The UK National
Strategy for
Maritime Security
May 2014

The UK National Strategy
for Maritime Security

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence
by Command of Her Majesty
May 2014

Cm 8829

© Crown Copyright 2014
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05/14

Contents

Contents
FOREWORD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
WHAT IS MARITIME SECURITY?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Explaining the Maritime Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Establishing Maritime Security Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Assessing Maritime Security Risks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
OUR APPROACH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
UNDERSTAND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
INFLUENCE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PREVENT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PROTECT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
RESPOND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DELIVERING OUR OBJECTIVES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Objective 1: To promote a secure international maritime domain anduphold international maritime norms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilitiesof states in areas of strategic maritime importance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Objective 3: To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens
and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore
installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Objective 4: To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy
transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally  . . . . . . . . . . 33
Objective 5: To protect the resources and population of the UK and theOverseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including seriousorganised crime and terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
FUTURE DIRECTION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ANNEX A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
UK Maritime Security Governance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
ANNEX B  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for Maritime Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ANNEX C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Glossary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

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Foreword

Foreword

Foreword

Foreword
The UK’s maritime industry directly contributes up to £13.8 billion to the UK economy1 and indirectly
contributes a further £17.9 billion.2 The sector accounts for over 2% of the entire economy, supports
one in every 50 jobs and creates nearly £8.5 billion in revenue for the UK Exchequer each year.3
The United Kingdom is an island nation with a strong maritime heritage and maritime interests throughout
the world. Almost every aspect of our national life depends on our connections to the wider world, andmost of these connections are provided by the sea. We depend on the sea for our prosperity and security
and are reliant on a stable global market for the raw materials, energy and manufactured goods critical tosustaining our way of life. Recent trends such as globalisation, resource competition, population growthand climate change have changed the maritime domain to one that is simultaneously more connected –providing substantial growth opportunities for UK business; and more contested – in which developments
in distant maritime regions can have an immediate and direct impact on our prosperity and security.
As a nation, we have always looked out into the wider world to shape and influence international events.
This strategy explains how we organise and use our current national capabilities to identify, assess andaddress maritime security issues at home and overseas, and how we intend to improve our ability to do
so in future through the most efficient use of available resource.
We will achieve the objectives set out here through a thorough understanding of the risks we face, coupledwith an ambitious but pragmatic approach to the opportunities we could exploit – so as well as having thecapabilities to respond to security incidents, we also undertake overseas capacity building, deterrence anddiplomacy to disrupt potential future threats before they appear. This requires a comprehensive crossgovernment approach to maritime surveillance, information gathering, and decision making, enhanced byregional and multinational cooperation, and supported by ongoing scrutiny to ensure we continue to improve.
The future will see further expansion in the global requirement for safe and secure seas as the offshoreenergy sector continues to expand and maritime trade increases to meet the consumer demandsof emerging countries and new consumer classes. We will seek to take advantage of this economic
opportunity by continuing to promote London as the global centre for maritime business, promoting astable maritime domain and the freedom of the seas, and maintaining the UK’s position as a driver ofinternational cooperation and consensus.

William Hague

Theresa May

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Home Secretary

Philip Hammond

Patrick McLoughlin

Secretary of State for Defence

Secretary of State for Transport

1 Department for Transport analysis.
2 Oxford Economics research, Department for Transport Analysis.
3 Oxford Economics research.

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Executive Summary

Executive
SummaryExecutive Summary

Executive Summary

Introduction

Our Objectives

1.1 The UK considers ‘maritime security’ to be
the advancement and protection of the UK’s
national interests, at home and abroad, throughthe active management of risks and opportunities
in and from the maritime domain, in order tostrengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security
and resilience and to help shape a stable world.

1.4 The UK benefits from a strong position.
We have highly competent policing, military anddiplomatic capabilities; we are a centre of global
trade with a large network of capable ports andmaritime infrastructure supporting our economy;
and our large coastline provides us with extensive
resources, including fisheries and energy. While
we assess that our capabilities are adequate todeliver this strategy and that we already haveeffective mechanisms in place to counter maritime
security threats, the maritime domain is extensive
and the future will see considerable expansion
in the global use of the seas. Thus, in a climateof limited resources, we must maximise theeffect of our assets, focusing on integration andcooperation wherever possible.

1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain incontext and explains why it matters to the UK. It
sets out our approach and the objectives we wish
to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to
improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines
the governance structure which will allow us todeliver effective and efficient maritime security.

The Maritime Domain Matters
1.3 While the sea is the lifeblood of our economy,
conveying the vast majority of our trade and manyof our vital resources, it can also be exploited bynations, criminals and terrorists. It thus requires
national and international policing and regulation,and strong global partnerships to address areas ofcommon interest, striking the appropriate balance
between facilitating legitimate movement, andmonitoring hostile activity. The maritime domain
is also a complicated international system in which
the UK is a leading player, using diplomatic, militaryand law enforcement levers to drive international
cooperation and build capacity. In order for us
to influence and intervene where necessary, wemust carefully assess and prioritise the maritime
risks and opportunities we face, and allocate ourresources accordingly.

1.5 Analysis of the UK’s maritime security risks(covered further in Paragraph 3.7) identified
terrorism, disruption to trade or freedomof navigation, maritime attack against UK
infrastructure, arms proliferation, drugs and people
smuggling as the areas of greatest significance.
1.6 We will therefore advance and protect our
national interests by focusing our effort on fivemaritime security objectives:
1. Promoting a secure international maritime
domain and upholding international maritime
norms;
2. Developing the maritime governance capacity
and capabilities of states in areas of strategic
maritime importance;
3. Protecting the UK, our citizens and our
economy by supporting the safety and security ofports and offshore installations and Red Ensign
Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;

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Executive Summary

4. Assuring the security of vital maritime tradeand energy transportation routes within the UK
Marine Area, regionally and internationally;
5. Protecting the resources and populationof the UK and the Overseas Territories fromillegal and dangerous activity, including seriousorganised crime and terrorism.

Our Approach to the Maritime Domain
1.7 In order to manage a security environment
which incorporates the overlapping interestsof multiple UK government departments andagencies as well as almost every nation andmultiple international organisations, we need
to work together to deliver maritime security
outputs that are more than the sum of theirparts. Therefore the two key principles wehave adopted to guide our work are integrationand collaboration – we will bring together the
instruments of government, driving cooperationand efficiency; and we will work globally with allies
and partners, including industry and the public, inpursuit of our mutual goals.
1.8 We will apply these principles of integrationand collaboration to five core Maritime Security
Tasks which support the delivery of the objectives
described. These represent the strategic ‘ways’ of
our approach – to UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE,
PREVENT, PROTECT and RESPOND.
1.9 The maritime domain is vast, but not
uniform – the activity taking place within it islargely concentrated within ports, shipping lanes,
waterways, fixed infrastructure, and fishinggrounds, leaving large swathes of the world’s seasand oceans broadly empty. Our first challenge
is therefore to monitor activity and identify thatwhich has relevance to our security. We therefore
invest significant resource in understanding themaritime domain – gathering intelligence, sharing
information, building partnerships, analysing dataand identifying concerns.
1.10 Once we understand, we seek to influence.
Influence takes a number of forms, from
diplomacy through to law enforcement, economic
activity and military engagement. The aim is tohelp achieve our objectives by driving behaviour– persuading our allies to support us, or deterring
adversaries from acting against our interests.

1.11 Where understanding and then influence
fail, we aim to prevent maritime security concerns
from arising or escalating. Prevention takes
the form of pre-emptive work to build security
capacity in areas of instability, but can also be in
the form of responsive action. An example is theinternational work to improve regional stability
and provide lawful economic opportunities toprevent piracy off the Horn of Africa.
1.12 When we are unable to prevent a threat
from arising, we work to protect our interests
by taking action to reduce the vulnerability of
our shipping and maritime infrastructure (suchas enabling the use of armed Private Security
Companies through published guidance andexisting legislation and the provision of military
assets to deter violent behaviour) as well as efforts
to increase our resilience in the event of an attack(for example through the establishment andimplementation of protective security practices).
1.13 Throughout this systematic approach, we
remain ready to respond whenever appropriate
or necessary. This may take the form of law
enforcement or interdiction action or, in the more
extreme cases, the use of military force.
1.14 This strategy describes how the UK will apply
the above approach to our five maritime security
objectives (which are not in any order of priority):
1. To promote a secure international
maritime domain and uphold international
maritime norms.
We pursue an active and activist foreign policy,
working with other countries to strengthen
the rules-based international system. We arecommitted to freedom of navigation, unimpeded
lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes based upon international law. We use
our best efforts to secure compliance by otherstates with the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and workwith allies to bring non-compliant states into
compliance. Where disputes arise, we use
diplomacy wherever possible to settle them,with recourse to judicial settlements if necessary.
We maintain strong and effective representationin the key organisations dealing with these issues.

Executive Summary

2. To develop the maritime governancecapacity and capabilities of states in areas ofstrategic maritime importance.
Maritime security is an international responsibility,
but some states are more capable than others.
In recognition of this, we need to carry out work
to build intelligence, law enforcement, coastguard
and military capabilities within specific states sothat they are better able to police their marine
area and contribute to regional and international
efforts on the high seas.
3. To protect the UK and the Overseas
Territories, their citizens and economies by
supporting the safety and security of ports andoffshore installations and Red Ensign Group(REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships.
The Department for Transport (DfT) regulates
port and ship security to ensure UK citizens
and assets are protected at sea, assessing theterrorist risks, setting appropriate security levels
for maritime traffic, providing intelligence-led
security advice, and monitoring compliance. The
Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure(CPNI) works with the operators of criticalmaritime infrastructure, including oil rigs andwind farms, to ensure that risk is understoodand mitigated.
4. To assure the security of vital maritime
trade and energy transportation routes
within the UK Marine Area, regionally andinternationally.
The UK and global economies depend on
international trade and energy. Where security
is threatened, we work with our international
partners, including through the deploymentof our navies, to build understanding, deter
threats and protect shipping engaged in lawfulcommerce. As a last resort, we are prepared
to use force to prevent attacks and to upholdinternational law.
5. To protect the resources and populationof the UK and the Overseas Territories fromillegal and dangerous activity, including seriousorganised crime and terrorism.
The UK faces threats from the maritime domain
including organised crime, terrorism, unlawful
crossing of our borders, and illegal exploitationof our marine area (including fisheries).

To enable UK criminal law to be enforced at sea,
power is vested in the police, Border Force, theNational Crime Agency (NCA) and the Royal
Navy. These agencies carry out surveillance,
deter unlawful activity, and interdict suspect
vessels. Police forces use local knowledge torespond to threats in their maritime regions
while the NCA’s Border Policing Commandprovides a coordinated response to organised
crime in the maritime domain. The Royal Navyand Border Force work together to patrol ourwaters, intercepting vessels when required.

Improving Maritime Security
1.15 We intend to take the following action to
improve our maritime security efforts in the future.

• Understanding: We will harmonise

understanding of the maritime domain throughbetter use of existing cross-government
resources, such as the National Maritime
Information Centre (NMIC), and strengthening
relationships with our industry and international
partners. We aim to bring together existing
separate activity focused on generating maritime
understanding and will investigate how best tomeasure the effectiveness of these efforts;• Influence: We will continue to work closelywith our maritime partners – bilaterally, throughchampioning regional security initiatives, byworking towards an EU Maritime Security
Strategy and through assertion of our freedomof navigation. The UK has declared an Exclusive
Economic Zone, recognising the additional
security benefits that this can bring;• Prevention: We will share information,
intelligence and best practice with our partners
and continue our international capacity-building
efforts in areas of key strategic importance,
including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf 4and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red
Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean
and the Gulf of Guinea;• Protection: We will monitor developments
in security technology to ensure that we stayahead of the threat. We will exploit crossgovernment research and development insupport of our joint maritime security goals;

4 The Persian Gulf is also known as the Arabian Gulf.

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Executive Summary• Response: We will seek better to coordinate

joint operations between UK maritime
departments and agencies. We will investigate
opportunities to acquire equipment jointly
which meets the common needs of different
maritime-focused government departments
and agencies.

Governance to Maximise Impact
1.16 Effective delivery of maritime security
activity requires clear and robust decision making
in government – to respond to incidents, to seek
evidence, and to generate policy. This strategy
sets out a more holistic approach to maritime
security than we have taken in the past, bringing
together myriad government activity under a single
governance structure.
1.17 A ministerial working group has been formed
to focus on maritime security in its entirety. This
group will meet regularly to consider maritime
security issues and make decisions. Beneath this,a group of senior officials will meet to coordinate
the cross-government work required to enact
the decisions made by ministers. To reflect thecross-government nature of maritime security, theministerial group will be chaired by the Foreign andCommonwealth Office while the officials’ groupwill be chaired by the Department for Transport.
An additional forum will support regular dialogue
with our industry partners. As with other areas of
National Security, the National Security Council will
engage when relevant.

SCOPE
2.1 This National Strategy for Maritime Security(NSMS) contributes to and is fully coherent
with Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) 2010
National Security Strategy (NSS),5 reflectingthat the UK wishes to be a prosperous, secure,modern and outward-looking nation which
promotes its values and ideas globally. Pursuant
to the NSS, the NSMS aims to safeguard andpromote our interests and prosperity by upholding
the freedom of the seas, by mitigating national
security threats (ideally at range) and by exploiting
opportunities throughout the maritime domain.

2.2 Focused primarily on the five-year period
from 2014 to 2019 but adopting a 20-year
outlook where appropriate, the NSMS setsout our approach to these challenges, including
how maritime capabilities support the deliveryof objectives. By outlining cross-government
priorities, this strategy sets out the whole-ofgovernment approach, including our reliance oninternational partners, required to secure theseas and oceans that Britain depends upon for its
national security and economic well being.
2.3 The NSMS formalises the structures
which allow our Government departments
jointly to identify solutions to the maritime
security challenges faced by the UK, its Crown
Dependencies and Overseas Territories.
Further, it identifies potential cost-efficientsolutions to improve our effectiveness andrationalise our efforts on issues of crossdepartmental maritime interest.
2.4 The NSMS is focused first and foremost on
maritime security as set out at Paragraph 3.1 andwhile maritime safety is touched upon where it has
direct relevance to security, the following areas are
not considered further in this strategy:• ‘Defence of the Realm’ i.e. the protection of

the UK, our 3 Crown Dependencies and 14
Overseas Territories from concerted militaryattack. The response to such an attack would
be authorised by the Cabinet and coordinatedby the National Security Council;• Military Campaigns i.e. coordinated UK
military responses to direct threats or hostileacts. These are authorised by the Cabinet,coordinated by the National Security Council,
and implemented by a number of departments;• Maritime Safety. Maritime safety includes shiptechnical and quality standards, the trainingof crews and labour conditions, routing andnautical charts, and responsibility for lifesaving and pollution prevention and control.
The responsibilities lie primarily with the
Department for Transport (DfT) and the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA);6

6 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for providing

5 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,

HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf).

information and assistance to mariners, responding to accidents andemergencies at sea and around the UK coastline, and helping to save lives
and prevent pollution. The MCA works nationally and internationallywith partners in the shipping industry to promote the safe construction,
operation and navigation of ships.

Executive Summary• Natural disasters and major accidents.

The Department for Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs (Defra) and the devolved
governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland are responsible for national emergency
planning for flooding and coastal erosion in
the UK. Support to our Overseas Territories
is detailed in a White Paper published by theGovernment in 2012.7 The MCA is the leadagency for responding to maritime accidents
within the UK Pollution Control Zone8 and
Search and Rescue Region.9

7 The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability, HM

Government, June 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/32952/ot-wp-0612.pdf).
8 Established under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Extends out to 200
nm from the baseline (or to the international median line).
9 The UK Search and Rescue Region includes the Pollution Control Zone
and extends to 40° West.

2.5 The NSMS is one of several strategies
stemming from the NSS. In implementing
the strategy we will ensure that it is alignedwith related strategies, notably the CONTESTCounter Terrorism Strategy, the Serious andOrganised Crime Strategy, the International
Defence Engagement Strategy, the Building
Stability Overseas Strategy, and the Cyber
Security Strategy.

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What is Maritime Security?

What is Maritime
Security?

What is Maritime Security?

What is Maritime Security?

3.1 For the UK, and in the context of thisNational Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS),
Maritime Security is:
The advancement and protection of the
UK’s national interests, at home and abroad,through the active management of risks
and opportunities in and from the maritime
domain, in order to strengthen and extend
the UK’s prosperity, security and resilienceand to help shape a stable world.

Explaining the Maritime Domain
3.2 The seas and oceans account for 72% of theearth’s surface. This maritime domain is divided
into a series of maritime zones (Figure 1) asdetailed in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in which state authority,
both in terms of law and capacity, diminishes ineach zone as distance from the land increases.
3.3 UNCLOS is the international agreementthat resulted from the third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), which took place between 1973 and 1982.
It defines the rights and responsibilities ofstates in their use of the world’s oceans, andestablishes a framework for the conduct ofmaritime commerce, the environment, andthe management of marine natural resources.
The Convention sets the geographical limitsof maritime zones, and establishes rights
and discretionary and non-discretionary
responsibilities of coastal States, as follows:

Figure 1: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Zones (Source: MOD)

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What is Maritime Security?

Baseline. The normal baseline for measuring thebreadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line
along the coast as marked on officially recognised
large-scale charts;10

setting laws and regulating the use of these waters(Figure 2), subject to the right of vessels fromother states to exercise innocent or transit passage.
This zone is also referred to as Territorial Waters;

Internal Waters. Covers all water and waterways
on the landward side of the baseline (Figure 2).
The UK is responsible for setting laws andregulating the use of these internal waters;11

Contiguous Zone. A zone, that may not extend
beyond 24 nm (or the international median line),
in which a coastal State can intervene to prevent
potential offences that may otherwise occur
inside its territorial sea (relating to fiscal, customs,
sanitary and immigration offences), and toapprehend vessels that have committed offences
inside territorial waters and are endeavouring
to escape. The UK does not currently claim acontiguous zone;

Territorial Sea. From the baseline up to 12
nautical miles (nm).12 The UK is responsible for

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This extends
from the edge of the territorial sea up to 200
nm from the baseline. Within this area, a state
may claim sole exploitation rights over all natural
resources. Foreign nations have the freedomof navigation and overflight, provided these
activities do not prejudice the economic interestsof the coastal State. Foreign states may also lay
submarine pipes and cables. The UK Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) is the area within which the
UK is responsible for enforcing fishing measures.
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have theirown zones within the EEZ in which they are
responsible for fisheries enforcement;
Continental shelf. On the physical continental
shelf beyond 200 nm from the baseline the UK
has the right to exploit the mineral and othernon-living resources of the seabed and subsoil,
together with living organisms belonging tosedentary species, to the exclusion of others;

Figure 2: The UK Marine Area (Source: UKHO) – a
definition of UK Marine Area is provided in the Glossary
10 As stated in Part II of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm).
11 The term ’UK’ includes reference to the UK Overseas Territories andBritish Crown Dependencies.
12 The limit remains 3 nm in British Indian Ocean Territory, Gibraltar,
Montserrat, Pitcairn, the Sovereign Base Areas, and Guernsey. The limit is
12 nm in the UK, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Falkland Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, the Isle of Man
and Jersey. Where the United Kingdom currently claims three nautical milesof territorial sea, it formally reserves the right under Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and customary international
law to claim a territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles.

High Seas. The high seas are open to all states.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under theconditions laid down by international law. As ageneral rule, states have exclusive jurisdiction overtheir flagged vessels on the high seas and while
engaged in innocent or transit passage throughterritorial waters. States also have a duty toeffectively regulate their flagged vessels;13
3.4 Freedom of Navigation. Freedom of
Navigation (FON) is the term given to the bundleof rights and freedoms that warships, merchantships, aircraft and submarines enjoy to navigate
13 Limited rights of visit by foreign warships are provided for in UNCLOS(Article 110) (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos/closindx.htm).

What is Maritime Security?

on, over, and under the world’s seas: it is vitalto the security and economic stability of theUK. FON facilitates global maritime trade andprovides the UK military with the legal landscapeto allow it to respond to threats to security at
range.14 FON rights are set out in the 1982
United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). The stability of the UNCLOS
regime, and in consequence maritime security,

may be fundamentally undermined by excessive
claims over sea areas or interferences withnavigational rights and freedoms. HMG supports
a programme to capture and record excessive
geographical or jurisdictional maritime claims
by states, including incidents of unwarranted
interference with UK shipping, and directs
diplomatic responses or demonstrations of UK
counter-practice as appropriate.

The Scale of the Task

• The UK Marine Area extends over some 298 thousand square miles (3.5 times the UK terrestrial
extent); (Figure 2)• The marine zones of the UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies extend over some
2.32 million square miles (25 times the UK terrestrial extent); (Figure 3)

393 million tonnes of• Shipping carries 95% of British trade by volume. UK ports handle
15
international cargo and over 4.4 million containers annually;• The value of UK goods imported/exported by sea is over £500 billion/annum. UK16export growthof 30% to Asia, over 40% to Latin America and almost 70% to Africa is predicted;

large commercial ships off the UK coast and every day• At any one time there are around 1,50017500 ships use the busy Dover Strait;• There are around 675 UK direct-owned, 845 UK parent-owned, 1,151 UK-managed trading ships,
18
3,700 Red Ensign Group-registered ships and approximately 24,000 UK seafarers active at sea;more than 55,000 merchant ships carry more than 8.4 billion tonnes of goods• Internationally,19
each year.

14 The seas beyond territorial waters are free from the sovereignty of all States. Access through the high seas does not rely on third state permission either inpeacetime or conflict. Warships can operate in all the world’s oceans right up to the edge of the territorial sea unfettered by coastal State control.
15 DfT UK Port Freight Statistics, 2012.
16 Centre for Economic and Business Research Study, 1 July 2012 (http://www.cebr.com/reports/good-exports).
17 Business Plan 2012-2016, MCA, Page 4, April 2012 (http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/the__business_plan_2012_16.pdf).
18 Shipping Fleet Statistics 2012, DfT, 25 September 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shipping-fleet-statistics-2012).
19 How Shipping Has Changed the World, M Stopford, 7 September 2010.

17

18

What is Maritime Security?

Figure 3: The Marine Zones of the UK, Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Territories (Source: UKHO)

Establishing Maritime Security Objectives
3.5 The 2010 ‘Programme for Government’ set out
the Coalition’s strategic priorities across the range ofgovernment business, with an emphasis on tacklingthe deficit and returning to economic growth. In
the defence and security sphere, the 2010 NSS built
upon this and emphasised two principal national
security objectives: ensuring a secure and resilient
UK; and shaping a stable world.20 For an island
trading nation, maritime security has an importantrole to play in support of both our economic andwider national security objectives.
3.6 The UK’s maritime security objectives, alongwith the activity we will carry out to achieve them,
are detailed below. The objectives are focusedboth on protecting our citizens and our economy,
and on promoting a secure international maritime
domain which will benefit all nations. They strike abalance between managing risks and creating andexploiting opportunities to strengthen the securityof the maritime domain. They represent thestrategic ‘ends’ of our approach.

UK Maritime Security Objectives21
1. To promote a secure international
maritime domain and uphold international
maritime norms;
2. To develop the maritime governancecapacity and capabilities of states in areas ofstrategic maritime importance;
3. To protect the UK and the Overseas
Territories, their citizens and economies by
supporting the safety and security of ports andoffshore installations and Red Ensign Group(REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
4. To assure the security of vital maritime
trade and energy transportation routes
within the UK Marine Zone, regionally andinternationally.22
5. To protect the resources and populationof the UK and the Overseas Territories
from illegal and dangerous activity, including
serious organised crime and terrorism.
21 Not in any order of priority.
22 Vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes include the Dover

20 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,

HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf).

Strait, North Channel, Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor,
connecting the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulfof Aden and the Persian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the Eastand South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; anda western corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of theNorthern Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacificmay take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.

What is Maritime Security?

Assessing Maritime Security Risks
3.7 Our maritime security strategy requires us
to identify the most pressing risks to the deliveryof our objectives, and to put in place the ways
and means to address them. On a biennial basis,
the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)
process is used to prioritise all major areas of UK
national security risk – domestic and overseas.23
The NSRA was used as an evidence base forthe 2010 NSS and underpinned its decisions onpriorities. The risks identified in the NSRA are
those which are likely to cause significant harmand disruption to the UK. For the purposes ofthis strategy, a more specific risk assessment
was carried out – the Maritime Risk Assessment(MRA). Cognisant of, and consistent with, theNSRA, this assessment identifies the key risks
that we face in the maritime domain. The 2013
Maritime Risk Assessment assessed the following
risks to be those of highest priority, taking into
account both likelihood and impact.

The Maritime Security Risks for 2014-15• Terrorism affecting the UK and its maritime
interests, including attacks against cargo or
passenger ships;

3.8 The Maritime Risk Assessment will be
refreshed biennially in line with the timeframe for
updating the NSRA.
3.9 Mitigating these risks, and achieving themaritime security objectives outlined above
requires close coordination of national, regional
and international activity across the maritime
domain, and flexible response options that areproportionate, and both cost- and operationallyeffective.24 While, with international partners,
we will continue to maintain our contribution
to maritime security on a global scale wherever
possible, our national resources will be focusedon safeguarding the following maritime interests(which are not in any order of priority):• UK citizens and UK entitled persons in a vesselof any state;• The UK Marine Area;25• Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger andcargo ships;
including• Maritime infrastructure in the UK,25
maritime offshore installations;• UK-owned maritime offshore installations;25• UK trade.26• Disruption to vital maritime trade routes
as a result of war, criminality, piracy orchanges in international norms;• Attack on UK maritime infrastructure or
shipping, including cyber attack;• The transportation of illegal items by sea,
including weapons of mass destruction,
controlled drugs and arms;• People smuggling and human trafficking.
24 And where possible allows the UK to overcome challenges at range.
25 While the Overseas Territories have, in the main, taken responsibility for

23 As described in A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National
Security Strategy, HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/nationalsecurity-strategy.pdf).

policing their maritime zones, the UK has an ongoing scalable responsibility inmany areas. Additional information is available in, The Overseas Territories:
Security, Success and Sustainability, HM Government, June 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/32952/ot-wp-0612.pdf); Overseas Territories – the MoD Contribution,
HM Government, March 2011 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27626/overseas_territories.pdf); DfT’sPartnership With the Overseas Territories: An update, HM Government,
May 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/3977/overseas-territories.pdf); and DECC Support
for the Overseas Territories, HM Government, January 2013 https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69184/
Paper_-_DECC_Support_for_the_Overseas_Territories.pdf).
26 While the security of the ship, its crew and cargo lie with the Flag State,
HMG retains an interest in maintaining the safe passage of energy imports,
food and manufactured goods through UK ports.

19

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Our Approach

Our ApproachOur Approach

Our Approach

4.1 At the heart of our approach to maritime
security are two key principles: integration andcollaboration.
• Integration: Maritime security is a wholeof-government activity, reflecting the extent
to which the UK’s security and prosperity isreliant upon the sea. This is reflected in thegovernance structure, which will be explainedlater, but which brings together 16 parties within
Government27 to maximise the coherence andefficiency of our approach. Consistent with the
National Security Strategy, the aim is to draw
together and use all the instruments of national
power and influence to deliver an output that isgreater than the sum of its parts.
• Collaboration: Beyond our sovereign
responsibility to protect our territorial sea, ourinfrastructure, our citizens and our interestsfrom seaborne threats, we do not have to
do everything ourselves. Maritime security
is a truly international affair. The scale ofthe challenge means that working in close
collaboration with our allies and partners, at thenational, regional and multinational level, is thebest way to uphold the rules-based international
system which governs it.

27 Cabinet Office, the Department for Transport, the Home Office,the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence,
the Department of Energy & Climate Change, the Department forEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs, the National Crime Agency, theBorder Force, the Royal Navy, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, theCrown Prosecution Service, the National Maritime Information Centre,
the police, the Marine Management Organisation, and the Maritime andCoastguard Agency. The Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office andWales Office will be invited to attend for specific agenda items. The
Offices will be consulted in-between NMSC(O) meetings as part of crossgovernment work stream development.

4.2 The NSS set out eight National Security
Tasks to support the delivery of the UK’s
national security objectives. In a similar way,
this strategy is built upon five core Maritime
Security Tasks which support the delivery of theobjectives described at Paragraph 3.6. These
represent the strategic ‘ways’ of our approach –to UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE, PREVENT,PROTECT and RESPOND.

UNDERSTAND
4.3 The starting point of this strategy is that weneed to understand both the evolving strategic
context and the maritime domain itself if we are
to be able to identify threats and opportunities,
to orientate ourselves rapidly to change and to
focus our limited resources in the most efficientand intelligent way. Understanding also underpins
the development of the Maritime Risk Assessment
described earlier. In the maritime domain,understanding comes from three core activities:• Long-term horizon-scanning: The
Government has recently strengthened theinternal architecture which allows it to take along-term view of the future. From a security
perspective, the key programme of work is the
Global Strategic Trends (GST) programme,
which is run by the Ministry of Defence’s
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre(DCDC). This supports a 30-year view of whatestablished and emerging trends at the strategiclevel might mean for the maritime domain,
allowing us to test the resilience of this strategy
against possible future changes.
• Terrorism Intelligence & Risk Analysis: The
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), and,for Northern Ireland, the Security Services,

21

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Our Approach

Understand Case Study: The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)
Recognising the need for cross-government understanding of activity within the maritime domain,
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review established a National Maritime Information Centre(NMIC) to provide the UK with a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security.
The NMIC brings together information and intelligence provided by Border Force, the MCA,
the police, the Armed Forces, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Marine Management
Organisation, the National Crime Agency (Border Policing Command) and other agencies and,supported by its international partnerships, incorporates additional global information to provide theUK with unified situational awareness of maritime activity in UK and international waters.
The NMIC’s focus is on the here and now rather than delivering the longer-term strategic analysis
undertaken elsewhere in government. It provides real-time information to assess the impact ofmaritime activity to the UK and contribute to decision making.
Its roles are to:• Monitor and track maritime activity around the UK and areas of national interest, and collate thatdata within a trusted environment;• Analyse and share information, enabling better understanding of maritime security issues;• Act as a national focal point for regional and international partners on maritime domain awareness;• Support government and industry decision making in times of need;• Respond to government department and agency tasking to support their outputs on acase-by-case basis.

Since its inception in 2011, the NMIC has undertaken daily provision of data to support many
maritime security operations and provided support to ensure the safety and security of the Olympic
Games and during 2011 operations to protect civilians in Libya.
This strategy recognises the added value provided by NMIC to maritime stakeholders acrossgovernment and in industry since its inception. Within revised maritime security governancearrangements (Annex A) maritime stakeholders are considering how NMIC can be utilised tomaximum effect to support the UK’s maritime security objectives for 2014–15 and beyond.
provide a synthesised assessment of terrorist
threats in the maritime domain by drawing upon
and analysing intelligence from a wide range ofsources. The Department for Transport (DfT),
in conjunction with the CPNI, undertakes theanalysis of terrorist risks to the commercial
maritime industry (ports and shipping) and is
responsible for liaison and advice to industry on
terrorism threats and risks.
• Information & Non-Terrorism Intelligence
Analysis: Activity in the maritime domain
produces enormous quantities of data everyday. For example, international regulations
require all larger ships to carry transponders
which regularly transmit their position. In 2011,
the UK established the National Maritime
Information Centre (NMIC), which fuses

together all-source data to create the mostcomplete picture of daily maritime activity that
the UK has ever had. Effective analysis anddistribution of this fused picture underpins
much of our maritime security activities. The
National Crime Agency’s (NCA) intelligence
hub provides a similar capability for serious andorganised crime. At the same time, the UK has
a well-developed network spread across a rangeof Government Departments and Agencies
for gathering intelligence on illegal activities, oron emerging threats to UK national interests.
This includes the work carried out by DefenceIntelligence (DI) to provide maritime focusedstrategic intelligence to the Ministry of Defence
and the Armed Forces.

Our Approach

4.4 Again, we aim to draw together and analysesuch information in order to maximise warning
time of impending threats, and to inform ournational response.

INFLUENCE
4.5 The UK will exert all its levers of influence
to uphold and strengthen the rules-based
international system which governs the maritime
domain, and which underpins our national security
and prosperity. The ‘influence’ task is primarily the
responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO), and involves diplomatic activity
through the UN Security Council, of which the
UK is a permanent member, and through theassociated bodies to promote maritime security
and to uphold the UN Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS). In addition, the UK willcontinue to play its part at the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in supporting action
to establish international standards for security
across the maritime domain, and EU efforts
to monitor standards within member states.
Influence can also be achieved through economic
and other pressures including the use of law
enforcement and, where deemed appropriate
and lawful, military activity to deter or interdict
terrorism, illegal activity or other threats tomaritime security.

PREVENT
4.6 The NSS emphasised the importance of
tackling problems early and at source, rather than
waiting until they manifest themselves closer tothe UK. In this spirit, the strategy incorporates
efforts overseas to prevent maritime security
threats from occurring. This includes action to
support the development of maritime security
capabilities amongst partner nations. For example,
the development of fishery protection capabilities
can help to safeguard legitimate livelihoods forcoastal communities in developing countries, andprevent them turning to illegal activities such as
piracy, maritime crime or smuggling.

PROTECT
4.7 Our aim is to strengthen our protection
against known threats, improving security andreducing vulnerabilities. Where, despite ouractions, threats are manifested, we seek tomaximise our resilience, response and recovery
arrangements. The ‘protect’ task includes, forexample, DfT security regulation and advice on
protective practice to the commercial maritime
industry, the deployment of Royal Navy units toenforce international maritime law and protect
UK merchant shipping,28 as well as steps to reduce
vulnerabilities at national infrastructure sites, suchas ports and offshore installations. A key tenetof the Protect function is to ensure freedom ofnavigation, a policy spearheaded by the FCO andcodified in international law through UNCLOS.
Wherever possible we seek to minimise the impact
of protection measures on trade, and will maintainclose liaison with industry and other partners.

RESPOND
4.8 Where we have identified activities which
may be illegal, or which may threaten our national
interests (nationally or internationally), we havea range of capabilities which provide us with theability to respond in a timely, precise and intelligent
manner. This includes law enforcement assets topolice the UK’s borders, to prevent the traffickingof illegal goods and to protect our economic
resources, as well as a range of military capabilities
which can, as a last resort, use lethal force toprotect our people, economy, infrastructure,territory and way of life from seaborne threats.

28 The Shipping Defence Advisory Committee (SDAC) provides along-established forum for Government-Military-Industry security anddefence dialogue.

23

24

Delivering Our Objectives

Delivering Our
Objectives

Delivering Our Objectives

Delivering Our Objectives

Objective 1: To promote a secureinternational maritime domain anduphold international maritime norms.
5.1 The UK pursues an active and activist foreign
policy, working with other countries to strengthen
the rules-based international system in supportof our values. In the maritime domain, we arecommitted to freedom of navigation, unimpeded
lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes based upon international law.
5.2 A stable and secure maritime domain isessential to the smooth working of the global
economy, with over 90% of global tradetransported by sea. The high seas are often
referred to as part of the ‘global commons’ – anarea of resource that lies beyond the politicalownership or control of any single nation-state.
Their security is dependent upon international
cooperation aimed at setting and enforcing
appropriate and globally shared standards ofaction, consistent with international law,custom and practice.
5.3 The key international framework underpinning
this collaboration is the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which 166
states are party, including the UK. UNCLOS
defines the rights and responsibilities of nationsin their use of the world’s oceans, establishingrules for shipping, the environment, and the
management of marine natural resources. As apermanent member of the UN Security Council,
the UK is committed to upholding and, where
necessary and through lawful means, enforcing
UNCLOS in the interests of the international
community as a whole.

5.4 The maritime domain is constantly evolving.
Our long-term horizon-scanning activity ensuresthat we are alive to potential future changes,
opportunities and risks to freedom of navigationand trade on the high seas, and the concomitantrisks to regional and international stability whenthese are threatened. For example, horizon
scanning has identified the Arctic region is criticalto the UK’s national interests,29 with 29% ofenergy consumed in the UK being imported from
Norway. Over the next 20 years, the impact
of climate change will mean that previously
impassable navigational routes, notably theNorth West Passage, Transpolar Route andNorthern Sea Route will be open for longer
periods.30 The latter of these (Figure 4) reduces
the sailing distance between Felixstowe (the UK’s
busiest container port) and Busan in Korea from10,700 to 7,400 nm. This presents the UK withboth opportunities for responsible commercial
exploitation, and potential new maritime security
threats. International cooperation, particularly
through the Arctic Council, on which the UK has
observer status, and the Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable, of which the UK is a member, will
be an essential means of managing thesesignificant developments.

29 Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic, Foreign andCommonwealth Office, 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government).
30 The Russian Government predicts that traffic through the Northern Sea
Route will increase from 1.26 million tonnes in 2012 to 4 million tonnes in2015 (http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6036).

25

26

Delivering Our Objectives

Influence Case Study: Military Alliances
The UK is an important contributor to three military alliances which help deliver maritime security;
NATO, the EU and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). These alliances operate groups of ships,
aircraft and other assets in the strategically important regions of the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean and the Persian Gulf. By playing a part in these collaborative international organisations wegain from the benefits of regional understanding, influence and security that they deliver.
Following the re-organisation of the NATO Command structure, the sole senior maritime
commander in the organisation is a British Vice Admiral based in the NATO Maritime HQ near
London. Alongside broader NATO responsibilities, he/she commands two maritime security
operations; Operation OCEAN SHIELD, focused on counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean,and Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR providing broader maritime security in the Mediterranean.
Both these operations are conducted primarily by task groups of warships provided by NATOmember states but there is also a growing emphasis on drawing together the information from a
network of sensors and sources to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the maritime
domain. The NATO task groups work closely with regional Navies and Coast Guards on operations
and exercises to provide maritime security and to help to develop their capacity and capabilities.
The main EU contribution to maritime security is Operation ATALANTA – the first EU maritime mission.
Under UK Command since its inception in 2008, ATALANTA is focused on counter-piracy in the Indian
Ocean. It links into and supports EU missions ashore that aim to develop regional maritime capacity andto provide military training to strengthen the institutions of the Somali National Government.
Finally, the UK has an important role in CMF, a broad coalition of 29 nations with a shared interest incontributing to maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
5.5 The UK Government is concerned by thetensions in the South and East China Seas. The
UK has significant political and economic interestsin the Asia Pacific region, as reflected in the recent
strengthening of our diplomatic network there. It
is important that all nations in the region resolve
any maritime disputes peacefully and within
the rule of law, while protecting and promoting
freedom of navigation and trade.

Figure 4: Northern Sea Route (blue) and alternative route
through the Suez Canal (red) (Source: MOD)

5.6 The UK works to promote a secureinternational maritime domain through active
diplomatic engagement to build and enhance key
relationships. This involves working withinternational partners to safeguard maritime security
by ensuring compliance with existing internationallaw, and where necessary developing newinternational agreements which help to defend themaritime domain and enable freedom of movementon the high seas. The principal means are:
• To use best efforts to secure complianceby other states with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and promote other agreements complementary
to UNCLOS;

Delivering Our Objectives• To monitor situations where the rules in

UNCLOS are not being complied with and, in
collaboration with allies and partners, to use
best efforts to bring States into compliance;• Where a dispute occurs, to use appropriate
diplomatic efforts to secure our interests and, if
necessary, to use the available means of judicial
settlement; 31• To maintain strong and effective representationin the key organisations dealing with Law of the
Sea issues.

Objective 2: To develop the maritime
governance capacity and capabilities ofstates in areas of strategic maritime
importance.
5.7 Many coastal States do not have the capacity
to govern their maritime zones effectively. This,and the failure of some Flag States effectively toadminister their Flag Vessels, or enforce maritime
security in their territorial seas, creates theconditions for a wide spectrum of crime which
impacts upon stability ashore. Piracy and theft
are just two manifestations of maritime insecurity
which, in areas such as the Horn of Africa andGulf of Guinea, threaten not only national but
also regional stability. £90 billion of UK maritime
trade transits the Horn of Africa every year andthe cost of piracy to the global economy has been
estimated at over £12 billion.32 In Nigeria alone
the equivalent of around 100,000 barrels of crude
oil are stolen every day, with a market value of
between £2 billion and £5 billion per year.33
5.8 Fisheries are also a vital natural resource. Fish
represents over 25% of all protein consumed
in many of the poorest countries,34 but it is also
a global export industry worth more than £80billion in 2011, more than half of which comesfrom developing countries. While this is an
essential source of revenue, illegal, unreported andunregulated (IUU) fishing is estimated to be worth
31 UNCLOS, Annex VII. Arbitration (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex7.htm).
32 The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation, World
Bank, 2013 (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/
pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf).
33 Nigeria’s Criminal Crude. C Katsouris and A Sayne, Chatham House,
September 2013 (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/
Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf).
34 Sustainable Fisheries and Poverty Reduction (http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/environment/fish_en.htm). EC Development and Cooperation, accessed 21 October 2013.

up to £15 billion every year.35 The theft of natural
resources, whether energy supplies or fish, canhave a very severe impact upon the economies
of developing countries, feeding corruption andinstability which, in turn, affects the stability andsecurity of the maritime domain.36
5.9 The 2010 NSS emphasised the importanceof tackling at root the causes of instability. As
a result, the Department for International
Development (DfID), the Foreign andCommonwealth Office and the Ministry of
Defence published the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy (BSOS),37 which sets out Government’s
strategic approach to addressing instability andconflict overseas.
5.10 In the maritime context, the Government
recognises that instability at sea usually stems
from problems on the land. In seeking to addressthese challenges at source, and to prevent threats
to maritime security from emerging, we aim toemploy a sophisticated and integrated approachdrawing upon a wide range of Government
Departments and agencies. This can include:• Work to build the intelligence, law enforcement,
coastguard and military capabilities of States sothat they are better able to police their own
waters, and successfully detain and prosecute
those who break the law;
• Efforts to strengthen States’ economies, forexample by seeking recognition of an Exclusive
Economic Zone;• Development efforts to reduce poverty andincrease stability;• Political efforts to foster peace and reconciliation
initiatives in conflict-affected countries at thenational, regional and local levels.

35 Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. DJ Agnew, J Pearce, G

Pramod, T Peatman, R Watson, et al, PLoS ONE 4(2), 2009 (http://www.
plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2F
journal.pone.0004570&representation=PDF).
36 Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, andTanzania, G Schbley and W Rosenau, CNA, October 2013 (http://www.cna.
org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf).
37 The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stabilityoverseas-strategy.pdf)

27

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Delivering Our Objectives

Prevent Case Study: Promoting a Secure Maritime Domain
Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea presents a significant risk to economic development,
peace and security in West and Central Africa, and the reduction of these risks will contributeto the security and prosperity of other nations including the UK. A number of partners engage
in capacity building activities with countries in the region, and the UK identified that better
coordination of international efforts could help avoid duplication of effort, facilitate joint projects
and best use of resources, and therefore maximise capacity building efforts to tackle maritime
crime in the Gulf of Guinea.
Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea was discussed under the G8 peacekeeping/peace building
experts group in 2011 with the aim of improving the coordination of international maritime capacity
building in West and Central Africa. The UK presented a paper at the April 2012 meeting suggesting
the establishment of a larger, informal group that involved all countries conducting capacity building
work in the Gulf of Guinea. The first initial meeting of this new grouping was held in July 2012.
Subsequently, under the UK Presidency of the G8 in 2013, this group became formalised and known
as the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG). The FOGG is an official-level group comprisinginternational partners actively engaged in working to support States in the Gulf of Guinea region
on maritime security. It includes representatives from the G8 plus Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, as wellas the EU, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the International Maritime Organisation.
The FOGG has helped reduce duplication of effort while maximising international support to tackle
maritime crime. Specifically, to date, the FOGG has delivered:• The establishment of a G8++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea Coordination Platform. The Platform

details all activities planned or undertaken by international donors and helps target assistance andavoid duplication;• A clear statement of international support for regional ownership of maritime security capacity
building, with targeted international assistance to support this aim;

• Agreement on clear and consistent political messages;• A mechanism for the delivery of financial support from international partners for the industryled initiative to establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea;• A framework for a joint strategy for pursuing prosecutions in the region.
In sum, the FOGG has reduced duplication of effort while maximising support from international
partners to discuss political developments which contribute to tackling maritime crime.
5.11 Some of our current activities, designed toprevent the emergence of maritime security
threats, include:• Full and active participation in international
action, e.g. the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia and the G8++ Friends of the
Gulf of Guinea Experts Group;• Developing the maritime capacity of coastal
States to combat crime e.g. the Regional Fusion
Law Enforcement Centre - Safety, and Security

at Sea (REFLECS-3)38 based in the Seychelles andthrough training and capacity building projects
in coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea including
Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Togo, Sao
Tome and Principe, Ghana and Nigeria;
38 REFLECS-3, opened in February 2013, brings together experts to share

intelligence and information to tackle the king-pins and financiers of piracy. It
supports regional initiatives to tackle organised crime in Somalia and acrossthe Indian Ocean. The UK committed £550 000 toward construction costs
and provided legal advisors, and the Centre’s first co-director. International
partners include the Seychelles, the USA, Tanzania, Mauritius, theNetherlands, Australia, INTERPOL and the EU Naval Force. The CPS has
also provided prosecution advice to Kenya.

Delivering Our Objectives• Being a contracting party and key donor to

the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP);• Working in close partnership with UK industry,including by supporting the proposed industryled initiative to establish a Maritime Trade
Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) for the
Gulf of Guinea; 39• Promoting and contributing to overseas
maritime governance building programmes
including the international deployment of RoyalAir Force Command and Control aircraft,
Royal Navy warships, or Naval Task Groups,
to areas of potential tension. For example
we are providing cross-government assistancein regions including the Persian Gulf, theMediterranean, East and West Africa andthe Caribbean; 40• Development of other States’ judicial
procedures and assistance with theconstruction and operation of prisons, e.g.
support to Somalia in establishing an effective,
internationally recognised, prosecution anddetention process;• The forward deployment of training teams
to work in partnership with other nations totrain, mentor and assist state-led maritime
security elements, including in Albania, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and the United
Arab Emirates;• Working in partnership with states andinternational legal organisations to tackle
transnational maritime crime, including throughinformation sharing;• Contributing to EU and NATO efforts to build
partner capacity and uphold maritime norms.

Objective 3: To protect the UK and
the Overseas Territories, their citizens
and economies by supporting the safety
and security of ports and offshore
installations and Red Ensign Group(REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships.
5.12 The Government’s primary responsibility
is to protect its citizens, both in the UK andabroad. We therefore take steps to ensurethat our people are protected irrespective of
their location.41 This includes working with
our European and international partners toraise security standards. In addition, the global
economy and the UK’s dependence on maritime
trade means that the Government requires thatreasonable steps are taken to protect specificmaritime assets of UK economic interest – ships,
cargoes and infrastructure – from harm.

Port and ship security
5.13 The International Maritime Organization(IMO) is the United Nations’ specialised agency
with responsibility for the safety and security ofshipping and the prevention of marine pollution
by ships. The IMO’s International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) sets international
standards for the security of ships, and the areas ofports from which they operate, in the International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Within
Europe, the IMO standards are mandated throughEuropean legislation.42 The ISPS Code requires
all ports and ships which fall under the Code43 totake appropriate security measures based on astandardised risk assessment framework.
5.14 The DfT sets the security levels with whichmaritime interests in the UK, UK Overseas
Territories, Crown Dependencies, and Red Ensign
Group shipping must comply. This process takes
account of the maritime threat assessments
provided by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
41 Including onboard ships and offshore infrastructure.
42 Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security, Regulation (EC) No 725/2004

39 MTISC is intended to be the regional information portal for merchantshipping operating in the Gulf of Guinea. A successful trial, conducted in
February 2013, involved the Oil Companies International Marine Forum(OCIMF), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), INTERPOL, the
EU Joint Research Centre, the Royal Navy (RN), the Ghana Navy (GN),industry and the IMO. This centre will open in 2014.
40 The deployment of Royal Navy ships is decided by a cross-Government
group which determines priorities based on risk to UK interests and thestrategic effects required.

Of The European Parliament And Of The Council, 31 March 2004 (http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:129:0006:0091:
en:PDF). There is also additional European security legislation that applies tothe wider port area – Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, 26
October 2005 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:2005:310:0028:0039:EN:PDF).
43 Article 3.1 of the ISPS Code applies to the following types of ships
engaged on international voyages: passenger ships, including high-speed
passenger craft; cargo ships, including high-speed craft; of 500 gross tonnage
and upwards; and mobile offshore drilling units; and port facilities serving suchships engaged on international voyages. In addition, the UK has extended theprovisions of the ISPS Code to certain categories of domestic ships.

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Delivering Our Objectives(JTAC), the vulnerability of assets, and existing
security measures which help to mitigate the threat.
To communicate these requirements, DfT issues
instructions to the UK port and shipping industries
which explain which security measures ports andships in the UK, and UK-flagged ships overseas, arerequired to put in place.44 As part of this process
DfT maintains close liaison with industry.

highlights the potential for major international
maritime crime, including piracy, to migrate toother areas. The FCO leads on counter-piracy
policy with the DfT, MOD, Home Office, BIS, theCrown Prosecution Service (CPS), a number ofother Government Departments and industry
playing a significant role. The FCO sets out HMG’s
approach to piracy in Somalia on its website.46

5.15 Compliance is monitored and measured
through a comprehensive programme ofinspections and reviews:• DfT operates a risk-based security inspection
programme covering port facilities in the UK, UK
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies,
and UK passenger ferries and cruise ships;• The programme includes the review and approvalof the security required from industry partners(Port Facility Security Plans, Port Security Plans,
Ship Security Plans) and the undertaking of
security assessments at ports/port facilities;• Security compliance of the UK-flaggedcommercial cargo fleet is undertaken by the
MCA. As part of this security complianceprogramme, the MCA provides thecommunication infrastructure for the receipt ofship security alerts and undertakes inspectionsof overseas ships arriving in UK ports;• DfT and MCA hold ships assessed to haveserious security deficiencies at UK ports,and have powers to compel ports to rectify
security deficiencies.

5.18 DfT is responsible for the developmentof counter-piracy policy for UK flagged shipping,including the policy in relation to engaging armed
guards. This is set out in the DfT’s Interim
Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of
Armed Guards to Defend Against the Threat of
Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances.47

5.16 SO15 Counter Terrorism Command has lead
responsibility for the initial notification of maritime
terrorist incidents involving a vessel that may
affect the UK’s interests. Our national response
is administered through Operation STERN45 andinvolves partner agencies and organisations. The
Senior National Co-ordinator Counter Terrorism(SNCCT) has overall responsibility for managing
the initial UK policing response.

5.19 The Government is working to promote
the highest standards, including on human rights,
across all private maritime security companies.
The FCO is supporting the UK Accreditation
Service to conduct a pilot, to accredit certifying
bodies to independently certify Private Maritime
Security Companies (PMSCs) to the ISO 28000
standard, incorporating the requirement of the
ISO PAS 28007 guidance. This sets out guidelines
for PMSCs providing privately contracted armed
security personnel on board ships. The FCO
are contributing to the funding of the newlyestablished International Code of Conduct forPrivate Security Providers Association. The
Association, made up of governments, industry
and civil society organisations, will independently
monitor implementation of the International
Code of Conduct. The Government encourages
the clients of PMSCs to take into account bothaccredited certification, and membership of the
Association, when contracting PMSCs.
5.20 The UK Armed Forces work withinternational partners to police, intercept andinterdict illegal activity to provide freedom ofnavigation and safety in areas of high risk.

Counter-piracy policy for UK-flaggedshipping
5.17 Recent years have seen a growth in the threat
from piracy. This has been particularly prevalenton the coast of East Africa, and a growing trend
44 A combination of physical and procedural security measures, including

searching, screening and the designation of restricted areas.
45 The Metropolitan Police Service response on behalf of UK policing to thenotification of a potential terrorist incident at sea.

46 Preventing and reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia, HM Government,

December 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/preventing-andreducing-piracy-off-the-coast-of-somalia).
47 DfT Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed
Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/204123/use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-against-piracy.pdf), HM
Government, May 2013.

Delivering Our Objectives

Protect Case Study: Counter Piracy Off Somalia - An International Dilemma
The fall of the Somali government
and the ensuing civil war in 1991
marked the beginning of a long period
during which Somalia lacked effective
governance. Consequently instability,
terrorism, crime and corruption
flourished throughout the failed
state. The consequent freedom to
conduct illicit activity from Somalia’s
2,100 nm coastline was seized byinternational criminal and terrorist
elements manifesting itself in piracy,
people trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling(including narcotics and weapons), illegal
fishing and toxic waste dumping. Figure
5 shows the vast area of risk generated
by this illicit activity. It is estimated that
40% of the world’s traded material –fuel, food, manufactured goods andtrade (£600 billion of which is en-routeto or from European ports) transits
through the High Risk Area annually.
A global response was required to reduce the permissiveness of this environment to illegal activity
and to then rebuild the governance and capability of the failed state. The UK contributed Royal Navy
warships to EU, NATO and CMF task forces to patrol and intercept renegade ships within the High
Risk Area as well as providing the leadership under a UK Admiral and staff to coordinate multi-national
activity from a headquarters just outside London. This international answer, including the authorisation
for Private Security Companies to embark on our merchant ships and the issuing of policy guidance –including industry issued self-protection measures, and reporting procedures – to Shipping Companies
when coming into contact with pirates significantly reduced opportunities for illegal activity in the area.
With a lack of guaranteed financial return, the incentives for many of the criminal elements disappeared– however it remains important to dissuade any future return to such practices.
As an example of the comprehensive nature of the UK approach, a number of prevention measures
have been taken:• UK-led international efforts to develop regional justice and the rule of law programmes inSomalia and the wider Indian Ocean region including developing prosecution capabilities in the
Seychelles and Mauritius, and a detention capacity in Somalia;• In order to generate legitimate employment for the population, the UK is developing opportunities
in Somalia by supporting prosperity and tackling poverty with the Department for International
Development (DfID) engaged in a 4-year, £250 million, programme – one example of which is the
support to the economic and alternative livelihood program which aims to create 45,000 jobs;• The UK is actively encouraging the Somali Government to declare an EEZ in order to bringcertainty to its maritime claims.
From a peak of 47 ships in 2010, the international effort reduced piracy by over 80% by 2012 and in2013 there was not a single successful attack.
(EU NAVFOR Somalia. Key Facts and Figures. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures)

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Delivering Our Objectives

Figure 6: The International Underwater Cable Network (Source: TeleGeography). www.submarinecablemap.com

Security of energy and communications
infrastructure
5.21 The UK’s coastline is home to a significant
number of critical energy assets, including muchof the civil nuclear power infrastructure, which
provides on average 16% of the UK’s electricity.
In addition, the security of gas and oil importterminals, and undersea pipelines in the North
Sea, are critical to the delivery of a robust energy
supply. Within the UK Marine Area there areapproximately 300 gas and oil rigs and a rapidly
increasing number of offshore wind farms.48 The
Department for Energy and Climate Change(DECC) is responsible for setting the security andresilience approach for energy infrastructure.
5.22 With over 95% of all intercontinental digitaltraffic traveling through underwater cables (Figure6) rather than satellites,49 it is important that we
protect this essential flow of information, on which
the global economy relies, from physical or cyberattack, as well as ensure compliance by coastal
States with the freedom to lay cables conferredby UNCLOS.50 While measures to allow the48 One of 19 operational sites, the London Array (opened in July 2013) isthe world’s largest offshore wind farm – consisting of 175 turbines capableof generating enough energy to power nearly half a million UK homes.
49 NSTAC: Cyber Security Collaboration Report, National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee, 21 May 2009.
50 Reliability of Global Undersea Cable Communications Infrastructure(ROGUCCI) Study and Global Summit, K F Rauscher, Issue 1, 2010 (http://
www.ieee-rogucci.org/files/The%20ROGUCCI%20Report.pdf).

redistribution of data flow and resilience of theonshore Cable Landing Stations will continue to be
the primary mitigation actions, response options
may be required in the future.
5.23 The Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI) is engaged with asset
owners and operators to ensure that risks tocritical marine and coastal infrastructure are fully
understood, and that proportionate mitigation
strategies are in place. Procedures to regain
control of offshore installations that have been
overrun by subversive elements are practised ona regular basis.

Food Security
5.24 Around 40% of the food consumed by the
UK is imported, and over 91% of that arrives
by sea. The dependency on a small number of
specialised ports through which the imported foodarrives creates vulnerability. Defra, working closelywith other departments, has commissioned work
to mitigate this vulnerability and thus increase theresilience of UK food supply.

Delivering Our Objectives

Figure 7: Global Maritime Shipping Density (Source: Prof JP Rodrigue, Hofstra University)

Objective 4: To assure the securityof vital maritime trade and energy
transportation routes within the
UK Marine Area, regionally andinternationally.51
5.25 The oceans are a medium connecting
peoples and nations. Both the UK Marine Area
and the world’s maritime superhighways are
increasingly a crucial supply of resources andconduits of trade (Figure 7). National prosperity
is often dependent on distant resource, and theGovernment is clear on the importance of theinternational system to our national interests: theUK depends on open trade routes and a stableglobal market for the critical supply of energy, rawmaterials, food and manufactured goods. The
likelihood and impact of disruption is elevated instrategic ‘chokepoints’: straits like Dover, Gibraltarand Hormuz where the proximity of land funnels
ships into higher densities.
5.26 Because the global economy is vulnerable
to disruptions to maritime routes, we and othernations consider their protection an important
51 Vital Maritime Trade Routes include the Dover Strait, North Channel,

Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor, connecting the Straitsof Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and thePersian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the East and South China
Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and a western
corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of the Northern
Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may
take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.

output of Government requiring international
action. The UK achieves this by applying a
combination of diplomatic, military and law
enforcement effort, informed by accurate realtime situational awareness:• We maintain a range of international alliancesand partnerships which provide a powerful
lever to preserve free movement of trade whenroutes are threatened;• We deploy Royal Navy ships acting
independently or as part of an international
force to maintain vital trade routes and ensure
freedom of navigation, including a persistentforward presence in the Atlantic, Indian
Ocean and the Persian Gulf. We also deploy
specialised Naval shipping and capabilities to
key chokepoints in order to understand andinfluence these areas, and if necessary to takeaction to prevent and respond.
• Should the security situation deteriorate suchthat safe passage cannot be guaranteed, we willtake action to reduce the level of risk in thearea. This could include military protection totransiting ships or other UK maritime interests,
or lowering the risk through deterrence.
5.27 The potential for maritime criminality tothreaten vital energy trade and transport routes is
mitigated through coordinated, cross-government
effort, outlined in more detail at Objective 5.

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Delivering Our Objectives

Protect Case Study: Maintaining Freedom of Navigation in a Strategic Chokepoint
While threats to Freedom of Navigation commonly take the form of excessive geographicaljurisdictional claims, in relation to the world’s key maritime chokepoints they may also be physical.
The Strait of Hormuz, which separates the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea, is a key route forall shipping both in and out of the Gulf area. All ships have a right of transit passage through theStrait, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), yet
periodic threats to close the Strait do arise. The Persian Gulf remains an economic centre of gravity
with 17 million barrels of oil and 3.5 billion cubic feet of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) passing throughthe Strait of Hormuz daily – representing over 20% of worldwide trade. Any threat of disruption
would have a profound effect on world oil and gas prices and many economies: HM Treasury analysis
predicts that a 30-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have an impact on the global economy
lasting at least four years. Consequently, it is a key strategic chokepoint, not only for the countries of
the region, but globally – and freedom of navigation for all ships must be maintained.
The geographical nature of the Strait, which is 21 miles across at its narrowest point, makes
shipping highly vulnerable to disruption. For relatively little cost the Strait could be closed for someconsiderable time by state or non-state actors. Conflict or an increase in tensions in the area would
have a similar effect.
In order to mitigate this risk, to deter attempts to disrupt the Strait, and to maintain freedom ofnavigation to and from the Gulf, an international military coalition, including the UK Armed Forces,
operates in the region. Since 2006 the Royal Navy has maintained four forward-deployed Mine
Countermeasure Ships (MCMVs) operated out of Bahrain. This expeditionary force, supported by aship from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and a Command and Control element, is part of the international
effort to maintain the movement of the world energy supply. The success of this effort continues
to be dependent on wider political engagement and whole-of-government activity across the region,
including intelligence and information sharing.
5.28 As outlined at Objective 5, within the UK
Marine Area, a permanent prevent and respondcapability is provided by Border Force Cutters,
Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels and the Royal
Navy Fleet Ready Escort.

Objective 5: To protect the resources
and population of the UK and theOverseas Territories from illegal anddangerous activity, including seriousorganised crime and terrorism.
5.29 Threats from the maritime domain include
the illegal entry of people and goods, criminal
activity including terrorism, organised crime
incorporating a maritime component, and thedeliberate or wilful failure to observe laws toprotect resources such as fish stocks or Marine
Protected Areas. Organised crime costs the
UK more than £24 billion per year52 and while
52 Understanding organised crime: estimating the scale and the social andeconomic costs. H Mills, S Skodbo and P Blyth Research Report 73. Home
Office, October 2013. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/246390/horr73.pdf).

this is not confined to seas and waterways, thecharacteristics of the maritime domain lendthemselves to certain types of activity, including
drug and people trafficking. In addition, we face
periodic maritime hazards, such as flooding,pollution or extreme weather events. As
mentioned in Paragraph 2.4 while these are notconsidered maritime security threats, the national
response will require coordination of government
assets and personnel normally employed on
maritime security tasks. To enable UK criminal
law enforcement to be conducted at sea, power isvested in a number of government agencies – thepolice, Border Force, National Crime Agency andthe Royal Navy, among others.

Protecting our territory and resources
5.30 Border Force is responsible for securing
the UK border and facilitating the legitimate
movement of goods. This is achieved by carryingout immigration and customs controls for people
and goods entering the UK, with Border Force
officers working at 140 sea and air ports acrossDelivering Our Objectives

the UK and overseas. The three Royal Navy
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and five Border
Force fast patrol ships (Cutters) are the main
contributors to the protection of the UK’s Marine
Area, carrying out reconnaissance, deterrence
and interdiction at sea.53 The UK also operates
an airborne maritime surveillance capability.54
Together these efforts:• Deter unlawful activity across our maritime
borders;• Provide reconnaissance to locate, identify, track
and interdict traffic approaching the UK;• Have the capability to carry out enforcement
operations and act upon intelligence including
through the interdiction of vessels suspected ofcarrying out illicit activity;• Provide a law enforcement capability in remoteharbours, ports and coastlines where there islimited shore presence, and provide operational
seagoing capability to partner organisations suchas the police or National Crime Agency (NCA).
5.31 Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels andBorder Force Cutters work together to improvetheir combined effect by coordinating patrols,
exchanging specialist personnel and sharing
information. The Border Force Cutters are usedprimarily in coastal waters to intercept drug
shipments and other restricted or prohibited
goods being trafficked by sea while the Royal Navyspecialises in offshore patrolling, with a provenhigh-seas ship intercept capability. Both classes ofship can also be used to insert specialist Maritime
Counter Terrorism (MCT) teams. A numberof Royal Air Force aircraft and the Fleet Ready
Escort of the Royal Navy (a Frigate or Destroyer)
are also held at very short notice to respond to
major intelligence-led risks, maritime terrorism
incidents or other escalating events within the UK
Marine Area. This multi-layered reconnaissance,
deterrence and interdiction capability will befurther improved with the introduction of new
RN Offshore Patrol Vessels in 2017 and the next
generation of Border Force Cutters in 2020.
53 Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance andInterdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK
is doing more with fewer homeland based maritime assets when consideredagainst international partners or comparable nations. Although the report
was favourable on the output of our UK based forces and agreed thatcurrent levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended thatfurther reductions should not be made without detailed analysis.
54 Currently delivered by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Border
Force, the Marine Management Organisation and Marine Scotland.

5.32 Our fishing industry directly employs
over 12,000 people and UK fishing vessels
land over 600,000 tonnes of fish with a valueof £770 million each year; fish stocks are alsoa critical source of revenue for many of ourOverseas Territories.55 The Marine Management
Organisation (MMO) and the Devolved
Administrations work with partner organisations
to secure fish stocks, prevent the importationof illegal fishing products and protect theenvironment from illegal activities:• In England, the MMO co-ordinates anenforcement programme for monitoring,
control and surveillance of all sea fishingactivity around the coast of England, and UK
vessels operating outside those waters. The
programme includes the inspection of fishingvessels at sea and in port, inspections of fishingindustry premises, fish markets and otherlocations around the coast and further inlandby marine enforcement officers. Inspections at
sea are carried out by the Royal Navy under anagreement with the MMO;

• In Northern Ireland, the Northern Irish

Government co-ordinates a programme formonitoring, control and surveillance of sea
fishing activity. This programme includes theactivities described for England’s programme,
above. The Department for Agriculture
and Rural Development of Northern Ireland
carries out inspections at sea, with the supportof the Royal Navy;• In Wales, the Welsh Government and the

MMO co-ordinate a programme formonitoring, control and surveillance of sea
fishing activity. This programme includes theactivities described for England’s programme,
above. A Welsh team of Marine Enforcement
Officers carries out fisheries protection andenforcement with the support of the Royal
Navy for inspections at sea. Welsh Marine
Enforcement Officers have a range of assets
at their disposal including two Fisheries
Patrol Vessels;

55 UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2012, Marine Management Organisation:(http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/fisheries/statistics/documents/
ukseafish/2012/final.pdf).

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Delivering Our Objectives• In Scotland, fisheries protection is carried out

by Marine Scotland – a directorate of Scottish
Government. Marine Scotland operates
shore-based fisheries compliance officers anda support headquarters, as well as a fleet of
3 Marine Protection Ships, and 2 aircraft. In
addition, the UK Fisheries Monitoring andControl Centre is located in Edinburgh and run
on behalf of the UK by Marine Scotland.

5.35 The Police National Maritime Security
Strategy (PNMSS) sets out the protective security
posture undertaken by the police and partners,
to counter the combined landside, seaward andsub-surface threat from terrorism and crime in
an integrated programme of activity. The UK isdivided into Portal Regions where close-to-shore
protective security activity is undertaken including:• The Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment

5.33 The UK’s rights and responsibilities regarding
the maritime security and sustainable managementof the waters of its 14 Overseas Territories
are defined within UNCLOS. Where these
territories are uninhabited, the UK Government
administers these responsibilities directly. Where
they are inhabited, we work in partnership withthe territorial administrations, helping to build
the necessary legislative capacity and othermechanisms to safeguard their maritime security
and manage their marine resources sustainably. In
addition to maintaining Permanent Joint Operating
Bases in Gibraltar, the Sovereign Base Areas in
Cyprus,56 the British Indian Ocean Territory andthe Falkland Islands,57 when appropriate, we
deploy specific military capabilities to reassure
the citizens of the overseas territories and, if
necessary, deter hostility.

(MATRA). This is used to detail the relevant
threats to the security of the maritime region
and an assessment of the effectiveness of the
security measures in place to mitigate those risks;• Regional Maritime Security Plans. These
consider the detection, deterrence or
disruption of waterborne and landside attacks
within the portal region, and build upon othersecurity plans and codes already in place suchas: the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code, Port Facility Security
Plans; Port Security Plans; Ship Security Plans;
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) site
security plans; Government Security Zones;
and other miscellaneous plans. The police workwith stakeholders to ensure that these plans
are comprehensive and collectively provide a
coherent security framework.

5.34 In the Southern Ocean, we remaincommitted to strong and effective engagement insupport of our sovereign responsibilities for the
security of the British Antarctic Territory (BAT),
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI)(shown in Figure 3). The UK is a party to the 1959
Antarctic Treaty which froze existing territorial
claims and prevented new claims from being
submitted. By maintaining our strong leadership
position within the Antarctic Treaty System andan active and influential continuous presence in
Antarctica, we will ensure effective international
management of the Southern Ocean maintaining
a clear focus on conservation and sustainable
management of resources, as well as the long-term
prohibition on commercial hydrocarbons/minerals
related activities.

5.36 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland,Special Branch police operating at ports work
closely with the National Crime Agency’s Border
Policing Command, the NMIC, Border Force,and other agencies to assess and respond to
threats. This includes ensuring that individuals ofknown interest are identified and appropriate
action taken, and that those previously unknown
individuals of potential interest are identified
through intelligence wherever possible. Routine
policing brings together a suite of techniques andassets focused on risk assessment, data gathering,
information sharing and community influence tocombat maritime risks. In Scotland, this function isled by Police Scotland’s Border Policing Command
which brings together all agencies operating at theborder, including the National Crime Agency.

56 The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia were retained by the

UK under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. (http://www.sbaadministration.
org/images/admin/docs/SBAA_Treaty_of_Establisment.pdf).
57 RAF maintains an air station on Ascension Island.

Delivering Our Objectives

Respond Case Study: Defeating Transnational Crime at Home and Overseas
In August 2013 the National Crime Agency (NCA) received intelligence that a South Americanorganised crime group planned to use a merchant ship to transfer cocaine to the UK. The NCA
requested support from its partners at the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) to
identify and track ships sailing from South American ports. Government maritime experts at the
NMIC filtered a vast quantity of data to identify a ship that met the profile provided by the NCA.
The NMIC was able to make use of global, regional and national surveillance systems to track theship throughout its journey. The NMIC’s collaborative environment allowed a single harmonised
product to be delivered to those with response responsibilities. On arrival in the UK Territorial Sea,
the ship was boarded by a specialist Border Force Search Team, and narcotics were discovered in aconcealed compartment. As a result of close multi-nation and cross-government working, Class A
drugs were prevented from reaching the UK and the individuals involved were arrested. Post-event
analysis, and the criminal investigation of this case, presented a compelling picture of further illicit
activity which we continue to monitor.
Later, in October 2013, the Royal Navy Ship HMS LANCASTER, in its role as Atlantic Patrol Task
(North) protecting the security interests of the Caribbean Overseas Territories and Bermuda,
seized £58 million worth of cannabis and cocaine in the Caribbean. LANCASTER, alerted tosuspected traffickers by a Canadian tanker, gave chase using her Lynx helicopter, and the embarked
Royal Marine sniper team shot out the speedboat’s engine. Once stopped, a United States Coast
Guard team apprehended those on board and recovered 400 kg of cocaine. Just days earlier, thewarship recovered marijuana weighing 1.2 tonnes. HMS LANCASTER was working with the USbased Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATFS), contributing to a 15-nation effort to preventthe transfer of illicit goods in Central America and drug trafficking from South America to the
Caribbean and on to the UK.
5.37 The National Crime Agency (NCA) is an
important, new and powerful intelligence-led
body that has an unprecedented mandate tolead the whole of law enforcement’s fight against
serious and organised crime affecting the UK. Its
remit is broad, with a determined and nationally
coordinated strategy to pursue those individuals
and groups who pose the greatest risk to the
public. While the NCA’s activity is not confinedto specific domains (land, sea or air), the activityof one of its four commands, the Border Policing
Command (BPC), includes the maritime domain.
BPC brings together the NCA’s overseas capability
and its border capability into a single operational
response to disrupt and prevent serious, organised
crime in the maritime domain and ensure that all
law enforcement agencies operating in and aroundthe UK’s border are working to achieve the sameends. The BPC representatives within the NMIC
support NCA’s efforts to make the border moresecure and prevent criminal exploitation of themaritime domain.

5.38 Internationally, the UK has the ability to
deploy military and law enforcement personnel
at range to conduct effective counter terrorist
activity. In addition, the UK is a signatory to several
multinational treaties and agreements which
promote cooperation to interdict vessels on thehigh seas.58 These include vessels suspected ofillegal activity such as carrying Weapons of Mass
Destruction or constituent parts, or prohibited
narcotic or psychotropic substances.
5.39 Separately, a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) was signed between
Bermuda and Hampshire Constabulary in
October 2013 to provide a framework forpolice co-operation to investigate serious crimes
committed on board Bermudian registered ships
when Hampshire is the first port of call post
incident. This MoU will be subject to an annual
review to monitor and evaluate its effectiveness.
58 Such as the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, the1998 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs andPsychotropic Substances, and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (to which 188 States are party/parties).

37

38

Future Direction

Future Direction

Future Direction

Future Direction

6.1 The future will see considerable expansion
in the global use of the seas as both UK andinternational offshore-energy sectors continue
to expand, fishing intensifies,59 maritime trade
increases to meet the consumer demands ofemerging countries and new consumer classes,
and seabed mining becomes a reality. Between
2014 and 2020 the transportation of global
maritime cargo is predicted to double while
the number of floating oil and gas platforms ispredicted to rise from under 300 today to over
600 by 2030.60 In addition, there is likely to bea huge expansion in the offshore renewableenergy market with potentially 100 times as many
offshore wind turbines in operation by 2030.61
6.2 To counter potential threats, and ensure that
our nation, our markets, and our seas remain
secure and prosperous, the UK will continue
to utilise diplomatic, development, intelligence,
military, and law enforcement levers.
6.3 In order to continue to deliver our maritime
security objectives in the most effective andefficient manner, we will focus on the following
priorities between 2014 and 2019.

UNDERSTAND• Horizon Scanning. We will use preparations for the 2015 National Security Strategy to harmonise

horizon scanning across Government, and will review the Maritime Risk Assessment biennially toidentify future threats. This horizon scanning will help us anticipate future resource competition
which may require mitigation. In addition, we will assess the security implications of future growthin the marine transportation and offshore-energy sectors and the potential for international tension
as the Northern Sea Route increases in significance.

• Maritime Domain Awareness. Through the proven framework of the NMIC, we will continue

to build coherence across departments and agencies, and develop a robust, accurate and timely
understanding of maritime activity affecting our interests domestically and internationally. Working
closely with the private sector, and our international partners, we will share situational information,
harmonise future regional and international maritime domain awareness initiatives, and provide themaritime industries accredited to the UK with the situational awareness information necessary tosupport coordinated action.

• Aerial Surveillance. In order to deliver more cost-effective aerial surveillance of the UK Marine Area

while satisfying the needs of the MCA, Border Force and MMO, we will work to harmonise contracted
Aerial Maritime Surveillance provision by 2015. This new provision will take full advantage of advances

59 Between 2001 and 2011 fish catches in the Eastern Indian Ocean increased by 48% (MMO UK Sea fisheries Statistics 2012)(http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/fisheries/statistics/documents/ukseafish/2012/final.pdf).
60 Global Marine Trends 2030, Qinetic, Lloyd’s Register and the University of Strathclyde Report, 2013(http://www.qinetiq.com/what/capabilities/maritime/Documents/GlobalMarineTrends2030Report.pdf).
61 Offshore Wind Power Summary Report, Low Carbon Innovation Coordination Group, February 2012(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48279/4467-tina-offshore-wind-summary.pdf).

39

40

Future Directionin technology and deliver some contingent capability to other agencies and government departments.
The UK Armed Forces requirements and capabilities in air-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), including future maritime surface and sub-surface surveillance, will beconsidered in 2015, within the Strategic Defence and Security Review process.62• NMIC. The creation of the NMIC in SDSR 2010 has proven a great success. Under new

governance arrangements, Border Force will take lead agency responsibility for NMIC, supported
by a Management Board reporting to the National Maritime Security Committee (Officials) (asoutlined at Annex A). Work is ongoing to define the NMIC’s future role, initiate its relocation,
strengthen information sharing, and maximise its cross-government effect.

• MCA. The Future Coastguard Programme will deliver a single maritime safety responseorganisation, linked together by a robust information and command and control network. This willallow vessel traffic risks to be coherently assessed and managed.

• Measures of Effectiveness. We will develop a framework for qualitative assessment of theeffectiveness and significance of action taken to deliver the UK’s maritime security objectives.

INFLUENCE• NATO. We will support NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy.63 While the NATO Strategy has awider remit and a more military focus than the NSMS, it shares many of the same overarching
objectives, namely preservation of freedom of trade; maintenance of traffic flow throughchokepoints; protection of infrastructure; the prevention of proliferation, terrorist activity andcrime; and the protection of citizens aboard private vessels. In addition, we will train routinely
with our NATO Allies in order to maintain a level of interoperability that allows rapid and effective
collective maritime security when necessary.

• European Union (EU). We will aim to play a leading role in developing an EU Maritime Security
Strategy, ensuring that it is coherent with the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy and sea basin strategies.64• Regional Security Initiatives. Regional Security Initiatives are cooperative agreements between
groups of states with common maritime security interests. The UK will champion these throughdiplomatic efforts and strengthen regional institutions, as the principal method for delivering
effective security in areas of potential instability within the maritime domain.65• Rules-Based International System. Freedom of Navigation operations provide an enduring strategic
benefit to UK security by protecting our maritime rights and freedoms, encouraging lawful practiceand preventing excessive geographical and/or jurisdictional claims gaining legal traction in internationallaw. We will continue to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations to ensure that the UNCLOS
provisions are respected. Operations will be agreed and reviewed jointly by the FCO and MOD.
• The UK Marine Zone. The UK declared EEZ came into force on 31 March 2014.66 In addition,
consideration into statutory powers will be examined in relation to the declaration of a Contiguous
Zone for the UK.

62 While the Government took the difficult decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme in 2010, core aircrew skills have been maintained throughpersonnel placement with some of our key Allies.
63 Alliance Maritime Strategy (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm).
64 Progress of the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=688422:EN:NOT), The Commission
to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee Of The Regions, 11 September 2012.
65 Such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
66 This EEZ declaration related to the UK only. It does not include the OverseasTerritories

Future Direction

PREVENT• International Cooperation. We will help to build strong, legitimate maritime capability byworking with our regional and international partners, including our Overseas Territories, toshare information and intelligence, best practice on protective security and, where appropriate,interdiction capabilities in order to ensure security at identified points of vulnerability.

• Capacity Building. In cooperation with our international and regional partners, and UK industry,

we will continue to encourage nations to invest in protective security, maritime surveillance andinterdiction capabilities, and the legal structures to enable effective policing of their maritime zones.
Our national effort will be focused on developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilitiesof allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East
Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, theCaribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.

• Presence. In order to engender a secure maritime domain, anticipate instability internationally,and be ready to take fast, appropriate and effective action, we will, where appropriate, maintain apersistent maritime presence both internationally and within our marine zone.

PROTECT• Innovation. We will continue to monitor the latest innovative technological developments insecurity screening and detection equipment with a view to sponsoring joint trials with UK industry
and our European and international partners. This will allow us to exploit the latest research anddevelopment activity and deliver effective and low cost solutions to future maritime threats.

RESPOND• Interdiction. In order to allow the rapid and effective deployment of interdiction assets in supportof maritime security objectives, capability needs will be regularly reviewed and options for closer
operational and tactical coordination and cooperation between the maritime forces of the UK law
enforcement agencies and the UK Armed Forces explored. The interdiction and enforcement
capabilities within UK waters will be further improved with the introduction of new RN Offshore
Patrol Vessels in 2017.67• Enforcement. Linked to the above we will investigate options for harmonizing the empowerment
of officials across agencies to allow enforcement in the widest range of circumstances, both within
the UK Marine Area and beyond.

• Research and Development. Where maritime security interests clearly overlap, cooperative researchand development across government, and where possible internationally, will become the norm.

• Common Acquisition. We will build the evidence base for greater flexibility, interoperability,

cost-effectiveness and coherence in relation to maritime security. This will include identification of
new or shared capability requirements and investigation of the feasibility and benefit of deliveringcommon systems, equipment and platforms.

67 Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK is doing
more with less homeland based maritime assets when considered against international partners or comparable nations. Although the report was favourable on
the output of our UK based forces and agreed that current levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended that further reductions should not bemade without detailed analysis.

41

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Annex A

Annex AAnnex A

Annex AUK Maritime Security Governance

National Security
Council (NSC)

KEY
Lines of reportingLine of accountability

Ministerial Body
Ministerial Working Groupon Maritime Security(Chaired by FCO)
(Previously the Counter-Piracy Working Group)

Border Force chaired
inter-Departmental
Management Board

DfT Maritime
Administration Board*

Senior Official Body

Any DfT workstream
would share info asnecessary with MAB

National Maritime Security
Committee (Officials) NMSC (O):

Hosted by DfT, incl all MSOG Depts/Agencies
Meets minimum three times per year

NMSC(O) Secretariat
National
Maritime
Information
Centre (NMIC)

National Maritime Security
Committee (Industry) - NMSC (I)NMSC(O)’s
Stakeholder/Industry Group
Would meet yearly / twice yearly

Cross-government Maritime Security Workstreams

DfT Port
Security WG

DfT ShipSecurity WG

DfT Cyber
WG* The Maritime Administration Board (MAB), chaired by the Department for Transport was established to take a strategic overview of all maritime policy and regulatory activity being
undertaken by the Department, and is a key focal point for engagement with other Government Departments, Arms’ Length Bodies, the devolved administrations and maritime stakeholders on
policies affecting UK maritime interests. The MAB takes a cross-cutting view of environmental, safety and security issues affecting shipping, ports and the maritime industry with valuable input
from industry experts and other government departments.

Figure 8: UK Maritime Security Governance Structure

Introduction
I. In order to deliver greater coherence togovernment and industry workstreams on maritime
security a revised governance structure has been
established (Figure 8). The existing Ministerial
Working Group on Counter-Piracy has been
expanded to cover all maritime security matters,
and renamed the Ministerial Working Group on
Maritime Security (MSWG). The Maritime Security
Oversight Group (MSOG) has been mergedwith the National Maritime Security Committee(NMSC), and will now have both an officials forum
and an industry forum. The National Security
Council, as the main forum for collective discussionof the government’s objectives for national security,
may, when relevant, task the MSWG. Details of the
new governance structure are provided below.

Ministerial Working Group on
Maritime Security
II. The Ministerial Working Group on Maritime
Security, which meets regularly, has responsibility to:• Provide oversight for the National Strategy for
Maritime Security (NSMS);• Provide oversight on maritime security moregenerally;• Co-ordinate and drive forward national andinternational security issues relating to themaritime domain.

III. Chaired by the FCO Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State, the Working Group members
represent the Attorney General’s Office; Cabinet
Office; the Department for Transport; the Home

43

44

Annex A

Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministryof Justice; the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs; and the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills.

National Maritime Security Committee(Officials) (NMSC(O))
IV. The cross-Government NMSC(O) is
responsible for:• Maintaining an overview of maritime security

risks and commissioning updates from
Departments and Agencies on a biennial basis(to coincide with updates to the NSRA wherepracticable), and identifying to Departments
and Agencies where there are gaps or where
further mitigation / capability may be needed;• Maintaining an overview of, and co-ordinating

and challenging, the delivery of crossgovernment maritime security work streams inorder to implement the future work programme
set out in the NSMS and decisions taken by the
Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security;• Communicating maritime security priorities to
the NMSC(I) and ensuring there is effective
co-ordination of government and industry
maritime security work streams;• Commissioning and coordinating updates from
Departments and Agencies to the NSMS,
ensuring that cross-government maritime
security activity is coherent with the NSMS;

V. Chaired by the Director of DfT Maritime
Directorate, the NMSC(O) members represent
the Cabinet Office, the Department for Transport,
the Home Office (Office for Security and Counter
Terrorism), the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy,
the Department of Energy & Climate Change,
the Department for Environment, Food andRural Affairs, the National Crime Agency, Border
Force, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, theNational Maritime Information Centre, the police,
the Marine Management Organisation, and the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Scotland Office,Wales Office, and Northern Ireland Office.

National Maritime Security Committee(Industry) (NMSC(I))
VI. The NMSC(I) is the senior forum forinteraction between the commercial maritime
industry and Government on maritime security
matters. It is responsible for:• Providing a high level forum for consultation
between Government and key industry
maritime security stakeholders on maritime
security initiatives;• Acting as the NMSC(O) industry stakeholder
advisory group;• Providing strategic direction relating to existingand proposed maritime transport security
policies;• Providing assurance that the UK’s maritime

transport security regime is commensurate tocurrent risks and is being delivered effectively;• Setting objectives for the Port Security Working
Group, Ship Security Working Group and other
Working Groups as appropriate.

VII. Chaired by the maritime transport industry,
the NMSC(I) draws its members from key
senior level maritime transport industry strategic
stakeholders and senior government officials.
Other organisations and specialist individuals
will be requested to support working groups, or
attend meetings as necessary, in order to informdiscussions on specific issues.

46

Annex B

Annex B

Annex B

Annex B
Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for
Maritime Security

DI/Security Services

JTAC

Marine Scotland

MMO

Police Svc

NCA(BPC)

DEFRA

DfT

BF

RN

NMIC

MCA

SupportMCA

CPS

NCA(BPC)

Police Service
DECC

MOD
MoJ

Home Office

Objective 4: To assure the security of vital
maritime trade and energy transportation routes
within the UK Marine Area, regionally andinternationally.
Objective 5: To protect the resources andpopulation of the UK and the OTs from illegal anddangerous activity, including serious organised
crime and terrorism.

DFID
FCO

Objective 3: To protect the UK and the OTs, theircitizens and economies by supporting the safety/
security of ports and offshore installations and
REG-flagged passenger and cargo ships.

Department for Transport

MOD

MoJ

Objective 2: To develop the maritime governancecapacity and capabilities of states in areas ofstrategic maritime importance.

Delivery

CPNI/Security Services

Policy/Strategy

Objective 1: To promote a secure international
maritime domain and uphold international
maritime norms.

RAF

UK Maritime Security

International Maritime Security
UnitedNations

International Maritime
Organisation

NATO

European
Union

Other States

Key
Government Department
Devolved entity

International Actor

Delivery organisation responsible to government

Cross-government body

NDPB

Intelligence analysis organisation

Figure 9: Interaction and responsibilities within the Maritime Domain

Departmental Roles and Responsibilities
for Maritime Security
This annex outlines the roles and responsibilitiesof departments and agencies in connection withmaritime security.
Border Force (BF) checks arriving crew andpassengers and regulates goods both in and outof the UK. The long coastline of the UK makes
it challenging to control arriving ships. Maritime
transport can arrive and depart from the largest
ports in the UK, for example Dover, through toharbours or small stretches of beach. Border
Force has permanent presence at large ports
and deploys officers to smaller ports based on
intelligence and/or risk but not all known ships
are met by Border Force officers. To enhance
intelligence Border Force is actively involved at
the NMIC and builds partnerships with coastal
communities to improve monitoring of thecoastline. It has a fleet of five fast patrol ships
used for UK coastal enforcement, intervention,
surveillance, and stop-and-board activity.

47

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Annex B

Through the Border Policing Command (BPC),
the National Crime Agency (NCA) is a vital
part of the Government’s wider approach todelivering increased security at the border andtackling all serious and organised crime threats
before they reach the UK. The BPC brigades
the NCA’s operational response overseas andat the UK border into a single entity. The BPC
leads border partners in driving the allocatedcontrol strategy activity, setting out the multiagency response to the threats, and leading andcoordinating action to address them.

UK’s national intelligence committee – the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) – and also to the
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).

The Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI) is an interdepartmentalorganisation, with resources from industry,
academia and a number of government
departments and agencies that provides
intelligence-led and risk-based integrated security
advice (across the physical, personnel, cyber andhuman factors disciplines) in response to industry
requirements. CPNI’s advice is derived fromexpert knowledge about how to make the national
infrastructure less vulnerable. Through advice
delivery CPNI aims to protect national security byhelping to reduce the vulnerability of the national
infrastructure to terrorism, espionage and otherthreats. Key partners within the maritime domain
include DfT and Police.

The Department for Environment, Food andRural Affairs (Defra) is responsible for policy andregulations relating to: the natural environment,
food supply/resilience, fisheries, international
trade in plant and animal material, environmental
protection and pollution.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is
the Government Department responsible forprosecuting criminal cases investigated by thepolice and other investigating bodies in Englandand Wales. In Scotland, this function is carriedout by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal
Service, and in Northern Ireland by the Public
Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (PPS).
As part of the UK’s counter-piracy effort, the
CPS has provided advice on prosecutions to theauthorities of the Seychelles, Kenya, Somalia
and Mauritius.
Defence Intelligence (DI) provides strategic
defence intelligence to the Ministry of Defence
and the Armed Forces. It provides timely
intelligence products, assessments and advice toguide decisions on policy and the commitment
and employment of the Armed Forces; to informdefence research and equipment programmes;
and to support military operations. DI is also an
essential element of the UK’s wider intelligencemachinery, contributing staff and resources to the

The Department of Energy and Climate Change(DECC) is responsible for driving ambitious
action to tackle climate change and for delivering
secure energy on the way to a low-carbon future.
DECC holds policy responsibility for the securityof the UK’s energy sector, which includes offshore
renewable energy sources and offshore Critical
National Infrastructure (CNI), as well as CNI sites
and civil nuclear sites on the UK’s coastline.

The Department for Transport (DfT) is the
security regulator responsible for the securityof ports/port facilities in the UK and the UK’s
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies,
and for the UK-flagged shipping fleets. It ensuresthat the UK balances commercial interests withsafety, security and environmental considerations
while promoting a successful, safe and sustainable
UK shipping and ports sector. It encourages
shipping companies to be UK registered;
implements and influences International
and European Union safety and security
legislation; and ensures the efficient delivery
and modernisation of marine aids to navigation.
The DfT represents the UK at the IMO as well
as representing the UK at the EC’s Maritime
Regulatory Security Committee (MARSEC).68
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
is responsible for coordinating the promotionof British interests overseas and supporting UK
entitled personnel and businesses across theglobe. It has overall responsibility for ensuring the
integrity of UNCLOS and for representing the
UK in bilateral and multilateral discussions on Lawof the Sea issues. It also represents the UK in theInternational Seabed Authority, which deals withdeep sea mining. It works with other countries to
68 MARSEC is a Regulatory Committee established by virtue of Article 11

of Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. It assists the Commission with regard
to its activities under Directive 2005/65/EC. The Regulatory Committee
is chaired by the Commission and consists of experts representing all
Member States.

Annex B

strengthen the rules-based international system andis responsible for the coordinating efforts acrossgovernment to ensure the safety, security andgovernance of the Overseas Territories, delivered
through Royal Navy presence in the Caribbean
and South Atlantic. The FCO also plays a leadingrole in identifying and funding the developmentof maritime capacity building initiatives in coastal
States to combat maritime crime around the world,
together with other Government Departments
and international partners.

System (AIS).69 The MCA supports DfT in its roleas security regulator by being responsible for cargo
ship security compliance activity.

The Home Office (HO) is responsible for UK
immigration, security, and law and order, including
counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism

Marine Scotland is the directorate of Scottish
Government responsible for marine and fisheries
issues in Scotland. In addition to a number ofshore-based fisheries compliance officers and a
support headquarters, Marine Scotland operates
a fleet of 3 Marine Protection Ships, MPV Minna,
MPV Jura and MPV Hirta, and owns 2 aircraft.

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)
assesses the threat worldwide from international
terrorism to UK maritime assets. It analyses
incoming intelligence from a wide range ofsources on potential maritime terrorist threatsand produces assessments detailing theirjudgement on their credibility and plausibility.
JTAC regularly reviews the intent and capabilityof terrorist groups to conduct maritime attacks
and communicates this information in the form
of JTAC threat levels. JTAC sets the threat levels(terrorism) for UK commercial maritime assets,
military vessels and important maritime areas suchas choke points. These threat levels communicate
JTAC’s view on the likelihood of a terrorist attack
on maritime assets in that location and are used bywider government as the basis for assessments of
the risk to shipping worldwide.
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
is the United Kingdom Maritime Authority. It acts
as the safety regulator for UK flag shipping, andoperates the UK Ship Register. It also coordinates
the activities of the ship registers of the Overseas
Territories and Crown Dependencies via the
Red Ensign Group (REG). It has responsibility forthe implementation of international maritime
safety conventions and codes, the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and the International Conventionof Standards of Training, Certification andWatchkeeping for Seafarers. It inspects foreign flagmerchant ships calling at UK ports for compliancewith regulatory instruments. It is the UK’s National
Competent Authority (NCA) for the long-range
identification and tracking of ships (LRIT) andfor the operation of the Automatic Identification

The Marine Management Organisation (MMO)
is a non-departmental public body responsible for
implementing a marine planning system designed
to integrate the social requirements, economic
potential and environmental imperatives of ourseas; implementing the marine licensing regime;
enforcement of fishing activity of all nationalities
within English waters.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is responsiblefor defence against direct threats to the UK
and its overseas territories; providing strategic
intelligence; supporting counter-terrorism work
(CONTEST); and providing military assistance tothe civil authorities.
The multi-agency National Maritime Information
Centre (NMIC), established in 2011, harmonises
departmental and agency activity to help secure
the UK advantage in the maritime domain. It
delivers improved identification and assessmentof surveillance and operational risks to maritime
security and provides a permanent architecture
for facilitating national, regional and international
information sharing.

69 The Vessel Traffic Monitoring Directive imposes an obligation on

Member States to monitor certain activities, to receive reports on accidents
and incidents, to communicate information to other Member States and toinitiate action internally within the UK on receipt of information from otherMember States pursuant to the Directive.

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Annex BThe Police Service – the police seek to prevent
crime in Inland Waterways, Ports, Harbours,
UK Territorial Waters and Offshore Energy
Installations. Through the Police National
Maritime Security Strategy they work withpartner agencies to provide proportionate
protective security in and around the UK. They
also have a global responsibility to investigate
crimes committed on British Ships.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) protects Britain’s
interests, citizens, territory and trade throughthe intelligent application of Air Power, exploiting
the inherent speed of reaction, speed of reachand speed of effect that this offers – to enable
flexible political choice and, ultimately, to deliver
military effect. In concert with allies, partners andthe other Services, the RAF provides support
to international maritime security and deters
threats to UK prosperity and security. The RAF
maintains a number of aircraft and units readyto respond at extremely short notice to threats
to the UK; the roles include Quick Reaction
Alert (to sustain Control of the Air), Attack, andIntelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance(ISR). Internationally, the RAF works withpartners to counter illegal maritime activity,
including piracy, drug smuggling and other illegal
trade, particularly in the Mediterranean, the Gulf,
the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, and it also
contributes to the development of maritime air
surveillance capabilities.
The Royal Navy (RN) protects Britain’s interests,
citizens, territory and trade through judicious useof its ships, submarines, aircraft, Royal Marines andtraining teams. In concert with allies and partners,
the RN promotes international maritime security
and deters threats to UK prosperity and security.
For the UK Marine Area, the RN maintains a
number of ships and units ready to respond atshort notice and 3 Offshore Patrol Ships (OPV)
delivering a permanent at sea presence; theprimary role is an armed response capability todeter or interdict terrorism and other criminal
activities, with the OPVs also having a secondary
responsibility to deliver fisheries enforcement
under a Marine Management Organisation(MMO) contract. Internationally the RN, including
the Royal Marines, works independently, bilaterally
or as part of an EU, NATO or other Maritime Task
Forces reinforcing and developing international
relationships and deterring or countering illegal
maritime activity, particularly in the Northern
Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, East and West coasts
of Africa, the Caribbean and South Atlantic andcontributes to the development of maritime
governance capacity and capabilities in areas ofstrategic maritime importance.
SO15 Counter Terrorism Command (CTC)sits within London’s Metropolitan Police Service.
This CTC is responsible for providing a proactive
and reactive response to terrorism, domestic
extremism and related offences, including theprevention and disruption of such activity;
supporting the National Coordination ofTerrorist Investigations outside London; assessing,analysing and developing intelligence to aid
operational activity; being the police single pointof contact for international partners in counterterrorism matters; assisting in the protection of
UK interests overseas and the investigation of
attacks against them.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
office in Dubai is the primary point of contact formerchant ships and liaison with military forces in
the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The
Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC) in
Portsmouth supports UKMTO outputs.

52

Annex C

Annex CAnnex C

Annex C
Glossary

Baseline: This is usually the low water markaround the coast. But there can be straightbaselines across the mouths of bays, and all
rocks, reefs etc above the sea at low water but
submerged at other times extend the baseline ifthey are within 12 nm of the mainland or an island.
The UK baseline is delineated in the Territorial
Waters Order in Council 1964 (as amended by
the Territorial Sea (Amendment) Order 1998, SI
1998/2564). Marine waters to the landward sideof the baseline are known as internal waters.
Crown Dependencies: Crown Dependencies are
the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey
and the Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies
are not part of the UK but are self-governing
dependencies of the Crown. They have theirown directly-elected legislative assemblies,
administrative, fiscal and legal systems and theirown courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are
not represented in the UK Parliament.
The Ministry of Justice is responsible for managing
the constitutional relationship with the Crown
Dependencies.
Contiguous Zone: The band between 12
nm and 24 nm, in which a coastal State canintervene to prevent potential offences that mayotherwise occur inside territorial sea (relating
to fiscal, customs, sanitary and immigration
offences), and to apprehend vessels that havecommitted offences inside territorial waters andare endeavouring to escape. The UK does not
currently claim a contiguous zone.

Continental Shelf: The continental shelf of acoastal State comprises the seabed and subsoilof the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongationof its land territory to the outer edge of thecontinental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadthof the territorial sea is measured where the outeredge of the continental margin does not extend
up to that distance.
Exclusive Economic Zone: Under UNCLOS,
an EEZ is capable of extending to 200 nm fromthe baseline. Details of the UK EEZ are foundin the Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013
(S.I. 2013/3161)
Flag State: The role of ship registration and therights of ships to fly national flags is set out in
Article 91 of UNCLOS.70
Freedom of Navigation (FON): This is the term
given to the rights and freedoms that warships,
merchant ships, aircraft and submarines enjoy
to navigate on, over, and under the world’s seas;
it is vital to the security and economic stabilityof the UK and facilitates global maritime tradeand provides the UK military with the legal
framework to allow it to respond to threats tosecurity at range. FON rights are set out in the1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).
Hazards: Non-malicious risks which occur
naturally, by accident, or where the architect of
the threat was not malicious.

70 Article 91 of UNCLOS (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm).

53

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Annex CHigh Seas: All parts of the sea that are notincluded in the EEZ, territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a state. The high seas being open to all
nations, no state may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid
down by the UN Convention on the High Seas andby the other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states:
freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom
to lay submarine cables and pipelines; freedom to
fly over the high seas. These freedoms, and others
which are recognized by the general principles ofinternational law, shall be exercised by all states withreasonable regard to the interests of other states intheir exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Interdict: Intercept and prevent the movement ofa prohibited commodity or person.
Internal Waters: see ‘Baseline’.
Marine Area: The area of sea within the seaward
limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the state, andany area of sea within the limits of the exclusive
economic zone, and the area of sea within thelimits of the state’s sector of the continental shelf(including the bed and subsoil of the sea withinthose areas) (see also ‘UK Marine Area).
Marine Protected Area: Marine area protected
by Government due to its ecological importance.71
Maritime Domain: All areas and things of, under,
relating to, or bordering on a sea or ocean including
all maritime-related activities, infrastructure,people, cargo, ships and other conveyances.
Maritime terrorism: The undertaking of terrorist
acts and activities in the maritime domain, using or
against ships or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or
against anyone and their passengers or personnel,
against coastal facilities or settlements, including
tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.
Piracy: Consists of any of the following acts: Anyillegal acts of violence or detention, or any actof depredation, committed for private ends by
the crew or the passengers of a private ship ora private aircraft, and directed on the high seas,
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft oragainst a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
71 The Government’s approach to Marine Protected Areas is covered further

at: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-and-sustainably-usingthe-marine-environment/supporting-pages/marine-protected-areas.

place outside the jurisdiction of any state; Any
act of voluntary participation in the operation ofa ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft; Any act ofinciting or of intentionally facilitating the two acts
described previously.
Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged ship: The
REG is a group of British Shipping Registers. It is
made up from the United Kingdom, the Crown
Dependencies (Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey)
and the UK Overseas Territories (Anguilla,
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St Helena
and the Turks & Caicos Islands) which operateshipping registers from their jurisdiction. Any ship
registered in the UK, a Crown Dependency or UK
Overseas Territory, is a “British ship” and is entitled
to fly the Red Ensign flag.
Southern Ocean: The Convention Area, which
covers around 10% of the Earth’s surface, isdefined in the CAMLR Convention as thearea south of the Antarctic Convergence. The
Convention also applies in the area south of 60°S
to which the 1959 Antarctic Treaty applies.
UK Continental Shelf: The seas within the UK
sector of the continental shelf comprise the areaof sea outside the UK territorial sea but within
an area specified in an order under section 1(7)of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (c. 29). Rights
in the continental shelf extend to mineral andother non-living resources of the seabed andsubsoil together with living organisms belonging tosedentary species.
UK Entitled Persons: Entitled persons are
non-UK citizens for whom HMG has accepted
responsibility for their safety and security.
UK-flagged Ship: Merchant ships are required
to register under a national flag to determine thelegal jurisdiction under which they operate andtheir associated tax obligations. UK-flagged ships
are those registered in the UK.
UK Marine Area: As detailed in the Marine andCoastal Access Act 2009, this consists of thefollowing: (a) the area of sea within the seaward
limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United
Kingdom, (b) any area of sea within the limits of the
exclusive economic zone, (c) the area of sea within
the limits of the UK sector of the continental shelf(so far as not falling within the area mentioned inAnnex C(b), and includes the bed and subsoil of the sea
within those areas. The area of sea mentioned insubsection (c) is to be treated as part of the UK
marine area for any purpose only to the extent
that such treatment for that purpose does notcontravene any international obligation binding on
the United Kingdom or Her Majesty’s government.
UK Overseas Territories: Anguilla; Bermuda;
British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean
Territory; The British Virgin Islands; The Cayman
Islands; The Falkland Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat;
The Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie & Oeno Islands;Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha(including Gough Island Dependency); South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands; Sovereign
Base Areas (SBAs) Akrotiri and Dhekelia (onCyprus); The Turks & Caicos Islands.
UK Territorial Sea: The UK territorial sea isdefined by the Territorial Sea Act 1987 as the sea
extending 12 nm from the baseline. For the mostpart, the territorial sea of the UK does not adjointhat of any other state. Where it does so, in the
English Channel, the Territorial Sea (Limits) Order
1989 (SI 1989/482) sets out the limits of theterritorial sea in the Strait of Dover. Within the
territorial sea, the UK has jurisdiction for the sea
itself, the seabed subjacent and the air above. Thisis subject to the right of innocent passage by shipsof all other states. A graphical representation ofthis area is available at: https://www.ukho.gov.uk.

United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS): Also called the Law of the
Sea Convention, UNCLOS is the international
agreement that resulted from the third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973
and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines
the rights and responsibilities of nations in their useof the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines forbusinesses, the environment, and the managementof marine natural resources. UNCLOS came into
force in 1994. 166 countries and the European
Union have joined the Convention.
Vital maritime trade and energy transportationroutes: Vital Maritime Trade Routes include: theDover Strait; North Channel; Irish Sea and thePentland Firth; a southern corridor connecting
the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez; theRed Sea; the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf;
an eastern corridor stretching from the East andSouth China Seas through the Malacca Straits
into the Indian Ocean; and a western corridor
connecting Europe with the Americas. The
opening of a northern corridor, running along theRussian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may takeon similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in
the medium term.

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