IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2012) 3-1

Research article
erd

Effective Governance Strategy: Key to Sustainable
Collaborative Management in a Wildlife Sanctuary inSouth-Eastern Part of Bangladesh
REZAUR RAHMAN*
Natural Resources Institute, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada

MOHAMMED SALIM UDDIN
Natural Resources Institute, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada

SHIRLEY THOMPSON
Natural Resources Institute, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada
Email: s_thompson@umanitoba.ca
Received 14 December 2011

Accepted 18 April 2012(*: Corresponding Author)

Abstract The Forest Department of Bangladesh piloted collaborative management, also
known as co-management, in five protected areas, through its Nishorgo Support Projectfrom 2004 to 2009. This paper documents one of the pilot co-management sites,
specifically for the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary comparing actual governance to theframework for good governance for protected areas. Through stakeholders and key
informant interviews and observation of council and committee meetings, the research
revealed that the co-management structure was   an   appendum   in   the   forest   department’s  organizational structure. Unwillingness to share responsibilities and decision-making was
the major obstacle to effective co-management in the protected area. The lack of legal
recognition and limited functional arrangements to support co-management resulted in
weak managerial performance and poor governance. Thus, extraction of resources fromthe reserve continued. Moreover, no quick solutions to deal with environmental threats ofland encroachment inside the sanctuary were undertaken. For co-management to result in
effective forest and wildlife conservation, more focus on good governance and provisionof socio-economic opportunities is needed.
Keywords protected area, Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary, co-management, governance

INTRODUCTION
Depletion of forests is occurring worldwide. In Bangladesh, only 10.2% of the country’s  landmass  remains under forest cover (Laurance, 2007). Forests continue to be degraded due to encroachmentof forest land for habitation and cultivation (Muhammed et al., 2008) with 50% of   the   nation’s  forests destroyed in the last two decades of the 20th century (Huda & Roy, 1999). To halt thisdestruction and preserve biodiversity, the Government of Bangladesh established one protectedarea in the 1980s and increased the number of protected areas to 28 in 2011 (Chowdhury et al.,2009). However, due to ineffective management, protected areas are subject to the samedegradation as state forests, wetlands and other land-use resources (FSP, 2001). DeCosse & Roy(2005) found that the principal cause of destruction of parks and other protected areas in
Bangladesh are the local elites who extract resources from protected areas for their own benefit, notthat of the poor. Commercial demand for timber and firewood is the leading cause of forest loss
with the poor engaged as hired hands to carry out this work for the elites (DeCosse & Roy, 2005).
Realizing the importance of protected areas for biodiversity conservation, a collaborative
management approach was formally introduced in the protected areas of Bangladesh in the year
2004 (Sharma et al., 2008; Roy & DeCosse, 2006). One of the major emphases of applying comanagement in protected areas was to ensure a congenial situation for governance as a recognizedⒸ ISERD

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requirement for sustainable development (DFID, 2001). The Forest Department initially piloted comanagement in five protected areas in 2004. The focus of this paper is to look at co-management in
one of these areas, namely the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary (TWS), located at 210 00′  N  and  920 20′  E in the Teknaf Peninsula of  Cox’s  Bazaar  district  in  south-eastern Bangladesh. The total area ofthe sanctuary is 11,615 hectares, which is composed of tropical evergreen and semi-evergreen
forests (Green, 1990). This sanctuary is surrounded by 115 settlements with a total population of
119,950 (Mollah et al., 2004). The wild elephant, sambar, barking deer, leopard, Bengal tiger,
panther etc. were common in this area but now most of these animals are extirpated or the
population has dwindled, due to habitat destruction. Now, megafauna are restricted to a few small
areas (Mollah et al., 2004; IPAC, 2009). In 2004, only a few small patches of natural forest
remained in the sanctuary (Mollah et al., 2004) due to economic activities diminishing the forest
by: fuel wood collection for household use and brick making; illegal timber extraction forcommercial sale; non-timber forest products (mainly bamboo and rattan) collection; betel-leaf
cultivation; and grazing of domestic animals (Studd, 2004).
Governance is considered to be the single most important factor for sustainable forest resource
management (Larson, 2004), which highlights the need for analyzing the quality of governance at
TWS. Realizing good governance is needed to ensure wildlife conservation and biodiversity, a twotier governance structure consisting of a 1) co-management   council   (henceforth   called   ‘council’)  and 2) a co-management executive committee (henceforth called   ‘committee’)   that   was   formed  with diverse stakeholders (NSP, 2006). Stakeholders include tribal people, forest villagers, local
resource users, the middle class and elites. The business class has a strong role in land
encroachment, including local elites, political leaders, law enforcing agencies, and forest headmen(Mollah et al., 2004), and must be engaged to prevent further habitat destruction and shift practice.
Principles of good governance for protected areas
Governance determines who has power and makes decisions, how other stakeholders make their
voices heard and what accountability measures are in place. Sustainable protected area
management usually requires participation of local people in decision-making process, devolutionof power, equitable benefit sharing, and building transparent and responsive institutions to ensure
good governance (UNESCAP, 2007). Governance is also influenced by history, culture, legal andcustomary rights, access to information, economic outlook etc. Creating a suitable system ofgovernance for protected areas in a country is of high importance in which government agencies at
the national level usually play an eminent role (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2005). An analysis ofgovernance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making, implementing
the decisions made, and the structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement thedecisions (UNESCAP, 2007). Analyzing and taking action about governance of protected areas
provide a powerful and insightful learning process. The management authority or stakeholders canestablish criteria, principles and values to guide action to achieve good governance (BorriniFeyerabend, 2003).
Five principles of good governance for protected areas developed by Graham et al. (2003)
based on United Nations governance principles are: 1) legitimacy and voice, 2) accountability, 3)
performance, 4) fairness, and 5) direction. These five principles are harmonized with the eight
major characteristics of good governance principles namely 1) participation, 2) consensus-oriented,3) accountability, 4) transparency, 5) responsiveness, 6) effectiveness and efficiency, 7) equity andinclusiveness, and 8) devotion to rule of law, identified by the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2007), in Table 1.
METHODOLOGYThis in-depth case study used semi-structured interviews and participant observation from August
2007 to February 2008. Six interviews were conducted with site coordinators of the project andForest Department (FD) officials for the three ranges namely Whykong, Shilkhali and Teknaf.
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Information about the governance structure of the council and committee formation process, legal
matters, working mechanism of those bodies and experiences from performing activities throughco-management was collected.
The researchers attended committee and council meetings to observe participation ofrepresentatives from different stakeholders. Each of the three committees was comprised of 18-19
members who were elected from 51-55 council members in those ranges. Formal interactive
interviews were conducted with local government, non-government organization (NGO) groups,
local elites, ethnic communities, forest department, resource user and other government
representatives in committee using a semi-structured questionnaire. Descriptive responses from theinterviewees were gathered and cross-checked through field observation and discussion with key
informants working at forest beat level (smallest administrative unit for forest management)
including individuals from tribal community, forest villagers and patrol team members. Overall, an
inductive approach was followed in the research process by moving to broader generalization from
specific observations and results. Direct observation methods were followed to observe
phenomenon and collect information on participants’ behavior and field condition. Based on thesefindings an analysis of actual governance compared to the framework for good governance forprotected areas developed by Graham et al. (2003) and (UNESCAP, 2007) were made in Table 1
which is a similar approach to that taken by Lockwood (2010) for other projects.
RESULTSThe changes in governance attained by the re-arranged governance structure developed for comanagement are analyzed by each governance principle (Table 1) and explained below.
Governance by co-management authority in TWS.
1. Legitimacy and voice: participation and consensus oriented (principle one)
Co-management was legitimated by a 2006 government gazette notification, which establishedthree co-management committees and assigned them responsibilities. However, only 12% of thecommittees are made up of resource users, limiting their influence. The committees have a numberof business persons with vested interest in the sanctuary, who do not play a convening role. A NGO
representative in Whykong committee said: “I  did  not  get  any  direction  to  interact  with  other  local  NGOs   and   don’t   know   how   I   will   collaborate.” Forest Department workers are not included incouncil and committee and often do not attend field meetings, which results in suboptimal effort inco-management activities and is of concern to Community Patrolling Groups, as they needassistance and enforcement from these field level employees.
Attendance in monthly committee meeting is poor as some members are unwilling to provide
voluntary service  but  attendance  is  better  for  council  meeting  representatives.  Forest  users’  group  meetings often do not take place due to lack of both participants and representatives from thecommittee. Activities at the field level are highly influenced by planning made at higher levels asactivities and financing are not decided at the site office.
2. Accountability and transparency (principle two)
The co-management   committee   members’   accountability is demanded only at the monthly
meetings. The committees do not have access to information on operations and budget expendituresof a part of the Nishorgo Support Project (NSP) as it was implemented by the Forest Department(FD) only. Committee  members’  do  not  have  any  established  mechanism  to  convey  learning  and  engage their own constituency. Although linkages have been established between forest usergroups and community patrolling groups with the Forest Department, activities and requirements ofthe groups were not monitored: a Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) refers to this divide: “It  is  not  pleasing for FD to work with local NGOs in co-management. Some of our staffs have shared theiruncomfortable feeling on losing territorial  control  and  authority  in  their  work  with  groups  in  field”.  

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Table 1 Analysis of whether the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary Co-management meets good
governance principles and responsibilities
Good governancePrinciples
1. Legitimacy andvoice

Governance responsibilities
1.1.1 Free expression of views
with no discrimination

1.1 Participatory

1.1.2 Dialogue and collective
negotiation

1.2 Consensusoriented

1.2.1 Stakeholders trust eachother and have the feeling ofowning the rules

2. Accountability
and transparency

2.1 Accountability should beaccessible to all
2.2 Accountability is linked toappropriate rewards andsanctions

3. Performance
3.1 Responsiveness3.2 Effectivenessand efficiency

4. Fairness
4.1 Equity &inclusiveness2.3 Clarity and transparency of
responsibility
3.1.1 Capable administration
with sufficient institutional andhuman capacity to carry out
required responsibilities
3.2.1 Dealing with complaints
and criticisms in constructive
manner
3.2.2 The management structure
should be robust, resilient, andcapable to perform adaptive
management
4.1.1 Conservation efforts
should not humiliate or harm
people’s  normal  life
4.1.2 Vulnerable ones shouldhave opportunity to maintaintheir own happiness

4.2 Rule of Law

4.2.1Consistent application oflaws and regulations
4.2.2 Fair opportunities forconflict management and nondiscriminatory option to justice

5. Direction
5.1 Strategic vision

5.1.1 Peoples concerns should
be listened and effective
leadership with consistentvision for long term
development should prevail
5.2.1 Context of the area should
be clearly understood andinnovative ideas and processes
should be supported

5.2 Embracing
complexities

How governance principles and responsibilities areworking in the study area?
All committee members are encouraged to express theiropinion in meetings.
Field  level  employees  and  group’s  representatives  still  too  vigilant to speak before elites.
Interaction occurs but dialogue is limited to project
objective specific agendas. Limited discussion was
performed on burning but sensitive issues.
Lack of trust is evident from absence of important
stakeholders in meetings.
Rules and agendas are fixed ex-situ having local
stakeholders at supportive role on site.
Very limited accountability of committee members andForest Department staff.
Rewards and sanctions mechanism is not free fromnepotism by influential members.
No graduated sanctions are applied de facto for extracting
resources and illegal felling.
No posting of names & duties of committees, ongoing
activities and budget in site offices.
Co-management council have symbolic role only.
Insufficient staff and dissatisfaction of working groups
made large area conservation tough.
Committee and participants are learning from training andvisits to other protected areas.
Lively discussion on co-management activities in meetings.
Forest Department staff will not give up control but
linkages with field groups are made.
Activities depend on project funding but earning moneyfrom eco-tourism has started.
The co-management institutions on site are precarious andhas not attained self-sustaining situation yet.
Tribal community, forest users and women were minimally
involved.
Alternative income generating initiatives were few
compared to needs of forest depended households.
Tribal community was not integrated well in decision
making process and received little financial and material
support for community economic development
Committee is often reluctant to apply regulations tocommittee members. A number of committee members are
known well for past illegal activities in the sanctuary.
Community people depend on local leaders for conflict
resolution. Conflicts related to the sanctuary are discussed
in monthly committee meeting.
A vision for efficient co-management of the sanctuary is
discussed but committee and council members seldom playleadership role or start initiatives.
Innovative ideas like establishing biogas plant, fuelefficient improved cooking stove making are encouraged
through arranging demonstration and training programs.

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3. Performance: responsiveness and efficiency (principle three)
Co-management authorities empowered under government order are reluctant to apply rules tocontrol extraction of resources, which allows widespread breaking of the rules. The field levelgroups cannot hand-over any violator to law enforcing agencies without consulting FD employees.
With very limited alternative income generating support and other financial incentives, the forest
patrolling groups are unwilling to provide voluntary service. On the other hand, NSP field staffs
working in remote locations are unsatisfied with governance and facilities. A project field staff
said: “Major decisions and planning of co-management activities on ground is performed at higher
levels which don’t   reflect  the   acceptance  of  field  level   employees   and   conscious   people.   But  the  system of adding our field experience to  planning  is  not  well  established”.  
Senior project staffs and academics discussed three aspects that mainly have prevented FDfrom efficient management of the sanctuary. These are: 1) administrative faults 2) policy & legal
loopholes and 3) weak enforcement of rules. Co-management did not result in any organizationalor logistical changes in FD, as this has to be approved by central government in cabinet.
4. Fairness: inclusiveness and rule of law (principle four)
The three committees include 57 representatives from the different stakeholder groups of which 31(54%) are from local government or are local elites who rarely visit the sanctuary, 14 (24.5%) areinstitutional stakeholders and 12 (21%) are from resource user including ethnic communities. Only
six (11%) were women (Rahman, 2008). Although some effort was made to be inclusive, theinclusion of different stakeholders did not result in a concerted effort towards viable income
generating activities. A head from tribal community in Whykong union complained about lack ofresources for performing co-management activities:“We  are  not  included  in  [the]  true  sense  in  most  of  the  development  initiatives  in  TWS  area  including activities under the Nishorgo Support Project. We are given responsibilities to implement
small-scale projects like making handicraft[s] but incentives provided for implementing those werevery insufficient. So, it is difficult to sustain these businesses. Again, we take part in performing
big responsibilities like preventing illegal logging in the sanctuary but often do not get information
about the proceedings and do not have decision-making power. We are not happy with activities ofboth  FD  and  NSP  officials”.  
One of the FD field level officials reported about how the corruption disrupts law and order:“Many  times  we  are  bound  to  do what the influential people in the area want. FD employees
are asked to give privileges to them and gets [an] offer to take [a] bribe even from committee
members, otherwise we will be harmed. TWS is a very dangerous area for prevalence of armed
robber groups, smuggling gangs and illegal migrant. Local law enforcing agencies find it muchdifficult to keep control over the fragile law and order  situation”.
5. Direction: strategic vision and embracing complexities (principle five)
A participatory visioning exercise named ‘Nishorgo   vision   2010’ was conducted with thestakeholders by FD staff, which identified a number of future threats to TWS and other protectedareas, and identified co-management as an effective way to deal with these threats (FD, 2007).
Innovative ideas, like planning for ecotourism, public-private partnership, local entrepreneurshipetc., were identified as promising prospect in co-management.
CONCLUSION
Considering the constant deterioration of forest in the TWS and decline in the population of floraand fauna, effective co-management is necessary to prevent unlawful use and extraction of
resources from the sanctuary. The governance framework linking institutions with different
stakeholders in the community holds promise to reduce forest degradation. Some good governanceprinciples were observed, which include finding direction through both strategic vision exercisesand embracing complexities. As well, fairness was evident in efforts to include many diverse
stakeholders on committees. Regarding the fairness principle, efforts were made to support
alternative income generating initiatives but these were small relative to the need. Improvements
are still needed regarding legitimacy and voice, to ensure participation without discrimination andⒸISERD178

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build the trust required for a true consensus-orientation. A real weakness was the lack of
accountability and transparency. As well, performance was poor in its effectiveness and efficiency
with insufficient staff for the large conservation area resulting in continued environmental
degradation. However, justice and the rule of law were not applied with many committee members
continuing to engage in the sanctuary based illegal businesses. This study was useful for
scrutinizing governance performance of the organizations involved in co-management in TWS but
ongoing mechanisms for review would improve the governance function.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We sincerely thank committee and council members, the Forest Department and Nishorgo Support
Project (NSP) staff, University of Manitoba and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(NORAD) for financial support.
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