SIPRIYEARBOOK

2013
Armaments,
Disarmament andInternational
Security
SummarySTOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into
conﬂict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI
provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, topolicymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

THE SIPRI YEARBOOKSIPRI Yearbook 2013 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world military
expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conﬂicts
and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms
control, peace and international security. The SIPRI Yearbook, which was ﬁrst published in
1969, is written by both SIPRI researchers and invited outside experts.
This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2013 and gives samples of thedata and analysis that it contains.

CONTENTS
Introduction

1

Part I. Security and conﬂicts, 2012

1. Armed conﬂict
2. Peace operations and conﬂict management24Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2012

3. Military expenditure
4. Arms production and military services
5. International arms transfers
6. World nuclear forces

6
8
10
12

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2012

7. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
8. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
9. Conventional arms control and military conﬁdence building
10. Dual-use and arms trade controls

14
16
18
20

Annexes22

www.sipriyearbook.org© SIPRI 2013

INTRODUCTION. AN ECONOMIST’SPERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY,
CONFLICT AND PEACE RESEARCH

tilman brück
The use of physical force is, unfortunately,
one of the key elements in the repertoire ofhuman behaviour. Given the persistence
and prominence of the intentional use offorce, or violence, for human interactions,group behaviour and state actions, it issurprising how limited the degree ofunderstanding of this topic still is.
Many of the policies dealing withpotential or actual group-based violence
therefore remain imperfect. For example,
not one of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), which have shaped thedevelopment aid discourse since 2000,
refers to peace or security. This silence on
security, conﬂict and peace is overdue to be
remedied.
The SIPRI Yearbook aims to ﬁll existingknowledge gaps: it provides information onand endeavours to enhance understandingof conﬂict, peace and security, thereby
enabling better policies to be made in the
pursuit of a more peaceful, secure andequitable world. Social science has
identiﬁed at least four further signiﬁcantﬁelds that exhibit knowledge gaps
concerning the strategic use of force bygroups in areas with weakened state
institutions, including in undemocratic
states. These four ﬁelds areƀɟ the drivers of insecurity, conﬂict andfragility;ƀɟ trends in security, conﬂict and peace;ƀɟ the consequences of violent conﬂict andinsecurity; andƀɟ interventions and institutions forsecurity and peace.

Taken as a whole, these gaps imply theabsence of a comprehensive system of
security data tying together the different
strands of peace research, which may be
the most fundamental and systematic
knowledge gap presented thus far.
This lack of understanding greatly
complicates peacebuilding and conﬂict
prevention. It makes interventions in
conﬂicts much more ideological, much lessan issue of actual common interests andultimately less successful—leading to selffulﬁlling prophecies or ‘narratives’ of failed
interventions, seemingly demonstrating
the limitations of such actions.
If so many other issues in an individual’slife or in society can be measured, it should
be possible to develop metrics for peace andsecurity, both at the individual and theaggregate, national levels. However,measuring perceptions of insecurity,
counting the war dead, tallying incidents of
weapon smuggling, developing proxies forpeace and estimating security indicators is
not sufficient. Despite these and many otherdevelopments referenced in the SIPRI
Yearbook over the years, at least two
important challenges remain.
The ﬁrst challenge is to deﬁne theremaining data needs to advance the studyof security, conﬂict and peace. The second
will be to develop a ‘global system of
security accounts’, which brings together ina consistent framework the many variables
measuring ﬂows of security and peace.
The SIPRI Yearbook has for almost ﬁve
decades provided a narrative on global
security developments, building on SIPRI’s
unique ability to gather, collate andinterpret relevant trends. The time may beright to ask how this narrative can beformalized to further develop knowledge
on and policies for security and peace.

ƀ

introduction 1

2 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

SpringMali, Syria and Yemen were ravaged in2012 by armed conﬂicts related in one way
or another to the Arab Spring. All threecases point to the importance ofunderstanding the Arab Spring and its
repercussions in order to fully grasp
regional conﬂict developments. They are all
to some extent deﬁned and inﬂuenced by
the major political upheavals in 2011.
While the chain of events set in motion
by the Arab Spring was different in eachcountry, depending on the domestic
contexts, Mali, Syria and Yemen illustrate
general phenomena central to peace andconﬂict research: conﬂict diffusion andconﬂict escalation.
There is a clear risk that conﬂict may
spread and escalate further in this region.
However, just as the present conﬂicts weredifficult to foresee at the outset of the ArabSpring, the future paths of conﬂict are
equally difficult to predict.
The fragile peace in East and South East
Asia

More than 30 years of relative peace havecontributed to making East and South East
Asia the world’s main economic growthb at t l e - r e l at e d de at h s i n
a r m e d c o n f l ic t s i n e a s t a n ds ou t h e a s t a s i a , 19 4 6 –2 0 0 8
800 000
700 000
600 000
500 000
400 000
300 000
200 000
100 000
0

19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05

In 2011–12 conﬂict continued to be a major
concern for the international community,
most notably in the Middle East, western
Asia and Africa, but also with increased
levels of interstate tension in East Asia.
Nevertheless, deaths resulting from majororganized violence worldwide remained athistorically low levels.
Perhaps the biggest single factor that has
shaped the signiﬁcant global decline in thenumber of armed conﬂicts and casualty
rates since the end of the superpower
confrontation of the cold war has been thedramatic reduction in major powers
engaging in proxy conﬂicts. However, therelationship between states and conﬂict
may be changing once again.
In recent years there has been an
increase in the number of intrastate
conﬂicts that are internationalized—that is,that have another state supporting one sideor another. Such involvement often has theeffect of increasing casualty rates andprolonging conﬂicts.
Shifting interests and changing
capabilities as a result of a weakening of
the unipolar post-cold war security
balance and the emergence of elementsof multipolarity are clearly affecting
the overall international order, evenwhile levels of conﬂict remain relatively
low.
Nevertheless, some developments in
2011–12 could be seen as warning signs that
if the positive trends in conﬂict thatemerged in recent decades are to besustained, new ways need to be found tobuild cooperative international relations
to manage the changing global security
order.

Armed conﬂict in the wake of the Arab

No. of deaths

1. ARMED CONFLICTPatterns of organized violence, 2002–11

The Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program(UCDP) maps organized violence aroundthe world according to three categories ofviolent action: state-based conﬂict, nonstate conﬂict and one-sided violence.
The overall number of incidents oforganized violence resulting in the deathsof at least 25 people in a particular year (thethreshold for counting by UCDP) was
slightly lower in 2011, at 98, than in 2002,
when it stood at 114. This was solely due to adecrease in incidences of one-sided
violence; both state-based and non-state
conﬂicts were more prevalent in 2011 thanin 2002.
In the 10-year period 2002–11 there were
73 active state-based conﬂicts, including 37
that were active in 2011; 223 non-state
conﬂicts, including 38 that were active inn u m b e r s o f a r m e d c o n f l ic t s ,2 0 0 2 –1 1
50

40

Numberregion. Yet the peace seems by no means
secure. While states have avoided direct
conﬂict with each other and have stopped
supporting insurgent movements on eachother’s territory, decades-old suspicions
linger and economic integration has notbeen followed up with political integration.
Increasing tensions since 2008 have been
underpinned by rapid military build-ups inseveral countries, notably in East Asia.
Meanwhile a number of intrastate armed
conﬂicts—in Myanmar, the Philippines andThailand—remain active in South East
Asia, and some of these have escalated inrecent years.
A deepening of peace in the region will
require improvements in several bilateraland multilateral relationships, notably
between North and South Korea; China andJapan; China and ASEAN; and China andthe United States.

30

20

10

0

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

State-based conflict

Non-state conflict

One-sided violence

2011; and 130 actors recorded as carryingout one-sided violence, including 23 in 2011.
The three categories show markedly
different patterns over time. The annual
number of non-state conﬂicts can rise andfall sharply, displaying no obvious trends.
In contrast, major changes in the number ofstate-based conﬂicts tend to happen slowly.
Developments in the incidence of one-sided
violence fall somewhere between these two
extremes.
The data for 2002–11 illustrate thedifficulty of drawing direct links between
patterns in the three categories oforganized violence. The different
categories can certainly inﬂuence eachother (as shown by the examples of the
Arab Spring and East and South East Asia).
However, the mechanisms are complex,
and understanding them—let alone how tomanage them—requires in-depth, casebased study.

ƀsecurity and conflicts 3

A total of 53 peace operations wereconducted in 2012, one more than in 2011
but still the third lowest number in the
period 2003–12. The number of personnel
serving with multilateral peace operations
worldwide fell by more than 10 per cent in2012—down by 28 487 to 233 642—as theslight reduction in deployed personnel thatstarted in 2011 gathered pace. The large
drop was due to the withdrawal of troops
from the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. However, thereductions followed almost a decade of
rapid expansion, and the total for
deployments was still the third highest
since 2003.
Excluding ISAF, deployments increased
by 847 personnel. This is the ﬁrst increasein non-ISAF personnel numbers ISAF since2008. The small increase in the number ofoperations between 2011 and 2012 suggeststhat the trend, which has been downwards
since 2009, may be beginning to stabilize.
Austerity led some states to be morecritical of spending on peace operations andto increase budget constraints on missions
in 2012. The United Nations Security
Council increasingly imposed benchmarks
and indicators to evaluate existing UN
missions’ effectiveness and efficiency, andlinked these to future mandate renewals.
Doubts about the capacity and will for
protection of civilians (POC) in peace
operations were reinforced in 2012 by theperceived failures of UN operations in Côte
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC) and South Sudan. However,the problem may lie more in unrealistic
mandates and expectations. Divisions in
the international community were also

4 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

visible in the response to a military coup in
Guinea-Bissau, where the African Union(AU), the European Union (EU) and the UN
refused to recognize a transitional
government set up through a controversial
process mediated by the Economic
Community of West African States(ECOWAS).
Despite these doubts, divisions andbudget constraints, there is no reason tobelieve that the number of operations will
decrease signiﬁcantly in the near future,and the number of troops deployed outside
Afghanistan is in fact likely to grow. Howdeep the dip in total personnel deployed
will be after the drawdown of ISAF and
how diffuse the future picture depend on
three factors: the depth of future budget
cuts in the West and the extent to which
they are allowed to affect the military andpeacekeeping capacity; the number oftroops that are eventually deployed in Mali,
the broader Sahel and potentially Syria; andthe extent to which countries are willing to
put the responsibility to protect (R2P) and
POC into practice rather than simply
express outrage over the lack of
responsiveness.

n u m b e r o f p e ac e o p e r at io n s ,2 0 0 3 –1 260
50
No. of operations

2. PEACE OPERATIONS AND
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

40
30
20
10
0

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Conducting organization:
United Nations
Regional organization or alliance

Ad hoc coalition

t o p 10 c o n t r i b u t o r s o f t r o o p s t o m u lt i l at e r a l p e ac e
o p e r at io n s , 2 01 2
Including ISAF

Excluding ISAFUSA

PakistanUK

Bangladesh

Pakistan

India

Bangladesh

UgandaIndia

Ethiopia

UgandaBurundi

Italy

Kenya

Ethiopia

Nigeria

BurundiRwanda

Kenya

Nepal
0

50 000100 000

0

No. of troops

5 000

10 000No. of troops

Peace operation changes in 2012

Three new missions opened in 2012: the
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau(ECOMIB), the EU Capacity Building
Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) andthe UN Supervision Mission in Syria(UNSMIS).
Four missions closed during the year: theEU Police Mission in Bosnia andHerzegovina (EUPM), the UN Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and two
missions in Syria: the League of Arab States
Observer Mission to Syria and UNSMIS,
both of which were forced to close due tohigh levels of violence, which hampered
their ability to implement their mandates.

interest in Somalia; continued to struggle
with issues of impartiality and with POC in
the DRC; and decided to retain a ‘lightfootprint’ in Libya.
Transition-related developments andplanned withdrawals continued for two
operations in Asia and Oceania in 2012:
ISAF focused on withdrawing by the end of2014 and UNMIT closed at the end of
2012.

ƀ

Regional developments

Two operations were active in theAmericas in 2012, 8 in Asia and Oceania,
15 in Europe and 11 in the Middle East.
As in previous years, the largest
concentration of peace operations was inAfrica. There were 17 operations deployedin the region, 9 of them under UN
command—a smaller proportion of UN
operations than in recent years. Theinternational community took a renewed

security and conflicts 5w o r l d m i l i ta r y e x p e n di t u r e ,2 0 0 3 –1 2

World military expenditure in 2012 isestimated to have been $1756 billion,
representing 2.5 per cent of global grossdomestic product (GDP) or $249 for each
person in the world. The total is about
0.4 per cent lower in real terms than in
2011, the ﬁrst fall since 1998. Nonetheless,the total is higher than in any year between
the end of World War II and 2010. The
distribution of global spending in 2012shows what may be the beginnings of a shift
from the West to other parts of the world, inparticular Eastern Europe and thedeveloping world.
In Western and Central Europe, austerity
measures continued to reduce militaryspending. In Asia and Oceania, while
military spending still increased in 2012, it
w o r l d m i l i ta r y s p e n di ng ,2 01 2
RegionAfricaNorth Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
AmericasCentral America
and the Caribbean
North America
South America
Asia and Oceania
Central and South Asia
East Asia
OceaniaSouth East Asia
EuropeEastern Europe
Western and Central
Middle East
World total

Spending Change($ b.)
(%)
39.2
16.4
22.7
782
8.6

1.2
7.8
–3.2
–4.7
8.1

708
65.9
390
59.8
268
28.2
33.7
407
100
307
138

–5.5
3.8
3.3
–1.6
5.0
–3.7
6.0
2.0
15
–1.6
8.3

1 756

–0.4

Spending ﬁgures are in current (2012) US$.

6 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

2000
Military expenditure (US$ billion)

3. MILITARY EXPENDITURE

1500

1000

500

0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Africa North America Asia and Oceania
Latin America
Spending figures are in constant (2011) US$

Eastern Europe
Middle East
Western and Central Europe

did so at a slower pace, partly as a result of
weaker economic growth in the wake of the2008 global ﬁnancial crisis.
In Central and South Asia, North
America, Oceania, and Western andCentral Europe, increases in the period
2003–2009 were followed by decreases in
2009–12; in sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia,and Latin America, there was a major
slowdown in the growth rate, with smaller
slowdowns in Eastern Europe and South
East Asia. In contrast, the rate of growth
accelerated in the Middle East and North
Africa. The overall effect on the world total
was a lowering in growth in 2010–11, now
followed by the fall in 2012.
US Military expenditure

Military spending by the United States
declined by 5.6 per cent in real terms in2012. Together with the 1 per cent fall in
2011, this is the ﬁrst clear manifestation ofan adjustment of US military spending to a
post-war situation. However, spending in
2012—$685.3 billion—was still 69 per centhigher in real terms than in 2001, whichmarked the beginning of the wars on‘terrorism’, in Afghanistan and, from 2003,
in Iraq.

u s m i l i ta r y s p e n di ng , 19 5 0 –2 01 7
Military expenditure(constant 2005 US$ billion)

800
700
600
500
400
300

countries was constant or falling until atleast the mid-2000s. However, in more
recent years this trend has reversed, assome of the region’s militaries have become
involved in the ﬁght against drug cartelsand organized crime groups, alongsideinternal security forces.

200

The governance of military budgeting and100

expenditure in Colombia and Indonesia
0

5
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15

19
6

5

19
6

19
5

19
5

0

0

The future level and trend in US military
expenditure was a prominent topic in thepolitical debate in the USA during 2012.
However, much of the decision-making
process on future military spending was
linked and subordinated to the politicalprocess of addressing high and rising
government debt.
Russian military expenditure

The rising trend in Russia’s military
expenditure, which started in 1999,
accelerated sharply in 2012, with a realterms increase of 16 per cent. The draft
budget for 2013–15 contains plans for afurther rise in nominal terms of just over
40 per cent by 2015. The increases come as
Russia implements the ambitious 2011–20
State Armaments Programme andundertakes a wide-ranging reform of its
armed forces, which many doubt can be
implemented fully.
Security spending and violent organizedcrime in Central America

Central America has had some of the lowest
levels of military expenditure as a share of
GDP in the world. Following the end of theregion’s civil wars in the 1990s and in theabsence of any external military threats,
defence spending in most Central American

Colombia’s ﬁve-decade war against
guerrilla and drug trafficking groups has
been the primary determinant of thecountry’s level of military expenditure.
Despite the long-running civil war andsevere problems of human rights abuses by
the security forces, Colombia has no recent
history of military rule. Transparency inmilitary spending is also fairly good, andhas been improving in recent years.
The extensive security sector reform that
accompanied Indonesia’s transition todemocracy since 1998 has largely ended themilitary’s dominant role in politics.
However, while the Indonesian armed
forces no longer seeks to interfere inpolitics, democratic civilian control of themilitary remains weak, and serious gaps intransparency and accountability in relation
to military ﬁnance, budgeting andprocurement remain, although some
progress has been made in these areas.

ƀt h e r e p o r t i n g o f m i l i ta r ye x p e n di t u r e data t o t h e u n
The number of states reporting to the UN
Standardized Instrument for Reporting
Military Expenditures has dropped from ahigh of 81 in 2002 to 49 in 2012. European
states had the highest reporting rate in 2012(27 of 48 states). The worst rates were in Africa(2 of 54 states) and the Middle East (0 of
14 states).

military spending and armaments 7

4. ARMS PRODUCTION AND
MILITARY SERVICES
The economic downturn following the2008 global ﬁnancial crisis and thesubsequent austerity measures imposed in
North America and Western Europe began
to have an impact on sales in the world’s
arms industry in 2011–12. However, theimpact on the industry was not uniform,
with varied results for individualcompany.
Ongoing spending discussions havegenerated uncertainty in the largest arms
and military services market—the UnitedStates—and are a key reason companies
based there and in Western Europe are
seeking increased market shares in otherregions, including Asia, Latin America andthe Middle East. Individual companies aretaking steps to insulate themselves against
austerity measures through military
specialization, downsizing, diversiﬁcation,and exports and other forms ofinternationalization. In some cases
company subsidiaries have maintained orincreased arms and military services sales
outside of the countries in which the parent
companies are headquartered.
Companies also use acquisitions toimprove the products and services they
already deliver. While much attention ispaid to acquisitions, a number ofdivestitures also indicate the ways in which
the industry is restructuring toaccommodate the austerity environmentand changing customer requirements.
Governments use a number of strategies
to assist their arms industries outside of
their home markets. These include directgovernment arms export promotion;
support for cost reductions; and the use ofrhetoric about arms industry employment.

8 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

In contrast, countries that have not cut
military expenditure see this dilemma as
an opportunity to either obtain morefavourable terms on arms imports or todevelop their own industries.
Cybersecurity and the arms industry

The growing importance of cybersecurity
in the military and civil realms has led to
noteworthy diversiﬁcation by armsproduction and military services
companies into the cybersecurity
market.
In 2012 cybersecurity continued to riseon the agendas of the international politicaland security communities. Revelations
about Flames and Stuxnet made headlines
and inspired fresh discussions about thegrowing use of cyberweapons andcyberwarfare. While there is no reliable
evidence, a growing number of countries—
including China, Iran, Israel, Russia andthe USA—were suspected of using
cyberweapons and making offensive
interventions across cyberspace.
The rise of cybersecurity on the politicaland military agenda has evident economic
implications. According to one estimate,global public and private cybersecurity
spending was approximately $60 billion in2011 (equal to 3.5 per cent of world military
expenditure). The USA was the biggest
spender on cybersecurity, accounting forhalf of the total, and was the only country
where the levels of public and private
spending on cybersecurity were almost
equal. In the rest of the world, the private
sector accounted for the majority ofnational spending on cybersecurity.
States’ reliance on private cybersecurity
providers could become a matter of politicalconcern, particularly with regard to
democratic transparency, oversight,

accountability and cost. The provision ofservices by arms-producing companies—aswell as traditional cybersecurity
providers—may change the way in whichstates deﬁne and manage theircybersecurity and cyberdefence
policies.
The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing andmilitary services companies

c o m pa n i e s i n t h e si p r i t o p 10 0
f o r 2 01 1 , b y c ou n t r y
Other non-OECD, 5 companies
Russia, 6 companies
Other OECD,
15 companies

United States,
44 companies

Western Europe,
30 companies
Country or region refers to the location of the company headquarters, notnecessarily the location of production. China is excluded due to lack of data.

The SIPRI Top 100 lists the world’s
100 largest arms-producing and military
services companies (excluding Chinesecompanies), ranked by their arms sales in2011. Sales of arms and services bycompanies in the SIPRI Top 100 totalled$410 billion in 2011. In comparison with theTop 100 companies in 2010 (which is aslightly different set of companies), the 2011arms sales represent a 5 per cent decrease
in real terms.
The decrease in arms sales by the SIPRI
Top 100 companies in 2011 is due to several
factors, including the withdrawal from Iraq

and the United Nations embargo on arms
transfers to Libya; programme delays due
to austerity-related military spending cutsand related postponements in weapon
programme commitments; and the weak
US dollar in many countries in 2011.

ƀ

the 10 l a rgest a r msp r oduc i ng c o m pa n i e s , 2 01 1
Company

Arms sales Proﬁt($ m.)($ m.)

1 Lockheed Martin
36 2702 Boeing
31 8303 BAE Systems (UK)29 1504 General Dynamics
23 7605 Raytheon
22 470
6 Northrop Grumman 21 390
7 EADS (trans-Europe) 16 390

2 655
4 018
2 349
2 526
1 896
2 118
1 422

8 Finmeccanica (Italy) 14 560
9 L-3 Communications 12 520
10 United Technologies 11 640–3 206956
5 347

Companies are US-based, unless indicatedotherwise. The proﬁt ﬁgures are from allcompany activities, including non-military
sales.

military spending and armaments 9the tr end in tr a nsfers ofm a jor a r m s , 2 0 0 3 –2 01 2

5. INTERNATIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERSThe volume of international transfers ofmajor conventional weapons grew by 17 percent between 2003–2007 and 2008–12. The
ﬁve largest suppliers in 2008–12—theUnited States, Russia, Germany, France andChina—accounted for 75 per cent of thevolume of exports. This is the ﬁrst timesince the end of the cold war that China has
ranked among the ﬁve largest arms
exporters, which had consisted solely of the
USA and European states.
China may represent the vanguard of anincrease in the signiﬁcance of Asian
suppliers in the international arms trade, asSouth Korea is an emerging arms supplierand Japan and Singapore have potential to
become major suppliers.
Other signiﬁcant changes in 2008–12
include the absence from the top ﬁve
suppliers of the United Kingdom for theﬁrst ﬁve-year period since 1950; thedeparture of the Netherlands from the 10
largest suppliers; and the ranking of
Ukraine as the ninth largest supplier.

the m ain importers a nd
ex porter s of m a jor a r ms,
2 0 0 8 –1 2
Exporter
1. USA
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. France
5. China
6. UK
7. Spain
8. Italy
9. Ukraine
10. Israel

Globalshare (%) Importer
30
26
7
6
5
4
3
2
2
2

Globalshare (%)

1. India12
2. China
6
3. Pakistan
5
4. South Korea 5
5. Singapore
4
6. Algeria
4
7. Australia
4
8. USA
4
9. UAE
3
10. Saudi Arabia 3

10 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

Volume of arms transfers(billions of trend-indicator values)

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year moving average (plotted at thelast year of each five-year period).

One of the consequences of the impact of
the ﬁnancial crisis in the USA and Europe
has been the additional pressure to seek
new export markets. This has led the USA
and European states to streamline
bureaucratic procedures and to be more
willing to engage in licensed production,technology transfer and cooperative
production arrangements.
While SIPRI data on international arms
transfers does not represent their ﬁnancial
value, a number of states also publish
ﬁgures on the ﬁnancial value of their arms
exports. Based on national data, SIPRI
estimates that the total value of the global
arms trade in 2011 was at least $43 billion.
Arms transfers to Western and Central
Europe

The trend in the volume of major
conventional weapons imported by states inWestern and Central Europe broadly
matches recent trends in military spending
in the region. Between 2003–2007 and2008–12, imports in Western Europe fell by
16 per cent and in Central Europe by 49 per
cent. In Western Europe the overall fall inimports was largely driven by declines inimports by Greece and Italy, which fell by
61 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively.

Decisions to delay and cancel importcontracts appear to be affecting European
states’ efforts to boost their own arms
exports, which have been stepped up in
recent years in order to help offset losses inrevenues caused by reduced domestic
procurement. The budget cuts of European
states may also affect efforts to promote theconsolidation of arms production in Europe
and the joint development and acquisitionof weapon systems.

r e c i p i e n t r e gio n s o f m a jo r
a r m s i m p o r t s , 2 0 0 3 –2 0 0 7 a n d
2 0 0 8 –1 2
2008–12Africa,9%
Africa,Americas,5%
Americas,11%
10%
03–200720

Europe,15%

Asia and
Oceania,41%

Europe,22%

Arms transfers to Syria

As the conﬂict in Syria intensiﬁed in 2012,
the international community remained at
an impasse on how to respond. It could notagree on how to deal with the conﬂict ingeneral or with supplying arms to theparties in the conﬂict in particular.
Whereas the European Union, the Leagueof Arab States, Turkey and the UnitedStates maintained arms embargoes against
the Syrian Government, Iran and Russia
continued to supply it with arms. Rebel
forces called for foreign military aid andneighbouring countries appeared to supply
them with arms or provide funds for arms
acquisitions.
Since the start of the conﬂict in 2011
there has been a sharp division between
states that oppose the imposition of United
Nations sanctions on Syria and that
continue to supply arms to the Syrian
Government, and states that have imposedarms embargoes on Syria and called for a
UN embargo. Russian officials have been
most vocal with regard to the former
position and made clear statements that
arms supplies were continuing in 2011–12.
The main source of weapons for Syrian
rebel groups appears to have been thecapture of arms from government troops
and arsenals. Small arms and light weapons

Middle East,
22%

Asia and
Oceania,
47%

Middle East,
17%

were also obtained on the black market in
Iraq and Lebanon. Nevertheless, rebel
forces repeatedly called in 2012 forgovernments supporting their cause tosupply them with weapons and othermilitary equipment.

ƀt r a n s pa r e nc y i n a r m s
tr ansfers
The number of states reporting their arms
imports and exports to the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
decreased from 86 states in 2011 to an all-time
low of 52 states in 2012. Africa was the only
region that did not record a signiﬁcant decline
in reporting.
An increasing number of governments havepublished national reports on arms exports.
As of January 2013, 35 states had published atleast one national report on arms exports
since 1990.

military spending and armaments 11

6. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES
At the start of 2013 eight states possessed
approximately 4400 operational nuclear
weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in astate of high operational alert. If all nuclear
warheads are counted—operational
warheads, spares, those in both active andinactive storage, and intact warheads
scheduled for dismantlement—the UnitedStates, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
China, India, Pakistan and Israel possess a
total of approximately 17 270 nuclear
weapons.
The availability of reliable information
about the nuclear weapon states’ arsenals
varies considerably. France, the UK and the
USA have recently disclosed important
information about their nuclear
capabilities. In contrast, transparency inRussia has decreased as a result of its
decision not to publicly release detailed
data about its strategic nuclear forces underthe 2010 Russian–US New START treaty,
even though it shares the information with
the USA. China remains highly nontransparent as part of its long-standing
deterrence strategy.
Reliable information on the operational
status of the nuclear arsenals andcapabilities of the three states that havenever been party to the 1968 NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Israel
and Pakistan—is especially difficult toﬁnd. In the absence of official declarations,the available information is often
contradictory, incorrect orexaggerated.
The legally recognized nuclear weapon
states

All ﬁve legally recognized nuclear weapon
states, as deﬁned by the NPT—China,

12 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

w o r l d n u c l e a r f o r c e s , 2 01 3
Country

Deployed Other
Total
warheads warheads inventory

USA
RussiaUK
FranceChina
India
PakistanIsraelNorth Korea

2 150
1 800
160
~290
–
–
–
–
..

5 550
~7 700
6 700
8 500
65
225
~10
~300
~250
~250
90–110
90–110
100–120 100–120
~80
~80
..
6–8?

Total

~4 400~12 865~17 270

All estimates are approximate and are as ofJanuary 2013.

France, Russia, the UK and the USA—appear determined to remain nuclear
powers for the indeﬁnite future. Russia andthe USA have major modernization
programmes under way for nuclear delivery
systems, warheads and production
facilities. At the same time, they continue toreduce their nuclear forces through theimplementation of New START andthrough unilateral force reductions.
Since the nuclear weapon arsenals of
Russia and the USA are by far the largest,
one result has been that the total number ofnuclear weapons in the world has been
declining. The nuclear arsenals of the otherthree legally recognized nuclear weapon
states are considerably smaller, but all
three states are either deploying new
weapon systems or have announced theirintention to do so. Of the ﬁve legally
recognized nuclear weapon states, only
China appears to be expanding the size of
its nuclear arsenal. In 2012, China
conducted a comprehensive series of
missile trials consolidating its road-mobile,land-based and submarine-based nuclear
deterrent.

Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces

India and Pakistan are increasing the sizeand sophistication of their nuclear arsenals.
Both countries are developing anddeploying new types of nuclear-capableballistic and cruise missile and both are
increasing their military ﬁssile material
production capabilities.
India’s nuclear doctrine is based on theprinciple of a minimum credible deterrent
and no-ﬁrst-use of nuclear weapons. A
meeting in June 2012 of India’s Nuclear
Command Authority reportedly stressed
the need for the ‘faster consolidation’ ofIndia’s nuclear deterrence posture based on
an operational triad of nuclear forces.
In 2012 Pakistan conducted a series of
missile trials testing most of its nuclearcapable missile types that are currently inoperational service or still underdevelopment. Pakistan is also expanding its
main plutonium-production complex at
Khushab, Punjab.
Israeli nuclear forces

Israel continues to maintain its longstanding policy of nuclear opacity. Itneither officially conﬁrms nor denies that it
possesses nuclear weapons. It is estimatedthat Israel has approximately 80 intact
nuclear weapons, of which 50 are fordelivery by Jericho II medium-range
ballistic missiles and 30 are gravity bombsfor delivery by aircraft. The operational
status of the longer-range Jericho III
ballistic missile is unknown. There wasrenewed speculation in 2012 that Israel
may also have developed nuclear-capable
submarine-launched cruise missiles.
North Korea’s military nuclear capabilities

North Korea maintains a secretive andhighly opaque military nuclear programme.

There is no public information to verify thatit possesses operational nuclear weapons.
However, in January 2012 the US Directorof National Intelligence assessed that
North Korea had produced nuclear
weapons, although he gave no estimate of
the size of the country’s weapon inventory.
During 2012 several non-governmental
reports concluded, based on the analysis ofsatellite imagery and other evidence, that
North Korea was making technicalpreparations for carrying out a third
underground nuclear test in tunnels at its
nuclear test site, Punggye-ri, in the northeast of the country.

ƀ

globa l stocks of fissile
m at e r i a l s , 2 01 2
Materials that can sustain an explosive ﬁssion
chain reaction are essential for all types ofnuclear explosive, from ﬁrst-generationﬁssion weapons to advanced thermonuclear
weapons. The most common of these ﬁssile
materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France,
Russia, the UK and the USA have produced
both HEU and plutonium; India, Israel andNorth Korea have produced mainly
plutonium; and Pakistan mainly HEU. All
states with a civilian nuclear industry havesome capability to produce ﬁssile materials.
The International Panel on Fissile
Materials compiles information on global
stocks of ﬁssile materials.

Global stocks, 2012
Highly enriched uranium ~1285 tonnes*
Separated plutonium
Military stocks~224 tonnes
Civilian stocks~264 tonnes* Not including 92 tonnes to be blended down.

military spending and armaments 13

7. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND
NON-PROLIFERATION
Nuclear proliferation concerns in IranIn 2012 the nuclear programme of Iranremained at the centre of international
concerns about the spread of nuclear
weapons. Little progress was madetowards resolving the long-running
controversy over the scope and natureof the programme. The resumption oftalks between Iran and the ﬁvepermanent members of the United
Nations Security Council plus Germany(the ‘P5+1’ states) failed to break thedeadlock over Iran’s non-compliancewith the Security Council’s demands
that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment
and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle
activities.
Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) were also unable toagree on a framework plan for addressing
the IAEA’s concerns that Iran had pursued
nuclear activities with possible military
dimensions, in contravention of its
commitments under the 1968 NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The impasse
led to renewed calls to expand the IAEA’s
legal powers to investigate NPT parties
suspected of violating their treatymandated safeguards agreements, evenbeyond those set out in the Model
Additional Protocol.
The lack of progress in these two
separate but closely related sets of talks
fuelled speculation that some states—
speciﬁcally, Israel or the United States—
might prioritize extra-legal measures, oreven resort to the preventive use of militaryforce, to deal with Iran’s suspected nuclear
weapon programme. The renewed
attention to military options raised

14 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

further doubts about the efficacy ofinternational legal approaches, inparticular the use of punitive economic
sanctions, in dealing with suspected or
known cases of states violating importantarms control treaty obligations andnorms.
North Korea’s nuclear programme

The Six-Party Talks on thedenuclearization of North Korea remained
suspended in 2012, while North Korea
reaffirmed its status as a nuclear weaponpossessing state. In an apparent
breakthrough, North Korea agreed tosuspend its nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes in exchange for humanitarianassistance from the USA. However, the dealsoon broke down when North Korea
launched a satellite-carrying rocket that
the USA and its allies in the region
described as a disguised ballistic missile
test.
The launch, conducted on 13 April 2012
in the presence of international observers,
was a widely publicized failure. The threestage Unha 3 rocket exploded shortly after
lift-off. North Korea’s decision to proceedwith the launch elicited a wave ofinternational criticism.
Developments in North Korea’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programmes in 2012suggested that the new North Koreanleadership under Kim Jong Un would
prioritize the country’s ‘military-ﬁrst’
policy underpinned by advances in its
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
The year ended with deepening pessimism
in North East Asia about the prospects forrestarting multilateral negotiations aimed
at inducing North Korea to give up its
nascent nuclear arsenal in exchange forinternational assistance.

NATO and non-strategic nuclear weapons

The issue of the future of non-strategic(tactical) nuclear weapons in Europe cameto the fore with the completion by theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) of its Defence and Deterrence
Posture Review (DDPR) in 2012. The DDPR
reaffirmed that nuclear weapons remained
a core component of NATO’s overallcapabilities for deterrence and defence, as
outlined in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept,
and did not recommend any force posturechanges regarding US nuclear weapons
stationed in Europe. At the same time, by
saying that NATO would consider options
to further reduce non-strategic nuclear
weapons if Russia undertook reciprocal
measures, the DDPR left open thepossibility of extending nuclear arms
control measures beyond the 2010 Russian–
US New START treaty.
The prospects for successful negotiatedreductions in non-strategic nuclear
weapons will require the USA, together
with its NATO allies, and Russia to modify
what were, in 2012, incompatible positions.
At the end of the year there was no
indication that such modiﬁcations would beforthcoming.

2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit
and issued a communiqué identifying
priority areas for increasing the security of
nuclear and radiological materials. They
also considered the relationship between
nuclear safety and security in the light of
the accident in 2011 at the nuclear power
plant in Fukushima, Japan.
The leaders agreed to convene a third
summit meeting, in the Netherlands in2014, amid discussions about how tosustain nuclear security cooperation. The
main contribution of the nuclear security
summits has been to focus high-level
political attention on the need to implement
programmes and projects that have been indevelopment for many years. While thehigh-level meetings increased theprobability that agreed targets would be
met prior to the gathering of heads of stateand government, future summits may bringdiminishing returns as the focus of
discussions moves from agreement on
broad objectives to more technical issues
and speciﬁc projects.

ƀMeasures to combat nuclear terrorism

In 2012 the risks of nuclear terrorism andthe illicit diversion of nuclear andradioactive materials continued to be
discussed at the highest political level. In
March, 53 heads of state and government
gathered at the Nuclear Security Summit inSeoul, South Korea, for a meeting aimed atstrengthening legal and regulatory
arrangements for securing nuclear
materials and facilities worldwide.
The leaders reviewed implementation of
the voluntary commitments made at the

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 15

8. REDUCING SECURITY THREATSFROM CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Chemical weapon arms control anddisarmament

Russia and the United States were unable tomeet the ﬁnal April 2012 deadline forcompleting the destruction of theirdeclared chemical weapon stockpiles underthe 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC). The Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) inspected Libya’s previously
undeclared chemical weapons. Elsewhere,
the destruction of old and abandoned
chemical weapons, including thoseabandoned by Japan in China during WorldWar II, continued.
During 2012 the states parties to the
CWC also discussed the future nature andfocus of the regime in the lead-up to theThird CWC Review Conference, held in
April 2013. The veriﬁcation of thedestruction of chemical weapons
nevertheless remained the primary
operational focus of the regime.

o l d a n d a b a n d o n e d c h e m ic a l
w e a pons
As of December 2012,ƀɟ 3 countries had declared that abandoned
chemical weapons (ACW) are present on
their territoriesƀɟ 15 countries had declared that they havepossessed old chemical weapons (OCW)
since the CWC’s entry-into-forceƀɟ OCW inspections had been carried out in
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan and theUKƀɟ approximately 75 per cent of the ACW thathave been recovered thus far in China had
been destroyed

16 sipri yearbook 2013 , summaryd e s t r u c t io n o f c h e m ic a l
w e a pons
As of 31 October 2012,ƀɟ Iraq, Libya, Russia and the USA had yet tocomplete destruction of their chemical
weapon stockpilesƀɟ 54 258 tonnes (78 per cent) of category 1
chemical weapons had been destroyedƀɟ 13 states had declared 70 former chemical
production facilitiesƀɟ 43 of these facilities had been destroyedand 21 converted to peaceful purposes

No new states joined the CWC in 2012. Asof 31 December, 188 states had ratiﬁed or
acceded to the convention; 2 states had
signed but not ratiﬁed it; and 6 states had
neither signed nor ratiﬁed it.
Biological weapon arms control anddisarmament

During 2012 the states parties to the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC) held the ﬁrst two of a series of fourintersessional meetings of experts andparties agreed by the 2011 Seventh BTWC
Review Conference. The exercise consistsof an exchange of views and information on
capacity-building measures, on theimplications of developments in science andtechnology for the regime, on effective
national implementation of theconvention’s provisions, and on enhancing
transparency and conﬁdence among theparties.
The BTWC Implementation Support
Unit (ISU) began implementing a databaseproject to match offers and requests forassistance and cooperation. In comparison
to the CWC, however, the regime’s
institutional capacity remained limited.
One new party joined the convention in
2012: the Marshall Islands. An additional12 states had signed but not ratiﬁed theconvention as of 31 December 2012.
Allegations of chemical and biologicalweapon programmes

Allegations of chemical and biologicalweapon programmes and use continued in2012 with little official or otherwise
authoritative reporting to clarify them.
Many of these allegations concernedsuspected Syrian chemical weapon
stockpiles and fears that such stocks would
be used in that country’s civil war.
A Syrian Government official responded
to the numerous reports of suspectedchemical weapon stockpiles by stating thatthe country possesses such weapons but
would only use them against outside forces,
not against its own people. A number ofstates, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, theUnited Kingdom and the USA, reportedly
consulted on options to monitor and securesuspected chemical weapon sites in Syria inorder to prevent use of these weapons or
their falling into the possession of third
parties. The United Nations SecretaryGeneral and the Director-General of the
OPCW conferred on the political andtechnical implications of the possible use of
Syrian chemical weapons under theirrespective mandates.
In addition, new information emerged on
the methods used by the Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo in its 1995 sarin attack on theTokyo underground and a deﬁnitive
account of the Soviet biological weapon
programme was published.

on the transmissibility of avian inﬂuenza
among ferrets. The underlying concern wasthat such research could be misapplied for
hostile purposes, such as by changing avian
inﬂuenza virus to a form suitable foraerosol transmission between humans.
A specially convened World HealthOrganization (WHO) committee formed toreview the work of two research groups—
based in the Netherlands and the USA,
respectively—also discussed the issue. The
Netherlands considered imposing export
controls on ﬁndings in the researchmethodology section of the Dutch-based
group, but then abandoned the plan. The US
National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) reversed its previous
opposition to publication, stating that the
researchers had modiﬁed the draft ﬁndings
in a manner that allowed it to support
publication. Both papers were published in
2012.

ƀ

Oversight of dual-purpose research in thelife sciences

During 2012 the security and life sciences
communities debated the appropriatenessof publishing research, completed in 2011,non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17

9. CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL AND MILITARYCONFIDENCE BUILDINGIn 2012 conﬁdence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs)—that is, openness andrestraint to provide reassurance thatmilitary capabilities will not be used forpolitical gain—made a valuable
contribution to reducing tensions andpreventing the escalation of incidents inseveral regions of the world.
As well as helping to prevent speciﬁc
incidents from escalating into somethingworse, CSBMs are being developed more
broadly in several regions as a positive tool
to enhance cooperative relations amongstates based on partnership, mutual
reassurance and transparency.
While CSBMs cannot shoulder theburden of promoting cooperative security
alone, in several regions they make a usefulcontribution to promoting and fosteringstability and creating the conditions for
positive growth and development.
As regards arms control—binding
commitments to self-restraint in the
structure, equipment or operations ofarmed forces—the situation in 2012 was lessencouraging.
Humanitarian arms control initiatives

In the area of humanitarian arms control(in which states forgo capabilities that haveindiscriminate or inhumane effects,
regardless of their military utility), the paceof implementation of existing agreements
remains slow and uneven.
During 2012 the main issue for theparties to the 1981 Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) Convention was thepossibility of extending the treaty to covermines other than anti-personnel mines

18 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

pa r t i e s t o c c w p r o t o c o l v o n
e x p l o s i v e r e m n a n t s o f wa r

Non-parties to the CCW Convention
Parties to the CCW Convention
Parties to the CCW Convention and Protocol V(MOTAPM). A consensus among CCW
parties on MOTAPM has proved elusive,
but their views appear closer on this issue
than on cluster munitions.
The CCW Convention’s Protocol V on
explosive remnants of war (ERW) aims to
reduce the impact on civilians of
unexploded and abandoned munitions.
There has been a steady growth inmembership: of the 115 states party to the
CCW Convention at the end of 2012, 81
were also party to Protocol V. Membershipof Protocol V remains sparsest in Africa,
the Middle East and South East Asia.
Ten states ratiﬁed the 2008 Convention
on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2012. Thissuggests that, while membership is steadily
increasing, the CCM did not experience anupsurge of new membership in 2012 after
the failure of the parties to the CCW
Convention to agree on measures related tocluster munitions in 2011.
Small arms control in Africa

Over the past decade a framework for thecontrol of small arms and light weapons(SALW) in Africa has gradually beencreated. Four arms control agreements
have been adopted, mainly under the aegis
of subregional economic communities:
ƀɟ the 2001 Protocol on the Control ofFirearms, Ammunition and otherrelated Materials in the SADC
Region;ƀɟ the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for thePrevention, Control and Reduction of
SALW in the Great Lakes Region and theHorn of Africaƀɟ the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on
SALW, their Ammunition and Other
Related Materials; andƀɟ the 2010 Central African Convention for
the Control of SALW, their Ammunition,
Parts and Components that can be used
for their Manufacture, Repair andAssembly (Kinshasa Convention).
Despite the strong subregional focus on
SALW control in Africa, some key external
partners, such as the European Union,
nevertheless still prefer to conduct theirstrategic dialogue with African states at thecontinent level. Given the subregional
instruments’ current dependency on
external funds and the difficulty ofreaching consensus on SALW-related
issues in the African Union, ﬁnding a way
to improve collaboration between
subregional instruments and external
partners will be crucial in order to ensure
implementation.
Conventional arms control and CSBMs in
EuropeIn 2012 the difficulties in agreeing on
further progress on conventional arms
control in Europe reported in 2011
continued. However, at the end of 2012
Ukraine, the incoming chair of theOrganization for Security and Co-operationin Europe (OSCE) for 2013, initiated aprocess that might provide a future
framework for developing a new approachto conventional arms control.
At the OSCE Ministerial Council in
December 2012, foreign ministers agreed tolaunch a process labelled ‘Helsinki+40’, oneof the objectives of which is to develop
practical measures to implement thecommitment made in the 2010 AstanaCommemorative Declaration to overcome
the impasse in conventional arms control inEurope and open the way for negotiations
on a new agreement. The measures shouldbe elaborated by 2015—four decades after
the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.
CSBMs in Asia and the Americas

Asia is a region with a signiﬁcant number ofbilateral and subregional tensions,unresolved conﬂicts that periodically leadto deadly incidents, and disputes over landand sea borders. Nevertheless, althoughseveral Asian initiatives include CSBMs as
part of their agenda, there is no strong
mandate or institutional structure
supporting CSBMs in Asia.
Unlike Asia, border disputes in theAmericas have not led to tensions that haverequired a military response. The region
faces no major external military threat andin the past two decades it has developed anarray of CSBMs at both the regional andsubregional levels. For example, themembers of the Union of South American
Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR) continued to implement
measures agreed in 2011 and to elaborate
new CSBMs.

ƀ

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19

10. DUAL-USE AND ARMS TRADECONTROLS
Governments are increasingly aware that
controlling ﬂows of conventional arms anditems that can be used for both civilian andmilitary purposes—dual-use items—is acomplex process involving regulation ofexports and associated brokering, transit,
trans-shipment and ﬁnancing activities.
This complexity requires effort andcooperation from countries around theworld. States, therefore, engage in various
multilateral mechanisms and continuallycreate or adapt instruments to addressthese challenges.
Negotiations on an arms tradetreatyThe July 2012 United Nations conferenceon an arms trade treaty (ATT) concluded
without agreement on a draft treaty text.
Several states, in particular Russia andthe United States, called for more timefor UN member states to discuss theseissues.
Two issues proved particularly
challenging for ATT negotiators in 2012:
ﬁnding an agreeable compromise on how toincorporate respect for obligations underinternational humanitarian and humanrights law alongside state security
prerogatives for arms transfers; anddeﬁning the scope of items to be subject totransfer controls.
The ﬁnal conference on the ATT took
place in March 2013, with UN member
states given a ﬁnal chance to achieveconsensus on an international treaty toestablish the ‘highest possible common
international standards for the transfer ofconventional arms’.

Arms embargoes, ﬁnancial sanctions andother restrictive measures

During 2012, 13 UN arms embargoes,
19 European Union (EU) arms embargoes,and 1 League of Arab States arms embargo
were in force. No new arms embargo was
imposed or lifted in 2012. The UN Security
Council failed to agree an arms embargo
against Syria.
A variety of other restrictive measures
have been used to prevent proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
and missile systems for their delivery.
These measures include restrictions on

m u lt i l at e r a l a r m s
e m b a r g o e s i n f o r c e , 2 01 2
United Nations (13 embargoes)ƀ Al-Qaeda and associated individuals andentities ƀ Democratic Republic of the Congo(NGF) ƀ Côte d’Ivoire ƀ Eritrea ƀ Iran ƀ Iraq
(NGF) ƀ North Korea ƀ Lebanon (NGF)ƀ Liberia (NGF) ƀ Libya (NGF) ƀ Somalia
ƀ Sudan (Darfur) ƀ Taliban
European Union (19 embargoes)
Implementations of UN embargoes (9):ƀ Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associatedindividuals and entities ƀ Democratic
Republic of the Congo (NGF) ƀ Côte d’Ivoire
ƀ Eritrea ƀ Iraq (NGF) ƀ Lebanon (NGF)ƀ Liberia (NGF) ƀ Libya (NGF) ƀ Somalia(NGF)
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): ƀ Iranƀ North Korea ƀ Sudan
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (7):ƀ Belarus ƀ China ƀ Guinea ƀ Myanmar
ƀ South Sudan ƀ Syria ƀ Zimbabwe
ECOWAS (1 embargo)ƀ Guinea
Arab League (1 embargo)ƀ Syria
NGF = non-governmental forces.

20 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

trade, ﬁnancial sanctions and restrictions
on travel. Restrictions on trade can beeither general or targeting particular
goods.
Financial sanctions can include, forexample, the freezing of funds or economic
resources, prohibitions on ﬁnancialtransactions or requirements for priorapproval before entering into suchtransactions, and restrictions on theprovision of export credits or investment
funds. Examples of restrictions on travelinclude ﬂight bans and restrictions on theadmission of named individuals.
In 2012 an important understanding wasreached among the states that play a central
role in managing the international ﬁnancial
system on how to use ﬁnancial sanctions to
support non-proliferation. In addition, newand expanded measures were adopted toattempt to bring about a change in thenational nuclear policy of Iran.
Export control regimes

Four informal, consensus-based export
control regimes—the Australia Group, theMissile Technology Control Regime, theNuclear Suppliers Group and theWassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dualuse Goods and Technologies—work within
their speciﬁc ﬁelds to strengthen tradecontrol cooperation.
One cross-regime trend throughout 2012
involved ongoing efforts to expand thescope of discussions and guidelines about
activities and items to be subject tocontrols, in particular regarding brokering,transit and trans-shipment, intangible
transfers of technology, and proliferation
ﬁnancing. Although export controls
remain the regimes’ main organizing
principle, associated trade activities are

increasingly becoming the focus of control
efforts.
Export control developments in theEuropean Union

During 2012 the ongoing review of the EU
Common Position deﬁning common rules
governing control of exports of militarytechnology and equipment led to no major
developments regarding EU-wide rules forthe control of arms exports, brokering,trans-shipment and transit. However, EU
member states implementated a new
regulation governing intra-community
trade in defence goods.
The range of dual-use items subject tocontrol was expanded in line withagreements in the multilateral control
regimes, albeit with a substantial delay due
to the new requirement to involve theEuropean Parliament. The Parliament’s
efforts to expand the coverage of EU
controls on dual-use items to include
transfers of surveillance technology
formed part of a range of initiatives in thisarea in the wake of the events of the ArabSpring in 2011 and 2012. The Parliament isthus emerging as a new actor shaping dualuse trade controls in the EU.

ƀnon-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21

ANNEXES
Arms control and disarmament
agreements in force, 1 January 2013

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare(1925 Geneva Protocol)
1948 Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide(Genocide Convention)
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons inTime of War; and 1977 Protocols I and
II Relating to the Protection ofVictims of International and
Non-International Armed Conﬂicts
1959 Antarctic Treaty
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water (Partial TestBan Treaty, PTBT)
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Explorationand Use of Outer Space, Including theMoon and Other Celestial Bodies(Outer Space Treaty)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation
Treaty, NPT)1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weaponsand other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
thereof (Seabed Treaty)
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production andStockpiling of Bacteriological

22 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary(Biological) and Toxin Weapons andon their Destruction (Biological andToxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)
1974 Treaty on the Limitation ofUnderground Nuclear Weapon Tests(Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, TTBT)1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
PNET)
1977 Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modiﬁcation
Techniques (Enmod Convention)
1980 Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material
1981 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to have Indiscriminate Effects(CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane
Weapons’ Convention)
1985 South Paciﬁc Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
1987 Treaty on the Elimination ofIntermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty)
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weaponsand on their Destruction (Chemical
Weapons Convention, CWC)
1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of
Bangkok)1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)
1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control (Florence Agreement)

c h r o n o l o g y 2 01 2 , s e l e c t e devents
1 Jan.

The Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran announces that Iran has
manufactured a nuclear fuel rod.
10 Feb. Sudan and South Sudan sign amemorandum of understanding on
non-aggression and cooperation.
22 Mar. Malian President Amadou Toumani
Touré is overthrown in a coup.
12 Apr. A military coup d’état ousts thecivilian government of GuineaBissau.
1 May Afghanistan and the USA sign astrategic partnership agreement on
their relationship after 2014.
22 June A Turkish F-4 combat aircraft is shot
down by Syrian forces.
2 July The 2012 UN Conference on theArms Trade Treaty begins.
2 Aug. Koﬁ Annan resigns as the UN–ArabLeague Joint Special Envoy for Syria,
and is replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi.
11 Sep. Japan announces that it has bought
3 of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu)
Islands in the South China Sea.
10 Oct. A Syrian passenger aircraft isintercepted and forced to land at
Ankara Airport.
29 Nov. The UN General Assembly adopts a
resolution granting Palestine nonmember state status at the UN.
12 Dec. North Korea successfully launches a
Unha 3 rocket.

1997 Inter-American Convention Against
the Illicit Manufacturing of andTrafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other
Related Materials (CIFTA)
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production andTransfer of Anti-Personnel Minesand on their Destruction (APM
Convention)

1999 Inter-American Convention on
Transparency in Conventional
Weapons Acquisitions
2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms,
Light Weapons, their Ammunition
and Other Related Materials
2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk)
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START)2011 Vienna Document 2011 on
Conﬁdence- and Security-Building
Measures
Agreements not yet in force, 1 January
2013

1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
Treaty2010 Central African Convention for theControl of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and All
Parts and Components That Can Be
Used for Their Manufacture, Repair
and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)
Security cooperation bodies

Notable changes in 2012 include Mongolia
becoming a participating state of theOrganization for Security and Co-operationin Europe (OSCE) and Guinea-Bissau’ssuspension from the African Union (AU).
Mexico was admitted to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and to the Wassenaar
Arrangement, and Belarus joined the
Zangger Committee. No states joined theother strategic trade control regimes—theAustralia Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime.

ƀannexes 23

SIPRI DATA PORTALThe SIPRI databases onƀɟ military spending,ƀɟ international arms transfers,ƀɟ the arms industry andƀɟ multilateral peace operations,which are widely regarded as the gold standard around the world, are now available via asingle user interface, the SIPRI Data Portal.
The data in the portal is searchable by country, region, time period and subject. SIPRI has
updated and standardized the functioning of the different SIPRI databases, enabling users togenerate and compare data in a variety of new formats.
The SIPRI Data Portal also allows researchers to carry out combined searches across
SIPRI’s databases.
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Gives consistent time series on the military spending of 172 countries since 1988, allowing
comparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US
dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of GDP.
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Shows all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950,
the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms
transfers.
SIPRI Arms Industry Database

Contains ﬁnancial and employment data on most of the largest arms-producing companies
around the world
SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database

Offers information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including
location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of
personnel, costs and fatalities.
Access the SIPRI Data Portal: www.sipri.org/databases
Support for the development of the portal was provided by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond.

24 sipri yearbook 2013 , summary

HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2013
SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in print and online by Oxford University Press
ISBN 978-0-19-967843-3, hardback, xxii+574 pp., £100/$185

1More information is available at www.sipriyearbook.org

TRANSLATIONSSIPRI Yearbook 2013 will be translated intoƀɟ Arabic by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), Beirutwww.caus.org.lb

ƀɟ Chinese by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Beijingwww.cacda.org.cn

ƀɟ Russian by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow
www.imemo.ruƀɟ Ukrainian by the Razumkov Centre (Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political
Studies, UCEPS), Kyiv
www.razumkov.org.ua

These translations are funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protectionand Sport. Contact the publishing organizations for further details.

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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONALPEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTESIPRI YEARBOOK 2013
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
The SIPRI Yearbook is a compendium of data and analysis in the areas ofƀɟ/,#.3ɟ(ɟ)(ũ#.ƀɟ #&#.,3ɟ-*(#(!ɟ(ɟ,''(.ƀɟ)(Ɛ*,)&# ,.#)(Żɟ,'-ɟ)(.,)&ɟ(ɟ#-,''(.
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peace in East and South East AsiaĊǩǩ)*,.#)(-ǩ(ǩ)(ó#.ǩ'(!'(., including accounts of new operations in
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cybersecurityĊǩ (.,(.#)(&ǩ,'-ǩ.,(- ,-, highlighting the changing patterns of supply and demand
and with a study on arms supplies to SyriaĊǩ),&ǩ(/&,ǩ ),-, including stocks and production of ﬁssile materialsĊǩ/&,ǩ,'-ǩ)(.,)&ǩ(ǩ()(Ě*,)&# ,.#)(, examining NATO’s non-strategic nuclear
weapons and efforts to combat nuclear terrorismĊǩ/#(!ǩ-/,#.3ǩ.",.-ǩ ,)'ǩ"'#&ǩ(ǩ#)&)!#&ǩ'.,#&-, highlighting theoversight of dual-purpose research in the life sciencesĊǩ)(0(.#)(&ǩ,'-ǩ)(.,)&ǩ(ǩ'#&#.,3ǩ)(ð(ǩ/#&#(!, with studies on small arms
control in Africa, and conﬁdence- and security-building measures in Asia and theAmericasĊǩ/&Ě/-ǩ(ǩ,'-ǩ.,ǩ)(.,)&-, with accounts of the arms trade treaty negotiations,sanctions and developments in multilateral export control regimes
as well as extensive annexes on arms control and disarmament agreements, international
security cooperation bodies, and events during 2012.

www.sipriyearbook.org