Broken Record
Temperatures hit new highs, yet world
fails to cut emissions (again)
Executive summary

Emissions Gap Report 2023

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record© 2023 United Nations Environment Programme
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Broken Record
Temperatures hit new highs,
yet world fails to cut emissions (again)

Executive summary

Emissions Gap Report 2023

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Executive summary

Stocktake during a year of broken records
The world is witnessing a disturbing acceleration in thenumber, speed and scale of broken climate records. At
the time of writing, 86 days have been recorded withtemperatures exceeding 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
this year. Not only was September the hottest month ever,it also exceeded the previous record by an unprecedented
0.5°C, with global average temperatures at 1.8°C above
pre-industrial levels. These records were accompanied bydevastating extreme events, which the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned us are merelya meek beginning. While the records do not imply that theworld has exceeded the 1.5°C temperature limit specified in
the Paris Agreement, which refers to global warming levels
based on multi-decadal averages, they signal that we are
getting closer.
This fourteenth Emissions Gap Report is published ahead of
the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 28). It provides an annual, independentscience-based assessment of the gap between the pledged
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and the
reductions required to align with the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement, as well as opportunities tobridge this gap. COP 28 marks the conclusion of the firstglobal stocktake under the Paris Agreement, held every five
years to assess the global response to the climate crisis andchart a better way forward. This closely mirrors the objectiveof the Emissions Gap Report, and the report aims to provide
findings relevant to the concluding discussions under the
global stocktake.
To inform COP 28 – including on the outcomes neededfrom the global stocktake – and set the scene for the next
round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) thatcountries are requested to submit in 2025, which will include
emissions reduction targets for 2035, this report looks atwhat is required this decade and beyond 2030 to maintainthe possibility of achieving the long-term temperature goalof the Paris Agreement. It underscores that maintaining thispossibility hinges on relentlessly strengthening mitigation
action this decade to narrow the emissions gap. This will
facilitate significantly more ambitious targets for 2035 in
the next round of NDCs, and pave the way for enhancing
the credibility and feasibility of the net-zero pledges that byIV

now cover around 80 per cent of global emissions. Failure to
bring global GHG emissions in 2030 below the levels impliedby current NDCs will make it impossible to limit warming to
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and strongly increase thechallenge of limiting warming to 2°C.
As this report shows, not only temperature records continue
to be broken – global GHG emissions and atmosphericconcentrations of carbon dioxide (CO 2) also set new records
in 2022. Due to the failure to stringently reduce emissions
in high-income and high-emitting countries (which bear
the greatest responsibility for past emissions) and to limit
emissions growth in low- and middle-income countries(which account for the majority of current emissions),
unprecedented action is now needed by all countries. For
high-income countries, this implies further accelerating
domestic emissions reductions, committing to reaching
net zero as soon as possible – and sooner than the global
averages from the latest IPCC report implies – and at thesame time providing financial and technical support to lowand middle-income countries. For low- and middle-income
countries, it means that pressing development needs
must be met alongside a transition away from fossil fuels.
Furthermore, the delay in stringent mitigation action will
likely increase future dependence on carbon dioxide removal(CDR) from the atmosphere, but availability of large-scale
CDR options in the future cannot be taken for granted. This
year, the report thus explores opportunities and challenges
associated with energy transitions as well as development
and deployment of CDR.

1.
▶

Global GHG emissions set new record of
57.4 GtCO2e in 2022
Global GHG emissions increased by 1.2 per cent from2021 to 2022 to reach a new record of 57.4 gigatons of
CO 2 equivalent (GtCO 2e) (figure ES.1). All sectors apartfrom transport have fully rebounded from the drop inemissions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic andnow exceed 2019 levels. CO 2 emissions from fossil
fuel combustion and industrial processes were themain contributors to the overall increase, accounting
for about two thirds of current GHG emissions.
Emissions of methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) andfluorinated gases (F-gases), which have higher global
warming potentials and account for about one quarterof current GHG emissions, are increasing rapidly: inEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2022, F-gas emissions grew by 5.5 per cent, followedby CH 4 at 1.8 per cent and N 2 O at 0.9 per cent. Basedon early projections, global net land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) CO 2 emissions
remained steady in 2022. LULUCF CO 2 emissions andremovals continue to have the largest uncertainties of
all gases considered, both in terms of their absoluteamounts and trends.

▶

GHG emissions across the G20 also increased by
1.2 per cent in 2022. However, members vary widelyin their trends with increases in China, India, Indonesia
and the United States of America, but decreases in
Brazil, the European Union and the Russian Federation.
Collectively, the G20 currently account for 76 per centof global emissions.

Figure ES.1 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions, 1990–2022
57.4 GtCO2e
in 2022

Total GHG emissions 1990–2022 (GtCO2e/yr)

50
40

54.5
GtCO2e51.6
GtCO2e60
41.8
GtCO2e37.9
GtCO2e

30
20
10
0

1990

2000
Fossil CO2

▶

2.
▶

CH4

2010
N2O

Global primary energy consumption expanded
in 2022 – an expansion mainly met by a growth incoal, oil and renewable electricity supply – whereasgas consumption declined by 3 per cent following
the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine. Overall, net
electricity demand growth in 2022 was primarily met
by renewable sources (excluding hydropower), driven
by a record increase in solar capacity additions.
Nonetheless, investments in fossil fuel extraction
and use have continued in most regions worldwide.
Globally, Governments still plan to produce more thandouble the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would
be consistent with the long-term temperature goal of
the Paris Agreement.

Current and historical emissions arehighly unequally distributed within
and among countries, reflecting global
patterns of inequality

F-gases

2020
LULUCF CO2

world average of 6.5 tons of CO 2 equivalent (tCO 2 e)in the Russian Federation and the United States ofAmerica, while those in India remain under half of it.
Per capita emissions are fairly similar in Brazil, theEuropean Union and Indonesia, and at levels slightly
below the G20 average. The G20 as a group averaged
7.9 tCO 2 e, whereas least developed countries
averaged 2.2 tCO 2 e and small island developing
States averaged 4.2 tCO 2e.
▶

Inequality in consumption-based emissions is
also found among and within countries. Globally,
the 10 per cent of the population with the highest
income accounted for nearly half (48 per cent) ofemissions with two thirds of this group living indeveloped countries. The bottom 50 per cent of theworld population contributed only 12 per cent of total
emissions.

Per capita territorial GHG emissions vary significantly
across countries. They are more than double theVEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

Historic emissions and contribution to global warming
similarly vary significantly across countries andgroups of countries (figure ES.2). Nearly 80 per centof historical cumulative fossil and LULUCF CO 2
emissions came from G20 countries, with thelargest contributions from China, the United Statesof America and the European Union, while least
developed countries contributed 4 per cent. The

United States of America account for 4 per cent of
current world population, but contributed 17 per centof global warming from 1850 to 2021, including theimpact of methane and nitrous oxide emissions. India,
by contrast, accounts for 18 per cent of the world
population, but to date only contributed 5 per centof warming.

Figure ES.2 Current and historic contributions to climate change
Current and historic contributions to climate change(% share by countries or regions)

30%
19%

13%
4%
5%

25%

16%

3.
▶

▶

VI

17%

10%
5%
6%
22%

China

4%

United Statesof America

6%

EU27

11%

18%

India

7%

2%

7%

RussianFederation

14%

5%

24%

18%
14%

4%

6%

3%

Historical
CO2 emissions(1850–2021)

Contribution
to warming(1850–2021)

Current GHG
emissions(2021)

There has been negligible movement on
NDCs since COP 27, but some progress
in NDCs and policies since the Paris
Agreement was adopted
Nine countries have submitted new or updated
NDCs since COP 27, bringing the total number of
NDCs that have been updated since the initial NDCs
were submitted in advance of or following the Paris
Agreement to 149 (counting the European Unionand its 27 Member States as a single Party) as at
25 September 2023. More NDCs now contain GHG
reduction targets, and more of these targets are
economy-wide, covering a country’s entire economy
as opposed to certain sectors only.
If all new and updated unconditional NDCs are
fully implemented, they are estimated to reduce

Rest of G20
Rest of world

18%

21%

18%

G20

12%

Rest of world

13%

Least developed
countries

Current
population(2021)

global GHG emissions by about 5.0 GtCO 2 e (range:
1.8–8.2 GtCO 2e) annually by 2030, compared with theinitial NDCs. The combined effect of the nine NDCs
submitted since COP 27 amounts to around
0.1 GtCO 2 e of this total. Thus, while NDC progresssince COP 27 has been negligible, progress since theadoption of the Paris Agreement at COP 21 is more
pronounced, although still insufficient to narrow theemissions gap.
▶

Progress since the Paris Agreement is clearer on thepolicy side. Globally, GHG emissions in 2030 basedon policies in place were projected to increase by
16 per cent at the time of the adoption of the Paris
Agreement. Now the projected increase is 3 per cent.

▶

Policy progress has contributed to reducing theimplementation gap, defined as the differenceEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

between projected emissions under current policies
and projected emissions under full implementationof the NDCs. The global implementation gap for2030 is estimated to be around 1.5 GtCO 2 e for theunconditional NDCs (down from 3 GtCO 2e in last year’s
assessment) and 5 GtCO 2e for the conditional NDCs
(down from 6 GtCO 2e last year). The implementation
gap for the G20 members has also been reduced.

As a group, the G20 members are projected to fallshort of their new and updated NDCs by 1.2 GtCO 2eannually by 2030, which is 0.6 GtCO 2 e lower thanlast year’s assessment (figure ES.3). The impact of
newly implemented policies is a main driver of both
lower global and G20 emission projections for 2030.
Other factors include changes in emission trends andsocioeconomic circumstances.

Figure ES.3 Implementation gaps between current policies and NDC pledges for the G20 members collectively andindividually by 2030, relative to 2015 emissions
GHG emissions (relative to 2015 = 100%)
200%

Current
policies
scenario

Unconditional
NDC scenario

Conditional
NDC scenario

Uncertainty
range

150%

Emission
level
2015

100%

11

50%

Implementation gap in %4.
▶

The number of net-zero pledges continues
to increase, but confidence in theirimplementation remains low
As at 25 September 2023, 97 Parties covering
approximately 81 per cent of global GHG emissions
had adopted net-zero pledges either in law (27 Parties),
in a policy document such as an NDC or a long-term
strategy (54 Parties), or in an announcement by a

11%

19%

4%

United Kingdom

United Statesof America

G20

11%

South Africa

Türkiye6%

Saudi Arabia

Russian Federation

8%

India

18%

9%

EU27

Republic of Korea

2%

China

Mexico27%

Canada15%

9%BrazilJapan

14%

Australia

Indonesia

11%

Argentina

0%

No implementation gap

high-level government official (16 Parties). This is
up from 88 Parties last year. A total of 37 per centof global GHG emissions are covered by net-zerotargets for 2050 or earlier, while 44 per cent of global
emissions are covered by net-zero pledges for years
later than 2050.
▶

Responsible for 76 per cent of global emissions,G20 members will dominate when global emissions

VIIEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

reach net zero. Encouragingly, all G20 members
except Mexico have set net-zero targets, and overthe past year, some members have taken important
steps towards strengthening and implementing theirtargets. Overall, however, limited progress has been
made on key indicators of confidence in net-zero
implementation among G20 members, including legal
status, the existence and quality of implementationplans, and alignment of near-term emissions
trajectories with net-zero targets. Most concerningly,
none of the G20 members are currently reducing
emissions at a pace consistent with meeting their
net-zero targets.

5.
▶

The emissions gap in 2030 remains high:current unconditional NDCs imply a 14 GtCO2e
gap for a 2°C goal and a 22 GtCO2e gap forthe 1.5°C goal. The additional implementationof the conditional NDCs reduces theseestimates by 3 GtCO2e▶

These least-cost pathways assume stringent
emissions reductions starting in 2020, which current
trends contradict. Since emissions today are higher
than in 2020, this implies that the world has alreadyfurther depleted the limited remaining carbon budget
and committed to slightly higher global warming
than indicated by the least-cost pathways, unlessthere is further acceleration of emissions reductions
after emissions levels consistent with the least-cost
pathways are met. The emissions gap estimates arethus likely to be lower-bound, as they do not accountfor the excess emissions since 2020 compared withthe least-cost pathways, and should be read with thiscaveat in mind.

▶

The emissions gap for 2030 remains largely
unchanged compared with last year’s assessment.
Full implementation of unconditional NDCs isestimated to result in a gap with below 2°C pathwaysof about 14 GtCO 2 e (range: 13–16) with at least
66 per cent chance. If the conditional NDCs are also
fully implemented, the below 2°C emissions gap isreduced to 11 GtCO 2e (range: 9–15) (table ES.1 andfigure ES.4).

The emissions gap is defined as the difference
between the estimated global GHG emissions resulting
from full implementation of the latest NDCs and thoseunder least-cost pathways aligned with the long-term
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Table ES.1 Global total GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and estimated gaps under different scenarios

Scenario

GHG emissions(GtCO2e)

Estimated gap to least-cost pathways consistent withlimiting global warming to specific levels (GtCO2e)Median and range

Below 2°C

Below 1.8°C

Below 1.5°C

Current policies

56 (52–60)

16 (11–19)

22 (17–25)

24 (19–27)

Unconditional NDCs

55 (54–57)

14 (13–16)

20 (19–22)

22 (21–24)

Conditional NDCs

52 (50–55)

11 (9–15)

17 (15–20)

19 (17–23)

2030

2035
Current policies continued

56 (45–64)

20 (9–28)

29 (18–37)

31 (20–39)

Unconditional NDCs continued

54 (47–60)

18 (11–25)

27 (20–34)

29 (22–36)

Conditional NDCs continued

51 (43–58)

15 (8–22)

24 (17–31)

26 (19–33)

Current policies continued

55 (24–72)

35 (4–52)

43 (12–60)

46 (16–63)

Unconditional NDCs and net-zero pledges
using strict criteria

44 (26–58)

24 (6–38)

32 (14–46)

36 (18–49)

Conditional NDCs and all net-zero pledges

21 (6–33)

1 (-14–13)

9 (-6–21)

12 (-2–25)

2050

VIII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure ES.4 Global GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 and 2035 (median estimate
and tenth to ninetieth percentile range)
GtCO2e60

Current policies scenario
Unconditional NDC scenario

2°C
range

40

30

GtCO2e

GtCO2eMedian estimate of level consistent
with 2°C: 41 GtCO2e (range: 37–46)

Green area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 1.5°C witha 50% chance by 2100 andminimum 33% likelihood overthe course of the century

22

19
Unconditional NDC caseBlue area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 2°C with
about 66% chance

Remaining
gap to staywithin 2°C
limit

GtCO2eConditional NDC case

GtCO2e14
Unconditional NDC case1150

Conditional NDC case

Conditional
NDC scenario

Median estimate of level consistent
with 1.5°C: 33 GtCO2e (range: 26–34)

1.5°C
range

20
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

6.

Action in this decade will determine theambition required in the next round of NDCs
for 2035, and the feasibility of achieving
the long-term temperature goal of theParis Agreement▶

The emissions gap in 2030 between unconditional
NDCs and 1.5°C pathways is about 22 GtCO 2 e(range: 21–24) with at least 50 per cent chance. If theconditional NDCs are also fully implemented, the 1.5°Cemissions gap is reduced to 19 GtCO 2e (range: 17–23).

▶

Unconditional and conditional NDCs for 2030 are
estimated to reduce global emissions by 2 per cent and9 per cent respectively, compared with current policy
projections and assuming they are fully implemented.
To get to levels consistent with least-cost pathways
limiting global warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C, global
GHG emissions must be reduced by 28 per cent and42 per cent respectively. This is 2 percentage points
lower than last year’s assessment, illustrating the
progress in narrowing the implementation gap between
current policies and NDCs.

▶

The first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement
is envisaged to inform the next round of NDCs thatcountries are requested to submit in 2025, which will
include targets for 2035. Overall, global ambition in thenext round of NDCs must be sufficient to bring global
GHG emissions in 2035 to the levels consistent withbelow 2°C and 1.5°C pathways of 36 GtCO 2e (range:
31–39) and 25 GtCO 2 e (range: 20–27) respectively(table ES.2), while also compensating for excess
emissions until levels consistent with these pathways
are achieved.

▶

Nonetheless, immediate, accelerated and relentlessmitigation action is needed to bring about the deep
annual emission cuts that are required from now to2030 to narrow the emissions gap, with unparalleledannual cuts required to bridge the gap, even without
accounting for excess emissions since 2020.

▶

In contrast, a continuation of current policies and
NDC scenarios would result in widened and likely
unbridgeable gaps in 2035 (table ES.1). A continuationof current policies is projected to result in global
GHG emissions of 56 GtCO 2 e in 2035 (table ES.1),
which is 36 per cent and 55 per cent higher than the

IX

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

levels consistent with below 2°C and 1.5°C pathways
respectively (table ES.2), without compensating forexcess emissions.
▶

▶

Again, these findings underline that immediate andunprecedented mitigation action in this decadeis essential. Over-complying with current NDC
targets for 2030 will enable countries to put forward
more ambitious mitigation targets for 2035 in theirnext NDCs, and it will make the realization of such
ambitious targets for 2035 more feasible.

Looking beyond 2035 at mid-century scenarios(table ES.1) reinforces these findings and points
to the necessity of enhancing the credibility andfeasibility of net-zero pledges. Total global GHG
emissions in 2050 are only brought closer to 1.5°C
and 2°C pathways if the conditional NDCs are fully
implemented in combination with the achievement of
all net-zero pledges.

Table ES.2 Global GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and global warming characteristics of least-cost pathways
starting in 2020 consistent with limiting global warming to specific temperature limits
Least-cost
pathwaysconsistent with Number oflimiting global scenarios
warming to
specific levels
Below 2°C
(66% chancethroughout thecentury)
Below 1.8°C(66% chancethroughout thecentury)
Below 1.5°C(50% chancein 2100 andminimum
33% chancethroughout thecentury)

7.
▶

▶

X

Global total GHG emissions(GtCO2e)In 2030

In 2035

In 2050

Estimated temperature outcomes
Closest IPCC
Working Group III
50% chance 66% chance 90% chance Sixth Assessment
Report scenario
class
Peak:

195

139

50

41
(37–46)35(28–41)33(26–34)36(31–39)27(21–31)25(20–27)20(16–24)12(8–16)

8(5–13)

If current policies are continued, global
warming is estimated to be limited to 3°C.
Delivering on all unconditional and conditional
pledges by 2030 lowers this estimate to 2.5°C,
with the additional fulfilment of all net-zeropledges bringing it to 2°C
A continuation of the level of climate change
mitigation efforts implied by current policies is
estimated to limit global warming to 3°C (range:
1.9–3.8°C) throughout the century with a 66 per centchance. Warming is expected to increase further after
2100 as CO 2 emissions are not yet projected to reachnet-zero levels.
A continuation of the unconditional NDC scenario
lowers this estimate to 2.9°C (range: 2–3.7°C),
whereas the additional achievement and continuation

Peak:
1.8–1.9°C

Peak:
2.2–2.4°C

1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

In 2100:
2–2.4°CPeak:
1.5–1.7°C

Peak:
1.6–1.8°C

Peak:
1.9°C–2.2°C

In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C

In 2100:
1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.8–2.2°C

Peak:
1.5–1.6°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
1.9–2.1°C

In 2100:
1.1–1-3°C

In 2100:
1.2–1.5°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:

C3a

N/A

C1a

of conditional NDCs lowers this by around 0.4°C to
2.5°C (range: 1.9–3.6°C).
▶

In the most optimistic scenario where all conditional
NDCs and net-zero pledges, including those madeas part of long-term low-emissions development
strategies, are assumed to be fully achieved, global
warming is projected to be limited to 2°C (range:
1.8–2.5°C) with 66 per cent chance over the courseof the century. However, as noted previously, net-zeropledges remain highly uncertain.

▶

Even in the most optimistic scenario considered in thisreport, the chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C
is only 14 per cent, and the various scenarios leave
open a large possibility that global warming exceeds
2°C or even 3°C. This further illustrates the needto bring global emissions in 2030 lower than levels
associated with full implementation of the current

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

NDCs, to expand the coverage of net-zero pledges to
all GHG emissions and to achieve these pledges.
▶

countries with greater capacity and greater historic
responsibility for emissions – particularly highincome and high-emitting countries among the G20– will need to take more ambitious and rapid action,
setting the course and demonstrating the viabilityof fossil-free development. However, this will not
be sufficient as low- and middle-income countries
already account for more than two thirds of global
GHG emissions. Accordingly, the Climate Solidarity
Pact proposed by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral calls on all big emitters to make extra efforts
to cut emissions and wealthier countries to provide
financial and technical resources to support low- andmiddle-income countries in their transformation,reflecting differentiated timelines.

Central temperature projections are slightly higher
than in the 2022 edition of the Emissions Gap Report,
as a larger number of models have been includedin the estimation of future emissions. However, theprojections are consistent with those from othermajor assessments, such as the International Energy
Agency’s 2023 Announced Pledges Scenario, theClimate Action Tracker and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 2023
NDC Synthesis Report, noting that these reporttemperature projections with a 50 per cent rather thana 66 per cent chance.

8.

▶

The failure to stringently reduce emissions
in high-income countries and to prevent
further emissions growth in low- andmiddle-income countries implies that
all countries must urgently accelerate
economy-wide, low-carbon transformations toachieve the long-term temperature goal of theParis Agreement▶

Delivering transformational change requires
unprecedented global cooperation reflecting the Paris
Agreement principle of common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities in light ofnational circumstances. This principle implies that

Energy is the dominant source of GHG emissions,currently accounting for 86 per cent of global CO 2
emissions. The coal, oil and gas extracted over the
lifetime of producing and under-construction mines
and fields as at 2018 would emit more than 3.5 times
the carbon budget available to limit warming to
1.5°C with 50 per cent probability, and almost thesize of the budget available for 2°C with 67 per centprobability. Global transformation of energy systems
is thus essential, including in low- and middle-income
countries, where pressing development objectives
must be met alongside a transition away fromfossil fuels.

Figure ES.5 Committed CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure, compared with carbon budgets reflecting
the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement
Emissions (GtCO2)
Carbon budget

1,000
950

2 °C
(67% chance)

800

Coal
Other
Buildings

600

Transport

400

Industry

Gas

Carbon budget
250
200

0

Electricity
Oil

1.5 °C(50% chance)

Existing extraction
infrastructure

Existing consuming
infrastructure

Committed emissions

XI

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

9.
▶

Low- and middle-income countries facesubstantial economic and institutional
challenges in low-carbon energy transitions,but can also exploit opportunities

economic challenges from high-income countries,
especially in view of the required speed of transition.

Energy transitions in low- and middle-income countries
are shaped by the overarching objective of pursuingdevelopment. Low- and middle-income countries
face several common challenges in having to bringmillions out of poverty, expand strategic industries,
urbanize and deal with the political challenges of atransition away from fossil fuel use. Meeting basic
energy needs of people living in poverty would havea limited impact on global GHG emissions. Yet today,
2.4 billion people lack access to clean cooking and775 million to electricity, with women and children
disproportionately affected. Meeting energy needs forbroader human development will lead to significant
energy demand growth, but there is scope to meetthis growth more efficiently and equitably, and with
low-carbon energy as renewables get cheaper.

▶

▶

Low- and lower-middle-income countries are in thegreatest need of affordable finance as they are alreadysaddled with debt, receive disproportionately low clean
energy investments, are more vulnerable to volatile
fossil fuel markets either as exporters or importers,
and may face future stranded fossil fuel assets.
Upper-middle-income countries are typically further
along in building clean energy economies, but still
face risks of stranded assets and related employment
implications and macroeconomic shocks.

▶

Access to affordable finance is therefore a prerequisite
for increasing mitigation ambition in low- and middleincome countries. Yet, costs of capital are up to seventimes higher in these countries compared with theUnited States of America and Europe (figure ES.6).
International financial assistance will therefore
have to be significantly scaled up from existinglevels, and new public and private sources of capital
better distributed towards low-income countries,
restructured through financing mechanisms thatlower costs of capital. These include debt financing,increasing long-term concessional finance,
guarantees and catalytic finance.

National circumstances vary with natural resource
endowments and economic conditions, and will shapeenergy transition pathways. Capacity and institutions
are often weak in low- and middle-income countries,
and they may face different and additional politicalFigure ES.6 Weighted average cost of capital for solar photovoltaic projects against per capita gross national income forselect countries in 2021

Weighted average cost of capital (%)

Gross national income per capita (US$)

70,900XII

Country category
Low-income* Excluding lower-middle-income countries

Lower-middle-income

Americas

Upper-middle-income

Europe*

USA

Chile

UruguayArgentina

BrazilMexicoBolivia

EcuadorNicaragua

China

ThailandSri Lanka

Indonesia

India

Pakistan

Mauritius

Asia

Islamic Rep. of Iran

AfricaSouth Africa

Algeria0
Namibia0
Morocco3

Egypt

10,000Tunisia6

Kenya

20,000Ghana

9Senegal30,000Uganda12

Ethiopia

40,000

Rwanda15

Burkina Faso

50,000EuropeHigh-income

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

▶

Low- and middle-income countries can takeownership of their low-carbon development agenda
by laying out national low-carbon development
strategies suited to their national context, including byadopting measures in key energy-intensive demand
sectors, such as housing, transport and food, whichhave known synergies between climate mitigation andhuman development. This will require strengthening
domestic energy and climate institutions to undertake
strategic planning and enhanced coordination
across sectors. Furthermore, strong stakeholder
engagement is needed to ensure just outcomes andeconomic diversification.
The preparation of the next round of NDCs offers an
opportunity for low- and middle-income countries
to develop nationally driven road maps with broad
domestic visions for ambitious development andclimate policies and targets, for which implementation
progress can be measured, finance and technology
needs are clearly specified, and detailed investmentready implementation plans are prepared. With lessthan two years left until the next round of NDCs aredue, COP 28 would be a timely occasion to call forinternational support to prepare such robust andambitious NDCs that integrate development andclimate objectives.

10.

		 Further delay of stringent global GHG
emissions reductions will increase future
reliance on CDR to meet the long-term
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement▶

Immediate and stringent emissions reductions are
required to bridge the emissions gap and maintainthe feasibility of achieving the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement. All least-cost pathways
starting in 2020 consistent with meeting this goal
require immediate and deep emission cuts as well asa growing quantum of CDR over time (figure ES.7).
With the delay in stringent mitigation action, theneed for CDR in the longer term will likely increase
even further.

▶

CDR is necessary to achieve the long-term goal of theParis Agreement as reaching net-zero CO 2 emissions
is required to stabilize global warming, whereas
net-zero GHG emissions will result in a peak anddecline in global warming. Since it is impossible tofully eliminate all CO 2 or other GHG emissions throughstringent emissions reductions, residual emissions
must be balanced by removals from the atmosphere,
i.e. through CDR, to reach net-zero emissions.

Figure ES.7 The role of emissions reductions and CDR in least-cost pathways consistent with the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement
Emissions reductions starting from 2020 levels (GtCO2e/yr)
2020

2020
gross
emissions60

1.5°C scenario

2°C scenario

60

-2.0

50

60

50

50

55

-18

GtCO2e40

Emission level 2020
55 GtCO2e

40

-27

40

Total emissions
reductions

-1.1
-0.3

Gross emissions
reduction

-39

30

30

20

-2.8
-1.0

20

24

GtCO2e10

Land-based CDR

30

-38

20

-3.6

GtCO2e-5.6

10
GtCO2e0
2020

Transparent area
indicates uncertainty
range

-1.6
-7.1

Net GHG emissions

10

Uncertainty range

7.7

6.8

0

Novel CDR

35

2035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2050)

GtCO2e02035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2070)* Net emissions areabove 0 due toresidual emissionsof other GHGs

XIII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

CDR is already deployed today – mainly in theform of conventional land-based methods, suchas afforestation, reforestation and managementof existing forests, with a large share located indeveloping countries. Present-day direct removals
through conventional land-based methods are
estimated to be 2.0 (±0.9) GtCO 2 annually, almost
entirely through conventional land-based methods.
Direct removals through novel CDR methods, suchas bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,
biochar, direct air carbon capture and storage, andenhanced weathering, are currently miniscule at
0.002 GtCO 2 annually.

▶

Nonetheless, 1.5°C and 2°C least-cost pathways
assume significant increases in both conventional andnovel CDR over time (figure ES.7). Conventional CDR
grows to up to 6 GtCO 2 annually by 2050 under thesepathways and novel CDR up to 4 GtCO 2 annually by
2050. Conventional land-based CDR plays a stronger
role in the near- and mid-term, while novel CDR plays astronger role later in the century to reach net-negativeemissions, noting that levels depend on the underlying
economic and technological assumptions as wellas the magnitude of temperature drawdown after
achieving net-zero CO 2 emissions.

▶

XIV

Achievement of the gigaton levels of CDR implied laterin this century by pathways consistent with the Paris
Agreement is uncertain and associated with several
risks. Increased reliance on conventional land-based
CDR is risky due to issues of land competition,

protection of Indigenous and traditional communities’
land tenure and rights, and sustainability, biodiversity
and permanence risks of forest-based CDR, includingfrom forest fires and other disturbances. Novel CDR
methods are generally at an early stage of development
and are associated with different types of risks,
including that the technical, economic and politicalrequirements for large-scale deployment may notmaterialize in time. Furthermore, public acceptanceis still uncertain, particularly for approaches involving
carbon capture and storage, or the open ocean. Theserisks can negatively affect the prospects for scale-up,
despite technical potentials.
▶

To spur innovation and enable scaling up of novel CDR
technologies, these technologies will first need to go
through a formative phase, which will require strong
policy and financial support. Given the time it takes tomature technologies, the next decade will be crucial
for novel CDR methods. Failure to create momentum
in this formative phase will result in a widening
discrepancy between the levels of novel CDR needed
and available by 2050 and beyond.

▶

This points to four important areas for political action:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Setting and signalling CDR priorities
Developing robust measurement, reporting andverification systems to enhance credibility
Harnessing synergies and co-benefits withother efforts
Accelerating innovation.

This publication is supported by the Environment Fund – UNEP’s core financial fund. The Fund is used to provide scientific evidence on thestate of the global environment, identify emerging environmental issues and innovative solutions, raise awareness and advocacy, bring together
stakeholders to agree on action, and for building capacity of partners. Core funding gives UNEP the strength and flexibility to implement the
programme of work (in support of the 2030 Agenda) as approved by its Member States, and to strategically respond to emerging challenges.
UNEP is grateful to all the Member States that contribute to the Environment Fund.
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