SIPRIYEARBOOK

2017
Armaments,
Disarmament andInternational
Security
SummarySTOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conﬂict,armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data,
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers,
media and the interested public.

THE SIPRI YEARBOOKSIPRI Yearbook 2017 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conﬂicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security. The SIPRI Yearbook, which was ﬁrst published in
1969, is written by both SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2017 and gives samples of thedata and analysis that it contains.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction

1

Part I. Armed conflicts and conflict management, 2016

2. Armed conﬂict and peace processes
3. Armed conﬂict and instability in the Middle East and North Africa
4. European security
5. Peace operations and conﬂict management

2
4
6
7

Part II. Security and development, 2016

6. Sustaining peace and sustainable development in dangerous places
7. Coping with crises: forced displacement in fragile contexts
8. Exploring the links between climate change and violent conﬂict

9
10
11

Part III. Military spending and armaments, 2016

9. Military expenditure
10. International arms transfers and developments in arms production
11. World nuclear forces

12
14
16

Part IV. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2016

12. Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control
13. Chemical and biological security threats
14. Conventional arms control
15. Dual-use and arms trade controls
www.sipriyearbook.org

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20
21
22
© SIPRI 2017

1. INTRODUCTION.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT

dan smith
An overall perspective on 2016 ﬁnds abalance between negative developments
and the continued functioning of theinternational system. However, the year
ended with clear grounds for concern thatthe balance sheet seemed to be tipping
towards the negative amid growing uneaseabout the durability of key parts of theinternational security architecture.
Conﬂicts in the Middle East continued togenerate humanitarian tragedies and largescale movement of refugees, and violent
conﬂict continued in several other parts of
the world, most notably Africa, Asia and toa lesser extent Eastern Europe. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear programme
contributed to international politicalinstability with potentially serious
knock-on effects. On the positive side, the2015 Paris Climate Agreement entered into
force in November 2016, the 2015 Irannuclear deal began implementation on timein early 2016 and the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a resolution tostart negotiations in 2017 on eliminating
nuclear weapons. Progress was also madeon work to monitor the unfolding
implementation of the UN’s Agenda 2030
for international social and economic
development. A major contribution to thepositive side of the balance sheet in 2016
was the peace agreement in Colombia.
Nonetheless, virtually all the major
global indicators for peace and security
have moved in a negative direction: moremilitary spending, increased arms trading,more violent conﬂicts and the continuing
forward march of military technology.

Existing multilateral and bilateral arms
control agreements and processes are also
under challenge—not least due to thedeteriorating relationship between Russia
and the United States—raising questions ofglobal concern and potentially epochal
scope. Were the great gains in peacefulrelations since the end of the cold war now
being reversed? Would the return ofstrategic competition between the major
powers have negative implications for
managing increased conﬂict risk? These
uncertainties, combined with politicaldevelopments in Europe and the USA—especially the vote by the United Kingdom
to leave the European Union and theelection of Donald J. Trump as US
President—seemed to reveal a muchdecreased commitment to international
institutions and a renewed emphasis inseveral key states on a narrowly deﬁned
national interest.
The scale of the challenges facing
humanity has been summed up in the
proposal to adopt the label of ‘the
Anthropocene’ for the current era, thus
designating it as one in which humanactivity is the dominant inﬂuence on
climate and the environment. It is
disconcerting to note that such cooperation
risks becoming more elusive than it has
seemed for most of the time since the end of
the cold war, at a time when it is moreneeded than ever. Experience has shownthat international cooperation can work.
But is the international cooperative urge as
persistent as the problems it needs toaddress?

•

introduction 1

2. ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACEPROCESSES
Patterns of armed conflict, 2007–16

The pattern of armed conﬂict and peace
processes in 2016 appeared to conﬁrm therecent trend for a reversal of the post-cold
war peace, but the picture is mixed.
According to the Uppsala Conﬂict Data
Program (UCDP), for example, the numberof active armed conﬂicts decreased from52 to 49 in 2016. However, despite thisreduction, 2016 conﬁrms the trend for there
to be a signiﬁcantly larger number of
conﬂicts in the past three years comparedto the period 2007–13. Comparisons over alonger period show that the number ofarmed conﬂicts in recent years has beenequivalent to the number in the period
1990–92. The two periods 1990–92 and2014–16 constitute two distinct peaks in the
post-cold war era. Much of the increase in
the number of conﬂicts in 2014–16 stemmed
from the spread of the Islamic State (IS),which often transformed active conﬂicts
and led them to be recorded as new
conﬂicts in UCDP data.
Of the 49 active conﬂicts in 2016, 2 werefought between states (India–Pakistan andEritrea–Ethiopia) and the other 47 werefought within states and over government(22), territory (24) or both (1). There is aclear recent pattern for a larger share of
intrastate conﬂicts to involve troops fromother states on the side of one or both of thewarring parties. In 2016 over one-third(38 per cent) of intrastate conﬂicts wereinternationalized in this way. Most of these(13 out of 18) were fought against Islamist
organizations.
The UCDP recorded 12 wars—deﬁned as
an armed conﬂict that results in 1000
battle-related deaths—in 2016, one more

2 sipri yearbook 2017, summaryt h e gl ob a l pe ac e i n de x , 2 0 1 7
The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced by
the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses
23 indicators to rank 163 states and territories
by their relative states of peace. The overall
GPI score improved in 2016, but the averagecountry score is lower now than in 2008. The
largest deterioration in peacefulness
occurred in North America, and there were
smaller deteriorations in sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East and North Africa. The
largest improvements in peacefulness
occurred in South America, Russia andEurasia, and the Asia-Paciﬁc region. The
impact of terrorism increased in 2016,
continuing a decade-long trend. A total of
60 per cent of the countries in the GPI haveexperienced an increase in terrorism since2007, and the impact of terrorism has morethan doubled in 22 countries.
Rank

Country

Score

Change

1
2
3
4
5
159
160
161
162
163

Iceland
New ZealandPortugal
Austria
Denmark
Yemen
South Sudan
Iraq
Afghanistan
Syria

1.111
1.241
1.258
1.265
1.337
3.412
3.524
3.556
3.567
3.814

–0.081–0.044–0.098–0.013+0.091+0.013–0.069–0.014+0.029+0.008than in 2015. Three of the wars listed in2015 had de-escalated to the level of aminor armed conﬂict in 2016 (Nigeria,
Pakistan and Ukraine). Four previously
recorded conﬂicts escalated to the level ofwar: Afghanistan–IS, Libya–IS, Turkey–IS
and Turkey–Kurdistan. Africa was theregion with the highest number of conﬂicts
in 2016 (19 active conﬂicts) followed by Asia
(15 conﬂicts). Ten conﬂicts were recordedin the Middle East, three in Europe and twoin the Americas.

r e gion a l di st r i bu t ion a n d t o ta l n u m b e r of a r m e d c on f l ic t s ,2 0 0 7–16
60

No. of armed conflicts

50

40

30

20

10

0

2007
Africa2008

2009

Americas

2010

2011
Asia

Conﬂict-related developments have been
discouraging in recent years, not least in
the Middle East, but not all the changes
have been negative. While many conﬂicts
were initiated or escalated, many others
ceased to be active or were de-escalated.
The reduction in the number of conﬂicts in
Latin America is particularly noteworthy.
After the 2016 peace agreement between
the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia–People’s Army (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–
Ejército del Pueblo, FARC–EP) and theGovernment of Colombia, and with ongoingnegotiations with the National Liberation
Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
ELN), the only guerrilla group still in
conﬂict with the Colombian Government, it
seems likely that the region will soon haveno active conﬂicts.

2012

2013

Europe2014

2015

Middle East

2016
Total

Islamist armed conflicts

About one-third of the world’s Islamist
armed conﬂicts are taking place in the
Middle East and North Africa, one-third in
sub-Saharan Africa and the rest largely in
Asia. In some cases, an escalation can beobserved over time from not necessarily
religiously framed opposition to explicit
Islamist grievances, followed by atransformation into transnational Islamist
aspirations. The need to recognize andconstructively manage this type of conﬂict
at each step of its escalation, and seek toresolve it has important implications forconﬂict prevention policy. South East Asia
stands out as a region that is bucking theempirical trend, where the proportion ofIslamist armed conﬂicts seems to be
decreasing.

•armed conflicts and conflict management 3

3. ARMED CONFLICT AND
INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
remained at the heart of global security
concerns throughout 2016. A variety offactors explain the region’s seemingly
chronic insecurity and persistentsusceptibility to armed conﬂict, such as
governance failures in most Arab countries,
the still-unfolding consequences of the2003 invasion of Iraq by the US-led
coalition, and the complex relations andrivalries among regional powers. In 2016 atleast 7 of the 16 countries in the region used
military force in combat on their own
territory, and 11 used it on the territory ofother countries.
A key element in MENA’s security proﬁleis the aftermath of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’.
Five years on, it is only in Tunisia that theﬂowers bloom, although the country’s path
to a stable democracy remains fraught with
risk.
Syria

The war in Syria has resulted in thedisplacement of half the population—over
4.8 million as international refugees andover 6.3 million as internally displaced
persons—and the death of over 400 000,
although there are no reliable casualty
statistics. Amid the complex array ofcontending forces in Syria, in 2016 thebalance of power tilted quite sharply infavour of President Bashar al-Assad as aresult of three important developments: theRussian air campaign in support of the
Syrian Government, combined with groundforce support from Iran and Hezbollah;
Turkey’s reconciliation with Russia, and its
ensuing policy shift from regime change in
Syria to securing continued Turkish

4 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

inﬂuence; and the defeat of antigovernment forces in eastern Aleppo in
December 2016. By the end of the year, theUnited States had been sidelined in theregional peace talks, and Iran, Russia andTurkey were at the forefront of discussions
about Syria and Assad’s future.
Libya and Yemen

Libya ended 2016 still mired in the chaotic
aftermath of the 2011 civil war andinternational intervention, and still seeking
a pathway to stability and security for its
citizens.
The interstate relationship that is thehighest proﬁle, most complex and mostdangerous in the region is that between
Iran and Saudi Arabia. One major issue thatexacerbates poor Iranian–Saudi relations is
Yemen, which has experienced an intermittent civil war since 2004. Saudi andother Arab forces have been involved since2015. By the end of 2016, the Saudi
intervention was associated with a major
humanitarian crisis and had failed to inﬂict
decisive setbacks on Houthi forces.
The Islamic StateThe Islamic State (IS) remained a potent
force and focus of international concern in
2016, despite the fact that it sufferedsigniﬁcant setbacks in Iraq, Syria and
Libya. The framework of Operation
Inherent Resolve, the US-led global
coalition formed in September 2014,
continued to set the pace for external
military operations against IS in 2016.
While the core membership of IS remains
in Iraq and Syria, its efforts have been
reinforced by a network of foreign ﬁghters
and affiliate groups in several countries
across four continents. Terrorist attacks
attributed to the group or to individuals

m i l i ta ry e x pe n di t u r e b y t h e
f i v e l a rge s t s pe n de r s i n t h e
m i ddl e e a s t, 2 0 0 7–16
100 000

Constant US$ m. (2015)

80 00060 00040 000

20 00002007

Israel

2008

2009

Iran

2010

Turkey2011

2012

Saudi Arabia

2013

2014

2015

2016

United Arab Emirates

that it has inspired cost hundreds of lives in
the wider Middle East, Africa, South Asia
and Europe in 2016.
IS relies on infrastructure andinstitutions more usually associated with astate, such as oil sales, taxation, cash
holdings, the sale of antiquities andransoms, as well as access to national orinternational ﬁnancial systems. Theserevenue streams are also key points ofvulnerability; targeting them has been thefocus of an international economic war
conducted by several states that has both amilitary dimension (e.g. airstrikes against
oil infrastructure, cash holdings and key IS
ﬁnancial operatives) and a non-military
dimension (e.g. preventing donations,freezing assets and inhibiting trade withthe group). International efforts were also
made to combat IS propaganda and counterviolent extremism more generally, albeit
with mixed results.
Despite it losing territory in 2016, IS’s
aims and terrorist capabilities are likely topersist in the coming years, possibly in adifferent and even more lethal form.

Middle East illustrate the importance ofmilitary capability in the region. Military
expenditure as a share of gross domestic
product, also known as the military burden,
tends to be particularly high. Total militaryspending in the Middle East in 2015 and2016 cannot be calculated due to missing
data. This reﬂects a general lack oftransparency and accountability on
military matters in the region. Saudi Arabia
is by far the largest military spender in the
Middle East, and was the fourth largest in
the world in 2016.
Arms imports to the Middle East
increased by 86 per cent between 2007–11
and 2012–16. The Middle East accounted
for 29 per cent of global arms imports in
2012–16, making it the second largest
importing region for that period. Many
countries in the Middle East have acquired
sophisticated military systems that seem
likely to substantially increase theirmilitary capability. The USA and several
West European states continued to be themajor arms suppliers to most countries in
the region throughout 2012–16. It is likelythat arms imports have contributed to theinstability, violent conﬂict and humanrights violations in the region.

•

Military expenditure and arms transfers in
the Middle East

Trends and patterns of military expenditure and arms transfers to countries in thearmed conflicts and conflict management 5

4. EUROPEAN SECURITY
Cooperative security under strain

At the end of the cold war the underlying
causes of confrontation in Europe appeared
to have been eliminated. A sharedassessment of the main problems facing
Europe and a common approach to dealing
with them seemed possible. In constructing
a rules-based European order in which toorganize cooperation, states carefullybalanced political, politico-military, humansecurity, environmental and economic
issues within a framework ofcomprehensive security.
Events in 2016 reinforced the view that
all the elements of the European
cooperative security system were understrain. A step-by-step estrangement
between Russia and the member states of
the European Union (EU) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has led topolitico-military policy change, militarymodernization and adapted force posturesthat could increase the risk of confrontation
and, in crisis conditions, military clashes
between major military powers. At the endof the year, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
proposed a renewed emphasis on
addressing the politico-military aspects of
security.
The political and human rights
dimensions of the European security
system were also challenged in different
ways. With mixed success, key security
institutions, the OSCE, the EU and theCouncil of Europe responded to the need toprotect the independence of the judiciaryand safeguard the freedom of the media
while combating hate speech, protecting
the rights of minorities and ensuring that

6 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

states meet their legal obligations regarding
the humane treatment of refugees.
Armed conflict in the post-Soviet space

Armed conﬂict has returned to Europe, inparticular through an escalation in violencein some of the protracted conﬂicts in the
post-Soviet space that emerged in the ﬁnal
years of the Soviet Union and the years that
followed its demise. Efforts to ﬁnd asustainable peace in eastern Ukraine,where conﬂict has now claimed roughly
10 000 lives, did not bear fruit. All these
conﬂicts contain the potential forsigniﬁcant escalation.
TurkeyRecent developments in Turkey reveal adomestic, regional and international
security environment that is the mostcomplex in Europe. The dramatic events in2016—including a sequence of violent
attacks, an attempted coup d’état andsubsequent government crackdowns on
suspected plotters and other dissidents—
made the year one of the most challenging
in recent Turkish history. At the end of
2016, neither the conﬂicts on its borders
with Iraq and Syria—and their spillover
effects, such as the major displacement ofcivilians—nor the upsurge in domestic andinternational mass-impact terrorism had
abated. Internal political and constitutional
challenges in the aftermath of the failed
coup competed with importantreassessments of relations with key
partners: the EU, Russia and the UnitedStates.

•5. PEACE OPERATIONS AND
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

no . of m u lt i l at e r a l pe ac e
ope r at ions , b y t y pe ofc on duc t i ng org a n i z at ion ,2 0 0 7–16

Trends and developments in peace

70

operations in 201660
50
No. of operations

In 2016 it became clear that many of thetrends in terms of the number of missions
and personnel have peaked and now seemto be slowly declining or levelling out. Two
new peace operations were started: theUnited Nations Mission in Colombia andthe European Union (EU) Military
Training Mission in the Central African
Republic (CAR) (EUTM RCA). Four
missions were terminated: the EU Military
Advisory Mission in the CAR (EUMAM
RCA); France’s Operation Sangaris (also in
the CAR); the EU Advisory and Assistance
Mission for Security Reform in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSECRD Congo); and the EU Police Mission(EUPOL) in Afghanistan. The number ofpeace operations active during 2016
decreased by one compared with 2015
(to 62). The total number of personnel
deployed in the ﬁeld declined by 6 per centto 153 056, continuing a trend that began in2012.
Moreover, while the UN clearly remains
the principal actor in peace operations,after three consecutive years of personnel
increases in UN operations, this trend
reversed in 2016. The trend for decreases inpersonnel looks set to continue. The UN
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) andthe UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) areplanned to drawdown, while other UN
operations are reaching authorized
personnel levels and long-awaited
operations in places such as Burundi, Libya,
Syria, Ukraine and Yemen may never see
the light of day.

40
30
20
10
0
2007

Conducting organization:

2008

2009

2010

United Nations

2011

2012

2013

2014

Regional organization or alliance

2015

2016
Ad hoc coalition

Peace operations in Africa

Africa remained the primary focus of peace
operations. As recommended in the reportby the UN High-level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations (the HIPPO report), theUN, the African Union (AU) and theRegional Economic Communities andRegional Mechanisms are deepening theirpartnerships. Funding African operations
is still one of the main challenges. In 2016
the AU Assembly of Heads of State andGovernment decided to increase the AU
contribution to the funding of all AU peace
support operations to 25 per cent by 2020,
by means of a 0.2 per cent import tax on‘eligible imports’ into the continent.
However, African actors will remain
dependent on external funding in the short
to medium term, and some external
actors—particularly the EU and its member
states—are becoming less generous andmore demanding. This presents ﬁnancial
challenges for several African peace
operations, some of which face potential
closure as contributors consider
withdrawing their troops.
Grey zone operations

Military and civilian personnel are
increasingly being deployed in operations

armed conflicts and conflict management 7

Protection of civilians

no . of m u lt i l at e r a l pe ac e
ope r at ions , b y r e gion ,2 0 0 7–16
30

No. of operations

25
20
15
10
5
0
2007
Africa2008

2009

Americas

2010

2011

2012

Asia and Oceania

2013

2014

Europe2015

2016

Middle East

that fall in the ‘grey zone’ of just within orjust outside the SIPRI deﬁnition ofmultinational peace operations. While insome cases troop contributing countries
and host nations would be helped if the UN
Security Council considered mandating
and ﬁnancing operations, such as theMultinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
against Boko Haram, in other instanceshost nations resist having a peace operationon their soil. Such operations can be seen as
an infringement of national sovereignty,
and may also contribute to an image of state
failure. Examples include (a) Burundi’s
resistance to the deployment of the African
Prevention and Protection Mission in
Burundi (MAPROBU), the AU humanrights and military experts, and the UN
police contribution to Burundi; (b) Syria’s
reluctance to even allow observation of theevacuations from eastern Aleppo to other
districts of the city; and (c) Colombia’s
insistence on making the UN Mission in
Colombia a political mission rather than apeacekeeping operation. Thesedevelopments stress the importance offurther expanding data collection andanalyses of operations in the grey zone.

8 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

The protection of civilians is anotherchallenge faced by the AU and the UN. The
impotence of the international community
in Ukraine and Syria has been madepainfully clear, and is frequently covered in
the media. The inability to deal with thesituation in South Sudan has received lessattention. With some 200 000 civilians
under its care in Protection of Civilian(POC) sites, the UN Mission in South Sudan(UNMISS) faces unprecedented challenges.
Several attacks on POC sites in 2016
demonstrated that providing civilians withprotection was far beyond the capability of
UNMISS and that the POC sites raised
unrealistic expectations among those who
had expected to be protected. Moreover, as
many civilians have already been living in
the POC sites for more than three years,
rather than a temporary solution, thesesites have become de facto internallydisplaced person camps, which requireassociated levels of internal security andliving standards. As the POC sites in South
Sudan are likely to remain for many years tocome, it is important for UNMISS to learn
lessons from events in 2016.

•

6. SUSTAINING PEACE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INDANGEROUS PLACESThe United Nations officially launched the2030 Agenda for Sustainable Developmenton 1 January 2016. The aim is to achieve the17 Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.
This reﬂects the fact that peace anddevelopment are continuous processes that
require constant cultivation and maynecessitate decades of effort before thebeneﬁts are realized. Allied to thesustainable development agenda is the new
UN concept of sustaining peace, whichcalls for better linkages between the UN’s
three foundational pillars: peace andsecurity, development and human rights,
and humanitarian action. It replaces thesequential approach to conﬂict that often
resulted in silos of prevention,
humanitarian action, peacekeeping,peacebuilding and development—and calls
for better linkages and sharing of
instruments across these different sets of
responses.
The context for the development of the
UN’s sustaining peace framework included
pockets of violence concentrated in theworld’s dangerous places; ongoing complex
humanitarian emergencies; and limited
capacities for preventing, responding to,
managing and recovering from conﬂict.
Sustaining peace is also linked to theprinciples of national ownership andinclusivity, and is consistent with theconcept of positive peace.
Sustaining peace seeks to shift actors
away from structural violence and towards
collaborative solutions and development,
and thus towards positive peace outcomes.
It is vital to understand the long-term
impact of armed conﬂict on development
and to implementing peace accordingly:

while a typical civil war lasts 7 years, ittakes 14 years to recover from one
economically, the chances of a setback arehigh and it can take 25 years to rebuild loststate systems and institutions to the level of‘good enough’ governance. Only in the past
10 years have Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam
started to take off economically after
decades of conﬂict followed by decades ofrecovery. This suggests that the ongoing
conﬂicts and dissolution of the state in
Libya, South Sudan and Yemen will each,on average, lead to another 15 to 25 years oflost development.
Several important events took place in2016 in the ﬁelds of preventing violent
extremism, humanitarian action, and thewomen, peace and security agenda. Theseﬁelds show some of the mechanisms
through which the concept of sustaining
peace is being integrated into global peaceand development practice. The May 2016
World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), forexample, resulted in over 3100 individualand joint commitments in core areas suchas political leadership to prevent and end
conﬂict, upholding the norms thatsafeguard humanity, and better targetedfunding of humanitarian assistance.
While the concept of conﬂict prevention
remains mostly aspirational, several
developments in 2016—such as the WHS,
the Sendai Framework, the Global
Partnership for Preparedness and the
Global Alliance for Urban Crises—can beinterpreted as investments in sustaining
peace and possible paths for a positive
peace.

•

security and development 9

7. COPING WITH CRISES:FORCED DISPLACEMENT INFRAGILE CONTEXTSIn 2016 forced displacement continued to
be a major challenge to human security,
most notably in the Middle East and Africa,
which together currently host over twothirds of the world’s displaced population.
In recent years the number of forcefully
displaced persons—over 60 million—has
increased signiﬁcantly in comparison with,for example, population growth or generalmigration. This rise has been caused by
new displacement crises (such as those in
Yemen and South Sudan) coupled withprotracted crises (such as those in Syria andAfghanistan) and the low number ofreturnees. The clear majority of these
displacement crises were generated
primarily by armed conﬂicts.
The challenges are particularly
pronounced due to the concentration offorcefully displaced persons in conﬁned
geographical spaces—in a city, at a border,
in a camp or along a narrow transit route—and, above all, across a small number ofcountries. This concentration leads tocoping crises, overcrowding and associatedproblems, most notably inadequate physicalprotection, health care issues, increased
resource constraints, and loss of livelihoodand educational opportunities.
State-centric structures for addressing
forced displacement and the lack of acommonly agreed international legal
framework are serious obstacles tosuccessfully addressing both short-term
human security needs and long-term
challenges, such as the legal status ofdisplaced persons in a host country and theconsequences this has for livelihoods andother opportunities. While existing
international law offers protection to those

10 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

ﬂeeing their home country and seeking
protection in other states, most major
refugee-hosting countries have not signed
the United Nations Convention on
Refugees. In any case, the convention does
not apply to internally displaced persons—the group that makes up the vast majorityof those forcefully displaced.
The most useful way to understandcurrent displacement dangers, andtherefore better address them, is throughtheir shared context of large-scale
displacement in fragile, violent situations.
While fragility refers to societies’
heightened exposure to risks combinedwith a low capacity to mitigate or absorb
them, violent conﬂicts were also closely
associated with all the major displacement
crises in 2016.
The depth and breadth of the ongoingdisplacements may have spillover effects onother societies and countries. Regional andinternational processes have been initiatedto address the humanitarian challenges ofdisplacement and the concerns of refugeehosting and other states. In 2016 the UN
General Assembly, for example, took theﬁrst step towards a political process todesign an international framework on safe
migration, including more equitable burden
sharing in hosting and supporting refugees.
However, some processes risk undermining
the international legal framework that iscurrently protecting refugees. For example,
on at least two occasions in 2016, theEuropean Union sought to reach politicalsolutions with major refugee-hosting statesthat had no written or legal basis.

•

8. EXPLORING THE LINKS
BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND
VIOLENT CONFLICTThe security challenges posed by climatechange are multifaceted and affect human,community and state security. Climatechange also has short-, medium- and longterm impacts, which makes the time
perspective adopted key. In addition, theimpacts of climate change on, for instance,
food or water security are heavily
dependent on socio-economic conditions,which means that the same impact might
have diverse consequences depending on
the context. Hence, climate change puts
additional pressures on current
vulnerabilities for humans and societies
across the world, and has particularly
adverse effects in already fragile contexts.
One class of security challenge in relation
to a changing climate is the increased riskof violent conﬂict. A large body of researchin the past decade has examined theclimate–conﬂict link and its inﬂuences onpolicymaking, most notably in foreign,
defence and development policy.
In East Africa, for example, fourmechanisms linking climate change toviolent conﬂict have been identiﬁed:
worsening livelihood conditions; migrationand changing pastoral mobility patterns;
tactical considerations of armed groups;
and exploitation of local grievances by theelite. While the ﬁrst two mechanisms deal
mainly with the causes of conﬂict, the latter
two are about changing conﬂict dynamics.
This difference illustrates that themechanisms both interact with andcomplement each other.
Mechanisms linking the impacts ofclimate change on peace and conﬂict canalso be explored in the context of extreme
weather events. Among the deadliest of theextreme weather events that occurred
between 2000 and 2016 were tropical
cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, theheatwaves in the northern hemisphere in2010 and the tropical cyclones in thePhilippines in 2013. Violent conﬂict was an
outcome in some of these cases. By focusing
on these events it is possible to identify not
only the mechanisms that link extreme
weather events to violent conﬂict, but also
the mechanisms that enable pressures to beresolved peacefully. Four mechanisms wereidentiﬁed. The ﬁrst two—competition overscarce resources and failure of conﬂict
management institutions—are linked toincreased risk of violent conﬂict. The third
mechanism—social-coherence building—however, illustrates how extreme weather
events in areas plagued by conﬂict
sometimes facilitate social-coherencebuilding and enable cooperation, rather
than deepening ongoing conﬂicts. The
fourth mechanism—acceleration oftransformation—emphasizes the social
dynamics following a disaster, which in theselected cases lack a clear direction interms of increasing or reducing the risk ofviolent conﬂict after an extreme weather
event.
Among the policy implications are theimportance of mitigating the negative
effects of climate change on livelihoods andthe need for adequate conﬂict resolution
mechanisms. It is also important to notethat climate change does not deterministically lead to violent conﬂict. Humanagency permeates every link in the chain
from climate change to violent conﬂict.
This provides a foundation for investigating
how peace can be maintained and shaped in
the face of vast pressures, including thoseof climate change.

•

security and development 11

9. MILITARY EXPENDITURE
World military expenditure was estimatedat $1686 billion in 2016, equivalent to
2.2 per cent of global gross domestic
product or $227 per person. Total global
expenditure in 2016 was roughly constantcompared to 2015, being only
0.4 per cent higher in real terms.
Military expenditure in North America
saw its ﬁrst annual increase since 2010,
while in Western Europe spending was up
by 2.6 per cent on 2015. Spending
continued to rise in Asia and Oceania andEastern Europe. In contrast, militaryspending fell in Africa, South and Central
America and the Caribbean and thosecountries in the Middle East for whichdata is available. Overall, the increases inmilitary spending in Asia and Oceania,
Europe and North America have been
almost completely offset by decreases in
the rest of the developing world.
With a total of $611 billion, the UnitedStates remained the largest militaryspender in 2016. Its spending grew by
1.7 per cent compared with 2015—the ﬁrst
annual increase since 2010 when US
military expenditure reached its peak.
There is uncertainty over the future
direction of US military spending, butestimates in the National Defense Budget
suggest a modest increase in procurement
and research, development, test andevaluation (RDT&E) spending for 2017,
and substantial increases over the period
2018–21.
The impact of the oil price shock

The sharp fall in the price of oil, continuing
the price slump since late 2014, had asigniﬁcant impact on many oil exportdependent countries. Where there had
been a close correlation between high oil

12 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

wor l d m i l i ta ry spe n di ng , 2 0 16

RegionAfricaNorth Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
AmericasCentral America
and Caribbean
North America
South America
Asia and Oceania
Central and South Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth East Asia
EuropeCentral Europe
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Middle East
World total

Spending Change($ b.)(%)(37.9)(18.7)
19.2
693
7.8

–1.3
1.5
–3.6
0.8
–9.1

626
58.8
450
73.3
308
26.6
41.9
334
21.0
75.4
237
..

1.7
–7.5
4.6
6.4
4.3
1.7
5.1
2.8
2.4
3.5
2.6
..

1 686

0.4

( ) = uncertain estimate; . . = data unavailable.
Spending ﬁgures are in current (2016) US$.
All changes are in real terms for the period
2015–16.

prices and rising military spending overthe previous 10 years, the fall in the price ofoil has led to substantial decreases. The
decrease in oil revenues has forced many
oil-producing countries to cut their total
government budget, and thus militaryspending. In Africa, South and Central
America and the Middle East, the decreasein military spending in a few oil exportdependent countries has had a major effecton regional trends.
Cuts in government spending have led toresource prioritization choices and tradeoffs between military and social
expenditure. In the period since the oil
price crash, the evidence from the national
reports of oil export-dependent countries
indicates an average decrease in militaryc h a nge s i n m i l i ta ry e x pe n di t u r e , b y r e gion , 2 0 1 5 –16
World
AfricaSouth and Central America,
and the Caribbean
North America
Asia and Oceania
Western Europe
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
–8

–7

–6

–5

–4

–3

–2

spending that is relatively greater than thedecrease in social sectors such as health oreducation.
Military expenditure data

Although there has been a lack of voluntary
reporting to the United Nations, manystates publish military spending
information in government reports, inbudgets and on other publicly accessible
platforms. Incomplete and inaccurate
information on military spending is aproblem due to its association with national
security, but national transparency has
improved in many cases. In 2016 SIPRI
collected reliable and consistent militaryspending data for 148 countries.

–1

0

1

2

3

4

5

current US dollars and as a share of grossdomestic product, the extended data set
offers major opportunities for new researchand insights into the dynamics of militaryspending. The data also enables the
exploration of long-term trends in military
expenditure in different regions andcountries, covering both the cold war andpost-cold war periods.

•

An expanded SIPRI data set

SIPRI has achieved a long-held ambition to
publish an expanded military expenditure
data set that goes back in some cases as far
as 1949. Providing data in constant andmilitary spending and armaments 13

10. INTERNATIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN ARMS PRODUCTION
The volume of international transfers ofmajor weapons grew by 8.4 per centbetween 2007–11 and 2012–16. The ﬁvelargest suppliers in 2012–16—the UnitedStates, Russia, China, France andGermany—accounted for 74 per cent of thevolume of exports.
Since 1950 the USA and Russia (or theSoviet Union before 1992) have consistently
been by far the largest suppliers. They,
together with West European suppliers,
have historically dominated the list of the
10 largest suppliers and there are no signsof any major change in the near future. In
fact, this group increased its share of the
global total between 2007–11 and 2012–16.
This group has now been joined by China,
which has ﬁrmly established itself as one of
the world’s largest exporters of major
weapons.
At the regional level, the ﬂow of arms to
the Middle East grew by 86 per centbetween 2007–11 and 2012–16, while theﬂow of arms to Asia and Oceania rose by

7.7 per cent. By contrast, the ﬂow of arms toEurope decreased notably (by 36 per cent),
as did those to the Americas (by 18 per cent)and Africa (by 6.6 per cent).
Weapons delivered as military aid

Tensions and conﬂicts were ongoing inlarge parts of the world in 2016, and theseoften had direct links to arms acquisitions
from abroad. Weapons used in these
conﬂicts are sometimes delivered as aid. In
other cases, such aid is less linked toongoing conﬂicts and major tensions but
rather is used as a tool to support or
improve wider political relations or to gain
foreign approval for policies. While thevolume in arms transfers as aid has
dropped, such transfers continue to be a key
policy tool for some of the main suppliers.
Transparency in arms transfers

Following the trend set over the past few
years, 2016 was once again disappointing interms of arms transfers transparency. The
number of states reporting arms imports
and exports to the United Nations Registerof Conventional Arms (UNROCA)t h e t r e n d i n t r a n sf e r s of m a jor w e a p ons , 19 5 0 –2 016

Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)

50

40

30

20

10
0
1950

1960

14 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010 2016remained low, and while the mandatory
reporting under the Arms trade Treaty(ATT) started reasonably well in 2016, a
comparison with UNROCA reporting
raises questions about whether the two
instruments can jointly help to improveoverall levels of transparency in theinternational arms trade. No major changes
occurred in transparency at national andregional levels.
The financial value of arms exports,
2015*

Although SIPRI data on arms transfers
does not represent their ﬁnancial value,
many arms exporting states do publish
ﬁgures on the ﬁnancial value of their arms
exports. Based on such data, SIPRI
estimates the total value of the global arms
trade in 2015 to be at least $91.3 billion.
However, the actual ﬁgure is likely to behigher.
Developments in the arms industry

Total sales for the arms-producing andmilitary services companies ranked in the
SIPRI Top 100 declined for the ﬁfth
consecutive year in 2015.* There was aslight decrease of 0.6 per cent comparedwith 2014. This is the lowest level of annual
decline observed since the peak of 2010.
The decrease is largely attributable to an
overall fall in sales for US-based companies,
which continue to dominate the Top 100.
Taken together, West European arms
producers show increases, some of themlinked to signiﬁcant export sales. Despite
sanctions, Russia’s arms industry also grew
its arms sales in 2015, mostly due todomestic sales and some exports, while
emerging and established producers show
mixed results.

t h e m a i n e x p or t e r s a n d
i m p ort e r s of m a jor w e a p ons ,2 0 1 2 –16
Globalshare (%) Importer

Exporter
1 USA
2 Russia
3 China
4 France
5 Germany
6 UK
7 Spain
8 Italy
9 Ukraine
10 Israel

33
23
6.2
6.0
5.6
4.6
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.3

Globalshare (%)

1 India13
2 Saudi Arabia 8.2
3 UAE
4.6
4 China
4.5
5 Algeria
3.7
6 Turkey
3.3
7 Australia
3.3
8 Iraq
3.2
9 Pakistan
3.2
10 Viet Nam
3.0

A review of 14 years of data on the arms
industry conﬁrms that the ranking
hierarchy, especially of companies ranked
in the top 10, is very stable. It also
highlights the fact that despite yearlyvariations, arms sales for companies ranked
at the top and bottom of the SIPRI Top 100
have steadily increased between 2002 and2015 in constant dollar terms. However, italso shows that the top 10 arms companies’
share of the yearly total revenues of the
SIPRI Top 100 has shrunk over the period.
*The latest year for which data isavailable.

•

military spending and armaments 15

11. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES
At the start of 2017 nine states—the UnitedStates, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK, or North Korea)—possessed
approximately 14 935 nuclear weapons, ofwhich 4150 were deployed with operational
forces. Nearly 1800 of these are kept in astate of high operational alert.
Nuclear arsenals

Overall, inventories of nuclear warheads
continue to decline. This is primarily due toreductions made by the USA and Russia,
which together account for approximately
92 per cent of nuclear weapons globally.
They are reducing their deployed nuclear
forces as a result of the 2010 Treaty on
Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(New START) while also making unilateralcuts in their nuclear warhead stockpiles. At
the same time, however, both the USA andRussia have extensive and expensive
programmes under way to replace andmodernize their nuclear warheads, missile
and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear
weapon production facilities.
The nuclear arsenals of the other nucleararmed states are considerably smaller, but
all are either developing or deploying new
weapon systems or have announced theirintention to do so. China, India, North
Korea and Pakistan are thought to be
expanding the size of their nuclear arsenals.
North Korea continues to prioritize its
military nuclear programme as a central
element of its national security strategy, andconducted its fourth and ﬁfth nuclear test
explosions in 2016. The tests took the total
number of nuclear explosions recorded
worldwide since 1945 to 2057.

16 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

w o r l d n uc l e a r f or c e s , 2 0 16
Deployed Other
Total
warheads warheads inventory

CountryUSA
RussiaUK
FranceChina
India
PakistanIsraelNorth Korea

1 800
1 950
120
280
–
–
–
–
–

Total

4 150

5 000
6 800
5 050
7 000
95
215
20
300
270
270
120–130 120–130
130–140 130–140
8080(10–20) (10–20)
10 78514 935. . = not applicable or not available; – = zero;( ) = uncertain ﬁgure. ‘Other warheads’
includes operational warheads held instorage and retired warheads awaiting
dismantlement. All estimates areapproximate and as of Jan. 2017.
Inadequate transparency

The availability of reliable information on
the status of the nuclear arsenals andcapabilities of the nuclear-armed statesvaries considerably. The USA has disclosed
substantial information about its stockpile
and forces, and the UK and France havealso declared some information. Russia
refuses to disclose the detailed breakdownof its forces counted under New START
even though it shares this information with
the USA, and the US Government has
stopped releasing detailed information
about Russian and Chinese nuclear forces.
The governments of India and Pakistan
make statements about some of their
missile tests but provide no information
about the status or size of their arsenals.
Israel has a policy of not commenting on its
nuclear arsenal, and North Korea provides
no information about its nuclear
capabilities.

•

gl ob a l s t o c k s of f i s si l em at e r i a l s , 2 0 16
The raw material for nuclear weapons isﬁssile material, either highly enricheduranium (HEU) or separated plutonium.
China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA
have produced both HEU and plutonium foruse in their nuclear weapons; India and Israel
have produced mainly plutonium; andPakistan has produced mainly HEU, but it isenhancing its ability to produce plutonium.
North Korea has produced plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons but may have produced
HEU as well. All states with a civilian nuclear
industry are capable of producing ﬁssile
materials.
The International Panel on Fissile
Materials compiles information on global
stocks of ﬁssile materials.
Global stocks, 2016
Highly enriched uranium
Separated plutonium
Military stocks
Civilian stocks~1 340 tonnes~230 tonnes~285 tonnes

si pr i fac t s h e e t s
Each year, in the run-up to the next edition of
the SIPRI Yearbook, SIPRI releases data setson key research topics, covering the latest
year for which data is available. Each data
launch includes the publication of a detailed,up-to-date fact sheet that highlights SIPRI’s
main ﬁndings—ﬁndings that are explored in
more depth in the corresponding Yearbook
chapter.
Fleurant, A., Perlo-Freeman, S.,
Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T. and Kelly, N.,‘The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing andmilitary services companies, 2015’, SIPRI
Fact Sheet, December 2016, <https://www.
sipri.org/publications/2016/sipri-fact-sheets/
sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-militaryservices-companies-2015>.
Fleurant, A., Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T.,
and Tian, N., ‘Trends in international arms
transfers, 2016’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, February
2017, <https://www.sipri.org/
publications/2017/sipri-fact-sheets/trendsinternational-arms-transfers-2016>.
Tian, N., Fleurant, A., Wezeman, P. D. andWezeman, S. T., ‘Trends in world military
expenditure, 2016’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April
2017, <https://www.sipri.org/
publications/2017/sipri-fact-sheets/trendsworld-military-expenditure-2016>.
Kile, S. N. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘Trends inworld nuclear forces, 2017’, SIPRI Fact Sheet,
July 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/
publications/2017/sipri-fact-sheets/trendsworld-nuclear-forces-2017>.

military spending and armaments 17

12. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,NON-PROLIFERATION AND
ARMS CONTROL
Towards a new legally binding instrument
on nuclear disarmament

In 2016 the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution mandating
negotiations in 2017 leading to theelimination of nuclear weapons. This
followed earlier intensive discussions in theOpen-ended Working Group on nuclear
disarmament, which met in Geneva tocomplete its report to the UN General
Assembly. The report included a
recommendation to convene in 2017 an
international conference open to all states
to begin negotiations on a legally binding
prohibition of nuclear weapons, leading
towards their elimination.
The UN General Assembly and the First
Committee also voted to establish a highlevel preparatory group to meet in Geneva
for two sessions of two weeks each, the ﬁrst
in 2017 and the second in 2018, to consider
and make recommendations on substantial
elements of a future non-discriminatory,
multilateral, and internationally andeffectively veriﬁable treaty banning the
production of ﬁssile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
However, the Conference on Disarmament, the world’s sole multilateral
forum for negotiating arms control anddisarmament agreements, was yet again
unable to agree on a programme of work in2016 and thus was unable to commence
negotiations on any item on its agenda.
US–Russian nuclear arms control

In 2016 US–Russian nuclear arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts
remained stalled by the broader

18 sipri yearbook 2017, summaryt h e 2 0 t h a n n i v e r s a ry oft h e c om pr e h e n si v e n uc l e a r t e s t - b a n t r e at y
The year 2016 marked the 20th anniversaryof the opening for signature of theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT) on 24 September 1996. To promote
the entry into force of the CTBT, a ‘Joint
Statement on the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon
States’ was issued on 15 September 2016. It
pledged to strive for the CTBT’s early
ratiﬁcation and prompt entry into force. Thiswas followed by the adoption of Resolution
2310 by the UN Security Council on
23 September 2016, which urged all statesthat have either not signed or not ratiﬁed the
CTBT—particularly the eight remaining
Annex 2 states—to do so without further
delay.

deterioration in political relations between
the two countries. The United States andRussia continued to implement the2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START). However,the prospects for the two sides agreeing to
make deeper cuts in their strategic nuclear
forces appeared increasingly remote. No
progress was made towards resolving theimpasse over the USA’s allegation that
Russia had violated an important cold warera arms control treaty limiting
intermediate-range nuclear forces(1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, INF Treaty). Russia rejected thecharge and countered with its own treaty
compliance concerns. The year also saw thesuspension by Russia of the implementationof a bilateral agreement with the USA to
irreversibly eliminate plutonium froms u m m a ry o f i n t e r n at ion a l c on v e n t io n s , i n s t ru m e n t s a n di n i t i at i v e s r e l at e d t o n uc l e a r s e c u r i t y

Name

Year signed/ No.
established of parties

Description

Convention on the Physical1979
Protection of Nuclear Material(CPPNM)

153

Requires states to provide appropriate
level of physical protection of nuclear
material during international transport

Global Partnership against
the Spread of Weapons andMaterials of Mass Destruction

2002

29

Funds and coordinates activities forcountering risks of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear terrorism

Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI)

2003

107

Coordinates voluntary actions by states
to stop proliferation-related trafficking
of weapons of mass destruction, theirdelivery systems and related material

UN Security Council
Resolution 1540

2004

193

Requires states to establish domestic
controls and regulations to prevent theillicit trafficking of nuclear materialInternational Convention on
the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

2005

106

Promotes cooperation to prevent thepossession and use of radioactive
material or devices, and use or damageof nuclear facilities, for terrorist acts

Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

2006

86

Conducts multilateral nuclear security
activities for preventing, detecting andresponding to nuclear terrorism

Note: An amendment to the CPPNM entered into force in May 2016 and the agreement was
subsequently renamed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities.

dismantled nuclear warheads declared to
be in excess of defence needs.
Nuclear Security Summit

The fourth and ﬁnal meeting in a series of
Nuclear Security Summits was held in
Washington, DC, on 31 March–1 April 2016.
One of the main objectives of the meeting
was to ﬁnd ways to sustain the political
momentum created by the previous
summits to support the work of states andinternational organizations to strengthen
the global nuclear security system beyond
2016.

The Iran nuclear deal

Iran continued to implement the provisionsof the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA) covering limitations on its nuclear
programme. The JCPOA deal, which was
facilitated by the European Union (EU),was signed in July 2015 by Iran and the E3/
EU+3 (France, Germany and the United
Kingdom plus China, Russia and the USA).
The International Atomic Energy Agency
monitors and veriﬁes that Iran is incompliance with its JCPOA obligations.

•non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

13. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICALSECURITY THREATS
Investigation of allegations of chemical
weapon use in Iraq and Syria

In 2016 there were continued instances ofalleged and conﬁrmed use of chemical
weapons in the armed conﬂicts in Iraq and
Syria. Governments continued to target theIslamic State, including its suspectedchemical weapon-related infrastructure inconnection with the 2016 Mosul Offensive.
The United Nations Security Council
remained split on whether the Syrian
Government has engaged in chemical
warfare.
The Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW), the body that
implements the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention, sought to conﬁrm thecompleteness and correctness of Syria’s
declarations partly through the work of the
Declaration Assessment Team, the FactFinding Mission and the OPCW–UN Joint
Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria.
The JIM issued four major reports in 2016
and concluded that an insurgent group was
responsible for at least one instance ofsulphur mustard use in Syria, while Syrian
government forces were responsible forthree instances of dispersal of chlorine.
Syria and eight other states disputed the
JIM’s ﬁndings with respect to the use by
Syrian government forces. A substantial
number of governments accepted the JIM’s
overall ﬁndings, while others refrained
from taking a public position on thequestion of whether the Syrian
Government had authorized the use of such
weapons. The JIM’s mandate was modiﬁed
and extended for another year, but it
remains tasked with attributing

20 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

responsibility for select (including new)cases of alleged chemical weapon use.
There were further allegations ofchemical weapon holdings and use inconnection with the continued ﬁghting in
Iraq. The OPCW provided analytical advice
and related support to Iraq in connection
with alleged chemical weapon use and tosupport the planned destruction ofremnants of chemical weapons left overfrom the government of Saddam Hussein.
The OPCW also carried out a maritime
chemical removal operation from Libya, thesecond such operation. (The ﬁrst was from
Syria in 2013–14.)
Biological and chemical arms control

Russia’s proposal to negotiate a new
multilateral convention against chemicaland biological terrorism at the Conference
on Disarmament was met with mixed
reactions. The Eighth Review Conferenceof the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention was held in November 2016 andagreed a minimalistic intersessional
process consisting of annual Meetings ofStates Parties for the period 2017–20. It also
agreed to extend the mandate of the
Implementation Support Unit (unless later
decided otherwise) for the period 2017–21
and to continue a cooperation databaseestablished by the Seventh Review
Conference.

•14. CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROLICRC guidance and its application in urban
warfareThe Geneva conventions are aninternational benchmark for behaviour
during armed conﬂict. In 2011 theInternational Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) initiated a multi-year project toupdate a series of Commentaries thatprovide guidance to states on how tointerpret and implement the conventions.
The ﬁrst update is on the Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, and is part of a series ofCommentaries that will consider changes
in the nature of armed conﬂict. One of themost important issues addressed in the
updated Commentary is how to apply the
Geneva conventions to non-internationalarmed conﬂicts. Other key issues are how
to safeguard the impartiality ofhumanitarian relief, attacks on health care
workers and the increasing use of militaryforce and violence in populated areas.
Humanitarian arms control

The use of explosive weapons in populatedareas (EWIPA) is a growing concern of theICRC, among others, and has also featured
in ongoing humanitarian arms control
efforts. In 2016 close to 42 000 civilians
were reported killed or injured by explosive
weapons, and the bombardment of Aleppo
was the nadir of this form of warfare. The
1981 Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW Convention), in particular,
was designed to protect civilians andcombatants in situations of armed conﬂict,
but the Fifth Review Conference to update
the Convention failed to effectively address

issues related to EWIPA, incendiary
weapons and new technology in warfare.
However, ongoing attempts to expand thescope of the existing humanitarian arms
control regimes included discussions on
lethal autonomous weapon systems andsome ﬂedgling efforts by the outgoing US
Administration to regulate theinternational transfer and use of armed
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones)
and to increase transparency on their use.
In addition, states met to discuss
implementation of the United Nations
Programme of Action on small arms andlight weapons (SALW) and agreed strong
language on the gendered aspects of SALW
proliferation and violence, and the UN
Sustainable Development Goals.
Conventional arms control in Europe

Europe is the only region that has createdan integrated conventional arms control
system. There is a consensus, however, that
this framework, which was created in the
1990s, no longer delivers the results
expected of it. The deep divisions between
Russia and the West over causality wereplayed out during discussions within the
Organization for Security and Co-operationin Europe (OSCE) in 2016. Nonetheless,following a German-led initiative, theOSCE agreed to launch a structured
dialogue on current and future challenges
and risks to security in the OSCE area, witha particular focus on conventional arms
control.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21

15. DUAL-USE AND ARMS TRADECONTROLS
The Arms Trade Treaty

An Extraordinary Meeting of States Parties(CSP1.5) to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
took place in February 2016 and the Second
Conference of States Parties (CSP2) took
place in August 2016. At the February
meeting, key decisions were taken in
relation to the role and functioning of the
ATT Secretariat. At CSP2 consensus wasachieved on the permanent Head of the
ATT Secretariat, Dumisani Dladla; thereporting templates recommended for the
initial report on treaty implementation and
the Annual Report on Arms Transfers;
draft terms of reference for the ATT
Voluntary Trust Fund; and the setting up ofIntersessional Working Groups on Effective
Implementation of the ATT, Treaty
Universalization, and Transparency andReporting. Major challenges remain withregard to the practical impact of the ATT:
the low levels of accession in Asia and the
Middle East; the commercial and politicalconsiderations shaping the interpretationof treaty provisions; the fact that importantarms-supplying and recipient states remain
outside the treaty; and the limitations on
the role and capacities of the Secretariat.
Multilateral arms embargoes

In 2016 there were 38 multilateral arms
embargoes in force: 15 imposed by theUnited Nations, 22 by the European Union(EU) and 1 by the League of Arab States. Of
the EU embargoes, 11 directly implemented
UN decisions, 3 implemented UN
embargoes with modiﬁed geographicalscope or coverage in terms of the weapon
types included and 8 had no UN counterpart. The single Arab League arms embargo

22 sipri yearbook 2017, summarym u lt i l at e r a l a r m s
e m b a rg oe s i n f orce , 2 0 16
United Nations (15 embargoes)• Central African Republic (NGF)• Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF)• Côte d’Ivoire (NGF) • Eritrea • Iran • Iraq
(NGF) • ISIL, al-Qaeda and associatedindividuals and entities • North Korea• Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia (NGF) • Libya(NGF) • Somalia (NGF) • Sudan (Darfur)• Taliban • Yemen (NGF)
European Union (22 embargoes)
Implementations of UN embargoes (11):• Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities • Central African
Republic (NGF) • Democratic Republic of theCongo (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire (NGF) • Eritrea• Iraq (NGF) • Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia(NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia (NGF)• Yemen (NGF)
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran
• North Korea • Sudan (Darfur)
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (8):• Belarus • China • Egypt • Myanmar• Russia • South Sudan • Syria • Zimbabwe
Arab League (1 embargo)• Syria
NGF = non-governmental forces.

(on Syria) had no UN counterpart. Most ofthese embargoes only cover conventionalarms. However, the UN and EU embargoes
on Iran and North Korea, and the EU
embargo on Russia also cover exports ofdual-use goods. No new multilateral arms
embargoes were imposed in 2016.
Implementation of the UN embargoes wasagain not without problems, as demonstrated by the reports of the different panelsof experts charged with monitoring theirimplementation.

Export control regimes

All the multilateral export control
regimes—the Australia Group, the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), theNuclear Suppliers Group and theWassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dualuse Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar
Arrangement, WA)—sought to update theirrespective trade control lists and guidelines. Most of the regimes continued to facedifficulties with admitting new members,
owing to the requirement that all existing
members must approve the application.
However, in June 2016 India ﬁnally got one
step closer to its goal of joining the export
control regimes by becoming aparticipating state in the MTCR and in The
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation. Discussions
continued in all the regimes about how tobetter engage with non-participatingstates. Several of the regimes conductedbroader outreach dialogues that went
beyond technical brieﬁngs.
EU dual-use trade controls

The EU’s revision of its Regulation on theexport, transit and brokering of dual-use
items continued throughout 2016. It is
unlikely to reach a conclusion before 2018.
In September 2016 the European
Commission put forward a legislative
proposal that includes several elementsthat have provoked negative reactions fromindustry and several EU member states,
and would constitute a fundamental
change to aspects of the EU dual-use
control regime. The elements were: an
expansion of the deﬁnition of dual-use
items to include certain types of cybersurveillance technology; an EU control listthat for the ﬁrst time goes beyond the listsof the four export control regimes; an
expansion of the so-called catch-all
controls for unlisted items to cover items
that may be intended to be used inviolations of human rights or international
humanitarian law or in connection with
acts of terrorism; and an expansion of thecriteria that states are required to apply
when assessing licence applications toinclude issues related to human rights,
international humanitarian law andterrorism.
Applying human rights concerns to dualuse export controls

The application of human rights norms toarms export controls has been broadly
accepted for many years. However, theirapplication to dual-use export controls has
always been less clear-cut and more
uneven. This issue has received increased
attention largely as a result of the additionof a number of information andcommunications technology surveillancesystems to the WA and EU dual-use lists.
These items have been identiﬁed largely
owing to the human rights concerns
associated with their use. Their inclusion in
the WA and EU dual-use lists has led tocalls for a further expansion in the range ofsuch surveillance systems that are subject
to control. At the EU level, this has also fed
into discussions about establishing aclearer connection between dual-use
export controls and the application ofhuman rights norms.

•

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 23

SIPRI DATABASESSIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Gives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988, allowing
comparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in
US dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of gross domestic product.
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950,
the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms
transfers.
SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Gives information on all arms embargoes that have been implemented by an internationalorganization, such as the European Union or the United Nations, or by a group of nations. All
embargoes that are in force, or have been in force since 1998, are included.
SIPRI National Reports Database

Provides links to all publicly accessible national reports on arms exports and is constantly
updated to include links to newly published national reports on arms exports.
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including
location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of
personnel, costs and fatalities.
Access the SIPRI databases at www.sipri.org/databases

24 sipri yearbook 2017, summary

HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2017
SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

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ISBN 978-0-19-881180-0, hardback
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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI YEARBOOK 2017
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
The SIPRI Yearbook is appreciated worldwide by politicians, diplomats, journalists,
scholars, students and citizens as an authoritative and independent source of data andanalysis on the topics of armaments, disarmament and international security. It provides
an overview of developments in international security, weapons and technology, military
expenditure, the arms trade and arms production, and armed conﬂicts, along with efforts
to control conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
This booklet summarizes the 48th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which covers
developments during 2016, including• Armed conﬂicts and conﬂict management, with coverage of the Middle East and North
Africa, European security and the peace agreement in Colombia, as well as analysis ofglobal and regional trends in peace operations• Security and development, including studies on sustaining peace and sustainable
development in dangerous places, forced displacement in fragile contexts, and thelinks between climate change and violent conﬂict• Military expenditure, arms production and international arms transfers• World nuclear forces, with an overview of each of the nine nuclear-armed states• Nuclear arms control, featuring developments in multilateral arms control anddisarmament, and discussion of the implementation of Iran’s nuclear deal
• Conventional arms control, with studies on humanitarian arms control and the current
state of conventional arms control in Europe• Chemical and biological security threats, including the investigation of allegations ofchemical weapon use in the Middle East
• Dual-use and arms trade controls, with a focus on developments in the Arms Trade
Treaty, multilateral arms embargoes and export control regimes
as well as a 10-year overview of patterns of armed conﬂict, a summary of the Global Peace
Index, and annexes listing arms control and disarmament agreements, international
security cooperation bodies, and key events in 2016.

www.sipriyearbook.org