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Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Original paper

Methodology and procedure of business impact analysis for improving port
logistics business continuity management
Felipe Caselli Benavente 1 , Mauricio Reyes Gallardo1, Mario Beale Esquivel1, Yasuhiro
Akakura 2 and Kenji Ono2
Received: 31/01/2015 / Accepted: 03/03/2016 / Published: 17/06/2016

Abstract This paper offers an overall view of applying business impact analysis (BIA) to prepare
business continuity plans (BCP) for port logistics based on the joint research project to create a tsunami
resilient society undertaken by researchers from Chile and Japan. Authors review Chilean socio-economic
circumstances and currently developed disaster responding system in the national and regional context,
and identify significance and social request of maintaining the continuity of port logistics functions inassociation with integrated risk management of tsunami disaster. The authors place particular emphasis on
the possible engagement of BIA for improving efficiency and effectiveness of port logistics BCP. The
authors propose an appropriate procedure, techniques and tools for BIA implementation in this regard,and demonstrate them as a practical example of BIA implementation in the port of Iquique, Chile. Finally,some recommendations and suggestions are provided for the development of future work, as well as thenecessary development of policies.

Keywords Tsunami resilient society; Business continuity plan; Business impact analysis;
Integrated disaster risk management; Business continuity management.
1. INTRODUCTION

Since the Central Chile earthquake and tsunami in 2010, and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011,
both countries have shared a growing concern of large scale tsunami disasters destroying the nationalsocio-economy and coastal communities. Therefore, an international joint research project, namely
SATREPS Chile (Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development between

1

Escuela de Ingeniería Civil Oceánica, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile, felipe.caselli@uv.cl /mauricio.reyes@uv.cl / mario.beale@uv.cl
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Disaster prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, akakura.yasuhiro.6n@kyoto-u.ac.jp /kenji.ono.5z@kyoto-u.ac.jp1

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Japan and Chile) was initiated.
The project includes, as an overarching approach to create tsunami resilient communities, a research
objective of preparing business continuity plans (BCP) in the Chilean ports to facilitate minimizing
aftermath negative impact of the disaster on the socio-economy, as well as promptly mobilizing portfunctions for emergency relief logistics (ERL).
The port of Iquique, located in the region of Tarapacá, was selected as a pilot study site to develop thenecessary methodology to properly prepare a Chilean port BCP guideline. A consulting body, comprising
port community members from Iquique, was set up in the port for undertaking a series of intensive
discussions on the possible procedures and techniques needed for BCP preparation. One of the particularfindings of this research include the significance of business impact analysis (BIA) in line withrequirements for the development of a business continuity management system (BCMS), as stated in
ISO22301 (ISO 2012). Necessary procedures and techniques for implementing the analysis in atransparent and traceable manner such as business flow analysis techniques and mobilization ofworksheets suggested by Ono et al. (2014) were also discussed and their validity confirmed by the
consultation meeting.
In view of this, the authors review first in this paper the national and regional emergency response
system in Chile. The natural hazards and disaster risk which the country faces are also discussed. To meetthe requirements for securing port logistics functions, integrated risk management of ports is needed. The
authors consider that this can be achieved through the implementation of a comprehensive BIA. An
appropriate procedure, techniques and tools for BIA implementation is proposed in this regard.
Recommendations on the necessary policy development for facilitating proper inclusion of BIA andprompt preparation of BCP in the Chilean ports are provided accordingly.

2. ECONOMY AND PORT LOGISTICS IN CHILE
2.1 National and regional economy in Chile
2.1.1 Characterization of the economic environment
Since the mid-80s, Chile has defined its development strategy through exports growth (Agosin 1999;
Bergoeing et al. 2011). As a result, the exports in 1985, 2000 and 2013, reached US$ 3,804 million,
US$ 18,158 million, and US$ 77,367.5 million respectively. These numbers show a significant sustained
growth over the last 35 years (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2009). The export growth in Chile ismost certainly accompanied by increasing importance of port infrastructure. In fact nowadays
approximately 95% of the international trade happens through ports (CAMPORT 2013). The relation
between the Chilean economy and its international trade was seen in 2009 after a sharp decline in exports.
This caused deterioration in expectations for economic growth, employment and income; eventuallycausing a fall in GDP in 2009 over 2008 (CEPAL 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed that a disruption
in the operation of ports could generate adverse impacts on the national economy.
2.1.2 Economic situation in the north of Chile
The GDP of the region of Tarapacá in 2010 represented 3.4% of total GDP of the country (INE 2010).
The economy of the region is mainly based on extraction, i.e. mining and fishing industries. However,trade is very important because there is the passage of products to northern countries (especially Peru,
Bolivia and Brazil), through a highway network known as the oceanic corridor.
ZOFRI (Tax Free Zone of Iquique) has led to commercial development. There are 1,900 companies,
with great impact on commerce and regional employment. The labor force in Iquique reached 87,000
people, of which 40% were related to ZOFRI (Banco Central de Chile n.d., ZOFRI 2012).

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However, 43% of regional GDP is explained by mining. Projections for the regional mining sector for
2012-2020, indicate it could reach US$67,000 million of investment. Projections of mining production
indicate that by 2020 fine copper production could reach 7.5 million tons, of which 74% will come fromthe Upper North 3.
Tourism is also very important in Northern Chile. It has one of the best developed tourism industry inthe country. In fact, hotels, restaurants and trade represent 30.68% of regional GDP.
With all that, the port of Iquique has faced a significant increase in demand, about 103% in 11 years(since 2000) in terms of port cargo. Port cargo of Iquique is projected to reach 5.6 million tons in 2015
(Banco Central de Chile 2010).
2.2 Risk appraisal for the coastal area in Chile
Since there are several conceptualizations of risk in several fields, a clear definition is needed. In thisstudy, risk is considered as the product of probability of hazard occurrence and its impact, which arefunctions of vulnerability and exposure. These mathematical relations are not easy to compute, andgenerally require qualitative approaches to complement the scarce quantitative evidence.
For conceptual order, this appraisal will be disaggregated in terms of hazard and vulnerabilities.
2.2.1 Earthquake and Tsunami Hazards for the coastal area in Chile
Chile has a particular position and orientation that makes it prone to be affected by the tectonic plate’s
behavior: The country stretches from north to south between the volcano line of the Andes Mountains andthe Pacific Ocean, and thus parallel to the subduction trench in almost its whole extension. So, Chile islocated just over the zone where the Nazca and South American plates converge. Since 1562, historical
data shows that more than 31 near-field tsunamis have ravaged the coasts of Chile, even producing thedevastation of entire cities, like Arica in 1604 and Concepción in 1751 (Winckler et al. 2010). Taking into
account the paleo-geological data, it appears that some giant tsunami show a larger recurrence: thus
introducing a shadow of uncertainty over the statistical approaches for earthquake occurrence (Goldfinger
et al. 2013). Figure 1 shows the tectonic configuration of the southeast Pacific Ocean.

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Area that includes the regions of: Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá and Antofagasta, plus the northern half ofAtacama.

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Figure 1 Tectonics configuration of the southeast Pacific Ocean. Active volcanoes represented with black
circles (modified from Winckler et al. 2010)

The historical record indicates that more than 110 earthquakes with a magnitude greater than 7.0 haveoccurred since the year 1570 CE (Winckler et al. 2010). From these documented earthquakes, 78% did
not generate destructive tsunami, and only 11% generated highly destructive tsunami. Some locations
show recurrence of tsunami impact, and several towns had even been moved from their original sites tosafer locations (Reyes and Miura 2013).
Some of the historical descriptions include relevant information about tsunami, even justifying thecities’ reposition because of tsunami inundations (Lomnitz 1970). There is little recurrence forearthquakes with inland epicenter and rupture zone. Whatsoever, the rupture zone is usually underwater,
hence the majority of earthquakes in Chile meet the conditions of being tsunamigenic, even if only a few
of them generate destructive tsunamis. Nonetheless, there is a permanent risk of tsunami generation,
therefore tsunami generation scenarios must always be considered in the coastal regions of the country.
The statistical behavior of earthquakes and tsunamis show some tendency in very specific parts of thecountry. Notwithstanding, it is not possible to generate forecast information from that. For seismic design,
the building code includes an acceleration spectrum that has been prepared on the base of historicalearthquakes. After the earthquake of February 27th, 2010, some aspects of local seismicity and soil relatedrisks has been introduced for improvement of the code. In the case of tsunami, just some supposition oftsunamigenic zones based on historical data are the usual input for estimation of inundation maps. All thebiggest coastal cities have inundation maps developed by the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service of
the Navy (SHOA). The precision is not sufficient however for detailed hazard estimation, and have beenused only to define evacuation zones and procedures, under very conservative criteria (Reyes and Miura
2013). Additionally, the introduction of tsunami resistant design of structures is not yet fully developed;
however, there is an official standard recommended for that purpose since 2013.
2.2.2 Northern Chile
The northern part of Chile cannot be evaluated in the same way as the rest of the country, due to theparticular conditions of its historical development. Although evidence is scarce, several scientific studies
had identified the existence of a seismic gap in northern Chile, with at least the capacity of generating anearthquake similar to the 1877 event, possibly with energy of Mw 8.6 – 8.8. However, the conditions

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have changed after the M8.2 earthquake occurred on April 1st, 2014. According to Hayes et al. (2014), theparticular characteristics of that earthquake show a constraint in size and spatial extent of rupture, thusparts of the seismic gap remain locked. Thus, it is possible to expect future megathrust earthquakes to thesouth or to the north of the April 1st event’s rupture zone (Hayes et al. 2014). Regarding the confidence inearthquake forecasting along the subduction zone in front of Chile, Hayes et al. highlighted and compared
the fore and aftershock’s behavior of the April 1st 2014 earthquake and the February 27th 2010 earthquake,showing the difficulty of earthquake prediction in Chile (Hayes et al. 2014).

Figure 2 Historical earthquakes in Chile (modified from Winckler et al. 2010)

On the other hand, the April 1st 2014 earthquake generated a small tsunami with limited impact suchas damage to some fishing boats, fishing equipment and materials, and the strand of a tug boat in Iquiqueport. However, some tsunami inversion studies are showing that there is a deficit of tsunamigenic slip at
the western part of the South American plate along the seismic gap (Chao et al. 2014). So, with theavailable information on seismicity and tsunami generation in northern Chile it is not immediately
possible to discount the possibility of megathrust earthquakes of Mw 9.0 or higher with destructive
tsunamis. The occurrence of tsunami earthquakes must also be considered a possibility.

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2.3 Emergency response system in Chile
2.3.1 Disaster risk analysis in Chile
After the large earthquake and tsunami of 27th February 2010 (herein referred to as 27F), Chile has
been the subject of various studies towards the improvement of its natural disasters management system.
The country is prone to almost all natural hazards possible, with the exception of hurricanes. Among thedisasters that have occurred in Chile during the last century, the largest damages in term of casualties andeconomic losses were due to earthquakes (PNUD 2012a).
Maybe the most relevant and complete diagnostic study was undertaken by the United Nations
Development Program (PNUD 2012b), reaching to a very good overview of Chile’s performance andcapacities in regard to natural disaster management. A number of issues are noted in the report, fromwhich the following are considered more relevant for this research:a. The entire country is susceptible to some kind of natural threat.
b. The risks due to these threats are increased, because the methods for their identification, analysis,
evaluation and data availability were not sufficiently developed in Chile.
c. The risks due to natural disasters might be amplified, because the knowledge about vulnerabilities
of communities, infrastructure and systems were not sufficiently developed in Chile.
d. There are risk management strategies in Chile that are either on course or in the planning stages,
with favorable conditions in the coordination of personnel, initiatives and institutions for
improving the situation.
e. The absence and/or difficult access to relevant and up-to-date information and utilities for disastermanagement, including initiatives, tools and past experience, is a limitation for risk management.
f. In terms of indicators, the country has sufficient financial resources to invest in the prevention andreduction of risks, with good levels of social expenditure, and adequate infrastructure.
The regulatory and institutional framework in Chile for disaster risk management has been developed
and consolidated after each event. Also it should be noted that the large earthquake and tsunami that hit
Valdivia in 1960 was the basis for the creation of the National Office of Emergency of the Ministry ofInterior (ONEMI), and after 27F resulted in the proposition of the new National System of Emergency
and Civil Protection, and the National Agency of Civil Protection, both currently in discussion in
Parliament. ONEMI is the institution in charge of disaster management and has the following strategic
objectives:
1) Strengthen, develop and coordinate the State´s management in a crisis, through the technicalassistance to sectorial bodies, as well as to regional, provincial and community teams.
2) Generate, foster and advise authorities and personnel from the different administrative levels of
the country and community, in aspects related to risk management, early warning and emergency
management, in order to upgrade the community with more and better conditions for protection andsecurity.
3) Develop and disseminate methodologies, programs, studies and technical reports concerningvulnerability factors to different hazards, establishing guidelines for continuous improvement in thefield of mitigation, prevention and preparedness, through projects and coordination with scientific andtechnical agencies.
The National System of Emergency and Civil Protection propose a series of decentralized bodies,created either from the public or private sector. The objectives of this system are to promote andimplement actions in the prevention and relief of active or potential emergencies that may result incollective damage to people, property or the environment (PNUD 2012a).

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2.3.2 Standard procedure for regional and local level risk management
At regional level, the standard procedure corresponds to the system of national regulations being
adapted for regional context through the Regional Emergencies Response Plan (ONEMI 2012). It ismanaged by the ONEMI regional office, with the remit outlined above. Response plans are mainly
focused on emergency management (ONEMI 2012).
Emergency management at the local level is the responsibility of each municipality. Since 2011 there
has been a Communal Response Plan, developed by the Municipality of Iquique, which outlines
hypothetical disaster scenarios and the administrative measures to be put into effect in these emergencies(I. Municipalidad de Iquique 2011). The concept of risk, however, is not well defined, and is often
mistaken for hazard.
2.3.3 Institutional aspects
Risk management in Chile is a specialized and, to some extent, an exclusive activity, without theeffective participation of community organizations in terms of analysis and decision-making processes(PNUD 2012a).
One weakness of the risk management system in Chile is the lack of coordination between theinstitutions. This is worsening by the lack of preventive measures or preparation in society as a whole(PNUD 2012b). For national or regional governmental institutions the administrative structure is clear
and robust, but for local government and administrative bodies, management capacities result in problems
due to centralism and poor communication during emergencies (PNUD 2012a). ONEMI has made efforts
to coordinate the work of NGOs and volunteers during emergencies and important investments have been
made by the government during the last 3 years. Nowadays the functionality and organization have beennotoriously improved.
Another relevant issue is the loss of the government controls because of privatization of some public
services. Usually the government is not aware of the levels of risk and preventive measures undertaken by
private entities until a crisis has already evolved (PNUD 2012a). This has been partially improved
through several measures at national levels.
2.3.4 Case study: the earthquake and tsunami of February 27th, 2010.
PNUD conducted a survey in the town of Talcahuano, one of the biggest and most severely affectedurban areas in the disaster zone of 27F. The conclusions of the survey were stated with reference to six
dimensions: basic services, social, habitat, livelihood, connectivity and infrastructural, and governance(PNUD 2012b).According to the cited report, the disaster of 27F demonstrated a massive lack of
preparation and risk management at all levels, which went from central government down to local
communities, essentially involving the whole of Chilean society.
2.3.5 Case study: the earthquake and tsunami of April 1st, 2014.
This earthquake tested all the accumulated experience after the 27F earthquake. Northern Chile has aparticular context, in terms of culture and infrastructure, which determined certain aspects of the disaster.
For instance, the earthquake was not large if measured by the number of people affected. However, it canbe considered large when considering losses due to impacts on infrastructure.
The particular condition of foreshocks and aftershocks was very relevant for people’s behavior and forinfrastructure. Several evacuation actions, due to the main shock and some aftershocks, were wellconducted and people showed a good preparation.
The port of Iquique was partially damaged, and it was in parallel to the BCP studies undertaken by theauthors and the port headquarters, and benefits from that were observed.

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3. BIA CONSIDERATION IN THE PORT-SUBSECTOR
Since earthquakes and tsunamis are a permanent hazard for ports, hence they represent a risk for the
economy. This section introduced some considerations to be taken in BIA for the port industries.

3.1 Objectives and importance of BIA
BIA is, as indicated by ISO 22301, one of key elements for successful business continuity
management (BCM), which enables ports to fully understand its context and, therefore, decrease thepossibility of a disruptive incident. It also enables, if such incident occurs, an appropriate response. Hence,
it can dramatically reduce the damage of such an incident. The idea is that the impact that different
disasters may have on a business become clear once this analysis is complete (Botha and Von Solms
2004).
Discussions about analysis and appraisal procedures for preparing port logistics BCPs were led by
SATREPS Chile work group 4b (hereinafter referred as WG4b), and port people from Iquique actively
participated. A schematic view of the BCP preparation procedures is shown in Figure 3. The procedureincludes three major steps for analyzing and appraising potential risks of the port logistics functions, i.e.:the Business impact analysis (BIA), the Risk assessment (RA) and the Business continuity strategy
development.

Figure 3 Suggested procedures for preparing port BCPs

The BIA process enables port managers to understand the magnitude of operational and financial
impacts associated with a disaster. It also provides them with information about the business interest of
the port clients in order to judge how long they can wait for the recovery of port logistics functions andwhat are the minimum port services needed to meet the requirements for their business activities at the8IDRiM (2016) 6 (1)DOI10.5595/idrim.2016.0114

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port. These requirements by the clients are expressed as the concept of the maximum tolerable period of
downtime (MTPD) which is essential for estimating recovery time objective (RTO) and recovery levelobjective (RLO) of the port logistics function. The BIA is expected to provide accurate and objective
evaluation of MTPD, RTO and RLO; thus, should be based on scientific and systematic approaches.
Another target of BIA is to identify critical resources needed for the sound port operation. The
meaning of a disaster is, in short, a loss of some resources needed for livelihood and economic activities.
Here resources include human resources, assets and opportunities of receiving social services. From thispoint of view, the BIA process starts from selecting the most important port businesses, namely “port corebusinesses”, and identifying important port operations needed for conducting such businesses. These
resources are often under mutual interdependent relationships. Multiple resources sometimes rely on the
supply of only a few other resources, which are in general called “bottleneck resources”. It is later
discussed that the bottleneck resources decide the necessary time for recovering port functions. As such,the bottleneck resources are of great importance for the port to meet the clients’ requirements.
The mission of RA in Figure 3 includes identifying the most critical natural risk to the port,
evaluating magnitude of the negative impact on the resources due to the natural disaster, and estimating
the needed recovery efforts of the damaged resources.
The most important parameters obtained from the RA are the predicted recovery times (PRTs) and thepredicted recovery levels (PRLs), which have to be compared with RTO and RLO in order to prepare thebusiness continuity strategy. PRTs are sometimes much longer than RTO because of the time estimatedfor the completion of the recovery works for critical resources. Therefore, the port managers are requested
to curtail the PRTs in order to meet the RTO and RLO, which should be accomplished through themeasures defined in the business continuity strategy.

3.2 Port system: Difference between business and public service entities
Chapter 4 of ISO22301 places particular emphasis on the leadership, which is vital for efficient andeffective implementation of the BCM. This is of particular relevance for the ports, given its administrativeand business characteristics, as follows.
One of the particularities of undertaking BIA in a port is likely to be its governance structure, which
normally includes multiple independent entities, from public regulatory organizations such as port
authority, harbor master, CIQ offices and local municipality, to port businesses such as shipping
companies, stevedoring companies, shipping agencies and port service providers. These entities normallyevaluate and respond to risks independently, based on their respective information, interests and norms;
therefore implementing BCM in line with a single BCP sometimes looks like substantially impossible.
In particular, public and private entities tend to think in an opposite manner on a disaster scene.
Typical examples might be those of the harbor master and the shipping companies, under the aftermath ofa disaster. The companies may request an earlier resume of port calls while the harbor master may bereluctant, giving a higher priority to safe navigation. Another example is that an emergency rehabilitation
procedure of damaged quays may benefit some stevedoring companies and shipping companies. This fact
might discourage the other companies to actively participate under a single BCM scheme.
So, a port community by nature may find it difficult to jointly prepare and implement a single BCM.
However, through discussions under SATREPS Chile project the authors learnt and consider it possible
to: i) share risk scenario for developing the common target of the port BCM among the port community,ii) identify and agree on the mission of respective port entities to be included in their own BCPs or
emergency responding programs, iii) improve capacity to undertake respective BCM under cooperationand mutual assistance among the community, and iv) integrate risk management efforts of the community
members for reviewing the risks scenario and awareness. This may pave the way of preparing an

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overarching plan for improving port logistics continuity, and mutual assistance arrangements in order tocope with requests from the port clients.
3.3 Significance of BIA implementation in Chilean ports
As stated, BIA is highly important for providing precise information about the port logistics business
requirements; this idea is supported by Lin et al. (2012) who indicated that a business contingency plan ishighly dependent on industrial characteristics such as type, structure, company location, business
operation style, internal business processes, and supply chain. However, it is likely that companies withina specific industry will share some common elements that shape the specific context for each company. In
this sense, it will be helpful to identify these elements from the Chilean port system, which will be part ofthe context of each port.
Currently the Chilean port system includes 56 ports: 10 state ports for public use including 7 ports
operating under concession contracts, 14 private ports for public use and 32 ports for private use (MTT,n.d.). Until 1997 the national port system in Chile was controlled and managed by EMPORCHI (Chilean
Port Company), when the Chilean government enacted the law N° 19542 that reformed the state owned
port sector by following three courses of action of: i) creating 10 independent port companies which areassigned to undertake main roles to manage, operate, develop, and maintain state owned ports, ii)
modernizing labor issues, and iii) allowing participation of private companies in the development of state
ports through concessions for the exclusive operation of some berths of each port, and keeping theadministration of the rest of the berths in the state company. This change in the port policy led to the state
port companies to become legal entities with autonomy and decentralized power. The port companies arerequested to focus on managing infrastructure by themselves or allowing private sector participation
through concession contracts into the port operation. Furthermore, this law gives the Ministry ofTransport and Telecommunications (herein MTT) the power to modify the port areas, as well as a broader
strategic mandate, that includes functions as to propose strategic plans for the state ports development(MTT 2014).
Thus, along with the board of directors and the concessionaire (where there is any), the state ports
relate with 3 key members of the State: i.e. i) The Enterprises System of the Ministry of Economy, towhich the port companies belong. The Ministry is responsible for supervision and control of their
management. The Ministry nominates and removes members of the board of directors of each port
company; ii) the MTT, which provides the national policies and goals for each port; and iii) the
Directorate of Port Works of the Ministry of Public Works, which is responsible for port infrastructuretechnical issues. Figure 4 shows such relations.
The new model for the national port system allowed an increase in both the cargo transferred andrevenues, and a reduction in operating costs (SEP 2006), according to Carrillo and Santander (2005) thisincrease in the transfer rate in part is explained because of the investment in high-tech equipment for
cargo transfer and in infrastructure to receive larger ships. The state ports are located along the 4,000 kmof the Chilean coast 4, so they must address the specific requirements of the regional economy where they
are located: e.g., in the north, mining and fishing industries, in the center agriculture industry and in thesouth aquaculture and forestry industries. Hence, BIA is important to understand who the related
stakeholders are and what their specific needs are, in order to prepare an appropriate business continuity
strategy for each port.

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Considered linearly

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Figure 4 Relations within the national port system (state players)

3.4 Lesson learnt from past disasters.
Immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, emergency rehabilitation works were
undertaken by the Japanese government in the affected ports. The less damaged wharves were prioritized
to attend emergency relief logistics by sea, for which a minimum clearance of water area was secured
almost within two weeks. As a result, the first emergency relief ship arrived on March 16, 2011 at the portof Miyako, Iwate prefecture, followed by neighboring ports on March 18, March 19 and March 23. Until
August 15, 2011, 871 ships had arrived in major ports of Tohoku for bringing in relief supplies for thedisaster area. (MLIT 2012)
However, this did not necessarily mean, that these ports had immediately come back for commercial
use. The cargo handling and storage functions of these ports were lost because of the tsunami, which
derailed quay gantry cranes, demolished transit shed and warehouses, and damaged cargo handlingequipment. Consequently, cargo handling functions of the majority of ports were still unrecoverable after
the completion of clearing the waterways and rehabilitation of quay structures. It resulted in delays on
resuming of the regular shipping links, in particular, of the container shipping services, for which loading
and unloading operations by quay gantry cranes were essential. A good example of this is the port of
Sendai-Shiogama, where it took three months to resume coastal container shipping services, 6 months forthe container links with Asian neighboring economies and 10 months for intercontinental link with North
America.
One of the effects observed was that port calls of international container ships were delayed because of
the time-consuming repair works of quay gantry cranes, which restarted operation only on September 2,
2011. Meanwhile, small container vessels for coasting came back on June 1, 2011 for linking Tohokuwith ports of Tokyo and Yokohama. However, the reopening of the international trunk container line with
North America was on January 22, 2012, more than 10 months after the disaster.
The delay in recovery of port functions seriously affected the restoration of the local economy. One
example is the case of the port of Ishinomaki, where a paper-manufacturing company located at the port
area, fully resumed operation one year after the disaster. Hence, it suffered a decrease of market share duethat long absence. Another example is the case of the grain terminal at Ishinomaki that suspended its
operation and had to be temporarily merged with Hachinohe Port..

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As such, the lesson learnt from the Great East Japan Earthquake highlighted that the criticaloperational resources are essential for the early recovery of the port logistic operations. Therefore, they
are of great importance in the BCM context.
4. FRAMEWORK AND PROCEDURE FOR BIA IN PORTS
As stated in chapter 3.1, the main goals of BIA is to obtain the MTPD, RTO and RLO, along with thebottleneck operational resources. The procedure conducted by the SATREPS working group 4b is
described below.
4.1 Procedure for implementing BIA
The whole view and outlines of the BIA implementation procedure is recommended by the authors asa flow chart diagram shown in Figure 5. BIA starts by screening current port businesses to select its “corebusiness”, for which the needed operational resources with mutual dependency of the resources and theirbottlenecks, and the requested recovery time period and service level are identified. The procedures are
divided into eight steps, for which work sheets are prepared for guiding the BIA analyst.

Figure 5 Flow chart of BIA procedures and steps

As stated before, among the output of BIA is the MTPD, which is essential to understand the portclients’ limitation of the tolerance as well as the RLO and the RTO. So, the MTPD indicates the
maximum period the port logistics can be suspended. Once failure to meet this requirement occurs, it may
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affect the market credibility and competitiveness of the port’s core business, resulting in losing market
position. RTO and RLO are determined by considering the time rugs (or lead time) and minimum
requirements of the port logistic functions under the aftermath of the disaster. Another target of the BIA is,
as stated in the former chapter, identifying interdependency and bottlenecks of operation resources.
A schematic view of the MTPD, RTO and RLO is shown in Figure 6, which suggests that normallythe period of RTO is less than the MTPD because of the time rug needed for mobilizing BCP responding
actions and for preparing resume of the service.

Figure 6 Schematic view of MTPD, RLO and RTO

4.2 Goals and methodology of BIA
After finding the core business of the port, there are two tracks of processes to be undertaken as shownin Figure 3, decision of MTPD and Identifying important business operations. Among them, theevaluation of MTPD is prone to be evaded because of the lack of clear approach. The authors consider theevaluation of the MTPD through: i) consideration of health and humanitarian situation of local residents,ii) discussion on possible damage and loss suffered by the port clients including consignee/consignor andshipping company, iii) projection of port cargo throughput after the disaster, and iv) remaining volume ofthe stocks of fuel, industrial material and other local inventory.
The possible impact on the logistics business caused by port shutdown should be evaluated under thebroad discussion with the participation of the site managers and practitioners as well as port management.
The procedures, discussions and analysis should be properly documented and reported for future review
and improvement of BCP. Many BCP textbooks offer templates of worksheets for preparing BCP, basedon which the authors develop a series of worksheets for undertaking BIA and RA for BCPs in Chilean
ports.
One of the advantages of the worksheet system is that increases transparency in the procedures. The
authors consider that it is much easier for the practitioner, and for third parties, to trace and understand the
BIA and RA analysis with this “step by step” approach for obtaining BCP parameters, based on wellprepared worksheets. As such, the worksheet system is expected to facilitate broader participation of port
community members and wider echelons ranging from top management to site staff in the BCM
preparation, implementation and monitoring. Another means to facilitate broad participation may
include working group discussions for aggregating in-site expertise, knowledge and information for the
BCP preparation (Komatsu et al. 2013, Ono et al. 2014)
4.3 Risk response plan
Following the BIA and RA procedures should be developed the business continuity strategy, toachieve the objectives defined for resuming port logistics function. The strategy could include

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countermeasures such as strengthening of structures of the port facilities, improving stockpiles of
construction materials for emergency rehabilitation, shearing inventory of cargo handling equipment andparts, accelerating procurement procedures, and improving redundancy of external supplies (Table 1).
Table 1 Possible measures for developing port continuity strategy
Stre n gth e n in g
stru c tu re
In fra stru c tu re

Hu manre siu rc e

Stoc kpile

Su pplie s

Ac c e ralatin gproc u re me n t
proc e du re s

Re du n dan c yPort facilities

○

○

Road

○

○

Civil works○○

Cargo handlingPort
operation
Port services*1

○

△

○

△

Ship crue

○

△

○

○

○

○

Cargo handlingequipment*2○○

Port service
equipment*3

○

○

○

△

Construction
Reconstru material
ction
Equipment
Mate rials /e qu ipme n t

Sh e arin g
in ve n try
in formation○

Operation

Ship○

Electricity○○

Water supply○○

City gas○○

Waste disposal○○*1：includes port administration, Harbor master works, Pilotage, mooring line services*2：includes quay crane, falklift, truck and trailer, warehouse, passenger terminal*3：includes boats and small vessels operated by port authority, harbor master and harbor police, and tugboat.

5 TECHNIQUES FOR BIA PROCEDURES
This section introduces some particular techniques to be used when port community tackles BCP
preparation. These techniques were used in Iquique Port and may be used to follow a systematic
procedure for avoiding unnecessary dependence on personal capacity and judgment, and to achievetransparency and traceability for later review and update.

5.1 Work flow analysis
In view of the above discussions, the authors recommend the use of business flow analysis based on
the IDEF0 method 5 as an indicative methodology for identifying the detail steps of business operations
and resources needed. It is necessary to note that, as shown in Figure 5, the first step of the BIA is to
identify the core business of the port; however this will be explained in the following point.

5

IDEF0 (Integrated DEFinition method 0) may be defined as a business process modeling tools, developed by aresearch group in US air base in Oklahoma.

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The business flow analysis is a technique that uses diagrams to breakdown the business process
structure. The IDEF0 is a function modeling method designed for identifying decisions, actions, andactivities included in an organizational function or social/information system. Komatsu et al. (2013)
introduced “job cards” for developing a business flow diagram of a water treatment plant in Osaka, Japan.
A template of a job card modified by the authors for port BCP preparation, and a business flow diagram,are illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.

Figure 7 Modified job card for Port BCP preparation

Figure 8 An example of business flow diagram for Port BCP preparation

A business flow diagram is described as an event chain system, where the job card identifies: i)necessary operational steps, and ii) essential resources, for properly implementing the port core business.

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For this analysis there are two inputs to take under special consideration in each job card: i.e. “mechanism”
from below and “control” from the top, as shown in Figure 7. The mechanism includes resources directly
needed for processing the step, and control represents necessary information for processing such as
permission, notification, order, guidelines, program, and any other regulations and conditions of concern.
As a result of the business modeling, a complete description of the core business, including the direct
resources needed, can be obtained. The next task is the identification of dependencies among resources.
using the worksheet system.

5.2 Worksheet system
The worksheet system is likely an effective means to address, evaluate and identify port core business,the maximum tolerance of the port clients, and dependency among port operation resources.
The worksheet for screening major port business and identifying port core business is a starting pointof BIA. The worksheet shown in Table 2 is provided by the authors based on commonly-used BCP
worksheets (Kon 2009). The worksheet assists in selecting the core businesses to be included in the BCM
by rating the possible negative impacts of the port shutdown in association with certain criteria, such as
possible future port development, securing major shipping links and financial soundness of the port
management. Once the core businesses are selected, the business flow can be analyzed as shown in theprevious section.
Table 2 Proposed worksheet for screening port core business

The worksheet developed by the authors for evaluating MTPD for the port of Iquique is shown in
Figure 9. The impact of the shutdown of port core business is evaluated in association with the client’s
tolerance. The criterion should be set forth under discussions among site managers and commitment of
the top management. Notice that RTO is calculated based on MTPD and time rug parameters

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Figure 9 Suggested worksheet for deciding MTPD, RTO and RLOOnce the resources have been identified through work flow analysis, the worksheet system is used forthe follow up. The work flow diagram provides information about the resources needed for implementing
each step of the port's core business. The “mechanisms” indicates direct resources needed, and the“controls” indicates the resources needed to provide such controls. Hence, through the worksheet system
all operational resources are identified and categorized through “step by step basis”, as displayed in Table
3 and Table 4.

5.3 Resource dependency matrix
Often there are interdependent relationships among the operational resources that, as a consequence,create resource bottlenecks, as illustrated in Figure 10. An example is the interdependence between wharf,
mobile crane and tug boat: the wharf cannot undertake loading and unloading operation without
assistance of those facilities, which fully rely on fuel oil supply; therefore, function of wharf eventuallydepends on the fuel supply. So, fuel oil is found to be a critical resource through tracking process ofresource dependency. These tracking processes are described as “resource dependency matrix”, which
sequentially follows dependency of resources and find possible bottleneck resources for the port corebusiness as demonstrated in Figure 11.
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Table 3 Suggested worksheet for identifying operational resources
ID
Nos

Business activities

Resources

Controladministrations/Managements

Control

Direct input

Needed for control

A1 Entry into port

Entrance permission/notice

Harbour master.
Port authority

Access channel, Dock Pilotage, Tug boat

Harbour masrer staff, Hqs. building, and OA equipment
Port authority staff, office and OA equipment

A2 Anchoring off the shore port

Anchoring order

Harbour master.

Anchoring area

Harbour masrer staff, Hqs. building, and OA equipment

A3 Docking & mooring

Berth allocation

Port authority

Turning basin, Tug boat, Wharf, Mooring line service,

Port authority staff, office and OA equipment

A4 Loading & Unloading

Ship stowage plan

Terminal operationcompany

Wharf, Quay cranes, Cargo handling equip., Chesses,
Dock workers, Tally men, Berth window management

Staff, office, and OA equipment of the terminal operationcompany.

A5 Release & Undocking

Clearance premission/notice:

Terminal operationcompany

Access channel, Turning basin, Wharf, Tug boat, Mooring Staff, office, and OA equipment of the terminal operationline service, Berth window management,
company.

Table 4 Suggested worksheet for categorizing operational resources
Resources
Business activities

Control

Outside services
Power supply

workforces

Facilities & equipment

ICT & networks

A1 Entry into port

Entrance
permission/notice

Harbour masrer official, port Access channel, Tug boat
authority staff, dock Pilotage

OA equipment of harbour masrer
and port authority

A2 Anchoring off the shore port

Anchoring order

Harbour masrer official

OA equipment of harbour masrer

A3 Docking & mooring

Berth allocation

Power supply

Port authority staff, line men Berth, turning basin

Berth window management, OA
equipment of port authority

A4 Loading & Unloading

Ship stowage plan

Power supply

Dock workers, tally men, staff Wharf, Quay cranes, cargo handlingof the terminal operationequipment, yard trailer/chassis
company.

Terminal control system, OA
equipment of port authority

A5 Release & Undocking

Clearance
premission/notice:

Power supply

Harbour masrer official, port Access channel, Turning basin, Wharf, Berth window management,
authority staff, dock Pilotage, Tug boatliAnchoring area

Figure 10 Analyzing critical relationships among resources

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Figure 11 Example of the resource dependency matrix operation

Tracking algorism included in the resource dependency matrix is as the followings: i.e.
The mutual relationship of operational resources is expressed by an N × N matrix as shown in formula(1) and (2)X ij = �

1: f 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑥𝑗
0: f 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑥𝑗(1)

 X 11  X N 1 
 

 

 X 1N  X NN 

Here,𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝐷𝑗𝑗 → 𝐷𝑖𝑖(2)i, j, k = 1 - N(3)f 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑥𝑗 : Dependency of resource (xi) to resource (xj)

N : the number of operational resources.
Dij := Xij = 1

When the resource i depends on the resource j, this relationship can be expressed as Xij=1, and when
there is no dependency; as Xij=0. When the resource j further depends on the resource k, then the resource
i depends on the resource k as expressed by formula (3).
Based on the formula (1), (2) and (3), dependencies of all resources are checked and tracked
accordingly.
By coupling with the predicted recovery time (PRT) and the predicted recovery level (PRL), thisresource dependency matrix defines bottleneck resources, without which it is almost impossible toproperly implement the port core businesses. The port managers can give to those resources the firstpriority to secure them for properly meeting the requirements from clients.
In comparison with the recovery time objective (RTO) and the recovery level objective (RLO), as
stated in the sections 3.1 and 4.3, the bottleneck resources may give clear indications of necessary actions
to be taken in advance to improve business continuity capacity.

5.4 Evaluation of the port user demand
In the aftermath of a disaster, some port’s clients initiate to resume using the port; however, the port

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might not be available for ship accommodation due damages of facilities, for which restrictions of time,
cost and resources are to be managed. In this context MTPD, RTO and RLO are key factors.
On the other hand, there is a possibility of the port clients also being damaged by the disaster;
therefore, they cannot resume full business operation immediately. Figure 12 shows the impact of 2010
Chile Earthquake on port cargo volume.

Port Cargo Volume Rate(2010/2012)

1.50
1.25

The Other Customs

1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00

Talcahuano Customs

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2010/2012

Figure 12 Impact of 2010 Chile earthquake on port cargo volume

On the vertical axis in Figure 12 appears port cargo volume ratio and indicates a proportion ofmonthly port cargo volumes in 2011 to those in 2010. The port cargo volume ration of Talcahuano port
area, which suffered severe damaged by the earthquake and tsunami, dramatically decreased by more than
80 percent in March, and gradually recovered in the following months. This suggests that the port cargohandling demand is notably low; hence it is possible to undertake the recovery works during the twomonths after the disaster.
As such, it is vital for the port managers to properly estimate the recovery degree of port cargohandling demand. The extent of cargo throughput downturn and recovery speed depends on industrial
structure, business conditions, and scale and nature of the hazard. In this view, the authors consider it
necessary that the port community, in collaboration with the academia, conducted a survey to identify thepossible damage of local industry due to disaster, and its consequences on cargo handling demand at port
in the aftermath of the disaster.
Among the currently undertaken studies, a series of demand recovery curves may provide a reference
for Chilean ports. Tsunami inundation depth and seismic intensity were considered as the main parameterfor the chart of hazard intensities by Japan Meteorological Agency. The chart was developed based on thesurvey data from Great East Japan Earthquake, and estimates degree of risen demand in the aftermath ofdisaster (Akakura et al. 2014).

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6. CASE STUDY OF BIA IMPLEMENTATION IN IQUIQUE PORT
6.1 Iquique area and port logistics
Iquique is the capital of the administrative region of Tarapacá, located at 20.2°S and 70.1°W. With apopulation of around 186,000 people, it is the largest city in its region. The workforce is composed ofnearly 87,000 people, representing 46% of the regional population (INE 2013).
As capital of the region, the offices of the regional government, which is part of the national
government, are located in downtown Iquique. The city is also the capital of Iquique Province. It borders
the province of Arica, region of Parinacota, to the North;the province of Tamarugal to the East; theprovince of Tocopilla,, region of Antofagasta, to the South, and the Pacific Ocean to the West (Figure 13).

Figure 13 Location of Iquique City in Chile (Region of Tarapacá). Modified from Google maps (2014)

The city is connected to the rest of the country through domestic flights, highways and by merchantships. There are no commercial passenger ships links along Chilean coast. As Iquique is located in adesert area, the access by road can be very fragile in case of earthquakes. The main land surface accessroute to Iquique is route 16 that connects with the neighboring commune of Alto Hospicio, and later withroute 5-North which goes through almost the entire country. In the southern part of the city there is acoastal route: i.e. route 1, which connects Iquique with Antofagasta city. This situation means the city
has a fragile land surface connectivity.
Iquique Port is located at 20°11'59''S and 70º09'25''W, built on a small island connected to the city
through a breakwater (Figure 14). Accordingly, as mentioned in chapter 2, the port plays a fundamentalrole in the local economy.

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Figure 14 Location of Iquique Port in the city of Iquique. (Google Maps 2014)

The port of Iquique is owned and managed, by “Empresa Portuaria Iquique” (Iquique Port in Spanish,hereinafter referred as EPI), and includes two terminals: Terminal N° 1 which includes berths 1 and 2,
both for commercial ships, plus one area for fishing boats service; Terminal N° 2 which includes berths 3
and 4, both for commercial ships. In year 2000 the operation of the Terminal N° 2 was given inconcession to “Iquique Terminal Internacional S.A.” (hereinafter ITI), which operates under a monooperator mode unlike EPI that operates under a multi-operator mode. In addition, EPI provides a serviceof a “logistic center” which is a complementary business to the port business.
According to operational statistics provided by EPI in the year 2013, 76.6% of the cargo in IquiquePort corresponded to containerized cargo, most of which were handled by ITI, because EPI have notinvested in container transfer equipment for Terminal N°1. In Table 5 and Table 6 is displayed theevolution of freight transfer by each terminal from 2008 through 2011 (EPI 2013). This has greatsignificance in the port operation of Iquique in the aftermath of the earthquake on April 1, 2014. Becauseof the disaster the Terminal N° 1 was seriously damaged; however, the port could resume theircompliance with the requirements of its customers operations by fully mobilizing cargo handling capacityof Terminal N° 2.
Leaving aside the containerized cargo, the main products transshipped in Iquique Port includes copper,
fishmeal, fish oil, sulfur and vehicles (EPI 2013). The vehicles are the only major imported cargo.
According to EPI’s statistics, the imported cargo at the port in the last 5 years reaches on average to
58% among the port throughput. Most of the imported cargos are containerized, however, several
consignees represents only 1% or less of total imports. This is because of ZOFRI, which gathers several
small wholesale businesses; from where 26% of the total of the imported products are sold primarily tocustomers in Bolivia (ZOFRI 2013). As a consequence of this, most of the containers that leave the port
are directed toward storage areas in ZOFRI.

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Table 5 Freight transfer [ton], Terminal N°1, from 2008 through 2011.
(Modified from EPI (2013)).

Type of freight
Break bulk
Containerized
Bulk
Total

2008
213,408
665,097
28,86590,737

2009
162,522
381,476
28,417572,415

2010
209,749
288,689
70,051
568,4892011
279,728
99,792
197,878
577,398

Table 6 Freight transfer [x1000 ton], Terminal N°2, from 2008 through 2011.
(Modified from EPI (2013))

Type of freight
Break bulk
Containerized
Bulk
Total

2008
324.4
1,585.0
201.6
2,111.0

2009
24.6
1,340.4
75.0
1,661.02010
26.9
1,802.0
90.2
2,160.8

2011
248.0
1,801.1
80.0
2,129.1

Furthermore, and consistent with Table 6, the main clients for exports are mining companies operatingin the region as well as fisheries. Note that this means that most of the containers arriving to Iquique withcargo must leave empty to the center of the country where they will be used (Caselli et al. 2014), so
empty containers will stay at the port for some time.
Figure 15 illustrates different stakeholders of the port besides Chilean Government and organisms
displayed in Figure 4, which may provide the basic context of the stakeholders in port of Iquique.

6.2 Disaster Response in the Iquique port
According to the Chilean law, all ports must develop emergency response plans, which include
responding actions against earthquake and tsunami disasters. Each plan states the actions to be taken inorder to ensure safety of the workforce and the liabilities to return to the port for taking preliminary
actions. However, none of the plans include neither possible course of actions nor scenarios to return tonormal operation, which is expected to be addressed with the BCP/BCM.
In any case, the response plans of the port must stay in line with the National Civil Protection System
mentioned on chapter 2.

6.3 BIA discussion in Iquique port community
Through discussions among the Iquique Port community and SATREPS Chile researchers, operationsof multi-purpose terminals at the sites 1 and 2, and container terminals at the sites 3 and 4 are identified as
the core businesses of port; these discussions were guided through the use of worksheet system shown in
Table 2, in Figure 16 is possible to observe the criteria used to make this selection.

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Figure 15 Iquique Port stakeholders general view

However, the sites 1 and 2 were completely demolished by the subsequent earthquake on April 1,
2014; this fact is properly reflected in the BCP of the port. It is noted that the vulnerability of site 1 and 2
had been detected through remarks of some participants during the BIA discussion process in Iquique;this shows one of the benefits of applying a participative methodology for the BIA and RA to prepare
BCP, others are mentioned bellow.
Following with the methodology of Figure 5, core business activities were identified and modeled
through business flow analysis method, shown in Figure 17 with letters from A to F. Particular attention
should be paid to the fact that activities of Emergency and Relief Logistic (ERL) were included in thebusiness flow diagram, even though they are not activities of the core businesses; this was done in thisway because they are very important for the support of the local community.

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Selection policy

RatingContainer
terminal
operation

Multipurpose
terminal
operation

Logistics
centeroperation

Fishing port
operation

Sustainable development Negative impact on the growth of local industryof the local economy
including business in ZOFI, and fishery and mining.

A

A

A

B

Livelihood of the local
peopleA

B

CB

Undertaking efficient and Risks to fail to meet requirements for the
emergency relief logistics by sea.
effective ERL.

A

A

C

C

Risks of the terminals to lose out in competition
Port competitiveness andwith the rival ports and/or competing land surface
market sharetransportations.

A

A

A

C

Financial soundness of
port operation

Risks of the port operating entities to lose incomesand profit.

A

A

A

C

Loss/fineRisks of the port operating entities to incur penalty
or compensation for port service disruption.

B

B

C

C

Total score

11

10

6

2

Inclusion or exclusion in BCP

Include/exclude

Include/exclude

Include/exclude

Include/excludeCriteria

Specific impacts/risks of lossing business.

Negative impact on the people's livelihood due tosupply disruption of consumer goods.

(Impact rating: A=high [2], B=Medium [1], C=low [0])Note: ERL: Emergency relief logistics

Figure 16 Screening core business of Iquique Port

Figure 17 Breakdown of the core business structure

For the modeling of the activities, a series of workshop meetings were carried out with different
members of the port community, including a union of transporters, as well as with members of theemergency management community such as staff from ONEMI. The modeling of ERL activities,
identified as D, E and F in Figure 17, were discussed under participation of ONEMI. This process

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allowed participants to share their knowledge and information beyond port and logistic operations,
including issues regarding the participation and responsibilities of the different organizations after adisaster. After the series of discussions, strong ties and links were established among the participants,
which proved to be useful at the time of 2014 earthquake (Caselli et al. 2014); according to the regional
Director of Port Works of Tarapaca as well as to the Chief of the Engineering Department of EPI, thediscussions carried out before the earthquake were very useful and helped to restart the operations of theport in only 3 days. In order to create a participative environment in the workshops, it was proved thatleadership and coordination function is necessary to facilitate, and maintain the focus and goal of the
discussion, without constraining the contributions of the participants. This role was undertaken by the
WG4b members of SATREPS Chile project.
It's worth noting that somebody related to the port system should take this role. On the one hand the“continuity activities” should be considered as permanent, applying the continual improvement principles.
So it is necessary that somebody within the port community be the formal leader to have a sense ofrepresentativeness. On the other hand, the links and ties among the organizations participants of the port
community helps to bring them closer to achieve some of the principles included in the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 by UNISDR (the United Nations Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction). Specifically, they may strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk,
through a "clear vision, plans, competence, guidance and coordination within and across sectors as well as
participation of relevant stakeholders" (United Nations 2015, p. 12).
Nevertheless, at final stages of the BIA discussion, it was confirmed by the workshop members thatthe activities of ERL were not part of business activities, thus were not included in the worksheets of the
BIA, by considering that the goal of the BCP is to ensure fast recovery of the port operations inaccordance with customers’ requirements. The information obtained is of tremendous value for the phaseof continuity strategies preparation, specifically for the early stages of recovery.
This process of discussion also proved the benefits of having a team dedicated to BCP development.
In the case of Iquique this team is formed by professionals of EPI’s engineering department. Currently theISO 22301 does not require the establishment of a continuity team, which was part of the BS25999
published on 2006 6. However this team indeed facilitated the process of analysis and data collection, as
well as the communications with the concessionaire and with departments within the company. Also, theestablishment of this team has the benefit of allowing the management of an emergency, in accordancewith the ISO 22320 standard. Because the port system is indeed made up of various organizations theyshould have the ability to share a common approach beyond their boundaries (a multi-organizational one)to allow that cooperation, coordination and exchange of information are carried out effectively andefficiently. Using the worksheets allows having a simple tool to establish the relations among resources
and its relevance on the core businesses, and facilitating the understanding for the different actors who are
not only the permanent team members but are also all concerned.
6.4 Suggestions, implications and recommendations
The authors reviewed in this chapter in-site applications and discussions in terms of the proposed BCP
preparation procedure, in particular, by focusing on techniques for BIA implementation. Intensive
discussions were undertaken, and the awareness about disasters and methodologies are well shared among
SATREPS Chile WG4b and Iquique port community members. Implications, suggestions, andrecommendations obtained through the BIA implementation are summarized as the followings:

6

British Standard 25999-1:2006, Code of practice for business continuity management
British Standard 25991-2:2007, Specifications

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i. Business flow analysis by mobilizing IDEF0 technique may properly assist port community in
identifying and shearing port business process details and operational resources based on their respective
views, information and expertizes.
ii. The Worksheet system may help define port core business, evaluate MTPD and recognize
interdependency among the resources precisely. Worksheets are also available as effective and traceable
records for maintaining and reviewing BCP.
iii. Workshop meetings not only facilitate BIA discussions but also encourage active participation of
the port community in Iquique.
iv. Leadership is definitely needed to activate and properly summarize the workshop discussion. In
this view, contributions extended by SATREPS Chile members from University of Valparaiso are notable.
v. Implementing a continuity team within the Port, with members of different departments, may
facilitate development and maintenance of BCP.
vi. Intensive discussions on RA should be continued for completing BCP analysis and appraisal. The
authors recommend encouraging further involvement and commitment of Chilean Government, inparticular the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunication.

7. CONCLUSIONS
Because of it geomorphological characteristics, Chile is prone to disasters by earthquakes andtsunamis, which can cause serious damage on ports as well. Given that ports are of high importance to theChilean economy, it is necessary to explore ways to accelerate recovery operations, to manage theircontinuity. From this view point the proposed technique for undertaking the BIA proved to be useful toanalyze the port business work flow structure in the Port of Iquique. Suggested BIA process comprising
IDEF0 method and the worksheet system are transparent enough to be followed not only by port people,
but people from other areas as well. At the same time, the benefits of undertaking workshop discussions
with people from the community include securing proper participation of people involved in some way inpost disaster activities, and creating strong ties among them. The methodology and techniques presented
in this paper are expected to facilitate effective and efficient brainstorming among port communities for
detecting vulnerabilities of port logistics functions, some unknown activities, weak points ofadministrative procedures and regulatory frameworks, and further increasing awareness of the potentialityof joint works.
For the case of the Port of Iquique, there has been a lot of interest among the port site managers toparticipate in this project, and the BIA process has successfully demonstrated its usefulness in particularafter the earthquake of April 1, 2014. However, every Chilean port should implement the BIA procedure
for preparing BCP. Further involvement of MTT is vital in order to guarantee the needed leadership, inorder to convince all port players to participate in the BCM preparation. In this regard, it is strongly
recommended that a clear policy regarding the implementation of BCP/BCM should be established atleast in state ports as soon as possible.
At the end, the final goal is to increase the recovery and resiliency of the entire community and thiskind of work has proven to be useful to achieve that goal.

REFERENCES
Agosin, M. (1999) Comercio y crecimiento en Chile (Growth and commerce in Chile). Revista de la
CEPAL, Issue 68, pp. 79-100 (in Spanish)Akakura, Y., Hemmi, M., Ono, K., Ishihara, M., and Fukumoto, M. (2014) An estimation of recovery

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