Global Strategic Trends
The Future Starts Today

Sixth Edition

How to navigate

Discernible patterns of change
are described in Part 1 underthematic headings, and thendescribed in a regional context
in Part 2.

Impact

The Executive Summary
summarises all the findings
into six drivers of change,
16 focus areas and
40 strategic implications.

At the end of each thematic
chapter in Part 1, alternative
future worlds are describedalong with potential watch
points, discontinuities andimplications.

Defence and security
deductions are highlighted
in the lower half of each box.

An illustrative map of key global
stresses bridges the thematicand regional sections. A moredetailed map is at the back of
the publication.

ImpactKey deductions for defence
and security are highlighted
in bold throughout Part 1.

Exploring
Exploring uncertainty
uncertainty
12
10

Impact

6

12

9

7

Uncertainty Chart??
13

14

4

8

15

Uncertainty

ImpactIncreased size expresses
greater variance of assessment

Uncertainty

1. Harnessing artificial intelligence
2. An expanding competitive space
3. Increasing proliferation of weapons of mass effect
4. Erosion of state sovereignty
5. Adaptation of the rules-based international system
6. An expanded and unregulated information space
7. Rising inequality, reducing social cohesion, and fragmented societies
8. Understanding human enhancement
9. Increasing competition in the global commons
10. Increasing disruption and cost of climate change
11. Increasing demand and competition for resources
12. Greater automation and an increasingly diverse workforce
13. Managing technological change
14. The challenge of affordability
15. Increasing threat from crime and extremism
16. Managing demographic change

SPINE GLUE AREA

16

11

5

3

Contents
Foreword ....................................................................3
Introduction and method ............................................7
Executive summary ..................................................11
Future worlds ...........................................................21
Part 1 – Thematic
Environment and resources ......................................30
Human development ................................................58
Economy, industry and information ...........................82
Governance and law...............................................104
Conflict and security ...............................................124
Global stress map ..................................................148
Part 2 – Geographic
Central Asia ............................................................150
Southwest Asia ......................................................158
South Asia ..............................................................166
East Asia ................................................................174
Southeast Asia .......................................................184
Oceania ..................................................................192
Africa ......................................................................200
Europe ...................................................................212
Russia ....................................................................220
North America ........................................................230
Latin America and the Caribbean ............................242
The Antarctic ..........................................................252
The Arctic ...............................................................258
Bibliography ...........................................................268
Acknowledgements ................................................271
Contact details .......................................................273

Global Strategic Trends

The Future Starts Today

Sixth Edition

Global Strategic Trends

1Conditions of release

Global Strategic Trends describes a strategic context for defence and security looking
out to the middle of the century. It takes a comprehensive view of the future derived
through research headed by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).
This publication is the sixth edition of Global Strategic Trends. The findings anddeductions contained in this publication do not represent the official policy of the
UK government or that of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD). It does,
however, represent the view of DCDC, a department within the MOD.
This information is Crown copyright © Ministry of Defence 2018 and the intellectual
property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the MOD. No material orinformation contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments, except as authorised byboth the sponsor and the MOD, where appropriate. This information may be subject toprivately owned rights.
All images, unless stated otherwise, are © Shutterstock.com.

2

Global Strategic Trends

Foreword“Resolving the tension between foresight and inherent uncertainty
is the holy grail of sound strategy”
Dr Frank Hoffman – US National Defense University

We are at an inflection point. Many future trends are familiar; environmental stress and changing demography,
accelerating technological change, the increasing importance of information, greater human empowerment
and national and international transitions in both economic, political and military power. Much less familiar isthe unprecedented acceleration in the speed of change, driving ever more complex interactions between thesetrends. The cumulative effect represents a strategic challenge that requires a strategic response.
We must learn to think differently and develop the agility to enable continuous adaptation. Creating, inventing,designing, introducing new processes, new ways of thinking, new forms of leadership and management whichenable new ideas to be embraced, new technologies to be exploited and integrated, transforming our current
system into one which is permanently innovative, adaptable, responsive and proactive. We need to explore
new ways of finding answers for future, unforeseeable threats, to be ready to harness fleeting opportunities,
and seek new ways to keep on finding answers and opportunities. It means changing the way we think, act,
and acquire equipment, exercise command, lead. We are at a paradigm shift in the character of conflict: weneed to change the way we do things fundamentally. The future starts today.
Since its inception in 2001, the Global Strategic Trends publication, part of a wider strategic analysis
programme led by our Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, has undertaken continuous research
to identify the key drivers of change that will shape and reshape our world. This analysis helps Defence,and our cross-government partners, to identify future developments, spot potential disruptions and detect
weak signals that need to be evaluated. This helps improve our strategic foresight, offering us the potential
to evolve upstream of threats and opportunities. As Dr Hoffman notes, however, there is no predictive holygrail. Like the actual holy grail, though, the synthesis referred to above has never been, and will never befound. Nevertheless, the development of a working long-term view is indispensable to any organisation thatseeks to think, invest and act strategically, notwithstanding that the only certainty about the future is its inherent
uncertainty. Foresight can prepare us better for an unexpected challenge; agile adaptation will close the gap.
Drawing on analysis from across other government departments, other nations’ governments, business andacademia, this sixth edition of Global Strategic Trends focuses on supporting those who are formulating
Defence policy, strategy and capability development, making it more relevant and useable. To better explore
the range of uncertainty that exists, the illustrative ‘future worlds’ give an insight into alternate, plausible futuresand discontinuities. The ‘impact and uncertainty’ analysis helps to quantify how confident we can be in our
understanding of the key drivers. Without offering solutions, this work identifies the issues that need to beaddressed and so helps us judge where – and perhaps when – we must invest our efforts. We commend
it to you.
Chief of the Defence Staff					Permanent Secretary
General Sir Nick Carter KCB, CBE, DSO, ADC Gen		
Stephen Lovegrove CB

Global Strategic Trends

3

4

Global Strategic Trends

Contents

Foreword.....................................................................3
Introduction and method.............................................7
Executive summary...................................................11
Future worlds............................................................21
Part 1 – Thematic
Environment and resources.......................................30
Human development.................................................58
Economy, industry and information............................82
Governance and law................................................104
Conflict and security................................................124
Global stress map...................................................148
Part 2 – Geographic
Central Asia.............................................................150
Southwest Asia.......................................................158
South Asia...............................................................166
East Asia.................................................................174
Southeast Asia........................................................184
Oceania...................................................................192
Africa.......................................................................200
Europe....................................................................212
Russia.....................................................................220
North America.........................................................230
BahadirTanriover / iStock.com

Latin America and the Caribbean.............................242
The Antarctic...........................................................252
The Arctic................................................................258
Bibliography............................................................268
Acknowledgements.................................................271
Contact details........................................................273

Global Strategic Trends

5Contents

Put the contents here

6

Global Strategic Trends

Introduction and method

Introduction and method

Purpose. Global Strategic Trends (GST) provides a strategic context for those in the
Ministry of Defence (MOD), and wider government, who are involved in developing
long-term plans, policies and capabilities. Without an impartial strategic context there
is a risk that planners, policymakers and capability developers would assume a futurethat supports their assumptions and bias. This publication seeks to improve foresightand encourage better strategic choices to shape the future we want, build preparedness
for alternative futures, and create an organisation that can adapt to the evolving future.
Additionally, it aims to alert readers to changes that are likely to become threats but may,
if addressed promptly, provide opportunities. To ensure it is objective, GST is based
upon evidenced trends (discernible patterns of change). GST does not attempt topredict the future (it cannot), but instead it is an aid to thinking about the future.
Genesis. The need for the MOD to set out a future strategic context was articulated in
the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. To meet that requirement, and as part of a broader
strategic analysis programme, the first edition of GST was published in 2003. GST has
been a key element of the MOD’s contribution to both the National Security Strategy andthe Strategic Defence and Security Review and ‘…was one of the main contributions to
the policy-making process that culminated in the 2015 UK strategy’.1 Elements of thisedition of GST have also been used to develop the National Risk Assessment.

Kapook2981 / iStock.com

Scoping. Work on this sixth edition of GST (GST 6) started in early 2016 with a review ofprevious editions to identify gaps, inconsistencies, enduring trends and, most importantly,
topics for further study. This work was augmented by an online literature review and an
online survey. The literature review identified future-focused topics that had attracted
greatest interest (as measured by number of publications) since GST 5 was publishedin 2014. The online survey was designed to collect, from a diverse and international
audience,2 thoughts and ideas about the future, and hence potential topics for research.
This work culminated in a workshop that brought together partners from academia,
government, industry and the non-profit sector, both domestic and international, to test
and validate our ideas. The workshop identified 39 topics for research and during the
research phase a further three topics were identified and researched.
Research. Each topic was researched by a member of the Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC’s) Futures Team. A literature review was the starting point,
followed by workshops, interviews and, in most cases, the commissioning of at least one
research paper. In total, over 70 pieces of academic research were commissioned from
42 different institutions. A key output of the research was identifying the trends, and the1Lunn, J. and Scarnell, E., (14 December 2015), House of Commons Briefing Paper 7431, The 2015 UK
National Security Strategy, page 5.

2

Responses were received from participants in five continents.

Global Strategic Trends

7Introduction and method

projection of those trends forwards. Data has been used to generate projections, whereappropriate, whilst recognising the limitations of this technique (the future rarely follows
the smooth projections of statistical models). These projections do, however, give a
direction, and often a sense of the speed of change. Finally, the findings from the various
activities were brought together into a single paper for each topic.
Validation. From the outset, we have attempted to manage bias, where practical,
by adopting a structured approach that considered a wide variety of viewpoints andperspectives. As well as sharing and testing the findings from each topic individually,
the collective findings from the entire programme of work have been shared, tested andvalidated at workshops and seminars with academia, partners across government andwith international partners in over 40 countries on five different continents. In addition,
DCDC’s Development Analysis and Research Team have ‘red teamed’ the work, testing
the logic and looking for inconsistencies, contradictions and quality of evidence.
Collaboration. When compared with previous editions, GST 6 has benefited from an
unprecedented level of collaboration. As well as support, comment and advice frompartners across government, the Department for International Development provided thefoundation research for two topics and the Force Development Directorate of the New
Zealand Defence Force also provided two foundation papers. Officers from Australia,
Germany, Finland and Sweden have been embedded in the Futures Team throughout
the production of GST 6, ensuring that the work has continuously benefited from aninternational perspective.
Fusion. The sheer volume of information in the 27 thematic topics (plus oceans andspace) meant that it was necessary to further consolidate them. This also allowed across-impact analysis of the significant ideas to be conducted, which highlighted theinteractions between the major drivers and trends. The result is five ‘fused’ thematic
chapters that comprise Part 1 of GST 6, which are:• environment and resources;• human development;• economy, industry and information;• governance and law; and• conflict and security.
The geographic topics have translated into 13 individual chapters in Part 2, and all but
one of these chapters covers a geographic region of the world consisting of a numberof countries. The exception is Russia, which is so vast, stretching from Europe toalmost North America, it is a region in its own right.
As with GST 5, a journalistic approach (focusing on conveying the findings throughthe written word) has been taken and this has been supplemented by a first orderanalysis to identify key deductions, which have been highlighted in bold within the
text. Attempting to describe how the world might look over the next 30 years inevitably
involves extrapolation and imagination, and so, as in GST 5, probabilities have not been
assigned to our findings. Given the inherent uncertainty, such figures would be simplistic,
and probably misleading. Instead, GST 6 should allow the reader to draw their own
informed and nuanced conclusions about the future.

8

Global Strategic Trends

Introduction and method

New features. Feedback has, however, highlighted that a trends-based approach
can give too linear a view of the future as it flags continuity rather than discontinuity.
To address this, with the support of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories(Dstl), four ‘future worlds’ have been produced (further detail can be found on pages
21-29). At the end of each thematic chapter, the most important trends have been
analysed through a ‘future worlds’ lens offering plausible alternatives to the outcomes
described in the chapter. Watch points (indicators that an aspect of a future world is
likely to emerge) and possible discontinuities (factors that will change the path of a trend)
have also been produced. Each set of future worlds is also accompanied by a numberof deductions for defence and security and implications. In addition, an impact anduncertainty analysis has been conducted. The analysis has drawn on multiple inputs,
including a crowd-sourced survey, to produce an assessment of the scale of impact andthe uncertainty (if the impact will be realised or not) and the variance of that assessment.
A visual representation of this work is on page 10. A global stress map has also been
produced that illustrates where in the world we judge the key stresses (described in thethematic chapters) are likely to have the greatest impact.
Exploitation. The output from all the activities described have been used to identify
16 focus areas where the potential for profound change to humanity is high, and fromthese, 40 strategic implications, the issues that will need to be addressed. The findings
from previous editions of GST have been taken forward in a subsequent document(the Future Character of Conflict in the case of GST 4 and the Future Operating
Environment – Out to 2035 in the case of GST 5). This time, however, to further enhance
GST 6’s relevance and utility for the defence and security community, selected strategic
implications will be taken forward through a series of strategic implications projects.
Some papers will be produced in collaboration with international partners and published,
while others are likely to be classified and not publically released.

GST 6 has benefited from support, comment and advice from partners across government

Global Strategic Trends

9Introduction and method

Exploring uncertainty
Exploring
uncertainty
12
10

Impact

6

12

11

5
9

4

7

16
13

3

8
14

15

Uncertainty

ImpactIncreased size expresses
greater variance of assessment

Uncertainty

10

1. Harnessing artificial intelligence
2. An expanding competitive space
3. Increasing proliferation of weapons of mass effect
4. Erosion of state sovereignty
5. Adaptation of the rules-based international system
6. An expanded and unregulated information space
7. Rising inequality, reducing social cohesion, and fragmented societies
8. Understanding human enhancement
9. Increasing competition in the global commons
10. Increasing disruption and cost of climate change
11. Increasing demand and competition for resources
12. Greater automation and an increasingly diverse workforce
13. Managing technological change
14. The challenge of affordability
15. Increasing threat from crime and extremism
16. Managing demographic change

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

Executive summary‘The future is already here, it’s just not evenly distributed.’
William Gibson

The world is becoming ever more complex and volatile. The only certainty about the
future is its inherent uncertainty, yet we must prepare. We need to encourage curiosity,
be comfortable with ambiguity and open to the world of possibility not probability. The
purpose of this sixth edition of Global Strategic Trends (GST 6) is to help those tasked
with developing long-term policies, strategies and capabilities to think about the future,
allowing them to make the necessary choices today to better prepare for tomorrow,seize opportunities and mitigate risks. As with previous editions, our start point has
been identifying and projecting trends (discernible patterns of change) to build a seriesof evidence-based perspectives on the future. The findings from this work is describedin the five thematic chapters, and have been distilled below into the six key drivers that
our research indicates are particularly important. Dealing with the resulting threats andopportunities will require adaptation, exploitation and action. This work has been further
developed in the geographical chapters, illustrating how a global trend can often havean unequal or disproportionate impact in different parts of the world. From this analysis
a central idea has emerged: the rate of change and level of uncertainty may outpace
good governance and unity. The complex interaction of these trends is potentially gamechanging and demands a new approach that places strategic adaptability at its core.
Focusing solely on continuity (trends), however, gives an unrealistically linear andpredictable view of the future, and risks missing weak signals of potentially major change.
Therefore, GST 6 has used two techniques to derive non-linear insights. The first is the
production of ‘future worlds’ to explore alternate and plausible futures, including shocks,
shifts and surprises. The second has been an impact and uncertainty analysis, which
has drawn on multiple inputs to produce an assessment of the scale of impact and theuncertainty (if the impact will be realised or not) and our confidence in that assessment.
The output from these, and other, activities (including red teaming and workshops)
have identified 16 focus areas that we judge offer great potential for profound change
to humanity, and from these we have identified 40 strategic implications, which areimportant issues that will need to be addressed. It is worth noting that this list is unlikely
to be complete and, given the significant complexity and interplay between the drivers
and trends and the obvious focus on defence and security issues, further work will be
required to develop the ideas more fully, and this will be taken forward in the broader
Strategic Analysis Programme.

Global Strategic Trends

11Executive summary

Trends that require adaptation
Increasing human empowerment. Human security will be enhanced as more people
escape absolute poverty and have access to education and health care. Technology
is likely to lead to spectacular medical advances and the number of people dying from
infectious diseases is likely to reduce, although the number of people suffering from
non-communicable diseases, such as obesity and dementia, are increasing. Humanempowerment will increase with unprecedented numbers of people having access toalmost limitless information, and more people having the means to travel abroad andto maintain relationships with people from outside their immediate community. Equality
is improving and increasing numbers of people in developed (and some developing)countries will have the freedom to determine their gender and sexuality. Individualism
and personal empowerment is likely to enhance personal fulfilment and the way
individuals and communities interact with, and influence, the world around them is
evolving, but this may come at the price of more fragmented societies and increasing
populism. In addition, inequality is growing, with the rich getting substantially richer
but, particularly in developed countries, the middle class and the poor seeing slower
economic growth. There also appears to be a growing division within many countries
between those with liberal and those with traditional views, and nationalism, religious
intolerance and antipathy towards immigrants are on the rise. There are also signs thatmany governments are becoming more authoritarian.
Power transition and diffusion. As the economic power of Asia increases, the politicaland military power of China, and to a lesser extent India, will grow, potentially rivalling thatof the United States (US). While Russia and Europe will remain important political actors,
their influence is likely to diminish and the economic and soft power of the West will
reduce. A crucial question is whether the current institutions, mechanisms and normsof the international system can adapt to accommodate this shifting balance of power.
If it cannot, the system will fail, disputes will be more difficult to resolve, and these
could escalate and lead to conflict. As political power becomes more dispersedand contested it will become harder to forge internationally-binding treaties, andnon-compliance and subversion of international laws are likely to increase. The transitionof power between states is occurring alongside the diffusion of power within states,
which in turn is making the stage on which power plays more crowded. States will face
increased competition in the provision of public services that have traditionally been the
responsibility of governments and they will be confronted by emerging non-state actors
both domestically and internationally. The economic, demographic and political powerof many cities (and some regions) is likely to grow relative to the state and this may leadto demands for devolution or at least accommodation. Some countries may not exist
in their current form by 2050. A few multinational corporations will become bigger andmore powerful, providing vital services that states will depend on, and some will use theirpower to demand concessions from the state. The sovereignty of the state is, therefore,
likely to continue to be eroded and a more complex, potentially decentralised, hybrid
system of governance may evolve.

Trends that require exploitation or mitigation
Centrality of information. Processing power, the volume and variety of data andconnectivity will continue to grow exponentially, driving the development of artificial
intelligence, quantum computing and the ability to solve problems of increasing
complexity and difficulty, leading to improvements across all aspects of humanendeavour. Digitisation is fundamentally changing how people interact, and leading
to a shift in value away from physical goods to the underlying blueprints and designs.
As an increasing number of people spend more time conducting an ever-widening rangeof activities in cyberspace, information will become ever more central to humanity, andconflict. Information will be used to deliver cyberattacks and spread misinformation.

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Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

Social media may cause an ‘echo chamber’ effect polarising populations, eroding trust
in institutions, creating uncertainty, and fuelling grievances. Without effective regulationand protection, cyberspace and social media will continue to be exploited by criminals
and other malicious actors.
Accelerating technological advancement. As well as improving computing power,
technology will drive improvements in virtually every area, including medicine,transport and industry. Technologies such as ‘gene editing’ will allow previously
untreatable genetic conditions to be cured. Transport will become cheaper, fasterand possibly cleaner as electric vehicles become more commonplace and fuelefficiency improves. The automation of industry, including 3D printing, will reduce thetime needed to develop new products and allow an increasing number of products tobe tailored to the individual customer. Technology will ensure that products are produced
precisely in optimum conditions, thereby reducing cost and pollution, and improving
performance. The speed of transition from the current model of work to one wheremachines do much more could, however, be critical. The industrial revolution resulted
in considerable upheaval and the loss of many livelihoods, yet the transition took several
decades. The change to a significantly more automated world (variously referred toas the 4th Industrial Revolution) involving a range of new technologies that are fusing
the physical, digital and biological worlds and impacting all disciplines, economies andindustries, is likely to happen faster than previous transitions. This is likely to increase therisk of societal upheaval, grievance and possibly violent protest by the disadvantaged.
If well-managed, however, automation could lead to more leisure time, less drudgery andreductions in poverty.

Trends that require action
Increasing environmental stress. Human influence on the climate system will havefar-reaching consequences as floods, drought, storms, heatwaves and heavy rainfall
become more intense and possibly more frequent. Transport and trade routes,
including key chokepoints, are likely to be disrupted affecting global markets andsupply chains. Rising sea levels will increase the risk of flooding with low-lying tropicalisland communities and coastal cities (especially in developing countries) at particularrisk. Pollution, habitat destruction and over exploitation will lead to significant
reductions in biodiversity and increase the risk that some ecosystems will rapidly
collapse. The demand for food and water will increase but some crops will fail andwater shortages will become more frequent. The destruction of homes and livelihoods
due to natural disasters could also lead to increasing migration and increased tensions.
Better management of water and improvements in agriculture (including throughtechnology) could meet rising demand, but this will require investment and action.
If not handled effectively, it could lead to disputes, and possibly conflict.
Changing populations and evolving habitats. The population is expected to grow byaround 2.1 billion and reach around 9.8 billion people by 2050, but growth will be
unbalanced. In many developing countries growth will be rapid and populations will beyouthful, whilst most European and East Asian countries’ populations will shrink andage, with more than a quarter aged over 65. As societies age their character is likely
to change. Elderly populations tend to be more peaceful, but they are also often moreconservative, potentially stifling innovation and change. Ageing populations will also
demand increased spending on health care and welfare, straining governments’ budgets.
Migration will increase and, if managed effectively, could boost the economies of bothcountries of destination and origin, however, if badly managed, a lack of integration could
lead to fragmented societies. Increasing numbers of people will live in towns and cities,
boosting economies, although rapid urban expansion in developing countries will lead tothe growth of slums and criminal violence.

Global Strategic Trends

13Executive summary

Discontinuities
Discontinuities are those factors that cause disruption and change the paths of trends,
or even cause them to disappear. Discontinuities will occur in unexpected ways
due to the accelerating pace of change and complex interaction of the key drivers
described above. Examples include: significant geopolitical shifts in allegiance; societal,
ideological or economic paradigm shifts; major conflict; natural disaster; financial crisis;
destruction of transoceanic fibre-optic cables and/or space systems; collapse of key
multilateral organisations; and the proliferation of a disruptive technology, such as artificial
intelligence or genomic editing. Whilst ‘Black Swans’ (a commonly used metaphor
describing the disproportionate effect of previously unobserved, high impact, hard to
predict and rare events) often grab the headlines, ‘Black Jellyfish’ and ‘Black Elephants’
may have greatest impact. ‘Black Jellyfish’ are issues we think we know about andunderstand, but which turn out to be more complex and uncertain, sometimes with along tail and nasty sting in the end. ‘Black Elephants’ are a cross between a ‘Black
Swan’ and ‘the elephant in the room’, these are challenges visible to everyone, butwhich no one wants to deal with. They are, in effect, blind spots, where due to cognitive
bias, powerful institutional forces, short sightedness, or failure (or unwillingness) to readthe signals we avoid the unpalatable, potentially at significant cost. A state’s inability toidentify, understand and implement policy to deal with these issues will increase the riskthat they will manifest into large-scale or acute issues with much larger latent cost. Thisrisk often appears more applicable to Western societies where democratically elected
governments are less likely to be decisive on highly political issues and where public
opinion is divided or social expectations are changing.

What needs to be addressed?
Focus areas and strategic implications
Increasing disruption and cost of climate change. The cost of climate change togovernments and societies will increase and, as time passes, mitigation measures
will become increasingly complex and expensive to implement.
• The demand for a coordinated global campaign to address climate change willgrow as acute effects are felt from an increasingly volatile climate and concerns
develop about an approaching ecological ‘tipping point’.
• Geoengineering (deliberate, large-scale manipulation of an environmental process)could become a strategic geopolitical (and irreversible) choice for governments.
• Defence and security planning assumptions, not least access, basing, routes,
logistics and the environmental envelope in which military capabilities will haveto operate, will need to be reviewed.
Increasing demand and competition for resources. Increasing world population andrising living standards are increasing demand on all resources, including food and water,energy and rare earth materials. The effects of food and water shortages are likely to be
most keenly felt by the poor, but advances in technology will improve existing, and offer
new, food production techniques. Despite advances across all resource categories,
distribution will remain unequal, which may lead to social disorder and violence,
economic disadvantage and increased interstate and intra-state competition and conflict.
• Effective international governance, including trade agreements, will be vital toensure distribution and management of global resources.
• Increasing national and global resilience to resource disruptions is essential tonational defence and will reduce the need for humanitarian interventions.

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Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

Managing demographic change. Rates of migration are likely to increase as transport
becomes easier and cheaper to use and populations in many parts of the developingworld grow. The rate of urban growth is likely to outstrip the capacity of governments
in many developing countries. An ageing population is likely to be a key issue in Europe
and East Asia as current models of employment, health/social care and retirement may
become unsustainable.
• Strong national and regional leadership will be required to ensure effective
management and integration of a growing migrant population.
• Ageing and more diverse workforces will require current models of employment
and welfare to be changed.
• The increasing complexity of cities will require militaries to adopt specialist
equipment and operating concepts, and improve cooperation with othergovernment partners.
Greater automation and an increasingly diverse workforce. By 2050, machines will play
an increasing role in the workplace. The workforce, particularly in developed countries,
is likely to include more women, older people and people with physical impairments or
cognitive differences, such as autism. In militaries, there may be a shift in the balance
between the components of fighting power with an increased use of machines in many
combat functions previously performed by humans.
• Automation presents an opportunity to mitigate current challenges of recruiting
in some areas. However, developing a workforce that has the intellectual andpsychological aptitude to work within an increasingly automated operational
environment will present alternative challenges.
• Future employers, including militaries, will need to adopt more inclusive stylesof leadership and management and adapt recruiting models, organisational
structures and working practices.
• Policy, not technology, will decide if a human is needed inside the decision loop
for the use of lethal force.
Rising inequality, reducing social cohesion, and fragmented societies. Whilst inequality
between countries has reduced, inequality within countries has increased, with the gap
between the haves and have-nots increasing in terms of income, wealth, education,social mobility, prosperity and political advantage. If left unchecked, inequality could leadto instability.
• Governments will need to get ‘upstream’ of the problem to address thecauses not symptoms of inequality, rather than just poverty, to avoid the riskof fragmented societies.
• Nested within a whole-of-government approach, the defence and security
community should consider placing human security (‘the people’) at the centreof their world view.
Increasing threat from crime and extremism. There is a strong correlation between
violence and extremism, and corruption, organised crime and state fragility. The networkof organised criminal groups is global, fuelling conflict and connecting conflict areas toour home countries.
• Governments will need to reduce the physical and virtual ungoverned space thatprovides freedom of manoeuvre to transnational criminal and violent extremist
organisations.

Global Strategic Trends

15

Executive summary• Tackling transnational criminal and violent extremist organisations will require
global cooperation and a whole-of-government approach.
Erosion of state sovereignty. The nation state is expected to remain the primary actor
in shaping societies and in global politics for at least the next 30 years. However,state authorities may struggle to cope with the rate of change, level of uncertainty
and the growing demands of their increasingly diverse populations. States will face
increased competition in the provision of public services that have traditionally been the
responsibility of governments and will be confronted by emerging non-state actors both
domestically and internationally.
• If states are to remain the pre-eminent domestic and global actors, they need
to become more agile to effectively shape the rapidly changing environment.
• Governments will need to manage the increasing mismatch between the rising
expectations of their citizens and the states’ capacity to deliver.
• States will increasingly need to work in partnership with a range of actors, andthose that do so effectively will gain a substantial competitive advantage.
An expanded and unregulated information space. An increasingly expanding,unregulated information space (blurring between fact and opinion, and between realand virtual), where there is little or no quality control, combined with the echo chamber
effect, will make individuals more susceptible to misinformation and/or radicalisation.
Ultra-high speed, ultra-agile networks of interacting smart devices will present societal,organisational and personal challenges, which could potentially be exploited by malignactors.
• A whole-of-society approach to defensive and offensive measures in theinformation space is necessary to ensure protection against physical and cognitive
attack and subversion of society, for example, through legislation and education.
• Consideration may need to be given to establishing national or regional cyberborders to provide defence against increasingly persistent and capable
cyber threats.
• Seizing the initiative in the dynamic information environment requires a shift awayfrom a defensive/reactive posture to a concerted whole-of-government approachthat includes mobilising networks and continuously updating a truthful andcompelling narrative to proactively shape the debate.
Managing technological change. The rate and impact of technological change will be inpart cultural (societies’ capacity to absorb, and demand for, technological change) andin part technological. The interplay and layering of rapid technological advancements
makes prediction extremely challenging and the spread of technology will make it harder
to preserve a competitive advantage.
• Collaboration with a range of partners (including industry and allies) and thecoherent integration of the national industrial base with the defence science andtechnology community will be essential to achieve technological transformationand maintain interoperability. This should be underpinned by strong leadership,
vigorous experimentation and shrewd investment in military research anddevelopment.
• Governments will need to carefully balance investment between augmenting
legacy capabilities and developing genuinely new capabilities that could delivera transformational advantage.

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Understanding human enhancement. Human enhancement technologies, including
gene editing, physical and cognitive prosthesis, and pharmaceutical enhancement,
are nascent now and their development over the next 30 years is likely to offer
profound expansion of the boundaries of human performance. The application ofthese technologies and the integration of human and machine on the battlefieldpresent opportunities to enhance military capability and improve performance of force
elements. An actor’s willingness and appetite to exploit these technologies may confer
a competitive advantage over an adversary.
• Moral, ethical and legal thresholds need to be defined to inform the developmentof human enhancement technologies within societies and armed forces.
• Timely investment to understand the potential applications and risks ofenhancement technologies will generate competitive advantage and could
enable global leadership in developing governance frameworks.
Harnessing artificial intelligence. As more devices and people are connected throughthe Internet, the volume and variety of data created and the speed at which it isgathered and analysed will increase. This will be important for developing and using
artificial intelligence and machine-learning algorithms. Applications of artificial intelligence
will enable machines to develop perception, reasoning, solve problems, learn andplan. Artificial intelligence will also improve the management and verification of data,
data analysis and data integration. It could challenge traditional notions of work,and maybe even human purpose. The rate of artificial intelligence adoption will beaffected by culture, governed by policy and affected by commercial developments.
Data management will be vital to exploiting artificial intelligence.
• Governments will need to proactively contribute to the debate to build societies’
trust and confidence in this emerging technological field.
• A technical, legal and ethical framework needs to be developed with partners andallies to employ artificial intelligence-enabled technologies.
• A failure to understand artificial intelligence capabilities may create vulnerabilities
and cede advantage to competitors.
The challenge of affordability. Competing priorities will make the affordability challengeever starker and necessitate harsh choices. Economic growth could become ever moreelusive and countries are likely to spend less on defence unless there is a clear andpresent threat to the state. Sectors of fast technological change (such as defence) will
require an increased share of funding due to rapid obsolescence and high replacement
costs. Countries like the United Kingdom (UK), whose financial sector dwarfs thenational economy will be more vulnerable to financial crisis and economic warfare.
• In fiscally constrained environments, investing in science and technology isnecessary to identify and realise opportunities to gain asymmetrical, or offset,
advantage over adversaries.
• Governments will need to adjust to likely growth figures when planning budgets
and better articulate the cost/benefit of the ‘insurance’ value offered by defence.
• Careful consideration will need to be given as to how to create mass effect andwhether advantage is best achieved through a few very expensive advanced
capabilities or acquiring large numbers of cheaper capabilities.

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Adaptation of the rules-based international system. The world order is changing andcurrent rules, norms and institutions are being increasingly challenged, as many believe
the current system is biased in favour of the West. Interstate competition (and potentiallyconflict) may be more about defending old or new ‘rules’ as if they were a strategicinterest in themselves.
• Governments will need to understand their role in a changing world order and how
to accommodate emerging powers. Failure to adapt risks a polarised, less-stableworld with a higher likelihood of conflict.
• A careful balance between national interests and regional interests will be required
when developing alliances and establishing allegiances.
Increasing competition in the global commons. Nations are becoming increasingly
reliant upon capabilities and infrastructure that are dependent upon access to the global
commons (cyberspace, the oceans, polar regions and space). Maintaining freedom ofaction in the global commons will thus be a vital objective for governments. Governancewill continue to be a contentious issue as increasing levels of activity in the global
commons could lead to a rise in competition, and possibly conflict.
• The reinforcement of existing, and where necessary establishment of new,multilateral global governance frameworks is essential to ensure continued accessto the global commons. An international framework for the governance of spaceand cyberspace provides an opportunity for international collaboration.
• Governments will need to invest in homeland resilience (and by implication
redundancy and spare capacity) to protect national vulnerabilities.
• As activity in the Arctic increases, competition is likely to intensify andgovernments will need to establish methods of cooperation, otherwise
militarisation and conflict may follow.
An expanding competitive space. As the balance of power shifts, competition
between states and other actors is likely to intensify and become ever more
persistent. Conflict will be most likely where relative power differentials are greatestor when power is contested or redistributed. The number of intra-state and non-state
conflicts is increasing and the boundary between war and peace is becoming increasingly
blurred. However, the level of interconnectedness and dependencies could increase
the cost of armed conflict. Actors will, increasingly, use a hybrid approach to warfare
and confrontation below the threshold of armed aggression, going beyond militaryand economic activities and opening-up new arenas of conflict, including in space,cyberspace, sub-oceanic and, potentially, augmented and virtual reality.
• Actors who develop the capabilities, potentially including disruptive technologies,
and a robust framework that most effectively exploits this expanding conflict space
will derive a significant advantage.
• States will need to be prepared for state-on-state warfare, including throughcollective defence alliances, whole-of-government approaches and strengthening
homeland resilience.
Increasing proliferation of weapons of mass effect. The number of nuclear-armed states
could rise and increasing investment in tactical nuclear weapons and electromagnetic
pulse weapons will increase the risk that nuclear weapons are used. The cost ofdeveloping chemical, biological and radiological weapons is likely to reduce andadvances in genetics and biological sciences have increased the risk of their use throughnew delivery mechanisms that will make detection hard. Further, the ‘weaponisation of18

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information for influence’ may provide opportunities for state and non-state actors todeter or coerce adversaries asymmetrically.
• Deterrence strategies need to adapt to new and emerging weapons of mass effectand an expanding competitive space.
• Arms control regimes, already under stress due to differing interpretation andapplication, will need to be robustly enforced to restrict proliferation of weapons ofmass effect, and modified to cope with a new range of weapons, such as cyberweapons and using artificial intelligence in conflict.

A final thought
Few would dispute that the character of conflict is changing, for example, distanceis becoming increasingly irrelevant as a security buffer and the West’s technologicaladvantage is reducing. The physical dimension could become less important than the
cognitive and moral dimensions. Warfare could become ever more personalised withindividuals and their families being targeted in novel ways. However, war is inherently ahuman activity whose character is determined by politics, strategy, society and technology.
Whilst it is envisaged that humans will continue to be central to the decision-making
process, conflicts fought increasingly by robots or autonomous systems could change thevery nature of warfare, as there will be less emphasis on emotions, passion and chance.

Machines may be used for many combat functions previously performed by humans

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Future worlds

Future worlds

Four future worlds are provided for each of the five thematic chapters. Two variables are used
to define the four future worlds, namely, distribution of power and cooperation. Distribution of
power varies between centralised power (where states are the main actors) at one end of thespectrum, and diffused power (where state power is eroded and the power of non-state actors
increases). The level of cooperation varies between full and open cooperation of actors at one
end of the spectrum to intense competition between actors at the other. The alternative futureworlds are not a summary of the five thematic chapters.
This ‘two by two’ combination of variables creates four different future worlds: multilateralism,
multipolarity, network of actors and fragmentation. This allows readers to contrast theoutcomes described in the thematic chapters with alternatives, which should allow for a morethorough consideration of the future. This approach draws on the work of our international
partners, and in particular the Australian Department of Defence’s Future Operating
Environment: 2035.3
Whilst the worlds are written as though they are mutually exclusive, some aspects of one world
will crossover into other worlds. By providing descriptions of alternative futures, we hope toillustrate the significant impacts of not only drivers and trends but also of decisions and choices.
The characteristics of each of the worlds are described below. An important question toconsider is – which of the four worlds might today’s choices drive us towards?
Powerful states

Multipolarity

Cooperation

States are the most influential actors in the global
order. Almost all states use multilateral institutions
to address global challenges, define legal
frameworks and settle disputes. Good global
governance is a characteristic of this world.

Major powers are the main international actors
who form blocs with other geographically closeor like-minded states. While states within a bloc
cooperate under the leadership of the major
power, the blocs compete for power and influence.

Network of actors

Fragmentation

Power is shared between a variety of state andnon-state actors. Corporations and megacity
leaders are the main non-state actors, but all
actors cooperate to address global challenges
and provide effective governance.

Competition

Multilateralism

States, corporations, megacities and othernon-state actors, including organised criminal
and dissident groups, compete for power.
Cooperation is rare and only sought when there
is a benefit to further an actor’s interests.

Diffusion of power3

Commonwealth of Australia, Vice Chief of Defence Force, (15 November 2016), Future Operating Environment: 2035.

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Multilateralism

In the multilateral world, states remain the most influential actors in the global order.
Almost all states support the use of multilateral institutions to address global challenges,
define legal frameworks and settle disputes. Good global governance, driven byindividual states and their populations, is a characteristic of this world.
Environment and resources. States recognise the challenges and threats of climatechange, and cooperate to adapt and mitigate against them. Cooperation also includes
protection of the natural environment, including biodiversity. With a growing global
population, the demand for resources, including food, water and energy, grows.
Resources are traded in interconnected-interdependent markets. States collaborateusing multilateral institutions to mitigate the inequalities that exist from unequal
distribution, access and consumption. Access to mineral resources is regulated toensure fair competition and access rights, which benefits local populations. In a world
where constant and unhindered exchange of resources is an important feature, it is ashared interest of states to preserve and protect the global commons.
Human development. Continued globalisation is an important feature of the multilateralworld and human empowerment continues in most places. With only a few exceptions,access to information is ubiquitous. States recognise the need to regulate theinformation environment and collaborate to protect citizens. One way to balance
the remaining global inequalities, caused by different speeds of development, is by
migration from poor regions into wealthy ones. Consequently, most successful societies
are multicultural, but, the state remains an important component of people’s identity.
Uncontrolled illegal economic migration remains a challenge for international institutions
and states.
Economy, industry and information. Economies are largely driven by a free market
model. States are constantly seeking to find the right balance between open andunregulated financial trade to maximise economic growth, and a certain amount ofregulation to keep the financial markets stable. Despite high levels of cooperation at the
global scale, different speeds of economic development continue to exist. Countries like
China and India manage to sustain their economic rise and the shift of economic powerfrom the Global West to the Global East has continued. A relatively benign international
security environment means that technological change is almost exclusively driven by
economic interests instead of defence and security interests. Global interchange oftechnological advances results in a high rate of innovation. There is a growing divide
between the wealthier, better educated urban population and the rural population.
Additionally, the societal consequences of a rapid and unbalanced global transition
towards a digital economy is difficult to handle for many states, and this causes domestic
inequality and dissatisfaction.

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Governance and law. States recognise that global challenges are best addressedin multilateral institutions. Organisations such as the United Nations and the World
Trade Organization are strengthened. The demand of new powers for more influencein multinational institutions is increasingly accommodated and, thus, the process ofinstitutional reform is largely successful. In general, international law has primacy overnational law. By using the multilateral framework, states manage to limit organised crimeand its impacts. However, a divide exists in this world between elites who orchestrate
the multilateral institutions and those who perceive themselves as powerless. At thenational level, strong and effective state institutions have the capacity to address thepolitical, societal and environmental challenges. States provide a sufficient level of public
services to the population, although unequally. Though challenged by the transition
towards a digital economy, agile governments retain some form of welfare system.
Conflict and security. The security environment reflects the cooperative nature of thisworld. States do not have an incentive to disturb the current order through conflict ifthey can pursue their interests within the existing order by leveraging their soft power.
Competition and confrontation is managed cooperatively in a multinational framework.
Consequently, states seek to spend less on defence and invest more in economic
prosperity. Violent conflict mainly occurs where unaddressed regional pressures (forexample, sharp population growth, resource scarcity and weak states) overlap with
global challenges (such as, climate change, pollution and inequality). Where conflicts doarise, the framework of multinational institutions is able to successfully resolve them andmitigate many of the underlying factors. The number of deaths due to conflict continues
to decrease.

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Future worlds

Multipolarity

In the multipolar world, major powers are the main international actors that form blocs
with other geographically close or like-minded states. While states within a bloc
cooperate under the leadership of the major power, the blocs themselves compete forpower and influence.
Environment and resources. The formation of blocs, and the competition between
them, prevents international efforts to focus on global challenges, such as climatechange. Measures to adapt to climate change, and attempts to preserve the naturalenvironment and biodiversity are unsuccessful. Opportunities to harness natural
resources for human benefits, such as medical advances, are limited to a handful ofnations. The redistribution of resources (including water, food and energy) outside of
blocs is limited. Similarly, access to mineral resources required for industrial processes
is fiercely contested. For states without secure access to resources, shifting towards
a more circular economy is incentivised to build resilience against resource politics andresource scarcity. The consequence is an increasing global resource inequality andcompetition. Rather than connecting people and economies, the global commons arehighly contested.
Human development. The information environment is critical for both communications
and economic prosperity. As a consequence, states place a particular emphasison the security and control of the information environment, partly to prevent externalinterference. Societies are less diverse and cohesion is achieved by the common
perception of a threat. On a global scale, the interruption of migration puts greaterpressure on areas with large population growth, while also creating economic andsocietal pressures for ageing societies. Human enhancement is used to mitigate
economic and health impacts of ageing populations. Urban areas, as economic
hubs, are home to large proportions of populations. Domestically, megacities areaccommodated by making them the capitals in their states. While most urban areas
are well-connected to other urban areas within the blocs, links beyond the borders of
blocs are rare.
Economy, industry and information. Global trade is perceived as zero-sum and most
blocs pursue protectionist trade policies, raising trade barriers. Security has a highpriority and consequently the free flows of goods, information and people is limited
beyond the bloc borders. Similarly, financial flows between the blocs are strictly
controlled. International trade institutions are sidelined and ineffective. Domestically,
prosperity agendas aim to lower domestic inequality and increase national resilience.
Expenditure on defence and security-related innovation is proportionally high and, asa result, technological development is focused mainly on security-related applications.
However, reduced global cooperation and the spread of technology reduces its rateof development. Due to the competitive security environment, innovation is lessconstrained by ethical concerns.

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Governance and law. Multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, are constantly
blocked and fail to deliver solutions. This leads to the evolution of regional institutions
and legal frameworks within the blocs under the leadership of the major powers, creating
further barriers between blocs. Organised crime is used by blocs as an instrument ofhybrid and covert interference, with the aim of exploiting vulnerabilities and undermining
opposing actors. The competitive environment increases the demand for strong
leadership personalities who, once in power, pursue less liberal and more nationalistic
politics. Unpopular domestic decisions are justified through the lens of global competitionand national interests. Internally, states seek to control the distribution of critical services,
particularly welfare, to strengthen national resilience. This, in combination with a slower
rate of economic and technological change, allows nationalistic political leaders tomanage the transition to the digital economy comparably well.
Conflict and security. The security environment is highly competitive between theblocs. Conflicts are managed by deterrence and coercion outside of multilateral
institutions. Persistent competition results in volatility, constant vigilance, mistrust
and a high potential for misunderstanding. Reduced global interconnectivity changes
the cost-benefit calculus for the use of hard power, increasing the risk of conflict.
The potential for big shifts in the global power balance exists and defence spendingis generally high, although wide variations exist between states and between blocs.
The number of deaths due to conflict is low as blocs mostly contain violence, however,there is a high risk of major conflict. The disempowerment of multilateral institutions
prevents the development of international legal frameworks for new weapons, such as
electromagnetic pulse weapons or personalised biological weapons.

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Network of actors

In the networked world, power is shared between a variety of state and non-state
actors. Corporations and megacity leaders are the main non-state actors, but all actors
cooperate to address global challenges and provide effective governance.
Environment and resources. The network of state and non-state actors understands theurgency of global challenges and how they affect their individual interests. As a result,
there is a shared willingness to adapt measures that deal with the impacts of climatechange and invest further in measures that mitigate significant future harm, preserve thenatural environment and biodiversity, and reduce waste and pollution. The economic
network spans around the globe, and so states, as well as non-state actors, have avested interest in reducing resource inequalities. So, while states allow access to theirresources, corporations prove to be efficient in managing the distribution process.
Access to mineral resources for industrial processes is also managed fairly. Recycling
and substitution are necessary to mitigate resource scarcity, but are also implemented tomake industry more efficient. States and non-state actors are partnering to preserve andefficiently exploit the global commons.
Human development. The new skillsets required in the digital industries drive migrationof those who possess the right, but rare skills. Whilst almost everyone has accessto information, the development is mainly driven by corporations and entrepreneurs
based on economic interests. In general, people are treated as consumers rather thancitizens. Most successful societies comprise people from many different origins. Despite
this, there is a seller’s market for loyalty and identity, which is led by non-state actors,
including megacities and corporations. Most people have multilayered identities that not
only reflect allegiances to non-state actors, but also a particular nation or region.
Economy, information and industry. Global trade is characterised by the free market
model. The high number of actors manage the fair and benign economic competition inlayered and connected networks. However, with a larger and more diverse set of actors,
authority is dispersed and decision-making takes longer. Managing these complex
networks is challenging for rising powers with authoritarian political systems. The
reformed global trade organisations are part of many of these networks. Technologicalchange is driven mainly by non-state actors and their economic interests. This
cooperation allows a greater ability to leverage technology. However, cooperation
becomes difficult when interests clash, for example, over the regulation of financial
markets. Actors seek to balance autonomous and human production, but investment
in digital and financial markets at the expense of capital and labour has led to increased
inequality between socio-economic groups.

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Governance and law. Organisations like the United Nations and the World Trade
Organization are intact and manage to accommodate the variety of actors, including
megacities. However, there is constant pressure for continual reform to makeinternational institutions adapt to the new world order. The spread and impact oforganised crime is limited by hybrid global governance. Geography and state territory
are of lesser importance in this world and instead it is the function of actors that mattersmost. Due to slower decision-making, the political process for managing the transition
to digital economies is hardly keeping pace. Domestically, states seek to mitigate theimpacts of this transition by working together with corporations to provide services in themost effective and efficient way. However, the supplementary services are not affordable
for everyone.
Conflict and security. The security environment is mostly peaceful. Although states
differ in their defence and security organisations, common trends include reduced
defence spending and the private contracting of large parts of the armed forces.
Corporations and urban areas seek to prevent conflicts from escalating to protect theirinvestments and avoid discontent and disruption among their populations. Nevertheless,confrontations, mostly around economic issues, still exist but they are usually settled bymediation using the multilateral framework, hence the number of deaths due to conflictremains relatively low. Coalitions and alliances are formed by shared interests and are
constantly shifting. Leveraging smart power through a variety of overlapping networks
is demanding and creates a highly-dynamic security environment. The high speed oftechnological advances, driven by corporations and their economic interests, and theirpotential for weaponisation, creates a challenging environment for international law.
States seek to reduce the risk of proliferation whilst corporations seek to protect theirshare of sales in the small defence market.

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Future worlds

Fragmentation

In the fragmented world, states, corporations, megacities and other non-state actors,
including organised criminal and dissident groups, compete for power. Cooperation israre and only sought when there is a benefit to further an actor’s interests.
Environment and resources. In a world characterised by persistent competition, it is
impossible to address global challenges like climate change and biodiversity loss. Some
actors attempt to do the minimum necessary to adapt to the severe consequences they
are facing. The stress caused by the impacts of these challenges adds to the tension
caused by resource inequality, which cannot be addressed effectively due to the chaotic
state of the global order. Weak states who fail to protect citizens from resource priceshocks come under increasing pressure. Response to natural disasters is uncoordinatedat the state level with private companies stepping-in to provide humanitarian assistancein exchange for access rights to resources. The global commons, particularly space, areheavily contested.
Human development. Many people seek refuge from the impacts of climate change
and migrate to more habitable regions and cities. Together with a greater numberof mostly economic migrants, they change the composition of many societies wherelevels of integration are low, which compounds cultural divergence. Additionally, asignificant number of people are stateless. Societal cohesion deteriorates in this world,at least in part because of the states’ weakness but also because of the multitude ofother identification points. States are already too weak to provide governance in theinformation environment, which is nevertheless widely accessible and an essential
resource, but also exploited by all actors to further individual interests.
Economy, industry and information. Global trade is unregulated and the system is basedon unconstrained markets, which increases the problems of inequality. Global tradeorganisations are dysfunctional. Actors negotiate bilateral agreements if they provide
the opportunity to further their interests. However, most agreements are short lived.
Technological change is mainly driven by private corporations and shared with the cities
that host them. Due to the high likelihood of conflict, the focus is mainly on technology
relevant to security. The development rate is high but uneven and less constrained by
ethical concerns. Hence, the implementation of new technologies, such as autonomy,
is governed weakly, leading to increased inequality. The unregulated information
environment is highly contested and exploited by a variety of actors. Notwithstanding,
it is used for a high volume of digital transactions which are, under these circumstances,
susceptible to theft of intellectual property.

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Governance and law. Global governance is almost impossible. The United Nations still
exists but is unable to provide solutions and international law is sidelined. Institutions,such as the World Trade Organization, are weak and easily undermined. States lose
their role in service provision as well as their legitimacy to raise taxes. Non-state actors
seek to exploit this to further weaken states and gain more power. While states struggle
to manage the transition towards a digital economy and reform the welfare states,
corporations, as well as cities, design new service provision models without the burdensof bureaucracy and accountability. Organised crime cannot be addressed without global
cooperation. It is spreading and increasing its role in all illicit activities where money canbe earned. Conversely, the monopoly on law enforcement of many states is eroded.
Conflict and security. The security environment is chaotic and multilateral organisations
are unable to settle conflict. Conflict is omnipresent and defence and security spendingis high for all actors. Coalitions are fluid and based on national interests rather thannorms and values. In this environment, hard power is required to survive and project
influence. With a dysfunctional international legal framework, technology is weaponised
where feasible and seen as beneficial, without ethical constraints. Most conflicts are
regionally contained and of smaller size. Nevertheless, continuous fighting in someplaces results in increasing numbers of deaths.

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Environment and resources

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Environment and resources

Environment and resources

Synopsis
Human influence on the climate system will have far-reaching consequences over the
next 30 years with floods, droughts, storms, heatwaves and heavy rainfall all expected to
become more intense and possibly more frequent. Transport and trade routes, including
chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, are likely to be disrupted, affecting global
markets and supply chains. The demand for food and water will increase, but somecrops will fail and water shortages are likely to become more prevalent. Such shortages,
along with the destruction of homes and livelihoods as a result of natural disasters, could
also lead to increasing migration and conflict. Better management of water supplies
and improvements in agriculture (not least by harnessing technology) could meet risingdemands for food and water, but this will require investment and action. Rising sea levels
will increase the risk of flooding, with low-lying communities (for example, tropical islands
and coastal cities) in developing countries at particular risk. The demand for energy
and mineral resources will also increase and shortages can be expected, with somenations potentially hoarding supplies deliberately. Competition and disputes could leadto conflict, although advances in technology are likely to open up new sources, improverecycling and facilitate further exploitation of renewable energy.

Fotos593 / Shutterstock.com

Pollution, habitat destruction and over-exploitation will lead to significant reductions
in biodiversity and increase the risk that some ecosystems will rapidly collapse, with
substantial loss of animal and plant species. Catches of tropical fish are likely to
reduce, harming coastal communities and possibly leading to an increase in piracy.
The governance of the global commons (cyberspace, the oceans, polar regions andspace) will continue to be a contentious issue, especially in space where the increasing
number of actors will lead to a progressively congested and contested environment.
Dependency on space-based capabilities for a range of services, including navigation,
precision timing and communication, is growing, yet so are the risks, such as a collisionfrom space debris or deliberate actions by malicious actors.

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Environment and resources

Climate change
Temperature. The Earth’s climate is warming and by 2050 the average global
temperature is likely to rise by between 1° Celsius and 2° Celsius and there is
widespread scientific agreement that this is because of human activity.1 The impact ofclimate change is already noticeable with 17 of the 18 warmest years on record (since1880) occurring since 2000.2 Inertia in the climate system means that temperatures
will almost certainly continue to rise, regardless of any mitigation. Recent estimatessuggest that even if the commitments made under the Paris Agreement of 2015 are met,
temperature rises are likely to reach between 2.3° Celsius and 3.5° Celsius by 2100.3
In addition to increases in average temperature, climate change will probably result in
future weather events that are more extreme than today’s. Floods, droughts, storms,
heatwaves and heavy rainfall are all expected to become more intense and possibly
more frequent. Military equipment will need to be able to operate in these increasingly
extreme conditions.

The Paris Agreement. In 2015, world political leaders agreed to take action tokeep global temperature rise below 2° Celsius (compared to pre-industrial levels),with the aim of holding rises to a safer limit of 1.5° Celsius. To achieve these goals,
greenhouse gas emissions need to peak as soon as possible, before rapidly declining
and becoming net-zero in the second half of the 21st Century. This could occur ifmanmade emissions are substantially reduced and greenhouse gases are removed(through afforestation or by using carbon capture and storage technologies).

By 2050 theaverage global
temperature
is likely to riseby between
1° Celsius and
2° Celsius.

32

Rainfall. Global average rainfall is expected to rise and periods of heavy rain arelikely to become more intense and frequent. Floods have accounted for 47% of
all weather-related disasters since the mid-1990s4 and about half the world could
experience increased flooding in the next 30 years. Outbreaks of waterborne diseases
often accompany flooding, along with damage to agriculture and soil fertility caused byincreased run-off and soil erosion. Climate change-related disruption to rainfall patterns
and higher temperatures, alongside increased demand, may also lead to many regions
suffering water shortages.
Impact on agriculture. Weather and climate affect all aspects of agriculture. The
effects of climate change (such as heat-stress and drought) are likely to result in poorer
yields and greater variability from one year to the next. The Russian heatwave of 2010
contributed to a doubling of global wheat prices, illustrating some of the practicalconsequences of climate change, and similar events can be expected in the coming
decades. While more effective irrigation could mitigate some of the agricultural impactsof climate change, it may not be a viable solution everywhere. Changes to the climate
could have a positive impact in some parts of the world. For example, more frost-freedays in parts of Europe and North America will probably lengthen the growing season.5

1

Anticipated 1-2° Celsius rise is relative to the 1986-2005 period. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), (2014), Climate Change 2014; Synthesis Report.

2

United Nations (UN), (2017), UN Climate Change Annual Report 2017.

3

International Energy Agency, (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017.

4

Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) and The United Nations Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction (UNISDR), The Human Cost of Weather Related Disasters, 1995-2015.

5

Davie, J., et al., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research
paper prepared for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

Global Strategic Trendsdani daniar / Shutterstock.com

Environment and resources

Floods, droughts, storms, heat waves and heavy rainfall are expected to become more intense and possibly more frequent

Impact on cities. Urban areas are often warmer than the surrounding countryside
because of their high-density energy generation and the prevalence of building materials
that retain heat. This ‘urban heat island effect’ means that some cities could experiencetemperatures 2° Celsius to 3° Celsius warmer than the global average.6 Warmer
temperatures are likely to exacerbate urban pollution, which could lead to increased
problems for people with asthma, allergies and other respiratory diseases. As cities
expand, there will be greater pressure to develop land in areas prone to environmental
hazards, such as flooding and landslides. In 2000, around 30 million people lived inurban floodplains in Asia. This is projected to increase to between 83-91 million by
2030 and 119-188 million by 2060.7 Combined with the effects of climate change,
this suggests that the impact of natural disasters will be more severe in urban areas.
Impact on transport and trade. Increasingly intense storms, sea level rises and longer
periods of heavy rain will disrupt shipping. Air transport is also likely to be affected, forexample, the polar front jet stream (a current of fast-moving air in the upper atmosphere)
will probably strengthen and, during the winter, incidents of high turbulence might be
40-170% more frequent. Without mitigation, this could lead to longer flight times, higher
fuel consumption and an increased need for aircraft maintenance. Inland waterways
are also likely to be affected by climate change, for example, the cost of shipping on the
North American Great Lakes is forecast to increase by 9% by 2050 as water levels drop.
Other parts of the world may experience much higher rainfall and might have to closeinland waterways as they become unsafe for use.8 In some parts of the world, risingtemperatures are likely to buckle railway tracks, overheat underground rail networks andmelt tarmac surfaces. Increasingly heavy rainfall will affect road networks. Roads inmany parts of the world are often impassable because of rain and subsidence, and thiswill be amplified by climate change.
6

Estrada, F., et al., Nature Climate Change, Volume 7, (June 2017), A global economic assessment of city
policies to reduce climate change impacts.

7

Government Office for Science, (October 2011), Migration and Global Environmental Change, page 110.

8

Davie, J., et al., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research
paper prepared for DCDC.

Global Strategic Trends

33Environment and resources

Impact on the economy. Without mitigation, the damage from climate change is likely
to reduce global economic growth and could cause an economic decline. Mitigationis, however, likely to be costly. It is estimated that the energy sector alone will needto invest United States (US) $3.5 trillion annually,9 but delaying action would be morecostly. For example, delaying climate mitigation investment beyond 2030 is expected toincrease the 2030-2050 costs by between 14-44%, relative to taking immediate action.10
The economic impact of climate change will be felt before 2050, for example, thosecountries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are expected to experience
increased debt repayments of around US $168 billion due to climate risk from floods,
droughts and severe weather events over the next ten years.11
Global growth rates per capita, under different climate change scenarios
Percentage (%) annual grossdomestic product (GDP)growth rates per capita

ER1

6

No warming

5

Low warming

4

High warming

3
2
1
0

2020s

2030s

2040s

Sources

Note: Data based on International Panel for Climate Change scenarios.
Source: International Climate Initiative

Impact on defence and security. Climate change will require ships, aircraft and vehicles
to operate in more extreme environmental conditions and planning assumptions (suchas where ships and aircraft can be based and when routes will be passable) will need
to be revised. Climate change may also drive responses that exacerbate migration andsecurity challenges. For example, prolonged periods of extremely low rainfall have been
cited as a probable reason for increases in violent conflict, as a result of scarce vital
resources.12 Criminal, or even terrorist, groups could take advantage of the stresses thatclimate change may bring. For instance, climate-induced disruption of water supplies andimpacts on agriculture could be used as a tool to push individuals to join dissident groups.
Such shortages of vital resources, along with the destruction of homes and livelihoods
as a result of natural disasters, could also lead to increasing migration and conflict,particularly in developing countries that do not have the capacity to mitigate these effects.
Globalconsumption ofenergy is likely
to have risen by
between 40-60%.

EnergyDemand. By 2050, global consumption of energy is likely to have risen by between
40-60% and the way the world meets its growing energy needs will probably look quite
different from today. The historic link between rising gross domestic product (GDP) andenergy consumption appears to be weakening as the global population growth slows
and economies become service sector based, rather than manufacturing based.
9

The World Bank, (2018), ‘Climate Change’.

10 IPCC, (2014), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
11 UN Climate Change, (3 July 2018), Climate Change is Driving Debt for Developing Countries.
12 Davie, J., et al., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research
paper prepared for DCDC.

34

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Global growth in energy consumption looks likely to slow to 1% per annum, about half
the annual speed of increase seen between 2000 and the present day.13 The yearly rateof growth in energy consumption will be unequal around the world. In future, developed
economies could see average increases of around 0.5%, compared with 1.4% indeveloping countries.14 Industry will probably continue to consume the largest proportionof energy, followed by energy used in buildings (domestic use and use by service
sectors), and then transport. Energy consumption is likely to increase most rapidly inbuildings however, not least because of increasing urban populations. Consumption
increases will probably grow most slowly in industry, as it becomes more energy
efficient. Over the last 25 years, efficiency measures have saved an amount of energy
equivalent to the total current demand of China, India and Europe combined, and further
improvements are likely in the future.15
Greenhouse gases. Annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy generation havestarted to flatten out in the past few years, and might peak in the 2030s. Projections
suggest that hydrocarbons are likely to remain the main source to meet overall energy
demand, at around 70%, by 2050. To keep temperature rises below 2° Celsius,hydrocarbon use would need to be half of this.16 While carbon capture will probably bean essential part of mitigating the effects of climate change in future, it is not happening
at the rate needed to meet long-term climate goals.
Total global primary energy demand

ER2 – Primary energy demand
40

Millions of tonnes of oil
equivalent (Mtoe)

35

16,00014,00030

12,00025

10,000
8,000
6,000

20
15
10

4,000
2,000

5

Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide
emissions (CO2 Gt)

20,00018,0000

Bioenergy
Hydro
Nuclear
Gas
Oil
Coal
CO2 Gt

2050

2045

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

0

Other
renewables

Source: International energy Agency World Energy outlook 2017
Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2017

Fuel. Oil will probably remain the world’s largest source of energy (meeting just undera third of needs) by 2050, while consumption of coal is likely to stabilise, in line with
political commitments to tackle climate change and improve air quality. Gas will probably
replace coal as the second largest energy source sometime in the mid-2030s, generatingaround 26% of the world’s power by 2050. China is likely to become the second largest
net importer of gas, behind Europe, and a key player in future energy markets.

13 Rennie, C., Pointer Energy, (2017), Global Strategic Trends: The Future of Energy; a primer on trends anddrivers of energy technologies through to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
14 The International Energy Agency, (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017.
15 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), (2017), Advancing the Global Renewable
Energy Transition: Highlights of the REN21 Renewables 2017 Global Status Report in Perspective, page 10.
16 Rennie, C., Pointer Energy, (2017), Global Strategic Trends: The Future of Energy; a primer on trends anddrivers of energy technologies through to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

Global Strategic Trends

35

Nahorski Pavel / Shutterstock.com

Environment and resources

Warmer temperatures are likely to exacerbate urban pollution

By 2050, approximately 75% of the world’s oil could be used in Asia, making it the mostimportant global market for oil exports. China is likely to consume more oil than the US
by 2030. India, although likely to consume less oil than China, is expected to see themost rapid increase in consumption.17 Oil and gas production in the US could reachrecord-breaking levels by the mid-2020s, fundamentally altering the oil and gas market,
although oil from Middle East is likely to remain important. Liquefied natural gas (LNG)
could also account for the vast majority of growth in long-distance gas trade, somethingthat is likely to make many new cross-border pipeline projects uncompetitive.18 By 2050,
the US could emerge as the world’s largest producer of LNG.
Renewables. Renewable means of energy production (such as wind, solar, bioenergy,hydro and geothermal) are the fastest growing sources of energy. Together with nuclear
energy, renewables could rise to meet around a quarter of all energy needs and over halfof total electricity generation capacity by 2050. In some countries, renewables could
become the cheapest source of new electrical power generation.19 China will probably
remain the world’s largest investor in renewable energy, as well as one of the leading
manufacturers and exporters of energy technologies, from solar equipment tohigh-voltage mega-grids that could enable long distance and even internationaltransmission. More energy is also likely to be generated from nuclear power over the
next 30 years, with probable global increases of around 1.6% per year.20
Networks. The rapid rise of renewables is likely to be accompanied by increases inenergy storage and digitisation, as well as energy market changes and investment inelectricity networks. The power sector is likely to become more complex as a result of
rapidly evolving interdependent technologies, new business models and a shifting

17 The International Energy Agency, (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017.
18 Ibid., pages 69, 26-28, and 90.
19 The US Energy Information Association, (23 July 2018), ‘Today in Energy’.
20 The International Energy Agency, (2017), World Energy Outlook 2017, page 74.

36

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

regulatory landscape.21 Information technology and automation could radically transform
energy supply and demand, including locating and extracting oil and gas more efficiently
and effectively, and improving storage and distribution. It will also allow devices to almost
instantaneously adjust their energy use in response to the prevailing conditions. For
example, a domestic washing machine might only become active when there is plentiful
energy (such as when a strong wind drives a turbine), and pause when supply reduces oris diverted elsewhere (perhaps if the wind drops or the householder switches on a kettle).

Information
technology andautomation could
radically transform
energy supply
and demand.

Storage. As costs reduce and storage volumes grow, batteries (and potentiallycapacitors) will play an increasingly important role in storing electricity on a large scale.22
Thermal storage might become more significant in regions where there is high demandfor heating and cooling, by storing energy when demand is low and releasing it later.
Pumped hydro-energy reserves have dominated large-scale power storage for over a
century, accounting for 95% of today’s installed capacity. This proportion, however,is likely to fall in coming years as other forms of storage become more common.
For example, surplus energy might be used to compress gas, which could subsequently
be released to generate electricity.
Evolution of battery energy
ER4density and cost

Battery energy density
Battery cost

1,000
800
600
400
200
0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Battery energy density
watt hour per litre (Wh/l)

Cost (US $ per kilowatt hour)

1,200

Sources: US DOE (2015 and 2016) for PHEV battery cost and energy density estimates;
EVofobsession
Source: United States Department
Energy (2015); and HybridCARS (2015).

Complexity. Over the next 30 years, power will be generated in an increasing numberof ways from multiple sources. Both large- and small-scale wind, solar and battery
technologies are likely to become cheaper and more effective. Coupled with digitisation,these advancements could make it easier for central and decentralised energy
generation to work together, providing power for domestic use as well as industrialuse. Small-scale electricity generation and storage in residential and commercial
properties are likely to be linked to mega-grids that cross administrative or even nationalboundaries. Cities and towns could run their own energy systems, or connect to otherareas to obtain security of supply and generate income. Other new business models
could also emerge, such as ‘pay-as-you-go’ systems where solar panels and batteries
are rented as needed, bringing electricity to remote areas without the need for expensive
infrastructure.23 Increasingly digitised and electrified energy systems will probably bemore efficient and flexible, but they are also open to new vulnerabilities. As the numberof actors in the energy system increases, it will almost certainly become more complex,
making inherent risks harder to understand and manage. This could increase the risk ofa systemic failure.
21 World Economic Forum, (10 March 2017), The Future of Electricity: New Technologies Transforming theGrid Edge.
22 World Energy Council, (2016), World Energy Resources: E-Storage.
23 International Energy Agency, ‘Technology Roadmap Series’.

Global Strategic Trends

37Environment and resources

Some mineral resources are likely to be increasingly scarce

Mineral resources
Demand. Worldwide demand for resources has been rising sharply over the last century.
Between 1900 and 2010, global resource consumption grew from nine to 71 gigatons.
Over the same period, the amount of material used to sustain one individual showed acorresponding increase, from 4.6 to 10.3 tons per person, per year.24 As the world’s
population grows and becomes more prosperous, the demand for products made frommineral resources is also likely to rise. However, this is unlikely to lead to an exponential
rise in the use of all resources, for example, demand for iron ore tends to level out as
GDP per capita increases.25 Nevertheless, on current trends, some mineral resources
are likely to be increasingly scarce. Governments, industries and academics havealready raised concerns about future demand outstripping supply for rare earth elements(which are crucial components for a range of advanced technologies) and basic industrial
metals. In the coming decades, some countries may be tempted to deliberately limit
supplies of scarce resources for geopolitical gain (resource nationalism) and tension overresources, possibly including military action to secure supplies, cannot be ruled out.
Demand for mineral resources will vary geographically. Currently it is driven mainly by
China, which consumes 40% of metals worldwide.26 While in the near-to-medium term
the Chinese requirement for steel is likely to decrease (due to a surplus), it will probably
grow in the long term due to continued urbanisation and infrastructure modernisation.
Similarly, the country’s need for base metals (such as copper, aluminium and nickel) is
likely to grow due to modernisation of China’s power supply.27 However, over the
next 30 years, India could overtake China to become the world’s largest consumerof resources.
24 Mayer, A., et al., (2017), How Countries’ Resource Use History Matters for Human Well-being –An Investigation of Global Patterns in Cumulative Material Flows from 1950 to 2010.
25 Graedel, T., et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America(PNAS), (2015), On the materials basis of modern society.
26 Lee, B., et al., Chatham House, (2012), Resource Futures – A Chatham House Report.
27 Roberts, I., et al., (2016), China’s Evolving Demand for Commodities.

38

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Forecast depletion of mineral resources
ER5 – Forecast depletion of mineral resources

Chromium (chrome plating, paint)

Aluminium(transport,
electrical,
consumerdurables)1027

Antimony(drugs)

Copper (wire, coins, plumbing)
143
40

510

Zinc (galvanising)

Uranium (weapons,
power stations)Gallium (LEDs, solar cells, lasers)
61
38

Germanium (wire, coins,plumbing)

30
13
n/a
46

59

36

Gold (jewellery, dental)

45

Hafnium(computer chips,
power stations)

n/a

34

Number ofyears left

1940

Tin (cans, solder)4

13

Indium (LCDs)

8

17

42

n/a
20

116

n/a

Lead (lead pipes,
batteries)

9
57
90

29

Tantalum (cellphones,
camera lenses)
Silver (jewellery,catalytic converters)

42

Nickel (batteries,
turbine blades)

142
345

360

Phosphorus (fertiliser,
animal feed)

Rhodium (x-rays, catalytic converters)

Platinum (jewellery, catalysts,
fuel cells for cars)
SourceNote: Years
left based on 2015 global consumption rates (lower figure) and half the United States 2015 consumption rate
(higher figure). For example, gold has 35 years left on the 2015 global consumption rates or 45 years left at half the 2015
US consumption rate.
Source: New Scientist

By 2017, scientists had identified approximately 300,000 materials, compared with just
12 widely used a century ago.28 Carrying on this trend, new, more complex materials(for example, materials with novel structures, such as carbon nanotubes or composite
materials made from many elements) are likely to be developed. If materials become
more complex in future, they could also be harder to reuse and recycle, although recycling
processes for most materials are likely to become much more efficient and effective.
Recycling and substitution are likely to become increasingly important, both to obtain
resources and for environmental and economic considerations. For example, aluminium
recycling can reduce energy and associated greenhouse gas emissions by up to 90-95%,
compared to initial production.29
28 Powell-Turner, J., Frith Resource Management, (2017), Future of resource and materials, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
29 Moya, J. A., et al., European Commission, (2015), Energy Efficiency and GHG Emissions: Prospective
Scenarios for the Aluminium Industry.

Global Strategic Trends

39Environment and resources

New materials. The future of energy storage is likely to take advantage of new
and emerging materials, as well as those we are familiar with today. Next generation
batteries and other forms of renewables could enable renewable energy to match
supply with demand. Advances in energy storage using sodium, aluminium andzinc-based batteries could, for example, make mini-grids increasingly feasible.
Graphene nanocoating could help improve battery efficiency. Graphene flakes
could be used to produce incredibly lightweight construction material, possibly
reducing the energy needed for building materials. Hexagonal boron nitride
has already been combined with graphene to improve lithium-ion batteries andsupercapacitors, suggesting further improvements as the technology matures.
It is feasible that gas-based lithium-ion batteries could become available for use
in high-altitude drones. Flexible batteries spun from fibres could make energy
storage part of everyday items, like smart clothing or e-textiles. This could
transform electricity needed to power personal electronic devices like smartphones,
making it an attractive option for defence or aid organisations that currently
experience logistics restrictions in hard-to-reach areas, or locations impacted bynatural disasters.
Using uranium as a base material could transform how industry makes bulk
chemicals, polymers, new drugs and plastics. Self-fixing concrete could reducethe cost and energy required to maintain and repair roads. Self-poweringsolar harvesting roads where power generating technologies are integrated intransportation infrastructure might allow roadways or paths to light themselves,or melt snow and frost.
A new form of aluminium bubble wrap has recently been developed that could
revolutionise packaging. It weighs 30% less than regular sheet metal but is nearly
50 times stronger.

Water
Demand. By 2050, demand for water is expected to increase by between 20-30%,
meaning that over five million cubic kilometres is likely to be consumed annually. Greaterurbanisation, population growth and an expanding economy could mean that industrial
and domestic demand for water will increase faster than in the farming sector, but
agriculture is likely to remain the largest overall user. By 2050, the amount of water
needed to irrigate crops is likely to increase by approximately 40%, compared with
2010,30 although this figure could fall if improved techniques are implemented andincreased investment occurs. With the exception of North America and parts of Europe,industry’s consumption of water is likely to grow worldwide in the coming decades, andthe manufacturing sector’s demand for water could be 400% higher by 2050 than in
2000. The greatest increases in domestic water demand are expected to occur in Africa,
Asia and Central and South America, although there will probably be a significant rise inevery region, apart from western Europe where usage is likely to remain fairly constant.
While in principle there is sufficient water in most countries to meet projected demands,
systemic problems will probably lead to shortages in some areas. Without effective
governance, pollution and extraction will not be controlled and significant quantities ofwater will be lost through leaks. In many countries there are insufficient funds to operate
and maintain current systems, let alone invest in new ones.31
30 UN Water, (2018), World Water Development Report 2018: Nature-based solutions for water.
31 Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

40

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

ER6

Global freshwater use withdrawals (agriculture, industry and domestic use)

1960

1940
1920

1970

3

trillions cubic metres (m ) per year
1

2

3

4

5

1980

2050

1990
2040
2000
2010

2020

2030

Source: https://ourworldindata.org/water-access-resources-sanitation#total-freshwater-use
Source: Our World in Data, University of Oxford

Availability of water. The rate at which water is being extracted from the ground isbelieved to be close to the maximum sustainable level. Groundwater provides drinking
water to at least 50% of the world’s population, and around 2.5 billion people depend
solely upon groundwater to satisfy their daily water needs. However, a third of the
Earth’s largest aquifers are already being drained at an unsustainable rate and by 2050,
groundwater extraction could be 39% higher than current levels.32 Climate change
is likely to mean that average global rainfall will rise and episodes of heavy rain will
become more frequent and intense. This will increase the risk of flooding in many partsof the world, although other regions are likely to experience a drier climate. Changes
in precipitation and greater evaporation (due to higher temperatures) are likely to meanthat large parts of the globe experience droughts of increased frequency, intensityand duration. Renewable surface and groundwater resources will probably reducesignificantly in most dry subtropical regions. Rivers fed from glaciers are likely to becomeless reliable, leading to water security concerns in the Alps, Andes and central Asia.33
Water quality. While some regions might experience an absolute shortage of waterover the next 30 years, declining quality is likely to be a bigger issue. For example,
an estimated 85% of Bangladesh’s groundwater is contaminated, and water pollution
has worsened in almost all rivers in Africa, Asia and Latin America since the 1990s.34
Water quality in coastal areas is also likely to be affected by saltwater intrusion. Today,
2.1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water and 4.5 billion do not have adequate
sanitation. These figures are projected to worsen, with almost half of the world’s
population unlikely to have reliable access to clean water by 2050, and around 90% of
people facing such shortages are expected to be living in southern and eastern Asia.35

Almost half of theworld’s populationis unlikely to havereliable accessto clean waterby 2050.

Pollution will continue to be a major factor behind declining water quality and it is also
often associated with waterborne diseases. Agriculture is a key contributor to pollution,
as excess nutrients (for example, nitrates and phosphates in fertilisers) run off fields andinto water supplies. Currently, around 80% of industrial and urban wastewaters are
released into the environment without treatment, causing contamination with substances
32 UN Water, (2018), World Water Development Report 2018: Nature-based solutions for water.
33 Davie, J., et al., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research
paper prepared for DCDC.
34 UN Water, (2018), The United Nations World Water Development Report 2018: Nature-based solutions
for water.
35 UN, (2017), The United Nations World Water Development Report, Wastewater The Untapped
Resource 2017.

Global Strategic Trends

41

Environment and resourcesthat are toxic, hard to treat and persistent over decades. Antibiotics and other microbial
agents are also discharged in wastewater from people and livestock, leading to anincrease in the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant waterborne pathogens.36
Water management. In many parts of the world, water management is an international
issue with around 40% of the global population living in 263 river basins that crossnational boundaries. However, 158 of these basins lack any form of collaborative
agreement on the control of their rivers.37 Shared waters can provide a motivation for
dialogue and cooperation between neighbouring countries, even where disputes overother issues exist. For example, Pakistan is seeking an arrangement with India andAfghanistan for river basin and transboundary aquifer management. In other parts of theworld, friction over river management could worsen in the coming decades, for example,
there are plans to build dams on the Amu Darya, Mekong and Nile rivers and the
Tigris-Euphrates river system, but none of these waterways have comprehensive treaty
arrangements in place. Lack of effective governance and management will result inunsustainable use of water in many parts of the world and, combined with the disruptive
effects of climate change (particularly where water resources are shared), tensions arelikely to increase, possibly leading to conflict.
Wasted water. Water loss through inadequate or poorly maintained infrastructure willcontinue to affect water management. In Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) nations, leakage currently ranges from 44% in Mexico City (where
there is an acute water scarcity problem), to 4% in Amsterdam. In the United Kingdom(UK), total leakage in England and Wales is over 20%.38 Deteriorating infrastructure
in many of the world’s most vulnerable countries is wasting large quantities of water,
reducing availability and resilience. For example, in the late 2000s, an estimated 60%
of Syria’s water was being lost through leaks, which greatly compounded drought-driven
crop failures. With sufficient investment, the amount of water lost through leaks could
be reduced considerably, but without adequate funding, the situation will worsen.

Advances in technology could make unusable water fit for drinking using minimal amounts of energy
36 Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.

42

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Replacing livestock with insect proteins could liberate one third of agricultural land for other uses

Technology. Advances in technology have the potential to reduce consumption
and make useable water from sources such as seawater and wastewater. Many
developments that may have a dramatic impact on water sustainability are alreadybeing implemented today. For example, pricing mechanisms and smart metering arestarting to encourage people to reduce the amount of water they use. Systems thatallow buildings to capture rain and make use of greywater (mildly contaminated water,such as water used for washing) are becoming more economically viable. Techniquesthat use the heat or organic matter from waste treatment (for heating or generating
biogas) are beginning to make wastewater processing cheaper and far more energy
efficient. Wastewater treatment technologies, such as filtration and reverse osmosis, arealso reducing in cost whilst becoming more reliable and effective. At the cutting edge isbiomimicry, which copies the processes that allow some fish and plants to live in both
salty and fresh water, using minimal energy.39

Food
Agriculture. Agriculture currently occupies around 38% of the world’s total land
(4.9 billion hectares) and this is likely to grow to around 40% by 2050. Improvements in
productivity, rather than substantial increases in the amount of land used, are expected
to meet most of the increase in demand for food.40 The potential for developing new
agricultural areas is limited, and some existing farmland is likely to be lost in the coming
decades due to urban expansion and sea level rise. This loss means that yields willprobably need to increase by about 35% by 2050, at an annual growth rate of 0.9%.
However, a range of factors are likely to make this rate of increase challenging,including climate change, competition for natural resources, underinvestment andtechnology gaps.41

39 Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
40 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), (2017), The future of food and agriculture: Trends andchallenges.
41 Ibid.

Global Strategic Trends

43Environment and resources

By 2050, global
annual demand
for meat products
could be 76%
higher than2005 levels.

Diets. By 2050, average levels of food production will probably have to increase byaround 50% (from a 2012 baseline) if the demands of the world’s population are to be
met. In sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, however, production is likely to need tomore than double. The challenge of feeding the world in a sustainable way over the
next 30 years will be further compounded by changing diets. As people become richer,they tend to eat more vegetable oils, meat, dairy and sugars. Calorific consumption is
likely to increase to as much as 2,800 Calories per day in developing countries, and over
3,000 Calories per day in developed economies by 2050.42 Since the 1960s, global
meat production has more than tripled (from 72 billion kilograms in 1961 to 258 billion
in 2005), and per capita consumption of fish has more than doubled. The averageamounts of milk, dairy products and vegetable oils eaten by each person have also
almost doubled since the 1970s.43 Greater consumption, and changes in diet, needincreasing levels of resource to sustain it, which will probably have implications for landuse, water consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. For example, production ofanimal protein typically requires 2.5-10 times more energy than it takes to generate thesame amount of protein from plants, and about a third of cereal production is currently
diverted to animal feed. On average, producing a kilogram of beef requires around 30
times more water than a kilogram of wheat. By 2050, global annual demand for meatproducts could be 76% higher than 2005 levels.
Projected increase in agricultural production required to meet expected world
demand (2013-2050)

ER7 – Increase in agricultural production to meet world food demand in 2050
World

Sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia
Rest of the world
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Percentage (%) increase required from 2013 to 2050
Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/678740/agricultural-projection-increase-required-toSource: Statista
match-2050-demand/

Food security. Just eight crops provide 74.2% of the calories eaten by people: maize(20.4%); wheat (18.4%); rice (15.5%); palm oil (6.2%); soya (5.7%); barley (4.4%);
sugar cane (3.6%); and potatoes (2.0%).44 Dependence on such a small number ofcrops could be a critical vulnerability should one of them fail, particularly since mostare produced in just five main areas or ‘breadbaskets’: Latin America (soya and sugarcane); Midwestern United States (soya and maize); Europe (wheat); Asia (rice); andSoutheast Asia (palm oil). The impact of climate change may increase the probabilityof simultaneous ‘breadbasket’ failures, with the potential for devastating impacts on the
global food market. There could also be knock-on effects for worldwide stability, as
higher food prices, in combination with poor governance, have been shown to heighten
the risk of protests, riots and conflict.
42 Laverick, M., (2017), Food Security 2050 – ‘Dietary Middle-Classing’ and the Importance of South East Asia
in Predicted Global Protein Deficiencies, a research paper prepared for DCDC.
43 UN FAO, (2017), The future of food and agriculture: Trends and challenges.
44 Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

44

Global Strategic Trendskynny / iStock.com

Environment and resources

Hydroponics could reduce the land and resources needed to grow food

Trade will almost certainly continue to be essential to global food security, with nearly
every country likely to remain dependent upon imports for a significant proportion of theirfood. Widespread international trade in essential crops, coupled with global competition
and technological developments, have driven up yields and, for the most part, lowered
prices. Although this trend is likely to continue, even small changes in supply can havelarge effects on costs. The effects of climate change are likely to disrupt agriculture andfuture global price spikes cannot be ruled out, nor can the risk of increasing malnutrition.
Wealthier countries are likely to be able to cope much better with price spikes, whilst
developing countries will probably remain the most adversely affected.
Technology and innovation. Technology is likely to play a major role in improving
agricultural productivity over the coming decades. For example, genetic engineering
has the potential to boost yields and increase the resistance of crops to pests andenvironmental stresses, including heat and exposure to saltwater.45 Widespread
adoption of techniques such as hydroponics (where plants are grown in mineralsolutions instead of soil) could mean that it is possible to significantly reduce the amountof land and resources needed to produce some types of food. This could make farmingin urban areas more practical. ‘Lettuce factories’ have already been developed inJapan, where plants are grown in laboratory-like conditions. In these ‘factories’ every
aspect of agriculture is precisely controlled, including the temperature, frequency andintensity of light, and the level of CO2 and other gases. They consume 95% less water
than conventional methods, do not need to use pesticides and are unaffected by theweather. The use of big data and information technology could allow farming to occur
at the individual level (specific plants or animals) rather than the field or herd, allowing
pesticides, nutrients and water to be applied precisely, significantly reducing waste andcost, as well as boosting productivity.
Technological innovations could also reduce pressure on resources by making novel
alternatives to meat widely available, such as substitute meat derived from plant protein,
growing laboratory-cultured meat or using insects as a protein source. The replacementof 50% of the world’s livestock consumption with insect proteins could mean that morethan a third of existing agricultural land could become available for other uses.
45 Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

Global Strategic Trends

45

Environment and resources

If traditional livestock continues to be
consumed at high rates, there are stillways to make efficiency savings, forexample, algae could be cultured toprovide animal feed. An area three times
the size of Texas, if used to grow algae,
could produce ten times more protein thanis currently generated by global soybean
harvests. Advances in automation
could enable faster harvesting, storage
and distribution, substantially reducing
the amount of food loss. Currently,
approximately a third of all food produced
is wasted.46
Agriculture and the environment.
Unless more environmentally-sensitivetechniques are employed, agriculture is
likely to continue to cause widespread
Global forest coverage could stabilise or even increase
environmental damage. The sector isthe second largest emitter of greenhousegases, and intensive farming techniques are also linked to soil degradation, pest
resistance and water pollution. Agriculture is a major driver of habitat destruction,
contributing to the removal of mangrove forests, salt marshes and seagrass beds.47
By 2050, intensive farming could account for 70% of the predicted loss of terrestrial
biodiversity.48 This could, in turn, result in unchecked expansion of pest species, as well
as reducing resilience. Loss of biodiversity will mean that there is less genetic material
available for breeding new crops and plant varieties that could allow food systems toadapt to climate change.

Natural habitats
Ecosystems. Functioning ecosystems oxygenate and purify the air, absorb CO2 andtoxins, clean water and provide raw materials and food. However, pollution, climatechange and widespread habitat destruction has led to significant damage. Climatechange also appears to be altering the life cycles of animals and plants. In Europe,for example, plants now leaf, flower and fruit earlier than they did in the 1970s, andmigratory birds have been arriving sooner in the year.
The harm to ecosystems between 1997 and 2011 due to land-use change alone has
been estimated to have cost between US $4.3-20.2 trillion,49 and this figure can be
expected to increase significantly in the coming decades. Global terrestrial biodiversity(measured as mean species abundance where 100% means maximum natural species
diversity and 0% means no original species are found) was estimated to have fallen
to 68% in 2010 and is forecast to drop to 60% by 2050. This may be a conservative
estimate, as it does not take into account the risk of a ‘tipping point’ (where relatively
small changes cascade through a highly-interdependent structure) being reached where
ecosystems rapidly collapse, leading to substantial loss of animal and plant species.
The Amazon basin ecosystem may be at particular risk from this effect, as complex
interactions between deforestation, forest fires and climate change could turn the area
46 UN FAO, (2017), The future of food and agriculture: Trends and challenges.
47 UN FAO, (2016), The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture.
48 UN Water, (2017), The United Nations World Water Development Report, Wastewater The Untapped
Resource 2017.
49 Davie, J., et al., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research
paper prepared for DCDC.

46

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resourcesfrom a rainforest to a savannah. Such a shift would almost certainly have global
impacts, including the loss of a major carbon sink. Some studies even suggest that aplanetary-scale tipping point (resulting in widespread damage to the global ecosystem)
could be reached.50
Projected change in global terrestrial mean species abundance
Percentage (%) mean species abundance

ER8

70%
68%
66%
64%
62%
60%

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source:Organisation
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932570924
Source:for Economic Co-operation and Development

Forests. Demand for land and timber has resulted in significant tropical deforestationin recent decades, although the rate of deforestation has slowed in some of the mostbadly-affected countries, including Brazil and Indonesia. By 2020, the amount of theworld covered by forest could stabilise or even start to increase, driven mainly by greaterafforestation in temperate areas. Rising temperatures in high northern latitudes are likely
to expand the range of boreal forests, while higher concentrations of CO2 could stimulate
plant growth globally. However, if the effects of climate change worsen in the next
30 years (as seems likely), reduced soil moisture and greater vulnerability to fire, drought,
pests and diseases could prevent forests expanding, and may even cause dieback.51

Waste
Waste management. Globally, around two billion tonnes of solid household waste areproduced each year, probably rising to three billion tonnes by 2050.52 Lower-income
cities in Africa and Asia are likely to double their household waste generation in thenext 15-20 years. In most developed countries, comprehensive waste management
systems have been developed. However, in many developing parts of the world, open
dumping, uncontrolled burning and unmanaged composting are widespread,53 withsimple dumpsites (where waste is deposited with little or no operational controls or
environmental protection) receiving approximately 40% of the world’s waste.54 If it
is not properly managed, waste can cause pollution and disease, especially in
densely-populated areas. Open dumpsites can be particularly harmful to health, aswell as to the environment, for example, run-off from dumps can contain persistent andGlobally, around
two billion
tonnes of solidhousehold waste
are produced eachyear, probably
rising to threebillion tonnes
by 2050.

50 European Environment Agency, (2015), ‘SOER 2015 – The European environment – state and outlook 2015’.
51 Met Office, (2017), ‘Dangerous climate thresholds’.
52 The World Counts, ‘World waste facts’.
53 Stringfellow, A., et al., University of Southampton, (2017), The future of solid waste management to 2050,
a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
54 International Solid Waste Association (ISWA), (2016), A Roadmap for closing Waste Dumpsites: The World’s
most Polluted Places.

Global Strategic Trends

47

Environment and resources

By 2050, plastic production could quadruple and there could be more plastic than fish (by mass) in the oceans

harmful pollutants that contaminate local waterways. Similarly, dust and debris blown
from these sites may agitate respiratory illness, open burning sometimes releases toxic
gases, and animals feeding at dumpsites can introduce toxins and pathogens into thefood chain. As populations grow and urbanisation increases, many more people arelikely to dispose of their waste in simple dumpsites, with harmful consequences forhuman health and the environment.
Landfill sites. In developed economies, engineered landfill sites are often designed
to reduce health risks, protect underlying soil and groundwater, and collect harmful
emissions (such as methane, which can be burned to produce electricity). These sites
often need investment and management for over 100 years after they stop receiving
waste. Developed countries are also increasingly recovering resources from waste byvarious means, decreasing the amount of landfill. For example, landfill in the European
Union fell by 50% between 1995 and 2005 (from 144.2 million tonnes to 60.7 million).
Over the same period, recycling more than doubled from 25 million tonnes to 69 million.
While developed (and in time, developing) economies are likely to reduce their use oflandfill, some capacity will continue to be required, not least to deal with waste resulting
from unplanned events such as floods and earthquakes. The hurricanes in Houston and
the Caribbean Islands in 2017 highlighted the immense amounts of waste that can beproduced by a natural disaster and damage from such incidents can be expected
to worsen. Flooding (which climate change is expected to increase) will pose aparticular hazard to landfill sites as pollution could leak out when landfills are flooded,
and non-engineered dumpsites could collapse catastrophically.55 There are estimatedto be over 1,700 licensed and historic landfills in coastal flood and erosion buffer zones
in England and Wales56 and in certain low-lying parts of the world future pollution fromcoastal landfills is anticipated to be a major issue.

55 Stringfellow, A., et al., University of Southampton, (2017), The future of solid waste management to 2050,
a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
56 Beaven, R. P., et al., (2017), The impact of coastal landfills on shoreline management plans.

48

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Plastic. The low price, versatility, strength and durability of plastic have led to its
widespread use in multiple industries around the world. Global production of plastic
products has risen from around two million tonnes a year in the 1950s to 322 million
tonnes in 2015, and production could quadruple by 2050. Plastic waste has also
increased, with around 274 million tonnes generated annually at the start of thisdecade,57 and plastic waste is found almost everywhere, particularly in the oceans
and along shorelines.
Nanomaterials. Nanomaterials are already being used in a wide variety of industries,
with global production estimated to produce 320,000 tonnes a year.58 Although theuse of these substances can deliver significant benefits, their effects on health andhabitats are not well understood. Nanomaterials are probably accumulating in theenvironment, perhaps entering the wastewater system by passing through treatment
works and accumulating in sewage sludge. Waste of this kind is typically spread on
soil (potentially entering the food chain), or incinerated, with the resulting ash often
used in the construction industry or put into landfill. In open dumps, without mitigation
measures, run-off is likely to cause contamination. The amount of waste nanomaterials
accumulating in the environment is, therefore, almost certainly increasing, yet the impact
is unknown.

deepblue4you / iStock.com

Alternatives to waste. The ‘circular economy’ is a relatively new concept that may alter
the way waste is managed in the future. Unlike in the traditional economy (where items
are made, used and disposed of), in a circular economy, resources are kept in use for as
long as possible to extract their maximum value. Consequently, products are designed
and optimised for disassembly and reuse. Instead of owning a product, it is often leasedor shared, reducing the amount of resources needed to meet a community’s needs.
As automation and technology improve, it is likely that it will become much cheaper
to sort and separate waste, increasing the amount of material that can be recycled,reused, composted and (as a last resort) incinerated or treated. By 2050, today’s waste
products could be valuable resources.

As technologies improve, the amount of material that can be recycled, reused or composted will increase
57 Geyer, R., et al., Science Advances, (2017), ‘Production and fate of all plastics ever made’.
58 Keller, A. A. and Lazareva, A., Environmental Science and Technology Letters, (2014), ‘Predicted Releases
of Engineered Nanomaterials: From Global to Regional to Local’, pages 65-70.

Global Strategic Trends

49Environment and resources

Most coral on tropical reefs could die by 2050

Global commons – oceans
Sea level rise. Climate change will lead to a rise in the sea level. From 1901 to 2010,
the average sea level rose by around 0.19 metres and, by 2050, it is projected to riseby a further 0.17-0.38 metres,59 although it has been suggested this figure could bemuch higher. Fluctuations in ocean circulation mean that rates of sea level rise in someareas will be significantly different from the worldwide average. For example, since 1993
the rate of sea level rise in the Western Pacific has been up to three times greater than
the global average. A higher sea level will increase the frequency of coastal flooding
and storm surges, with the numerous low-lying island nations in the tropics particularly
vulnerable to flooding. Areas located near current and former glaciers or ice sheets
could, however, experience a fall.60 Approximately 50% of people live in coastal regions
and most of the world’s largest cities are on or near the coast, rendering them particularly
vulnerable to flooding. If a major city is flooded, military assistance is likely to be needed,both at home and overseas.
Fishery yields
in tropical areas
could decline
by 40%.

The marine environment. Climate change is likely to have an increasing effect onmarine ecosystems. Variations in the timing of plankton blooms, migration patterns andspawning of fish have already been observed in recent decades, while tropical corals
are under threat from higher temperatures and ocean acidification. On current trends,
the coral on most tropical reefs could die over the next 30 years and this will greatly
decrease marine biodiversity and dramatically reduce fish stocks, which are already atrisk. In 2011, around 29% of global fish stocks were considered to be overfished, andabout 61% were fully exploited.61 Fishery yields in tropical areas could decline by 40%
by 2050, but in high-latitude waters, the catch could increase by as much as 70%.
Pollution. Pollution is leading to the creation of ‘dead-zones’ in parts of the ocean and it
is estimated that at least 26% of all the carbon released as CO2 from fossil fuels, cement
manufacture and land use changes between 2002 and 2011 was absorbed by theoceans. In total, the oceans probably contain around 93% of the world’s CO2.62
59 IPCC, (2014), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
60 IPCC, (2014), Observations: Oceans.
61 European Environment Agency, (2015), ‘SOER 2015 – The European environment – state andoutlook 2015’.
62 Science and Issues Water Encyclopedia, Carbon Dioxide in the Ocean and Atmosphere.

50

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

As more CO2 is absorbed, the oceans will become more acidic, harming wildlife,
particularly calciferous organisms such as corals and shellfish. Increasing levels of plastic
waste are found almost everywhere in the oceans and along shorelines, including on thebeaches of remote uninhabited islands and in deep ocean sediments. This vast amountof non-biodegradable debris is likely to have wide-reaching health implications for people
and marine life. An abundance of plastics in the oceans is also likely to facilitate thespread of invasive species that are transported on floating debris, further disrupting
ecosystems. Without significant improvements in waste management, the amountof plastic waste in the oceans could increase by an order of magnitude within just a
decade. On current trends, by 2050 there will be more plastic than fish (by mass) in
the oceans.63
Atmospheric dissolved carbon dioxide and sea water acidity (pH) in the North Pacific

ER9

8.33

425
Atmospheric CO2 (ppm)
pCO2 insitu (µatm)
pH insitu

Carbon dioxide (CO2 ) ppm

400

8.28

375

8.23

350

8.18 pH

325

8.13

300

8.08

275
1958

1968

1978

1988

1998

2008

8.03
2018

Note: Data taken around the islands of Hawaii. Partial pressure of CO2 (pCO2) is measured in
Source:Mauna Loa (ftp://aftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/products/trends/co2/co2_mm_mlo.txt) ALOHA
atmosphericunits.

(http://hahana.soest.hawaii.edu/hot/products/HOT_surface_CO2.txt Ref: J.E. Dore et al, 2009.
Source: Adapted
from:
J. E., Lukas,R., Sadler,ofD.oceanW., Church,
M. J. inand
D. M.
PhysicalandDore,biogeochemical
modulation
acidification
theKarl,
centralNorth Pacific.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106: 12235-12240.

Shipping. By 2050, shipments of raw materials are likely to double to Western economies
and quadruple to other regions, and global freight trade could grow between 330-380%.
Technology is likely to reduce the cost of shipping, for example, a completely crewlesscontainer ship (the Yara Birkeland) may be operational by 2020. The melting of polar ice
is likely to provide new, shorter sea routes through the Arctic. However, climate change
is likely to result in increasingly intense storms, sea level rise and periods of more intense
rainfall, which are expected to disrupt shipping, increase the frequency of port closures,
reduce the speed of passage, require routes to be altered, damage infrastructure anddisrupt major trade routes.64 Maritime choke points (for example, the Panama Canal)
could be affected by climate change, disrupting international trade and security ofsupplies and potentially exacerbating geopolitical tensions.
63 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, (2016), The New Plastics Economy — Rethinking the future of plastics.
64 Bailey, R. and Wellesley, L., Chatham House, (27 June 2017), Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global
Food Trade.

Global Strategic Trends

51

VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com

Environment and resources

The number of illegal maritime incidents is expected to continue to increase

Seabed. Whilst vast quantities of oil and gas have been extracted from the seabedfor decades, there has been little large-scale extraction of minerals, but in the coming
decades, deep sea mining is likely to be commercially viable. The environmental
damage from this type of mining could, however, be substantial, for example, releasing
contaminated water and sediment-laden plumes.65 The numbers of pipelines and cables
running across the ocean floor are also likely to increase. For example, the European
Union is currently scoping the possibility of laying the longest undersea pipeline ever built
between Israel and southern Europe.
Governance of the seas. The International Maritime Organization and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are likely to provide the governanceframework for the seas. However, there remain certain areas where tensions will persist,in particular over disputed claims and access to resources, not least in the South and East
China Seas.66 These will require careful monitoring and management to avoid escalationand conflict, which would disrupt free and open access to sea lanes and marine resources,
thereby hindering more general international economic and political cooperation. UNCLOS
is also likely to be tested by disagreements on deep sea mining and contested claimsof ownership. The International Maritime Organization will need to modify regulations in
response to advances in technology, for example, automated shipping and newenergy-efficient means of propulsion (such as solar power or modern sails).
Criminality at sea. Piracy, smuggling and human trafficking are likely to continue toafflict maritime activity. The number of illegal maritime incidents has grown since themid-1990s, a trend that is likely to continue. The effects of climate change (including
flooding and storm damage) and disruption to fisheries are likely to be destabilising tocoastal communities in developing countries, which may lead to an increase in piracy
and associated disruption to trade routes. As maritime traffic becomes increasingly
reliant on automated technology and interconnectivity, cyberattacks on shipping (andmaritime infrastructure) can also be expected.67
65 Global Ocean Commission, (November 2013), ‘A sustainable development goal for the global ocean’.
66 Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment out
to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 56.
67 Deloitte, (2017), ‘Cyber Security in the shipping industry’.

52

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Extreme space weather is rare but could knock out satellites, interfere with navigation systems and disrupt power grids

Global commons – space
Spacecraft. Between 1960 and 2005, the cost of launching a rocket (vertical launchsystem) reduced tenfold whilst lift capacity has increased tenfold. In the coming
decades, costs could continue to fall and capacity increase. The development of newmaterials, along with advances in production, design and construction techniques have
reduced the weight and improved the capacity of components, whilst increasing theirresilience. Driven by lower costs, new designs of rockets that are reusable have started
to be tested, such as Blue Origin’s New Shepard rocket or the SpaceX Falcon series.
There have also been promising developments in horizontal launch systems (where
vehicles are lifted into the sky by an aircraft, before launching into space), which could
be used for space tourism and putting objects into low-level orbit. Concepts include
the European Space Agency’s IXV space plane,68 Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo,
and China’s ambition to launch a rocket from a Y-20 strategic transport craft. Future
developments in new types of jet engine and rocket technology may allow access tospace in the same way as a commercial aircraft takes off and lands.69
Satellite launch costs

Cost in 2008 US $ER10

500,000
450,000
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,00001959

Cost/kilogram high Earth orbit
Cost/kilogram low Earth orbit

1960

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source:Source: http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/spring-2010/
Aerospace.org
launch-vehicles-then-and-now-50-years-of-evolution/

68 European Space Agency, (February 2015), ‘ESA Experimental Spaceplane Completes Research Flight’.
69 Ceurstemont, S., New Scientist, (17 May 2017), ‘Plasma jet engines that could take you from the groundto space’.

Global Strategic Trends

53Environment and resources

Launch capability. The number of countries able to put satellites into space using theirown launch facilities have increased from two in the 1950s (US and Russia) to over 11 in2017, with New Zealand being the latest, and by 2050 this figure looks certain to grow.
Spaceports are being developed in Canada, China, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. China has opened a commercial facility in Hainan
province where it is planning on launching its space station into orbit,70 and Russia’s new
Siberian Cosmodrome launched its first rocket in 2016.71 In 2000, only five countries hadlaunched satellites which could observe the Earth. By 2014, there were over 30, withlaunches no longer solely government-funded and in 2014, 23 of the world’s 92 launches
were commercial. The market for launching satellites has seen a significant worldwide
increase in value, with revenue almost doubling since 2001. The global space industry is
expected to grow from around US $350 billion in 2017 to over US $640 billion in 2030,
principally driven by the commercial sector (which had a 76% share in 2017). By 2050,
the figure is likely to exceed US $1 trillion.
Total worldwide
ER11orbital launches

30
Total number of nations

6

New nations
Total

5

25

4

20

3

15
2

10

1

5
0

1993

2001

2005

2008

2011

2014

0

Number of new nations in a single year

35

India
1(4%)

Multinational
1(4%)

23

Europe
6
(26%)

Total
commercial
launches in
2014

US
11
(48%)

Russia4(17%)

Sources: Union of Concerned Scientists; Federal Aviation Authority

Sources: Data from UCS Satellite Database updated July 31, 2014; andFederal Aviation Administration (FAA 2015).
Capabilities. Innovation will continue to drive space capabilities. Entrepreneurs haveproposed ambitious new projects such as: new launch platforms; on-orbit-servicing;space mining; in-space manufacturing; and the colonisation of Mars.72 Advances in theminiaturisation of electronics, energy storage and remote power generation have alreadydriven significant improvements in space-related technology, and will continue to do so.
For example, the average lifetime for communication satellites lengthened from 11 years
in 1996 to 15 years in 2015, and the resolution of images from observation satellites
sharpened by more than 50% between 1999 and 2014. By 2050, non-state actors could
acquire high-resolution satellite images of anywhere on Earth, although only the wealthy
will be able to achieve continuous coverage. Small satellites called ‘nanosats’ (mostcommonly used for Earth observation and remote sensing) are becoming increasingly
numerous. Launches of nanosats increased from two in 1998 to almost 300 in 2017.73
By 2050, there could be many thousands of nanosats, increasing the risk of an accidental
collision. Automated and remotely-controlled technology is already in use in space (forexample, operating the International Space Station), and as advances in automation andartificial intelligence continue, systems are likely to be developed for more complex tasks,
for example, to mine asteroids or build structures on the Moon or further afield.
70 David, L., Space.com, (2 April 2017), ‘China’s New Spaceport to Launch Country’s Largest Rocket Yet’.
71 Solovyov, D., Reuters, (27 April 2016), ‘Russia launches first rocket from new spaceport at second attempt’.
72 Quintana, E., RUSI, (9 August 2017), ‘The New Space Age: Questions for Defence and Security’.
73 Bhavya, L., et al., Science and Technology Policy Institute, (June 2015), ‘Global Trends in Space Volume 2:
Trends by Subsector and Factors that Could Disrupt Them’.

54

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

Dependency. A broad range of systems are dependent on space including the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which is used for a range of services, including
navigation, accurate timings for financial transactions, electrical power distribution andcommunication. Economies are becoming increasingly dependent upon space-based
systems, for example, in 2015 it was estimated that 11.3% of the UK’s GDP was
directly supported by GNSS.74 As the number of systems dependent on space-based
capabilities increases, both developed and developing countries will become increasingly
reliant upon them and so too will their vulnerability to disruption. For example, whena single US satellite malfunctioned in 1998, it not only disrupted television andcommunication systems, it also stopped credit card systems from processing payments,
weather radars went blind and some automated petrol station pumps stopped working.
Risks. Threats to space capabilities include: accidental collisions form space debris;space weather; malicious jamming and spoofing; and, possibly, anti-satellite weapons.
Denying access to certain types of space capability is not hard or expensive. Manysatellite ground stations are vulnerable to attack and a standard GPS jammer can
be bought for as little as GBP £20 over the Internet (found through a simple Internet
search). Between 2013 and 2017, over 90 GPS jamming incidents were reported bypilots through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASAs) safety
reporting system.75 In addition, extreme space weather events (for example, Coronalmass ejections, which are bursts of high energy particles from the Sun) are rare but
could occur by 2050, and these have the potential to knock out satellites, interfere withnavigation systems and disrupt power grids. The impact of these events may, however,be at least partially mitigated by improved space situational awareness, allowing theprediction and detection of space weather and mitigating action to be taken.
Governance. Since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, there have beensignificant changes in the way space is used and who has access, and there are otheremerging issues that the Treaty does not cover, such as space debris. At least 17,000
trackable pieces of debris have entered orbit since Sputnik 1 was launched in 1957.76
Space debris is of growing concern, especially for high-risk orbiting platforms such as
the International Space Station. The current Treaty also does not consider ownershipof space assets by anyone other than national governments, which does not reflect theincreasing trend towards space commercialisation. International dialogue on the use of
space has developed in the decades following the 1967 Treaty, with proposals including
cooperating to enhance space situational awareness, improving data-sharing andimplementing mechanisms to safely remove debris. But, the fact that not a single newtreaty has been concluded to tackle these problems since 1979 indicates not only how far
space law currently lags behind the requirement in practice, but also how difficult it will beto obtain international agreement on an appropriate way forward.77 As in other areas, soft
law instruments, such as a non-binding code of conduct, may be more feasible as a firststep towards cooperation than the ratification of a formal and universally applicable treaty.

Economies
are becoming
increasingly
dependent upon
space-based
systems.

Military operations. The military uses space-based assets for a range of purposes.
These include navigation, early warning systems, surveillance, intelligence gatheringand military communication. Dependency on space-based capability, however, brings
vulnerability. Militaries are, therefore, developing alternative capabilities, including
unmanned aerial sensors, long-range high endurance communication drones and theuse of traditional microwave and terrestrial towers. By 2050, space-based weapon
systems may also be deployed,78 which could include nuclear weapons.
74 Sadlier, G., et al., London Economics, (June 2017), ‘The economic impact on the UK of a disruption to
GNSS’, page iii.
75 Buesnel, G. and Holbrow, M., (June 2017), ‘GNSS Threats, Attacks and Simulations’.
76 European Space Agency, (21 February 2018), ‘About Space Debris’.
77 Ling, Y., (2011), ‘The Future of Space Law’, page 546, in Muller, S., et al., The Law of the Future and the
Future of Law.
78 Heath, V., (10 April 2016), ‘The Weaponization of Space and the Future of Star Wars’.

Global Strategic Trends

55

Environment and resources

Future worlds: Environment and resources
Multilateralism

Multipolarity• Climate adaptation and the impacts ofinequality are effectively managed byinstitutions.
• Energy and resources are sustainably managed
by multilateral institutions.
• Global imbalances in food, water and energy
are mitigated by redistribution and emerging
technologies.
• Circular economies reduce waste.
• Global efforts to reverse ocean damage
have begun.

• Climate change is managed within blocs.
• Energy supply chains are largely within blocs,
encouraging sustainable energy.
• States compete fiercely over access toresources causing over-exploitation.
• Complex transboundary water agreements.
• Blocs dominate access to fisheries.
• Tariffs cause global price volatility.
• Increased pollution and loss of biodiversity.
• Poorer blocs struggle with waste.
• Blocs compete in the global commons.

• Global cooperation mitigates environmental
and climate stress, particularly in thedeveloping world, thus reducing drivers of
instability and conflict.
• The remaining resource-driven disputes
between states are settled in international
forums, preventing escalation into violence.
• Defence is obliged to reduce its environmental
footprint, during both peace and operations.

• Increased likelihood of conflict between blocs
over shared resources.
• Blocs drive weaponisation of space.
• The overlapping environmental and resource
stresses drive state fragility, leading toinstability.
• Barriers between national or bloc energy grids
reduce efficiency and harms economies.
• Defence is central to deterrence and used toprotect and secure resources.

Network of actors

Fragmentation• Public and private actors cooperate to mitigate
the effects of climate change.
• Greater innovation delivers new solutions forenvironmental and resource issues.
• Fair competition and collaboration encourage
efficient use of resources.
• Megacities are increasingly independentof states.
• Pollution is controlled by industry regulation.
• The global commons are preserved andexploited efficiently.

• Climate change is unmitigated, resulting in
extended periods of destructive weather.
• Intense pollution damages environment.
• Waste and wastewater generate diseases.
• All actors compete fiercely over resources andagreements are hard to broker.
• Drought, famine and energy insecurity increase.
• Uncontrolled seabed mining destabilises
marine ecosystems.
• The global commons, particularly space,are heavily contested.

• Non-state actors are increasingly perceived
as the leaders in delivering solutions to climate
challenges.
• Corporations have a greater role inhumanitarian aid and disaster relief.
• Corporations and other non-state actors havea greater role in environmental protection
activities (for example, fishery protection).

• Unmitigated impacts of climate change,
resource scarcity and inequality as well as
heavy environmental pollution, drives violent
tensions across the globe.
• Some regions are unsuitable for habitation
leading to widespread displacement.
• The operating environment is more complex
and environmental changes challenge
transportation and logistics.
• Space is becoming increasingly congested
and risks becoming unusable.

Competition

Cooperation

Powerful states

Diffusion of power

56

Global Strategic Trends

Environment and resources

N
W

E

Watch points

Discontinuities

S• Shifts in the rate of climate change.

• Abrupt changes in the natural environment.

• Changes to the frequency, duration and intensityof extreme weather and the damage caused.

• Ecosystem tipping point reached.

• Speed of change in natural habitat, for example,
biodiversity, soil quality and desertification.

• Public acceptance of sustainability and its costs.

• Effects of, and policy on, climate change.

• Unilateral adoption of geoengineering.
• Breakthrough in energy technology (cold fusion).

• Progress towards climate targets.

• Rapid technological development enabling local
production of food, water and energy.

• Adoption of carbon capture technology.

• Pandemics infect both crops and livestock.

• Societal attitudes on environmental issues.

• Uncontrolled spread of invasive species.

• Complexity of materials, their impacts on theenvironment and effectiveness of waste treatment.

• New resource with one monopoly supplier.

• Increased seabed mining and drilling.
• Progress towards sustainable non-carbon
based economy.

• Major competition in the global commons.
• Attack on transoceanic fibre-optic cables and/or
space systems.

• Conflicts over resources.

Implications• The climate is changing and will have major
consequences for humanity. The impacts of climatechange need to be mitigated effectively, otherwise
it could act as a driver of instability and conflict with
far-reaching humanitarian, economic and geopoliticalconsequences.
• Defence needs to take the implications of thechanging environment into consideration. The
requirement to support humanitarian aid anddisaster relief operations might be more frequent,while the local operating environment will be more
complex and contested.
• As reliance on space-based capabilities increases,
investment in resilience needs to keep pace.
• Systems to mitigate food and water scarcity anddisruptions to supplies need to be developed to
avoid shortages and prevent instability.
• Waste that pollutes food and water needs tobe better understood, prevented and properly
managed.

Global Strategic Trends• Access to resources is important for economies.
Recycling and substitution in agricultural andindustrial processes may help to reduce resource
demands and susceptibility to supply shortages.
• The uptake of renewable energy and other low
carbon technologies could increase the resilienceof national energy supply.
• The impacts of climate change will increasingly
challenge extant defence and security planningassumptions such as basing, logistics or theenvironmental envelope for capability development.
• As competition in, and reliance on, the global
commons increases, governments will need toinvest in ensuring freedom of action.
• Good governance that invests in climate change
adaptation and enables fair access to resources
is important for stability and security, as well as
efficient and unhindered access to supply andtransport routes.

57

Human development

58

Global Strategic Trends

Human development

Human development

Synopsis
By 2050, the global population is expected to reach 9.8 billion people, but growth will be
unbalanced. Many developing countries will experience rapid population growth, withthe population of Africa almost doubling, whilst the size of populations in many European
and East Asian countries will shrink. More people will live in towns and cities, boosting
economies, although rapid urban expansion in developing countries will lead to thegrowth of slums and criminal violence. Nevertheless, human security will be enhanced
as more people escape absolute poverty and have access to education and health care.
The number of people dying from infectious diseases is likely to reduce and advances inmedicine, particularly gene editing and gene therapy, could potentially lead to spectacular
medical advances. The risk of a global pandemic will, however, endure, and the numberof people suffering from conditions such as obesity and dementia is increasing, as is theprevalence of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria.

ronniechua / iStock.com

Human empowerment will also increase. Unprecedented numbers of people will
have access to almost limitless information and more people will have the means
to travel abroad and the ability to maintain relationships with people from outside
their immediate community. Equality between the sexes is improving and increasing
numbers of people in developed (and some developing) countries will have the freedom
to determine their gender and sexuality. Divorce is also becoming more common, as
are single-parent families. Individualism and personal empowerment is likely to enhance
personal fulfilment, but this may come at the price of more fragmented societies andincreased populism. Inequality is rising and there appears to be a growing division
within many countries between those with liberal views and those with traditional views.
The ‘echo chamber’ effect of social media may drive further division within societies,
which may be exploited by external actors. Because of demography, the followers ofthe main religions will increase in number, although they may be less devout. Increasing
numbers of people are, however, searching for spiritual guidance online, meaning thenumber of people who could be targeted for religious radicalisation could also rise.

Global Strategic Trends

59

Human development

Demography
Population. In 2017, the global population reached 7.6 billion and by 2050 it is expected
to reach 9.8 billion. Half of this growth is likely to be concentrated in just nine countries:
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Tanzania, Uganda and the United States (US). By 2050, China, India, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Pakistan and the US are likely to have populations in excess of 300 million and
Africa’s population will probably double to around 2.5 billion. In the same time frame,
populations of some East Asian countries are likely to reduce, as are several European
countries, for example, the populations of Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, theRepublic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia and the Ukraine are expected to shrink by morethan 15% out to 2050.1
Global population
HD12
1950
100

Age

90

Males

2017
Females

100
90

Males

2050
Females

100
90

80

80

80

70

70

70

60

60

60

50

50

50

40

40

40

30

30

30

20

20

20

10

10

10

0

0

500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500

500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500

0

Males

Females

500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500

Population (millions)
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World
Population
Prospects:
The 2017
Revision.
Source: United
Nations,
Departmentof EconomicandSocial Affairs. Population Division

Marriage and family. Marriage rates are declining and divorce rates are increasing acrossthe world. In the US the proportion of adults who had never been married increased
from 8% of women and 9% of men in 1970 to 17% of women and 23% of men in 2012.2
In the Middle East the divorce rate is also increasing, for example, in Kuwait there are six
divorces for every ten marriages, up from just over five in 2015; and in Egypt, President
Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi’s has stated that four in ten marriages end in divorce. In China,
although divorce is relatively rare (about three per thousand marriages), the rate doubled
between 2006 and 2016.3 Same-sex marriage and cohabitation are also becoming more
acceptable in many (though not all) parts of the world, as are mixed-race relationships.
The number of families with just one child is rising, a trend that is likely to continue. Morechildren are being raised in one-parent households, the use of medical interventions
to enable single people to have children is becoming more widespread, and adoption
agencies are also increasingly accepting applications from one person. If, as expected,
these trends continue, traditional family bonds can be expected to loosen. This may
mean that traditional values are less likely to be passed on, with societies possibly
becoming more progressive and/or fragmented, potentially weakening social cohesion.

60

1

United Nations (UN), (2017), World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, United Nations, page 2.

2Wang, W. and Parker, K., Pew Research Center, (24 September 2014), Record Share of Americans Have
Never Married As Values, Economics and Gender Patterns Change.

3Zhou, V., South China Morning Post, (6 September 2017), ‘Marriage rate down, divorce rate up as Chinese
couples say I don’t or I won’t any more’.

Global Strategic Trends

Human development

Automation of heavy manual tasks should mean that people can work for longer

Ageing. The number of people aged over 60 is increasing by 3.26% per year worldwide,
making it the fastest growing age group. In 1950, only 8% of the global population
was over 60; in 2015 it was around 12%; and by 2050 it is expected to be over 20%.
Probable decreases in fertility combined with increasing life expectancy could mean that,by 2050, more than a quarter of most regions’ populations (except Africa’s and parts ofAsia’s) will be aged over 65.4 If current retirement ages are maintained, the proportion ofworking-age people to retirees will decrease markedly. Currently, the dependency ratio(the proportion of working-aged people compared to children and the elderly) is 13:1 in
Africa but just 2:1 in Japan (the lowest ratio in any country). By 2050, the dependency
ratio is likely to have dropped to below 2:1 in seven countries in Asia, 24 in Europe andfour in Latin American. Conversely, the working-age populations of Africa and parts ofAsia are likely to grow significantly.
Declining dependency ratios are likely to make current models of employment andretirement unsustainable. Some countries are already increasing retirement ages (in2017, the UK government announced it would raise the state pension age from 67 to
68 after 2037, seven years earlier than originally planned) and further rises are likely.5
Improvements in health care and technology, such as the automation of heavy manualtasks, should mean that people can work for longer. As societies age, their character islikely to change. Elderly populations tend to be more peaceful, but they are also often
more conservative, potentially stifling innovation and change.

4

UN, (2017), World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, page 7.

5Milligan, B., BBC News, (19 July 2017), ‘State pension age rise brought forward’.

Global Strategic Trends

Decliningdependency ratios
are likely to makecurrent models
of employment
and retirement
unsustainable.

61

When managed well, migration can have a significant positive effect on both the destination and origin countries

Migration
Growing numbers. Over the past 25 years, the number of international migrants (people
who live outside their country of birth) has increased from 152.5 million in 1990 (2.86%of the world’s population) to 258 million in 2017 (3.41%). Approximately five million
students currently study outside their home countries, and in 2012 international tourist
numbers surpassed one billion for the first time.6 Economic opportunities and the desire
to travel, learn and explore will act as a draw for migration. Conflict, environmental
degradation and poverty will also lead to migration, and improving communications andtransport will make it faster, easier and cheaper to travel. On current trends, there will bearound 400 million (4.1%) international migrants in 2050.
Total international migrant population

HD7

400

Population (millions)

350
300
250
200

Oceania
Northern America
Latin America and Caribbean
EuropeAsia
Africa
World

150
100
50
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Source:Source:United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
6

62

Dorman, A. and German, T., (2017), How will the overarching global political order change over the next 30
years?, a research paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC),
page 6.

Global Strategic Trends

Nicolas Economou / Shutterstock.com

Human development

Human development

Origin and destination. In 2017, of the 258 million international migrants, 106 million
were born in Asia, 61 million in Europe, 38 million in Latin America and the Caribbean,
and 36 million in Africa, with fewer than 20 million originating from North America or
Oceania. Asia currently hosts the largest number of migrants (80 million) followed closely
by Europe (78 million). As a proportion of the region’s population, however, Oceania
hosts the most migrants (over 20%) followed by North America (over 15%) and Europe(over 10%), with migrants making up around 2% of the rest of the world’s population.7
Most migrants are concentrated in just a few nations, with more than 50% of the world’s
migrants in just ten countries. The US has the greatest number of migrants with justfewer than 50 million, followed by Saudi Arabia, Germany and the Russian Federation.
The
increasing
affluenceof Asia is likely
to make it a more attractive destination for
HD13– Migrant
distribution
by destination
migrants, and the proportion of the region’s population (as well as absolute numbers) canbe expected to increase.
Migrant
HD13distribution by destination
150
2050

Population (millions)

120

2015

90
60
30
0

AfricaAsia

EuropeLatin
America
Destination

Oceania

Northern
America

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2017). Trends in
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population DivisionInternational Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017).

Benefits and challenges. Migrants usually create jobs, pay taxes and make social
contributions to the host country, and often send remittances home. In 2000, it wasestimated that US $126 billion flowed from immigrants back to their countries of origin.
This was estimated to have increased to US $575 billion in 2016, which is four times
more than the global total spent on overseas development aid.8 The value of remittances
is likely to grow significantly by 2050 and comprise a significant element of the global
economy. Despite the benefits they bring to their destination country, migrants often
experience discrimination and sometimes persecution. Improving digital connectivity
will almost certainly make it easier for migrants to maintain strong links with their countryof origin, and this may delay integration with the host community. When managed
well, migration can have a significant positive effect on both the destination and origin
countries, but if not effectively integrated, ghettos can form and cultural differences
between migrant and host population can become a source of tension, an issue thatis likely to become more important.

7

UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, (2017), International Migration Report
2017: Highlights.

8International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2018.

Global Strategic Trends

The value ofremittances is likely
to grow significantly
by 2050 andcomprise asignificant elementof the global
economy.

63

Herianus / iStock.com

Human development

Urban slums lack sanitation and are vulnerable to natural disaster and disease

Urbanisation
Population. The number of people living in cities will continue to increase. In 2017,
around 55% of the world’s population lived in urban areas and this figure is likely to rise
to approximately 66% (an extra two billion people) by 2050.9 With most of the world’s
population living in urban environments, the future of humanity will be intrinsically linked
to the future of cities. Although the proportion of people living in rural areas is reducing,
the number of people living there is still growing and is expected to peak at around3.42 billion in 2025, before reducing slightly to around 3.3 billion by 2050.
Urban
HD2 : rural population divide over 20 year periods
Percentage (%) total population

2050
2030

Urban population

2010

Rural population

1990
1970
1950

1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). World
Source:UnitedProspects:
Nations, Departmentof Economic
and Social
Affairs, Population Division
Urbanization
The 2014 Revision,
CD-ROM
Edition.
964

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, (2016), The World’s Cities
in 2016.

Global Strategic Trends

Human development

Where we live. In 2015 there were 29 megacities (urban areas with a population
greater than ten million), but there are expected to be 41 megacities by 2030 and 50 by
2050. The number of large cities (with a population between five and ten million) is also
expected to increase, from 45 today to 71 by 2050.10 Presently, the largest city in theworld is Tokyo with a population of around 38 million, but, by 2050, Mumbai is likely to be
the most populous, with a population of over 42 million. In wealthy countries a greater
proportion of the population live in cities, but the rate of urbanisation is progressing much
faster in poorer countries. Asia and Africa (the world’s two least urbanised regions) areexperiencing the highest rates of urbanisation. By 2050, Asia’s urban population is likely
to rise from 48.2% to 64.2%, and Africa’s will probably grow from 40.4% to 55.9%.11
Unlike Africa, Asia is also building skyscrapers at a rapid rate, allowing more intensive
urbanisation. In the 1980s, 49% of the world’s tall buildings were in North America, but
66% of them are now in Asia.
Urban development. In many developing countries, urbanisation is unplanned, leading
to sprawling slum areas that often lack adequate infrastructure (including sanitation)
and, hence, are particularly prone to natural disasters and disease. Poor or unmanaged
urban growth may also lead to congestion, non-regulated building construction andpollution. These areas are also often poorly governed, lacking basic services and, assuch, they are prone to insecurity and risk becoming lawless spaces where police areunwilling or unable to enter. Without effective governance, criminality and violence inthe cities of developing countries could soar and become havens for terrorists. Despite
these hazards, increased urbanisation is likely to boost economic growth (urban areas
have approximately 55% of the world’s population, but account for over 80% of global
gross domestic product (GDP)).12
Average height
HD1of the world’s tallest 100 buildings
1,800

Height (metres)

1,500
1,200
900
600
300

305

287

363

345

472

440

408

562

536

504

0
2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Source: http://global.ctbuh.org/resources/papers/download/3604-the-global-tall-building-picture-impact-of-2017.pdf

Note: Average height of the 100 tallest buildings globally averaged over a five year interval. Forecasts from 2017 are basedon a linear extrapolation. Building height beyond 2016 is illustrative.
Source: Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat

10 University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Sustainability Today, (2014) ‘City Population 2050’.
11 UN DESA, Population Division, (2014), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision.
12 McKinsey & Company, McKinsey Global Institute, (March 2011), Urban world: Mapping the economic
power of cities.

Global Strategic Trends

65

Human development

Urban areas will probably also consume the most resources, with over 80% of theworld’s energy use likely to occur in cities by 2050 (up from 66% today). However, cities
present opportunities for efficiencies. Densely-populated areas often lead to shorter
commuting distances and delivery times. Congestion, energy consumption and pollution
could be reduced by using advanced technology, such as implementing intelligent
traffic management (possibly overseeing fleets of driverless cars). Large buildings
have smaller surface-to-volume ratios, conserving heat, and future technology could
exploit temperature differences to generate electricity. A decade ago the constructionof buildings accounted for 30-40% of global energy use, however, new construction
materials and methods, improved urban practices and integration of smart technologies
could significantly reduce this figure.

HealthLife expectancy. Global life expectancy has increased at a rate of more than three years
per decade since the 1950s. Life expectancy was 70 in 2015 and is likely to be around
82 by 2050.13 Recently, however, research has identified ways to significantly extend thelives of simple animals, such as worms. While formidable obstacles remain, it is plausiblethat by 2050 these techniques could extend human lives by many years, at least for
those who can afford it.
Global HD8
life expectancy at birthLife expectancy (years)

90
Less developed regions
More developed regions
World

80
70
60
50
40
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000
Year

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source: United Nations, Department ofSource:
Economicand Social
Affairs,
Population
Division
UN Population
Division
Departmentof Economic
and Social Affairs

Infectious diseases. Although we are currently better at fighting infectious disease thanat any other time in history, the risk of a global pandemic could be increasing. Over thelast 100 years there have been at least four global influenza pandemics:14 Spanish flu in
1918 (50 million deaths); Asian flu in 1957 (two million deaths); Hong Kong flu in 1968
(one million deaths); and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (200,000 deaths). High population
densities, travel and poverty are thought to have been the primary contributing factors to
the spread of these diseases. By 2050, more people will be living in cities and travelling
further and more frequently. As the number of animals being farmed rises, the risk ofanimal diseases mutating to infect people (as happened with bird flu and swine flu) is also
likely to increase. Advancements in health surveillance, preparedness and medicine

13 United Nations (UN), (2017), World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, United Nations, page 6.
14 Hsieh, Y. C., et al., Journal of the Formosan Medical Association, Volume 105, (2016), ‘Influenza
Pandemics, Past, Present and Future’.

66

Global Strategic Trends

Human development

could, however, mitigate the risk of pandemics. Growing antimicrobial resistance will
exacerbate the threat from infectious diseases. Over time, microorganisms that are
exposed to antibiotics can develop a tolerance, meaning that medication stops working.
This is exacerbated by the overuse of antibiotics in both people and animals. In 2016,it was estimated that 700,000 people died after being infected by resistant bacteria,
so unless mitigation measures are put in place, by 2050 there could be over ten million
fatalities annually.15 Without working antibiotics (or a similarly-functioning alternative),post-surgical infections could make major surgery extremely risky.
Deaths attributable to antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in 2050 could surpass that ofother common diseases in 2016
HD10
AMR in 2050
10 million
Tetanus60,000Road traffic
accidents

Cancer
8.2 million

1.2 million

AMR now
700,000(low estimate)
Measles
130,000

Cholera100,000–
120,000

Diarrhoeal
diseaseDiabetes

1.4 million

1.5 million

Source: AMR
https://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf
Source:
Review

Non-communicable diseases. In 2000, 60% of worldwide deaths were caused by
non-communicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes and heart conditions, rising to
69% in 2015.16 This increase is partially due to reductions in deaths from other causes
as treatment for infectious diseases has improved. However, lifestyle factors are also
a substantial cause of the rise in deaths from non-communicable diseases, particularly
obesity, which could be the world’s most pressing health issue by 2050. Between
1975 and 2016, obesity levels almost tripled to around 650 million, with child obesity
increasing from 4% in 1975 to 18% in 2016. In Africa, the number of overweight children
under five has increased by nearly 50% since 2000, and in Asia, approximately 20 million
children under five were overweight or obese in 2016.17 Rising levels of obesity, alongwith ageing populations, could lead to recruitment problems for some armed forces.
However, better access to health care, changes in lifestyle and advances in medicine
may reverse these trends.

15 Marlieke, E. A., et al., (29 November 2016), ‘Will 10 Million People Die a Year due to Antimicrobial
Resistance by 2050?’.
16 The World Bank, (2016), ‘Cause of death, by non-communicable diseases’.
17 World Health Organization (WHO), (16 February 2018), ‘Obesity and Overweight’.

Global Strategic Trends

67

Human development

AdultsHD9
with a body mass index (BMI) of 25 or higher
2050

56.9%

2040

51.6%

2030

46.3%

2020

41%

2010

35.7%

2000

30.8%

1990
1980

20%

26.7%
23.1%
25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

Percentage (%) of adults with a BMI of 25 or higher
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.GLOBAL2461A?lang=en
Source:Source:
World HealthOrganization

Nutrition. Malnutrition is a multifaceted condition affecting 50% of the global population.
Some malnourished people have a comparatively high-calorie diet with low nutritional
value, whilst others still struggle to get enough to eat. There has recently been an
increase in the number of people who are chronically undernourished, up from
777 million in 2015 to 815 million in 2016.18 It is unclear whether this is a short-term,
reversible effect or an early sign of a worsening long-term situation. In addition to hunger,
around 30% of the world’s population suffer from vitamin and mineral deficiencies andthis could worsen in the coming decades.19
Mental health. Mental health disorders (such as schizophrenia, dementia anddepression) were estimated to affect over 700 million people in 2014, and are likely toremain a significant issue.20 Mental illness and suicide can be closely linked, but numbersof suicides seem to be declining. Between 2000 and 2012, suicides decreased by about
9%, from 883,000 to 804,000 globally. A better understanding of, improvements in, andgreater spending on mental health care are likely to lead to a continued reduction in thenumber of suicides. However, some forms of mental illness, such as anxiety disorders,
may increase in the coming decades. This is partly because of the harassment, scrutiny
and bullying resulting from greater use of social media, and as more of our social lives are
lived online, real-life interactions may dwindle, increasing loneliness.

Spending on ‘digital
health care’ grew
twelvefold between
2009 and 2016.

Digital medicine. The use of technology in health care is likely to accelerate. Spendingon ‘digital health care’ grew twelvefold between 2009 and 2016 (from US $500 million
to US $6 billion).21 Increasing computing power and bigger data sets are allowing moreaccurate diagnoses of disease to be made, for example, scanning chest x-rays for signsof cancer or drawing on a range of data to identify patterns that indicate a propensity

18 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), et al., (2017), The state of food security and nutrition in theworld: Building resilience for peace and food security.
19 Tulchinsky, T. H., Public Health Reviews, Volume 32, (2010), ‘Micronutrient deficiency conditions: global
health issues’, pages 243-255.
20 Mnookin, S., World Bank Group and WHO, (2016), Out of the Shadows: Making Mental Health a Global
Development Priority.
21 CB Insights, (1 March 2017), ‘Digital Health Funding Sees Record year 2016’.

68

Global Strategic Trends

Human development

Advances in sensor technology may allow earlier and more accurate diagnosis

for diabetes. Advances in sensor technology are likely to further improve our capacity
to diagnose disease accurately and early. Present-day examples of health care sensors
include the automated monitoring of physical activity and blood pressure.
Regenerative medicine. Regenerative medicine is an umbrella term for restoringdamaged tissues and organs by using advances in a range of medical sub-disciplines,
including stem cell biology, biomaterials and genetics.22 Regenerative medicine is alreadyhelping growing numbers of people, as seen in the use of stem cells to treat diseasedbone marrow. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of patients receiving this treatment
increased by over 46%. Regenerative medicine has the potential to help cure problems
such as spinal injuries and heart defects, and may eliminate the need for organ donation.
Personalised medicine. In 2001, the cost of sequencing a human genome wasaround US $100 million, falling to just over US $1,000 by 2017.23 As technology
improves, this figure is likely to reduce dramatically. Being able to ‘read’ a patient’s
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is, however, only a first step. Designing or identifying aneffective treatment for that patient (or group of patients) is the next essential step, andthe number of drugs designed in this way increased from five in 2008 to 132 in 2016 with
oncology seeing the greatest benefit. As medical databases grow, the computers andalgorithms that search those databases improve, and advances take place. Health careis, therefore, likely to become much more personalised and effective.

22 Huimin, X., et al., nature.com, (19 June 2018), ‘Tissue and regeneration with endogenous stem cells’.
23 Keshavan, M., STAT, (9 January 2017), ‘Illumina says it can deliver a $100 genome – soon’.

Global Strategic Trends

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Human development

Declining cost of DNA sequencing per genome
HD11
100,000,000
February 2001
drafts of two humangenome sequences

10,000,000

February 2004
1st human genome
sequence publishedUS $1,000,000

February 2007
2nd human genome
sequence published100,000

February 2008
four more genomes publishedFebruary 2014
~228,000 human genomes
sequenced to date

10,000

17
20

16
20

15
20

14
20

13
20

12
20

11
20

10
20

09
20

08
20

07
20

06
20

05
20

04
20

03
20

02

20

20

01

1,000

Source: https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-genome/

Source: National Human Genome Research Institute

Gene editing can
precisely, reliably
and efficiently
make changes totargeted DNA.

Gene therapy. A new technique known as gene therapy has recently been used tomodify or replace genes that cause illnesses, and has significant potential to eradicate
some currently incurable conditions. For example, in 2015, a boy with a rare genetic
skin condition was successfully treated using a combination of stem cell techniquesand gene therapy.24 Between 1989 and 2017 the number of approved gene therapy
trials increased from one to over 132. Recently, a new method of gene therapy, called‘gene editing’, has been developed: the CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced
Short Palindromic Repeats) and Cas9 (CRISPR associated protein 9) enzyme process.
Gene editing can precisely, reliably and efficiently make changes to targeted DNA.
The technique is expected to lead to the development of treatments for a wide rangeof conditions ranging from congenital blindness to cancer. Gene editing has also beenused to create the first stable semi-synthetic single cell organism.25 Gene editing could
lead to significant improvements in medicine, but also enable rogue actors to develop
deadly biological weapons.26 In addition, the technique may, in future, allow DNA to bemodified so that selected traits can be enhanced, potentially giving people extraordinary
abilities.
Prosthetics. The use of 3D printing is already allowing prostheses to be individually
tailored, including printed skin for burn victims, dental crowns and components for
facial reconstruction. New types of composite materials are likely to be developed thatwill be stronger, lighter and more durable. Carbon-fibre sport prosthetics have alreadyallowed disabled athletes to compete with, and in some cases outperform, able-bodied
athletes.27 Robotic limbs are used today, although they are at the early stages of
24 Hesman Saey, T. H., Science News, (8 November 2017), ‘Scientists replaced 80 percent of a ‘butterfly’
boy’s skin’.
25 Scrips Research Institute, (23 January 2017), ‘First stable semisynthetic organism created’.
26 Regalado, A., MIT Technology Review, (9 February 2016), ‘Top U.S. Intelligence Official Calls Gene Editing
a WMD Threat’.
27 Greenemeier, L., Scientific America, (5 August 2016), ‘Blade Runners: Do High-Tech Prostheses Give
Runners an Unfair advantage?’.

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Neurotechnology. Brain-to-machine and brain-to-computerinterfaces have seen significant advances in recent
decades. The first human neural prosthetic was usedin the mid-1990s, and there are now 450,000 implanted
hearing aids worldwide, as well as implants that treat
Parkinson’s disease. Brain-to-machine interfaces are
already used to control robotic limbs, and improvementsin this technology should lead to an increasing arrayof operable devices. In the nearer term, neural
prosthetics could help with conditions including chronic
pain and spinal injuries and by 2050, this could include
interface-controlled technology such as cars andphones.28 Although the technical barriers are formidable,
by 2050, brain-to-computer interfaces may allow people
to augment their mental abilities with automatic accessto the memory and processing power of computers.
This could include remotely operated military vehicles.

flickr_by_Mario_Sixtus-F

development, are expensive and have significant limitations, but by 2050 they could bestronger, faster and more dextrous than the limb they replace. Similarly, exoskeletons
could be routinely used by both the able-bodied and disabled to enhance performance,
including in extreme environments.

Neil Harbisson is the first legally recognised cyborg

Education and employment
Enrolment. The proportion of children being formally educated is likely to increase, withlevels of primary school enrolment approaching 95% and secondary school education
89%. As more people in a society are educated, economic performance and qualityof life improves. However, countries experiencing poverty, conflict, humanitarian
emergencies and rapid population growth (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) may
struggle to achieve 100% enrolment in the next 30 years. Nevertheless, by 2050,
only five countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali and Niger) are likely to havemore than 20% of children out of school.29 Although improving, the education of girls,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, is still likely to lag behind that of boys.
Standards and access. Despite growing rates of enrolment, the quality of education
around the world is often poor. The number of children attending school in Latin America
has doubled, but the quality of education has not kept up. In the 2015 Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA), an assessment of 72 nations in reading and science, Latin America
and the Caribbean nations ranked the lowest in quality.30 However, advancements
in technology could lead to a revolution in education, driving global improvements.
By 2050, virtually anyone (including those living in poor and remote regions) is likely
to be able to cheaply and easily access online education. Technology will probably
also raise the quality of education, for example, a system called ALEKS uses artificial
intelligence to determine the student’s knowledge of a topic, then targets learning toaddress the gaps. In India, a system called Mindspark has already led to substantial
gains in mathematics and reading.31 Turning learning into a game or simulation (suchas Minecraft: Education Edition) is likely to become more widespread, with better
engagement likely to raise standards.

28 Varrasi, J., ASME, (January 2014), The Next Generation in Heural Prosthetics.
29 The World Bank, (2 October 2017), ‘Data Education Statistics’.
30 Bobak, A., School of International Futures, (2017), The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean out to2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
31 The Economist, (22 July 2017), ‘Together, technology and teachers can revamp schools: How the scienceof learning can get the best out of edtech’.

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Human development

Despite online learning, traditional schools will endure

Literacy rates. Globally, literacy rates for those 15 and over are continuing to improve,from 81% in 2000 to 86% by 2016.32 By 2050, they are likely to be around 95%, butsome regions (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) could still have significant numbersof people who are illiterate. Developments in technology, such as voice recognition
technology, however, may reduce the impact of being illiterate.
Schools. Although technology may mean that high-quality education can be delivered
online, traditional schools and universities will endure. As well as providing education,schools play an important role in developing social skills, providing childcare, fosteringsocial cohesion and allowing governments to impart shared values. Teaching children
the skills to differentiate between true and false information could also make societies
more resilient to manipulation. Universities not only impart information, but also providea ‘rite of passage’ offering rich personal and social experiences, features that are likely
to remain attractive (for those who can afford them). Nevertheless, the link between
a traditional degree and securing a higher-paying job is likely to further weaken, andalternative models of higher education will evolve.
Through-life learning. The linear path from education and training, to work and thenretirement looks unlikely to endure.33 Increased life expectancy and higher state pension
ages mean that people are likely to work for longer and will need to more frequently
update their knowledge and abilities. Partnerships between universities and industry canbe expected to strengthen in the coming decades, as businesses encourage, and evenrequire, their staff to continuously improve their skills. Some governments are also likely
to support individuals who wish to re-train, for example, the Government of Singapore
provides vouchers for students to spend on any of 500 approved courses. Businesses,
particularly large organisations (including militaries) will need to invest in through-lifetraining and education if their employees are to remain competitive.
Recruitment. Businesses will probably rely less on academic attainment to selectemployees, with aptitude tests and simulations likely to be more important than formal
qualifications. For example, in 2013, a leading financial services firm in the UK abandoned
32 The World Bank, Data Education Statistics.
33 Daheim, C., et al., (2017), The Future of Work: A Meta-Analysis on Disruptive Perspectives,a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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academic qualifications as a recruiting metric.34 Formal education may, therefore,
become less important, but increasing automation in the workplace is likely to makehigh skill-levels even more critical, as people strive to compete in the future job market.
Flexibility. Advances in technology have allowed many people to work remotely, reducing
the need for office space and travel. Although technology and a less-rigid working
structure means people can balance their employment and other commitments (suchas childcare) more effectively, it also means that they can be continuously connected tothe demands of work, potentially increasing stress levels and adversely affecting health.35
Further technological developments are likely to make working remotely, at any time,even easier. Many employees are also becoming more independent and autonomous,
being assessed on their outputs rather than on time spent at work. The number ofpeople working as freelancers, independent contractors and temporary staff (known as
the ‘gig economy’) looks likely to increase. Freelance work is, however, often low-paid,lacking the benefits and security of formal employment and, therefore, the growth of thegig economy could increase inequality.
Diversity. The number and proportion of women in paid work is likely to continue
to increase. In OECD countries, the percentage of working-age women in paid
employment increased from 37% in 1971 to 63% by 2013 (although this is still 17%
lower than men).36 Whilst global figures are likely to lag behind those of the OECD, inthe next 30 years job opportunities for women are expected to improve markedly acrossthe world. Women are, however, more likely than men to be employed in low-wage,
part-time and temporary work. This suggests that, despite improving employment
prospects, women are likely to remain economically disadvantaged in the coming
decades. As well as including more women, the workforce of 2050 will almost certainly
be older and include workers on a variety of employment terms. The shift towards morediversity and inclusion is expected to accelerate and broaden to include more people
with physical impairments or cognitive differences such as autism.37 Future employers,
including militaries, will therefore need to adopt more inclusive styles of leadership andmanagement and adapt organisational structures and working practices.

Technology developments will make remote working, at any time, even easier
34 Hellen, N. and Griffiths, S., Sunday Times, (5 March 2017), ‘We can work it out: exam ‘failures’beat graduates at top firm’.
35 Eurofound and International Labour Organization, (2017), Working anytime, anywhere: The effects
on the world of work.
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (2016), Trends shaping
Education 2016.
37 Deloitte University Press, (2017), Rewriting the rules for the digital age: 2017 Deloitte Global Human
Capital Trends, page 118.

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Virtual and augmented reality will become much more widely used

Communication
Communication technology. Communication technology has become increasingly
portable, accessible and high speed, perhaps most clearly seen in the changes to mobile
phones. Today’s mobile phone has multiple sensors and functions. Future mobile
devices are likely to be much more capable, and by 2050 the vast majority of the world’s
population will routinely use digital devices to communicate. Between 2010 and 2017,
the number of social media users more than doubled,38 and there are likely to be further
substantial rises in the coming decades. Greater public demand, declining costs andimproving utility will mean that digital communications networks will continue to increasein importance. The comparatively simple voice and text messages of today are likely
to be replaced by more complex constructs, potentially using virtual and augmented
reality.39 As digital communication becomes more dominant, those not connected arelikely to be increasingly isolated and disadvantaged, which is reflected in the United
Nations’ (UN’s) declaration that access to the Internet is a fundamental human right.
Volume of information. The volume of data per consumer is currently growing
exponentially. While in 1986 the daily amount of information available to one person(from all media sources) equalled 40 newspapers with 85 pages, today’s consumer
receives information equating to 174 newspapers (the equivalent to 34 gigabytes ofdata). It is likely that this upward trend will continue, and possibly increase. The humanability to process information remains limited, with the conscious mind only able toprocess approximately 50 bits (units of information) of factual information per second,a small fraction of the overall volume of information received daily.40 As a consequence,

38 Statista, (2018), ‘Number of social network users worldwide from 2010 to 2021 (in billions)’.
39 Marr, B., Forbes, (31 July 2017), ‘The Amazing Ways Companies Use Virtual Reality for Business Success’.
40 BK101, ‘Human Brain – Neuroscience – Cognitive Science’.

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people will increasingly be required to manage, filter and select from this huge andincreasing volume of information, running the risk of selection bias. Even with extremely
well-developed techniques to handle the constant stream of information, the volume of
information will still exceed our capacity to process it, potentially impacting on physicaland mental health. This growing information overload could place excessive demandson the individual, hindering concentration and the development of critical thinking skills.41
Echo chamber. As individuals become exposed to ever greater volumes of information,
they are more likely to focus on sources that reflect their existing preferences andprejudices. This can create an ‘echo chamber’ effect (where people only see and hear theviews of those with similar opinions, leading to positions being reinforced and hardened),
which can make people more susceptible to manipulation. As technology improves, it islikely to become easier to filter information so that people are further screened from facts
and opinions they dislike or disagree with. This could lead to social fragmentation and aweakening of community values.42 As the volume of information increases and people
get more of their information from social media (as well as advances in mixed reality
technology), it may become harder to tell what stories are real, potentially making people
easier to manipulate. The relatively light regulation of the Internet in the West may mean itis especially vulnerable to external manipulation.
Virtual and augmented reality. As technology improves and costs fall, video andlivestreaming are likely to take over from text and static images as the dominant formof electronic communication. The influence of radio, television and cinema, however, islikely to reduce, as increasing numbers of people directly disseminate their content to awide audience.43 As information technology further develops, augmented reality (where
one’s physical view of the world has virtual data superimposed upon it) is likely to become
mainstream. For example, information could be provided by wearable smart-glasses orcontact lenses to help people navigate and locate services, similar to the way smartphones
are used today. Mixed reality (where virtual objects are presented as though they were real)
may also become so advanced that it will become increasingly difficult to easily determine
what is real. Virtual and augmented reality will become much more widely used, with someexperts predicting an annual growth rate of 82% over the next few years.44

Mixed reality may
also become soadvanced that it will
become increasingly
difficult to easily
determine what
is real.

Language. The number of languages is likely to decline, 25% are currently spoken
by fewer than 1,000 people, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO) has identified 2,500 languages at risk of extinction.
By contrast, speakers of the world’s dominant languages are likely to increase.
In 2017, 1,284 million people spoke a version of Chinese as a first language;
437 million spoke Spanish; 372 million spoke English; and 295 million spoke Arabic.
The global reach of the Internet and social media are likely to reinforce the dominanceof the most commonly-used languages, and English is expected to remain highly
influential.45 English is also the most commonly studied foreign language in the world,
although Chinese, Hindi and Urdu are likely to take on increasing importance. Amidrising migration and international communication, languages will evolve, including
incorporating foreign words, for example, ‘Konglish’ is a variety of English that has
evolved amongst South Koreans. An increasing number of countries are, however,using legislation to protect national languages and dialects.46

41 Tech 21 Century, ‘The human brain is loaded daily with 34 GB of information’.
42 Lance Bennet, W., (2016), News: The Politics Of Illusion.
43 Wenger, J., (2017), The Future of Art, Expression and Design, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
44 Cisco, (2017), ‘Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology 2016-2121’.
45 Kaufman, S., The Linguist, (13 October 2015), ‘English Will Remain The International Language’.
46 Baratta, A., (2017), Putting an Accent on the Future, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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The young appear to be adopting liberal values more readily than the old

Culture, belief and identity
Liberal and traditional values. The increasing ease, and reducing cost, with which ideas
and information can be spread globally, particularly due to the widespread use of theInternet, combined with increasing travel by unprecedented numbers of people have
had significant effects on culture. Groups of people separated around the globe can
now choose to exchange ideas, read the same books, watch the same films and eat
virtually identical food. Whilst this has led to an increasing number of people across theworld with shared values, it does not appear to be leading to a universal convergenceof culture. Instead, while some societies are adopting more liberal attitudes, others areseeing their traditional, more conservative values reinforced.
As societies become more prosperous, wealthier and more educated, they tend to be
more liberal and accepting of difference (for example, being more welcoming to foreigners
or removing legislation criminalising homosexuality).47 These trends are not universal.
Some Middle Eastern countries, for example, continue to embrace more traditional
values despite increasing prosperity. Regardless of societal wealth, however, the young
appear to be adopting liberal values more readily than the old. Rising prosperity is also
linked to growing ‘individualism’ (personal empowerment through access to information,
participation, accountability and economic development), including in India and China,
suggesting that, over time, most societies will probably become more liberal.

47 Chatterje-Doody, P., (2017), Self-identification in a global age: influences on the development of cultural
identity, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 5.

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Intra-societal differences. Whilst there have always been differences between thewealthier, better educated and the less privileged, these differences appear likely towiden in the coming decades, at least in the West. Mobility is often crucial. Those
who are willing (and able) to move in the pursuit of better education or employment
often become richer, more liberal and more accustomed to mixing with those fromdifferent cultural backgrounds. Those unwilling (or unable) to move are often less welleducated, poorer and more likely to have their existing traditional values and beliefs
reinforced. This appears to be leading to a growing division within many countries that
could result in a backlash by the less liberal who perceive they are being disadvantaged.
Digital communication platforms and social media could also exacerbate divisions
within societies because of the echo-chamber effect. The increase in the number ofpeople living in gated communities might also lead to further polarisation. The effects ofautomation could lead to widespread job losses, lower pay and inequality, driving further
discontent and division between the wealthy and the disadvantaged48 and this could
result in violent protest.
Internationally, cultural differences will continue to affect attitudes and beliefs. The
Chinese, for example, think and look at society differently to the West. Whilst the Westfocuses more on the rights of the individual, the Chinese have traditionally prioritised
those of the collective. As global economic power shifts to the East this difference inoutlook may lead to a clash between Western and Eastern perspectives and values.
Gender equality. Whilst the idea that there should be equality between the sexes isgaining ground, it is unlikely to be a universally-held view by 2050. In the Middle Eastand North Africa only one in four men support gender equality, and 70% of Egyptians ofboth genders believe that a woman should tolerate violence to keep the family together.
Nevertheless, women and men are becoming more equal based on the World Economic
Forum’s four criteria of: health and survival; educational attainment; economic participationand opportunity; and political empowerment. However, the rate of improvement is slow
and possibly decreasing, it could take a century to eliminate the gender gap.49

Identity, including gender, will be increasingly fluid
48 Goodhart, D., (2017), The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics.
49 World Economic Forum (WEF), (2016), The Global Gender Gap Report 2016, page 7.

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More people are likely to identify as religious: religious parents have more children, children usually retain their parents’ religion

Total surveillance bysome governments
might stifle
difference andlead to widespreadconformity.

Internet identity. Most of the world’s population already has access to the Internet (tosome extent) and by 2050 access is likely to be almost universal. As people spend moretime online, their identity will increasingly be defined by their digital presence, such as
their involvement with networks, projects and communities of interest.50 In the coming
decades, every facet of one’s life is likely to be recorded by the ubiquitous presence ofwearable devices, smart sensors and the Internet of things. Left unchecked, this could
mean unparalleled levels of surveillance and the end of privacy. People would knowthat everything they do can be viewed and judged. What sort of society this may lead
to is unclear. Societies might become almost crime free and tolerant, or oppressed
and fearful. Total surveillance by some governments might stifle difference and leadto widespread conformity,51 reinforcing and strengthening existing cultural values. The
Chinese social credit system, (a system that uses government data to score citizens’
economic and social status and trustworthiness, with a low score attracting various
penalties, for example, being prevented from obtaining a credit card or travelling abroad)
although still in its early stages of development, may be a forerunner of such a society.
Gender identity. Some non-Western cultures have traditionally viewed gender asa more complex concept than a binary choice between male and female, and thismore ambiguous approach is likely to be increasingly accepted, especially in Westerncultures. Behaviours, roles and aspects of appearance are less likely to be seen as either‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’. In the US, the number of people identifying as transgendergrew between 2007 and 2015,52 and this is likely to increase due to greater awareness,social acceptance and legislative change. While in many ways a positive development,
this could pose complex challenges, for example, deciding who is entitled to use
women’s prisons or refuges.
National identity. As people travel more and form relationships with those from othercountries, including through online communities, nationality is likely to become lessimportant to our sense of identity. People may begin to identify more strongly with thosein other parts of the world due to shared values and beliefs. Those who live in
50 Verdon, J., (2017), The Emerging Constraints of the Digital Environment and the Future of Identity,a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 5.
51 Watson, R., (2016), Digital vs Human: how we’ll live, love, and think in the future, page 24.
52 Meerwijk, E. and Sevelius, J. M., PMC, (2017), Transgender Population Size in the United States:
a Meta-Regression of Population-Based Probability Samples.

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cities (characterised by ethnic and cultural mixing) are particularly likely to become lessnationalistic.53 Nevertheless, national identity will almost certainly remain a potent force
in the coming decades, especially for many of those who are poor, less well educatedand living in small towns and rural areas. National identity will continue to be used bypolitical leaders to galvanise their populations, including to divert attention away from agovernment’s failings.
Religion. More people are likely to identify as religious, due to demographics:54 most of
the world’s population are religious; children usually retain the religion of their parents;
and religious parents tend to have more children. As societies get richer, however,they typically become more liberal and the social pressure to retain one’s parental
religion diminishes. This could mean that the proportion of people who are not religious
increases. Globally, there is a decline in the time devoted to formal religious activity.55
Therefore, whilst the number of people who are religious is likely to increase, many willcommit less time and may become less devout. Hence, the importance of religion
to identity and communities may reduce. Increasing numbers of people (particularly
the young) are, however, looking for spiritual inspiration on the Internet, making themprone to radicalisation by unscrupulous actors. The tendency of younger people toseek spiritual information and guidance online may further undermine ties to institutionalreligion. Such Internet-based engagement may not be mediated by contact with anestablished member of a religious organisation, increasing the likelihood of changes in
the form, practice and content of religion.
GlobalHD6
religious adherence
2010

Asia

2050
5

5

4

4

Asia

ReligionsHindu
MuslimUnaffiliated3

Buddhist3

Folk religions

Population(billion)
2
2

1
Sub-SaharanAfricaOther

Sub-SaharanAfrica1

Middle Eastand North Africa
EuropeEuropeLatin America

ChristianNorth America

Latin America

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, Pew Research Centre,
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/
Note:
Evolution of global religious adherence with forecasted increase in global population.

Source: Pew Research Center

53 Chatterje-Doody, P., (2017), Self-identification in a global age: influences on the development of cultural
identity, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 2.
54 Pew Research Center, (2015), ‘The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050’.
55 Hart Group Oxford XXI, (2018), GST – Future of Beliefs: Final report, a research paper commissioned by
DCDC, page 21.

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Future worlds: Human development
Powerful states

Multilateralism

Multipolarity• Illegal economic migration is a challenge forinternational institutions and states.
• Medical advances help to overcome many
health and poverty issues, but they aresometimes held back by state regulation.
• Internet access is ubiquitous and it is regulated
effectively where required.
• The state is the focus of people’s loyalty andidentity, although international organisations
are respected.
• Human empowerment continues to improvein most places.

• Blocs control migrant flow in response todemographic needs.
• As some blocs lack key resources, malnutritionand communicable disease continue to beregional problems.
• Communication technology is run by blocs.
It controls populations, influences other blocs
and limits human empowerment.
• Global liberalisation has been reversed.
• National and bloc identity drives culture.
• Blocs research and exploit humanenhancement and genetic weaponry.

• People support efficient provision of defence
and security, including use of private militaryenterprises and cooperative approaches.

• Unleashed nationalism and populism drives
support for inter-bloc competition and conflict.

Cooperation• Border protection is an increasingly important
issue for most states.

• Offensive operations in other blocs’ networks
are a key tool of conflict.
• Defence is valued and attracts funding.
• Conscription is politically viable and used
where necessary.
• Defence against novel weapons of mass effectis a priority.

Network of actors

Fragmentation• Migration is less constrained and driven by
the demand for skills.
• The Internet is an essential tool of life.
Cyber security is an important factor inpeoples’ loyalty and identity choices.
An alternative dark net flourishes.
• Non-state actors including megacities andcorporations compete for people’s loyalty.
• There are opportunities for humanempowerment but a risk of exploitation due
to limited democratic participation.

• A large number of people seek refuge fromthe impacts of climate change, migrating tohabitable regions and cities.
• Communicable disease is rife amongst thepoor with a high risk of pandemics.
• The Internet is an essential resource but isunregulated and dangerous.
• Diverse actors compete for people’s loyalty
and to influence their identity. The state is lessimportant to them.
• There are few opportunities for humanempowerment due to lack of regulation.

• Recruiting is challenging for state-based
militaries, but less difficult for new security
providers, such as cities.
• There is a strong undercurrent of resistanceto the rise of the mega-corporation, but thisresistance struggles to find a unified voiceor action.
• New conventions for the use of force emerge
and are well governed by cooperative
organisations at all levels. They enjoy popularsupport.

• People will look for security providers
wherever they can and where security isprovided by the market, costs to individuals
will increase.
• The security sector is a major employer
and there is strong resistance to using
autonomous systems in defence.
• International norms and organisations are
eroded and ineffective, and there is little
support for them.

Competition• International organisations lead the planningand execution of military operations impacting
on national defence cultures.

Diffusion of power

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N

Watch points

Discontinuities• Changes in the scale, drivers and patternsof migration.

• A medical advance that significantly increases
life expectancy.

• An increasing divide of wealth and outlook
between urban and rural populations.

• The emergence of a pandemic that causes
widespread loss of life.

• Cities start to behave more like states.

• Creeping crises, such as obesity, mental health,antimicrobial resistance, are not tackled.

W

E
S• (Enhanced) life expectancy is perceived as a‘human right’.
• Development, regulation and use of humanaugmentation.
• Increasing adoption of Internet-based education
spreading new values.
• Increasing numbers of people forming
non-traditional allegiances as an alternative
to national identity.

• The Internet becomes too ‘unsafe’ to use.
• Emergence of a new communication tool whichenables the creation of defensible sovereign
cyber territory.
• Major changes to a religious belief system similar
to the Christian Reformation.

Implications• A large proportion of migration is rural to urban
leading to increasingly large and dense urban
agglomerations. In many cities, the rate of urban
growth will outpace the capacity of governments
to implement sound urban management practices
leading to a failure to provide secure basic humanliving conditions and sufficient security to avoid
instability.
• Cities are likely to increasingly become nodes ofglobal interconnectivity. Integration of cities into
the rules-based international system may provide
appropriate representation of the cities’ population,
reducing tensions and enhancing global harmony.
• Management of societal inequalities andexpectations resulting from improvements in medical
science, may prove a particularly challenging area forthe state, especially if these advances are exploitedfor defence and security purposes.
• Timely investment in understanding the applications
and risks for how human enhancement technologies
may progress will generate competitive advantage
and enable global leadership in the development ofgoverning frameworks.
• There may be a moral or legal imperative to use
performance-enhancing technologies to ensure thehighest performance on the battlefield and in other‘life and death’ professions.

Global Strategic Trends• Technology will change jobs and skills and could
even challenge people’s sense of human purpose.
Education and training will need to change to matchthese developments.
• An expanded and unregulated information space
could make individuals more susceptible tomisinformation and/or radicalisation.
• Defence and security exploitation of cyberspace
and autonomy will be influenced by, and havean influence on, societal approaches to thesetechnologies.
• Governments should prepare to function in aworld where states, organisations and individuals
hold diametrically opposing values and attitudes.
Some may increase nationalist sentiment, whileothers become increasingly liberal, looking beyond
borders to form communities with people of similarvalues. It may be increasingly difficult to predict
how democratic influences will affect the actions of
traditional allies, partners and competitors.
• If properly managed, migration might releasepressures from areas with fast growing populations,providing benefits to receiving societies, especiallythose that are aging. However, if unmanaged or
managed badly, integration is likely to fail, causingsocial unrest, negative sentiments towards migrants
and drive fragmentation of the society.

81Economy, industry and information

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Economy, industry and information

Economy, industry and information

Synopsis
By 2050, the combined size of the Emerging 7 (E7) economies (Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey) are likely to have surpassed the Group of Seven(G7) (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) and the UnitedStates (US)). As the centre of economic power shifts eastward, Asia will become anincreasingly important centre for not just commerce and finance but also accountancy,
insurance and commercial law. Such a shift will reduce the economic and soft power ofthe West. The capacity of international trade and financial institutions to accommodate
this transition will be vital in ensuring that international markets are effective andcompeting trade blocs are avoided. Digital trade will grow and could become thedominant form of trade by 2050. The economies in most developing countries are likely
to grow significantly and workers’ wages are likely to rise, although inequality could
also increase. In developed countries, however, growth may remain low leading to
low wages, resentment, social division and possibly internal conflict. Low growth will
also restrict governments’ spending, including on welfare, which is likely to exacerbate
inequality. The rising costs of new military equipment could become unaffordable, hence
military interventions could become prohibitively expensive for developed countries.
The high levels of debt in many developed economies, combined in many cases with afinancial sector substantially bigger than national gross domestic product (GDP), could
make them particularly vulnerable to future financial crises.
Improvements in sensors, data analysis/decision-making and actuation (mechanicalmotion) will drive the automation of industry. Sensors will allow every facet of a factory’s
operation to be monitored and controlled, allowing products to be produced precisely
in optimum conditions. This could reduce cost and pollution, and improve performance.
Motors are becoming smaller, more powerful and more efficient, with controls so
precise that machines can conduct microsurgery. The use of technologies such as
computer-aided design and 3D printing will significantly reduce the time needed todevelop new products and allow them to be tailored to individual customers. Transport
will become cheaper, faster and possibly cleaner as electric vehicles become morecommonplace and fuel efficiency improves. By 2050, virtually everyone is likely to haveaccess to the Internet, mobile devices and virtually limitless information. The volume ofdata and processing power will grow exponentially and quantum computing could be
realised. These improvements will accelerate artificial intelligence development, which
will be used to solve increasingly complex problems, leading to improved productivity
and generating substantial economic growth, although its effect on jobs could behighly disruptive.

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Economy and finance
Changing economic balance. By 2050, the world economy is likely to have doubled,
although the rate of growth will probably have slowed. The seven largest emerging
economies, the E7 (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey) are likely
to have increased their share of the global economy from around 35% to almost 50% by
2050, surpassing the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US).1
China’s GDP (at market value) could overtake that of the US by 2020, and by 2050 it islikely to be around 40% larger, accounting for 20% of global GDP. India’s economy isalso expected to grow substantially in the coming decades, with some estimating that by
2050 its GDP (at market value) will be about 85% the size of that of the US.2
Gross domestic product (adjusted
purchasinggrowth
power parity) expressed in US $ trillion at 2016 values
R1/EII15for– Economic
UK 2.7 Italy
2.3
2.8
Germany 4.1 France
2.8
4

5.0
4.6

8.1
51.3
28.3

EU
20.2

Turkey
4.9
2.0

China

8.7

21.4

Russia3.7

3.0 Canada
1.7

6.3 Japan
5.4
2.9 Republic of Korea
1.9

32.1

18.6
Mexico
2.2

India
30.7

6.8

Indonesia
3

US

5.9

World in 2015
103.8

8.3

Brazil3.1

World in 2050
205.0
Key
2050
2015

Global economic centre of gravity shifting

2050

2020

1990

Source: DCDC internal analysis based on PwC, Goldmansachs; OECD and Centre d’Etudes Prospectives d’Informations Internationales

84

1

PwC, (February 2017), The Long View – How will the global economic order change by 2050?

2

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Data, OECD, (2017), ‘Real
GDP Forecast’.

Global Strategic Trends

Economy, industry and information

Europe’s share of the global economy is likely to decline in the next 30 years, with theEuropean Union 27 countries (EU27 – although there are currently 28 EU members,
EU27 refers to the 2018 membership minus the UK following Brexit) expected to have a
combined share of around 10% of world GDP by 2050, less than India’s share. If Asia
achieves the economic, industrial and commercial dominance that is forecast, it could
also become the centre of political and military power.
As increasing numbers of people (particularly in Asia) escape poverty and become
consumers, the global economic centre of gravity is likely to continue to shift eastwards
with Bangladesh, India and Vietnam likely to be the fastest growing economies.
The share of trade between developing economies (known as South-South trade)is also expected to increase. Demands for a greater variety of products, improved
communications and better customs arrangements have seen increases in trade
between and within Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America that can be
expected to endure. Although the value of trade between developed economies
will probably continue to grow, their share of world trade is likely to decline fromapproximately 30% today to around 20% by 2050. A similar pattern is occurring in
intra-regional trade, where the Asia-Pacific’s proportion is expected to grow from 17%
today to around 27% by 2050, while Europe’s and North America’s share is expected toreduce from around 23% to 14%.

EII17 percentage (%) share of intra-regional trade
GlobalPercentage (%)
1990

2010

2030

2050

North-North

56

37

25

19

North-South

33

38

41

42

23

33

37

South-South
8

Sources: Intra-regional trade 2015 and 2050 in % share of global trade, and
HSBC – Trade Winds
Source: Trade Winds, Shaping the future of international businessGovernance of trade. Between 1990 and 2016, the number of trade agreements rose
tenfold.3 If this trend continues, it will lead to an increase in international trade, althoughprotectionist policies could also prevail. Trade agreements give access to new markets
and provide regulation through measures such as technical standards, labelling andpackaging requirements. While protectionists may seek to define new standards tolimit imports, emerging economies are increasingly likely to meet the standards set intrade agreements. This will probably lead to higher levels of international trade and may
contribute to greater compliance with safety and environmental regulations. Many of theconsumer and industrial products of 2050 are likely to depend on the ability to exchange
information without restrictions.4 The desire of many governments to protect data andprevent cyber fraud could also lead to new standards, trade agreements and, possibly,
3

Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), The Future of Trade, pages 7-8.

4

Khanna, P., (2016), Connectography – Mapping the Global Network Revolution, pages 32-33.

Global Strategic Trends

85Economy, industry and information

Automated markets may be more efficient but they risk algorithm-driven flash crashes

new institutions. Technological advances should also make global value (or supply)
chains more effective, allowing processes to be carried out in the most cost-efficient
locations in the world.5 These developments are likely to increase connectivity, further
driving globalisation. Without agreed rules and effective institutions, however, tradedisputes and protectionism will increase, possibly leading to the formation of competing
trading blocs.
Intercity trade. Cities are likely to play an increasingly prominent role in world trade overthe next 30 years. In 2014, the world’s 20 largest cities were home to 75% of the largest
global companies. As cities grow wealthier and job opportunities improve, attracting
young workers and entrepreneurs, universities and colleges are likely to secure more
funding. In turn, this will attract students, some of whom are likely to stay and set up
their own companies, creating a virtuous circle. Consequently, today’s leading cities
look likely to strengthen their position in the global economy, and could replace states as
the most important economic entities.6 In the coming decades, many of the wealthiest
emerging cities are likely to be in Asia, contributing to the shift of the economic centre ofgravity eastwards.
Financial markets. By 2030, the Chinese bond market is expected to have grown
more than tenfold, from around US $3 trillion to US $32 trillion, and by 2050, Asia’s
financial sector is likely to be four times the size of the West’s.7 As the global economic
centre of gravity moves towards Asia, a shift in financial markets may follow. Although
Western financial centres such as London and New York could remain pivotal (becauseof their time zones, levels of expertise and, possibly, standards of probity), those in Asia
(for example, Beijing, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Mumbai, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo)
will almost certainly grow in significance over the next 30 years. As well as banking,
Asian cities are likely to become increasingly important hubs for accountancy, law andinsurance. As Asia becomes an increasingly important centre for finance, banking,accountancy, law and insurance, the West’s importance is likely to reduce, leading to
a decline in its soft power.

86

5World Trade Organization (WTO), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors shaping the future of world trade,
page 54.

6

Khanna, P., (2016), Connectography – Mapping the Global Network Revolution, page 51.

7

Financial Times, (2015), ‘‘Asian century’ will dominate financial markets’.

Global Strategic Trends

Economy, industry and information

International financial institutions. The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (often known as the Bretton Woods Institutions) were established at the endof the World War 2 and have since been joined by a variety of international banks
including: the African Development Bank; Development Bank of Latin America (CAF);
Asian Development Bank; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development; and the Inter-American Development Bank. It is
widely accepted that international financial institutions, whether global or regional, haveplayed an important role in facilitating worldwide economic development and, as longas they have the capacity to adapt, they are expected to continue to do so.8 However,the dominance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is likely to decline
in the coming decades, with other institutions becoming increasingly significant. For
example, by 2050, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could become as powerfulas the World Bank, particularly if the potential of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (aninitiative seeking to expand maritime routes and land infrastructure networks connecting
China with Asia, Africa and Europe, boosting trade and economic growth) is realised.
Banking. Despite lessons from the financial crisis of 2008, which identified the risks ofhaving banks that are ‘too big to fail’, the banking sector is now even more concentrated.
For example, in 1990, the five largest banks in the US controlled 9.7% of the industry’s
assets, but, by 2015, that figure had increased to 45%.9 As in many industries, a risingnumber of financial service activities are being automated and conducted online. In
the next few years, 30% of jobs in both investment and retail banking are likely to be
automated, with significantly more jobs likely to automated by 2050. While automation
will probably lead to greater efficiencies, it is also likely to increase the risk of unintended
consequences, such as the algorithm-driven ‘Flash Crash’ of 2010, where the Dow
Jones index suffered its largest single-day fall. Malicious manipulation of digital systems
is also a threat. By one estimate, the cost of cybercrime quadrupled between 2013 and2015 and is expected to reach US $2.1 trillion a year by 2019. An alternative estimate isthat the cost of cybercrime will increase at the rate 15% per year.10 As cybercrime grows
in sophistication, banks are likely to devote increasing levels of resource to keep theirsystems and information secure.
Currencies. The US Dollar is currently the world’s
principal ‘reserve currency’ (a currency commonly used
in international transactions and investments, and heldby banks in substantial quantities). It currently makes up
around 64% of global reserves, with the Euro accountingfor 20%, Sterling and the Yen making up around 5% eachand the Renminbi around 1%. Owning a reserve currency
reduces the cost of international transactions, and by 2050
several developing countries (such as India and Brazil)
will probably have taken steps to have their currencies
adopted as reserve currencies. The dominance of the
US Dollar will probably reduce in the coming decades,with China’s Renminbi likely to become a more significant
reserve currency, although the Renminbi is unlikely to have
replaced the US Dollar by 2050. Digital currencies arealso likely to increase in number and importance. Without
the cost of printing cash, digital currencies are relatively
cheap to administer and should, in theory, be impossible tocounterfeit or steal, although it is not clear who (if anyone)
is liable should their underpinning technology fail.11

As cybercrime
grows insophistication,banks are likely to
devote increasinglevels of resource
to keep theirsystems andinformation secure.

Governments may adopt and regulate digital currencies

8

García, E., Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, (2016), ‘Regional Multilateral
Banks in a New Global Context – The Experience of CAF – Development Bank of Latin America’.

9Cox, J., CNBC, (15 April 2015), ‘Biggest banks now own almost half the industry’.

10 Ponemon Institute, (October 2016), 2016 Cost of Cyber Crime Study & the Risk of Business Innovation.
11 Leising, M., Bloomberg.com, (13 June 2017), ‘The Ether Thief’.

Global Strategic Trends

87Economy, industry and information

Quantitative easing is likely to be an enduring feature of developed countries’ economies

Governments have been wary of digital currencies because widespread use could limit
their capacity to enact monetary policy, thwart illegal transactions and collect taxes.
In the future, digital currencies could be more regulated and may even be adopted
as fiat currencies (a government-backed legal tender). However, the involvement ofgovernments in digital currencies might undermine their appeal for some users, whoenjoy their unregulated aspect. States may also dilute the value of digital currencies
through measures such as quantitative easing.
Quantitative easing. In modern times, quantitative easing was first used by the Bank ofJapan in 2001 to tackle falling growth rates.12 The process works by buying government
debt (for example, bonds or treasury bills) from commercial organisations such as banks
or pension fund managers, using electronic money created by central banks. The
aim is to boost the economy by encouraging commercial borrowing and consumer
spending. Quantitative easing has also helped governments (and other borrowers) bykeeping interest rates low, although it has penalised savers. The central banks of mostdeveloped countries have few other options for stimulating economic growth because:interest rates are already low (and hence there are limited opportunities for further cuts);
most are heavily indebted (so could find it expensive to borrow more); and there are
few opportunities to raise taxes without economic damage. In the coming decades,
therefore, quantitative easing is likely to be an enduring feature of developed countries’
economies and it may be used to fund infrastructure investment projects.
Debt. Debt will be an ongoing (and perhaps increasing) feature of developed economies.
Public, private and financial sector gross debt has grown to reach around 385% of GDP
for developed economies, far exceeding real economic growth.13 Such a level of debt isunprecedented in peace time. Most economists agree that there will probably be at least
one major financial crisis before 2050, and that governments’ attempts to boost growthby more borrowing might further reduce states’ financial resilience. The level of debt
12 Cavallo, E., Market Mogul, (22 February 2015), ‘A Brief History of Quantitative Easing’.
13 International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, (2014), Geneva Reports on the World Economy 16,
Deleveraging? What deleveraging?

88

Global Strategic Trends

Economy, industry and informationin developing countries, excluding the financial sector (which is generally far larger indeveloped countries), is around half that of developed countries. Due to low global
interest rates and high state borrowing, national decision-makers in developed countries
are running out of options for boosting economic growth. Innovation remains one of the
few areas that might stimulate growth in the future.
Economic resilience. Several developed countries have financial institutions thatcollectively own derivatives (‘contracts’ based upon the value of assets such as stocks
or shares) worth more than the nation’s GDP. For example, in 2017, the value of EU
derivatives was estimated to be €282 trillion,14 16 times the EU’s GDP. The value of the
UK’s banking system is estimated to be 4.5 times the size of its GDP and could be 9.5
times the size by 2050. Countries (like the UK) whose financial sector is much bigger
than the national economy may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of an economiccrisis, and possibly malicious financial manipulation.
Per capita gross domestic product. Globally, per capita GDP is growing and many
workers in developing countries have seen their wages increase substantially. The
worldwide rate of growth has, however, been declining over the last 50 years (if the
field of view is limited to the last 30 years the rate of growth appears to be increasing,reflecting the uncertainty of future growth rates). On current trends, it will have fallen to
0.7% a year by 2050. In the economically developed countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the decline is even more pronounced(although in the last five years it has started to recover). Falling growth rates may haveseveral drivers, for example, many developed countries have ageing populations andas people grow older, particularly if they retire, they tend to spend less. Developed
countries frequently have high levels of both consumer and government debt and money
is often spent on servicing those debts rather than on growth-boosting consumption andinfrastructure investments. High levels of investment in financial products and property,
another feature of developed economies, can reduce economic growth since money is,in effect, being hoarded15 and since money can be made from buying and selling money(or other financial assets), investment in financial assets has increased, taking money outof the ‘real’ economy.

Several developed
countries
have financial
institutions thatcollectively own
derivatives worth
more than thenation’s GDP.

World percentage growth rate, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita

EII19 – World growth rate (GDP) per capita
Percentage (%) GDP per capita

5
4
3
2
1
0
-1

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

-2
-3

Source: Please provide.
Source: World Development Bank

14 European Securities and Markets Authority, (2017), EU derivatives markets – a first-time overview.
15 Rognlie, M., Brookings, (Spring 2015), Papers on Economic Activity, Deciphering the fall and rise in the net
capital share: accumulation or scarcity?, pages 1-69.

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89Economy, industry and information

The growth dilemma. If the rate of economic growth remains low, or stalls completely,
it could pose a strategic risk to governments in developing countries16 because theircitizens expect regular rises in living standards and political legitimacy has partiallycome to depend on it. Low economic growth and increasing inequality may lead toresentment, social division and possibly conflict, although this is not inevitable. Japan,
for example, has sustained low levels of growth but remained stable. Without growth,
however, governments (particularly in countries that have ageing populations) arelikely to find it increasingly difficult to fund rising welfare costs, service public debt andkeep investing in public services, especially those that need to keep pace with rapidly
improving technology, for example, defence. Spending on defence is likely to be
especially squeezed since the cost of new hi-tech military equipment is frequently much
more expensive than the cost of the equipment it is replacing, a phenomena known
as ‘defence inflation’. If economic growth remains low, governments will struggle toafford the rising costs of new military equipment and, hence, conventional conflict could
become prohibitively expensive.
Further challenges. In addition to the challenges already described, there will be others,
including novel issues that are difficult to imagine. Innovation could unleash a wave of
productivity that might boost national incomes and create jobs. Alternatively, artificial
intelligence and automation might boost productivity, and hence economic growth, but
without creating jobs. Some skills that have taken years to build (for example, a taxi
driver’s knowledge of a city) are already being rendered obsolete. Attempts to reducegreenhouse gas emissions will put stresses on the economy. Coal, and in time oil, could
be abandoned as sources of energy, upturning industries that have been mainstays ofmany economies. Technology-driven social change could lead improvements without
increasing consumption (and GDP). For example, self-driving vehicles might lower
transport costs whilst also reducing the number of cars bought, and services suchas Airbnb (which allows people to rent out spare rooms) could reduce the costs ofaccommodation and the need for hotels and hotel staff.

Industry and work

Increases inprocessing power
are allowing
information frommultiple sensors
to be fused
together, meaningthat images ofextraordinary
fidelity can beproduced.

Automation. A key industrial trend is the increasing automation of industry. Automation
is based on three areas of technology: sensors; data analysis/decision-making; andactuation (mechanical motion). Significant advances are expected in all three areas, andmany facets of industry are likely to be affected by automation. Sensors have recently
become increasingly capable, for example, smartphones can often capture images of aquality that only used to be produced by the most sophisticated and expensive cameras.
On current trends, future cameras might be able to provide images at microscopic
levels of detail from far away. Already some of today’s most powerful satellites can
produce images in fine detail.17 Increases in processing power are allowing informationfrom multiple sensors to be fused together, meaning that images of extraordinary
fidelity can be produced. Improvements in pattern recognition and machine learning
will allow machines to operate independently in increasingly complex environments.
For example, driverless cars could re-route to avoid congestion, and heating systems
could automatically adjust to account for changing weather and numbers of occupants.
Motors are being developed that are smaller, more powerful and more efficient, with
controls that allow for ever more precise and meticulous movements, for example, therobot da Vinci assists surgeons to carry out microsurgery. In future, machines are likely
to be able to operate in increasingly hazardous and inaccessible locations. A worm-likemachine is currently being developed which can change shape, allowing it to squeeze
through small gaps when searching for survivors in collapsed buildings.18
16 Drezner, D., Brookings, (May 2016), Project on International Order and Strategy, Five Known Unknowns
about the Next Generation Global Political Economy.
17 Bump, P., The Washington Post, (21 April 2017), ‘Here’s why the resolution of satellite images never seems
to improve’.
18 Horchler, A. et al., Biomimetic and Biohybrid Systems, (2015), Worm-like Robotic Locomotion with aCompliant Modular Mesh.

90

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Economy, industry and information

Microsurgery: machines are being developed which allow increasingly precise movements

The use of sensors is likely to have a transformative
effect on manufacturing, for example, General ElectricCompany (GE) owns a battery factory in New York,
where there are estimated to be over 10,000 sensors
spread across 180,000 square feet.19 These sensors
are connected to a network which monitors almost
every facet of the factory’s operation, including local
weather. Combining this data allows GE to ensurethat every battery is made in precisely the same way,
and that the amount of energy required is precisely
controlled, reducing cost and pollution, and improving
performance. An Austrian logistics company, KNAPP,
has equipped its warehouse staff with a headset thatuses augmented reality to help them locate items.
The device presents relevant information on asee-through display, while an integrated camera
captures serial numbers for real-time stock tracking.
This process has reduced error rates by nearly 40%.20

Steve Lagreca / Shutterstock.com

Manufacturing. Many of the technologies that will transform manufacturing are alreadyestablished or clearly emerging. For example, in 2014 a US car manufacturer, Local
Motors, designed and built a car almost entirely using 3D printers, in just one year(compared with an industry average of six years). The car produced by Local Motors
also used a design that was influenced by potential consumers and enthusiasts,suggesting a future where manufactured products are more customised, evenpersonalised to individual consumer demands. Use of computer-aided design and 3D
printing may rapidly reduce development and production times, cutting the time and costof making military equipment. While traditional mass production techniques are currently
the cheapest way to make goods, by 2050, 3D printing and distributed manufacturing(networks of small production facilities) may have largely replaced assembly lines. This
will allow manufacturing to be both dispersed (conducted at multiple locations) andlocalised (near the consumer), potentially making it more difficult for law enforcement toprevent illegal production of weapons and for military targeting of manufacturing facilities.

The first entirely 3D-printed car

19 Fitzgerald, M., MIT Technology Review, (28 January 2013), ‘An Internet for Manufacturing’.
20 Baur, C. and Wee, D., McKinsey & Company, (June 2015), ‘Manufacturing’s next act’.

Global Strategic Trends

91Economy, industry and information

Industrial robots. Although industrial robots have been a feature of advanced
manufacturing for years, their use will become much more widespread. Between 2010
and 2015, the number of industrial robots in use increased by 59% to around 1.5 million
worldwide.21 By 2050, it is likely that there will be tens if not hundreds of millions ofindustrial robots in operation. Some of the world’s most advanced factories are alreadymostly automated, for example, in a factory operated by Siemens in Germany, machinesand computers handle 75% of operations autonomously. South Korea currently has thehighest density of industrial robots (with 630 per 10,000 workers), followed by Singapore
and Japan, although China is now the largest market for industrial robots. In 2016,
China purchased more industrial robots than Europe and the Americas combined (a totalof 87,000 units, 30% of the total world supply).22
Estimated global annual supply of industrial robots

Number of industrial robots (thousands of units)

EII11 – Estimated annual supply of industrial robots
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Source: International FederationSource:of Robotics
United Nations Conference On Trade and Devlopment.
Http://www.unctad.org/en/Pages/statistics.aspx#

Work and automation. The number of jobs that machines can do more effectively thanpeople appears to be growing inexorably. Today’s technology can (to an extent) drive
trains, pick fruit, fly aircraft and drive taxis, and machines will get better and cheaper.
Automation has, in part, been responsible for the lack of job creation in the US in the last
20 years, although forecasts for jobs in the US over the next decade show positive netchange in every area of employment except manufacturing.23 The impact of automation
will affect regions differently over the next 30 years.24 More than 50% of jobs are at riskof becoming automated in many countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, with China
potentially being the hardest hit (because of the country’s high number of manufacturingjobs). In developed countries, fewer roles are likely to be vulnerable, although theproportion of jobs that will be automated could still be between 20%-40%.25
21 International Federation of Robotics, (2017), Executive Summary World Robotics 2017 Industrial Robots.
22 Ibid.
23 World Economic Forum (in collaboration with The Boston Consulting Group), (January 2018), Towards a
Reskilling Revolution: A Future of Jobs for All, page 8.
24 Daheim, C., et al., ((2017), The Future of Work: A Meta-Analysis on Disruptive Perspectives, a research
paper commissioned by DCDC.
25 PwC, (March 2017), UK Economic Outlook.

92

Global Strategic Trends

Economy, industry and information

Human-machine interaction. The most advanced of today’s machines use ‘assisted
intelligence’ to help workers with tasks, such as autopilots for aviation and computersthat carry out pattern-identification in large data-sets. The next major developmentin automation, which is expected in the coming decades, is likely to be ‘augmented
intelligence’, where humans and machines collaborate to make decisions. This will
significantly affect how we work in the coming years, favouring those with skills such as
emotional intelligence, creativity, persuasion and innovation. Many researchers believethat ‘autonomous intelligence’ (where machines think for and act by themselves) will be
developed by 2050.26 Autonomous intelligence will further reduce the amount of workthat humans are best-placed to do. So far, though, the greatest impact of automation
has been in middle-income jobs, such as those in factories. Since the early 1990s, thelabour market in many industrialised nations has seen a rise in high-income, high-skill
jobs and low-income, low-skill jobs, with a loss in middle-income and middle-skill jobs.27
This polarisation is likely to lead to a widening income divide.28

Many researchers
believe that
‘autonomous
intelligence’ will
be developedby 2050.

Percentage change in skilled employment due to automation (1995-2015) in
EII21
Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
Southern Europe
Northern Europe
Western Europe
Central Europe
North America

Low skilled
Middle skilled

Japan

High skilled

Total

-15

-10

-5

0
Percentage (%) change

510

Source: OECD
Source: http://www.oecd.org/employment/Policy%20brief%20%20Automation%20and%20Independent%20Work%20in%20a%20Digital%20Economy.pdf

As businesses increasingly use automation (including artificial intelligence), they will
become more efficient, driving down costs. In time, however, profit margins will also
be squeezed, leading to a business model where profit on individual items and services
is so small that the only way of generating a meaningful profit will be to sell in verylarge numbers (as has already happened with many commodities). This would drive
companies to grow and absorb rivals, reducing competition and creating the conditions
for monopolies, which could lead to economic stagnation and fewer jobs and increasingly
concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. For market economies to work, however,consumers are needed, and consumers need an income. So, the economies should,
26 Barrat, J., (2015), Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the end of the Human Era.
27 Ford, M., (2016), Rise of the Robots, page 51.
28 OECD, (2016), Automation and Independent Work in a Digital Economy.

Global Strategic Trends

93Economy, industry and information

More than 50% of jobs are at risk of becoming automated in some countries

eventually, rebalance. Previously unconsidered jobs have emerged throughout history
and the middle of the 21st Century might be no different.29 Jobs where human input(rather than technical competence) is considered the most valuable component (forexample, sport, artisanal crafts and, arguably, politics) could see significant growth.
Alternatives of offering a universal wage, payable whether a person works or not (asin Finland), nationalisation of industries, or a tax on capital, may all be features of the
future economy.
The speed of transition from the current model of work to one where machines do somuch more could, however, be critical. The industrial revolution resulted in considerable
upheaval and the loss of many livelihoods, yet the transition took several decades. Thechange to a significantly more automated world is likely to happen faster than previoustransitions, thus increasing the risk of societal upheaval, grievance and violent protests
by the disadvantaged. If well-managed, however, automation could lead to more leisuretime, less drudgery and reductions in poverty.
Industrial biotechnology. Industrial biotechnology aims to make biochemical processes
useable for manufacturing and wider industry. Uses of biochemistry are often moreenergy-efficient and less polluting than conventional industrial processes. Biotechnology
can use renewable biomass to make materials such as bioplastics, which reducegreenhouse gas emissions during production and can be fully biodegradable.30 Althoughbioplastics currently make up a relatively small percentage of the world’s plastics(about 0.5-1%) this proportion may expand. The chemical industry currently uses
biotechnological fermentation to make a variety of substances, such as citric acid andpropane. An increasing range of chemicals could be produced cheaply, effectively andcleanly using biotechnology. Biofuels might also play an important role in replacing fossil
fuels in the future, although they are currently expensive and, because they are derived
from crops such as sugarcane, wheat or corn, they will compete with food production.31

29 World Economic Forum (in collaboration with the Boston Consulting Group), (2018), Towards a Reskilling
Revolution: A Future of Jobs for All, page 8.
30 Biotechnology Industry Organization, ‘Consumer Products Made with Industrial Biotechnology’.
31 Bioful.org.uk, ‘Disadvantages of Biofuel’.

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Economy, industry and information

Transport
Rail and cars. By 2050, transport and communication costs will probably have fallen
substantially, and the number of kilometres travelled per year is likely to more thandouble. In some parts of the world, recent transportation growth has been rapid, forexample, there were almost no rail passengers in China in 2000, but by 2014, 2.9 billion
journeys had taken place on China’s trains. With 20,000 kilometres of track, China
already has the largest high-speed rail network in the world and this is expected to
expand to 80,000 kilometres by 2035.32 Between 2015 and 2016, 23 million private
cars were purchased in China, taking the overall number owned to 172 million, alongwith estimated totals of 50 million scooters and 20 million rural vehicles.33 If India’s
economy grows as predicted over the next 30 years, it is likely to see similar increases
in vehicle ownership. On current trends, the number of private vehicles could double
to around 1.6 billion by 2050. By then, however, attitudes to car ownership worldwide
may have changed, particularly for people in areas where ‘on demand’ transport services
are available. This trend may already be in evidence in the US where the proportion of
16 to 24 year olds holding a driving licence dropped from 76% in 2000 to 71% in 2013
(although other factors such as increasing costs may be the cause).34 Improved publicand ‘on demand’ transport may, therefore, lead to a slowing, or even a reduction, in thenumber of privately-owned vehicles.

By 2050, attitudes
to car ownershipworldwide may
have changed,
particularly forpeople in areas
where ‘on demand’transport services
are available.

Global transport and communication expenditure relative to 1930
Cost, as a percenatge (%), relative to 1930

EII13

110
100
90
80
70
60

Sea freight costs
Passenger aircraft costs

50
40

Calling costs

30
20
10
0
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Source:Source: Our
World https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/real-transport-and-communication-costsin Data, University of Oxford

Transport infrastructure. To support increased demands for transport infrastructure,spending is projected to increase by 5% per annum worldwide in the coming years.
While there will probably be strong growth in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacificregion is likely to remain the largest infrastructure market globally. Investment in‘gateway infrastructure’, such as ports and airports, will be a crucial part of meeting
rising requirements for transportation in the coming decades as current infrastructure
will be unable to support future demand.35 New national and regional transport hubs arelikely to be established or improved to support the world’s cities, as good transportation
links are often essential components of economic prosperity.

32 Ollivier, G., et al., World Bank, (2014), High Speed Railways in China: A Look at Traffic.
33 Shaohui, T., Xinhua, (2016), ‘China’s car ownership reaches 172 million’.
34 McKinsey & Company, (2016), Automotive revolution – perspective towards 2030.
35 OECD International Futures Programme, (2011), Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030.

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Growth in global travel

Non-urban road
Urban private transport
Urban public transport
Non-urban rail
International aviation
Domestic aviation

Billion passenger kilometres

EII2 – Global travel growth in passenger kilometres
120,000
100,000

2050

80,00060,00040,00020,00002015
2030
Source: OECD (2017) ITF Transport Outlook 2017. OECD

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Improved public
transport will bevital to the qualityof urban life andthose cities that
can afford toare expected toinvest heavily intransport.

Major cities, particularly those in developed countries, which are constrained by theirlayout, buildings or nearby geographical features could find adapting their transport
infrastructure challenging and costly. Cities are likely to get bigger, leading to longer
average commutes, increased congestion, and greater environmental problems.
However, advances in technology may provide solutions to these issues. One study(that took place in economically developed countries) suggested that replacing
privately-owned cars with shared-use autonomous vehicles could reduce car use by
between 23-65% for peak periods, and almost completely remove the requirement forparking facilities.36 Improved public transport will be vital to the quality of urban life andthose cities that can afford to are expected to invest heavily in transport in the coming
decades. The ability to work, socialise and shop remotely, however, could lead to asignificant decrease in the number of journeys people make. For example, between
1998 and 2014, the number of home workers in the UK increased by 44%, comprising
2.8% of the total workforce.37 If working patterns change substantially in the next
30 years, this will have a major effect on transport, particularly in cities.
Power and efficiency. Transport as a whole is likely to use 45% more energy by 2040
compared with 2010 figures, despite probable improvements in fuel efficiency. Most
personal vehicles are expected to be powered by hybrid and electric engines fromaround 2025 onwards, but the majority of commercial vehicles are likely to run on
heavy duty fuel, such as diesel, unless batteries become significantly cheaper and more
powerful. Substantial increases in the number of electric vehicles would require major
infrastructure investment, particularly in providing significantly more charging points; thecurrent forecast of availability will not meet likely future demands. Designed intelligently,
changes in infrastructure could help develop ‘smart grids’, where electric vehicles act as‘batteries’, providing energy back to power grids during peak usage, and absorbing

36 OECD International Transport Forum, (2015), Urban Mobility System Upgrade How shared self-driving cars
could change city traffic.
37 Office for National Statistics, (4 June 2014), ‘Record proportion of people in employment are home
workers’.

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VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com

Economy, industry and information

Shared autonomous vehicles could dramatically reduce car use

excess capacity when demand is lower. Electric propulsion systems could offer many
advantages in military vehicles, but it may not be practical to field expeditionary charging
infrastructure. Military vehicles may need bespoke, and therefore expensive, power
storage and generation capabilities.
Solely electrically-powered ships or large aircraft may not be in common usage by
2050. It is not currently technologically or economically feasible to store electricity in thequantities such vehicles would need. Ships’ exposure to extreme weather also meansthat renewable energy is not a viable power source for commercial shipping in the shortterm. However, hybrid systems such as tri-fuel diesel electric propulsion ships are
currently just entering service, with an electric propulsion system that runs on natural gas,marine diesel gas or heavy fuel oil. Hybrid engines may become an established way of
powering shipping in the coming decades.38 Widespread electrification of aircraft is also
unlikely before 2050. Despite the success of the Solar Impulse 2 solar-powered aircraft(which circumnavigated the world in 2015), there are problems scaling the concept forcommercial use.39 The next generation of electric aircraft is likely to be primarily used fortraining and recreation, involving much shorter trips than commercial transportation flights.
Electrically-powered drones may, however, operate as air taxis and deliver goods toindividual customers (particularly in urban areas), while more intelligently coping with traffic.
Improving efficiency will play a crucial role in reducing pollution from transport.
Refinements to standard ship, vehicle and aircraft design may further reduce drag and,
therefore, provide a better rate of energy consumption, but they are only likely to provide
a limited amount of efficiency savings. More significant gains may be delivered by using
technologically-advanced surfaces (such as diamond-like carbon materials and

38 Ship & Bunker, (4 July 2013), ‘Tri-Fuel LNG Carrier to enter service this month’.
39 Gleave, J., (2017), The Future of Transport 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 103.

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nanocomposites), which could reduce friction by between 10% and 50%.40 Rail travel
could see significant increases in speed and efficiency if prototypes currently in operation
come to fruition. For example, a US company (Hyperloop One) has successfully
tested the propulsion of electromagnetically-levitated pods through underground tubes
containing lowered air pressure, which substantially reduces drag and could allow travelat speeds of up to 600 mph. New aerodynamic and propulsion systems are being
developed, which may mean aircraft could fly at Mach 5 to Mach 9, and adoption of
space technologies for commercial use might generate even more impressive speeds.
For example, German researchers are developing a reusable spaceplane (called
SpaceLiner) which aims to fly at Mach 25, transporting up to 50 passengers. This
could mean, for example, that you could fly from the UK to Australia in 90 minutes.
Commercial application of these technologies could be up to 30 years away, althoughwidespread military adoption might bring this forward. There may be significant
environmental benefits by using hypersonic technology, for example, SpaceLiner would
be fuelled solely by liquid hydrogen and oxygen, meaning that water vapour is the only
by-product.
Volumeof global surface freight shipped
EII7

Metric tons (millions)

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Source: https://ifr.org/downloads/press/Executive_Summary_WR_2017_Industrial_Robots.pdf
Source: United Nation conference on trade and development

Information
The Internet. Over the last 25 years, Internet use has transformed industries, economies
and trade worldwide. The Internet has become the conduit for a vast amount ofcommerce, and allows billions of people to talk, collaborate and share ideas almost
instantaneously to and from almost anywhere. In 2001, only 9% of the world’s population
were using the Internet and by 2016 this had risen to 48%. Today, more people accessthe Internet via mobile devices, a trend that is likely to continue. In 2001, there were 18
mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people and by 2017 there were 103.5.41 By around
2040, virtually everyone is likely to have access to the Internet, and probably through amobile device. The Internet has led to the development of a multibillion-dollar trade indigital devices and services, which is likely to grow.42 Digital trade is also expected
40 Gleave, J., (2017), The Future of Transport 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 104.
41 International Telecoms Union, (2017), ‘ICT Facts and Figures 2017 – supporting data’.
42 WTO, (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors shaping the future of world trade, page 54.

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to surpass the value of traditional commerce.43 In the coming decades, rather thanpurchasing finished goods, consumers are more likely to buy a product design or
blueprint, particularly if 3D printing becomes widespread. If more customers buy
finished products at source, there could be a reduction in transportation requirements,
although high volumes of raw materials and fuels will continue to be moved. Even
without a substantial rise in 3D printing, the trade in digital services is likely to surpass the
traditional global economy by 2050.44 There has already been a substantial rise in digitalproducts, for example, the number of applications available via the Google Play storerose from 16,000 in 2009 to over 3.5 million in 2017. On current trends, the volume of
information flowing across national boundaries will grow substantially. It increased by
45 times between 2009 and 2014.45
Global information communication and technology development

EII8 – Mobile and Internet access
150
Mobile-broadband
subscriptions

Percentage (%)

120

Fixed-broadband
subscriptions

90

Fixed-telephone
subscriptions

60

Internet subscriptions
30
0

Mobile phone
subscriptions
2001

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD
Source: International Telecommunications Union

Data. The volume of the world’s digital data continues to grow rapidly. There was atenfold increase between 2010 and 2017, from approximately 1.7 to 18.3 zettabytes(a trillion gigabytes or 1021 bytes). By 2025, global data is expected to rise to over
163 zettabytes, and on that trend, there could be over 10,000 times more data in
2050 than there is today. The largest source of this new data is likely to be generated
by machine-to-machine communication, for example, an engine providing automatic
updates to the manufacturer on its usage. As the volume of data has grown, storage
costs have reduced. Storing a gigabyte of digital data cost US $0.11 in 2009, but fell
to US $0.02 in 2017. The energy and space needed to store data has also fallen, anddramatic improvements could be generated by new technologies, such as encoding
information using the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) of bacteria. It has been estimatedthat less than a kilogram of DNA would be needed to store all the digital informationin the world today.46

43 Tyson, L. and Lund, S., World Economic Forum, (21 February 2017), ‘Globalisation isn’t in retreat. It’s justgone digital’.
44 Schwab, K., World Economic Forum, (2016), ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to
respond’.
45 McKinsey & Company, (2016), Digital globalization: The new era of global flows.
46 Extance, A., Nature, (2 September 2016), ‘How DNA could store all the world’s data’.

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The largest source of new data is likely to be machine-to-machine communication

Advances inprocessing
power willcontinue to drive
improvements
across all
aspects of humanendeavour.

Processing power. The processing power of computers will continue to improve.
A supercomputer made in 2017 could perform 750,000 times more calculations per
second than a supercomputer from 1993. If this trend continues, the computers of2050 could be hundreds of thousands of times more powerful than today’s, althoughphysical limitations on the capacity of microchips may slow future increases.47 It isthought a silicon transistor cannot have a width of less than seven nanometres due
to interference effects, and that limit is approaching. In 2017, manufacturers made atransistor 14 nanometres wide. If chips are made from an alternate material, however,this limitation might be overcome, for example, tests are underway to develop a chip
two nanometres wide made from molybdenum and carbon nanotubes.48 Advancesin processing power will continue to drive improvements across all aspects of humanendeavour. For example, distributed ledger technology (blockchain), which is alreadybeing used when cryptocurrencies are traded, will be able to validate transactions on
an increasingly large scale. As processing power increases, it will fuel developments in
artificial intelligence.
Quantum computing. Quantum computers could allow substantial advances inprocessing power and, in certain tasks, could be much more powerful than conventional
computers. Traditional computers rely on binary ‘bits’ that are either one or zero toprovide computational solutions to a calculation. Quantum computers, however, relyon ‘quantum bits’ (qubits) that can have values between one and zero, a superpositionof states and in combination they represent every combination (with some probability)
at the same time. This curious property is expected to allow massive calculations tobe performed simultaneously, allowing certain problems to be solved far more quickly
than conventional computers could. For example, molecular-level behaviour could bemodelled to make better medicines or explosives and codes could be strengthened
47 The Economist, (12 March 2016), ‘Technology Quarterly: After Mores Law’.
48 Desai, S. B., et al., (7 October 2016), ‘MoS2 transistors with 1-nanometer gate lengths’.

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Economy, industry and information

or cracked. Already there are quantum computers that can perform calculations with a72-qubit chip, but, the rate of error (qubits not holding their quantum state) is high, thus
reducing performance and effectiveness.49 By 2050, these problems are likely to beresolved and quantum computing could be a mature technology. China has alreadyset up the world’s first quantum-cryptographic network (the Jinan Project) and iswell-positioned to become the front-runner in the field.50
Artificial intelligence. By 2050, artificial intelligence is likely to be an integral part of the
global economy. Funding of artificial intelligence startup companies increased from US$0.1 billion in 2009 to US $1.2 billion in 2015, and if the trend continues, hundreds ofbillions (perhaps trillions) of US Dollars of funding could be secured by 2050. In recent
years, the technique known as ‘reinforcement learning’ (modelled loosely on the neuronsof human brains) has led to notable advances in artificial intelligence capability. For
example, artificial intelligence systems outperformed humans when identifying faces ina series of images;51 beat the world champion at the game Go;52 and defeated leading
poker players over an extended run of games. Artificial intelligence is likely to have morepractical applications, such as identifying the most efficient route for delivering goods
shipments or establishing which consumers are likely to be interested in (and able toafford) new products. As ever more data is generated over the coming decades, artificial
intelligence will probably be brought to bear on highly complex problems, improving
productivity and generating substantial economic growth. By 2030, artificial intelligence
could add almost US $15.7 trillion (14%) to the global economy, with China (which
hopes to be a world leader in the technology) benefiting most significantly. While artificial
intelligence is likely to bring many benefits, there are risks to embracing the technology.
The effect of artificial intelligence on jobs may be disruptive, at least in the short term, andit could be used maliciously by rogue actors.
Projected
intelligence contributions
R21 artificial– AI’s Transformative
Potential to economic activity by 2030 in
US $ Projected
trillions (tr) Global Economic Effects of AI by 2030

Northern
Europe US $1.8 tr
Southern US $0.7 tr
EuropeNorth
America
US $3.7 tr

China
US $7 trDevelopedAsia

US $0.9 tr

US $0.5 tr

US $1.2 tr

Latin
AmericaRest ofthe world
Source:Source:Visual http://www.visualcapitalist.com/economic-impact-artificial-intelligence-ai/
Capitalist

49 New Scientist, (6 March 2018), ‘Google’s 72-qubit chip is the largest yet’.
50 Ricks, T., Foreign Policy, (28 November 2017), ‘The Quantum Gap with China’.
51 Gershgorn, D., Quartz, (26 July 2017), ‘The data that transformed AI research – and possibly the world’.
52 Silver, D., et al., Nature, (28 January 2016), Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks andTree Search.

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101Economy, industry and information

Future worlds: Economy, industry and information
Powerful states

Multipolarity• Economic power continues to shift from the
Global West to the Global East.
• Cooperation improves, resulting in increased
innovation and cross-fertilisation of ideas.
• Investment is directed towards economicallybeneficial innovations.
• Physical and digital global connectivity
increases, lowering barriers and reducing
regulations.
• Levels of global inequality reduce but domestic
inequality increases.

• Global trade is perceived as zero-sum andtrade barriers are raised. Most trade takes
place within blocs and global institutions are
sidelined.
• The spread of technology reduces as does
the rate of development.
• Digital trade between blocs is heavily regulated
and controlled.
• National prosperity agendas aim to lower
domestic inequality and increase national
resilience.

• The Western-centric rules-based systemevolves to accommodate new powers.
• Western influence in reformed institutions
reduces.
• The global economic system is susceptible
to economic shocks.
• The impact of artificial intelligence andautomation creates significant challenges
for many governments.
• Patents are respected globally.

• Trade is used as a geopolitical tool.
• Global rates of economic growth are low,
although those with diverse economies
flourish.
• Some blocs seek to create military mass effectby investing in automated systems.
• Regulation of the information space andmanagement of the potentially disruptive
impacts of artificial intelligence and automation
is easier within blocs.

Network of actors

Fragmentation• Global trade is managed through reformed
institutions.
• The number and diversity of actors andinterests slows international decision-making.
• Autocratic states struggle to manage the
networks of actors in their interest.
• Actors seek to balance autonomous andhuman labour but inequality between
socio-economic groups increases.

• Global trade is largely unregulated, ad hoc
and based on bilateral agreements.
• Uneven economic growth and innovation.
• The information space is unregulated, chaotic
and highly contested and is exploited by avariety of actors.
• Technology advances will be rapid, butirregular and theft of ideas will be frequent.
• Most actors do not feel obliged to takeresponsibility for their impact on society.
• Uncontrolled adoption of autonomy isleading to inequality.

• The link between geography and work is
dissolving and companies are able to avoid
paying tax, weakening states.

• Strategies are short term with little
consideration for the long term.

• The high speed of technological development
disrupts societies and governments.
• Open networks become vulnerable toexploitation.

Competition

Cooperation

Multilateralism• The volatile and risky environment will increase
the costs of trade, causing higher prices.
• Non-state actors use private (military) security
companies to protect their interests andinvestments.

• Socio-economic inequality will lead to further
fragmentation of societies.

Diffusion of power

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Economy, industry and information

N
W

E

Watch points

Discontinuities

S• The number of jobs being automated.

• New economic paradigms.

• Levels of debt.

• Move to post-consumerism.

• Size of China’s and India’s gross domestic productcompared to Europe’s and the United States’.

• New reserve currency.

• Levels of inequality both within and between
states.

• Shifts in allegiances and alliances.

• Changes to the balance of globalisation andisolationism.
• Geopolitical positioning of military assets in supportof economic interests.
• Impacts of technological change on society andthe economy.

• The next major economic or financial crisis.

• Sudden closure of trade choke points.
• Natural disaster involving a global financial/economic centre.
• Sudden change of regime in major power.
• Automation-driven fiscal collapse.
• Development of singularity.

• The evolution of mature economies and credible
alternatives to capitalism.
• Increased human-machine teaming.

Implications• The use of artificial intelligence and automation
could transform economies and have a fundamental
impact on societies. States may need to change
models of taxation, wealth distribution andeducation. To manage the inevitable tension ofsuch a transition, clear and consistent strategic
communication will be required. The managementof this process might be particularly difficult forpolitical systems with short election cycles.
• Global and domestic inequality could result inpolitical instability and potentially violent conflict.
• The unconstrained growth of the information space
will require a whole of society approach to manage
inherent risks and exploit opportunities. It may benecessary to develop virtual space within nationalor regional control, not dissimilar to borders in thephysical world. By reducing the free flow of data
there is likely to be an adverse economic impact.
• The shift eastwards of the global economic centreof gravity will likely lead to a decline in Western soft
power and competitive advantage.

Global Strategic Trends• Economic growth could become evermore elusivefor developed economies. Economic paradigms
and assumptions need to be carefully consideredand planning considerations need to be realistic.
• To exploit the opportunities of fast developing
technologies, governments may need to accept anincreased level of partnerships and decentralisation
with a range of actors.
• As the economic value shifts from physical goods toideas and data, control of networks will be importantand states will need to find evermore sophisticatedways to protect intellectual property.
• Competing priorities, such as technological change,
health, welfare and defence costs, will make theaffordability challenge ever starker and may require
harsh political choices.
• In a fiscally-constrained environment, investing inscience and technology is necessary to identify andrealise opportunities to gain asymmetric or offset
advantage over competitors.

103

Governance and law

104

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Governance and law

Governance and law

Synopsis

luxiangjian4711 / iStock.com

As the economic power of Asia increases, the political power of China (and to a lesser
extent India) will grow, potentially rivalling that of the United States (US), and while Russia
and Europe are likely to remain important political actors, their influence is likely todiminish. A crucial question is whether the current institutions, mechanisms and normsof the international system can adapt to accommodate the shifting balance of power.
If it cannot, the system could fail and disputes will be more difficult to resolve, potentially
escalating and leading to conflict. As political power becomes more dispersedand contested it will become harder to forge internationally binding treaties, andnon-compliance and subversion of international laws are likely to increase. The transitionof power between states is occurring alongside the diffusion of power within states, as
they face an increasing number of problems that they cannot solve alone. Challenges
such as climate change and international terrorism will require cooperation internationally,
but also with non-state actors such as large corporations and local governments. The
economic, demographic and political power of many cities (and some regions) is likely
to grow relative to the state and this may lead to demands for devolution, or at leastaccommodation. Some countries may not exist in their current form by 2050. Some
multinational corporations could become much bigger and more powerful, providing vital
services that states are dependent upon, and some may use their power to demand
accommodation from the state. The sovereignty of the state is, therefore, likely tocontinue to be eroded, resulting in a more complex, hybrid system of governance.
Paradoxically, the capacity of governments, particularly those in developing countries,
is likely to increase as their ability to raise taxes and deliver services is enhanced bydigital technology. Digital technology will also increase states’ capacity to police
effectively, which should make societies safer, but the risk of repression will increase.
Criminals will, however, also exploit technology and cybercrime is likely to be a growing
menace. The proportion of people living in absolute poverty is likely to reduce andvirtually everyone is likely to have far greater access to information, empowering citizens
who will demand more of their government. But, whilst most people’s economic
circumstances will improve, their sense of satisfaction may not. Instead, grievances
could increase and nationalism, religious intolerance and antipathy towards immigrants
could rise. If automation leads to widespread unemployment, the risk of widespreaddissent will increase.

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105Governance and law

International order
A multipolar world. Over the next 30 years, an increasingly multipolar world is likely todevelop, in which the current liberal international order and its institutions will come underincreasing strain. Relative economic power will move from the Atlantic to the Pacific, andby 2050 the economies of China, and potentially India, are likely to have surpassed thatof the US. Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey and Vietnam might also becomemuch more economically and politically influential in the coming decades and, if so, they
can be expected to demand better representation in global institutions.1
Multilateral institutions. As global political and economic power becomes increasingly
diffused, the challenge of securing agreement between member states may hinder
the effectiveness of global multilateral institutions. While such institutions will probably
endure, they are also likely to be modified to accommodate the interests of rising
powers. Countries with growing economic status are also likely to develop their own
institutions, as has already been seen with the creation of the New Development Bankand the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.2 If current international institutions do notaccommodate the interests of rising powers a breakdown of the international order could
occur, possibly resulting in greater instability.

In recent years,
countries such as
China and Brazil
have entered thelist of the top ten
contributing states.

The United Nations. The United Nations (UN) will continue to face significant challenges,
with increasing calls for reform from several member states as the disconnect between
its power structures and the realities of where global power actually sits in the world
system increases. Nevertheless, the UN is likely to survive, so long as the majority ofcountries continue to regard it as essential to international peace and security. While the
US and other Western states are currently the largest contributors to the UN budget,the balance is shifting. In recent years, countries such as China and Brazil have entered
the list of the top ten contributing states. In addition, the presence of emerging powers
such as Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa in the top 20 troop-contributing states
will probably add to the strength of their demands for greater decision-making powers
within the institution, including reform of the UN Security Council. The desire of existingpermanent members to protect their own influence is, however, likely to remain an
obstacle to any meaningful reform.
The changing balance of power. In the next 30 years, the relationship between China,
India and the US (and to a lesser extent, Europe and Russia) will be pivotal to theinternational order. An increasingly powerful China is likely to adopt a more authoritative
and assertive stance on the world stage, whilst Europe, Russia and the US might find it
difficult to accept their relative decline. Russia is likely to remain a vociferous opponentof the US (finding support from many countries around the world) and can be expected
to push hard for a multipolar order that allows Russia to act as a key player. Russia
and China will continue to cooperate on a range of issues, but there are also likely to be
points of friction, not least in Central Asia.3 India will continue to be wary of China andmay look to establish alliances with other powers.
It is impossible to forecast the balance of power in 2050, as it will be dependent not juston trends, but also shocks and surprises, including natural disasters, financial crises and,potentially, war. Given the economic and political interdependencies between countries,
cooperation could flourish, but recent years have seen a considerable rise in populist andnationalist sentiment, particularly among the poor and disenfranchised in many parts of
the world. These political movements could lead to the election of protectionist

1061

Dorman, A. and German, T., (2017), How will the overarching global political order change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC),
page 14.

2

Ibid., page 14.

3

Ibid.

Global Strategic Trends

Ankor Light / Shutterstock.com

Governance and law

The global legal environment is likely to experience competing local and regional understandings of international norms

governments that undermine the international system of trade. While the current shift of
the US towards a more protectionist stance may be a short-term phenomenon, if it wereto endure the international system of trade might not survive. If the international systemof trade were to unravel, interdependencies between countries would reduce, and it isplausible tensions could increase. Conflict between major powers, therefore, cannot be
ruled out.
The international legal order. Over the next 30 years the redistribution of global power will
challenge the universalist approach to international law and human rights.4 The global
legal environment is likely to become increasingly pluralist in character, with competing
local and regional understandings of international norms likely to prevail. However,if the world economy continues to become more closely integrated, as is expected,
the internationalisation of some aspects of law will probably continue. Furthermore,as the range of issues requiring a global response increases (such as climate change,
cyber regulation and transnational crime), they too could encourage the adoption ofinternational legal frameworks and institutions.5 It is therefore likely that there will bea convergence around existing norms and rules in some respects, such as trade, but
probably not in others, such as the application of universal human rights. For example,
Russia and China are likely to continue to support the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), viewing it as an important mechanism to uphold order in regions such as
the High North. Both countries see UNCLOS as a vehicle through which to further theirown political and economic national agendas. Likewise, China and Russia are membersof the World Trade Organization, however, Russia has not ratified its membership of theInternational Criminal Court, and China is not party to it (neither is the US).
Legal fragmentation. Although a universalist approach is likely to prevail in someareas of law, a multipolar world consensus is, in general, likely to be more difficult toachieve. With more actors, common ground between countries is likely to reduce,
making it harder to deliver large-scale international law-making projects. In addition,
the international legal environment is likely to use an increasing number of informal
mechanisms, thereby undermining its effectiveness as a universal regulatory frameworkand increasing its vulnerability to non-compliance and subversion. This process could
reduce the influence of states, potentially resulting in the adoption of new legal principles
4

Peerenboom, R., The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, (2011), ‘The Future of Law in a Multi-Polar
World: Toward a Global New Deal’, page 43.

5

Muller, S., et al., (2011), The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, page 2.

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107Governance and law

City Hall, London: national and local governance will become more complex

that exceed the parameters that individual countries would accept.6 Nevertheless,leading powers will continue to shape international law, with China likely to play a more
influential role in future worldwide legal development. For example, it is already taking
steps to enhance its international law capabilities and to lead in emerging areas such as
cyber law. China has also developed a training programme to share its growing legal
expertise with less developed countries.7

The state, nationalism and politics
Challenges. Governments will face an expanding array of threats and issues over the
next 30 years, including terrorism and international crime, migration, automation andclimate change, that they will not be able to solve alone.8 Countries that enjoy strong,effective and trusted state institutions and a stable economy are more likely to havethe capacity to address these challenges effectively. However, weak and ineffective
governments may be overloaded by the scale of future problems, exacerbating statefragility. Some countries are likely to face opposition to their system of government asother actors increase in power and influence, both nationally and internationally. The riseof new political movements (such as those based around populism and nationalism) willprobably also challenge existing regimes. Although the next 30 years are very unlikely to
see the end of the state system, it may signal the erosion of state sovereignty.
Capacity of governments. Paradoxically, the capacity of many governments, particularly
in developing countries is likely to increase. In the coming years, developing countries
are likely to expand their domestic tax base through the professionalisation of theirtax authorities and digitisation of their economies. Providing banking and payment
services online and using mobile phones has, particularly in developing countries,
brought large sections of the informal economy into the formal economy where it can be
regulated and taxed. As increasing numbers of people move into the formal economy,
the governments’ tax income will increase, allowing them to devote more resources torevenue collection and, thus, leading to a virtuous circle. By paying taxes the citizens’
relationship with their government is thickened and they are likely to demand better
services, which governments are increasingly able to afford. A growth in domestic
economic activity is also likely to increase many governments’ revenues in the coming

1086Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment out
to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 2.

7

Sceats, S., Chatham House, (4 July 2016), ‘China’s Fury Over South China Sea Belies Its Legal Insecurities’.

8

Dorman, A. and German, T., (2017), How will governance within current state boundaries change over the
next 30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 2.

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Governance and law

decades.9 An increasing range of services are likely to be available through the Internet
over the next 30 years, giving access to large sectors of the world’s population, including
many who previously would have been unable to access government services. In
remote areas, technological advancements will improve health care and overcome criticalskills shortages. Artificial intelligence may even be used to develop better governmental
policies, assist with their implementation and help evaluate their effectiveness.10 New
technology could also improve citizens’ safety and security, but in some authoritarian
countries, a more capable state security apparatus is likely to stifle individual freedoms.
Automation and jobs. Current employment models are likely to be significantly alteredby advances in automation and artificial intelligence. While new jobs are likely to emerge
at some point, it is not clear if they will be created quickly enough to avoid significant
disruption, or that there will be enough to provide mass employment. In many developed
countries, citizens have come to expect a steady growth in living standards and if
these expectations are not met, governments may face a backlash. Without sufficientnumbers of people in work, traditional taxation will not generate sufficient revenue to fundgovernment services.
Welfare provision. In many parts of the world (particularly in Europe and parts of Asia),
pension schemes are likely to be unaffordable as populations age and tax bases
decline. This issue could be further compounded by medical advances that prolong life.
Health care might also become unaffordable in many places, for example, spending in
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is likely to
double to around 15% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2050. If US spending on
health care continues to grow at current rates, it could reach around 30% of GDP overthe same period. Ageing populations and the increasing cost of health care are likely
to make current levels of welfare provision unaffordable, reducing funds available for
defence and security. However, developing countries could see greater access to healthcare as their economies improve. Better governance should also expand health careprovision, for example, over 90% of Rwanda’s population have access to health care,
despite a comparatively low GDP of around US $750 per person.11

Current
employment
models are likely
to be significantly
altered byadvances in
automation
and artificial
intelligence.

Average percentage (%) of gross domestic product (GDP) spend on health care

G530

Percentage (%) GDP

25

Total average GDP across all countries with data
United States

20
15
10
5
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Note: GDP
spend
on health care includes government spending and health insurance
Source:OECDcontributions.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
9

Cheeseman, N., How will governance within current state boundaries in Africa change over the next 30
years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

10 Tito, J., Centre for Public Impact, (21 September 2017), ‘Destination unknown: Exploring the impact ofArtificial Intelligence on Government Working Paper’.
11 The Economist, (28 April 2018), Special Report, Universal Health Care, page 4.

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Donald Yip / Shutterstock.com

Governance and law

Discrimination will remain a block to prosperity for someHybridisation of government. If government-funded services reduce, those who
can afford to do so will probably find commercial providers or seek support from theiremployers. People without these options may look to non-state actors (potentially
including militant groups), some of who may offer low cost or free service provisionin exchange for political support. We may therefore see a growing ‘hybridisation’of government, where state responsibilities are delegated into more complex
public/private networks, organised on a transactional basis according to the task
in question. The concept of state sovereignty may become ever more blurred, withthe relationship between public and private actors increasing in complexity. In lessdeveloped countries, there may be a ‘governance leapfrog’ to a networked system
where the state is only one of many actors providing a range of services between them.
Inequality. Over the past 30 years, economic inequality between countries has reduced,
mostly because of the fast growth seen in Asian countries. By contrast, economic
inequality within countries has increased in Central Asia, Europe and North America.
It has remained consistent in South Asia, and fallen slightly in Latin America, North Africa,
Southwest Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.12 Economic inequality will be shaped by rapid
population growth in developing countries and rising wage inequality within developed
countries (probably compounded by a scarcity of jobs caused by greater automation).
If economic inequality within countries continues on current trends, global income
inequality will continue to rise steeply. The share of the world’s wealth owned by therichest 1% of the population could increase from nearly 20% today to almost 25% by2050, and if all countries were to follow the trajectory of the US since 1980, that figure
would rise to 28%.13 Crime may become more socially acceptable in some communities
if inequality within countries increases.14

12 Lea, N. and McGowen, J., Department for International Development (DFID), Chief Economist’s Office, (2015),
Income Inequality And The Distribution Of Opportunity, internal discussion document shared with DCDC.
13 Alvaredo, F., et al., World Inequality Lab, (2018), World Inequality Report 2018.
14 European Police Office (EUROPOL), (2015), ‘Exploring tomorrow’s organized crime’.

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In the coming decades, the very highest earners will almost certainly remain rich,
entrenching the power of a small elite. Vested interests could reduce the prospect of
economic reforms that would benefit the poorest. Even in Asia (where absolute poverty
is likely to be eradicated over the next 30 years), some ethnicities, genders, sexualities,
castes and religions are likely to remain as barriers to prosperity, as well as employment
and social opportunities. Economic growth will probably be concentrated in cities,
resulting in urban residents enjoying opportunities and increasing prosperity not seen byrural residents, creating further inequality. Urban inhabitants who own property are likely
to be especially fortunate. Many urban residents in the rapidly growing cities of Asia andsub-Saharan Africa are likely to live in slums, characterised by limited governance andservices.15 In these areas, criminal groups might fill the gap left by governments to anincreasing extent. For example, drug gangs already provide welfare services, protection
and job opportunities in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.
Security, fragility and poverty. Security, fragility and poverty are highly intertwined andcan be drivers of discontent. The proportion of the world’s population living in poverty(on less than US $1.90 a day at purchasing power parity 2015) is likely to decline fromaround 10% in 2015 to approximately 4% (roughly 420 million people) by 2050. On
current trends, absolute poverty is likely to be almost eliminated in Asia, Latin America
and most of East and North Africa by 2030, with India joining this list by 2035. Poverty
is, however, likely to endure in much of sub-Saharan Africa.16 Although absolute poverty
will reduce, there are still likely to be substantial numbers of people who are very poor.
These populations will have substantial material wants and remain particularly vulnerable
to shocks. The trend towards a reduction in the number of people living in absolute
poverty could be reversed, particularly if populous states (such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) descend into conflict. While not all fragile countries will havesubstantial impoverished populations, most poverty will be linked to fragility, and thepoorest countries are likely to remain especially vulnerable to natural disasters and otherhumanitarian crises.

Vested interests
could reduce
the prospect of
economic reforms
that would benefit
the poorest.

Projected decline
G1 in absolute global poverty
10

800
700

8
7

500

6

400

5

300

4
3

200

2

100
0

Percentage (%)

600
Millions of people

9Percentage of world population
living in absolute poverty

1
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

0

East Asia and Pacific

Europe and Central Asia

Latin America and Caribbean

South Asia

Middle East and North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Department for International Development, Chief Economists Office
Source: CEOFF analysis
15 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, (2014), World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
16 Dissanayake, R., et al, (2017), DFID, Chief Economist’s Office, Three Worlds In 2050: Scenarios for Poverty
and Development, a research paper prepared for DCDC.

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KDN759 / Shutterstock.com

Governance and law

Some governments appear to be aligning the state with a particular religion

Political pressures
Religion and nationalism. While the latter half of the 20th Century saw governments
take more secular positions, many now appear to be going in the opposite direction,aligning the state with a particular religion. Examples can be found across the world.
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, gave a speech arguing that Europe as acivilisation would die unless it re-discovered its Christian heritage. Vladimir Putin
has tied the Russian Orthodox Church to Russian identity and Turkey is taking an
increasingly Islamic-nationalist position. In India, Hindu nationalists and Muslims are
adopting harder viewpoints, and both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been moving
towards religious nationalism. Even the Chinese Communist Party has incorporated
Confucian and Buddhist narratives into the new Chinese national narrative.17
Rising religious nationalism, particularly when combined with intolerance for otherreligions, increases the risk of conflict both between and within countries. For
example, sub-Saharan Africa could see an arc of conflict from Nigeria via Ghana to
Sudan between Christians and Muslims.18 Similarly, the Sunni-Shia divide, alongside
Saudi-Iranian competition, is likely to drive, and be driven by, conflict in the Middle East.
Rising religious nationalism could exacerbate existing tensions in flashpoints aroundthe world, increasing the risk of conflict both within and between countries. There are,nevertheless, some parts of the world where religious difference appears to be reducing
in importance. In North America and western Europe, for example, the increasing ethnic
and religious diversity of their populations may force politicians and policymakers to
adopt a ‘religion-neutral’ approach to avoid alienating potential voters. Similarly, South
Korea, which had experienced an upswing in Christianity, also appears to be becoming
more secular.19
Populism and nationalism. Support for populist and nationalist movements could
grow in the coming decades. The world is experiencing unprecedented levels of
population movement, facilitated by significant improvements in technology (which havedramatically reduced the time and cost of travel), and these trends are likely to continue.
This unprecedented movement of people and ideas has brought a greater degree ofunderstanding and tolerance in some circles, but in others it has led to tension and theerection of barriers (both physical and virtual) through fear of increased competition overjobs and resources, as well as perceived threats to cultural identity. If job numbers are
17 Hart Group Oxford XXI, (2018), GST Future Beliefs, page 14, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
18 Ibid., page 40.
19 Ibid., page 41.

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reduced, wages are lowered by automation and levels of migration also remain high(which seems likely), widespread dissatisfaction can be expected. In the West, feelingsof disenfranchisement have led to support for more radical political groups. In countries
such as South Africa, India and Pakistan, higher levels of urbanisation, together with anincrease in the number of foreign migrants, are leading to the emergence of a new wave
of nationalist and populist leaders.20
Information and politics. As the amount of information being produced and disseminatedgrows, information technology will become an increasingly important political tool. The
availability of real-time user analysis to measure trends in public opinion might also allow
state and non-state actors to manipulate or control political views and voting behaviour.21
The threshold between publicising a political agenda and swaying the views of the publicwith misleading information is not clearly defined and leaves a grey area, which could
be increasingly exploited.22 There are already signs that social media platforms arebeing used to mobilise people on the basis of discontent, making them a valuable tool
for populist and nationalist movements that seek to feed on fear and insecurity. Digitalcommunications are likely to be increasingly powerful tools for political mobilisation,
potentially facilitating political power transitions.

360b / Shutterstock.com

Art and politics. Throughout history the arts have played a role in the world’s social,political and ideological struggles, and there is no expectation that this will cease. Artists
will continue to use their work to engage in criticism, or to act in defence of a cause.
Recently, the way in which art is disseminated has altered with the Internet and social
media allowing art to be seen by a wider audience, including protest and activist art.
For example, the Chinese dissident artist Ai Weiwei gains public exposure through his
WeChat channel and through his hundreds of thousands of followers on Instagram, withwhom he shares images that not only criticise the Chinese regime but also provide moregeneral social and political comment.23

Art will still play a role in ideological and political struggles: life jackets draw attention to the plight of drowning migrants
20 Cheeseman, N., How will governance within current state boundaries in Africa change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
21 Dutton, W., (2009). Prometheus, Volume 27, (2009), The Fifth Estate Emerging through the Network of
Networks, page 3.
22 Bennet, W. L., (2016), News: The Politics of Illusion, pages 209-210.
23 Lesser, C., Artsy, (7 November 2016), ‘Ai Weiwei Returns to New York with Powerful Shows at Deitch
Projects, Mary Boone, and Lisson’.

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Governance and law

Artists may take on a greater role in shaping societal opinion and decision-making

The ability of thearts and cultural
heritage to bring
together divided
communities andbuild trust is likely
to become more
widely recognised.

As the ability to publish art via social media and other forms of online dissemination
increases, artists (both professional and amateur) may take on a greater role in shaping
societal opinion and decision-making, expanding the role of art as a political influence
tool. For example, Daesh digitally published traditional Islamic poetry in support of theircause, presumably as an attempt to influence hearts and minds. At the same time, thearts may increasingly be used as a tool for reconciliation in post-conflict environments.
An example is David Best’s temple in Northern Ireland, built to symbolise and promotehealing between Catholic and Protestant communities. The ability of the arts and cultural
heritage to bring together divided communities and build trust is likely to become more
widely recognised,24 whilst digital media may also facilitate projects aimed at building
trust and reconciliation both internationally and within fragmented communities.
Online gaming will become ever more realistic, immediate and interactive, creating large
Internet communities with increasing social and political relevance.25 The potential
for these virtual worlds to develop into a space for political activism should not be
underestimated. In particular, where repressive regimes seek to clamp down on otherforms of public protest (such as physical rallies or online social media campaigns),
activists might seek to exploit these less obvious channels as a way of mobilising dissent.
It is not inconceivable that a virtual equivalent of the Arab Spring will occur, where an
uprising which begins within an online gaming community expands into the real world.
Political transitions. The increased weight of urban voices could undermine the hold on
power of ruling parties. In several countries, incumbent regimes depend on their rural
constituencies to remain in power, and in Africa, urban areas appear to be more likely
than rural constituencies to back opposition parties. Most recent transfers of power
have resulted, at least in part, from influential urban constituencies swinging behind an
opposition party.26 Because of short-term electoral pressures, democratically elected
governments may find it more difficult than authoritarian regimes to balance competing
24 British Council, (2016), Art connects us: our strategy for the arts.
25 Wenger, J., (2017), The Future of Art, Expression and Design, a research paper commissioned for DCDC.
26 Cheeseman, N., How will governance within current state boundaries in Africa change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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demands and make difficult and unpopular decisions to prepare for the future.
Authoritarian governments are, however, less likely to manage transitions of power as
peacefully as established democracies, and so may be more at risk of violence andrevolution, although young democracies are also vulnerable. Nevertheless, despite
the optimism surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, authoritarian systems areproving to be extremely resilient. Illiberal and authoritarian forms of governance may beon the rise. Although the number of ‘free’ countries in the world has slightly increased
over the last 20 years, the last decade has seen a decrease in global freedoms withFreedom House identifying 105 countries that have become less free during the period.27

Percentage (%)

Changing
percentage
of balancecountries classified as freeG3 – Freedom
in the
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Free
Partly free
Not free

1986

1996

Years

2006

2016

Source:Freedom
House
Note:
Free
definedby Freedom House, Freedom World 2018.
Source: Freedom House

State fragmentation. Devolutionary pressures and continued separatist demands
mean that some countries may not exist in their present form by 2050. Greater
globalisation and advances in technology may lead to the fragmentation of some states
as sub-regions are able to deal directly with counterparts in other countries, effectively
bypassing governments. In other cases, while there may not be pressure for national
borders to be altered, there could be increasing calls for devolution of power to the local
level, particularly as cities gain greater economic, demographic and political weight.
Today’s megacities have bigger economies than many countries, and their economic
weight is likely to grow. This will increase their ability to act independently of their national
government. For example, the decision of several US cities, states and technology firms
to sign up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, in response to the US Federal
Government’s decision to withdraw from it, may in the future be replicated by other
cities on different issues. As urban areas grow, the capacity and mandate of municipal
authorities is also likely to increase, not least to handle the challenges of developing
and expanding new urban infrastructure. If the power and influence of major global
cities expand in the coming decades, they (and their populations) may have more incommon with other cities around the world than with their national government.28 Those
multinational corporations that thrive in the coming years are also likely to become bigger
and more powerful, and they too may be increasingly able to act independently fromthe state.

27 Dorman, A. and German, T., (2017), How will governance within current state boundaries change over the
next 30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 8.
28 Dorman, A. and German, T., (2017), How will the overarching global political order change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 21.

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Evolution of the state system. Despite the many challenges that the state is likely toface in the coming decades, it has proved remarkably resilient and will remain a key
component of the international system. It is, however, likely to occupy a less central roleby 2050, since the capacity of individual states to single-handedly deal with the array ofchallenges they face is likely to diminish. Instead, governments may increasingly exercise
their power through accommodation with other actors. From a global perspective,
political power and authority may be based on a networked governance system, which
may not sit neatly within the borders of a particular country.

Crime and corruption
Organised crime and corruption. In 2017, transnational crime was estimated to havegenerated between US $1.6-2.6 trillion of illicit profit, threatening peace and security, andundermining the economic, social, cultural and political development of societies aroundthe world.29 Since 2010, organised crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope andinfluence, and it has diversified, globalised and reached macroeconomic proportions.30
Organised crime will probably continue to influence local, national and (in some cases)
international governance.
Corruption. Corruption (the abuse of public positions of trust for private gain) is closely
related to organised crime and drives state fragility by weakening the social contract
between state and its citizens. Corruption also increases inequality and is a major
obstacle to development and poverty reduction. By some estimates, businesses andindividuals worldwide pay between US $1.5-2 trillion in bribes every year.31 Technology
could, however, reduce the opportunities for corruption in the coming decades; forexample, using the Internet to apply and pay for government licences (possibly using
distributed ledger (or blockchain) technology to record transactions) thereby reducing
opportunities for corrupt officials to demand bribes. Increasing levels of education and a
growing lack of tolerance of corruption from businesses, including international investors
and insurance companies, may make it more difficult to get away with corrupt behaviourin the future.

Technology may reduce opportunities for corruption
29 May, C., Global Financial Integrity, (27 March 2017), Transnational Crime and the Developing World.
30 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, (2010), The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime
Threat Assessment.
31 Kaufmann, D., International Monetary Fund, (September 2015), ‘Corruption Matters’.

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Organised crime and conflict. Corruption and organised crime are strongly correlatedwith politically instability, violence and extremism.32 Organised criminal groups willprobably remain an integral part of conflict, particularly civil wars, where they are likely
to compete with states for power and profit, or establish alliances with corrupt or fragile
governments.33 Organised crime (or state actions disguised as such) will continue to be
used as an instrument in hybrid or covert warfare. For example, the Russian governmentis believed to have used criminal networks to conduct assassinations, coercion andcyberattacks. Due to their different objectives, most historical examples of cooperation
between a state and criminal groups have tended to be counterproductive for the state,
and this is likely to hold true in future. State actions disguised as organised crime,
however, may well be part of future hybrid (or grey zone) warfare.
Criminal violence. Between 2003 and 2014, homicide rates fell in high and upper-middle
income countries, while remaining steady in low and lower-middle income countries.
Central and South America, the Caribbean and Southern Africa have all suffered fromparticularly high rates of homicide, especially in urban areas.34 For example, in 2015,
El Salvador’s homicide rate surpassed one murder per thousand people, and forcomparison there was approximately one murder per one hundred thousand in the UK in
2017.35 Homicide victims were overwhelmingly young and male, and homicide rates wereclosely related to income inequality. With increasing urbanisation, growing populations
and rising inequality, there is a substantial risk that many cities in developing countries,
particularly sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia could experience very high murder rates,
similar to those seen in Latin America today.

Markets for illicit
goods and sex willremain importantsources of revenue
for criminal groups.

G4 homicides by level of income inequality
International

Homicides per (100,000)

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

High income inequality (Gini index >0.45; 15 countries)
Medium income inequality (Gini index 0.35-0.45; 20 countries)
Low income inequality (Gini index <0.35; 45 countries)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2016).

Note: Gini index is a measure of income inequality.
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Homicide Statistics (2016)

Smuggling, vice and trafficking. Markets for illicit goods and sex will remain importantsources of revenue for criminal groups, but technology is likely to have a significant
impact in future, for better and worse. Criminals will continue to obtain weapons, buttraditional arms smuggling could be replaced as criminals (particularly in developed
countries) find it cheaper and easier to use 3D printing to make guns and to create
homemade explosives from Internet-sourced recipes. Synthetic substances may cometo dominate the global drugs market, overtaking cocaine and heroin. This shift would
cause significant disruption to current trafficking routes and reduce the importance ofexisting growing sites in countries such as Afghanistan.
32 Chayes, S., Fragility Study Group, (September 2016), Policy Brief Number 1: Corruption and State Fragility.
33 Cockayne, J., (2016), Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime.
34 Cockane, J. and Roth, A., United Nations University, (2017), Crooked States, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
35 The Economist, (7 April 2018), ‘Latin America’s homicide problem is a harbinger for the developing world’.

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By 2050, it may be easy to download recipes for synthetic drugs, rendering somesmugglers and low-level drug dealers obsolete. Legalised synthetic recreational
substances might also be produced that are less harmful, allowing governments to
reduce the toxicity of drugs, generate revenue and starve criminal dealers of profit.
If rapid population growth in Africa and Southern Asia is not followed by economic
development, the appeal of illegal migration is likely to increase, providing greater
opportunities for people traffickers. Gender imbalances in some countries may add tothe profitability of sexual exploitation. Other illegal markets are also likely to become
more entrenched. For example, the trade in illegal wildlife products is already one of
the world’s largest illicit markets, involving nearly 7,000 different species and generating
between US $5 billion to US $23 billion in revenue annually.36 Asia is likely to remain the
major market for these products, although the Gulf, Latin America and Africa may also
become important destinations.

Genderimbalances insome countries
may add to the
profitability ofsexual exploitation.

Fraud and counterfeiting. Ageing populations, particularly in Europe and East Asia, may
offer greater opportunities for criminal groups to exploit elderly people.37 In particular,
acts of fraud against pension and social benefit schemes are likely to increase, as istargeting of the health care industry, which could offer criminals lucrative profits. Where
food and water supplies are scarce, counterfeit goods may be sold by organised criminalgroups, making buyers vulnerable to health and safety risks.
Illicit financial flows. Between 2005 and 2014, illicit financial flows grew at an averagerate of between 8.5% and 10.1% a year, with a total value of US $1 trillion in 2014.38
As a share of total global trade, it has remained relatively constant. Illicit financial flows
are closely tied to high levels of systemic corruption, which may in turn perpetuateinequality, lead to sociopolitical insecurity and harm economic progress, particularly indeveloping countries. Sub-Saharan Africa has been the region most severely affectedby the illegal movement of money due to high levels of fragility and poor governance.
Digital currencies and peer-to-peer payment networks may provide significant newopportunities for criminal organisations to move their funds, thus weakening affectedstates’ control over revenues and their economies. However, technology is also likely toprovide opportunities to monitor payments and identify illegal transactions. International
cooperation to control financial flows, seize illicit assets and curtail tax avoidance amongmajor corporations is likely to become increasingly important in the coming decades.

Synthetic substances may come to dominate the global drugs market, overtaking cocaine and heroin
36 May, C., Global Financial Integrity, (27 March 2017), Transnational crime and the developing world.
37 EUROPOL, (2015), Exploring tomorrow’s organized crime.
38 Global Financial Integrity, (April 2017), Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005-2014.

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Algorithms could even predict criminal activity before it occurs

Cybercrime. The number of cybercrimes has expanded significantly in recent years, as
has their financial impact. A variety of different methods are used to estimate the cost of
cybercrime and, hence, figures vary widely.39 By one estimate, between 2013 and 2015,
the cost of cybercrime quadrupled, and is expected to quadruple again by 2019 to
US $ 2.1 trillion a year.40 Advances in information technology, automation and artificial
intelligence will have profound implications for the future of crime. In a world where
almost every instruction, process, transaction and secret is located in cyberspace,
there could be a wealth of opportunities for criminals. Cybercrime is likely to have an
increasingly severe impact in the coming decades, and will require law enforcement
agencies to collaborate internationally and with private companies to combat the threat.
With relatively low start-up costs and potentially huge profits, cybercrime will appeal topeople in countries with limited economic opportunities. For example, most cyberattacks
against targets in the European Union primarily originate outside the region.41 This
presents challenges for law enforcement organisations, although by 2050, technologicaladvances may make it more difficult to conduct cybercrime. Over the next 30 years,
cyberspace will also provide a new venue for competition and collaboration between
states, criminal groups and other aspiring governmental actors. The ability to subjugate
and control cyberspace and data might become the most effective way of exerting
economic, military and political power for both state and non-state actors.42

Law and justice
Law enforcement. As crime becomes more sophisticated, so will policing. In addition tokeeping the streets safe, police forces (at least in developed countries) are also expected
to police inside the home, preventing domestic abuse and coercive control, and police
cyberspace. This will require new policing models supported by an unprecedented
degree of specialisation and expert knowledge. A high level of cooperation between
governments, private businesses and non-governmental organisations will also be
39 Levi, M., Crime, Law and Social Change 67 (1), (2017), Assessing the trends, scale and nature of economic
cybercrimes: overview and issues.
40 Morgan, S., Forbes, (17 January 2016), ‘Cyber Crime Costs projected to reach $2 Trillion by 2019’.
41 EUROPOL, (2014), The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2014.
42 Cockane, J. and Roth, A., United Nations University, (2017), Crooked States, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

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Technology will play a growing role in surveillance and policing

needed. If cyberspace retains its transnational nature, law enforcement in cyberspace
will need substantial international collaboration, with private firms likely to play a crucialrole in protection, prevention and detection. For example, providing online identity andverification services is primarily provided by commercial organisations. The probablegrowth in the cybersecurity industry, both domestically and internationally, may, however,further erode states’ monopoly on law enforcement.
Surveillance. Technology will play a growing role in surveillance and policing. Facialrecognition technology could monitor a suspect’s every move in public, and the useof algorithms may predict some kinds of criminal activity before it occurs.43 Evidence
extracted from Internet-connected devices, including those used in the home, will be
used in future criminal prosecutions. These kinds of technological advancements could
have profound implications for citizens’ right to privacy, and developments in this area
are likely to be contested, at least in some countries. Chinese authorities are developing
a social credit system, which uses government data to grade citizens’ ‘worthiness’.
While purportedly aimed at tackling corruption and poor-quality goods, the systemdemonstrates governments’ increasing power to monitor every aspect of their citizens’
lives. Similar developments may also take place in other countries.44
The development of legal practice. Technological advancements are also likely tochange the practice of law. Artificial intelligence and big data analytics will allow hugequantities of material to be rapidly sifted and analysed, while other routine and lesscomplex legal tasks are likely to be automated. Over time, developments in artificial
intelligence could mean that machines take on ever more complex tasks. In remoteareas where lawyers are scarce and expensive, online legal services may open up accessto justice. Digitally-delivered justice is likely to be cheaper and could be more consistent,
43 Ng, Yi Shu, Mashable, (24 July 2017), ‘China is using AI to predict who will commit crime next’.
44 Hawkins, A., Foreign Policy, (24 May 2017), ‘Chinese Citizens Want the Government to Rank Them’.

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objective and impartial, although it could also be blunt and harsh, for example, it might
fail to recognise extenuating circumstances. Technology is also likely to play a greaterrole in punishment and offender management. For example, Global Positioning System(GPS) tagging (already used to monitor some offenders) could be used to prevent travelon public transport. Technology could also be used to deny access to certain areasof the Internet and prevent the purchase of prohibited materials such as alcohol. This
could reduce the size of the prison population, lowering costs for governments.45 In the
coming decades, technology could also be used in criminal rehabilitation, for example,
virtual reality simulations could help offenders develop and practice coping strategies forsituations that may lead to criminal behaviour.
Regulation of new technologies. Advances in technology will have far-reaching legal
implications that could test governments’ abilities to adapt the law quickly enoughto mitigate any disruptive effects on society. Many technologies are likely to haveapplications outside their country of origin, which may have implications for internationallaw. However, it is unlikely that a multilateral consensus would be achieved rapidly. As aresult, much of the regulatory response to new technologies is likely to initially take placeat the national, or even local, level before happening at a transnational level. In somecases, regulation and standard-setting will probably be driven by non-governmentalorganisations (including industry and insurers) rather than countries, potentially seeing
states ceding leadership on international standardisation.46
The development of new technologies could pose challenging ethical questions.
For example, technologies could be developed that substantially boost physical andcognitive capabilities. Those who hold a professional duty of care towards the public(such as military or medical personnel) may have an obligation to use those technologies
to ensure the highest performance. Advancements in fields such as genetic engineering,artificial intelligence and creating synthetic life forms will pose moral questions where aninternational consensus could be difficult to obtain,47 particularly if sentient (conscious)
intelligence is developed. Perhaps more plausibly, machines will be developed that many
people believe are sentient and some people could form strong emotional attachments
to their machines, especially to robots with appealing features, such as those used in acaring role.

Virtual reality
simulations could
help offenders
develop andpractise coping
strategies forsituations that may
lead to criminal
behaviour.

45 Moody, G., techdirt.com, (18 August 2017), ‘Welcome To The Technological Incarceration Project, Where
Prison Walls Are Replaced By Sensors, Algorithms, And AI’.
46 Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment out
to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
47 Parasidis, E., (2011), ‘The Essence of Being Human’, in Muller, S., et al., The Law of the Future and the
Future of Law, page 523.

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121Governance and law

Future worlds: Governance and law
Multilateralism

Multipolarity• International institutions are reformed effectively
to accommodate the interests of new powers
and address global challenges.
• The elites of international organisations
become more powerful.
• Strong and effective state institutions havethe capacity to address political, societal andenvironmental challenges.
• Organised crime is limited by cooperation.
• Although challenged, governments are able
to provide an acceptable level of welfare.

• As blocs compete for power multilateral
institutions become ineffective.
• Intense competition in the global commons
results in resource inequality.
• Welfare is seen as vital to national resilience.
• Organised crime is used by blocs to exploit
opposing state’s vulnerabilities.
• Increasingly contested global norms anddisparate development of regional legal
frameworks.

• Strong multilateral institutions cooperate to
reduce global instability.
• Current rules, norms and institutions are likely
to be reformed.
• As elites become more powerful, domestic
inequality becomes a divisive factor.
• Social programmes attract increased funding,whilst spending on defence reduces.

• Emerging and extant powers will seek toenhance their position in the global order(for example, by defining the rules), which
may trigger conflict.
• Democracy will increasingly come underpressure from authoritarian leaders.
The world will be less liberal.
• Unmitigated drivers of conflict in thedeveloping world will make crisis and conflict
more likely, which will affect countries in thedeveloped world.

Network of actors

Fragmentation• Globally and domestically, hybrid governanceexists with non-state actors having a prominentrole, including delivering essential services.
• Although theoretically accessible to everyone,
private services are not affordable for many.
• Network-based cooperation limits organised
crime and illicit activity.
• Non-state actors are increasingly involved indeveloping and managing the international
legal framework.

• Global governance is almost impossible inthis volatile environment.
• States are unable to provide services, asituation which non-state actors exploit.
• Inequality rises drastically due to a lack ofregulation, corruption and welfare services,that are driven by market forces.
• Organised crime plays an important role inlocal, regional and some global aspects ofgovernment.
• State monopoly on law enforcement is eroded.

• The legitimacy of some states will diminish
if non-state actors increasingly provide
services, including defence and security.
• The participation of the population ingovernance may be reduced if the role ofnon-state actors increases.
• Inequality of opportunities and access toresources may reduce societal cohesion.
• Networks of actors cooperate to address
issues, reducing the risk of violent conflict.

• States lose their monopoly on the use of force
and taxation.
• The social contract between people and thestate is largely eroded, causing high levelsof uncertainty and insecurity. The result isincreased levels of violence within societies.
• Many people are exploited by non-state actors
without the states’ protection.
• All actors increase their investment in security
to protect their interests.

Competition

Cooperation

Powerful states

Diffusion of power

122

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Governance and law

NWE

Watch points

Discontinuities

S• Transnational issues are, increasingly, addressed
through multilateral cooperation.

• War, disaster or financial crisis leads to a suddenchange in the global order.

• Emerging powers begin out-competing theestablished powers.

• Unexpected development (collapse or change inapproach) of one of the current major powers.

• Changes in the ability of multilateral institutions
to accommodate relevant actors’ interests.

• Regime change in one or more of the major
powers.

• The number of autocracies compared todemocracies.

• Role of multilateral organisations is underminedby societal disapproval.

• The prevalence of organised crime.

• Widespread adoption of collective values andrejection of universal human rights.

• The support for, and success of, multilateral
institutions.
• Ability of states to collect taxes and enforce
the law.

• Emergence of a new, and successful, political
ideology.

• The capacity of states to operate in a social
media-driven environment.

Implications• The current global order will increasingly comeunder pressure. Changes to the global distributionof power will necessitate adaptation of the existing
governance architecture within the international
system. If insufficient effort is made to accommodate
the interests of rising powers, a breakdown of theinternational order is highly likely.
• States will need to shape the change in international
order and proactively respond to the influence of
non-state actors if they are to remain the primary
actors in the global system. The social contract
between a state and its citizens will need to evolve
to maintain social cohesion.
• Global and domestic inequality will need to beaddressed to maintain social cohesion and avoid rifts
between the state and the people.
• The current global legal framework will be increasingly
challenged, possibly giving rise to more informal
mechanisms, which will in turn undermine the extant
regulatory framework and increase its vulnerability to
non-compliance and subversion.

Global Strategic Trends• Technological advances could fundamentally change
the relationship between people and the state as
education, health care, lifestyles, labour markets andtaxation models are altered. This change could occur
over an extended period of time and therefore require
strategic choices that endure beyond election cycles.
• Alternative models for providing state services andfunctions could emerge, resulting in a competition
for peoples’ allegiances. Agile states that are able
to make a consistently better offer, and develop
a strong narrative, are more likely to succeed inthis competition and may better manage internal
inequalities.
• Global cooperation will be needed to addressorganised crime. If it is not, it will become anincreasing threat to governments and communities,
fuelling conflict and violent extremist organisations.
• States will increasingly need to work in partnershipwith a range of actors. Those that do so effectively
will gain a substantial competitive advantage.

123

Conflict and security

124

Global Strategic TrendsConflict and security

Conflict and security

Synopsis

Joel Carillet / iStock.com

The world order is changing and current norms and institutions are being challenged.
If the current institutions fail to adapt, a period of volatile transitions could follow.
As the balance of power shifts from West to East, competition between states andother actors is likely to intensify and become ever more persistent. Whilst the risk ofa war between states is likely to remain low, but not implausible, sub-threshold conflictis likely to become increasingly common. The number of intra-state and non-state
conflicts has been increasing and this is likely to continue. Inequality and a sense of
injustice, religious intolerance, nationalism and intolerance of immigrants are on therise and could mutate into violent ideologies. Continuing instability in the Middle Eastand South Asia are also likely to perpetuate the activities of Islamic violent extremist
organisations. Some actors are likely to exploit these and other grievances using
misinformation (fake news) and propaganda to erode trust in governments and provoke
conflict. The boundary between war and peace will become blurred and actors will,
increasingly, use a hybrid approach to warfare, going beyond military and economic
activities and opening-up new arenas of conflict, including in cyberspace, augmented
and virtual reality. The rules-based international system has not evolved to deal withthese challenges and is likely to struggle to respond effectively. Arms control regimes,
already under stress, are also likely to struggle to cope with new challenges such as
cyber, directed energy weapons and hypersonic weapons, and the use of artificial
intelligence in conflict.
The oceans, polar regions and space have all seen increased levels of activity and arelikely to become the focus of increasingly intense competition, and possibly conflict,as states compete for resources and influence. Cyberspace is already an active
battleground and as more people spend more time conducting an ever-widening
range of activities, it could become the vital ground of the future. Similarly, as more
people live in cities they too are likely to become more central to conflict. States arelikely to remain the central actors in future conflicts but violent extremist organisations,
irregular actors and private security companies are likely to play an increasing role. The
state will increasingly need to work in partnership with a range of actors, particularly
technology firms. Those that do this most effectively will have a substantial advantage
over their opponents. The number of nuclear-armed states is likely to rise and increasing
investment in tactical nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear weapons being
used. Weapon systems such as rail guns, directed energy weapons and hypersonicmissiles will allow possessors to strike rapidly, practically anywhere in the world. As
machines and artificial intelligence become more capable, they will play an increasing rolein conflict and combat. Technology will continue to change the character of conflict, andpossibly its nature.

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125Conflict and security

Context
The global context. As global power is redistributed, current norms and institutions will
be challenged,1 and new stresses will emerge. The international legal environment islikely to become more fragmented, with competing local and regional interpretations ofinternational standards increasingly prevalent.2 As populations and economies grow,competition for resources is likely to intensify and, in a more fragmented, multipolar
context, could increase the risk of conflict. If the world trading system breaks down,
a less integrated and less globalised economic system may also mean that, for somecountries, the cost of military action could reduce. Therefore, the risk of war between
states in the coming decades cannot be ruled out.

HomoCosmicos / iStock.com

Great power rivalry. Historically, when great powers emerge and alter the world’s
geopolitical balance, conflict often follows. Change to the global order is likely to create
several opportunities and incentives for great powers to challenge one another. For
example, China’s growing economic, military and diplomatic capability could equal,
or even surpass, that of the United States (US) in the coming decades. Potential
developments in North Korea and disputes over maritime territory in the East and South
China Seas all provide potential flash points between China, the US and their respective
allies. India’s economy is also growing rapidly, and it may emerge as a great power
during the next 30 years. India and China’s shared 3,000 kilometre border has alreadyseen clashes, and the two countries are likely to increasingly vie for influence and control,
not least in the Indian Ocean. Russia has also become more assertive in recent years
and, though unlikely to want a major conflict with the West, is likely to use sub-thresholdconflict (activity that remains below the threshold of armed aggression to avoid reprisal),and the threat of it, to pursue its aims. In addition to great power rivalry, many regional
power struggles will also endure and some could turn violent. The Middle East is one
theatre where an enduring regional power contest has become more violent since the endof the Cold War. Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue to vie for influence and both sides
are engaged in regional conflicts. Outside the Middle East, multiple territorial disputes
remain unresolved, particularly in Africa and Asia, many of which could lead to conflict.

Regional power struggles will endure and some could turn violent

126

1

Peerenboom, R., (2011), ‘The Future of Law in a Multi-Polar World: Toward a Global New Deal’, in Muller, S.,et al., The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, page 43.

2Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment
out to 2050, page 6, a research paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre (DCDC).

Global Strategic TrendsConflict and security

Evolving nature of power. Globalisation and technology have combined to create
complex interdependencies and more ways and means for nation states to influenceeach other. The terms ‘soft power’, ‘smart power’ and ‘sharp power’ were all coined
to describe how influence can be achieved beyond using simple military and economic
power. Increasing numbers of actors are likely to have the ability to influence events
across the globe.3 Technology such as cyberspace, augmented and virtual reality will
open up new arenas within which human desires can be met more reliably and efficiently
than in the ‘real world’. Although the extent to which power and influence in these
arenas will translate to traditional domains is not clear. Citizens may increasingly seek
allegiance to forms of authority beyond the nation state. For example, citizens could owe
their allegiance to corporations that make it their business (literally) to reliably understand,predict and fulfil the needs and wants of citizens. The driving forces of future conflicts
may involve corporations seeking resources, or civil conflicts involving large numbers ofdisenfranchised or excluded citizens confused about where their allegiances lie and being
dissatisfied with systemic changes. Corporations may be able to ‘discipline’ citizens on
their own terms by disconnecting offenders from vital electronic systems such as medicalcare, navigation, education or employment. Security in domains such as cyberspace
could be outsourced to selected ‘tech-savvy’ individuals or sub-contractors. Conflict ismost likely to occur where the relative power differentials are greatest and where power iscontested or redistributed.

Citizens may
increasingly seek
allegiance toforms of authority
beyond thenation state.

Defence spending. Defence spending has been declining globally since 1960 as thelevel of violence has dropped and, on current trends, defence spending is likely tocontinue to fall. Currently, the US spends more on defence than any other country,
although the proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defence has
declined from 4.7% in 2010 to 3.3% in 2016. In 2017, China spent the second largest
amount on defence, using around 2% of its GDP (approximately a third of what the US
spent). However, when China’s GDP surpasses that of the US, as is expected, it could
become the global leader in defence expenditure. The proportion of GDP that India
spends on defence has been declining in recent years (in 2017 it used around 2.5% of its
GDP, compared to a high of 4.2% in 1987). If its economy grows as forecast, it will be
the third biggest spender on defence by 2050.
France, Russia and the UK currently spend similar amounts on defence, but different
proportions of their GDP, around 2% by France and the UK, and an estimated 5% by
Russia. A large part of Russia’s defence and security expenditure is classified or hidden
under other budgets. Along with ‘open’ spending on national defence and security, theshare of defence spending could be at a post-Soviet high.4 Although Russia is likely tosustain this level of defence spending in the next few years, whether it can be maintainedin the longer term is less clear. Across Europe, the average proportion of GDP devoted
to defence is currently around 1.5%, although this has fallen recently, despite general
economic growth, which is similar to the situation in Canada and the US.5 Eight of theeleven countries with the highest military expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) are in
the Middle East and North Africa, with Pakistan, Iran and Russia recently increasing the
proportion of government revenues spent on defence. High levels of military spending
indicates that the potential for conflict in these regions will probably endure, as countries
facing an external threat (or the possibility of major internal unrest) are likely to devote ahigh level of their GDP to defence.6 There are, however, alternative explanations for thisexpenditure, such as the desire to play a more significant international role.

3

Moyer, J., et al, Atlantic Council, (January 2018), Power and Influence in a Globalized World.

4

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database.

5

Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

6

Ibid.

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127Conflict and security

As trade between
countries has
increased, so
have the ties
between them,and as mutual
dependency
increases, so does
the cost of conflict.

Trends in conflict. Globally, the proportion of lives lost due to armed conflict is at its
lowest level since at least the end of the Middle Ages.7 Western Europe has neverenjoyed such a long period of peace, state-on-state conflict in North America andOceania is almost unimaginable and it has also been over 20 years since there wasan international conflict in Latin America. As trade between countries has increased,so have the ties between them, and as mutual dependency increases, so does thecost of conflict, suggesting that the risk of state-on-state conflict will reduce if trade
becomes more globalised. The risk of being killed in an armed conflict has also declined
considerably since 1946 (although there has been a slight increase since 2005). Thisis almost certainly due to: a reduction in the number of state-on-state conflicts (thedeadliest type of conflict); more precise weapons (causing fewer unintended casualties);
better medical care; and effective humanitarian aid.
Global battle death rates in state-based conflicts

CS1 – Battle death rate in state-based conflicts by type (1946-2013)22

Annual worldwide battle deaths
per 100,000 people

20
18
16
14
12

Civil war with foreign intervention
Civil war
Wars between states
Colonial war
Not categorised wars*

10
8
6
4
2
0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Source: Our World in Data, University of Oxford* For the period 2011-2013 wars are not designated by type.
Source: Our World in Data, University of Oxford

Intra-state conflict. While the incidence of state-on-state conflict has been declining,
the number of armed conflicts is increasing, particularly intra-state conflicts. There
are several explanations for this increase, including improved communications leading
to more conflicts being recorded. Conflicts are also being more tightly classified, forexample, the conflict against Boko Haram in West Africa was described as one conflictin 2014, but in 2015 was split into six separate conflicts depending on the country andallegiance of the armed group. As well as greater reporting of conflict there are otherreasons to think the incidence of conflict may continue to increase. For example, today,
fewer people are caught in the trap of absolute poverty and, freed from poverty, impotent
grievance can turn into conflict. The increasing activity of Islamic violent extremist
organisations accounts for a significant proportion of the recent increase in intra-state
conflicts, a trend that is likely to endure, not least because of continuing instability in
the Middle East and South Asia. The number of intra-state conflicts with at least one
external country intervening to support one side has also increased. These conflicts tend
to last longer and become more violent, suggesting that the death toll from intra-state
conflict is likely to rise.8

128

7

Roser, M., Our World in Data, (2018), ‘War and Peace’.

8

Dupuy, K., et al., Center for Security Studies, for the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), (2017),‘Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2016’.

Global Strategic Trends

RuralAfricaClips / Shutterstock.com

Conflict and security

Governments will be challenged by the consequences of climate change and population growth

Grievances and inequality. Many parts of the world have recently seen increases innationalism, intolerance between religious groups and intolerance for immigrants.
In most cases these sentiments have not led to armed conflict but there is an enduring,
possibly worsening, risk that some may mutate into violent ideology. Income inequality
is likely to increase within countries,9 which may lead to growing resentment and a senseof grievance in many populations. Social media’s echo chamber effect (where people
only see and hear the views of those with similar opinions, leading to positions being
reinforced and hardened) could further drive division within societies. If mass job losses
occur because of automation, severe intra-state rifts could develop. While large numbersof unemployed people do not necessarily become violent, they do create a potential for
mass-mobilisation,10 potentially by unscrupulous actors. In addition to inequality withincountries, the Internet and social media will lead to groups becoming aware of theirrelative inequality compared to people around the world and this could also fuel a senseof grievance. Taken together, growing inequality, the risk of mass unemployment andfragmentation of societies, exacerbated by social media, means that the risk of intrastate and non-state conflict looks likely to increase.
Many governments are likely to be challenged as the effects of climate change start
to be realised, and populations continue to grow, mainly in developing economies.
Limited resources and limited (albeit in many cases improving) capacity of governments,
combined with the likely impact of climate change, means that parts of Africa, Central
and South America and Central, South and Southeast Asia may all experience conflict in
the coming decades. Rapid population growth and enduring poverty means that Africa
will be at particular risk. Poverty is a key driver, and there is a strong correlation between
corruption, organised crime and violence.11 A gender imbalance is also associated withhigher levels of violence, and many Asian countries are likely to have significantly more
men than women in 2050.12
9Alvaredo, F., et al., World Inequality Lab (2018), World Inequality Report 2018.

10 Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
11 Chayes, S., Fragility Study Group, (September 2016), Policy Brief Number 1: Corruption and State Fragility.
12 Schacht, R., et al., New Scientist, (October 2014), Does a surplus of men really mean more violence?

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129Conflict and security

CS2 – Armed conflict by type, 1946-2016
Global armed conflict by type

Number of conflicts

60
50
40

Intra-state
Internationalised intra-state

Intra-state: between a government and a
non-governmental party
Internationalised intra-state: between agovernment and a non-government party
where one or both sides receive military
support from other governments
Interstate: between two or more governments
Extra-state: between a state and a non-stategroup outside its own territory

Interstate
Extra-state

30
20
10
0
1946

1956

1966

1976

1986

1996

2006

2016

Source: Uppsala Conflict data Program
Source: Uppsala Conflict data Program

Countries arelikely to adopt anincreasingly broad
understanding ofwhat constitutes
an ‘armed attack’.

Law of Armed Conflict. The norms and mechanisms of the rules-based international
system have largely been shaped by state-centric approaches of assessing security
threats and determining thresholds for when, where and how to respond to them.
They have not yet evolved to deal with the diffusion of power, proliferation of actors
below state level, threats in cyberspace, exploitation of information, and political andeconomic warfare. States and international institutions are therefore not well equipped
to respond to these threats. Changes to laws governing the use of force in international
relations are, however, expected over the coming decades. For example, countries arelikely to adopt an increasingly broad understanding of what constitutes an ‘armed attack’
by a state or non-state actor, within the context of offensive cyber activities. This could
result in the threshold for the use of military force in self-defence being lowered. The
general prohibition on the use of force is almost certain to remain in place, but it may be
progressively challenged and narrowed in scope. This could in turn lead to increased
tensions and a greater tendency to resort to military action to settle disputes. New
developments in battlefield technology will probably also require careful re-interpretation,and in some cases adaptations, of existing rules. For example, if artificial intelligence
becomes so advanced that it can be used in warfare, legislation will be needed to govern
the behaviour of such entities and to allocate responsibility for any breaches of law
committed by them.13
Laws and norms. The inherent difficulty of renegotiating and reformulating internationalrules and norms to take account of technologies such as cyber weapons andartificial intelligence, particularly regarding sub-threshold activities, is illustrated by thepracticalities of drafting the first and second Tallinn Manuals on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare. The process involved producing non-binding, academic
studies by a group of international experts, observed by members of the International
Committee for the Red Cross, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and USCyber Command. It demonstrated that when states are exploiting a new technology
they will usually be prepared to show that they intend to use that technology (broadly)in accordance with international humanitarian law, but not how they will use it. The
process also showed that different actors are likely to use very different conceptualmodels when exploiting a new technology, and that it may be impossible (for operations
security reasons) for them to discuss how they envisage international humanitarian law tobe applied. This illustrates how difficult it is to agree how international humanitarian law
should be applied, even if the approaches to using the new technology are shared.
In addition, by allowing non-governmental organisations and scholars to lead on the
13 Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment out
to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

130

Global Strategic TrendsConflict and security

development of how international humanitarian law is applied to a new technology, states
ability to influence the development and application of international humanitarian law has(arguably) been diminished.14
Human rights law. In recent years, international human rights instruments have been
applied more frequently to the activities of states operating outside their own territories,
including during military operations. Such norms may increasingly be used as a yardstickagainst which the legality and legitimacy of armed interventions are measured.15 Some,though not all, governments will find themselves coming under more scrutiny andpressure from their citizens, affording them less freedom of manoeuvre and potentiallyleading to a divergence in international standards for the conduct of military operations.

Nickolay Vinokurov / Shutterstock.com

Arms control treaties. Attempts to ban or limit possession of proscribed weapons arelikely to become increasingly challenging as the ability to draft comprehensive, binding
international treaties becomes more difficult. Recent events, such as the use of chemical
weapons by Syria (a Chemical Weapons Convention signatory) during its civil war, or theattempted development of nuclear weapons by Iran, highlight some of the difficulties
associated with implementing current arms control regimes. States can use technology
workarounds, loopholes or misrepresentation to create the appearance of compliancewhilst continuing to develop prohibited weapons. The different views on imposing
sanctions between the US and European Union in 2018 illustrate the challenges with bothverification of, and acting against, a breach. Finally, the withdrawal of North Korea from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2005 demonstrates that states will remain prepared toendure sanctions if it is assessed that an overt breach is in its strategic interest.

Some governments will be more closely scrutinised by their citizens

14 Schmitt, M. N., and Watts, S., Texas International Law Journal, Volume 50, (August 16, 2014), ‘The Declineof International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare’.
15 Sari, A. and Jachec-Neale, A., (2018), The Future of the Domestic and International Legal Environment out
to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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131Pictorial Press Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo

Conflict and security

Limiting possession of proscribed weapons may become more challenging

The arms control system will be further challenged by future weapons and weapon
manufacturing technologies. It is plausible, given advances in technology and theavailability of information, that states will be able to construct a new nuclear weapon
with such a high degree of assurance that they will not need to conduct a confirmatory
detonation. Without a detonation, and hence a seismic signature, the capability islikely to remain covert. Advances in technology, such as microlabs, may also make iteasier to secretly create chemical and biological weapons. The diffusion of power tonon-state actors may also provide a challenge to the (essentially) state-based framework
for arms control treaties. It is possible that new technologies, for example, artificial
intelligence, automated systems and offensive cyber, will be the subject of attempts tocontrol proliferation and limit numbers. Treaty negotiations are likely to be hindered by
the absence of a clear concept for using these systems, and the unwillingness of actors
to give up an advantage in an emerging technology. Such technological developments
could, however, undermine the norms and conventions under which current treaties
operate, for example, by creating the ability to destroy nuclear missiles in flight, thus
limiting their deterrence effect.

Approaches and arenas
Hybrid conflict. Actors, both state and non-state, seeking to challenge the current
international order have developed a series of techniques that allow them to neutralise
the conventional strengths of Western powers. This occurs in two main forms. First,‘sub-threshold conflict’, which is hostile activity that remains below the thresholdof armed aggression to avoid reprisal. Secondly, ‘hybrid warfare’, which combines
conventional warfare with unconventional activity, usually by non-state actors, to offset
conventional military strength. These approaches have been given the label ‘hybrid’ dueto the mixture of military and non-military means, the combination of warfare types, andthe dual nature of many of the actors involved.

132

Global Strategic TrendsConflict and security

Sub-threshold conflict (known as ‘hybrid threats’ in Europe16 or ‘Gray zone’ in the US17)
is likely to become more frequent in the coming decades as states compete for power
within the international system while avoiding full-scale conflict. At the global level,rising powers will seek to expand competition beyond traditional diplomatic, militaryand economic activities into new areas, including technology, information and cyber,where they can seek relative advantage to secure their interests. At the regional level,
dissatisfied states will also use all available means across all domains to improve theirstatus.18 At all levels, a wide range of levers will be employed to conduct disruptive
activity, from proxy actors in cyberspace to criminal gangs operating across borders.
Hybrid conflict and warfare are challenges that are likely to persist and evolve.19
The strategic environment will present state and non-state actors with an array of new,more cost-effective means that can be employed in combination against an opponent’svulnerabilities. In the short term this could range from information operations incyberspace to the proliferation of cheap military technology. The evolution of hybrid
warfare in the longer term will be driven by actors motivated to develop and employ
new modes of conflict. The most likely developments will continue to be with nonstate actors given their higher appetite for risk and incentive to generate asymmetricadvantage over more powerful adversaries. The evolution of hybrid warfare by state
actors should, however, not be ignored as it provides an effective way of escalating
confrontation. Hybrid warfare can offer protection through ambiguity in the early stagesof conflict, for example, using proxy actors to commit arms-length aggression, or inciting
uprisings.20 Similarly, simply brute effectiveness through complexity an be achieved by
combining cyberattacks, urban warfare and biological and chemical attacks.

Hybrid conflict
and warfare arechallenges thatare likely to persist
and evolve.

A key feature of hybrid conflict and warfare is using misinformation (fake news) andpropaganda. It is designed to erode trust in adversaries’ governments and institutions,create uncertainty and stir up grievances. The increasing reach and penetrationof information technology, including social media, could allow these activities to beundertaken on a vast, potentially global, scale. Using proxies and militias will also be
favoured, because the sponsoring country can plausibly deny responsibility for theiragents’ actions. Similarly, some states are likely to disguise their actions as the activities
of organised crime, for example, the Russian government is believed to have usedcriminal networks to conduct assassinations and cyberattacks.21 Cyberattacks andinformation operations, particularly on social media, are a key part of hybrid warfare
because they can often be deployed without revealing the aggressor’s (or sponsor’s)
identity. The past ten years have seen an almost continuous stream of cyberattacks
and there is no evidence to suggest that this will change in the coming decades.
Hybrid warfare is likely to be a pervasive feature of future conflict, occurring
simultaneously across multiple geographical regions.

16 For more information see European Union (EU), (2016), Joint Communication To The European Parliament
And The Council: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response.
17 For more information on the ‘grey zone’, see Dubik, et al., Institute for the Study of War, (February 2018),
America’s Global Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context.
18 Puri, S., Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(4), (2017), The Strategic Hedging of Iran, Russia, and China:
Juxtaposing Participation in the Global System with Regional Revisionism, pages 307–323.
19 DCDC, (2017), Joint Concept Note 1/17, Future Force Concept.
20 Johnson, R., (2017), Hybrid War and its Countermeasures, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
21 Galeotti, M., European Council on Foreign Relations, CRIMINTERN ‘How the Kremlin uses Russia’s criminal
networks in Europe.

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The global commons. The oceans, polar regions
and space have all seen increased levels ofactivity (such as shipping, tourism, military activity
and satellites in orbit) and are likely to become
the focus of increasingly intense competition,and possibly conflict. In the oceans, deep sea
mining is already technologically feasible and vast
deposits of minerals and precious metals havebeen identified. Competition to claim the rights tothese deposits can be expected. An increasing
number of pipelines and cables are being laidacross the seabed, creating new vulnerabilities.
The oceans will also continue to be vital conduits
for international trade with global freight trade
forecast to grow by between 330% and 380%.22
While the United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS) will continue to provide aneffective framework of governance, it is also likely
to be challenged in some areas, not least in theSouth and East China Seas. As Arctic sea ice
melts, resources will become easier to extractand shipping routes will open up. Competition tocontrol both the resources and shipping routes
will increase and could lead to tension. Activity in
An increasing number of pipelines creates new vulnerabilities
the Antarctic is also increasing and the Antarctic
Treaty System is likely to come under increasingpressure. With a review of the Antarctic Treaty System not due until 2048, somecountries (particularly non- and late-treaty signers) may see this as an opportunity torenegotiate the Antarctic Treaty System, potentially leading to tension.
Space is also the site of increasing activity and dependency on spaced-based
capabilities is increasing. The numbers of satellites, particularly small satellites
nanosats), in orbit is increasing rapidly, as is the number of actors involved, bothstate and non-state. The main governance framework, the Outer Space Treaty of
1967, however, has not been updated since 1979. The risk of the treaty breaking
down, possibly leading to conflict and/or weapons basing in space cannot be ruledout. As reliance on the global commons increases, maintaining freedom of accesswill be a vital objective for governments.
Cyber. Cyberspace is already an active battleground, with state and non-state actors
continuously searching for adversaries’ vulnerabilities, trying to obtain secret information,
developing weapons and occasionally deploying them. For example, cyber attacks canbe used to disable industrial facilities or shut down public services. Those countries with
open cyber borders are likely to benefit economically, as well as being able to analyse
the data flowing into their territories and to distribute their own information more easily.
However, such countries are also likely to be more exposed to cyber hazards than thosethat control their cyber borders, so states may need to carefully balance openness andcontrol. Algorithms are likely to be used increasingly by some countries to analyse datafrom civilian populations, including that harvested from social media, thereby enabling
actors to develop effective strategies for manipulating public opinion.

22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (27 January 2015), ‘IFT Transport
Outlook 2015’.

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Urban conflict. As more people live in cities, urban areas are likely to become more
central to conflict. The governments of developing countries that experience rapid
urbanisation, many of which will be in coastal regions, may be unable to provide essential
services to their growing populations, leading to grievance and possibly conflict, including
terrorism. In failing or fragile states, criminal-insurgent groups may takeover cities,
controlling the population through intimidation and low-intensity terror.23 The dense,
multidimensional nature of urban environments means that military and police tactics
are likely to require modification over the coming decades. For example, the value ofhigh ground may be eroded by the lack of manoeuvrability entailed by operating at the
top of high-rise buildings. The vast underground network created for transportation,
sewage and utilities infrastructure could become the vital ground of urban operations.
Similarly, large numbers of people and electronic devices with their associated emissions(such as heat, light and radio waves) are likely to challenge today’s surveillance systems.
Conversely, using the embedded surveillance systems likely to be found in the smart
cities of the future could confer an overwhelming advantage to the possessor. The
connectivity and density of cities are likely to leave them vulnerable to devastating
attacks (whether by cyber or conventional means) from irregular actors, criminals or
hostile states. The capacity and technical competence of civil defence organisations is,therefore, likely to have to grow significantly to meet these challenges.

Diy13 / iStock

The complex, crowded nature of cities already makes it easy for insurgents to hide, anddifficult for government forces to use air power and artillery effectively without causing
unacceptable numbers of civilian casualties. Military and security forces are likely to be
increasingly required to fight within cities, including going into buildings and clearing themroom by room. Machines could play a more important role in this process in the future,moving ahead of troops to see what is in a room, clearing booby traps and explosives,and firing weapons either at the command of a remote operator or automatically.

Urban areas will become even more central to conflict
23 Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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States will continue to form or maintain traditional alliances, but alliances may also diversify

ActorsStates. Although state governments will face an increasing number of threats andchallenges, they are likely to remain the key security actor. States will continue to be theprincipal organisations that set and shape laws, both domestic and international, collecttaxes and determine relationships with other states. The capacity of many governments,
particularly in developing countries where they are likely to significantly expand theirdomestic tax base, are likely to increase. New surveillance technology is likely tostrengthen the hand of states in ensuring domestic security, although this could leadto repression. There is, however, likely to be an increasing number of actors delivering
services that are (in many cases) currently the preserve of the state. For example, inmost countries Internet services, including Internet security, are delivered by privatecompanies. Private companies are also putting satellites into orbit and, particularly inWestern countries, running critical national infrastructure. Many governments could,
therefore, adopt a federated approach to delivering services.
Alliances. The norms of the rules-based international system are currently shaped mainly
by a state-centric approach and have not yet evolved to deal with the diffusion of power
and proliferation of actors below state level. As a result, states will probably continue toform or maintain traditional alliances, such as NATO, and partnerships at the state levelthat will help them sense, attribute and respond to threats. In addition, states’ alliances
may diversify. In future they may partner with multinational corporations or private
security companies and even powerful regional or global institutions, gaining advantage
from the collective capabilities they possess. This may allow close coordination of
cyberspace, exploitation of information, and political and economic warfare, for which
expertise and resources, particularly at scale, may primarily exist outside the state.
Some contemporary alliances may realign if the global power dynamic rebalances.
Some alliances, such as the US and Canada’s bilateral cooperation, including the North
American Aerospace Defence Command, will remain geographically based. Others may
evolve as a global network in response to new threats to which distance is only a limited
defence. If regional organisations such as the European Union remain strong, they may
increasingly develop common security policies to be better able to share the burden

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Global Strategic TrendsConflict and securityof military and security costs. Access to technology may become a new influence on
alliances. States that can form successful partnerships with private industry, especiallywith technology firms, are likely to derive a crucial advantage in future conflicts.
People’s identities will become more layered and complex as the forces of globalisation
contribute, simultaneously, to both increased cosmopolitanism and retrenchment. As
citizens’ identity becomes more complex and the number of actors with whom they
associate (for example, religious organisations, online gaming communities, politicalgroups, football clubs and celebrities) demand varying degrees of allegiance, states
are likely to find maintaining the support of their citizens increasingly challenging. The
ability of governments, and competing non-state actors, to build alliances across thisincreasingly broad array of actors will be essential for the power of a state. States
will therefore have to work with an increasingly diverse set of partners, including,non-governmental organisations, commercial organisations and, for some, criminalorganisations. Private security companies are also likely to play an increasingly importantrole, possibly at a far greater scale than currently.
Private security companies. Organised crime, including piracy, and the threat fromcybercrime have led private companies to increase their investment in security in recent
years. If, as expected, the threat from terrorism endures, companies are likely to seek
to enhance, and invest in, their own security, rather than relying on protection from thestate.24 Some of these funds could be spent internally, but much will also be paid toprivate security companies. Private security companies range from those supplying
computer antivirus software to businesses providing armed personnel for a multitudeof tasks.

People’s identities
will become
more layered
and complex
as the forcesof globalisation
contribute,
simultaneously,
to both increased
cosmopolitanism
and retrenchment.

Private security companies offer several advantages that are likely to make themattractive in the future, particularly if (as seems probable) the currently high numbersof minor conflicts and multinational missions continue. For example, private security
companies only have to be paid for when they are needed (as opposed to being
expensively maintained whether used or not); the employing organisation can, withvarying degrees of credibility, deny they are using them; and, if killed, private security
employees rarely attract the same degree of sympathy from an employing state’s
citizens. Private security companies are also often used without being subject to thefull range of governance limitations that a state’s armed forces are held to, making themmore politically convenient. There are, however, several disadvantages associated withthe use of private security companies, not least the risk of companies failing to meettheir contractual obligations or engaging in behaviour that discredits the employing state.
Nevertheless, the advantages of using private security companies are likely to endure,and possibly increase, meaning that they could be an increasingly important feature of
future conflicts.
Private companies. Recent decades have seen the growing use of private companies toprovide support to military operations, such as supplying bottled water, communication
facilities and logistics. Governments are also increasingly replacing state-run security
services with provision from private companies, for example, delivering diplomatic
protection. Private companies, particularly in Western militaries, are already used
to build, maintain, repair and even operate military vehicles, ships, aircraft and othercomplex capabilities. As industry continues to develop advanced capabilities in artificial
intelligence and robotics, private companies will play a more important role in many
countries’ ability to use military force. Since several companies that produce militarycapabilities sell to multiple governments, it is conceivable that in future conflicts, a single
private company could be providing essential capabilities to both sides.

24 Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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Commercial cyber actors. In many parts of the world, cyber security and Internet services(such as social media and online banking) are provided by private organisations. Cyber
security companies are likely to benefit from significant rises in funding during the coming
decades, and will probably become increasingly capable. While a cyber company’s
focus is likely to be protecting corporate, and clients’ networks and capabilities,
developers will almost certainly understand how to conduct cyberattacks, if only to learn
how to better defend against them. It is likely, however, that at least some cyber security
companies (or individual employees) will provide offensive cyber capabilities for hire.

The likelihood ofviolent extremist
organisationsacquiring andusing a nuclear
weapon remains
low but plausible.

Violent extremist organisations. The number of attacks by violent extremist organisations
increased sharply in 2008, reaching their highest recorded level in 2014, with over
16,000 attacks.25 The Middle East and North Africa region has experienced the highest
number of attacks by far, followed by South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, while Northand South America have seen significant reductions. In Europe, the frequency of violent
extremist organisation attacks is currently approaching levels similar to those seen in
the 1970s.26 The global number of attacks by violent extremist organisations is likely torise, partly because weapons and explosives (or the means and information needed tomake them) are becoming more readily available, but also because the grievances andstresses that give rise to conflict are likely to increase. While separatist nationalism has
been the most common ideological motivation for violent extremist organisations, violent
jihadism has become the most potent ideology and it shows no sign of diminishing.
Anti-immigration and anti-Islamic sentiments are also on the rise and they too could
become driving motivations.
Number of terrorism attacks per region

CS3 – Number of terrorism attacks per region – 1970-2015
18,000

North America
EuropeCentral America and Caribbean
South America
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Rest of the world

Number of attacks

16,00014,00012,00010,000
8,000
6,000
4,000

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

0

1970

2,000

Source: Datagraver
Source: Datagraver

The likelihood of violent extremist organisations acquiring and using a nuclear weapon
remains low but plausible, particularly for groups with sufficient funds to suborn thosewith legitimate access to such technology. All known instances of planned or actual
theft of nuclear or radiological material have been facilitated by insiders who stated theirmotivation was financial gain. Violent extremist organisations are also likely to try todevelop or obtain chemical and biological weapons, although the majority of attacks willprobably continue to involve small arms and explosives when they can be obtained, andvehicles and knives when they cannot. While some violent extremist organisations mightdevelop highly capable abilities equivalent or close to NATO soldiers, most are likely toremain ad hoc, drawing on the society from which they originate.
25 Datagraver, (2016), ‘Worldwide Terrorism 1970-2015’.
26 Roser, M., et al., (2018), ‘Our World in Data: Terrorism’.

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Conflict and security

Nuclear-armed states are in the process of modernising their arsenals

Most violent extremist organisations will continue to depend on cheap, readily available
equipment, and this could continue to provide an asymmetric advantage against a more
technologically-advanced foe. For example, in 2017, it was established that Houthi
rebels in Yemen had employed low-cost drones to disable Patriot missile systems in
Saudi Arabia.27 Asymmetries of this sort are likely to remain favoured techniques in the
coming decades, as they allow violent extremist organisations to cause heavy financial
losses at a relatively low cost to themselves.

Capabilities
Nuclear weapons. While the overall number of nuclear weapons in the world has
declined, nuclear-armed states are in the process of modernising their arsenals.
Moreover, the destructive power of each nuclear warhead has increased significantly
since the first atomic weapons were used in World War 2.28 Countries with nuclear
weapons are unlikely to relinquish them in the foreseeable future. Indeed, on current
trends, the number of nuclear-armed states is likely to continue to rise in the coming
years, at the rate of roughly one or two nations per decade, with North Korea the latest
confirmed country in 2006. However, a nuclear arms race could occur, for example, if
one Middle Eastern country develops nuclear weapons, others are likely to follow suit.
While Russia and the US account for more than 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads,

27 Defense News, ‘Report: Houthi rebels flying Iranian-made ‘Kamikaze drones’ into surveillance radars’.
28 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2017), ‘Global nuclear weapons: modernization remains
the priority’.

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China has the resources to substantially increase its nuclear capability, should it choose
to do so. While more-powerful nuclear weapons might be developed in the coming
decades, the current focus is on building smaller, more accurate, faster missiles withmultiple warheads.
Estimated global number of nuclear warheads

CS4

Number of warheads

80,000Russia/Soviet Union
United States
China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the UK
Total global

70,00060,00050,00040,00030,00020,00010,000

2014

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

1955

1950

1945

0

SourceSource: Federation of American Scientists

Russia’s growing emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons could heighten the likelihoodthat they will be used, perhaps to compensate for gaps in conventional capability.29
Because the use of tactical nuclear weapons is not expected to result in mutuallyassured destruction, the threshold for their use may be lower than that of strategic
nuclear weapons. Therefore, although impossible to quantify, the risk that nuclear
weapons are used looks likely to increase. It is also probable that nuclear weapons arebeing developed for the specific purpose of delivering electromagnetic pulses to destroy
electronic devices and networks across wide areas.30

Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons aredesigned to inflict massive damage and prime targets are cities, particularly capitals.
The owners of strategic weapons also have the capability to fire back if they are
subject to a nuclear attack, allowing them to cause substantial retaliatory harmto their attackers, a deadly balance known as mutually assured destruction.
The intention of some of those who hold strategic nuclear weapons is to deter
potential attackers, so that they never have to be used. Tactical weapons,
however, are designed not to deter but to create military effect, such as destroying
a hardened command and control centre or an aircraft carrier. Their use isintended to be calibrated so as not to lead to escalation and retaliation withstrategic nuclear weapons.

29 Goliath, M., et al., Granholm N. (red), Rydqvist J. (red), Kärnvapen för slagfältsbruk och europeisk säkerhet– en strategisk faktors regionala betydelse [Translation – Nuclear arms for the battlefield and European
Security].
30 Kristensen, H. and McKinzie, M., International Review of the Red Cross, 97, (2015), ‘Nuclear arsenals:
current developments, trends and capabilities’, pages 563-599.

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Electromagnetic pulses. A high-altitude nuclear detonation generating an enhanced
electromagnetic pulse would instantaneously shut down numerous satellites, mostof a country’s electric power grid and severely damage national telephone lines,
communication systems, other electrical installations and even diesel generators forweeks, possibly years. While military equipment might be hardened, civilian capabilities
would be badly affected. Data would be corrupted, broadcast stations would go off air
and the effects on automated systems could be catastrophic. Much of modern society
has forgotten how to survive for long periods without electricity, meaning that there could
be disastrous follow-on consequences from a large electromagnetic pulse, such as
shortages of food and water, as well as a breakdown in law and order.
Potential methods of reducing the effects of an electromagnetic pulse detonation (suchas using optical fibre or protecting transformers and other vital equipment) already exist
in principle, but would require significant investment to be implemented on a large scale.
The detonation of a small nuclear weapon designed to deliver an electromagnetic pulse
wave could be an effective asymmetric option. Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse
technologies could also be fielded by developed militaries, less powerful states and evennon-state actors. Although the effect of a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse is likely to
be much smaller than a nuclear electromagnetic pulse, this also makes the effect more
precise. For example, terrorists could have a disproportionate disruptive (but non-lethal)effect by initiating a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse outside a facility containing
important electrical equipment or data storage.31

Kovalenko Alexander / Shutterstock.com

Chemical and biological weapons. Although banned under international law, it is likelythat some states and non-state actors will continue to develop, stockpile and use
chemical and biological weapons.32 Syria has repeatedly used chemical weapons inrecent years and, similarly, Iraq deployed chemical weapons against Iranian troops in the
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, and against its own population in 1988. Chemical weapons
have also been used by non-state actors in recent decades (for example, by insurgentsin Iraq and by Daesh), as has anthrax. Developments in biology and chemistry could
allow weapons to be developed that can be precisely targeted and are more lethal, or
possibly with specific non-lethal effects, making them more attractive to potential users.
Genetic engineering could allow bacteria and viruses to be developed that only target
victims with selected genetic traits.

Some states will continue to develop, stockpile and use chemical and biological weapons
31 Emanuelson, J., ‘Non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse Generation’.
32 Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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Conflict and security

Directed energy weapons could offer unprecedented levels of accuracy and variability of effectPrecision strike. Weapon systems will become more accurate and have longer ranges.
Rail guns that use electromagnets to fire projectiles at speeds of 4,500 miles per hour
have already been developed.33 Directed energy weapons, including lasers, could
offer unprecedented levels of accuracy and variability of effect, potentially including
non-lethal results such as immobilising vehicles or temporarily incapacitating individuals.
Hypersonic missiles that can fly faster than five times the speed of sound are underdevelopment, as well as improved cruise missiles and glide vehicles which could belaunched to the edge of space before attacking their targets. Such weapons might beused to strike practically anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, and their ability
to change direction in flight will probably make it hard to predict their targets or deploy
appropriate responses. They are also likely to make air and sea lines of communication
increasingly vulnerable, and mean that distance will become increasingly irrelevant as asecurity buffer or defence.
Future weapons could be deployed much more rapidly, reducing the amount of time
available to determine if an attack is underway and what the appropriate response
should be. This could heighten the risk of miscalculation, such as retaliation in response
to a false alert. Since it may be harder in future to distinguish between a conventionalor nuclear attack, the risk of a nuclear response is also likely to increase. Space
could develop as a theatre of war in the coming decades. Weapons that can destroysatellites and other human-made space objects are likely to be created, and it is evenpossible that armaments designed to be fired from space onto the Earth’s surface will
be manufactured.34 In parallel, methods of denying space capability without generatinglarge amounts of debris, such as cyber weapons, are being developed. At the sametime, some major powers are preparing for wars without access to space, for example,
by training without Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation.

33 The Economist, (27 January 2018), ‘Power Projection’, page 12.
34 Johnson, R., (2017), The Future of Conflict, Violence and Security: A study in support of the Global
Strategic Trends research – II: Future Defence and Security, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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Remote and automated systems. Remotely-operated air vehicles are a common
feature of many of today’s battlefields, and some automatic systems (such as thosethat allow manned aircraft to operate if the pilot is injured) are already in service. Suchsystems are less familiar in the land and maritime environment, but are likely to becomecommonplace. For example, automated submarines are likely to be used to conduct
reconnaissance missions against enemy coasts to seek and destroy mines, and possiblyused to automatically attack submarines or ships that enter a defined area. Similarly,
on land, vehicles are likely to be developed that automatically deliver supplies, conduct
reconnaissance, and clear obstacles, including mines and booby traps.

Chesky_W / iStock.com

Increasingly, machines capable of combat are likely to be used on the battlefield underclose human supervision, but as confidence in the machines capabilities grow, they
could be employed further away from human supervision. In time, for those who canafford them, machines will be used first, before putting people in harm’s way. Automatedsystems need not be expensive. Cheap mass-produced swarming devices could
be used to conduct attacks, overwhelming defensive systems.35 Armed machines
are also likely to be developed, some of which might be able to automatically engage
targets without human intervention. Removing the operator from danger should
reduce the occurrence of instinctive, adrenalin-fuelled decision-making, influenced
by fear, fatigue and anger and thus, an automated response could be more rational,
possibly strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law. Alternatively,
poorly designed and insufficiently supervised machines might dogmatically follow
poorly-designed rules that lead to unjustifiable deaths. The (apparently) inexorable
improvements in the capability of machines suggest that the physical component offighting power could overshadow the conceptual (perhaps also done by machines) andmoral components, at least at the tactical level.

Cheap mass-produced drones could overwhelm defences

35 Hammes, T. X., War on the Rocks, (2014), ‘The Future of Warfare: Small, Many, Smart VS. Few & Exquisite?’.

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The oceans
might berendered virtuallytransparent.

Sensors. The growing number of sensors monitoring the physical world will givemachines vast amounts of data to analyse and draw conclusions from. Sensors are
becoming more powerful, capable of exploiting a broad array of the electromagnetic
spectrum and seeing ever further with increasing fidelity. In the coming years, however,the sheer volume of devices that emit signals and other forms of energy are likely tooverwhelm some surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Although in the longer term
more powerful computers, enhanced by developments in artificial intelligence, are likely
to weave information from multiple sources (including from secondary signals, suchas changes in air temperature and trace emissions from engines) into comprehensive
pictures of future battlefields. Theoretically, the oceans might be rendered virtuallytransparent and hostile aircraft could be identified before they take off, although capable
adversaries will almost certainly use deception and false signals to camouflage theiractivities. Actors with the best sensors, data and algorithms will probably be able toidentify the positions of combatants and non-combatants with a high degree of accuracy
and thus achieve an important competitive advantage.
Artificial intelligence. The very nature of cyberspace makes it the ideal environment
for artificial intelligence to be deployed. In future, artificial intelligence could be used
to provide automatic defences, evolving rapidly to counter changing threats, as well
as for dynamic cyberattacks, constantly probing for weakness and developing new
ways to attack opponents at lightning speed. Outside cyberspace, the use of artificial
intelligence to mine data and fuse information from sensors should help leaders to bebetter informed, and in time, artificial intelligence will probably be used to automaticallymake decisions. Indeed, some systems are already automated, such as those on ships
designed to shoot down incoming missiles, because a response is needed before humancalculations could be made. However, allowing artificial intelligence to decide to kill a
person without human oversight is a step many find horrifying. In particular, some fear
that, if any kind of permission is given to machines to kill, a rogue artificial intelligencemight decide to exterminate or enslave humanity. While attempts are being made to
ban the development of autonomous machines that can kill, it is difficult to see such
restrictions being wholeheartedly accepted (let alone enforced) by all countries or actors.
Attracting suitably skilled personnel to work in artificial intelligence for military purposes islikely to be a strategic challenge for many countries, partly due to the multimillion-dollar
salaries that the best developers can obtain.36 Moreover, some programmers are likely
to refuse to work on military artificial intelligence, although these decisions are unlikely tobe respected everywhere. For example, the Chinese and Russian governments are likely
to insist that technology firms operating in their countries develop military capabilities(as artificial intelligence is a national priority for both nations), and this could deliver asignificant military advantage for them.37

36 Bughin, et al., (2017), McKinsey Global Institute, ‘How artificial intelligence can deliver real value
to companies’.
37 The Economist, (27 January 2018), ‘The Future of War’, page 11.

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Actors that most effectively integrate man and machine may derive a decisive advantage

Nature and character of warfare
As already described, weapons such as hypersonic missiles are being developedthat will almost certainly reduce decision-making time. It is plausible therefore thatsome countries may decide to delegate defence against such weapons to an artificial
intelligence. Others might go further, calculating that using an artificial intelligence tocommand and control wider military operations (perhaps using automated ships, aircraft
and land systems) could deliver an overwhelming advantage. The ethical consequencesof the militarisation of artificial intelligence could be profound. A machine may take noaccount of human suffering and might all too readily resort to violence. Alternatively,
free from ego, hubris and nationalistic sentiment, an artificial intelligence might morerationally calculate the probable costs of conflict, thus preventing states from making
rash decisions.
If artificial intelligence and machines carry out an increasing number of combat functions
and decisions, the impact will be profound. Courage, fortitude and valour have beensynonymous with the military ideal, yet in a future where machines do most of aprofessional military’s fighting and key decision-making, from where will personnel draw
their values and inspiration? The potentially cool, hyper-logical calculations of machines
could remove passion from war and if the digital exertions of cyberspace are the vital
battles of future wars, violence too might become a diminishing part of conflict. Thosethat most effectively integrate the capabilities of machines and people may derivea decisive advantage. Historians will be the judges, but it is plausible that by 2050
(or perhaps before) automation and artificial intelligence will have altered not just thecharacter, but the very nature of war.

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Future worlds: Conflict and security
Multilateralism

Multipolarity• States adapt and adhere to arms control
treaties.
• Cooperation reduces the requirement for
defence spending.
• The incentive to weaponise civil technology
is low.
• Violent extremist organisations are addressedin a globally-concerted way.
• Defence capabilities are frequently employedon operations other than war, for example,
humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

• States are more willing to use military force
to achieve objectives.
• Deterrence is key to conflict prevention,
resulting in increased defence spending.
• Arms control treaties are of limited effect.
• New weapons of mass effect are developed
and proliferated within blocs.
• Smaller regional conflicts are exploited as
proxies by blocs.
• Blocs engage in persistent competition
exploiting new technologies and hybrid
techniques.

• Reduced defence-oriented science andtechnology development.

• Constant mistrust and the potential for anarms race.

• Greater emphasis on using contractors topreserve defence and security services.

• Investment in science and technology isprioritised to defence-oriented activity.

• Expeditionary and humanitarian and disaster
relief operations capabilities are prioritised overterritorial defence.

• Alliance capabilities are prioritised for territorial
defence, rather than expeditionary operations.

• Some states focus on developing niche
capabilities for operating within alliances.

• Support to humanitarian aid, stabilisation andpeacekeeping operations is reduced.

Network of actors

Fragmentation• States and corporations cooperate in amutual effort to provide defence and security,
nationally and internationally.

• States are no longer the principal defence
and security actor. They also face diminishingsocietal cohesion.

• Arms control treaties exist but adaptation to
fast-changing technologies is challenging.

• Spending on defence and security is very high,but is spread across multiple actors.

• Defence spending is reduced and states use
private security companies widely.

• Arms control treaties are ignored.

• Non-state actors (including cities andcorporations) take the lead in providing security
services for their interests and responsibilities.

• Greater role of non-state actors in providing
security changes the nature of power.
• State’s monopoly of violence is dissolving
and populations are less able to influence thedecision to use violence.
• Coordination of defence and security-related
activities becomes more complex.
• More actors and less regulation increases
the risk that illegal weapons are developed
and proliferated.

Competition

Cooperation

Powerful states• New arms technologies are exploited by all
actors without ethical constraints.
• Violent extremist organisations proliferate.

• State defence capabilities focus on protecting
critical infrastructure and interests, counteringsignificant internal and foreign threats.
• There is a high risk of violent conflict,particularly ethnic and sectarian violence.
• Societal erosion causes increasing (and more
persistent) threats from terrorism, insurgency
and criminality.

Diffusion of power

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N
W

E

Watch points

Discontinuities

S• Level of cooperation in conflict prevention andinternational responses to conflict and disaster
relief activities.
• Degree to which international law and ethics
constrain the use of novel technologies, such as
human enhancement and artificial intelligence,for defence and security.
• Adherence to arms control treaties.
• Increases in confrontational nationalistic politics.
• Changes in global defence spending.
• Rise in unregulated, privatised defence andsecurity providers.

• Global conflict (i.e., a ‘World War’).
• Shifts in the membership of alliances.
• Declining military pre-eminence of US.
• Rapid proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
• Collapse of key multilateral organisations, forexample, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, European Union, and so on.
• Ideological/religious revolution within a major state.
• Major cyberattack resulting in the breakdown
of a country/region.
• Disruptive technologies.
• Changing nature of war.

Implications• In a complex interconnected world, an
understanding of the causes of crises and conflicts
is critical and requires a whole-of-government
approach and response.
• States will need to be prepared for state-on-state
warfare, including through collective defence
alliances, whole-of-government approaches andstrengthening of homeland resilience. Deterrence
strategies need to adapt to new and emerging
weapons of mass effect and defensive capabilities.
• How to create mass effect and competitive
advantage, either by few very expensive advanced
capabilities or by large numbers of cheaper
capabilities, will need careful consideration.
• The variety and influence of non-traditional security
actors will make it necessary to think differently
about defence alliances and partnerships. New
forms of cooperation will be required to achieve
viable, legitimate and equitable rules, norms andinstitutions.
• Arms control regimes, already under stress due todiffering interpretation and application, will need
to be robustly enforced to restrict proliferation of
weapons of mass effects, and modified to cope witha new range of challenges such as cyber weapons
and the use of artificial intelligence in conflict.

Global Strategic Trends• Actors who develop the capabilities and framework
to exploit the expanding competitive space will
derive a significant advantage.
• Artificial intelligence and robotics could be astransformational to warfare as radio and aviation.
The pace of technological change will necessitatechanges in policymaking, norms, permissions andauthorities otherwise there is a risk of ceding theinitiative to competitors.
• Despite sustained downward trends in defence
spending, states will need to ensure they match
investment with their level of ambition. A clear
understanding of the value defence offers as anational insurance policy is needed, and this may
require a narrative with the public.
• Distance will become less relevant as a security
buffer as weapon systems will be faster, moreaccurate and have greater range/reach. The
homeland can no longer be considered a sanctuary,
with obvious need for resilience. Warfare will
become ever more personalised as individuals
and their families are targeted in novel ways.
• Tackling transnational criminal and violent extremist
organisations will require global cooperation and awhole-of-government approach.

147

Global stress map

These stress maps are an illustrative visualisationof the potential impact of seven stress influences:
water security, food insecurity, population, statefragility, impact of climate change, megacities andchoke points.
The maps illustrate expected impacts on people
and their activities rather than physical attributes
in 2050.

148

These maps are based on analysis completed as part of thisedition of Global Strategic Trends, and made particular use of:• Human Dynamics of Climate Change, Met Office;• Global City Populations, UNDP;• City Population 2050, University of Ontario;• 2018 Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace; and• Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade,
Chatham House, 2017.

Global Strategic Trends

Higher

Relative stress
Lower

Water security

Megacities

Food insecurity

Maritime chokepoint

Population

Coastal chokepoint

State fragility

Inland chokepoint

Megacities
Climate change

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149

Central Asia

1
2
3
4
5

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

1

2

5
4

150

3

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Central Asia

Central Asia

Having only gained their independence in the 1990s, the countries of Central Asia
are still adjusting to the changed geostrategic environment. The region will become
more closely integrated into the global economy, particularly the markets of China andEurope. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China is making substantial investments
in infrastructure in Central Asia, enhancing the land route to Europe. This is likely toboost and lead to diversification of the economy. Whilst China is the largest trading
partner and investor in the region, Russia will seek to retain its influence, not least
through its indigenous ethnic Russian populations. Many of the region’s governments
are authoritarian and corruption is endemic, but a better educated and increasingly
globally connected population could force improvements. Governments will also seek
to balance their relationships with China, Russia and the West. The risk of ethnic andreligiously motivated violence is likely to endure, and could be exploited by organised
crime groups and terrorists. Climate change and unsustainable practices are likely toresult in water shortages that could lead to conflict. There are several unsettled borderdisputes in the region and local skirmishes across these borders are likely to endure.
Whilst armed conflict between Central Asian states cannot be ruled out, the transnational
nature of security challenges and the influence of outside powers should drive regional
cooperation.

Environment
The effects of climate change in the region will be mixed. Although a rise in averagetemperature may increase the agricultural output in northern and eastern Kazakhstan,it will probably worsen droughts and desertification and increase water demand inwestern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.1
Both water use and availability varies amongst Central Asian countries and water is likely
to remain an important and contested resource.2 Whilst increased glacier melting might
increase flows of water in the medium term, higher temperatures will increase water loss
due to evaporation. Water management is as significant as water scarcity. Obsolete andunsustainable infrastructure and practices, particularly in the agricultural sector, are highly
wasteful, which could threaten the water-intensive economies of Central Asia. However,they may also provide strong incentives for regional cooperation and for investment in
new technologies in the agricultural sector and in water management in general.

1

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report.

2

International Crisis Group, (11 September 2014), Water Pressures in Central Asia.

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151Central Asia

Central Asia is a seismically active region. The Fergana Valley, a particularly vulnerable
area, is home to 20% of the region’s population. More than half of the inhabitants live inhouses that were not built to withstand strong earthquakes. Due to the many built andplanned dams, earthquakes could cause significant damage, including severe flooding.

Human development
Central Asia’s population is likely to grow by approximately 40%, from about 68 million
in 2015 to an estimated 94.5 million in 2050.3 Growth will not be uniform, for example,
Tajikistan’s population is projected to grow by 68%. As a result, the difference in sizeof the population between Russia and Central Asia will reduce. Most of Central Asia’s
population growth will occur in and around the Fergana Valley, putting pressures on
economies, infrastructure and food production.
Population growth will drive greater urbanisation. The share of Central Asia’s population
living in urban areas is likely to grow from 44% in 2015 to 54% in 2050, an additional
20 million people. Rapid urbanisation could pose problems for Central Asian countries
because urban governance is poor, with limited resources and ill-defined divisionsof responsibility between local, regional and national authorities. Infrastructure islargely obsolete and employment opportunities may be insufficient to support urban
populations.4 However, potential domestic and foreign investment in technologies suchas renewable energy, electric cars and automated service provision could lead to majorurban improvements in the region.
As people move from poorer rural to wealthier urban areas, comparatively well-educatedand cosmopolitan people are likely to mix with the more religious, traditionalist andless educated.5 Combined with interstate migration patterns, this may increase social
integration but could also lead to a rise in tensions. In addition to the internal movementof people, external labour migration and remittance flows may also increase, dependingon economic opportunities abroad, particularly in Russia.

Central Asia population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
1.0
0.9

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Population (millions)910

Central Asia 2015
Central Asia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)152

3

United Nations (UN) Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), (2017), The World Population
Prospects: 2017 Revision.

4

Center for Economic Research, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and UN
Development Programme (UNDP), (2013), Urbanization in Central Asia: Challenges, Issues and Prospects.

5

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, (2016), The Silk Road to 2050: Key Trends,
a research paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

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Central Asia

Education in Central Asian countries is based on the Soviet system, which brings bothstrengths and weaknesses. Some fundamental indicators are positive as there is almost
universal literacy and high enrolment rates in both primary and secondary education.
However, there is also a mismatch between education provision and the needs of thelabour market, which may hamper economic growth, modernisation and diversification.
Education systems in Central Asian countries still reflect the effects of Soviet emphasison technical and vocational training over university education. As a result, the labour
force is not optimised for a modern economy. This is exacerbated by limited accessto tertiary education in some countries.6 However, increasing numbers of students areseeking higher education abroad. International investments and cooperation with theEuropean Union, the United Kingdom and others are likely to bring novel ideas and skills
to a new generation.

velirina / Shutterstock.com

Since gaining independence from Russia in the early 1990s, Central Asian countries haveincreased spending on health care. Improvements, including a greater focus on primarycare, have led to an increase in life expectancy equivalent to lower-middle income
countries. However, the number of HIV/AIDS cases in the region continues to grow,and health care expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) remains far
below the average of former Soviet countries. It may take decades of sustained reform
to ensure that health care professionals are highly qualified and equipped, preventative
medicine receives sufficient attention, and health care is sustainably financed.7

Central Asian literacy and enrolment levels are high but Soviet-style education may not match future labour market needs

6

Riboud, M., Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, (2016), ‘Investing in Inclusive
Human Development’.

7

Ibid.

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153

Leonid Andronov / Shutterstock.com

China’s investment in infrastructure, such as the railways, brings increasing influence

Economics
Central Asia has good rates of economic growth, largely due to commodity exports.
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan export hydrocarbons, cotton and minerals,
while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also export some commodities, but have a greater
dependence on remittances from emigrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan. Energy
exports from Central Asia to China are likely to decrease, as countries in the region
diversify their economies and use their resources for high value domestic production.
Greater diversification is likely to help achieve sustainable economic development andprovide employment. The revolution in communications technology could offer newopportunities for Central Asian countries to realise productivity gains. However, there
are some obstacles to diversification. Central Asian countries may need to improve theirattitudes to business and investments by strengthening institutions, improving property
rights and the rule of law, and carrying out structural reforms. They will also need toaddress corruption and tackle infrastructure shortcomings, while overcoming resistanceamong influential elites with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.8 Regional
integration could also become increasingly important, as countries seek to reduce trade
costs. The city of Tashkent has the potential to regain its old role as a regional trade hub.
Central Asia’s geostrategic position between China and Europe may lead to significant
development following Chinese investment as part of the infrastructure programme of
the Belt and Road Initiative (an initiative seeking to expand maritime routes and land
infrastructure networks connecting China with Asia, Africa and Europe, boosting tradeand economic growth). The land corridor between China and Europe allows faster but
more expensive transportation compared to sea lanes, and China has earmarked large
sums of money to improve the route.9 This would present Central Asia with greater
economic opportunity, with the region likely to become a more mature market for China
in the future.

154

8International Crisis Group, (15 March 2017), Uzbekistan: The Hundred Days.

9

PwC’s Growth Market Centre, (February 2016), China’s New Silk Route: The long and winding road.

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Central Asia

GovernanceCentral Asian countries continue to develop their national identity nearly 30 years
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, Kazakhstan is changing fromthe Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet and using Kazak as the national language, as well as
promoting local culture and history. However, through its extensive control of the media
in most countries, Russia may continue to have a significant influence on public opinion.
Secularism and tolerance are generally accepted norms in the region’s ethnically diverse
societies, but religion is growing in importance in parts of Central Asia. Islam is thelargest religion in the region, practised by 70%-90% of the population.
The countries of Central Asia are predominantly authoritarian and suffer from corruption,
weak institutions and parallel power structures. As a result, the peaceful transitionof power is likely to be challenging and will probably be a source of great interest forexternal powers, particularly Russia. The next generation of leaders, representing newvalues and ideas, may struggle to establish influence over politics and the economy.
A variety of actors with competing interests, including criminal organisations, are likely toresist change.10 Governance challenges may also occur at the sub-national level due toan increased demand for devolution of some central authority, despite political qualms
about ceding power to local and regional levels of government.11
There may be increasing pressure on Central Asian countries to address governanceissues, due to: a greater awareness among a digitally and globally connected newgeneration; population growth; increased urbanisation; fluctuating commodity prices;
and international influences. There are some indications that reforms may besuccessful. For example, Kyrgyzstan has recently attempted to foster a pluralistic
parliamentary system. After two civil wars in the space of five years, the country has had
trouble-free parliamentary and presidential elections, and is seeing initial consolidation ofan open political system. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s new president has pushed for greatertransparency and openness, and Kazakhstan may see a new president elected in 2020.

Central Asia’s geostrategic position between China and Europe may increase development: Samarkand lay on the old Silk Route10 International Crisis Group, (15 March 2017), Uzbekistan: The Hundred Days.
11 Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, (2016), The Silk Road to 2050: Key Trends,
a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

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155

Geopolitics
Russia remains a major influence in the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia, despite
their efforts to form ties with the wider world after gaining independence.12 Central
Asian countries tend to avoid making foreign policy choices on ideological grounds.
Instead they engage with multiple actors (with a variety of political philosophies) basedon cost-benefit analysis. As a result, Central Asian countries have: joined Russian-led
security and trade blocs (the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU)); engaged with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)(through the Partnership for Peace programme); and become part of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (a political, economic and security group). Kyrgyzstan, forexample, has Russia as a key partner (providing trade opportunities, direct investments
and even security equipment), but also hosted a United States (US) air base until 2014.
In the future, Central Asia’s geopolitical focus may shift and there are already somesigns that a change of emphasis has begun. Trade between China and Central Asia
has risen dramatically since 2000, and China is now the region’s leading trade partner,
providing investments and financing for large infrastructure projects. Chinese investment
in Central Asia surpassed that of Russia in 2009. While China’s stated aim is to boost
trade by improving regional infrastructure, increasing regional economic policy integration
and removing trade barriers, security arrangements are likely to follow to protect theirinvestments.
Although anti-Chinese sentiments are currently strong among the Central Asian public,
as China’s investments in the region grow, its influence is likely to rise. In response,
Russia will seek to maintain its own influence through the EAEU, an organisation
modelled roughly on the European Union. Russia’s aspiration to reclaim so called ‘lost
territories’ is likely to persist, particularly as some Central Asian countries have Russianminorities, hence the spectre of a Crimean-style annexation will endure in the near term.
While the European Union is expected to play an important role in a number of fields,
particularly education, the US has recently lowered levels of aid to Central Asia, arguably
reducing its soft power influence in the region.13
12 Hanks, R. R., in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11(3), (September 2009), ‘Multi-vector politics’and Kazakhstan’s emerging role as a geo-strategic player in Central Asia’, pages 257-267.
13 Ayres, A., Forbes, (4 May 2017), ‘Trump to Cut Foreign Aid Budgets, Opening South and Central Asia’s
Door to Chinese Influence’.

156

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MehmetO / Shutterstock.com

Monument of Victory in Biskek, capital of Kyrgyzstan: Russia remains a major influence in post-Soviet Central Asia

Central Asia

Security
Ethnic tensions are a looming threat to security in Central Asia. Major ethnic violence
flared up in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 with hundreds killed and many wounded, and tensions
continue to run high.14 Similarly, there is an ethnic dimension to border disputes between
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the fertile and densely-populated Fergana
Valley.15 The borders, initially drawn up when the countries were part of the Soviet
Union, are not yet settled and ethnic enclaves dotted around the area complicate thesituation in a time of rising nationalism. Violent clashes are common among locals, theborders are militarised and security forces have used force to interdict one another inthe borderlands. Existing tensions between neighbouring Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan over access to water could be worsened by the effects of climate change since
all three countries rely heavily on water for agriculture or hydroelectric power.16 This
could even lead to armed conflict in the region, particularly as populations grow anddemand for water and power increases further.
Terrorism and organised crime will continue to threaten security in Central Asia. Over
recent years, mainly as a result of external influence from the Middle East and SouthAsia, radical fundamentalist groups (affiliated with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS) haveemerged, recruited and maintained a presence in the region, although government
crackdowns have led many to seek refuge in Afghanistan and Pakistan.17 Withoutstability in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is unlikely to be an end toproblems from religious extremism and crime in Central Asia. Terrorists often receiveat least part of their funding through the illicit drug trade and organised crime. There
are a number of synergies between the tactics, logistics and organisational structures
employed by both types of actor.18 Given the transnational character of security problems
likely to affect the region, as well as the need to balance the interests of competing great
powers, there is likely to be a strong drive for regional cooperation in the future. China islikely to have an increasingly prominent role in matters of security cooperation.

Tensions about water could be worsened by climate change

14 Malashenko, A., Carnegie Moscow Centre, (31 March 2012), ‘Kyrgyzstan: A White Ship Amidst the Ice ofPost-Soviet Authoritarianism’.
15 Borthakur, A., Asian Affairs, 48:2, (2017), ‘An analysis of the conflict in the Ferghana Valley’, pages 334-350.
16 International Crisis Group, (11 September 2014), Water Pressures in Central Asia.
17 Zenn, J., Hudson Institute, (2013), ‘On the eve of 2014: Islamism in Central Asia’.
18 Reyes, L. and Dinar, S., Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:5, (2015), ‘The Convergence of Terrorism andTransnational Crime in Central Asia’, pages 380-393.

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157

Southwest Asia

4
1

2

16

15
10

6

5

7 14
8
9
3
12

13

17
11

18

1 Armenia
2 Azerbaijan
3 Bahrain
4 Georgia
5 Iran6 Iraq
7 Israel
8 Jordan
9 Kuwait
10 Lebanon
11 Oman
12 Qatar
13 Saudi Arabia
14 State of Palestine
15 Syrian Arab Republic
16 Turkey
17 United Arab Emirates
18 Yemen

158

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Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia will remain a volatile region with many actors competing for influence andseveral conflicts likely to endure. Although the United States’ (US) presence may reduce,
it will remain an important actor and other powers, including China (not least investing ininfrastructure as part of the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative), India and Russia, arelikely to play a greater role. Southwest Asia will remain the world’s largest producer ofoil and gas but, on current trends, energy consumption will rise dramatically with somecountries becoming net importers. Climate change will drive summer temperatures evenhigher, droughts will become more frequent and water scarcity will increase. Religion willremain a defining issue for the region. The loosening of social rules in Saudi Arabia, andthe increasing empowerment of women (albeit from a low starting point), could meanthat the region adopts an increasingly moderate interpretation of Islam, although it is also
plausible that the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shia could intensify. Across theregion, access to health care and education is likely to improve and illiteracy and extreme
poverty could be virtually eliminated.

Environment
Southwest Asia already endures considerable extremes of climate and this is likely toincrease in the future, with varying effects across the region.1 Overall, Southwest Asia will
experience a warmer and drier climate that will generate further water stress and impact
agricultural production. By 2050, parts of the region may become so hot that they are
uninhabitable, dramatically increasing the number of people migrating due to climatechange. Sea level rise, increased flooding risk and water scarcity are likely to be major
issues. Demand for fresh water could increase by about 50% due to population growth,
rapid urbanisation and the impact of climate change. However, this may be ameliorated
by advances in technology and more efficient water management, particularly in the
agricultural sector (the region’s biggest consumer of water). Reducing the cost ofdesalination, eliminating reliance on fossil fuels, and mitigating environmental impacts
will all be crucial. Food security will also be a challenging issue as Southwest Asia (apartfrom Turkey) will be increasingly reliant on food imports.2 Water stress and fluctuations infood prices may even drive large-scale migration and conflict.

1

Rance, H. and Bradshaw, C., The Met Office, (2017), Climate change in South West Asia: A review of trends
out to 2050, a research paper prepared for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

2

INRA and Pluriagri, (October 2015), Addressing agricultural import dependence in the Middle East – North
Africa region through the year 2050.

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159

Southwest Asia

ferrantraite / iStock.com

Southwest Asia is likely to remain the world’s largest
hydrocarbon-producing region in the coming decades,with energy consumption likely to rise dramatically.3
Some of the region’s biggest energy producers, suchas Saudi Arabia, are likely to become net importers
well before 2050.4 With a high proportion of theworld’s proven natural gas reserves, the case for using
expanding gas where possible as a substitute foroil is relatively straightforward. Liquid natural gas is
expected to become a key part of the energy export.
Investment in renewable energy sources is increasing,but it is unclear when output will be able to meet theregion’s energy demands. Nuclear energy use is also
on the rise in Southwest Asia, and nuclear energy
cooperation agreements with countries around theworld are likely to be an increasingly important part ofRenewables may allow continued oil and gas exports
energy policies. Investments in renewable and nuclear
energy may be a way to enable continued hydrocarbon
exports. However, environmental concerns and technological developments are drivinga transformation of the energy markets towards renewable energy. This, together with
the US becoming a major oil exporter, may lead to a downward pressure on oil prices.
Competing suppliers of natural gas and a more flexible market are likely to keep gas
prices low. As a result, Southwest Asian countries are highly unlikely to build theireconomies purely on energy exports in the future.

Human development
Southwest Asia’s population will increase by approximately 50% over the next
30 years, from 322 million in 2015 to 485 million by 2050. Population growth willprobably be highest in the region’s most unstable and undeveloped states, for example,
the populations of Iraq, Palestine and Yemen are likely to double in size. Global trends
towards smaller families and ageing populations are evident in Southwest Asia,5 but anumber of countries may still have substantial youth populations by 2050. If these young
people do not have access to the opportunities they expect, greater migration or risingtensions could occur.

Southwest Asia population

An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
4.0
3.5

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19

Southwest Asia 2015
Southwest Asia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

0-9
35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Population (millions)
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)160

3

BP, (2016), ‘BP Energy Outlook, Regional Insights – Middle East’.

4Hino, Y., Brookings, (2 July 2015), ‘Saudi Arabia field report: Another potential oil crisis in the Middle East’.

5

United Nations (UN) Population Division, (2017), World Population Prospects 2017.

Global Strategic Trends

Southwest Asia

The urban population of Southwest Asia will increase over the next 30 years, withan estimated 70% of the population living in cities by 2050 compared to 61.5%
today. Future urban habitats will probably be a mixture of highly developed,
technologically-enabled areas (such as Tel Aviv, Dubai and Beirut) and big cities
surrounded by unplanned sprawls. The region will contain some of the biggest
urban agglomerations in the world by 2050, including Istanbul, Tehran and Baghdad.
Emigration will continue to be driven by conflict, the effects of climate change, political
disruption, a lack of economic opportunities and youth unemployment.6 The historic
trend of inward migration to the Gulf States, as people look for work, is likely to decrease
as more attractive employment appears elsewhere.
Levels of human development vary considerably in Southwest Asia, with Israel having thehighest human development ranking and Yemen the lowest. Although high population
growth in conflict zones is a continuing barrier to rapid poverty reduction, the region
could see a total elimination of absolute poverty well before 2050. Women’s rights
and opportunities are likely to remain limited by discriminatory inheritance laws, childmarriage and deep-seated cultural norms, particularly for those living in poverty and rural
areas.7 However, significant progress is expected in areas such as access to health care,education and political participation.
There was a significant increase of non-communicable diseases, such as heart disease(44%), strokes (35%) and diabetes (87%) in Southwest Asia between 1990 and 2010.
This trend is likely to continue as it is often related to lifestyle choices.8 The responseof countries in the region to the rise in non-communicable diseases is variable. Richer
countries are investing heavily in health care provision, but demand for services isincreasing. Curbs on government spending could increase the importance of private
health care.

Women’s rights will improve, although progress could be slow due to cultural norms
6International Organization for Migration (IOM), (2017), IOM Middle East and North Africa: Regional Strategy
2017-2020, pages 10-11.

7

UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), (2016), Equality in the New Global
Agenda, Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals 1
and 2 in the Arab Region, page 3.

8

The World Bank, (4 September 2013), ‘In Middle East and North Africa, Health Challenges are Becoming
Similar to Those in Western Countries’.

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161

Southwest Asia

The influence of religion on politics will remain, but a more moderate Islam may develop

Education provision has greatly improved in the region over the last few decades withliteracy rates rising from 59% in 1990 to 78% in 2010, and by 2050, rates of illiteracy
may no longer be a concern in Southwest Asia. Despite entrenched attitudes towards
women, there is almost complete gender parity in primary education,9 and female
university graduates outnumber men in many countries. The region is seeing increasing
participation of women in the paid labour market, which is likely to drive further economic
growth. However, some countries lag behind these positive educational trends, mainly
as a result of conflict. A key issue will be whether higher education adequately prepares
young Southwest Asians to enter high-skilled employment.

Economics
Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to be the major regional economies by 2050, although
Turkey could substantially outperform them all if it is able to implement structuralreforms.10 Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP) is likely to grow if the economy diversifies
and a more business-orientated environment takes hold. However, reforms progress
slowly in Iran and (as in the region as a whole) prospects for long-term economic growth
are directly connected to the political environment and wider governance issues. The
region’s reliance on oil exports and the escalation of conflicts could hamper significant
economic growth. Many countries have acknowledged the need for economic
diversification, but actions to achieve this vary considerably (there are some positive
examples, such as the United Arab Emirates, where oil now accounts for a third of thecountry’s GDP). Southwest Asia (apart from Israel) also has poor rates of technology
adoption, contributing to economic underperformance.11 The Gulf States in particularwill face the challenge of balancing the use of foreign labour to drive economic growth,versus providing opportunities for their citizens.
China, and increasingly India, will play an important role in the region’s economic
development, with trade between China and Southwest Asia increasing fiftyfold in thepast 20 years.12 The Horn of Africa will also be a key area of economic and politicalinterest for the region, where rising investments are likely to be followed by broader
cooperation, including on security. Intra-regional commerce is also likely to increase,with Turkey reorientating towards its immediate neighbours (which currently account foraround 25% of overall trade). As part of a long-term strategy for economic and politicalcooperation between Turkey and the Arab world, the Turkish government has set a goalto achieve US $100 billion of annual trade with the six countries that make up the Gulf
Cooperation Council by 2023.
9

The World Bank, (2014), ‘Education attainment in the Middle East and North Africa: success at a cost’.

10 PwC, (February 2017), The Long View: How will the global economic order change by 2050.
11 Stansfield, G. and Ranharter, K., (2017), The Middle East to 2050: Key trends, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
12 Kane, F., The National, (27 May 2014), ‘China blazes a trail as trading partner for Middle East’.

162

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Southwest Asia

Governance
The political culture in Southwest Asia has been dominated by ‘strong men’ andauthoritarian governance resulting in personality-based politics that are sensitive to
disruptions. It is therefore doubtful whether political, cultural and religious pluralism canbe improved and inclusive prosperity achieved. There are a number of challenges tocreating stable democratic systems in the region, however, it is plausible that limited
democracies could be established.13
Religious, national, ethnic and tribal affiliations will continue to play important roles in
identity-building in Southwest Asia. In Iran, the only theocracy (a form government inwhich priests rule in the name of God) in Southwest Asia, most people define
themselves along nationalistic or ethnic lines (as either Iranian or Persian), dependingon their support for the regime. The recent increased influence of religion in politics
in Turkey and a number of other countries in the region could persist over the next 30
years. However, the authoritarian and violent character of some religious movements islikely to weaken public support for political Islam and, in combination with social reform,
drive a long-term trend towards greater religious moderation.14 If more moderate Islam
takes hold in countries such as Saudi Arabia, strict social rules may be loosened, withcorresponding improvements in gender equality, transparency, state accountability andeconomic structures.
Persistent discrimination against Sunnis or Shia (depending on the country) and thecurrent struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran has led to sectarian identity
becoming increasingly important.15 While it is plausible that the sectarian divide could
be bridged (Shia and Sunnis live in peaceful coexistence in countries such as Kuwait),
current trends suggest there will be a growing divide. This is particularly significant in Iraq
where the survival of democracy largely depends on political leadership that manages tounify both Sunnis and Shia.
Governmental legitimacy will increasingly depend on prosperity, with economic growth,fiscal sustainability and job creation for an ever-growing youth population constituting
major challenges. State expenditure has already overtaken revenue, as countries seek
to use expansionary monetary policies as a means of resolving political problems, as
opposed to concentrating on economic development. Major public sector employment
schemes reflect tribal, ethnic and sectarian pressures, while security and defence
expenditure as a proportion of government spending is the highest in the world.16
Food and energy subsidies (key methods of suppressing inflation and avoiding public
discontent) have grown dramatically in response to consumption habits and rapid
population growth. The social contract may be affected by: jobs moving from the public
to the private sector; higher income tax; and significantly reduced subsidies. Most
governments in Southwest Asia will seek to retain power by gradual reform rather thanmajor systemic change, which could cause political instability if public expectations are
not met. Those with competing political and personal interests are also likely to oppose
far-reaching reforms.17

13 Muasher, M., (2014), The Second Arab Awakening: And the Battle for Pluralism.
14 Pollock, D., Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2572, (25 February 2016), ‘Polls Show Most Muslims Reject
Both Extremism and Islamic Reform’.
15 Kinninmont, J., Chatham House, (6 January 2016), ‘Middle East’s Sectarian Divide Threatens to Overwhelm
a Generation’.
16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2016), ‘Trends in the world military
expenditure, 2016’.
17 Kinninmont, J., Chatham House Report, (2015), ‘Future Trends in the Gulf’.

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Southwest Asia

The legitimacy of the theocratic regime in Iran may be increasingly challenged withgrowing demands to modernise from a highly-educated citizenry, increasingly influenced
by women. The government will endeavour to hold on to power at any cost, but gradualreform is probable. Abrupt regime change is unlikely if the security apparatus remains
loyal. Reimposed sanctions are, however, likely to strengthen the more conservative
elements of Iranian society.

Geopolitics
Influenced by nationalist rivalries and religious sectarianism, the struggle for influence
between Iran and Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, is likely to be a long-term theme inregional geopolitics. Non-state actors may continue to play a role as proxies, butalso in their own right challenging the established state structures. Turkey’s strategicinterests appear to be moving away from Europe in favour of greater influence throughintra-regional cooperation with countries in Southwest Asia. Nevertheless, Turkey
is unlikely to develop lasting relationships with its historic rivals, Iran and Russia.18
Modernisation of Saudi Arabia and Iran could dramatically change regional geopolitics,
although power dynamics in Southwest Asia will continue to be characterised by a highdegree of pragmatism, and personal relationships.
The US will remain an important regional actor, but will probably reduce its presencein Southwest Asia as its energy dependence on the region declines. This could create
an opening for other powers. For example, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil
war may be the start of a renewed long-term presence in the region, serving Russian
security interests and reinforcing its role as a global power. China may also become amore active player in the region, as it implements its Belt and Road Initiative, a massive
programme of infrastructure investment. A significantly more capable Chinese navy
(supported by base facilities in the region) could help secure its access to the Gulf,
protecting trade and national interests. China may even become a serious competitor
to Western countries over arms deals and form bilateral security arrangements withcountries in the region.19
Due to demographic changes, Israel is likely to become more conservative, affecting
its economic and political landscape,20 and its influence in the region may decline.
It is unlikely that US backing will cease, but the type and extent of support provided to
Israel will be largely dependent on the priorities of the incumbent US president. Egypt islikely to remain closely connected to the politics, economics and security of Southwest
Asia. However, the financial support to Egypt from some of the Gulf States is likely
to decrease, due to increasing fiscal pressure. It may result in a reduction of Egypt’s
political support to those countries and its capacity to provide internal stability. Internal
instability in Egypt or a major humanitarian crisis, such as flooding of the densely
populated Nile delta, could also have major ramifications in Southwest Asia. Further
fragmentation of some countries in the region is possible and new states may emerge,such as an independent Kurdistan. However, internal divisions among the Kurds andcompeting interests among regional powers could constitute significant constraints.

18 Larrabee, F. S. and Nader, A., (2013), Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East.
19 Castilla, C., Institute for Security & Development Policy, (18 March 2016), ‘China’s Evolving Middle
East Role’.
20 Staff, T., Times of Israel, (19 May 2017) ‘Half of Israel to be Arab, ultra-Orthodox by 2059 – projections’.

164

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Southwest Asia

SecuritySouthwest Asia will remain a volatile region where the potential for conflict will behigh. Security challenges will be driven by socio-economic issues, resource scarcity(particularly water) and discrimination. Such issues will mainly be internal, but with atransnational character. The impact of climate change is likely to exacerbate the drivers
for conflict. Organised crime and corruption could continue to drive state fragility, andreligious radicalisation will also continue to exist.21 Countries outside Southwest Asia andnon-state actors are likely to play an important role in determining the regional balanceof power. The prospect of the conflicts in Syria and Yemen stabilising are limited in the
short term. Syria is likely to remain an arena for strategic competition among external
powers for the foreseeable future.
Due to its complex amalgam of political, economic, environmental and security factors,
the Israel-Palestine conflict may remain unresolved. Although the conflict no longer has
the same profile it once had (in regard to understanding how the region would develop),
this may change.22 With a rapidly growing Palestinian Arab population, frustrated overinjustices and lack of opportunities, tensions could escalate again. Egypt will continue tohave an important role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Rostislav Glinsky / Shutterstock.com

Southwest Asian militaries are likely to see continued major investment in conventional
capabilities, however, asymmetric warfare will probably gain in importance.23 The major
military powers in the region will almost certainly be Turkey, Iran and Israel, along with
Saudi-led coalitions. While the Gulf States have the greatest conventional militarystrength in Southwest Asia due to years of extensive defence spending, they have, inpractice, limited influence on Iran.24 Iran’s credible conventional deterrent and use ofasymmetric methods (including proxies) gives it major advantages in the struggle forregional dominance. Direct state-on-state conflict and further nuclear arms development
cannot be ruled out in the next 30 years.

The Israel-Palestine conflict is expected to continue
21 Clarke, C., RAND Corporation, (2 November 2016), ‘Al Nusra Is Stronger Than Ever’.
22 Stansfield, G. and Ranharter, K., (2017), The Middle East to 2050: Key trends, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.
23 Cordesman, A., Center for Strategic and International Studies, (4 January 2016), ‘The [New-Old] Crises
and Instability in the Middle East and North Africa in 2016’.
24 Cordesman, A. and Toukan, A., Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2016) ‘Iran and the Gulf
Military Balance’.

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1

7
6

3
2

4

8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
BhutanIndia
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka

5South Asia

South Asia

The relationship between China, India and Pakistan will dominate regional geopolitics anddrive, or thwart, regional integration and trade. Driven by a rising number of consumers,
the economy is expected to grow rapidly, and India’s economy could be the world’s
second largest by 2050. Absolute poverty is likely to have been virtually eliminated by
2050, although relative poverty and inequality will endure. Tensions between religious
and ethnic groups are likely to be an enduring feature of the region, and governments’ability to manage that tension will be crucial. South Asia will be badly affected by climatechange with high temperatures, droughts and flooding. Water shortages are likely andwithout mitigation food production will reduce by approximately 15-30%. South Asia’s
armed forces are likely to grow, with India’s armed forces reaching over four million
by 2050. Nuclear proliferation will remain a cause for concern, and regional rivalry andcontinued investment in tactical nuclear weapons could spark a nuclear arms race, withthe possibility of nuclear conflict.

Environment
South Asia will be one of the regions most affected by climate change. Over the next
30 years, droughts, floods and other natural disasters could displace tens of thousandsof people across the region. Sea level rises, bringing increased risk from tsunamis,
cyclones, typhoons and flooding, could constitute an existential threat to island andcoastal populations, and are likely to threaten a number of major South Asian cities,
including Kolkata, Mumbai and Dhaka.1
Access to water has improved across the region in recent years. However, water
availability is likely to become an increasing concern as populations grow, industrial
activity increases and ground water sources are depleted. Some of South Asia’s mostvaluable water sources pass through disputed territory, and although access to water
alone is unlikely to trigger conflict, it will probably constitute an increasing source oftension between and within South Asian countries if not managed sensitively. South Asia
is also expected to experience temperature rises of between 2° Celsius and 4° Celsius
over the next 30 years, reducing food productivity by up to 15-30%, unless mitigation
measures are put in place. Those most directly affected are likely to be the poor living inrural areas who currently account for 70% of the South Asian population.2
South Asia will witness a steep rise in regional energy demands, driven largely by India’s
growing energy needs. India is currently the world’s fourth largest electricity consumer
and will need to substantially increase its use to sustain its economic growth levels.
Current estimates suggest that coal consumption will need to increase tenfold by
1

Asian Development Bank, (2011), Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, page 79.

2

Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by the Development,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), page 12.

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South Asia

2050.3 Pakistan’s energy security will be highly dependent on the full implementationof the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which includes 21 energy projects.4
If successful, these could have a positive impact on Pakistan’s social and economic
development. Smaller countries in the region may also benefit from Chinese investment
in regional energy projects, and China may increasingly be regarded as an alternative
partner to India for energy cooperation.

Human development
It is expected that South Asia’s population will grow to a little under 2.5 billion,
representing approximately a quarter of the world’s population and 46% of the total Asian
population by 2050.5 India’s population alone is expected to increase from 1.35 billion
today to 1.65 billion. On that projection, India will overtake China as the most populous
country in the world around 2024. Importantly, South Asia’s working age population
continues to grow and is not expected to peak until around 2040, presenting ademographic window of opportunity that, if harnessed effectively, could boost economic
growth and productivity in the region. Education and employment will be importantpriorities for South Asian governments. Rates of technical and vocational educationand training remain low in South Asia, with 1.2% secondary enrolment in vocational
programmes in India in 2014, compared with 27.1% in Europe and 21.7% in China.6
Addressing this deficit will be crucial if South Asia is to provide adequate employment
opportunities for its growing working age population and sustain current levels of
economic growth.

South Asia population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
24.4
24.7

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
200 180 160 140 120 100 80

60

40

20

0

0

20

40

60

80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Population (millions)South Asia 2015
South Asia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Much of the region’s growing population is likely to live in cities. South Asia’s urban
population is expected to more than double over the next 30 years, resulting in over 50%
urbanisation by 2050. A considerable amount of this development is likely to consist of
informal, slum housing, lacking basic services and infrastructure. In addition, despite
this increasing urbanisation, South Asia’s rural population will almost certainly remain
substantial, and governments may come under pressure to invest in rural infrastructure

168

3

Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 12.

4Ibid., page 8.

5Asian Development Bank, (2011), Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, page 121.

6

The World Bank, (2017), ‘World Bank Education Statistics 2017’.

Global Strategic Trends

South Asiaand connectivity to maintain its political support. Concerns over food security, in
combination with the projected increase in both droughts and flooding, could have ahuge impact on rural India. If agriculture is not given the attention and investment it
requires, it is likely to drive even more migration to urban areas, placing a strain on bothurban and rural development.
Religious tensions in South Asia (across the region as well as within individual states)
are likely to endure. India’s Muslim population is projected to surpass Indonesia as theworld’s largest. However, the country will almost certainly remain majority Hindu, with
Hindus comprising 76.7% of India’s total population in 2050.7 Sectarian violence could
be exacerbated if one religion is perceived to be benefiting at the expense of another.
Therefore, governmental ability to manage the relationship between religious groups will
be a key determinant of national and regional stability.
Countries in South Asia are home to almost 37% of the world’s poor, with 31% of the
population currently surviving on less than United States (US) $1.25 per day.8 However,despite the region’s massive population growth, the number of those living in extreme
poverty is likely to reduce substantially, and may be eliminated completely by 2050.

pjhpix / Shutterstock.com

South Asia’s health care priorities are likely to include managing the impact of climatechange and non-communicable diseases. As a result of climate change, new disease
vectors may emerge and the malaria season could lengthen, with more outbreaks.
Higher incidences of flooding could increase the threat of waterborne diseases anddiarrhoea, although some states, such as Bangladesh, are making efforts to mitigate
this by improving sanitation.9 At the same time, the probable rise in non-communicableand chronic diseases will mean that countries will face a ‘double burden’ of disease,which some will struggle to address. In 2010, 53% of all deaths in India were throughnon-communicable diseases,10 but this figure is likely to grow, as life expectancy
increases and improving living standards lead to the better management ofcommunicable diseases.

Much of South Asia’s population growth will be in cities such as Mumbai

7

Hackett, C., Pew Research Center, (21 April 2015), ‘By 2050, India to Have World’s Largest Populations of
Hindus and Muslims’.

8

United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, (2016), Achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals in South Asia: Key Policy Priorities and Implementation Challenges.

9

The Economist, (24 March 2018), ‘Beating the Bugs’.

10 World Health Organization (WHO), (2011), India: Non-Communicable Diseases.

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169

South Asia

Some projections place India as the world’s second largest economy by 2050

EconomyProspects for economic growth remain promising. In 2015, South Asia was the fastest
growing economy in the world, driven not just by India but also Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Bhutan.11 India’s economy is already converging on that of the US and can be
expected to continue to do so. Some projections place India as the world’s second
largest economy after China by 2050, by which time the two countries are expected tobe contributing 15% and 20% respectively to global gross domestic product (GDP) levels(purchasing power parity adjusted). However, there are some challenges to economic
growth, most notably, creating sufficient jobs. The Indian labour force will reachapproximately one billion workers by 2050, 25% more than China.12 This could act as aspur to economic growth, potentially resulting in India exceeding Chinese growth rates.
Although current efforts to boost the Indian manufacturing sector show commitment
to job creation, if historical trends are taken into account there is a very high probability
that at least 150-175 million Indians will be unemployed by 2050. Given its increasing
working age population, the pressure to reduce manufacturing costs through automation
could prove problematic for India.
Continuing distrust and hostility between South Asian countries, as well as a lack of
the necessary physical infrastructure, currently makes regional economic cooperation
problematic. South Asia, therefore, remains one of the least economically integrated
regions in the world.13 At present, intra-regional trade represents less than 5% of total
trade, compared with 35% in East Asia and 60% in Europe. However, intra-regional
trade is increasing slowly from this low level, largely as a result of bilateral trade initiatives,
but increasingly through wider sub-regional approaches. In particular, China’s massive
regional infrastructure programme, the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to bring significant
opportunities for South Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative may be one of the key drivers
boosting regional economic integration.

11 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 39.
12 Asian Development Bank, (2011), Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, page 21.
13 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 41.

170

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South Asia

GovernanceAlthough questions remain over levels of democratic development in much of South Asia,
technological innovation, economic growth and the need for greater regional economic
integration are likely to drive changes, shaping the character of regional governance.
India in particular will continue to take pride in its status as the world’s largest democracy
and is likely to remain an important advocate of democracy in the region. The key
governance challenge for South Asian countries will continue to be fragmentation withinstate boundaries, with pressure for greater devolution to the local level currently inevidence in India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal. Although national governments may beforced to accede to such demands to a limited extent, they will almost certainly continue
to oppose any moves towards actual secession, and it is unlikely that the region will see
a shift in current state borders in the foreseeable future.14

Geopolitics
The triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan will dominate regional
geopolitics and drive the progress, or otherwise, of the wider region. The long-standing
relationship between China and Pakistan is highly likely to endure, supported by the
US $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. China will also seek toboost its relations with each of India’s neighbours, through investment in infrastructure
projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and free trade agreements. China is currently
negotiating such an agreement with Sri Lanka, which could turn China into its major
investor and trading partner by 2050.15
India’s relationship with China, as geographic neighbour, trade partner and competing
power, will almost certainly remain complex and problematic. India will continue toview China as a military threat and a geostrategic rival, particularly as Chinese activity
in the Indian Ocean Region is increasing. India will remain suspicious of Chinese
investment in South Asian infrastructure projects, such as the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor, which passes through disputed territory and which India views as
having a military element. However, growing economic interdependence between thetwo countries may be a stabilising factor. Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, levelsof Chinese-Indian trade will remain substantial. In 2015, China was already one ofIndia’s largest trading partners. This relationship was heavily weighted in China’s favour,with India’s trade deficit at more than US $40 billion, but Indian exports to China havesince risen sharply.16 If this can be sustained, it may place the economic relationship ona more equal footing.
As China becomes more economically and politically dominant, India may seek tostrengthen relations with the US, seeing it as a counterweight to Chinese power andinfluence in the region. The US is unquestionably already India’s most important
strategic partner, and India will almost certainly view any signs of a US disengagementfrom the region with concern. Fear of US withdrawal may result in India seeking
greater regional cooperation. However, given tensions in its near abroad, and inparticular in its volatile relationship with Pakistan, India may focus its efforts towards
the wider continent. India’s partnerships with Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia
are likely to deepen, whilst those with Japan and South Korea may also strengthen
further.17 India could be increasingly drawn towards East and Southeast Asia, and may
pursue opportunities to invest in regional infrastructure in response to China’s foreign
infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean Region. Other South Asian states may also

14 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC page 47.
15 Ibid., page 42.
16 Ibid., page 45.
17 Ibid., page 41.

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South Asia

India will almost certainly remain majority Hindu

look outside the region for global partnerships, in an effort to balance and hedge against
existing relations with India and China. The Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh
are likely to be increasingly mindful of the dangers of the Chinese debt trap (if China
decides to call in its infrastructure loans) and will probably look to the US and the United
Kingdom (UK) as a counterweight to the regional powers. Sri Lanka in particular may
seek to forge closer ties with the UK, France and the US.18

Security
India-Pakistan and India-China tensions are likely to endure, although bilateral dialogue is
expected to continue, and there are prospects that limited settlements will be reached onsome disputed areas by 2050. As China develops transport networks as well as energy
and communications infrastructure in its western border regions as part of the Belt andRoad Initiative, this may test the strength of territorial agreements and heighten tensions
over disputed claims. As the Belt and Road Initiative gathers pace, similar skirmishes tothose seen on the Bhutan-China border in 2017 are possible and may escalate in somecases, although they are likely to stop short of conflict.
Although the number of fatalities caused by terrorism and insurgency in the region(excluding Afghanistan and Iran) has decreased steadily in recent years (from around
9,000 deaths in 2010 to under 3,000 in 2016),19 terrorism will remain South Asia’s major
security challenge. However, improving state security and surveillance capabilities meanthat some South Asian governments could succeed in containing the threat, even if theycannot remove it completely.
Between 1990 and 2015, the size of the armed forces of South Asia doubled from alittle over two million to around 4.6 million. By 2050, India alone is expected to haveincreased the size of its armed forces to at least four million.20 As well as boosting thesize of its military, India may seek to enhance the sophistication of its technical
18 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 54.
19 South Asia Terrorism Portal, (2017), South Asia Fatalities 2005-2017.
20 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 52.

172

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South Asia

capabilities, sourcing cutting-edge technology from international partners such as the
US and Israel, potentially through co-development initiatives with Indian firms.21 India
may also conduct joint military exercises in the region with countries such as Australia,
Singapore, Japan, the US and Indonesia. As well as boosting its own capabilities, such
exercises could be used as a strategic messaging tool towards China.

Joe Ravi / Shutterstock.com

Nuclear proliferation will remain a cause for regional and international concern,
particularly in the face of continued hostility between India, Pakistan and China. In
particular, continued regional investment in tactical nuclear weapons might increase theprobability of their use, whether by state security forces, after theft by non-state actors,
or even as a nuclear retaliation.22 At best, continued investment in tactical nuclear
weapons could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, making deterrence in South
Asia increasingly dangerous and risky to manage.

India may seek to enhance its technical capabilities with international partners: the Tejas jet is 60% indigenous content by value

21 PwC, (2012), Decoding the Indian Aerospace and Defence Sector.
22 Chaudhuri, R., (2017), South Asia out to 2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC, page 62.

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173

7

5

8
1

3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

China
China, Hong Kong SAR
China, Macao SAR
China, Taiwan Province of China
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Japan
Mongolia
Republic of Korea

2

4

6

East Asia

East Asia

East Asia is likely to account for 25% of the global economy by 2050, a larger sharethan any other region. China’s investment in research and development could surpass
that of the United States (US) within a decade, and China, Japan and South Korea arelikely to remain leading investors in robotics and automation. The transition to atechnology-driven economy will pose significant challenges for the region, and China will
also have to concurrently manage the transition to a consumer based economy. The
ability of China’s government to manage these transitions will be pivotal for the region
and the world, as will its relationship with the US. China will become an increasingly
powerful military actor, potentially rivalling the US, while the militaries of Japan and South
Korea are likely to operate globally. Increasing economic interdependency within theregion will reduce the risk of conflict, although it cannot be ruled out. A rising sea level
and increasingly intense storms will threaten many coastal cities, and prolonged periodsof drought will result in water shortages. The region’s population is likely to shrink andthe median age will increase, making the affordability of welfare and pensions an acutechallenge for governments, although access to, and the quality of, health care andeducation are likely to improve.

Environment
All countries in East Asia will be affected by climate change. Flooding and landslides
already affect many parts of the region, and the frequency of such events is likely toincrease due to more intense rains. Rising sea levels will worsen the effectsof storm surges associated with cyclones, increasing the risk of severe impacts on
densely-populated coastal regions.1
Overfishing, rising sea temperatures and ocean acidification will reduce fish stocks,
possibly leading to tensions over fishing rights. Demand for water, particularly in the
agricultural sector, is likely to increase. Northern China, parts of North Korea andnorthern Taiwan are likely to face severe water stress by 2050. If not adequately
managed, water scarcity may lead to large-scale economic and social displacement.
For example, northern China contains 20% of the country’s water resources, but 41%
of its population and 38% of its agriculture.2 Although longer periods of drought may
result in food shortfalls, rain-fed crop production is likely to increase by 2-10% by 2050.3
Technological advancements are likely to improve the efficiency of food production andwater management. Agriculture is likely to be part of urban development.

1

Westphal, M., et al., Asian Development Bank, (2013), Economics of Climate Change in East Asia.

2

Du, T., et al., in Food and Energy Security, Volume 3, Issue 1, (2014), ‘China’s food security is threatened by
the unsustainable use of water resources in North and Northwest China’.

3

Conforti, P., (Ed), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, (2011), Looking ahead in world
food and agriculture: perspectives out to 2050.

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East Asia

In East Asia, the demand for energy will grow, mainly driven by the modernisationof China. Due to the scale of demand, East Asia will continue to be dependent on
imported energy. The US could become a major liquefied natural gas exporter to theregion. Decades of heavy industrialisation has caused significant environmental damage,with air pollution, contaminated drinking water and damage to crops becoming major
political issues in China. Greater investment in renewable and nuclear energy (which
could account for 60% of China’s energy consumption by 2050) is likely to have a major
impact on the long-term regional energy mix.4 Making economic and structural changes,
including introducing electric cars, to create a lower carbon infrastructure will take time,
meaning that in the short term there will be continued increases in emissions.

Human development
East Asia’s population is projected to both increase in median age and decline
in numbers, with profound effects on political frameworks, welfare systems andeconomies.5 The region’s population is likely to shrink by 3%, from 1.63 billion today
to 1.59 billion by 2050.6 Parts of the region may well be deserted by 2050, with thevast Russian Far East currently home to just six million people, 25% of whom are at
retirement age. East Asia’s population is ageing faster than any other region in the world,
and is likely to comprise 434 million people over the age of 65 by 2050.7 Accordingly,
dependency ratios (the proportion of children and the elderly compared with those ofworking age) will increase dramatically in the next 30 years. The legacy of Chinese birthcontrol policies is likely to prove particularly challenging, as each worker will need tosupport two parents and four grandparents, as well as their own children.

East Asia population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
15.5
22.2

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

0

20

40

60

80

100

Population (millions)

120

140

East Asia 2015
East Asia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Pension provision is likely to remain a long-term financial challenge, although policy
interventions, such as increasing retirement ages and creating programmes to incentivise
bigger families, are underway. If they are to be effective, such policies will probably
need to address the cost of raising children and a lack of access to child care. Althoughimmigration from outside the region could be a solution to East Asia’s demographic

176

4

Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), (2016), Northeast Asia to 2050: Key Trends, a research
paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

5

Ibid.

6

United Nations (UN) Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), (2017), World Population
Prospects: 2017 Revision.

7

Ibid.

Global Strategic Trends

ChameleonsEye / Shutterstock.com

East Asia

Ageing populations, urbanisation and environmental challenges may drive governance changes in East Asia

problem, societies in the area are comparatively conservative in this respect. However,intra-regional migration is significant, and is expected to continue to grow due toincreased interconnectivity, economic opportunities and environmental challenges.
The urban population of East Asia is likely to increase from 982 million in 2015 to 1,250
million by 2050. In China, approximately 50% of the current rural population (269
million people) are expected to move to cities by 2050. While Japan, South Korea andTaiwan are already highly urbanised, the transformation of China into a predominantly
urban country could be one of the most profound changes in Asia in the next 30 years,
with immense social and political ramifications. Urbanisation in the region is unlikely
to be uniform, with some cities being technology-driven and highly organised (such as
those in Japan), contrasted with less efficient urban sprawls, as may occur in parts ofChina. Megacity regions are likely to change the economic and political dynamics in theregion. Four of the major Chinese megacity regions already have status on par with theprovinces and by 2050 this number is likely to have more than doubled.
Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have very high rankings on the Human
Development Index, but may face problems providing social security and addressing
age-related inequality, due to economic slowdowns and ageing populations. China
has recently seen a period of major progress in prosperity and providing public goods(with the state guaranteeing food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses).
However, income inequality is rapidly increasing and there may be rising publicdissatisfaction at the lack of improvement in living conditions. North Korea will continue
to have the lowest human development level in the region due to extreme politicalsuppression and constraints to economic development. However, as a whole, East Asia
is likely to see the elimination of absolute poverty well before 2050.8
The region will continue to see further investments and structural changes in education toaddress the technology skills gap. Private education, influences from students studying
abroad, less rigid education systems and the introduction of apprenticeships are likely to
mitigate skills shortages in the future, as well as addressing an innovation deficit between
East Asian and Western countries.
8

Dissanayake, R., et al., Department for International Development (DFID), Chief Economist’s Office, (2017),
Three worlds in 2050: scenarios for poverty and development, a research paper prepared for DCDC.

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East Asia

With Japan at the forefront, significant parts of East Asia are likely to have accessto highly advanced health care. As life expectancy rises and the treatment ofcommunicable diseases improves, the relative incidence of non-communicable illnesses(such as cancer and diabetes) will probably increase significantly. Rising health carecosts will be burdensome, particularly for China, due to the scale of demand.
However, state provision of services may drive economic growth by ensuring greater
disposable income.

Economics
The coming decades will see continued economic growth as strategies of sectorial
rebalancing take hold and regional trade links are strengthened.9 Led by China,
Northeast Asia is likely to account for about 25% of the global economy by 2050,10
with a rapidly expanding middle class driving increased domestic consumption. Small,
flexible, technology-driven companies are likely to comprise a larger part of the economy,
replacing some state-owned enterprises or major conglomerates. China will likely
transition to a market-based economy, and eventually deregulate interest rates andincrease the flexibility of its exchange rate.
E-commerce and hi-tech businesses could contribute significantly to the East Asian
economy. South Korea and Japan will remain among the top investors in research anddevelopment, while China’s spending on research and development could eclipse the USwithin a decade. The region (especially China) already conducts substantial advanced
research in artificial intelligence with deep pools of data, and has significant internalmarkets. East Asia also has the potential to play a leading global role in the spaceindustry. However, the transition from labour-driven to technology-driven economies
will pose significant socio-economic challenges for the region.
The East Asian share of the global trade is estimated to increase from 22% in 2015 to
29% in 2050.11 A greater extent of the trade is expected to be with markets within the
Indo-Pacific region. Although the US has strong interests in the region (with 11 million
jobs dependent on trade with Asia), trade between the US and East Asia will continue
to be a politically contentious issue. Protectionism or weak demand in the US, or
elsewhere, may drive further regional cooperation on trade. Negotiations are alreadyunderway for a comprehensive trade agreement between China, South Korea and Japan(and could potentially include Taiwan in the future). A successful economic integration
could give these countries significant influence on future financial markets. However,over-reliance on Chinese trade will be a cause for political concern among China’s
trading partners and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are likely to remain major global
trading nations in their own right.

Governance
Amidst a deteriorating regional security environment and lingering historical grievances,
nationalism will continue to be a dominant factor in shaping the identity of the region.
The Chinese Communist Party will continue to promote a strong historical Chinese
identity, as well as emphasising its own role in China’s strength and prosperity. In thenext 30 years, Beijing may face a growing threat to its control from ethnic minority
groups adopting increasingly violent tactics to promote their interests. Failure to address
grievances and socio-economic disparities may drive future unrest.

9

Asian Development Bank, (2011), Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century.

10 ISDP, (2016), Northeast Asia to 2050: Key Trends, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
11 HSBC Commercial Banking, Trade Winds: Shaping the future of international business.

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Despite rising cross-border exchanges in East Asia, regional identity remains
underdeveloped, but may mature in the next 30 years. One example of cultural
cross-pollination can be seen in South Korea and Japan’s music and film industries,
which provide both countries with soft power throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Christianity is growing in East Asia, with the largest increase in adherents seen in China,
from eight million in 1991 to 67 million in 2010. Some Chinese academics project
substantial growth of the population identifying as Christian by 2050.12 Despite a recent
decline in the numbers of religiously affiliated people in Japan, spiritual beliefs are likely
to remain important in identity building in East Asia in the coming decades. However,greater individualism and departing from traditional collectivist norms may also become
more important in identity building.
Ageing populations, urbanisation and environmental challenges may drive innovativeand decentralised forms of governance throughout Northeast Asia in the coming
decades. Better rates of education and greater interconnectivity, as well as a moredemanding Chinese middle class, will also contribute to growing calls for more effective
and responsible governance. It is unclear, however, whether China will become moredemocratic, or if the current system of government is adaptive enough to endure.
Hierarchical social norms, increased surveillance and nationalistic sentiment in a tense
regional security environment are powerful constraints to democracy. Democratisationin North Korea is only likely to happen should the current regime collapse.

MAHATHIR MOHD YASIN / Shutterstock.com

Women’s representation in politics remains low in East Asia, with women comprising
9.5% (Japan) and 23.6% (China) of delegates to national parliaments. It is likely,
however, that women’s representation in politics will increase significantly, due to policy
interventions and women comprising a greater part of the paid workforce.

Tokyo’s first female Governor, Yuriko Koike, at the Tokyo Annual Public Disaster Drill in 2016
12 Pew Research Center, (2015), The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.

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Jenson / Shutterstock.com

East Asia

Economic and social reforms will be required to promote Chinese stability

China 2050. China’s economic, social and geopolitical future will have a significant
impact on the rest of the world. There are a number of domestic constraints that will
limit China’s prospects of becoming the world’s dominant superpower.13 A key question
will be how effectively China’s one-party state addresses the country’s broad range ofsocial, economic and environmental challenges.14 This will depend on developments
in China’s political system and its external strategic environment. Whether the Chinese
Communist Party loosens, tightens or maintains its current controls over Chinese society,
it is bound to have a defining impact on its future.15 Hard authoritarianism is unlikely
to deliver far-reaching socio-economic reforms, and hence could increase the risk of
economic stagnation and exacerbate social problems. A softer authoritarianism is more
likely to facilitate the economic and social reforms that will promote stability. In any
event, it is unlikely that China will return to the totalitarianism seen under Mao Zedong,
due to the economic importance of the private sector, global interdependencies, and alack of support for such a position from the public, government and armed forces. On
the other hand, Chinese society lacks the features that could lead to Singaporean-styledemocracy, and such a path is also unlikely to be tolerated by the Chinese Communist
Party. If China fails to transition to a modern sustainable economy, there is likely to
be internal instability that could have global ramifications. However, if the transition
succeeds, China could have an affluent, urban middle class, and a population that
benefits from a healthier environment and a more efficient welfare system. The Chinese
Communist Party would probably still be in power under these circumstances, with
China experiencing a more benign international environment and taking on a moreproactive global role.

13 Fenby, J., (2017), Will China Dominate the 21st Century?
14 The World Bank and Development Research Centre of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China,(2013), China 2030: Building a modern, harmonious, and creative society.
15 Brown, K., (2016), CEO, China: The rise of Xi Jinping.

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Geopolitics
It is highly likely that regional cooperation in East Asia will continue to be impeded byhistorically-based distrust and nationalism, but pushed forward by desires for prosperity,
regional stability, free markets and trade, and access to sustainable energy. This may
well lead to parallel trends of cooperation and confrontation.
In the coming decades, China’s economic, military and diplomatic strength will increase,making it a global power with the potential to compete with the US. China’s aspirations
and rapid progress towards achieving great power status could be one of the mostimportant geopolitical factors shaping the region, and perhaps even the global worldorder. China is using (and is likely to continue to use) a number of economic, politicaland military strategies to generate regional influence and challenge US interests. For
example, the Belt and Road Initiative is a massive trade and infrastructure programme,
which is central to China’s prosperity and stability, and is likely to boost regional
economic integration.16 The Belt and Road Initiative also includes a system of bases
and security arrangements, as China seeks to protect its trade routes (particularly in
the Indian Ocean and Central Asia). This expansion is likely to cause concerns to otheractors (most notably India), who could drive countermeasures and competing projects.

Thana Thanadechakul / Shutterstock.com

The US will probably remain the strongest military power in the world and continue tohave a significant military presence in East Asia, partly to preserve its deep and enduring
economic and security ties to the region. The relationship between the US and China willbe the key determinant of the regional security environment. Although the two powers
will probably be increasingly competitive, they are also likely to see an ever-increasing
degree of economic and social entanglement, and so they are likely to avoid direct
military confrontation.17

Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall: The relationship between China and Taiwan could be a potential flashpoint

16 Bower, E. Z., et al., Center for Strategic & International Studies, (CSIS), (June 2015), Southeast Asia’s
Geopolitical Centrality and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
17 Shambaugh, D., (2016), China’s Future.

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East Asia

The relationship between China and Taiwan could be a potential flashpoint in the coming
decades. Taiwan’s population is increasingly likely to self-identify as Taiwanese rather thanChinese, which may drive greater calls for independence. However, Taiwan’s significant
demographic decline, combined with a probable rise in immigration from China, andextensive ‘brain drain’ to China may provide a counterbalance to this trend.18 By 2050,
China is likely to have the capacity to establish military superiority in the western Pacific,
and asymmetric approaches, including artificial intelligence and automated systems, arelikely to play an important part.19 If future Taiwanese governments make direct moves
toward independence, China may respond with military threats and possibly action. The
US position on Taiwan will remain an important part of China-US interactions.
In the next few years, it is likely that Japan will conclude its post-war ‘normalisation’,and implement a new constitution allowing it to play an independent part in Indo-Pacificpower relations. Despite historical issues, closer cooperation between Japan and South
Korea may develop over the coming decades. By 2050, both Japan and South Korea
will almost certainly have the capacity to operate globally with small-scale expeditionary
forces. Both countries’ relationships with China will depend on a mix of economic
opportunities and security concerns.
China-Russian relations will be based on a mutual fear of US-led containment, with astrategic partnership to counter US influence and promote economic growth. However,as the weaker partner in the relationship, Russia will probably continue to have concerns
about China’s strategic intentions and will pursue its own agenda in the region. Europe
is likely to maintain a keen economic interest in East Asia, as its exports to the region
have increased by 347% since 2000.20 After the US, East Asia is Europe’s biggest
trading market, and commerce with the region may overtake trade with the US by 2050.
As China is not seen as a potential existential threat, Europe is more likely to try andmaintain a productive relationship with China.

Security
The East Asian security environment is a particularly complex and challenging one,particularly due to: the presence of some of the most powerful military forces in the world;
great power competition; tensions on the Korean peninsula; maritime territorial disputes;
transnational threats such as organised crime and terrorism; and the potential for natural
disasters. The increasing military powers of Chinese and North Korean weapons of mass
destruction are likely to lead to the strengthening of the military capabilities of Japan andSouth Korea, and ongoing demand for US presence. Economic entanglement is likely
to deter full-scale conflict in the region, although the use of asymmetric means, such as
cyberattacks, may increase. Although the East Asian security environment lacks sharedsecurity mechanisms, many of the regional security challenges will demand a collaborative
response, and could therefore be a driver for regional security cooperation.
Complicated by historical controversies and grievances, nationalism, domestic politics
and competition over energy resources, the East Asian maritime territorial disputes(Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan; Takeshima/Dokdo
are claimed by Japan and South Korea; and the southern Kurils is claimed by Japan andRussia) will persist. Whilst there has been increased militarisation and uncompromisingrhetoric regarding the disputed islands, growing economic interdependence may lead tomore pragmatic ways of handling these disagreements in the future.

18 Oxford Economics, (2012), Global Talent 2021: How the new geography of talent will transform humanresource strategies.
19 Kania, E. B., The Strategy Bridge, (2018), ‘Strategic Innovation and Great Power Competition’.
20 UN DESA, Statistical Division, ‘International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Volume II, Annex D’.

182

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Mattis Kaminer / Shutterstock.com

It is plausible that Kim Jong-un will remain in power for a considerable period in North
Korea by maintaining a level of domestic popularity, a loyal circle of officials and highlevels of political repression. The future of the North Korean nuclear capability is highly
uncertain. If it develops a more effective nuclear capability, the regional actors may haveto adjust to containment of a nuclear-armed country. North Korea would be highly likely
to use its nuclear weapons if it was attacked and believed the regime’s survival was at
risk. A North Korea with long-range missiles also changes the geostrategic conditions
in East Asia as it will make it difficult for Japan not to be drawn into any future war on
the Korean Peninsula. However, Kim Jong-un could craft a deal with both China andthe US that may lead to the end of the Korean War and create a new, more stable statusquo. The sudden death or resignation of the North Korean leader may trigger a regime
collapse with significant ramifications. The longer-term outlook will be influenced by thepolitical situation in the two Koreas and regional powers’ strategies. China is unlikely
to change its preference for the status quo and any potential regime change that is
unfavourable to China’s strategic interests may lead to Chinese military intervention.

Long-term outlooks will be influenced by the political situation in the two Koreas and regional powers’ strategies

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11

6
4

9
7

2

1
5

5

8

3

3

3
3
3
10

1 Brunei Darussalam
2 Cambodia
3 Indonesia
4 Lao People’s Democratic Republic
5 Malaysia
6 Myanmar
7 Philippines
8 Singapore
9 Thailand
10 Timor-Leste
11 Vietnam

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia

Sitting between the rising powers of India and China, and astride the busiest shipping
lanes in the world, geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia is likely to be intense.
The region hosts some of the fastest growing economies in the world and future foreign
investment is likely to further boost the region’s economy. Corruption is, however,endemic and is likely to dampen economic growth, and whilst standards of governancecould improve some governments, others could become more authoritarian. Climatechange, in particular its impact on the monsoon season and rising sea levels, could
lead to flooding, crop failures and water shortages. Absolute poverty may be virtuallyeliminated, although inequality will endure, and could increase. Although the region has
been relatively peaceful over the past few decades, rising defence spending and anincreasingly complex security environment with several potential flash points, including
the South China Sea, could make the risk of conflict more likely.

Environment
Southeast Asia’s annual mean temperatures will continue to rise, particularly inland.
Along the east coast of Vietnam, northwest Sumatra and islands in the southern partof Indonesia, there have been recent increases in rainfall in excess of 50 millimetres per
decade. Similar increases in rainfall are likely to continue, although projections for future
rainfall vary, depending on the climate model used. The region relies heavily on monsoon
rains for food production, meaning that any change in future monsoonal patterns could
have a significant impact on food security. Food production may also be threatened byrising sea levels and salt water intrusion, which could reduce the availability of suitablearable land. Some projections suggest that countries that are currently net producers ofrice (such as Vietnam) may become net importers by 2050 and coastal crop areas could
routinely become submerged in salt water.1 Poorer Southeast Asian countries will almost
certainly be less able to adapt, and consequently will be harder hit by climate changes.
Coastal communities in Southeast Asia will experience sea level rise, with some areas atparticular risk. For example, a projected one metre rise in sea level by 2100 could impact
on 10% of the population of Vietnam and submerge 6% of the Philippines. All climate
models suggest an increase in intensity of extreme weather events, with higher sea levels
exacerbating their impact.2

1

Rance, H. and Bradshaw, C., The Met Office, (2017), Climate change in South West Asia: A review oftrends out to 2050, a research paper prepared for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre(DCDC), page 14.

2

Ibid., pages 15-16.

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Southeast Asia

Human development
Southeast Asia is currently home to 649 million people, comprising 14% and 8.6%of the overall Asian and global populations respectively. By 2050, there may be 797
million people in the region, representing a growing proportion of the Asian population at
15% and a slightly reduced percentage of the world’s inhabitants at 8%.3 Despite thispopulation growth, fertility rates across Southeast Asian countries will probably continue
to decline with nine countries likely to fall below the replacement rate of 2.1 children
per woman by 2050, although there will be significant disparities across the region.
Thailand’s population could begin to shrink by 2025 and Singapore’s by around 2045.4
Declining birth rates and longer life expectancies will probably mean that Southeast
Asia’s population ages, possibly leading to more problematic dependency ratios (theproportion of children and the elderly compared with those of working age). Social,financial and political structures will need to be implemented and resourced across theregion, otherwise many elderly people will be at risk of poverty.

Southeast Asia population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015

100+
90-99

2050

80-89

Percentage shareof global population
8.1
8.6

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Population (millions)Southeast Asia 2015
Southeast Asia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Across Southeast Asia, the level of absolute poverty has fallen significantly over the past
20 years, with the number of people living on less than United States (US) $2 per day
reducing significantly. Absolute poverty has been eradicated in Singapore and Brunei;
is below 5% in Malaysia and Thailand; but is above 40% in the rest of the region.5
However, despite declining levels of poverty, inequality has increased between urban
and rural regions within each country, reducing social inclusiveness. Climate-induced
migration may erode advances in poverty eradication. Southeast Asia will likely maintaina net emigration rate in line with the broader Asian trend (three people per thousand
emigrating annually), although there are countries within the region that will continue to
see high rates of immigration over the next 30 years. The region’s urban inhabitants
are likely to increase in number. Today, rates of urbanisation vary significantly between
countries, from 100% in Singapore to just over 20% in Cambodia.6 An increase in thenumber of informal settlements lacking basic services and an inadequate police presence
could lead to an environment in which criminal or terrorist groups prosper.

186

3

United Nations (UN) Population Division, (2017), ‘World Population Prospects Interactive Data’.

4

UN Population Division, (2017), ‘World Population Prospects Interactive Data’.

5

Cook, S. and Pincus, J., Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, Volume 31, Number. 1, (2014), ‘Poverty,
Inequality and Social Protection in Southeast Asia: An Introduction’, pages 1–17.

6

The World Bank, (2017), ‘World Bank Open Data’.

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Southeast Asia

Inequality between rural and urban areas is likely to remain significant

Human development standards throughout Southeast Asia vary greatly. Singapore andBrunei have ‘very high’ human development levels (ranked 5th and 30th in the worldrespectively); Malaysia and Thailand have ‘high’ levels (59th and 87th, respectively);while all other countries have ‘medium’ levels, showing a decline over the last 30 years.7
Educational standards vary across the region, but all countries demonstrate a positive
trajectory. There are high levels of attendance at primary schools throughout the region,
but greater diversity in the level of secondary education enrolments, ranging from over
95% in Brunei to below 75% for Myanmar. Over the past decade, Timor-Leste, Vietnam,
Thailand and Malaysia have increased their investment in education, which will almost
certainly have positive impacts on their economies. The value of investment in technicalskills is recognised across the region, as each country transitions to increasingly digital
economies, but critical thinking and creativity-based skills remain undervalued.
Key health indicators in all Southeast Asian countries have improved in recent decades,with a continuous increase in life expectancy since 1950. As the region’s population
ages, incidences of non-communicable diseases, such as cancer and diabetes, arealso likely to rise. Changing weather patterns may lead to more outbreaks of infectious
diseases, especially those linked to greater temperatures and rainfall. Although spendingon health care is currently low across the region (around 4% of gross domestic product(GDP) compared to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) average of 9.5%), trends suggest that there will be significant increases in the
future.8 Health care quality and provision will continue to vary greatly across the region,
possibly leading to increased pressure on governments to meet the needs of their
population.

7

UN Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Human Development Report 2016’.

8

Hashim, J., United Nations University, (2012), ‘Health and Healthcare Systems in Southeast Asia’.

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Educational, institutional, governmental and financial reforms will be required to achieve full potential

EconomyAs an economic bloc, Southeast Asia currently has a GDP of nearly US $3 trillion,
ranking as the seventh largest global economy (if considered as a single nation) and it
will probably be the fifth largest within ten years. Vietnam could be the fastest-growing
global economy over the next 30 years, with a projected average annual GDP growth ofaround 5%, closely followed by the Philippines (fifth fastest-growing at 4.3%), Indonesia(ninth at 3.7%), Malaysia (tenth at 3.5%) and Thailand (19th at 2.6%).9 Within thesecountries, growth is being driven by both population increases (stimulating demand andcapital investment) and technological integration that increases productivity. However,if the region is to realise its full economic potential, sustained financial reforms andstrengthened commercial and governmental institutions will be required, alongside
investment in education.
Southeast Asia has experienced a rapid growth in trade of merchandise and services
since 2000 and this is likely to continue, albeit at a declining rate. However, despite theregion’s potential, most Southeast Asian countries (except Singapore and Brunei) arestill developing economies, and may be unable to afford new infrastructure to support
rapid urbanisation. Southeast Asia is a major destination for foreign direct investment,
attracting 16% of such funds sent to developing economies worldwide in 2016.10 China
is also investing in infrastructure in the region as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, andthis is likely to help the ease with which trade can be conducted within Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, an over-reliance on foreign direct investment may be problematic, sincefunding streams are volatile and are likely to remain so unless barriers to investment
are addressed.

Governance
Southeast Asia currently contains five ‘flawed democracies’, three hybrid regimes, two
authoritarian states and one absolute monarchy.11 Although several democratic reforms
have taken place over the last ten years, this trend may have stalled, with increased
instances of dissent being suppressed across the region. As civil societies struggle
9

PwC, (2017), ‘The long view: how will the global economic order change by 2050?’.

10 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (2016), ASEAN Investment Report 2016.
11 The Economist Intelligence Unit, (2016), ‘Democracy Index 2016’, page 34.

188

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Southeast Asia

to emerge from military power bases and as religious and secular forces clash, it may
continue to be hard for democracy to flourish in the region. Without mitigation, it isplausible that some countries in Southeast Asia could see increasingly authoritarian
forms of government in the future. Corruption is endemic within Southeast Asia andis estimated to cost the region 1% of its potential annual economic growth.12 Most
Southeast Asian countries rank highly on corruption indexes, and public office iswidely seen as a means to acquire personal wealth. Anti-corruption organisations areoften undermined by political elites, while activists are at increasing risk of attack andincarceration.13 It is unlikely that anti-corruption efforts will gain significant traction by
2050, meaning that corruption could continue to be a constraint on the region’s potential
growth and broader influence.

Geopolitics
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has provided a framework forregional governance since its inception in 1967. It is central to how Southeast Asia
engages with the broader Indo-Pacific region, giving member countries substantial
collective bargaining strength. The forum has been lauded for its successes but also
criticised for its inability to act decisively, which may lead to obsolescence in the future.14
Historically, ASEAN has been based on balanced representation within the organisation,
however, Indonesia may push to take a leadership role commensurate with its growing
economic might. This may either provide the unifying leadership that is required, or
fracture the organisation.

Ho Chi Minh City: Vietnam could have the world’s fastest growing economy
12 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2016’.
13 Welsh, B., ASEAN Studies Program, (2016), ‘Corruption Trends in 2016: Southeast Asia’s
Governance Plight’.
14 Quah, D., The Economist, (2015), ‘Is the ASEAN Way the Right Way?’.

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Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia will grow in importance globally, in large part because much of theworld’s trade passes through strategic chokepoints within the Southeast Asianarchipelago. All Indo-Pacific powers, including the US, China and India, are seeking
to improve their influence within the region, and ASEAN can also expect an increasinglevel of engagement from non-regional partners, including the United Kingdom andthe European Union. Even if its internal problems lead to ASEAN’s dissolution or
marginalisation, Southeast Asia will remain critical to the Indo-Pacific power balance.

Security

Open sea lanes will be critical to peaceful outcomes in the region and encourage international cooperation
15 Ak, H., Kyoto University, (2016), ‘An Arms Race in Southeast Asia: The Claims and Realities’.
16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2018), ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

190

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Kyodo News / Contributor

Over the last 50 years, Southeast Asia has experienced relatively low levels of conflict
when compared with other regions. With the exception of several long-runninginsurgencies and sporadic intra-regional territorial conflicts, non-violence has become
the norm. However, it cannot be assumed that (relative) stability and peace will persist.
Many Southeast Asian countries were founded through violent struggle, and the region’s
military dynamics are influenced by elites, corruption, intra-regional economic inequalities
and differing perceptions of extra-regional state actors.15 The region has benefited froma strong US presence and security guarantees since the end of World War 2, but major
global powers are increasingly vying for influence. As the security environment becomes
more complex, the risk of conflict is likely to grow. This, along with growing economic
power, has been driving increased defence spending within the region over the last 30
years.16 This trend is expected to continue as economic circumstances improve and thegeopolitical environment remains uncertain.

Southeast Asia

The complexity of the Southeast Asian security environment is exemplified by the South
China Sea territorial dispute between Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan and Vietnam. China views its claim as vital to its physical and economic security,and its reinforcement of military installations in contested territory is likely to continue, sothat it can take control in a crisis. However, China may also seek to use diplomacy toappease other claimants by offering compromises that reflect its pre-eminent positionin the disputed waterways. China’s actions within the South China Sea are increasingly
drawing international attention and are seen as a test case for how the country willfunction within a liberal rules-based world order. Although there is a risk of military
incidents, the likelihood of full-scale war is limited as long as the sea lanes remain open.
People smuggling and human trafficking in Southeast Asia have been increasing since
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Some estimates suggest that the number of trafficked
victims rose from around 5,000 people in 2009 to just under 14,000 in 2015.17 However,
the true extent of the problem is difficult to assess because there are porous borders
between many countries and a lack of birth and citizenship records in some areas.
Piracy within Southeast Asian waters poses a significant threat to the region’s maritime
security, particularly as over 50% of global shipping passes through the region. Whilethe number of piracy-related incidents has decreased, globally, between 2011 and2015, there was a 71% rise within Southeast Asian waters, with the majority of incidents
occurring around Indonesia.18 Since 2015, there has been increased counter-piracy
cooperation between Southeast Asian countries, which has led to some degree ofstabilisation. However, piracy will continue to plague the region, particularly in areas
such as the Southern Philippines, where the reach of law enforcement is limited. Local
insurgencies, transnational organised crime and terrorist networks may seek to exploit
opportunities provided by piracy-related activities.
As Southeast Asian economies digitalise and as more people in the region have accessto the Internet, there will probably be a corresponding growth in cybersecurity risks.
Differing rates of modernisation within Southeast Asia is already creating a digital divide,
presenting opportunities for exploitation by transnational cybercrime.19 Collaborative
efforts between ASEAN countries to date have focused on capacity building within
member states, and have not established the legal framework necessary to combat
trans-border criminal cyber activities. The development of a collaborative and credible
multilateral cyber deterrence mechanism will be critical for ASEAN’s continuing economic
and geopolitical growth over the next 30 years.20

17 US Department of State, (2016), ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’.
18 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau, (January 2016), ‘Piracy andArmed Robbery against Seas: Report for the period 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2015’.
19 Thomas, N., Asian Security, Volume 5, (2009), ‘Cyber Security in East Asia: Governing Anarchy’.
20 Chen, Q., The Diplomat, (2017), ‘Time for ASEAN to Get Serious About Cyber Crime’.

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14
6

8

9
10

15

1 American Samoa
2 Australia
3 Cook Islands
4 Fiji5 French Polynesia
6 Guam
7 Kiribati
8 Marshall Islands
9 Micronesia (Federated States of)
10 Nauru
11 New Caledonia
12 New Zealand
13 Niue
14 Northern Mariana Islands
15 Palau
16 Papua New Guinea
17 Samoa
18 Solomon Islands
19 Tokelau
20 Tonga
21 Tuvalu
22 Vanuatu
23 Wallis and Futuna Islands

16
18

22
4
11
2

12

Inset for South Pacific Islands

7

21
19

17
1

23

5

4

13

20

3

Oceania

Oceania

Covering a vast area of the Pacific and stretching into the Southern Ocean, Oceania
will act as a bellwether for humanity’s impact on the oceans and the effects of climatechange. Increasingly intense storms and rising sea levels will have a profound impact
on small island communities, which could become trapped in a continuous cycle ofenvironmental disasters that devastate local economies. Australia and the larger islands
will also be adversely affected by climate change, but not to the same extent. Levelsof health care, education and literacy are likely to improve as is access to information,although poverty and inequality could increase and some communities could be
dependent on foreign aid. Both China and the United States (US) are likely to vie for
influence in Oceania, although the US, with its close ties to Australia and New Zealand(who will remain the dominant actors), is likely to remain the most influential external
actor. France and the United Kingdom (UK) will also remain active in the region (bothhaving territories and strong historical links) and Russia has a developing relationshipwith Fiji. The risk of state-on-state conflict in the region, however, is low. Illegal maritime
activity is increasing and is likely to become a focus for security cooperation.

Environment
Climate change will present growing economic and social challenges. Sea levels in the
Pacific are expected to increase by 1.2 metres by 2100 and temperatures are likely torise by between 1° Celsius and 4° Celsius.1 Extreme weather events, such as cyclones,
will also become more severe, although it is currently uncertain if they will become more
frequent.2 The effects of climate change are already stressing Pacific communities to theextent that migration is often seen as the only solution, for example, 70% of households
in Tuvalu believe that they will need to move if farming becomes more difficult. However,
it is unclear where climate migrants will live, and how they will fund this process. For
example, the median monthly household income in Kiribati is US $12, meaning many
would not have the financial means to relocate.3

1

Australian Bureau of Meteorology and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation(CSIRO), (2011), Climate Change in the Pacific: Scientific Assessment and New Research, Volume 1:
Regional Overview.

2

Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland, (September 2016), Global Strategic Trends 6: Out
to 2050 in Oceania, Key Ideas Paper, a research paper commissioned by the Development, Concepts andDoctrine Centre (DCDC).

3

United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), (2015), ‘PacificClimate Change Migration – Survey Fact Sheet’.

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193

ChameleonsEye / Shutterstock.com

Oceania

Effects of climate change will continue to drive migration in the region

Water supply security will be an increasing challenge for all Oceanian countries. While
Australia and New Zealand have the means to develop climate-resilient water sources,
such as desalination and recycling, many countries elsewhere in the region are reliant
on a single type of water supply. As sea levels rise, salt water may contaminate moregroundwater aquifers and at the same time rainfall will become more unpredictable,
perhaps leading to reservoirs and surface flows drying up. Urban populations willprobably increase, with inadequate sanitation infrastructure further contributing to watercontamination as cities grow. Both Australia and New Zealand are currently assessed
as being food secure, but Australia’s agriculture may become more susceptible to theeffects of climate change.4 Elsewhere in the region, as many Pacific Island countries
become more urbanised, their reliance on imported foods may increase, contributing
to an insecure national food supply. Currently, all Pacific Island countries have either
negative or highly-negative food trade balances.5
All Oceanian countries are subject to natural disasters (such as cyclones, tsunamis andearthquakes), with their effects sometimes worsened by human-caused deforestationor environmental degradation. The predicted increase in severity of extreme weather
events6 could be exacerbated by a growing population, as well as increasing urbanisation.
Resilience to environmental disasters within Oceania is likely to remain low7 and, by
2050, many nations in the region could be in a constant state of recovery. A severe
weather event across multiple countries (or concurrent environmental disasters)
could mean that relief efforts are significantly delayed, potentially resulting in a broad
humanitarian crisis.

Human development
Australia will have approximately 31 million inhabitants by 2050 and New Zealand will
have six million. Both nations’ populations are currently ageing, and this is likely tocontinue. Fertility rates will remain below replacement-level and life expectancy is likely
to increase, hence any population growth will mainly be due to immigration. Papua New
Guinea’s current population of around seven million people could reach over 20 million by
2050, with Fiji’s 880,000 citizens increasing to 1.1 million. By contrast, Niue’s population
will probably shrink to around 1,050 by 2050, from approximately 1,600 today.

194

4

Di Nunzio, J., Future Directions International, (2014), Consumption Patterns and Food Demand in Australia
to 2050.

5Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland, (September 2016), Global Strategic Trends 6:
Out to 2050 in Oceania, Key Ideas Paper, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

6

Ibid.

7

Boxall, S., New Zealand Defence Force, (August 2017), Directorate of Future Force Development
Publication: Foresight Report: Oceania.

Global Strategic TrendsOceania

Fertility rates within the Pacific Island countries have declined in recent years, but remainhigh by world standards, contributing to a proportionately large youth population.8 High
fertility rates, combined with over 50% of Pacific Islanders currently under the age of
25, will mean that the region has a surging working-age population, but not enougheducation provision or employment. This opportunity gap could lead to increases incriminal activity, substance abuse and violence, if not addressed.
Across Oceania, it is estimated that 73.5% of the population will live in urban areas in
2050, compared with 70.8% in 2017, although there will continue to be substantial
regional variations. On small islands such as Guam, everyone lives in cities, whereas
only 20% of Papua New Guinea’s population is urban. The existing trend of rural tourban migration in search of employment is likely to continue, which may lead to a rise inspontaneous informal settlements that lack basic services and government oversight.9

Oceania population
An ageing population
Male
2015

90-99

Female
2015

2050

80-89

2050

100+

Percentage shareof global population
0.6
0.5

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
5

4

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

Population (millions)

Oceania 2015
Oceania 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Prosperity (as measured by the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index) varies
across Oceania, from ‘very high’ in Australia and New Zealand to ‘low’ in Kiribati, Papua
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. All Pacific Island countries in Oceania rely on
external development assistance, which has been increasing over the last 20 years.
However, due to global fiscal conditions, future aid flows are likely to remain at current
levels or potentially decline in real terms.
Inequality and poverty are rising across the region, with recent economic growth failing to
improve living standards. Papua New Guinea has the highest rate of poverty in Oceania
with 40% of its population affected.10 Inequality (as defined by the Gini coefficient: ‘ameasure of income inequality with higher values representing greater disparity withina given country’), is highest in the Melanesian countries, although it is not extreme
by global standards. Levels of poverty and inequality are unlikely to improve, as
governments are reluctant (or lack the capacity) to redistribute wealth.

8

UN Population Fund, (April 2014), Population and Development Profiles: Pacific Island Countries.

9

Mageto, A., et al., UN Human Settlements Programme, (2010), Papua New Guinea: Port Moresby
Urban Profile.

10 The World Bank, ‘Poverty & Equity Data Portal’.

Global Strategic Trends

195

Fiji was Christianised in the 19th Century and Christianity will remain the most widely observed religion in the region

Most children in Pacific Island countries attend primary school, and there are highliteracy rates (90% or better) in the region, with the exception of Papua New Guinea
at 60%.11 However, enrolment figures for secondary education are lower, while
technical and professional training is insufficient to meet demand. Without investment
to address current skills shortage in the extractive and hospitality sectors, future
economic development potential will not be met.
Since the initiation of the Millennium Development Goals, most Pacific Island
countries have seen improvements in health, including decreases in maternal andchild mortality, and progress in eliminating vaccine-preventable diseases. However,rising global temperatures are increasing the incidence of some communicablediseases. Currently, 40% of Pacific Islander populations have non-communicablediseases such as cardiovascular problems, diabetes and hypertension, which are
likely to increase due to an increasing Westernisation of diets. Such conditions areoften worsened by a reliance on cheap imported food, which also contributes todietary deficiencies. Waste management within the Pacific Islands will probably be amajor threat to public health (and sustainable economic development) as populations
grow and as landfill space decreases.
Religious adherence in many Pacific Island countries is over 80% and is likely to remain
consistent with Christianity being the largest group.12 Historically, other faiths have been
tolerated in the region, although ethnic tensions in some communities (exacerbated byuneven economic development) may disrupt this trend over the coming decades.
In 2015, over 60% of Pacific Islanders had access to a mobile phone, up from 10%
in 2006, a trend that is expected to continue.13 Mobile Internet is enabling new
solutions (such as telemedicine) to many of the challenges facing people living inremote communities. Increased access to telecommunications is also allowing
greater political participation, and is already contributing to increased scrutiny andtransparency of local governments. However, the cost of communications in the
Pacific Islands will probably remain high.
11 Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland, (September 2016), Global Strategic Trends 6:
Out to 2050 in Oceania, Key Ideas Paper, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
12 Pew Research Center, (2015), The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.
13 Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland, (September 2016), Global Strategic Trends 6:
Out to 2050 in Oceania, Key Ideas Paper, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

196

Global Strategic TrendsOceania

EconomyThe economies of Australia and New Zealand are likely to grow over the coming
decades, although probably at slower rates than over the past 30 years.14 Ageing
populations in both countries will result in declining labour force participation andincreasing dependency ratios, reducing productivity.
All Pacific Island countries have developing economies, each with different economic
bases. Generally, the smaller islands have subsistence economies, the medium-sizedislands focus on commercial tourism, and the larger islands are building extractive
industries. The most significant challenge that Pacific Island economies face is theirrelative isolation from major markets, which increases the costs of providing services anddoing business. Their limited economic bases also restrain diversity and opportunities
for value creation, while high transportation costs and relatively poor commercial
infrastructure hinders their ability to trade.15 With the possible exception of Papua
New Guinea, the economies of most Pacific Island countries are likely to remain small,narrowly-based and highly vulnerable to external financial shocks. Papua New Guinea
has the largest economy of the Pacific Island countries, with the highest 30-year
projected growth rate.
The Pacific Ocean contains a wealth of natural resources that could provide economic
benefits if managed sustainably. However, rising sea temperatures, increasing
acidification and poor regulation of fishing practices are eroding the economic benefit
to nations in the region. More generally, the annual costs of environmental disasters are
increasing Pacific Island countries’ government debt.

Governance
New Zealand and Australia are well-established democracies and both rank highly inworld democracy indexes. The Pacific Island countries are becoming more democratic,
but poor governance will probably continue to hamper economic development and growth.
Meeting internationally-accepted standards of transparency and public sector management
is likely to be a slow process, due to entrenched nepotism and authoritarianism.16

Isolation from major markets will continue to challenge Pacific Island economies
14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Data Portal, ‘GDP long-term forecast’.
15 Asian Development Bank, (2015), Corporate Evaluation Study: ADB Support to Pacific Small Island
Countries.
16 Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland, (September 2016), Global Strategic Trends 6:
Out to 2050 in Oceania, Key Ideas Paper, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

Global Strategic Trends

197

Oceania

Regionalism is seen as a solution to many of the challenges facing Pacific Island
countries, who formed an intergovernmental cooperation organisation in 1971 (thePacific Islands Forum). However, in recent years nationalism has been more frequently
prioritised above regionalism. The disparities in the economies of the richest and poorest
countries will almost certainly create asymmetric relationships that may further challenge
regional cohesiveness.17

Geopolitics
Oceania has historically been of particular interest to China and the US (the latter has
close military ties to Australia and New Zealand), but recently it has also seen increased
activity from non-traditional actors such as Russia and Indonesia. The two main Oceania
powers see regional stability as critical to their national security as both are heavily
engaged in capacity building and development programmes in the region. Australia iscurrently the most influential actor in Oceania. It contributes approximately two thirds ofthe region’s aid, and seeks to be the principal security partner in the region.18 Throughaligned policies, New Zealand will probably continue to work closely with Australia,
whilst also trying to retain its reputation for independence. However, growing Chinese
economic involvement in Pacific Island countries is challenging Australia and New
Zealand’s influence.19
China will continue to be interested in Oceania so that it can gain access to fishing ports
and maritime zones, secure rights to seabed mining and generate increased support
in international bodies (particularly to counter pro-Taiwanese independence policies).
Chinese aid to the region increased significantly between 2006 and 2016, and it was
Oceania’s second largest donor over that period, providing an estimated US $1.7 billion(of a US $9 billion total). However, Chinese aid can involve unconditional low interest orconcessional loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, resulting in debt burdens that
may be beyond the capacity of receiving nations to service. There is also speculationthat Chinese aid may be funding infrastructure that will help with its longer-term militaryaspirations, such as developing large jetties capable of supporting naval operations
beyond the South China Sea.20
The US’ objectives in the region are focused on balancing Chinese influence. The US
maintains several bases in the Pacific and entered into the Compact of Free Association
with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. The US will remain a major donor of
foreign aid to the region and is likely to operate in concert with Australia and New Zealand.
France has over 1.6 million citizens living in its territories in the Pacific, as well as several
military bases and a sizeable maritime presence. It contributes to regional security
frameworks including the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group, alongside theUS, Australia and New Zealand. France has recently expressed concern over Chinese
influence, implying that it will cooperate with other Western powers to help maintain theregional status quo and protect its economic interests. Australia’s recent decision to buy
submarines built by a French state-owned naval company has strengthened the strategic

17 Boxall, S., New Zealand Defence Force, (August 2017), Directorate of Future Force Development
Publication: Foresight Report: Oceania.
18 Wallis, J., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, (27 September 2017), ‘Do Australia’s interest
match its influence in the Pacific Islands?’.
19 Bately, J., Lowy Institute, (27 April 2018), Review: Safeguarding Australia’s security interests through closer
Pacific ties.
20 Dibb, P., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, (4 April 2018), ‘If China builds a military base in
Vanuatu, what are the implications for Australia’s defence planning?’.

198

Global Strategic TrendsOceania

relationship between the two countries, and indicates France’s interest in the region.21
While French territories in the Pacific are likely to move to independence, this is notexpected to have a significant impact on France’s strategic interests in the region.
The UK’s announcement that it will open three new diplomatic missions in Tonga,
Vanuatu and Samoa means that the UK will have greater diplomatic coverage inthe region than the US or France. Its strategic interests in Oceania are centred on
maintaining the rules-based global order, but also positioning itself as an environmental
leader and providing support to many Pacific Island countries that face significant
challenges in managing climate change impacts over the next 30 years.22

Security
With the exception of civil wars in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, andpolitical violence in Fiji, the region has experienced a relatively high level of stability.
Defence expenditure has historically been low in the Pacific Island countries and somenations do not have militaries. Security forces in the region often work together, and
New Zealand and Australia have helped to develop regional maritime protection
capabilities in other countries, for example, by providing patrol boats, infrastructure andtraining. External military partners, particularly Russia and China, are also playing an
increasingly important role in the region. Fiji and Russia signed a technology and military
cooperation agreement in 2013,23 and China recently gifted 14 military vehicles and a
medical unit to Vanuatu.24

pichitchai / Shutterstock.com

Illegal maritime activity has been growing in Oceania and is expected to continue torise. Transnational criminal syndicates are exploiting the region’s isolated and porous
borders to traffic drugs, weapons and people,25 and expanding their operations into
other sectors such as fishing and mining. Illegal maritime activities could be a driver for
greater regional cooperation. If left undeterred, however, these activities could undermine
regional stability. Should the activities of extractive industries in remote areas increase,private security companies are likely to be used more frequently.26

Deterring illegal maritime activity could drive greater regional cooperation
21 Wyeth, G., The Diplomat, (16 October 2017), ‘France in the Pacific: Growing Strategic Ties with Australia’.
22 Paskal, C., Lowy Institute, The interpreter, (24 April 2018), ‘Britain’s new Pacific presence’.
23 The Fijian Government, (2013), ‘Fiji Signs Landmark Agreement with Russia’.
24 Boxall, S., New Zealand Defence Force, (August 2017), Directorate of Future Force Development
Publication: Foresight Report: Oceania.
25 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (September 2016) and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Transnational
Organized Crime in the Pacific: A Threat Assessment.
26 Pacific Islands Report, (2015), ‘Security Services Fasted Growing Industry In Papua New Guinea’.

Global Strategic Trends

199

20 Gabon
21 The Gambia
22 Ghana
23 Guinea
24 Guinea-Bissau
25 Kenya
26 Lesotho
27 Liberia
28 Libya
29 Madagascar
30 Malawi
31 Mali
32 Mauritania
33 Mauritius
34 Mayotte
35 Morocco
36 Mozambique
37 Namibia
38 Niger
39 Nigeria

1 Algeria
2 Angola
3 Benin
4 Botswana
5 Burkina Faso
6 Burundi
7 Cabo Verde
8 Cameroon
9 Central African Republic
10 Chad11 Comoros
12 Congo
13 Côte d’Ivoire
14 Democratic Republic of theCongo
15 Djibouti
16 Egypt
17 Equatorial Guinea
18 Eritrea
19 Ethiopia

40 Réunion
41 Rwanda
42 Saint Helena
43 São Tomé and Príncipe
44 Senegal
45 Sierra Leone
46 Seychelles
47 Somalia
48 South Africa
49 South Sudan
50 Sudan
51 Swaziland (renamed Eswatini)
52 Togo53 Tunisia
54 Uganda
55 United Republic of Tanzania
56 Western Sahara
57 Zambia
58 Zimbabwe

53
35
28

1

16

56
32
31
7
21

38

44

50

10

18

5

24

23
45
27

3
13

22 52

15
39

19

49

9
8

47

17
43

20

54

25

12
14

6

41

46

55
11
42

2

30

57

36
58

37

29

4
51
48

26

34

40

33

Africa

AfricaAfrica will remain one of the most economically and culturally diverse regions in theworld, with substantial regional differences. By 2050, Africa’s population is likely
to have doubled to around 2.5 billion people. It will also have the most youthful
population of any region, giving it a huge workforce, but providing sufficient educationand employment opportunities to realise this potential will be challenging. In somecountries unemployment is already around 50%. Climate change is likely to lead to
extreme weather including droughts, floods and storms, and crop failures are likely
to be increasingly common. Extreme poverty is likely to endure and could increase.
Criminality, conflict and terrorism will be enduring challenges that could worsen
substantially, although African security services should become increasingly effective.
Partly driven by technology, many, perhaps most, Africans will have increased accessto information and electricity, better health care and education.

Environment
Climate change will pose a huge challenge for Africa in the coming decades. Many
countries will experience an increase in extreme weather events, including more severe
and frequent droughts and floods, heatwaves, intense storms and tropical cyclones incoastal areas. A rising sea level could displace up to 1.4 million Africans by 2050.1
Africa is likely to see average temperature rises of 2° Celsius by 2050, with the drier
regions of North and Southern Africa potentially increasing up to 3° Celsius.2 Combinedwith the continent’s rapid population growth, this could exacerbate existing water
insecurity, potentially leading to high levels of water stress if not managed effectively.
Widespread water shortages could lead to the spread of disease, a reduction inagricultural productivity, damage to industrial production and slower economic growth.
Water stress could prove a significant source of social and political tension throughout
the continent and may lead to conflict, particularly in areas of high population density andwhere shared water resources are disputed.
The effects of climate change will also have a major impact on agricultural production,
and as Africa’s population increases, there may be more frequent food shortages andfamines. At present, despite having 24% of the world’s agricultural land, Africa only
produces 9% of global agricultural output.3 The continent currently imports 30% of its
food cereals and whilst food imports in themselves are not indicative of food security,
reliance on food imports out of necessity is an issue for concern. Currently, 27 out

1

Brown, S., et al., (2011), Sea-Level Rise and Impacts in Africa, 2000-2100, page 8.

2Richardson, K., UK Met Office Hadley Centre Report, (2015), Climate Change in Africa: a review to inform
DCDC’s Africa Regional Survey 2045.

3

African Development Bank, (2014), Tracking Africa’s Progress in Figures.

Global Strategic Trends

201

Africaof 34 countries highlighted for their inability to produce their own food due to waterand land limitations are in Africa.4 High levels of population growth are likely to drive a
growing dependence on food imports over the next 30 years. However, developments
in biotechnology could have a positive impact on food security, and the adoption ofhigh-yield, drought-resistant crops may help to mitigate the effects of climate change.5

Human development
Africa’s population is projected to more than double to around 2.5 billion (a quarter ofthe world’s population) by 2050. This would provide a huge boost to Africa’s potential
workforce, predicted to exceed China’s by 2030 and India’s by 2035,6 with potentiallysignificant benefits for African economies. However, some of the highest rates of
population growth will occur in Africa’s poorest regions such as the Sahel and themost densely populated areas such as Nigeria and the Great Lakes. This could strain
inadequate resources and infrastructure, adding to the challenge of poverty reduction.
Africa is expected to have the world’s fastest growing rate of urbanisation, with 56% of
the continent’s population likely to live in cities by 2050. However, there are also likely to
be increasing numbers of people living in rural areas, meaning that Africa will be the least
urbanised continent in the world in 2050.
Where adequate opportunities are not available at home, population growth may act
as a spur to migration, encouraging young Africans to leave their countries of birth insearch of employment. Whilst some of this migration will be to other continents, possibly
leading to an African ‘brain drain’, most African migration is likely to take place within
the continent. Considerable numbers of people may also migrate because of conflict,insecurity and the impact of climate change, meaning that the movement of people
will remain a significant economic and social challenge, potentially creating tension andhigher levels of conflict on the continent.

Africa population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
25.8
16.2

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
300

250

200

150

100

50

0

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Population (millions)

Africa 2015
Africa 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)202

4

World Atlas, (2017), ‘Countries Most Dependent On Others For Food’.

5

Ruane, J. and Sonnino, A., Journal of Biotechnology, 156, (2011), ‘Agricultural biotechnologies in developing
countries and their possible contribution to food security’, pages 356-363.

6

Cilliers, J., et al., Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Monograph 175, (2011), ‘African Futures 2050’, page 15.

Global Strategic Trends

Africa

As religion is very important to many Africans, religious tensions may be another driverof conflict in Africa. Christianity will remain the majority religion, but the proportion of
the population who are Muslim will probably increase, largely due to higher birth rates.7
Although religious tolerance has often been the norm in Africa, tensions may grow withthe rise of less tolerant movements such as Salafism and evangelical Pentecostalism.
In some areas, these groups may be manipulated for political purposes, resulting in
religious persecution and potentially an increase in violence between adherents ofdifferent faiths.
Despite high levels of economic growth throughout the continent, wealth will continue
to be unevenly distributed. Although the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty in the region will decrease, Africa’s rapid population growth means that the
number of people living in extreme poverty (those living under the global poverty lineof United States (US) $1.90 in purchasing power parity terms, set by the World Bank)
may increase. By 2050, it is likely that extreme poverty will almost exclusively beconcentrated in Africa.8

mtcurado / iStock.com

Government spending on education to boost economic development is likely to increase
across many African countries. Although basic levels of literacy and numeracy are
currently low, trends suggest they are likely to improve, with primary school enrolment
having more than doubled between 1990 and 2015.9 However, secondary and tertiary
education provision (although improving) will require significant investment if sufficientnumbers of African workers are to be equipped with the necessary technical, vocationaland other specialist skills required to realise the continent’s economic potential.
At present, only 11% of secondary education students are enrolled in vocational
programmes in Africa, in comparison with 21% in East Asia and 20% in Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.10

Some of the highest rates of population growth will occur in Africa’s poorest and most densely populated areas
7

Pew Research Center, (2015), ‘The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections 2010-2050’.

8

Dissanayake, R., et al., (2017), Department for International Development (DFID), Chief Economist’s
Office, Three Worlds In 2050: Scenarios for Poverty and Development, a research paper prepared for theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

9The Africa-America Institute, (2105), State of Education in Africa Report 2015: A report card on the
progress, opportunities and challenges confronting the African education sector.

10 African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United
Nations (UN) Development Programme (UNDP), (2017), ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’, page 209.

Global Strategic Trends

203Adam Jan Figel / Shutterstock.com

AfricaPrimary school enrolment has more than doubled between 1990 and 2015

Health care provision will probably improve in many African countries, with access to,and the quality of, medical services likely to get better for most. Recent years haveseen significant advances in tackling diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS, as well
as reducing child mortality, and further improvements are expected over the coming
decades. However, African medical services will face new challenges. Climate change
could cause the emergence of new disease vectors, resulting in longer transmission
seasons and the spread of malaria to currently unaffected areas. The risk of epidemics
will endure (despite better vaccination programmes), and it is plausible that the threat ofa global pandemic could emerge from Africa. In addition, as life expectancy and living
standards increase, Africa is likely to see an increase in non-communicable diseases,
which could see these emerging as the primary cause of health-related deaths by2025-2030.11 In the next decade, Africa is expected to see the world’s largest increasein deaths from non-communicable diseases. This problem could worsen as smoking
and drinking trends amongst the youth of Africa are on the rise.12
Increasing urbanisation may act as a spur to economic growth, but could also create
new challenges for some African countries. Many African cities have grown informallythrough rapid internal population growth and movement (from waves of inward migrants
in search of temporary or seasonal employment, people escaping from civil war).
Consequently, much of the continent’s urbanisation is unstructured, with large slums,
inadequate infrastructure and a lack of services. Many urban areas are likely to remain
poorly planned and difficult to govern, leading to tension and possibly urban conflict.
Nevertheless, where the necessary investments are made, Africa could see successstories, with cities such as Lagos developing into ‘smart cities’.
Greater investment in road and rail construction, both by government and foreign
investors, will boost economic integration and dramatically improve transport links
to many poorly-connected areas. Cheaper and more efficient air travel may provide
alternative routes for goods and services to parts of the continent that are currently
expensive and time-consuming to access.
11 Cilliers, J., et al., ISS Monograph 175, (2011), ‘African Futures 2050’, pages 15 and 25.
12 Naik, R. and Kaneda, T., Population Reference Bureau, (2015), Non-communicable diseases in Africa:
Youth are key to curbing the epidemic and achieving sustainable development.

204

Global Strategic Trends

Africa

The next 30 years could also see a ‘technology leapfrog’ in the energy sector in Africa,
currently the only region in the world where the majority of the population do not haveaccess to electricity.13 Some forecasts indicate that the percentage of sub-SaharanAfrica’s population with access to the energy grid could rise from 34% in 2010 to 71%
by 2050, and an additional 8% could gain access to electricity through the creation ofoff-grid systems. Universal access to electricity could have a positive impact on poverty
reduction strategies in Africa, with probable increases in gross domestic product (GDP)and business productivity.14
Share of African population without access to electricity (2012)

Percentage (%)
<25
25–49
50–75
>75

rce: Economist.com; andSource: The Economist
s://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/11/09/what-technology-can-do-for-africa

Internet penetration rates are currently low in much of Africa, with only 1% of the
population having access to cable Internet, whilst 25% go online via their mobile
telephones. However, technological advancements, rising incomes and cheaper formsof computing and electricity generation will drive a huge growth in Internet usage, with
90% of Africans able to use Internet broadband by 2050.15 This could in turn provide asignificant boost to economic growth and human development. An increasing range ofgovernment services may also be available through the Internet, dramatically widening
access and potentially strengthening ties to the state.
13 International Energy Agency, (2014), ‘Africa Energy Outlook Special Report: A Focus on Energy Prospects
in Sub-Saharan Africa’.
14 Bössner, S. and Stang, G., European Union Institute for Security Studies, (2014), The EU and sub-SaharanAfrica: An energy partnership?
15 African Development Bank Group, (2011), ‘Africa in 50 Years’ Time – The Road Towards Inclusive Growth’,
page 14.

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205Africa

Economics
If recent growth rates can be sustained, the African economy as a whole may quadruplein size by 2050, with some countries, such as Nigeria, growing at an even fasterrate. Africa’s share of the global economy will remain relatively small, although it willrise to around 6% of global GDP by 2050.16 However, African economies currently
face a number of challenges, including fluctuations in commodity prices, a sluggish
performance in the global economy, protracted armed conflict in a number of countries
and, in North Africa in particular, political instability in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Africa’s rapidly growing population could give a significant boost to the continent’s
economies, providing a larger pool of potential workers as well as a growing domestic
consumer market for African goods and services. However, unemployment currently
remains high, at up to 50% in some countries, with Africa’s youth population particularly
adversely affected. Finding meaningful employment for young people will remain achallenge in the future.

Anca Dumitrache / Shutterstock.com

Economic diversification will remain a key priority for African countries. The
manufacturing sector is likely to grow, although it has made a slow start in Africa andcurrently provides only 5% of the continent’s jobs. Service provision offers huge potential
for growth and Africa’s young and increasingly skilled youth population could play animportant role in driving expansion.17 Those countries that do not achieve sufficientlevels of diversification will find themselves falling increasingly behind the continent’s more
successful economies.

High levels of unemployment in Africa particularly affect the youth population

16 The World Bank, (2006), ‘The Road to 2050: Sustainable Development for the 21st Century’.
17 African Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, (2017), ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’, pages 82 and 209.

206

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Africa

Although levels of regional trade are low compared to the rest of the world, they mightgrow due to technological developments and investments in transport infrastructure.
However, political action to address high trade tariffs, lengthy customs procedures
and other barriers to cross-border trade will be required if substantial growth is to beachieved. Although traditional trading partners such as Europe and the US are likely
to remain important for African countries, they will face increasing competition from
Asian markets. China and then India are currently Africa’s largest trading partners, but
India may surpass China by 2050. Although the European Union accounted for 30%
of Africa’s total global trade in 2015, more than half of Africa’s interregional trade is
now with emerging and developing economies, a share which may grow further in the
coming years.18
Africa’s
R31 main trading partners (2000-2015)
China
India
FranceUnited States
Spain
2000

Germany

2000

2010

Italy

2010

2015

Netherlands

2015

United Kingdom
16

12
8
4
0
Percentage (%) share in
Africa’s global trade in goods

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

Total value of trade in goods (US $ billion)

Source: Adopted from IMF data, http:data.imf.org; andhttps://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/african-economic-outlook-2017_aeo-2017-en#page77
Source: African Economic Outlook

Foreign direct investment in Africa has increased fivefold since 2000, reaching an
estimated annual total of US $56.5 billion in 2016. Foreign direct investment now
regularly exceeds levels of aid to the continent, a trend likely to continue, with economic
diversification spurring additional interest from investors. Africa’s share of global foreign
direct investment could double by 2050.19 Increased foreign direct investments could
mean increased diplomatic links but also reliance on external actors.
Africa’s growing connection to the global information network has recently facilitatedanother type of external funding in the form of remittances (money that emigrants sendhome). In 2016, remittances to Africa (not including unreported flows), were worth anestimated US $64.6 billion, compared with aid levels of US $50.2 billion. Remittancesfrom diaspora are likely to remain a major source of external finance for the continent andprovide a vital lifeline for many African households through the next 30 years.20

18 African Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, (2017), ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’, pages 30, 74, 76
and 209.
19 Cilliers, J., et al., ‘ISS Monograph 175’, (2011), ‘African Futures 2050’, pages 15 and 61.
20 African Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, (2017), ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’, pages 45 and 209.

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207

Governance
Advances in democratic standards are evident in many African countries, with anincreasing number setting term limits on their presidents and many peaceful powertransitions following elections. This trend is likely to continue, although the path isunlikely to be free from setbacks. In some cases, particularly in the early years of ademocracy, elections could be a major source of instability and tension, particularly
where results are contested. Over time, however, there are likely to be increasing
expectations of free and fair elections, which could provide a significant boost to
democratic development. As urbanisation increases, the greater weight of urban voices
may undermine the power of ruling parties in some countries. For example, Africa’s
urban areas are far more likely to back opposition parties than rural constituencies.
Most transfers of power on the continent have resulted, at least in part, from influential
urban constituencies supporting an opposition party.21 If the proportion of Africans living
in urban areas continues to rise, this may result in a higher rate of governmental turnover,demonstrating greater support for democratic processes, but it could also have adestabilising effect.
Rising standards of education could have a positive impact on African governance.
Higher rates of literacy and greater use of social media will enable greater accessto information and provide an effective platform to voice concerns over government
policies. This could lead to calls for improvements in the quality of state governanceand provision of services, as well as demands for an end to corruption. In addition,
increasing levels of economic development will lead to a growth in the African middle
class, which may play a pivotal role in driving improvements in state governance. As
educational standards improve, the expanding middle class may provide a larger pool of
Africans with the requisite skills and political awareness to staff government positions.

21 Cheeseman, N., (2017), How will governance within current state boundaries in Africa change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.

208

Global Strategic Trends

NerishaRaySingh / Shutterstock.com

Technology and enhanced professionalism should lead to an improvement in law enforcement and security

Africa

Geopolitics
African countries could become increasingly engaged in global matters and may exerta growing influence on the international stage, particularly in partnership with others.
Increasing dissatisfaction over the continued dominance of Western economies ininternational institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fundhas led in recent years to the involvement in alternative structures, such as South Africa’s
membership of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the New Development Bank. These
institutions, together with South-South initiatives, could grow in importance, meaningthat the rest of the world may have to take greater notice of their actions.
Africa’s strategic importance as a geographic centre of global trade is likely to become
more significant as international trade increases. Ports on Africa’s eastern coastline
could grow in strategic importance as trade with Asia and the Middle East grows, anda similar trend emerging for the continent’s west coast is possible given a developed
interest in South American markets. However, the strategic importance of Africa’s
geographic location may be tempered by the opening of new trade routes throughthe Arctic.

Aekkaphob / Shutterstock.com

The US, France and the United Kingdom will remain important influences in Africa overthe next 30 years, but will be joined by other state and non-state actors. Growing
powers, such as China, India and Brazil, all view Africa as an opportunity for trade andinvestment. Elsewhere, Middle Eastern countries, such as Qatar and the United ArabEmirates, will continue to compete for influence in the Horn of Africa, motivated bypolitical and economic factors. Aside from state-led engagement, private multinational
companies will attempt to secure a foothold on the continent, seeking access to Africancommodity reserves but also, increasingly, looking for investment opportunities in other
African business sectors, such as financial services, construction and manufacturing.

Movement of people throughout the continent will provide social and economic challenges

Global Strategic Trends

209punghi / Shutterstock.com

AfricaThe African continent will continue to account for a large share of the world’s armed conflicts

Security
State fragility will continue to drive conflict and violence in a number of African countries,
with North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes being particularly
vulnerable to continued instability.22 As the continent’s population increases, competition
over water, food, energy and land may result in heightened levels of conflict at the local
level, particularly in southern and northern Africa, where the effects of climate change willprobably be felt most keenly. A declining proportion of the African population is being
affected by armed conflict, but, the continent still accounts for the largest share of theworld’s armed conflicts.23 Since 2010, there has been an increase in the level of armed
violence in Africa, largely due to the protracted conflicts in Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan,
Somalia and the Central African Republic.24
Terrorism will continue to present a challenge to African governments, with Islamic
extremist groups posing an enduring threat. Such organisations are likely continue tomount foreign and domestic attacks, using African countries as a base for overseas
operations, as well as striking foreign interests on the continent. The emergence of an
Islamist Caliphate in the region within the next 30 years is plausible, although unlikely
because of the diverse and often localised character of African extremist groups.
22 Cilliers, J. and Sisk, T., ISS Monograph 188, (2013), ’Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects
for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries’.
23 African Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, (2017), ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’, pages 26 and 209.
24 Cilliers, J., ISS Paper 273, (2014), ‘Africa’s conflict burden in a global context’.

210

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AfricaPoverty, inequality and a growing awareness of socio-economic imbalance will continue
to drive high levels of crime in Africa. The effects of population growth and resource
shortages could see rates of criminal activity (including violent crime) increase evenfurther, potentially deterring tourism and foreign direct investment to some Africancountries. In urban areas, youth unemployment and poor service provision may cause
a rise in crime rates,25 in some cases resulting in urban areas becoming so dangerous
that they are considered ‘no go’ areas for state security forces.26 These ungovernable
spaces are at risk of being taken over by belligerent non-state actors.
Weak state governance will provide space for organised crime to flourish in parts ofAfrica. Increasingly powerful criminal networks (some of which might have strong links tothe state) may exploit developments in communications technology and Africa’s growing
integration into the global economy. The growing connection of Africa’s criminals to
global crime networks may also result in rising levels of illegal migration, the majority ofwhich is facilitated by transnational criminal organisations as a source of finance. Europe
is likely to remain an important destination for illegal migration due to its geographic
proximity to Africa and higher levels of prosperity.27
The increasing professionalism of Africa’s security providers and law enforcement
agencies, together with investment in new technological capabilities, should lead toan improvement in law enforcement and security on the continent. While capabilities
will continue to vary widely from country to country, many militaries and police forces
are likely to see improvements in their capabilities and effectiveness, helping to tackle
challenges such as terrorism, piracy and violent crime. Whilst the United Nations willcontinue to be a major actor in African security operations, the African Union should
become increasingly influential, playing a vital role in maintaining peace and stabilityon the continent, diminishing the requirement for international involvement over time.

25 Cilliers, J., et al., ISS Monograph 175, (2011), ‘African Futures 2050’, pages 15 and 76.
26 Cheeseman, N., (2017), How will governance within current state boundaries in Africa change over the next
30 years?, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
27 European Police Office (EUROPOL), (February 2016), Migrant Smuggling in the EU.

Global Strategic Trends

211

22
45
15
14

34
13
26
12

23

28

24

4

48

33
5

8
16

35

18

29

46
31

2

43

38

21
39

9
6

40

41
7

32

20

1

44

37
19

17

1 Albania
2 Andorra
3 Austria
4 Belarus
5 Belgium
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 Bulgaria
8 Channel Islands
9 Croatia
10 Cyprus
11 Czechia
12 Denmark
13 Estonia
14 Faeroe Islands
15 Finland
16 France
17 Gibraltar (UK)

42

3

27
25

36

47

11

30

18 Germany
19 Greece
20 Holy See
21 Hungary
22 Iceland
23 Ireland
24 Isle of Man
25 Italy
26 Latvia
27 Liechtenstein
28 Lithuania
29 Luxembourg
30 Malta
31 Monaco
32 Montenegro
33 Netherlands
34 Norway

10

35 Poland
36 Portugal
37 Republic of Macedonia
38 Republic of Moldova
39 Romania
40 San Marino
41 Serbia
42 Slovakia
43 Slovenia
44 Spain
45 Sweden
46 Switzerland
47 Ukraine
48 United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland

Europe

EuropeEurope will retain considerable soft power, despite its reducing influence on global issues
and dwindling share of the global economy. Productivity growth is likely to remain low
and unemployment could rise. Nevertheless, Europeans should remain relatively wealthy
compared with people in most other regions of the world. Europe’s neighbourhood
is, however, likely to remain a challenging one, with the Middle East and Africa likely toexperience rapid population growth and instability, forcing migration to Europe. Europe’s
relationship with Russia is also likely to remain difficult. The impact of these factors will
hit southern and eastern Europe hardest, sub-regions that are the most affected bylow economic growth, climate change and ageing populations. A divide between thewealthier, more competitive and climatically cooler northern and western Europe andthe poorer south and east could challenge European cohesion. Furthermore, most
governments will be challenged by ageing populations and increasing demands for
greater spending on welfare. Despite these challenges, the European Union (EU) should
survive, as without it, the challenges that some European countries will face may bebeyond the capacity of their governments to manage.

Environment
Climate change will have far-reaching consequences across European countries.
Climate projections show a marked increase in high temperature extremes, droughts
and heavy precipitation events, albeit with variations across Europe.1 Sea level rises
and extreme rainfall are projected to increase coastal and river flood risk in Europe.
Consequently, without adaptive measures, flood damage is expected to increase.
There will also be an impact on human health in Europe. Heat-related deaths andinjuries are likely to increase, particularly in southern Europe. Changes in the distribution
and seasonal pattern of some infections and increased risk of new infectious diseases
are plausible.
Southern Europe is particularly vulnerable to climate change, with multiple sectors likely
to be adversely affected, including tourism, agriculture, forestry, infrastructure, energy
and health care. Hot and cold weather extremes will have adverse effects in some areas,
but benefits in others. For example, transport could face challenges of overheating
infrastructure, but could also benefit from a reduction of maintenance costs in winter.
Climate change could also increase cereal yields in northern Europe whilst decreasing
yields in southern Europe. Furthermore, as temperatures increase, plants will need morewater, potentially necessitating greater extraction from rivers and aquifers, and requiring

1

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2014), Fifth Assessment Report: Europe.

Global Strategic Trends

213

Europe

The risk of wildfires in southern Europe will increase

improved water management schemes. Rising temperatures will increase forest
productivity in the north, although there will probably be more damage from fires anddiseases throughout Europe, particularly in the south.2
Crude oil largely dominates EU energy imports with a share of 69% in 2017, followed bynatural gas with 20%. In 2017, Russia was the largest supplier of oil and gas to the EU,
ahead of Norway.3 If energy dependence continues as projected, Europe will import 93%
of its oil and 83% of its gas in 2030, predominately from Russia, Norway and the Middle
East.4 The EU and Russia have an interdependent energy relationship which is likely
to persist for the next 20-30 years. Maintaining the current pace of renewable energy
deployment throughout Europe would enable the EU to achieve its target of sourcing
at least 27% of its gross final consumption of energy from renewable sources by 2030.
Breakthroughs in energy production and distribution could bring even wider adoption ofrenewable energy sources, safer and cheaper nuclear power, and potentially even fusion
technologies.5 Regulatory changes could affect investors’ confidence in renewables,and market barriers may continue to discourage new competitors from entering therenewable energy sector.

Human development
Urban development is projected to increase throughout Europe, particularly in the east.
The development of super-cities, mega-corridors and mega-regions is likely to change
the human habitat, but could also lead to greater polarisation within countries. Thereis an increasing Europe-wide concern about growing social and regional imbalances,which could lead to social and political instability.6 Peri-urbanisation in Europe is also an
increasing trend in which residents move out of cities to rural locations, whilst retaining
a functional link to cities by commuting to work.

214

2

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2014), Fifth Assessment Report: Europe.

3

Eurostat, (2018), ‘EU imports of energy products – recent developments’.

4

Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, (2017), The Future of Europe 2050, a research paper
commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

5

Pick, L., POLIS Journal, Volume 7, ( Summer 2012), ‘EU-Russia Energy Relations: a Critical Analysis’.

6

Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, (2017), The Future of Europe 2050, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

Global Strategic Trends

Europe

Health care and social welfare have improved everywhere in Europe, with reductions inadult and child mortality rates, but social inequalities both within and between countries
persist. Despite declining fertility rates (fertility in Europe more than halved between
1950 and 2010),7 the population of most EU countries has risen, primarily as a result of
net immigration. With persistently low fertility rates, Europe’s population is expected to
decline in the next 30 years. Continued migration could, however, offset this decreasing
trend if countries are willing to accept more immigrants.
Europe will have to deal with an ageing population and an increasing age dependency
ratio. European welfare states may need to undergo fundamental structural reform to
avoid crises and create lasting economic growth.8 European governments will face
increasing pressure to increase spending on health care, long-term care and pensions.
This combination of higher spending commitments and lower tax revenues is likely to bea source of concern for all European countries, especially those with high debt levels andunfunded pension schemes. Economic necessity may mean that people cannot retire
until they are 80, or possibly even older.

Europe population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
7.3
10

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Population (millions)

Europe 2015
Europe 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

It is plausible that migration from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa
will accelerate in the future. Contributing push factors include demographic growth,
conflict and climate change, whilst pull factors include the promise of a better life ina relatively wealthy Europe and the opportunities presented by its labour market.
However, the greatest proportion of migrants will move within their region of origin.
Growing socio-economic inequality and increasing polarisation between some sub-regionsin Europe has already generated substantial movement within the region. In 2014,
internal migrants accounted for more than half of Europe’s migrant population. As longas current inequalities among EU countries remain, this trend is likely to continue. By
2050, estimates indicate that the Muslim population in Europe will double and reach
10% of the population (70 million people), whilst the Christian population in Europe could
decline by 100 million, constituting 65% of the population. These figures should be seenin the light of the worldwide secularisation trend.9
7

Bussolo, M., et al., The World Bank, (2015), ‘Golden Aging: Prospects for Healthy, Active and Prosperous
Aging in Europe and Central Asia’.

8

Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, (2017), The Future of Europe 2050, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.		

9

Ibid.		

Global Strategic Trends

215

Jazzmany / Shutterstock.com

EuropeImmigration could offset population declines in Europe

Overall, Europe may experience several social challenges: an increase of external andinternal migration; an ageing population; increased income, wealth and employment
inequality; declining innovation performance; and increased urbanisation. If not mitigatedby collaborative action, underpinned by technological development and coherent policy,
there is a risk of fragmentation and unrest within Europe.

Economics
Europe’s global economic position shows signs of weakening. Since 2000, the EU’s
economy grew by 17% against a worldwide average of 47%. In the same period,
China’s economy grew by more than 100% and the United States (US) by 18%. BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) currently rival Europe and the US Fortune 500
companies in terms of revenue.
Productivity has grown significantly less in the EU over the past 20 years compared to
the US, although there are substantial regional variations. For example, most northern
European countries have displayed rapid productivity growth, while other sub-regions
have fallen behind. This divide in European income distribution reflects a global trendof income inequality that has been growing in most wealthy countries in recent decades.
In the 1980s, the average disposable income of Europe’s richest 10% was around seventimes higher than that of the poorest 10%. Today, it is around nine and a half times
higher. The unequal distribution of wealth in the region surpasses that of income. The
top 10% of the wealthiest households hold 50% of the total wealth, whereas the bottom
40% own little over 3%.10 Unless European governments or the EU are able to mitigate
this disparity, a widening wealth and income divide could threaten not only the social, butalso the political, stability of European societies.
Innovation is a key aspect of future growth in Europe. Current trends suggest a
pessimistic outlook for the next decades with many European sub-regions showing
declining innovation performance since 2008. Similarly, Forbes list of the 20 mostinnovative companies shows that only one came from Europe while 17 were in the US.11
If innovative performance is measured in terms of higher education, scientific
10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Centre for Opportunity and Equality,(2017), Understanding the socio-economic divide in Europe.
11 Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, (2017), The Future of Europe 2050, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

216

Global Strategic Trends

Europepublications, research and development, patents and export of knowledge-intensive
services, the US outperforms Europe in almost all aspects. However, this gap is closing.
The US performance lead was at 33% in 2007, but declined to 22% in 2014. China, on
the other hand, is quickly strengthening its performance and is already outperforming the
EU in many areas.
Long-term unemployment is likely to rise, as an increasing skills gap continues todampen employment prospects.12 Under-employment and a lack of job security may
become increasingly problematic. Gender gaps in employment and earnings havedeclined in most countries in the EU, but they persist, and women remain disadvantaged
in terms of the type of jobs they hold.13 Substantial differences in productivity andcompetitiveness within and between nations and sub-regions in Europe could also leadto tensions and imbalances.

R32

Annual percentage (%) change

European Union gross domestic product (GDP), employment and labour
productivity growth

2.5

Potential GDP
Labour productivity per hour
Employment

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
2016

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source: European Commission.

Source: European Commission

Growing automation may have a profound impact on employment and service provision.
Studies show that between half and two-thirds of jobs could be automated in the next
20-30 years. The cost of automation will probably decline rapidly, reducing the numberof skilled jobs, whilst increasing quality.
China’s influence in Europe is increasing. China is now the EU’s second-biggest
trading partner behind the US, while the EU is China’s biggest trading partner. Chinese
investments in the EU have grown from less than EUR 1 billion in 2000 to almost EUR 35
billion in 2016. Despite a decline in 2017, investment is expected to continue.14 From2005 to 2015, China’s share of the EU’s total trade rose, while the EU’s proportion ofChina’s trade volume fell.15
While Chinese investment could have a positive impact on the EU by increasing trade,investment, finance and flows of tourists and students, there is a risk that Europe will
become dependent on Chinese investment. Chinese companies may even take over
European strategic industries, particularly if there is an imbalance in respective levels
of investment.
12 Hoorens, S., et al., RAND Corporation, (2013), Europe’s Societal Challenges: An analysis of global societal
trends to 2030 and their impact on the EU.
13 OECD, Centre for Opportunity and Equality, (2017), Understanding the socio-economic divide in Europe.
14 Hanemann T. and Houtari M., Mercator Institute for China Studies, (2018), ‘Chinese FDI in Europe in 2017’.
15 Garcia-Herrero, A., et al., (2017), EU-China Economic Relations to 2025: Building a Common Future.

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217

nito100 / iStock.com

Active separatism and demands for autonomy by cities could challenge national and EU cohesion

GovernanceEurope’s future will be heavily influenced by the success of its dominant economic
and political structure, the EU. Several forces are currently driving the EU towards
fragmentation. Migration, increasing income inequality and growing regional imbalances
have led to Euro-scepticism with anti-immigration parties gaining ground across Europe.
The political challenges resulting from the growing divide between the public and theelites, as well as between liberal and authoritarian-minded groups, are likely to persist
for many years.16
The factors driving EU fragmentation could also be replicated on the national level within
EU member states. There are active separatist movements in many European countries
and many leading cities are likely to seek greater autonomy. The challenge posedby a fragmented Europe could hamper the EU’s future development, and provide an
opportunity for external powers to exploit and further widen division.
While the EU’s prospects appear uncertain today, this could be a transitory situation.
Historically, the EU’s development has not been smooth and transition has occurredwith a series of setbacks. Despite increasing Euro-scepticism, there are parallel forces
pulling the EU together, such as the newly established banking union. It is unlikely,
however, that a federalised block will develop by 2050 as there appears to be little
appetite for creating a ‘United States of Europe’.

Geopolitics
By 2050, significant economic, political and military power is likely to have shifted fromthe US and Europe to other countries and regions, primarily China and India. Europe’s
influence on global issues will probably be tied to its ability to leverage hard and soft
power, both of which are likely to be reduced by Europe’s smaller share of global grossdomestic product (GDP). Moreover, European states currently lack the ambition to act
in a coordinated fashion or to project a strong EU globally.17 These trends suggest that
Europe’s relative power in the world will decline. Being a wealthy region with global
interests, Europe is, however, expected to continue to exert some leadership worldwide,primarily through soft power.

16 Raines T., et al., Chatham House, (June 2017), The Future of Europe: Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes.
17 Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, (2017), The Future of Europe 2050, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

218

Global Strategic Trends

Europe

Although there are likely to be periods of tension between the US and Europe, thetransatlantic relationship and the US’ role in European security and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is likely to endure.18 However, the EU’s security priorities
may differ from NATO’s. NATO is likely to focus more on hard security issues (such as
territorial defence) and the EU on soft security issues (such as migration and inequality),
based on where EU member states have common security interests. Rather thanforming an autonomous EU or European defence union, states with similar outlooks
are likely to collaborate more closely to enhance security.
Turkish politics will preclude EU accession, at least in the next ten years. Becauseof this and existing interdependencies, a continuous dialogue between Turkey andEurope seems likely. However, against this background, Turkey’s future role in NATOis uncertain.

Security
Europe will continue to be caught in an unstable geostrategic environment to its east andsouth, facing potential tensions with Russia. Russia is likely to continue, and possibly
increase, its soft power and propaganda efforts in Europe, particularly in former-Soviet
countries. The long-term outcome of the ongoing fighting in Ukraine and the frozen conflictin Georgia remains uncertain. Eastern Europe and the Caucasus will continue, however,to be part of a wider great power competition and an escalation leading to an armed
conflict between Western countries and Russia cannot be ruled out. Meanwhile, stressand instability in Africa and the Middle East may spill over into Europe. As Europe’s
population stagnates and the populations of Africa and the Middle East grow, parts ofEurope are likely to focus on the south, but these trends could also lead to a potential
split within Europe, as different sub-regions focus on different security concerns.
Public support for a common EU foreign, security and defence policy has remained
high for the past 25 years.19 There is a clear trend in increased defence and security
prioritisation and EU defence spending has increased in real terms over the past five
years. Three European states remain in the top ten of the world (France, Germany andthe United Kingdom), and 14 EU members have increased defence spending as a shareof GDP since 2014.20 However, unless there is a clear threat to the European states, thistrend is less likely to continue, as Europe’s share of global GDP reduces along with lesstax income and increasing social costs. More money may also be allocated to fighting
the effects of climate change. In general, trends show that countries are less willing tospend money on defence as a share of GDP.
While the threat from international terrorism and extremist violence will continue to be asecurity concern on the European continent, it is expected to remain at a comparatively
low level. Although Europeans remain concerned about terrorism, especially Islamic
extremism, only 0.4% of global attacks occurred in Western Europe between 2001 and2014.21 The overall trends concerning ideology and motivation behind terrorist action
are changing. Violent jihadism is on the rise in Western Europe, as is right-wing terrorism
motivated by anti-immigration and anti-Islamic sentiments. The old, but still mostcommon, form of terrorism motivated by separatism is fading away, although a returnof this form cannot be ruled out.22
18 Salonius-Pasternak, C., Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (November 2016), The Future of US-Europe
Relations: Institutional Constraints and Public Opinion May Render Changes Smaller Than Expected.
19 Iso-Markku, T., et al., (Eds.), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (2017), The EU’s Choice: Perspectives
on deepening and differentiation.
20 Stanley-Lockman, Z., European Union Institute for Security Studies, (1 March 2017), ‘SMS – European
defence 2016’.
21 Roser, M., et al., Our World in Data, (2013), ‘Terrorism’.
22 Iso-Markku, T., et al., (Eds.), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (2017), The EU’s Choice: Perspectives
on deepening and differentiation.

Global Strategic Trends

219

2

1

1
2

Kaliningrad
RussiaRussia

RussiaStretching from Europe, across Asia to within 51 miles of North America, and with oneof the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, Russia will remain a major global actor. By
2050, Russia’s population is likely to reduce by around ten million and have concentrated
in major urban centres, leaving much of the country almost uninhabited. Climate change
will open up shipping routes along Russia’s Arctic coast and increase the area of land
suitable for agriculture in the north, but hotter and drier weather in the south and west
will limit agricultural output. Russia’s economy should be sustained by its huge reservesof oil and gas, but chronic underinvestment in other sectors will hamper growth. Russia
will continue to maintain pressure and influence on countries in its near abroad andpush for a multipolar world order. Its relationship with Europe and North America islikely to remain awkward, and whilst its relationships with Asian countries will become
increasingly important, China’s growing influence, particularly in Central Asia and the Far
East could create tensions. Military spending will remain high and its capabilities can be
expected to improve, although a declining number of healthy recruits may limit the size of
its armed forces.

Environment
The northern territories of Russia will continue to be the area most affected by climatechange. Melting Arctic ice, leading to the opening of the Northern Sea Route will
create significant economic opportunities, and might reverse the exodus of inhabitants
which began in the 1990s. Research suggests that the passage will be mostly ice
free and navigable in the summer months by 2025-2030. However, the long northerncoastline will be vulnerable to land erosion and thawing of permafrost. Legacy Soviet oil
infrastructure on land and offshore will be increasingly vulnerable and require significant
investment. Overall, precipitation across Russia is projected to increase slightly,
particularly in winter, and extreme snowfall events may become more frequent.
Temperature increases will also be most pronounced in the north. Without significant
internal and external pressure, the primary focus of Russia’s environmental concern
is likely to remain the clean-up of Soviet era legacy infrastructure and pollution rather
than preventing climate change. There is unlikely to be substantial policy interest
or investment in climate change prevention or mitigation from either governmentor business.
Food supply will remain a national security issue for Russia. In recent years, as muchas half of Russian food has been imported, increasingly from European Union (EU) or
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, and there remain concerns about thestrategic grain reserve. Although temperature rises could increase arable land availability
in northern Russia, the Volga region (Russia’s traditional breadbasket) could be adversely
affected by climate change and may even become arid. Therefore, any gains in the northGlobal Strategic Trends

221

Russia

are likely to be more than offset by losses in the south and west, where wildfires could also
destroy crops and cause pollution. Since Russia is a major exporter of grains, particularly
wheat (supplying 13% of total exports in 20151), this may have an adverse effect on global
food security. Russia holds 20% of the world’s forests, however, economically accessible
stocks are shrinking and may be exhausted before 2050, unless management strategies
are improved. Although the availability of saltwater fish could increase due to warming
oceans,2 management of inland fish stocks and new, ice free, fishing grounds may prove
essential if an enduring Russian demand for fish products is to be met.
Energy will remain pivotal to Russia’s economy, due to its position as the world’s largest
natural gas exporter, and holds the world’s largest reserves.3 Internally, a shift awayfrom coal and oil towards gas is already taking place and is expected to continue
under Russia’s ‘Energy Strategy to 2035’. Outside European Russia, the transition
will be slower. Strong regional demand from Europe, and increasingly Asia, will enable
Russia to diversify its export markets and remain a leading exporter of hydrocarbons.
A shift towards renewable energy is unlikely in the next ten years, but technologicalbreakthroughs could change this in the longer term. The cost of gas production from
Russian fields may rise in the longer term. Nevertheless, Russian oil and gas willremain competitive due to the size of its eastern onshore fields, output from which will
increasingly replace falling production from the West Siberian fields. It is unlikely that the
Arctic offshore fields will be developed systematically and on a large scale before 2030.

Energy supply will probably remain a tool for influence and even coercion

222

1

Salmon, K. and Davie, J., (2018), Climate summary for Russia, a research paper prepared for theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

2

Ibid.

3

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), (2013), ‘World Proven Natural Gas Reserves
by Country’.

Global Strategic Trends

Russia

Human development
Russia’s population will probably decrease from 146 million to around 143 million by
2030. However, by 2050, high rates of inward migration from Central Asia, as wellas rapid population growth in some of Russia’s southern regions, could stabilise thepopulation to 130-140 million. High numbers of Muslims among these immigrants,
and the higher fertility rates in Muslim populations, may change the ethnic balance inRussia substantially. By 2050, non-Slavic ethnic groups could account for approximately
one third of the population, and Russia is projected to possess one of the highest
dependency ratios (the proportion of children and the elderly compared with those ofworking age) in the world. Due to a relatively low rate of economic growth and hightaxes, the resources to support Russia’s dependent population will be spread thinly.

Russia population
An ageing population
Male
2015

90-99

2050

80-89

Female
2015

100+

2050

Percentage shareof global population
1.4
1.9

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
12 11 10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12Population (millions)

Russia 2015
Russia 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Policy interventions aim to repopulate Russia’s agricultural regions and Far East but
are unlikely to be fully successful unless additional resources are made available. As aresult, degradation of these regions may continue and in the north, central and easternregions, population density may decline to 1930s levels. Russia’s plans to encourage
Chinese industry in its Far East may increase population density, but could also change
the ethnic balance. Associated Chinese economic migration could worsen inter-ethnic
tensions. By 2050, most Russians will live in urban areas away from the most remoteregions. Depopulation will leave many parts of the country unoccupied and without
basic social infrastructure.
Russian budgets and spending increased in the period 2007-2014, primarily as a resultof revenue from the export of hydrocarbons. However, the share of the population
with incomes below the minimum subsistence level remained unchanged. During thesame period, the state share of the economy increased from 35% to 70%. Between
2011 and 2016 federal expenditure increased from 13.9% of total spending to 19.6%,
but spending on health care and education fell by more than 25% and may continue todrop.4 Russian educational performance appears to have benefited from the increased
investment in the 2007-2014 period, with attainment in almost all areas having improved
to around the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)average since the early part of the 21st Century.5
4

Domanska, M., Centre for Eastern Studies, (2017), Crisis in Russia: The degradation of the model of
economic governance.

5

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (2017), ‘PISA 2015 key findings for
Russian Federation’.

Global Strategic Trends

223

Russia

nd
Ch

in

a

ila
Th
a

Ru
ss
ia

gl
ad
es
h
Vi
et
na
m
No
Am rt
e r her
ica n
In
do
ne
sia
Br
az
il

Ba
n

In
di
a

M

ya

nm

ar

R33

Estimated projections of rural population change in Russia and selected otherregions (2018-2050)

0%
-10%

-30%
-40%

Percentage (%) charge

-20%

-50%
-60%
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

By 2016, Russia’s per capita expenditure on health care was the eighth lowest amongthe 45 countries covered in an OECD health survey, and only one third of the OECDaverage (with purchasing power parity applied). Life expectancy at birth has improved
significantly since the Soviet era but remained fourth lowest of the countries surveyed,
at 71.3 years, in 2015.6 Russia also had the greatest variance between male andfemale life expectancy. Low life expectancy levels are largely due to lifestyle choices.
Russia had the eighth highest number of adult smokers, and above average number ofdrinkers.7 However, Russian women were among the least likely to smoke, and Russianadolescents were significantly less likely to smoke than Russian adults and were among
the least likely to drink alcohol globally.8 If this trend continues into adulthood, healthoutcomes may improve.

Economics
The Russian economy will be sustained by its vast natural gas reserves and large
population, and the country’s economic performance will be shaped by global
commodity demand and technological developments outside Russia. Measured bypurchasing power parity, Russia could be a major economy by 2050. In per capita
terms, however, Russia is likely to be poorer than its European neighbours, although
there will be significant regional variation.
In the short term, some effort may be made to reduce Russia’s dependence on
extracting and selling natural resources. State policies to foster the development of
new industries may be partially successful. However, unless a new political direction
strengthens property rights, any significant rise in investment is likely to occur only in224

6OECD, OECD Indicators, (2017), ‘Life expectancy at birth’, Health at a Glance 2017.

7

Ibid.

8

OECD, OECD Indicators, (2017), ‘Smoking and alcohol consumption among children’, Health at a
Glance 2017.

Global Strategic Trends

Russiastate-owned or state-influenced sectors of the economy. Such investment is likely to
be confined to strategically-important sectors. Due to security concerns, as well as
demographic trends, federal government spending will continue to be dominated bymilitary and social welfare expenditure and, as a result, most available resources will
be diverted to the defence industry, the extractive industry sector and welfare for theageing population. Therefore, the Russian economy is likely to display only small
pockets of globally competitive industry, particularly hydrocarbon extraction, defence
equipment and other state-sponsored enterprises. These will exist alongside larger,
uncompetitive sectors.
Russia will, however, be more closely integrated with the global economy, particularly
the hydrocarbon market, and may shift its focus towards East Asia in line with thebroader shift of global economic activity. Its hydrocarbon export market will broaden as
non-OECD countries seek to diversify supply. Russia will be an increasingly important
supplier of oil and gas to China and this will probably result in construction of denser
overland energy supply infrastructure. This will help boost Russia’s Far Eastern regions
economically and promote a rising mutual dependence between China and Russia.9
Russia’s draft ‘Energy Strategy for 2035’ continues to emphasise the limited availabilityof gas, Europe’s future demand and Russia’s diversification of supply to Asia. Thissuggests that energy supply will remain a tool for influence and even coercion.

Exploitation of Arctic resources will accelerate: the Prirazlomnaya is the first production platform on Russia’s Arctic shelf

9OECD, OECD Indicators, (2017), ‘Smoking and alcohol consumption among children’, Health at a
Glance 2017.

Global Strategic Trends

225

GovernanceRussia is likely to retain its current governance model of managed democracy,
administrated corruption, directed media, and nepotism for at least the next decade.
However, Russia will be unable to modernise without changing its network-based
governance patterns10 in which corruption has been, and will remain, a way to accessand keep political power and to retain loyalty.11 The Russian model of governance istherefore likely to show signs of continued administrative inefficiency with high levels ofcorruption, inertia in the model, and loyalty to the system and leaders. This would remain
an obstacle to change, even if a reform policy was adopted.
A large-scale, state-controlled project promoting patriotism, nationalism and Russian
values is in progress to maintain public support for the current leadership under President
Putin. This will also garner public support for revisionist, nationalist foreign policy. New
institutions, such as the National Guard, the ‘Youth Army’ and the All-Russia Front, arealso being created to help the state control the population. Younger Russians may
therefore be more indoctrinated than the older generation who remember the Sovietera. As a result, demand for reform may be limited, unless social conditions decline
significantly, but any protests are likely to be ruthlessly suppressed.

Geopolitics
Russia assesses that international affairs are entering a time of increasing competition
over resources, values, influence and access to markets, and uses this to generate abaseline for a Russian geopolitical viewpoint.12 Power politics will remain important andRussia will be prepared to use military means to secure its national interests and defend
the Russian Federation. It is likely to continue to push for a multipolar world order with
Russia as one of the leaders. It may seek to regain equilibrium with the United States(US) by reducing US global influence while increasing its own. Russia may also increase
its soft power and propaganda efforts, as a disruptive force and an integral part of efforts
to achieve foreign policy objectives that undermine other states’ security through effects
on civil society.13
10 Ledeneva, A., (2013), Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance.
11 Galeotti, M., European Council on Foreign Relations, (5 April 2016), ‘The Panama papers show
how corruption really works in Russia’.
12 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, (2016), Foreign Policy Concept of theRussian Federation.
13 Kuhrt, N. and Feklyunina, V., (Eds), BISA, King’s College London and Newcastle University, (2017),
Assessing Russia’s Power: A report.

226

Global Strategic Trends

vlad_karavaev / iStock.com

A large-scale, state-controlled project promotes patriotism, nationalism and Russian values to support President Putin

Russia

Core Russian foreign policy priorities will probably remain largely unchanged in the earlypart of the period and the Eurasian region will retain dominance in Russian strategic
thinking. Russia’s insecurity about its territorial integrity, and even national survival,
will continue to drive expansion and attempts to maintain pressure and influence on
countries in Russia’s neighbourhood. This will act as both a security buffer zone anda manifestation of Russian status and values.
Russian engagement in the wider international arena may also increase, particularly in
the Arctic but also in the Middle East and North Africa. Power projection further afield
may prove desirable and to enable it, Russia may seek to establish new relationships anddevelop bases.
The Asia-Pacific region accounts for 60% of Russia’s arms exports, and will therefore
continue to be of high importance to the Russian defence industry. As Russia seeks todeepen commercial and defence trade relations with China, it will also engage with otherregional powers, shown by expanding projects in Southeast Asia, ongoing military ties
with India and a new strategic engagement with Pakistan.

Free Wind 2014 / Shutterstock.com

China and Russia will continue to explore potential areas of mutual interest, and promote
cooperation and trade, to enhance economic growth and balance US influence. As
China’s Belt and Road Initiative develops, Russia may seek to deepen its involvement
and could gain from cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and theBelt and Road Initiative.14 The initial promise of improved relations with China has,
however, not been realised and less than 3% of China’s promised investments in Russia
have materialised. This suggests that although Russia is a major supplier of gas andespecially oil to China, it is not yet seen as a critical economic partner. Nevertheless,
China’s increasing need for Russian oil and gas, especially in its eastern provinces, may
deepen the relationship.15

Russian engagement in the wider international arena is expected to increase, particularly in the Arctic
14 Saalman, L., (Ed.), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2017), China-Russia relations
and regional dynamics – From Pivots to Peripheral Diplomacy.
15 Maslow A., et al., Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme, (2015), ‘Russia and China:
Entanglements and Points of Tension’.

Global Strategic Trends

227

Russia

The resources to support Russia’s old and young dependant population will be spread thinly

Russia will remain suspicious about China’s intentions in Northeast Asia, Central Asiaand the Western Pacific. It may perceive China as a threat in the medium or long term,
especially in the Russian Far East. Depopulation, combined with increased Chinese
agricultural and industrial activity may give substance to fears that China could dominate
the region, either directly via incursions over the border, or indirectly through the
expansion of Chinese businesses northwards.16
Russia will also continue being an influential actor in the Central Asian region. As
Central Asian populations increase, the power dynamic with Russia may begin to shift.
Russia may become more engaged in the region in response to an increasingly Muslim
population and a growing fear of religiously-motivated extremism and terrorism. Russia
will continue to use investment in Central Asian economies and projects, such as gas
distribution systems, as a tool of influence, as well as for economic gain.17
Since the Soviet era, the Arctic has been of great importance to Russia. It will continue
to view the region as both a strategic priority and a resource base, especially once theretreat of the ice cap opens the Northern Sea Route and allows extraction of oil andgas.18 Russia is claiming 1.2 million square kilometres of the Outer Continental Shelf in
the Arctic Sea, and therefore, can be expected to enhance its Arctic military presence.
The ongoing military build-up is partly a reacquisition of bases and capabilities thatwere lost after the Cold War. Russia’s Arctic infrastructure has suffered from severe
underinvestment over the last 20 years. Russia will continue to uphold the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a means of maintaining
status and influence, but without damaging diplomatic relations or upsetting potential
Asian investors.

16 Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), (2016), Northeast Asia to 2050: Key Trends, a research
paper commissioned by DCDC.
17 Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, (2016), The Silk Road to 2050: Key Trends,
a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
18 Kefferpütz, R., Centre for European Policy Studies, Number 205, (February 2010), On thin ice?
(Mis)interpreting Russian policy in the High North.

228

Global Strategic Trends

Russia

Russia has also increased its Antarctic presence and ambitions since the early 2000s,
and may be preparing for an eventual breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty System.
However, Russia has not yet moved to exploit Antarctic resources and may merely bekeeping its Antarctic options open.

Security
Traditional fears about internal and external threats will continue to underpin theimportance of security to Russia, and lead to continued investment in military and internal
security capabilities, even at the expense of economic growth. These fears shape
Russian approaches to the use of force, and coercive operations short of actual conflict.
The share of military expenditure in Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) has increased
from 3.6% in 2005 to 5.3% in 2016. This is the manifestation of a political will toprioritise military expenditure over other public sector spending.19 Russian defence andsecurity priorities reflect concerns about international instability. A major programme ofreform and re-equipment will continue to modernise Russia’s armed forces, and would
only be delayed by a significant upsurge in the requirement for welfare spending. This
programme will include Russia’s strategic deterrence capability, precision weapons, andspecific capabilities such as cyber, autonomous systems, directed energy or hypersonic
weapons, and robotics. Russia may develop a different ethical and legal framework forusing these technologies compared with the West. The mobilisation of the whole state insupport of Russia’s strategic objectives will remain a feature of Russian operations.

NaumB / iStock.com

Russian military ambition could be hindered by a lack of recruits. In the next five years,
the youth population will fall to less than 25 million and will continue to decline. This
could limit traditional Russian aspirations for a one million person armed force, especiallywhen combined with public health factors. Today, a third of recruits to the armed
forces are not fit for active service. Russia’s decision to recruit foreigners aged 18 to 30
offers some mitigation. There is potential for increased domestic disorder as a result of
economic conditions. In addition, an increased terrorist threat may emerge, particularly
among diaspora Central Asian Muslim communities, and where fighters have returned
from the Middle East.

The Russian Armed Forces are embarking on a major programme of reform and modernaisation
19 Persson, G., (Ed.), FOI Report, (2016), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016.

Global Strategic Trends

229

3
5

2

4
5

1

1
2
3
4
5

BermudaCanadaGreenlandSaint Pierre and Miquelon
United States of America

North America

North America

The United States (US) will retain significant influence in the international system and islikely to remain the pre-eminent global military power, supported by an extensive networkof allies and partners. However, its world-leading economic and technological position
will be challenged by China and its response will have global ramifications. Nevertheless,
North America will remain one of the world’s most prosperous, safe and stable regions.
With higher birth rates than many other developed parts of the world, North America
will have a relatively large and young working-age population by 2050. Rising levels
of wealth inequality and uneven access to education between socio-economic groups
and regions may, however, cause social (possibly violent) discontent and may influence
domestic politics. The effects of climate change will be felt across the region, particularlyin the US, which is likely to experience a fourfold to sixfold increase in heat stress.
Southern areas are particularly likely to suffer from worsening droughts. More intensestorms, combined with sea level rise, will make coastal cities, particularly along the Eastand Gulf Coast of the US, vulnerable to flooding.

Environment
In the last 70 years, Canada has experienced increasing precipitation and a higher rateof average annual temperature rise than most of the rest of the world. These trends
support projections that temperature increases of up to 2° Celsius are likely to beexperienced in North America by 2050. The region’s vast span from north to southmeans that the effects of climate change will be felt very differently from the Arctic
and tundra of northern Canada and Alaska to the semi-arid and desert areas in thesouthern interior. The north is likely to experience increases in precipitation, whereas
southern areas will probably experience decreases. The southwest, already affected bydroughts, is also likely to experience increased moisture loss due to evaporation at higher
temperatures. Additional tropical cyclone activity may result in more extreme rainfall on
the East and Gulf Coasts and, along with sea level rise, may increase the risk of storm
surge damage. New York, Miami and New Orleans are expected to be among the 20
cities with the greatest exposure of population and assets to coastal flooding.1
By 2050, a fourfold to sixfold increase in heat stress is likely across the US, with thelargest rise expected in the Southwest. The effects on agriculture will vary. Overall
yields of major crops, such as maize and wheat, will probably decline by mid-century.
In Southeastern US, wheat will be particularly vulnerable to reduced soil moisture.
However, northern areas are likely to see a modest increase in agricultural production.
Longer and warmer growing seasons should allow higher-value warmer-weather crops tobe grown further north and lengthen outdoor feeding seasons for livestock. The lucrative
maple syrup industry could expand northward.2
1

Davie, J., et al., (2017), Climate Change report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, pages 70-72, a research
paper prepared for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

2

Government of Canada, (2015), ‘Impacts of Climate Change’.

Global Strategic Trends

231

North America

The US is likely to become a net oil exporter, resulting in an expansion of Alaskan oil infrastructure

Increased water stress and drought are likely in arid and semi-arid areas of Canada andareas of the Western US, such as the Rio Grande basin.3 Declining flows in southern
Canadian rivers are already resulting in problems over sharing and water quality along theCanada-US border, including the Great Lakes.4 These issues are currently well-managed
by a joint Canadian-US organisation, the International Joint Commission, although they
may increasingly become a cause of regional tension.
Across Alaska, Canada and Greenland, infrastructure will be affected by changes topermafrost and sea ice that currently provide stable surfaces for buildings and pipelines,
contain waste and protect shorelines.5 Ice routes that use frozen lakes and rivers
will need to shift to land routes, potentially increasing the isolation of many northern
communities. However, melting sea ice might reduce remoteness, resulting in economic
benefits, but also challenging the traditions of indigenous Arctic communities. Greenlandis already benefiting economically from climate change due to increases in the variety andamount of fish caught in warmer waters, better agricultural opportunities and improved
access to onshore and offshore mineral resources.
Across North America, increased energy efficiency is likely to offset increases in demand.
By 2022, the US should become a net energy exporter, driven by flat domestic demandand growing hydrocarbon production of both oil and gas. Due to falling costs, newpower plants will increasingly be gas or renewable, while nuclear power use may reduce.6
The Canadian government has made enduring policy commitments to reduce greenhousegas emissions and progress is likely. In 2014, 65% of Canada’s electricity came fromrenewable sources and 80% from non-greenhouse gas-emitting sources. Hydroelectricity
accounts for 67% of Canada’s power generation (90% in British Columbia), but is232

3

Davie, J., et al., (2017), Climate Change report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, page 72, a research paper
prepared for DCDC.

4

Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, (2015), ‘From Impacts to Adaptation, Canada in a
Changing Climate’.

5

Ibid.

6

US Energy Information Administration, (6 February 2018), Annual Energy Outlook 2018 with projections to 2050.

Global Strategic Trends

North America

particularly vulnerable to climate change. As the world’s second largest producer ofuranium, 88% of which is exported, Canada will continue to make significant investment
in nuclear power. Despite the increasing energy independence of the US, Canada willcontinue to export significant amounts of electricity, oil and gas across its southern border,
possibly expanding the current network of 34 cross-border electricity transmission lines
and 840,000 kilometres of oil and gas pipelines. Higher demand for water in a more arid
Southwestern US may result in the bulk export of Canadian water, possibly via a new
network of water pipelines. This would require significant adjustments to trans-borderagreements on water and trade.

Human development
By 2050, there will be approximately 435 million people in North America. Canada andthe US will both experience population growth of just over 20%, to around 45 and 390
million respectively. Net immigration will play a significant part in this population increase,especially in Canada. Greenland and Bermuda could see small reductions in their
populations due to decreasing fertility rates and greater emigration.

North America population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

90-99

Female
2015

80-89

2050

100+

Percentage shareof global population
4.4
4.8

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
30

25

20

15

10

5

0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Population (millions)North America 2015
North America 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)

Immigration and differing fertility rates will continue to change the racial compositionof the US. Between 2000 and 2015, the US Asian population grew by 72%,7 whilst in
the same period the Hispanic population grew by 60%, accounting for more than halfof all population growth. In the next 30 years, projections suggest that there may be
no racial or ethnic majority in the US8 and that there could be more Asian than Latin
American immigrants. By 2050, the median age in the US will have increased by nearlyfive years to 42, but will still be relatively low compared with many other developed
economies, such as Canada at 45 and Europe at 47. As a result the US is likely to havea strong working-age population. However, the age of the population will not be evenly
distributed among racial and ethnic groups, and should broadly reflect 2014 medianages: Hispanic 28; Black 33; Asian 36; and White 43.9

7

Lopez, G., et al., Pew Research Center, (8 September 2017), ‘Key facts about Asian Americans, a diverseand growing population’.

8

Cohn, D. and Caumont, A., Pew Research Center, (2016), ‘10 demographic trends that are shaping the
U.S. and the world’.

9

Patten, E., Pew Research Center, (2016), ‘The Nation’s Latino Population Is Defined by Its Youth’.

Global Strategic Trends

233North America

Population percentage (%)

R35States population by ethnicity
United
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

1965

1975

1985

White

1995
Black

2005

2015

2025

Hispanic

2035

Asian

2045

2055

Other

Source: Pew Research Centre

In 2015, more than 81% of the US population lived in urban areas, and this proportion
should continue to rise and, by 2050, 89% of Americans, 87% of Canadians and 93%
of Greenlanders are likely to inhabit urban areas.10 Work patterns will also continue
to change. In 2017, 31% of the US workforce mainly worked remotely, up from 24%
in 2013. Such substantial alterations in the way people work will affect office spacerequirements and commuter travel, as well as urban economies and culture, but there
are currently no indications that this is affecting urbanisation trends. Multigenerational
living, with two or more adult generations under the same roof, has gradually increased
and is at its highest level since 1950, at 20% of households. This trend is expected
to continue.
Higher education institutions in the US and Canada, particularly the best performing
ones, should remain strongly competitive academically, helping to prolong the region’s
global technological and economic lead. Since 2000, there has been a gradual increasein tertiary education enrolments in both countries, a trend which is expected to continue.
Canada’s workforce currently has the highest levels of tertiary education in the world.
The US is currently the most popular destination for people studying abroad and places
at North American universities will remain in high demand for international students,
especially in graduate school and science and technology programmes.
The US consistently underperforms in science, mathematics and reading at secondary
school age.11 Canada ranks in the top ten globally in all three subjects, despite
spending 20% less as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). The effects ofsocio-economic disadvantage on academic performance in the US have been reducing,but significant inequalities in educational outcome remain, depending on family income
and ethnicity.12 Of those currently gaining college degrees, 15% are Hispanic Americans
compared with 23% Blacks, 36% Whites and 53% Asians. For high school completion,
the current figures are Hispanics 67%, Blacks 88%, Asians 89% and Whites 93%.13
Without mitigation, the US may not realise the full economic benefits of its relatively
young and sizeable population.
10 United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), ‘2018 Revision of World
Urbanization Prospects’.
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (2016), Country Note: Key findings
from PISA 2015 for the United States, page 18.
12 Alvaredo F., et al., World Inequality Lab, (2018), World Inequality Report 2018.
13 Pew Research Center, (27 June 2016), ‘On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds
Apart: 1. Demographic trends and economic well-being’.

234

Global Strategic Trends

North America

Despite a probable increase in the number of people without a religious affiliation, belief
is likely to play a relatively important part in North Americans’ private, public and politicallife, particularly in the US. In 2010, 77% of North Americans identified as Christian and
17% were religiously unaffiliated. By 2050, demographic changes, including migration,
combined with a continuing gradual trend for secularisation, could reduce the percentage
of Christians to 65% and increase the unaffiliated to around 25%. Muslims and Hindus
should overtake Buddhists becoming the second and third largest religious groups. Levelsof religious engagement among North American Christians and Muslims show fluctuations
but no clear trends. However, North Americans are consistently more religiously engaged
than Europeans, with almost twice as many likely to attend a religious event each week.
Between 1995 and 2013, life expectancy in the US increased from 74.7 to 78.8 years,
and in Canada from 76.3 to 81.7 years. In Canada the upward trend continues, but inthe US life expectancy has plateaued, despite world-leading health care research, cancer
outcomes and waiting times.14 Among the contributing factors may be a US obesity
rate that has more than doubled since 1978, reaching 38.2% of the population in 2015.
Childhood obesity is also trending upwards, meaning that overall obesity may exceed
46% by 2030. If unaddressed, this may lead to an increase in non-communicablediseases, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease, with associated rises in deathsand disabilities. In addition to increased health care costs, this would also damage theeconomy due to reduced productivity.

sshepard / iStock.com

Health care costs in the US will probably continue to outstrip economic growth. In
2016, total national expenditure on health care comprised 17.9% of GDP (double theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average), and without
policy intervention, this could reach between 24% and 37% of GDP by 2050.15 Highcosts, an ageing population and workplace health insurance schemes may result in
unfunded liabilities creating fiscal shortfalls for states and cities, and bankruptcies
for businesses.

High health care costs and an ageing population may result in unfunded liabilities

14 OECD, (2017), Health at a Glance 2017.
15 Getzen, T., Altarum, (6 January 2015), ‘Medical costs over the long run 1850-2050’.

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North America

North America’s share of global merchandise trade is expected to decline from 11% in 2015 to 9% in 2050

Economics
The US and Canada have an extremely close trade and investment relationship, withover 75% of Canada’s merchandise exports going to the US. Since World War 2,
Canada has successfully transitioned through the growth of its manufacturing, mining
and service sectors. Despite the abundance of its natural resources, which may be ingreater demand due to climate change, this shift is unlikely to be reversed. The futureof Canada’s economic success will, however, remain closely tied to that of the US.
Despite having had the world’s largest economy for more than a century, in 2014 the
US was overtaken by China in GDP at purchasing power parity,16 and is expected to be
overtaken in GDP at exchange rate by around 2030. By 2050, the US could have just
12% of the world’s economy at purchasing power parity compared with China’s 20%,and India’s 15%.17 The North American region’s share of global merchandise trade isalso expected to decline from 11% in 2015 to 9% in 2050. US policy responses tothe loss of its economic lead, and in particular the effects on its workforce, may haveimportant global ramifications.
In 2013, the US spent more on research and development than all European Union
countries combined, more than a quarter of global research and development
expenditure. However, China has gradually been closing the gap, and now spends
nearly the same amount as the US.18 Between 2005 and 2016, research anddevelopment spending by the US (as a share of GDP) increased slightly from 2.51%
to 2.74%, while China’s rose from 1.31% to 2.12%, with the result that China’s actual
expenditure rose from 25% to 90% compared to the US. If, as trends suggest, China’s
share of global GDP increases and US GDP declines, the latter may struggle to retain its
technological lead.

16 International Monetary Fund (IMF), (2018), World Economic Outlook, April 2018: Cyclical Upswing,
Structural Change.
17 PwC, (February 2017), The World in 2050.
18 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), (2015), UNESCO Science Report,
Towards 2030.

236

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North America

Since the start of the century, the US has seen its share of global exports fall from 11.8%
to 9.1%, whilst China’s has increased from 4.3% to 13.8%, with over two million US
manufacturing jobs lost during the same period. It is unclear to what extent these job
losses are due to Chinese import competition as opposed to the effects of automation orother factors. These effects will continue to be felt unevenly between more prosperous
US regions and those where the economic and industrial base has not adapted. If
manufacturing jobs continue to decline, many Americans will probably move to lower-tierindustrial or service employment. Given the two-tier US labour market, in which newer
employees and those with less professional skills are paid less, receive smaller pay rises
and fewer benefits such as health insurance, this may generate social discontent andeconomic uncertainty.
Diverging income-inequality in the United States

R36

20

Western Europe top 1%
Western Europe bottom 50%

15

United States top 1%
United States bottom 50%

10

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

5
1980

Percentage (%) national
income share

25

Source: WorldSource:
Inequality
Lab, World
inequalityL.,report
2018
Alvaredo,F., Chancel,
Piketty,T., Saez, E., Zucman, G (2018)-World Inequality Lab, World Inequality
Report 2018, available at http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf

Rising international trade competition, technological change, differences in access to
education, and US labour market conditions will continue to generate financial inequality
in the US. Between 1980 and 2014, the wealth share of the top 1% rose from just over
10% to 39%, while that of the bottom 50% decreased from 20% to 13%.19 Similar
developed economies in western Europe saw much smaller rises and falls. A lack ofpublic capital in the US may also limit both federal and state governments’ ability totackle inadequate ageing infrastructure, particularly where local tax revenues are low.

Socio-economic factors will continue to drive uneven educational outcomes
19 Alvaredo, F., et al., World Inequality Lab, (2018), World Inequality Report 2018.

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237

Ted Odeh / Shutterstock.com

North America

Religion is likely to remain an influence on politics in the US

Governance
The traditional model of Canadian party politics was overturned in the 2011 election
when the New Democratic Party replaced the Liberal Party as the official opposition
and made significant gains from the Bloc Quebecois. It was reinstated with the
Liberal victory of 2015. The relatively centrist positions of all major Canadian parties
suggest that far-left or far-right politics will not have significant influence in Canada
and that secessionist movements in Quebec and other provinces and territories are also
unlikely to garner significant political traction. Although plausible, the prospectof a province or territory leaving Canada is low.
The US two-party political system may be more susceptible to polarisation, which could
increase as a result of social and economic inequality. In the last 25 years, the numberof American voters who expressed consistently conservative or consistently liberal
opinions doubled,20 and there are significantly less senators and representatives
adopting cross-cutting positions on partisan political issues.21 Such polarisation may
make bipartisan consensus more difficult to achieve and limit prospects for a modern‘New Deal’ to address social inequality. Religion is also likely to remain an influence on
politics in the US, for example, 57% of Republican support is based on a combinationof evangelical Christians together with Catholics and Mormons of similar views, andin the 2016 presidential election, 81% of evangelical Christians voted for Trump.22
Nevertheless, the Washington establishment, comprising the career civil service,bureaucracy, Congress and the Senate, should continue to provide long-term continuity
and balance in US domestic and foreign policy, even if presidential administrations are shorter
term in outlook and influenced by populist and protectionist views of the electorate.
20 Pew Research Center, (12 June 2014), ‘Political Polarization in the American Public’.
21 Parker, C., Phys Org, (21 December 2017), ‘U.S. political parties more polarized than voters’.
22 Aaltola, M., et al., Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (31 January 2018), Between change andcontinuity: Making sense of America’s evolving global engagement, page 17.

238

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North America

Greenland is the most likely candidate for revised status within the region. Having gained
self-rule in 2009, it is not fully independent. It is currently sustained by a US $580 million
grant from Denmark, equivalent to one quarter of its GDP. Economic opportunities,
whether as a direct result of climate change, which will allow access to minerals andhydrocarbons, or because of China’s investment in mining and fishing, could lead to a
reduction in reliance on Denmark. This, in turn, could lead to an increased demand forfull independence.23

Geopolitics
Despite the increased economic prominence of China and other Southeast Asian
nations, the North American Free Trade Agreement members (the US, Canada and
Mexico) should remain one of the world’s strongest economic blocs. The US in particularwill retain significant influence in the international system due to its extensive networkof alliances and partnerships and strong global linkages to interdependent networks oftrade, finance and information.
Although the US may continue its historic oscillation between isolationism andinterventionism, it is difficult to envisage it being anything other than a global power in
2050. The future direction of US foreign policy and global engagement remains unclear
over the longer term, but crucial factors are likely to include how the US responds tothe potential transition of power to China (and other eastern countries), and the tension
between state sovereignty and humanitarian responsibilities. In addition, there is arisk that current economic protectionism could undermine key partner relationships,
particularly in Europe, South Asia and Southeast Asia.
There are likely to be changes to how US influence in the international system isachieved. Given the probable reduction in its share of global GDP, the US may find its
use of economic levers less viable. While the US will continue to fulfil its international
responsibilities, its participation may become increasingly conditional on allies andpartners taking on more equitable burden-sharing.
Despite cycles of tension, the relationship between the US and its European allies islikely to remain strong, defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security
cooperation, economic ties and shared values. Even with political polarisation on
both sides, core values and interests should remain sufficiently coherent to maintain astrong transatlantic relationship. The US will remain Europe’s major democratic ally andessential partner as no other power can provide similar security guarantees or political,
diplomatic, technological and economic resources.24 However, there may be significant
divergence of interest. For example, Europe is unlikely to wish to engage militarily in the
Indo-Pacific region, nor will European allies necessarily concur with the methods the
US chooses to achieve its strategic ends, especially where the unilateral use of force isinvolved. The US will also continue to demand that other NATO members commit tospending 2% of their GDP on defence, which may prove problematic for many countries.
Greater difficulty in achieving consensus in an enlarged NATO structure could lead toincreased multilateral or bilateral arrangements with NATO members.

23 Strategic Comments, 20:2, (16 April 2014), ‘China’s strategic arctic interests’.
24 Aaltola, M., Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (31 January 2018), Between change and continuity:
Making sense of America’s evolving global engagement, page 107.

Global Strategic Trends

239

michaelbwatkins / iStock.com

North America

Maritime power projection is likely to remain important to the US

European fears of a grand bargain between Russia and the US have receded due tothe recent increase in US Armed Forces in Europe, including the deployment of anarmoured brigade on a continuous basis and the proposal to add US $1.4 billion to
the US $3.4 billion budget allocation.25 This serves as a direct contribution to deterring
Russia in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, and also signals to NATO allies, other
European partners and Russia, that European security remains important to the US.26
The Indo-Pacific region is growing in importance to the US (relative to Europe and the
Middle East), which has historically been unwilling to accept another power as regionalhegemon in Asia.27 Despite criticism of Japan’s participation in burden-sharing, the US
is likely to: continue strengthening alliances in Asia; encourage a more interconnected
region; and build military capabilities to balance China’s prominence. The US may alsoseek to balance China’s influence by supporting India as a regional power and recruiting
countries bordering the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea to help
counter China’s maritime ambitions.
When deciding how to act strategically in the region, liberal values and human rights may
be less important to the US than interest-based considerations, such as commercial
access or security concerns, including the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
This may allow progress to be made on long-term regional issues and limit the likelihoodthat potential flashpoints, such as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or Taiwan,
spark conflict. Nevertheless, an assertive China seeking a central role in Asia and alarger role in global affairs, does challenge the US’ own strategic position and could
evolve into a latent strategic rivalry. Over the next 30 years, even if the US loses its
economic and technological lead to China and India, it is likely to remain the pre-eminent
global military power, supported by an extensive network of allies and partners.
25 Herszenhorn, D., Politico, (24 May 2017), ‘NATO cheers Trump’s military budget’.
26 Deni, J., Parameters, Volume 46, Issue 1, Spring, (2016), ‘Modifying America’s Forward Presence in Eastern
Europe’, page 42.
27 Green, M., (2017), By more than Providence: Grand Strategy and American power in the Asia Pacificsince 1783, page 3.

240

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North America

Unlike Canada, the US has traditionally been a reluctant Arctic actor, although it has
shown greater interest in the region over the last decade. US national security interestsin the region will almost certainly endure due to the proximity of Russia to Alaska, andthe presence of crucial elements of US strategic deterrence, global missile defence
and early warning architecture. The US has also shown greater interest in the maritime
area around Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. The US does not recognise
Canada’s claim that the waters within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are territorial,
which may become an increasing source of tension as climate change renders the Arctic
more accessible. If Greenland were to gain greater or even full independence this would
alter the North American Arctic’s geopolitical balance, especially if it were accompanied
by greater economic investment from other actors. Given its strategic interests inGreenland, such as Thule Air Base, the US would probably try to limit Chinese
influence there.

Security
North America will remain one of the most stable regions in the world, and there isa very low risk of substantial national instability or conflict within the region. Sharedsecurity interests between Canada and the US, derived in part from Canada’s up-threat
geographic position for the most likely direction of a ballistic missile attack, will continue todrive close defence cooperation. In the US, successive administrations appear to sharean enduring consensus regarding threats to US security (such as China, Russia, Iran,North Korea and violent extremist organisations), and this seems unlikely to change.28

Roman Tiraspolsky / Shutterstock.com

There will remain a risk of terrorist activity resulting from external issues, particularly
when the US and Canada are involved in interventionist military operations or economic
coercion. There is a much smaller risk of coordinated internally-motivated terrorism,
but it is possible that this could arise, especially if secessionist movements feel
underrepresented in the political process. High levels of gun ownership mean that
insurgent groups would have little difficulty arming themselves.

Gun ownership levels will remain high28 The White House, (December 2017), National Security Strategy of the United States of America, page 2.

Global Strategic Trends

241

1

5

32

16

12

7
26
21

39

2

45

28

30

29

25
38 10

18

46 33

31

19

40
6
41
24

4 17
11

34
15

42

44
35

48
27

14

43 23

20

9

37

8

1 Anguilla
2 Antigua and Barbuda
3 Argentina
4 Aruba
5 Bahamas
6 Barbados
7 Belize
8 Bolivia
9 Brazil
10 British Virgin Islands
11 Caribbean Netherlands
12 Cayman Islands
13 Chile
14 Colombia
15 Costa Rica
16 Cuba
17 Curaçao
18 Dominica
19 Dominican Republic
20 Ecuador
21 El Salvador
22 Falkland Islands
23 French Guiana
24 Grenada
25 Guadeloupe

26 Guatemala
27 Guyana
28 Haiti
29 Honduras
30 Jamaica
31 Martinique
32 Mexico
33 Montserrat
34 Nicaragua
35 Panama
36 Paraguay
37 Peru
38 Puerto Rico
39 Saint Kitts and Nevis
40 Saint Lucia
41 Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
42 Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
43 Suriname
44 Trinidad and Tobago
45 Turks and Caicos Islands
46 United States Virgin Islands
47 Uruguay
48 Venezuela

36

13

47
3

22

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean

By 2050, Latin America and the Caribbean’s (LAC’s) increasing share of the global
economy (Brazil could be the fifth largest economy and Mexico the seventh) couldchange the global political and economic order. The United States (US) will remain akey partner for the region, but its dominance is likely to reduce, while China will be anincreasingly important trading partner and investor. Trade with other Asian countries,
and Africa, is also likely to increase. Whilst levels of poverty had been reducing,since 2014 economic growth has stalled and, in the coming decades, insufficient
work may lead to increasing levels of poverty. This, combined with poor governanceand inequality, could lead to social unrest, populism and political instability. Levels ofviolent crime are likely to remain high and organised crime and corruption could reduce
economic growth and hamper efforts to improve governance. Armed conflict between
states in the region is, however, unlikely and the focus for military activity will continue
to be internal security. Rising sea levels, increasingly heavy rains and intense storms
combined with urban growth in environmentally exposed areas will make the region
vulnerable to natural disasters.

Environment
The vast north to south span of LAC encompasses varied climate types and a highdegree of biodiversity. By 2050, the annual mean temperature of the Caribbean, Central
America and northern South America is likely to increase by between 1° Celsius and 2°
Celsius, with slightly smaller rises projected for western and southeastern South America.
A 2° Celsius rise in temperature by 2050 could cost LAC up to US $100 billion, or 2-5%of overall gross domestic product (GDP).1 LAC experiences high average, but unevenly
distributed, rainfall, and this is reflected in uncertain estimates that arid and semi-arid
areas may become drier, whilst other areas may experience higher rainfall. In Central
America and the Caribbean, extreme rainfall is projected to increase during tropical
cyclones, but overall, the frequency of tropical cyclones is projected to decrease.2 The
pattern of coastal urbanisation is likely to continue with densely-populated coastal areas
being vulnerable to a combination of sea level rise and extreme weather.
By 2050, there is likely to be water stress in many areas in LAC. This is largely due toeconomic and demographic growth. Current water shortages in semi-arid areas and thetropical Andes are expected to increase due to the climate change effects ofglacier retreat, rainfall reduction and increased evaporation. This would reduce water
availability for cities, food production and hydroelectric power generation. Statistics forcountries that are relatively water stress-free may mask important differences between
1

Edwards, G., et al., The Brookings Institution, (2015), A New Global Agreement Can Catalyze Climate
Action in Latin America.

2

Davie, J., Met Office, (2017), Climate Change Report for Global Strategic Trends 2050, a research paper
prepared for the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).

Global Strategic Trends

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Latin America and the Caribbean

Coastal areas will be vulnerable to a combination of sea level rise and extreme weather

individual states. For example, Brazil, which has nearly the same land area as Europe,and is sustained by the Amazon River, lacks water availability in some states and has
recently experienced droughts in Sao Paulo, Brasilia and the north east, worsened by
the fragility of supply systems and water allocation regimes.3 Water stress is likely to
be particularly high in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru, Chile and Mexico, closely
followed by Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador.4
Agriculture will remain the largest consumer of water in the region. Meat and milk
production are particularly water-intensive farming industries and may be adversely
affected by shortages. However, climate change could create conditions that
benefit crops such as soybean, maize and sugar cane, and there could be increased
productivity in some parts of the region. Together with an increased demand for biofuel,this could lead to an accelerated expansion of pastures, and associated deforestation,with a potential to influence biodiversity in certain key regions.5 Careful management will
be required to ensure that such land use transitions do not worsen climate change andwater shortages.
Energy use in LAC has tripled in the last 30 years and is expected to increase by morethan 80% by 2040, with electricity requirements doubling in the same period. The
majority of future demand is expected to come from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela.6 Currently, fossil fuels make up around 74% of total energy use.
Natural gas production and use is increasing, but so too are energy efficiency measuresand the use of renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectric power. In 2017, almost
all of Costa Rica’s electricity was generated from renewables. However, reduced water244

3

Benton, T., et al., (2017), Food and water systems and security: looking to the future, a research paper
commissioned by DCDC.

4World Resources Institute, (2010), ‘Aqueduct Projected Water Stress Country Rankings’.

5Magrin, G. and Marengo, J., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2014), Central and SouthAmerica. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change.

6

Balza, L., et al., Inter-American Development Bank, (2015), Lights on? Energy needs in Latin America andthe Caribbean to 2040.

Global Strategic Trends

Latin America and the Caribbean

availability may in turn reduce the capacity for hydroelectric generation and lead to thediversification of renewable energy sources. Despite LAC generating three times more
electricity from renewables than the global average, fossil fuels are likely to remain an
important part of the region’s energy mix.

Electricity generation (Ej) per year

Latin
Americanelectricity
generation
R37– LatinAmerica
1
14

Wind

12

Solar

10

Geothermal

8

Nuclear

6

Hydro

4

Oil

2

Gas

0
2010

2020

2030

2040

Biomass

2050

Source: IIASA’s GEA Model Database.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank
Source: IDB. 2017. Energy Access. www.iadb.org/en/topics/energy/home,19006.html
Taken from Commissioned work on Latin America by Allie Bobak.

Human development

LAC is experiencing a rapid decline in fertility rates, coupled with a longer life expectancy,
creating an ageing population. Life expectancy has increased from 68.4 years in 1995
to 74.6 years in 2015, and, by 2050, is expected to reach 81.3 years, and the region’s
population is likely to be 779 million. Although Latin America has a very large youth
population, the median age rose from 19.7 years in 1980 to 29.5 years in 2018, and it isprojected to reach 41.1 by 2050. A consequence of an ageing population is an increasein the dependency ratio (the proportion of children and the elderly compared with thoseof working age), which is expected to rise from 50% today to 59% in 2050.7

Latin America population
An ageing population
Male
2015
2050

Female
2015
2050

100+
90-99
80-89

Percentage shareof global population
8.0
8.6

70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39

2015
2050

20-29
10-19
0-9
60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Population (millions)

Latin America 2015
Latin America 2050
Rest of the world 2015
Rest of the world 2050

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)7

United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Demographic
Observatory, (2015), 2014 Population projections.

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245

EvijaF / Shutterstock.com

Latin America and the Caribbean

An increasing proportion of the population will be elderly

The middle class (those living on US $10-50 a day) has expanded in LAC in recent years.
However, since 2014, this growth has stagnated and the vulnerable class (those living on
US $4-10 a day) has increased three times as quickly as the middle class.8 Insufficient
work and suppressed economic growth, particularly from 2030 onwards, could meanthat many fall back into poverty.
It is likely that migration will increase. In 2014, 28.5 million people from LAC lived outside
their home nation. By 2050, net migration of young low-skilled workers from LAC to
the US could slow to zero, as job opportunities decline.9 Intra-regional migration is likely
to increase, mainly as people seek employment opportunities, but also as they try toescape political crises, flee from violence and avoid the effects of climate change.
The general trend of rising urbanisation will continue. In 2016, 80% of the population
lived in urban areas, making LAC one of the world’s most urbanised regions. Inadequate
planning and land shortages will continue to drive the development of informal settlements
on hillsides and floodplains, making settlers more vulnerable to natural disasters.
The gender gap in LAC is narrowing faster than much of the rest of the world. An
increase in the number of working women has been partially attributed to recent strong
economic growth. About 70 million women joined the workforce during a period ofrecord economic growth between 2004 and 2014. Thus, compared with other parts of
the world, LAC has a high level of diversity in the workplace, including professional-level
employment. However, women are still more likely to work in the informal economy.
This is unlikely to change in the next 30 years, despite some initiatives to shift jobs

246

8

Calvo-Gonzalez, O., World Economic Forum, (2016), ‘Why is middle-class growth in Latin
America slowing?’.

9

Burke, A., The Brookings Institution, (23 March 2017), ‘Why undocumented immigration from
Latin America to the US will slow to a crawl – even without a border wall’.

Global Strategic Trends

Latin America and the Caribbean

from the informal to the formal economy.10 LAC has had many female heads of state,although, despite quota laws that increase participation, only 30% of current government
representatives are women.
Christians will remain the largest religious group, comprising about 90% of the religiously
affiliated population. On current trends, however, the number of people who are
religiously unaffiliated could grow from 45 million (7.7%) in 2010 to 65 million (8.7%)
in 2050, driven by higher fertility rates among the religiously unaffiliated and by people
renouncing their faith.11
Health care is improving in LAC, a trend expected to continue over the next 30 years.12
As economic development increases and the population ages, the prevalence ofcommunicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, is expected to fall, with a corresponding
rise in non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes and cancer. Pressure on healthservices may be most acute when dealing concurrently with both types of disease.
As temperatures rise, it is likely there will be an increase in the number of heat-related
fatalities, as well as an increase in the spread of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria
and dengue fever.
Steady improvements in education levels in LAC will continue, although the region lags
behind much of the world. In 2013, Latin America ranked near the bottom of every
global test of student achievement. There are skills shortages in the region, with acorresponding impact on productivity, making education a key development priority for
all LAC countries. LAC spent less than 4% of its GDP on education in 1990, increasing
to 5% by 2013, although there were substantial variations within the region. This level of
spending, to which some countries have made a long-term policy commitment, is similar
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average, andis higher than in most other developing countries.13 Many countries, especially Brazil and
Mexico, have invested in Massive Open Online Courses, allowing a greater proportionof the population access to free learning and opportunities for upskilling. Widespread
adoption of e-learning may help reduce skills shortages.

Economics
Economic growth is expected to slow, particularly during the next decade. Many
countries in the region may find themselves falling behind comparable economies after
2030. However, there will probably be some regional economic success stories, andMexico and Brazil will remain regional and international economic powers. Brazil iscurrently the world’s ninth largest economy and Mexico the 15th. By 2050, Brazil could
be the world’s fifth largest economy and Mexico the seventh. Other countries, such as
Panama and Peru, are expected to become high-income nations by 2050.14
The trend for increased LAC regional economic cooperation and integration should
continue.15 Initiatives, such as the Pacific Alliance formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexicoand Peru, are helping to promote open borders and trade agreements with countries all
10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Bank of Latin America(CAF)/UN ECLAC, (2016), Latin American Economic Outlook 2017: Youth, Skills and Entrepreneurship.
11 Pew Research Center, (2 April 2015), The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections,2010-2050.
12 Bobak, A., School of International Futures, (2017), The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean out to2050, a research paper commissioned by DCDC.
13 Fleischner, N., Americas Society/Council of the Americas (AS/COA), (25 August 2016), ‘Weekly Chart:
Education in Latin America and the Caribbean’.
14 Marczak, J. and Engelke, P., Atlantic Council, (2016), Latin America and the Caribbean 2030:
Future Scenarios.
15 Mori, A. and Zanatta, L., (Eds), International Society for Performance Improvement (ISPI), (2017), Latin
America at a Crossroads.

Global Strategic Trends

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Latin America and the Caribbean

over the world, as well as intra-regionally. Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru currently
represent 35% of Latin America’s GDP, almost 50% of its trade and attract 45% offoreign investment. Over the next 20 years their annual average growth rate could be
3.3%, rising to 5.2% given further improvements in productivity. In addition, Brazil,
historically a ‘closed’ nation, is opening up, and will continue to explore new trade
agreements. For example, despite the absence of a formal agreement, trade between
Africa and Brazil rose from US $6 billion in 2003 to US $25.6 billion in 2012.

Thousand US $ (2011) at PPPSouth
R38 American gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power
parity (PPP)
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2

AndeanCaribbean
Central America
Southern Cone

Total
Upper middle
income economies

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
IFs 7.19;onand
Note: All Source:
figures basedInter-American Development Bank data except upper middle
Marczak, J., and Engelke, P. December 2016. Latin America and the Caribbean 2030: Future
economies, which is based on World Bank data.
Scenarios. Atlantic Council. [online] http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/la-tin-america-and-the-caribbean-2030-future-scenarios
Source: Atlantic
Council

The US is currently LAC’s largest international investor and should remain a significant
trading partner, generating 20% of the region’s foreign direct investment flows.16
However, LAC has substantially increased trade with China as part of its drive to diversify
its partners. China has made, or proposed to make, investments in regional projects,
such as a car factory in Mexico (US $200 million), and the Nicaragua Canal (a US $50
billion programme). Chinese investment in the region is likely to rise, as a way to protect
access to extractive industries. Other large infrastructure projects, such as ports in the
Caribbean, could also follow. The region will continue to increase business with Asia
in general. Japan is already a significant, and growing, trading partner for many LAC
countries, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group of ten
countries, is likely to become more commercially important.

Governance
Most LAC countries have transitioned from dictatorship to democratic governance in thelast 20 to 40 years. Some countries have fluctuated between being free, ‘partly free’ or‘non-free’, including Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras.17 In such a recent democraticenvironment, populist sentiment about the fairness of power transitions and politicalprocesses, as seen in Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador, are likely to continue.18
Economic stagnation, poor governance and high-profile political scandals could betriggers for unrest. Some governments are already responding to this type of pressure
by increasing democratic participation and transparency, for example, Chile recently
16 UN ECLAC, (2017), Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean.
17 Freedom House, (2018), Freedom in the World 2018.
18 Marczak, J. and Engelke, P., Atlantic Council, (2016), Latin America and the Caribbean 2030:
Future Scenarios.

248

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Latin America and the Caribbean

involved its citizens in rewriting its constitution. Failure to establish improved democratic
processes could cause conflict in the region, for example, political instability and a weakeconomy in Venezuela caused an estimated 150,000 people to flee to neighbouring
countries in 2015 alone. In some countries, very high levels of corruption could result ingovernance being led, or at least heavily influenced by, drug cartels.

Geopolitics

Lucy Brown - loca4motion / Shutterstock.com

The balance of power in the region is closely linked to economic success. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru will continue to be the most influential countries
in LAC. Political relationships may, to some extent, follow trade alliances, as the USchanges its focus away from the region and as Asian countries, especially China,
continue to invest in Latin America. The Caribbean may not undergo the same shift
given its physical location away from major trade routes. However, while the influence of
the US in LAC may reduce, overall trade will probably not change significantly, given thesize of the existing market and the regions’ proximity. There are also important social ties
between LAC and the US. Hispanics currently make up the largest and fastest-growing
minority ethnic group in the US, and may increasingly influence policy towards LAC.19
Unlike China, the US will also have enduring security interests in the region. These
considerations suggest that there may be competing influences from China and the USwithin LAC. A breakdown in relations between the two powers could trigger tensions in
the region.

Corruption may continue to fuel unrest

19 Guardiola-Rivera, O., (2010), What if Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the North into
the 22nd Century, page 282.

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Antonio Scorza / Shutterstock.com

Latin America and the Caribbean

Governments will continue to use military forces for policing and internal security

Many South American countries have a particular strategic interest in the Antarctic. Both
Chile and Argentina were original members of the Antarctic Treaty because their southernborders almost enter Antarctic waters. Other LAC countries have subsequently become
signatories, including Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay. These nations, and others,
have invested in research and expeditions in the Antarctic, and are likely to continue todo so, not least to maintain a footing in the region for the review of the Antarctic Treaty
System in 2048. The majority of countries in the region believe that resources in the
Antarctic will be strategically important by the middle of the century.20

Security
There has not been a state-on-state conflict in LAC since the month-long Cenepa War
between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Stability is likely to be maintained, at least in part,by strong bilateral relationships, which are particularly important for countries that havesubstantial shared borders, such as Brazil. Armed conflicts between countries will
therefore remain unlikely.
Military forces are often used for policing and internal security in LAC countries. It is
likely that this will persist as long as armed forces are respected by the public. Defence
spending in the region, as a percentage of GDP, has remained fairly constant in Central
America and the Caribbean since 1988. A slight increase is explained by an increase inmilitary funding to counter drug cartels by the Mexican government. South America’s
military spending, however, has declined. This recent reduction in spending is probably
due to a lack of external threats, the impact of falling oil prices and Brazil’s economic
problems.21 Regional militaries could become responsible for protecting natural
resources, which would make developing rapid reaction forces a priority.
20 Alejandro Sanchez, W., Center for International Maritime Security, (2017), ‘Latin American Navies
and Antarctica’.
21 Tian, N., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (2017), Trends in World Military
Expenditure 2016.

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Religiously motivated terrorism is an emerging regional threat, particularly in the
Caribbean. Radicalisation is increasing due to a lack of education, family breakdown, thespread of violent ideas through social media and the influence of returning fighters from
Syria and Iraq. Trinidad had the highest rate of Islamic State recruitment in the Western
Hemisphere in 2016.22
Crime levels in the region are exceptionally high and criminal activity has a significant
effect on wealth and human development. Despite having only 8% of the world’s
population, the region suffers 38% of global murders. El Salvador, Guatemala andHonduras have some of the highest murder rates in the world, fuelled by drug violence.
Jamaica’s high level of violent crime over the last 40 years has resulted in significant
suppression of economic growth. Drug cartels and organised crime will continue to playa significant role in LAC, wielding significant power and influence in Mexico and Central
America, and increasing power in a weakened Venezuela. Weakening governance will
exacerbate this dynamic. Corruption is commonplace and not expected to diminish.23
Diversification of criminal activity is already occurring. Colombia, Bolivia and Peru are thelargest cocaine producers in the world, but established smuggling routes are increasingly
used for human trafficking. A growing security concern may be cybercrime. Currently,
much of the region is unprepared for cyber threats,24 although some countries aredeveloping national cybersecurity strategies and mapping cyber capacity.

Drug cartels and organised crime will continue to play a significant role in the region

22 Cottee, S., The Atlantic, (8 December 2016), ‘ISIS in the Caribbean’.
23 McDermott, J., InSight Crime, (4 December 2014), ‘How Organized Crime & Corruption Intersect in LatAm’.
24 World Economic Forum, (2016), ‘Global Agenda Council on Cybersecurity’.

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41

1

3

Antarctica

Countries adjoining the Antarctic region
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Chile4 Falkland Islands
5 New Zealand
52The Antarctic

The Antarctic

The Antarctic is the most inhospitable continent on Earth and plays a crucial role inits climate. It holds 90% of the world’s freshwater. Since 2014, however, Antarctic ice
has started to reduce substantially. If this trend continues, it is likely to have a profoundeffect on the global climate and sea level rise. The number of people visiting andworking in the Antarctic continues to increase, and with it the risk of a major accident
that surpasses the capacity of regional actors. As the region becomes more accessible
it may become the focus of increased competition, particularly if global demand forresources leads to the end of the prohibition on commercial extraction of minerals, oiland gas. The Antarctic Treaty System is due for renewal in 2048 and, while it is expected
to be renewed, it may come under increasing pressure. Should it unravel, a scramble for
the Antarctic could follow.

Environment
Antarctica covers 10% of the planet’s surface, an area of 14 million square kilometres,(approximately 1.4 times the size of the United States (US)) and holds 90% of the world’s
fresh water.1 In the next 30 years, global climate change will be significantly affectedby conditions within the Antarctic. For example, the Gulf Stream (a ‘conveyor’ of heataround the world) is, in part, driven by the cold, dense Antarctic waters. The melting
polar ice cap in the Antarctic is therefore likely to influence this process. Antarctic sea
ice had been increasing until 2014, but, since then, the amount of sea ice has reduced
substantially.2 If this trend continues it could accelerate changes to the Gulf Stream andcontribute to severe climatic events and rising sea levels.
Antarctica has a large and diverse ecosystem, with species unique to its inhospitableenvironment. The Antarctic Circumpolar Current is one of the most powerful ocean
currents on Earth that has physically isolated the Southern Ocean from adjacent oceans
for millions of years. The steep drop in climatic temperature across the Antarctic has
also acted as a physical barrier to any species unable to adapt to the colder weather.
These two phenomena have traditionally acted as a barrier within the Antarctic to counterthe effect of significant change in other ocean environments around the globe. One ofthese changes is increasing ocean acidification, which is particularly harmful to the polar
ecosystems. The dramatic decrease in sea ice (from 2014) may be an indicator of futureenvironmental change that would significantly impact the Antarctic ecosystem.3

1

British Antarctic Survey, (2015), ‘Antarctic Factsheet’.

2

Nature, (19 July 2017), ‘Solve Antarctica’s sea ice-puzzle’.

3

Aronson, R. B., et al., (2011), Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Anthropogenic impacts on
marine ecosystems in Antarctica.

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The Antarctic

R5

3
2
1
0
-1
-2

2014

2009

2004

1999

1994

1989

1984

-3
1979

Sea ice extent relative to 1981-2010 mean
(million km2)

Changes in Antarctica’s sea ice cover

Source: US National Snow and Ice Data Center.

Note: Total area with sea ice concentration of 15% or higher (calculated using satellite pixels).
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center

As well as oil and gas, Antarctic resources include minerals such as copper, uranium andgold, with many undiscovered deposits likely throughout the continent. The Antarctic’s
weather, ice and distance from any industrialised areas mean that mineral extraction canbe extremely hazardous and is currently not commercially viable. However, automatedmining technology has seen significant advances in recent years and is used throughout
the world.4 As this technology develops, climatic conditions change and global demands
for resources increase, it may become more feasible to extract the region’s minerals.
If so, current international agreements protecting the environment and resources in the
Antarctic may come under strain.

Scientific research will continue to drive cooperation in the region
4

254

Atmanand M. A. and Ramadass G. A., Deep-Sea Mining, (2017), ‘Concepts of Deep-Sea Mining
Technologies’, pages 305-343.

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The Antarctic

Human development
The Antarctic has no indigenous population and is inhabited mainly by scientific researchstaff. In 2017, the number of residents varied from around 1,100 in the winter to 4,400
in the summer. The countries with the most people within Antarctica during the peaksummer months include: the US (1,293), Argentina (667), Russia (429), Chile (359), theUnited Kingdom (UK) (217), Australia (200), France (125), Japan (125) and Italy (102).5
In the coming decades there could be growing numbers of tourists as the continent
becomes increasingly accessible, and infrastructure to support the more casual visitor isdeveloped. Landed Antarctic tourist numbers have risen from 1,055 in 1990 to 36,907
in 2016. Estimates of future growth vary dramatically, from around 6% per year to more
extreme scenarios where tourism could double every five years.6 This potential growth intourism is likely to drive changes in the way the industry is regulated in the region throughthe Antarctic Treaty System.7

Economics

MarcAndreLeTourneux / Shutterstock.com

Fishing, bioprospecting (looking for valuable plants and animals) and scientific activities
are currently important industries in and around Antarctica. Traditional fisheries include
mackerel, icefish, Antarctic rock cod and seals. Toothfish and krill are the most commonly
fished species, and whaling (for scientific purposes) still occurs.8 The region has
traditionally suffered from fishing to near-extinction before stocks are allowed to recover.
Although international agreements (for example, the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources) have helped limit overfishing, illegal, unregulated andunreported fishing remains a significant regional problem, which could worsen in
the future. Fish stocks may also be affected by ecological changes, such as warming
ocean temperatures.

The number of tourists travelling to Antarctica is likely to increase significantly

5World Population review, (2017), Antarctic Population 2018.

6

Bender, N., et al., Antarctic Science, Volume 28, Issue 3, (February 2016), ‘Patterns of tourism in the
Antarctic Peninsula region: a 20-year analysis’.

7

Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition, (2005), Some Legal Issues Posed by Antarctic Tourism.

8

British Antarctic Survey, ‘Fishing’.

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The Antarctic

Governance and geopolitics
Seven countries have made territorial claims within the Antarctic: Argentina, Australia,
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK. The UK, Argentina and Chile haveoverlapping and competing claims that will continue to be disputed. Additionally,around 30 countries operate an Antarctic research station, including China, the US andRussia.9 Occupied research stations are often seen as contributing to the legitimacyof territorial claims, and these outposts may develop into hubs for industrial and tourist
activity. This could add to geopolitical tensions within the region.
Many governance issues relating to the region are covered by the Antarctic Treaty
System, comprising the original treaty of 1959 and a series of subsequent agreementsthat came into force in 1998. The Antarctic Treaty System is likely to endure (with areview due in 2048), but it will probably come under increasing pressure as perceived
tipping points are reached. Access to resources, more tourism and growing geopoliticaltensions could all strain international cooperation. Countries who are not full signatories
to the Antarctic Treaty System may increasingly feel as if they have been ‘shut out’ ofaccess to valuable territory, and view the Antarctic Treaty System as invalid.
International territorial claims

NorwayUnited Kingdom

Argentina
Sanae IV
Neumayer (South Africa)(Germany)
Maitri(India)See inset
Halley(UK)

Novolazarevskaya(Russia)
Syowa(Japan)Molodezhnaya(Russia)
Mawson(Australia)

Belgrano II(Argentina)

Zhong Shan (China)

Bharati (India)

Progress (Russia)

Chile

Amundsen-Scott(US)

Unclaimed
St. Kliment Ohridski Base
Esperanza(Bulgaria)(Argentina)
Comandante Ferraz(Brazil)
Bernardo
O’Higgins
Arturo Prat (Chile)(Chile)Palmer(US)

Marambio(Argentina)

Davis(Australia)

Vostok(Russia)
Concordia(France & Italy)

Scott
(NZ)
McMurdo(US)

Mirnyy(Russia)

Australia

Casey(Australia)

Jang Bogo Station(South Korea)
Dumont d’Urville(France)

FranceVernadsky(Ukraine)

San Martin(Argentina)

New Zealand

Rothera(UK)

Source: Discovering Antarctica
9256

Cool Antarctica, ‘Antarctic Stations – Bases – Currently Occupied’.

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The Antarctic

Security
Military activity is banned by the Antarctic Treaty System, but military support to civil
activity is permitted. National militaries are currently the primary regional providers ofsearch and rescue, scientific access, resupply, monitoring and policing. In the coming
decades, there is likely to be a significant increase in military activity to support growing
numbers of civilian operations, raising the possibility of an accidental or deliberate
incident involving military vessels, aircraft or personnel. More intense commercial activity
within Antarctica (including illegal fishing and illegal mineral extraction) is likely to require
military forces to be able to monitor, intervene and rapidly react.

Crown Copyright

Antarctica does not have its own judicial system or a resident governance capacity: alldecisions about the region are made jointly by international committee and implemented
by representatives of countries active in the region. For example, fishing patrols
are conducted by the armed forces or coastguards of participating countries, whileprosecutions occur through international courts or the judicial system of the accused
person’s home country. As the number of people within the region rises in the coming
decades, an increased burden is likely to be felt by resident organisations.

HMS Protector: more intense commercial activity in Antarctica may require military forces to monitor, intervene and react

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8

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

CanadaFinland
Greenland (Denmark)Iceland
NorwayRussiaSwedenUnited States

6

Arctic

3

4

2
7

5

The Arctic

The Arctic

As the Arctic region becomes increasingly accessible it will assume ever greater
geostrategic significance as competition between global and regional actors increases.
Rising temperatures, melting sea ice and thawing permafrost will alter the region’s
landscape, with significant impact on its population and infrastructure. Although the
Arctic will continue to be a challenging environment in which to operate, commercial
activity in the region will increase and it could become a global shipping route. By
2050, the Arctic could be a major supplier of oil and gas and, as its waters warm,
an increasingly important fishing ground. As competition in the Arctic increases the
security paradigm could change and the region may become increasingly militarised.
New institutions and frameworks may be required to ensure security and governanceof the region and to reduce the risk of military conflict.

Environment
The Arctic is expected to warm more rapidly than other parts of the world, with averagesurface temperatures forecast to rise by between 1° Celsius and 3° Celsius.1 The
surface area of sea ice will, on current trends, reduce significantly from an average areaof 12.24 million square kilometres (as measured from 1979 to 1999) to just 8.9 million
square kilometres by 2050. In summer months, the Arctic Ocean could be virtually
ice free. Sea ice is melting most rapidly in the eastern Arctic Ocean and adjacentseas, whilst the thicker, older ice within the central Arctic Ocean and waters north ofGreenland and the Canadian Archipelago is likely to persist longer. The Greenland ice
sheet is losing an average of 269 billion tonnes of ice per year (against a total mass ofaround 2.9 million, billion tonnes). The majority of meltwater from Greenland ends up
in the North Atlantic, disrupting ocean currents and affecting global weather patterns.
Although extremely unlikely, if the whole of the Greenland ice sheet melted, it is expectedthat the global sea level would rise by over seven metres. These changes will haveconsequences for the global climate, for example, as the area of sea ice and snow cover
reduces, it will lessen the Arctic’s ability to reflect solar radiation (the ‘albedo effect’),causing further global temperature rises.2

1

Overland, J. E., et al., (2013), Future Arctic Climate Changes: Adaptation and Mitigation Time Scales.

2

Riihelä, A., (2013), nature.com, ‘Observed changes in the albedo of the Arctic sea-ice zone for theperiod 1982-2009’.

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The Arctic

R3 – Forecast of average sea ice surface area out to 2050 based on

Forecast ofNSIDC
averagedata
yearly Arctic sea ice surface area out to 2050
1990-1999

0%

2010-2019

20%

40%

60%

2040-2049

80%

100%

Percentage (%) remaining
Sources:Basedon National
Snow& Ice Center
Data Center forecasts. http://nsidc.org/data/search/#keywords=ice+sheets
Source:National
Snow andIce Data
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/melting-ice

Permafrost near the surface is thawing and is forecast to reduce by around 25% by2050,3 causing damage to buildings, roads, railways and pipelines. Melting permafrost
is already shortening the season in which ice roads can be used. Coastal erosion(occurring at an average of half a metre per year, with high local and regional variations)will almost certainly be exacerbated by the loss of sea ice, which protects coasts fromstorms. In addition, the thawing of some types of permafrost may release large amountsof carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere, potentially accelerating global
warming. Some models predict that the release of such methane could cause global
temperatures to increase by an additional 0.6° Celsius on top of current forecasts, by2050.4 Melting permafrost is also likely to result in the spread of disease. For example,
in 2016, reindeer herds in the Russian High North were culled after being exposed toanthrax released from the melting permafrost. There are over 500 anthrax burial points
registered in Siberia and the Far East, and the melting of permafrost is likely to expose
more infected corpses, potentially including those carrying other diseases, such as
bubonic plague and smallpox.5
Climatic changes will also lead to alterations in the redistribution of Arctic species.
While this may lead to an increase in the number of species present, the survival of native
species will be threatened. As oceans further south become warmer, fish will continue
to migrate northward, causing catches to increase in higher latitudes by up to 20% by
2050.6260

3Kong, Y. and Wang, C., ScienceDirect, (2017), ‘Responses and changes in the permafrost and snow waterequivalent in the Northern Hemisphere under a scenario of 1.5°C warming’.

4

Oskin, B., LiveScience, (24 November 2013), ‘Twice as Much Methane Escaping Arctic Seafloor’.

5

Parkinson, A. J., et al., (2014), Climate Change and Infectious Diseases in the Arctic: Establishment of a
Circumpolar Working Group.

6

Weatherdon, L., et al., PLOS ONE, (13 January 2016), Projected Scenarios for Coastal First Nations’Fisheries Catch Potential Under Climate Change: Management Challenges and Opportunities.

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The Arctic

Arctic states are expected to increase the resources they commit to protecting the sovereignty of their Arctic territories

Human development
The population inside the Arctic Circle is currently around four million, a figure which
has been broadly stable since 2000 and, on current trends, is likely to remain so. The
region, however, has considerable demographic diversity. The population is likely torise in Alaska, Canada and Iceland, whilst in parts of northern Scandinavia and theRussian Arctic population is likely to decline.7 This could pose a challenge to respective
governments’ ability to manage these increasingly empty spaces. Some areas may
become ungoverned spaces or become vulnerable to annexation (or proxy annexation)by other states.
By 2050, the Arctic population is likely to be increasingly male and include a greater
proportion of immigrants. For example, in Alaska between 2010 and 2014, theforeign-born population increased by 19.4% (compared to a 5.8% increase in the UnitedStates (US) over the same period). Whilst immigration is likely to boost local economies,
and be vital to stabilising the decline of the Russian north east in particular, a rapid inflow
of immigrants could change the social and religious balance of societies, potentiallyleading to friction.
The Arctic population will become increasingly urbanised. As well as providing better job
opportunities, cities offer superior access to health care, social services and education.
Arctic societies tend to have lower levels of educational attainment compared to theirmore southerly counterparts, a situation which is unlikely to change (although remote
7

Nymand Larsen, J. and Fondahl, G., (Eds.), (2014), Arctic Human Development Report.

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The Arctic

access to education could help to improve it). For example, only 6.1% of the indigenous
population of the Canadian Northwest Territory have graduated from university,
compared with an average rate of 25.9% in Canada as a whole. Women have recently
been outperforming men and, on current trends, this growth in women’s educational
performance may widen the gap between men and women.8 This could improve
women’s access to better jobs and leadership roles. Rising levels of urbanisation
are expected to improve living standards, but may also heighten existing inequalities,
creating a new or changing set of ‘class’ relations. Those with nomadic and traditional
lifestyles are already finding their way of life threatened by climate change. Increasing
urban centralisation could further isolate and marginalise these communities, possibly
resulting in a sense of grievance and hostility.

R4
Population
change in selected Arctic regions (2000-2018)

Nunavut
AlaskaIceland
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Yamal-Nenets Okrug
Nenets Okrug
Greenland
Taymyr Okrug
Murmansk Oblast
Chukotka Okrug
-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Percentage (%) change from natural increase
Percentage (%) change from net migration
Source: http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:788965/FULLTEXT03.pdf
Source: Nordic Co-operation

Economics
On current trends, melting sea ice will open up shipping routes between Asia, Europe
and North America, potentially reducing travel times and fuel costs by more than 40%
when the Arctic is fully open.9 Currently, journeys from Dalian in China to Rotterdam in
the Netherlands take 48 days via the Suez Canal, but only 38 days via the Northern Sea
Route. Though the amount of shipping will increase, the numbers of transits are likely
to remain small. Current trends show around 50 transits per year (assuming little or no
sea ice reduction), although this could be a significant underestimate, especially whencompared to other shipping routes such as the Suez Canal or the Malacca Straits.10
8

Emelyanova, A., International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, (2017), Population projections of the
Arctic by levels of education, page 12.

9Kingdom of Denmark, (2011), Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy
for the Arctic 2011-2020.

10 Government North West Territories, (29 May 2015), ‘7.3 Trends in shipping in the Northwest Passage andthe Beaufort Sea’.

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The Arctic

The Arctic will continue to be a difficult area in which to operate, and costs (including
insurance premiums) are likely to remain high. Most Arctic shipping is expected to befrom vessels travelling to and from the region, and is likely to be heavily tied to the oil andgas mining, tourism and fishing industries. The Arctic will also remain an important air
route, with more than 5,000 aircraft currently crossing over the North Pole each year,
and this number is likely to increase.
It is estimated that the Arctic seabed contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30%of undiscovered natural gas and 20% of undiscovered natural gas liquids.11 The majorityof oil and gas extraction is expected to occur in the Barents Sea area, north of Norway
and Russia, and in northern Alaska. For there to be a major increase in Arctic oil andgas production, however, there would need to be significant investment in infrastructure
and technology. Whether this is forthcoming will depend on increased energy prices.
Should renewable energy lead to lower prices for oil and gas, the Arctic may not become
a commercially viable option. To date, mining has attracted much less publicity thanoil and gas extraction, but it could become the major economic activity in the Arctic.
For example, mining already accounts for half the income of the Canadian Northwest
Territory. Improving technology, including automation, is likely to improve efficiency,
precision and speed of extraction, as well as reducing the number of people needed,which will improve the prospects for extractive industries operating in the Arctic.
Arctic waters are expected to become increasingly important fishing grounds, someof which are unlikely to be covered by a regional fishery’s management arrangement.12
An increase in unregulated and unsustainable fishing in international Arctic waters maylead to tensions between states, possibly of the sort seen during the Iceland/United
Kingdom (UK) ‘Cod Wars’ of the 1970s. Tourism will become an increasingly importantelement of the commercial sector. For example, between 2013 and 2016, the numbersof Chinese visitors to Finnish Lapland almost tripled (to 10,446).13

Permafrost near the surface is thawing and is forecast to reduce by around 25% by 2050

11 Williams, A., et al., (2011), The Future of Arctic Enterprise: Long-term Outlook and Implications.
12 Blomeyer, R., et al., European Parliament, (2015), Fisheries Management and the Arctic in the Context of
Climate Change.
13 Williams, A., et al., (2011), The Future of Arctic Enterprise: Long-term Outlook and Implications.

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The Arctic

Investment in communications infrastructure is also likely to increase. In 2012, at least
three companies had outlined their plans to lay undersea cables in Arctic waters;14
in 2010 Canada established the Inuvik Satellite Station; and between 2017 and 2025
Russia plans to establish the Arktika satellite network. In the coming years, at least two
satellites are expected to be in constant operation over the Arctic, improving weather
forecasting, environmental monitoring and communications.

Governance
The eight ‘Arctic states’ (Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Russia, Sweden and the US) all have territory extending outside, as well as within,
the Arctic Circle (the physical geographical zone above 66° north of the Equator). The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is expected to remain
the basis upon which Arctic states claim their rights over the seabed and polar waters.
Norway has already established its sovereignty over the Outer Continental Shelf in andaround Svalbard and northern Norway, and it is widely expected that Canada, Denmark(Greenland) and Russia will continue to present evidence to support their claims.15 All
parties appear committed to this process, and rulings are expected before 2050. Whilst
the process is expected to be peaceful, if Russia’s sovereign rights over the central
Arctic Ocean are not recognised, there is a danger that Russia might reject any further
negotiations with Canada and Denmark.16

The Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is expected to continue to play animportant role in promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among its
member states, including on border issues and the rights of indigenous people.
However, such issues are not (and are unlikely to become) the sole preserve of theeight Arctic states. The Council is likely to increasingly involve non-Arctic observer
nations and organisations (of which there are currently 39 in total) in its activities.
The continued acceptance of observer nations into the Arctic Council is likely tostrengthen the position of the Council globally.

By 2050, Arctic states are expected to increase the resources they commit to protecting
the sovereignty of their Arctic territories. However, increasing activity, particularlycommercial, is likely to require new institutions and frameworks to keep the region secureand effectively governed. For example, negotiations between the five Arctic coastal
states (Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the US) plus Japan, Korea,
China, Iceland and the European Union (EU) (known as the ‘five plus five’) are exploring
the establishment of a fisheries management organisation to protect fish stocks.
Within Arctic states, local (particularly indigenous) communities may seek greater
autonomy from their distant, non-Arctic capitals.17 In particular, further demands forthe independence of Greenland from Denmark can be expected. By 2050, the rural
population of the Arctic is expected to decrease, potentially weakening states’ claims
to sovereignty over these areas. Most Arctic states highlight the occupancy of northernpeoples in their Arctic policy strategies, a form of political power that has been significant
in the background to international negotiations about the conditions of access for

14 Weisburger, A., The Arctic Institute, (4 May 2012), ‘Planned Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable Projects in Arctic
as Allegory for Changing Region’.
15 Maritime Executive, (2016), ‘Rival Claims to a Changing Arctic’.
16 Klimenko, E., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2016), Russia’s Arctic Security Policy:
Still Quiet in the High North?
17 Pelaudeix, C., (2012), Devolution and globalization in the Arctic: Differentiated Approaches of Arctic states.

264

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The Arctic

observer states. A trend of weakening occupancy could undermine Arctic states’
claims of sovereignty over remote areas. This may present a particular challenge
for Russia, where the declining population in its eastern Arctic may undermine its
legitimacy and ability to govern.

Geopolitics
The Arctic’s relative geographic isolation will reduce in the coming decades, withan increasing number of actors, both state and non-state, having Arctic interests.
The last decade has witnessed a growth in formal declarations of Arctic strategies
and policy frameworks from both Arctic and non-Arctic states, including the EU,
Germany, Japan and the UK. While others, such as China, have not issued any
such formal statements, they too appear to regard themselves as Arctic players,
and can be expected to seek to play a more significant role in the region.
The eight Arctic states will remain the principal Arctic stakeholders for geographicalreasons.18 A stable and orderly Arctic region is likely to remain a priority for them,although that is not to say the relationships between the Arctic states will, necessarily,
remain the same. For example, whilst Iceland has traditionally looked to the US
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for security, its small, yet
independently-minded population might, if the circumstances were right, decidethat its interests were best served by forming alliances with partners outside NATO.
For Russia, the Arctic will retain a special significance, since it represents a potential
source of riches and a security buffer against encroachment and encirclement.
In particular, the Northern Sea Route is expected to become a strategic artery for
trade, as well as allowing Russia to reposition its naval forces between the Atlantic
and the Pacific Oceans.

Increasing activity, particularly commercial, may require new frameworks to keep the Arctic secure and well-governed

18 Koivurova, T., (2010), Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly changing scene of
Arctic governance.

Global Strategic Trends

265

Maksimilian / Shutterstock.com

The Arctic

Russia plans to build between 11 and 16 more diesel and nuclear-powered icebreakers by 2050

China’s long-term interest in the region is likely to become increasingly noticeable.
In May 2013, China was granted permanent observer status on the Arctic Council,
formalising its intent to participate in discussions about Arctic issues. Analysts today
refer to China as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and an ‘Arctic stakeholder’. Recently, China has
strengthened its diplomatic ties to Nordic countries, and in 2013 Beijing hosted thefifth World Reindeer Herders Congress. This event was widely reported as evidenceof its respect for indigenous people.19 China is also looking to invest in Greenland andshould Greenland become independent from Denmark, China might become its primarypartner.20 China may view Arctic shipping routes as an alternative to those in the South
China Sea and may, therefore, champion UNCLOS in the Arctic to uphold international
access to shipping routes.
The EU is likely to remain a major extraterritorial regional actor, not least becauseof member states with their own interests. However, the EU has not been granted
permanent observer status to the Arctic Council. Opposition to EU admittance may
endure, depending on relations with Russia. In the coming decades, India may also
become an actor in the Arctic. Cooperation in the Arctic constitutes an importantcomponent in recent deals struck between Indian Prime Minister Modi and Russian
President Putin, which have boosted Indian involvement in northern Russianenergy projects.

Security
The increase in shipping in Arctic waters arising from the melting sea ice will likely leadto a growth in maritime crime, including smuggling. In particular, malicious actors,
including terrorists, may take advantage of the empty spaces across the Arctic toenter Europe, Russia and North America. The opening of a counterterrorism centre
in Murmansk signals that Russia is already concerned. Despite the melting sea ice,
Arctic waters will remain a challenging environment that will require specialist, andtherefore expensive, shipping. It will become a more challenging environment in which
to operate submarines, as the cover provided by sea ice reduces. In addition to hard
19 Wang, K. and Yang, F. G., ChinaDaily Europe, (2013), ‘Last of the Reindeer Hunters’.
20 Lulu, J., Asia Dialogue, (2017), ‘China, Greenland and Competition for the Arctic’.

266

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The Arctic

security concerns, it is expected that there will be an increased demand for soft security
measures relating to search and rescue and emergency response capabilities, which
could drive cooperation between Arctic states and actors. International cooperationin this area will be crucial, not only to provide effective cover across the region but also
as a factor in improving regional security over the next 30 years.
Russia is displaying an increased military interest in the Arctic. It has recently establishedand re-opened bases across the Russian Arctic; set up the Russian Joint Strategic
Command North; resumed regular military flights over the region; created two extra
brigades to add to existing naval infantry; and formed a brigade on the Kola Peninsula.
Russia’s current total of 41 icebreakers far exceeds the US’ five and NATO’s combined
total of 20. By 2050, if all current plans for icebreaker expansion follow throughto completion, Russia will have an additional 11-16 diesel and nuclear-powered
icebreakers, with more capable icebreakers by 2050.21 This large fleet of icebreakers
will allow Russia to move ships between the North Atlantic and North Pacific throughout
the year.
The increase in Russian military activity in the Arctic, however, masks long-term economic
and social problems.22 Budgetary constraints may hamper further expansion of Russia’s
military footprint in the Arctic, at least in the short term.23 Russia’s strategy will therefore
most likely focus on controlling access to the Russian Arctic and maintaining its nuclear
deterrent capabilities in the region. Russia will almost certainly remain a concern forneighbouring countries, and the possibility of state-on-state conflict over disputed
territory, although unlikely, cannot be ruled out.
It is not clear what military presence the US will have in the Arctic in the coming decades.
The US has long had airpower superiority in the Arctic, and this advantage is likely to
be maintained by the Pentagon’s investment in the F-35 series of aircraft. Tested in
the Arctic conditions, these aircraft should ensure American power can be projected
northward. A new icebreaker is being planned, and there has been discussion of
establishing new bases in the region. Much will depend on how the US relationshipwith Russia develops. Thule Air Base is, however, likely to take on renewed significancewithin US defence as the only deep water port in that part of the Arctic, particularly
as the Northern Sea Route becomes an increasingly important route for shipping.
Whilst the prospects for Greenland’s independence remain a matter for speculation,
an independent Greenland that wanted to leave NATO would throw into question the
future of the US military base at Thule.

Partnerships and alliances. Over the past decade, increased military activity in the
Arctic has produced new forums such as the Northern Chiefs of Defence conference
and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. Such forums are still nascent and havebeen negatively affected by the deterioration of relations with Russia in recent years.
However, they do indicate a growing realisation among the Arctic States, including
Russia, of the need for some form of Arctic security architecture where joint interests
can be discussed in a way that does not pit Russia against the rest.

21 O’Rourke, R., (9 July 2018), Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Program: Background and Issues for Congress.
22 Hille, K., Financial Times, ‘Russia’s economy: challenges facing Vladimir Putin’.
23 Gorenburg, D., Russian Military Reform, (2017), ‘Russia’s Military Modernization Plans: 2018-2027’.

Global Strategic Trends

267

268

Global Strategic Trends

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Global Strategic Trends

Acknowledgements

We have benefited enormously from the time andeffort generously given by numerous individuals andorganisations. However, the responsibility for the final
product is solely ours. We regret that space does not
permit us to list all those who have helped, but someindividuals and organisations have made contributions
that require acknowledgement, and these are listed
below. We are extremely grateful for all of those who
helped produce this edition of Global Strategic Trends,
thank you. We look forward to working with you in
the future.

Department for Work and Pensions
Professor Nick Dunn*
Economic and Social Research Council
Ernst and Young LLPDr Charles Enoch*
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats, Helsinki
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland*
Finnish Defence Research Agency, Finland*
Finnish National Defence University, Finland

Aarhus University, Danish School of Education (DPU),
Campus Emdrup, Copenhagen*Aerospace Strategy/Management Consultancy
Anglia Ruskin University, Global Sustainability Institute
Australian Defence Force, Force Design Division, Joint
Force Analysis Branch
Australian National University, National Security College
Dr Alex Baratta*
Biotechnology and Biological Science Research Council*
Dr Chris Boyko
Professor Rebecca Braun*
British Council*

Foreign Commonwealth OfficeFrith Resource Management Limited*
Future Impacts, Cornelia Daheim*
Government Office for Science
Lena Garrett*Professor Lars Hammershoj*
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
Her Majesty’s Treasury
Home OfficeInstitute for Security and Development Policy,
Stockholm*

Bundeswehr Office for Defence Planning

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Bahrain,
London and Singapore

Cabinet OfficeKing’s College London*

Cardiff University

Lancaster University*

Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program*

Loughborough University

Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development

Dr Steven Main

Dr Precious Chatterje-Doody*

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

City Forum*

Ministry of Defence of FinlandCollege of Policing

Ministry of Justice

CDS

Dr Gemma Mitchell

Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, Denmark*

National Crime Agency

Richard Cornwell

National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo

Cranfield University

Natural Environment Research Council

Defence Science and Technology Laboratories*

New Zealand Defence Force, Future Force Development*

Deloitte MCS Ltd
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command
Transformation

Department for Education

Northumbria University

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Department for Health and Social Care

Open University, School of Environment, Earth andEcosystem Sciences*

Department for International Development – Chief
Economist’s Office*Oxford Analytica*
Oxford XXI, Dr Lyudmila Nurse*

Department for International Development*

Pointer Energy*

Department for International Trade

Dr Serena Pollastri

Department for Transport

Reading University

Global Strategic Trends

271

Professor Martin Rhisiart

University of Warwick

Royal Holloway, University of London*

US Joint Staff J7

Royal United Services Institute

US National Intelligence Council

Russian Military Studies OfficeJohn Verdon*

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Water Policy International Ltd

Scandinavian Risk Solutions Group

Jérémie Wenger*

School of International Futures

West Mercia Police

Simplexity

Wilton Park

SOAS London University

Peter Wright*

Specialist Group Military Intelligence*
Dr Emily Spiers*
Swedish Armed Forces, HQ
Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm* Indicates that a paper has been produced in support ofthis edition of Global Strategic Trends by this individual ororganisation.

Swedish Defence University, Sweden
Swedish Police Authority
Thames Valley Police
The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul
The Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies*
The Economist Intelligence Unit
The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
House)
Transport Futures Ltd, James Gleave*
UK Army Centre for Historical Analysis and ConflictResearch
UK Met Office*United Nations University*
University College London*
University of Bath*
University of Birmingham*
University of Birmingham, Centre for Russian, European
and Eurasian Studies
University of Cambridge
University of Cambridge, Institute for Manufacturing*,
Scott Polar Research Institute*
University of Exeter*
University of Helsinki, Finland
University of Hull*
University of Lapland, Finland
University of Leeds, Faculty of Biological Sciences*
University of Manchester
University of Manchester, Institute of Education*
University of Oxford
University of Oxford, Changing Character of War Centre*
University of Queensland, Global Change Institute*
University of Sheffield
University of Sheffield, Department of Economics*
University of South Wales*
University of Southampton*
University of Surrey*
University of the West Indies, Institute for Sustainable
Development

272

Global Strategic Trends

Contact details

If you have comments on this publication, please send them to the Futures Team at:
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Shrivenham
SwindonSN6 8RF
Email: dcdc-strategictrends@mod.gov.uk
This publication is available through the gov.uk website.

Global Strategic Trends273

Water security

Food insecurity

Population

274

Continuing high demand,
especially for agriculture
and industry. Supply stressthrough depletion ofgroundwater, reliance on
desalination, polluted
supplies and poor
infrastructure.

Population increase drives
high demand for food withclimate change, water stressand production methods
contributing to food insecurity.
Depletion of fisheries throughover-extraction and sea
temperature changes
are a particular factor
for Northeastern Asia.

Global population
growing with increasing
urbanisation and an ageing
population with associatedhealth and social issues,and dependency on
younger generations.

Global Strategic Trends

State fragility

Impact ofclimate change

Megacities(≥10m) andchoke points

Increasing nationalism
and internal fragmentation
political and economic instability
and regime changes.
Economic and social inequality,
poverty, religious tensions,displacement,
military tensions and terrorism.

Increasing temperatureacross land and oceans,coastal and inland flooding,droughts and other weather-related
events such as cyclones and fires.
Impact will contribute to changes
in food production,water stress, population
displacement due
to flooding ofurbanised areas.

There are expected to
be 52 megacities with apopulation over ten million,
by 2050.
Maritime, coastal andinland choke points for
global transportationof goods and food.

Global stress map

These stress maps are an illustrative visualisationof the potential impact of seven stress influences:
water security, food insecurity, population, statefragility, impact of climate change, megacities andchoke points.
The maps illustrate expected impacts on people
and their activities rather than physical attributes
in 2050.

These maps are based on analysis completed as part of thisedition of Global Strategic Trends, and made particular use of:• Human Dynamics of Climate Change, Met Office;• Global City Populations, UNDP;• City Population 2050, University of Ontario;• 2018 Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace; and• Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade,
Chatham House, 2017.

s
of:

,

HigherRelative stress
Lower

Water security

Megacities

Food insecurity

Maritime chokepoint

Population

Coastal chokepoint

State fragility

Inland chokepoint

Megacities
Climate change© Crown copyright 10/18
Published by the Ministry of Defence UK
This publication is also available at www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc
The material in this publication is certified as an FSC mixed resourced product, fully recyclable and biodegradable.