UNCLASSIFIEDSENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICESSTATEMENT OF
CHARLES A. RICHARDCOMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
13 FEBRUARY 2020

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

1UNCLASSIFIEDINTRODUCTION
USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command, and I am privileged to lead the 150,000
Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians who dedicate themselves to the Department of
Defense’s highest priority mission. I thank the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs for their confidence in me to lead this Command and the Department’s nuclear enterprise. I also
thank Congress for their continued support, which ensures USSTRATCOM has the required resources
necessary to continue providing our Nation’s strategic deterrence.
Commander, USSTRATCOM, as a key enabler and contributor to Joint Force operations, is the
combatant commander responsible for Strategic Deterrence; Nuclear Operations; Global Strike; Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; Missile Defense; Analysis and Targeting; and Missile Threat
Assessment. To execute our assigned responsibilities, the men and women of this Command operate
globally across all domains, to include the information environment. We work closely with the Joint
Force across organizations, and with our Allies and partners to address the strategic challenges facing our
Nation. Our mission: To deter strategic attack and employ forces, as directed, to guarantee the securityof our Nation, our Allies, and our partners.
The Command’s priorities are: 1) above all else, we will provide strategic deterrence for the
Nation and assurance of the same to our Allies and partners; 2) if deterrence fails, we are prepared todeliver a decisive response, decisive in every possible way; and 3) we will do this with a resilient,equipped, and trained combat-ready force. A powerful, ready triad; a survivable nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) system; and a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure are thefoundation that enables strategic deterrence and assurance which is fundamental to our survival as a
Nation, and deters adversaries from conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our
Nation, our Allies, and our partners.
The dedicated professionals working for and with USSTRATCOM allow the Command to
execute its operations and provide the Nation with its strategic deterrent against threats in all domains.
Without the men and women of USSTRATCOM, actively performing the deterrence mission every day,we could not deter potential adversaries and guarantee the freedoms our Nation holds dear.
To be clear, nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense – ourdeterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop
of our national defense.
The ability of the United States to deter threats to our Nation and our Allies is at a critical point.
The contemporary security environment is the most challenging since the Cold War. In the nuclear
dimension, we face a range of potential adversaries, each with different interests, objectives, andcapabilities. To maintain a credible deterrent in this environment requires us to modernize and2

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recapitalize our strategic forces to ensure our Nation has the capability to deter any actor, at any level.
Doing so requires we remain committed to modernizing and recapitalizing our strategic forces andsupporting infrastructure, and that we continue to pursue the supplemental nuclear capabilities intended toaddress new challenges in the security environment.
A visible symbol of our commitment to nuclear modernization is the recently completed General
Curtis LeMay Command and Control Facility (C2F) at USSTRATCOM. The C2F is one of the mostadvanced weapon systems ever constructed, and will be a critical element for the integration of global
intelligence, nuclear planning, and operations with other combatant commands in coordination with our
national leadership. Its modern infrastructure for Command and Control of strategic forces provides theflexibility for effective oversight and clear direction in a new era of global, integrated operations.
We must proceed with modernization. Sustainment and modernization of our nuclear forces has
transitioned from something that we should do to something that we must do. Continuing to maintain the
Nation’s strategic deterrent needed to meet the challenges of the global security environment and torealize Presidential and Departmental guidance defined by the National Defense Strategy (NDS), National
Military Strategy (NMS), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) requires continued Congressional support,
budget stability, and on-time appropriations.
GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTThe NDS’s prioritization of great power competition is the impetus for increasing lethality,
strengthening alliances and partnerships, and reforming the Department in an increasingly complex global
environment. It addresses the changing nature of threats to the United States. Competitors, such as China
and Russia, are developing advanced capabilities to directly challenge our strengths across all domains.
USSTRATCOM is committed to fulfilling our NDS requirements and searching out innovative ways tounderstand the environment and adapt to the challenges presented in the global security environment.
We understand competition does not equal conflict, and war does not have to be an inevitableconclusion in an era of great power competition. However, we must be responsive to the increasing
desire for state and non-state actors to reshape the world in their favor, doing so at the expense to thesecurity of our Nation, our Allies, and our partners, and accepted international norms and rules. We must
be capable of recognizing and communicating the potential for adversarial actors who use forces in any
domain to coerce, undermine, or erode the current rules-based order.
CHINA
China is advancing a comprehensive modernization program for the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) and is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning all domains, the electromagnetic

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spectrum, and the information environment. These initiatives increase China’s ability to project power
further from their mainland and support their aspirations to impose China’s will throughout the
Indo-Pacific region. Beijing’s military modernization supports longstanding goals to establish regionalhegemony, deny U.S. power projection operations in the Indo-Pacific, and supplant the U.S. as the
security partner of choice.
China continues to expand and increase its strategic force capabilities. Despite maintaining a “NoFirst Use” policy, China’s lack of transparency regarding its modernization efforts to increase regional
capabilities and to expand its overall arsenal bring its motives and intent into question. Among questions
about Chinese intentions is their drive to likely double the size of their nuclear stockpile by the end of thedecade. The PLA’s range of new systems that complement its growing nuclear stockpile includes
developing a survivable nuclear triad, counter-intervention, and power projection capabilities to deter anddeny foreign regional force projection in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA’s Air Force (PLAAF) newly
reassigned nuclear mission, and a deployment of a strategic bomber would provide China with its firstcredible nuclear triad. During the 70th Anniversary Parade in October 2019, the PLA unveiled new
strategic nuclear systems, including the H-6N BADGER bomber, DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM), DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, and improved submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBM). Other advanced systems include a range of ballistic missile defense technologies and increased
anti-access/area denial operations. Finally, the PLA is developing a space-based early warning capability
and more sophisticated command and control (C2) systems to safeguard the integrity of a larger, moredispersed force. Collectively, Chinese improvements to its nuclear capabilities raise troubling concerns
and underscore the need to press on with modernizing our nuclear forces, including the supplemental
capabilities outlined in the NPR.
Our Nation, and our Allies and partners, should not accept Chinese policies or actions thatthreaten the international rules-based order or undermine regional and global stability. We must remain
postured to counter Chinese coercion and subversion, assure our regional Allies and partners, and protect
our national security interests as international law allows.
RUSSIA
Russia seeks to regain its role as a world power and erode U.S. leadership in world affairs.
Russia continues to pursue a sphere of influence over the states on its periphery and attempts to dictate theparameters of those states’ sovereignty, especially regarding matters of security or economics. Russian
military doctrine emphasizes the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons and Russia
fields advanced capabilities to achieve these objectives. Moreover, Russian doctrine and rhetoric

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highlights a willingness to use nuclear weapons first, perhaps in an attempt to terminate a conventional
conflict on terms acceptable to Russia.
Russia’s aggressive and robust military and nuclear modernization campaign across its strategic
triad and dual-use systems is close to completion. To date, Russia has recapitalized 76 percent of its
strategic nuclear forces with modern weapons and equipment, strengthening its overall combat potential.
It is easier to list the nuclear weapons and equipment Russia has not modernized, than it is to describe
their all new equipment and capabilities. Upgrades to existing strategic forces include updating the Tu95MS BEAR strategic bomber and Kh-101/102 long-range, air-launched cruise missiles; building anddeploying the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBN platform for the BULAVA SS-N-32 SLBM; replacing silobased and mobile ICBMs with newer systems and increased warhead upload capacity; and fielding the
Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle. In addition to modernization efforts, Russia is embracing new andnovel technologies such as the TSIRKON hypersonic anti-ship missile, Belgorod submarine, nuclear
capable Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, Kalibr land-attack cruise missile, Kinzhal air-launchedballistic missile, and Skyfall nuclear powered intercontinental cruise missile. These advanced dualcapable systems are specifically designed to challenge U.S. and Allied deterrent structures and target ourcapabilities.
Over the past decade, Moscow has not only emphasized strategic forces preparedness, but alsoendeavored to enhance Russia’s civil defense readiness for strategic conflict, and has conducted exercises
geared towards increasing interoperability between civil and military organizations in a time of war.
Additionally, both Russia and China appear to be expanding their strategic partnership in the Asia/PacificRegion. Last summer, this partnership went on display through a combined out-of-area (OOA) flight.
Their joint efforts continue to erode transparency and predictability, use force to achieve their goals,
undermine rules-based international order, and violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of theirneighbors.
Russia’s nuclear forces include a range of strategic weapons, some not captured by existing arms
control structures, and theater and tactical nuclear weapons entirely outside the arms control framework.
Due to Russia’s refusal to submit these theater (or non-strategic) systems to arms control limits ortransparency initiatives, a considerable level of uncertainty clouds judgements on the scope anddisposition of Russia’s stockpile. However, Russia’s overall nuclear stockpile is likely to growsignificantly over the next decade – growth driven primarily by a projected increase in Russia’s
non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia’s determined pursuit of “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, together
with their recent theory of nuclear rhetoric, indicates a troubling readiness to resort to nuclear weapons
early in a crisis. Accordingly, our nuclear forces must include a sufficient range of capabilities such that

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Russia never mistakenly perceives any advantage from using nuclear weapons, at any threshold ofviolence.
NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
North Korea continues to defy international norms and conducts malign activities to foster
regional instability. North Korea has tested ICBM-class missiles designed to reach the United States andhas increased the number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles in its inventory. USSTRATCOM
is committed to supporting the Department’s efforts to work with like-minded regional partners to reduce
military tensions and support our diplomats in achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of North
Korea.
Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of terror. By arming and utilizing proxy forces withadvanced conventional weapons, Iran threatens our Nation and our partners in the region. Iran relies on
its missile forces as a tool for signaling, propaganda, and retaliation, as observed through violation of the2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and further illustrated by last month’s ballistic
missile launches against airbases in Iraq. Additionally, Iran continues to retain the technologicalcapability and capacity to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so. Irancontinues to ready and develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, coupled with an aggressive
strategy to destabilize the Middle East; calling into question Iran’s commitment to foregoing nuclear
weapons. Iran’s actions introduce greater risk to an already volatile environment and threatens global
commerce, security, and stability.
We remain vigilant to the threats both North Korea and Iran pose to the United States, our Allies
and partners, and support on-going international and whole-of-government approaches to reduce thesethreats.
INTEGRATED STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
The 21st century global security environment presents challenges to deterrence. Competitors are
conducting subversive actions below the levels of traditional conflict across all domains. Additionally,
our adversaries are integrating nuclear, conventional, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and cybercapabilities to form an unprecedented range of threats; this includes the exploitation of the potential threatof nuclear employment to shape our response to their actions.
In a new era of warfighting, traditional Cold War deterrence concepts may be insufficient to deter
the full range of threats in the modern security environment. The United States must apply tailoreddeterrent strategies to specific adversaries, while integrating the full spectrum of our military capabilities,
both nuclear and conventional, with all elements of U.S. national power. An integrated strategic

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deterrence concept must leverage and exploit information advantage to seek long-term gains andcapabilities in response to advancing threats; and fully assess the risks associated with deterrence failure.
To address 21st century challenges, integration cannot stop within our government. Building andmaintaining our relationships are critical to preserving shared interests and responding to mutual threats.
The Command continues to engage with Allies and partners to strengthen relationships, build trust, andset conditions across the globe.
USSTRATCOM supported seventeen senior-level international engagements in 2019, including
visits to the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Canada as well as visits from the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and 32 Defense Attachés through the International
Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). Our daily interactions with our Allies and partners coupled with
Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployments, submarine port-calls and visits, and cooperative missile defense
activities provide unique opportunities to strengthen relationships, build trust between our senior leaders,and increase the interoperability of our forces. The Command also hosted an annual Deterrence
Symposium to exchange viewpoints on security challenges; senior political, military, and academic
leaders from over 13 nations attended this event.
To facilitate these interactions, Headquarters USSTRATCOM hosts permanently assigned liaison
officers from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom; and our Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense hosts a liaison officer from Germany.
These Foreign Liaison Officers serve as a conduit between the Command and their nations’ militaries. To
the extent possible, liaison officers and their superiors participate in our Tier 1 globally integrated
exercises, offering mutual benefits to our Allies and the United States. These peacetime engagements
develop relationships before a crisis. This past year’s successes have included funding securecommunication infrastructure compatibility, defining operational relationships, enhancing our militaryinteroperability, improving combined capabilities across our Allies and partners, and integrating criticaldefense missions to assure Allies and partners of our Nation’s extended deterrence commitments and nonproliferation objectives.
GLOBALLY INTEGRATED OPERATIONS
Globally integrated operations remain essential to achieving defense objectives in this era of great
power competition. The worldwide dispersal of friendly and adversarial forces create both opportunities
and challenges. As a Joint Force, we must continue to work with our Allies and partners acrossgeographic and warfighting boundaries to create security advantages. Additionally, the Joint Force must
increase proficiency in employing global capabilities - space, cyber, and special operations forces hand-in-hand with traditional air, land, and sea warfighting capabilities. The essence of globally

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integrated operations is the alignment of the Joint Force in purpose, time, and tempo regardless of which
commander is responsible for execution; this is particularly important for execution of the strategic
deterrence mission where the operations and activities of combatant commanders significantly affectdeterrence success. Investments in cross-combatant command coordination are vital. There is also atemporal aspect to global integration; the ability of operational commanders to gain warfighting
advantages depends on enacting decisions faster than our adversaries. In the last year, the Joint Force has
made enormous strides in implementing the Secretary’s vision for global integration, but we must
continue on the path to defend the Nation’s interests in the 21st century.
NUCLEAR OPERATIONSUSSTRATCOM bears the responsibility for operating our Nation’s nuclear triad. The Nation’s
nuclear triad is safe, secure, and effective; and is foundational to our survival. It remains the greatest
contributor to deterring adversaries from conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our
Nation, and our Allies and partners. However, the Nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future of
our nuclear forces. Since the end of the Cold War, we led the world in reducing our nuclear stockpile
while increasing transparency. While we reduced the number and types of nuclear weapons in ourarsenal, our adversaries went in the other direction and continued to modernize and expand their strategic
capabilities. We now find ourselves fielding a reduced Cold War era arsenal against a larger, more
modern, and more varied Russian force and a continually improving and growing Chinese force. If we do
not address 2018 NPR recommendations, this will create the potential for insufficient flexibility in thetriad to impose costs and deter all potential conventional and nuclear threats in the early-2030s.
For the last three decades, we have anticipated reaching a tipping point in the nuclear weapons
complex. That point is almost here. Our weapons, NC3, and triad delivery systems will soon reachretirement or require refurbishment. If we do not invest smartly and consistently in our nuclear enterprise
now, we will need to rebuild from scratch the talent and infrastructure required to design the deterrent
forces for our Nation’s future needs. As the foundation for deterrence for our Nation, Allies, andpartners, we must continue to sustain, modernize, and recapitalize our Nation’s strategic nuclear
capabilities. Previous de-emphasis on our nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure that supports it, coupledwith a changing security environment, coupled with adversaries that are modernizing and creating
increasingly capable forces, has led us to the point where we must modernize now to continue to maintaina viable deterrent in the future. We appreciate that Congress has recognized the importance ofmodernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has funded these
programs. We request your continued support to modernize and sustain our Nation’s nuclear deterrent.

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LAND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENTUSSTRATCOM's geographically dispersed ICBM force is the most responsive leg of the triad,
continuing to deliver a highly reliable, secure deterrent capability and an overwhelming challenge todefeat. While the Minuteman has served as the backbone of our Nation’s ICBM force since 1962, its
aging infrastructure, and asset attrition require a comprehensive weapon system replacement beginning in
2028. The Air Force remains focused on sustaining our ICBM force at the lowest reasonable cost. The
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives provided decisive analysis that
continued life extension of the Minuteman III (MM III) would be more costly than a replacement system
and would not address future challenges and threats to our current ICBM force. GBSD is the lowest risk,
highest value decision to meet current and future military requirements.
USSTRATCOM supports the ongoing MM III sustainment programs needed to keep the weapon
system viable and effective until GBSD reaches full operational capability in 2036. Smart, consistentsustainment of our current missile systems, while we modernize the ICBM force, will ensure an effective
deterrent remains for many decades. GBSD is a just-in-time replacement program, and we cannot afford
to have the MM III weapon system deteriorate prematurely.
The GBSD program completes the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase in
FY2020 and transitions to Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) following a successful
Milestone B decision this year. USSTRATCOM remains firmly committed to GBSD as the Air Forcepursues mature, low-risk technologies, modularity, and open system standards to enable affordable
technology insertion. On-time GBSD deployment remains a USSTRATCOM imperative; we must keep
requirements stable and protect existing schedule margin or where possible, expand these schedulemargins.
GBSD, when fielded, will be an affordable, modern weapon system, deployed in updated
infrastructure and fully integrated into a modernized NC3 system. Our ICBMs, and prospectively the
GBSD, raise the threshold of an adversary’s attack on the homeland by presenting an intractable targetingproblem. Eliminating our ICBM capability, and specifically the GBSD, would be dangerously
provocative, present a less credible strategic threat, and grant adversaries a vastly reduced target set –raising the risk to our Nation of a disabling first strike. Thus, USSTRATCOM strongly supports the Air
Force in providing GBSD to ensure our deterrent remains effective and lethal in an ever-changing andincreasingly threatening strategic environment.
AIR-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT
The bomber leg of the nuclear triad is the most flexible and visible aspect of our Nation’s nuclear
forces. Through their discernable adaptability, bombers continue to provide a wide variety of deterrence

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options to the President and unambiguously signal unwavering resolve to our adversaries. Additionally,
their persistence and reliability of our bomber force reassures our Allies and partners. Nevertheless,current bombers and associated weapon systems are beyond or quickly approaching their intended end ofservice life and require sustainment to remain operational and modernization to address evolving andemerging threats.
The B-52 remains the backbone of the bomber force and will remain in service for an additional
30 years. It serves as an important hedge against delays in our future bomber programs and is a key
component of the Nation’s triad. To remain effective, the B-52 must receive several critical upgrades.
First, the B-52’s Commercial Engine Replacement Program will replace the existing TF-33 engines(1960s era) that are becoming increasingly unsupportable, and will also yield increased fuel efficiency
resulting in greater range, longer flight times, and reduced tanker requirements. In addition to newengines, modernization plans are underway to upgrade the B-52’s radar, avionics, and NC3 systems,
which must remain on schedule to meet the operational requirements of our airborne deterrent
requirement.
The B-2 is the only long-range, penetrating stealth bomber in the world. It is imperative wemaintain the B-2’s unique deterrent and combat capability, until replaced by the B-21. Decisions on the
future bomber force structure and key enablers must be based upon strategic imperatives and combat
effectiveness, ensuring no capability gaps for critical tasking across the family of operational plans(nuclear and conventional).
The future of the bomber force is the B-21 Raider. Designed to meet NDS objectives and basedon firm requirements leveraging existing and mature technology, the B-21 will deliver unrivaled combat
capability. It is an Air Force “Top 3” acquisition program with a planned procurement of at least 100
aircraft and is currently executing in the EMD acquisition phase. The B-21 will utilize both direct attackand standoff weapons, providing a multitude of options to the warfighter to meet national objectives. It is
critical the Air Force delivers the B-21 on time and on budget to meet the Nation’s deterrence objectives
and global security requirements.
In addition to the bombers, the air delivered weapon stockpile modernization is also occurring
through just-in-time Life Extension Programs (LEPs). Notably, the Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
weapon coupled with the W80-4 warhead will replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and its
W80-1 warhead as that system faces reliability and sustainability challenges. Likewise, the B61-12 will
replace aging B61 nuclear gravity bombs deployed on strategic long-range bombers and on our Nation’sand Allies’ Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). The B61-12 life extension includes a guided tail kit assembly
to improve weapon accuracy, enabling a more accurate, single gravity nuclear weapon capability that will
enhance our Nation’s nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrence provided to our Allies and partners.

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The success of all bomber missions depends on adequate tanker support to achieve the necessary
global reach to hold strategic targets at risk. The KC-46, currently in the Initial Operational Testing and
Evaluation (IOT&E) acquisition phase, will partially replace the aging KC-135 fleet. Air Forceleadership continues to engage with Boeing to ensure the new tanker will meet operational objectives.
SEA-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENTThe OHIO-class SSBN with the highly capable Trident II D5 ballistic missile constitutes the mostsurvivable leg of our nuclear triad and provides a reliable deterrent to our adversaries around the world.
The SSBN’s ability to operate continuously and clandestinely sends a very clear message that our
adversaries cannot benefit from a strategic attack against the U.S. or our Allies.
The OHIO-class SSBN is a marvel of technology and its robust design, along with acomprehensive maintenance program, has allowed it to be life extended from 30 to 42 years – longer thanany previous submarine class in U.S. history. The Navy has never kept a single submarine in service
longer than 37-years, let alone an entire class. There is no margin to extend the OHIO-class further;
therefore, the COLUMBIA-class SSBN must field on time to avoid a capability gap in the triad. It isessential we maintain our technological advantage in this critical mission, and to this end, the Navy has
designated COLUMBIA as the top shipbuilding priority in order to ensure its first strategic deterrent
patrol in FY2031. As production begins, we must support our industrial partners’ expansion of bothinfrastructure and training programs to minimize risk.
Furthermore, to remain survivable, we must address anticipated security threats that could
undermine our own future capabilities. Advancements in Russian submarine stealth and detection
requires us to remain committed to the recapitalization of our Integrated Undersea Surveillance System(IUSS) to preserve our advantage in the undersea domain.
Following the decision to extend the OHIO-class SSBN, the Navy determined the need tolife-extend the Trident II D5 ballistic missile, both to address obsolescence issues and to ensure therequired quantity of deployable ballistic missiles into the early 2040s. The life extension program, known
as D5LE, will ultimately serve as the transition missile from OHIO to COLUMBIA. Additionally, efforts
are underway to further extend the D5 missile through the life of the COLUMBIA with the D5LE2
program. D5LE2 will recapitalize the D5, using highly reliable components still in production, pullforward previously unused system margin, and provide a more cost effective design with sufficient
flexibility to account for evolving threats. In order to realize these capabilities, we must revive an
atrophied industrial base required to produce critical non-nuclear components employed on the D5LE2.
To enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of our nuclear forces as directed in the 2018 NPR,
we will pursue two supplemental capabilities to existing U.S. nuclear forces: a low-yield SLBM warhead

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UNCLASSIFIED(W76-2) capability and a modern nuclear sea launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address regional
deterrence challenges that have resulted from increasing Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. These
supplemental capabilities are necessary to correct any misperception an adversary can escalate their way to
victory, and ensure our ability to provide a strategic deterrent. Russia’s increased reliance on non-treaty
accountable strategic and theater nuclear weapons and evolving doctrine of limited first-use in a regional
conflict, give evidence of the increased possibility of Russia’s employment of nuclear weapons. We must
counter these dangerous perceptions with the supplemental capabilities the LYBM and SLCM-N will
provide. An analysis of alternatives is under way for SLCM-N.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
Today’s nuclear stockpile meets current operational and policy requirements. While the stockpile
and its supporting infrastructure are safe, secure, reliable, and effective, both remain fragile. Many of ourweapons have remained in service well beyond their original design lives, owing to the robustness oforiginal designs and the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA)
continuing stockpile stewardship efforts. However, the accumulation of concurrent risks and capacity
margins limit the ability to mitigate adverse impacts to the deterrent. Insufficient resourcing over the past
30+ years postponed much-needed weapon and infrastructure modernization programs, which typicallyrequire 10-15 years to execute. Directive policy changes affecting priorities and inefficient program
execution across administrations have directly contributed to the related erosion in the critical capabilities
and capacity of our strategic deterrent forces. As a result, many of the modernization and sustainment
efforts necessary to ensure the deterrent’s viability have zero schedule margin and are late-to-need.
I firmly support the Secretary’s and Chairman’s public statements identifying nuclear deterrence
as the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense. Our nuclear deterrent underwrites every
U.S. military operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense. I
cannot overemphasize the need to modernize our nuclear forces and recapitalize the supporting
infrastructure to ensure we can maintain this deterrent in the future. I am concerned that the oft-repeatedmessage of the need to modernize and recapitalize has lost its impact, and that collectively we haveunderestimated the risks associated with such a complex and time-constrained modernization andrecapitalization effort. Even seemingly small issues can have a disproportionate impact on the force. We
cannot afford more delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities, and must maintain a focus onrevitalizing our nuclear forces and the associated infrastructure.
The 2018 NPR described a hedging strategy to meet future risks and unexpected challenges. The
atrophy in our nuclear weapons supporting infrastructure is consuming our hedge for avoidable
programmatic risk. We no longer have hedge capacity to fully account for geopolitical risk, technological

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risk, or operational risk. Continued modernization and sustainment work deferral will only further
exacerbate an already untenable situation as we repeatedly extend weapon lifetimes and do not invest in
the diagnostic capabilities needed to ensure confidence in the viability of these systems.
To maintain military effectiveness in the future, we must execute the program of record (POR)
immediately, and invest in advanced diagnostic, research, and development activities to mature emerging
technologies to certify and field a modern deterrent for the 21st century. The next generation of deterrent
forces must encompass responsive weapon systems, world-class personnel, resilient infrastructure, andintelligence informed decisions. We must address emerging 21st century threats that may reduce theeffectiveness of our nuclear deterrent force.
The NNSA took efforts in 2019 to address a gap identified in the 2018 NPR by converting a small
number of W76-1s into the W76-2 low-yield variant. W76-2 deliveries to the Navy and remaining
production are continuing as scheduled in FY2020. In 2019, our weapon modernization programs saw asetback when reliability issues emerged with commercial off-the-shelf non-nuclear components intended
for the W88 Alteration 370 program and the B61-12 LEP. NNSA has worked closely with DoD tomitigate impacts, but correcting these issues will delay initial fielding of both systems. Finally, anotherjust-in-time program is the W80-4 LEP, which remains in synchronized development with the LRSO
delivery system. It is critical for this standoff attack capability program to remain on track.
While air-delivered weapon modernization is proceeding in the B61-12 and W80-4, we must
begin efforts now to modernize ballistic missile warheads for our ICBM and SLBM force in the 2030s
and 2040s. After the 2018 NPR, re-evaluation of our stockpile strategy shifted to pursue separate NEP
designs for the Air Force and Navy. However, the ballistic missile end-state remains the same: address
known and projected aging and performance concerns; preserve triad attributes; balance warhead types
across the force; and improve inter- and intra-leg hedge capability. The Air Force is developing the
MK21A/W87-1 to replace the W78 ICBM warhead that will be over 50 years old when finally retired.
When deployed, the W87-1 will provide enhanced safety and security compared to all other ballistic
missile warheads.
The Nuclear Weapons Council has established a requirement for the W93/Mk7 warhead. Thiswarhead will provide USSTRATCOM and the Navy a means to address evolving ballistic missile
warhead modernization requirements, improve operational effectiveness, and mitigate technical,
operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-leg of the triad. This effort will also support a parallel
Replacement Warhead Program in the United Kingdom whose nuclear deterrent plays an absolutely vitalrole in NATO’s overall defense posture. Without a coordinated, joint effort to develop and field the
W93/MK7 as a system, the bulk of our day-to-day deterrent force will be at increased risk in the early2040s due to aging legacy systems. Given the potential severity of impacts on overall deterrence from13

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late delivery of the W93/MK7, it is imperative the complex work to identify opportunities to accelerate
the development timeline and invest in technologies to reduce schedule risk. Research and development
efforts for critical national capabilities, such as fuzes and aero shells, must begin immediately to deliver acapability in the 2030s that maintains a credible at-sea deterrent through the 2050s and beyond.
Our present Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) infrastructure, which we count on to sustain our
strategic deterrent, continues to atrophy and requires timely recapitalization. NNSA planned facility
improvements to critical capabilities will not materialize in the near-term, yet facility age and capacities
currently limit our ability to timely respond to unforeseen technical, geopolitical, programmatic, or
operational developments. The non-nuclear component issue affecting the B61-12 LEP and W88
Alteration 370 program is a symptom of a fragile enterprise – a single component failure caused a
disruption across multiple programs for a period of years. USSTRATCOM is able to mitigate theoperational impacts today, but proposed steps to reduce accumulating further operational impacts provide
a partial capability at best. The Nuclear Weapons Council Strategic Plan, NNSA Stockpile Stewardshipand Management Plan, and 2020 Requirements and Planning Document describe a path forward to enable
an effective, responsive, and resilient NSE, but successful navigation of the path will only be possible
through continued on-time investments.
USSTRATCOM supports NNSA’s highest infrastructure priority to reconstitute plutonium pit
production. Since the closure of the Rocky Flats facility 30 years ago, no significant quantities of newpits have been added to the stockpile. The Nation must be able to produce no fewer than 30 pits per year
in 2026 and produce at least 80 pits per year during 2030 to maintain stockpile effectiveness. This
capacity is the minimum required to execute the POR; anything less will force difficult decisions on
which modernization programs to defer, which could result in a less-capable nuclear deterrent, and accept
unprecedented pit ages. The NNSA’s two-site plan to achieve plutonium pit production at Los Alamos
National Lab and the Savannah River Site is prudent and necessary to achieve pit production
requirements rather than accept pit lifetimes that threaten the confidence in our weapons’ capabilities.
Failure to accomplish these goals will place all future stockpile modernization programs at risk.
In addition to plutonium pit production, the NSE must continue to recapitalize capabilities toprocess uranium and lithium, produce tritium, manufacture and procure trusted radiation-hardened
microelectronics, and manufacture non-nuclear components in sufficient quantities to sustain andmodernize the force. Production of nuclear weapon components and the materials needed to constructthem effectively stopped during the 1990s when we began to life-extend legacy systems. This includes
recruiting and developing the specialized workforce and experts required to produce and maintain thesesystems. Maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective strategic deterrent into the future requires
restoring or increasing the capacity of these material, component, and workforce capabilities.

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Congressional legislation has recognized and supported the need for an effective, responsive, andresilient NSE by directing the NNSA to continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize,
develop, engineer, certify, and deploy nuclear weapons. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP),
combined with the POR and its supporting science program, enables a process to exercise thedevelopment of nuclear weapons. I remain supportive of the program, especially activities like the rapid
design-to-test experiment, which cuts time from clean-sheet design to hydrodynamic test by two-thirds.
Maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile that continues to meet its intended
deterrence and assurance roles into the future will require consistent, predictable funding for weapons
modernization and the supporting infrastructure over the next two decades. Failure to make thisinvestment presents an existential risk to the Nation. Success hinges on continued coordination between
DoD and NNSA as well as the consistent cooperation among all stakeholders.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY AND SECURITY
Our nuclear security standard is complete denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. We
have worked closely with our Navy and Air Force partners to assess nuclear security requirements andadjust our force posture, training, and equipment to address current and evolving threats. While wecontinue to advance our security capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are necessary
to maintain the high standards this mission demands.
The proliferation, ease of use, and sophisticated capabilities of small, unmanned aircraft systems(sUAS) pose a threat to our operations. The Department continues to field counter sUAS capabilities andare refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the developing threat. Focused leadership,
vigilance, and dedicated investment are necessary to remain ahead of this challenge.
With intense advocacy from our Command and strong support from Congress, we achieved asignificant ICBM security milestone with the Air Force awarding a contract to replace our Vietnam-era
UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139 “Grey Wolf.” The Air Force expects delivery of the firsttwo aircraft to Eglin AFB in 2020 for developmental testing. Delivery of subsequent aircraft to eachmissile wing will provide full operational capability by FY2027. With this program moving forward, we
can now focus our efforts on replacing aging armored security vehicles with Joint Light Tactical Vehicles,
equipped with advanced weapons and communications systems that will provide security personnel
uninterrupted situational awareness anywhere they operate.
Finally, we encourage Congress to continue supporting our ICBM Transportation and Handlingequipment. The Payload Transporter Replacement and Transporter Erector Replacement Programs will
provide safe, secure MM III solid rocket motor (SRM) transport, removal, and emplacement, and over the
coming years, these heavily tasked force enablers will facilitate the transition from MM III to GBSD. We

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continue to support fully funding the weapons security programs for on-time delivery, enhancing thesecurity of our strategic weapons and our vast ICBM complex.
NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISE
Our layered approach to providing NC3 capabilities remains reliable and effective in our current
strategic environment; however, we have identified challenges in the near-term to address maintaining
deterrence in the coming decades. Our posture and capabilities were adequate for the Cold War needs,
especially against the Soviet-era ballistic missile and bomber threats. Now, we face improved adversarial
capabilities in air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and evolving space and cyber threats. We must lookbeyond traditional ballistic missile profiles and understand the full spectrum of threats to NC3. We must
innovate and outpace those threats to maintain our deterrent capabilities. Our continued focus is tomaintain positive command and control of U.S. nuclear forces at all times, before, during, and after anuclear attack. As we modernize our triad, we must maintain current capabilities while we address futureNC3 requirements. This is one of my top priorities.
In October 2018, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, USSTRATCOM, as theNC3 Enterprise Lead responsible for NC3 enterprise operations, requirements, and systems engineeringand integration. Last year, USSTRATCOM established the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) and started
building relationships with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S))
as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). In the effort to consolidate authorities andresponsibilities for the NC3 portfolio, we jointly presented the status of the NC3 Enterprise to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; this will reoccur on a continual basis
as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
USD(A&S) and the Commander, USSTRATCOM, coordinated and recommended adjustmentsfor our most pressing NC3 shortfalls. We support fully funding our approach to quantitatively assessing
the NC3 enterprise. While an understandably complex and ambitious undertaking, we want to be able tomodel and monitor the entire enterprise. Data science is quickly proving its value to industry and weneed to leverage this capability and implement it into our approach to assess the NC3 Enterprise’s
mutually supportive, interdependent architecture. Additionally, in order to move forward, we must
provide the necessary manpower to build enterprise level capabilities.
Last year we saw success in validating the mission need statement for the next generation NC3
architecture. We are continuing to build out processes and supporting capabilities that will befoundational to establishing an architecture that is mutually supportive and resilient to the entire spectrumof attacks. While we develop the next generation NC3 to conduct nuclear command and control (NC2)over assured communication paths, we must consider how NC2 infrastructure will align and interoperate

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with the future Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) structure. Future NC3 architecture willretain elements specific to NC2 while leveraging JADC2 to maintain resilient and redundant C2 andfacilitate quick decision cycles.
In order to provide continuous communications and control of nuclear forces between the
President, senior advisors, and Joint Forces, we must maintain our Advanced Extremely High Frequency(AEHF) satellites, paired with ground and airborne Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals(FAB-T). We continue to develop the plan for the next generation of airborne command and control
aircraft, replacing the legacy E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), E-6B Airborne
Command Post (ABNCP) and Take Charge and Move-Out (TACAMO), and C-32 Executive Transport
fleets. Existing capabilities will need to retain their current roles and may need to accept new ones as ournext generation of NC3 takes shape. As we build on our airborne communication capabilities, we are
evaluating the relay capabilities of ground forces to augment and enhance the survivability and enduranceof our airborne layer. The Air Force’s Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (G-ASNT) gives ourground forces a multi-band communications system to maintain situational awareness and relay direction
to nuclear forces not in direct contact with decision makers.
Cutting across all of these capabilities is the cyber defense of the systems themselves. Our NC2
hardware infrastructure fails if the NC3 fails due to a cyber-attack. We must continue to invest in active,
persistent cyber defense of our NC3 systems, both current and future. We have collaborated withUSCYBERCOM, USD(A&S), and the Services to ensure our existing NC3 systems remain free ofadversary influence in real time and to protect our future NC3 acquisitions and sustainment from cyberthreats. Cyber defense is not a “trade space” discussion; it is an additive necessity in today’s technologycentric world.
USSTRATCOM, as the NC3 Enterprise lead, will continue to develop the Enterprise’s future
requirements and ensure a safe, secure, and reliable architecture for the future. As we move towards thenext generation of NC3, we must work with industry to rapidly prototype new technologies andexperiment with them to determine their effectiveness. In addition, we will continue cooperation on
NATO NC3 systems that require modernization to enable appropriate consultations and effective nuclear
operations, improve survivability, resilience, and flexibility. We need to move rapidly and if a newtechnology appears promising, acquire and field it quickly – and if our experiment shows it is not
feasible, to “fail fast,” and move on. We rely on the necessary resources for sustainment andmodernization of NC3 systems. We must also attract the right experience and talent needed to fulfill
enterprise manpower requirements to develop the innovative NC3 solutions described in the NC3
Enterprise Center Mission Needs Statement. A combined effort between the Services and Agencies,
National Labs, industry, and academia are necessary to generate innovative ideas, establish working

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relationships with key stakeholders, and maintain deterrence during this transition. I am confident in theforming relationships and the direction the Department is taking to prioritize NC3 modernization.
GLOBAL STRIKE
Strategic competitors continue to invest in and rapidly develop anti-access/area denial capabilities
to counter U.S. military advantages in power projection and freedom of movement. Additionally,
competitors are developing hypersonic weapons as part of this counter-intervention strategy. The
Department requires flexible, prompt, survivable response options for global strike. Continued
investment and a commitment to fielding advanced capabilities are crucial to offset these threats andensure our deterrence and conventional power remains strong into the future.
Offensive hypersonic strike weapons will provide conventional capabilities to ensure the Joint
Force can deter aggression in contested environments short of nuclear use. They provide a highly
responsive, long-range, conventional strike capability for distant, defended, or time-critical threats whenother forces are unavailable or not preferred. Fielding advanced hypersonic capabilities will allow us to
tailor our strategies and plans with an expanded range of conventional options. While not a replacement
for nuclear weapons, new classes of hypersonic weapons will complement and enhance strategic
deterrence and can deliver surgical strikes to provide effects or be integrated into larger campaigns,
increasing the effectiveness of our warfighting advantages.
For more than a decade, the U.S. matured its hypersonic strike technologies and successfully
demonstrated their significance to future warfighters. FY2020 represents a pivotal year for hypersonic
weapon development and fielding as the Department begins aggressively flight testing capabilities acrossmultiple domains and posturing the industrial base to produce these systems at scale to allow the Services
to field operational capabilities in the near-term. A flexible mix of capabilities launched from land, sea,
and air will provide a constant, visible, and global presence designed to influence adversary behavior inall stages of conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold, and will provide an effective deterrent andstrike capability in the near-term to address current and future threats.
MISSILE DEFENSE
As a global warfighting command, Commander, USSTRATCOM is the coordinating authority
and is responsible for global missile defense planning in coordination with other combatant commands,
Services, and agencies that employ our Nation’s missile defense capabilities. USSTRATCOM’s Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) supports missile defense
operations worldwide: this means helping to identify and minimize gaps and seams in regional planning,

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conducting missile defense operations support, and advocating for capabilities on behalf of all othercombatant commanders.
While current missile defense capabilities ensure defense of the homeland against a rogue
ballistic missile threat, a concerted U.S. effort is required to expand and improve existing capabilities forboth homeland and regional missile defense. Potential adversaries are improving existing missile systemcapabilities and capacities, blurring missile defense operations across traditional regional boundaries.
Solving the trans-regional threat, increased range, and lethality requires more than just active missile
defense; we must address the problem of decreased warning and adjust defensive postures appropriately.
Navigating this environment requires a comprehensive approach that establishes a renewed emphasis onleveraging opportunities to negate missile threats prior to launch, during all phases of flight, and after
impact, drawing on effects generated from capabilities throughout all domains.
As the warfighter advocate for missile defense, USSTRATCOM must focus developers on
examining, developing, and exploiting advanced concepts and technologies. Research and development
across all domains is key to ensuring we keep pace with evolving adversary threats, such as hypersonic
weapons and cruise missiles. Future space-based sensors may be able to provide birth-to-death detection,
tracking, and discrimination of hypersonic glide vehicle, cruise missile, and ballistic missile threats
globally. These abilities cannot be fully achieved with the current or future terrestrial-based radararchitecture due to the constraints of geography and characteristics of future missile threats.
Our regional missile defenses protect against missile attacks on deployed U.S. forces, Allies, andpartners; assist Allies and partners in better defending themselves; preserve freedom of action; andcounter adversary anti-access/area denial tactics. However, challenges remain to the Department’s efforts
to fully integrate and optimize limited defense resources and architectures through Allied and partner
integration and interoperability. USSTRATCOM’s NIMBLE TITAN exercise series, with participantsfrom 24 countries and four international organizations, advances multinational collaboration through theexperimentation of operational integration concepts to enhance deterrence and defense against missile
attacks.
The Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) currently emplaced have the capability of defending thehomeland from today’s rogue threat. Although we are pursuing development of the Next Generation
Interceptor (NGI) to complement our GBI capability, we need to examine new approaches to defeat
ICBMs in ways that repurpose existing options and are cost effective. As we address future threats, wemust account for the air and missile defense assets required to defend the homeland, while simultaneously
improving our regional security architectures. We continue to embrace new and developing technologies
and find innovative ways to use, as well as repurposing existing technologies to strengthen and expand

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current capabilities. Examples include developing an underlay for homeland defense to account forballistic missiles and using existing sensors for tracking ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats.
The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) provided an opportunity to conduct focused reviews
clarifying and optimizing missile defense roles and responsibilities across the Department. In accordancewith the MDR, the Department is reviewing policy, responsibilities, and procedures for missile defense
research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, operations, and sustainment. Revised
improvements to the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) will meet 2019 MDR guidance, align with
Department budget process and maximize warfighter input in capability development and acquisition, andseeks to deliver missile defense capabilities in a timely manner. USSTRATCOM is working with thecommunity of interest to update the WIP and incorporate findings established in the MDR. As
Commander, I will continue to advocate for missile defense requirements through continued capability
and utility assessments and by ensuring operational tests and evaluations meet warfighter demands.
Missile defense endures as a critical component of comprehensive U.S. strategic and tailored regional
deterrence strategies and is a key element of any integrated response options.
JOINT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM OPERATIONS (JEMSO)The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the one physical maneuver space depended upon by
forces across all warfighting domains. If we cannot achieve EMS superiority and assure access to the
EMS, the joint force cannot prevail. Our adversaries have observed our use and dependence on the EMS,
and have developed and organized their forces to achieve EMS superiority; it is essential we develop
capabilities and appropriately organize to counter this threat. Achieving and maintaining EMS superiority
is the critical enabler for successful Joint Force operations.
To address warfighter requirements, USSTRATCOM collaborates with the Secretary of Defense
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Cross Functional Team, the Electronic Warfare Executive
Committee (EW EXCOM), the Services, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the joint staff, andUnder Secretary of Defense offices to advocate for essential warfighter EMSO capabilities. Additionally,
we engage with Australia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners to ensure compatible JEMSO
doctrine, capabilities, and concepts of operation.
USSTRATCOM led the effort to create the first Joint Publication for JEMSO. Working withDoD CIO and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), USSTRATCOM provided the initial
warfighter requirements for an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system to achieve EMS
superiority. In coordination with the DISA Defense Spectrum Organization, USSTRATCOM isestablishing the initial Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Information Analysis and Fusion capability thatwill provide spectrum specific data for battle management and combatant command operational cells.

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Our Command also led a combatant command JEMSO cell manpower requirement validation study
through the joint manpower validation process for the FY2022 Program Objective Memorandum budget.
All of these warfighter requirement initiatives will require sustained investments.
CONCLUSIONUSSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command, actively and successfully deterring strategic
attack against our Nation and our Allies. The men and women of our Command are committed tomaintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective deterrent for our Nation. If deterrence fails, ourcombat-ready force is prepared now to deliver a decisive response anywhere on the globe, across all
domains, in coordination with geographic and global warfighting combatant commanders and our Allies
and partners.
The Command is focused on integrating strategic deterrence in the 21st century, expanding theintellectual capital to educate the joint force on deterrence and nuclear policy, and ensuring our forces areprepared to meet challenges in the global security environment.
Our strategic forces provide the foundation and credibility that backstops all U.S. military
operations and diplomacy around the world. Our triad remains the most effective way to deter
adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against our Nation and our Allies and partners. Our
Nation’s strength has helped deter great power war and we must continue to prioritize the capabilities that
underpin our strength.
Our Nation is at a critical point in maintaining our strategic advantages and must remaincommitted to modernization and recapitalization programs in place. Our strategic forces are a prudent
investment in the current and future security of our Nation, with some systems scheduled to operate
effectively well into the 2070s and 2080s. With continued Congressional support and budget stability, we
can continue to pace the threat and develop the future force necessary to guarantee the continued
execution of the Department’s highest priority mission, to keep our Nation and our Allies safe.

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