KOYAMA : The Influence and Damage caused by the Nuclear
商学論集
Disaster第on81
Fukushima’s
巻第 4 号 Agriculture
2013 年 3 月【論文】

The Influence and Damage caused by the Nuclear Disasteron Fukushima’s Agriculture
KOYAMA Ryota

Abstract
This paper firstly focuses on the critical issue of radioactive contamination.

Secondly, we evaluate theeffects of the nuclear disaster on the regional economy, agriculture and community in Fukushima Prefecture.

Finally, the locality and industrial structure there is deeply considered.

To do so, the way how theinspections and distribution of agricultural goods and products should be enacted in radioactive-polluted areas, isexamined for the agricultural industry in future.
Keywords : Nuclear Disaster, Fukushima Agriculture, Radioactive Contamination, Damage Compensation

1.

Introduction

So far, the overall influence of the nuclear disaster on the local society, economy, and industry of
Fukushima Prefecture remains unclear. Unlike the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, the Fukushima
nuclear disaster resulted in an unprecedented international incident because the population density there
was larger compared to the contaminated areas in the USSR. In addition, residents there must continue
to live and farm as the restoration and recovery are making progress. Therefore, it is difficult to directly
apply past issues to this case straightly. Though two years has passed since the nuclear disaster, there
are still no prospects for a resolution to the issue of radioactive contamination. Japan has implemented
some decontamination projects. however, the accurate radioactive contamination of all agricultural land
has not been investigated yet. Without making a contamination map, systematic decontamination cannot be proceeded and a restoration plan cannot be drawn up. Therefore, it is necessary for policy makers there to make a systemized investigation.
This paper examines the influence of the nuclear disaster on the local society, economy, and industryof Fukushima Prefecture and clarifies the correct scope of the damage, particularly for agriculture. In
addition, some countermeasures are considered against economic damage caused by rumors, which is an
issue with emergency recovery, as well as a framework for clarifying the structure of damages :Flow : regional products
Stock : regional property
Social capital : infrastructure
As long as such a systematic analysis of the current situation is not performed, it will remain impossible
to determine a practical recovery plan. This is precisely the greatest reason for confusion within thecontaminated regions.

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Characteristics of agriculture in Fukushima Prefecture and the issue of radioactive contamination

As illustrated in Figure 1, Fukushima Prefecture is divided largely into three districts : Hamadori,
Nakadori, and Aizu. The current nuclear disaster occurred in Futaba-gun, situated in the Hamadori district. The radioactive contamination spreads from the center of Hamadori through the northern area of
Nakadori which is called the Kempoku region, and the center of Nakadori called the Kenchu region.
According to the map, areas with systematic evacuations and restricted entries have been labeled as
A : restricted planting districts. This is the area where efforts have been made to create a horticultural
production area recently (the Soma and Futaba greenbelt plan), decided by the Fukushima Prefecture
Agricultural Promotion Plan. Therefore long-term employment-type horticultural production companies had been established. Furthermore, the prefecture embarked upon an agricultural land improvement project, the introduction of collective crop conversion, formation of open-air vegetables cultivation
areas (e.g. broccoli, tomatoes, and so on), and implementation of community farming area. This last israre in Fukushima Prefecture paddy field agriculture, which strongly emphasizes individual administration. In other words, because the region received strategic agricultural investments, the influence ofthe evacuation of citizens and planting restrictions was not limited to loss of the annual harvest. Moreover in Abukumakouchi, high-land where stock breeding has been developed, the dairy farms faced
issues of raw milk contamination. In addition, the region has invested money and effort over an

Nakadori
Fruit (Peaches)+ Paddy fields

Paddy

Paddy field and Horticulture(Tomatoes)

Ａ：Restricted
planting district

Mutual Green belt

Livestock
Abukumakouchi

Ｃ: districts hurt by financial
damage caused by rumors

Aizu Bandaisan

Paddy field and Horticulture(Asparagus)

Paddy fields
andHorticulture

Hamadori

Ｂ：Partial Distribution Restrictied
district

Paddy fields and Horticulture(cucumber)

Aizu

Paddy fields andHorticulture

Paddy fields +Fruit (Pears)
Horticulture

Figure1 Characteristics
of inagriculture
in Fukushima
prefctureand responseto radioactive contamination
Figure1: Characteristics
of agriculture
Fukushima prefcture
and responseto radioactive
contaminationmaterial: preparedby the authormaterial: prepared by the author― 12 ―KOYAMA : The Influence and Damage caused by the Nuclear Disaster on Fukushima’s Agriculture

extended period of time in implementing livestock branding such as Date free-range chickens, Kawamata
gamefowl, and Iitate beef. As demonstrated by the systematic evacuation of Iitate Village, radioactive
contamination does not spread in consecutive circles but rather it depends on the geological features andclimatic conditions. These semi-mountainous livestock and agricultural areas have become highly contaminated with radioactivity.
We can confirm the serious fact that radioactive contamination also spread to the northern (Fukushima City, Population of 290,000) and central area (Koriyama City, Population of 340,000) of Nakadori1. In these areas, constant measurements indicate an air radiation level of 1.5 μSv/h as of May 2011
(the normal level for Japan being 0.05-0.08). However, hotspots have also been observed ; contamination was scattered in a mosaic pattern. Areas with soil pollution of 1,000-5,000 becquerels/kg arewidespread ; some areas have been observed to comprise agricultural land containing 5,000-10,000 Bq/
kg, which exceeds planting restriction standards. Many administrative bodies such as prefectural
offices, educational institutions, and regional corporate headquarters are intensively located in the Nakadori district. Furthermore, Nakadori holds both an area providing traffic infrastructure such as the
Tohoku Shinkansen and National Highway No. 4 and a distribution hub for various regions of
Tohoku. Nakadori’s agriculture is based on rice cultivation, while being an integral agricultural community endowed with horticulture/fruit tree cultivation as the definitive product of the prefecture. The significance of Nakadori agriculture is great. At present, a portion of agricultural products have been
restricted from distribution.distribution. The Aizu district is situated more than 100 km away from the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant ; radioactive contamination is light in this district. Air radiationlevels were measured at 0.16 μSv/h in Aizuwakamatsu, and 0.07 μSv/h in Minamiaizu (as of January2012). Radioactive material in the soil did not exceed 1,000 Bq/kg. However, the original distribution
regulations framework mandated a complete restriction on distribution within a prefecture if any agricultural production was found to exceed temporary regulatory values ; as such, Aizu also faced distribution
restrictions. Subsequently, regulations were revised to apply to respective cities, towns, and villages ;however, the area was exposed to economic damage caused by harmful rumors and misinformation.
Three months later the nuclear accident, the issue of agricultural product distribution restrictions inFukushima Prefecture has been announced, focusing on livestock and horticulture. In the months following the season for exporting fruit, the chief commodities of the prefecture (apples, peaches and pears
from July) and rice (Aizu Koshihikari from October) arrived and restrictions on the export of bothresulted in rumors. Henceforth, the issue will be whether we can (1) create a system for inspecting
radioactive contamination, (2) construct an easy approach to understand the distribution system, and (3)work out an accurate method for information transfer to overcome rumors.
3.

Problems with the food inspection system and contradictions evident in Fukushima

A)

Food inspection system in Fukushima Prefecture
In Fukushima Prefecture, after rice crops were declared safe, some rices that were detected withover 500 Bq/kg, i.e., above the temporary regulatory value, had been found one after another. If we consider safety and peace of mind, then this is the worst phenomenon that could have occurred. As a1

See “Results of Airborne Monitoring by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the
U.S. Department of Energy” (announced April 5, 2011).
1304797_0506.pdf― 13 ―

http://radioactivity.mext.go.jp/old/en/1280/2011/05/

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result, all shipments of rice were delayed, regardless of whether contracts had been finalized before rice
above the regulatory value was detected. Though levels far below those of regulatory values were
found in rice from the Aizu district and the level of radiation contamination was virtually undetectable,
the sales of rice proved to be difficult nevertheless proved difficult. According to an emergency surveyof radioactive contamination of rice conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries(MAFF) and Fukushima Prefecture, product with levels exceeding 500 Bq/kg accounted for 0.3% of thetotal rice produced and crop that exceeded the new standard level of 100 Bq/kg commanded only 2.3% of
the total. Regardless of this fact, circulation of all rice produced in Fukushima Prefecture was stopped.
It can only be said that this problem was a result of the inspection system. According to inspection
methods during the first year after the nuclear accident, farms could generally freely choose what to plant
as long as cesium on agricultural land was below 5,000 Bq/kg. At the stage when product was ready for
harvest, samples were examined and the crop was approved for distribution as long as the sample wasfound to be below regulatory values. In case where the sample was found to exceed regulatory values
resulted in the restriction of all distribution within the area (first, municipalities ; now revised to former
town/village level). In other words, the inspection system comprised of the following points. 1) Crops
could be produced without restriction of shipment, 2) Measuring product for radiation and then deciding
whether to allow distribution, 3) Conducting a survey of one sample from the selected produce from theformer municipality. This system has a great flaw.
Radioactive material and contamination has been proven to disperse widely. This effect was alreadyunderstood from surveys of the nuclear incident at Chernobyl and should have been assumed from the
beginning when drafting Fukushima countermeasures. Radioactive material indicators differ with eacharea of cultivated field and each agricultural area. Specimens were selected as survey samples throughthe process of random sampling. For the sampling survey results to hold significance within the entire
agricultural area, it must be assumed that radioactive material follows a normal distribution. However,contaminants are not expelled from the source evenly but rather scatter irregularly. Maps of the actual
contamination conditions show that the contaminants scattered in a mosaic pattern. Observing the stateof contamination dispersion, an organizational flaw of the present survey system allowed agricultural produce that was overlooked by the survey to be distributed. While survey organizations remain limited,
inspectors have no choice but to conduct sample surveys before distribution. Henceforth, efforts must
be made to raise sample accuracy. In addition, sample survey accuracy must be raised by creating adetailed contamination map, dividing districts according to the division of agricultural land into areas ofhigh concentration, medium concentration, and low concentration, and performing sample selection
according to pollution indicators. Even with the latter approach, it is important to realize the current
state of contamination.
B)

Realities of the nuclear disasterOn February 2012, the Reconstruction Agency office was finally established, 11 months after thedisaster and nuclear accident. Branch Office were established in Iwaki and Soma. It has been notedthat these institutions were responsible for taking measures to mitigate the effects of both the earthquake and nuclear disaster. However, problems surrounding the nuclear disaster were deeply
rooted ; the scope of this endeavor spanned both Miyagi and Iwate prefectures and involved 30 different
systems. No one predicted a nuclear disaster, there was no agency tasked with addressing such a longterm problem, and it was considered within the framework of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
Furthermore, the cabinet decided in February to establish the “Act on Special Measures Concerning― 14 ―KOYAMA : The Influence and Damage caused by the Nuclear Disaster on Fukushima’s Agriculture

Fukushima Recovery,” addressing recovery from the Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd. Fukushima Daiichi
Accident. This act did have a “sweetener ;” it included business incentives and preferential tax treatment aimed at Fukushima Prefecture, an area contaminated by radioactive materials. However, an issue
with this act is that development of plans was entrusted entirely to local municipal governments. Sucha situation is the same for developing nuclear disaster recovery and decontamination plans.
The method implemented for recovery and restoration from the tsunami and earthquake was a plan
for advancing community development involving outside consultants working together with each municipal government to designate special economic zone ideas2̶in other words, a top–down political decision
process. On the other hand, no government guidelines were issued in reference to the nuclear disaster(or if there were limited guidelines, local understanding was lacking) ; circumstances continued to evolvein which all decisions were left to local governments, which groped in the dark for a plan without validmaterials or data.
There were no government guidelines or timeline for responding to a nuclear disaster because writers of government guidelines did not anticipate the situation and did not direct accurate analysis of theextent of contamination. This process, wherein Japan did not initially contend with the issue, further
magnifying damage, was also noted in the results of research into the Minamata disease3.
Is it possible for effective decontamination to proceed without a detailed contamination map thatmeasures the spread of nuclear contamination ? Is it possible to construct a food safety survey system
without understanding the circumstances of a radioactive contamination event ? Is it possible to plan forlife without a systemized health survey or to decide upon and implement a recovery plan without taking
into account the inhabitants’ need for peace of mind ?
The reality of the nuclear disaster is that the first responsibility for mitigating the disaster goes tothe power company business employees and organizations supervising their actions. These did not takeactions that should have been taken, resulting in the scattering of radioactive material across the country. The government, which did not take valid countermeasures, did not survey present damages, anddid not confirm the state of radioactive contamination, is largely responsible for the disaster. A large
portion of the rumor-caused economic damage could have been overcome by measures after the accident. At the very least, the government should have been able to prevent the exacerbation of theissue. It would have been possible to prevent in advance the rice straw, beef, rice, and concrete problems by conducting detailed surveys of the damage due to radioactive contamination. This issue waspointed out locally prior to the incident.
C)

Composition contradictions held by the Fukushima Prefecture
Many research institutions and corporations established presences in Fukushima Prefecture to conduct research and technological development. The chief of these was decontamination technology
which, if selected by Japan or municipal governments, would result in a great amount of decontaminationrelated business. The national budget concerned with decontamination comprised approximately 453.6
billion yen (requested in one sum by the Ministry of the Environment) and for the period of 2012-2013
amounted to 1.1482 trillion yen, with appropriations from the Cabinet Office.
There are some issues with decontamination technology ; however, the greatest issue is that eachorganization or region was conducting disconnected technological development or investigation and the2

See Hamano (2012).

3

See Harada (2004).

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creation of plans for decontamination were entrusted to each municipal government body. The spreadof radioactive material transcends municipal governments and has no concern for administrative districts. For this reason, there was no reason to emphasize the boundaries of Fukushima Prefecture. “Hot areas” also exist in Tochigi, Ibaraki, and Miyagi prefectures.
What we shoud do is the establishment of a functioning center of comprehensive information andresearch comprising a database of various combined research results. Construction of a research system for disaster recovery has been required, which does not represent “business model” by which universities, institutions, and corporations compete each other in research and development. The needs ofareas contaminated by radiation are expressed by this single fact. Already over one year has passed
since the nuclear accident occurred ; however, no location for listening to local concerns over the centralization of information and establishment of a base of research has been established as of yet. This isperhaps the most necessary function among the roles necessitated for the recovery government and the
Fukushima recovery department.
Why, is there not more protest from the inhabitants of the Fukushima Prefecture ? The truth isthat the region face a composition of contradictions. Enthusiastic efforts to turn toward recovery andreconstruction are being conducted in Fukushima. They are attracting tourism and promoting sales ofagricultural produce from the region. Fukushima aid events persistently advance recovery
efforts. This reflects that the nuclear disaster was not so extensive. On the other hand, the number of
independent evacuees is increasing and a large amount of damage has been caused by the stagnation ofregional industry, economy, and so on. How can a solution for this be demanded from the government
and Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd ? As a nation, this thought is connected to the following two logicalquestions. 1) Why is decontamination needed if the government has declared it safe ? and 2) Should a
fee for the inconvenience caused to people be charged to Tokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd. ?
We cannot condemn those present at the affected locations. The desire for returning to normal lifeand early recovery would occur in the same fashion even if the nuclear disaster had hit anotherregion. The issue lies in the social landscape in which voices wishing for an early recovery are confronted with the underestimation of damages and coincides with the interests of the perpetrators of thisunderestimation. Perpetrators work in safety without grasping the reality of the situation and the present analysis, and they do not understand the true damages incurred in the current disaster. For this reason, true recovery and restoration can be neither established nor put into practice. Essentially, whether
it is safe cannot be determined without discussing the present analysis and accurate information on which
it is based.
There is some public access to information regarding cesium (e.g., the 2-km graphed contaminationmap). However, only a portion of the publicly available information depicts visualizations of the diffusion
patterns in regard to plutonium and strontium ; there is no established organized inspection/monitoring
system. National political policy omitted the fact-gathering stage and instead suddenly declared thatless than 100 mSv/year, or up to 20 mSv/year, is permissible. Before discussing its scientific foundation,
the issue should be whether this is a standard that can be accepted by society. The desire to declare it
safe and anxiety of not understanding the current contamination conditions are the greatest contradictions faced by those affected.

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4.

Damages and CompensationA)

Three types of damage caused to agriculture.
Damage caused by radioactive contamination can be perceived in three frameworks.
(1) Flow damage is the real economic harm due to the portion of products that could not be sold,such as agricultural products that could not be planted because of restrictions or those held up because of
distribution restrictions, and the portion of the loss of value caused by rumors. This accounts for thecurrent retroactive increase in claims for damages.
According to Table 1, damages to agricultural production produced in areas, where planting restrictions/partial distribution restrictions were implemented, were calculated to be 41.9% of the prefectural
total or 107.7 billion yen. In other words, if farmers receive 100 billion yen in compensation, they canfor the time being voluntarily restrict distribution of their agricultural produce, secure funds necessary
for current living and farming needs, and utilize the money for future countermeasures. For Tokyo
Electric Co., Ltd., considering that the cost of the nuclear accident, which was calculated in this year’s
deficit, was 1.3 trillion yen, the area can cope with this limited compensation.
(2) Stock Damage includes material funds, damage to the production infrastructure, radioactive
contamination of agricultural land, facilities for evacuation, and usage restrictions on machinery. At
present, damage surveys have yet to cover this. In order to measure damage incurred to agriculturalland, an accurate radioactive contamination map must be drafted and soil analysis of individual portions ofcultivated land must be conducted.
(3) What is important is the loss of society-related capital. Till date, a great variety of tangible
and intangible damages have paid to cover such things as investments into creating production areas
within the region, regional brands, human resources, a foundation necessary for establishing a region,
network structure, community, and cultural capital. Furthermore, evacuated areas have lost the ability
to utilize resources and funds for ten-odd years. Answering the questions of how can this loss be measured and how can gaps in countermeasures be filled is exceedingly important. At present, the need fora review board for compensating damages has been entirely ignored.

Table 1

State of Agricultural Product Damages in areas effected by the Nuclear Disasterproduct

Vegetables

Livestock

Fruit

Rice

Regional
Total

Fukushima PrefectureTotal

evacuated/restricted area
share（%）

42.4

68.0

48.9

35.9

̶

̶

evacuated/restricted area
ratio（100 million yen）

225

346

135

371

1,077

2,568

evacuated/restricted area
ratio（%）

8.8

13.5

5.2

14.4

41.9

100.0

item

Source : The Tohoku Department of Agricultural Administration “MAFF Statistics”
Note 1）Evacuated/restricted areas are calculated from portions of the north and central areas of the prefecturethat have records of distribution restrictions and evacuation/entering restrictions.
Note 2）Evacuated/restricted areas share is a ratio of the appropriate region’s production comprising the total for
Fukushima Prefecture for each agricultural produce type.

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B)State of damage compensation for agricultural produce
The Fukushima JA group established the “JA Group Tokyo Electric Co., Ltd. Nuclear Accident
Agriculture and Livestock Damage Compensation Countermeasures Convention of Fukushima Prefecture” on April 26. This comprises all JA within Fukushima Prefecture as well as 35 other organizations,
including the All-island Prefectural Headquarters, Prefectural Dairy Association, Livestock Recovery
Association, Prefectural farm managers organization Liaison Assembly, and Prefectural Mushroom Promotion Assembly. The executive office has taken the burden of the Central JA Union for Fukushima
Prefecture. Every month since its establishment, the prefectural association general meeting has been
held to decide upon the amount demanded for compensation of damages and bring these demands toTokyo Electric Power Co., Ltd. So far, the amount of compensation demanded (as of May 2012) amounts
to 62.5 billion yen. The amount of money received accounts for 73% of the amount claimed.
Claims for compensation according to Table 2 can be broken down into 1.1 billion yen for rice, 13 billion yen for horticulture, 6.2 billion yen for fruit, 1.8 billion yen for milk, 9.9 billion yen for livestock, 8.5
billion yen for other livestock related damages, 2.7 billion for pasture, 16.3 billion yen for untilled land(compensation for suspension of work), and 3 billion yen for damage to business.
Many problems have been pointed out in regard to claims for damages submitted to Tokyo ElectricPower Co., Ltd, but those issues related to Fukushima Prefecture agriculture and agriculture cooperative
include ; (1) delays in payment (payment on a three month basis), (2) not paying the full amount claimed,(3) denying claims when people restrain themselves from production and distribution voluntarily, (4)claims related to property damage, (5) compensation for discontinuation of business, (6) the closing dateissue (compensation period), (7) business damages of organizations such as the JA, and (8) support fordamages not clearly specified in the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation guidelines.
The Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture is undertaking countermeasures to support funds
for farmers who sustained damages. The union is organizing zero interest funds in coordination with

Table 2

Breakdown of Fukushima Prefecture Union Compensation Claims（Present May
1, 2012）
Monetary value（100 million yen）

Percentage（%）

Rice

11

1.8

Horticulture

130

20.8

Fruit

62

9.9

Milk

18

2.9

Livestock disposal

99

15.8

Other livestock damages

85

13.6

Pasture27

4.3

Untilled land（compensation for suspension of
work）

163

26.1

Business damages

30

4.8

625

100.0

Claims Details

Total
Source : Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture― 18 ―KOYAMA : The Influence and Damage caused by the Nuclear Disaster on Fukushima’s Agriculture

Fukushima Prefecture and aid from the Central Federation of Societies of Commerce and Industry for theimmediate needs of those union member farmers who fell victim to the disaster (Farmers management
stability funds). Funds for compensating national and prefectural level deal with beef distribution
restrictions help projects support emergency management of national companies raising cattle for consumption, measures for support of emergency rice straw provisions, and in Fukushima Prefecture projects for measures to allow undisturbed distribution of cattle and programs sponsoring free rice straw.
How to proceed with the issue of compensation for those things, which is not noted within thisframework is still unclear. In areas where restrictions were placed on planting, standard compensation
per 10 are is guranteed ; however, in reality, issues with uniform compensation exist, including differences in the amount of produts per 10 are, discrepancies in farming method (e.g., organic farming,), andthe rise and fall of the added value of produce. At present, compensation claims negotiations are being
conducted separately ; however, realistically it is quite difficult for an individual farmer to independently
negotiate claims. For example, compensation for areas with new planting restrictions as of 2012 wasmeasured at 59,000 yen per 10 are ; however, in reality, cases existed whereby people who purchased
rice for their own consumption and managed maintenance themselves fell into a deficit. This amountcannot be considered compensation. Similar issues have been identified in connection with the questionof compensation, which takes into account living property in evacuation areas.
5. Conclusion
In order to resolve the problems being currently faced by Fukushima Prefectural agriculture, wehave no choice but to drastically reexamine the way in which the inspection of radioactive materials is
conducted. Thus far, the inspections and regulations concerned with food and agriculture were conducted within Japan’s vertically segmented administration through : (1) soil surveys and inspection ofagricultural produce by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, (2) monitoring of air radiation levels by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Science and Technology, (3) regulation
value determination of food products conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare,and (4) training regarding food safety conducted by the Consumer Affairs Agency. The government did
not indicate fundamental national policies, and each agency was left to independently improvise its
actions in pieces. This disallowed exhaustive utilization of investigation results in the realization of production and distribution countermeasures, clearly resulting in at least one of either the “rice distribution
restriction/planting restriction problem.” Systemizing investigations of radioactive materials would
allow for unified control over production, distribution or consumption, and experimental work/agricultural
leadership.
A map of agricultural land pollution is a source document for policy making, and can be practicallyapplied to a cross section of fields related to evacuation instructions and rescinding, decontamination, andagricultural countermeasures. A map depicting the visualization of radiation levels in the sphere of daily
existence could also be used by local residents as a resource for choosing methods for decreasing external exposures in their daily lives. At present, the contamination map drafted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology is a 2-km gridded map. A detailed survey needs to be
conducted. In order to conduct a factual investigation, it is important that : (1) the Recovery Officemanages the investigation comprehensively, (2) the investigation be made according to the level of damage incurred in an area, (3) central government reacts more quickly to respond to the level of damage, (4) the government maintains the budget by adopting simple techniques for restraining expenses,― 19 ―

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and (5) the Recovery Office utilizes the maximum amount of power held by the government, research
institutions, local people, and private businesses in surveys.
Regardless of whether the data from germanium solid-state detectors are scientifically accurate, thisdata has been positioned merely as the data utilized for judging “distribution permissions.” If we link
data from : (1) the radioactive material content of agricultural produce, (2) cultivated land position data,and (3) soil composition data, it is possible to complete a database of the rate of transfer of radioactive
material to agricultural produce and a contamination map according to different commodities. If we
assemble this type of source material, it will be possible to encourage use of produced vegetables unaffected by the transfer of radioactive materials.
Japan’s central and local government should introduce an approval system for voluntary food productinspections, the need for which began to increase gradually in the summer of 2011. Japan should :(1) consider results reports for the government as a prescreening for obligatory monitoring inspections,(2) prevent misinterpretation of inspection results related to the spread of financially damaged rumors,and (3) instruct retailers and distributers regarding indications related to radioactive materials that areconnected to food safety and peace of mind. In 2012, when simple food product measurement inspection
units were established for each area, education regarding inspection manuals, technology instruction for
those responsible for taking measurements, and interpretation of inspection results holds greater significance.
One further issue of importance is the construction of a system that allows results of experimental
work done by universities or research institutions to rapidly be fed back into regional agriculture and connected to “the recovery of food and agriculture.” If we do not take measures now, reviving and resettling agricultural regions cannot be done after a great majority of farmers abandon their profession. This
will increase the amount of abandoned agricultural land, regardless of whether research results are published years from now. What is needed now for Fukushima Prefecture is to become the nexus forresearch promoting factual investigation and technological development in connection with municipalities
and local citizens, for research to be promptly made public, and for effective countermeasures to be
spread rapidly and systematically implemented.
[note]A portion of this manuscript is being revised according to cited literature [2][3][References]［ 1 ］ KOYAMA Ryota, KOMATSU Tomomi, and ISHII Hideki, (2012) Houshanou osen kara shoku to nou no saisei wo［Thereproduction of food and agriculture from the radiation contamination］, Ienohikari Shuppan. (jp)［ 2 ］ KOYAMA Ryota, (2012) “Fukushima Ken niokeru houshanou osen mondai to shoku no anzen taisaku”［Radiation
contamination problem in Fukushima Prefecture and security precaution of food］, Fukkou no Ibuki, Nousan Gyoson Bunka Kyoukai, pp. 151-193. (jp)［ 3 ］ KOYAMA Ryota, (2012) “Genshiryoku saigai ga Fukusima ken nougyou gyoson ni ataeta eikyou”［Influence of thenuclear disaster upon Fukushima Prefecture agriculture and farm village］, Nihon Nougyou Nempo, No. 58, Nourin
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shisutemu no hatan to chiiki saisei he no michi, Jichitai Kenkyuusha. (jp)［ 6 ］ OKA Tosihiro, (2012) “Application of cost-benefit analysis to the regulation of foodstuffs contaminated with radioactive substances,” Japanese Journal of Health Physics, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 181-188.
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