the alliance, such as
overseas operations led by the United States involving some level of Japanese support.14 ese,
however, suﬀer from an almost exclusive focus on the highest echelons of the foreign policy
and defense establishments, giving no sense of the complex nature of communication andcoordination taking place at lower levels of government.
None of this is to suggest these works are unimportant.
ey provide in-depth
analysis and understanding of how speci c parts of the alliance function and associated policy
challenges. In other words, they “oﬀer a peeking window into the often opaque Japanesenational security policy infrastructure.” 15 What this scholarship lacks, however, is a focus
inside the bilateral black box of decision-making and how the alliance communicates andcoordinates on a routine basis and possibly in a contingency. Importantly, the bulk of theexisting scholarship does not cover how the changes over the past year aﬀect alliancemanagement.
Without a doubt, policymakers and scholars on both sides of the Paci c are wellaware of the important role the alliance plays in regional security. is awareness has increased
in recent years as small legal changes translate into possible new roles and missions. Because
the regional challenges facing the allies are great, no aspect of the alliance relationship can rely
on chance. is is particularly true of simple communication and coordination mechanisms.
Seamless responses demand seamless communication. With the April 27, 2015, Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation indicating that the two governments will strive to ensure
seamless and eﬀective coordination, we have to ask whether the allies are communicating
seamlessly. If not, why? Are there structural hurdles that frustrate eﬀective communication?
If so, how can they be mitigated?
is project seeks to assess all the channels ofcommunication the allies have with one another in the national security realm as an attempt
to answer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication and coordination
optimized for managing alliance relations?

14

For the Gulf War, see Michael Armacost, Friends or Rivals? e Insiders Account of U.S.-Japan Relations (NewYork, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chapter 4; Asahi Shimbun Wangan Kiki Shuzai Han, Wangan Sensō
to Nihon: Towareru Kiki Kanri [ e Gulf War and Japan: Questioned Crisis Management] (Tokyo: Asahi
Shimbun-sha, 1991); Takeshige Kunimasa, Wangan Sensō to iu Tenkanten [ e Gulf War as the Turning Point](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999); Kōichirō Matsūra and Seiichi Kondo, “Sono Toki, Gaimushō ha Dō Taiō Shita
Ka” [At that Time, How Did MOFA Respond?] Gaiko Forum No. 158 (September 2001): 21-7; and Ryuichi
Teijima, 1991-nen Nihon no Haiboku [Japan’s 1991 Defeat] (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 1994). For the Iraq War, see
Satorshi Morimoto, Iraku Sensō to Jieitai Haken [ e Iraq War the Dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces] (Tokyo:
Toyo Keizai Shinhō-sha, 2004) and Tetsuya Kakitani and Masayuki Kikuchi, Jieitai Iraku Haken no Shinjitsu: Sengō
Saidai no Seiji Ketsudan no Seika to Mondaiten [ e Facts of the SDF’s Iraq War Dispatch: Accomplishments andProblems of the Biggest Postwar Political Decision] (Tokyo: Ariadone Kikaku, 2005). For the indigenousdevelopment and production of weapons in Japan, see Michael Green, Arming Japan (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1995). For the evolution of bilateral military cooperation and security debates, see Richard
Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007) and Sheila Smith, “ e Evolution of
Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance” in e U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, MichaelGreen and Patrick Cronin, eds. (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
15
Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 10.

Structures
Without a doubt, change in an oﬃce’s authority or its relationship with other oﬃces is afunction of the speci c person leading that oﬃce. After all, personalities matter. is study
sought a more general approach, however, hoping to draw general conclusions based on the
responsibilities of and interaction between individual departments and commands, rather thanthe people leading them.16 As such, to understand how alliance managers communicate andcoordinate with one another, it was necessary to examine the discrete organizations
responsible for policies in the defense, foreign aﬀairs, and national security realm as well as
the operational elements of the allies’ respective military establishments. It was necessary todelve into levels below organizational leadership to examine where routine management isperformed throughout various agencies and commands. is rst section presents a structural
analysis of all the relevant organizations, both policy and operational, on both sides of thePaci c Ocean that are responsible for alliance management. Before we begin, two caveats arenecessary.
For the purposes below, “policy” structures relate to those oﬃces generally
responsible for making security-related policies while “operational” structures relate to thoseoﬃces engaged in military operations or implementing the relevant security policies createdby the “policy” structures. is division is arti cial, as there is signi cant overlap between thetwo realms. It is more eﬀective than a simple civilian-military distinction, however, given the
cross-cutting nature of civilians and military personnel in these structures. Because theobjective of this report is to isolate structural actors for the purpose of simplifying the analysis,
the policy-operational division should not be overanalyzed.
e author’s intention is to analyze daily management of the security aspects of thealliance. While this study began with an inclusion of how the alliance handles issues pertaining
to Okinawa, it quickly became evident that alliance management of Okinawa-related issues
includes a number of actors relevant only to Okinawa. is included, among others, the U.S.
Consulate, the Okinawa governor’s oﬃce, the Okinawa Prefectural government, and
MOFA’s Okinawa Liaison Oﬃce. Understanding their relationship and how these actors
manage Okinawa-related issues is important, but it is beyond the scope of this report because
it is much more focused than the author’s intent for this study. While the report does touchon how Okinawa-related issues are managed, that topic is largely on the margins and not thereport’s focus.

16

is is not to suggest a study on speci c personalities is unimportant but that it is just beyond the scope of thisstudy.

United States: Policye U.S. organizations responsible for policy relating to managing the alliance are fewer thanthose in Japan. is is understandable. e United States is a global power with interests
spanning the globe. Within those interests, Japan is but one, albeit an important one.
Nevertheless, it means that outside of the American Embassy in Tokyo, the extent of U.S.
organizations responsible for national security issues with Japan refers to two main “Japan
Desks” and two other oﬃces.

Department of StateIn the Department of State (DOS), the Bureau of East Asian and Paci c Aﬀairs is responsiblefor U.S. foreign policy and U.S. relations with all countries in the Asia-Paci c region. Headedby the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Paci c Aﬀairs (EAP A/S), thisindividual serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary for Political Aﬀairs and theSecretary of State on foreign policies relating to the Asia-Paci c region. Under the Assistant
Secretary sit four to six Deputies, although there is no hard-and-fast rule on this and numbers
and titles change depending on the administration. For the Barack Obama Administration,
there were six, with the focus of these Deputy Assistant Secretaries being: (1)China/Mongolia/Taiwan; (2) Japan/Koreas; (3) Australia/New Zealand/Oceania; (4)Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional aﬀairs; (5) Mainland andmaritime Southeast Asia; and (6) Public aﬀairs/public diplomacy in East Asia. It is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Japanese and Korean Aﬀairs who is responsible for overseeing theformulation and implementation of diplomatic policies relevant to Japan. e Bureau of East
Asian and Paci c Aﬀairs itself is divided into thirteen distinct Oﬃces, with the Oﬃce ofJapanese Aﬀairs handling all relations with Japan. Headed by a Director who reports directly
to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japanese and Korean Aﬀairs, the Oﬃce oversees
a broad span of political, economic, consular, and public diplomacy issues bearing on thebilateral relationship with Japan. Japan comes up occasionally with other Oﬃces, dependingon the topic. For example, if DOS is pursuing trilateral initiatives with the South Korea, thenthe desk responsible for South Korea would also be involved in communication with Japan.

Department of Defense
In the DOD’s Oﬃce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asian and Paci c Security Aﬀairs (ASD APSA) serves as the principal advisor to the

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

9

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security
strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the nations and internationalorganizations of the Asia-Paci c, its governments and defense establishments, and foroversight of security cooperation programs in the region.17 Under the ASD APSA sit three
Deputies, one responsible for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, one for South andSoutheast Asia, and one for East Asia. It is this last Deputy who oversees the formulation andimplementation of defense policy for Japan as well as for four other countries and Taiwan.18
Under this Deputy, the portfolio directly responsible for defense policies with Japan is that of
the Director for Japan, who falls directly beneath the Deputy Assistant Secretary for EastAsia.
e Director oversees approximately ve or six individuals focusing on the entire
spectrum of bilateral defense relations.19

U.S. National Security Council
e U.S. National Security Council (US-NSC) is the U.S. President's principal forum forconsidering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security
advisors and cabinet oﬃcials. As such, the US-NSC’s main function is to advise and assist the
President on national security and foreign policies as well as coordinate these policies among
U.S. government agencies. e US-NSC is chaired by the President, and statutory members
include the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, theSecretary of Energy. Statutory advisers include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ (JCS)
and the Director of National Intelligence. Other oﬃcials are invited to attend, and thePresident can add other members at his/her discretion. One regular, non-statutory member
includes the Assistant to the President for National Security Aﬀairs, who is the National
Security Advisor. Underneath this individual sit three Deputy National Security Advisors andmultiple Senior Directors covering both regional (e.g., Senior Director for Asia) andfunctional responsibilities (e.g., cyber, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation). Underneaththese three Deputies are multiple Directorships, who are the staﬀ-level machinery of the USNSC. Included in this is the Director of Japan Aﬀairs. While the Senior Director for Asia
covers Japan, the main point of contact with Japan in the White House is the Director forJapan Aﬀairs. As of this writing, despite President Trump’s changes to the National Security
Council, this does not appear to have changed.

17

U.S. Department of Defense, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Paci c Security Aﬀairs,”
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Oﬃces/ASD-for-Asian-and-Paci c-Security-Aﬀairs.
18
Other countries this individual is responsible for include China, Mongolia, and North and South Korea.
19
ere are approximately twenty- ve portfolios on Japan.

10

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

American Embassy (Tokyo)
When every Ambassador is posted to Japan, the President gives instructions that he or she isin charge of all members of the executive branch in Japan, with the exception of military who
fall under a combatant command (COCOM).20 As such, the majority of military personnel
serving in Japan do not fall under the Ambassador’s authority. Only the Defense Attaché(DATT) and some select liaison oﬃcers fall under the Ambassador’s authority. is means
the Embassy is not the primary interlocutor with Japan on military and security issues. Yet,because of the in uential role MOFA took on in defense and security matters after WorldWar Two (WWII),21 the Embassy assumed a position of importance in security issues thatthe DOD could not. is meant that while alliance relations have not been run out of the
Defense Attaché Oﬃce, the U.S. Embassy has utilized its Political-Military Aﬀairs Unit as
the Mission’s chief interlocutor to communicate with the host government on security-related
issues. Headed by a Chief who falls directly beneath the Minister Counselor for PoliticalAﬀairs, the Unit is composed of approximately twelve individuals who cover a broad range of
security-related issues. Crucial to their success is the role played by foreign-service nationals
who provide not only institutional knowledge and continuity across U.S. staﬀ changes but
critical linguistic skills to assist Embassy staﬀ in their jobs.

20

Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, February 10, 2017.
Japan’s immediate post-WWII anxiety with military meant that Japan did not have a Ministry of Defense; rather,it had a less powerful and less in uential Japan Defense Agency. e Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs instead was themain driver of the alliance in Japan.
21Japan: Policy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
外務省 (Gaimushō)
In MOFA, most issues are managed and policies are shaped primarily at the division level (課; ka); the divisions are headed by division Directors (課⾧; ka-chō). ese divisions exist
within larger bureaus (局; kyoku), which are each headed by a Director General (DG) (局⾧;kyoku-chō) and seconded by a Deputy Director General (DDG) (審議官; shingi-kan). As ofthis writing, as seen in table 1, MOFA is organized into twelve bureaus (seven functional; ve
regional), of which three (in bold type) are relevant to the focus of this study.22

Table 1. MOFA Bureaus and Divisions.
Regional:
Asian and Oceanian Aﬀairs
North American Aﬀairs
Latin American and Caribbean
AﬀairsEuropean Aﬀairs
Middle Eastern and AfricanAﬀairsFunctional:
Minister’s Secretariat
Foreign Policy
Economic Aﬀairs
International Cooperation
International Legal Aﬀairs
Consular Aﬀairs
Intelligence and Analysis
ServiceRelevant Bureaus

Relevant Divisions

North American Aﬀairs

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
DivisionFirst North America Division
Status of U.S. Forces
Agreement Division

Foreign Policy

National Security Policy
DivisionInternational Legal Aﬀairs

Treaties Division

North American Affairs Bureau (北米局, Hoku Bei-kyoku)
More than any other bureau, the North American Aﬀairs Bureau (NAAB) has an exclusive
focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Prior to the creation of the Foreign Policy Bureau, the22Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, About Us: Organization, http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html.

12

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

NAAB had a long history of leading the Japanese government’s consultation with the UnitedStates on the alliance. 23 In fact, prior to creation of today’s MOD, the NAAB was thepreeminent bureau that did many of the policy functions the U.S. DOD was performing.
Today, although the majority of the NAAB’s focus is the United States, the NAAB oﬃciallyleads matters that include planning work connected with the formulation of policies
concerning all North American countries, coordination of implementing such policies, andthe political aﬀairs concerning the North American countries.24 With the bureau’s exclusive
focus on North America, it is no surprise that each of its four divisions serves as a custodian
for diﬀerent aspects of Japan’s relationship with the United States. ree of these divisions are
relevant to this study.25

North American Affairs Bureau: Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
日米安全保障条約課 (Nichi-Bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku-ka)
Unlike in the MOD where the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division holds a preeminent
position as a manager of alliance issues above other divisions, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division shares responsibilities for diﬀerent aspects of alliance management with other
MOFA divisions. For example, while the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division is
responsible for interpretation of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation forincidents and accidents of U.S. forces in Japan, this division is responsible for steady stateaﬀairs as well as the long-term big-picture design of the alliance. is division, however, could
be considered the main manager of the alliance given that it is responsible for alliancemanagement issues, such as implementation of the Security Treaty and Defense Guidelines,
as well as leading government negotiations with the United States on alliance issues. For
example, this division focuses on issues like the U.S. realignment plans as well as trilateral
cooperation with other countries alongside the United States Most recently, when the Abe
Administration worked to pass the security legislation, it was this division that led eﬀorts in
MOFA, working closely with its counterpart in the MOD—Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division.

North American Affairs Bureau: Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division
日米地位協定室 (Nichi-Bei Chii Kyōtei-shitsu)
As the name implies, the primary responsibility of this division is to handle SOFA-related
matters.
ese include all issues that have to do with negotiation, conclusion, andinterpretation of SOFA implementation, as well as related-issues, such as getting parts for

23

Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, “North American Aﬀairs Bureau,” About Us: Organization,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html.
25
e Second North America Division focuses on economic issues.
24

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

13

Japan’s F-35 through Japan’s import restrictions. While its responsibilities are therefore broad,
it is primarily seen as responsible for incidents and accidents that arise involving U.S. military
personnel living in Japan. Speci cally, the division has the responsibility for coordinating
bilateral eﬀorts to respond to a situation involving U.S. personnel that includes facilitating
communications between Japanese law enforcement and U.S. military police. 26
iscomplements the robust linkages between each major U.S. command’s Provost Marshal andJapanese law enforcement agencies as well as those between U.S. Forces, Japan and theMinistry of Justice, and law enforcement agencies. Via these linkages, the United States anddomestic law enforcement agencies are able to discuss a broad array of issues that include
crime and force protection.

North American Affairs Bureau: First North America Division
北米第一課 (Hokubei Dai-Ichi-ka)
e primary responsibility of this division is overseeing the political aspects of the alliance.
is excludes economic issues, which are handled by the Second North America Division, but
includes things like youth exchanges and visas. It does not focus on alliance management
issues, per se; instead, these are handled primarily by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division.
Still, it is responsible for overarching foreign policy toward the United States In this sense, itis broader than the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division by focusing more on the diplomaticside of the alliance, not simply the security aspect. For example, this division was responsible
for organizing President Obama’s historic visit to Hiroshima in May 2015. As such, a large
portion of this division’s work is assistance on arranging talking points for communications
between Japan’s Foreign Minister or Prime Minister with the U.S. Secretary of State or
President. Similarly, this division is responsible for networking with other U.S. allies, albeit
strictly at a diplomatic/political level.

Foreign Policy Bureau
総合外交政策局 (Sōgō Gaikō Seisaku-kyoku)
Created in 1993 to better synchronize overall policy coming out of MOFA, the Foreign Policy
Bureau today is the most powerful Bureau in MOFA precisely because it is responsible forcoordinating policies formulated by all of MOFA’s bureaus and is responsible for planning ofbasic and middle- or long-term foreign policy from a broader perspective.27 at said, theBureau is not responsible for maintaining bilateral contact with foreign states, including theUnited States. Instead, that responsibility is handled by divisions within speci c

26

Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, “Foreign Policy Bureau,” About Us: Organization,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html.
27

14

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

geographically focused bureaus. For example, the NAAB oversees U.S.-related issues. e
Bureau itself is divided up into twelve divisions and a Recruitment Center for International
Organizations.

Foreign Policy Bureau: National Security Policy Division
安全保障政策課 (Anzen Hoshō Seisaku-ka)
e fact that the Foreign Policy Bureau does not reach out to states does not mean that it iscompletely free of the alliance. Quite the contrary: Because the Bureau puts an emphasis on
national security issues, it provides input to other bureaus regarding policies—which could
involve the United States—and also has the ability to veto division-level decisions if they areinconsistent with existing policy. 28 Within its thirteen divisions, the relevant one for thealliance is the National Security Policy Division. is division’s responsibility is macro inscope, internally coordinating policy issues within MOFA to ensure consistency,
disseminating information within MOFA gathered from other agencies, and disseminating
Japanese security policy internationally.29 Even if an issue is narrowly bilateral in scope with
one country, such as Australia, the National Security Policy Division is involved to ensure
consistency with current and possible future policies with other countries.

International Legal Affairs Bureau
国際法局 (Kokusai Hō-kyoku)
e International Legal Aﬀairs Bureau is the bureau that takes charge of the conclusion oftreaties and other international agreements, matters of international law, and legal mattersconcerning foreign relations.30 It is the successor to the Treaty Bureau, which was replaced in
2004. e bureau’s essential responsibility is to ensure that international legal agreements
signed by the government are consistent with Japan’s domestic laws. 31 Additionally, theBureau ensures that there are operative legal means to implement any obligations underinternational agreements.

International Legal Affairs Bureau: Treaties Division
条約課 (Jōyaku-ka)
e bureau is divided into four divisions: International Legal Aﬀairs Division, Treaties
Division, Economic Treaties Division, and Social Treaties Division. e responsibility for the28

Anonymous P, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.
Ibid.
30
Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, “International Legal Aﬀairs Bureau,” About Us: Organization,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html.
31
Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 36.
29

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

15International Legal Aﬀairs Division is self-evident in that it deals with international law.
Examples include law of the sea and international judicial proceedings, for which the division
is sub-divided, but also any issue relating to customary international law, international
humanitarian law, or the International Court of Justice. e Economic and Social Treaties’
Divisions are responsible for economic or social related treaties, such as the Transpaci c
Partnership Agreement or the Paris Agreement. e Treaties Division is relevant to thisstudy, as it is responsible for synchronizing political and security-related treaties to Japan’s
domestic laws.
is includes the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, SOFA, defense equipment
transfers, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, and the General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). is means that the division works very closelywith the NAAB—the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the Status of U.S. Forces
Division—as they are both in charge of interpreting implementation of the Treaty and SOFA,
respectively. ey take the lead in communicating with the United States in their respective
area, but it is the responsibility of the Treaties Division to provide legal advice to make surethat their work is consistent with the long-standing interpretation of the Treaty and SOFA.32

Ministry of Defense
防衛省 (Bōei-shō)e MOD consists of an Internal Bureau (IB), Joint Staﬀ, staﬀ oﬃces for each of the SelfDefense Force (SDF) services, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA)
as an external bureau. Like MOFA, in the MOD most issues are managed and policies areshaped primarily at the division level (課; ka); the divisions are headed by division Directors (課⾧; ka-chō). ese divisions exist within larger bureaus (局; kyoku), which are headed by
DGs (局⾧; kyoku-chō). In the Bureau of Defense Policy, this DG is seconded by two DDGs
(次⾧; ji-chō) while in the Bureau of Local Cooperation (BLC), there is one. ere are sevenCouncilors (審議官; shingikan) who belong to the Minister’s Secretariat and are designatedto function as Deputies for speci c items for all the Bureaus. As shown in table 2, the civilian
component in the MOD is organized into ve bureaus that exist within the IB.33 ese civilian
agencies exercise oversight over not just the SDF but the management of relations with theUnited States, including issues that arise from U.S. forces stationed in Japan. In the scope of
this study, two (in bold type) of the IB’s bureaus play an important role in terms of the alliance:
the Bureau of Defense Policy and the BLC.

32

For example, when Japan and the U.S. negotiated the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, theJapan-U.S. Security Treaty Division took the lead in the negotiation but the Treaties Division participated in thesenegotiations to ensure that the language of the Guidelines is consistent with the Treaty and other domestic law.
Similarly, when Japan and the U.S. negotiated the Host Nation Support Agreement in 2015, it was the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty Division that took the lead in the negotiation and the Treaties Division closely advised and ensured
legal consistency.
33
Japan Ministry of Defense, Organizational Chart, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/organization/chart_a.html.

16

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Table 2. MOD Internal Bureau’s Bureaus and Divisions.
Internal Bureau
Minister’s Secretariat
Bureau of Defense Policy
Bureau of Defense Buildup
Planning
Bureau of Personnel and
Education
Bureau of Local Cooperation

Relevant Bureaus
Bureau of Defense Policy

Bureau of Local Cooperation

Relevant Divisions
Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division
Operational Policy Division
Strategic Planning DivisionInternational Policy Division
Local Cooperation Planning
Division
Local Coordination Division
Okinawa Coordination
Division
Living Environment
Improvement DivisionSoundproof Measures
Division
Compensation Division
Facilities Administration
Division
Facilities Improvement
Program Division
Labor Management Division

Bureau of Defense Policy
防衛政策局 (Bōei Seisaku-kyoku)
e IB is the most consequential MOD bureau for the alliance, given the concentration of
responsibilities. Historically, the IB was established to closely control the SDF, with the headof the IB responsible for reviewing everything that went to the Director General of the Japan
Defense Agency, the precursor to the current MOD. is function is still performed for thesake of conformity with legal restrictions, but it gives the IB a rm lock on all MOD actions.
Within the IB’s ve sections, the most important for the alliance is the Bureau of Defense
Policy, which is responsible for developing a defense strategy that takes into account Japan’s
broader national interest and national security policy goals. It is the direct domestic
counterpart to MOFA’s Foreign Policy Bureau. As such, it sits atop the policy hierarchy in
the MOD, as it is tasked with all issues of Japan’s defense. Within the Bureau of Defense
Policy, four divisions hold portfolios responsible for diﬀerent aspects of the U.S.-Japan
alliance that are critical to its management.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

17

Bureau of Defense Policy: Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division
日米防衛協力課 (Nichi-Bei Bōei Kyōryoku-ka)
Established as a full division in 2007, the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is
responsible for all aspects of Japan’s defense policy vis-à-vis the United States to include, but
not limited to, roles and missions of defense cooperation, basic framework issues, and matterspertaining to U.S. forces realignment under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) andthe Special Action Committee on Okinawa. e division is the lead entity to handle basic
framework issues, such as the defense guidelines. When changes occur in the SDF’s mission
domestically, they must be re ected in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation so that the allies areclear about what changes will occur in the execution of their responsibilities and duties.
Phrased aptly by one defense oﬃcial, “we need to be on the same sheet of music.”34 is isbecause any legislative change aﬀects mission planning and training and exercises. Another
responsibility, although one shared by the BLC, is negotiating a special measures agreement
on Japan’s Host Nation Support (HNS) every ve years. HNS is the U.S.-Japan agreement
under which the Government of Japan (GOJ) pays large portions of yen-denominatedexpenses for U.S. stationing of personnel in Japan (e.g., Japan laborers on bases and utility
costs). Because all the money that is earmarked and expended is part of the MOD budget, theMOD has a stake in how that money is spent and therefore works with the BLC in theseeﬀorts.
Domestically, the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is the counterpart of
MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the Status of U.S. Forces Division.
Occasionally, it will even deal directly with MOFA’s National Security Policy Division in theForeign Policy Bureau, although that usually only happens at a policy coordination level.
Responsibilities shared with MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division are split along themilitary-diplomatic divide. e MOFA division deals with treaty-related issues that do not
fall under the defense portfolio. An example would be interpretation of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty or the U.S.-Japan Environmental Agreement to supplement the SOFA.
Mission planning or the speci cs of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, however, would fallunder the MOD division’s authority simply because MOFA does not handle military-related
issues (although, in principle, the counterparts keep each other informed of their discussions
with the United States).

Bureau of Defense Policy: Operational Policy Division
運用政策課 (Unyō Seisaku-ka)
e Operational Policy Division is primarily in charge of the legal and policy aspects of SDF
operations, both domestically and overseas. It interprets the laws passed by the Diet and thenis responsible for the lower laws necessary for implementation. For example, after the passage

34

Anonymous BB, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.

18

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

of the 2015 security legislation, new rules of engagement and weapons’ use standards for the
SDF were required. ese types of things are drafted by the SDF services, but this division
has to check the drafts for legal correctness and provide input to the Defense Minister onwhether exibility exists within the legal mandate for political choice to be exercised.

Bureau of Defense Policy: Strategic Planning Division
戦略企画課 (Senryaku Kikaku-ka)
Like ATLA (below), the Strategic Planning Division was created on October 1, 2015. Prior
to October 1, 2015, the Defense Policy Division handled both strategic planning matters andmid- to long-term policy planning. On October 1, however, the division was split into a new
Defense Policy Division and the Strategic Planning Division. e responsibility of the new
Defense Policy Division is primarily managing the various divisions within the Bureau, acting
as the point of contact for the US-NSC, and developing policies like the MOD’s National
Defense Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense Program. e responsibility of theStrategic Planning Division is to create mid- to long-term strategic planning on issues. isincludes outer space policy, missile defense policy, and cyber policy. For example, in regards
to missile defense, although the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) procures the Aegis
ballistic missile defense system and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) the Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense system, the division is responsible for developing theoverall policy parameters within which these services use their systems. Of these three issues,
the division is responsible for coordinating and taking a leading role on space policy andmissile defense policy. When it comes to cyber policy, however, it plays simply a coordinatingrole with other members from MOD, MOFA, National Security Secretariat (NSS), and the
National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity.

Bureau of Defense Policy: International Policy Division
国際政策課 (Kokusai Seisaku-ka)
Whereas the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division is responsible for Japan’s cooperation
with the United States, the International Policy Division (IPD) is responsible for making
bilateral defense exchanges and cooperation with countries other than the United States. Withpriorities based on the 2013 National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program
Guidelines, the IPD is particularly targeting ties with partners such as Australia, South Korea,
India, and ASEAN countries as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States andAustralia. 35 Because the security architecture in the region has moved away from the35

e U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral is currently handled by the International Policy Division, but its oﬃcial
portfolio falls under the Strategic Planning Division.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

19

traditional hub-and-spokes mechanism of the Cold War,36 this division is working to create
linkages between the spokes by reaching out to countries like the Philippines and India withthe hope to create other formal trilateral cooperative frameworks.37

Bureau of Local Cooperation
地方協力局 (Chihō Kyōryoku-kyoku)
If there are base issues with a local community, MOFA does not deal with the local
communities directly, though it would be involved in SOFA-related issues with the UnitedStates via its Status of U.S. Forces Division. Instead, the BLC has the responsibility of directly
reaching out to Japanese communities that have base-related issues, be they U.S. forces or
Self-Defense Forces. Composed of ten divisions that are each responsible for diﬀerent aspectsof the relationship with U.S. Forces in Japan, the Bureau has as its key responsibility providing
the facilities and areas for U.S. forces as called for under Article XI of the security treaty.
Tangential to this, it plays a vital role in maintaining smooth communication with the UnitedStates on daily management issues as well as the occasional problems that may arise. Toward
this end, the Bureau serves as a conduit to transmit local communities’ concerns that arise
from the U.S. presence.38 ere is overlap with MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Agreement
Division in that they both are responsible for SOFA-related issues, but their responsibilities
are distinct. MOFA’s Division, for example, is authorized to handle negotiation, conclusion,and interpretation of SOFA.
e divisions within the BLC, however, cover SOFA
implementation, including things like management and return of facilities and areas.
Speci cally, the BLC’s divisions, and their responsibilities, are:36

Local Cooperation Planning Division (地 方 協 力 企 画 課): Responsible forsupervising all divisions in the Bureau and chairing U.S.-Japan meetings, whennecessary.



Local Coordination Division (地方調整課): Responsible for coordinating relations
between U.S. forces and local communities other than Okinawa.

Okinawa Coordination Division (沖 縄 調 整 官): Responsible for coordinating
relations between U.S. forces and local communities in Okinawa. is includes issues
related to defense facilities and infrastructure, construction, land return, noise,
accidents, incidents, and pollution.

e hub-and-spokes mechanism refers to the network of formal bilateral alliances the U.S. maintained throughout
the Cold War with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Under this system, the U.S. was the dominant “hub”
maintaining strong ties with each of the three “spokes,” but the three “spokes” had no signi cant connections among
themselves.
37
Anonymous II, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
38
Anonymous HH, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.

20

JEFFREY W. HORNUNGLiving Environment Improvement Division (周辺環境整備課): Responsible forsubsidies to local base-hosting communities from the GOJ.

Soundproof Measures Division (防音対策課): Responsible for noise mitigation
measures around U.S. bases.

Compensation Division (補償課): Responsible for compensation for accidents andincidents stemming from actions by U.S. personnel.

Facilities Administration Division (施設管理課): Responsible for administration of
U.S. forces’ facilities.



Facilities Improvement Program Division (提 供 施 設 課): Responsible for
implementation of the Facilities Improvement Program budget.

Labor Management Division (労 務 管 理 課): Responsible for addressing issues
related to Japanese laborers working at U.S. facilities.



Procurement Division (調達官): Responsible for procurement of goods and services
for U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency
防衛装備庁 (Bōei Sōbi-Chō)
Until October 2015, defense equipment and technology cooperation between the UnitedStates and Japan was an ad hoc venture that generally required executive exceptions toauthorize. In 2015, however, the ATLA was established in the MOD as an external bureau.
is means that it is not one of the ve units in the IB.
Although four of its ve core missions are strictly domestic in nature, a fth one isstrengthening defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries, including
the United States.39 Under ATLA’s Commissioner, there are a Deputy Commissioner/Chief
Defense Scientist who is responsible for technology aﬀairs; four DGs for joint weapons,
ground, naval, and air systems development; and an Assistant Commissioner who assists theCommissioner in general. Under them are a Secretariat, ve departments, and research centers
and test centers.40 e ve departments are: Procurement Operations, Project Management,
Equipment Policy, Technology Strategy, and Procurement Management. 41 While the39

e other four are enhance technological capacity; enable more eﬃcient acquisition of defense equipment;
maintain and strengthen defense production; and reduce costs and strengthen inspection and audit functions. It isnoted, however, that there are international aspects inherent in some of ATLA’s work. For example, the Buildup
Planning Bureau’s mission was responsible for negotiations related to the choice and purchase of F-35s.
Anonymous GG, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
40
Japan Ministry of Defense, “Organizations,” About ATLA, http://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/soshiki.html.
41
Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016 (Tokyo: 2016), 362.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

21

majority of the 1,800 personnel are dedicated to purely domestic issues, such as procurement
policies or R&D programs, the Department of Equipment Policy is responsible forinternational defense equipment and technology cooperation. It is at this interface that ATLAis pertinent to the alliance, given that this department deals with issues like joint R&D andcooperation with partners.

Japan’s National Security Council
国家安全保障会議 (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi)
Japan’s National Security Council (J-NSC) was created on December 4, 2013, with the
expectation that it would become the "control tower" of national security policies to enable
the Prime Minister to take a more comprehensive approach to security issues and improvecrisis management. Prior to its establishment, security-related issues were primarily led by
MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the MOD’s Defense Policy Division.
Many times MOFA and MOD did not work as a team.42 In fact, inter-ministerial rivalries
had the tendency to retard important national security decisions because the Prime Minister
often lacked information from all the relevant ministries. e lack of coordination between
the two agencies often frustrated the United States43
Frustrations and problems stemming from this lack of coordination were one of the
motivations leading to the J-NSC’s establishment. e J-NSC is a consultation forum for
relevant ministers to provide coordinated strategic advice to the Prime Minister. e coregrouping of the J-NSC, called the Four Ministers’ Meeting, is the Prime Minister, the Chief
Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs, and the Minister of Defense. Meeting
approximately once every two weeks, this meeting discusses pressing security concerns. It can,however, be expanded to include more individuals, called the Nine Ministers’ Meeting: theDeputy Prime Minister; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry; the Minister of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications;
the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation; and the Chairman of the National
Public Safety Commission.

National Security Secretariat
国家安全保障局 (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kyoku)
Ensuring smooth operations of the J-NSC is the NSS, which was established on January 7,
2014. Legally speaking, the NSS’s portfolio does not overlap with what other ministries do

42
43

Anonymous BB, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
Anonymous Y, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.

22

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

despite the apparent overlap in substance. is is because the NSS is meant to be an advisory
and coordinating oﬃce, not a lead agency.44 e NSS has the authority to prepare meetings
with the premier and ministers, an authority no other agency has.45 Additionally, the NSS isconsulted about security issues by MOFA and MOD, which are the lead agencies in theirrelevant issues. If the Prime Minister deems a speci c issue to be particularly important,however, the NSS intervenes to coordinate, guaranteeing the highest level of attention.
e NSS is staﬀed by about seventy individuals seconded from MOFA and MOD
and is structured in a hierarchical pyramid. 46 On the very bottom rest six divisions:
Administrative, three Policy Divisions, Strategic Planning, and Intelligence. Each of thesedivisions is headed by a director called a Cabinet Counsellor (内閣参事官; naikaku sanjikan).
Sitting atop of these six Cabinet Counsellors are four Director General-level individuals called
Councillors (審議官; shingikan): two from MOFA, one from MOD, and one from the SDF.
One MOFA Councillor is responsible for the Administrative Division and Second Policy
Division. e MOD Councillor is responsible for the First Policy Division and the Strategic
Planning Division. Finally, the SDF Councillor is responsible for the ird Policy Divisionand the Intelligence Division.
e second MOFA Councillor, established recently on atemporary basis, is responsible for Russian aﬀairs to address the recent developments in JapanRussia ties. On top of these individuals sit two Deputy Secretaries General (次⾧; jichō),representing both MOFA and the MOD. Finally, sitting on top of the entire structure is the
Secretary General (局⾧; kyoku-chō).

Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C.
在アメリカ 合衆 国日 本国 大使 館 (Zai Amerika Gashū
Koku Nihon Koku Taishikan)e Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., is divided into ten major sections devoted topolicy. Only two of these are responsible for national security issues with the United States:
Political Section and Defense Section.47 While the Ambassador and the head of the Political
Section, called Political Minister, do play roles in alliance handling, the bulk of this
responsibility falls onto two diplomats in the Political Section and one uniformed SDF oﬃcer
in the Defense Section.48

44

Anonymous X, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
Anonymous Y, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
46
Japan National Security Secretariat Staﬀ, Documents given to author, July 26, 2016.
47
e other eight sections are: Ambassador’s Oﬃce; Management and Coordination; Economic; Congress;
Science; Finance; Public Aﬀairs; and Visa Section.
48
While it is true that other diplomatic sections in the Embassy play a role in the alliance, they do so indirectly. For
example, the desk covering China works with the U.S. directly if the U.S. is interested in a China-related issue, but
45

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

23

e two diplomats in the Political Section are currently called Political Counselors (参事官, sanjikan), but in the past they have also been called 1st Secretaries.49 Regardless of
title, one of these Political Counselors is drawn from MOFA, the other from MOD. ey do
not have the authority to make policy decisions. Instead, they focus on coordinating
information and facilitating communication to minimize room for any misunderstandings
privately so that the governments deliver similar messages publicly.
eir duties can be
explained by three broadly de ned responsibilities: (1) communicate instructions/messages
from Tokyo to their American counterparts in DOS and DOD; (2) provide Tokyo with anuanced understanding of actions/policies by, or thinking in, the U.S. government, to include
who is advocating what; and (3) coordinate delegations from Tokyo visiting the UnitedStates. 50 Essentially, these two positions work to ensure smooth communication andinformation sharing by “always trying to ll the gaps between our countries…and reducemisunderstandings.”51
While the two Political Counselors are involved in discussions at a policy-related
level, the Japanese DATT primarily focuses on strictly military aspects of the relationship with
the United States. e DATT position is a dual-hatted one, serving as the DATT as well as
the SDF service attaché to which he/she belongs. e DATT is supported by two other service
attachés to ensure that all three SDF services are represented at the Embassy. e primaryrole for the DATT is to gather information on military and national security issues thatpertain to Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance and report this information back to MOFA.
Diﬀerent from DATTs at embassies from other countries who retain their aﬃliation with
their national defense agency via their military service, the Japanese DATT resigns as amember of the MOD (which has strict civilian control over the SDF) to be seconded to theUnited States as a MOFA diplomat under the control of MOFA and Japan’s Ambassador to
the United States. Although the DATT is able to use his/her SDF rank and continue to wear
his/her uniform, the position itself is the same as that of the two Political Counselors.

if it is a question of Japanese response to China or how the alliance should handle a speci c issue emanating from
China, then it goes through one of the two diplomats from the Political Section.
49
Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
50
Anonymous SS, Interview with author, November 21, 2016; Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November
21, 2016.
51
Anonymous SS, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.

Japan: Self-Defense Forces
自衛隊 (Jieitai)Japan’s SDF, established in 1954, is the uniformed armed forces of Japan. While Japan’sSupreme Court found the SDF to be constitutional and Japanese governments haveconsistently upheld the policy that Japan can maintain a minimum amount necessary for an
exclusively defensive purpose, the Japanese government does not legally call the SDF a“military.” During the Cold War, its primary mission was the defense of Japan. Today, eventhough its operations have expanded both regionally and globally, its primary mission remains
the same. e SDF consist of three services: the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Air SelfDefense Force, and Ground Self-Defense Force.52 Each of these services is led by a Chief ofStaﬀ who, as a force provider, oversees force development and management of each particularservice. Each of these individuals, in turn, serves as the highest-ranking military advisor to thedefense minister from that particular service. Since March 27, 2006, the highest ranking
military advisor in the entire SDF is the Chief of Staﬀ, Joint Staﬀ Oﬃce (below).
While the SDF services are strong cooperative partners with the United States withvarying avenues of communication that will be described below, traditionally, the SDF
provided minimal input to the bilateral decision-making processes at the policy level. Instead,
it was viewed as an organization to carry out military operations without participating in theirformulation.
at has changed over the past two decades.
e SDF, while still strictly
adhering to civilian control, provides input to many policy-level, bilateral decision-making
processes, including having about a dozen SDF oﬃcers work in Japan’s NSS (with thehighest-ranking oﬃcer being a two-star). As part of Japan’s strict civilian control over the
SDF, however, the civilian institutions described above in the MOD’s IB supervise andcontrol the uniform institutions by establishing policies, creating the budget, and controlling
the personnel. 53 Sitting atop this civilian bureaucracy is the Defense Minister, who is
supported by the IB and SDF Staﬀ Oﬃces.

52
53

For an excellent English overview of the three services, see Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure.
Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, 34.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

25

Joint Staff Office
統合幕僚監部 (Tōgō Bakuryō Kanbu)
e Joint Staﬀ Oﬃce (JSO) is the staﬀ organization for the Minister of Defense concerning
the operation of the SDF.54 e highest-ranking uniformed oﬃcer is the Chief of Staﬀ-Joint
Staﬀ Oﬃce (COS-JSO). According to Japan’s MOD, there are two primary roles for the
COS-JSO: (1) develop a joint operations concept for SDF operations and centrally support
the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective and (2) the Defense
Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the
COS-JSO and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the COS-JSO.55
Additionally, like the U.S. Chairman, JCS, the COS-JSO is vested with advisory
responsibilities to the Minister of Defense.
Reporting directly to the COS-JSO are the Chiefs of Staﬀ of the three SDF services
who, as force providers, lead their own service hierarchies. For operations, command travels
directly from the Minister of Defense to the COS-JSO down to the major commands of thethree SDF services, which execute the operational order from the Minister. e COS-JSO
delegates operational authority to an SDF commander with operational control (OPCON)
over his/her personnel and assets. Speci cally, this means one of the Ground Self-Defense
Force’s (GSDF) ve regional army commanders, the Commander in Chief Self-Defense Fleet(CinCSDFLT), or one of the commanders of the ASDF’s Air Defense Command or Air
Support Command.56 If a Joint Task Force (JTF) is needed to respond to an event, generally
speaking the COS-JSO assigns one of these eight individuals to be the JTF Commander.
Diﬀerent from a U.S. JTF where mobility and words like “expeditionary” bear heavily in an
assignment, being mobile or expeditionary does not have the same priority in a Japan JTF.

Maritime Self-Defense Force
海上自衛隊 (Kaijō Jieitai)e MSDF is the smallest of the SDF services in terms of manpower, with 42,052 personnel.57
In terms of equipment, the MSDF has 137 surface and sub-surface ships, of which fortyseven are destroyers.58 It also has 180 aircraft, of which seventy-seven are P-1 or P-3C patrol

54

Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 278.
Ibid., 279-80.
56
In non-contingency operations, such as a regional HA/DR operation, other commanders--for example, the twostar Force Escort Flotilla commander--could be assigned as JTF Commander.
57
Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 408.
58
Data on ships in service found in Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 405. e other ships include
seventeen submarines, twenty-seven mine warfare ships, six patrol combatant craft, eleven amphibious ships, andtwenty-nine auxiliary ships.
55

26

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

planes. 59
e MSDF is organized into one Self-Defense Fleet, ve regional districts(Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo, and Ōminato) that command six Minesweeper Divisions,an air training command, a training squadron, and a few other commands and training
schools. Of particular importance is the Fleet, commanded by a three-star admiral, called the
CinCSDFLT, who has OPCON over the MSDF. e Self-Defense Fleet is composed of
Fleet Escort Force (four escort otillas that include thirteen escort divisions), the Fleet Air
Force (seven Air Wings that include four Air Patrol Squadrons and ve Air Anti-Submarine
Warfare Helicopter Squadrons), the Fleet Submarine Force (two submarine otillas that
include ve submarine divisions), a Mine Warfare Force, and a few other commands.

Air Self-Defense Force
航空自衛隊 (Kōkū Jieitai)e ASDF Chief of Staﬀ oversees a modern air force with 43,027 personnel and 419 aircraft,of which 347 are ghters.60 e ASDF is managed through ve functional commands: Air
Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development andTest Command, and Air Material Command. As the largest of these commands, the Air
Defense Command is responsible for all tactical air operations, including Japan’s ballistic
missile defense operations. Headed by a three-star general with OPCON in wartime, itcommands four sector air forces (Northern, Central, and Western Air Defense Commands,
and Southwestern Composite Air Division), an Airborne Warning and Control Wing, aTactical Reconnaissance Group, and an Air Rescue Wing. It also commands six surface-toair defense missile groups. Alongside the Air Defense Command, the Air Support Commandalso plays a vital role as it is responsible for coordinating any joint mission for the three SDF
services and providing support for combat missions carried out by the Air Defense Command.
Headed by a three-star general also with OPCON during peacetime, it commands threetactical airlift wings, an Air Traﬃc Control Service Group, Air Weather Service Group, a
Flight Check Squadron, and a Special Airlift Group.

59

Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 404. e other, rotary-wing aircraft include forty-two SH-60J
and forty-nine SH-60K patrol helicopters and fourMH-53E and eight MCH-101 minesweeping and transport
helicopters.
60
Uniformed ASDF Personnel found in Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, 408. Fixed-wing aircraft
data found in Ibid, 405. e other xed-wing aircraft include thirteen reconnaissance, thirty-six transport, six aerial
refueling, and seventeen early warning/early warning and control.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

27

Ground Self-Defense Force
陸上自衛隊 (Rikujō Jieitai)e GSDF Chief of Staﬀ oversees a modern ground force. It is the largest of Japan’s threeservices with 138,610 personnel.61 Unlike the MSDF and ASDF, the GSDF is divided intove regional armies (Western, Middle, Eastern, Northeastern, and Northern) and otherspecialized forces under command of the Central Readiness Force.62 e three-star generals
in command have OPCON over their speci c personnel and assets. A planned reform will see
the creation of a Ground Central Command (GCC; 陸上総体: rikujō sōtai) by April 2018with one commander to command the ve regional armies, possibly resulting in a structure
similar to the MSDF. 63 Although the planned end state for this individual may result inhaving OPCON, the GSDF and Ground Staﬀ Oﬃce are still de ning the relationshipbetween the GCC and the regional armies in peacetime situations. In addition to minor units
and engineer brigades, nationally the GSDF has nine divisions and nine brigades spreadthroughout the ve regional armies. 64 Each regional army also has its own air wing andcombined brigade.65

61

Ibid, 408.
e ve districts of the MSDF diﬀer from the ve regional armies of the GSDF in that the latter have their own
forces and assets. is diﬀers from the MSDF, where all ships belong to the Self-Defense Fleet and airpower to the
Fleet Air Force.
63
No oﬃcial name has been given for the GCC. Other variants include Ground Force Command and Ground
Component Command. e author is using Ground Central Command, given usage in the English version of theMedium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018). Japan Ministry of Defense, Medium Term Defense Program(FY2014-FY2018), 4, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/Defense_Program.pdf.
64
Divisions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.
Brigades: 5th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, the Central Readiness Force’s 1st Airborne, 1st Helicopter, and Fuji
Combined Arms School’s Combined Brigade
65Japan Ministry of Defense, Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_diagram_web.pdf.
62

United States: Armed
Forces
Before providing a description of the major U.S. operational structures involved in the U.S.Japan alliance, it is necessary to brie y explain operational staﬀ structure. U.S. militaryplanners base their staﬀ design on the nineteenth-century Napoleonic system. What thismeans is that staﬀ directorates for diﬀerent services generally follow a relatively similar
structure, although the letter-pre x assigned to a staﬀ position changes according to theformation’s element (Army=G; Air Force=A; Navy=N; and Marine Corps=G; Joint=J). Some
services/commands have slight variations that are a function of that directorate’s speci c role.
For example, while the U.S. Army headquarters combines the G3/5/7 into Operations, U.S.
Paci c Command (PACOM) shifted the J7 (Training and Exercises) into its J3 (Operations)while keeping the J5 separate (Strategic Planning and Policy). Table 3 provides a general
understanding of the division of responsibilities among directorates, although it is not true of
all commands.
is Napoleonic staﬀ structure carries through all the headquarters for the four
services in the JCS, PACOM, PACOM’s four component commands, USFJ, and each inJapan service component. Understanding that this includes a large number of directorate staﬀ
oﬃces responsible for various aspects of the alliance, most communications take place between
the codes in these U.S. directorates. ere is no general rule on how much communication
occurs, however. Sometimes on very speci c issues, there is limited interaction between
directorates. 66 For other areas, frequent communication occurs.
at said, mostcommunication regarding Japan between staﬀs is carried out between the J5 directorates,
which have a Japan desk in its Northeast Asia Policy Division. Importantly, this same staﬀ
structure is utilized in Japan. Yet, because the SDF is smaller than the U.S. military and has
a sole focus on Japan’s defense, the staﬀ directorates are fewer in number, limited to each of
the three SDF services and the JSO reviewed above.

Joint Chiefs of Staff
e JCS consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staﬀ of the Army, theChief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staﬀ of the AF, the Commandant of the Marine

66

Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

29

Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. e Chairman is the principal militaryadviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, although
by law all JCS members are military advisers, and they may respond to a request or voluntarily
submit, through the Chairman, advice or opinions to the President, the Secretary of Defense,or the US-NSC.67 e JCS has no executive authority to command combatant forces, nordoes the Chairman have operational command of any forces. e Chiefs of Military Services
act as force providers, responsible for organizing, training, and equipping.
ey do notcommand. ese individuals assign forces under their jurisdiction to uni ed and speci ed
COCOMS to perform missions assigned to those commands.68

Table 3. Military Staff Structure Utilized by the United States and Japan.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Manpower/Personnel
Intelligence
Operations
Logistics
Plans and Policy
Communications
Training/Exercising
Resource Management
Civil Aﬀairs

U.S. Pacific Command and its Component Commands
U.S. Pacific Command
PACOM, headquartered in Hawaii, is one of six geographic Uni ed Combatant Commands
which, in turn, is supported by four component commands—U.S. Paci c Fleet (PACFLT),U.S. Paci c Air Forces (PACAF), U.S. Army Paci c (USARPAC), and U.S. Marine Corps
Forces, Paci c (MARFORPAC)—and two sub-uni ed commands, one of which is U.S.
Forces Japan.69 In the past, Special Operations Command Paci c (SOCPAC) was a third
sub-uni ed command, but this moved to Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with
OPCON still maintained by PACOM. 70 PACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR)
encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the Paci c Ocean west of the west

67

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, About the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, http://www.jcs.mil/About.
Ibid.
69
e other one is U.S. Forces, Korea.
70
U.S. Special Operations Command, “Mission,” eater Special Operations Command-SOCPAC,
http://www.socom.mil/Pages/socpac.aspx.
68

30

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

coast of the United States to the western border of India and from Antarctica to the North
Pole.71 PACOM is a joint command, commanded by a four-star ag oﬃcer who is the senior
U.S. military authority in the PACOM AOR who exercises command of assigned forces as
the Joint Force Commander.
e chain of command is clear: from the President to theSecretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the PACOM Commander (or any
combatant commander).
Each of the component commands is also commanded by a four-star, with the
exception of the MARFORPAC commander (three-star). Also with the exception of the
MARFORPAC commander, the other three component commanders are dual-hatted aseater Joint Force Component Commanders (TJFCC) who have OPCON over theirrespective units: TJFMCC (PACFLT), TJFACC (PACAF), and TJFLCC (USARPAC)[In these acronyms, M is for maritime, A is for air, and L is for land]. eir AORs are identicalto that of PACOM’s AOR. e main function of the components is to ful ll their Title X
responsibilities to organize, train, and equip (OTE). e component commanders ful ll thesefunctions reporting to their Service Chiefs but responding to the operation requirements of
the COCOM. ese Title X responsibilities, in turn, drive requirements that have signi cant
impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance in areas such as basing, training ranges, personnel training,and bringing in new equipment like the MV-22.

U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commanded by a four-star admiral, PACFLT is the largest eet command in the Navy,
consisting of approximately 200 ships/submarines, nearly 1,100 aircraft, and more than
130,000 sailors and civilians.72 PACFLT reports to the Chief of Naval Operations to ful lltheir service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under
COCOM purview. Commands that are OPCON to PACFLT include “type” commands forsurface ships, submarines and aircraft, regional commands that include Commander, Naval
Forces Japan, and two operational commands, the Seventh Fleet in Japan and the ird Fleet
in San Diego.73 PACFLT is also prepared to be assigned as a four-star JTF.

U.S. Pacific Air Forces
Commanded by a four-star general, PACAF is one of nine AF major commands. It consistsof approximately 320 ghter and attack aircraft with approximately 100 additional deployed

71

U.S. Paci c Command, About USPACOM, http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/
U.S. Paci c Fleet, About Us, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/about.
73
In addition to Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, other regional commands include: Commander, Naval
Forces, Korea; Commander, Joint Region, Marianas; Commander, Logistic Group Western Paci c; andCommander, Navy Region Hawaii.
72

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

31

aircraft rotating on Guam and approximately 46,000 military and civilian personnel serving in
nine strategic locations and numerous smaller facilities.74 PACAF reports to the Chief of Staﬀof the AF to ful ll their service component OTE requirements and to PACOM for all
operational matters under COCOM purview. Commands that are OPCON to PACAF
include three Numbered Air Forces, including the 5th AF in Japan, and nine bases in the
Indo-Asia-Paci c region, including Kadena, Misawa, and Yokota air bases in Japan.75

U.S. Army PacificCommanded by a four-star general, USARPAC commands Army forces in the Asia-Paci cregion and includes approximately 80,000 soldiers.76 USARPAC is the assigned Army Service
Component Command to PACOM which, in turn, provides OPCON for U.S. Army
personnel throughout the PACOM AOR.
e one exception to this rule is the Korean
Peninsula, where OPCON is vested in the U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) Commander.
USARPAC reports to the Chief of Staﬀ of the Army to ful ll their service component OTE
requirements and to PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview.
Subordinated units that fall directly under USARPAC include U.S. Army Japan as the
directed Army Forces (ARFOR) to USFJ.77

U.S. Marine Forces PacificCommanded by a three-star general, MARFORPAC is the largest eld command in the
Marine Corps and commands all U.S. Marine Corps forces assigned to PACOM. Combining
forward deployed forces both ashore and a oat and forces stationed in the United States, theCommander is responsible for approximately 86,000 Marines and sailors.78 It is composed of
two MEF units, including the III MEF in Okinawa (I MEF is in California) as well as Marine
Corps Activity Guam and Marine Rotational Force-Darwin. MARFORPAC reports to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to ful ll service component OTE requirements and to
PACOM for all operational matters under COCOM purview. MARFORPAC is also
prepared to be assigned as a three-star JTF.

74

U.S. Paci c Air Forces, “AOR,” Mission: Strategy and Vision,
http://www.pacaf.af.mil/Info/PACAFStrategyMission.aspx.
75
e other Numbered Air Forces include the 7th Air Force in South Korea and the 11th Air Force in Alaska. eother bases include the 15th Wing in Hawaii, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, Eielson Air Force Base and Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, and Kunsan Air Base and Osan Air Base in South Korea.
76
U.S. Army Paci c, About Us, https://www.usarpac.army.mil/about.asp.
77
Other subordinated units include the Eighth Army in South Korea, U.S. Army Alaska, and nine other units all
located in Hawaii.
78
U.S. Marines Corps Forces, Paci c, “Structure,” About, http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Unit-Home/About.

32

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

U.S. Forces, Japan and in-Japan Service Components
U.S. Forces, Japan
Located at Yokota Air Base, USFJ is a sub-uni ed command under PACOM with theprimary duty to coordinate peacetime relationships among the U.S. forces stationed in Japanand the GOJ. Originally established on July 1, 1957, USFJ consists of approximately 54,000
military personnel, 42,000 dependents, and 8,000 DOD civilian employees with its U.S.
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and AF elements (broken down into approximations by service
component below). 79 e size of the USFJ staﬀ, however, is approximately 180 personnel(military, civilians, Japanese nationals). 80 Mirroring PACOM, USFJ has in-Japan service
components—5th AF, U.S. Army-Japan, Commander, Naval Forces Japan, and Marine
Forces Japan—nominally the Commander, III MEF). Other commands include U.S. Naval
Forces Japan at the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture; Marine Corps
Installations-Paci c at Camp Foster in Okinawa prefecture; and U.S. Army Garrison Japanat Camp Zama in Kanagawa prefecture. ese organizations are not covered in this researchbecause their primary responsibilities are maintaining and operating bases and facilities. As
such, they are mainly base/facilities managers.
e AF analogue, Air Force Installation
Management & Support Center, is located in San Antonio, Texas, and is responsible forproviding centralized management of facilities and bases across the U.S. AF. As PACOM’srepresentative, USFJ is responsible for administering the Status of Forces Agreement,
improving combat readiness, enhancing the quality of life of military and DOD civilian
personnel and their dependents as well as war planning, and conducting joint/bilateral
exercises and studies.81
USFJ is commanded by a three-star AF oﬃcer who is dual-hatted as bothCommander, USFJ, and Commander, 5th AF. In his capacity as joint force Commander, he
has limited authority. His responsibility is largely con ned to coordinating force postureinitiatives and activities to ensure access among the service components in support of regional
contingencies, conducting joint unilateral and bilateral operations and exercise, developing
plans for the defense of Japan and representing the PACOM Commander in communications
among U.S. forces, the U.S. Ambassador, and Japanese government agencies. is leads him
to often act as a negotiator between disagreements that arise between PACOM and Japan’s
JSO.82 While he does not have OPCON for U.S. forces in Japan, he must be prepared toassume OPCON of assigned and attached U.S. forces for the execution of war plans. Even in
his capacity as the 5th AF Commander, he lacks OPCON of his own forces. Instead, that
authority is vested in PACAF. While administering unilateral and bilateral defense issues, the79

U.S. Forces, Japan, “Headquarters U.S. Forces, Japan,” About USFJ, http://www.us .mil/About-USFJ.
Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016; Anonymous WW, Interview with author,
December 13, 2016.
81
U.S. Forces, Japan, “Headquarters U.S. Forces, Japan,” About USFJ, http://www.us .mil/About-USFJ.
82
Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
80

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

33

Commander, USFJ is very much a communication and coordination window for all daily
discussions with the Japan’s JSO and GOJ regarding U.S. forces in Japan. is is the USFJ
Commander’s “full-time job.”83

U.S. Seventh Fleete U.S. Seventh Fleet is the largest forward-deployed U.S. eet. At any given time there areroughly fty to seventy ships and submarines, 140 aircraft, and approximately 20,000 Sailors
in the Seventh Fleet.84 Commanded by a three-star admiral, the Commander, Seventh Fleet(C7F) reports directly to PACFLT in an operational chain of command.
e Fleet is85
organized into ten specialized Task Forces. As such, C7F has a role not con ned to Japan.

U.S. Army, Japan / I Corps Forward
e Army’s presence of about 2,500 soldiers makes it the smallest of all U.S. service
components in Japan. Commanded by a two-star general, U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ), is
responsible for ARFOR related tasks in support of all Army assigned units, attached units,
and augmentation forces in Japan. 86 Additionally, USARJ maintains Senior Mission
Command authority over all subordinate and tenant units in Japan. In March 2016, theheadquarters at Camp Zama was split between USARJ and I Corps Forward (F), with the
USARJ Commander dual-hatted as the I Corps (F) Commander as well.87 I Corps (F) is
responsible for low operational and tactical engagement with the GSDF regional armies,
while USARJ is responsible for high operational and strategic-level engagement with the
GSDF Staﬀ Oﬃce (e.g., bilateral training exercises and planning), serving as USARPACs
proxy. Focusing on the operational/tactical level, I Corps (F) can concentrate on cooperation
with regional armies in areas such as training and exercises. Toward this end, I Corps (F) will
become part of a bilateral coordination element in April 2018 at Camp Zama.88

83

Ibid.
U.S. Seventh Fleet, e United States Seventh Fleet,
http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Portals/8/documents/7thFleetTwoPagerFactsheet.pdf?ver=2016-01-27-061248-087.
85
ese Task Forces include: CTF-70, CTF-71, CTF-73, CTF-74, CTF-75, CTF-76, CTF-78, CTF-79, CTF7J, and CTF-77.
86
U.S. Forces, Japan, “United States Army Japan & I Corps (Forward),” About USFJ, http://www.us .mil/AboutUSFJ.
87
In 2005, both governments agreed to move I Corps to Japan. is was oﬃcial U.S. policy. e Army reversed
this decision in 2011. In reality, the U.S. Army cannot aﬀord to have an entire Corps sitting in Japan.
88
Anonymous EE, Interview with author, July 28, 2016.
84

34

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

III Marine Expeditionary ForceWith approximately 21,000 personnel forward-based in Japan, the Marine Corps is the largest
service element in Japan.89 Under the operational command of MARFORPAC, the III MEF
is headquartered at Camp Courtney in Okinawa. Commanded by a three-star general, who isdual-hatted as the U.S. Area Coordinator in Okinawa, III MEF reports directly to
MARFORPAC in an operational chain of command. With a fully scalable Marine AirGround Task Force, the III MEF is capable of generating, deploying, and employing forces
for crisis response, forward presence, major combat operations, and campaigns. 90 Major
subordinate commands of the III MEF include the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, the III MEF Headquarters Group, the 3rd Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. Tactical units are divided
between Okinawa, Iwakuni, Hawaii, and eventually Guam.

5th Air Force
Like USFJ, the 5th AF is headquartered at Yokota Air Base with 15,000 airmen and AF
civilians assigned to it and its three main bases: Yokota, Misawa, and Kadena.91 It consists ofapproximately 130 aircraft, ninety of which are ghter aircraft. 92 As noted above, theCommander of the 5th AF is also dual-hatted as Commander, USFJ. Unlike other Numbered
Air Forces, and similar to other in-Japan service components, the 5th AF Commander does
not have OPCON. Instead, that authority is held by PACAF.93 e designated 5th AF role
under typical circumstances is to assume "speci ed" administrative control over units based inJapan. Depending on the type of crisis, it is possible that the 5th AF could be delegated
OPCON of U.S. air assets in Japan.94

89

III MEF HQ staﬀ, E-mail message to author, February 6, 2017.
U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force, “Mission,” Home, http://www.iiimef.marines.mil.
91
U.S. 5th Air Force, “Welcome to 5th Air Force,” Home, http://www.5af.pacaf.af.mil and U.S. 5th Air Force,
Units, http://www.5af.pacaf.af.mil/Units.
92
5th Air Force staﬀ, E-mail message to author, December 9, 2016.
93
e 5th Air Force is responsible for the routine maintenance and training and administration of the equipment
and personnel, but PACAF writes the Air Tasking Order that assigns missions to the aircraft, both for training andfor crisis or con ict.
94
Anonymous F, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
90

Structural Interactions
Understanding these discrete actors helps provide situational awareness of the universe of
relevant stakeholders in the alliance as well as what responsibilities are housed in which oﬃces.
In turn, this helps set up an examination of how these stakeholders interact. It is to thesestructural interactions that we now turn.

PolicyAt the very top of the agencies responsible for policy sits those agencies’ leadership, both
political appointees and career bureaucrats. table 4 shows these alliance counterparts in the
diplomatic realm and table 5 shows these alliance counterparts in the defense realm. Becauseof the small number of oﬃces responsible for the alliance in the United States, it is possible
to identify speci c, Japan-relevant leadership positions. In Japan, there is a much larger
universe, as will be explained below. Generally speaking, however, a hierarchy of positions
does exist within each organization.

Table 4. Diplomatic Counterparts.
United States

Japan

Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of State

Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs
Administrative Vice Minister*State Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs*Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs
Deputy Minister for Foreign Aﬀairs

Under Secretary for PoliticalAﬀairsAssistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Paci c Aﬀairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Japanese and Korean Aﬀairs*Structurally equivalent positions.

Director General of a bureau
Deputy Director General of a bureau

36

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Table 5. Defense Counterparts.
United States

Japan

Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Minister of Defense
Administrative Vice Minister*State Minister of Defense*Parliamentary Minister for Defense
Vice Minister of Defense for International Aﬀairs

Undersecretary of Defense for
PolicyAssistant Secretary of Defense for
Asia and Paci c Security Aﬀairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense*Structurally equivalent positions.

Director General of a bureau
Deputy Director General of a bureau

Beyond these senior positions, things become more complicated. is is because
structural interaction among policymakers is asymmetric, with a large number of Japaneseoﬃces responsible for the alliance compared with two primary oﬃces in Washington. ese
two main conduits of communication in the United States are the DOS’s Oﬃce of JapaneseAﬀairs and OSD’s Japan Team. eir primary counterparts are MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty Division and MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division. Unlike its MOD
counterpart, however, which focuses essentially on issues related to bilateral defense
cooperation, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division looks more at managing the alliance inbroader terms at the policy level. It also has a heavy in uence on interpreting agreements with
the United States, even those with military implications. Although simplistic, it is best to
think of the MOD division handling speci cs of military-related issues while the MOFA
division focuses on security issues at a broader policy level. is tendency to stay at the broad,policy level leads to this division having a bigger voice in policy discussions with the premier.95
While the DOS Director of the Oﬃce of Japanese Aﬀairs and the OSD Director forJapan talk directly with their MOFA/MOD counterparts via video teleconference (VTC) or
in-person, it is not daily. Instead, their staﬀs conduct daily communication. Importantly, theDOS-MOFA and DOD-MOD relationships are not strict linear relationships.
e fourheads of these oﬃces, as well as their staﬀs, communicate regularly with one another in somemanner, albeit ad hoc.
It is not the only link, however, for these four oﬃces. e DOS’s Director for theOﬃce of Japanese Aﬀairs and OSD’s Director for Japan also communicate regularly with thetwo Political Counselors at the Japanese Embassy in Washington.96 e MOFA diplomat’s

95

Anonymous DD, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
Contact with other oﬃces in the U.S. government does exist, but it is not as regular or de ned. For example, theMOD diplomat communicate occasionally with the Defense Technology Security Administration and the GuamOﬃce in the DOD.
96

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

37

primary counterpart is the DOS Japan Desk Director and the MOD diplomat’s primarycounterpart is the OSD Director for Japan. ese interactions occur daily, even multiple times
a day via all forms of communication as well as physical meetings. ey focus on sharing
thinking in their respective governments on relevant issues “to get an insider’s sense” of what
is occurring in the interagency process.97 is includes informally sharing unnegotiable stancesof their home governments as a means of laying the groundwork for expectations. Crossinteraction also occurs (e.g., MOFA-DOD and MOD-DOS), mainly on large issues and onan ad hoc basis.98 In keeping with full transparency, these four individuals make an eﬀort tokeep each other in the loop on all communications.
ese two Political Counselors, in turn, sit at a unique intersection in alliancemanagement. Not only do they have counterparts in the United States, but they also havecounterparts in their respective ministries. Communication between the Political Counselors
and MOFA’s Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division staﬀ and the MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division occurs daily. at said, the channel of communication is much stricter,with the MOFA division communicating with its MOFA representative and the MOD
division communicating with its MOD representative, although communication between thisMOD representative and MOFA is not uncommon.
Similarly, DOS’s Oﬃce of Japanese Aﬀairs and OSD’s Japan Team also maintainregular communications with the Political-Military Aﬀairs Unit in the U.S. Embassy inTokyo. It is a unique arrangement because usually the DATT is utilized as a conduit for
Washington to reach out to a country.99 In Japan, the DATT is not utilized as a conduit
because of the presence of USFJ and three other ag oﬃcer/general oﬃcer (FOGO) levelcommands. e DATT structure works in countries without a robust U.S. military presence
because the DATT is the Senior Defense Oﬃcial for the United States in that country. In
Japan (as in Korea), the existence of multiple senior military commanders keeps the DATT’srole minimized.
e arrangement in Japan means the Directors in MOFA’s Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty Division and Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division and MOD’s JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation Division also communicate directly with the Chief of the PoliticalMilitary Aﬀairs Unit. In addition to ad hoc meetings that are required to handle daily issues,these oﬃces hold regular conversations to go over broad alliance issues. An example includes
the Alliance Transformation Oversight Panel (ATOP), where the Directors of MOFA’s
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division
act as ATOP Directors on the Japan side and, joined by the U.S. Embassy’s Chief of the
Political Military Unit and the USFJ J5, as ATOP Directors on the U.S. side. 100 ese
conversations are largely informative and issues are raised that need to be addressed. In turn,when the Political-Military Aﬀairs Unit needs to transmit security-related information to97

Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
Anonymous SS, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
99
Anonymous XX, Interview with author, January 13, 2017.
100
MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Division Director attends but is not one of the four.
98

38

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Washington, the primary conduit through which this occurs is with the DOS’s Director for
the Oﬃce of Japanese Aﬀairs and OSD’s Director for Japan.
is is not the only conduit for information between Japan and the United States formilitary and security aﬀairs. USFJ, PACOM, and OSD also communicate on a regular basis.
While keeping PACOM in the loop sometimes proves to be challenging, regularcorrespondence occurs between the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the USFJ
Commander; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) and the Deputy
Commander at USFJ; and the J5 and Senior Country Director. When SOFA-related mattersarise that involve broader strategic considerations, all these actors work together. In thesecases, it is not uncommon for the Political-Military Unit in the Embassy to work closely with
USFJ, the in-country component commands (e.g. III MEF and the 5th AF), PACOM, andOSD to together engage the GOJ.
e network of alliance management extends from this nexus of core oﬃces. For
example, the First North America Division’s primary U.S. counterpart is the DOS’s Oﬃce ofJapanese Aﬀairs. Like the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director, the U.S. counterpart
for the Director of this division is the DOS Director for the Oﬃce of Japanese Aﬀairs. ese
two individuals do not speak regularly, however. Rather, most communication is done on an
ad hoc basis. Occasionally, if an issue involves a broader foreign policy component linked to
the United States, such as a multilateral endeavor or trilateral framework, the Division
Director will increase the level of his communications by reaching out directly to the Assistant
Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Paci c Aﬀairs.
A similar dynamic exists with the MOD’s IPD. Although this division is tasked withJapan’s defense exchanges and cooperation with countries other than the United States, whenworking on Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral issues, its main counterpart is OSD’s Japan Desk.
eir interaction is also conducted on an ad-hoc basis, essentially focusing on coordinating
their policies. For example, they work on developing trilateral defense cooperation with
Australia as well as exchange views on capacity building assistance to ASEAN countries.101
Given the wide scope of responsibilities today’s alliance has taken on, it isunderstandable that the two Japan Desks in the DOS and OSD cannot alone manage thealliance on the U.S. side. is contrasts with Japan, which has divisions to cover very speci c
aspects of the alliance relationship. Still, there are a wide range of oﬃces throughout the DOS
and OSD responsible for functional issues that communicate and coordinate with Japan,
despite lacking a Japan-speci c portfolio.

101

Anonymous II, Interview with author, July 29, 2016. On the military side of the alliance, Japan’s Joint Staﬀ Oﬃce
holds its own separate trilateral talks with Australia and the U.S. at the necessary staﬀ directorate level. e IPD,
however, is rarely kept in the loop with these communications, meaning that the communications at the policy leveland military level are often kept separate.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

39

MOFA’s Treaties Division, for example, does not interact with DOS’s Oﬃce ofJapanese Aﬀairs. Instead, communication occurs largely with DOS’s Legal Advisors Oﬃce.
ese communications are on an ad hoc basis. e only regular discussions that take place
between the agencies is an annual meeting between the Director General from theInternational Legal Aﬀairs Bureau and the DOS Assistant Legal Advisor, who inform eachother of work they have done since their last meeting. e two oﬃces do not meet for any
speci c alliance purpose; rather the content of their discussions focuses on a broad range ofissues, such as exchanges of legal practices, with the alliance but one of these issues.
Similarly, given the eclectic nature of issues that the MOD’s Strategic Planning
Division is responsible for, much of its communication with the United States is ad hoc andwith oﬃces not seen elsewhere in this study. For example, when working on issues of space,cyber, or missile defense, the division’s primary U.S. counterpart for space is the oﬃce of the
DASD for Space Policy. e primary counterpart on missile defense issues is the oﬃce of
DOD’s Missile Defense Agency. Finally, the primary counterpart for cyber issues is the oﬃceof the DASD for Cyber Policy. While communication between the Director of the divisionand the senior leadership in these oﬃces is infrequent and ad hoc, staﬀ members communicate
quite often, even daily on some issues.102 e focus of all these communications is primarily
to coordinate their independent national policies.
Given its very speci c focus on defense acquisitions, ATLA’s U.S. counterparts are
diﬀerent from other divisions in MOD. ATLA’s primary institutional counterpart is with theOﬃce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)). At this level, discussions focus on government-government joint research anddevelopment of defense technology and technological cooperation. Yet, other key
counterparts include the Mutual Defense Assistance Oﬃce (MDAO) at the U.S. Embassy inTokyo, the J4 at PACOM, and the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).103
On Foreign Military Sales issues, ATLA’s Department of Procurement Management
interacts with MDAO and DSCA.104 On other issues of U.S.-Japan cooperation, such as joint
R&D or cooperation with partners, ATLA’s Department of Equipment Policy takes the leadand interacts with MDAO, DSCA, and PACOM’s J4. MDAO’s function is to act in anadvisory or assistance role to foster an atmosphere of cooperation between the MOD and
DSCA and the service component security assistance oﬃces. MDAO does not inject newpolicies or priorities. e most important framework regarding U.S.-Japan equipment-related
cooperation takes place in the Science and Technology Forum (S&TF). Normally held oncea year and chaired by the Japanese ATLA Commissioner and the Director General of the102

Anonymous FF, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
Anonymous GG, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
104
ere is also a Security Cooperation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) that is chaired by the ATLA Commissioner
and the Director of DSCA that acts as a bilateral consultation body mainly related to FMS program.
103

40

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning and the American OUSD (AT&L), the S&TF focuseson major equipment and technology cooperation and procurement issues.105
Because of the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the primary responsibilities ofcommunication falling on USFJ and the U.S. Embassy, it is not surprising that many policyrelated oﬃces in MOD and MOFA communicate regularly with both U.S. policymakers andoperational representatives. Speci cally, this means USFJ’s J5 and the U.S. Embassy’s
Political-Military Aﬀairs Unit. In MOFA, while the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
speaks with USFJ, the majority of SOFA-related discussions with USFJ for MOFA falls to
its Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division and its communication with USFJ and OSD’s
Japan Desk. In preparation for bi-weekly Joint Committee (covered below) meetings, thepersonnel from MOFA’s Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division communicate with the
USFJ J5, Joint Committee Secretariat, Staﬀ Judge Advocate, the Embassy’s Political-MilitaryAﬀairs Unit, and other relevant staﬀ sections. At these meetings, a variety of operational andadministrative issues related to the SOFA are discussed, like the provisions of land return or
the maintenance and joint use of a facility or area. One recent example includes being
responsible for the language of the agreement to return the existing facility and area of theNorthern Training Area to the GOJ. Also, if an issue gets highly political or extremely
sensitive, the Division works with the USFJ J5 and U.S. Embassy’s Director for the PoliticalMilitary Aﬀairs Unit to ensure the issue can be resolved with “political correctness.”106 For
example, when a member of the U.S. military commits a crime or gets caught for drunk driving
in Japan, the Division talks with counterparts in both USFJ’s J5 and the Political-MilitaryAﬀairs Unit at the same time. If an issue arises that is deemed policy signi cant, D.C. basedorganizations become involved.
ere are also times that non-MOD, non-MOFA issues
arise, such as environmental damage. In these instances, representatives from other Japaneseministries are invited to join the meetings as well. ese are largely on an exceptional basis,
however.
e same dynamic is at play in the MOD. While the MOD’s Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division and Operational Policy Division have regular contact with USFJ’s J3and J5, the MOD’s BLC communicates regularly with USFJ’s J4. Speci cally, this includes
the Okinawa Coordination Division, Local Cooperation Planning Division, Local
Coordination Division, Facilities Improvement Program Division, and the Labor
Management Division.
e BLC plays an important role in ensuring a sustainable basepresence, which includes maintaining peaceful relations between the U.S. presence in Japanand the local communities. Japanese nationals transmit U.S. force-related concerns to a
105

Working-level sessions also exist, but focus is the same. Unlike the Executive Session, the working-level sessions
are normally convened on an as-needed basis, such as when the Executive Session cannot be scheduled in a timely
manner. is working-level session is chaired by the Japanese ATLA Assistant Commissioner and the Director,
International Cooperation (AT&L) in the U.S.
e Capability/Coordination Group that serves as executive
secretariat for the S&TF framework is convened at least once a year. Other Groups include: Equipment, Technology,
and Program Development.
106
Anonymous U, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

41

Regional Defense Bureau and, in turn, these concerns get transmitted to the relevant BLC
division. ese divisions, in turn, talk with relevant staﬀ sections within USFJ.
Finally, the MOD’s Operational Policy Division is responsible for SDF operational
planning. It is in this connection that the division interacts with the United States, as it is
responsible for bilateral planning with the United States. While the Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division, the SDF services, and the JSO are also involved, it is the Operational
Policy Division that leads these eﬀorts. is takes place primarily with PACOM’s J5, although
PACOM also assigns USFJ as executive agent for some bilateral planning. e frequency ofcommunication is a derivative of the plans themselves. 107 If the security environment isunstable, then plans require a revision. As such, the division and the J5 would meet until arevision of the plans is concluded.
Over the past few years, a new conduit of communications opened between the allies’
executives with the establishment of Japan’s NSS. Beyond ad hoc communications that
Cabinet Counsellors have with Political-Military Councilors at the U.S. Embassy, in Japan’s
NSS there are essentially three main contact points at the Division level with the UnitedStates: Strategic Planning Division, First Policy Division, and Second Policy Division.
Because the portfolio for the First Policy Division contains the United States, Canada,
Europe, Australia, India, and ASEAN, its Cabinet Counsellor works regularly with the Japan
Director in the US-NSC and occasionally the US-NSC staﬀ dealing with Australia and India.
Talking roughly once a week, these discussions essentially serve as information-sharing
sessions where both sides update each other on respective issues and discuss pressing regional
security issues. Still, this is one of the main conduits between the allies’ National Security
Councils. e Second Policy Division’s portfolio contains Northeast Asia and Russia, so the
Cabinet Counsellor for this division maintains frequent communication with the Japan
Director in the US-NSC over regional-related issues. Given the portfolio, this individual also
maintains contact with the US-NSC’s China Director and South Korea Director as well,though not regularly. Finally, the Strategic Planning Division focuses on speci c policy areas,such as the National Defense Program Guidelines, National Security Strategy, and mid- tolong-term national security policies. Unlike the previous two divisions, this division has noclear counterpart in the US-NSC. Instead, the Cabinet Counsellor reaches out to individuals
in the relevant oﬃces in Washington on an as-needed basis.
e four Councillors at the DG level all share the US-NSC’s Senior Director for
Asia as their counterpart, dividing up issues based on their portfolio. ese individuals haveregular dialogues with the Senior Director about once a month that cover close to the same
topics that the Cabinet Counsellors cover.108 During these meetings, the Councillors appear
together in VTCs; the MOFA Councillor usually takes the lead, although it depends on the107

Anonymous AA, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
If there is a need to talk about issues beyond the portfolio of the NSC’s Senior Director for Asia, the NSS
reaches out to a Senior Director in charge of the issue at hand.
108

42

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

issue. Because these individuals are more senior, the discussions are narrowed in scope andshorter and have more potential to reach the ear of the executive in each country. Above theCouncillors, the two Deputy Secretaries General talk with the U.S. Deputy National Security
Advisor on an ad hoc basis. Like the interaction between the Councillors and the US-NSC’s
Senior Director, these discussions are also usually led by the MOFA Deputy Secretary
General, although it depends on the issue.

Operational
Unlike the policymaking structure, asymmetry in the structural interactions among
operational personnel consists of a large number of U.S. commands facing a smaller numberof SDF commands: three individual SDF services versus USFJ, in-Japan service components,
PACOM, PACOM components, and the Joint Staﬀ. As shown below, the Chiefs of Staﬀ of
the three SDF services and the COS-JSO have multiple counterparts that vary depending on
the activity.
While communication varies at the Commander level through occasional VTCs orvisits, the majority of communication and coordination is conducted at the staﬀ level. eprevalence of many directorates on the U.S. side that interact with Japan is done via adecentralized communication structure. Generally speaking, while the matches are not perfector even existing in some staﬀs, these directorates match up fairly closely between the allies.109
Additionally, when it comes to relationships between USFJ and in-Japan service components
and the SDF, there are not always direct counterparts (e.g., three-star to three-star) simply
because the U.S. military forces in Japan are not built for the purpose of ensuring similar
ranking across the services.110 Instead, in an eﬀort to ensure achievement of objectives, manytimes the United States is forced to match up lower-ranking oﬃcers with higher-ranking
oﬃcers on the Japanese side.
Because the JCS is responsible for America’s global strategy and policies, and thus
dealing with other militaries around the world, there is no exclusive focus on Japan. is does
not mean, however, that the JCS staﬀ does not interact with Japan. In the JCS J5 there is aJapan Desk (J51), where there is usually more than one person assigned to take on Japanrelated responsibilities.111 e Japanese DATT at the Washington Embassy communicatesfrequently with the J51 (but is able to talk to anyone in the JCS directorates). Similarly, theSDF service attachés at the Japanese Embassy in Washington communicate with theircounterparts in the individual U.S. service directorates—including the Marines—to exchange
security-related information. On strategic or operationally relevant issues—both Japan-related

109

Anonymous E, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
111
Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.
110

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

43

and regional in scope—the JCS J5 defers these to the PACOM J5. e PACOM J5, in turn,can defer issues to its counterpart at the USFJ J5. e JCS’s J51 handles Japan-related aﬀairs
that do not get deferred to USFJ or PACOM, such as resource issues. Other directorates in
the JCS have Japan-related responsibilities, but these tend to focus on very speci c issues, like
intelligence sharing or foreign military sales.
is includes particularly the J2, J4, andsometimes the J3. e primary linkage point is therefore the JCS J5 with Japan’s JSO J5. At
the action oﬃcer level, communication is conducted weekly. At the Director-level,
communication occurs monthly, sometimes even quarterly.
At the level of Chairman, JCS, the primary counterpart on the Japanese side is the
COS-JSO. Between these two senior military advisers, communication takes place once every
six months up to a year. e same is true of communication between the service chiefs in bothcountries. e content of all of these discussions focuses on broad global issues where the twoare able to exchange opinions about the world and sometimes also discuss issues like combined
training, equipment requirements, and interoperability. In addition to these, discussions
between the Chairman, JCS, and the COS-JSO also cover bilateral issues or coordinating
activities outside of PACOM’s AOR. It is not uncommon for policy oﬃces responsible forthe alliance, such as the Japan Desks in DOS or OSD, to be kept informed of such high-levelcommunications. Importantly, eﬀorts are made to keep the J5 oﬃces in PACOM and USFJ
informed, particularly PACOM’s J5. Otherwise, the JCS defers constant communication withJapan to PACOM as do the service chiefs to PACOM components.
is has two implications. First, while the Chairman, JCS and the four service Chiefs
in the United States have counterparts in Japan (table 6), they have a low frequency ofcommunication. e reason is simple: the JCS are responsible for a global military force andmilitary-military relations with a large number of militaries around the world, not justJapan.112 e second is that the content of their communications tend to stay relatively general.
While Japan’s COS-JSO and the U.S. Chairman, JCS do discuss speci c bilateral issues insome depth, their meetings usually focus on exchanging opinions about broad, global issues.
Likewise, when the SDF service chiefs meet with their U.S. counterparts, they do sometimes
discuss speci c force issues, but their discussions tend to stay fairly general, focusing on broad
global or strategic issues and policies.

112

One individual noted that the one exception to this rule is the Joint Staﬀ’s involvement via its J5 with PACOM’s
J5 due to it being policy-related. Anonymous K, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.

44

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Table 6. National Level Operational Counterparts.
United States

Japan

Content ofCommunications

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staﬀ

Chief of Staﬀ, Joint Staﬀ
Oﬃce

Broad global issues; Some
discussion on bilateralissues/perceptions; Coordinate
activities outside of PACOM
AOR

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staﬀ, Maritime
Staﬀ Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Air Staﬀ
Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce

Chief of Staﬀ, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staﬀ, U.S. Army
Commandant of the Marine
Corps

Broad global/strategic issues andpolicies; force development

As Japan has moved to become more operationally connected with PACOM,
relations between the SDF and PACOM have grown. PACOM today engages in weekly—
even daily—communication with Japan’s JSO via PACOM’s J5s and the JSO’s J5.113 It is an
important means by which the allies can discuss operational coordination, exercises, upcoming
engagements, unexpected regional pop-ups, as well as complaints and requests.114 At the deskoﬃcer level, communication is weekly. At the directorate Director level, communication isroughly once every two weeks. Importantly, the actual secured link between PACOM and the
JSO goes through USFJ, which is on all of these meetings as the host. is PACOM-JSO
link is crucial, as it is an attempt to synchronize and harmonize all the interaction taking placethroughout the operational side of the alliance in the United States. Other relevant U.S.
stakeholders are invited to sit in on meetings with Japan, as needed, and the results are briefed
to other actors on the U.S. side. It is tedious and lends itself to information falling throughthe cracks, but taken together, the system makes for a complex process of routing products,
requests, and information between the two militaries.
Communication and coordination channels at the level of PACOM and its
components are similarly decentralized. Like the Chairman, JCS, the PACOM Commander
is a direct counterpart with Japan’s COS-JSO. e content of their communications focuseslargely on regional issues at the strategic level but also operational issues in the PACOM
AOR. Essentially, these are issues that exceed the scope of USFJ but not broader issues inother theaters. Each of the four component commands carry on separate interactions withJapan via their respective staﬀ relationships (table 7). ese relationships mirror the national-

113

e J2 also engages in constant communication, but as stated in the introduction, intelligence is outside thescope of this study.
114
Anonymous I, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

45

level operational counterparts: PACFLT-Maritime Staﬀ Oﬃce (MSO); PACAF-Air Staﬀ
Oﬃce (ASO); USARPAC-Ground Staﬀ Oﬃce (GSO); and MARFORPAC-GSO. To
highlight a crucial point:e GSO is facing two counterparts, the USARPAC andMARFORPAC. is has not always been the case. During the Cold War, when there wereplans to ght together, the Chief of Staﬀ of GSO looked primarily to the USARPAC
Commander. With the Cold War over, and GSDF making eﬀorts over the past decade to
develop amphibious capabilities, MARFORPAC has increasingly become an equallyimportant counterpart. As table 7 shows, the content of communications across these diﬀerent
dyads diﬀers, with the exception of the USARPAC-GSO and MARFORPAC-GSO ties,
which both are mostly operational in nature, although some strategic-level discussions do
occur.

Table 7. PACOM-Level Operational Counterparts.
United States

Japan

Content ofCommunications

PACOM Commander

Chief of Staﬀ, Joint Staﬀ
Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Maritime
Staﬀ Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Air Staﬀ
Oﬃce

Regional issues at strategic level;
operational issues in AOR
Localized strategic, mostly
operational
Some strategic; mostly
operational; integration ofcapabilities between the U.S. AF
and ASDF
Some strategic; mostly
operational
Some strategic; mostly
operational

PACFLT Commander
PACAF Commander

USARPAC Commander
MARFORPAC Commander

Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce

What this means is that each component command carries out its own
communication with its Japanese counterpart, from the commander level down through eachstaﬀ directorate. PACOM has the authority, however, to direct how each of its components
interacts with counterparts or what to do with counterparts. For example, every year PACOM
publishes a eater Campaign Order (TCO) that tells the components certain things they are
required to do, like major exercises or ag oﬃcer engagements. When things are thought ofafter the TCO is published, PACOM publishes a TCO addendum called a fragmentary order(FRAGO). Additionally, once a year a Joint Senior Leaders Seminar is held where the
PACOM Commander and his components attempt to synchronize all the work they are
doing with Japan in the operational realm with U.S. policy to ensure that all the components
are moving in the same direction.

46

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Mirroring the way alliance management is handled at the PACOM level, in-Japan
service components communicate and coordinate with their SDF counterparts in adecentralized manner (table 8). Like the Chairman, JCS and the PACOM Commander, the
USFJ Commander’s primary counterpart is the COS-JSO.
eir communications largely
focus on regional issues at a strategic level and operational issues in the AOR with a focus on
Japan. Organizationally, therefore, USFJ and JSO are also considered counterparts, although
the USFJ Commander in his dual-hatted role as 5th AF Commander also conducts regularcommunication with the Chief of Staﬀ, ASO, to discuss strategic issues. Importantly, the
USFJ Commander communicates directly with the PACOM Commander, as he is the
PACOM Commander’s representative in Japan commanding a PACOM-supporting subuni ed command. Unlike the PACOM Commander, who is not available to interact with the
COS-JSO on a daily basis, the USFJ Commander is, acting as a conduit to PACOM. e
PACOM Commander, or his staﬀ, however, does not regularly communicate directly with
in-Japan service component commanders or their staﬀ (i.e., 7th Fleet, USARJ, III MEF, or
5th AF—although because USFJ Commander is dual-hatted, any contact is inherently alsowith the 5th AF commander), as USFJ does not have OPCON over these units. Like theU.S. Service Chiefs and the PACOM component commands, these in-Japan service
components conduct regular communication with their SDF counterparts in the appropriate
Staﬀ Oﬃce, although the GSO interacts with both the Marines and Army. At this level,
communications and coordination fall closer to the category of operational discussions. With
all, the Chiefs of Staﬀ hold regular communications with their counterpart through both
VTCs and physical visits.
While the in-Japan service components conduct regular communication with thethree SDF Staﬀ Oﬃces, these are not their only connections with the SDF.
ey alsomaintain structural relationships with commands where they discuss both operational andtactical issues. ese relationships and content of communications are summarized in table 9.
Diﬀerent from the relationships mentioned thus far, the units below do not necessarily
represent counterparts in the same way that the PACFLT Commander looks to the MSDFMSO, for example. As such, it is more accurate to view these as critical relationships rather
than counterparts.
e structural relationship between MSDF-U.S. Navy is the simplest relationship tounderstand. Primary maritime relationships are between the 7th Fleet Commander andCinCSDFleet.
e relationship between ASDF and USFJ is more complex. Primary air
counterparts are between the 5th AF Commander and the Air Defense Command
Commander (although ties with other ASDF functional commanders also important).
Because of the dual-hatted nature of the 5th AF/USFJ Commander, the 5th AF Vice
Commander, who is a one-star general, is the Director, Paci c Air Forces Joint Air
Component Coordination Element. In this capacity, he/she interacts with the ASDF’s Air
Defense Command Commander regularly at the operational level through weekly scheduled
meetings, along with additional consultations, as needed, based on events in the region and/or

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

47

other issues that might require further discussion. Because this sets up an asymmetric
relationship between a U.S. one-star and a Japanese three-star, this is not a formallyinstitutionalized relationship. Instead, each 5th AF Commander makes this decision on thebasis of necessity given other primary duties he is responsible for as USFJ Commander.115

Table 8. U.S. Forces in Japan-SDF Chief of Staff Operational Counterparts.
United States

Japan

Content ofCommunications

USFJ Commander

Chief of Staﬀ, Joint Staﬀ
Oﬃce

Commander, 7th Fleet

Chief of Staﬀ, Maritime
Staﬀ Oﬃce
Chief of Staﬀ, Air Staﬀ
Oﬃce

Regional issues at strategic level;
Operational issues in AOR withfocus on Japan
Largely operational focused on
the defense of Japan
Component air coordination
within Japan; integration ofcapabilities between the U.S. AF
and ASDF
Largely operational; sometactical; support to training
exercises
Component groundcoordination; integration ofamphibious capabilities with the
GSDF

Commander, 5th Air Force

Commander, U.S. ArmyJapan

Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce

III MEF Commander

Chief of Staﬀ, Ground Staﬀ
Oﬃce

e division of the GSDF into ve regional armies also introduces complexity to therelationships as these regional commanders do not have true counterparts in the same sense of
the one-on-one relationship that the MSDF and ASDF have with their in-Japan service
component counterparts.116 I Corps (F) conducts regular contact with the ve regional armies,
which is aided by regular communication between the USARJ Commander, in his dual-hatted
role as I Corps (F) Commander, and the Commanders of the ve regional armies. III MEF
does not have a dedicated GSDF command that it can call its true counterpart. Like USARJ,
the III MEF Commander and commanders of the ve regional armies do communicate but
not as regularly as the communication between USARJ/I Corps (F) and the ve regionalarmies. Because the GSDF’s Western Regional Army is focused on building amphibious
capabilities and has a responsibility to defend Okinawa, the III MEF’s primary counterpart isthe Western Regional Army, which is pushing for a closer relationship with

115
116

Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
Anonymous Q, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.

48

JEFFREY W. HORNUNGMARFORPAC.117 As evidence of this special relationship, the Marine Corps places a liaisonoﬃcer in the GSDF at the Western Army HQ. One of the main motivations for the creationof the GCC was to establish an operational-level command between the regional headquarters
and Ichigaya (MOD, JSO, GSO) and remedy the lack of a “true counterpart” between the
GSDF armies and the Army/Marines in Japan.118

Table 9. In-Japan Service Components-SDF Commands Critical
Relationships.
United StatesJapan

7th Fleet Commander

Commander in Chief, Self
Defense Fleet (CinCSDFleet)
Air Defense Command
Commander and other ASDF
functional commanders
5 GSDF Commanders ofRegional Armies
5 GSDF Commanders ofRegional Armies; Emphasison Western Regional Army

5th Air Force Vice
Commander
USARJ/ I Corps (F)Commander
III MEF Commander

Content ofCommunications

Operational; tactical

Joint
Formalized Meetingse alliance is not short of formalized joint meetings. ere are four primary meetings held
regularly with the objective being to ensure policy consistency between the allies. ese are:the Security Consultative Committee (SCC, also called 2+2 Meeting), Security
Subcommittee (SSC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), and the AllianceManagement Meeting (AMM).119


117

SCC/2+2 meetings: High level meetings, second only to oﬃcial summits between
executives. Taking place almost annually, 120 these meetings have as participants theJapanese Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of

III MEF interacts with the Northern and Northeast Regional Armies when it conducts exercises in areas close
to these regional headquarters. Yet, because these Armies are not pursuing amphibious capabilities, the interaction
is much more limited when compared with the deep connections between III MEF and the Western Regional
Army.
118
Anonymous R, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.
119
Information provided below drawn from Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2015 (Tokyo: 2015), 184 as
well as information received from Anonymous X, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
120
e last 2+2 was held in April 2015. Prior to that, the last one was held in October 2013.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

49

Defense and Secretary of State.
e purpose of these meetings is largely to discussnational security issues to promote policy understanding between the governments andstrengthen cooperative relations.


SSC: One level down in the hierarchy.
ese meetings are working-level meetings
generally at the Director General level (DG NAAB in MOFA, DG of the Bureau of
Defense Policy in MOD) in Japan and the Assistant Secretary level in the United States(ASD, APSA; EAP A/S). e purpose of these meetings is to exchange views on security
issues of mutual concern to both countries. e meetings are held irregularly.

SDC:
e mission of the SDC is to draft and implement the U.S.-Japan Defense
Guidelines. Like the SSC, the meetings are held irregularly. Participants from Japan
include the DG NAAB in MOFA, the DG of the Bureau of Defense Policy in MOD,and representatives from the JSO. Participants from the United States include Assistant
Secretaries of State and Defense (ASD, APSA; EAP A/S), the USFJ Commander, as
well as representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Joint Staﬀ, and PACOM. SDCDeputies meetings are also held at the DDG/Deputy Assistant Secretary level.



AMM: More than any other meeting, the AMM (formally called the “Mini-SSC”) is the“real workhorse of the entire alliance management regime.”121 Acting as the clearinghousefor alliance management that shapes the agenda for SCC and SSC meetings, it comprises
numerous lines of work that straddle multiple organizations within MOD and MOFAon the Japanese side and the DOD and DOS on the U.S. side. Participants generally
include the DDG of NAAB in MOFA, the DDG of the Bureau of Defense Policy inMOD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Japan and Korean Aﬀairs and the
DASD for East Asia in the United States. e USFJ Deputy Commander and the USFJ
J5 are also sometimes included. In-Japan service components are invited, although they
do not always send representatives. ere is no rigid schedule of AMM meetings, but it
usually works out to approximately once quarterly and lasts about one day. e outcomesof this meeting are put into a report that subsequently moves up the hierarchy.

Joint Committee
In addition to these alliance meetings is the Joint Committee (JC), the principal interface
between U.S. military forces in Japan and the Japanese government that acts as the primaryinteragency coordination mechanism between the governments for coordinating militaryaﬀairs. 122 Issues related to implementation of the SOFA are adjudicated by it.
e JC ischaired on the U.S. side by the Deputy Commander, USFJ with the Minister for Political

121

Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, March 10, 2017.
Information provided in undated document entitled Alliance Framework: Communication Framework, Forums,
and Mechanisms. Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, December 1, 2016.
122

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JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Aﬀairs at the U.S. Embassy serving as the Senior Deputy. Each U.S. military service isrepresented as well. e Japanese side is chaired by the DG of NAAB in MOFA. ere are
no SDF personnel assigned as permanent members of the JC, but they do observe on occasion.
e JC comprises seven subcommittees that meet regularly. 123 Numerous othersubcommittees, panels, and working groups addressing a broad spectrum of issues meet as
required. Two in particular require mention. e ATOP (co-led by the USFJ J5 and the U.S.
Embassy Political-Military Unit Chief and their counterparts on the Japanese side), whichmeets quarterly, is charged with executing, managing, and controlling all base realignment
initiatives related to DPRI.
e Alliance Transformation Implementation Panel provides
recommendations to the Facilities Subcommittee on matters related to alliance transformation
projects (for example, new construction, reconstruction, relocation, and renovation ofbuildings and structures funded by the GOJ).

Alliance Coordination Mechanism
In the 2015 review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the allies agreed
to establish an Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) as a means to “strengthen policy
and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces andthe United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.”124 e ACM
was meant to correct the aws of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) that wasestablished in 1997 but unutilized, particularly in the response to the March 11, 2011, disasters
due to the fact that the triggering mechanism was designed to be a contingency, not a natural
disaster. It also neglected an interagency emphasis. e objective of this new structure was tonot only lower the triggering mechanism for its usage but to aid interagency coordination
through information sharing and the development and maintenance of common situationalawareness.
In the time since the ACM was created, considerable work has been done on eshingout the conceptualization. It has even been utilized to follow and respond to North Korea’s
nuclear test in January 2016, the April 2016 earthquake in Kumamoto, and the “swarming”
of Chinese vessels around the Senkaku Islands in August 2016. 125 While the ACM isconsidered “standing” at all times and expected to function on a continuous basis without
needing a triggering event for actors to utilize it, it does not physically exist. Instead, it is123

Training Relocation Subcommittee (J3 lead); Frequency Subcommittee (J6 lead); Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee(J3 lead with 5th AF assist); Environmental Subcommittee (J4 lead); Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee (SJA leadwith J5); Labor Subcommittee (J1 lead); and a Facilities Subcommittee (J4 lead).
124
Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, e Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Tokyo: April 27, 2015), 3,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/ les/000078188.pdf.
125
e use of the ACM for North Korea was even publicized. See U.S. Department of Defense, Readout of Secretaryof Defense Carter’s Call with Japan Defense Minister Nakatani, Release No: NR-009-16, January 8, 2016.
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/642034/a-readout-of-secretary-ofdefense-carters-call-with-japan-defense-minister-naka.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

51

completely virtual, with an Executive Secretary at USFJ who sets up phone bridges andmeeting times. ese meetings are conducted by secure VTC, phone, and e-mail. is is bydesign. e ACM was not designed to be a physical or permanently manned organization.
After all, the members who participate in the ACM have other important jobs to ll on a daily
basis.
Still, the overall structure of the ACM is clear: there are three layers. e top layer
focuses on policy, the mid layer on joint operations, and the lower layer on tactics. ere are
no set numbers assigned to these layers; rather, membership is largely determined by the task.
is allows the ACM to ex in times of crisis both vertically (up the escalation ladder) andhorizontally (across to other ministries/departments). e details of these layers are provided
below.126


Policy layer: Consists of the Alliance Cooperation Group (ACG), which includes largely
representatives from Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat, MOFA, MOD’s IB, and SDF (ifneeded) as well as representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and USFJ and, as
needed, representatives from US-NSC, DOD, DOS, PACOM, and the JCS.
e
ACG’s main duty is that of coordinating security policy.
oree sub-groups in the ACG: Director General-level (ACG-DG) sub-group(DASDs and above); a Director-level (ACG-D) sub-group (O6 level, like the
Director for OSD’s Japan Desk, USFJ’s J5, and PACOM’s Chief, Northeast Asia
Policy Division J51) and an Executive Secretariat-level (ACG-ES) sub-group thatconsists of action oﬃcers. Military representatives are also at the table of these
discussions, to include PACOM, USFJ, and JCS from the United States and the
JSO and three SDF services from Japan. Who exactly attends depends on thesituation and who else is attending. Of the three layers, this layer is the most concrete,
as it is already functioning (i.e., meetings have already taken place), albeit mostactivity focuses on the ACG-D and ACG-ES sub-groups.

Operations layer: Consists of the Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC),
which includes military personnel from Japan’s JSO and three services as well as USFJ
augmented by PACOM and component command members. e purpose of the BOCC
is to coordinate and conduct bilateral operations between the SDF and the U.S. military.
Building oﬀ of the BCM, the physical coordination space for the BOCC is in the
Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota. Although it is notmanned permanently, it is resourced and regularly maintained by USFJ.



Tactical level: Consists of uniformed military personnel in three Component
Coordination Centers (CCCs) to re ect the three services in Japan and each service of126

Anonymous M, Interview with author, November 15, 2016, and Japan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs,
Dōmei Chōsei Mekanizumu (ACM) no Kōsei [Organization of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)],
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ les/000108947.pdf.

52

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

the U.S. military. While there is no rm rule on where the units come from, most would
be drawn from units already in the PACOM AOR.
is makes USFJ andPACOM/USFJ components heavily involved. e Component Coordination CenterAir (CCC-A) includes staﬀ from PACAF, the 5th AF, and ASDF. e Component
Coordination Center-Maritime (CCC-M) includes staﬀ from PACFLT, 7th Fleet,
Naval Forces Japan, and MSDF. Finally, the Component Coordination Center-Ground(CCC-G) includes staﬀ from USARPAC, USARJ, MARFORPAC, III MEF, and the
GSDF.
Unlike every alliance structure outlined above, the ACM is the newest. While theuppermost layer—the ACG—has been utilized, bringing together representatives from bothsides of the alliance, the lower layers of the ACM focusing on military interactions have not.
Prior analogues of the current BOCC and CCCs have existed for over a decade under theprevious BCM, such as a naval component coordination cell at Funakoshi and an air
component coordination cell at Yokota. What this means is that the structural interactions at
the lower levels of the ACM—as established in the 2015 Guidelines—exist largely in theory,
not practice. If a situation gets serious, it is expected that the allies will depend on the ACM
to carry out VTCs between all the relevant military headquarters and civilian oﬃces, including
committing personnel to the tactical level’s CCCs. If a situation devolves into something reallyserious, such as war, it is expected that a physical space for the ACM would also be establishedat the NSS, similar to the BJOCC at Yokota that was utilized to respond to the March 11,
2011, earthquake and tsunami.127 rough escalation ladders, the ACM will scale up in sizeand seniority, depending on the severity. When something begins to emerge, personnel fromthroughout various military commands will devote more attention to the ACM and less totheir daily jobs. At this point, commands make decisions to send personnel to ll physicalspaces in the BOCC and CCCs with counterparts.

127

Anonymous M, Interview with author, November 15, 2016.

Findings
Understanding what the discrete structures look like and how they communicate andcoordinate provides insight into whether the current alliance management structures are
optimized for eﬃciency.
is research found that while there are positive aspects of theexisting structures of communication and coordination, they are not optimized to manage
today’s alliance relations. As shown in this section, while the additions of the J-NSC andACM are critical improvements for alliance handlers, there are challenges inherent in theexisting system that should be addressed. e challenges posed, however, diﬀer in terms of
their applicability to situations of peacetime versus those of crisis and con ict. Below, I present
ve challenges in the existing alliance structures of communication and coordination that are
most relevant for peacetime situations. Following this, I present three additional challenges
that are most relevant for crisis and con ict scenarios.

Positive Aspects
National Security Council
ere is widespread agreement on both sides of the alliance that the establishment of the JNSC is a positive development for communications, particularly in non-crisis phases. In thewords of one U.S. oﬃcial, Japan’s “NSC has become massively important.”128 Two or three
decades ago, MOFA led most security-related issues because the MOD was still the Japan
Defense Agency. For some, MOFA “looked down on” the defense establishment and instead
wanted to monopolize security policy. 129 Strengthening MOFA’s power was the weak
decision-making capability of the Prime Minister’s oﬃce. e Prime Minister often had torely on the whims of his agencies to share information which, in turn, made decision-making
diﬃcult and served as an impediment to bilateral decision-making. e Prime Minister was
unable to act quickly without rst gaining the necessary information from relevant agencies.
Over its short existence, the J-NSC has secured an important position in Japan, given its
ability to break down walls preventing information sharing between agencies and provide
oversight on important issues. is has strengthened the Prime Minister vis-à-vis government
ministries, like MOFA. Importantly, the J-NSC has become a great asset in communications
with the United States via its direct relationship with the US-NSC, providing a direct channelof information ow between the allies’ executive branches. Using the J-NSC as a separate tool

128
129

Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
Anonymous BB, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.

54

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

from MOFA aids the Prime Minister, as he is able to force interagency coordination and pushfor quick responses to national security issues. Not all MOFA oﬃcials agree, as theorganization is seen as a potential rival. 130 is is not unique to Japan.
e US-NSC issometimes seen as a rival to the DOS and other parts of the federal government.

Alliance Coordination Mechanism
Like the J-NSC, the ACM is a positive development for the alliance.
is is because
coordination, communication, and information sharing between Washington and Tokyo have
improved since its establishment, particularly in gray zone activities that are still considered apeacetime situation. Importantly, the ACM does not need an agreement to activate it, as was
the case with the previous BCM. Because the ACM can expand both vertically andhorizontally, the structure is exible and scalable to meet any scenario. Already it has provencapable of ramping up to meet threatening situations, like North Korea missile provocations,as the allies successfully were able to conduct information sharing in real time to meet asituation that had the potential to develop into a crisis or con ict scenario.131 At the sametime, because the ACM is new, no one expects it to be a perfect organization. As shown
below, there are a few areas where problems exist.

U.S. Forces, Japan
USFJ’s main purpose, as PACOM’s representative, is to perform the vital task ofcommunicating and coordinating with GOJ on anything regarding U.S. forces in Japan. A
positive actor in maintaining eﬀective communication between the militaries, USFJ staﬀ has
direct contact with both Japan and PACOM. USFJ plays a key role in PACOM’s eﬀorts attheater-wide force posture initiatives, provides joint training and interoperability, maintains
the SOFA, and creates the conditions for access.132 is is an enormous asset to have. Not
only does its presence ensure a U.S. understanding of what is happening in Japan, but it also
ensures smooth implementation of DOD policies and PACOM directives.
While almost all interviewees expressed a positive evaluation for the administrativerole USFJ plays in peacetime situations, this research uncovered pockets of skepticism on bothsides of the Paci c about USFJ’s utility in a crisis or con ict situation. For example, one retired
senior oﬃcer noted that Japan “respects Yokota and brings issues to USFJ, but they simply
send these to Hawaii.”133 As such, USFJ is “not necessary.”134 is skepticism was rooted in

130

Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
Anonymous M, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
132
Anonymous VV, E-mail message to author, February 10, 2017.
133
Anonymous S, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.
134
Ibid.
131

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

55

four factors: (1) USFJ lacks OPCON of military units in Japan; (2) USFJ would likely notreceive OPCON in a contingency; (3) if urgent responses are required, PACOM will beneeded; and (4) if a JTF is needed, III MEF or 7th Fleet would most likely be designated thecommander. Because it is unclear what role the USFJ would play in such situations, some
respondents questioned the value of the USFJ. is led to three suggestions that were generally
shared by those critical of USFJ in both the United States and Japan: operationalization of thecommand, downgrading it to a two-star billet, or shrinking the command dramatically to asmall, permanently detached group solely in charge of administrative functions and located in
Ichigaya. A brief summary of these three options is in Appendix 3.
e author disagrees with this negative characterization of USFJ. Because USFJ plays
an extremely valuable role in daily communication with the Japanese government, the author
believes the USFJ stands out as a positive organizational structure enabling communicationand coordination on critical issues.
ese criticisms demonstrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of USFJ, particularly its role in situations that escalate beyond a peacetime
state.
ey also assume that PACOM is happy to take on issues that are USFJ’s
responsibilities, overlooking the fact that PACOM has many other responsibilities it should
be prioritizing.
USFJ has an invaluable and irreplaceable role. USFJ’s strength is that it facilitates
coordination and communication with Japan, as it is the best administrative unit that knows
where communications should be directed with the GOJ. e USFJ Commander is a goodtranslator of the Japanese situation to PACOM and knows the domestic force deployment
situation better than PACOM. is is vital on-the-ground situational awareness for PACOM
that is not limited to peacetime situations.
While USFJ is not responsible for war ghting or operational command, it is
responsible for a tremendous amount of activity that war ghters would depend on. Dependingon the point on the escalation ladder, forces would ow into the region. e pivot point for
any con ict in the region, regardless of the intensity, would be Japan. is is primarily because
U.S. forces are not constrained to Japan. U.S. bases in Japan are premised on the assumptionthat they will be sent somewhere else. is is in contrast to U.S. forces in South Korea, where
the force management construct is that the United States is there to defend South Korea andcommitted to maintaining existing troop numbers on the peninsula. e crucial job that USFJ
would have to perform for a regional contingency involving the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan
is securing GOJ permission for the use of individual ports and bases and informing the GOJ
which American units and equipment are arriving. Additionally, any commander tasked withleading an operation in the region would face numerous “downstream” functions that are
required for the U.S. forces deploying out of Japan into the region. is commander would

56

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

not have the established relationships or knowledge of how to make any of this happen or
have a staﬀ knowledgeable enough to do so. ese functions include: 135

Deploying guards to bases.

Ensuring coordination between MOD and U.S. bases and between U.S. bases and local
communities.

Communicating with hospitals and prefectural governments to ensure proper treatmentof wounded U.S. soldiers in Japanese hospitals.



Coordinating with GOJ regarding any in ux of radars, ships or airplanes, missile defense
gear, or an additional carrier task force.

Coordinating logistics to support the war ghter’s units, such as moving fuel around Japanto ensure it gets where it is most needed.

USFJ is uniquely situated to handle these tasks to establish the operationalframework to support any regional war ghting eﬀort precisely because that is what it wasestablished to do.
is makes USFJ one of the most critical structures to facilitatecommunication and coordination in the alliance.

135

Anonymous QQ, Interview with author, November 16, 2016; Anonymous VV, Interview with author,
November 23, 2016.

Challenges in Peacetime
Situations
1. Multiplicity of U.S. Operational Actors
e multiplicity of operational commands and headquarters on the U.S. side remains a
mammoth, complicated structure for the Japanese. One senior U.S. oﬃcer likened thissituation to a saloon in the Wild West, where allies—like Japan—enter and can ask any
number of actors for assistance while simultaneously being asked questions, all without any of
the actors knowing what the other is doing.136 To understand this, consider Japan’s COSJSO. e individual in this position has three very diﬀerent U.S. counterparts: the Chairman,
JCS; the PACOM Commander; and the USFJ Commander. ese three individuals exist in
three diﬀerent geographical locations, have diﬀerent roles and responsibilities, and holddiﬀerent authorities. It is natural that seams exist in the communication Japan’s COS-JSO is
having with each of these U.S. counterparts. While staﬀs on the U.S. side work hard tocoordinate among relevant stakeholders, information is not always shared. Such a situation
will not be critical for the alliance in most peacetime situations, but the current structure gives
rise to two very diﬀerent dynamics in alliance communication and coordination.

Confusingis research found that a substantial number of SDF personnel nd the multiplicity of U.S.
operational actors to be confusing at times. In turn, this leads to frustration in Japan. For any
directorate in one of the three SDF service staﬀ oﬃces, counterparts exist in USFJ, in-Japan
service components, PACOM, PACOM components, and the JCS. is has the tendency to“overwhelm Japan” because these multiple components and directorates do not always
communicate with each other. 137 Not only are there problems communicating andcoordinating among and between staﬀs of these commands, but these problems extend tocommunicating and coordinating with the civilian leadership in the DOD as well as the
Embassy and DOS. In addition to using electronic communication and phone calls,
representatives from these various oﬃces and headquarters make visits to Japan.
is results in a large number of actors where the sheer volume of communication
confuses Japanese stakeholders due to a lack of communication and/or poor transmission of
information among U.S. actors. “Sometimes [the alliance] gets lucky and it all works.” 138

136

Anonymous D, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
Anonymous H, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.
138
Ibid.
137

58

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

Often, however, the fact that no one coordinates the U.S. side has a tendency to confuse
counterparts in Japan. is confusion gets exponentially worse when these actors, through lackof coordination, fail to have the same position on an issue.139

Taking advantage
A second dynamic found in this research, identi ed by both U.S. and Japanese respondents,
is that some on the Japanese side have learned how to take advantage of the problems ofcommunication on the U.S. side. Japanese SDF oﬃcers often go to their most direct
counterpart rst but have options to move to others if they receive a negative response.140
Knowing that there are a large number of actors who could still say yes, and who do notcommunicate well with their own U.S. counterparts, SDF oﬃcers frequently “knock on doors
until someone says yes.” 141
is could mean a component commander, the PACOM
Commander, or even the Chairman, JCS. Who they ask depends on the nature of the request
and whether that person will give them what they want. As one senior U.S. oﬃcer quipped,“whoever gets them the most, they’ll go with that person.”142 Sometimes these Japanese actors
reach out to other actors without informing anyone that they have already received negative
responses elsewhere.143 “ ey play mom versus dad on us,” quipped one former U.S. oﬃcial.144
e Japanese actors are not being malicious. Rather, “Japan plays this to their advantage”145
because it is simply “the [U.S.] system is such, so of course you’ll do it.”146

2. Multiplicity of Japanese Policymakers
As shown above, Japanese policymakers far outnumber those in the United States. is isbecause Japan is but one ally among many for the United States, whereas the United States isJapan’s only ally. erefore, Japan has a reason to devote attention to various aspects of therelationship. Because the United States does not have this manpower, alliance management
falls largely upon two oﬃces in D.C. While this nite set of contact points is eﬃcient in its
simplicity, from the Japanese perspective it is not eﬃcient in handling an increasingly complex
array of communication and coordination on complicated issues.

139

Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
While none of the anecdotes the author heard were classi ed, speci ed examples are best not to be made public
in order to avoid indirectly identifying interviewees.
141
Quote from Anonymous D, Interview with author, June 29, 2016. Similar sentiment heard from Anonymous G,
Interview with author, June 30, 2016; Anonymous I, Interview with author, June 30, 2016; Anonymous L,
Interview with author, July 5, 2016; Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
142
Anonymous G, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.
143
Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
144
Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.
145
Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.
146
Anonymous Q, Interview with author, July 25, 2016.
140

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

59

While the majority of Japanese respondents recognized the eﬀorts made by the two
Japan Desks in recent years, some of them expressed concern that the smaller manpower ofthese two Japan Desks translates into a reduced level of attention devoted to Japan-related
issues. As one Japanese oﬃcial complained, “we’d like to see more attention to the Asia-Paci cregion.”147 is is because there is a sense of frustration that the smaller number of oﬃcials
working alliance issues in the United States naturally results in delays. 148 Additionally,
Japanese respondents noted that when they try to discuss issues directly with other oﬃces in
Washington, there is a tendency for other U.S. oﬃces to direct these communications back to
the two Japan Desks.149 is tendency to be directed back to the Japan Desks leads to a view
among some Japanese respondents that these desks are trying to control all interaction withJapan. Not everyone interviewed for this project shares this view. In fact, the majority ofJapanese respondents expressed a sentiment of admiration for the Japan Desks “handling awide range of alliance issues by such a small team.”150 ey had never heard, observed, or
experienced the Japan Desks as attempting to control communication with MOFA or MOD
oﬃces.
A nal view, shared by the fewest respondents, is the opinion the Japan Desks at DOS
and OSD occasionally act as gatekeepers in their agencies to Japanese oﬃces wanting todiscuss issues outside the realm of the alliance, such as nuclear missile defense. For these
individuals, MOFA and MOD have an interest in expanding their contacts to other desks in
DOS and DOD making decisions on functional issues so as to reduce their dependency on
the two Japan Desks. eir hope is, by relying less on the two oﬃces, they can promote quicker
communication and coordination with the United States and expand the number ofstakeholders in Japan-supported policies. As one individual stated, more contact with nonJapan Desks would aﬀord Japanese oﬃcials the opportunity to explain Japanese interests on
speci c issues to “educate these other [DOD/DOS] oﬃces” to “convince” them on decisions
more agreeable to Japan since “Japan Desks don’t have [a] full understanding of all issues.”151

3. Running Problems up to the Highest Decision-Maker
Washington and Tokyo are close allies, but this does not mean they agree on everything. Past
disagreements over the Futenma Replacement Facility and revisions to the Status of Forces
Agreement are good examples of how contentious some issues can be. Other times, frustration
emerges from the process by which communication and coordination are done within thealliance. Speci cally, sometimes Japanese alliance managers push up issues to the very top of
the decision-making hierarchy in Japan (such as the Prime Minister and senior leadership) or

147

Anonymous BB, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.
149
Anonymous U, Interview with author, December 27, 2016.
150
Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.
151
Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
148

60

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

try to do so in the United States (such as the PACOM Commander and senior leadership in
DOD or DOS). Understandably, it is not prevalent everywhere. Having a U.S. AF three-star
general and a Japanese ASDF three-star general located together in Yokota, for example,
makes instant communication easy. 152 is research revealed a shared opinion by alliancemanagers on both sides of the Paci c that, generally speaking, running problems up to thehighest decision-maker is more frequent than not.
From the U.S. perspective, there is a chain of command in place that starts all alliancemanagement issues at the desk oﬃcer level and works their way up. Many of the issues thatJapan raises should be taken care of at the working level, as they are in the United States.153
is works well for Americans because alliance managers at these lower levels generally feelthey are in agreement on issues and communicate frequently, thereby ensuring common
knowledge across oﬃces. From the U.S. perspective, the reason why their Japanesecounterparts run things up to higher levels is because they sense otherwise they will get ananswer they do not like—or get the “slightest whiﬀ of a no” for something they want.154
Responses by Japanese interviewed for this research reveal that their rationale to go high hasless to do with expected responses and more because action at lower levels sometimes takes
weeks or months due to “too many stops to the top” of the military chain of command.155 esame occurs on the policymaking side because of the time it takes “to rely on a single
window/channel at the Japan desks in DOS and DOD.” 156 Concerns over time arecompounded by other reasons that include U.S. oﬃcials sometimes being quite defensive andnegotiations becoming counterproductive 157 as well as vague American answers to speci crequests.158 Going directly to higher levels is seen as the best means to push forward toward aquick decision. As one Japanese interviewee stated, “I will start with someone who isin uential,” understanding that this sometimes angers the United States.159
e result of pushing issues to the top domestically or in context of the alliance is thesame for many of the U.S. respondents: complicated bilateral communications andcoordination. In the case of a decision pushed to the top domestically, a decision by the Prime
Minister on a sticky issue immediately shuts down all room for negotiation.160 In the case ofa decision pushed to the top of leadership in the United States, it generates confusion among
U.S. oﬃcials.
is is particularly true for staﬀ forced to play defense on an issue with acommander or senior civilian who said yes—without knowing the full background of thatissue—and now is forced into having to think who is right, “the Japanese counterpart or his152

Anonymous WW, Interview with author, December 13, 2016.
Anonymous PP, Interview with author, September 7, 2016.
154
Anonymous T, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
155
Anonymous CC, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
156
Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
157
Anonymous U, Interview with author, July 26, 2016.
158
Anonymous KK, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
159
Anonymous CC, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
160
Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
153

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

61

own staﬀ.”161 Decisions that are not well thought out and are not more right than wrong hurt
the alliance.
Both sides recognize the problem. One U.S. oﬃcer noted that “when the focus isn’t on
Asia by senior leaders, things get harder with making decisions.” 162 is translates into
defensive actions because the U.S. side gets nervous about taking initiatives that may upset
senior leaders. Japanese respondents recognize the negative view of Japan’s behavior. One
senior MOD oﬃcial quipped that he sensed “there was no atmosphere to support this,”referring to direct contact with higher authorities in the United States. 163 Going one stepfurther, he also acknowledged that “PACOM people show reluctance” when Japanesecounterparts engage in this type of behavior. Yet, despite this mutual understanding, thepractice continues.

4. Over-Utilization of ACM for Questionable Peacetime Purposes
Most American respondents familiar with the ACM regret that while it has been used for a
few real-world events since it was rst established, Japan has tended to over-utilize it for popup issues that are of questionable value—from an alliance standpoint. 164 Even Japanese
respondents familiar with the ACM believe that in handling even the smallest of issues, ACM
members “need to see each other more than we do.”165 is is because it is believed that more
face time translates into better communication and understanding on all issues. Americans
familiar with this disagree, believing that many of these lower-priority issues can be addressed
through e-mails, not necessarily face time. Without a doubt, it is a positive development thatJapan wants to rely on the ACM as much as it does, given that it synchs up the allies andenables them to discuss things frankly.166 at said, the split in views between Japanese andAmerican respondents reveals a disagreement on how to use it. While the ACM was created
to coordinate issues that involve the SDF and U.S. military from peacetime to an emergency,
and all gray zones in between, when it comes to speci c events, responses indicate that there
is no common understanding on ACM usage. Importantly, while basic guidelines exist for
how the ACM should work, standard operating procedures (SOPs) have yet to be nalized.
At the time of writing (March 2017), although SOPs for the ACG and BOCC appear to beclose to completion and awaiting signature, more work is necessary on the SOPs for the three
CCCs.

161

Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.
Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.
163
Anonymous DD, Interview with author, July 27, 2016.
164
While none of the anecdotes the author heard were classi ed, speci ed examples are best not to be made public
in order to avoid indirectly identifying interviewees.
165
Anonymous OO, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.
166
Anonymous XX, Interview with author, January 13, 2017.
162

62

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

5. Information Sharing
For any alliance to communicate eﬀectively, transparency is necessary. In other words,
information sharing is key.
e Abe administration’s Act on the Protection of Specially
Designated Secrets that passed the Diet on December 6, 2013, was seen as an eﬀort to get
serious about protecting classi ed information, but the United States remains wary of sharingclassi ed information with Japan. Due to an ongoing lack of trust in the Japanese ability toprotect classi ed information, the U.S. default for classi ed information is “secret-no foreign.”
is remains a source of frustration for all Japanese alliance managers interviewed for thisresearch who are familiar with information-sharing issues. From their perspective, it isconfusing as to why the United States calls Japan its most trusted security ally in the region
with which it shares formal intelligence sharing structures (e.g., GSOMIA) similar to allies
like Australia and Canada, yet the United States consistently demonstrates that it considers
these countries more trustworthy by the amount of classi ed intelligence it shares with them.
Although a strictly minority opinion in the context of this research, one Japanese respondent
questioned whether an ethnic or language bias or even continued animosity lingering fromWWII were to blame.167 From the U.S. perspective, while the secrecy laws helped, Japaneseleakage of classi ed information remains a problem.
ey “simply don’t keep secrets,”lamented one senior U.S. civilian.168 Re ecting a similar sentiment, one senior U.S. militaryoﬃcial believed that “If we release information releasable-to-Japan, we assume it will get out
into the public.”169 Related, there is an uncertainty in the United States whether intelligencefrom the United States will be shared among all relevant stakeholders in Japan or remain“stove-piped” in any one ministry. ere is a view that Japanese ministries sometimes use U.S.
intelligence as a source of power in domestic debates—and therefore hold on to intelligence—
rather than as a way to inform decision-making.170 In turn, this reduces the motivation for theUnited States to share intelligence. While U.S. trust of Japan has increased, particularly after
the 2013 legislation, getting to a level of trust that allows information sharing on a level theUnited States does with other allies will take time. Information sharing, however, is not a oneway street. ere are challenges with Japan sharing its intelligence with the United States,
leading to the view that Japan “takes” but does not “share” its intelligence.171 Challenges onboth sides hamper eﬀective communication and cooperation between the allies on sensitive
topics.

167

Anonymous TT, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
Anonymous L, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.
169
Anonymous F, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
170
Anonymous ZZ, Interview with author, March 13, 2017.
171
Ibid.
168

Challenges in Crisis andConflict Situations
1. Language Differencese primary language with which the allies communicate remains English, which imposes
constraints on Japan. For MOFA or non-SDF, MOD oﬃcials, there has always been a streamof talented people who speak English.
e situation is diﬀerent amongst the operationalcommands and staﬀs. In the past, while SDF oﬃcers rarely spoke English, particularly senioroﬃcers, today many oﬃcers do. e United States, however, lacks a large number of Japanese
speakers for reasons of simply being a global force and oﬃcers being promoted via non-Japanrelated operations (mostly non-Asian-related). Understandably, this does not pose a criticalchallenge in peacetime situations. Interpreters are used largely without problems in commands
and during exercises and training. Generally speaking, however, while the United States has
both permanent interpreter positions within its organizations (e.g., USFJ and in-Japan service
components) and brings additional interpreters on board for exercises and operations, theJapanese side does not always dedicate the same commitment of resourcing to interpreters.
Instead, oﬃcials rely on their own capabilities which, while they are improving, are not alwaysuent.
In a real-world contingency, the diﬀerence in language at a tactical level is a criticalvariable aﬀecting communication and coordination between the allies. is is because there
are no interpreters assisting them. In most operations, because of the extensive training
conducted between the United States and Japan, language diﬀerences will not matter because
the two militaries have clear understandings of their missions and train together on a
combined Operation Plan.
ey “speak the same language of military.” 172 Anticipatedsituations make things easier.
e concern revealed in this research, however, is when asituation arises for which the allies have not exercised or planned or when the assets from
diﬀerent services in Japan and the United States come into contact with each other in the eldof battle for which possibly no joint training has ever been conducted. It is at this interface
that clarity of communications becomes paramount. After all, “ad hoc maneuvers become so
diﬃcult if the guys on the ground can’t talk to each other.”173 Extending this line of thinking
even further, it is just as diﬃcult—if not more so—for those units in the air and at sea.

172
173

Anonymous RR, Interview with author, November 17, 2016.
Anonymous UU, Interview with author, November 22, 2016.

64

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

2. Lack of Self-Defense Force Unitye creation of the JSO in 2006 was a positive step forward in promoting jointness among theSDF.174 Yet more needs to be done. A common recognition by both American and Japanese
respondents was that Japan’s three SDF services do not do jointness well. Japan has madestrides in working toward greater jointness among its own services. is includes the looming
restructuring of the GSDF to include a GCC to sit on top of the ve regional armies. Butoﬃcers in both countries lament that progress is too slow. Even with the introduction of a
JSO and a growing willingness to fall under commanders of other services, oﬃcers admit that
underneath the COS-JSO exist “highly siloed services.”175 To be fair, inter-service cooperation
is diﬃcult for any country. In the United States, it took failures and military pressure, coupledwith the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, to force jointness among the services. Although the
SDF’s U.S. counterparts both in Japan and in Hawaii have long wanted better coordinationand communication among the three SDF services, it was not until the recent upgrades in thealliance that the need for these services to make a more concerted push to work together has
been brought into sharp focus.
is is because the lack of unity on the Japanese side interferes with the alliance’s ability
to coordinate and communicate in combined operations. In peacetime, the United States has
had to search for workarounds for interfacing with the SDF because the individual services
are often not on the same page.176 is puts pressure on the United States because its military
personnel have to double their eﬀorts to communicate and coordinate with their SDF
counterparts as the SDF does not do a good job talking among itself. Given Japan’s worsening
security environment, the United States needs closer cooperation with Japan on a host ofissues, like cyber, missile defense, maritime security, and non-traditional security challenges.
For this to occur, the militaries from both countries need to work seamlessly together. Not
having the SDF work well together calls this ability into question.

3. Alliance Coordination Mechanism’s Ability to Handle a Crisis
Another issue has to do with the ACM’s viability in a scenario other than peacetime. Asidefrom being used to respond to North Korean missile provocations, the “swarming” of Chinese
ships, or the earthquake in Kumamoto, the ACM has not been called upon to do more thanshare information. A concern expressed by some respondents familiar with the ACM is how
it would function in a crisis that evolves from a steady state situation and all the intervening
steps in between. e ACM lacks a robust communication mechanism and the integration of
instantaneous shared information. For example, while the allies enjoy use of the Combined

174

Prior to this was the Joint Staﬀ Council, which was created in July 1954.
Anonymous K, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.
176
Anonymous QQ, Interview with author, November 16, 2016.
175

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

65

Enterprise Regional Information Exchange-Japan (CENTRIX-J) network throughout thealliance, it is only deployed in a few nodes within Japan.177
Also pertinent to operational coordination is the fact that no joint manningdocuments exist for all the CCCs. While it is true that assumptions made in developing a
Joint Manning Document rarely live up to what is needed in a real-world crisis, decisions onwhat is needed or where the people will come from to man all three cells have yet to becompleted (progress diﬀers by service). What is known is that the respective services would
largely be drawn from U.S. units in the region (i.e., components). Until these are completed
for all three CCCs, if a contingency erupts, most manning decisions would be made ad hoc.
is extends to lack of clarity where a JTF commander would “plug in” to this ACM if
assigned to a regional crisis by PACOM, although most likely a JTF would plug in where it
operationally makes the most sense.
Finally, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that
although the ACM was created to improve operational coordination, it “lacks the commandand control elements necessary for a rapid combined and joint response to potential crises orcon icts.”178 If this critique refers to the mechanisms and people to generate and distributeorders on the battle eld, then the critique is misguided. is is because the purpose of the
ACM was never meant to be a command and control mechanism to be inserted between JTF
commanders. Instead, it is meant to focus more on policy and operational coordination. As
such, if the critique is meant to highlight the lack of communication systems or the lack ofdata link feeds or intelligence feeds, then the critique is fair given the paucity of CENTRIXJ terminals mentioned above.

177

CENTRIX allows the U.S. to be brought into a secure e-mail environment with other allies and partners, similar
to the SIPR network in the U.S. In the case of Japan, the system is called CENTRIX-J.
178
Michael Green, et al, Asia-Paci c Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016), 58, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_ les/ les/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPaci cRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf.

Recommendations
Both U.S. and Japan Relevant
1. Encourage Language Training Via Formal Training and More CoLocation of Uniformed Personnel.
It was noted above that the cadre of English speakers in Japan’s SDF is larger than Japanese
speakers in the U.S. military. While this does not pose a critical challenge in peacetime, itdoes in crisis and con ict situations. Using English as an element to evaluate SDF oﬃcers forpromotion or requiring the TOEIC exam to enter the Japanese Staﬀ Colleges is crucial for
ensuring English-language training of Japanese SDF personnel. is occurs now and should
continue to ensure that SDF oﬃcers have a working level of English to be able tocommunicate with their American counterparts in all situations relevant to their missions. At
the same time, while it is unrealistic to expect programs promoting widespread Japanese
language acquisition among U.S. oﬃcers, increasing the number of Japan Foreign AreaOﬃcers (FAOs) who can speak Japanese in all services is critical. ese eﬀorts on both sides
are crucial steps toward ensuring more bilingual service members in the alliance. is should
be augmented by a commitment to hiring trained interpreters in all commands. All too often
there are vast diﬀerences in the quality of the interpretation among Japanese and Americancommands that result in misunderstandings. If shortfalls persist, the allies should consider
bringing retired oﬃcers and enlisted personnel back on duty to ll critical interpreter positions.
In addition to these direct eﬀorts to increase language skills, the allies should focus
on increasing the number of co-located uniform personnel on both sides of the alliance as along-term, indirect means to improve language skills. e author has argued in another venue
for the need to co-locate personnel. 179 Currently, the allies have asymmetric numbers ofForeign Liaison Oﬃcer (FLO) exchanges. While the exact numbers are not publicly shared,
the United States has approximately nine FLOs in Japan compared with approximately thirty
Japanese FLOs at in-Japan service components, nine at PACOM and its components, andno more than ten on the U.S. mainland in various headquarters, such as SOCOM. FLOs areimportant means by which the two countries’ militaries facilitate communications. Senioroﬃcers on both sides of the alliance who remember times when FLOs did not exist in today’s
numbers were unanimous in the view that communication between the allies “has greatly
improved” since liaisons have increased.180 For the host country, FLOs are used as a resource

179

Jeﬀrey Hornung, Modeling a Stronger U.S.-Japan Alliance: Assessing U.S. Alliance Structures (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2015), 19-21.
180
Anonymous NN, Interview with author, July 29, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

67

to get information about their ally’s responses to issues and policies and to gain better insight
into domestic views. ey are also a communications channel to funnel information back totheir home capital regarding the host country.
Having FLOs not only supports greater bilingual language use in the alliance but
helps create shared perspectives and mutual understanding, build personal networks, and aid
trust building. All this facilitates communication. Having them placed throughout the allianceaddresses all aspects of language concerns: (1) expose oﬃcers to their ally’s military culture
and forms of communications; (2) foster understandings of these cultures andcommunications through an understanding of how their ally makes decisions; and (3) trainoﬃcers in both countries in critical language skills by being forced to use the host nation’s
language in their daily routines. It is for this reason that gaps in FLOs should be lled.
Although exact numbers are unknown, Japanese FLOs already work at USFJ, inJapan service components, PACOM, PACOM’s component commands, and various
headquarters on the U.S. mainland. While this suggests Japanese FLOs are quite extensive,and probably do not need to be increased, if there are mission-speci c headquarters that could
assist Japanese capabilities, like ballistic missile defense or amphibious warfare doctrine,
Japanese FLOs should be placed there to ensure a bene t to the alliance apart from simply
adding another liaison. is should be mirrored by an increase in Japanese-speaking U.S.
FAOs as FLOs in Japan. While there are U.S. FLOs in each of the GSDF’s regional armies,
the MSO, and GSO, there are none in the ASO, JSO, the MSDF’s Self-Defense Fleet, or
the ASDF’s Air Defense Command. American FLOs should be placed in these oﬃces. It is
hoped that increasing the number of FLOs in both countries would help today’s junior to
mid-level oﬃcers and senior enlisted build the familiarity that is required to execute current
operations while building future language and communication skills critical to the alliance.

2. Improve Elements of the ACM
ere is no need to make the ACM a standing physical structure akin to the Combined Forces
Command found in South Korea, where personnel from both countries are permanently
headquartered. Neither the SDF nor the U.S. military can aﬀord the money or the space todeploy people to Tokyo to wait for something to happen possibly years from now. Further,
the ACM is not a military body, so it would be staﬀed by civilians. Improvements that areneeded for the ACM are relatively easy xes. ey just require the bureaucratic and politicaleﬀort to see them through to their completion.
To address the crisis and con ict scenario challenges, alliance managers need to placea high priority on creating joint manning documents and building out a more robust
communication mechanism. As noted above, because not all the CCCs have joint manningdocuments, should a crisis erupt, it is expected that component commands responsible formanning the CCC would nd themselves making a lot of ad hoc decisions. Because time is

68

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

critical in meeting challenges, particularly those that rapidly move up the escalation scale, theallies need to minimize the amount of uncertainty in their structural relations by prioritizing
the completion of a joint manning document for those headquarters expected to send
personnel to the CCCs. Resources need to be dedicated to eshing out the speci cs of theACM, and this should begin with determining who will ll what seat should a crisis erupt.
A similar priority that should be addressed immediately is building out a more robust
communication mechanism. Alliance coordination requires a secure bilateral informationsharing system to reliably and quickly move sensitive data. Currently, the most built-out ofthese is CENTRIX-J, but, as mentioned above, the system is not deployed to its fullest,particularly in Japan. e system should be either expanded or replaced with something larger
and better tailored to alliance requirements. If the ACM is to be utilized in all situations frompeacetime to contingency, it needs a more robust communication mechanism that is placed inmany more oﬃces throughout the alliance system. CENTRIX-J’s limited availability
throughout the alliance system has to do with simple priorities. e community that wants
this technology in both Japan and the United States is small. As such, bureaucratic
impediments tend to dominate. Since people at the top do not have a need for it, they nd no
utility in allocating critical resources to it. ose who need it, largely the desk oﬃcers, are notin uential enough to demand its installation, particularly since some of the resources would
be for terminals that would sit dormant until a crisis emerges.181 Alliance managers need to
put CENTRIX-J at the top of their priorities.
Finally, while credit needs to be given to alliance managers for how far the ACM hascome since its inception in 2015, nalizing the SOPs needs to be prioritized. is will help
the alliance by explicitly clarifying things like who gets to call meetings and when, for what,
and who can attend meetings for speci c topics.182 Once all sets of SOPs are completed andsigned, these should immediately be included in bilateral exercises.

3. Review current security practices and restrictions of classified
intelligence
Classi ed information sharing between the United States and Japan has been diﬃcult and asource of tension for many years. e intelligence services of both countries routinely compare
nished analytical judgments on common potential threats such as North Korea, China, andmany other issues. In addition, the U.S. armed forces and the SDF routinely exchange
classi ed operational information in order to operate together. e much larger American
intelligence collection agencies, especially the National Security Agency and the National
Geospatial Agency, however, do not routinely provide intelligence reports to Japan through

181
182

Anonymous M, Interview with author, November 15, 2016.
Anonymous M, Interview with author, July 5, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

69

their automated classi cation and dissemination systems. Most of their products are classi ed“NOFORN” (No Foreign Nationals), which prevents their distribution to Japan.
With tensions and threats increasing in East Asia, it is time for the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence and Japan’s Director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Oﬃce,
to commission a study by their oﬃces to improve U.S.-Japan intelligence sharing. e study
should cover current practices and restrictions, the mission objectives for intelligence sharing,and the actions required by both sides to make improvements, and it should recommend anaction plan.
For Japan’s part, despite the changes in the Secrecy Law, there is a lack of con dence
among Americans in Japanese oﬃcials’ ability to handle classi ed information. Arguably, thisproblem will resolve itself in time as Japanese civilian and SDF organizations engrain in theiroﬃcials a stronger ethos of secrecy and the laws are enforced when someone is caught inviolation. Toward this end, they should increase their information security practices, such as
establishing a security cadre in these organizations. As time passes and they prove morecapable of handling classi ed information, they will earn the trust of their Americancounterparts. In turn, “when you trust, more ow of information happens.”183 Additionally,
Japanese actors need to do a better job at internally sharing U.S. intelligence among all relevant
stakeholders. Given the increasing role the J-NSC is playing in national security aﬀairs, the
NSS should make a concerted eﬀort to distribute intelligence across ministries and ensure theUnited States is aware of it.

U.S. Relevant
1. More and Better Communication Among U.S. Military Actors
As much as the U.S. side tries to communicate and coordinate across staﬀ oﬃces, it isundeniable that information falls through the cracks. U.S. respondents for this researchacknowledged that the staﬀ directorates in PACOM do not communicate well with eachother or across the component commands. is leads to confusion on the U.S. side whenthings are implemented that others thought had been denied as well as confusion on theJapanese side when diﬀerent actors are saying diﬀerent things. To address this, all actors on
the U.S. side needs to improve their internal communications up and down the command
structure and across commands.
Because a new communication channel to take the lead in centralizing
communication on the U.S. side would add a layer of complexity to an already complex
situation, the United States should focus on improvements to the current structure. Desk

183

Anonymous A, Interview with author, June 8, 2016.

70

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

oﬃcers throughout the directorates need to do a better job at communication with other
American stakeholders on decisions regarding Japan.
ere needs to be much greater
cognizance of the importance of simple communications, particularly on hot topic issues. If
the United States wants to stop the Japanese from “playing mom versus dad” on them, alliancemanagers “have to make sure everyone on the U.S. side is on the same sheet of music.”184 Asa means of creating better habits of communication, commanders should include
communication in exercises as a way to practice these critical habits. ey can do this bycreating training objectives in exercises to grade people on how they communicate with otherstakeholders. In so doing, U.S. alliance handlers can learn greater discipline in keeping all
relevant stakeholders informed on the U.S. side.

2. Specify Communication and Coordination Channels
Encouraging greater communication among U.S. stakeholders is not the only means by whichto address the challenges outlined above stemming from asymmetry in military-military
relations. Problems stemming from the multiplicity of operational actors in the United States
are a function of unclear processes and the rapid in ux of communication and informationfrom multiple sources.
In the short term, a course on the directives, regulations, communication channels,
authorities, and responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship may be useful. isis because the relationship is so complicated, as demonstrated in this report. More damaging
is the fact that staﬀ turnover in the United States, especially among military oﬃcers, means
there is very little institutional knowledge in the alliance.
In the long term, understanding that the multiplicity of actors is a problem that will
not disappear due to the structure of the U.S. military, the United States should consider
dividing responsibilities more eﬃciently between US-NSC, OSD, Joint Staﬀ, PACOM, andUSFJ as a means for everyone to work on the issues important to their own organizations. For
example, in the wide array of alliance issues, there are some issues more appropriate for
PACOM and its components rather than USFJ and the in-Japan service components and viceversa. For issues relevant only inside Japan, USFJ should handle communication andcoordination. For issues in the PACOM AOR, like a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
operation, it is appropriate for PACOM and its components to take the lead. If an issue arisesthat goes beyond the PACOM AOR, then the Joint Staﬀ should step in.
It is a vast simpli cation of the division of labor, no doubt, but the point is to simplify
the avenues of communication. Doing so has the potential to help PACOM alliance handlers
the most, as they are becoming overwhelmed by the increasing number of issues and requests
coming from Japan. e challenge, however, is that it requires discipline on the Japanese part
184

Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

71

to not go to PACOM rst, components second, and USFJ last. It also requires discipline by
the United States to push their Japanese counterparts back into the proper channel ofcommunication, should they deviate. is option does not change any communication or
coordination structures, per se. It simply directs communication and coordination into
speci ed channels that may or may not be diﬀerent from existing channels. Assuming that
U.S. alliance handlers across all levels direct communications to the proper channels, over time
it is expected that the Japanese could be socialized into these new channels. Two other options,dismissed as unworkable, are presented in Appendix 2.

Japan Relevant
1. Encourage Greater Understanding of Intra-agency Processes inthe Departments of State and Defense
Japanese policymakers need to better understand the limitations on the U.S. side. While U.S.
policymakers are well aware of the importance the United States plays in Japanese strategic
thinking, the United States is a global power with a global strategy. Japan is not always thepriority in Washington, or even Hawaii, but it does not mean that Japan is valued any less.
ere is a small community of individuals, primarily in the Japan Desks in DOS and OSD,
who have a Japan-speci c portfolio responsible for all aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship.
is is diﬀerent than in Japan, where the entire national security system is focused on the
United States—either directly or indirectly—with legions of people in functionally focused
divisions and bureaus that are working on very speci c aspects of the alliance relationship. e
United States cannot match this. Nor will it ever, as the United States is a global force with
global interests. As such, it is unrealistic to argue for structural change in the DOS and DOD
to provide greater attention to Japan.
Still, challenges identi ed in this report stem from this asymmetry among
policymaking organizations. While the research found that some believe the Japan Desks’tendency to control any and all communication from Japan unnecessarily slowed down
decision-making, a small group of Japanese felt that these same Japan Desks occasionally act
as gatekeepers to MOFA/MOD oﬃcials who are interested in communicating with oﬃces
outside of the Japan Desks on non-alliance issues. ese charges against the Japan Desks,
while no doubt rmly believed by those interviewed, are nevertheless diﬃcult to substantiate.
It also goes without saying that neither Japan Desk has the ability to control who Japaneseoﬃcials are talking to at DOS or DOD.185
In an eﬀort to address this misunderstanding of the role played by the Japan Desks,
this report encourages a greater understanding of intra-agency processes in both the DOS and

185

Anonymous B, Interview with author, January 11, 2017.

72

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

DOD. ere was agreement among Japanese oﬃcials that the Japan Desks try to get involvedin communications, no matter what the issue. For example, in response to the MOD
discussing capacity building assistance in Southeast Asia with PACOM, OSD’s Japan Desk
wanted to be involved and proposed creating a new format to integrate it under the ACM.186
Yet, what gets misinterpreted as a desire for control is their desire to “keep track of many
goings-on on various alliance fronts.”187 Broadly speaking, their purpose is to know the entire
universe of Japan-related engagement. If they are doing their jobs correctly, they will “playdiligently their role of focal point.”188 If others are doing their jobs correctly, they will keep
the Japan Desks involved on Japan-related issues. is may be misperceived as controlling, oreven gatekeeping, but it is to ensure the alliance-relevant oﬃces know about any developments
so as to understand “the many lines of bilateral eﬀorts that are happening in our alliance.”189
In eﬀorts outside of typical alliance-related issues, keeping the Japan Desks involved helps“make the process smooth” by “accelerating…bureaucratic slow consideration[s].”190 Also, if
something related to Japan needs to go up to higher-level decision-makers, it needs to go
through the desks, thereby warranting the necessity to keep them in the loop.191 Tokyo can
assist them in their responsibilities. A synchronization and prioritization of eﬀort on theJapanese side would help these Japan Desks respond to a coherent set of information feeds
and requests.

2. Encourage Jointness in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, by Law if
Necessary
Understanding that jointness is a command and control issue for the SDF and an issue thatchallenges communication and coordination between the allies on combined operations, it iscritical for Japan to take steps to address it.
One relatively easy avenue is to follow up on elements in the 2015 security legislationand U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Given that new overseas missions are elements includedin these documents, Tokyo should pursue new overseas missions as a forcing function todispatch teams that include all three SDF services. Such new missions envisioned in the
security legislation lean toward the necessity of joint teams.
Another idea, with slightly more diﬃculty, would be to entrust defense planning andprograming to the JSO. While the JSO’s ten years of experience in joint training has provento push the three services closer together, there is still work to be done. If the JSO is given theability to provide input in the defense buildup, it would ensure a joint approach to the SDF
186

Anonymous II, E-mail message to author, December 22, 2016.
Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, January 5, 2017.
188
Anonymous OO, E-mail message to author, December 19, 2016.
189
Anonymous BB, E-mail message to author, January 5, 2017.
190
Anonymous GG, E-mail message to author, December 26, 2016.
191
Anonymous XX, Interview with author, January 13, 2017.
187

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

73

from the planning and programming stage. is is expected to be diﬃcult simply because each
SDF service has maintained its own control over defense buildup plans and, heretofore,
successfully minimized the JSO’s role. Each service ghts to retain its own power in these
critical decisions. Yet, moving forward, the SDF cannot meet today’s regional challenges
through service-by-service planning. e sooner they realize this and entrust planning andprogramming to the JSO, the sooner the SDF can take more important steps to greater
jointness.
If resistance continues over the long-term, then Japan should consider a GoldwaterNichols Act Japanese Version to force each service to give up some of its authority to the
COS-JSO. is would be diﬃcult. Each service would ght it and try to retain their current
authorities and power.192 Moreover, MOD policymakers are likely to resist given that, in mostpeople’s thinking, the legislation that created the JSO in 2006 is seen as something akin to
Japan’s Goldwater-Nichols Act.193 Most importantly, there are no big lessons of failure to
motivate such a change.194 But given that the SDF has been talking about jointness for years,
and the fact that its eﬀorts have been proceeding slowly, if Japan is interested in having its
SDF work cohesively as one likeminded force to ensure smooth combined operations with theUnited States, then a Goldwater-Nichols Act may be the best answer.

192

Anonymous SS, Interview with author, November 21, 2016.
Anonymous S, Interview with author, November 17, 2016.
194
Time is spent essentially on drawing up lessons learned, reviewing them, developing ideas, writing up a new law,and then getting the political capital to pass it over the expected resistance of each SDF service.
193

Conclusions
e passage of the Security Legislation and the issuance of the Defense Guidelines opened up
new opportunities for cooperation that were not options in the past. is is because thesechanges brought with them relaxation and/or changes in laws that encourage the allies towardeven greater frank and direct conversations on policy, plans, and operations.195 is results inbetter communications and coordination as the range of possibilities are much more open. At
the same time, the U.S. side has come to expect that Japan will be much more forward leaning
on security issues than it has been in the past.
ese changes have resulted in the U.S.-Japan alliance becoming the strongest it has
ever been. is is important because central to successful U.S. engagement in the Asia-Paci cregion will be Japan, as both a force multiplier and platform for U.S. power projection. With
the alliance being in peak condition, it was a prime opportunity to take stock of how well it
operates. is report sought to examine the structural linkages in the U.S.-Japan alliance,
aiming to answer the central question: Are the existing structures of communication andcoordination optimized for managing alliance relations? e research found that while there
are positive aspects of the existing structures of communication and coordination, they are not
optimized for managing alliance relations.
Since Shinzo Abe returned to the premiership in 2012, the allies have pursued an
active agenda that has resulted in greater roles and missions for Japan and a better-functioning
alliance. e alliance is no longer a one-sided relationship as it was in the past. Today, it ismuch more a relationship of con dent equals. While none of the challenges found in thisresearch revealed fundamental weaknesses in alliance management, they showed that despite
alliance ties being the strongest they have ever been, there are still areas for improvement. isis not meant in any way to detract from the good work alliance handlers have performed inrecent years to bring security ties to their present state. Identifying a small number ofchallenges reinforces the fact that the alliance management structure is not suﬀering from any
fundamental issues. In the spirit of movement toward an ever stronger and better-functioning
alliance, it is hoped that this report can play a constructive role.

195

Anonymous E, Interview with author, June 29, 2016; Anonymous J, Interview with author, June 30, 2016.

Appendix A: Research
Methodology
e scope of this research is limited to the means by which policymakers and operational
actors communicate with one another regarding national security issues in the U.S.-Japan
alliance. It does not include a focus on military command and control structures, although
aspects of command and control appear in this report. It also does not include the broader setof issues with which the alliance engages, such as energy, space, science and technology, andeconomics. is was deliberate to narrow the research to a nite set of actors and issues.
Instead, this project focuses solely on civilian government agencies responsible for national
security issues, including the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Ministry of Defense, and National
Security Council in Japan and the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National
Security Council in the United States. Additionally, the project focuses on the militarycommands and staﬀ that serve to implement these policies. is includes the diﬀerent service
branches of both the U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces located at diﬀerent
headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Hawaii; and Japan.
is research does not include the Coast Guards of either country or theirintelligence communities. is too is deliberate. While Coast Guards play an important rolein each country’s security, they were excluded given their domestic focus and little interaction
with the other country. is is not to imply the Coast Guards of both countries do not interact.
ey do, such as through the North Paci c Coast Guard Agencies Forum, but theirinteraction is not as structured or deep as the military connections in the alliance. Likewise,
while the author acknowledges the importance that intelligence communities play and thecomplex networks of communication between these communities, uncovering what theseagencies substantively do with one another and who they talk to on a daily basis proved
diﬃcult from a research perspective. Unlike the extensive interviews conducted with actors
from the foreign policy and security establishments, the intelligence communities in bothcountries were reluctant to meet with the author. As such, the author abandoned this variable
as an element of the study.
e focus of the study is on the structure of the alliance and the eﬃciency with whichalliance handlers communicate. As shown above, scholars have tackled various aspects of thisstructure over the years, but none have brought both sides together to show how alliancemanagers function on a daily basis and how they could work together in a contingency.
Organizational charts of individual agencies or commands are helpful to provide anunderstanding how that speci c organization is structured, but these charts do not explain

76

JEFFREY W. HORNUNG

divisions of responsibilities within organizations and relationships among organizations
between countries or provide any insight into counterparts and the content ofcommunications. In other words, a simple organizational chart analysis does not provide anunderstanding of how the alliance works.
is is not to say organizational charts are meaningless. Quite the contrary, theauthor began this research with an examination of organizational charts of the various civilian
departments/ministries and military commands to obtain an understanding of the universe of
possible actors. ese primary sources were limited in their information, however, as they
could not provide any insight into understanding oﬃce responsibilities, linkages withcounterparts, and frustrations in bilateral communication. Given this challenge, the author
decided to speak to individuals in these organizational units as primary sources to better
understand bilateral interactions and, in turn, provide careful descriptions of the interaction.
e author conducted interviews due to the nature of the research question.
Although the analysis focuses on structural linkages, structural linkages alone only tellconnections between oﬃces.
e author did not know enough a priori about all theorganizations managing the alliance to judge eﬀectiveness or identify potential challenges inbilateral relations. erefore, it was necessary to go beyond descriptions and explanations of
the complex realities of these linkages and include descriptions of speci c behaviors andindividual experiences and opinions on possible structural impediments blocking eﬀective
communication. is is eﬀective in identifying intangible factors not shown in organizational
charts, such as cultural norms and language factors. As such, the research problem demanded
a thorough examination of the perspectives of those operating within the relevant alliancestructures. Toward this end, the author relied solely on in-depth interviews with primarysources to collect data on individuals’ perspectives and experiences.
In total, the author conducted fty-two interviews with relevant civilian oﬃcials andmilitary oﬃcers in Washington, D.C.; Hawaii; and Japan. Of this fty-two, twenty-threewere American and twenty-nine were Japanese. Because this group includes predominately
current senior oﬃcials and active military oﬃcers on both sides of the alliance, including seniorcommanders, the author conducted all of these interviews with the promise of not identifying
the source. Even among the eight retired oﬃcials interviewed, ve of them had retired within
the past year and thus, still desired for the interview to be conducted oﬀ-record. As such, whileinterviewees are heavily quoted throughout the report, they were alphabetically coded andreferred to as Anonymous A, for example.
is is to protect the identity of all thoseinterviewed, particularly because of the nature of some of the responses. All of the interviews
were conducted by the author.
Because the research depends heavily on primary source interviews, the author
recognizes concerns over problems of inference and proof in participation observation.
Although not “participating” in the daily life of the people interviewed, these interviews
gathered data from members of a group of individuals under study. is is because the purpose

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

77

of the interviews was to talk directly to participants to better understand their daily activities
with their counterparts and how they behave across a range of situations in order to discover
their interpretations of how the alliance is managed. In the process of conducting interviews,
such observational research produced a tremendous amount of rich, detailed descriptions. echallenge the author faced was how to discern credible responses.
In preparing for research, the author created a list of questions that was used as a core
set of questions asked of every interviewee. Some information gathered was repeated by a large
number of discrete interviewees. Because such information was con rmed by many diﬀerent
sources, it was deemed credible and treated as typical and widespread behavior. When
information was gathered that was unique, the author would include it in questions withsubsequent interviewees as a means to con rm or falsify it. If the author was able to triangulate
support for such information from at least two other discrete sources (usually one American,
one Japanese), then the author tended to treat the information as credible and representativeof typical and widespread behavior. If the author could not triangulate support for a comment,
it was not dismissed as valueless, but if used in the report, it was identi ed as simply an
individual’s or a small group’s comment rather than typical or widespread.

Appendix B: Unworkable
Options to Deal with
Multiplicity of U.S.
Operational Actors
Components Delegate a Lead Directorate
Understanding that an increasing number of SDF staﬀs are communicating and coordinatingwith PACOM and its components, and this is something out of U.S. power to control, one
idea is for PACOM to have each of its components delegate a key lead to interact with their
Japanese counterparts to minimize the number of dyads interfacing across the spectrum. is
would reduce what one senior U.S. oﬃcer called the “spray” of requests coming from thevarious staﬀ oﬃces and headquarters. 196 Operationally, it would mean that mostcommunication and coordination, including formal requests, would be narrowed down tofour, with the 5 Directorate in each component command being the most likely recipient of
this responsibility. e problem with this idea is its impracticability. It is simply impossible tohave one oﬃce within each command handle all the communication and coordination withJapan. After all, would the GSDF G3 want to talk to the G5 at USARPAC or the J5 at
PACOM? It would actually cause more confusion and complicate communications andcoordination because people with diﬀerent knowledge backgrounds would be forced tocommunicate with one another. One oﬃcial, critical of this option, said “this would be thefunnel of information death.”197

Delegate One Lead Component Command
Another option is to designate a lead coordinating authority from one of PACOM’s
components to funnel formal communication and coordination between the allies, similar to
MARFORPAC’s role in the Philippines, for example. One lead coordinating authority

196
197

Anonymous D, Interview with author, June 29, 2016.
Anonymous VV, Interview with author, November 23, 2016.

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

79

provides integrated, centralized communication with Japan, thereby simplifying
communication. Given that the dominating geographical feature of the region is the Paci c
Ocean—hence a maritime theater—PACFLT would likely be the lead coordinating
authority. is option, as the most drastic of the three options, understandably is the mostproblematic.


It would minimize USFJ’s role in Japan as the main interlocutor with JSO because the
USFJ Commander would undoubtedly say he is the lead coordinating authority.

It would require discipline by each PACOM component to change their approach toJapan by funneling communication and coordination directly through PACFLT.



It would give PACFLT a new dimension of responsibilities that would overburden its
staﬀ already tasked with PACFLT-speci c duties.

e example of MARFORPAC and the Philippines works precisely because themain role of the United States is largely security assistance. In Japan, a country with roughly
50,000 forces, all four services represented, and three three-star ag oﬃcers, this option is notworkable due to the sheer volume of interaction between U.S. forces and Japan’s SDF.

Appendix C: Unworkable
Changes to USFJ
Operationalization
Many respondents liked the idea of operationalizing USFJ. Indeed, of all the possible options
I dismiss here, operationalizing USFJ is the hardest to disregard. Holding certain authorities
in Hawaii worked when Japan was a sanctuary location from which the United States could
operate with impunity. Today, if Japan is attacked, it makes operational sense for USFJ tohave the authority to direct action on the ground until PACOM can designate an operational
unit to respond. e problem, however, stems from what this change in authorities requires.
Because operationalization requires organizing, training, and equipping another three-starcommand, the changes promise to be expensive, and in today’s scal realities, there are noresources for this. Similarly, it would demand a signi cant increase in manpower, but it isunclear from where these forces could be drawn. Another issue to consider is what the mission
would be for an operationalized USFJ command. Most of the contingencies that planners
envision are for combat outside of Japan, such as the Korean Peninsula or the South China
Sea. In this case, however, it is not necessary to operationalize USFJ when the 7th Fleet andIII MEF are already authorized as JTF-capable commands.

Downgrade to Two-Star Command
A second option would be to keep USFJ in its current form and function as PACOM’srepresentative doing administrative work with GOJ but to downgrade it to a two-starcommand.
e logic is that a three-star command is not necessary for work that can beaccomplished by a two-star. One problem with this is that of symbolism. If PACOM’s top
representative in Japan is a two-star while Navy and Marines maintain three-stars, it sends astrong message to Japan’s JSO—which USFJ mainly communicates with—that it is not highly
valued, particularly if the Commander for USFK/Combined Forces Command/UN
Command remains headed by a four-star. Also, a two-star would not be able to deal at theright level with the SDF. If the downgrade to a two-star is accompanied by a similar
downgrade in capacity, this leads to a second problem. If the capacity of USFJ staﬀ is reduced,
it does not mean that the responsibilities disappear. Quite the contrary, the question thenbecomes who picks up those responsibilities. Both the Navy and Marine three-star commands

MANAGING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

81

focus on missions beyond the defense of Japan, so it is diﬃcult to expect these commands totake over these administrative duties. If not them, then who?

Shrink USFJ and Move to Ichigaya:
e third option is to drastically shrink USFJ from its current form to a small, permanently
detached group assigned with administrative duties and move this onto the grounds of MOD
to ensure quick access between USFJ-MOD oﬃcials. In so doing, the dual-hatted nature of
the USFJ Commander could be eliminated and the 5th AF commander could exist separately
as a three-star. e problem with this option is an accentuation of the problems in option 2;
namely, if the current capacity of USFJ staﬀ is reduced, who picks up those responsibilities?
With USFJ staﬀ at approximately 180 people, if this gets drastically reduced, the bandwidth
to engage Japan and assist any U.S. war ghting commander operating out of Japan becomessigni cantly reduced. e four in-Japan service components cannot operate without having
someone in charge. USFJ’s “administrative requirements are much bigger than most realize”
and will need to be taken care.198 As such, this option is not suggested.

198

Ibid.

About the Author
Dr. Jeﬀrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes inJapanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense
policies in the Asia-Pacific region, including its alliances. Hornung joined RAND in April
2017. He was the Fellow f or the Security and Foreign Af f airs Program at Sasakawa USA
from 2015 until 2017.
From 20102015, Hornung worked as an Associate Professor for the Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Paci c Center for Security Studies, a Department of Defense executive education
facility in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to that, Hornung served as a Postdoctoral Researcher at
the Ohio State University’s East Asian Studies Center, a research assistant at George
Washington University’s “Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Paci c” project, and also
worked for a member of the Japanese Diet during the 2001 House of Councillors election.
Hornung has written about Japanese security and foreign policy issues for numerous
media, policy, and academic outlets. He is also co-editor of the forthcoming Routledge book
Chinese-Japanese Competition and the East Asian Security Complex: Vying for In uence (Spring2017).
Hornung received his Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington
University. He also holds an MA in international relations with a concentration in Japan
Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
and a BA in political science and international aﬀairs from Marquette University. During
20052006, Hornung was also a visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo where heconducted his doctoral research as a Fulbright Fellow.