Discussion Paper No. 968

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL STATUS
ON LONGEVITY:
EVIDENCE FROM TWO LITERARY PRIZESIN JAPAN
Shusaku Sasaki
Mika Akesaka
Hirofumi Kurokawa
Fumio Ohtake

April 2016

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

Positive and Negative Effects of Social Status on Longevity:
Evidence from Two Literary Prizes in Japan
Shusaku Sasakia Mika Akesakab

Hirofumi Kurokawac Fumio Ohtaked

April 13, 2016
Abstract We show evidence that receiving Japan’s Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes forliterature has positive and negative effects on their recipients’ longevity. Using adataset covering both awards, we show that recipients of the Akutagawa Prize forrising novelists exhibit lower mortality than fellow nominees. The increase of
longevity is estimated at 2.4 years. Recipients of the Naoki Prize for establishednovelists exhibit higher mortality than fellow nominees, and the decreased longevity is
5.1 years. These results indicate positive and negative causal effects from social status
to longevity, and we identify and isolate those effects. In doing so, this study clarifies
why earlier studies show conflicting relationships between receiving awards and therecipients’ longevity.
Keywords: Social Status, Longevity, Mortality, Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model,
Time-dependent Covariates, Time-dependent Parameters
JEL: I12, H14aGraduate School of Economics, Osaka University, and Research Fellow of JSPS
E-mail: ssasaki.econ@gmail.com, Postal Address: Institute of Social and Economic
Research,
Osaka University, Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki city, Osaka, Japan, 567-0047bGraduate School of Economics, Osaka University, and Research Fellow of JSPSc
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, and Research Fellow of JSPSdInstitute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
We thank Yuriko Shiiba, Akihiro Nakajima, Tomoya Nomizo, Jun Kamohara, and Yuta Matsuo for
their support in dataset construction. We also thank Naoki Matayoshi, Kanako Nishi, Ryo
Kambayashi, Yoshiki Ishikawa, Ayumi Shintani, and participants at the 10th Applied Econometrics
Conference 2015 and ABEF’s 9th Annual Conference 2015 for discussions, comments, andencouragement.
Our gratitude goes to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Institute of Socialand Economic Research at Osaka University for financial supports. JSPS Grant Numbers are
14J04581(S. Sasaki), 14J07655(M. Akesaka), 13J05272(H. Kurokawa), and (A) 26245041(F.
Ohtake).
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1. Introduction
It is said that a rise in social status boosts longevity. There are three possible explanations that
support this association. First, people with a higher social status generally have higher income,better living conditions, and more access to quality medical care. A rise in social status extends
longevity through improved economic conditions. Second, people with a lower social status havemonotonous and stressful jobs. In addition, they do not get much emotional or practical support
from people close to them (Marmot et al., 1991; Putnam, 2000). A fall in social status shortens
longevity through low satisfaction and psychological stress. Third, perceived lower social status
induces embarrassment and anxiety. A fall in social status shortens longevity by eroding mental
health (Wilkinson, 2000).
Several empirical studies reveal positive correlations between social status and longevity/health(Reid et al., 1974; Marmot et al., 1978; Rose and Marmot, 1981; Marmot et al., 1984; Marmot et al.,1991). Rose and Marmot (1981) used a survey of male civil servants in London to show that men inhighly ranked job classifications have relatively low risk of coronary heart disease. However, theseresults do not demonstrate that causality runs from social status to longevity because reverse
causality is possible. In addition, Boyce and Oswald (2012) used a large dataset of British workers
to show that workers initially in good health do not become healthier when promoted.
To exploit a causal effect from status to longevity, empirical studies examine datasets ofcandidates for prestigious prizes, including Academy Awards (Oscars®) and Nobel Prizes.
Recipients and nominees of distinguished awards plausibly are homogeneous in multiple respects,
and thus, being awarded a prize can be viewed as an exogenous shock to social status. Therefore,
we can exploit a causal effect from heightened social status to longevity by comparing the life
expectancies and mortality rates of recipients and fellow nominees.
Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) show that recipients of Oscars® live 3.9 years longer thanOscar® nominees. In contrast, screenwriters who receive Oscars® live 3.6 years less than theirfellow nominees (Redelmeier and Singh, 2001b). Abel and Kruger (2005) show that players
inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame live 5.0 years less than players of similar age. However,Rablen and Oswald (2008) find that Nobel laureates in chemistry and physics live 1.6 years longer
than fellow nominees.
Why do studies present these conflicting effects? Sylvestre et al. (2006) and Han et al. (2011)
point out that Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) ignore immortal time bias, i.e., they do not consider
that actors and actresses who live longer have more opportunities to earn Oscars. To eliminate thisbias, Sylvestre et al. (2006) re-estimate Redelmeier and Singh’s (2001a) dataset by fitting a Cox
2

proportional hazard model with recipient status as a time-dependent covariate and survival
measured from the date of first nomination. They show that the effect of a rise in social status on
longevity is positive but statistically insignificant.1 When Rablen and Oswald (2008) use a method
similar to that of Sylvestre et al. (2006) to address immortal time bias, they show that causality runs
from social status to longevity. Differences in how studies address immortal time bias can cause
differences in size and directionality of the effects of receiving prizes, but it remains unclear why
studies produce conflicting results about the effects of receiving prizes.
To solve this puzzle, we return to the three mechanisms introduced earlier. We suggest that a risein social status need not boost longevity. First, a positive effect through improved economic
conditions can be strengthened when candidates have not obtained stable social status, and thiseffect weakens as their social status stabilizes. Mirowsky and Hu (1996) empirically show that thesize of the effect of higher income on improved physical conditions is larger for lower income
levels, and its magnitude diminishes as income rises. In addition, the positive effect of absoluteincome on utility is larger for lower incomes, and its magnitude diminishes as income rises(Easterlin, 2004; Ohtake et al., 2010). Second, the negative effect of heightened stress canstrengthen in some occupations as social status rises. For example, receiving prizes compounds theworkloads of novelists, screenwriters, and songwriters, and they struggle to meet diverse needs anddeadlines without rest. Redelmeier and Singh (2001b) indicate that a rise in social status shortens
longevity of screenwriters nominated for Academy Awards.2 In addition, Damaske et al. (2016)
collect information regarding stress from 122 employees at multiple time points across consecutive
days to show that workers with a higher socio-economic status report greater stress at work and areless likely to meet work demands than those with a lower socio-economic status. Third, a negative
effect through erosion in mental health can remain strong after social status rises. Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters (2004) and Ball and Chernova (2008) show empirically that utility, well-being, andhappiness are influenced more by relative than absolute socioeconomic conditions. Thus, people
with high social status can experience disutility by comparing themselves with neighbors,colleagues, and friends.
1

Smith (2011) notes that no records reveal dates of death for several Hall of Fame inductees, andAbel and Kruger (2005) treated them as still living. After excluding them from the sample, Smithfinds that the negative effect from Hall of Fame membership becomes statistically insignificant.
2
The authors attribute the negative effect to differences in occupational characteristics between
performers and screenwriters. For example, screenwriters are less compelled to preserve their social
image by avoiding disgraceful behavior and maintaining healthy lifestyles. In addition, no
following study re-estimates this dataset by addressing immortal time bias. Thus, it remains unclear
whether negative causality exists.
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We explore two hypotheses. First, positive and negative causal effects run from social status tolongevity. If both effects exist, sizes and directionality of the effects of receiving prizes depend on
which exerts the larger effect. Second, we can detect the effects on longevity from receiving a prize
when candidates occupy an unstable socio-economic status. In that case, the positive effect throughimproved economic conditions can be strengthened, and it exceeds the negative effects caused by alack of job control. Conversely, when candidates’ socio-economic status is stable, the negative
effect prevails.3
To test these two hypotheses, we use a dataset of two Japanese literary prizes, the Akutagawa andNaoki Prizes. Testing our hypotheses requires two datasets: one that encompasses lower
socio-economic status recipients and nominees and one that encompasses candidates in similar
occupations but with higher socio-economic status. Datasets for the two prizes fulfill theserequirements. The Akutagawa Prize is awarded to new and promising novelists. Candidates are
lowly ranked in an unofficial literary community, Bundan. Also, they generally have low income,vulnerable social network, and a high level of anxiety about their future. In those senses, thecandidates are expected to have unstable socio-economic status. In addition, it is awarded forserious literature. Serious literature sells less than popular literature and its books are lessfrequently published because it is often written in a short story format. Authors who do not receive
the prize cannot continue earning income without winning it. In contrast, candidates for the Naoki
Prize are recognized novelists and expected to have more stable socio-economic status. Since thisprize is for popular literature, they can more easily attain higher economic conditions without
receiving it than those for the Akutagawa Prize. We expect empirical results to reveal extended
longevity among recipients of the Akutagawa Prize and shorter longevity among recipients of the
Naoki Prize.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the two prizes, our dataset, and descriptive
results. Section 3 explains econometric strategies. Sections 4 and 5 present estimation results andtheir interpretation. Section 6 discusses our study’s implications and limitations.

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Previous studies indicate that a positive effect grows among younger candidates. For example, inthe dataset of Academy Awards for actors and actresses (Redelmeier and Singh, 2001a), life
expectancy is 3.9 years longer for recipients than for fellow nominees. Their median age is 39.
Among the dataset of Nobel laureates, life expectancy is 1.6 years longer for recipients than
nominees. Their average age is 51. It is reasonable to regard the socioeconomic status of younger
candidates as less stable. However, we acknowledge systematic differences in candidates’
occupations and the nature of these awards.
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2. Data
2.1. Overview of Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes
The Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes share several characteristics. Both were establishedsimultaneously in 1935 by novelist Kan Kikuchi and are sponsored by Bungeishunju Ltd. and theSociety for the Promotion of Japanese Literature. Both are awarded twice yearly in January andJuly, and the 154th awards were presented on January 19, 2016. There have been 1,061 candidates
in total, and 344 have received one of the two prizes.
Second, the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes are Japan's most prestigious literary recognitions, andreceiving either delivers an equivalent shock to social status.4 Kenzaburo Oe received the 39th
Akutagawa Prize in 1958 and the Nobel Prize for literature in 1994. Among novelists awarded theNobel or said to be candidates, Kobo Abe won the 25th Akutagawa Prize, Shusaku Endo the 33rd,and Haruki Murakami was nominated for the 81st and 83rd Akutagawa Prizes. In addition, Yasunari
Kawabata, Junichiro Tanizaki, and Yukio Mishima were members of the review committee for
Akutagawa Prizes. Works by candidates for the Naoki Prize, including Ryotaro Shiba and Jiro
Akagawa, have sold over 100 million copies worldwide, paralleling sales of worldwide best-sellingnovelists Steven King and Sidney Sheldon. Print, broadcast, and Internet media cover recipients of
the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes.
Third, the two prizes have similar selection procedures. Candidates are selected by 20 membersof Bungeishunju Ltd. over a span of 10 meetings. Bungeishunju Ltd. telephones finalists andconfirms they have a will to receive a prize if they are awarded it. Recipients are selected byprofessional novelists on the review committee. Authors can receive either prize only once, but
those who have received neither prize can be candidates for both.
However, there are two differences between the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes. The former is for
new or rising novelists, whereas candidates for the latter are established novelists. In addition, theAkutagawa Prize recognizes achievements in serious literature and the Naoki Prize in popularliterature, as specified in official introductions written by Bungeishunju Ltd. (2014b).

The latter half of this subsection describes the dataset of the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes andcompares it with datasets in previous studies. First, the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes are awarded
for works published between semiannual awards. Thus, novels appear near the date awards are

4

Recipients receive a pocket watch and prize money. The amount is identical for both prizes, andthe relative level does not vary over time.
5presented, and social status at publication is similar to social status upon receiving the award. This
characteristic is shared by Redelmeier and Singh’s (2001a) dataset of Oscar® nominees.
Second, candidates in our dataset know they are being considered. This means that a causal
effect from wining the prizes to longevity includes the discouragement felt by fellow nominees.
This characteristic is shared by Redelmeier and Singh’s (2001a) dataset.
Third, our candidates can receive either prize only once. That is not the case among populations
in Redelmeier and Singh’s (2001a) nor in Rablen and Oswald’s (2008) datasets. If candidates canreceive the same award multiple times, the analysis must consider that previous recognition mightalter covariates for the second award.5 Analyzing data for the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes allows
us to ignore influences from these possibilities. In sum, our award-centered dataset parallels that ofsimilar studies while better enabling us to draw causal inferences to longevity.

2.2. Information Sources of the Dataset
Our dataset captures recipients’ and nominees’ names, dates and places of birth, dates and causesof death, educations, side jobs, other prizes received, and books published. We construct thisdataset from multiple sources (Table 1). We identify recipients and nominees from records ofBungeishunju Ltd. (2014a) and the home pages of Bungeishunju Ltd. (2014b), “Akutagawa shouno subete, no youna mono” (Kawaguchi, 2015a) and “Naoki shou no subete” (Kawaguchi, 2015b).
We collect information regarding birthdays, dates of death,6 places of birth, education, side jobs,
and other prizes received7 from four biographical dictionaries for Japanese novelists (Shinchosha
Publishing Co., Ltd., 1988; Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2002; Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2004; Japan
Writers' Association, 2015)8 and home pages of literary prizes in Japan. We determine whether
5

Rablen and Oswald (2008) exclude recipients of multiple Nobel Prizes from the sample. Han et al.
(2011) use g-estimation to eliminate bias caused by repeat recognition. Robins (1986, 1992) andRobins et al. (1992) develop g-estimation to consider immortal time bias and the possibility of aprevious win affecting future nomination.
6
Records for some novelists indicate only the year of birth or death, not their dates, so we insert
January 1 as the date. We add a dummy variable that denotes no record for dates of birth or death.
7
There are public and non-public literary prizes. We consider the following public prizes in Japan:
All Yomimono Shinjin, All Yomimono Suiri Shousetsu Shinjin, Asahi Shinjin Bungaku, Asahi
Shimbun Kenshou, Bungakukai Shinjin, Bungei, Dazai Osamu, Gunzou Shinjin Bungaku, Shinchou
Shinjin, Shousetsu Gendai Shinjin, Shousetsu Subaru Shinjin, Sunday Mainichi Taishu Bungei,
Subaru Bungaku, Umitsubame Shinjin Bungaku, and Waseda Bungaku Shinjin. We consider thefollowing non-public prizes: Bungaku, Kawabata Yasunari Sakka, Mishima Yukio, Noma Bungei,
Noma Bungei Shinjin, Noma Bungei Shourei, Sakka (Doujin), Shibata Renzaburo, Shinchosha
Bungaku, Shinchosha Bungei Dai 1 Bu, Shinchosha Bungei Dai 2 Bu, Tanizaki Junichiro,
Yamamoto Shugoro, Yoshikawa Eiji Bungaku, and Yoshikawa Eiji Bungaku Shinjin.
8
When we find insufficient information in these four references, we use the National Diet Library6

nominees have received other literary prizes by consulting “Akutagawa shou monogatari”(Kawaguchi, 2013) and “Naoki shou monogatari” (Kawaguchi, 2014). We compile published books
from the database of the National Diet Library (2015). We identify causes of death from databases
provided by Asahi Shimbun Company (2015), Mainichi Newspapers (2015), and Yomiuri Shimbun(2015).

[Table 1 Here]2.3. Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis uses 708 observations of novelists, among whom 363 (345) are recipients andnominees of the Akutagawa (Naoki) Prize. We exclude from analysis novelists nominated for bothprizes, one novelist with a corporate identity, and two nominated in joint name. We exclude
novelists for whom dates of birth or death are unavailable. Our analysis covers Japanese malenovelists to avoid gender-based and racially based differences in life expectancy.

[Table 2.1 Here]

Table 2.1 shows descriptive results of the outcome variable age at death. It reveals that on
average Akutagawa Prize recipients are 6.6 years older at death than their fellow nominees (1%statistical significance). On average, Naoki Prize recipients are 2.4 years younger than their fellow
nominees when they die (10% statistical significance).
Although the results cannot support causal claims, they can be consistent with the expectationthat receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive effect on longevity and receiving the Naoki Prize
has a negative effect. As introduced in Section 1, our empirical expectations depend on theassumption that candidates for the Akutagawa prize have less stable socio-economic status thanthose for the Naoki prize. We already supported this assumption by introducing characteristics ofthe two prizes. We can also confirm it using the information regarding candidates’ age, number ofpublished books, side jobs, and other attributes.

[Table 2.2 Here]and Kawaguchi’s two home pages to complete novelists’ profiles.
7First, we examine candidates’ ages when they were nominated and the number of books
published by them before nomination. Table 2.2 shows that their average age at final nomination is37.7 (44.8) for the Akutagawa (Naoki) Prize. At 1% significance, we can reject the null hypothesisof no difference in ages. Nominees for the Akutagawa Prize are 7.1 years younger than nominees
for the Naoki Prize. In addition, the average number of books published is fewer among candidates
for the Akutagawa Prize (4.83) than candidates for the Naoki Prize (15.62) at 1% significance.
Younger novelists with fewer publications are more likely to have an unstable socio-economic
status.
Next, we consider side employment. Table 2.2 shows two results: (1) the proportion of novelists
with no side job or no stable side job9 is significantly higher among candidates for the Akutagawa
Prize (34%) than candidates for the Naoki Prize (23%) at 1% significance, and (2) the proportion ofnovelists who are office workers is lower among candidates for the Akutagawa Prize (20%) thanamong candidates for the Naoki Prize (34%) at 1% significance. These results also support thepossibility that candidates for the Akutagawa Prize are more likely to have unstable socio-economic
status than those for the Naoki prize.
However, the descriptive results include the possibility of reverse causality that novelists wholive longer have more opportunities to be candidates for awards. We should compare the effects ofreceiving the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes after statistically dealing with the prospect of reverse
causality.

3. ModelFollowing Sylvestre et al. (2006) and Rablen and Oswald (2008), we use Cox’s proportional
hazard model for the analysis. Its advantages are as follows: (1) we can control for confounding
effects by adding covariates, (2) we can address heterogeneity between recipients and nominees
before observing them by setting time-zero, (3) we can address heterogeneity between recipientsand nominees from the time we start observing them by adding time-varying covariates, and (4) we
can consider whether effects of receiving the prizes vary over time by adding time-varying
parameters.
Subsection 3.1 explains how we address time-dependency of covariates and parameters ofreceiving the prizes. The estimation model appears in Subsection 3.2.

9

We define novelists with no stable side job as those who work part-time or frequently change aside job.
8

3.1. Time-varying Covariates and Time-varying Parameters
We consider time-dependency of covariates and time-dependency of parameters from threeperspectives. First, to address the possibility that novelists who are destined to live longer havemore opportunities for nominations, we set time-zero as the date of first nomination. Second, we
address the previously described immortal time bias by adding time-varying covariates to themodel. More precisely, we construct the dataset in a panel format capturing first and final
nominations. Using a step function, we code novelists as nominees until they receive a prize. We
allow as time-varying covariates age and the number of nominations, other prizes received, andpublished books to vary during the first and final nominations (Simon and Makuch, 1984; Sylvestre
et al., 2006; Rablen and Oswald, 2008; Shintani et al., 2009).

[Figure 1 Here]Third, we address the possibility that effects of receiving prizes vary over time (Kleinbaum andKlein, 2012). To check the time-dependency of parameters of winning, we draw Kaplan–Meiersurvival functions in Figure 1. Values on the vertical axis are survival rates, and values on thehorizontal axis are the number of days between the first nomination and death. We treat as censored
samples novelists who are alive at stopping observing, and the novelists who died from non-naturalcauses.
If the parameters of receiving prizes lack time-dependency, the reduction rates of survival
functions among recipients do not vary over time. Figure 1 reveals that the reduction rate among
the Akutagawa recipients rises sharply 11,000 days (almost 30 years) after the first nomination. We
find no change in reduction rates among Naoki recipients.

[Table 3 Here]To confirm this finding, we check Akutagawa recipients’ survival functions in Table 3. The
reduction in their survival function is 0.07 between 7,000 and 11,000 days, 0.28 from 11,000 to
15,000 days, 0.02 from 10,000 to 11,000 days, and 0.10 from 11,000 to 12,000 days. That is, thereduction rate among Akutagawa recipients rises sharply 11,000 days after their first nomination.
In sum, Figure 1 indicates that the parameter for receiving the Akutagawa Prize varies over time.
It could change after 30 years following authors’ first nomination for the prize. Similar
time-dependency is not observed among recipients of the Naoki Prize.
93.2. Estimation Model and Variables
We estimate the following equation:|

11,000′The equation is divided into the baseline hazard ofregression, the treatment variable,

and the regression of… . In the

distinguishes recipients from fellow nominees. We add

covariates for age and number of nominations, books published, and other public or non-public
prizes received. We also add several attribute covariates, including birth year, winning rate10 whennominated, education, information about side jobs, and place of birth.
As explained, we treat novelists as nominees until their prize is actually awarded. We also allow
age and number of nominations, other prizes received, and books published to vary between thefirst and final nominations. In analyzing the Akutagawa Prize, we add

11,000 11

to the regression, considering the time-dependency of the parameter for receiving the prize.

4. Basic Analysis
4.1. Results[Table 4 Here]

Table 4 shows results of the survival analysis by a Cox proportional hazard model. We conduct
the analysis from datasets for the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes. We express estimation results inhazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality increases, and vice versa. We can read achange in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from the estimated value and multiplying by
100.
This subsection initially presents the estimation results of receiving the prizes and then presents
the estimation results of some covariates.
10

We define winning rate as the proportion of winners for nominees in each prize.
We conduct a specification test using the STATA command “linktest,” which can detectspecification errors in a Cox’s proportional hazard model. Test results suggest adding
11,000 to the model for the Akutagawa Prize but not for the Naoki prize.
1110Column A1 shows that recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 62.0% lower mortality thanother nominees until 30 years after the first nomination. After 30 years, their mortality is 4 times
higher than the controls. Both effects are statistically significant at 1%.
Column N1 shows that Naoki Prize recipients exhibit 58.4% higher mortality than fellow
nominees. This effect is also statistically significant at 1%. The accompanying columns show theseeffects are stable after adding a suicide dummy to the model or excluding suicide subjects from thesample.
These results indicate that receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive causal effect onlongevity during the period within 30 years of the first nomination, and receiving the Naoki Prize
has a negative causal effect. However, recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 4.0 times higher
mortality than fellow nominees after 30 years. Thus, we cannot insist that receiving the Akutagawa
Prize affirmatively and causally affects longevity during the whole period.
Then we use the predicted values to calculate the expected values for the longevity of eachnovelist, and we compare them between recipients and fellow nominees. Expected longevity is 48.3
years for recipients of the Akutagawa Prize and 45.9 years for nominees. That is, receiving the
Akutagawa Prize extends the longevity of recipients by 2.4 years on average. On the other hand, theexpected longevity for Naoki Prize recipients is 34.1 years and for nominees it is 39.2 years. That is,receiving the Naoki Prize shortens recipients’ longevity by 5.1 years on average. As a result, we caninsist that receiving the Akutagawa Prize exerts a positive causal effect on longevity throughout theperiod, and receiving the Naoki Prize exerts a negative causal effect.
Next, we present estimation results for age and number of nominations among several covariates.
Table 4.1 shows that age and the number of nominations have a statistically significant and stableeffect on mortality. Aging increases mortality in both prize datasets. In contrast, the directional
effects of the number of nominations differ between the two datasets. Estimation results show that ahigher number of nominations increases the mortality of candidates for the Akutagawa Prize but
reduces it for those of the Naoki Prize.

4.2. Interpretations
Our analysis shows that receiving the Akutagawa prize has a positive causal effect on longevity,
whereas receiving the Naoki prize has a negative effect on it. These results are consistent with ourempirical estimations introduced in Section 1, i.e., these results confirm our two hypotheses thatreceiving awards exerts positive and negative effects on longevity and that the net effect depends
on the times and situations of receiving the prizes.
11

The reasons for these results can be found by considering differences in characteristics between
the prizes. We detect a positive effect from receiving the Akutagawa Prize, because it is for new orrising novelists and serious literature, and thus candidates are expected to have unstablesocio-economic status. That is, receiving this prize substantially enhances longevity by improving
the recipients’ economic conditions, and the positive effect exceeds the negative effect because of
their increased workloads and lack of job control. We detect a negative causal effect from receiving
the Naoki Prize because it is for established novelists producing popular literature, and candidates
are expected to have more stable socio-economic status. Therefore, receiving this prize exerts a
positive effect on longevity that is less than the negative effect.
Our analysis further shows aging increases mortality in both prize datasets while the directional
effects of the number of nominations differ between the two datasets. The former result is intuitive.
We can also explain the latter result by surmising that the two prizes generate different degrees ofmental shocks from not receiving the awards and from the publicity effects of being nominated.
Perhaps mental shock is larger among candidates for the Akutagawa Prize, or the publicity effect islarger among candidates for the Naoki Prize. Receiving the Naoki Prize could be more serious for
new or rising novelists. In addition, since established novelists have published more books, being
nominated for a prestigious award could boost sales of previous publications.

5. Further Analysis
5.1. Results
Section 4 established that receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive causal effect andreceiving the Naoki Prize has a negative causal effect on longevity. We explained that we detect a
positive effect from receiving the Akutagawa Prize, because it is awarded to new or rising novelists
producing serious literature. We further explained that we detect a negative effect from receiving
the Naoki Prize, because it is awarded to established novelists writing popular literature.
Some might argue that receiving the Akutagawa or Naoki Prize produces a differential effectthrough unobserved factors, including talent and effort, between candidates for the two prizes. If
the Akutagawa Prize assembles more talented and earnest candidates and the Naoki Prizeassembles less talented and earnest candidates, differences could appear in the effects of receiving
the prizes.
However, we found that several novelists nominated for the Akutagawa Prize were nominated orawarded the Naoki Prize. This evidence suggests there is little difference in talent and effort
between candidates for the two prizes. We run the second analysis empirically dealing with that12

concern. The second analysis is based on the new assumption that candidates for both prizes are
extracted from a common population. More concretely, we combine the datasets of the Akutagawa
and Naoki Prizes, assume every candidate can win either prize, and investigate the effect ofreceiving the Akutagawa or the Naoki Prize.12 If the two prizes’ candidates constitute different
populations defined by unobserved factors, estimation results of receiving the prizes with the
combined dataset can be inconsistent with those with each dataset.
When combining datasets, we consider that unsuccessful nominees for the Akutagawa Prizecannot hope to receive it after becoming established authors. However, unsuccessful nominees for
the Naoki Prize can expect to receive it later, assuming their standing as established authors does
not falter. There are systemic differences between the two prizes in nominees’ expectations of being
re-nominated and eventually receiving them. To consider that difference, we add to the model avariable denoting endorsements (letters, comments, feedback) of review committees for nominees
who did not receive the prize during previous selections. We assume nominees with moreendorsements have stronger expectations of receiving the prize eventually. After adding thecovariate, candidates for both prizes plausibly become homogeneous (assuming equal talent andeffort).

[Table 5 Here]In Table 5, the model of Column 1 includes the variable that explains the number of lettersreviewing nominees for the Naoki Prize only. This variable shows 0 for other candidates. Model 2
includes the variable that explains the number of letters reviewing nominees for both prizes.
The estimation results show that recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 53.1%–56.8% lower
mortality than fellow nominees until 30 years after their first nomination. After 30 years, recipients’mortality becomes 3.1–3.2 times higher than that of fellow nominees’. The first (second) effect isstatistically significant at 5% (1%). Conversely, recipients of the Naoki Prize exhibit 57.3%–59.0%
higher mortality than fellow nominees. This effect is also statistically significant at 1%. In addition,
we reject the null hypothesis that the first effect of receiving the Akutagawa Prize equals that ofreceiving the Naoki Prize, and we do so for the second effect of receiving the Akutagawa Prize.

12

The second analysis adds to the sample 44 new candidates nominated for both prizes. As a result,some won either of the two.
13

5.2. Interpretations
These results coincide with results in Section 4.1. This finding arrests concerns that we detect a
positive effect from the Akutagawa Prize and a negative effect from the Naoki Prize because ofunobserved factors between candidates for the two prizes. The more reasonable explanation is that
the Akutagawa Prize is awarded to rising novelists producing serious literature, and the Naoki Prize
is awarded to established novelists writing popular literature.

6. Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that recipients of Akutagawa Prizes live 2.4 years longer thanauthors who were nominated for the prize but did not receive it, and recipients of Naoki Prizes
lived 5.1 fewer years than their fellow nominees. These results confirm our hypotheses thatreceiving awards exerts positive and negative effects on longevity, and that the net effect depends
on the times and situations of receiving the prizes. The analysis did not display differences in themagnitude of the effects between the two prizes, and this limitation invites future studies. However,it does demonstrate that the affirmative (negative) effect from receiving the Akutagawa Prize(Naoki Prize) exceeds the negative effect (positive effect).
This study has extended the literature in several ways. First, it suggests why earlier studies show
conflicting effects on longevity from receiving awards. Namely, studies showing statisticallyinsignificant correlations between Academy Award winners and longevity (Sylvestre et al., 2006;
Han et al., 2011) would yield different results if samples were subdivided into beginning andexperienced performers. Second, it refines previous conclusions (Redelmeier and Singh, 2001a) byexplaining that findings of negative relationships between awards and longevity are relative—that
is, positive and negative effects coexist, but the latter overshadow the former. Third, it introduces atime factor that shows previous findings of an affirmative correlation between longevity and awards(Rablen and Oswald, 2008) are attributable to lags between the dates of achievement andrecognition.

14

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17

Newspapers).

RetrievedfromTables and Figures
Table 1. Information Sources of the Dataset
Information Sources

A List of Winners and Unsuccessful Nominees

One Record Book Published by Bungeishunju Ltd. (2014a)
The Homepage of Bungeishunju Ltd. (2014b)
The Homepage of "Akutagawa shou no subete, no youna mono" (Kawaguchi, 2015a)
The Homepage of "Naoki shou no subete" (Kawaguchi, 2015b)

Birthday
Date of Death
Place of Birth
Educational Background
Side Job

Four Biographical Dictionaries for Novelists in Japan (Shinchosha Publishing Co., Ltd.,
1988; Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2002; Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2004; Japan Writers'
Association, 2015)
Homepages of Literary Prizes in Japan

Other Prizes besides the Two Prizes
Published Books

The Database of the National Diet Library in Japan (2015)

Cause of Death

Three Databases of Newspapers (The Asahi Shimbun Company, 2015; The Yomiuri
Shimbun, 2015; The Mainichi Newspapers, 2015)18

Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Age at Death and Death (Dummy)
The Akutagawa Prize

The Naoki Prize

Recipients(N=109)

Fellow Nominees(N=254)

Recipients(N=125)

Fellow Nominees(N=220)Mean of Age at Death74.42 (12.90)

67.83 (15.57)

72.48 (11.36)

74.89 (12.10)

Mean of Death (Dummy)

0.49 (0.50)

0.50 (0.50)

0.56 (0.50)

0.59 (0.49)

Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics of Information Regarding Socioeconomic Status

Variable NameTimeThe Akutagawa Prize(N = 363)

The Naoki Prize(N = 345)

Mean of Age

at First Nomination

36.33 (8.25)

42.52 (8.42)

Mean of Age

at Final Nomination

37.70 (8.56)

44.82 (8.99)

Mean of Number of Total Nominations

at Final Nomination

1.79 (1.20)

1.99 (1.45)

Mean of Number of Published Books

at Final Nomination

4.83 (12.86)

15.62 (23.30)

Mean of Number of Other Public Prizes

at Final Nomination

0.33 (0.58)

0.32 (0.58)

Mean of Number of Other Non-public Prizes

at Final Nomination

0.25 (0.46)

0.21 (0.50)

Side Job 1: No Job or No Stable Job

0.34 (0.48)

0.23 (0.42)

Side Job 2: Creators

0.06 (0.23)

0.10 (0.31)

Side Job 3: Office Workers

0.20 (0.40)

0.34 (0.47)

Side Job 4: Self-employed

0.18 (0.38)

0.19 (0.39)

Side Job 5: Servants

0.21 (0.41)

0.13 (0.34)

Note: We define novelists with no stable side job as those who work part-time or frequently change a side job.

19

Figure 1. Survival Functions for Recipients and Fellow Nominees

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

The Naoki Prize

0.00

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

The Akutagawa Prize

0

10000

Time, days

20000

30000

Recipients (solid line)

0

10000

Time, days

20000

30000

Fellow Nominees (dashed line)

Table 3. Survival Functions for Recipients and Fellow Nominees
The Akutagawa Prize
Time, days

Beg.
Total

Failures

Survivor
Function

5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000

97
93
84
78
72
68
64
56
50
44
36

2
1
2
1
1
2
1
8
4
3
4

Recipients
0.98
0.97
0.95
0.94
0.92
0.90
0.88
0.77
0.71
0.67
0.60

5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000

202
194
189
177
164
153
142
125
108
97
94

25
2
3
8
8
7
2
10
10
7
3

Fellow Nominees
0.90
0.89
0.88
0.84
0.80
0.76
0.75
0.70
0.64
0.60
0.58

The Naoki Prize
Std.
Error

[95% Conf. Int.]

Time, days

Beg.
Total

Failures

Survivor
Function

Std.
Error

[95% Conf. Int.]

0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.85
0.82
0.78
0.76
0.71
0.60
0.57
0.46
0.34
0.28
0.26

0.96
0.94
0.92
0.90
0.87
0.79
0.76
0.67
0.55
0.49
0.46

0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

0.87
0.87
0.84
0.79
0.76
0.70
0.63
0.56
0.47
0.40
0.33

0.95
0.94
0.92
0.89
0.86
0.82
0.76
0.71
0.62
0.55
0.49

0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.06

0.92
0.91
0.88
0.86
0.84
0.81
0.79
0.66
0.60
0.55
0.48

0.99
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.94
0.94
0.85
0.80
0.76
0.71

5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000

100
94
86
82
73
60
55
47
33
28
26

8
3
3
2
4
8
3
8
10
4
2

Recipients
0.92
0.89
0.86
0.84
0.80
0.71
0.67
0.57
0.44
0.39
0.36

0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04

0.85
0.84
0.83
0.78
0.74
0.70
0.69
0.63
0.57
0.53
0.51

0.93
0.92
0.91
0.88
0.85
0.82
0.81
0.76
0.70
0.66
0.65

5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
12000
13000
14000
15000

185
181
168
155
146
133
113
99
80
66
51

18
1
5
8
5
8
12
9
14
10
9

Fellow Nominees
0.92
0.91
0.89
0.84
0.82
0.77
0.70
0.64
0.55
0.48
0.41

20

Table 4. Basic Analysis
Probability-of-death Equations with Time-varying Covariates
Time-zero: Date of First Nomination
The Akutagawa Prize Winner： Before 30 Years
After 30 Years

The Akutagawa Prize

The Naoki Prize

A1

A2

A3

0.380***(0.127)3.963***(1.525)0.358***(0.118)4.305***(1.642)0.381***(0.134)4.059***(1.625)The Naoki Prize Winner：

Time-varying Covariates： Age
Number of Nominations (Akutagawa)1.068***(0.021)1.255***(0.090)1.068***(0.021)1.251***(0.088)1.066***(0.021)1.229***(0.088)

Number of Nominations (Naoki)

Number of Published Books
Number of Other Non-public Prizes
Number of Other Public Prizes

0.989(0.009)0.593(0.358)1.648(1.110)0.989(0.009)0.525(0.259)1.875(1.008)

Suicide Dummy

Other Attribute Variables：
Suicide Failures：
Number of Subjects：
Number of Observations：
Robust seeform in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.990(0.009)0.310**(0.183)3.186*(1.995)

N1

N2

N3

1.584***(0.254)

1.617***(0.262)

1.614***(0.261)

1.093***(0.020)1.094***(0.020)1.095***(0.020)0.842***(0.051)0.842***(0.051)0.844***(0.051)

1.002(0.003)1.295(0.593)0.756(0.366)1.002(0.003)
1.216(0.541)
0.788(0.382)1.002(0.003)1.160(0.551)0.819(0.415)

11.491***(4.457)
IN
IN
363
1,409

IN
IN
363
1,409

21

13.194***(5.650)
IN
OUT
358
1,388

IN
IN
345
1,901

IN
IN
345
1,901

IN
OUT
343
1,899

Table 5. Further Analysis
Probability-of-death Equations with Time-varying Covariates

The Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes

Time-zero: Date of First Nomination

1

2

0.432**(0.142)3.080***(1.097)1.590***(0.251)0.469**(0.157)3.141***(1.114)
1.573***(0.244)

1.075***(0.014)1.066(0.058)0.897**(0.043)

1.076***(0.014)1.039(0.056)0.915*(0.044)1.002(0.003)1.265(0.439)0.791(0.286)1.002(0.003)1.263(0.440)0.788(0.286)The Akutagawa Prize Winner： Before 30 Years
After 30 Years
The Naoki Prize Winner：

Time-varying Covariates： Age
Number of Nominations (Akutagawa)Number of Nominations (Naoki)

Number of Published Books
Number of Other Non-public Prizes
Number of Other Public Prizes

Number of Letters in Reviews
for Fellow Nominees (Only Naoki)
Number of Letters in Reviews
for Fellow Nominees (Both)Other Attribute Variables：
Number of Subjects：
Number of Observations：
Robust seeform in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.023**(0.012)
1.016*(0.009)
IN
752
4,049

22