IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
114 W. Edenton Street
Raleigh, NC 27603
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
STATE OF COLORADO
1300 Broadway, 7th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
165 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106

Case No. 1:24-cv-00710

STATE OF MINNESOTA
445 Minnesota Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
STATE OF OREGON
100 SW Market St
Portland, OR 97201
STATE OF TENNESSEE
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, TN 37202
andCase 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 1 of 115

STATE OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188,
Plaintiffs,v.
REALPAGE, INC.
2201 Lakeside Blvd.
Richardson, TX 75082,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT

Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 2 of 115

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

II.

RealPage’s Revenue Management Software Is Fueled by Nonpublic, Competitively
Sensitive Information Shared By Landlords ............................................................ 6A.

Landlords Agree to Share Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive
Transactional Data with RealPage for Use in Generating Competitors’
Pricing Recommendations............................................................................. 7

B.

AIRM and YieldStar Users Agree with RealPage to Use the Software
to Align Pricing ........................................................................................... 11C.

RealPage’s Transactional Data Is Fundamentally Different from Other
Data Available to Landlords ....................................................................... 13

D.

RealPage Revenue Management Software Uses Nonpublic,
Competitively Sensitive Data to Recommend Prices.................................. 15
1.

2.
E.

III.

AIRM and YieldStar Leverage Competitively Sensitive Data to
Generate Price Recommendations ................................................... 15a)

AIRM model training relies on competitively sensitive
data to generate learned parameters. ..................................... 16b)

AIRM and YieldStar incorporate competitors’ nonpublicdata to generate floor plan price recommendations. ............. 16c)

AIRM and YieldStar use competitors’ nonpublic data—
including data on future occupancy—to determine unitlevel prices. ........................................................................... 20

LRO Relies Primarily on Landlords to Input Data on Competitors.......................................................................................................... 22

RealPage Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Increase Compliance with
Price Recommendations .............................................................................. 23
1.

AIRM and YieldStar Make it Easy to Accept Recommendations
and More Difficult and Time-Consuming to Decline ...................... 23

2.

RealPage Pushes Clients to Adopt Auto-Accept Settings That
Automatically Approve Recommendations ..................................... 25

3.

RealPage Pricing Advisors Provide a “Check and Balance” on
Property Managers to Increase Acceptance of Recommendations .. 26

4.

Pricing Recommendations Heavily Influence Landlords’
Behavior ........................................................................................... 27

Coordination Among Competing Landlords Is a Feature of this Industry............. 28iCase 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 3 of 115

A.

Rental Housing is a Necessity for Millions of Americans .......................... 29

B.

The Multifamily Property Industry is Rife with Cooperation Among
Ostensible Competitors ............................................................................... 29

C.
IV.

V.

VI.

1.

At the Local Level, the Multifamily Property Industry Comprises
a Small Number of Large Landlords Managing Buildings withDifferent Owners .............................................................................. 30

2.

Landlords Regularly Discuss Competitively Sensitive Topics
with Their Competitors and Swap Information ............................... 31

3.

At RealPage User Group Meetings, Landlords Discuss
Competitively Sensitive Topics ....................................................... 35

RealPage Uses Nonpublic Information to Allow Landlords to More
Easily Compare Units on an Apples-to-Apples Basis................................. 40

RealPage Harms the Competitive Process and Renters By Entering Into Unlawful
Agreements With Landlords to Share and Exploit Competitively Sensitive
Data......................................................................................................................... 40
A.

AIRM and YieldStar Have the Purpose and Effect of Distorting theCompetitive Pricing of Apartments............................................................. 41

B.

AIRM and YieldStar Impose Multiple Guardrails Intended to
Artificially Keep Prices High or Minimize Price Decreases ...................... 49

C.

AIRM and YieldStar Harm the Competitive Process by Discouraging
the Use of Discounts and Price Negotiations .............................................. 53

D.

AIRM and YieldStar Increase and Maintain Landlords’ Pricing Powerby Using Competitors’ Data to Manage Lease Expirations ........................ 54

E.

No Procompetitive Benefit Justifies, Much Less Outweighs,
RealPage’s Use of Competitively Sensitive Data to Align Competing
Landlords ..................................................................................................... 56

RealPage Uses Landlords’ Competitively Sensitive Data To Maintain Its Monopoly
And Exclude Commercial Revenue Management Software Competitors ............. 56
A.

Landlords Are Drawn to RealPage Because of Access to Nonpublic
Transactional Data That Is Used to Increase Landlords’ Revenue ............. 57

B.

RealPage’s Collection and Use of Competitively Sensitive Data
Excludes Competition in Commercial Revenue Management Software .... 59

Relevant Markets .................................................................................................... 62
A.

Conventional Multifamily Rental Housing Markets ................................... 62
1.

Product Markets ............................................................................... 62ii
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2.

B.

VII.

a)

Conventional Multifamily Rentals Are Distinct From
Other Types of Multifamily Housing.................................... 62b)Single-Family Housing Is Not A Reasonable Substitute toMultifamily Rentals .............................................................. 64c)

Conventional Multifamily Rental Units With Different
Bedroom Counts Are Relevant Product Markets.................. 66

Geographic Markets ......................................................................... 69a)

RealPage-Defined Submarkets Identify Relevant
Geographic Markets .............................................................. 71b)Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) Are Relevant
Geographic Markets .............................................................. 73

Commercial Revenue Management Software Market ................................ 76
1.

Product Market ................................................................................. 77

2.

Geographic Market ........................................................................... 78

Jurisdiction, Venue, and Commerce....................................................................... 79

VIII. Violations Alleged .................................................................................................. 81
IX.

Request for Relief ................................................................................................... 87

Appendix A: Submarkets .................................................................................................. 98
Appendix B: Submarkets By Bedroom Count ................................................................ 102

iii
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I.

INTRODUCTION
1.

Renters are entitled to the benefits of vigorous competition amonglandlords. In prosperous times, that competition should limit rent hikes; in harder times,
competition should bring down rent, making housing more affordable. RealPage has built
a business out of frustrating the natural forces of competition. In its own words, “a risingtide raises all ships.” This is more than a marketing mantra. RealPage sells software tolandlords that collects nonpublic information from competing landlords and uses thatcombined information to make pricing recommendations. In its own words, RealPage“helps curb [landlords’] instincts to respond to down-market conditions by either
dramatically lowering price or by holding price when they are losing velocity and/or
occupancy. . . . Our tool [] ensures that [landlords] are driving every possible
opportunity to increase price even in the most downward trending or unexpectedconditions” (emphases added).
2.

In fact, as RealPage’s Vice President of Revenue Management Advisory

Services described, “there is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentiallytrying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the entire industry
down” (emphasis added). As he put it, if enough landlords used RealPage’s software,they would “likely move in unison versus against each other” (emphasis added). To
RealPage, the “greater good” is served by ensuring that otherwise competing landlords
rob Americans of the fruits of competition—lower rental prices, better leasing terms,

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more concessions. At the same time, the landlords enjoy the benefits of coordinatedpricing among competitors.
3.

RealPage replaces competition with coordination. It substitutes unity forrivalry. It subverts competition and the competitive process. It does so openly anddirectly—and American renters are left paying the price.
*****
4.

Americans spend more money on housing than any other expense. On

average, American households allocate more than one-third of their monthly income tohousing. Some purchase a home, while others choose to, or must, rent. A family’s
selection of an apartment reflects a complex set of values and criteria including comfort,
safety, access to schools, convenience, and critically, affordability. To ensure they secure
the greatest value for their needs, renters rely on robust and fierce competition between
landlords.
5.

RealPage distorts that competition. Across America, RealPage sells

landlords commercial revenue management software. RealPage develops, markets, andsells this software to enable landlords to sidestep vigorous competition to win renters’
business. Landlords, who would otherwise be competing with each other, submit on adaily basis their competitively sensitive information to RealPage. This nonpublic,
material, and granular rental data includes, among other information, a landlord’s rental
prices from executed leases, lease terms, and future occupancy. RealPage collects a broad
swath of such data from competing landlords, combines it, and feeds it to an algorithm.

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6.

Based on this process and algorithm, RealPage provides daily, near real-time pricing “recommendations” back to competing landlords. These recommendations
are based on the sensitive information of their rivals. But these are more than just“recommendations.” Because, in its own words, a “rising tide raises all ships,” RealPage
monitors compliance by landlords to its recommendations. RealPage also reviews andweighs in on landlords’ other policies, including trying to—and often succeeding in—ending renter-friendly concessions (like a free month’s rent or waived fees) to attract orretain renters. A significant number of landlords then effectively agree to outsource theirpricing function to RealPage with auto acceptance or other settings such that RealPage asa middleman, and not the free market, determines the price that a renter will pay.
Competing landlords choose to share their information with RealPage to “eliminate theguessing game” about what their competitors are doing and ultimately take instructions
from RealPage on how to make business decisions to “optimize”—or in reality,
maximize—rents.
7.

Each landlord pays steep fees to license RealPage’s software. RealPage’s

stated goals and value proposition are not a secret. Its executives are blunt: They wantlandlords to “avoid the race to the bottom in down markets.” Sometimes RealPage iseven more direct, acknowledging that its software is aimed at “driving every possible
opportunity to increase price” or observing that among landlords, “there is a greater goodin everybody succeeding versus essentially trying to compete against one another in a
way that actually keeps the entire industry down.”

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8.

But that is not how the free market works. A free market requires thatlandlords compete on the merits, not coordinate pricing. Landlords should win renters byoffering whatever combination of price and quality they think is most attractive. For
example, landlords could lower rents or provide other financial concessions, like freemonths of rent, or with investments in amenities like gyms, grilling areas, or pools. Put
differently, the fear of losing a renter to a competitor should motivate rival landlords tocompete vigorously.
9.

RealPage’s revenue management software ingests on a daily basis

nonpublic rental rates, future apartment availability, and changes in competitors’ rates
and occupancy. As competitor-landlords increase their rents, RealPage’s software nudges
other competing landlords to increase their rents as well. RealPage calls this“maximiz[ing] opportunity[.]” As RealPage explained to one landlord, by using
competitors’ data, they can identify situations where “we may have a $50 increase insteadof a $10 increase for that day.” This is what RealPage encourages as “stretch and pull
pricing.”
10.

RealPage allows landlords to manipulate, distort, and subvert market

forces. One landlord observed that RealPage’s software “can eliminate the guessinggame” for landlords’ pricing decisions. Discussing a different RealPage product, anotherlandlord said: “I always liked this product because your algorithm uses proprietary datafrom other subscribers to suggest rents and term. That’s classic price fixing . . . .” A third
landlord explained, “Our very first goal we came out with immediately out of the gate is4Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 9 of 115

that we will not be the reason any particular sub-market takes a rate dive. So for us our
strategy was to hold steady and to keep an eye on the communities around us and ourcompetitors.”
11.

RealPage’s scheme not only distorts competition to the detriment of renters,

but also allows it to reinforce its dominant position in the market for commercial revenue
management software. By its own account, RealPage controls at least 80 percent of thatmarket. Its dominant position is protected by substantial data advantages due to its
massive reservoir of ill-gotten competitively sensitive information from competing
landlords. No other revenue management company can match RealPage’s access tolandlords’ nonpublic, competitively sensitive rental data. This is why RealPage
acknowledges that it “does not have any true competitors, mainly because our data isbased on real lease transaction data.” RealPage’s conduct is predatory and exclusionary,
which has allowed it to distort the market opportunities for honest providers of revenue
management software.
12.

At bottom, RealPage is an algorithmic intermediary that collects, combines,

and exploits landlords’ competitively sensitive information. And in so doing, it enriches
itself and compliant landlords at the expense of renters who pay inflated prices andhonest businesses that would otherwise compete.
13.

The United States and the States of North Carolina, California, Colorado,

Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington, acting by and throughtheir respective Attorneys General, bring this action pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of the5
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Sherman Act to rid markets of (i) RealPage’s unlawful information-sharing scheme, and(ii) its illegal monopoly in commercial revenue management software. In so doing,
Plaintiffs seek to restore the free market to deserving individuals, families, and honest
businesses.
II.

REALPAGE’S REVENUE MANAGEMENT SOFTWARE IS FUELEDBY NONPUBLIC, COMPETITIVELY SENSITIVE INFORMATIONSHARED BY LANDLORDS
14.

RealPage dominates the market for commercial revenue management

software that landlords use to price apartments, controlling at least 80 percent of thatmarket, according to its own estimates. RealPage currently offers three revenue
management systems to landlords: YieldStar, AI Revenue Management (AIRM), andLease Rent Options (LRO). The company’s main legacy software, YieldStar, is the
product of three acquisitions and subsequent internal development. Its successor, AIRM,
uses much of the same codebase as YieldStar, but RealPage claims that AIRM’s refinedmodels and forecasting are more precise. RealPage acquired its other revenue
management software, LRO, in 2017. RealPage has made plans to sunset both YieldStar
and LRO by the end of 2024.
15.

Competitively sensitive data collected from competing landlords is a

critical input to RealPage’s revenue management software. AIRM and YieldStar collectthis data, such as rental applications, executed new leases, renewal offers andacceptances, and forward-looking occupancy, and use it to generate price6
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 11 of 115

recommendations for the competing landlords. This information is among the mostcompetitively sensitive data a landlord maintains.
16.

The exploitation of sensitive data from competing landlords is central to

RealPage’s approach. As part of pitching its software to landlords, RealPage highlightsthat its pricing algorithms use their competitors’ data sourced directly from “leasetransaction data.” RealPage describes this nonpublic data from competitors as one ofthree “building blocks of price” in AIRM and YieldStar. Landlords thus share theircompetitively sensitive information with RealPage with the understanding that
RealPage’s software will use the data to generate recommendations for rivals (and viceversa).
A.

Landlords Agree to Share Nonpublic, Competitively Sensitive
Transactional Data with RealPage for Use in Generating Competitors’
Pricing Recommendations

17.

RealPage amasses nonpublic, competitively sensitive data from competing

landlords through use of its pricing algorithms, other rental property software, andthousands of monthly phone calls. The combined troves of nonpublic, competitively
sensitive data are much more granular, sensitive, timely, and comprehensive thanalternatives—and far more detailed than any data publicly available to potential renters.
RealPage then uses this data in generating competitors’ pricing recommendations.
18.

Data shared through YieldStar and AIRM. Each AIRM and YieldStar

client agrees to share detailed data with RealPage that are private, updated nightly, andgranular. The data include lease-level information on each unit’s effective rent (rent net

7
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of discounts), rent discounts, rent term, and lease status, as well as unit characteristics
such as layout and amenities. It also includes the number of potential future renters who
have visited a property or submitted a rental application.
19.

Landlords understand that AIRM and YieldStar use their data torecommend prices not just for their own units, but also for competitors. For example, arevenue management director at Landlord 1 testified that she understood that Landlord 1,
and other competing landlords who used AIRM or YieldStar, agreed with RealPage toshare their data, which was combined in a single data pool for use by YieldStar and
AIRM. An executive at Landlord 2 noted the advantages to using YieldStar at a property
if others in the property’s submarket—the small geographic area around the property—
also used YieldStar because “the shared data between the models at different
communities can be a benefit in getting accurate transactional data on a timely basis.”
20.

Landlords agree to provide this information for use by their competitors

because they understand they will be able to leverage the sensitive information of theirrivals in turn. In its pitch to prospective clients, RealPage describes AIRM’s andYieldStar’s access to competitors’ granular, transactional data as a meaningful tool that it
claims enables landlords to outperform their properties’ competitors by 2–7%. RealPageclients receive training that highlights the role of competitors’ transactional data in theprice recommendation process.
21.

Data Shared Through Other RealPage Products. AIRM and YieldStar are

not the only ways that RealPage shares nonpublic, competitively sensitive information

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among landlords. RealPage obtains the same confidential transactional data fromlandlords that license at least three other programs: OneSite, Performance Analytics with
Benchmarking, and Business Intelligence.
22.

OneSite is RealPage’s property management software, which operates as

the central source of data for landlords’ leasing activity. Performance Analytics with
Benchmarking allows landlords to compare the performance of their properties and floor
plans (e.g., a one-bedroom, one-bathroom unit) to their competitors. Business Intelligenceis a data analytics tool that pulls data from a landlord’s property management softwareand other products.
23.

Each landlord using RealPage’s OneSite, Business Intelligence, andPerformance Analytics with Benchmarking products agrees to share its proprietary datawith RealPage and agrees that RealPage’s revenue management software can use the datato generate pricing recommendations. The license agreements for these products
specifically identify the shared data, such as pricing information, as confidential,
nonpublic information. RealPage takes this deeply confidential information and uses it toprovide rent recommendations to competitors of these clients.
24.

These agreements grant RealPage access to confidential information fromover 16 million units across the country, including many that do not use its revenue
management products. With respect to Performance Analytics with Benchmarking alone,a RealPage sales representative told a prospective client that “we have over 16 million
units of data coming from various source operating systems (PMS) [property

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management software] into the PAB platform,” making RealPage the top choice for“transactional data benchmarking.” With properties containing approximately 3 million
units using AIRM and YieldStar, these additional agreements meaningfully multiply thescale of the transactional data used by AIRM and YieldStar. This gives RealPage greater
visibility, including into markets with less penetration by AIRM and YieldStar, granting
even initial AIRM and YieldStar adopters in a new market the benefit of access to asignificant amount of nonpublic, competitively sensitive information.
25.

Landlords understand that AIRM and YieldStar will use data from theseproducts. A revenue management director at Landlord 1 explained that RealPage ingests
transactional data from several RealPage products, besides AIRM and YieldStar, for use
in revenue management.
26.

A revenue management executive at Landlord 2 asked RealPage if otherspecific landlords were using RealPage’s non-revenue management products. The
landlord’s owner client was concerned about the data available to YieldStar because
competing properties were unsophisticated and did not use revenue management. This
executive wanted to confirm that “YieldStar will be able to leverage actual transactional
data behind the scenes and not just look at offered rents for their comps.” RealPage
reminded the Landlord 2 executive that RealPage collected transactional data for all usersof OneSite, Business Intelligence, and Performance Analytics with Benchmarking, andreassured the executive that YieldStar had ample transactional and survey data for that
area.

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27.

Calling Landlords. RealPage has an additional, complementary productcalled Market Analytics. Market Analytics compiles data from over 50,000 monthly
phone calls that RealPage makes to landlords across the country. On these calls RealPage
collects nonpublic, competitively sensitive information by floor plan on occupancy rates,
effective rents, and concessions, as well as information on the owner, managementcompany, and any revenue management software used at the property. These market
surveys cover over 11 million units and approximately 52,000 properties. Landlords,
including but not limited to those that use AIRM, YieldStar, or other RealPage products,
knowingly share this nonpublic information with RealPage.
B.

AIRM and YieldStar Users Agree with RealPage to Use the Software to
Align Pricing

28.

In addition to agreeing to share nonpublic, competitively sensitive data with

RealPage, each AIRM and YieldStar licensee agrees with RealPage to use the AIRM or
YieldStar pricing software as RealPage designed it. Landlords are expected to review
daily AIRM or YieldStar floor plan price recommendations and use the programs to setscheduled floor plan rents or even unit-level prices.
29.

While landlords may not accept every price recommendation, they use

AIRM or YieldStar as their pricing software, regularly review AIRM or YieldStar floor
plan recommendations, use AIRM or YieldStar to set a scheduled floor plan rent, and use
AIRM or YieldStar to set unit-level prices.
30.

Landlords who use AIRM and YieldStar know that others are using thesame software. Some landlords track which revenue management software their
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competitors use, including by contacting competing properties directly and exchanging
nonpublic information. Other landlords, including prospective AIRM and YieldStar
users, ask RealPage whether there are existing AIRM and YieldStar users nearby before
they themselves license the products.
31.

An executive at Landlord 2, for example, explained to her team how she

would learn from RealPage data or from a property’s website whether a property used
revenue management. This information is important because properties that use revenue
management tend to update prices much more frequently, and so a landlord will react
differently to those price changes if it knows the competitor is using revenue
management.
32.

RealPage frequently tells prospective and current clients that a “rising tideraises all ships.” A RealPage revenue management vice president explained that thisphrase means that “there is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentiallytrying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the industry down.”
This rising tide lifts all landlords, including but not limited to AIRM and YieldStar users.
33.

In using AIRM and YieldStar, landlords expect this pricing alignment anduse RealPage software in part for this reason. One landlord echoed the RealPage
executive, using the phrase “a rising tide rises [sic] all ships” to explain that AIRM would
move prices in a “similar manner” to how the top and bottom of the market move.
Elsewhere that same landlord noted that “if everyone in the market is doing well andeveryone in the market has [sic] is having the rates go up, so should ours, right?” An

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employee at Landlord 2 referenced RealPage’s use of the phrase “a rising tide raises all
ships” to explain how AIRM would provide price recommendations that amplify market
trends. Multiple landlords have expressed their preference that their competitors use
YieldStar and AIRM because widespread use would benefit them all. An executive of
one landlord (which itself uses YieldStar and AIRM) said in a 2021 earnings call that
more sophisticated, “high-quality competition” was better for that landlord when “they all
use revenue management. They are all smart. They raised rents when they should.”
C.

RealPage’s Transactional Data Is Fundamentally Different from Other
Data Available to Landlords

34.

The data that RealPage uses and supplies is unique relative to public data

available to landlords on listing or property websites. As compared to public data,
RealPage data is much more granular, covers a broader array of business information,and includes competitively sensitive data across several dimensions. For example:
 Information on Actual Transactions. RealPage’s data include, for eachlease, the unit, floor plan, listed rent, final transacted lease price (including
any discounts), and lease term.
 Renewals. RealPage’s data include the same information for lease renewals.
Information on renewals is not listed publicly—not even asking rents—
leaving a significant blind spot for landlords not using RealPage.
 Time Span. AIRM and YieldStar have access to current and historical leasedata, from the previous day and going back two to three years.

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 Future Demand. The shared data further include information on tenant
demand, including detailed information on inquiries and applications bypotential future tenants.
 Accuracy. Landlords have greater assurance of the accuracy of the data
because it comes directly from the landlords’ own databases.
 Coverage. The RealPage data covers millions of units from users of its
revenue management software and other products.
35.

RealPage touts how its data is different. As one RealPage pitch deck put it,“we have [the] most data and the best data.” And the “[q]uality of data is best in classgiven that it is ‘lease transaction data’—this provides insight into performance data from
actual signed leases, both new and renewal, net effective of concessions.” Another notedthat without YieldStar “you’ll be pricing your renewals in the dark without insight into
actual lease transaction data that YS uses to help you make pricing decisions. This is
critical to price renewals right[,] especially in a downturn.”
36.

Access to this data proves important in winning over revenue management

clients, including skeptical ones. One RealPage senior manager noted that a “highly
suspicious CFO” was won over in part by YieldStar’s “lease transaction data” thatallowed his company to “achieve what his people couldn’t achieve on their own.”
37.

Another landlord’s internal training presentation on YieldStar highlighted

the importance of having access to competitors’ transactional data:

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1

D.

RealPage Revenue Management Software Uses Nonpublic,
Competitively Sensitive Data to Recommend Prices

38.

AIRM and YieldStar are built upon similar code and leverage competitive

data in similar ways. LRO, on the other hand, was originally developed outside of
RealPage and takes a different approach.
1. AIRM and YieldStar Leverage Competitively Sensitive Data to
Generate Price Recommendations
39.

AIRM uses competitors’ nonpublic, transactional data in three separate

stages of the pricing process: (1) model training, (2) floor plan price recommendations,and (3) unit-level prices. YieldStar uses competitors’ nonpublic, transactional data instages two and three of its process.
1

Landlord names have been obscured in images in this complaint.
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a) AIRM model training relies on competitively sensitive data to
generate learned parameters.
40.

In the first stage, RealPage trains its AIRM models using nonpublic datafrom OneSite and other property management software, totaling millions of executed
lease transactions, new lead applications, renewal applications, and guest cards filled out
by visiting potential tenants. This data is run through a machine learning model togenerate learned parameters for supply and demand models that are then used for all
AIRM clients across the country. Like the coefficients in a regression model, the learned
parameters are applied to the data of a landlord’s specific property, and to the data of its
competitors, when AIRM makes pricing recommendations. RealPage generally retrains
the models three to four times per year using updated nonpublic data.
b) AIRM and YieldStar incorporate competitors’ nonpublic data to
generate floor plan price recommendations.
41.

In the second stage AIRM or YieldStar provides a price recommendationfor every floor plan of a given property. A floor plan is a grouping of units that sharesimilar characteristics, such as the number of bedrooms and bathrooms and square
footage. Landlords define the floor plans in their buildings—for example, a large
apartment building might have separate sets of floor plans for studios, one-bedroom, andtwo-bedroom apartments. As discussed below, AIRM and YieldStar use competitors’
nonpublic, transactional data in nearly every step of setting a recommended floor plan
price, including identifying peer properties, forecasting occupancy and leasing, increasing
rents to match competitors’ changes, and determining the magnitude of price changes.

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42.

Identifying Peers. First, AIRM and YieldStar use confidential transaction

data to identify a property’s peer properties, which include close competitors. In selecting
peer properties, RealPage’s algorithm generally looks for properties with similar floor
plans, within close geographic proximity, and with similar effective rents over time.
AIRM or YieldStar clients may review the list of peer properties and request that
RealPage add or remove specific properties.
43.

AIRM or YieldStar then uses the nonpublic data from competitors’

executed leases to generate a market range chart for each floor plan. This chart identifies
a “smoothed” market minimum effective rent and market maximum effective rent. The
market minimum is a hard floor. AIRM and YieldStar will not recommend a rent below
the market minimum. On the other hand, the market maximum is a “soft ceiling,” and theprograms will recommend prices above the ceiling.
44.

The client has access to the market range chart within the AIRM and

YieldStar interfaces. As shown below, for each floor plan the client can see the smoothedmarket minimum and market maximum and where the client’s own floor plan sits within
the market range.

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45.

Forecasting Occupancy and Leasing. Every night, for each participating

property, AIRM applies the model’s learned parameters to that property’s internaltransactional data to forecast the number of expected vacancies and expected leaseapplications for a certain period into the future. AIRM may also use competitors’ data toadjust the projected supply.
46.

AIRM or YieldStar then determines whether actual leasing for a floor planis on track to meet predicted leasing. To do so, it creates a forecast of the number ofleases over time, using nonpublic lease and application data from the subject property,
and potentially from so-called surrogate properties (similar properties in the surrounding

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area).2 When there is an imbalance between a property’s actual and forecasted leasing, it
recommends a price change.
47.

Changing Rents to Match Competitors. Even when a property’s supply

and demand are balanced, RealPage’s software will still recommend a price change,
based on competitors’ nonpublic data, when it determines that the market is moving. For
example, if the minimum and maximum of the competing floor plans’ effective rents
increase, it will recommend a price increase to maintain the floor plan’s market position(its price position relative to its competitors).
48.

Determining Magnitude of Price Changes. Once AIRM or YieldStar has

determined that it will recommend a price increase or a price decrease, it again uses
competitors’ transactional data to determine how much the price should move andprovide a floor plan price recommendation. It uses nonpublic transactional data from peer
properties, in addition to data from the subject property and surrogate properties, togenerate a market response curve—analogous to a market demand curve—for every floor
plan. This demand curve provides an estimate of how demand for particular apartments
would change in response to changes in rents, a measure that RealPage calls elasticity. In
other words, it uses competitors’ nonpublic transactional data to calculate how manyleases the property will likely gain or lose for a particular floor plan, for every price point2

If there is insufficient historical data for a particular building, or floor plan within thatbuilding, RealPage will use data from what it calls a “surrogate property,” which is theconfidential transactional data from another property with characteristics similar to thesubject property.
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along the curve. Using this data, AIRM or YieldStar can determine how much the pricecan increase and still achieve the target number of leases, or by how little price candecrease to maintain a target occupancy.
49.

RealPage describes elasticity as a pivotal input into balancing supply anddemand and, therefore, price.
50.

The use of surrogate properties in this pricing process has the potential topush convergence on price even further. As two properties’ surrogate sets become
closer—and therefore their respective demand curves become more similar—AIRM and
YieldStar will generate increasingly similar prices for the two properties. And the use of
surrogates is common. One of the largest landlords in the country, for example, uses
surrogates at over 80% of its properties.
51.

This process repeats for every floor plan in the client’s property, every

night. A new floor plan price recommendation is generated daily.
c) AIRM and YieldStar use competitors’ nonpublic data—
including data on future occupancy—to determine unit-level
prices.
52.

A property manager at the landlord reviews each floor plan

recommendation daily and enters the floor plan price. AIRM and YieldStar then use thefloor plan price to generate prices for every unit within the floor plan. The unit price isshown in a pricing matrix, which provides the price for each combination of start dateand lease term. To generate the price for an individual unit, the floor plan price isadjusted to account for unit-specific factors such as amenities (e.g., a desirable view, the20Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 25 of 115

floor level, or an in-unit washer and dryer), staleness (i.e., how long that specific unit has
been vacant), and the timing of lease expirations. AIRM and YieldStar again use
competitors’ nonpublic data during this step in at least two ways.
53.

First, AIRM and YieldStar use data on competitors’ supply of multifamily

housing to adjust recommendations to limit “exposure” with a feature called lease
expiration management. Exposure refers to the number of units that are available forlease. Managing lease expirations is an important element of revenue management
software. If too many leases expire and the corresponding units become available at thesame time, supply increases and rents for those units will tend to drop. This process will
also tend to repeat itself as the same units will become available at the same time a year
later for leases with a standard twelve-month term.
54.

The objective of expiration management is to smooth out this exposure sothat landlords, as explained by one RealPage employee, “remain in a position of pricing
power.” For example, if AIRM or YieldStar sees that a large number of units will likely
be available in twelve months, it will increase the price recommendation for a twelvemonth lease relative to price recommendations for leases of other terms, such as 11months or 13 months, in order to nudge potential renters to accept those terms. Expiration
management can only raise prices—AIRM does not lower a unit’s price if the lease term
would fall in an underexposed period.
55.

This calculation does not rely only on the predicted future supply for theclient’s property. For any landlord who uses a “market seasonality” setting, AIRM and

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YieldStar also rely on competitors’ transactional data and the supply for thosecompetitors—including the supply of competitors’ existing leases that expire in the
future. AIRM and YieldStar thus work to manage lease expirations for the client’s units
based on how competitors’ supply will change.
56.

The use of competitors’ nonpublic data in expiration management to fill out

the pricing matrix occurs regardless of whether the landlord accepts the AIRM or
YieldStar recommendation. Thus, even if a landlord were to override every pricerecommendation, its rental prices would still be influenced by nonpublic information
about its competitors’ supply.
57.

Second, AIRM and YieldStar include an amenity optimization feature. By

pricing specific amenities within units, landlords can avoid making wholesale pricing
changes to a floor plan if a specific unit fails to lease. Within the amenity analysis, AIRM
and YieldStar provide market values for specific amenities to landlords, allowing them tocompare their perceived value of an amenity with the nonpublic valuation of theircompetitors. The peer data include the market minimum and maximum value for specificamenities.
2. LRO Relies Primarily on Landlords to Input Data on Competitors
58.

RealPage’s LRO also provides pricing recommendations to users. LRO,

however, does not inherently use competitors’ transactional data from RealPage’s
systems to make those recommendations. Instead, each week, LRO users manually input

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competitor information into the system that they have obtained from public websites ormore questionable means, such as communicating directly with their competitors.
59.

A small number of LRO users subscribe to a feature called AutoComp.

With this feature, RealPage provides information on competitors’ rents, traffic, andoccupancy. This information comes from market surveys that RealPage compiles using
call centers to call competitor properties. Landlords may use LRO without using
AutoComp.
E.

RealPage Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Increase Compliance with Price
Recommendations

60.

AIRM and YieldStar provide daily price recommendations. RealPage hastaken multiple steps to increase compliance with AIRM and YieldStar pricerecommendations. It designed AIRM and YieldStar to make it much easier to accept
recommendations than to decline them. It built an auto-accept function and pushes clientsto adopt it and increase its role. And its pricing advisors encourage landlords to follow
AIRM and YieldStar pricing recommendations. Among their duties, pricing advisors
review any request to override a price recommendation.
1. AIRM and YieldStar Make it Easy to Accept Recommendations andMore Difficult and Time-Consuming to Decline
61.

Every morning, the landlord’s property manager chooses whether to accept

the floor plan price recommendation, keep the previous day’s rent, or override therecommendation. These options are the same for new leases and renewal leases.
RealPage makes it easier and faster for a client to accept a recommendation than to23
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decline it. When accepting recommendations, the manager can choose to do a bulk
acceptance—she can accept all or multiple floor plan recommendations at once. But she
cannot do the same when overriding, or rejecting, the recommendation.
62.

Instead, for every recommendation that she does not accept—whether

overriding or keeping the previous day’s rent—the property manager must provide“specific business commentary” for diverging from the recommendation. Thisjustification, RealPage instructs, should not be a mere preference for another price but
must be based on a factor that the model cannot account for, such as local construction or
renovations occurring in the building. It must be a “strong sound business minded
approach.”
63.

The property manager knows that these recommendation rejections andaccompanying justifications will be sent to a RealPage pricing advisor.3 If the pricing
advisor disagrees with the rejection or justification, the disagreement is escalated for
resolution to a landlord’s regional manager, who typically supervises the property
manager.
64.

As one client who complained to RealPage explained, RealPage’s design is“trying to persuade [clients] to take the recommendations (almost like we made it hard to
do anything but).”

3

Some clients have internal revenue managers that are certified by RealPage. For thoseclients who have internalized the revenue management function, recommendation
rejections may be routed to the internal revenue manager rather than a RealPage pricing
advisor.
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2. RealPage Pushes Clients to Adopt Auto-Accept Settings That
Automatically Approve Recommendations
65.

AIRM and YieldStar each include auto-accept functions. This functionality

automatically accepts price recommendations falling within certain parameters. By
default, AIRM and YieldStar set auto-accept parameters of a 3% daily change and an 8%
weekly change. The landlord can change these parameters, disable or enable auto-accept,
and even enable partial auto-accept. With partial auto-accept, if the recommendation
exceeds the auto-accept parameters, the recommendation is accepted as far as theparameter permits. For example, if the auto-accept daily change limit is 4% and the pricerecommendation is 5%, using partial auto-accept will result in an increase of 4%. By
enabling auto-accept, a landlord functionally delegates pricing authority to RealPage(within the bounds of the daily and weekly limits).
66.

As part of the onboarding process, internal RealPage guidance states,“AUTO ACCEPT should be confirmed as ‘on’ with parameters in place.” Internal AIRM
training explained that RealPage wanted to “widen auto accept parameters” byintroducing the feature and then “creating enough trust so that over time we have client[s]that are willing to let auto accept run with very wide parameters… AKA – accept all
recommendations.” RealPage trains pricing advisors to have an “accountability
conversation” or a “refresher on short term vs long term goals” for clients that show lesstolerance for increasing auto-accept parameters.
67.

Even if a landlord does not want to use auto-accept, RealPage trains its

advisors to convince the landlord to turn it on with 0% limits—a setting whereby auto25
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accept will never accept price changes. The reason? So that it is no longer a question ofwhether the client turns on auto-accept, but only a matter of convincing them to widen
the parameters and further delegate pricing decisions. RealPage instructs its advisors on
best practices: “[I]f a partner is not ready to use auto acceptance, are they ready to use
revenue management?”
3. RealPage Pricing Advisors Provide a “Check and Balance” on
Property Managers to Increase Acceptance of Recommendations
68.

RealPage offers landlords pricing advisory services. Landlords typicallyhave an assigned pricing advisor, unless the client has internal revenue managers thatwere certified by RealPage. Pricing advisors play an important role in the daily review ofpricing recommendations. Landlords’ property managers are asked to review
recommendations every morning by 9:30 a.m. After their review, a pricing advisor
accepts agreed-upon pricing within an hour and escalates any disputes to the landlord’s
regional manager.
69.

If a property manager disagrees with the direction of a recommended pricechange—e.g., the manager wants to implement a price decrease when the model
recommends a price increase—the RealPage pricing advisor escalates the dispute to the
manager’s superior. As a pricing advisor manager explained in a client training, theadvisor would “stop the process and reach out to our partners”—the property manager’s
supervisors—to “talk about this further.” The advisors, the manager elaborated, are partof a system of “checks and balances.” The client confirmed the value of this system to26
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stop property managers from acting on emotions, which could limit RealPage’s influenceon their pricing.
70.

Beyond the daily interactions between pricing advisors and their own

property managers, clients agree to make meaningful changes when they use RealPage’s
pricing advisory services. Under the specifications for this service, clients agree to use
AIRM or YieldStar exclusively to give quotes to potential renters, further tying
landlords’ pricing decisions to RealPage’s software. Clients also agree to change theircommission programs for leasing agents to “ensure these programs motivate sales
behavior that is consistent with the objectives of revenue growth.” And clients further
agree to revenue growth as the official metric to evaluate AIRM and YieldStar, as
opposed to occupancy rates.
4. Pricing Recommendations Heavily Influence Landlords’ Behavior
71.

RealPage defines an acceptance as where the final floor plan price is within

1% of the recommended floor plan price. According to that definition, the average
acceptance rate across all landlords nationally for new leases between January 2017 andJune 2023 is between 40-50%. But RealPage itself recognizes that acceptance rates are
not necessarily the best measure of its influence; one employee explained that the spread
between a floor plan recommendation and the final scheduled floor plan price is more
useful for measuring model adoption—and therefore influence—than the binary
accept/reject decision that the RealPage-defined acceptance rate reflects. Widening thedefinition of acceptance even slightly to account for partial acceptances illustrates the27
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influence of recommendations: nearly 60% of final floor plan prices are within 2.5% of
RealPage’s recommendation, and more than 85% are within 5% of RealPage’s
recommendation.
72.

RealPage’s preferred measure of acceptance understates the influence of

RealPage’s price recommendations and the effect of competitors’ data. AIRM and
YieldStar use competitors’ nonpublic transactional data to adjust unit-level pricing, after
a floor plan recommendation has been accepted or rejected. RealPage’s metric does not
capture the cumulative effect of rate acceptances over time. Nor do they capture when aclient is influenced by and partially accepts a recommendation.
III.

COORDINATION AMONG COMPETING LANDLORDS IS AFEATURE OF THIS INDUSTRY73.

Several characteristics of apartment-rental markets make it easier for

landlords to coordinate with, or accommodate, each other. Rental housing is a necessity
for many Americans, meaning that demand is inelastic—that is, changes in rent produce
relatively small changes in the number of renters. There is significant concentration
among landlords in local markets, and these landlords engage in widespread, regularcommunications with one another. And RealPage makes rental units more comparable toeach other in AIRM and YieldStar, allowing landlords to track one another more easily.
These industry characteristics exacerbate the harm to the competitive process—andultimately to renters—from the exchange of nonpublic, competitively sensitive data
through RealPage and the use of the AIRM and YieldStar models.

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A.

Rental Housing is a Necessity for Millions of Americans

74.

Shelter is a basic, foundational necessity of life. And for tens of millions ofAmericans, conventional multifamily apartment buildings are the only reasonable option
for much of their lives. Many renters cannot afford the significant down payment needed
to purchase a single-family home, among other requirements.
75.

Demand for apartments is relatively inelastic. Rising rents havedisproportionately affected low-income residents: The percentage of income spent on rent
for Americans without a college degree increased from 30% in 2000 to 42% in 2017. In
2021, the proportion of severely burdened households—households spending more thanhalf of their income on gross rent—was 25%, or approximately 10.4 million households,
an increase in approximately 1 million households since 2019. By 2022, this number
increased to 12.1 million households. For college graduates, the percentage of income
spent on rent increased from 26% to 34% from 2000 to 2017.
B.

The Multifamily Property Industry is Rife with Cooperation Among
Ostensible Competitors

76.

Within particular metropolitan areas and neighborhoods, the multifamily

property industry is concentrated and replete with competitively sensitive discussions
among ostensible competitors. Landlords have agreed with one another to sharenonpublic, sensitive information, both indirectly through RealPage software and directly
outside of RealPage’s software. RealPage facilitates some of these discussions, whileothers are made directly between competing landlords. These discussions supplement andreinforce the indirect information sharing among landlords that occurs through AIRM
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and YieldStar. As a result of this coordination, RealPage’s pricing algorithms are evenmore likely to restrain, rather than promote, competition.
1. At the Local Level, the Multifamily Property Industry Comprises a
Small Number of Large Landlords Managing Buildings withDifferent Owners
77.

In 445 zip codes with at least 1,000 total multifamily units across 109 core-

based statistical areas, five or fewer landlords manage more than 50% of the multifamily
units. Within the submarkets alleged in this complaint, there are at least 139 zip codes,
each with at least 1,000 total multifamily units, in which five or fewer landlords manage
more than half of those units. Similarly, within the ten core-based statistical areas allegedin the complaint, there are 117 zip codes, each with at least 1,000 total multifamily units,in which five or fewer landlords manage more than half of those units.
78.

The same landlord often oversees nearby properties with different owners.

In at least 502 zip codes, at least one landlord using AIRM or YieldStar oversees
properties with different owners.
79.

There is also overlap among RealPage pricing advisor assignments. In atleast 683 zip codes, within 96 core-based statistical areas, a RealPage pricing advisor has
responsibility for properties managed by different landlords. RealPage takes no steps to
avoid assigning the same pricing advisor to properties with different owners, even if
those properties compete with each other or are RealPage-mapped competitors.

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2. Landlords Regularly Discuss Competitively Sensitive Topics with
Their Competitors and Swap Information
80.

Landlords regularly solicit and obtain nonpublic information aboutinquiries by prospective renters, occupancy, and rents from their direct competitors.
Although this information is not as accurate or thorough as the transactional-level data
shared with AIRM and YieldStar, it is nonetheless sensitive competitive information.
81.

Landlords collect this information through a variety of means, including

weekly phone calls, emails, and in-person visits. Some landlords also share informationon their local geographic markets through shared Google Drive documents. One
RealPage employee explained to his colleagues, reflecting on his former time working at
a landlord, that these weekly inquiries “required cooperation among the comp[etitor]s but
wasn’t hard to get that.” In June 2023, a senior director at Landlord 3 admitted that “thispractice has been prevalent in our industry for a long time.”
82.

Landlords not only knew of these so-called “market surveys,” but expected

their property managers to participate. As a manager of Landlord 3’s revenue
management department explained, “we have always expected our properties to continue
doing a traditional market survey[,]” which “gives us insight into the very specifichandful of competitors closest to the subject property.”83.

At a February 2020 industry event, representatives from Landlord 3 andtwo other landlords shared tips on collecting information on concessions and net effective
rents from competitors. The suggestions included bi-weekly and monthly meetings withcompetitors, sponsored “cocktail hours for regional competitors to share info and build
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relationships and rapport,” and using Google Drive documents to share information on a
weekly basis. Building relationships with competitors to get accurate data was “critical.”The representatives cautioned that the collected data was used to make “major decisions
about pricing,” so the landlord employees collecting data should be trained accordingly to
ask such questions as “are you seeing a slow down?” and “are you adjusting pricing?”
84.

Some landlords engage in even more sensitive communications about price,

demand, and market conditions. These communications are not isolated instances at a
specific property. Rather, they are conversations at the corporate revenue managementlevel about strategies and approaches to market conditions that apply to the landlords’
business across all markets.
85.

For example, in January 2018, Landlord 2’s director of revenue

management reached out to Landlord 1’s director of revenue management and asked
about Landlord 1’s use of auto accept in YieldStar. In response, Landlord 1’s director
provided Landlord 1’s standard auto-accept settings, including daily and weekly limits
and for which days of the week auto accept was used. The Landlord 1 director,
explaining why she provided this information, testified that the Landlord 2 director was a“colleague,” even though Landlord 2 was a competitor to Landlord 1.
86.

In September 2020, Landlord 4’s director of revenue management reached

out to Landlord 1’s director of its internal revenue management team. Landlord 4 asked
Landlord 1—a direct competitor—what increases on renewal pricing Landlord 1 had seenin August and offered what it had seen. Landlord 1’s director replied with information

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not only on August renewals, but also on how Landlord 1 planned to approach pricing in
the upcoming quarter. Landlord 1’s director further disclosed its practices on accepting
YieldStar rates and use of concessions. As the conversation continued, the twocompetitors shared additional highly-sensitive information on occupancy—including inspecific markets—demand, and the strategic use of concessions.
87.

In June 2021, Landlord 2’s head of revenue management emailed Landlord

1’s revenue management director. She proposed collaborating with Landlord 1 toconvince a client to move all of its properties, including those managed by Landlord 2
and those managed by Landlord 1, to AIRM. But she also noted that, in thinking about“the larger picture as well,” it could be useful to “coordinate with the other companies
that we often share business with” to prepare to move their clients to AIRM as well.
Landlord 1 responded favorably to transitioning the joint client to AIRM.
88.

In November 2021, a revenue management executive at Landlord 5 emailed

an executive at Landlord 4 to propose a call to discuss how Landlord 4 approached leaserenewals, for the purpose of informing how Landlord 5 calculated renewal increases. The
two spoke that day. The following day, another Landlord 5 executive—who was included
on the call—thanked the Landlord 4 executive for the opportunity “connect on industry
best practices” and asked another “operational question” about implementing “larger
renewal increases.” The executives exchanged emails over the next few months,
including discussing their respective strategies on maximum increases to lease renewal

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prices. They shared not only their increase limits in specific markets but also what priceincreases they were able to achieve.
89.

In September 2021, a property manager at Landlord 6 explained to acolleague that the manager had called two competitors and received from them pricing
information on two-bedroom and three-bedroom units. The property manager asked forthe information to decide how to act on YieldStar’s price recommendations.
90.

In addition to contacting each other directly, many landlords also exchange

information through other intermediaries. One vendor offers a tool for landlords toexchange with one another nonpublic information on concessions, net effective rents,
inquiries and visits by prospective renters, and occupancy that is pulled from eachlandlord’s property management software. Over 150 landlords nationally use this service,including Landlord 1 and Landlord 5, and some of the other largest landlords across thecountry. The vendor’s CEO described this as a “quid pro quo or give to get” arrangement
among landlords where “if you share this data with me, I’ll share the same data.” A
RealPage employee noted that this vendor makes it “quicker and easier to get yourmarket surveys.”
91.

Some landlords use this direct exchange of competitively sensitive

information to update competitor rents within LRO—a practice that RealPage is aware ofand accepts.
92.

Recently, under the scrutiny of antitrust lawsuits, at least one landlord(Landlord 3) has adopted an internal policy prohibiting “call arounds” and other direct

34
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sharing of competitively sensitive information with direct competitors. But evenassuming that its property managers fully comply with these legally unenforceableinternal policies, Landlord 3 continues to use RealPage’s revenue management software.
3. At RealPage User Group Meetings, Landlords Discuss Competitively
Sensitive Topics
93.

RealPage holds monthly “user group” meetings attended by competing

landlords that use RealPage’s software. There are separate user group meetings for LRO
and for YieldStar and AIRM.4 One of RealPage’s stated purposes for the user groups is to“to promote communications between users.” Attendees include a wide mix of competing
landlords. For example, the June 2022 YieldStar user group included representatives
from five of the largest property management companies in the country, among a larger
group.
94.

Recurring topics at the user group meetings include product enhancements

and an “idea exchange” on potential changes to the products. The user group participants
often vote on the proposals discussed in the idea exchange. But discussions have covered
competitively sensitive topics, including managing lease expirations, pricing amenities,
and how to manage properties during the COVID-19 pandemic. RealPage encouraged
landlords to use the user group meetings to discuss such topics in their industry and set
agendas for these meetings to aid them in doing just that.

4

RealPage previously held separate AIRM and YieldStar user groups but combined themin 2023.
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95.

At an April 2020 YieldStar user group meeting, the participants discussed

strategies for handling the COVID-19 pandemic. In the presentation, two RealPage
employees and a landlord led a group discussion of trends in rent payments andcollections and provided five strategic tips. One tip encouraged landlords to “push foroccupancy but don’t give away the farm (pricing).” Another counseled landlords to“balance internal and external dynamics” and, referring to the nonpublic information usedby YieldStar, to “use transactional market data for decision support and to know when
you can be more aggressive” in pushing higher rents. Invited attendees included
representatives from at least twelve landlords. At this meeting, Landlord 1 and anotherlandlord shared information on their usage of payment plans with tenants.
96.

In May 2020, RealPage started a YieldStar user group meeting by

surveying them on concessions. RealPage asked landlords how many of their properties
offered concessions, whether concessions applied to new leases or renewals, and thetypes of concessions offered (such as discounts, gift cards, or other benefits). Invited
attendees included representatives of thirteen landlords.
97.

RealPage began its agenda for an April 2021 YieldStar user group meetingwith “strategic insights” from a RealPage economist. This employee shared “21 key
strategic insights,” including “focus on renewals,” “be cautious with concessions,” and“drive up revenues—not just base rent.” Specifically, he urged the group to “push up new
and renewal pricing where demand [is] solid” and warned against over-relying on
concessions. They were instead to “trust the science” of YieldStar.

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98.

In May 2021, RealPage included a “Back to Basics” discussion in a

YieldStar user group meeting. This discussion covered “returning to renewal increases
post-COVID” and “declining concessions,” as well as eviction moratoria and areas where
acceptance rates were “seeing significant uptick in past 6 months.” The meeting groupchat is even more revealing. Over a period of approximately fifteen minutes,
representatives from fifteen landlords shared their plans for renewal increases and theiruse of concessions. These representatives made statements on renewal increases such as“increasing, back to normal,” “major rent growth on the west coast,” “increasing therenewals,” “almost all markets we are raising rents,” “actually raising more than before
covid at some,” “raising,” and “we are pushing to get back to normal. Sending increases.”
A representative from Landlord 5 stated, “increasing renewals and pushing new leaserents.”
99.

The user group members were similarly open about their disinterest inconcessions, signaling to each other that they do not intend to offer them or would offer
them less frequently. Their pronouncements included “no consessions [sic],” “noconcessions,” “considerably less concessions,” “less frequent and less aggressive,” “noconcessions except in markets with a lot of lease-ups,” and “almost no concessions
currently.”
100.

When the discussion turned to acceptance rates, one user group member

explained to the group, for “about 1/3 of the communities I manage the [YieldStar] model

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was too slow to respond, and we are pushing rates above market and above YS
rec[ommendation].”101.

The Landlord 5 representative who attended this May 2021 meeting

testified that similar discussions happened numerous times during the COVID-19
pandemic—specifically, the beginning of 2020 through the middle of 2022. In thesemeetings, user group members discussed new and renewal rent increases, concessions,and renewal strategies, as well as other sensitive topics.
102.

RealPage claims that this and other user group meetings were not recorded.

103.

The July 2021 YieldStar user group meeting, held at RealWorld (aRealPage-hosted industry event), included a roundtable discussion among competitors.
One of the discussion topics? “What is the one thing you consistently consider outside of
the model when accepting or changing price and why?”104.

At the October 2021 YieldStar user group meeting, a RealPage economist

gave a presentation regarding the 2022 market outlook. RealPage presented analyses oncurrent occupancy and pricing, and on expected occupancy and rent growth in 2022 bygeographic regions.
105.

At the July 2022 RealWorld YieldStar user group meeting, RealPage

hosted a “roundtable discussion” on market volatility and its impact on how to use

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revenue management, unit amenities and their impact on tenant rents, and best practices
for conducting lease ups.5
106.

RealPage recognized the sensitive nature of the information shared at thesemeetings. Beginning in late 2022, after public reporting about AIRM and YieldStar,
RealPage added an antitrust compliance statement in the user group presentations.
Among other directions, the statement instructed participants not to discuss “confidential
or competitively sensitive information,” and then noted that this included “you or yourcompetitors’ prices or anything that may affect prices, such as current or future pricing
strategies, costs, discounts, concessions or profit margins.” But these were the very topics
of previous user group meetings, as described above, that RealPage encouraged its users
to discuss. And these are the very types of nonpublic information that AIRM and
YieldStar use to recommend and determine prices.
107.

Landlords frequently take advantage of RealPage user group meeting

invites to email each other directly. In August 2020, for example, an employee ofLandlord 6 emailed a user group invitee list and asked them to support a change to how
YieldStar calculated the number of leases needed. In response, an employee of a different
landlord agreed, adding that “I also rely on comparing available units to adj[usted] leases
needed, to forecast leases, to gut check the pricing recs. These data points are always afactor in my pricing decisions.”

A lease up is typically a pre-leasing period (such as with a newly constructed property)
where a landlord is seeking to reach a certain, initial occupancy threshold.

5

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C.

RealPage Uses Nonpublic Information to Allow Landlords to More
Easily Compare Units on an Apples-to-Apples Basis

108.

Renters typically search for a rental unit using certain key criteria,

including the number of bedrooms and the location. Recognizing this market reality,
RealPage enables landlords to more easily compare unit prices. When picking aproperty’s “peer set,” RealPage matches floorplans with the same number of bedrooms
that are geographically proximate. This makes it easier for landlords, through AIRM and
YieldStar, to track and respond to competitors’ movements at the floor plan level.
109.

To account for amenities, RealPage instructs landlords to identify amenities

using standardized naming conventions so that RealPage can use machine learning togroup amenities together. RealPage then provides the market value for specific amenities,
allowing landlords to more accurately identify and track how their competitors value
these amenities and adjust their own pricing accordingly. The peer data include themarket minimum and maximum value, as well as market quartile values, for specificamenities.
IV.

REALPAGE HARMS THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND RENTERS
BY ENTERING INTO UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS WITHLANDLORDS TO SHARE AND EXPLOIT COMPETITIVELYSENSITIVE DATA
110.

AIRM’s and YieldStar’s use of nonpublic, competitively sensitive data islikely to harm, and has harmed, the competitive process and renters. AIRM and YieldStar
distort the competitive process by using nonpublic data to maximize pricing increases andminimize pricing decreases. AIRM and YieldStar incorporate special rules, called

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“guardrails,” that override the ordinary functioning of the algorithms in ways that tend topush rival landlords’ rental prices higher than would occur in a competitive market.
RealPage presses landlords to curtail “concessions” to renters. And AIRM and
YieldStar’s “lease expiration management” features aim to sequence vacancies tomaximize landlords’ pricing power.
A.

AIRM and YieldStar Have the Purpose and Effect of Distorting theCompetitive Pricing of Apartments

111.

As RealPage frequently trumpets to landlords, “a rising tide raises all

ships.” AIRM and YieldStar ensure that the ‘tide’ flows primarily one way—higher
rental prices. In a hot market, AIRM and YieldStar will recommend price increases to test
what the market will bear, while in a down market AIRM and YieldStar will, to theextent possible, still increase or hold prices and minimize price decreases to reach thetarget occupancy rate.
112.

AIRM and YieldStar are designed to help landlords press pricing beyond

what they could otherwise achieve while reducing the risk that other landlords would
undercut them. A revenue manager at Landlord 2 explained it succinctly: YieldStar is“designed to always test the top of the market whenever it feels it’s safe to.” By using
competitors’ sensitive nonpublic data to generate elasticity estimates, among other things,
AIRM and YieldStar can recommend higher price increases to extract more money from
renters without losing an additional lease. As RealPage explained to a YieldStar client in
training, this pricing elasticity measurement informs “how far do we stretch and pull

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pricing within the market.” That, in turn, means that “we may have a $50 increase insteadof a $10 increase for that day.”
113.

That insight, gleaned from competitors sharing sensitive, transactional datawith RealPage, which is in turn shared with landlords through pricing recommendations,removes uncertainty and competitive pressure that benefits renters. As one landlord put it,these products “eliminate the guessing game” on rent.
114.

As RealPage explains to its clients, AIRM and YieldStar reveal “hidden

yield.” This extra yield or revenue is hidden in a competitive market—a market in which
competitors do not share sensitive information with each other—because landlords “can’t
see the opportunity” and “fail to capture [the] full opportunity.”
115.

AIRM and YieldStar disrupt the normal competitive bargaining process

between landlords and renters. They place landlords in a better negotiating position vis-àvis renters. Landlords using AIRM and YieldStar know that these models recommend
floor plan prices and price units incorporating nonpublic data of their competitors,
including effective rents and occupancy rates, all of which allow landlords to raise pricewith more certainty.
116.

As landlords appreciate, AIRM and YieldStar use competitors’ nonpublicdata to predict with more certainty the highest price that the market will bear for aparticular unit. A landlord is therefore less likely to negotiate on price. Any potential
negotiation instead turns on lease term and move-in date, which AIRM and YieldStar
adjust the pricing for to avoid overexposure for the landlord in the future.

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117.

AIRM and YieldStar also encourage landlords to follow each other inraising rents. When transactional data reveal that peers are raising effective rents—
particularly the highest and lowest competitors for a given floor plan—AIRM and
YieldStar follow with recommendations to increase rental prices. This movement withthe market is ingrained in the AIRM and YieldStar models; AIRM and YieldStar will notrecommend a floor plan price that falls below the market minimum.
118.

Accordingly, as adoption of AIRM and YieldStar increases among peercompetitors, the use of AIRM and YieldStar can push prices up through a feedback
effect. As peers move up, other AIRM or YieldStar users may move up accordingly. Thisphenomenon, where participating landlords “likely move in unison versus against eachother,” a RealPage executive testified, explains “the rising tide.” The same executive saw
evidence of this “rising tide” in 2020: When looking at multiple peer sites using
YieldStar, “we started to see the trajectory of performance and trends be eerily similar
when comparing subject sites and comp sets, thus showing that we are in fact ‘r[a]ising
the entire tide.’” He acknowledged that YieldStar contributed to market prices rising as a
tide.
119.

Landlords rely on competitors’ data within AIRM and YieldStar todetermine their prices and how hard they need to try to be competitive. A revenue
management director at Landlord 1 noted in an internal AIRM deck that competitors’
data is “like the boundaries of the street you are driving on.” The director elaborated that

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“the competitive market range are [sic] the edges of the road, staying in those boundaries
are [sic] necessary to get you to the destination.”
120.

Another landlord that used YieldStar told RealPage that within a week ofadopting YieldStar they started increasing their rents, and within eleven months hadraised rents more than 25% and eliminated concessions. The landlord added that they
were now pricing at the top of their peers and, importantly, had “brought the rest of theComps rents up with us.” A RealPage executive responded internally that this was a“great case study that highlights performance before, during, and a result of YS[YieldStar].”121.

Landlord 6 explained in an internal presentation that because YieldStar

recommends floor plan pricing that moves with the market—a market position—
YieldStar would use competitors’ data to inform “how competitive we need to be [e]ach[d]ay.”

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122.

AIRM uses machine learning to train models on competing landlords’

sensitive data. The parameters learned in this training are then applied to each AIRM
client.6 As a result, the model uses the same method and learned parameters to generate
price recommendations from the relevant data for each landlord.
123.

This aligns and stabilizes prices in at least two ways. First, it reduces

volatility in how prices change, compared to a situation in which each client sets prices
independently. No longer do competitors react in distinctive ways to changing market

6

There are separate AI Supply models, and therefore potentially different learned model
parameters, for clients using Yardi’s property management software and clients using otherproperty management software. But within these two categories the learned model
parameters for the AI Supply models are the same.
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conditions as they would in a market without access to competitors’ transactional data.
Instead, AIRM price recommendations tend to standardize those reactions. This leads tothe second result: pricing recommendations, and consequently pricing decisions, become
more predictable and aligned among competitors as each is using the same set of learned
model parameters.
124.

RealPage has even manipulated competitor mappings to increase thelikelihood that AIRM or YieldStar would recommend price increases. For example, aprominent client asked why a subject property had mapped peers located more than 100
miles away, in a different metropolitan area, when there were satisfactory mappedcompetitors within five miles. RealPage’s response was that if these distant properties
were not mapped, the client’s property would be at the top of the market and it would be
more difficult for AIRM to recommend price increases. RealPage had originally mapped
these distant properties to give the model more room to recommend price increases forthe client’s property.
125.

This dynamic exists not only in markets with growing demand, but also so-called “down markets,” where demand is decreasing. In a competitive market with afixed supply (at least in the short run) of housing units, a demand decrease would resultin prices falling. But AIRM and YieldStar resist price decreases in down markets asmuch as possible while achieving targeted occupancy rates. RealPage told one
prospective AIRM client that the combination of “AI and the robust data in the RealPage
ecosystem” would allow the landlord to “avoid the race to the bottom in down markets.”

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126.

Using competitors’ transactional data to calibrate and set the bounds of its

model enables YieldStar and AIRM to decrease prices as little as possible in a down
market. As one example, in 2023 a landlord reached out to RealPage with concerns about
price recommendations at a property. Despite the property having too many vacancies
and peer properties decreasing in price, AIRM was recommending price increases,
frustrating the property owner. A senior RealPage executive responded that the model
was not lowering prices because “there isn’t much elasticity between the recommended
position and the current one” and “the model would recommend the highest possible
position [i.e., price] without affecting demand.”127.

RealPage succinctly summarized for landlords the effect of using AIRM

and YieldStar in down markets: it “curbs [clients’] instincts to respond to down-market
conditions by either dramatically lowering price or by holding price when they are losing
velocity and/or occupancy.” These tools instill pricing discipline in landlords, curbing
normal fully independent competitive reactions by substituting them with interdependent
decision-making (i.e., through the use of pricing recommendations based on shared,
competitively sensitive information). These products ensure that clients are “driving
every possible opportunity to increase price even in the most downward trending or
unexpected conditions.”
128.

When one client wanted to cancel YieldStar, a RealPage executive noted tocolleagues that with cancelation the client would lose “our helping them mitigate damage

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during rent control and covid.” In particular, the client would lose “us helping them risewith the tide given their strategy.”
129.

Landlords understand the sensitivity of the information being shared andthe likely anticompetitive effects. One potential client put it succinctly to RealPage: “Ialways liked this product [AIRM] because your algorithm uses proprietary data fromother subscribers to suggest rents and term. That’s classic price fixing . . . .”130.

Landlord 3 recognized the anticompetitive potential of sharing this level ofdetailed competitor data. When a property owner asked for information on specificcompetitors, Landlord 3’s director of revenue management replied that the requested tool,
RealPage’s Performance Analytics with Benchmarking, did not provide information on
specific competitors. The reason? Performance Analytics with Benchmarking “tracks
transactional information therefore due [to] the potential pricing collusion, it’sanonymize[d] by RealPage.” Performance Analytics with Benchmarking draws from thesame transactional database as AIRM and YieldStar. And while AIRM and YieldStar do
not display the granular transactional data to the user, AIRM and YieldStar see and usethat data. The price recommendations are based upon the very data that this client
recognized could lead to collusion.
131.

Even RealPage employees selling LRO recognized the anticompetitive

harm from using competitors’ transactional data to recommend prices. In a 2018 training
deck provided to clients, RealPage explained, “we often times get the question about if
comps are on LRO, can we just update the rents for you? Unfortunately, no, we can’t.

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That could be considered price collusion, and it’s illegal.” But this is precisely what
AIRM and YieldStar do.
B.

AIRM and YieldStar Impose Multiple Guardrails Intended to
Artificially Keep Prices High or Minimize Price Decreases

132.

Unsatisfied with relying merely on competitively sensitive data toadvantage landlords, RealPage created “guardrails” within AIRM and YieldStar to force
adjustments to the price recommendation. But these guardrails serve as one-way ratchetsthat help landlords, not renters, by increasing price recommendations or limiting a
recommended decrease. And each of these guardrails makes use of competitively
sensitive data that landlords agree to share with RealPage. These guardrails have evenspurred multiple landlords to tell RealPage that AIRM and YieldStar are not dropping
recommended rents as much as their individual conditions, or even market conditions,would warrant.
133.

Hard Floor. AIRM and YieldStar will not recommend a floor plan pricethat falls below the smoothed market minimum effective rent. The market minimum is a
hard floor. AIRM and YieldStar thus explicitly constrain floor plan pricerecommendations based on the prices of competitors, using shared nonpublic
information.
134.

Revenue Protection Mode. RealPage created a “revenue protection” modethat effectively lowers output to increase revenues. Revenue protection activates when
AIRM or YieldStar predict—using calculations incorporating competitors’ data—that
demand is too low for a landlord to meet its target occupancy. Rather than lowering the49
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price to stimulate demand, the algorithm reduces the target number of leases. AIRM and
YieldStar then maximizes revenue for the reduced occupancy level, which tends toreduce price decreases or increase rental prices.
135.

RealPage acknowledges that revenue protection “may seem counterintuitive

to leasing needs.” In June 2023, a landlord complained to RealPage that “something inyour model is broken” because “the pricing model is not lowering rents dramatically”
despite the client’s high exposure during a busy summer leasing season. RealPage
explained that, with revenue protection, “the model still sees the way to make more
revenue is to lease fewer units at higher prices.” In other words, the model seeks to “raise
rates to get the highest dollar value possible for the leases we can statistically achieve”
and ignore those leases that the client wants but the model predicts, using competitors’
data, the client will not get.
136.

The model’s hard price floor can trigger revenue protection mode. In May

2022, for example, a landlord complained that AIRM was recommending price increases
despite a projected shortfall in leases. Because revenue protection mode cannot be turnedoff, the RealPage pricing advisor recommended that the client reduce sustainablecapacity. Sustainable capacity is a client-set parameter that imposes an inventory
constraint and determines the number of leases AIRM and YieldStar will try to achieve.
This is, of course, what revenue protection mode functionally does on its own: increase
inventory constraints to reduce output.

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137.

This phenomenon, a RealPage employee explained internally, was “truerevenue protection mode.” The client’s floor plan was priced toward the bottom of its
competitors. AIRM did not see any price decrease that would achieve the original target
number of leases without dropping below the market floor (determined using
competitors’ data). Because AIRM never recommends prices below the market floor,
AIRM instead reduced the number of leases and optimized against that new, lower
occupancy rate.
138.

Revenue protection mode interrupts AIRM’s and YieldStar’s normal

revenue maximization process. As a RealPage data scientist explained, “the model reallywants to reduce rent but is prevented from doing so by the revenue protection
restriction.” Revenue protection leads to higher prices and lower occupancy.
139.

Sold-Out Mode. Once a landlord reaches its targeted capacity for aparticular floor plan, the model considers that floor plan “sold out” even though units
may still be physically available. In that situation, AIRM and YieldStar recommends the
maximum rent charged by a property’s competitors, even if the floor plan’s previous
price was far lower.
140.

RealPage intentionally designed sold-out mode to use competitively

sensitive data to lift rents. In an earlier version of the software, sold-out mode pushed
rents to 95% of that floor plan’s highest recently achieved rent. But RealPage modified

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the algorithm in 2022 to go “straight to 100% of comps,” deliberately aligning rents withcompetitors’ highest rents, rather than the property’s own historical performance.7
141.

The Governor. AIRM and YieldStar favor recommended price increases

over price decreases. When the model calculates that the current day’s “optimal” pricewill result in greater revenue than the previous day, a feature called the “governor”
causes the model to recommend the current day’s optimal price.8 But when AIRM or
YieldStar calculates that the current day’s optimal price will result in less revenue thanthe previous day, the governor recommends the recent average price even though it is not
optimal for the current day. In other words, when market conditions weaken and themodel calculates that a price decrease is warranted, this guardrail kicks in andrecommends keeping the recent rent even though it is suboptimal. This asymmetry favors
price increases over price decreases.
142.

The effect of these guardrails is intentionally asymmetric. AIRM and

YieldStar recommend price increases generated by the model. But the guardrails reduceor eliminate certain proposed price decreases even though the model has determined suchdeviations may contravene the landlord’s individual economic interest.

7

RealPage has at least considered changing this model logic because it introduced
meaningful pricing volatility and significant price increases. Even if RealPage has
implemented this proposed logic change, the new model logic still incorporates
competitors’ confidential rents because AIRM and YieldStar recommend a market position
that is tied to the bottom and top of the market, as defined by mapped competitors.
8

In some circumstances AIRM will cap the floor plan recommended price increase at afive percent increase.
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C.

AIRM and YieldStar Harm the Competitive Process by Discouraging theUse of Discounts and Price Negotiations

143.

RealPage discourages landlords using AIRM and YieldStar fromdiscounting rents. In the multifamily property industry, discounts typically consist of“concessions,” which are financial allowances (such as a free month’s rent or waived
fees) offered to incentivize renters. Concessions may be offered generally or negotiatedindividually with a potential tenant.
144.

In a competitive marketplace, each landlord may independently decide tooffer concessions so that it can better compete in enticing lessors. But, again, RealPage
seeks to replace fully independent, competitive decision-making with collective action by
ending concessions. AIRM and YieldStar do not work as well when landlords use one-off
or lumpy concessions. In its “best practices” for revenue management to landlords,
RealPage’s guidance is simple: “Eliminate concessions.” Detailed “best practices”
documents for both YieldStar and AIRM users explain that “concessions will no longer
be used in conjunction with” YieldStar and AIRM.
145.

When onboarding a new property, RealPage emphasizes the importance of

accepting price recommendations without offering discounts, including “no concessions.”
Concessions cause landlords to deviate from what RealPage determines is the maximum
revenue-generating price.
146.

Landlords have worked to implement RealPage’s requests. In one YieldStar

training, Landlord 1 explained that “Concessions are gone!” In a client-facing FAQ
document about its revenue management products, RealPage explained that “the vast
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majority of our clients have discontinued the use of concessions.” A 2023 RealPage client
presentation showed that the number of units offering concessions generally trended
downward from approximately 30% of units in 2013 to under 15% in 2023. A client’s
refusal to offer concessions is bolstered by its awareness of competing landlords
receiving the same advice from RealPage. In addition to discouraging discounts,
RealPage discourages negotiating prices with renters. RealPage trains landlords that
“YieldStar [or AIRM] is managing your Price,” so the landlord’s staff can focus on otherthings. The YieldStar or AIRM rent matrix is to be the source of prices that are given to aprospective renter. RealPage instructs leasing staff to provide prospective renters the
specific price from the matrix that corresponds to the prospect’s desired move-in date,unit, and lease term. RealPage cautions landlords not to show renters the matrix itself.
D.

AIRM and YieldStar Increase and Maintain Landlords’ Pricing Powerby Using Competitors’ Data to Manage Lease Expirations

147.

Supply is a basic component of pricing. For this reason, information on acompany’s supply is highly sensitive, and its disclosure to competitors is particularly
concerning. Yet AIRM and YieldStar use competitors’ supply data precisely for the
purpose of adjusting unit-level pricing, regardless of whether the landlord accepts thefloor plan price recommendation. The goal of this “lease expiration management” isclear: As a RealPage senior manager explained for a client, using this data means that theclient’s property “will remain in a position of pricing power.”

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148.

The purpose of lease expiration management is to avoid too many units

becoming available in the market at the same time. Expiration management only
increases unit-level prices. It never reduces the price.
149.

Every landlord can choose to use “market seasonality” to inform its lease

expiration management. As the name suggests, market seasonality adjusts the landlord’s
prices based on how many of its competitors’ units will be vacant—that is, future supply.
This feature is popular among landlords. For example, one of the largest landlords in the
United States uses it in 98% of its properties. Every single property that uses market
seasonality is leveraging RealPage’s access to this highly sensitive, nonpublic data about
its competitors’ supply to inform pricing.
150.

When activated, the market seasonality function changes unit-level prices

across the different possible lease terms regardless of whether the landlord accepts the
AIRM or YieldStar floor plan price recommendation.
151.

Fueled by competitor data, expiration management results in “increased

stability” and “pricing power.” Using competitors’ data reduces the risk of overexposurethat “could erode rent roll growth.” By adjusting price recommendations based on how
much total supply is forecast in the market for a given time period, AIRM empowers
landlords to charge higher prices than they could without access to competitors’
nonpublic data.

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E.

No Procompetitive Benefit Justifies, Much Less Outweighs, RealPage’s
Use of Competitively Sensitive Data to Align Competing Landlords

152.

AIRM and YieldStar do not benefit the competitive process or renters. Anylegitimate benefits of revenue management software can be achieved through lessanticompetitive means, and any theoretical additional benefits of AIRM and YieldStar are
not cognizable and outweighed by harm to the competitive process and to renters.
153.

RealPage plans to remove LRO, a less restrictive alternative, from themarket. LRO does not inherently contain the same competitive defects as AIRM and
YieldStar. Unlike AIRM and YieldStar, LRO does not require the same type and quantity
of nonpublic, transactional data pulled from competitors’ property management softwareor obtained from contacting competing landlords. RealPage has already stopped offering
LRO to new clients and plans to discontinue LRO for legacy clients by the end of 2024.
V.

REALPAGE USES LANDLORDS’ COMPETITIVELY SENSITIVEDATA TO MAINTAIN ITS MONOPOLY AND EXCLUDE
COMMERCIAL REVENUE MANAGEMENT SOFTWARECOMPETITORS
154.

Landlords are not the only ones that benefit from RealPage’s rental pricing

practices. RealPage benefits too through maintaining its monopoly over commercial
revenue management software for conventional multifamily housing rentals. In thatmarket, RealPage’s internal documents reflect that it commands an 80% share.
155.

RealPage’s core value proposition creates a self-reinforcing feedback loopof data and scale advantages. The sharing of competitively sensitive information among
rivals attracts more landlords that seek to maximize revenues and extract more money

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from renters. As a result of its exclusionary conduct, RealPage has been able to obstruct
rival software providers from competing on the merits via revenue management productsthat do not harm the competitive process.
156.

Over time, RealPage has become more entrenched and has stymied

alternatives unless they too enter into similar unlawful agreements with landlords toobtain and use nonpublic transactional data to price units. Even then, RealPage’s
unparalleled troves of competitively sensitive data provide an ill-gotten advantage.
A.

Landlords Are Drawn to RealPage Because of Access to Nonpublic
Transactional Data That Is Used to Increase Landlords’ Revenue

157.

Landlords prize RealPage’s accumulation of nonpublic transactional datafrom competing landlords. For example, Landlord 1 noted that “RealPage supplies thebest set of transactional data available via their millions of units of data --- this becomes avaluable source of truth to our competitive landscape.” In a training document for its
employees, the same landlord explained that “better data = better outcomes” and that
AIRM has “over 15 million units of data available.” From the perspective of Landlord 1,“pricing decisions start with data” and that precision in pricing “comes from data driven
decisions.” Importantly, the landlord believed that AIRM’s ability to “examine data
quality . . . each night” via its property management software integrations, including
guest card entry, “plays an important role” in pricing.
158.

As another example, Landlord 3 identified this data as especially helpful ina dense market because of insights into competitors’ actions in the market. The samelandlord also concluded that the more data points, the better confidence a landlord has in
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RealPage’s rental recommendations. According to Landlord 3, more data—especiallydata about concessions—enabled the landlord to make better decisions because it showed
the landlord where the market stood. Landlord 3’s director of revenue management
explained to a colleague that YieldStar “collects about 14 MILLION transactional leasedata across the US and has over 20 years of historical records.” The director
acknowledged that “[t]his is huge! Essentially, this is a window into the market and theshifts we are going to experience . . . Having insight into this data, allows [landlords] tomake changes with the dynamic changes in the market.”
159.

Landlord 2, who compared AIRM to another commercial revenue

management software product, noted that the competing product “is about half of the costand does a good job in reviewing rents and making recommendations but does it without
the additional reporting capabilities and market data that AIRM uses.” Ultimately, thislandlord decided to push their owner clients towards AIRM. The landlord’s decision to
use AIRM was in part based on receiving “more accurate and time sensitive data” andnoted that, although revenue management is not changing, “the amount of data and howthat information is used to grow revenue is bigger and better than ever” with AIRM.
160.

Landlords want access to RealPage’s transactional data because RealPage

advertises, and landlords believe, that the use of this data will increase a landlord’s
revenue. “Due to the amount of data RealPage possesses,” Lessor 1 explained, RealPage
developed AIRM “to leverage machine learning to improve both the supply and demandmodeling and provide a tool to further customize to each asset’s needs.” The materials

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sent to the landlord’s clients also included a flyer explaining that AIRM will “outperformthe market 2-7% year over year” and that it provides “[a]ctionable intelligence derived
from the industry’s largest lease transaction database of 13M+ units.”
B.

RealPage’s Collection and Use of Competitively Sensitive Data Excludes
Competition in Commercial Revenue Management Software

161.

RealPage recognizes the barriers to competition on the merits that its data,scale, and business model provide. RealPage understands that “pricing decisions startwith data.” RealPage explains to its clients that “[t]he data entered into your [property
management software] and collected each night, along with current market data (and leaddata if OneSite) provides insight into advantageous demand drivers, identifies revenue
risk and opportunity, and captures this competitive landscape for informed pricing.”
162.

This data and scale advantage is significant and creates a feedback loop thatfurther increases barriers to competition for commercial revenue management software.
RealPage touts its access to an “unmatched database.” In one case from 2023, a RealPage
sales representative noted that RealPage’s “revenue management is the most widelyadopted solution in the industry” and RealPage had “approximately 4.8M units onrevenue management.” In a 2023 presentation for AIRM, RealPage advertised that the“[a]mount of data we have (~17mm units) is unique to RealPage” and that the “[q]ualityof data is best in class given that it is ‘Lease Transaction Data.’” RealPage claimed this
“supports that fact that the industry views RealPage as the source of truth for
performance data.”

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163.

RealPage has used this competitively sensitive data to develop an AI-driven

revenue management solution that leverages the scale and scope of its data. RealPage’s
plan to use this database as fuel for its AI pricing model is spelled out in a Go-To-Market
summary from 2019. In that document, RealPage describes that:
RealPage can achieve $10 Million in organic ACV growth through deliveryof the next generation of revenue management. Failure to do so reduces theopportunity to harvest gains from our $300M investment in LRO and places
a portion of current $100M revenue management revenue at risk to emerging
competitors, including Yardi and low-cost alternatives that say ‘all revenue
management is the same.’ Over time we can sunset YieldStar and LRO
reducing expense, and leverage LRO capabilities as a revenue management
lite offering.
164.

This plan came to fruition with the introduction of AIRM. In a RealPage

training presentation from February 2020—right before the launch of AIRM—RealPage
discusses a new optimization solution that is built on the “RealPage Foundation” which isdefined as “13.5m units of lease transactional data informing our models with realactionable intelligence in near real time.” As described earlier in the deck, RealPage’s
competitors “lack the foundational capabilities on which to build upon” leaving RealPage
with the possibility “to tie together each capability . . . in a single view.”
165.

RealPage knows that its rivals do not have access to similar data sets. In

one presentation from 2022, RealPage discussed competing revenue management
products from Yardi and Entrata. Yardi and Entrata have fewer than 250,000 units,
RealPage concluded, while RealPage had at least 4 million. Unlike RealPage, Yardi had alimited data set that used data only from Yardi’s property management software.

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RealPage likewise explained that Entrata lacked much data outside of student housing
and Entrata’s revenue management software worked only with its own property
management software, meaning Entrata could not pull data from RealPage’s OneSite orother property management software products. RealPage further criticized manual inhouse pricing options for having biased data, introducing errors through manual pricing,and being inefficient.
166.

In June 2023 a landlord emailed RealPage and asked, “who are yourcompetitors?” A RealPage sales executive responded, “Our revenue management solution
does not have any true competitors, mainly because our data is based on real leasetransaction data from all kinds of third-party property management systems . . . .”167.

In addition, when discussing a potential entrant, a RealPage executive notedthat the entrant needed “to get the data to enable [revenue management].” He further
noted that [g]etting the data (and more modern methods) … will be hurdles for [theentrant].” Another RealPage senior executive explained that shifting clients from LRO,
which is less reliant on competitively sensitive information of rivals, to AIRM, which isvery reliant on such information, reduced the threat from new entry when she noted that
migrating LRO clients to AIRM was “critical to reducing the risk that may come fromthis new [entrant’s] offering.”
168.

RealPage’s power and conduct in connection with commercial revenue

management software serves to exclude rivals. RealPage has ensured rivals cannot
compete on the merits unless they enter into similar agreements with landlords, offer to61
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share competitively sensitive information among rival landlords, and engage in actions toincrease compliance. As a result of its exclusionary conduct, RealPage has been able toobstruct rival software providers from competing via revenue management products that
do not harm the competitive process in addition to cementing its massive data and scaleadvantage that keeps increasing due to feedback effects.
VI.

RELEVANT MARKETSA.

Conventional Multifamily Rental Housing Markets
1. Product Markets

169.

Conventional multifamily rental housing is a relevant product market.

Conventional multifamily rental housing includes apartments available to the generalpublic in properties that have five or more living units. Conventional rental housing does
not include student housing, affordable housing, age-restricted or senior housing, or
military housing. This product market reflects consumer preferences, industry practice,and governmental policy.
170.

In 2023, RealPage estimated the conventional multifamily rental market tocover approximately 14 million units. The 2021 American Housing Survey estimated a
total of 21.1 million multifamily apartments—not limited to conventional—in the UnitedStates.
a) Conventional Multifamily Rentals Are Distinct From Other
Types of Multifamily Housing
171.

Other types of multifamily apartment buildings are not good substitutes forconventional multifamily rentals. Some kinds of multifamily buildings are restricted to62
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specific types of renters, such as student housing units, affordable housing units (i.e.,
income-restricted housing), senior (i.e., age-restricted) housing, and military housing.
These housing units focused on different classes of renters are not reasonable substitutes
for conventional multifamily rentals. RealPage distinguishes conventional multifamily as
being in a different market segment from senior, affordable, and student housing in theordinary course of business.
172.

Non-conventional units are not widely available to all renters and can

exhibit different buying patterns. For example, student housing serves individuals
enrolled in higher education and is typically located on or near universities. Student
housing is typically leased by the bed instead of by unit, and faces a significantly
different leasing cycle and different patterns in renewals and leasing practices.
Recognizing these differences, RealPage will assign to student properties surrogates thatare distant student assets rather than nearby conventional assets. RealPage in fact offers a
different version of both AIRM and OneSite, its property management software, for the“student market.”173.

Affordable housing units are available only to individuals or households

whose income falls below certain thresholds. Multiple federal affordable housing
regulations, for example, require participants in affordable housing programs to haveincomes lower than a set percentage, such as 30%, of the median family income in thelocal area. Affordable housing units are also relatively scarce, with families seeking suchhousing often waiting years on a waitlist. These legal and practical restrictions prevent

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affordable housing from being a reasonable substitute to conventional multifamily
housing for the typical renter.
174.

Senior housing is typically restricted to individuals aged 55 and older.

RealPage separates senior housing into four categories: independent living, assisted
living, memory care, and nursing care. Independent living offers senior-focusedamenities—such as transportation, meals, and social gatherings among community
members—that materially increase housing costs and are less desirable to younger
households. The other three categories of senior housing provide professional or special
care to assist renters with basic tasks like eating, bathing, and dressing, and they are notreasonable substitutes for conventional multifamily rentals.
175.

Military housing is also not a reasonable substitute to conventional

multifamily rentals. It is typically geographically proximate to military installations, withroughly 95% of military housing found on-base. Although civilians may in some cases beable to live in military housing properties experiencing low occupancy rates, military
regulations place them below five higher-priority categories of potential renters,
including active and retired military personnel.
b) Single-Family Housing Is Not A Reasonable Substitute toMultifamily Rentals
176.

The multifamily industry, government regulators, and policy documents

distinguish between properties with at least five units, which are classified as“multifamily housing” and those with fewer units, which are classified as “single-family
rentals.”
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177.

The purchase of single-family homes is not a reasonable substitute forconventional multifamily housing rentals. A former RealPage economist explained that“the choice between renting and owning is first and foremost a life stage and lifestylechoice over a financial one.” Single-family homes also generally require a substantial
down payment. In March 2023, a RealPage economist estimated an “entry premium” of$800 per month to home ownership over rentals. According to a 2021 RealPage strategicplanning guide, the “myth” that people were abandoning multifamily properties for
single-family homes is false, stating that “rising home sales do not hurt apartment
demand.” Single-family home sales are not reasonable substitutes for conventional
multifamily housing.
178.

More broadly, renters living in conventional multifamily apartments will

not switch to single-family homes—purchases or rentals—because of a small increase inrent. The decision to move from an apartment building to a single-family home is
primarily a life-stage and lifestyle choice. For example, the decision by a household tohave children may spur a move to a single-family home. In many areas, relatively few
children live in conventional multifamily apartments. Multifamily apartments typicallyoffer community amenities and a different lifestyle, such as high walkability in an urban
area, whereas single-family homes generally do not offer the same amenities and offer
instead increased privacy, including private yards. A RealPage analyst explained in 2022
that because a move to a single-family home is a “lifestyle choice,” single-family homerentals were not direct competitors to multifamily rental housing. A 2022 RealPage deck,

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shared with a landlord, stated that multifamily rentals and single-family rentals were“complementary, not competitive,” and targeted different renters, with different floor
plans, in different locations. Another RealPage analyst explained to a multifamily
property owner that single-family rentals offer a different renter profile than multifamily
rentals.
179.

Industry participants agree that single-family rentals attract a different poolof renters from multifamily rentals. A managing director of a single-family rental
property management company explained in 2021 that a renter’s journey frommultifamily apartment living to single-family rentals came as life stages evolved. The
CEO of a single-family rental developer similarly explained that these single-family
rental homes are for renters who age out of multifamily apartments.
180.

Single-family rentals are also typically priced higher than multifamily

apartments, further reducing potential substitution between them. The chairman of one
institutional multifamily property owner explained in a 2022 earnings call thatmultifamily housing was relatively affordable compared to single-family rentals. An
industry price index showed that, in March 2024, single-family rent was approximately
18% higher than multifamily rent.
c) Conventional Multifamily Rental Units With Different Bedroom
Counts Are Relevant Product Markets
181.

Different bedroom floor plans also constitute relevant product markets. A

key criterion by which a current or prospective renter searches for a rental unit is thenumber of bedrooms. One-bedroom units are substitutes for other one-bedroom units,
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two-bedroom units are substitutes for other two-bedroom units, and so forth. Individual
renters may change their desired numbers of bedrooms, but this is typically tied tochanges in circumstance independent from price. For example, the birth of a new child
may require a family to shift from a one-bedroom unit to a two-bedroom unit.
182.

RealPage adopts this practical reality in the ordinary course of business. For

every property using AIRM or YieldStar, RealPage maps peer floor plans. These mapped
floor plans capture reasonable substitutes for the subject property floor plan and reflect
the perceived market by a prospective renter.
183.

To be selected as a peer, a floor plan must have the same number ofbedrooms. A RealPage employee explained the mapping process to a client: “we arelooking specifically at the bedroom level. The tool will only map 2b[edroom] with
2b[edroom] or 1b[edroom] with 1b[edroom].” The object of mapping peers is to mirror
the prospect buying experience by identifying properties that a potential tenant will see in
online searches when searching for a particular floor plan and price range.

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184.

AIRM and YieldStar price the different floor plans, which consist ofdifferent numbers of bedrooms, independently. RealPage testified that the model
considers no cross-price elasticity between different floor plans: “when you set up the
different floor plans, a one bedroom, a two bedroom, or three bedroom, those arecompletely independent. . . . [T]here’s no influence in what the pricing is for the two
bedrooms, for example . . . has no influence on what the pricing is for the one bedrooms.”
Landlords also take steps to maintain a pricing spread between one- and two-bedroom
units and avoid pricing one-bedrooms at a higher rate than two-bedroom units.
185.

Landlords recognize that units with different bedroom counts face different

demand from renters. For example, Landlord 1 explained internally in 2022 that demand
for studio apartments differs from demand for three-bedroom units. A separate 2023
training by Landlord 1 reiterated that demand trends, and therefore pricing trends, differ

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by bedroom counts and that staff should not react to a downward trend in one category,such as two bedrooms, with discounts in one- or three-bedroom units. A revenue manager
at Landlord 2 similarly explained to colleagues that one-bedroom units have drasticallydifferent demand patterns from two-bedroom units and from three-bedroom units.
2. Geographic Markets
186.

Defining relevant geographic markets help courts assess the potential

anticompetitive impact of the agreements challenged. Here, the relevant geographic
markets for the purposes of analyzing the anticompetitive effects of RealPage’s
agreements with landlords are the areas in which the sellers (the landlords) sell and inwhich the purchasers (potential renters) can practicably turn for alternatives. RealPage’s
agreements are alleged to have suppressed price competition in the markets forconventional multifamily housing. The relevant geographic markets to assess thoseagreements are those property locations close enough for their apartments to beconsidered reasonable substitutes. In delineating a geographic market for conventional
multifamily housing, the focus is inherently local. Renters are typically tied to aparticular location for work, family, or other needs.
187.

RealPage recognizes the local nature of geographic markets. One RealPage

former employee explained that under “Real Estate 101 rules, real estate is local, local,
local.” Another RealPage former chief economist noted that an effective evaluation of aproperty’s performance must be done in comparison to similar properties in theproperty’s neighborhood because competitive conditions in the neighborhood could differ

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widely from the city at large. Similarly, a former property manager explained that
potential tenants will look at a small number of properties in the same neighborhood, and
it is on that neighborhood level where competition occurs among multifamily properties.
This individual testified, “location really does matter in real estate.”
188.

RealPage has created a tool called True Comps. Used in performancebenchmarking products that provide decisional support to AIRM and YieldStar, True
Comps provides a more accurate mapping of competitor properties. It uses an algorithm
to find the properties most comparable to the subject property, as measured bycharacteristics including distance, effective rent, age, property height, and unit count andmix. By default, True Comps picks competitors within a 15-mile radius. In scoring
distance, True Comps applies a “highly-punitive model”—the distance score drops from99% for a distance of 0.05 miles, to 56% for a distance of 2 miles, and to 10% for a
distance of 8 miles. Thus, RealPage acknowledges and incorporates small geographic
areas as the appropriate location in which to find true competitive alternatives.
189.

During a property’s implementation process, AIRM and YieldStar require

the mapping of peer properties, including competitors. RealPage starts by looking forcompetitors within a half-mile radius from the subject property and then expands asnecessary. Geographic proximity is in fact so important that YieldStar has a default
radius that limits its search for competing properties to no more than 5 miles in urban
settings, and to no more than 10 miles in suburban settings. RealPage has an internal
process for escalating any proposed peer property that is more than 15 miles away.

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a) RealPage-Defined Submarkets Identify Relevant Geographic
Markets
190.

RealPage defines geographic submarkets in the ordinary course of business.

Each submarket reflects the geographic area, defined by a set of zip codes, that features
similar properties that compete for the same pool of potential renters. In constructing
submarkets, which are generally larger than its neighborhoods, RealPage considers majorroads, city and county boundaries, and school districts. RealPage also considers
socioeconomic factors and apartment market characteristics, such as the age of properties
and rental rates.
191.

Even within a city, apartment demand varies significantly based on factors

such as employment. Supply may also vary widely as existing properties and new
construction may be located in different parts of a city. A former RealPage chief
economist explained that because “real estate is very local . . . you typically want to takea . . . more narrow view if you can on what’s going on in any given submarket.”9192.

The multifamily industry recognizes submarkets as an important

geographic area for analyzing competition and pools of renters. Multiple industry
analysts offer data by submarkets. A revenue management director at Landlord 1 testified
about a submarket that “everybody in our industry uses this term.” She further stated thatsubmarkets are a standard categorization system, used by RealPage and others, including
to benchmark a subject property’s performance with comparable properties. A revenue
9

RealPage also tracks data at a more granular level than a submarket, called aneighborhood.
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manager at Landlord 3 circulated a scorecard comparing performance to the submarket,
and exclaimed that “we’re perfectly aligned with the submarket” on rent roll.
193.

A revenue management executive at Landlord 2 testified that submarkets

identify specific, smaller areas of a city where renters look to live to be close to schools
or work. This executive testified that submarkets typically identify the area within whicha renter is comparing apartment options. This landlord tracks other properties’ rents in a
subject property’s submarket to make sure the subject property remains competitive, andif rents in a submarket increased, then the landlord expected that its property in thatsubmarket would also raise its rents.
194.

Appendix A lists RealPage-defined submarkets that identify relevant local

markets in which the agreements among RealPage and landlords to share nonpublic,
competitively sensitive information for use in pricing conventional multifamily rentals
have harmed, or are likely to harm, competition and thus renters.
195.

The RealPage-defined submarkets identified in Appendix A are relevantmarkets in which the agreements between RealPage and AIRM and YieldStar users toalign pricing has harmed, or is likely to harm, competition and thus renters. In each ofthese markets, the penetration rate for at least (i) AIRM and YieldStar, or (ii) AIRM,
YieldStar, and OneSite ranges from at or around 29% to more than 60%.10 In each of

10

Including penetration rates for RealPage’s Business Intelligence and Performance
Analytics with Benchmarking products, which landlord users agree to share nonpublic datawith RealPage that RealPage then uses in AIRM and YieldStar, would increase the data

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these markets, the landlords using AIRM or YieldStar and/or sharing competitively
sensitive information have market power.
196.

Appendix B identifies submarkets by bedroom count that are relevantmarkets in which the agreements between RealPage and landlords, and agreements
among landlords, to share nonpublic, competitively sensitive information for use inpricing conventional multifamily rentals have harmed, or are likely to harm, competition
and thus renters.
197.

The markets identified in Appendix B are relevant markets in which theagreements between RealPage and landlords to align pricing has harmed, or is likely toharm, competition and thus renters. In each of these markets, the penetration rate for atleast (i) AIRM and YieldStar, or (ii) AIRM, YieldStar, and OneSite ranges from at or
around 28% to over 80%. In each of these markets, the landlords using AIRM or
YieldStar and/or sharing competitively sensitive information have market power.
b) Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) Are Relevant Geographic
Markets
198.

A core-based statistical area (CBSA) is also a relevant geographic market.

A CBSA is a geographic area based on a county or group of counties. A CBSA has atleast one core of at least 10,000 individuals. A CBSA includes adjacent counties thathave a high degree of social and economic integration with the core, as measured bycommuting ties. A CBSA includes both metropolitan statistical areas and micropolitan
penetration rates subject to unlawful agreements for these and all other relevant
conventional multifamily rental housing markets identified in the Complaint.
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statistical areas. A CBSA includes the set of reasonable conventional multifamily rental
alternatives to which a renter would turn in response to a small but significant,nontransitory price increase.
199.

RealPage itself tracks CBSAs in the ordinary course of business and refers

to them as “markets.”
200.

Table 1 identifies relevant markets in which the agreements between

RealPage and landlords, and agreements among landlords, to share nonpublic,
competitively sensitive information for use in pricing conventional multifamily rentals
have harmed, or are likely to harm, competition and/or consumers. In each of thesemarkets, the penetration rate for at least (i) AIRM and YieldStar, or (ii) AIRM, YieldStar,
and OneSite ranges from at or around 29% to 38%. Three of these markets are located in
North Carolina.
Table 1: Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) Markets
Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) Markets
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Austin-Round Rock, TXCharleston-North Charleston, SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Raleigh, NC

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201.

The markets identified in Table 1 are relevant markets in which theagreements between RealPage and landlords to align pricing have harmed, or is likely toharm, competition and thus renters.
202.

Table 2 identifies relevant CBSAs by bedroom counts that are relevantmarkets in which the agreements between RealPage and landlords, and agreements
among landlords, to share nonpublic, competitively sensitive information for use inpricing conventional multifamily rentals have harmed, or are likely to harm, competition
and/or consumers. In each of these markets, the penetration rate for at least (i) AIRM and
YieldStar, or (ii) AIRM, YieldStar, and OneSite ranges from at or around 27% to nearly40%.
Table 2: Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) Markets by Bedroom Count
Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) Markets
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TXCharleston-North Charleston, SC
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN

No. ofBedrooms
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

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Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) Markets

No. ofBedrooms

Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Raleigh, NC
Raleigh, NC
203.

2
1
2
1
2

The markets identified in Table 2 are relevant markets in which theagreements between RealPage and landlords to align pricing have harmed, or is likely toharm, competition and thus renters.
204.

Even assuming available land and no regulatory constrictions, local markets

for conventional multifamily rental housing feature substantial barriers to entry.
Landlords seeking to respond to rising rental prices by expanding supply, rather thansimply acquiring an existing property, typically face substantial lead times to construct a
new multifamily property. Additionally, there are significant upfront capital costs,
including to fund expenditures on building material and labor, that are recuperated overtime, which may require landlords to secure financing.
B.

Commercial Revenue Management Software Market

205.

RealPage has monopoly power in the market for commercial revenue

management software for conventional multifamily housing rentals in the United States,with a market share over 80%, according to internal documents and other information.

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1. Product Market
206.

Commercial revenue management software for conventional multifamily

housing rentals is a relevant antitrust product market.
207.

Other methods for pricing conventional multifamily housing units are notreasonable substitutes for commercial revenue management software. RealPage andothers in the industry recognize that revenue management software companies for
multifamily housing units compete primarily against each other and not do-it-yourself
pricing methods.
208.

Internal documents from RealPage refer specifically to commercial revenue

management for multifamily housing and recognize RealPage’s substantial market share.
For example, a 2021 strategy presentation described RealPage as “the market leader incommercial revenue management for multifamily [housing] with 45 of the 50 Top
NMHC Owner and Operators” all using RealPage’s revenue management products.
209.

A presentation to RealPage’s board in 2022 noted that “[RealPage] hasgained [the] pole position in Revenue Management largely through the success of AI
Revenue Management, which has become RealPage’s leading differentiating product.”
Additionally, the presentation described how “Revenue Management is experiencing
strong growth driven by AIRM” due to its “PMS agnostic approach” which gives
RealPage the ability to aggregate data from its clients resulting in “revenue management[that] has achieved a market share of 95% of the top 50 owners and operators.”

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210.

Likewise, a 2023 RealPage presentation reviewing the use of artificial

intelligence in property technology noted that “RealPage is already the de facto market
leader in certain key areas at leveraging AI for multifamily proptech” and shows“revenue management” as the area where it is the furthest ahead.” Later, the same
presentation noted that RealPage’s current offer for revenue management is “best-inclass” and that “[n]o other company is cross-pollinating their pricing tools with data in away similar to [RealPage].”
211.

Landlords also recognize RealPage’s substantial market share. In a 2023

pricing dispute with a large landlord, RealPage refused to lower the price for its AIRM
software. In response, an employee employed by the landlord noted that it was no
surprise they would not decrease their price remarking that “[h]ere is the joy of amonopoly on a product category.” Around the same time in 2023, during a sales pitch toa property owner, a RealPage representative noted that “[RealPage] has 80% to 85% of
the market share with the closest competitor around 12% (<750K units).”
2. Geographic Market
212.

The United States is a relevant geographic market for commercial revenue

management software. RealPage sells its commercial revenue management software in
the United States and tracks its business in the United States in the ordinary course ofbusiness. RealPage sets its subscription prices on a nationwide basis. Further, RealPage
can deploy its commercial revenue management software, which may use inputs fromproperties located throughout the country, in any U.S. state. Landlords in the United

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States purchase commercial revenue management software from RealPage to set rental
prices for renters in the United States. Many landlords have centralized revenue
management teams that set nationwide revenue management policies and conduct
revenue management trainings for their employees across the United States.
VII. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND COMMERCE
213.

The United States brings this action pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, to prevent and restrain RealPage’s violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
214.

The Attorneys General assert these claims based on their independent

authority to bring this action pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26,
and common law, to obtain injunctive and other equitable relief based on RealPage’s
anticompetitive practices in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2.
215.

The Attorneys General are the chief legal officers of their respective States.

They have authority to bring actions to protect the economic well-being of their States
and their residents, and to seek injunctive relief to remedy and protect against harm
resulting from violations of the antitrust laws.
216.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under Section 4of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.

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217.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over RealPage; venue is proper in thisDistrict under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391
because RealPage transacts business and resides within this District.
218.

RealPage is a privately-owned company organized and existing under thelaws of the State of Delaware and is headquartered in Richardson, Texas. It is registered
to do business in the State of North Carolina as a foreign corporation offering software
solutions for the multifamily housing industry and software as a service.
219.

RealPage engages in, and its activities substantially affect, interstate tradeand commerce. RealPage provides a range of products and services that are marketed,distributed, and offered to consumers throughout the United States and across state lines.
220.

The Durham-Chapel Hill CBSA is partially or entirely within the Middle

District of North Carolina.
221.

RealPage tracks the number of rental housing units that use its commercial

revenue management software products, including AIRM and YieldStar, by market (i.e.,a CBSA) and submarket, and several of these markets and submarkets are entirely or
partially within North Carolina. These RealPage-defined markets include
Raleigh/Durham, NC; Charlotte–Concord–Gastonia, NC–SC; Greensboro/WinstonSalem, NC; Wilmington, NC; Fayetteville, NC; and Asheville, NC. The submarkets
include Southwest Durham, Northwest Durham/Downtown, and Chapel Hill/Carrboro,
all of which are located entirely or partially within this District.

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222.

Landlord 1, Landlord 2, Landlord 3, Landlord 4, Landlord 5, and Landlord

6 each own or manage one or more properties in the Middle District of North Carolina forwhich they agree to share information and align pricing by using AIRM or YieldStar to
generate rental pricing using pooled, competitively sensitive information.
223.

A substantial part of the activities and conduct giving rise to the claims

asserted in this Complaint occurred within this District. As alleged in paragraphs 194–
197 above and Appendix A below, relevant local geographic markets in which
competition and renters have been harmed by RealPage’s anticompetitive conduct
include the RealPage-defined submarkets in Raleigh/Durham. As alleged in paragraphs
200–203 above, relevant geographic markets in which competition and renters have been
harmed by RealPage’s anticompetitive conduct include the Durham–Chapel Hill CBSA.
VIII. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED
First Claim for Relief: Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Unlawfully
Sharing Information for Use in Competitors’ Pricing
224.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 223 above.

225.

Each landlord using AIRM and YieldStar has agreed with RealPage toprovide RealPage daily nonpublic, competitively sensitive data. RealPage invites eachlandlord to share this information so that it can be pooled to generate pricing
recommendations for the landlord and its competitors. Each of these landlords uses
RealPage software, knowing or learning that RealPage will use this data to train its
models and provide floor plan price recommendations and unit-level pricing not only forthe landlord, but for the landlord’s competitors (and vice versa). Landlords are therefore
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joining together in a way that deprives the market of fully independent centers ofdecision-making on pricing.
226.

Each landlord using OneSite, Business Intelligence, or Performance

Analytics with Benchmarking has agreed with RealPage to provide RealPage daily
nonpublic, competitively sensitive data. RealPage invites each landlord to share thisinformation, and each of these landlords understands that RealPage will use this data in
RealPage’s other products, including revenue management products.
227.

The transactional data these landlords agree to provide to RealPage, andindirectly to each other, includes current, forward-looking, granular, and highly
competitively sensitive information. It includes information on effective rents, rent
discounts, occupancy rates, availability, lease dates, lease terms, unit amenities, and unit
layouts. Landlords also shared information on guest cards and lease applications.
228.

Landlords, including landlords that compete with each other in the relevantmarkets alleged, have agreed with one another, through RealPage and directly, toexchange nonpublic, competitively sensitive data, both through RealPage’s revenue
management software and by other means. The other means include RealPage usergroups, direct communications, market surveys, and other intermediaries. The
information exchanged includes future pricing plans, current pricing and occupancy rates,
pricing discounts, and guest traffic.
229.

RealPage uses this nonpublic, competitively sensitive data to train its

AIRM models and provide floor plan price recommendations and unit-level pricing to82
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AIRM- and YieldStar-using landlords. AIRM and YieldStar are designed to increaseprices as much as possible and minimize price decreases.
230.

RealPage engages in a variety of conduct to increase compliance with theoutput of its products and the objectives it touts.
231.

The sharing of nonpublic, competitively sensitive data with RealPage, andits use in AIRM and YieldStar, is anticompetitive. It harms or is likely to harm thecompetitive process and results, or is likely to result, in harm to renters and prospective
renters in at least the relevant antitrust markets identified in this complaint.
232.

In each relevant market, RealPage and participating landlords havesufficient market power, including market and data penetration, to harm the competitive
process and renters.
233.

AIRM and YieldStar do not benefit the competitive process or renters. Any

theoretical benefits are outweighed by harm to the competitive process and to renters.
234.

Less restrictive alternatives are available to RealPage and the market.

RealPage’s LRO product, for example, does not use competitors’ nonpublic,
competitively sensitive data in the same way and to the same extent as AIRM and
YieldStar. RealPage has recently altered AIRM or YieldStar for a small number of clientsto remove those clients’ access to competitors’ nonpublic data in at least certain portionsof the model. RealPage has the ability to make changes to remove broader access tocompetitors’ nonpublic data in AIRM and YieldStar.

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Second Claim for Relief: Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act Through Vertical
Agreements with Landlords to Align Pricing
235.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 234 above.

236.

Each landlord that licenses AIRM or YieldStar has agreed with RealPage to

use the software. This includes providing nonpublic, competitively sensitive transactional
data to RealPage, but more broadly is an agreement to use AIRM or YieldStar as themeans to price the landlord’s rental units. The landlord agrees to review AIRM or
YieldStar floor plan price recommendations, use AIRM or YieldStar to set a scheduled
floor plan rent, and use the AIRM or YieldStar pricing matrix to price units to renters.
237.

AIRM and YieldStar are designed to “raise the tide” for all landlords,

including AIRM- and YieldStar-using landlords. AIRM and YieldStar have the likely
effect of aligning users’ pricing processes, strategies, and pricing responses.
238.

These landlords understand this effect, and it is a reason why they sign up

for and use AIRM or YieldStar and discuss their usage with one another in user groupmeetings and other settings.
239.

RealPage engages in a variety of conduct to increase compliance with theoutput of its products and the objectives it touts.
240.

The agreement between each AIRM or YieldStar landlord and RealPage to

use AIRM or YieldStar, respectively, harms or is likely to harm the competitive process
and renters.

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241.

The agreement by a landlord to use AIRM or YieldStar is an agreement toalign users’ pricing processes, strategies, and pricing responses. It is harmful to thecompetitive process and to renters.
242.

In each relevant submarket and CBSA, RealPage and participating AIRM

or YieldStar landlords have sufficient market power, including market and data
penetration, to harm the competitive process and renters.
243.

AIRM and YieldStar do not benefit the competitive process or renters. Any

theoretical benefits are outweighed by harm to the competitive process and to renters, andless restrictive alternatives are available to RealPage and these landlords.
Third Claim for Relief: Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act ThroughMonopolization of the Commercial Revenue Management Software Market
244.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 243 above.

245.

Commercial revenue management software for conventional multifamily

housing rentals in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and RealPage hasmonopoly power in that market.
246.

RealPage has unlawfully monopolized the commercial revenue

management market through unlawful exclusionary conduct. RealPage has amassed a
massive reservoir of competitively sensitive data from competing landlords. RealPage
has ensured that rivals cannot compete on the merits unless they enter into similar
agreements with landlords, offer to share competitively sensitive information among rival
landlords, and engage in actions to increase compliance. As a result of its exclusionary
conduct, RealPage has been able to obstruct rival software providers from competing via
85
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revenue management products that do not harm the competitive process in addition to
cementing its massive data and scale advantage that keeps increasing due to selfreinforcing feedback effects.
247.

RealPage’s anticompetitive acts have harmed the competitive process andrenters.
248.

RealPage’s exclusionary conduct lacks a procompetitive justification that

offsets the harm caused by RealPage’s anticompetitive and unlawful conduct.
Fourth Claim for Relief, in the Alternative: Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Through Attempted Monopolization of the Commercial Revenue Management
Software Market
249.

Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 248 above.

250.

Commercial revenue management software for conventional multifamily

housing rentals in the United States is a relevant antitrust market.
251.

RealPage has attempted to monopolize that market through unlawful

exclusionary conduct enhanced by its self-reinforcing data and scale advantages. By
amassing its massive reservoir of competitively sensitive data from competing landlords
and the follow-on benefits that scale and its feedback effects provide in terms of blunting
competition among landlords, RealPage’s conduct excludes commercial revenue
management rivals from competing on the merits in a lawful manner. As such, it has
increased, maintained, or protected RealPage’s power.
252.

RealPage’s anticompetitive acts have harmed the competitive process andrenters.

86
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253.

RealPage has acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to eliminate

effective competition in, the commercial revenue management software market in the
United States. There is a dangerous probability that, unless restrained, RealPage will
succeed in monopolizing the commercial revenue management software market inviolation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
IX.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF254.

To remedy these illegal acts, Plaintiffs request that the Court:a.

Adjudge and decree that RealPage has acted unlawfully to restrain
trade in conventional multifamily rental housing markets across theUnited States in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1;b.

Adjust and decree that RealPage has acted unlawfully tomonopolize, or attempt to monopolize, the commercial revenue
management software market in the United States in violation ofSection 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2;c.

Enjoin RealPage from continuing to engage in the anticompetitive
practices described herein and from engaging in any other practices
with the same purpose and effect as the challenged practices;d.

Enter any other preliminary or permanent relief necessary andappropriate to restore competitive conditions in the markets affectedby RealPage’s unlawful conduct;

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e.

Enter any additional relief the Court finds just and proper; andf.

Award Plaintiffs an amount equal to their costs, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees, incurred in bringing this action.

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Dated this 23rd day of August, 2024.
Respectfully submitted,
FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
JONATHAN S. KANTER
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
DOHA MEKKI
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust
HETAL J. DOSHI
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust
ANDREW J. FORMAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust
RYAN DANKS
Director of Civil Enforcement
CATHERINE K. DICK
Acting Director of Litigation
GEORGE C. NIERLICH
Deputy Director of Civil Enforcement
AARON HOAG
ChiefTechnology & Digital Platforms Section/s/ Henry C. Su*
HENRY C. SU
Senior Litigation Counsel/s/ David A. Geiger
DAVID A. GEIGERSARAH M. BARTELSMARKUS A. BRAZILLJESSICA BUTLER-ARKOWIAN HOFFMAN
JOHN J. HOGAN
CLAIRE M. MADDOXARSHIA NAJAFIJARIEL A. RENDELLCHRISTINE SOMMER
ANDREW TISINGER
Attorneys
United States Department of JusticeAntitrust Division
450 Fifth Street N.W., Suite 7100
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 307-6200
Email: henry.su@usdoj.gov* LEAD ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDDANIELLE HAUCKAssistant Chief
Technology & Digital Platforms Section
ADAM SEVERTAssistant Chief
Technology & Digital Platforms Section

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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA:JOSHUA H. STEIN
Attorney General of North Carolina
SARAH G. BOYCE
Deputy Attorney General & General Counsel
JASMINE S. MCGHEE
Senior Deputy Attorney General/s/ Kunal J. Choksi
KUNAL J. CHOKSI
Special Deputy Attorney General
N.C. Bar. No. 55666
JESSICA V. SUTTON
Special Deputy Attorney General
N.C. Bar No. 41652
North Carolina Department of Justice
114 W. Edenton Street
Raleigh, NC 27603
Telephone: 919-716-6032
Email: kchoksi@ncdoj.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of North Carolina

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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF CALIFORNIA:ROB BONTA
Attorney General of California/s/ Doan-Phuong (Pamela) Pham
PAULA L. BLIZZARD, Senior Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL JORGENSON, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
DOAN-PHUONG (PAMELA) PHAM, Deputy Attorney General
QUYEN TOLAND, Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
California Department of Justice300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
Tel: (213) 269-6000
Email: Pamela.Pham@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California
Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming

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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF COLORADO:
PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General/s/ Bryn Williams
BRYN A. WILLIAMSFirst Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 7th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Telephone: (720) 508-6000
Email: Bryn.Williams@coag.gov
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Colorado
Notice of Special Appearance forthcoming

92
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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF CONNECTICUT:WILLIAM TONG
Attorney General of Connecticut
JEREMY PEARLMAN
Associate Attorney General
NICOLE DEMERS
Deputy Associate Attorney General/s/ Julián A. Quiñones Reyes
JULIÁN A. QUIÑONES REYES
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Connecticut
165 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106
Telephone: (860) 808-5030
Fax: (860) 808-5391
Email: julian.quinones@ct.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Connecticut
Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming

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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF MINNESOTA:
KEITH ELLISONATTORNEY GENERALJAMES CANADAY
Deputy Attorney Generals/Katherine A. Moerke
KATHERINE A. MOERKEELIZABETH ODETTE
SARAH DOKTORIAssistant Attorneys General
Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, Suite 1400
445 Minnesota Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
Telephone: (651) 757-1433
katherine.moerke@ag.state.mn.us
elizabeth.odette@ag.state.mn.us
sarah.doktori@ag.state.mn.us
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Minnesota
Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming

94
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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF OREGON:ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM
Attorney General of Oregon/s/ Timothy D. Smith
Timothy D. Smith
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust and False Claims Unit
Oregon Department of Justice
100 SW Market St, Portland OR 97201
971.673.3885 | tim.smith@doj.oregon.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Oregon
Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming

95
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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF TENNESSEE:
Jonathan Skrmetti
Attorney General/s/ J. David McDowell
David McDowell
Deputy Attorney General
S. Ethan Bowers
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Daniel Lynch
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Tennessee Attorney General
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, Tennessee 37202
ethan.bowers@ag.tn.gov
daniel.lynch@ag.tn.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Tennessee
Notices of Special Appearance forthcoming

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FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF WASHINGTON:ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General/s/ Brian H. RoweBRIAN H. ROWE, WSBA #56817
RACHEL LUMEN, WSBA #47918
SARAH SMITH-LEVY, WSBA #55770
KENDALL SCOTT COWLES, WSBA #57919
Assistant Attorneys General
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188(206) 464-7744
brian.rowe@atg.wa.gov
rachel.lumen@atg.wa.gov
sarah.e.smith-levy@atg.wa.gov
kendall.scottcowles@atg.wa.gov
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Washington
Notice of Special Appearance forthcoming

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APPENDIX A: SUBMARKETS
AreaSubmarket

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
Birmingham-Hoover, AL
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC

South Orange County
Alpharetta/Cumming
Briarcliff
Buckhead
Chamblee/Brookhaven
DuluthDunwoody
Kennesaw/Acworth
Midtown Atlanta
Norcross
Northeast Cobb/Woodstock
Roswell
Sandy Springs
SmyrnaSoutheast Gwinnett County
Southeast Marietta
Southwest Atlanta
Vinings
Arboretum
Cedar ParkFar South Austin
Far West Austin
Near North Austin
Northwest Austin
Pflugerville/Wells BranchSouth Austin
Southwest Austin
Columbia/North LaurelSoutheast Birmingham
Chelsea/Revere/Charlestown
West Norfolk County
Downtown/Mount Pleasant/Islands
West Ashley
Ballantyne
Huntersville/Cornelius
Myers Park
South Charlotte98

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Area

Submarket

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Colorado Springs, CO
Columbus, OH
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield
Beach, FL
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX

UNC Charlotte
Uptown/South End
North Colorado Springs
Gahanna/Northeast Columbus
Addison/Bent Tree
Allen/McKinney
Carrollton/Farmers Branch
East Dallas
FriscoGrand Prairie
Intown Dallas
Las Colinas/Coppell
North Irving
Oak Lawn/Park Cities
Richardson
Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie
The Colony/Far North Carrollton
West Plano
Broomfield
Highlands Ranch
Littleton
North Aurora
Southeast Aurora/East ArapahoeCountyTech Center
Westminster
Plantation/Davie/Weston
Grapevine/Southlake
Northeast Fort Worth/North
Richland Hills
Bear Creek
Downtown/Montrose/River Oaks
Far West Houston
Friendswood/Pearland
Galleria/Uptown
Greater Heights/Washington
AvenueGreenway/Upper Kirby

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Area

Submarket

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Jacksonville, FL
Jacksonville, FL
Kansas City, MO-KS
Lansing-East Lansing, MI
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Mobile/Daphne, AL
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin,
TN
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC

Katy
Memorial
Sugar Land/Stafford
The Woodlands
West University/Medical
Center/Third Ward
Baymeadows
Upper Southside
Lee's Summit/Blue
Springs/Raytown
East Lansing
Henderson
Northwest Las Vegas
Summerlin/The Lakes
Cordova/Bartlett
Germantown/ColliervilleNorth Mobile
Central NashvilleSouth NashvilleWest Nashville
Casselberry/Winter Springs/Oviedo
Central Orlando
East Orange County
East Orlando
Sanford/Lake MarySouth Orange County
Southwest Orlando
Winter Park/Maitland
Chandler
Deer Valley
North GlendaleSouth Phoenix
Aloha/West Beaverton
Central Portland
Central Raleigh
Chapel Hill/Carrboro

100
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Area

Submarket

Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Reno, NV
Richmond, VA
Richmond, VA
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CARiverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tucson, AZ
Tucson, AZ
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWVWashington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWVWashington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWVWashington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWVWashington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWVWashington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWV

Far North Raleigh
Near North RaleighNorth Cary/MorrisvilleNortheast RaleighNorthwest Durham/Downtown
Northwest RaleighSouth Cary/Apex
Southwest DurhamSouth Reno
Northwest RichmondTuckahoe/Westhampton
Rancho Cucamonga/Upland
Temecula/Murrieta
Southwest Salt Lake City
Far North Central San Antonio
Far Northwest San Antonio
North Central San Antonio
Northwest San Antonio
Northeast San Diego
Redmond
RentonCarrollwood/Citrus Park
Central Tampa
Town and Country/WestchaseCasas Adobes/Oro Valley
Catalina Foothills
Germantown
Loudoun County
Navy Yard/Capitol South
Reston/Herndon
West Alexandria
West Fairfax County

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APPENDIX B: SUBMARKETS BY BEDROOM COUNT
Area

Submarket

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA

South Orange County
Alpharetta/Cumming
Briarcliff
Buckhead
Chamblee/Brookhaven
DuluthDunwoody
Kennesaw/Acworth
Midtown Atlanta
Norcross
Northeast
Cobb/Woodstock
Roswell
Sandy Springs
SmyrnaSoutheast Gwinnett
CountySoutheast Marietta
Southwest Atlanta
Vinings
Arboretum
Cedar ParkFar South Austin
Far West Austin
Near North Austin
Northwest Austin
Pflugerville/Wells BranchSouth Austin
Southwest Austin
Columbia/North LaurelSoutheast BirminghamWest Norfolk County
Downtown/Mount
Pleasant/Islands
West Ashley
Ballantyne
Huntersville/Cornelius

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
Birmingham-Hoover, AL
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC

No. ofBedrooms
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Area

No. ofBedrooms
Myers Park
1
South Charlotte
1
UNC Charlotte
1
Uptown/South End
1
North Colorado Springs
1
Addison/Bent Tree1
Allen/McKinney
1
Carrollton/Farmers Branch
1
East Dallas
1
Frisco1Grand Prairie
1
Intown Dallas
1
Las Colinas/Coppell
1
North Irving
1
Oak Lawn/Park Cities
1
Richardson
1
Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie
1
The Colony/Far North
1
Carrollton
West Plano
1
Broomfield
1
Highlands Ranch
1
Littleton
1
Southeast Aurora/East
1
Arapahoe County
Tech Center
1
Westminster
1
Submarket

Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Colorado Springs, CO
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield
Beach, FL
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX

Plantation/Davie/Weston

1

Grapevine/Southlake
Northeast Fort
Worth/North Richland
Hills
Southeast
Hartford/Middlesex
CountyBear Creek

1103
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 108 of 115

1
1
1

Area

Submarket

Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Jacksonville, FL
Jacksonville, FL
Kansas City, MO-KS
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Mobile/Daphne, AL
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN

No. ofBedrooms

Downtown/Montrose/River OaksFar West Houston
Friendswood/Pearland
Galleria/Uptown
Greater
Heights/Washington
AvenueGreenway/Upper Kirby
Katy
Memorial
Sugar Land/Stafford
The Woodlands
West University/Medical
Center/Third Ward
Baymeadows
Upper Southside
Lee's Summit/Blue
Springs/Raytown
Henderson
Northwest Las Vegas
Summerlin/The Lakes
Cordova/Bartlett
Germantown/ColliervilleNorth Mobile

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Central Nashville

1South Nashville

1

West Nashville1

Casselberry/WinterSprings/Oviedo
Central Orlando
East Orange County
East Orlando
Sanford/Lake MarySouth Orange County

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL

1

104
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 109 of 115

1
1
1
1
1
1

Area

Submarket

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC

Southwest Orlando
Winter Park/Maitland
Chandler
Deer Valley
North GlendaleSouth Phoenix
Aloha/West Beaverton
Central Portland
Central Raleigh
Chapel Hill/Carrboro
Far North Raleigh
Near North RaleighNorth Cary/MorrisvilleNortheast RaleighNorthwest
Durham/Downtown
Northwest RaleighSouth Cary/Apex
Southwest DurhamSouth Reno
Northwest RichmondTuckahoe/Westhampton
RanchoCucamonga/Upland
Temecula/Murrieta
Southwest Salt Lake City
Far North Central San
Antonio
Far Northwest San
Antonio
North Central San Antonio
Northwest San Antonio
Northeast San Diego
Redmond
Carrollwood/Citrus Park
Central Tampa
Town andCountry/Westchase

Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Reno, NV
Richmond, VA
Richmond, VA
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CARiverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL

No. ofBedrooms
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

105
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 110 of 115

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Area

Submarket

Tucson, AZ
Tucson, AZ
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA

Casas Adobes/Oro Valley
Catalina Foothills

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX

No. ofBedrooms
11Germantown

1

Loudoun County

1Navy Yard/Capitol South

1

Reston/Herndon

1

West Alexandria

1West Fairfax County

1South Orange County
Alpharetta/Cumming
Briarcliff
Buckhead
Chamblee/Brookhaven
DuluthDunwoody
Kennesaw/Acworth
Midtown Atlanta
Norcross
Northeast
Cobb/Woodstock
Roswell
Sandy Springs
SmyrnaSoutheast Gwinnett
CountySoutheast Marietta
Southwest Atlanta
Vinings
Arboretum
Cedar ParkFar South Austin
Far West Austin

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

106
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 111 of 115

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Area

Submarket

Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
Birmingham-Hoover, AL

Near North Austin
Northwest Austin
Pflugerville/Wells BranchSouth Austin
Southwest Austin
Columbia/North LaurelSoutheast Birmingham
Downtown/Mount
Pleasant/Islands
West Ashley
Ballantyne
Huntersville/Cornelius
Myers Park
South Charlotte
UNC Charlotte
Uptown/South End
North Colorado Springs
Gahanna/Northeast
Columbus
Addison/Bent Tree
Allen/McKinney
Carrollton/Farmers Branch
East Dallas
FriscoGrand Prairie
Intown Dallas
Las Colinas/Coppell
North Irving
Oak Lawn/Park Cities
Richardson
Rockwall/Rowlett/Wylie
The Colony/Far North
Carrollton
West Plano
Broomfield
Highlands Ranch
Littleton
North Aurora

Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Colorado Springs, CO
Columbus, OH
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO

No. ofBedrooms
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

107
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 112 of 115

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Area

Submarket

Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield
Beach, FL
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Jacksonville, FL
Jacksonville, FL
Kansas City, MO-KS
Lansing-East Lansing, MI
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Mobile/Daphne, AL

No. ofBedrooms

Southeast Aurora/East
Arapahoe County
Tech Center
Westminster22
2

Plantation/Davie/Weston

2

Grapevine/Southlake
Northeast Fort
Worth/North Richland
Hills
Southeast
Hartford/Middlesex
CountyBear Creek
Downtown/Montrose/River OaksFar West Houston
Friendswood/Pearland
Galleria/Uptown
Greater
Heights/Washington
AvenueGreenway/Upper Kirby
Memorial
Sugar Land/Stafford
The Woodlands
West University/Medical
Center/Third Ward
Baymeadows
Upper Southside
Lee's Summit/Blue
Springs/Raytown
East Lansing
Henderson
Northwest Las Vegas
Summerlin/The Lakes
Cordova/Bartlett
Germantown/ColliervilleNorth Mobile

2

108
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 113 of 115

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Area

Submarket

Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN

No. ofBedrooms

Central Nashville

2South Nashville2

Casselberry/WinterSprings/Oviedo
Central Orlando
East Orange County
East Orlando
Sanford/Lake MarySouth Orange County
Southwest Orlando
Winter Park/Maitland
Chandler
Deer Valley
North GlendaleSouth Phoenix
Aloha/West Beaverton
Central Portland
Central Raleigh
Chapel Hill/Carrboro
Far North Raleigh
Near North RaleighNorth Cary/MorrisvilleNortheast RaleighNorthwest RaleighSouth Cary/Apex
Southwest DurhamSouth Reno
Northwest RichmondTuckahoe/Westhampton
RanchoCucamonga/Upland
Temecula/Murrieta
Southwest Salt Lake City
Far North Central San
Antonio

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Raleigh/Durham, NC
Reno, NV
Richmond, VA
Richmond, VA
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CARiverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Salt Lake City/Ogden/Clearfield, UT
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX

109
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 114 of 115

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Area

Submarket

San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Tucson, AZ
Tucson, AZ
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VAMD-WV

No. ofBedrooms

Far Northwest San
Antonio
North Central San Antonio
Northwest San Antonio
Northeast San Diego
RentonCarrollwood/Citrus Park
Central Tampa
Town andCountry/WestchaseCasas Adobes/Oro Valley
Catalina Foothills

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Germantown

2

Loudoun County

2Navy Yard/Capitol South

2

Reston/Herndon

2West Alexandria

2West Fairfax County

2110
Case 1:24-cv-00710 Document 1 Filed 08/23/24 Page 115 of 115