se
fen
De
ide
ns
yI
db
ine
Ob
ta
National Air and Space Intelligence Center
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OhioAir Dominance

Page Number
3fen

Key Findingsse

Table of Contents

5

Airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance andReconnaissance

6

Multi-Role Fighter

10

Fourth Generation Fighter

12

Fifth Generation Fighter

18

Sixth Generation Fighter

24

ns

ide

De

Network Centric Warfare

Air-to-Air Missiles

25

Global and Regional Strike

27

Cruise Missiles andHypersonics

29

Air Combat Tactics

30

db

yI

4

ine

Scientific and Technical Analysis of Aerodynamic Systems

Obta

Aircraft and weapons will remain a doctrinal part of foreign military strategy. As advanced technologies
incrementally improve aerodynamic threat capabilities, it is imperative that scientific and technical analysis
continues to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of emerging systems. Scientific and technical intelligenceis geared toward preventing technological surprise, ensuring technical superiority for US weapons systems
for their entire life cycle, and maintaining an air combat advantage for US air forces. As foreign systems
capabilities approach near parity with US systems, a more detailed understanding of their capabilities isrequired to maintain US air dominance.

2Key Findingsfen

Russian T-50

De

China and Russia are currently the only nearpeer threat countries that are equipped with the
aerodynamic systems and air forces to challenge US
and Coalition forces.

se

Foreign militaries have learned from US and Coalition
air combat operations during recent conflicts, andseek to resolve air combat deficiencies using US
airpower as the yardstick.

Key Findingside• China and Russia are working toward a network warfare strategy that creates a kill chain matrix tofind, fix, target, track, and engage potential targets.
• Russia remains a key original equipment supplier of aircraft and aerodynamic weapons to rogue
nations.

ns• The global aerospace industry uses common aerodynamic system designs to allow customization oftechnology.

yI• China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey are each developing fifth-generation
fighter aircraft. The most prominent are the Chinese J-20 and the Russian T-50 (PAK-FA).
• China and Russia both continue to revitalize, research, and develope new strategic bombers to create
a global-reach capability using cruise missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).

db• Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) present a major threat to both military operations andpotentially the United States. Over 10 foreign countries currently produce and export LACMs, andover 30 countries own and employ them.

Ob
ta

ine

• Almost any multi-role fighter or bomber can be configured to carry a weapon of mass destruction.

Chinese J-20

3

Air Dominance

fen

se

The United States and its Coalition partners have maintained air dominance because of technical and tactical
air systems superiority. The ability to protect US forces from airborne attack provides a safe operating
environment for persistent air surveillance, plus the freedom to maneuver for military and civil air, ground, andmaritime assets. Air dominance has become a military instrument of power that provides the United Stateswith an asymmetric advantage over nearly any country in the world. That advantage is being eroded by foreign
weapons systems being designed and fielded today. The relative ease for achieving air dominance during
recent conflicts has created a grossly inaccurate perception that foreign military weapons systems will remaintechnologically inferior to US equipment.

Near-Peer Air Threat: Potential adversaries thathave advanced aerodynamic systems, operational
inventories, and integrated air defenses to directly
potential adversaries that have an aerodynamic
power projection capability. China and Russia are

Chinese J-16

db

yI

considered the only near-peer threats.

nschallenge sustained US air dominance. This includes

ide

De

The technology being incorporate into foreign weapons systems since the turn of the century is the mostsignificant threat to US air combat observed in decades. The advantages once held by US legacy combat
aircraft are quickly eroding with select adversaries.

Asymmetric Air Threat: Potential adversaries

operate aerodynamic systems, but cannot compete
directly with US airpower because of limited

ine

technology, small inventories, or a limited integrated
air defense. Asymmetric air threats often include
leading technology that could disrupt or delay US
air dominance, and temporarily deny US access to aObtaparticular country or region.

Russian Su-35S4

Network-Centric Warfare

fen

se

Individual physical airborne threats remain a concern, but they can no longer be viewed as single threat
platforms. Transformation toward information warfare drives integrated information sharing among threat
platforms enabling faster, more precise, more effective employment. Emerging network-centric warfare will
ultimately require the combined analysis of foreign air, space, ground, and sea capabilities together to fullycomprehend a potential adversary capability.

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

Significant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) developments are occurring in China andRussia, where network warfare strategies are evolving to establish a multi-layered sensor and communicationarchitecture for regional activity monitoring. Advanced sensor computer processing and communications data
links allow networks to passively track and rapidly combine data for surveillance, target de-confliction, andweapons delivery against fixed or even mobile targets within minutes. Passive tracking capabilities provide US
aircraft or ships little to no threat warning.

5

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissancese

Fixed-Wing Airborne ISR

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

Chinese Airborne ISR Systems that Offer a Layered Sensor Network

De

fen

Over 1,300 foreign fixed-wing ISR aircraft and 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) are in operation in 40
countries. These systems utilize radar, electro-optical (EO) cameras, and/or infrared (IR) sensors to monitor,
detect, and identify threats in the air, sea, or on the ground. These ISR assets can also direct intercepts of thesethreats. ISR aircraft support persistent surveillance networks designed for the protection of national interests,
including patrol of shipping lanes, preventing drug trafficking, environmental monitoring, and stemming illegal
immigration. These same foreign ISR assets have been used to collect data on US military force locations,command structures, operating methods, and training patterns. This data can be used to create electronic
databases of US military equipment and define US capabilities.

6Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

fen

ide

De

Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
aircraft are force multipliers in that they amplify thecapabilities of a national military to detect, track, andtarget threats. AEW&C extend the range of a country’s
integrated air defense system (IADS) network. In
particular, these systems are better suited to detect
low-altitude targets at greater standoff distances. Until
recently, only the United States, Russia, and NATO werecapable of effectively operating such aircraft. Since
2000, Russia, China, Israel, and Sweden have marketed
new AEW&C aircraft that incorporate state-of-the-art
Russian A-50
radar technology, such as active electronically scannedarrays (AESA).

se

Airborne Early Warning and Control

ine

db

yI

ns

The reduced size of solid-state electronics and advances in radar technology allow smaller aircraft to beconverted to AEW&C. The end result is an increase in proliferation to smaller cash-strapped nations that desire
this ISR capability. Pakistan’s procurement of the Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C aircraft is an excellent example of
how smaller foreign militaries are integrating AEW&C.

Ob
ta

Chinese KJ-2000 AWACS

7

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

se

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Swedish Saab 340

Chinese KJ-200

8

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissancese

Active Electronically Scanned Arrayfen

Today’s AEW&C aircraft are fitted with AESA radars that offer instantaneous target updates; electronic beamsteering; advanced radar modes; vastly improved signal and data processing; very large search volumes; theability to stare at a target or electronically steer the radar beam; and track thousands of targets simultaneously.
These features combine to provide faster target acquisition time, more accurate target position data, andincreased ability to detect low-observable targets. AESAs offer increases flexibility, allowing for specialized
modes designed to find specific targets, such as cruise missiles and ground targets.

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

Simultaneous Functions of AESA Radars

9Multi-Role Fighter

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

se

Fighter aircraft designs were historically focused on aerodynamics and engines geared toward speed andmaneuverability to win traditional dogfight scenarios. Today’s integrated air defense and network warfare
strategies demand fighter aircraft that fuse data from multiple sensors across the information spectrum toenhance pilot situational awareness; use high-bandwidth communications and data links to share data among
air defense participants in near-real time; and employ sophisticated, precise, long-range weapons.

Russian Su-30SM

Chinese J-11B

10

Multi-Role Fighter

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

se

The significant technical advantage held by US fighter
aircraft has subtly eroded, as the cost and complexityof weapons system development has increased. This
forced the global aerospace industry to consolidate
and engage in joint development programs forsurvival. Mergers blurred the lines between different
indigenous fighter programs and the technology
proliferated, creating a worldwide customer base.
More importantly, avionics and weapon design
Chinese J-10B
specifications that were once established to ensure
Coalition partner interoperability became a global industry standard. This has yielded hybrid combat aircraft
designs based on best-in-class equipment either purchased from foreign suppliers, or indigenously copied andproduced.

Chinese J-11B

db

Russian Su-35S

Ob
ta

ine

“Airpower is like poker.
A second-best hand is like none at all– it will cost you dough and win you nothing”– General George C. Kenney, USAF

11

Fourth-Generation Fighterfen
De

Malaysian Su-30MKM

ns

ide

• Russian produced engines, airframe, radar, and IR targetingsystem• Israeli produced electronic warfare (EW) jammers andtargeting sensors• French produced pilot displays and navigation systems• India produced radar warning receiver (RWR) and mission
computersse

The Russian Sukhoi Design Bureau Su-30MKI and Su-30MKM
are excellent examples of hybrid multi-role combat aircraft thatexhibit state-of-the-art technology common to newly produced
and upgraded fourth-generation fighters. They include thefollowing:

Indian Su-30MKI

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

Common Fourth-Genration Fighter Technology

12

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

se

Fourth-Generation Fighter

Obta

Russian Su-35S13

Fourth-Generation Fighterse

Cockpit Design

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

Most fourth-generation fighters incorporate glass cockpit technology that includes head-up displays (HUDs);head-down multi-function displays; mission computers with reprogrammable software; geospatial information
system mapping products; and a digital data bus. New cockpit designs are allowing data fusion from multiple
onboard and offboard sensors. Digital image and video processing displays show graphical representations of
sensor threat data to provide greater situational awareness to the pilot.

14

Fourth-Generation Fighter
AESA technology similar to that being installed on
aforementioned AEW&C surveillance aircraft is also
being integrated into new fighters. Advanced fourthgeneration fighters have a passive electronically scannedarray (PESA) radar, providing long-range radar detectionand electronically scanned radar beams that enable theradar to track multiple targets. The end result is reduced
pilot workload, automatic target acquisition, and highly
accurate target position for air combat engagements.
Air-to-ground modes with pinpoint accuracy for
precision-guided weapon delivery are also available.

se

Radar Technology

Electronic Warfare

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

T-50 AESA Radar

Ob
ta

ine

The most significant EW technology being used with air
combat is the digital radiofrequency memory (DRFM)
jammer. DRFM jammers enable instantaneous smart
jamming responses by automatically selecting jamming
waveforms to counter a specific threat. DRFM jammer
employment substantially improves fighter aircraft
survivability by disrupting or denying the opposing
fighter’s radar from tracking. This can drastically reduce
any advantage US fighter aircraft hold with a first lookand first-shot capability. Russia, China, France, andIsrael lead the foreign market with DRFM jammer
technology and sales.

Russian Su-34

DRFM
Jammer Pods

15

Fourth-Generation Fighter

fen

Russian MiG-31BM

De

Most of today’s modern fighters are equippedwith an infrared search and track system (IRSTS) to
locate, track, and engage enemy aircraft in a passive
engagement. New IRSTSs are being integrated
onto newly built aircraft and on older aircraft via
upgrades. IRSTS technology is expanding in different
wavelengths to optimize detection range andperformance.

ns

ide

Reduced Inventories with Upgraded
Capabilities
The staggering cost of fighter procurement has forcedsome air forces to seek cheaper aircraft upgrade
alternatives. Modifications also draw from best-in-classsensors, communications, and long-range weapons
procured by the same manufacturers that are building
today’s frontline multi-role fighters. The end result
is often a one to two generation technology leap in
mission capability for aircraft that were once deemed amarginal threat.

se

Infrared Search and Track System

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

Russian MiG-29
Another effect of high fighter costs is the reduction of
aircraft inventories in foreign militaries. The sheer cost of fighter acquisition is producing almost a one-fortwo reduction in aircraft in most foreign air forces. The advent of the multi-role fighter allows the aircraft toconduct roles such as air intercept, strike interdiction, anti-ship, suppression of enemy air defenses, and LACM
launches.

Chinese J-11B

16

Fourth-Generation Fighter

fen

Russian Su-35S

De

The Russian Su-35S is a 4++ generation aircraft that
employs fifth-generation technologies into its design,
and is the most advanced FLANKER variant to date.
Technologies include advanced radar, engines, andavionics. At the center of the cockpit are two large
multi-function displays to give the pilot complete
situational awareness. New advanced air-to-air missiles(AAMs) and precision-guided weapons round out the
progressive capabilities of the Su-35S.

seBest in ClassObta

Chinese J-16

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

The Chinese J-16 FLANKER is China’s most advanced
FLANKER. This multi-role strike variant is based on its
predecessor, the J-11B, with upgraded avionics, long-range radar, and weapons. Weapons for the J-16
include a full suite of indigenous Chinese air-to-air and air-to-ground guided munitions, combined withan AESA radar to engage targets at longer distances. The J-16 survivability combined with the long-range
capability of FLANKER aircraft enables pilots to attack or defend against any enemy target.

17

Fifth-Generation Fighter

fen

se

Russia and China are developing fighters to challenge
air dominance. Each system has specifically been
designed to counter and compete with US F-22 andF-35 capabilities. Other countries such as India,
Indonesia, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, andTurkey have also stated that they are developing fifthgeneration aircraft.

De

The Chinese J-20, FC-31 (unofficially known as J-31),
and the Russian T-50 (PAK-FA) all have potent airto-air lethality, combined with a standoff attack
capability designed to operate using network-centricwarfare technology sensor-to-shooter operations.

yI

ns

ide

Chinese FC-31 (J-31)

db

Chinese J-20

Ob
ta

ine

Sample of Worldwide Fifth-Generation Fighter Programs

18

Fifth-Generation FighterseCommon Technology of Fifth-Generation Fighters

Chinese J-20

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

fen

Chinese J-20 Cockpit Mock-up

19

se

Fifth-Generation Fighter
Key systems include:fen• Super cruise capability, which is the ability to fly above Mach 1.0 without the use of full engine throttle• Super maneuverability or the freedom to maneuver with very high agility during a dogfight• Reduced aircraft radar and IR signaturesDe• AESA radar that extends detection and tracking ranges up to 200 NM. New systems allow air-to-air andair-to-ground targeting of multiple targets (track up to 30 targets while simultaneously engaging upto 8). Radars are being designed with electronic counter-countermeasures against jamming• Advanced data link that fuses data from air and ground networks into a single air picture; plus sharesensor data. Cockpit data includes geospatial terrain databases to enhance air-to-surface targetingide• Cockpit displays that fuse radar, video, and textual data from sensors data to enhance pilot situationalawareness• Advanced multi-band EO systems, allowing for increased target detection capabilities• Helmet-mounted sight cueing systems that allow an over-the-shoulder look and shot capability• Advanced DRFM jammers with more power to deny adversary radar use

ns• EO defensive systems that enable IR and ultraviolet missile launch warning, plus laser warning

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

• Internally carried AAMs with off-boresight and long-range capabilities

Russian T-50

Chinese J-20

20

Fifth-Generation Fighterse

US versus Chinese/Russian Fifth-Generation Fightersfen

The Chinese FC-31 (J-31) is a twin engine, mid-sized
fighter aircraft manufactured by the Shenyang Aircraft
Corporation. Having similar external characteristics, it
is likely that the FC-31 is China’s export alternative to
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The first flight was on 31
October 2012, and is currently in flight testing.

db
Chinese FC-31 (J-31) Cockpit Mock Up

Ob
ta

ine

Chinese FC-31 (J-31)

yI

ns

ide

De

Chinese FC-31 (J-31)

21

Fifth-Generation Aircraft DevelopmentsseConcept Design Drawings

Sweden: Flight System 2020 (FS2020)

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

India: Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft

ns

ide

De

Japan: Mitsubishi Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X (ATD-X) Shinshinfen

The rest of the world is also developing fifth-generation aircraft technology. India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, South
Korea, Sweden, and Turkey have stated that they are all developing fifth-generation aircraft that will challenge
air dominance.

22

Fifth-Generation Aircraft Developments
Turkey: Turkish Aerospace Industries TFX (TAI TFX)

Russia: Multi-Role Fighter Interceptor (MFP)

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

Russia: Lightweight Future Fighter (LMFS)

ns

ide

De

fen

South Korea: Korean Aerospace Industries KF-X withIndonesia (IF-X)

seConcept Design Drawings

23

Sixth-Generation FighterseWhat’s Next?

fen

Sixth-generation aircraft will replace fifth-generation technology and aircraft. Foreign nations have not finalizedplans or requirements for a sixth-generation aircraft, though research and development (R&D) has begun.

db

yI

ns

ide

De

Chinese 6th Generation Concept

Piloted versus Unmanned

Ob
ta

ine

The debate will continue on piloted versus unmanned aircraft as technology evolves with each system.
It is likely that most countries will continue to operate both manned and unmanned aircraft for theforeseeable future as part of their integrated air defense network.

24

Air-to-Air Missilesse

Active Radar

Russian AA-X-13

ine

db

yI

ns

Chinese PL-12 (SD-10A)

Russian AA-12

ide

De

fen

Today, AAMs employ active radar seekers that give fighter aircraft a launch-and-leave option. This allows
the fighter to launch and move out of harm’s way as the missile continues to track and destroy its target
autonomously. Active-radar missiles are being designed with aerodynamics and propulsion systems that
increase missile range and velocity, thus impacting first-shot ranges and first-missile impact advantages once
held by the United States.

Obta

Chinese J-20 with PL-15

25

Air-to-Air Missilesse

Infrared Missilesfen

A first-shot advantage remains just as critical during
within-visual-range or close-in air combat. Today’s
short-range missiles utilize imaging IR seekers
and digital processing that enhance lock-on range,
reduce minimum range requirements for launch, andare very effective at defeating IR countermeasures.

ide

De

Short-range IR missiles are also being produced withhigh maneuverability, advanced flight controls, andnew seeker technology to enable high off-boresight
missile shots. China and Russia both produce helmetmounted sights (HMS) and helmet-mounted display
Russian HMDS
system (HMDS) that allow the pilot to shoot at virtually Chinese HMDS
anything they can see outside the cockpit. The pilot
can simply look in the direction of their target (which may be outside the normal operating envelope of theaircraft’s other sensors) to acquire a missile lock and launch.

ns

New IR technology is introducing staring array and imaging seekers that enhance detection and lock-on.

Russian AA-11

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

Chinese Missile Display

Chinese PL-10

26

Global and Regional Strikese

Future Medium- and Long-Range Bomber Developments

Russian PAK-DA Concept

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

De

Future Chinese Fighter Bomber Conceptfen

New stealth bombers are being developed in both China and Russia for the main purpose of striking global
and regional targets. Stealth technology continues to play a key role in the R&D of these new bombers that are
expected to reach initial operating capability (IOC) in the 2025+ timeframe. New Chinese and Russian bombers
will have additional capabilities with full-spectrum upgrades over the operational bomber fleets, and will
employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.

Future Chinese Fighter-Bomber Concept27

Global and Regional StrikeseBomber Upgrades

fen

Russian strategic air attack capabilities are well demonstrated by bomber flights that occur along US andCoalition borders. Russian Tu-95/BEAR and Tu-160/BLACKJACK bombers are receiving service life extensions
and are being modified with new aiming and navigation systems to permit more precise targeting forconventional weapons and new cruise missiles with standoff ranges up to 2,700 NM. Tu-95/BEAR and Tu-160/
BLACKJACK are currently the only adversary bombers that have a global reach. They can fly over 5,000 NM, andeven farther with aerial refueling.

yI

ns

ide

De

China realizes the benefit of power projection from long-range bombers. It is developing indigenous bombers(like the H-6) equipped with ASCMs and/or LACMs. Chinese bomber and weapons development programs
are geared toward regional power projection and anti-access strategy to prevent or hamper US air and naval
operations throughout East Asia and the Pacific.

Russian Tu-95

Russian Kh-38 Missile VariantsObta

Chinese H-6

ine

db

Russian Tu-160

28

Cruise Missiles and Hypersonic Cruise MissilesfenDeRussian Tu-95

Russian Kh-101

ide

ASCMs are a significant concern for navies around the world. They
are effective against both military and civilian ships. Aircraft thatcarry ASCMs can influence international shipping lanes used forworld commerce and pose a direct threat to our carrier battlegroups. ASCMs rely on launch aircraft or over-the-horizon sensor
data for target position, but after launch, employ an onboard seeker
to acquire and guide the missile to the target impact. ASCMs are
becoming faster, stealthier, and more accurate than those fieldedin the past. Distributed sensors and communications networks willcontinue to improve ASCM targeting in littoral regions throughout
the world.

se

Cruise missiles are categorized as either ASCMs or LACMs. Morethan 10 foreign countries develop ASCMs and LAMs. This missile
technology continues to proliferate despite international control
efforts, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Chinese Cruise Missile

db

yI

ns

LACMs are pre-programmed and autonomous. They navigate to
the target using an onboard inertial navigation system (INS). Thesesystems are often paired with satellite navigation (SATNAV) likeGPS and terrain contour-matching radar, or optical-scene-matchingsystems to improve navigational accuracy. During the terminal
guidance phase, these weapons can use optical-scene-matching orradar seekers to find the intended target. Many cruise missiles fly at
low levels, and some are treated with radar cross section (RCS) or
counter-IR signature-reducing materials to hamper detection. New
missile propulsion, navigation, and seeker technology continues toimprove long-range accuracy and lethality.

Hypersonic Cruise Missiles

Brahmos-II

Ob
ta

ine

India and Russia are currently developing a hypersonic (>Mach 5) cruise missile called the Brahmos-II. The
Brahmos-II program’s stated goal is to achieve a range of 165 NM and a speed of about Mach 7, which isdouble the speed of Brahmos-I. A scramjet engine will provide power during the cruise stage of flight.

29

Air Combat Tactics

De

fen

se

Effective employment of advanced weapon systems requires the combined effects of technology and air
combat tactics. Historically, the United States has had significant technological advantages, plus the added
advantage of other countries’ poor pilot training and tactics. Foreign air forces have studied US air combat
tactics during recent conflicts, and are starting to incorporate more and better tactics. Almost all fourthgeneration fighters are equipped with video and audio equipment to enhance post-mission training. Manynations are also acquiring lead-in fighter trainers equipped with cockpits similar to their frontline fighters, andground-based simulators to provide a well-rounded training regiment.

Ob
ta

ine

db

yI

ns

ide

Su-35S Simulator

Chinese L-15

Russian Yak-130

30

Page

Chinese J-20

SourcePage

SourceDe

Russian T-50

fen

se

Photo Credits

Page

Source23

Top Left: Russian Internet
Top Right: Russian Internet
Bottom Left: Russian Internet
Bottom Right: Russian Internet

24

Middle: Chinese Internet

25

Top Left: Chinese Internet
Top Right: Russian Internet
Bottom Left :Chinese Internet
Bottom Right: Russian Internet

Top: Russian Internet
Middle: defense-update.com
Bottom: airliners.net

26

Top Left: Chinese Internet
Top Right: Russian Internet
Middle Right: Russian Internet
Middle Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

16

Top: Russian Internet
Middle: Russian Internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

27

Middle: Chinese Internet
Bottom Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom Right: Russian Internet

6

Y8: Chinese Internet
KJ-2000: Chinese Internet
Yilong UAV: Chinese Internet
Data Fusion Photos: US Defense
Contractor Briefings

17

Top: Russian Internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

28

Top Left: Russian Internet
Top Right: Russian Internet
Bottom Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom Right: Russian Internet

7

Top: Russian Internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

18

Top: Chinese Internet
Middle: Chinese Internet
Bottom: defensenet.com

29

Top Right: Russian Internet
Upper Middle Right: Russian Internet
Lower Middle Right: Chinese Internet
Bottom: Russian Internet

8

Left: defense-update.com
Right: Chinese Internet

19

Top: Chinese Internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

30

Top: Russian Internet
Bottom Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom Right: Russian Internet

9

US Defense Contractor Briefing

20

Left: Russian Internet
Right: Chinese Internet

31

Top Left: Russian Internet
Top Right: Chinese Internet

Back
Cover

air-and-space.com

12

Top Right: Russian Internet
Middle Right: Russian Internet
Bottom: Russian Internet

2

deviantart.com

13

Bottom Center: Russian Internet

3

Top: airliners.net
Bottom: Chinese Internet

14

Top: Russian Internet
Bottom: Russian Internet

4

Top: Chinese Internet
Bottom: ausaipower.net

15

5

Air ISR: Chinese Internet
SAM: ausairpower.net
Fighter: Russian Internet
Computer Exploit: US Internet
Space ISR: thespacereview.com

ns

yI

db

ine

Ob
ta

Cover

ide

Top: Russian internet
Bottom: Chinese Internet

10

Top: US Defense Contractor Briefing
Bottom Left: airliners.net
Bottom Right: Chinese Internet

21

Top Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom Left: Chinese Internet
Bottom Right: Chinese Internet

11

Top: Chinese Internet
Bottom Left: Russian Internet
Bottom Right: Chinese Internet

22

Top Left & Right: globalaviationreport.com
Bottom Left: Indian Internet
Bottom Right: Indian Internet

31

se
fen
De
ide
ns
yI
db
ine
Ob
ta

NASIC Public Affairs Office • 4180 Watson Way • Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433(937) 522-6600 • NASIC-1340-5466-15

This report contains material copyrighted by others
No claim of copyright is made for any included works of the US government.