名古屋高等教育研究 第 19 号 （2019）

Institutional Logics and Governanceof Higher Education: Implications for Academic
Productivity and Professional Autonomy
・

Liudvika LEIŠYTE*＜Abstract＞
This paper addresses the change in governance of universities in
Europe and its effects on academic work, especially productivity andprofessional autonomy. Drawing on the institutional logics perspective(Thornton and Ocasio 2008) and the governance equalizer model (DeBoer, Enders and Schimank 2007) we observe that New Public
Management inspired reforms have led to stronger managerial andstakeholder guidance in most European systems, while at the sametime, academic oligarchy is still powerful, especially in the systems
following the Humboldtian higher education tradition (e.g. Germany). I
argue that Academic logic based on the Mertonian (1973) values ofscience where higher education is public good is being challenged by
the Quasi-market logic that is based on proprietary values and is
manifested in private appropriation of financial returns in European
higher education.
Studies show that even though in the context of higher education
reforms productivity may be increasing as measured by traditional
indicators, it may come at the cost of reducing professional autonomy.
Statistics shows that in Germany, France and the UK the number ofpublications and patents has steadily increased in the period 2008-2015.
At the same time the pressure to perform has increased academic
workloads, especially due to increased administrative procedures. The
stronger institutional imperative to attract external research funding
has encouraged more mainstream research topics as well as more
short-term research horizons. Academics in this context use a range ofProfessor, Center for Higher Education, TU Dortmund University, Germany(Visiting Professor, Center for the Studies of Higher Education, Nagoya
University)

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strategies to maintain their ‘protected spaces’ (Rip 2011). While forsome disciplines and star academics it has been possible to do so, forjunior academics and disciplines such as, for example, humanities, it has
been a challenge, as shown in the example of historians. Thus, for somedisciplines the institutional complexity with the prevalence ofQuasi-market logic may change what counts as an output and whatknowledge is produced, which in the end may have implications for theattractiveness of the academic profession.

1．Introduction
Since 1980s the New Public Management (NPM) reforms in European
Higher Education (HE) have been widespread and have been instrumental inchanging governance arrangements between the states and universities.
Some authors have portrayed these reforms as an attack on academic
profession and professional autonomy, while others have argued thesereforms have brought rationalized decision-making processes and other
instruments which increased productivity and efficiency of HE systems. As
the systems have been expanding massively and the financing of higher
education has increasingly become an issue for national governments, NPM
has been an attractive policy rhetoric to decrease the burden of the state
purse using private sources of income in HE via tuition fees or industrial
funding.
As part of reforms, the management of universities has been strengthened,
their accountability to the state as well as other stakeholders has increased.
Consequently organizational control has been strengthened which has
caused tensions for academics at universities (Bleiklie et al. 2015). However,
how do governance arrangements change in different contexts and what dothese governance transformations mean for academic work and especiallyfor productivity and professional autonomy remains unclear even thoughsome of the studies to date have addressed some of these aspects (Leišytė
and Dee 2012, Leišytė 2016, De Boer, Enders and Schimank 2010).
Thus, in this paper we aim to understand how and why are thegovernance arrangements in European higher education changing? How do

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

academics respond to the managerial reforms and what does it mean for
productivity and professional autonomy?
We start with an overview of the key system reforms in European higher
education and point to the prominence of New Public Management rhetoric
behind them. Further, we present the theoretical concepts of institutional
logics, governance dimensions as well as protected spaces. Afterwards weprovide an example of governance change in Germany and especially in thestate of North Rhine-Westphalia followed by the presentation of the key
trends in productivity and professional autonomy in European higher
education. Drawing on the example of the study of historians in the UK and
the Netherlands we illustrate the issues surrounding protective spaces inacademia under managerial changes and especially the implications ofgovernance shifts for research outputs and choice of research topics.

2．Key System Reforms in European Higher Education
In the past decades profound changes in higher education have been
observed. They have been part and parcel of the overall societal shift fromthe society rooted in the Gemeinschaft system towards the system based onimpersonal and competitive relations which are grounded in commodification,
bureaucratization and impersonal ties of competitive exchange and contractin Tönnies words−the Gesellschaft. The New Public Management (NPM)
inspired reforms of public sectors have been part and parcel of this societal
shift heralded in the UK in the 1980s. These reforms fostered theintroduction of markets in the public administration and spread the idea that
actors are accountable for what they do and the state develops the
instruments to monitor and appraise them (Olssen 1996). In higher education,
NPM was mainly introduced in European countries in the 1990s, where
deregulation and privatization of higher education has been taking place withthe goal of making the systems work more efficiently and effectively (Leišytė
and Dee 2012). On the one hand the state ‘steers at a distance’ withevaluation and other accountability measures. On the other hand, a range ofstakeholders from industry as well as civil society has increased their
participation at different decision − making levels in running higher

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education. Thus the movement “from government to governance” can beobserved (Enders et al. 2009). The multi-level and multi-actor governance(Leišytė and Dee 2012) has been also influenced by increasing globalization as
well as local communities and authorities (Broucker et al. 2016). Thus, thegovernance arrangements and power balances within higher education
systems have been significantly changing although at different pace anddifferent points of time (Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008, Broucker et al.
2016).
At the same time, as in the 1990s, today further rationalization of thehigher education systems is observed due to further development of‘Quasi-markets’ in higher education. This propels the competition forstudents, staff as well as other resources among the systems as well asuniversities. NPM further promotes accountability and efficiency atuniversities (Pollitt, Van Thiel, and Homburg, 2007). In the past decade thekey rationalization policies across Europe have introduced system andinstitutional changes, such as, building alliances and clusters of research anddevelopment (e.g. Poles de Recherche et d’Enseignement Superieur inFrance in 2008), merging institutions in the name of improving quality or‘saving’ money (e.g. Denmark in 2007, Finland in 2010, Lithuania in 2018), as
well as stratification and profiling of universities (e.g. the Research
Excellence Initiative in Germany since 2006).
Further, accountability between universities and the ministries of
education has increasingly been formalized in performance agreements
which are more based on output than on input measures, as, for instance, inGermany, Finland, or the Netherlands. On the research side, the national
evaluations of research performance to monitor the ‘quality’ of research havealso been introduced in various European countries (e.g. the UK, theNetherlands, the Czech Republic). Performance-based funding acrossEuropean higher education systems has gone hand in hand with the
deregulation. During the period 2007-2013, the overall funding for research
has increased in some countries and was distributed on a more competitive
basis, e.g. in Germany GERD increased from 69.5% to 83.8%. The increase infunding of higher education is also observed in other parts of the world like
USA and Japan, so the trends observed in Germany are largely in line with202

Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

developments in other OECD countries.
As a result of deregulation, the managerial core of the universities wasstrengthened through giving more powers to the Presidents and Rectors aswell as the introduction of supervisory boards comprised of external
stakeholders. It has been noted that overall the NPM-based public reforms
have transformed universities from loosely coupled systems to strategic
actors which, in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness, became more
professionally managed and performance-driven organizations (Krücken et al.
2013). This new type of university is being referred to as managerial
university (Deem et al. 2007). The main characteristics of a managerial
university

include1)

top-down

decisionmakingandstrengthened

performance evaluation of academic employees 2) rationalized budgeting anddiversification of resource base relying on external funding (research money
obtained e.g. from research councils and industry), 3) implementation ofefficiency measures and increased accountability to the management(Leišytė and Dee 2012). As a result, academics are evaluated on the basis of
the revenue and commercial value that they generate and are rewarded
based on their performance (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). This makes themincreasingly dependent on the requirements of external funders anduniversity management.
Looking at the dynamics of human resources in higher education in
Europe, one can observe a steady increase. In fact, the number of academics
has been increasing in quite a few systems in Europe as a result of theincrease in external competitive research funding. If we look at the numberof researchers from 2007 to 2013, we can observe that France, Germany andthe UK have increased their human resource capacities in higher education.
Germany in this regard stands out with the increase from 290,900 in 2007 to
360,300 in 2013 (see Figure 1). A similar development is also observed in the
US although in Japan the number of researchers has contracted over thisperiod of time.

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Change in the Percentage of Researchers between 2007 and 2013

European Union

18.4%

OECD

14.9%

France19.5%

Germany
UK

23.9%
2.6%

-3.5% Japan

USA

11.6%

Source: UNESCO 2015

Figure 1 Human Resources Development in R&D in Selected Countries

3．Theoretical Considerations
In this paper we turn to institutional logics perspective as well as thegovernance equalizer model to understand the shifts in university
governance taking place across European higher education. Further, we
draw on the concept of protected spaces that academics create and maintain.
3.1

Institutional Logics and Governance Mechanisms

We use the Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) definition of an Institutional logic.
They define it as “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals
produce and re-produce their material substance, organize time and space,and provide meaning to their socially reality.” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999:804) Societies have been guided by a range of logics stemming from social
orders such as state, corporation, community, market, profession. When it
comes to higher education, professional and market logics seem to be
opposing each other and possibly conflicting, thus, in the following we will
focus on two seemingly opposite logics−market and professional logics.
Professional logic includes adherence to the values of profession

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education(Kitchener 2002) and in higher education sector this would imply adhering to
the values of academic profession. We call it Academic logic as it is based on
the Mertonian (1973) values of science such as Universalism, Communalism,
Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism, where peer-review is central
as the key justification of value and prestige. Relations in scientificcommunity are based on traditions and mutual obligations. Collegiality is at
the center of this logic where science and higher education are public good.
In scientific communities guided by the academic logic professional
autonomy is of high regard. Identification with the university as anorganization is very loose and academic identities are mainly shaped bydisciplinary communities. Control is exerted by the esteemed peers in thescientific community who act as gate-keepers in peer review processes anddetermine the quality of scientific work. Following this logic, university is aloosely−coupled organization which guards professional values. Academics
have professional autonomy in carrying out the main two functions ofacademic work−teaching and research (Fini and Lacetera 2010, Murray2010).
In contrast, Quasi-market logic is based on proprietary values and is
manifested in private appropriation of financial returns (Teixeira, Jongbloed,
Dill, and Amaral 2006). As there are no perfect markets in state subsidized
and largely steered systems, we term this logic quasi-market logic. Following
Polanyi (1944), in competition-based society the economic gain becomes “themajor justification for action and behavior in everyday life.” (p. 30) Thus, theQuasi-market logic in higher education transpires in bureaucratic control,
restrictions on disclosure in science, and the rationalized performancemeasurement (Sauermann and Stephan 2013: 891). Following this logic atuniversities organizational managers and vested stakeholders are at thecenter of defining value and prestige on the one hand, and control
instruments and procedures ensure the monitoring of the ‘success’ and‘added value’ created by universities. The performance criteria following thislogic are defined outside the academic community (Leišytė 2014).
We argue that among other, these two institutional logics predominantly
guide the modes of governance in higher education (Leišytė 2014). It issuggested that different institutional logics co-exist at the same time and the205complexity of institutional logics is increasing as the academic logic guiding
academic self-regulation is being challenged by the Quasi-market logic which
may lead to a very different environment for academic work (Greenwood etal. 2010, Thornton and Ocasio 2008).
However, how to understand this institutional complexity in governance ofHE systems? We turn to the governance equalizer model which consists offive governance dimensions. This model helps us understand the particularconstellation of actors and distribution of their power in the higher education
coordination system (De Boer, Enders, and Schimank 2007): academic
self-governance, competition for resources, managerial self-governance, state
regulation, and stakeholder guidance.

・ Academic self-governance is rooted in disciplinary communities and is
exercised through collegial decision-making practices at universities andin the national agencies where academic communities participate indeciding on resources.

・ Competition for resources is the mechanism that is exercised throughcompetition for research funds, personnel, students and prestige.

・ Managerial self-governance concerns the role of university leadership,organizational

decision-making

structuresandcentralizationofdecision-making processes, professional management and professional
administration at universities.

・ State regulation is the traditional mechanism of governance with the
top-down authority vested in the state. The regulation by directives
prescribes the behavior of higher education institutions in detail.

・ Stakeholder guidance is the mechanism based on goal setting and advice
provided by various societal stakeholders (including the government).
To envision the linkages between different types of logics and the fivegovernance mechanisms, we use a ‘low−medium−high’ scales, with ‘low’
denoting limited presence of a particular logic, and with ‘high’ signifying thedominating role of a particular logic guiding a particular governancemechanism (Leišytė 2014). The governance mechanisms are not mutually
exclusive, as each of them can change irrespective of stability or change inthe other mechanism. Leišytė (2014) argues that a certain dominant logic

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

shapes the creation of a particular configuration of governance of higher
education in a given system at a particular point of time. The dominance oftheAcademic

logic

providesthegrounds

forstrongacademic

self-governance as one can see in the Humboldtian model of university.
Competition for resources following this logic is low, while managerial
self-governance and state regulation can be low to medium. Following thislogic, stakeholder guidance can be medium, especially in terms of state
guidance. In case of the Quasi-market logic dominance in higher education,on the other hand, one can expect the governance mode with high level ofcompetition for resources, strong managerial self-governance and strong
stakeholder guidance. At the same time, under this logic low state regulationand low academic self-governance would be expected (Ibid).
3.2

Understanding Academic Responses

In this paper we focus on two aspects of academic work−research
productivity and professional autonomy. To understand the institutional
complexity and how it affects productivity we turn to the dichotomy ofresearch outputs as they illustrate very well the potential clash between the
openness of science for public benefit versus proprietary interests of themarket. Firstly, traditional research outputs in academia are peer-reviewed
publications. They are part and parcel of open science−where knowledge ispublic and ideally accessible to all. On the other hand, patenting is the
proprietary type of research output that protects it from overall access.
Patents are deemed important in commercialization of knowledge andbringing in possibly commercial value if they are licensed from universities
to industry.
When it comes to professional autonomy we concentrate on the freedom tochoose own research topics and being able freely pursue own researchinterests, such as for example, risky research lines. Here a notion of‘protective space’ (Rip 2011) is important−as it is the space where academics
can choose research topics of their own choosing and produce outputs they
like and deem important for their academic community. Given the conflicting
notions of academic self-governance versus managerial governance and theaims of efficiency versus scientific excellence, an increasing duality between

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the academic profession and the university as organization has been
observed (e.g. Noordegraaf 2011). A typical reaction of professions to suchdualities is creating and maintaining protective spaces and maintaining
professional identities via strategic positioning and strategic responses(Leišytė 2015).
Not having protective space to pursue one’s research agenda may lead toa potential clash between being relevant to the needs of economy andconducting high quality research in some disciplines. Not having secure
funding of research may lead to abolishing certain research lines or thechange of work roles of academics. Following previous research, we can
expect academics to respond to the dominance of the Quasi-market logic in
their institutional environment through a range of strategies, which may
range from collective acts of resistance to more individual ways (Nentwichand Hoyer 2013, Leišytė and Hosch-Dayican 2017).

4．Governance and Institutional Complexity in German Higher
Education
To illustrate the changing institutional complexity in higher education weturn to the German higher education system. This system is complex due toits federal organization with 16 state (Länder) governments that govern
universities in their respective states. The HE systems of the 16 states arerooted in the same Humboldtian idea of academic freedom. The core
historical feature of the governance of higher education is characterized by
the power of professors (chairs) which traditionally has come hand in handwith the subordination to the state. As noted by Schimank (2005), the system
could be characterized by chairs who act as ‘businessmen who cannot gobankrupt’ (p. 363) as they hold the public servant status and have job security
for life. This has meant that although the individual professional autonomy ofprofessors has been high in teaching and research, organizational autonomy
of universities has been quite low as the state was controlling many aspects
of decision-making in higher education as well as was the main funder of thesystem (Ibid.). In 2015, the German system of higher education consisted of 88
universities

208(Universitäten),

104

universitiesofappliedsciencesInstitutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education(Fachhochschulen) and 46 universities of art and music (Kunst-und
Musikhochschulen) (HRK 2015). In 2014-2015 academic year 64% of all
students were studying at universities and the number of students has beensteadily increasing over the past decade by nearly a million.
In the past decades NPM reforms have been a popular policy slogan in theGerman higher education policy context (Schimank 2005)−as in many other
European countries. Most recent reforms generally have moved in the same
direction of gradual marketization, albeit at different speeds (Hüther andKrücken 2018). Even though the complexity of the reforms and theirdifferent guises is obvious, Schimank (2005) has argued that NPM entails
actually an integrated approach to overhaul the whole higher education
system in Germany to replace ‘the old regime dominated by a state-regulated
profession, with a new regime, dominated by a market− and state-driven
organization’ where the ministries force the reforms upon universities
replacing direct control with management by objectives (Schimank 2005:
366).
As the governance of higher education varies among the 16 states, tounderstand the shifts in governance we turn to the example of one state−
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) as it has the highest density of universities
and research institutions in Germany and has embraced the NPM reforms toquite some extent and even introduced tuition fees albeit for a short period oftime.
North Rhine-Westphalia is one of the states that has been active inmanagerial turn of higher education since 2000 with passing the NRW
University Autonomy Law in 2004. The autonomy here was more a keyword
to give stronger powers to university management and weaken the powers
of professors, while at the same time, foster accountability measures touniversities from the state. Performance agreements as well as yearlyreporting to the ministry continue to be the practice and one can see that
this brought even more bureaucracy to universities.
This state has a particular history and has a dense web of universities anduniversities of applied sciences. It has faced a decline in steel and coalindustries and universities have been part and parcel of the policy to createknowledge-based economy since 1960s. The system expansion has led to 30

209

universities and 43 universities of applied sciences in NRW. Traditionally,
universities were tightly controlled by the Ministry of Education while
professors had individual freedom to carry out teaching and research of theirown choosing. The Senate was an important decision-making body as it
elected rectors. Even though it had an advisory and control function of the
Rectorate, over the years its importance has decreased. The chairs(professors) in this state traditionally were very independent and powerful−where decision-making in the faculties was reached by consensus toensure that no one is seriously dissatisfied. This system has maintained thestatus quo for decades in terms of protecting professional autonomy on the
one hand and halting any serious change in the structures and procedures
unless it benefits everyone involved (Schimank 2005).
In NRW the Ministry of Education has, however, as part of the reforms,
lost some of its powers even though a statutory amendment passed in 2015
gave further strength through target and performance indicators andcontrols (Enders et al. 2013). The state of NRW monitors the performance ofuniversities in terms of numbers of graduates and research productivity,
which inevitably leads to comparisons between universities and different
funding levels. Third party funding is increasingly seen as an important
indicator of performance at universities. University professors appointed in
the past decades follow the new system of salary scales which are partly
based on these performance-based indicators. At the same time, theimplementation of this system varies also depending on the university(Schimank 2005).
In terms of the role of external stakeholders in university governanceimportant changes have taken place. Since 2007, universities in NRW haveestablished University Supervisory Boards which consist of external
stakeholders, such as industry representatives as well as members of civilsociety groups. The 2004 Law allowed universities to hire professors. The
more recent 2014 Universities’ Future Law gave more power to theSupervisory Boards as they now can monitor the Rectorate to a greater
extent (Higher Education Act of 2014, § 16, 19, 21). The University Board issmaller in size than the Senate and checks financial health of the university(Kretek and Dragsic 2012), but their composition, size and actual

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

responsibilities vary from university to university.
One can say that the legal provisions in NRW envisage negotiations
between the Senate, the Rectorate, and the Supervisory Board. It is stillrather atypical to make a single-handed decision at a university (Hüther andKrücken 2018). At the same time, collegial decision-making prevails inpractice (Ibid.). The informal norm of collegiality is as strong as before andhas an impact on the actual decision-making processes in higher education
institutions (Kleimann 2015, Bieletzki 2018). Thus, even though theconcentration of decision-making power among Supervisory Boards andRectorates has formally increased, these changes cannot always take place inpractice because as argued by Hüther and Krücken (2018), the conditions fora top-down hierarchy at a German university do not exist. Academics retain
their power in practice, although these are usually the elites who are well
represented in governance of universities as well as have strong allianceswith the government and/or industry (Ibid.). Sometimes the managers do nothave managerial tools at their disposal−such as, for example−the flexibility
to fire academic staff. At the same time, academics retain power in terms ofcontrol of key processes and in this regard the managerial turn has not yettaken place (Krücken et al. 2013). When it comes to professional autonomy of
the chairs and their departments, their freedom is protected by the German
Constitution, thus, there is very little leeway for the management to
influence the content of academic work.
When it comes to another important governance dimension−competition−the federal level policies in German higher education have been influential,
mainly through the power of the purse. One example of this is the Excellence
initiative that started in 2006 to promote a certain number of research
universities and strengthen graduate schools. Following this policy, a set
number of universities are selected to receive funding for different research
initiatives over extended period of time. This has pushed the system towards
differentiation among universities. Another significant competitive federal
funding instrument was created to promote excellent teaching (2 bn Euro intotal) by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). According
to Wilkesmann (2016), this money distribution meant that many bottom-up
initiatives started at each university and that these funds were extremely211beneficial to the universities of applied sciences which traditionally havereceived less third-party funding compared to other universities in Germany.
Still, they were distributed on a competitive basis where universities had tosubmit project proposals to improve the quality of teaching. Finally, at thestate level, external funding has also become more important over the years
as state ministries provide competitive grants to universities and academics.
At present, around one third of universities’ budgets come from third party
funding − which includes federal and state ministry funding as well as
industry funding.
Competition has also been propelled by rankings of all sorts. For example,
the German CHE ranking of university programmes has added to thecompetitive pressures for the university management to compete and profile
their universities as best as they can. One can observe that facing
competition

Germanuniversities

have

been

openinguptointernationalization, publishing and teaching more in English, attracting
foreign staff and students, marketing themselves more fiercely.
Thus, we could summarize that universities in NRW have increased their
institutional autonomy vis-a-vis the state, regulation of the state has been
substituted by state guidance through performance agreements. The
influence of external stakeholders’ role has increased over the past two
decades to a medium level due to the involvement of Supervisory Board in
financial matters as well as setting the Rector to account. Further, thecompetition for resources has increased in terms of attracting third party
funding and other resources. Managerial self-regulation has increased due tothe powers allocated to them by the latest Law in NRW, like appointment ofprofessors and strategy setting. At the same time, the hierarchical steeringin practice is limited, as the de facto power of academic self-regulation
remains rather strong. Thus, we can observe that the Quasi-market logic is
not yet dominant in the NRW university governance, even though it has been
guiding a range of new policies, procedures and creation of new structures.
Certain elements of governance following Quasi-market logic are embraced
as can be observed in the increased role of external stakeholders,competition for resources as well as less state interference in higher
education. One can assert that academic logic is co-existing in sometimes

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

conflicting ways with the quasi-market logic in higher education in NRW,
where the concrete institutionalization depends on the particular policy issue
and area, as well as on the type and history of the university. Thus, theexample of NRW HE governance confirms what other authors haveobserved−German higher education has followed a soft NPM orientation(Hüther and Krücken 2018).

5．Implications for Academic Work: Productivity
Looking at the trends of productivity in terms of journal publications andpatenting among the highly industrialized big countries we can observe an
increasing number of publications per million of inhabitants between 2008
and 2014. When we look at the OECD countries as well as big EU countries−we can see overall increase in productivity when measured in journalinternational publications per million inhabitants. Even though it is a
simplistic and crude measure which does not include books and bookchapters−and thus excludes to some extent some disciplines, it is useful forunderstanding a general trend of changing research productivity. Here we
see that the traditional production of scientific publications in line with the
Academic logic is maintained and strengthened across the board (See Figure
2).

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

USA

Japan

UK

Publication per million inhabits 2008

Germany

FranceOECD

European Union

Publication per million inhabits 2014

Source: UNESCO (2015)

Figure 2 Publication Change per Million Inhabitants

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When we examine this trend in more detail, we can see that the highest
increase in publication percentage among the selected countries is achievedin Germany, that is by 15.4% over the period 2008-2014 (see Figure 3). At thesame time, the productivity increase in the UK reaches 14%. While Germany
represents a soft NPM country, the UK is the most neoliberal and managerial
higher education system in Europe−a hard NPM country. This leaves us
puzzled−is there no relationship between shifts in governance of higher
education and productivity? Or is it specific elements of governance, like forexample, increased competition−that matters most for the increase inpublications even in the soft NPM regime? Or is it about the increase in R&D
staff numbers (in the UK it increased only slightly while in Germany inincreased significantly over the studied period) while in Japan the decreasein publications is also seen alongside the decreased academic staff numbers?
But then − how about France, which has increased staff numbers
significantly, but did not increase the productivity in publishing as high as
German academics did? These questions bring us to one possible
interpretation: path dependency matters how institutional complexity of
Quasi-market logic and Academic logic play out in a specific context and how
academics behave in terms of research productivity. Further, when it comesto changes in academic behavior-as we saw in a number of studies (Leišytė etal. 2010, Teelken 2012) with NPM gaming starts where the quantity but notnecessarily the quality matter. If the incentives are directly geared towards
the key producers − academic staff − and this supports their credibility
building−then the likelihood of changing behavior is higher.

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

European Union

14.0%

OECD
France12.3%
9.7%

Germany

15.4%

UK
-4.1%

14.0%

Japan
USA

11.1%

Source: UNESCO (2015)

Figure 3 Change in Publication Productivity between 2008-2014

When we examine productivity in terms of production of patents as an
example of proprietary output, we observe an overall increase across thestudied countries. Based on the UNESCO 2015 data, we can see that in the
countries we have studied the filing of patents in the EU has beensignificantly increasing−with France being the highest performer, followedby the UK and Germany. All these countries have strong industrial base−as also do Japan and the US. Here again it is difficult to see big difference
between hard and soft NPM countries. Obviously, this indicator is strongly
correlated with the industrial bases in these countries and industrial
competitiveness and given that the US and Japan have been high patentproducers for decades, the relatively low change percentage does not mean
low overall performance. Overall, one can see that the Quasi-market logic isincreasingly enacted through patenting activity across the big selectedOECD and European countries (See Figure 4).

215

European Union

88.2%

OECD

72.9%

France97.9%

Germany

77.6%

UK
Japan
USA

95.3%
54.5%
74.0%

Source: UNESCO (2015)

Figure 4 Change in USPTO Patents (%) between 2008 and 2013.

Thus, looking at the two key productivity indicators−journal publications
and patenting, we can observe an overall increase in the selected big
industrialized countries. Germany stands out when it comes to the increase
in international journal publications and it has been increasingly performing
well in terms of patenting increases. So seemingly when it comes to
productivity−both logics−Academic logic as well as Quasi-Market logic are
at play.
To understand how governance shifts have affected professional
autonomy, we turn to the studies observing the changes in academic work inGermany at more micro-level. German academics perceive the changes ingovernance as an attack on professional autonomy (Hüther and Krücken
2018). The ‘attack’ on universities (Hüther and Krücken 2018) leads toindividualization, loss of collegial values and the essence of what academy isabout−academic freedom (Leišytė and Dee 2012). One of the major concerns
is related to the disruption of teaching-research nexus so important to the
Humboldtian model of higher education. With the incentives and pressures
towards research performance as well as intrinsic motivation to build
scientific reputation which leads to the institution “research matters”(Wilkesmann 2016), teaching is perceived as not that important activity

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which may have serious implications for the future of the universities(Leišytė, De Boer, and Enders 2009).
Quite a few studies have shown that performance measurements from theministries or quality assurance agencies lead to ‘box ticking’ mentality(Leišytė 2007, Jansen 2010, Kehm and Lanzendorf 2006), where the academic
performance is narrowed down to a set of performance indicators which do
not necessarily show the innovation and contribution to science and skews
what matters for academic work towards research even more away fromteaching (Leišytė and Wilkesmann 2017, Hüther and Krücken 2018).
A number of studies have pointed towards strategic behavior of academics
facing new performance criteria and increased competition in Germany. Oneof the more studied aspects has been the strategies used around publications
to ensure that the demands of the management are met. Here the discussionof quality versus quantity has been extremely poignant (Hüther and Krücken
2018). Dividing research results into the most publishable units referred assalami publishing has been observed (Butler 2003, Leišytė and Westerheijden
2014, Hüther and Krücken 2018). The quality of these publications and ingeneral the quality of increasingly higher volumes of publications isquestioned (Osterloh 2012). When the shifts in governance resulting in thepressure to perform seem to affect the quantity of publications, it isquestionable what happens to the quality of publications.

6．Productivity and Professional Autonomy of Historians
To further illustrate how institutional complexity and changes ingovernance influence productivity and professional autonomy in a morequalitative way, we turn to the study of historians at two universities in the
UK and two universities in the Netherlands (Leišytė and Hosch-Dayican2014). The study includes document, website as well as 16 semi-structured
interviews with historians carried out in 2008/09 in two different national
contexts. Interviews provided the opportunity to explore the key issues
surrounding the day to day practices as well as their perceptions about theeffects of changes in their university for their work. In both countries, astrong and a weak department were selected based on the results of external

217

research evaluation results to account for different levels of productivity andquality. Moreover, the interviewees were chosen to ensure an even
distribution between senior and junior academic positions.
The UK is the context of hard NPM since 1980s while the Netherlands hasa softer version of NPM which was also implemented one decade later thanin the UK. The experiences observed in these two contexts can be expected
to provide a useful comparison to see the multi-level effects of Quasi-market
logic penetrating the academic profession. Historians are especiallyinteresting to understand the changing academic work as they usually do not
fit directly the standardized performance criteria dominated by the hardsciences. They traditionally write in their native language and focus on
publishing books and spend a lot of time in archives for their fieldwork. First,
we explore how performance requirements affect their choices forcommunication channels−were to publish. Second, we observe how do theserequirements affect their professional autonomy and satisfaction with workand academic profession.
6.1

Publishing Practices of Studied Historians

Institutional management rules in the case study universities in the UK
and the Netherlands affect the autonomy of academics to decide about thetypes of publications. In both studied contexts, publishing articles in highly
rated peer-reviewed journals has been emphasized by public and private
funders and university managers, leading towards a practice where books (atraditional outlet for historians) are not valued as outputs to the same extent
as international peer-reviewed journal articles. These new regulations put
pressure on historians regarding publishing. In this specific field, books are−in addition to peer reviewed journal publications−still very importantcriteria to establish academic credibility. To what extent can medievalists
from both countries uphold their discipline-specific publishing outlets in theface of these challenges?
In the UK, according to our interviewees, publishing articles in top
academic journals is required by the university management as it is central
criterion in the UK national research evaluation scheme (REF). While thestudied British historians try to conform to the requirements, it is still very

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important for them to publish work where colleagues will read it, value it andrespond to it. Seemingly, national research evaluation routines have changed
the perceptions on the hierarchy of publishers for the studied historians (e.g.
certain prestigious university presses and peer-reviewed journals), which
also have a certain value order based on impact factors. The mainstream
medium of publishing such as textbooks does not count for the national
research evaluation scheme and this goes against the way of how some of thestudied historians would publish.
The guidelines from university management define the ‘appropriate’
publishing outlets. This results in university management becoming invasive
about the media through which historians publish. For example, the studied
historians are instructed not to publish their articles in collections but inrefereed journals. More than that, they may be ‘strongly encouraged’ topublish their articles in high ranked international journals, even if the article
fits better in another journal which is not included in any databases. These
newly created publishing outlet hierarchies seriously influence historians’
work and change the way they produce outputs in both studied universities
in the UK since the number of published monographs has decreased in bothstudied history departments.
Especially we can observe that the research reputation of the department
matters in terms of vulnerability to these management demands. The notionof a credible output in history is changing in the weak department−andstudied academics are forced to comply with this. Here the managerial
demands are taken much more seriously by the interviewed academics; they
feel more urge to follow the instructions for publishing strategies in order to“please the research managers” (UKwJ2). Researchers at senior levels of thisdepartment have only little freedom to choose not to comply with theserequests. The new system of appraisals accounts for this tendency to a highextent:“Appraisal occurs at two levels. With regard to research. The first is at the level ofthe school and the old department, where the head will see me once a year and talkto me about me research. And suggests ways in which I could produce bettermoney or recognition for the school, the department, but I don’t have to listen. And
the other way is completely new. It is just starting to be put in place now and that219

is that henceforth every professor at [university], that is people with the highest
academic title, like myself, will be divided into three academic levels. And at theend of every year a performance with regard to the university expectations will bereconsidered and we can be promoted or demoted according to how well they
think we are doing. Now this potentially is quite a powerful mechanism for
destroying our freedom to choose our topics and how we work. Because if we areconsidered not to be working with sufficient achievement then we get put down.”(UKwS4)On the contrary, in the strong research department, historians generally
do not report much about the research management pressure and they treat
the managerial demands more as a ‘noise’. Senior researchers mostly tend to
make their own research and publishing strategies; for junior researchers,
journal choice is also quite topic-driven. They are also inclined to publish ingood quality journals and also publish books, but they do not mention anypressure from outside to do so. But they feel the changes that the new
system has brought for the academic profession. According to a juniorresearcher, historians’ profession has changed from being producers of
research papers and books towards research management and writing grantapplications to get external funding (UKsJ4). Yet the key output is still thebook. Thus, the UK strong history department maintains its status throughtraditional outputs in the discipline.
In the Netherlands, publishing books in Dutch (and edited volumes) arehighly valued outputs among historians in general, but they are also required
to write articles as this is part of their performance requirements.
Institutional management rules indicate the output preferences in thestudied Dutch universities while at the same time, the studied senioracademics have freedom to declare themselves free from management rules.
Although they do publish articles themselves, they tend to ignore the ruleson the quantity of outputs, and to encourage their younger colleagues and
PhD students to write books. In general, there is a higher inclination towards
adhering to the traditional way of publishing through books. However, it
should be noted that the understanding of books being the most important
form of research output is not anymore widely shared by junior academics.
Publishing in journals, also in other languages than in Dutch, is becoming

220

Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Educationcommon practice, since the medieval history community in the Netherlands
is too small and it would not make sense to publish only for this audience(NLsJ4). This seems to be the case for both strong and weak departments.
“I am always working on Dutch history, so I am mainly publishing in Dutch
journals, speaking Dutch language but also, well, outside this in German
proceedings mainly but no so much in let us say English journals; no, not so muchthan I should be doing. At least, I think, I should be doing this more than I do.
Because, well, it is for the record of course but it is also because I think these areinteresting topics and they should be more broadly advertised.” (NLwj5)

So publishing in English for this junior researcher who comes from
relatively weak department is internalized as a positive development toincrease readability and international visibility. However, his seniorcolleagues seem not to agree with this and continue their traditional
publishing practices concentrating on edited volumes and books in Dutch.
6.2

Professional Autonomy of Studied Historians

When it comes to professional autonomy, we also inquired how studied
historians design their research lines and how they choose their topics ofstudy. They note that the need to attract funding from third parties likeresearch councils at the national and international level pushes them tocollaborate with other fields, and to do research and publish on topics that do
not necessarily fit into their research line. How academics approach this fact
seems to vary across individuals. The studied senior historians in the UK do
not feel obliged to obey the pressures from the management when it comesto research topic preferences, as they prefer to determine their topics ofinterest themselves and believe that it will be valued by others.
However, differences can be observed between weak and strong
departments in this regard. Senior academics from the weak department feel
more strain, claiming that resisting these developments is possible, but notwithout taking risks. In the strong department, senior academics feel lessrestricted by the national research evaluation requirements, they follow the
topics of their choice:221

“There is limited time, one obviously wants to find out as many things as one canand push the subject forward as far as one can. And so in a sense that is nodifferent now than it was then. I am, certainly not driven myself by therequirements of the RAE or requirements of writing a letter to the Vice
Chancellor. I do it because I want to do these things. That’s been the casethroughout my career.” (UKsS1)

In the Netherlands, some senior researchers are not very positive about
having to focus on subjects that are not really interesting to them in order toattract funding, which is important to the university management, whereas
others appear enthusiastic about the opportunity to combine innovative
research with more traditional fields. They think that deviating from own
research topics is not necessarily an impeding factor, on the contrary, it isbetter this way for the sake of societal relevance. Thus, the latter do not feelthat their professional autonomy is threatened.
6.3

Experiencing Pressure to Perform

As discussed above, the uniform criteria of evaluation such as high rated
journals or book publishers are experienced as a drawback as well as aninterference with the freedom to determine research content and publication
outlets. However, pressure to perform increases also in terms of academic
job profiles: professors are expected to take more of a leadership role and to
fit into the template of a new role description. Certain targets should be met
at certain stages of academic careers, studied historians must conform to theparticular performance criteria. Otherwise they could lose their jobs orwould not get a promotion, which creates a new layer of anxiety. In addition,
the complex system of accountability and the resulting bureaucratic
procedures and high expectations from the management to publish andattract external funding add up to the workload of the studied academics at
all levels.
The interviews with the Dutch medievalists indicate that teaching,supervision of students and administrative tasks do not leave enough time towrite articles, and certainly not to write a book. These tasks take a lot oftime at the disadvantage of research and writing which result in chronic
reported overtime work and dissatisfaction. A Dutch professor mentions

222

Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Educationthat he spends “an average of 85 hours a week” working (RugHWR4II). Yetgiving up on teaching or research is not the solution for him, since his
profession as an academic goes along with a strong feeling of responsibility:“I considered a lot of things I do as my duty to society and to my profession. And
the so-called luxury situation of the 60s and the 70s and the world social relevanceof what we are doing was invented in the early 70s; that situation allowed scholars
either to be lazy and there were examples of that, or indeed within their working
time in a relatively normal degree, to spend time on all of these things.” (NLwS4)

The solution for them to get along with the pressures in getting funding sothat they can buy themselves out of teaching and administrative duties for acertain time period. Although they take up new tasks of acquiring externalfunding, the traditional role of being a researcher is prioritized over anythingelse and there is concern that the new performance monitoring measuresand increased paperwork may impair their research performance, as thesame professor states:“I also think that all the paperwork that is created by all these procedures is socounterproductive so the productivity of our scholarly field would be higher if they
simply […] had allowed us to do our research in a proper way that what we areappointed for. And I fiercely object the suggestion that there are lazy scholars;
maybe they were in the 60s but the paradise of the 60s and the early 70s alreadyhas vanished by the end of the 80s, and we are all aware of our duties, and people
work very hard, and zealously and in fact they devote too much of their social life
to their profession because they simply love their profession and do not want tomake their research suffer from the comebacks and the increase of duties in thefield of teaching, but that, certainly over the last 6 years, is clearly noticeable.”(NLwS4)

Junior academics feel less pressure from the management although they
are also expected to teach, do research and attract external funds. They do
not think that the organizational change has led towards work intensification.
This may be related to them taking this multiplicity of roles as given as they
have been already socialized already into this managerial regime. One juniorhistorian from the Netherlands reports that high performance is a part of the
job:

223

“I do not feel pressured into doing anything; it is a positive choice. […] I know ofother people who have felt very pressured to do things that they really did not likedoing but in my case, that is not so. I mean I love my job−let me be very clear
about that. I also love the performance part of that. I mean I enjoy giving papers
and I enjoy answering questions and you know doing the usual stuff that comes
your way.” (NLsJ4)

The reported limited pressure among junior academics may be related tothe socialized norm and accepted fact that working overtime and writing
publications in the ‘free time’ are already accepted as a part of the normal
work portfolio of an academic, especially by the new generation of studied
historians. A Dutch post-doc states that “there is always a lot to do, too manythings to do, but that is also because as I said I am always publishing aboutother things as well. So you can also skip that and then, well, it would bemuch easier and more quiet.” (NLwJ5) Yet since they are strongly attachedto their researcher identities and are strongly geared to produce academic
publications, they prefer to invest extra time on writing as they perceive it
also crucial for their career development. Exiting the academic system is nota preferable scenario for the studied junior academics, they see themselves
dedicated to the academic profession.
Overall, the output demands created by management rules have different
implications for the studied historians. In the UK, where the higher education
system is more managerial and characterized by stricter hierarchies,
complex accountability structures and harder sanctions for underperformance in research, academics tend to conform to the new rules morestrongly, in fear of sanctions. And this development leads to concerns about
the future role and identities of academics among the interviewed UK
historians:“So key themes have emerged as being… the extent to which… globalization isleading to isomorphism to all universities being the same… The role of a global
university in its local context. And I think above all […] the role and identity ofacademics in a global system of higher education. And I think we are concerned
about, by saying identity and role of academics, and what say they have had inpolicy making. So those are some of the key issues.” (UKwJ2)

On the contrary, Dutch medievalists tend to perceive the new regulations

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more as “incentives” rather than “sticks”. Still, the new management rules
and performance monitoring indicators are seen as overstated. Also, theadverse effects of quantification of performance indicators have been
mentioned. In order to guarantee accountability, the management sanctions
the ‘low’ number of publications by taking away research time and vice versa,
which is a measure that is questioned by the studied academics. Some ofthem state that they are motivated to be accountable to taxpayers, but intheir view the national and university performance evaluation criteria hinder
academic work. A senior academic summarizes his observations as follows:“I am fortunately in a period of my career that I simply can say what the heck, I dowhat I want, I stand for what I do. But younger colleagues, they suffer from theserules, and these are examples of what has grown wrong I think in this tendency
which, in general, is a good tendency that not only politicians but also the scholarly
world itself wants to make the best use of the money the taxpayer makes available
to us. So we want to control, we want to stimulate productivity but it has turned
into an over-expressed control and that has increased over the years I think.”(NLwS4)In sum, compared to their British colleagues, Dutch academics experience
less stress and anxiety. Being an academic is still professionally satisfying inspite of all pressures created by the changing management rules andincreasing workloads. According to them, academic work is still “hard work
but still one of the best jobs in the world” as put by the senior academic in thewell performing history department in the Netherlands (NLsJ2). Thus, theability to keep the protected spaces among the studied historians depends on
the seniority as well as research credibility of the department- as well as thenational context. This points to the importance of the institutional complexity
found in the two national contexts where the UK historians are stronger
affected which leads to their conformity to the performance pressures
especially among the junior academics and in the weaker departments (seeTable 1):225

Table 1 Protected Spaces Regarding Publications and Topic Choice
Academic work

UK

Research Output ・Shift towards journal
publications
・Maintaining books as primary
outlet in the strong

Topic Choice

NL・Shift among junior researchers(tend to publish more in journals
and in English)
・Strong maintenance of Dutch

department and among seniorbooks as primary outlet in bothresearchers (protected space)departments (protected space)・Maintenance of topics of own

・Both boundary crossing andpreference only possible

maintenance, no pattern

among strong departments

observed

and senior researchers (limited
protected space)
Source: Author

7．Conclusion
As we have shown Quasi-market and Academic logics are playing out indifferent ways across European higher education systems. The NPM
reforms have been fostered by the governments to provide more
‘institutional’ autonomy to universities while at the same time, to curtail thepower of academic oligarchy. The examples provided have shown that the
Humboldtian type of systems like Germany followed the softer NPM
approach compared to the UK. In the case of North Rhine-Westphalia weobserve that Quasi-market logic has not yet become a dominant logic toguide governance arrangements despite a range of changes that have takenplace in the formal governance arrangements, such as increase incompetition and accountability to the state, retreat of direct ministerial
control and strengthening of external stakeholders and managers. At thesame time, in practice the university bureaucracy expands but the consensus
based decision-making culture is retained. Academic collegiality remains
important and chairs in practice retain their professional autonomy inteaching and research and are part and parcel of the key decisions regarding
academic content. Thus even though shifts in governance towards NPM

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Institutional Logics and Governance of Higher Education

have taken place, we cannot ascertain that Quasi-market logic has become
dominant in the German higher education context.
However, looking at academic practices in different European countries
we see a varied picture. When it comes to the productivity measures,
German academics are producing an increased number of publications
compared to other big industrialised nations and have increased the patentfiling as well. The UK has also increased its publication and patent filingnumbers, although to a lesser extent. At the same time, in Germany the
numbers of academic staff have significantly increased due to third party
funded projects, while in the UK−slightly decreased, which points that
productivity pressures seem to be stronger in the UK.
The example of historians from the UK and the Netherlands has also
qualitatively indicated that the pressure to perform is experienced in bothcountries, but in the UK the consequences are quite severe for thosedepartments that are underperforming as research lines may becompromised and protected spaces are more difficult to maintain. One of theissues related to such performance pressures is the change in motivations foracademics from intrinsic to extrinsic (Hüther and Krücken 2018). It is argued
that academics no longer may be pursuing the ‘truth for the truth sake’’, but
for example apply for external funding to pursue a particular research
project just for the funding sake and to ‘tick the box’ in the performancematrix to get higher salary and build credibility rather than pursue aninteresting and innovative research line (Schimank 2010). Another side effectfor academic profession and indeed science is the resulting risk-averseness in
grant applications to ensure the acquisition of external competitive
third-party funds (Leišytė 2007). The long-term result of this is possible
inability to pursue innovative lines of research due to the Matthew effect−
those who have funding and are successful staying within ‘safe’ researchlines continue to get more funding, while those who chose for more riskylines are likely to lose the competition. Although studies have shown thestrategic behavior of academics designing risky projects on the side as wellas creating protecting spaces and manipulating the university bureaucracy
to attract resources (Leišytė et al. 2010, Teelken 2012)−only some academics,
usually the elites and more seniors can achieve this. Continuous staying

227within the mainstream can potentially erode academic ethos and what
constitutes science (Hüther and Krücken 2018). Thus, some NPM reforms
may come at the cost of reducing professional autonomy. For somedisciplines this may change what counts as an output and what knowledge is
produced.
This calls for rethinking of how the governance arrangements are
implemented in practice and how to balance out the possibly conflicting
Quasi-market and Academic logics. Rebuilding trust in academics seems to
be one of the key imperatives on the one hand, while on the other hand−
having senior management as role models who create a shared vision of theuniversity with the open culture for dialogue and learning celebrating
bottom-up initiatives of change seems to be crucial for productive university
transformation. It is clear that the status quo cannot be maintained given theincreased student numbers and increasing costs of higher education. At thesame time, professional autonomy and creativity driven by intrinsic
motivation in protected spaces from work overloads, stress and anxiety haveto be nourished if we are to aim to contribute to the societies of producing
reflective graduates and offering research results that move the science
frontier forward as well as contribute to our societies in a positive way. Herethe notion of transformative governance is useful as it allows for this dialogue
and co-creation. Bottom-up agency combined with top-down leadershipwhere the complexity of logics is tolerated seems to allow for transformative
governance and thus is important for the future of universities and academic
profession (Leišytė and Wilkesmann 2016).

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制度ロジックと大学ガバナンス−学術生産性と専門職の自律性への示唆−
リドヴィカ・ライシト*＜要旨＞

本稿は欧州における大学ガバナンスの変容とそれが教育研究活動
へ与える影響について、研究の生産性と専門職の自律性に着目して考察する。特に、制度ロジック（Thornton and Ocasio 2008）とガバナ
ンス等化モデル（De Boer et al. 2007）という 2 つの理論的枠組みを用いることで、NPM 型の大学改革が極度の管理主義をもたらすと同時に、ドイツなどのフンボルト型大学では同僚制支配も未だに影響力を保持していることを論じる。また、公益や普遍性を重視した科学研
究のマートン的価値観を基本とするアカデミアの論理が、高等教育からの私的な経済的価値を基本とする市場の論理によって脅かされていることを論じる。本稿の分析の要点は、以下の通りである。第 1 に、NPM 型の高等教育改革の最中にあっても、論文数などの古典的な研究生産性指標は向上している。ただし、その背後で専門職の自律性を犠牲にするというコストを負っている可能性がある。たとえば、ドイツ、フランス、イギリスでは、論文数と特許数は 2008 年から 2015 年の間、着実に増加してきた。同時に、教員の労働時間も増加しており、それは主に管理的業務の増加によるものであった。また、機関による外部資金獲得圧力は、教員を流行の研究課題や短期的研究課題に向かわせることになった。第 2 に、このような状況下では、自分たちの研究を正当に評価するための戦略が重要であるが（Rip 2011）、それが可能なのは一部の専門分野や一部のスター教員のみで、若手教員や歴史学など人文系分野では非常に困難である。すなわち、市場の論理が持ち込まれた大学では、何を成果としてカウントするか、何が新たな知として生み出されたかの見方が揺らぐことになり、このことは長期的に大学教授職の魅力を損なうことにつながる恐れがある。

ドルトムント工科大学高等教育研究センター・教授
名古屋大学高等教育研究センター・客員教授

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