NID S

C HIN AS E C U R I T Y

R E P O R T

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship
Published by
The National Institute for Defense Studies
5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8808 Japan
Website: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp
Translated by The Japan Times, Ltd.
Copyright © 2017 by the National Institute for Defense Studies, JapanAll rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written, prior permission fromthe publisher.
This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in February 2017.
ISBN978-4-86482-047-9

Printed in Japan

NIDS China Security Report 2017

Contents
Preface ······················································································································ iii
Chapter Summary ···································································································· v
Acronyms and Abbreviations ·················································································vii
Introduction ·············································································································· 1
Chapter 1: The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan ································ 7
1. The Age of Mao Zedong: Pursuing the Liberation of Taiwan ························· 8
2. The Deng Xiaoping Years: Moving to Peaceful Reunification and
One Country, Two Systems ·············································································· 9
3. The Jiang Zemin Years: Blocking Taiwan’s Independence byModernizing the Military ················································································· 11
4. The Hu Jintao Years: Handling the Taiwan Issue as
China Grows Stronger ···················································································· 15
5. The Xi Jinping Years: Stressing the 1992 Consensus ··································· 23
Chapter 2: China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective ······················· 25
1. From Reconquering the Mainland to Taiwan-centered Policy —The Chiang Governments ··············································································· 26
2. Taiwan’s Promotion of Democratization —The Lee Teng-hui Governments ····································································· 30
3. The Impact of DPP Government —The Chen Shui-bian Administration ······························································· 32
4. The Outcome of Taiwan’s Increasingly Conciliatory Policy Towards China —The Ma Ying-jeou Administration ··································································· 36
Chapter 3: The United States and the Taiwan Problem ····································· 41
1. The Taiwan Policy of Successive US Administrations ·································· 42
2. US Domestic Controversy over Taiwan ························································· 47
3. Deepening the US-Taiwan Security Relationship ·········································· 50
Chapter 4: Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and“Maintaining the Status Quo” ···························································· 57
1. Growing Taiwanese Identity ··········································································· 58
2. China’s Military Pressure on Taiwan ······························································ 64i

3. Status of Taiwan Military Response ······························································· 67
4. Tsai Ing-wen’s Vision of Fixed Status Quo ···················································· 72
Column Development of National Defense and Military Reforms

under Xi Jinping, and Their Influence on the China-Taiwan
Relationship·························································································· 74
Conclusions ············································································································ 79
Endnote ··················································································································· 84iiPreface
Preface

The NIDS China Security Report is published annually by the National Institute for
Chapter Summary

Defense Studies (NIDS) to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s militaryaffairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminatedboth in Japan and overseas. Since March 2011 it has been published annually in Japanese,
Chinese, and English editions. The NIDS China Security Report has attracted significant

Introduction

interest from research institutions and the media in Japan and abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange and dialogue with research
institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China.

Chapter 1

The China Security Report 2017, the seventh in this series and subtitled “Change inContinuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship,” analyzes trends and transitions in China’s Taiwan policies, Taiwan’s policies toward China, and US policies regarding
Taiwan over the last 70 years. Based on such analysis, the report argues that describing theChapter 2

China-Taiwan relationship as a status quo merely means maintaining the current face-off
between two systems; rather, it shows that the status quo is in fact a dynamic situation, not a
static one. In drafting this report, its authors had the opportunity to exchange views withresearchers and other experts in Japan and overseas, including in China and Taiwan, while

Chapter 3

the authors attempt to make the analysis as objective as possible. Endnotes introduce thewide range of primary and secondary sources of information used in producing this report.

Chapter 4

The China Security Report 2017 has been written solely from the viewpoints of theindividual researchers and does not represent an official view of the Japanese Government,
the Ministry of Defense, or NIDS. The report was coauthored by Rira Momma (the leadauthor responsible for Chapters 2 and 4), Shinji Yamaguchi (Chapters 1 and 3), and Yasuyuki

Conclusions

Sugiura (the Column). The editorial team was led by Tetsuo Murooka, editor-in-chief, alongwith Koichi Arie, Masafumi Iida, Akira Jingushi, Masami Nishino, and Masaaki Yatsuzuka.
The authors of the China Security Report 2017 hope that it will promote policy discussions concerning China in Japan and other countries, and at the same time they hope that
the Report will contribute to a deepening of dialogue and exchange as well as cooperation
between Japan and China regarding security.

iii

Preface

February 2017
Tetsuo Murooka
Director, Security Studies Department
The National Institute for Security Studiesiv

Chapter Summary
Preface

Chapter 1 The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan
Chapter Summary

For China, the Taiwan problem is a matter impinging on the legitimacy of its politicalpower. At the same time, it ranks as one of the core issues in China’s relations with theUnited States and in its efforts at nation building. Every leader of China, from Mao Zedong
to Xi Jinping, in the end has had to take reunification of Taiwan with the motherland as one

Introductionof his greatest goals. Deng Xiaoping was able to move official policy from the “liberation”
of Taiwan during Mao’s years to “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems,”
both of which still figure in Chinese policy. Jiang Zemin, aware of the progress of democratization in Taiwan and the support being received from the United States, resorted to the

Chapter 1

threat of armed force. Hu Jintao sought to cooperate with the United States while also repressing moves toward Taiwan’s independence, and he further formulated the policy of“peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.” In doing so he achieved success in creating
a situation favorable to an advantageous China-Taiwan relationship, all against the back-

Chapter 2

ground of developing China’s economic and military might. He was almost totally unable,
however, to make progress toward a political dialogue which would facilitate unification.
While attempts by the Xi Jinping administration to promote the peaceful development ofcross-Strait relations have foundered, the new government in Taiwan is generating distrust

Chapter 3

and exasperation.

Chapter 2 China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective
Chapter 4

Under the governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the Republic ofChina (ROC; Taiwan) was bolstered by rapid economic growth. During this period, Taiwan
viewed mainland China as territory it should regain and the People’s Republic of China as anenemy it should fight. However, with the United States’ announcement of the Guam Doctrine,

Conclusions

the international environment around Taiwan began to worsen. Accordingly, Taiwan changed
its strategy towards China from aggression to the unity of offense and defense, starting toplace emphasis on the defense of its territory. The Lee Teng-hui administration viewed China
as a negotiating partner and established a framework for that purpose. With the democratization and Taiwanization of the ROC during this process, mainland China ceased to be territory
to be reconquered and Taiwan adopted a purely defensive strategy. During the Chen Shuibian administration, economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China rapidly deepened, but the political relationship that had deteriorated from the time of the Lee administration
continued to worsen. Reflecting this change, Taiwan adopted a military strategy of proactive
defense. The Ma Ying-jeou government strove to implement a policy of rapprochementvChapter Summary

towards China, returning to a purely defensive military strategy. Although Taiwan’s relationship with China improved, the sense of Taiwanese identity of its citizens grew and a risingtide of opinion favored maintaining the status quo in China-Taiwan relations.

Chapter 3 The Taiwan Problem as Seen from the United States
The United States is an element in the China-Taiwan relationship that cannot be ignored. US policies toward China and Taiwan have developed in the search for a balance topermit building a stable strategic relationship with China while maintaining US trustworthiness as a friend to Taiwan. Such a subtle balance underlies the basic documents which haveshaped those relationships, including the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, the communiquéestablishing diplomatic relations with China in 1979 and that year’s Taiwan Relations Act,and in 1982, the US-China Communiqué and the Six Guarantees directed at Taiwan. Since
2000, China has been developing itself into a major power, and domestic US opinion has
taken various competing forms such as calls for abandoning Taiwan, for forging a stronger
US-Taiwan relationship, and for maintaining the status quo. Apart from such arguments,
however, attention should be directed to how the US-Taiwan security relationship will continue to develop as influenced by a working-level, software-oriented approach.

Chapter 4 Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and“Maintaining the Status Quo”
It is easy to have the impression that trade and investment expanded greatly during theadministration of Ma Ying-jeou because of improved relations with China. While it is certainly true that the number of tourists from China increased dramatically during the Ma administration, Taiwan’s total trade with China and total investment in China began to growvisibly during the administration of Chen Shui-bian. While relations deepened in economic
and trade arenas based on this foundation, the percentage of Taiwanese people who supported the status quo of neither unification with China nor independence has continued toincrease gradually and by 2016 reached about 80%. Further, the number of Taiwanese people
who self-identified as “Taiwanese” clearly increased following the establishment of the Ma
administration. Meanwhile, there was no easing of Chinese military pressure toward Taiwan
even with the Ma administration as the counterpart. Tsai Ing-wen was elected president
promising “continuation of the status quo” and cannot simply implement a hostile policy
with China on her own, but as seen in her support among younger generations, re-evaluationof the role of indigenous peoples in Taiwan’s history, and the beginning of a “New Southern
Policy,” it is thought Tsai will promote policies that relativize the relationship with China.

vi

Chapter Summary

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEP

circular error probability

CMC

Central Military Commission

CSSTA

Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement

DPP

Democratic Progressive Party

ECFA

Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement

EU

European Union

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

JDAM

joint direct attack munition

KMT

Kuomintang Party

NPC

National People’s Congress

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF

People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC

People’s Republic of China

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

RIMPACRim of the Pacific Exercise

ROC

Republic of China

SAR

Special Administrative Region

SEF

Straits Exchange Foundation

SRBM

Short-Range Ballistic Missile

TRA

Taiwan Relations Act

UN

United Nations

US

United States

Conclusions

Chinese Communist Party

Chapter 4

CCP

Chapter 3

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Chapter 2

ASEAN

Chapter 1

Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits

Introduction

ARATS

Chapter Summary

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Preface

APEC

vii

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan RelationshipIntroduction

Introduction
For China, which saw Hong Kong and Macao revert to its rule during the 1990s, theonly remaining problem of any great political and historical significance is Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. In 1949, however, Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of thePeople’s Republic of China in Beijing and Chiang Kai-shek took Taipei as the temporary
capital of the Republic of China, and ever since then, for almost seven decades, China andTaiwan have remained in confrontation across the Strait of Taiwan.
China, convinced that this situation where two forms of government stood glaring atloggerheads across the strait must be resolved, has repeatedly sought a way to make thispossible, calling at times for either armed or peaceful “liberation” of Taiwan and at times
assuring Taiwan of peaceful reunification while also resorting on occasion to the threat ofarms. No Chinese government, however, from Mao Zedong through Hu Jintao, has achieved
unification with Taiwan. In 2012 Xi Jinping, who followed Hu Jintao and inherited the resultof economic development begun during the Deng Xiaoping years, spoke of achieving the
dream of a great renaissance of the Chinese people, in whose name he pushed forward
China’s expansion toward the outside world. At present the specific targets of that expansion
seem to be the South China Sea and the East China Sea. There has been no change, however,in China viewing Taiwan alongside the Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous regions as
an area of extreme importance constituting one of China’s “core interests.” As China strives
to become a major maritime power, Taiwan’s geographic importance has grown all the more,since it sits at the intersection of the East China Sea and the South China Sea and thus is
China’s threshold to the Western Pacific.
For Taiwan, the Chinese mainland was a target to be taken over by force of arms, andthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was a rebellious group to be pounded down, so Taiwan
had no leeway for negotiation. Still, Lee Teng-hui, who followed Chiang Ching-kuo as president of the Republic of China, moved forward with making the ROC more democratic andmore Taiwanese. In the process, with the seismic changes in the international environment
after the end of the Cold War, an attitude that sees China in a relative sense prevailed in
Taiwan. No longer was the CCP government something to be knocked down by force; itbecame a partner in negotiation with a governing entity. Meanwhile, qualified voters in thoseareas under ROC governance became able to cast direct votes for the president. In 2016,
Taiwan had its third transition to a new administration, and the China-Taiwan relationshiphas also been greatly influenced by this process.
The situation of China-Taiwan confrontation across the Taiwan Strait is described as“maintenance of the status quo.” All that the status quo actually maintains, however, is the2Introduction

framework of confrontation between the two bodies, the People’s Republic of China and thePrefaceRepublic of China, and virtually everything else, including international relations in East
Asia and China’s strength, the military balance between the PRC and the ROC, and the governing structure in Taiwan, is undergoing dynamic change. But the phrase “maintain the

Chapter Summary

status quo” retains currency even in this changing environment, despite the status actuallychanging greatly. This report aims at addressing these issues and shows how the ChinaTaiwan relationship has changed under the term of “maintaining the status quo” by analyzing (a) the Taiwan policies of successive Chinese leaders, such as Mao Zedong, Deng

Introduction

Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, (b) the transition in policies toward China and military strategies under six presidents in Taiwan from Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Ching-kuo,
Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen, (c) the actual state of
China-Taiwan relations, and (d) the United States policy towards Taiwan as a factor which

Chapter 1

cannot be ignored in any discussion of the cross-strait issue.
The NIDS China Security Report 2017 uses “China” to mean the People’s Republicof China and “China’s military” to refer to the People’s Liberation Army, while “Taiwan” isused to abbreviate the Republic of China and “the Taiwanese military” to mean the Republic

Chapter 2of China Armed Forces, although in some cases these abbreviations are not used for historical reasons or clarity. Also, when “Republic of China” is used in reference to the period
following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, it denotes the areas under
ROC rule, i.e., the areas of Taiwan, Penghu (the Pescadores Islands), the Jinmen Islands, andChapter 3

the Matsu Islands.
The authors of the Report hope that it will be useful in understanding the current
China-Taiwan relationship amidst the increased attention to that relationship which has ac-

Chapter 4companied the third passing of the torch of governance in Taiwan. We also hope the reportwill give food for thought to foster a stable and peaceful Taiwan Strait.
(Author: Rira Momma)

China

Conclusions

Figure 0-1: The China-Taiwan Relationship Over Time
Taiwan1948
People’s Republic of China established

Battle of Guningtou
Sets up temporary capital in Taipei

1949

Korean War (-1953)

1950
1952
Mao Zedong

1953
1954

Chiang Kai-shek

1951

1st Taiwan Strait Crisis (-1955)
US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty signed

1955
1956
1957

3

Introduction

China

TaiwanGreat Leap Forward (-1961)

1958

2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Mao Zedong

Cultural Revolution (-1976)

1965
1966
1967
1968

Chiang Kai-shek

1964

1969
1970
Receives China’s seat in UN

1971

Shanghai Communiqué

1972

Removed from UN

1973
1974
1975
1977

US, PRC establish diplomatic relations

Hua Guofeng

Deng Xiaoping takes power, adopts policy ofreform and opening up

1978
1979

Diplomatic relations with US cut

1980
1981
1982

Deng Xiaoping

1983
1984

Chiang Ching-kuo

Announces policy of “Peaceful Reunification”
with Taiwan

Yen
Chia-kan

1976

1985
1986

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) formed

1987

Martial law ended

1988
Tiananmen Incident

1989
1990

Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits established

Straits Exchange Foundation establishedEnd proclaimed of “Period of Mobilization for
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”

1991
1992

Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin’s Eight-point Proposal
announced
3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis (-1996)

1994
1995
1996

Lee Teng-hui

1993

Lee Tend-hui visits US
3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis (-1996)
1st direct popular election of president

1997
1998

1st Taiwan White Paper released by StateCouncil Taiwan office

4

1999

Lee Teng-hui announces “Two China” theory

2000

1st DPP government takes office (-2008)

Introduction

China

Taiwan

2003
2005
2006

Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao announces Six-Point policy
Signs ECFA2008

KMT retakes government (-2016)

2009
2010

Sunflower Student Movement
DPP major victory in unified local elections
Talks between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping

2016

DPP wins in presidential and legislator
elections

2017
2018
2019

Tsai Ing-wen

2015

Chapter 1

Xi Jinping

2014

Introduction

2013

Signs ECFAMa Ying-jeou

201219th CPC National Congress

Lien Chan visits China

2007

2011

Talks between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeouChen Shui-bian announces policy of “OneCountry on Each Side” of Taiwan Strait

Chapter Summary

2004
Anti-Succession Law adopted

Preface2002
Chen Shui-bianJiang Zemin

2001

Chapter 2

2020(Note 1) Periods of leadership for the ROC represent years serving as president since the start ofconstitutional government and for the PRC, the years served as chairman of the CCP Central
Military Commission.
(Note 2) For simplicity, the start for Taiwan represents the beginning of constitutional government andChapter 3

for China, the founding of the PRC; ends represent the official conclusion of the administration.
Source: Prepared by authors.

Chapter 4
Conclusions

5

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

Chapter 1
The Transition in China’s
Policy toward Taiwan

Chapter 1

1. The Age of Mao Zedong: Pursuing the Liberation of
TaiwanFor China, Taiwan represents not only a problem of the legitimacy of its control overthat territory, it is also a central concern in China’s relationship with the United States, anda problem of nation building as well.
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won a decisive victory in the civil war
with the Nationalists and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Kuomintang
Party (KMT) leadership, however, fled to Taiwan, where it maintained the governmental
structure of the Republic of China (ROC). Furthermore, there were still some regions ofChina, such as Tibet, which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had not yet penetrated; assuch, the country as a whole had not yet been completely “liberated.” While it was Leninist
in nature, the CCP also bore responsibility for Chinese nationalism, and its most cherishedgoal was completion of China’s reunification. Thus “liberating” Taiwan was an essential stepin attaining that reunification.
The CCP set for itself the goal of liberating Taiwan during 1950, but it didn’t actually
have the power to carry that out. As part of its preparations for liberating Taiwan, in October1949 the PLA landed on the Jinmen Islands off the coast of Fujian to bring them under control, but the ROC forces handed the PLA a major defeat, which set back the CCP’s captureof Taiwan. In June 1950 when the Korean War broke out, the United States dispatched the
7th Fleet to the Strait of Taiwan to block the spread of communism, also strengthening its
support for the KMT in Taiwan. This combination of steps made the CCP’s strategy to liberate Taiwan virtually impossible. In December 1954, the United States formalized its commitment to the defense of Taiwan through a US-ROC mutual defense treaty.
For the PRC, while Taiwan remained a question of attaining Chinese unification, theStrait of Taiwan had now become the front line in the Cold War, with Taiwan as an elementin China’s efforts to avoid the surrounding net being spread by the United States.
Mao Zedong, however, had not given up on liberating Taiwan. He pursued both armed
liberation and peaceful liberation. First Mao sought to use military pressure on the Jinmen
Islands to drive a wedge between the United States, which wanted Taiwan to give up theseislands, and Taiwan, which saw these islands as a base for attacks on the mainland.1 China
believed that using this difference between the United States and Taiwan positions would
make it possible to take the Jinmen Islands. During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55
and the Second Crisis in 1958, however, the United States made clear the strength of its commitment to Taiwan, and the goal of liberating Taiwan grew even more remote.
Mao, aiming to shred the net the United States sought to pull around the PRC andachieve reunification, finally recognized that there was no choice but for China to build up

8

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

its own strength. By building itself into a major power, China could make the United States
Prefacerealize the great price it would have to pay by intervening in China’s Taiwan problem, resulting in the United States pulling out of Taiwan on its own. Mao thus sought to strengthen
China rapidly. Military industries were given priority in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-

Chapter Summary

1957), followed by the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and its pursuit of rapid development of China’s economy. China’s domestic political problems were linked together with thequestions of reunification and US-China relations. The Great Leap Forward ended in failure,
however, and it became even more difficult to make progress on the Taiwan issue.

Introduction

China was not able to liberate Taiwan, but in no way could it accept the institution of“two Chinas,” separate countries on the mainland and on Taiwan. The result was a Chinese
decision to emphasize isolating Taiwan from international society. Important to this was theunderlying logic of the “One China” principle. This One China principle stated “There is only

Chapter 1

one China in this world, and Taiwan is a part of China. The People’s Republic of China is the
only legitimate government representing all of China.” According to research conducted by
Madoka Fukuda, the principle of One China has not been preached continuously and unchanged since the 1950s; instead, it has gradually taken shape over time.2 Framing the con-

Chapter 2

frontation between the Mainland and Taiwan as a struggle over the legitimate government of
one China, the PRC could successfully defer the question of reunification to the future, while
it could neither unify China nor permit the division across the strait to become permanent.
In 1971, the PRC secured official United Nations recognition as representing China,

Chapter 3

depriving Taiwan of that position. In the process of reconciliation between the United States
and China in 1971-72, China remained firm to its position that the Taiwan issue was a matterof importance and stressed the One China principle. As a result, the 1972 Shanghai

Chapter 4

Communiqué included parallel recitations of the US and Chinese positions, which were left
as is, but China was able to win some concessions from the United States in the form of anoral agreement.3

Conclusions

2. The Deng Xiaoping Years: Moving to Peaceful
Reunification and One Country, Two Systems
Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, with Deng Xiaoping finally emerging successfully
from the leadership battle that ensued. At the 3rd plenary session of the 11th CCP Central
Committee at the end of 1978, Deng introduced a new policy initiative called “Reform andOpening Up.” Almost simultaneously, Deng normalized diplomatic relations with the UnitedStates in January 1979, and the United States dissolved diplomatic relations with the ROC.
The Reform and Opening Up policy made it necessary for China to strengthen economic ties
to its neighbors, and with the dissolution of the US mutual defense treaty with the ROC,

9

Chapter 1

China was faced with both the need and the potential to formulate a new Taiwan policy.4
The result of this new policy formulation process was “Peaceful Reunification” and“One Country, Two Systems.” During the Mao era, Taiwan was seen by the CCP only as atarget for “liberation”; in contrast, Peaceful Reunification seemed to suggest a softer approach to unification. On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress (NPC) released a Message to Compatriots in Taiwan which called for Taiwan toengage in talks to end the military standoff and also pledged a halt to the cannon fire directed
at the Jinmen Islands.5 A clearer and more systematic policy statement was made on
September 30, 1981, by NPC Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying, who put forward
a nine-point proposal for Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems.6 Particularly
important were proposals (1) to use yet a third United Front to seek reunification of themotherland, (2) to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services as well as
academic, cultural, sports and artistic exchanges, and (3) to allow Taiwan to enjoy a highdegree of autonomy as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) and retain its armed forces,
maintaining its economic and cultural relations with other countries.
In his application of the Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems policies, Deng incorporated a number of important elements: (1) As an SAR, Taiwan could
maintain its own independence and adopt a system different from that on the mainland. (2)Its legal system would be independent and not be required to refer matters to Beijing for any
final judgment. (3) Taiwan could have its own military so long as it presented no threat to themainland. (4) The PRC government would not station personnel in Taiwan. (5) Taiwan
would manage its own political, government, military and other systems. (6) The mainland
central government would incorporate members from Taiwan into its central leadership.7
Deng seemed to have considerable confidence in achieving peaceful unification with Taiwan.8
Deng’s speech on January 16, 1980, presented three missions which must be accomplishedduring the 1980s, and the return of Taiwan to the motherland was one of those missions. As
part of the efforts toward Peaceful Reunification, Taiwanese enterprises would be accorded
priority in commerce and investment with the mainland, measures were adopted to provide
preferential treatment in commerce and investment, and exchanges were instituted between
mainland groups and Taiwan’s KMT and private organizations.
Deng’s Taiwan policy of Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems represented a major shift from Mao Zedong’s era and has continued up to the present as thebasis of policy toward Taiwan. Their application, however, wasn’t as successful as Deng had
hoped in reaching an early solution. One cause would be the negative response of Taiwan’s
leadership, and another would be that US involvement with Taiwan was much deeper than
Deng had anticipated. ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo adopted the “Three Noes” policy(“no compromise, no contact, and no negotiation”) and remained negative toward dialogue

10The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

with China until 1987. In addition, the Taiwan Relations Act adopted by the United States in
Preface1979 permitted continued arms exports to Taiwan.

Chapter Summary

3. The Jiang Zemin Years: Blocking Taiwan’s
Independence by Modernizing the Military(1) The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
When Jiang Zemin assumed the position of general secretary of the CCP after the

Introduction

Tiananmen disruption of 1989, he at first maintained Deng Xiaoping’s policies toward
Taiwan and sought to lessen the tension between Taiwan and the mainland and to promote
Peaceful Reunification. In 1987, Taiwan had taken a step back from its longstanding refusal
to engage in dialogue and began to show a willingness to talk with China, and 1991 saw

Chapter 1

establishment of two semi-official working level groups, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF) and the PRC Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).
The following year the two sides arrived at the “1992 Consensus” as a basis for conducting
a governmental dialogue. To the Chinese side, this represented agreement that both China

Chapter 2

and Taiwan belong to the same “One China,” while Taiwan interpreted that the two sides had
agreed to “One China, Differently Expressed,” in other words that Taiwan and the mainland
would each explain its own interpretation of the term “One China.” The result was a very
ambiguous consensus that did not clarify the differences between the two sides. Wang

Chapter 3

Daohan, the chairman of ARATS, and Koo Chen-fu, the chairman of SEF, were able to meetfor discussion in April 1993 in Singapore.
In January 1995, Jiang Zemin released an Eight-point Proposal to clarify his govern-

Chapter 4

ment’s position toward Taiwan. The eight points were: (1) maintenance of the One China
principle; (2) acceptance of Taiwan’s development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties with other countries, but opposition to any activities seeking to establish “twoChinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; (3) progress on both sides of the strait toward peacefulConclusions

reunification; (4) efforts to achieve peaceful reunification and rejection of force of arms between all Chinese compatriots (the people of the mainland and the people of Taiwan alike);(5) greatly increasing economic exchange and cooperation on both sides of the strait; (6)maintaining and enlivening Chinese culture; (7) protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the compatriots on Taiwan; and (8) exchange of visits by leadership on both sides.9
Overall, these proposals are seen as offering a more moderate approach.
The China-Taiwan relationship worsened, however, as a problem appeared regarding
a visa for ROC President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States, giving rise to the Third
Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 into 1996. Lee sought to visit the United States at the invitation of his alma mater Cornell University, and the Clinton Administration yielded to11

Chapter 1

Figure 1-1: Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
Leping launch base for
Dongfeng ballistic missiles

Zhejiang
Province

Missile launch training
July 21–23 and August
15–25, 1995.

Jiangxi
Province
Relocated from
Leping Base forlaunchMatsu Islands
Fujian Province
Yong’an launchbase forDongfengballistic missiles

DongshanIslandGuangdong
Province

Keelung

TaiwanKaohsiung

PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) live-fireexercises, March 12-20, 1996

习Taipei

PLA Army, PLAN, and
PLAAF joint exercises
March 18-25, 1996

Jinmen Taiwan
StraitIslands
Penghu Islands(Pescadores)

Ballistic missile launchtraining March 8, 1996.

Ballistic missile launch training
March 8-13, 1996.

Source: John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 74; and Shigeo Hiramatsu, Taiwan Mondai:
Chugoku to Beikoku no Gunjiteki Kakushitsu [The Problem of Taiwan: Chinese and US Military
Discord], Keiso Shobo, 2015, p. 150.

congressional pressure and approved the visa. The PRC reaction was to suddenly harden its
stance toward Taiwan, so that President Lee’s visit to the United States was accompanied by
PLA naval and air force exercises and test firings of DF-15 missiles. In 1996, at the time of thepresidential election in Taiwan, the mainland increased its pressure on Taiwan by conducting
large-scale military exercises, including missile launches and amphibious landing exercises.
Why did China so greatly harden its position? It was because of a growing awarenesson the mainland that Taiwan was making progress toward its effective independence andinternational recognition.10 First, democratization was making headway in Taiwan. As the
ROC became more Taiwanized and democratization spread, the mainland leadership considered that Taiwan had stopped struggling to position itself as the legitimate government of all
China and was aiming instead for the independence of Taiwan.
Second, China had a sense that the United States and other Western countries viewed
China as the enemy and sought to use Taiwan to contain the mainland, and that they were
trying to spread this view to other countries. Following Tiananmen Square and the later

12

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

transformations in the communist systems of a number of Eastern European countries as
Prefacewell as the collapse of the Soviet Union, China found itself left as one of the few communist
systems. It was widely felt in China that the United States viewed China as the next enemy
and that the United States was trying to use Taiwan to contain China.11 For example, in

Chapter Summary

September 1992 the George H. W. Bush administration decided to respond to China’s purchase of Su-27 fighter aircraft by exporting to Taiwan some 150 F-16A/B fighters. The following Clinton administration announced a review of US policy toward Taiwan in September
1994 and elevated the level of exchange with Taiwan. Such developments no doubt appeared

Introduction

to China as real and major changes in the US policy toward Taiwan.
As noted above, China started conducting missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in summerof 1995 and carried out large-scale military exercises beginning in early 1996 in the lead up
to Taiwan’s presidential election. The goal of these actions was to show the US China’s de-Chapter 1

termination and halt its intervention in Taiwan, as well as to get a better understanding of US
intentions, provide a warning against the growing independence in Taiwan, and influence theupcoming elections.12 Since the US reaction to the 1995 missile tests was rather restrained,
the Chinese leadership judged that the United States would not intervene or do so only at a

Chapter 2

symbolic level and therefore launched the large-scale exercises of 1996.13 The United States,
however, dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, led by the carriers USS
Independence and USS Nimitz, making it impossible for China to apply any greater militarypressure to Taiwan.

Chapter 3(2) Influences of the Third Crisis
This Third Taiwan Strait Crisis clearly had a strong influence on the East Asian secu-

Chapter 4rity environment. From China’s standpoint, this crisis in the Taiwan Strait was an opportunity to make clear Chinese determination toward Taiwan. The message conveyed to Taiwan
and the United States was that to China, the Taiwan issue was a crucial matter of national
interests and the legitimacy of its rule and could result in the use of force. Later, the US-

Conclusions

China relationship showed improvement from 1997 into 1998, and in June 1998, President
Clinton visited Shanghai and there pronounced his own “three noes”: The United States
would not support independence for Taiwan, it would not support one China, one Taiwan or
two Chinas, and it would not support Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations or any
international organization which required that its members be nation states.
While China achieved some degree of diplomatic victory, however, militarily the situation had become much more intense than China had imagined, with grave results for China:
Because the United States had had to send in two carrier battle groups, it became evident that
China had no military action it could take in response, leaving China with little possible reaction. Some Chinese came to believe that if a similar situation arose in the future and China

13

Chapter 1

could not respond to US intervention, this could in some cases end up meaning acceptanceof Taiwan’s independence.
With the end of the Cold War, China recognized a need to modernize its military.
China’s military strategy had been influenced by the military reforms the United States had
displayed during the Gulf War of 1991, and in 1993 it evolved a new military strategy for
dealing with regional war in a high-tech environment. Jiang Zemin then stressed that if amajor incident should ever occur which could promote Taiwanese independence, it might
become necessary to respond with a regional high-tech war.14
The Taiwan Strait crises spurred the modernization of China’s military. In December
1995, an expanded plenary session of the Central Military Commission (CMC) adopted alist of the most important matters the CMC wanted included in China’s ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000) as a way to build up the military. These elements included emphasis that theninth Five-Year Plan must seek major advances in military technology, and further, that theplan was expected to achieve two important transitions, i.e., in promoting overall military
fighting readiness, the transition from military preparations for conventional regional war topreparations for high-tech regional war, and a shift in emphasis in building the military fromquantity to quality and from personnel-intensive to technology-intensive development.15
Speaking of these essential elements, General Zhang Zhen, vice chairman of the
CMC, emphasized that as Taiwan was conducting activities aimed at independence, China
would improve its own equipment, seeking to develop a type of trump card that could beplayed to contain the enemy (“Assassin’s Mace,” Shashoujian).16 General Zhang Wannian,
who rose about this time to vice chairman of the CMC, stressed the importance of new technology for the military, pointing out the effectiveness of precision attacks and electronic
warfare and noting that the role of technology in increasing fighting capacity was greater
today than ever before. He also noted the understanding that regional warfare under current
conditions was increasingly becoming a contest of technological ability, and that the sidewhich had the technological advantage could dominate the battlefield.17
Since the CMC publication ofthese essential elements, China has tried
to improve military power in order toobtain such capabilities as precision attacks which could exploit US weak
points, thereby blocking its intervention
in Taiwan. China’s ability at asymmetrical attack capability that has been attracting attention since the latter half ofthe 2000s is the result of investments

14

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

made since that period.
Preface

The China-Taiwan relationship following the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis required
China to maintain close attention. In 1999 ROC President Lee Deng-hui referred to the relationship across the Taiwan Strait as “special state-to-state relations,” which China inter-

Chapter Summary

preted as another step toward Taiwanese independence. In addition, the 2000 presidential
election was won by Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whichleaned strongly toward independence. For China, this appeared to be a new challenge to themainland through a further move toward independence.

Introduction

In February 2000, at the height of the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Officeof the PRC State Council issued a white paper entitled The One China Principle and the
Taiwan Issue to emphasize China’s position. This white paper lists three situations whenforce could be used: (1) when Taiwan has cut itself off from China regardless of what name

Chapter 1

is used; (2) when Taiwan has been occupied by a foreign power; or (3) when Taiwanese authorities have put off negotiations for a peaceful resolution of reunification until some undefined point in the future.18 The third point in particular was a new inclusion and seems tohave been aimed at restraining Chen Shui-bian.

Chapter 2

China also redefined its meaning of One China. In August 2000, Deputy Premier Qian
Qichen provided a new, revised definition by proclaiming “There is only one China in theworld; the Mainland and Taiwan are both parts of China; and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be separated.”19 In the past, China had insisted that under the One

Chapter 3

China principle, China’s only legitimate government was that of the People’s Republic ofChina. With the growing democratization and Taiwanese orientation of the ROC, however,Taiwan became less interested in contesting the title of China’s legitimate government. The

Chapter 4

restatement of the principles thus can be seen as constituting a new focus on the changing
situation, one which would block Taiwan’s separation from the mainland regardless of thespecific form.

Conclusions

4. The Hu Jintao Years: Handling the Taiwan Issue as
China Grows Stronger(1) Anti-Secession Law
Assuming the position of CCP general secretary in 2002 and chairmanship of the
CMC in 2004, Hu Jintao became the supreme leader of China both in name and in reality.
He sought to apply an approach to the Taiwan issue that differed from the consistent hardline of his predecessor Jiang Zemin.
Hu Jintao sought a mixed approach that would effectively apply both hard-line andsoft-line stances.20 In other words, Hu moved away from the past insistence on immediate

15

Chapter 1

and total reunification. While he would still use a hard-line position threatening the use offorce to prevent Taiwan from seeking a separate independence, below that level he introduced a gentler approach to promoting dialogue and exchange. On May 17, 2004, the PRC
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office announced that if Taiwan recognized the One China
principle and halted any separatist activities, dialogue and exchange could be resumed andeconomic cooperation could also be increased, indicating the shift to such a softer policy
toward Taiwan.21
First for attention was putting a stop to any moves toward secession on Taiwan’s part.
The Hu Jintao administration proposed an Anti-Secession Law that was passed on March 14,
2005, at the third conference of the 10th NPC. Professor Yasuhiro Matsuda points out that
this law reflects a shift in policy from promotion of reunification to prevention of independence. In other words, (1) emphasis is placed on maintaining the status quo, (2) no stressis placed on the one country, two systems concept, (3) the law offers both hard-line andsoft-line approaches, and (4) strict limits are placed on resort to non-peaceful measures.
Matsuda also sees maintenance of a “strategic ambiguity” in application of the law as one ofits salient characteristics.22
In reference to conditions under which non-peaceful measure may be applied, theAnti-Secession Law cites three conditions: (1) when Taiwan has separated from China, (2)when major changes have taken place which threaten to separate Taiwan from China, and (3)when all possibility of peaceful reunification has disappeared. Regarding the law, Wu
Bangguo, NPC Standing Committee chairman, explained that it was wholly in keeping with
important policies such as peaceful reunification and one country, two systems set by thecentral authorities and that it was designed as a law to oppose and suppress activities to split
the country by Taiwanese separatists.23(2) “Chen Shui-bian is a Troublemaker”
At the time of his inauguration, Chen Shui-bian indicated he would follow a moderateline. China did not respond to this gesture toward reconciliation but adopted a wait-and-see
attitude and continued its diplomatic pressure. As March 2004 approached and Chen set aim
on his reelection, he abandoned his moderate line and took on a more radical stance. In
August 2002 he announced the position that there was a separate country on each side of the
Taiwan Strait. In September 2003 he further called for the Taiwanese electorate’s popular
adoption of a new constitution and reoriented his focus on whether or not Taiwan should
strengthen its national defense.24
In reaction to this radicalization by Chen Shui-bian, a DPP leader, the Hu Jintao government sought to isolate Chen through ties with the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and theUnited States. It expanded ties between the CCP and the KMT. In March 2005, KMT Vice

16

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

Chairman Chiang Pin-kung visited China, where he met with Chen Yunlin, director of thePreface

CCP Central Committee Taiwan Affairs Office. This was followed by an April 2005 visit toChina by KMT Chairman Lien Chan. He held talks with Premier Hu Jintao, and the two
produced a joint statement strongly supporting the 1992 consensus, opposing independence

Chapter Summary

for Taiwan, and reopening of negotiations and exchanges across the strait among other topics
of mutual concern.25 Through such a deepening of contacts with the KMT, China was able toappeal to those Taiwanese domestic groups which wanted stabilization of the China-Taiwan
relationship and a deepening of exchanges centering on economic affairs, at the same time

Introduction

showing them that their opposition to independence was a rewarding position.
To the United States, China made the argument that Chen Shui-bian was a troublemaker seeking to disrupt the status quo, seeking to achieve joint China-US efforts to containhim. No doubt China made a variety of approaches to the United States on this issue, one of

Chapter 1

which came in March 2004, shortly before the presidential election in Taiwan, when Dai
Bingguo, Hu Jintao’s foreign relations guru and head of the CCP Central Committee office
on foreign affairs, was sent as Hu’s special envoy to the United States, Germany, France,
Japan, and Russia. In each of these locations, he argued for opposition to the popular vote

Chapter 2

called for by Chen Shui-bian. In the United States, he met and talked with a large number ofcurrent and former high-ranking officials.26
In seeking to convince the United States, Dai Bingguo conveyed the following message. First, Chen Shui-bian was following a schedule for Taiwanese independence, and China

Chapter 3

and the United States must block that schedule. Second, the United States should send Taiwan
a clear signal and the statements of all US government officials should be consistent. In addition, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly was given

Chapter 4

the message that the Taiwan problem was not a problem of democracy or of socialist versus
capitalist systems, it was a matter of China’s interests as a nation and as a people, and China
hoped the United States would handle it as such and not as an issue of ideology. In his talks
with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Dai

Conclusions

Bingguo stressed that the CCP was not
the Soviet Communist Party, China was
not the Soviet Union, and unlike theSoviet Union, China did not seek hegemony. Dai noted (1) the dangers of
Taiwanese independence, (2) that Chen
Shui-bian was unpredictable and not tobe trusted, (3) that the government ofChina was working in good faith forpeaceful reunification, and (4) that there

17Chapter 1

were many statements coming out of the United States that differed from official pronouncements such as the December 2003 statement (see below) by President George W. Bush. US
statements on the subject should follow the Presidential statements, Dai said.27
As is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, following Chen Shui-bian’s pronouncement of “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait, the United States felt a steadily
growing distrust of Chen’s administration. For the United States, Chen had become a political figure who ignored the big picture in favor of giving priority to his own political goals,
and as a result it steadily tried to shut him out. In October 2002, at the press conference following President Bush’s meeting with Chairman Jiang Zemin, the President announced that
the United States did not support independence.28 President Bush moved another step forward in his talks with Premier Wen Jiabao by strongly stating that the United States opposed
attempts to alter the status quo between China and Taiwan, categorizing Chen Shui-bian’s
actions as a unilateral attempt to change the existing situation.29 As a result, Chen was forced
to change the contents of the plebiscite and to nullify the vote itself because the minimum
necessary number of valid ballots was not cast.
Such coordination between China and the United States helped reach the goal of containing attempts in Taiwan to alter the status quo. China had informed the United States via
a variety of routes about the contents of the Anti-Secession Law.30 While the United States
was not able to forestall adoption of that law, through close discussions, the United States iscredited with achieving a number of changes to soften the language of the draft, such as
eliminating reference to “one country, two systems.”31 During his meeting with President
Bush in November 2005, Chairman Hu Jintao noted approvingly that the United States andChina had a common strategic interest in opposing and preventing Taiwanese independence
and maintaining the peaceful stability of the Taiwan Strait.32
Subsequently, while the second
Chen Shui-bian administration did at firstseek a more moderate course, towards theend of the term it once again returned tothe path toward independence. In May
2007, President Chen indicated the intention to seek membership in the United
Nations under the name Taiwan and later
announced that a plebiscite would beheld on that question. As a result of clear
US opposition, however, voters did notcast the required number of valid ballots.

18

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan(3) “Peaceful Development on Both Sides of the Strait”
Preface

The birth of the KMT Ma Ying-jeou government as seen from China’s standpoint
meant success at derailing the Chen Shui-bian administration’s attempts at independence for
Taiwan. The Hu Jintao government welcomed the Ma Ying-jeou government’s change ofChapter Summary

course toward closer ties to China.
Hu Jintao identified “peaceful development across the strait,” based on such a stabilization of relations, as the next step in the cross-strait relationship. Peaceful development
across the strait was proposed during the 2005 talks between Hu and Lien Chan and was

Introduction

actively promoted when the KMT administration came into power. At the 17th NPC in 2007,
Hu laid out a roadmap for the future, calling for “consultations to formally lay to rest theadversarial stance across the strait, based on the One China principle, conclusion of a peaceagreement, and creation of a framework for peaceful development on both sides of the

Chapter 1

strait.”33 The basic thrust of this roadmap was “economy first, politics later” and “do the easy
things first and leave the difficult for later,” setting to work first to achieve the achievable andgradually building on the accumulated results to open the road to reunification.
To make this vision possible, in his December 31, 2008, speech at the commemora-

Chapter 2tion of the 30th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,
President Hu laid out his policies for peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait. To realize a peaceful reunification of the motherland, it was first necessary to ensure
peaceful development on both sides of the strait. For that purpose, Hu indicated six policies:

Chapter 3(1) strong support for One China and promotion of mutual trust; (2) promotion of economic
cooperation and common development; (3) promotion of Chinese culture; (4) expansion ofhuman exchanges; (5) consultations on external affairs (including some loosening of restric-

Chapter 4

tions on Taiwan’s participation in international organizations); and (6) engaging in peacefulconsultations to end adversarial relations.34
Such changes on both sides brought a turn toward improvement in the China-Taiwan
relationship, and in June 2008, the leadership of ARATS and the SEF met again for talks.

Conclusions

The China-Taiwan relationship has deepened since then, primarily in terms of economic
cooperation. Talks between top working-level leaders from the two sides were held eighttimes under the Hu Jintao administration, bringing signature of 18 agreements on cooperation in economics and other areas, including removal of bans on mainland tourism to Taiwan
and on shipping and communications. In June 2010, the two sides concluded the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), including the phasing out of customs duties on
539 items exported from the mainland and 267 from Taiwan.

19

Chapter 1(4) China’s Military Modernization and Its Relations with Taiwan
The China-Taiwan relationship has changed greatly as China has become more andmore of a major power. Since 2008, both have been beset by financial crisis and have tried
to get their economies back on a firm footing as quickly as possible, and China’s rise has
been quite remarkable. The bilateral relationship since the advent of the Ma Ying-jeou administration has been based on such development by the mainland.
First, as the Chinese economy has developed, Taiwan has deepened its reliance on its
ties with the Chinese economy. It has been expected that such economic incentives would
halt Taiwanese moves toward independence and refocus Taiwan on reunification with China.
Next, the growing modernization of the PLA’s military power has given China a
steadily growing advantage in the military balance across the strait. Since 1995, China has
made steady progress in its military modernization. It is considered that China sees its display of the potential to use military force against Taiwan as a way to halt moves toward independence, with the military capabilities serving at the same time to promote a desirable
political solution to the Taiwan problem.35 Also, based on the lessons learned during theThird Taiwan Strait Crisis, China has sought to concentrate its weapons investment on what
it would need to maximize the damage inflicted in response to any US intervention in the
Taiwan Strait, thereby influencing US calculations regarding intervention and its politicalwillingness to do so.
In particular, Chinese capacity for missile and air attacks represents a great threat for
Taiwan,36 and such attacks are likely to be by ballistic and cruise missiles seeking to destroy
Table 1-1: China and Taiwan Balance of Forces
China
Total

Taiwan Strait Area

TaiwanTotal

Ground Personnel

1,250,000

400,000

130,000

Destroyers

23

16

4

Frigates

52

40

22

Amphibious Landing Craft

52

44

14

Diesel Submarines

57

38

4

Nuclear Submarines

5

2

0

Fighters

1,700

130

384

Bombers/Attack Aircraft

400

200

0

Transport

475

150

19

Special Mission Aircraft

115

75

25

Source: US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 26, 2016, pp. 107-109.

20

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

Figure 1-2: Trends in PRC and Taiwan Modern Jet Fighters
Preface(Number)
850
800
750
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, J-10, J-15)
Chapter Summary

Taiwan (F-CK-1(DF), F-16, Mirage 2000)

Introduction
Chapter 1

1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Note: Draws on Military Balance for all years
Source: Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016 (Annual White Paper), p.70.

Chapter 2

Figure 1-3: Trends in Chinese and Taiwanese Military Budgets(US$ billions)
160
140

Chapter 3

120
100
80
60

Chapter 4

40
20
0

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015
Conclusions

China

2011

TaiwanSource: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress,
November 2015, p. 509.

radar facilities, communications networks, bases, and similar locations.
Short-range ballistic missiles are primarily the DF-11 and DF-15 located on Base 52
directly across the strait from Taiwan. The range of the new DF-16 is 1,000 kilometers, and
it is also thought to be located across the strait from Taiwan. According to reports from the
US Department of Defense, in 2015 China had some 200 to 300 launchers for short-range
ballistic missiles, with at least 1,200 missiles available.37 The accuracy of the ballistic

21

Chapter 1

missiles is also improving, with the DF-15A, DF-15B, and DF-16 featuring a circular error
probability (CEP) under 10 meters.
In addition, Taiwan’s fighter aircraft have not been updated and are becoming outmoded, while China is introducing a large number of 4th-generation fighters such as the J-10
and J-11; the number of mainland 4th-generation fighters surpassed that of Taiwan in 2007.
Some analyses indicate that not only would it be difficult for Taiwan to secure superiority inthe air, it is already difficult to meet the demands placed on its air defense capabilities.38
China is also importing the S-300PMU1 and S-300PMU2 ground-to-air missiles and has
deployed the HQ-9 and HQ-15/18 as part of strengthening its air defense. In addition, negotiations are underway with Russia for purchase of the S-400, with a range of 400 kilometers,
and if it is eventually deployed, China’s air defense capability would increase greatly.
Further, primarily because of the improvement of China’s precision strike capabilities
with the development in particular of medium-range ballistic missiles, the cost of interventions is increasing for the United States. The DF-21D and DF-26 ballistic missiles are known
for their anti-ship applications, and are thought to be a threat to US carriers. China has also
markedly increased activity in the western Pacific Ocean by its PLAN vessels and PLAAF
bombers, representing a potential threat to US military bases.
The United States is also concerned that the stabilization of the China-Taiwan relationship and the resultant weakening of the sense of threat from the mainland could influence Taiwan to hold back on efforts at its own defense, or Taiwan’s “Finlandization,” throughwhich a country takes a neutral position under the neighboring great power’s sphere of influence while maintaining its own government.39 As the Taiwan Strait has steadily grown morestable, China has been able to turn its interest to other regions and other problems andexpand the range of its activities. One condition that contributed to China’s remarkable increase in activities at sea starting the latter half of the 2000s was quite likely that the situationin the Taiwan Strait had stabilized in a form that was advantageous to China.
Policy toward Taiwan during the Hu Jintao years appears rather successful in that it
blocked Taiwan’s independence and achieved stability across the Taiwan Strait in a form
advantageous to China. Still, it was largely unsuccessful at moving the political dialogue inthe direction of reunification. While China and Taiwan had a common sense of the importance of stability and peace on both sides of the strait, maintaining the status quo was nevermore than an acceptable minimum to China, and the status quo needed to move the parties
down the path to reunification.40 The leaders from both sides were in contact repeatedly,
despite which there was no major progress in the desired direction.
The question of creating a mechanism to establish mutual trust in military affairs was
first formally addressed in a statement issued May 17, 2004, by the CCP Central Committee
Working Group for Taiwan Affairs and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council.41

22

The Transition in China’s Policy toward Taiwan

Later, Hu Jintao also raised the subject of a military security mutual trust mechanism in a
Preface2008 speech. For China, however, a military trust mechanism was something which shouldarise out of mutual political trust, for which agreement on basic political principle was essential.42 Joint exercises on maritime rescue were held three times, in 2010, 2012, and 2014,

Chapter Summary

and there were also other cases of non-military sub-national level cooperation, but there wasno other progress beyond a few such examples.43

5. The Xi Jinping Years: Stressing the 1992 Consensus

Introduction

The Xi Jinping government has run up against the limits to such peaceful development on both sides of the strait. Most of all, it faced a distinct dilemma: The more China andTaiwan met for exchanges, the more the Taiwan side seemed to take on a sense of their

Chapter 1

identity as Taiwanese, which increasingly obscured the path to reunification. It began toseem increasingly likely that in the January 2016 presidential elections, which would selectthe successor to Ma Ying-jeou, could be won by the DPP.
Xi Jinping took the audacious step of meeting with Ma Ying-jeou on November 7,

Chapter 2

2015, shortly before the elections, for the first China-Taiwan summit talks. In the talks, Xi
stressed that: (1) the two sides should avoid shaking the common political foundation on thetwo sides of the strait; (2) the two sides should resolutely pursue the peaceful developmentof relations across the strait; (3) each should pursue the welfare of the compatriots on both

Chapter 3

sides of the strait; and (4) the two sides should move forward with one mind for the great
renaissance of the Chinese people. Xi emphasized the importance of the 1992 Consensus to
the first of these four points, also stating that this is the embodiment of the One China prin-

Chapter 4

ciple and clearly defines the fundamental nature of
the relationship between the two sides of the strait.
That relationship, Xi said, is that the mainland andTaiwan belong to one China and is not a country-to-Conclusions

country relationship, nor is it one China and one
Taiwan.44 Such emphasis on the 1992 Consensus
was also likely intended as a warning to the upcoming administration.
In January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP
won the presidential election, and in May her new
administration was born. Since then, Xi Jinping’s
response to the new administration has been characterized by distrust and wariness.
(Author: Shinji Yamaguchi)

23

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

Chapter 2
China-Taiwan Relations
from Taiwan’s PerspectiveChapter 2

1. From Reconquering the Mainland to Taiwancentered Policy — The Chiang Governments(1) From Military Confrontation to Stabilization
When the Chairman of the Central People’s Government, Mao Zedong, proclaimed
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the top of Tiananmen Gate on
October 1, 1949, the civil war (known in Taiwan as the Period of Mobilization for Suppressionof the Communist Rebellion) between the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces (ROC
Army; referred to as Taiwan Army following relocation of the provisional capital to Taipei
in December 1949) and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was still continuing insouthern and western China. In the coastal area from Zhejiang to Guangdong, some regions
and islands remained under the control of the ROC government and its armed forces. The
PLA aimed to “liberate” these areas.
Jinmen (Quemoy), an area of about 150 square kilometers consisting of the small islands of Greater Jinmen and Lesser Jinmen, are on the opposite coast from Xiamen (Amoy)in Fujian Province (5 kilometers west of Greater Jinmen). Surrounded by the Chinese mainland on three sides, the islands are located opposite Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. In thestrategic environment of the time, there were no missiles or aircraft that could easily crossthe Taiwan Strait. From Taiwan’s viewpoint, Jinmen occupied an important strategic position from which it could restrain an attack over the Taiwan Strait by the PLA, as well as
serving as a base for a counterattack on the mainland. Accordingly, the ROC Army stationeda large number of troops on the islands and built up a strong defensive position there. On
October 25, 1949, 15,000 troops of the PLA landed at Guningtou on Greater Jinmen.1
However, the ROC Army had been conducting exercises with an attack on Guningtou in
mind. The PLA units, on the other hand, held the ROC Army in contempt and underestimated the strength of its naval and air forces. After the first PLA troops landed, the landingof the second attacking force was blocked by the ROC Army’s naval and air forces2 and coordination was poor between the PLA units that had already landed on the island.3 Switchingfrom defense to counterattack, the ROC Army succeeded in comprehensively defeating the
PLA forces on October 27.4
The following year, the Hainan Campaign was conducted on the island of Hainan off
the coast of Guangdong Province. With a total area of 33,000 square kilometers, Hainan isroughly the same size as the island of Taiwan, which has an area of about 36,000 square kilometers. On April 16, 1950, the PLA launched its Hainan landing operation and by April 30
it had occupied the whole island in just 15 days. Three main reasons can be given for the
PLA’s ability to occupy Hainan so quickly: (1) Since the Leizhou Peninsula extends frommainland China, the distance from the peninsula to Hainan was only 11-27 nautical miles

26

China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective(20-50 kilometers), making it possible to reach the island in wooden junks in 5-7 hours overPreface

one night, provided that the currents and wind were steady;5 (2) Since Hainan is far removed
from Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek was considering abandoning Hainan and the Zhoushan archipelago in order to concentrate his forces in Taiwan;6 and (3) On Hainan, the PLA could re-

Chapter Summary

ceive assistance from Communist units that were already conducting their own operations
on the island, while the fighting strength of the Taiwan Army was relatively weak there.7
The Taiwan Army was able to repel the PLA from the small Jinmen islands off thecoast of mainland China because, in view of their strategic importance, Chiang Kai-shek had

Introduction

resolved to defend its position and, anticipating the PLA’s landing operation, had massed
troops there and conducted repeated military exercises. On the other hand, although Hainan
was much larger in area and considerably further from the Chinese coast, the island fell to
the PLA in just two weeks because Chiang Kai-shek had previously decided to abandon it in

Chapter 1

the event of such an attack.
In May 1950, the PLA amassed a force of almost 500,000 personnel (including
300,000-380,000 combat troops) and established a frontline headquarters in Fujian Province
under Commander Su Yu (who later became Chief of the PLA General Staff). PLA units

Chapter 2

conducted amphibious landing exercises in preparation for a Taiwan campaign. However,with the outbreak of the Korean War in June, the PLA’s strategic focus shifted from thesoutheast to the northeast and the liberation of Taiwan had to be postponed.8
In October 1951, PLA units entered Lhasa in Tibet and, with the armistice in the

Chapter 3

Korean War in July 1953, the focus of PLA operations once again shifted to Taiwan. One
after another, the PLA recaptured the islands held by the Taiwan Army on the coasts ofZhejiang and Fujian provinces. The artillery bombardment of Jinmen in September 1954

Chapter 4

was followed by the Battle of the Yijiangshan Islands in January 1955, the PLA’s first-evercampaign combining the forces of the army, navy and air force.9 In February of the same year,
34,000 Taiwanese troops retreated from the Dachen archipelago (off the coast of Zhejiang)
under the protection of the US Navy. This was known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Conclusions

Until the mid-1950s, the Chiang Kai-shek government occupied 36 islands off thecoast of China, using them as bases for guerrilla operations. From the fall of 1949 to July
1953, a total of 4,070,000 Taiwanese troops were mobilized by the ROC Army in 70 operations involving forces ranging in size from hundreds to tens of thousands of personnel.10
Although Chiang’s strategy was one of aggression under the slogan of “reconquering themainland,” it was difficult in practice for the Taiwan Army to conduct a large-scale counterattack on the Chinese mainland by regular troops. The small-scale guerrilla operations on
the Chinese coast were the best means available for demonstrating to the world Taiwan’s
determination to conduct its mainland counteroffensive.11 However, the policy of the US
government was not to allow Taiwan’s mainland counteroffensive while preventing an attack

27

Chapter 2

on Taiwan by China. This policy was embodied in the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty
signed in December 1954. The treaty maintained the security of Taiwan (and the Penghu
Islands) and, from around 1954 onwards, the military capabilities of the Taiwan Army werevisibly strengthened through US support and guidance and training by the US Military
Assistance Advisory Group.12 On the other hand, following the aforementioned First Taiwan
Strait Crisis, the regions controlled by the Chiang Kai-shek government became limited tothe same territory as that controlled by present-day Taiwan, namely the island of Taiwan, thePenghu Islands, Jinmen, and Matsu.13 The only territories susceptible to direct attack by the
PLA’s weapon systems at the time were Jinmen and Matsu, which were located close to themainland. At the beginning of 1955, the US Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, which
stipulated that, under the powers of the US President, it could defend ROC territory otherthan the main island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. The fact that Jinmen and Matsu
could now be viewed as being under US protection provided powerful motivation for ChiangKai-shek to defend these islands, and the Taiwan Army’s defensive garrisons in these territories were increased from 60,000 troops in 1954 to 100,000 troops in 1957.14 From August
to October 1958, China conducted a heavy artillery bombardment of Jinmen (The Second
Taiwan Strait Crisis; known in Taiwan as the 823 Artillery Bombardment). The fierce artillery battle continued from August 23 to October 6, during which time a total of 474,910
shells were fired on Jinmen – 1,472 shells per square kilometer.15
While maintaining its posture of fighting China through an offensive strategy, Taiwan
put its energies into economic recovery. In 1953, a population of 8.31 million had to support
armed forces of almost 600,000 personnel. The army thus accounted for 7.2 percent of
Taiwan’s population, a high proportion compared even with the 4.8 percent of contemporary
North Korea (based on a total of about 1.2 million personnel out of a population of almost
25 million16). In view of the need to support this number of troops, it was natural that Taiwan
would promote economic development. Together with economic aid from the United States,
the growth in agricultural production arising from farmers’ increased zeal for production asa result of agrarian reforms made a great contribution to military finances. One study has
estimated that, of the 10.5 million tons of rice collected during the 15-year period from 1951
to 1965, which accounted for roughly 30 percent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product, about
70 percent was used to feed the military and civil servants.17 By the beginning of the 1960s
it had become clear that China’s Great Leap Forward policy had failed. By 1962, ChiangKai-shek’s preparations for the “mainland counteroffensive” were almost complete.
However, since the United States refused to provide support for transportation essential forthe counteroffensive operations, Taiwan was only able to continue with its small-scale military attacks. From the beginning of 1963, the Taiwan Army focused on concentrated sea attacks and guerrilla warfare by landings on the Chinese mainland. Taiwan viewed China’s

28

China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

Cultural Revolution beginning in August 1966 as an opportunity for a counteroffensive, but
Prefaceagain it was unable to get support from the United States.18 During this time Taiwan enteredits period of economic development, maintaining a high level of continuous growth.19 This
provided further support for an offensive military strategy based on the Chiang govern-

Chapter Summary

ment’s mainland counteroffensive concept, but when US President Richard Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine to strengthen the self-defensive capabilities of Asian countries
in July 1969, the international environment became unfavorable for Taiwan. As a result, it
became necessary to rethink the aggressive “mainland counteroffensive” strategy and Taiwan

Introduction

came to adopt an integrated offensive and defensive strategy by placing emphasis on defending itself against attack.

(2) Chiang Ching-kuo’s Tacit Acceptance of Democratization andChapter 1

Taiwanization
Even after the death of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, the regime of his successor, Yen Chia-kin, and accession of his son Chiang Ching-kuo in 1978, Taiwan officiallymaintained its national policy of anti-Communism. However, with the rapprochement be-

Chapter 2

tween the United States and China after the PRC was recognized as the only legitimate
representative of China at the United Nations in 1971 followed by the normalization of relations between the PRC and Japan in September 1972, the international environment aroundTaiwan became increasingly severe. Furthermore, with the normalization of US-China rela-

Chapter 3

tions in January 1979, the PRC shifted its position from unification by force to peacefulunification in order to lay political siege to Taiwan. In response to these developments,
Taiwan maintained its “Three No’s” policy: no compromise, no contact, and no negotia-

Chapter 4

tion.20 Meanwhile, in July 1987 President Chiang Ching-kuo proclaimed the lifting of martial law in Taiwan. Chiang understood that there were already too many people who were
opposed to martial law and that their voices could no longer be suppressed. In November ofthe same year, the ban on visiting the Chinese mainland was lifted under the pretext of al-Conclusions

lowing Taiwanese citizens to visit relatives in China, opening the door to cross-strait exchange. According to former president Lee Teng-hui, it was in 1987 that Chiang Ching-kuo
began publicly stating that he was “a Taiwanese.”21 It is possible that, from that time, Chiang
began to be strongly aware that the Kuomintang Party (KMT) must be firmly rooted in
Taiwan. A year earlier, in September 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had suddenly been formed with a party platform based on the establishment of a Taiwanese republic.
Although this formation of a new party had been a violation of martial law, Chiang Chingkuo ordered that it be tacitly accepted. Such actions can be cited as evidence that Chiang had
undergone a change of heart.

29Chapter 2

2. Taiwan’s Promotion of Democratization — The Lee
Teng-hui Governments
Upon the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January
1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui was promoted to
President in accordance with the Constitution.22
Although he was appointed President, Lee had virtually no power base within the KMT at that time. Lee
Teng-hui only began to wield power within the party
after he emerged victorious from the political conflicts after being officially elected KMT Chairman at
the party’s National Congress in July of that year, culminating in his re-election as president by the National
Assembly in 1990.23 From that time, Taiwan’s policy
towards China under the Lee administration finallywent into full swing.
In October 1990, President Lee established the
National Unification Council under the Presidential Office, which embarked on research tolay the ground for the formulation of the Guidelines for National Unification. In January
1991, the Mainland Affairs Council responsible for planning and administering the government’s relations with China was set up in the Executive Yuan. In March of the same year, at
the government’s request, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established for the
purpose of negotiating with China and conducting the related administrative procedures. On
April 30, President Lee announced the termination of the Period of Mobilization for the
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the abolition of the Mobilization for the
Suppression of Communist Rebellion Provisional Act. This was in effect a declaration oftermination of the civil war, which meant that, the PRC government was no longer viewed
as a reactionary force but as a negotiating partner. Furthermore, in September 1992, theTaiwan government promulgated the Act Governing Relations between the People of the
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Since the Taiwan and China did not officially recognize
each other as nations even though Taiwan had announced the end of the civil war, it was still
inappropriate for organs of the two states to have contact with each other. Accordingly,
Taiwan set up the SEF and China established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits (ARATS) and the two countries authorized the respective organizations to conduct
negotiations on their behalf. Thus the Lee administration established the systems, laws, andmechanisms necessary for contact with China and prepared the organizational structure required in Taiwan for cross-strait negotiations. According to recent research, Taiwan

30China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

maintained an integrated offensive and defensive strategy based on the concept of “reconPreface

quering the mainland” until around 1991.24 Abandoning this concept of reconquering themainland, Taiwan adopted a purely defensive strategy, aiming to ensure its security througha policy of “resolute defense, effective deterrence.”

Chapter Summary

Nevertheless, making the provisions for China to become a negotiating partner did notguarantee the progress of China-Taiwan negotiations. Although the SEF and ARATS continued to negotiate under the Lee administration, there were no concrete moves toward unification. Regarding its China policy, the Lee administration adopted the strategy of “no haste, beIntroduction

patient” and adjusted its legislation accordingly.25 From around this time, it began to be saidin China that Lee Teng-hui was a proponent of Taiwanese independence. One of the reasons
Lee was seen this way was his attitude toward diplomacy. Until then the only visit to a friendly
nation by a president under the ROC Constitution had been Yen Chia-kan’s visit to Saudi

Chapter 1

Arabia in July 1977; Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had not made a single overseas
visit. Lee Teng-hui, however, actively visited nations overseas. Starting with his visit toSingapore in March 1989, he visited the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in February
1994, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, South Africa and Swaziland in May of the same year, and the

Chapter 2

United Arab Emirates and Jordan in April 1995. These visits included countries with which
Taiwan did not have diplomatic relations, but Lee Teng-hui pursued what he called “pragmatic diplomacy” in which he did not insist on the form of an official “visit by a head of state”
or on using the official name “Republic of China.”26 During Lee’s period in office, Taiwan’s

Chapter 3

President, Vice-President and Premier of the Executive Yuan made a total of 24 visits to nations with which Taiwan did not have diplomatic relations. (During the same period, 36 visits
to friendly nations were made.)27 Pragmatic diplomacy was a means of resistance against

Chapter 4

China’s attempts to reduce Taiwan’s sphere of activity in the international community.
President Lee’s visit to the United States in June 1995 can also be understood in this context,
and can be viewed as a watershed in the shift in China-Taiwan relations from the easing oftensions to confrontation. In a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, President Lee,

Conclusions

referring many times to “the Republic of China on Taiwan,” emphasized that Taiwan existed
in isolation from the Chinese mainland, further reinforcing the impression that he was an
advocate of Taiwanese independence. After that, China ramped up its political and militarypressure on Taiwan.28 In January 1996, the head of the Mainland Affairs Department in chargeof mainland policy in the KMT pointed out that, in view of China’s belief that Taiwan’s firstpresidential election to be held in March would damage China-Taiwan relations, it might takeaction to influence the election.29 This prediction proved to be correct. China conducted missile tests and military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan’s main island (the Third Taiwan
Strait Crisis). In August 1998, angered by China’s stance of not recognizing the ROC as asovereign state, Lee Teng-hui ordered Tsai Ing-wen, who was then a senior advisor of the31Chapter 2

National Security Council, to set up a group for “strengthening the status of the Republic ofChina as a sovereign nation” and commence research for this purpose.30
After the completion of the group’s research, President Lee called for “special stateto-state relations” (the “two-state theory”) in an interview broadcast by the German international radio station Deutsche Welle in July 1999. Until that time, meetings between China
and Taiwan had been held at various levels, including meetings of top-level representativesof the SEF and ARATS. However, China-Taiwan relations, which had clearly cooled after
President Lee’s visit to the United States, were immediately broken by his advocacy of thetwo-state theory. From then on, right through the period of the Chen Shui-bian administration to the inauguration of the Ma Ying-jeou administration in May 2008, no top-level meetings were held between the SEF and ARATS.

3. The Impact of DPP Government — The Chen
Shui-bian Administration(1) China’s Distrust of the Chen Administration
In the second Taiwan general presidential held in March 2000, Chen Shui-bian and
Annette Lu of the DPP were elected as President and Vice President with 39.3 percent of thevote, a proportion considerably less than a majority of the electorate. After serving as Mayorof Taipei for four years from 1994, Chen Shui-bian had put himself forward as a candidate
for a second term as mayor in 1998. By that time, people’s level of satisfaction with the
Mayor of Taipei’s policies had risen to 76 percent.31 Since Chen Shui-bian nevertheless lostthe mayoral election of 1998 to former Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou, he decided to run
for President. On the other hand, in the KMT, Lee Teng-hui, who had promoted Taiwanizationand democratization of the ROC, decided not to stand in the presidential election. At a stage
when Lee’s successor had not yet been decided, James Soong Chu-yu, the former Governorof Taiwan Province who had broken with Lee over the freezing of Taiwan Provincial
Government functions and operations in 199832, split from the KMT and ran for President as
an independent candidate. As a result, the KMT vote was divided between Vice President
Lien Chan and James Soong Chu-yu. The DPP reaped the benefit of this division.
Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as President on May 20, 2000. Looking back on theChen administration, the general assessment of China-Taiwan relations during this period isthat, in the tense relationship between the two sides, little progress was made in exchange. It
is certainly true that China-Taiwan relations visibly improved under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. However, at the outset, the Chen administration also adopted a stance of promoting good relations with China. In his inauguration speech, for instance, President Chen
made his declaration of what became known as the “Five No’s”: “As long as the CCP regime

32China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

has no intention to use military force
Prefaceagainst Taiwan, I pledge that during myterm in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national

Chapter Summary

title, I will not push forth the inclusion of
the so-called “state-to-state” description
in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status

Introduction

quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, theNational Unification Council and the
Guidelines for National Unification will not be abolished.”33 This statement reflects an

Chapter 1

awareness of China’s fears that the DPP was aiming for Taiwanese independence and a corresponding change in the country’s name. This statement that Taiwan would not unilaterally
promote independence was also an expression of goodwill towards China. Since the
Guidelines for National Unification existed in 2000, Chen also stated in his inauguration

Chapter 2

address that, “building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdomand creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future ‘one China’.”34 Moreover, one of
the reasons for the appointment of Tang Fei, a former Minister of National Defense (aChapter 3

member of the KMT and former ROC Air Force Commander-in-Chief and Chief of theGeneral Staff) who was born on the Chinese mainland and strongly supported unification, as
Premier was a desire to indicate that the Chen administration was not going to move in the

Chapter 4

direction of Taiwanese independence. At a press conference held once month after he took
office, regarding the situation in 1992, President Chen clearly stated that, although the twosides had discussed the issue of “one China,” there had been no consensus and that, regarding the meaning of “one China” it was necessary to formulate conclusions on a foundation

Conclusions

that could be accepted by both sides.35 However, on June 27, Chen told a visiting American
delegation that he could accept the 1992 Consensus for “one China, differently expressed.”36
Although this was a clear statement that he could not accept the viewpoint that “one China”
was the People’s Republic of China, it should be noted that this stance did not change under
the Ma Ying-jeou administration.37(2) Chen Shui-bian’s Advocacy of the “One Country on Each Side”
Doctrine
The PRC took a cool view of the Chen administration from Chen’s appointment aspresident to the end of his tenure. Seemingly exasperated by this, President Chen stated that,33

Chapter 2“if China does not respond to Taiwan’s concessions, Taiwan will have to consider whether
or not to advance along the road to independence.”38 He expressed this view in clear terms
when he advocated the “one country on each side” doctrine in an Internet telecast to theannual conference of the World Federation of Taiwanese Association in August 2002. In thisaddress, President Chen said, “Our Taiwan is not someone else’s local government. Our
Taiwan is not someone else’s province. Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong or Macau,
because Taiwan has always been a sovereign state. In short, with Taiwan and China standingon opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on each side.”39 Like Lee Teng-hui’s“two-state” theory, this doctrine clearly expressed the shift from the position of claiming tobe the rightful government of China to the position of standing for Taiwan’s sovereignty.40
From that time onwards, China’s response to Chen Shui-bian was very severe. In
particular, after he won re-election as President in March 2004 by fanning the flames of
Taiwanese nationalism, China took measures such as the promulgation of the Anti-Secession
Law in March 2005, establishing the legal basis for an armed invasion of Taiwan, and commencing exchange with the KMT, which had become the opposition party in Taiwan.
Seemingly in response to this, the Chen administration promoted the Name
Rectification Campaign, through which it took steps to change the terms “China” or“Republic of China” to “Taiwan” at the beginning of names of organizations, etc. Furthermore,
the Guidelines for National Unification and operations of the National Unification Council,
which had been established during under the Lee Teng-hui administration, were terminatedin February 2006. The DPP historian Chang Yen-hsien has praised the abolition of the
Guidelines for National Unification for giving the Taiwanese people a choice other thanunification with China.41 President Chen also placed importance on visits to foreign countries, making 15 overseas visits during his eight years in office, all of them to friendly nations. Chen’s diplomacy was criticized by the KMT as “beacon-fire diplomacy” (setting“fires” everywhere to cause trouble), but
Chang Yen-hsien described it as “proactive diplomacy.”42 However, Chen’s foreign policy also came in for criticism
from the United States. Whenever Chen
visited the United States using thePresident’s private jet, it was usual for alarge city such as Los Angeles or San
Francisco to be designated as a transit
As part of the name rectification movement, thisdecorated gateway was renamed from the Gate ofIntegrity to Liberty Square, 2016
(author’s photograph)34

stop, but when he made a visit towards
the end of his term of office, he wasgiven the cold shoulder by being limited

China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

to a stopover in Anchorage, Alaska.
PrefaceAround the time when relations between the Chen administration and China clearlystarted to worsen, a change also became evident in Taiwan’s concept of its military strategy.
In 2002, this shifted from the defensive strategy of “resolute defense, effective deterrence”

Chapter Summary

to the more proactive defensive strategy of “effective deterrence, resolute defense.” Officiallyexplained in terms of the autonomous development of military forces, this shift was basedon “comprehensive defense by all citizens.”43 This military strategy was maintained until theend of Chen Shui-bian’s term as president in 2008.44 To make it effective, an offensive capa-

Introduction

bility that could actually deter an attack on Taiwan by China was required. Weapons such as
ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, bombers, ground attack aircraft and submarines would be necessary for this purpose. However, since Taiwan was unable to deploy such
weapons from 2002 to 2008, the strategy of proactive defense was not functioning in reality.

Chapter 1

Basically Taiwan’s military strategy should be viewed as remaining in the area of pure defense during this period.
However, it must be noted that, while talks with China’s top-ranking government officials were in effect suspended, discussions at the administrative level continued. The fol-

Chapter 2

lowing exchange projects that were continued under the Ma Ying-jeou administration haveborne fruit.
One of these projects is direct air transportation between Taiwan and China. The complete implementation of the “three links” (postal, transportation, and trade links) had been

Chapter 3

an outstanding problem between China and Taiwan, but under the Chen administration,
weekend charter flights began. The periods, number of flights and airports for direct flights
were steadily expanded. The first flights via Hong Kong (initially landing in Hong Kong andChapter 4later passing through the Hong Kong Flight Information Region) became direct flights andthe charter flights were upgraded to regular services. As of 2016, 10 airports in Taiwan and61 airports in China are being used for direct flights and a total of 890 flights travel between
Taiwan and mainland China every week.45 Since restrictions on direct cargo shipping by sea

Conclusions

are less strict than on air transportation, there are many cases where goods are recorded as
being shipped via third-party countries or regions but are in fact shipped directly.
Another cross-strait exchange operation is known as the “mini three links.” These are
the postal, transportation and trade links between the Chinese mainland and Jinmen andMatsu, which are located at the shortest distance from the mainland. The mini three links
were established in accordance with the Isolated Islands Construction Act, which was promulgated in April 2000 at the end of the term of the Lee Teng-hui administration with theaim of developing Taiwan’s remote islands. In his inauguration speech, President Chen
pledged that Taiwan would steadily promote the three links and the three mini links wereformally launched on January 1, 2001.

35

Chapter 2

Even after the establishment of direct cross-strait flights and the three mini links, military concerns remained an issue. Nevertheless, prior to the admission of China and Taiwan
to the World Trade Organization (in November 2001), many people in Taiwan’s businesscircles called for the relaxation of the “no haste, be patient” policy set forth in 1996 by Lee
Teng-hui for the purpose of restricting investment in China.46 At its National Congress heldin October 2011, the DPP changed its policy from “no haste, be patient” to “proactive liberalization and effective management.”47 This led to an increase in Taiwan’s volume of tradewith China. While the policy of “proactive liberalization and effective management” waschanged to “proactive management and effective liberalization” in January 2006,48 ChinaTaiwan trade continued to grow and the three mini links took root under the Chen administration. Passage between Taiwan’s main island and China via Jinmen or Matsu, which was
still prohibited when the three mini links were first launched, was permitted from the time of
the Ma Ying-jeou government. Now that the ban on Taiwan tourism by Chinese nationals has
been lifted, the three mini links do not play such a great role in the sphere of tourism, but itis symbolically significant that Jinmen and Matsu, which had served as the “front line” of
Taiwan’s defenses from the mainland, have become a gateway to exchange.

4. The Outcome of Taiwan’s Increasingly Conciliatory
Policy Towards China — The Ma Ying-jeouAdministration(1) Accelerating Cross-Strait Exchange and the Growth of Taiwanese
Identity
In his inaugural address in May 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would
maintain the current status of the Taiwan Strait under the framework of the Republic ofChina Constitution, reviving Taiwan-China exchange based on the 1992 Consensus and adhering to the “three No’s” policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force.”49
China welcomed the inauguration of the Ma government and the top-level meetings between
the SEF and ARATS, which had been suspended since the time of the Lee Teng-hui government, were re-opened in June of the same year. From then until the Ma administration cameto an end in 2016, 11 top-level meetings between the SEF and ARATS were held and a totalof 23 agreements were signed.50 During the Ma administration, the strained relations with
China were quickly eased. Taiwan’s economic and trade relations with China saw immediate
progress, travel to Taiwan by Chinese groups and independent travelers was steadily approved, and successive visits to Taiwan were made by delegations led by Communist Party
subcommittees and governors of provinces from all over China.
A distinctive feature of Taiwan-China relations during the Ma administration was the36

China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

holding of negotiations between working-level ministers in addition to negotiations by the
Prefaceprivate organizations of the SEF and ARATS, through which several meetings were held
between working-level ministers in charge of cross-strait relations. The background to thiswas a strong recognition on both sides of the need for mutual understanding between the

Chapter Summary

respective authorities of Taiwan and China amid deepening bilateral relations centering on
economics and trade. The governments of China and Taiwan respectively established theState Council Taiwan Affairs Office and the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council as theadministrative agencies for conducting cross-strait relations. This recognition is also appar-

Introduction

ent from the fact that Taiwan refers to these meetings “cross-strait leaders’ meetings.”51
However, the Press Secretary for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office referred to
the Taiwanese representative as the “responsible person of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs
Council.” At the actual meeting, Zhang Zhijun, Minister of the State Council Taiwan Affairs

Chapter 1

Office, and Wang Yu-chi, Minister of the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council, addressed each other using abbreviated forms of their titles. This is quite common practice in
the Chinese language and, as this form of address is normally used in Taiwan as well, it is
not necessarily impolite. Nevertheless, since the Xinhua News Agency also used the words

Chapter 2“Taiwan’s mainland affairs chief,” it can be supposed that the Chinese deliberately avoidedusing their Taiwanese counterpart’s official title.52
The meeting held on November 7, 2015, between President Ma Ying-jeou and General
Secretary Xi Jinping, was the culmination of China-Taiwan exchange through talks between

Chapter 3

the SEF and ARATS and between the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council and theState Council Taiwan Affairs Office. This meeting was made possible by the two leaders
calling each other “Mister” rather than using their official titles, thereby avoiding recogniz-

Chapter 4

ing that their counterpart was the representative of a country and holding the meeting in thethird-party country of Singapore. However, there was no joint declaration or press conference and it did not trigger a turning of
the tables in favor of the KMT in theConclusions

presidential election of January 2016.
On the contrary, as relations between the
Ma government and China deepened,
citizens’ sense of their Taiwanese identity increased year by year. This trend
was reflected in the emergence of the
Sunflower Student Movement, in which
students opposed to the Cross-Strait
Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) occupied the Legislative Yuan for almost a37

Chapter 2

Table 2-1: Talks between Chinese and Taiwanese Ministers
Date

Venue

1st
meetingFeb. 11, 2014

Nanjing

2nd
meetingJune 25, 2014

TaoyuanCounty(currently
TaoyuanCity)

Unofficial
meetingNov. 12, 2014

Beijing

3rd
meeting

May 23, 2015

JinmenCounty4th
meeting

Oct. 14, 2015

Guangzhou

SummitmeetingNov. 7, 2015

Singapore

Taiwanese
representative

Chineserepresentative

Wang Yu-chi(Minister of the
Executive Yuan
MainlandAffairs Council)

Zhang Zhijun(Minister of
the State
CouncilTaiwan Affairs
Office)Notes

Sunflower
Student
Movement in
Taipei in MarchApril 2014
On the occasionof the APEC
meeting in Beijing

Andrew Hsia
(as above)

Ma Ying-jeou

Xi Jinping

Addressed eachother as “Mister”

Source: Compiled by the author from the website of the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Councilmonth in March-April 2014, and the election, through support from the DPP, of five candidates from the strongly pro-Independence New Power Party, which represented the feelingsof the younger generation in Taiwan, to seats in the Legislative Yuan in January 2016.
Although relations between Taiwan and China stabilized and deepened under the Ma administration, there was a growing sense of Taiwanese identity and a rising tide of opinion thatstrongly favored maintaining the status quo.

(2) Shift of Military Strategy towards Defense
The Ma Ying-jeou government shifted from the proactive defensive strategy of “effective deterrence, resolute defense” of the Chen Shui-bian government to the purely defensive
strategy of “resolute defense, effective deterrence.”53 This military strategy was maintained
throughout the eight years of the Ma administration’s two terms of office. The distinctive
characteristic of the first four years was the lack of a sense of crisis regarding China. Thiswas particularly evident in Ma Ying-jeou’s address at a joint graduation ceremony of the
ROC Military Academy and National Defense University in July 2008. In his speech, Ma
pointed out that China still had more than 1,000 short-range missiles pointed at Taiwan, but
at the same time the two countries enjoyed close economic and trade relations. He also stated
that, through changes in their relationship over more than two decades, mainland China wassimultaneously a threat and an opportunity.54 In the Chinese language the character meaning“opportunity” is part of the word meaning “crisis.” There is said to be a Chinese tradition of38

China-Taiwan Relations from Taiwan’s Perspective

believing that, if it is managed properly, a crisis can be transformed into a favorable turning
Prefacepoint.55 In his address, Ma Ying-jeou stated that “By being ready to fight, we can prevent afight” and “We are certainly not looking for a fight, but we will not avoid a fight and are notafraid of one.” However, no other president of Taiwan had ever incorporated this vision ofChapter Summary

turning relations with China into a business opportunity in an address to graduates of theMilitary Academy and National Defense University rather than at a meeting, for instance,with Taiwanese companies or businesspeople active in the Chinese market. These statements
also suggest that President Ma was hoping to promote military confidence-building with

Introduction

China in his first term. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in 2009 included
sixteen lines regarding the military confidence-building with China. However, in the 2013
QDR, published in the Ma administration’s second term, this was reduced to four lines.
Considering that “the objective and subjective conditions for the issue have not yet ma-

Chapter 1

tured,” it stated Taiwan would have to carefully assess such measures in accordance with thegovernment’s policy.56 Former ROC Army Commander, Hu Chen-pu, recollected that the
military conducted an internal investigation on cross-strait military confidence-building but
reached the conclusion that it was not possible to achieve this in a situation where a relation-

Chapter 2

ship of political trust could not be built.57(3) The Ma Administration: Keeping Political Distance from China
While the Ma administration promoted closer economic and trade relations with

Chapter 3

China, it showed a cautious attitude regarding any specific political cooperation. It is particularly noteworthy that, in February 2013, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
it would not enter any agreement with China concerning the disputed Senkaku Islands. This

Chapter 4statement pointed out that China was opposed to leaving settlement of the dispute to thePermanent Court of Arbitration, that it was engaged in “territorial wars” with neighboring
countries, that its ideas for settling the dispute were different from those of Taiwan, and that
Taiwan had for a long time shared great advantages from its relations with the United States

Conclusions

and Japan in the fields of politics, economics and defense. The statement concluded that if
China and Taiwan were to reach agreement on this matter, particular care should be taken to
ensure that there was no adverse influence on Taiwan’s cooperative relationships with theUnited States and Japan and on the political and military balance in East Asia.58 Up to thatpoint, whenever Taiwan claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, the Ma government
had repeatedly stated that it would not cooperate with China on this matter. However, it issignificant that Taiwan refused to take a united front with China in response to the Senkaku
Islands dispute, citing as reasons its vital geopolitical position in the First Island Chain andthe importance it places on its cooperative relationship with the United States and Japan.59 In
March 2013, Wang Ginn-wang, Minister of the ROC Coast Guard Administration,

39

Chapter 2announced that in cases where Taiwanese vessels engaged in Baodiao (Diaoyu Islands “defense”) activities flew the Chinese national flag, coast guard vessels of the Coast Guard
Administration would not escort them, since this might be viewed as a sign that Taiwan and
China were cooperating in the Baodiao campaign.60 In Taiwan, the Chung Hwa Baodiao
Alliance often sends vessels engaged in demonstrations to the seas around the Senkaku
Islands, and some reports state that they receive funding from the PRC State Council Taiwan
Affairs Office.61(Author: Rira Momma)

40

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

Chapter 3
The United States andthe Taiwan Problem

Chapter 3

1. The Taiwan Policy of Successive US Administrations
US policy toward China and Taiwan has been based on the search for balance between
building a stable strategic relationship with China while maintaining trust with Taiwan as afriend.1 While this sort of subtle balance already existed as early as the 1960s, it became all
the more clear following the 1971 secret visit to China by Assistant Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger. This section overviews the primary documents which laid out the US position
toward Taiwan from the Nixon administration through the Clinton and then examines how
the US Taiwan policy developed under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

(1) Primary Documents, Nixon through Clinton Administrations
1972: The Shanghai Communiqué
In the course of US and Chinese rapprochement, the United States at first did not view
Taiwan as being a major potential problem. Instead, it viewed rapprochement with China as
a way to contain the Soviet Union, improve East-West relations, and distance itself from theVietnam War.2
For China, however, the issue of Taiwan was perceived as an extremely importantquestion, and China sought acceptance of the One China principle. The communiqué coming
out of President Nixon’s visit to China included references to both sides’ positions.3 The
Chinese side stated that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China” while “Taiwan is a province of China” and that “all U.S. forces andmilitary installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.” For its part, the United States notedit “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one
China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” and “does not challenge that position.” The US
government reconfirmed “its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question,” and it
also affirmed “the ultimate objective of
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces andmilitary installations from Taiwan.”
There were, however, verbal understandings that accompanied this communiqué: (1) there was one China, andTaiwan was a part of China; (2) the
United States did not support the
Taiwanese independence movement; (3)the United States would use its influence
to prevent Japan from expanding its engagement with Taiwan; (4) the United

42The United States and the Taiwan Problem

States would support the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem and would not encourPreface

age an attack against the mainland; and (5) the parties would seek the normalization of diplomatic relations. Ryo Sahashi points out that it is undeniable that the United States madeconcessions such as permitting the One China principle to be included in the Shanghai

Chapter Summary

Communiqué, not making specific demands regarding the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
problem as a precondition of the restructuring of US engagement with Taiwan and changes
in the level of the US military stationed there, and the five verbal understandings.4

Introduction

1979: Normalization of China-US Relations and the Taiwan Relations Act
At the occasion of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and theUnited States in 1979, the United States confirmed that the People’s Republic of China was
the only legitimate government representing China, and it broke diplomatic relations with

Chapter 1

the Republic of China (ROC) and rescinded its mutual defense treaty with the ROC. At thesame time, the United States indicated its intention to maintain cultural, commercial, andother non-official relations with the people of Taiwan and stated its expectations for peacefulresolution of the Taiwan problem. The question of continuation of US export of weapons to

Chapter 2

Taiwan, however, could not be brought to a common understanding and agreement between
the Chinese and US sides, and it was left as not completely resolved.5
With establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC,
diplomatic relations with Taiwan came to an end. Realistically, however, it was necessary to

Chapter 3

establish legal measures to permit maintenance of the economic relationship and other ties.
The US Congress also sought to ensure the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem andthe security of Taiwan, the result being the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 adopted as

Chapter 4

US domestic law.
The TRA provides the basis for the US commitment to Taiwan after 1979. The act
specifies that the United States would maintain the capability to resist the use of militaryforce which would threaten the safety of the people of Taiwan or its socioeconomic system

Conclusions

or otherwise exert compulsion against Taiwan; it states that the greatest concern to the UnitedStates was any measures which might threaten the peace and security of the western Pacific,
such as boycotts and blockades or any other attempts to try to determine Taiwan’s future bymeans other than a peaceful resolution; and it makes plain US opposition to any solution of
the Taiwan problem that did not resort to peaceful means. For such reasons, the act provides
that the United States shall provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive nature.6 However,while the TRA makes clear US concern for the security of Taiwan, it remains vague regarding US actions if Taiwan were attacked. In addressing weapons exports, the act also does notclearly define the meaning of weapons of a defensive nature.7

43

Chapter 3

The 1982 Communiqué
As the result of the TRA, US weapons exports to Taiwan were resumed in the 1980s.
President Ronald Reagan, who took office in 1981, sought ways to provide Taiwan with jet
fighters. China, however, adamantly opposed this and instead pressed the United States tospecify when its weapons exports would come to an end. Secretary of State Alexander Haig
was well aware of the value of China in US strategy toward the Soviet Union, and out ofconcern that the weapons exports to Taiwan could damage relations with China, he supported making a concession to China.8 In the end, while the United States resisted deciding
an endpoint for weapons exports, it offered a compromise on fighter sales and the volume ofexports, which was announced in the form of the joint communiqué of August 1982.
In that communiqué, the United States reiterated that it had no intention of pursuing“a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’,” and stated that the US government“does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.” The United States
also mentioned that “its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce
its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”9

1982: The Six Assurances
In July 1982, President Reagan offered Taiwan six points of assurance. These havecome to be succeeded as an effective declaration of policy by subsequent administrations.
These six points are: (1) no time would be set to halt weapons exports; (2) the United States
would not consult with China in advance about weapons exports to Taiwan; (3) it would not
mediate between Taipei and Beijing; (4) the United States would not agree to revision of the
TRA; (5) it would not change its long-term position on Taiwan’s sovereignty; and (6) the
United States would not pressure Taiwan to conduct negotiations with the People’s Republicof China.10
At present, the six assurances are considered along with the TRA as the foundation
for US relations with Taiwan. In 2016, both houses of Congress passed decisions reaffirmingthat fact and urging the president and the Department of State to formally recognize the six
assurances.11 These Congressional decisions are worthy of attention because this was thefirst time that the six assurances ever appeared in an official US document.

1994: Taiwan Policy Review
In September 1994, following the Cold War, President Clinton conducted a review ofpolicy toward Taiwan. This review was conducted against the background of growing democratization in Taiwan, a more critical view of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

44

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

following the Tiananmen Square Incident, and the reduced importance of China in US policy
Preface

toward Russia after the conclusion of the Cold War.
One of the salient features of the review was that rather than a full-scale rethinking of
all aspects of the US-Taiwan relationship, it was designed primarily to increase the level of

Chapter Summary

protocol. For example, in place of the US office of the Coordination Council of North
American Affairs serving as the contact body for Taiwan, the review would permit this to berenamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, moreclearly stating its identity; US government officials would be able to enter the buildings ofIntroduction

Taiwan’s government bodies, and except for the White House and a few other locations,
government officials from Taiwan would be able to enter the buildings of US government
agencies, while meetings among national defense officials and economic dialogue would
become possible at just below cabinet level.12 Stanley Roth, senior director for Asian Affairs

Chapter 1

at the United States National Security Council, was negative toward the review, saying thatit should not have been conducted, and Taiwan was disappointed that the review included
nothing that expressed support for its participation in international organizations.13 Still, thevarious changes produced by the review can be seen as important for the development of the

Chapter 2

US-Taiwan working relationship.

1998: The Three No’s
Following resolution of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96, the China-US rela-

Chapter 3

tionship rebounded quickly. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s actions during the crisis struck
the Clinton administration as dangerous. In 1997 Jiang Zemin visited the United States, followed in 1998 by President Clinton’s visit to China. In Shanghai, President Clinton issued a

Chapter 4statement of policy consisting of “three no’s”: (1) The United States would not adopt policies of One China, One Taiwan or Two Chinas; (2) the United States would not support independence for Taiwan; and (3) the United States would not support Taiwan’s membershipin international organizations whose members required sovereignty or representation in theConclusions

United Nations. This was the first official US statement of non-support for Taiwanese
independence.
This policy, however, had already been informally passed to China much earlier. In
August 1995, in the midst of the crisis, Secretary of State Warren Christopher handed Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen a letter from President Clinton for President Jiang Zemin. The contents of this letters have not been made public, but Qian Qichen has said that it included astatement of opposition to Taiwanese independence.14(2) Since the Bush Administration
During the 2000 presidential election campaign, President George W. Bush

45

Chapter 3

categorized China as a “strategic competitor,” typical of the severe view held of China at thattime, but the position taken toward Taiwan was clearly one of support. In April 2001, large
weapons exports to Taiwan were announced, which along with other signs plainly reflecteda deepening of the US-Taiwan military relationship. The collision between US and Chinese
military aircraft near Hainan Island took place that same month, creating even more tension
in the US-China relationship. In contrast, President Bush announced that if Taiwan were to
be attacked by China, the United States would “do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend
herself.” This was just one of a number of indications which removed much of the “strategic
ambiguity” from the US reaction if China were to attack Taiwan, replacing it with a “strategic clarity.”15
As touched on in Chapter 1, however, this sort of honeymoon-like relationship between the Unites States and Taiwan became unstable as the Chen Shui-bian administration
repeatedly took actions which seemed to turn Taiwan to the direction of independence. In thewar on terror that was launched following the 9/11 attacks and in dealing with the North
Korean nuclear problem, China’s cooperation was essential, and it became necessary tomaintain stability in the US-China relationship. As a result, the Bush administration came toview Chen Shui-bian as a troublemaker, and eventually, in 2003, President Bush made clear
and public the US opposition to independence.
The Obama administration inherited the late Bush administration policy of supporting stability in the Taiwan Strait as the cornerstone of cooperation with China. Ma Ying-jeou
took office in Taiwan and the cross-strait relationship stabilized, a trend which the Obamaadministration welcomed. But while the Obama administration recognized that China’s cooperation was important in maintaining the status quo, from 2009 onward China adopted
tougher foreign policies which raised the level of tension in Asia.
Given concern with the importance of the Asian economy and with an emerging China,
since 2011 the Obama administration has adopted the policy of rebalance toward the region,
placing an even greater emphasis on Asia. In Congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said that an important element in sucha rebalance was maintaining strong and multifaceted unofficial relations with Taiwan; he also
noted that a more constructive relationship with China did not require the United States tosacrifice its relationship with Taiwan but, just the opposite, was mutually reinforcing.16
Still, China-Taiwan relations stabilized and no major problems occurred, and in general there were no particularly remarkable developments in the US-Taiwan relationshipunder President Obama. The US-China relationship, however, did worsen, and given thedeterioration of China-Taiwan relations with the birth of the Tsai Ing-wen government in
2016, the new US administration that takes office in 2017 may well find itself once again
steering a hazardous course.

46

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

2. US Domestic Controversy over Taiwan
Preface

In the United States, government policies toward China and Taiwan have continued to
attract controversy. In recent years such controversy has developed out of concern over how

Chapter Summary

the United States would respond to an emerging China. Arguments over the appropriate USChina and US-Taiwan policies have fallen into three broad categories or schools of thought:(1) abandonment of Taiwan, (2) strengthening relations with Taiwan, and (3) the status quo.17
First is the argument for abandoning Taiwan. As China emerges on the international

Introduction

scene, the argument that the United States should reduce or completely abandon its commitment to Taiwan has been raised and discussed. This is not necessarily the majority position among US researchers or practioners. It is, however, supported by some respectedscholars and experienced persons, and we should not forget that they could have influence

Chapter 1

on actual policies.
This position can be broadly separated into two arguments: (1) accommodation with
China so as to avoid a US-China war, and (2) moving Taiwan itself into a position of neutrality. The first argument would involve a kind of bargaining with China, in which the United

Chapter 2

States would reduce or remove its commitments to Taiwan in order to avoid the risk of war
with China. According to Charles L. Glaser, professor at The George Washington University,
the great power competition between the United States and China involves a variety of inhibiting factors. The presence of nuclear weapons makes it difficult to expand territory throughChapter 3

invasion, and if the United States maintains its clear commitments to countries such as Japanand South Korea along with forward deployment of conventional weapons and the high survivability of its nuclear weapons, China would have little reason to disrupt the status quo andChapter 4violent confrontation could be avoided. The Taiwan issue, however, is the only element that
does not fit neatly into this picture. The United States and China do not agree over the justifiability of Taiwan’s current situation. The United States deems it appropriate to maintain thestatus quo, while China does not. With the modernization of China’s military, the risk of aConclusions

military clash has grown. By pulling back from its commitments to Taiwan, the United States
can reduce the danger of an armed conflict.18 In another article, Glaser enumerates the benefitsof pulling out of the commitments to Taiwan as including (1) reducing the likelihood of a USChinese war, (2) potential for dramatic improvement in the US-China relationship, and (3)reduction in the two countries’ competition over military expansion. He suggests that theUnited States should promote a grand bargain with China in which the United States drops its
commitment to Taiwan on the one hand, and China resolves maritime territorial issues peacefully and admits the long-term US military and security role in East Asia.19
Professor John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago notes that there is a strong
possibility of US-China confrontation in Asia. The United States can join with China’s

47

Chapter 3neighbors in trying to contain China’s emerging status, but Taiwan is in no position to join theranks in such an effort. This is because, first, over the coming ten or more years the UnitedStates will become unable to aid Taiwan in protecting itself from attack by China, with thegeographical proximity of Taiwan to China working to China’s advantage. Second, concerted
US efforts to protect Taiwan would raise a strong probability of war with China, which would
not be in the US interest.20 Similar arguments are also being raised and developed by those
who once worked for the US government such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National
Security Advisor, and Chas Freeman, widely experienced in diplomacy and foreign affairs.21
The second argument for abandoning Taiwan reasons that if Taiwan itself were toseek neutrality, the United States would have no choice but to weaken its commitments. As
Chinese influence in the region grows, if Taiwan should decide to take neutral or a somewhat
Finland-like position, it might also decide not to maintain a close security relationship with
the United States. In such a case, dissuading Taiwan is not possible for the United States nor
its interest. In a 2010 article, Bruce Gilley pointed to the possibility of Taiwan’s Finlandization.
According to him, the warming of China-Taiwan relationship under Ma Ying-jeou will
reveal problems of the ambiguous US policy. The United States will be faced with the needto make a strategic choice whether it uses Taiwan as a part of balance of power against
China, or it promotes a gradual economic, social, and political accommodation between
China and Taiwan for the long-term peace. If a democratized Taiwan chose of its own volition to become neutral, the United States could accept that as a means to promote stability inboth the China-Taiwan and the US-China relationships.22 The same viewpoint can be foundin arguments by Professor Robert Sutter of The George Washington University.
The Taiwan abandonment school has encountered a variety of counter-arguments.23
The most telling of these would include: (1) abandoning Taiwan would influence otherallies’ and friendly nations’ confidence in the United States; (2) there is no assurance that
China would be satisfied simply by resolving its Taiwan problem, and it might be misled into
thinking that other new expansion would be possible; and (3) the improvement in the ChinaTaiwan relationship has been overrated. Since Taiwan also has a strategic importance because of its geographic location, says another argument, its unification with the mainland
could affect the safety of East China Sea maritime lanes or increase Chinese influence inSoutheast Asia.24 So far there have been relatively few arguments which go deeply into themilitary or strategic influence on the region should Taiwan be united with China. Behindsuch arguments for abandoning Taiwan has been the improvement in China-Taiwan relations
since 2008 as well as the pessimism toward the future power of the United States itself. As
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, however, limits have appeared to improvement in the ChinaTaiwan relationship, and the relative shift in power between China and the United States has
not proceeded as quickly as once expected, so questions remain of the validity of the Taiwan

48

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

abandonment school’s arguments.
Preface

The second school of thought speaks in favor of strengthening the US-Taiwan relationship. As a result of China’s growing status, there is an increasing need to strengthen
Taiwan’s security so as to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Some insist that

Chapter Summary

as China moves to develop a more hard-line foreign policy, Taiwan will take on a greater
strategic importance in responding to such policy. At present, however, there is no consensus
as to just how far this process should proceed. Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific affairs, known also as the architect of the US rebalance

Introduction

policy toward Asia, has stressed the need to maintain and strengthen the country’s relationship with Taiwan. He has proposed that the United States should provide Taiwan with whatis necessary to maintain the status quo in the strait under the terms of the TRA, continue
weapons exports and expand military and security ties with Taiwan, support building up

Chapter 1

Taiwan’s asymmetrical capabilities such as sea mines which are needed for defense against
China, push Taiwan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and begin mutual visitsof high-ranking officials such as cabinet members.25
Those who stress the deterrence of China argue that through military and security

Chapter 2

cooperation with Taiwan, the country’s own defense capabilities as well as intelligence andsurveillance against China should be strengthened. Taiwan’s maintenance of its defense capabilities is considered important to maintaining the balance of power in East Asia. As China
moves forward with modernization of its military forces, it will be important for Taiwan to

Chapter 3

improve its interdiction capability at sea, calling for greater strength in submarines, mines,
and missiles among other areas. The United States, according to this argument, will need toprovide some form of support to such efforts.26 In 2014 Randy Forbes, member of the US

Chapter 4

House of Representatives, proposed linking the US missile defense system to early-warningradar in Taiwan.27 Taiwan is seeking to improve its maritime intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance capability and is already quite skilled at grasping situations at sea and so canprovide the US Pacific fleet with intelligence. It was suggested that cooperation should beConclusions

strengthened in this respect.28 Others have argued that the United States should facilitate
Taiwan’s military exchanges with other countries by allowing Taiwan to participate in theannual RIMPAC exercises.29
The third school of thought promotes maintenance of the strategic status quo, arguingthat there is no need to greatly change the existing policies. While the second position above
calls for strengthening relations with Taiwan in order to maintain the power balance in the
Taiwan Strait, this third view strongly favors maintaining consistency of US policy. For instance, Douglas Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, stresses that seeking to appease China through abandonment of Taiwan without the agreement of Taiwan’s
population could lead to greater tension in China-Taiwan relations, and that US weapons49

Chapter 3

exports to Taiwan play an important role in maintaining peace in the western Pacific.30 Paalat the same time warns that the birth of the Tsai Ing-wen administration in Taiwan has injected some instability in the China-Taiwan relationship and in US-China-Taiwan relations
as well. There is a need for the United States, Paal says, to reaffirm the three communiqués(the Shanghai Communiqué, that establishing diplomatic relations, and the ’82 Communiqué)and the TRA, while he shows concerns about raising the level of the relationship with Taiwan
and strengthening Japan-US-Taiwan security cooperation as they might draw strong objection from China, with costs that cannot be predicted or controlled.31

3. Deepening the US-Taiwan Security Relationship(1) Arms Sales
As already noted, the United States has continued its export of weapons to Taiwan
based on the TRA. Aside from the practical contribution to strengthening Taiwan’s defense
capabilities, weapons exports also carry a strong symbolic meaning, making the exports
stand out and be politicized. Jeffrey Bader, former Senior Director for Asian affairs of the
National Security Council, sees three purposes for the arms sales to Taiwan: (1) they provide
Taiwan with the means to resist a Chinese attack until the United States can come to its aid;(2) they are a signal that the United States remains committed to the security of Taiwan; and(3) they display to allies and friends within the region that the United States can be trusted.32
China greatly dislikes these weapons exports, objecting with what it severely calls “strong
indignation,” and in reaction China has cut off a variety of exchanges.33
US exports of weapons to Taiwan have been strongly influenced by the US politicalsituation surrounding its policy toward China and Taiwan, as well as by the domestic politics
of Taiwan and its relationship with China. In 2001, the Bush administration released plans
for large-scale arms sales to Taiwan. The
purchase process on the Taiwan side,
however, was bogged down by domestic
political situations. In particular, Taiwan
had difficulty coming up with the hugesums to procure the Patriot PAC-3 missiles, P-3C patrol planes, and diesel submarines, sparking growing irritation on
the US side. The impression was strong
in the United States that Taiwan was
Practice launch of Taiwan’s Patriot 2 missile, 2001
(IHS Jane’s [online news module])

50

poking at China while neglecting its own
defense capabilities. Starting in 2007,

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

Figure 3-1: Trends in US Arms Sales to Taiwan (Procurement Basis)
Preface（US$ thousands）
2,500,000

Chapter Summary

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

Introduction

500,000

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

0

Chapter 1

Source: Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Taiwan Relations Act at 35 Years: The Path Ahead,” Policy Brief III (April2014), Wilson Center, p. 4.

Table 3-1: Major US Arms Sales to Taiwan (As Reported to Congress)
Price ($mil.)

F-16 A/B fighter, 150

5,800

1992/9/14

Modified Patriot Air Defense System (MADS), 3 systems

1,300

1993/3

E-2T Hawkeye AWAC, 4700

1997/11/9

F-16 Fighter pilot training and logistic support

280

1998/1/28

Knox-class frigate, 3300

1999/7/30

E-2T Hawkeye 2000E AWAC, 2

400

2001/7/18

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)

725

2002/11/21

Kidd-class destroyer, 4875

2003/9/24

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS)

775

2004/3/30

Microwave long-distance early warning radar, 2 systems

1,776

2007/9/12

SM-2 block IIIA antiaircraft missile, 144

2007/9/12

P-3C patrol aircraft, 12

2007/11/9

Upgrade to Patriot config. 2

2008/10/3

PAC-3 ground-to-air missile, 330

3,100

2008/10/3

AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter, 30

2,532

2010/1/29

PAC-3 ground-to-air missile, 114

2,810

2010/1/29

UH-60M Blackhawk multipurpose helicopter, 60

3,100

2010/1/29

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS)

2011/9/21

F-16 A/B fighter modernization

2011/9/21

F-16 fighter pilot training

500

2015/12/16

Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate, 2

190

2015/12/16

Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS)

75

Chapter 4

1992/9/14

Chapter 3

Item

Chapter 2

Date

272
1,960
939

Conclusions

340
5,300

Source: Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service,
August 29, 2014, pp. 56-59, and “The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to
Taiwan,” US-Taiwan Business Council, December 16, 2015.

51

Chapter 3

Taiwan at last passed budgets for weapons procurement, despite which the Bush administration showed little enthusiasm for the weapons exports to Taiwan.34
Since 2006, Taiwan has been seeking to procure the F-16C/D fighter from the UnitedStates. The F-16C/D offers higher performance than the F-16A/B Taiwan already has, and it
was expected that procurement of the F-16C/D would let Taiwan recover the balance in air
combat capability it was starting to lose to China. The Bush administration, however, disliked being manipulated by Taiwan’s domestic politics, and also concerned by China’s extreme sensitivity toward fighter exports, it refused to provide the F-16C/D.35
Under the Obama administration weapons exports to Taiwan became much less of a
focus of attention, both because of improvements in China-Taiwan relations and because the
Obama administration was hoping for stability in the relationship with China. Still, the Obamaadministration has tried to maintain strong, multifaceted relations with Taiwan, and in January2010 it notified Congress that it had decided on $6.4 billion in arms sales. The Obama administration authorized another $1.8 billion in weapons exports in December 2015, but there wasno progress regarding Taiwan’s desire fordiesel submarines and the F-16C/D. The
Obamaadministrationhad

notifiedTaiwan in 2011 of an upgrade programfor 145 F-16A/B fighters, consisting ofequipping the F-16A/B with active
phased array radar systems and JDAM,
which are said to improve those fighters’
F-16 fighter flown by Taiwan’s air force, 2011

capability up to about 80 percent of that

(IHS Jane’s [online news module])of the F-16C/D.36(2) Institutionalizing the Military and Security Relationships
The United States has been taking an approach which goes beyond just the export of
weapons; growing emphasis has been placed on an approach centered on software whichseeks to strengthen all of Taiwan’s defense capabilities. The software here covers such areas
as training and education, a defense policy dialogue, reform of Taiwan’s military structure,and reform of the weapons export process. This software-centered approach began following
the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. According to officials such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell, Senior Country Director for the RPC,
Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Randall Schriver, andMark Stokes, country director for the RPC, Taiwan and Mongolia in the OSD, this approach
aimed at producing a shift from a military relationship that consisted only of negotiations on
weapons exports to an approach which would provide qualitative enhancement of Taiwan’s

52

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

defense capabilities.37 In the process of conducting substantial discussion of Taiwan’s secuPreface

rity, Taiwan also developed a new awareness of what the United States had in its military,which served to reduce Taiwan’s feeling of international isolation. For the United States,
such discussions were an approach to understanding Taiwan’s thoughts on its security, facili-

Chapter Summary

tating their communication.
The process of deepening the military and security relationships became conspicuous
under the Bush administration. As described below, this process included such areas asreform of the weapons export process, multiplication of the channels for dialogue, inspec-

Introduction

tion of training, dispatch of evaluation teams, dispatch of serving officers, and support forreform of the military industries. It is important that these activities were carried forward by
the Obama administration and have continued to be conducted. The strengthening of themilitary and security relationship is becoming less and less likely influenced by differences

Chapter 1

in successive administrations and the views of successive presidents; this can be seen as asign of the institutionalization of the relationship.

Reform of the Weapons Export Process
Chapter 2

In April 2004, the Bush administration announced the reform of the process for weapons export to Taiwan. The process up to that point was fixed, i.e., in November of each year,
Taiwan would present the United States with a list of its desired weapons, and the UnitedStates would reply by the following April. The fixed nature of the process also made it likely

Chapter 3

to attract attention.38 In the past, the weapons exports carried a very strong political nuance.
The Taiwan side thought of the purchase of weapons as a symbol of US support and did notconsider how the purchases could increase its defense capability. On the US side as well,

Chapter 4

Washington was wary of inciting China and so limited the weapons it would sell.
For its part, the United States did not know very well just what weapons Taiwan actually needed for its defense. Due to the limits as to which government officials could visit
Taiwan, an official charged with setting policies for security in the Asia-Pacific region could

Conclusions

not visit the country. Since there was no way to conduct a discussion with the Taiwanese side
regarding military operations, the US side was left with nowhere to turn for an understanding of Taiwan’s plans and thoughts about its own defense.39
The Bush administration converted the weapons export process to the same one used
for conventional states, i.e., Taiwan became able to express its hope for what was needed
when it was needed.40 Not only did the weapons export process gain a degree of flexibility,
it became possible to avoid excessive attention to the process. Since it became possible to tie
weapons exports to real improvement in Taiwan’s defense capabilities, participants came tosee a need for the two sides to conduct a closer dialogue.

53Chapter 3

Channels for Dialogue
Beginning late in the Clinton administration, channels were created for substantive
debates on military and security affairs between the United States and Taiwan, with a system
for regular consultations put into place. Broadly speaking, such consultations were conducted on three levels, the National Security Council level, the defense authority level, andthe military branch level.41
First, the Monterey Talks are the top-level dialogue between government officials.
These talks were first held in 1997 and have been convened every year since. The US side isrepresented by the assistant secretary of defense, while the deputy secretary-general of the
National Security Council leads the Taiwan delegation; other participants come from therespective National Security Councils, defense authorities (the Department of Defense andthe Ministry of National Defense), diplomatic circles among others.42 The 2015 Monterey
Talks were held at the Pentagon for the first time.43
Second, talks at the national defense establishment level include the US-Taiwan
Defense Review Talks, the US-Taiwan Security Cooperation Dialogue, and the General
Officer Steering Group. The Defense Review Talks, which were first held in 2001, are aforum for the two sides’ defense establishments to discuss directions of defense cooperation
for the next year and matters of mutual interest. The Security Cooperation Dialogue has replaced the annual weapons negotiations of the past, and since its establishment in 2001, it
has presented the opportunity to discuss technological and management issues involving
weapons exports. The General Officer Steering Group consists of regular talks between theuniformed officers regarding military operations and tactics.44 Working-level, service-toservice talks are also held between the US Pacific Command and Taiwan military, with thetalks called Luwei for the Army, Bihai for the Navy, and Lantian for the Air Force.45

Table 3-2: US-Taiwan Security Dialogue Channels
ChannelNational Security Council level

Monterey Talks

National defense authority level• US-Taiwan Defense Review Talks• US-Taiwan Security Cooperation Dialogue• General Officer Steering Group

Service level• “Luwei” (Army)• “Bihai” (Navy)• “Lantian” (Air Force)

Other mechanisms

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

Source: “开启台美国防伙伴关系的新章节 [New Chapter for US-Taiwan Defense Partnership],” 国防政策
蓝皮书第4号报告、新境界文教基金会国防政策諮询小组 [Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 4,
New Frontier Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee], June 2013, p. 11.

54

The United States and the Taiwan Problem

Another important channel for discussions is the US-Taiwan Defense Industry
Preface

Conference. This has been held annually since 2002 as a “track 1.5” conference. It was first
held in 2002 under the name of US-Taiwan Defense Summit and consisted of talks between
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-

Chapter Summary

ming. In 2003 the name was changed to the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, and it
discusses the situation in Taiwan’s defense industries.46

Other Exchanges

Introduction

Department of Defense evaluation teams conduct studies of Taiwan’s military capabilities and related topics of interest. At the time of the Taiwan Strait crises, the United States
had no sources of information about Taiwan’s military capabilities nor channels for communication with the Taiwanese military. The evaluation teams are considered contributing not

Chapter 1

only to the United States’ obtaining of information about Taiwan military affairs, but also to
Taiwan’s integration of equipment and improvement of operational efficiency.47 An evaluation team was first sent to Taiwan in 1999. A team prepared a report in 2000 on modernizationof Taiwan’s navy which was submitted to the Department of Defense and Congress. Later,

Chapter 2

evaluation teams were dispatched in 2001 to deal with the command structure, air force
equipment, and air defense capability among other topics. From 2007 through 2009, with US
assistance, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense conducted an integrated national defense capability
evaluation and studied directions for reform of Taiwan’s military and the necessary equip-

Chapter 3

ment. In 2009, an evaluation report was submitted on Taiwan’s air defense and anti-missile
capabilities. In 2011, a comprehensive report was submitted on air force capabilities.48
In addition, there are also mutual visits for observation of training and education. In

Chapter 4

April 2001, US field-grade officers observed the Hanguang-17 training exercises for the firsttime, and observation has been conducted regularly since that time. Military officers from
Taiwan are also being sent for visits to the US National Defense University and the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii.49 US active-duty military officers are

Conclusions

also sent to Taiwan. In 2002, the US government approved sending its officials to the American
Institute in Taiwan. Subsequently, beginning in August 2005, an active-duty army colonel has
been assigned to Taipei.50 Such dispatch of active-duty officers serves the purpose of strengthening close communications on security between Taiwan and the United States.
(Author: Shinji Yamaguchi)

55

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

Chapter 4
Transformation of the
China-Taiwan Relationshipand “Maintaining the
Status Quo”

Chapter 4

1. Growing Taiwanese Identity
The relationship between China and Taiwan could be summarized as “maintaining
the status quo” in the sense of the continued existence of two political entities facing eachother over the Taiwan Strait, however, the reality is the relationship has transformed dramatically since 1949. Taiwan’s position in the international setting dropped rapidly in the 1970s,
China began to exert economic power in the 1980s, and in terms of military power, the military balance between China and Taiwan tipped in favor of China in the 2000s. China has
positioned Taiwan as a core national interest, inseparable from the Chinese mainland, andthe majority of Chinese people think this way. On the other hand, the growth of a Taiwanese
identity has been remarkable, and the number of Taiwanese nationals putting psychologicaldistance between Taiwan and China is increasing steadily. Against this backdrop of a growing Taiwanese identity, the Tsai Ing-wen administration is trying to slow the movement of
the China-Taiwan relationship from “maintaining of the status quo” that is favorable for
Taiwan to one that is increasingly advantageous for China overall.

(1) The Reality of China-Taiwan Economic Relationship
During the Ma Ying-jeou administration, relations with China deepened primarily inthe areas of economics and trade. For example, looking at a country-by-country breakdownof visitors to Taiwan, tourists from China increased dramatically during the Ma administration, dominating other countries. Taiwan lifted the ban on group tours from China in July
2008, and currently places a daily maximum limit of 5,000 tourists. As a result, a total of
11.19 million Chinese have visited Taiwan through April 2016. Further, the Ma administration lifted the ban on individual tourists from China in June 2011, and is accepting up to
5,000 individual visitors per day for residents from 47 cities in China. As of the end of April
2016, 3.8 million individual tourists have visited Taiwan.1 This is directly reflected in theincrease in the number of flights between China and Taiwan, and the establishment of new
airline routes between the two countries.
The number of tourists from China pulled away steadily from that of other countries
but in June 2016, the number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan declined 11.88% year-onyear to 271,478 visitors, the lowest level recorded since March 2014.2 The growth rate ofnumber of tourists from China continued to slow from 2014 to 2015. Following the electionof Tsai Ing-wen, China implemented restrictions on the number of outbound tourists to
Taiwan, and the possibility of future increases in tourist numbers is not high.
Total trade between China and Taiwan peaked in 2011 when the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) was concluded, and it has not been in a recovery trend
since that time.

58

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

Figure 4-1: Changes in Tourist Visitors to Taiwan, by Country
Preface

Unit: Total People

4,500,000

4,184,102
3,987,152

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,874,702
2,586,428

2,500,000
2,000,000

1,784,185
1,634,790

1,630,735
1,161,489

1,000,000
643,338

1,166,380

700,287

1,294,758
1,086,691
725,751
618,667

225,814

172,777
196,260

1,132,592

1,261,596

1,071,975

1,388,305
1,375,770

1,627,229
1,513,597
1,425,485

1,183,341
1,016,356

689,027

329,204 167,641

1,421,550

794,362395,729
216,901

817,944412,617242,902411,416
259,089

527,684

414,060
351,301

458,691

658,757
479,452

186,483

200,914

197,070

203,301

212,148

218,045

223,062

264,880

274,035

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Japan
EuropeHong Kong & Macao
Southeast Asia

South Korea

China

Chapter 1

2006

397,965
252,266

972,123

1,080,153
911,174

718,806
369,258
387,197

491,437

431,884
500,00 394,802

1,000,661

1,432,315

Introduction

1,500,000

0Chapter Summary

3,500,000

United States

Source: 观 光 统 计 图 表 [Tourism Statistics], July 20, 2016 from the Tourism Bureau, Ministry ofTransportation and Communications of the Republic of China.
Chapter 2

Investment from Taiwan into China viewed since 1999 has been increasing broadly,
and the US$13.1 billion recorded in 2011 was the highest. Of note is change in the scale ofinvestment on a per-project basis. The change from small-scale investments during the Chen

Chapter 3

Shui-bian administration to the large-scale investments during the Ma Ying-jeou administration is evident. Investment amounts themselves fell from a peak around the US$13 billion
level in 2010 and 2011, having reached a certain size and reflecting sluggish economies in

Chapter 4

China and Taiwan, and have only just returned to levels exceeding US$10 billion in 2015.
While it is generally said that Taiwan’s economic dependence upon China increased
since the formation of the Ma Ying-jeou administration, the share of China in Taiwan’s total
trade shot up in 2002 during the Chen Shui-bian government. This was the year when theConclusions

Lee Teng-hui government policy vis-a-vis China of Jièjí yòngrěn, which means “no haste,
be patient,” changed to “proactive liberalization and effective management.” Taiwan’s economic dependence upon China in 2000 was 11.6% (US$33.52 billion) but by 2007 had increased to 28% (US$130.3 billion). In 2008, the year when Ma Ying-jeou government wasformed, Taiwan’s economic dependence upon China was 26.7% (US$132.49 billion) and30.4% (US$154.87 billion) in 2015, illustrating the rapid and dramatic increase in economic
dependence during the Chen Shui-bian administration compared with the languid paceduring the Ma government. This 30.4% figure, however, is equivalent to twice that of number
two ASEAN, and the shift to China as Taiwan’s most important trading partner is a greatone. Note that the rapid and dramatic drop in Taiwan’s 2009 total trade and investment in

59

Chapter 4

Table 4-1: Flight Routes between China and Taiwan
Number ofOpen
Airports,
TaiwanNumber ofOpen
Airports,
China

Number offlights, per
week

June 13, 2008

8

5

36

November 4, 2008

8

16

108

April 26, 2009

8

27

270

Decision to allow scheduled
flights from August 31, 2009.
Direct flights to Taiwan begin
at Hefei, Harbin, etc. airports.

March 3, 2010

8

31

270

Direct flights begin at
Changchun, Taiyuan, etc.
airports.

November 2, 2010

8

33

370

Direct flights begin at
Shanghai (Hongqiao) andShijiazhuang airports.

February 25, 2011
March 15, 2011

8

37

370

Direct flights begin at
Xuzhou, Wuxi, Quanzhou,
and Sanya airports.

June 21, 2011

9

41

558

Direct flights begin at Tainan,
Lanzhou, etc. airports.

January 25, 2013

10

54

616

Direct flights begin at Ciayi,
Urumqi, etc. airports.

August 12, 2013

10

54

670

January 8, 2014

10

54

828

November 6, 2014

10

55

840

Direct flights begin at
Changzhou airport.

August 19, 2015

10

61

890

Direct flights begin at
Huainan, Kashgar, etc.
airports.

Notes

Number of flights, Friday-toMonday weekend charter
flights

Source: Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, 两岸空运直航航点开放情形 [The situation of theestablished Cross-strait direct air flight routes].

China is due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the latter half of 2008.3 Viewed fromthis perspective, intercourse between China and Taiwan centered on economics and traderelations clearly increased and the trend toward deepening was evident. This, however, was
not a special characteristic of the administration of the Ma Ying-jeou but rather a long-term
trend following the establishment of the Chen Shui-bian government. The defining characteristic of China-Taiwan relationship during the Ma Ying-jeou government is to be found in60

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

Figure 4.2: Taiwanese Trade with China
Preface(US$100 million)

(%)
35

2,000

30
Chapter Summary

1,500

25
20

1,000
15

Introduction

10

500

5
0

20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15

0

Exports to China (USD100 million)

Imports from China (USD100 million)

Percentage of Total Trade (%)

Chapter 1

Trade with China

Chapter 2

Note: All values include trade with Hong Kong
Source: “Analysis of International Trade Trends” Annual Reports for 2000-2015 from Bureau of Foreign
Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Chapter 3

Figure 4-3: Taiwanese Investments in China(US$100 million)
2,500

140
120

Chapter 4

2,000
100
1,500

80

Conclusions

60

1,000

40
500

20
0

15
20

14

20

13

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

20

02

01

20

20

00

20

19

99

0

Value of Taiwanese investments in China (US$100 million)
Number of Taiwanese Investments in China
Source: Preliminary Statistics of Cross-Strait Economic Relations by The Executive Yuan, MainlandAffairs Council.

61

Chapter 4

the deepening of political contacts between the nations but many Taiwanese responded negatively to the deepening political ties between China and Taiwan.

(2) Taiwanese Rejection of China’s Policy toward Taiwan
The presidential and Legislative
Yuan elections held in January 2016 represented a clear rejection of theKuomintang conciliatory policy toward
China. This is not a one-time phenomenon; this trend is clear in the Sunflower
Student Movement sparked by criticism
of the deliberations in the Legislative
Yuan regarding ratification of the CrossStraits Service Trade Agreement signedwith China in March 2014 and reflectedin the results of the Taiwanese local elections held in November of the same year. As can also
be observed in the graph below, the results of the Ma Ying-jeou government’s conciliatory
policy toward China and the feelings of the Taiwanese people in regards unification and independence do not move in concert. At a minimum, the number of Taiwanese desiring unification was clearly in a pattern of decline (total of [maintain status quo, then unify] and[unify as soon as possible]). President Ma Ying-jeou’s conciliatory policy toward China waslaunched into the face of increasing solidification of the Taiwanese people’s will for an independent Taiwan, which was linked to increased dissatisfaction among the public.
Moreover, the number of Taiwan residents who self-identify as Taiwanese continues
to grow. Notably, the percentage of people who self-identify as Taiwanese jumped 10 points
in the year following the first presidential election. The percentage of self-identifying as
Taiwanese increased around ten points during the eight-year terms of both the Chen Shuibian and Ma Ying-jeou administrations. The Chen administration emphasized Taiwanese
identity. On the other hand, while the Ma administration frequently used the expressions“descendants of Yan and Huang,” referring to two emperors of China and forefathers of the“Chinese tribe” in Chinese legend, the trend of growing Taiwanese identity continued.

62

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

Figure 4-4: Taiwanese People’s Views on Unification and Independence
Preface

(%)
100
90
80

Chapter Summary

70
60
50
40

Introduction

30
20
10

/1
0
09
20 /4
09
/1
20 2
10
20 /9
11
20 /5
11
/1
20 1
12
20 /8
13
/1
20 2
14
/
20 7
15
20 /3
15
/1
20 1
16
/8
20

/3

08

20

08

20

2
20

07

/7

/4

/1

06

20

/8
20

06

2

05

/1

20

04

20

04

20

03

/1

1

/5
20

/7

/7

03

02
20

Chapter 1200Declare independence as soon as possible
Maintain the status quo and gain independence later
Maintain the status quo indefinitely
Maintain the status quo and decide on independence or unification later

Chapter 2

Maintain the status quo and achieve unification later
Achieve unification as soon as possible
Don’t know

Source: Materials published by Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan.

Chapter 3

Figure 4-5: Taiwanese Identity
(%)
70
60.6

60

59.5

59.3

33.3

33.6

4.1

Chapter 4

57.1
54.3
51.6

50

47

46.4

49.3

44.6

40

44.1

42.5

41.4
39.6

30
20
10

25.5

26.2

17.6

20.2

10.5

8.9

25

24.1

20.7

17.6

7.3

42.5

44.9

44.7

43.4

44.2

43.7

41.1

43.1

39.8

39.8

40.3

38.5
35.8

36.9

36.2

32.5

16.3

9

7.8
5.3

12.5

5.8

6.5

10.6
9.2

8.3

5.8

5.9

6.2

4.7

5

7.2

6.3

6.2

4.4

4.6

5.4

4.5

4.2

3.8

3.9

3.6

3.8

3.5

4

4

4

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.3

3.5

3.3

3

95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16

12.1

19

94

19

93

19

92

41.2

45

43.3

19.2

0
19

41.6
39.6

43.7

52.2

Conclusions

34

43.1

52.7

48.4

47.7

Taiwanese

Taiwanese and Chinese

ChineseNo Response

Note: Data for 1993 not available.
Source: National Chengchi University Election Study Center, 重要政治態度分布趨勢図 [Core Political
Attitudes Trend Chart].

63

Chapter 4

2. China’s Military Pressure on Taiwan
During the eight-year term of the Ma Ying-jeou administration, in comparison to theChen Shui-bian administration, cross-straits relations improved through interchange in suchareas as economics, culture, and education.4 Despite the increased contact between China
and Taiwan, it cannot be said that China has been friendly to Taiwan and China’s continued
military pressure on Taiwan can be identified as one of the reasons for the shift of the
Taiwanese people’s emotional attitude toward independence and increase in the number ofpeople self-identifying as Taiwanese. China’s Defense White Paper emphasizes the Taiwan
issue is related to national unification and long-term development, and national unification
is a historic necessity for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.5 Moreover, China’s
enactment of the Anti Secession Law (2005) and the National Security Law (2015) made itlegal domestically to use non-peaceful means to unify with Taiwan.
Since 1979, China has argued for peaceful unification with Taiwan under a “onecountry, two systems” principle. This Chinese policy is unchanged regardless of Kuomintang
or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration in Taiwan.6 Taiwan’s national defense ministry view has remained unchanged: China is increasingly prepared for a People’s
Liberation Army strategy to seize Taiwan.7 Of the China’s publicly stated “core national interests” of Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Taiwan, the only country not unified with China is
Taiwan. Thus, while China talks about peaceful unification, it has not renounced the right touse military force in regards Taiwan.8 There are many different arguments for what mightcause China to use military force against Taiwan but the Taiwan national defense ministrystated the following seven scenarios in the first National Defense Report published in 1992.9(1) Taiwan moves toward independence(2) internal disturbances in Taiwan(3) when Taiwan military strength is comparatively weakened(4) when foreign powers interfere with Taiwan internal problems(5) Taiwan refuses unification negotiations over a long period(6) Taiwan develops nuclear weapons(7) Taiwan creates political crisis in China through use of Peaceful Evolution
Scenarios (6) and (7) are seen as less realistic than the others but case (3) is practicallya reality now and each of the seven cases above have been referenced by Chinese leadershipin the past, thus require vigilant observation going forward. China is making a range ofpreparations for superiority in a future military invasion of Taiwan and seeking to guide thecircumstances of the Taiwan Straits to its own advantage.10
The table below shows numerical variations in China’s Short-Range Ballistic Missile(SRBM, estimated range: 300-1,000 km) deployments. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)64

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou in November 2015 discussed
Preface

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile deployments facing Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou revealed
that Xi stated “missile deployments are fundamentally not in response to Taiwan.”11 A certain Taiwanese general points out that China has already increased its number of surface-to-

Chapter Summary

surface and cruise missiles to 1,500, and most of these are short-range; the only country
within range of these missiles is Taiwan.12 Significant increases in the number of SRBMs
have not been observed since 2008. The accuracy of the missiles is, however, thought to have
improved along with scientific advances over the years. It is reasonable to assume older mis-

Introduction

siles have been updated to maintain reliability and strengthen military capacity.
The Han Kuang Exercise is an annual exercise by all three services of the Republic ofChina Armed Forces, planned and executed in response to China’s invasion of Taiwan strategy and conducted for the 32nd time in 2016.

Chapter 1

Every year, active-duty and retired US senior officers are invited, and from last year
the retired officers participated in the planning and evaluation of the exercise, indicating aconsiderable degree of military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States.

Chapter 2

Table 4-2: SRBM Deployments by China
350

2002

350

2003

500

2004

650-730

2005

710-790

2006

900

2007

990-1,070

2008

1,050-1,150

2009

1,050-1,150

2010

1,000-1200

2011

1,000-1,200

2012

1,100+

2013

1,000+

2014

1,200+

2015

1,000-1,200

Conclusions

2001

Chapter 4

No. of Missiles
Chapter 3

Year

Source: Jun Yasuda and Rira Momma eds., Taiwan o Meguru Anzen Hosho [Taiwan Security Issues],
Keio University Press 2016, p. 172, and Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, p. 109.

65

Chapter 4

Conventional thinking held that the opening attack on Taiwan would be a saturation attack
using ballistic and cruise missiles. This year’s Han Kuang Exercise added a so-called fifth
column of PLA soldiers infiltrated inside of Taiwan and a coordinated cyberwarfare to the firstwave attack scenario. The scenario called for fifth column elements to launch guerrilla attacks
on Taiwan military bases and strategic assets in advance of a saturation attack using missiles.

Multiple Incidents of Spying Against Taiwan Armed Forces
Spy incidents targeting senior Taiwanese military leadership continue, including thearrest of an active-duty major general commanding an army communications facility in
January 2011, and the arrest of a retired commissioned officer in 2012. In 2013, Tsai Desheng, Director-General of the National Security Bureau, testified before the Legislative
Yuan “many people who shouldn’t be here were everywhere” at the opening of relations
between China and Taiwan.13 Director-General Tsai added that spies from China were mixed
in with diplomats, visiting delegations, academics, and general tourists coming to Taiwan.14
Chen Wen Jeng, assistant professor at Tam Kang University (appointed deputy secretary general of the National Security Council in May 2016), “If China wanted to, it could
board armed PLA soldiers on to airplanes connecting China and Taiwan, and if vehicles
were placed at Taipei Songshan Airport (located in Taipei city), the PLA could overwhelm
the Ministry of Defense, covering the one-kilometer distance in less than 10 minutes. The
Ministry of Defense is protected by only a battalion of armed military police and a small
number of soldiers.” Taiwanese newspapers reported that if 1% of the annual 3 million tourists from China were, in fact, hidden PLA operatives, that would be the equivalent of 30,000
to 40,000 people, about two divisions.15

United Front Operation Targeting Retired General Officers
The frequent visitation to China by retired Taiwanese senior military officers is a particular case of China-Taiwan relations during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. In May
2013, Hsu Li-nung, retired general and a former chief of the General Political Warfare
Department, visited Beijing and Tianjin as the head of a delegation of retired military officers. The visiting delegation was welcomed at a reception at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouseby Zhang Zhijun, Minister of the Office of Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, and met withYu Zhengsheng, Chairman of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at theGreat Hall of the People. Chairman Yu Zhengsheng is a relative of Yu Ta-wei (1897-1993),
who was Minister of National Defense of Taiwan. The members of the military leaders visiting China at this time were all direct report subordinates of Minister of National Defense Yu
Ta-Wei.16 It was reported that the delegation would visit the Central Military Commission,
PLA units in Beijing, National Defense University (including symposiums), and the PLA

66

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

General Staff Department.17
PrefaceUp to this point, there had been cases of retired Taiwanese military officers visiting
China through the auspices of the Huangpu Alumni Association (members are retired PLA
18

officers), but these were reportedly exceeded this time by the reception held by the Central
Chapter Summary

Military Commission. Testifying at the Legislative Yuan, Zeng Jinling (retired army general)of the Veteran Affairs Council, which supports re-employment and receipt of benefits of retired and reserve military personnel, stated it was not appropriate for groups of retired military officials to be invited as guests, and continued to answer “They received a pre-event

Introduction

briefing before departure and are not traitors (as DPP members might criticize). From asystemic perspective, retired generals cannot exert influence over politics.”19
There are other cases of friendships between retired officers of Taiwan and PLA
forces developed through frequent golf outings.20 It can be said that Taiwan’s Ministry ofChapter 1

Defense must pay attention to the actions of China setting up a united front operation targeting the Taiwan military community through the Huangpu Alumni Association.
From the above, it is clear that the deepening of economic and trade relations between
China and Taiwan is having no limitation at all on China’s promotion of preparations for a

Chapter 2

military invasion of Taiwan.21

3. Status of Taiwan Military Response
Chapter 3

President Tsai Ing-wen observed
the three combined forces military exercise Han Kuang Exercise at the Joint

Chapter 4

Operations Training Base Command at
Renshou Shan in Pingtung County on
August 25, 2016. During the inspection,
president Tsai declared that the armed

Conclusions

forces needed a new strategy that would
chart a firm direction for them andchange their culture, and called on the
Ministry of National Defense to prepare a first draft of that strategy by January 2017.22
Li Huaqiu, national defense researcher for the Society for Strategic Studies R.O.C.,
points to frequently occurring scandals in the Taiwanese armed forces, weakening of military discipline, insufficient training for war, inadequate sense of crisis, and an environment
in which little emphasis is given to the question of why military forces fight. Further, Li
Huaqiu points to a variety of incidents such as accidental launch of Hsiung Feng III missiles
or mistreatment of puppies by soldiers, expressing his view of the need to reform the bad air

67

Chapter 4

spreading inside the military.23 From this meaning, President Tsai’s comments perhaps aim at
an improvement in the culture of the military, not military strategy in the pure sense.
Moreover, as detailed in Chapter Two, the focus of Taiwan’s military strategy toward
China has shifted from offense to defense. While the huge numbers of military personnel ofthe early 1950s, which were around 8% of total population, were gradually reduced, Taiwan’s
population of 20.61 million residents continues to support armed forces consisting of
473,000 active-duty personnel, the equivalent of 2.3% of Taiwan’s population, despite thedeclaration in 1991 of the end of the Chinese Civil War.
Further, until the early 1990s Taiwan’s armed forces remained organized as they had
been when active as a continental army on the Chinese mainland.24 However, organizing
Taiwan armed forces on the premise of a continental army would not function for an island
like Taiwan, whose land area is only about the size of Kyushu, and Taiwan’s military strategy
no longer considered a land-based counterattack. This, along with other factors—such as theglobal trend toward military downsizing in conjunction with advances in technology, theinability to meet future staffing needs at conventional levels due to the decline in Taiwan’s
birth rate, modernization of both PLA military strategy and weapons systems, and the needto respond effectively—made clear the necessity of moving toward a Taiwanese military

Table 4-3: Taiwan’s Population vs. Number of Military Personnel
Year

Population

Military Personnel(fixed number)

As percent of
population (%)

1950

7.56 million

800,000

10.6

1951

7.81 million

640,000

8.2

1952

8.05 million

597,713

7.4

1991

20.61 million

473,000

2.3

1997

21.74 million

452,000

2.1

2001

22.41 million

400,000

1.8

2004

22.69 million

385,000

1.7

2007

22.96 million

296,000

1.3

2009

23.12 million

275,000

1.2

2016

23.51 million

215,000

0.9

Note:

Figures are active-duty only.

Source: Taiwan Ministry of Interior, Statistical Annual Report; Chen Hong Xian, A Study of the Military
Counter-Offensive in the Early 1950s, Academia Historica, 2015, p. 117; Ministry of National
Defense, National Defense Report editing committee, 1992 ROC National Defense Report, Li
Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd., 1992, p. 221; Ministry of National Defense ed., 2009
Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 35; and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division, 2015.

68Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

based on smaller numbers of more advanced forces.
Preface

Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s military has been transforming its organization to reflect
the reality of changes in relations with China and in the social landscape, under four reform
programs: the 10-Year Military Capacity-Building Project, and the Jing-shi, Jing-jin, andChapter Summary

Jing-cui Plans.

Ten-Year Military Force Capacity Building Project, 1994-2003(Suspended 1996)

Introduction

At the time of projected completion in 2003, this plan would have limited military
personnel to 1.7% of total estimated population of just over 22 million Taiwanese, or lessthan 400,000 personnel. It also called for:(1) Simplifying the organization of the general staff division and the land, sea, and air

Chapter 1

commands(2) Prioritizing military power of the three services for air and sea superiority, adjusting the force structure accordingly(3) Disposing of antiquated systems, upgrading air-defense systems, and building

Chapter 2

new missile frigates(4) Automating command-and-control systems, dimensionalizing anti-submarine
warfare, and strengthening anti-blockade operations25(5) Implementing reductions in personnel and adjustment of force composition (offi-

Chapter 3

cers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers)(6) Implementing simplified structure, reducing the number of layers.
At the time, organization structure had five layers: general staff, three service com-

Chapter 4

mand headquarters, corps, divisions, and brigades. There were overlaps in the organizationand the scale complicated, with too many people and too much organizational in-fighting,and the lines of command were not clear. Aiming for reform, aligned General Political
Warfare Department as a subordinate division under general staff leadership, while holding

Conclusions

force command responsible for training during peace time as a force command organized asa single division under the general staff office.
While this plan was somewhat successful from the perspective of simplification ofcommand structure and reduction of officers, it came to a standstill with the 1996 resignationof Navy Admiral Liu Heqian, chief of the general staff, which was precipitated by the army’s
dissatisfaction with reform plans focusing on the navy and air forces.26

Jing-Shi Program, July 1997 to January 2001
The incomplete Ten-Year Military Force Capacity Building Project was suspended in
1996 without any alternative in place, in the face of changes in the internal and external

69

Chapter 4

environment of Taiwan, including Chinese missile testing intended to interfere with holdingof general presidential election. The Jing-Shi Program was implemented under the leadership vision of a defensive military strategy. Under that strategy, Taiwan still had too many
standing military personnel and the ratio of officers was too high.
The Ministry of National Defense reduced personnel by increasing the reduction ratio
to match upper-management layers, strictly enforcing simplification down to the staff numbers of specific posts, and achieved its targets.27

Jingjin Program, January 2004 to December 2008
The Chen Shui-bian administration launched a military reform called the Jingjin
Program in January 2004. This program focused on maximizing joint operational capabilities while further reducing military personnel from 385,000 to 275,000. Included also werereductions in forces dispatched to remote islands of Jinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.28 The “MiniThree Links,” including Jinmen, was already beginning at this time, as seen in changes in thepositioning of Jinmen island, now as a symbol of exchange, not confrontation. As PLA missile capacity continued to improve and grow, Jinmen and Matsu may not necessarily be up
to the task of serving as defensive seawalls.
This program became known for reducing manpower but also increasing firepower.
Since the military strategy was shifted to active defense, procurement and deployment of
weapons and systems that had a strong deterrence factor were the norm. Introduction of
Kidd-class destroyers and P-3C anti-submarine airplanes, and the start of production/deployment of Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missiles also occurred around this time.29
The length of conscription, which had been reduced from 24 months to 22 months
under the Lee Teng-hui administration in 1999, was shortened further in phases, shrinking to
20 months, then 18 months, and finally 12 months. In addition, the retirement age was reduced from 40 to 35 years old for active-duty reserve personnel who originally joined as
conscripts. Reduction in the number of military personnel and organizations means fewer
active-duty personnel, resulting in implementation of reduction of both compulsory service
term and absolute number of new soldiers. Increased numbers of people entering reserves
under the Military Personnel Reduction Plan also means a reduction in the number of years
required for military retirement.
Taiwan has previously employed a professional corps of officers leading non-commissioned officers and conscripted soldiers. However, the reduction in conscripted years ofservice made its difficult to produce soldiers proficient enough in use of weapons and systems that grow in technological sophistication every year. The administration of Chen Shuibian took a serious look at implementations of an all-volunteer system employing national
security-conscious young people, regardless mandatory length of service, and these were70

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

phased in under the Ma Ying-jeou government.30
Preface

Jingcui Program, January 2011 to December 2014
Military reform was undertaken seriously during the Ma Ying-jeou administration

Chapter Summarywith a reduction to 215,000 from 275,000 authorized strength personnel with the objectiveof a small but strong military, with significant cuts in the national defense organization as
well. Thus, the post of General Staff Officer was reduced to three stars (2nd grade general)from four (1st grade general), and a 1st grade general position would not be staffed during

Introduction

peace time, and the remaining non-army/navy/air force command headquarters—military
police, combined logistics, and reserves—were all demoted to commands. When these werestill command headquarters, the commanding officer would have been a general, but as commands, their commanding officers position was filled by a lieutenant general.31 The conscrip-

Chapter 1tion system was scheduled to conclude at the end of 2014 but was extended. The actual
number of military personnel is estimated to have fallen below 200,000, to around 190,000.

Yonggu Program
Chapter 2

When the Jingcui Program ended during the Ma Ying-jeou administration, theYong-gu Plan, which called for further reductions in authorized forces of 170,000-190,000
personnel, was reevaluated and never actually implemented. This situation remains unchanged under the Tsai Ing-wen government. The Ma Ying-jeou government created a com-

Chapter 3paratively stable national defense environment through actively pursuit of relationship-building
with China and implemented a defensive military strategy of “Resolute Defense, Credible
Deterrence” through military reform designed with building Taiwan military forces that

Chapter 4

were compact yet precise and powerful, like Taiwan itself.
There weren’t any new weapons or system upgrades to pull the crowd’s attention but
the on-ship deployment of the Hsiung Feng III hypersonic missile and the deployment of
Tuo Chiang-class missile corvettes featuring both stealth technology and a catamaran design,

Conclusions

and Kuang Hua VI-class missile boats were noteworthy. These deployments are a result of
selecting low-budget, high-effectiveness weapons systems in a defense environment where
there is no hope of large increases in ships or fighter aircraft as with the PLA.
As the relationship with China turns unfavorable, the possibility emerges of change in
the Ma Ying-jeou government’s defensive military strategy. The national defense law stipulates that the Ministry of National Defense shall submit the Quadrennial Defense Review
within 10 months of the inauguration of a new president. March 19, 2017 is the deadline in
the case of the Tsai Ing-wen administration and the new military strategy under the Tsai administration may be signaled by then or the 2017 publication of National Defense Report.32
In June 2016, Feng Shih-kuan, Minister of National Defense, announced the provisional

71

Chapter 4

naming of Ministry of National Defense cyber-forces to be in cooperation with and underleadership of Executive Yuan as “the 4th Military Service.”33 Minister Feng explained that thecyber-forces would focus on asymmetric warfare capabilities, particularly in deterrence.34
Taiwan is a target of attack by China’s cyber-forces, whom it is said tests newly developed
attack vectors on Taiwan and the United States. Per 2013 statistics, the Legislative Yuan receives on average 1,990 cyber-attacks each week and about 440 email attacks each month.
Taiwanese news media reports that the favorite attack targets of China’s cyber-forces
are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense but in synchronization
with the progress of China-Taiwan negotiations the target of information collection is expanding to include the economic, finance, health and welfare ministries.35

4. Tsai Ing-wen’s Vision of Fixed Status Quo
The fundamental structural issue of two political bodies facing each other across the
Taiwan Straits remains unchanged since 1949. The reality of “maintaining the status quo” ischanging with dramatic shifts in the power relationship between China and Taiwan, the military strategies of both sides, the political system of Taiwan, and consciousness of Taiwaneseand Chinese identities.
The most important point is the reality that the majority of Taiwanese do not see
China as a subject for unification. Taiwan during Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo
was under martial law and expressing Taiwanese independence was directly dangerous to
one’s life. The generation born and raised in Taiwan following the realization of democratization holds the belief that the Republic of China is a politically free, independent, sovereign
nation. The phrase “Born Independentists”（天然独）which was used frequently during the2016 elections, is a clear indication of this thinking. Taiwanese people think that Taiwan and
China are two different things and this way of thinking will not change dramatically any
time soon.
President Tsai Ing-wen’s acceptance speech of May 2016 refers to restoration of indigenous people’s rights as a matter of social justice.36 Moreover, President Tsai declared
August 1 as Indigenous Peoples’ Day and apologized as president of the Republic of China
for unjust treatment in the past. President Tsai also promised to pursue regular convening ofa convention to draft Indigenous Peoples Basic Law in the Executive Yuan, and set up a commission for indigenous peoples to be headed by the president in the Office of the President.37
President Tsai placing greater weight on indigenous peoples’ rights and history is thought tomean a greater emphasis on the existence of Taiwan as a society with a history different fromthat of the Chinese mainland.
But with China accounting for 30% of Taiwan’s trade, relationships with China cannot

72Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

be ignored. With “Continuation of Status Quo” as stated policy, Taiwan is not about to abroPreface

gate currently valid agreements. Taiwan is attempting to lessen its dependence upon China
by reducing China’s share of total trade, even if only by a little. The “New Southbound
Policy” is hoped to be that policy. In September 2016, the Executive Yuan announced it

Chapter Summary

would formally begin the New Southbound Policy as an operative plan. The newly established Office of Trade Negotiations is responsible for negotiating and implementing policy,
targeting the 10 ASEAN countries, 6 countries from South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan), Australia and New Zealand for a total of 18 countries. Not

Introduction

limited to just investment and trade, the Office aims to build multi-faceted partnerships including public exchange, culture, and education.38
In 1998, Taiwan’s top three trading partners were the United States, Japan, and theEuropean Union, which together accounted for 57% of total trade. In contrast, China was

Chapter 1

only 12%. In 2015, China’s share had risen to 30%, compared with the decline of UnitedStates, Japan, and EU to 33%. Expanding the axis of trade to include countries other thanChina is, as a plan itself, valid. The point of difference between the southern policies of thetwo governments is the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and South Asia as targets. With

Chapter 2

a large population base, the region may develop into an attractive market for Taiwan. As illustrated by the failure of southern policies of both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, success is difficult by definition. Ties with China for both ASEAN and Australia are very strong,
and there exists sufficient potential on the China side to cause disturbance to Taiwan.

Chapter 3

In South Asia, ties at the government level are less strong. To make the New
Southbound Policy a success will require strong growth in the Taiwan economy and effective trade policies, and Taiwan’s diplomatic powers and overall strength will be tested as it

Chapter 4

Figure 4-6: Share of Taiwan’s Total Trade, by Country (1998, 2005, and 2015)
South Korea
3%
Japan
17%

China,
Hong Kong
12%

ASEAN
11%

United States
23%

EU
17%

Other
14%

South Korea
5%

2005

Japan
16%

China, Hong Kong
25%

Middle East
6%
ASEAN
13%

United States
13%

EU
11%

South Korea
5%

2015

Japan
11%

China, Hong Kong
30%

Conclusions

1998

Middle East
3%

Other
11%
Middle East
6%

ASEAN
16%

United States
12%

EU
10%

Other
10%

Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1998 Analysis of International Trade
Trends; 2005 Analysis of International Trade Trends; and 2015 Analysis of International Trade
Trends.

73

Chapter 4

tries to implement both.
The Tsai Ing-wen administration has stated its diplomatic vision as “steadfast diplomacy.” The reality of that vision will be judged by the circumstances to be revealed following overseas visits but to the extent president Tsai talks about maintaining status quo with
China, it is difficult to imagine a diplomatic scenario where Taiwan attempts to disrupt anation’s established diplomatic relations with China. It is likely that diplomacy to steadilyprotect existing relationships will develop. It will be difficult for China-Taiwan relations toreturn to the days of the Ma Ying-jeou government when heads of the Straits Exchange
Foundation, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Executive Yuan MainlandAffairs Council, and the Taiwan Affairs Offices could simply meet.
The probability is high that there will be a return to the format where the meetings
between the public agencies of China and Taiwan will only be held with a definite necessity,
as during the time of the Chen Shui-bian administration. PLA pressure on Taiwan is expected to be stronger than during the Ma Ying-jeou government. The Tsai administration
will be increasingly pressured to respond.
(Author: Rira Momma)

ColumnDevelopment of National Defense and Military
Reforms under Xi Jinping, and Their Influence on
the China-Taiwan Relationship
In November 2015, the reform working group of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) Central Military Commission (CMC) met in Beijing. At this meeting, Xi Jinping
indicated his determination to reform the national defense and the military and laid out
proposals for reform. These proposals for reform included (1) establishing an Army command structure, (2) strengthening the authority of the CMC by absorbing the functionsof the four General Headquarters, (3) establishing an operational command structurefrom the CMC through theater commands to troops and an administration system fromthe CMC through each service to troops, and (4) strengthening official discipline within
the military through creation of a CMC discipline inspection commission and a CMC
political and legal affairs commission. Xi also issued a time schedule calling for completion of the series of military reforms by 2020.39 On December 31, 2015, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) held a presentation of colors ceremony to mark the progress ofreforms: (1) activation of an Army leading organ, (2) renaming the Second Artillery Forceas the Rocket Force and elevating it to a service branch, and (3) establishment of the74Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

Prefacenew Strategic Support Force.40 On January 11, 2016, four General Headquarters werereorganized into a new CMC structure consisting of 15 departments.41
In addition, on February 1, 2016, it was announced that the existing seven military
regions were replaced by five theater commands, namely the Eastern, Southern,

Chapter Summary

Western, Northern, and Central, and each theater command was given its own integrated operational command system. The commanders of the theater commands
were all Army officers, and with the exception of Zhu Fuxi (Western Theater Command),
who came from the Air Force, all of the theater commands’ political commissars had
Army backgrounds.42 Each theater command had deputy commanders from the Army,

Introduction

Navy, and Air Force. The chiefs of staff for the theater commands were selected fromamong the deputy commanders, with Rear Admiral Wei Gang becoming chief of staff
in the Southern Theater Command and Air Force Major General Li Fengbiao taking
that position in the Central Theater Command.43

Chapter 1

Features of this structural reform of the military include (1) increasing the authorityof the CMC and its Chairman Xi Jinping to provide greater control of the military;44 (2)launching of a simpler and more rational command and control system, based on theslogan “the Commission directs, the theater commands fight, and the branches build”(the CMC exercises overall direction and control, while the theater commands mainly

Chapter 2

engage in fighting and the branches mainly develop their forces); and (3) partial correction of the PLA’s traditional tendency of “Army centrism.”45
For a simpler and more rational command and control system, the PLA separated
the military’s operational command and control systems from the administration

Chapter 3

system. According to the PLA Daily, the old military region system presented an obstacle to an integrated war-fighting system by lumping the operational command andcontrol functions together with the development and management functions. By setting up the integrated operational command system in each theater command as partof the reforms, the operational command and control functions were separated from

Chapter 4

the development and management functions, which, the article stressed, made it possible for the theater command to concentrate on command and control of the fighting,strengthening the integrated operational system.46
It is pointed out that simplifying the chain of command makes it possible for theConclusions

PLA to raise its overall fighting capabilities and its ability to respond to emergencies,
centered on the CMC.47 As one of the reasons behind conducting such reforms, a
Ministry of National Defense spokesperson cited the response to grave and complex
changes in the international environment.48 It seems likely that this statement reflected
deterioration in China’s relations with the United States and neighboring countries
over the issue of the South China Sea and tensions between Japan and China over the
Senkaku Islands. In that sense, it would appear that the deteriorating internationalsituation involving China today was an element bringing Xi Jinping to conduct reformsof national defense and the military.
In these reforms, the theater command covering the area directly across the straitfrom Taiwan, and the one which always tops the list of the five theater commands, is

75

Chapter 4

Figure 4-7: Deployment and Strength of the Chinese MilitaryCentral Theater
Command(HQ: Beijing)
Northern Theater
Command(HQ: Shenyang)(Shijiazhuang)(Jinan)(Lanzhou)Western Theater
Command(HQ: Chengdu)

Southern Theater
Command(HQ: Guangzhou)(Fuzhou)

Eastern Theater
Command(HQ: Nanjing)(Nanning)(Note 1)
Theater command headquarters, Theater command PLA facility(Note 2) Demarcations of the theater commands have not been officially announced;
illustration is based on US Dept. of Defense reports and media accounts.

China(Ref.) Taiwan

Strength of military

Approx. 2.3 million

Approx. 220,000

Groundstrength

GroundtroopsApprox. 1.6 million

Approx. 130,000

Tanks, etc.

99/A, 98A, 96/A, 88A/B, etc.
Approx. 7,200

M-60A, M-48A/H, etc.
Approx. 1,200

Ships

Approx. 880 (1.502 mil tons)

Approx. 390 (210,000 tons)

Carriers,
destroyers,
frigates

Approx. 70

Approx. 30

Submarines

Approx. 60

4Marines

Approx. 10,000

Approx. 10,000

CombataircraftApprox. 2,720

Approx. 510

Modernfighters

J-10 × 347
Su-27/J-11 × 352
Su-30 × 97
J-15 × 14(4th-generation combat
aircraft, total 810)

Mirage 2000 × 56
F-16 × 145
Jingguo × 128(4th-generation combat
aircraft, total 329)

Population

Approx. 1.37 billion

Approx. 23 million

Military duty

2 years

1 yearNavalstrength

Air forcestrength

Notes

Note:

Information taken from “Military Balance” (2016) and similar sources. China’s troop
strength is expected to be reduced by 300,000 by the end of 2017.
Source: Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016 (Annual White Paper), p. 49.
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2016/html/n1232000.html#zuhyo01020303

76

Transformation of the China-Taiwan Relationship and “Maintaining the Status Quo”

Prefacethe Eastern Theater Command. Compared to the military region system of the past,
the new system of theater commands strengthens the command and control authority
to fight at the strategic and tactical levels under the overall command of the CMC.49
The commander of the Eastern Theater Command is Liu Yuejun (formerly commander

Chapter Summaryof the Lanzhou Military Region) and Zheng Weiping (formerly political commissar of
the Nanjing Military Region) is political commissar, with a deputy commander anddeputy political commissar serving under them from each of the three military services(see Table 1).50 For the purpose of integrated military operation, the three services
each assign personnel to the command headquarters. At present, the Army covers all

Introduction

the important posts such as chief of staff and director of the political work department,
showing that the Army still has an advantageous position regarding personnel assigned
to the Eastern Theater Command, but it is probable that in the future, officers fromother services currently serving at the deputy level will be promoted to commander.

Chapter 1

It is still very difficult for the PLA to attain a genuine integrated fighting capability.
In order to overcome difficulties, however, training and exercises for integrated operation have been actively conducted since the establishment of the Eastern Theater
Command.51 The training is considered to be based on a scenario of armed invasionof Taiwan.52 That the Eastern Theater Command is at the top of the list of five theater

Chapter 2

commands and is given priority in the deployment of new equipment and information
technology, also indicates the importance this theater command. The command headquarters of the Eastern Theater Command, responsible for the training of the troops
during peace time and the maintenance and repair of weapons and other equipment,

Chapter 3

is located in Fuzhou, right across the strait from Taiwan.53 Since the Eastern Theater
Command fronts on both the Pacific Ocean and Taiwan, it is reasonable to interpretthat ground forces including the 31st Group Army in the theater are there primarily to
attack Taiwan. That might also be the reason why the Eastern Theater Command’s
Army headquarters is located in Fuzhou.

Chapter 4

It is very fortunate for Taiwan’s military that so far, the PLA has not yet been able
to obtain force projection capabilities suitable to cross the strait and the ability to conduct a finely coordinated attack by the land, sea, and air, in addition to the fact that the
Taiwanese military has technological superiority and the geographical advantage ofConclusions

defending islands. It will probably take time before China can complete its current
reform of the national defense and military. According to the National Defense Reportput out by the Ministry of National Defense, however, the PLA is expected to have all
the capabilities it would need to attack Taiwan by 2020. It is clear that China’s militaryreforms will exert greater military pressure on Taiwan.54(Author: Yasuyuki Sugiura)

77

Chapter 4

Table 4-4: Principal Officers of the Eastern Theater Command
Name

Title

Rank

BranchNotes

Liu Yuejun

Commander

GeneralArmy

Fought in Sino-Vietnamese
War (1979)

Zheng
Weiping

Political
Commissar

General

Army

Yang Hui

DeputyCommander

Lt. General

Army

Gu
Xiangbing

DeputyCommander

Rear
AdmiralNavy

Sun Herong

DeputyCommander

Lt. General

Air Force

Qin Weijiang

DeputyCommander

Lt. General

Army

Concurrently theater Armycommander

Su Zhiqian

DeputyCommander

Vice
AdmiralNavy

Concurrently theater Navycommander

Huang
Guoxian

DeputyCommander

Lt. General

Air Force

Concurrently theater Air Forcecommander

Wang Ping

Dep. Pol.
Commissar

Lt. General

Army

Concurrently director oftheater political work
department

Liao Keduo

Dep. Pol.
Commissar

Maj.
GeneralArmy

Concurrently theater Army
political commissar

Wang
Huayong

Dep. Pol.
Commissar

Vice
AdmiralNavy

Concurrently theater Navy
political commissar

Liu Dewei

Dep. Pol.
Commissar

Maj.
GeneralAir Force

Concurrently theater Air Forcepolitical commissar

Concurrently theater chief ofstaff

Source: 中共研究杂志社 [Zhonggong Yanjiu Zazhishe, Chinese Communism Research Publishers Co.]ed., 军改后共军重要领导人事评析専辑 [Analysis of important leaders of the Chinese postreform military], pp. 69-71.

78

NIDS China Security Report 2017
Change in Continuity: The Dynamics of the China-Taiwan Relationship

Conclusions

Conclusions
This report has examined the China-Taiwan relationship since the People’s Republicof China was proclaimed on the Chinese mainland in October 1949 and, very shortly thereafter, the Republic of China crossed to Taiwan and set up a temporary capital in Taipei. This
report revealed some important points.
For China, Taiwan represents an area to be reunited to the mainland, and it is also on
the front line of China’s confrontation with the United States. As such, even after the end of
the Cold War, the Taiwan problem has remained one potential source of conflict between
China and the United States, and in this sense, the Taiwan problem is also important to thestability of the whole region. More recently, however, as China has continued to emerge on
the international scene, the Taiwan problem has grown in importance in another sense as
well. As a result of the stabilization of Taiwan problem in a way that has been beneficial to
China, China has been able to rise above single-minded concentration on Taiwan and advance its presence and activities in maritime affairs. Since this process has at times involved
China following a very hard line, it is having an influence on the stability of the region. It is
possible that if Taiwan devotes less of its efforts to self-defense, China’s actions will become
even more expansionistic. In that sense, Taiwan’s attention to improving its self-defense
capabilities may influence the stability of the region as a whole. Further, maritime affairs
also become important since Taiwan lies at the nexus of international channels of navigation
tying together the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. As geographical confrontation in East Asia takes on new dimensions, the strategic importance of
Taiwan will likely increase as well.
Each change of government in Taiwan has often been considered as a turning point of
the China-Taiwan relationship. Not only the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo governments which ruled Taiwan under the Kuomintang Party (KMT)’s de facto one-party dictatorship and saw the relationship with China as a civil war, but also the Lee Teng-hui andChen Shui-bian governments which advanced democratization and Taiwanization did nothave high-level contacts between the mainland and Taiwan. However, although it is often
understood that the bilateral exchange was resumed under Ma Ying-jeou, direct air transport
between China and Taiwan had already begun during the Chen Shui-bian administration,even though in an incomplete way. In addition, it was also under Chen Shui-bian that tradeand investment between them began to show rapid growth. Thus, Ma Ying-jeou’s government used the favorable environment generated during Chen Shui-bian’s term to promotefurther negotiations. What the Ma Ying-jeou administration in particular advanced was
making it possible for Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan.

80Conclusions

The China-Taiwan relationship is generally seen as becoming tense since the late
Prefacephase of the Lee Teng-hui government and the Chen Shui-bian government beginning in
2002, while the military tension lessened under Ma Ying-jeou. From a historical, long-term
perspective, from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the resultant split

Chapter Summary

down the Taiwan Strait, up to the present, however, there has been a steady trend toward adecline in military tension. During the early 1950s, fighting continued around the country
between the national army and the liberation army, and crises arose in the Taiwan Strait in1954 and 1958. During the 1960s armed encounters did occur between China and Taiwan,

Introduction

albeit on a very limited scale. Compared to the Mao Zedong-Chiang Kai-shek years when
there was active conflict, despite continuation of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises
seemingly premised on a PLA attack on Taiwan and exercises on Taiwan to counteract a
PLA amphibious landing during the Deng Xiaoping-Chiang Ching-kuo years, there was no

Chapter 1

actual combat. On the other hand, although the bilateral relationship has deepened in areas
such as economy, trade, and tourism, this trend has not been accompanied by a halt ofChinese efforts to build up its military capabilities toward Taiwan and in no way seems to becontributing to any military confidence-building between China and Taiwan.

Chapter 2

The Xi Jinping government is very wary toward Tsai Ing-wen and her administration.
The way in which President Tsai recognized the rights of Taiwan’s indigenous people andapologized for ignoring those rights hints at the possibility of efforts to reshape the historyof Taiwan as separate from that of China. Further, guidance was drawn up and distributed

Chapter 3

under the Ma Ying-jeou administration for a high school history curriculum emphasizing
Chinese history, but the Tsai government has decided to discard that.1 With regard to a verdict handed down by an arbitration court regarding the South China Sea, the Tsai govern-

Chapter 4

ment has expressed the objection only to the reference to Pacific islands under Taiwan’s
effective control as “rocks.” China has used the so-called “nine-dash line” as the basis for its
claims to sovereignty over all the islands of the South China Sea, but the Tsai administrationdiffers from the Ma Ying-jeou administration in not making any positive statements regard-

Conclusions

ing the “11-dash line” which was the basis for the nine-dash line.
Given these recent trends, China will no doubt continue to plan a variety of pressuresand political maneuvers against Taiwan. One of these would be support to the KMT, which
is now an opposition party in Taiwan. In September 2016, a group of eight prefectural andmunicipal leaders belonging to the KMT visited China and met with Yu Zhengsheng, vicechairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Taiwan Work Small Leading Group, themain group dealing with the Taiwan problem, as well as Zhang Zhijun, chairman of theChinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and director of the Taiwan Affairs Officeof the State Council.2 In addition, during the Chiang Shui-bian administration the CCP and
the KMT formed the Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum (commonly referred81Conclusions

to as the “KMT-CCP Forum”) to serve as a forum for peaceful cross-strait development.
China has already begun to exert some pressure through diplomacy, for instance in theselection of Taiwan’s official prime minister’s representative for Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and refusing Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organizationand the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) general conferences. Taiwan was
not invited to attend the 2016 ICAO session. China might also examine ways to steal away
Taiwan’s friendly countries. Militarily, it is possible China will carry out exercises designed
for PLA attacks on Taiwan, strengthen its weaponry, and increase its cyber-attacks.
China will likely continue to strengthen the PLA, giving it the power it needs to dissuade the United States from intervening in problems in the Taiwan Strait, at the same time
promoting the economic and trade ties it built up during the Ma Ying-jeou years as a way of
putting political pressure on the Tsai Ing-wen government and seeking to build the Taiwanesepeople’s sense of insecurity toward the Democratic Progressive Party. The next presidential
election in Taiwan is scheduled for 2020, which is also the year foreseen for completion of
the military reforms as well as for the PLA’s attainment of the capacity to invade Taiwan.
The Tsai government, however, is strongly supported by the people of Taiwan and also hasa majority in the Legislative Yuan. Enjoying a solid political foundation and keeping its determination to “maintain the status quo,” the Tsai administration is certain to be even harderfor China to deal with than the Chen Shui-bian government so long as it does not face along-term decline in popular support due to criticism for domestic affairs. The Xi Jinping
government has not yet subjected Tsai Ing-wen to the kind of personal criticism once directed at Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, a situation likely designed to leave some leeway
for negotiations with her administration. Tsai Ing-wen herself is trying to avoid escalating
any confrontation with China, which would seem to leave the door narrowly open for negotiations. In light of the fact, however, that a majority of voters in Taiwan does not support
Taiwanese independence or China-Taiwan reunification but rather “maintaining the statusquo,” the Tsai Ing-wen administration will likely adopt policies aimed at “consolidating” thestatus quo.
(Author: Rira Momma)

82

Endnote

Chapter 1
1

Madoka Fukuda, Chugoku Gaiko to Taiwan: “Hitotsu no Chugoku Gensoku” no Kigen [Chinese
Diplomacy and Taiwan: Origins of the “One China Principle”], Keio University Press, 2013,
pp. 85-156.

2

Ibid.

3

Ryo Sahashi, Kyozon no Mosaku [A Search for Coexistence], Keiso Shobo, 2015, pp. 130-135.

4

Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Chugoku no Tai-Taiwan Seisaku 1979-1987 [China’s Policy toward Taiwan
1979-1987],” Kokusai Seiji [International Politics] No. 112, May 1996, pp. 123-138.

5“全国人大常委会告台湾同胞书” [Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, “TheMessage to the Compatriots in Taiwan”], 中国社会科学院台湾研究所 [Institute of Taiwan
Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], 现代国际关系研究所 [China Institutes ofContemporary International Relations], 北京市台湾事务办公室 [Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs
Office], 北京市台湾经济研究中心编 [Beijing’s Taiwan Economic Research Center],ed., 台湾
问题重要文献资料匯编 [The Important Literature Compilation of Taiwan Issue], 红旗出版社[The Red Flag Publishing House], 1997, pp. 208-209

6“叶剑英向新华社记者发表的谈话” [Ye Jianying talks to the Xinhua News Agency reporters],
台湾问题重要文献资料匯编 [The Important Literature Compilation of Taiwan Issue], p. 78.

7

邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], “中国大陆和台湾和平统一的设想” [An Idea for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan], 邓小平文选 第3卷 [Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, Volume 3], 人民出版社 [The People’s Publishing House], 1993, pp. 30-31.

8Matsuda, “Chugoku no Tai-Taiwan Seisaku 1979-1987 [China’s Policy toward Taiwan 1979-9江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], “为促进祖国统一大业的完成而继续奋闘” [Fighting continuously to1987],” pp. 126-127.
promote the accomplishment of the great cause of the reunification of the motherland], 江泽民文选 第1卷 [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 1], 人民出版社 [The People’s Publishing
House], 2006, pp. 418-424.
10钱其琛 [Qian Qichen], 外交十记 [Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy], 世界知识出版社 [World
Affairs Press], 2003, pp. 306-307.

11

John Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization, Seattle andLondon: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp. 13-26.

12Garver, Face Off, pp. 118-126; Arthur S. Ding, “The Lessons of the 1995-1996 Military Taiwan
Strait Crisis: Developing a New Strategy toward the United States and Taiwan,” Laurie Burkitt,Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation
Army at 75, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 380-383.

13

Garver, Face Off, pp. 111-117.

14

江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], “国际形势和军事战略方针” [The International Situation and Guidelinesof Military Strategy], 江泽民文选 第1卷 [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 1], p. 286.

15

军事科学院军事歴史研究所编著 [Military History Institute, Academy of Military Sciencesed.], 中国人民解放军八十年大事记（1927-2007）[Historical Events of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army over the past 80 years (1927-2007)], 军事科学出版社 [Military Science Press],
2007, p. 518.

16

84

张震 [Zhang Zhen], “全面加强军队幹部队伍建设” [Comprehensively Strengthening of theEndnote

Construction of the Army Cadres], 张震军事文选 下卷 [The Selected Military Works of Zhang
Zhen (Second volume)], 解放军出版社 [People’s Liberation Army Publishing House], 2005,
pp. 655-656.
17张万年 [Zhang Wannian], “ “九五”至二十一世纪初军队建设的奋闘目标和指导思想” [TheGoal and the Guiding Ideology of the Military Construction from the Ninth Five-year Plan Period
to the Early 21st Century], 张万年军事文选 [The Selected Military works of Zhang Wannian],
解放军出版社 [People’s Liberation Army Publishing House], 2008, pp. 519-520.

18“一个中国的原则與台湾问题” [The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue], 台湾事务办
公室 [Taiwan Affairs Office] and 国务院新闻办公室 [State Council Information Office], 中华
人民共和国国务院 [State Council of the People’s Republic of China], February, 1, 2000.

19

For example, “钱其琛副总理会见台湾联合报系访问团” [Vice-Premier Qian Qichen Meets
Delegation from United Daily News Group of Taiwan], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency]. August25, 2000.

20

Yoshiyuki Ogasawara refers to this as his “flexible approach.” See Yoshiyuki Ogasawara,“Chugoku no Tai-Taiwan Seisaku no Tenkai [Evolution of Chinese Policy toward Taiwan],”Satoshi Amako and Emi Mifune eds., Bocho suru Chugoku no Taigai Kankei: Pakusu Shinika to
Shuhenkoku [China’s Burgeoning Foreign Relationships: Pax Sinica and China’s Neighboring
Countries], Keiso Shobo, 2010, pp. 200-204.

21“中共中央台湾工作办公室、国务院台湾事务办公室受权就当前两岸关系问题发表声明”[Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Have Been Authorized toMake a Statement on the Current Cross-straits Relations], 中共中央台办、国务院台办 [Taiwan
Affairs Office, State Council of the People’s Republic of China], May 17, 2004.

22

Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Kaizen no Kikai wa Sonzai Shita ka? Chu-Tai Tairitsu no Kozo Henka [Was
There a Chance for Improvement? Structural Changes in the China-Taiwan Confrontation],”Masahiro Wakabayashi ed., Posuto Minshukaki no Taiwan Seiji: Chin Suihen Seiken no 8 Nen[Taiwan’s Politics in the Post-democratization Period: The Eight Years of the Chen Shui-bianGovernment], Institute of Developing Economies, 2010, pp. 242-244.

23“反分裂国家法” [Anti-Secession Law of the People’s Republic of China], 新华社 [Xinhua
News Agency], March 14, 2005.

24

Matsuda, “Kaizen no Kikai wa Sonzai shita ka? [Was There a Chance for Improvement?],”pp. 237-240.

25

Ogasawara, “Chugoku no Tai-Taiwan Seisaku no Tenkai [Evolution of Chinese Policy toward
Taiwan],” pp. 204-209.

26

戴秉国 [Dai Bingguo], 战略对话 ：戴秉国回忆录 [Strategic Dialogue: The Memoirs of Dai
Bingguo], 人民出版社 [People’s Publishing House] and 世界知识出版社 [World Affairs Press],
2016, pp. 65-85.

27

戴 [Dai], 战略对话 [Strategic Dialogue], p. 73.

28“President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,” Office of the Press

29“President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press,” Office of the Press Secretary,

Secretary, White House, October 25, 2002.
White House, Dec. 9, 2003.

85

Endnote

30“2005年3月3日外交部发言人刘建超在例行记者会上答记者问” [Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Liu Jianchao Held a Regular Press Conference and Answered Questions on March 3rd, 2005],
中华人民共和国外交部 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China].

31

Bonnie Glaser, “Sino-U.S. Relations: Drawing Lessons from 2005,” CSIS Freeman Report,
January 2006.

32“中国国家主席胡锦涛與美国总统布什举行会谈” [Chinese President Hu Jintao Held Talks
with US President Bush], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], November, 20, 2005.

33

胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “在党的十七大上的报告” [Report to the 17th CPC National Congress], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], October 24, 2007.

34

胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “纪念『告台湾同胞书』30周年胡锦涛发表重要讲话” [Hu Jintao Delivered
an Important Speech to the Symposium Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Release of “TheMessage to Compatriots in Taiwan”], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], December 31, 2008.

35

Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations, Washington, D.C.;
Brookings Institution Press, 2013, p.147.

36

For an analysis of how China’s military operations toward Taiwan would be carried out, see: Roger
Cliff, China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2015, pp. 182-222; Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,”International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 51-86; Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Chu-Tai no
Gunji Baransu: Chu-Tai no Anzenhosho Senryaku ni Ataeru Eikyou [Military Balance between
the PRC and Taiwan: The Impact on National Security Strategies of the PRC and Taiwan],”Nihon Taiwan Gakkaihou [Japan Taiwan Society Journal], Vol. 7, May 2005, pp. 69-89.

37

Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” p. 34.

38

Michael J. Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James Williams, and Barry Wilson, Air Defense
Options for Taiwan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016.

39

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Political Development and U.S.-China Relations,” Cheng-yi Lin
and Denny Roy eds., The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 13-28.

40Bush, Uncharted Strait, pp. 98-103.

41“中共中央台湾工作办公室、国务院台湾事务办公室受权就当前两岸关系问题发表声明”[Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Have Been Authorized toMake a Statement on the Current Cross-straits Relations], 中共中央台办、国务院台办 [Taiwan
Affairs Office, State Council of the People’s Republic of China], May 17, 2004.

42

National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) ed., China Security Report 2013, NIDS, 2014, pp.
16-23.

43“台办就2010年海峡两岸海上联合搜救演炼等答问” [Taiwan Affairs Office Answered Questions
on 2010 Cross-strait Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise], 中国网 [China Internet
Information Center], September 15, 2010. “海峡两岸海上联合搜救演炼在厦门、金门海域举行”[Cross-strait Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise Was Held in the Waters Between
Xiamen and Kinmen], 交通运输部网 [The Ministry of Transport website], August 31, 2012. “两岸海上联合搜救演炼促航运发展” [Cross-strait Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise

86Endnote

Will Promote the Development of the Shipping Industry], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], August 19,
2014.
44

“习近平同马英九会面” [Xi Jinping Meets Ma Ying-jeou], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], November 8,
2015.

Chapter 2
1

金门古宁头舟山登步岛之战史料续辑 [Series of Military Documents on the Battles of Kinmen
Guningtou and Zhoushan Dengpudao], 国史馆史料処编 [Historical Material Department,
Academia Historica] ed., 1982, p. 27.

2“金门战闘失利的原因（1949年11月14日）” [Causes of Defeat in the Jinmen Battle (November
14, 1949)], 粟裕文选（1949.10-1984.1）[Selected Works of Su Yu (October 1949-January1984)], Vol. 3, 粟裕文选编辑组 [Selected Works of Su Yu Editing Council] ed., 军事科学出版
社 [Military Science Publishing House], 2004, pp. 12-13.

3“大力做好解放海南岛的準备工作” [The Great Efforts to Prepare for the Liberation of Hainan
Island], 中共中央文献研究室、中国人民解放军军事科学院编 [CCCPC Party Literature
Research Office, The Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Armyed.], 建国以来毛泽东军事文稿 [Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Founding of the
PRC] Vol. 1, 军事科学出版社 [Military Science Publishing House], 中央文献出版社 [Central
Party Literature Press], 2010, pp. 119-120.

4

林君長 [Lin Junchang] ed., 中华民国建国七十年纪念丛书

国民革命军之奋闘 [Seventieth

Anniversary Series on the Founding of the Republic of China: Struggle of the National
Revolutionary Army], 黎明文化事业股份有限公司 [Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd.],
1981, pp. 429-435.
5

军事科学院军事历史研究部 [Department of Military History Studies, Academy of Military
Science] ed., 中国人民解放军全国解放战争史 [Chinese Civil War History of the PLA], Vol. 5(February 1949-June 1950), 军事科学出版社 [Military Science Publishing House], 1997,
p. 424.

6

Ibid., p. 442.

7

“大力做好解放海南岛的準备工作” [The Great Efforts to Prepare for the Liberation of Hainan
Island], pp. 119-120.

8

姜廷玉 [Jiang Tingyu] ed., 台湾地区五十年军事史（1949－2006）[The 50-Year Military
History of the Taiwan Region (1949-2006)], 解放军出版社 [Chinese People’s Liberation Army
Publishing House], 2013, p. 23; “关与台湾作战问题的报告（1950年6月23日）” [Report on
Taiwan Operation Problems (June 23, 1950)], 粟裕文选编辑组 [Selected Works of Su Yu Editing
Council], “粟裕文选（1949.10－1984.1）” [Selected Works of Su Yu (October 1949-January1984)], Vol. 3, pp. 44-52.

9“中国人民解放军史”编写组编 [History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army] ed., 中国人
民解放军史 [History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army], Vol. 5, 军事科学出版社 [Military
Science Publishing House], 2011, p. 75.

10

姜 [Jiang], 台湾地区五十年军事史(1949－2006) [The 50-Year Military History of the Taiwan
Region], p. 25.

87

Endnote11

林孝庭 [Hsiao-ting Lin], 台海 冷战 蒋介石1949-1988 解密档案中消失的台湾史 [Taiwan Strait,
the Cold War and Chiang Kai-shek: The Hidden History of Taiwan in Declassified Documents],
联経出版事业股份有限公司 [Linking Publishing], 2015, p. 114.

12

Yasuhiro Matsuda, Taiwan ni okeru Ittou Dokusai Taisei no Seiritsu [The Establishment of OneParty Dictatorship in Taiwan], Keio University Press, 2006, p. 361.

13

姜 [Jiang], 台湾地区五十年军事史(1949-2006) [The 50-Year Military History of the Taiwan
Region], p. 27.

14

宋怡明 [Michael Szonyi], 前线岛屿冷战下的金门 [Cold War Island: Quemoy on the FrontLine], 国立台湾大学出版中心 [National Taiwan University Press], 2016, pp. 65-66.
15

Ibid., pp. 85-86.

16

Japan Ministry of Defense ed., Defense of Japan 2014, p. 15, Figure I.1.2.1.

17

Mikio Sumiya, 劉進慶 [Shinkei Liu], 凃照彦 [Jaw-Yann Twu], Taiwan no Keizai: Tenkei NIES
no Hikari to Kage [The Economy of Taiwan: Positive and Negative Aspects of Typical NIEs],
University of Tokyo Press, 1992, p. 78.

18

Takayuki Igarashi, Taiwan no Tairiku Koufuku Kousou to Gunji Senryaku no Tenkan [Taiwan’s
Reconquering the Mainland Concept and Shift in Military Strategy] (1965-1991), M.A. thesis,
National Defense Academy Graduate School of Security Studies, 2015, pp. 15-27.

19

Sumiya, 劉 [Liu], 凃 [Twu], Taiwan no Keizai [The Economy of Taiwan: Positive and Negative
Aspects of Typical NIEs], University of Tokyo Press, 1992, p. 39.

20

赵春山 [Chao Chun-shan] ed., 两岸关系与政府大陆政策 [Cross-Strait Relations and the21

李登辉 [Lee Teng-hui] 笔记, 李登辉 [Lee Teng-hui] 口述歴史小组编注 [Oral History Group

Government’s Mainland Policies], 三民书局 [San Min Books], 2013, p. 4.
ed.,], 见证台湾蒋经国总统与我 [Witness of Taiwan: Chiang Ching-kuo and I], 国史馆[Academia Historica], 2004, p. 235.
22

李登辉 [Lee Teng-hui]（雏景文）, 李登辉执政告白实录 [Memoir of the Lee Teng-hui
Administration], 印刻出版 [Yinke Press], 2001, pp. 48-54.

23

Masahiro Wakabayashi, Taiwan no Seiji: Chukaminkoku Taiwanka no Sengoshi [Politics of Taiwan:
Postwar History of Taiwanization of the Republic of China], University of Tokyo Press, 2008,
p. 178.

24

Igarashi, Taiwan no Tairiku Koufuku Kousou to Gunji Senryaku no Tenkan [Taiwan’s Reconquering25

黄伟修 [Wei-Hsiu Huang], “Li Touki soutou no tairiku seisaku kettei katei [The Mainland China

the Mainland Concept and Shift in Military Strategy] (1965-1991), p. 59.
Policy-making Process of President Lee Teng-hui],” The Japan Association for Taiwan Studies
Bulletin, Vol. 10, Japan Association for Taiwan Studies, 2008, pp. 97-118.
26

田弘茂 [Tien Hung-mao], “中华民国元首外交的意义” [Significance of ROC Presidential
Diplomacy], 行政院新闻局 [Government Information Office] ed., 和平之旅 [Journey of Peace],
行政院新闻局 [Government Information Office] , 1997, p. 4.

27

“表1-8

国民党与民进党执政时期正副元首及阁揆出访国纪录” [Table 1-8 Visit records of

the President, Vice President and the Prime Minister during the ruling period of the Kuomintang
and the Democratic Progressive Party respectively], 苏起 [Su Chi], 两岸波涛二十年纪实 [Recordof 20 Years of Great Waves over the Taiwan Strait], 远见天下文化出版股份有限公司 [Global
Views – Commonwealth Publishing Group], 2014, p. 45.

88

Endnote28

苏 [Su], 两岸波涛二十年纪实 [Record of 20 Years of Great Waves over the Taiwan Strait],p. 41.

29

法务部调查局共党问题研究中心编 [Ministry of Justice, Investigation Bureau, Studies in
Communism Center], ed., 两岸关系大事记 民国八十五年 [Chronology of Major Events
across the Taiwan Strait in 1996], 匯泽股份有限公司 [Huize Co. Ltd.], 1997, p. 20.

30

李登辉 [Lee Teng-hui]（雏景文）, 李登辉执政告白实录 [Memoir of the Lee Teng-hui
Administration], pp. 222-227.

31

陈水扁 [Chen Shui-bian], Taiwan no ko [Child of Taiwan], The Mainichi Newspapers, 2000,
p. 113.

32

Measures to terminate the functions of the Taiwan Provincial Government and Taiwan Provincial
Consultative Council. Since most of the areas of the Free Area of the Republic of China and Taiwan
Province (Free Area of the Republic of China excluding Kaohsiung City, Kinmen, and Matsu)
overlap (as of 1997, accounting for 85 percent of the population and 98 percent of the land), it
was pointed out that this was an unnecessary measures and a waste of administrative resources.

33总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “中华民国第十任总统、副总统就职庆祝大会”[President Chen’s Inaugural Address], May 20, 2000.

34

Ibid.

35

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “总统620记者会答问实录” [Presidential Press
Conference], June 20, 2000.

36

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “总统接见美国亚洲基金会会长傅勒博士” [President

37

However, on July 6, Tsai Ing-wen, who was Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council at theChen Meets with Chairman William Fuller], June 27, 2000.
time, stated, “At the meeting in Hong Kong in October 1992, the One China Principle was discussed, but no conclusion was reached. Accordingly, the Taiwan side proposed that each side
make respective statements through verbal announcements. In response to this, the China sidestated that it would ‘respect Taiwan’s proposal.’ Taiwan expressed this process as ‘one China,
with respective interpretations’,” correcting President Chen’s statement by pointing out that noconsensus had actually been reached either on “one China, with respective interpretations” or on
China’s view of “one China.” The DPP government may have striven internally to arrive at acommon view of the One China Principle.
38

苏 [Su], 两岸波涛二十年纪实 [Record of 20 Years of Great Waves over the Taiwan Strait],p. 323.

39

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “总统以视讯直播方式於世界台湾同乡联合会第二十九届年会中致词” [President Chen Delivers the Opening Address at the 29th Annual Meetingof the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link], August 3, 2002.

40

Wakabayashi, Taiwan no Seiji [Politics of Taiwan], p. 376.

41张炎宪 [Chang Yen-hsien], 陈世宏 [Chen, Shihong] ed., 台湾主権与攻势外交 [Taiwanese
Sovereignty and Aggressive Diplomacy], 财团法人吴三连台湾史料基金会 [Wu San-lien
Taiwan History Material Foundation], 2012, p. 9.

42

Ibid., p. 15.

43

国防部「国防报告书」编纂委员会 [National Defense Report Editing Council, Ministry of
National Defense], 中华民国95年国防报告书 [2006 ROC National Defense Report], 国防部

89Endnote[The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China], 2007, p. 93.
44

中华民国97年国防报告书 [2008 ROC National Defense Report], 2008, p. 114.

45

Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council Website, “推動两岸空运直航” [Promoting Direct Air
Transportation between Taiwan and China], August 31, 2016.

46

杨丹伟 [Yang Danwei], 解析台湾的大陆政策 [Analysis of Taiwan’s Mainland China Policies],
群言出版社 [Qunyan Press], 2007, p. 65.

47

Hidenori Ijiri, Gekiryu ni Tatsu Taiwan Seiji Gaikoshi [History of Politics and Diplomacy of
Taiwan in Rapid Transition], Minerva Shobo, 2013, p. 109.

48

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “中枢举行中华民国95年开国纪念典礼暨元旦团拜”[President Chen’s New Year Message], January 1, 2006.

49

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “中华民国第12任总统马英九先生就职演说”[President Ma’s Inaugural Address], May 20, 2008.

50

National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2016, NIDS,
2016, p. 126.

51

See the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council Website, “两岸大事记” [Chronology of Major
Events across the Taiwan Strait]

52

Rira Momma, “Chu-tai Mondai Tantou Kakuryou, Nankin de Seishiki ni Kaidan Jisshi [Ministers
in charge of the China-Taiwan Problem Hold Official Meeting in Nanjing]” (Trends in Taiwan,
January-February 2014), East Asia, March 2014, p. 53.

53

国防部「国防报告书」编纂委员会 [National Defense Report Editing Council, Ministry of
National Defense], 中华民国98年国防报告书 [2009 ROC National Defense Report], 国防部[The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China], 2009, p. 79.

54

总统府 [Presidential Office] Press Release, “总统主持97年三军五校院联合毕业典礼” [President
Ma Presides over Joint Graduation Ceremony of Military Cadets in 2008], July 2, 2008.

55

NIDS ed., NIDS China Security Report 2013, NIDS, 2014, p. 16.

56

中华民国98年「四年期国防総検讨」编纂委员会 [QDR Editing Council, Ministry of National
Defense], 中华民国98年

四年期国防总检讨 [2009 Quadrennial Defense Review], 国防部[The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China], 2009, p. 23; 中华民国102年「四年期国防総検讨」编纂委员会 [QDR Editing Council, Ministry of National Defense], 中华民
国102年

四年期国防总检讨 [2013 Quadrennial Defense Review], 国防部 [The Ministry of

National Defense of the Republic of China], 2013, pp. 24-25.
57

胡镇埔 [Hu Chen-pu], 扁执政最机密军演也拟告知对岸, 联合晚报（电子版）[United Daily
News Evening Edition (Online Edition)], December 7, 2011.

58

台湾外交部 [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China], “在钓鱼台列屿争端、
我国不与中国大陆合作之立场 [The ROC Does Not Cooperate with Mainland China in the
Diaoyutai Dispute],” February 8, 2013.

59

Rira Momma, “Ma Eikyu Seiken, Senkaku Shori de Chugoku to Renkei Sinai Mune o Meikaku ni
Hyoumei [Ma Ying-jeou Administration States That It Will Not Cooperate with China in Dealing
with the Senkaku Islands]” (Trends of Taiwan, January-February, 2014), East Asia, April 2013,
p. 52.

60“持中国五星旗保钓

将不再受我国护卫 [The Protesters Holding a Chinese National Flag to

Defend the Diaoyu Islands Will No Longer Be Protected by Our Country],” 自由时报（电子版）90Endnote[The Liberty Times (Online)], 速报 (News Flash), March 11, 2013.
61“国安单位 ：黄锡麟保钓 背后有国台办身影 [National Security Agent: Taiwan Affairs Officeof the State Council is Behind the Scene of Huang Hsi-lin’s Activity of Protecting Diaoyu
Islands],” 自由时报（电子版）[The Liberty Times (Online)], March 1, 2013.

Chapter 3
1

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009.

2

Ryo Sahashi, Kyozon no Mosaku [A Search for Coexistence], Keiso Shobo, 2015, p. 114.

3

“Shanghai Communiqué (The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and thePeople’s Republic of China relating to President Nixon’s Visit to China),” The World and Japan
Database Project, Akihiko Tanaka Research Center, University of Tokyo Institute for Advanced
Studies on Asia.

4

Sahashi, Kyozon no Mosaku [A Search for Coexistence], pp. 130-134.

5

Ibid., pp. 151-182.

6

H.R.2479, Taiwan Relations Act, 96th Congress (1979-1980), Jan.1, 1979.

7

Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States,
Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act,” The China Quarterly, No. 165 (March 2001), pp. 147-151.

8

James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon
to Clinton, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, pp. 118-128.

9“The Second Shanghai Communiqué (The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America
and the People’s Republic of China [relating to the matter of US sale of arms to Taiwan]),” The
World and Japan Database Project, Akihiko Tanaka Research Center, University of Tokyo Institutefor Advanced Studies on Asia.

10

Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 147.

11

H.Con.Res.88, “Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones ofUnited States-Taiwan relations,” 114th Congress (2015-2016).

12

Winston Lord, “Taiwan Policy Review,” The DISAM Journal, Winter 1994-95.

13

Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 203-204.

14

钱其琛 [Qian Qichen], 外交十记 [Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy], 世界知识出版社[Beijing: World Culture Publishing House], 2003, p. 312.

15

Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 259-262.

16

Kurt M. Campbell, “Why Taiwan Matters,” Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, US Department of State, October4, 2011.

17

Stokes and Tsai divide the problem of diplomatic recognition into four categories. See Mark Stokes
and Sabrina Tsai, “The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait: Driving
Forces and Implications for U.S. Security Interests,” Project 2049 Institute, February 1, 2016.

18

Charles L. Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.90, No.2, Mar/Apr
2011, pp. 80-91.

19Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition
and Accommodation,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 49-90.

91Endnote

20

John J. Mearsheimer, “Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March-April 2014.

21

Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Balancing the East, Upgrading the West,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No.1,
January/February 2012, pp. 97-104.

22

Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits US Security,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, January/February 2010, pp. 44-60.

23

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The
Washington Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 23-37; Richard C. Bush, “Uncharted Strait,” Policy Brief,
No.186, Brookings Institute, January 2013; Denny Roy, “Trading away Taiwan is no bargain for
the USA,” PacNet, June 23, 2015.

24

Michael McDevitt, “Alternative Futures: Long-Term Challenges for the United States” Roger
Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold eds. New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s
Security, RAND Corporation, 2011, pp. 105-107.

25

Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, New York and Boston:Twelve, 2016, pp. 255-258.

26

Ian Easton,“Taiwan’s Naval Role in the Rebalance to Asia,” Project 2049 Institute, March 2015;
Dean Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security: A Critical American Interest,” Backgrounder, No.2889,
Heritage Foundation, March 19, 2014; Alexander Sullivan, “Navigation the Future: U.S.-Taiwan
Maritime Cooperation and Building Order in Asia,” Center for a New American Security, June
2015.

27

“Caucus Brief: US Might Tap Into Taiwan Early Warning Radar,” China Caucus Blog, May 9, 2014.

28

Easton, “Taiwan’s Naval Role in the Rebalance to Asia,” pp. 3-4.

29

Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security,” pp. 11-12.

30

Shu-tu Lee, Douglas Paal, and Chales Glaser, “Disengaging from Taiwan: Should Washington
Continue Its Alliance with Taipei?” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, pp. 179-182.

31

Douglas Paal, “China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition,” The Diplomat. Dec. 29, 2015.

32

Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy,
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p.71.

33

Regarding the Chinese reaction, see “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales,” US-Taiwan
Business Council, Project 2049 Institute, March 2012.

34

Yasuhiro Matsuda, “‘Sairyo no Kankei’ kara ‘Sogo Fushin’ e [From “The Best Possible
Relationship” to “Mutual Distrust”],” Masahiro Wakabayashi, ed., Posuto Minshukaki no Taiwan
Seiji: Chin Suihen Seiken no 8 Nen [Taiwan’s Politics in the Post- democratization Period: The
Eight Years of the Chen Shui-bian Government], Institute of Developing Economies, 2010,
pp. 286-292.

35

Shirley Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service,
August 29, 2014, pp. 20-24.

36Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” pp. 24-25.

37

Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 227-228.

38

Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process,” CRS Report for Congress, June 5, 2001.

39

Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” p. 162; Michael S. Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan
Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship,” Nancy Bernkopf Tucker ed.,Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005,

92

Endnote

pp. 170-174.
40

Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 261.

41“开启臺美国防伙伴关係的新章节 [New Chapter for US-Taiwan Defense Partnership],” 国防政策蓝皮书第4号报告 [Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 4], 新境界文教基金会国防政策諮询
小组 [New Frontier Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee], June, 2013, p. 11.

42

Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation,” pp. 174-175; “开启臺美国防伙伴关係的新章节”[New Chapter for US-Taiwan. Defense Partnership], p. 11.

43“美台蒙特瑞会谈今在五角大厦登场” [US-Taiwan Monterey Talks Will Be Held in Pentagon
Today], 自由时报 [The Liberty Times], July 20, 2015.

44“开启臺美国防伙伴关係的新章节” [New Chapter for US-Taiwan Defense Partnership], p. 11.

45

Ibid.

46

“开启臺美国防伙伴关係的新章节” [New Chapter for US-Taiwan Defense Partnership], Kan,
“Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” pp. 6-7.

47

Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation,” pp. 179-180.

48

Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” pp. 3-5.

49

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The United States and Taiwan’s Defense Transformation,”
Brookings Institution, Feb. 16, 2010.

50

Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” pp. 5-6.

Chapter 4
1

“大陆政策

答客问

经贸类

陆客来台观光执行情形如何？政府如何因应陆客减少？”[Policy implementation of opening up Taiwan to Mainland tourists], Executive Yuan, MainlandAffairs Council website,
2“Chugoku Tairiku Kyaku Genshou de Taiwan Ryokougaisha Tousan [Taiwan Tourism Company
Bankruptcies Grow as Tourists from China Mainland Decline],” Taiwan Times, September 1,
2016.

3

经济部国际贸易局 [Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade], 2009年中华民国对外贸易发展概况 [2009 Status of Foreign Trade Development with the Republic of China],
May 26, 2010, p. 3.

4

国防部「国防报告书」编纂小组 [Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report editing committee], 中华民国104年国防报告书 [2015 National Defense Report ROC], 国防部[Ministry of National Defense], 2015, p. 47.

5

中华人民共和国国务院报道办公室 [The State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
Information Office],中国的军事战略 [China’s Military Strategy], 外文出版社 [Foreign
Language Press], 2015, p. 5.

6

罗致政 [Luo Zhizheng], “民共交流的困境与出路” [The Difficulties and Outlet of the Communication between the Communist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party], 苏起·童振源主编 [Su Chi and Tong Zhenyuan], ed., 两岸关系的机遇与挑战 [The Opportunities and Challengesof the Cross-straits Relations], Wunan Book Co., Ltd., 2014, p. 316.

7

国防部「国防报告书」编纂小组 [Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report editing committee], 中华民国104年国防报告书 [2015 National Defense Report ROC], p. 47.

93

Endnote8吴 建 德 [Wu Jiande] et. al. ed., 对 立 的 和 谐

跨 越 两 岸 关 系 深 水 区 [The Opposite ofHarmonious—Across the Deep Waters of the Cross-straits Relations], 黎明文化事业股份有限公司 [Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd.], 2013, p. 43.
9

国防部「国防报告书」编纂小组 [Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report editing committee], 中华民国81年国防报告书 [1992 National Defense Report ROC], 国防部[Ministry of National Defense], 1992, p. 47.

10

国防部「国防报告书」编纂小组 [Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report
Editing Committee], 中华民国104年国防报告书 [2015 National Defense Report ROC], p. 47.

11总统府 [Office of the President], Press Release, “总统出席『两岸领导人会面』后召开国际记者会 [Opening Remarks by President Ma at an International Press Conference Following Meetingwith Mainland Chinese Leader Xi Jinping in Singapore],” November 7, 2015.

12“飞彈非针對台 军方斥习睁眼說瞎话 [The Missiles Are Not Aimed at Taiwan—The Militaries
Criticize That Xi Was Lying Through His Teeth],” 自由时报（电子版）[The Liberty Times(Online)], November 8, 2015.

13“立法院第8届第3会期外交及国防委员会第6次全体委员会议纪录 [Record of the Proceedingsof the Diplomatic and Defense Committees, 6th Meeting of Full Committees],” March 20, 2013,
Third Session, Eighth Legislative Yuan.

14“匪谍就在你身边？// 国安局长 ：现在到处有不该来的人 [Communist Espionage Is Just
Around the Corner // National Security Bureau Director: There Are People Everywhere Who
Should Not Come],” 自由时报（电子版）[The Liberty Times (Online)], March 21, 2013.

15“国防部新大楼 恐不敌中国『第五纵队』攻击 [The New Building of the Ministry of National
Defense—Perhaps It Could Not Resist the Attack of the Fifth Column of China],” 自由时报（电子版）[The Liberty Times (Online)], June 17, 2015.

16“兪正声 ：两岸同根同源

应共御外侮 [Yu Zhengsheng: Mainland and Taiwan Come from theSame Origin—We Should Join Hands against Attacks from Outside],” 中国时报（电子版）[China
Times (Online)], May 15, 2013.
17“退将今登陆退将今登陆

首访中共中央军委会 [The Retired Generals Will Visit Mainland

Today—They Will Visit the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee First],” 中国时报（电子版）[China Times (Online)], May 10, 2013.
18

National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2013, NIDS,

19“退役将领访陆退役将领访陆

2013, pp. 196-197.
退辅会 ：有说明 [The Retired Generals Visit Mainland—

Veterans Affairs Council: It Has Been Explained],” 中央社 [Central News Agency], May 15,
2013.
20

“两岸退役将领厦门打高尔夫

我退将两岸退役将领厦门打高尔夫

我退将 ：两岸同胞要

相信自己是一家人 [The Retired Generals on Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits Play Golf in
Xiamen—The Retired Generals of Taiwan: The Compatriots on Both Sides Should Believe That
We Are All One Family],” 风傳媒 [Storm Media Group], November 16, 2015.
21“立法院第9届第1会期外交及国防委员会第28次全体委员会议纪录 [The 28th Committee
Meeting Proceedings of the Foreign and National Defense Committee, Session 1 of the 9th
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China],” 立法院公报 第105卷第49期委员会纪录 [Legislative
Yuan Gazette, Vol. 105, 49th Committee Meeting Proceedings], p. 88.

94

Endnote22“蔡总统视导汉光32号演习

嘉勉国军精实战力 [President Tsai Inspects Han Kuang No. 32

Military Exercises and Encourages the National Army to Upgrade Their Combat Power],” 军事
新闻通讯社（电子版）[Military News Agency (online)], August 25, 2016.
23“剖析国军新军事战略（李华球）[Analysis of the New Military Strategy of the National Army (LiHuaqiu)],” 苹果日报（电子版）[Apple Daily (online) ], September 5, 2016.

24

赵峰 [Zhao Feng], 台军20年轉型之路－从「精实案」到「精粹案」[20 Years Transformation
Process of the National Army—From “Simplified and Practical Plan” to “Streamlined andEssential Plan”], National Defense University Press, 2015, pp. 62-63.

25

国防部「国防报告书」编纂小组 [Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report editing
committee], 中华民国82-83年国防报告书 [Republic of China National Defense Report 82-83],
黎明文化事業股份有限公司 [Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd.], 1994, pp. 74-75.

26

赵 [Zhao], 台军20年轉型之路－从「精实案」到「精粹案」[20 Years Transformation Processof the National Army—From “Simplified and Practical Plan” to “Streamlined and Essential
Plan”], pp. 64-66

27

Ibid., p. 71.

28

Ibid., p. 82.

29

Ibid., pp. 84-85.

30

Rira Momma, “Taiwan Seiji to Gunji Senryaku no Kankei [The Relationship of Taiwan’s Politics
and Military Strategy], Jun Yasuda & Rira Momma eds. Taiwan o Meguru Anzenhosho [TheSecurity Environment Surrounding Taiwan], Keio University Press, 2016, pp. 65-68.

31

Ibid., p. 63.

32“新军事战略 明年三月参谋总长国会报告 [New Military Strategy—Chief of Staff Will Reportto the Congress in March Next Year],” 自由时报（电子版）[The Liberty Times (Online)],August 28, 2016.

33“冯世寬 ：行政院主导第四军种 国防部支援 [Feng Shi-kuan: Executive Yuan Leads the Fourth
Military Branch—Ministry of National Defense Provides Support],” 中央通讯社 [The Central
News Agency], May 23, 2016.

34“新国防政策 冯世宽 ：成立第四军种 [New National Defense Policy—Feng Shikuan: Establish
the Fourth Military Branch],” 中央通讯社 [The Central News Agency], May 26, 2016.

35“科技部长张善政 ：陆网军天天攻台当练兵 [Chang San-cheng, Minister of Science andTechnology: Mainland Cyber Army Attacks Taiwan Everyday as a Training],” 联合报（电子版）[United Daily News (online)], August 14, 2014.
36

总统府 [Office of the President], Press Release, “中华民国第14任総统蔡英文女士就职演説[Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen],” May 20, 2016.

37

总统府 [Office of the President], Press Release, “总统代表政府向原住民族道歉 [President
Tsai Ing-wen Apologized on the Morning of August 1 to the Indigenous Peoples on Behalf of theGovernment], 总统出席 105年度全国原住民族行政会议 [The President Attends the 2016
Executive Session of the Aborigines of ROC],” August 1, 2016.

38

行政院 [Executive Yuan], Press Release, “政院：整合所有资源 全力推动新南向政策 [Executive
Yuan: Integrate All of Our Resources—Make Every Effort to Promote the New Southbound
Policy],” 行政院经贸谈判办公室 [Executive Yuan Office of Trade Negotiation], 国家发展委员
会 [National Development Council], “新南向政策推动计画” [“New Southbound Policy”

95Endnote

Promotion Plan Launched], September 5, 2016.
39“习近平在中央军委改革工作会议上强调全面实施改革强军战略坚定不移走中国特色

强军之路 [Xi Jinping Stresses at CMC: Comprehensively Apply a Strategy for Reforming theArmy, Unwaveringly Follow the Path of a Strong Military with Chinese Characteristics],” 解放军报 [PLA Daily], November 27, 2015.
40“陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行 [Army Leadership Groups Stage
Conference in Beijing to Establish Rocket Force Strategic Support Unit],” 解放军报 [PLA
Daily], January 2, 2016.

41“习近平在 接见军委机关各部门负责同志时强调构政治谋打赢搞含做表率努力建设 ‘四铁’军委机构 [Xi Jinping Stresses When He Meets The Leaders of the Departments of theMilitary Authority: Emphasize on Political Awareness, Win the War, Improve Services andBecome Role Models to Make Efforts on Building a ‘Four Iron-like’ Military Authority],” 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 12, 2016.
42“中国人民解放军战区成立大会在北京举行 [Ceremony Held in Beijing to Establish People’s
Liberation Army Theater Commands],” 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 2, 2016.

43

大公网 [Ta Kung Net], February 23, 2016, http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2016-02/
3283259.html.

44South China Morning Post, January 13, 2016.

45

马浩亮 [Ma Haoliang], “中国军队大改革 [Major Reforms for Chinese Military Units],” 中国省级政经生态周报 第45期 [Volume 45].

46

“中国人民解放军战区成立大会在北京举行 [Ceremony Held in Beijing to Mark Establishmentof People’s Liberation Army Theater Commands].”47

香港 “文匯报 [Wen Wei Po],” November 27, 2015.

48“国防部举行专题新闻发布会 [Ministry of National Defense Holds Special Press Conference],”
解放军报 [PLA Daily], November 28, 2015.

49

胡光正 [Hu Guangzheng], 许今朝 [Xu Jinzhao], “伟大改革的精髓―论军委管总、战区主战、
军种主建 [The Spirit of the Great Reforms—Discussing Overall Control by the CMC, Taking
the Theater Commands for the Main Fighting, Building Based on the Service Branches],” 国防[National Defense], 国防杂志社 [National Defense Magazine Co.], March 2016 (Vol. 361),
pp. 6-8.

50

中共研究杂誌社编 [Studies on Chinese Communism Publishing Co. ed.], 军改后共军重要领导人事评析专辑 [Collection of Evaluations of Important Leaders of the Communist Military
after the Military Reforms], 中共研究杂誌社 [Studies on Chinese Communism Publishing Co.],
June 2016, pp. 69-71.

51“合心，从敞开胸襟开始 [Heart-felt Cooperation, Starting from Opening One’s Heart],” 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 16, 2016; “标准化，消除联合作战的“数据时差 [Standardization,
Removal of the Time Difference in “Numbers” on Joint Battle Operations],” 解放军报 [PLA
Daily], February 16, 2016.

52“520前夕 共军模拟海陆空袭台 [Evening Before May 20, Communist Military to Simulate Sea,53

凤凰网 [Ifeng.com], February 3, 2016, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160203/47349250_0.

Land, and Air Attack on Taiwan],” 中国时报（电子版）[China Times (Online)], May 18, 2016.
shtml#_zbs_baidu_bk.

96Endnote54

余元杰 [Yu Yuan-Chieh], 王志鸿 [Wang Chih-Hung], “习近平的国防政策对台湾之影响”[The Influence on Taiwan of the Xi Jinping Government’s National Defense Policies], 中共研究第50卷第1期 [Studies on Chinese Communism, Vol.50, No. 1], 中共研究杂誌社 [Studies on
Chinese Communism Publishing Co.], January 2016, p. 74.

Conclusions
1

Takeshi Watanabe, “Chugoku no Keikai Suru ‘Bunka Tai Doku’” [China is Wary of “Taiwanese
Cultural Independence”], Toa [East Asia], September 2016, pp. 6-7.

2“8县市赴陆救观光 国台办释利多！[Heads of 8 Cities and Counties Go to the Mainland to Save
the Tourism. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council Reveals Positive News!],” 中時電子報[Chinatimes.com], September 18, 2016.

97