Global Britain in
a competitive age
The Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

CP 403

Global Britain in
a competitive age
The Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
Presented to Parliament by the Prime Ministerby Command of Her Majesty
March 2021

CP 403

Cover image: summer sun over the UK
Credit: Tim Peake/ESA/NASA© Crown copyright 2021
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Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s
Stationery OfficeContents
I. Foreword from the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister’s vision for the UK in 2030

3
6II.	Overview

10III.	The national security and international environment to 2030

23

IV.	Strategic Framework33

1. Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology

35

1.1 Growing the UK’s science and technology power

35

1.2 Responsible, democratic cyber power40

2. Shaping the open international order of the future44

2.1	A force for good: supporting open societies anddefending human rights				47

2.2 An open, resilient global economy

51

2.3 Extending an open international order in future frontiers

55

The UK in the world: a European country with global interests

60

The Indo-Pacific tilt: a framework66

3. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas

69

3.1 Countering state threats: defence, disruption and deterrence70

The nuclear deterrent

76

3.2 Conflict and instability

79

3.3 Homeland security and transnational security challenges

80

4. Building resilience at home and overseas

87

4.1 Building the UK’s national resilience88

4.2 Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss

89

4.3 Building health resilience

93

V.	Implementing the Integrated Review

96

Annex A: Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020

100

Annex B: Evidence and engagement

106

Annex C: Glossary

110

﻿

1

I. Foreword from the Prime Minister
When we began the Integrated Review in early 2020,
we could not have anticipated how a coronavirus would
trigger perhaps the greatest international crisis since theSecond World War, with tragic consequences that will
persist for years to come. COVID-19 has reminded usthat security threats and tests of national resilience cantake many forms.
Thanks to the fortitude of the British people and themonumental efforts of our NHS, the UK is emerging
from the pandemic with renewed determination andoptimism. Our journey to recovery has already begun
and we are resolved to build back better, ensuring that
we are stronger, safer and more prosperous than
before. Yet if we are to escape the malign effect of thevirus, the race to vaccinate and therefore protect people cannot stop at national borders.
Hence the UK has joined other countries in the COVAX initiative to extend this campaign
across the globe.
Having left the European Union, the UK has started a new chapter in our history. We will
be open to the world, free to tread our own path, blessed with a global network of friends
and partners, and with the opportunity to forge new and deeper relationships. Our Tradeand Cooperation Agreement with the EU gives us the freedom to do things differently andbetter, both economically and politically. In the years ahead, agility and speed of action
will enable us to deliver for our citizens, enhancing our prosperity and security.
My vision for the UK in 2030 sets high ambitions for what this country can achieve.
The Union between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has proved its
worth time and again, including in this pandemic. It is our greatest source of strength
at home and abroad. Our country overflows with creativity in the arts and sciences: thewellsprings of unique soft power that spans the globe.
Few nations are better placed to navigate the challenges ahead, but we must be willingto change our approach and adapt to the new world emerging around us. Open anddemocratic societies like the UK must demonstrate they are match-fit for a morecompetitive world. We must show that the freedom to speak, think and choose – andtherefore to innovate – offers an inherent advantage; and that liberal democracy and freemarkets remain the best model for the social and economic advancement of humankind.
History has shown that democratic societies are the strongest supporters of an open
and resilient international order, in which global institutions prove their ability to protect
human rights, manage tensions between great powers, address conflict, instability andclimate change, and share prosperity through trade and investment. That open andresilient international order is in turn the best guarantor of security for our own citizens.

I. Foreword from the Prime Minister3

To be open, we must also be secure. Protecting our people, our homeland and our
democracy is the first duty of any government, so I have begun the biggest programmeof investment in defence since the end of the Cold War. This will demonstrate to ourallies, in Europe and beyond, that they can always count on the UK when it really matters.
We will exceed our manifesto and NATO spending commitments, with defence
spending now standing at 2.2% of GDP, and drive forward a modernisation programmethat embraces the newer domains of cyber and space, equipping our armed forces
with cutting-edge technology. And we will continue to defend the integrity of ournation against state threats, whether in the form of illicit finance or coercive economic
measures, disinformation, cyber-attacks, electoral interference or even – three years after
the Salisbury attack – the use of chemical or other weapons of mass destruction.
As the attacks in Manchester, London and Reading have sadly demonstrated, the terrorist
threat in the UK remains all too real – whether Islamist-inspired, Northern Ireland-related
or driven by other motivations. Our security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement
community work around the clock to stop would-be terrorists in their tracks, disrupting
28 planned attacks since 2017. We will continue to invest in this essential work, throughincreased funding for the intelligence agencies and Counter Terrorism Policing in 2021‑22
and our drive to recruit an extra 20,000 police officers. And we will maintain constantvigilance in protecting British citizens from serious and organised crime.
We will also bring to bear new capabilities such as the Counter Terrorism Operations
Centre and the National Cyber Force. Learning from the pandemic, we will bolster our
national resilience with a new Situation Centre at the heart of government, improving
our use of data and our ability to anticipate and respond to future crises. And we will
deliver our goal of having the most effective border in the world by 2025, embracing
innovation, simplifying the process for traders and travellers, and improving the security
and biosecurity of the UK.
Keeping the UK’s place at the leading edge of science and technology will be essential
to our prosperity and competitiveness in the digital age. Our aim is to have secured our
status as a Science and Tech Superpower by 2030, by redoubling our commitment
to research and development, bolstering our global network of innovation partnerships,
and improving our national skills – including by attracting the world’s best and brightest
to the UK through our new Global Talent Visa. We will lay the foundations for long-term
prosperity, establishing the UK as a global services, digital and data hub by drawing
on our nation’s great strengths in digital technologies, and attracting inward investment.
In 2021 and beyond, Her Majesty’s Government will make tackling climate change andbiodiversity loss its number one international priority. Under my chairmanship, the UN
Security Council recently held its first ever high-level meeting on the impact of climatechange on peace and security. The UK was the first advanced economy to set a net zerotarget for 2050. We will now begin an unprecedented programme of new investment,
taking forward our ten‑point plan for a green industrial revolution by funding British
research and development in green technologies, and helping the developing world with
the UK’s International Climate Finance.

4

Integrated Review

The creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is thespringboard for all our international efforts, integrating diplomacy and development toachieve greater impact and address the links between climate change and extreme
poverty. The UK will remain a world leader in international development and we will returnto our commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income on development when thefiscal situation allows. And we will maintain the other vital instruments of our influence
overseas, such as our global diplomatic network and the British Council, driving forward
campaigns for girls’ education and religious and media freedom.
British leadership in the world in 2021
2021 will be a year of British leadership, setting the tone for the UK’s international
engagement in the decade ahead, through our presidency of the G7 and the Cornwall
summit in June, the Global Partnership for Education, which we will co-host with Kenya
in July, and culminating in the 26th UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow inNovember, in partnership with Italy.
In 2021 the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the two largest warships everbuilt for the Royal Navy, will lead a British and allied task group on the UK’s most ambitious
global deployment for two decades, visiting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and theIndo‑Pacific. She will demonstrate our interoperability with allies and partners – in particular
the United States – and our ability to project cutting-edge military power in support ofNATO and international maritime security. Her deployment will also help the Government todeepen our diplomatic and prosperity links with allies and partners worldwide.
I am profoundly optimistic about the UK’s place in the world and our ability to seize theopportunities ahead. The ingenuity of our citizens and the strength of our Union will
combine with our international partnerships, modernised armed forces and a new green
agenda, enabling us to look forward with confidence as we shape the world of the future.

I. Foreword from the Prime Minister

5

The Prime Minister’s vision for the UK in 2030
A stronger, more secure, prosperous and resilient Union
The United Kingdom will be a beacon of democratic sovereignty and one of the mostinfluential countries in the world, tackling the issues that matter most to our citizens
through our actions at home and overseas.
Our Union will be more secure and prosperous, with the benefits of growth andopportunity shared between all our citizens, wherever they live in the UK.
We will have built back better from COVID-19 with a strong economic recovery and greater
national resilience to threats and hazards in the physical and digital worlds.
We will be better-equipped for a more competitive world – defending our democratic
institutions and economy from state threats, terrorists and organised crime groups,
while embracing innovation in science and technology to boost our national prosperity
and strategic advantage.
A problem-solving and burden-sharing nation with a global perspective
The UK will meet the responsibilities that come with our position as a permanent memberof the UN Security Council. We will play a more active part in sustaining an international
order in which open societies and economies continue to flourish and the benefits ofprosperity are shared through free trade and global growth.
We will sit at the heart of a network of like-minded countries and flexible groupings,
committed to protecting human rights and upholding global norms. Our influence will be
amplified by stronger alliances and wider partnerships – none more valuable to British
citizens than our relationship with the United States.
We will continue to be the leading European Ally within NATO, bolstering the Allianceby tackling threats jointly and committing our resources to collective security in theEuro-Atlantic region. As a European nation, we will enjoy constructive and productive
relationships with our neighbours in the European Union, based on mutual respect forsovereignty and the UK’s freedom to do things differently, economically and politically,
where that suits our interests.
By 2030, we will be deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partnerwith the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually-beneficial trade,shared security and values. We will be active in Africa, in particular in East Africa andwith important partners such as Nigeria. And we will have thriving relationships in the
Middle East and the Gulf based on trade, green innovation and science and technology
collaboration, in support of a more resilient region that is increasingly self-reliant inproviding for its own security.

6

Integrated Review

Creating new foundations for our prosperity
By 2030, the UK will continue to lead the advanced economies of the world in green
technology as part of our wider international leadership in tackling climate change
and biodiversity loss. We will be firmly on the path to achieving global net zero carbon
emissions, having reduced our own national emissions by at least 68% compared to1990 levels. We will also have protected at least 30% of our land and sea to support therecovery of nature.
We will be recognised as a Science and Tech Superpower, remaining at least third in theworld in relevant performance measures for scientific research and innovation, and having
established a leading edge in critical areas such as artificial intelligence.
We will be at the forefront of global regulation on technology, cyber, digital and data
– to protect our own and fellow democracies and to bolster the UK’s status as a global
services, digital and data hub, maximising the commercial and employment opportunities
for the British people.
The UK will be a magnet for international innovation and talent, attracting the best andbrightest from overseas through our points-based immigration system. Every part of theUK will enjoy the benefits of long-term investment in research and development, educationand our cultural institutions.
Adapting to a more competitive world: our integrated approach
The UK will continue to be renowned for our leadership in security, diplomacy anddevelopment, conflict resolution and poverty reduction. Our cooperation will be highly
prized around the world and we will be a model for an integrated approach to tackling
global challenges, integrating our resources for maximum effect.
As a maritime trading nation, we will be a global champion of free and fair trade. We willcontinue to ensure that the openness of our economy – to the free flow of trade, capital,
data, innovation and ideas – is an advantage by protecting ourselves and our allies from
corruption, manipulation, exploitation or the theft of our intellectual property.
Our diplomatic service, armed forces and security and intelligence agencies will be themost innovative and effective for their size in the world, able to keep our citizens safe athome and support our allies and partners globally. They will be characterised by agility,
speed of action and digital integration – with a greater emphasis on engaging, training andassisting others.
We will remain a nuclear-armed power with global reach and integrated military capabilities
across all five operational domains. We will have a dynamic space programme and will be
one of the world’s leading democratic cyber powers. Our diplomacy will be underwrittenby the credibility of our deterrent and our ability to project power.

I. Foreword from the Prime Minister7

UK strengths
DEFENCE AND SECURITY
World-leading security
and intelligenceagencies, supportedby over £3bn ofinvestment each year

2nd highest defence
spender in NATO andhighest in Europe
28 terror attacks
disrupted in the UK
since 2017

2 tonnes of drugs,
77 firearmsand £54m in
criminal cash
seized and 746
arrested under
Operation Venetic
OUR ECONOMYA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUPERPOWER
Home to leading medical research,such as the Oxford University/
AstraZeneca vaccine£

UK has won the 2nd highest
number of Nobel Prizes, with
99 Nobel laureates

Ranked 4th in the Global
Innovation Index

11.5%
of all global
foreign-listedcompanies
worldwide
are listed on
the London
Stock Exchange

3rd in the world for tech
unicorns, with 77 techcompanies valued
at over $1bn

A GLOBAL LEADER IN DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT

4th largest diplomatic
network: 281 posts
in 178 countries andterritories
One of the largest
funders of the WHO,
increasing funding by 30%
over four years, and thelargest funder of Gavi
1
8

Integrated
Review
1IntegratedReview

One of thelargest bilateral andmultilateral donors
to global education,committed togetting 40m moregirls into schoolby 2025
One of the largest
donors and founding
members of COVAX,
which will supply 1bn
vaccine doses in 2021,
vaccinating up to
500m people in over 90
developing countries

NATO
World Bank and IMF
OSCEUN Human Rights
Council 2021-22

G7 (President 2021) Commonwealth

The UK has a seat in every
major multilateral organisation
Founding member of the UN
P5 member of the
UN Security Council
Council of Europe

G20

A SOFT POWER SUPERPOWER
The BBC is the mosttrusted broadcasterworldwide, reaching
468m people every
week, in 42 languages

3rd ranked
soft powerin the world

The British Council
operates inover 100countries

A RESPONSIBLE CYBER POWER
5th largest economy
in the world

3rd most
powerful
cyber nationin the world,
ranking top
in defence,
intelligence,
norms and
offensive
capabilities

The UK space industry
generates an income of£14.8bn annually, with moresatellites produced in Scotland
than in any European country
3rd top destination
for private technology
investment, ahead of
the rest of Europe

Belfast is a world-leading cybersecurity hub, and a top international
investment location for cybersecurity firms

UK cyber
network covers
122 countries
across 6
continents
Major sponsor
of women incyber across theglobe, including 24
cyber fellowships
in the Gulf and
14 across theCommonwealth

A WORLD LEADER IN CLIMATE ACTION

UK reduced its
emissions byover 40%
between
1990-2018

From 2021 to 2026,
the UK will commit £11.6bn
to International Climate
Finance, including £3bn for
nature financing

Wales is home to worldleading hydrogen researchand development facilities ,such as Cardiff University’sGas Turbine Research Centre

Establishedthe world’s
first dedicateddiplomatic green
network – theClimate Change
and Energy
Network. UK’s
climate finance hasleveraged £4.1bn
public and £2.2bn
private financefor climate action
across Africa, Asiaand Latin America

Ut ullupta
tatendissum
I. X.
Foreword
fromthe Primeducipsum
Minister2
9

II.	Overview

1.

The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy(Integrated Review) concludes at an important moment for the United Kingdom.
The world has changed considerably since the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security
Review, as has the UK’s place within it. Our departure from the European Union(EU) provides a unique opportunity to reconsider many aspects of our domestic
and foreign policy, building on existing friendships but also looking further afield.
We must exploit the freedom that comes with increased independence, such as
the ability to forge new free trade deals. We must also do more to adapt to majorchanges in the world around us, including the growing importance of the Indo-Pacificregion. Our ability to cooperate more effectively with others, particularly like-minded
partners, will become increasingly important to our prosperity and security in thedecade ahead.

2.

At the heart of the Integrated Review is an increased commitment to security andresilience, so that the British people are protected against threats. This starts
at home, by defending our people, territory, critical national infrastructure (CNI),
democratic institutions and way of life – and by reducing our vulnerability to the threat
from states, terrorism and serious and organised crime (SOC).

3.

In strengthening our homeland security, we will build on firm foundations in counterterrorism, intelligence, cyber security and countering the proliferation of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We will seek to match thisexcellence in other areas, through enhanced capabilities and appropriate legal
powers that equip us to meet rapidly changing threats. We will also ensure thatscience and technology (S&T) is elevated to the highest importance as a componentof national security, with a particular emphasis on growing our cyber power.

4.

In keeping with our history, the UK will continue to play a leading international rolein collective security, multilateral governance, tackling climate change andhealth risks, conflict resolution and poverty reduction. We accept the risk thatcomes with our commitment to global peace and stability, from our tripwire NATO
presence in Estonia and Poland to on-the-ground support for UN peacekeeping
and humanitarian relief. Our commitment to European security is unequivocal,
through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force and strong bilateral relations.
There are few more reliable and credible allies around the world than the UK,with the willingness to confront serious challenges and the ability to turn the dial oninternational issues of consequence.

5.

The Integrated Review also signals a change of approach. Over the last
decade, UK policy has been focused on preserving the post-Cold War ‘rulesbased international system’ which has greatly benefited the UK and other nations.
Today, however, the international order is more fragmented, characterised byintensifying competition between states over interests, norms and values. A defenceof the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead.

II. Overview

11

6.

The Integrated Review therefore recognises the need for a sharper and more
dynamic focus in order to: adapt to a more competitive and fluid international
environment; do more to reinforce parts of the international architecture thatare under threat; and shape the international order of the future by working
with others. In particular, we will increase our efforts to protect open societies anddemocratic values where they are being undermined; and to seek good governanceand create shared rules in frontiers such as cyberspace and space.

7.

Our foreign policy rests on strong domestic foundations, in particular our
security, resilience and the strength of our economy. It also, crucially, depends on abond of trust with the British people. Polling in the UK shows deep reserves of faithin bodies like the UN and NATO and the pillars of British defence such as the armed
forces and the nuclear deterrent. This is bolstered by high levels of trust in the powerof S&T to tackle domestic and international challenges, as we have seen during the
COVID-19 pandemic.

8.

Yet the international order is only as robust, resilient and legitimate as the statesthat comprise it. Liberal democracies must do more to prove the benefits ofopenness – free and fair trade, the flow of capital and knowledge – to populations
that have grown sceptical about its merits or been inadequately protected in thepast from the downsides of globalisation. This means tackling the priority issues– health, security, economic well-being and the environment – that matter mostto our citizens in their everyday lives. In the years ahead, our national security andinternational policy must do a better job of putting the interests and values of the
British people at the heart of everything we do.

The Integrated Review
9.

This publication sets out the principal conclusions of the Integrated Review. It comprises:• The Prime Minister’s vision for the UK in 2030, from which the other outputs of
the Integrated Review flow.
• The Government’s current assessment of the major trends that will shape thenational security and international environment to 2030.
• A Strategic Framework that establishes the Government’s overarching national
security and international policy objectives, with priority actions, to 2025.
• An outline of the approach we will take to implementing the Strategic Framework.
• A list of Spending Review (SR) 2020 decisions that support the Integrated Review,
and a description of our use of evidence and the programme of domestic andinternational engagement which supported our work.

10. The document is intended as a guide for action for those responsible for aspects ofnational security and international policy across government, including in departmentsthat would not previously have been considered part of the national security
community. It will also inform spending decisions to be taken in future SRs.

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Integrated Review

11. The findings of the Integrated Review are publicly available so that the British people
can understand how the Government will seek to protect and promote their interestsand values. Given the Review’s strong emphasis on the need to work with others,
we are also aware that it will be of interest to our allies and partners, especially in
identifying the UK’s long-term objectives following our departure from the EU.
Our interests and our values: the glue that binds the Union
12. The Government’s first and overriding priority is to protect and promote the interestsof the British people through our actions at home and overseas. The mostimportant of these interests are:i. Sovereignty: the ability of the British people to elect their political representatives
democratically in line with their constitutional traditions, and to do so free fromcoercion and manipulation. This encompasses the ability of citizens to protect
their individual sovereignty within the rule of law, ensuring that their rights andliberties are protected, including online.
ii. Security: the protection of our people, territory, CNI, democratic institutions andway of life. Ensuring security in today’s world involves a growing range of activities:
from tackling threats from states and non-state actors such as terrorists andorganised crime groups; to building societal resilience so that we are better able towithstand risks and unexpected shocks, including future environmental and global
health emergencies.
iii. Prosperity: the ability of the British people to enjoy a high level of economic
and social well-being, supporting their families and seizing opportunities toimprove their lives. This Government believes that true prosperity depends on
the levelling-up of opportunity and doing more to share the benefits of economic
growth across the UK. It also believes that our prosperity and security aremutually reinforcing.
13. These shared interests bind together the citizens of the United Kingdom,along with our Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, giving us an advantage
in an increasingly competitive global environment and a distinctive and influential voicein the world. It is as the United Kingdom that we boast armed forces with global reachand have one of the most extensive diplomatic networks in the world, promoting
British interests and providing round-the-clock consular assistance to British nationals
abroad. It is by combining the resources of our Union and pooling the expertise of
our citizens in areas such as science and health that we are able to respond to global
challenges and project our influence overseas. It is as the United Kingdom that in
2021 we will host the G7 in Cornwall and 26th UN Climate Change Conference of theParties (COP26) in Glasgow.
14. The Union is also bound by shared values that are fundamental to our national
identity, democracy and way of life. These include a commitment to universal humanrights, the rule of law, free speech and fairness and equality. The same essential
values will continue to guide all aspects of our national security and international
policy in the decade ahead, especially in the face of rising authoritarianism and thepersistence of extremist ideologies. They are also expressed through our support forclimate action and the UK’s leadership in poverty reduction around the world.

II. Overview

1315. In most cases, the UK’s interests and values are closely aligned. A world in which
democratic societies flourish and fundamental human rights are protected is one thatis more conducive to our sovereignty, security and prosperity as a nation. In pursuing
our goals to 2030, we will seek to make steady progress towards the protection andpromotion of these values and of democracy around the world.
16. At the same time, our approach will be realistic and adapted to circumstances.
Our ability to tackle transnational challenges, from security to climate change,
will depend on our capacity to work with a wide range of partners across the world,
including those who do not necessarily share the same values.
The Government’s approach so far: Global Britain in action
17. The UK is a European country with global interests, as an open economy and amaritime trading nation with a large diaspora. Our future prosperity will be enhanced
by deepening our economic connections with dynamic parts of the world such as the
Indo-Pacific, Africa and the Gulf, as well as trade with Europe. The precondition for
Global Britain is the safety of our citizens at home and the security of the Euro‑Atlantic
region, where the bulk of the UK’s security focus will remain. As we look further afield,
the future success of Global Britain requires us to understand the precise natureand extent of British strengths and the integrated offer we bring in other parts of theworld. It is an approach that puts diplomacy first. As we engage more in the IndoPacific, for example, we will adapt to the regional balance of power and respect theinterests of others – and seek to work with existing structures such as the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
18. What Global Britain means in practice is best defined by actions rather thanwords. The fundamentals of this Government’s approach to national security andinternational policy are reflected in the actions we have taken since the 2019 generalelection. They demonstrate an active approach to delivering in the interests of
the British people: sustaining the UK’s openness as a society and economy,
underpinned by a shift to a more robust position on security and deterrence.
This runs alongside a renewed commitment to the UK as a force for good in
the world – defending openness, democracy and human rights – and an increased
determination to seek multilateral solutions to challenges like climate change andglobal health crises, as seen in our response to COVID-19.
19. For example, in seeking multilateral solutions, we have used the UK’s convening
power on a range of issues across security, trade and development, including at
the NATO Leaders Meeting of December 2019 and the Africa Investment Summitof January 2020. Under our ambitious environmental agenda, we have set a net
zero target for 2050 and increased our commitment to International Climate Finance(ICF) to £11.6 billion. The UK also played a central role in negotiating the Leaders’Pledge for Nature adopted in September 2020, committing world leaders to urgent
action to reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. These efforts have set up our year ofleadership in 2021.

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Integrated Review

20. We have also led international efforts in response to COVID-19, underwhich we have:• Hosted the Global Vaccine Summit in June 2020 and reinforced our position as
the largest donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
• Committed up to £548 million to COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX)
to help provide developing countries with 1 billion doses of the vaccine in 2021.
We will also send the majority of any future surplus coronavirus vaccines fromour supply to the COVAX scheme.
• Launched a five-point plan at the UN General Assembly to protect the world fromfuture pandemics.
• Established an informal network of government, industry and academics to advise
the G7 on accelerating the development and deployment of vaccines for new
pathogens in future.
• Offered our expertise in genome sequencing to support other countries in tracking
new variants, building on the work of British researchers in sequencing 50% of the
global database of coronavirus genomes. The findings of the UK’s Recovery Trial– the world’s largest clinical trial for COVID-19 treatments – have also prevented
over a million deaths worldwide.
21. In strengthening our defence and security, and to play our part in burden-sharing
with allies, we have:• Made the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of theCold War, exceeding NATO’s 2% spending guideline and strengthening our mostimportant alliance.
• Deployed 300 UK troops to Mali in December 2020 to support the UN’s
peacekeeping mission, providing highly-specialised reconnaissance capability.
• Increased funding for counter-terrorism (CT) policing and introduced newlegislation to improve our tools for fighting terrorism and state threats, including
the Covert Human Intelligence Source Act, the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing
Bill and the National Security and Investment Bill.
• Made a significant breakthrough in the fight against SOC in June 2020, when we
infiltrated the encrypted communications of criminals under Operation Venetic– the UK’s largest ever law enforcement operation.
• Disrupted cyber-attacks targeting vital national infrastructure, publicly attributing
attacks to state actors where we had compelling evidence to do so.
• Published a pioneering ethical framework in February 2021 to guide theresponsible use of artificial intelligence (AI) by Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) across its missions – from tackling SOC to disrupting
state‑based disinformation campaigns.
• Demonstrated global leadership on reducing space threats, working with likeminded nations to deliver a UN General Assembly resolution that reshapes theinternational debate on threats to the space systems on which we rely.

II. Overview

1522. As part of our efforts to defend human rights and support vulnerable people,
we have:• Introduced a new system of ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions to target human rights violators
and abusers around the world. We were the first European country to announce
sanctions against the regime in Belarus in September 2020.
• Offered British Nationals (Overseas) and their eligible family members the right tolive and work in the UK, putting them on a path to British citizenship, when China
breached a legally-binding agreement and imposed a repressive national security
law on Hong Kong.
• Announced a package of measures to ensure that British organisations are neither
complicit in nor profiting from the extensive human rights violations in Xinjiang,as part of our efforts to tackle modern slavery.
• Launched our tackling child sexual abuse strategy to drive action in the UK andinternationally to disrupt and prevent offending, both online and offline.
• Supported vulnerable children’s education by funding the salaries of over 5,500
teachers in refugee camps in 10 countries through UNHCR. We have also
adapted our bilateral programmes in response to COVID-19 to support girls whoare hard to reach and at risk of leaving education permanently.
• Launched the Call to Action to Prevent Famine in September 2020 and appointed
the UK’s first Special Envoy for Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Affairs.
We have since pledged £180 million to tackle food insecurity and famine risk,
providing aid to more than seven million vulnerable people in some of the world’s
most dangerous places.
23. We have also pursued measures to enhance our long-term prosperity. For example:• In under two years, we have secured trade agreements with 66 non-EU countries
in addition to our Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. We have also
applied for accession to the CPTPP.
• We have published the 2025 UK border strategy, with the goal of creating aborder that is efficient, smart and responsive.
• We have introduced a new points-based immigration system, including a new
Global Talent Visa, to attract the best and brightest from around the world. This
will ensure we can secure the talent we need for key sectors in our economy,treating EU and non-EU citizens equally.
• We have published a national research and development (R&D) roadmap.
Learning from the successes of the Vaccines Taskforce, we have announced
an independent Advanced Research and Invention Agency, which will be led
by scientists with the freedom to identify and fund transformational science andtechnology at speed.
24. In 2021, we will build on this work by convening the G7 and hosting COP26 inpartnership with Italy and the Global Partnership for Education with Kenya. Our mostimmediate priority will be to build back better from COVID-19, demonstrating
the benefits of international cooperation. In addition, we will pursue an extensive
multilateral agenda on climate change, global health, free and fair trade and economic

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resilience. We will continue to work with others to reform and strengthen theinstitutions that support those objectives, including the World Health Organization(WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO).
The Government’s long-term approach to 2030
25. To meet the Prime Minister’s vision for 2030, we will need a long-term strategic
approach – combining all the instruments available to government – that continues
to adapt to a changing international environment. This is a context defined by:geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, such as China’s increasing international
assertiveness and the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific; systemiccompetition, including between states, and between democratic and authoritarianvalues and systems of government; rapid technological change; and transnational
challenges, such as climate change, biosecurity risks, terrorism and SOC.
26. Against this uncertain backdrop, the unifying purpose of the UK’s national security
and international policy is to ensure that the things that define us as a nation –our open society and economy founded on democratic values – remain sources ofstrength and comparative advantage, driving prosperity and improving the wellbeing of people across the Union.
27. In the more contested environment of the 2020s, this requires us to be more active
in creating a world in which open societies and economies can flourish, shaping theinternational order of the future – championing free trade and global cooperation,
tackling conflict and instability, and standing up for democracy and human rights.
We must also strengthen our security and resilience against those who seek tocoerce us, and make it harder for terrorists and organised crime groups to achieve
their goals.
28. The ability to move swiftly and with greater agility, amplifying our strong,
independent voice by working with others, will be the determining characteristic of
the UK’s foreign policy following our departure from the EU. Our effectiveness will
also depend on our ability to maintain a consistent level of international influence,
maintaining the soft and hard power capabilities required to support this. We must be
prepared to compete with others, and to find new ways to cooperate throughcreative diplomacy and multilateralism.
29. In the years ahead we will need to manage inevitable tensions and trade-offs:
between our openness and the need to safeguard our people, economy and way oflife through measures that increase our security and resilience; between competingand cooperating with other states, sometimes at the same time; and between
our short-term commercial interests and our values. Maintaining a long-term
perspective will help us navigate the path ahead. Preserving our freedom of action
will enable us to adapt to circumstances as they change.

II. Overview

17

Introducing our Strategic Framework to 2025
30. As the outcome of the Integrated Review, we have established a Strategic
Framework, which responds to prevailing trends in the international context and isintended to provide handrails for future policy‑making to deliver our long-term
approach. The Framework sets the Government’s overarching national security
and international policy objectives to 2025. It identifies how we can bring all the
instruments available to the Government together to achieve these objectives.
It does not provide detailed regional and country strategies or an exhaustive
description of all the activity we will undertake in the coming years. Instead, it setsa foreign policy baseline and identifies priority actions, reflecting the need for flexibility
in our approach and setting out where further policy work and new sub‑strategies
are required.
31. The Strategic Framework has been used to guide spending decisions under SR
2020, including departmental settlements and funding for several new initiatives(see Annex A). Future SRs will also be informed by this Framework and will provide
further opportunities to align resources with ambition.
32. The four overarching and mutually supporting objectives set by the Strategic
Framework are:i. Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology: we will
incorporate S&T as an integral element of our national security and international
policy, fortifying the position of the UK as a global S&T and responsible
cyber power. This will be essential in gaining economic, political and security
advantages in the coming decade and in shaping international norms incollaboration with allies and partners. It will also drive prosperity at home andprogress towards the three objectives that follow.
ii. Shaping the open international order of the future: we will use our convening
power and work with partners to reinvigorate the international system. In doing
so, we will ensure that it is one in which open societies and open economies
can flourish as we move further into the digital age – creating a world that is morefavourable to democracies and the defence of universal values. We will seek toreinforce and renew existing pillars of the international order – such as the UN
and the global trading system – and to establish norms in the future frontiers ofcyberspace, emerging technology, data and space.
iii. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas: we will workwith allies and partners to address challenges to our security in the physicalworld and online. NATO will remain the foundation of collective security in ourhome region of the Euro-Atlantic, where Russia remains the most acute threat
to our security. We will also place greater emphasis on building our capacity
and that of like-minded nations around the world in responding to a growing
range of transnational state threats,1 radicalisation and terrorism, SOC andweapons proliferation.
iv. Building resilience at home and overseas: we will place greater emphasis onresilience, recognising that it is not possible to predict or prevent every risk to our
1

18

The term ‘state threats’ is now used in place of ‘Hostile State Activity’.

Integrated Review

security and prosperity – whether natural hazards such as extreme weather eventsor threats such as cyber-attacks. We will improve our own ability to anticipate,prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from risks – as well as that ofour allies and partners, recognising the closely interconnnected nature of ourworld. And we will prioritise efforts to tackle climate change and biodiversity
loss, long-term challenges that if left unchecked threaten the future of humanity– in addition to building global health resilience.
33. The UK will not be able to achieve these objectives working alone: collective action
and co-creation with our allies and partners will be vitally important in thedecade ahead – leading by example where we have unique or significant strengths(such as in areas of medical science, green technologies and aspects of data andAI) and identifying where we are better placed to support others in leading theadvance towards our shared goals.
34. The Government will need to combine a planned strategy – which sets long-term
objectives, anticipates challenges along the way, and charts a course towards
them – with an adaptive approach. Essential to this is deeper integration acrossgovernment, building on the Fusion Doctrine introduced in the 2018 National
Security Capability Review. A more integrated approach supports faster decisionmaking, more effective policy-making and more coherent implementation by bringing
together defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security, trade andaspects of domestic policy in pursuit of cross-government, national objectives.
35. The logic of integration is to make more of finite resources within a more competitive
world in which speed of adaptation can provide decisive advantage. It is a responseto the fact that adversaries and competitors are already acting in a more
integrated way – fusing military and civilian technology and increasingly blurring theboundaries between war and peace, prosperity and security, trade and development,
and domestic and foreign policy. It also recognises the fact that the distinction
between economic and national security is increasingly redundant.
36. We are already taking major steps towards greater integration across government,
including:• The creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office(FCDO), bringing our diplomatic and development expertise and policy together
as One HMG overseas.
• The Integrated Operating Concept 2025, which will deepen integration of UK
defence across the five operational domains and with other instruments of state
power, and improve interoperability with allies.
• New cross-cutting capabilities such as the Situation Centre, Counter Terrorism
Operations Centre (CTOC), National Cyber Force (NCF) and a national
capability in digital twinning.
37. Finally, the UK will also bring an integrated approach to working with othersaround the world – that is, we will combine hard and soft power, harness the public
and private sector, and deploy British expertise from inside and outside government
in pursuit of national objectives.

II. Overview

19

The principal continuities and changes in our approach
Our Strategic Framework involves significant continuities from the UK’s previous
national security and international policy, adapted to meet the opportunities andchallenges of the coming decade:i. The United States will remain our most important bilateral relationship, essential to
key alliances and groups such as NATO and the Five Eyes, and our largest bilateral
trading partner and inward investor. We will reinforce our cooperation in traditional
policy areas such as security and intelligence and seek to bolster it where together
we can have greater impact, such as in tackling illicit finance.
ii. Collective security through NATO: the UK will remain the leading European Allyin NATO, working with allies to deter nuclear, conventional and hybrid threats to our
security, particularly from Russia. We will continue to exceed the NATO guideline ofspending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, and to declare our nuclear
and offensive cyber capabilities to Allies’ defence under our Article 5 commitment.
iii. CT and SOC: we will keep our citizens safe from terrorism, working at homeand overseas to detect, disrupt and deter terrorist threats, and to address theirunderlying drivers. Our CT capabilities will be integrated in our new Counter
Terrorism Operations Centre. We will also tackle SOC, strengthening the National
Crime Agency and regional and local policing, and sustaining our international
networks so that we are able to address the links between criminality from the local
to international levels.
iv. Upholding universal human rights: we will act as a force for good in standing up
for human rights around the world, providing support to open societies and using
our independent (‘Magnitsky-style’) sanctions regime to hold to account those
involved in serious human rights violations and abuses.
v. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): we will remain a world-leadinginternational development donor, committed to the global fight against poverty andto achieving the UN SDGs by 2030. We will support others to become more selfsufficient through trade and economic growth and increase our ability to achieve
long-term change through combining our diplomatic and development expertise.
vi. Girls’ education: we will continue our efforts to ensure all girls have at least
12 years of quality education and to get 40 million more girls in developing countries
into school by 2025, using our aid spending and presidency – with Kenya – of the
Global Partnership for Education summit in 2021.
vii. An open and innovative digital economy: we will establish the UK as a global
services, digital and data hub and remain one of the world’s most open economies– championing free and fair trade, welcoming inward investment under our planfor growth and tackling illicit finance. We will use all our economic tools and our
independent trade policy to create economic growth that is distributed more
equitably across the UK and to diversify our supply chains in critical goods.
Our new Investment Security Unit will safeguard British intellectual property andcompanies against national security risks, intervening in inward investment where
necessary and proportionate.
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Integrated Review

Attaining our objectives under the Strategic Framework will also involve somesignificant changes and shifts in policy:
i. Shaping the international order of the future: we will move from defending
the status quo within the post-Cold War international system to dynamicallyshaping the post-COVID order, extending it in the future frontiers of cyberspaceand space, and protecting democratic values. This will require active diplomacy,
especially in using regulatory diplomacy to influence the rules, norms and standards
governing technology and the digital economy. It will also require us to maximise
our convening power and to do more to win elections for senior positions within
multilateral institutions.
ii. Europe: the UK will remain deeply invested in the security and prosperity of Europe.
Our exit from the EU means we have the opportunity to follow different economic
and political paths where this is in our interests, and to mark a distinctive approach
to foreign policy. Equally, we will work with the EU where our interests coincide – forexample, in supporting the stability and security of the European continent and incooperating on climate action and biodiversity.
iii. Climate and biodiversity: we will lead sustained international action to accelerate
progress towards net zero emissions by 2050 and build global climate resilience,starting with our presidency of COP26 in 2021 and our International Climate
Finance commitment of £11.6 billion. And we will lead efforts to reset the world’s
relationship with nature, including by committing £3 billion of our ICF to solutions
that protect and restore nature.
iv. Science and technology: we will take a more active approach to building andsustaining strategic advantage through S&T, using it in support of our national
goals. We will create the enabling environment for a thriving S&T ecosystem in the
UK and extend our international collaboration, ensuring that the UK’s successful
research base translates into influence over the critical and emerging technologies
that are central to geopolitical competition and our future prosperity. We will adopt
an own-collaborate-access framework to guide government activity in priority areasof S&T, such as AI, quantum technologies and engineering biology.
v. Responsible, democratic cyber power: we will adopt a comprehensive cyberstrategy to maintain the UK’s competitive edge in this rapidly evolving domain. We
will build a resilient and prosperous digital UK, and make much more integrated,creative and routine use of the UK’s full spectrum of levers – including the National
Cyber Force’s offensive cyber tools – to detect, disrupt and deter our adversaries.
vi. Space: we will make the UK a meaningful actor in space, with an integrated space
strategy which brings together military and civil space policy for the first time.
We will support the growth of the UK commercial space sector, and ensure the UK
has the capabilities to protect and defend our interests in a more congested andcontested space domain – including through the new Space Command and theability to launch British satellites from the UK by 2022.

II. Overview

21

vii. Indo-Pacific: we will pursue deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific in supportof shared prosperity and regional stability, with stronger diplomatic and tradingties. This approach recognises the importance of powers in the region suchas China, India and Japan and also extends to others including South Korea,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. We willseek closer relations through existing institutions such as ASEAN and seek
accession to the CPTPP.
viii. China: we will do more to adapt to China’s growing impact on many aspects of ourlives as it becomes more powerful in the world. We will invest in enhanced Chinafacing capabilities, through which we will develop a better understanding of China
and its people, while improving our ability to respond to the systemic challenge thatit poses to our security, prosperity and values – and those of our allies and partners.
We will continue to pursue a positive trade and investment relationship with
China, while ensuring our national security and values are protected. We will also
cooperate with China in tackling transnational challenges such as climate change.
ix. Global health: we will work to strengthen global health security, including throughthe Prime Minister’s five-point plan to bolster international pandemic preparedness.
We will seek reform of the WHO, increasing our funding by 30% to £340 million overthe next four years, and we will prioritise supporting health systems and access to
new health technologies using our Official Development Assistance (ODA).
x. Armed forces: we will create armed forces that are both prepared for warfighting
and more persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment, training,
capacity-building and education. They will have full-spectrum capabilities –embracing the newer domains of cyberspace and space and developing high-tech
capabilities in other domains, such as the Future Combat Air System. They will also
be able to keep pace with changing threats posed by adversaries, with greater
investment in rapid technology development and adoption.
xi. State threats: we will bolster our efforts to detect, deter and respond to state
threats in order to protect our people, infrastructure, economy and values fromthose who seek to do them harm. We will introduce new legislation to give our
security and intelligence agencies and police the powers they need to tackle thechallenges we will face in the coming decade.
xii. Domestic and international resilience: we will improve our ability – and that of ourallies and partners – to anticipate, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover fromrisks to our security and prosperity. It will be essential to take a whole-of-society
approach to resilience across the Union, in addition to cooperating with international
partners to address challenges such as climate change and global health risks.
Learning from COVID-19, we will improve our ability to anticipate and respond tocrises by establishing a cross-government Situation Centre in the Cabinet Officeand developing a national capability in digital twinning.

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Integrated Review

III.	The national security andinternational environment to 2030

1.

This section describes the Government’s assessment of the strategic context to2030. Its judgements are drawn from the evidence base assembled during theIntegrated Review (see Annex B), including external consultation, the public call forevidence and internal analysis.

2.

The nature and distribution of global power is changing as we move towards
a more competitive and multipolar world. Over the coming decade, we judge thatfour overarching trends will be of particular importance to the UK and the changing
international order:• Geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts: such as China’s increasing power andassertiveness internationally, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific to global
prosperity and security, and the emergence of new markets and growth of the
global middle class.
• Systemic competition: the intensification of competition between states andwith non-state actors, manifested in: a growing contest over international rules
and norms; the formation of competing geopolitical and economic blocs ofinfluence and values that cut across our security, economy and the institutions
that underpin our way of life; the deliberate targeting of the vulnerabilities within
democratic systems by authoritarian states and malign actors; and the testingof the boundary between war and peace, as states use a growing range of
instruments to undermine and coerce others.
• Rapid technological change: technological developments and digitisation
will reshape our societies, economies and change relationships – both between
states, and between the citizen, the private sector and the state. S&T will bringenormous benefits but will also be an arena of intensifying systemic competition.
• Transnational challenges: such as climate change, global health risks, illicit
finance, SOC and terrorism. These threaten our shared security and prosperity,
requiring collective action and multilateral cooperation to address them. Of thesetransnational challenges, climate change and biodiversity loss present the most
severe tests to global resilience and will require particularly urgent action.
These trends will overlap and interact, and the long-term effects of COVID-19 will
influence their trajectory in ways that are currently difficult to predict.

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Integrated Review

3.

The realistic optimum scenario is an international order in which these trends can be
managed effectively, with nations coming together to revive multilateral cooperation,
strengthen global governance and harness the opportunities ahead for growth andprosperity. We must also prepare for the possibility that the post-COVID international
order will be increasingly contested and fragmented, reducing global cooperation andmaking it harder to protect our interests and values. The Strategic Framework that
follows this chapter is designed to help us navigate the challenges ahead, laying out
how we will work with others, maximising opportunities and minimising risks to the
UK and our citizens.

Geopoliticaland geoeconomic
shiftsSystemiccompetition

Rapid
technologicalchangeTransnational
challenges

III. The national security and international environment to 2030

25

Geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts: moving towards a multipolar world
There will be significant areas of geopolitical and geoeconomic continuity in the 2020s:
the US will remain an economic, military and diplomatic superpower, and the UK’s mostimportant strategic ally. The Euro-Atlantic region will remain critical to the UK’s security
and prosperity; partnerships beyond the immediate European neighbourhood will also
remain important. Russia will remain the most acute direct threat to the UK, and the US willcontinue to ask more from its allies in Europe in sharing the burden of collective security.
Overall, however, the distribution of global political and economic power – both within
and between states, and between regions – will continue to change, with direct andindirect implications for UK interests. By 2030, it is likely that the world will have moved
further towards multipolarity, with the geopolitical and economic centre of gravity moving
eastward towards the Indo-Pacific.
China as a systemic competitor. China’s increasing power and international
assertiveness is likely to be the most significant geopolitical factor of the 2020s.
The scale and reach of China’s economy, size of its population, technologicaladvancement and increasing ambition to project its influence on the global stage,for example through the Belt and Road Initiative, will have profound implications
worldwide. Open, trading economies like the UK will need to engage with
China and remain open to Chinese trade and investment, but they must also
protect themselves against practices that have an adverse effect on prosperity
and security. Cooperation with China will also be vital in tackling transnational
challenges, particularly climate change and biodiversity loss.
Shifts in the global balance of economic power. Drivers of growth in the global
economy are likely to continue moving to the south and east, in particular towards
the Indo-Pacific region. The rapid growth of emerging markets is also expected
to increase the size of the global middle class, from 3.8 billion people in 2018 to
5.3 billion in 2030, increasing opportunities for trade in higher value-added goods
and services. This will offer considerable opportunities for countries like the UKwith its strengths in these areas.
Global growth and economic stability. Before COVID-19, the world was alreadyfacing a decade of weak growth. COVID-19 has caused a deep global recession
and the economic impact of the pandemic is likely to dominate the first half of thedecade, with the shape of the recovery uncertain. Further economic shocks are
possible, for example caused by the uneven impact of new technologies acrossand within states. The expected shift away from fossil fuels is likely to present
economic challenges, particularly for oil-producing countries.
Challenges to an open global economy. Globalisation began to stall after the
2008-09 financial crisis. COVID-19 will likely accelerate the trend towards moreregional and national approaches, although trade flows recovered relatively quickly
following the initial shock. The momentum for trade liberalisation may continue
to slow and cases of protectionism increase, driven by political and economic
conditions within states and the increasingly aggressive use of economic and trade
policy as a lever in competition between states.

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Decreasing global poverty. Global poverty has reduced markedly in recent
decades, and is projected to fall to under 5% by 2050. After the immediate shockof COVID-19, the momentum towards poverty reduction is likely to resume, withabsolute poverty estimated to be almost eliminated in Asia and Latin America inthe 2030s. Under current trends, however, Africa will increasingly be left behind:by 2045, it is likely that around 85% of the poorest billion people will live in Africa.
Improvements in global education. Over the coming decades, technology
is likely to significantly improve access to and the quality of education globally.
By 2050, almost anyone is likely to have easy access to online education,with technology becoming increasingly portable, accessible and high-speed.
This is likely to help sustain improvements in global literacy rates. In 2000, 81% of
the world’s population was able to read; by 2016 this had increased to 86% andby 2050 it is likely to be around 95%.
Changing demographics. The global population is expected to reach 8.6 billion
by 2030. Population growth will be greatest in sub-Saharan Africa, interacting withother trends, including climate change, poverty and conflict and instability. Globally,
demographic imbalances will become more pronounced, with ageing populations
in more parts of the world.
Geopolitical importance of middle powers. Increasing great power competitionis unlikely to mean a return to Cold War-style blocs. Instead, the influence of
middle powers is likely to grow in the 2020s, particularly when they act together.
In this context, the Indo-Pacific will be of increasing geopolitical and economic
importance, with multiple regional powers with significant weight and influence,both alone and together. Competition will play out there in regional militarisation,
maritime tensions, and a contest over the rules and norms linked to trade andtechnology.
Challenges to democratic governance. The geopolitical role of non-state
actors, in particular large tech companies, is likely to continue to grow. In somedemocracies, inequality – made more visible by digital technology – may increasesocial and political dissatisfaction. Governments may struggle to satisfy populardemands for security and prosperity, with trust further undermined throughdisinformation from malign actors. Authoritarian states will face and confront similar
challenges with a different toolkit, including the use of technologies for surveillanceand political control.

III. The national security and international environment to 2030

27

Systemic competition: a more contested international environment
In a multipolar world, there will be a growing contest between states and groups ofstates to shape the international environment. Non-state actors – ranging from large techcompanies to organised crime groups – will participate in this competition, increasing
its complexity.
Systemic competition will determine the shape of the future international order: the extent
to which it is open, upholding the free exchange of ideas and trade, and facilitating
cooperation on transnational challenges; or fragmented and broadly divided into
geopolitical neighbourhoods and technological ecosystems, eroding cooperation between
nations and enabling the spread of authoritarianism. Competition is likely to be ‘systemic’in a number of ways:
Competition between political systems. Ideological competition between
different types of political system will increase. On current trends, the 15‑year
decline in democracy and pluralism will continue to 2030, accelerated by
COVID-19. Tensions between democratic and authoritarian states are highly likely
to become more pronounced, as authoritarian states seek to export their domestic
models, undermine open societies and economies, and shape global governancein line with their values.
Competition to shape the international order. Competition will increase thestrains on the existing multilateral architecture, weakening established rules
and norms that govern international conduct. In some areas, such as emerging
technology or space, there will be a growing contest – in which non-state
actors will play an important role – to shape new rules, norms and standards,
and to control access to shared resources such as space. Those parts of theinternational architecture where multilateral cooperation adds value, such as
the International Financial Institutions, are more likely to thrive. Conversely,
where multilateral approaches are blocked, nations will likely caucus in smaller,
regional or like‑minded groups.
Competition across multiple spheres. Competition will continue within theconventional military domains of land, sea and air, and will grow in other spheres,
including technology, cyberspace and space, further shaping the wider geopoliticalenvironment. Systemic competition will further test the line between peace andwar, as malign actors use a wider range of tools – such as economic statecraft,cyber-attacks, disinformation and proxies – to achieve their objectives without
open confrontation or conflict. The UK is likely to remain a priority target for suchthreats. Our ability to deter aggression will be challenged by new techniques andtechnologies.

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A deteriorating security environment. Proliferation of CBRN weapons,
advanced conventional weapons and novel military technologies will increase
the risk and intensity of conflict and pose significant challenges to strategic
stability. The advantages offered by high-tech capabilities may be eroded byaffordable, easily-available, low‑tech threats such as drones and improvised
explosive devices. Opportunistic states will increasingly seek strategic advantage
through exploiting and undermining democratic systems and open economies.
Russia will be more active around the wider European neighbourhood, and Iranand North Korea will continue to destabilise their regions. The significant impact ofChina’s military modernisation and growing international assertiveness within the
Indo‑Pacific region and beyond will pose an increasing risk to UK interests.
Growing conflict and instability. The last decade saw an increase in violent
conflict globally. 2016 and 2019 witnessed the highest number of active armed
conflicts internationally since 1946 – the majority being civil wars involving
external actors. To 2030, conflict and instability will remain prevalent and may
increase unless concerted action is taken to address underlying political, social,economic and environmental drivers, especially in fragile states. Driven by systemiccompetition, external powers will likely remain involved in national and regional
conflicts, influencing their course in pursuit of their own advantage. This will
increase risks of conflicts escalating.
Economic statecraft. More states will adopt economic statecraft as a leverin systemic competition. As well as greater protectionism and economic
nationalism, this will sometimes include the deliberate use of economic tools –from conventional economic policy to illicit finance – to target and undermine theeconomic and security interests of rivals. There will be increased competition for
scarce natural resources such as critical minerals, including rare earth elements,
and control of supply may be used as leverage on other issues.
Cyberspace. Cyberspace will be an increasingly contested domain, used bystate and non-state actors. Proliferation of cyber capability to countries andorganised crime groups, along with the growing everyday reliance on digital
infrastructure, will increase the risks of direct and collateral damage to the UK.
Consequently, cyber power will become increasingly important. There will be a
struggle to shape the global digital environment between ‘digital freedom’ and‘digital authoritarianism’, which will have significant implications for real-world
governance.
Space. Space will be a domain of increasing opportunity, as the applicationof new technologies in space enables new possibilities – from commercial
opportunities to international development and climate action. But increasing
commercial and military use of space will make it an important sphere ofcompetition; there will be considerable risks to strategic stability if this is not
managed and regulated effectively.

III. The national security and international environment to 2030

29

Rapid technological change: science and technology as a metric of power
S&T will be of central importance to the strategic context: critical to the functioning of
economies and societies, reshaping political systems and a source of both cooperationand competition between states. This will unfold in a number of ways:
A rapidly changing landscape. The S&T landscape has changed significantly
since 2015 and the pace of change will accelerate further to 2030. Novel
technologies and applications are being developed and adopted faster than everbefore. AI is accelerating scientific discovery; quantum technologies are expected
to bring advances in medical imaging and in measuring electric, magnetic andgravitational fields; and advances in clean technologies will equip us with new andcheaper tools to tackle climate change. New analytical techniques are producing
greater insight from increasing volumes of data, enabling innovation.
S&T as an arena of systemic competition. Over the coming decade,the ability to advance and exploit S&T will be an increasingly important metricof global power, conferring economic, political and military advantages.
The tech ‘superpowers’ are investing to maintain their lead. At the same time,
many more countries are now able to compete in S&T, while large technology
companies are able to grow more powerful by absorbing innovations producedby small companies. Competition is therefore intensifying, shaped in particularby multinational firms with the backing of states, some of which take a ‘wholeof-economy’ approach to ensure dominance in critical areas. Maintaining acompetitive edge will rely on preeminence in and access to technology – as well as
access to the human and natural resources needed to harness it – and the ability
to protect intellectual property. As the volume of data grows exponentially, theability to generate and use it to drive innovation will be a crucial enabler of strategic
advantage through S&T.
New challenges to security, society and individual rights. Technology will
create new vulnerabilities to hostile activity and attack in domains such as
cyberspace and space, notably including the spread of disinformation online.
It will undermine social cohesion, community and national identity as individuals
spend more time in a virtual world and as automation reshapes the labour market.
While the exploitation of personal data will support the growth of innovation,
it will also pose challenges to individual privacy and liberty, including through theincreased availability of surveillance technologies.
Technology and data standards. Technological advances have always driven
global rule-making. But in the years ahead, the enormous pace of change is likely
to result in a growing gap between what technological advances make possible
and the limits of existing global governance. This will make frontier spaces –and the technologies, infrastructure and data underpinning their use – subject tointense competition over the development of rules, norms and standards.

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Transnational challenges: tests of resilience and international cooperation
COVID-19 will not be the only global crisis of the 2020s. The world faces transnational
challenges which overlap, reinforce each other and require a global response. This will
include, for example: climate change and biodiversity loss driving poverty, instability
and migration; states continuing to use organised crime groups as proxies in systemiccompetition; and technology both facilitating and helping to detect terrorism, SOC andillicit finance.
Climate change. Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and industry
increased from five billion tonnes to more than 36 billion between 1950 and2019. Significant action to decarbonise the global economy is needed by 2030 toprevent climate change from accelerating rapidly and possibly irreversibly: undercurrent policies the world is heading for around 3.5 degrees of warming by theend of the century, with real risks of even higher warming. Economic recovery fromCOVID-19 offers a chance to accelerate the transition to net zero. At the sametime, the impact of existing climate change will cause increasing damage: more
frequent and intense events such as extreme heat, storms and rain, leading toincreased flooding, landslides and other impacts such as wildfires. This can amplify
displacement and migration – increasing food and water insecurity – and damage
ecosystems. The effects will be felt most acutely in sub-Saharan Africa, South andEast Asia and the Middle East, with a disproportionate impact on areas that are
already fragile and on the people who live in them.
Biodiversity loss. Global biodiversity is already in unprecedented decline: 75% of
the world’s land surface and 66% of the ocean has been significantly altered anddegraded by human activity and an estimated one million species are threatenedwith extinction. To 2030, unsustainable patterns of production and consumption,
population growth and technological developments will cause further biodiversity
loss, as a result of land and sea use change, overexploitation, climate change,pollution and invasive alien species. This will have particularly severe consequences
for the world’s poor and vulnerable.
Global health. Infectious disease outbreaks are likely to be more frequent to 2030.
Many will be zoonoses – diseases caused by viruses, bacteria or parasites thatspread from animals to humans – as population growth drives the intensification ofagriculture and as the loss of habitats increases interaction between humans andanimals. Another novel pandemic remains a realistic possibility. On current trends,
global deaths related to antimicrobial resistance will rise from 700,000 to 20 million
per year by 2050.
Migratory flows. Migration will remain a permanent feature of the global
landscape. Demographic change, climate change, biodiversity loss, conflictand instability and poverty – exacerbated by the effects of COVID-19 – will driveincreased population movements, with Europe the destination for mass migrationfrom the Middle East and Africa in particular. But interstate and intrastate migration
is likely to have more stressful effects in other parts of the world.

III. The national security and international environment to 2030

31

Radicalisation and terrorism. Terrorism will remain a major threat over the coming
decade, with a more diverse range of material and political causes, new sourcesof radicalisation and evolving tactics. In the UK, the main sources of terrorist threat
are from Islamist and Northern Ireland-related terrorism, and far-right, far-left,
anarchist and single-issue terrorism. In Northern Ireland, there remains a risk thatsome groups could seek to encourage and exploit political instability. Overseas,poor governance and disorder, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, is likely
to increase space for terrorist and extremist groups to operate. There is a realistic
possibility that state sponsorship of terrorism and the use of proxies will increase.
It is likely that a terrorist group will launch a successful CBRN attack by 2030.
Serious and organised crime and illicit finance. SOC will continue to havea significant impact on UK citizens. The scale and complexity of SOC will likely
increase – aided by new technologies – and will adapt to events faster thangovernments. Most SOC will continue to be transnational: criminals will source
illicit goods, exploit the vulnerable and defraud UK citizens and businesses fromoverseas. SOC will also enable threats such as state threats and terrorism, and will
undermine regional stability, especially in post‑conflict zones. It will continue to be
facilitated by cross-border flows of illicit finance, with tens of billions of pounds
likely to be laundered through the UK every year.

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IV.	Strategic
Framework

Deepmind’s Alphafold: UK-based AI
research which cracked protein folding,a complex computational problem thatwill fundamentally advance engineering
biology. This computer-generated image isof T1037, part of a protein from a virus that
infects bacteria. © Deepmind

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1. Sustaining strategic advantage through scienceand technology
1.

The rapid pace of change in science and technology (S&T) is transforming many
aspects of our lives, fundamentally reshaping our economy and our society,and unlocking previously inconceivable improvements in global health, well-being
and prosperity. As competition grows between states, S&T will also increase inimportance as an arena of systemic competition. In the years ahead, countries which
establish a leading role in critical and emerging technologies will be at the forefrontof global leadership.

2.

The UK has a strong record of innovation in S&T – discovering graphene, decoding
the structure of DNA, and contributing life-saving treatments and a vaccine to theglobal effort against COVID-19. In the fast-evolving and more contested environment
ahead, the UK must take an active approach to building and sustaining adurable competitive edge in S&T – anticipating, assessing and taking action on our
S&T priorities to deliver strategic advantage for the UK. This will become increasingly
important to our domestic prosperity and our international relationships in the coming
decade. It is also an essential foundation for all the objectives in this Strategic
Framework: ensuring that the UK has the tools and influence to shape a futureinternational order based on democratic values; bolster our security and maintainmilitary advantage; and contribute to building a more resilient world.

3.

Our first goal is to grow the UK’s science and technology power in pursuitof strategic advantage. Achieving this objective requires a whole-of-UK effort,
in which the Government’s primary role is to create the enabling environment for a
thriving S&T ecosystem of scientists, researchers, inventors and innovators, acrossacademia, the private sector, regulators and standards bodies, working alongside the
manufacturing base to take innovations through to markets. It also requires strategic
choices and decisions by the Government, both on S&T priorities and on how we use
our national S&T capability in support of wider policy goals – from net zero through toeconomic growth.

4.

Our second goal is to cement the UK’s position as a responsible anddemocratic cyber power, able to protect and promote our interests in,and through, cyberspace. The cyber domain is unique in that it is man-made,subject to rapid technological change, and at an early stage in the evolutionof its rules and norms; all of which combine to create enormous opportunity
and risk. Over the past decade we have established the UK as a cyber power,building cutting‑edge defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, and a leading cybersecurity sector. In the digital age, sustaining this competitive edge in cyber will be afundamental component of strategic advantage through S&T.

1.1 Growing the UK’s science and technology power
5.

The UK is already an S&T power. As well as our deep and broad research base,
we are ranked fourth in the Global Innovation Index (2020), attract significant venture
capital – at a level that exceeds that of Germany, France and Sweden combined– and are a world leader in applied innovation and transformative tech.

IV. Strategic Framework

35

6.

The UK nevertheless needs to maximise its innovation potential, ensuring that ideas
translate into practical applications which enhance everyday life and contribute toproductivity, economic growth and international influence. A common problem in the
UK innovation landscape is that although support is available for early-stage R&D,
it often falls away before ideas are fully commercialised and brought to market. As
a result, innovation and intellectual property sometimes move out of the UK before
companies are able to mature into commercial successes.

7.

Building a durable competitive edge in S&T depends on ensuring that the success of
our research base translates into influence over the design and use of criticaland emerging technologies. This requires the creation of a favourable environment– ranging from a talented workforce and strong science infrastructure, to speed ofcommercialisation, our ability to attract trusted international partners, and ethical andlegal frameworks that foster public trust and early adoption. To achieve this, our priority
actions will be:• To build on the UK’s successful S&T base. The Government has committed toincreasing economy-wide investment in R&D to 2.4% of GDP by 2027, including
through inward investment. Through the R&D roadmap, we will ensure that public
R&D spending continues to support discovery research, and increase investment
in applied research, development and implementation. We will also take greater
account of place-based outcomes, ensuring that public spending on R&D unlocks
growth and societal benefit across the UK. We will accept more risk in our public
investments, supporting the most creative, innovative and radical ideas for future
development. We will invest at least £800 million to set up an independent bodyfor high-risk, high-reward research: the Advanced Research and Invention Agency(ARIA), which will back breakthrough technologies and basic research throughexperimentation.
• To unlock the full potential of the UK’s S&T and data ecosystemby improving and accelerating the ‘pull through’ from research tocommercialisation. The Government will use all the levers at its disposal to develop
the infrastructure, business and regulatory environment to support innovation andadoption across the UK economy. We will do this in partnership with all of the British
S&T community, within government and across the devolved administrations,academia, the private sector, the financial sector, regulators and standards bodies.
The Government’s plan for growth and the digital and national data strategies will
be core planks of this effort, supported by the pro-growth, pro-innovation regulatory
reforms set out in the white paper on regulation for the fourth industrial revolution.
We will improve access to finance, including from specialist investors able to provide
longer-term capital to promising companies across all stages of growth. We will
make the UK the best place in the world to be a researcher, inventor or innovator,
strengthening our talent offer through the newly-established Office for Talent and theintroduction of the Global Talent Visa.
• To better protect our intellectual property and sensitive research. We will
support the research and innovation sector through the Trusted Research
programme and act to protect our organisations, capabilities and skills where
there is a national security case – including by ensuring companies can accessinvestment safely (see 2.2).

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Attracting global talent to the UK
The UK’s ambition is to become the top destination for international talent, offering
the professional opportunities, skills environment and high quality of life to attract thebest scientists, researchers and innovators worldwide to come to the UK and makeit their home.
The newly-established Office for Talent will ensure the UK’s talent offer is stronger thanever for students, those building their careers, and those who are already world leadersin their fields. It will make it easier for those with the most talent, potential, energy andcreativity to come to the UK from around the world – reaching out to those with theskills the UK needs and helping them to understand the opportunities on offer.
This ambition will be supported by the UK’s new points-based immigration system,
which will ensure that the immigration process is simple, easy and quick, supporting
aims to create a high-wage, high-skill, high-productivity economy. The Global TalentVisa provides a new route for talented and promising individuals to come and work in
the UK. We are also introducing a new Graduate Route to make it easier for some of
the best young international graduates to secure skilled jobs in the UK and continue
making a valuable contribution to our economy and society.

• To improve our ability to identify, build and use the UK’s strategic S&T
capabilities. We will establish new S&T horizon-scanning, assessment and policy
capabilities within government, to anticipate and assess priorities as we pursue
strategic advantage. We will also adopt an own-collaborate-access framework(see S&T power textbox) to guide strategic decisions on building and using
capability in priority areas of S&T: first, where the potential for social and economic
benefit is greatest, or progress helps tackle the most pressing global challenges;
and second, where the UK is capable of establishing a leading position, or future
dependence on non-allied sources of supply carries unacceptable risks to ournational interests.
• To build a strong and varied network of international S&T partnerships, as
an essential component of the own-collaborate-access framework and to shape theresponsible use of technology. We will develop a new framework for international
science partnerships, putting S&T at the heart of our alliances and partnerships
worldwide. Our new Technology Envoy to the US will strengthen the UK’s
relationships in Silicon Valley. The UK-EU deal will support continued collaboration
between researchers and scientists, through Horizon Europe, the Euratom Research
and Training programme and Copernicus. We will maintain the UK’s leadershipin multilateral research and innovation organisations and networks, such as Eureka.
And we will continue to use ODA to support R&D partnerships with developing
countries, sharing research expertise in support of the SDGs.

IV. Strategic Framework37• To adopt ‘business science’ approaches, using commercial ways of working
within government. This will support the own-collaborate-access framework,
ensuring that the UK is able to access a wide range of technology withoutbuying it outright or inventing it here: improving models for partnerships; pooling
resources within government, across the public and private sectors, and withother countries; and using acquisitions and options-based deals alongsidecooperation and collaboration.
8.

The Government will also develop its partnership with academia and industry insupporting the technological innovation integral to the UK’s national security, for which
it has a fundamental responsibility. The Government funds roughly 85% of military R&D,
delivering both essential capabilities and strengthening the wider S&T ecosystem.

9.

Through the Ministry of Defence (MOD) science and technology strategy 2020,
we will prioritise higher-risk research to support the modernisation of our armed
forces. Over the next four years, we will invest at least £6.6 billion of defence fundingin advanced and next-generation R&D to deliver an enduring military edge in areas
including space, directed energy weapons, and advanced high-speed missiles.
A network of MOD innovation hubs within UK technology clusters and investment
in Defence and Security Accelerator challenges will improve the ‘pull through’ of thisR&D investment into cutting-edge equipment. The defence and security industrial
strategy will support this, creating a more certain environment for industry thatenables investment to support innovation and convert it into deployable national
security capabilities and future commercial opportunities.

10. We will also explore more agile and affordable routes to innovation that strengthen our
wider national security. The National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF)
is the Government’s corporate venturing arm for dual-use advanced technologies,
supporting long-term equity investment to accelerate the adoption of new capabilities
in areas such as audio and visual processing, computational behavioural analysis
and identity technologies. And through the National Security Technology andInnovation Exchange (NSTIx), we are taking a coordinated and systematic approachto technology development, including by establishing a cross-government networkof co-creation spaces to bring together expertise and specialist facilities from acrossgovernment partners, the private sector and leading academic S&T communities.
This will support the development of effective, user-driven technology at pace andat scale in areas that are critical to national security, including data science, AI andprotective security.
A framework for S&T power: own‑collaborate‑access
Growing the UK’s S&T power requires a long-term approach to building and using
capability in the most important future fields. The UK will seek to establish a leadingrole in critical and emerging technologies where there is a realistic prospect ofdelivering strategic advantage. A new ‘own-collaborate-access’ framework will
guide our approach:• Own: where the UK has leadership and ownership of new developments,from discovery to large-scale manufacture and commercialisation. This will always
involve elements of collaboration and access.
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• Collaborate: where the UK can provide unique contributions that allow us tocollaborate with others to achieve our goals.
• Access: where the UK will seek to acquire critical S&T from elsewhere,
through options, deals and relationships.
The Government’s role in delivering the framework is as an enabler of the private
sector and wider S&T community, including as a user and acquirer of technology.
The Government’s action may include: for ‘own’ – better funding, regulation andincentives for academia and businesses, from research to commercialisation; for’collaborate’ – identifying strategic partners and creating the market and regulatory
conditions for international collaboration; and for ‘access’ – schemes for investment
in S&T companies.
Case study: quantum computing as an example of quantum technologies.
Quantum computing has the potential to unlock a step-change in computing power,with wide-ranging applications across key sectors including pharma, health, logistics,
information technology, energy, chemicals and finance. The UK is well placed toemerge as a global leader in the quantum revolution. Our world-class researchers andfacilities have enabled the UK to achieve a deep understanding of quantum science,
and we have a diverse and growing ecosystem of companies able to compete inthis emerging global market. New quantum systems will require the development ofmuch smaller and more robust components such as specialist lasers, high vacuum
equipment, electronic control systems and photon detectors; all areas where theUK has significant industrial capability. Through the National Quantum Computing
Centre and the wider National Quantum Technologies Programme, the Government
will support the establishment of a sustainable quantum computing sector in the UK– through grant funding, contracts for prototypes, discovery and training programmes,
action to stimulate the right business environment, and supporting links to the growinginternational community.
Case study: engineering biology. Engineering biology is the application of engineering
principles to the design and re-design of biological systems, harnessing advances inareas such as genomics and gene editing, processing power and machine learning.
It has the potential to deliver significant advances across a range of areas including
defence and security, the environment and the economy.
The UK is in a strong position in this rapidly-developing sector, but needs to acceleratecommercialisation – which the Government will support through mechanisms to help
research and develop, engineer and manufacture at scale in the UK under the National
Engineering Biology Programme.
Case study: AI. The UK has established an early lead in AI thanks to our homegrown research, a healthy start-up scene and a history of innovation in computing.
We drive AI policy through the Office for AI, alongside the UK AI Council, and througha nearly £1 billion partnership between government, industry and academia. This is
strengthening the UK’s position as a global leader in developing AI technologies by:
improving the supply of AI talent and boosting high-level skills, including through Turing
AI Fellowships; increasing investment in AI research and innovation; supporting theeffective and ethical adoption of AI and data technologies; and identifying international

IV. Strategic Framework39

opportunities to collaborate on AI R&D, ethics and regulation. Our investments
are growing across defence and security sectors, rapidly advancing AI capabilities
in autonomy, cyber security, logistics and intelligence. We are reviewing
our AI needs for the next decade, to ensure that the UK stays ahead of growinginternational competition.

1.2 Responsible, democratic cyber power
11. Cyber power is the ability to protect and promote national interests in and throughcyberspace: to realise the benefits that cyberspace offers to our citizens andeconomy, to work with partners towards a cyberspace that reflects our values, andto use cyber capabilities to influence events in the real world. Like wider S&T power,
cyber power depends on the Government pursuing a whole-of-nation effort, bringing
together industry and academia in partnership. It also involves engaging citizens,
who have a central role to play in our national cyber security.
12. In the digital age, the UK’s cyber power will be an ever more important lever fordelivering our national goals. Cyber power protects our national security and theresilience of our CNI. It supports economic growth, enabling businesses andindividuals to transition confidently to the digital world, boosting productivity anddriving the innovation that will create new skilled jobs. It also creates new ways
to pursue and protect our interests, enabling us to detect, deter and disrupt
our adversaries in cyberspace and on the ground, and to influence the global
environment to ensure a safe and beneficial digital future for all.
13. Since 2011, the Government has pursued an ambitious national strategy andsustained programme of investment that have established the UK as a global leader
in cyber, emulated by others. We have developed cutting-edge cyber capabilities,
including through the establishment of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
and the National Cyber Force (NCF). As well as building the capabilities needed
for national security, this investment has also supported the development of awider cyber ecosystem, including a thriving cyber security sector, with over 1,200
companies and 43,000 skilled jobs across the UK.
14. We will need to keep adapting, innovating and investing to maintain and extend theUK’s competitive edge as a responsible, democratic cyber power. Technology ischanging, as is the way individuals and organisations make use of it. Our allies andadversaries are also investing in their capabilities, with adversaries constantly finding
ways to exploit it for their own ends.
15. Cyber security is the foundation for cyber power, and has been the primary focus
of our strategy to date. However, to cement our competitive edge, we will now
adopt a comprehensive cyber strategy, taking a ‘whole-of-cyber’ approachthat considers the full range of our capabilities and gives greater weight to building
advantage in critical cyber technologies, as well as to international action to influence
the future of cyberspace. To oversee this approach, we have formed a ministerial
small group to cohere cyber decision-making across government.

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16. The Government will publish the UK’s new cyber strategy in 2021. Under thisstrategy, our priority actions will be:• To strengthen the UK’s cyber ecosystem, enabling a whole-of-nation approachto cyber and deepening the partnership between government, academia andindustry. We will take a more coherent approach to skills, recruitment, R&D,
exercising and innovation across defensive and offensive cyber: investing in an
integrated education and training system to grow diverse talent; supporting a
UK research base that can compete with allies and adversaries, as well as anindustrial base that delivers innovative and effective cyber security products andservices that help everyone stay safe in cyberspace; and developing regulations
and policies that encourage a world-class cyber security ecosystem.
• To build a resilient and prosperous digital UK, where citizens feel safe online
and confident that their data is protected. We will enable the digital transformationof the UK economy, bolstering our cyber security and ensuring our people,
businesses and organisations are empowered to adopt new technology, and areable to withstand and recover from cyber-attacks. We will continue to invest in the
NCSC, address critical vulnerabilities in the public sector and our CNI, including
our data and digital infrastructure, and ensure the lessons from cyber-attacks
are acted upon.
• To take the lead in the technologies vital to cyber power, such as
microprocessors, secure systems design, quantum technologies and new formsof data transmission. We will support our growing industrial base, working within
the own-collaborate-access framework to build advantage in critical technologies,
pursue economic opportunities and, where needed, mitigate the risks ofdependence on non-allied sources of supply. We will put in place the cuttingedge policy, regulatory and legal frameworks to enable the adoption of emerging
applications of digital technology – for example in smart cities. We will also workwith others to ensure the rules and standards governing digital technologies arerooted in democratic values.
• To promote a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, as describedin 2.3, working with other governments and industry, and drawing on the UK’s
thought leadership in cyber security. We will also deepen and broaden ourinternational partnerships to advance our shared security, prosperity and values,
through stronger cyber resilience and joint action to uphold international norms,
holding adversaries to account for breaches.
• To detect, disrupt and deter our adversaries. We will build seamless systems
to detect and act with industry on cyber threat information at scale and pace.
We will also make much more integrated, creative and routine use of the UK’s
full spectrum of levers – our diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, legal andstrategic communications tools, and the new NCF (see textbox) – to impose costs
on our adversaries, deny their ability to harm UK interests, and make the UK amore difficult operating environment. This will include tackling malicious activity
in cyberspace and taking action online with real-world effect, for example incountering terrorist or organised crime groups, and to support military operations.
We will also strengthen our criminal justice response to cyber-attacks.

IV. Strategic Framework41

Transforming the UK’s cyber capabilities: the National Cyber Force
Established in 2020, the NCF conducts targeted, responsible offensive cyber
operations to support the UK’s national security priorities, bringing together defence
and intelligence capabilities.
The NCF draws together personnel from GCHQ and MOD, as well as the SecretIntelligence Service (SIS) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl),under one unified command for the first time. Alongside the MOD’s operational
expertise, Dstl’s scientific and technical capabilities and GCHQ’s global intelligence,
SIS provides its expertise in recruiting and running agents alongside its unique ability
to deliver clandestine operational technology.
Used in combination with diplomatic, economic, political and military capabilities,
examples of cyber operations could include:• Interfering with a mobile phone to prevent a terrorist from being able tocommunicate with their contacts.
• Helping to prevent cyberspace from being used as a global platform for serious
crimes, including fraud and sexual abuse of children.
• Keeping UK military aircraft safe from targeting by weapons systems.
The UK is committed to using its cyber capabilities in a responsible way, in line with
UK and international law. Past and future cyber operations have and will continue tooperate under existing laws, including the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and theInvestigatory Powers Act (2016). This ensures UK cyber operations are responsible,
targeted and proportionate, in contrast to the operations of some of our adversaries.

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UN headquarters, New York.
© Crown copyright 2021

2. Shaping the open international order of the future

44

1.

The UK’s openness to the flow of trade, capital, data, ideas and talent is essential to
our long-term prosperity. This international exchange will be critical in driving healthy
competition, innovation and productivity growth as we build back better from COVID-19
and seek to level up across the nation. The ability of open societies and economies
such as the UK to flourish in this way depends on the effective functioning of theinternational order – the laws, rules and norms that are used to manage international
cooperation and competition, and the institutions that enable countries to come together
to tackle shared problems.

2.

In the more interconnected, multipolar and contested environment we will face in the
coming decade, the UK must be more active in shaping the open international
order of the future: using our convening power and working with others to ensure
it is fit for the 21st century and more resilient to short-term shocks and longterm challenges. We must also work to restore a spirit of greater international
cooperation, based on dialogue and compromise, while standing up for our values.

3.

There are multiple systems of international institutions, laws, rules and norms thatcomprise the international order. We must tailor our approach to the opportunities
and challenges we face in each of them: in the increasingly digital global economy
and newer domains of cyberspace and space, which are addressed in this chapter;and in the security and ecological systems, which are addressed in chapters 3 and 4.

4.

The UK remains deeply committed to multilateralism. We prize our membershipof many global bodies, of which the UN is the most important. We must strengthen
those institutions that are vital to the future functioning of the international order,
such as the WTO and WHO, and deepen our engagement in those that are growing
in importance, including those governing technology standards. Where we become
more involved in other parts of the world, we will work with existing bodies, such
as ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific. And we will be active in seeking election to senior
positions within international institutions where our interests and values are mostdirectly at stake. In doing so, we will field strong candidates that represent the true
diversity of our communities across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

5.

Our first goal is to support open societies and defend human rights, as aforce for good in the world. The international order is only as robust, resilient andlegitimate as the states that comprise it. We will therefore support open societies– characterised by effective governance and resilience at home, and which
cooperate with other countries on the basis of transparency, good governance andopen markets.

6.

Our second goal is to shape an open, resilient global economy, restoring trustin free and fair trade as we build back better from COVID-19. To do so, we must
address the drivers of fragmentation and build the global economy of the future – onethat is digital and sustainable. The UK economy must be more competitive within thislandscape, as a global services, digital and data hub that delivers for all our citizens.

Integrated Review

7.

Our third goal is to shape the international order as it develops in future
frontiers – in the domains of cyberspace and space, where the possibilities for
economic, social and military activity are expanding rapidly, and existing rules and norms
are struggling to keep pace. We will need to be active in ensuring effective accountability
and oversight that protects democratic values, while opposing the overreach ofstate control.

Our force for good agenda: the combined power of diplomacy and development
Diplomatic leadership in a changing world
Effective diplomacy is a critical tool in the UK’s ability to deliver for British citizens in
the world. It is through our efforts to build relationships and mutual understanding withallies, partners and countries beyond that we are best able to navigate the changing
balance and diffusion of power.
To shape the open international order of the future, we must reinforce and renew
our diplomacy, adapting our statecraft for a new era. In doing so, we must hold firm
to our existing strengths. Our diplomatic network of 281 posts in 178 countries andterritories will continue to build the relationships and expertise to support our national
goals, representing the whole of the United Kingdom and providing support to British
people abroad through our consular services. Our diplomats and legal experts will
maintain their significant contribution at the heart of multilateral institutions. And the UK
will play an important convening role on issues of consequence to our shared security
and prosperity.
We will also innovate, ensuring that our diplomacy is equipped for the challenges
ahead. We have already made a significant change in combining our development
expertise with the global reach of our diplomatic network – greatly enhancing our ability
to achieve long-term change around the world through our force for good agenda.
We will build on this through greater emphasis on:• Regulatory diplomacy: bringing together governments, standards bodies andindustry to influence rules, norms and standards – particularly in rapidly evolving
areas such as space, cyberspace, emerging technologies and data. We will workwith a wide range of partners – including technology companies, independent
standards bodies, civil society and academia – across an increasing number of
specialised international institutions.
• S&T diplomacy: strengthening our relationships worldwide and supporting the UK’s
strategic advantage through S&T, building on our Science and Innovation Network
in more than 40 countries and our Research and Innovation Hubs in Africa, theMiddle East and India.
• Cyber diplomacy: as a critical element of our cyber power, with our network ofofficers stretching across six continents. In addition to our cyber security capacitybuilding programmes, we have initiated cross-government dialogues with 20
countries. Through these, we will continue to grow the international coalition
working with us to strengthen the case for a free, open, peaceful and secure
cyberspace, and to respond to and deter state-directed malicious cyber activity.
IV. Strategic Framework45• National security diplomacy: reinforcing our deterrence by taking a more active
approach to attribution of state threats and coordinating the use of sanctions
to hold state and non-state actors to account for unacceptable behaviour – inaddition to doing more to tackle state threats, terrorism and crime overseas,
before they reach the UK. This will be supported by the work of the security andintelligence agencies.
• Dispute resolution: as part of a more effective and focused approach to addressing
conflict and instability through prevention.
• Legal diplomacy: supporting open societies through capacity-building and justicereform, and promoting UK legal services, ensuring that the principles and values on
which our domestic system is built remain the global standard.
• Data-driven development and diplomacy: using insight and analysis from around theworld to target our diplomatic interventions overseas more effectively and to informthe full breadth of domestic policy.
UK ODA: increasing our impact as a force for good
The UK is one of the world’s leading development actors, committed to the global
fight against poverty, to achieving the SDGs by 2030 and to maintaining the highest
standards of evidence and transparency for all our investments.
As one of the world’s largest providers of ODA – well above Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages – we will focus our aid work on
those areas which are important to a globally-focused UK and where we can have thegreatest life-changing impact in the long term. We will maintain our commitment toAfrica, with a particular focus on East Africa and on important partners such as Nigeria,
while increasing development efforts in the Indo-Pacific.
We will set out our approach in a new international development strategy, which
will ensure close alignment of UK aid from 2022 onwards with the objectives in thisStrategic Framework. This strategy will build on our strategic priorities for ODA in
2021-22: climate and biodiversity; global health security; open societies and conflict
resolution; girls’ education; humanitarian preparedness and response, especiallyfood security and famine prevention; S&T; and trade and economic development.
It will also consider the competitiveness of our trade and development offer todeveloping countries.
We will ensure that all UK ODA is aligned to the Paris Agreement, reflecting ourcommitment to tackling climate change and its effects as a driver of future instability
and poverty. We will maintain a liberal approach to economic development, creating
greater opportunities for all and modelled on open societies. We will more effectively
combine our diplomacy and aid with trade, working with our partners to adapt ouroffer. As governments become able to finance their own development priorities, we will
gradually move towards providing UK expertise in place of grants and using a variety offinancing models to tackle regional challenges in our mutual interests.

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The UK will continue to champion International Humanitarian Law and humanitarianaccess, and provide principled humanitarian assistance at moments of crisis. We will
maintain our capacity to respond to unanticipated events, fund bilateral and multilateralprogrammes in humanitarian hotspots and lead a global campaign to protect 20 million
people from catastrophic famine. To support this, we will seek to reform and strengthen
the international humanitarian system, and promote the use of digital technology toprovide faster and cheaper support to those affected by crises.
One HMG overseas
We will ensure our ambassadors and high commissioners are fully accountable forcross-government objectives, not just the work of the FCDO. We will also ensure that
the FCDO is better represented across the UK, including by increasing our staff in East
Kilbride by 50%.

2.1	A force for good: supporting open societies and defending
human rights
8.

Open societies are crucial building blocks in a sustainable international order,modelling inclusive, accountable and transparent governance. However, they – andthe individual liberties on which they are built – are coming under growing pressurein the physical world and online. There has been a general decline in global freedom
since the mid-2000s, with autocracies becoming stronger and more prevalentworldwide.

9.

Our efforts to reverse this decline in global freedom must start at home, with open
societies working together to strengthen our domestic governance and resilience,agree common agendas for future action, and tackle with speed and agility thosechallenges that undermine our citizens’ security and prosperity. Doing so is crucial
in tending to the long-term health of our own democracy, as well as in sustaining
our soft power – our ability to attract and influence others (see textbox later in thissection). It is this imperative that is driving our G7 agenda, working with our fellow
members, and through outreach to Australia, India and South Korea, to build backbetter from COVID-19.

10. The UK will also work with allies, like-minded partners and civil society
worldwide to protect democratic values, as part of our force for good agenda.
In many instances, this will involve working bilaterally with countries to strengthen theirdomestic governance and to build their resilience to threats and hazards. In doing so,
we will focus our efforts primarily in the wider European neighbourhood, East Africa
and the Indo-Pacific, tailoring our approach to meet local needs and combining our
diplomacy, development, trade, security and other tools accordingly. Our priority
actions will be:• To defend universal human rights, including by working with local civilsociety and human rights defenders. Alongside our traditional bilateral andmultilateral efforts, including at the UN and the Council of Europe, we will use our
independent sanctions regime to hold to account those involved in serious humanrights violations and abuses.
IV. Strategic Framework47

• To promote gender equality, working with women’s rights organisations totackle the discrimination, violence and inequality that hold women back. We will
use our aid spending and diplomacy to pursue the goal of getting 40 million moregirls into school in low- and middle-income countries by 2025, starting with the
Global Partnership for Education summit in 2021. We will also promote women’s
economic empowerment at the WTO, G7, OECD, the UN and World Bank, and in
free trade agreements (FTAs).
• To promote effective and transparent governance, robust democratic
institutions and the rule of law. The UK will support strong, transparent andaccountable political processes and institutions overseas, including parliaments
and political parties, through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy andother institutions. This work will be bolstered by a new UK capability to support
election observation and activity to strengthen existing multilateral efforts. We will
also establish a new global sanctions regime on corruption (see textbox) andreinvigorate our efforts to tackle illicit finance.
The UK’s independent sanctions policy
In July 2020, the UK established our first autonomous sanctions regime: the global
human rights (‘Magnitsky-style’) sanctions regime. It gives the UK a powerful new
tool to hold to account those involved in serious human rights violations or abuses,
by imposing targeted asset freezes and travel bans.
We will use our sanctions regimes as part of an integrated approach to promote ourvalues and interests and to combat state threats, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and the use
and proliferation of chemical weapons. Our departure from the EU means we can move
more quickly than through multilateral channels where it is in our interests to do so,while continuing to coordinate closely with a range of like-minded partners. We havealready demonstrated the agility of our autonomous sanctions: in September 2020,
we were the first European country to announce sanctions against the leader of Belarus
and several officials over election fraud and violence against protestors.
In 2021, the UK will launch a second global sanctions regime on corruption, giving
us powers to prevent those involved in corruption from freely entering the UK orchannelling money through our financial system. This will complement existing anticorruption tools, including law enforcement powers, and enable us to work with allies
who have similar regimes, such as the US and Canada.
• To promote freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) overseas, taking forward therecommendations of the Bishop of Truro’s 2019 independent review and raisingawareness of cases of particular concern – including through collaboration with
the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance. In 2022, we will host aninternational ministerial conference to agree steps to advance FoRB for all.
• To defend press and media freedom including through our commitments to
the Global Media Defence Fund, which we co‑founded with Canada. Alongside
our efforts to challenge censorship of the internet and digital media, we will also
promote appropriate protections against online harms. We will tackle online
violence, particularly where it is directed against women and girls, and help
independent media in developing countries to establish new, resilient business48

Integrated Review

models for the digital age. The independent work of the BBC World Service will
also support media freedom.
• To end the practice of arbitrary arrest, detention or sentencing of foreign
nationals to exercise leverage over other governments. We will support Canada’s
initiative to end the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals – including those withdual nationality – without due process and the legal protections of a fair trial.
This practice violates human rights obligations, is contrary to international law,undermines international relations and has a negative impact on foreign nationals
travelling, working and living abroad.
A soft power superpower
The UK’s soft power is rooted in who we are as a country: our values and way of life,
and the vibrancy and diversity of our Union. It is central to our international identity as
an open, trustworthy and innovative country. It helps to build positive perceptions of theUK, create strong people-to-people links and familiarity with our values through cultural
exchange and tourism. It also enhances our ability to attract international business,
research collaboration and students – and, ultimately, to effect change in the world.
To date, the UK has consistently ranked within the top three countries in indices thatmeasure soft power. In 2020, the UK topped a British Council/Ipsos MORI poll as themost attractive country for young people across the G20. This strong performance isunderpinned by our model of democratic governance, legal systems and Common
Law heritage, the Monarchy, our world-class education, science and research
institutions and standards-setting bodies, creative and cultural industries, tourism
sector, sports sector, large and diverse diaspora communities, and contribution tointernational development.
The source of much of the UK’s soft power lies beyond the ownership of government –an independence from state direction that is essential to its influence. The Government
can use its own assets, such as the diplomatic network, aid spending and the armed
forces, to help create goodwill towards the UK – for example, through support todisaster relief or through our international work to protect cultural heritage in conflictsettings. Otherwise, the Government’s main role is to: create a conducive enabling
environment in which independent organisations, assets and networks in every part of
the UK can flourish; assist them in building mutually beneficial international relationships;
and harness, where possible, their outputs for global goods – using scientific researchand technology to provide solutions to global challenges, for example.
However, the soft power landscape is changing. Those who challenge the valuesof open and democratic societies increasingly do so through culture: systemiccompetitors like Russia and China invest heavily in global cultural power projection andinformation operations. Our allies are also taking a more strategic approach: cultural
relations is one of the three pillars of German foreign policy and an important part ofFrench foreign policy. Our perception of other countries – and therefore their soft power– is also increasingly shaped in the digital space, driven by individuals and non‑state
actors, including through disinformation.
Such dynamics illustrate that the strength of the UK’s soft power cannot be taken for
granted. As a vital part of our foreign policy, it requires thoughtful investment that
IV. Strategic Framework49enables our domestic assets and international activity to thrive in the long term. We will
therefore continue to support the UK’s creative and cultural sectors, including through:investing £150 million under our Creative Industries Sector Deal; increasing economywide investment in R&D to 2.4% of GDP by 2027; and providing funding of £1.7 billion
a year to 45 arm’s-length bodies that support UK cultural and sporting excellence.

UK soft power strengths
Media and culture
The BBC is the most trusted broadcaster worldwide; the BBC World Service
reaches 468m people every week, in 42 languages
The UK has vibrant creative and cultural industries. One in eight music albums
sold around the world is by a UK artist. One quarter of global box office receipts
are driven by UK-made films
Exhibitions from our museums and galleries reach over 500m people every
year at home and abroad. Over 2021 and 2022, we will invest over £284m
in government-sponsored galleries and museums. In 2022, Festival UK* will
showcase the UK’s creativity and innovation to the world – bringing together
science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics in ten large-scale public
engagement acts
There are 32 UNESCO World Heritage Sites across the UK and our Overseas
Territories, attracting visitors from around the world
Education
Nearly 500,000 overseas students chose to study in the UK in 2019, making the
UK the 2nd most popular destination. Over 1 in 4 countries around the world
has a Head of State or of Government who was educated in the UK
The British Council reaches 100m people in over 100 countries
3 government scholarship schemes are available to the next generation of
global leaders: the Commonwealth, Marshall, and Chevening scholarships
Sport
Since the London Olympics and Paralympics in 2012, the UK has secured over
100 major international sporting events. In 2021 we will co-host the UEFA Men’s
EURO competition and in 2022 we will host the Women’s EURO competition
and the Commonwealth Games
The Premier League broadcasts to 188 countries worldwide and welcomesinternational talent from over 100 countries. The Wimbledon Championships
reach audiences across the globe, with over half a million visitors each year
People-to-people links
Our people have links all over the world: 9.5m people living in the UK were born
outside the UK, and over 5m UK citizens live overseas
Over 40m overseas visitors came to the UK in 2019, contributing £28.4bn to
the UK economy and promoting familiarity with our values
Our #loveisgreat campaign celebrates equality and diversity, raising awarenessof the UK as a welcoming destination for international LGBTQ+ visitors
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2.2 An open, resilient global economy
11. Sustaining an open global economy – and the benefits it offers – is critical to ourambition to establish the UK as a global services, digital and data hub, laying
the foundations for the long-term prosperity of our citizens. This will capitalise on
UK‑wide strengths in services and digital, underpinned by our capabilities as a global
S&T power. It will also play well to many global economic trends, such as the growthin the global middle class and the centrality of data to global GDP. However, the open
global economy is facing significant challenges that are putting considerable strain on
the international institutions and ‘rulebook’ that govern it – with COVID-19 a further
complicating factor.
12. We have an opportunity now to build back better from COVID-19, by working
with our allies and partners to pursue economic recovery and rebuild consensus
in support of free trade and investment – underpinned by renewed trust in theinternational economic system to deliver effective governance and provide stability.
13. Our approach will build on our long-standing successes in delivering benefits for UK
economic competitiveness and consumers: our integration into the global economic
and financial system provides access to essential items such as medical supplies,
offers UK firms access to innovations and fast-growing markets for British goods andservices around the world, and enables us to attract inward investment to support
jobs and growth at home. Nevertheless, our recovery from this economic crisis mustdeliver more equitably for people across the UK.

The UK economy
Total trade accounted for 62%
of UK GDP in 2019

5th in the world for exports of goods
and services

UK FDI to GDP ratio is 72%,
ahead of France (32%) andGermany (27%)

Economy-wide investment in
R&D will increase to 2.4% of GDP
by 2027

The UK is a global leader infinancial services, which in 2018
contributed £132bn to the UK
economy (6.9% of GDP)

There are 1.1m jobs in the financial
services sector across the UK(3.2% of all jobs) – 65% of which arelocated outside of London

The digital sector contributed
nearly £150bn to the UK
economy in 2018 – an increaseof 30% since 2010

In 2019, UK digital tech investment
reached a record high of £10.1bn,
up £3.1bn from 2018 – accounting for
33% of all European tech investment

There are 1.6m jobs andaround 232,000 businesses in
the UK digital sector, most ofwhich are small and mediumsized enterprises

There were 485,000 international
students in the UK in 2018-19,
accounting for 20.7% of the total
student population

IV. Strategic Framework51

14. We must also work with others to increase the resilience of the global economy
to short-term shocks and long-term distortions, and to prepare for the structural
challenges of the future. This will involve creating rules that are fit for the 21st
century, rooted in high standards and democratic values, better enabling open
societies such as the UK to harness the future frontiers of economic growth. It will
also support the integration of developing countries into the global economy.
15. In addition to accelerating the transition to a zero-carbon global economy, our priority
actions will be:• To nurture a strong UK economy that delivers for all citizens and ismore competitive internationally. We will use all our domestic levers andour international trade agenda (see textbox) to foster productivity growth andinnovation, so that all our people benefit as we build back better from COVID-19.
Through our plan for growth and the digital strategy, we will invest in national
infrastructure, innovation and skills, signalling our regional and sectoral priorities toguide private‑sector investment. We will also anticipate and respond to the needsof those disadvantaged by the changing shape of our economy – for example,
through jobs lost to automation or the effects of a greener economy on fuel poverty.
• To promote inward investment while minimising the potential risk to ournational security. We will maximise the contribution of foreign direct investment(FDI) to economic growth across the UK through an updated investment strategy,
our trade policy and the work of the new Office for Investment. Where necessary
and proportionate, we will intervene in FDI transactions to protect national
security, under the provisions of the National Security and Investment Bill and ledby the new Investment Security Unit. The UK is committed to a transparent andpredictable regulatory environment in response to a more complex set of threats.
• To revitalise free, fair and transparent trade by strengthening the global
trading system and modernising the international rulebook, especially on
the environment, services and the digital sector. Countries around the world –large or small, developed or developing – need to be able to compete. The UK
will therefore work with allies and partners to reinvigorate the WTO so that its
rules and agreements are better able to address current and future trade issues.
As part of this, we will seek to re-establish a fully functioning dispute settlement
mechanism. We will also do more to challenge those who consistently pursue
unfair, trade-distorting practices – such as forced technology transfer andsubsidies – including through state-owned enterprises, and those who abuse selfdesignation rights in claiming developing country status.
• To establish global leadership in digital trade and support dynamic andcompetitive digital markets that deliver for all in UK society. Our goal is tomaximise economic growth while managing the potential disruption caused by
rapid innovation in areas from digital currencies to e-commerce and new businessmodels that monetise data. The UK will use our leadership in digital trade toadvance WTO negotiations on e-commerce and incorporate modern digital anddata trade provisions in our FTAs. A new Digital Markets Unit – hosted by theCompetition and Markets Authority – and a new mandatory code of conduct
for dominant digital firms will be at the centre of our pro-competition regime for
digital markets. Through our G7 presidency, we will support the OECD’s work toensure digital companies pay the right amount of tax in each country in which

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they operate. We will also drive efforts to ensure that digital technical standards
developed by international standards bodies deliver for all.
• To promote green trade as part of the solution to climate change andbiodiversity loss. The UK will remain at the centre of WTO discussions on trade
and the environment, exploring opportunities to liberalise environmental goods
and services, mitigate carbon emissions, set standards and make progress
towards a circular economy.
• To tackle economic crime and illicit finance, which fund organised crime groups,
terrorists and other malicious actors, undermine good governance and faith in our
economy, and tarnish our global reputation by allowing corrupt assets to be heldin the UK. Under the 2019 Economic Crime Plan, we will: increase the numberof trained financial investigators within our police forces; overhaul our Suspicious
Activity Reports regime to ensure critical intelligence informs their investigations;and bolster the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC). As soon as parliamentary
time allows, we will introduce legislation that tackles economic crime, including
the use of UK corporate structures in facilitating high-end money laundering.
This legislation will incorporate reform of Companies House registration and limited
partnerships, and introduce a register of overseas entities owning property in the
UK. In addition to promoting action on corporate transparency and accelerating
asset recovery through our G7 presidency, we will use our strong relationships withother major financial markets, such as the US, to maximise our collective impact.
• To diversify the UK’s supply in critical goods, such as medical equipment andrare earth elements, through trade partnerships and international collaboration.
Starting with our G7 presidency, we will: use market-led strategies, such as
targeted trade promotion and lowering barriers to trade; develop multilateralapproaches to assess global supply chain vulnerabilities, for example throughthe OECD; promote global standards to support a greater circular economy inline with our clean growth ambitions; and establish agreements to keep tradein critical goods open in times of crisis. Within the UK, we will continue to explore
opportunities around domestic extraction and processing of critical minerals,
such as lithium, as well as their recovery, recycling and reuse to establish a
viable circular economy. The Government is already supporting a number ofpilot projects across Cornwall, for example, through its ‘Getting Building Fund’,
Local Enterprise Partnership and Smart Grants.
16. We will use the full range of domestic and international tools available to theGovernment in pursuing these actions: putting our independent trade policy at
the centre of our international and national security policy; and using regulatory
diplomacy to shape the standards and values that will underpin the global economy
in the future, so that we are better able to compete. International cooperation will beessential, working multilaterally with the WTO and OECD, and with the G7, G20 andother groupings, to establish common approaches and demonstrate the benefits ofcooperation in influencing multilateral debates.

IV. Strategic Framework

53

Putting trade at the heart of Global Britain
As an independent trading nation, our aim is to increase prosperity in all parts of theUK with a values-driven trade policy to open up markets and update international
trading rules. Our policy is based on the core principles of democracy, humanrights, free enterprise and high standards in areas like the environment, food, animal
welfare and data.
Our new UK Global Tariff is a simpler, lower tariff regime than the EU’s Common
External Tariff, which nevertheless retains tariffs on certain key sectors. This reflects
our commitment to supporting global growth through trade and our determination tomaintain an open and competitive UK market in the interests of UK consumers.
We will use the full range of trade tools now available to the Government, in combination
with our other instruments, in pursuit of our national goals. In particular, we will:• Champion free and fair trade and reinvigorate the WTO, working with like-minded
partners to modernise the trading rulebook, support sustainable trade and ensure
all countries are fairly treated.
• Negotiate bilateral and regional free trade agreements, reducing trade barriers,
opening up opportunities for UK exporters, maintaining high standards andreinvigorating relationships with trading partners, old and new. The Government’s
manifesto commitment is to establish trade agreements with countries covering
80% of UK trade by the end of 2022. In addition to the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement we have signed with the EU, our closest trading partner, we havesecured FTAs with 66 non-EU countries and have applied for accession to the
CPTPP, linking the UK to one of the most dynamic trading areas in the world.
• Secure market access and influence the rules, regulations and standards of our
trading partners. We will do so through international organisations and using
government-to-government dialogues such as Economic and Financial Dialogues,
Joint Trade Reviews, Joint Economic and Trade Committees (JETCOs), mutual
recognition agreements and bilateral investment treaties.
• Promote exports and support business across the UK. We will support businesses
with a range of activity across the UK, including: export campaigns in sectors criticalto export growth; a programme of export missions to tradeshows; expanding our
network of Export Finance Managers across the UK; launching new UK Trade andInvestment Hubs in Wales and Northern Ireland, in addition to that established in
Scotland, to connect businesses to opportunities in international trade; support
through our International Trade Advisors and the High Potential Opportunities
Programme; and support to small and medium-sized enterprises in building theirexport capability through enhanced online services. We will also work with partners
to address other activity that distorts the level playing field in global trade, making it
more difficult for UK businesses to compete. This includes, for example, the use oftied concessional finance to win overseas contracts for domestic companies.

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• Use our trade policy to create local jobs in all parts of the UK. Capturing the benefitsof global trade opportunities will be vital in supporting job creation, wage growthand levelling up the economy across the UK. Creating opportunities for exports
will be particularly important: an estimated 6.5 million jobs were supported byexports in 2016 – either directly or indirectly – of which nearly three-quarters wereoutside London.
• Equip the UK with the tools to tackle unfair and pernicious practices and maintain
trust in free and fair trade. We will establish the Trade Remedies Authority as anindependent body, enabling businesses across a range of UK manufacturingsectors – notably steel and ceramics – to seek redress against unfair trading
practices, such as dumping and subsidisation, and the surge of imports. This will
support stability and predictability for exporters and investors alike.
• Enable developing countries’ integration into the global economy, creating stronger
trade and investment partners for the future – in particular, through economic
partnership agreements and an improved unilateral trade preferences scheme thatwill contribute to poverty reduction and strengthen our supply chains.

2.3 Extending an open international order in future frontiers
17. As the world moves further into the digital and data-driven age, scientific discovery,
emerging technologies and the ability to exploit huge quantities of data will open up
new frontiers: rapidly expanding possibilities for economic, social and military activity
in domains such as cyberspace and space. These future frontiers bring significant
opportunity for future prosperity and well-being. But they will be subject to intensecompetition, raising important questions about the interaction between economic
opportunity, security and ethics, and the balance between the role of the state,businesses and individuals.
18. To make the most of the opportunities ahead, we must ensure that these future frontiers
evolve in a way that reflects democratic values and interests: with open and trusted
markets, strong safeguards for human rights, norms of behaviour that reduce the risk of
conflict and limit malign activity, and international cooperation to benefit our citizens andeconomies. The UK will work with our allies and partners – and wider stakeholders,
including industry – to extend the open international order in future frontiers,
ensuring effective accountability and oversight but opposing the overreach ofstate control.
19. Doing so will depend on our success in building a competitive edge in the technologies
driving the development of the future frontiers – whether through our cyber and spacecapabilities, or growing our influence in areas such as AI. Building strategic advantage
through S&T is therefore the foundation for our approach.
20. Our effort will involve three main strands of activity: engaging in industry-led technicalstandards development; developing regulatory frameworks governing infrastructure,technologies, data and commercial activity; and establishing the rules for responsible
behaviour by states and non-state actors, which must be negotiated between states.
Our priority actions to support this will be:
IV. Strategic Framework55

• To promote a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. We will work withother governments and in partnership with industry to ensure that cyberspace isgoverned by rules and norms that enhance collective security, promote democraticvalues and support global economic growth, and counter the spread of digital
authoritarianism. The UK will uphold the rule of law in cyberspace: embodying
responsible state behaviour and shaping international best practice; and incentivisingcompliance, deterring attacks and holding others to account for irresponsible statebehaviour. Where needed, we will shape new rules so that offensive cyber tools aredeveloped and used responsibly and in accordance with international law.
• To protect an accessible and interoperable global internet for future
generations, protecting the right for all to share information and communicate
freely and safely over the internet. The UK will oppose efforts to bring
management of the internet under restrictive inter-governmental control,
redoubling our support for the multi‑stakeholder model. We will also advocate forgreater diversity in standards bodies.
Online harms
The UK is establishing a new approach to governing digital technologies which drives
inclusive and dynamic growth across our whole society. Priorities include promoting
dynamic competitive digital markets, building trust through ensuring safety andsecurity online, unlocking the value of data, and protecting and promoting freedom of
expression online.
But the internet also enables and facilitates a range of harmful and criminal activity,
many aspects of which we will address through a new online harms regulatory
regime, introduced into law by the Online Safety Bill. The Government recognises thecomplexity, diversity and dynamism of the digital economy. We have designed the new
regime to be proportionate and based on risk of harm, and flexible enough to accountfor emerging harms and technical solutions.
The regime will protect users from harm and safeguard freedom of expression andpluralism online, establishing a new system of accountability and oversight for techcompanies that moves far beyond self-regulation. It will require all online service
providers to have systems and processes which tackle illegal content and activity on
their platforms, and protect children from harmful content and activity. Companies will
be expected to take particularly robust measures to tackle child sexual exploitationand terrorism. The largest companies will be required to set out standards for what
legal material is and is not acceptable on their services, and enforce their terms andconditions consistently and transparently.
The regulatory framework will be complemented by government support for media
literacy and growth and innovation across the UK’s safety tech sector.

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• To ensure human rights are protected online as they are offline – promoting
freedom of expression online, including through the Freedom Online Coalition,and protecting citizens from online harms, building on the UK’s pioneering
approach to online safety (see textbox). As part of this, we will seek to ensurethat lawful access to data is maintained as digital technologies and services
develop, so that law enforcement and intelligence services have the capabilities toinvestigate the most serious crimes, while protecting individuals’ right to privacy.
• To ensure that transparency and accountability are embedded from theoutset in the design and deployment of new technologies. The UK will
work with industry, the British Standards Institution and other countries toinfluence new technical standards and develop new public policy approaches
to technology which encourage innovation and interoperability, while protecting
rights and freedoms. Through our G7 presidency, we will host the Future Tech
Forum – bringing together governments, industry, academia and civil society indialogue on a core set of principles to guide the evolution of the international
technology ecosystem.
• To champion the international flow of data, enabling secure, trusted andinteroperable exchange across borders, while maintaining data protection
standards. The UK’s national data strategy aims to harness data to drive
economic growth, support scientific research, improve policy and public services
and create a fairer society; while ensuring that all data is used responsibly,
in ways that are secure, ethical and accountable. We will seek to extend thisapproach to global data governance, working with our international partners to
overcome barriers to data flows and promote international data standards thatenable growth and innovation.
• To ensure a secure and sustainable space environment (see textbox). We willcontinue to lead international efforts to develop norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviours in space, to reduce the risk of conflict, manage threats to
the UK and our allies, and assure our freedom of action. The UK will also seek toshape the standards and regulations governing the civil use of space, to protect
the space environment and to support the growth of a sovereign UK spaceindustry. We will strengthen the resilience of the position, navigation and timing(PNT) services on which our CNI and economy depend; and use space assets tosolve shared problems, supporting development efforts and disaster response.

IV. Strategic Framework57

An integrated space policy: making the UK a meaningful player in space
Since 2010, space has proved to be one of the UK’s fastest growing sectors, treblingin size. It now employs 42,000 people and generates an income of £14.8 billion eachyear, with particular strengths in small satellite technology, satellite and deep-spacetelecommunications, robotics and Earth observation.
The UK nevertheless relies heavily on our allies for access to critical capabilities, suchas satellite launch. By 2030, the Government’s ambition is for the UK to have the ability
to monitor, protect and defend our interests in and through space, using a mixture ofsovereign capabilities and burden-sharing partnerships with our allies.
To meet this ambition, the National Space Council will develop the UK’s first national
space strategy in 2021. This strategy will establish an integrated approach acrossmilitary and civil space policy, under which we will:• Establish a new Space Command by summer 2021, ensuring that the armed
forces have cutting-edge capabilities to advance UK interests on Earth and inspace – enhancing our cooperation with allies and ensuring we can compete with
our adversaries.
• Develop a commercial launch capability from the UK – launching British satellites
from Scotland by 2022 as part of the UK Space Agency’s programme to enable a
UK-wide market for spaceflight services. This will give us greater strategic autonomy
and flexibility in terms of what the UK puts into space, and when.
• Develop other critical space capabilities for military and civil use, including Space
Domain Awareness, which uses integrated in-space and ground sensing to track
space debris, investigate incidents in space, and detect, anticipate and attributehostile activity.
• Support the UK space sector to realise the economic benefits from this new anddynamic market, and extend the UK’s influence in the space domain. As part ofbuilding the UK’s strategic advantage through S&T, the Government will build theenabling environment for a thriving UK space industry developing space- andground-based technologies. We will promote a ‘whole-of-life’ offer from R&D
through finance to satellite operations, launch capability data applications andend‑of-life services. Defence will carry out more space-related science activity,
R&D and operational concept demonstrators.
• Prevent the proliferation of technologies that pose a threat in space, such as ballistic
missile technologies, through robust export controls (see 3.3.3).
• Increase the UK’s international collaboration across our space-related objectives.
We intend to continue our participation in the EU’s Copernicus Earth observation
programme, and will deepen our cooperation with NATO and through the
Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative. We will also develop our work withbodies including NASA and the European, Canadian, Australian and Japanesespace agencies.

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Goonhilly Earth Station, located on the Lizard
Peninsula, Cornwall, is home to numerous
telecommunications antennae and to the
UK’s first commercial Deep Space Antenna(named GHY-6, foreground) capable of receiving
telemetry from spacecraft orbiting the Moon,
Mars or beyond. Credit: GES Ltd

The UK in the world: a European country with global interests
Among European countries, the UK has uniquely global interests, partnerships
and capabilities. As one of five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council,
and with a leading voice in organisations like the G7, G20 and Commonwealth, we havea global perspective and global responsibilities. Our patterns of trade and investment are
as global as they are European, and our international policy reflects this reality. Our aim
is to be well-placed to take advantage of emerging markets, shifts in the global economy
and global progress in S&T, and to shoulder our share of the burden in providing forstability and security at the global level as well as in the Euro‑Atlantic area. This will guidethe way we prioritise our diplomatic efforts, including in our tilt to the Indo-Pacific.
The United States will remain the UK’s
most important strategic ally and partner.
The heart of the relationship is a human
one: the flow of people and ideas between
our countries, our shared history, and acommon language. Almost a million British
and American nationals live and go towork in each others’ countries each day.
Our relationship is also one of common
values – a shared belief in democracy,
the rule of law and fundamental freedoms.
As a result of these foundations, we
cooperate to an unprecedented degree.
Across the full spectrum of defence,
intelligence, cyber power, counter-terrorism
and nuclear, the US-UK partnership
underpins our security and saves lives.
We will continue to deepen our relationship,including through the Carrier Strike Group,
joint work on emerging technologies, andcollaboration on our future nuclear deterrent.
The US is the UK’s biggest single bilateral
trading partner, accounting for over £230
billion in trade, almost 20% of UK exports
and the largest single source of FDI in
2019. We will seek to grow this further
through an FTA, which will help both our
economic recoveries from COVID-19 andaid our shared ambition to level up, setting
a new bar for trade deals of the future indigital trade, in the protection of intellectual
property and in accelerating efforts on the
low-carbon economy. We will also seek
closer collaboration in tackling illicit finance.
Our European neighbours and allies remainvital partners. The UK will be the greatest
single European contributor to the security

60

Integrated Reviewof the Euro-Atlantic area to 2030. We
will work with our partners to defend ourcommon values, counter shared threats
and build resilience in our neighbourhood.
We will also sustain our people andcultural ties, and look for opportunities tocollaborate, including in developing green
technology and through a green recovery
from COVID-19.
We recognise the important role playedby the EU in the peace and prosperity ofEurope and will find new ways of working
with it on shared challenges. Our Tradeand Cooperation Agreement provides abasis for protecting our essential economic
interests and cooperating as appropriate,while enabling us to pursue different
economic and political approaches in many
areas where this suits our interests.
We have a deep and long-standing security
and defence partnership with France,
underpinned by the Lancaster House
treaties and exemplified by our Combined
Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). We willcontinue working together to counter
terrorism and state threats, and to sustain
international security. Managing our
economic relationship in a collaborative andconstructive way, particularly in handlingour shared border in relation to both tradeand security, will be important to ensuring
the overall relationship remains positive.
Our intention is to enhance this partnershipand to build on the Lancaster House
treaties in the UK-France Summit in 2021.

Germany is an essential ally, with which wehave deep economic ties and a growing
foreign policy partnership, as members of
the E3 and bilaterally. We will continue towork together to defend our neighbourhoodand our values, including through the Joint
Declaration on Foreign Policy we hope tosign in 2021. We will seek to bolster thisrelationship in the years ahead, including
through cooperation on important issues
such as climate change.
We are committed to a strong bilateral
partnership with Ireland, with which we
enjoy a Common Travel Area. We havea shared responsibility and an essential
common interest in upholding the 1998
Belfast Agreement in all its elements.
These include its three strands: the internal
governance of Northern Ireland, NorthSouth cooperation and East-West relations.
We will seek to work constructively
with Ireland to ensure that the 2019 EU
Withdrawal Agreement is implemented
in a way that protects this agreement
and the hard-won gains of the peace
process, including prosperity and stability
in Northern Ireland. In addition, we willfurther develop our relationship throughincreasing connectivity, clean growth andinternational cooperation.
Other European partners, both within
and outside the EU, will remain essential
to our approach. We enjoy a particularly
close partnership with Italy at the present
time given our respective G7 and G20
presidencies and COP26 in 2021. Poland
is a vital partner on European security
with which we share a deep history.
Similarly, we work with other European
partners including Spain, Portugal,
the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey on afocused set of interests where we can findcommon cause, such as values, free trade
and a commitment to transatlanticism.
Bilaterally, and through NATO and the Joint
Expeditionary Force, we work with all ourallies in support of our common objectives,to meet shared defence and security
challenges. We will continue to develop
our Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with
Italy and Sweden.
The UK respects the people, culture andhistory of Russia. However, until relations
with its government improve, we will
actively deter and defend against thefull spectrum of threats emanating from
Russia. Through NATO, we will ensure a
united Western response, combining our
military, diplomatic and intelligence assets insupport of collective security. We will upholdinternational rules and norms and holdRussia to account for breaches of these,
working with our international partners,
as we did after the Salisbury attack.
We will also support others in the Eastern
European neighbourhood and beyond tobuild their resilience to state threats. This
includes Ukraine, where we will continue tobuild the capacity of its armed forces.
The UK will continue to invest deeply in
our partnerships with Australia, Canada
and New Zealand, which are based onshared history, values and people-topeople connections, including as membersof the Commonwealth. We continue towork bilaterally with all three across foreign
policy and security issues, intelligence,law enforcement and defence. We also
work together, with the US, through ourunique and highly valued Five Eyes
partnership. We have increased our Five
Eyes cooperation, including in responseto the pandemic, and will seek tostrengthen policy cooperation further on
a range of issues. Under our independent
trade policy, we will seek bespoke FTAs
with each partner.
The UK is one of the 54 members of theCommonwealth, a voluntary international
association that values democraticsovereignty and encompasses 2.4 billion
people – 60% of whom are under theage of thirty. The Commonwealth is an
important institution in supporting an open

IV. Strategic Framework61and resilient international order, bringing
together states with a national interestin promoting democracy, sustaining
individual freedoms, driving sustainable
development and enabling cross-border
trade in goods and services that supports
economic growth.
In the decade ahead, the UK will deepen
our engagement in the Indo-Pacific (seefollowing section), establishing a greaterand more persistent presence than any
other European country. The regionis already critical to our economy andsecurity; is a focal point for the negotiationof international laws, rules and norms;
and will become more important to UK
prosperity over the next decade. Japanis one of our closest strategic partners,
including on security, and we are committed
to deepening this partnership. We will lookto cement our ties with South Korea andother regional powers such as Indonesia,
Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. We willremain the most engaged non-regional
partner on denuclearisation by North
Korea and on sanctions enforcement. We
have close historical links with Pakistan
and will continue to develop a strong,
modern relationship focused on security,
stability and prosperity. We will continue tosupport stability in Afghanistan, as part ofa wider coalition.
The UK-India relationship is alreadystrong, but over the next ten years weseek transformation in our cooperation
across the full range of our shared interests.
India – as the largest democracy in theworld – is an international actor of growing
importance. As Commonwealth nations,
we have strong cultural links: 1.5 million
British nationals are of Indian origin; andwe enjoy broad collaboration across theeducation sector. Trade between the UK
and India more than doubled between
2007 and 2019, our investment relationshipsupports over half a million jobs in eachother’s economies, and the UK is India’s
second-biggest research partner. The

62

Integrated Review

ability to strike our own trade deals willallow us to grow our economic relationshipfurther, including through increased bilateral
investment flows.
Our vision is for re-energised trade andinvestment, rooted in S&T and supportinglevelling up in the UK and India alike;enhanced defence cooperation thatbrings a more secure Indian Ocean
Region, building on the existing biannual
Ministerial Defence Dialogues; and UK-India
leadership to tackle global challenges likeclimate change, clean energy and global
health. We will take a major step towards
achieving this vision in 2021 when welaunch our Enhanced Trade Partnershipwith India as a roadmap to a potential
comprehensive trade deal. This relationshipwill be underpinned by our largest singlecountry diplomatic network anywhere in
the world, with more than 800 staff spread
across eleven posts.
China’s growing international stature is by
far the most significant geopolitical factor
in the world today, with major implications
for British values and interests and for the
structure and shape of the international
order. The fact that China is an authoritarianstate, with different values to ours, presents
challenges for the UK and our allies. China
will contribute more to global growth thanany other country in the next decade with
benefits to the global economy. China andthe UK both benefit from bilateral tradeand investment, but China also presents
the biggest state-based threat to the UK’s
economic security.
We will require a robust diplomatic
framework for this relationship thatallows us to manage disagreements,
defend our values and preserve spacefor cooperation where our interests align.
China is an increasingly important partner
in tackling global challenges like pandemic
preparedness, biodiversity and climatechange. We will continue to pursue a
positive economic relationship, including

deeper trade links and more Chinese
investment in the UK. At the same time,
we will increase protection of our CNI,
institutions and sensitive technology, andstrengthen the resilience of our criticalsupply chains, so that we can engage withconfidence. We will not hesitate to standup for our values and our interests where
they are threatened, or when China acts
in breach of existing agreements. The UK
has responded to China’s actions in Hong
Kong by creating a new immigration routefor British Nationals (Overseas) and theireligible family members and dependents,
and to China’s human rights violations in
Xinjiang through measures to ensure that
British organisations are neither complicit innor profiting from them.
Africa is the most diverse continent in
the world with significant countervailingtrends. We will partner with the African
Union on climate and biodiversity,
global health security, free trade, crisis
management, conflict prevention andmediation, the Women, Peace andSecurity agenda, and promoting good
governance and human rights. Building on
the success of the 2020 Africa Investment
Summit, we will revitalise UK economic
engagement with Africa, deepening anddeveloping mutual partnerships, working
together to build resilient and productive
economies and open societies, withimproved development, investment andfinancing offers, more effective humanitarian
response, increased climate resilience andreduced security threats.
We will work in partnership with South
Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia andGhana in particular to further our sharedprosperity goals, our democratic values
and our security interests. South Africa
and Nigeria are regional powers with global
reach through international fora, with which
we share common values and commercial
and development interests: together theyaccount for 46% of GDP in sub-SaharanAfrica and for 60% of its trade with the UK.

The UK shares significant security andcounter-terrorism concerns in the Hornof Africa with Ethiopia and Kenya. We will
invest further in regional stability, moving
towards closer defence cooperation with
Kenya, and Ethiopia if the situation there
allows. We will deliver the UK-Kenya
Strategic Partnership, building on our deep,
historic relationship.
The UK will continue to support conflict
resolution and stabilisation efforts in
Somalia and Sudan and work to ensure
the freedom of navigation in the Gulf ofAden and maritime security in the Indian
Ocean. We will continue to support UN
and African peacekeeping operations –including through increased commitment tothe successor mission to the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – to address
shared security concerns and protect
the most vulnerable. We have deployed
UK troops to the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali(MINUSMA) and provide training for African
troop contributors to UN missions.
The UK has strong, historic bilateral ties
in the Middle East and North Africa
region – such as with Jordan and Oman
– which are vital to UK prosperity andsecurity. We will look to deepen these links
to become one of the region’s primarytrade and investment partners and build
support for our climate objectives. We willbring a more integrated security offer toprotect our interests, tackling the upstream
drivers of terrorism, and working with ourpartners to enhance and modernise theirsecurity capacity and capabilities to ensure
lasting stability in the region. Our armed
forces will continue to contribute to the
Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and
Syria. We will also build upon our close
security partnerships, including with Israel
and Saudi Arabia, to better protect ourinterests in the region.
We will enhance our work promoting
greater economic, societal and

IV. Strategic Framework

63environmental resilience, including in key
countries such as Egypt. We will work withpartners to build more open, inclusive andresilient societies, in particular championing
and supporting women’s participationand girls’ education. We will seek toincrease trade and investment with our Gulf
partners, to support the levelling up agenda
in the UK. We will enhance collaborationin areas such as life sciences and green
technology with Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel andsupport work on sustainable growth andclimate change with Iraq and Morocco.
We will also increase our cooperation withour close partner the UAE to tackle global
illicit financial flows.
As a priority, we will continue to work withpartners on a renewed diplomatic effort
to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon, to hold it to account for its
destabilising activity in the region, including
seeking regional rapprochement. The UK
will continue working towards durable
political solutions in Yemen and Libya.
We will likewise address the humanitarian,
economic and regional consequences of
the Syria conflict and work for a durable
political solution, including through our
support to Jordan and Lebanon.
In Latin America and the Caribbean,
the UK will continue to develop a strong
set of partnerships based on shareddemocratic values, inclusive and resilient
growth, free trade and mutual interest in
tackling SOC and corruption. With at least
23% of the world’s tropical forests, 30%of global reserves of freshwater and 25%of the world’s cultivable land, this regionis also a vital partner in tackling climatechange and restoring biodiversity.

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Integrated Review

We will deepen our ties with Brazil and
Mexico, strengthening partnerships on
trade, innovation, climate, security anddevelopment as well as working with
Argentina, Chile and Colombia to support
our interests. We will continue to defend theUK’s sovereignty of the Falkland Islands,
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands
and ensure the interests of the 3,500
people who live there are protected in linewith the principle of self-determination.
By 2021, the Antarctic Treaty will havebeen in force for 60 years. The UK was
the first signatory of the treaty, which
protects Antarctica as a continent forpeaceful scientific cooperation. Using
our new state-of-the-art Polar Research
vessel RRS Sir David Attenborough, andthrough further investment in our Antarctic
scientific stations and capabilities, the UK
will continue to uphold and strengthen
the Antarctic Treaty System and maintainour leadership in the study of the global
implications of climate change in Antarctica.
The UK is the nearest neighbour to the
Arctic region. Through our role as a State
Observer to the Arctic Council, we willcontribute to maintaining the region as oneof high cooperation and low tension. We will
also maintain a significant contribution to
Arctic science, focused on understanding
the implications of climate change. We arecommitted to working with our partners
to ensure that increasing access to theregion and its resources is managed safely,
sustainably and responsibly.

Chevening Scholars at an orientation event.
© Crown copyright 2021

The Indo-Pacific tilt: a framework
The Indo-Pacific region matters to the UK: it is critical to our economy, our security
and our global ambition to support open societies. At least 1.7 million British citizens
live across the region and our trading relationships continue to grow. In the decades
to come it will be the crucible for many of the most pressing global challenges – fromclimate and biodiversity to maritime security and geopolitical competition linked to rules
and norms.
The UK needs to engage more deeply:• For economic opportunities – theIndo-Pacific is the world’s growth engine:
home to half the world’s people; 40%of global GDP; some of the fastestgrowing economies; at the forefront of
new global trade arrangements; leading
and adopting digital and technologicalinnovation and standards; investingstrongly in renewables and green tech;and vital to our goals for investment
and resilient supply chains. The IndoPacific already accounts for 17.5% of
UK global trade and 10% of inward FDI
and we will work to build this further,including through new trade agreements,
dialogues and deeper partnerships inscience, technology and data.
• For our security – the region is at
the centre of intensifying geopoliticalcompetition with multiple potential
flashpoints: from unresolved territorial
disputes; to nuclear proliferation andmiscalculation; to climate change andnon-state threats from terrorism and
SOC. It is on the frontline of new security
challenges, including in cyberspace.
Much of the UK’s trade with Asia
depends on shipping that goes througha range of Indo-Pacific choke points.
Preserving freedom of navigation istherefore essential to the UK’s national
interests. We already work closely with
regional partners and will do morethrough persistent engagement by ourarmed forces and our wider security
capacity-building.

66

Integrated Review• For our values – we need to deepenand expand our partnerships topromote open societies and to uphold
the international rules and norms that
underpin free trade, security and stability.
We remain committed to development
in a region that is home to one-third of
the world’s poorest people. We will work
closely with like-minded bilateral andmultilateral partners, including on global
priorities such as girls’ education andtackling climate change.
Our goal: we will be the European partnerwith the broadest and most integrated
presence in the Indo-Pacific – committed
for the long term, with closer and deeper
partnerships, bilaterally and multilaterally.
Our role: we will lead where we are bestplaced to do so and we will partner andsupport others as necessary to pursue
our goals. This will include both sustaining
and supporting bilateral and multilateral
partnerships in the region, such as theFive Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),
and working with organisations such as
ASEAN and the Pacific Island Forum.
We will also look for ways to work moreclosely with European partners, includingFrance and Germany. We will be an open
and liberal trade partner, do businesswith reliability and integrity, and build on
our deep expertise and engagement ininternational peace and security issues.

Our actions: this ambition will be delivered
through prioritised cross-government
engagement, focused on nine areas:• Concluding and implementing new
bilateral trade agreements with Australia
and New Zealand, and agreeing an
Enhanced Trade Partnership with
India as a stepping stone towards acomprehensive trade deal, in addition to
new trade dialogues and reviews withpartners across the region.
• Acceding to the Comprehensive andProgressive Agreement for Trans‑PacificPartnership to secure increased
trade and investment opportunities,
and to diversify our trading links andsupply chains, embedding open tradeand integration.
• Strengthening supply chain resilienceof critical goods and raw materials,
including medical supplies.
• Becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner
to work together on global challenges,
support ASEAN’s central role inregional stability and prosperity andenable sustainable development inSouth East Asia.
• Strengthening defence and security
cooperation, including in maritime
security, building on our overseas militarybases and existing contribution in the
Indo-Pacific, enhancing our engagement
and exercising with our FPDA partners,
and increasing our engagement with
regional security groupings.
• Cooperating and building capacity on
cyber security.
• Tackling climate change, using both
adaptation and mitigation activity tosupport a transition to clean, resilientand sustainable growth in the IndoPacific through influence with major
and growing emitters and the mostvulnerable countries, linked directly to
our wider COP26 strategy.
• Our force for good agenda, promoting
open societies and protecting public
goods through conflict prevention,strong rule of law, respect for humanrights and media freedoms, girls’
education and humanitarian response.
We will also continue to deepen ourpeople-to-people links, including
through bilateral cultural seasons withJapan, Australia and India.
• Using our ODA more strategically,in support of many of these objectives.
We will continue to support partnercountries in the region to combat
extreme poverty. Where countries canfinance their development, we will
move gradually from offering grants toproviding UK expertise and returnable
capital to address regional challenges
in our mutual interest. This will include
support to high-quality infrastructure.
Deepening cooperation in S&T withpartners across the region will be central to
our overall partnership with the Indo-Pacific,
underpinning our future success acrossall these areas.
Our presence: the UK has alreadyinvested significantly in this region witha network of 52 posts, four of whichhave been opened since 2018. A new
FCDO Director General responsible for
the Indo‑Pacific was appointed in 2020,as was a dedicated Ambassador to
ASEAN in 2019. Since 2018, we have
had regional Trade Commissioners basedin Singapore, Mumbai and Shanghai.
During 2020, we agreed new trade deals
with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam. We
have a long‑standing naval presence in the
Gulf and Indian Ocean through Operation
Kipion. Naval visits and defence diplomacy
across the wider Indo-Pacific grew in 2019.

IV. Strategic Framework67HMS Queen Elizabeth, RFA Tideforce and
HMS Northumberland taking part in WESTLANT 19.
UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021

3. Strengthening security and defence at homeand overseas
1.

The UK can only maximise the benefits of our openness if we are strong andsecure at home – ensuring that our citizens are safe from harm, while protecting our
democracy, the economy and the critical national infrastructure on which daily life
depends. Security is also essential to an international order in which open societies
and economies like the UK can flourish and collaborate in pursuit of shared goals,
free from coercion and interference.

2.

We will take a more robust approach in response to the deteriorating global security
environment, adapting to systemic competition and a wider range of state and nonstate threats enabled by technology. In doing so, we must improve our ability todetect, disrupt, defend against and deter the threats we face in the physicalworld and in cyberspace. These may be state threats above and below thetraditional threshold of war, transnational security challenges such as terrorism andserious and organised crime (SOC), or a combination of these. We will demonstratethat we are able and willing to respond when our citizens and interests are targeted,including with force if necessary.

3.

Equally, we must recognise that we cannot disrupt or deter every threat in our moreinterconnected world in which the distinction between domestic and international
security is increasingly blurred. We must therefore make it more difficult andcostly for malign actors – both state and non-state – to achieve the effects
they desire. This will involve reducing our vulnerabilities and improving ourresilience to persistent threats. We must also minimise the opportunity for others to
exploit conflict and instability for their own gain, and reinforce the governance andinternational architecture that help to preserve peace.

4.

Cooperation with allies and like-minded partners will be fundamental to thiseffort. As a P5 member, we have a responsibility to contribute to international
security. As a European power with global reach, we are well-placed to do so,through a broad, integrated security approach that addresses the spectrum ofchallenges to our shared security and prosperity. We will tailor our presence andsupport according to the country and region, continuing to focus our security efforts
primarily on the Euro-Atlantic region and providing support in Africa – in particularin East Africa and to important partners in West Africa such as Nigeria – and in the
Middle East. We will also place a greater emphasis than before on the Indo-Pacific,
reflecting its importance to many of the most pressing global challenges in the
coming decade, such as maritime security and competition linked to laws, rules
and norms.

5.

Our first goal is to counter state threats at home and overseas. We must improve
our ability – and that of our allies and partners – to detect, understand, attribute andact in response to the spectrum of state threats we face: sharing risk and poolingcapabilities through collective security; using our armed forces to disrupt and deter
through persistent engagement overseas; and building our collective capacity tocounter state threats in the physical world and in cyberspace.

IV. Strategic Framework

69

6.

Our second goal is to tackle conflict and instability. We will seek to address theirlong-term drivers, reduce the incidence and intensity of conflict, and minimise theopportunities for states and non-state actors to renegotiate power balances and toundermine international security.

7.

Our third goal is to enhance UK homeland security by tackling transnational
security challenges, addressing a range of increasingly overlapping threats toour security at home and overseas. These include radicalisation and terrorism,
SOC, and the proliferation of CBRN capabilities and advanced military technology.

3.1 Countering state threats: defence, disruption and deterrence
8.

State threats to the UK, and to our allies, are growing and diversifying as
systemic competition intensifies. States are becoming increasingly assertive in
how they advance their own objectives and in their willingness to undermine ours.
While their actions often fall short of open conflict, they can nevertheless threaten
and interfere with our security, open economy, democracy and social cohesion– risking escalation into war. State threats are persistent and take many forms,
including espionage, political interference, sabotage, assassination and poisonings,
electoral interference, disinformation, propaganda, cyber operations and intellectual
property theft. These tools of coercion and interference can also be used in ‘hybrid’
combination with more traditional hard power methods.

9.

Great power competition and the opportunism of states such as Russia, Iran andNorth Korea are key factors in the deterioration of the security environment and theweakening of the international order. But the dynamics of systemic competition are
more complex and the UK faces threats from a wider range of states. Non-state
actors also participate in this competition. They often use the same methods, such as
cyber-attacks and disinformation, to target our citizens and exploit our openness fortheir own gain. And states increasingly work with non-state actors to achieve theirgoals, including as proxies in conflict. This affords them deniability and blurs the line
between state threats and other types of security threats, such as terrorism and SOC.

10. The UK must improve its ability to detect, understand, attribute and act in
response to aggression across the range of state threats, whether in the physicaldomain or in cyberspace, and whether military or non-military in nature. We must
work with our allies and like-minded partners to do the same, so that together we are
more resilient and our collective response is greater than the sum of its parts. This will
enable us to manage escalation, by responding in the domain and at a time of ourchoosing. It will also strengthen open societies and economies, international security
and the international order.
11. This means that responding to state threats can no longer be viewed as anarrow ‘national security’ or ‘defence’ agenda. We must bring together theelements of our work across this Strategic Framework at home and overseas,
and all the instruments available to government, in an integrated response.

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Integrated Review

3.1.1 Defending the UK and our people, at home and overseas
12. The first responsibility of the Government is to defend the UK and its citizens.
This includes our responsibility to ensure the security of the fourteen Overseas
Territories (OTs) and the Crown Dependencies of the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwickof Guernsey and the Isle of Man. We also have responsibilities to the five million
British people that live outside the UK, and to British nationals on visits overseas.
In fulfilling these responsibilities, our priority actions will be:• To secure British territory against physical incursions. The Royal Navy willremain active in the UK’s territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone, including byinvesting in new capabilities to protect undersea CNI. The Royal Air Force (RAF)
will continue to provide a 24-hour quick reaction alert force to defend UK airspaceand our new Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will patrol the North Atlantic fromtheir base at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland.
• To support the OTs and Crown Dependencies in deterring and defending
against state and non-state threats. The armed forces will continue to deter andchallenge incursions in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters. Significant investment in
the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus will assure our ability to contribute to security,with allies, in the Eastern Mediterranean. The armed forces will also maintain apermanent presence in the Falkland Islands, Ascension Island and the British Indian
Ocean Territory; and a permanent maritime presence in the Atlantic and Caribbean,
contributing to counter-trafficking operations and delivering humanitarianassistance and disaster relief during the annual hurricane season. We will promote
the right of self-determination for the peoples of the OTs and continue to defend
and represent internationally the three Crown Dependencies. We will uphold theUK’s Antarctic Treaty obligations, including around the British Antarctic Territory.
• To enhance the support and assistance available to UK nationals overseas,
offering a wider choice of digital services for consular assistance. The armed
forces will maintain readiness to evacuate British nationals caught up in events
overseas when needed.
3.1.2 Defence and deterrence through collective security
13. The UK’s network of military alliances and partnerships is at the heart of our ability todeter and defend against state adversaries. It is also a powerful demonstration of thecollective commitment to the free association of sovereign nations and the willingness
to share the burden in maintaining an open international order.
14. NATO is the foundation of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area, where ourcommitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains our most powerfuldeterrent. In an era of rapid developments in technology and doctrine, the Alliance must
be equipped to deal with the full range of possible threats. These include long-range
precision strike weapons, cyber weapons and weapons aimed at degrading spacebased infrastructure. They also include malign activity intended to test the boundary
between peace and war, and our resolve in response. Russia is the most acute threat
in the region and we will work with NATO Allies to ensure a united Western response,
combining military, intelligence and diplomatic efforts. We will continue to support
closer practical cooperation between NATO and the EU in pursuit of this goal. We will

IV. Strategic Framework71cooperate with the EU on matters of security and defence as independent partners,
where this is in our interest.
15. To bolster collective security with our allies worldwide – especially in the Euro-Atlantic
and with a new emphasis on the Indo-Pacific – our priority actions will be:• To reaffirm our commitment to leadership in NATO, supporting its adaptation
to threats above and below the threshold of war under international law. We
will increase our defence budget by over £24 billion over the next four years andremain the largest European spender on defence in NATO, with our expenditure
now standing at 2.2% of GDP. We will continue to: commit a full spectrum offorces to the Alliance, from our nuclear deterrent to offensive cyber capabilities;
make a leading contribution to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence andResponse Force; and ensure we are at the forefront of implementing NATO’s new
Deterrence and Defence Concept. We will also continue to serve as a framework
nation able to connect and coordinate NATO’s forces effectively, while more UK
equipment will be prepositioned in Germany to facilitate rapid response. Operating
across the Euro-Atlantic region, and with a focus on the northern and southernflanks of Europe, we will support collective security from the Black Sea to the High
North, in the Baltics, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.
• To improve interoperability with our Euro-Atlantic allies. We will strengthen
bilateral relationships – particularly, but not solely, with our key allies the UnitedStates, France (via the Lancaster House treaties and the CJEF) and Germany– as well as multilateral groupings such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, which
comprises the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden.
• To modernise the UK armed forces, maintaining a full spectrum of capabilities,
as set out in the Defence Command Paper. We will prioritise the development andintegration of new technologies – including those required for near-peer, high-tech
warfighting – and a ‘digital backbone’ to enable multi-domain operations andinteroperability with allies and partners. In the Euro-Atlantic, the UK will be oneof only two NATO Allies to bring to bear nuclear, offensive cyber, precision strikeweapons and fifth-generation strike aircraft. We will also contribute to missile
defence, to space awareness and resilience (including through a new SpaceCommand) and to CBRN resilience. A new generation of warships will support
our historic role in keeping the North Atlantic open. Our highly mobile airborne andamphibious forces will be able to reinforce Allies at short notice. Our land force will
undergo its most comprehensive modernisation for two decades, becoming better
integrated with other domains, better able to intervene quickly and effectively overlarge distances, better protected from electronic, air and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
threats, and better able to engage an adversary at long range. Our Special Forces
will be ready to operate in the most hostile environments and against our mostsophisticated adversaries. With international partners including Italy and Sweden,
we will continue to develop FCAS as a replacement for our Typhoon fast jets,
drawing on ground-breaking technologies from the defence sector and beyond.
• To improve our ability to manage and de-escalate a multi-domain crisis,
reflecting the increased intensity of competition from our potential adversaries and themore complex range of routes for escalation, including to nuclear coercion. The UK
will run a series of national, strategic-level exercises to test resilience and our ability tonavigate crises. We will actively support similar NATO and EU-NATO exercises.
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• To sustain our commitment to collective security beyond the Euro-Atlantic,
strengthening our ties and understanding. In particular, given the growing
importance of the Indo-Pacific, we will reinforce our commitment to the FPDA andincrease our regional maritime presence to support norms and laws in the region.
In 2021, HMS Queen Elizabeth will lead a multinational task group on a global
deployment, visiting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.
Modernising defence for a competitive age
We must update our deterrence posture to respond to the growth in state competition
below the threshold of war under international law. As set out in the 2020 Integrated
Operating Concept, this means being able to move seamlessly between ‘operating’and ‘warfighting’. This will require a force structure that principally deters through‘persistent engagement’ below the threshold of war, while remaining prepared forwarfighting when necessary. All activity, including that which has previously been seen
as routine, has the potential to constrain or deter adversaries.
In practice, persistent engagement will mean deploying more of our forces overseas
more often and for longer periods of time, both with NATO and alongside our wider
network of allies and partners. Greater global presence will improve our understandingof events, help us to detect and tackle problems earlier, and give us a foundation to
respond more assertively to threats. Our armed forces will remain ready to fight major
wars but will operate as a flexible campaigning force.
To provide a more solid overseas foundation we will invest in the strategic hubsthat give our forces reach, access, influence and insight. As well as investing in ourfacilities and infrastructure in Cyprus, Gibraltar and Germany, we will improve those in
Oman, Singapore and Kenya. We will also invest around £60 million in expanding andimproving our global network of British Defence Staffs, increasing it by nearly a third.
We will place greater priority on identifying, funding, developing and deploying newtechnologies and capabilities faster than our potential adversaries, under the MOD
science and technology strategy 2020. This will allow our forces to be decisiveat greater reach, to integrate better with allies and to be more efficient and costeffective, reversing the trend of fewer and increasingly costly platforms. It will also
stimulate the national S&T base across both industry and academia. We will invest
at least £6.6 billion over the next four years in R&D in areas including space, cyber,quantum technologies, engineering biology, directed energy weapons and advanced
high-speed missiles. Investment in Defence and Security Accelerator challenges aswell as a network of MOD innovation hubs within important UK technology clusters
will improve the ‘pull through’ of this R&D into cutting-edge equipment. We will also
publish a defence AI strategy and invest in a new centre to accelerate adoption of thistechnology across the full spectrum of our capabilities and activities.
Finally, we will implement a new defence and security industrial strategy alignedwith the Government’s plan for growth. It will constitute a more strategic approachto our core industrial base, from building ships in Scotland and armoured vehicles
in Wales, to manufacturing aircraft in England and satellites in Northern Ireland.
Through our investment in priority equipment and technologies to meet national

IV. Strategic Framework73security requirements, we will convert innovation into commercial opportunities more
effectively and support prosperity and growth in the wider economy. We will move awayfrom the 2012 policy of ‘competition by default’ and prioritise UK industrial capability
where required for national security and operational reasons. We will also reform andrevitalise our approach to acquisition, exports and international collaboration, including
greater use of government-to-government arrangements.

3.1.3 Countering state threats to our democracy, society and economy
16. Our wider efforts to counter state threats will reinforce our collective security. We willseek to deter states from aggressive acts: through the prospect of punishment– by detecting, attributing and responding accordingly; and by denying them theopportunity to act, through reducing our vulnerabilities and improving our resilience.
In the UK, this will involve bringing together the work of the Defending Democracy
programme – a cross-government programme to protect our institutions and elected
officials from intimidation, interference and espionage – with our efforts to protect
our economic security, strengthen UK cyber security, enhance our national security
communications and build our national resilience.
17. The experience of the 2018 Salisbury attack demonstrated the value of a collective
response to aggression. Equally, some threats such as cyber-attacks anddisinformation easily cross borders and require international action. We must
therefore also work with allies and like-minded partners to strengthen their approachto state threats. This will involve deepening our security relationships in the wider
Euro-Atlantic area, Africa and the Middle East, and with a greater emphasis on the
Indo-Pacific. Through our support to others in capacity-building, we will: develop ashared understanding of the security threats we face, including through increased
information-sharing; undertake joint education, training and exercises; and provide
assistance and expertise in developing policy, legislation and regulatory frameworks.
18. Our priority actions will be:• To take a whole-of-government approach to protecting democracy in
the UK, supporting a democratic system that is fair, secure and transparent.
Our goal under the Defending Democracy programme is to ensure the integrityof the UK’s democratic processes and sustain public confidence in them. We areenhancing government capabilities to ensure the safe delivery of democratic
events. This includes operating structures such as the Election Cell, which provides
a monitoring and response mechanism, and the cross-government CounterDisinformation Unit. Our work programme will include: introducing voter ID atpolling stations; improving the transparency of online political campaigning with adigital imprints regime; and introducing a new electoral sanction to tackle abuse.
We are also increasing our efforts with international partners to defend democracy
and champion shared values, including through our G7 presidency (see 2.1).
• To bolster our cross-government approach to countering state threats. We willreform laws, policies and practices to remove impediments to the protection ofnational security, ensuring that the security and intelligence agencies and police
have appropriate powers to combat all the threats we now face while appropriately
protecting the legal rights of individuals. We will introduce Counter-State Threats
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legislation when parliamentary time allows. This will revise existing offences – todeal more effectively with the espionage threat – and create new offences, tocriminalise other harmful activity conducted by, and on behalf of, states. The
legislation will also introduce a form of UK foreign agent registration scheme. Where
legislation engages the Sewel Convention we will seek legislative consent, as well
as taking on board views from and working with the devolved administrations.
• To ensure the future security of the UK telecoms network as the basis forsecure and safe CNI. Under the provisions of the Telecommunications (Security)
Bill, supported by the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, we will: manage
and mitigate risks from high-risk vendors; introduce a new, robust security
framework for telecoms to ensure our networks are secure and resilient to futurechallenges; and work with partners, including the Five Eyes, to create a morediverse and competitive supply base for telecoms networks.
• To strengthen cyber security capacity and cooperation with like-minded
partners. Our bilateral capacity-building programmes will draw on the UK’s
thought leadership and expertise in cyber security, in government and the private
sector. They will: enhance partners’ political resilience to common state-related
and other advanced persistent threats in cyberspace; build the resilience ofoverseas infrastructure; share information about supply chain threats and risks;
and increase the capacity of cyber law enforcement partners. We will continue toextend our Five Eyes cooperation on cyber security policy and strengthen regionaland multilateral platforms for capacity-building.
• To enhance efforts to counter disinformation at home and overseas. We will
increase societal resilience in the UK to all forms of disinformation through a new
regulatory framework under the Online Safety Bill and a media literacy strategy.
Investment in the Government’s behavioural science expertise, horizon-scanningand strategic communications will also help us to improve our response todisinformation campaigns. In addition to bilateral capacity-building programmes
for priority partners overseas, the Counter Disinformation and Media Development
programme will fund initiatives to understand and expose the disinformation threat
and to support independent media, especially in Russia’s near abroad. We will also
strengthen international cooperation through multilateral groups such as the G7.
• To use our armed forces to detect, understand and deter state threats below
the threshold of war through persistent engagement overseas (see defence
textbox). The UK will deploy more of our armed forces overseas more often and for
longer periods of time, to train, exercise and operate alongside allies and partners
across all our priority regions. Working bilaterally, with partners and in support ofNATO missions, we will: build the capacity of others to deter and defend against
state threats; support, mentor and, where necessary, assist nations in countering
non-state challenges; and strengthen our network of relationships.
• To put diplomacy at the centre of international efforts to counter state
threats, building international coalitions for attributing and responding to state
threats, including through sanctions. We will also provide diplomatic and expert
support to multilateral organisations that uphold international norms on security,
such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)and the Council of Europe. This will include strong support to the OSCE’s Special
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Council of Europe’s attribution of Russia’s
hostile and destabilising activity.

IV. Strategic Framework

75The nuclear deterrent
The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent has existed for over 60 years to deter the mostextreme threats to our national security and way of life, helping to guarantee our security
and that of our Allies. We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear
armed states, emerging nuclear states, and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks
have not gone away. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their
nuclear arsenals. They are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new‘warfighting’ nuclear systems which they are integrating into their military strategies
and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others. The increasein global competition, challenges to the international order, and proliferation of potentiallydisruptive technologies all pose a threat to strategic stability. The UK must ensure potential
adversaries can never use their capabilities to threaten us or our NATO Allies. Nor can weallow them to constrain our decision-making in a crisis or to sponsor nuclear terrorism.
The UK’s minimum, assured, credible nuclear deterrent
The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercionand deter aggression. A minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent, assigned
to the defence of NATO, remains essential in order to guarantee our security and thatof our Allies. In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear
warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s.
However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing
range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will
move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.
To ensure that our deterrent is not vulnerable to pre-emptive action by potential
adversaries, we will maintain our four submarines so that at least one will always be on aContinuous At Sea Deterrent patrol. Our submarines on patrol are at several days’ notice
to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state. We remain committed
to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear
deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats
from any direction.
We will continue to keep our nuclear posture under constant review in light of theinternational security environment and the actions of potential adversaries. We will maintainthe capability required to impose costs on an adversary that would far outweigh thebenefits they could hope to achieve should they threaten our, or our Allies’, security.
UK nuclear weapons policy
The UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent and only the Prime Minister canauthorise their use. This ensures that political control is maintained at all times. We would
consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence,
including the defence of our NATO Allies.

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While our resolve and capability to do so if necessary is beyond doubt, we will remain
deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technologicalenvironment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer
give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile
numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces therisk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes tostrategic stability.
The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon
state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT).
This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation
obligations. However, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat of
weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging
technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.
Working with NATO, the US and France
NATO recognises that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would
fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons
exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Since 1962, the UK has declared our nuclear
capability to the defence of the Alliance. We will continue to do so, safeguarding European
and Euro-Atlantic security. We will work with Allies to ensure that NATO’s nuclear deterrent
capabilities remain safe, secure and effective, adapt to emerging challenges including thegrowing and diversifying nuclear threats that the Alliance may face, and contribute to theindivisible security of the Alliance.
Nuclear cooperation remains an important element of the relationship between the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom, enhancing transatlantic security. We will continue to work
closely with the United States on nuclear matters, including nuclear deterrence policy.
The 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) has been central to our shared nuclear
security goals and we are committed to its renewal in 2024.
Since 1995, France and the United Kingdom, Europe’s only nuclear powers, have statedthat they can imagine no circumstances under which a threat to the vital interests of one
would not constitute a threat to the vital interests of the other. We will continue our daily
and unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues, including our collaboration under the2010 Teutates Treaty.
Our future capability
Our independent nuclear deterrent is relevant not only for today but will also remain
relevant for the immediate future. It is for these reasons that we have committed to aonce-in-two-generations programme to modernise our nuclear forces. This investmentin the future security of both the UK and our Allies demonstrates that the UK’s nuclear
commitment remains undiminished.
Parliament has voted to renew our nuclear deterrent and replace the Vanguard Class
submarines with four new Dreadnought Class submarines. The programme remains withinbudget and on track for the First of Class to enter service in the early 2030s.

IV. Strategic Framework77

To ensure we maintain an effective deterrent throughout the commission of theDreadnought Class, we will replace our existing nuclear warhead. We will work with theAtomic Weapons Establishment to build the highly skilled teams, facilities and capabilities
needed to deliver this, while also sustaining the current warhead until it is withdrawn
from service. We will continue to work closely with the United States to ensure ourwarhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon System, our cooperation
underpinned by both the MDA and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement.
Delivery of the modernisation of the deterrent will be subject to the Government’s major
programme approvals and oversight. We will continue to provide updates through anannual report to Parliament. We will work collaboratively across the defence and civil
nuclear sectors to optimise the Defence Nuclear Enterprise for the future. This will
ensure that the UK has a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent for as longas is necessary.
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation: our commitment tointernational treaties
We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
We continue to work for the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation measures, taking into account the prevailing security
environment. We are strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its
aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy; there is no credible alternative route to nuclear disarmament. The UK has
taken a consistent and leading approach to nuclear disarmament. The UK possesses thesmallest stockpile of any of the nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT. We arealone amongst those states in only operating a single nuclear weapon system. We willcontinue to press for key steps towards multilateral disarmament, including the entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and successful negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We will continue to takea leading international role on nuclear disarmament verification; this is an essential step for
nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.
The UK will continue to work internationally to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict andenhance mutual trust and security. We will champion strategic risk reduction and seek
to create dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons, and between states
possessing nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states, to increase understanding
and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation. The UK takes its
responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state seriously and will continue to encourage otherstates to do likewise.

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3.2 Conflict and instability
19. It will not be possible to prevent all conflicts through deterrence and building resilience
to security threats. Conflict and instability will continue to pose a major test to global
security and resilience, marked by weakened or failed states, extreme poverty andflourishing transnational security challenges. External intervention in conflicts is also
increasing, as states seek to renegotiate power balances and contest internationallaws and norms.
20. The UK will work to reduce the frequency and intensity of conflict and instability,
to alleviate suffering and to minimise the opportunities for state and non-state actors
to undermine international security. Our bilateral efforts will focus on priority contexts
where the increased threat and our ability to have an impact coalesce. We will also
continue to support global efforts, including through: championing International
Humanitarian Law; contributing specific capabilities in partnership with allies andmultilateral organisations; our work at and with the UN; and as a financial and militarycontributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Our priority actions will be:• To establish a more integrated approach to government work on conflictand instability, placing greater emphasis on addressing the drivers of conflict(such as grievances, political marginalisation and criminal economies), atrocity
prevention and strengthening fragile countries’ resilience to external interference.
We will focus on political approaches to conflict resolution, harnessing the fullrange of government capabilities, with clearly-defined political goals and theoriesof change. This will enhance our impact and reduce the risk of ‘mission creep’ orof inadvertently doing harm.
• To establish a new conflict centre within the FCDO. This centre will draw on
expertise from across government and beyond to develop and lead a strategic
conflict agenda, harnessing the breadth of conflict and stability capabilities
and working with partners to increase our impact in preventing, managing andresolving conflict in priority regions.
• To build momentum on efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict. In
particular, we will work with others to strengthen justice for survivors of conflict‑related sexual violence, as well as providing support to survivors and children bornof conflict-related sexual violence. In doing so, we will continue to follow the ‘dono harm’ principle and take a survivor-centred approach.
• To tighten the focus of the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security
Fund. We will prioritise its resources on the foundational link between stability,
resilience and security, and work with governments and civil society in regionsthat are of greatest priority to the UK. This activity will be supported by funding of£874 million for 2021-22.

IV. Strategic Framework793.3 Homeland security and transnational security challenges
21. Transnational security threats such as terrorism, SOC and the proliferation of CBRN
and advanced military technology continue to pose a direct threat to the UK’s citizens,interests and values, whether they originate in the UK or overseas. As these threats
evolve and increasingly overlap, we will sustain our commitment to homeland security
and build on our considerable expertise, linking our national and international efforts.
3.3.1 Countering radicalisation and terrorism
22. Terrorism remains a major threat to UK citizens and our interests at home and abroad.
Although the risks have evolved in recent years, Islamist terrorism continues to posethe primary threat to the UK. There is also a diversifying threat from far-right and,to a lesser extent, far-left, anarchist and single-issue terrorism. In Northern Ireland,
the Dissident Republican threat endures and there remains a minority who aim todestabilise the peace process. Paramilitary and criminal activity by both Dissident
Republican and Loyalist groups adds to the wider security challenges we face inNorthern Ireland.
23. We will take a robust, full-spectrum approach in response. This will involve addressing
the conditions that give rise to terrorism, including through countering the radicalising
influence of extremist individuals or groups, as well as maintaining high‑end
capabilities to disrupt and deter terrorist attacks. Working in the UK and with partners
overseas – especially those in the wider European neighbourhood, Africa and the
Middle East – our priority actions will be:• To strengthen the UK’s counter-terrorism (CT) system. Building on the work
undertaken since the Anderson Review and Operational Improvement Review,
we will: integrate the UK’s CT capabilities in a new Counter Terrorism Operations
Centre (see textbox); strengthen the criminal justice system under the CounterTerrorism and Sentencing Bill and the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early
Release) Act 2020; and sustain the £70 million uplift in funding for CT policing in
England and Wales into 2021-22. Equivalent funds are available to the Scottish
Government and Northern Ireland Executive for CT policing.
Counter Terrorism Operations Centre
Our new Counter Terrorism Operations Centre (CTOC) will create a single, integrated
CT centre for the first time, with all the principal actors working side-by-side to keep
citizens across the UK safe. The centre will bring together government departments,
the security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement and operational partners,
and elements of the judicial system.
This integrated approach will: improve the speed of response, with multi-agency teams
established dynamically to tackle incidents as they unfold; strengthen end-to-end
management of terrorist offenders; and foster innovation, including the development
and deployment of new capabilities that will help the UK to stay ahead of the evolving
threats we face.

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• To reinforce our approach to countering radicalisation and terrorism in the
UK. We will continue to improve the delivery of the PREVENT programme tosafeguard people vulnerable to radicalisation, including through an independent
review of its effectiveness and a refreshed training package for policy-makers andpractitioners in 2021. A new PROTECT duty will make it a legal requirement forowners and operators of public spaces and venues to take measures to keep the
public safe from terrorist attacks.
• To reduce the operational capabilities and intent of those involved in
Northern Ireland-related terrorism (NIRT). We will work to degrade the wider
ecosystem that supports the NIRT threat through a more flexible operational
response. Our efforts to deter individuals and groups from engaging in NIRT will
include the promotion of alternative pathways. We will also support improvements
in offender management to reduce the likelihood of reoffending.
• To address the conditions that give rise to terrorism overseas through our
support to open societies and our efforts to tackle conflict and instability. We will
also continue to strengthen the CT capabilities of international partners throughcapacity-building, alongside law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.
• To disrupt the highest-priority terrorist groups overseas using the full rangeof our CT capabilities. These include our high-end PURSUE capabilities, throughtargeted military activity, intelligence-sharing and cooperation with international
partners. Under persistent engagement, our armed forces will continue tocontribute to the Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, provide support
to the Government of Afghanistan and support French operations in the Sahel.
• To prevent terrorist activity online. Our objective is to ensure that there are nosafe spaces online in which terrorists can promote or share their extreme views.
To achieve this, we will continue to challenge terrorists’ presence online, working
with technology companies, international partners and civil society organisations,and delivering through the multi-stakeholder Global Internet Forum to Counter
Terrorism and the UK’s law enforcement organisations. Our new online harms
regime (see textbox in 2.3) will further strengthen the response to both illegal
and legal but harmful online content in the UK and globally, addressing terrorist
material and content relating to child sexual exploitation and abuse in particular.
• To strengthen aviation security worldwide, including through our bilateralprogrammes with more than 25 countries. Working with the International Civil
Aviation Organization, the European Civil Aviation Conference and our Five Eyes
partners, we will ensure the effective implementation of global security standards,
anticipating evolving threats to aviation.

IV. Strategic Framework81World-class security and intelligence agencies
The UK’s security and intelligence agencies work to protect the UK and make a vital
contribution to an open international order. They do so by helping us to understandand get ahead of malign actors, partnering with allies across the world to prevent
harm, improving attribution of responsibility for attacks and abuses, and strengthening
collective responses.
The security and intelligence agencies include SIS, GCHQ and MI5. They work on
a range of issues including counter-terrorism, state threats, cyber security, SOC,
counter‑proliferation and supporting UK defence. Since 2019, the budget supporting
this activity has risen in real terms by an average of 5.4% a year, to £3.1 billion in
2021‑22. It includes £695 million in additional R&D funding between 2021-22 and2024-25 to support the development of cutting-edge capabilities.
Our approach to intelligence is predicated on rigorous, independent assessment
for effective national security policy-making, with the intelligence analysis profession
overseen across government by the Joint Intelligence Committee. Robust legislation
also ensures that the security and intelligence agencies’ work fully reflects our values inbeing democratically accountable, as transparent as possible and meeting our humanrights obligations.

3.3.2 Serious and organised crime
24. SOC2 directly undermines the safety of UK citizens, the integrity of the state andconfidence in our financial system – costing the UK at least £37 billion each year.
Organised criminality is linked to much of the crime experienced in communities: it isestimated that 45% of all acquisitive crime is committed by people who regularly use
heroin, cocaine or crack cocaine and that nearly 50% of murders are drugs-related.
Overseas, SOC is a threat to international security and prosperity: it extends andexacerbates conflicts; undermines allies and partners’ stability; and inflicts the highest
economic cost on the lowest-income countries.
25. Organised crime groups are resilient to disruption, moving across crime types to
exploit opportunities in search of criminal profit. The most sophisticated groups use
technology such as encrypted communications to remain outside the attention oflaw enforcement. We must address the visible symptoms, enablers and underlying
causes of SOC, disrupting, dismantling and destroying criminal enterprises at homeand overseas. The inherently transnational nature of SOC means that our approach
must link the local response with the regional, national and international. Our priority
actions, in response to the 2020 Mackey Review, will be:• To bolster our response to the most pressing threats the UK faces fromorganised criminals, including: economic crime, illicit finance and fraud, with an
2 Serious and organised crime is defined as individuals planning, coordinating and committing serious
offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks. The main categories
of serious offences covered by the term are: child sexual abuse; modern slavery and human trafficking;organised immigration crime; illegal drugs; illegal firearms; organised acquisitive crime; cyber crime;
fraud; money laundering; and bribery, corruption and sanctions evasion.

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additional £83 million investment to ensure our economy is a safe place to dobusiness (see 2.2); tackling child sexual abuse through a new cross‑government
strategy published in January 2021; doubling our investment in tackling county
lines and drugs supply; and tackling the most pernicious forms of cybercrime,
such as ransomware, including by blocking malicious online activity at scale
through Active Cyber Defence. We will also take measures to ensure that thenext generation of digital technologies are deployed in a way that safeguards
their security.
• To strengthen the National Crime Agency (NCA), meeting our manifesto
commitment and developing the critical data, intelligence and investigative
capabilities required for the NCA to lead the law enforcement system in Englandand Wales. We will pursue greater integration where there is an overlap with otherthreats such as terrorism and state threats. We will also ensure that the NCA’s
funding mechanism supports the delivery of long-term goals and its ability toadapt to changing threats.
• To increase regional and local policing capacity. We will bolster Regional
Organised Crime Units, in coordination with local policing and the NCA.
This includes our recruitment in 2021-22 of 300 police officers dedicated to SOC,
as part of our commitment to recruit a total of 20,000 extra police officers by
2023. We will revise the Strategic Policing Requirement so that it more effectively
supports policing’s response to national threats. In 2021-22 we will pilot the
improved use of Serious Crime Prevention Orders to prevent crimes before they
happen. Our investment of an additional £275 million in the criminal justice system
will help to bring more offenders to justice.
• To strengthen international efforts to disrupt and dismantle SOC networks.
In doing so, we will build on the work of our diplomatic and operational networks
such as the NCA’s liaison officers and work closely with international partners
such as the Five Eyes and the EU, including via our liaison officers at Europol.
In particular, we will work with like-minded partners to strengthen Interpol’s
support to frontline law enforcement, through increased data-sharing andinvestment in its technical capabilities.
• To tackle SOC within the UK’s territorial sea, through: coordinated action
between the UK Border Force, law enforcement and Royal Navy; andimplementation of the UK 2025 border strategy (see textbox). Coordinating closelywith France in particular, we will continue to work with European partners to manage
shared maritime spaces such as the Channel, and the North and Irish Seas.
The UK border: the gateway for Global Britain
Our vision is that by 2025 the UK border will be the most effective in the world.
The border is more than a line on a map: it is a combination of policies, processes
and systems delivered by both public and private organisations across more than 270
recognised crossing points and many other smaller entry points across the UK.
The smooth operation of the border is vital to the UK’s economy, enabling travel andtrade with the rest of the world. It is also a unique intervention point in enhancing thesecurity and biosecurity of the UK: preventing terrorists, criminals and illicit goods fromreaching our streets; preventing illegal migration; and protecting plant, animal and
IV. Strategic Framework

83human health. However, changing trends in trade, migration and security, as well as
major events like the COVID-19 pandemic, mean our border is under more pressure
than ever before.
Our cross-government action under the 2025 UK border strategy will build on theimplementation of our new points-based immigration system, the Government’s
2050 maritime strategy and export strategy, and our efforts to tackle illegal migration(see textbox in 4.3). Working with the devolved administrations and local authorities,
law enforcement, industry and international partners, we will deliver the six
transformations and the Target Operating Model needed to meet our vision. This will
involve making better use of data and advanced analytics, technology and innovation,and creating a highly skilled workforce.

The 2025 UK border strategy
We will increase the effectiveness of the UK’s border with six transformative changes
which will promote prosperity and enhance security.

Develop a coordinatedapproach to border designand delivery which enables
border innovation

1

Bring together
Government’s
collection, assurance
and use of border data

2

Use upstream
compliance to moveprocesses away from theactual frontier whereappropriate

3

Establish resilient‘ports of the future’ atborder crossing points

4

Build the capabilityof staff responsiblefor deliveringborder processes

5

6

Shape the future
development of borders
worldwide to facilitate
end-to-end trade
and travel

3.3.3 Strengthening global arms control, disarmament and counter‑proliferation
26. Countering proliferation3 is integral to the UK’s security and prosperity. It helps tomaintain regional and global stability, reduces threats to our citizens and armed
3 Countering proliferation is defined here as preventing the spread or development of CBRN capability andtheir means of delivery, or advanced military technology to state or non-state actors that could threaten
UK interests or regional stability.

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forces, facilitates safe trade for our industry and protects high-skilled jobs acrossthe UK. Our successes in the past five years – including the response to Russia’s
Salisbury attack and the attribution of chemical weapons use in Syria – havecontributed to our global reputation as a force for good and an S&T power.
27. To protect these gains, we must: address growing threats from states such as Iran,
Russia and North Korea; respond to emerging threats such as the illicit acquisition ofadvanced and dual-use technologies; and reinforce the global counter-proliferationarchitecture against growing pressures, shaping its future in our interest. Our priority
actions will be:• To reinforce international governance of state access to CBRN weapons,materials or related technology through our work with the relevant treaty
bodies – especially the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons andInternational Atomic Energy Agency, whose nuclear safeguards system we will
strengthen. In particular, we will do more to expose non-compliance with governing
treaties (see nuclear deterrent section). Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran toaccount for its nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive
nuclear and regional deal. We will also remain the most engaged non-regional
partner on North Korea’s denuclearisation and on sanctions enforcement.
• To reduce tensions in South Asia, by encouraging regional dialogue on nuclear
responsibilities, and by working with states there to understand and respond tosafety and security threats to the region.
• To counter proliferation to states. Using intelligence analysis, we will increase
our knowledge of those who seek access to CBRN and advanced military anddual-use technology. We will tackle proliferation networks and proliferation financeby identifying hot spots, routes and mechanisms for their transfer. Improvements
to the Academic Technology Approval Scheme will help to stop states from using
research relationships with UK academia to steal intellectual property and obtainknowledge that could be used to develop CBRN weapons and their means ofdelivery, or advanced military technology.
• To counter proliferation to non-state actors, strengthening the security andsafety of nuclear materials in priority countries. We will also reduce the risk ofterrorist acquisition of biological agents through our International Biological Security
Programme and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons andMaterials of Mass Destruction.
• To balance the opportunities of new technologies with controls, sustaining
our own legitimate investment and supporting other responsible states’ use of newtechnologies through technical cooperation. Working with experts, industry andallies, the UK will maintain an efficient export control system on weapons and dualuse technology that adapts with technological change. We will also recommend
changes to counter-proliferation regimes and international governance that takeaccount of new routes to CBRN and advanced weapons enabled by technology.

IV. Strategic Framework85

Iceberg A-68(a): one of the largest-ever recorded icebergs,
floating near the island of South Georgia, South Atlantic.
UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021

4. Building resilience at home and overseas
1.

COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last global crisis of the 2020s. As the world becomesboth more interconnected and contested, incidents in one region – a novel virus,
the loss of habitats or a cyber-attack – can have systemic consequences worldwide,
which we cannot always predict or avert. This means that as well as strengthening
our security, we need to build our resilience across England, Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland: addressing the root causes of risks, and increasing the UK’s
preparedness to withstand and recover from crises when they occur.

2.

The UK’s resilience is intertwined with global resilience. The transnational natureof many challenges, from climate change and biodiversity loss to biosecurity andenergy security crises, means that no single government can address them alone.
Yet COVID-19 has shown how quickly international cooperation can falter understress. It has also highlighted the vulnerabilities that have resulted from the global
trend towards optimising governance and processes for efficiency, rather thanfor resilience.

3.

As the world recovers from the pandemic, we must strengthen global resilience –ensuring that more resilient countries worldwide can come together through stronger
international institutions to act on the most pressing shared challenges. Alongside
our efforts to respond to a more challenging security environment, greater resilienceis essential if we are to ensure an international order in which open societies andeconomies can flourish.

4.

Our first goal is to build our national resilience, so that we are able to reducethe impact of acute shocks and longer-term challenges on lives and livelihoods in
the UK. National resilience is the product of multiple factors, including effective andtrusted governance, government capabilities, social cohesion, and individual andbusiness resilience. Achieving this goal therefore requires a national effort, supportedby the Government’s wider domestic agenda. In particular, we will adopt a new
approach to preparedness and response to risks, which fully recognises that natural
hazards and other risks can cause as much disruption to the UK’s core interests as
security threats.

5.

Our second goal is to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss, which
require immediate and concerted action worldwide. This will be the UK’s foremostinternational priority, building on our domestic commitment to reach net zero by
2050. We will work to accelerate the transition to a zero-carbon global economy,
protect and restore biodiversity, and support adaptation and resilience – particularly
for the most vulnerable worldwide.

6.

Our third goal is to build health resilience at home and at the international level,
recognising the interconnected nature of our global health system. In particular,
we will bolster our efforts to improve pandemic preparedness – taking a One Healthapproach – and to reform the WHO, applying the lessons of COVID-19.

IV. Strategic Framework874.1 Building the UK’s national resilience
7.

Resilience has long been part of the UK’s approach to national security. But in an
increasingly interconnected world, in which we cannot predict or stop all of thechallenges ahead, we need to renew our approach – making resilience a national
endeavour, so that as a country we are prepared for the next crisis, whatever
it might be.

8.

The Government will continue to prepare for and respond to individual risks, whether
terrorism, flooding or a new pandemic. Learning the lessons of COVID-19, we will
also seek to build a better understanding of the UK’s strengths and weaknesses,
and improve our national preparedness and readiness across the whole risk lifecycle,
from anticipation to recovery. To do so, the Government will start developing acomprehensive national resilience strategy in 2021, in partnership with thedevolved administrations and English regions, local government, the private sector
and the public. Under this strategy, our priority actions will be:• To establish a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to resilience, so that individuals,
businesses and organisations all play a part in building resilience across the UK.
We will seek to develop an integrated approach, bringing together all levels ofgovernment, CNI operators, the wider private sector, civil society and the public.
As part of this, we will: improve government communications to the public
on preparedness; consider strengthening the role and responsibilities of local
resilience forums (LRFs) in England; and consider the scope and responsibilities of
CNI owners and operators to ensure a consistent resilience standard across CNI
sectors. This is in addition to any necessary sector-specific legislation, such as
the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. The new cyber strategy will contribute tothis overall approach, increasing the UK’s resilience to cyber risks. This will include
raising the level of cyber security across CNI sectors and increasing the adoptionof the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework.
• To consider threats and hazards in the round, so that we can build national
resilience across the diverse range of risks facing the UK: malicious and nonmalicious, direct and indirect, and acute and chronic – including low-probability,
catastrophic-impact events. This means integrating national security witheconomic, health and environmental policy, and taking an approach that covers
the full lifecycle of risk: anticipation, prevention, preparation, response andrecovery. As part of this, we will more closely link our domestic and international
action, putting more emphasis on acting upstream to tackle risks at source –from climate action to cyber capacity-building and efforts to disrupt transnationalorganised crime groups.
• To develop more capabilities – people, skills and equipment – that canbe used across a range of scenarios. We will improve our ability to test anddevelop our capabilities through contingency planning and regular exercises,
bringing together government, the emergency services, the armed forces,
other local responders and industry. The armed forces will also continue to provide
support to emergency responses – such as COVID-19 – through Military Aid to
the Civil Authorities (MACA), and we plan on making greater use of the militaryreserves in supporting domestic national security priorities. We will also consider
how to extend this to a civilian reservist cadre for support in times of crisis.

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• To review our approach to risk assessment. The National Security Risk
Assessment (NSRA) is a classified document which lists and assesses the impact
and likelihood of the most serious risks facing the UK and its interests overseas.
It is produced in conjunction with all risk-owning departments and agencies
and its findings were reviewed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The publicly
available version of the NSRA, the National Risk Register, was published in
December 2020. A review of the NSRA methodology is currently underway,
which will address all aspects of the underlying methodology, including how weaccount for interdependencies, cascading and compound risks.
• To strengthen our analytical, policy and operational tools – including thecollection and use of data – to better assess cross-cutting, complex risks.
We will establish a new Situation Centre to provide live data and rapid analysis,
supporting collaboration across government and informing crisis decision-making.
We will also invest in the digital transformation of the security and intelligenceagencies and in ‘all source’ assessment that brings this intelligence together with
open-source information.

4.2 Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss
9.

The window of opportunity the world has to tackle the climate and biodiversity
crisis is shrinking. Urgent action is needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C andto end species decline and environmental destruction. Without it, nature loss
could result in a cumulative economic cost of up to $10 trillion between 2011 and
2050. In particular, we must accelerate the global transition to net zero, laying thefoundations for future growth and creating new, sustainable employment in theindustries of the future. We must also increase our collective resilience to the damage
that has already been done, in particular supporting the most vulnerable worldwide inadapting to climate effects and nature loss.

10. The UK is already at the forefront of climate action. Since 2000, we have reduced
emissions more quickly than any other country in the G20, and were the first major
economy to adopt a legal obligation to achieve net zero carbon emissions by 2050.
The UK invested £5.8 billion in International Climate Finance (ICF) between April
2016 and March 2021. In November 2021 we will host COP26 in Glasgow, bringing
together the 197 parties which have signed or acceded to the Paris Agreement toagree further action on climate mitigation, adaptation and finance.
11. Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss will be the UK’s international priority
through COP26 and beyond. Our priority actions will be:• To accelerate the UK’s transition to net zero by 2050, working with thedevolved administrations and drawing on strengths and expertise across the UK,such as green hydrogen and wind power in Wales. We will take an ambitious
approach, including through the ten-point plan for a green industrial revolution,a forthcoming series of sector strategies (such as the transport decarbonisationplan) and our overarching net zero strategy. Our aim is to become the world’s
leading centre for green technology, finance and wind energy, mobilising£12 billion of government investment and much more private investment to createand support up to 250,000 jobs across the UK. We will increase support for net
zero innovation and new industries, including in low-carbon hydrogen production
IV. Strategic Framework

89and carbon capture and storage. Through the proposed North Sea Transition
Deal, we will support the UK’s oil and gas hubs to diversify into new energies,
protecting and creating new jobs in areas such as the north east of England andScotland. We will issue the UK’s first Sovereign Green Bond in 2021 and become
the first G20 country to make disclosures specified by the Task Force on Climaterelated Financial Disclosures fully mandatory across the economy by 2025, withmost requirements introduced by 2023.
• To accelerate the global transition to net zero, ensuring that everyone canshare the opportunities of clean growth sooner. The shift to a green global
economy requires action from everyone – from the largest and most advanced
economies to developing countries and small island developing states, acrossgovernments, businesses and individual citizens. As COP26 president, the UK
will seek to reach a positive negotiated outcome which balances the interests ofall the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, with more
ambitious nationally-determined contributions and long-term decarbonisation
strategies. We have also committed to align all of our ODA with the Paris
Agreement, and we will consult on ending new direct financial or promotional
support for the fossil fuel energy sector overseas.
• To strengthen adaptation to the effects of climate change that cannot be
prevented or reversed, supporting the most vulnerable worldwide in particular.
We will seek ambitious commitments on finance for adaptation and resilience at
COP26. The UK has already committed £11.6 billion to ICF between 2021 and2025 and doubled our contribution to the Green Climate Fund, to £1.44 billion.
At home, the Second National Adaptation Programme (2018) sets out a five-year
strategy to make the UK more resilient to climate change, including action on themost pressing risks such as flooding. We will also seek nature-based solutions,such as the £80 million Green Recovery Challenge – which funds projects that
restore nature – and the £640 million Nature for Climate Fund for tree-planting andpeat restoration.
• To reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, delivering the goals set by the Paris
Agreement, the commitments of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the2020 Leaders’ Pledge for Nature. We will protect and restore nature, including by
driving support for ambitious new global targets for nature at the UN Biodiversity
Conference (CBD COP15) in Kunming in 2021, to improve ecosystem resilienceand species recovery, and to tackle the causes of nature loss. We will continue
to campaign for global agreement to protect at least 30% of the world’s land andocean globally by 2030, through our Global Ocean Alliance and as co-chair, with
Costa Rica and France, of the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People andlead the Global Ocean Alliance. The UK will lead by example, protecting 30% of
our own land and sea by 2030.
• To drive sustainable and legal use of natural resources. The UK will promoteagriculture that regenerates ecosystems and provides healthier and moresustainable food. We will convene the Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade
Dialogue, bringing together the world’s largest producer and consumer countries
of forest-risk commodities to agree collaborative actions that will protect forests
whilst promoting trade and development. At home, we will introduce a new law toprevent trade of products in the UK that contribute to illegal deforestation. We will
also continue working to end the market for illegal wildlife products, strengthening
law enforcement efforts and supporting sustainable alternative livelihoods.

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• To invest in nature and a ‘nature positive’ economy, integrating biodiversity into
economic decision-making in response to the findings of the Dasgupta Review.
We will increase finance for nature and for nature-based solutions to climatechange, including by spending at least £3 billion of our ICF on nature over the
next five years, and supporting the protection and restoration of critical habitats,including through our Biodiverse Landscapes Fund and Blue Planet Fund.
The ten-point plan for a green industrial revolution
Innovation and finance:developing cutting-edge
low-carbon technologies
and a new sovereign
green bondNature: protecting
and restoring our
natural environment,
including £5.2bn forflood defences

Carbon capture:£1bn to become aworld leader intechnology tocapture and store
harmful emissions

Greener buildings:£1bn to make homes,
schools and hospitals
greener, warmer andmore energy efficient£12bn
of HMG
investment

Offshore wind:producing 40GW –enough offshore
wind to power every
home in the UK
Low-carbon hydrogen:aiming for 5GW ofproduction by 2030
and pioneeringhydrogen heating trials

Supporting up to
250,000
highly skilledgreen jobs by 2030

Unlocking 3 times as muchprivate sector investment in thegreen economy by 2030

Jet zero and green
ships: researching
projects forzero-emission planes,
ships and sustainableaviation fuels

Green public transport,
cycling and walking:investing £5bn inzero-emission public
transport

Delivering new
and advanced
nuclear power:
investing in thenext generationof nuclear
technology(large andsmaller-scale
plants andadvanced
modular reactors)
Zero-emission vehicles:
ending the sale of new
petrol and diesel carsand vans by 2030,
while backing our
automotive sector,
supported by £2.8bn

IV. Strategic Framework

91

Energy security
Ensuring the supply of secure, affordable and clean energy is essential to the UK’s
national interests. In the years ahead, our focus will be on the transition to clean energy.
As set out in the energy white paper, we will decarbonise our energy system, boosting
the production of clean energy and seeking to reduce the costs of new technologies bydeploying at scale.
As we make this transition, oil and gas will remain an important, if diminishing, part of
the UK’s energy supply. We will work with our international partners to maintain secure
global oil supplies, particularly in the Middle East. As a member of the International
Energy Agency, the UK continues to hold international oil stocks that can be releasedin the event of major disruption. We will also support efforts to ensure European
gas security, seeking to avoid disruption which could have knock-on impact for
prices and supply.
More widely, we will protect the UK’s energy CNI, which remains an attractive target for
attacks by states and non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals. This will involve
ensuring adequate defence against new cyber security risks as our energy system
becomes increasingly reliant on digital technologies. We will also promote nuclear
safety, high standards and safeguards both through our participation in the International
Atomic Energy Agency and bilaterally.

Supporting a resilient ocean
The world has one ocean shared by all nations. The ocean provides 50% of theoxygen we breathe, supports livelihoods worldwide, contains vast biological andmineral resources, and is critical to trade. But it is coming under pressure from climatechange and environmental degradation, growing tensions around maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and the South China Sea, as well as migration,
piracy and SOC.
The UK’s vision is that by 2030 the ocean will be effectively governed, clean, healthy,safe, productive and biologically diverse, linking resilient and prosperous coastal
communities around the world, and supporting sustainable economic growth for theUK, the Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies. To deliver this vision, we
will combine our work on maritime security, the environment and trade. Fundamental
to this will be an absolute commitment to upholding the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea in all its dimensions, as an essential enabler of global prosperity, security and ahealthy planet.
The Royal Navy’s new Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship will demonstrate thismore integrated approach in practice, protecting our CNI at sea and improving ourknowledge of the maritime environment. The Royal Navy’s Offshore Patrol Vessels,
alongside the UK Border Force, will continue to support border surveillance, shipping
safety, maritime environmental protection, fishery activity control, search and rescue
operations and customs enforcement.

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In addition, we will:• Protect the maritime environment, supporting international action through the
UK-led Global Ocean Alliance and other coalitions. We will strengthen our
marine science capabilities, contributing to the UN Decade of Ocean Science
for Sustainable Development, and use our new Blue Planet Fund to protect andrestore marine ecosystems and resources, support sustainable fisheries and reducepoverty. We will also continue to enhance marine protection around the Overseas
Territories, including across the 4.3 million square kilometres of marine environment
already protected through the Blue Belt programme.
• Deploy more of our naval assets across the world to protect shipping lanes anduphold freedom of navigation. The Joint Maritime Security Centre will support this,strengthening operational maritime coordination across government. The Royal
Navy’s Maritime Component Command in Bahrain will continue to ensure theflow of trade in the Gulf, including through support to part of the new International
Maritime Security Construct.
• Contribute to wider maritime security, including in tackling piracy off the coast ofWest Africa as co-chair of the G7 Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group in 2021.

4.3 Building health resilience
12. Infectious disease outbreaks are likely to become more frequent in the coming years,
while antimicrobial resistance (AMR) remains a long-term challenge to human health.
As COVID-19 has shown, such health crises can have devastating human, economic
and social consequences, testing national responses and the global health system,and straining international cooperation.
13. We must learn the lessons of COVID-19, bolstering our domestic and international
action to address global health risks as part of our wider approach to biosecurity.4
In doing so, we will build on our One Health approach, which recognises the close
connection between the health of people, animals and the environment. Reflecting
the interconnected nature of our global health system, we will sustain our support tohealth programmes in developing countries. We will also continue our collaboration
with partners including the EU and the multilateral development banks on issues suchas AMR, AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Our priority actions will be:• To accelerate equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics anddiagnostics (VTDs) worldwide as the fastest route to national and global
recovery from the current crisis. Our goal is to have offered the entire UK adult
population the first dose of a coronavirus vaccine by the end of July 2021 under
our domestic vaccination programme, which also extends to our Overseas
Territories. The UK will continue to support developing countries’ access to4 Biosecurity is defined as the protection of the UK and our interests from biological risks (particularly
significant disease outbreaks) whether these arise naturally, through the less likely event of an accidental
release of hazardous biological material from laboratory facilities, or as the result of a deliberate
biological attack. These risks could affect humans, animals or plants.

IV. Strategic Framework

93

COVID-19 vaccines through the COVAX Advanced Market Commitment, throughour contribution of £548 million, continued leadership to close the funding gap,
and support for rapid approval of vaccines in line with international standardsof safety, quality and efficacy. We have committed to share the majority of any
future surplus vaccines from our supply with COVAX, while our commitment of£1.65 billion over five years to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, will support immunisationof children in the world’s poorest countries. And to strengthen detection of new
COVID-19 variants worldwide, our experts will also offer support in genomic
sequencing to other countries through the New Variants Assessment Platform.
• To review and reinforce the cross-government approach to biosecurity, as
part of our efforts to learn the lessons of the COVID-19 response and to build
our national resilience. Our ongoing review of responsibility for biosecurity withingovernment will inform future considerations relating to a revised biosecurity
strategy and potential machinery-of-government changes.
• To strengthen the UK’s preparedness for future pandemics, taking a One
Health approach. Building on the creation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre andthe National Institute for Health Protection in 2020, we will improve surveillance,
understanding and communication of emerging domestic and cross-border healththreats, including zoonoses.5 We will undertake scenario analysis and contingency
planning within the UK, including to ensure the resilience of medical supply
chains. And we will review our national stockpile of clinical countermeasures andconsumables such as personal protective equipment, expanded testing capability
and laboratory equipment, ensuring they meet the planning assumptions within
the 2020 National Risk Register.
• To reform the global health system, strengthening coherence across theinternational architecture – including between health and economic institutions– and harnessing the potential of data to improve global health surveillance.
We will seek reform of the WHO, supported by a 30% increase in UK corefunding to £340 million over the next four years. We will support stronger healthsystems worldwide, with improved capacity to comply with the International
Health Regulations. To strengthen the One Health approach worldwide, wewill seek to establish a Global One Health Intelligence Hub, providing countries
and organisations with a single source of intelligence on human, animal andenvironmental risks, as well as global networks of zoonotic experts and zoonotic
centres of excellence – including a centre in the UK. We will also strengthen
domestic and international efforts to combat the threat posed by increasing AMR.
• To strengthen global pandemic preparedness, building on the Prime Minister’s
five-point plan to prevent future pandemics. The UK will seek to accelerate
the development and deployment of VTDs for emerging diseases, using ourG7 presidency to cut the development and deployment of vaccines for priority
pathogens to 100 days through partnership between governments, industry
and international organisations. We will also seek to increase and improve R&D
for VTDs, including through: genomic sequencing and assessing zoonotic links;
increasing innovation in storage and deployment; and standardising clinical
trials and harnessing data. We will ensure sustainable financing for pandemic
preparedness and response, and explore a WHO-led pandemic preparedness
treaty, to improve international coordination and collaboration.
5 Diseases caused by viruses, bacteria or parasites that spread from animals to humans.

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Resilience and migration
Cross-border migration will likely increase over the coming decade, driven by a growing
global population and climate change, instability and economic factors. This will haveconsequences for many countries around the world, including the UK.
The UK has a long and positive history of migration. Most migrants move throughsafe, legal routes. The economic benefits of their doing so are enormous – both forhost countries, including the UK, and for their countries of origin, for example throughremittances. Following our departure from the EU, we will use our new points-based
immigration system to ensure we can secure the talent we need for key sectors in
our economy, not least to sustain our competitive edge in S&T, which is pivotal toproductivity and jobs in other sectors across all parts of the UK.
As a force for good in the world, the UK will remain sensitive to the plight of refugees
and asylum seekers. We have a proud track record of protecting those who needit, in accordance with our international obligations. Our resettlement schemes haveprovided safe and legal routes for tens of thousands of people to start new lives in
the UK. Since 2015, we have resettled more than 25,000 refugees across all ourresettlement schemes, around half of whom were children, including many affected by
the conflict in Syria.
The UK is also committed to tackling irregular migration because it endangers lives,often those of the most vulnerable, and places burdens on host countries. We will workwith European and other partners to manage the movement of people within Europe’s
wider neighbourhood, including towards the UK – whether they are pursuing economic
opportunities overseas or escaping instability at home.
Such people flows can be complex, spanning multiple jurisdictions across large
distances. We will take a whole-of-route approach, working through our diplomatic anddevelopment network along key migration routes – from Africa via the Mediterranean,from the Middle East via Eastern Mediterranean and from Asia via Eastern Europe.
In doing so, we will help to shore up stability and improve socio-economic conditionsin fragile regions, thereby addressing the issues that drive irregular migration in thefirst place. We will also build capacity upstream for enforcement, including to addressorganised immigration crime, which exploits the vulnerable. We will protect the mostvulnerable, including by offering support to the victims of trafficking, modern slavery
and exploitation.
We will return people without the right to remain in the UK to their countries of origin
or another safe country, rebalancing the asylum system to disincentivise specific illegalroutes and strengthening the returns process. We will also increase our capability totackle the migrant challenge in the Channel, including ending the dangerous, illegal
and unnecessary small boat crossings, through collaboration with France and othernear neighbours.

IV. Strategic Framework

95V.	Implementing theIntegrated Review

1.

The Integrated Review has established new and demanding ambitions for the UK’s
national security and international policy in an increasingly complex, contested andinterconnected global context. Success will depend on more integrated, adaptive
and innovative structures and capabilities, reaching beyond central government
where necessary.

2.

‘Integration’ is not a new theme in the UK’s approach to national security, although
the language used to describe it has varied over time. Systems and capabilities
have been increasingly integrated across as well as within departments, most visibly
through joint units, joint funding mechanisms and cross-Whitehall governancemechanisms, with the National Security Council (NSC) at the apex. The establishmentof the FCDO in 2020 signalled the Government’s intent to ensure deeper integrationof the UK’s international capabilities and delivery, and recognised that fundamentalorganisational structures still matter. This chapter sets out the main priorities forenabling integrated strategy-making and delivery across government and beyond,ensuring the successful implementation of the Integrated Review’s ambitions.

Strengthening strategy and implementation
3.

The NSC will remain the key formal mechanism through which ministers collectively
set national security strategy and policy, and oversee implementation. The 2018
National Security Capability Review reformed the structures that support the NSC
and introduced new cross-Whitehall mechanisms for providing advice and supporting
implementation of its priorities. These reforms have been effective in some areas,bringing greater coherence and structure to advice on complex strategic issues,
and better supporting coordinated delivery. Overall, however, more flexibility andagility is needed in the way in which departments tackle cross-cutting challenges,
with clearer accountability for delivery under stronger ministerial oversight. Ministers
should be engaged collectively at earlier stages in policy-making and more emphasis
needs to be placed on effective implementation, including in reporting to and review
by the NSC.

4.

The National Security Adviser will therefore review national security systems andprocesses to ensure that Integrated Review objectives and priority actions, as well
as future policy decisions, are implemented swiftly and effectively, and to establish
systems that better support the NSC.

Reform priorities
5.

Strategy capability: stronger collective strategy capability is fundamental tosuccessful, integrated implementation. During the Integrated Review process,we have developed or employed a number of tools and techniques for strategic
analysis, assessment and challenge, as well as better links with a range of externalbodies to support policy development. Some of this capability will be developed further
for ongoing support to strategy implementation and development. This includes:• Better technological skills and capability within strategy functions.
• Strategic communications and public engagement capability.
• Enhanced access to evidence, including the use of futures, foresight techniques,
data and challenge.
V. Implementing the Integrated Review

97The new Net Assessment function within the MOD is an example of the type ofcapability we will create to support cross-government strategy-making.
6.

Digital and data: a continuing focus on interoperability through architectures,standards and development methods will be required so that teams acrossgovernment can work effectively together across all levels of security. This will need to
be underpinned by investment in next-generation secure digital, data and technology
platforms, skills and a strong focus on improving knowledge and information
management practices. We will focus on the responsible use of new data platforms,
digital tools and participative processes to support policy-making and improve
inclusivity and transparency. Our new Central Digital and Data Office will be an
important catalyst for further change.

7.

Culture, diversity and inclusion: achieving a culture that supports integration,
adaptation and innovation is critical. The national security community was oneof the first parts of the Government to trial a new Civil Service-wide approach toculture change. Recognising that diversity and inclusivity are operational imperatives,
we have driven initiatives such as a ‘Mission Critical’ toolkit for staff and shadowboards. In doing so, we have built on lessons from reports including the Review ofIntelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Butler), the Report of the Iraq Inquiry(Chilcot) and Windrush Lessons Learned (Williams). We have also tested innovations
in reverse mentoring, targeted recruitment and development, national security vetting
transformation, workplace adjustments and digital outreach.

8.

However, there is much more to do to harness the diverse perspectives andexperience that drive innovation and adaptation and to maintain the collaborative,
agile and inclusive behaviours needed to enable integration. We will learn fromarrangements made during the COVID-19 pandemic which demonstrated thepotential to work more flexibly and inclusively. We will need to:• Become better connected to, and fully representative of, the people we serve.
Despite some progress, the national security and international policy community
has much further to travel.
• Foster a culture that encourages more and different kinds of challenge, further
developing capabilities such as red-teaming to mitigate the cognitive biases that
affect decision-making.
• Develop a strategic approach to recruitment and development to increase the flow
and diversity of people into, and out of, the community so that we have a robust
pipeline of diverse future talent.
• Target roles for external recruitment where such experience would be beneficial,and locate a wider range of roles across all the regions of the UK.

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9.

Professionalisation, training and skills: delivering the Integrated Review will
depend on the availability of people with the right skills, experience and security
clearances to form flexible, diverse and multidisciplinary teams. Regular experienceof joint working, greater efforts in recent years to develop relevant professionalcourses, and the development of clustered security vetting services are helping tobuild these capabilities. However, faster progress is needed. In preparation for the
next SR, we will review the case for a dedicated College for National Security as partof the new Curriculum and Campus for Government Skills. This could upgrade ourworkforce and the tools available to it, driving culture change, providing a platform forinternational collaboration and establishing S&T as a core skill. We will also further use
military reservists to support the full range of national security priorities and explore
options for a wider civilian reserve.

Implementation
10. The Government has launched a new Performance and Planning Framework andis establishing an Evaluation Taskforce. The Framework sets out priority outcomes,
including four which will cover the Integrated Review’s major themes and which
are intended to be supported by multiple departments. Government departments
will develop Outcome Delivery Plans, against which ministers will receive regularperformance reports. This will provide the ability to monitor implementation (projects,
programmes and outputs) and measure impact (outcomes and benefits), as wellas complementing other monitoring mechanisms for tracking delivery, such as theGovernment Major Projects Portfolio.
11. A Defence Command Paper will be published alongside the Integrated Review,setting out plans for defence in more detail. We intend to publish further strategies,
including on resilience, cyber and international development, in due course.
Future SRs will provide further opportunities to align spending plans with the priorities
set by the Integrated Review.

V. Implementing the Integrated Review

99Annex A: Integrated Review priorities fundedin Spending Review 2020
The Integrated Review sets out the Prime Minister’s vision for a UK that is stronger athome and in the world, ensuring that we can match our ambitions for Global Britain.
That vision is reflected in spending decisions in SR 2020, including departmental
settlements and funding for new initiatives. SR 2020 has set us on the path to achieve
our outcomes with funding provided to priority areas of resilience, security, climatechange, domestic R&D, clean technology and to maintaining our cutting-edge military andworld‑class diplomatic network. The Strategic Framework will guide future SRs, which willoffer further opportunities to align resources with ambition over the longer term.
This section sets out the specific measures within SR 2020 that support the delivery of theStrategic Framework. We have divided the information below into chapter categories but
most of the capabilities described are cross-cutting and will be used in support of activity
described in more than one chapter.
SR 2020
Commitment

Description

1. Strategic advantage through science and technology
Clean energy
technologies (BEIS)• £1bn into Carbon Capture and Storage and support tothe low-carbon hydrogen production industry with a new£240m Net Zero Hydrogen Fund and £81m for pioneeringhydrogen heating trials.

R&D (BEIS)

Nearly £15bn funding including:• Commitment to raising economy-wide investment in R&D to
2.4% of GDP by 2027.
• A multi-year settlement for the National Academies and UK
Research and Innovation’s core research budgets, which
will grow by more than £400m on average per year for the
next three years.
• By 2023-24 the Government will be investing £1.4bn more
per year in core funding for its world-leading research base.
• Up to £17m in 2021-22 to establish a new unit and fundthat will focus on the last mile of innovation to help ensurethat public-sector knowledge assets (R&D, intellectual
property, and other intangible assets) translate into new
high-tech jobs, businesses and economic growth.
• Innovate UK’s grant programmes and the Catapult
Network provide critical support for innovative small
and medium-sized enterprises and £490m has been
provided for Innovate UK’s core budgets next year. This will
support high-tech firms across the UK in developing thetechnologies of the future.

100

Integrated Review

SR 2020
Commitment

Description

Defence R&D• Investment of at least £6.6bn in R&D, enabling research
into AI and other battle-winning technologies as part of the
MOD’s four-year settlement (see below).

UK security
and intelligenceagencies R&D• £695m of additional R&D funding between 2021-22 to
2024-25. To support the development of cutting-edge
capabilities in the agencies.

National
Cyber Force (MOD)• The MOD settlement includes funding for the NCF in
partnership with the security and intelligence agencies
to enhance the UK’s position as a responsible,
democratic cyber power.

Cybersecurity (NCSP)• £305m of continued investment in 2021-22 in the crossgovernment National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP),
funding transformational cyber security projects to support
departments, the private sector and wider society. This
investment will enable the UK to stay at the forefront of
global action to secure a safe digital future and successfully
adopt new technology to drive resilience and economic
growth. There is a further £18m in 2021-22 for international
cyber, digital and data capacity-building programmes, andprojects from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.

Digital & data (DCMS) • £45m for programmes to drive growth throughdigital technologies and data, while improving online
safety and security.
2. Shaping the open international order of the future
Diplomatic
network (FCDO)• Investment in FCDO priority estates projects to deliver asafe, modern platform for our overseas network.

Trade (DIT)• Continued implementation of the UK’s new independent
trade policy – including ongoing trade negotiations with
the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and theUK’s accession to CPTPP – with the aim of enabling
80% of UK trade to be covered by trade agreements by
the end of 2022.

Soft power(FCDO/DCMS/DfE)• Continued support for the British Council (£150m of ODA
and £39m non-ODA grant funding from FCDO for 202122, and further financial support to allow the Council toreform and invest).
• Over £284m for galleries and museums.
• Over £150m to continue to strengthen our cultural andheritage infrastructure, including through the Cultural
Investment Fund and Museums Infrastructure Fund.

Annex A: Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020101

SR 2020
Commitment

Description

Soft power(FCDO/DCMS/DfE)• More than £100m in capital investment for
DCMS-supported bodies working across culture,
heritage and sports.
• £72m in 2021-22 to support the commitment to build
20 Institutes of Technology.
• Over £42m for VisitBritain to promote the UK to visitors fromaround the world, promoting familiarity with UK values.

Economic crime (HO)• £63m to tackle economic crime, including the reform of
the Suspicious Activity Reports system, and to grow the
NECC, which coordinates law enforcement’s response tomoney laundering.
• £20m to support the reform of the Companies
House register.

3. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas
Defence (MOD)• Over £24bn increase in cash terms over four years,
including at least £6.6bn of R&D (as mentioned above)
to maintain a cutting-edge military. This reaffirms theUK’s commitment to its allies, making the UK the largest
European spender on defence in NATO and the second
largest in the Alliance.
• The additional funding in this settlement will:• Enable research into AI and otherbattle-winning technologies.
• Reshape the UK’s armed forces for a morecompetitive age.
• Establish a new Space Command and enhance thebreadth of our space capabilities.
• Continue the renewal of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
• Develop the next generation of naval vessels,
including Type 32 frigates and Fleet Solid Support
ships, and deliver our plans for eight Type 26 andfive Type 31 frigates.
• Progress our Carrier Strike capabilities, with at least
48 F-35s by 2025.
• Develop the Future Combat Air System for the RAF,
along with delivering upgraded Typhoon radars.
• Enhance the UK’s position as a responsible, democratic
cyber power (as mentioned above).

102

Integrated Review

SR 2020
Commitment

Description

CBRN – nuclear
detection
capability (HO)• £22m resource funding in 2021-22 and £329m capitalfunding from 2021-22 to 2024-25 to enhance nuclear
detection capability.

Conflict, Stability andSecurity Fund• £874m to support the UK’s national security and resiliencethrough overseas engagement. This is focused on
tackling instability, preventing conflict and supporting
capacity-building.

Borders (HO/CO)• £217m for HO to deliver the Future Border and Immigration
System, a new points-based immigration system in linewith the Government’s ambition to have the most effective
border in the world by 2025.
• A further £1bn for HMRC to reform and enhance the UK
customs system will be accompanied by £363m to recruit
1,100 Border Force officers to deliver transit customs
arrangements and to continue supporting law enforcement
cooperation with EU member states from 1 January 2021.
• Seed funding of £16m for the CO for the Borderand Protocol Delivery Group for transformative workat the border which will support development of aSingle Trade Window.

Counter Terrorism(HO/UK security andintelligence agencies)• The budget for CT policing in England and Wales ismaintained, including the extra £70m provided in the last
financial year, for 2021-22.
• Establishing CTOC to transform our ability to fight terrorism
by creating an integrated CT centre.

Serious and• Maintains existing funding for tackling SOC and continues
Organised Crime (HO)the additional £30m provided at SR 2019 to tackle childsexual exploitation.
UK security andintelligence agencies• £695m on additional R&D funding between 2021-22 and2024-25 to support the development of cutting-edge
capabilities in the agencies.

Telecommunications
Diversification(DCMS)• In order to make early progress on telecommunications
diversification and to build momentum to deliver our longterm vision, the Government has committed an initialinvestment of £250m, to initiate work on our key priorities.

Annex A: Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020103SR 2020
Commitment

Description

4. Building resilience at home and overseas
Situation Centre
and Cabinet Office
Briefing Rooms (CO)• £9.3m to provide continued support to the COBR crisis
suite and establish a Situation Centre which will provide live
data, analysis and insights to decision-makers on what ishappening in the UK and around the world, strengthening
our ability to identify, understand and respond to national
security issues and crises.

Climate change andbiodiversity• £12bn investment to support a green industrial revolution
including innovative clean energy technologies, lowhydrogen carbon production, carbon capture and storage,
offshore wind and nuclear power. Provides funding for
the Prime Minister’s ten-point plan, which has set out
the Government’s vision to tackle climate change while
simultaneously supporting hundreds of thousands ofjobs across the UK.
• The Prime Minister committed in 2019 to double the UK’s
public ICF to at least £11.6bn between 2021 and 2025.
ICF will help developing countries limit their greenhouse gas
emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change.
• £5.2bn in the next six-year flood and coastal defence
programme, and £200m on innovative resilience measuresover the same period. This is to better protect homes andcommunities across England from flooding and to ensure
they are better prepared for when it does happen.
• This accompanies allocations for the Nature for Climate
Fund (£92m), Green Recovery Challenge Fund (£80m)
and an additional £7m for biodiversity conservation in theOverseas Territories.

Health resilience(DHSC, BEIS,MHCLG, FCDO)• £6bn to develop and procure COVID-19 vaccines, aswell as over £5.4bn to help local authorities respond to
COVID-19 in 2020-21.
• £1.3bn to DHSC for R&D to continue the world-leading
work of the National Institute for Health Research andGenomics England and their research into better patient
outcomes, including on COVID-19 research, as well as
supporting the wider UK life sciences sector.
• £548m available through the COVAX Advance Market
Commitment to support developing countries’ access to
COVID-19 vaccines.

104

Integrated Review

SR 2020
Commitment

Description

Health resilience(DHSC, BEIS,MHCLG, FCDO)• Support to the WHO through a core contribution of £340m
over four years. This represents a 30% increase to existingfunding, which cements the UK’s place as the secondlargest member state contributor.
• Support to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, with £1.65bn over
five years to support immunisation of children in the world’s
poorest countries. This helps to ensure that COVID-19
does not undermine global efforts to protect against
preventable diseases.

Official Development
Assistance (ODA)• £10bn ODA in 2021-22 to be used overseas to fightpoverty, tackle climate change, support girls into
education and improve global health. The UK will spend
the equivalent of 0.5% of gross national income (GNI) as
overseas aid in 2021.

Implementing the Integrated Review
ROSA (CO)• £2.2m to improve security, to protect our sensitive datafrom ever-evolving threats by investing in the ROSA system.

Annex A: Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020105

Annex B: Evidence and engagement
1.

This annex sets out our approach to building the evidence base for the Integrated
Review. The ambition was to root the review in the best available evidence,
analysis and expertise, drawing on a diverse range of high-quality sources tocreate a foreign policy baseline; taking key partners’ and stakeholders’ views
into consideration; and embedding evidence and rigour throughout the strategy
development process.

2.

To achieve this ambition, we undertook a systematic programme of engagement,
analysis and challenge. We established new processes and products where thesewere needed to address gaps and better inform decision-making. Lessons learned
during the process will inform our future approach to engagement and our useof evidence.

Approach3.

This programme was designed to support each stage of the strategy development
and drafting process. This involved working with government departments andagencies, the UK’s overseas networks, and experts, practitioners and partners fromacross the globe. In particular, we sought to:• Identify and understand the established and emergent trends in the domestic
and international system.
• Highlight what the UK could and should learn from other countries and from theprivate sector.
• Clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the UK’s current policies, processes,
systems and capabilities, and identify what needed to change.

4.

New mechanisms were established to integrate efforts across government sothat the Review benefited from the full range of expertise and resources available,
including extensive domestic and overseas networks and research and assessment
capabilities. Three programmes of activity were developed: engagement; analysis andassessment; and challenge and assurance.

Engagement

106

5.

We designed engagement to bring in different perspectives and policy ideas
from across the UK and around the world. We adapted the programme in lightof COVID-19 to make full use of online platforms and we issued a public callfor evidence.

6.

International partners and stakeholders: the Cabinet Office and Foreign andCommonwealth Office, and later the FCDO, designed and delivered a virtualinternational engagement programme to which heads of mission, ministers and senior
officials contributed. In particular, senior officials – including the Deputy National
Security Adviser for the Integrated Review and the Prime Minister’s Special Adviser
on Foreign Policy – held more than 100 engagements with over 20 countries across
six continents, with a particular focus on key allies and partners. With support from

Integrated Review

Wilton Park, we convened 22 young leaders and emerging experts from 14 different
countries to better understand young people’s perspectives on, and ambitions for,the future.
7.

Departmental engagement: government departments and agencies consulted
networks and stakeholder groups across the UK and the world to inform inputs to
the Integrated Review. For example, the FCDO established a group of experts andhosted roundtables on key themes and GO-Science consulted established networks
such as the UK Science and Innovation Network (SIN) to coordinate a range of inputs
from external experts. Chief Scientific Advisers across government also played an
important role in improving the standards of evidence use throughout the Integrated
Review. This included support from the FCDO Research and Evidence Division (RED)to review the Integrated Review evidence base.

8.

Public engagement: gaining perspectives from the public was vital to informing theIntegrated Review, although the process was necessarily restricted due to COVID-19.
New research was conducted to understand public perceptions of foreign policy
and national security at home and overseas. On 13 August 2020, we launcheda public call for evidence. Contributions were invited on a range of security,
defence, development and foreign policy questions. We received more than 450
submissions from individuals and organisations. Organisational respondents included
representatives of a range of industries, non‑governmental organisations, internationalorganisations, academia, think tanks, local government, LRFs, the media, religiousorganisations and fire and police organisations. We reviewed and catalogued thesubmissions, which we then shared with policy-makers and senior officials acrossgovernment.

9.

Parliamentary engagement: we made extensive use of reports by the relevant
parliamentary committees. During the Integrated Review process, officials briefed theHouse of Commons Select Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs and International
Development. The Prime Minister gave evidence to the Liaison Committee on the
Integrated Review. The Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary also gave evidence
to the relevant departmental select committees, the then-National Security Adviser
gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, and Defence
Minister (Lords) led briefing sessions for members of the House of Lords.

10. Experts and practitioners: with support from the Government’s Open Innovation
Team and Wilton Park, we engaged academics and experts from more than 30
different institutions and 20 countries. This included five facilitated discussion sessions
and three roundtables with senior officials. Senior officials conducted a virtual tour of
established think tanks and new research bodies. During the Integrated Review, weclosely tracked work in relevant journals, think tanks and other research bodies fromacross the world. This work included two focused reviews of expert opinion, involving
input from 45 academics and practitioners, to gather perspectives on the UK’s role in
the world over the next ten years, UK capabilities in relevant areas, and the extent towhich current systems support their effective use.

Annex B: Evidence and engagement107Analysis and assessment
11. We commissioned new analyses and assessments to address gaps, updated existing
analyses, and developed new analytical products to inform decision-making andstrategy development.
12. Global strategic outlook: the assessment community coordinated a crossgovernment analysis of global trends up to 2030. This analysis drew on a rangeof expertise, including horizon-scanning and futures analysis work by the MOD’s
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, GO-Science and the FCDO. It outlined
the most significant global trends, drivers and changes, and their implications fornational security and foreign policy over the coming decade.
13. Capabilities and systems: we sought to develop a detailed understanding of UK
capabilities and systems to inform strategy and resourcing decisions. We carried out
a cross-government assessment to provide an overview of government spending.
We also compared the UK’s capabilities with those of key partners and undertook
analysis of the culture of the national security community.
14. Risk assessment: the NSRA is a classified document that lists and assesses
the impact and likelihood of the most serious risks facing the UK and its interests
overseas. It is produced collaboratively with all departments and agencies and its
findings were reviewed in light of COVID-19. The publicly available version of the
NSRA, the National Risk Register, was published in December 2020.
15. Products to support decision-making and strategy development: we sought toimprove the accessibility of the evidence base, synthesising inputs where appropriate.
This included regular sharing of insights from the evidence base.
Challenge and assurance
16. We put in place challenge and assurance processes to test our assumptions andemerging thinking during the strategy development process. These drew from a
range of tools and methods, which included:• Research into mitigating cognitive biases in national security and international
policy. The Open Innovation Team looked at a range of ‘alternative analysis’approaches, audited existing initiatives and interviewed ten officials and 17
external experts including academics.
• Red-teaming to challenge and test emerging thinking from the perspective of
third parties including, but not limited to, allies and adversaries.
• Reading groups of senior officials with specific subject matter expertise fromacross government departments and agencies to contribute to and provide
feedback on the emerging Strategic Framework.
• Challenge groups to discuss the key assumptions and judgements of
the Integrated Review, with participants from across government and ouroverseas network.
• Quality assurance at each phase of the Integrated Review process to assessthe use of evidence against a framework, check figures and provide feedback onwhether the Integrated Review presented a clear theory of change.
108

Integrated Review

Future priorities
17. The Integrated Review’s programme of engagement, analysis and assessment
has reinforced the need to improve the use of evidence across government.
We are committed to improving the use of evidence, analysis and challenge,
including from diverse sources, in developing and delivering national security andinternational strategy.

Annex B: Evidence and engagement

109Annex C: Glossary

110

Term

Definition

AI

Artificial intelligence

AMR

Antimicrobial resistance

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BEIS

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy

CBRN

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CJEF

Combined Joint Expeditionary ForceCO

Cabinet Office

COBR

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms

COP26

26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties

COVAX

COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access

CPTPP

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement forTrans-Pacific Partnership

CNI

Critical national infrastructure

CT

Counter-terrorism

CTOC

Counter Terrorism Operations Centre

DCMS

Department for Digital, Culture, Media & SportDHSC

Department of Health and Social Care

Dstl

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

EU

European Union

FCAS

Future combat air system

FCDO

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

FDI

Foreign direct investment

FoRB

Freedom of religion or belief

FPDA

Five Power Defence Arrangements

FTA

Free trade agreement

GCHQ

Government Communications Headquarters

GDP

Gross domestic product

GNI

Gross national income

HO

Home Office

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICF

International Climate Finance

LRF

Local resilience forum

MHCLG

Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government

Integrated Review

TermDefinition

MOD

Ministry of Defence

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA

National Crime Agency

NCF

National Cyber ForceNCSC

National Cyber Security Centre

NCSP

National Cyber Security Programme

NECC

National Economic Crime Centre

NSC

National Security Council

NSRA

National Security Risk Assessment

ODA

Official Development AssistanceOECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPCW

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

RAF

Royal Air Force

R&D

Research and development

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SIS

Secret Intelligence Service – also known as MI6

SOC

Serious and organised crimeSR

Spending Review

S&T

Science and technology

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

The UN Refugee Agency

VTD

Vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics

WHO

World Health Organization

WTO

World Trade Organization

Annex C: Glossary111

CCS: CCS0221035122
ISBN: 978-1-5286-2453-4