SIPRIYEARBOOK

2010
Armaments,
Disarmament andInternational
Security
SummarySTOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conﬂict,armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data,
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers,
media and the interested public.

GOVERNING BOARD
Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden)
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)
Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)
Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)
Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)
The Director

DIRECTORDr Bates Gill (United States)

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Fax: +46 8 655 97 33
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org© SIPRI 2010

THE SIPRI YEARBOOKThe SIPRI Yearbook was ﬁrst published in 1969 and is now in its 41st edition. SIPRI
Yearbook 2010 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, major armed
conﬂicts and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important
aspects of arms control, peace and international security. The Yearbook is written by both
SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2010 and gives samples of thedata and information in its appendices and annexes.

CONTENTS
Introduction. International security, armaments and disarmament in 2010
1. A world without nuclear weapons: fantasy or necessity?

2
3Part I. Security and conﬂicts, 2009

2. Armed conﬂict, crime and criminal violence
3. Civilian roles in peace operations
4. Euro-Atlantic security and institutions: rebalancing in the midst of global change

468Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2009

5. Military expenditure
6. Arms production
7. International arms transfers
8. World nuclear forces

10
12
14
16

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2009

9. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
10. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
11. Conventional arms control
12. Controls on security-related international transfers

17
18
19
20

Annexes22

INTRODUCTION. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ARMAMENTS ANDDISARMAMENT IN 2010

bates gill

As the analyses in SIPRI Yearbook 2010
suggest, 2009 began hopefully for manywith the advent of a new administrationin the United States. In addition, somepositive momentum was generated
around the goals of arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation,
resulting in important declarations andconcrete actions in support of thosegoals. However, 2009 also showed justhow difficult it is to make continued
progress in meeting the many
challenges that the world faces today.
The ﬁnancial crisis and economic
recession that affected most of the globe
appeared to have little effect on levels of
military expenditure, arms production
or arms transfers. However, the crisis
probably did undermine the willingness
and ability of major governments andmultilateral institutions to invest other,non-military resources to address thechallenges and instabilities thatthreaten societies and individuals
around the world.
The contributions to SIPRI Yearbook
2010 describe a world at a critical
turning point. On questions ofinternational security, the world faces
continuing changes in the nature ofarmed conﬂict and instability towards
greater diffusion of the means andactors involved in violence. Civilian
contributions to peace operations areneeded, but the international
community continues to struggle with

2 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

how to provide them. Meanwhile, theEuro-Atlantic security partnership also
struggles to deﬁne new roles andrelationships consistent with the threat
environment for the coming decades.
Many of these challenges are amply
demonstrated in the ongoing difficulties
in stabilizing Afghanistan.
Continued upward growth inmilitary spending, arms production andarms transfers will depend on how the
global ﬁnancial situation changes, aswell as on developments in the conﬂicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq. The year 2010
will be important for disarmament andnon-proliferation as well, with theworld watching for progress in bilateraldisarmament between Russia and theUSA. The world will also look forprogress on disarmament and tightened
controls against would-be proliferatorsin the context of a successful NonProliferation Treaty Review
Conference. The Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva will need to
begin substantive negotiations as called
for in the draft programme of work
adopted in 2009, such as on a ﬁssile
material cut-off treaty. New
proliferation challenges in the area of
dual-use technologies also require theinternational community to develop
more effective mechanisms to prevent
their misuse.

1. A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: FANTASY OR NECESSITY?

james e. goodby

At Reykjavik, in October 1986, Mikhail
Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan
endorsed the idea of eliminating all
nuclear weapons. The idea lay fallow
until the publication of two articles by
George Shultz, Henry Kissinger,
William Perry and Sam Nunn inJanuary 2007 and January 2008. They
argued that the world was at a
dangerous tipping point and that the
response to the growing nuclear threat
required a sustained step-by-step
programme and a serious commitment
to a world without nuclear weapons.
Russia and the United States have
now agreed to reduce their nuclear
arsenals by concluding a New START
Treaty. This could open the door todeeper Russian–US reductions. Many
analyses have investigated this,including models ranging from 1000
warheads to zero. Veriﬁcation is a major
issue, but less formidable than many
think. Russia and the USA have had
years of experience in verifying
numbers of operationally deployed
nuclear warheads. In fact, the task of
veriﬁcation may become easier as
progress towards zero is achieved.
Unless there is a broadly sharedinternational commitment to the goal ofa nuclear-free world, however, themomentum necessary to sustain further
Russian–US negotiations will be lost.
An array of actions is available tonuclear-armed states. Many of these

could be pursued without delay,
including an agreement to cease theproduction of ﬁssile material for
weapons.
Nuclear deterrence will not
disappear even if nuclear weapons are
eliminated. It will exist in the form offunctioning nuclear laboratories andsome capacity to produce nuclear
weapons, if needed, over a period oftime. Agreements to regulate this will
be necessary. A world free of nuclear
weapons means that the use of nuclear
weapons would not be easily available
even to those who have the provencapacity to build them.
Politically, a higher degree ofcooperation among the permanent
members of the United Nations Security
Council would surely be necessary.
Although governance issues tend to
focus on the Security Council, much of
the process of eliminating nuclear
weapons will be based on regionalarrangements, particularly in the
Middle East, South Asia and North EastAsia.
The obstacles to ending the nuclear
threat are more political than technicalor military. No law of nature stands inthe way.

introduction 3

2. ARMED CONFLICT, CRIME AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

ekaterina stepanova

MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS, 2009

In 2009, 17 major armed conﬂicts wereactive in 16 locations around the world.
Conﬂict location
AfricaRwanda* ‡SomaliaB
Sudan?
Uganda* ‡Americas
ColombiaB
Peru?
USAB
Asia
AfghanistanB
India (Kashmir)?
Myanmar (Karen State)
PakistanB
Philippines
Philippines (Mindanao)
Sri Lanka (‘Tamil Eelam’)Middle East Iraq?
Israel (Palestinian territories)
Turkey (Kurdistan)*
Where a conﬂict is over territory, the disputed
territory appears in parentheses after the countryname. All other conﬂicts are over government.
* Fighting in these conﬂicts also took place in otherlocations.
B Increase in battle-related deaths from 2008.
? Decrease in battle-related deaths from 2008.
‡ Conﬂict inactive or not deﬁned as ‘major’ in 2008.

Only 6 of the major armed conﬂicts in2009 were over territory, with 11 being
fought over government. Indeed,
conﬂicts over government outnumberedthose over territory in 9 of the
10 years 2000–2009.
For the sixth year running, no majorinterstate conﬂict was active in 2009.

4 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

Criminal groups and proﬁt-driven
motives account for a substantial
proportion of violence in many areas ofarmed conﬂict. Growing reliance byarmed non-state actors on shadow
economic activity contributes to theerosion of boundaries between politicaland criminal violence. Traditional
distinctions between politico-militarygroups contesting control over territory
or government and criminal actors
prioritizing illicit proﬁt become lessrelevant in conﬂict areas, especially indysfunctional or failed states. In acomplex web of fragmented violence,
militias and other local powerbrokers
ﬁght for control of power and resourcesand exploit opportunities offered by
insecurity and war economy.
On a global level, criminal violence is
far more widespread than organizedpolitical violence. Decline in numbers ofarmed conﬂicts since the early 1990s
has not been matched by a global
decline in homicide rates. While overall
global crime levels increase slowly,
2009 saw a notable rise in some types oftransnational crime, including in armed
conﬂict.
As demonstrated by the rising piracy
based in Somalia, high-proﬁle criminal
business in some conﬂict settings may
have even broader transnational
implications and resonance than the
conﬂict itself. The case of Afghanistan
shows the multifunctional role that theOver the decade 2000–2009, only 3 of thetotal of 30 major armed conﬂicts havebeen interstate.
Major armed conﬂicts, 2000–200920

No. of conflicts

deeply embedded opium economy plays
in conﬂict and post-conﬂict
environments: not only ﬁnancing armed
opposition groups, but yielding proﬁts
to most major local politico-military
actors, including those loyal to thegovernment, alongside criminal
trafficking networks. In such conﬂict
areas, organized crime and the shadow
economy can only be effectively
addressed once the state has alreadyregained some basic elements offunctionality, such as the ability toprovide minimal law and order. This
explains why the ﬁght againstorganized, especially transnational,
crime should not be divorced fromconﬂict resolution efforts. Finding
political solutions to conﬂicts shouldtake priority as the main precondition
for rebuilding or extending functional
state capacity that is essential for
effectively tackling organized crime.
The case of drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico shows that, even in
the absence of conﬂict over government
or territory, large-scale campaigns ofcriminal violence can pose as great athreat to human security as armed
conﬂict. Such campaigns of criminal
violence, often accompanied by intense
anti-criminal violence by the state,deserve a category of their own in crimeand conﬂict analysis. More generally,
the study of organized crime andcriminal violence should be more
actively integrated into the broader
analysis of collective organized armed
violence in and beyond conﬂict areas.

15

10

5

0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2010

The Global Peace Index (GPI) seeks todetermine what cultural attributes andinstitutions are associated with states ofpeace. It ranks 149 countries by theirrelative states of peace using
23 indicators.
Rank

Country

Score

1
2
3
4
5

New Zealand
IcelandJapan
Austria
Norway

1.188
1.212
1.247
1.290
1.322

145
146
147
148
149

Pakistan
Sudan
Afghanistan
Somalia
Iraq

3.050
3.125
3.252
3.390
3.406

Small, stable and democratic countries
are consistently ranked highly. Islandstates also generally fare well.
These facts and data are taken from appendix 2A,‘Patterns of major armed conﬂicts, 2000–2009’, byLotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, UppsalaConﬂict Data Program (UCDP), based on the UCDP
Database, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database/>, andappendix 2B, ‘The Global Peace Index 2010’, by Tim
Macintyre and Camilla Schippa, Institute for
Economics and Peace.

security and conflicts 5

3. CIVILIAN ROLES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

sharon wiharta and stephanie blair

PEACE OPERATIONS, 2009

In 2009, 54 multilateral peace operations
were conducted in 34 different locations
The annual total of active peace
operations fell in 2009, having risen
steadily from 2002 to 2008.
Number of peace operations, 2000–200960

No. of operations

50
40
30
20
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Conducting
organization:

Ad hoccoalition

Regional organization or alliance

UnitedNations

Peace operations, by region, 2009
No. ofoperations

Total personnel
deployed

AfricaAmericas
Asia
EuropeMiddle East

16
2
9
17
10

85 5629 571
88 27019 75016 125Total

54

219 278

The number of personnel deployed topeace operations increased by 16 per centover 2008 to reach 219 278 by the end of
2009, 89 per cent of whom were military
personnel and 11 per cent civilian staff.
With no new operations in 2009, theincrease in the number of personnel

6 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

Civilian personnel play an ever more
central role in multidimensional andintegrated peacekeeping andpeacebuilding operations, which often
integrate political, humanitarian,development and military activities toassist the host country’s transition fromconﬂict to sustainable peace. As mission
mandates have grown increasingly
complex, the requirement for qualiﬁed
civilian expertise has grown apace. The
number of civilian tasks mandated in
United Nations Security Council
resolutions for UN peace operations andthe number of civilian missions
undertaken by regional organizations
have increased dramatically in the past
ﬁve years. These increases are coupledwith a near doubling of the number ofcivilians assigned to global multilateralpeace operations: they currently exceed
6500.
On the 10th anniversary of theseminal Brahimi report, whichhighlighted for the ﬁrst time thecentrality of the civilian contribution to
the effectiveness of UN peace
operations and called for astrengthened UN capacity in this area,
2009 was marked by sustained
attention to the civilian dimension.
Although that dimension has beenstrengthened by a range of recent
institutional innovations (both at themultilateral and national level) to
overcome the deployment challenges

deployed was due to troop reinforcement
for existing operations, mostsigniﬁcantly for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. ISAF was nearly four times
larger than the next largest operation,and the number of ISAF troops (84 146)
exceeded the total number deployed to
the 12 UN peace operations with troops(83 089).
Personnel deployed to peace operations,
2000–2009
250 000

No. of deployed personnel

Total (including ISAF)
Total (excluding ISAF)
200 000

150 000

100 000

50 00002000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Civilians deployed to peace operations,
2000–2009
7000
6000
No. of personnel deployedthat have plagued past missions, these
nascent structures are still neither
appropriately conﬁgured nor provided
with adequate resources. Morecritically, there is a lack of a common
understanding of the civilian role—who
are the civilian experts and what istheir role? In addition, these
institutional ﬁxes may not translate into
concrete or workable solutions in theﬁeld. The UN Mission in Sudan(UNMIS) illustrates the operational
challenges in ﬁlling and sustaining thecivilian component of peace operations
and how the lack of conceptual clarity
can affect the mission’s overall efficacy.
Enhancing the civilian dimension isthus a broader agenda and goes beyond
expeditiously deploying the rightexperts in the numbers necessary. It
requires revisiting the broader
architecture and examining thelinkages between interrelated factors,
such as ﬁnancing peace operations andrecruitment. It also necessitates criticalanalysis of the purpose and objectivesof each civilian function in order toavoid duplication of tasks within the
mission.

5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

These facts and data are taken from chapter 3 andappendix 3A, ‘Multilateral peace operations, 2009’,
by Kirsten Soder and Krister Karlsson, and are
based on the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations
Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>.

security and conflicts 7

4. EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONS: REBALANCING IN
THE MIDST OF GLOBAL CHANGE

alyson j. k. bailes and andrew cottey

In 2009 the chief institutions of theEuro-Atlantic space—the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), theEuropean Union (EU) and theOrganization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE)—
celebrated several anniversaries but had
no cause for euphoria. In face ofsetbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, the2008 Georgia conﬂict, and a global
economic crisis, each institution had torethink its strategies and even its raisond’être.
NATO in its 60th anniversary year
faced continued obstacles, both militaryand political, to success in Afghanistan,with more voices questioning the realism
of its aims. NATO–Russia relations
improved as NATO echoed President
Barack Obama’s attempt at a ‘re-set’ andresiled from early eastward enlargement.
Obama’s revised missile defence plans
were also less provocative to Russia, yet
the overall relationship remained fragile.
NATO began a debate on revising its
Strategic Concept, which will raisedifficult and divisive issues about NATO’s
underlying guarantees, its nuclear
doctrines and its newer security tasks.
The EU proceeded cautiously withenlargement plans in the Western
Balkans and sought to reinvigorate its
Neighbourhood Policy towards theformer Soviet Union. The year 2009
marked the 10th anniversary of theCommon Security and Defence Policy

8 sipri yearbook 2010, summary(CSDP), but little progress could be
noted on harmonizing member states’
defence spending or force structures.
CDSP missions have ﬁlled useful niches
but remain a minor aspect of the EU’s
overall security impact. The Lisbon
Treaty entered into force in December,creating new political leadership posts
in Brussels albeit ﬁrst ﬁlled by littleknown candidates. It creates new
openings for EU ‘solidarity’ operations
to help members in non-warlike crises,
but national choices will determine how
far these are explored.
Russia published in November 2009 afull draft of the European security
treaty it proposed in 2008. The treaty isseen by many in the West as aiming tofreeze strategic frontiers while
downplaying the human rights-related
and reforming principles of the OSCE.
Nevertheless, interest was shown frommany sides in exploring options for amore inclusive pan-European approachto security, and this discussion is being
pursued through a ‘Corfu process’ of
informal dialogue rooted in the OSCE.
The EU, NATO and the OSCE must
learn lessons but also ﬁnd new
dynamism to justify their continued
existence. Many current security
challenges require global cooperationand the West must increasingly focus
on how to work with new ‘rising’powers.

SIPRI DATABASESSIPRI’s databases, which provide the foundation for much of SIPRI’s research andanalysis and are an unrivalled source of basic data on armaments, disarmamentand international security, are available at <http://www.sipri.org/databases/>.
Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)

Provides a federated system of databases on topics related to international relations
and security, accessible through a single integrated user interface.
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000,
including location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating
countries, number of personnel, costs and fatalities.
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Gives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988,
allowing comparison of countries’ military spending : in local currency, at current
prices; in US dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates ; and as a share of GDP.
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms
since 1950, the most comprehensive publicly available source of information oninternational arms transfers.
SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Provides information on all multilateral arms embargoes implemented since 1988.

security and conflicts 9

5. MILITARY EXPENDITURE

sam perlo-freeman, olawale ismail and carina solmirano

MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 2009

Military expenditure, 2000–2009

Military expenditure (US$ b.)

2000

1500

1000

500

0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

To allow comparison over time, the ﬁgures in the bar
chart are in US dollars at constant (2008) prices.

Military expenditure, by region, 2009
RegionSpending ($ b.)

AfricaNorth Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa

27.4
10.0
17.4

AmericasCentral America
and the Caribbean
North America
South America

738
5.6
680
51.8

Asia and Oceania
Central Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth Asia

276
..
210
20.4
44.0

EuropeEastern
Western and Central

386
60.0
326

Middle East

103

World total

1 531

The spending ﬁgures are in current (2009) US
dollars.

10 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

Total global military expenditure in2009 is estimated to have been
$1531 billion. This represents anincrease of 6 per cent in real terms
compared to 2008, and of 49 per centsince 2000. Military expenditurecomprised approximately 2.7 per cent of
global gross domestic product (GDP) in2009. All regions and subregions saw anincrease in 2009, except the Middle
East.
The global economic crisis had little
impact on world military spending in
2009, as most major economies boosted
public spending to counteract therecession, postponing deﬁcit reduction.
While military expenditure was not amajor feature of economic stimulus
packages, it was not generally cut either.
Nine of the top 10 spenders increased
military spending in 2009. However,some smaller economies less able tosustain large deﬁcits did cut spending.
Natural resource revenues appear to
be a signiﬁcant driver of military
expenditure in many developing
countries, with rapidly rising revenues
from oil and other commodities inrecent years, due to increases in bothprice and production. This may lead toincreased military spending as a meansof protecting resources from internal orexternal threats, while resource
revenues are often a source of funding
for arms purchases. The drop in

commodity prices in 2009 has slowed
this trend in some cases.
The conﬂict in Afghanistan is proving
increasingly costly to many of thecountries with a substantial troop
presence there and has also generated
debates as to the focus of militaryspending, between equipment of use incurrent conﬂicts and major weapon
platforms designed for power
projection. In the United Kingdom a
combination of the Afghanistan
conﬂict, high deﬁcits and an
overambitious equipment programme
have sharpened this debate.
US military spending is continuing torise under the Obama Administration,
partly due to the escalating conﬂict in
Afghanistan. Spending is budgeted torise further in 2010, and militaryspending is exempted from a generalfreeze on discretionary spending. The
2010 budget saw some refocusing ofpriorities, with cancellation of somemajor weapon systems and increased
focus on information andcommunications technology, but nomajor strategic shift.
Military spending patterns in
Afghanistan and Iraq both reﬂect thedemands of rebuilding a country’s
armed forces from scratch following
external invasion and with continued
requirement for substantial externalfunding.

The 10 largest military spenders in 2009accounted for 75 per cent of world
military spending, with the USA alone
accounting for 43 per cent. While theidentities of the top spenders have notchanged in recent years, their relative
rankings have, with European countries
falling down the ranking.
The top 10 military spenders, 2009
Rank Country
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Spending($ b.)

USA
661
China
[100]
France63.9
UK
58.3
Russia[53.3]
Japan
51.0
Germany
45.6
Saudi Arabia
41.3
India
36.3
Italy
35.8

World total

World
share (%)
43
[6.6]
4 .2
3.8
[3.5]
3.3
3.0
2.7
2.4
2.3

1 531

[ ] = SIPRI estimate. The spending ﬁgures are incurrent (2009) US dollars.

SIPRI military expenditure ﬁgures are
based on information available in open
sources, primarily supplied bygovernments. They represent a low
estimate; the true level of militaryspending is certainly higher, due toomitted countries and items of spending.
Nonetheless, SIPRI estimates capture
the great majority of global militaryspending and accurately represent
overall trends.

These facts and data are taken from appendix 5A,‘Military expenditure data, 2000–2009’, by Sam
Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, Noel Kelly andCarina Solmirano, and are based on the SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database, <http://www.sipri.
org/databases/milex>.

military spending and armaments 11

6. ARMS PRODUCTION

susan t. jackson

THE SIPRI TOP 100 FOR 2008

The SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest
arms-producing companies in the world(outside China) according to their arms
sales.
The 10 largest arms-producing companies,
2008
Company(country)
1 BAE Systems (UK)2 Lockheed Martin
3 Boeing
4 Northrop Grumman
5 General Dynamics
6 Raytheon
7 EADS (trans-Europe)
8 Finmeccanica (Italy)
9 L-3 Communications
10 Thales (France)

Arms sales Proﬁt($ m.)($ m.)
32 42029 88029 200
26 09022 78021 03017 90013 24012 16010 760

3 250
3 217
2 672
–1 262
2 459
1 672
2 302
996
949
952

Companies are US-based, unless indicatedotherwise. The proﬁt ﬁgures are from all company
activities, including non-military sales.

Almaz Antei tripled its arms sales since2003 to reach $4.3 billion in 2008,
entering the top 20—a ﬁrst for a Russiancompany. No Australian-owned company
appeared in the SIPRI Top 100 for 2008
following BAE Systems’ acquisition of
Tenix Defence Systems in early 2008.
Hewlett-Packard entered the Top 100
following its acquisition of EDS, a former
Top 100 arms-producing company.

12 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

In 2008 the world’s 100 largest armsproducing companies (outside China)
maintained the upward trend in theirarms sales, which increased by$39 billion to reach $385 billion. While
companies headquartered in the UnitedStates again dominated the SIPRI Top
100, for the ﬁrst time a non-US
headquartered company registered thehighest level of arms sales—BAE
Systems of the United Kingdom.
Thirteen companies increased theirarms sales by more than $1 billion in
2008, and 23 increased their arms sales
by more than 30 per cent. In contrast,
only six companies in the SIPRI Top
100 had decreased arms sales in 2008.
Two of these companies—SAFRAN ofFrance and Boeing of the USA—experienced decreases of more than
$1 billion.
The conﬂicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
continued to heavily inﬂuence sales of
military equipment such as armoured
vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) and helicopters. At the sametime, sales registered by military
services companies continued to grow,as did the arms sales of Russiancompanies to both domestic and foreign
customers.
Following peak levels earlier in thedecade, the number of largetransnational mergers and acquisitions
fell again in 2009. The acquisition of US
companies by British companies

slowed. There was, however, more
consolidation in the Israeli, Russian and
US industries as well as a continued
pattern of arms-producing companies
diversifying into the security industry.
Even though more than a year has
passed since the onset of the global
ﬁnancial crisis and economic recession,
an initial assessment shows that manyarms-producing companies continued
to increase arms sales in 2009.
Sustained high levels of military
expenditure (especially in the USA—thelargest military spender and arms
procurer) and the ongoing conﬂicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq partly explain thecontinuing increase. However, themonopsonistic structure of the arms
industry, the consequent strong
relationship between arms producers
and governments and the industry’s
perceived importance to national
security also shield it from theimmediate impact of severe economic
downturns. This status is reﬂected in
the continued high levels of arms sales,high proﬁts, large backlogs and strong
cash ﬂows generated by arms
production.

National or regional shares of arms sales
for the SIPRI Top 100 for 2008
Region/country

No. ofcompanies

Arms sales($ b.)

USA
Western Europe
RussiaJapan
Israel
India
South Korea
Singapore
Canada

44
34
7
4
4
3
2
1
1

229.9
122.1
10.8
7.0
6.9
4.2
1.8
1.3
0.7

Total

100

384.7

Figures refer to the arms sales of Top 100 companies
headquartered in each country or region, including
those of their foreign subsidiaries, not the sales ofarms actually produced in that country or region.

ARMS INDUSTRY ACQUISITIONS, 2009

There were no acquisitions of armsproducing companies worth over
$1 billion in 2009, down from four in 2008
and seven in 2007.
The largest acquisitions in the OECD arms
industry, 2009
Buyer
company

Acquiredcompany

Dealvalue($ m.)

Precision
Carlton Forge
850
Castparts Corp.
Works
General Dynamics Axsys Tech.
643
BAE Systems
BVT Surface Fleet 558
Goodrich Corp.
Atlantic Inertial 375
Systems
Woodward
HR Textron
365
Governor

These facts and data are taken from chapter 6,
appendix 6A, ‘The SIPRI Top 100 arms producing
companies, 2008’, by Susan T. Jackson and the SIPRI
Arms Industry Network, and appendix 6B, ‘Major
arms industry acquisitions, 2009’, by Susan T.
Jackson.

military spending and armaments 13

7. INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

paul holtom, mark bromley, pieter d. wezeman andsiemon t. wezeman

THE SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS OF
MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONSThe trend in transfers of major
conventional weapons, 2000–2009

SIPRI trend-indicator value (b.)

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: ﬁve-year
moving average (plotted at the last year of each ﬁveyear period).

The ﬁve largest suppliers of major
conventional weapons, 2005–2009

Supplier

Share of
Main recipients
global arms (share of supplier’s
exports (%) transfers)

USA

30

Russia23

Germany

11

France8UK

4South Korea (14%)
Israel (11%)
UAE (11%)China (35%)
India (24%)
Algeria (11%)
Turkey (14%)
Greece (13%)
South Africa (12%)
UAE (25%)
Singapore (21%)
Greece (12%)
USA (23%)
India (15%)
Saudi Arabia (10%)

14 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

The volume of international transfers ofmajor conventional weapons continues
to increase. The average annual level forthe period 2005–2009 was 22 per centhigher than the annual average for
2000–2004.
The United States and Russia
remained by far the largest exporters,
followed by Germany, France and theUnited Kingdom. Together these ﬁve
countries accounted for 76 per cent of
the volume of exports for 2005–2009.
Although the dominant position of theﬁrst-tier suppliers, the USA and Russia,
is unlikely to be challenged in the near
future, the second-tier of arms suppliers
is growing in number.
The major recipient region for theperiod 2005–2009 was Asia andOceania, followed by Europe and the
Middle East. The major recipient
countries for 2005–2009 were China,
India, South Korea, the United ArabEmirates (UAE) and Greece. Asian andMiddle Eastern countries are expected
to remain among the world’s largest
importers
Israel, Singapore and Algeria were
not among the 10 largest arms
importers for the period 2000–2004 but
ranked sixth, seventh and ninth for
2005–2009. Recent arms acquisitions
by certain states in Latin America, theMiddle East, North Africa and South
East Asia suggest that a pattern ofreactive arms acquisitions is emerging,Reports to UNROCA, 1999–2008
150

120
No. of reportsthat could develop into regional arms
races.
In recent years concerns have been
expressed that regional rivals Algeria
and Morocco are engaged in an ‘arms
race’. SIPRI data shows that theoverwhelming majority of arms
transfers to North Africa for the period
2005–2009 were destined for Algeria.
However, in recent years Morocco hasplaced signiﬁcant orders for combat
aircraft, missiles and naval vessels.
Although it is unlikely that theseacquisitions in themselves will lead to
conﬂict, they do not help to improve
relations between the two countries.
Furthermore, their acquisitions arelikely to inﬂuence Libyan plans.
Iraq continues to rely on the USA forthe provision of equipment to rebuild its
armed forces, but has also received
arms from Russia, Ukraine, Hungary,
Italy, Poland and Turkey. Its ambitious
procurement plans have been hit by the
economic crisis and declining oil prices.
Nevertheless, the timetable for thewithdrawal of US forces from Iraq lends
a sense of urgency to international
efforts to provide Iraq with the arms
and military equipment it seeks to meetits perceived internal and external
security needs.

90

60

30

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

TRANSPARENCY IN ARMS TRANSFERS

Official and publicly accessible data onarms transfers is important for assessing
states’ arms export and arms
procurement policies. However,publishing data on arms sales andacquisitions is a sensitive issue for nearly
all states.
The United Nations Register ofConventional Arms (UNROCA) is the key
international mechanism of officialtransparency on arms transfers. The
recent downward trend in states’
participation in UNROCA continued
during 2009. As of 31 December 2009,
only 79 states had submitted reports on
their arms transfers during 2008.
Since the early 1990s an increasing
number of governments have publishednational reports on arms exports. As ofJanuary 2010, 32 states had published atleast one national report on arms exports
since 1990, and 28 have done so since
2006.

These facts and data are taken from chapter 7,
appendix 7A, ‘The suppliers and recipients of major
conventional weapons’, by the SIPRI Arms
Transfers Programme, and appendix 7C,‘Transparency in arms transfers’, by Mark Bromley
and Paul Holtom, and are based in part on the SIPRI
Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/
databases/armstransfers/>.

military spending and armaments 15

8. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES

shannon n. kile, vitaly fedchenko, bharath gopalaswamy andhans m. kristensenWORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, 2010

Other
warheads

Total

USA
2 468
Russia4 630
UK
160
France
300
China
..
India
..
Pakistan..
Israel
..

7 100
7 300
65
–
200
60–80
70–90
60

9 600
12 000
225
300
240
60–80
70–90
80

7 560

14 90022 600Country

Total

Deployedwarheads

All estimates are approximate and are as of January
2010.

GLOBAL STOCKS OF FISSILE
MATERIALS, 2009

As of 2009, global stocks of highly
enriched uranium totalled
approximately 1370 tonnes (not including
227 tonnes to be blended down). Global
military stocks of separated plutonium
totalled approximately 255 tonnes andcivilian stocks totalled 248 tonnes.
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, 1945–2009

In May 2009 North Korea conducted
what is widely believed to be its second
nuclear test explosion. This brought the
total number of nuclear explosions
recorded since 1945 to 2054.
These facts and data are taken from chapter 8,
appendix 8A, ‘Global stocks of ﬁssile materials,
2009’, by Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian,
International Panel on Fissile Materials, andappendix 8B, ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2009’, by
Vitaly Fedchenko.

16 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

In January 2010 eight states—the
United States, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom, France, China,
India, Pakistan and Israel—possessedmore than 7500 operational nuclear
weapons. If all nuclear warheads arecounted, including operational
warheads, spares, those in both active
and inactive storage, and intact
warheads scheduled for dismantlement,these states together possessed a totalof more than 22 000 warheads.
The ﬁve legally recognized nuclear
weapon states, as deﬁned by the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—
China, France, Russia, the United States
and the United Kingdom—are either
deploying new nuclear weapon systems
or have announced their intention to doso; none appears to be prepared to giveup their nuclear arsenals in theforeseeable future.
India and Pakistan, which along with
Israel are de facto nuclear weapon
states outside the NPT, continue todevelop new missile systems that arecapable of delivering nuclear weapons
and are also expanding their capacities
to produce ﬁssile material. Israel
appears to be waiting to assess how thesituation with Iran’s nuclear
programme develops. North Korea isbelieved to have produced enoughplutonium to build a small number ofnuclear warheads, but it is unknown
whether it has operational weapons.

9. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

shannon n. kile

The year 2009 saw new momentum
behind global efforts to promote nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation.
Russia and the USA opened formal
negotiations on a new strategic arms
reduction treaty to succeed the 1991
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitationof Strategic Offensive Arms (START
Treaty) and the 2002 Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).
The main points of contention centredon simplifying the START Treaty’s
veriﬁcation provisions and adapting its
rules for counting deployed nuclear
warheads. The two sides failed toconclude the negotiations prior to
START’s expiration in December 2009
but did so in the spring of 2010. The
resulting New START Treaty, which
mandated modest additional reductions
in Russian and US deployed strategic
nuclear warheads and associateddelivery vehicles, was signed in Prague
on 8 April 2010.
Other positive developments in 2009
included the entry into force of two new
nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, one
covering Central Asia and the other
Africa. In September the UN Security
Council unanimously adopted apolitically binding resolution thatcodiﬁed a broad consensus on a range ofactions to promote nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation andto address the threat of nuclear
terrorism. An apparent breakthroughwas also achieved at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, when the 65
member states agreed to open
negotiations on a ﬁssile material cut-off
treaty (FMCT) after a 12-year impasse;
however, the negotiations were
subsequently blocked by procedural
reservations from Pakistan.
In 2009 little progress was madetowards resolving the long-running
controversies over the nuclear
programmes of Iran and North Korea,
which have been the focus ofinternational concerns about the spreadof nuclear weapons. These concerns
were heightened by North Korea’s
decisions to conduct a second nuclear
test explosion in May 2009 and toresume production of plutonium fornuclear weapons. The controversy overthe scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear
activities intensiﬁed during the yearwith the revelation that Iran wasbuilding a previously undeclareduranium enrichment plant. In
November the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) criticized Iran for not
fulﬁlling its safeguards obligations andfor not complying with previous
demands by the Board and the UN
Security Council that it suspend all
uranium enrichment-related activities.

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17

10. REDUCING SECURITY THREATS FROM CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

john hart and peter clevestig

At the international, national andregional levels in 2009 states continued
to develop strategies to prevent andremediate the effects of the possible
misuse of chemical and biologicalmaterials. With some success, theparties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) maintained theirfocus on capacity building, achieving
universality of membership andeffective implementation of national
obligations, including those related tothe security of dual-purpose materials.
President Barack Obama’s US
Administration presented its muchanticipated policy on the BTWC in
December 2009, while the European
Union (EU) worked to develop acommunication based on therecommendations of an EU chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear(CBRN) working group.
In 2009 India became the third party
to the CWC to complete the destructionof its declared chemical weapon
stockpile. Iraq joined the convention
and declared that it possesses chemical
weapons (holdovers from the previous
regime and under UN seal). The parties
to the BTWC met in 2009 to consider
the enhancement of international
cooperation, assistance and exchange inthe life sciences and related technology
for peaceful purposes.

18 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

Security analysts and government
officials studied the implications ofdisease outbreaks in the context of
preparedness for and response tobiological warfare. In 2009 states
continued to develop mechanisms tolicense and oversee scientiﬁc research,
the chemical industry andbiotechnology—including forcompanies that offer gene synthesis
services—because of the security
implications of these activities.
An emphasis on control and oversightof chemical and biological materials
implies reduced focus on traditional
state military programmes. In addition,
numerous uncertainties are associatedwith international trade generally. The
negative effects of the signals that havebeen given to non-state actors by
various threat assessment statements
about the desirability of using chemicaland biological weapons (CBW), and theanxiety that such use would provoke,
could be mitigated by better
understanding of the variability of theeffects of CBRN weapons. Operational
challenges associated with the volume
and type of trade in dual-purpose
material technology and intangible
technology transfers can also informthreat assessments. This, in turn, would
help to promote a balanced
understanding of the role of CBW
threats in international peace andsecurity.

11. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

zdzislaw lachowski

The prospects for advances in European
arms control appeared better in 2009
than in preceding years, even though
the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) regime
has remained in limbo since December
2007 when Russia unilaterally
suspended its participation. As part of
the Corfu process, a wide-ranging
dialogue on European security, thesigniﬁcance of arms control for
European security was reacknowledgedby all Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE)
participating states. At the 2009 Athens
OSCE Ministerial Council these states
reaffirmed the desire to overcome thelong-standing deadlock in the main
regimes—the CFE Treaty and theVienna Document on conﬁdence- andsecurity-building measures (CSBMs). In
relation to broader security, Russia
insists on convening a Euro-Atlantic
summit with the aim of crowning itwith a European security treaty. The
Western states demonstrated caution
and restraint, making their consent
contingent on the adequacy of thesubstance and scope of an eventual
agreement.
The United States has embarked on athorough review of the US arms control
agenda, and in February 2010 a Special
Envoy for Conventional Armed Forcesin Europe was appointed to start
consultations with the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), European
partners and Russia on the future of the
CFE regime.
Further steps were taken to make theWestern Balkans subregional arms
control framework more self-reliant.
European security-related measuresthat are associated with arms control
aim to respond to traditional as well as
new threats and to risks and challenges.
However, progress as regards theVienna Document CSBMs remains at astandstill. The OSCE participants strive
to counter cross-dimensional threatsthat are increasingly of a local andsubregional nature. With the decreased
norm-setting activity, the practicalassistance given to the Euro-Atlantic
states through the implementation of
select projects remains a chief activity
in the improvement of security andstability in the OSCE region.
Efforts to control ‘inhumane
weapons’ continued in 2009, althoughwith less dynamism than that
demonstrated in 2008 by the ‘Osloprocess’ on cluster munitions. The
grass-roots ‘processes’ and conventions
as well as the traditional
intergovernmental treaties andprotocols compete, yet continue to havea mutually reinforcing moral impact asthey strive to address the problems ofhuman suffering and the betterment ofliving conditions in conﬂict-ridden
areas and throughout the world.

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

12. CONTROLS ON SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS

sibylle bauer and ivana mićić

MULTILATERAL ARMS EMBARGOES,
2009

There were 29 mandatory multilateralarms embargoes in force in 2009,
directed at a total of 17 targets, including
governments, non-governmental forces
and a transnational network. The United
Nations imposed 12 of these embargoes,the European Union (EU) imposed 16 andthe Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) imposed 1.
During 2009 the UN Security Council
imposed its ﬁrst new arms embargo since2006, on Eritrea. The UN widened thearms embargo on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, orNorth Korea) and lifted the arms
embargo on the Government of Liberia.
Nine of the 16 EU embargoes werestraightforward implementations of UN
arms embargoes. In addition, two EU
arms embargoes differed from UN
embargoes in their scope or coverage andﬁve did not have UN counterparts. In
2009 the EU imposed a new arms
embargo on Guinea and lifted its arms
embargo on Uzbekistan. ECOWAS
imposed a new arms embargo on Guinea.
As in previous years in 2009 several
violations of UN arms embargoes wererecorded. For example, cargo inspections
led to the uncovering of violations of theUN embargoes on arms exports from
Iran and North Korea.

20 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

The multiplicity of actors involved inproliferation-sensitive transactions andtheir inherent complexity require
adjustments not just of the concepts andlanguage, but also of related laws aswell as licensing and enforcement
mechanisms. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has shifted fromthe physical movement of goods toanalysis of which elements of atransaction are relevant to, and should
be subject to, controls. Thesedevelopments not only create
challenges, but also offer newopportunities for international
cooperation.
The main forums where states meetto discuss how to maintain effective
export controls on items that may be
used in nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons as well as missile delivery
systems for them are the Australia
Group (AG), the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) and theWassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms andDual-use Goods and Technologies(WA). The intangible transfer oftechnology (ITT), enforcement andpenalties, best and proven practices for
effective export controls, andengagement with non-participatingstates are being discussed across thedifferent regimes. In recent years, theEuropean Union (EU) has also

increased its cooperation with non-EU
countries at working level throughtechnical assistance programmes.
In 2009 the EU adopted an updated
and strengthened version of the 2000
Dual-use Regulation. The revised
document introduces EU-wide powers
to control transit and brokering fordual-use items that may be intended foruse in connection with weapons of mass
destruction or their delivery systems.
During 2009, a new directive tofacilitate the movement of defence
goods inside the EU also entered into
force.

Multilateral arms embargoes in force
during 2009
United Nations arms embargoes
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities
Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF)
Côte d’Ivoire
Eritrea
Iran (technology related to nuclear weapondelivery systems)
Iraq (NGF)
North Korea
Lebanon (NGF)
Liberia (NGF)
Sierra Leone (NGF)
Somalia
Sudan (Darfur)
European Union arms embargoes
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities
China
Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF)
Côte d’Ivoire
GuineaIran
Iraq (NGF)
North Korea
Lebanon (NGF)
Liberia
MyanmarSierra Leone (NGF)
Somalia
Sudan
Uzbekistan
Zimbabwe
ECOWAS
GuineaNGF = non-governmental forces .

These facts and data are taken from appendix 12A,
‘Multilateral arms embargoes’, by Pieter D.
Wezeman and Noel Kelly.

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21

ANNEXES

nenne bodell

Annex A, ‘Arms control anddisarmament agreements’, contains
summaries of multi- and bilateraltreaties, conventions, protocols andagreements relating to arms control anddisarmament, and lists of theirsignatories and states parties.
Annex B, ‘International security
cooperation bodies’, describes the maininternational and intergovernmentalorganizations, treaty-implementing
bodies and export control regimes
whose aims include the promotion of
security, stability, peace or arms control
and lists their members or participants.
Annex C, ‘Chronology 2009’, lists thesigniﬁcant events in 2009 related toarmaments, disarmament andinternational security.
Arms control and disarmament
agreements in force, 1 January 2010

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)
1948 Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention)
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative
to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

22 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

Space and Under Water (Partial
Test-Ban Treaty, PTBT)
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon andOther Celestial Bodies (Outer
Space Treaty)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean(Treaty of Tlatelolco)
1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NonProliferation Treaty, NPT)1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and other Weapons ofMass Destruction on the Seabedand the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production andStockpiling of Bacteriological(Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on their Destruction(Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, BTWC)
1974 Treaty on the Limitation ofUnderground Nuclear Weapon
Tests (Threshold Test-Ban
Treaty, TTBT)1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty, PNET)

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Useof Environmental Modiﬁcation
Techniques (Enmod Convention)
1980 Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material
and Nuclear Facilities
1981 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which
may be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to haveIndiscriminate Effects (CCW
Convention, or ‘Inhumane
Weapons’ Convention)
1985 South Paciﬁc Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty)
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their
Destruction (Chemical Weapons
Convention, CWC)
1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
(Treaty of Bangkok)
1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control (Florence Agreement)
1997 Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturingof and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, andOther Related Materials

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction(APM Convention)
1999 Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional
Weapons Acquisitions
1999 Vienna Document 1999 on
Conﬁdence- and SecurityBuilding Measures
2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions (SORT, Moscow
Treaty)2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small
Arms, Light Weapons, theirAmmunition and Other RelatedMaterials
2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk)
Agreements not in force, 1 January
2010

1972 Treaty on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems (ABM
Treaty)1991 Treaty on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START I Treaty)
1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START II Treaty)
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the
CFE Treaty
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
2010 Treaty on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitationof Strategic Offensive Arms (NewSTART Treaty, Prague Treaty)annexes 23

RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS

China and Nuclear Arms Control: Current Positions and Future Policies

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/4
By Bates Gill
SIPRI, April 2010End-user Certiﬁcates: Improving Standards to Prevent Diversion

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/3
By Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths
SIPRI, March 2010
China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/2
By Linda Jakobson
SIPRI, March 2010
Demilitarizing mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the case ofnorthern Katanga Province

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/1
By Ruben de Koning
SIPRI, January 2010
China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications

SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25
By Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang
SIPRI, November 2009
Handbook of Applied Biosecurity for Life Science Laboratories

By Peter Clevestig
SIPRI, June 2009
Air Transport and Destabilizing Commodity FlowsBy Hugh Griffiths and Mark Bromley
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 24
SIPRI, May 2009
Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-Use Goods

SIPRI Research Report No. 24
By Anna Wetter
Oxford University Press, 2009
Information on all SIPRI publications is available at <http://books.sipri.org/>.
24 sipri yearbook 2010, summary

HOW TO ORDERSIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in July 2010 by Oxford University Press on behalf ofStockholm International Peace Research InstituteISBN 978-0-19-958112-2, hardback, 580 pp., £100/$185
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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI YEARBOOK 2010
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas of• Security and conﬂicts• Military spending and armaments• Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmamentThis booklet summarizes the 41st edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which includes
coverage of developments during 2009 in• Major armed conﬂicts• Multilateral peace operations• Military expenditure• Arms production• International arms transfers• World nuclear forces, stocks of ﬁssile materials and nuclear explosions• Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation• Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials• Conventional arms control• Controls on security-related international transfers• Multilateral arms embargoes
as well as special studies on• A world without nuclear weapons• Armed conﬂict, crime and criminal violence• Civilian roles in peace operations• Euro-Atlantic security and institutions
and extensive annexes on arms control and disarmament agreements, international
security cooperation bodies and events during 2009 in the area of security and arms
control.