Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated May 5, 2022

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45811

SUMMARY

Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress

R45811
May 5, 2022
Kelley M. Sayler

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering
Analyst in Advanced
Technology and Global
weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike
Security
program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts ondeveloping hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to atarget, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines
during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander ofU.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable“responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles]
when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic
weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress haveshown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs
and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S.
hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As aresult, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than
nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2023 budget request for hypersonic research is $4.7 billion—up from $3.8 billion in the FY2022 request.
The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not haveapproved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not
yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation ofpotential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about therationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control.
Potential questions include the following:

What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effectivemeans of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine
and concepts?

Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate
funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic
weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of researchon hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary andtechnologically feasible?

How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateralarms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for CongressContents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
United States ............................................................................................................................. 4
Programs ............................................................................................................................. 4
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 12
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 14
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 14
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 16
China ....................................................................................................................................... 16
Programs ........................................................................................................................... 17
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 18
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 21
Mission Requirements ............................................................................................................. 21
Funding and Management Considerations .............................................................................. 22
Strategic Stability .................................................................................................................... 23
Arms Control........................................................................................................................... 24

FiguresFigure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles............ 3
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard......................................................................................... 15
Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype ........................................................... 19

TablesTable 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding.............................................. 10
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities ..................................................................... 26
Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges................................................................................................ 27
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets ..................................................................................................... 27
Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities .............................................................................. 28
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities ..................................................... 28
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities .......................................................... 28

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure ....................................................................... 26

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 29

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Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s.1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter andintermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicatesthat both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and likely fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congressthat the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in acorresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as apriority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead.3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging
to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the DefenseIntelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements:(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries onsuch technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.
1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:

Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1840_04-18-18.pdf.
3 Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve Trimble, “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-rangehypersonic-glide.

Congressional Research Service1Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology. 4

This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “howhypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, andChina, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.

Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (fivetimes the speed of sound).6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to atarget.7
Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or“scramjets,” after acquiring their target.

Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and canmaneuver en route to their destination. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andformer Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or
time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy
derived from motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities.9
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight.10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight.11 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.

4 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title II, §247.
5 P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1689.
6 At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing

hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spreadof a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html;
and Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.
7 When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonicboost-glide weapon.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13.
10 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/112019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.

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Figure 1.Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-flyfaster-than-mach-5-are-coming.

This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting onlya single intercept attempt.12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, with former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that spacebased sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performanceinterceptors or directed energy weapons14—could theoretically present viable options for
defending against hypersonic weapons in the future.15 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved
tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise
missiles.”16
12 Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider Threat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.
13 David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018, athttps://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New Technologies to
Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf,
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
14 Section 1664 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) granted the “Director of the Missile Defense Agency the authority
to budget for, direct, and manage directed energy programs applicable for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense
missions, in coordination with other directed energy efforts of the Department of Defense.”
15 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1840_04-18-18.pdf; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Testimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing
on United States Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, at https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
16 Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/

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Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of widearea hypersonic weapons defense.17 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “pointdefense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is thatthey can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you
would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”18 In addition, some analysts haveargued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of“processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”19(For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623,
Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall.)United States
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s
Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with theability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as throughseveral Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.20 Those who support these development efforts
argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military
with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form
the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies.21 In recognition of this, the2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies“[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”22 Similarly, theHouse Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that
hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.23

Programs
Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed.
As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more
2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
17 See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
18 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
19 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons,
American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control
systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons. See
John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in
America Can’t Stop Them),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html.
20 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
21 Roger Zakheim and Tom Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,” Remarks atthe Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army
Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580.
22 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p. 3, athttps://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
23 House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, at
https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/
424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf.

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4Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed,according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100
times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.24
According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonictechnology programs, including the following (see Table 1):









U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
U.S. Navy—Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2), also
known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO);
U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”);
U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); andDARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced“hawk”).

These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons.25

U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of acommon glide vehicle for use across the services.26 The common glide vehicle is being adaptedfrom a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully
tested in 2011 and 2017.27 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, thedesigner of the original concept, then will build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems
are being developed separately.”28
The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle witha booster system to create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army.
According to the Navy’s FY2023 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in
24 James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Testimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review

Commission, February 23, 2017, at https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
25 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March
15, 2019, at https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
26 The services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Ramps up Funding for Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense, February
28, 2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
27 Steve Trimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First-gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week, October 11, 2018, at http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonicproduction-line; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Warhead Is Key To Joint Hypersonics,” Breaking Defense,
August 22, 2018, at https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/.
28 Steve Trimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First-gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week, October 11, 2018, at http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonicproduction-line.

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5Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025.29 Although Navy officials
have previously noted plans to achieve “limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines
as early as 202530 and on Virginia-class submarines by FY2028, as well as to eventually field
hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2023 budget
documents.31 The Navy is requesting $1.2 billion for CPS RDT&E in FY2023—a decrease of$169 million from the FY2022 request and $120 million from the FY2022 appropriation.32
The Navy is also developing the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2),
also known as Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO)—a new start in FY2023.33 Although
few details about the program have been released publicly, HALO is likely to be compatible with
the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet.34 The Navy is requesting $92 million for HALO RDT&E in
FY2023.35

U.S. Army
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program is expected to pair the common
glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over
1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat
A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time
sensitive targets.”36 The Army is requesting $806 million in RDT&E for the program in
FY2023—$394 million over the FY2022 request and $380 million over the FY2022

29 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
30 See Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/22pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf; Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY
2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf;
and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020,
at https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.
31 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says Trump’s national security adviser,”
Defense News, October 21, 2020, at https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-gethypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/.
32 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1458, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
33 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
34 Joesph Trevithick, “Hypersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Has To Be Ready By 2028 Navy Says,” The Drive, April
23, 2022, at https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hypersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-has-to-be-ready-by-2028navy-says.
35 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1373, at https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/
Documents/23pres/RDTEN_BA4_Book.pdf.
36 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking
Defense, May, 12 2021, at https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-mileswatch-out-china/; and at https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannonadvances/ Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.

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6Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congressappropriation.37 It plans to conduct flight tests for LRHW in FY2022, field an experimental
prototype in FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024.38 The
Army additionally requested $249 million for the procurement of LRHW ground support
equipment in FY2023.39

U.S. Air Force
The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical
Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable oftravelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000
miles.40 Although ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019, it has
experienced failures in all three of its subsequent flight tests.41 The Air Force continues to assert
that, despite these failures, “it is still possible to provide [early operational capability] in latecalendar year 2022, provided future flight testing [of ARRW] concludes as per the current plan.”42This schedule could leave little to no room for test delays or additional flight failures. The Air
Force has requested $115 million for ARRW RDT&E in FY2023—$123 million under the
FY2022 request and $204 million under the FY2022 appropriation.43 In addition, the Air Force

37 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 711-726, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/
72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf; and Department of Defense
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation,
Volume II, Budget Activity 5D, p. 185, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/
Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2Budget_Activity_5D.pdfhttps://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/20

22/Base Budget/rdte/RDTE_BA_4_FY_2022_PB.pdf.
38 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, pp. 705-709, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/
72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/rdte/vol_2-Budget_Activity_4.pdf.
39 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
p. 66, at https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2023/Base%20Budget/Procurement/
MSLS_ARMY.pdf.
40 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. Thomas Newdick, “Air Force Says
New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit Targets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, at
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-milesaway-in-under-12-minutes.
41 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight Test,” Military.com, April 6, 2021, at
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text=
In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states; and Anthony
Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, athttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia.
42 Anthony Capaccio, “Hypersonic-Missile Failures Risk U.S. Chase of China, Russia,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2022, athttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/hypersonic-missile-failures-imperil-u-s-chase-of-china-russia.
43 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/
RDTE_/FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?
ver=LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d.

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7

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

requested $47 million for ARRW procurement in FY2023;44 however, Air Force officials havestated that they will submit a reprogramming request to shift these funds to ARRW RDT&E.45
In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon
program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use
the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose
between ARRW and HCSW.46 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW
was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW]
is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” heexplained.47 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four
ARRWs.48
Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)
program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA
technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers
and fighter aircraft,49 with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20
HACMs or more.50 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is
contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”51 The
Air Force requested $317 million for HACM in FY2023, up from $200 million in the FY2022
request and $190 million in the FY2022 appropriation.52
44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile

Procurement, Volume I, p. 23, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/PROCUREMENT_/
FY23%20Air%20Force%20Missile%20Procurement.pdf?ver=QeRLpOSY7vcLmsKbr3C-Qw%3d%3d. The Air Forcerequested $161 million in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles. Congress authorized $116
million for ARRW procurement in the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81), noting that additional funds were “early to need.”
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile Procurement,
Volume I, p. 19, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20JBook%20-%203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d.

https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22 DAF
J-Book - 3020 - Missile Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d
45 Valerie Insinna, “Air Force ditches plans to buy first hypersonic ARRW missile in FY23,” Breaking Defense, March

29, 2022, at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/air-force-ditches-plans-to-buy-first-hypersonic-arrw-missile-in-fy23/.
46 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, February 10, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonicweapons-programs/.
47 John A. Tirpak, “Roper: The ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2,
2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. Tirpak additionally notesthat “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed
to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.”
48 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
49 FY2023 Air Force budget documents note that “the HACM program will prioritize integration on the F-15E platform
to enable quick entry into flight test.”
50 John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Will Try Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine,
June 3, 2021, at https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/.
51 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/
RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20-%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
52 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 145 and 161, at https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/
FY23/RDTE_/

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8Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic AirBreathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem.
According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at thenext step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems” andis intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”53
Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads fordifferent mission sets.54

DARPA
DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped
hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstratetechnologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”55 TBG
will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch
System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested$30 million for TBG in FY2023—$20 million under the FY2022 request and appropriation.56
DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a groundlaunched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air
defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA requested andreceived $45 million for OpFires in FY2022, but did not request funds in FY2023, following the
program’s completion.57
DARPA has similarly concluded work on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept(HAWC), which, with Air Force support, sought “to develop and demonstrate criticaltechnologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”58
FY23%20Air%20Force%20Research%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=
LK67U_ThMsX7AwahfurKGw%3d%3d; and Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air
Force Justification Book of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, athttps://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDTE_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%2303600%20%20AF%20RDT%20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d.
53 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A
Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defenseconversation-mike-white.
54 See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High-Priority USAF Project,” Air
Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, at https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomeshighpriority-usaf-project/.
55 “Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide;
and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, athttps://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics.
56 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 171, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; andDepartment of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
57 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 172, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; andDepartment of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
58 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, at https://www.darpa.mil/

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9Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

DARPA successfully tested HAWC in March 2022, launching the missile from a B-52 bomber.59
Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that hypersonic cruise missiles like
HAWC would be smaller than hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider
range of platforms. Principal Director White has additionally noted that HAWC and otherhypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles.60
DARPA requested and received $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2022.61 DARPA requested$60 million for MoHAWC, the successor program to HAWC, in FY2023.62 Like HAWC,MoHAWC seeks to develop technologies for use in future air-launched hypersonic cruise
missiles.63
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
Title

FY2022 Request($ in millions)

FY2022 Enacted($ in millions)

PB2023($ in millions)

Schedule

Conventional
Prompt Strike (CPS)

1,374

1,325

1,205

Platform
deployment in
FY2025 and FY2028

Hypersonic AirLaunched OASuW(HALO)

00

92

Field in FY2028

Long-Range
Hypersonic
Weapon (LRHW)

412

426

806

Prototypedeployment in
FY2023

AGM-183 AirLaunched Rapid
Response Weapon(ARRW)

238

319

115

Flight tests throughFY2023Hypersonic Attack
Cruise Missile(HACM)

200

190

462

Complete test anddevelopment in
FY2027

Tactical Boost Glide
(TBG)

50

50

30

Complete third test
flight in FY2023

Hypersonic Airbreathing Weapon
Concept (HAWC)/MoHAWC101060

Begin integrationand ground testingin FY2023

program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
59
Oren Liebermann, “US tested hypersonic missile in mid-March but kept it quiet to avoid escalating tensions with
Russia,” CNN, April 5, 2022, at https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/04/politics/us-hypersonic-missile-test/index.html.
60 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
61 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
62 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 173, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf.
63 Ibid.

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10Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY2022 and FY2023
Justification Books, available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Note: MoHAWC, a new start in FY2023, is the successor program to HAWC, which concluded in FY2022.

Hypersonic Missile Defenses64
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.65 In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
guns, and electronic attack systems.66 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype
proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor intended
to be fielded in the mid-2030s; however, the program was later cancelled in favor of a nearer-term
solution, the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI).67 MDA seeks to field a regional, sea-based GPI
capability in the mid- to late 2020s.68 In addition, MDA is developing the Hypersonic andBallistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)—which it hopes to launch in March 2023—in an effort
to improve the agency’s ability to detect and track incoming missiles.69 MDA requested $89.2
million for HBTSS in FY2023; the agency requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense in
FY2023—down from its $247.9 million FY2022 request and $287.8 million FY2022
appropriation.70 Finally, DARPA is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “willdevelop critical component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise

64 For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile

Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed.
65 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, at https://dod.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretaryof-defens/.
66 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, Title XVI, §1687; Hudson and Trimble, “Top U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; and Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
67 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon
System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8; and Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,”Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveilsgpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
68 Steve Trimble, “MDA Unveils GPI In Retooled Counter-Hypersonic Plan,” Aviation Week, February 4, 2021, at
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/mda-unveils-gpi-retooled-counter-hypersonic-plan.
69 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-WideJustification Book 2a of 5, p. 841, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-15, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
70 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-WideJustification Book 2a of 5, p. 631 and 853, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Departmentof Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 2a of5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/
03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf.

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11Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congressengagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”71 DARPA requested $18 million for Glide
Breaker in FY2023, up from its $7 million request and appropriation in FY2022.72

Infrastructure
According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),73 the United States had 48
critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of
hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.74 These specialized
facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed,pressure, heating),75 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges,
11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5
industry or academic facilities.76 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation
infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent,
coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
these characteristics above Mach 8.”
Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6
hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.
Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University ofNotre Dame, respectively, is ongoing.77 In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its
wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army
Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel.78 (For a partial list of
71 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,

Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164.
72 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 169, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2023.pdf; andDepartment of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf.
73 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, Title X, §1071.
74 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, andprivate U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office,Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development
Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
75 These conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics.
76 This list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively
and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis andAssessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
77 Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology Testing at Two Indiana Universities,” Military.com,
April 23, 2019, at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technologytesting-two-indiana-universities.html.
78 University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube,” at https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at Texas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-openhypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy, the University of Tennessee, andVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct

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12Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.) The United States also uses
the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range
in Norway for flight testing.79 In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch
Test Complex at China Lake, CA to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for theconventional prompt strike program.80 According to an assessment conducted by the Government
Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility
modernization from FY2015 to FY2024.81
In February 2022, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it had concluded its twoyear-long evaluation of current ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability
and capacity would be sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule; however, DOD did notrelease the evaluation to the public.82 Similarly, an annual report by DOD’s Director of Test and
Evaluation evaluated the sufficiency of U.S. hypersonic weapons test infrastructure; this report
was not released publicly.83
Congress has also continued to express interest in hypersonic weapons infrastructure. Section 222
of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research andEngineering, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to
the congressional defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities
and infrastructure used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments intesting capabilities and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based
testing for such weapons.” Section 225 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) requires the Secretaryof Defense to identify the hypersonic facilities and capabilities of the Major Range and Test
Facility Base and brief the congressional defense committees on a plan for improvement.
Finally, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” toassess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply
chain.84 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs.85

hypersonic research.
79 (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
80 “Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required), February
12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
81 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure
Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao21-378.
82 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
Test and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF; andDepartment of Defense Office of Inspector General,” Evaluation of the Ground Test and Evaluation Infrastructure
Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (DODIG-2022-056),” February 3, 2022, at https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/
Article/2921419/evaluation-of-the-ground-test-and-evaluation-infrastructure-supporting-hyperson/.
83 Anthony Capaccio, “Pentagon Hypersonic Weapons Tests Need More Wide-Open Spaces,” Bloomberg, February 3,
2020.
84 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020, at
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
85 C. Todd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD
News, October 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisitionregulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.

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RussiaAlthough Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United Statesand Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2001.86 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in thecomplete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”87 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability.88

Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (orZircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic
missile.89
Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”90 Reports indicate that Avangard iscurrently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch thevehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is still in development, although it was successfully tested
in April 2022 and is scheduled to be deployed by the end of 2022.91 Avangard features onboard
countermeasures and will reportedly carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in2016 and once in December 2018, reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October
2017 test resulted in failure. Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty
in December 2019.92
86 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic

Arms Control, February 2019, at https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challengeand-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
87 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
88 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See Tong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, at https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemmapub-76894.
89 Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle orhypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason—and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here forreference.
90 Steve Trimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
91 Lateshia Beachum, Mary Ilyushina and Karoun Demirjian, “Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S.,
scholars say,” Washington Post, April 20, 2022, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/satan-2-icbm/;
and Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription
required), April 22, 2021, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
92 “First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,at https://tass.com/defense/1104297.

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Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard

Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.

In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable ofstriking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of
between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems
mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350
frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.93 These sources assertthat Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January, October, andDecember 2020 and from a Project 885 Yasen-class submarine in October 2021.94 U.S.
intelligence reports indicate that the missile will become operational in 2023.95
In addition, Russia has fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile modified
from the Iskander missile. Russia reportedly fired Kinzhal from a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft in
Ukraine96 and additionally plans to deploy the missile on the Su-34 long-range strike fighter97 andthe Tu-22M3 strategic bomber, although the slower-moving bomber may face challenges in“accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.”98 Russian media has reported
Kinzhal’s top speed as Mach 10, with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from the MiG93 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of Tsirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018, at

http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, at https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
94 “TASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile Test,” Reuters, February 27, 2020, at
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Samuel CrannyEvans, “Russia conducts first submarine test launches of Tsirkon hypersonic missile,” Jane’s (subscription required),
October 4, 2021.
95 Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—which will likely be ready for
combat by 2022,” CNBC, December 20, 2018, at https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missilethat-could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “Russian Navy to accept latest Tsirkon hypersonic missile for service
in 2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, at http://tass.com/defense/1049572.
96 Roxana Tiron, “Hypersonic Weapons: Who Has Them and Why It Matters,” Washington Post, April 6, 2022, athttps://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hypersonic-weapons-who-has-them-and-why-it-matters/2022/04/05/
1f6d0280-b557-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html.
97 Mark B. Schneider, “Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles … and What It Means” in Defense Technology
Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019.
98 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range if Fired from SupersonicBomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aeroballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.

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31. The Kinzhal is reportedly capable of maneuverable flight, as well as of striking both groundand naval targets, and could eventually be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, such claims
regarding Kinzhal’s performance characteristics have not been publicly verified by U.S.
intelligence agencies, and have been met with skepticism by a number of analysts.99

Infrastructure
Russia reportedly conducts hypersonic wind tunnel testing at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic
Institute in Zhukovsky and the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics in
Novosibirsk, and has tested hypersonic weapons at Dombarovskiy Air Base, the Baykonur
Cosmodrome, and the Kura Range.100

China
According to Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, “mostexperts argue that the most important reason to prioritize hypersonic technology development [inChina] is the necessity to counter specific security threats from increasingly sophisticated U.S.
military technology,” such as U.S. missile defenses.101 In particular, China’s pursuit of hypersonic
weapons, like Russia’s, reflects a concern that U.S. hypersonic weapons could enable the UnitedStates to conduct a preemptive, decapitating strike on China’s nuclear arsenal and supporting
infrastructure. U.S. missile defense deployments could then limit China’s ability to conduct a
retaliatory strike against the United States.102
As General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of United States Northern Command(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified in a
February 2020 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, China is “testing a[nuclear-capable] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle” that could evade U.S. missile
defense and warning systems.103 Reports additionally indicate that China may have tested anuclear-capable HGV104—launched by a Long March rocket—in August 2021.105 In contrast to
the ballistic missiles that China has previously used to launch HGVs, the Long March, a
99 David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game Changer?,” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, athttps://www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias-new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer.
100 “Aerodynamics,” Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, http://tsagi.com/research/aerodynamics/; “Russia announces
successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jane’s (subscription required), January 3, 2019, athttps://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1451630-JMR; and “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for
deployment,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 26, 2018, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/
avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml.
101 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the
Security Dilemma.”
102 Tong Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability”; and Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on HypersonicGlide,” August 15, 2017, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at https://www.sipri.org/commentary/
topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
103 General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 13, 2020,
at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-02-13-united-states-northern-command-and-united-statesstrategic-command.
104 It is not clear if this nuclear-capable HGV is the same model as that referenced by General O’Shaughnessy.
105 Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile,” October 16,
2021, at https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Zhao Lijian has stated that “this was a routine test of [a] space vehicle,” rather than a test of a nuclear-capable HGV.
Zhao Lijian, “Remarks at Regular Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
October 18, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1915130.shtml.

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fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), launches the HGV into orbit before the HGV deorbits to its target. This could provide China with a space-based global strike capability andfurther reduce the amount of target warning time prior to a strike.106
China has also demonstrated a growing interest in Russian advances in hypersonic weapons
technology, conducting flight tests of a hypersonic-glide vehicle (HGV) only days after Russia
tested its own system.107 Furthermore, a January 2017 report found that over half of open-source
Chinese papers on hypersonic weapons include references to Russian weapons programs. 108 This
could indicate that China is increasingly considering hypersonic weapons within a regional
context. Indeed, some analysts believe that China may be planning to mate conventionally armed
HGVs with the DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles in support of an anti-access/area denial
strategy.109

Programs
China has conducted a number of successful tests of the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch HGVs. U.S. intelligence analysts assess that the missile has arange of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 miles and may now be deployed.110 China has also tested
the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could be modified to carry a conventional or
nuclear HGV, according to a report by a U.S. Congressional commission. The development of theDF-41 thus “significantly increases the [Chinese] rocket force’s nuclear threat to the U.S.
mainland,” the report states.111
China has tested the DF-ZF HGV (previously referred to as the WU-14) at least nine times since2014. U.S. defense officials have reportedly identified the range of the DF-ZF as approximately
1,200 miles and have stated that the vehicle may be capable of performing “extreme maneuvers”
during flight.112 China reportedly fielded the DF-ZF in 2020.113

106 Greg Hadley, “Kendall: China Has Potential to Strike Earth from Space,” Air Force Magazine, September 20, 2021,

at https://www.airforcemag.com/global-strikes-space-china-frank-kendall/.
107 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide.”
108 Lora Saalman, “Factoring Russia into the US-China Equation on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” SIPRI, January 2017,at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Factoring-Russia-into-US-Chinese-equation-hypersonic-glide-vehicles.pdf.
109 Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide”; and Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese
hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription required), March 12, 2019, athttps://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
110 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle,” The National Interest, December 28, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinasnewly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/; and Bill Gertz, “China’s new hypersonicmissile,” Washington Times, October 2, 2019, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/2/china-shows-df17-hypersonic-missile/.
111 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018 Annual Report, p. 235, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
112 “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The Economist, April 6, 2019, athttps://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-arecoming; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” The
Diplomat, April 28, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-smissile-defense-systems/.
113 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, p. 60,
at https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

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According to U.S. defense officials, China also successfully tested Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong2), a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle prototype, in August 2018.114 China claims the vehicle
reached top speeds of Mach 6 and executed a series of in-flight maneuvers before landing.115
Unlike the DF-ZF, Starry Sky-2 is a “waverider” that uses powered flight after launch and derives
lift from its own shockwaves. Some reports indicate that the Starry Sky-2 could be operational by2025.116 U.S. officials have declined to comment on the program.117

Infrastructure
China has a robust research and development infrastructure devoted to hypersonic weapons.
Then-USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stated in March 2018 that China has conducted 20 times as
many hypersonic tests as the United States.118 China tested three hypersonic vehicle models(D18-1S, D18-2S, and D18-3S)—each with different aerodynamic properties—in September
2018.119 Analysts believe that these tests could be designed to help China develop weapons thatfly at variable speeds, including hypersonic speeds. Similarly, China has used the Lingyun Mach6+ high-speed engine, or “scramjet,” test bed (Figure 3) to research thermal resistant components
and hypersonic cruise missile technologies.120

114 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2019, May 2, 2019, p. 44, at https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/
2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
115 Jessie Yeung, “China claims to have successfully tested its first hypersonic aircraft, CNN, August 7, 2018, athttps://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/china/china-hypersonic-aircraft-intl/index.html.
116 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
117 Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 10, 2018, athttps://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-missile/.
118 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2015, p. 20.
119 Malcolm Claus and Andrew Tate, “Chinese hypersonic programme reflects regional priorities,” Jane’s (subscription
required), March 12, 2019, at https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1731069-JIR.
120 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s hypersonic military projects include spaceplanes and rail guns,” Popular
Mechanics, June 26, 2018, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-work-speeds-up.

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Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype

Source: Photo accompanying Drake Long, “China reveals Lingyun-1 hypersonic missile at National Science andTechnology expo,” The Defense Post, May 21, 2018.

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “China is also investing heavily in hypersonic groundtesting facilities.”121 For example, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Centerclaims to have 18 wind tunnels, while the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is known
to operate at least three hypersonic wind tunnels—the FD-02, FD-03, and FD-07—capable ofreaching speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and Mach 12, respectively.122 China also operates the JF-12
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 9 and the FD-21
hypersonic wind tunnel, which reaches speeds of between Mach 10 and Mach 15.123 It willreportedly complete construction of the JF-22 wind tunnel, capable of reaching speeds of Mach30, in 2022.124 In addition, China is known to have tested hypersonic weapons at the Jiuquan
Satellite Launch Center and the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

121 Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with hypersonic vehicles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription

required), October 2, 2018, at https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_1120806-JDW.
122 Kelvin Wong, “China claims successful test of hypersonic waverider,” Jane’s (subscription required), August 10, at
2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1002295-JDW; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China builds
advanced weapons systems using American chip technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021.
123 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A look at China’s most exciting hypersonic aerospace programs,” Popular Science,
April 18, 2017, at https://www.popsci.com/chinas-hypersonic-technology.
124 Andrew Tate, “China’s new hypersonic wind tunnel expected to be ready next year,” Janes Defence Weekly(subscription required), August 24, 2021, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinas-new-hypersonicwind-tunnel-expected-to-be-ready-next-year.

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Global Hypersonic Weapons Programs
Although the United States, Russia, and China possess the most advanced hypersonic weapons programs, anumber of other countries—including Australia, India, France, Germany, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan—
are also developing hypersonic weapons technology. Since 2007, the United States has collaborated with Australia
on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonictechnologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a
Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies. HIFiRE’s successor,
the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) program, is to further develop hypersonicair-breathing technologies. SCIFiRE demonstration tests are expected by the mid-2020s. In addition to the
Woomera Test Range facilities—one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world—Australia reportedly
operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
India has similarly collaborated with Russia on the development of BrahMos II, a Mach 7 hypersonic cruise missile.
Although BrahMos II was initially intended to be fielded in 2017, news reports indicate that the program faces
significant delays and is now scheduled to achieve initial operational capability between 2025 and 2028. Reportedly,
India is also developing an indigenous, dual-capable hypersonic cruise missile as part of its Hypersonic Technology
Demonstrator Vehicle program and successfully tested a Mach 6 scramjet in June 2019 and September 2020. India
operates approximately 12 hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 13.
France also has collaborated and contracted with Russia on the development of hypersonic technology. AlthoughFrance has been investing in hypersonic technology research since the 1990s, it has only recently announced its
intent to weaponize the technology. Under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program, France plans
to modify its air-to-surface ASN4G supersonic missile for hypersonic flight by 2022. Some analysts believe that the
V-max program is intended to provide France with a strategic nuclear weapon. France operates five hypersonicwind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 21.
Germany successfully tested an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle (SHEFEX II) in 2012; however, reports
indicate that Germany may have pulled funding for the program. German defense contractor DLR continues toresearch and test hypersonic vehicles as part of the European Union’s ATLLAS II project, which seeks to design a
Mach 5-6 vehicle. Germany operates three hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to
Mach 11.
In addition, South Korea reportedly has been developing a ground-launched Mach 6+ hypersonic cruise missile,Hycore, since 2018 and plans to test the missile in 2022. According to Janes, South Korea is developing the missile“in response to growing concern about North Korea military modernization” and plans to eventually develop seaand air-launched variants.
Although North Korea tested the Hwasong-8—which it identifies as a hypersonic glide vehicle—in September
2021, reports indicate that the vehicle may have reached speeds of only Mach 3. Similarly, North Korea claims tohave tested a second hypersonic weapon in January 2022; however, experts believe that that weapon may instead
be a maneuvering reentry vehicle.
Finally, Japan is developing the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile(HVGP). According to Jane’s, Japan invested $122 million in HVGP in FY2019. It reportedly plans to field HVGPs
for area suppression and neutralizing aircraft carriers. HVGP is expected to enter service in 2026, with a moreadvanced version available by 2030, while HCM is expected to enter service in 2030. The Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency operates three hypersonic wind tunnels, with two additional facilities at Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and the University of Tokyo.
Other countries—including Iran, Israel, and Brazil—have conducted foundational research on hypersonic airflows
and propulsion systems, but may not be pursuing a hypersonic weapons capability at this time. In addition, anumber of countries are testing increasingly maneuverable systems that travel at hypersonic speeds but that do
not qualify as “hypersonic weapons” as defined in this report.
Note: For information about South Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Jon Grevatt and Rahul Udoshi,“South Korea develops Hycore hypersonic cruise missile,” Janes (subscription required), January 25, 2022. For
information about North Korea’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Choi Soo-hyang, “N. Korea's ‘hypersonicmissile’ appears to be at early stage of development: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, September 29, 2021; and Ankit
Panda, “The real danger of North Korea’s new hypersonic missile is not its speed,” NK News, January 10, 2022.
For information about Japan’s hypersonic weapons programs, see Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons
plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020. For additional information about global hypersonic weapons programs, seeRichard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation.

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Issues for Congress
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs during theannual authorization and appropriations process, it might consider a number of questions about
the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, budget and management, and theirimplications for strategic stability and arms control. This section provides an overview of some ofthese questions.

Mission Requirements
Although the Department of Defense is funding a number of hypersonic weapons programs, it has
not established any programs of record, suggesting that it may not have approved requirements
for hypersonic weapons or long-term funding plans.125 Indeed, as Principal Director for
Hypersonics (USD[R&E]) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire
hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to “[identify] the most viable
overarching weapon system concepts to choose from and then make a decision based on successand challenges.”126
Given the lack of mission requirements, DOD officials have expressed a number of competing
perspectives about the potential costs and intended quantities of U.S. hypersonic weapons. For
example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that “hypersonics are not going to
be cheap anytime soon ... [and thus] we’re more likely to have relatively small inventories of[hypersonic missiles] than large ones.”127 Conversely, a number of other senior defense officials
have stated that DOD intends to buy large quantities of hypersonic weapons. Then-DOD Directorof Defense Research & Engineering Mark Lewis has noted that DOD wants “to deliver
hypersonics at scale.... That means hundreds of weapons in a short period of time in the hands ofthe warfighter.”128 Similarly, Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that DOD
seeks to “[produce] hypersonics in mass, because you have to be able to deliver capability inmeaningful numbers, even to defeat the high-end targets.”129 These perspectives appear to be
grounded in differing assumptions about the affordability of hypersonic weapons. Likewise, they
are likely to hold different implications for the unit cost of the weapons.
As Congress conducts oversight of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it may seek to obtain
information about DOD’s evaluation of potential mission sets for hypersonic weapons, a cost
analysis of hypersonic weapons and alternative means of executing potential mission sets, and anassessment of the enabling technologies—such as space-based sensors or autonomous commandand control systems—that may be required to employ or defend against hypersonic weapons. For
example, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint
125 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
126 Steve Trimble, “New Long-Term Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics.”
127 John A. Tirpak, “Only Small Inventories of Hypersonic Missiles in USAF’s Future, Due to Cost,” Air Force

Magazine, February 15, 2022, at https://www.airforcemag.com/only-small-inventories-of-hypersonic-missiles-in-usafsfuture-due-to-cost/.
128 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Hypersonics: DoD Wants ‘Hundreds of Weapons’ ASAP,” Breaking Defense, April 24,
2020, at https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/hypersonics-dod-wants-hundreds-of-weapons-asap/.
129 “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Conversation with Mike White,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 10, 2021, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white. See also Jon
Harper, “Just In: Pentagon to Spend Billions Mass-Producing Hypersonic Weapons,” National Defense Magazine,
March 4, 2020, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/4/pentagon-to-spend-billions-massproducing-hypersonic-weapons.

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Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to thecongressional defense committees a report on strategic hypersonic weapons, including “adescription of how the requirements for land and sea-based hypersonic weapons will be addressedwith the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and how such requirements will be formallyprovided to the military departments procuring such weapons.” This report is to additionally
include “the potential target sets for hypersonic weapons ... and the required mission planning tosupport targeting by the United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands.”

Funding and Management Considerations
Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has noted that DOD is prioritizing offensive
programs while it determines “the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy.”130 Thisapproach is reflected in DOD’s recent budget requests. For example, DOD requested $225.5
million for hypersonic defense programs and $4.7 billion for hypersonic weapons programs in
FY2023.131 Similarly, in FY2022, DOD requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense
programs and $3.8 billion for hypersonic weapons programs.132
Although the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees increased FY2020
appropriations for both hypersonic offense and defense above the FY2020 request, they expressed
concerns, noting in their joint explanatory statement of H.R. 1158 “that the rapid growth inhypersonic research has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
capabilities and increase costs.”133 To mitigate this concern, they appropriated $100 million for
DOD to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office (JHTO) to “develop and implement an
integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics” and “establish a university
consortium for hypersonic research and workforce development” in support of DOD efforts.134

130 Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?” Defense News, March 21, 2019,at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving-quickly-enough-on-hypersonicdefense/.
131 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-WideJustification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 631, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2023/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB23_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, April 2022, p. 2-16, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
132 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency Defense-WideJustification Book Volume 2a of 5, p. 569, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/
budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf; and Defense
Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, May 2021, p. 3-2, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
133 “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020: Joint Explanatory Statement,” Defense Subcommittees of theAppropriations Committees, December 16, 2019, at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/
democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/HR%201158%20-%20Division%20A%20%20Defense%20SOM%20FY20.pdf.
134 Ibid. The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office, then called the Joint Technology Office on Hypersonics, wasoriginally mandated by Section 218 of the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364). The office was redesignated as the Joint
Hypersonics Transition Office and given additional authorities in Section 214 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91).
Section 216 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) further amended the office’s authorities to include the ability to enter
into agreements with institutions of higher learning. The office went unfunded until FY2020 and was not establisheduntil April 2020.

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DOD established the JHTO in April 2020 and announced on October 26, 2020, that it awarded
Texas A&M University with a $20 million contract—renewable for up to $100 million—to
manage a University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics (UCAH).135 UCAH is to be overseen
by a group of academic researchers from Texas A&M University, the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, theUniversity of Arizona, the University of Tennessee Space Institute, Morgan State University, theCalifornia Institute of Technology, Purdue University, the University of California-Los Angeles,
and the Georgia Institute of Technology.136 The consortium is to “facilitate transitioning academic
research into developing systems [as well as] work with the department to reduce systemdevelopment timelines while maintaining quality control standards.”137
In addition, Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Secretary of the Armyand the Secretary of the Navy to jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a reporton LRHW and CPS, including total costs of the programs, “the strategy for such programs withrespect to manning, training, and equipping, including cost estimates, [and] a testing strategy andschedule for such programs.” It directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to submit to the congressional defense committees an independent cost estimate of these
programs.138
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, however, it may bechallenging for Congress to evaluate the balance of funding for hypersonic weapons programs,
enabling technologies, supporting test infrastructure, and hypersonic missile defense.

Strategic Stability
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. Some have identified
two factors that could hold significant implications for strategic stability: the weapon’s short
time-of-flight—which, in turn, compresses the timeline for response—and its unpredictable flight
path—which could generate uncertainty about the weapon’s intended target and therefore
heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the event of a conflict. This risk
could be further compounded in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities or
facilities.
Some analysts argue that unintended escalation could occur as a result of warhead ambiguity, orfrom the inability to distinguish between a conventionally armed hypersonic weapon and anuclear-armed one. However, as a United Nations report notes, “even if a State did know that an
HGV launched toward it was conventionally armed, it may still view such a weapon as strategic
in nature, regardless of how it was perceived by the State firing the weapon, and decide that a
strategic response was warranted.”139 Differences in threat perception and escalation ladders

135 David Vergun, “DOD Awards Applied Hypersonics Contract to Texas A&M University,” DOD News, October 26,

2020, at https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2394438/dod-awards-applied-hypersonics-contract-totexas-am-university/.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 The Government Accountability Office notes DOD’s difficulty in developing accurate cost estimates for hypersonic
weapons programs. For example, between FY2019 and FY2020, estimates for CPS “almost doubled.” Government
Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination
across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 21, at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378.
139 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons.

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could thus result in unintended escalation. Such concerns have previously led Congress to restrict
funding for conventional prompt strike programs.140
Other analysts have argued that the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal.
Pavel Podvig, a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
has noted that the weapons “don’t … change much in terms of strategic balance and militarycapability.”141 This, some analysts argue, is because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia
already possess the ability to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles,
which, when launched in salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.142 Furthermore, theseanalysts note that in the case of hypersonic weapons, traditional principles of deterrence hold: “itis really a stretch to try to imagine any regime in the world that would be so suicidal that it would
even think threating to use—not to mention to actually use—hypersonic weapons against theUnited States ... would end well.”143
Section 1671 of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to submit to thecongressional defense committees a report that examines
How escalation risks will be addressed with regards to the use of strategic hypersonic
weapons, including whether any risk escalation exercises have been conducted or areplanned for the potential use of hypersonic weapons, and an analysis of the escalation risks
posed by foreign hypersonic systems that are potentially nuclear and conventional dualuse capable weapons.

Arms Control
Some analysts who believe that hypersonic weapons could present a threat to strategic stability or
inspire an arms race have argued that the United States should take measures to mitigate risks orlimit the weapons’ proliferation. Proposed measures include expanding New START, negotiating
new multilateral arms control agreements, and undertaking transparency and confidence-building
measures.144
The New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms treaty between the United States and Russia,
does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight,
as do hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles.145 However, Article V of the treaty
states that “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration
140 For a history of legislative activity on conventional prompt global strike, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional

Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
141 Amy Mackinnon, “Russia’s New Missiles Are Aimed at the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019, athttps://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/russias-new-missiles-are-aimed-at-you-weapons-hypersonic-putin-united-statesinf/.
142 David Axe, “How the U.S. Is Quietly Winning the Hypersonic Arms Race,” The Daily Beast, January 16, 2019, athttps://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-is-quietly-winning-the-hypersonic-arms-race. See also Mark B. Schneider,“Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles,” p. 14.
143 Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019, athttps://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632.
144 See United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapon; and Richard H. Speier et al., HypersonicMissile Proliferation.
145 In some cases, hypersonic glide vehicles may be launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles that are alreadycovered by New START, as is reported to be the case with Russia’s Avangard HGV. See Rachel S. Cohen,“Hypersonic Weapons: Strategic Asset or Tactical Tool?”

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24Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congressin the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).” Accordingly, some legal experts hold that theUnited States could raise the issue in the BCC of negotiating to include hypersonic weapons in
the New START limits.146 However, because New START is due to expire in 2026, this may be ashort-term solution.147
As an alternative, some analysts have proposed negotiating a new international arms control
agreement that would institute a moratorium or ban on hypersonic weapon testing. These analysts
argue that a test ban would be a “highly verifiable” and “highly effective” means of preventing a
potential arms race and preserving strategic stability.148 Other analysts have countered that a test
ban would be infeasible, as “no clear technical distinction can be made between hypersonicmissiles and other conventional capabilities that are less prompt, have shorter ranges, and also
have the potential to undermine nuclear deterrence.”149 These analysts have instead proposedinternational transparency and confidence-building measures, such as exchanging weapons data;
conducting joint technical studies; “providing advance notices of tests; choosing separate,distinctive launch locations for tests of hypersonic missiles; and placing restraints on sea-based
tests.”150

146 James Acton notes: “during [New START] negotiations, Russia argued that boost-glide weapons might constitute ‘a

new kind of strategic offensive arm,’ in which case they would trigger bilateral discussions about whether and how
they would be regulated by the treaty—a position [then] rejected by the United States.” James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?:
Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013, p. 139, at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf.
147 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
148 Mark Gubrud, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 6, 2015, athttps://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-hypersonic-missiles/.
149 Tong Zhao, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”
150 Rajaram Nagappa, “Test Ban for Hypersonic Missiles?”; see also James M. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 134-138.

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Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure151
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Air Force Arnold Engineering andDevelopment Complex (AEDC) von
Karman Gas Dynamics Facility
Tunnels A/B/C

Tunnel A: 40-inch Mach 1.5-5.5; up
to 290 °F
Tunnel B: 50-inch Mach 6 and 8; up
to 900 °F
Tunnel C: 50-inch Mach 10; up to1700 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC High-Enthalpy
Aerothermal Test Arc-Heated
Facilities H1, H2, H3

Simulate thermal and pressure
environments at speeds of up to
Mach 8Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC Tunnel 959-inch Mach 7, 8,10, 14, and18; up
to 2900 °F

White Oak, MD

Air Force AEDC Aerodynamic and
Propulsion Test Unit

Mach 3.1-7.2; up to 1300 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Air Force AEDC Aeroballistic Range
G

Launches projectiles of up to 8
inches in diameter at speeds of up
to Mach 20

Arnold AFB, TN

Holloman High Speed Test Track

59,971 ft. track; launches
projectiles at speeds of up to Mach
8

Holloman AFB, NM

Air Force Research Laboratory(AFRL) Cells 18, 22

Mach 3-7

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

AFRL Laser Hardened Materials
Evaluation Laboratory (LHMEL)

High-temperature materials testing

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

AFRL Mach 6 High Reynolds
Number (Re) Facility

10-inch Mach 6

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

Test Resource Management Center
Hypersonic Aeropropulsion Clean
Air Test-bed Facility

Up to Mach 8; up to 4040 °F

Arnold AFB, TN

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al. Air Force AEDC Tunnel 9 was upgraded in 2019 to enable Mach 18
testing. See “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.

151 The following information is derived from the 2014 report (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the

Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure, and therefore, may not be current. Permission to use this material
has been granted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

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Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges
Range

Location

Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Defense Test Site

Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the
Marshall Islands

Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)

Kauai, HI

Western Range, 30th Space Wing

Vandenberg AFB, CA

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons(NAWC) Division

Point Mugu and China Lake, CA

White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)

New Mexico

Eastern Range, 45th Space Wing

Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station/Patrick AFB/Kennedy
Space Center, FL

NASA Wallops Flight Facility

Wallops Island, VA

Pacific Spaceport Complex (formerly
Kodiak Launch Complex)

Kodiak Island, AK

NAWC Weapons Division R-2508
Complex

Edwards AFB, CA

Utah Test and Training Range

Utah

Nevada Test and Training Range

NevadaSource: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets
Asset
Navy Mobile Instrumentation
SystemPMRF Mobile At-sea Sensor System
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Collector
MDA Mobile Instrumentation
System Pacific Tracker
Kwajalein Mobile Range Safety
System 2
United States Navy Ship Lorenzen
missile range instrumentation ship
Sea-based X-band Radar
Aircraft Mobile Instrumentation
Systems
Transportable Range Augmentation
and Control System
Re-locatable MPS-36 Radar
Transportable Telemetry System
Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

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Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Ames Research Center (ARC)
Arc Jet Complex

High-temperaturematerials testing

Mountain View, CA

ARC Hypervelocity Free
Flight Facilities

Launches projectiles at
speeds of up to Mach 23

Mountain View, CA

Langley Research Center(LaRC) Aerothermodynamics
Laboratory

31-inch Mach 10, 20-inch
Mach 6, and 15-inch Mach
6

Hampton, VA

LaRC 8-foot High
Temperature Tunnel

96-inch Mach 5 and Mach
6.5

Hampton, VA

LaRC Scramjet Test Complex

Up to Mach 8 and up to
4740 °F

Hampton, VA

LaRC HyPulse Facility

Currently inactive

Long Island, NY

Glenn Research Center(GRC) Plumbrook Hypersonic
Tunnel Facility Arc Jet Facility

Mach 5, 6, and 7 and up to
3830 °F

Sandusky, OH

GRC Propulsion Systems
Laboratory 4

Mach 6

Cleveland, OH

GRC 1’ x 1’ Supersonic Wind
Tunnel12-inch Mach 1.3-6 (10discrete airspeeds) and up
to 640 °F

Cleveland, OH

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

Sandia National Laboratories Solar
Thermal Test Facility

High-temperature materials testing
and aerodynamic heating simulation

Albuquerque, NM

Sandia National Laboratories
Hypersonic Wind Tunnel

18-inch Mach 5, 8, and 14

Albuquerque, NM

Source: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.

Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities
Facility

Capability

Location

CUBRC Large Energy National
Shock (LENS)-1/-II/-XX Tunnels

LENS 1: Mach 6-22
LENS II: Mach 2-12
LENS XX: Atmospheric reentry
simulation

Buffalo, NY

Boeing Polysonic Wind Tunnel

48-inch up to Mach 5

St. Louis, MO

Lockheed Martin High Speed Wind
Tunnel48-inch Mach .3-5

Dallas, TX

Boeing/Air Force Office of Scientific
Research (AFOSR) Quiet Tunnel atPurdue University

9.5-inch Mach 6West Lafayette, IN

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AFOSR-University of Notre Dame
Quiet Tunnel

24-inch Mach 6

Notre Dame, IN

Stratolaunch Carrier Aircraft

Reusable Mach 6 test bed

N/A

Sources: (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al.; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic Technology
Testing”; University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg Tube”; and Ashley Tressel, “Army to open hypersonic
testing facility.”
Notes: Hypersonic wind tunnels are under construction at the following universities: Texas A&M University(Mach 10 quiet tunnel), the University of Arizona (Mach 5 quiet tunnel), Purdue University (Mach 8 quiet tunnel),and the University of Notre Dame (Mach 10 quiet tunnel). Additional universities, such as the University of
Maryland, the California Institute of Technology, the Georgia Institute of Technology, the Air Force Academy,
the University of Tennessee Space Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also maintainexperimental hypersonic facilities or conduct hypersonic research.

Author Information
Kelley M. Sayler
Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global
Security

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of andunder the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes otherthan public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress inconnection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are notsubject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed inits entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images ormaterial from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
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