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Joint Publication 3-72

AT E S O F

ANuclear Operations

11 June 2019

PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, andassess nuclear operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), andprescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force andexecuting the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commandersof combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat
support agencies.
b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.
c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally incoordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (allianceiPrefaceor coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures
ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine andprocedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Developmentii

JP 3-72TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................v
CHAPTER IOVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
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Introduction ................................................................................................................. I-1
Purpose of Nuclear Forces in United States Strategy ................................................. I-1
Deterrence ................................................................................................................... I-1
Assurance of Allies and Partners ................................................................................ I-2
Achievement of United States Objectives if Deterrence Fails.................................... I-2
Hedge Against an Uncertain Future ............................................................................ I-3
Sources of Policy Guidance on Nuclear Weapons ..................................................... I-3

CHAPTER II
NUCLEAR FORCES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURESCharacteristics ............................................................................................................II-1
Strategic Triad ............................................................................................................II-2
Nonstrategic Forces ...................................................................................................II-3
Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Infrastructure and Support Capabilities ......................II-3

CHAPTER III
PLANNING AND TARGETING
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Nuclear Planning ...................................................................................................... III-1
Targeting .................................................................................................................. III-2
Intelligence Support ................................................................................................. III-2
Theater Planning and Targeting Considerations ...................................................... III-2
Operational Consequence of Execution ................................................................... III-4

CHAPTER IV
COMMAND AND CONTROL
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Introduction .............................................................................................................. IV-1
National-Level Leadership and Release Authority .................................................. IV-1
Operational Command and Control Considerations ................................................ IV-1
Command of Nuclear Forces ................................................................................... IV-4
Command and Control in Post-Nuclear Environments ........................................... IV-4

iii

Table of Contents

CHAPTER V
NUCLEAR OPERATIONSIntroduction ............................................................................................................... V-1
Principles and Purpose .............................................................................................. V-1
Operations in a Nuclear Environment....................................................................... V-2
Modeling in Support of Nuclear Planning/Operations ............................................. V-4

CHAPTER VI
SURETY

General ..................................................................................................................... VI-1
Safety ....................................................................................................................... VI-2
Security .................................................................................................................... VI-3
Control Measures ..................................................................................................... VI-4

APPENDIXA
B
C
D

Support Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities.......................................... A-1
Points of Contact ........................................................................................B-1
References ..................................................................................................C-1
Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... D-1

GLOSSARY
Part I
Part II

iv

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1
Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-3

JP 3-72

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Discusses the four principal roles for US nuclear forces that guide thedevelopment of US force capabilities and prescribes the use of thesecapabilities.



Outlines the sources of Policy Guidance on Nuclear Weapons.



Describes nuclear forces and support structures.

Discusses nuclear planning, targeting, intelligence support, and theaterplanning and targeting considerations.



Describes nuclear command, control, and communications systems.

Discusses the Department of Defense’s and Department of Energy’s shared
responsibility to ensure US nuclear weapons are safe, secure, reliable, andunder positive control, a concept commonly referred to as “surety.”
Overview of Nuclear Strategy

Purpose of Nuclear Forcesin United States Strategy

Sources of Policy Guidanceon Nuclear Weapons

The National Security Strategy and National Defense
Strategy are supported through four principal roles for
US nuclear forces that guide the development of US
force capabilities and prescribe the use of thesecapabilities. These roles are:

Deter nuclear and nonnuclear attack.

Assure allies and partners.



If deterrence fails, achieve US objectives.



Hedge against an uncertain future.



National Security Strategy of the United Statesof America. This presidential document statesthat nuclear weapons are the foundation of ourstrategy to preserve peace and stability bydeterring aggression against the US, our allies,
and our partners.



National Defense Strategy of the United Statesof America. This Department of Defense (DOD)v

Executive Summary
document establishes that the US will modernize
the nation’s nuclear weapons strategic triad, toinclude command and control and options tocounter an adversary’s coercive strategies.


Nuclear Posture Review.
This document
establishes US nuclear policy, strategy,
capabilities, and force posture. Presenting a 5to 10-year vision, the Nuclear Posture Review
establishes the roadmap for implementing thePresident’s nuclear strategy.



The President provides direction on theplanning, command and control, safety, andsecurity of nuclear weapons via written policy
directives.



The Guidance for Employment of the Force,
Annex B, also known as the Guidance for the
Employment of Nuclear Weapons, is a Secretaryof Defense (SecDef) document implementing
presidential guidance on nuclear planning.



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
Instruction 3110.04, (U) Nuclear Supplement to
Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, provides the
CJCS’s refinement of the SecDef’s implementing
guidance to the United States Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM) for preparing and coordinatingplans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Forces and Support Structures
Characteristics

Nuclear forces provide capabilities to achieve US
national objectives. Nuclear forces deter threats bysustaining modern, credible military capabilities. It isimperative that nuclear force capabilities are diverse,
flexible, adaptable, effective, responsive, andsurvivable.

Strategic Triad

The US maintains a triad of strategic nuclear forcesconsisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and longrange bombers. Each system provides strength to the US
nuclear force posture through unique and complementary
attributes. Further, the strategic triad reduces thevi

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Executive Summary
possibility that a technical problem in any one leg of thestrategic triad or adversary technical advancement will
leave the US at a strategic disadvantage.
Nonstrategic Forces

Dual-Capable Aircraft. The US and select North
Atlantic Treaty Organization allies maintain dualcapable aircraft capable of delivering nuclear orconventional weapons in support of national strategic
extended deterrence objectives and bolstering regional
deterrence.

Nuclear Weapons
Enterprise Infrastructureand Support Capabilities

Nuclear infrastructure and support includes thoseelements and structures organized, sized, andmaintained to enable the full range of DOD nuclear
operations. An effective support structure is critical for
nuclear forces to be successful. Necessary infrastructureand support capabilities include certain US Government
departments and agencies outside of DOD.
Planning and Targeting

Nuclear Planning

Developing nuclear contingency plans sends animportant signal to adversaries and enemies that the US
has the capability and willingness to employ nuclear
weapons to defend itself and its allies and partners.
This planning provides:


Tailored deterrence options, as a basis for
dialogue between planners and decision makers
before a crisis arises.

An opportunity
requirements.



A means to assess the anticipated effectivenessof options prior to execution.



A means to assess the nature and extent of
unintended consequences.



The ability to rapidly implement select, flexible
deterrent options and, if needed, predetermined
nuclear employment options.

toidentify

intelligencevii

Executive Summary
Targeting

The joint targeting cycle and supporting doctrine
provide the geographic combatant commander (GCC),
supported by USSTRATCOM, with a comprehensive,
iterative, and logical methodology to perform nuclear
targeting to generate desired effects and achieve
objectives.

Intelligence Support

A variety of agencies within the intelligence community
provide vital input to three areas:

Theater Planning andTargeting Considerations



Identification of military targets (facilities orforces) that meet targeting objectives.



Examination of facilities and forces to determine
vulnerability to nuclear weapons effects.

Monitoring of detonations and their effects.
Such collection would likely require reallocationof selected assets; such reallocation (such as to
USSTRATCOM) should be preplanned andwould likely occur at declaration of hostilities.

GCC’s Guidance.
The employment or threat of
employment of nuclear weapons could have a significant
influence on ground operations.
Therefore, thecommander’s guidance for integrating nuclear weapons in
the combatant command’s (CCMD’s) campaign plan isestablished early in the planning process to effectively
make such options and plans available to the President.
Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning. In crisis orconflict, there may be a requirement to strike additional(follow on and/or emerging) targets in support of wartermination or other strategic objectives.
Weapon Application Considerations. The unique effectsof nuclear weapons require the staff to consider additional
factors when planning for their operational employment.

Operational Consequence of Survivability operations take on increased importance ina nuclear environment. The destructive power of nuclear
Execution
weapons requires measures to reduce vulnerabilities andto increase survivability. The commander must employ
appropriate protective measures to ensure mission-criticaloperations can continue after exposure to nuclear effects.
Units must also protect personnel and/or equipment fromchemical, biological, and radiological contamination soviii

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Executive Summary
mission-critical functions can continue following
nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction attacks.

Command and Control
Nuclear command and control (NC2) requires both
centralized control and centralized execution, a uniqueconstruct different than command and control ofconventional joint force operations. Centralized control not
only ensures US policy decisions made at the national level
directly affect the deployment and employment of joint
nuclear forces but also provides clarity of purpose and unityof command. Centralized execution ensures joint nuclear
forces are responsive to the direction of national
authority. Nuclear command, control, and communications(NC3) are varied systems stretching across Services,
CCMDs, and other DOD entities that enable the executionof discrete portions of NC2. These NC3 systems comprise
the Nuclear Command and Control System through which
responsive centralized NC2 will be conducted following thedirection of national authority.

National-Level Leadershipand Release Authority

The President authorizes the use of nuclear weapons. The
President bases this decision on, among other things, therecommendations of SecDef, the CJCS, combatantcommanders, other senior advisors, and allies. The
President directs employment of nuclear weapons via the
CJCS in accordance with established emergency action
procedures.

Operational Command andControl Considerations

GCCs will have insight on current conditions, operations,and regional sensitivities that may shape weaponeeringparameters by planners and decision making by the
President and other senior leaders. Initiation of suchdiscussion can be from top-down or bottom-up, to achieve
national and/or theater objectives.
Top-down communication ensures receipt of criticalorders for execution and minimizes significant impacts totheater operations.
For this reason, Commander,
USSTRATCOM, and the supported GCC advise thePresident on nuclear options and are a critical componentof the President’s weapon engagement decision.

Nuclear Operations
Nuclear weapon capabilities constitute a vital element of
national defense. Nuclear operations are those activitiesix

Executive Summary
within the range of military operations, to include
deterrence, crisis response, strike, assessment, andreturn to stability.
Nuclear operations include unique requirements andprocesses within policy and plans. Any proposed
nuclear strike option requires a presidential decision andhas far-ranging diplomatic, strategic, operational, andlegal implications.
A subordinate joint force will not have, and the CCMD
may not have, the organic/internal ability to nominate, planfor, and/or refine nuclear targets. Joint forces may rely on
external support from multiple agencies for assistance withtargeting; nuclear/conventional planning integration;consequences of execution assessment; force protection;
execution; and chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear (CBRN) response or international CBRN
response. This assistance may be provided via deployedsupport teams and through reachback.
Principles and Purpose

The strategic triad of nuclear forces serves a primary
purpose of deterring nuclear attack on the US homelandand our allies and partners.

Operations in a Nuclear
Environment

Possibly the greatest and least understood challenge
confronting the joint force in a nuclear conflict is how to
operate in a post-nuclear detonation radiologicalenvironment. Knowledge of the special physical andphysiological hazards, and psychological effects of thenuclear battlefield, along with guidance and training tocounter these hazards and effects, greatly improves theground forces ability to operate successfully.

Modeling in Support of
Nuclear Planning/
Operations

Several DOD agencies provide modeling tools that can
support commanders’ staffs in conducting nuclear
planning. These tools generally enable planners tomodel effects of a nuclear weapons strike on bothfriendly and enemy forces to ensure the commander’sintent is met. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
develops, manages, and continuously updates its models
and tools to ensure they are capable of meeting the needsof commanders and their staffs.

x

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Executive Summary
SuretyA primary responsibility of the DOD and Department ofEnergy (DOE) stockpile mission is to ensure US nuclear
weapons are safe, secure, reliable, and under positive
control, a concept commonly referred to as “surety.”Dual-Agency Responsibilities. DOD and DOE, working
through the National Nuclear Security Administration,
share primary responsibility for the safety, security, andcontrol of US nuclear weapons. In 2011, the Deputy
Secretaries of Defense and Energy signed a DOD-DOE
Nuclear Physical Security Collaboration Memorandum,
which codified DOD-DOE commitment to develop
common standards for the physical security of nuclear
weapons and special nuclear material.
SafetyThe four principal safety themes for nuclear weapons are
isolation, incompatibility, inoperability, and independence.
These themes are related to the protection concepts of“stronglinks,” which must be activated to enable operationof the fusing system, and “weaklinks,” which, if broken, willdeactivate the weapon. The critical components necessary
for a nuclear detonation are isolated from their surroundings
by placing them within a physical barrier known as an
exclusion region.

Security

Nuclear weapons security refers to the range of active andpassive measures employed to protect a weapon fromaccess by unauthorized personnel and to prevent loss ordamage from unauthorized acts that would result in a
nuclear yield, radiological dispersal/contamination, orrendering the weapon non-serviceable. These measures
include nuclear security policy; security forces;
equipment; technology; tactics, techniques, andprocedures; and personnel security standards.

Control Measures

DOD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability
Assurance. DOD Manual 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulation,
establishes the Personnel Reliability Assurance Program to
manage individuals assigned to perform specific duties
associated with nuclear weapons, weapon systems,
components, and materials.

xiExecutive Summary
CONCLUSION
This publication provides fundamental principles andguidance to plan, execute, and assess nuclear operations.

xii

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CHAPTER IOVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY“[N]uclear deterrence will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear
attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nucleararmed states for the foreseeable future. US nuclear weapons assure anddefend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, furthering ournonproliferation goals and increasing global security.”
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis
2018 Nuclear Posture Review

1. Introduction
Nuclear weapons are a key feature of the security environment. Adversaries
increasingly rely on nuclear weapons to secure their interests. Those seeking ways to use
nuclear weapons for coercion and war termination present complex deterrence andescalation management challenges. US nuclear weapons and the associated capabilities
needed to conduct nuclear operations are essential to ensure an effective deterrent.
2. Purpose of Nuclear Forces in United States Strategy
US nuclear forces serve the national objective of maintaining peace through strength.
The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy are supported through four
principal roles for US nuclear forces that guide the development of US force capabilities
and prescribe the use of these capabilities. These roles are complementary and interrelated,
and the adequacy of US nuclear forces is assessed against each role and the strategy
designed to fulfill it:a. Deter nuclear and nonnuclear attack.
b. Assure allies and partners.
c. If deterrence fails, achieve US objectives.
d. Hedge against an uncertain future.
3. Deterrence
a. Deterrence is the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of
unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of the action outweighs the perceived
benefits. Credible deterrence operates by influencing adversary decision makers throughthe demonstration of US capability and strategic messaging of US resolve to employ
capabilities that deny the benefits of adversary action and impose costs on them.

I-1

Chapter I
b. Credible nuclear capabilities are important, as the President must have the means
to respond appropriately to an attack on the US, its allies, and partners. Nuclear forcesmust be prepared to achieve the strategic objectives defined by the President. Strategic
deterrence does not stop once a conflict has started but continues throughout the entire
range of military operations. The application of nuclear and/or conventional deterrence
operations during all phases of planning and execution is critical to influence anadversary’s decision-making process, regardless of the stage of conflict.
c. In addition to deterring adversaries from launching large-scale conventional attacks
or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear forces extend deterrence to allies
and partners. This supports nonproliferation efforts by dissuading nation states fromdeveloping nuclear capabilities of their own.
d. There is no “one size fits all” for deterrence. Consequently, the US applies atailored and flexible approach to effectively deter a spectrum of adversaries, threats, andcontexts. Nuclear weapons proliferation, acquisition of nuclear materials of concern, andexchange of technical expertise follow pathways and threat networks similar to those ofother WMD proliferation.
Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more
information on pathway defeat. Refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more
information on threat networks.
4. Assurance of Allies and Partners
The US has formal deterrence commitments that assure European, Asian, and Pacificallies. Assurance is a common goal based on collaboration with allies and partners to deteror defeat the threats we face. No nation should doubt the strength of our deterrence
commitments or the strength of US and allied capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat
any threat’s nuclear or nonnuclear aggression. In many cases, effectively assuring allies
and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of US nuclear deterrence, whichenables most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to US
nonproliferation goals.
5. Achievement of United States Objectives if Deterrence Fails
a. US forces, including nuclear forces, provide the President with various escalation
control options to achieve military objectives and strategic goals with the minimum use offorce.
b. Escalation control options support military objectives, demonstrating US capability
and resolve to counter a threat’s actions. These options should also avoid creating potential
incentives for further escalation, and the threats must understand or perceive when and why
the US would escalate. Options must balance the need for military action and the need todemonstrate resolve with the requirement to avoid further escalation.

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JP 3-72

Overview of Nuclear Strategy
c. US nuclear forces provide the means to apply force to a broad range of targets in atime and manner chosen by the President. Nuclear forces are prepared to execute
preplanned options, adaptively planned options, or a combination of options to achieve
national security objectives prescribed by the President.
6. Hedge Against an Uncertain Future
The US will continue efforts to create a more stable security environment but mustalso plan against prospective and unanticipated risks. Strategies can help reduce
geopolitical, technological, operational, and programmatic risks and mitigate threats that
may emerge over time.
7. Sources of Policy Guidance on Nuclear Weapons
a. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This presidential
document states that nuclear weapons are the foundation of our strategy to preserve peaceand stability by deterring aggression against the US, our allies, and our partners.
b. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. This Department of
Defense (DOD) document establishes that the US will modernize the nation’s nuclear
weapons strategic triad, to include command and control and options to counter anadversary’s coercive strategies.
c. Nuclear Posture Review. This document establishes US nuclear policy, strategy,
capabilities, and force posture. Presenting a 5- to 10-year vision, the Nuclear Posture
Review establishes the roadmap for implementing the President’s nuclear strategy.
d. The President provides direction on the planning, command and control, safety, andsecurity of nuclear weapons via written policy directives.
e. The Guidance for Employment of the Force, Annex B, also known as the Guidance
for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, is a Secretary of Defense (SecDef) document
implementing presidential guidance on nuclear planning.
f. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.04, (U) Nuclear
Supplement to Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff’s (CJCS’s) refinement of the SecDef’s implementing guidance to the United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) for preparing and coordinating plans to deploy andemploy nuclear weapons.

I-3Chapter I

Intentionally Blank

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CHAPTER II
NUCLEAR FORCES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES“The bedrock of our deterrence is our safe, secure, ready, and reliable nuclear
Triad. The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared for it.”
General John Hyten, Commander, United States Strategic Command,
Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense,11 April 2018

1. Characteristics
a. Nuclear forces provide capabilities to achieve US national objectives. Nuclear
forces deter threats by sustaining modern, credible military capabilities. It is imperativethat nuclear force capabilities are diverse, flexible, adaptable, effective, responsive, andsurvivable.
b. Diverse. No single weapon system possesses all the characteristics required for
deterrence; therefore, a variety of capabilities are necessary. Force diversity provides
redundant and synergistic US capability and confronts any potential aggressor withinsurmountable attack responses and defensive problems. The US maintains a strategic
triad to protect against unforeseen developments that might threaten US retaliatory
capabilities. Each leg of the strategic triad exhibits attributes and capabilities thatcomplement those of the other legs. The US also maintains nonstrategic nuclear forces andcapabilities to increase the regional deterrent value of US forces.
c. Flexible. Flexibility enables engaging the enemy at an appropriate level or placewith the capability of escalating or de-escalating the level of conflict. Flexibility isimportant because deterrent credibility hinges on having a convincing capability to executea variety of nuclear or nonnuclear options. US forces have the flexibility to provide nuclear
and nonnuclear options that allow the US to maintain deterrence and, if necessary,
successfully execute a broad array of missions against the full spectrum of potential targets.
Flexible responses tailored to the provocation and what the threat values most afford
greater control over the possible escalation of conflict.
d. Adaptable. Effective deterrence requires a force that is adaptable to changing
strategic environments. Strategies should address the complex and ever-changing strategic
environment resulting from geopolitical and regional instabilities, state and non-state
actors, WMD proliferation, and rapid advances in technology. Adaptability is crucial
because the traditional alignment of nuclear weapon states has diverged from a bipolarworld to a multipolar world with more focus on regional competition and dominance.
e. Effective. Nuclear forces and a nuclear deterrent must be effective and credible.
Nuclear forces are designed and deployed specifically to create a desired effect. Credibility
depends on the appearance of the deterrent from the threat’s point of view. The threat

II-1Chapter IIshould, in no way, miscalculate the consequences of nuclear first use, either regionally oragainst the US itself. This is achieved by a diverse nuclear force capability—the strategic
triad—with different weapon systems and warheads to achieve both strategic andnonstrategic objectives. Additionally, effectiveness is achieved by commanders training
the joint warfighter to survive, fight, and win in a nuclear environment. A safe, secure, andeffective nuclear stockpile further strengthens credibility of the force. Commanders of
nuclear forces hold their warfighters to the most rigorous training and operational
standards, ensuring the warfighter understands their contribution to US nuclear capabilities
and deterrence. Maintaining and sustaining leadership focus, a cadre of expertise, training,and operational excellence on nuclear capabilities is fundamental to the effectiveness andcredibility of US nuclear forces. The readiness of our strategic and conventional forces to
conduct nuclear operations lends to the credibility and effectiveness of the US nuclear
deterrent.
f. Responsive. Responsiveness (measured as the interval between the decision to
strike a specific target and detonation of a weapon against that target) is critical to engaging
emerging targets. Some targets must be struck quickly once a decision to employ nuclear
weapons has been made. Just as important is the requirement to promptly strike highpriority, time-sensitive targets that emerge after a conflict begins. Because force
employment requirements may evolve rapidly and unexpectedly, some nuclear weapons
must be capable of striking these targets within the brief time available.
g. Survivable. US nuclear forces and command and control structures are designed
to survive enemy attacks to convince potential aggressors that, in any scenario, sufficient
US capability will remain to deliver a retaliatory strike. Both warfighting utility anddeterrence require survivable nuclear forces and command and control structures.
Survivability is enhanced by a combination of redundant systems, mobility, sufficientnumber of weapons, hardened sites, and an effective deployment concept.
2. Strategic Triada. The US maintains a triad of strategic nuclear forces consisting of land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs), and long-range bombers. Each system provides strength to the US nuclear force
posture through unique and complementary attributes. Further, the strategic triad reduces
the possibility that a technical problem in any one leg of the strategic triad or adversary
technical advancement will leave the US at a strategic disadvantage.
b. ICBM. The ICBM force remains continuously on alert and provides the President
with responsive options. Flexibility in response options and the ability to rapidly retarget
complicates enemy attack planning. With dispersed basing, responsiveness, and robustcommand and control, the ICBM force creates an extraordinarily high threshold for a
successful, large-scale, conventional or nuclear attack on the US homeland. The ICBM
force is survivable from the standpoint that an enemy would be required to commit a largescale expenditure of nuclear warheads to target all ICBM launch facilities and control
centers.

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Nuclear Forces and Support Structures
A discussion of ICBM capabilities is found in Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-72, Nuclear
Operations.
c. SLBM. The ballistic missile submarine (nuclear-powered) (SSBN) and its
associated SLBM provide an assured, survivable strike capability. The SSBN force
provides the nation with a highly reliable, safe, secure, accurate, flexible, and effective
deterrent capability that complicates a threat’s planning, forcing them to consider the
response capability from SSBNs.
For more information on SSBN/SLBM capabilities, refer to Navy Warfare Publication 372, Navy Strategic Nuclear Deterrence.
d. Long-Range Bombers. Long-range bombers are capable of striking targets aroundthe globe, providing a visible and flexible nuclear deterrent capability, while assuring allies
and partners. Bombers provide both standoff and penetrating capabilities needed to defeat
a variety of threats, to include modern air defenses, mobile targets, and targets embedded
in complex terrain. Unlike SLBMs and ICBMs, bombers are recallable.
A discussion of bomber capabilities is found in Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-72, Nuclear
Operations.
3. Nonstrategic Forces
Dual-Capable Aircraft. The US and select North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) allies maintain dual-capable aircraft capable of delivering nuclear or conventional
weapons in support of national strategic extended deterrence objectives and bolstering
regional deterrence. These nuclear forces offer an important capability against regional
threats, assuring allies of the US commitment to their security and are a clear and visible
message to any threat.
4. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Infrastructure and Support Capabilities
a. General. Nuclear infrastructure and support includes those elements and structuresorganized, sized, and maintained to enable the full range of DOD nuclear operations. An
effective support structure is critical for nuclear forces to be successful. Necessary
infrastructure and support capabilities include certain United States Government (USG)
departments and agencies outside of DOD.
b. Aerial Refueling. A robust air refueling fleet is essential to the mission of thelong-range bombers. Air refueling provides the global strike and safe recovery capabilities
necessary for an effective bomber nuclear deterrent. Air refueling also provides essential
support to nuclear command and control (NC2) assets.
c. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Supporting DOD, the
NNSA is the Department of Energy (DOE) entity responsible for developing andmaintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile. Additionally, theII-3

Chapter II
NNSA is responsible for securing related nuclear and radiological materials, providing theUnited States Navy (USN) with safe and effective nuclear propulsion fuels and reactors,
securing nuclear and radiological materials, and providing the nation with nuclear
counterterrorism and emergency response capabilities.
d. Maintenance, Storage, and Transportation. Maintenance, storage, andtransportation of nuclear weapons requires qualified, specially trained personnel. The
decision to deploy or disperse nuclear weapons requires the deployment or availability at
the destination of qualified storage facilities separate from conventional munitions andnuclear-certified ordnance tools and equipment, as well as additional safety and security
requirements and technical manuals. Prior to moving nuclear weapons to a new location,planners review support issues and incorporate unique support requirements for nuclear
operations away from established infrastructure, to ensure all support requirements are inplace.
For descriptions of additional organizations that support the nuclear enterprise, see
Appendix A, “Support Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities.”

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CHAPTER III
PLANNING AND TARGETING“My guess is that nuclear weapons will be used sometime in the next hundredyears, but that their use is much more likely to be small and limited thanwidespread and unconstrained.”
Herman Kahn, The Essential Herman Kahn: In Defense of Thinking, 2009

1. Nuclear Planninga. Comprehensive plans enable the US to employ nuclear forces in response to avariety of scenarios. Developing nuclear contingency plans sends an important signal to
adversaries and enemies that the US has the capability and willingness to employ nuclear
weapons to defend itself and its allies and partners. The US is prepared to take actions to
restore strategic stability, limit damage, and/or terminate the conflict on the best achievable
terms for the US, its allies, and partners.
b. It is necessary and prudent to preplan nuclear employment options for contingencies
prior to a crisis. This planning provides:(1) Tailored deterrence options, as a basis for dialogue between planners anddecision makers before a crisis arises;(2) An opportunity to identify intelligence requirements;(3) A means to assess the anticipated effectiveness of options prior to execution;(4) A means to assess the nature and extent of unintended consequences; and(5) The ability to rapidly implement select, flexible deterrent options and, if
needed, predetermined nuclear employment options.
c. The process begins with presidential guidance, establishing strategic objectives andbroad employment guidance. SecDef and the CJCS issue policy and amplifying guidanceconsistent with presidential direction.
d. Preplanning also provides a baseline from which branches and sequels may be
developed. Planning is initiated upon direction from the President, SecDef, CJCS, or
combatant commander (CCDR) with support from the subordinate joint force commanders(JFCs) and component commanders. It may involve synchronizing emergent target strikes
with existing force employment plans, modifying an existing plan of sufficient similarity
to the developing crisis, or creating new plans.
e. Additional planning guidance is available in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance; theIII-1

Chapter III
Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and JP 5-0,
Joint Planning.
f. In circumstances defined in Allied nuclear doctrine, Supreme Headquarters AlliedPowers, Europe, can call on nuclear planners at US and Allied defense cooperationagreements organizations, and USSTRATCOM, for information to assist in formulating
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe’s, advice to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
2. Targeting
The joint targeting cycle and supporting doctrine provide the geographic combatantcommander (GCC), supported by USSTRATCOM, with a comprehensive, iterative, andlogical methodology to perform nuclear targeting to generate desired effects and achieve
objectives. Pertinent references include JP 3-60, Joint Targeting; JP 3-09, Joint Fire
Support; and CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards.
3. Intelligence Support
a. A variety of agencies within the intelligence community provide vital input to threeareas:(1) Identification of military targets (facilities or forces) that meet targeting
objectives. This requires looking at adversary facilities and force laydown by function anddetermining their impact on the functionality of the adversary system.
(2) Examination of facilities and forces to determine vulnerability to nuclear
weapons effects. This step involves the physical characterization of the facility (e.g., size,
construction, location); the location, movement, and disposition of forces; and adversary
behavior to support planning to create the desired effect.
(3) Monitoring of detonations and their effects. Such collection would likely
require reallocation of selected assets; such reallocation (such as to USSTRATCOM)
should be preplanned and would likely occur at declaration of hostilities.
b. The resulting information is then coordinated and managed by the applicable joint
force intelligence directorate to feed the target development process and produce a target
nomination list. As a supported command, USSTRATCOM integrates the targeting
processes and production elements to nominate a target list to achieve objectives. As asupporting command, USSTRATCOM adapts its battle rhythm and processes tocomplement the targeting objectives and requirements of the supported combatantcommand (CCMD) and joint force.
4. Theater Planning and Targeting Considerations
a. GCC’s Guidance. The employment or threat of employment of nuclear weapons
could have a significant influence on ground operations. Therefore, the commander’sIII-2

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Planning and Targeting
guidance for integrating nuclear weapons in the CCMD’s campaign plan is establishedearly in the planning process to effectively make such options and plans available to the
President. Clear guidance will assist the staff in understanding targeting and mitigation
parameters and aiding in ensuring key elements the commander requires for conducting
operations are available. Integration of nuclear weapons into a theater of operations
requires the consideration of multiple variables. Using nuclear weapons could create
conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability. Specifically, theuse of a nuclear weapon will fundamentally change the scope of a battle and create
conditions that affect how commanders will prevail in conflict. Weapons, platforms,
weather conditions, and planning requirements are unique in the case of nuclear weapons
due to their prompt and sustained effects. As such, careful deliberation of nuclear weapons
use includes their impact on future operations throughout the operational environment.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more information oncommander’s guidance.
b. Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning. In crisis or conflict, there may be arequirement to strike additional (follow on and/or emerging) targets in support of wartermination or other strategic objectives. Commanders must maintain the capability to
rapidly identify and strike previously unidentified or newly emerging targets. This
capability includes planning for, and being able to perform, time-sensitive or adaptiveplanning for newly identified targets by maintaining flexibility in planning for availabilityof weapons and delivery systems for striking these targets.
Refer to Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume
VIII, Adaptive Planning Procedures, for guidance on the coordination between the
CCMDs.
c. Weapon Application Considerations. The unique effects of nuclear weapons
require the staff to consider additional factors when planning for their operational
employment. While not all-inclusive, the following considerations should be addressed
during the planning process.
(1) Yield Selection. The intensity of the blast wave, thermal effects, radiation
effects, and the size of the affected area depend on the amount of energy released by thedetonation. US weapons have varying yields, enabling the planning staff to select a
weapon commensurate with the desired effect.
(2) Height of Burst (HOB). A weapon may be set to detonate at or near the
Earth’s surface. Some weapons may be employed at higher altitudes. Selection of HOB
enables planners to take advantage of the incident blast wave, with resulting dynamic airpressures to vary the effect on the target. A higher HOB may be selected to alter theweapons effects footprint or to avoid the production of fallout. Some high-altitude bursts,
in excess of 100,000 feet, will produce widespread electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events,
which may affect non-EMP-hardened systems. Adverse effects on adjacent allies andpartners, as well as the enemy, must be considered.

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Chapter III(3) Fallout. The weapon debris from a nuclear burst, mainly remnants offissioned atoms, is highly radioactive. Soil swept into the radioactive debris cloud from anear-surface, surface, or subsurface burst may become activated by and combine with theradioactive debris to create a radioactive hazard, particularly as it falls back to the ground.
The heavier fallout particles reach the area around ground zero shortly after the burst. The
lighter particles reach the ground at later times and at greater distances, depending on
weather and atmospheric conditions.
(4) Weapon System Selection. The US nuclear arsenal consists of multiple
capabilities to provide a credible, flexible deterrent for the US and its allies. These systems
include gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles delivered by aircraft, ICBMs, andSLBMs. Each system in the arsenal has unique planning and employment advantages anddisadvantages that should be considered.
(5) Law of War. The law of war governs the use of nuclear weapons, just as it
governs the use of conventional weapons. For example, nuclear weapons must be directedagainst military objectives. In addition, attacks using nuclear weapons must not be
conducted when the expected incidental harm to civilians is excessive compared to themilitary advantage expected to be gained. US policy on the use of nuclear weapons
complies with all law of war requirements. CCDRs, and other subordinate commanders
responsible for the conduct of nuclear operations, must ensure their staff judge advocate is
involved in nuclear operations planning and targeting processes.
5. Operational Consequence of Execution
a. Survivability operations take on increased importance in a nuclear environment.
The destructive power of nuclear weapons requires measures to reduce vulnerabilities andto increase survivability. The commander must employ appropriate protective measures
to ensure mission-critical operations can continue after exposure to nuclear effects. Units
must also protect personnel and/or equipment from chemical, biological, and radiologicalcontamination so mission-critical functions can continue following nonnuclear WMD
attacks.
b. Commanders must rapidly assess the effects of nuclear weapons and determine
appropriate actions and responses, including long-term effects on future operations. The
immediate impact on combat power can degrade the force’s ability to accomplish current
and future missions. The timeliness and effectiveness of such assessment depends oncommanders’ prior identification of measures that are clear, observable, and preferably
quantifiable.
c. To minimize impacts to military operations, civilian casualties, population centers,
and items critical to mission success, a series of safety distances are utilized to preclude
the negative effects to friendly forces.

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CHAPTER IV
COMMAND AND CONTROL“Maintaining strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control capabilities
requires a multifaceted long-term investment approach and a sustainedcommitment to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent…[and] that nuclear
deterrent is only as effective as the command and control that enables it tofunction.”
General John E. Hyten, Commander, United States Strategic Command,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 8 March 2017

1. Introduction
NC2 refers to the command and control construct for forces conducting nuclear
operations. NC2 requires both centralized control and centralized execution, a uniqueconstruct different than command and control of conventional joint force operations.
Centralized control not only ensures US policy decisions made at the national level directly
affect the deployment and employment of joint nuclear forces but also provides clarity of
purpose and unity of command. Centralized execution ensures joint nuclear forces are
responsive to the direction of national authority. Nuclear command, control, andcommunications (NC3) are varied systems stretching across Services, CCMDs, and other
DOD entities that enable the execution of discrete portions of NC2. These NC3 systems
comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) through which responsive
centralized NC2 will be conducted following the direction of national authority.
2. National-Level Leadership and Release Authority
The President authorizes the use of nuclear weapons. The President bases this decisionon, among other things, the recommendations of SecDef, the CJCS, CCDRs, other senioradvisors, and allies. The President directs employment of nuclear weapons via the CJCS
in accordance with established emergency action procedures.
3. Operational Command and Control Considerations
a. GCCs play a critical role and are involved in any consideration of employing
nuclear weapons in theater, as their use will have significant effects on the execution oftheater plans and can potentially affect friendly forces.
(1) GCCs will have insight on current conditions, operations, and regional
sensitivities that may shape weaponeering parameters by planners and decision making by
the President and other senior leaders. Initiation of such discussions can be from top-down
or bottom-up, to achieve national and/or theater objectives.
(2) Top-down communication ensures receipt of critical orders for execution andminimizes significant impacts to theater operations. For this reason, Commander,
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USSTRATCOM, and the supported GCC advise the President on nuclear options and area critical component of the President’s weapon engagement decision.
b. To facilitate NC2, robust, survivable, and redundant communications are available
for real-time discussion between the CCDR and national-level leadership. These
communication systems are hardened against nuclear attack. Specific systems andarchitecture may vary between CCMDs.
c. For the CCDR, a key element in NC2 is timing. The tempo of modern warfare
dictates streamlined and efficient methods of NC2 to facilitate timely decision making,either in response to a CCDR request or to support a presidential-directed engagement.
The President must have the most current information and intelligence available and mustbe familiar with the CCDR’s plans and options.
d. NC2 relies on a collection of activities, processes, and procedures performed byappropriate military commanders and support personnel that, through the chain ofcommand, support senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment. The President
commands nuclear forces via NCCS. DOD ensures the communications architecture forthe nuclear deterrent can serve as the core component of a broader national command andcontrol system supporting the President. CCDRs advise the President, through SecDef, on
the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict.
e. The ability to move trusted data and advice from sensors to correlation centers,from presidential advisors to the President, from the President to the National MilitaryCommand System (NMCS), and from the NMCS to the nuclear weapons delivery
platforms depends on NC3 systems. The NCCS relies on terrestrial, airborne relay, andsatellite communication systems to transmit and receive voice, video, or data. Some ofthese systems may be able to operate through nuclear effects, while others are subject tonuclear effect disruption for periods ranging from minutes, days, months, or evenpermanent disruption.
f. Force direction implements decisions regarding the generation, execution,
termination, destruction, and disablement of nuclear weapons. This function relates tonuclear surety, accomplished through procedures, physical security, electronic monitoring,internal warhead locks, and disabling mechanisms, to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. Force direction also relies on positive control, accomplished through procedures,continuous training, equipment, and communications, which ensures receipt andimplementation of the President’s nuclear control through the NC3 system.
g. NC3, managed by the Services, nuclear force commanders, and DOD agencies,
provides the President with the means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. The NC3
system performs five critical functions: detection, warning, and attack characterization;
adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving/distributing
presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces. Many NC3
requirements are set forth in national and DOD policy; among these are the requirementsthat NC3 be reliable, assured, enduring, redundant, resilient, unambiguous, survivable,

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Command and Control
secure, timely, flexible, and accurate. These requirements translate into specific,
measurable, and testable criteria to evaluate the performance of NC3 through exercise,testing, and analysis.
h. Detection, warning, and attack characterization is accomplished through a
combination of space-based and terrestrial sensors. North American Aerospace Defense
Command is responsible for notifying national leaders of a missile attack against North
America and all CCMDs. Space-based sensors usually provide indications of a missile
launch, and ground-based radars provide additional information on launches andconfirmation of nuclear attack. Nuclear detonation (NUDET) detection capabilities
provide a persistent, global, and integrated sensor capability to provide surveillancecoverage of critical regions of the globe and provide warning and assessment
recommendations to the President, SecDef, and CCDRs, indicating location, altitude, andyield of NUDETs.
i. Mission-critical NCCS facilities and equipment can resist the effects of a nuclear
explosion, especially EMP, which can interrupt or destroy sensitive electronics.
Additionally, modern systems are capable of operating on networks to provide survivable,
reliable support for senior USG officials, the US military, and allies, as appropriate. It isnecessary to protect critical information and information systems against malicious
cyberspace activity.
j. The US NC3 architecture consists of two layers.
(1) The first layer is the day-to-day and crisis architecture that supports US
national policy by responding under all conditions in both peacetime and war to provide
the means to exercise positive control and direction by the President, SecDef, and CCDRs.
It provides secure, reliable, immediate, and continuous access to the President and provides
robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations.
(2) The second layer provides the assured, unbroken, redundant, survivable,
secure, and enduring architecture for connectivity between the President, SecDef, CJCS,
and designated commanders through all threat environments to perform all necessary NC2functions.
k. Theater-level NC2 architecture will vary from region to region. Integration withallies such as NATO may dictate a different communications architecture. Unilateral US
NC2 varies by region as well.
l. NC2 relationships may differ when integrating conventional and nuclear operations.
It is possible for Commander, USSTRATCOM, to control nuclear forces while the GCC
provides command and control of conventional forces in a conventional conflict with anuclear element.

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Chapter IV
For additional information on the NMCS, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, andfor additional information on protecting the DOD information network, see JP 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations.
4. Command of Nuclear Forces
a. As prescribed by Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 162 (CombatantCommands), all nuclear forces are assigned to respective CCDRs, in accordance withassignment tables found in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. At
present, strategic forces (i.e., ICBMs, SSBNs/SLBMs, and long-range bombers) are
assigned to Commander, USSTRATCOM. Nonstrategic combat forces (i.e., dual-capable
aircraft) are assigned to geographic CCMDs. As is the case with other CCMDs, therespective Service components exercise administrative control of forces and personnel, in
support of CCDR priorities.
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for a general discussion
on command and control.
b. JP 1 states, CCDRs have the authority to structure their command organizations as
they see fit. Circumstances will dictate the specific organizational requirements related tothe execution of nuclear operations as directed.
5. Command and Control in Post-Nuclear Environments
Environmental conditions in a post-NUDET environment will likely affect the NC3
system until those conditions dissipate. CCDRs and Services should be familiar with theeffects EMP and radiation will have on critical weapon systems, command and control
centers, and personnel. EMP and radiation shielding and hardening is one mean to ensure
continuous command and control in a post-NUDET environment. Reference Chapter V,“Nuclear Operations,” for specific effects.

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CHAPTER V
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS“It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come, but rather torely on one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack,but rather to make one’s self invincible.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War

1. Introduction
a. Nuclear weapon capabilities constitute a vital element of national defense. Nuclear
operations are those activities within the range of military operations, to include deterrence,crisis response, strike, assessment, and return to stability.
b. To deter an attack on the US, its allies, and partners, joint forces conduct nuclear
deterrence operations as part of the US strategic security posture. These nuclear deterrence
operations assure the security of allies and partners and reduce their need for their own
nuclear capabilities.
Refer to JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for additional information.
c. Nuclear operations include unique requirements and processes within policy andplans. Any proposed nuclear strike option requires a presidential decision and has farranging diplomatic, strategic, operational, and legal implications.
d. A subordinate joint force will not have, and the CCMD may not have, theorganic/internal ability to nominate, plan for, and/or refine nuclear targets. Joint forces
may rely on external support from multiple agencies for assistance with targeting;nuclear/conventional planning integration; consequences of execution assessment; force
protection; execution; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
response or international CBRN response. This assistance may be provided via deployedsupport teams and through reachback. For example, the United States Army Nuclear andCountering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency’s (USANCA’s) nuclear employment
augmentation teams (NEATs) assist in the integration of nuclear effects. Computer models
for nuclear targeting reside within USSTRATCOM and effects estimation resides within
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which, without proper coordination
between commands, would challenge the JFC to synchronize the ground scheme ofmaneuver, air tasking orders, friendly communications vulnerabilities, troop survivability,and force flow.
2. Principles and Purpose
a. The strategic triad of nuclear forces serves a primary purpose of deterring nuclear
attack on the US homeland and our allies and partners. Moreover, there are several

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Chapter V
principles underlying the strategic triad, comprising unique characteristics and capabilities
that complement the others.
b. Joint forces provide flexibility and employment options that allow the US toprovide effective deterrence and, if necessary, execute missions against the spectrum ofpotential targets. Flexibility allows the President to engage the enemy with the capabilityof escalating or de-escalating a conflict. Flexibility, such as that offered by long-range
bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft, is important because deterrent credibility hinges
on having a convincing capability to execute a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear options.
Furthermore, nuclear-capable aircraft offer the greatest degree of flexibility in the triad
because they can be a highly visible sign of resolve and, once ordered to conduct a nuclear
strike, are recallable.
c. The application of tailored responses to an enemy’s provocation affords greater
control over the possible escalation of conflict. At the operational level, joint forces areable to adapt to a rapidly changing operational environment to provide commanders as
many options as possible to prevent conflict and manage escalation if conflict does occur.
d. The survivability of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and NC3 systems
communicate to the threat that the joint force is resilient in any phase of conflict. A
combination of redundant systems, mobility, quantity of delivery systems and weapons,hardening/protection, and varied employment concepts enhance survivability. For
example, mobility increases survivability because an enemy cannot attack joint forces withany certainty of destruction due to the unpredictability of their location at the time of attack.
Survivability strengthens deterrence by providing nuclear forces for continued use, or the
threat of use, against an enemy. Due to the difficulty in locating them at sea, SSBNs are
the most survivable leg of the triad.
e. Conflict may require responsive strikes against emerging high-priority, timesensitive targets. In some cases, surviving nuclear weapons must be capable of retaliatory
strikes against enemy targets within a narrow window of opportunity. Responsivenesscompels the enemy to fully commit forces during a preemptive or preventive attack, whichraises the threshold for nuclear weapons use by an enemy. Continuously on alert, ICBMs
provide the most responsive leg of the triad.
3. Operations in a Nuclear Environmenta. Possibly the greatest and least understood challenge confronting the joint force ina nuclear conflict is how to operate in a post-NUDET radiological environment.
Knowledge of the special physical and physiological hazards, and psychological effects of
the nuclear battlefield, along with guidance and training to counter these hazards andeffects, greatly improves the ground forces ability to operate successfully.
b. Commanders and their staffs understand that, when planning operations, the use of
nuclear weapons has specific, tangible implications that go well beyond the actual effectsof the detonation. By design, nuclear weapons are highly destructive and have harmful

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Nuclear Operations
effects that conventional weapons do not have. Commanders must plan for and implement
protective measures to mitigate these effects and continue operations.
c. Commanders should know how nuclear weapon effects can affect personnel,
equipment and the dynamics of combat power. They should train for and implement
survivability measures and techniques.
For additional information on the effects of operating in a post-NUDET environment, seeJP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
d. The spectrum of nuclear warfare may range from tactical application, to limited
regional use, to global employment by friendly forces and/or enemies. The use of a nuclear
weapon in support of even tactical operations requires detailed planning at all levels.
Whatever the scenario for employment of nuclear weapons, planning and operations must
not assume use in isolation but must plan for strike integration into the overall scheme offires.
e. Employment of nuclear weapons can radically alter or accelerate the course of a
campaign. A nuclear weapon could be brought into the campaign as a result of perceived
failure in a conventional campaign, potential loss of control or regime, or to escalate theconflict to sue for peace on more-favorable terms. The potential consequences of using
nuclear weapons will greatly influence military operations and vastly increase thecomplexity of the operational environment.
f. Integration of nuclear weapons employment with conventional and special
operations forces is essential to the success of any mission or operation.
(1) In a regional conflict, the USN and United States Air Force (USAF) provide
nuclear support to the GCC by providing regional deterrence and/or flexible response
options to the President.
(2) The United States Army (USA) and US Marine Corps no longer possessorganic nuclear capability. However, these forces may be impacted by nuclear weapons
effects disproportionally compared to other components. The land component and special
operations forces, supported by joint assets, must be capable of conducting all operations
in a post-NUDET radiological environment.
(3) The CCDR can nominate potential targets to consider for nuclear options thatwould support CCDR objectives in ongoing operations. The CCDR and staff must analyze
any preplanned targets and provide options for mitigation of consequences of weapons
employment or request reachback support and expertise to conduct the analysis.
For further information on operations in CBRN environments, see JP 3-11, Operations in
a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and Field Manual 311/Marine Corps Reference Publication 10-10E.3/Navy Warfare Publication 3-11/Air

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Chapter V
Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.42, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.
4. Modeling in Support of Nuclear Planning/Operations
a. Several DOD agencies provide modeling tools that can support commanders’ staffs
in conducting nuclear planning. These tools generally enable planners to model effects ofa nuclear weapons strike on both friendly and enemy forces to ensure the commander’sintent is met. DTRA develops, manages, and continuously updates its models and tools toensure they are capable of meeting the needs of commanders and their staffs.
b. DTRA conducts training on these tools at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School(DNWS). In addition, the USANCA can provide vital training and resources for various
staffs as they conduct planning.
c. US Special Operations Command’s DOD Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Fusion Center provides centralized countering weapons of mass destruction(CWMD) planning, exercises, assessments, and intelligence support for the DOD CWMD
campaign plan and for the National Capital Region.

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CHAPTER VI
SURETY“[W]e will first maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent.”
General James N. Mattis, during his confirmation
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 12 January 2017

1. Generala. The primary responsibility of the DOD and DOE stockpile mission is to ensure US
nuclear weapons are safe, secure, reliable, and under positive control, a concept commonlyreferred to as “surety.”b. Dual-Agency Responsibilities. DOD and DOE, working through the NNSA,
share primary responsibility for the safety, security, and control of US nuclear weapons.
In 2011, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Energy signed a DOD-DOE Nuclear
Physical Security Collaboration Memorandum, which codified DOD-DOE commitment todevelop common standards for the physical security of nuclear weapons and special
nuclear material.
c. Because a nuclear weapon is in DOD custody for the majority of its lifetime, DOD
is responsible for a wide range of operational requirements, including accident prevention
and response. DOE/NNSA is responsible for the design, production, assembly, surety
technology, disassembly, and dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. DOE/NNSA is also
responsible for the transportation of weapons to and from the first military destination.
There are, however, overlaps in responsibility between DOD and DOE/NNSA, requiringconsiderable coordination between the two regarding surety issues. For example, DOD
and DOE/NNSA share responsibility for the interface between the weapon and the delivery
system.
d. National policy provides guidance for coordinated interagency efforts concerning
safety, security, and control across the nuclear enterprise.
e. DOD and DOE Surety Standards. DOD surety standards are promulgated underDepartment of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.02, DOD Nuclear Weapons Surety
Program. DOE surety standards are prescribed in DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive andWeapon Surety Program. Although the operating environments differ significantly, DOD
and DOE standards share many similarities.
(1) DOD surety standards.
(a) Prevent nuclear weapons involved in accidents or incidents, or jettisoned
weapons, from producing a nuclear yield.

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Chapter VI(b) Prevent deliberate pre-arming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear
weapons, except when directed by NC3.
(c) Prevent inadvertent pre-arming, arming, launching, or releasing of
nuclear weapons in all normal and credible abnormal environments.
(d) Ensure adequate security of nuclear weapons, as governed by DODD
5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons; deny unauthorized access tonuclear weapons; and, failing denial of unauthorized access, all authorized actions shall betaken immediately to reestablish security, prevent loss, or regain control of nuclear
weapons.
(2) DOE nuclear explosive surety standards.
(a) For all nuclear explosive operations, there must be a positive measurethat will effectively interrupt each credible scenario that leads to an unintended nuclear
explosive detonation or main charge high-explosive violent reaction (HEVR).
(b) Effectively interrupt each credible scenario that leads to an unintended
nuclear explosive detonation or main charge HEVR given the first measure fails.
(c) There must be positive measures to prevent unauthorized access,intentional physical damage, misuse, and theft of nuclear explosives.
(d) There must be positive measures (a combination of site, facility, or
nuclear explosive operation-specific as appropriate) to prevent malevolent acts that could
lead to deliberate unauthorized use.
(e) New and refurbished nuclear weapons must have design attributes toprevent nuclear explosive detonation and main charge HEVR given an adverse
environment or unauthorized act.
(f) New and refurbished nuclear weapons must have design attributes toprevent deliberate unauthorized use, given a malevolent act.
2. Safety
a. The four principal safety themes for nuclear weapons are isolation, incompatibility,
inoperability, and independence. These themes are related to the protection concepts of“stronglinks,” which must be activated to enable operation of the fusing system, and“weaklinks,” which, if broken, will deactivate the weapon. The critical components
necessary for a NUDET are isolated from their surroundings by placing them within aphysical barrier known as an exclusion region. It is critical to ensure only a deliberate act
activates the stronglinks and opens the energy circuit. An incompatible pattern will cause
the switch to lock up and remain in a safe condition. Weaklinks perform the opposite
function of stronglinks. They must be functional for a NUDET, but weaklinks are designed

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Surety
to fail in a predictable manner at lower environmental levels than stronglinks, thus
rendering the weapon inoperable. Typically, two different stronglinks with different
patterns are used in each weapon to provide the required assurance of safety. With
independent stronglinks, a flaw may cause one stronglink to fail, but the other stronglink
will still protect the weapon.
b. Insensitive High Explosive. Nuclear weapon design safety is increased throughthe use of insensitive high explosive as opposed to conventional high explosive. By
reducing sensitivity to shock or heat, a weapon is more resistant to accidental detonation
and represents a great advance in safety by reducing the likelihood of fissile material
dispersal.
c. Fire-Resistant Pit. Another feature of nuclear weapons design safety is the fireresistant pit. In an accident, fissile material can be dispersed if it is aerosolized by intense
heat, such as that from ignited jet fuel. To prevent this, the nuclear weapon pit can be
designed with a continuous barrier to contain the highly corrosive, molten fissile material,
which provides sufficient time to extinguish the fire.
3. Security
a. Nuclear weapons security refers to the range of active and passive measures
employed to protect a weapon from access by unauthorized personnel and to prevent loss
or damage from unauthorized acts that would result in a nuclear yield, radiologicaldispersal/contamination, or rendering the weapon non-serviceable. These measures
include nuclear security policy; security forces; equipment; technology; tactics, techniques,and procedures; and personnel security standards. Ensuring security is vital throughout theentire life cycle of a weapon, as it contributes directly to the shared surety objectives ofboth DOD and DOE/NNSA.
b. Nuclear Custody. DOD and DOE are responsible for providing appropriate
security for all nuclear weapons in their custody. Custody is the responsibility forcontrolling the transfer, movement, and access to a nuclear weapon or its components.
Inherent in these custodial responsibilities is control, and the custodial agent must secure
the weapon to ensure positive control is maintained at all times.
c. DOD Nuclear Weapon Security Standard. DODD 5210.41, Security Policy forProtecting Nuclear Weapons, establishes the DOD Nuclear Weapon Security Standard andimplements measures to ensure consistency with Presidential Policy Directive-35, US
Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security. The objectives of thestandard include:(1) Deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons;(2) Prevent damage or sabotage to nuclear weapons;(3) Prevent loss of control of nuclear weapons;

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Chapter VI(4) Prevent unauthorized NUDET;(5) Prevent, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused
by unauthorized acts or damage, emergency destruction actions, or security force actions.
Security forces must not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions toneutralize an adversary; and(6) Ensure weapons are operationally available to the President.
d. To develop a standardized approach to nuclear security, as it is applied to DODDOE nuclear weapons environments, the 2011 DOD-DOE Nuclear Physical Security
Collaboration Memorandum pledges to develop and use a common threat assessment, theNuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA), and methodology to identify
and assess threat capabilities and determine nuclear weapons security vulnerabilities. The
Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment is developed, reviewed annually, andupdated as necessary to support the preparation of unit or facility vulnerability assessments.
4. Control Measures
a. DOD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance. Department of
Defense Manual (DODM) 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program(PRP) Regulation, establishes the Personnel Reliability Assurance Program (PRAP) to
manage individuals assigned to perform specific duties associated with nuclear weapons,
weapon systems, components, and materials. The DOD PRAP is designed to ensure thehighest possible standards of individual reliability for those personnel assigned to nuclear
weapons duties. It emphasizes the importance of the individual’s loyalty, integrity,
trustworthiness, behavior, and competence. The program applies to all personnel who
handle nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or nuclear components, as well as tothose who have access to nuclear weapons.
b. Procedural Security. The most important aspect of procedural security is the twoperson rule, which requires the presence of at least two cleared, PRAP-certified, taskknowledgeable individuals whenever there is authorized access to a nuclear weapon. Each
person is required to be capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized actions pertaining
to the task being performed. Restricted entry to exclusion areas based on strict need-toknow criteria reduces the possibility of unauthorized access.
c. Use Control. The term “use control” refers to the collection of measures thatfacilitate authorized use of nuclear weapons and protects against unauthorized use. These
measures include a combination of weapon design features and operational procedures.
Use control is achieved by designing weapon systems with electronic and mechanicalfeatures that prevent unauthorized use and allow authorized use. Not all use control
features are installed on every weapon system.

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JP 3-72

Surety(1) Weapons System Coded Control. Both nuclear missile systems and bomber
aircraft use system coded control. ICBM and SSBN crews require externally transmitted
codes to launch an ICBM or SLBM. Bomber crews use a pre-arming circuit that also
requires an externally transmitted authorization code to employ nuclear bombs or cruise
missiles.
(2) Coded Control Device. A coded control device is a use control component
that may be a part of the overall weapons system coded control.
(3) Command Disablement System (CDS). The CDS enables manual
activation of the non-violent disablement of essential weapons components, which renders
the weapon inoperable. The CDS may be internal or external to the weapon and requires
human initiation. The CDS is not installed on all weapon systems.
d. Active Protection System. The active protection system senses attempts to gain
unauthorized access to weapon-critical components. In response to unauthorized access,critical components are physically damaged or destroyed automatically. This system
requires no human intervention for activation and is not installed on all weapons systems.
e. Environmental Sensing Device. The environmental sensing device is a featureplaced in the arming circuit of a weapon providing both safety and control. It prevents
inadvertent functioning of the circuit until the weapon is launched or released andexperiences environmental parameters specific to its particular delivery system. For
example, accelerometers are a common tool employed for this purpose.
f. Permissive Action Link. A permissive action link is a device included in or
attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming and/or launching until the insertionof a prescribed, discrete code or combination. It may include equipment or cabling external
to the weapon or weapons system to activate components within the weapon or weaponssystem. Most modern US permissive action link systems include a multiple coded switch.

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Intentionally Blank

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JP 3-72

APPENDIX ASUPPORT AGENCIES’ ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIESThe following are specified duties and responsibilities executed by DOD nuclear
enterprise support agencies.
a. DTRA. DTRA enables DOD, the USG, and international partners to counter anddeter WMD and improvised threats networks. Implied in this mission is the strategic
imperative to enable a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. DTRA provides
nuclear experts and mission support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint
Staff, the Services, CCMDs and partners with the NNSA, and other USG departments andagencies. DTRA provides or participates in:(1) Mission Assurance. Conducts mission assurance assessments in support of
OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCMDs, the Services, and other DOD and USG
departments and agencies.
(2) Contingencies and Exercises. DTRA serves as the DOD lead for US nuclear
weapon incident training and manages the Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Exercise
program. DTRA also provides CWMD-related operational expertise and capabilities tosupport special operations forces, nuclear exercises and training, and international CBRN
response exercise support to CCMDs and interagency partners.
(3) Nuclear Inspections. The Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight
Team supports the nuclear surety inspection oversight of both USAF and USN nuclear
surety inspection teams, while visiting every nuclear-capable base or ship every 48 months.
Additionally, they instruct the Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspectors Course, ensuring
inspection standards across both Services.
(4) Nuclear Logistics Operations. Responsible for policy support and technicaland operational matters for managing and sustaining the US nuclear weapons stockpile,including the reliability, accountability, safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.
(5) Nuclear Surety. Focal point for nuclear surety; nuclear and physical security
research, development, test, and evaluation; Explosive Ordnance Disposal Steering Group;
use control and weapons project officer groups; nuclear safety; weapons system safety
reviews; policy support; and the NATO Joint Theater Surety Management Group. The
Mighty Guardian program executes force-on-force exercises to evaluate nuclear weapon
security policy.
(6) DTRA Planners and Liaison Officers. Provide a crucial link between
theater planners and DTRA technical assets to support theater nuclear planning.
(7) Nuclear Technologies. Researches, develops, and transitions technologies andcapabilities to mitigate the threat and/or effects of nuclear/radiological events and to enhance
the safety, security, survivability, and performance of US nuclear systems and facilities.

A-1

Appendix A
Technologies include nuclear detection, nuclear effects, treaty verification assurance
technologies, nuclear forensics, and nuclear survivability. The National CWMD Technical
Reachback Enterprise provides DOD with time-sensitive access to CBRN subject matter
experts and modeling and technical information for planning, execution/response, andassessment.
(8) On-Site Inspection. DTRA reduces the threat of WMD through arms-control
treaty monitoring and on-site inspections and by providing advice and support on WMD
and nonproliferation matters. Under international arms-control treaties and agreements,
DTRA conducts USG inspections of foreign facilities, units, or events and coordinates andescorts foreign inspections at US facilities, units, or events.
(9) DNWS. DNWS provides nuclear weapons core competencies and response
training for WMD and CBRN incidents to DOD; national laboratories personnel; and otherfederal, state, and local agencies to ensure our nation maintains a safe, reliable, and credible
nuclear deterrent and a robust incident response capability. Additionally, the DNWS
maintains DOD’s only radiological training site and the Nuclear Weapons Instructional
Museum, which houses an example of every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal.
(10) Hard Target Research and Analysis Center. DTRA’s Hard Target
Research and Analysis Center provides support to the CCDRs and the intelligencecommunity through a unique partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA’s)
Underground Facility Analysis Center. The center:(a) Develops new techniques to characterize complex proliferation threats.
(b) Maintains a collaborative capability for information sharing thatcombines intelligence collection and all-source analysis expertise with science andengineering research and development capabilities.
(c) Integrates DTRA, intelligence community, and other expertise in a multidisciplined effort to address hard and deeply buried target developments.
(d) Develops innovative collection and analysis processes and technicalcapabilities to understand hard and deeply buried targets.
b. Intelligence Community. Provides worldwide threat assessments that include
regional and country assessment of nuclear technology, tests, weapon development, andfielded nuclear forces. The Underground Facilities Analysis Center, a government-wideconsortium managed by the DIA, will:(1) Analyze foreign facility design, construction, and physical vulnerability
trends.
(2) Perform computational, static, and dynamic structural analysis of nuclear
weapons effects on structures.

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Support Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities(3) Produce and maintain nuclear vulnerability data in the National Production
Workshop.
(4) Maintain nuclear weapons effects reference documents.
(5) Lead the US hard and deeply buried target knowledge-building activities andwork with partner nations and allies to ensure broad-based substantive cooperation.
(6) Maintain an enduring, interactive relationship with each operational, policy,
and weapons development/acquisition entity with essential underground facility knowledge.
(7) Examine new ways to collect against, analyze, and exploit undergroundfacilities of all types.
c. USANCA(1) USANCA’s NEATs are an integral part of nuclear planning in support of thegeographic CCMDs, subordinate unified commands, and Army Service component
commands. NEATs deploy on order to support the GCC with additional nuclear expertise.
The teams provide the ability to assist in the integration of nuclear effects with theater
objectives and potential impacts to the conventional scheme of maneuver. This includes
the analysis of nuclear weapons effects on US, allies, and multinational partners’ systems,
structures, and forces.
(2) The NEAT provides a preclusion focused analysis to allow the commander tounderstand the effects and advise/recommend potential mitigation options.
d. 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command
integrates, coordinates, deploys, and provides trained and ready chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) forces.
(1) Exercises command and control of specialized CBRNE operations to support
JFCs and USA commanders primarily for overseas contingencies and warfighting
operations but also in support of homeland defense.
(2) Maintains technical links with appropriate joint, USA, federal, and state
CBRNE assets, as well as the research, development, and technical communities to assure
USA CBRNE response readiness.
e. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). Provides response
and consultation in the event of any accident or incident involving radiation or radioactive
materials by way of the medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) and/or reachback.
Provides consultation specializing in the health effects of radiation, biodosimetry, andtreatment of radiation casualties. The AFRRI also provides educational outreach via the

A-3

Appendix A
Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation course, Biodosimetry Assessment Tool, and Medical
Management of Radiological Casualties handbook.
f. Army Public Health Center(1) Provides consultation on all aspects of nuclear and radiation health effects insupport of all of DOD. This includes radiation dose assessments and health risk
assessments for military personnel and the general public.
(2) Provides response and consultation in the event of any accident or incident
involving radiation or radioactive materials by way of the MRAT.
(3) Provides consultation on operational exposure guidance and the Radiation
Exposure System as a reachback resource, or through onsite evaluation. The Army Public
Health Center also offers operational exposure guidance and Radiation Exposure Systemtraining to other units.
(4) Provides technical reachback capability in a post-NUDET environment to
deployable medical units with nuclear medicine science officer and/or preventive medicine
specialist health physics.
g. Regional Public Health Command-Europe and Regional Public HealthCommand-Pacific(1) The Regional Public Health Command-Europe provides support to both US
European Command and US Central Command areas of responsibility. The Regional
Public Health Command-Pacific provides support to US Indo-Pacific Command areas of
responsibility.
(2) Provides consultation on all aspects of nuclear and radiation health effects,
including radiation dose assessments and health risk assessments for the Armed Forces of
the United States and the general public.
(3) Provides response and consultation in the event of any accident or incident
involving radiation or radioactive materials.
(4) Provides consultation on operational exposure guidance and the Radiation
Exposure System as a reachback resource, or through onsite evaluation, and offers
operational exposure guidance and Radiation Exposure System training to other units.
(5) Provides technical reachback capability in a post-NUDET environment to
deployable medical units with nuclear medicine science officer and/or preventive medicine
specialist health physics.
h. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC). AFNWC is Air Force MaterielCommand’s supported center for synchronizing nuclear materiel management across theA-4

JP 3-72

Support Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities
USAF. AFNWC delivers nuclear capabilities used by US nuclear forces to deter our
adversaries and assure our allies. This includes the development of solutions to acquire,sustain, recapitalize, and modernize nuclear capabilities to ensure safe, secure, andeffective nuclear weapon systems and related nuclear-certified systems in support of the
President, as well as supporting operational objectives. AFNWC is assigned direct support
authority to facilitate and synchronize nuclear materiel management support to Air Force
Global Strike Command, to include direct communication at all levels regarding nuclear
materiel management. The Commander, AFNWC, is also the USAF Program Execution
Officer for Strategic Systems. AFNWC mission responsibility includes the following:(1) ICBM Systems Capabilities. Responsible for life cycle of ICBMs andinfrastructure for the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. They are also responsible forinteragency synchronization of ICBM delivery systems with applicable warheads managed
by NNSA.
(2) Air-Delivered Capabilities. Responsible for acquiring and sustaining airdelivered nuclear capabilities and integration with aircraft. Manages the life cycle
integrated weapon systems management of nuclear bomb, warhead, and air-launchedcruise missile programs and oversees the Weapon Storage and Security System program.
Also responsible for interagency synchronization with applicable air-delivered warheads
and bombs managed by NNSA.
(3) NC3 Weapon System Integration. Responsible for integrating the NC3
weapon system across the USAF, to include authority and responsibility for weapon systemarchitecture, weapon system configuration management, overall integration, system test,
system verification, and system certification.
(4) Nuclear Technology and Integration. Responsible for nuclear certification,
to include assessing the safety, security, and effectiveness of USAF nuclear weapon
systems. Analyzes the full spectrum of weapons effects to support acquisition programs
and inform tactics and procedures; assesses current and future nuclear systems to identify
and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
i. USN Strategic Systems Programs. The Strategic Systems Programs manages
development, production, and life cycle support of the USN’s fleet ballistic missile
strategic weapons system.
(1) Maintains and extends the life of the Trident II Strategic Weapons System.
(2) Assures the security of nuclear weapons in USN custody.
(3) Provides rapid and cost-effective expansion of submarine-based capabilities
that fill validated joint warfighting gaps.
(4) Assures Department of Navy compliance with all applicable arms control
treaties and agreements.

A-5

Appendix A
j. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA is a DOD combat support agency thatprovides effective and efficient logistics solutions to CCMDs and Military Departments.
In this role, DLA recognizes that nuclear enterprise weapon systems require special
consideration because of their strategic and military importance to national security.
(1) Establishes and enforces processes and procedures necessary to optimize
nuclear enterprise sustainment to USSTRATCOM and Military Departments by dedicating
resources in DLA’s supply chains, demand chains, and process areas specifically to support
the DOD nuclear enterprise.
(2) Provides nuclear enterprise customer materiel requirements. Ensures DLAmanaged materiel is not a limiting factor for nuclear enterprise warfighters by intensively
managing inventory investment to satisfy customer requirements.
(3) Collaborates closely with the Military Departments’ weapon system program
offices and sustainment organizations.
k. Air Force NC3 Center. This center is tasked by Air Force Global Strike
Command to provide technical and operational support to maintain the health ofcommunication links between the National Military Command Authority and the nuclear
warfighters of the USAF. The center’s mission is to ensure national leadership has asurvivable, secure, and resilient communications path for issuing nuclear orders to thewarfighter. It also provides a focal point for support to all USAF elements of the national
NC3 system.
(1) Provides NC3 systems operational, logistics, planning, programming, andcommunications support.
(2) Provides “direct support” to the Headquarters Air Force Global Strike
Command staff.
(3) Provides liaison support to NC3 using and supporting major commands.
(4) Provides governance support for the National Leadership Command
Capability/NC3 Council framework.
l. Air Force Technical Applications Center. As an Air Combat Command field
operating agency, the center performs research and development of nuclear proliferation
detection technologies to enhance nuclear treaty verification and encourage nuclear
nonproliferation.
(1) Performs nuclear treaty monitoring and nuclear event detection.
(2) Provides national authorities with quality technical measurements to monitor
nuclear treaty compliance.

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APPENDIX B
POINTS OF CONTACT
Joint Staff/J-7/Doctrine Division
Website:http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail Support:
js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone Number:
703-692-7273 (DSN 222)
Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-36/Nuclear Operations Division
At the time of this publication:
E-mail Support:
js.pentagon.j3.list.nod-nuclear-strike-branchmbx@mail.smil.mil
Phone Number:
701-697-9168 (DSN 227)
Chief of Naval Operations/N3N5
At the time of this publication:
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policy
Phone Number:
703-693-2775 (DSN 223)
Headquarters Air Force/HAF A-10
At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address:
1488 Air Force Pentagon, Suite 4E235
Washington, DC 20330
Phone Number:
703-693-9747 (DSN 223)
Headquarters Department of the Army/US Army Nuclear and Countering Weaponsof Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA)At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address:
5915 16th Street
Fort Belvoir VA 22060-0529
Phone Number:
703-805-1284/1136/7855 (DSN 656)

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Appendix B

Intentionally Blank

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JP 3-72

APPENDIX CREFERENCES
The development of JP 3-72 is based upon the following primary references.
1. Generala. Title 10, USC.
b. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
c. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.
d. National Military Strategy.
e. Defense Strategy Review.
f. Guidance for Employment of the Force.
g. Nuclear Posture Review, 2018.
h. 2016 Nuclear Matters Handbook.
2. Department of Defense Publications
a. DODD 2060.02, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy.
b. DODD 3020.26, DOD Continuity Policy.
c. DODD 3100.10, Space Policy.
d. DODD 3150.02, DOD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program.
e. DODD 3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents.
f. DODD S-3710.01, (U) National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC).
g. DODD 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate
Unified Commands.
h. DODD 5105.62, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
i. DODD 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons.
j. DODD S-5210.81, (U) US Nuclear Weapons Command and Control Safety, andSecurity.

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Appendix C
k. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.21, DOD Support to International
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents.
l. DODI 3020.45, Mission Assurance (MA) Construct.
m. DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards.
n. DODI S-3150.07, (U) Controlling the Use of Nuclear Weapons.
o. DODI 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Survivability Policy.
p. DODI 3150.10, DOD Response to US Nuclear Weapon Incidents.
q. DODI O-3710.02, Secretary of Defense Communications (SDC).
r. DODI S-3730.01, (U) Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
System.
s. DODI 4540.05, DOD Transportation of US Nuclear Weapons.
t. DODI S-5200.16, (U) Objectives and Minimum Standards for Communications
Security (COMSEC) Measures Used in Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)
Communications.
u. DODI 5210.42, DOD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance.
v. DODI 5210.83, DOD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI).
w. DODI 8330.01, Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including
National Security Systems (NSS).
x. DODM 3150.02, DOD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program Manual.
y. DODM 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulation.
z. DOD S-5210.92M, (U) Physical Security Requirements for Nuclear Command andControl (NC2) Facilities.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
a. CJCSI 2310.01C, Implementing Procedures for Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the RussianFederation.

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JP 3-72References
b. CJCSI 3110.01K, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).
c. CJCSI 3110.04B, (U) Nuclear Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for
FY05.
d. CJCSI 3150.04B, (U) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Logistics Management andNuclear Weapons Reports Under the Joint Reporting Structure.
e. CJCSI 3222.01B, (U) CJCS Requirements for High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
Protection of Nuclear C3 Nodes and Systems.
f. CJCSI 3231.01C, Safeguarding Nuclear Command and Control Extremely
Sensitive Information.
g. CJCSI 3260.01E, (U) Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Coded
Control Devices.
h. CJCSI 3261.01C, (U) Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons.
i. CJCSI 3262.01J, (U) Nuclear Command and Control Staff Assessment Visit (SAV)
Program.
j. CJCSI 3263.01D, Nuclear Command and Control Command Assistance Visit(CAV) Program.
k. CJCSI 3263.05D, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections.
l. CJCSI 3264.01F, (U) Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
Operational Assessment Programs.
m. CJCSI 3265.01A, Command and Control Governance and Management.
n. CJCSI 3280.01D, (U) National Military Command System (NMCS).
o. CJCSI 3401.04A, Alert System of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
p. CJCSI 3420.01E, CJCS Conferencing Systems.
q. CJCSI 3431.01E, Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team.
r. CJCSI 3500.02B, Universal Joint Task List Program.
s. CJCSI 3520.01D, Nuclear Command and Control Mission-Essential Tasks andComputer-Based Training.

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Appendix C
t. CJCSI 5220.01B, Security Classification Policy for Multiple Independently
Targetable Reentry Vehicles and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles.
u. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.
v. CJCSM 3150.01C, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions.
w. CJCSM 3150.03D, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports.
x. CJCSM 5222.01E, (U) National Military Command System Security Classification
Manual.
y. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
z. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
aa. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Environments.
bb. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
cc. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.
dd. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

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APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the
Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorshipa. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff
Operations Directorate (J-3).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint
Staff doctrine sponsor, CDR Christopher Blais, Joint Staff J-3; Mr. Alan Armitstead, Joint
Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Larry Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint
Doctrine Division.
3. Change Recommendations
a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,pleasecompletethe
Joint
Doctrine
FeedbackFormlocatedat:https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
ande-mailitto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would changesource document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and otherorganizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
4. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readinessof the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are

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Appendix D
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of thedevelopment process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
5. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.
6. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions areavailable on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp(NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

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GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
AFNWC
AFRRI

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

CBRN
CBRNE
CCDR
CCMD
CDS
CJCS
CJCSI
CJCSM
CWMD

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives (USA/NGB/USCG)
combatant commander
combatant command
command disablement system
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
countering weapons of mass destruction

DIA
DLA
DNWS
DOD
DODD
DODI
DODM
DOE
DTRA

Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
Department of Defense
Department of Defense directive
Department of Defense instruction
Department of Defense manual
Department of Energy
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EMPelectromagnetic pulse

GCC

geographic combatant commander

HEVR
HOB

high-explosive violent reaction
height of burst

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

JFC
JP

joint force commander
joint publication

MRAT

medical radiobiology advisory team

NATO
NC2
NC3
NCCS
NEAT

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nuclear command and control
nuclear command, control, and communications
Nuclear Command and Control System
nuclear employment augmentation teamGL-1

Glossary
NMCS
NNSA
NUDET

National Military Command System
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)
nuclear detonation

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PRAP

Personnel Reliability Assurance Program

SecDefSLBM
SSBN

Secretary of Defense
submarine-launched ballistic missileballistic missile submarine (nuclear-powered)

USA
USAF
USANCAUSC
USG
USN
USSTRATCOM

United States Army
United States Air Force
United States Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons ofMass Destruction Agency
United States CodeUnited States Government
United States Navy
United States Strategic Command

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

JP 3-72

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONSThere are currently no terms sourced to JP 3-72.

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Glossary

Intentionally Blank

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JP 3-72JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0JP 2-0JP 3-0

JP 4-0JP 5-0

JP 6-0PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONSLOGISTICS

PLANS

COMMUNICATIONSSYSTEMAll joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-72 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
STEP #1 - Initiation

STEP #4 - Maintenancel

JP published and continuously
assessed by users
l Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publicationl Revision begins 3.5 years
after publicationl Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signaturelJoint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fillextant operational voidl Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis
l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validationl Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working groupl PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorshipl JS J-7 approves and releases PD tolead agent (LA) (Service, combatantcommand, JS directorate)

MaintenanceInitiation

ENHANCEDJOINTWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITYJOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Approval

Development

STEP #3 - Approvall

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
JS J-7 prepares publication for signaturel JSDS prepares JS staffing packagel JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signaturel

STEP #2 - Developmentl

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the firstdraft (FD)l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l FD comment matrix adjudicationl JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) systeml Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrixl FC joint working group