SIPRIYEARBOOK

2018
Armaments,
Disarmament andInternational
Security
SummarySTOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict,armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data,
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers,
media and the interested public.
THE SIPRI YEARBOOKSIPRI Yearbook 2018 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2018 and provides samples of thedata and analysis that it contains.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction

1

Part I. Armed conflict and conflict management, 2017

2. Armed conflicts and peace processes
3. Peace operations and conflict management24Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2017

4. Military expenditure
5. International arms transfers and developments in arms production
6. World nuclear forces

6
8
10Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2017

7. Nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation
8. Chemical and biological security threats
9. Conventional arms control
10. Dual-use and arms trade controls

12
14
15
16

Annexes18

www.sipriyearbook.org© SIPRI 2018

1. INTRODUCTION.
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND
HUMAN SECURITY IN 2017

dan smithGlobal security has deteriorated markedly
in the past decade. The number, complexityand lethality of armed conflicts haveincreased, and there has been prolonged
and shocking violence in large parts of the
Middle East, Africa and South Asia. The
world total of forcibly displaced people isover 65 million and has been climbing
sharply in recent years. Further layers ofcomplexity exacerbating human insecurity
are the internationalization of what often
start as purely internal conflicts, the nexusof criminal violence and the activities of amultitude of armed groups, and the impact
of climate change.
International transfers of major weapons
have increased and global militaryspending has stabilized at a high plateau.
Although the number of deployed nuclear
warheads has continued to decline, themeasures that achieved these cuts areunder threat: Russia and the United States
have accused each other of infringing the1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles (INF Treaty); and, although it isbeing implemented, the 2010 Treaty on
Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(New START) expires in February 2021 andthere are no current talks on extending or
replacing it.
The global nuclear non-proliferation
picture is mixed. North Korea has joined
the ranks of nuclear weapon-possessing
states, despite major international efforts toprevent it, while the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed with Iran
has thus far been regarded as a success. The
adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017
generated considerable opposition from thenuclear weapon states and their allies,
while for supporters it offers a potentiallydecisive opportunity to restart progress
towards complete nuclear disarmament.
However, long-standing and deep
philosophical differences remain regarding
the relationship between nuclear weapons
and international security.
International tensions and shifting
dynamics of power were also to the fore in2017. The ailing relationship between
Russia and the USA—fuelled by, among
other things, Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and engagement in the conflict in eastern
Ukraine, as well as allegations of Russianinterference in Western domestic politics—
ended any likelihood in the medium term ofRussian integration with the West. Othersignificant areas of international tension
included the South China Sea, the East
China Sea, China–India tensions, reignitionof the India–Pakistan conflict over
Kashmir, the regional rivalry between Iranand Saudi Arabia, and intra-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) tensions withTurkey.
Beyond tensions between dyads of rivals
or within specific geographic zones, there
is a bigger picture of shifting geopoliticaland geostrategic relationships and power
dynamics. Neither the bipolar global modelof the cold war era nor the unipolar model
following its end is useful for explaining
what is happening now. While it is clearthat change is under way, it is not clear
what the outcome will be.

•

introduction 1

2. ARMED CONFLICTS AND PEACEPROCESSES
In contrast to historical patterns,
contemporary armed conflicts tend to beconcentrated in urban areas and affectmore civilians in terms of casualties thanthe military. In the first 11 months of 2017 atleast 15 399 civilians were killed by
explosive weapons, the vast majority incities, which is an increase of 42 per centcompared with 2016. The number offorcibly displaced people worldwide at theend of 2016 was 65.6 million, and it seems
likely that these record numbers continued
into 2017, especially in light of a newdisplacement crisis in Myanmar andprotracted displacement crises in manyother places, including Afghanistan,
Central America, the Democratic Republicof the Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan,
Syria and Yemen. Armed conflicts also
contributed to increased food insecurity in2017, with seven countries recording crisis
or emergency levels of food insecurity in atleast a quarter of their people: Afghanistan,
the Central African Republic (CAR),
Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria andYemen.
The Americas

In the Americas, there were positive signs
that the ongoing peace process in Colombia
might soon bring the only active armed
conflict in the western hemisphere to aclose. However, in several countries inCentral and South America (including El
Salvador, Mexico and Paraguay) the levelsof political and criminal violence remained
high. Cities in the Americas are some of theworld’s most dangerous, and there is anescalating crisis of forced displacement
especially from northern Central America.

2 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

Asia and Oceania

Five countries in Asia and Oceania wereinvolved in active armed conflicts in 2017:
Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Pakistan
and the Philippines. In Myanmar, theforced displacement of the Rohingya
caused spillover effects in Bangladesh,
while in other places such as thePhilippines, state security forces
committed widespread violence with
impunity. In Afghanistan and thePhilippines, the Islamic State (IS) is a
growing threat, while other parts of Asiaand Oceania continued to be affected byinstability from a variety of causes. Most
notably, tensions are rising in North East
Asia, which is one of the world’s mostmilitarized regions, chiefly due to the
nuclear weapon and ballistic missile
programmes of North Korea. On a morepositive note, ongoing peace processes in
Nepal and Sri Lanka contributed to
growing stability in those two countries.
EuropeTwo armed conflicts were active in Europe
in 2017: in Nagorno-Karabakh (involving
Armenia and Azerbaijan) and in Ukraine.
Some unresolved conflicts, although
inactive, seemed as intractable as ever:
Cyprus, Georgia (Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), Moldova (Trans-Dniester) andKosovo. In the background, tensions
remained heightened between Russia andmembers of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the West in
general, and there were allegations of
Russian interference in Western domestic
politics. European states also continued toprioritize combating terrorism.

The Middle East and North Africa

There were seven active armed conflicts in
the Middle East and North Africa in 2017:
in Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, Libya,
Syria, Turkey and Yemen. Many of theseconflicts are interconnected and involve
regional and international powers as wellas numerous substate actors. Key regional
developments included the continuing
fallout from the Arab Spring, the regional
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, andthe territorial losses of IS.
Egypt is facing its worst human rights
situation in decades and open civil war in
the Sinai. Iraq has the daunting task ofreconstruction in the areas once held by
IS—especially in Mosul, which sufferedwidespread destruction—and achieving
genuine political reconciliation between
and within the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni
communities. The complex war in Syria
involving regional and international
powers has led to the displacement of half
the population—over 5.4 million refugees
and over 6.1 million internally displaced
persons—and 6.5 million people with acutefood insecurity and a further 4 million atrisk of the same. Neither the United
Nations-mediated peace talks nor theparallel Astana negotiations made muchprogress. In Yemen, the Saudi Arabian-led
coalition maintained its partial blockade of

Houthi-controlled territories withdevastating humanitarian consequences: atleast 17 million people, or 60 per cent of the
population, faced acute food insecurity.
Sub-Saharan Africa

There were seven active armed conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa in 2017: in Mali,
Nigeria, the CAR, the DRC, Ethiopia,
Somalia and South Sudan. A number ofother countries experienced post-war
conflict and tension or were flashpoints forpotential armed conflict, including
Burundi, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya,
Lesotho, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Two broaddevelopments can be identified in subSaharan Africa. First, many conflicts
overlap across states and regions as a resultof transnational activities of violent
Islamist groups, other armed groups andcriminal networks. In many countries, andespecially those in the Sahel and Lake Chadregions, these overlapping conflicts arelinked to extreme poverty, instability,
economic fragility and low resilience—
situations that are further exacerbated byclimate change, corruption, inadequate
economic policies and mismanagement.
Second, there appears to be a growinginternationalization of counterterrorism
activities in Africa, led primarily by two
external state actors: France and the UnitedStates.

•armed conflict and conflict management 3

3. PEACE OPERATIONS AND
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
In contrast to 2016, 2017 was a hectic year
for peace operations, both in the field and at
headquarters, particularly for the United
Nations. The fall in the total number of
personnel deployed in peace operations,which began in 2012 with the drawdown of
the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF), continued in 2017. The total numberof personnel deployed in the field declined
by 4.5 per cent during 2017 to 145 911.
Although UN deployments had been on therise before 2016, they fell in 2017, by 7.6 per
cent, whereas the number of personnel in
non-UN operations increased by 2.3 percent to 47 557.
Trends and developments in peace
operations in 2017

There were 63 multilateral peace
operations active during 2017, one morethan in 2016. Three UN peace operations
closed: the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI), the UN Mission in Colombia(UNMC) and the UN Stabilization Missionin Haiti (MINUSTAH). The latter two were
replaced by smaller missions: the UN
Verification Mission in Colombia(UNVMC) and the UN Mission for JusticeSupport in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). Only one
non-UN mission closed during the year—
the Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands (RAMSI)—while three
new non-UN operations were established:
the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Mission in the Gambia(ECOMIG); the European Union (EU)Advisory Mission in support of Security
Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq); andthe Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Preventive Mission in
the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL).

4 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

Although the UN clearly remains theprincipal actor in peace operations, the two
non-UN operations deployed by African
regional economic communities show how
African actors are claiming an increasingrole on the peace operations stage. This isalso reflected in the establishment of theGroup of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) Joint
Force (Force Conjointe des Etats du G5
Sahel, FC-G5S), a multilateral non-peace
operation that falls into the grey zone
outside the SIPRI definition of amultilateral peace operation.
Tensions with host states

Under the sustaining peace agenda, UN
peace operations are giving increased
attention to political processes,
peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In
so doing, they increasingly encounter
tensions over national sovereignty andoperate on the boundary of host-stateconsent. This is already evident in Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo andSouth Sudan, where host governments see
UN efforts as an infringement of theirsovereignty and respond by obstructing
deployment. Outside the UN system, much
more has been possible. Host governments
have tended to favour predominantly
military solutions in support of theirauthority, such as the FC-G5S and theMultinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
against Boko Haram. In the cases ofGambia and Lesotho, regionalorganizations were able to intervene insmall countries, even though the amount ofhost government support was debatable in
the former.
Peacekeeper fatalities

In previous years, peacekeeper fatalities
linked to hostile acts had primarily been aUnited Nations peacekeeping reform andno . of m u lt i l at e r a l pe ac e
ope r at ion s , b y t y pe ofc on duc t i ng org a n i z at ion ,the budget

2 0 0 8 –1 77060

No. of operations

50
40
30
20
10
0
2008
Conducting organization:

2009

2010

2011

United Nations

2012

2013

2014

2015

Regional organization or alliance

2016

2017
Ad hoc coalition

challenge for the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali(MINUSMA). In 2017, however, the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic(MINUSCA) and the UN Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of theCongo (MONUSCO) also faced substantial
losses. A particular low point was theattack on a MONUSCO Company Operating
Base at Semuliki, North Kivu, on
7 December, in which 15 Tanzanianpeacekeepers were killed and at least
53 injured.
Overall, the UN witnessed a dramatic
escalation in fatalities linked to hostileacts—in both absolute terms (from 34 in2016 to 61 in 2017) and as a ratio of thenumber of personnel deployed (from 0.31 to
0.61 per 1000). An independent review into
the security of peacekeepers, led by
Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos
Santos Cruz, left one main questionunanswered: How would the UN generate
the agile and mobile forces needed for the
more robust and proactive force posturerequired to deal with these morechallenging mission environments?

Peacekeeping reform, including
implementation of the report by the UN
High-level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations, continued to be discussed in
the General Assembly and the Security
Council. At times, this discussion was
overshadowed by two other developments:
the greater insecurity of personnel
deployed in UN peace operations, and theefforts by the administration of UnitedStates President Donald J. Trump to
drastically reduce the UN peacekeeping
budget.
In 2017, UN peace operations, like
African peace operations, could no longer
be certain of ‘predictable and sustainablefunding’. The budget cuts sought by the
Trump administration, in particular, meantthat the UN had to rethink its strategy inmany operations. A number of financecontributing countries hoped that thesebudget cuts might be used pragmatically tostrengthen peacekeeping reform. However,
the effects of ‘salami-slicing tactics’ onsome operations, such as MONUSCO, andof more substantial drawdowns in otheroperations, such as the African Union/UN
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),might put peacekeepers more at risk andleave populations more vulnerable. If so, it
raises the question: Is it realistic to expect
the UN to continue to do more with less,and is it worth taking the risk?

•

armed conflict and conflict management 5

4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE
World military expenditure is estimated tohave reached $1739 billion in 2017, thehighest level since the end of the cold war,equivalent to 2.2 per cent of global grossdomestic product (GDP) or $230 per person.
Total global expenditure in 2017 was
marginally higher compared with 2016, up
by 1.1 per cent in real terms.
Military spending in North America fell
for the seventh consecutive year, down by
0.2 per cent compared with 2016. Bycontrast, military expenditure in East Asia
continued to rise, for the 23rd year insuccession, and was up by 4.1 per centcompared with 2016. In Western Europe,spending increased for the third
consecutive year, up by 1.7 per cent from2016. There were mixed spending trends inthe rest of the world: military spending
decreased in Africa, Central America andthe Caribbean, and Eastern Europe, while
spending increased in Central Europe, theMiddle East (based on the countries forwhich data is available) and South America.
At $610 billion, the United Statesremained the world’s largest spender,
accounting for 3.1 per cent of its GDP,unchanged from the level in 2016. While US
military expenditure in 2017 was 22 percent below the peak reached in 2010, thetrend of falling US spending has tapered off.
In late 2017 the US Senate approved a new
military budget for 2018 of $700 billion, asubstantial increase over the 2017 budget.
China, the world’s second largest
spender, allocated an estimated $228 billion
to its military in 2017, an increase of 5.6 percent compared with 2016—the lowest
increase since 2010 but remaining in linewith GDP growth plus inflation. Saudi
Arabia became the third largest spender in2017 following a 9.2 per cent increase in

6 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

wor l d m i l i ta ry s pe n di ng , 2 0 1 7
RegionAfricaNorth Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
AmericasCentral America
and Caribbean
North America
South America
Asia and Oceania
Central and South Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth East Asia
EuropeCentral Europe
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Middle East
World total

Spending Change(US$ b.)(%)(42.6)(21.1)
21.6
695
7.6

–0.5
–1.9
0.9
0.0
–6.6

630
57.0
477
82.7
323
29.9
41.1
342
24.1
72.9
245
..

–0.2
4.1
3.6
3.0
4.1
–0.6
0.1
–2.2
12
–18
1.7
..

1 739

1.1

( ) = uncertain estimate; . . = data unavailable.
Spending figures are in current (2016) US$.
All changes are in real terms for the period
2016–17.

military expenditure to $69.4 billion. By
contrast, Russia’s military spending fell by
20 per cent to $66.3 billion, making it the
fourth largest spender in 2017. India, where
spending rose by 5.5 per cent in 2017 to$63.9 billion, was the fifth largest spender.
Debt, oil price and military expenditure

For countries whose economies are
dependent on the export of oil, the size ofgovernment oil revenues plays animportant role in decisions on spending.
The fall in the price of oil in 2014 (and low
prices since then) has severely reduced oilrevenues in these countries, leading to aneed for alternative sources of finance (e.g.
borrowing or debt) to fund spending,including military expenditure. An

pe rc e n tage c h a nge s i n m i l i ta ry e x pe n di t u r e , b y r e gion , 2 0 16 –1 7
World
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central America and the Caribbean
North America
South America
Central and South Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth East Asia
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
Western Europe

–20

–15

–10

–5

assessment of the trend in the price of oilcompared with the trend in militaryspending and debt as a share of GDP for
15 oil export-dependent countries—Algeria,
Angola, Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria,
Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan
and Venezuela—showed that when oilrevenue fell, alternative forms of financewere required and found. For these15 countries, military expenditure between
2014 and 2017 decreased by an average of
16 per cent, but the price of oil dropped byover 45 per cent and the average increase intotal debt as a share of GDP was around
154 per cent. The differences between
revenue and expenditure in these countries
have mostly been funded through debt.
Transparency in military expenditure

SIPRI made major steps in 2017 to improvetransparency in military expenditure by
mapping off-budget funding in Peru andVenezuela. Off-budget spending, which is
not part of the state budget and is often
non-transparent, is usually earned fromnatural resource exports. It may be used

0

5

10

15

without the knowledge of the parliament or
the finance ministry to pay for arms
purchases and other activities. Off-budget
funds offer lucrative opportunities for selfenrichment to public officials andbusinesses involved in the decision-making
processes. In the cases of Venezuela andPeru, such funding amounted to billions ofdollars of spending, often without
accountability or oversight.
Military expenditure transparency at theinternational level remains a concern,
specifically in the context of the United
Nations Report on Military Expenditures.
By 31 July 2017, at least 42 states had
submitted a report to the UN on theirmilitary spending in 2016. No submission
had been received from any state in Africa
or the Middle East or from four of the fivelargest military spenders in the world: theUSA, China, Saudi Arabia and India.
Continued low participation in, and thelack of comprehensiveness of, the UN
reporting mechanism puts into question its
future viability.

•

military spending and armaments 7

5. INTERNATIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN ARMS PRODUCTION
The volume of international transfers ofmajor weapons rose by 10 per cent between
2008–12 and 2013–17, to reach its highest
level since the end of the cold war. The
increase marks a continuation of the steadyupward trend that began in the early
2000s.
The five largest arms suppliers in 2013–17
were the United States, Russia, France,
Germany and China, and they accounted
for 74 per cent of the total global volume ofexports of major weapons. Since 1950 the
USA and Russia (or the Soviet Union before1992) have consistently been by far thelargest suppliers and, together with West
European suppliers, have historicallydominated the top 10 list of suppliers.
The top five arms importers were India,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United ArabEmirates and China, which together
accounted for 35 per cent of total arms
imports. Asia and Oceania was the mainrecipient region, accounting for 42 per centof the total global volume of imports ofmajor weapons in 2013–17, followed by the
Middle East, which accounted for 32 per
cent. The flow of arms to the Middle East

no . of s u b m i s sion s t o t h e
u n i t e d n at ion s r e gi s t e r ofc on v e n t ion a l a r m s , 19 9 2 –2 0 16
150

Number of submissions

120

90

60

30

0
2

9
19

94
19

9
19

6

9
19

8

00

20

02

20

04

20

06

20

08

20

10
20

12
20

8 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

14
20

16
20

t h e m a i n e x p or t e r s a n d
i m p or t e r s of m a jor w e a p on s ,2 0 1 3 –1 7
ExporterGlobalshare (%) Importer

1 USA
34
2 Russia
22
3 France
6.7
4 Germany
5.8
5 China
5.7
6 UK
4.8
7 Spain
2.9
8 Israel
2.9
9 Italy
2.5
10 Netherlands 2.1

Globalshare (%)

1 India12
2 Saudi Arabia 10
3 Egypt
4.5
4 UAE
4.4
5 China
4.0
6 Australia
3.8
7 Algeria
3.7
8 Iraq
3.4
9 Pakistan
2.8
10 Indonesia
2.8

grew by 103 per cent between 2008–12 and2013–17. The flow of arms to Asia andOceania also rose, by 1.8 per cent. By
contrast, the flow of arms to Europe
decreased notably, by 22 per cent, as did
those to the Americas, by 29 per cent, andAfrica, by 22 per cent.
Transparency in arms transfers

As has been the case for the past few years,
there were few positive developments inofficial public transparency in arms
transfers in 2017. The number of states
reporting their arms exports and imports
to the United Nations Register ofConventional Arms (UNROCA) dropped toan all-time low and no major changes
occurred with respect to the various
national and regional reporting
mechanisms. However, most of thegrowing number of states that have ratified
the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty have fulfilled
their obligation of reporting arms exports
and imports.

t h e t r e n d i n t r a n s f e r s of m a jor w e a p on s , 19 5 0 –2 0 1 7

Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)

50
40
30
20
10
0

0

5
19

5
19

5

6
19

0

5

6
19

70 975 980 985 990 995 000 005 010
1
2
19
1
2
1
1
2
1

The financial value of states’ arms
exports, 2016*

While SIPRI data on arms transfers does
not represent their financial value, manyarms-exporting countries publish figureson the financial value of their arms
exports. Based on such data, SIPRI
estimates the total value of the global arms
trade in 2016 to have been at least$88.4 billion.
Arms production and military services

The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing andmilitary services companies ranks thelargest companies in the arms industry(outside China) by their sales, both
domestic and for export. The total sales of
the SIPRI Top 100 for 2016* totalled almost$375 billion, a 1.9 per cent increase
compared with 2015. This was the firstyear of increase since the peak of 2010. The
rise is mainly attributable to the overall
increase in the arms sales of US-based
companies, which dominate the Top 100.
Taken together, the arms sales of West
European arms producers were stable in

17
20

2016. The combined arms sales of Russiancompanies continued to grow in 2016,
while there were mixed trends in arms
sales for the arms producers in countries
with emerging arms industries and othercountries with established arms industries.
Major drivers for the growth in arms salesof the Top 100 include international
tensions and armed conflict on the demandside and the implementation of militaryindustrialization strategies at the national
level on the supply side. Other key causes ofchanges can be company mergers,
acquisitions and divestments.
*The latest year for which data isavailable.

•

military spending and armaments 9

6. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES
At the start of 2018 nine states—the UnitedStates, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK, or North Korea)—possessed
approximately 14 465 nuclear weapons, ofwhich 3750 were deployed with operational
forces. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in astate of high operational alert.
Nuclear arsenals

Overall, inventories of nuclear warheads
continue to decline. This is mainly due tothe USA and Russia, which collectively
account for approximately 92 per cent of
global nuclear weapons, reducing theirstrategic nuclear forces in line with the2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START). Despite
making reductions in their arsenals, boththe USA and Russia have extensive andexpensive programmes under way toreplace and modernize their nuclear
warheads, missile and aircraft delivery
systems, and nuclear weapon production
facilities.
The nuclear arsenals of the othernuclear-armed states are considerably
smaller, but all are either developing or
deploying new weapon systems or haveannounced their intention to do so. China,
India, North Korea and Pakistan arethought to be expanding the size of their
nuclear arsenals.
North Korea conducts sixth nuclear test
explosion

North Korea continues to prioritize its
military nuclear programme as a central
element of its national security strategy,
and conducted its sixth test explosion in

10 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary2017. The test took the total number ofnuclear explosions recorded worldwide
since 1945 to 2058.
Inadequate transparency

The availability of reliable information on
the status of the nuclear arsenals andcapabilities of the nuclear-armed statesvaries considerably. The USA has disclosed
important information about its stockpile
and nuclear capabilities, and the UK andFrance have also declared some
information. Russia refuses to disclose thedetailed breakdown of its forces counted
under New START even though it sharesthe information with the USA, and the US
Government has stopped releasing
detailed information about Russian andChinese nuclear forces. The governmentsof India and Pakistan make statements
about some of their missile tests but
provide no information about the status or
size of their arsenals. Israel has a policy of
not commenting on its nuclear arsenal andNorth Korea provides no information
about its nuclear capabilities.

•

wor l d n uc l e a r f orc e s , 2 0 1 7
Country

Deployed Other
Total
warheads warheads inventory

USA
RussiaUK
FranceChina
India
PakistanIsraelNorth Korea

1 750
1 600
120
280
–
–
–
–
–

4 700
5 250
95
20
280
130–140
140–15080(10–20)

6 450
6 850
215
300
280
130–140
140–15080(10–20)

Total

3 750

10 71514 465– = zero; ( ) = uncertain figure not included in
the total. ‘Other warheads’ includes
operational warheads held in storage andretired warheads awaiting dismantlement.
The figures for Russia and the USA do notnecessarily correspond to those in their2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START) declarations
because of the treaty’s counting rules. Total
figures include the highest estimate when arange is given. All estimates are approximate
and as of Jan. 2018.

gl ob a l s t o c k s of f i s si l em at e r i a l s , 2 0 1 7
The raw material for nuclear weapons is
fissile material, either highly enricheduranium (HEU) or separated plutonium.
China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA
have produced both HEU and plutonium foruse in their nuclear weapons; India and Israel
have produced mainly plutonium; andPakistan has produced mainly HEU, but it isexpanding its ability to produce plutonium.
North Korea has produced plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons but may have produced
HEU as well. All states with a civilian nuclear
industry are capable of producing fissile
materials.
The International Panel on Fissile
Materials compiles information on global
stocks of fissile materials.
Global stocks, 2017
Highly enriched uranium
Separated plutonium
Military stocks
Civilian stocks~1 340 tonnes~230 tonnes~290 tonnes

military spending and armaments 11

7. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,
ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATIONi r a n a n d t h e joi n t
c om pr e h e n si v e pl a nof ac t ion

There was important new momentum
behind global efforts to promote nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation in2017.

Iran continued to implement the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) tolimit its nuclear programme in 2017. The
JCPOA was agreed in July 2015 between Iranand the E3/EU+3, which refers to threemember states of the European Union (EU)—France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
known as the E3—as well as China, Russia
and the USA. During the year, however,political tensions between Iran and the USA
threatened to undermine the agreement. In
October, US President Donald J. Trump
refused to certify that the continued lifting of
US sanctions on Iran was proportional to
Iran’s actions under the JCPOA—a decisionthat under US law triggered a 60-day review
period for the US Congress to decide whether
to reimpose the sanctions. Although theCongress did not subsequently decide to doso, Trump’s decertification decision put the
USA at odds with all the other signatories of
the JCPOA.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons

The year was marked by the negotiationand opening for signature of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW). The treaty is the first legallybinding international agreement tocomprehensively prohibit nuclear
weapons, with the ultimate goal of their
total elimination. The opening ofnegotiations on the treaty had been
mandated by a United Nations General
Assembly resolution at the end of 2016,
which had in turn been motivated by thegrowing international awareness of thedevastating humanitarian consequences of
any use of nuclear weapons. These steps
reflected the frustration of many nonnuclear weapon states that the nuclear
weapon states were not taking seriously
their obligation under the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) to pursue
nuclear disarmament. While proponents of
the TPNW acknowledged that it would
have no immediate impact on existing
nuclear arsenals, they highlighted its longterm normative impact—it would serve todelegitimize and stigmatize nuclear
weapons and thereby contribute toachieving the ultimate goal of nuclear
disarmament. At the same time, there wasa recognition during 2017 that therelationship between the TPNW, the NPT
and related agreements would have to be

12 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

defined over time in order to prevent the
fragmentation of nuclear disarmament
efforts.
Russian–US nuclear arms control

Russia and the United States continued to
implement the 2010 Treaty on Measures
for the Further Reduction and Limitationof Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),
which places numerical limits on theirstrategic nuclear forces. However, theprospects for sustaining the progress madein Russian–US nuclear arms control since
the end of the cold war appeared to be
increasingly in doubt. Neither Russia nor
the USA indicated that it would agree toextend New START before its scheduled
expiration in 2021. They also showed little
interest in negotiating deeper reductions intheir nuclear arsenals beyond thosemandated by New START. At the sametime, the USA continued to allege that
Russia was violating an important cold
war-era arms control treaty, the1987 Soviet–US Treaty on the Eliminationof Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles (INF Treaty), by deploying a new
ground-launched cruise missile proscribedby the treaty. These developments comeagainst a background of further
deterioration in political relations between
Russia and the USA, underscoring
fundamental differences in their respective
goals and priorities for arms control.
Multilateral arms control

There were also developments during 2017
related to other multilateral treaties andinitiatives on nuclear disarmament, arms
control and non-proliferation. In February,
the Conference on Disarmament (CD), theworld’s sole multilateral forum fornegotiating arms control and disarmament
agreements, renewed efforts to break thedeadlock that has left it unable to adopt a
programme of work since 2009. It
established a working group to take stockof the progress on all CD agenda items andto identify common ground for a
programme of work with a negotiating

mandate. In May, the first session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT
Review Conference was convened in
Vienna, Austria. There were also events
connected with two unresolved items on
the multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation agenda: a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), and the 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT). In July and August, a high-level
expert preparatory group met in Geneva,
Switzerland, to consider ways tocommence negotiations on an FMCT. In
September, the 10th Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
CTBT was held in New York, USA.
Sanctions on North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea’s (DPRK, or North Korea)
programme to develop nuclear and otherweapons of mass destruction, in
contravention of UN Security Council
resolutions, remained a source of graveinternational concern. During 2017 theSecurity Council adopted three additional
resolutions imposing new or expanded
sanctions on North Korea in response to its
nuclear weapon and ballistic missile
testing activities.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 13

8. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICALSECURITY THREATS
Allegations of chemical weapon use in
Iraq and Syria

The United Nations, the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW), and governments continued toevaluate allegations of chemical weapon(CW) use in Iraq and Syria in 2017. Both the
UN Security Council and the OPCW
Executive Council remained deadlocked on
the question of Syrian Government
responsibility for CW use, including withregard to the use of sarin at Khan
Shaykhoun on 4 April. This attack
prompted the United States to launch
retaliatory Tomahawk cruise missile
strikes against a Syrian airbase.
The mandate of the OPCW–UN Joint
Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria
expired in November because the Security
Council was unable to agree terms for an
extension. While it operated, the JIM
issued seven reports and concluded that the
Syrian Government was responsible forfour cases of CW use and that non-state
actors were responsible for two cases. The
work of the OPCW Declaration Assessment
Team on the completeness and correctness
of Syria’s declarations to the Technical
Secretariat and of the OPCW Fact-finding
Mission (FFM) to evaluate allegations of
CW use in Syria will continue in 2018. The
FFM provided the information baseline on
allegations of CW use to the JIM.
As the Islamic State lost territory in both
Iraq and Syria, various governments
undertook further efforts to ascertain thegroup’s CW-related intentions andcapabilities. The work of international
criminal investigations and prosecutions,such as the ‘International, Impartial and14 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Most Serious Crimes under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic since March 2011’ established by
the UN General Assembly at the end of 2016,
could eventually facilitate the achievementof a common international understanding
on responsibility for all the documented
instances of confirmed CW use.
Chemical arms control

Russia—formerly the largest possessor ofchemical weapons—completed thedestruction of its stockpile in 2017, as
required by the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). The 22nd Conferenceof the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC
convened in November 2017. It reviewed
the status of planning for the Fourth CWC
Review Conference, which will be held in
2018, and elected Ambassador Fernando
Arias of Spain as the next Director-General.
Biological arms control

In December, the annual Meeting of States
Parties (MSP) to the 1972 Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
agreed a further inter-sessional process ofannual meetings for the period 2018–20.
The states parties will continue to discussand promote common understanding andeffective action on selected topics.
Although some states parties wish to movethe interactions among the membershiptowards more specific discussions aboutcompliance, the outcome of the 2017 MSP
represents a continuation of the status quo,
whereby information, views and bestpractices on the convention’s various
provisions are exchanged in annual
Meetings of Experts and MSPs with thesupport of the Geneva-based
Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

•9. CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL
Humanitarian arms control

The regulation of different categories of
weapons as a means of trying to improve
compliance with international
humanitarian law has become an important
theme in conventional arms control.
However, participation in humanitarianarms control agreements is far fromuniversal and states parties to suchagreements still face many implementation
challenges. According to some states andcivil society groups, there are also gaps in
humanitarian arms control anddisarmament law that need to be addressed.
In 2017, negotiations to address some ofthese challenges continued within theframework of the 1981 Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or tohave Indiscriminate Effects (CCW
Convention); the 1997 Convention on theProhibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction (APM
Convention); and the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions (CCM).
Afghanistan and Lebanon joined the
CCW Convention in 2017, bringing the total
number of states parties to 125. The CCW
Convention has also been a vehicle fordiscussions on how to regulate new or
emerging technologies, and the focus in2017 was on lethal autonomous weapon
systems (LAWS). For the first time, these
discussions took place in the format of aGroup of Governmental Experts (GGE),
which considered the technological,
military and ethical/legal dimensions ofemerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

While no substantive decisions were made,it was recommended that the GGE should
convene again in 2018 for 10 days, with afocus on the characterization of systems
under consideration and the implications ofhuman–machine interaction.
The growing international concern overthe use of incendiary weapons andexplosive weapons in populated areas,
including the use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups,
failed to generate new concrete outcomes
during discussions within the frameworkof the CCW Convention. The lack ofconsensus was compounded by the fact thatseveral expert meetings were cancelled due
to a lack of funding. States parties agreed to
discuss some of the issues further in 2018.
Anti-personnel mines and cluster
munitions

Sri Lanka and Palestine became the 163rdand 164th states parties to the APM
Convention in 2017, which celebrated its
20th anniversary in September. In 2016,global casualties from APMs were at theirhighest level since 1999, largely as a resultof the armed conflicts in Afghanistan,
Libya, Ukraine and Yemen. In 2017, Algeria
and Mozambique declared themselves freeof landmines, but 57 states and 4 otherareas remained contaminated by mines.
Discussions on mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) also took
place within the framework of the CCW
Convention in 2017; and Benin andMadagascar ratified the CCM, bringing thetotal number of states parties to 102. There
was continued use of cluster munitions in
Syria and Yemen during the year.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 15

10. DUAL-USE AND ARMS TRADECONTROLS
Global, multilateral and regional efforts
continued in 2017 to strengthen controls on
the trade in conventional arms and in dualuse items connected with conventional,
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems. Membership ofthe different international and multilateral
instruments that are aimed at establishingand promoting agreed standards for dualuse and arms trade controls expanded
further. As in previous years, ensuring
effective implementation of these
instruments remained a challenge. This
could be seen in disagreements between
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and states about how to measure andensure effective implementation of the2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the many
reported violations of United Nations arms
embargoes, and the difficulties associatedwith ensuring that dual-use and arms tradecontrols keep pace with advances intechnology and evolving trade patterns.
The Arms Trade Treaty

The third conference of ATT states parties
took place in Geneva, Switzerland, in
September 2017. While the conference took
a number of key decisions, the tensions
between states parties and the communityof NGOs that supported the creation of the
ATT were again on display. Moreover, eventhough the number of states parties to thetreaty continued to increase, the levels ofcompliance with reporting and funding
obligations continued to fall short in several
areas. Efforts to increase the number ofstates parties have focused on Asia inrecent years and the region faces a numberof the security challenges that the ATT is
intended to address. However, the region’s

16 sipri yearbook 2018 , summarym u lt i l at e r a l a r m s
e m b a rg oe s i n f orc e , 2 0 1 7
United Nations (13 embargoes)• Central African Republic (NGF)• Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF)• Eritrea • Iran • Iraq (NGF) • ISIL (Da’esh),al-Qaeda and associated individuals andentities • Korea, North • Lebanon (NGF)• Libya (NGF) • Somalia (NGF) • Sudan(Darfur) • Taliban • Yemen (NGF)
European Union (21 embargoes)
Implementations of UN embargoes (9):• Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities • Central African
Republic (NGF) • Democratic Republic of theCongo (NGF) • Eritrea • Iraq (NGF)• Lebanon (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia(NGF) • Yemen (NGF)
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran
• Korea, North • Sudan (Darfur)
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (9):• Belarus • China • Egypt • Myanmar• Russia • South Sudan • Syria • Venezuela• Zimbabwe
Arab League (1 embargo)• Syria
NGF = non-governmental forces.

current political dynamics also placesignificant obstacles in the way of further
increases in the number of states parties.
Multilateral arms embargoes

Thirty-five multilateral arms embargoes
were in force in 2017: 13 imposed by the UN,
21 by the European Union (EU) and 1 by the
League of Arab States. Of the EU’s
21 embargoes, 9 implemented UN arms
embargoes directly, 3 were similar to UN
embargoes but differed in geographicalscope or the types of weapon covered, and9 had no UN counterpart. Most of theseembargoes only covered conventional arms.
However, the UN and EU embargoes onIran and North Korea, and the EU embargoon Russia, also covered exports of dual-use
items. One new multilateral arms embargo
was imposed in 2017: an EU embargo on
Venezuela. As in previous years,
investigations by the UN revealed problems
in the implementation of its embargoes,with numerous reported cases of violations.
However, the scope and significance of
these violations varied considerably, withsome involving large shipments of arms incontravention of the embargo and others
involving a failure by a supplier or recipient
state to notify a sanctions committee abouta transfer.
Export control regimes

Each of the four multilateral export control
regimes—the Australia Group (AG), theMissile Technology Control Regime(MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-use Goods and Technologies(Wassenaar Arrangement, WA)—updated
its respective trade control lists in 2017. As
in previous years, a key challenge that all
the regimes faced was ensuring that thecontrol lists continue to account for andcover the often rapid advances in goods,
software and technology. In recent years allof the regimes have faced difficulties withadmitting new members, owing to therequirement that all existing members
must approve an application. However, in2017 India was admitted to the WA and inearly 2018 it was admitted to the AG. This
follows its admission to the MTCR in 2016.
India’s application to join the NSG
continues to be strongly opposed by a groupof countries led by China. There were few
changes in EU export controls during 2017,with the main developments involving

ongoing discussions about the proposed
recast of the EU Dual-use Regulation.
Controls on intangible transfers oftechnology

The main export control regimes, EU
controls on the trade in arms and dual-use
items, and UN and EU arms embargoes all
include requirements to exert controls on
intangible transfers of technology (ITT).
ITT are generally divided into those thatinvolve transfers of technical data andthose that involve transfers of knowledge
and technical assistance. ITT are seen as
being particularly difficult to detect,making enforcement hard for national
authorities. In addition, controls on ITT
can generate significant compliance costs
for companies and research institutes. The
problems in this area are only going tobecome more acute in the years to come, as
new trading patterns and technologies
increase the volume and range of ITT thatare potentially subject to export controls.
During 2017 there were discussions about
how controls on ITT should be best
structured and applied, particularly within
the context of the review of the EU Dualuse Regulation but also in the export
control regimes. Key challenges in this area
include if and how export controls should
apply to cloud computing and thechallenges presented by additive
manufacturing (also known as 3D printing)as both an enabler of ITT and a multiplier ofassociated proliferation risks.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17

agreements in force, 1 January 20181976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
PNET)

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Militaryor Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modification Techniques(Enmod Convention)

1948 Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide(Genocide Convention)

1981

ANNEXES
Arms control and disarmament

1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to theProtection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar; and 1977 Protocols I and II Relating
to the Protection of Victims ofInternational and Non‑International
Armed Conflicts
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space andUnder Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty,
PTBT)
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space
Treaty)1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation
Treaty, NPT)1971

Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons andother Weapons of Mass Destruction on
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production and Stockpilingof Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction(Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, BTWC)
1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground
Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold TestBan Treaty, TTBT)

18 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or tohave Indiscriminate Effects (CCW
Convention, or ‘Inhumane Weapons’
Convention)

1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty(Treaty of Rarotonga)
1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles (INF Treaty)
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE Treaty)
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stock­pilingand Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction (Chemical Weapons
Convention, CWC)
1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)
1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control (Florence Agreement)
1997 Inter-American Convention Against theIllicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, andOther Related Materials (CIFTA)
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction (APM Convention)
1999 Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional Weapons
Acquisitions

2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms,
Ammunition and other related Materials
in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Region
2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention,
Control and Reduction of Small Arms andLight Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
and the Horn of Africa
2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms andLight Weapons, their Ammunition andOther Related Materials
2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone inCentral Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk)
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START)2010 Central African Convention for theControl of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All
Parts and Components That Can Be Usedfor Their Manufacture, Repair andAssembly (Kinshasa Convention)2011 Vienna Document 2011 on Confidenceand Security-Building Measures
2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Agreements not yet in force, 1 January
2018
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT)
1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
Treaty2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons
Security cooperation bodies
On 29 March 2017 the UK notified the European
Council of its intention to leave the European
Union on 29 March 2019 by triggering Article 50of the Treaty on European Union. Other
developments in 2017 included Morocco joining
the African Union; and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines joining the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).

•

c h ronol o gy 2 0 1 7 , s e l e c t e devents
1 Jan.

António Guterres becomes the ninth
Secretary-General of the United
Nations
28 Feb. China and Russia veto a UN Security
Council resolution that would have
imposed sanctions against Syria for
the use of chemical weapons
31 Mar. The UN Security Council recognizes
the significance of the Lake Chadcrisis and unanimously issues
Resolution 2349 against terrorism
and human rights violations in theregion13 Apr. The United States drops the largest
non-nuclear bomb ever deployed incombat (the GBU-43/B Massive
Ordnance Air Blast bomb), targetingan Islamic State (IS) base in
Afghanistan
6 May A partial ceasefire is agreed in thewest of Syria, and de-escalation
zones are created in an agreement
between Iran, Russia, Syria andTurkey1 June US President Donald J. Trump
announces that he is withdrawing
the USA from the Paris Agreement
on climate change
7 July The Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons is adopted
28 Aug. A border confrontation between
India and China ends after a 73-day
standoff
3 Sep. North Korea conducts its sixth andlargest nuclear test
6 Oct. The International Campaign toAbolish Nuclear Weapons wins theNobel Peace Prize
16 Nov. The mandate of the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons–UN Joint Investigative
Mechanism in Syria expires
9 Dec. Iraq declares victory in its war
against IS

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

SIPRI DATABASESSIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Gives the annual military spending of countries since 1949, allowing comparison ofcountries’ military spending in local currency at current prices; in US dollars at constantprices and exchange rates; and as a share of gross domestic product.
SIPRI Arms Industry Database

Contains annual data on total revenue and revenue from arms sales and military services
since 2002 for the 100 companies with the highest arms sales in the world (with the
exception of Chinese companies).
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers of major conventional arms since 1950, the mostcomprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms transfers.
SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Gives information on all arms embargoes that have been implemented by an internationalorganization, such as the European Union or the United Nations, or by a group of nations. All
embargoes that are in force, or have been in force since 1998, are included.
SIPRI National Reports Database

Provides links to all publicly accessible national reports on arms exports and is constantly
updated to include links to newly published national reports on arms exports.
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including
location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of
personnel, costs and fatalities.
Access the SIPRI databases at the SIPRI website.

20 sipri yearbook 2018 , summary

HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018
SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in print and online by Oxford University Press
ISBN 978-0-19-882155-7, hardback
ISBN 978-0-19-186088-1, online
More information is available at www.sipriyearbook.org

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Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI YEARBOOK 2018

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Long appreciated worldwide by politicians, diplomats, journalists, scholars and students,
the SIPRI Yearbook is an authoritative and independent source of data and analysis onarmaments, disarmament and international security. It provides an overview ofdevelopments in international security, weapons and technology, military expenditure,
the arms trade and arms production, and armed conflicts and conflict management, alongwith efforts to control conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
This booklet summarizes the 49th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which covers
developments during 2017, including• Armed conflicts and conflict management, with an overview of armed conflicts andpeace processes in five regions (Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe, the Middle Eastand North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa), as well as a focus on global and regional
trends in peace operations• Military expenditure, international arms transfers and developments in arms production,
featuring analysis of the relationship between debt, military expenditure and the oil
price in oil export-dependent countries, as well as transparency in military
expenditure and arms transfers, and the financial value of arms exports• World nuclear forces, with an overview of each of the nine nuclear-armed states andtheir nuclear modernization programmes, as well as the North Korean nuclear test
explosion• Nuclear arms control, featuring the negotiation and opening for signature of the2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Russian–US nuclear arms
control and disarmament, implementation of Iran’s nuclear deal, and international
non-proliferation sanctions against North Korea• Chemical and biological security threats, including the investigation of allegations ofchemical weapon use in the Middle East
• Conventional arms control, with a focus on humanitarian arms control, including
efforts to regulate lethal autonomous weapon systems and explosive weapons in
populated areas• Dual-use and arms trade controls, featuring developments in the Arms Trade Treaty,
multilateral arms embargoes and export control regimes, including the challenges ofseeking to control intangible transfers of technology and additive manufacturing
as well annexes listing arms control and disarmament agreements, international security
cooperation bodies, and key events in 2017.
www.sipriyearbook.org