Security Culturea handbook for activists

Rights
5. ANYTHING YOU SAY TO THE POLICE MAY BE
USED AGAINST YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE. Once
you've been arrested, you can't talk you way out of it.
Don't try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond toaccusations.
6. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO REVEAL YOUR HIV STATUS TO THE POLICE OR JAIL PERSONNEL. If
you've been arrested you should refuse to take a blood
test until you've been brought before a judge andhave a lawyer of your choice.
7. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO TELEPHONE A LAWYER
OF YOUR CHOICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Thismeans after you've been arrested, charged and booked
into jail. This does not mean however, that you'll begiven the right to speak with you family and friends.
This is left up to the discretion of the police involved inyour case.
8. LYING TO THE POLICE IS A CRIME.

This handbook is the third edition of what we has been an evolving andgrowing document dealing with security issues and canadian activism.
We would like to say a big thanks to the Collective Opposing Police
Brutality in Montreal for editing some of the text of the original pamphlet
and adding so many great examples to the Informants and Infiltrators
section. We have replicated many of their changes in this edition.Thanks
also goes out to Eric Drooker whose artwork we used throughout thispamphlet.

9. IF YOU ARE NERVOUS ABOUT SIMPLY REFUSING TO TALK, YOU MAY FIND IT EASIER TO TELL
THEM TO CONTACT YOUR LAWYER. Once a lawyer
is involved, people will know more about your state i.e.
charges, bail, court date, etc.

For more information or to make contributions to this document - pleaseemail securitysite@tao.ca
Third edition - prepared November 2001.

2

27

Introduction:Your
1. YOU DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO THE POLICE OR
INVESTIGATORS. You do not have to talk to them on
the street, if you've been arrested, or even if you're in
jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow “inmates” in holding as they may be plants.
2. YOU DON'T HAVE TO LET CSIS OR THE POLICE
INTO YOUR HOME OR OFFICE UNLESS THEYHAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST WARRANT. Demand
to see the warrant. It must specificallydescribe theplace to be searched and things to be seized. It must
be authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.
3. IF THE POLICE DO PRESENT A WARRANT, YOU
DO NOT HAVE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING OTHER
THAN YOU NAME, ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE.
Carefully observe the officers; you're in your own
home you're not required to stay in one room. You
should take written notes of what they do, theirnames, badge numbers, and what agency they're
from. Have friends who are present act as witnesses.
It's risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.
4. IF THE POLICE TRY TO QUESTION YOU OR TRY
TO ENTER YOUR HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT,JUST SAY NO. The police are very skilled at getting
information from people, so attempting to outwit themis very risky. You can never tell how a seemingly
harmless bit of information can hurt you or someone
else.

Resistance has been on the rise for the past few
years, with activists adopting more and more effective
tactics for fighting back. Our increased activity andeffectiveness has meant that the RCMP, FBI, andlocal police have continued to escalate their activities
against us. As well, the events of September 11th andensuing state hysteria are no small footnote to theway that our radical and revolutionary movements
have and will be targeted by repressive state forces.
If we want our direct action movement to continue, it
is imperative we start tightening our security andtaking ourselves more seriously. Now is the time toadopt a security culture. Good security is certainly thestrongest defense we have.
This is a handbook for the Canadian activist who isinterested in creating and maintaining security
awareness and culture in the radical movements. We
are always looking for contributions - so please feel
free to email securitysite@tao.ca with any images ortext you think belong in a handbook such as this.
This is the third edition of this zine that we have put
out in order to add and improve on the original text
(thanks for the work of the Collective Opposing Police
Brutality in Montreal for their help). There will be
future editions of this handbook so keep putting
forward suggestions to us.
We hope that you will put the material contained
within to good use. Now more than ever is the time to
act!

26

3

of the agent will accomplish aneffective neutralization. But if theagent is no great threat to thegroup's functioning, the agent
staying inside the group may be
useful for other purposes.
The group might decide thatthey prefer to keep the agent,rather than risk not knowing who
would replace a known quantity.
It the agent is not in a sensitive
position, can be monitored andisolated from important work, thegroup may want to keep such anagent at a low organizational
level. Or the agent might begiven tasks that seem to besensitive but are in reality not
crucial to the group. Under thecover of doing "sensitive" work,
false and semi-false information
about the group can be relayed
to the intelligence agencies thatthe agent belongs to. Or perhaps certain information that is
in fact true about the group can
be willfully discredited by creation of pseudo-events and/or
false information. Rememberthat when the intelligenceagencies have a great deal ofcontradictory information, it
decreases their ability to act
decisively against the group.

connection with the agent it iscertainly the group's responsibility to quietly contact leadershipin other groups to warn them
about the agent. Often public
exposure is done through thegroup's newspaper/newsletter/journal; in this case, the news
article should be sent to a wide
variety of groups. The morepressing problem is the instance
where there are only suspicions
but not decisive evidence.
Experience has shown that
suspicions are taken seriously
only when then is a politicalbond that exists between
persons with long movement
experience. People who havebeen in the movement a longtime, and who are known toeach other and trusted as
dedicated movement people,
can convey agent suspicionsthat will get a favorable hearing
or be readily believed. This "oldhands trust network" is relatively
independent of political point ofview; veteran leaders of rival
radical organizations can freely
and easily exchange information
on matters of security.

(d) What are the responsibilities
to other groups of the group's
knowledge of an informer? If thegroup makes a decision to sever

4

25

MOVING AGAINST INFORMERS:CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES(Taken from PROTECTING OURSELVES FROM STATE REPRESSION:A MANUAL FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS. Published in 1984 by
the Anti-Repression Resource Team - Jackson, Mississippi)

Assuming that the security
people within the group havesuspicions about a groupmember being an informer/
provocateur, it is useful for
security/leadership to resolve
certain questions both before
and after the investigation:(a) How badly do you want toknow whether the person is inagent or not? Clearly, if theperson under suspicion isrelatively important to thegroup's functioning, then leadership must know one way or theother. The more important theperson under suspicion is to thegroup, the more intensive theinvestigation. We may suggest
methods of investigation which
are unorthodox and from acertain point of view morally
indefensible. But the question isalways how badly the groupneeds to know. No group needuse all or any of the methods we
describe. But under the condition that the correct information
is a life-and-death matter for thegroup, certain drastic measures
may be justified.

24(b) What will be done if theinformation is inconclusive?
Often there is not enoughevidence to confirm that someone is a police agent, but there
IS enough evidence to confirm
certain suspicions. A great deal
will depend upon what is atstake with the person undersuspicion. In general, thechoices come down to1) labelling the person a security
risk and acting accordingly;2) doing nothing outwardly but
continuing the investigation;3) isolating the person fromsensitive work but keeping him
or her in the group;4) moving to a higher stage ofinvestigation.
(c) What will be done If theperson does turn out to be anagent? While common sense
dictates that the person be
exposed and severed from thegroup, other actions might beinitiated. If the presence of theagent is a real threat to thegroup, then the agent should beneutralized in an effective
manner. Usually wide exposure

Sec uri t yWhat it is, why we need it
and how to implement it...

A CTIV ISM A ND STATEREPRESSION
This pamphlet has essential
information for anyone asso ciated with groups advocating
or using economic disruption
or sabotage, theft, arson, selfdefence from police or moremilitant tactics. The advice
that followsalso applies toanyone associated withgroups practising civil disobedience, especially sincepeople often work in several
groups at the same time andgossip travels freely between
them.
Even if you've never
expressed your politics by
doing property damage,pitching cobblestones, or
getting arrested for civil
disobedience; even if you
think you have nothing tohide, these guidelines arepresented here to enhanceyour personal safety as wellas the overall effectiveness of
our movements.
The simple reality is thatgovernments in industrializedcountries target groups that
advocate economic sabotage
and groups that don’t, move-

C ult urements that are militant andmovements that are markedly
pacifist. The government's
security machinery serves theelitist political and economic
objectives of capitalism. There
are over 250 political prisoners in Canada and the US that
can testify to this from firsthand experience. By adopting
a security culture, we can limit
or neutralize counter-intelligence operations meant to
disrupt our political organizing, be it mainstream orunderground.
Peasant-rebels; communards;
liberationists; abolitionists;
labour organizers; revolutionaries; from large uprisingschallenging the entire politicalstructure, to isolated environmental and social struggles,
people have constantly worked
to create a better world. The
response of government has
always been repression topreserve the status quo..
Historically, government
surveillance and harassment
has increased relative to theascendancy of direct action
movements. Minimizing thedestructiveness of politicalrepression requires that we

5

implement and promote asecurity culture within our
movements.
SO WHAT IS A SECURITYCULTURE?

movements have a lot of work to
do before we address the bigger
questions - what’s important
here is to recognize how
oppressive behaviours play into
bad security culture overall.
(IN)SECURE PRACTICES

It’s a culture where the people
know their rights and, more
importantly, assert them. Those
who belong to a security culture
also know what behaviour
compromises security and they
are quick to educate thosepeople who, out of ignorance,
forgetfulness, or personal
weakness, partake in insecure
behaviour. This security consciousness becomes a culture
when the group as a wholemakes security violationssocially unacceptable in thegroup.
Security culture is about morethan just targetting specificbehaviours in individuals suchas bragging, gossipping or lying.
It is also about checking
movement behaviours andpractices as a whole to ensurethat our own oppressive
practices don’t feed into
intelligence operations being
carried out against ourcommunity.
For example, racism or sexismin the movement can help tospread division, make somepeople more open to infiltrators(those who feel marginalized bygroup practices), and create
openings that can be used bystate operatives. Obviously, our

6

Activists like to talk, we
generally can spend hours andhours discussing theory, tactics,
and strategy. Mostly this isuseful in building our analysis
and our work, but in other cases
this can be dangerous.

are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us demand retractions andcorrections. Speak to the journalists involved, call them on theirsloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and complain to thejournalists' ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist, private-media
for any kind of fairness.
It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of thepolice. There exists a long and documented history. Factual information about police covert activities also comes out as evidence presented in court. An important, too often neglected part of our strengthis our knowledge of, and our protection from, police action against
us.

WHAT NOT TO SAY
To begin with, there are certain
things that are inappropriate to
discuss. These things include:> your involvement or someone
else’s involvement with anundergound group> someone else’s desire to get
involved with such a group> asking others if they are amember of an undergroundgroup> your participation or someone
else’s participating in any actionthat was illegal> someone else’s advocacy forsuch actions> your plans or someone else’s
plans for a future action
Essentially, it is a bad idea tospeak about an individual's

23

COVERT ACTION OTHER
THAN INFILTRATION
Covert (or "Special") Action
from police and secret service isalso done outside of the group,with or without infiltration. These
efforts include: intimidation andharassment, blackmail andmanipulation, propaganda,
informing employers andsecurity checks, as well as
physical sabotage like theft andarson.
Intimidation and harassment
can include visits from secretservice agents, calling you or
your partner by their first nameon the street, thefts where
obvious clues are left. Police
will try to blackmail people ifthey want to recruit or neutralize
them.
Police uses propaganda in an
attempt to poison the atmosphere and manipulate media
and public opinion. In December 1971, when the FLQ wasnear its end and heavily infiltrated, the RCMP issued a false
FLQ communiqué in the nameof the "Minerve" cell. The
communiqué adopted a hardline position, denouncing theabandonment of terrorist action
by a well-known activist, Pierre
Vallières, and urging the continuation of armed struggle.
In Genoa, Italy, police played an
active covert role in trying todiscredit black bloc anarchists

22

during the July 2001 meeting of
the G8. Several reports revealthat Italian police masked as
black bloc members attacked
demonstrators and small shops.
With a lack of public information,
the police help manipulate
public discourse along the linesof "how do legitimate demonstrators isolate activist thugs?"
Slanderous propaganda cantake the form of anonymous
letters, or rumours aimed at theactivist milieu. There are also
examples where police will
make uncorroborated, casualaccusations to journalists that,to use two examples, a person
is a drug dealer, or that at ademonstration, a person aimed
a handgun at an officer. It is
often for slanderous reasonsthat police charge activists with"weapons possession" forhaving a penknife, or charges ofviolence like "assault."
The growth of the anti-globalization movement has been accompanied by renewed anarchist-scare propaganda on thepart of authorities. Politicians
and police attempt to massage
public opinion, preparing
people for a crack down, inorder to legitimate the use ofheavier methods of social
control, exclusion andrepression.
Manipulative disinformation
spread through the media needs
to be denounced as lies. Thereinvolvement (past, present or
future) with illegal activities.
These are unacceptable topics
of discussion regardless ofwhether it is rumor, speculationor personal knowledge.
Please note: this is not to saythat it is incorrect to speak about
direct action in general terms. It
is perfectly legal, secure anddesirable that people speak out
in support of mokeywrenching
and all forms of resistance. The
danger lies in linking individual
activists to specific actions orgroups.

THREE EXCEPTIONSThere are only three times that itis acceptable to speak about
specific actions and activist
involvement.
The first situation would be if
you were planning an action
with other members of yoursmall group (your “cell” or“affinity group”). However, these
discussions should never takeplace over the Internet (email),phone line, through the mail, orin an activist's home or car, as
these places and forms ofcommunication are frequently
monitored. The only people whoshould7dear this discussion
would include those who are
actively participating iXäthe
action. Anyone who is not
involved does not need to know
and, therefore, should not know.
The second exception occuresafter an activist has beenarrested and brought to trial. If
s/he is found guilty, this activist
can freely speak of the actions
for which s/he was convicted.
However, s/he must never giveinformation that would help theauthorities determine who else
participated in illegal activities.
The third exception is for anonymous letters and interviews withthe media. This must be donevery carefully and withoutcompromising security. Advice
on secure communication
techniques can be found at
http://security.tao.ca.
These are the only situations
when it is appropriate to speak
about your own or someone
else's involvement or intent tocommit illegal direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES
Veteran activists only allow aselect few to know about theirinvolvement with direct actiongroups. Those few consist of thecell members who they do theactions with AND NO ONE
ELSE!
The reason for these security
precautions is obvious: if people
don't know anything, they can't
talk about it. When activists who
do not share the same serious
consequences know who did an
illegal direct action, they are far
more likely to talk after beingharassed and intimidated by theauthorities, because they are
not the ones who will go to jail.
Even those people who aretrustworthy can often be tricked7

by the authorities into revealing
damaging and incriminating
information. It is safest for all
cell members to keep theirinvolvement in the group
amongst themselves. The fewer
people who know, the lessevidence there is in the longrun.

SECURITY VIOLATINGBEHAVIOURSIn an attempt to impress others,
activists may behave in waysthat compromise security. Somepeople do this frequently - they
are habitually gossiping andbragging. Some activists say
inappropriate things only when
they consume alcohol. Many
activists make occasional
breeches of security because
there was a momentary
temptation to say something or
hint at something that shouldn’t
have been said or implied. In
most every situation, the desire
to be accepted is the root
cause.
Those people who tend to be
the greatest security risks arethose activists who have low
self-esteem and strongly desire
the approval of their peers.
Certainly it is natural to seek
friendship and recognition forour efforts, but it is imperativethat we keep these desires incheck so we do not jeopardize
the safety of other activists orourselves. People who place
their desire for friendship overthe importance of the cause can8

do serious damage to our
security.
The following are examples of
security-violating behaviours:
Lying: To impress others, liars
claim to have done illegal
actions. Such lies not only
compromise the person's
security -- as cops will not takewhat is said as a lie-- but also
hinders solidarity and trust.
Gossiping: Some people thinkthey can win friends because
they are privy to special
information. These gossips willtell others about who did what
action or, if they don't know who
did it, guess at who they think
did what actions or just spreadrumors about who did it.
This sort of talk is very damaging. People need to rememberthat rumors are all that areneeded to instigate an
investigation or even lay
charges.
Bragging: Some people whopartake in illegal direct action
might be tempted to brag about
it to their friends. This not only
jeopardizes the bragger's
security, but also that of theother people involved with theaction (as they may besuspected by association). As
well the people who s/he told
can be charged as accessories
after the fact. An activist who
brags also sets a bad example.
Indirect-Bragging: Indirectbraggers are people who make

It is your responsibility to
instruct these people on theimportance of security culture.
The other type of activistinformer is the person who
cracks under pressure andstarts talking to save his or
her own skin. Many activists get
drawn into situations they are
not able to handle, and someare so caught up in the "excitement" that they either don't
realize what the consequences
can be, or they just don't thinkthey'll ever have to face them.
Keep in mind that the categories of "planted informer" and"activist-turned-informer" can,and have been blurred. In 1970,
during the height of the FLQ's
activities, Carole de Vault - ayoung Parti Quebecois (PQ)
activist was drawn to the FLQ,
but then became a paid police
agent. Her "activism" was with
the PQ; she disagreed with theheavier FLQ actions since itthreatened the "legitimate" workof the PQ. Her involvementwith the FLQ was as a planted
police informer.

KNOW YOUR OWN LIMITS
We have to know the possible
consequences of every action
we take and be prepared todeal with them. There is no
shame in not being able to doan action because of responsibilities or circumstances thatmake it impossible for you to do

jail time at this point in your life.
As long as capitalism and all of
its evils exist, there will be
resistance. In other words, there
will be plenty of great actions foryou to participate in when yourlife circumstances are morefavourable.
If others are dependent on you
for support, you aren't willing tolose your job, or drop out ofschool or ruin your future career,
DON'T DO THE ACTION. If you
are addicted to an illicit drug
and/or have a lengthy
criminal record, the cops will
use this to pressure you for
information. If you don’t feel
capable of detoxing underinterrogation and brutality, or
doing a hell of a lot more timethan your comrades, DON’T DO
THE ACTION.
Make certain that you talk withothers in your affinity groupabout situations that make you
uncertain whether you should
be involved in particular actions,especially those that are at ahigh risk of being criminalized.
Remember - there is no excuse
for turning in comrades to thepolice - and those activists that
do effectively excommunicate
themselves from our movements. We must offer no legal
or jail support to those activists
who turn in others for theirimpact on our movement is farreaching and can have devastating effects.

21

fessed ideals and how they live?
One of our strengths as activists
is our ideas and values, ourcounterculture, our attitudes
towards the dominant society.
Our sincerity in discussing thesethings is also a way of learning
about each other.
When planning for new actions,care must be taken concerning
who is approached. As little aspossible should be said about
the actual action plan until aperson’s political philosophy,
ideas about strategy, and levelsof risk they are willing to engage
in have been discussed on an
abstract basis. If there is astrong basis for believing thisperson might be interested in
the action, then the general ideaof an action can be run bythem. Only when they haveagreed to participate, do theycome to the group to discuss
action details.
During the trials of activists,
police often reveal the kinds ofinformation that they havegathered concerning our groups
and activities. Note what revelations come out of these trials.
What are the possible and likely
sources of the information?
Speak to persons that havebeen arrested and interrogatedto see what they may have said
to the police, or discussed intheir jail cell.
Placing infiltrators in social
justice and revolutionary movements is an established prac-

20

tice. It was done to the Black
Panthers, AIM, the Front deLibération du Québec (FLQ),
and the peace/ anti-war/and
anti-nuclear movements on alarge scale. Small groups, suchas affinity groups, or working
groups of larger more openorganizations, need to be
especially careful with newmembers. Direct action organizing is ideally done withlongstanding, trusted membersof the activist community.
This doesn't mean that no one
else should ever be allowed into
these groups. On the contrary, if
our movement is to continue togrow, new people should be
welcome and recruited; we justneed to keep security in mind
and exercise caution at all
times.

a big production on how theywant to remain anonymous,
avoid protests, and stay"underground." They might notcome out and say that they doillegal direct action, but they
make sure everyone within earshot knows they are up to
something.

persons whose behaviour
breaches security. If someone
you know is bragging about
doing an action or spreading
security-compromising gossip, it
is your responsibility to explain
to her or him why that sort oftalk violates security and isinappropriate.

They are no better thanbraggers, but they try to be
more sophisticated about it bypretending to maintain security.
However, if they were serious
about security, they would justmake up a good excuse as towhy they are not as active, or
why they can't make it to theprotest . Concealing sensitive
information from even trusted
comrades is far better thanjeopardising underground work.

You should strive to share thisknowledge in a manner thatencourages the person' s
understanding and changes her/
his behaviour. It should be done
without damaging the person’s
pride. Show your sincere
interest in helping him/her tobecome a more effective
activist. Keep your humility andavoid presenting an attitude ofsuperiority. An insensitive
approach can raise anindividual’s defences andprevent them from listening toand using the advice offered.
The goal of addressing theseissues with others is to reduce
insecure behaviour, rather thanshowing how much moresecurity-conscious you are.

EDUCATE TO LIBERATEThe Unwitting Informer
Possibly an even greater threat
to our movements than the
covert operative is the activistturned-informer, either unwittingly or through coercion.
The unwitting informer is theactivist who can't keep his/hermouth shut. If someone brags to
you about what they’ve done,
make sure this person neverhas any knowledge that can
incriminate you, because sooner
or later, the wrong person willhear of it. These activists don't
mean to do harm, but theirbragging can be very damaging.

The unfortunate truth is there
are some security-ignorantpeople in the movement andothers who have possibly beenraised in a "scene" that thrives
on bragging and gossiping. It
doesn't mean these people arebad, but it does mean they needto inform themselves and learn
about personal and groupsecurity. Even seasoned
activists make mistakes when
there is a general lack of
security consciousness in ourgroups.
And that's where those of you
who are reading this can help.
We must ALWAYS act to inform

Share your concerns andknowledge in private, so that theperson does not feel as if they
are being publicly humiliated.
Addressing the person as soon
as possible after the security
violation increases effectiveness.
If each of us remains responsible for discussing security
information with people who slip
up, we can dramatically improvesecurity in our groups and9activities. When people
recognise that lying, gossiping,bragging, and inappropriate
debriefing damages boththemselves and others, thesebehaviours will soon end.
By developing a culture where
breaches of security are pointed
out and discouraged, all sincere
activists will quickly understand.

DEALING WITH CHRONICSECURITY PROBLEMSSo what do we do with activists
who repeatedly violate security
precautions even after being
informed several times?
Unfortunately for them, the bestthing to do is to cut them loose.
Discuss the issue openly andask them to leave your meetings, basecamps and organizations. With law enforcement
budgets on the increase, newanti-terrorist laws that call for

stiffer sentences for politicalactions, and with courts
handing down long sentences
for political "crimes", the stakes
are too high to allow chronic
security offenders to work
among us.
By creating a security culture,
we have an effective defence
against informers and agents
who try to infiltrate groups.
Imagine an informer who, every
time they ask another activist
about their activities, receives
information about security. It
would frustrate the informer'swork. When other activists
discovered that she/hecontinued to violate security
precautions after being
repeatedly informed, there
would be grounds for isolating
the person from our groups. And
that would be one less informer
for us to deal with!

posals. Infiltrators often need tobuild credibility; they may do thisby claiming to have participatedin past actions.
Also, infiltrators will try to exploit
activist sensibilities regarding
oppression and diversity. Intelligence organizations will send insomeone who will pose as aperson experiencing the common oppression of the particular
activist group. For example, inthe 1960's, the Weather Underground ("Weathermen" - a whiteanti-imperialist armed struggle
in the US) was infiltrated by an"ordinary Joe" informant with aworking class image. Black war
veterans infiltrated the Black
Panther Party.
A fresh example of police
infiltration and manipulation
tactics is that of Germinal, agroup targeted for arrest twodays prior to the April 2001 antiFTAA demonstrations in Quebec
City. Five months prior, thepolice set up a false transportcompany and specificallypostered opportunities for
employment in the vicinity of a
Germinal member seeking
employment.
The trap worked. Tipped off by
an initial informant, two undercover cops worked for fourmonths in the group. This
operation resulted in the mediahyped "dismantlement" ofthe group on the eve of thesummit. Seven Germinal members were arrested, 5 of whom

10

spent 41 days in preventive
custody, only to be released
under draconian bail conditions.
The police's covert action was inpart about dismantling thegroup, but it was also about
creating a media/propaganda
campaign to justify the policestate security for the summit.

BACKGROUND CHECKS AN ESSENTIAL TOOL
What are some ways of looking
into the possibility that someone
is an informer? Firstly, unless
you have concrete reasons orevidence that someone is an
infiltrator, spreading rumours will
damage the movement. Rumours that you do hear ofshould be questioned andtraced back.
A person's background can belooked into, especially activism
they claimed to have participated in, in other places. Do
your contacts in those places
know of the person, their involvement? Did problems evercome up? One important
advantage of having links with
far away places is that it makes
it more difficult for informers tofabricate claims about theiractivities.
What are a person's means ofliving? Who are her or his
friends? What sorts of contradictions exist between their pro-19

**The "novice" type: presents asomewhat more active role, but
confines themselves to lessprominent work. They don't takeinitiatives, but the work they do
is valued. This helps them build
trust and credibility.
**The "super activist" type: theycome out of nowhere and all ofa sudden, they are everywhere.
Whether it's a meeting, protest,or an action, this person will beright in the thick of it. Keep inmind however that this canalso be the mark of a newactivist, whose enthusiasm andcommitment is so strong that
she/he wants to fight the power
every minute of the day.
It should be said that withseveral of these modus operandi, the behaviour is hard to
distinguish from a sincere new
person’s involvement. How do
we tell them apart? Well, aplanted infiltrator will ask a lot ofquestions about the direct actiongroups, individuals and illegal
activities. She/he may suggest
targets and volunteer to doreconnaissance as well as takepart in the action. Infiltrators
also try to build profiles on
individuals, their beliefs, habits,
friends, and weaknesses. At thesame time, infiltrators will shield
their true selves from otheractivists.
Anyone who asks a lot ofquestions about direct actions
isn’t necessarily an infiltrator,
but they ARE someone you

18

should be careful with. At thevery least, they need to be
informed about security issues.
New activists should understandthat direct action tactics can berisky (though some risks areworth taking!) and that asking a
lot of questions endangers
people. If the person persists inasking questions, there is aproblem and appropriate measures must be taken. Activists
who can't understand the needfor security should be shunned
and kept away from the movement.
Some types of infiltrators stay inthe background and offer
material support, other informants may have nothing to dowith the group or action, but
initially heard certain plans andtipped off the police. Among themore active types of infiltrators
can be a gregarious person thatquickly wins group trust. Some
infiltrators will attempt to gain
key forms of control, such as ofcommunications/ secretarial, or
finances. Other informants canuse charm and sex to get
intimate with activists, to betterspy or potentially destabilize
group dynamics.
Active infiltrators can also be
provocateurs specializing in
disruptive tactics such as
sowing disorder and demoralizing meetings or demos, heightening conflicts whether they areinterpersonal or about action ortheory, or pushing things further
with bravado and violent pro-a brief primer on the
canadian state security apparatus

Recent incidents of repression
against activists in British
Columbia illuminate the need forgrassroots people to understandand practice movement security.
Police monitoring, infiltration andagent provocateurs are routinely
used by the state to collectinformation about our groups, or
specific individuals in them, andto subvert our activities.
For example, during the APEC
hearings, it was revealed thatover seventy groups andindividuals were monitored
before and during the APEC
meetings in 1997. A paid
industry informant/disruptor was
identified at a wilderness action
camp in 1999. Provocateurs
also targeted some Vancouver
activists, trying to convince themto disclose information and as
well, to break the law.
The Canadian security
apparatus identifies a number ofour groups and activities as athreat to "national security".
People and organizations arewidely targeted; even avowedpacifists have been included insurveillance and repressive
measures. According to the
Canadian Security andIntelligence Service's (CSIS)
annual reports, activities
targeted in the late 1990s
included: native resistance,
environmental & animal rights
movements, anti-poverty, antiglobalization, anti police
brutality, anti-racist, anarchist
and communist groups.
With the rise in militant First
Nations' struggles; covert direct
action against corporations; therenewed militancy and strengthof popular struggles; and themass-media's increasing focus
on anarchists and antiglobalization protests, there isalso a growing level of police
surveillance and repression.
The need for security in our
movements is obvious however, it is incredibly
important that we don't fall into
the trap of using our awarenessof security issues to shut otherpeople out of our growing
movements.
One of the key aims of the FBI's
Counter-Intelligence Program("COINTELPRO") operations
against the Black Panthers andAmerican Indian Movement(AIM) was to spread distrust and11paranoia so that these activists
would be reluctant to integrate
new people into their struggles.
A security culture can exist in alarge movement; indeed, it is
one indication of a movement's
strength. Arming ourselves withknowledge about how thesystem works and works against
activists is essential in building
security culture. The aim of thissection is to give a brief run
down of the working of domestic
intelligence in Canada. In thisway, we can better understandhow to avoid its traps.
AN OVERVIEW OFDOMESTIC INTELLIGENCEORGANIZATIONSThe Canadian Security andIntelligence Service (CSIS) is
probably the best known of the"security" agencies that deal
with activist "threats". Its
predecessor was the Security
Service division of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police,(RCMP-SS). In 1984, following
the MacDonald Commission on
the illegal activities of the
RCMP, the civilian spy agency
CSIS took over RCMP spy
work. That said, the RCMP did
not abandon its intelligencegathering, it’s just that CSIS
specifically gathers politicalintelligence.
The split from the RCMP
allowed the new spy agency to
do legally what the Mounties
had been doing illegally. At the12

operations level, the newagency was granted more leeway in terms of public accountability than the Mounties had
ever had.

everything you ever wanted to know
about informers andinfiltrators

CSIS carries out a wide range ofsurveillance activities. Since
they are not a law-enforcement
agency and since their evidence
is not used in court, nothing
stops them from contravening
the few regulations that doexist regarding privacy rights.
For example, CSIS is not
required to inform people, as is
RCMP, ninety days after awiretap (or bugging) is over.

Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return ofmass mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, antipoverty, anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as well
as declarations to continue struggling in the streets and undergroundhas drawn attention from the state's secret police. More infiltrators will
be sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate individuals.
The extent to which
they are able to infiltrate our groups depends on our seriousness andresponsibility in learning about, promoting, and working within asecurity culture.

Agents working for CSIS are
allowed, with "authorization", toenter people's homes to plantbugs, wiretap phones, open mailand look into health,employment and government
records without ever having totell a targeted individual what
they are doing. The informationthat they gather is used to build
profiles and dossiers (files) on
individuals, organizations,networks, etc. This informationis also passed on to other wingsof the federal security system
who are responsible for "lawenforcement", and will thenobtain whatever warrants arenecessary for legal surveillance(to be brought into court asevidence).
The National Security Investigation Service (NSIS) is theprimary law-enforcement wing in
Canada. The NSIS is a section

Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our
projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo,
contain, or remove the danger.
This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spotand deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.

WHO IS AN INFORMER?

ible methods or operation, or“modus operandi”. These are:

There are actually two kinds ofinformers. The deliberate
informer is an undercover agent
on the payroll of government or
industry. The second type is theactivist-turned-informer. Bothkinds try to infiltrate our ranks
and are equally dangerous toour movements.

**The "hang around" type: they
are persons who regularly showat meetings and actions but
generally don't get involved.
They collect documents, listen
to conversations and note who's
who. This observation role isrelatively inactive.

Let's discuss the deliberate
informers first. They are often
difficult to identify. Informers canbe of any age and any profile,
but they do have a few discern-**The "sleeper" type: is similar
to the "hang around" modus
operandi, except that theirabsorption of information isused to activate their role at alater date.

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of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP). Most major
cities across the country havean NSIS office including Vancouver, Edmonton, Montreal,
Ottawa, and Toronto. The NSIS
maintains a computer databaseon activists, immigrants and socalled "terrorists" which ishoused in Ottawa.
It is believed that the Vancouver
NSIS employs between 12 and18 members. Within NSIS there
are several sub-groups called
Team 1, Team 2, Team 3 - etc.
that have different investigative
targets.
They employ informants,
infiltrators, personal physicalsurveillance, electronic
surveillance including phone
and room "bugs" and othermeans of investigation andresearch.
The RCMP/NSIS also haveother resources at their disposal
during counter-insurgency
operations. "Special O" is ateam of surveillance specialists
that may be called upon.
"Special I" is a penetration teamwhose specialty is to break into
homes, vehicles and otherproperties for investigative
purposes. They are the team,which among other things,
installs listening devices,
photographs building interiors,etc.

of surveillance were usedagainst several Vancouver
activists. During the Vancouver
investigation, house and vehicle
bugs were located by sometargeted individuals. The bugs
had large battery packs
attached to facilitate lessfrequent battery changes. The
NSIS also visited several
activists across Canada in an
attempt to question themregarding the individuals underinvestigation.
THE GOLDEN RULE OF
SILENCEIt needs to be stressed
throughout our movements thatno one is under any legal
obligation to provide to thepolice anymore information than
one's own name, address andbirth date, and this only if one isunder arrest. That is it! Saying
anything more jeopardizes
security. Even answering seemingly insignificant questions can
assist the police in developing
personality profiles on a range ofactivists. It may not be"evidence" but it is used to give
police "leads" on other suspects
and construct intent during legal
proceedings. The only principled
response to police questioning
when under arrest is to say
nothing more than your name,birth date and address. Ifquestioned further you cansimply say "I have nothing to say(except in the presence of mylawyer".

In a long-running case based in
Vancouver, all of these methods

16

13

The Communications Security
Establishment (CSE) is anagency of the National Defence/ War department, which has
been long clouded in secrecy.
They collect and process
telephone, fax and computercommunications of foreignstates, corporations andindividuals. The federal
government uses theintelligence gleaned from thedata to support troops abroad,catch "terrorists" and "further
Canada's economic goals"(what that means is up to them).
Although the CSE is nottechnically allowed to collect thecommunications of Canadiancitizens, it is known to be apartner in the Echelon project a multinational monitoring
operation which sees CSE andcounterpart agencies in the
United States, Britain, Australia
and New Zealand shareintercepted communications ofinterest with one another,effectively creating a global
surveillance web.
The Terrorist Extremist Section(TES Unit) is British Columbia's
anti-terrorist unit. A joint
Vancouver/Victoria Police
Department/RCMP unit called
the Organized Crime Agency(formerly the Coordinated Law
Enforcement Unit - CLEU), it isbelieved that the this unit
employs two or three members
only.

14

Most activists will be initimatelyfamiliar with their local police
forces. Be aware that cops do
not only show up in blue
uniforms - but routinely practice
crowd infiltration and carry out
surveillance and investigative
activities either alone or jointlywith the RCMP depending on
the type of case. Watch for themon demonstrations - as they liketo come along and take photographs and video for the record and they often appear in crowds
as “fellow demonstrators”.

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency should
occur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements aremost vulnerable. They have not experienced a high degree ofrepression. They consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As they
are not breaking laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely
openly. The intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit these
conditions and develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people.
The information will be extremely valuable to them later on.
Important historical revolutionary activities and groups began as small,serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance andrepression. It is therefore important to practice security at all points inthe movement's development. State agents gather more than just"hard evidence;" they are interested in knowing about radicals' beliefs
as well.
Police try to control with fear; don't be intimidated. Remember - If an
agent comes knockin', do no talkin'.

Most Western nation-states
follow a model of counterinsurgency developed by a
British intelligence expert named
Kitson who wrote, Low Intensity
Operations, after much fieldwork in the colonies. He broke
down movement development
into three stages:
The Preparatory Phase: iswhen the movement is small,tends to focus on education,
publishing and groundwork.
The Non-Violent Phase: iswhen the movement takes onmore of a mass character. Largedemonstrations are the norm.
In the Insurgency Phase: themovement has taken on a
popular character. Perhaps amore assertive, guerrillacomponent has emerged.

15