ensuring secure seas: INDIAn MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY

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Ensuring Secure Seas:
Indian MARITIME Security Strategy

© Copyright Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015
ISBN: 978-93-81722-22-0
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Prepared by the Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Integrated Headquarters,
Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi.
Editorial and Production Team
Commodore Sanjay J Singh, NM
Commander Sarabjeet S Parmar
Commander Jasneet S Sachdeva
Designed by FACET Design, New Delhi

Ensuring Secure Seas:
Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Indian Navy
Naval Strategic Publication (NSP) 1.2
October 2015

Foreword
India’s quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location are twin
factors that have defined her growth as a nation and evolution as a cosmopolitan
civilisation. Her prominent peninsular orientation and flanking island chains overlook
strategic sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, linking her security and prosperity inextricably
to the seas. With rugged terrain and high mountain ranges dominating her Northernborders, India finds the seas to be the primary means of extending her connectivity
and trade links with her neighbourhood and the world at large. Not surprisingly, over
90% by volume and 70% by value of her external trade even today is transacted by sea.
The last decade has witnessed India’s dependence on her maritime environment
expanding substantially as her economic, military and technological strength grew,
her global interactions widened and her national security imperatives and politicalinterests stretched gradually beyond the Indian Ocean Region. There seems little
doubt today that the 21st century will be the ‘Century of the Seas’ for India and that theseas will remain a key enabler in her global resurgence.
The Indian Navy today remains the principal manifestation ofIndia’s maritime power and plays a central role in safeguarding andpromoting her security and national interests in the maritime domain. The
Navy’s roles and responsibilities have also expanded significantly over theyears in response to changing geo-economic and geo-strategic circumstances.

Foreword iii

ii Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

These facts and factors were aptly reflected in the Indian Maritime Doctrine,

This document covers a wide canvas. It seeks to provide readers in the Indian

promulgated in 2004 and revised in 2009, and the Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s

Navy, Indian Coast Guard, other maritime agencies and Armed Forces, as well as

Maritime Military Strategy, published in 2007. The two publications articulated thethe Government and informed public, an insight into the rationale for strengthening

Navy’s maritime strategic outlook, defined the parameters of its employment, andIndia’s maritime security in the coming years. It has been compiled through anprovided overarching guidance for its evolution as a combat force. They, however,iterative and inclusive process, eliciting inputs from the Indian Army, Indian Air

need periodic review to continue reflecting prevailing circumstances and remaining

Force, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Indian Coast Guard, several defence-contemporary and relevant. Such an exercise has become necessary today owing torelated ‘think tanks’, and a large number of acknowledged experts in maritime affairs

three significant developments of the past decade that affect India’s maritime security

within and outside the Navy.

and the role of her Navy.

The document intends to provide strategic guidance for the growth, development

The first is the sweeping change that the global and regional geo-strategicand deployment of the Navy in the coming years, and will need review and retuning as

environment has seen during the period. The shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic

circumstances and conditions change and evolve. I am sanguine that it will provide ato an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power

useful template to guide the professional perspectives of those in the white uniform, as

towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in thewell as those that are associated with, or interested in, strengthening India’s maritime

Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.

security in different ways in the 21st century.

The second is a considerable change that India’s security-cum-threat calculus

Jai Hind.

has seen during the period. In addition to persisting threats and challenges of the‘traditional’ nature, India’s maritime security environment has become even more
complex and unpredictable today with the expansion in scale and presence of avariety of ‘non-traditional’ threats. The ‘26/11’ terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008,
for instance, demanded a re-evaluation of our security perceptions and devolved to
the Navy the responsibility for India’s overall maritime security, including coastal andoffshore security. This, in turn, called for a reorientation of our organisation, operating
philosophy and force development plans.
The third is a national outlook towards the seas and the maritime domain, and aclearer recognition of maritime security being a vital element of national progress andinternational engagement. Today, India interacts more actively with littoral states of
the Indian Ocean Region and employs maritime security engagement as a cornerstoneof her regional foreign policy initiatives. There is also wider acknowledgement of therole the Navy can play in strengthening and enhancing maritime security in the region.
These developments have necessitated a revision of the Navy’s 2007 strategy andthe promulgation of a follow-on edition. Titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime
Security Strategy, this edition aims to highlight India’s contemporary maritime security
considerations and reflect the incontrovertible link between secure seas and India’s
resurgence in the 21st century.

(RK Dhowan)
New Delhi

Admiral

10 October 2015

Chief of the Naval Staff

The Indian Navy’s Vision Statement 2014 and Guiding Principles v

iv Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Course to Steer

Way Points

The Indian Navy’s Vision Statement 2014

The Guiding Principles

To effectively confront the multifarious challenges it faces in the complex maritime
environment of the 21st century, the Indian Navy will:-

Raison d’être
Whereas preventing war and conflict is its primary purpose, the Indian Navy must

Strengthen itself continuously as a formidable, multi-dimensional and networked

play a decisive role in bringing them to an early and favourable conclusion, should they

force that maintains high readiness at all times to protect India’s maritime interests,

be thrust on the nation or become inevitable. All its capability-development measuressafeguard her seaward frontiers and defeat all maritime threats in our areas ofand operational plans will be guided by this core consideration.

interest.
Optimise every resource, embrace innovation, and maximise indigenisation andNavy for National Development

self-reliance, to bridge critical capability gaps and generate credible combat power,

Operating with other stakeholders and agencies, the Navy is to ensure and enable maritime

to accomplish missions across the full spectrum of naval operations.

security in the sea areas of interest to India, to establish an environment conducive for

Undertake quality maintenance, timely infrastructure modernisation, and efficientlogistics management, to ensure optimum performance and operational safety at
all times.
Develop effective leadership at all levels, accord
highest priority to developing and retaining
well-trained, highly-motivated and skilled
professionals, and initiate and implement
community support measures thattogether make the Navy a taut,efficient and happy Service.

the unhindered conduct of shipping, fishing and offshore exploration and other maritime
interests that contribute vitally to economic growth and national development.

Organisational and Operational Agility
With its external environment remaining unpredictable and the range and scale of its
operations changing constantly, the Navy is to adapt to the dynamic and uncertain geopolitical landscape and the rapidly-advancing technological environment it operates in.
It is to develop and maintain the organisational ability and agility to embrace, manage
and absorb change, transformation and innovation.

Full Spectrum Capability
The Navy is to constantly sharpen its capabilities as a multi-dimensional, operationallyeffective and balanced force that is capable of countering the full range of maritime
challenges, and fulfilling its military, constabulary, diplomatic and benign roles
effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Multi-mission and Seamless Operational Capabilities
In synergy with the other Armed Forces, the Navy is to always maintain effective
deterrence and warfighting capabilities. This it will do by generating adequate maritime

The Indian Navy’s Vision Statement 2014 and Guiding Principles vii

vi Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
domain awareness, maintaining the required reach and sustainability, and conducting

levels and widening operational canvas, and to cater to all future operational andseamless and effective networked operations across multiple missions in the surface,

functional requirements. In doing so, the Navy is to ensure its bases are clean andsub-surface, air, space and cyber-space domains.

green and have a zero carbon footprint, espousing the Navy’s adopted theme of “Green
Footprint to Blue Water Operations”.

Maritime Cooperation
The Navy will effectively engage friendly maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region‘Man behind the Machine’and beyond, through port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, operational

The Navy will need to attract the best of India’s youth to join its ranks, provide them

exercises and technical support arrangements, in order to establish a cooperative

efficient and effective training, and a living and working environment that fosters

framework that promotes mutual understanding and enhances security and stability inprofessionalism, motivation, loyalty and innovation. Maintaining the right quality

the region.

and numbers of personnel, it needs to instill among all ranks and at all levels,a sense of pride, ownership and commitment, and ensure their personal

Operational Logistics

and professional growth through appropriate empowerment,
decentralisation and delegation.

The Navy is to constantly review and refine its maintenance philosophy,
technical practices and logistics support structures, to ensure that

Naval Community

its combat units and formations receive quality maintenance andlogistics support, while maintaining a high operational tempo.

The Navy is to strive constantly to improve the quality

Through smooth and effective budget-management, it shouldof life and cohesion of its community, and inspire aendeavour to stretch every rupee to the maximum in ensuring thatsense of belonging and community welfare among its personnel.
Concurrent with developing the required competencies amongst its

frontline operations are backed robustly by a responsive and efficient
operational logistics structure.

personnel, it needs to ensure their professional and personal satisfaction,
assist them in finding a post-retirement second career, and maintain life-long bonds

Self-Reliance and Indigenisation
The blueprint for the future Navy is firmly anchored on indigenisationand self-reliance. The Navy is to remain steadfast in striving for self-sufficiency acrossthe ‘Float’, ‘Move’ and ‘Fight’ components of all platforms, and provide highest priority

with them thereafter. The welfare and well-being of the veteran community is to remainof high importance to the Service.

Way Aheadto developing, integrating, inducting and managing high-end future technologies

In order to contribute effectively to the nation’s geo-political aspirations andindigenously, in partnership with the DRDO, DPSUs, other government agencies anddevelopmental goals, the Navy will need to grow and develop rapidly, in an

the growing domestic defence-industrial base.

appropriately balanced manner. Considerable distance has been steamed in thisendeavour over the past decades, yet there remains a large expanse of water to cross.

Infrastructure Development and Environmental Consciousness
The Navy is to constantly upgrade, modernise and transform its operational, training,
administrative and functional infrastructure, to remain abreast of its expanding force

The vision statement and way points aim to guide that transition. Accomplishing thisvision requires all personnel of the Navy, uniformed and otherwise, to “pull together
on their oars”, with eyes focused firmly on a promising future.

Contents
Forewordi

Vision Statement and Guiding Principles

iv

Chapter 1
Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective

2

Chapter 2
Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences

16

Chapter 3
Strategy for Deterrence

46

Chapter 4
Strategy for Conflict

60

Chapter 5
Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment

78

Chapter 6
Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security

104

Chapter 7
Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development

126

Chapter 8
Epilogue

148

Notes

154

Explanatory Notes

162

Abbreviations

174

Acknowledgements

180

Bibliography

181

Index

183

1
Maritime Security
Strategy In
Perspective

Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective 3

2 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

1This strategy has served its role well over the past decade, in providing long term
direction and guidance to the Indian Navy in a dynamic environment. The strategy has
been revised in order to keep it relevant and contemporary, taking into consideration
developments in the geo-strategic environment, and corresponding changes in our
maritime strategic imperatives and influences.

Maritime Security
Strategy in Perspective

Revised Maritime Security and Strategic Perspective
The revised strategy has been titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security
Strategy, in recognition of two key aspects. First, the rise in sources, types and intensityof threats, with some blurring of traditional and non-traditional lines, requires aseamless and holistic approach towards maritime security. Second, in order to provide‘freedom to use the seas’ for India’s national interests, it is necessary to ensure that“...a nation’s social and economic well being is intricately linked to the seas, not only for
trade but also how it faces threats to its own security that develop across the seas...our resolveto achieve high growth can be realised only if our maritime frontiers and assets are safe, stable
and act as enablers. The Indian Navy, as the primary element of India’s maritime power, has thechallenging task of safeguarding the country’s maritime interests.”— Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Hon’ble President of India1
As India moves forward in the 21st century, its development and prosperity
will remain closely linked to the maritime domain. History bears out the roleand contribution of maritime power in the growth and prosperity of great nations.
The effective exercise of maritime power and employment of its primary instruments,
especially the Navy and Coast Guard, requires an overarching strategy for achieving
the maritime strategic goals.
Freedom to use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, published by the Indian Navyin 2007, met this requirement for India’s maritime military power. It emphasised thegrowing importance of the maritime environment, and the centrality of maritime
security for national development. It provided an insight and rationale for the
resurgence of Indian maritime power and postulated a strategy underpinned on“freedom to use the seas for our national purposes, under all circumstances”, witha central role for the Navy. The strategy brought out the various ways in which theIndian Navy could serve as a catalyst for peace, security and stability in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR).

the seas remain secure. The expanded outlook, reflected in the title, also takes into
account the additional mandate of the Indian Navy, which has been entrusted with the
responsibility for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security.2

Ensuring secure seas for national development

Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective 5

Key Determinants for Shaping the Maritime
Security Strategy
The key determinants for shaping the maritime security strategy cover broader maritime
strategic imperatives and more specific maritime security drivers. These are, both,
important influences in shaping the overall strategy, and also govern the determinationof India’s areas of maritime interest.
The maritime strategic imperatives cover India’s relations with the seas that also have asecurity connotation. These include India’s unique maritime geography with a central
location and reach across the IOR, which is also the hub of global trade and commerce.
Another important feature is India’s relations with its maritime neighbours and role inthe maritime neighbourhood, including the fact that these are based on mutual respect
for international law and norms, and desire for cooperative, inclusive development.
The key imperative, which underscores the development of this strategy, is India’s
dependence on the seas for national development, which has increased steadily andsignificantly. The steady shift in global economic and military power towards Asia hascontributed to this imperative.
Employing various naval roles and means in an integrated manner

India’s maritime economic activities have continued to expand across a large range,
including energy security, seaborne trade, shipping and fishing, with substantial
Indian investments and citizens overseas. India has an overwhelming reliance on
the seas for its external trade and for sustaining its energy needs. These include

The strategy employs the various roles and means of the Indian Navy in an integrated

crude and liquefied hydrocarbon imports, export of refined products, offshore

manner, and also guides the development of new means. It further utilises the potential

development, and economic partnerships across the world. India’s trade and energy

for increased maritime cooperation and coordination, across multiple agencies in India

security, development of its deep sea mining areas, and supporting its scientificand with friendly nations. This strategy, while it is centred on the Indian Navy as theresearch stations in Antarctica, are all dependent on its Sea Lines of Communication

prime maritime force of the nation, also provides a broader framework for synergising(SLOCs).

actions in the maritime domain with the other stakeholders.
The revised strategy follows the previous edition and is based on the principles andThis has lent a pivotal role to the security of India’s SLOCs and increased theimportance of the sea routes, international shipping and freedom of navigation to India’s

concepts of national security and maritime power, enunciated in the Joint Doctrine
Indian Armed Forces and the Indian Maritime Doctrine. It builds upon the Indian
Navy’s Vision Statement and Guiding Principles, formulated in 2014, which highlightthe strategic ‘way points’ for the next decade. It reviews the key maritime strategic
imperatives and influences, articulates the national maritime interests, and defines
the related maritime security objectives. It then derives corresponding strategies for
attainment of these objectives.

The key determinants for shaping the maritime security strategy coverbroader maritime strategic imperatives and more specific maritime security
drivers

Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective 7

6 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

interagency coordination. These have duly evolved, and the revised strategy provides

India’s maritime security drivers have also shown increasing complexity
in recent years, covering both traditional and non-traditional threats, with
continuing and increased challenges across the regional maritime security
environment

dedicated focus on:• Combating the persisting nature of threats emanating at and from the sea.
• Strengthening mechanisms for interagency coordination and cooperation.
• Developing a seamless, cohesive maritime security framework.
Other non-traditional threats have also been rising in recent years. Piracy and armed
robbery at sea have flared up in new regions over the past decade, and remain a significant

national interests. The revised strategy has, therefore, accorded increased focus on thefollowing:• The safety and security of seaborne trade and energy routes, especially in the IOR,
considering their effect on global economies and India’s national interests.
• The importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and strengthening theinternational legal regime at sea, particularly the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for all-round benefit.

threat to international shipping and seafarers. The constant challenge of unregulated
activities, and inherent limitations in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) on the seas,hold a possibility of their linking with or enabling other threats. There has also beena higher incidence of natural disasters and regional instabilities over the past decade,necessitating increased deployment of the Indian Navy for Humanitarian Assistanceand Disaster Relief (HADR) operations and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations(NEO). The ways and means to address the range of increased non-traditional threats
require a revised focus and suitable augmentation of capabilities in some areas, alongwith further pursuit of a broader, cooperative approach across the region.

• The considerable scope and value in undertaking cooperation and coordination
between various navies, to counter common threats at sea.
India’s maritime security drivers have also shown increasing complexity in recent years,
covering both traditional and non-traditional threats, with continuing and increased
challenges across the regional maritime security environment. There has been no
reduction in the potential threat from traditional sources, necessitating continued focus
on appropriate military preparedness for all contingencies. However, there is potential
for simultaneous cooperation even amidst competition, which can be promoted throughmaritime efforts and is a focus area in the revised strategy.
In the case of non-traditional threats, in particular, there has been a sharp increase inthreat-levels, necessitating higher focus and attention. Maritime terrorism has expanded
in recent years, and has developed new ways and means. It poses a serious andcontinuing threat, with potential for asymmetric and hybrid warfare, with possibilityof overlapping traditional challenges. The ‘26/11’ terrorist attacks in Mumbai, in 2008,
led to change in mandate of the Indian Navy, which was thereupon entrusted with theadditional responsibility for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore
security. This necessitated some organisational changes and adapting the existing
strategy to address requisite ways and means, especially mechanisms for strengthening

Maintaining presence and preparedness for all contingencies

8 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
A significant development in this regard has been the growing recognition of India’smaritime outlook, capabilities and actions, on the national and international stage. The
increased role and involvement of the Indian Navy in strengthening maritime security
in the IOR have been in strong evidence over the past decade. Some important featuresthat have been further shaped and incorporated in the revised strategy are:• The steady increase in the Indian Navy’s operational footprint across India’s areasof maritime interest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a‘net security provider’ in the maritime neighbourhood, including deployments foranti-piracy, maritime security, NEO and HADR operations.
• An expansion in maritime operational engagements, with increased number andcomplexity of exercises with foreign navies, coordinated mechanisms for maritime
security operations, and enhanced training, technical and hydrographic cooperation
with friendly maritime forces.
• Continued development of regional cooperative approaches for enhancing maritime
security in the IOR, including growth of the operational interactions termed as‘MILAN’, evolution of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and emergenceof maritime security cooperation as a priority area for the Indian Ocean Regional
Association (IORA).
Another important aspect is the growth and development of the Indian Navy’s force
levels and maritime capabilities, with steady focus on indigenisation. While this has
been in pursuance of the earlier strategy and perspective plans, its steady progress

There has been a growing recognition of India’smaritime outlook, capabilities and actions

underscores the ongoing resurgence of India’s maritime power. The revised strategy
has, accordingly, reflected the substantive enhancement in the Indian Navy’s capabilities
for exercising deterrence, projecting maritime power, providing maritime security andsafeguarding India’s maritime interests.
These various determinants and developments have been factored into the articulationof the maritime interests and maritime security objectives, and the revised strategy has
been formulated to address these requirements.

National Maritime Interests
India’s maritime interests that are addressed by the strategy are summarised asfollows:• Protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against threats in the maritime
environment.
• Promote safety and security of Indian citizens, shipping, fishing, trade, energy

The Indian Navy’s operational footprint has spread across India’s areas ofinterest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a ‘net
security provider’ in the maritime neighbourhood

supply, assets and resources in the maritime domain.
• Pursue peace, stability and security in India’s maritime zones, maritime
neighbourhood and other areas of maritime interest.3• Preserve and project other national interests in the maritime dimension.

Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective 11

10 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

India’s Maritime Security - Aim and Objectives
India’s maritime security aim is to safeguard national maritime interests at all times.
India’s maritime security objectives, flowing from the above aim, are:• To deter conflict and coercion against India.
• To conduct maritime military operations in a manner that enables early terminationof conflict on terms favourable to India.
• To shape a favourable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net
security in India’s areas of maritime interest.
• To protect Indian coastal and offshore assets against attacks and threats emanatingfrom or at sea.
• To develop requisite maritime force levels and maintain the capability for meeting
India’s maritime security requirements.

of India’s armed forces. The Indian Navy will contribute to national deterrence at nuclear
and conventional levels, by strengthening the credibility of its military capability,
readiness posture and communication of intent. This strategy shall be progressed
through development of appropriate force structures and capabilities, conduct of threat
assessment and contingency planning, maintenance of strategic situational awarenessand MDA, maintenance of preparedness and presence, and effective strategic
communication. The strategy for deterrence is supported and strengthened by the otherstrategies and will, in turn, reinforce them.
Strategy for Conflict. This strategy describes the broad manner of employment
of India’s maritime forces during conflict. The strategy is based on the principles ofwar, with application of force and focus on strategic effect as additional operational
principles. It employs MDA, networked operations, preparedness, jointness andcoordination, and operational tempo, as the main operational enablers. The strategy iscentered on various operational actions, which include maritime manoeuvre, maritime

Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Ensuring Secure Seas envisages a coordinated and cooperative set of actions, inconsideration of the spectrum of threats and challenges, and the key determinants anddevelopments. In implementing this strategy, the Indian Navy will operate in concert

strike, sea control, sea denial, SLOC interdiction, SLOC protection, coastal and offshore
defence, information warfare, and escalation management. These will be undertaken as
per the operational plan and situation, in coordination with the other armed forces andnational agencies.

with the Indian Coast Guard, other armed forces, and the various Union/ State agencies

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment. This strategy

that have a role and responsibility for distinct elements of maritime security.

describes the ways in which the Indian Navy will contribute to shaping a favourable and

The maritime security strategy is, in effect, a combination of five constituent strategies
for attaining corresponding maritime security objectives. Each strategy employs
a combination of various doctrinal roles of the Navy, viz. military, diplomatic,
constabulary and benign, with their associated objectives, missions and tasks.4 The
various constituents of the strategy describe the range of coordinated and synergised
efforts, to maintain and strengthen India’s maritime security.

positive maritime environment, to enhance net security therein. The strategy covers thewide range of activities undertaken by the Navy in peace time, across all doctrinal roles.
These aim to promote security and stability at sea, and enhance cooperation, mutual
understanding and interoperability with maritime forces of friendly nations. These
include naval deployments for exercising presence in our areas of interest, engagementwith maritime forces of friendly nations in a number of ways and at multiple levels,
maritime capacity building and capability enhancement through cooperation in

Strategy for Deterrence. The strategy for deterrence is the foundational strategy fortraining, technical areas and hydrography, cooperative efforts for development ofIndia’s defence. Prevention of conflict and coercion against India is the primary purpose

regional MDA, and conduct of maritime security operations, both independently andin coordination with other maritime forces in the region.

Ensuring Secure Seas envisages a coordinated and cooperative set ofactions, in consideration of the spectrum of threats and challenges, in a
combination of five constituent strategies

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security. This strategy describes the ways by which
the cooperative framework and coordinative mechanisms for coastal and offshore security
will be strengthened and developed, against threat of sub-conventional armed attack andinfiltration from the sea. It articulates the coastal and offshore security framework, measures

Maritime Security Strategy in Perspective 13

Ensuring Secure Seas has endeavoured to be informative, explanatory anddefinitive, so as to provide clarity on ‘what’ and ‘how’ the Indian Navy will
undertake to ensure India’s maritime security

for development of coastal MDA and coastal community participation, mechanisms for
coordinating interagency presence, patrol and operational response, cooperative capability
development, and focus areas for supporting maritime governance.
Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development. This strategy describes theways to develop and maintain a combat ready, technology driven, network enablednavy, capable of meeting India’s maritime security needs into the future. The capability
development covers conceptual, human resource and force level aspects. The major
thrust areas for force development have been defined, with focus on indigenisation,
MDA, Network Centric Operations (NCO), force projection and protection, maintenanceand logistics, and new technologies.
Ensuring Secure Seas has endeavoured to be informative, explanatory and definitive,
so as to provide clarity on ‘what’ and ‘how’ the Indian Navy will undertake to ensure
India’s maritime security, in concert with the other armed forces and maritime agencies.
While it is aimed at providing insight and guidance primarily to the Indian Navy, italso provides a framework for strengthening jointness and cooperation with the othermaritime stakeholders and security agencies. The strategy would further serve toenhance understanding of maritime security issues and approach towards the sameamongst both, key stakeholders and the general public.
The maritime security strategy has considered a variety of factors, such as the geo-economic
and geo-strategic environment, changes in type and nature of threats and challenges,
availability of own forces, capabilities and resources, assessments of intensity, duration,
type and tempo of possible conflicts, and the overall political direction. The strategy andits constituents cater for all these factors and a dynamic environment, in which India’s
relations with the seas have been steadily growing. As India moves further ahead in the
21st century, its employment of maritime power for safeguarding national interests andIndian Navy - A combat ready, technology driven, network enabled
force, capable of meeting India’s maritime security needs into the future

meeting national aspirations would also increase. Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime
Security Strategy will shape and guide this employment, over the next decade.

2
Maritime Security
Imperatives And
Influences

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 17

16 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

2

Maritime Security
Imperatives and Influences

Maritime Geography“The vital feature which differentiates the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic or the Pacific is the
sub-continent of India, which juts out far into the sea for a thousand miles. It is the geographicalposition of India that changes the character of the Indian Ocean...”— KM Panikkar5
Geography is a vital aspect, which can aid but also complicate maritime security,
depending on the nation’s geographic characteristics and the prevailing geo-strategic
environment. India has a vast coastline extending to more than 7,500 km, with morethan 1,200 islands, and a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of about two million sq.
km.6 The anticipated addition of approximately 1.2 million sq. km of continental shelfwould make India’s total seabed area almost equal to the land mass.7

India’s Maritime Outlook
Although land has been the primary and natural habitat of mankind, and iscentral to political, economic, military and social activities, the oceans havedirectly and indirectly influenced events on land. Over the past two centuries, inparticular, technological and maritime developments have significantly altered therole and influence of the maritime environment. From a medium of transportation
for trade, economy and the projection of power onto land, the oceans have become

The Indian Ocean, through which much of the world’s shipping transits, is distinguishedby a land rim on three sides, with maritime access to the region possible only throughcertain ‘choke points’ leading to and from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, andfrom the southern Indian Ocean. India flanks the first two regions and has a central
position overseeing the third. Its peninsular feature provides a natural reach acrosswide sea spaces in all directions, extended by the islands in the Andaman & Nicobarand Lakshadweep Island groups.

the primary conduits of international trade and are central to the global economy.

India’s central position in the IOR, astride the main International Shipping Lanes (ISLs),

The oceans and seabed are increasingly looked upon today as resource providers andaccords distinct advantages. It places the outer fringes of the IOR and most choke points

critical contributors to national growth and prosperity. Maritime power is an importantalmost equidistant from India, thereby facilitating reach, sustenance and mobility of its

component of national power and is a key enabler for national growth and development.

maritime forces across the region. India is, therefore, well positioned to influence the

These aspects have prompted a steady, global shift of attention from land to the seas

maritime space, and promote and safeguard its national maritime interests, across theand an expanding maritime outlook, including for India.

IOR. At the same time, India’s vast coastline and maritime zones require significant

The maritime outlook of a nation is shaped by the growth of population, industry,

resources and investments to ensure their security.

infrastructure and politico-economic power along the coast, and the ensuingdependence on the seas for national growth and prosperity. It is a central determinant ofa nation’s maritime interests and strategy. The key drivers of India’s maritime outlook
are its unique and advantageous geography, the need for sustained economic growth,a dynamic geo-strategic environment, the need to ensure safety and security of its
SLOCs, and the security of Indian investments and other interests overseas, including
Indian diaspora.

Maritime power is an important component of national power and is a key
enabler for national growth and development. These aspects have prompteda steady, global shift of attention from land to the seas and an increasing
maritime outlook, including for India

Map 2.1: Important Choke Points and ISLs

Suez Canal

Persian
Gulf

Strait of
HormuzIndia

Malacca andSingapore
South
China Sea
Straits

Bab-el-Mandeb

Ombai
and Wetar
Straits
Sunda
StraitLombokStraitMozambique
ChannelCape of Good Hope

North Arabian Sea. Persian Gulf and Gulf ofOman to West Coast of India.

Bay of Bengal. East Coast of India to ArabianSea, Bay of Bengal Eastern Rim, Andaman &Nicobar Islands and Malacca Strait.

Central Arabian Sea. Red Sea/ Gulf of Adenand East Coast of Africa to West Coast ofIndia.

South-East Indian Ocean. India to SouthEast Indian Ocean, including Indonesia andAustralia.

South-West Indian Ocean. Cape of Good
Hope and IOR Island States (Mauritius,
Seychelles and Maldives) to India.

Indo-Pacific. Indian Ocean to Pacific Ocean,through the various Indo-Pacific Straits andSouth/ East China and Philippines Seas.

Table 2.1: Choke Points in IOR

Cape ofGood Hope

Mozambique
ChannelBab-el-Mandeb

Suez Canal

Strait of
HormuzThe Cape of Good Hope is not a conventional choke point, sinceadequate space and depth of water lies to its South and thepassage of ships is not restricted by land. However, economic
considerations and strong currents encourage ships to route
closer to the coast. Ships that cannot pass through the Suez Canalfollow this route. There was substantial increase in traffic in thisarea when the Suez Canal was shut down from 1967 – 1975.

The Mozambique Channel is approximately 1,000 nautical miles (nm)long and 250 nm wide at its narrowest point. The usage of thischannel reduced after the Suez Canal opened in 1869. However,with estimations of Mozambique holding over 100 trillion cubicfeet of recoverable natural gas (one of the largest gas finds in theworld) and huge coal reserves, the channel may regain
prominence as an important sea route and choke point.

Bab-el-Mandeb is a 17 nm wide stretch of water that connects the Gulfof Aden with the Red Sea and, thence, the Suez Canal. Closure of theBab-el-Mandeb, for any reason, would cut-off the Red Sea littoral fromthe Arabian Sea and Asia, and also prevent access to the Suez Canal.
This would necessitate significant increase in shipping and tanker
capacities, via other ISLs and choke points, to maintain the rate of oil
and trade flow.

The 105 nm long Suez Canal is the maritime gateway between
Europe and Asia. Closure of the Suez Canal, for any reason,
would cause traffic to be diverted around the Cape of Good
Hope, thereby increasing the transit time and transportation
costs. To illustrate, the distance between Mumbai to London is
6,200 nm via the Suez Canal, and 10,800 nm via the Cape ofGood Hope.
The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf ofOman and Arabian Sea, has a width of about 30 nm and primarynavigable channel across a six nm wide zone. It has no maritime
detour, rendering it as a critical choke point. About 17 million barrelsof oil pass through this Strait each day, representing 35% of theworld’s oil trade by sea. Any closure of this strait would severely
affect energy security of many nations, including India.

Malacca &Singapore
Straits

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore link the Indian Ocean to theSouth China Sea and Pacific Ocean. Providing the shortest sea
route from the Persian Gulf to East Asia/ West Pacific regions, it isa strategic choke point in the IOR. A dense shipping zone, morethan 70,000 ships transit it each year. The narrowest point
amongst the two straits is the 1.5 nm wide navigable stretch of thePhillip Channel in the Singapore Strait.

An alternative route to the Malacca and Singapore Straits is the
Sunda Strait, which is 50 nm long and 15 nm wide at its North-East
entrance. Large ships do not prefer passage through this strait due
to navigational hazards, depth restrictions and strong currents.
Sunda
StraitAt a minimum channel width of 11.5 nm, the Lombok Strait has
sufficient width and depth, with lesser congestion, and provides analternative passage between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans,
especially for larger ships.
LombokStraitOmbai &
Wetar Straits

The Ombai Strait lies between the islands of Alor and Timor, and
the Wetar Strait lies between the islands of Timor and Wetar. Due
to longer distance, routeing through this area is not normallypreferred as an alternative to the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
The route provides adequate depth for submarines to transit
submerged between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

22 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Maritime Neighbours

Good maritime relations are reflected by interactions like
Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol in the Andaman Sea

India’s relations with most maritime neighbours have been friendly. India sharesmaritime boundaries with seven countries and has settled the boundaries with all, except
Pakistan, in accordance with international laws and norms. Most of the settlements, infact, predate UNCLOS. India has duly promulgated its baselines and submitted its claim
for extension of the continental shelf, in accordance with the UNCLOS, in May 2009.
India has also welcomed the judgement of the Arbitration Tribunal settling the maritime
boundary with Bangladesh in 2014, considering it to be of overall mutual benefit.
Resolution of jurisdiction promotes peace, by reduction in the scope for disputes, andfacilitates maritime governance, investments in maritime economic activities, legitimate
use of the seas, and cooperation for maritime security. Strengthening relations
with maritime neighbours requires mutual respect for the common principles ofinternational law and the tenets of Panchsheel.8 These principles and tenets have been
consistently supported by India, including in the maritime domain.

Table 2.2 - Settlement of India’s Maritime Boundaries
Delimitation of Continental Shelf
Indonesia

17 December 1974 (Extension 15 August 1997)

Thailand15 December 1978

Bilateral Boundary Agreements

Maritime Relations
India’s maritime neighbours are not only those sharing common boundaries of ourmaritime zones – but also nations with whom we share the common maritime space of

Sri Lanka

10 May 1976 (Extension 05 February 1977)

the high seas. Accordingly, India has a vast maritime neighbourhood, which extends

Maldives

08 June 1978

Myanmar

14 September 1987

across the IOR. Maritime relations with the nations in our wider neighbourhood andThailand17 January 1996

Bangladesh

07 July 2014
(judgement date of the
Arbitration Tribunal)

Trilateral Agreements

beyond are an important facet of our broader politico-economic relations, in which theIndian Navy also plays an important role.
This was reflected in the “Look East” policy, wherein the Indian Navy was a key
instrument in India’s diplomatic outreach to countries in East and South-East Asia,
particularly ASEAN members. The “Look East” policy has now been transformed into

Sri Lanka, Maldives

31 July 1976

the “Act East” policy, to expand India’s engagement and relations to its East, acrossIndonesia, Thailand

02 March 1979

Thailand, Myanmar

24 May 1995

the Indo-Pacific, with emphasis on economic and security cooperation. India has also
in the IOR.9 It has further projected the vision of SAGAR – ‘Security And Growth for All

Historic Waters
Sri Lanka

launched Project Mausam in 2014, to renew the cultural links and contact among countries

08 July 1974

in the Region’, in 2015, as part of India’s endeavours to strengthen economic relations
and development in the IOR, in a mutually supportive and cooperative manner.10

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 25

24 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

built up substantial refining capacity and exports refined petroleum products to many

The Indian Navy will remain prepared for contributing to, and continue toplay an important role in, national efforts towards enhancing India’s relations
and engagement with friendly countries, and strengthening the international
legal regime for all-round benefit

other countries by sea. The products of the petroleum industry account for about 15%
of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP).11 Taking into account the total oil imports bysea, offshore oil production and petroleum exports, the country’s cumulative ‘sea
dependence’ for oil is estimated to be about 93%.
India has sovereign rights for exploitation of living and non-living resources in its EEZ,
which essentially comprise the offshore energy sector and fisheries sector at present.
India has been promoting exploration and production of hydrocarbon energy in its

International law and norms provide a proven template for conduct of maritime

EEZ under the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP), which has seen expanded

relations and resolution of maritime issues between nations, which include handlinginvestments in recent years.

divergence and enabling maritime security cooperation. Respect for international law
and promotion of its principles at sea would, therefore, continue to be accorded due
attention by the Indian Navy. However, it is recognised that there have been instanceswhere some states have not respected the established international legal regime or even
their own commitments, and others where non-state actors have been able or enabled

Merchandise trade constitutes 42% of India’s GDP, and can be expected to increase in
the future.12 More than 90% of India’s international trade by volume and over 70% byvalue is carried over the seas.13 The total size of the Indian shipping industry has been
growing over the years, even as the relative share of Indian flagged shipping in theto operate outside state jurisdictions. In such cases, the risks of maritime instability and40with friendly countries, and strengthening the international legal regime at sea, for35

all-round benefit.

30

10

been growing in importance and value for India. Maintenance of a secure maritime

5

4

4

4
2

s
er
th

sia

O

tA

es

W
n

si

th

er

th

er

si

n

Af

ric

a

la
go

n

An
O

h
ut
So

Ira

a

Am

er

ic

E
UA

ria

t

Ni

ge

ai
w

a
el

a
bi
iA
ud

O

using the ISLs across the Indian Ocean. Another 11% of national crude oil requirement

8
6

ra

on the seas. Nearly 80% of the country’s crude oil requirement is imported by sea,

9

0

Sa

India’s energy security has a vital role in national development, and is highly dependent

10

15
10

essential purpose of the maritime security strategy.

1220

offshore energy assets, undersea pipelines and cables, and seabed resources. These haveenvironment, which enables unhindered pursuit of these economic activities, is an

1325% Percentage of Imports

Kudomain, including for ports, coastal infrastructure, shipping, fishing, seaborne trade,

Quantity in MMT

qMaritime economy covers the range of economic activities related to the maritime

Value in USD Bn

zu

Maritime Economy

18

neimportant role in, national efforts towards enhancing India’s relations and engagement

Ira

The Indian Navy will remain prepared for contributing to, and continue to play an

Diagram 2.1: Crude Oil Imports by India, 2014–2015

Ve

insecurity could suddenly rise, and will need to be catered for in our security matrix.

is met from offshore energy sources within the Indian EEZ. Offshore gas fields also
contribute to 80% of India’s domestic natural gas production. In addition, India has

Data Source: Ministry of Commerce/Government of India (GoI), Export Import Data Bank. www.commerce.nic.in/eidb/

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 27

26 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
country’s external trade has declined, from about 40% in the 1980s to approximately

Map 2.2: Major and Non-Major Ports in India

8.5% by 2014. This is largely because the growth of our seaborne trade, post economic
liberalisation, has been relatively higher and faster than the growth of our shipping
industry. While the Indian shipping industry is set to grow, the pace and needsof national development indicate that our dependence on foreign shipping would

Major Ports

continue over the coming years. There is also a significant presence of Indian nationals

Non-Major Ports

in the international seafaring community, operating on both Indian and foreign ships,with approximately 6.6% of the world’s merchant mariners being Indian.14 The overall
safety and security of Indian seaborne trade and seafarers, on both Indian and foreign
ships, require that international shipping and sea routes remain safe, secure and free fornavigation and legitimate uses.

Diagram 2.2: Growth of Indian Shipping

1

41 Gujarat
Daman & Diu
2Maharashtra
2 48
AndhraPradesh
Goa
12
1
1
5

1600
1400
1204

1200
1040

1

1000
846

800

721

600
400
200

Lakshadweep 10
Islands

700

West
Bengal1
1
Odisha13
1

2 Puducherry
11 Karnataka
Tamil
Kerala Nadu
15 3
1
17

Andaman &Nicobar Islands
23

549

325

368
273

485

470

418

383

340

312
256
162

219

251

237

358

236

Source: Basic Port Statistics of India, 2013 – 2014, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Transport
Research Wing/GoI, March 2015

95

58

0
1980

1985

1990

1995

COASTAL VESSELS

2000

2005

2010

OVERSEAS VESSELS

2014

2020

2025

TOTAL

India has 12 major and 200 non-major ports, spread along its East and West coasts, as also
its islands.15 Ports play a vital role in the overall economic development of the country,
as they provide the trade hubs where sea and land trade routes meet and the cargo

As on 01 January 2013, India was ranked 17 in the world in terms of Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT) with a global
share of only one percent.

moves from one medium into the other. These are both the destination and the source

As on 31 December 2014, India had a fleet strength of 1,204 ships with Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of 10.31
million. Of this, 358 ships with 9.09 million GRT were deployed for overseas trade and 846 ships with 1.22 million
GRT for coastal trade.

infrastructure in these ports and cities, and the development of support services thereinthSource: MoS/GoI Annual Report 2014 – 2015 and Ministry of Road Transport and Highways Transport Research
Wing/GoI Indian Shipping Statistics 2014 (data extrapolated to 2025).

of the maritime leg of global supply chains. The cargo handling capacity of the ports, thehave a direct link to the economy. These are presently being developed under India’s
Sagarmala project, which is estimated to boost the nation’s GDP growth by 2%.16

28 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
India is the second largest producer of fish in the world, accounting for 5.68% of theworld’s fish production.17 There are about 2,45,000 fishing vessels in India and the annual
marine fish landings amount to about four million metric tonnes. India’s fisheries sector
contributes about one percent of the national GDP and 4.6% of the agricultural GDP.18
It is estimated that the fishing communities along the coast comprise over 8,60,000
families and number about four million, with livelihood from fishing extending toapproximately 14.5 million people.19

Sea Lines of Communication
The importance of SLOCs to a nation may vary, as per its geography and dependence
on specific routes, both for transportation of essential commodities and for conductof maritime operations. There has been increased movement of trade and goods
by sea in recent decades, along with increased dependence on energy imports forsustaining developmental goals. The higher density of shipping, traversing throughrelatively narrow areas of maritime space, has focused most nations’ dependence on
their SLOCs, including India. Consequently, safety and security of SLOCs has become

Safety, security and freedom of navigation
along ISLs is of high international importancea key national interest. During peace, the SLOCs would generally coincide with the
ISLs. Hence, the safety, security and freedom of navigation along ISLs assume highinternational importance.
In the case of India, there has been increasing dependence on sea routes for import andexport of essential cargo, including crude and refined energy products, trade and othercommodities, and for support to Indian interests overseas. India’s interests and linkages
have also expanded over the years, from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, to the
IOR, thence across the Indo-Pacific Region, and now also into the Atlantic Ocean. The
ISLs to these areas have, accordingly, grown in importance for India, with sea routes
through the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, South-East and South-West Indian Ocean, andthe Indo-Pacific region contributing to India’s SLOCs.

There are several potential threats and challenges to India’s SLOCs from both traditionaland non-traditional sources, which can impact our national interests. The security ofthese SLOCs would require that the main ISLs, through India’s areas of maritime interest,
remain safe, secure and free for movement of shipping, as prescribed by internationallaw. This emphasises the importance of maritime cooperation and universal respect forinternational law, promotion of which would, therefore, be in India’s interests. At thesame time, India will also need to undertake measures for maintaining security andunhindered movement of shipping in its maritime zones and adjacent waters, and acrossits areas of maritime interest. In times of heightened readiness or conflict, for conduct ofmaritime operations, SLOCs would acquire increased importance, both for India and theadversary, necessitating measures for protection and interdiction respectively.

The importance of SLOCs to a nation may vary, as per its geography
and dependence on specific routes, both for transportation of essential
commodities and for conduct of maritime operations

Overseas Maritime Investments
There has been a growth in India’s overseas economic and trade relations. These
are reflected in India’s investments in and from other maritime nations, which are
likely to expand in the coming years. These span various sectors, including energy,
infrastructure, industry, manufacturing and services.

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 31

30 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
India has also invested in overseas scientific research stations. India has two stations

Map 2.3 – Indian Diaspora (NRIs & PIOs)

in Antarctica: Maitri set up in 1989, and Bharati commissioned in 2012. Theseare valuable sources of information and research into the climate and weather
patterns, on which the Indian monsoons and, consequently, a substantial portion of
the nation’s economy depend. India has commissioned its first Arctic research station,
Himadri, in 2008, which also conducts research in various fields with emphasis on

Europe & Russia

North America

climate change.

West Asia

The Indian Ocean is a potential source of various minerals, including rare earth
South-East/East Asia
North/West/Central Africa
IOR Islands
Pacific Islands
South & Central Americas

metals important for Indian industries, which can be obtained from the ocean
floor and sub-soil. India has made significant strides towards harnessing deep sea
resources, with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) according it pioneer status
and current allocation of 75,000 sq. km of the seabed in the Central Indian Ocean Basin

North-East/East/
South Africa(CIOB). Investments in survey, exploration and technology development, to extract

Australia & New Zealandand exploit deep sea resources, are being progressed under India’s polymetallic
nodules programme.20 A case for allocation of further 10,000 sq. km is in progress, for
exploration of polymetallic sulphides.

Overseas Indians

1 Million (Mn) People
1,00,000 People
50,000 People
RegionThe safety and security of Indian citizens in other countries is also an important

NRIs

PIOs

Region

NRIs

PIOs

West Asia

7.26 Mn 17,000

North-East/ East/ South Africa 82,000 1.59 Mn

North America

1.45 Mn 4.01 Mn

North/ West/ Central Africa

61,000spread across 206 nations/ territories. These include nearly 11.5 million Non-Resident

South-East/ East Asia

0.73 Mn 4.62 Mn

Indians (NRIs) who are Indian citizens, and another 17 million Persons of Indian

Europe & Russia

0.72 Mn 2.08 Mn

IOR Islands
South & Central Americas

Origin (PIOs) who have maintained close links with India. Significantly, 94% of theAustralia & New Zealand 0.29 Mn 0.34 Mn

55,000 2.88 Mn
17,000 1.14 Mn
9,000 0.25 Mn

consideration. India has the second-largest diaspora in the world, of nearly 28.5 million
21

Pacific Islands

700

NRIs and 99.7% of the PIOs reside in coastal states, adding to our maritime links andoverseas interests. The large numbers and spread of Indian citizens, many in regionsthat have been afflicted with instabilities, add to our maritime challenges. In recent

Data Source: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (moia.gov.in/index.aspx)

years, the Indian Navy has been deployed for several NEO in crisis-affected areas, bothin precautionary support and for actual evacuation of Indian nationals and those offriendly countries, and for HADR operations.

Areas of Maritime Interest
India’s areas of maritime interest are defined in consideration of the factors describedabove. Based on their relative degree of impact on India’s maritime interests, the areas

As India’s interactions across the world and the effects of globalisation
increase, the areas of interest would correspondingly evolve

have been categorised as primary and secondary areas of interest. As India’s interactions
across the world and the effects of globalisation increase, the areas of interest would
correspondingly evolve.

32 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Primary Areas
India’s primary areas of maritime interest include the following:-

Ensuring security against
the range of maritime threats• India’s coastal areas and maritime zones, including coastline, islands, internal sea
waters, territorial waters, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf.
• The Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, and their littoral regions.
• The Persian Gulf and its littoral, which is the source of majority of our oil supplies
and gas imports, and is home to more than seven million expatriate Indians.
• The Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and their littoral regions.
• South-West Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein and East Coast of
Africa littoral regions.
• The choke points leading to, from and across the Indian Ocean, including the Sixdegree Channel; Eight/ Nine-degree Channels; Straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb,
Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok; the Mozambique Channel, and Cape ofGood Hope and their littoral regions.
• Other areas encompassing our SLOCs, and vital energy and resource interests.

Secondary Areas
India’s secondary areas of maritime interest include the following:• South-East Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral
regions in vicinity.
• South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean, and their littoral regions.

Maritime Threats
Threats and challenges to India’s maritime interests emanate from traditional andnon-traditional sources. The various sources and types of maritime threats must
be catered for in the maritime security strategy. The strategic assessment of probable• Southern Indian Ocean Region, including Antarctica.

and possible sources of threats to India is a continuous process, and is carried out• Mediterranean Sea, West Coast of Africa, and their littoral regions.

by various national agencies and the armed forces. The Indian Navy will continue• Other areas of national interest based on considerations of Indian diaspora, overseas
investments and political relations.

to monitor all developments impacting the maritime domain, which may affectits roles and responsibilities, and incorporate the same into its strategic andoperational plans.

Traditional Threats and Sources
The Indian Navy will continue to monitor all developments impacting
the maritime domain, which may affect its roles and responsibilities, andincorporate the same into its strategic and operational plans

The traditional sources refer to states with organised military capability and resources,
which harbour adversarial posture and inimical intent towards India. Hostile actions
by such states, in terms of scale, scope and intensity of force that may be applied, would
potentially be of a higher order. Traditional sources, therefore, pose a higher level of
threat to India’s national security interests.

Map 2.4: Areas of Maritime Interest and Investments

HimadriNationOil & Gas
Investments

Australia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
BrazilCanadaColombia
East Timor
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Libya
Mozambique
Myanmar
New ZealandNigeria
RussiaSouth Sudan
Sudan
Syria
USA
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen

1
2
2
2
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1

Primary Areasof Interest
Secondary Areasof Interest
Oil (Offshore)
Oil (Onshore)
Gas
Deep Sea Mining
Area
Oil and Gas Investment Data Source: MoPNG/GoI Annual Report 2014 – 2015

Indian Research
Station
Maitri

BharatiMaritime Security Imperatives and Influences 37

The likely sources of traditional threat would be from states with a history of aggression
against India, and those with continuing disputes or maintaining adversarial postures
to India’s national interests. The traditional sources of threat could also extend tonations that have the capability to harm Indian interests and display inimical intent
against India. The possibility of sudden politico-economic and military events leading
to changes in the regional security environment would also need to be considered.
The prevailing geo-strategic environment is characterised by simultaneous competitionand cooperation, resulting in blurring of conventional divisions. Nations with vastlydiffering international views and divergent national interests can be significant trade
partners today, and share many areas of convergence. There can also be issues of wide
divergence, including in security perceptions, with nations that may be traditional
friends. This could emanate from their policies concerning a third country, which may
maintain postures that are inimical to India’s security interests.
There has been a rise in regional tensions and instabilities in some areas of maritime
interest to India, particularly the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden littoral, in recent years.
These have already had a spill-over effect from land to sea, giving rise to non-traditional
threats and maritime security challenges, such as piracy, terrorism, and humanitariancrises necessitating NEO. A number of leading powers maintain military presence in
the IOR to safeguard their interests, through military bases and forward deployed units.
There has been continued militarisation of the region and proliferation of weapons
amongst non-state groups, including private security organisations. These factors havecomplicated the regional maritime security environment. Increased tension in our areasof interest can adversely impact maritime security and prosperity in those areas andadjacent waters, with consequent effect on India’s maritime interests.

Non-Traditional Threats and SourcesCountering traditional maritime security threats will remain the raison d’être of the
Indian Navy, particularly the way in which it is structured, equipped, modernised,trained and deployed. However, in recent years non-traditional security threats havenecessitated the development of a fresh paradigm for maritime security. There has
been a steady rise in non-traditional threats, in occurrence and scale, with the lines
at times getting blurred with traditional challenges. This is especially the case where
non-traditional threats receive cooperation, support and sponsorship from traditional
Countering traditional threats remains the raison d’être of the Indian Navy

entities. Changes in the nature of non-traditional threats and challenges necessitate38 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 39

corresponding changes in strategies, force structures, operating methodology, training,and coordination mechanisms. Some of the main threats are described below.

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism has displayed an increasingly hybrid nature, with acharacteristic of morphing into different, deadlier forms

Terrorism, in particular, has had a major impact on our maritime security. In recent
decades, there been an expansion of this threat from land to sea, and from sea further
onto land, aimed at multiple targets located off or near the coast. The targets may include• From the Sea. Movement of arms, explosives and terrorists by sea, for subsequently

conventional military and soft non-military assets, such as commercial and population

or directly conducting terrorist attacks ashore. India has faced terrorism from

centres, industrial centres, ports, ships, tourist centres, iconic structures, and strategic

the sea in both these ways. In 1993, the seas were used to smuggle explosives forinfrastructure like offshore oil production installations and nuclear power plants. The

subsequently conducting terrorist attacks in Mumbai.22 In 2008, this graduated topossibility of terrorists obtaining lethal weapons, including chemical, biological, nuclear

terrorists emerging from the sea to carry out direct attacks on landing ashore.23

material and associated ‘dirty weapons’, bears continued attention.

• At Sea. Conducting attacks against ships at sea. These used explosives and small

Maritime terrorism has displayed an increasingly hybrid nature, with a characteristic

craft in the early 2000s, which has recently graduated to direct weapons and rocketof morphing into different, deadlier forms. It is enabled by the availability of advanced

attacks against ships from ashore.24 There were also attempted hijackings of naval

technologies, including readily available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment

ships in our neighbourhood in 2014, with the intention of attacking maritime targets

to non-state actors, and niche expertise and active/ passive support provided by someusing their conventional capabilities.25 This represents a new genre of threat, whereinstate sponsors and radicalised agencies. Maritime terrorism has evolved from indirect toradicalised or vulnerable state forces may be commandeered by terrorists to launch

direct actions from and at sea, and remains active in our maritime security environment.

semi-conventional attacks against other nations and populace.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Piracy and armed robbery at sea constitute the oldest forms of maritime security threats.
These target maritime trade and, therefore, the economies of affected nations.26 Thesealso put the lives of people working onboard ships at risk, and threaten freedom to use
the seas for livelihood and economic growth, affecting the maritime interests of a large
number of countries. Hence, combating piracy has been a traditional task of navies,
over hundreds of years – and remains so in the 21st century.
Piracy has seen a rise in recent years in areas of maritime interest to India. This includes
the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin, from where piracy had spread across the
Arabian Sea and to within 500 nm of the Indian mainland by 2011. Robust action by
the Indian Navy and Coast Guard pushed piracy away from India’s maritime zones.
The Indian Navy has also maintained a ship on patrol in the Gulf of Aden continuously
since October 2008, safely escorting more than 3,000 merchant ships and nearly 25,000
Indian seafarers, besides other nationalities. Cooperative efforts of international navies,
Patrolling off the coast against seaborne ingress

adoption of ‘Best Management Practices’ (BMP) by transiting merchant vessels, andMaritime Security Imperatives and Influences 41

40 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

smuggling, not only in relation to India’s close maritime neighbours, but also across the

A large part of the maritime domain comprises the high seas, which areoutside the jurisdiction of any single state or authority. There is also reduced
scope for the monitoring and regulation of activities at sea, especially farther
away from the shoreseas and extended maritime neighbourhood. This places a constant demand on various
maritime agencies and their resources. The threat of nuclear material being smuggled
in/ from our maritime neighbourhood also needs to be a constant consideration,requiring monitoring of the maritime spaces.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU). IUU disregards establishedinternational and national laws on conservation and management of living marine
resources. It is a global issue, which can be a threat to ocean ecosystems and sustainablestabilising actions ashore in Somalia, have all resulted in a steady reduction of Somali

fishing. IUU carries the risk of seriously damaging or even destroying living resources,

piracy threat since 2012. However, till the root causes ashore are addressed, the danger

marine environment and bio-diversity, to the detriment of the marine ecosystem andof resurgence will remain, with potential for instability in the littoral.

future livelihood of the coastal populace. This could lead to shortages and tensions, andArmed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea and off the West coast of Africa has also increased
in recent years, while there has been periodic resurgence of piracy and armed robberyin the Malacca Strait. These challenges are being addressed by cooperative mechanisms
amongst the regional maritime forces and law enforcement agencies.

Unregulated Activities at Sea

to further activities that increase insecurity. The advent of piracy off Somalia has been
linked to the fall in fish stocks and, hence, sustenance of traditional fishermen, due tosubstantial IUU by mechanised foreign vessels.27 IUU also affects India as it impacts
food and related economic security, as well as the livelihood of the Indian fishingcommunity.28 In the Palk Bay, tensions between fishermen of India and Sri Lanka
have, in large part, been due to differently perceived fishing rights and employment ofdifferent fishing methods. Transgression by fishermen between neighbouring maritime

A large part of the maritime domain comprises the high seas, which are outsidezones, like between India and Pakistan, also renders the fishermen liable to the otherthe jurisdiction of any single state or authority. There is also reduced scope for thestate’s jurisdiction and actions by its maritime and law enforcement agencies, whichmonitoring and regulation of activities at sea, especially farther away from the shore.

can aggravate sensitivities and heighten insecurities. Poaching in the Andaman &This may also be experienced within the EEZ, especially for nations with a large EEZ

Nicobar Islands and the Andaman Sea has been a matter of concern for India and otherand relatively smaller maritime forces. Unregulated activities at sea are, therefore,

littoral states.

a historical and continuing fact, which cover both legitimate and inimical activities.
There is inherent risk, however, that unregulated activities at sea, especially by nonstate actors, could turn against good order at sea and the security interests of others,
including maritime communities and nations. Due to connectivity of the seas, these
activities can also transgress into another nation’s maritime zones and, thence, ashore,
to threaten the security and economy of the coastal state.

Proliferation of Private Armed Security. There is increasing privatisation of armed
security, with related concerns on the scope for increased violence and threats frominimical elements using this mechanism to act against state interests. Piracy off the coastof Somalia has resulted in the proliferation of private armed guards for protection ofmerchant vessels transiting the piracy High Risk Area (HRA). This has led to large
numbers of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) being employed

Trafficking/ Smuggling. The use of unregulated movements at sea for seaborneby Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), often operating from ‘floating

trafficking in narcotics and arms remains a constant threat to India, with the ‘Golden

armouries’ in the Arabian Sea. While the deployment of private armed security

Crescent’ to its West and ‘Golden Triangle’ to its East. The modus operandi of trafficking/onboard ships has been of value in countering piracy, their functioning can also lead tosmuggling by sea is transshipment of consignments on the high seas into local craft,

insecurity and threats especially in case of non-availability of international regulations

which then mingle with dense fishing activity offshore and can land at any of theor non-adherence to governing standards.29 In particular, the possibility of terrorists

myriad landing points ashore. The sea route has been in use for human trafficking/embarking merchant ships under the guise of PCASP and, thereby, reaching within

Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences 43

42 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Table 2.3: Concerns Regarding Deployment of
Armed Security Guards on Merchant Ships

get exacerbated with climate change, place increased demands on capability for HADR,
Search and Rescue (SAR), and aid to civil authorities, all under the benign roles of the
Indian Navy and Coast Guard. At the same time, in keeping with domestic laws andinternational trends, the need for imbibing ‘clean and green’ marine technologies inPossible infiltration of non-state actors
Possibility of escalation of violence at sea
Liabilities for injuries/ deaths of innocent
fishermen and seafarers
Issue of right of innocent passage(as per UNCLOS) by merchant ships witharmed security personnel embarked

naval projects and infrastructure, will need to be addressed.

Critical Common Requirements for Maritime Security
In formulating the overall maritime security strategy and its constituents, there arecertain aspects that would overlap and others that would remain common, as theseare essential to the viability and success of each strategy, in an interlinked manner.

Facilitation by Coastal States forembarking/ disembarking foreign
security guards from hitherto unarmed
merchant ships

These are discussed in subsequent chapters with respect to their specific role, impact

Infringement of over-riding authority of
the Master, mandated under International
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)• Force Structures and Capabilities.

and relation to respective strategies:• Maritime Domain Awareness.
• Preparedness and Presence.
• Networked Operations.
• Jointness and Coordination.

Source: MoS/GoI F.No. SE – 13020/6/2009-MG(pt.) dated 29 August 2011

• Strategic Communication.

striking distance of a coastal city or offshore assets, has to be guarded against. India’s
Ministry of Shipping and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have issued
guidelines on the employment of PCASP, which also bring out many related concerns.

Climate Change and Natural Disasters
Climate change has manifested in alterations of seasonal temperatures and weather
patterns the world over, with increased incidence of natural disasters. Changing
precipitation and melting snow are altering hydrological systems, causing changes
in the life pattern of terrestrial, fresh water and marine species.30 Climate change has,thus, started impacting human and maritime security, with potentially major effects
in the future. These include impact on oceanic living resources due to changes in
the levels of salinity and acidity, possible inundation of low-lying coastal areas, andthe loss of national territory, which force migration. While the magnitude of change
and consequences may remain largely speculative, their impact may be suddenly
experienced, across dispersed areas. The current trends of natural disasters, which may

Securing the maritime frontiers in all dimensions

3
Strategy for
Deterrence

46 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Strategy for Deterrence

Role

Objectives

3

Table 3.1: Strategy for Deterrence – Employed, Supporting
and Supported Roles, Objectives, Missions and Tasks
Military

Diplomatic

Constabulary

Deterrence against Conflict andCoercion

Strengthen Political Relations andGoodwill

Coastal and Offshore
Security

Defence of India’s Territorial
Integrity, Citizens and Offshore
Assets from Seaborne Threats

Strengthen Defence Relations with
Friendly States

Security of EEZ

Influence Affairs on Land

Good Order at Sea

Portray Credible Defence Posture
and Capability

Safeguard India’s National
Interests and Maritime Security

Strengthen Maritime Security in IOR

Nuclear Second Strike

Constructive Maritime Engagement

Counter Terrorism

MDA

Maritime Assistance and Support

Sea Control

Presence

Counter Armed
Threats from NonState Actors

Surveillance

Overseas Deployment

Counter Infiltration

PatrolFlag Showing/ Port Visits

PatrolAnti-Submarine Ops

Hosting Foreign Warships’ Visits

Anti-Trafficking

Anti-Surface Ops

Technical and Logistics Support

Anti-Air Ops

Foreign Training

Information Ops

Bilateral/ Multilateral Exercises

for conflict to occur, with assurance of denying victory to and imposing punishment

Electronic Warfare

Coordinated Patrol

upon the adversary. Deterrence is provided at both nuclear and conventional levels,

Protection of Offshore Assets

including in the maritime domain. The Indian Navy will contribute to national

Mine Warfare

Activities under the IONS
Programme

Maritime Security Objective
To deter conflict and coercion against India

defence and the tenets of Panchsheel. The primary objective of the maritime
security strategy is, accordingly, to deter conflict and coercion against India. Thisrequires that any potential adversary must be inhibited from initiating conflict orMissions

India’s broader national security policy has been based on the principle of self-

Sea Denial
Power Projection
Expeditionary Ops

attempting coercion against India. A strategy of deterrence will be employed to achieve

SLOC Protection

this purpose, which will also employ, support and be supported by various roles andSpecial Forces Ops

associated objectives, missions and tasks of the Indian Navy. India’s security strategies

Seaward Defence

rely on both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.

Coastal and Offshore Defence

India’s Deterrence Strategy
The strategy for deterrence will form part of the overall national deterrence strategy,
diplomatic, informational, military and economic), and be appropriately conveyed
through strategic communication. The success of deterrence will rest on its credibility
to the potential adversary. Towards this, India will, in fact, have to be fully prepared

deterrence strategy by its capability, posture and actions under its overall maritime
security strategy.

Tasks

towards a composite effort that would synergise all elements of national power (political,

Promote Regional and Global
Security

Harbour Defence

48 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence merits consideration as a separate level of deterrence, due to the natureof the weapon and its potential for mass destruction. As per India’s nuclear doctrine,
the fundamental purpose of India’s nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat ofuse of nuclear weapons against India.31 Hence, its nuclear weapons will only be used inretaliation against a nuclear attack.32 Accordingly, India is committed to both, a No First
Use (NFU) policy for nuclear weapons, and to their non-use against non-nuclear weapon
states.33 Nuclear deterrence by India is, therefore, directed against only nuclear coercionand conflict. It is, accordingly, distinct from conventional deterrence and conflict.
India’s nuclear deterrence is based on the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent,with assurance of massive nuclear retaliation designed to inflict unacceptable damage,in response to a nuclear strike against India. The credibility of our nuclear deterrence
and “retaliation only” policy rests upon the survivability of our nuclear forces andassurance of punitive response. This requires the maintenance of adequate, dispersed
nuclear forces that have very high survivability against surprise attacks, and the ability
to thereupon undertake punitive retaliatory action.
The three principles central to India’s nuclear deterrence, viz. credibility, effectivenessand survivability, are imbibed in the sea-based segment of the nuclear triad, primarily
the nuclear powered submarine carrying ballistic missiles (SSBN).34 An SSBN, due
to stealth characteristics enabling discrete and prolonged deployment, and combat
capabilities including weapon outfit, provides a credible, effective and survivablecapability, and contributes to assurance of punitive retaliation in accordance with our
nuclear doctrine. SSBN deployments also counter an adversary’s strategy of seeking
advantage from nuclear posturing or escalation. The efficacy of SSBN deployments
is predicated on the maintenance of robust command and control systems, effective
MDA, sound planning and proper training, with due regard to safety and security.
India is developing sea-based nuclear deterrence, in accordance with its nuclear doctrine.
The Indian Navy will operate the SSBN to reinforce nuclear deterrence, supported bycorresponding operational capabilities and procedures for optimal deployment, in
keeping with national policy.

Nuclear deterrence by India is directed against only nuclear coercion andconflict. It is, accordingly, distinct from conventional deterrence and conflict

India’s nuclear deterrence is based on themaintenance of a credible minimum deterrent

50 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Conventional Deterrence
The core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, will remain centeredon conventional deterrence and conventional military forces.35 Conventional deterrence
requires the maintenance of suitable combat power for exercising both methodsof deterrence, viz. by denial and by punishment.36 It will be necessary, therefore, tomaintain highly effective conventional military capabilities for achieving conventional
deterrence, and also for raising the nuclear threshold in support of the nuclear
doctrine.37 India’s maritime forces, through the ambit of maritime deterrence, must beable to counter a potential adversary’s strategy by convincing the adversary that thedesired gains will be denied, whilst retaliation would impose adequate punishment
to make the cost of aggression unacceptably high. The success of maritime deterrence
will rely substantially on the effectiveness of the other maritime security strategies, so
as to provide a net credible posture. The main components of the maritime strategy for
deterrence, which also find resonance in the other components of the maritime security
strategy, include:• Force Structure and Capabilities.

Naval combat power strengthens national deterrence• Threat Assessment and Contingency Planning.
• Strategic Situational Awareness and Maritime Domain Awareness.
• Preparedness and Presence.
• Strategic Communication.

Force Structure and Capabilities

The quantum and type of force required to ensure credible deterrence will also dependon the adversary’s capabilities and strategy, the specific nature of threat, and the interests
affected. The force structure and capabilities must cater to the full range of threats posedby potential adversaries, based on their history, capabilities and posture, including

The threats and challenges to India’s maritime security range across the entire spectrum

sources of support. At the same time, the force development plans must account for theof conflict. The higher levels of threat would tend to be traditional threats, due to theirfact that new threats may emerge faster than the new capabilities being developed.

higher scales of violence, intensity of operations and geographical spread. The more
likely would, however, remain non-traditional threats that are lower on the spectrum.
At the core of the overall force structure must be the ability to deter and effectively
prosecute high intensity conflict, even as the force levels and structures remain adequate
to address the wider range of lower level threats.

An iterative and broader capability-driven approach, which also incorporates likely
current and future threats, will be maintained to enhance deterrence and safeguard
India’s maritime interests. The Indian Navy will continue to maintain and develop
adequately-sized force levels that are balanced, flexible, versatile, threat-based andcapability-driven, with supporting organisational structures, prepared to undertakeand sustain maritime operations across the entire spectrum. Since maritime force
levels and structures are developed and deployed over a period of several decades,

The core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, willremain centered on conventional deterrence and conventional military forces

the Indian Navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) will continue to berefined, as per emergent threats and challenges. Capability gaps will be addressed bydeveloping a timely, efficient and effective process, in coordination with other agencies.

The Indian Navy will maintain threat-based, capability-driven,balanced forces for the entire spectrum of maritime operations

Strategy for Deterrence 55

54 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

specialists, area/ country specialists; development of technical means, including for

Constant monitoring and assessment of the maritime environment, including
threat scenario, potential adversaries’ strategies and situations, will remain
essential along with development of suitable strategies

gathering of data across all dimensions – air, surface, underwater, space and cyber;creation of data banks and networks; automated filtering, correlation and dissemination;
as also arrangements for sharing of relevant information amongst friendly foreign
agencies.
The term Maritime Domain Awareness qualifies a traditional maritime need for situational

Suitable cooperation and synergising of capability development amongst various

awareness at sea, and is used in the modern sense as an all-encompassing concept.

maritime security agencies will be supported, especially for the lower intensity, non-

It involves being cognisant of the position and intentions of all actors, whether own,

traditional threats, so as to ensure optimisation of resources and maximisation of

hostile or neutral, and in all dimensions - on, over and under the seas. MDA in theoperational capabilities.

areas of maritime interest will be developed by the Indian Navy based on both, integral
efforts and inputs from other agencies.

Threat Assessment and Contingency Planning

The Indian Navy is, accordingly, enhancing coordination between all maritime

Constant monitoring and assessment of the maritime environment, including threat

stakeholders, including the Indian Coast Guard, Indian Air Force, Central andscenario, potential adversaries’ strategies and situations as they develop, will remain

State maritime agencies, and national intelligence agencies. Efforts will be directed

essential along with development of suitable strategies and operational plans to counteremerging threats. This is of as much value to deterrence as it is to conflict.
The Indian Navy will continue to monitor the maritime and threat environment, incoordination with other agencies. Contingency plans for changes in the strategic situation,
including stages and pace of change, from stable deterrence to unstable deterrence,38
and proxy/ covert conflict to open conflict by the adversary, will be kept updated. Thismechanism would enhance the deterrence value of our strategy, as also the response
capability. Further, it will enable application of suitable levers, including military andnon-military, to contain and push emergent situations back towards stable deterrence.
In maritime terms, the main lever used will be maritime posture, which will include force
deployment, readiness levels, security states, exercise patterns, shipping instructions, andstrategic communication. Plans for escalation will be incorporated, with a view to manage
and control possible escalation by the adversary. This would also convey to the adversary
the likely failure of his plans, with assurance of high costs, so as to strengthen deterrence.

Strategic Situational Awareness andMaritime Domain Awareness
Strategic situational awareness will require gathering and correlation of information
obtained at all levels, and its analysis, to develop the strategic picture. Organisationally,
this will require sustained investment in human resources, including analysts, language

Monitoring the maritime domain in all dimensions

Strategy for Deterrence 57

Appropriate maritime posture will be maintained
to counter threats and enhance deterrence

Preparedness for undertaking the range of missions and tasks will be enhanced throughthe combination of force capabilities, materiel readiness, training, leadership, MDA,
jointness, networking and logistics.
Presence will be exercised by the forward deployment of naval forces with requisite
capabilities, reach and sustenance through various methods. These include surveillanceand patrol missions, maritime exercises and operations, port visits, and interactions
with friendly maritime forces.

Strategic Communication
Strategic communication is an essential component in any modern strategy, and is ofparticular relevance to the Indian maritime security strategy and its constituents.39 The
Indian Navy will pursue strategic communication through the systematic projection ofactivities, in a linked, coherent and mutually supportive manner, to inform, engage andshape the perceptions of various stakeholders and audiences, for strategic purpose. This
will aim to enhance understanding, focus efforts and improve coordination amongst
our forces and agencies, whilst providing reassurance in the public domain. It will alsoendeavour to undermine the confidence of potential adversaries in pursuing aggressive
posture against India and, thereby, strengthen deterrence.
Appropriate ways and means of communication will be exercised to convince thepotential adversary of our capability and readiness to both, prevent any “adventurism”
from succeeding and to impose a heavy cost for attempting aggression. This will
be done by a combination of ‘words’ and ‘actions’. ‘Words’ will include relevant
towards building the support infrastructure, including hardware, interfaces, trained

statements of policy, practices and posture, while ‘actions’ will be conveyed throughmanpower and software systems, and evaluating various actions of the potential

presence, demonstration of force capability, deployment patterns, force development

adversary, especially monitoring of likely movement along possible strategic paths andand training.

determining key indicators of such movement. This will assist in developing a maritimeand strategic picture of the adversary, and facilitate improved strategic situationalawareness and assessment.

Preparedness and Presence
The translation of the Indian Navy’s combat potential into combat power will be enabledthrough preparedness and presence. The Indian Navy will maintain appropriate
preparedness and presence in its areas of maritime interest, as per the threat assessment,with a forward deployed and ready naval posture to deter potential threats.

The translation of the Indian Navy’s combat potential into combat power
will be enabled through preparedness and presence. The Indian Navy will
maintain appropriate preparedness and presence in its areas of maritime
interest, as per the threat assessment, with a forward deployed and readynaval posture to deter potential threats

4Strategy for
Conflict

60 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Military

Diplomatic

ConstabularyStrengthen Political Relations andGoodwill

Coastal and Offshore
Security

Objectives

Decisive Military Victory in Caseof WarDefence of India’s Territorial
Integrity, Citizens and Offshore
Assets from Seaborne Threats
Influence Affairs on Land
Safeguard India’s Mercantile
Marine and Maritime Trade
Safeguard India’s National
Interests and Maritime Security
Nuclear Second Strike
MDA
Sea Control
Sea Denial
BlockadePower Projection
Force Protection
Expeditionary Ops
Compellance
Destruction
SLOC Interdiction
SLOC Protection
Special Forces Ops
Seaward Defence
Coastal and Offshore Defence

Constructive Maritime Engagement

Counter Terrorism

Presence

Counter Armed
Threats from NonState Actors

Missions

Strategy for Conflict

Role

Surveillance
PatrolMaritime Strike
Anti-Submarine Ops
Anti-Surface Ops
Anti-Air Ops
Amphibious Ops
Information Ops
Electronic Warfare
Protection of Offshore Assets
NCAGS & NCS Ops
Mine Warfare
VBSS
Harbour Defence

Technical and Logistics Support

Counter Infiltration

Foreign Training

PatrolCoordinated Patrol

Anti-Trafficking

Tasks

4

Table 4.1: Strategy for Conflict – Employed, Supporting
and Supported Roles, Objectives, Missions and Tasks

Maritime Security Objective
To conduct maritime military operations in a manner that enables
early termination of conflict on terms favourable to India

India’s desire for friendly mutual co-existence or promoting conditions of peaceand security may not be shared by another state or armed groups. In such a case,there would remain the possibility that conflict is forced upon India. Necessary actions
to prosecute conflict would be undertaken by the armed forces, in concert with othersecurity agencies. These would aim to counter and neutralise the threats posed by theaggressor state and armed groups, in accordance with the inherent right of self-defence
and the political objectives of the conflict.40
The military strategy for conflict is determined jointly by the three armed forces, incoordination with other agencies concerned, and synergised at the national level.
Operational readiness (contingency) planning is undertaken in this regard at joint andmaritime levels. The Indian Navy will prosecute conflict in the maritime domain, in
keeping with the broad tenets described in this strategy and directions provided by
the Government, even as specific actions and methods may vary as per the operationalsituation. The strategy for conflict also supports and strengthens the primary strategy
of deterrence against conflict and coercion.
The maritime strategy for conflict employs the inherently military character of power
projection of the Navy, in coordination and synergy with the other armed forces,
Indian Coast Guard and other maritime agencies, to conduct military operations so

Strengthen Defence Relations with
Friendly States
Portray Credible Defence Posture
and Capability

Strategy for Conflict 63

as to attain the desired political ends and bring the conflict to an early and favourable
conclusion. This strategy will also employ, support and be supported by various roles
and associated objectives, missions and tasks of the Indian Navy.
The Indian Navy’s strategy for conflict is, for the most part, in the classified domain.
However, the broad contours of this strategy can be seen in relation to three componentsthat flow from the doctrinal concepts of maritime power and operational art, viz.
operational principles, enablers and actions.41

Operational Principles
Operational principles comprise the various principles of war, described in the Indian
Maritime Doctrine.42 Two additional principles that are central to the strategy for conflictare the application of force and strategic effect.
Application of Force. The use of properly directed force is central to the prosecutionof conflict, as experienced since the earliest days of Indian history.43 The maritime
strategy for conflict envisages the application of adequate armed force, in an effective
and efficient manner against the adversary, so as to optimally attain the military and,
thereby, political objectives.44 The application of maritime force shall be in accordancewith the prescribed Rules of Engagement (RoE) and the Laws of Armed Conflict,particularly the principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction.45 These would
duly consider the distinct legal regime related to maritime warfare, and the prevailingcircumstances and conditions.46
Strategic Effect. The focus of the strategy for conflict will remain on the desired ends,
and all actions will be coordinated to deliver the required effects.47 The strategic effectof maritime operations will finally be measured upon land. Hence, the impact ofmaritime operations will be focused on the adversary’s political, military, economic,
informational and psychological paradigms ashore, so as to influence the strategic
course and result of conflict. Maritime operations will be conducted at and from thesea. These will comprise defensive ‘shields’ and offensive ‘strikes’, to deliver effectthrough both, direct and indirect operations. The strategy will cater to factors of scale,tempo, intensity and duration of conflict, including possible limitations in some or allof these aspects in a future conflict. The strategy will aim to attain the desired effects
within such limited conflict, whilst being prepared to face and exploit escalation.
Application of Force forStrategic Effect

64 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
The strategic effects sought would include the following:-

MDA and networked operations – Across and over the seas

• Repulsion of aggression.
• Management of escalation.
• Degradation of the threats emanating from conflict.
• Imposition of punitive costs.
• Psychological dominance.
• Creation of military conditions for an early and favourable conclusion of conflict.
• Protection of national maritime interests.

Operational Enablers
The strategy for conflict covers many activities that are omnipresent in peace time andgain further momentum during conflict. These activities enable the conduct of operations
and prosecution of conflict, and are termed as operational enablers.48 The strategy
for conflict will employ several operational enablers, including MDA, networked
operations, preparedness, jointness and coordination, and operational tempo.
Maritime Domain Awareness for Conflict. The development of MDA will be a key
component of the strategy for conflict, with inputs collated from various sources, both
maritime and national. Developing comprehensive MDA is a continuous process and will

During conflict, MDA will also need to be maintained on the presence or absence ofalso involve actions during peace time, to aid planning, deployment and employment

neutrals. This is a unique requirement for maritime warfare, governed by internationalof maritime forces for conflict. These will include gathering of intelligence, conduct oflaw, since a maritime conflict zone is neither static nor limited by geographicalsurveillance and reconnaissance in all dimensions (space, air, surface, underwater andconstraints, except the territorial waters of a neutral nation. Hence, global seaborne

electronic), and analytical review of the same, so as to derive actionable information. In a similar

trade and commerce are likely to continue, which will need to be catered for as it wouldvein, actions by potential adversaries to develop MDA in our areas of interest, including

affect identification and targeting. While international shipping may avoid a known

during peace time, will be monitored and analysed, and will feed into our broader strategic

conflict area, it would need to use many of the choke points and areas where SLOCs

situational awareness and operational planning matrices. MDA will be developed using all

and ISLs converge. This challenge to MDA development will be addressed by various

sources, including aircraft, both manned and unmanned, ships, submarines, Special Forces

measures that include information sharing, navigational warnings, technical means(SF), ground and space-based assets, information and cyber systems. MDA will shapeand tactical procedures.

and support our actions during conflict, enable disruption of the adversary’s InformationDecision-Action (IDA) cycle, and contribute to generation of battle-space dominance.

Networked Operations. Networking is an essential requirement for effective MDA,
and for attaining synergy in operations. The wide range of operational activities, spread
across all dimensions and vast areas, will be controlled and coordinated through secure

The strategy for conflict will employ several operational enablers, including
MDA, networked operations, preparedness, jointness and coordination, andoperational tempo

and efficient networking of our maritime forces. The means of communication andexchange of operational information would be extended across the Navy, Air Force,
Coast Guard, and also Army and other agencies as relevant to the operations. This
will employ space-based capabilities, with application and integration of satellites for66 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
communication and networking. Multiple networks have, accordingly, been developed
over terrestrial, wireless and space-based media, and will be progressively upgraded.
These provide connectivity across the maritime theatre and strengthen the IDA cyclewith rapid, real-time/ near real-time, information correlation and dissemination.
Preparedness for Conflict. The Indian Navy will maintain appropriate preparedness
levels for conflict, in consideration of all factors. These include the tempo and intensityof modern warfare, prevailing security environment, and the possibility of an adversary
launching surprise attacks against India, wherein the ability to respond quickly to sudden
events could prove critical. Preparedness will be supported by improved intelligence,along with efforts to enhance our awareness of a likely adversary’s intent throughconstant monitoring and analysis. In addition to maintaining strategic situationalawareness and MDA to guard against surprise, the Indian Navy will strengthen its
operational capability to rapidly overcome any surprise and provide suitable response
to sudden attacks. This would offset the possible initial advantage that may accrue toan adversary from choosing the time, place and method of attack. The following would

Joint operations – Across expanding dimensions

be amongst the measures undertaken:• Contingency planning, catering for possible eventualities.
• Human resource development, including adequate and realistic training, for the full
spectrum of maritime operations.
• Higher operational availability and readiness of combat forces.
• Suitable weapons and arming policies.
• Sufficient stock of munitions and combat spares for sustaining the envisaged tempo,
scale, intensity and duration of conflict.
• Quick and dispersed Operational Turn Round (OTR) capability.
• Improved operational logistics and replenishment capability at sea.
• Maintain presence in areas of interest, to develop MDA, obtain familiarity with theoperational environment, and enable quick response to any crisis.
• Augment means and improve preparedness through the strategy for force andcapability development.

Jointness and Coordination. The principles of jointness and interagency coordination
are central to maritime operations, and shall be optimally employed. These will cater tothe multiple dimensions of maritime operations, with a variety of platforms operating
on sea, air and land, across dispersed areas, and the involvement of numerous agencies.
The awareness of actions by other agencies, methodologies of coordination and working
together, and provision of mutual support will be incorporated into the operational
plans.
The Indian Army, Navy and Air Force will jointly determine the operational plansfor defending the nation and prosecuting the conflict. The maritime operations plans
will be synergised with the joint plan. The Indian Coast Guard, which will function
under operational control of the Indian Navy during conflict, will undertake maritime
security tasking along with suitable naval forces, as per the operational requirements
and plan. The Coast Guard will also coordinate aspects of coastal security with the

The principles of jointness and interagency coordination are central tomaritime operations, and would be optimally employedvarious state and civil agencies, as part of the overall plan for coastal defence. The
high degree of jointness and coordination required during conflict will be enabled byappropriate networking, joint operational planning, joint training and exercises, andcommon Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Strategy for Conflict 69

will employ the operational principles and exploit the operational enablers, to executespecific offensive and defensive missions as per the joint and maritime operations plans.
Operational actions constitute the main component of the strategy for conflict and will
include projection of force, coastal defence, sea control, sea denial, SLOC protection,
information warfare, and escalation management. The various operational actions areinterlinked in many ways, and would mutually support and reinforce each other.

Force Projection
The Indian Navy will project combat force in and from the maritime domain, andundertake offensive action for national defence. Some of the key elements of force
projection, which will be employed to develop battle-space dominance as per theoperational plans, include maritime manoeuvre, maritime strike, SLOC interdiction,
and amphibious operations.51
Projecting combat force for national defence

Maritime Manoeuvre. Maritime manoeuvre aims to shock and disrupt the IDA cycleof the adversary. The strategy for conflict will employ maritime manoeuvre in allits dimensions in a coordinated manner so as to achieve the desired objectives. The
utilisation of manoeuvre will enable concentration of force at the required place andOperational Tempo. Conduct of rapid, synergised operations, with high operational
tempo is an important feature of warfighting. A high tempo of operations will increase
the speed of the IDA cycle, even as it would aid in challenging and disrupting theadversary’s IDA cycle, so as to generate a favourable asymmetry.49 The ability to quickly
attain and maintain a high operational tempo will facilitate control over the conflict intime, space or scale, and enable management of escalation on our terms, as required for
attaining the desired objectives.
In order to maintain and sustain a high operational tempo, the corresponding
requirements will be accorded priority and thrust. Emphasis on handling higher
pace and complexity of the range of operational activities will be maintained throughcomprehensive planning, preparation, training, and strengthening of systems andstructures in the IDA cycle.

time, to counter surprise, gain the initiative, and obtain decisive results.
Maritime Strike. The Indian Navy will employ maritime strike to project accurate
combat force onto a maritime or strategic target, at sea or ashore, with the purpose ofdestroying or damaging it. It will cover the range of combat strikes at sea, viz. antisurface, anti-submarine and anti-air, with weapons launched from aerial, seaborne,
underwater and shore platforms. In addition, maritime anti-surface strike will be
undertaken by Air Force maritime strike aircraft and by Naval Coastal Missile Batteries,
in coordination with the naval forces at sea.
SLOC Interdiction. Interdiction of the adversary’s SLOCs will be aimed at applying
strategic leverage, including psychological pressure, against the adversary by disrupting
his freedom to use the seas for military purposes. This would also hinder his efforts
for movement of commodities required by his national strategy. The Indian Navy will

Operational Actions
Operational actions are the key activities that characterise the way in which theIndian Navy will prosecute conflict. These will be aimed at maintaining, enhancing
and exploiting freedom of action, to attain the desired objectives.50 Operational actions

The Indian Navy will project combat force in, and from, the maritime domain
and undertake offensive action for national defence

70 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
target the adversary’s use of sea routes for executing his operational plan and sustaining
war efforts. SLOC interdiction would be carried out in various areas: off the Sea Ports of
Embarkation/ Disembarkation (SPOE/SPOD), choke points through which the SLOCs
may pass, and in the open oceans. The Indian Navy’s SLOC interdiction plans will take
into account the following factors:• Maritime geography and dependence of an adversary on specific sea routes for his
conduct of maritime operations and trade.
• Extent of dependence of the adversary on seaborne trade and strategic commodities
imported by sea.
• The adversary’s vulnerabilities in case of denial of strategic commodities. This
aspect would also consider the existing stocks and availability of strategic reserves.
• Probable duration of conflict.
• Our capabilities for interdicting the adversary’s SLOCs, in relation to his SLOC
protection capabilities.
Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations will remain valid and valuable in

Carrier Task Force – Exercising sea control

the Indian context, due to the coastal terrain in our primary areas of interest and ourmany islands. Therefore, the Indian Navy, in close cooperation with the Indian Armyand Air Force, will retain the capability and expertise for conducting amphibious
operations, and will be prepared to undertake them as required for both defensive andoffensive purposes.

Coastal and Offshore Defence

those in the vicinity of our own ports, offshore and coastal assets, conduct of Visit,
Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations and Examination Services, and Local
Naval Defence (LND), including harbour defence, conduct of mine clearance andmaintenance of mine-swept channels into harbours. Conduct of coastal and offshore
defence will be supported by maritime strike, as required.

Actions for ensuring coastal and offshore defence will be carried out by the Indian
Navy in synergy with the Indian Army, Air Force, Coast Guard and security agencies.
Air defence of India’s coastal and offshore assets would be provided by the Indian Air
Force. Various tasks that will be undertaken for coastal and offshore defence include
maintenance of MDA, coastal and offshore surveillance and patrol, monitoring, control
and coordination of shipping and vessel movement in the maritime zones, especially

Sea Control
Sea control is a central concept around which the Indian Navy will be employed. It is a
key component of the strategy for conflict and a prerequisite for most naval operations.
The Indian Navy will undertake the range of naval missions and tasks commensuratewith the degree and duration of sea control required for execution of the operational
plan. These will include developing MDA, power projection and force protection, in all
dimensions, against the adversary. A balanced, multi-dimensional fleet is necessary for

Sea control is a central concept around which the Indian Navy will be
employed. It is a key component of the strategy for conflict and a prerequisite
for most naval operations

obtaining sea control beyond coastal waters. The Carrier Task Force (CTF), consistingof Carrier Battle Group(s) (CBG) with integral Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface
Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability, Surface Action
Groups (SAG), and Underway Replenishment Groups (URG), supported by land-based

Strategy for Conflict 73

that may be adopted are maritime strike and mines. Maritime strike, using long range
missiles fired from ships, shore and aircraft, and the use of mines in selected chokepoints for the enemy, are also proven means of sea denial. Elements necessary forensuring effective sea denial will be given due attention. These will include MDA,
especially identification and distinction between neutrals and belligerents, accurate
targeting information, rapid projection of force, and high mobility to reposition assets
in the designated area. In the exercise of sea denial, the following aspects will also be
considered:• The importance of a maritime area to the adversary, in pursuing his strategy.
• Adversary’s capability to exercise sea control in that area.
• The vulnerability of the adversary in that area to sea denial by our forces.
• Future requirements of the maritime area for our use.
Silent sentinel – Exercising sea denial

SLOC Protection
Protection of India’s SLOCs, and carriage of national trade and cargo therein, will bean essential component of the strategy for conflict. The actions will be carried out inaircraft, will be deployed for establishing the required sea control. The following factors

five broad ways. First, the determination of any changes required to the sea routes

will be taken into account while planning for sea control:-themselves, in relation to their location, routeing points, traffic and timing, as per the• The main purpose and requirements of the maritime operation, which qualify theextent of sea control and freedom of action required.
• Our ability to deploy the appropriate type and numbers of forces, to generate therequisite freedom of action.
• The ability of the adversary to oppose our attaining and exploiting freedom of action.
• Our ability to maintain and exploit our freedom of action, including by countering
the adversary’s actions.

Sea Denial
The Indian Navy will exercise sea denial as an offensive measure, to reduce thenature, areas and type of threats envisaged. Second, will be the promulgation of selected
sea routes for use by Indian and foreign shipping, operating to/ from Indian harbours.
This will be done by means of Naval Cooperation and Guidance to Shipping (NCAGS),
indicating the preferred sea routes where the threat is lesser or where higher protection
is available. Third, are the measures for Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) for Indian
merchant ships, which include control over their movements and routes followed,
as per prevalent threat and availability of suitable escort/ protection. Fourth, are themeasures to ensure safety and security of shipping in our SLOCs, including physicalprotection, provision of escort and attaining sea control in key areas. And, fifth, will be
the measures to seek and neutralise the sources of threat to our shipping and SLOCs, asnecessary for our operations.

adversary’s freedom of action and to degrade his operations. It will be exercised though
suitable methods to prevent units of the adversary from operating in the designatedmaritime space, so as to thwart their purpose of deployment.52 Towards this, the Indian
Navy will primarily employ submarines, which are highly suited for carrying out sea
denial, in areas through which the adversary forces may seek to traverse, including
harbour approaches, areas of SLOC convergence, and also mid-ocean. Other means

The Indian Navy will exercise sea denial as an offensive measure, to reduce
the adversary’s freedom of action and to degrade his operations

74 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Information Warfare
The strategy for conflict will employ Information Warfare (IW) operations, todevelop information advantage over the adversary. These measures will address theinformation chain in relevant domains, including cyber, optical, radar, radio, sonar,
visual and voice, and cognitive processes at various stages, across strategic, operational
and tactical levels. Information protection will be accorded critical importance, and will
be ensured through an array of information security measures. Measures to strengthen
our information chain and information development mechanisms will be taken in
conjunction with the development of MDA, which they shall support and reinforce.
This will include both technical and procedural measures.
Strategic communication will also play a key role in binding own actions, cognitionand purpose, whilst seeking to counter those of the adversary, employing the rangeof communication means. At the operational and tactical levels, the Indian Navy will
progress IW as an integral part of maritime operations. At the strategic level, the Indian
Navy will contribute to joint and national efforts by undertaking related actions in themaritime domain.

Escalation Management

Escalation Management –Gaining initiative to retain control

Broader national security objectives would normally require that any conflict against
India be first contained, in some or all aspects of area, time and scale. Further, it mustbe suitably progressed to enable early termination and resolution on terms favourable

retained and exploited. This will require a rapid response and, perhaps, initial counter-to India. It is necessary, therefore, that our forces maintain the means and strengthen

escalation by own forces, to overcome the effect of any surprise and early gains madethe methodology for ensuring management of escalation. This will provide the ability toby the adversary, such as in case of sudden aggression. The role of MDA, networked

control escalation, in a joint manner and in the maritime domain, so as to shape the course

operations, preparedness and presence will, in particular, be critical. The escalationof conflict. It will, further, pose deterrence to the adversary against escalating the conflict.

will thereupon need to be controlled and maintained to our advantage, to progress

Escalation control will be obtained by countering actions of the adversary at all levelsof warfare and, more importantly, by gaining the initiative, which would, thereafter, be

our objectives. This will be done by exploiting the area, scale, intensity and tempo
of operations, whilst undertaking actions to counter, including defend against andneutralise, the adversary’s moves and aggression.
Escalation control in the maritime domain will be coordinated with the overall defence

Broader national security objectives would normally require that any
conflict against India be first contained, in some or all aspects of area,time and scaleand national effort. The adversary will also have to be assured that each set of actions
taken by him would be countered, resulting in his failure to achieve the desired aims,
to deter further escalation. In this regard, our actions would aim to impose calibrated
punishment on the adversary, with assurance of additional costs in case of escalationin any manner.

5
STRATEGY FOR SHAPINGA FAVOURABLE ANDPOSITIVE MARITIMEENVIRONMENT

78 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

5

Table 5.1: Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive
Maritime Environment – Employed, Supporting andSupported Roles, Objectives, Missions and Tasks

Strategy for Shaping a
Favourable and Positive
Maritime Environment

Objectives

Role

To shape a favourable and positive maritime environment, forenhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest

Missions

Maritime Security Objective“We seek a future for the Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR – Security And
Growth for All in the Region.”—Shri Narendra Modi, Hon’ble Prime Minister of India53

instability and insecurity, across different maritime areas. In recent years, there has
been an increase in the movement and spread of terrorism, piracy, arms/ drug/ humantrafficking and smuggling by sea. India’s maritime environment is, accordingly,
affected by security threats and challenges spread across its maritime neighbourhood
and adjacent areas. Hence, it is important to shape favourable and positive conditions
across the broader maritime environment, towards enhancing our own maritime
security and for supporting our national interests.

Tasks

in the maritime domain, wherein there can be free flow of influences, including

Constabulary

BenignPromote Civil
Safety andSecurityStrengthen Political
Relations and Goodwill

Coastal andOffshore Security

Security of India’s Territorial
Integrity, Citizens andOffshore Assets from
Seaborne Threats

Strengthen Defence
Relations with Friendly
StatesSecurity of EEZ

Influence Affairs on Land

Good Order at Sea

Project
National SoftPowerCounter Terrorism

HADR

Counter Armed
Threats from NonState Actors

Aid to Civil
Authorities

Portray Credible Defence
Posture and Capability

Safeguard India’s Mercantile Strengthen Maritime
Marine and Maritime Trade Security in IOR
Safeguard India’s National
Interests and Maritime
Security

Promote Regional andGlobal Security

MDA

Constructive Maritime
Engagement

Force Protection
SLOC Protection
Seaward Defence
Coastal and Offshore
Defence

Maritime Assistance andSupportPresence

Overseas Deployment

Counter Infiltration

PatrolFlag Showing/ Port Visits

PatrolInformation Exchange

Hosting Foreign Warships’ Anti-Piracy
VisitsAnti-Poaching
Technical and Logistics
Anti-Trafficking
SupportHarbour Defence

Foreign Training
Coordinated Patrol
Bilateral/ Multilateral
Exercises
NEO
Peace Enforcement, Peace
Making, Peace Keeping
and Peace Building
Activities under the IONS
Programme

Hydrography
SAR

Peace Support Ops

Surveillance

VBSS

space and conditions therein, across the maritime zones of India, and extending to

Diplomatic

Deterrence against Conflictand Coercion

Protection of Offshore
Assets

The term maritime environment in this strategy refers to the multi-dimensional
India’s areas of maritime interest. It takes into consideration the seamless connectivity

Military

Provisionof Relief
Material andSupplies
MedicalAssistanceDivingAssistanceHydrographic
Assistance80 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 81

A favourable maritime environment entails conditions of security and stability at sea,
with various threats remaining at a low level. A positive maritime environment implies
conditions wherein any rise in threats can be prevented or contained. The promotion ofa favourable and positive maritime environment will, therefore, require the creation of
conditions wherein threats and challenges can be regularly monitored and appropriately
countered. This would require adherence to international norms and laws by all actors,

A favourable maritime environment entails conditions of security andstability at sea, with various threats remaining at a low level. A positive
maritime environment implies conditions wherein rise in threats can beprevented or contained. Together, this would provide net security

with strong maritime cooperation amongst all stakeholders, supported by requisite
maritime force capability.
The promotion of a favourable and positive maritime environment would also
contribute significantly towards providing net security in the maritime area. The term
net security describes the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing
prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in a maritime environment,

Principles of Net Maritime Security“India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it,so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.” 55

against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these. The shaping or creation

The principles of net maritime security will guide the broad methodology to reduceof conditions that enhance net maritime security would support our national maritime

common threats and challenges, and build conditions whereby these will be monitored,interests and maritime security objectives.

contained and countered. The principles comprise the following:-

The ways by which the Indian Navy would shape a favourable and positive maritime• Preservation of Peace. Maintaining and promoting conditions of peace in theenvironment, and thereby be a ‘net maritime security provider’, is described in thismaritime environment would enable keeping of traditional threats and challenges atstrategy. In doing so, this strategy will also employ, support and be supported byminimal levels, which will also facilitate economic growth and national development.

various roles and associated objectives, missions and tasks of the Indian Navy. The

This would need adherence to international law and norms by maritime nations.

components of this strategy are categorised under two main segments – principles andEnhancing mutual understanding through maritime engagements between maritime

actions for net maritime security.

forces, and the exercise of strategic communication, would assist this element.

54• Promotion of Stability. Regular monitoring of the maritime situation, promotion
Maritime forces preserve peace, promote stability and maintain security at sea

of good order at sea, and measures to prevent and check the rise of threats fromtraditional and non-traditional sources, would strengthen stability of the maritime
environment. Maintenance of presence by our own and friendly maritime forces,
both independently and under cooperative mechanisms, would help promote
maritime stability.
• Maintenance of Security. The core element in a favourable and positive maritime
environment is the degree of security available therein. The maintenance of security
in a maritime environment, with many Indian and international stakeholders,requires a comprehensive and coordinated approach to contain challenges, counterthreats and manage changes. The measures would include maintenance of presence,
pursuit of maritime engagements, capacity building and capability enhancement,
and conduct of maritime security operations.

82 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Actions for Net Maritime Security
The actions for net maritime security would transcribe the principles into sustained
activity, so as to preserve peace, promote stability and maintain security. The key
actions for net maritime security, under this strategy, are as follows:• Presence and Rapid Response.
• Maritime Engagement.
• Capacity Building and Capability Enhancement.
• Develop Regional MDA.
• Maritime Security Operations.
• Strategic Communication for Net Maritime Security.

Presence and Rapid Response
Presence and rapid response will be exercised by the Indian Navy, both independently
and in coordination with other Indian and friendly foreign maritime forces, in thefollowing ways:• Presence and Surveillance Mission (PSM).
• Patrol.
• Overseas Deployment (OSD).
Presence and Surveillance Mission. The Indian Navy will deploy ships and aircraft
for exercising presence and conducting surveillance in our areas of maritime interest.
Conduct of PSMs will be done as a dedicated action and would also be conjoined withother activities, such as exercises, patrols and deployments.
Patrol. The Indian Navy will deploy ships, submarines and aircraft for conduct ofpatrols in defined maritime areas to strengthen security and provide rapid responseto emerging threats. Patrols will also be carried out under the strategy for coastal andoffshore security.
Overseas Deployment. OSDs are an intrinsic part of the Indian Navy’s operating
philosophy, for exercising presence across our areas of maritime interest. The Indian
Navy will continue to send its forces on OSDs, to gather operational experience andenvironmental knowledge, undertake military exercises, demonstrate reach andsustenance, exercise freedom of navigation, pursue maritime engagements, andshowcase the nation and the navy.

Indian Navy – Exercising presence
through PSMs, Patrols and OSDs

84 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Maritime Engagement
Shaping a broader maritime environment to counter the flow of threats and challenges
from one area to another requires inclusive and cooperative efforts between thenations concerned and their maritime forces. These efforts are facilitated by maritime
engagements, as a principal means of conducting maritime diplomacy. Interaction withmaritime forces of different nations will be pursued to mitigate traditional concerns
and address non-traditional threats for mutual benefit. These will also serve to enhancemutual understanding, cooperation, and interoperability between the maritime forces.
The Indian Navy will pursue maritime engagements in multiple ways:• Port Visits.
• Personnel Exchanges.
• Staff Talks and Interactions.
• Exercises with Foreign Navies.
• Maritime Assistance.
• Operational Interactions.
• High-Level Maritime Strategic Interactions.

Fostering mutual understanding and cooperation through exercises at sea

Port Visits. Ships of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard regularly undertake port
visits to other nations, to promote goodwill and professional interactions. Similarly,
port visits to India by warships of friendly nations are welcomed. Port visits will be
undertaken as part of OSD or OTR, and also for special occasions such as national days,

Staff Talks and Interactions. Staff talks provide the mechanism for naval staff ofcommemoration of historical events, and International Fleet Reviews (IFRs).

friendly navies to deliberate on various issues of mutual interest. The Indian Navy

Personnel Exchanges. The Indian Navy undertakes attachments and exchanges of
personnel with other maritime forces, for training interaction, gaining operational
experience, sharing and developing skill sets, building interoperability andstrengthening maritime diplomacy. These include reciprocal positioning of naval
personnel in diplomatic billets, training and technical support teams, and onboard eachothers’ ships for short durations, especially at sea (termed as ‘sea riders’).

conducts bilateral staff talks with around 20 foreign navies, on annual/ biennial
basis. These enable structured growth of ideas and interactions, including plans
for further maritime engagements and cooperation. The Indian Navy will continue
to accord high importance to the mechanism of staff talks with friendly navies,
and seek to progressively enhance their content and expand the number of navies
thus engaged.
Exercises with Foreign Navies. The Indian Navy regularly exercises with various
foreign navies, at bilateral and multilateral levels. These exercises are used to project

Shaping a broader maritime environment to counter the flow of threats
and challenges from one area to another requires inclusive and cooperative
efforts between the nations concerned and their maritime forces

Indian capabilities, hone operational skills, imbibe best practices and procedures, andenable doctrinal learning. Exercises also provide a benign means for benchmarking ourcapabilities against international standards, and develop mutual friendship and respect.
The Indian Navy will progress exercises with foreign navies in three participative
formats – passage, occasional and institutionalised.

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 87

86 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy• Passage Exercises. The Indian Navy will seek to maximise the opportunity of port
visits and passages to conduct exercises with friendly navies. Such Passage Exercises

Table 5.2: Institutionalised Exercises with Foreign Navies(PASSEX) would be conducted when ships of either navy pass near the other’s coast.
The duration and complexity of PASSEX will be determined as per the operational

The Indian Navy conducts institutionalised exercises withforeign navies as follows:-

considerations and degree of interoperability attained between the two navies.
• Occasional Exercises. The Indian Navy will participate in certain occasional exercises,

The United States Navy in
Exercise Malabar, since 1992

and also occasionally participate in other periodic exercises. These include HADRThe Royal Navy (UK) in
Exercise Konkan, since 2004

Exercises, maritime security exercises on the sidelines of OSDs and IFRs, and themultinational maritime warfare Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise.
• Institutionalised Exercises. The main thrust of exercises with foreign navies is,however, on institutionalised bilateral/ multilateral exercises. These are conducted
on regular basis in our areas of maritime interest with a select group of navies, withwhom our maritime relations are strong. The scope and content of these exercises
are progressively enhanced, to keep pace with both traditional and non-traditional
maritime challenges.

The Royal Oman Navy, in
Exercise Thammar-al-Tayyib,
since 1993, later renamed as
Exercise Naseem-al-Bahr in 2007
The Republic of Singapore
Navy, since 1994, in IN-RSN
ASW Training Exercise Sea
Lion, later renamed as Singapore India
Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX)

Maritime Assistance. The Indian Navy has provided maritime assistance to friendly
nations, on their request to the Government of India, to address specific requirements.
These include hydrographic surveys, diving assistance, ordnance disposal, salvage(removal of wrecks), sealift of critical stores, search and rescue, and overseeing ship

The Sri Lanka Navy in
SLINEX, since 2005
The Brazil and South Africannavies in IBSAMAR, since
2008
The Japanese Maritime Self
Defence Force in JIMEX, since
2012

The French Navy in Exercise
Varuna, since 2001

The Royal Australian Navy in
AUSINDEX, since 2015

The Russian Navy in Exercise
INDRA, since 2003

The Indonesian Navy, since
2015

construction. Such assistance has been instrumental in reassuring the beneficiarycommunities, and has been a catalyst for enhancing relations and goodwill in thosenations. Maritime assistance of this nature is also indicative of the trust and confidence
reposed by requesting nations in India’s capabilities and readiness to address

The Indian Coast Guard has been conducting an annual Exercise Dostiwith the Maldives National Defence Force since 1991. It has been upgradedto a trilateral exercise with addition of the Sri Lanka Coast Guard since 2012

contingency issues. The Indian Navy will continue to provide such maritime assistance,as part of national efforts.
Operational Interactions. The Indian Navy also interacts with friendly maritime
forces in specific professional mechanisms, to enhance mutual understanding,operational coordination and maritime security cooperation. These include MILAN,

International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) Meetings, and Anti-Piracy cooperative
mechanisms.
• MILAN. The Indian Navy initiated a biennial meeting of regional navies, named
as MILAN, in 1995. It will continue to promote MILAN as a forum for improving

The Indian Navy has provided maritime assistance to friendly nations, on
their request to the Government of India, to address specific maritime
requirements

operational interaction between navies in the region. Participation in MILAN has
steadily increased from five navies in 1995 to 17 navies in 2014, which is indicativeof its progress and success.

Institutionalised Exercises, like Malabar, are carried out witha select group of navies with whom our relations are strong

90 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy• IMBL Meetings. The mechanism of holding regular meetings at the IMBL, between
maritime forces of neighbouring states, facilitates mutual understanding andBringing IOR navies together

communication between local commanders, for clarification of issues, coordinationand cooperation, so as to maintain stability. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard holdbiannual IMBL Meetings with the Sri Lanka Navy and Coast Guard, for this purpose.
• Anti-Piracy Cooperative Mechanisms. The growth of piracy in the IOR has led toseveral initiatives for improving operational coordination between maritime forces
operating in the region. These include the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),56 Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),57 and Shared Awareness andDeconfliction (SHADE) mechanism.58 The Indian Navy will continue to support
anti-piracy cooperative mechanisms and interactions.
High-Level Maritime Strategic Interactions. High-level maritime strategic interactions
are periodically held with other nations to improve strategic communication, sharemaritime strategic perspectives, and review measures for maritime cooperation. Thesealso serve to shape maritime policy in a cooperative, balanced and mutually beneficial
manner, and facilitate persuasion or dissuasion, where necessary.59 The interactions• Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. IONS was conceptualised and activated by theare conducted by way of high-level visits, delegations and dialogues between India

Indian Navy in 2008, as a regional forum for navies of the Indian Ocean. It provides

and other countries, in bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The Indian Navy willa platform wherein the Chiefs of Navy can regularly meet,62 as a mechanism forcontinue to support and progress maritime strategic interactions, and a synergised

constructive engagement, to review and enhance common maritime security. The

approach to maritime security. Some key IOR mechanisms in this regard are:-

IONS has gained momentum since inception, with a steady growth in activities that

• Maritime Security Focus in IORA. The IORA was formed in 1997, with India as afounding member. Since the 2011 meeting in Bengaluru, IORA has highlighted theaddress the range of maritime security challenges. The Indian Navy will continue toplay a leading role in strengthening and supporting IONS.

key linkage of maritime security with regional economic growth and development.60• Maritime Security Multilateral Cooperation. A maritime security trilateral

It has also endorsed the role of IONS, and called for IORA’s work on maritime

cooperation initiative was launched by India, Sri Lanka and Maldives in 2011. The

security to align with and complement IONS initiatives.

three countries have also agreed on a roadmap for cooperation in enhancing MDA,

61

training, capacity building of maritime forces, and joint activities to strengthen
maritime security.63 The Indian Navy is an active participant in this mechanism, andwill support its activities and further development.

High-level maritime strategic interactions are periodically held with othernations to improve strategic communication, share maritime strategic
perspectives, and review measures for maritime cooperation

Capacity Building and Capability Enhancement
In order to address the wide range, increasing numbers and large spread of maritime
security challenges, it is beneficial for the various maritime forces, both within India
and across our maritime neighbourhood, to assist each other. This assistance can be

92 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
provided in areas of respective strengths and expertise, through measures for capacity
building and capability enhancement. This will also facilitate increased efforts andcooperation for maritime security. At the national level, the Indian Navy will continue
to assist and support the development of the Indian Coast Guard, and both would,
in turn, support capacity building and capability enhancement of the marine policeand other maritime security agencies. Similar measures for cooperative development
will be pursued by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard with friendly maritime forces,
across our areas of maritime interest. These include cooperation in training, technicalsupport and maintenance, provision of platforms and equipment, and conduct ofhydrographic survey.
Training Cooperation. The Indian Navy will pursue training cooperation with friendly
maritime forces, to support capability development, facilitate a shared understandingof maritime issues, strengthen relations, enhance interoperability and enable broader
cooperation. The Indian Navy has a well developed and internationally reputed
training framework, covering all aspects of maritime security activities. India has been

MCGS Barracuda - Building Bridges of Friendship,from GRSE Kolkata to Port Louis, Mauritius

offering formalised training courses to maritime forces of friendly foreign countries
for several decades,64 and has also provided assistance for operational sea training of
their ships. This allows friendly maritime forces to avail of quality training with India,
which strengthens their skill sets and capabilities, in an economical manner, whilst
Admiral’s Cup at INA, Ezhimala – Sailing
together towards common challenges

enhancing mutual relations. To meet specific requirements and assist in developing
resident expertise, the Indian Navy also deputes Training Teams to some countries,
upon their request. In addition, during various port visits and overseas deployments,
opportunity is availed of to provide exposure and training in specialised areas,
onboard the visiting ships, as per the host navy’s requirements. The Indian Navyitself avails of a few training courses with other navies, under similar programmesor reciprocal arrangements, to gain insight into their training techniques, doctrinesand procedures.
Technical Cooperation. The Indian Navy will continue to provide technical andmaintenance support to friendly maritime forces, as per their request. This includes
technical advice, assistance for maintenance, repairs and refits of their ships andequipment, support in operation of vessels and equipment made in India, developmentof resident technical expertise in these navies through joint programmes, and transferof hardware by means of gift, sale, lease or attachment. In recent years, the Indian
Navy has facilitated construction of new ships at Indian shipyards, as per the needsof the friendly maritime force. Increase in technical cooperation, especially in defence

94 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
production, will remain a focus area in the years ahead. This not only strengthens thecapacity of the other maritime force to provide maritime security in its own area of
operation, which goes towards improvement of net security in the regional maritime
environment, but also strengthens bilateral relations and maritime interoperability.

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 95

Developing Regional MDA
The obscurity provided by the maritime environment, due to its vast expanse andlimits in surveillance ranges, provides inherent cover to vessels at sea, especiallythose operating further from the coast and on the high seas.66 In order to reduce theHydrographic Cooperation. Hydrographic cooperation has been a key feature of the Indian

information gaps and enhance maritime security for common benefit, the Indian Navy

Navy’s regional engagement initiatives. Hydrography is a resource intensive activity,

will promote mechanisms for developing regional MDA.

and the Indian Navy is one of the few navies with considerable expertise in this field.
Cooperation in the field of hydrography is an important area of naval diplomacy, which
includes hydrographic assistance to friendly foreign navies for survey of their maritime
zones and preparing nautical charts.65 This strengthens bilateral relations and augments
marine safety. The Indian Navy has been actively pursuing hydrographic cooperation
with several countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania, andshall endeavour to gain the status of producer nation of nautical charts in the IOR.

This will include efforts for development of Coastal Surveillance Radar System(CSRS) Chains in the region, especially the IOR island states. This would enhance
the surveillance coverage of these states, whilst facilitating development of a broader
regional MDA network. The data from CSRS would be interlinked with informationfrom other sources, as per mutual arrangements. Efforts to develop broader Air Domain
Awareness (ADA), as a part of MDA, would also be pursued, including by harnessing
air traffic information.
The Indian Navy is, accordingly, pursuing arrangements for sharing of white shipping
and air traffic information between friendly nations in the region. This will besupported by the creation of networked systems that link and compare all information

Charting a shared future – Hydrographic chart
being presented to the Prime Minister of Mauritius

received, including data from commercial sources. Such networked systems will enable
monitoring of vessels across the region, with online correlation and validation of
information. The information sharing arrangement would be progressively expanded
to cover neighbouring regions, and coordinate with similar initiatives by other nations.67

Maritime Security Operations
In addition to the various measures described above, the Indian Navy will continue
to undertake operations that augment maritime security in our areas of maritime
interest. A key component of the strategy to shape a favourable and positive maritime
environment, these operations would seek to enhance net maritime security in theregion, in cooperation and coordination with other friendly maritime forces. The
operations would include possible support to other maritime states, based upon theirrequest to the Government of India.

The Indian Navy will continue to undertake operations that augment
maritime security in our areas of maritime interest

96 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
The maritime security operations under this strategy include the following:-

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 97

Securing the global commons – Maintaining anti-piracy vigil• EEZ Surveillance and Patrols.
• Coordinated Patrols (CORPAT).
• Anti-Piracy Operations.
• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.
• Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
• Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).
• Peace Support Operations (PSO).
• Maritime Search and Rescue (M-SAR).
EEZ Surveillance and Patrols. The sovereign rights of a nation, over exploitation ofnatural resources in the waters, seabed and subsoil of its EEZ, are safeguarded byrespective designated maritime agencies. The lead Indian agency in this regard is the
Indian Coast Guard, which conducts regular surveillance and patrol in India’s EEZ,
to maintain presence, monitor activities, and enforce relevant laws of the country.
This is also in support of coastal and offshore security, as the EEZ provides accessto our territorial waters and the coast. The Indian Coast Guard is supported by the
Indian Navy, as required. In recent years, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard have also
been providing support to island nations in the IOR, for undertaking surveillance andpatrol of their vast EEZ, in joint operations with the local maritime forces. These joint
patrols augment maritime security of the island nations and also the surrounding
maritime environment.
Coordinated Patrols. CORPATs for enhancing maritime security are undertaken by
the Indian Navy with several regional navies.68 Patrols are conducted in respective
waters, on either side of the IMBL, by naval ships and aircraft in a coordinatedmanner.69 The CORPATs address the range of non-traditional maritime security
challenges, including maritime terrorism, gun running, human and drug trafficking,and poaching.

Anti-Piracy Operations. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard have taken robust andkinetic actions to counter piracy, through sustained anti-piracy operations. These have
led to the disruption and thwarting of more than 40 pirate attacks on merchant shippingin the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden, with the arrest of 120 pirates, and pushing

India’s maritime forces will continue to counter piracy, in consonance withdomestic and international law, to ensure security for shipping and fishingin the region

the furthest line of piracy back, to off the Horn of Africa by 2013. India’s maritime
forces will continue to counter piracy, as required, in consonance with domestic andinternational law, to ensure security for shipping and fishing in the region. These
actions will also be carried out in coordination with international efforts and antipiracy cooperative mechanisms.

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 99

98 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations. The IOR and its
hinterland form the locus of about 70% of the world’s natural disasters, resulting
from earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones and floods. The Indian Navy has been at

Table 5.3: Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
Conducted by the Indian Navy

the forefront of HADR operations in coastal areas over the past decade, both inOperation

Personnel
Evacuated

By Indian
Naval Ships

Year

Rajdoot

Nil, as situation
stabilised. Ships
were on standby
in the area

Godavari
Shakti1986

LEBANON

Sukoon1,764 Indian
citizens and 516
foreign nationals

Mumbai
Betwa
Brahmaputra
Shakti

2006

LIBYA

Blossom

150 Indian citizens

MysoreJalashwa

2011

KUWAIT

India and in the maritime neighbourhood. The Indian Navy will, accordingly,

CapellaNil. Ships wereon standby in
the area

MysoreMumbai

2014

Rahat

1,783 Indian
citizens and 1,291
foreign nationals
from 35 nations

SumitraMumbaiTarkash2015

maintain credible HADR capability, and also promote capability development andCountry

Working Group (IWG) on HADR, which has formulated a way ahead for developing
coordinated HADR response amongst IOR navies.

Map 5.1: HADR Operations Undertakenby the Indian Navy since 2004

Jammu & Kashmir

Uttarakhand

BANGLADESH

INDIA

MYANMAR

Tsunami (2004)
Cyclone Sidr (2007)
Cyclone Nargis (2008)
Cyclone Phailin (2013)
Heavy Rains (2013)
Cyclone Hudhud (2014)
Heavy Floods (2014)
Failure of Desalination
Plant (2014)

YEMEN

as part of IONS initiatives in 2014, the Indian Navy assumed the chair of the IONS

YEMEN

coordination between regional navies for combined HADR operations. Towards this,Andhra Pradesh

KeralaTamil Nadu

Andaman &Nicobar Islands

SRI LANKA

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. There are large numbers of Indian citizens

MALDIVES

Humanitarian Assistancefor Fresh Water Supply

working and residing overseas in areas that have been, and remain susceptible to,
INDONESIA

instability and insecurity. Consequently, the Indian Navy has undertaken several NEO
in recent years, in coordination with other national agencies, providing succour to both
Indian and foreign nationals. The Indian Navy will remain prepared to conduct NEO,
on directions from the Government of India, to strengthen maritime security in ourareas of interest.

Strategy for Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment 101

Strategic Communication for Net Maritime Security
There are a large number of participants and stakeholders involved in the maritime
environment. Shaping of favourable and positive conditions also depends on efficient,effective communication and understanding between these various actors. Hence,
strategic communication of efforts by the Indian Navy to enhance net security in ourareas of maritime interest will remain important and be accorded due focus.
In order to ensure positive effect of activities conducted, relevant tools of communication
will be utilised to project the appropriate image, in a timely and accurate manner,
taking into consideration both planned events and sudden developments. Participationin various maritime engagements and interactions, provision of images and statements
in support of our stance, and communication of our message through staff channels andin the open domain, are some of the measures that will be undertaken in coordination
Operation Rahat – Extending helping handswith our diplomatic and other government agencies, towards the larger purpose ofpromoting a favourable and positive maritime environment.

Map 5.2: Indian Search and Rescue Region (ISRR)
Maritime Interdiction Operations. The Indian Navy will remain prepared to undertake
MIO, as required, to stop movement of vessels that jeopardise India’s maritime security
interests, to prevent their reaching the intended destination. Conduct of MIO would bebased on specific intelligence or security conditions and in accordance with applicablelaws, to prevent or counter movement of maritime threats in the region. This may
include operations in support of friendly nations on their request to the Government

MRCC
Mumbaiof India.70 These operations may be conducted independently, in joint action with theIndian Coast Guard and other armed forces, or in coordination with maritime forces offriendly countries.

MRCC
Chennai
MRCC
Port Blair

Peace Support Operations. The Indian Navy will also remain prepared to contributeto PSO mandated by the United Nations, and as directed by the Government of India.71
Maritime Search and Rescue Operations.72 The Indian Coast Guard is the National
Maritime Search and Rescue Coordinating Authority for SAR missions in the Indian
Search and Rescue Region (ISRR). It has established Maritime Search and Rescue
Coordination Centres (MRCCs) at Mumbai, Chennai and Port Blair, and the Indian
Maritime Search and Rescue computerised ship reporting system called INDSAR, forships transiting through the ISRR. M-SAR efforts are supported by the Indian Navy and
Air Force, in addition to all other maritime agencies in the ISRR.73

TOTAL SRR
4.6 Mn Sq Km
Data Source: www.indiancoastguard.nic.in/indiancoastguard/sar/sar_index/sarindex3.jpg

6
STRATEGY FOR COASTALAND OFFSHORESECURITY

104 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

6Strategy for Coastal andOffshore Security
Maritime Security Objective
To protect Indian coastal and offshore assets against attacks
and threats emanating from or at sea

The seamless nature of the maritime domain enables ready flow of threats andOperating in a framework of jointness and coordination

challenges from one area to another. In recent years, the rise in non-traditional
threats, especially maritime terrorism, has necessitated increased focus on coastal andoffshore security. Maritime terrorism has grown and expanded over the years, operatingfrom the sea and at sea, in both direct and indirect forms. It has also started taking an
increasingly hybrid character, with possible blurring of lines between conventional andsub-conventional levels of conflict.

The strategy for coastal and offshore security has, accordingly, been developed withfocus on the Indian Navy, as per its current mandate and being the principal maritime
force of the nation, in a framework of jointness and coordination with the other maritime
agencies. An increasing role and operational responsibilities are envisaged to be taken

India has faced this expanding maritime threat for over two decades. The coastal

up by the Indian Coast Guard and other agencies, as their capabilities and the ambit ofand offshore security apparatus has accordingly evolved as per changes in the

coastal security both evolve.

74

nature and type of threats, with increased involvement of the Indian Navy and Coast
Guard in support of the state police and security agencies.75 The events of ‘26/11’
and unabated threat of terrorism led to an urgent revamp of the coastal and offshore
security organisation. Enhanced patrolling and surveillance in coastal areas havesince been undertaken by the State Marine Police (SMP), Customs, Coast Guard andthe Navy. Substantial progress has been made in recent years, to a large, complex anddynamic challenge. Impetus has also been given to development of the coastal andoffshore security infrastructure.

The strategy for coastal and offshore security shall seek to reduce, counter and eliminate
the threat of armed attack by sub-conventional groups, and also influx of arms andinfiltration by armed attackers from the sea, against coastal and offshore assets. It relies
substantively on the other strategies for its operative elements, particularly the broader
strategy for deterrence, key elements of the strategy for conflict, and many aspects ofthe strategy for shaping a favourable and positive maritime environment. This strategy
also employs, supports and is supported by various roles, and associated objectives,
missions and tasks of the Indian Navy.

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 107

Table 6.1: Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security –Employed, Supporting, and Supported Roles, Objectives,
Missions and Tasks

Developing Coastal and Offshore Security Mechanisms
This strategy is focused on developing the coordinative framework and ways by which
the mechanism for coastal and offshore security will counter a continuing and evolving
threat. The measures will be progressed by the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard andObjectives

Role

Military

Diplomatic

Constabulary

BenignDeterrence against conflictand coercion

Strengthen Defence
Relations with Friendly
StatesCoastal andOffshore Security

Promote Civil
Safety andSecurity

Defence of India’s territorial
integrity, citizens andPortray Credible Defence
offshore assets from
Posture and Capability
seaborne threats
Strengthen Maritime
Safeguard India’s national
Security in IOR
interests and maritime
Promote Regional andsecurity
Global Security

Good Order at Sea

MDACounter Terrorism

Missions

Sea Control
Force Protection

Maritime Assistance andSupportSpecial Forces Ops

Presence• Coastal and Offshore Security Framework.
• Coastal and Offshore Maritime Domain Awareness.
• Coastal Community Participation.
• Coordinated Presence and Patrol.
• Coordinated Operational Response.
• Cooperative Capability Development.
• Maritime Governance.

Counter Armed
Threats from NonState Actors

Aid to Civil
Authorities

Coastal and Offshore Security Framework
In a cooperative and coordinative mechanism, it is essential to maintain a common
understanding of the framework in which the strategy will operate. Aspects of theroles, responsibilities and applicability of various means and methods in the maritime
domain have been aligned accordingly and will be progressively synergised. The main

Seaward Defence

concepts that govern the framework of actions are summarised below.

Coastal and Offshore
Defence

Coastal Security Mandates. In February 2009, the Indian Navy was entrusted with

Surveillance
PatrolMaritime Strike
Tasks Tasks

Constructive Maritime
Engagement

other maritime agencies, with focus on the following areas:-

the responsibility for overall maritime security, including coastal security andTechnical and Logistics
SupportCoordinated Patrol

Counter Infiltration
PatrolAnti-Piracy

Information Ops

Anti-Trafficking

Electronic Warfare

Anti-Poaching

Protection of Offshore
AssetsMedicalAssistanceDivingAssistanceoffshore security.76 The Indian Coast Guard is responsible for ensuring security ofthe maritime zones of India, and protection of maritime and other national interests
therein.77 It has been additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal
security in territorial waters, including waters to be patrolled by the State Marine
Police.78 The Director General Indian Coast Guard, also designated as the Commander
Coastal Command, is responsible for overall coordination between Central andState agencies in all matters relating to coastal security.79 The Naval Commandersin-Chief (Cs-in-C) have been additionally designated as Cs-in-C Coastal Defence.

VBSS
Harbour Defence

The Indian Navy is entrusted with the responsibility for overall maritime
security, including coastal security and offshore security

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 109

108 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
The Indian Navy is assisted by the Indian Coast Guard, State Marine Police, andother Central and State agencies for the coastal defence of the nation, and controls all

Diagram 6.2: Agencies Involved in Coastal Security

Navy – Coast Guard joint operations.
Coastal Waters. The context of coastal security is in relation to the coastal waters

MoF

zone, in which it is to be principally applied. This is considered, for the purpose

MoP&NGof this strategy, as the water area seawards of the Indian coast upto the limit ofCentral Industrial Security Force

MoA

Customs and Immigration

MoS

Port Trust
DG Shipping

India’s contiguous zone, or the IMBL in case the latter is nearer.80 However, threatscan move swiftly across open waters from the high seas into India’s maritime zones
and coastal waters. This necessitates monitoring of sea areas extending beyond thecoastal waters, in order to secure this zone and ensure timely detection and responseto emergent threats.

State Police

Diagram 6.1: Coastal Waters

Indian Coast Guard

Coastline

Territorial
WatersCOASTAL
SECURITY

Fisheries (DADF)

DGHydrocarbons

Economic
Agencies

STATES
Shipping & Energy
Operators

Other Armed Forces

Internal
WatersContiguous
Zone

CENTRE

Indian Navy

Baseline
Contiguous Zone

DG Lighthouses& Lightships

Border Security ForceIntelligence Agencies

MoD

MHA

Coastal Security. Coastal security is a subset of maritime security, focused on the coastal
waters. It is ensured through coordinated efforts amongst multiple stakeholders at the

Territorial
WatersCentre and States, towards provision of comprehensive security against traditional andnon-traditional threats. Coastal security has a wide connotation encompassing maritime
Baseline

border management, island security, maintenance of peace, stability and good order incoastal areas and enforcement of laws therein, security of ports, coastal installations
and other structures, including Vital Areas and Vital Points (VAs/ VPs), vessels andpersonnel operating in coastal areas. An effective organisation for coastal security also
facilitates coastal defence.

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 111

Coastal and Offshore Maritime Domain Awareness

Immediate Support Vessels conduct coastal and offshore defence patrols

The complexity of MDA in coastal and offshore areas is very high due to the larger
numbers and types of vessels operating therein, which are mostly exercising thefreedom of action and navigation prevalent in peace time, in the legitimate pursuitof maritime activities at sea. Development of effective MDA in coastal and offshore
waters is being done by maximising use of available systems, creating new means
and interfaces amongst the various agencies, and developing advanced information
management, analysis and decision-support systems.
Position Reporting Systems. Indian and foreign vessels report their positions by
various means, including manual and automatic, under voluntary and mandatory
mechanisms. This is done to improve security response, search and rescue, andcollision-avoidance. These systems and processes also assist the maritime agencies inmaintaining MDA for coastal and offshore security, by suitable sharing, linking andcorrelation of information:• Indian Ship Position and Information Reporting System (INSPIRES).82• Indian Maritime Search and Rescue (INDSAR).83• Island Reporting (ISLEREP).84• Pre-Arrival Notification of Security (PANS).85• Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT).86• Automatic Identification System (AIS).87• Space-Based Automatic Identification System (AIS-SB).88• Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B).89
Offshore Security. Offshore security relates to the safety and protection of offshore• White Shipping Information.

assets, including artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and other structures• Air Traffic Information.

and devices in the EEZ. It is a primary responsibility of the Indian Coast Guard, which
81

would be supported by the Indian Navy as required towards overall maritime security.
Indian naval ships, including dedicated Immediate Support Vessels (ISVs), conduct
regular offshore defence patrols in the Offshore Development Areas (ODA) in support

New Position Reporting Systems. A dedicated Indian transponder system has beendeveloped for sub-20 m vessels, to close the information gap on their position andmovement. This will cater for limitations in the use of existing position reportingof offshore security. The seaward approaches are sanitised by other ships and aircraftof the Coast Guard and Navy.
Coastal and Offshore Defence. The actions for coastal and offshore defence have been
covered under the strategy for conflict. There is a close linkage, and some overlaps,of these actions with components of the strategy for coastal and offshore security,
particularly those related to the threat of sub-conventional armed attack.

Offshore security relates to the safety and protection of offshore assets,
including artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and otherstructures and devices in the EEZ112 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Dynamic surveillance is undertaken by deployment of Indian Navy, Indian
Coast Guard and State Marine Police assets, in multiple layers across thecoastal waters and seaward approaches

systems, including AIS, due to lesser antenna height and power generation onboard
these small vessels.
Fishing Vessels and License Information Management. Verification and monitoringof the identity and ownership of about 2,45,000 fishing vessels in India, amidst a fishingcommunity of about four million, has been greatly eased by creation of the online
ReALCraft (Registration and Licensing of Fishing Craft) portal. The information is alsoavailable to the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.
Biometric Identity Cards. Issuance of biometric identity cards to majority fishermen
and composite card readers to the maritime security agencies has been done, to enablebiometric verification of the identity of fishing vessel crews at sea.90
Port Vessel Information Management. The details of various vessels in harbour andtheir planned movements are available with the major ports, which have developed an
online information portal, called the Port Community System (PCS). This informationis shared with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard. Similar steps would be pursued for

Surveillance and information networking isessential for coastal and offshore security

the non-major ports.
Static Surveillance. Surveillance radars and AIS receivers have been fitted along theIndian coast, islands and offshore installations. Radars at major ports monitor andInformation Networking and Management. The varying inputs mentioned above aremanage traffic approaching respective harbours. These various static surveillance

spread over time and space, and need to be correlated so as to develop a composite

systems provide active information on vessels operating in their vicinity (upto 25 nm,

and coherent MDA. This requires information networking and management in several,or 45 km), and feed into the development of MDA.

simultaneous layers, which is being done through dedicated systems:-

Dynamic Surveillance. Dynamic surveillance is undertaken by deployment of Indian• Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) and Vessel and Air Traffic Management

Navy, Indian Coast Guard and State Marine Police assets, in multiple layers across

System (VATMS).

the coastal waters and seaward approaches. These include Long Range Maritime• National AIS (NAIS) Network.

Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft in the outer layer, Short Range Maritime Reconnaissance• Merchant Shipping Information System (MSIS).

(SRMR) aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and ships across the interim layers,• Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN).

and patrol vessels and micro-UAVs in the inner layer. These will be aided by space-• National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network (NC3IN).

based surveillance, to increase and intensify the surveillance cover.

• National MDA (NMDA).

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 115

Map 6.1: National Command Control Communication andIntelligence Network (NC3IN)

Coastal Community Participation
Coastal and fishing communities are the largest constituents of the coastal security
framework and are amongst its core strengths. Effective involvement of the vast fourInformation Management &Analysis Centre (IMAC)
Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
Regional Coastal Security
Operations Centre (RCSOC)
State Coastal Security
Operations Centre (SCSOC)

IMAC

million strong fishing community, and the larger coastal community, has the potential
to significantly complement efforts of the security agencies. The maritime security
agencies will, therefore, foster the coastal community to serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of
security agencies.
Community Interaction Programmes (CIP) are being conducted by the Indian Coast
Guard at all fishing hamlets, to enhance awareness of the coastal populace andfishermen in particular.91 Initiatives such as the Sagar Rakshak Dal and Village VigilanceCommittees, who are a voluntary group from fishing and coastal communities, assist

Gandhinagar
Porbandar
Mumbai

Kolkata

the security agencies in surveillance, intelligence and patrolling, and have contributed

HaldiaParadip

to enhancing coastal security in several states.92

Visakhapatnam

The coastal and fishing communities areimportant partners in ensuring coastal security

Goa
New Manglore
Kavaratti

Puducherry

Diglipur

ChennaiPort Blair

Kochi
Campbell Bay

Intelligence. A relatively lesser reaction time to respond to situations off/ along the coast
underscores the criticality of accurate, timely and actionable intelligence. The Indian
Coast Guard has been designated as the Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for the coastal
sea borders since 2003, with the mandate to generate, coordinate and share intelligencewith the agencies concerned. A Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and Subsidiary MACs
(SMACs) at state levels facilitate information and intelligence sharing on a continuous
basis amongst the intelligence agencies. Measures for improved intelligence gathering,
analysis and sharing, have been vital in developing a common understanding of theoperating environment and enabling timely, effective response. These measures will be
continually strengthened and progressed.

Coordinated presence and patrolling is carried out acrossmultiple layers, from the coastline to the high seas

118 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 119

Coordinated Operational Response
Presence and patrol missions are central to the strategy for coastal andoffshore security. These are coordinated between the various maritime
security agencies, to provide seamless protection

Coastal security involves multiple stakeholders with both, independent and shared
responsibilities. Coordination amongst these agencies will be maintained througha cooperative approach that will focus on the key aspects described below, whilst
remaining sensitive to any limitations and constraints of partner agencies. This takes
into consideration the specific needs of changing threat levels, including conditions
wherein a coastal security operation may need to translate rapidly into a coastal defence

Toll free communication arrangements have been established, with shore-based control
centres manned by State Marine Police/ Indian Coast Guard personnel in all states andUnion Territories (UTs), in order to facilitate coastal community participation. These
measures have not only improved security but have also saved lives, and provide animportant link between fishermen and security agencies.

operation, with joint deployment of forces from multiple maritime agencies.
Operational Control and Coordination. Unified control of joint operations enhances
the efficiency and effectiveness of response, with optimal utilisation of all assets.
Control and coordination of joint operations will be exercised through the Joint
Operations Centres (JOCs), which have been suitably equipped for the purpose,

Measures to involve, sensitise and incentivise the coastal community to contribute to theutilising the NC3IN. Towards this, four JOCs have been set up under the respective

coastal security construct will remain a focus area. Implementation of Best Management

Naval Cs-in-C, at Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapatnam and also under the C-in-C ANC

Practices for security of vessels and offshore installations will also be promoted.

at Port Blair. These JOCs are jointly manned by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard,
with inflow of information from all stakeholders through the Regional Coastal Security

Coordinated Presence and Patrol

Operations Centres (RCSOCs), State Coastal Security Operations Centres (SCSOCs) and

Presence and patrol missions are central to the strategy for coastal and offshore
security. Under this strategy, presence is coordinated between the various maritime
security agencies, with provision of mutual support and back-up, to provide seamlessprotection. Presence and patrolling is maintained in multiple layers, by the State Marine
Police, Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy, in their respective zones of responsibility,
as per prevalent capabilities and threat perceptions:• State Marine Police. The State Marine Police is responsible for patrolling the inner
layer from the coastline upto the territorial waters, in coordination with Customs,
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and respective port authorities, as relevant.
• Indian Coast Guard. The Indian Coast Guard patrols the maritime zones of India,
and supports the State Marine Police within the inner layer as required.
• Indian Navy. The Indian Navy supports the Indian Coast Guard within themaritime zones as required, and provides presence, including surveillanceand patrol, on the high seas beyond the EEZ. The Indian Navy also undertakes
patrolling in the ODA, and its Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) specialised force undertakes
patrolling of naval harbours.

Joint operations are conducted to improveoverall response and optimally utilise all assets

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 121

120 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Area Coastal Security Operations Centres (ACSOCs). The RCSOC, SCSOC and ACSOC
have been activated by the Indian Coast Guard for coordination with Central and Stateagencies, at regional, state and area levels respectively, through corresponding Coast
Guard formations. Each operations centre has suitable representation from the agencies
concerned. All stakeholders operate in a ‘hub-and-spoke’ model.

SOPs for ensuring interoperability and synergy in coastal security operations
have been established between the various agencies, taking into consideration
respective capabilities, characteristics and operating conditions

Interoperability, Flexibility and Response. SOPs for ensuring interoperability andsynergy in coastal security operations have been established between the various
agencies, taking into consideration respective capabilities, characteristics and operating
conditions. The SOPs will be periodically reviewed and updated, with the experience
gained. Good interoperability will also strengthen flexibility in catering to rapid changes
that may occur during the conduct of operations. These include transition of control
from first responder to lead agency, from single-agency to multi-agency operations,and from security to defence operation, with the insertion of additional forces, in acoordinated and mutually supportive manner. The response mechanisms will also
be prepared for operating under conditions of possible information and intelligence

Cooperative Capability Development
Training and Technical Assistance. The various agencies operating in the coastal
security framework will need to develop respective maritime capacity and capability.
The Indian Navy will provide assistance, as required by the other maritime security
agencies, for their capability development. This includes training support fordevelopment of expertise in joint maritime security operations, and technical support
in the development of their maritime force levels and infrastructure.

gaps, capability mismatch and operational ‘fog’, through training, communication andExercises. Joint coastal security exercises have been carried out regularly in all coastalinteroperability. Appropriate RoE will govern the use of force, in relation to the threat

states and UTs, to test the coordinative mechanisms, identify voids, streamline

perceptions and prevailing circumstances.

procedures, and provide operational training. Coordinated by the Indian Coast Guard,

Visit, Board, Search and Seizure. Conduct of VBSS is the primary method by which thebona fide character of a vessel can be ascertained. VBSS operations will be undertaken
in coastal waters primarily by the Indian Coast Guard and State Marine Police, which
are law enforcement agencies. The Indian Navy will also exercise VBSS under certain
conditions, such as during conflict and under its mandate for coastal and offshore defence.
Coordinated Security Measures. Credible proximate/ onboard security measures,
including passive and active, commensurate with the threat assessment, are essential
prerequisites for security of vessels, offshore assets as also coastal assets ashore. These will
be regularly strengthened, reviewed and refined, both independently and in a coordinatedmanner. The mechanisms of the Offshore Security Coordination Committee (OSCC),
under the chairmanship of Director General Indian Coast Guard, and the Joint Venture
Offshore Protection Advisory Committee (JVOPAC), a sub-committee of the OSCC

with participation by the Indian Navy, State Marine Police and other Central and Stateagencies, these exercises have graduated steadily to more complex levels and acrossa wider maritime front. Joint coastal security exercises will be progressed as a central
means of enhancing preparedness and coordinated operational response, amongst themultiple agencies.
Operational Infrastructure. The efforts for strengthening operational infrastructure
will be progressed in a joint and coordinated manner. The Indian Navy and Coast
Guard have included their capability and infrastructure needs for coastal security,
under the revised mandate post-‘26/11’, in respective perspective plans. The capability
development for coastal and offshore security needs will be further coordinatedbetween the two forces, to optimise financial value, maximise operational gains, andensure interoperability, as has been done for the JOCs, CSN and NC3IN.

under chairmanship of the Flag Officer Offshore Defence Advisory group (FODAG),

Joint Preparedness. Joint preparedness necessitates a gamut of activities across multiple

would continue to be strengthened and employed. Initiatives for strengthening security

agencies. While these would mostly remain independent responsibilities of eachby public sector and private players will continue to be encouraged, and measures forsecurity agency, a high degree of cooperation and interagency coordination will need

improving their coordination with security agencies will be facilitated.

to be maintained, with mutual awareness of capabilities and, especially, any limitations

Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security 123

122 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
that may impact the overall operational response. This will be attained by fostering
jointness and synergy, strengthening interagency communication and operational
mechanisms, and working closely together to promote evolution in organisational
structures for joint functioning.

The Indian Navy shall continue to participate in various mechanisms andcontribute to measures for strengthening maritime governance, as per its
designated role, responsibilities and tasking

Maritime GovernanceMaritime governance relates to the structured and coordinated actions to govern themaritime domain under India’s jurisdiction, with multiple agencies and functions
involved. These include aspects of apex-level policy and review, interagency monitoring
and coordination, and legislative and regulatory framework, which govern the
conduct of various maritime activities that also bear upon maritime security. Maritime• Single Agency, Multiple Functions. Each agency has its own structure, with
policy and review functions handled at respective apex levels, with appropriate
representation from other agencies. Regular reviews are carried out by each agency,with necessary interactions and information to the other agencies concerned.

governance, therefore, plays an important role in, and contributes to, maritime• Single Function, Multiple Agencies. Specific functions that affect multiple agencies

security, including both coastal and offshore security. The Indian Navy shall continue

are addressed by dedicated multi-agency mechanisms, such as National Shipping

to participate in various mechanisms and contribute to measures for strengthening

Board (NSB) for shipping issues, Maritime States Development Council (MSDC) for

maritime governance, as per its designated role, responsibilities and tasking.

coastal states issues, and OSCC for offshore security issues.

Policy and Review. In keeping with the multitude of agencies and the complexity of• Multiple Agencies and Functions. National apex level policy and review of maritime

maritime governance, the functions of policy and review are handled at various levels

security, covering all maritime agencies and domains, is undertaken through theand forums.

‘National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security against
Threats from the Sea’ (NCSMCS), constituted under the chairmanship of the Cabinet
Secretary in 2009. This has representatives from all the ministries, departments, andorganisations concerned in the Government of India, as well as the Chief Secretaries/
Administrators and senior police officials of the coastal states and UTs.
Apex Monitoring and Coordination Functions. The monitoring and coordination
tasks are carried out by each agency, for their respective domains. However, multidisciplinary issues also require substantial interagency coordination. Given thediversity of issues, a central body for guiding activities, monitoring implementation ofpolicy decisions, and facilitating interagency coordination would be desirable.
Legislative and Regulatory Framework. Maritime governance includes legislations,
regulations and rules for conduct, control and monitoring of activities in the maritime
domain, with consideration to extant international conventions, customary laws andrelated national legislations. The legislative and regulatory framework for the maritime
domain requires regular review and revision, to identify and address any limitations.
These would also strengthen the legal empowerment of various agencies for maritime

Eternal vigilance and preparedness are the key enablers for security

security.

7
STRATEGY FORMARITIME FORCE
AND CAPABILITY
DEVELOPMENT

126 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

7Strategy for Maritime
Force and Capability
Development

Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development 127

Conceptual Capability Development
In the initial decades after independence, the Indian Navy’s conceptual element wasprovided through its ‘Plan Papers’, which gave the overarching direction for envisaged
force levels, capabilities and capacities. These plans have been regularly aligned to meetthe emerging challenges posed by changes in the geo-strategic environment, adventof new technologies, and related concepts of force deployment and employment. The
conceptual element was progressively strengthened over the years, and led to theenunciation of the first Maritime Military Strategy in 1988.94
The 1990s witnessed major global geo-political changes and a reorientation of India’snational and economic strategies. There was also progressive recognition of the significant
role of the maritime environment. These were reflected in revision and refinement of
naval strategy and plans, and conduct of several studies such as the navy-wide Indian
Navy’s Vision 2020 study in 1997. The conceptual capability development on maritime
issues was further strengthened by the institution of dedicated structures and bodies,

Maritime Security Objective

in 2005-2006, including the Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts (FODC) and the Maritime
Doctrines and Concepts Centre (MDCC) at Mumbai; and the Indian Naval Strategic and

To develop requisite maritime force levels and maintain thecapability for meeting India’s maritime security requirements
A balanced, multi-dimensional force is required for
ensuring maritime security across the full spectrum
The Indian Navy has evolved as a balanced, multi-dimensional, multi-spectrum
force, with a mix of ships, submarines, and aircraft (manned and unmanned),with dedicated satellite and information systems. The purpose of this strategy is tomaintain and further develop the Indian Navy as a combat ready, technology driven,
networked force, which will remain capable of safeguarding India’s evolving national
maritime interests in the future and of providing net maritime security across India’s
areas of interest. This will be done primarily by developing multi-mission, strategic,
operational and tactical capabilities, across all dimensions and for the full spectrum ofnaval combat power.
While developing appropriate maritime force levels and capability, the Indian Navylooks at three interrelated elements that can be seen in the form of an equilateral triangle- Conceptual, Human and Physical.93 While this strategy covers all three elements, it isfocused on the development of the physical element, viz. the maritime force levels andensuing capability.

Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development 129

128 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

The Indian Navy has formulated its Human Capital Strategy (in 2013), along with its

The Indian Navy is poised to grow substantially over the next decade, withincreasing operational footprint and rapid technological transformation, which
necessitate detailed, comprehensive planning and preparation at all levels

Training Doctrine (in 2014), to guide the way ahead. These documents cover the rangeof activities from recruitment, training and grooming, to progressive employment withattendant skills-development and, finally, retirement and resettlement.
The inductions and developments, as per the maritime capability and infrastructure
perspective plans, will be supported by recruitment of quality manpower. The Human

Operational Council (INSOC), Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation (DSCT),

Capital Strategy will guide the maintenance of a professional and motivated humanand the Navy-supported think-tank National Maritime Foundation (NMF) at New Delhi.

resource base, with constant development of expertise and warfighting skills, and their

The institutionalisation of the conceptual element has provided stronger intellectual
underpinnings to the development and employment of maritime capability. This is also
seen in the publication of several strategic-level documents and their regular revision,
including the Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004 and 2009), Science and Technology Roadmap(2004, 2009 and 2015), Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (2005 and 2011), Indian Navy
Vision Document (2006 and 2014), India’s Maritime Military Strategy (1988 and 2007,

optimum employment. The human resource development efforts will cater for the sharp
increase in the Navy’s manpower strength and technical skills, which are required formeeting India’s growing maritime security requirements, and will also support similarneeds of the Indian Coast Guard and other maritime security agencies.

Force Levels and Capability Development

further revised by this document), Strategic Guidance for Transformation (2006 and 2015),

The strategy for force level and capability development will remain cognisant of theForeign Cooperation Roadmap (2011 and 2014), Human Capital Strategy (2013), Indian Navylong lead time and high investment costs required by maritime forces. It will maintainSpace Vision (2014), Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan (2015), and Indian Navalassessment of the future threat environment and technological trends, to identify the

Indigenisation Plan (2015).

major thrust areas and required critical capabilities. This will enable the planners to

The Indian Navy’s capability development plans are, therefore, well founded oncomprehensive study of the various factors affecting India’s maritime environment,along with development and examination of several options for the way ahead. The
naval conceptual thought process has also evolved significantly over the past two
decades, with substantial development and revision of concepts and doctrines. The
efforts in maintaining and enhancing the conceptual element will be continued andkept contemporary. These will support the development of capabilities and capacities,
and employment of India’s maritime forces for ensuring maritime security.

Human Resource Development

monitor, update and review the inter-se priority, make appropriate decisions to refine
capability perspective plans, and allocate necessary financial, technical and humanresources to aid the procurement and development process.
The major thrust areas under this strategy are as follows:• Indigenisation for Self-Reliance and Self-Sufficiency.
• Standardisation and Modularity.
• Maritime Domain Awareness.
• Network Centric Operations.
• Enhanced Reach and Sustainability.
• Power Projection and Sea Control.

The Indian Navy is poised to grow substantially over the next decade, with increasing• Force Protection.

operational footprint and rapid technological transformation, which necessitate detailed,• Joint Operations.

comprehensive planning and preparation at all levels. As always, our men and women• Special Forces Operations.

will play a pivotal role in these efforts, and the Indian Navy will lay highest priority• Force Maintenance.

on developing its human resources into ‘human capital’. The concept of People, Assets• Infrastructure and Logistics.

and Combat Efficiency (PACE) will remain central to human resource development.

• New and Evolving Technologies.

130 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Indigenisation for Self-Reliance and Self-Sufficiency

Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development 131

Table 7.1: Indigenous Projects on the Horizon

The Indian Navy is committed to indigenisation and self-reliance, and will continue tobuild upon its substantial achievements in this regard over the past several decades. It
has steadily evolved from being a ‘buyer’s navy’ in the initial years, to a ‘builder’s navy’and, thence, a ‘designer’s navy’ in recent years.95 Sustained efforts will be invested in
maximising self-reliance, for both strategic and economic reasons. Indigenisation ofadvanced naval weapon systems, missiles and ammunition will be given focus. Navalefforts will also be directed towards striving for self-sufficiency in the coming years, so

Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC)
INS Vikrant is being built at Cochin Shipyard
Limited (CSL), Kochi. Feasibility study for
IAC-2 project is being progessed.

Naval Oﬀshore Patrol Vessel (NOPV) Fiveships are under construction at Pipavav
Shipyard, Gujarat.

as to enhance strategic autonomy.
At the same time, force capabilities and capacities must remain modern, and be
maintained at adequate levels to deal with the range of threats and challenges. Capability
gaps cannot be allowed to occur, as these will create vulnerabilities in India’s maritime
security.
A multi-pronged plan will, therefore, be pursued to harness national capabilities andenhance support structures. This is based on identifying and building upon the core

Project 15A Indigenously designed, thesethree ships follow-on to the Delhi classdestroyers, with construction by Mazagon
Docks Limited (MDL), Mumbai. The first ship,
INS Kolkata, was commissioned in 2014.
Project 15B Project 15B consists of four shipsthat follow-on to Project 15A. Under
construction at MDL, the first ship INS
Visakhapatnam was launched in 2015.

Training Ship – Three ships are underconstruction at ABG Shipyard, Surat.

Survey Vessel – Order for six catamaran hullsurvey vessels has been placed on Alcock
Ashdown, Bhavnagar. The first ship, INS
Makar, is already in service.

national strengths in the maritime domain, with a view to focus investment in nicheareas and best practices for longer term developmental gains. The Indian Navy’s efforts
will supplement those of other government agencies, as also the private sector. The
Science and Technology Roadmap (2015-2035) and Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan (20152027) will steer the efforts to synergise overall Research and Development (R&D) efforts
in the maritime sector.

Project 17A Seven stealth frigates follow-on
to Project 17 (Shivalik class) under thisproject. Four ships will be constructed by
MDL and three ships by Garden Reach
Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE).

The Indian Navy’s partnership with the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) will be further strengthened, in continuation of sustained joint
achievements over the past several decades. Maintenance of close relations withdesigners, maintainers and users has been the key to these past achievements, and willcontinue to be accorded the highest attention.

Sustained efforts will be invested in maximising self-reliance, for both
strategic and economic reasons. A multi-pronged plan will be pursued toharness national capabilities and enhance support structures

Project 28 Four ASW stealth corvettes arebeing constructed by GRSE, Kolkata.
Indigenously designed, the first ship, INS
Kamorta was commissioned in 2014 and thefourth launched in 2015.

Project 75 Six Scorpene submarines areunder construction at MDL in collaboration
with DCNS of France. The first submarine,
INS Kalvari, was launched in 2015.
Project 75(I) This project envisages
construction of six submarines in Indian
shipyards with foreign collaboration.

Landing Craft Utility (LCU) Eight LCUs areunder construction at GRSE. Four of thesehave been launched.

Fast Attack Craft (FAC) Four FACs are underconstruction at GRSE. Three of these have beenlaunched.

Immediate Support Vessel (ISV) Order for 14
ISVs was placed on SHM Shipcare, Mumbai,
and 11 of these have been commissioned.

Light Combat Aircraft (Navy) The first
prototype (NP1) successfully completed
ski-jump tests at the Shore-Based Test
Facility (SBTF) at Goa in 2014. This aircraft
would operate from the IAC.

132 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Naval procurement plans will endeavour to support indigenous defence industry,as part of the ‘Make in India’ national strategy, for meeting naval requirements bydesigning and producing state-of-the-art platforms, equipment and systems, withinglobally competitive timelines and costs. These may require Indian industry to progressformation of consortia, joint ventures and public-private partnerships with foreign
collaborators, involving transfer of technology (ToT), in accordance with government
policy. Niche technologies and specific thrust areas in various developmental fields willbe identified and shared with the industry, such as metallurgy, ship and aircraft designand construction, manufacturing of weapons, design and development of sensors andcommunication systems, and integration of maritime systems.
In specific areas, where domestic industry has not developed adequate capacity formeeting naval requirements within the timelines required, the Indian Navy will seek
necessary import, as per government guidelines, to maintain its combat readiness andclose critical capability gaps.

Standardisation and Modularity
The Indian Navy fields a vast inventory, procured from diverse foreign and indigenous
sources. This is as much a legacy of the past, as due to the inherently long service lifeof naval ships and systems. Efforts to move towards increasing standardisation havebeen initiated in recent years, and will be given further thrust. The aim is to standardise
equipment, weapons and sensors, to progressively reduce inventory variations to
optimum levels. This will ease requirements of maintenance, repair, training, stockand spares, and logistics management, while improving interoperability. Efforts
towards modularity will also be pursued, with encouragement to Indian shipyards todevelop and expand their capacities for modular construction and repairs. These willcater for upgrades, address technological obsolescence issues, and reduce replacement
time, towards operational and financial benefits. The efforts for standardisation andmodularity will also endeavour to enhance interoperability with the other armed forces,
Coast Guard and various maritime agencies.

Naval procurement plans will endeavour to support indigenous defence
industry, as part of the ‘Make in India’ national strategy. Niche technologies
and specific thrust areas will be identified and shared

The launch of INS Kalvari, the first Indian Scorpene,
was a significant milestone for indigenisation

134 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Maritime Domain AwarenessThe centrality of MDA in maritime operations has been highlighted in the preceding
chapters. Improvement in capability for developing MDA covers the sources of
information, their networking for information-exchange using secure multiple-media
communication, correlation for identification, and provision of decision-support,
based on advanced information technology and computing systems. All elements that
contribute to MDA will merit attention and development. Amongst these, the main
thrust areas will include:• Surface and Aerospace Surveillance. Effective surveillance of the surface andaerospace dimensions in our maritime zones and areas of interest will require
investments in advanced technologies, as a priority area. These include satellitebased surveillance, aircraft, UAVs, and ship-borne and shore-based surveillancesystems. Advances in electronic and optronic technologies will be harnessed withthese systems, to improve situational awareness and resolve identification challenges
at sea.

Airborne Early Warning aircraft
enable networked operations• Sub-surface Surveillance. The increased presence of submarines in India’s areas ofinterest, with weapons capable of striking military and strategic targets at standoff ranges, necessitates development of our sub-surface surveillance systems. These
include both mobile and static systems, for use onboard ships, submarines, aircraft,and in vantage positions at sea.

Network Centric Operations
NCO encompass the networking of all units, with real-time/ near real-time secureexchange of operational information between sensors, decision-makers and ‘shooters’,• Identification. Joint and single service identification systems, with an ability to

so as to enable rapid, accurate actions across wide areas and in all dimensions. While

discern between friend, foe and neutral, will be pursued in conjunction with the

MDA is enabled by networking, it is NCO that gives it full effect. The Indian Navy willsurveillance effort.

develop itself as a network centric force, wherein the following aspects will be accorded• Information

andCommunication

Technology.

National

advancements

infocused attention:-

information and communication technology will be harnessed, for maintaining• Satellite Capabilities. The launch and operationalisation of India’s GSAT-7 satellite

secure, reliable and rapid information exchange. These will also aid development ofhas provided a pivotal boost to our maritime Command, Control, Communications

networked operations, and provide greater efficiency and effectiveness.

(C3) and NCO capabilities across the IOR. Satellite capabilities for maritime and• Cyber Space. Capability for safeguarding, and also obtaining, information in cyber
space is critical, and will be continuously developed.

joint operations will need augmentation, to cater to the needs of NCO, offset
vulnerabilities and increase redundancy.
• Communications. Secure and reliable communication, connecting all hierarchies ofthe operational organisation, using high bandwidth networks over multiple media

While MDA is enabled by networking, it is NCO that gives it full effectwith layered redundancy, will be accorded continued investment with exploitationof advancing technology.

136 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy• Cooperative Engagement Capability. Integration of various information systems
will be essential for developing Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). This
will cover sensors, weapons and communication equipment, across the Navy andalso with the other armed forces and the Coast Guard. Technologies for MultiPlatform, Multi-Sensor Data Fusion (MPMSDF) will be pursued.
• Network Integrity. Exchange of operational data and information for targeting andcooperative engagement will require establishment of secure and high Quality ofService (QoS) networks, with assured integrity and adequate bandwidth for a hightempo of operations. The networks will be developed over multiple media, andupgraded periodically to meet contemporary operational requirements. Developmentof robust, multi-layered security systems will be accorded focused attention.
• Data Analysis. Data analysis capabilities will play a critical role in networked
operations and MDA. The establishment of IMAC has been a major step in thisregard. This will be progressed and further developed in terms of technology,

Launch of INS Visakhapatnam –Designed for the future Navy

with linking of systems for sharing of data, and computer-automated correlation,filtering, selection and dissemination of relevant information.
• Geographical Information and Position Fixing Systems. The use of common data
across different units requires a common, geographical information system, withadjustments for inherent errors across dispersed spaces and dimensions. This
will be pursued along with indigenous satellite-based position fixing system, toprovide requisite accuracy to enable precision weapons engagement, for maritimeand joint operations.

• Longer ‘Sea Legs’. Design and induction of ships with improved reach andsustainability, in terms of type of propulsion, fuel economy and capacity,
continuous-operation periods of equipment with high performance and reliability,
reduced maintenance needs, inbuilt redundancies, and enhanced onboard repair/
replacement capacity.
• Longer Operational Cycles. Measures to support increased intervals between

Enhanced Reach and Sustainability
In order to ensure sustained presence, the Indian Navy will comprehensively address
the twin issues of ‘reach’ and ‘sustainability’ of naval forces. This would be undertaken
in both, the design of platforms and the acquisition of equipment. Emphasis will beplaced on the enabling aspects.

maintenance and docking cycles, to enable longer deployment patterns for ships,
submarines and aircraft.
• Force Mix Ratio. Preponderance of ships with longer sea legs in the overall force
structure, with improved ratio between capital ships and minor war vessels.
• Logistics Support. Induction of tankers and afloat support ships with enhanced
capacity to replenish fuel, ammunition and provisions at sea, and provide onsite

The Indian Navy will comprehensively address the twin issues of ‘reach’and ‘sustainability’ in both, the design of platforms and the acquisition ofequipment

maintenance and medical support in distant areas for ships and submarines.
• Extended Air Reach. Induction of aircraft with longer endurance and extension of
aerial reach by facilities for in-flight and ‘hot’ refuelling, including induction ofsuitable Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA).

138 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy• Operational Turn Round Facilities. Improved OTR facilities for the range of naval
forces and inventory, at all naval harbours and select ports in India, with focus on

The future naval fleets will be centered on two CTFs

the island groups.
• Cooperative Logistics. Logistic support arrangements for OTR and Underway
Replenishment (UNREP), in the farther reaches of our areas of interest, in cooperation
with friendly maritime forces operating therein.
• Through Life Support. Provision of Through Life Support (TLS) for all new equipment
and systems, catering to the faster obsolescence and shorter supportability of modern
technologies against requirement for their utilisation over longer time frames.

Power Projection and Sea Control
India’s growing maritime interests, across wide geographical spaces, underscores thecentral importance of adequate power projection in and from the seas, and for sea
control capability in ‘blue waters’, to safeguard interests and counter threats before
they can bear upon India. The primary means for this will be potent, balanced naval
fleets supported by strong, integral and shore-based, maritime air power. The Indian
Navy presently has two fleets, each with multi-dimensional power projection and force
protection capabilities. Development of the future naval fleets will be focused on thefollowing force capabilities:• Carrier Battle Groups. Development of three CBGs, each centered on an aircraft
carrier with multi-mission escort and support ships, with integral anti-air, antisurface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
• Carrier Task Force. Develop an operational capability of two CTFs, each comprising
one or more CBGs and other specialist forces, to meet the growing requirements ofprotecting India’s maritime interests.

• Naval Air Power. Enhancing and progressively indigenising naval aviation
capability, covering integral and shore-based aviation assets, including UAVs, forsurveillance and strike missions in all dimensions.
• Submarine Capability. A mixed force of conventional and nuclear powered
submarines, for operations in both near and far areas, with thrust on developing
indigenous capability.
• Sea Lift and Amphibious Capability. Enhancing sealift capability, which would• Surface Action Groups. Induction of requisite multi-mission ships, which canbe essential for Amphibious Operations, HADR and NEO. The induction offunction with the CBG for its protection or be detached as SAGs from the CTF, forLanding Platform Docks (LPDs), with associated combat and support forces, andmaritime strike operations.

development of a Marine force will be progressed in coordination with the Indian• Anti-Submarine Warfare. Stronger ASW capability in both, coastal and oceanic

Army and Air Force.

waters by all-round development of capabilities. This would include shore-based• Long Range and Precision Strike Weapons. Longer range and precision strike

ASW aircraft and helicopters, ASW ships with integral ASW helicopters, submarines,

weapons, for use by surface, air and underwater platforms for conduct of maritime

and advanced sub-surface surveillance systems.

strikes into and from the seas, so as to effectively engage targets at sea and on land.

Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development 141

140 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Force Protection

Joint Operations

Force protection is an essential, integral part of naval forces in both offensive and

The centrality of jointness in military operations is well established and accepted. The

defensive operations, and would be incorporated into force development. There are

Indian Navy will remain committed to achieving synergy in operations by pursuing

two areas, however, where dedicated force protection capability will be pursued:-further measures for developing joint capabilities, interoperability, infrastructure,• Mine Counter Measures. Robust Mine Counter Measures (MCM) capability is an
essential requirement for a maritime country like India. The Indian Navy is focusedon modernising its mine hunting and clearance capability, including Remotely
Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) for thisspecialised operation.
• Asymmetric Threats. The Indian Navy will strengthen its defence against asymmetricthreats, especially in restricted spaces such as harbours and airfields. This will
include harbour defence systems, air defence framework (in conjunction with theArmy and Air Force), expansion of the SPB, Marine Commandos (MARCOs) andQuick-Reaction Teams (QRTs), supported by helicopters and fast craft, including
ISVs and Fast Interceptor Craft (FIC).

training and organisation. Development of common doctrines, coordination ofstrategies, joint planning and perspectives, commonality of equipment and common
standard operating procedures are essential, and will continue to be focus areas.

Special Forces Operations
The Indian Navy is cognisant of the strategic and operational potential of SF operations.
The Indian Navy’s MARCOs have significant capabilities for undertaking SF operationsin the maritime domain, as well as on land and by air. They can operate independently
and in conjunction with Army and Air Force SF, including against non-state actors.
Development of MARCO capabilities will remain a thrust area for the Navy.

Force Maintenance
The Indian Navy possesses mature and robust force maintenance structures toundertake effective materiel management and technical maintenance of operational

Achieving operational synergy through joint training

platforms. Ship design and modelling capabilities are also integral to the Navy’s
growing indigenous framework. It will be a constant endeavour to reinvigorate
the existing maintenance mechanisms, by harnessing modern technology andincorporating total quality management. The strategic approach to force maintenancewill take into account modern trends in design, production, logistics and refittingof naval platforms, in order to optimise operational cycles, enhance self-relianceand minimise cost and time overruns. Focus will be accorded to modernisation of
dockyards and upgradation of facilities therein, to meet the growing requirements offorce maintenance.

The centrality of jointess in military operations is well established. The Indian
Navy will pursue measures for developing joint capabilities, interoperability,
infrastructure, training and organisation

142 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Infrastructure and Logistics

Weapon technologies
will be a focus area

The ability to develop, maintain, sustain, train and operate force levels is dependent on
the incumbent support infrastructure. As force levels and technologies are enhanced,
the support infrastructure will also need to be developed and upgraded, withnecessary allocation of land and budget to enable wider naval shore support acrossall coastal states and UTs. This covers the span of maintenance, logistics, medical,
administrative, personnel and family support. To cater for increasing numbers,
diversity of operating assets, and areas of operation, the Indian Navy has formulated
its Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan, in tandem with the Maritime Capability
Perspective Plan. Infrastructure development will also cater to the need for resilienceagainst damage from both, traditional and non-traditional threats, including natural
disasters.
Maritime logistics is all pervasive and impacts all naval functions, in peace and conflict.
The logistics supply chain will be strengthened commensurate with the growing force
levels, related increase in inventory and support infrastructure, envisaged higher tempo
of operations, and simultaneous support to maritime forces operating in dispersed areas.
This will be achieved by augmenting existing infrastructure and creating additional
logistics nodes, enhancing or restructuring organisational and functional hierarchies
where required, reinforcing human capital, and harnessing technologies, including
software, to enhance agility and responsiveness.

New and Evolving Technologies
The Indian Navy will opt for ‘leapfrogging’ technologies, to ensure that a high percentage
of assets with contemporary equipment remains capable of combating emergent

These aspects would also entail participation of the private sector, which will aid
development of an indigenous defence industry and a strong R&D base. Some of the newand evolving technologies that will need investment are:-threats. This will be pursued by encouraging building of partnerships with suitable• Future Satellites. Satellites are a force multiplier and are central to communications,organisations, both national and foreign, and supporting focused investments in R&D

MDA and NCO. The Indian Navy has been at the forefront of seeking developmentof new technologies, preferably with a compatible market interface for product support.

of indigenous satellites for uses in the maritime domain. It shall continue to givethrust to this vital element, in accordance with its Space Vision 2014-2027.
• Precision Weapon Technologies. In view of our dense maritime and air environment,

As force levels and technologies are enhanced, the support infrastructure
will also need to be developed and upgraded, with wider naval shore support
across all coastal states and Union Territories

accurate and precise weapons and systems will be essential. Induction of suitable
technologies to aid precision attack will be a thrust area, especially acoustic, laserand signal processing. Focus will be given to development of inertial navigation
systems, fibre-optic gyros, micro-miniature electronic modules, digital cartography
and homing technologies.

144 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Strategy for Maritime Force and Capability Development 145

footprint. In this regard, the Indian Navy has already implemented an ‘Environment

In line with the growing global and national requirement to balanceenvironmental and security concerns, the Indian Navy will progressincorporation of sustainable green technologies

Conservation Roadmap’ for its bases, which seeks to achieve charted ‘green
initiatives’. These include Green Rating for Integrated Habitat Assessment (GRIHA),
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), and Indian Green
Building Council (IGBC) norms. Also, technologies adaptive to climate change willbe amalgamated into suitable designs and systems.
• Nano-Technology. Nano-technology will have significant implications for military• Electromagnetic and Laser Technologies. Electromagnetic technologies for aircraft

forces, particularly in the fields of information exchange, sensors and mechanicaland projectile launch, and directed energy systems using solid-state/ fibre-optic

systems. The technology would serve to increase capability and enhance capacity,lasers, are being developed by the leading navies in the world. Induction of theseby reducing size, weight and signature, with increased tensile strengths using newtechnologies for our next generation naval systems will be a focus area.

materials. The Indian Navy will encourage research and development in nano-• Propulsion and Power Technology. The emphasis will be to provide assets
with increased reach and sustenance, longer operational periods, and reduced

technology, in recognition of its strategic effect, and in consideration of the time andresources required to be invested.

maintenance. Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) for submarines, and nuclear
propulsion for both submarines and ships, constitute the next evolutionary step.
The option of electrical propulsion will also be examined, for reduction of noiselevels and provision of power for next generation weapons and systems.
• Unmanned Marine Systems. The applications of unmanned marine systems (UMS) in
warfare have been steadily growing in recent years. Investments in UMS (air, surface
and underwater) technology and military application systems will, accordingly, bepursued towards uses for maritime security.
• Computation and Automation Technologies. Exponential growth in computing
capabilities has aided improvements in performance of processor-based sensors,
reducing the sensor-to-shooter cycle. To further augment naval systems, nichetechnologies in system architecture, artificial intelligence, computing (molecular,
quantum and cloud) and 3D printing, will be explored.
• Cyber Security Technologies. The increasing role of cyber space and technologies
in our security architecture makes cyber security of critical importance. The
development of cyber security technologies and systems will be a priority area for
the Indian Navy.
• Green Technologies. In line with the growing global and national requirement
to balance environmental and security concerns, the Indian Navy will progressincorporation of sustainable green technologies, towards achieving a zero carbon

Newer technologies and assets will enhance combat power andpotential – LCA (Navy) undertaking ski jump tests at SBTF, Goa

8
EPILOGUE

148 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

8

Epilogue
The Indian philosophical perspective of “vasudhaiva kutumbakam” (Sanskrit for“the world is but one family”) describes the inextricable linking of nations by theseas, in terms of resources, trade and maritime security. It leads on to the strategicneed to preserve peace, promote stability and maintain security within a regional andglobal framework, so as to alleviate poverty and promote all-round socio-economic
development. Considering the peninsular character and maritime nature of India, it
follows that the nation’s well being, prosperity and development are closely linked tosecurity of the seas. This has been in increasing evidence over recent decades, wherein
the maritime consciousness and outlook of India have also been evolving. As India
moves forward in the 21st century, the importance of the seas to its national interests
will continue to rise, with corresponding attention on the role of the Indian Navy insafeguarding the same.
The Indian Navy has grown, steadily and surely, from a fledgling surface flotillaat Independence, into a potent, multi-dimensional, balanced and professional force,
capable of undertaking the full spectrum of maritime operations. At the same time,
maritime threats and challenges to India’s national interests have also been increasing.
While the scope of traditional threats has become more complex, the spread of

As India moves forward in the 21st century, the importance of the seas to its
national interests will continue to increase. The threats to these interests
and national security in the maritime domain will need constant appraisal,and measures to prevent and counter their rise

The Indian Navy has grown into a potent, multi-dimensional, balanced andprofessional force, capable of undertaking the full spectrum of maritime operations

Epilogue 151

focusing on its capability, readiness posture and communication of intent. In orderfor deterrence to be credible and succeed, the Indian Navy will remain prepared for
conflict, in synergy with the other armed forces and in pursuance of higher directions
for national defence and security.
The seamless nature of the maritime domain enables ready flow of threats andchallenges from one area to another. In order to ensure secure seas, the Indian
Navy will endeavour to build a favourable and positive maritime environment, andenhance net maritime security in our neighbourhood, in cooperation with maritime
forces from friendly nations. However, to safeguard against these threats reaching
Indian shores, especially maritime terrorism, substantive steps have also been taken
in recent years to revamp our coastal and offshore security framework. These shallbe strengthened, so as to prevent, repulse and eliminate threats to India’s security
in coastal and offshore areas. The Indian Navy shall pursue a collaborative andcoordinated approach in this regard, with a central and growing role for the Indian
Review of strategies and development of force levels will be a continuous process

Coast Guard and other maritime agencies.
The Indian Navy will also continue to develop its force levels and capability forundertaking the range of missions and tasks, to provide overall maritime security
and safeguard national maritime interests into the future. The efforts to develop all

non-traditional threats has been increasing, particularly over the past decade. These

three elements of naval combat power, viz. conceptual, human and physical, will

include maritime terrorism, piracy, natural disasters and regional crises, which havebe progressed. The focus will remain on developing and maintaining the Navy as aacquired greater incidence and prominence. Operating largely away from the public

continually formidable, multi-dimensional, balanced and networked force, capable ofgaze, the task of the ‘silent service’ has become more challenging in recent years.

countering the full range of maritime threats and challenges.

Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy has been developed after a

The maritime security strategy shall continue to be reviewed and refined, in relation

comprehensive review of India’s maritime environment, including prevailing threats,

to developments in the maritime strategic environment, so as to remain contemporary

challenges and future trends. A wide consultative process was undertaken, both within

and relevant.

the Navy, and with the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, joint organisations, and experts
in the strategic and academic community. This provided a holistic perspective, which
served to guide the revision process and crafting of the current strategy.
The maritime security strategy comprises five constituent strategies, each of which
employs multiple doctrinal roles, with their associated objectives, missions and tasks,
in an interrelated manner to provide an integrated, holistic approach to ensuring
India’s maritime security. The foundational strategy amongst these remains deterrence,
to prevent conflict and coercion against India. The Indian Navy will contribute todeterrence in the maritime domain, as part of national and joint military efforts, by

The Indian Navy will continue to develop its force levels and capability forundertaking the range of missions and tasks, to provide overall maritime
security and safeguard national maritime interests into the futureIndian Navy - Sailing ahead in the 21st century

Notes 155

154 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Notes
Chapter 1
1Address at ceremonial reception of INSV Mhadei, at Mumbai, on 06 April 2013.

2

As per directives of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), in February 2009. See www.
mod.nic.in/forms/Mainlinks.aspx?lid=1529&Id=0 and mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2014-pdfs/rs171214/2701.pdf, last accessed on 01 August 2015.

3

The Maritime Zones of India have been defined in the ‘The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf,
Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976’. There are four maritime zones
measured in nautical miles (nm) from the promulgated baseline – Territorial Waters (12 nm),Contiguous Zone (24 nm), Exclusive Economic Zone (200 nm), and Continental Shelf (upto 350
nm). The areas of maritime interest have been defined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009, pp. 6568, and have been amplified in Chapter 2 of this strategy.

4

Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009, Chapter 7, pp. 89-122.

15

Major port comes under the jurisdiction of the Union Government, and non-major port under therespective coastal state where it is located.

16

The Economic Times dated 27 March 2015. www.articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-27/
news/60475179_1_waterways-varanasi-haldia-port-led-development, last accessed on 29 July 2015.

17

dahd.nic.in/dahd/WriteReadData/Animal%20Husbandry%20English%202014-2015%20(1).pdf,
Chapter 5, last accessed on 08 August 2015.

18

Ibid. Marine fish production increased from 2.447 million tonnes in 1991-1992 to 3.443 million
tons in 2013-2014. The export value of fish products was INR 30,213 crores (about USD 4.9 billion)
during 2013-14, recording a growth of 5.98% in quantity and 60.23% in monetary value over theprevious fiscal year.

19

There are around 3,937 fishing villages, 1,896 traditional fish landing centres, 33 minor fishingharbours and six major fishing harbours, which serve as bases for India’s fishing fleet.

20

www.moes.gov.in/programmes/polymetallic-nodules-programme-pmn, last accessed on
08 August 2015. Seabed mining areas in the Indian Ocean have also been allocated to China(South-West Ridge) and the Republic of Korea (Mid-Indian Ridge).

21

As per data updated till January 2015, by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, there are around
11,379,746 NRIs and 17,075,280 PIOs residing in 206 nations/ territories. www.moia.gov.in, lastaccessed on 26 June 2015.

22

In 1993, RDX explosives were smuggled by sea to India’s West coast, by a criminal-terrorist nexus.
These were used for conducting serial blasts in Mumbai on 12 March 1993, which killed 257
civilians and injured over 700.

23

In November 2008, ten Pakistani terrorists from the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group, sailed out from
Karachi and commandeered an Indian fishing boat Kuber to Mumbai. After killing all its crew
members, the LeT terrorists proceeded ashore to carry out a series of twelve coordinated shooting
and bombing attacks between 26 and 29 November 2008, killing 166 civilians and wounding morethan 300, including both Indian and foreign nationals, besides causing considerable damage tocivilian property. Nine terrorists were killed and one captured by Indian security forces. The
terrorist attacks were revealed to have extensive links to Pakistani agencies and handlers (many ofwhom remain at large in Pakistan, including in public view).

24

These include explosives attacks against USS Cole off Aden in 2000, MV Limburg off Yemen in
2002, and Philippine Superferry 14 off Manila in 2004, and rocket attacks against MV Cosco in theSuez Canal in 2013, and an Egyptian naval vessel off Sinai in 2015.

25

Attempted hijacking of Pakistan Navy Ship Zulfiquar in Karachi in September 2014 by Pakistani
terrorists, and of an Egyptian Missile Boat in the Mediterranean Sea in November 2014, exemplify
this new threat.

26

The cost of piracy to the global economy has been estimated by the World Bank to be around USD
18 billion a year in increased trade costs, with an estimated USD 53 million average ransom paid
annually. See ‘The Pirates of Somalia: Enduring the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation’, Executive Summary,p.xxiii. www.worldbank.org/africa/piratesofsomalia, last accessed on 17 July 2015.

Chapter 2
5

KM Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History(George Allen and Unwin (India), 1946), p. 19.

6

As per previous surveys, India’s coastline was calculated at 7,516.6 km with 1,197 islands.
However, these are likely to increase based on current surveys.

7

National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government ofIndia. www.ncaor.gov.in/pages/researchview/8#, last accessed on 16 June 2015. India’s total
land mass area is 3.274 million sq. km

8

The five tenets of Panchsheel are - mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity andsovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

9

www.indiaculture.nic.in/project-mausam, last accessed on 29 July 2015.

10www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=0, last accessed on 29 July 2015. In hindi, ‘sagar’
means ‘ocean’.

11

www.investindia.gov.in/oil-and-gas-sector/, last accessed on 29 July 2015.

12

Sagarmala Press Release dated 25 March 2015, by Press Information Bureau, Government of India/
Cabinet. www.pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=117691, last accessed on 29 July 2015.

13

Ibid.

14

As noted by DG Shipping, this 6.6% comprises around 30,000 officers and 80,000 ratings. www.
dgshipping.gov.in/content/ourstrength.aspx, last accessed on 17 July 2015.

Notes 157

156 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
27

Fisheries constituted an export industry for Somalia, but the collapse of the Siad Barre government
in 1991 forestalled foreign investments and development of this industry.

28

The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 covers theregulations and related aspects for fishing by foreign vessels in the maritime zones of India.
Enforcement under this Act is a responsibility of the Indian Coast Guard, with empowerment also
accorded to the Indian Navy.

29

The International Maritime Organisation has issued revised interim recommendations for Flag
States regarding use of PCASP, apropos publication of International Standard ISO 28007-1:2015(Ships and marine technology – Guidelines for PMSC), on certification of PMSC. See IMO MSC.1/
Circ.1406/Rev.3 dated 12 June 2015. This is expected to assist the development of regulatory andstandardisation frameworks for PMSC and PCASP functioning. However, grey areas may still
continue in the interim and in case of non-adherence.

30

See IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, andVulnerability.Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [C.B. Field, V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J.
Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma,
E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 4.

Chapter 3
31 Article 2(4) of Draft Report on India’s Nuclear Doctrine, released on 17 August 1999 by the National
Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), upon reviewing the
progress in operationalising this doctrine, on 04 January 2003, promulgated a summary of thedoctrine that, in effect, constitutes the nuclear policy. www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916,
and www.pib.nic.in/archive/Ireleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html, last accessedon 31 July 2015.

38 A state of unstable deterrence would exist when the adversary is not convinced of the credibilityof the deterrent value, or perceives or observes a reduction in it and, therefore, pursues conflict or
coercion due to the inherent incentive of accruable gains over cost of conflict.
39 Strategic communication can be defined as the transmission of integrated and coordinated themes,
messages and actions that advance national interest and policies through synergised efforts of all
the agencies involved.
Chapter 4
40 The inherent right of self-defence, as enunciated in Article 51 of the UN Charter and examinedin various rulings by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), covers armed attacks not only by
regular armed forces of another state, but also armed attacks carried out by armed groups, bands,
irregulars, terrorists, mercenaries, who may be sent by or on behalf of a state. See Dieter Fleck (Ed.),
The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (UK, Oxford University Press, 2014), p.6.
41 Indian Maritime Doctrine, Op Cit., Chapter 9, pp.135-154.
42 Ibid, Chapter 4, pp.35-45
43 The Indian holy book, Bhagwad Gita, is essentially a discourse to the warrior Arjuna by the Lord
Krishna to take up his arms and fight, viz. use force, as a matter of dharma, i.e. rightful duty andrighteous conduct. The means and methods of warfare in India have always been governed byvenerable codes, as evinced in the description of the great epic Mahabharata.
44 This would qualify and complement the principles of concentration of force and economy of effort.
45 The term ‘laws of armed conflict’ is often used synonymously with ‘international humanitarianlaw’. The latter, however, is considered to be broader, as it also addresses peacetime obligations.
46 Also see, Dieter Fleck (Ed.), Op Cit., Chapter 10, ‘The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea’, pp.463-547.
47 This would qualify and complement the principle of selection and maintenance of aim.

32 Ibid. CCS Review, Article 2 (ii), 04 January 2003. However, in case of a major chemical or biologicalweapons attack, the option for retaliation with nuclear weapons would be retained.

48 Indian Maritime Doctrine, Op Cit., p.141.

33 Idem and Article 2(v).

50 Ibid, p.143.

34 Cold War experience has shown that reduction in the first-strike and increase in the second-strike(retaliatory) component considerably stabilises and strengthens deterrence. The rationale is based
upon the survivability of an SSBN in a first-strike, which makes the command system confident
that retribution can be made in an assured, planned manner.

51 Ibid., pp.78-83.

35 NSAB Report, Op Cit., Article 2(4) and 2(7).

49 Ibid, p.42

52 ‘A2/AD’ or ‘Anti-Access/ Area Denial’ is a relatively recent term, which is essentially sea denial
itself, but includes aspects of air-space denial as well. However, while the concept of sea denial
focuses on the ‘sea area’, the use of air assets, including sea-based, are endemic therein.

36 Indian Maritime Doctrine, Op Cit. p.26, 123-131

Chapter 5

37 NSAB Report, Op Cit., Article 2(7).

53 Prime Minister’s address on the commissioning of Mauritian Coast Guard Ship Barracuda,
at Mauritius on 12 March 2015. www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-thecommissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda, last accessed 08 August 2015.

158 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Notes 159

54 During his address to the Naval Commanders Conference on 12 October 2011, Shri AK Antony,
the then Defence Minister, stated that the Indian Navy had been mandated to be a ‘net security
provider’ to island nations in the IOR. www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=76590, lastaccessed on 29 July 2015. Noting India’s contributions to regional stability, on 23 May 2013, thethen Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh, noted that India was well positioned to become a net
provider of security in our immediate region and beyond.

65 For example, in 2011, the UN Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf approved a joint
submission of Mauritius and Seychelles, under Article 76 of UNCLOS, on Limits of the Continental
Shelf concerning the Mascarene Plateau. The submission was based upon hydrographic survey
undertaken at Saya de Malha bank for Mauritius, by INS Investigator (2008). Commissioning of a
Hydrographic Technical Support Team (HTST) at Mauritius in 2013, the first of its kind overseas, isanother example of the growing hydrographic assistance and cooperation.

55 NSAB Report, Op Cit, Article 1(4).

66 Waters beyond territorial waters of 12 nm are termed as international waters, while waters beyond
the EEZ of 200 nm, are termed as high seas.

56 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP) is an inter-governmental initiative. The Indian Coast Guard represents India at
ReCAAP meetings, and is our focal agency for information sharing and coordination of actions
under ReCAAP.
57 The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) provides a forum for cooperation
amongst governments, industry and maritime forces, in efforts to counter piracy. The Indian
Navy participates in CGPCS interactions, along with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) andDirectorate General of Shipping.
58 The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism facilitates tactical coordination andinformation sharing on conduct of anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, amongst the various
maritime forces and agencies deployed in the region. The Indian Navy regularly participates in
SHADE interactions.

67 The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) has set up an Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in 2009,
which links 65 agencies across 35 countries. It houses 16 International Liaison Officers (ILOs),
including one officer from the Indian Navy, and facilitates information sharing and collaboration
amongst these countries to enhance maritime security. Seychelles has also set up a Regional Fusionand Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea (REFLECS3) in 2013, which includes
sharing and development of intelligence against piracy and other transnational organised crimes,
to augment maritime security.
68 The Indian Navy commenced CORPATs with the Indonesian Navy in 2002, with the Royal Thai
Navy in 2005, and with the Myanmar Navy in 2013.
69 The coordination is done through mutually established Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), toenhance the coverage, efficiency and efficacy of patrols by both navies.

59 Indian Maritime Doctrine, Op Cit., p.30. Persuasion is convincing another state, by diplomatic means
and without the threat or use of force, to carry out certain actions that are in its own interests,
by emphasising the benefits of the actions to that state. Dissuasion is convincing another state, by
diplomatic means and without the threat or use of force, to desist from carrying out certain actions
that are inimical to our interests, by emphasising the disadvantages of the actions to that state.

70 In the past, the Indian Navy has undertaken MIO against a mercenary group fleeing Maldivesonboard MV Progress Light, after a failed coup in 1988, and against LTTE movements by sea in the
1990s. It has also deployed ships for conduct of MIO against seaward threats to the African Union
Summit in 2003 in Maputo, and to the World Economic Forum and Afro-Pacific-Caribbean (APC)summit in Mozambique in 2004.

60 Bengaluru Communiqué, 11th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the IORA, 15 November 2011.
www.iora.net/documents/communique.aspx., last accessed on 17 July 2015.

71 The Indian Navy has contributed to UN Humanitarian Relief Operations in Somalia, from 1992
to 1994, by conducting seaward patrols, transportation of humanitarian aid, and de-induction ofIndian Army troops on completion of their UN PSO mission.

61 Perth Communiqué, 13th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the IORA, 01 November 2013, and14th Meeting on 09 October 2014. www.iora.net/documents/communique.aspx., last accessed on
17 July 2015.
62 The term also extends to heads of designated principal agencies responsible for maritime security,
in states where there is no formally constituted ‘navy’.
63 www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.html?23037/NSA+level+meeting+on+trilateral+Maritime+
Security+ Cooperation+between+India+Sri+Lanka+Maldives, last accessed on 31 July 2015.
64 These are mostly under the ambit of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)
programmes, under the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Over the past four decades, the Indian
Navy has trained more than 11,000 foreign naval, coast guard and marine police personnel fromabout 40 countries. Presently, the Indian Navy offers around 25 training courses for officers and 100
courses for sailors, covering a variety of disciplines.

72 The obligation of ships to assist vessels in distress and safety of life at sea is enshrined in traditionand endorsed in international law, vide the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea(SOLAS) 1974. This has been augmented by an international treaty covering the responsibilitiesof governments, with emphasis on regional approach and coordination vide the International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention), 1979, with revised Annex 1998.
India acceded to the Convention in May 2001.
73 See revised National Maritime Search and Rescue Plan promulgated in 2013. www.indiancoastguard.
nic.in/indiancoastguard/sar/SAR%20PLAN%20f2013%20.pdf.

Notes 161

160 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Chapter 6
74 In 1990, the LTTE terrorist threat led to the institution of IN-ICG Op Tasha off the Tamil Nadu coast,with increased surveillance, patrols and maritime interdiction operations at sea, even as the statepolice and security agencies adapted to the new threat. The operation is still continuing. Similarly,
IN-ICG Op Swan was launched in 1993, in the wake of the terrorist blasts in Mumbai, to enhancesurveillance and patrolling off the coasts of Gujarat and Maharashtra, against criminal-terrorist
infiltration, as an interim measure till development of the coastal security structure. This wasmaintained as a joint IN-ICG operation till early 2012, whereupon it subsumed in the revamped
coastal security structure in the ICG led Op Avardhan, which commenced in end-2011.
75 After the Kargil war in 1999, and review of the national security apparatus, several measures were
initiated to revamp India’s coastal security, with focus on strengthening the Marine Police andICG. A new Coastal Security Scheme was approved in 2005, to be implemented over five years. The
measures were still being developed when maritime terrorism struck in a new form, with armed
terrorists from Pakistan landing on the Mumbai coast on 26 November 2008 (‘26/11’), to carry out
direct attacks on premeditated targets.
76 CCS Directives, Op Cit.
77 Coast Guard Act, 1978, Sections 1 and 14. www.indiancoastguard.nic.in.
78 MoD Annual Report 2014-15, Section 6.5. mod.nic.in/writeraddata/AR1415.pdf.
79 Idem.
80 As per UNCLOS, the territorial waters extend upto 12 nm from the normal baseline (low-water line
along the coast) or straight baselines (in case of indented coasts and fringe of islands), as applicable,with the sea area on the landward side of these baselines forming part of the internal waters. The
contiguous zone extends upto 24 nm from the applicable baseline, i.e. a further 12 nm beyond theterritorial waters. The IMBL delimits the maritime zones between adjacent states, from the coast
upto the limits of the EEZ. The IMBL between India and Sri Lanka also delimits the ‘historic waters’in Palk Bay, which constitute internal waters on each side.
81 Coast Guard Act, Op Cit.
82 Coordinated by the Indian Navy, INSPIRES is used by Indian vessels above 100 GRT and on
voluntary-basis by foreign vessels operating in the Arabian Sea/ Bay of Bengal.
83 Coordinated by the Indian Coast Guard, INDSAR is a computerised system used by Indian vessels
above 100 GRT and on voluntary-basis by foreign vessels operating in the Indian Search and Rescue
Region (ISRR).
84 Coordinated by the Coast Guard, ISLEREP is a voice communication system for vessels closing
within 20 nm of the islands of Andaman & Nicobar, and the Lakshadweep Group.
85 Coordinated by port authorities, PANS applies to all vessels intending to enter Indian ports. The
information is received by respective port authorities, and also relayed to the Indian Coast Guard
and Indian Navy.

86 Coordinated by DG Shipping, LRIT is a satellite-based system, promulgated by the IMO, provides
information on ships above 300 GRT operating within 1,000 nm of India’s coast. The information is
also relayed to Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard.
87 Promulgated by IMO, AIS is applicable to ships above 300 GRT, using VHF radio frequencies withnormal ‘line-of-sight’ ranges of 15-20 nm.
88 The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Resourcesat-2 satellite has been fitted with AIS-SB.
It relays information received from shipborne AIS systems to the IN and other maritime agencies,
and provides an updated picture of global shipping traffic at regular intervals.
89 ADS-B is a satellite-based system that provides information of an aircraft, to other aircraft, ships
and ground stations.
90 In addition to issuance of fishermen biometric identity cards by the Department of Animal
Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries (DADF) to the fishermen, the coastal village community of
about 6.5 million has been issued with biometric identity cards by the Registrar General of India(RGI), which has also developed a composite card reader Pramanika, compatible for both types ofcards.
91 Since 2009, the ICG has conducted more than 3,652 CIPs along all coastal villages/ hamlets. Inputs
from CGHQ, July 2015.
92 Sagar Rakshak Dal was set up in Maharashtra in 1999, with IN assistance. Similar initiatives havebeen progressed in recent years in other states, including Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.
Chapter 7
93 Indian Maritime Doctrine, Op Cit., Chapter 8, pp 123 – 131, covers these elements in detail asinterrelated components of Naval Combat Power.
94 Maritime Military Strategy for India 1989-2014.
95 The Indian naval design organisation was established in 1954, and has a matured capability with awide range of sophisticated ship designs.

162 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Explanatory Notes 163

Explanatory Notes

and order, measures to monitor and regulate activities with a bearing on security, and aspects related
to defence in case of armed threat or attack in coastal waters. In view of the range of activities, directly
and indirectly affecting India’s coastal security, there are a large number of agencies that are involvedin the coastal security framework.

Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations are joint military operations wherein land forces
are projected ashore from the sea. Inherently complex, and requiring the highest degree of jointness
and coordination amongst the three armed forces, these operations require specialised capabilities
in all dimensions to be synchronised and seamless. The operation would require sea control, which
includes Favourable Air Situation (FAS), in the maritime spaces during the transit phase and on arrivalin the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), including maritime approaches, beach-head and landward
area of operations. This will ensure safe and rapid movement of the landing force from ship to shore,
amphibious build-up ashore, and maintenance of the landing force from the sea.

Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN). The Indian Coast Guard has established a CSN, to integrate
the surveillance information obtained from the static surveillance chain. The CSN would be further
augmented and expanded to cover additional radar sites and sources of information.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capability. The submarine, with its stealth features and array of
weapons and sensors, projects a potent threat. It is the primary instrument for exercising sea denial
against SLOCs and naval operations. Therefore, development of strong ASW capability is essential tocounter adversary submarine forces. This includes integral ASW capability within the naval fleet for
its protection, and for deployment of dedicated forces in coastal waters and for open ocean ASW. The
ASW capability comprises both ships and aircraft, including shore-based and integral.
Carrier Battle Group (CBG). Aircraft carriers are central to fleet operations and the concept of sea
control, as they offer flexibility and versatility of a very high order. These mobile airfields combine
substantial integral air power with mobility, to provide ubiquitous and enhanced combat power
across vast maritime spaces, and the advantage of rapid redeployment. The aircraft carrier operates
in a composite CBG with multi-mission ships as escorts against multi-dimensional threats, and withlogistics ships for extending their reach and sustenance.
Carrier Task Force (CTF). The CTF is a self-supporting force capable of undertaking the full range
of operational tasks in all dimensions. These include Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare(ASuW), ASW, Maritime Strike, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Presence and Surveillance Missions(PSMs). The CTF comprises one or more CBGs, with additional Surface Action Groups (SAGs), AAW,
ASuW and ASW forces, and integral logistics ships. Dedicated forces may be attached to the CTF as per
mission requirements, such as for conduct of Expeditionary, Out-of-Area, or Amphibious Operations.
Coastal Defence. Coastal defence is primarily a military function of defending the nation andcitizens against seaborne threat of conventional and sub-conventional armed attacks in coastal areas.
It encompasses measures to prevent, counter and neutralise such attacks, both in the coastal areas
and further seawards, before the threat can be brought to bear on the coast. Seaborne attacks against
our coast, and offshore assets, could include use of missiles, mines, guns and explosives, by ships,
submarines, aircraft and marine/ Special Forces, and even by collision or scuttling of vessels. Coastal
defence entails protection from such seaborne attacks against the coast and coastal assets, including
populace, ports, harbours, infrastructure, Vital Areas and Vital Points (VAs/ VPs).
Coastal Security. Coastal security is a subset of maritime security, focused on the coastal waters. It
entails the protection, preservation and promotion of peace, stability and security in coastal waters,
against various threats. This would enable the pursuit of legitimate activities in the coastal waters andalso adjacent coastal land. The ensuring of coastal security would encompass the maintenance of law

Coastal Waters. The term ‘coast’ implies the land next to the sea, demarcated by the low-water line,
while the word ‘coastal’ means along or near the coast. A coastal area may, thus, cover both, a certain
water area seawards of the coastline and also a land area at or along the coastline. The coastal zone
would, hence, comprise a ‘coastal waters zone’ and a ‘coastal land zone’. The coastal waters zone isconsidered, in the context of coastal security, as the water area that is seawards of the Indian coast(low-water line), upto the limits of India’s contiguous zone or the IMBL, in case the latter is nearer. The
concept of coastal waters extends upto the contiguous zone so as to provide the necessary space andfocus on timely detection and response, considering the short time it may take for threats to traverse
this distance to the coast. The coastal waters would, thus, comprise any internal waters between India’s
coast and straight baselines, its territorial waters, and upto the contiguous zone/ IMBL. In some areas,such as in India’s island groups and gulfs, the coastal waters may extend to more than 24 nm from thenearest Indian coast, due to larger swathe of internal waters, as per India’s straight baselines.
Defence. Defence is defined as protection against attack. The right to self-defence is enshrined innational and international law, and covers both individual and collective self-defence against armed
attack. It applies to situations where an armed attack has taken place, and also situations where armed
attack is imminent. The concept of defence is the basis for the right to use force, governed by therules of engagement and the various laws of armed conflict. The concepts of security and defence areinterrelated and mutually supportive. While security has a broader connotation, wherein force may or
may not be required, in the case of defence there is an intrinsic role and likely requirement for the useof force to counter the armed threat as per the prevalent circumstances and conditions.
Deterrence. Deterrence is the prevention of conflict and coercion, by convincing a potential adversarythat the cost of such aggression would be higher than the gains accrued, and hence it would serve hisinterests better to refrain or resile from aggressive plans and actions. In this, the understanding andinterpretation by the potential adversary, of one’s capability, resolve and preparedness in relation tohis, would remain pivotal. It is essential that such capability and commitment are not only present, but
are also convincingly seen as being present, through appropriate communication of one’s posture andintent. Strategic communication will, thus, play a key role in deterrence. Deterrence can be achievedin two principal ways – by denying the gains or by raising the costs for the adversary. The former isknown as ‘deterrence by denial’, while the latter is termed as ‘deterrence by punishment’.
Deterrence by Denial. Deterrence by denial is based on assurance of being able to prevent theaggressor from accruing the desired gains, regardless of the costs and effort invested by either side.
It requires maintenance of requisite capability and portrayal of appropriate posture. This should
assure effective defence against any aggression, sustained for the duration, scale and intensity ofconflict, while simultaneously applying suitable leverages upon the aggressor. These would include
direct and indirect pressures, aimed at rendering the aggressor’s actions ineffective by preventing
accomplishment of his goals.

164 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Deterrence by Punishment. Deterrence by punishment is based on assurance of imposing high costs
and punishment on the aggressor, such as to outweigh any gains that he may accrue. This requires
maintenance of a robust and resilient military capability, which can provide assured retaliation. Itshould be able to absorb and contain the initial aggression, and to take such punitive retaliationthat would outweigh the aggressor’s envisaged gains. The capability and intent to impose suchpunishment, in response to aggression, will also need to be adequately portrayed to the potential
adversary for deterrence to be effective.
Doctrine. Doctrine is a body of thought on a subject describing established beliefs and principles, whichenable wider understanding of the issue, thereby guiding further activities related to that subject. It
may include a framework of concepts and considerations, and also practices and procedures, whichhave been derived and developed over a period of time, based on cumulative study and accumulated
experience. For military forces, doctrines exist at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At thestrategic level, doctrine is based on thoughts, beliefs and principles; at the operational level, it iscentered on principles and concepts; and at the tactical level, it mainly comprises practices and also theframework for procedures. Tactical level doctrines would, thus, include what are often called Fighting/Manoeuvering/ Tactical Instructions. While tactical doctrines are generally prescriptive, flexibility andinitiative continue to be necessary and important. Doctrines at the strategic and operational levels,
however, are mostly descriptive and are to be seen as a set of guiding principles rather than beingprescriptive. Whilst such doctrine is authoritative in nature, and provides a common approach tounderstanding and approaching the subject, it neither prescribes a specific manner of dealing with thesubject, nor should it be seen as dogma. Strategic doctrine, thus, guides policy and supports strategy,
but does not dictate these.
Indian Maritime Doctrine. The Indian Maritime Doctrine describes the foundational concepts,
considerations, characteristics and principles related to the understanding and application ofmaritime power. The maritime doctrine, accordingly, provides the conceptual framework related
to the development of maritime power and for the employment of maritime forces, particularly the
Indian Navy. It describes the range of activities of the Indian Navy in both peace and conflict acrossthe spectrum of operations, including the broad roles of the Indian Navy, viz. military, diplomatic,
constabulary and benign, with their associated objectives, missions and operational tasks. The maritime
doctrine therefore ‘guides’ the ways in which the Indian Navy would be developed, organised,equipped, trained and employed. However, it does not prescribe or describe specific ways, which is tobe done by the corresponding strategies and related plans.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). The IONS, conceptualised and activated by the Indian
Navy in 2008, is a regional forum of navies, which aims to attain mutually beneficial maritime security
outcomes in the Indian Ocean. It is an open, inclusive, consultative and cooperative forum, whichfunctions on consensual basis. It provides a platform to promote shared understanding of maritime
issues, formulation of common strategies and cooperative measures, and strengthen capability andinteroperability amongst regional navies, to address various maritime security challenges. IONS is aforum wherein the Chiefs of Navy of all littoral states of the Indian Ocean can regularly meet (the term
also extends to heads of designated principal agencies responsible for maritime security, in states
where there is no formally constituted ‘navy’), to share maritime strategic perspectives and promotemechanisms for constructive engagement, to enhance maritime security. The majority of Indian
Ocean littoral nations are represented at IONS, with 22 navies as members and four as observers.

Explanatory Notes 165
IONS has gained momentum since its inception, with a steady growth in activities including biennial
Conclave of Chiefs, endorsement of its Charter of Business, conduct of seminars, workshops andessay competitions, and formation of IONS Working Groups (IWGs), to harness areas of expertiseand develop common approaches, cooperative solutions and standard operating procedures, so as
to address the range of maritime security challenges. The IONS facilitates development of relations
and wide consultations between all maritime forces operating in the region. It provides a strong
mechanism for developing a favourable and positive maritime environment. The Indian Navy plays
a leading role in IONS.
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) was formed in
1997, with India as a founding member. Founded as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the name was changed to Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2013. It
has 20 member states, six dialogue partners, and two observers, which are expected to increase in theyears ahead. All 20 members of IORA also have their respective navies as members of IONS. IORA
is primarily an inter-governmental movement, steered by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
with participation from business sectors and academia. It is considered the lead body for enhancing
regional cooperation amongst nations on the Indian Ocean Rim, towards economic growth anddevelopment. Since the 2011 meeting in Bengaluru, IORA has highlighted the key linkage of maritime
security with regional economic growth and development. It has also endorsed the role of IONS, andcalled for IORA’s work on maritime security to align with and complement IONS initiatives.
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is an all-encompassing term that involves being
cognisant of the position and intentions of all actors, whether own, hostile or neutral, in all dimensionsof a dynamic maritime environment, across the areas of interest. MDA is central to the InformationDecision-Action (IDA) cycle in the maritime environment. It is a key enabler for maritime security andlies at the core of all constituent strategies for maritime security, as it governs awareness of what and
who is operating in the maritime domain relevant to our security – on, over and under the seas. MDA
is never complete or absolute, and requires a constant, continuing effort to maintain and develop.
The knowledge is sought to be made up through Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) andsharing of information. It enables early identification of potential threats, timely planning of responses,
more informed decision-making with suitable prioritisation of missions and allocation of resources.
MDA is essential for effective actions at all levels of maritime operations – strategic, operational
and tactical. The development of MDA relies upon various sources of information, including space,
air, surface, underwater, cyber, human, and their correlation and constant assessment. Advancesin technology of platforms, sensors and weapons, increased density in the maritime environment,changes in the trade flow patterns and interactions between nations and regions, all impact the scopeof awareness required, and also corresponding efforts for degrading the adversary’s MDA.
Maritime Manoeuvre. Maritime manoeuvre describes the ability of naval forces to employ movement
to incapacitate the enemy’s resistance and decision-making cycle, through shock and disruption.
Maritime forces have inherent attributes of access, mobility, reach, sustenance, flexibility and versatility.
These enable their quick deployment and redeployment, to apply combat power across vast maritime
spaces, for a range of missions. The utilisation of manoeuvre enables concentration of force at therequired place and time, which is essential for countering surprise, gaining the initiative, and obtaining
decisive results.

166 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Maritime Security Strategy. The maritime security strategy operates within the broader national
security concepts and framework, to protect, preserve and promote national maritime interests, against
prevailing and assessed threats and challenges, taking into consideration the risks, vulnerabilities
and opportunities. The central theme is to provide requisite freedom to use the seas for the pursuitof maritime activities, in support of national development and prosperity, and promote legitimate
use of the maritime global commons. The maritime security strategy provides a set of plans (ways)
for provision of maritime security (ends), by employment and development of suitable elements ofnational maritime power, especially naval power, including coordinated and cooperative efforts withother maritime forces and agencies (means). While it denotes a singular, overarching strategy in effect,
it comprises several constituent strategies that overlap in some segments and are distinct in others, but
are all interlinked and mutually complementary.
Maritime Strike. Maritime strike is the projection of accurate combat force onto a maritime or strategic
target, at sea or ashore, with the purpose of destroying or damaging it. Maritime strike is the primarymethod by which combat power is exercised at and from the sea. It exemplifies the role of force in themaritime domain, especially reach, mobility and precision. It is qualified by the ability to distinguishand attack the chosen target in the maritime domain with accuracy, usually from longer, beyond visualranges, which also entails some form of guidance and control logic for initiating arming/ explosion.
Maritime strike covers the range of combat strikes at sea, viz. anti-surface, anti-submarine and antiair, with weapons launched from aerial, seaborne, underwater and shore platforms. The weapons
used include missiles (anti-surface, anti-air and land attack), torpedoes, smart bombs, and guns. It is
dependent upon MDA and accurate targeting information, provided by either integral sensors or in acooperative engagement with a consort platform.
Merchant Shipping Information System (MSIS). The data obtained from the National Automatic
Identification System (NAIS) network and other sources of AIS-based information, including open
source ‘white shipping’ information, is correlated, fused and disseminated on a dedicated MSIS,
developed by the Indian Navy.
MILAN. The word MILAN means ‘unification’, or ‘a meeting’, or ‘a gathering of people’, in Hindi. It isthe name given to the operational interaction held at Port Blair (Andaman & Nicobar Islands), between
regional navies. It is an initiative of the Indian Navy to bring together navies of the region at a common
operational forum, where they can interact professionally, socially and culturally. This aims to develop
mutual understanding and respect, share operational experiences and promote cooperation, towards
strengthening common maritime security. It is a biennial event, held over five days, with participatingnavies sending their ships, aircraft and delegates. The first MILAN was held in 1995 with participationof five navies, which has steadily increased over the years to 17 navies participating in the 9th MILAN
in 2014, from South-East Asia, Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions.
Mine Warfare. Mining remains an economical and effective way of disrupting movement of naval andmerchant shipping, with a disproportionate effect on military and economic activities, especially port
operations. Mine warfare, which includes both mine laying and mine clearance, may be conducted
defensively off our own coast, or offensively in areas of likely enemy operation, normally harbours
and choke points. Mines that are laid would also need to be cleared on completion of hostilities. Mine
Counter Measures (MCM) include the use of dedicated MCM forces in synergy with intelligence, route
mapping, surveillance at the operational and tactical levels, reconnaissance, and protection of nonMCM forces. Mine clearance by dedicated MCM vessels are carried out both before the outbreak ofhostilities and during war, to ensure unrestricted movement of shipping.

Explanatory Notes 167
National Automatic Identification System Network (NAIS). The Directorate General of Lighthouses
and Lightships (DGLL) has developed a NAIS network in coordination with the Indian Navy andIndian Coast Guard, by setting up of shore stations on existing lighthouses, for tracking of vessels
equipped with AIS. The new proprietary system developed for smaller (sub-20 m), non-AIS vessels
would be compatible with this network.
National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network (NC3IN). The Indian Navyhas established the NC3IN linking 51 stations, including 20 of the Navy and 31 of the Coast Guard, witha nodal Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC). Information from various sources,
including CSN, Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), NAIS, Space-Based AIS, Vessel and
Air Traffic Management System (VATMS), and other, open sources are fused at the IMAC, to develop
a correlated picture of maritime traffic.
National MDA (NMDA). Under the NMDA project, the NC3IN system between the Indian Navy andIndian Coast Guard will be progressively extended to other stakeholders for further improving overall
MDA and coordination, by linking all maritime agencies, coastal states and union territories. It willaugment the present NC3IN with additional information obtained from ongoing and new projects,
including information on fishing and merchant vessels.
National Security. National security implies the protection, preservation and promotion of the national
interests, against internal and external threats and challenges. Maintenance of national security
is critical for providing the necessary freedom, and removing fear and hindrances to the pursuit oflife, happiness and prosperity for a nation’s populace. India’s security is an integral component of its
development process. Ensuring national security is, thus, a key element of national strategy.
National Security Strategy. The essence of national security relies upon the availability of appropriate
national power, particularly military power, as no nation can be secure unless it possesses thenecessary strength to protect itself and its citizens. Comprehensive national power, including military
power, therefore, comprises the means for providing national security, which represents the ends
defined in the national security objectives. The suitable ways for developing and employing national
power, to meet the national security objectives, within the broad contours of the national security
policy, would constitute the national security strategy. This safeguards national security by optimallydeveloping and appropriately using suitable elements of national power, including military power, inconsideration of the prevailing threats and emergent challenges. The term ‘grand strategy’ has often
been used interchangeably to denote both national strategy and national security strategy. The militarycomponents of the national security policy and national security strategy are enunciated in the Defence
Minister’s ‘Op Directive’, which provides the basis for development of the Joint Military Strategy and thecorresponding Land, Maritime and Air Strategies.
National Values. National values evolve from a nation’s culture and history. They represent a nation’s
civilisational beliefs, core principles, and ‘way of life’, which govern and guide its national aims andinterests. In India, an ancient, continuing civilisation with rich, varied cultures and a long history,
national values are duly reflected in the sustained presence of practically every culture and religion
in the country. India’s belief in plurality, respect for diversity, centrality of righteousness, necessityof balance, acceptance of social responsibility, pursuance of law, promotion of accountability andjustice, are some such principles that find resonance in the nation’s culture and societal philosophy
over the centuries. These aspects, along with the centrality of human equality, egalitarian ethos and168 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategysocial justice, have also been reiterated in the preamble, fundamental rights, fundamental duties anddirective principles enshrined in the Constitution of India. The national aim evolves from the national
values and provides the basis for deriving national interests.
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEO are operations undertaken, on directions fromthe Government of India, for the evacuation of non-combatant Indian citizens from foreign nations,when their lives are endangered by conflict, civil unrest or natural disaster, to designated safe havens.
NEO are undertaken by the armed forces and other state agencies, essentially maritime and aviation,
operating in close coordination with the MEA. In case of large scale NEO, or where safety and securityof the embarkation point is not available, and force may have to be used to protect the civilians, theIndian Army may also be involved.
Offshore Defence. Offshore defence entails the defence of India’s offshore assets against conventionaland sub-conventional warfare, and is closely related to coastal defence. It is provided by the IndianNavy, in coordination with the Indian Coast Guard and Indian Air Force. Command and control overmobile forces and static defences, in the defence of offshore installations, is carried out by the Flag
Officer Offshore Defence Advisory Group (FODAG), under the respective Naval Commanders-inChief (Cs-in-C), who are also the Cs-in-C Coastal Defence.
Operational Tempo. Operational tempo, also called op tempo, refers to the pace of operational activities
across the IDA cycle. A high op tempo would require the ability to maintain MDA amidst changes inoperational environment and effect of various events, take swift decisions in response to the emerging
situation, and undertake rapid operational actions.
Patrols. A patrol is the exercise of presence by maritime forces with high operational readiness, withina defined maritime area, so as to maintain and develop MDA, and prevent occurrence or counter
activities that are inimical to security in that area. A patrol is different from PSM in that, firstly, patrols
are regularly conducted not only by ships, but also by aircraft and submarines. Second, it is conductedin a specific, and mostly smaller, maritime area. Third, it is focused on designated activities, to monitor
and prevent their occurrence. Fourth, it is normally sustained over a period of time. This may be doneon continuing basis, wherein the patrolling unit would be relieved in the area after regular, specified
intervals, or repetitive basis wherein the patrol would be repeated after a specified time interval as per
operational considerations. The main types of patrol conducted by our naval, coast guard and marine
police vessels include the following:•‘General Patrol’ for monitoring general activities and augmenting security in the defined area. For
example, along a SLOC, in a choke point, or across a barrier line, to monitor the movement ofvessels.

•‘EEZ Patrol’ to monitor, check and ensure that the activities in the designated area, within the EEZ,
are as per those legally authorised, including fishing, scientific and hydrographic survey.

•‘IMBL Patrol’ to check unauthorised movement of vessels, cargo and persons across the IMBL
into/ from our maritime zones, especially territorial waters.

•‘Security/ Defence Patrol’ to ensure security/ defence respectively in defined areas, by preventing/countering seaborne infiltration of armed anti-national elements, and other actions that may
threaten our maritime security. Security/ defence patrols may be carried out in our offshoredevelopment areas (ODA Patrol), coastal waters (Coastal Patrol), off islands (Island Patrol), and in
harbours and ports (Harbour Patrol).

Explanatory Notes 169
Policy and Plan. Policy defines the guiding parameters for the strategy and plan. At the strategic level,
policy would flow from the values and beliefs, and provides the broad considerations for shaping
strategy. At the operational level, policy is reflected in the Higher Commander’s Op Directives andOperational Commander’s Intent/ Planning Directions, including constraints and restraints, forderiving the operational plan. Accordingly, while thought and action is guided by doctrine, the specificcourse of action or plan is determined as per the strategy, formulated within the framework of policy,
to attain defined objectives, with regard to the available means and prevailing operating environment.
Port Visits. Port visits by warships are the basic method of undertaking defence diplomacy withother nations, and interaction between their maritime forces. A warship is a sovereign instrumentof the State, and represents its interests, intent, capability and technological prowess. The crew, as a
microcosm of the nation’s population, similarly represents their culture, values and attributes. A port
visit by a warship to another nation, therefore, projects our nation and people to the host military,
government and populace. It also provides bonding and reassurance to Indian diaspora settled there.
A port visit is seen as an act of trust, friendship and respect. It paves the way for further interactions
and building of ‘bridges of friendship’.
Presence. Presence enables ready availability of naval forces in an area of maritime interest, to preventor respond to crises and be advantageously deployed in case of an imminent confrontation/ conflict. It
is a primary means to display intent and commitment, gain operational familiarity, exercise maritime
power, encourage good order at sea and adherence to applicable laws, promote stability and provide
net maritime security in an area of interest.
Presence and Surveillance Mission (PSM). PSM is an important peace time activity, which entails
operational deployment of suitable naval forces in a maritime area, so as to establish presence andconduct surveillance. These are normally carried out by naval ships, and sometimes aircraft, across andbeyond India’s maritime zones. PSM enables the monitoring of operational conditions in all dimensions,
to maintain and develop MDA, display commitment, project deterrence and provide rapid response
capability. It can be carried out as an independent action or conjoin with other singular or multiple
activities, such as exercises, patrols and deployments. PSM can be done independently by our maritime
forces, and also in a coordinated or combined manner with other navies and coast guards.
Sea Control. Sea control denotes a condition where one is able to use a defined maritime space(including surface, underwater and air), for a specific period of time, for one’s own purpose, whilst
simultaneously denying its use to the adversary. Sea control is not equal to ‘control of the sea’, and is
not an end in itself. It is, rather, an enabling condition that needs to be established, so as to provide thenecessary freedom of action, in terms of area, time and nature, which is required for achieving the main
operation and purpose. Hence, sea control is considered as a prerequisite for most naval operations,
as it qualifies the basic condition of attaining the necessary degree of freedom of action required forundertaking and progressing such operation. Sea control can be attained either by the force undertaking
the main operation, itself and at the same time, or by dedicated forces deployed prior to or along withthe main operation, such as for larger, complex operations. As it is related to the desired objective andalso corresponding naval operation(s) to achieve the objective, the requirements for sea control willvary. For example, the type of sea control required for keeping ports that are outside the primary Areaof Operations (AO), safe and free for navigation will be very different from the sea control required for
SLOC protection close to the enemy coast, while an amphibious operation would normally require the170 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
highest degree of sea control, including its maintenance by a separate force. In all cases, the focus will
be on ensuring that the degree of control and freedom of action necessary to undertake and progressthe main operation are available.
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The sea routes used by a nation for transportation of its
essential commodities, including energy, trade and other cargo towards its sustenance, growth anddevelopment, and by its maritime forces for conduct of operations, are termed as its SLOCs. These
would generally coincide with the International Shipping Lanes (ISLs) in peace time, but may need to
be altered as per the threat, especially during conflict. The sea routes used by the maritime forces for
conducting and sustaining maritime operations would further vary as per the operational plans. The
security of a nation’s SLOCs forms part of the principle of war on ‘security’. The options for sea routes
would depend on maritime geography, navigational conditions, including climate and weather, ships’
characteristics, ports/ hubs enroute, security threats in various sea areas, and dependence on specificports of origin/ destination.
Sea Denial. Sea denial is a concept of denying the adversary the use of a particular maritime space, fora period of time when it is not required for one’s own use. It is essentially an offensive action, to reduce
the adversary’s freedom of action and to degrade his operating capability. It targets the adversary inareas important to him, and disrupts the use of these areas for the adversary’s purpose. Sea denial canalso be used in a defensive manner, to prevent the adversary from operating in an area from where hecan launch strikes against our VAs/ VPs, forces and other assets. Sea denial is distinct from sea control,
even though the latter has sea denial as a concomitant attribute. The difference is that, for sea denial, thesame area is not required for our own purpose. This aspect dictates the ways and means of exercisingforce. In sea denial, the choice of force deployments can be less overt, and also less concentrated, whilst
keeping the adversary in doubt as to the degree and quantum of our presence. This would additionallyserve to inhibit his freedom of action, as force could be applied against units operating in the area.
Security. In the broadest sense, security can be understood in terms of the presence of freedom andthe absence of fear and want – with regard to the pursuit of the core purpose and values governing
the existence and evolution of a society and state. In traditional Indian thinking, the great aims ofhuman endeavour (purusharthas) were centered on dharma (righteous conduct), artha (material wellbeing), kama (worldly pleasures and happiness) and moksha (salvation). To pursue these rightful goals,
the individual and society needed security, which was a core duty and responsibility of the Ruler(State). The modern idea of human rights and social security is in consonance with these traditional
Indian thoughts. The concept of human security entails the presence of freedom, equality and theessentials of life, in a safe, peaceful, and stable environment, so as to facilitate societal and economic
growth. Accordingly, national security is viewed in a holistic framework, which extends to all aspectsof societal well-being and growth, including physical, economic, energy, food, water, health andenvironment. These factors also influence and shape the core national values, aims and interests thatneed to be secured, and play an organic role in the determination of national strategy. Security can be
the objective or end-state of a certain strategy. In such case, it defines the purpose of that strategy anddescribes what the strategy seeks to secure. Security can also be the enabler for some other, related
strategy, as part of the ways and means employed. The concept of security, therefore, shapes, governs
and guides strategy.

Explanatory Notes 171
Strategy. A strategy provides the ways for suitable development and employment of the means, toachieve the desired ends. It caters to trends and changes, including risks and opportunities that may
emerge. It also looks at enhancing and augmenting the means, and developing the most effective
and efficient ways for their employment. A strategy is developed at the single armed force, joint andnational levels, with the assistance of instruments such as net assessments, threat assessments, scenariobuilding, technology forecasting, and wargaming. Such a plan at the apex, national level that seeks
to harness national means and power, to meet the national aim and aspirations, would constitute thenational strategy. The national strategy itself flows from a clearly stated or implied national policy. In asimilar manner, the plan by which a state would harness all elements of its national power to attainvarious maritime objectives, in support of the national strategy and attainment of the national aim andinterests in the maritime domain, would constitute its maritime strategy.
Submarines. Submarines are the most potent instruments for exercising sea denial against theadversary. These are offensive weapon platforms, which can apply strategic leverage with theirincreased ranges of weapons and power projection capability. Submarines are also used for othertasks, including land-attack, ISR, ASW, and ‘silent presence’, as per their equipment and weapon
capabilities. Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), which canoperate submerged for longer periods, enhance the potency of submarine operations.
Surface Action Groups (SAG). These are dedicated task groups formed for the purpose of carryingout specific ASuW tasks at sea. These are generally destroyers and frigates, attached to the main Task
Force/ CTF, for undertaking specific surface actions as part of the operational plans and situation.
Maintenance of potent SAG capability within the fleet remains essential for maritime operations.
Trafficking/ Smuggling. Smuggling may be understood as transshipment of cargo in evasion of thelaw, such as avoidance of duty or the lawful procedure, while trafficking covers transshipment ofcargo, in direct contravention of the law, where such cargo is prohibited to be imported/ exported bylaw.
Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) and Vessel and Air Traffic Management System(VATMS). The surveillance information from port radars is integrated in a VTMS system, withinformation relayed to the Indian Navy and Coast Guard. Similarly, the surveillance information
obtained in the Offshore Development Area (ODA) is integrated in a VATMS (W) system, coordinatedby the Indian Navy.
White Shipping Information. Information is available on merchant shipping position and movementsfrom both, open sources such as the World Register of Shipping database, Lloyd’s List Intelligence,
etc., and information-sharing arrangements with friendly nations in a cooperative framework.
The information is collated by the Indian Navy and feeds into the overall MDA.

Abbreviations 175

174 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Abbreviations
AAW

Anti-Air Warfare						ACSOCArea Coastal Security Operations Centre				ADA

Air Domain Awareness 						ADS-BAutomatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast				AIPAir Independent Propulsion						

AIS		Automatic Identification System					AIS-SBSpace-Based Automatic Identification System

ANC

Andaman & Nicobar Command				AO		

Area of Operation						

AOAAmphibious Objective Area						ASEANAssociation of South-East Asian Nations					ASuWAnti-Surface Warfare						

ASWAnti-Submarine Warfare						

BMPBest Management Practices						

3

C 		

Command, Control, Communications 					

CBGCarrier Battle Group						

CCSCabinet Committee on Security						

CECCooperative Engagement Capability					CGPCSContact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia				

CIOB

Central Indian Ocean Basin 						

CIP		Community Interaction Programme					CISFCentral Industrial Security Force					CORPAT

Coordinated Patrol						COTSCommercial Off-The-Shelf						

CSLCochin Shipyard Limited						

CSNCoastal Surveillance Network						CSRSCoastal Surveillance Radar System					

CTFCarrier Task Force						DADFDepartment of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries		

DGLL

Directorate General of Lighthouses and Lightships

DPSU

Defence Public Sector Undertaking				DRDO

Defence Research and Development Organisation				

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone						

EW		Electronic Warfare						

FACFast Attack Craft						

FASFavourable Air Situation						

FIC		Fast Interceptor Craft						

FRAFlight Refuelling Aircraft 						

GDPGross Domestic Product					GRIHAGreen Rating for Integrated Habitat Assessment			

GRSE

Garden Reach Shipyard and Engineers Ltd			

HADR

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief			

HRAHigh Risk Area (Piracy)					HTSTHydrographic Technical Support Team				

IDA

Information-Decision-Action					

IFC		International Fusion Centre					

IFR		International Fleet Review					IGBCIndian Green Building Council					

ILOInternational Liaison Officer					IMACInformation Management and Analysis Centre			

IMBL

International Maritime Boundary Line				

IMO

International Maritime Organisation				INDSAR

Indian (Maritime) Search and Rescue				

INSPIRES

Indian Ship Position and Information Reporting System		

IOC

Indian Oil Corporation					IONSIndian Ocean Naval Symposium				IOR

Indian Ocean Region						IORAIndian Ocean Rim Association					

ISA		International Seabed Authority				

ISL		International Shipping Lane					ISLEREP

Island Reporting						

ISR		Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance			

ISRO

Indian Space Research Organisation				

ISRR

Indian Search and Rescue Region				ISV		Immediate Support Vessel					ITECIndian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme		

IUU

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (Fishing)			

IW		

Information Warfare						

IWGIONS Working Group					

JOCJoint Operations Centre					JVOPAC

Joint Venture Offshore Protection Advisory Committee		

LCA

Light Combat Aircraft					

LCULanding Craft Utility						LEEDLeadership in Energy and Environmental Design			

LIA

Lead Intelligence Agency					

LNDLocal Naval Defence						

LPDLanding Platform Dock					LRITLong Range Identification and Tracking				LRMRLong Range Maritime Reconnaissance 				LTTELiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam				MAC
MARCOsMulti-Agency Centre						Marine Commandos						Abbreviations 177

176 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
MCM
MDA
MDL
MHA
MIO
MoA
MoD
MoF
MOIA
MoP&NGMoSMPMSDF
MRCC
M-SAR
MSDC
MSIS
NAIS
NC3IN
NCAGS
NCO
NCS
NCSMCS
NELP
NEO
NFU
NMDA
NOPV
NRI
NSAB
NSB
ODA
ONGC
OSCC
OSD
OTR
OVL
PACE
PANS
PASSEX
PCASP
PCS
PIO
PMSC
PSM

Mine Counter Measures						Maritime Domain Awareness						Mazagon Dock Limited
Ministry of Home Affairs		
Maritime Interdiction Operation
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
Ministry of Shipping
Multi-Platform, Multi-Sensor Data Fusion 				Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centre				Maritime Search and Rescue						Maritime States Development Council 					Merchant Shipping Information System					National Automatic Identification System				National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network
Naval Cooperation and Guidance to Shipping				
Network Centric Operations						Naval Control of Shipping						National Committee for Strengthening Maritime
and Coastal Security against Threats from Sea				New Exploration Licensing Policy					Non-combatant Evacuation Operation					No First Use						National Maritime Domain Awareness					Naval Offshore Patrol Vessel						Non-Resident Indian						National Security Advisory Board					National Shipping Board 						Offshore Development Area						Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Offshore Security Coordination Committee 				Overseas Deployment						Operational Turn Round						ONGC Videsh Limited						People, Assets and Combat Efficiency					Pre-Arrival Notification of Security					Passage Exercise						Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel				Port Community System						Person of Indian Origin						Private Maritime Security Companies					Presence and Surveillance Mission					

PSO
QoS
QRT
R&D
RCSOC
ReALCraft
ReCAAP
REFLECS3
RIMPAC
RoE
ROV
SAG
SAGAR
SAR
SBTF
SCSOC
SF		
SHADE
SIMBEX
SLOC
SMAC
SMC
SMP
SOLAS
SOP
SPB
SPOD
SPOE
SRMR
SSBN
SSN
TLS
ToT
UAV
UMS
UNCLOS
UNREP
URG
UT		
UUV
VAs/VPs
VATMS
VBSS
VTMS

Peace Support Operation						Quality of Service						Quick Reaction Team					Research & Development					Regional Coastal Security Operations Centre			Registration and Licensing of Fishing Craft			Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 			Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea
Rim-of-the-Pacific						Rules of Engagement						Remotely Operated Vehicle						Surface Action Group						Security and Growth for All in the Region				Search and Rescue						Shore-Based Test Facility 						State Coastal Security Operations Centre					Special Forces						Shared Awareness and Deconfliction					Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise				Sea Lines Of Communication						Subsidiary Multi-Agency Centre					State Monitoring Centre						State Marine Police						Safety of Life at Sea						Standard Operating Procedure						Sagar Prahari Bal						Sea Ports of Disembarkation						Sea Ports of Embarkation						Short Range Maritime Reconnaissance 					Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (submarine)				
Ship Submersible Nuclear (submarine)					Through Life Support 						Transfer of Technology						Unmanned Aerial Vehicle						Unmanned Marine System						United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea				Underway Replenishment 						Underway Replenishment Group					Union Territory						Unmanned Underwater Vehicle					Vital Areas/ Vital Points						Vessel and Air Traffic Management System				Visit Board Search and Seizure						Vessel Traffic Management System

Bibliography 181

180 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

Acknowledgements

Bibliography

The task of drafting a revised Indian maritime security strategy was steered by the Directorate ofStrategy, Concepts and Transformation (DSCT) at the Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence(Navy), as per the vision and guidance of the Chief of the Naval Staff. In a comprehensive review,
inputs were solicited from a wide range of expert organisations and individuals. Their generous
provision of time and professional insights were key facilitators for the project, and their substantial
contributions are gratefully acknowledged.

Documents

The comprehensive review of the strategy and all factors was enabled by the guidance and directionsof the Flag Officers Commanding-in-Chief and Principal Staff Officers at IHQ MoD (Navy). The
examination of the draft strategy and revision process was undertaken by the Controllers and AssistantPrincipal Staff Officers at IHQ MoD (Navy), Commandant Naval War College, and Flag Officer
Doctrines and Concepts. Detailed professional insights were provided for examination of fresh aspects
and areas for revision by the professional directorates at IHQ MoD (Navy), IHQ MoD (Army), Air HQ,
HQ Integrated Defence Staff, and Coast Guard HQ.
The review process benefited immensely from insights and inputs provided by various professionalorganisations and institutions. These include HQ Eastern Naval Command, HQ Western Naval
Command, HQ Southern Naval Command, HQ Andaman & Nicobar Command, HQ Army Training
Command, Naval War College, College of Defence Management, Maritime Doctrines and Concepts
Centre, National Maritime Foundation, United Services Institution, and Observer Research Foundation.
A holistic revision was possible due to the large number of senior experts in defence and strategic
affairs, who spared valuable time and effort to provide wide-ranging inputs, which were very
beneficial to the project. These include Adm Arun Prakash (Retd), VAdm Premvir S Das (Retd), VAdm
Vijay Shankar (Retd), VAdm Arun K Singh (Retd), VAdm Pradeep Chauhan (Retd), VAdm Anurag G
Thapliyal (Retd), VAdm Girish Luthra, VAdm Anil Chawla, RAdm K Raja Menon (Retd), Maj Gen BK
Sharma (Retd), RAdm SY Shrikhande, RAdm Monty Khanna, RAdm R Hari Kumar, RAdm Ajendra B
Singh, RAdm Ravi J Nadkarni, RAdm Suresh K Grewal, RAdm Biswajit Dasgupta, Cmde Deepak Bist,
Cmde Rajesh Singh, Cmde Ajay V Bhave, Cmde Srikant B Kesnur, Cmde Rajesh Pendharkar, Cmde
Krishna Swaminathan, Cmde Ajay Kochhar, Capt CR Praveen Nair, Capt Probal K Ghosh (Retd), Capt
Gurpreet S Khurana, Prof KR Singh and Prof Sachin Pendse.
The task of examining all inputs, undertaking further research and drafting the revised strategy was
undertaken by a core team comprising Cmde Sanjay J Singh, Cdr Sarabjeet S Parmar and Cdr Himadri
Das. They were guided in their efforts by RAdm SY Shrikhande, who provided constant support andvaluable course corrections to the project.
The task of document design and production was undertaken by M/s Facet Design, and coordinatedby Cdr Jasneet S Sachdeva. The photographs used were provided by numerous directorates and offices
at IHQ MoD (Navy), Command Photo Sections from Eastern and Western Naval Commands, INS
Viraat, Cdr Navtej Singh and Rakesh Poonia POA (PH). Support for collating inputs, managing project
timelines, progressing production milestones, overseeing design and layout, and vetting multiple
drafts was carried out by Capt Deepak Singhal, Cdr KV Narsimham, Cdr Yogesh V Athawale, Pavittar
Pal Singh POR (Tel), Gena Ram LS RC1, Praveen Kumar LS UW2, and Parixit B Singh LS RP2.
The revision of the strategy was a team effort, and owes its realisation to many others who worked
behind the scenes, exemplifying the ‘silent service’ character of the navy. Their efforts and contributions
are also gratefully acknowledged.

A Maritime Military Strategy for India (1989 – 2014), Indian Navy, 1988
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, Ministry ofAgriculture, Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Earth System Science Organisation, Ministry of Earth Sciences,
Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Ministry of Coal, Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Ministry of Defence, Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Ministry of Shipping, Govt of India
Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)
A Seaman’s Guide to International Law (INBR 1650), Indian Navy, April 1999
Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2007
Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2012
Comprehensive Marine Fishing Policy – Nov 2004, Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and
Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Govt of India, New Delhi
Cyber Doctrine, Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts, Indian Navy, July 2013
Energising the Nation, Annual Report 2014 – 2015, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Govt ofIndia
Energy Statistics 2015, Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics and Implementation Programme,
Govt of India
Foreign Cooperation Roadmap, Indian Navy, 2014
Handbook on the Law of Maritime Operations (Laws of Peacetime Naval Operations - INBR 1652),
Vol I, Indian Navy
Handbook on the Law of Maritime Operations (Laws of Armed Conflicts - INBR 1652), Vol II, IndianNavy
Handbook on the Law of Maritime Operations (Concept and Development of Rules of Engagement INBR 1652), Vol III, Indian Navy
Human Capital Strategy, Indian Navy, 2014
Indian Armed Forces - Joint Information Warfare Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff(HQIDS), 2005
Indian Army Doctrine, 2010
Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8), Indian Navy, 2004
Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8), Indian Navy, 2009
Indian Maritime Military Strategy, Indian Navy, 2007
Indian Naval Doctrine for Information Warfare, 2000

Index 183

182 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan (2015-2027)
Indian Naval Training Doctrine, 2014

Index

Indian Navy Space Vision (2014 – 2027), 2014
Indian Navy Vision Document, 2014
India’s Nuclear Doctrine - NSAB Report and Press Release of CCS Review
Joint Doctrine for Air-Land Operations (JP-10), HQIDS, 2010

A

Cooperative Engagement Capability

ACSOC

120

Amphibious Operations

70,162

136

Coordinated Patrol

96

Cyber Security Technologies

144

Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, HQIDS, 2008

Anti-Piracy

Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare (JP-8), HQIDS, 2010

Anti-Air Warfare

71,162

D

Joint Doctrine for Maritime Air Operations (JP-6), HQIDS, 2009

Anti-Submarine Warfare

138,162

DefenceAnti-Surface Warfare

71,162

Deterrence

Application of Force

11,63

Deterrence by Denial

163

Areas of Maritime Interest

31,34

Deterrence by Punishment

163

Armed Security

41,42

Dynamic Surveillance

112

Joint Doctrine for Perception Management and Psychological Operations (JP-9), HQIDS, 2010
Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (JP-5), HQIDS, 2008
Joint Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations, (JP-7), HQIDS, 2010
Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, HQIDS, 2006

8,87,90,96,97

Asymmetric Threat

140

Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, HQIDS, 2007
Maritime Agenda 2010 – 2020, Ministry of Shipping, Govt of India.
Maritime Capability Perspective Plan 2012 – 2027, Indian Navy, 2011
Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan 2015 – 2027, Indian Navy, 2015
Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Doctrine (INBR 1836), Indian Navy, 2009

8,10,11,163

E

B
Battle-Space Dominance

64,69

Best Management Practices

39,118

Biometric Verification

112

Science and Technology Roadmap, Indian Navy, 2015

C

Strategic Guidance for Transformation, Indian Navy, 2015

Capability Development

121,127,129

Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR), HQIDS, 2013

Capability Enhancement

82,91,92“Vision 2030” Natural Gas Infrastructure in India, Report by Industry Group for Petroleum andNatural Gas Regulatory Board.

163

Capacity Building

81,82,91,92

Carrier Battle Group138,162

Carrier Task ForceElectromagnetic and Laser Technologies 144
Energy Security

4,24

Escalation Management

74

Exclusive Economic Zone

17

Exercises with Foreign Navies

85

F
Fishing Community

26

Force Maintenance

129,141

138,162

Force Mix Ratio

137

Cgpcs	90

Force Projection

13,69

Works of Chanakya, Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, and Panikkar

Choke Points

18,20

Force Protection

71,129,138,140

Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945 – 1950, and Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951 – 65,
both by Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh (Retd), AVSM

Climate Change

42

Force Structure

43,50,51,137

Transition to Triumph: The Indian Navy 1965 – 1975, Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976 – 1990,
and Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991 – 2000, all by Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani(Retd), PVSM, AVSM, NM, PhD

Coastal Community

The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Third Edition (Ed), Dieter Fleck, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2013

Coastal Security Mandate

107

Coastal Surveillance Network

163

Books

India’s Security in a Turbulent World, Jasjit Singh, National Book Trust, New Delhi, 2013

Coastal and Offshore Defence

70,71
118

Coastal Defence

67,108,110,162

Coastal Security

10,104,109,162

Coastal Waters
Computation and Automation
Technologies

108,163
144

Contingency Planning

50,54,66

Conventional Deterrence

48,50

G
Green Technologies

144

H
Hub and Spoke Model120

Human Resource Development

130

Humanitarian Assistanceand Disaster Relief
Hydrographic Cooperation

43,86,98,139
94

Index 185

184 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy
I

Maritime Security Objective

4,8,10,80

Illegal , Unreported andUnregulated Fishing

Maritime Security Strategy

166

41

Information-Decision-Action Cycle 64,66,68
Indian Diaspora

31

Indian Search And Rescue Region

101

Indigenisation

130

Information Security

74

Information Warfare

74

Infrastructure and Logistics

142

International Fleet Review

84,86International Maritime
Boundary Line87,90,96,108

International Shipping Lanes

17,18,170

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

90,91,164

Indian Ocean Regional Association

90,165

12,55

Maritime Strike

69,71,72,138,166

Maritime Terrorism

38,96,104,150

67,96,108,119,129,135,141

Joint Operations Centre

119

Joint Venture Offshore Protection
Advisory Committee

120

Jointness

43,57,67,105,141

81,82,84,85,101

Maritime Geography

17,70

Maritime Governance

12,22,106,122

Maritime Interdiction Operation

96,100Maritime Manoeuvre

69,165

Maritime Neighbours

4,22,23,41

Maritime Outlook

8,16

Maritime Relations

23,24,86

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

100

Strategic Effect

63,64,145

169

Multi-Agency Centre

114

Port Community System

112

Multi-Platform Multi-Sensor
Data Fusion

Port Visit

84,169Technical Cooperation

136

Power Projection

60,138

Technologies 127,129,134,136,138,142,143,144

37,39,40,41

Precision Weapon Technologies
PreparednessN

143

11,43,50,56,66

Surface Action Group

54
138,171

T
93

Threat Assessment

54

Through Life Support

138

167

Presence

Nano-Technology

145

Presence and Surveillance Mission

82,169Trafficking/ Smuggling

170

4,9,10,64,166

Propulsion and Power Technology

144

Training Cooperation

92

Trilateral Cooperation

91

National Maritime Interests

169

Strategic Situational Awareness

NAIS

167

Traditional Threats

33,37,50,81,148

National Security Strategy

167

R

National Values

167

RCSOC

119

U

Naval Air Power

139

ReCAAP

90

Unmanned Marine System

144

NMDA

167

Regional MDA

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle

140

Net Maritime Security

Non-combatantEvacuation Operations

Maritime Engagement

84

57,74,101

Policy and Plan

138

24

96,100171

Strategic Communication

166

Logistics Support

Maritime Economy

Peace Support Operations

Strategy140

No First Use

22

82,96,118,168

112

Mine Warfare

114

Maritime Domain Awareness 54,64,134,165

86

Patrols

104,107,112,118,120

Static Surveillance

Mine Counter Measures

Lead Intelligence Agency

Maritime Boundaries

Passage Exercise

State Marine Police

PiracyNetworked Operations

M

22,46

Personnel Exchange

81,82,95,101,126,151

Network Centric Operations
L

Panchsheel

Milan	87,166

National Security

J
Joint Operation

Maritime Stakeholders

P

135,143
43,64,65,75,134
48
30,99,139,168

82,95

Remotely Operated Vehicle
Rules of Engagement

140
63,163VBSS
S

VTMS/ VATMS

Sagar Prahari Bal

118

Sagarmala27

Non-Traditional Threats 37,50,84,104,109,142

Satellite

135,143

Nuclear Deterrence

SCSOC

119

48

O
Offshore Defence
Offshore Security Coordination
Committee

70,110,168
120

Operational Actions

68,69,160

Operational Enablers

11,64,69

Operational Principles

62,69

Operational Tempo

68,168Overseas Deployment

82

Overseas Indians

30

Overseas Maritime Investments

29,34

V

Sea Control

68,71,129,139,169

Sea Denial

68,72

Sea Lines of Communication 28,32,65,70,170
Search and Rescue
Security
SHADE

43,96,100
170
90

SLOC Interdiction

69,70

SLOC Protection

69,70,73

Special Forces Operations

129,141

Staff Talks
Standardisation and Modularity

84,85
132

71,120171

WWhite Shipping Information

95,111,171

ensuring secure seas: INDIAn MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY

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www.indiannavy.nic.in

Ensuring Secure Seas:
Indian MARITIME Security Strategy