Broken Record
Temperatures hit new highs, yet world
fails to cut emissions (again)

Emissions Gap Report 2023

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record© 2023 United Nations Environment Programme
ISBN: 		978-92-807-4098-1

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DOI: 		

https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/43922

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Broken Record
Temperatures hit new highs,
yet world fails to cut emissions (again)

Emissions Gap Report 2023

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Acknowledgements
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) would
like to thank the members of the steering committee, the leadand contributing authors, the reviewers and the Secretariat
for their contribution to the preparation of this assessment
report. Authors and reviewers have contributed to the reportin their individual capacities. Their affiliations are only
mentioned for identification purposes.

Steering committee
Muna Alamoodi (Ministry of Climate Change and Environment,
United Arab Emirates), Juliane Berger (German Environment
Agency), Ruta Bubniene (Secretariat of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]); John
Christensen (UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre [UNEPCCC]), María Paz Cigaran (Libélula); Navroz K. Dubash (Centre
for Policy Research), Simon Evans (Carbon Brief) (steeringcommittee observer), Jian Liu (UNEP), Gerd Leipold (Climate
Transparency) (steering committee observer), Simon
Maxwell (independent), Shonali Pachauri (International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA]); Dan Plechaty(ClimateWorks Foundation), Katia Simeonova (independent),
Youba Sokona (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[IPCC]), Oksana Tarasova (World Meteorological Organization)and Iman Ustadi (Office of the UAE Special Envoy for Climate
Change, United Arab Emirates)

Authors
Chapter 1
Authors: Anne Olhoff (CONCITO – Denmark’s green thinktank, Denmark) and John Christensen (UNEP-CCC, Denmark)Chapter 2
Lead authors: William F. Lamb (Mercator Research Instituteon Global Commons and Climate Change, Germany; Universityof Leeds, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland) and Minal Pathak (Ahmedabad University, India)
Contributing authors: Lucas Chancel (World Inequality Lab,
Paris School of Economics, France), Monica Crippa (European
Commission, Joint Research Centre [JRC], Italy), Giacomo
Grassi (European Commission, JRC, Italy), Diego Guizzardi(European Commission, JRC, Italy), Jing Meng (University
College London, United Kingdom), Glen P. Peters (CICERO
Center for International Climate Research, Norway) and Julia
Pongratz (Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich, Germany)

Chapter 3
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, the Netherlands) and Taryn Fransen(World Resources Institute, United States of America)

Contributing authors: Jesse Burton (University of Cape Town
and E3G, South Africa), Ioannis Dafnomilis (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands), Ipek
Gençsü (ODI, United Kingdom), Archie Gilmour (ODI, United
Kingdom), Mariana Gutiérrez Grados (Climate Transparency,
Germany), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute, Germany),
Sarah Heck (Climate Analytics, Germany), Niklas Höhne(NewClimate Institute, Germany), Camilla Hyslop (Oxford
University, United Kingdom), Anna Kanduth (Canadian Climate
Institute, Canada), Ben King (Rhodium Group, United Statesof America), Hannah Kolus (Rhodium Group, United Statesof America), Ho-Mi Lee (Korea Energy Economics Institute,
Republic of Korea), Jared Lewis (Climate Resource, Australia),
Swithin Lui (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Natasha Lutz
(Oxford University, United Kingdom), Andrew Marquard(University of Cape Town, South Africa), Silke Mooldijk(NewClimate Institute, Germany), Leonardo Nascimento(NewClimate Institute, Germany), Analuz Presbítero (Iniciativa
Climática de México [ICM], Mexico), Jazmín Rocco Predassi(Farn, Argentina), Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London,
United Kingdom; International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis [IIASA], Austria), Clea Schumer (World Resources
Institute, United States of America), Alister Self (Climate
Resource, Australia), Kentaro Tamura (Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies [IGES], Japan) and Jorge Villarreal(ICM, Mexico)
Data contributors: Johannes Gütschow (Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research, Germany), Christopher Henderson(World Resources Institute, United States of America), Elena
Hooijschuur (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, the Netherlands), Kimon Keramidas (European
Commission, JRC, Spain), Mia Moisio (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Mika Pflüger (Climate Resource, Germany) and
Claire Stockwell (Climate Analytics, Germany)

Chapter 4
Lead authors: Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London, United
Kingdom; IIASA, Austria), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands) and
Joana Portugal-Pereira (Graduate School of Engineering[COPPE], Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Contributing authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources
Institute, United States of America), Jarmo Kikstra (Imperial
College London, United Kingdom), Robin Lamboll (Imperial
College London, United Kingdom), Malte Meinshausen(University of Melbourne, Australia) and Isabela Schmidt
Tagomori (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, the Netherlands)
Data contributors: Ioannis Dafnomilis (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands) andKimon Keramidas (European Commission, JRC, Spain)

VEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Chapter 5

Reviewers

Lead authors: Jesse Burton (University of Cape Town and
E3G, South Africa) and Greg Muttitt (International Institute for
Sustainable Development [IISD], United Kingdom)

Muna Alamoodi (Ministry of Climate Change andEnvironment, United Arab Emirates), Jesica Lelynn Andrews(UNEP Finance Initiative), Oluleke Babayomi (Shandong
University), Juliane Berger (German Environment Agency),
Marie Blanche Ting (UNEP-CCC), Pierre Boileau (UNEP),
Olivier Bois von Kursk (IISD), Raymond Brandes (UNEP), Ruta
Bubniene (Secretariat of the UNFCCC), David Carlin (UNEP
Finance Initiative), Rob Dellink (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD]), Subash Dhar (UNEPCCC), Paul Dowling (European Commission), Swati Dsouza(International Energy Agency [IEA]), Simon Evans (Carbon
Brief), Ivetta Gerasimchuk (IISD), Niklas Hagelberg (UNEP),
Yasuko Kameyama (University of Tokyo), Maarten Kappelle(UNEP), Alaa Al Khourdajie (Imperial College London),Thaddeus Idi Kiplimo (UNEP), Andrea Klaric (European
Commission), Gabriel Labbate (UNEP), Kate Larsen (RhodiumGroup), Gerd Leipold (Climate Transparency), Jian Liu (UNEP),
Bert Metz (independent), Bavelyne Mibei (UNEP), Shonali
Pachauri (IIASA), María Paz Cigaran (Libélula), Balakrishna
Pisupati (UNEP), Dan Plechaty (ClimateWorks Foundation),
Rula Qalyoubi (UNEP), Mark Radka (independent), Zoltán
Rakonczay (European Commission), Andy Reisinger(Independent), Jade Roberts Maron (UNEP), Yann Robiou
du Pont (Climate Energy College, Utrecht University), Gregor
Semieniuk (University of Massachusetts Amherst), Yuli Shan
(University of Birmingham), Katia Simeonova (independent),
Jim Skea (Imperial College London/IPCC), Youba Sokona(IPCC), Masahiro Sugiyama (University of Tokyo), Oksana
Tarasova (WMO), Iman Ustadi (Office of the UAE Special
Envoy for Climate Change, United Arab Emirates), José Maria
Valenzuela (University of Oxford), Chris Vivian (Joint Groupof Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental
Protection [GESAMP]), Adrien Vogt-Schilb (Inter-American
Development Bank [IDB]), Daniel Wetzel (IEA), Zhao Xiusheng(Tsinghua University), Maya Zenko Ulezic (European
Commission) and Jinhua Zhang (UNEP)

Contributing authors: Fatima Denton (United Nations
University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, Ghana),
Sivan Kartha (Stockholm Environment Institute, UnitedStates of America), Narasimha Rao (Yale School of theEnvironment, Yale University, United States of America),
Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London, United Kingdom;
IIASA, Austria), Saritha Sudharmma Vishwanathan (Indian
Institute of Management Ahmedabad, India; National
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Dan Tong
(Tsinghua University, China), Marta Torres Gunfaus (IDDRI,
France) and William Wills (Centro Brasil no Clima, Brazil; Eos
Consulting, Brazil)

Chapter 6
Lead authors: Narasimha Rao (Yale School of theEnvironment, Yale University, United States of America) andYacob Mulugetta (University College London, United Kingdom)
Contributing authors: Jesse Burton (University Cape Town
and E3G, South Africa), Joisa Dutra Saraiva (Getulio Vargas
Foundation [FGV], Brazil), Ashwin Gambhir (Prayas Energy
Group, India), Jessica Omukuti (University of Oxford, United
Kingdom), Nadia S. Ouedraogo (United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa [UNECA], Ethiopia), Setu Pelz (IIASA,
Austria), Fei Teng (Tsinghua University, China) and Meron
Tesfamichael (University College London, United Kingdom)

Chapter 7
Lead authors: Oliver Geden (German Institute of Internationaland Security Affairs, Germany), Matthew Gidden (IIASA,
Austria), Mai Bui (Imperial College London, United Kingdom)and Mercedes Bustamante (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)
Contributing authors: Holly Buck (State University of New
York at Buffalo, United States of America), Sabine Fuss
(Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons andClimate Change, Germany), Gaurav Ganti (Climate Analytics,
Germany), Jan Minx (Mercator Research Institute on Global
Commons and Climate Change, Germany), Gregory Nemet(University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States of America),
Julia Pongratz (University of Munich and Max Planck Institutefor Meteorology, Germany), Joana Portugal-Pereira (COPPE,
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Stephanie
Roe (World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF], United Statesof America) and Stephen M. Smith (University of Oxford,
United Kingdom)

VI

Chief scientific editors
Anne Olhoff (CONCITO – Denmark’s green think tank), John
Christensen (UNEP-CCC), Simon Maxwell (independent) andNavroz Dubash (Centre for Policy Research)

Secretariat, production and coordination
Anne Olhoff (CONCITO - Denmark’s green think tank), Julia
Rocha Romero (UNEP-CCC), Kaisa Uusimaa (UNEP) andMaarten Kappelle (UNEP)Media and launch support
UNEP Communication
communication teamDivision

and

UNEP - CCC

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Design and layout
Weeks.de Werbeagentur GmbH (figures), Strategic Agenda(layout) and Beverley McDonald, UNEP (cover design)

Translation of the executive summary andlanguage editing
Strategic Agenda

Thanks also to:Siska Adriani Ringbo (UNEP-CCC), Angeline Djampou (UNEP),
Dany Ghafari (UNEP), Selma Hedges (UNEP), Andrea Hinwood(UNEP), Christian Ibsen (CONCITO – Denmark’s green thinktank), Jason Jabbour (UNEP), Jarl Krausing (CONCITO –Denmark’s green think tank), Thomas Laursen (UNEP-CCC),
Anita Mujumdar (UNEP), Pia Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEPCCC), Ignacio Sánchez Díaz (UNEP), Pinya Sarasas (UNEP),
Ying Wang (UNEP) and Edoardo Zandri (UNEP)
The 2023 edition of the Emissions Gap Report is supportedby the Environment Fund, UNEP’s core financial fund. UNEP
would like to thank the ClimateWorks Foundation, the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Climate Policy, and the German Government andits International Climate Initiative (IKI), for their support for the
production of the Emissions Gap Report 2023.

VII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

VIIIEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Glossary

This glossary is compiled drawing on glossaries andother resources available on the websites of the following
organizations, networks and projects: the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, United Nations Environment
Programme, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and World Resources Institute.
Annex I Parties: Consists of the group of countries listed in
Annex I to the UNFCCC. Under Articles 4.2 (a) and 4.2 (b) of
the UNFCCC, Annex I Parties were committed to adopting
national policies and measures with the non-legally binding
aim to return their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990
levels by 2000. The group is largely similar to the Annex B
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that also adopted emissions
reduction targets for 2008–2012. By default, the othercountries are referred to as Non-Annex I Parties (see below).
Annex II Parties: The group of countries listed in Annex II to
the UNFCCC. Under Article 4 of the UNFCCC, these countries
have a special obligation to provide financial resources tomeet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing
measures mentioned under Article 12, paragraph 1. They
are also obliged to provide financial resources, including forthe transfer of technology, to meet the agreed incremental
costs of implementing measures covered by Article 12,
paragraph 1 and agreed between developing country Parties
and international entities referred to in Article 11 of the
UNFCCC. This group of countries shall also assist countries
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects ofclimate change.
Anthropogenic emissions: Emissions derived from humanactivities.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change ismeasured. In the context of climate change transformation
pathways, the term “baseline scenarios” refers to scenarios
based on the assumption that no mitigation policies ormeasures will be implemented beyond those already inforce and/or legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline
scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future,
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve tohighlight the level of emissions that would occur without
further policy efforts. Typically, baseline scenarios arecompared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed
to meet different goals for GHG emissions, atmosphericconcentrations or temperature change. The term “baseline
scenario” is used interchangeably with “reference scenario”
and “no-policy scenario”.

Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget): Fora given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C
long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects
the total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted
for temperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently,
a carbon budget is an area under a carbon dioxide (CO 2)
emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain levelof global mean surface temperature rise.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2e): A way to place emissionsof various radiative forcing agents on a common footing byaccounting for their effect on the climate. It describes, fora given mixture and amount of GHGs, the amount of CO 2that would have the same global warming ability, whenmeasured over a specified time period. For the purpose ofthis report, unless otherwise specified, GHG emissions are
the sum of the basket of GHGs listed in Annex A to the Kyoto
Protocol, expressed as CO 2 e, assuming a 100-year global
warming potential.
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR): Refers to anthropogenic
activities removing CO 2 from the atmosphere and durably
storing it in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or inproducts. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic
enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct
air capture and storage, but excludes natural CO 2 uptake notdirectly caused by human activities.
Carbon markets: A term for a carbon trading system throughwhich countries and/or companies may buy or sell units of
GHG emissions to offset their GHG emissions by acquiring
carbon credits from entities that either minimize or eliminate
their own emissions. The term comes from the fact that CO 2
is the predominant GHG, and other gases are measured inunits called CO 2 equivalents.
Carbon neutrality: Is achieved when an actor’s net
contribution to global CO 2 emissions is zero. Any CO 2
emissions attributable to an actor’s activities are fullycompensated by CO 2 reductions or removals exclusively
claimed by the actor, irrespective of the time period or the
relative magnitude of emissions and removals involved.
Carbon price: The price for a voided or released CO 2 or CO 2 eemissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax or the
price of emission permits. In many models used to assess
the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are used asa proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies.

IX

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Conditional nationally determined contribution: A
nationally determined contribution (NDC – see below)
proposed by some countries that is contingent on a rangeof possible conditions, such as the ability of national
legislatures to enact the necessary laws, ambitious action
from other countries, realization of finance and technicalsupport, or other factors.
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP): The supreme bodyof the UNFCCC. It currently meets once a year to review theUNFCCC’s progress.
Emissions pathway: The trajectory of annual GHG emissions
over time.
Emissions trading: A market-based instrument used tolimit emissions. The environmental objective or sum of
total allowed emissions is expressed as an emissions cap.
The cap is divided in tradable emission permits that areallocated – either by auctioning or handing out for free – toentities within the jurisdiction of the trading scheme. Entities
need to surrender emission permits equal to the amount of
their emissions (e.g. tons of CO 2). An entity may sell excess
permits. Trading schemes occur at the intracompany,
domestic and international levels, and may apply to CO 2 ,other GHGs or other substances. Emissions trading is also
one of the mechanisms specified under the Kyoto Protocol.
Gross national income: Gross national income, abbreviatedas GNI, is the sum of the incomes of residents of an
economy in a given period. It is equal to GDP minus primary
income payable by resident units to non-resident units, plus
primary income receivable from the rest of the world (fromnon-resident units to resident units).
Global stocktake: The global stocktake was establishedunder Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. It is a process for
Member States and stakeholders to assess whether they arecollectively making progress towards meeting the goals of
the Paris Climate Change Agreement. The global stocktake
assesses everything related to where the world stands
on climate action and support, identifying the gaps, andworking together to agree on solutions pathways, to 2030
and beyond. The first global stocktake takes place at COP
28 in 2023.
Global warming potential: An index representing the
combined effect of the differing times GHGs remain in theatmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing
outgoing infrared radiation.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs): The atmospheric gases
responsible for causing global warming and climatic change.
The major GHGs are CO 2 , methane (CH 4) and nitrous oxide(N 2 O). Less prevalent, but very powerful, GHGs includehydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) andsulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

X

Integrated assessment models: Models that seek tocombine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the formof equations and/or algorithms, in order to explore complex
environmental problems. As such, they describe the fullchain of climate change, from the production of GHGs toatmospheric responses. This necessarily includes relevant
links and feedback between socioeconomic and biophysicalprocesses.
Intended nationally determined contribution (NDC):
Intended NDCs are submissions from countries describing
the national actions that they intend to take to reach theParis Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting
warming to well below 2°C. Once a country has ratified
the Paris Agreement, its intended NDC is automaticallyconverted to its NDC, unless it chooses to further update it.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement signed in 1997
and which came into force in 2005, standing on its own, andrequiring separate ratification by Governments, but linked
to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among other things,
sets binding targets for the reduction of GHG emissions byindustrialized countries.
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A GHG
inventory sector that covers emissions and removals of
GHGs resulting from direct human-induced land use, landuse change and forestry activities.
Least-cost pathway: Least-cost pathway scenarios identify
the least expensive combination of mitigation options tofulfil a specific climate target. A least-cost scenario is basedon the premise that, if an overarching climate objective isset, society wants to achieve this at the lowest possible
cost over time. It also assumes that global actions startat the base year of model simulations (usually close to thecurrent year) and are implemented following a cost-optimal(cost-efficient) sharing of the mitigation burden between
current and future generations, depending on the social
discount rate.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 per cent chance.
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities ofmeeting temperature limits.
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, mitigation
relates to a human intervention to reduce the sources orenhance the sinks of GHGs. Examples include using fossil
fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity
generation, switching to solar energy or wind power,
improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forestsand other “sinks” to remove greater amounts of CO 2 fromthe atmosphere.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Nationally determined contribution (NDC): Submissions
by countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement which
present their national efforts to reach the Paris Agreement’s
long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well
below 2°C. New or updated NDCs are to be submitted in2020 and every five years thereafter. NDCs thus represent a
country’s current ambition or target for reducing emissions
nationally.
Non-Annex I Parties: These consist mostly of developing
countries. Certain groups of developing countries arerecognized by the UNFCCC as being especially vulnerable
to the adverse impacts of climate change, including
countries with low-lying coastal areas and those prone
to desertification and drought. Others, such as countries
that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production andcommerce, feel more vulnerable to the potential economic
impacts of climate change response measures. The
UNFCCC emphasizes activities that promise to answer the
special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries,
such as investment, insurance and technology transfer.

Offset: In climate policy, a unit of CO 2 e emissions thatis reduced, avoided or sequestered to compensate foremissions occurring elsewhere.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold, basedon “if-then” propositions. Scenarios typically include an initialsocioeconomic situation and a description of the key driving
forces and future changes in emissions, temperatures orother climate change-related variables.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releasesa GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG or aerosol into
the atmosphere.

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Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

XII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Contents
Acknowledgements
Glossary		Foreword		
Executive summary

V
IX
XV
XVI

Chapter 1
1.1		
1.2		

Introduction
Context and framing of the Emissions Gap Report 2023
Approach and structure of the report11
2

Chapter 2
2.1		
2.2		
2.3		
2.4		

Global emissions trends
Introduction
Global emissions trends
Emissions trends of major emitters
Some countries have peaked in emissions, meanwhile global per capita levels remain
highly unequalContributions to climate change are unequal

3
3
4
6

2.5		
Chapter 3
3.1		
3.2		
3.3		
3.4		
Chapter 4
4.1		
4.2		
4.3		
4.4		
4.5		
Chapter 5
5.1		
5.2		
5.3		
5.4		
Chapter 6
6.1		
6.2		
6.3		
6.4		
6.5		
6.6		
Chapter 7
7.1		
7.2		
7.3		
7.4		
7.5		
7.6		

Nationally determined contributions and long-term pledges: The global landscape and G20
member progress
Introduction
Global progress of NDCs is negligible since COP 27, but there is some progresssince the adoption of the Paris Agreement
Implementation progress of G20 members continues, but must be accelerated
Developments in long-term and net-zero pledges: The number continues to increase,but confidence in their implementation remains low

7
8
11
11
12
13
20

The emissions gap in 2030 and beyond
Introduction
A set of scenarios is needed to assess the emissions gap and global temperature outcomes
Pathways matter for the carbon budget, the interpretation of emissions gaps and the chanceof achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal
The emissions gap in 2030 and 2035 must be bridged through action in this decade
The emissions gap has severe implications for global warming projections

23
23
23

Global energy transformation in the context of the Paris Agreement
Introduction
Avoiding new fossil fuel capacity will limit the existing infrastructure that must be retired earlyto achieve Paris Agreement goals
Meeting the basic energy needs of people living in poverty would have a limited impact
on global GHG emissions
Delivering change requires global cooperation that reflects the equity and fairness principlesof the Paris Agreement

34
34

27
28
30

34
36
36

Energy transitions for low-carbon development futures in low- and middle-income countries:
Challenges and opportunities
Introduction
Development and energy are interlinked
The political economy of clean energy transitions is challenging
Clean energy transitions also bring opportunities
Adequate international finance is an essential enabler of clean energy transitions
Low- and middle-income countries can take concrete steps towards clean energy transitions

38
38
38
41
42
44
45

The role of carbon dioxide removal in achieving the Paris Agreement’s long-term
temperature goal
Introduction
The land sector dominates current CDR levels
The risks of depending on large-scale CDR to meet climate goals
Equity and differentiated responsibilities associated with deploying CDR
Scaling up CDR will require dedicated policies and innovation
Political priorities for action are needed

48
48
51
53
54
56
56

References		

60

XIII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Foreword

Humanity is breaking all the wrong records when it comesto climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions reached
a new high in 2022. In September 2023, global averagetemperatures were 1.8°C above pre-industrial levels.
When this year is over, according to the European Union’s
Copernicus Climate Change Service, it is almost certain to
be the warmest year on record.
The 2023 edition of the Emissions Gap Report tells us thatthe world must change track, or we will be saying the samething next year – and the year after, and the year after, likea broken record. The report finds that fully implementing
and continuing mitigation efforts of unconditional nationallydetermined contributions (NDCs) made under the Paris
Agreement for 2030 would put the world on course forlimiting temperature rise to 2.9°C this century. Fully
implementing conditional NDCs would lower this to 2.5°C.
Given the intense climate impacts we are already seeing,neither outcome is desirable.
Progress since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015 has
shown that the world is capable of change. Greenhouse gas
emissions in 2030, based on policies in place, were projected
to increase by 16 per cent at the time of the agreement’s
adoption. Today, the projected increase is 3 per cent.
However, predicted 2030 greenhouse gas emissions must
fall by 28 per cent for the Paris Agreement 2°C pathway and42 per cent for the 1.5°C pathway.
Change must come faster in the form of economy-wide,
low-carbon development transformations, with a focus
on the energy transition. Countries with greater capacity
and responsibility for emissions will need to take more
ambitious action and provide financial and technical support
to developing nations. Low- and middle-income countries,
which already account for more than two thirds of global
emissions, should meet their development needs with lowemissions growth, which would provide universal accessto energy, lift millions out of poverty, and expand strategic
industries.
The first global stocktake, concluding at COP 28 in Dubai
this year, will inform the next round of NDCs, which will set
new national emissions targets for 2035. Ambition in these
NDCs must bring greenhouse gas emissions in 2035 tolevels consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C pathways. Stronger
implementation in this decade will help to make thispossible. The world needs to lift the needle out of the grooveof insufficient ambition and action, and start setting newrecords on cutting emissions, green and just transitions, andclimate finance – starting now.

Inger Andersen
Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme

XVEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Executive summary

Stocktake during a year of broken records
The world is witnessing a disturbing acceleration in thenumber, speed and scale of broken climate records. At
the time of writing, 86 days have been recorded withtemperatures exceeding 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
this year. Not only was September the hottest month ever,it also exceeded the previous record by an unprecedented
0.5°C, with global average temperatures at 1.8°C above
pre-industrial levels. These records were accompanied bydevastating extreme events, which the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned us are merelya meek beginning. While the records do not imply that theworld has exceeded the 1.5°C temperature limit specified in
the Paris Agreement, which refers to global warming levels
based on multi-decadal averages, they signal that we are
getting closer.
This fourteenth Emissions Gap Report is published ahead of
the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 28). It provides an annual, independentscience-based assessment of the gap between the pledged
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and the
reductions required to align with the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement, as well as opportunities tobridge this gap. COP 28 marks the conclusion of the firstglobal stocktake under the Paris Agreement, held every five
years to assess the global response to the climate crisis andchart a better way forward. This closely mirrors the objectiveof the Emissions Gap Report, and the report aims to provide
findings relevant to the concluding discussions under the
global stocktake.
To inform COP 28 – including on the outcomes neededfrom the global stocktake – and set the scene for the next
round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) thatcountries are requested to submit in 2025, which will include
emissions reduction targets for 2035, this report looks atwhat is required this decade and beyond 2030 to maintainthe possibility of achieving the long-term temperature goalof the Paris Agreement. It underscores that maintaining thispossibility hinges on relentlessly strengthening mitigation
action this decade to narrow the emissions gap. This will
facilitate significantly more ambitious targets for 2035 in
the next round of NDCs, and pave the way for enhancing
the credibility and feasibility of the net-zero pledges that by

XVI

now cover around 80 per cent of global emissions. Failure to
bring global GHG emissions in 2030 below the levels impliedby current NDCs will make it impossible to limit warming to
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and strongly increase thechallenge of limiting warming to 2°C.
As this report shows, not only temperature records continue
to be broken – global GHG emissions and atmosphericconcentrations of carbon dioxide (CO 2) also set new records
in 2022. Due to the failure to stringently reduce emissions
in high-income and high-emitting countries (which bear
the greatest responsibility for past emissions) and to limit
emissions growth in low- and middle-income countries(which account for the majority of current emissions),
unprecedented action is now needed by all countries. For
high-income countries, this implies further accelerating
domestic emissions reductions, committing to reaching
net zero as soon as possible – and sooner than the global
averages from the latest IPCC report implies – and at thesame time providing financial and technical support to lowand middle-income countries. For low- and middle-income
countries, it means that pressing development needs
must be met alongside a transition away from fossil fuels.
Furthermore, the delay in stringent mitigation action will
likely increase future dependence on carbon dioxide removal(CDR) from the atmosphere, but availability of large-scale
CDR options in the future cannot be taken for granted. This
year, the report thus explores opportunities and challenges
associated with energy transitions as well as development
and deployment of CDR.

1.
▶

Global GHG emissions set new record of
57.4 GtCO2e in 2022
Global GHG emissions increased by 1.2 per cent from2021 to 2022 to reach a new record of 57.4 gigatons of
CO 2 equivalent (GtCO 2e) (figure ES.1). All sectors apartfrom transport have fully rebounded from the drop inemissions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic andnow exceed 2019 levels. CO 2 emissions from fossil
fuel combustion and industrial processes were themain contributors to the overall increase, accounting
for about two thirds of current GHG emissions.
Emissions of methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) andfluorinated gases (F-gases), which have higher global
warming potentials and account for about one quarterof current GHG emissions, are increasing rapidly: inEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2022, F-gas emissions grew by 5.5 per cent, followedby CH 4 at 1.8 per cent and N 2 O at 0.9 per cent. Basedon early projections, global net land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) CO 2 emissions
remained steady in 2022. LULUCF CO 2 emissions andremovals continue to have the largest uncertainties of
all gases considered, both in terms of their absoluteamounts and trends.

▶

GHG emissions across the G20 also increased by
1.2 per cent in 2022. However, members vary widelyin their trends with increases in China, India, Indonesia
and the United States of America, but decreases in
Brazil, the European Union and the Russian Federation.
Collectively, the G20 currently account for 76 per centof global emissions.

Figure ES.1 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions, 1990–2022
57.4 GtCO2e
in 2022

Total GHG emissions 1990–2022 (GtCO2e/yr)

50
40

54.5
GtCO2e51.6
GtCO2e60
41.8
GtCO2e37.9
GtCO2e

30
20
10
0

1990

2000
Fossil CO2

▶

2.
▶

CH4

2010
N2O

Global primary energy consumption expanded
in 2022 – an expansion mainly met by a growth incoal, oil and renewable electricity supply – whereasgas consumption declined by 3 per cent following
the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine. Overall, net
electricity demand growth in 2022 was primarily met
by renewable sources (excluding hydropower), driven
by a record increase in solar capacity additions.
Nonetheless, investments in fossil fuel extraction
and use have continued in most regions worldwide.
Globally, Governments still plan to produce more thandouble the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would
be consistent with the long-term temperature goal of
the Paris Agreement.

Current and historical emissions arehighly unequally distributed within
and among countries, reflecting global
patterns of inequality

F-gases

2020
LULUCF CO2

world average of 6.5 tons of CO 2 equivalent (tCO 2 e)in the Russian Federation and the United States ofAmerica, while those in India remain under half of it.
Per capita emissions are fairly similar in Brazil, theEuropean Union and Indonesia, and at levels slightly
below the G20 average. The G20 as a group averaged
7.9 tCO 2 e, whereas least developed countries
averaged 2.2 tCO 2 e and small island developing
States averaged 4.2 tCO 2e.
▶

Inequality in consumption-based emissions is
also found among and within countries. Globally,
the 10 per cent of the population with the highest
income accounted for nearly half (48 per cent) ofemissions with two thirds of this group living indeveloped countries. The bottom 50 per cent of theworld population contributed only 12 per cent of total
emissions.

Per capita territorial GHG emissions vary significantly
across countries. They are more than double the

XVIIEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

Historic emissions and contribution to global warming
similarly vary significantly across countries andgroups of countries (figure ES.2). Nearly 80 per centof historical cumulative fossil and LULUCF CO 2
emissions came from G20 countries, with thelargest contributions from China, the United Statesof America and the European Union, while least
developed countries contributed 4 per cent. The

United States of America account for 4 per cent of
current world population, but contributed 17 per centof global warming from 1850 to 2021, including theimpact of methane and nitrous oxide emissions. India,
by contrast, accounts for 18 per cent of the world
population, but to date only contributed 5 per centof warming.

Figure ES.2 Current and historic contributions to climate change
Current and historic contributions to climate change(% share by countries or regions)

30%
19%

13%
4%
5%

25%

16%

3.
▶

▶

XVIII

17%

10%
5%
6%
22%

China

4%

United Statesof America

6%

EU27

11%

18%

India

7%

2%

7%

RussianFederation

14%

5%

24%

18%
14%

4%

6%

3%

Historical
CO2 emissions(1850–2021)

Contribution
to warming(1850–2021)

Current GHG
emissions(2021)

There has been negligible movement on
NDCs since COP 27, but some progress
in NDCs and policies since the Paris
Agreement was adopted
Nine countries have submitted new or updated
NDCs since COP 27, bringing the total number of
NDCs that have been updated since the initial NDCs
were submitted in advance of or following the Paris
Agreement to 149 (counting the European Unionand its 27 Member States as a single Party) as at
25 September 2023. More NDCs now contain GHG
reduction targets, and more of these targets are
economy-wide, covering a country’s entire economy
as opposed to certain sectors only.
If all new and updated unconditional NDCs are
fully implemented, they are estimated to reduce

Rest of G20
Rest of world

18%

21%

18%

G20

12%

Rest of world

13%

Least developed
countries

Current
population(2021)

global GHG emissions by about 5.0 GtCO 2 e (range:
1.8–8.2 GtCO 2e) annually by 2030, compared with theinitial NDCs. The combined effect of the nine NDCs
submitted since COP 27 amounts to around
0.1 GtCO 2 e of this total. Thus, while NDC progresssince COP 27 has been negligible, progress since theadoption of the Paris Agreement at COP 21 is more
pronounced, although still insufficient to narrow theemissions gap.
▶

Progress since the Paris Agreement is clearer on thepolicy side. Globally, GHG emissions in 2030 basedon policies in place were projected to increase by
16 per cent at the time of the adoption of the Paris
Agreement. Now the projected increase is 3 per cent.

▶

Policy progress has contributed to reducing theimplementation gap, defined as the differenceEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

between projected emissions under current policies
and projected emissions under full implementationof the NDCs. The global implementation gap for2030 is estimated to be around 1.5 GtCO 2 e for theunconditional NDCs (down from 3 GtCO 2e in last year’s
assessment) and 5 GtCO 2e for the conditional NDCs
(down from 6 GtCO 2e last year). The implementation
gap for the G20 members has also been reduced.

As a group, the G20 members are projected to fallshort of their new and updated NDCs by 1.2 GtCO 2eannually by 2030, which is 0.6 GtCO 2 e lower thanlast year’s assessment (figure ES.3). The impact of
newly implemented policies is a main driver of both
lower global and G20 emission projections for 2030.
Other factors include changes in emission trends andsocioeconomic circumstances.

Figure ES.3 Implementation gaps between current policies and NDC pledges for the G20 members collectively andindividually by 2030, relative to 2015 emissions
GHG emissions (relative to 2015 = 100%)
200%

Current
policies
scenario

Unconditional
NDC scenario

Conditional
NDC scenario

Uncertainty
range

150%

Emission
level
2015

100%

11

50%

Implementation gap in %4.
▶

The number of net-zero pledges continues
to increase, but confidence in theirimplementation remains low
As at 25 September 2023, 97 Parties covering
approximately 81 per cent of global GHG emissions
had adopted net-zero pledges either in law (27 Parties),
in a policy document such as an NDC or a long-term
strategy (54 Parties), or in an announcement by a

11%

19%

4%

United Kingdom

United Statesof America

G20

11%

South Africa

Türkiye6%

Saudi Arabia

Russian Federation

8%

India

18%

9%

EU27

Republic of Korea

2%

China

Mexico27%

Canada15%

9%BrazilJapan

14%

Australia

Indonesia

11%

Argentina

0%

No implementation gap

high-level government official (16 Parties). This is
up from 88 Parties last year. A total of 37 per centof global GHG emissions are covered by net-zerotargets for 2050 or earlier, while 44 per cent of global
emissions are covered by net-zero pledges for years
later than 2050.
▶

Responsible for 76 per cent of global emissions,G20 members will dominate when global emissions

XIX

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

reach net zero. Encouragingly, all G20 members
except Mexico have set net-zero targets, and overthe past year, some members have taken important
steps towards strengthening and implementing theirtargets. Overall, however, limited progress has been
made on key indicators of confidence in net-zero
implementation among G20 members, including legal
status, the existence and quality of implementationplans, and alignment of near-term emissions
trajectories with net-zero targets. Most concerningly,
none of the G20 members are currently reducing
emissions at a pace consistent with meeting their
net-zero targets.

5.
▶

The emissions gap in 2030 remains high:current unconditional NDCs imply a 14 GtCO2e
gap for a 2°C goal and a 22 GtCO2e gap forthe 1.5°C goal. The additional implementationof the conditional NDCs reduces theseestimates by 3 GtCO2e▶

These least-cost pathways assume stringent
emissions reductions starting in 2020, which current
trends contradict. Since emissions today are higher
than in 2020, this implies that the world has alreadyfurther depleted the limited remaining carbon budget
and committed to slightly higher global warming
than indicated by the least-cost pathways, unlessthere is further acceleration of emissions reductions
after emissions levels consistent with the least-cost
pathways are met. The emissions gap estimates arethus likely to be lower-bound, as they do not accountfor the excess emissions since 2020 compared withthe least-cost pathways, and should be read with thiscaveat in mind.

▶

The emissions gap for 2030 remains largely
unchanged compared with last year’s assessment.
Full implementation of unconditional NDCs isestimated to result in a gap with below 2°C pathwaysof about 14 GtCO 2 e (range: 13–16) with at least
66 per cent chance. If the conditional NDCs are also
fully implemented, the below 2°C emissions gap isreduced to 11 GtCO 2e (range: 9–15) (table ES.1 andfigure ES.4).

The emissions gap is defined as the difference
between the estimated global GHG emissions resulting
from full implementation of the latest NDCs and thoseunder least-cost pathways aligned with the long-term
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Table ES.1 Global total GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and estimated gaps under different scenarios

Scenario

GHG emissions(GtCO2e)

Estimated gap to least-cost pathways consistent withlimiting global warming to specific levels (GtCO2e)Median and range

Below 2°C

Below 1.8°C

Below 1.5°C

Current policies

56 (52–60)

16 (11–19)

22 (17–25)

24 (19–27)

Unconditional NDCs

55 (54–57)

14 (13–16)

20 (19–22)

22 (21–24)

Conditional NDCs

52 (50–55)

11 (9–15)

17 (15–20)

19 (17–23)

2030

2035
Current policies continued

56 (45–64)

20 (9–28)

29 (18–37)

31 (20–39)

Unconditional NDCs continued

54 (47–60)

18 (11–25)

27 (20–34)

29 (22–36)

Conditional NDCs continued

51 (43–58)

15 (8–22)

24 (17–31)

26 (19–33)

Current policies continued

55 (24–72)

35 (4–52)

43 (12–60)

46 (16–63)

Unconditional NDCs and net-zero pledges
using strict criteria

44 (26–58)

24 (6–38)

32 (14–46)

36 (18–49)

Conditional NDCs and all net-zero pledges

21 (6–33)

1 (-14–13)

9 (-6–21)

12 (-2–25)

2050

XX

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure ES.4 Global GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 and 2035 (median estimate
and tenth to ninetieth percentile range)
GtCO2e60

Current policies scenario
Unconditional NDC scenario

2°C
range

40

30

GtCO2e

GtCO2eMedian estimate of level consistent
with 2°C: 41 GtCO2e (range: 37–46)

Green area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 1.5°C witha 50% chance by 2100 andminimum 33% likelihood overthe course of the century

22

19
Unconditional NDC caseBlue area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 2°C with
about 66% chance

Remaining
gap to staywithin 2°C
limit

GtCO2eConditional NDC case

GtCO2e14
Unconditional NDC case1150

Conditional NDC case

Conditional
NDC scenario

Median estimate of level consistent
with 1.5°C: 33 GtCO2e (range: 26–34)

1.5°C
range

20
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

6.

Action in this decade will determine theambition required in the next round of NDCs
for 2035, and the feasibility of achieving
the long-term temperature goal of theParis Agreement▶

The emissions gap in 2030 between unconditional
NDCs and 1.5°C pathways is about 22 GtCO 2 e(range: 21–24) with at least 50 per cent chance. If theconditional NDCs are also fully implemented, the 1.5°Cemissions gap is reduced to 19 GtCO 2e (range: 17–23).

▶

Unconditional and conditional NDCs for 2030 are
estimated to reduce global emissions by 2 per cent and9 per cent respectively, compared with current policy
projections and assuming they are fully implemented.
To get to levels consistent with least-cost pathways
limiting global warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C, global
GHG emissions must be reduced by 28 per cent and42 per cent respectively. This is 2 percentage points
lower than last year’s assessment, illustrating the
progress in narrowing the implementation gap between
current policies and NDCs.

▶

The first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement
is envisaged to inform the next round of NDCs thatcountries are requested to submit in 2025, which will
include targets for 2035. Overall, global ambition in thenext round of NDCs must be sufficient to bring global
GHG emissions in 2035 to the levels consistent withbelow 2°C and 1.5°C pathways of 36 GtCO 2e (range:
31–39) and 25 GtCO 2 e (range: 20–27) respectively(table ES.2), while also compensating for excess
emissions until levels consistent with these pathways
are achieved.

▶

Nonetheless, immediate, accelerated and relentlessmitigation action is needed to bring about the deep
annual emission cuts that are required from now to2030 to narrow the emissions gap, with unparalleledannual cuts required to bridge the gap, even without
accounting for excess emissions since 2020.

▶

In contrast, a continuation of current policies and
NDC scenarios would result in widened and likely
unbridgeable gaps in 2035 (table ES.1). A continuationof current policies is projected to result in global
GHG emissions of 56 GtCO 2 e in 2035 (table ES.1),
which is 36 per cent and 55 per cent higher than the

XXIEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

levels consistent with below 2°C and 1.5°C pathways
respectively (table ES.2), without compensating forexcess emissions.
▶

▶

Again, these findings underline that immediate andunprecedented mitigation action in this decadeis essential. Over-complying with current NDC
targets for 2030 will enable countries to put forward
more ambitious mitigation targets for 2035 in theirnext NDCs, and it will make the realization of such
ambitious targets for 2035 more feasible.

Looking beyond 2035 at mid-century scenarios(table ES.1) reinforces these findings and points
to the necessity of enhancing the credibility andfeasibility of net-zero pledges. Total global GHG
emissions in 2050 are only brought closer to 1.5°C
and 2°C pathways if the conditional NDCs are fully
implemented in combination with the achievement of
all net-zero pledges.

Table ES.2 Global GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and global warming characteristics of least-cost pathways
starting in 2020 consistent with limiting global warming to specific temperature limits
Least-cost
pathwaysconsistent with Number oflimiting global scenarios
warming to
specific levels
Below 2°C
(66% chancethroughout thecentury)
Below 1.8°C(66% chancethroughout thecentury)
Below 1.5°C(50% chancein 2100 andminimum
33% chancethroughout thecentury)

7.
▶

▶

XXII

Global total GHG emissions(GtCO2e)In 2030

In 2035

In 2050

Estimated temperature outcomes
Closest IPCC
Working Group III
50% chance 66% chance 90% chance Sixth Assessment
Report scenario
class
Peak:

195

139

50

41
(37–46)35(28–41)33(26–34)36(31–39)27(21–31)25(20–27)20(16–24)12(8–16)

8(5–13)

If current policies are continued, global
warming is estimated to be limited to 3°C.
Delivering on all unconditional and conditional
pledges by 2030 lowers this estimate to 2.5°C,
with the additional fulfilment of all net-zeropledges bringing it to 2°C
A continuation of the level of climate change
mitigation efforts implied by current policies is
estimated to limit global warming to 3°C (range:
1.9–3.8°C) throughout the century with a 66 per centchance. Warming is expected to increase further after
2100 as CO 2 emissions are not yet projected to reachnet-zero levels.
A continuation of the unconditional NDC scenario
lowers this estimate to 2.9°C (range: 2–3.7°C),
whereas the additional achievement and continuation

Peak:
1.8–1.9°C

Peak:
2.2–2.4°C

1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

In 2100:
2–2.4°CPeak:
1.5–1.7°C

Peak:
1.6–1.8°C

Peak:
1.9°C–2.2°C

In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C

In 2100:
1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.8–2.2°C

Peak:
1.5–1.6°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
1.9–2.1°C

In 2100:
1.1–1-3°C

In 2100:
1.2–1.5°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:

C3a

N/A

C1a

of conditional NDCs lowers this by around 0.4°C to
2.5°C (range: 1.9–3.6°C).
▶

In the most optimistic scenario where all conditional
NDCs and net-zero pledges, including those madeas part of long-term low-emissions development
strategies, are assumed to be fully achieved, global
warming is projected to be limited to 2°C (range:
1.8–2.5°C) with 66 per cent chance over the courseof the century. However, as noted previously, net-zeropledges remain highly uncertain.

▶

Even in the most optimistic scenario considered in thisreport, the chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C
is only 14 per cent, and the various scenarios leave
open a large possibility that global warming exceeds
2°C or even 3°C. This further illustrates the needto bring global emissions in 2030 lower than levels
associated with full implementation of the current

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

NDCs, to expand the coverage of net-zero pledges to
all GHG emissions and to achieve these pledges.
▶

countries with greater capacity and greater historic
responsibility for emissions – particularly highincome and high-emitting countries among the G20– will need to take more ambitious and rapid action,
setting the course and demonstrating the viabilityof fossil-free development. However, this will not
be sufficient as low- and middle-income countries
already account for more than two thirds of global
GHG emissions. Accordingly, the Climate Solidarity
Pact proposed by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral calls on all big emitters to make extra efforts
to cut emissions and wealthier countries to provide
financial and technical resources to support low- andmiddle-income countries in their transformation,reflecting differentiated timelines.

Central temperature projections are slightly higher
than in the 2022 edition of the Emissions Gap Report,
as a larger number of models have been includedin the estimation of future emissions. However, theprojections are consistent with those from othermajor assessments, such as the International Energy
Agency’s 2023 Announced Pledges Scenario, theClimate Action Tracker and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 2023
NDC Synthesis Report, noting that these reporttemperature projections with a 50 per cent rather thana 66 per cent chance.

8.

▶

The failure to stringently reduce emissions
in high-income countries and to prevent
further emissions growth in low- andmiddle-income countries implies that
all countries must urgently accelerate
economy-wide, low-carbon transformations toachieve the long-term temperature goal of theParis Agreement▶

Delivering transformational change requires
unprecedented global cooperation reflecting the Paris
Agreement principle of common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities in light ofnational circumstances. This principle implies that

Energy is the dominant source of GHG emissions,currently accounting for 86 per cent of global CO 2
emissions. The coal, oil and gas extracted over the
lifetime of producing and under-construction mines
and fields as at 2018 would emit more than 3.5 times
the carbon budget available to limit warming to
1.5°C with 50 per cent probability, and almost thesize of the budget available for 2°C with 67 per centprobability. Global transformation of energy systems
is thus essential, including in low- and middle-income
countries, where pressing development objectives
must be met alongside a transition away fromfossil fuels.

Figure ES.5 Committed CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure, compared with carbon budgets reflecting
the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement
Emissions (GtCO2)
Carbon budget

1,000
950

2 °C
(67% chance)

800

Coal
Other
Buildings

600

Transport

400

Industry

Gas

Carbon budget
250
200

0

Electricity
Oil

1.5 °C(50% chance)

Existing extraction
infrastructure

Existing consuming
infrastructure

Committed emissions

XXIII

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

9.
▶

Low- and middle-income countries facesubstantial economic and institutional
challenges in low-carbon energy transitions,but can also exploit opportunities

economic challenges from high-income countries,
especially in view of the required speed of transition.

Energy transitions in low- and middle-income countries
are shaped by the overarching objective of pursuingdevelopment. Low- and middle-income countries
face several common challenges in having to bringmillions out of poverty, expand strategic industries,
urbanize and deal with the political challenges of atransition away from fossil fuel use. Meeting basic
energy needs of people living in poverty would havea limited impact on global GHG emissions. Yet today,
2.4 billion people lack access to clean cooking and775 million to electricity, with women and children
disproportionately affected. Meeting energy needs forbroader human development will lead to significant
energy demand growth, but there is scope to meetthis growth more efficiently and equitably, and with
low-carbon energy as renewables get cheaper.

▶

▶

Low- and lower-middle-income countries are in thegreatest need of affordable finance as they are alreadysaddled with debt, receive disproportionately low clean
energy investments, are more vulnerable to volatile
fossil fuel markets either as exporters or importers,
and may face future stranded fossil fuel assets.
Upper-middle-income countries are typically further
along in building clean energy economies, but still
face risks of stranded assets and related employment
implications and macroeconomic shocks.

▶

Access to affordable finance is therefore a prerequisite
for increasing mitigation ambition in low- and middleincome countries. Yet, costs of capital are up to seventimes higher in these countries compared with theUnited States of America and Europe (figure ES.6).
International financial assistance will therefore
have to be significantly scaled up from existinglevels, and new public and private sources of capital
better distributed towards low-income countries,
restructured through financing mechanisms thatlower costs of capital. These include debt financing,increasing long-term concessional finance,
guarantees and catalytic finance.

National circumstances vary with natural resource
endowments and economic conditions, and will shapeenergy transition pathways. Capacity and institutions
are often weak in low- and middle-income countries,
and they may face different and additional politicalFigure ES.6 Weighted average cost of capital for solar photovoltaic projects against per capita gross national income forselect countries in 2021

Weighted average cost of capital (%)

Gross national income per capita (US$)

70,900XXIVCountry category
Low-income* Excluding lower-middle-income countries

Lower-middle-income

Americas

Upper-middle-income

Europe*

USA

Chile

UruguayArgentina

BrazilMexicoBolivia

EcuadorNicaragua

China

ThailandSri Lanka

Indonesia

India

Pakistan

Mauritius

Asia

Islamic Rep. of Iran

AfricaSouth Africa

Algeria0
Namibia0
Morocco3

Egypt

10,000Tunisia6

Kenya

20,000Ghana

9Senegal30,000Uganda12

Ethiopia

40,000

Rwanda15

Burkina Faso

50,000EuropeHigh-income

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

▶

Low- and middle-income countries can takeownership of their low-carbon development agenda
by laying out national low-carbon development
strategies suited to their national context, including byadopting measures in key energy-intensive demand
sectors, such as housing, transport and food, whichhave known synergies between climate mitigation andhuman development. This will require strengthening
domestic energy and climate institutions to undertake
strategic planning and enhanced coordination
across sectors. Furthermore, strong stakeholder
engagement is needed to ensure just outcomes andeconomic diversification.
The preparation of the next round of NDCs offers an
opportunity for low- and middle-income countries
to develop nationally driven road maps with broad
domestic visions for ambitious development andclimate policies and targets, for which implementation
progress can be measured, finance and technology
needs are clearly specified, and detailed investmentready implementation plans are prepared. With lessthan two years left until the next round of NDCs aredue, COP 28 would be a timely occasion to call forinternational support to prepare such robust andambitious NDCs that integrate development andclimate objectives.

10.

		 Further delay of stringent global GHG
emissions reductions will increase future
reliance on CDR to meet the long-term
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement▶

Immediate and stringent emissions reductions are
required to bridge the emissions gap and maintainthe feasibility of achieving the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement. All least-cost pathways
starting in 2020 consistent with meeting this goal
require immediate and deep emission cuts as well asa growing quantum of CDR over time (figure ES.7).
With the delay in stringent mitigation action, theneed for CDR in the longer term will likely increase
even further.

▶

CDR is necessary to achieve the long-term goal of theParis Agreement as reaching net-zero CO 2 emissions
is required to stabilize global warming, whereas
net-zero GHG emissions will result in a peak anddecline in global warming. Since it is impossible tofully eliminate all CO 2 or other GHG emissions throughstringent emissions reductions, residual emissions
must be balanced by removals from the atmosphere,
i.e. through CDR, to reach net-zero emissions.

Figure ES.7 The role of emissions reductions and CDR in least-cost pathways consistent with the long-term temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement
Emissions reductions starting from 2020 levels (GtCO2e/yr)
2020

2020
gross
emissions60

1.5°C scenario

2°C scenario

60

-2.0

50

60

50

50

55

-18

GtCO2e40

Emission level 2020
55 GtCO2e

40

-27

40

Total emissions
reductions

-1.1
-0.3

Gross emissions
reduction

-39

30

30

20

-2.8
-1.0

20

24

GtCO2e10

Land-based CDR

30

-38

20

-3.6

GtCO2e-5.6

10
GtCO2e0
2020

Transparent area
indicates uncertainty
range

-1.6
-7.1

Net GHG emissions

10

Uncertainty range

7.7

6.8

0

Novel CDR

35

2035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2050)

GtCO2e02035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2070)* Net emissions areabove 0 due toresidual emissionsof other GHGs

XXVEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record▶

CDR is already deployed today – mainly in theform of conventional land-based methods, suchas afforestation, reforestation and managementof existing forests, with a large share located indeveloping countries. Present-day direct removals
through conventional land-based methods are
estimated to be 2.0 (±0.9) GtCO 2 annually, almost
entirely through conventional land-based methods.
Direct removals through novel CDR methods, suchas bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,
biochar, direct air carbon capture and storage, andenhanced weathering, are currently miniscule at
0.002 GtCO 2 annually.

▶

Nonetheless, 1.5°C and 2°C least-cost pathways
assume significant increases in both conventional andnovel CDR over time (figure ES.7). Conventional CDR
grows to up to 6 GtCO 2 annually by 2050 under thesepathways and novel CDR up to 4 GtCO 2 annually by
2050. Conventional land-based CDR plays a stronger
role in the near- and mid-term, while novel CDR plays astronger role later in the century to reach net-negativeemissions, noting that levels depend on the underlying
economic and technological assumptions as wellas the magnitude of temperature drawdown after
achieving net-zero CO 2 emissions.

▶

XXVI

Achievement of the gigaton levels of CDR implied laterin this century by pathways consistent with the Paris
Agreement is uncertain and associated with several
risks. Increased reliance on conventional land-based
CDR is risky due to issues of land competition,

protection of Indigenous and traditional communities’
land tenure and rights, and sustainability, biodiversity
and permanence risks of forest-based CDR, includingfrom forest fires and other disturbances. Novel CDR
methods are generally at an early stage of development
and are associated with different types of risks,
including that the technical, economic and politicalrequirements for large-scale deployment may notmaterialize in time. Furthermore, public acceptanceis still uncertain, particularly for approaches involving
carbon capture and storage, or the open ocean. Theserisks can negatively affect the prospects for scale-up,
despite technical potentials.
▶

To spur innovation and enable scaling up of novel CDR
technologies, these technologies will first need to go
through a formative phase, which will require strong
policy and financial support. Given the time it takes tomature technologies, the next decade will be crucial
for novel CDR methods. Failure to create momentum
in this formative phase will result in a widening
discrepancy between the levels of novel CDR needed
and available by 2050 and beyond.

▶

This points to four important areas for political action:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Setting and signalling CDR priorities
Developing robust measurement, reporting andverification systems to enhance credibility
Harnessing synergies and co-benefits withother efforts
Accelerating innovation.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

1Introduction

Authors:
Anne Olhoff (CONCITO – Denmark’s green think tank, Denmark) and John Christensen ((UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre[UNEP-CCC], Denmark)1.1

Context and framing of the Emissions
Gap Report 2023

The world is witnessing a disturbing acceleration in thenumber, speed and scale of broken climate records: 2023 ison track to become the warmest year on record. At the timeof writing, 86 days have been recorded with temperatures
exceeding 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Not only
was September the hottest month ever, it exceeded theprevious record by an unprecedented 0.5°C, with global
average temperatures at 1.8°C above pre-industrial levels(Copernicus Climate Change Services 2023a; Copernicus
Climate Change Services 2023b). This does not imply
that the world has exceeded the 1.5°C temperature limit
specified in the Paris Agreement, which refers to global
warming levels based on multi-decadal averages. However,it does signal that we are getting closer to that point. Thesetemperature records were accompanied by devastating
extreme events, which the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has warned us are merely a meek
beginning. Every increment of warming results in rapidly
escalating hazards with extensive implications for human
livelihoods and ecosystems (IPCC 2023).
This is the fourteenth Emissions Gap Report by UNEP,
published ahead of the twenty-eighth session of theConference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP 28). COP 28 is special,
as it marks the conclusion of the first global stocktake
under the Paris Agreement. The global stocktakes are held
every five years to assess the global response to the climate
crisis and chart a better way forward. This objective closely
mirrors that of the Emissions Gap Report, which is to provide
an annual, independent science-based assessment of thegap between pledged greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
reductions and the reductions required to align with thelong-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, andopportunities to bridge this gap.
To inform the discussions at COP 28 – including on theoutcomes needed from the global stocktake – and set
the scene for the next round of nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) that countries are requested to submit

in 2025, which will include emissions reduction targets for2035, this report looks at what is required this decade andbeyond 2030 to maintain the possibility of achieving thelong-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.
The IPCC concluded that global emissions levels by 2030
resulting from the implementation of the current NDCs will
make it impossible to limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited
overshoot, and strongly increase the challenge of limiting
warming to 2°C (Pathak et al. 2022). This finding is reiterated
in this report. It highlights that maintaining the possibility ofachieving the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement hinges
on relentlessly strengthening ambition and implementation
this decade, thereby facilitating significantly more ambitious
targets for 2035 in the next round of NDCs and paving theway for operationalizing and implementing the net-zeropledges by countries that currently cover around 80 per centof global emissions.
The report shows that movement on the NDCs has been
negligible since COP 27, and although the ambition of the
NDCs has been strengthened since the adoption of the Paris
Agreement at COP 21 in 2015, it has been insufficient tonarrow the 2030 emissions gap.
Progress since the adoption of the Paris Agreement is more
visible on the policy implementation side. Globally, GHG
emissions in 2030 based on policies in place were projected
to increase by 16 per cent at the time of the adoption of theParis Agreement. Now the projected increase is 3 per cent.
However, the challenge remains immense. In just sevenyears, global GHG emissions must be reduced by 28–42
per cent compared to where they are headed under policies
currently in place, to get to levels consistent with pathways
that limit global warming to well below 2.0°C and 1.5°C
respectively.
Due to the failure to stringently reduce emissions in highincome countries – which bear the greatest responsibility
for past emissions – and to limit emissions growth inlow- and middle-income countries, which account for the
majority of current emissions, unprecedented action is now

1

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

needed by all countries. For high-income countries, this
implies further accelerating domestic emissions reductions,committing to reaching net-zero as soon as possible – andsooner than the global averages from the latest IPCC report
implies – and at the same time providing financial andtechnical support to low- and middle-income countries. For
low- and middle-income countries, this means that pressing
development needs must be met alongside a transition
away from fossil fuels.
Furthermore, the delay in stringent mitigation action
will likely increase future dependence on carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) from the atmosphere. However, availabilityof large-scale CDR opportunities in the future cannot betaken for granted. The second part of the report explores
the opportunities and challenges associated with energy
transformation, and development and deployment of CDR.
The feasibility of the necessary transformation hinges
on reconciling development and climate objectives in all
countries. As has been amply illustrated during the COVID-19
pandemic and the energy crisis, development choices andresponses to economic shocks are inseparable from – andoften determine – climate outcomes. Previous editions of
the Emissions Gap Report have illustrated that well plannedand socially just transformations can bring economic
benefits, create new jobs, advance gender equality, andempower people, communities and societies. All available
evidence confirms the availability of a wide range of mature,efficient and economically attractive options to reduce GHG
emissions. They just need to be deployed, immediately andat unprecedented rates (Pathak et al. 2022; International
Energy Agency 2023; Lee et al. 2023).
Doing so could simultaneously help reverse the concerning
general international setback on the achievement of
the global Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. A
preliminary assessment shows that of the around 140
targets for which data is available, only 12 per cent are on
track, whereas more than half are moderately or severely
off track, and around 30 per cent have either seen no
movement or have regressed below the 2015 baseline(United Nations 2023).

2

1.2

Approach and structure of the report

The Emissions Gap Report is an assessment report. It
provides an evaluation of scientifically and technicallycredible knowledge on emissions trends, progress, gaps andopportunities, based on a synthesis of the latest scientific
literature, models, and data analysis and interpretation,
including that published by the IPCC.
As in previous years, this Emissions Gap Report has been
prepared by an international team of leading experts. This
year, 79 leading scientists from 47 expert institutions
across 22 countries have been engaged in producing thereport. The assessment process has been overseen by aninternational steering committee and has been transparent
and participatory. Geographical diversity and gender balancehas been considered to the extent possible. All chaptershave undergone external review, and the assessment
methodology and preliminary findings were made available
to the Governments of the countries specifically mentioned
in the report, to provide them with the opportunity tocomment on the findings.
The report is organized into seven chapters, including thisintroduction. Chapter 2 assesses the trends in global GHG
emissions. Chapter 3 provides a global update of NDCs andlong-term net-zero emissions pledges, and assesses the
progress of G20 members towards achieving their NDCs
and net-zero emissions pledges. Chapter 4 updates theassessment of the emissions gap by 2030 based on thelatest NDCs, and looks at potential gaps beyond 2030. It
also considers the implications of the emissions gap on
the feasibility of achieving the long-term temperature goalof the Paris Agreement. Chapter 5 frames the second partof the report, laying out global issues related to energy
transformation and CDR. Chapter 6 assesses challenges
and opportunities for accelerating energy transitions inlow- and middle-income countries, while meeting criticaldevelopment needs and priorities. Finally, chapter 7
considers the role, status and scope for CDR in achieving
the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2

Global emissions trends

Lead authors:
William F. Lamb (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Germany; University of Leeds,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and Minal Pathak (Ahmedabad University, India)

Contributing authors:
Lucas Chancel (World Inequality Lab, Paris School of Economics, France), Monica Crippa (European Commission, Joint
Research Centre [JRC], Italy), Giacomo Grassi (European Commission, JRC, Italy), Diego Guizzardi (European Commission,
JRC, Italy), Jing Meng (University College London, United Kingdom), Glen P. Peters (CICERO Center for International Climate
Research, Norway) and Julia Pongratz (Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich, Germany)

2.1

Introduction

This chapter assesses greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
trends up to and including 2022. Starting from global
emissions trends by GHG and sector (section 2.2), it describes
the emissions of the G20 and top emitters (section 2.3)
before covering household and consumption-based
emissions (sections 2.4 and 2.5). In doing so, it sets thestage for subsequent chapters on G20 policies and theemissions gap.1 Importantly, this chapter provides multiple
perspectives on national emissions, including absolute, percapita and historical cumulative emissions. Each of theseperspectives offer insight into inequalities in contributions
to climate change, while highlighting that turning aroundglobal emissions growth now requires ambitious andurgent efforts from all countries to reduce fossil fuel use
and deforestation.
As in previous years, the Emissions Gap Report focuses
on total net GHG emissions across all major groups ofanthropogenic sources and sinks reported under theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). This includes carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions
from fossil fuel and industry (fossil CO 2), CO 2 emissions
and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry(LULUCF CO 2), methane (CH 4) and nitrous oxide (N 2 O)
emissions. It includes fluorinated gas (F-gas) emissions
reported under the UNFCCC, but excludes F-gas emissions
regulated under the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting
substances, which accounted for approximately 1.6 gigatons

1of CO 2 equivalent (GtCO 2 e) in 2021 (Forster et al. 2023).
Non-CO 2 LULUCF emissions are also excluded due to data
limitations.
Following the change in methodology outlined in the
Emissions Gap Report 2022 (United Nations Environment
Programme [UNEP] 2022), the global bookkeeping approachis used to report global estimates of net LULUCF CO 2
emissions and the national inventory approach to reportnational estimates of net LULUCF CO 2 emissions. This
ensures that global estimates are consistent with the
mitigation scenarios presented in chapter 4, as well as the
carbon cycle and climate science literature; while national
estimates are consistent with those reported by countries
to the UNFCCC. As this chapter reports, total net LULUCF
CO 2 emissions differ substantially between these two
approaches, due to known differences in system boundaries
and other assumptions.
Where GHG emissions are aggregated to CO 2 equivalentsin this report, 100-year global warming potentials from thelatest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Working Group (WG) I Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)(Forster et al. 2021) are used. Alternative metrics can beused – for instance, global warming potentials with a
20-year time horizon would highlight the relative importanceof CH 4 on near-term warming – but are not explored here.
Uncertainties in emissions estimates are reported following
the IPCC WGIII AR6 of ±8 per cent for fossil CO 2 , ±70 per centfor LULUCF CO 2 , ±30 per cent for CH 4 and F-gases, and

The African Union became a permanent member of the G20 in September 2023, which was after the assessments for this report had been completed.
Consequently, the African Union is not included in the G20 assessment this year.

3

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record±60 per cent for N 2 O (Dhakal et al. 2022). This chapter follows
a territorial-based accounting of emissions (i.e. emissions
are allocated to the sectors and nations where they occur)
unless otherwise noted. Indirect and consumption-based
perspectives are considered in section 2.5, in particular in
the context of household emissions.
The principal sources in this chapter include the Emissions
Database for Global Atmospheric Research dataset forfossil CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O and F-gas emissions (Crippa et al.
2023); the Global Carbon Budget for global LULUCF CO 2
estimates, taking the average of three bookkeeping models(Friedlingstein et al. 2022); and Grassi et al. (2022; 2023)
for national inventory-based LULUCF CO 2 (with updates tothe latest inventories for the top emitters). The latest yearsof data in these sources should be treated as preliminary –particularly in the case of LULUCF CO 2 and non-CO 2 GHG
emissions – due to the use of provisional methodologies
based on available activity data. Emissions are generally
reported up to 2022. However, due to data limitations, thisis not possible for inventory-based LULUCF CO 2 . Complete
national totals including LULUCF CO 2 are therefore only
given up to 2021. Lamb (2023) contains the code and data
used to produce all emissions estimates in this chapter.

2.2

Global emissions trends

2.2.1 Global emissions increased to record levels in
2022
Global GHG emissions reached a record high of 57.4 GtCO 2 e
in 2022, growing by 1.2 per cent (0.6 GtCO 2 e) from theprevious year (figure 2.1 and table 2.1). This rate is slightly
above the average rate in the decade preceding the
COVID-19 pandemic (2010–2019), when GHG emissions
growth averaged 0.9 per cent per year, but was slower
than the emissions growth of the 1990s (1.2 per cent peryear) and 2000s (2.2 per cent per year). Atmospheric CO 2
concentrations grew to 417.9 ± 0.2 parts per million in 2022
(World Meteorological Organization 2023), and will continue
to grow until annual emissions are reduced sufficiently to
be balanced by removals. In contrast, as shown in chapter 4of this report, global GHG emissions must decline to levels
between 33 and 41 GtCO 2 e by 2030 (chapter 4 and table 4.2)
to get on a least-cost pathway to meeting the temperature
goal of the Paris Agreement.

4

Fossil CO 2 emissions account for approximately two
thirds of current GHG emissions using 100-year global
warming potentials. According to multiple datasets, fossil
CO 2 emissions grew between 0.8–1.5 per cent in 2022 andwere the main contributor to the overall increase in GHG
emissions (Friedlingstein et al. 2022; Energy Institute 2023;
International Energy Agency 2023; Liu et al. 2023). CH 4 , N 2 O
and F-gas emissions account for about one quarter of current
GHG emissions. Although their absolute contribution to theoverall increase in 2022 was lower since they represent amuch smaller share of the total, emissions of these gases
are increasing rapidly: in 2022, F-gas emissions grew by
5.5 per cent, followed by CH 4 at 1.8 per cent and N 2 O at
0.9 per cent.
Global net LULUCF CO 2 emissions – using the global
bookkeeping approach – remained steady in 2022, but
are based on an early projection of land-use activity withrelatively high uncertainties (Friedlingstein et al. 2022).
Updated estimates indicate that net LULUCF CO 2 emissions
slowly declined in the past two decades, with average
emissions of 4.5 gigatons of CO 2 (GtCO 2) per year during
2012–2021, compared with 4.9 GtCO 2 per year during
2002–2011. The primary driver behind the decline is anincrease in removals on forest land (from 3.0 to 3.5 GtCO 2 peryear), including afforestation/reforestation, while emissions
from deforestation remained high (6.8 and 6.7 GtCO 2 peryear for 2002–2011 and 2012–2021, respectively). LULUCF
CO 2 emissions and removals continue to have the largest
uncertainties of all gases considered here, both in terms of
their absolute amounts and trends.
Global bookkeeping and national inventory-based accounts
of LULUCF CO 2 emissions diverged by approximately
6.4 GtCO 2 in 2021 (table 2.1). This is due to known differencesin system boundaries between each approach, in particular
the fact that bookkeeping models consider only “direct”
human-induced fluxes as anthropogenic (e.g. deforestation,afforestation and other land use-related vegetation
changes), whereas national inventories typically also include
most of the “indirect” human-induced fluxes (e.g. enhanced
vegetation growth due to increased atmospheric CO 2) that
occur on managed land (Grassi et al. 2021; UNEP 2022, p. 4).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 2.1 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions, 1990–2022
57.4 GtCO2e
in 2022

Total GHG emissions 1990–2022 (GtCO2e/yr)

50
40

54.5
GtCO2e51.6
GtCO2e60
41.8
GtCO2e37.9
GtCO2e

30
20
10
0

1990

2000
Fossil CO2

CH4

2010
N2O

F-gases

2020
LULUCF CO2

Sources: Crippa et al. (2023) for GHG emissions; Friedlingstein et al. (2022) for bookkeeping LULUCF CO 2 ; Grassi et al. (2023) for
inventory-based LULUCF CO 2 .
Note: GHG emissions include fossil CO 2 , LULUCF CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O and F-gas emissions. Bookkeeping-based net LULUCF CO 2 emissions are
depicted. Non-CO 2 gases are converted to CO 2 equivalents using global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon from the IPCC
AR6 (Forster et al. 2021).

Global primary energy consumption expanded in 2022,
and was mainly met by a growth in coal, oil and renewableelectricity supply (Energy Institute 2023; International Energy
Agency 2023). Gas consumption declined by 3 per cent in
2022 following the war in Ukraine (Energy Institute 2023).
Coal consumption increased, in part driven by switching fromgas to coal, as well as the steady growth of coal-fired power

production in some emerging economies. Net electricity
demand growth in 2022 was primarily met by renewablesources (excluding hydropower), in particular driven by arecord increase in solar capacity additions (Energy Institute2023). Overall, while investments in renewables increased
globally, investments in coal, oil and gas have continued andeven increased in some countries.

Table 2.1 Total global emissions by source
GtCO2e2010–2019 (average)

2020

2021

2022

GHG

54.6 ± 5.55

54.5 ± 5.36

56.8 ± 5.45

57.4 ± 5.48

Fossil CO 2

36.1 ± 2.89

35.9 ± 2.88

38.1 ± 3.05

38.5 ± 3.08

LULUCF CO 2
(global bookkeeping)

4.72 ± 3.3

4.06 ± 2.84

3.94 ± 2.76

3.87 ± 2.71

LULUCF CO 2
(national inventory)*-2.64 ± -1.85-2.49 ± -1.74-2.4 ± -1.68

N/A

CH 4

10.1 ± 3.03

10.4 ± 3.13

10.6 ± 3.18

10.8 ± 3.23

N2O

2.47 ± 1.48

2.57 ± 1.54

2.63 ± 1.58

2.65 ± 1.59

F-gases

1.17 ± 0.351

1.46 ± 0.439

1.54 ± 0.461

1.62 ± 0.486

Note: * Inventory-based LULUCF CO 2 is excluded from total GHG emissions. Non-CO 2 greenhouse gases are converted to CO 2 equivalents
using global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon from the IPCC WGI AR6 (Forster et al. 2021).

5

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2.2.2 Emissions rebounded across most global
sectors following the COVID-19 pandemic
Emissions can be split into five major economic sectors:
energy supply, industry, agriculture and LULUCF, transportand buildings. In 2022, energy supply was the largest
source of emissions at 20.9 GtCO 2 e (36 per cent of thetotal), which is mainly due to combustion emissions in
the power sector (14.8 GtCO 2 e) and emissions from fossil
fuel production including fugitive methane (6.1 GtCO 2 e).
The energy supply sector is the largest contributor to theincrease in emissions over the past decades, largely due
to the worldwide expansion of coal- and gas-fired power
generation (International Energy Agency 2023). However, it
is also one of the only sectors where some countries havemade progress in reducing emissions by switching to lower
emission fuels and by scaling up renewable sources.
Industry is the second largest sector when accounting bydirect emissions (14.4 GtCO 2 e, 25 per cent of the total),followed by agriculture and LULUCF CO 2 (global bookkeeping
approach) (10.3 GtCO 2 e, 18 per cent), transport (8.1 GtCO 2 e,
14 per cent) and buildings (3.8 GtCO 2 e, 6.7 per cent).
However, if power sector emissions are reallocated to final
sectors based on their use of electricity and heat (i.e. indirectemissions, which highlight a demand perspective), then thecontribution of the industry and buildings sectors increasesignificantly (to 34 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively)(Lamb et al. 2021b).
The latest data up to 2022 indicate that most global sectors
have fully rebounded from the drop in 2020 emissions, which
was induced by COVID-19, and now exceed 2019 levels withlittle change in the overall composition of sector emissions(Liu et al. 2023). An exception is aviation emissions, which
remain at 74 per cent of their 2019 peak of 1.0 GtCO 2 e, but
are likely to continue to rebound in 2023 as air passenger
numbers start to reach pre-pandemic levels (International
Air Transport Association 2023).

2.3

Emissions trends of major emitters2.3.1 Emissions of the G20 members increased in
2022 and accounted for three quarters of the
totalPreliminary estimates for 2022 (which exclude LULUCF CO 2
for which data is only available up to 2021) show an increasein GHG emissions compared with 2021 in Indonesia(+10 per cent), India (+5.1 per cent), the United States ofAmerica (+1.6 per cent) and China (+0.3 per cent), and adecrease in the European Union (-0.8 per cent), the RussianFederation (-1 per cent) and Brazil (-2.5 per cent). Internationaltransport emissions rapidly increased (+11.4 per cent), but
remain below pre-pandemic levels. Total emissions of theG20 also increased (+1.2 per cent).

6

The top seven global emitters remain the same as
in 2021: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the European
Union, the Russian Federation and the United States ofAmerica (figure 2.2). Collectively, and with the addition ofinternational transport, these emitters accounted for a totalof 33 GtCO 2 e in 2021, or 65 per cent of global emissions
on a territorial basis, including national inventory-based
LULUCF CO 2 . Combined, the G20 accounted for 76 per centof global emissions. By contrast, least developed countries
accounted for 3.8 per cent of global emissions, while small
island developing States contributed less than 1 per cent.
Generally, global emissions have shifted from high-income tolow- and middle-income countries in the past two decades.
High-income countries, which include eight members of
the G20 (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan,
Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdomof Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Statesof America) contributed 43 per cent of GHG emissions in
2000, but 28 per cent in 2021. Conversely, low- and middleincome countries, which include nine members of theG20 (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, theRussian Federation, South Africa and Türkiye) contributed
53 per cent in 2000 and 69 per cent in 2021.
There is some evidence that the global energy crisis andthe international sanctions following the war in Ukraine
have impacted regional economic activity and emissions,with highly uncertain long-term implications (International
Energy Agency 2022). Direct emissions from military
operations, vehicles and installations are likely nontrivial, but remain insufficiently accounted under UNFCCC
reporting conventions, and there is limited evidence inthe literature on the scope, scale, composition or trend ofthese emissions (Rajaeifar et al. 2022). The energy crisishas driven efforts towards a clean energy transition, withincreased investments in renewables and support forclean energy policies and phasing out fossil fuels in somecountries (Steffen and Patt 2022; Tollefson 2022). At thesame time, some countries have expanded domestic fossil
fuel extraction, citing energy security concerns (United
Kingdom 2022). There is evidence of an increase in energy
prices and a shift in regional energy supplies, particularly
in Europe, which took active measures to decrease fossil
imports from the Russian Federation (Steffen and Patt
2022). Rising costs of energy and products dependent
on fossil fuels could push millions of people globally intopoverty, in addition to the hundreds of millions already living
under hardship (Guan et al. 2023).
Net LULUCF CO 2 emissions, especially from deforestationand land-use change, continue to be concentrated intropical regions, with Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo contributing 58 per cent of the global
total in 2021 – albeit with extremely high uncertainties(Friedlingstein et al. 2022). Countries such as these thathave a higher contribution from LULUCF CO 2 also tend to
experience larger annual fluctuations in GHG emissions due
to policy-induced land-use changes, deforestation, wildfires
on managed land or shifts towards forest protection(figure 2.2).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 2.2 Emissions trends of major emitters
GHG emissions in 2021 and trend since 2000, including inventory-based LULUCF CO2 (GtCO2e)
15

China
USA

12

India
9

EU27
RussianFederation

6

Brazil
LULUCF CO2

Indonesia

3

Fossil CO2, CH4,
N2O, F−gases

Internationaltransport
-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0
2000

2005

2010

2015

2021

Per capita GHG emissions in 2021 and trend since 2000, including inventory-based LULUCF CO2 (tCO2e/capita)
25
USA
RussianFederation

20

China
15

BrazilEU27

10Indonesia
5

World
India
0

4

8

12

16

0
2000

2005

2010

2015

2021

Sources: World Bank (2023) for population; Crippa et al. (2023) for GHG emissions; Grassi et al. (2023) for inventory-based LULUCF CO 2 .
Note: The top panel depicts total GHG emissions in 2021 and their trends since 2000 for the top seven emitters and international transport.
Insufficient LULUCF CO 2 data prevents an update of these trends to 2022 and before 2000. The lower panel depicts per capita GHG
emissions in 2021 for these countries and their trends since 2000. Both include inventory-based net LULUCF CO 2 emissions. Non-CO 2gases are converted to CO 2 equivalents using global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon from the IPCC WGI AR6 (Forster
et al. 2021).

2.4

Some countries have peaked inemissions, meanwhile global per
capita levels remain highly unequal

Per capita territorial-based GHG emissions in the UnitedStates of America and the Russian Federation are over double
the world average of 6.5 tons of CO 2 equivalent (tCO 2 e),while those in India remain under half of it (figure 2.2). The
G20 as a whole averaged 7.9 tCO 2 e, whereas least developed
countries averaged 2.2 tCO 2 e and small island developing
States averaged 4.2 tCO 2 e. In general, per capita GHG

emissions are highly unequally distributed across countries,
with emissions as low as 1.3 tCO 2 e in Nepal and as high as
73 tCO 2 e in Qatar. By comparison, global median estimatesof per capita emissions by 2050 consistent with 2°C and
1.5°C scenarios are 2.2 tCO 2 e and 1.0 tCO 2 e respectively(see chapter 3).
An increasing number of countries have peaked and reduced
absolute emissions for more than 10 years (Le Quéré et al.
2019; Hubacek et al. 2021; Lamb et al. 2021a). As of 2022,
36 countries have now sustained emissions reductions for

7

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

longer than 10 years, in terms of both fossil CO 2 and total
GHG emissions, excluding LULUCF CO 2 . Of these, 22 arecountries in the European Union, while a further eight are
high-income countries: Australia, Israel, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United Statesof America. Six middle-income countries have also reduced
emissions over this time period: Albania, Cuba, Jamaica,
Mexico, North Macedonia and South Africa. Generally, whilethese countries have succeeded in reducing power sector
and industry emissions, success in reducing transport,
buildings and agriculture emissions has so far been limited(Lamb et al. 2021a).

Cumulative emissions between 1850 and 2021 varyacross regions (IPCC 2022). The United States of America
is responsible for the largest share of these emissions,followed by the European Union and China (figure 2.3).
Collectively, the United States of America and the European
Union contributed nearly a third of the total cumulativeemissions from 1850 to 2021. Consequently, emissions
from these countries have also contributed significantly
to warming, including the impact of methane and nitrous
oxide emissions, since industrialization (Jones et al. 2023).
In comparison, least developed countries contributed
4 per cent of historical cumulative fossil and LULUCF CO 2
emissions (figure 2.3).

2.5

The G20 as a whole is responsible for approximately threequarters of warming to date, and an even greater proportionof historical cumulative fossil CO 2 emissions (figure 2.3).
However, the G20 is itself diverse in terms of economic andsocial development stages, including population, level ofurbanization, industrialization and resource endowments.

Contributions to climate change areunequal2.5.1 A minority of countries have contributed the
majority of historical emissions and warming

Figure 2.3 Current and historical contributions to climate change
Current and historic contributions to climate change(% share by countries or regions)

30%
19%

13%
4%
5%

25%

16%

17%

10%
5%
6%
22%

China

4%

United Statesof America

6%

EU27

11%

18%

India

7%

2%

7%

RussianFederation

14%

5%
18%

21%

18%

G20

12%

Rest of world
24%

18%
14%

4%

6%

3%

Historical
CO2 emissions(1850–2021)

Contribution
to warming(1850–2021)

Current GHG
emissions(2021)

Rest of G20

Rest of world

13%

Least developed
countries

Current
population(2021)

Sources: World Bank (2023) for population; Crippa et al. (2023) for current GHG emissions; Friedlingstein et al. (2022) for historic CO 2
emissions; Jones et al. (2023) for historic contributions to warming.

8

Note: This figure contrasts the distribution of global population in 2021 (total = 7.86 billion), GHG emissions in 2021 (total = 51.6 GtCO 2 e),
cumulative CO 2 emissions (total = 2,200 GtCO 2) and historic contributions to warming (total = 1.61°C). Historic contributions to warming
result from cumulative CO 2 emissions, but also estimated CH 4 , N 2 O and F-gas emissions (cooling from aerosols is excluded, leading toa higher estimate of warming than currently observed). Note that due to missing data, these totals are not complete for all categories
and exclude, for example, international transport. Current GHG and cumulative CO 2 emissions include net LULUCF CO 2 emissions (global
bookkeeping approach) to align with historical emissions estimates (note that this leads to differences with section 2.3.1 where national
inventories are used). Non-CO 2 gases are converted to CO 2 equivalents using global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon fromthe IPCC AR6 (Forster et al. 2021).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2.5.2 Wealthy households contribute nearly half ofconsumption-based emissions worldwide
Globally, emissions inequality exists among households
across and within countries, reflecting underlying
inequalities in wealth and income (Bruckner et al. 2022). A
consistent finding in the literature is that households withthe highest income or wealth contribute a disproportionate
amount of emissions worldwide. Emissions of the global
top 10 per cent of individuals (ranked according to income,wealth or emissions) contributed 45 per cent to 49 per centof total global emissions, while the global bottom 50 per centemitted 7 per cent to 13 per cent of the total (Chancel and
Piketty 2015; Kartha et al. 2020; Chancel 2022; Bruckner
et al. 2022;).
Estimates of household-level emissions can include those
associated with the direct consumption of energy forheating, cooling and transportation, as well as the indirectemissions associated with the consumption of goods andservices, or with financial investments (Starr et al. 2023).
There are high emitters in all regions and countries.
However, emissions of the high-income households in Southand Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa appear to besignificantly lower compared to other regions (figure 2.4).
The emissions of the top 1 per cent households in the UnitedStates of America, the Russian Federation and China far
exceed their counterparts from developing countries suchas Brazil, India and Indonesia.
Emissions trends also vary across income groups. For theUnited States of America, Starr et al. (2023) found that the
top 1 per cent consumption-based per capita emissions
increased over the recent period, while they decreased forother groups of the population. Zheng et al. (2023) foundthat emissions of the top 20 per cent declined less rapidly
than that of other groups in most high-income countries. At
the global level, the top 1 per cent contributed to a quarterof the growth in per capita emissions over 1990–2019(Chancel 2022).

These inequalities in consumption-based emissions reflect
income and wealth inequality, and unequal consumption
and savings patterns both within and between countries(Cheng et al. 2021; Duarte, Miranda-Buetas and Sarasa
2021). Drivers of high energy consumption in wealthiercountries include living space (very large homes orsecondary homes), the use of large vehicles such as sportutility vehicles, leisure and work that involve driving and air
travel, and the high consumption of meat, dairy and fast
fashion (Wiedmann et al. 2020; Hickel and Slamersak 2022).
Emissions from investments can also lead to significant
inequalities between high- and low-income households(Starr et al. 2023). Evidence from China shows a positive
relationship between income and wealth inequality, andhigh-consumption lifestyles and emissions (Liu et al.
2019; Mi et al. 2020; Qin et al. 2022). In the United Statesof America, emissions from high-income households are
due to higher energy needs resulting from lifestyle choices
such as preference for larger homes and higher dependence
on private transport (Feng, Hubacek and Song 2021).
Evidence of emissions inequalities between high- and lowincome households has been reported for India, Mexicoand the Philippines (Santillán Vera and de la Vega Navarro
2020; Seriño 2020; Sri and Banerjee 2023). Climate policy
instruments have not always been successful in reducing
emissions-intensive consumption or investments, and inmany cases have increased the burden on low- and middleincome households (Chancel 2022).
Materials and energy are also required to sustain decent
living standards, such as shelter, mobility, nutrition andhealthcare – however, the estimated impact of satisfying
these needs is relatively small (Pachauri 2014; Rao, Min
and Mastrucci 2019; Vélez-Henao and Pauliuk 2023; seealso chapter 5). Achieving targets of the Sustainable
Development Goals including eradicating extreme poverty,
providing clean energy access and providing decent living
standards to these regions are consequently global priorities
alongside deep emissions reductions (chapters 5 and 6).

9

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 2.4 GHG emissions across different groups of households (2019)
Household GHG emissions in 2019, excluding LULUCF (tCO2e/capita)
0

50

100

150

200

USA
RussianFederation
China
World
Europe*BrazilIndonesia
India

0

10

20

Lower
50%

Middle
40%

Next
9%

Top
1%

USA
RussianFederation
China
World
Europe*BrazilIndonesia
India

Source: World Inequality Database (2023).
Note: Emissions include those from domestic direct and indirect consumption, and public and private investments, imports and exports ofcarbon embedded in goods and services traded. In these estimates, emissions associated with the formation of capital (i.e. investments)
are attributed to the owners of capital. This excludes LULUCF CO 2 emissions. Emissions are split equally within households.
* In this table, Europe refers to, and is calculated as the weighted average, of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom.

10Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

3

Nationally determined contributions andlong-term pledges: The global landscapeand G20 member progress

Lead authors:
Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, the Netherlands) and Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, United States of America)

Contributing authors:
Jesse Burton (University of Cape Town and E3G, South Africa), Ioannis Dafnomilis (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, the Netherlands), Ipek Gençsü (Overseas Development Institute [ODI], United Kingdom), Archie Gilmour(ODI, United Kingdom), Mariana Gutiérrez Grados (Climate Transparency, Germany), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Sarah Heck (Climate Analytics, Germany), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Camilla Hyslop (Oxford
University, United Kingdom), Anna Kanduth (Canadian Climate Institute, Canada), Ben King (Rhodium Group, United Statesof America), Hannah Kolus (Rhodium Group, United States of America), Ho-Mi Lee (Korea Energy Economics Institute,
Republic of Korea), Jared Lewis (Climate Resource, Australia), Swithin Lui (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Natasha Lutz
(Oxford University, United Kingdom), Andrew Marquard (University of Cape Town, South Africa), Silke Mooldijk (NewClimate
Institute, Germany), Leonardo Nascimento (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Analuz Presbítero (Iniciativa Climática deMéxico [ICM], Mexico), Jazmín Rocco Predassi (Farn, Argentina), Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London, United Kingdom;International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA], Austria), Clea Schumer (World Resources Institute, United Statesof America), Alister Self (Climate Resource, Australia), Kentaro Tamura (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan)
and Jorge Villarreal (ICM, Mexico)

Data contributors:
Johannes Gütschow (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Christopher Henderson (World Resources
Institute, United States of America), Elena Hooijschuur (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, theNetherlands), Kimon Keramidas (European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Spain), Mia Moisio (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Mika Pflüger (Climate Resource, Germany) and Claire Stockwell (Climate Analytics, Germany)

3.1

Introduction

This chapter provides a global update of greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions reduction pledges for 2030 and beyond,as well as an assessment of G20 members’ implementation
progress. The chapter addresses the following threequestions:1

How have the nationally determined contributions(NDCs) evolved since the twenty-seventh session of
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 27)
and since the Paris Agreement was adopted, andwhat does this imply for global GHG emissions in
2030? (section 3.2)

2

What progress have G20 members made towards
achieving their NDC targets since COP 27, and what
new policies are they implementing? (section 3.3)

3

To what extent have net-zero targets beenstrengthened and moved towards implementation
since COP 27? (section 3.4)

The cut-off date for the literature and data assessed inthis chapter is 25 September 2023. In line with the otherchapters of this report, all GHG emissions numbers are
expressed using the 100-year global warming potentials
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth
Assessment Report (IPCC AR6). For historical emissions,this chapter refers to the national inventory reports
submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), unless otherwise noted. The
methodology and preliminary findings of this chapter weremade available to the Governments of the G20 members
to provide them with the opportunity to comment on
the findings.

11

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

According to the Paris Agreement, its implementation
should “reflect equity and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
in the light of differing national circumstances” (UNFCCC
2015). An assessment of the extent to which countries’
2030 and long-term pledges are ambitious in light of equity,
responsibility, capability and other burden-sharing principles
is beyond this chapter. These are highly contested andnormative issues. However, the chapter showcases thewide variation in per capita emissions implied by current
NDCs and policies. Moreover, it notes that the ambition of
an NDC is one of the factors likely to influence whether acountry is on track to achieving it, as a less ambitious target
for 2030 will be easier to implement than a more ambitious
target. Similarly, a country not currently on track to achieve
its NDCs might nevertheless be taking substantially more
mitigation action than a country that is on track. The chapter
should be read with this context in mind.

3.2

Global progress of NDCs is negligible
since COP 27, but there is some
progress since the adoption of theParis Agreement

3.2.1 A growing number of NDCs contain GHG
reduction targets, and more of these are
economy-wide
The Conference of the Parties (COP) decision that
accompanied the Paris Agreement invited countries tocommunicate new NDCs or to update their current NDCs by
2020, while subsequent COP decisions have asked countries
to revisit and strengthen their targets “as necessary to alignwith the Paris Agreement temperature goal”. The Emissions
Gap Report tracks the number of countries communicating
new or updated NDCs, as well as key characteristics related
to the emissions reduction targets included in these NDCs.
Since COP 27, nine countries have submitted new or updated
NDCs. Of these, four propose to reduce 2030 emissions
further than the country’s prior NDCs (Egypt, Türkiye, theUnited Arab Emirates and Uruguay), two are unclear or notcomparable to the prior NDCs (Kiribati and Turkmenistan),
one does not further reduce emissions (Kazakhstan) and
one is the country’s first NDC (the Holy See) (Climate Watch
2023). These submissions bring the total number of Paris
Agreement parties that have replaced or updated their NDCs
as at 25 September 2023 to 149 (counting the European
Union and its 27 Member States as a single party). The

12

mitigation content of these NDCs has evolved over time, in
several ways (table 3.1).
First, more NDCs now contain GHG reduction targets, andmore of these targets are economy-wide – that is, they covera country’s entire economy as opposed to certain sectors.
The Paris Agreement stipulates that developed countries
should adopt “economy-wide absolute emissions reduction
targets” and encourages developing countries to “moveover time” to economy-wide emissions targets. Now, 148
NDCs contain GHG reduction targets, up from 122 at COP 21
where the Paris Agreement was adopted. Of these targets,
97 are economy-wide, versus 55 in the initial NDCs. The
share of NDCs with targets covering all seven GHGs listed
in the Kyoto Protocol, in contrast, has remained modest at
only 23, up from 20 at COP 21.1
Second, the number of NDCs noting that they may useinternational market mechanisms to achieve their targets
has increased to 121, up from 92 at COP 21. Article 6 of
the Paris Agreement provides that parties may cooperatewith other parties to achieve their targets by trading
emissions credits or offsets. The increase in targets that
may incorporate these mechanisms might reflect greatercertainty regarding the modalities of these mechanisms
since they were clarified at COP 26.
Finally, developing country parties often specify that all orpart of their NDCs are conditional on international finance,technology transfer or other provisions. The number of
NDCs containing elements that are not conditional onsuch measures has increased to 135, compared with 108
at COP 21.

3.2.2 The effect on global emissions of new andupdated NDCs submitted since COP 27 is
negligible, while the aggregate effect of new
and updated NDCs since the Paris Agreement
is more pronounced
If all the latest unconditional NDCs2 are fully implemented,
they are estimated to reduce global GHG emissions in 2030
by about 5.0 gigatons of CO 2 equivalent (GtCO 2 e) (range:
1.6–8.1) annually compared with the initial NDCs (seeappendix B.2 for details on the impacts of various country
contributions). The combined effect of the nine NDCs
submitted since COP 27 amounts to about 0.1 GtCO 2 e ofthis total.3 Thus, while progress since COP 27 is negligible,
progress since the adoption of the Paris Agreement is more
pronounced.

1

There are 136 NDCs that contain targets covering methane.

2

Through 25 September 2023.

3

The data comes from three model groups with updated NDCs, with cut-off dates ranging from November 2022 to September 2023 across studies(Keramidas et al. 2022; den Elzen et al. 2023; Meinshausen et al. 2022; Meinshausen et al. 2023) and two open-source tools (Climate Action Tracker
2023a; Fransen et al. 2022, as updated using Climate Watch 2023).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Table 3.1 Trends in global NDC characteristics since the Paris Agreement
COP 28(2023)

NDC characteristics
Number of NDCs

COP 27(2022)COP 26(2021)COP 21(2015)

Number (percentage of global emissions)That reduce 2030 emissions relative to initial NDCs

81 (79%)79 (79%)65 (63%)

N/A

That contain a GHG reduction target

148 (90%)147 (90%)143 (89%)

122 (85%)

That contain a GHG target covering all sectors (energy,
industry, waste; agriculture, forestry and other land-use
change; or agriculture and land use, land-use change andforestry [LULUCF])

97 (54%)96 (53%)91 (52%)55 (44%)That contain a GHG target covering all GHGs listed in the
Kyoto Protocol (carbon dioxide [CO 2], methane, nitrous oxide,hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride andnitrogen trifluoride)23 (30%)23 (30%)23 (30%)20 (29%)That may be achieved using international market mechanisms

121 (39%)120 (39%)120 (37%)

92 (24%)That contain elements not conditional on international support

135 (82%)

134 (82%)

131 (81%)108 (77%)

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the share of global GHG emissions from countries communicating NDCs with the characteristic
shown in the first column. The last day of each COP is used as the cut-off date for each column, except for COP 28, for which the cut-off
date is 25 September 2023.

3.3

Implementation progress of G20
members continues, but must be
accelerated

This section provides an update on the progress of G20
members towards their latest NDC targets. It assesses
collective and individual progress of G20 members inbridging the implementation gap, defined as the difference
between projected emissions under current policies andprojected emissions under full implementation of the NDCs
(section 3.3.1). This is accompanied by consideration ofrecent major policy developments that are not yet fullyreflected in emissions projection studies (section 3.3.2).
To take stock, box 3.1 concludes on the predecessor of
the NDCs (the Cancun Pledges for 2020) against which the
Emissions Gap Reports (until 2015) assessed the emissions
gap for 2020.

Box 3.1 Did the G20 achieve the Cancun Pledges for 2020?
As part of the 2010 Cancun Agreements, developed
country parties communicated emissions reduction
targets for 2020 and developing country parties
communicated nationally appropriate mitigation
actions, many of which also contained 2020 emissions
targets (UNFCCC 2011). Thirteen of the G20 members
made such pledges (counting the European Union
Members – France, Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom – as a single entity), while three countries(Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye) did not. GHG
inventory data for 2020 are now available for all
Annex I countries and some non-Annex I countries,
making it possible to assess whether these pledges
were achieved.
Collectively, G20 members achieved the Cancun
Pledges (see appendix B.1). Ten G20 members(Australia, Brazil, China, the European Union [including
the United Kingdom], India, Japan, Mexico, South

Africa, the Russian Federation and the United Statesof America) achieved their Cancun Pledges, while two
members (Canada and the Republic of Korea) did notachieve them. Some countries, such as Indonesia,
need to update their national data and information to
enable tracking progress towards their pledges.
However, the achievement of the Cancun Pledges still
resulted in a large emissions gap in 2020. The failure
to bridge the 2020 emissions gap has added further tothe present mitigation challenge and the feasibility ofbridging the 2030 emissions gap.
The assessment is based on a comparison of 2020
GHG emissions with the trajectories associatedwith the achievement of these parties’ pledges (seeappendix B.1 for further detail). Emissions data issourced from official GHG inventories (where available)or from independent data sources (chapter 2).

13

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

3.3.1 Progress of G20 members towards the 2030
NDC targets varies
Collectively, the G20 members are projected to fall shortof their latest NDCs by 1.2 GtCO 2 e (central estimate)annually by 2030. This is 0.6 GtCO 2 e lower than last year’s
assessment. For two G20 members, the projected emissions
under the NDC have, from the time they were submitted,
significantly exceeded current policies projections (theRussian Federation and Türkiye), thereby lowering theimplementation gap compared with what can be reasonably

expected. If NDC projections for these two members aresubstituted by current policies scenario projections, theG20 members would collectively fall short of achieving their
NDCs in 2030 by an annual 1.8 GtCO 2 e in 2030, which is
0.8 GtCO 2 e lower than in last year’s assessment. The impact
of newly implemented policies is the driver of the lower
projections. Other factors include that the scenario dataset
has been updated to reflect the latest emissions trends andsocioeconomic developments and circumstances, and that
there have been methodological updates to scenario models(see box 3.2 and chapter 4).

Box 3.2 Methodology underlying the assessment of G20 member progress
The updated assessment of progress towards 2030
targets is based on a synthesis of emissions projection
studies by independent research groups. The studies
considered in the assessment are mostly publishedbetween 2021 and 2023. A list of the studies aswell as the criteria for their inclusion is available inappendix B.3. In line with previous Emissions Gap
Reports, the assessment follows the methodology
of den Elzen et al. (2019). NDC targets are comparedto emissions projections under a current policies
scenario, which reflects all policies adopted andimplemented up to specific cut-off dates, and which,for the purposes of this report, are defined as legislativedecisions, executive orders or their equivalent. Thisimplies that officially announced plans or strategies
alone would not qualify, while individual executive
orders to implement such plans or strategies would
qualify. It is important to note that some of the mostrecently adopted policies, some of which are presented
in section 3.3.3, may not be considered in the scenario
studies reviewed as they were prepared before theadoption of these policies. Many studies reviewed thisyear reflect the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
both historical and projected emissions. 4

14Additionally, a few studies published in 2022 and 2023
partially reflect the impact of the energy crisis and thewar in Ukraine.
To evaluate the conditionality of NDCs, the categorizationof the World Resources Institute (Climate Watch 2023)
is adopted. According to this categorization, Indonesia
and Mexico have both unconditional and conditional
NDCs, while India and South Africa have only
conditional NDCs (see appendix B.2). The assessment
based on independent studies is compared with official
projections published by national Governments. Manyof the “with existing measures” scenario projectionsin the latest UNFCCC submissions are considered as
current policies scenario projections. Methodologicallimitations of the assessment are similar to thosedescribed in previous Emissions Gap Reports (seeappendix B.4). The assessment is based on “point intime” emissions projections for the NDC target year.5
European Union Member States are not assessedindividually. The assessment is based on emissions
including LULUCF.

4

Earlier studies suggest that the economic rescue and recovery measures would not lead to substantive additional future emission reductions (Hanset al. 2022; Nahm, Miller and Urpelainen 2022).

5

Some countries also set an emissions budget for a multi-year period; an assessment of these targets may lead to different conclusions.

Progress of individual G20 members towards their latest
NDC targets is shown in more detail in table 3.2, organized by
the likelihood of achieving the targets with existing policies.
There are no major changes to the overall assessment of
whether individual G20 members are on track to meet their2030 targets with existing policies, compared with last year’s
assessment. Overall, ten G20 members are assessed to fallshort of achieving their NDC targets with existing policies.

It should be noted that many of these countries havesubmitted stronger NDC targets in 2020 or later, and are in
the midst of their implementation efforts to meet their new
targets. G20 members that are projected to meet their latest
NDC targets based on policies currently in place are thosethat did not strengthen, or only moderately strengthened,
their target levels in their new or updated NDCs.

Table 3.2
Table 3.2 Assessment of progress towards achieving the current NDC targets

Australia

TurkeyRepublicof Korea

UnitedStatesAustralia
BrazilTurkeyCanadaUnitedStatesKingdom

BrazilJapan

Republic
ofFrance
Korea

European Union*
Australia* Indicated by bold font, if overachieved by more than 15%.

MexicoUSA

TurkeyConditional NDC

UK

Saudi Arabia

Target within reachTarget will be missed

South Africa

Republic
European Union* Australiaof Korea

Target will be achieved

RussianFederation

Republic of Korea

Number of studies indicating:TurkeyUnitedStatesJapan

MexicoAustralia

EU27

European
Union*
Indonesia

Mexico1

1

Republic
Brazilof Korea

CanadaEuropeanSaudi
Union*
ArabiaTurkeyTürkiyeMexicoChina

Brazil1
2

UnitedAustralia
CanadaStatesSaudi Arabia

1

1

Republic
RussianMexicoof Korea
Federation

Australia

BrazilFranceTurkey
Saudi
ArabiaAustralia
Argentina

India

UNCERTAIN

Indonesia

UnitedSaudi Arabia
Indonesia
StatesArgentina

RussianRepublicTurkey
RussianEuropeanAustralia
China Union*
BrazilCanadaUnited
India
Federation
Kingdomof Korea
Federation

LESS LIKELY
to meet the target
with existing policies

China

RussianFederation

CanadaAustralia
Italy

RussianSaudi
UnitedSouth
AfricaIndonesia
Argentina
Japan
Germany
FranceMexicoIndiaChina Brazil ItalyUnited
TurkeyArabiaJapan
CanadaKingdom
Federation
StatesUnitedRussian
UnitedArgentina
Republic
China
IndiaArabia
South
AfricaUnion*
Japan
China
Italy
Germany
Indonesia UnitedJapan
CanadaEuropeanArgentina
Australia
MexicoFranceBrazilKingdomSaudi
Federation
Kingdomof KoreaStatesUnitedRussian
China
RepublicUnited
UnitedIndonesia
Argentina
India
Saudi
ArabiaIndonesia
FranceJapan
Italy
BrazilChina
MexicoFranceEuropean
Union*
CanadaTurkeyKingdom
Federation
Kingdomof KoreaStatesRussian
UnitedRussian
UnitedArabia
Indonesia
South Africa
Republic
China
MexicoFranceGermany Argentina
CanadaSaudi
Indonesia
CanadaEuropean
Union*Japan
TurkeyFranceBrazil
Federation
Kingdom
Federation Australia
ofStates
Korea
Russian India
Republic
Russian
UnitedSaudiCanada
ArabiaAfrica
SouthIndonesia
China
European
Union*UnitedFrance
Saudi Arabia
Italy
BrazilGermanySouth
AfricaMexicoBrazilGermany
CanadaAustralia
Federation
Kingdom FederationofTurkey
Korea
StatesRussian
UnitedUnitedSaudi Arabia
Republic
Argentina
MexicoIndia Indonesia Italy
BrazilJapan
MexicoFrance
India
CanadaTurkeyEuropean
Saudi
ArabiaUnion*
Brazil Italy
Australia
Federation
StatesStatesof Korea
UnitedRussian
UnitedRepublic
Republic
MexicoChina
UnitedArgentina
ArabiaEuropean Union*
South AfricaSaudi
European
Union*
Argentina
Japan
Canada Brazil
Australia
MexicoGermanyJapan
TurkeyKingdom Federation
Statesof Koreaof KoreaStatesRepublicFrance
UnitedUnitedEuropean Union*
Indonesia
Republic
ChinaSaudi
MexicoArabiaIndiaTurkey
China
BrazilUnitedTurkey
Union*
Australia
of Korea
Kingdom Italy EuropeanStatesKingdomof Korea
RussianRepublic Indonesia
UnitedIndonesia
European
Union*
MexicoTurkeyArgentina
CanadaAustralia
FranceJapan
Australia
FranceTurkeyGermany
Federationof KoreaSouth Africa
StatesLIKELY
to meet the target
with existing policies*

Argentina
Italy

Russian
UnitedArgentina
MexicoSouth
AfricaGermany
Japan IndiaFrance
Indonesia
ChinaUnited
Germany
Italy
CanadaStates Kingdom
Federation
UnitedRepublic
RussianIndia EuropeanSaudi
China
Germany
India
Union*
ItalyArabia
ArgentinaCanadaSouth
AfricaIndonesia
Italy
BrazilGermanyJapan
FranceKingdomof Korea
Federation

1

European Union*

MexicoSaudi Arabia

India

Note: All NDCs considered in this assessment are unconditional NDCs, unless otherwise mentioned. The assessment is based on
independent studies mainly published in 2021 or later. See appendix B.3 for the list of studies reviewed. The number of independent studies
that project a country to meet its current NDC targets are compared with the total number of studies. The assessment is based on the
middle of the projection range for each independent study. “Within reach” is applied when the lower bound estimate of a current policies
scenario projection is within the NDC target range, even though the assessment based on the middle of the projection range suggeststhat the country will not achieve its target. In the case of Indonesia, “uncertain” is mainly due to the variations in LULUCF emissions anduncertainty of LULUCF emissions projections as a result of peat fires.

South Africa

South Africa

Germany

Assessment of progress towards the latest NDC target

India Brazil
Saudi Arabia
ItalyAfrica United
Indonesia
ChinaSouth
Argentina
FranceJapan
Kingdom

Kingdom

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

1Current policies scenario projections from official publications were also examined. The official publications for five G20 members(Australia, Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) show that they do not yet project to meettheir “point in time” NDC target under their current policies scenarios (European Environment Agency 2023; European Commission,
Directorate-General for Energy, Directorate-General for Climate Action, Directorate-Generate for Mobility and Transport 2021; UNFCCC
2023a). For the Russian Federation, official projections of the fourth biennial report indicate that the country would achieve its NDC
with existing policies.

2

Both independent studies and official projections do not account for the impact of some recently adopted policies, most notably the
REPowerEU plan.

However, for most G20 members, central estimates ofprojected emissions in 2030 under current policies arelower than in last year’s assessment. Based on the scenario

modelling, the largest reductions (8–14 per cent) are
observed for Australia, the European Union, Japan, Mexico,
the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. Figure 3.1

15

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

illustrates the collective and individual implementation gapsof the G20 members and shows them relative to emissions
levels in 2015, the year the Paris Agreement was adopted.
The figure illustrates a wide variation in implementation
gaps as well as projected emissions in 2030 relative to 2015
levels. The aggregate emissions of the G20 members in 2030
under current policies are projected at 36.1 GtCO 2 e (central

estimate), which is slightly above 2015 levels. The impact
of newly implemented policies is a main driver of the lower
emissions projections for 2030 for G20 members. Other
factors include an updated scenario dataset reflecting thelatest emission trends, and socioeconomic developments
and circumstances.

Figure 3.1 Implementation gaps between current policies and NDC pledges for the G20 members collectively and individuallyby 2030, relative to 2015 emissions
GHG emissions (relative to 2015 = 100%)
200%

Current
policies
scenario

Unconditional
NDC scenario

Conditional
NDC scenario

Uncertainty
range

150%

Emission
level
2015

100%

50%

Implementation gap in %

11%

19%

4%

United Kingdom

United Statesof America

G20

11%

South Africa

Türkiye6%

Saudi Arabia

Russian Federation

8%

India

18%

9%

EU27

Republic of Korea

2%

China

Mexico27%

Canada15%

9%BrazilJapan

14%

Australia

Indonesia

11%

Argentina

0%

No implementation gap

Note: The 2015 emissions are based on national inventory data and provided in table B.2 of appendix B.2. For the G20 total, the bar for
unconditional NDCs also includes the conditional NDCs of India and South Africa. The error bars show the uncertainty range across studies,
which reflects model variations as well as interpretation of policies and targets.

Per capita emissions are highly unequal across G20
members, and far from levels consistent with the Paris
Agreement

16

To supplement the findings presented above andcomplement chapter 2, table 3.3 presents per capita GHG
emissions in 2015 and projections for 2030 under current

11

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

NDC targets and current policies scenario.6 There are only
small changes compared with last year. The average percapita emissions in 2030 of G20 members under the latest
NDCs are projected to be only marginally lower (6.8 tonsof CO 2 equivalent [tCO 2 e]) than under the current policies
scenario (7.1 tCO 2 e). They are still very far from the medianestimates implied by 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios by 2050,
which are 2.2 tCO 2 e (fifth and ninety-fifth percentile range:
1.4–2.8) and 1.0 tCO 2 e (0.1–1.6), respectively.7
Echoing the findings of chapter 2, table 3.3 shows thatper capita emissions range widely across G20 members.

Australia, the European Union, the United Kingdom and theUnited States of America are projected to reduce their per
capita emissions by more than one-third between 2015 and2030 under current policies, and by between 40 per centand 50 per cent under unconditional NDCs. For five G20
members (China, India, Mexico, the Russian Federation andTürkiye), per capita emissions are projected to increase
between 2015 and 2030 under both current unconditional
NDC targets and current policies. Furthermore, per capita
emissions are projected to stay above 10 tCO 2 e in 2030 for
several G20 members, both under current policies and underfull implementation of the unconditional NDCs.

Table 3.3 G20 member per capita emissions implied by current policies and unconditional NDCs
Unconditional NDC: Per capita GHG emissions 1

Current policies scenario: Per capita GHG
emissions 1

tCO2e/cap in 2030 2, 3

vs. 2015 levels

tCO2e/cap in 2030 2, 3

vs. 2015 levels

G20 4

6.8

-10%

7.1

-6%

Argentina

7.5

-16%

8.4

-5%

Australia

12.7

-44%

14.7

-35%

Brazil

6.1

-23%

6.7

-15%

Canada

10.5

-49%

14.5

-30%

China

10.0

+19%

10.2

+21%

EU27

4.6

-42%

5.0

-37%

Country

India

2.8

+40%

3.1

+52%

Indonesia

6.9

-28%

6.5

-32%

Japan

6.5

-35%

7.6

-23%

Mexico

5.8

+25%

4.8

+3%

Republic of Korea

8.7

-32%

10.6

-18%

Russian Federation 15.8

+54%

12.4

+21%

Saudi Arabia

16.1

-16%

17.2

-11%

6.0

-35%

6.8

-27%

Türkiye

7.9

+55%

6.7

+31%

United Kingdom

4.0

-49%

4.5

-43%

United States ofAmerica

9.4

-50%

11.7

-38%

4

South Africa

4Notes: The figures presented here may not exactly match those presented in other chapters of this report (including figure 2.2) and official
estimates by the national Governments, due to the differences in data sources.
1

Emissions estimates include LULUCF.

2

Central estimates are the median value when five or more studies were available, otherwise they are average values.

3

Data on historical and projected (medium fertility variant) population per country are taken from the United Nations World Population
Prospects 2022 (United Nations 2022).

4

To estimate G20 total emissions for the NDC pledges scenario, emissions projections under the current policies scenario were used
for India, the Russian Federation and Türkiye.

6

Note that the 2015 estimates are not identical to those of chapter 2, due to the differences in data sources and the consideration of LULUCF emissions.

7

Estimated based on the IPCC AR6 scenario database (Byers et al. 2022; Riahi et al. 2022) and United Nations population projections, medium fertility
variant (United Nations 2022).

17

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

3.3.3 Recently adopted policies in G20 economies
shows mixed progress

2030 emissions range presented in section 3.3.2 is therefore
similar to that of the 2022 assessment.

The projections in section 3.3.2 do not include all themost recent policy updates, as some of these are not yet
reflected in the underlying models. Therefore, this section
provides recent policy updates (mid-2022 to mid-2023) of
the G20 members.

Fit for 55 and REPowerEU – European Union: In the last 12
months, the European Union significantly advanced several
policy packages to achieve its 2030 emissions reduction
target and accelerate the European Union transition awayfrom fossil fuels (European Commission 2021; European
Commission 2022). These include the expansion of thecurrent European Union Emissions Trading System, updates
to regulation on emissions from transport and buildings,
improvements in the renewables and energy efficiency
targets and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which
will ensure that carbon-intensive imports are subject toa carbon price equivalent to that of products from within
the European Union, and at the same time a gradualphase-out of free allocations to those industries within theEuropean Union Emissions Trading System. Still, increased
investments in fossil gas infrastructure and a temporary
shift from gas to coal pose a threat to the European Union’s
climate ambition. Many elements of the Fit for 55 package
and REPowerEU plan have now been adopted. The emission
scenario studies reviewed in section 3.3.1 show a range
of interpretation (or lack thereof) on the implementation
status of these policies. The elements adopted in the last
12 months result in roughly 0.5 GtCO 2 e lower emissions in
2030. If all packages are adopted, the European Union could
overachieve its 2030 target (Climate Action Tracker 2023c).

Responding to the climate emergency requires rapid
policy implementation in all countries with discernible
progress each year. However, this chapter finds that recent
developments in national policies has been mixed withsome steps forward, while some imply a standstill or evendeterioration.
3.3.3.1

Some recent policies of G20 members could havesubstantial effects on GHG emissions in 2030

This section provides examples of recently adopted policies
in the G20 member states that are quantified or analysed
to have positive or negative effects in reducing global
or national implementation gaps in recent studies. It is
acknowledged that these policies cover only a fraction ofG20 policy developments, and that other policies may still
result in substantial emissions reductions or support theimplementation of more stringent policies.
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) – United States of America:
The United States of America’s federal Government has
advanced several important regulations implementing the
IRA, which was passed in August 2022. These regulations
propose or finalize requirements for claiming electric power
generation, clean vehicles and home energy tax credits(United States of America, Internal Revenue Service 2023);
provide funding to reduce methane emissions (United Statesof America, Environmental Protection Agency 2023); andimplement new lease sales and royalty rates for oil and gas
leasing on public lands and in public waters (United Statesof America, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management 2023; United States of America, Departmentof the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 2023),
among others. More and more analyses confirm that theact will bring the United States of America roughly two
thirds of the way to meet its NDC targets for 2030, with
reductions of up to 1 GtCO 2 e over a scenario without thatpolicy (Bistline et al. 2023). While a big step forward, the IRA
also received criticism as it, for example, allows for more oiland gas exploration, potentially increasing emissions, but
not overcompensating reductions elsewhere. The name of
the IRA suggests that it is more an economic policy than aclimate policy. It has significant knock-on effects on othercountries, as many industries are considering whether toplace their production lines in the United States of America
or abroad. The potential impact of the IRA on 2030 emissions
has been considered in all national-level scenarios reviewed
in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Emissions Gap Report since the 2022 edition; the projected

18

Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) – Indonesia:
In November 2022, a JETP to support limiting Indonesia’s
power sector emissions was agreed between the Indonesian
Government and an international partner group. It securesapproximately US$20 billion to support investments in gridand transmission, early coal power retirement, accelerated
uptake of dispatchable and variable renewables, as well as
supply chain build-out for renewable energy technologies.
It also helps to mitigate adverse effects on communities.
It reinforces the commitment established in a presidential
regulation to stop the addition of new coal-fired power
plants to the electricity grid (Indonesia 2022). However, thepresidential regulation still allows for off-grid power plants
where the electricity is directly used by industry to be built,
which results in increasing emissions up to 2030. The deal
stipulates that Indonesia caps its power sector emissions to
290 megatons of CO 2 equivalent (MtCO 2 e) in 2030 (Edianto2023). Estimates indicate that the emissions cap constitutes
a reduction of emissions in the order of up to 100 MtCO 2 e
in 2030 over current policies (International Energy Agency
2022; Edianto 2023). This alone may be small on a global
scale, but if the concept of JETP proves successful, it canlead to similar agreements in other countries.
Emissions Reduction Plan – Canada: Many recent
developments in Canada advance the implementation of its
Emissions Reduction Plan, which is the federal Government’s
first comprehensive roadmap for how to achieve the 2030
target (Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record2022). The federal Government’s Clean Fuel Regulations
were finalized in June 2022 and came into effect in July 2023
(Canada 2022). The regulations require all fuel importers
or producers to gradually reduce the life-cycle emissions
intensity of their fuels. Beginning in 2023, the federal
carbon price rose from CA$50/tCO 2 e to CA$65/tCO 2 e, andis scheduled to increase linearly to CA$170/tCO 2 e in 2030.
Additionally, the 2023 budget made significant investments
to expand clean electricity and accelerate low-carbon
growth. The federal budget contained over CA$40 billion
in new or reallocated funds for emissions-reducing actions
by 2034/2035, including a number of new investment tax
credits for carbon capture, utilization and storage, clean
electricity, clean hydrogen, clean technology and clean
technology manufacturing. While some of the tax credits
are not yet in force, once legislated, many of the credits will
be retroactively available to businesses. The implementationof legislated and developing policies in Canada results inemissions at approximately 520 MtCO 2 e in 2030, bringing
Canada more than halfway through meeting its 2030 target(Sawyer et al. 2022) and roughly 100 MtCO 2 e lower than lastyear without the policies (Climate Action Tracker 2022a).
Fossil fuel expansion in the G20: Although many policies
constitute progress in the past year, an opposite trend offossil fuel infrastructure expansion is at odds with global
climate goals. Over the past year, many countries increased
their plans for fossil fuel extraction and production. Several
major G20 economies, such as Australia, Canada, theUnited Kingdom and the United States of America issued
new licences for oil and gas explorations, and Argentina
pursued expansion (NewClimate Institute and Climate
Analytics 2023; International Energy Agency 2023). In
addition, rather than declining, fossil fuel subsidies haveincreased significantly. The International Monetary Fund
reports that explicit subsidies more than doubled globallyfrom 2020 to 2022 (Black et al. 2023). The United Statesof America is now the largest fossil fuel producer in theworld, with oil production doubling and gas production
increasing by around 60 per cent since 2010 (United Statesof America, Energy Information Administration 2023). The
recent increase in fossil fuel production and exports of theG20 members result in domestic emissions and undermine
global GHG emission reductions. This year’s edition of the
Production Gap Report (Stockholm Environment Instituteet al. 2023) shows that globally, Governments still plan toproduce more than double the amount of fossil fuels in
2030 than would be consistent with the collective goalsof the Paris Agreement. G20 Governments account for the
majority of current fossil fuel production (73 per cent on anenergy basis [International Energy Agency 2023]).
3.3.3.2

The effect of other selected policy developments
cannot yet be quantified

Several other policies have been adopted by G20 members,
but in many cases their impacts remain unclear. Some of the
key policy developments since the last edition of the UNEP
Emissions Gap Report are described below.

Argentina: In December 2022, Argentina published its
new National Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation
Plan (Argentina, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable
Development 2022). This strategy includes targets forthe decarbonization of the transport sector, incentives toincrease energy efficiency in buildings, and measures toreduce food loss and waste. It also includes agroecologicalpractices measures, which affect one of Argentina’s biggest
productive sectors. The plan, however, does not include any
new renewable energy targets, nor does it include a plan toreduce absolute emissions from livestock, one of Argentina’s
major emissions sources. Additionally, the plan proposesmeasures related to oil and gas expansion (focusing
on the Vaca Muerta shale fields), as well as hydrogenproduction without clarifying if the hydrogen is produced
from electricity (Argentina, Ministry of Environment andSustainable Development 2022).
China: Policy developments in China go both ways. On
one hand, the Government is rapidly implementing its
double strategy of overarching carbon peaking before
2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060 goals, and has
issued supporting sectoral peaking plans. The Central
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission ofChina announced in 2023 the transition of the economy
from targeting energy consumption and intensity reduction
to limiting carbon (intensity and reduction) – a clear sign ofsupport for clean energy (Xinhua 2023). Non-fossil energy
capacity has surpassed 50 per cent of all installed capacity,reaching a 2025 milestone target early, and was forecasted
to grow in 2023 by another 180 gigawatts (GW) off theback of a strong year for solar and wind (China Electricity
Council 2023; Xinhuanet 2023). On the other hand, energy
security concerns are leading to the continued expansion
and overcapacity of the coal-fired power fleet: 243 GW ofcoal-fired power plants are currently either permitted or inconstruction (Global Energy Monitor et al. 2023). Energy
demand has increased in 2023, with domestic production
and consumption of coal, gas and oil up compared to lastyear (China, National Energy Administration 2023).
Japan: A new law that proposes a carbon levy, an emissions
trading scheme and issuance of new government bonds
was adopted in June 2023 (Japan 2021). However, its
impact on emissions remains unclear due to lack ofclarity on the level of carbon pricing. The Government will
mobilize JP¥20 trillion through the issuance of the Green
Transformation (GX) Economy Transition Bonds (Japan,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2023). The Basic
Hydrogen Strategy was also revised and now sets newhydrogen supply targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050, and an
investment plan of US$107.5 billion over the next 15 years(Japan, Cabinet Secretariat 2023).
Mexico: In February 2023, Mexico announced a renewables
energies plan – the Sonora Plan – aiming at deploying
renewable energy as well as low-carbon investments in thenorth of the country (Conan 2023). The Sonora Plan is a
step in the right direction to accelerate the energy transition,

19

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

but is the only new renewable energy project announced bythis administration. In May 2023, the Energy Regulatory
Commission revised the criteria to calculate clean energy.
The Commission states that a portion (30 per cent) of theelectricity generation from combined cycle power plants
using fossil gas could be legally considered as “clean”
energy. Clean Energy Certificates could also be granted tofossil fuel-based power plants (Mexico, Secretariat of theGovernment 2023). This regulation has been provisionallysuspended, and further legal processes are expected toaddress environmental concerns. The Government has
also updated the new light vehicle fleet’s fuel efficiency
standard (NOM-163), but captured only half of the potential.
The adopted standard lowers emissions by 9 MtCO 2 by2030 (Jiménez and Pineda 2022), while a more ambitious
standard could have achieved up to 19.5 MtCO 2 by 2030
(Iniciativa Climática de México 2022).
Republic of Korea: In April 2023, the Government of the
Republic of Korea released its National Basic Plan for Carbon
Neutrality and Green Growth (the Basic Plan) (Republic ofKorea, Climate Change Strategy Division 2023). The newplan reaffirmed the Republic of Korea’s commitment tocarbon neutrality by 2050 and a 40 per cent reduction of GHG
emissions below 2018 levels by 2030. The plan introduces
12 measures to realize carbon neutrality, including making
the most of domestically available low-carbon energy
sources and transitioning to low-carbon industry structure
and circular economy. In line with the tenor of the Basic
Plan, several sectoral targets in the national 2030 scenario
were revised (for power generation and industry, among
others). Among the major changes are an increased role ofnuclear energy in power generation mix and expanded useof overseas carbon offset programmes.
South Africa: In response to the supply pressure facing thestate-owned utility Eskom, South Africa opened the electricity
market in 2022, enabling generation at large-scale for ownuse or sale to others. The pipeline of new privately developed
generation is significant, especially considering new windand solar. A total of 33 GW of variable renewable energy andbatteries either has approval or is in the process of applying
for environmental licencing (i.e. is relatively advanced).
Overall, there are 66 GW of new wind, solar, battery andgas projects under development, albeit at varying stagesof project development and certainty, up to 2028 (Eskom,South African Photovoltaic Industry Association and South
African Wind Energy Association 2023). This constitutes
a major projected increase compared to the 6 GW ofrenewable installed capacity operational in 2022. The uptake
is driven largely by supply insecurity and declining costs –exemplified in recent auctions where the average cost of theportfolio, across technologies, was approximately US$0.026
per kilowatt-hour, similar to Eskom’s coal plant fuel costs(Independent Power Producers Office 2023). South Africa’s
Just Energy Transition Investment Plan, which supports

20

8South Africa’s transition away from coal and towards
clean energy with US$8.5 billion, is the first of its kind andif successful, can lead the way to similar partnerships. But
its success depends on the partners spelling out the exact
detail of what they are offering and how the local political
dynamics can be overcome.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Government madea U-turn on climate policies in September 2023 andannounced the country is to delay in phasing out new petroland diesel cars, to delay in phasing out gas boilers andto eliminate the requirement for landlords to improve theenergy efficiency of their homes, among other measures.
This undermines progress made, for example, on emissions
standards for cars and in heavy industry. As a response, theUnited Kingdom’s Climate Change Committee (the national
scientific oversight body) remains “concerned about thelikelihood of achieving the United Kingdom’s future targets,
especially the substantial policy gap to the United Kingdom’s
2030 goal” (Dooks 2023).

3.4

Developments in long-term andnet-zero pledges: The number
continues to increase, but confidence
in their implementation remains low

3.4.1 The number of net-zero targets has inched
upwards
As at 25 September 2023, 97 parties representing 101
countries and covering approximately 82 per cent of global
GHG emissions had adopted net-zero pledges either in law(27 parties), in a policy document such as an NDC or a longterm strategy (54 parties), or in an announcement by a highlevel government official (16 parties). 8 This is up from 88
parties as at last year’s report. An additional nine parties
covering an additional 2 per cent of global GHG emissions
have another (non-net zero) GHG mitigation target as partof their long-term strategy. A total of 37 per cent of global
GHG emissions are covered by net-zero targets for 2050 or
earlier, while 44 per cent of global emissions are covered by
net-zero pledges for years later than 2050.
Net-zero targets vary in their scope, with some applying to
all GHGs and sectors of the economy and others applying toa subset of sectors and gases. A total of 69 net-zero targets
cover all sectors, while the remainder do not specify sectoral
coverage. A total of 48 cover all gases, 11 cover fewer than all
gases and 38 do not specify. The vast majority of countries
with net-zero targets fail to specify whether their targets
cover international shipping and aviation, and whether they
permit the use of international offsets.
Likewise, few net-zero strategies yet clarify the role of
CO 2 removal in achieving their net-zero targets, with only

These figures do not count parties where net-zero pledges are under discussion but do not yet take one of the forms listed above.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

six countries having set separate goals for emissions andremovals. These countries are Australia, Colombia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, and together account for lessthan 3 per cent of global emissions. Long-term strategies,
likewise, contain limited detail on the role of CO 2 removal
in counterbalancing residual emissions (Buck et al. 2023;
Lebling, Schumer and Riedl 2023).

3.4.2 Overall, confidence in the implementation of
G20 members’ net-zero pledges remains low
Responsible for three quarters of current global emissions,G20 members will have an outsized impact on when global
emissions reach net zero. Encouragingly, all G20 members
except Mexico have set net-zero targets, and since the 2022
Emissions Gap Report, some members have taken important
steps towards strengthening and implementing their targets.
Argentina and India, for example, communicated long-term
low-emissions development strategies, formalizing theirpreviously announced targets.
Overall, however, limited progress has been made on
key indicators of confidence in net-zero implementation,
including legal status, the existence and quality of
implementation plans, and alignment of near-term emission
trajectories with net-zero targets (Rogelj et al. 2023). Nine
G20 members have legally binding net-zero targets – thesame as last year. Implementation planning has seen further
progress, with 10 G20 members now having published an
implementation plan, counting new or more detailed plansfrom the Republic of Korea and Türkiye. A majority of theseplans, however, still lack concrete details and milestones toguide implementation at a granular level. Most concerningly,
no G20 members are currently reducing emissions at a paceconsistent with net-zero scenarios in the published literature.
Reflecting the principle of common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities, some countries
will need more time than others to align their emissions
trajectories with their net-zero targets. Most countries’
long-term strategies and other net-zero plans do notrobustly justify their targets in light of fairness and equity.
The Paris Agreement recognizes that peaking emissions– a prerequisite to aligning emissions trajectories with net
zero – will take longer for developing countries. For thosecountries that have peaked emissions, it will be necessary
to accelerate reductions to match net-zero trajectories. For
those countries that have not yet peaked emissions, it willbe especially important to develop clear plans to peak andthen align emissions with net-zero trajectories.
Table 3.4 presents a meta-analysis of key characteristics of
G20 members’ net-zero targets, based on three independent
trackers (Climate Action Tracker 2022b; Climate Watch
2023; Net Zero Tracker 2023). The indicators and criteria bywhich they are assessed are as follows:9▶

Source: Refers to whether the net-zero target isestablished in law, in a policy document (including
an NDC or a long-term strategy), or via a politicalannouncement or pledge, such as those made at the2020 Climate Ambition Summit.

▶

Target year: Refers to the year by which the source
indicates net-zero emissions will be achieved.

▶

Covers all sectors and gases: Receives green
checkmark if the source specifies that the target
applies to all economic sectors (as opposed to, forexample, the energy sector only) as well as all Kyoto
greenhouse gases.

▶

Transparent information on carbon removal:
Receives green checkmark if the source contains
transparent assumptions for both domestic LULUCF
and domestic removals and storage; receives
yellow checkmark if source contains information
on domestic LULUCF, removals and storage, but
assumptions are not transparent.

▶

Published plan: Receives green checkmark if source
meets all Climate Action Tracker and Net Zero Tracker
criteria for information on anticipated pathway ormeasures for achieving net-zero target, and a yellow
checkmark if source meets some, but not all, criteria.9▶

Review process: Receives a green checkmark if
source establishes a legally binding process toreview progress against the target at regular intervals;
receives a yellow checkmark if the process is notlegally binding, is still being established, or lacks detailor tracking of progress.

▶

Annual reporting: Receives a green checkmark
if source establishes a process to report at least
annually on progress towards the target.

All indicators receive an “X” if the criteria for either a green
or yellow checkmark are not met, a question mark where no
information is available, an “inconclusive” if the data sources
reach differing conclusions regarding the indicator and a “nodata” if none of the data sources track the indicator for theG20 member. The European Union is evaluated according
to its long-term strategy, while individual European Union
Member States are evaluated according to the laws, policies
and plans specific to the respective States. Further detailon the methods underlying each indicator can be found at
Climate Action Tracker, Climate Watch and Net Zero Tracker.
A number of overall conclusions can be drawn fromthis chapter. While G20 members are making collective
progress towards achieving the NDC targets with policy

The yellow category is new for this year’s report. According to the 2022 coding criteria, the yellow checkmarks would have been green.

21

Union*

exico

rabia

UnitedRussian IndiaSaudi South
RussianArabiaEuropean
Union*
ChinaSaudi
Argentina
Indonesia
AfricaChina
IndiaSouth
IndonesiaBrazil
Africa ItalyCanada
ArgentinaUnited
JapanArabia Republic Brazil
FranceGermanyFrance
Italy
CanadaGermanyJapan
Kingdomof Korea
Federation Kingdom Federation

Lower- and upper-middle-income G20 members

Russian
UnitedUnitedRussianRepublic
UnitedRepublic
UnitedSaudi
ArabiaIndia
MexicoChina
Indonesia
Argentina
European
Union*
Saudi
Arabia Union*
Indonesia
India
MexicoTurkey
Argentina
Australia
European
China
Italy
CanadaFranceJapan
Italy Brazil
JapanFrance
CanadaFederation
Kingdom States
StatesFederationof Korea
Kingdomof Korea

law

Italy

policyJapan

law

Republic of Korea

law

Saudi Arabia

United Kingdom

law

United Statesof America

policylaw

2060

South Africa

policy2050

TürkiyepolicypolicyBrazilpolicyChina

policyIndia

policyIndonesia

policyMexicono net-zerotarget2053

MexicoArgentina

RepublicUnited Brazil
UnitedTurkey
Republic
Saudi Arabia
European
Union*
MexicoMexico European
Australia
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Coversall sectors
and gases

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Australia

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implementation, there is wide variation and the speedof progress needs to be accelerated. Few countries have
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report from the technical dialogue of the global stocktake
process (UNFCCC 2023b) to put forward more ambitious

Australia

2050

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Kingdom

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

NDCs for 2030. As the next chapter shows, this results ina large emissions gap in 2030. Relentlessly strengthening
implementation is key to go beyond the existing 2030 targets,
open the way for more ambitious targets for both 2030 and
2035, and ultimately achieve long-term net-zero goals.

Table
Table3.4
3.4Key characteristics of G20 members’ net-zero targets

Sources: Climate Action Tracker 2022b, Climate Watch 2023; Net Zero Tracker 2023.

Transparent
information
on carbon
removal2045?

Published
plan

?

?

inconclusive?

Partially fulﬁlled

Review
process

Not fulﬁlled

Annualreportinginconclusiveinconclusive
not evaluatedinconclusiveinconclusive

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

No information

2

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

4

The emissions gap in 2030 and beyond

Lead authors:
Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London, United Kingdom; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA], Austria),
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands) and Joana Portugal-Pereira(Graduate School of Engineering, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Contributing authors:
Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, United States of America), Jarmo Kikstra (Imperial College London, United
Kingdom), Robin Lamboll (Imperial College London, United Kingdom), Malte Meinshausen (University of Melbourne,
Australia) and Isabela Tagomori (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands)

Data contributors:
Ioannis Dafnomilis (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, the Netherlands) and Kimon Keramidas (European
Commission, Joint Research Centre, Spain)

4.1

Introduction

This chapter provides an updated assessment of theemissions gap, which is the difference between theestimated global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting
from the full implementation of the latest country pledges,
and those under least-cost pathways aligned with theParis Agreement’s long-term temperature goal to limit
the global average temperature increase to well below
2°C, while pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C comparedwith pre-industrial levels. Put simply, the emissions gap
represents the discrepancy between pledged GHG emission
reductions and the reductions required to align with the Paris
Agreement. This chapter also assesses the discrepancy
between pledged GHG emission reductions and those
associated with current policies or a continuation thereof.
This is referred to as the implementation gap.
This year’s assessment is particularly relevant as 2023
marks the conclusion of the first global stocktake. To informthe stocktake and the next round of nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) to be put forward by 2025 (whichshould include emission reduction targets for 2035), thisupdate addresses the following questions:▶

▶

What is the emissions gap in 2030 under the latest
NDCs and various policy assumptions?
What are the implications for the emissions gap in
2035 and for the global level of ambition required in
the next round of NDCs?

▶

What are the implications of delayed stringent
mitigation action for the emissions gap and global
warming over the century?

The scenarios that form the basis for assessing theemissions gap are described in section 4.2, with a summaryof the implications of delayed mitigation action provided
in section 4.3. The assessment of the emissions gap in
2030 and beyond is presented in section 4.4, while section
4.5 assesses the implications for global temperature
projections.

4.2

A set of scenarios is needed toassess the emissions gap and global
temperature outcomes

The emissions gap assessment draws on a set of scenarios(table 4.1) that are updated in this section. These scenarios
are organized into four categories: a current policies
reference scenario, NDC scenarios, mid-century scenariosand least-cost mitigation scenarios starting in 2020 andaligned with specific temperature limits. These scenarios
form the basis for estimating the emissions gap in 2030 andthe global temperature outcomes in section 4.5.
It is worth noting that emissions projections, especiallybeyond 2030, rely on the assumptions and choices ofmodelling teams in how to interpret scenarios in thelonger term.

23

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Table 4.1 Summary of scenarios selected for the emissions gap assessment
Category

Referencescenario

Scenario cases Cut-off year

Scenario description

Current
policies

2022

This scenario projects the GHG implications of climate mitigation
policies that have been adopted and implemented as at November
2022, including the short-term and midterm socioeconomic
impacts of COVID-19. Where necessary, these implications havebeen adjusted to account for the impact of recent policies, suchas the Inflation Reduction Act of the United States of America.

2023

This scenario projects the GHG implications of the full
implementation of the most recent NDCs that do not depend on
explicit external support (cut-off date: 25 September 2023). Whenextended beyond 2030, the scenario assumes a continuation ofefforts at a similar level of ambition.

Conditional
NDCs

2023

Additional to the unconditional NDCs, this scenario encompasses
the most recent NDC targets for which implementation iscontingent on receiving international support, such as finance,technology transfer and/or capacity-building (cut-off date:November 2022). When extended beyond 2030, it assumes acontinuation of efforts at a similar level of ambition.

Current
policies
continuing2022This scenario projects GHG implications per the current policies
scenario and assumes mitigation policies continue similar
reduction efforts when extended beyond 2030 (see appendix C.1).

2022

This scenario assumes an extension of the unconditional NDC
scenario plus net-zero pledges (including those made in long-term
low emissions development strategies) after 2030 that live up tostrict criteria regarding the comprehensiveness of implementationplans and current emission trajectories (see also appendix C.1).

Conditional
NDCs plus
all net-zeropledges

2022

This is the most optimistic scenario included. It assumes theachievement of the conditional NDC scenario until 2030 and all
net-zero or other long-term low emissions development strategy
pledges thereafter.

Below 2°C

N/A

A least-cost pathway starting from 2020 and consistent withkeeping global warming below 2°C throughout the twenty-first
century with at least a 66 per cent chance.

Below 1.8°C

N/A

A least-cost pathway starting from 2020 and consistent withkeeping global warming below 1.8°C throughout the twenty-first
century with at least a 66 per cent chance.

N/A

A least-cost pathway starting from 2020 and ensuring that global
warming is kept below 1.5°C with at least a 33 per cent chancethroughout the entire century and is brought below 1.5°C with atleast a 50 per cent chance by 2100. This pathway reaches net-zero
GHG emissions in the second half of the century.

Unconditional
NDCs
NDC scenarios

Mid-century
scenarios

Mitigation
scenarios
consistent
with limiting
globalwarming to
specific levels

Unconditional
NDCs plus
net-zeropledges using
strict criteria

Below 1.5°C

Note: Details are available in the subsequent sections and in table C.1 in appendix C.

4.2.1 The current policies scenario is a reference
scenario
The current policies scenario projects global GHG emissions
based on the assumption that currently adopted andimplemented policies (defined as legislative decisions,executive orders or equivalent) are achieved but with

24

no further measures undertaken since 2022. Typically,
selected policies are based on literature research, input
from the Climate Policy Database (NewClimate Institute2023) and country expert reviews of the policies identified,and are then implemented in global models following adetailed protocol, which is continuously updated and builds
on the work of Roelfsema et al. (2020; 2022). The data forEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

this scenario are based on the four modelling estimatesthat underpin the current policies assessment of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group
III Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC WGIII AR6) (Lecocq et al.
2022), and have been updated by the respective researchteams. These data updates use a policy cut-off date ofNovember 2022 and apply the most recent AR6 global
warming potentials over 100 years (Riahi et al. 2021; Climate
Action Tracker 2022; den Elzen et al. 2022; Keramidas
et al. 2022; Nascimento et al. 2022; den Elzen et al. 2023;
Schmidt Tagomori, Hooijschuur and Muyasyaroh 2023; van
Ruijven et al. 2023). The scenario considers the effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of recent policies,
such as the expected emission reductions from the Inflation
Reduction Act introduced in the United States of America.
The scenarios do not include the impact of the energy
crisis and the war in Ukraine on energy flows and related
emission levels. The resulting median estimate of global
GHG emissions in 2030 and 2035 under current policies is
56 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO 2 e) (range:
52–60 GtCO 2 e) and 57 GtCO 2 e (range: 46–61 GtCO 2 e),
respectively (see table C.4 in appendix C). The median 2030
estimate is about 1.5 GtCO 2 e lower than the median estimateof the Emissions Gap Report 2022, which is due to multiple
factors, including updated polices first and foremost, butalso latest emission trends, socioeconomic projections
and methodological updates. In line with the findings on
the emission trends of G20 members (see chapter 3), thecurrent policies projections have shown a flattening trend
since 2019, and are now significantly lower than those at
the time of the Paris Agreement’s adoption (United Nations
Environment Programme [UNEP] 2015), which indicated that
2030 emissions would increase by 16 per cent.

4.2.2 NDC scenarios project emissions based on
the full achievement of NDCs
The NDC scenarios project global GHG emissions basedon the full achievement of the latest unconditional andconditional NDCS submitted by Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
estimates are derived using an approach similar to thatused in Lecocq et al. (2022) and reflect the latest updates
available as at November 2022. The scenarios are basedon findings from four modelling exercises: Climate Action
Tracker (2022), Keramidas et al. (2022), den Elzen et al.
(2023) and Meinshausen et al. (2023). The unconditionaland conditional NDC scenario estimates result in median
global GHG emissions in 2030 of 55 GtCO 2 e (range:
54–57 GtCO 2 e) and 52 GtCO 2 e (range: 50–55 GtCO 2 e),
respectively (see table 4.3; further information is provided
in appendix C). The ranges mainly stem from uncertainty insocioeconomic baselines and current policies projections,as well as uncertainty from the conditionality or range of
NDC targets (den Elzen et al. 2023). The projected emissions
in 2030 assuming the full achievement of NDCs are similar
to the median estimates of the Emissions Gap Report 2022
(UNEP 2022).

4.2.3 Mid-century scenarios are subject to muchlarger uncertainty
The mid-century scenarios describe how GHG emission
trajectories might evolve in the longer term. Since GHG
projections to mid-century are subject to much larger policy
uncertainty than projections to 2030, three scenarios arepresented to reflect the range of possible outcomes. The
least ambitious mid-century scenario involves a simple
extension of current policies continuing at the current levelof climate policy effort after 2030. The most optimistic
scenario assumes the full achievement of all conditional
NDCs and all net-zero pledges, including those made aspart of long-term low emissions development strategies
and announced by 25 September 2023. Finally, a scenariothat uses the unconditional NDC scenario as a base andalso includes net-zero pledges that fulfil strict criteria
on operationalization and implementation progress is
considered.
The assessment of progress towards net-zero pledges isbased on a set of criteria as defined in Rogelj et al. (2023):(i) whether the long-term target is legally binding; (ii) whether
a credible policy plan has been published supporting its
implementation; and (iii) whether short-term emissions
under current policies are on a downward path over the next
decade (at least 10 per cent below 2019 levels) (for further
information, see appendix C). Only net-zero pledges thatlive up to the second and third criteria on credible policy
plans and downward emission trajectories are consideredin the scenario based on unconditional NDCs plus net-zeropledges that comply with strict criteria. Relatively few
net-zero pledges fulfil these two criteria, with those madeby New Zealand, the United States of America and theEuropean Union among the few that do (see table 3.4
in chapter 3). Currently, more than 80 per cent of global
emissions are not covered by long-term pledges that fulfil
these criteria (see table C.4 in appendix C). It is important
to note that compliance with the strict operationalizationand implementation criteria does not necessarily meanthat the net-zero pledges will be achieved. As chapter 3(section 3.4) illustrates, all countries need to enhance theoperationalization and implementation of their net-zeropledges to increase their credibility and feasibility. Similarly,
it should be noted that non-compliance with these criteria
does not imply that net-zero pledges cannot be achievedor that progress is not being made. Rather, it reflects thatsome countries are further along with operationalizing andimplementing their net-zero pledges than others.
Emissions projections for all mid-century scenarios areprovided in appendix C (table C.5), including a comparison
with the ranges from the corresponding four individualmodelling studies used for the current policies and NDC
scenarios (Climate Action Tracker 2022; Keramidas
et al. 2022; Dafnomilis den Elzen and van Vuuren 2023; van
Ruijven et al. 2023).

25

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

4.2.4 Mitigation scenarios that keep warming below
specified temperature limits
This category of scenarios reflects least-cost mitigation
pathways starting in 2020 for different global warming
outcomes relative to pre-industrial levels over the courseof this century. Consistent with previous Emissions Gap
Reports, three scenarios have been chosen to represent
warming limits relevant in the context of the Paris
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal, 2°C, 1.8°C and
1.5°C, noting that these limits are not intended to offer a
specific interpretation of the goal. The GHG emissions of
the scenarios were drawn from the IPCC WGIII AR6 scenario
database (Byers et al. 2022; Riahi et al. 2022) and grouped
according to characteristics as described in table 4.1. Theircorresponding temperature projections are based on IPCCWGI AR6 (Nicholls et al. 2021; Kikstra et al. 2022; Smith 2023)
and are consistent with recent updates to the remaining
carbon budget (Forster et al. 2023). Table 4.2 provides
an overview of the scenarios’ emissions and temperature
characteristics. The no or limited overshoot pathways in the
1.5°C category have at least a 33 per cent chance of keeping
warming below 1.5°C over the course of the entire century,
and at least a 50 per cent chance of doing so by 2100.1 In
many cases, median warming under these scenarios will
temporarily reach and exceed 1.5°C of global warming aspart of projected temperature developments (figure 4.1). As
figure 4.2 shows, pathways in the 1.5°C category achieve netnegative GHG emissions in the second half of the century
through the use of carbon dioxide removal (see chapter 7).

Figure 4.1 Global GHG emissions and corresponding median temperature projections of 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios
GHG emissions (GtCO2e/yr)
60
50
40

2.0°C median30

2.0°C 20th-80th
percentile range

20

1.5°C median10

1.5°C 20th-80th
percentile range

0

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100

Global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels (°C)

+2.0 °C

2.00

2.0°C median
2.0°C, 20th-80th
percentile
range

1.75

+1.5 °C

1.50

1.5°C median
1.5°C, 20th-80th
percentile
range

1.25
1.00
0.75

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100

Notes: The ranges show the twentieth to eightieth percentile range across each category’s scenarios. GHG emissions are aggregated using
AR6 global warming potentials over 100 years. The thick lines in each range represent the category median.

1

26

The global warming characteristics for the 1.5°C pathways are chosen to be consistent with category C1a from the IPCC AR6 Working Group 3
assessment. The 2022 edition of the Emissions Gap Report also applied a 33 per cent of limiting warming to 1.5°C over the entire century, but a
66 per cent chance of limiting warming below 1.5°C in 2100. Until mid-century, this change results in no or little difference in projected emission levels,as these are constrained by the minimum 33 per cent chance limit. Achieving a higher chance in 2100 relies on realizing net-negative emissions in thesecond half of the century through the use of carbon dioxide removal (see chapter 7).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Table 4.2 Global GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and global warming characteristics of least-cost pathways startingin 2020 consistent with specific temperature limits
Least-cost
pathwaysconsistent
with limiting
globalwarmingto specificlevelsBelow 2°C
(66% chancethroughout
the century)
Below 1.8°C(66% chancethroughout
the century)
Below 1.5°C(50% chancein 2100 andminimum
33% chancethroughout
the century)

Global total GHG emissions(GtCO2e)Numberofscenarios

195

In 203041(37–46)

In 203536(31–39)Estimated temperature outcomes

In 2050

50% chance

66% chance

90% chance

Peak:
20
(16–24)

1.7–1.8°CPeak:
1.8–1.9°C

Peak:
2.2–2.4°C

1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

In 2100:
2–2.4°CPeak:
1.5–1.7°C

Peak:
1.6–1.8°C

Peak:
1.9°C–2.2°C

In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C

In 2100:
1.4–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.8–2.2°C

Peak:
1.5–1.6°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
1.9–2.1°C

In 2100:
1.1–1-3°C

In 2100:
1.2–1.5°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.9°C

139

35(28–41)27(21–31)12(8–16)

50

33(26–34)25(20–27)8(5–13)In 2100:

Closest IPCC
WGIII AR6
scenario class

C3a

N/A

C1a

* Values represent the median and twentieth to eightieth percentile range across scenarios. The likelihood levels refer to peak warmingat any time during the twenty-first century for the below 1.8°C and below 2°C scenarios. When achieving net-negative carbon dioxide(CO 2) emissions in the second half of the century, global warming can be further reduced from these peak warming characteristics, as
illustrated by the ‘Estimated temperature outcomes’ columns. For the below 1.5°C scenario, the likelihood applies to the global warming
level in 2100, while the ‘no or limited overshoot’ characteristic is captured by ensuring that the lowest likelihood of warming being limited
to 1.5°C throughout the twenty-first century is never less than 33 per cent. This definition is similar to the C1a category definition of IPCC
WGIII AR6. The Emissions Gap Report analysis uses scenarios that assume immediate action from 2020 onward.

Note: GHG emissions in this table have been aggregated using IPCC AR6 global warming potentials over 100 years.
Source: Based on underlying data from Byers et al. (2022) and Riahi et al. (2022).

4.3

Pathways matter for the carbon
budget, the interpretation of emissions
gaps and the chance of achieving theParis Agreement’s temperature goal

Global warming is almost linearly proportional to thetotal net amount of CO 2 that has ever been emitted into
the atmosphere from human activities. Limiting global
warming to a specified level therefore requires the total
amount of CO 2 emissions ever emitted to be kept within
a finite carbon budget (Canadell et al. 2021). Until global
CO 2 emissions reach net-zero levels, the carbon budget
will continue to be depleted with each passing year. IPCC
AR6 reported remaining carbon budgets of 500 GtCO 2 fora 50 per cent chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C
from 2020 onward, and 1,150 GtCO 2 for a 67 per cent chanceof limiting warming to 2°C (Canadell et al. 2021). A recent
update that considers further warming until 2022 shows areduction of these budgets to 250 GtCO 2 from 2023 onward
for a 50 per cent chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C and

950 GtCO 2 for a 67 per cent chance of limiting warming to
below 2°C.
These values can be compared with the cumulative CO 2
emissions implied by the current policies and NDC scenarios.
Under current policies, the carbon budget for a 50 per centchance of limiting warming to 1.5°C is expected to clearly be
exceeded by 2030. Even the budget for a 66 per cent chanceof limiting warming to 2°C is expected to be reduced by morethan a third by 2030, leaving very little room for warming to
be kept well below 2°C if emissions continue at current rates.
This highlights the importance of the pathways followed toreach net-zero CO 2 emissions. As figure 4.1 and table 4.1
show, the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways assume stringent emission
reductions from 2020, which current trends contradict,resulting in implications for the achievability of significant
reductions by 2030. Emissions are now higher than in
2020, which implies a commitment to slightly higher global
warming than the least-cost pathways indicate, unless27

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

there is further acceleration of emission reductions after
emissions levels consistent with the least-cost pathways are
met. The emissions gap estimates are therefore likely to be alower bound as they do not account for the excess emissions
since 2020 compared with the least-cost pathways.
The emissions gap estimates in section 4.4 should beread with this caveat in mind, while section 4.5 shows that
following a delayed path compared with 1.5°C and 2°C
pathways is associated with higher warming and a lower
likelihood of achieving the Paris Agreement’s long-term
temperature goal.

4.4

The emissions gap in 2030 and 2035
must be bridged through action in thisdecadeThis section provides an updated assessment of theemissions gap in 2030 based on the scenarios described in
section 4.2, findings on the global level of ambition neededin the next round of NDCs (which will contain targets for2035) and implications for emissions by 2050.
Action in this decade will not only determine the ambition
required in the next round of NDCs, but also the feasibility ofachieving the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal.
Unless current NDC targets are over-complied with globally,
it will become impossible to limit warming to 1.5°C with noor limited overshoot, and strongly increase the challengeof limiting warming to well below 2°C. Furthermore, thefeasibility and credibility of net-zero emission pledges must
be enhanced.

4.4.1 The emissions gap in 2030 remains
significant
The emissions gap for 2030 is defined as the difference
between the estimated total global GHG emissions resulting
from the full implementation of NDCs and the total global
GHG emissions from least-cost scenarios that keep global
warming to 2°C, 1.8°C or 1.5°C, with varying levels of2

28

likelihood. As noted in section 4.3, this is an underestimate
as it does not account for excess emissions since 2020
compared with the least-cost pathways.
Figure 4.2 shows the emissions gap in 2030, with table 4.3
providing further information. Current NDCs remain highly
insufficient to bridge the emissions gap in 2030. Full
implementation of unconditional and conditional NDCs for2030 reduces expected emissions in 2030 under current
policies by only 2 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively,
whereas 28 per cent and 42 per cent is needed for 2°C or
1.5°C, respectively (table 4.2 and table 4.3). These estimates
are two percentage points lower than the 2022 assessment,
illustrating the progress in narrowing the implementationgap (defined as the difference between projected emissions
under current policies and projected emissions under thefull implementation of NDCs) (chapter 3). This difference
is now around 1.5 GtCO 2 e for unconditional NDCs (downfrom 3 GtCO 2 e in the 2022 assessment) and 5 GtCO 2 e
for conditional NDCs (down from 6 GtCO 2 e in the 2022
assessment) in 2030. 2 Nonetheless, unprecedented annual
emission cuts are required from now to 2030 to achieve thereductions required.
Full implementation of the latest unconditional NDCs isestimated to result in an 1.5°C emissions gap of 22 GtCO 2 e(range: 21–24 GtCO 2 e) with at least a 66 per cent chance(table 4.3 and figure 4.2). If conditional NDCs are also fully
implemented, the 1.5°C emissions gap reduces to 19 GtCO 2 e(range: 17–23 GtCO 2 e). The emissions gap for the below
2°C pathways is about 14 GtCO 2 e (range: 13–16 GtCO 2 e),assuming the full implementation of unconditional NDCs. If
conditional NDCs are also fully implemented, the below 2°C
emissions gap reduces to 11 GtCO 2 e (range: 9–15 GtCO 2 e).
These figures remain largely unchanged compared withthe 2022 assessment, with some small differences due
to rounding.
In conclusion, immediate and unprecedented mitigation
action is needed in this decade to reduce total global GHG
emissions compared with levels implied by the current NDCs,
and to ultimately narrow the emissions gap.

These estimates are based on original, unrounded scenario figures and therefore differ from those that can be derived from table 4.3.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 4.2 GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 and 2035 (median estimate and tenth
to ninetieth percentile range)
GtCO2e60

Current policies scenario
Unconditional NDC scenario
Conditional
NDC scenario

40

30Median estimate of level consistent
with 2°C: 41 GtCO2e (range: 37–46)

1.8°C
range

Green area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 1.5°C witha 50% chance by 2100 andminimum 33% chance overthe course of the century

GtCO2e

GtCO2eUnconditional NDC case

2°C
range

22

19
Conditional NDC caseBlue area shows pathways
limiting global temperature
increase to below 2°C with
about 66% chance

Remaining
gap to staywithin 2°C
limit

Unconditional NDC case

GtCO2e

GtCO2eConditional NDC case

11

50

14

Median estimate of level consistent
with 1.5°C: 33 GtCO2e (range: 26–34)

1.5°C
range

20
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Table 4.3 Global total GHG emissions in 2030, 2035 and 2050, and estimated gaps under different scenarios

Scenario

GHG emissions(GtCO2e)

Estimated gap to least-cost pathways consistent withlimiting global warming to specific levels (GtCO2e)Median and range

Below 2°C

Below 1.8°C

Below 1.5°C

Current policies

56 (52–60)

16 (11–19)

22 (17–25)

24 (19–27)

Unconditional NDCs

55 (54–57)

14 (13–16)

20 (19–22)

22 (21–24)

Conditional NDCs

52 (50–55)

11 (9–15)

17 (15–20)

19 (17–23)

2030

2035
Current policies continued

56 (45–64)

20 (9–28)

29 (18–37)

31 (20–39)

Unconditional NDCs continued

54 (47–60)

18 (11–25)

27 (20–34)

29 (22–36)

Conditional NDCs continued

51 (43–58)

15 (8–22)

24 (17–31)

26 (19–33)

Current policies continued

55 (24–72)

35 (4–52)

43 (12–60)

46 (16–63)

Unconditional NDCs and net-zero pledges
using strict criteria

44 (26–58)

24 (6–38)

32 (14–46)

36 (18–49)

Conditional NDCs and all net-zero pledges

21 (6–33)

1 (-14–13)

9 (-6–21)

12 (-2–25)

2050

Notes: The GHG emission ranges for 2035 and 2050 show the minimum–maximum range across different projection-model assumptions,
including 2030 current policy/NDC assessment uncertainty (see appendix C). The gap figures and ranges are calculated based on theoriginal figures (without rounding), which may differ from the rounded figures in the table. Figures are rounded to full GtCO 2 e. GHG
emissions have been aggregated using IPCC AR6 global warming potentials over 100 years.

29

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

4.4.2 Action in this decade will determine theambition required in the next round of NDCs
and the emissions gap for 2035
The first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement, which
will conclude at the twenty-eighth session of the Conferenceof the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 28), is envisaged to
inform the next round of NDCs (with targets for 2035) thatcountries are requested to submit by 2025. Although there
are no pledges for 2035 yet to enable an estimation of theemissions gap for 2035, it is possible to provide information
about the global level of ambition that will be required in thenext round of NDCs.
Overall, global ambition in the next round of NDCs must be
sufficient to bring global GHG emissions in 2035 to levels
consistent with the below 2°C and 1.5°C pathways. Theseare 36 GtCO 2 e (range: 31–39 GtCO 2 e) and 25 GtCO 2 e (range:
20–27 GtCO 2 e), respectively (table 4.2).
In contrast, a continuation of current policies and current NDC
scenarios would result in widened and likely unbridgeable
gaps in 2035 (table 4.3). A continuation of current policies
is projected to result in global GHG emissions of 56 GtCO 2 e
in 2035, which is 36 per cent and 55 per cent higher thanthe levels consistent with below 2°C and 1.5°C pathways,
respectively, even without compensating for excess
emissions.
Again, these findings imply that immediate andunprecedented mitigation action in this decade is essential.
Overcompliance of NDC targets for 2030 is not only
necessary to maintain the possibility of limiting global
warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, it will alsoenable countries to put forward more ambitious mitigation
targets for 2035 in their next NDCs and will make theachievement of such ambitious targets more feasible.

4.4.3 Looking beyond 2035 reinforces thesefindings and points to the essential needto enhance the credibility and feasibility of
net-zero pledges
The mid-century scenarios allow for an exploration ofdevelopments later in this century (table 4.1 and table 4.3).
Considering these scenarios strengthens the findings ofthe previous sections that action in this decade is critical,
and also highlights the crucial importance of increasing thesteps and policies that make the achievement of net-zeropledges more likely.
Total global GHG emissions in 2050 will only be broughtcloser to 1.5°C and 2°C pathways if conditional NDCs are
fully implemented and combined with the achievement of
all net-zero pledges. Again, this does not account for excess
emissions under this scenario compared with the 1.5°C and30

32°C pathways. Furthermore, and as table 4.3 illustrates, theuncertainties around GHG emissions and gap estimates arevast the further into the future projections are made.

4.5

The emissions gap has severe
implications for global warming
projections

The global failure to bridge the emissions gap to datehas various consequences. This section provides theconsequences for annual average global GHG emission
reduction rates until 2030 consistent with limiting warming
to 1.5°C or 2°C, and the global warming implications under
the scenarios considered in this chapter.

4.5.1 Unprecedented annual emission cuts are
required from now to 2030
The consequences of the continued delay in stringent
emission reductions are evident when examining the past
decade of Emissions Gap Reports. As highlighted in the
Emissions Gap Report 2019 (UNEP 2019) the underlying datafrom the reports reveal that had serious climate action been
initiated in 2010, the annual emission reductions necessary
to achieve emission levels consistent with the below 2°C and
1.5°C scenarios by 2030 would have been only 0.7 per centand 3.3 per cent on average, respectively (Höhne et al. 2020).
The lack of stringent emission reductions means that therequired emission cuts from now to 2030 have increased
significantly. To reach emission levels consistent with abelow 2°C pathway in 2030, the cuts required per year are
now 5.3 per cent from 2024, reaching 8.7 per cent per year
on average for the 1.5°C pathway. To compare, the fall in
total global GHG emissions from 2019 to 2020 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic was 4.7 per cent (UNEP 2022).

4.5.2 Temperature implications depend strongly on
scenarios
Temperature implications of the emissions gap are
estimated by projecting emissions over the twenty-first
century and assessing their global warming implications
with the Finite Amplitude Impulse Response (FaIR) reducedcomplexity climate model, which is calibrated to the IPCC
AR6 assessment (Nicholls et al. 2021; Kikstra et al. 2022;
Smith 2023; see also section C.1 in appendix C). Projections
until the end of the century are inherently uncertain andsubject to scenario assumptions, such as the level atwhich climate action continues or technology costs. These
uncertainties are reflected in the large ranges around thecentral warming projections indicated in table 4.4.
A continuation of the level of mitigation effort implied by
global warming under the current policies scenario isprojected to limit global warming to 3°C (range: 1.9–3.8°C) 3

The range captures uncertainty in the near-term (2030) assessment of current policies, as well as the uncertainty in the continuation of policies overthe course of the twenty-first century.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

with a 66 per cent chance (table 4.4). A continuation of theunconditional NDC scenario lowers this estimate to 2.9°C(range: 2.0–3.7°C), whereas the additional achievement

and continuation of conditional NDCs lowers this by around
0.4°C to 2.5°C (range: 1.9–3.6°C).

Table 4.4 Global warming projections under the scenarios assessed
Peak warming throughout the twenty-first century (°C)
Scenario

50% chance

66% chance

90% chance

Current policies continuing

2.7°C (range: 1.8–3.5)

3.0°C (range: 1.9–3.8)

3.5°C (range: 2.3–4.5)

Unconditional NDCs continuing

2.6°C (range: 1.8–3.4)

2.9°C (range: 2.0–3.7)

3.4°C (range: 2.3–4.4)

Conditional NDCs continuing

2.3°C (range: 1.7–3.3)

2.5°C (range: 1.9–3.6)

3.0°C (range: 2.2–4.2)

Unconditional NDCs and net-zero pledges
using strict criteria

2.5°C (range: 1.8–3.2)

2.7°C (range: 1.9–3.5)

3.2°C (range: 2.3–4.1)

Conditional NDCs and all net-zero pledges(most optimistic case)

1.8°C (range: 1.6–2.3)

2.0°C (range: 1.8–2.5)

2.4°C (range: 2.0–3.0)

2°C

3°C

Likelihood of limiting warming to below a specific warming limit (%)
Scenario

1.5°C

Current policies continuing

0% (range: 0–16)

4% (range: 0–73)

68% (range: 16–99)

Unconditional NDCs continuing

0% (range: 0–12)

6% (range: 0–69)

75% (range: 24–99)

Conditional NDCs continuing

0% (range: 0–20)

19% (range: 0–78)

90% (range: 30–100)

Unconditional NDCs and net-zero pledges
using strict criteria

0% (range: 0–16)

11% (range: 0–74)

83% (range: 42–99)

Conditional NDCs and all net-zero pledges(most optimistic case)

14% (range: 1–27)

69% (range: 22–85)

99% (range: 89–100)

Notes: The range between brackets reflects the scenario uncertainty, taking into account the range of emission estimates for 2030 and thevariations in their extensions (see section C.1 in appendix C). The Emissions Gap Report typically presents temperature projections with a
66 per cent chance. Other likelihoods are included for completeness. Values for 2100 are given in table C.6 in appendix C.

Under the scenario where unconditional NDCs are combinedwith the net-zero pledges that currently comply with strict
criteria on implementation progress, global warming isestimated to be limited to 2.7°C (range: 1.9–3.5°C) with a
66 per cent chance over the course of this century.
In the most optimistic scenario, where conditional NDCs
and all net-zero pledges (including those specified in longterm low emissions development strategies) are assumed
to be achieved, global warming is projected to be limited to
2°C (range: 1.8–2.5°C) with a 66 per cent chance over thecourse of this century. However, as chapter 3 shows, theachievement of net-zero pledges remains highly uncertain.

Values for other likelihoods and for 2100 are provided intable 4.4 and table C.6 in appendix C. Central temperature
projections are slightly higher than in the Emissions Gap
Report 2022, but uncertainty ranges strongly overlap.4 Thisis because a larger number of models has been included in
the estimation of future emissions for the 2023 assessment(see section C.1 in appendix C). The Emissions Gap Report’s
best estimated temperature projections are consistent withthose from other major assessments, such as the 2023
Announced Pledges Scenario of the International Energy
Agency, Climate Action Tracker and the 2023 UNFCCC NDC
synthesis report (all of which report temperature projections
with a 50 per cent chance).54

Current policies and unconditional and conditional NDC scenarios in the Emissions Gap Report 2022 were estimated to keep warming with a 66 percent chance to 2.8°C (range: 1.9–3.3°C), 2.6°C (range: 1.9–3.1°C) and 2.4°C (range: 1.8–3.0°C), respectively. The most optimistic case, combining
unconditional and conditional NDCs with all long-term net-zero targets, resulted in an estimate of 1.8°C (range: 1.7–1.9°C).

5

See appendix C and the joint technical note by UNFCCC and UNEP, both available online, for more detailed comparisons.

31

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 4.3 Temperature implications of key scenarios assessed in this chapter and the associated risks of extreme events
Projected maximum global warming over 21st century (°C)

Current policies continuing

Unconditional NDCs + net zeropledges using strict criteria

Conditional NDCs and all
net zero pledges
66% chance best estimate
best estimate distribution
min-max variations due toemissions projection assumptions

10-year event

0°

1.0°

1.5°

2.0°

3.0°

4.0°

5.0°

Hot temperature extremes over land
Frequency of extreme temperature
event that occurred once in
10 years on average in a
climate without humaninﬂuence

Once

now likely
to occur
2.8 times

will likely
occur
4.1 times

will likely
occur
5.6 times

will likely
occur
9.4 times

Once

now likely
to occur
4.8 times

will likely
occur
8.6 times

will likely
occur
13.9 times

will likely
occur
39.2 times

Once

now likely
to occur
1.3 times

will likely
occur
1.5 times

will likely
occur
1.7 times

will likely
occur
2.7 times

Once

now likely
to occur
1.7 times

will likely
occur
2.0 times

will likely
occur
2.4 times

will likely
occur
4.1 times

1850–1900

Present, 1.1°C

1.5°C

2.0°C

4.0°C

(1.8–3.2)(2.8–4.7)(3.8–6.0)(8.3-9.6)50-year event

Hot temperature extremes over land
Frequency of extreme temperature
event that occurred once in
50 years on average in a
climate without humaninﬂuence(2.3-6.4)(4.3-10.7)(6.9-16.6)(27.0-41.4)

10-year event

10-year event

Heavy precipitation over land
Frequency of heavy 1-day
precipitation event that
occurred once in 10
years on average in a
climate without
human inﬂuence(1.2–1.4)(1.4-1.7)(1.6-2.0)(2.3-3.6)

Agricultural & ecological droughts
in drying regions
Frequency of an agricultural andecological drought event that
occurred once in 10 years
on average in a climate
without humaninﬂuence(0.7-4.1)(1.0-5.1)(1.3-5.8)(1.7-7.2)

Future global warming levels

32

Notes: Peak global warming outcomes for emissions projections following the best estimate (solid histograms) and variations acrossdifferent models and projection assumptions and including 2030 current policy/NDC assessment uncertainty (line histograms). The thin
horizontal lines indicate the median estimate. Projections of extremes are taken from figure SPM.6 of IPCC WGI AR6 (IPCC 2021).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Even in this most optimistic scenario, the likelihoodof limiting global warming to 1.5°C is only 14 per cent(table 4.4), and the various scenarios leave open a large
possibility that global warming will exceed 2°C or even 3°C(table 4.4 and figure 4.3). This further illustrates the needto reduce global emissions by 2030 to less than the levels

associated with the full implementation of current NDCs, aswell as the need to expand the coverage of net-zero pledges
to all GHG emissions and to achieve these pledges. Climate
impacts and extremes increase with every increment of
global warming, emphasizing the significant risks that result
from insufficient near-term mitigation action (figure 4.3).

33

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

5

Global energy transformation in thecontext of the Paris Agreement

Lead authors:
Jesse Burton (University of Cape Town and E3G, South Africa) and Greg Muttitt (International Institute for Sustainable
Development [IISD], United Kingdom)

Contributing authors:
Fatima Denton (United Nations University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa, Ghana), Sivan Kartha (Stockholm
Environment Institute, United States of America), Narasimha Rao (Yale School of the Environment, Yale University, UnitedStates of America), Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London, United Kingdom; International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis [IIASA], Austria), Saritha Sudharmma Vishwanathan (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, India; National
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Dan Tong (Tsinghua University, China), Marta Torres Gunfaus (IDDRI, France)and William Wills (Centro Brasil no Clima and Eos Consulting, Brazil)

5.1

Introduction

Previous chapters document the continued delay in strong
mitigation action and the implications for the carbon budget
and projected global warming. The second part of the reportfocuses on two issues which result from these findings andthat are central for the possibility of achieving the longterm temperature goal of the Paris Agreement (United
Nations 2015).
First, all countries must accelerate economy-wide, lowcarbon transformations. Energy sector transformation isessential, as energy is the dominant source of greenhousegas (GHG) emissions. Accelerated mitigation by highincome countries is urgent and a priority to reflect theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) principle of common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities. However, thiswill not be sufficient, given that low- and middle-income
countries already account for more than two thirds of global
greenhouse gas emissions today (see appendix A). Thus,
energy sector transformation is also necessary in low- andmiddle-income countries, but must be aligned with meetingpressing development needs (chapter 6).
Second, all pathways consistent with meeting the Paris
Agreement long-term temperature goal require a growing
quantum of carbon dioxide removal in the longer term,alongside rapid and immediate GHG emission reductions.
Chapter 7 explores the implications of this.

34

Energy transformation and development of approaches tocarbon dioxide removal will need to be pursued in parallel,rather than more of one justifying less of the other. Action
on both must be consistent with the UNFCCC principle ofcommon but differentiated responsibility and respective
capabilities, and requires global collaboration.
This chapter outlines some of the major issues related to
global energy transformation, setting the scene for thesubsequent chapter on energy transition in low- and middleincome countries (chapter 6).

5.2

Avoiding new fossil fuel capacity will
limit the existing infrastructure thatmust be retired early to achieve Paris
Agreement goals

Energy consumption and production account for 86 per centof global carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions, comprising 37 percent from coal, 29 per cent from oil and 20 per cent fromgas (Friedlingstein et al. 2022; see also chapter 2). Achieving
the Paris Agreement goals thus requires a policy-driven
transformation of the global energy system.
The coal, oil and gas extracted over the lifetime of producing
and under-construction mines and fields, as at 2018, would
emit 936 gigatons of CO 2 if fully used (Trout et al. 2022)– around 3.5 times the carbon budget available to limit
warming to 1.5°C with 50 per cent probability, and almost
the size of the budget available for 2°C with 67 per centprobability (figure 5.1). Yet as described in chapter 3, newfields and mines continue to be opened.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Similarly, at the other end of the supply chain, the CO 2
emissions from full-lifetime operation of power stations,industrial plants, transportation and buildings already inexistence exceed the budget available for 1.5°C warming by afactor of 2.5, and amount to around two thirds of the budget
for 2°C (Tong et al. 2021; figure 5.1). Again, new energyconsuming infrastructure continues to expand (chapter 3).

Figure 5.1. Committed CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure, compared to carbon budgets reflecting thelong-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement
Emissions (GtCO2)
Carbon budget

1,000
950

2 °C
(67% chance)

800

Coal
Other
Buildings

600

Transport

400

Industry

Gas

Carbon budget
250
200

0

Electricity
Oil

1.5 °C(50% chance)

Existing extraction
infrastructure

Existing consuming
infrastructure

Committed emissions
Source: Adapted from Bustamente et al. (2023).
Note: Bars show future emissions implied by full-lifetime operation of fossil fuel-extracting infrastructure (Trout et al. 2022) and of fossil
fuel-consuming infrastructure (Tong et al. 2019). These are compared with carbon budgets remaining at the start of 2023 (chapter 4).
“Existing” generally means that infrastructure has been invested or committed, as at the start of 2018 (see previously cited sources forfurther details on methods). Since that time, while full data are not available, more infrastructure has been added than retired; hence thisfigure is an underestimate of the committed emissions problem.

In contrast, carbon budgets aligned with the long-term
temperature goal of the Paris Agreement require that muchof the existing capital stock will need to be retired early,
retrofitted with carbon capture and storage, and/or operated
below capacity (Trout et al. 2022; Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change [IPCC] 2022; IEA 2023), while ensuring
a just transition for workers and affected communities(International Labour Organization 2015; Smith 2017;
McCauley and Heffron 2018). Globally, this leaves no roomfor new fossil fuel infrastructure, unless an even greater
quantity of existing stock is stranded. Instead, new energy
investments should focus on clean energy supply and enduse electrification to avoid further increasing committed
emissions (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2021; IISD
2022; IEA 2023; Stockholm Environment Institute et al. 2023).

As low-carbon technology costs have fallen, wind andsolar now offer the lowest-cost means of generating
electricity in most of the world (UNEP 2019). The fall in thecost of renewables generally means that the “transitionfuel” argument for higher-emissions and higher-cost gas
is becoming increasingly invalid. However, there can bebarriers to immediate transitions, including where financefor renewable remains prohibitively expensive in poorer
countries (see chapter 6).
All this creates a dilemma for poorer countries with fossil fuelresources, between trying to use those resources to meettheir development needs, versus avoiding the economicrisk of stranded assets as the world decarbonizes (United
Nations University Institute for Natural Resources in Africa
2019; see also chapter 6).

35

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

While all countries face stranded asset risk, stranded assets
are likely to intensify existing systemic inequities and related
vulnerabilities, including fiscal deficits, indebtedness, highborrowing costs and currency devaluation, especially inpoorer countries (Sokona et al. 2023).

5.3

Meeting the basic energy needs ofpeople living in poverty would havea limited impact on global GHG
emissions

Access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services
is critical to human welfare and livelihoods, linking togethersocial equity, economic development and environmental
sustainability (United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs 2022; see also chapter 6). Energy accessenables food security and improved nutrition; reduces
drudgery for women and girls from the collection of
traditional fuels; provides light and frees time for educationand studying; improves health and well-being, both throughaccess to medicines and by reducing the burden of air
pollution; and is a critical input for small business and for
economic development.
Yet energy poverty persists, with women and children
disproportionately affected. In 2022, the number of people
without electricity access increased for the first time in a
decade (Cozzi et al. 2022), while annual investments would
need to triple to achieve universal access by 2030 (IEA et al.
2023; see also chapter 6).
Increasing consumption among the poorest to achieve
developmental outcomes would have limited impact on
GHG emissions (IPCC 2022; Wollburg et al. 2023). This isbecause at very low levels of development, measured by
the Human Development Index, gains can quickly be madethrough small increases in energy access and use (Garg
2020; Clarke et al. 2022).
The energy that is required to deliver the basic elements ofliving standards that enable well-being – including thermal
comfort, nutritious food, health and education, mobility,
and civic engagement (IPCC 2022) – ranges from 12 to
40 gigajoules per person (taking into account differencesin climate, geography, economic structure and culture),
well below the average global energy consumption of 47
gigajoules per person (Kikstra et al. 2021). Considering theunequal distribution of emissions across income groups
within and between countries documented in chapter 2,
the energy needed to achieve the basic elements of living
standards that enable well-being worldwide could evenbe supplied while decreasing aggregate global energy use(Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), if increases for some people
and countries were counterbalanced by decreases in thehigh per capita energy consumption of the world’s wealthiest
people (Rao et al. 2019; UNEP 2020; Kikstra et al. 2021).

36

5.4

Delivering change requires global
cooperation that reflects the equity
and fairness principles of the Paris
Agreement

Limiting global warming to well below 2°C, whilepursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C, requires anunprecedented degree of global cooperation. Fairness ofeffort-sharing is central to the intergovernmental trustbuilding that is essential to the bottom-up process of theParis Agreement (Holz et al. 2023). Reflecting this, theParis Agreement builds on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities inlight of national circumstances.
This principle implies that countries with greater capacity andgreater historic responsibility for emissions – particularly
high-income countries– will need to take more ambitious
and rapid action, setting the course and demonstrating theviability of fossil-free development. For example, the Climate
Solidarity Pact, proposed by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, calls on all big emitters to make extra efforts to
cut emissions, and wealthier countries to provide financial
and technical resources to support low- and middle-income
countries. Specifically, the Pact calls on developed countries
to reach net zero as close as possible to 2040, and emerging
economies to commit to reaching net zero as close as
possible to 2050 (United Nations Secretary-General 2023).
Differentiated timelines are important for the feasibility ofpathways aligned with the long-term temperature goal of theParis Agreement, which is an aspect that global modelling
tends to overlook. To illustrate, the median of 1.5°C pathways
reviewed by the IPCC sees unabated coal power decline by
88 per cent from 2020 to 2030 (Muttitt et al. 2023), whichin coal-dependent countries such as China, India and South
Africa would require transition at a historically implausible
rate, effectively replacing almost the entire fleet of power
stations within a decade, likely making a just transition
impossible (Vinichenko et al. 2021). This is compared toa 14 per cent reduction in gas power and 10 per cent for
all uses of oil (primary energy), implying slower transition
rates for most high-income countries, which generally
depend more on oil and gas than on coal. Adjusting to amore feasible coal phase-out pace in all countries would
require correspondingly faster declines in oil and gas use,and greater efforts by high-income countries (Muttitt etal. 2023). Thus, while global modelling is important toalign overall ambition, it needs to be complemented bynational models, which are better positioned to understandsocietal feasibility constraints, national realities, enabling
conditions, and integration with national development
strategies (La Rovere et al. 2018; Waisman et al. 2019; Deep
Decarbonization Pathways 2021; Gunfaus and Waisman
2021; Svensson 2023).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

The Paris Agreement fur thermore recognizes thatinternational support of at least three types is crucial forclimate action: finance, technology transfer and capacitybuilding (UNFCCC 2015). This includes access to sufficient,affordable and quality finance that addresses sectoraltransformations in different contexts (Ameli et al. 2021;
Pachauri et al. 2022; Svensson 2023), access to clean
technology that has been proven through deployment by theNorth; and technical assistance to drive nationally-definedand investment-ready low-carbon development pathways(Dubash 2023). Decarbonization will require affordable
finance, considerably above current levels: limiting warming
to 1.5°C while achieving the Sustainable Development Goals
will require several trillion US$ per year (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development 2020; UNFCCC
Standing Committee on Finance 2022; UNEP 2022; IEA andInternational Finance Corporation 2023).

Pressing development needs, existing resource profiles,
political economy constraints, and limited political andinstitutional capacity all constrain and challenge countries
to achieve transformations in power, transport and demand
sectors at pace, and avoid new emissions as they develop.
Thus, as discussed in chapter 6, a country’s capacity toinitiate the transformation of its energy system and thepace of transition that can be achieved will depend strongly
on national circumstances, in the context of national
developmental priorities (Mulugetta et al. 2022).

37

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

6Energy transitions for low-carbon development
futures in low- and middle-income countries:
Challenges and opportunities

Lead authors:
Narasimha Rao (Yale School of the Environment, Yale University, United States of America) and Yacob Mulugetta (University
College London, United Kingdom)

Contributing authors:
Jesse Burton (University Cape Town and E3G, South Africa), Joisa Dutra Saraiva (Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil), Ashwin
Gambhir (Prayas Energy Group, India), Jessica Omukuti (University of Oxford, United Kingdom), Nadia S. Ouedraogo (United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia), Setu Pelz (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA],
Austria), Fei Teng (Tsinghua University, China) and Meron Tesfamichael (University College London, United Kingdom)

6.1

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the relationship between energy
transitions 1 and low-carbon development futures in lowand middle-income countries, 2 whose emissions accountfor more than two thirds of global greenhouse gases (seechapter 5). Globally, the role for low- and middle-income
countries in climate action is framed by historical patternsof development, as recognized by the Paris Agreement
principle of common but differentiated responsibility andrespective capabilities in light of national circumstances.
Low- and middle-income countries share the challenge ofbringing millions out of poverty, including through energy
demand growth, while shifting to a clean energy system. Evenas they face some common challenges, their pathways will
vary, driven by different starting points, economic structuresand natural resource endowments. The objective of thischapter is to place these countries’ future opportunities
for energy transition in the context of their heterogeneous
starting points and development priorities, while exploring
the scope for an internationally supported energy transition.

38

6.2

Development and energy areinterlinked

Energy transitions in low- and middle-income countries
are shaped by the overarching objective of pursuingdevelopment. The historical expansion of the energy sector
has enabled development by providing energy services tohouseholds and industry, and in some cases generating
export revenues. Low- and middle-income countries’ futureenergy transitions, and their low-carbon implications, will inturn be shaped by their development context. This section
examines past and likely future links between development
and energy trends, and the importance of local context inshaping these links.

6.2.1 Development drives energy transitions
Energy transitions have historically been driven by therequirements of providing clean cooking and electricity
services to homes, and infrastructure needed to improveliving standards. In low- and middle-income countries, climate
mitigation measures have frequently been adopted as partof development policies that offer multiple environmental
and social benefits (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014). For example,
the policies database of the International Energy Agency(IEA) illustrates that policies often target achieving a mix ofenergy efficiency, green growth, air pollution reduction andaffordability objectives (IEA undated).

1

Consistent with IPCC usage, the term “transition” is used here to denote the process of changing from one state or condition to another in a given
period of time. Transitions are related to achieving a “transformation”, or a change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems, butemphasize the process of this change (IPCC 2023).

2

Low-and-middle-income countries are defined as countries with an annual per capita gross national income of less than US$13,205 in 2022 (Hamadeh
et al. 2022). This includes low-, lower-middle- and upper-middle-income countries. In this chapter, “middle-income countries” refers to both lower- andupper-middle-income countries together.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

The cooking transition is a good example of how energy
transitions are development-driven. Driven by healthobjectives and national context, electric or biogas stoves
offer the most attractive long-term pathways for the sector,
effectively leading to decarbonizing cooking and heating(Pachauri et al. 2021). Driven by this logic, about 600 million
people have transitioned from solid fuel to liquid petroleum
gas and electric stoves since 2012, resulting not only in
mitigation but in fewer premature deaths and diseases
among women and children (World Health Organization[WHO] 2014; WHO 2022) and easing the burden on womenin carrying out their productive activities (Maji et al. 2021).
However, the transition is yet incomplete; close to 2.4 billion
people continue to use solid fuels.
Electricity access through off-grid systems has beenenabled by steeply decreasing costs of solar photovoltaics(PV), albeit offset in low-income countries to an extent byhigh borrowing costs (section 6.5). Over 100 million people,
half of whom reside in sub-Saharan Africa, and 29 per cent inSouth Asia, had solar-based access through off-grid systems
by 2019 (IEA et al. 2021). However, about 775 million people
still lack electricity access (Cozzi et al. 2022); over 3.5 billion
suffer unreliable supply and electricity consumption remains
low (Ayaburi et al. 2020); and the share of renewables intotal energy consumption is only 17 per cent, and scarcely
keeping up with energy demand growth. Moreover, services
from off-grid systems are typically limited to basic lighting
and phone charging, neglecting longer-term energy services
and productive uses that would have transformative local
development benefits (Groenewoudt and Romjin 2022).
Notwithstanding these concerns, the scale-up of affordable
renewable-based access solutions offers an opportunity forstimulating development and raising living standards, while
avoiding emissions growth from the power sector.
National energy needs for broader human development,
including for poverty eradication and further quality oflife improvements, will require significant energy demand
growth (Kikstra et al. 2021). In 2021, average per capita
energy demand in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia was
19 and 16 gigajoules respectively, in contrast to 51 gigajoules
in China, 83 gigajoules in Western Europe and 181 gigajoules
in North America. However, as discussed in section 6.4.1,
there is scope for meeting energy demand more efficientand equitable, and meet energy needs with low-carbon
energy as renewables get cheaper (see chapter 5).

6.2.2 Countries have different starting points andpriorities for future clean energy transitions
The challenges faced by countries in bringing about
clean energy transitions are shaped by differing national
circumstances (Mulugetta et al. 2022). Yet, these challenges

fall into patterns based on countries’ stage of development,
economic structures, and fuel resource endowments, as
mapped out in figure 6.1. Low-income countries not only
contribute the least to global greenhouse gas emissions but
also face acute development challenges that limit their ability
to invest in clean energy opportunities without affordable
finance. Middle-income countries with a manufacturing andservices base may require a greater focus on decarbonizing
industry, while those with a services and agriculture
and silviculture base may give precedence to reducing
deforestation. Fuel endowments also matter: countries
with renewable (e.g. hydro) capacity, those with abundantfossil reserves for domestic use and/or exports, and thosedependent on energy imports, will all face different sets ofchallenges and opportunities.
The overarching economic context in low-income countries
and some lower middle-income countries, is low humandevelopment and high levels of debt. With underdeveloped
power sectors and industry, clean energy access for cooking
and electricity to reduce traditional biomass dependence
is a priority (Chen et al. 2022). However, financing energy
access expansion has been a challenge. Many low-income
countries have depleted public savings either to counterthe economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, to copewith volatile commodity prices or to service external debt.
In 2021, Governments in sub-Saharan Africa spent 16.5
per cent of their revenues servicing external debt, up fromless than 5 per cent in 2010 (World Bank, Office of the Chief
Economist for the Africa Region 2023). Today, 60 per cent of
low-income countries are in or at high risk of debt distress,
up from 49 per cent in 2019 (World Bank 2022).
The risks from undertaking a clean energy transition, andits implications for broader economic outcomes, varies
by resource base. For instance, in net fuel importing lowincome countries, such as Mali, threats to fossil fuelsupply may exacerbate trade deficits and debt burdens.
Consequently, they are likely to prioritize energy security,and value clean energy investments to replace imports (deHoog, Bodnar and Smid 2023).
Low-income countries with cheap energy due to abundanthydro resources, such as Ethiopia or Nepal (recently
classified as lower-middle-income), may choose to export
low-carbon electricity to earn revenues while easing theirforeign exchange bottlenecks. They also have more flexibility
to accelerate emission reductions because they do not facestranded fossil fuel asset costs. Bhutan, for example, isamong the few countries that have pledged to achieve carbon
neutrality in its second nationally determined contribution(NDC) targets, based on its significant hydropower potential
and over 70 per cent forest cover (Yangka et al. 2019).

39

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 6.1 Country groups based on development stage and fuel endowments share these challenges in the energy
transition, among other country-specific circumstances

Low-income
countries
Energy sources

Risks

Fossil fuelproducer

Agriculture andforestry

Democratic
Republicof the Congo(export-dependent)

Lower- and upper-middle
income countries

Cameroon
Equatorial Guinea

Manufacturing
and services
Algeria
EcuadorNigeria

Stranded
sectorrisks
Fossil fuelproducer

Burkina Faso

(domesticuse)

Renewable
producer(mainly hydro)

Energyimporter(low resources)

Climate risks
for energy
supplyEnergysecurityrisks

Common barriers

Afghanistan

Mali

BrazilIndonesia

Costa Rica
BhutanChina
India
Viet Nam

Kenya

SenegalMoroccoMyanmarJamaicaCôte d’Ivoire

Mauritius

Debt and lack ofaffordable financeLand-use conflict

Some low-income countries and a few middle-income
countries already do or plan to rely on fossil fuel exports,
and could benefit from economic diversification. These
countries face common risks, such as fuel price volatility
and locking into future stranded assets. For example,
a 50 per cent decline in oil prices during the pandemic
contracted revenues and depleted foreign currency reserves
in oil exporting countries (Akinola et al. 2022; Gerval andHansen 2022). These circumstances pose a considerable

40

threat to countries such as Angola and South Sudan, whereenergy accounts for up to 90 per cent share of their export
earnings (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2022; IMF
2023). In addition to incumbent producers in North and West
Africa, several African countries including, Mozambique,
Namibia, Senegal and Uganda, have made new discoveriesof significant oil and gas reserves. Countries such asthese seeking new sources of growth will avoid fossil fuelexpansion only if they have credible alternative choices.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

At the same time, oil and gas projects are capital-intensive,difficult to execute, and often face cost and time overruns(Mihalyi and Scurfield 2020). Because of long lead times todevelop their industries, countries will be in a race against
time to reap the economic benefits of the oil and gas trade.
As renewables and other low-carbon technologies becomecompetitive, the prospects of declining future demand could
risk lock-in and asset stranding over the long term (Anwar,
Neary and Huixham 2022). These fossil fuel-dependent lowincome countries may benefit from economic diversification.
Angola is an example of a country that has sought todiversify exports, as reflected in the country’s 2025 Strategy
and 2018–2022 Sector Development Plan.
Most middle-income countries, in contrast, typically havelarger urban centres, more developed energy infrastructure,and better access to capital. Those that are major coalproducers, such as China, India and South Africa, face
the risk of stranded assets, large-scale unemployment
and energy insecurity if coal is rapidly phased down. The
speed of transition required poses a particular challenge.
Energy transition consistent with Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC)-modelled pathways to 1.5°
would require declines in coal generation at historically
unprecedented rates (Muttit et al. 2023). However,the clean energy transition also offers opportunities,
contingent on international support. Notably, all three ofthe countries mentioned have developed ambitious plans
for mainstreaming climate into long-term development
strategies (South Africa 2019; India, Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change [MoEFCC] 2022).
In China, for example, to meet the projected rate of emissions
decline, the country’s energy infrastructure investment could
triple compared to the NDC scenario. In one 1.5° scenario,
these investments account for more than 2.6 per cent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) (He et al. 2022). Since muchof China’s energy infrastructure, including coal plants, hasbeen constructed in the past two decades, a rapid phaseout of coal could result in trillion-dollar stranded assets (Cui2019). Conversion to peaking plants (Cui 2021), and retrofits
with CCS or biomass co-generation (Xing et al. 2021), arepartial solutions to this challenge.
South Africa, a coal-producing and -exporting economy, has
rapidly expanded renewable energy development, yet faces
a long road to replace its coal dependence. In 2019, South
Africa had planned for 30 GW of variable renewable energy
in its Integrated Resource Plan (South Africa, Departmentof Mineral Resources and Energy 2019), and by 2022 had
18 GW in the grid connection queue and 33 GW of variable
renewable energy and batteries at an advanced stage ofapproval (South African Photovoltaic Industry Association2023). Yet to meet South Africa’s ambitious NDC targets
would require adding over 6 GW of variable renewableenergy every year to 2030, an amount equivalent to thecurrent installed capacity of variable renewable energy,
as well as investments in grid backbone (South Africa,
Presidency 2022). Without enhanced international financial

support, the country risks short-term negative impacts on
growth, exacerbating poverty and inequality, and failing tocapture future low-carbon industrial opportunities (WorldBank Group 2022).
India faces the challenge of mobilizing investment toachieve its ambitious clean energy transition plans. These
plans include increasing non-fossil fuel capacity in the
power sector to 65 per cent by 2030 (India, Ministry ofPower, Central Electrical Authority 2023), exceeding its
NDC commitment of 50 per cent, implementing building
and industrial energy efficiency standards and markets, andundertaking electric vehicle, biofuels and green hydrogenpromotion programmes (India, MoEFCC 2022; India,
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 2023). To fully
achieve this transition will require complementary measures
such as a smooth transition away from coal, strengthening
an already stretched electric grid, and decarbonizing thefertilizer, cement and steel industries. There is also scope to
exploit potential linkages between social development andclimate mitigation (Bhatia 2023), such as through electric
public transit and two- or three-wheeler vehicles, passive
designs for affordable housing (the Pradhan Mantri Awas
Yojana programme) and efficient cooling solutions.
In industrializing middle-income countries with strong
agriculture and forestry sectors, like Brazil and Indonesia,
curbing deforestation through forest management reform
may be a critical lever, though also with political challenges.
For example, Brazil had success in reducing deforestationfrom 2004 to 2012 through stronger monitoring andenforcement and incentive programmes, such as conditional
access to credit in rural areas with illegal practices(Assunção, Gandour and Rocha 2015), but some regression
has occurred with changes in political cycles. Such reforms
have had to contend with the conflict between conservationand the protection of indigenous rights, and land-grabbing
for agriculture (Brito et al. 2019).

6.3

The political economy of clean energy
transitions is challenging

Ensuring rapid, smooth and just national clean energy
transitions will require addressing many political andinstitutional challenges at the national and global levels.
Central to these challenges is the reality that greenhousegas emissions contributions and the capacity to mitigate
them have been, and will likely continue to be, highly
unequal (see chapters 2 and 5). Global inequalities carry
implications for financing and other means of international
support for energy transitions, as discussed in section 6.5.
National inequalities reflect unequal access to institutions
and resources, concentration of power among elites andcontestation among rival political interests. This section
focuses on the implications for energy transitions of national
development challenges, in particular capacity constraints,
weak institutions and complex political economies.

41

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

6.3.1 Clean energy transitions are limited bycapacity constraints

6.3.3 Political economy challenges include
entrenched fossil fuel interests

Ensuring that clean energy transition processes accountfor national circumstances requires deep capacity,
including autonomy to take decisions in the national
interest, inclusive processes, and the building and sharingof required knowledge (Klinsky and Sagar 2022). Yet
differences in wealth mirror differences in capacities toundertake a clean energy transition. Low-income countries
typically have limited resources and are often saddled withweak institutions and governance mechanisms to plan andmanage their transitions (Sokona 2021).

Undertaking clean energy transitions requires structuralchanges in political economy, with impacts on existing
economic structures and interests as well as new politicalconstituencies. For example, in South Africa, the historicallypowerful alliance of coal mining and the main electricity
utility Eskom have maintained their defence of incumbent
fossil fuel, while new alliances composed of parts of theState and civil society have lined up in favour of expanding
renewables (Hochstetler 2020). The chasm between these
coalitions has made it difficult for policymakers to commit
fully to either climate action or renewable energy. In Latin
American countries where livestock cultivation contributes
to deforestation, mitigation may threaten the politicalinfluence of the cattle industry and increase the importanceof food policies to reduce beef demand (Dumas et al. 2022).

Yet, capacity-building processes are often shaped more by
the interests of international actors than by local needs (Nagoand Krott 2020). For example, mitigation actions focusedon climate outcomes may privilege training and knowledge
acquisition on climate transparency, such as emissions
reporting, over knowledge on social benefits or assessing
needs for international support (Klinsky and Sagar 2022).
Such “knowledge politics” also require attention in capacitybuilding processes.

6.3.2 Institutional requirements are substantial
Clean energy transition processes are characterized bylock-ins and path dependence (Sovacool 2016), and require
structural changes including building new industries,
infrastructure and human capital (Muttitt and Kartha 2020).
Climate institutions, notwithstanding political challenges
in establishing them, can help shape policy and serve
governance functions needed for low-carbon transitions(Dubash et al. 2021).
Institutions that enable coordination across sector areas
are necessary because multiple and competing institutions
operating in silos are often in charge of energy- anddevelopment-related sectors, with implications for carbon
outcomes (Newell 2019). Enhancing policy coherence
through coordination between energy and the rest of theeconomy is critical to capitalize on the systemic benefits
from the energy transition (Shawoo et al. 2021). For
example, finance ministries are well placed to introduce
development- and climate-related conditionalities to the useof public funds.
The careful design of decarbonization processes can help
build consensus for complex transitions and broaden theknowledge base on which they are built. For example, Costa
Rica put in place a data-driven, stakeholder-co-designed
National Decarbonization Plan, which has also been an
important foundation on which significant international
concessional finance was mobilized (Jaramillo et al. 2023).
Elements of this approach include a deliberative process,and carefully crafted long-term scenarios based on opensource models with scope for input from broad research,
practice and policy communities.

42

The political acceptability of sustaining transitions depends
on how their economic impacts are distributed throughlabour shifts, energy price and macroeconomic impacts.
Labour retrenchment is a concern in coal-dependent
economies such as China, India, Indonesia, and South
Africa. Because the coal sector supports millions of people
directly and indirectly, a phase-down from coal would also
cause spillover effects in local economies and community
well-being (Ruppert Bulmer et al. 2021). Similarly, Algeria
employs 350,000 workers directly and 1.7 million people
indirectly in its oil and gas sector. Not least, the transitionout of fossil fuels could bring macroeconomic shocks with
political economy implications. For example, countries
that seek to exploit fossil fuel reserves for future economic
growth face the risk of dwindling revenues as the rest of theworld transitions to renewables-based economies (SolanoRodriquez et al. 2021).

6.4

Clean energy transitions also bring
opportunities

In addition to challenges, low emission energy transitions
bring potential opportunities for low- and middle-income
countries, including multiple social and environmental cobenefits. Many mitigation options bring both synergies andtrade-offs with the Sustainable Development Goals, but
the prevalence of synergies is greater than of trade-offs(Allan et al. 2021 p. 22). For example, sustainable transport
strategies could yield co-benefits such as air quality andhealth improvements, equitable access to transportation
services including enhanced gender equality, and improved
access to education (Doblas-Reyes et al. 2021, p. 1389).
Widening access to clean cooking options could improvehealth outcomes considerably, especially for women, while
reducing forest degradation and deforestation. Realizingthese co-benefits also depends on policy choices that
intentionally maximize co-benefits and minimize trade-offs.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

The scope for these sectoral co-benefits is well recognized.
This section focuses on the complementary question of how
broader structural economic changes could help generate
opportunities, across a wide spectrum of low- and middleincome countries, while keeping their specific national
contexts in mind. It discusses two such sets of opportunities:
demand-side changes that result in more efficient growth;and moving up the clean energy supply chain.

6.4.1 Demand-side changes bring efficiency andsocial benefits
Demand-side changes could bring social benefits and,through enhanced efficiency, reduce the need for supply
expansion (Creutzig et al. 2018). The most energy-intensive
demand sectors include housing, transport and food (Raoet al. 2019). Avoiding lock-in in these sectors require shifting
how low- and middle-income countries develop urban
areas where the most energy demand growth and lock-in
is expected. Given that future demand growth is dominatedby urban areas, the potential for avoided emissions isgreatest there.
Because urban and industrial infrastructure is still being
built in low- and middle-income countries, these countries
can avoid locking into energy- and carbon-intensive
infrastructure, thereby avoiding future emissions (Lwasa
et al. 2022). Urban planning and housing policies thatencourage more dense and affordable multifamily housing
can reduce commuting needs and building energy demand.
Building energy efficiency measures, coupled with financial
support to maintain affordability, such as for appliancesand housing construction practices, can save households
money and reduce emissions. In the transport sector, shifts
from investments in road infrastructure to facilitate sharedtransit, such as buses, mass transit rail or even car-sharing,can significantly reduce transport-related emissions, withnumerous social and environmental benefits (McCollum
et al. 2018).
In the food sector, energy investments at scale are
essential to support expected growth in food productionof 70 per cent by 2050 to meet the needs of a growing
population, increased urbanization, and dietary changes(International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA] andFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations[FAO] 2021). For example, improved access to modern
energy for cooling and mechanical power in the agrifood
supply chain can reduce waste in storage and increase
productivity in agroprocessing. Policies that support dietswith healthy coarse grains (Davis et al. 2019) and less meat(Willet et al. 2019) can have nutritional, environmental andeconomic benefits.
Shifts in development strategies that prioritize the poor or
broad public interests over private consumption can reduce
emissions growth. In South Africa, models show thatmacroeconomic policies that prioritize energy security andemployment can favour renewables over fossil investmentsin the power sector (Winkler et al. 2022). Shifts in investments
towards shared infrastructure that serve basic needs, suchas health or education facilities, and water and sanitation,
would reduce inequality in human development and limit
emissions growth (Kikstra et al. 2021; Millward-Hopkins andOswald 2023).

6.4.2 Participating in clean energy supply chains
can bring jobs and revenue
Moving from mineral extraction to the final product endof the clean energy supply chain provides considerable
opportunities to low- and middle-income countries. Doingso can create new revenue opportunities for the industry
and new jobs for the public, and, in some cases, help fossil
fuel-dependent economies to diversify.
The rise in the electric vehicle industry will require a material
shift from a liquid-based to a minerals-intensive energy
system, estimated to result in a six-fold increase in mineral
inputs in 2040 relative to today (IEA 2021a). By 2025, thesix segments of the US$8.8 trillion global electric vehicle
batteries value chain will include mineral exploitation (US$11
billion), minerals-to-metals transformation (US$44 billion),
production of precursors (US$217 billion), battery cellmanufacture (US$387 billion), cell assembly (US$1.8 trillion)
and electric vehicle manufacture (at least US$7 trillion).
Moving from the first segment to the third would allow
countries in Central Africa to capture gains beyond the very
first and least profitable stage of the chain (BloombergNEF
2021; Ouedraogo and Gasser 2022).
Low- and middle-income countries today are competitive in
exploration and mining of critical minerals, but lack capacity
for processing or refining operations, cell assembly, andmanufacturing of components necessary for electric vehicle
production. For example, almost all the cobalt mined in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is exported to Belgium
or China for refining, with insignificant economic benefits
accruing to the country (Bridle et al. 2021). Achieving thetransformative potential of lower- and middle-income
countries’ resources requires a new way of thinking
about minerals and their place in the industrialization anddiversification of economies.
Low- and middle-income countries that have been successful
in taking advantage of downstream opportunities in the
renewables value chain have done so through the supportof robust institutions, cross-sectoral coordination, industrial
policies to strengthen local manufacturing capabilities, anddevelopment of export partnerships. China’s PV programme,for example, has established an industrial ecosystem withstrong synergy between upstream and downstream sectors.
China’s PV industry promoted sustained cooperation
between local firms, universities and industry associations
across the PV value chain. Starting from portable lighting
devices, then moving to solar PV panels, and ultimately
creating domestic cell and wafer industry for export, theChinese PV industry has gradually become one of the pillars

43

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Recordof the Chinese manufacturing sector (Huang et al. 2016;
Zhang and Gallagher 2016). Conversely, India’s National Solar
Mission prioritized low-cost deployment of PV over building
domestic manufacturing capability, paying insufficientattention to training and research and development (R&D)(Behuria 2020). India’s relatively limited success in creating
opportunities for localizing manufacturing has therefore
resulted in high dependence on solar PV imports.
Prior expertise in related industries matters. For instance,
Viet Nam has had substantial experience producing
internal combustion engine based two-wheelers for several
decades, and has become the second-largest electrical twowheelers market worldwide, second only to China (Hiep etal. 2023). As part of the effort for upscaling electric vehicles,
the Government of Viet Nam agreed to reduce the excise
tax on domestically manufactured, assembled and imported
electric cars. A preferential import tax on raw materials
and components is currently under review (Le, Posada
and Yang 2022). However, Viet Nam still lacks a clear andcomprehensive e-mobility policy and regulatory framework
to plan for significant future investment.
Starting down the pathway to harness gains from theenergy supply chain may require taking early bold steps. For
instance, Peru reformed its copper royalty regime in 2021
to increase government revenue from the mining sector.
Indonesia has banned the export of unprocessed nickel toencourage value-added activities within its borders. Namibia
has also been actively exploring the development of greenhydrogen, mainly for export. Although it lacks the industrial
capacity and sectoral system capabilities of countries
further ahead, Namibia has established strong international
R&D interactions and collaborations to ensure the social
benefits of employment and local learning take place (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2023). The
initiative is expected to create an additional 600,000 jobs
by 2040 in Namibia, but the social, political and resourcerelated risks would need to be carefully assessed.

6.5

Adequate international finance is an
essential enabler of clean energy
transitions

Decarbonizing energy systems in low- and middle-income
countries requires mobilizing capital at an unprecedented
scale. Without affordable external climate financeassistance, the majority of low- and middle-income countries
will struggle to achieve their development objectives andreduce emissions. Global clean energy investment stands at
US$1.3 trillion today, and is projected to rise to US$2 trillion
by 2030 (though US$4 trillion is needed to stay on trackwith the net-zero scenario) (IEA 2021b). Low- and middleincome countries account for two-thirds of the global
population, yet received only a fifth of all energy transitions
investments (IEA 2021c). The implementation of the NDCs
alone, for instance in Africa, are projected to require close
to US$3 trillion of conditional and unconditional finance for44

implementation, a sum close to one year of Africa’s GDP in
current terms (UNECA 2020).
Enabling an energy transition in low- and middle-income
countries will require scaling up financial flows in strained
financial systems. In many cases, challenges of foodsovereignty, energy sovereignty, and the low value-added
content of exports relative to imports (Sokona et al. 2023)
contribute to structural trade deficits, weakened currencies
and persistent indebtedness. In low- and middle-income
countries with fossil fuel industries, affordable financeis important not only for scaling clean energy, but also to
manage the economic shocks from retiring fossil fuel assets.
For example, coal-fired power plants support the viability ofIndia’s rail system through coal freight charges and financestate budgets (Tongia, Sehgal and Kamboj [eds.] 2020).
Moreover, reduction in fossil fuel exports could threaten
fiscal solvency in countries such as Algeria, where oil andgas revenues accounted for 38 per cent of government
revenue between 2016 and 2021, increasing to more than
50 per cent in 2022 and 2023 (Oxford Analytica 2023).
Against this challenging backdrop, energy transitions inlow- and middle-income countries are impeded by nominal
financing costs that are up to seven times higher than thosein the United States of America and Europe (IEA 2021c). The
weighted average cost of capital varied between 5 and 21
per cent for solar and wind projects in lower- and middleincome countries (see figure 6.2). The regional weighted
average cost of capital for solar PV in 2021 was 7 per cent in
Africa and Asia and 4 per cent in Europe (IRENA 2022). Somelow- and middle-income countries face a climate investment
trap, where the high costs of capital that limit financial flows
are due in part to limited experience with these markets.
Perceived risks of investment are exacerbated by sovereign
credit scores and ratings, and the lack of concessional
finance, catalytic finance and guarantees (Mithatcan etal. 2022).
Reducing costs of capital can significantly increase thescope for low-carbon energy investments to provide
affordable energy services to wider populations (Ameli
et al. 2021). To do so, reforms are needed in international
finance as well as in domestic markets where clean energy
is sold. International climate finance needs to be re-oriented
towards long-tenor and low-interest concessional finance,
guarantees and catalytic finance need to be provided,and new public and private sources of finance should be
encouraged. New innovative models for finance are neededthat restore debt sustainability and restructure the rules ofinternational financial institutions (United Nations 2023).
In domestic markets, risks of energy off-take need to be
reduced by improving the financial viability of purchasing
utilities, developing reliable market design and rules, andstrengthening electric grids to ensure reliable delivery.
Further, climate finance is less forthcoming for countries
that need it the most. The 46 least developed countries
received 2.8 billion in energy transition investments inEmissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

2018, an amount lower than in previous years. Despite theenormous renewable potential and need to meet energy
access needs in Africa, only 2 per cent of global investment
flowed into Africa between 2000 and 2020, of which 75 percent was concentrated in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and South
Africa (IEA, IRENA, United Nations Statistics Division, WorldBank and WHO 2021).
The emerging Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs)
between international finance providers and low- andmiddle-income countries are finance packages intended tosupport country-led decarbonization strategies consistent
with national development priorities. They show promise,

but require considerable additional investment mobilizationand further assessment of their ability to addressdevelopment objectives. The amount of funding in a JETP
is small compared to the scale required for clean energy
transition. However, they offer a process to help develop
capacity and governance. For example, in South Africa
the JETP catalysed the development of a comprehensive
country investment plan that is much bigger (US$98 billion)
than what was on offer (South Africa, Presidency 2022).
Indonesia and Viet Nam have agreements to increase theircommitment to renewable energy and reduce their pipelineof coal generation expansion with international assistance(Southeast Asia Energy Transition Partnership 2022).

Figure 6.2 Weighted average cost of capital for solar PV projects against per capita gross national income for selectcountries in 2021.

Weighted average cost of capital (%)

Gross national income per capita (US$)

70,900Country category
Low-income* Excluding lower-middle-income countries

Lower-middle-income

Americas

Upper-middle-income

Europe*

USA

Chile

UruguayArgentina

BrazilMexicoBolivia

EcuadorNicaragua

China

ThailandSri Lanka

Indonesia

India

Pakistan

Mauritius

Asia

Islamic Rep. of Iran

AfricaSouth Africa

Algeria0
Namibia0
Morocco3

Egypt

10,000Tunisia6

Kenya

20,000Ghana

9Senegal30,000Uganda12

Ethiopia

40,000

Rwanda15

Burkina Faso

50,000EuropeHigh-income

Source: Adapted from IRENA (2022). Gross national income (current US$, World Bank Atlas method).

6.6

Low- and middle-income countries
can take concrete steps towards clean
energy transitions

The challenges on the path to clean energy transition in lowand middle-income countries are considerable. However,there are concrete steps that this large group of countries
can take towards accelerated energy transition. The starting

point is to develop nationally owned and context-specificvisions and strategies for energy futures that bring together
development and clean energy imperatives. To do so requires
low- and middle-income countries to undertake institutional
strengthening. And to realize these ambitious visions will
require mobilizing international support. This section laysout concrete measures towards each of these steps. Taken
together, these steps can assist lower- and middle-income

45

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

countries’ Governments in preparing investment-readyclimate and development plans that scale up mitigation
ambition through articulated policies and strategies, andtheir investment needs.

6.6.1 Develop domestic strategies towards
equitable, efficient and clean growth
Shifting development pathways towards sustainability
allows mitigation considerations to be incorporated
alongside a broad set of developmental objectives (Winkler
et al. 2022). But to do so requires developing energy
transition strategies that account for both synergies andtrade-offs across development and emissions outcomesin specific national contexts. At least three areas may beparticularly salient to lower- and middle-income countries’
strategies: encouraging energy-efficient and well-beingenhancing demand growth; developing economic and socialtransition plans for fossil dependence; and exploiting clean
energy supply chains.

6.6.2 Avoid emissions through demand-side
measures
Because many low- and middle-income countries have notfully locked into infrastructure or consumption patterns,
focused attention to the following aspects of energy
demand could avoid future emissions: in emerging urban
areas, preemptive urban planning with electric public transit,
affordable, efficient housing and compact design; social
service expansion through shared infrastructure such as
health, education, water and sanitation; and supporting
efficient food systems with diverse grains, which likely
entails less emissions-intensive growth, and potentiallycontributes to gender equality and youth employment(IRENA and FAO 2021).
Develop a strategic plan around fossil fuel use: Because of
the need for rapid global phase-down of all fossil fuels, lowand middle-income countries should develop strategic plansfor existing or planned fossil fuel use – domestic or exports.
These plans should examine the scope for economic
diversification and alternatives to fossil fuel expansion, theeconomic risks associated with stranding existing assets,
and the need for social protection mechanisms to managetransition shocks such as unemployment and higher energy
prices. The process of formulating these strategic plans
should be inclusive and gender-responsive, to identify andinvolve affected communities.
Foster green industrial opportunities: Capturing economic
and social gains from the large-scale deployment of
renewable energy and storage technologies is a key
development objective (United Nations Environment
Programme 2019). To do so, extraction-dependent low- andmiddle-income countries could broaden their involvement
in clean energy supply chains from ore exports to highermargin activities such as processing and manufacturing

46

technologies. This requires identifying value chain activities
that can feasibly be picked up by local firms and introducing
enabling measures such as local content incentives,
business incubation initiatives, domestic R&D and humancapital investments, and promotion of low-carbon industrial
clusters (Lema et al. 2021). Regional coordination may enablelow- and middle-income countries to build on comparative
strengths in raw materials, manufacturing, and trade routes.
For example, entities such as the African Continental FreeTrade Area can help develop an efficient regional low-carbon
industrial ecosystem by providing an impetus for African
Governments to address infrastructure gaps, improve andstreamline supply chains, improve manufacturing capacity,and foster cross-border cooperation.

6.6.3 Develop institutions to support energy
transitions
To enable low- and middle-income countries’ Governments
to take ownership of their mitigation strategies, developing
appropriate domestic institutions at national and subnational
levels is necessary (Dubash et al. 2021). Institutions
can enable strategic thinking, ensure coordination for
implementation, and strengthen gender-responsive inclusive
processes for designing, assessing, and implementing
policies that safeguard people’s interests during transition.
Appropriate institutional development is a precondition
for countries to exploit new green economy opportunities,
as discussed above. Identifying strategic opportunities,
coordinating and harnessing domestic capabilities to move
down the supply chain, working in partnership with domestic
industry, and establishing partnerships and markets
globally, all require considerable State capacity. Becauseof their cross-sectoral nature, managing energy transitions
will require coordinating across government departments
and jurisdictions. And because they risk creating winners
and losers, they require open processes that ensure theinterests of the poor are represented. This calls for lowerand middle-income countries’ Governments to take greater
responsibility for setting up transparent and accountable
governance systems with improved public administration.

6.6.4 Create improved conditions for international
financial assistanceA clean energy transition requires international support,
consistent with operationalizing the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities(Klinsky et al. 2017). In practical terms, global climate
mitigation financial flows from North America and Europe
to other regions would have to increase to hundreds ofbillions to reconcile development needs and fair effort
sharing (Pachauri et al. 2022). To facilitate such an increase
in international flows, the structure of international financeneeds reform, domestic market conditions need to be
improved, and country platforms for facilitating dialogue
need to be developed, as laid out below.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Fundamental to the goal of restructuring international
finance is to reduce costs of capital. This will requirede-risking early-stage investment, enabling long-tenor andlow-cost concessional finance, introducing catalytic financeand guarantees, and creating market conditions that provide
long-term certainty (Mithatcan et al. 2022). Mobilizing capitalat the scale required may require attracting private capitalthrough blended capital with international or domestic
financial institutions (IEA 2021c).
Domestic market conditions need to provide investor
confidence. In some low- and middle-income countries,
market design rules and regulations that enable theprivate sector to invest in clean energy need to be put inplace (Fazekas et al. 2022). Stable and robust legal andregulatory institutions are important to investors. Domestic
financial institutions can provide support to enhance thefinancial viability of projects. The India Infrastructure Project
Development Fund is an example of such an institutionthat bore early-stage risk in large infrastructure projects. 3
As discussed in section 6.5, the viability of clean energy
investments in electricity production also depends onreliable electricity policies, grid reliability and on the financial
viability of utilities.
Matching reformed and scaled up international financewith domestic mitigation strategies requires appropriate
mechanisms to facilitate international cooperation.
The preparation of the next round of NDCs due in lessthan two years, which will include mitigation targets for2035, provides an opportunity in this context. Most of the3

NDCs for 2030 are unconditional. However, some lowand middle-income countries have submitted conditional
NDCs – i.e. commitments with more ambitious emission
reduction targets for 2030 than those of unconditional
NDCs, but which are contingent on the provision of support.
Current NDCs often lack specificity on policies and on
investment needs (Pauw et al. 2018). A few countries list
policies associated with higher ambition, while some others
have merely listed sectoral policies in their NDC. The next
round of NDCs offers the opportunity for low- and middleincome countries to develop road maps for more ambitious
low-carbon development futures that include policies withaccompanying targets and investment needs, against
which finance and technology support can be negotiatedand implementation progress can be measured. The
twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 28) is a timely opportunity to call on low- andmiddle-income countries to lead the preparation of suchplans, and for industrialized countries to commit financial
and technical support towards them.
In addition, JETPs offer a semi-structured approach to linksupport to low-carbon development outcomes. However,they are likely to be more useful if they embrace a broad
domestic vision for national economic transformation andfund broader programmes rather than individual projects
for coal or other fossil-fuel phase-down. Moreover, they canoffer a process to help develop capacity and governancein key areas, such as project tracking, data management
and outcome measurement, and identify needs in line withnational goals and a vision of a just transition.

See https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/india-project-development-fund-ipdf.

47

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

7

The role of carbon dioxide removal in achieving
the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal

Lead authors:
Oliver Geden (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Germany), Matthew Gidden (International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis [IIASA], Austria), Mai Bui (Imperial College London, United Kingdom) and Mercedes Bustamante(Universidade de Brasília, Brazil)

Contributing authors:
Holly Buck (State University of New York at Buffalo, United States of America), Sabine Fuss (Mercator Research Instituteon Global Commons and Climate Change, Germany), Gaurav Ganti (Climate Analytics, Germany), Jan Minx (Mercator
Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Germany), Gregory Nemet (University of Wisconsin-Madison,
United States of America), Julia Pongratz (University of Munich and Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Germany), Joana
Portugal-Pereira (Graduate School of Engineering [COPPE], Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil ), Stephanie Roe(World Wide Fund for Nature [WWF], United States of America) and Stephen M. Smith (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

7.1

Introduction

Under current or planned emission reduction efforts, aspresented in chapter 4, the expanded use of carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) is unavoidable if the Paris Agreement longterm temperature goal is to remain within reach.
CDR is already being deployed, mainly in the form of
conventional land-based methods and mostly in thedeveloping countries. As described in section 7.1.1, there
are various current and emerging approaches for CDR.
These approaches are at varying levels of maturity andhave different types of risks that are either method- or
implementation-specific (e.g. relating to land competition,
sustainability, biodiversity, durability or high energy
requirements) or of a more systemic nature, such as thepotential to undermine the priority of emission reductions
or overestimating the future efficacy of CDR.
It is important to note that all mitigation scenarios assessedby the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)(Riahi et al. 2022) that are aligned with the Paris Agreement
temperature goal make use of CDR to some extent,
especially to achieve and even go beyond net-zero carbon
dioxide (CO 2) emissions and eventually all greenhouse gas

48(GHG) emissions. The gigaton-level application of CDR
in these scenarios imply a need for substantial growth innascent technologies. For this to happen, both national
and international policy and governance regimes will need
to be developed to better incorporate CDR constraints
and opportunities. Beyond a commitment to formally
integrating CDR in existing climate policy frameworks, four
important areas for political action can be identified: setting
and signalling priorities; developing robust measurement,
reporting and verification systems; harnessing synergies
and co-benefits; and accelerating needed innovation.

7.1.1

CDR methods and characteristics differ

As a result of the continued increase in GHG emissions
worldwide, CDR has gradually become an increasingly
essential element of scenarios consistent with limiting
global warming to 1.5°C or well below 2°C (Pathak et al.
2022; Riahi et al. 2022). Achieving these targets will stillrequire the rapid decarbonization of industry, transport, heatand power systems, but will need to be combined with thescale-up of CDR technologies to address residual emissions
from so-called hard-to-abate sectors, such as aviation,
shipping, heavy industry and some agricultural activities.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

When discussing CDR, it is vital to clearly differentiate
between a set of related but different options for managing
carbon emissions:▶

CDR is only the direct removal of CO 2 from theatmosphere and its durable storage in geological,
terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products.

▶

While carbon capture and storage and carbon capture
and utilization share components with some CDR
methods, their application on CO 2 emissions fromfossil fuels can never result in CO 2 removal from theatmosphere.

▶

Carbon capture and storage involves the capture of
CO 2 from point-source emissions, industrial process
streams or the atmosphere, which is then transferred
into permanent CO 2 storage (e.g. long-term geologicalstorage). Some CDR processes require carbon
capture and storage technologies to be considered for
CDR (e.g. bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
or direct air carbon capture and storage).

▶

Carbon capture and utilization involves the capture of
CO 2 from a point source or the atmosphere, which isthen used to produce other products, such as fuels
and chemicals. The key difference of this approachfrom CDR and carbon capture and storage is thatmost carbon capture and utilization products will
eventually be combusted, resulting in the re-releaseof the CO 2 back into atmosphere.

Methods that can provide direct removal of CO 2 from theatmosphere and durably store it include afforestation,
reforestation, coastal blue carbon management, enhanced
weathering, biochar, soil carbon sequestration, direct
air carbon capture and storage, bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage, ocean alkalinity enhancement andocean fertilization (Fuss et al. 2018; National Academiesof Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2019; Babiker
et al. 2022; Bui and Mac Dowell [eds.] 2022).1 Figure 7.1
summarizes the main characteristics of CDR methods.
Conventional approaches such as afforestation andreforestation have been practised for centuries, but not at
the scale assumed in IPCC-assessed mitigation scenarios,

1and will therefore need to be backed by improved inventory
methods for credibility. Other so-called novel CDR methods
are in the early stages of development, or have reachedpilot, demonstration and even commercialization stages,
for example bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,
direct air carbon capture and storage, biochar or enhanced
weathering (Smith et al. 2023).
CDR efficiency is the fraction of CO 2 captured that ispermanently removed from the atmosphere, having
also accounted for any GHG emissions arising along the
supply chain. CDR potential and scalability of each CDR
implementation pathway will depend on the method used.
Specific CDR approaches will have different co-benefits (e.g.
soil improvements), risks and adverse consequences (e.g.
land competition for food production).
The timescale of CDR from different CDR approaches is an
important factor to consider in terms of the possible speed
at which global warming is reduced. For instance, forest
carbon sinks can take decades to centuries to establish andsaturate, while the mineral carbonation process of enhancedrock weathering can take months to years, or even decades
to proceed to completion. In contrast, direct air capture
removes CO 2 on much more immediate timescales (Chiquieret al. 2022).
CDR permanence is the duration of time for which thecaptured carbon is stored and is also referred to as carbon
storage durability. Depending on the CDR method, this canvary from decades to thousands of years, or even longer(figure 7.1). Each carbon storage option will have some levelof risk of reversal, which refers to the risk associated withthe re-release of the stored carbon through an unintended
event or activity.
To accurately measure net CDR, measurement, reporting andverification methodologies are being developed for different
CDR options, which will provide standardized guidance on
project eligibility criteria, required field measurements, bestpractice principles (e.g. to avoid the reversal of CDR) andlife cycle assessment boundaries to quantify the carbon
stored and emitted. The ease of measurement, reportingand verification will have an impact on the cost, feasibility
and even the perception of CDR implementation options(Mercer and Burke 2023).

There is conceptual overlap between biological removal methods (such as reforestation, soil carbon sequestration or blue carbon management) andnature-based solutions, defined by the International Union for Conservation of Nature as actions to protect, sustainably manage and restore natural
or modified ecosystems that address societal challenges (e.g. climate change mitigation) effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously providing
human well-being and biodiversity benefits (Cohen-Shacham et al. 2016). Considering that nature-based solutions encompass both emission
reductions/avoidance and removals, the term is not used in this chapter due to the focus on CDR.

49

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 7.1 Overview of CDR methods and their main characteristics

Technology
Capturemechanism

Enhancedweathering

PeatlandandcoastalwetlandrestorationBlue
carbonmanagement

Ocean
alkalinity
enhancement

Ocean
fertilization

ChemicalGeochemical

Land-based
biological

Ocean-based
biologicalGeochemical

Ocean-based
biological> 800

100–500

< 100

< 100

Geological reservoirs

Minerals

Vegetation, soils andsediments

Minerals

Marinesediments

Decades to centuries

10,000years orlongerCenturies
tomillennia

Biochar

Bioenergy
withcarboncapture &storage

Direct air
carboncaptureandstorage

Land-based
biologicalLand-based
biologicalLand-based
biological< 100

100–500

100–500

Afforestation and reforestation

Soil
carbonsequestration

Land-based
biological< 100

Feasibility/
readiness
Scalability
Ease of MRV*
Potential
consequences
Publicperception
Cost(US$/tCO2)

StoragemediumPermanence

Buildings, vegetation, soils
and sediments
Decades to centuries

Metric performance

10,000 or longer

Signiﬁcantprogress

Moderate
progress

Someprogress

Too early to quantify

No/very limited
progress* Monitoring, reporting and verification. For example, ease of MRV indicates the level of development in practices for MRV of CO₂ for a given CDR option.
Green suggests MRV is well developed, where the methodology and techniques are well-established and standardized due to comprehensive anddemonstration trials providing valuable learnings. Red corresponds to either a lack of practical experience, or technical difficulties with the MRV
development for a CDR approach.

Note: The coloured circles indicate the level of progress for different metrics based on current development of the technology. Green
corresponds to progress being close to the target levels required for wider adoption, whereas red indicates no progress or limited progress
towards the target.
Sources: Adapted from Geden et al. (2022) and Pisciotta, Davids and Wilcox (2022).

7.1.2 CDR plays different roles in current and future
mitigation
Robust strategies for limiting a global temperature increase
include both immediate and stringent emission reductions
and the active removal of CO 2 from the atmosphere. Global
mitigation scenarios assessed by the IPCC Working GroupII Sixth Assessment Report (WGII AR6) show that the main
mitigation focus until net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached ison reducing emissions, mainly by substantially reducing theuse of all fossil fuels, electrifying energy end-use sectors(including mobility), reducing energy demand throughenergy efficiency measures and reducing deforestation andecosystem degradation (Riahi et al. 2022).
CDR can support ambitious mitigation strategies in three
ways. Firstly, it can contribute to the reduction of net

50

emissions in the near term, primarily through sustainableland-use practices and the expansion of forested land.
Secondly, in the medium term it can compensate forremaining emissions from challenging sectors, such as CO 2from industrial activities (e.g. the production of chemicals,
iron, steel and cement) and long-distance transport (e.g.
aviation and shipping), as well as methane and nitrous oxidefrom agricultural activity (e.g. animal husbandry and fertilizer
production), thereby supporting the achievement of netzero CO 2 emissions and eventually net-zero GHG emissions
later in the century. Lastly, in the long term, deploying CDR
at levels surpassing annual residual gross GHG emissions
would result in net-negative emissions that would thenfacilitate a decline in the global mean temperature, and amove towards the Paris Agreement long-term temperature
goal after a temporary overshoot (Fuss et al. 2014; Minxet al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

7.2

The land sector dominates current
CDR levels

CDR is already in use, with removals mostly taking placein the land sector. These carbon removals are largely
carried out via conventional methods that have been used
for decades (or even centuries), often for reasons otherthan climate change mitigation. Conventional methods
include afforestation, reforestation, enhanced soil carbon
sequestration, peatland and wetland restoration, agroforestry
and forest management, including the transfer of biomass todurable harvested wood products, in which CO 2 is taken up
by photosynthesis and is stored in terrestrial vegetation, soil
or as wood products. Countries already report these carbon
removals as standard practice under their land use, landuse change and forestry (LULUCF) activities. Bookkeeping
methods estimate present-day direct removals throughthese conventional methods to be 2.0±0.9 gigatons (Gt) of
CO 2 per year, primarily from afforestation and reforestationand the management of existing forests (Smith et al. 2023).
The majority (about two thirds) of these removals occur onland in non-Annex I countries (Friedlingstein et al. 2022).
Total CO 2 uptake in the LULUCF sector is substantiallylarger than that estimated for CDR alone: gross removals
in the LULUCF sector amount to 9.6±1.4 GtCO 2 per year
averaged over 2012–2021, with a net (removal) flux onforested land of 3.5±1.0 GtCO 2 per year (Friedlingstein et al.
2022). However, these additional removals through forest
regrowth are linked to land-use activities that also cause
emissions, particularly from slash and burn practices, soil
carbon and product decomposition in forestry and theclearing of forests by shifting cultivation. Only a transfer
to durable storage, such as long-lived harvested wood
products, is counted towards CDR (estimated to about 0.2
GtCO 2 in 2022) (Powis et al. 2023). Indirect anthropogenic
effects, such as carbon fertilization, enhance the ability of
the LULUCF sector to remove carbon from the atmosphereeven further but are counted towards the natural terrestrial
land sink and are not directly attributable to CDR activities inscientific assessments (Friedlingstein et al. 2022), although
they are partly included in national GHG inventories (Grassi
et al. 2023). Additional efforts to remove CO 2 throughenhancing natural sinks include coastal wetland (bluecarbon) management (Smith et al. 2023).
Other removal methods, including bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage, biochar, direct air carbon captureand storage and enhanced weathering (collectively
referred to here as novel CDR) are currently at lower
levels of technological readiness and are at smaller pilot
or experimental scales of implementation (Babiker et al.
2022). Estimates indicate that present-day removals fromthese approaches are small compared with removals fromconventional methods, amounting to approximately 2.3
megatons (Mt) of CO 2 per year, primarily from a small numberof bioenergy with carbon capture and storage facilities,
which remove 1.8 MtCO 2 per year, with approximately
0.5 MtCO 2 of removals per year occurring from biochar

production (Powis et al. 2023). Smaller contributions comefrom a range of other projects that use methods such as
direct air carbon capture and storage and enhanced rockweathering. It is important to note that CO 2 captured bythese methods is only considered CDR if the captured CO 2
is durably and permanently stored. Thus, captured CO 2 thatis used in short-lived products (e.g. for sustainable aviation
fuels) is not considered CDR. Similarly, captured CO 2 thatis used for enhanced oil recovery raises serious carbon
accounting concerns (Schenuit et al. 2023).

7.2.1 CDR contributes to global mitigation pathways
In least-cost mitigation pathways assessed in IPCC WII
AR6 and considered in chapter 4, the amount of mitigationachieved by reducing gross emissions (e.g. switching fromfossil fuels to renewable energy, increasing energy efficiency
or reducing the demand for emission-intensive goods andservices) compared with actively removing CO 2 from theatmosphere depends on various factors, most notably themagnitude and timing of the peak temperature achieved in a
scenario as well as the degree of temperature reduced after
the peak. Across all pathways assessed here, the primary
mitigation activity both in the near and long term is reducing
gross emissions (figure 7.2).
In the near term, 1.5°C and 1.8°C pathways both see
rapid gross emission reductions, further highlighting theimportance of reducing emissions this decade. However,these pathways differ, as the 1.5°C pathways tend to scale
up land-based carbon removals more ambitiously, resulting
in greater net emission reductions by 2035 comparedwith the 1.8°C pathways. In both cases, novel CDR plays
a relatively minor role until at least 2035, as the various
technologies begin to scale up to provide removals later inthese scenarios. Less ambitious climate targets such as 2°C
see slower gross emission reductions and lower levels ofboth land-based and novel CDR in comparison (figure 7.2).
Net-zero CO 2 emissions are achieved at different times
depending on the temperature target, with 1.5°C pathways
by mid-century and other pathways one or two decades
thereafter. By the time net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached,most mitigation efforts across all scenarios continue to bein the form of gross emission reductions, through whichroughly 80 per cent of total efforts occur (figure 7.2, panelc). The pathways mostly differ in the relative contributionof land-based CDR and novel CDR for the remaining 20 per
cent of efforts. In 1.5°C pathways, land-based removals
from afforestation and reforestation increase to 6.2 (4.5–
6.8) GtCO 2 per year (median and interquartile range) by midcentury, while novel forms of CDR increase to around 4.2(3.7–6.2) GtCO 2 per year, which is approximately 1,500 times
more than present levels. Because net-zero CO 2 emissions
are reached later in 1.8°C and 2.0°C pathways, larger relative
contributions to total CDR come from novel methods. In allcases, novel CDR begins to overtake land-based CDR, on
average, by around 2060, and is the main contributor to total
CDR by the end of the century.

51

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Figure 7.2 The role of emission reductions and CDR in least-cost pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement
Emissions reductions starting from 2020 levels (GtCO2e/yr)
2020

2020
gross
emissions60

1.5°C scenario

2°C scenario

60

-2.0

50

60

50

50

55

-18

GtCO2e40

Emission level 2020
55 GtCO2e

40

-27

40

Total emissions
reductions

-1.1
-0.3

Gross emissions
reduction

-39

30

30

20

-2.8
-1.0

20

24

GtCO2e10

Land-based CDR

30

-38

20

-3.6

GtCO2e-5.6

10
GtCO2e0
2020

Transparent area
indicates uncertainty
range

-1.6
-7.1

Net GHG emissions

10

Uncertainty range

7.7

6.8

0

Novel CDR

35

2035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2050)

GtCO2e02035

Net-zero CO2*
(around 2070)* Net emissions areabove 0 due toresidual emissionsof other GHGs

Notes: The left panel shows global GHG emissions and levels of CDR in 2020. The centre panel shows snapshots of gross emission
reductions, CDR and remaining GHG emissions in 2035 and at the time of net-zero CO 2 under a 1.5°C pathway. The right panel shows thesame for a 2°C pathway.
Sources: Byers et al. (2022); Riahi et al. (2022); Smith et al. (2023).

Certain sectors are crucial in facilitating these levels of
removals. The use of bioenergy with carbon capture andstorage in scenarios provides a source of power and heatwith net-negative emissions but uses less energy-efficient
processes to produce electricity and synthetic fuels while
drawing down CO 2 emissions (Bauer et al. 2018; Daioglou etal. 2020). Direct air carbon capture and storage is particularly
dependent on the electricity sector, both from an operational
perspective and for its net capture efficiency. When pairedwith zero-carbon or net-negative electricity systems, direct
air carbon capture and storage can remove CO 2 without
resulting in a substantive additional carbon footprint from its
operation (Bistline and Blanford 2021; Fuhrman et al. 2021;
Strefler et al. 2021). Other CDR methods, such as biochar,soil carbon sequestration and enhanced weathering, as
well as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, dependon agricultural and other environmental management
practices and decarbonized supply chains to support theirdeployment (Strefler et al. 2018; Beerling et al. 2020). As
highlighted in previous Emissions Gap Reports, the models’use of CDR options such as bioenergy with carbon captureand storage depend on several assumptions that may not
be fully realistic in terms of the availability of required land52

areas and competition for water resources and food, among
others (see section 7.3).
The level of CDR needed in 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios heavily
relies on policy decisions and technological advancements.
Further delays in near-term emission reductions are set
to increase future reliance on CDR to achieve ambitious
temperature goals or will otherwise make them unattainable
this century (Babiker et al. 2022). Limiting reliance on CDR
thus requires ambitious action to limit the total emissions
left in the energy–economy system. The sectors that will
end up contributing substantial residual emissions in a netzero or net-negative future will depend on both sector andcountry-level mitigation strategies. Hard-to-abate sectors
such as heavy industry (which includes iron, steel, cement,chemical and fertilizer production) have been identified as
sectors with relatively more expensive mitigation options.
For example, the agriculture sector contributes substantial
amounts of short-lived non-CO 2 emissions mainly due tolivestock husbandry and current agricultural practices,such as rice cultivation, and global transport sectors,
including long-haul aviation and shipping, currently use
high-emission fuels.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

7.2.2 National climate strategies focus on
land-based CDR

7.3

Many countries currently report net-negative LULUCF
emissions in their national GHG inventories, and thus
already include land-based CDR, which is part of thenegative component of gross LULUCF fluxes (see section
7.2). At present, many nationally determined contributions(NDCs) for 2030 and net-zero pledges made by countries do
not specify how much they will depend on CDR, nor the levelof residual emissions they plan to maintain when achieving
net-zero CO 2 and GHG emission targets (Buck et al. 2023b).
Removals from the land sector form the bulk of current
CDR estimates implied by existing NDCs, with 2030 levels
estimated to be between 2.1 and 2.6 GtCO 2 of removals per
year, depending on the conditionality of the NDC. Current
literature estimates of the implied levels of land-based
removals in long-term strategies and net-zero pledges are
2.1–2.9 GtCO 2 of removals per year by 2050, though this isbased on an incomplete sample of 53 countries (updated
from Smith et al. 2023). It is also important to note that theliterature estimates vary based on whether they exclude
indirect anthropogenic effects (see chapter 2). In general,very little information is available from country submissions
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in terms of the expected use of novel
CDR to achieve net-zero targets, with aggregate estimatesaround 600–1,000 MtCO 2 per year by 2050 (Smith et al.
2023). As figure 7.2 illustrates, these levels implied bycountry pledges are substantially below the levels in leastcost pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement’s longterm temperature goal.

Relying on large-scale CDR has various risks. The main
climate-related risks include the durability of conventional
land-based CDR approaches and an inability to deliver novel
CDR approaches at the envisaged scale, while the mainsustainability-related risks include impacts on biodiversity,
water resources, nutrient loading, food security andlivelihoods.

At present, countries do not separate their planned grossemission reductions from their planned use of CDR innational target setting, and thus can in principle achieve
their national climate targets by pursuing different mitigation
strategies. Countries choose their mitigation strategies
based on their capabilities, which in turn has significant
impacts on the amount of CDR required to meet theirclimate targets. Countries with significant dependence on
land-based removals may find their targets more difficult
to achieve since these removals weaken with increasingclimate action (Gidden, Gasser et al. 2023).
Large -scale CDR deployment may face significant
ecological, environmental and social constraints (Fujimori
et al. 2022). In many regions of the world, significant
expansion of land-based CDR will require much stronger
governance structures and will compete with agricultural
production. CDR that involves energy use, such as direct air
carbon capture and storage and enhanced weathering, will
require net-zero energy supply to be truly carbon negative(Realmonte et al. 2019; Grant et al. 2021). Furthermore,these options may face opposition from citizens concernedwith the impacts of new infrastructure, the cost of CDR, theability of Governments to safely regulate geological CO 2
storage and unintended consequences, among others (Cox,
Spence and Pidgeon 2020).

The risks of depending on large-scale
CDR to meet climate goals

7.3.1 Climate risks include issues with durability
and acceptance
Currently, terrestrial ecosystems are responsible forabsorbing a quarter of anthropogenic carbon emissions, withecosystem restoration (including the expansion of forest
cover through reforestation) the most cost-effective andscalable CDR option. The maintenance of the existing landcarbon sink and its enhancement represent a substantial
contribution to mitigation pledges and scenarios. However,the permanence of carbon stored in forests, peatlands,
coastal wetlands and soils under both climate change anddirect human intervention is uncertain (Windisch, Davin and
Seneviratne 2021). Storing carbon in plant biomass andsoils is limited to timescales of several decades to centuries,
with the carbon storing ability saturating over time. Naturaland managed ecosystems are also subject to natural andanthropogenic disturbances, such as fires, degradation anddeforestation, which release the stored carbon back into theatmosphere.
The durability of carbon sequestered in the biosphere,
including conventional CDR methods, is less than that ofnovel CDR measures that rely on geological storage (seefigure 7.1) (Fuss et al. 2018; National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine 2019; Bui and Mac Dowell [eds.]
2022; IPCC 2022a). However, the value of these options forclimate policy (Fuss, Golub and Lubowski 2021; Kalkuhl etal. 2022) should not be underestimated as they are often
associated with substantial ecosystem services andlivelihood co-benefits (Smith et al. 2019; Ruseva et al. 2020).
For climate policy to be effective, it is crucial to understandthe effects of CDR and emissions, potential interlinkages
and the timing of effects. Due to the impact of natural
disturbances on forests, the risk of such disturbances has
been integrated into forest management with a focus on
timber production rather than carbon benefits. A few riskaccounting methods have been introduced, specifically for
hurricanes and wildfires at site, region or country-specificscales (Chiquier, Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2022).
While novel CDR approaches that store carbon in thegeosphere have greater storage durability, there is a risk thatthe technical, economic and political requirements for largescale deployment may not materialize in time. Controversies
in the debate in many countries show that public acceptanceis still uncertain for various CDR methods, particularly

53

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

approaches involving carbon capture and storage or the
open ocean (Cox, Spence and Pidgeon 2020; Merk et al. 2022;
Nawaz, Peterson St-Laurent and Satterfield 2023; Satterfield,
Nawaz and St-Laurent 2023), which can negatively affectthe prospects for scale-up, despite the technical potentialof the approach. Furthermore, transparent and robust
measurement, reporting and verification is needed to build
trust and support CDR scale-up (de Coninck et al. 2022).
At both the national and international levels, overly-optimistic
dependence on future CDR could be used to design policies
that divert the focus from stringent near-term emission
reduction efforts (Lenzi et al. 2018; Markusson, McLaren
and Tyfield 2018) or mask insufficient mitigation policies(Geden 2016; Carton 2019).
A broad CDR portfolio that balances these trade-offs andpotential benefits will be important for mitigating the outlined
risks. Furthermore, energy-intensive methods such as direct
air carbon capture and storage or enhanced weathering in
the near to medium term will only be an option in pathways
with a quick and comprehensive phase-out of all fossil fuels(i.e. that involve a largely decarbonized energy mix and/or
lower energy demand). 2 Carbon capture and storage will stillbe needed in this transition to capture and store industrial
emissions (Bashmakov et al. 2022) that cannot easily be
reduced to zero or at least not quickly enough (Lecocq
et al. 2022). Carbon capture and storage thus has a dualrole of addressing residual emissions from fossil fuel andindustry in the medium term, and of removing CO 2 from theatmosphere in the longer term as part of direct air carbon
capture and storage and bioenergy with carbon captureand storage.
Even if the risks described in this section could be mitigated,
key uncertainties exist with respect to how much CDR will
be needed, as scenario-based assessments do not currently
account for the full range of uncertainties in Earth system
responses. Asymmetries in the climate response to netpositive and net-negative emissions (Zickfeld et al. 2021), as
well as the expected warming when CO 2 emissions cease(MacDougall et al. 2020; Koven, Sanderson and Swann
2023) can affect the levels of CDR needed to achieve a given
climate outcome.

7.3.2 Addressing sustainability risks will beessential
Strategies underlying national net-zero pledges and
NDCs generally tend to feature only conventional landbased CDR, most of which is centred around forestry andagriculture (Smith et al. 2023). Sustainability-related risksof conventional CDR (e.g. afforestation, reforestation,
agroforestry, ecosystem restoration and soil carbon
sequestration) are perceived to be less than those associated254with novel biological CDR methods (e.g. bioenergy withcarbon capture and storage) due to environmental concerns
including land-use change, fertilizer use or irrigation. Cobenefits for biodiversity, ecosystem services and livelihoods,
as well as co-delivery on other international and national
commitments on biodiversity, land degradation and people,
have also propelled the use of conventional CDR approaches.
However, the risks and benefits of CDR depend on themethod used and its implementation and management(e.g. reforestation with native species versus afforestationof non-forest biomes with non-native monocultures).
Competition for land is a pressing issue due to numerous
global demands, including for food production, resource
extraction, infrastructure development, biodiversity andecosystem services conservation and climate change
mitigation. Environmental changes, such as climate change,
may exacerbate land-use competition, due to complex
feedback processes between human and biophysicalcomponents in the land system (Haberl et al. 2014). Croplandand urban expansion therefore also compete with landbased CDR options. Modelling efforts show that croplandexpansion to fulfil future food demand is the primary causeof such competition, with more severe impacts seen in thetropics due to their greater land-based mitigation potential(Zheng et al. 2022). Such findings highlight that careful
spatial planning is essential for sustainable climate policies.
Various land-based CDR options have the potential toenhance biodiversity. An assessment of the biodiversity
impacts of 20 land-based mitigation options showed thatmost options benefit biodiversity. However, a quarter of theassessed options, including bioenergy with carbon captureand storage, decreased mean species abundance, while
afforestation and forest management either positively or
negatively affected biodiversity depending on the local
implementation method and forest conservation schemes
adopted (Nunez, Verboom and Alkemade 2020). Recent
studies explore how ambitious objectives and multiple
targets of biodiversity and climate conventions can be
operationalized spatially and pursued concurrently (e.g.
Soto-Navarro et al. 2020; Jung et al. 2021; Duncanson etal. 2023). Given potential land competition, it is crucial
to identify land areas where the greatest synergies canbe achieved.

7.4

Equity and differentiatedresponsibilities associated with
deploying CDR

Equity and the principle of “common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities” are key
normative pillars of the Paris Agreement. Scientists, analysts
and policymakers have long debated how to operationalize

See Fasihi, Efimova and Breyer (2019) for an in-depth assessment of direct air carbon capture and storage energy requirements.

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

this principle, with a focus on how to set equitable emission
reduction targets (Robiou du Pont et al. 2017; Holz et al. 2018;
Kartha et al. 2018), regional carbon budgets (Raupach et al.
2014) and fair mitigation financial obligations (Pachauri etal. 2022; Semieniuk, Ghosh and Folbre 2023). Relatively little
attention has been paid so far to extending this principle toequitable CDR targets, with some notable exceptions (Fyson
et al. 2020; Mohan et al. 2021; Yuwono et al. 2023).
The global achievement of net-zero GHG emissions does
not imply that all regions achieve net zero at the sametime or contribute the same amount of carbon removal.
The integrated assessment modelling pathways assessedin section 7.2.1 and in chapter 4, show specific regional

patterns associated with cost-effective CDR deployment.
When accounting for cumulative removals between 2020
and 2050, the highest shares of removals are in Asia andLatin America consistently across scenarios (table 7.1).
Both regions tend to have higher removal levels than the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) region when considering both land-based and novel
removals, while other regions have consistently lower levels.
Importantly, these results come from integrated assessment
modelling approaches to achieve climate targets in a global
cost-effective manner and are not necessarily oriented
towards identifying an equitable distribution of efforts(Bauer et al. 2020).

Table 7.1 Shares of cumulative removals in different scenarios between 2020 and 2050 by IPCC WGIII modelling region
IPCC modelling regions

Reformed
economies(R5REF)

Middle East
and Africa(R5MAF)

20 (16–24)%

5 (5–6)%16 (11–17)%

18 (17–25)%

7 (5–8)%13 (9–17)%

19 (18–23)%

8 (6–9)%12 (9–15)%

Asia

Latin
America

OECD

1.5°C

34 (29–36)%

22 (20–26)%

1.8°C

37 (34–43)%

20 (16–23)%

2.0°C

38 (36–43)%

23 (19–25)%

Scenarios consistent with limiting global
warming to specific temperature limits

Note: The median value is shown with the interquartile range in brackets.

Equitable distributions can differ quite significantly fromcost-effective deployment of mitigation options. Fyson et al.
(2020) suggest one possible approach to allocating global
CDR deployment fairly: allocating regional CDR in proportion
to regional emissions that exceed a counterfactual equal per
capita emission pathway. A slightly adapted version of thisapproach 3 is applied to the pathways assessed in section
7.2.1 to illustrate the difference of equitable distributions
from cost-effective deployment. Under this approach,developed countries (taken as the OECD region from chapter
3 of IPCC WGIII AR6) have equitable allocations of around 80
per cent of the cumulative removals deployed between 2020
and 2050 across the three pathway categories (1.5°C, 1.8°C
and 2°C) assessed in section 7.2. This illustrative calculation
demonstrates the importance of extending considerationsof equity under the Paris Agreement while deploying CDR.
Achieving more equitable outcomes in the 2020–2035 timeframe will require two broad strategies, even when novel
forms of CDR such as direct air carbon capture and storage
are available (Gidden, Brutschin et al. 2023), models are
increasing the technical representation of novel CDR: (1)deploying financial transfers at scale to facilitate emission
reductions (Pachauri et al. 2022; Ganti et al. 2023); (2)investing in a broad range of CDR options both domestically3

and internationally to ensure a portfolio of approaches isavailable. The latter is significant as many novel CDR options
are still in the early stages of innovation. Whether they will
be used to help reduce temperatures and in turn long-term
impacts will be decided by future generations.
CDR deployment decisions will also need to take into
account domestic equity considerations. Countries will haveto weigh the potential regressivity of payment schemes aswell as concerns around land competition and food prices(for afforestation, reforestation and bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage), water scarcity and nitrogen pollution(bioenergy with carbon capture and storage), additionalenergy demand (direct air carbon capture and storage)
and health issues due to fine dust (enhanced weathering),
among others (Strefler et al. 2021; Babiker et al. 2022). Landbased CDR deployment raises many of the same equity
concerns as other land-based mitigation activities, including
land tenure conflicts and dispossession, and mainly impacts
poorer and more marginalized rural farmers and workers(McElwee 2023) and Indigenous Peoples, who manage asignificant portion of the world’s land area (Garnett et al.
2018). Unequal power relations and poor governance might
further reduce confidence in and public acceptance of landbased CDR options (DeFries et al. 2022).

The approach is adapted from the original paper in the following ways: (1) the starting year for the calculation of excess emissions is 2005 as opposed
to 1990, because the data set developed by Gidden, Brutschin et al. (2023) models are increasing the technical representation of novel CDR since 2005;
and (2) the approach is applied to net CO 2 emissions (considering only the direct land component) as opposed to the aggregated six GHGs listed in
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol (the Kyoto “basket”).

55

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

Frameworks to guide national priorities in balancing
domestic equity considerations, intergenerational equity
concerns and the possible contribution of CDR to meet NDCs
through emerging carbon markets for removals are currently
missing and will be important to advance policy discussions
as a foundation for equitable future CDR deployment.

Bergek 2004; Grubler and Wilson eds. 2013). Given thescale of removals at the time of net-zero CO 2 or GHG
emissions described in scenarios, this platform for scaling
up technologies is essential. The empirical literature on
formative phases shows that the length of this period ishighly variable, with an average estimate of around 20 years(Bento and Wilson 2016).

7.5

The highly successful technology of solar photovoltaics(PV) is a specific example of a technology in a formative
phase and offers insight for the development of CDR
approaches, such as small-scale direct air carbon captureand storage. In this case, the first commercial applicationof solar PV occurred in 1957, took 60 years to becomecost-competitive and is now still a couple of decades awayfrom widespread adoption. If small-scale direct air carbon
capture and storage were to follow the path of solar PV,
it would require a much faster progression through its
formative phase to reach gigaton scale by mid-century. The
development of expectations of large, reliable and growing
markets is a repeated finding in innovation studies, as
already emphasized in the Emissions Gap Report 2018, andwill be crucial for CDR too. The research literature highlights
the importance of local context and distinct factors, andthe crucial but gradual progression in the period just before
scale-up that takes decades rather than years. Two robust
common implications are first, the need for strong policy
support and second, urgency in delivering that support given
the inherent lags in the innovation system.

Scaling up CDR will require dedicatedpolicies and innovation

Deliberate CDR policymaking is still scarce, apart from in theEuropean Union, the United Kingdom and the United Statesof America. CDR has only just entered the climate policy
debate in recent years, mainly as an unavoidable componentof meeting net-zero CO 2 and GHG targets (IPCC 2022a). Onlya few Governments have begun to specify the role of CDR
in domestic climate policy explicitly through CDR strategies
and policies. Overall, robust plans for CDR implementation
are still scarce and policymaking remains largely incremental(Smith et al. 2023). While more than 100 countries have
set net-zero emission targets, only a few countries include
clear information on CDR in their NDCs and long-term lowemission development strategies. Most Governments have
not yet expressed how large the contribution of CDR should
be in reaching net-zero emissions and which CDR methods
this might entail. Where this has been specified, removal via
forests and soils is the most common approach, even in
mid-century strategies (Smith, Vaughan and Forster 2022;
Smith et al. 2023). Examples of dedicated CDR policy andgovernance exist mainly at the national level and primarily
in developed countries (Schenuit et al. 2021). In multilateral
initiatives, CDR only has a limited role at present (e.g. theMission Innovation CDR). In the context of the UNFCCC,
the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body has been mandated by theParties to provide methodological guidance on CDR before
the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties
to the UNFCCC (COP 28).
This lack of concrete incentive frameworks is one of thereasons why there is currently almost no CDR deployment
beyond the LULUCF sector. Comparing the current CDR levelof 2 GtCO 2 to mid-century annual removals in scenarios
compatible with reaching the Paris Agreement long-term
temperature goal reveals a large discrepancy of several
gigatons per year. In the absence of a more supportive policy
environment than that indicated in existing NDCs and longterm low-emission development strategies, or the lack of
CDR in national climate policy (Schenuit et al. 2021; Smithet al. 2023), this discrepancy is likely to persist and evengrow, considering that the transition from first commercial
deployment of a new technology to widespread adoption
takes decades and not just a few years.
A large body of innovation research shows that newtechnologies must pass through a formative phase:the period between first commercial deployment tothe beginning of widespread adoption (Jacobsson and

56

There are already signs that CDR innovations are in motion.
As Smith et al. (2023) show, the number of CDR-related
patents have increased and are spread across a broader
set of CDR technologies, indicating an acceleration ininventive activity and a healthy innovation system. Funding
and entrepreneurial activity in CDR are also increasing.
Furthermore, niche markets, such as voluntary purchasefor removals, are providing the early support for novel
CDR demand, with the possibility of initiating a positive
feedback process of learning in which adoption begets cost
reductions and performance improvements. Still, this isjust the beginning. Stronger support is becoming an urgent
priority if novel CDR is to play a gigaton-scale role in thelonger term.

7.6

Political priorities for action areneededWith the enhancement of carbon sinks forming part ofclimate change mitigation (Honegger, Burns and Morrow2021), CDR governance challenges are in many respects
similar to those related to emission reductions, and similar
policy instruments, such as research, development anddemonstration funding, carbon pricing, tax or investment
credits, certification schemes and public procurement, will
be relevant (Babiker et al. 2022). Effectively integrating CDR
into Governments’ climate policy portfolios should therefore

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Recordbuild on pre-existing rules, procedures and instruments.
Furthermore, there is a need to include learnings fromshortcomings in the governance of land-based mitigationand to have a special focus on local conditions (Fridahl etal. 2020; Mace et al. 2021; Rickels et al. 2021; IPCC 2022b).
Beyond a political commitment to formally integrate CDR
into existing climate policy frameworks, four priority policy
action areas can be identified for the short to medium term.

7.6.1 Political priorities need to be established andsignalled
For countries with net-zero or net-negative emission targets,the core governance question is not whether CDR should
be mobilized, but which CDR approaches Governments
want to see deployed by whom, by when, at which volumes
and in which ways (Babiker et al. 2022). The choice of CDR
approaches and the scale and timing of their deployment
will depend on the respective ambitions for gross emission
reductions, feasibility and viability limitations, how theirunintended impacts can be managed and how politicalpreferences and social acceptability evolve (Bellamy 2018;
Forster et al. 2020; Waller et al. 2020; Smith et al. 2023).
To avoid CDR being misperceived as a substitute for deep
emission reductions, the prioritization of emission cuts canbe signalled and achieved with differentiated target setting
for reductions and removals (Geden, Peters and Scott 2019;
McLaren et al. 2019).
This needs to include the LULUCF sector, for which only
net fluxes tend to be highlighted in NDCs, long-term lowemission development strategies (Fyson and Jeffery2019) and national strategies, whereas national inventory
reports differentiate between land-based emissions andremovals. Similarly, subtargets are conceivable for different
types of CDR, to prioritize preferred methods according
to characteristics such as removal processes or storage
timescales (Smith 2021). Transparent information about
expected levels and types of CDR (e.g. through mandatory
inclusion in the ‘information to facilitate clarity, transparency
and understanding’ tables in NDCs) will also enable policy
debates about assumptions around the level of residual
emissions in and beyond the first year of net-zero emissions(Buck et al. 2023a).

7.6.2 Robust measurement, reporting andverification systems are needed
To maintain credibility in the CDR sector while driving
innovation and growth, measurement, reporting andverification frameworks for CDR methods will need to be
developed and adapted to new CDR approaches (e.g. newmeasurement techniques or modelling tools).
S ome measurement, repor ting and verif ication
methodologies already exist for project-based accountingof both LULUCF-related and novel CDR methods, but alack of coordination and minimum standards, especiallyfor voluntary carbon markets, leads to an inconsistentpatchwork of measurement, reporting and verification
approaches (Arcusa and Sprenkle-Hyppolite 2022; Mercer
and Burke 2023). In contrast, accounting for national
inventories under the UNFCCC has been established forconventional land-based CDR methods and some novel
methods such as biochar and bioenergy with carbon captureand storage, but similar methods have yet to be developed
and agreed upon for direct air carbon capture and storage
or enhanced rock weathering, for example. Such agreed
methodologies are crucial to make deployment eligible forconsideration under national or supranational complianceregimes (Lebling, Schumer and Riedl 2023).
In the context of the UNFCCC, the priority must be todevelop accounting rules for CDR and establish trusted
measurement, reporting and verification frameworks, mainly
based on methodological work carried out by the IPCC’s Task
Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. This can bedone, on the one hand, by strengthening rules for land-based
biological removals (most importantly addressing preexisting permanence and saturation challenges – see Maceet al. 2021), and on the other hand, by creating additional
guidance for novel CDR methods, for which there is aneed. For some methods, the measurement, reporting andverification of carbon flows will be relatively straightforward(e.g. direct air carbon capture and storage), whereas othermethods still lack foundational science, particularly those
operating in open-loop systems (e.g. enhanced weathering)(Mercer and Burke 2023).
Currently, measurement, reporting and verification andcertification methodologies for novel CDR methods beyond
LULUCF are being developed mainly in the European Union,
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, withthe latter already investigating measurement, reporting andverification for a wide range of marine methods (Cross etal. 2023). In the medium term, such methodologies will be
relevant not only for national inventory reporting but also
in the context of establishing international carbon trading
under the Paris Agreement’s article 6.4 mechanism.
However, these methodologies need to be globally vetted
and accepted as part of UNFCCC reporting standards aswell as national inventory rules. The latter are currently
based on IPCC guidelines from 2006 and 2019, which areunlikely to be expanded without the explicit request ofnational Governments.

7.6.3 The need to enhance synergies andco-benefits
CDR approaches can have multiple benefits for adaptation,
mitigation and other social and environmental goals. In somecases, these benefits may be a core motivator for adoption.
For example, improved soil water retention is a key motivatorfor farmers to adopt practices that sequester soil carbon(Fleming et al. 2019; Gosnell, Gill and Voyer 2019; Buckand Palumbo-Compton 2022), and farm resilience, income
diversification and food security can be important drivers of57

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

agroforestry adoption (Muthee et al. 2022). Co-benefits are
not limited to land-based CDR. In fact, scientists are studying
how forest biomass with carbon capture and storage canreduce the risk of wildfires when paired with forest thinning
projects (Sanchez et al. 2021; Elias et al. 2023). Social cobenefits for industrial CDR with carbon capture and storage
could include jobs or economic revenue in areas and fields
affected by the energy transition (Romig 2021).
Dedicated policy design can enhance such synergies.
For example, through government action to support
improvements in CDR measurement, reporting andverification so that adaptation projects can have anadditional revenue stream (Buck et al. 2020), or throughplanned actions that consider decarbonization and CDR
together, and not just in terms of developing bioenergy
via carbon capture and sequestration for hydrogen andelectricity generation, but also considering how hydrogenor synthetic fuels may be co-products of direct ocean-based
capture and sequestration (Digdaya et al. 2020). Considering
CDR in mitigation and adaptation infrastructure planning
can help ensure that potential co-benefits from CDR cometo fruition.

58

7.6.4 Innovation and learning needs to beaccelerated
Proceeding through the early years of CDR’s formative
phase will require various demonstration projects, forwhich a cost-reducing learning-by-doing process can be
put in place (Lackner and Azarabadi 2021). For example,
the Department of Energy of the United States of America
will provide US$3.5 billion in federal support for four regional
Direct Air Capture (DAC) hubs, with the United States
Government also funding the feasibility and design studies
of 19 other DAC projects at varying stages of technologicalreadiness. Similarly, emerging programmes for bioenergy
with carbon capture and storage in Sweden and the United
Kingdom will provide valuable progress during the “middle”
of the formative phase for CDR technologies.
Furthermore, the coming years of CDR development provide
an opportunity for societal learning about the sustainability
impacts of novel CDR (Honegger, Michaelowa and Roy 2021;
Madhu et al. 2021; Fuhrman et al. 2023). Insight on a large setof issues can be gleaned from experiments, demonstrations
and small-scale deployment. These issues include public
acceptance, distributional effects, affordability, life cycle
analysis, biodiversity, resource consumption, competition
for land and interactions among CDR approaches (Buck2016; Erans et al. 2022; Owen, Burke and Serin 2022), as
well as future costs (Shayegh, Bosetti and Tavoni 2021).

Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

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Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record

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