SIPRIYEARBOOK

2014
Armaments,
Disarmament andInternational
Security
Summary

Stockholm international
peace research institute
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into
conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI
provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, topolicymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.
The SIPRI Yearbook
SIPRI Yearbook 2014 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security. The SIPRI Yearbook, which was first published in
1969, is written by both SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2014 and gives samples of thedata and analysis that it contains.
Contents
Introduction
1. Aspects of the conflict in Syria

12Part I. Security and conflicts, 2013

2. Armed conflict
3. Peace operations and conflict management

46Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2013

4. Military expenditure and arms production
5. International arms transfers
6. World nuclear forces

8
10
12

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2013

7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
8. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
9. Conventional arms control and military confidence building
10. Dual-use and arms trade controls

14
16
18
20

Annexes22

www.sipriyearbook.org© SIPRI 2014

Introduction. International
security, armaments anddisarmament

ian anthony
SIPRI Yearbook 2014 documents some
disturbing tendencies in conflict, armament
dynamics and international security. The
world is still far from achieving anythingthat could be described as ‘global order’.
Moreover, given that political,
technological, economic, ecological andmilitary activities continue to undergo
continuous and rapid change, achieving
peaceful solutions to conflicts andpromoting a more stable security
environment may become increasingly
elusive.
In terms of conclusions that can be
drawn from events and developments in2013 in armaments, disarmament andinternational security, the interactions
between three interlocking sets of issues
should continue to be analysed.
First, the evolving approach tointernational governance will have a direct
bearing on the capacity of states to reachagreement on the best ways to promoteinternational and regional security. The
various chapters in this edition of the SIPRI
Yearbook underline the emergence of aseries of tensions of different kinds—for
example, within the various specialized
institutions and between global andregional bodies charged with security
governance. The continuous movementfrom seeking common ground to tolerating
national differences and managing theirconsequences has progressively corroded
multilateral approaches and, as the security
discourse escapes the confinement ofagreed frameworks, a new fluidity can beseen in the alignment of states overdifferent issues.
Second, improving understanding of therelationship between development andsecurity will help identify opportunities forjoint actions by actors that have not
traditionally been partners. Few would
dispute the existence of a relationshipbetween economic, social and humandevelopment, on the one hand, and peaceand security, on the other. The relationshipis complex: while security can lead todevelopment and development can lead tosecurity, neither is sufficient to promote theother and both may not always benecessary, in the short term. Better
understanding of this relationship will
require an approach that concentrates on
analysing problems in their entirety, rather
than focusing on trying to solve theindividual elements. In order to understandhow the different parts of these problems
interact, it will be necessary to draw frommany academic disciplines.
Third, the rapid pace and scope ofadvances in various fields of science andtechnology and the way that these advancesinteract with one another may now be
considered an independent factor shaping
international security. With growing
complexity, the assessment of technology
has become more difficult. Understanding
the interaction between science and public
policy has also become more of a challenge.
The need for ‘competent, unbiased
information concerning the physical,
biological, economic, social, and politicaleffects of the increasingly extensive andlarger applications of technology’ tosupport government decision making andthe legislative process is an idea that iscertainly not outdated, but arguably morenecessary than ever.

•

introduction 1

1. ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT IN
SYRIA
After three years of conflict in Syria, manyremain sceptical that a viable way to bringpeace will be found. Any attempt to mediatein the conflict requires an understanding of
the conflict’s dynamics, an area to which
the discipline of peace and conflict research
can contribute. However, as shown in 2013
by divisions in the United Nations Security
Council and among states in the region,
discussions of the evidence for chemical
weapon use and disputes over which groups
represent the anti-government forces, there
is no unified, reliable, evidence-based
narrative of the conflict.
Nevertheless, three aspects of theconflict in Syria in 2013—measuringconflict incidence, the restriction of arms
supplies, and the implications of the use ofchemical weapons—provide a starting pointfrom which to examine its wider impact.
Measuring conflict incidence in Syria

The principal difficulty for conflictresearchers is gathering reliable data,
including from media reports. Given thecomplexity of the Syrian conflict, media
bias in reporting remains a key challenge,

plaguing the collection of useful data andmisinforming researchers andpolicymakers regarding the actual events
taking place. The seriousness of theconsequences of the continuing failure of
diplomacy and politics, and the urgency of
better understanding the key elements
behind the intensification of violence, meanthat a more rigorous approach to datacollection is needed.
The exponential growth of online andsocial media outlets means that more
information on conflicts is now publicly
available. It is crucial for conflictresearchers to integrate such sources into
their coding processes. In the case of Syria,
given the tight government controls on the
traditional media there, social media
sources have become essential alternatives.
Nonetheless, information from unidentified
sources needs to be carefully verified,particularly due to polarization of opinions
in the dissemination of information.
The use and development of the crowdseeding methodology, coupled with thegrowing use of information technology ingathering and sharing data might present a
new way forward for the collection of
conflict event data. This will ultimately
provide policymakers and humanitariant y p e o f r e p o r t e d c o n f l ic t e v e n t s i n s y r i a , b y m e di a s ou r c e

AgenceFrance-Presse
Violent action

Associated
Press

BBC
Monitoring

Other forcible action

2 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

Al Arabiya

SANA

Political and organizational action

agencies with a more complete picture of
the reality of violence and political eventson the ground, such as that in Syria. At thesame time, crowd-seeding will not be apanacea against biases, and it is not faultfree.
Restricting arms supplies to Syria

The widespread view that internationalarms transfers need to be controlled toprevent such transfers from fuelling
violence and armed conflict was reaffirmed
in 2013 when a large majority of states
adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The
acceptance of the ATT by most states—or
support of at least the ATT’s mainprinciples by several others such as Russia
and China—coincided with major
disagreements among states about how todeal with arms supplies to the ongoing
conflict in Syria, which has been marred bygross violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law.
States had highly varied views on
whether such arms supplies can or cannot
contribute to establishing peace andsecurity in Syria. Even within theEuropean Union, with its long history of
restrictive arms exports and harmonizedarms exports policies and its strong support
for the ATT, states could not reachagreement on the risks or utility ofsupplying arms to certain armed groups in
Syria.
The variance in views on arms supplies
to Syria raises the question of how
harmonized the implementation of the ATT
will be, once it enters into force. A
considerable problem is that lessons related
to the arms-export risk assessments
required by such agreements as the ATT
are hard to draw from the Syrian case.
States have generally been secretive or

unclear about the objectives, or the scope,of their arms supplies to parties to theconflict in Syria.
Arms control implications of the use ofchemical weapons in Syria

Events in Syria in 2013 will have a longterm—if still somewhat uncertain andcontroversial—effect on future efforts to
respond to allegations of use of chemical
weapons. Arms control efforts undertaken
in Syria reflected an evolution ofinternational verification measures andactivity that encompass both cooperativeand coercive elements. Institutions andregimes not normally linked (e.g. theOrganisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons, OPCW, and the World
Health Organization, WHO) were brought
together due to high-level concerns withingovernments—especially Russia and theUnited States—and the international
community. This occurred within thecontext of a worsening armed conflict withwider and long-lasting destabilizing effects.
The developments in Syria, taken as awhole, underlined the strength of theinternational norm against the possession
and use of chemical weapons. They alsobrought to the fore policy and operational
challenges associated with arms control incases where non-state and state actors fromwithin and outside the region areinteracting in contested or ungoverned
spaces. In addition, they provided
operational lessons on what verification canor cannot achieve under suchcircumstances.

•introduction 3

2. ARMED CONFLICTIn recent years there has been an upward
trend in fatalities caused by state-based
conflicts. Some regions of the world,
notably the Middle East, have experienced
significant rises in the number of battlerelated deaths. There has also been a rise ininternationalized intrastate conflicts.
These developments suggest a worrying
upward trend in lethal violence related tostate-based conflicts.
In the post-cold war period, a leading
response of the international community toarmed conflict involving states—
particularly with regional or global
security dimensions (and especiallyinternational terrorism)—has been tolaunch interventions often involving theuse of military force. In 2013 there wereindications that the use of force as a means
to address conflict and terrorist challenges
was increasingly viewed by many in theWestern community as being of limited
utility and as being too costly in terms ofmoney, lives lost and political capital
expended.
Allegations of the use of chemical
weapons in an attack in Damascus on 21
August 2013 triggered a substantial
international debate about a militaryresponse to the civil war in Syria. There
was also widespread concern about theongoing large-scale loss of life in Syria,
reports that the conflict was serving as an
incubator for violent jihadi groups andindications of a growing risk of a wider
regional destabilization.
Initially, the USA and key European
allies seemed to be preparing for militarystrikes in Syria. Following a parliamentary
vote in the United Kingdom against the useof force in Syria, and concern that the US

4 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

Congress might also vote against action,
the US administration opted to pursue a
diplomatic response to the chemical
weapon issue and refrained from militaryintervention. This was widely viewed as
marking a turning point in Western policy
towards a far more limited military
involvement in conflicts around the world.
Mediation and peace agreements

Mediation offers an important means toresolve armed conflicts. Over recent
decades, traditional diplomatic approaches
have been supplemented by the emergenceof a myriad of non-state actors involved inmediation and ‘track 2’ diplomacy. As aresult of these efforts, a significant numberof armed conflicts have been brought toresolution through mediation, often leading
to a peace agreement. In recent years,
however, there has been a notable decline
in the number of peace agreements. This
raises concerns that there may be
important limits on the use of mediation as
an alternative to military intervention to
end conflicts, without a considerable newinvestment in peacemaking efforts.
The United Nations Security Council instate-based armed conflicts

In a situation of declining direct militaryintervention in response to conflict by theWestern powers, the United Nations could
take on increased responsibilities as aconflict prevention and resolution
mechanism. The UN Security Council’s key
tools for addressing conflicts include
resolutions passed under chapters VI andVII of the UN Charter. The number of such
resolutions provides a useful measure of
the attention that the Council pays to statebased armed conflicts. It shows a great
variation in this type of attention, whichn u m b e r s o f a r m e d c o n f l ic t s ,2 0 0 3 –1 2
50

Number40
30

has its own internal dynamics, only
partially affected by the other forms. The
full picture is more complex, but there is noclear indication that the three types ofviolence offset each other, for instance,with a decline in one type leading to anincrease in the other two.

•

20
10
0

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

State-based conflict

Non-state conflict

One-sided violence

can be attributed to the length andintensity of the conflict, the conflict’s
location, and how it is perceived to affectthe interests of any permanent member of
the Council.
Patterns of organized violence, 2003–12

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP) maps organized violence aroundthe world according to three categories ofviolent action: state-based conflict, nonstate conflict and one-sided violence.
The number of incidents of violent actionthat resulted in the deaths of more than
25 people in a particular year (UCDP’s
threshold for counting) was slightly lower
in 2012, at 97, than in 2003, when it stood at
111. While the number of state-based andnon-state conflicts had increased over the
decade, the number of incidences of onesided violence declined continuously.
Looking at the overall trend in thenumber of fatalities in organized violence, amore negative picture emerges. Largely due
to developments in state-based conflict, thenumber of deaths from organized violence
increased from almost 36 000 in 2003 tonearly 46 000 in 2012. Within the overall
trend, each of the three types of violencet h e g l o b a l p e ac e i n de x 2 01 3
The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced by
the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses
22 indicators to rank 162 countries by theirrelative states of peace.
Western and Central Europe was by far themost peaceful region in the 2013 GPI. North
America was the second-most peaceful region,
followed by East and South East Asia andOceania. South Asia was the region least atpeace.
Rank Country 		

Score Change

1
2
2
4
5

IcelandDenmark
New ZealandAustria
Switzerland

1.162 –0.003
1.207–
1.237 +0.003
1.250 –0.060
1.272 +0.013

158
159
160
161
162

Sudan
Iraq
Syria
Somalia
Afghanistan

3.242
3.245
3.393
3.394
3.440

+0.156+0.019+0.524–0.092+0.075security and conflicts 5

With the launch of 8 new multilateral peace
operations, and with only 4 closing, thetotal number of operations reached 57 in
2013. France, which conducted two of the
new operations, placed itself at the centre
stage of peace operations in 2013, anddetermined much of the agenda.
This increase was accompanied by adramatic decrease in the total number of
personnel deployed on peace operations—from 233 642 in 2012 to 201 239 in 2013—
primarily due to the drawdown of theInternational Security Assistance Force(ISAF) in Afghanistan. It is likely that total
personnel figures will fall further in 2015.
While some personnel will remain in a new
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
mission in Afghanistan and other European
countries may follow France to Africa, or
start contributing to United Nations
operations, this is unlikely to make up the
ISAF-related personnel decrease.
Peacekeeping in Africa

International attention appears to bemoving from Afghanistan to Africa and inparticular to the Central African Republic(CAR), the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC), Mali, Somalia and South
Sudan. The eight new peace operations in2013 were all deployed in Africa, and each
formed part of the complex constellationsof operations, organizations and actors
currently engaged there. While Africa has
been the host of the greatest number ofpeace operations since 2010, in 2013 thedrawdown of ISAF meant that it also
hosted the greatest number of personnel,
for the first time since 2008.

6 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

In fact, four of the eight new operationsin 2013 were deployed to Mali, three to the
CAR and one to Somalia. Two of theoperations were African-led: theInternational Support Mission to Mali
(AFISMA), jointly led by the Economic
Community of the West African States(ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU),and the AU-led International Support
Mission to the CAR (MISCA). With Africa
increasingly taking care of its own affairs
through the deployment of these missions,the question of whether Africa is ready forthis task became more important.
Developments in Africa in 2013 may
suggest increasingly robust peace
operations, as reflected in the peace
enforcement character and intrusiveness ofcertain missions. The new Force
Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the UN
Organization Stabilization Mission in the
DRC (MONUSCO) was mandated to‘prevent the expansion of all armed groups,
neutralize the groups, and to disarm them’.
Although it did not use suchcounterinsurgency language, the mandateof the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)n u m b e r o f p e ac e o p e r at io n s ,2 0 0 4 –1 3
70
60
50

No. of operations

3. PEACE OPERATIONS AND
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

40
30
20
10
0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Conducting organization:
United Nations
Regional organization or alliance

2011

2012

2013

Ad hoc coalition

t o p 10 c o n t r i b u t o r s o f t r o o p s t o m u lt i l at e r a l p e ac e
o p e r at io n s , 2 01 3
Excluding ISAF

Including ISAF
Pakistan

USA
Pakistan

India

India

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

UgandaUgandaBurundiBurundiBangladesh

Bangladesh

FranceFranceKenya

United Kingdom

Nigeria

Kenya

Rwanda0

20 00040 00060 000No. of troops

was also more robust than is usual for a UN
mission. Furthermore, in an unprecedented
step, the UN expanded its logistical support
packages for the AU Mission in Somalia(AMISOM) to the frontline units of theSomali National Army in their joint fightagainst the Islamist group al Shabab. In
another controversial step, MONUSCO
became the first UN operation to deploy
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones)
for surveillance.
Global developments

The protection of civilians remained highon the agenda of multilateral peace
operations, despite difficulties in
implementation. MONUSCO’s FIB showeda renewed determination to protect
civilians and was generally hailed as a
success. However, by the end of 2013 theUN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was
protecting tens of thousands of South
Sudanese civilians on its bases andcomparisons with safe areas in Bosnia andHerzegovina were already being made.
Consensus in the UN Security Council oncontroversial issues such as the use of force
and the use of UAVs was found on an ad hoc

01000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

No. of troops

basis. However, more structurally, theso-called Hollande doctrine—named after
French President François Hollande—of
short and limited humanitarian
interventions mandated by the Security
Council in cooperation with forces
deployed by a regional organization, and at
the invitation of the host state, appears tobe similar to China’s view on interventions.
In fact, Operation Serval in Mali andOperation Sangaris in the CAR determinedmuch of the agenda in 2013.
Yet, as tensions clearly increased
between the AU, the UN and African
regional organizations over the transitionsin Mali and the CAR, it may be questioned
whether deploying missions in complex
constellations is really the way forward andwhether these two countries will become
blueprints for future peace operations.

•security and conflicts 7

World military expenditure in 2013 isestimated to have been $1747 billion,
representing 2.4 per cent of global grossdomestic product or $248 for each person
alive today. The total is about 1.9 per centlower in real terms than in 2012.
The pattern of increases and decreases inmilitary spending in 2012 continued in2013, with falls in Western countries(North America, Western and Central
Europe, and Oceania) and increases in therest of the world. There were particularly
large increases in Africa and the Middle
East, while the impact of austerity policies
continued to be felt in Europe. The UnitedStates remained the largest militaryw o r l d m i l i ta r y s p e n di n g , 2 01 3
RegionSpending Change($ b.)(%)

AfricaNorth Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
AmericasCentral America
and the Caribbean
North America
South America
Asia and Oceania
Central and South Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth East Asia
EuropeEastern Europe
Western and Central
Middle East

44.9
18.7
26.2
736
9.6

8.3
9.6
7.3
–6.8
6.0

659
67.4
407
63.7
282
25.9
35.9
410
98.5
312
150

–7.8
1.6
3.6
1.2
4.7
–3.2
5.0
–0.7
5.3
–2.4
4.0

World total

1 747

–1.9

Spending figures are in current (2013) US$. Allchanges are in real terms.

8 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

w o r l d m i l i ta r y e x p e n di t u r e ,2 0 0 4 –2 01 3
Military expenditure (constant US$ billion)

4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND
Arms production

2000

1500

1000

500

0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

AfricaNorth America

Latin America

Asia and Oceania

Western and Central Europe

Eastern Europe
Middle East

spender in 2013, followed at some distanceby China and Russia.
World military expenditure now appears
to be following two divergent trends: afalling trend in the West, driven byausterity, efforts to control budget deficits
and the winding up of long wars; andincreasing trends in the rest of the world,
due to a combination of economic growth,
security concerns, geopolitical ambitions
and, frequently, internal political factors.
While the first may play itself out in the
coming few years, leading to stablespending or renewed increases, the second
shows no sign of abating.
US military spending

US military spending continued to fall due
both to the final withdrawal of US forcesfrom Iraq at the end of 2011 and to theimpact of the 2011 Budget Control Act on
the ‘base’ defence budget. While budgetarygridlock continued during most of 2013,
including a brief government shutdown, acongressional deal at the end of the year
finally allowed a full budget to be passed,
including a defence budget for 2014. While
the agreed 2014 budget will mitigate theimpact of the Budget Control Act, total USmilitary spending will still fall with thecoming withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Military spending in the Asia–Pacific

China’s military spending has led a strong
rise in total military spending in the Asia–
Pacific region for some time. In recent years
this has been accompanied by increasing
tensions due to territorial disputes in theSouth and East China seas. At the sametime, the US ‘pivot’ to Asia has drawn
attention to the region’s strategic
importance, while China’s rise continues toreshape the security environment.
Although concerns over China’s rise are a
key driver of military spending for somecountries with which China has maritime
territorial disputes, maritime issues remaina key factor for other countries that enjoy
better relations with China.
Arms production and military services

Declining military spending in the USA andWestern Europe was reflected in a decline
in the military-related sales of the Top 100
t h e 10 l a r g e s t a r m s p r o du c i n g c o m pa n i e s , 2 01 2
		Company

Arms sales Profit($ m.)($ m.)

1 Lockheed Martin
36 0002 Boeing
27 6103 BAE Systems (UK)26 8504 Raytheon
22 5005 General Dynamics
20 940
6 Northrop Grumman 19 400
7 EADS (trans-Europe) 15 400
8 United Technologies 13 460
9 Finmeccanica (Italy) 12 530
10 L-3 Communications 10 840

2 745
3 900
2 599
1 900
–332
1 978
1 580
5 200
–1 010782

t h e r e p o r t i ng o f m i l i ta r ye x p e n di t u r e data t o t h e u n
The United Nations Report on Military
Expenditures remains an important sourcefor official data on military expenditure.
However, the response rate of UN member
states to the annual request to submit data
continued to decline in 2013. The politicalsensitivity of military expenditure may be a
primary reason for not reporting in somecases, but many of them make their military
budgets available online to the general public.
Equally, the fact that many countries have
responded at least once suggests that they
have the capacity to report but lack thepolitical commitment to respond consistently.

arms-producing and military services
companies worldwide, excluding China,
which fell by 4 per cent in 2012. However,there was a sharp increase in the arms salesof Russian companies, again reflecting the
major rearmament programme being
pursued by Russia.
There were substantial increases by thelargest companies in a number of other‘emerging’ producers, such as Brazil, South
Korea and Turkey. Overall, the pattern ofrecent years shows a gradual diffusion of
the arms industry, with the traditional
producers in the USA and Western Europe
responsible for a slowly shrinking share of
the Top 100 arms sales and the share of new
players growing. However, the traditional
producers remain overwhelmingly
dominant.

•

Companies are US-based, unless indicatedotherwise. The profit figures are from allcompany activities, including non-military
sales.

military spending and armaments 9

5. International arms
transfers
The volume of international transfers ofmajor weapons grew by 14 per cent between
2004–2008 and 2009–13. The five largest
suppliers in 2009–13—the United States,
Russia, Germany, China and France—accounted for 74 per cent of the volume ofexports. With a few exceptions from otherregions, the USA and European suppliers
have dominated the top tier of suppliers forthe past 20 years. However, China has
re-established itself as one of the top
suppliers: in 2009–13 it was the fourthlargest supplier.
SIPRI data on arms transfers does not
represent their financial value. However, anumber of states also publish figures on thefinancial value of their arms exports. Basedon this data, SIPRI estimates that the total
value of the global arms trade in 2012 was atleast $58 billion.
Developments in arms transfers, 2013

One of the consequences of the financial
crisis in the arms-producing countries ofEurope, North America and elsewhere has
been reductions in military budgets. The

the tr end in tr a nsfers ofm a jo r a r m s , 2 0 0 4 –2 01 3
Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year moving average (plotted at thelast year of each five-year period).

10 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

resulting reduction in domestic
procurement has created additionalpressure on arms-producing countries tosignificantly increase the export share of
their total arms sale by seeking new export
markets. While governments have longsupported arms exports by their national
industry, many major suppliers are
expanding sales support in the form ofgovernment promotion and facilitation ofexports, or the relaxation of arms export
restrictions
Another consequence of reduced military
budgets was the notable decrease ininternational arms flows to states in Europe
between 2004–2008 and 2009–13. In
contrast, flows to Asia and Africa increased.
States in Asia and Oceania received nearly
half (47 per cent) of all imports of major
weapons in 2009–13, and the three largest
recipients of major weapons were all Asian:
India, China and Pakistan. Combined, theyaccounted for 32 per cent of all imports.
Two Middle Eastern countries returned tothe top-five list of recipients: the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Transfers of long-range guided missiles

A notable trend among the major recipientshas been the acquisition of long-range,
precision-guided, land-attack missiles.
These weapons improve a state’s capacity tothreaten or attack small targets deep inside
an adversary’s territory while decreasing
the risk of putting its own military
personnel or high-value platforms inharm’s way.
In the period 2004–13, 16 countries
received or ordered guided missiles withranges over 200 km from abroad and8 exported them. The proliferation of longrange guided missiles gives rise to several
concerns, such as their potential to disrupt

the m ain importers a nde x p o r t e r s o f m a jo r a r m s ,2 0 0 9 –1 3
			Exporter
1. USA
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. China
5. France
6. UK
7. Spain
8. Ukraine
9. Italy
10. Israel

Global			
share (%) Importer
29
27
7
6
5
4
3
3
3
2

Globalshare (%)

1. India14
2. China
5
3. Pakistan
5
4. UAE
4
5. Saudi Arabia 4
6. USA
4
7. Australia
4
8. South Korea 4
9. Singapore
3
10. Algeria
3

regional conventional and nuclear weaponbalances, fuel arms races, lead to military
escalation, drive interstate crises andincrease the likelihood of war.
While some international controls on
missile proliferation have been agreed,major supplier states regularly show
willingness to export guided missiles,
including to regions with high levels ofinterstate tensions and to countries thatpossess nuclear arms.

major arms have not reported to UNROCA
every year and several of the largest
importers have been absent for all five
years. Participation from some regions has
been consistently low in recent years. Only
one Middle Eastern state and two African
states reported in 2013.
Since the early 1990s a growing numberof governments have published national
reports giving details of their arms exports.
As of January 2014, 35 states had publishedat least one national report on arms exports
since 1990, including 32 that had done so inthe past five years (2009–13) and 23 that
had published a continuous series of annual
reports from the first year of theirreporting. During 2013 no state produced anational report on arms exports that had
not done so previously. Of the top 10
suppliers of major weapons, 3 have neverpublished a national report on arms
exports: China, Israel and Russia.

•

Transparency in arms transfers

Official and publicly accessible data onarms transfers is important for assessing
states’ arms export, arms procurement anddefence policies. However, publishing dataon arms sales and acquisitions is a sensitive
issue for nearly all states.
Similar to 2012, 2013 was a disappointing
year for transparency in arms transfers.
The number of states reporting their arms
imports and exports to the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
increased in 2013 but remained low.
In the five most recent reporting years(2008–12) several of the top 10 suppliers ofmilitary spending and armaments 11

6. World nuclear forces

w o r l d n uc l e a r f o r c e s , 2 014

At the start of 2014 nine states—the UnitedStates, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North
Korea—possessed approximately 4150
operational nuclear weapons. Roughly 1800of these are kept in a state of high alert,
ready for use on short notice. If all nuclear
warheads are counted—including
operational warheads, spares, those in bothactive and inactive storage, and intact
warheads scheduled for dismantlement—these states possessed a total of
approximately 16 350 nuclear weapons, ascompared with 17 270 at the beginning of2013.

Country

Nuclear arsenals

The total number of nuclear warheads inthe world is declining, primarily due to the
USA and Russia continuing to reduce their
nuclear arsenals as a result of their 2010
Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START) andunilateral reductions. Together, Russia andthe USA hold more than 90 per cent of the
global inventories of nuclear weapons.
However, the pace of their reductions

Deployed Other
Total
warheads warheads inventoryUSA~2 100Russia~1 600UK
160
France
~290
China
–
India
–
Pakistan–Israel–North Korea
..

5 200
~7 300~6 400~8 000
~65
~225
~10
~300
~250
~250
90–110
90–110
100–120 100–120
~80
~80
..
6–8

Total

~12 200~4 150~16 350

All estimates are approximate and are as ofJanuary 2014.

appears to be slowing compared with adecade ago. At the same time, all five legally
recognized nuclear weapon states as
defined by the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, theUK and the USA—are either deploying new
nuclear weapon delivery systems or haveannounced programmes to do so, andappear determined to retain their nuclear
arsenals indefinitely.
The nuclear arsenals of the othernuclear-armed states are considerably
smaller. However, India and Pakistan
continue to develop new systems capable ofn u c l e a r f o r c e s o f t h e 5 l e g a l ly r e c o g n i z e d n uc l e a r w e a p o ns tat e s , 19 7 0 –2 0 14
France: 300
China: 250

UK: 225

Russia:8000

USA: 7300

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2014

Total: 39 160

Total: 55 465

Total: 59 880

Total: 31 745

Total: 22 365

Total: 16 075

United States

USSR/Russia

12 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

China, France, United Kingdom

delivering nuclear weapons and are
expanding their capacities to produce
fissile material for military purposes.
Meanwhile, there is an emerging consensus
in the expert community that North Korea
has produced a small number of nuclear
weapons, as distinct from rudimentary
nuclear explosive devices. In 2013 North
Korea conducted a third nuclear test
explosion and affirmed the central role ofnuclear weapons in its national security
strategy.
Reliable information on the status of thenuclear arsenals and capabilities of thenuclear-armed states varies considerably.
The USA has disclosed substantial
information about its stockpile and forces,
and France and the UK have also declaredsome information. Russia refuses todisclose the detailed breakdown of its
forces counted under New START (eventhough it shares the information with theUSA), and the US Government has stopped
releasing detailed information about
Chinese and Russian nuclear forces.
The Indian and Pakistani governments
provide statements about some of their
missiles tests but no information about thestatus or size of their arsenals. Israel has apolicy of not commenting on its widelysuspected nuclear arsenal, and North
Korea provides no information about its
nuclear capabilities.
Estimated number of nuclear explosions,
1945–2013

On 12 February 2013 North Korea
conducted its third nuclear test explosion.
Most estimates of the yield vary between 5
and 16 kilotons. Since 1945 there have now
been 2055 known nuclear explosions,carried out by eight states—the USA, theSoviet Union, the UK, France, China, India,

globa l stocks of fissile
m at e r i a l s , 2 01 3
Materials that can sustain an explosive fission
chain reaction are essential for all types ofnuclear explosive, from first-generation
fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear
weapons. The most common of these fissile
materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France,
Russia, the UK and the USA have produced
both HEU and plutonium; India, Israel andNorth Korea have mainly produced
plutonium; and Pakistan mainly HEU. All
states with a civilian nuclear industry havesome capability to produce fissile materials.
The International Panel on Fissile
Materials compiles information on global
stocks of fissile materials.
Global stocks, 2013
Highly enriched uranium ~1 285 tonnes*
Separated plutonium
Military stocks~224 tonnes
Civilian stocks~268 tonnes* Not including 61 tonnes to be blended down.

Pakistan and North Korea. This total
includes nuclear tests conducted in nuclear
weapon test programmes, explosions
carried out for peaceful purposes and thetwo nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in August 1945.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which has not yet enteredinto force, would prohibit the carrying outof any nuclear explosion.

•

military spending and armaments 13

7. Nuclear arms control andnon-proliferation
Iran and nuclear proliferation concerns

In 2013 the international efforts to resolve
the long-running controversy over thescope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme made encouraging progress.
In November the negotiations between
Iran and the P5+1 states (the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security
Council—China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States—plus
Germany) produced an interim deal as afirst step towards a longer-term
comprehensive agreement aimed atproviding assurances that Iran’s nuclear
programme is solely for peaceful purposes.
Under the six-month interim deal Iranagreed to a series of practical measures
restricting its uranium-enrichment
programme and heavy-water nuclear
reactor project in exchange for limited
relief from US and European Union (EU)financial and trade sanctions.
Earlier in November Iran and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) signed a framework agreement forcooperation to increase the transparency of
Iran’s nuclear programme. The agreement
included a set of initial undertakings by
Iran to give the IAEA additional
information about, and greater access to, its
nuclear sites and facilities. The agreementon the confidence-building andtransparency measures was seen as setting
the stage for the IAEA to pursue its
investigation of allegations that Iran had
carried out nuclear activities with possible
military dimensions, in contravention of its
commitments under the 1968 NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).

14 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

The tentative breakthroughs achieved in
the two separate but closely related sets oftalks did not resolve fundamental
differences over the nature of Iran’s nuclear
energy rights under the NPT or the futureof its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
They did contribute to dampening
speculation that some states—in particular,
Israel—might prioritize extra-legal
measures, or even resort to the preventive
use of military force, to deal with asuspected Iranian nuclear weapon
programme. The agreements alsoenhanced the credibility of international
legal approaches, including UN Security
Council sanctions, in dealing withsuspected or known cases of states
violating important arms control treaty
obligations and norms.
North Korea’s nuclear programme

In 2013 tensions over the nuclear weapon
programme of North Korea escalated
sharply before gradually abating. In
February North Korea conducted a third
nuclear test explosion through which it
claimed to have certified a lighter and morecompact nuclear warhead design. Its
rejection of the UN Security Council’s
condemnation of the test was followed by aseries of provocative steps that raised thespectre of military conflict with the USA
and South Korea.
During the year North Korea’s leadershipreaffirmed its intention to retain nuclear
weapons for the indefinite future as a coreelement of its ‘military-first’ policy andarticulated a long-term strategy for
expanding and improving the country’s
nuclear forces. The year ended with little
optimism about the prospects for restarting
the stalled Six-Party Talks aimed at
inducing North Korea to give up its nuclear

arsenal in exchange for international
assistance.
Russian–US cooperation on reducing
nuclear risks

Russia and the USA agreed a bilateralaccord to replace the existing legal
framework for implementing nuclear
security and disarmament assistanceactivities in Russia under the landmark
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
programme. The US-funded CTR
programme, which began in 1992, hascontinued in Russia with an expanded
range of activities for dismantling strategic
nuclear forces, destroying Soviet-era
chemical weapons, and ensuring the safety
and custodial security of nuclear materials.
In scaling back or ending key CTR
programme activities in Russia, the newagreement reflected the evolution of
Russian–US relations in the direction of amore equal partnership.
Multilateral treaties and initiatives on
nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

During 2013 there were signs of growinginternational frustration with the lack ofprogress made in advancing themultilateral nuclear disarmament agenda.
Much unfinished business remained onthat agenda, in particular the opening ofnegotiations on the long-stalled fissile
material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and thebringing into force of the 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT). Efforts to promote an alternativeinternational dialogue on nuclear
disarmament that placed the humanitarian
impact of nuclear weapons at centre stage
gained momentum during the year.
The Norwegian Government hosted amajor international conference on thehumanitarian impact of nuclear weaponsthat examined the global and long-term
consequences of any nuclear detonation,
accidental or deliberate, from theperspective and concerns of wide range ofareas, including public health, economic
development, food security andenvironmental issues. In addition, in 2013
the UN General Assembly convened for the
first time a new Open-Ended Working
Group (OEWG) to develop proposals toadvance multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations.
The status of a proposed international
conference on establishing a zone free of
nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in the Middle Eastremained a source of controversy in 2013.
The decision to hold the conference had
been taken at the NPT Review Conferencein 2010, pursuant to the resolution on the
Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference. The
continued deadlock in 2013 over setting adate for the event led Egypt to stage asymbolic protest by walking out of the
Preparatory Committee meeting for the2015 NPT Review Conference.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 15

8. Reducing security threats
from chemical andbiological materials
In 2013 states continued to develop
strategies to prevent and remediate theeffects of the possible misuse of toxic
chemicals and of biological materials. Someof these activities are carried out in thecontext of environmental and humanhealth, while others are done in the
security and defence spheres. The principal
legal instruments against chemical andbiological warfare (CBW) are the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) andthe 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC). They inform theconsideration of CBW threats andresponses, understanding of past
programmes, allegations of the use of
biological or chemical weapons, the natureof possible standby programmes, andefforts to ensure that science andtechnology are not misused for hostile
purposes or as a method of warfare.
Syria

The most significant developments
concerning security threats from chemical
or biological materials in 2013 related to
Syria. After the Syrian Government’s
admission in 2012 that it possessedchemical weapons, in 2013 a series ofincreasingly serious allegations, threats ofmilitary intervention and attemptedinternational investigation eventually led
to an international inspection team,working under the auspices of the United
Nations Secretary-General, entering Syria.
Its report, which confirmed the use ofchemical weapons in the civil war without
specifying which side had used them, led to
Syria becoming a party to the CWC.

16 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

As a CWC party, Syria made a formal
declaration of its stockpiles of chemical
weapons and reached agreement on theirremoval from its territory and destruction.
A multifaceted and evolving verification
effort was carried out under a cooperative
arrangement involving the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), theOrganisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW), the World
Health Organization (WHO) and otherbodies, including national laboratories.
However, the Syrian Government
continued to deny that it had used chemical
weapons and did not mention in its initialdeclaration any weapons of the two types
identified by the international inspectors as
having been used at Ghouta on 21 August.
Chemical weapon arms control anddisarmament

The Third Review Conference of the CWC
and the 18th Conference of the States
Parties received significant international
prominence, partly as a result of attention
to the continued worsening conflict in Syria
and the decision by the United States not toattack Syria for its chemical weapon use ino l d a n d a b a n d o n e d c h e m ic a l
w e a pons
As of 31 December 2013,• 4 countries had declared that abandoned
chemical weapons (ACW) are present on
their territories;• 15 countries had declared that they havepossessed old chemical weapons (OCW)
since the CWC’s entry-into-force;• OCW inspections were carried out in 2013
in Belgium, Canada, Germany, theNetherlands and the UK; and• approximately 75 per cent of the 50 000
recovered ACW in China had been
destroyed.

de s t r u c t io n o f c h e m ic a l
w e a pons
As of 31 December 2013,• Iraq, Libya, Syria, Russia and the USA had
yet to complete destruction of theirchemical weapon stockpiles;• 58 528 tonnes (81 per cent) of category 1
chemical weapons had been destroyed;• 14 states had declared 96 former chemical
production facilities; and• 43 of these facilities had been destroyedand 22 converted to peaceful purposes.

exchange for verified chemical weapon
disarmament.
The US administration had repeatedly
indicated in preceding months that the useof chemical weapons in the conflict would
constitute a ‘red line’ and would lead to‘serious consequences’—widely understoodto mean the use of military force.
In 2013 the OPCW won the Nobel Peace
Prize ‘for its extensive efforts to eliminatechemical weapons’.

included the ending of the long-running
Russian–US Cooperative Threat Reduction(CTR) programme, the recent focus ofwhich has been on biological threat
reduction.
Researchers who discovered a new
botulinum neurotoxin chose not to submit
the sequence data to a public repository of
nucleotide sequences until an effective
antitoxin has been developed because of
the toxin’s serious risks to public health.
The threat posed by public availability ofsuch a nucleotide sequence was illustrated
by the announcement of a project todevelop the biological equivalent of a threedimensional (3D) printer, which might
eventually be used to sequence pathogenic
microorganisms.

•

Biological weapon arms control anddisarmament

The states parties to the BTWC met twice
during 2013 in the second of a series of fourintersessional meetings of experts andparties agreed by the 2011 Seventh Review
Conference. The meetings focused on
science and technology developments andon confidence-building measures—inparticular, on whether and how to establish
states parties’ compliance with theconvention.
Oversight of dual-purpose research in thelife sciences

Developments in dual-purpose research in
the life sciences—that is, scientific researchthat has potential military applications—non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17

9. CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL and militaryconfidence building
Arms control has been continuously
adapted in response to changes in the
security environment, including the needto regulate and restrain the behaviour of
non-state actors, and the emergence of newtechnologies. The scope of application oflegal restraint measures now reaches far
beyond the items that would traditionallybe defined as arms. The various
frameworks of restraint that have beencreated, or that are being discussed, are notlimited to treaties and conventions.
Politically binding confidence-building
measures (CBMs), intended to promote theresponsible use of information andcommunications technologies, and a shared
ethical code to guide thinking about thepotential misuse of new and emerging
technologies in the fields of artificial
intelligence and robotics, are new
innovations.
In September 2013 the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 2117,
its first ever text dedicated exclusively tothe issue of small arms and light weapons.
Introducing the resolution, the UN
Secretary–General, Ban Ki-moon,emphasized the humanitarian impact ofsmall arms—a theme that was echoed in theinterventions by many of the states andinternational organizations who
participated in the debate.
Humanitarian arms control

How to regulate different kinds of weapons
in order to ensure compliance withinternational humanitarian law has
become an important theme in arms
control. In the first instance, participation

18 sipri yearbook 2014 , summaryin existing treaties that can be considered
humanitarian arms control agreements is
far from universal. Furthermore, the statesthat are parties to such agreements still
have a lot of work to do in order toimplement them.
Several states that are parties to the 1997
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (APM or Mine Ban
Convention) remain in non-compliance.
Others have requested extensions to theirdeadlines for compliance.
In 2013, participation in the 2008
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
Weapons continued to expand as fivecountries joined the convention and sevenothers made a commitment to join once
national implementation measures are inplace.
Reducing the threat posed by improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) is a formidable
challenge, and one to which traditionalarms control approaches are difficult toapply. However, the indiscriminate use of
IEDs has serious humanitarianconsequences. States continued to discuss
how non-state actors can be denied accessto key materials and elements needed toconstruct an IED.
The governance of autonomous weapons

States have begun to discuss how toregulate new and emerging technologies toensure that they do not become an
unacceptable risk to the principles ofhumanitarian law or human rights law.
The issue of whether or not to regulate
fully autonomous weapons and, if so, how
to do that, was discussed in the frameworkof the 1981 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW Convention)and the UN General Assembly Human
Rights Council. At the end of 2013 the CCW
participating states agreed that a more
focused discussion of issues related to fullyautonomous weapons will become a formalpart of their work programme from 2014.
Confidence-building measures for
information and communication
technologies

In December 2013 the participating statesof the Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed todevelop a set of confidence-building
measures to reduce the risk that asuspicious activity in cyber space could be
misinterpreted as a hostile act. The OSCE
agreement to apply CBMs to informationand communications technologies is thefirst such agreement in the world. The
ultimate objective of the OSCE
participating states is to contribute to aninternational understanding andagreement on principles for responsible
state behaviour in cyberspace, and tostrengthen the rule of international law. At
the same time and in parallel, many OSCE
participating states continue to develop
their national capabilities to conduct
operations in cyberspace.

During 2013, members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as
well as Russia and other European states
identified a risk that military exercises
carried out in close proximity to the sharedboundaries between NATO allies, Russia
and Belarus might raise additionalquestions about the implications of current
tendencies in military planning. The
emerging pattern of military exercises may
no longer be consistent with the sharedobjective of making Europe more secureand more peaceful.

•

European debates and discussions onconventional arms control

In Europe, concern was expressed overwhether the conventional arms control
agreements reached in the 1990s, alongwith politically binding confidence- andsecurity-building measures, were any
longer playing their main role of ensuring
predictability in military behaviour andpromoting confidence that armed forces
exist only for legitimate defensive
purposes.

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

10. DUAL-USE AND arms TRADE
controlS
In 2013 considerable progress was made inglobal efforts to strengthen trade controls
for conventional arms, with the United
Nations General Assembly agreeing in Aprilon the text of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
after six years of negotiation. Multilateralefforts in the area of dual-use trade controls
were not marked by similar landmark
developments, but followed the incremental
development path of recent years.
The Arms Trade Treaty

The final conference on the ATT in March2013 ended with Iran, North Korea and
Syria blocking consensus. The draft treaty
text was subsequently put to a vote in the
UN General Assembly in June 2013, with155 states voting in favour, 3 against (Iran,North Korea and Syria) and 22 abstentions.
The approval of the treaty text was theresult of global efforts to reach a consensus
on an international treaty to establish the‘highest possible common international
standards for the transfer of conventionalarms’. The ATT will enter into force once
50 countries have ratified. By 31 December
2013 a total of 115 states—including theUnited States—had signed the ATT, ofwhich 9 had ratified the treaty.
The ATT is the first agreement of aninternational treaty covering the brokering,transit and export of conventional arms.
Sections of the treaty also apply to parts,
components and ammunition. The ATT
provides for information exchange on
various aspects of the treaty, although theprecise scope and mechanisms are yet to be
defined. The treaty also includes anobligation to report on national
implementation systems as well as on

20 sipri yearbook 2014 , summarytransfers of the seven categories of major
conventional weapons established by the
UN Register of Conventional Arms
(UNROCA), as well as on transfers of smallarms and light weapons (SALW). The
compulsory reporting of SALW imports
and exports distinguishes the ATT from
UNROCA. However, the scope of the ATT
is narrower than the Munitions List of theWassenaar Arrangement and does notinclude dual-use items with conventionalarms applications.
Advocates for an ATT sought to build on
principles and standards that already exist
in some conventional arms trade control
instruments at the regional and nationalm u lt i l at e r a l a r m s
e m b a r g o e s i n f o r c e , 2 01 3
United Nations (14 embargoes)• Al-Qaeda and associated individuals andentities • Central African Republic• Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF) •Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iran • Iraq (NGF) •North Korea • Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia (NGF)• Libya (NGF) • Somalia • Sudan (Darfur)• Taliban
European Union (21 embargoes)
Implementations of UN embargoes (10):• Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities • Central African
Republic • Democratic Republic of the Congo(NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iraq (NGF) •Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF)• Somalia (NGF)
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran
• North Korea • Sudan
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (8):• Belarus • China • Egypt • Guinea• Myanmar • South Sudan • Syria • Zimbabwe
Arab League (1 embargo)• Syria
NGF = non-governmental forces.

levels. The specific mention of genderbased violence as a criterion goes beyond
most national and regional agreements,
including the European Union (EU)Common Position on Arms Exports,
although it is implied in the latter. The
compromise agreement on the ATT sought
to reconcile a wide spectrum of UN
member states’ positions regarding therelationship between state security
prerogatives and human security
considerations—including obligations
under international humanitarian andhuman rights law—as well as the interestsof exporters and importers. This has
resulted in language that leaves scope forinterpretation as states translate the treaty
into law, policy and practice.
Multilateral arms embargoes

In the area of arms embargoes, results weremixed, given the continued failure to agree
a UN arms embargo against Syria, withdivisions among the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council
playing an important role.
The Arab League’s embargo against Syria
remained in force, while in June 2013 theEU allowed its 2011 arms embargo to
expire, due to a lack of agreement among
member states on whether to extend or
adapt the embargo, and in particular onwhether arms supplies to the opposition
should be permitted. In April the EU had
agreed to allow the supply of certain nonlethal equipment to Syrian opposition
forces, but the supply of equipment andsoftware for use in monitoring ofcommunications by the Syrian Government
remained prohibited.
In August EU member states suspended
exports to Egypt of any equipment thatmight be used for internal repression,

although this was not formalized in alegally binding embargo.
In 2013 the UN Security Council imposed
one new arms embargo, on the Central
African Republic. As in previous years, theUN panels tasked with monitoring
violations of UN arms embargoes reported
violations.
Export control regimes

During 2013 four informal, non-legallybinding regimes—the Australia Group, theMissile Technology Control Regime(MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies—
continued to work on consensus-based
decisions to strengthen strategic tradecontrols. These multilateral regimes
routinely updated the lists of items subject
to control, but did not agree on new
guidelines or principles for export-related
activities such as brokering, transit andtransshipment.
Mexico joined the Australia Group in
2013, having already been admitted by the
NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement in2012. Additional membership applications
are pending. India’s interest in joining theregimes continued to be subject toconsiderable discussion, without results.
The relevance and importance of theAustralia Group, which covers items thathave applications in biological andchemical weapons, were highlighted
through the use of chemical weapons in
Syria. Continued supplies of nuclear
reactors to China by Pakistan were subject
to controversy inside and outside theNSG.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21

Annexes
Arms control and disarmament
agreements in force, 1 January 2014

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare(1925 Geneva Protocol)
1948 Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide(Genocide Convention)
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons inTime of War; and 1977 Protocols I and
II Relating to the Protection ofVictims of International and
Non‑International Armed Conflicts
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water (Partial TestBan Treaty, PTBT)
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Explorationand Use of Outer Space, Including theMoon and Other Celestial Bodies(Outer Space Treaty)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation
Treaty, NPT)1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weaponsand other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
thereof (Seabed Treaty)
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production andStockpiling of Bacteriological

22 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary(Biological) and Toxin Weapons andon their Destruction (Biological andToxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)
1974 Treaty on the Limitation ofUnderground Nuclear Weapon Tests(Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, TTBT)1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
PNET)
1977 Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modification
Techniques (Enmod Convention)
1980 Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material
1981 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to have Indiscriminate Effects(CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane
Weapons’ Convention)
1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty)
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stock­piling and Use of Chemical Weaponsand on their Destruction (Chemical
Weapons Convention, CWC)
1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of
Bangkok)1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control (Florence Agreement)

c h r o n o l o g y 2 01 3 , s e l e c t e devents11 Jan.

France launches Operation Serval tosupport Mali’s armed forces
12 Feb. North Korea carries out anunderground nuclear weapon test
24 Mar. Séléka rebels sieze power in theCentral African Republic
2 Apr. The UN General Assembly adopts theArms Trade Treaty
2 May The UN Security Council establishes
the UN Assistance Mission in
Somalia
6 June The existence of Prism, a secret US
surveillance programme, is revealedby Edward Snowden
18 June Afghan Government forces take onfull security role in the country
3 July The Egyptian military ousts
President Mohamed Morsy
21 Aug. Reports emerge of a chemical
weapon attack in Ghouta, Syria
12 Sep. Syria agrees to join the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention
31 Oct. A proposed government amnesty billsparks large demonstrations against
the Thai Government
24 Nov. Iran agrees to restrict its nuclear
activities for a 6-month period
17 Dec. Japan announces plans to increase its
military spending

1997 Inter-American Convention Against
the Illicit Manufacturing of andTrafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other
Related Materials (CIFTA)
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production andTransfer of Anti-Personnel Minesand on their Destruction (APM
Convention)
1999 Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional
Weapons Acquisitions

2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms,
Light Weapons, their Ammunition
and Other Related Materials
2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk)
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START)2011 Vienna Document 2011 on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures
Agreements not yet in force, 1 January
2014

1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
Treaty2010 Central African Convention for theControl of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All
Parts and Components That Can Be
Used for Their Manufacture, Repair
and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Security cooperation bodies

Notable changes in 2013 included Mexico
joining the Australia Group, Croatia
becoming a member state of the European
Union and Serbia becoming a member of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

•

annexes 23

SIPRI DATABASESSIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Gives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988, allowing
comparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US
dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of GDP.
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950,
the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms
transfers.
SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Gives information on all arms embargoes that have been implemented by an internationalorganization, such as the EU or UN, or by a group of nations. All embargoes that are in force,or have been in force since 1998, are included.
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including
location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of
personnel, costs and fatalities.
Access the SIPRI Databases: www.sipri.org/databases

24 sipri yearbook 2014 , summary

How to order sipri yearbook 2014
SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in print and online by Oxford University Press
ISBN 978-0-19-871259-6, hardback
ISBN 978-0-19-178432-3, online

1More information is available at www.sipriyearbook.org
Translations
SIPRI Yearbook 2014 will be translated into
• Arabic by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), Beirutwww.caus.org.lb• Chinese by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Beijingwww.cacda.org.cn• Russian by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow
www.imemo.ru• Ukrainian by the Razumkov Centre (Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political
Studies, UCEPS), Kyiv
www.razumkov.org.ua

These translations are funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protectionand Sport. Contact the publishing organizations for further details.

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Fax: +46 8 655 97 33
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org

Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute

SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas of• Security and conflicts• Military spending and armaments• Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmamentThis booklet summarizes the 45th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which includes
coverage of developments during 2013 in• Armed conflict, with studies on mediation and peace agreements and on the role of the
UN Security Council in state-based armed conflicts• Peace operations and conflict management, including an analysis of peace operationsin Africa• Military expenditure and arms production, with an account of US budget debates and afeature on military spending and regional security in the Asia–Pacific• International arms transfers, with a study on transfers of long-range guided missiles
and an assessment of transparency efforts• World nuclear forces, with a description of the nuclear explosion in North Korea• Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, featuring developments related to Iran andNorth Korea and the Russian–US Cooperative Treat Reduction Programme• Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials, describing theinternational response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria and developments indual-purpose research in the life sciences• Conventional arms control and military confidence building, with studies on thegovernance of autonomous weapons, cybersecurity and European debateson conventional arms control• Dual-use and arms trade controls, with an account of the adoption of the Arms Trade
Treaty and developments in multilateral arms embargoes and export control regimes
as well as a series of essays on aspects of the conflict in Syria, and extensive annexes onarms control and disarmament agreements, international security cooperation bodies,and events during 2013.

www.sipriyearbook.org