Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

HUNGARYPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM
3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Final Report

Warsaw
29 July 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTSI.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 1II.

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................... 5III.

BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................... 5IV.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................... 6V.

ELECTION AND REFERENDUM SYSTEMS ............................................................................ 10

VI.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION .................................................................................................. 12

VII.

VOTER REGISTRATION .............................................................................................................. 14

VIII.

CANDIDATE REGISTRATION .................................................................................................... 17

IX.

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................... 19

X.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE ................................................................................................................... 22

XI.

PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES ..................................................................... 24

XII.

MEDIA .............................................................................................................................................. 25
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................................... 25
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................ 26
C. ODIHR EOM MEDIA MONITORING................................................................................................ 28

XIII.

COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS .................................................................................................... 30

XIV.

ELECTION OBSERVATION ......................................................................................................... 33

XV.

ELECTION DAY ............................................................................................................................. 34

XVI.

POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................... 36

XVII. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................. 39
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 39
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................... 40
ANNEX I: ELECTION RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 43
ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATIONMISSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 44
ABOUT ODIHR ............................................................................................................................................ 55

HUNGARYPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM
3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 1
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary to observe the 3
April 2022 parliamentary elections and referendum, in accordance with its mandate and based on therecommendation of a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM), the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutionsand Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 24 February. The
ODIHR EOM assessed the compliance of the elections and referendum processes with OSCE
commitments and other standards for democratic elections, as well as with domestic legislation. For
election day, the ODIHR EOM joined efforts with a delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly(OSCE PA) to form an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM).
In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 4 April, the IEOM concluded thatthe elections and referendum “were well administered and professionally managed but marred by theabsence of a level playing field. Contestants were largely able to campaign freely, but while competitive,
the campaign was highly negative in tone and characterized by a pervasive overlap between the rulingcoalition and the government. Candidate registration was inclusive, offering voters distinct alternatives.
The lack of transparency and insufficient oversight of campaign finances further benefited thegoverning coalition. The bias and lack of balance in monitored news coverage and the absence of
debates between major contestants significantly limited the voters’ opportunity to make an informed
choice. The manner in which many election disputes were handled by election commissions and courts
fell short of providing effective legal remedy. Women were underrepresented in the campaign and as
candidates. Contrary to established international good practice, the legal framework for the referendum
does not guarantee equal opportunities to campaign and voters were not informed in an objective andbalanced manner on the choices presented to them nor on their binding effect. IEOM observers assessed
all stages of the election-day process positively in the overwhelming majority of polling stations
observed and noted few procedural problems and violations, mostly related to voter secrecy and thetransparency of the tabulation process.”
The electoral legal framework provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections but
contains a number of omissions and key provisions that fall short of international standards andobligations, undermining its effectiveness and at times leading to legal uncertainty, mostly related tocampaign rules and provisions for a level playing field. The 2020 amendments to the election laws
introduced some positive technical changes and clarifications; however, the draft amendments were notpublicly available, contrary to the law, and the process lacked genuine consultation with relevant
stakeholders. Many prior ODIHR recommendations largely remain unaddressed, including on suffragerights, prevention of the misuse of administrative resources and blurring of state and party functions,media freedom, campaign finance, and citizen observation.
The referendum legal framework is largely inadequate and does not provide for a level playing field forreferendum campaigns, falling short of key recommendations under international good practice. Undera 2018 amendment, the government has full campaign rights when it is the initiator of a referendum,
contrary to international good practice. Further, the authorities are not obliged to provide the electorate
with objective information on the referendum issues or the positions of the proponents and opponents,
challenging voters ’ability to make an informed choice. While positive efforts were made to amend
legislation to harmonize administrative matters for the concurrent holding of the referendum and1

The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Hungarian.

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Page: 2elections, the holding of simultaneous campaigns led to legal ambiguities, particularly with regard to
campaign rules.
The 199 members of parliament were elected under a mixed electoral system: 106 were elected insingle-mandate constituencies by first-past-the-post voting, and 93 from closed candidate lists in anationwide proportional contest, with varying thresholds for parties and coalitions. A key 2020
amendment to election legislation substantially increased the number of single-mandate candidates thatparties need to nominate in order to contest in the national proportional contest, which some ODIHR
EOM interlocutors considered as an undue barrier to participation. Contrary to international goodpractice, the legislation allows up to a 20 per cent deviation from the average number of voters per
single-mandate constituency and contrary to national legislation, the parliament did not revise theboundaries of constituencies that exceeded the established deviation limit following the 2018 elections.
The unequal voter distribution amongst the constituencies, with up to a 33 per cent deviation, challenges
the principle of equality of the vote.
A referendum is deemed valid if more than 50 per cent of all registered voters cast valid ‘yes’ or ‘no’ballots. The 3 April referendum was proposed by the government and after judicial review included
four questions related to the so-called ‘child protection’ law. While by law the results of all valid
referendums are binding, the legal effect of the 3 April referendum was unclear, as the law which is thelegislative basis of the issues put to the referendum was already in force, at odds with international goodpractice.
The parliamentary elections and the referendum were managed by a four-tier structure of election
administration headed by the National Election Commission (NEC). A parallel structure of election
offices, headed by the National Election Office (NEO), was responsible for the technical administrationof the elections and for aiding the respective commissions in their decision-making process. Overall,the election administration managed technical preparations professionally and efficiently and met alllegal deadlines. NEC sessions were open to the public, and decisions were published in a timely manner.
However, the election administration did not enjoy the full confidence of all electoral contestants,
particularly at the higher level, due to concerns over the dominance of appointees of the ruling majority
in its bodies. Furthermore, most election commission sessions lacked genuine deliberations and werelimited to voting on pre-drafted decisions, especially before the party-delegated members joined,diminishing the collegiality and transparency of the decision-making.
Some 8.22 million voters were included in the voter register, which is maintained by the NEO. The law
contains restrictions on electoral rights based on intellectual disability and distinctions in suffrage rights
based on marital status, at odds with international standards. Political parties and civil-society
organizations (CSOs) that the ODIHR EOM met with expressed overall confidence in the accuracy ofthe voter register, and the NEO’s efforts to publish detailed voter registration figures on a weekly basis
increased transparency of the register. While voter registration figures per constituency for theseelections did not increase substantially, a November 2021 amendment which redefined residency andeased requirements for civil registration weakened safeguards against manipulation of voter
registration.
In an inclusive process, the NEC registered 55 nominating organizations, including 12 minority selfgovernments, from which six national proportional lists with a total of 1,035 candidates were registered.
Constituency Election Commissions registered 663 candidates for elections in the 106 single-mandate
constituencies. Less than 20 per cent of all candidates were women, significantly limiting theopportunity for strengthening the low representation of women in national politics in Hungary. The
process of collecting support signatures for single-mandate constituency candidates was marred bynumerous instances of fraudulent signatures and personal data misuse by some contestants. The election

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Page: 3administration’s efforts to address these violations were not sufficient, dismissing most of the related
complaints on formal grounds.
Fundamental freedoms of association and assembly in the campaign were generally respected, andelection participants were largely able to campaign freely. However, the campaign was marked by theabsence of a level playing field, characterized by a pervasive overlap between the ruling coalition’s
campaign messages and the government’s information campaigns, giving an advantage to the rulingcoalition and blurring the line between state and party. In a highly negative campaign, the war causedby the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine featured prominently, with the ruling and opposition
parties criticizing one another’s stance and launching personal attacks. The ODIHR EOM received
claims that, mainly in rural areas, opposition campaign activities were hindered by pressure on voters,
often by local mayors, not to attend opposition events. The sending of emails and text messages withcampaign messages led to allegations of the misuse of voters ’personal data by the government, theruling party and the United for Hungary opposition coalition. Referendum issues featured in the
campaign only to a limited extent.
Campaign finance legislation remained largely unchanged since the 2018 parliamentary elections, andrecent amendments did not address longstanding recommendations by ODIHR and the Council ofEurope’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). The law does not provide for disclosure ofcampaign donations, which maintains the opacity of campaign funding, at odds with international
commitments and good practice. Extensive spending through third party entities, which largely favoredthe ruling party, rendered spending limits ineffectual. Substantial sums were spent on Facebook
advertising, led by third-party entities associated with Fidesz. The State Audit Office is mandated withcampaign finance oversight and has the power to verify the information submitted to it but lacks theinvestigative capacity to ascertain actual campaign spending. No direct public funding is provided forreferendum campaigns, and there is no referendum spending limit, which further weakens safeguards
for a level playing field. Overall, the legislative shortcomings and limited enforcement of the regulatory
framework negatively affected transparency and accountability of campaign finances.
For these elections, all national minority self-governments except for the Roma minority submitted
candidate lists. Both the ruling party and United for Hungary had Roma candidates in high positions on
their respective proportional lists. While several interlocutors raised longstanding concerns about
potential election violations in relation to the Roma community, including vote-buying and possiblepressure by mayors connected to public employment programmes, the EOM did not directly observe
such instances. The ODIHR EOM observed instances of negative campaign rhetoric stigmatizing Roma.
The media are divided along political lines and operate in an increasingly concentrated market, with
only a handful of independent media operating at the national level. The government and state-affiliatedcompanies dominate the advertising market. Extensive government advertising campaigns and biased
news coverage in the public and many private media monitored by the ODIHR EOM provided apervasive campaign platform for the ruling party. For other parties, the campaign opportunities in the
media were significantly limited by the scarce allocation of free airtime by only a few media as well as
the constitutional prohibition on paid political advertisement, applicable to all political parties. The lackof impartial information in the media about the main contestants, the absence of debates among the
major electoral competitors, and the independent media’s limited access to public information andactivities of national and local government significantly limited voters’ opportunity to make an
informed choice.
The legal framework provides opportunity to seek legal remedy for election disputes on an expedited
basis; however, a recent amendment that restricts the legal standing to appeal decisions of election
commissions unduly limits the right to seek effective legal remedy. The NEC considered complaints

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Page: 4and appeals in public sessions within established deadlines and promptly published its decisions,contributing to the transparency of the process. Half of the filed complaints and appeals were denied
consideration by the NEC on technical grounds, and some dismissals on merit lacked necessary
examination or sound reasoning. While some election disputes were adequately resolved, the handlingof most cases by the adjudicating bodies fell short of providing effective legal remedy, contrary to
OSCE commitments.
The law provides for international election observation at all stages of the process, and the accreditation
process for international observers was efficient. However, despite repeated ODIHR recommendations,
it does not allow for observation of the election process by citizen observers, contrary to OSCE
commitments and international standards. A civil-society initiative delegated more than 19,000
volunteers to act as party-delegated polling station members across the country. CSOs also provided
civic awareness and voter-education campaigns, and election-day monitoring in the vicinity of polling
station aimed at preventing irregularities. Party observers could observe the tabulation process atconstituency and national level and the counting of postal votes.
IEOM observers assessed all stages of the election day process positively in the overwhelming majorityof polling stations observed. Election day was peaceful, with a voter turnout of 69.5 per cent, as
announced by the NEO. The opening was assessed positively in 116 of the 117 polling stations observed
by IEOM observers and opening procedures were largely followed. Voter identification and voting
procedures were largely respected, but secrecy was often compromised. Overcrowding and group voting
was frequently observed. IEOM observers reported only isolated cases of other violations or instancesof tension or intimidation in and around polling stations. Counting procedures were largely followed,
and IEOM observers reported relatively few procedural errors and omissions. The tabulation proceduresat Local Election Offices (LEOs) were generally followed but in some cases, transparency related toaccess to the premises and to data entry was lacking. IEOM observers noted some minor issues with thedata entry and reconciliation of election results. A total of 456,129 out-of-country voters were eligible
to cast postal ballots, out of which 318,083 voters (69.7 per cent) returned their packages. Other out-ofcountry voters had to cast their ballots in-person in Hungarian diplomatic representations. The differingmodalities for out-of-country voting challenged the principle of equal suffrage, and the postal voting
procedures do not include adequate safeguards to ensure the integrity and reliability of the process.
The NEC on 14 April announced the final election and referendum results. Some 16 per cent of returned
postal voting packages were declared invalid due to voters not being on the register, or missing or
incorrect data. The referendum was declared invalid as none of the four questions reached the required
threshold of 50 per cent of registered voters casting a valid vote; 20 per cent of referendum ballots castwere invalidated by the voters or otherwise found invalid. The NEC issued fines against CSOs that had
encouraged voters through social media and online websites to invalidate their referendum ballots. On
appeal, the Supreme Court overturned these decisions, on grounds that they unlawfully curtailed
freedom of expression, which the court reasoned should be protected at a higher level during a campaign
period.
This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Hungary closer
in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democraticelections. Priority recommendations relate to the legal framework, the separation of state and rulingparty and misuse of state resources, voter registration, campaign finance, the adjudication of electoral
disputes, the media, election observation, and the delimitation of constituency boundaries. ODIHR
stands ready to assist the authorities to further improve the electoral process and to address therecommendations contained in this and previous reports.

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II.

Page: 5INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary to observe the 3
April 2022 parliamentary elections and referendum, in accordance with its mandate and based on therecommendation of a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) conducted from 17 to 21 January, the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation
Mission (EOM) on 24 February. The mission, led by Jillian Stirk, consisted of a 20-member core team
based in Budapest and 18 long-term observers (LTOs) deployed on 5 March to eight locations aroundthe country. Mission members came from 18 OSCE participating States. The ODIHR EOM remainedin country until 14 April.
For election-day observation, an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) was formed as acommon endeavour of the ODIHR EOM and a delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE
PA). Kari Henriksen was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Co-ordinator andleader of the OSCE short-term observers. The OSCE PA delegation was led by Mark Pritchard. Eachof the institutions involved in the IEOM has endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles forInternational Election Observation. On election day, 312 observers from 45 OSCE participating States
were deployed, including 221 observers deployed by ODIHR, as well as a 91-member delegation fromthe OSCE PA; 47 per cent of the IEOM members were women.
The ODIHR EOM assessed the compliance of the elections and referendum processes with OSCE
commitments and other standards for democratic elections, as well as domestic legislation. This final
report follows a Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, which was released on 4 April
2022. 2The ODIHR EOM wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the invitation toobserve the elections and referendum, and the National Election Commission (NEC) and the National
Election Office (NEO) for their assistance and co-operation. It also expresses its appreciation to othernational and local state institutions, political parties, candidates, civil society, media, international
community representatives, and other interlocutors for sharing their views and for their co-operation.
III.

BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Hungary is a parliamentary republic, with legislative powers vested in a unicameral parliament. The
government, led by the prime minister, exercises broad executive powers. On 11 January 2022, thenPresident János Áder called parliamentary elections for 3 April. 3 The same day, the President also set
the date for a referendum on matters addressed by the so-called ‘child protection’ law to be held
concurrently with the parliamentary elections. 4 A state of danger, introduced in Hungary following theoutbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, remained in force throughout the election period. 5
Since coming to power in 2010, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, with its coalition partner, theChristian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), has held a two-thirds parliamentary majority for most
2
3
4

5

See previous ODIHR election observation reports on Hungary.
On 10 March 2022, in anticipation of the end of Mr. Áder’s second five-year term in May 2022, the parliamentelected Katalin Novák, former Vice-President of Fidesz, as the next president, the first female president of Hungary.
The Law on Stricter Measures against Pedophile Offenders and Amending Certain Laws to Protect Children was
adopted on 15 June 2021. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) Opinion from 13 December 2021 found the law incompatible with international human rights norms.
The state of danger, introduced in Hungary following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, was in placethroughout the election period (extended until 1 June 2022).

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Page: 6of the period. 6 Some of the significant legislative changes initiated by the ruling majority have led toinfringement procedures against Hungary by the European Commission (EC). 7 After the adoption of
the so-called ‘child protection’ law in June 2021, the EC initiated a legal action against Hungary for
violations of the fundamental rights of LGBTI people, following which Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
announced his intention to call a referendum. 8
7F

Women are generally underrepresented in public life in Hungary, and only twenty-six out of 199 MPs
in the outgoing parliament (13 per cent) and 2 out of 13 government ministers were women. On 10
March 2022, in anticipation of the end of Mr. Áder’s second five-year term in May 2022, the parliamentelected Katalin Novák, nominated by Fidesz, as the next president, the first female president of
Hungary. Following 2022 elections, only twenty-eight MPs and one of the government ministers are
women.
The ruling coalition contested in the elections with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as its joint prime
ministerial candidate. For these elections, six opposition parties, the Democratic Coalition (DK), Jobbik,
the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Momentum, the LMP – Hungary’s Green Party, and Dialogue,
agreed to back a joint prime ministerial candidate. They also agreed to support a single candidate ineach of the 106 single-mandate constituencies, and to put forward a joint list for the proportional
component. In primary elections held in September and October 2021, the mayor of Hódmezővásárhely
Péter Márki-Zay, was chosen as the prime ministerial candidate for the United for Hungary opposition
bloc. Other election contestants included the Our Homeland Movement, the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog
Party, the Normal Life Party, and the Solution Movement.
IV.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKThe Constitution provides for fundamental rights and freedoms, and Hungary is party to key
international human rights treaties and conventions pertinent to democratic elections. 9 These rights andfreedoms are exercised in a constrained environment. Media freedom, freedom of association,

6

7

8

9

In the 2018 parliamentary elections, the Fidesz–KDNP coalition won 133 out of 199 seats; Jobbik won 26; the
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in coalition with Dialogue won 20; the Democratic Coalition (DK) won 9;
Politics Can be Different (LMP; the party was renamed to LMP – Hungary’s Green Party in 2020) won 8 seats, theTogether party won one seat, and there was one independent. The National Self-government of Germans in Hungary
won one seat from the minority list component.
In June 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that a 2017 law restricting foreign funding of civil-society
organizations did not comply with EU law. In April 2021, parliament revoked the law. In November 2021, the ECJ
found the so-called ‘stop Soros law’, which criminalizes participating in organized assistance to illegal immigrants,
to be in violation of EU law. On 16 February 2022, the ECJ rejected a challenge by Hungary to a European ruleconditioning funding on respect for the rule of law.
The EC initiated infringement procedures on 15 July 2021. Mr. Orbán in an interview on 23 July 2021 stated that
“we need the referendum […] because Brussels attacked Hungary… We need everyone, the support of every
Hungarian person, otherwise we cannot win this battle.”
These include the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2003 Convention against Corruption, 2006 Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

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particularly for civil-society organizations (CSOs), 10 and access to information have been restricted inrecent years, 11 and safeguards for judicial independence have been weakened, including by recent
legislative changes. 12 Such limitations undermine international obligations and standards calling for fullenjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms. 13 Under the declared state of danger in force during theelection period, the government held extraordinary powers to issue decrees, including ones that may
restrict or suspend certain fundamental rights and freedoms. 14 While most pandemic-related restrictions
had been lifted prior to the elections, including on freedom of assembly, a decree extending the deadline
for the government to respond to access-to-information requests remained in force (see Media).
To provide a fully democratic basis for the conduct of elections and conditions that enable full andequal participation for all election stakeholders, parliament should review the broader legal framework
for compliance with international obligations and standards pertinent to fundamental rights andfreedoms that underpin a democratic election, including on judicial independence.
Parliamentary elections are primarily regulated by the 2011 Fundamental Law (Constitution), the 2011
Act on the Elections of Members of Parliament (Elections Act), the 2013 Act on Election Procedure,
and the 2013 Act on the Transparency of Campaign Costs (Campaign Finance Act). 15 Some election
law provisions of an administrative nature have cardinal status requiring two-thirds parliamentary
approval, thereby limiting parliament’s ability to effectively respond to necessary operational
modifications. The electoral legal framework includes binding regulations issued by the Minister ofJustice, though the elections were held largely without subsidiary legislation. 16 The Supreme Court
may, on its own initiative, render binding decisions to ensure the uniform application of law within the
judiciary. 17
10

11

12

13

14

15
16

17

The Joint ODIHR and Venice Commission Opinion on the so-called “Stop Soros” draft legislative package which
directly affect NGOs criticizes a key provision on illegal migration which introduces the offence of “facilitating
irregular migration”, and considers that it unfairly criminalises organisational activities not directly related to thematerialization of illegal migration, including “preparing or distributing informational materials” or “initiating
asylum requests for migrants.” The 16 November 2021 Judgement of the European Court of Justice stated that bycriminalising organising activities in relation to the initiation of a procedure for international protection by persons
not fulfilling the national criteria for granting that protection, Hungary infringed the EU law.
In 2020, in addition to defamation and libel, which were already criminalized, amendments to the Criminal Codeintroduced the offence of fearmongering, which effectively bans intentionally spreading misinformation thathinders the government response to the pandemic, subject to a maximum five-year prison term. Concurrent withthe 2021 repeal of a law restricting foreign funding of CSOs due to a finding by the ECJ on its non-compliancewith EU law, the parliament enacted the Act “on transparency of civil society organizations capable of influencing
public life”.
The Opinion of the Venice Commission on the 2019–2020 amendments concerning the judiciary stated that thechanges “could pose serious risks of politicization [of the Supreme Court] and important consequences for the
independence of the judiciary.”
Paragraph 8 of General Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of the ICCPR notes that “citizens also take part in the conductof public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through theircapacity to organize themselves.” See also Articles 19, 21, 22, and 25 of the ICCPR. Further, see Paragraph 19 ofGeneral Comment No. 34 to Article 19 of the ICCPR. See also paragraphs 20–25 of the ODIHR and Venice
Commission Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association.
Decrees issued by the government under the state of danger can remain in effect after 15 days with the approval ofparliament. The de facto indefinite rule by decree in Hungary’s COVID-19 response was noted by the OSCE’s
Parliamentary Assembly in April 2020 as “a dangerous step that undermines democracy in the country.”
Other relevant legislation governs political party finances, the rights of national minorities, the media, citizenshipand civil registration, criminal offences, and court proceedings.
On 11 January 2022, the Minister of Justice issued three decrees regulating the administration, timelines andfinancing of the 2022 elections and referendum. The National Election Commission (NEC) may issue non-binding
guidelines to ensure uniform application of the legislation by election bodies, but the NEC does not have authority
to issue binding regulations under the law. Fourteen NEC guidelines, adopted between 2014 and 2019, are in effect.
Despite certain ambiguities in the election legislation, the court’s body of uniformity decisions does not include
matters related to election law.

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Consideration could be given to reviewing the use of cardinal status for election law provisions. To
enhance legal certainty and contribute to consistent application of the election legislation, the National
Election Commission could be empowered to adopt binding regulations. In addition, the Supreme Court
could consider exercising its power to issue key uniformity decisions with respect to the application ofelection-related legislation.
The electoral legal framework forms an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections;however, it contains a number of omissions and provisions that fall short of international standards andobligations, undermining its effectiveness. The legal framework underwent a series of amendments
following the 2018 parliamentary elections. 18 The most recent substantive changes were proposed by
the government and adopted in 2020, in one package of amendments to seven laws. These related to arange of election-administration matters and also included a key change to political parties’ eligibility
to contest the proportional part of the elections (see Election and Referendum Systems). 19 In breach of
the law and international standards, the draft legislation was not published by the government withinvitation for comments. 20 Moreover, its adoption lacked genuine consultation with relevant
stakeholders, contrary to international commitments and good practice. 21 The lack of consultation andhasty adoption drew criticism from the opposition and civil society, while certain provisions wereperceived by some to be politically motivated. 22
While the 2020 amendments introduced a number of positive technical changes and clarifications,
aspects of some new provisions raise concerns, as also noted in a Joint Opinion of ODIHR and theCouncil of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Commission). 23 The amendments did not address a number of previous ODIHR recommendations to
18

19
20

21

22

23

Amendments to the Elections Act and/or Act on Election Procedure, as well as other relevant acts, were adopted inJuly 2018, December 2018, December 2019, December 2020, and November 2021. Apart from one single
amendment adopted in 2021, all amendment packages passed in parliament without opposition support or an
inclusive stakeholder consultation process.
The National Election Office (NEO) informed the ODIHR EOM that the election-administration amendments werelargely based on its proposals, stemming from lessons learned in prior elections.
The Act on Social Participation in Preparing Laws requires drafts prepared by government ministers to be available
to the public for comment for a period sufficient to make the necessary evaluation and to review any feedback prior
to submission to parliament. The ODIHR and Venice Commission 2021 Joint Opinion on 2020 Amendment toElectoral Legislation stated that “The whole package was adopted by Parliament a few weeks later, apparently
without public consultation, and came into force after one week only, with a few exceptions concerning
constitutional amendments.”
Paragraph 5.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that the legislation should be adopted at the end ofa public procedure. Paragraph 18.1 of the 1991 Moscow Document states that “Legislation will be formulated andadopted as the result of an open process reflecting the will of the people, either directly or through their elected
representatives”. Paragraph 48 of the 2020 Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation also specifically
recommend that “[l]egislation shall be adopted through a democratic process that ensures public participation andreview, and shall be made widely accessible so that individuals and political parties are aware of their rights andare able to keep their conduct and activities in conformity with the law.” The Ministry of Justice informed the EOMthat they considered the views of the civil society sector to be aligned with the political opposition and therefore
deemed consultations with these organizations unnecessary. The 2020 amendments were submitted to parliamenton 10 November, tabled on 10 December, and adopted on 15 December, with 134 ‘yes’ and 60 ‘no’ votes.
For instance, civil-society groups reported concerns about the 2018 and 2020 amendment packages – neither ofwhich underwent a consultative process – such as the shortened deadline for applications for absentee voting, lackof safeguards for postal voting, and new restrictions for seeking legal remedy in election disputes and also referredto additional provisions to address other problems identified in prior elections.
The Joint Opinion, which was requested by the authorities following the adoption of the amendments, noted somepositive changes related to voter and candidate registration, campaigning, postal voting, mobile voting,determination of election results, and repeat elections. Still, recommendations made in the Joint Opinion remain
unaddressed.

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Page: 9bring the laws further in line with international standards and commitments, including those related tosuffrage rights, the electoral-boundary delimitation mechanism, prevention of the misuse ofadministrative resources and blurring of state and party functions, media freedom, campaign finance,and citizen observation. 24 The authorities informed the ODIHR EOM that some of the recommendations
they had deemed not to be in line with Hungarian democratic and legal traditions would not be
addressed. 25 Gaps in the regulation of the campaign led to the election commissions and courts
effectively defining the rules during the adjudication of complaints. Legal certainty was further
challenged as the decisions on complaints and appeals that shaped the regulation of these campaign
matters were often overturned or annulled by higher adjudicative bodies.
To ensure a coherent and sound electoral framework, the legislation should be reviewed to bring it
further in line with OSCE commitments, international standards and good practice, well in advance ofthe next election period and on the basis of an inclusive and meaningful public consultation process.
The referendum legal framework is largely inadequate for the conduct of a democratic referendum anddoes not provide for a level playing field for such campaigns. 26 Under a 2018 amendment, thegovernment has full campaign rights as a referendum initiator. The Referendum Act does not prescribe
the neutrality of public authorities, nor ban their use of public funds for referendum campaigns as party
to the contest. Moreover, it guarantees equal opportunity to campaign in the broadcast media forparliamentary parties and the government, when it is the initiator of a referendum, instead ofguaranteeing equal campaign opportunity for the supporters and opponents of the referendum proposals.
These provisions are at odds with international good practice. 27 Neither the government nor the election
bodies are legally bound to provide voters with objective and balanced information on the issues put tothe referendum or the positions of the proponents and opponents on the issues, which is also not in linewith international good practice and challenged voters’ ability to make an informed choice. 28
A legislative ban on holding concurrently a national referendum and elections was lifted in November
2021. 29 The overlapping campaigns of these two events resulted in some complexity and ambiguities
in the applicability of the campaign rules, which were left unaddressed. Positively, some administrative24
25

26
27

28

29

In paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, all OSCE participating States committed themselves tofollow-up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.
For example, prior ODIHR recommendations to fully repeal restrictions on the voting rights of persons withintellectual disabilities, in line with international standards, and to repeal discriminatory voting rights based on
marital status are considered by the authorities not to be in line with Hungarian legal tradition.
Referendums are regulated by the Constitution and the 2013 Act on Initiating Referendums, the European Citizen’s
Initiative and Referendum Procedure (Referendum Act).
Guidelines I.2.2 and I.3.1 and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practiceon Referendums state: “Equality of opportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal
being voted on notably as concerns the coverage by the media, in particular news broadcasts, as well as public
subsidies and other forms of backing… Administrative authorities must observe their duty of neutrality, [to ensure]equality of opportunity [and as] one of the means of ensuring that voters can form an opinion freely… Contrary to
the case of elections, it is not necessary to prohibit completely intervention by the authorities in support of or against
the proposal… However, the public authorities must not influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided
campaigning and must not abuse their position… [T]he use of public funds by the authorities for campaigning
purposes must be prohibited.”
Guideline I.3.1.d and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on
Referendums state, in part: “The authorities must provide objective information… This implies that the text
submitted to a referendum and an explanatory report or balanced campaign material from the proposal’s supporters
and opponents should be made [directly] available to electors sufficiently in advance… in order to enable voters toarrive at an informed opinion…”
The amendment was proposed by an opposition MP, and 183 MPs supported its adoption. In addition, on 1 January2022, a complete ban on holding national referendums introduced by the government under a pandemic-related
emergency decree was lifted, while the ban on local referendums remained in force.

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Page: 10related amendments were subsequently introduced to the legislation aimed at harmonizing the
concurrent administration of such events. 30 While the Referendum Act refers to the application ofprovisions in the election legislation to the conduct of referendums, the lack of clear regulation of thereferendum campaign and its intersection with the election campaign adversely impacted the process. 31
Consideration should be given to review the referendum law to enhance legal certainty and bring it inline with international good practice for the holding of democratic referendums, including guarantees
of equal campaign opportunities for the proponents and opponents, a ban on the use of state resources,
and the provision of objective or balanced information to voters on the referendum issues.
V.

ELECTION AND REFERENDUM SYSTEMSThe 199 members of parliament are elected for a four-year term under a mixed system: 106 are electedin single-mandate constituencies by first-past-the-post voting, and 93 are elected from closed candidate
lists in a nationwide proportional contest through a partially compensatory system, with varying
thresholds of 5 per cent for parties standing individually, 10 per cent for two-party coalitions, and 15
per cent for coalitions of three or more parties. Under international good practice, the thresholds
applicable to party coalitions can be viewed as especially high, even for alliances. 32 Parties that pass thethreshold have the surplus votes from the single-mandate contests added to their vote totals before theproportional seat allocation. 33
The 2020 amendments introduced stricter criteria for parties to run in the proportional contest, requiring
the simultaneous nomination of at least 71 single-mandate candidates in a minimum of 14 of the 19
counties and in Budapest, an increase from a previous requirement of 27 candidates and 9 counties andBudapest. 34 While parties and other stakeholders generally agree that such a measure may alleviate aprevalent problem of so-called ‘fake parties’ running only to misappropriate public campaign funds, theincrease might be considered an undue barrier to participation, limiting political pluralism. 35
The constituency boundaries are entrenched in legislation as cardinal law that can only be changed with
two-thirds parliamentary support, and without mandated periodic review by an independent expert

30
31

32

33
34
35

For instance, deadlines for adjudication of election and referendum complaints were aligned in cases where theprocesses are to be simultaneously held.
For instance, the Referendum Act does not have a clear definition of political advertisement for referendums, while
the applicable definition of political advertisement in the Act on Election Procedure does not include the conceptof referendum campaigning. Free media airtime dedicated to referendum campaign advertisements was in somecases used for election campaign advertisements.
See the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case in Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, where the Court stated thata 10 per cent threshold, although not a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, seemed excessive
and recommended to lower it.
Surplus votes are the votes a party’s unsuccessful single-mandate candidates received and the votes of a party’s
winning candidates over and above those needed to win. The proportional seat allocation uses the d’Hondt method.
The proposal of the Ministry of Justice was to increase the number of candidates to 50, which was further increased
to 71 based on a proposal of an independent MP.
ODIHR and the Venice Commission in their Joint Opinion recommended significantly lowering the amended
numbers, noting that the stricter requirement “might aggravate the level of political polarization in the politicalarena and ultimately in the society” and that other means to minimize ‘fake’ parties could be used.

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body. 36 The delineation of the constituencies has not changed since 2014 when they were firstestablished under a new electoral system. There is a significantly unequal distribution of registeredvoters amongst the constituencies, with 25 of the 106 constituencies having more than a 10 per centdeviation, ranging up to a 33 per cent deviation, at odds with the principle of equal suffrage. 37 The
Elections Act allows up to a 20 per cent deviation from the average number of voters per single-mandate
constituency, contrary to international good practice. Moreover, in some instances, the deviations
breach the domestic law as revision of constituency boundaries that exceeded the legislated 20 per centmaximum deviation did not take place following the 2018 elections as required. 38
To guarantee the equality of the vote, the legal framework for delimitation of constituency boundaries
should be brought in line with international standards and good practice. Current boundaries should
be redefined in line with such revised law and by an independent body in a transparent and inclusive
manner well in advance of the next elections.
Each of the 13 national minority self-governments are entitled to submit a single candidate list that is
voted on by self-declared voters of the respective minority. 39 The first candidate on the list requires one
fourth of the standard electoral quota to be elected. 40 If this preferential quota is not reached, the national
minority is entitled to a non-voting parliamentary spokesperson.
National referendums can be initiated by 200,000 voters or ordered at the discretion of the parliament
when initiated by the president, the government, or at least 100,000 voters. 41 The 2022 referendum wasinitiated by the government. The NEC, which determines compliance of the referendum questions with
substantive and procedural legal criteria, approved all five proposed questions but on appeal theSupreme Court overruled the decision on one of them. 42 Multiple questions appear on the same ballot
36

37

38

39
40
41
42

The Elections Act provides for a maximum deviation of 15 per cent in most cases and above that in certain
circumstances at the time of boundary delimitation and requires parliament to amend the boundaries if any
constituency surpasses 20 per cent deviation based on the voter distribution as of the last parliamentary elections.
Guideline I.2.2 of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters states that “the permissible
departure from the norm should not be more than 10 per cent and should certainly not exceed 15 percent, except in
special circumstances.” Guideline II.2.2.vii provides that “when constituency boundaries are redefined it must be
done impartially; without detriment to national minorities; taking account of the opinion of a committee, themajority of whose members are independent. The parliament would then make a decision on the basis of thecommission’s proposals with the possibility of a single appeal.”
This includes 18 constituencies with more than 15 per cent deviation, of which 7 are more than 20 per cent, thelatter all in Pest county, based on current population distribution. See paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen
Document, which states that the participating States will “guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens”.
Paragraph 21 of General Comment No. 25 to Article 25 of the ICCPR states: “…within the framework of eachState's electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another.” On 28 October 2021, a
Hungarian citizen lodged a petition with the ECtHR arguing that the deviations violated the ECHR. The petition
was ruled inadmissible on grounds that the alleged breached right does not fall within the Convention.
The two concerned constituencies are No. 02 and 05 in Pest county. By law, constituency boundaries cannot bechanged starting from the calendar year preceding the year of a scheduled election. In August 2020, the NEO
submitted to the Ministry of Justice proposed revised boundaries of several constituencies to ensure the voter
distribution was within the legislated limit; the proposal was never tabled in parliament. In December 2020, an
opposition member tabled the same boundary revision proposal, which in turn was voted down.
Voters who self-declared that they belong to a national minority may choose to vote for the respective national
minority list, in which case they do not participate in the vote on the national party lists.
The preferential quota is determined by dividing the total number of national list votes, including surplus votes
from single-mandate contests, by 93 and then dividing that number by four.
Referendums may only be held on matters within parliament’s purview, with exceptions including issues that
impact international treaty obligations.
Multiple petitions to the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court challenged the substantive and procedural validityof the five referendum questions. One question overturned by the Supreme Court was subsequently confirmed by
the Constitutional Court; however, in the meantime the parliament had already called the referendum for the fourother questions. On re-examination, the Supreme Court on 23 March again rejected the fifth question.

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Page: 12with each question offering a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ option. A referendum is deemed valid if more than 50 per
cent of all registered voters cast valid ballots. While by law all valid referendum results are binding, thelegal effect of a potentially valid referendum on 3 April was unclear, as the legislative basis of the issues
put to the referendum, the 2021 ‘child protection’ law, was already in force, at odds with international
good practice. 43
VI.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The parliamentary elections and referendum were managed by a parallel four-tiered administration
comprised of the NEC, 20 Regional Election Commissions (RECs), 106 Constituency Election
Commissions (CoECs), and 10,243 Polling Station Commissions (PSCs). In addition, the NEO, 20
Regional Election Offices (REOs), 97 Constituency Election Offices (CoEOs), and 1,264 Local
Election Offices (LEOs) were responsible for administering elections and for providing assistance tothe respective commissions in their decision-making process.
Election commissions comprise elected and delegated members. The NEC is a permanent independent
body composed of seven elected members, including the president. They are nominated by the presidentof Hungary and elected by parliament with two thirds of the votes. The law does not establish clear
procedures and lists only general criteria for nominations by the president, vesting her or him with wide
discretionary powers. 44 The mechanism for appointing NEC members does not provide a reasonable
possibility for public consultation on the selection of NEC nominees and thus negatively impacts theoverall trust in the election administration. The NEC also has delegated members, political parties thathave a faction in parliament can each delegate one member to the NEC to represent them in the NEC in
between election processes. Once elections have been called, these party-delegated members no longer
take part in NEC sessions.
After registration for the elections, entities that field national proportional lists can delegate a member
to the NEC. 45 National minority self-governments that register a list can also each delegate a NEC
member who has voting rights only on issues affecting national minorities. Of the 18 NEC members
serving during these elections, only four, including the vice-president, were women. No readily
available gender-disaggregated data was provided regarding the composition of lower-levelcommissions, at odds with international standards. 46 For some 50 days, from the calling of the elections
until the nomination of party-delegated NEC members, a number of decisions on the registration ofparty lists, as well as the adjudication of complaints and appeals, took place without party-delegatedmembers, detracting from the pluralism of the NEC’s decision-making.
Consideration should be given to amending the legislation to ensure cross-party participation in the
NEC from the period of calling elections.
43

44

45
46

Guideline I.3.1.c. of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums states that “The question
put to the vote must be clear; it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer; electors must be informedof the effects of the referendum; voters must be able to answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blankvote.”
Section 17 of the Act on Election Procedure lists the following criteria for NEC members: Voters with an addressin Hungary who are eligible to vote in parliamentary elections and who hold a law degree can be NEC elected
members. Section 18 enumerates the grounds for incompatibility with holding a public office position: President,
speaker of the National Assembly, candidate, member of the armed forces, member of a political party or
nominating organization, or relative of a candidate.
For these elections, six political entities and five national minority self-governments delegated NEC members, whostarted attending sessions on 4 March.
According to paragraph 48d of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 23, State parties should provide “statistical
data, disaggregated by sex, showing the percentage of women relative to men who enjoy those rights”.

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Election offices operate in a hierarchical structure headed by the NEO president, who is appointed by
the president of Hungary, upon the prime minister’s nomination, for a nine-year term. Up to three vicepresidents, appointed for indefinite terms, assist the NEO president. The NEO is a state administrative
body tasked with the technical preparation and administration of the elections. Lower-level offices areheaded by municipal clerks and act as secretariats for the election commissions at the corresponding
level.
RECs, CoECs and PSCs each consist of three members elected by the corresponding county or local
representative body, based on proposals from the respective election offices. 47 Recent amendments havebroadened LEOs’ discretion in nominating additional PSC members in case PSCs have less than fivemembers due to insufficient nominations from contestants. 48 The recruitment of PSC members was
conducted by public calls which did not contain detailed criteria and did not follow a unified approach,diminishing the transparency and consistency of the selection process. LEOs provided training for PSC
registrars, who assist PSCs on election day and are responsible for filling out the results protocols, andorganized sessions for the elected and delegated PSC members, based on training materials producedby the NEO. The training sessions for PSC members attended by ODIHR EOM observers were assessed
as well-organized and comprehensive. CoECs and RECs did not receive standardized training, contrary
to international good practice, including regarding the RECs’ new role related to appeals on candidate
registration, but they could consult CoEOs and REOs if needed. 49
Election commissions are tasked by law to establish the results of the elections and to ensure fairness,
lawfulness, and impartiality of the electoral process, with assistance provided by election offices. In
most cases observed, election offices appeared to have overall responsibility for the election process interms of preparations, organization, management of the commission member nomination process,preparing commissions’ agenda and draft decisions, access to tabulation, and aggregation of results.
ODIHR EOM observers found that the parallel operation of offices and commissions, both defined bylaw as independent bodies but without clearly separated functions in practice, diminished thetransparency of the election management process. 50
Overall, the election administration managed the technical preparations professionally and efficiently
and met all legal deadlines. Between the call of the elections and the announcement of the election
results, the NEC held 39 sessions that were open to the public; the agenda was announced shortly before
each session, and NEC decisions were published in a timely manner. However, most sessions of election
commissions lacked genuine deliberations and were limited to voting on pre-drafted decisions,especially before the delegated members joined. This, along with strict time restrictions on members ’interventions, diminished the transparency and collegiality of the decision-making. 51 Following the
50F

47
48
49

50

51

In some cases, CoEOs and LEOs were headed by the same official.
Political parties and independent candidates registered in the respective constituency may nominate up to two
members each per PSC.
The ODIHR EOM was informed by some CoEOs that CoECs members are experienced election lawyers anduniversity professors and do not need training. The NEC chairperson, however, shared that CoECs did not
adjudicate complaints in a uniform manner during the election period and could benefit from training. Training wascompulsory only for staff of election offices and elected PSC members. Guideline II.3.1 of Code of Good Practicein Electoral Matters notes that “Members of electoral commissions must receive standard training.”
In a number of cases, ODIHR EOM long-term observers reported that access to CoEC members and meetings withcommissions were not possible without the facilitation and active involvement of election offices. In some cases,
this also undermined the perception of impartiality of the election bodies, as commission members were often
consulting the offices in their replies. Moreover, election offices have the main responsibility during the tabulation
process as they are aggregating the results and have access to the National Election System.
Paragraph 4 of the NEC Rules of Procedure (in Hungarian) specifies that commissioners may speak on two agenda
items during a session, with two interventions of two and one minute, respectively. This might be extended to fiveHungary
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Page: 142020 legislative amendments NEC sessions could be held using electronic channels, but these were notbroadcast or streamed online, and session minutes were published with a considerable delay of some 30days, decreasing transparency. Furthermore, the election administration did not enjoy the fullconfidence of some electoral contestants, particularly at the higher-level, due to concerns over thedominance of ruling majority appointees. 52
A 2020 amendment to the Act on Election Procedure granted the NEC president the right to direct thecontent of pre-drafted decisions, with NEC members able to propose amendments at the public session.
The law does not allow for genuine deliberation and limits the input of NEC members, undermining thetransparency and collegiality of the decision-making process, particularly on complaints and appeals.
While the NEC took more than 360 decisions in the election period, during the NEC sessions observedby the ODIHR EOM, only in six cases were minor amendments made to decisions related to complaints
and appeals. 53 For the period before the party-delegated members joined the NEC, the majority of NEC
decisions were taken unanimously and rarely with substantive deliberations.
To guarantee collegiality and transparency of the decision-making, consideration should be given toproviding all commission members meaningful opportunities to contribute to the formulation ofdecisions. The decision-making process should be inclusive and open for deliberation of alternative
proposals of all decisions.
The election administration made efforts to strengthen the accessibility of the elections for persons withdisabilities, in line with the law. 54 The NEO maintained a website with voter information for theelections and referendum, as well as voter education materials and easy-to-read content tailored forusers with visual and other impairments. Some 2,197 persons requested to vote at a designatedaccessible polling station, and 225 requested a voting template in Braille for use on election day. In
addition, 92,643 voters requested to vote using a mobile ballot box. An average of 76 per cent of polling
stations were reported by the NEO as being accessible for voters with physical disabilities or reduced
mobility; IEOM observers on election day reported that some 27 per cent of the polling stations visitedwere not accessible for independent use. Voter education was overall limited and did not facilitate asufficient understanding of voting procedures. ODIHR EOM long-term observers reported that voter
education campaigns were mainly conducted by CSOs and by election offices, with some conducting
awareness campaigns and sending letters to voters.
VII.

VOTER REGISTRATION

All citizens who are at least 18 years of age on election day and married citizens over 16 are entitled tovote. 55 The distinction based on marital status is at odds with international standards. 56 Those declared

52
53
54

55
56

minutes in total. While this rule may make meetings more efficient, it does not allow reasonable time for thoroughdeliberations.
Similarly, in a few localities controlled by the opposition, Fidesz raised concerns about lower-level election bodies.
The ODIHR EOM observed the vast majority of NEC sessions held during the observation period; its decisions
were largely related to complaints and appeals.
The Concluding Observations on Hungary of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, issued
on 25 March 2022, raised a number of concerns related to the right to vote of persons with disabilities and issued
four related recommendations including on suffrage rights, assisted voting, reasonable accommodation, andmeasures to promote the election and appointment of persons with disabilities.
The Constitution grants the right to vote and stand in elections to all adult citizens. Under the Civil Code, marriedcitizens over the age of 16 are given full rights as adults.
Paragraph 3 of General Comment No. 25 on Article 25 of the ICCPR states that “no distinctions are permitted
between citizens in the enjoyment of [voting rights] on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, politicalor other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.

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Page: 15of limited mental capacity may be disenfranchised by an individualized court decision, contrary tointernational standards. 57 The ODIHR EOM was informed by interlocutors from the CSOs that despite
the introduction in 2013 of a legal requirement for individualized court decisions as a replacement forthe previous blanket disenfranchisement of mentally incapacitated persons, the courts continue toautomatically disenfranchise such persons, and earlier decisions on deprivation of voting rights havenot been re-examined. 58
The Criminal Code provides that a court can deprive an individual of voting rights if convicted andimprisoned for an intentional crime and “deemed unworthy to take part in public affairs.” Any period
of disenfranchisement must include the time in prison and an additional one to ten years following
serving of the sentence. 59 Contrary to international good practice, the law does not guarantee theproportionality of the decision and length of disenfranchisement, for instance, allowing
disenfranchisement even for minor offences. 60 Moreover, according to some ODIHR EOM
interlocutors, the vast majority of convicts are disenfranchised for a period equal to the term of
imprisonment following their release, rather than based on an individualized, proportional assessment.
Restrictions of the voting rights of persons with mental and intellectual disabilities, as well as
distinctions in voting rights based on marital status, should be removed. Restrictions on voting rights
of convicts should be reviewed to ensure that any limitation is clearly defined in the law andproportionate to the gravity of the crime committed.
The voter register is maintained by the NEO, based on the civil registry. 61 A total of 8,215,466 citizens
were eligible to vote in the parliamentary elections and the referendum. 62 Voter registration is passive
for citizens with a domicile in Hungary. Political parties and CSOs with whom the ODIHR EOM met
expressed overall confidence in the accuracy of the voter register. However, a November 2021
amendment which redefined residency and eased requirements for civil registration weakened

57

58

59

60

61

62

Article 29 of the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), states that to “ensurethat persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis withothers, directly or through freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons withdisabilities to vote and be elected”. Paragraph 3 of General Comment No. 25 on Article 25 of the ICCPR states that:“no distinctions are permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of [voting rights] on the grounds of race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Inpractice, disenfranchisement is reportedly also extended to non-verbal voters without proper examination.
According to NEO data, some 47,000 voters were deprived of their civil rights due to mental incapacity. The 2020
amendments to the Act on Election Procedure removed “pathological addiction” from the grounds fordisenfranchisement.
In the case of Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, the 2010 judgement of the European Court of Human Rights stated that theprevious practice violated Article 3 (right to free elections) of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, and overturned a
Hungarian blanket provision which denied voting rights to mentally disabled people under partial guardianship.
The courts do not have discretion to disenfranchise prisoners for a term equal to or less than the period of
imprisonment. According to NEO data, some 25,000 persons are currently disenfranchised due to criminal
conviction.
Guideline I.1.1.d of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters states that deprivationof the right to vote and to be elected “may be subject the following cumulative conditions iii. the proportionality
principle must be observed; conditions for depriving individuals of the right to stand for election may be less strict
than for disenfranchising them and iv. The deprivation must be based [...] on a criminal conviction for a serious
offence.”
The civil registry contains data based on the Personal Data and Address Registry and the central register of travel
documents (since the recent amendments to the Act on Election Procedure), while the National Court Office andthe Criminal Registry provide data to the NEO on those deprived of suffrage rights.
This included 7,536,306 voters registered in their home constituency, 157,551 absentee voters, 65,480 votersregistered to vote at Hungarian diplomatic missions, and 456,129 voters abroad without a registered address inHungary who are eligible to vote by post. A total of 40,570 voters registered to vote for national minority lists.

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safeguards against manipulations of voter registration. 63 Contrary to international good practice, thevoter registers were not published, but voters could request changes to their data up to two days before
election day. 64 Following widespread debate about the civil registration changes, the NEO publishedvoter registration figures on a weekly basis increasing transparency. According to data published by theNEO, changes in voter registration figures per constituency following the November 2021 amendment
easing civil registration requirements ranged from 0.002 to 0.95 per cent. The voter registration figuresfrom 2021 were published by the NEO in a different format compared to recent data, which did not
facilitate the comparison of voter registration trends. 65
There are two different voting methods for voters abroad. Voters abroad with an in-country residence
had to register by 25 March to vote in one of the 145 polling stations established at Hungarian diplomatic
missions. These voters could vote for the national proportional list and the constituency components ofthe elections. Voters abroad without domicile in Hungary were eligible to vote by post for the national
proportional list component only. The provision for postal voting extends mostly to ethnic Hungariancommunities in neighboring countries, who were granted citizenship following an amendment to the
Act on Hungarian Citizenship where individuals whose ancestors were Hungarians could be naturalizedon preferential terms. 66 The differing modalities for out-of-country voting, depending on whether votersretain a domicile in Hungary or not, challenged the principle of equal suffrage. 67
To ensure equal suffrage, voter registration and voting procedures for out of country voters should bemade uniform for all citizens abroad.
The register for postal voting contained the data of some half a million voters. The records of thesevoters remain active provided they vote or amend their data at least once every ten years. This extended
period is at odds with international good practice and creates concerns about the accuracy of the registerof citizens residing abroad without domicile in Hungary. 68 In response to formal complaints related toalleged irregularities in the delivery of postal voting packages to voters and destruction of marked postal
ballots, the NEC stated that the scope of the election legislation extends to the territory of Hungary andthat it did not have competence to investigate the activities of unknown persons in another country. This

63

64
65

66

67
68

Amendments to the Act on the Records of Citizens ’Personal Data and Address changed the definition of residency
from the actual place of residence to the address used for communication with the state. One quarter of sitting MPs
unsuccessfully challenged the amendment before the Constitutional Court, claiming that the register of residential
addresses would no longer be proof of the actual place of residence. The Constitutional Court in its decision of 14
February 2022 ruled that the amendment was necessary as it “provides a regulatory response to the social
phenomenon that some of the notifications of residential addresses no longer reflect the reality of the situation.”
Guideline I 1.2. of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice prescribes that “[e]lectoral registers must be
published”.
The figures on changes in the voter register are based on the ODIHR EOM’s analysis of data published by the NEOfrom December 2021 (49th calendar week) to 31 March 2022. The NEO informed the ODIHR EOM that the newformatting per settlement and constituency was a novel approach and that previous data were not published in sucha format to allow comparison. Based on voter list data from 2018, several constituencies in Pest and one in Fejér
county had a population increase of more than 4 per cent.
Based on the data from the Department of Citizenship and Registration of the Government Office of Budapest
Capital, 36,101 persons were granted citizenship since 2020 based on the simplified naturalization procedure. In
2018, 378,449 citizens were eligible to vote by post, compared to 456,129 for these elections.
Paragraph 7.3 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document commits participating States to “guarantee universal andequal suffrage to adult citizens”.
Guideline I.1.2. of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters prescribes that fulfilmentof the following criteria is essential if electoral registers are to be reliable: “ii there must be regular up-dates, at least
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left the process of postal voting without proper oversight. 69 A total of 456,129 out-of-country voterswere eligible to cast a postal ballot for the proportional contest and the referendum.
To increase trust in the accuracy of the voter register and integrity of the election process, consideration
could be given to regularly updating the data of voters residing abroad without domicile in Hungary.
VIII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATIONThe right to stand is granted to every citizen with voting rights. Candidates for single-mandate
constituencies could be nominated by one or more nominating organization or run independently. 70
Candidates for single-mandate constituencies had to collect at least 500 support signatures from citizens
eligible to vote in that constituency, on signature sheets pre-approved by the NEO. 71 Candidates can be
simultaneously nominated on a national party list and in a single-mandate constituency.
In an inclusive process, the NEC registered 55 nominating organizations, including 12 national minority
self-governments, and denied registration to 7 entities due to omissions in their documentation. 72 In
total, six national proportional lists were registered from these nominating organizations, and one list
was rejected. 73 CoECs registered a total of 663 candidates for elections in single-member
constituencies, including 34 self-nominated. CoECs denied the registration of 105 candidates. 74 The
verification of support signatures was conducted by the CoEOs, within three days of submission of thecandidacies. By law, only the candidates, upon their request, are entitled to know the reasons for CoEOs’
invalidation of collected signatures, limiting the transparency of the verification process. The
proportional lists were registered by the NEC once the parties nominating the lists fulfilled therequirement of fielding candidates in at least 71 single-member districts in 14 counties and Budapest.
The registered lists included a total of 1,035 candidates, including 204 women (19.7 per cent). National
minorities fielded 111 candidates, including 49 women (44.1 per cent). Among the 663 single-mandate
candidates, 116, or 17.5 per cent, were women.
69

70

71

72

73

74

On 21 March, a complaint was filed by an individual citizen claiming that in Serbia, the Alliance of Vojvodina
Hungarians, an ethnic Hungarian party, delivered the postal voting packages instead of the Serbian postal services.
The NEC dismissed the complaint, stating that the NEO is not responsible for investigating proper delivery of the
postal voting packages. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision. On 3 April, the NEC dismissed acomplaint related to alleged destruction of ballots in Târgu Mureș, Romania, due to lack of jurisdiction. The Unitedfor Hungary opposition coalition called for the invalidation of all postal ballots after this incident.
Candidates may withdraw up to 11:00 on the day before elections. After the elections, party list candidates that did
not win a mandate are removed from the list, contrary to a previous ODIHR and Venice Commission
recommendation as it prevents replacement in case winning candidates are unable to take up their seats or resign.
The NEO issued a total of 190,229 signature sheets to 1,086 party and independent candidates. Based on data fromthe NEC secretariat, a total of HUF 6,624,000 (EUR 17,570) fines were imposed in 466 cases for late return or lossof signature sheets, according to a legal provision that may benefit from review, in line with a previous ODIHR
recommendation.
Nominating organizations include political parties that field single-mandate constituency or proportional
candidates, as well as national minority self-governments. Based on National Judicial Office data, as of April 2022,
a total of 268 political parties were active, with 76 having been registered since the 2018 elections.
The NEC refused the registration of the proportional list of Our Party – PRAYER as the party fielded only 10
individual candidates in 7 counties and the capital. United for Hungary, the Normal Life Party, the Two-Tailed Dog
Party, the Solution Movement, Our Homeland, and Fidesz–KDNP met the requirement for registration of theirnational proportional lists and submitted their documents by the legal deadline.
Eight candidates registered by CoECs subsequently withdrew, and one was deregistered. The Budapest REC
deregistered a candidate after reviewing the signature sheets based on an appeal. It found that the data on some ofthe sheets was not in compliance with legal requirements and invalidated part of the signatures, causing the numberof remaining valid signatures to drop below the required 500. The CoEO found that 40 of the signatures were ofdeceased persons and duplicate recommendations, and the respective CoEC filed a report to the police against an
unknown perpetrator.

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Women were underrepresented as candidates, accounting for less than 20 per cent (excluding minority
candidates), limiting the opportunity for strengthening representation of women in national politics. 75
Moreover, there are no special legislative measures to promote the political participation of women, andonly four parties informed the ODIHR EOM that they had internal rules to ensure women are
represented in high places on candidate lists.
Consideration could be given to introducing temporary special measures to promote women candidates,
including legislative gender quotas for party lists that place women in winnable positions and accessto public funding. Additionally, political parties could consider voluntary ways to further increase
gender balance on their party lists and internal party structures and strengthen their efforts to foster
inclusivity.
The NEO launched a new online portal where voters could check if their data had been used in supportof any single-mandate candidate. A total of 129,640 such checks were recorded as of 4 April 2022. Incase of suspected abuse, voters could file complaints to the RECs during the nomination period or
initiate criminal investigation proceedings. Eighty-one individuals informed the election bodies that
their data had been misused. During the nomination period, however, numerous complaints and appeals
were lodged by candidates and citizens alleging fraudulent signature collection or the misuse of personal
data. RECs dismissed most of these on formal grounds, due to late submission or inability to provide
sufficient evidence; only in some cases were such claims forwarded directly to the police. 76 The election
administration made insufficient efforts to address these violations and there was a lack of timely
handling of such cases by law enforcement. The Ministry of Interior informed the ODIHR EOM that
more than 100 criminal investigations were launched on suspected falsification of signatures or misuseof personal data in relation to the signature sheets submitted by candidates for registration. In the weeks
following the election, the investigations were ongoing. In relation to the signature collection process,the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH) informed the ODIHR
EOM of 14 individual complaints on personal data misuse and of some cases of political parties
collecting personal data for unclear purposes. 77
Consideration should be given to providing effective remedy and measures to address issues related to
the falsification of supporting signatures or the misuse of personal data during the process of candidate
nomination.

75
76

77

Twenty-six out of 199 MPs in the outgoing parliament (13 per cent) and 2 out of 13 government ministers were
women.
Most RECs reviewed individual claims by voters about the misuse of their data by candidates, which alleged misuse
predominantly by the Solution Movement and the Normal Life party. A number of candidates appealed CoEC
decisions on registration, requesting RECs to review the validity of the submitted support signatures. The NEC
received a total of seven complaints and appeals about signature collection irregularities, including falsified
signatures; all were rejected. ODIHR EOM observers were informed that election commissions lack investigative
powers to verify the validity of signatures and only have an obligation to forward reports to the police based on
concrete evidence of the misuse of data, including signatures of deceased voters or individual claims.
A fine of HUF 3,000,000 (EUR 8,000) was issued by NAIH on 2 March 2022 to the Common Ground 2018 party
and its founder, György Gődény, the current chairperson of the Normal Life Party, for a 2020 case on misleading
citizens about the purpose of collecting personal data in support of an online petition. On 17 March 2022, the NAIH
launched an investigation into the Normal Life Party, based on a number of complaints, concerning the unlawfulcollection of personal data online in connection with the 2022 elections. In addition, some criminal investigations
were launched into candidates suspected of attempting to pay voters for signing their recommendation sheets.

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The referendum legal framework does not include the concept of supporters and opponents of areferendum, contrary to international good practice, and does not require political parties or otherstakeholders to register to participate in the campaign. 78
IX.

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENTThe official campaign commenced on 12 February and continued through election day. 79 Campaigningby public officials is not explicitly restricted in any manner by the law, and the use of administrative
resources in the election campaign is not prohibited. 80 Referendum campaigning is largely unregulated,
and apart from provisions on free airtime in broadcast media for the government and parliamentary
parties there are no clear rules on who can campaign or the methods they can use in the referendum
campaign.
In the campaign, the fundamental freedoms of association and assembly were respected, and election
participants were largely able to campaign freely. A range of contestants represented different views.
However, the campaign was marked by a fundamental lack of a level playing field, characterized by apervasive overlap between the ruling coalition’s campaign messages and government information
campaigns, giving a clear advantage to the Fidesz-led coalition.
Parties campaigned actively around the country, with varied intensity between the regions, by means ofmeetings with voters, door-to-door and small-scale street campaigning, as well as indoor forums.
Attendance at campaign events observed by ODIHR EOM long term observers (LTOs) ranged fromsmaller gatherings focused on direct contact with voters to larger gatherings attended by a few hundred
people, with some gathering tens of thousands. 81 The ODIHR EOM noted a significant disparity in the
allocation of billboard space for campaign posters in favor of the ruling coalition. Most of the billboards
are owned by individuals affiliated with the ruling party and opposition parties and candidates enjoy
limited access to them. Both ruling and opposition parties also placed smaller campaign posters aroundthe country. The ODIHR EOM noted widespread defacing of such posters. 82
Parties and candidates relied heavily on social networks to promote their campaign messages.
Candidates frequently used their Facebook accounts to criticize each other. Mr. Orbán’s Facebook
account had by far the highest engagement in terms of followers, likes, shares and comments among
parties and politicians, while Mr. Márki-Zay had the highest engagement among opposition figures.
78
79
80

81
82

Guideline I.2.2 of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums provides that “equality ofopportunity must be guaranteed for the supporters and opponents of the proposal being voted on.”Campaign rallies and campaign advertisements in the media are prohibited on election day, and, pursuant to a 2018
amendment, campaigning may not take place within 150 meters of polling stations.
The 2016 ODIHR and Venice Commission's Joint Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the Misuse of
Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes stipulates that the “ordinary work of government must
continue during an election period. However, to prevent the misuse of administrative resources […], the legal
framework should state that no major announcements linked to […] a given party or candidate should occur during
campaigns” and that “the legal framework should provide effective mechanisms for prohibiting public authorities
from taking unfair advantages […].” The Act on Election Procedure establishes guiding principles of equal
opportunities for contestants and fairness of the election and prohibits campaigning in state or local governmentbuildings. The Act on Public Service Officials prohibits local public servants to engage in “any activity that would
compromise their impartial, non-influential activities.” The Act on Government Administration that regulates statepublic servants does not include a similar prohibition. Elected officials are not subject to any restrictions.
ODIHR EOM LTOs observed 32 campaign events in 9 counties and Budapest city.
The Ministry of Interior informed the ODIHR EOM that some 50 criminal investigations were initiated in relation
to damage to campaign posters, and some 20 related to the theft of campaign materials. Eighteen criminal
investigations into campaign-related public nuisance were initiated. Following recent legislative amendments,
advance written permission is required from the owner of a private property where campaign materials are posted.

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The government Facebook page also contained campaign messages, contributing to the blurring of theline between state and party. The campaign rhetoric and themes used by parties and candidates on social
networks largely mirrored the traditional campaign. However, non-party influencers were highly activein the campaign on social networks, particularly in support of Fidesz, and often used confrontationalrhetoric. 83
The campaign was highly negative in tone, with mutual accusations between the ruling party and themain opposition coalition. Both sides levelled accusations of corruption. Many campaign billboards
from third-party entities criticized the opposition and launched personal attacks, in particular against
Mr. Márki-Zay. The ruling coalition stressed its record in government, contrasting it positively with theprevious government, claiming that if the opposition came to power, a number of social and healthcare
benefits would be reduced or cut and utility bills would rise. 84 During the campaign, the sending of
emails and text messages with campaign messages led to allegations of the misuse of voters’ personal
data by the government, ruling party and opposition coalition (see Complaints and Appeals).
In the campaign, the war caused by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine featured prominently,
especially in the first two weeks following its start on 24 February. 85 The United for Hungary opposition
campaign focused on the activities of Mr. Márki-Zay campaigning around the country, while Fidesz
focused on the activities of Mr. Orbán as prime minister, notably concerning the war in Ukraine and theinflux of refugees from that country. However, in the last week of the campaign, Mr. Orbán actively
engaged in campaigning. Locally, Fidesz candidates drew attention to projects benefiting thecommunity. Other issues that featured in the campaign included energy security, the economy, notably
family support payments, pensions, inflation and utility prices, and later in the campaign EU funding
and foreign interference. 86 The Our Homeland Movement focused on COVID-19 restrictions, and in
the latter stages of the campaign United for Hungary criticized the record of the government in tackling
the COVID-19 pandemic. The referendum issues featured in the campaign only to a limited extent.
Several CSOs called upon voters to invalidate their referendum ballot.
The pervasive overlap of government information and ruling party messaging in media advertisements
and billboards, and in government letters about social benefits, blurred the line between state and

83

84

85

86

Instagram was used less extensively, and mostly with the same posts that appeared on Facebook. On 30 March, theFidesz website was attacked by unknown hackers in what the party called “an obvious interference in the elections.”
The website was accessible again in the evening of the same day. On 29 March, Our Homeland Deputy President
Dóra Dúró claimed that the decision by Facebook’s parent company Meta to block the party’s Facebook page was“conscious interference into the parliamentary elections.”
On 18 March, Mr. Márki-Zay filed a criminal complaint about the misrepresentation of his views by the rulingcoalition campaign. According to the Ministry of Interior, during the campaign period, a total of seven criminal
reports were filed on alleged defamation and slander.
The ruling coalition emphasized the need to preserve peace and security in Hungary, and claimed that if the
opposition were in power, Hungary would be directly involved in the conflict. The opposition rejected these claims
and accused the prime minister of having been too close to the government of the Russian Federation and of
pursuing a similar course to the Russian president.
On 29 March, a media report described alleged long-term foreign meddling in the Foreign Ministry IT system. On
29 March, Mr Márki-Zay called on Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó to resign for lack of action on the issue. In the
campaign, the opposition frequently raised the withholding of EU funding, pointing to this as a government failure.
On 31 March, Finance Minister Mihály Varga responded that the withholding of EU funding amounted tointerference in Hungary’s elections.

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party. 87 There were also widespread allegations in a number of regions that public-sector workers,
including those in public employment programs, were engaged in the election campaign. 88 There were
multiple formal complaints about a government program to distribute laptops in schools, alleging thatcandidates and officials used the delivery of the laptops as a campaign tool. Another complaint
concerned the government sending emails to citizens about the war in Ukraine, in which it criticized thestandpoints of the opposition (see Complaints and Appeals). Such use of state resources amplified theadvantage of the ruling party and further tilted the playing field, at odds with paragraph 5.4 of the 1990
Copenhagen Document. 89
To guarantee a level playing field, fair campaign and equality of opportunities, the legal andinstitutional framework should clearly prohibit the misuse of administrative resources, including theprohibition of state officials campaigning in their official capacity, and the barring of the initiation or
announcement of new state spending during a pre-election period.
The ODIHR EOM received claims by several opposition interlocutors that, especially in rural areas,
their campaign activities were hindered by the fact that people were pressured, often by local mayors,
not to attend opposition events. Furthermore, there were numerous allegations that public employment
programs, were widely abused by mayors who warned people that the programs would be withdrawn if
the opposition were to win in that locality. ODIHR EOM interlocutors made multiple allegations ofvote-buying. 90
To enhance public confidence in the electoral process and create a free and fair campaign environment,
public officials and electoral contestants should refrain from exercising pressure on voters or public
employees, and the relevant authorities should take prompt and effective steps to investigate allegations
87

88

89

90

Government media advertisements, posters featuring a photograph of the prime minister, and Facebook posts
stressing the preservation of peace and stability in Hungary dovetailed with Fidesz messaging that also criticized
the opposition position on the war in Ukraine. Similarly, a key Fidesz slogan, “let’s go forwards, not backwards”
closely mirrored a government information slogan used before the campaign period. Letters sent by the government
to citizens about increased pensions and support for families with children contained criticism of the previous
government of Mr. Gyurcsány. Utility bills contained messages describing how prices had been kept low, mirroringa Fidesz campaign message about the achievement of low prices and a claim that if the opposition gained power,
they would rise. It was further alleged in Budapest and in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county that Fidesz campaign
messages were sent to emergency caller devices used by the elderly.
The ODIHR EOM was informed about such allegations in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Hajdú-Bihar and Zala counties.
One complaint to NEC included apparent photographic evidence that municipal workers in Baranya county had
posted Fidesz campaign posters. Another formal complaint alleged a municipal worker distributed Fidesz leaflets
in Vas county.
Paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides for “a clear separation between State and politicalparties”. Paragraph 253 of the Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation state that “The abuse of state resources
often includes the use of public premises, office equipment, or public employees for the promotion of the
programme and actions of the governing party before and during elections. The same applies when government
resources are used to slander and denigrate opposition parties, regardless of whether this happens in the context ofor outside of elections. Moreover, where public authorities (not individual government officials) are involved incampaign announcements and advertising (and perhaps even obtain billboards and other equipment for free, or
below the market price), or the use of subsidies for party donations, they are abusing public funds allocated togovern a country.” Paragraph II. B. 1.1 of the Guidelines states that “the legal framework should provide effective
mechanisms for prohibiting public authorities from taking unfair advantages of their positions by holding official
public events for electoral campaigning purposes, including charitable events, or events that favour or disfavour
any political party or candidate”.
The Ministry of Interior informed the ODIHR EOM that five criminal investigations were launched during the
campaign regarding suspected undue influence of voters, including by means of financial benefits; in two cases the
charges were dismissed. In two observed examples, in Hajdú-Bihar County and Baranya County, Fidesz candidates
posted on their Facebook pages that they had distributed food packages respectively to the elderly and to Roma. In
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, the ODIHR EOM observed a representative of the LMP – Hungary’s Green Party
distributing feminine sanitary products to Roma.

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Page: 22of intimidation, coercion and vote buying, as well as proactively work to deter such practices andeducate voters on their rights and safeguards in place.
Women were largely not featured or addressed in the campaign. At the campaign events observed by
ODIHR EOM LTOs, messages were rarely directed at women, and when gender-related issues wereaddressed, they were mainly appealing to ‘traditional family values’.
X.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Party and campaign finance is regulated mainly by the 1989 Act on the Functioning and Managementof Parties (Political Parties Act) and the 2013 Act on the Transparency of Campaign Costs for theElection of Members of Parliament (Campaign Finance Act). 91 The legal framework remained largely
unchanged since the last parliamentary elections, and recent amendments did not address longstanding
recommendations by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption(GRECO), including those related to caps on individual donations, campaign finance disclosure andreporting, and third-party campaigning. 92 Overall, legislative shortcomings and limited enforcement of
the regulatory framework resulted in inadequate transparency and accountability of campaign finances.
Political parties and election campaigns are financed primarily through public funding, which
contributes to providing equitable opportunities to election contestants. 93 Parties and candidates may
also receive private donations from individuals and campaign using their own funds. 94 The law does
not provide for disclosure of campaign donations, nor does it set any caps on individual donations topolitical parties for their regular activities or contestants for the campaign. 95 The lack of disclosure of
donations maintains the opacity of campaign funding, at odds with international commitments and goodpractice. 96 The absence of caps on donations further heightens the risks associated with non-transparent
channeling of funds into electoral campaigns.

91
92

93

94
95

96

Other relevant legislation includes the 2003 Act on Party Foundations, 2010 Media Act, 2011 Act on the State
Audit Office, 2013 Act on Election Procedure, and 2016 Act on the Protection of the Townscape.
In its 2017 report concluding the evaluation with respect to transparency of party funding in Hungary, GRECO
expressed “regret that the legislative measures necessary to implement most of the recommendations have not takenplace.”
Political parties whose lists obtained at least 1 per cent of votes cast in parliamentary elections and their party
foundations receive annual public subsidies. State subsidies for election campaigns are also provided to candidates
in single-mandate constituencies (about HUF 1.2 million, or EUR 3,200, per candidate), and to entities nominating
candidate lists for the national proportional contest. Nominators of party lists received between HUF 471 and 706
million (EUR 1.3 and 1.9 million; depending on the number of candidates), while nominators of minority lists were
together entitled to some HUF 353 million (EUR 941,000; one third of this amount was divided equally among lists
while two thirds were allocated in proportion to the number of registered voters for the given minority).
Donations to political parties or contestants from legal entities, foreign individuals or states, as well as anonymous
donations are prohibited.
Donations to political parties exceeding HUF 500,000 (EUR 1,320) a year are identified in the parties’ annual
reports. There is no requirement to disclose donations above a certain threshold in the contestants’ campaign financereports.
Article 7(3) of the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption obliges states to make good-faith efforts to improvetransparency in election and political party financing. See also paragraphs 264 and 265 of the ODIHR and Venice
Commission’s 2020 Guidelines on Political Party Regulation.

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The law sets campaign spending limits. 97 However, their effectiveness was undermined by extensive
third-party spending, which remains unregulated. 98 Such spending primarily benefitted the rulingparties and was not transparent, leaving campaign funders unknown to the public. 99 This lack oftransparency was also facilitated by the legal framework, in particular with regard to campaign
billboards. The 2016 Act on the Protection of Townscape provides for publication of contracts forbillboard advertising concluded by state-subsidized bodies and entities, but the Act specifically excludes
campaign materials. Substantial sums were spent on Facebook advertising, led by third-party entities
associated with Fidesz. 100 In these circumstances, election campaign spending limits, which weregenerally regarded as too low by several ODIHR EOM interlocutors, provided further advantage to theincumbents.
No direct public funding is provided for referendum campaigns. Referendum initiators and politicalparties with a parliamentary group are entitled to indirect funding in the form of free airtime for political
advertising in the public media. Referendum campaigners, including the government when initiating
the referendum, are not subject to any financial disclosure or reporting requirements, at odds withinternational good practice. 101 The law does not set a limit on the referendum campaigns spending,which might facilitate the circumvention of election campaign spending limits when elections are held
concurrently with a referendum. 102 The most visible referendum campaign was conducted by thegovernment, but the amount spent was not made public. 103
To enhance the transparency and oversight of campaign finance, the legislation should be further
reviewed to address previously identified gaps and ODIHR and GRECO recommendations. In
particular, transparency of campaign funding should be strengthened by the disclosure of campaign
donations exceeding a certain amount, with disclosure requirements applicable to any entities
participating in election or referendum campaigns. To provide for a more equitable playing field,
campaign spending by third parties and by referendum campaigners should also be subject to limits.

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

Each independent candidate could spend up to HUF 5.9 million (EUR 15,700), while a party could spend up to
HUF 5.9 million for each candidate, but no more than HUF 1.2 billion (EUR 3.2 million) for a party or alliance
contesting all parliamentary seats.
Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors opined that third-party spending should be regarded as an in-kind contribution
to a party’s campaign. In consideration of complaints, at least two CoECs ruled that third-party spending as such isprohibited by the Campaign Finance Act, but these rulings were overturned by the NEC, which held that election
commissions have no jurisdiction over the matter.
For instance, a highly visible negative campaign against Mr. Márki-Zay, with numerous billboards and posters
across the country, was funded by a company set up by the NGO CÖF-CÖKA. CÖF-CÖKA acknowledged to the
ODIHR EOM that it is regularly supported by the Fidesz party foundation and has received funding from statecompanies and a state-owned bank in the past but maintained that its negative campaign in these elections was
funded from private contributions of individuals and companies. Megafon, one of the largest pro-Fidesz campaign
advertisers on Facebook, did not respond to the ODIHR EOM’s request for a meeting.
Based on Facebook advertising disclosures, the ODIHR EOM calculated that between 5 March and 3 April, entities
associated with the ruling party spent some HUF 716 million (EUR 1.9 million) on Facebook advertising; entities
associated with the opposition spent some HUF 606 million (EUR 1.6 million). All political parties contesting theelections spent a combined some HUF 380 million (EUR 1.0 million).
Paragraph 24 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on
Referendums recommends that “[a]s in the case of elections, funding must be transparent, particularly when it
comes to campaign accounts.”
Paragraph 2.2.h. of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums advises that “[t]he principleof equality of opportunity can, in certain cases, lead to a limitation of spending by political parties and other parties
involved in the referendum debate, especially on advertising.”
An official from the Prime Minister’s office explained to the ODIHR EOM that government advertising contracts
are routinely published; however, since the referendum campaign was not contracted separately but included withthe government’s information campaigns, its costs could not be calculated.

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Election contestants must publish a statement on their campaign incomes and expenditures in the
National Gazette within 60 days of election day. No reporting prior to election day is envisaged, limitingtransparency. The State Treasury, which administers campaign subsidies for candidates and politicalparties, verifies spending only with respect to the subsidy for candidates in single-mandate
constituencies, on the basis of reports submitted to it after election day. 104 The State Audit Office (SAO)
audits the campaign finances of the candidates and list nominators who obtained parliamentary
mandates. Those who did not obtain mandates may be audited only based on a request of othercontestants, which may result in lack of accountability for the use of public funds. 105
The SAO has the power to verify the information submitted to it, but its mandate does not include
monitoring campaign financing and it lacks the investigative capacity to ascertain actual campaign
spending, thus falling short of international standards related to the oversight of campaign finance. 106
Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors questioned the impartiality of the SAO due to its track record ofidentifying irregularities primarily in the finances of opposition parties and the prior political affiliationof the SAO president. 107 These concerns were compounded by the absence of legal remedies against
the SAO’s conclusions. 108 During the campaign, the NEC dismissed multiple complaints related topossible campaign finance violations due to lack of jurisdiction, undermining the possibility ofredress. 109
108F

To ensure compliance with spending limits and other campaign finance regulations, the oversightauthority should have the requisite monitoring and investigative capacities and could also be
empowered to deal with related complaints.
XI.

PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

According to the most recent national census in 2011, the largest national minority, Roma, comprisedsome 3.2 per cent of the population. 110 The constitution provides additional safeguard to the national
minorities, as a measure to promote national minority participation, minorities can win parliamentary
representation under special provisions (see Election and Referendum Systems). For these elections, 12

104
105

106

107

108

109
110

These reports are submitted within 15 days from the establishment of the official election results by the candidates
themselves or by their party, if the subsidy was assigned by the candidate to the party.
Nominators of candidate lists are therefore not audited automatically if they do not win any seats. The party list
subsidy must be paid back if the list received less than one per cent of the valid votes cast for political parties. Thereis no requirement to pay back the minority list subsidy.
Article 14.b of Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on common rules
against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns advises that: “The independent
monitoring should include supervision over the accounts of political parties and the expenses involved in election
campaigns as well as their presentation and publication.”
Between 2010 and July 2022, the SAO was headed by a former MP and deputy leader of the Fidesz parliamentary
faction, who resigned from his political positions after his appointment to the SAO. Following the audit of the 2014
election contestants, the SAO identified irregularities in the financing of two parties and one alliance from thepolitical opposition; the audit of the 2018 election contestants revealed irregularities in the financing of four parties,
all from the opposition.
The Act on the SAO provides that its findings and conclusions cannot be contested before courts or other authorities.
The Constitutional Court upheld this provision on two occasions in 2019 and 2020, indicating, however, that a
judicial remedy is available against the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the State Treasury on the basis of
SAO audits.
The State Treasury and the SAO also do not have jurisdiction to address such complaints.
The second largest national minority, Germans, comprised 1.9 per cent. All others, including Romanians, Slovaks,
Croats, and Serbs, comprised less than 0.5 per cent each. In the census, people may register more than one ethnicity.
As a result, many people indicate membership of the Hungarian majority as well as their own national minority.

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Page: 25of the 13 national minority self-governments submitted candidate lists. 111 On these lists, 43 per cent of
the candidates were women. Due to internal divisions, the Roma minority did not submit a list. Boththe ruling party and the United for Hungary opposition bloc had Roma candidates in high positions on
their respective lists for the proportional component of the elections. 112 Roma civil-society
representatives expressed concerns to the ODIHR EOM that the current system of national minority
self-government candidate lists fails in its intention of fostering meaningful national minority
representation in parliament. Notably, an individual choosing to participate in the election as a minority
voter has no opportunity to choose among alternative national minority candidates or lists. The measurescurrently in place do not guarantee genuine participation of national minorities in political life, contrary
to recommendations made by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). 113
Further efforts should be undertaken by the authorities to ensure that measures for national minority
representation promote meaningful participation of national minority representatives. Genuine
consultation with national minorities should be sought in identifying effective measures.
United for Hungary addressed a range of issues concerning Roma in its electoral program. Several
interlocutors, including Roma representatives, raised concerns with the ODIHR EOM about potential
election violations in relation to the Roma community, including vote-buying. Concerns were also
raised that alleged abuses of employment programs by mayors would potentially affect Roma, among
other vulnerable voters (see Campaign Environment). Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors asserted that,as many Roma live in considerable poverty, there is often a high degree of dependency on suchprograms, as well as vulnerability to abuse of their electoral rights. The ODIHR EOM observed
instances of negative rhetoric stigmatizing Roma at campaign events. 114
XII.

MEDIA

A.

MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

The media are divided along political lines and operate in an increasingly concentrated market. The
simultaneous transfer of the ownership of 476 media outlets, including the main regional print media,
to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) in 2018 was exempt from review by
the competition authority by government decree. 115 The change of ownership of the largest news portal
Index and the subsequent shift of its editorial policies further increased concentration. Only a handful
111
112
113

114
115

Representative of National Self-Government of Germans won a mandate in 2018 and 2022 elections and enjoys
same rights as other MPs.
There was one highly placed Roma candidate on the Fidesz list, and three on the United for Hungary list.
The 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities and Explanatory Note
recommend that states adopt “the system which would result in the most representative government in their specificsituation. This is especially important for persons belonging to national minorities who might otherwise not haveadequate representation.”
According to the Ministry of Interior, during the campaign period, three criminal complaints concerning the offence
of incitement against a community were filed with the police; investigations were launched.
The government decree exempted this deal from review by the competition authority and the media regulator due
to its “national strategic importance”. Previously, in 2017 the competition authority and the media regulator blocked
the merger of RTL Klub with the online media holding Central Digital Media Ltd, and in 2011 blocked the mergerof the Hungarian assets of Ringier with Axel Springer. Paragraph 8.18 of PACE Resolution 1636 (2008) “Indicatorsfor media in a democracy” states: “Legislation must be enforced against media monopolies and dominant market
positions.” See also CoE Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1. The Constitutional Court found that “the intertwiningof media companies, their fusion in the sense of economic and competition law - in terms of the creation andauthorization of which the government has extensive powers due to its economic policy powers - does notnecessarily mean an injury to the diversity of the press”.

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Page: 26of independent media operate at the national level. Journalists from media critical of the government
noted numerous cases of smear campaigns targeting them in the pro-government media and online andin 2021 raised concerns regarding government-sanctioned surveillance of critical journalists. 116
To stimulate media pluralism and diversity, measures to limit concentration of media should beconsidered, including enforcing existing legislation against media monopolies and dominant market
positions.
The government and state-affiliated companies dominate the advertising market. The distribution of
government advertising funds to media outlets mainly benefits outlets supporting the government, attimes becoming their main source of revenue. 117 Although the government informed the ODIHR EOM
that the allocation of government funds is conducted by an advertisement agency based on the target
group selected for an advertisement campaign, detailed or aggregated information on government
advertising was not publicly available. A number of major national and regional online media outlets
with whom the ODIHR EOM met linked the limited amount or absence of government advertising intheir media to their independent editorial policy. 118
The public broadcaster Duna Média operates seven television channels, seven radio stations and thecountry’s only news agency. It is obliged by law to present different opinions and provide balanced,
accurate and objective news coverage; however, it lacks editorial, organizational and financial
independence. The content for Duna Média is created by a separate entity, the Media Services andSupport Trust Fund (MTVA). MTVA is mainly funded from the state budget and was allocated someHUF 130 billion (EUR 340.3 million) for 2022, while Duna Média for 2022 was allocated HUF 1.8
billion (EUR 4.8 million) from the budget of MTVA. Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors, including
former and current MTVA journalists, described an established system of censorship and external
approval of editorial content. 119 The media regulator and several interlocutors close to Fidesz explainedthat in Hungary public media is traditionally supporting the government.
18F

B.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution; however, the 2010 Act on Media Services andMass Media (Media Act) has consistently been criticized by international institutions, including theCouncil of Europe, the Venice Commission and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

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119

In July 2021, an investigative news portal reported about surveillance of a number of journalists and managers ofmedia critical of the government, including Direkt36, Átlátszó, Hvg.hu and Central Media group. The National
Authority on Data Protection and Freedom of Information publicly acknowledged that surveillance took place, andwas carried out in compliance with the law.
According to monitoring of advertising conducted by the advertisement research agency Kantar based on list prices
for advertising, the Mediaworks holding (part of KESMA), received over half of its revenue in 2020 and 2021 fromthe government and government-affiliated companies. Paragraph 8.19 of the PACE Resolution 1636 (2008)“Indicators for media in a democracy” states that “if media receive direct or indirect subsidies, states must treat
those media fairly and with neutrality”.
The monitoring of Kantar found that in 2020 and 2021, despite higher viewership RTL Klub received eight times
less advertising from the government and government-affiliated companies, some HUF 4.05 and 4.03 billion (EUR
10.8 million and 10.7 million), respectively, than TV2, which received some HUF 34.2 and 31.9 billion (EUR 86.4
million and EUR 85.1 million), respectively. A number of regional journalists complained to ODIHR LTOs aboutsimilar discriminatory practices.
Paragraph 16 of General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 of the ICCPR requires States Parties to “ensure that publicbroadcasting services operate in an independent manner” and to “guarantee their independence and editorial
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(RFOM). 120 Access to public information is guaranteed by the legislation; however, the 2016
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act introduced undue restrictions on access to information
by broadening the definition of information not subject to disclosure and by increasing the fee forhandling information requests. In 2020, under its emergency powers, the government extended thedeadline for responding to freedom of information requests from 15 to 45 days, which could be
prolonged by an additional 45 days if required. 121 Furthermore, many national and regional media
outlets complained to the ODIHR EOM about limited access to public information, most state-organizedpress-conferences, and other activities of public interest that featured national and local government
officials, at odds with international commitments. 122
Authorities should ensure, in a timely manner, access of the media to public information, events anddocuments and proactively put in the public domain information of public interest. The law should
clearly define what information can be deemed as classified, restricting access only in limited andlegally justifiable cases.
Although the media legislation obliges the broadcast media to provide fair and balanced political
coverage, the editorial content is not explicitly regulated for elections or referendums. Free political
advertisements were provided to election contestants in the public media, while the government, as theinitiator of the referendum, and parliamentary parties were also entitled to free time for the referendum
campaign. 123 Private national broadcasters may choose to provide free time for election and referendum
campaigns; however, only RTL Klub chose to do so. 124
Paid political advertising in broadcast media is prohibited by the Constitution, but public-service
advertising may be broadcasted. The vague definition of political and public-service advertising,
especially in the context of two simultaneous campaigns, combined with the absence of clear guidance

120

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124

The OSCE RFOM noted that media legislation introduced since 2010 violates OSCE media freedom commitments
and media pluralism, and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights stated that it negatively affects
free speech. In 2015, the Venice Commission called for the narrowing of content-related restrictions.
See Decree 179 from 4 May 2020 and Decree 521 of 25 November 2020. In a meeting with the ODIHR EOM, theNational Authority on Data Protection and Freedom of Information acknowledged that some government ministries
may have misused the available extension to hinder access to information requests. For example, on 17 March, it
was reported in the media that the Prime Minister’s Office invoked the additional 45 days to respond to an
information request on whether the minister’s chief of staff still works for the office. Also in 2020, public officials(including teachers and healthcare workers) were officially prohibited from talking to media as all the information
related to COVID-19 and the related government response has been centralized.
While the government informed the ODIHR EOM that weekly press conferences of the Minister of the Prime
Minister's Office are open to all journalists, many journalists noted that this press-conference is the only regular
media event organized by the government. Paragraph 19 of General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 of the ICCPR
requires States Parties to “proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest” and“make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.” See also the 2009
Council of Europe Tromsø Convention.
Free airtime on the public media for the election and referendum campaigns was provided between 6:00 and 8:00,
12:00 and 14:00, and 18:00 and 20:00. It was used by all contestants except the United for Hungary opposition
alliance and the Normal Life Party. Following verbal complaints about the lack of access and public protests by
United for Hungary, MTVA provided each contestant which registered a proportional list or a national minority list
with one five-minute time slot in their morning programming.
Free airtime on RTL Klub was used by all contestants except the Normal Life Party. The parliamentary parties
which were part of the United for Hungary alliance used the free airtime allotted for the referendum campaign topromote their candidates in the parliamentary elections. On 21 March, following a complaint by RTL Klub, theNEC prohibited this practice; on 28 March, the Supreme Court upheld this decision.

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Page: 28by the regulatory body, created legal uncertainty which resulted in ad hoc and contradictoryinterpretations by the NEC and courts. 125
The media regulatory body, the National Media and Info-communications Authority (NMHH), has
broad oversight authority over the media. Although the NMHH conducts continuous media monitoringof the coverage of political actors, the methodology of such monitoring focused only on the quantity ofcoverage, without assessing the tone or other qualitative aspects. The NMHH informed the ODIHR
EOM that it cannot act ex officio based on its monitoring, while the late publication of its results
prevented any timely reaction to its findings. 126 Overall, the lack of initiative of the NMHH to address
the issues during the campaign, together with long deadlines for the review of media-related complaints
and appeals by the NMHH, resulted in contestants and media abstaining from interacting with theregulator and filing complaints and appeals to the NEC instead. 127
In order to provide for an effective system of appeal, the National Media and Info-communications
Authority could be vested with the authority to review media-related complaints and be given the power
to act ex officio on identified violations in a timely manner. The existing media monitoring could benefit
from detailed measurements of the coverage of contestants, including the tone of such coverage, andfrom regular and timely publication of monitoring reports during the campaign period.
C.

ODIHR EOM MEDIA MONITORING

Click Here to Read Media Monitoring Results

The pervasive bias in the news and current-affairs programs of the majority of broadcasters monitoredby the ODIHR EOM, combined with extensive government advertising campaigns provided the rulingparty with an undue advantage. This deprived voters of the possibility to receive accurate and impartial
information about the main contestants, thus limiting their opportunity to make an informed choice. 128
In particular, public M1, as well as private TV2 and Hír TV displayed a clear bias in favor of thegovernment and Fidesz by allocating 50, 54 and 37 per cent of politically relevant news coverage,
respectively, to the government and 5, 11 and 14 per cent, respectively, toFidesz, mainly positive in tone. 129 As a rule, such coverage lacked any clear distinction between
coverage of the government and the ruling party. 130 United for Hungary received 43, 34 and 45 per cent
125

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The Law on Election Procedure defines political advertisement by referring to the definition in the Media Act, withthe difference that political party, political movement and government is to be considered as well as nominatingorganization and independent candidate. The Media Act defines political advertisements as promoting or
advocating support for a party, political movement, or the government, or promoting the name, objectives, activities,
slogan, or emblem of such entities. It defines public interest advertising as a call or public interest message which
does not constitute political advertising and does not serve financial interest and advertising purposes, and whichseeks to influence the viewer or listener of a media service in order to achieve a public-interest objective.
For example, the NMHH published the results of the monitoring of political actors for February and March only on
2 and 3 June.
Under the Act on Election Procedure, the NEC has authority to assess complaints related to “participating inelection campaigns of media service providers, the press and movie theatres in violation of the provisions of the
Act on Election Procedure.” The CoECs adjudicate complaints concerning regional or local media providers.
From 3 March until 2 April, the ODIHR EOM monitored the prime-time (18:00–24:00) coverage of ATV, Hír TV,
M1, RTL Klub, TV2, as well as the websites 24.hu, 444.hu, hvg.hu, Index, Origo and Telex.
On 28 March, the news program of TV2 published on its official Facebook page an advertisement produced by the
television in which their news presenters and senior members of the news department announced their support for
Mr. Orbán. Furthermore, TV2 (on 14 March) and Hír TV (on 2 April) aired during primetime a 125-minute featurefilm which portrayed former Prime Minister Mr. Gyurcsány, as responsible for the violence and police brutality
during protests in 2006, when he was prime minister.
Paragraph 8.10 of CoE Resolution 2254 (2019) calls on member states to “guarantee the editorial independence of
public service media, putting an end to any attempts to influence them or transform them into governmental media:
the use of public service media to promote a specific political party or candidate must be classified as illegal misuseof public funds.”

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Page: 29of mainly negative coverage. Such coverage was often intertwined with comments and unsubstantiatedallegations expressed by journalists who were personally attacking Mr. Márki-Zay. 131 A similar trend
was observed in talk shows and current-affair programs of M1 and Hír TV. 132
By contrast, RTL Klub and ATV devoted 47 and 38 per cent and 15 and 13 per cent of mainly neutral,
and to lesser extent negative coverage to the government and Fidesz, respectively. United for Hungary
received 35 and 44 per cent of mainly neutral coverage. While RTL Klub did not offer any political
coverage outside of the news, the talk shows and current-affairs programs on ATV were often used byUnited for Hungary as a platform to present their views and criticize the government. No debates among
the main contestants were organized during the campaign, which further limited the opportunities forvoters to make an informed choice. 133
To ensure balanced coverage, the law should be amended to require public and private broadcast media
to cover the election campaign fairly and impartially in information and current affairs programmes.
Media should clearly distinguish between the campaign activities of candidates and activities of public
officials and coverage of such events. Public television should be given financial and editorial
independence, including from the MTVA.
In the absence of paid political advertisement in the broadcast media, extensive government
advertisement campaigns were reinforcing the main campaign messages of Fidesz by promoting
economic achievements, family support, and national security. 134 Another government advertisement
campaign displayed the potential consequences of a positive answer to one of thereferendum questions. 135 Such campaigns, paid for from the state budget, further blurred the lines
between the state and the party and provided Fidesz with an undue advantage, contrary to paragraph 5.4of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.

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For instance, on 2 April in the news of Hír TV, the program host, while introducing a news item about the opposition,stated that Mr. Márki-Zay “believes that for young people, blood is more important than oil”, while the left coalition
was repeatedly characterized as “warmongering” and “inciting war.” Furthermore, Hír TV, TV2 and M1 were, while
covering pre-election activities of Mr. Márki-Zay, continuously portraying him as ‘incoherent’, ’arrogant’,‘offensive’ and “confused by his own lies”. On 22 June 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that for balanced
editorial content it is not necessary to show the representatives of the opposite views, but only note that such views
exist, identify those who hold them, and describe how such opinions are different. The European Parliament
resolution of 3 May 2018 on media pluralism and media freedom in the European Union stresses “the need toguarantee full expression for all political actors” and “to base the amount of airtime they are given on public service
broadcast channels on journalistic and professional criteria and not on their degree of institutional
representativeness or political views.”
During the campaign, Mr. Márki-Zay was not part of any current-affairs programs on M1 and was for the first time
invited to an interview program on M1 only 11 days after election day.
On 11 March, Mr. Orbán, answering a question from an opposition MP regarding his participation in a debate, said:“There won’t be any debate because […] your boss isn’t running.” ODIHR EOM LTOs reported that while anumber of regional media outlets attempted to organize debates, they did not take place due to the decision of Fidesz
candidates not to participate.
In particular, ODIHR EOM media monitoring identified in the prime-time broadcasts of public M1 and private
ATV, Hír TV and TV2 over 190 instances of the broadcasting of an 80-second advertisement commissioned by thegovernment. This advertisement promoted national security and reinforced the main campaign messages of Fidesz.
It was narrated by and extensively featured Prime Minister Orbán.
ODIHR EOM media monitoring identified nearly a hundred instances of broadcasting of this advertisement in theprime-time broadcasts of private ATV, Hír TV and TV2. On 11 March, the Supreme Court ruled that thisadvertisement is not political advertisement. Meanwhile, on 11 March and 2 April, the NEC ruled thatadvertisements commissioned by Amnesty International calling on voters to invalidate their referendum ballot
constitute political advertisement; the latter decision also concluded that such advertisement cannot be aired in the
broadcast media since civil society organizations are not entitled to political advertising.

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In order to provide a level playing field, consideration could be given to reducing the government
advertising and banning the use of public-service advertisements by the national or local governments
during campaign period. The placement of public-funded advertising should be based on
predetermined, clear, equitable, objective and transparent criteria, and information on received publicfunding should be publicly available.
Among the monitored online media outlets, Origo (owned by Mediaworks) displayed a clear bias infavor of the government and against the main opposition coalition, while 444.hu, hvg.hu and Telex werecritical of the government and the ruling party and covered United for Hungary mainly in a neutral
manner. 24.hu covered both main contestants mainly in a neutral manner, with equitable proportions ofpositive and negative coverage. The coverage of Index, while also mainly neutral, was more positive
towards the government, and more negative towards United for Hungary.
During the campaign, 19 main regional newspapers which are part of the Mediaworks holding publishedidentical articles which criticized the opposition and Mr. Márki-Zay and promoted Fidesz candidates. 136
The same one-sided approach was utilized by a network of free newspapers, City7, which was publishedby Mediaworks since 2021 in 11 major cities with opposition-ruled councils, with the content adapted
for each city. The publication of City7 was discontinued shortly after election day. On 28 March, anumber of national and regional news websites that belong to the Mediaworks holding had their main
pages defaced with messages and video reports alleging government control over the media and posting
interviews with the leader of United for Hungary. 137
XIII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALSThe legal framework provides an opportunity to seek expedited legal remedy for election disputes. 138
Complaints concerning violations in single-mandate constituency elections, including against local
media, are filed with CoECs, while complaints related to nationwide election issues are considered by
the NEC. CoEC decisions on candidate registration can be appealed to the respective REC; 139 CoEC
decisions on any other issues are appealed directly to the NEC. Requests for judicial review of NEC
and REC decisions can be lodged with the Supreme Court, and Supreme Court decisions can bechallenged to the Constitutional Court. 140 Complaints and appeals must be filed within three days, withthe competent bodies having three days to adjudicate the matter. 141 Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors
noted a lack of trust in the impartiality of adjudicative bodies.

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For instance, on 2 April, all these newspapers published on their front pages an interview with Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán under the headline “War or Peace”, in which he strongly criticized United for Hungary and called on
voters to vote for Fidesz.
A few hours after the defacing, the Minister of Justice called it a “left-wing cyber-attack”. During the week prior
to election day, the websites 444.hu and telex.hu reported about denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) on their websitesthat caused short-term disruptions in their operations.
The dispute resolution process for referendums is the same as for elections.
The 2018 amendments changed the jurisdiction to handle appeals against CoEC decisions on candidate registrationfrom the NEC to RECs.
A Venice Commission opinion critically assessed the 2019–2020 legislative changes related to the judiciary,
including the new process for appointment of the Supreme Court president and its broad powers in allocation ofcases to judges, noting “serious risks of politicization and important consequences for the independence of the
judiciary” The 2020 European Commission Rule of Law Report, Hungary Chapter, stated that the “Government of
Hungary has initiated and implemented several steps that have adversely impacted the independence andimpartiality of judicial institutions in Hungary.”
In electoral matters, constitutional challenges against Supreme Court decisions must filed within three days; theConstitutional Court has three days to decide on the admissibility of the appeal and three days to adjudicate it.

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Contrary to a prior ODIHR recommendation, there is no guarantee to a public hearing of election-related
complaints at any level of the election-dispute process. 142 Complainants and respondents are notnotified in advance that their case will be reviewed by the election commission, but if present at thesession, the commission has the discretion to grant them a 2-minute statement on request. The ODIHR
EOM observed the review of some 200 complaints and appeals, and in only two cases was thecomplainant heard. Hearings are not held for cases in the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.
Amendments in 2018narrowed the possibility to appeal decisions of election commissions to thosecitizens and legal entities whose rights are ‘affected by the case’, which Supreme Court case law
referred to by the NEC in its decisions interpreted as a direct violation of the appellant’s rights, which
for the most part does not apply to voters as they can only prove “abstract legal affectedness.” This
unduly limited the right of all electoral stakeholders to seek effective legal remedy; the same legal
standing rule applies to requests for judicial review to the Supreme Court, at odds with international
standards. 143
142F

The electoral dispute resolution framework should be reviewed and amended to guarantee that all
voters have effective means to appeal against administrative decisions at any level of the election
dispute resolution process.
The NEC deliberated on complaints and appeals in public sessions within established deadlines, and its
decisions were promptly published on the NEO website, as were related Supreme Court decisions. 144
However, due to the lack of genuine deliberation in the open sessions of election commissions, thecollegiality and transparency in the decision-making process for complaints and appeals was limited.
The NEC received 195 pre-election complaints and appeals. Most disputes related to campaign rules,
including use of public position and resources to campaign, breach of campaign material rules,
campaign finance, and election and referendum campaign advertisements. 145 A 2018 amendment thatprovides that the exercise of government functions under the law does not constitute campaigning was
extensively used by adjudicating bodies to justify findings that public officials or the government did

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Paragraph 12 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that “proceedings may only be held in camera in
the circumstances prescribed by law and consistent with obligations under international law and international
commitments.” In addition, see Guideline II 3.3 of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters.
Paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that “everyone will have an effective means ofredress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal
integrity.” Article 2.3(a) of the ICCPR states that “any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy […]” Guideline II.3.3.3.f of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters provides that “all candidates and all voters registered in the constituency concerned
must be entitled to appeal.”
While NEC decisions described the content of the complaints and appeals, the petitions themselves and related
evidence were not made public, and in line with the Act on Election Procedure, the identity of individualcomplainants was not disclosed, undermining transparency in the dispute resolution process.
The NEC received 18 complaints alleging campaign calls and SMSs to citizens by political parties, and 3 cases
alleging that government campaign emails to citizens breached data protection rules. The National Authority for
Data Protection informed the ODIHR EOM that it received more than 250 complaints during the election period,
alleging receipt of unauthorized communications through various means in breach of data protection rules, most
campaigning in favor of opposition parties and to a lesser extent in favor of the ruling party, including messages
sent by the government. In response to complaints against a government email to citizens that included campaign
messaging, the data protection authority on 2 April effectively ruled that as general consent to receive government
information had been given when signing up for COVID-19 vaccination information, there was no limitation on
the content of such communications.

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not breach neutrality or misuse state resources in the campaign. 146 Some NEC decisions condoned theoverlap between government and the ruling party. 147 Half of all complaints and appeals were denied
consideration by the NEC on formal grounds. 148 The NEC did not consider the substance of complaints
rejected on technical grounds ex officio under its general mandate to ensure the legality of the election
process. 149 Moreover, some decisions lacked sufficient examination or sound and consistent reasoning,and some findings of violations were left without sanction. 150
To ensure effective legal remedy, the adjudicating bodies should avoid handling complaints in an overly
formalistic manner. The NEC should be explicitly empowered to consider an issue on the merits ex
officio when the complaint raises a valid point of concern. Election commissions should ensuresufficient examination of the cases before a decision is taken and ground their rulings in sound andconsistent reasoning.
The interpretation of jurisdiction by adjudicating bodies in some cases was problematic. 151 During the
campaign, the NEC denied its jurisdiction over complaints related to campaign finance, mostly
concerning third party campaigning and transparency of campaign spending. 152 When challenged, theSupreme Court upheld the NEC decisions, which resulted in a lack of a clear avenue for legal remedy
in more than 30 complaints and appeals. 153

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Decisions of different CoECs on this matter were not consistent, while on appeal the NEC overturned CoEC
decisions that found misuse of public position.
The NEC rejected 4 cases alleging that Fidesz campaign materials too closely resembled the government's
information materials, on the grounds that the government as a referendum initiator is entitled to campaign; The
NEC ruled that government posters that stated “Let’s protect Hungary’s peace and security” did not constitutecampaigning, but rather were a legitimate government communication to citizens. The NEC rejected a case alleging
that the prime minister campaigned at a state-funded National Memorial Day event on 15 March, on the grounds
that no specific legal basis of violation was indicated.
In total, 95 were found inadmissible and 12 were partially rejected. For example, 28 cases were rejected for missing
personal data or not citing the precise legal basis, and 14 were denied for lack of legal standing, including one
appellant who was contesting a CoEC decision on their complaint. Guideline II.3.3.b of the Venice Commission’s
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters states that “the procedure must be simple and devoid of formalism, inparticular concerning the admissibility of appeals.”
The NEC informed the ODIHR EOM that it does not consider itself to have ex officio power. Guideline II.3.3.i of
the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters provides that “if the appeal body is a higher
electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to rectify or set aside decisions taken by lower electoralcommissions.”
In deciding on a complaint about a government email to citizens with explicit referendum campaign messages, theNEC found no violation of data protection rules on grounds that the concerned citizens had generally consented toreceiving government information when signing up for COVID-19 vaccination information. In other cases,
however, the NEC found that SMS campaigns to citizens in favor of a political party violated a rule that prohibits
sending campaign messages via SMS (or email) without the express consent of voters. A decision that found thatgovernment referendum posters had been unlawfully placed over opposition candidate posters was left without
sanction. In cases where the NEC found campaign poster violations and breach of data protection rules for sending
unauthorized campaign communication to voters ’phones, the concerned political parties were not sanctioned, on
grounds that the responsible persons were unknown.
The NEC refused to accept jurisdiction in several cases regarding postal voting. Some CoECs took into
consideration campaign finance complaints which on appeal the NEC decided was not within their jurisdiction.
Some CoECs transferred complaints related to campaign material rules, which were under their jurisdiction, to the
NEC.
Articles 14 and 208 of the Act on Election Procedure provide that “Election commissions shall … ensure thelawfulness of elections” and that “objections [are to relate to] a breach of the laws related to elections […]”On 5 April, the Constitutional Court denied consideration of complaints challenging the constitutionality of such
Supreme Court decisions. Guideline II.3.3.c of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters provides that ‘the appeal procedures and in particular, the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies
should be clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction (whether positive or negative).”Hungary
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To provide for effective remedy on campaign finance violations, the law should clearly prescribe which
body is responsible for handling such complaints.
The Supreme Court received 13 appeals against REC decisions related to candidate registration and 55
cases against the NEC, most on its decisions on complaints and appeals; of these, 18 cases were rejected
on technical grounds. 154 The Court fully or partially overturned 12 NEC decisions. 155 On request, theConstitutional Court reviewed 16 Supreme Court decisions, declaring three unconstitutional. The
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the law when deciding to annul a Supreme Court decision thatfound that the government exceeded its functions and breached its duty of neutrality by criticizing the
opposition for their views [over the war in Ukraine] in a government communication widely delivered
to citizens, raised questions. 156 The court effectively authorized the government to engage in election
campaigning. Overall, the handling of most cases by the adjudicating bodies fell short of providing
effective legal remedy, contrary to OSCE commitments. 157
15F

156F

XIV. ELECTION OBSERVATIONThe Act on Election Procedure does not provide for observation of the election process by citizen
observers, contrary to OSCE commitments and despite previous ODIHR recommendations andinternational standards. 158 The lack of possibility for non-partisan observation detracts from thetransparency of the election process and may undermine public trust in the proceedings and results.
Consideration should be given to amending the legislation to explicitly provide for observation of all
stages of the electoral process by citizen observers, in line with OSCE commitments.
Several CSOs launched awareness and voter-education campaigns, as well as initiatives to recruit andtrain elected and party-delegated PSC members. 159 20K22, a project run by the Foundation for Clean
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The appeals were mostly rejected due to lack of legal standing or legal representation at the court; appellants are
not permitted to represent themselves in court. In a constitutional challenge in one such case, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the requirement for legal representation in the judicial review process is not unconstitutional.
In overturning one NEC decision, the Supreme Court ruled that party-delegated election commission members are
not required to act politically neutral outside the work of the commission, while in another case, it upheld the NEC’sruling that elected members of commissions must remain neutral. In its subsequent decisions, the NEC referred to
the former court ruling. In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that lowering campaign posters put on lampposts
violated the principle of equal opportunity. The Court overturned a NEC decision that found a political party
responsible for a data protection breach, on grounds that it cannot be established that the party actually sent the
impugned campaign SMS in its favor.
The Constitutional Court held that the war in Ukraine during a campaign period provided unique circumstances
under which the government, in exercising its functions, was permitted to inform the public about the diverse viewsof “non-governmental actors” on the conflict. It found that as the communication did not reference “the elections,voting, or the names of specific parties,” its reference to views of “the opposition” did not constitute campaigning.
It held that the Supreme Court’s finding was a “blatant error” that violated the press’s freedom to disseminate
information necessary for the formation of democratic public opinion and the government’s right to a fair trial. The
NEC referred to the court’s ruling when deciding on cases related to similar issues.
Paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that “everyone shall have an effective meansof redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal
integrity.”
Paragraph 20 of the General Comment No 25 to ICCPR. Paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document
states that OSCE “participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, canenhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place.”
Domestic civil-society organizations organized a number of activities aimed at improving the scrutiny of theelection procedures. Unhack Democracy launched a civic-awareness campaign and e-learning training to recruit
more party-delegated PSC members. Let’s Count Together produced more than 20,000 leaflets for party-delegated
PSC members and also organized in-person and online trainings.

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Elections with the aim to delegate PSC members on behalf of the joint opposition, recruited more than
27,000 volunteers; most of them were delegated by United for Hungary, while some were delegated onbehalf of the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party. 160 The Coalition for Clean Voting, comprising the Civil
Liberties Union, Political Capital, the Civil College Foundation and aHang, provided civil awarenesscampaigns, legal help to voters, and election-day monitoring aimed at preventing irregularities in thevicinity of polling stations.
The law allows for party observers in limited cases. Political entities that registered national lists canobserve the count of postal ballots and the aggregation of election results at the NEO, whereas up to
two party observers could be present at the constituency level during tabulation. However, the law does
not provide for party observers in polling stations, and their presence at the first level of tabulation at
LEOs is not regulated.
Party-delegated members formed an integral part of the PSC composition, with Fidesz and United for
Hungary delegating members in most polling stations. 161 Parties delegated a total of 40,231 PSC
members. Fidesz delegated 17,672 members, United for Hungary – 19,462, the Hungarian Two-Tailed
Dog Party – 2,144, and Our Homeland – 888. Eight entities registered a total of 308 party observers at
the constituency level.
For these elections, the NEO accredited a total of 906 observers from 39 international organizations,delegations and embassies. The criteria and process for accreditation of international observers is not
regulated and NEO decisions on the accreditation were not public and there is no legal remedy against
them. The ODIHR EOM was informed by the NEO that observers nominated by two internationalorganizations were not registered. 162 International observers are accredited by the NEO, with the rightto observe all stages of the electoral process. While the process of accreditation of international
observers was efficient and generally inclusive, it could benefit from more transparent procedures anddecision-making, including in cases when accreditation requests are denied.
XV.

ELECTION DAY

Election day was peaceful, with a final voter turnout of 70.2 per cent, as announced by the NEO
following the counting of out-of-country and absentee ballots. The opening was assessed positively in
116 of the 117 polling stations observed by IEOM observers, and opening procedures were largely
followed and the process was transparent. In two polling stations, the ballot boxes were not shown tobe empty and sealed in the presence of the first voter as required, and in five instances, no control sheet
was placed in the mobile ballot box before it was sealed.
IEOM observers assessed voting positively in 98 per cent of the 1,260 polling stations observed,
characterizing the process as well organized, orderly, and smooth. The transparency of voting wasassessed positively in almost all polling stations observed. However, the secrecy of the vote was often
compromised, particularly in overcrowded polling stations. In 16 per cent of polling stations observed,
not all voters marked their ballots in secrecy, and in 11 per cent they did not ensure that the mark on
their ballots could not be seen. The design and positioning of voting booths in 32 per cent of polling
160
161
162

20K22 informed the ODIHR EOM that some LEOs were not cooperative and did not facilitate the process of
nomination of party-delegated members.
According to the NEO, there were only two PSCs without any party-delegated members, in Baranya and Zala
counties.
The NEO informed the ODIHR EOM that some observers were denied accreditation. In one case, an organization
had nominated minors as observers; in another case, citizens of the Russian Federation put forward as observers by
the Union of Informed Citizens were denied accreditation.

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stations observed detracted from the secrecy of the vote. Voting procedures were largely respected, butgroup voting (multiple voters in the voting booth at the same time) was reported from 17 per cent ofpolling stations observed. Voters not using the voting booth, together with inadequate premises,
overcrowding and group voting compromised the secrecy of the vote. 163
To ensure secrecy of voting and to prevent group voting, the election administration should establish
and implement effective procedural safeguards.
Voter identification procedures were generally adhered to in the polling stations observed. In 16 percent of polling stations observed, one or more voters were turned away, mostly because they wereunable to produce a valid ID or could not be found on the voter list of that particular polling station.
Furthermore, in 8 per cent of polling stations observed, the PSC did not provide all voters with envelopes
when issuing ballots as required. IEOM observers reported only isolated cases of other violations. This
included proxy voting (less than 1 per cent) or attempts to influence voters (1 per cent). In 1 per cent ofpolling stations observed, the same person was assisting numerous voters to mark their ballots. In 2 percent of polling stations observed, the ballot boxes were not properly sealed.
IEOM observers reported overcrowding in 12 per cent of polling stations observed. Despite efforts by
the election administration to improve accessibility, some 27 per cent of polling stations were notindependently accessible for persons with physical disabilities, and in 12 per cent, the polling stationlayout was not suitable for these voters.
To facilitate equal and independent participation of voters with physical disabilities, the election
administration should continue implementing measures to improve accessibility of polling stations andto ensure that the layout of polling stations is adequate for the conduct of polling.
IEOM observers reported very few cases of tension or intimidation in or around polling stations, andonly isolated indications of organized transportation of voters, which is not allowed by law. In some 3
per cent of polling stations visited, campaign activities were noted within the 150 meters perimeter
where such activities are forbidden. Observers also reported one incident where they observed strong
indications of vote buying. 164
Party-delegated PSC members were present in 98 per cent of polling stations observed during voting
hours, mainly representing Fidesz (97 per cent) and the United for Hungary opposition coalition (91 percent). The presence of unauthorized persons was reported in 2 per cent of polling stations observed,
with nine cases of unauthorized persons, mostly local government officials, interfering in the process.
Overall, 67 per cent of PSC members in polling stations observed were women, and 76 per cent of PSCs
observed were presided over by women.
The vote count was positively assessed in 94 of the 96 polling stations observed and described by IEOM
observers as professional, well organized and orderly. Counting procedures were largely followed, andIEOM observers reported few procedural errors and omissions. The PSCs did not always follow
reconciliation procedures before opening the ballot boxes, including summing up and recording thenumber of voters who voted for each type of election in the results protocols. When counting the ballots,
some PSCs split into smaller groups to speed up the count, which is not in line with procedures. In 20
counts observed, the PSC did not note the reasons for invalidating ballots or sign invalid ballots as
required. In some 30 cases observed, the validity of contested ballots was not decided by a vote. In 20
163
164

Paragraph 7.4. of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that OSCE “participating states will ensure thatvotes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure”.
The incident occurred in Szabolcs-Satmár-Bereg county.

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counts, results protocols had been pre-signed, and in 19 cases, IEOM observers did not receive copiesof the results protocols upon request although they were entitled to them. 165
The tabulation process was assessed positively in 69 of the 74 LEOs observed. While tabulation
procedures were generally followed, some problems with the data entry and reconciliation of election
results were reported by IEOM observers. In almost half of LEOs where tabulation was observed, one
or more PSCs needed to correct their results protocols. IEOM observers reported problems with thetransparency of the tabulation process; in 12 cases, not everybody present had a clear view of theprocess, and in 6 LEOs, observers were restricted in their observations, as at times they were notprovided access to the data entry or given requested information. The way tabulation was conductedvaried across the different LEOs observed.
To increase transparency of the election process and to improve uniform implementation, tabulation
procedures at the Local Election Offices should be better regulated. Consideration could be given to
allow party observers to observe tabulation at the Local Election Offices.
The Ministry of Interior informed the ODIHR EOM that 19 criminal reports related to election day
offences were filed with the police, including five cases of alleged undue influence of voters, two casesof reported harassment, six cases related to damage and theft, two cases of alleged public nuisance, andone reported incident of violence against an official. Most investigations were ongoing in the weeks
following the election. The Coalition for Clean Voting, a CSO observing outside of polling stations,lodged some complaints to police and CoECs related to the harassment of its volunteers outside ofpolling stations, and to alleged organized voter transport, banned by the election law, and vote buying. 166
The NEC reviewed some 26 complaints and appeals related to election-day irregularities. Some cases
were related to mobile voters who were not visited with the ballot box and to alleged organized transportof voters, 167 while other complaints related to campaigning within the restricted area around polling
stations and polling stations members not automatically providing voters with referendum ballots. 168
The NEC rejected 14 cases on formal grounds and satisfied 6 complaints. In cases where the NEC foundviolations by PSC members, no sanctions were applied.
XVI. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS
The post-election environment was calm, but several statements by political leaders reflected the deep
political divisions and mistrust between the ruling coalition and the opposition that had been evident
during the election campaign. While Mr. Orbán hailed the size of the ruling coalition’s victory, Mr.
Márki-Zay acknowledged defeat, pointing to the unlevel playing field. Some opposition figures called
for a boycott of parliament unless certain conditions were met, especially regarding public-service
media. Several opposition leaders, including Mr. Márki-Zay, did not take up their mandate from thenational proportional list.
165
166

167
168

Section 4 of the Act on Election Procedure specifies that international observers “may inspect the documents of theelection commissions and request copies thereof, with the proviso that these copies shall not contain personal data.”
A 2 April decision of CoEC 05 in Hajdú-Bihar county ordered a local government to take down its online noticeon providing organized voter transport. Vote buying complaints alleged that voters in a settlement in Borsod-AbaújZemplén county were offered HUF 10,000 (EUR 27) and voters in the town of Mako in Csongrád-Csanád county
were offered five portions of pork meat.
Article 143/A (2) of the Act on Election Procedure, prohibits organized transport of voters. All cases related toalleged bussing were rejected on merits, due to lack of evidence.
The Supreme Court upheld a NEC decision that affirmed a CoEC decision issuing a fine against a United for
Hungary candidate campaigning near a polling station.

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The NEO started posting on its website detailed preliminary election results by polling station in theevening of election day. After the close of voting, the NEO commenced the counting of postal ballots
returned from abroad via ballot scanners and published preliminary results for the postal vote. The final
results for the postal vote were published as part of the NEC decision on final results on 14 April, after
a manual count. 169 A total of 267,834 postal ballots were declared valid with some 94 per cent cast infavor of Fidesz. Some 16 per cent of returned out of country voting packages were declared invalid due
to voters not being on the register, or missing or incorrect data. Out-of-country ballots cast at diplomatic
representations and absentee ballots were sorted by the NEO and forwarded to the respective CoEOs;
these ballots were counted on 9 April by designated PSCs. 170 Constituency results were announced on
8 and 9 April.
A total of 206,980 absentee and diplomatic envelopes were returned to the NEO. Following the countof these votes, the United for Hungary candidate won in Budapest constituency 13, reversing thepreliminary 38-vote lead of the Fidesz candidate. United for Hungary also won one more seat from the
proportional list, while Our Homeland lost one seat. Postal ballots were sorted centrally at the NEO
premises in the week before election day, and counting began following the closing of polls on election
day. Preliminary postal voting results were announced after a count using ballot scanning at the NEO
premises. The ODIHR EOM observed a limited sample of the postal ballot counting procedures at theNEO. The counting process was managed efficiently by the NEO but did not ensure proper tracking of
packages and security safeguards for handling the delivery of postal envelopes from abroad. Following
the earlier announcement of the constituency results and the NEO report on the manual count of the
postal vote, the NEC announced the final election results on 14 April 2022. 171
The referendum was declared invalid as none of the four questions reached the required threshold of 50
per cent of registered voters casting a valid ‘yes ’or ‘no ’vote for the referendum to be declared valid
and binding. The number of valid votes per question varied between 47.1 and 47.6 per cent of the total
number of registered voters. Notably, some 20 per cent of referendum ballots cast were invalidated by
the voters or otherwise found invalid. 172
17F

Appeals against a PSC decision establishing election results must be submitted to the NEC as part of an
appeal challenging the CoEC decision establishing the constituency results. Such an appeal shall referto the unlawful decisions by the PSC or to a violation of the rules on aggregating polling station results
and establishing the constituency election results. Petitions for judicial review of the NEC’s decision
establishing the national proportional results can be submitted to the Supreme Court. Under a 2018
amendment, appeals to the Supreme Court on the results must be filed within one day, and the court
must adjudicate the appeal within one day. The unduly limited grounds and timelines for appeals of the

169
170

171
172

Postal ballots were counted manually from 9 to 13 April.
Absentee voters could cast their votes in 23 polling stations designated only for transferred votes from otherlocations and in an additional 3,154 hybrid polling stations. Absentee voters were able to cast a ballot for theirresident constituency even if temporarily located outside their constituency.
NEC decision 366/2022. The deadline for announcing the final election results is 19 days after election day, i.e. 22
April 2022.
See NEO website.

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CoEC and NEC decisions establishing the constituency and national proportional results, respectively,
are at odds with international good practice. 173
To ensure the integrity of the election results, the law should give authority to the appeal bodies toannul election results at any level, including the final results of single-mandate and the national
proportional contests, if any kind of proven malfeasance might have affected the outcome. Reasonable
timelines for submission and adjudication of such complaints should be established to allow forsufficient preparation and proper consideration.
In the post-election period, the NEC received some 12 complaints and appeals. Two complaints wereagainst the national proportional results; one complaint challenged the validity of the postal vote. All of
those were rejected on formal grounds. Two cases challenged the NEC decision establishing the national
list results to the Supreme Court; the court rejected one on formal grounds and one on merits, statingthat the NEC decision establishing the national results cannot be challenged in connection with theactivities of the NEO. 174 No constituency results were challenged to the NEC.
Six complaints were filed with the NEC after election day against 17 CSOs that had encouraged votersthrough social networks and websites to invalidate their referendum ballots. All but one of thecomplaints were filed by individuals whose identities were not disclosed. Citing only the principle ofgood faith noted in the Act on Election Procedure, the NEC concluded in its decisions that encouraging
voters to vote invalid constitutes an unlawful act. 175 A HUF 3 million (approximately EUR 8,000) fine
was issued against the organizers of these activities, and the signatory CSOs were fined 176.470 HUF(approximately 500 EUR) each. These decisions undermined rule of law and freedom of expression.
Fourteen CSOs issued a joint statement announcing that they were appealing the fines to the Supreme
Court. 176 Five NEC decisions were appealed. In three cases, the Supreme Court, referring to theConstitution, overturned the NEC decisions on grounds that they unlawfully curtailed freedom of
expression which should be protected at a higher level during a campaign period and cannot be restrictedon the basis of the purpose of the referendum. 177 The court rejected two cases on formal grounds,
referring to a lack of legal reasoning. When the constitutionality of the Supreme Court decisions waschallenged, the Constitutional Court stated that no constitutional rights were violated.

173

174
175
176

177

Based on a 2018 amendment, the national proportional election results can be overturned on judicial review based
only on errors in aggregation or violation of the rules for establishing the election result. Similarly, appeals
challenging the CoEC decisions establishing the single-mandate constituency results can be based only on errors inaggregation or unlawful decisions by the PSCs. Guideline II.3.3.e of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters provides that “the appeal body must have authority to annul elections where
irregularities may have affected the outcome.” Guideline II.3.3.g and the Explanatory Report recommends timelimits for lodging and deciding appeals to be three to five days each at first instance and possibly a little more time
for higher courts to issue their rulings.
The appellant claimed that the NEO did not make public all relevant documents relating to the counting of postal
ballots, and that some ballots were damaged and re-wrapped by the postal service.
The NEC stated that encouraging voters to cast an invalid ballot not only undermines but also violates theconstitutional purpose of the direct exercise of power through a referendum.
Among other things, the statement asserted that the fines aimed “to silence the community which was able tooverturn the government’s propaganda referendum in a democratic way through their right to freedom of
expression.”
The court acknowledged that voters are not prohibited to cast invalid ballots and that the constitutionally enshrinedreferendum system provides for an invalid referendum if the majority threshold of valid votes cast is not reached.

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XVII. RECOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered with a view to enhance theconduct of elections in Hungary and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE
commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These
recommendations should be read in conjunction with prior ODIHR recommendations which remain to
be addressed. 178 ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Hungary to further improve theelectoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.
A.

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

To ensure a coherent and sound electoral framework, the legislation should be reviewed to bring
it further in line with OSCE commitments, international standards and good practice, well inadvance of the next election period and on the basis of an inclusive and meaningful public
consultation process.

2.

To guarantee a level playing field, fair campaign and equality of opportunities, the legal andinstitutional framework should clearly prohibit the misuse of administrative resources, including
the prohibition of state officials campaigning in their official capacity, and the barring of theinitiation or announcement of new state spending during a pre-election period.

3.

In order to provide a level playing field, consideration could be given to reducing thegovernment advertising and banning the use of public-service advertisements by the national or
local governments during campaign period. The placement of public-funded advertising should
be based on predetermined, clear, equitable, objective and transparent criteria, and information
on received public funding should be publicly available.

4.

The electoral dispute resolution framework should be reviewed and amended to guarantee thatall voters have effective means to appeal against administrative decisions at any level of theelection dispute resolution process.

5.

Authorities should ensure, in a timely manner, access of the media to public information, eventsand documents and proactively put in the public domain information of public interest. The law
should clearly define what information can be deemed as classified, restricting access only inlimited and legally justifiable cases.

6.

To ensure effective legal remedy, the adjudicating bodies should avoid handling complaints inan overly formalistic manner. The NEC should be explicitly empowered to consider an issue on
the merits ex officio when the complaint raises a valid point of concern. Election commissions
should ensure sufficient examination of the cases before a decision is taken and ground theirrulings in sound and consistent reasoning.

178

According to paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, OSCE participating States committed themselves“to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations.” The follow-up of priorrecommendations is assessed by ODIHR as follows: No recommendations from the final report on the 2018
parliamentary elections are fully or mostly implemented. The recommendations 5, 13 and 26 from the final reporton the 2018 parliamentary elections are partially implemented. The recommendation 36 from the final report on the2014 parliamentary elections is fully implemented. No recommendations from the final report on the 2014
parliamentary elections are mostly implemented. The recommendations 13, 15, 19 and 34 from the final report on
the 2014 parliamentary elections are partially implemented. See also the ODIHR Electoral Recommendations
Database.

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7.

Consideration should be given to amending the legislation to explicitly provide for observationof all stages of the electoral process by citizen observers, in line with OSCE commitments.

8.

To guarantee the equality of the vote, the legal framework for delimitation of constituency
boundaries should be brought in line with international standards and good practice. Current
boundaries should be redefined in line with such revised law and by an independent body in atransparent and inclusive manner well in advance of the next elections.

9.

To ensure balanced coverage, the law should be amended to require public and private broadcast
media to cover the election campaign fairly and impartially in information and current affairs
programmes. Media should clearly distinguish between the campaign activities of candidates
and activities of public officials and coverage of such events. Public television should be given
financial and editorial independence, including from the MTVA.

10.

To increase trust in the accuracy of the voter register and integrity of the election process,consideration could be given to regularly updating the data of voters residing abroad without
domicile in Hungary.

11.

To ensure equal suffrage, voter registration and voting procedures for out of country votersshould be made uniform for all citizens abroad.

B.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Legal Framework
12.

To provide a fully democratic basis for the conduct of elections and conditions that enable fulland equal participation for all election stakeholders, parliament should review the broader legal
framework for compliance with international obligations and standards pertinent tofundamental, rights and freedoms that underpin a democratic election, including on judicial
independence.

13.

Consideration could be given to reviewing the use of cardinal status for election law provisions.
To enhance legal certainty and contribute to consistent application of the election legislation,
the National Election Commission could be empowered to adopt binding regulations. In
addition, the Supreme Court could consider exercising its power to issue key uniformity
decisions with respect to the application of election-related legislation.

14.

Consideration should be given to review the referendum law to enhance legal certainty and bringit in line with international good practice for the holding of democratic referendums, including
guarantees of equal campaign opportunities for the proponents and opponents, a ban on the useof state resources, and the provision of objective or balanced information to voters on thereferendum issues.

Election Administration
15.

To guarantee collegiality and transparency of the decision-making, consideration should begiven to providing all commission members meaningful opportunities to contribute to theformulation of decisions. The decision-making process should be inclusive and open for
deliberation of alternative proposals of all decisions.

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Consideration should be given to amending the legislation to ensure cross-party participation in
the NEC from the period of calling elections.

Voter Registration
17.

Restrictions of the voting rights of persons with mental and intellectual disabilities, as well as
distinctions in voting rights based on marital status, should be removed. Restrictions on voting
rights of convicts should be reviewed to ensure that any limitation is clearly defined in the law
and proportionate to the gravity of the crime committed.

Candidate Registration
18.

Consideration could be given to introducing temporary special measures to promote womencandidates, including legislative gender quotas for party lists that place women in winnable
positions and access to public funding. Additionally, political parties could consider voluntary
ways to further increase gender balance on their party lists and internal party structures andstrengthen their efforts to foster inclusivity.

19.

Consideration should be given to providing effective remedy and measures to address issues
related to the falsification of supporting signatures or the misuse of personal data during theprocess of candidate nomination.

Campaign Environment
20.

To enhance public confidence in the electoral process and create a free and fair campaign
environment, public officials and electoral contestants should refrain from exercising pressure
on voters or public employees, and the relevant authorities should take prompt and effective
steps to investigate allegations of intimidation, coercion and vote buying, as well as proactively
work to deter such practices and educate voters on their rights and safeguards in place.

Campaign Finance21.

To enhance the transparency and oversight of campaign finance, the legislation should be further
reviewed to address previously identified gaps and ODIHR and GRECO recommendations. In
particular, transparency of campaign funding should be strengthened by the disclosure ofcampaign donations exceeding a certain amount, with disclosure requirements applicable to any
entities participating in election or referendum campaigns. To provide for a more equitableplaying field, campaign spending by third parties and by referendum campaigners should also
be subject to limits.

22.

To ensure compliance with spending limits and other campaign finance regulations, theoversight authority should have the requisite monitoring and investigative capacities and could
also be empowered to deal with related complaints.

Participation of National Minorities
23.

Further efforts should be undertaken by the authorities to ensure that measures for national
minority representation promote meaningful participation of national minority representatives.
Genuine consultation with national minorities should be sought in identifying effective
measures.

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Media
24.

To stimulate media pluralism and diversity, measures to limit concentration of media should beconsidered, including enforcing existing legislation against media monopolies and dominantmarket positions.

25.

In order to provide for an effective system of appeal, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority could be vested with the authority to review media-related
complaints and be given the power to act ex officio on identified violations in a timely manner.
The existing media monitoring could benefit from detailed measurements of the coverage ofcontestants, including the tone of such coverage, and from regular and timely publication ofmonitoring reports during the campaign period.

Complaints and Appeals
26.

To provide for effective remedy on campaign finance violations, the law should clearly prescribe
which body is responsible for handling such complaints.

Election Day
27.

To ensure secrecy of voting and to prevent group voting, the election administration should
establish and implement effective procedural safeguards.

28.

To facilitate equal and independent participation of voters with physical disabilities, the election
administration should continue implementing measures to improve accessibility of polling
stations and to ensure that the layout of polling stations is adequate for the conduct of polling.

29.

To increase transparency of the election process and to improve uniform implementation,
tabulation procedures at the Local Election Offices should be better regulated. Consideration
could be given to allow party observers to observe tabulation at the Local Election Offices.

30.

To ensure the integrity of the election results, the law should give authority to the appeal bodies
to annul election results at any level, including the final results of single-mandate and thenational proportional contests, if any kind of proven malfeasance might have affected theoutcome. Reasonable timelines for submission and adjudication of such complaints should beestablished to allow for sufficient preparation and proper consideration.

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ANNEX I: ELECTION RESULTS
Total number of eligible voters: 8,215,304
Postal voteTotal number of eligible voters perhome constituency

7,536,144

Voters at regular PS

5,241,436 Registered postal voters456,129

206,980 Received postal packages

318,083

Absentee and embassy voters
Total number of voters voted

5,711,925 Valid postal packages

268,766

Invalid ballots

57,065 Postal ballots

268,416

Minority voters

30,635 Valid postal ballots

267,834

National List Results
Votes

Percentage
of votes

Seats

Constituency

Total

Seats wonSeats Percentage
of seats

Fidesz-KDNP

3,060,706

54.13

48

87

135

67.84

United for Hungary(Democratic Coalition,
Jobbik, Dialogue,
Momentum, HungarianSocialist Party, LMP –Hungary’s Green
Party)

1,947,331

34.44

38

19

57

28.64

Our Homeland

332,487

5.88

6

0

6

3.02

Hungarian Two-Tailed
Dog Party (MKKP)

185,052

3.27

0

0

0

Solution Movement(MEMO)

58,929

1.04

0

0

0

Normal Life Party

39,7200.70

0024,630(minority
preferential
quota:
23,085)31,856registered1

1

National SelfGovernment ofGermans

Source: NEO website

1

0.50

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ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONOBSERVATION MISSIONOSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
Kari

Henriksen

Special Coordinator

NorwayMark

Pritchard

Head of Delegation

United Kingdom

FerranCosta

MP

AndorraReinhold

LopatkaMP

Austria

HaraldTrochMP

Austria

Ewa

Ernst-Dziedzic

MP

Austria

Christian

Ries

MP

Austria

Leo Joy

DonneMP

Belgium

Guillaume

DefosseMP

Belgium

Kristian

VigeninMP

Bulgaria

Desislava

Atanasova

MP

Bulgaria

Viktoria

VasilevaMP

Bulgaria

Davor

Bernardic

MP

Croatia

HrvojeSimic

MP

Croatia

OlgicaTolic

Staff of Delegation

Croatia

Jan

Bauer

MP

Czech Republic

HayatoOkamuraMP

Czech Republic

SilviaAndrisova

Staff of Delegation

Czech Republic

Heljo

PikhofMP

Estonia

Anti

Poolamets

MP

Estonia

Pia

Kauma

MP

FinlandEeva-Johanna

ElorantaMP

FinlandTom

PackalenMP

Finland

Stephanie

Koltchanov

OSCE PA Secretariat

FranceJean-Yves

LeconteMPFrancePetit

Frederic

MP

FranceTim

Knoblau

OSCE PA Secretariat

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Robin

WagenerMP

Germany

Malte

KaufmannMP

Germany

Nina

Henke

OSCE PA Secretariat

Germany

Anastasia

Gkara

MP

GreeceTheodoros

KaraoglouMP

GreeceGeorgios

Champouris

Staff of Delegation

GreeceGeorgios

Arvanitidis

MP

GreeceDimitrios

Markopoulos

MP

GreecePaulineO'ReillyMP

IrelandRebeccaMoynihanMP

IrelandAnna

Di Domenico

OSCE PA Secretariat

Italy

Massimo

Mallegni

MP

Italy

Niccolo

Invidia

MP

Italy

Pia

Califano

Staff of Delegation

Italy

Emanuele

Scagliusi

MP

Italy

Gianluca

FerraraMP

Italy

KairatKozhamzharov

MP

Kazakhstan

Salimzhan

Nakpayev

MP

Kazakhstan

Gustave Marcel

Graas

MP

Luxembourg

Emile Nico Taddeo

EicherMP

LuxembourgMarie Josée

LorscheMP

Luxembourg

Odontuya

SaldanMP

Mongolia

AntoineBeukeringMP

Netherlands

HermanBuisman

Staff of Delegation

Netherlands

Halil

SnopcheMP

North Macedonia

MonikaZajkova

MP

North Macedonia

Igor

Janushev

MP

North Macedonia

BiljanaOgnenovska

Staff of Delegation

North Macedonia

Marian Abdi

HusseinMP

NorwayHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 46

Bard

HoksrudMP

NorwayRafal

Adamszyk

MP

PolandGrzegorz

BiereckiMP

PolandDariusz

Stefaniuk

MP

PolandRobertDowhanMP

PolandAgnieszka

PomaskaMP

PolandDariusz

RosatiMP

PolandBarbaraBartusMP

PolandJoannaLichockaMP

PolandMarcinMykietynski

Staff of Delegation

PolandLuis Miguel

Da Graça Nunes MP

Portugal

António

Maló de Abreu

MP

PortugalCătălin-Daniel

FenechiuMP

Romania

Anca

Constantin

Staff of Delegation

Romania

Vesna

Markovic

MP

SerbiaJosé

Asensi

MP

Spain

Marta

Rosique i Saltor

MP

Spain

Björn

Söder

MP

SwedenMaria

Strömkvist

MP

SwedenMonicaHaiderMP

SwedenIlona

Szatmari Waldau MP

SwedenYasmine

Posio

MP

SwedenEwa

Hjelm

Staff of Delegation

SwedenMichaelRubbestadMP

SwedenManuchekhr

Salokhudinov

OSCE PA Secretariat

Tajikistan

EmomaliMirzoev

OSCE PA Secretariat

Tajikistan

Selami

AltinokMP

TurkeyGurselTekin

MPTurkeyEcem

Danik Gokce

Staff of Delegation

TurkeyVictoriia

Chumenko

OSCE PA Secretariat

UkraineHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 47

RoystonSmith

MP

United Kingdom

JordanWarlick

OSCE PA Secretariat

United States

Kyle

ParkerOSCE PA Secretariat

United States

MichaelCecireOSCE PA Secretariat

United States

Shannon Nicole

Simrell

OSCE PA Secretariat

United States

ODIHR EOM Short-Term Observers
MimozaHalimi

Albania

Xhenislava Seferi

Muslli

Albania

Nazeli Sergey

Hambardzumyan

Armenia

Mane

Torosyan

Armenia

Ramil Avaz

Iskandarli

Azerbaijan

Rashid Rasul

Yusifbayli

Azerbaijan

Tom Jaak D

De Munck

Belgium

Amandine

DusoulierBelgium

Marlies

Jaspers

Belgium

Asim

Dorovic

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aleksandar

VranjesBosnia and Herzegovina

James

BalaschCanadaMiranda Lee Catherine

Huron

CanadaJanet Korkor

NorteyCanadaJacques Raleish

Moise

CanadaBarbara Rose

PuszkarCanadaAndrei Mereuta

Stoiciu

CanadaEva

Dokoupilová

Czech Republic

Adam

Gazda

Czech RepublicOldřichLacinaCzech Republic

Lenka

Niznanska

Czech Republic

Vilem

Rehak

Czech Republic

Hani

Stolina

Czech RepublicHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 48

NadezdaStrakova

Czech Republic

KirstenAndersen

Denmark

Inge

Christensen

Denmark

Lars Peder Bjoerndal

Hollaender

DenmarkØjvindKyrø

Denmark

Lotte Sandberg

Ladegaard

Denmark

Tue

Magnussen

Denmark

Flemming Bjork

Pedersen

Denmark

Lene Tybjærg

SchackeDenmark

Karen Benedikte

Skipper

Denmark

Palle Erling

StaffeDenmark

Anastasia Sally Ida

Asikainen

Finland

Karita Johanna

ImmonenFinland

Jani Samuli

Korhonen

Finland

Juho Topias

Korhonen

Finland

Tatiana

Khrol-Lappalainen

Finland

MariamBurduliGeorgia

Malkhaz Makho

ChkaduaGeorgia

Frank

Aischmann

Germany

Claus

Auer

Germany

Julia

BaumannGermany

Melanie Jella Aurora

Bergmaier

Germany

Irene Maria

Fellmann

Germany

KaiFrankeGermany

JoachimFreundGermany

WalterGoepfert

Germany

MichaelHaußmann

Germany

Daniela Georgia Antonia

Heyn

GermanyFee

HögnerGermany

Hartwig Hans Guntram

KabothGermanyHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 49

Karin Andrea

Knöbelspies

Germany

Jutta Gisela

KrauseGermany

Sarah

Lohschelder

Germany

Tina

Mede-Karpenstein

Germany

SusanneNeymeyer

Germany

Sabine Matthay

PindurGermany

Oliver Siegfried

ScheelGermany

Sabine Krautschick

Smolka-Gunsam

Germany

Esther

Somfalvy

Germany

Kevin

Tepe

Germany

Jan-Marius

Tillmanns

Germany

JudithVorrathGermany

MichaelWiersing

Germany

Kira Ulrike

Moessinger

Germany

JuergenWintermeier

Germany

Modhafer

Hajji

Germany

Sena Tamara

Staufer

Germany

AdrienneBoyle

Ireland

Padraic

McDunphy

Ireland

Bernard Joseph

Quoroll

Ireland

CécileMichelItaly

Altynay

Daribayeva

Kazakhstan

AlibekTazhibayev

Kazakhstan

Liliana

VancaneLatviaMariana

Focsa

Moldova

Mihail Roman

Esanu

Moldova

Nikolina

Stepanovic

Montenegro

Maria

Nijenhuis

Netherlands

Leonardus Hubertus

Platvoet

Netherlands

Margriet Josephine

Teunissen

Netherlands

Hungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 50

Annemieke

Van der Ploeg

Netherlands

Leendert

Van der Zwan

Netherlands

MartinVan Rooijen

Netherlands

Servatius

Wiemers

Netherlands

Erik Henri

Verschuur

Netherlands

Arve

BørstadNorwayHanne

HansonNorwayNils Gunnar

Songstad

NorwayAlida Jay

Boye

NorwayOana

Napotnik

Romania

Bianca Maria

Necsa

RomaniaBărbulescu

Simona-Daniela

Romania

Katarina

AndricSerbiaJelena Radomir

Milosevic

SerbiaJelenaDelić

SerbiaVuk

Maricic

SerbiaNikola Ljubisa

Ratković

SerbiaSilviaHudáčková

Slovakia

Bruno

Castro Benito

Spain

Francisco

Cobos Flores

Spain

Katia

Feo Kutsch

Spain

Amparo Dolores

Hormigos Fernandez

Spain

Maria Luisa

Jover Aparicio

Spain

Maria Aurea

Montero - Arce

Spain

Eva María

Pérez Vara

Spain

DanielRajmil Bonet

Spain

Irene

Vázquez Serrano

Spain

Jan K.G.

Bolling

SwedenMats

EkholmSwedenStig Lennart

Glans

SwedenHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 51

Åke Lennart

Haggren

SwedenErik Hjalmar Knutsson

Hammarskjold

SwedenEwa Helena Christina

Jacobsson

SwedenChristianLeffler

SwedenArvid Anders

Liden

SwedenKarl Johan Thorild

Lindberg

SwedenMats Nils

Melin

SwedenKjell Torbjörn

Messing

SwedenHans Birger

Nareskog

SwedenHåkan Per-OlovNyman

SwedenLena Christina

Ohre Arnault

SwedenErik, Magnus, Ingemar

PerssonSwedenBertil Andreas

PerssonSwedenAnna

Rogalska Hedlund

SwedenPatrik Gunnar Verner

SchröderSwedenOla

Segnestam Larsson

SwedenSigrid Marie

Utterman

SwedenCarl Fredrik Bertil

von Essen

SwedenManne Olof Oscar

Wängborg

SwedenKarolina Magdalena

RiedelSwedenFabrizio Mario Giuseppe

Comandini

Switzerland

Johanna

Estermann

Switzerland

Paola Marcella

Fragnière

Switzerland

Fiorenza Paola

KuthanSwitzerland

Valérie Marie-Gabrielle

Nadrai

Switzerland

Giray

Sadik

TurkeyStephen Spencer

Paul

United Kingdom

Keith

TurnerUnited Kingdom

Katherine Anna-Maria

Chapanionek

United Kingdom

Katherine Mary

Igras

United Kingdom

Hungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

Page: 52

Peter A

LossauUnited States

Ivan

Weinstein

United States

Syeda Sameera

Ali

United States

Elizabeth Ann

CallahanUnited States

Henry Eugene

Crawford JR

United States

Scott Patrick

Cullinane

United States

DevontaeFreeland

United States

Sarah

Galt

United States

Felicia

GordonUnited States

Robert Scott

Heaslet

United States

Helen Sen

Kornblum

United StatesMark Leonard

LasserUnited States

Heidi Ann

LernihanUnited States

Karen Tess

LevineUnited StatesDavid Alan

LevineUnited States

Eric

MantonUnited States

Kimberly Ann

McCabeUnited States

Christopher Colin

McCullough

United States

Jessica Cathrine

Nash

United States

Michel Njang

Njang

United States

Tara Bree

O'Connor

United States

GinetteProphete

United States

Raleigh

Quesenberry

United States

Emily Ann

Rome

United States

Gregory Scott

SlottaUnited States

Melissa Leigh

Stone

United States

Annisa

Wanat

United States

Dinka Ivanova

Gyurova

United States

Pegah

Ebrahimi Eftekhari

United States

Quentin Robert Lomer

Lide

United States

Hungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

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Farkhod Anvarovich

NasriddinovUzbekistan

Shamshod Alisherovich

Yunusov

Uzbekistan

ODIHR EOM Long-Term Observers
JanBlažekCzech RepublicVeronika

Homolová

Czech Republic

Petteri

LondenFinlandAna

Kakalashvili

Georgia

Susanne Rosemarie

Greiter

Germany

UlrichSeel

Germany

JeroenDe Vries

Netherlands

Narve

Rio

NorwayNina

Wessel

NorwayMarijaTrifunović-Ljubojević

Serbia

Claes

Pile

SwedenBjörn

TedemanSwedenThomasHolzerSwitzerland

Alexandra

von Arx

Switzerland

Melanie

Leathers

United Kingdom

Paul

WessonUnited Kingdom

David

Ballard

United States

Degee

Wilhelm

United States

ODIHR EOM Core Team Members
Jillian

Stirk

Head of Mission

CanadaVasil

Vashchanka

Belarus

Desislava

Hristova

Bulgaria

Marla

Morry

CanadaHungary
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report

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MariamTabatadzeGeorgia

StefanKrauseGermanyPeter

MarronIrelandRoman

Railean

Moldova

RobertLech

PolandTomaszJańczyPolandMichał

Gałkowski

PolandŁukaszWidła-Domaradzki

PolandRužicaJovanović

Serbia

Saša

Pokrajac

SerbiaAndersErikssonSwedenRuslanOvezdurdyyev

Turkmenistan

Chris

TaylorUnited Kingdom

Egor

Tilpunov

UkraineYevheniia

Zamrii

UkrainePeter

PalmerUnited Kingdom

ABOUT ODIHRThe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE’s principal institution
to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, toabide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (…) to build, strengthen and protect
democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (1992 Helsinki Summit
Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.
ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris
Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed toreflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over
150 staff.
ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. Every year, it co-ordinatesand organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE
region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards
for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth
insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps
participating States to improve their electoral framework.
The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic
governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a numberof targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.
ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect humanrights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This isachieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide
expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing thehuman rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights
monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and security.
Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, ODIHR provides support to the participating
States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, antiSemitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and nondiscrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring,
reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as
educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.
ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti. It promotes
capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages theparticipation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.
All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating
States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.
More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).