Solving the social problems caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe:
20 years is not enough
Volodymyr Tykhyy∗

Introduction
Nearly twenty years that passed after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster call for deep investigation of its
consequences for people who were affected - usually referred to as "Chernobyl sufferers". Approximate
numbers (it is believed that exact numbers will never be known) reveal a real humane catastrophe:• more than 600,000 participated in the re-construction of the nuclear power plant itself and clean-up of
the area ("liquidators" of the aftermath of the accident; more than 300,000 of them live in Ukraine see details below);• more than 350,000 were resettled, of them about 120,000 evacuated during the first period, including
49,360 inhabitants of the city of Pripyat on 27 April 1986;• several millions live on contaminated lands since 1986.
Fortunately, it is not a scale of a major war, but it is a scale of a regional military conflict involving
several countries...
Economic sufficiency, optimal health, reasonable housing, access to education and recreation, andhappy relationships are some of the fundamental needs that constitute the essence of a social wellbeing. The importance of it is recognised by governments and policy makers. Governments andpolicy makers are those who influence social conditions of living to the greatest extent, especially instrongly regulated systems like the system of "developed socialism" that existed in the Soviet Union
and which dominated a great deal the life in Ukraine in the first half of 90th. What impact has the
Chernobyl catastrophe had on the social well being of affected population?
Due to limitations on the scope of this paper, we will not discuss health-related and children-related
issues, because these are separate big and most complicated topics.
Chernobyl had various repercussion not only for three most seriously affected nations (Ukraine,
Belarus, Russia), but all over the world. In 2002, a UN report "The Human Consequences of theChernobyl Nuclear Accident. A Strategy for Recovery" 1 was released. However, due to the goal of thatassessment the report is too general and in some aspects controversial (see, for instance, comments by
Nesterenko, Yablokov, Grodzinsky2). The most comprehensive account of events in Ukraine that followed
Chernobyl disaster could be found in the book published by the National Academy of Science of Ukraine
in 1995-1996 "Chernobyl Catastrophe", edited by Academician V.G.Baryakhtar 3 . The positive andnegative feature of this book is that almost all papers on social protection measures were written by those
who implemented them: thus, the papers comprise good factual data, but they reflect positions ofrespective government agencies that provided assistance and not the opinions of recipients. Since different
authors wrote different sections in the book, references are given accordingly. The Institute of Sociologyof the Academy of Science of Ukraine has published detailed reports of scientific investigation of social,economic and psychological consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe4.
* Volodymyr Tykhyy has Ph.D. in applied nuclear physics. He works in Kyiv, Ukraine as an independent
researcher and consultant in the field of environmental management. Participant of the liquidation of theconsequences of Chernobyl accident, category 2A. E-mail: voltykhyy@gmail.com.

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In this paper we will briefly outline only problems of those who live in Ukraine - liquidators,
resettled, those who still live in contaminated areas. The issue of several thousands workers of theChernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP) - veterans from before 1986 and newcomers - needs a separate
research, as it was developing first in the unique "closed" system of the Soviet nuclear industry, and later
under the influence of a fierce struggle between international community trying to close Chernobyl NPP
and the Ukrainian government trying to smooth over numerous negative consequences of closing the NPP.
Closely linked to their problems is the history of the city of Slavutych (population 26,000, built in 1987-89
chiefly to house personnel of Chernobyl NPP): all pains and tensions caused by changing social protection
policy and by the process of closing Chernobyl left their traces here.
For each affected community, each family and individual the disaster had various social, economic,
health and psychological impacts. From the first days after the catastrophe the state (first the Communist
Party and the Government of the Soviet Union, later Governments of independent states) played a majorrole in attempts to protect the affected population and to provide compensations for incurred adverse
impacts. An outline of these attempts (adopted legislative acts, economic decisions, social policies, directinternational assistance etc.) will be discussed in this paper, as well as results of implementation of theplanned measures. International assistance to the city of Slavutich, which was quite significant and which
went hand in hand with the political pressure on the Ukrainian government - to close down Chernobyl
NPP - will not be discussed in this paper.
Evolution of the social and political system of Ukraine between 1986 and 2004: brief
outline
The present-day Ukraine (a 48-million nation in Eastern Europe) at the time of Chernobyl catastrophe wasa republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR. The Communist Party ruled the country
in the so-called "command and control" manner. In 1985, attempting to solve numerous internal andexternal problems, a new dynamic leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched "perestroika" reconstruction of the whole system. This eventually led to a collapse of the USSR and resulted in many
hardships and successes for the people of the country.
The social and political system of the USSR at the time of Chernobyl catastrophe - known as"developed socialism" - was fully centralised with almost all important decisions taken in Moscow, withpractically 100 % state ownership of natural resources, bank system, industrial enterprises, infrastructure,
health care and educational systems, etc. Civil society virtually did not exist: municipalities, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), even church were all under the strict control of the state.
This situation has gradually changed over two last decades: multi-party political system developedwith decisions taken by the Parliament, the nationally elected President and the Cabinet of Ministers
appointed by them; independent from the state business sector has been created and flourishes; third sector
emerged with hundreds of de-jure and de-facto independent NGOs, protecting civil rights and interests of
their members; administrative reforms provide more and more power and financial resources tocommunities.
Several events have had deep influence on Ukrainian society in the last quarter of the XXth century.
We can list them starting with Chernobyl catastrophe (1986), which dislocated hundred of thousands ofpeople, created the state of anxiety in millions, and placed such a burden on the national economy andfinance that it obviously hastened the collapse of the USSR.
Disintegration of the Soviet Union that followed the unsuccessful attempt of coup-d'etat in 1991 led
not only to the feeling of instability, but also to huge economic problems with eventual impoverishment ofsome 90 % of Ukrainian population during 1992 - 1994. In some periods monthly inflation was higher
than 100 %, and all savings completely disappeared with the collapse of the State Savings Bank of the
USSR. All this created the feeling of insecurity and pessimism.

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Still this was not the end of hardships, because in mid-90s privatisation of the state property waslaunched, with members of political and economic "elites" becoming incredibly rich, while the majority of"ordinary" people becoming poor. During 90s a new political and economic system emerged. After the
stepping down of the President Leonid Kuchma in January 2005, who was elected in 1994, this system
was nicknamed "kuchmizm". The system was characterised by 50-60 % share of "black" and "grey"
economy, mass export of capital and total corruption in all spheres of social and economic life.
Transparency International index of Ukraine, which was 69th of 85 countries when Ukraine first appearedon the list in 1998, became 87th of 90 countries in 2000 (for comparison, Russia was 76th in 1998 and82nd in 2000)5.
During that period, sophisticated "schemes" of avoiding taxation were invented, and this led toserious budget problems. Many opportunities for avoiding taxation were created by the government itself most common were special "preferences" which allowed some companies and territories not to pay certain
taxes, custom duties and other "mandatory" payments to the budget (the reader may guess how thesecompanies and territories were selected). To give the feeling of incurred budget losses, we can mention
that when a new (appointed after the "orange revolution" of 2004) government cancelled these preferences,
the resulting planned additional income was 8.7 billion hryvna (US$1.64 billion) - more than 10 % of thebudget. Various preferences were created by the Chernobyl legislation as well, but most of them wereannulled several years ago. Of course, all this did not help in solving numerous problems of Chernobyl
sufferers. Only in the very end of 1990s the state finances became stable, as well as the funding for
Chernobyl programs.
Additional circumstance which seriously aggravated the situation in all rural areas - and more so in
those affected by Chernobyl contamination - were slow and inconsistent reforms in agrarian sector. These
reforms included reorganisation of soviet collective farms and state farms into "collective agricultural
enterprises" and joint-stock companies. Old system disintegrated, and the new one served only interests of
new owners - usually former "red directors". Limited opportunities opened for establishing independent
farms, but without governmental supports such attempts were often unsuccessful. The unresolved issues ofland ownership and agricultural land use were hindering transformations in agrarian sector, and thesituation changed only in 1999 when the special decree of the President was issued. With it, and with thefollowing decree of 2000, a market system in agrarian sector started to function and the population of therural areas obtained framework for implementation of economic initiatives that possibly can lead peasantsto prosperity.
Legislation, number of sufferers and budget expenditures
Chernobyl-related legislation and government policy for social assistance to affected
peopleDespite the fact that the USSR was a country with extensive military and civil nuclear programs, a country
with several tens of nuclear power reactors in operation, there was no law on the use of nuclear energy. In
cases of nuclear accidents that happened before Chernobyl, problems were settled behind the closed doors
of responsible ministries - of course, without any public consultations. Social issues were settled in thesame manner, and usually sufferers of the accidents were ordered to sign a special commitment of nondisclosing the matter: this was a condition sine qua non for obtaining assistance and social benefits.
When the Chernobyl catastrophe occurred, there was no existing legal base and no existing policy ofhandling the problem. All decisions were taken ad-hoc at the highest level of the government. Because
there were very limited possibilities of evaluation of real and expected doses for each affected community(due to enormous scale of affected territory and population, the insufficient background and current
information, lack of knowledge among those who were taking decisions and those who implemented them,- 213 -

absence of capacities for processing huge amount of radiological data), during the first period of 19861989 the decisions were based on the levels of contamination of soil by radioactive substances.
First government decisions after the Chernobyl catastrophe dealing with social problems (evacuationof the 30-km zone, compensations for loss of property, mobilisation of resources and manpower for
resettling people etc.) were taken by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party andthe Council of Ministers of the USSR. Only in April, 1990, the legislative body of the country - theSupreme Council of the USSR adopted a Resolution "On a comprehensive programme to liquidate theconsequences of the accident on Chernobyl NPP..."
The law of the USSR, which specified relations between the state and the affected population "On
Social Protection of Citizens who suffered from the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe", wasadopted in May 1991 - five years after the accident. Earlier that year, in February 1991 two basic
Ukrainian laws were adopted by Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of the Ukrainian SSR: "On the legal statusof contaminated territory..." and "On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered due to theChernobyl catastrophe".
It should be kept in mind, that Soviet and most of Ukrainian laws are indirect, which means that they
define general policy, but later specific regulatory acts are needed to start their implementation. For
serious problems such acts are adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers, and this was the case with Chernobyl:
the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR № 106 of 23.07.1991, in accordance with thetwo Laws mentioned in the previous paragraph, specified the list of 86 communities of "mandatory"
resettlement and 800 communities in the zones of "guaranteed voluntary resettlement" (it meant that thepeople willing to move out of this zone were allowed to do so and the government would pay
compensation for their property left behind).
But we must remember that on 8 December 1991 leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed anagreement to dissolve the Soviet Union. Resources from the "Soviet Union" ceased to come to Ukraine forsolving various Chernobyl-related problems. Economic decline that followed forced the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine to reduce the number of "voluntary resettlement" communities to 49 in January 1993.
The country was unable to provide resources for resettlement to the people from 751 communities thatwere excluded from the list. However, a huge programme of construction of housing and infrastructure
continued.
For the purpose of this paper we will make just several observations on the Law "On social
protection..." Naturally it was fully oriented on the soviet system, in which everything was produced bystate-owned and state controlled enterprises, almost all goods were centrally distributed and everything
was in scarce supply (in "deficit"). Because of this, many provisions of the Law were formulated in thisway: "Chernobyl sufferers can receive certain goods and services "in the first place" or "without queue"".
With coming of market economy during 90s these provisions lost their importance.
Essential feature of the law is that it deals both with incurred damage (either loss of health orproperty, loss of jobs etc.) and with risks which have not yet resulted in real damage (risk of livingon contaminated land, risk which poses to liquidators radiation exposure that occurred during theirwork at and around the Chernobyl NPP). And it is very difficult to determine the real levels of theserisks, although the National commission on radiation protection and other agencies made many attempts
to resolve the problem.
Many benefits (especially for liquidators) were defined in the form of preferences - e.g. certain
categories of liquidators were exempt from paying custom duties, excise duties, income tax and so on.
This led to many abuses and later most of these privileges were cancelled.
Some provisions provided for sufferers' access to subsidies and cheap loans either for individual
building of house or for opening own business. These privileges were mostly suspended by the year 2000.
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A very large part of the Law deals with health care (which we will not touch here) and recreation.
There are several articles, which preview direct payments to sufferers - e.g., addition to pension "for lossof health".
But on the whole the system of social protection was built in such a way that almost all budgetary
resources were left in hands of responsible government agencies and then these agencies "served" theneeds of sufferers. This was a typical soviet system that provided all opportunities of abuses, because theone who needed assistance had to ask for it. And it was a decision of authorised official to satisfy therequest or to refuse - and with a total deficit of everything (as could be seen from the following sections)in no way was it possible to satisfy all requests.
Legislation evolved significantly over the past 20 years. As it is mentioned on the web-site of the
Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies, more than 800 documents regulate now Chernobyl related issues.
Basic law - "On social protection..." - was modified 26 times: the first correction made 19.12.91 and thelast 03.03.05. The law "On the status of territory..." was modified 8 times. It is clear that new law isneeded, but due to the huge scale of territory and very large number of people affected it is hard to expect
quick changes.
Number of sufferers
It is very difficult to describe the diverse and big pool of Chernobyl sufferers in a short paper.
Apparently the first are those who are considered sufferers according to the Law. As of 1 January
2002 in a special Data Bank there were data on 2,422,212 persons of a total 3,096,814 people registeredby the State Committee of Statistics as Chernobyl sufferers 6 . This comprises roughly 6 % of the
population of Ukraine. There are two major categories: 335,785 liquidators (people who worked on
liquidation in 1986-1990) and 1,709,146 sufferers (people who live or have lived in contaminated areas).
These people are scattered all over Ukraine (see map on Figure 1, bars for oblasts with highest numbers,
data from6).

Figure 1. Number of liquidators of categories 1-3 (1), sufferers of categories 1-3 (2) andsufferers of category 4 (3) in some oblasts of Ukraine (bars are shown only for oblasts withhighest numbers).
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All liquidators and sufferers are divided into 4 categories, and receive benefits according to the category
they have. A liquidator, for example, can have:• category 1 if he/she is disabled (invalid) and his disability has causal relation with Chernobyl (thisrelation is established by an authorised panel of doctors);• category 2 if he/she worked in the 30-km zone either any number of days before 1 July 1986, or morethan 5 days between 1 July 1986 - 31 December 1986, or more than 14 days in 1987;• category 3 if the number of days is big enough (it's specified in the law) but not sufficient for
obtaining category 2.
Sufferers can have categories 1-3 if they live or have lived on the territory of mandatory or
guaranteed voluntary resettlement (here again, category 1 is for disabled) or category 4 if they live in zoneof "strict radiological control".
Children (evacuated, children who had lived in contaminated areas, or those with at least one parentliquidator) constitute a separate very large group of 1,048,628.
Among liquidators and sufferers there are hundreds of thousands of those who already incurred
damage either to health (number of invalids whose diseases have a proven causal connection withChernobyl catastrophe reached 96,000 by 2002), or loss of property, or loss of family. There are 13,027
families who receive welfare payments due to the loss of provider.
There were doubts as to whether all those who were registered as liquidators indeed earned this status.
From January 1997, 388,755 personal files have been reviewed, and 22,708 persons (6 %) were denied thestatus6.
Of course there are many people who have been experiencing hardships after the catastrophe, but are
not listed in the registries. Of them we can mention members of the families of liquidators, or thosecitizens of Kyiv and other cities and towns who were waiting in queue (sometimes for decade and more)
on a municipal or built by their enterprises flats and houses - and suddenly these flats and houses were
given to families evacuated from Chernobyl zone. For thousands of families this meant additional years oflife in over cramped conditions. Indirectly, the sufferers are all people of Ukraine who have been paying
for liquidation with their tax money.
Dynamics of required and provided financial means
During the first period (1986-1989) the funding for liquidation of the consequences of Chernobyl
catastrophe was provided by the budget of the Soviet Union, and only small portion of it was taken fromthe budget of Ukrainian SSR 7:
Table 1. Expenditures directed on mitigation of the consequences of Chernobyl catastrophe, million
roublesYear

1986

From the budget of
Ukrainian SSR
Total
1585.5

1987

1988

1989,
January-August

70.8

76.4

95.4

1646.4

735.1

551.2

At that period the official exchange rate was roughly 1 rouble = 1USD. In 1986-1989, main
component of social investments was construction of houses and social infrastructure (for evacuated andresettled). There was also significant funding for decontamination of soil and settlements. The volume of
construction works done by only one leading Ukrainian contractor - Ukragrobud company - and its
subcontractors is given in the following table. (Ukragrobud was a "head contractor", that means that it
subcontracted other design and construction organisations as needed):- 216 -

Table 2. Funding provided to Ukragrobud company for construction of housing and infrastructure
for liquidation of the consequences of Chernobyl disaster in 1986-19898.
Date of decision of Council of
Ministers of Ukraine allocating 10.06.86
funding
Allocated funding, million
377.0
roubles

14.10.86

12.12.86

08.04.87

08.12.88

TOTAL

31.4

231.9

87.0

14.0

746.7

These figures do not include other construction companies, and they do not include the city of Slavutich,because the leading contractor for Slavutich was "Slavutychenergobud" company of the Ministry ofEnergy of the USRR. The cost of building of Slavutich is estimated at 490,000,000 roubles9.
After 1988, there was a general expectation that the problem of resettlement has been resolved, but it
became obvious that many more thousand people have to be resettled in the safer environment.
There exist more information on the Chernobyl budget expenditures after the dissolution of the
USSR1.
Table 3. Chernobyl budget expenditure of Ukraine, millions of US dollars
1992
197.3
6.3
2.0
-

Social protection
Special medical care
Radiation control
Environmental recovery
Radiologicalrehabilitation
and0.3
radioactive material disposal
Resettling, housing and living
276.1
conditions improvement
Other expenditures
TOTAL
510.8

1994
478.1
8.8
2.3
0.4

1996
545.6
19.0
4.4
0.2

1998
429.1
8.2
8.7
0.2

2000
290.1
6.4
2.7
0.04

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.05

205.3

194.1

86.5

13.7

755.7

835.2

584.7

332.7

It is important to notice that the real GDP of Ukraine was steadily declining in 1990s (between 1991 and1994 the national income of Ukraine declined by 60 %10), and the share of Chernobyl fund in the budget
was also declining. However, the size of Chernobyl budget was still on the level of several percents of
GDP (4.6 % in 1992, 1.9 % in 1993, 2.2% in 199410). Of course it constituted even higher share in thenational budget.
In the same time, the needs of Chernobyl programs were growing. This is clear from the following
11
table :
Table 4. Funding for social protection of Chernobyl sufferers: needed, planned and provided (inmillion Hryvna)
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Averageexchange rateof Hryvna12$US1 =
1.83
1.86
2.45
4.13
5.44
5.37

Needs according
Planned intoChernobyl
state budget
legislation
2004.1
3291.73474.94408.05771.96731.51150.81799.3
1953.51310.1
1578.41559.6- 217 -

the Planned,
needs
57.4
54.7
56.2
29.7
27.3
23.2

% of

Providedfunds,
needs
49.8
36.0
30.2
27.4
27.3
23.2

%

of

For example, the state budget of Ukraine (expenditures) for the year 2000 was 33,946.5 million Hryvna13,
and Chernobyl needs were 5771.9 million Hryvna, that makes nearly 17 %. Provided funds amounted to
4.6 % of the state budget.
The gap between the needs and provided funds shows that the national economy was unable to carry
the burden of Chernobyl expenditures required by the law. How could it happen? One explanation is thatseveral generations of Parliament members became legislators using in their election campaigns promises
to improve the situation for Chernobyl sufferers. So these Parliament members lobbied interests ofChernobyl fund, and probably not only for the benefit of the sufferers, but also to satisfy requests ofnumerous lobbyist groups who were making good money on Chernobyl related contracts. So far, theParliament has been unable or unwilling to make fundamental amendments to Chernobyl legislation, andthere are indeed serious social reasons for this.
Implementation of social protection measures
Measures aimed at solving economic problems of the sufferers
The area contaminated by Chernobyl radionuclides is agricultural. If we set aside a case of the satellite
city of Chernobyl NPP - Prypiat (which we do not discuss in this paper), most economic activities in thearea were agricultural or centred around agricultural production (processing of crops and other agricultural
products, maintenance of agricultural machinery and infrastructure, transportation of raw materials andproducts etc.)
Papers and reports dealing with economic consequences of Chernobyl catastrophe usually speak
about loss of production: loss of energy generated by Chernobyl NPP, loss of industrial and agricultural
output, loss of agricultural lands. But social dimension of all these means loss of jobs, severe decrease infamily income, loss of perspectives for future. Domination of publications on consequences for economic
output is very characteristic both for the soviet era and for the first decade of post-soviet era, when
economy was considered much more important than people who were just "work force" for national
economy.
In Ukraine, however, even this account of economic losses was not done with necessary diligence. In
Belarus, six national evaluations of economic losses caused by Chernobyl on its territory were prepared
between 1986 and 1992, while in Ukraine this work started only in 19917.
Ability to work and to receive a decent income is a basic social need. After the catastrophe, thisability immediately disappeared for tens of thousands of peasants whose work directly depended on
agriculture: their crops were not needed, meet from their pigs and livestock could not be consumed, milk
and products harvested in forests were contaminated.
It should be mentioned that during the first period after the catastrophe the state made significant
efforts to keep economic life in affected areas running - even if the goal of that work was formulated interms of "production", and not "saving jobs and family income". To a great degree both went hand in hand,
and thus saved the economic potential and the employment.
On the contrary, decontamination measures in settlements proved inefficient14:"As an example, let's take desactivation of settlements in the zone of "strict" control, which wasdone by contingents of civil defence. During 4 years, 1.5 million man-rem (120,000 people wereinvolved) and 1.5 billion roubles were used on desactivation. Efficiency of this desactivation wasvery low. The radiation background was reduced by 10-15 %"A whole series of agromelioration measures was developed and implemented between 1986-1994 on
vast territories: application of lime - 4962 sq.km, application of higher doses of fertilisers - 7301 sq.km,
improving meadows and pastures - 6137 sq.km. The intensity of these measures was 2-3 times higher than

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before the catastrophe. Special measures were developed which allowed production of "clean" crops,
production of "clean" meat and milk on contaminated territories15.
However, the funding provided for these measures were always low (see Table 3 above) - some 1000
times lower than funding directed for resettlement. So, the efforts aimed at keeping the economy runningwere insufficient and production (and hence the number of jobs) dropped significantly. The area of usedarable land in four most contaminated oblasts dropped by 6.5 - 11.3 %. It is impossible to find in
published materials information about creation of new (for this area) sectors of employment. It is hard tosay whether this was possible - from the point of view of available humane potential, traditions andeconomic practicability, and only attempts could have provided an answer.
Only one new sector of employment emerged: control of radioactive contamination. As of September
1995 778 radiological laboratories were in operation only in the system of the Ministry of Agriculture andFood Production of Ukraine16, and there are other ministries and state committees. It is important, ofcourse, but for local people information about radioactive contamination can be useful only if
contaminated food products could be substituted - and usually this is not the case.
Equally serious problems waited evacuated and resettled on the new territories. There is no
information about new industrial facilities, farms, greenhouses and the like in the long lists of what was
built - only houses, schools, hospitals, roads etc. How could people make their living there, if jobs were in
scarce supply in most areas even without Chernobyl resettlers?
In the Law " On the status and social protection..." there were provisions for small loans "to startsmall business or individual farm", but there is no information on how many people were able to use theirchance. Apparently not too many.
It seems that only one business opportunity was intensively used until it was banned in 1995 - duty
and excise free import of some goods (like vodka) on contaminated "Chernobyl" territories. But there is no
information about benefits created by these activities for the territories and local people (and, respectively,
about loss of income of the state budget).
Housing and social infrastructure
Construction of cottages, apartment houses, housing and social infrastructure (water pump stations,schools, kindergartens, hospitals, outpatients health centres, roads, gas supply pipelines etc.) was a major
investment in the post-war period. As already mentioned, in early 90s annual expenditures for constructionof houses and social infrastructures reached several percents of GDP. Total figures of construction
between 1986-2000 are summed up in table1:
Table 5. Housing and social infrastructure construction, 1986-2000
Houses and flats
28,692
Schools (number of places)
48,847
Kindergartens (number of places)
11,155Outpatient health centres (visits/day)
9,564
Hospitals (beds)
4,391
The main effort was undertaken by August 1986, when 90,784 people were evacuated17. During 19901991 13,658 people were resettled from zones of mandatory resettlement. In all, by the end of 1991
105,000 were evacuated and resettled in mandatory order, and 58,700 people moved from the zones of"guaranteed voluntary resettlement" and other contaminated zones.
But the programme of resettlement continued, and by June 1996 additional 7,864 families weremoved from zones of mandatory resettlement, while 5,852 (of them 1,426 families with children) werestill living in these zones. It should be noticed that according to a special survey conducted in summer of
1995, only 56 % of families living in zones of mandatory resettlement were willing to move out17.

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By the end of 2002, 1612 families still lived in the zones of mandatory resettlement, of them 762
families refused to be resettled. During 1990-2002 13,787 families were resettled from the zones of"guaranteed voluntary resettlement"6.
The figures above confirm that the huge work has been accomplished. The question is to what extent
it solved the problem of Chernobyl? And were there other ways of handling these problems? We are not ina position to answer this question, but as it is stated by informed specialists:"Unfortunately, the attempt of resettling Chernobyl sufferers into new villages practically failed at that time they were still hoping that they would be able to return back to their houses in Polissia,
and they did not want to settle on new lands. So, the big and hard work of construction workers
was in fact used not for what it was intended 8".
So, the resources were used, and there were obviously many people who benefited - not only Chernobyl
sufferers. There are several reasons that could be mentioned. First, major part of resources was not given
to sufferers, but was transferred to different government agencies. Officials at all levels were responsible
for planning (without consultations with ultimate beneficiaries - affected population). Officials were in
charge of contracting construction companies and in charge of accepting their work. Officials were
responsible for distribution of houses and flats. In the Internet Russian version of the book3, which could
be found on the web site http://stopatom.slavutich.kiev.ua/1.htm, there is a page missing in the
Ukrainian version (it should be placed somewhere between pp.88 -89), which provides evaluation of theresults of the housing construction programme:"...more than 500 of built houses were not inhabited by fall of 1986... In Chervonoye village of
Yagotyn rayon by 1 June 1988 40 of 65 constructed houses were not inhabited, in Supoyevka
village - 53 of 140. Main reasons for this were low quality of construction, unsatisfactory social
conditions, absence of jobs for new settlers... When 27,800 inhabitants living in houses built forevacuated were inspected, it was found that part of them had no relation to evacuated. They werelocal residents and people from other "clean" areas of Ukraine and Russia who improved theirliving conditions."
Of course, a low quality and unfinished construction means that construction companies were overpaid
and construction materials used for something else. Obviously there were a lot of abuses during
distribution of houses and flats. At present, it seems unlikely that the truth about all this will ever be foundand disclosed.
Compensations to sufferers and personal benefits
Benefits for sufferers have been provided in form of free access to some services (free treatment insanatoria and rest houses, free or partly reimbursable tickets), privileges (tax exempt status, opportunity toimport some goods duty free), access to cheap loans (for purchase of house or flat, or starting small
business), easier access to budget-sponsored higher education in monetary form.
Access to loans and tax and custom duty privileges are already mostly annulled, some due to many
abuses (it is said that some entrepreneurial liquidators managed to import without paying duty more than
100 cars each before this privilege was cancelled). On the list there are still many benefits which werevaluable during the period of socialism, but which in fact lost most of their importance at present, becauseof the changes in the society, which looked during last decade more like a "wild capitalism".
A very big sector of social assistance is free medical service (annual medical examinations, free
medicines and so on) and free health improvement holidays for adults and children. This is arranged
between authorised government agencies and sanatoria/rest houses located all over Ukraine. Officials are
responsible for signing and paying contracts with sanatoria and "control of the quality of provided
services". Vouchers are distributed by various authorised agencies among liquidators, sufferers andchildren.

- 220 -

The numbers of those who used these free vouchers are impressive (data from1 and 18, although they
do not match precisely).
Table 6. Number of Chernobyl sufferers (1,000 persons) who used health improvement
holidaysYear
AdultsChildren
Total

1990
214
182
396

1991
160
282
442

1992
354
320
674

1993
185
505
690

1994
96
300
396

1995
49
401
450

1996
49
453
502

1997
37
467
504

1998
42
482
524

1999
30
427
457

2000
25
348
373

However, due to the insufficient funding only a fraction of those who have rights to use this benefit
according to the law, were able to enjoy it. In 1991, the system served each second sufferer, in 1992 each third, in 1995 - eighth (ibid.) The question remains whether the funding that was provided from thestate budget was used in the most efficient manner. With such deficit of free vouchers all sorts of abuses
could happen, and all people who have experience of living in the system of "developed socialism" knowwhat might be a quality of "free services". Also there were little stimuli for sanatoria and rest houses toimprove the quality and economic efficiency of their services, because in fact they were not competing on
the market - their goal was obtaining a wholesale contract from a government official.
Liquidators of categories 1 and 2 (see section "Number of sufferers" above) have a benefit of free useof public transport in cities and free use of commuter trains. This provision cannot be regarded as really
fair, because for a person living in a big city this privilege could amount to some $100-150 a year, while itis useless for someone living in a village. Serious problems with this benefit appear due to strengtheningof market system: transportation companies want to be reimbursed for their services, but nobody knows
how many rides liquidators make - they do not receive tickets of any sort. Only recently it became
necessary for any possessing such benefit to obtain free ticket on commuter trains so now a railway
company can count what it spends on Chernobyl sufferers.
Many benefits for sufferers of all categories are paid in monetary form. These payments comprise thebiggest share in Chernobyl budget, and they are important for hundreds of thousands of liquidators andpeople living on contaminated territories.
Those who were evacuated or resettled from the zone of mandatory resettlement, or who moved toclean areas from the zone of "guaranteed voluntary resettlement" have received compensations for lost
property: houses and other buildings, crops, livestock, fruit trees etc. This process is ongoing (partly
because it involves also heirs of those who were resettled), partly because of significant changes in pricing
during past 18 years. In accordance with the laws adopted in 1996 and 2002, compensations paid between
1992-1996 (during the period of galloping inflation) have to be recalculated into current Ukrainiancurrency (hryvna) and paid to sufferers by 31 December 2007.
People living in contaminated areas receive several forms of compensations. The basis for theircalculation is usually minimal salary, which is fixed by the government for each year: in 2004 it was 262
hryvna (about $50) per month. Payments are different for different categories, usually they include:• monthly payments as compensation for restrictions on the use of locally produced food (30-50 % ofminimal salary) for those living in contaminated areas;• additional annual payments for those who live and work in contaminated areas (1-3 minimal salaries);• higher salaries for civil servants and workers of budget organisations (like schools, hospitals etc.);• higher pensions and scholarships.
Liquidators, invalids (disabled, whose disability is caused by Chernobyl catastrophe) and liquidatorspensioners also receive some payments in monetary form (annual payment for recreation, payment for- 221 -

food, addition to pension) and some payments as discounts, e.g. reduced communal payments (water, heat,
telephone etc.)
On the whole, regular payments to sufferers play extremely important role for them and their families.
Very often these payments are of the same level or even bigger than an average wage a person can earn in
his/her locality. Other benefits like health care, sanatoria, free public transport are also important, although
there is a need to improve efficiency of them.
Evolution of the national policy and international assistanceCountry's policy on liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe was approved by the
Parliament in February 1993 as a "Concept of the national programme of liquidation of the consequencesof Chernobyl catastrophe and social protection of citizens for 1994-1995 and for the period until the year2000". It worth to note that it was not the "national programme", but a "concept" - a legal act of no
immediate force, so practical work was regulated by the effective laws.
In 1996 the Parliament turned down a bill "On radiation protection of people", which might hadprovided a legal basis for national actions. However, in February 1997 the improved version of the billpassed the first reading and in January 1998 the Law "On the protection of man from ionising radiation"entered into force. The Law is not retroactive, but together with the Law "On the protection of populationand territories from extraordinary situations of technogenic and natural sort" adopted in 2000 it provides
necessary legal basis for potential future nuclear disasters.
The "Concept of the national programme..." mentioned above should have been replaced after theyear 2000, and in November 2002 a bill "On the national programme of minimisation of the consequencesof Chernobyl catastrophe for 2002-2005 and for the period until 2010" passed the first reading in the
Parliament. However, as of March 2005, it has not been submitted for the second reading by the
Parliament. Institutional changes are also considered, namely creation of the special State Committee
dealing with liquidation of the consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe (see, for example 19).
As we already mentioned, international assistance focused mainly on the issues of Chernobyl NPP,
including damaged reactor and shutting down of the remaining reactors. Significant support was also
provided for managing the 30-km exclusion zone and for the social assistance to Chernobyl NPP workers
and the city of Slavutich. Many international organisations, including organisations of the UN system,
governments and non-governmental organisations provided humanitarian assistants to Chernobyl sufferers.
Detailed account of these efforts can be found in 20.
Among other efforts the UNESCO-Chernobyl Program which was implemented in three countries(Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) should be mentioned. It was launched in 1991 andterminated in1997. Although the work was fully relevant to the sufferers' needs, and more than $9,000,000
was mobilised, the results did not have a follow-up (except for one project), and the running costs andcosts not directly benefiting the Chernobyl victims were very high (executive summary of the external
audit of the programme21). Anyway, this effort could not influence the situation significantly - during thatyears annual budget expenditures of Ukraine on social Chernobyl programs reached US$200-500 million(see Table 3).
In Ukraine, with the support of the UNESCO-Chernobyl Programme, three centres of socialpsychological rehabilitation of population were established by the Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies in1994 and two more centres in 2000. These centres provide advice and psychological help to most sociallyunprotected groups of population (liquidators, resettled, disabled, unemployed, young people). A goal of
the work of these centres - abatement of general tension and alarm among population, professional
orientation for young people and unemployed, environmental education and information activities. Morethan 50,000 people appeal to these centres each year22.
In 2002, UNDP in Ukraine, along with the Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies and Affairs ofPopulation Protection from Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe, launched Chernobyl Recovery and- 222 -

Development Programme (CRDP). CRDP addresses issues highlighted in the joint UN report1. CRDP iscurrently funded by the UN and the governments of Switzerland, Japan and Canada. So far over
$3,000,000 was acquired, and the programme is expected to run until 200723.
CRDP components include policy development, community development, social development,
economic development and environmental recovery. Until the end of 2004, the programme worked in 63
communities in 3 oblasts of Ukraine (Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Chernihivska) and from 2005 6 more rayons
will be added. Over 70 community development projects were implemented in 2003-2004, with funding
coming from communities themselves (20 %), local governments (50 %), CRDP project (30 %) and othersponsors (10 %). More than 90 community organisations were formed and received support in the form of
training, development of networks of business services providers and initial grants. The programme also
provided information materials on environmental recovery and development opportunities in agriculture,
water supply, energy efficiency and other issues.
Conclusions
A huge system for social protection of Chernobyl sufferers has been built in Ukraine during 19 years. In
principle it is a "soviet-type" paternalistic system, in which government officials take almost all decisions,and sufferers are "dependants". Major part of financial resources stays in hands of responsible government
agencies. The figures of budget lines (after 1995 when the published state budget became more detailed)confirm this conclusion. E.g., in 1995 money allocated for those "who are moving out of Chernobyl zone
individually, and state construction programme for liquidators of category 1" comprised 16 % of money
allocated for state construction programme (for Chernobyl sufferers); in 1996 - 38 %; in 1997 - 44 %; in2000 - 39 %. Apparently this ratio was even lower before 1995. (It is not clear how much was paid
directly to people for individual building, and how much was spent for state-contracted construction of
housing for sufferers of category 1).
Similarly, with health improvement holidays main part of money is spent by government agencies.
For example, average price of one recreation voucher in 2000-2004 was around $150, while direct annual
monetary payment for "recreation" to each liquidator of category 2 was equal around $5. Compensations
for unused holidays were also several times lower than the price of recreation voucher, and they were notalways paid.
The system that emerged probably gives people some feeling of safety, but it does not stimulate
initiative. As sociological investigations show, an attitude of "dependant" became a common feature
among Chernobyl sufferers24. People do not take initiative in their hands, and often do not want to takesuch initiative. Social monitoring in contaminated territories and among sufferers is needed; it could havehelped in finding solutions. Such monitoring was started in 1997, but after several years discontinued on
the initiative of the Ministry of Ukraine of Emergencies (ibid.).
It is clear that the current system of social assistance to Chernobyl sufferers needs serious reforming,
but this reform cannot be abrupt due to very big numbers of those which depend on this system and thefact that many people, excluding children, are not at all young - an average age of liquidator in 2004 was
52 years. We would agree with the conclusion of the UN Report1 that several years of preparation areneeded. The Report proposed a ten-year Recovery Phase of initiatives:"The new approach should focus on enabling the individuals and communities affected by thedisaster to enter fully into society by taking control of their own lives and acquiring the means for
self-sufficiency through economic and human development" (ibid.).
New and much more significant efforts are needed for careful investigation of the current situation andformulation of possible solutions. All this should be done in an open and transparent manner and withintensive public consultations. Only after this, the needed changes to the system could be made without
creating additional psychological stress for sufferers and serious risk for the stability of the social situation- 223 -

(we should learn lessons from Russian experience with monetarization of benefits in the beginning of2005).
Those who formulate the state policy of social protection of Chernobyl sufferers should notconcentrate on struggle for higher budget allocations (which is probably impossible), but on finding waysof better use of available resources with the goal of creating the situation when sufferers and territories
become economically and socially self-sufficient.
***************************
Case study: the town of Poliske, Kyiv oblast
Poliske (Russian spelling Polesskoye) - a settlement (town) in Kyiv oblast, centreof Poliske rayon. Population 11,300 (1986). Sewing, furniture, flax processing
factories. Cannery. Production of construction materials, logging and lumber
processing.
(Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1987).
The town of Poliske is located 55 km to the SW of Chernobyl NPP, on the river Uzh, in geographicalprovince of Ukrainian Polissia. The region is known for its ancient and unique culture. The town (known
as Khabne before 1934) was first mentioned in written documents in 1425.
(As it was shown by later investigations, the town lies on the Southwest trace of Chernobyl fallout, withcontamination by Cs137 between 15-40 Ci/km2 and more. In 1987-88 scientists (who were closely
involved in drafting the boundary of the 30-km zone back in 1986) told the author of this paper that theyknew that Poliske should have been evacuated, but a town with a developed infrastructure was badly
needed to serve various logistical purposes - laundry, etc. - and thus it was decided to leave it outside thezone. Moreover, nearly 28,000 people from Prypiat and evacuated villages were temporarily stationed
nearby Poliske between 27 April - 5 May 198625.
A secret report, prepared 25.05.86 by the USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology, listed Poliske
among 15 settlements where the level of gamma-radiation on 10 May 1986 was between 3-5 mR/h.
Settlements with levels over 5 mR/h were subject to "temporary resettlement"26, which in effect turned out
to be permanent).
In 1986 and later - in 1987-1989 - when many villages were resettled, the town was not evacuated. Instead,a massive decontamination effort was undertaken: replacing roofs and fences, removing contaminatedasphalt and paving roads, squares and school yards with new asphalt etc. These works were executed bymen aged 30-40 years liable for military service (nicknamed "partisans"), who were drafted for"temporary military service". Effectiveness of this "decontamination" proved to be insufficient for making
living conditions safe.
(In the fall of 1988, when the author worked in Poliske conducting yard-by-yard measurements of soil
contamination with caesium, he had a chance to present some results and to talk to the Head of Rayonadministration. Results clearly showed that contamination exceed all existing limits, but the Head ofRayon insisted that "It is our land, we were born and we will live on it, and we will stay here". It is hard tosay what were his reasons to insist on this position - local patriotism, underestimation of danger,
willingness to obey orders or some personal agenda. His own position could have been important - he wasa Member of the Supreme Council (the Parliament) of the USSR, and that meant high level of authority.
Of course there were no consultations with the public...)- 224 -

Millions of roubles were invested in social infrastructure - new hospital, a whole district of multi-story
apartment houses, natural gas pipelines and gas ovens for individual cottages, summer vacations in "clean"regions for children and adults, - this is an incomplete list of measures undertaken by the state in 19861991.
Serious efforts were applied to continue (and even increase!) agricultural production in the vicinity of
town and the processing of agricultural products on the town cannery. Looking from present time andknowing what we know now, it must seem at least strange, because processed food products included wild
berries and mushrooms, dairy products, vegetables... Milk and meat production, working vegetablegardens, flax growing and processing, logging, production of construction materials - all these activities
mean work on soil or in a forest - that is, breathing dust.
In 1996, a special Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers classified certain places outside the 30-km
zone, where working conditions in 1986-87 should be considered equally dangerous as in the zone itself.
Among them were Poliske rayon hospital, Poliske flax processing factory, dosimetric stations on the road
Dibrova-Poliske-Vilcha, Poliske station for desactivation of vehicles and other machines. Equal statusreceived also workers who were involved in logging in nearby forests, as well as those who worked onreforestation and sowing grass on abandoned lands.
(In the same meeting with the Head of Rayon administration the author also raised an issue ofcompensations. I argued that these should be diversified according to the living and working conditions ofpeople, and hence potential (and actual) radiation doses. It is easy to understand that a person living on asecond floor of a concrete house with tap (artesian) water supply and a central heating receives much
lower doses then many others who live in wooden cottages, take water from private water wells in theyard and heat their houses with locally collected firewood. Even bigger difference must be between dosesof a tractor driver and an accountant sitting in the office where the floor is moped out five times a day.
However, the reaction of the Head of Rayon was straitforward: "We all live in this settlement, so we allmust receive same compensations").
By early 90s, when information about the real levels of radioactive contamination in the town became
widely known and most people acquired adequate and often exaggerated understanding of radiation
related risks, the feelings in the town were close to frustration. People, especially those with little children(there were two schools and three kindergartens) were looking for all possible ways of leaving the town.
But they needed permission - without such permission they could not receive compensations for theproperty left behind, and thus their fortune in any new place would be miserable.
(An international community was well aware of Poliske problems. Thus, for example, in 1991 a Swissorganisation SKH equipped Poliske rayon hospital with modern diagnostic equipment and organised
permanent consultations of patients and doctors by Swiss specialists, who stayed in Poliske on shift basis.
Many other teams of doctors, experts in dosimetry and radiation medicine visited Poliske).
Despite many efforts to improve the radioecological situation in the town, contamination remained
too high. So, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR (CMU) of 14 December 1989
gave permission to families with children under 14 to leave the town if they were willing to. Two months
later in February 1990 followed the decision on mandatory resettlement from Poliske of families withchildren and pregnant women. But of course there were no free houses and flats to implement this decision
immediately... And then at last followed a decisive Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 23.08.90 on"mandatory resettlement" of all population of the town. Later this decision was repeated in the Resolutionof CMU № 106 of 23.07.1991 in which the town of Poliske was listed among other 86 Ukrainian
communities as destined for "mandatory evacuation".
(In 1990, the author accompanied to Poliske a large delegation of Parliament Members, doctors andjournalists from Switzerland. The delegation met with town officials, who told about their efforts to makeliving conditions safe. Only one MP from Ukrainian Parliament joined his nine Swiss colleagues and 40
journalists for that visit.
- 225 -

Figure 2. Resettlement of the town of Poliske. Numbers near the name of the town
(village) indicate numbers of flats or houses built or provided for Poliske's resettlers.
Later that year a team from Swiss TV (Vladimir Tchertkoff) interviewed teachers at school andkindergarten, and they complained that radiation levels remained high, and that desactivation did nothave effect. Parents told about incredible bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining permission for resettlement.
It was still a soviet era, and people were not free in choosing the place to live - permits to settle depended
upon decisions of the state officials. Later on, in 1998, Tchertkoff's team revisited some people from
Poliske - in suburbs of Kyiv and in Kyiv oblast where they lived - and these people told about unbearable
humiliation they experienced when the decision on evacuation eventually was taken: they needed to bribe
officials to be resettled earlier, to receive better compensation for their property, to choose a place of
resettlement...)Resettlement of some 10,000 people was not an easy job. The government tried to relocate people inlarge groups to preserve to the extent possible existing families and traditional relations, to make it easierto the people to start new life on new places. But of course there were problems with new construction,
demand for new housing was very high. People from Poliske were resettled to 50 different communities in
Kyiv oblast (see map from 3 on Fig.2), 9 to 560 families in each. Rarely were they able to renew old
traditions on a new land - not only surrounding nature was different, but quite often people from "host"communities were hostile to newcomers. Due to economic hardships of mid 90s, jobs were in scarce
supply and no one wanted competitors. Older people who were willing to wait sometimes received better
living conditions - they were moved by groups as communes (usually these were neighbourhoods fromone or several streets of Poliske). There are several examples, like a half-isolated settlement (which later
became a part of the town of Berezan), where people from Poliske have formed a compact commune andlive friendly with their neighbours. However, since there are no jobs for younger generation, life in thiscommune dies out.
After all remaining inhabitants (most of them pensioners) left the town in early 1996, during someperiod its destiny remained unclear: legally it was still the centre of Poliske rayon. The end to the Poliske's
almost 600 years of civil history was enunciated by the Decree of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of
Ukraine N 204 of 10.07.1996 "On moving the centre of Poliske rayon to the village of Krasiatychi". When- 226 -

the resettlement of the town and all legal procedures were completed, the deserted town was passed under
the jurisdiction of the Administration of the 30-km zone.
(Several times after this the author visited Poliske. The view was really pathetic... Of all town's life, militia
quarters were guarding the empty town form looters; paramilitary fire brigade was permanently on alert
because of numerous fires in forest around the town. Newly-built apartment houses and century-old
cottages with new gas-heating ovens were gutted - partly by their owners who removed all that could be
used for their new houses (like windows, doors, pipes and toilets etc.), partly by looters. A dozen of older
people who refused to leave their houses and self-settlers from nowhere who live in the town depend on
bread supply from a bus-shop that made stop in the town once a week. The hospital built and refurbishedin 1987-1991 is in operation, but now it serves the needs of the workers of 30-km zone).
Addendum 26 April 2008
The work on this paper was completed in April, 2005. Few significant changes occurred during three
years that have passed. Some information and recent data are provided below.
In March 2006 a "State Programme of Mitigation of the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe for2006-2010" was approved by the Parliament. It lists numerous activities that need to be implemented to
improve social situation, including new legislation, systemic approach, scientific justification of measuresetc. Main problem with this, as well as with other governmental programs, is that there is no money in thestate budget to fully fund it.
It is estimated that the total costs spent by Ukrainian government between 1991-2005 on liquidationof consequences of Chernobyl disaster have reached about 8 billion US$ (Section 3 of the "Programme...")
On 16 April 2008, a hearing dedicated to the 22nd anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster was held in
the Parliament of Ukraine. For this hearing, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine prepared "Referencematerials". Follow some figures from these "Reference materials", which provide up-to-date information.
The number of Chernobyl sufferers which are registered by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Protection was (as of 01.01.2008) 2,376,218, of them: 276,327 liquidators (including 65,361 disabled),
2,099,891 sufferers (including 41,242 disabled and 541,641 children). Compensations, pensions andpayments for liquidators and sufferers have been increased during 2005-2007. Budget allocation for social
protection and pensions of Chernobyl sufferers for 2008 was increased by 27.8 % comparing to the year
2007, and reached 5,947,200 UAH (approximately US$1.2billion). Unfortunately, inflation and risingfood prices will significantly reduce real benefits for sufferers.
In 2007, the total of 147,110 sufferers used "free" health improvement holidays (compare Table 6
above). "Free" vouchers were provided to 15.5 % children and 1.4 % adult sufferers.
The ongoing work on "dozimetric pasportization" (calculation of average doses obtained byinhabitants of particular settlements) indicate gradual decrease in number of settlements where people
obtain high doses of radiation. Of 2130 settlements where this work has been performed, the data for
2002-2006 are distributed as follows:
Table 7. Number of settlements according to average calculated dose of irradiation of
population
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

<0.5
1471
1538
1551
1716
1763

0.5 - 0.99
317
334
405
298
294

Dose, mSv/year
1.00-3.99
368
289
202
112
72

- 227 -

> 4.0
7
5
5
4
1

Milk > 100 Bq/l
406
339
363
134
84

It becomes clear that status of some settlements could have been revised: thus, in accordance with theeffective legislation, there are 86 settlements in the zone of mandatory resettlement, and according to
pasportization data there should be 45; in the zone of "guaranteed voluntary resettlement" there are 841
settlements and could be 447. However, necessary legislation for such changes has not been passed yet.
The funding for radiological reclamation of agricultural lands in 2003-2007 was increased to about 5
mln Hryvna/year (in previous years it was about 2-3 mln Hryvna/year). Comparatively larger share of thisfunding is now allocated for purchase and application of higher doses of fertilizers and production of
fodder with radioprotective additives. However, because the total level of funding for improvement ofradioecological situation in contaminated areas was reduced after the year 2000 to about 12 mln
Hryvna/year (while at least 20 mln Hryvna/year is needed), there are no significant improvements andcurrent activities just keep the situation under control.
One of main issues raised at the Chernobyl hearing 2008 was significant underfunding ofcommitments which should be funded according to the effective Chernobyl legislation (compare Table 4
above, which shows that only about 25 % of needed funding was indeed allocated. The situation during
recent years was either similar or worse). Many MPs stated that it is necessary to "gather political will
and pass new Chernobyl legislation instead of outdated law of 1991", but with permanent politicalinstability and populistic habits of all Ukrainian parties it is unlikely that such legislation would be passedin the near future (controversial experience of Russia in this area is also quite discouraging). This meansthat the government bureaucracy will have same opportunities to manipulate insufficient funds as it has
had before.
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2 Nesterenko V.N., Yablokov A.V., Grodzinsky D.M. “Chernobyl Disaster for the Health of People
Continues (Marginalia on the UN Report of 2002). http://www.atomsafe.ru/books/gumposl/chernobl.htm
3 Chernobyl Catastrophe, V.G.Baryakhtar (chief editor). Kyiv, "Naukova Dumka", 1996. 576 p. (inUkrainian). There are numerous changes in Ukrainina edition compared to the Russian edition that was
published in 1995. In 1997 the English edition followed.
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- 229 -