NID S

C HIN AS E C U R I T Y

R E P O R T

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia
Published by
The National Institute for Defense Studies
5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8808 Japan
Website: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp
Translated by Urban Connections
Copyright © 2019 by the National Institute for Defense Studies, JapanAll rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written, prior permission fromthe publisher.
The China Security Report 2020 comprises NIDS researchers’ analyses and descriptions based on
information compiled from open sources in Japan and overseas. The statements contained herein do
not necessarily represent the official position of the Government of Japan or the Ministry of Defense.
This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in November 2019.
ISBN978-4-86482-077-6

Printed in Japan

NIDS China Security Report 2020

Contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................. iii
Summary........................................................................................................................... iv
Acronyms and Abbreviations..................................................................................... vi
Introduction......................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: China’s Eurasian Diplomacy: Regionalism, Balancing, andPragmatism................................................................................................5
1.

China as Regional Actor........................................................................................6(1) From the Shanghai Five to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
Regionalism and Balancing..............................................................................6(2) Pragmatism in Bilateral Approaches.................................................................92.

China’s Expanding Initiatives ..............................................................................12(1) Improving Connectivity in Central Asia...........................................................12(2) Expanding Influence in Europe and Its Reactions..........................................14

3.

The Belt and Road Initiative and International Security.......................................19(1) Role of the People’s Liberation Army..............................................................19(2) Advances in Functional Cooperation..............................................................22

Chapter 2: The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia
and Russia: Cooperation in Eurasian Space and Pursuit ofAutonomy..................................................................................................27
1.

The Post-Soviet States and the Concept of Eurasia ..........................................28(1) Rule of Central Asia by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union ................28(2) The Concept of “Eurasia” and the Eurasian Economic Union........................31

2.

International Cooperation in Central Asia............................................................33(1) Cooperation for Regional Stability..................................................................33(2) Connectivity Projects and the Belt and Road Initiative ..................................36(3) Diplomatic Trends within the Central Asia Region..........................................39i

3.

Central Asia and China from Russia’s Perspective.............................................41(1) Security Cooperation with Central Asian Countries.......................................41(2) Vigilance and Cooperation towards China .....................................................42

Chapter 3: Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security..................47
1.

Resource-rich Eurasian Countries in China’s Energy Policies............................48(1) Trends in Supply and Demand for Energy in China........................................48(2) China’s Energy Policies and Reliance on Imports..........................................52(3) China’s Perspective on Resource-rich Countries in Eurasia:
From Peripheral to Central Interest.................................................................54

2.

Energy Trade Negotiations between China and Resource-rich Countries
in Eurasia.............................................................................................................56(1) Oil Trade Negotiations.....................................................................................56(2) Natural Gas Trade Negotiations......................................................................60(3) Chinese and Russian Tactics Surrounding Gas Trade...................................65

3.

Working Towards New Energy Architecture........................................................67(1) Architecture from the Perspective of Chinese Energy Security......................67(2) Geopolitical Implications.................................................................................70

Conclusions....................................................................................................................75
Notes.................................................................................................................................79ii

Preface
Preface

The NIDS China Security Report is published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)
to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s military affairs and security from a midto long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminated both in Japan and overseas. Since March2011 it has been published annually in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions. The NIDS China

Summary

Security Report has attracted significant interest from research institutions and the media in Japanand abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange anddialogue with research institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China.
The China Security Report 2020, the tenth in this series and subtitled “China Goes to Eurasia,”

Introduction

analyzes the content and characteristics of China’s strategy toward Eurasia. This report further
analyzes how China is deploying its policies in the Central Asian region and how these are impacting
energy transactions in the region.
In writing this report, the authors have endeavored to present an objective analysis while
taking note of suggestions gained by exchanging opinions with researchers and stakeholders in Japanand abroad. The primary and secondary sources of information referred to for this report are listed

Chapter 1

in the endnotes.
The China Security Report 2020 has been written solely from the viewpoints of the individual
researchers and does not represent an official view of the Japanese Government, the Ministry of
Defense, or NIDS. The authors of this report are Masayuki Masuda (the lead author and author ofChapter 1), Hiroshi Yamazoe (Chapter 2), and Shigeki Akimoto (Chapter 3). The editorial team is

Chapter 2

led by Tetsuo Murooka, editor-in-chief, and includes Koichi Arie, Masafumi Iida, Hiroshi Iwamoto,Hiroaki Enta, Hiroto Sawada, Ryosuke Tanaka, Yu Harada, and Masahiro Yamashita.
The authors of the China Security Report 2020 hope that it will promote policy discussions
concerning China in Japan and other countries, and at the same time they hope that the report willcontribute to a deepening of dialogue and exchange as well as cooperation between Japan and China

Chapter 3

regarding security.
November 2019
Tetsuo Murooka
Director, Security Studies Department
The National Institute for Defense Studies

Conclusionsiii

Summary
Chapter 1

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

China’s diplomacy with Eurasia, and particularly the countries of Central Asia, has come tocomprise elements of regionalism and also soft balancing against the United States. From the late
1990s, Beijing began active involvement in regional cooperation in Central Asia and established theShanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the same time, from the perspective of soft balancing
against the United States, China discovered the significance of multilateral cooperation with neighboring countries. However, China did not always find it easy to share its policies with Russia and theCentral Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on
the desirable direction for regionalism and ways of soft balancing against the United States.
From the latter half of the 2000s onwards there was growing discussion among domestic
experts in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the revision of Beijing’s conventional diplomatic
approaches to addressing regionalism in Central Asia, with it being suggested that China’s actual
policies should not necessarily be bound by the approaches that had been implemented to date. While
Beijing emphasized the importance of regional cooperation on the one hand, it also made specificrequests to other countries to ensure that their various development strategies matched those of the
PRC. The outcome of China’s policy recalibration was the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative
announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013, which demonstrated the pragmatism inherent in China’s
diplomacy. The result was that the countries in the region accepted China’s initiative, thus improving
connectivity in economic relations between China and its regional neighbors. Seeking to protect thefoundations of this improved connectivity, Beijing is also advancing functional cooperation in thearea of security with Eurasian countries, specifically law enforcement cooperation.
However, as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has continued its global deployment, so too has
there been a growing tendency for China’s political discourse relating to the international order to incorporate the BRI. This tendency is particularly strong in China’s diplomacy with Europe and there is growing
recognition in Europe about the political and security risks associated with relations with China.

Chapter 2	The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia
and Russia
Although the five Central Asian Republics gained their independence following the dismantling of theSoviet Union, their ties with Russia remain strong; underlying this is Russian language-based educationand various other common systems. Also, given the history of interaction between China’s Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Central Asian region, where borders and resident populations
have fluctuated over the course of time, it has been necessary for Beijing to pay heed to the intentionsof regional countries, including Russia, in order to expand its regional role and influence.

iv

Summary

Through the forum of the SCO various cooperation initiatives have been implemented in
the Central Asian region relating to stabilization of border regions and countering international
Prefaceterrorism. China is also actively advancing security cooperation in border regions with Afghanistan,
Tajikistan and Pakistan. With regard to cooperation relating to the BRI, the countries’ acceptanceof China’s initiatives based on their own development initiatives has led to further advances of the
BRI and has also helped to improve distribution in the region. When advancing such cooperation
initiatives, China has also been mindful of any concerns on the part of Central Asian countries andSummary

Russia and advanced programs that can feasibly be taken forward.
Based on the recognition that improvements in public order have brought with them opportunities for improving connectivity, there is an emerging tendency among Central Asian countries
to engage actively in intra-regional interactions and cooperation. Russia has strengthened its secu-

Introduction

rity cooperation with the Central Asian Republics and, while asserting its own autonomy in implementing initiatives in former Soviet republics, it is also working together with China in military fields
and other areas where it has an advantage and is accepting China’s initiatives. When cooperatingwith China, the Central Asian countries and Russia also exert efforts to grow their own diplomatic
autonomy, working to ameliorate any negative aspects China’s expanding influence may incur.

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

Chapter 1

Chapter 3

China’s demand for energy has grown rapidly in line with its economic growth. It cannot meet its
own energy demands and is growing increasingly dependent on imports. Moreover, in recent years
China’s primary energy mix has also changed against the backdrop of changes in the economic
structure that aim for sustainable social and economic development, which has elevated projections

Chapter 2

for further increases in oil and gas imports. In the face of these trends and with security perspectives
in mind, the PRC sought to diversify its procurement sources and routes, focusing in particular on
the value of resource-rich Eurasian countries that would enable procurement via land-based routes.
From the mid-1990s onwards Beijing made careful attempts to engage in individual negotiations, andfrom the mid-2000s through to the mid-2010s built business relations.

Chapter 3

It can well be said that the energy trade relations that China spent time and money on building
with Eurasian resource-rich countries have turned out to be a prized strategic asset. This strategic
asset has double implications. Firstly, in order to maintain trade relations with the Eurasian countries
that are vital in terms of energy security, it makes sense for Beijing to actively assist the economic
development of these resource-rich countries. In such cases it is the way in which the BRI framework

Conclusions

is used that attracts attention. Secondly, by using these trading relations as leverage, China gains
geopolitical status that enables it to involve itself, albeit in a limited manner, in energy flows that link
Europe, Russia, the Middle East and even South Asia. How Beijing will use that status is the second
point that attracts attention.

v

Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADB
AIIB
APEC
ASEAN
CAREC
CBM
CDCEP 16+1
CEEC
CICA
CIS
CMC
CNPC
CPC
CPC
CPEC
CSTO
EAEU
ESPO
EU
FTA
G20
HGC
HSC
IEA
IEP
IMF
IMU
INTERPOL
KCP
KMG
LNG
MFA
NATO
OPEC
PfP
PLA
PRC
PSA
RATS
ROK
SASAC
SCO
SIC
SIPRI
SPA
SREB
SSD
TAPI
TFA
V4
WEP
WTO
16+1

vi

Asian Development Bank
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
confidence-building measures
Center for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects 16+1
Central and Eastern European Countries
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
Commonwealth of Independent States(China’s) Central Military Commission
China National Petroleum Corporation
Caspian Pipeline Consortium
Communist Party of China
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Collective Security Treaty Organization
Eurasian Economic Union
East Siberia-Pacific Ocean
European Union
free trade agreement
Group of Twenty
Heads of Government Council meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Heads of State Council meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
International Energy Agency
Institute for Economics and Peace
International Monetary Fund
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
International Criminal Police Organization
Kazakhstan-China Pipeline
KazMunaiGazliquefied natural gas
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Partnership for Peace
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Republic of China
production sharing agreement
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Republic of Korea(China’s) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
Shanghai Cooperation Organization(China’s) State Information Center
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Sales and Purchase Agreement
Silk Road Economic Belt
(Pakistan’s) Special Security Division
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
Trade Facilitation Agreement
Visegrád Four (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary)West-East Gas Pipeline
World Trade Organization
Sixteen Central and Eastern European countries plus China

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

Introduction
Masayuki Masuda

Introduction
China has expanded its strategic horizons towards the Eurasian continent. It can generally beunderstood that the direct stimulus for this move was the espousal of two Silk Road initiatives in
2013, which would subsequently be combined to form the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). After
having been appointed as President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in March 2013, in
September of the same year Xi Jinping set out his vision for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) in
Astana (currently Nur-Sultan) in Kazakhstan, which was followed in October by the announcementin Jakarta, Indonesia, of a “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative. Xi declared that these
initiatives would be used to improve connectivity with other countries in the region. In terms ofmaritime-related matters China’s ongoing disputes with neighbors over territorial sovereignty, andmaritime rights and interests, and its continued critical stance against the United States’ militarypresence in the Asia-Pacific region have meant that China has been unable to fully leverage initiatives towards the construction of a “Maritime Silk Road,” particularly in security-related areas. On
the other hand, the SREB initiative has reaped relatively significant outcomes in its vision to improveconnectivity across Eurasia, and international cooperation is now also being functionally promoted
in security areas. This has resulted in discussion both domestically and internationally about the
emergence of China as a “Eurasian Power.”1
Domestically in China it was around 2012 that assertions started to be made from a geopolitical perspective that China’s strategic direction should be to look towards Eurasia. In particular,
it was Professor Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, whoin October 2012 attracted attention with his “Marching Westwards” theory that appeared in the
Global Times.2 Wang’s “Marching Westwards” theory was based on the premise that the “AsiaPacific rebalancing” proposed by the U.S. Obama administration had resulted in “this new roundof geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the great powers becoming increasingly
intense,” and emphasized that China should engage in its own geopolitical “rebalance.” Given thatcompetition was intensifying with the United States to China’s “east,” or in other words in East Asia,
Wang stressed that, “China should not limit its sights to its own coasts and borders, or to traditional
competitors and partners, but should make strategic plans to ‘march westwards’,” arguing for thepolitical, diplomatic and economic significance of such a strategy. Noting that while on the one hand
“Sino-U.S. competition in East Asia is already increasingly becoming a ‘zero-sum situation’,” Wangobserved that “there have been almost no conflicts between China and countries in West Asia,” andthat “there are also very few points of contention between China and these countries,” leading him
to conclude that in order to China to gain a favorable position geopolitically and geo-economically,“marching westwards” was not only possible, but necessary.
It remains unclear as to the degree to which such arguments had a direct influence on the2Introduction

proposal of the BRI. Xi Jinping himself stated that, “the BRI is an initiative for economic cooperation, instead of a geopolitical alliance or military league,” denying any kind of geopolitical elements
Prefaceto the initiative.3 If we look into the actual details of the formulation process of the BRI, it becomesapparent that its primary purpose was to link the development of the western region of China, which
had lagged behind the rest of the country until then, to the development of neighboring countries
and the further development of China’s eastern seaboard. The aim therefore was to realize balanced
development in all regions of China and as a result the initiative was strongly oriented towards

Summary

economic cooperation with neighboring countries.4
However, as the BRI project advanced and came to take on a more globally oriented character,new political discourse came to feature in discussions of the BRI. This was a discourse relating to theconstruction of a new international order predicated on “reforming the global governance system”

Introduction

and “building a community with a shared future for mankind.” In October 2017, in a speech delivered to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping raised theexample of the BRI, stating that, “China champions the development of a community with a shared
future for mankind, and has encouraged the evolution of the global governance system.”5 In August
2018, at a roundtable discussion held to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the BRI, Xi pointed
out that, “the BRI was not only aimed at economic cooperation but also an important pathway to

Chapter 1

improve global development patterns and global governance and promote the healthy developmentof economic globalization.”6 At the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperationin April 2019 he also positioned the BRI as offering, “new ways for improving global economic
governance.”7 What can be said of these statements is that by advancing the BRI Beijing sought tostrengthen efforts to construct an international order. In other words, for China, Eurasia represented

Chapter 2

a space in which diverse significance could be found, in terms of connectivity, geopolitics and also
the construction of a new international order.
Naturally, the expansion of strategic horizons towards Eurasia would not be realized unilaterally only through areas of significance to China. Mutual relations between China and countries
in the region would be needed to make this aim a reality. The geopolitical thinking inherent in the

Chapter 3

BRI and China’s intentions with regard to changing global governance could also not be brought tothe fore without the consent and support of counterpart countries and regions. In terms of economic
cooperation, China would have to ensure that supply and demand with countries in the region were
well-balanced. The BRI in Eurasia, or in other words the SREB construction was the result ofdomestic economic imperatives in China—namely expanding the export market to eliminate excess

Conclusions

production capacity and securing stable energy supplies—dovetailing with the demand for infrastructure construction and the like in countries in the region.8 Of similar importance in diplomatic
terms was that China’s efforts to build and develop relations with Russia and the Central Asian
Republics following the dissolution of the Soviet Union had resulted in the groundwork being laid
for these countries to be accepting of a Chinese initiative.

3

Introduction

This report aims to identify the factors that enabled the expansion of China’s influence inEurasia. Accordingly, by analyzing the mid- to long-term changes in mutual relations, particularly
the development of policies since the dissolution of the Soviet Union from the early 1990s onwards,
the report describes the real nature of efforts by China to develop relations and portrays the dynamism that has been developed with countries in the region.
Chapter 1 analyzes the process leading to the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), which saw China emerge as a regional actor in Eurasia and particularly Central
Asia, and also subsequent changes in China’s approach to Central Asia. It also considers the current
status, whereby promotion of the BRI has improved connectivity between China and Central Asian
countries, and the potential for the formation of security-related networks that go beyond Central
Asia to encompass Eurasia. Chapter 1 also discusses China’s growing influence in Europe, the exit
point for a China that is looking to Eurasia.
Chapter 2 analyzes how Russia and Central Asian countries have accepted and managed
China’s expanding influence throughout the post-Soviet region of Central Asia. Chapter 3 analyzes
in detail energy transactions between China and countries in the region, and describes the architecture that is actually being constructed in the energy sector.
(Author: Masayuki Masuda)

4

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

Chapter 1
China’s Eurasian Diplomacy:
Regionalism, Balancing, and Pragmatism
Masayuki Masuda

1. China as Regional Actor(1) From the Shanghai Five to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
Regionalism and Balancing
China emerged as a regional actor in Central Asia with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in 2001. Until then China’s Central Asia policy had basically been low profileand bilateral relations had dominated China’s approach with its neighbors. During his visit to fourCentral Asian Republics in April 1994, Chinese Premier Li Peng enunciated the major principles
governing China’s relations with the Central Asian countries.1 The first of these was to maintain
good-neighborly relations and peaceful coexistence. Li emphasized that China was not seeking to
expand its sphere of influence in Central Asia and that even if China were to become rich and strong
in the future it would not engage in hegemonism or power politics. The second principle Li stated
was to promote economic and trade relations, upholding the principles of equality and mutually
beneficial cooperation in economic relations without appending political conditions. Thirdly, hestated that China would respect the choice of the peoples of Central Asia and would not interfere ininternal affairs. The final principle was to respect the sovereignty and independence of the countries
of Central Asia and seek to preserve stability in the region. Li Peng’s speech was low-profile in its
entirety.
China made great efforts to stabilize border regions and improve the conditions of communication and transportation to develop trade relations.2 With regard to the former, China engaged in negotiations with Russia and the Central Asian Republics on border demarcation and confidence-building
measures (CBM).3 By 1997 borders had been demarcated with Russia and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. In terms of CBM, leaders of five states signed an agreement on the CBM in Shanghai
in April 1996, and in April 1997 another CBM agreement in the military field in the border area
was signed by the heads of states in
Moscow.4 This gathering of five countries on matters relating to borderissues would eventually be referred toas the “Shanghai Five.” At the leaders’summit meeting and foreign ministers’
meeting in Almaty in July 1998, thefive countries agreed to aim to institutionalize the process.5 In other words,
it was decided to “expand and enhance
multilateral cooperation” that had beentargeted specifically on border-related

6China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

issues, advancing the framework of the “Shanghai Five” to go beyond simply confirming the execution status of the CBM, and extending it to include collaborative activities to combat the so-called
Preface“three evil forces” of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” and economic cooperation.
From 1999 onwards a mechanism of meetings was institutionalized for ministers of foreign
affairs, ministers of national defense, and heads of law enforcement agencies of the “Shanghai Five,”and Uzbekistan was welcomed as an observer. At the summit meeting in Dushanbe in July 2000 themember nations agreed to further enhance the “Shanghai Five” mechanism in order to effectively

Summary

respond to the “three evil forces.” At the 2001 summit held in Shanghai, Uzbekistan was formallyadmitted as a member. It was at this 2001 summit meeting that Chinese President Jiang Zemin
declared that, “A new regional multilateral organization on the Eurasian continent has been established, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 6Introduction

China was proactive in the process of institutionalizing the “Shanghai Five,” or promoting theestablishment of the SCO and its development. Firstly, this was because in security-related aspects,
in order to deal effectively with the “three evil forces” in particular, Beijing recognized the criticalnecessity of improving cooperation in related areas with the countries of Central Asia.7 From the
1990s onwards separatists in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China had repeatedly
engaged in terrorist activities and Beijing was increasingly alert to the possibility that such “three

Chapter 1

evil forces”-related activities could be linked to similar activities in Central Asia.8 Secondly, in orderto develop economic cooperation, including in the energy sector, Beijing believed in the effectiveness of multilateral rather than bilateral initiatives.9 Thirdly, it was also because in 1997 China’s
leadership had positioned the “Shanghai Five” as the means to put into practice a “new security
concept” that had been proposed to “discard the mentality of the Cold War.”10 What can be said from

Chapter 2

this is that Beijing found benefit in multilateral cooperation, from multidirectional and regionalist
perspectives.11 The establishment of the SCO represented a major turning point for China’s diplomacy, which until that point had been based on bilateral interactions.12 To put it another way, China
emerged as a regional actor in Central Asia.
Just three months after the establishment of the SCO, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in

Chapter 3

the United States, prompting the SCO to increasingly emphasize the importance of counterterrorism
within the context of the “three evil forces.” A serious issue for China was the United States’ moves
to embark on military action in Afghanistan. At an internal meeting of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) in October 2001, Jiang Zemin gave a speech as chairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC) in which he underlined the need to build an advantageous strategic position in the inter-

Conclusions

national climate following 9/11 and American military action in Afghanistan, focusing on three
diplomatic arenas: (a) relations with the major powers; (b) regional relations; and (c) multilateraldiplomacy.13 Specifically, with regard to the U.S. military presence in post-9/11 Central Asia, Jiang
emphasized the significance of “relative stability in strategic direction” by “strengthening cooperation with Russia and the countries of Central Asia,” and in that context indicated his understanding

7

Chapter 1that multilateral diplomacy, including the forum of the SCO, would be an “important route for amajor power to play such a role.” In other words, Jiang was underlining the importance of softbalancing against the United States, by maintaining and expanding its influence in relations withneighboring countries and regions. The SCO was highly regarded for its geopolitical value.
As the post-9/11 deployment and stationing of U.S. military forces in Central Asia became
increasingly long-term, Beijing adopted an “assertive diplomatic stance” in the arena of the SCO
in the context of soft balancing against the United States.14 Since 1997 all five of the Central Asian
Republics had taken part in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), implementing military exercises together with NATO and the United States. While China
had its concerns about such interactions, it also noted that the main competitor for the United Statesin the region was Russia and that the Central Asian countries had pursued a sophisticated strategy
of balance between the major powers, leading China to conclude that it would not be easy for theUnited States to enhance its military presence in Central Asia.15 However, the long-term deployment
and stationing of U.S. forces in Central Asia created a new situation that conflicted with this recognition of the security environment. The situation aroused discussion domestically in China that there
was a “possibility that the security structures of Central Asia and the strategic balance could bedestroyed.”16 It was for this reason that in the forum of the SCO too, China strengthened its anti-U.S.
stance in order to “hold the American penetration into Central Asia in check.”17 The SCO member
states demanded at their July 2005 Astana Summit that the United States should set a timeline forwithdrawing its troops from the region. At the same meeting, a decision was made to reject theUnited States’ application for observer status, while at the same time granting observer status toPakistan, India and Iran.18
However, it is questionable as to whether the SCO member states were joining forces to oppose
the military presence of the U.S. Experts of Russian and Central Asian affairs have observed that asmembers and new observers have joined the SCO, so too has the focus for interest in the SCO andthe degree of interest differed largely from country to country, with the result that while members
and observers may share similar views on broad-based issues, when it comes to specific matters theviews and directions taken by them are diverse.19 It could at best be said that China was the country
that was most active in its opposition to the U.S. military presence. Although Russia was opposed to
the long-term presence of the U.S. military in the region, it was accepting of U.S. military deployment in Central Asia. In addition, in engaging in military action in Afghanistan the United States not
only improved its relations with the Central Asian Republics, but also with India and Pakistan. This
led many Chinese experts to conclude that the United States had emerged as the “country with thegreatest influence” in Central Asian security, which presented China with the difficult challengesof how to maintain momentum among the member nations of the newly-established SCO, and inparticular the Central Asian members, and also how to maintain the role and status of the SCO.20
Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in December 2001 China emphasized8

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

the critical necessity for long-term, comprehensive measures and regional cooperation in order tothoroughly eliminate the “three evil forces,” and worked to elevate the role and status of the SCO.21
PrefaceHowever, China itself was also of the view that it would be difficult to maintain an anti-U.S.
stance in the forum of the SCO. In October 2002 China was already reaching out to make tentative
diplomatic contact with the U.S.-led NATO, seeking out possibilities for dialogue on terrorism andCentral Asian security issues.22 In addition, with regard to the matter of how to proceed with relations vis-à-vis the U.S., on which it had not been possible to reach consensus among SCO members,

Summary

from the late 2000s onwards China worked to advance concept formulation and institutional designthat would enable the establishment of relations between the SCO and the United States. The resultof these efforts was the establishment of the Dialogue Partner mechanism that was ratified at the
SCO summit meeting in August 2008, and which provided that the “status of partner shall be

Introduction

granted to a state or an organization to establish relations of equal and mutually beneficial partnership.”23 At the time, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that China “highly evaluates” the dialogue
partner mechanism, and “welcomes relevant countries and international organizations, through thedialogue partner platform, to join efforts with the SCO to promote stability and development in
the region.”24 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also expressed China’s support for the SCO’s
efforts to “accept new dialogue partners in accordance with relevant rules of the dialogue partner

Chapter 1

mechanism.”25 Many Chinese experts understood the dialogue partnership to be one that envisaged
the involvement of the U.S., and in actual fact, at the Special Conference on Afghanistan convened
under the auspices of the SCO in Moscow at the end of March 2009 both the United States andNATO were invited.26 In other words, while recognizing the role and value of the SCO given thenecessity of soft balancing against the United States, Beijing adopted a pragmatic approach that

Chapter 2sought to build relations with the United States.

(2) Pragmatism in Bilateral Approaches
From an early stage Beijing underlined that the advancement of economic cooperation was one ofthe priority areas for the SCO. At the May 2003 SCO Summit meeting in Moscow, President Hu

Chapter 3

Jintao stated that, “Economic cooperation is the basis for and a priority of the SCO,” and expressed
his hope that a breakthrough would be made in regional economic cooperation at the meeting of the
SCO Heads of Government Council (HGC) in September 2003.27 At that September 2003 meetingof the SCO HGC, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the establishment of a free trade zone within the
SCO.28 In addition, with a view to achieving “substantive outcomes” in economic cooperation, at theConclusions

2004 SCO summit President Hu Jintao announced that the Chinese government had decided to offer
US$900 million in preferential buyer’s credit loans to the SCO and its member states.29
Within the SCO, in addition to the Heads of State Council (HSC)/Summit and HGC meetings
there are several mechanisms in place for regular ministerial-level meetings.30 To further encouragefunctional cooperation in economic and trade areas, working groups have been established in a9Chapter 1

number of specific areas, including e-commerce (chaired by China), customs (Russia), quality
and inspection (Kazakhstan), investment promotion (Tajikistan), and development of cross-border
potential (Uzbekistan), with each SCO member state chairing a group and taking responsibility forplanning cooperation in the relevant field.31 In working-level consultations, China has continued totable proposals, such as on expanding bilateral cooperation in priority fields such as energy, power,transport and communications to the multilateral level, and forming networks for oil and naturalgas, power, transportation and communications that will link the countries in the region, as well as
initiating joint research on the feasibility of a SCO free trade zone.32
The reasons behind China’s focus on economic cooperation were a desire to halt the tendency
within the international community to view the SCO as an anti-U.S. body, and also the positioning
by the Hu Jintao administration of “Neighboring Diplomacy” as a pillar of China’s diplomatic
strategy. China’s leadership sought concrete results in the SCO, as a symbolic framework for neighboring diplomacy.33 However, it became apparent that there were differences of opinion among
SCO members, particularly between China and Russia, on the direction that the organization ought
to take. Russia sought to focus on security and military cooperation, including counterterrorism.
Moscow also countered Beijing’s initiatives for economic cooperation with a proposal in June 2006
for the establishment of a “SCO Energy Club.” This is considered to have been a proposal reliant
on interests in a priority sector for Russia, as a resource exporting nation.34 In 2011 China once
again proposed the launch of joint research into the establishment of a free trade zone, but as had
been the case previously, this was coolly received by other members.35 In 2010 Russia establisheda customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus that would subsequently lead to the inauguration of
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and in 2012 an agreement was reached on the “Common
Economic Space.” This represented an attempt by the major countries of the SCO, with the exceptionof China, to achieve Russian-led economic integration.36
This situation obliged Beijing to find new approaches. In other words, while continuing
to place importance on the SCO framework, Beijing clearly turned its focus to the promotion of
economic relations on a bilateral basis, in search of concrete results. In September 2013 at a time thatcoincided with the SCO summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping
visited all but Tajikistan of the countries of Central Asia, seeking out the possibilities for promoting
bilateral economic cooperation. The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative that formed the basis
for the BRI was first announced by Xi Jinping during this visit to Central Asian countries. China’s
new initiative was not announced in the forum of the SCO summit, but rather in a speech delivered atNazarbayev University in Kazakhstan.37 In addition, Xi made no direct mention of his SREB visionat the SCO summit, restricting his comments to stating that SCO members and observers “bear a
responsibility to carry forward the spirit of the Silk Road” in the context of developing practicalcooperation.38
It could probably be said that this move to focus on bilateral approaches was a sign of Beijing’s

10China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

frustration at a lack of progress in economic cooperation at the multilateral level in the SCO. In addition, from a relatively early stage, Chinese experts suggested that the multilateral approach in the
Preface

SCO and the initiative for a free trade zone should be reconsidered. For example, in a book publishedin 2006 Professor Pan Guang, director of the SCO Studies Center at Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences observed the following seven factors behind the lack of progress in economic cooperation:39(1) the low level of current items for cooperation and their negligible effect; (2) the weak capacityof SCO member countries to engage in external investment and the limits to mutual investment;

Summary(3) differences among members in the liberalization of trade and investment; (4) the existence ofmultiple economic cooperation organizations in Central Asia that are negating the attractive force of
the SCO; (5) the psychological barriers, particularly in Russia and Kazakhstan, about the impact of
expanding economic relations with China; (6) differences among SCO members about initiatives for

Introduction

external economic cooperation and gaps in priorities for economic development; and (7) competitive
relations among member countries in various sectors. One logical conclusion that emerged fromthese observations was that “bilateral cooperation is the foundation for multilateral cooperation,”and that from the perspective of seeking effective cooperation, it was proposed to engage in cooperation in the large-scale energy and transportation sectors.40
Professor Zhao Huasheng, director of the Center for SCO Studies at Fudan University recom-

Chapter 1

mended a rethink of China’s policy towards the SCO. For example, he noted that while regional
economic integration would be “in both China’s interests and also in line with trends toward regional
cooperation,” and was as such a “natural and sound target,” the proposal by China for a free tradezone initiative “lacked consideration of the political elements involved.”41 In other words, there wasa lack of recognition on the part of China about the unease among SCO members regarding theChapter 2

potential for China to rapidly expand its influence.
Xi Jinping’s proposal for an SREB in Kazakhstan in 2013 was the result of reconsiderationof existing policies and approaches, based on such expert observations. Firstly, there was the factthat Kazakhstan had been chosen as the venue to announce the initiative. Kazakhstan is Central
Asia’s largest country and policy coordination with it would be key to China’s Central Asia policy.

Chapter 3

In addition, many Chinese experts underscored the presence of “China threat” theories not only in
Russia, but also in Kazakhstan, which required a careful response. Secondly, the proposed initiative
demonstrated China’s readiness to compare notes with Central Asian countries on their respective
economic development strategies and policies. Having voiced China’s willingness to engage fully
with the countries of Eurasia on “economic development strategies and related policies,” Xi observed

Conclusions

that through “even closer economic partnership among countries” an SREB could be built together.42
Although Xi’s speech did not deny the importance of the SCO, it sought to gain more concrete
outcomes from cooperation, by advancing practical cooperation in the bilateral relations. To put it
another way, the proposal of building an SREB can be understood as a pragmatic approach by China.

11

Chapter 1

2. China’s Expanding Initiatives(1) Improving Connectivity in Central Asia
China’s initiatives were basically received favorably by the countries of Central Asia. For
example, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan announced that the BRI was in line with
Kazakhstan’s new economic policy “Nurly Zhol” (The Bright Road) that he had himself proposedin November 2014.43 In addition, when Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at the 21st Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting in October 2013, three Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—were quick to announce their intention to participate. A further factor
providing favorable winds for China’s initiative was the Ukraine crisis of 2014. Economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European Union (EU) restricted Russia’s access to external capital
markets.44 The Central Asian countries also lost the option of turning to Russia as a source of capital.
The result was that both Russia and Central Asian countries focused greater expectations on the BRI.
China responded by establishing the Silk Road Fund, to which it provided US$40 billion in order tomeet demand for construction in the countries along the route of the BRI.
The May 2015 Sino-Russian Joint Statement on Cooperation of Connection between the SREB
and EAEU was symbolic of these moves by countries in the region towards closer ties with China.45
This statement made clear the two countries’ mutual support for their respective roles in these twoframeworks, and announced that they would promote connectivity between the SREB and EAEU inorder to “ensure the sustainable growth of the regional economy, enhance integration of the regional
economy, and protect regional peace and development.” The statement also indicated support formutually complementary relations between regional mechanisms and that the two countries would
advance bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly in the forum of the SCO. It was not justa simple declaration of intent to crystallize cooperation in fields such as trade, investment and infrastructure construction. It also called for the creation of working groups under diplomatic leadershipto advance collaboration in various sectors, and to oversee the status of progress towards cooperationon connectivity through existing cooperation mechanisms, such as regular summit meetings.
To what degree has the BRI contributed to closer cooperation between China and the countriesof the region? To gain an insight on this point it is helpful to look at China’s assessment on connectivity.
In October 2016 the State Information Center (SIC) published the Belt and Road in Big Data 2016,
which was compiled under the supervision of the General Office of Leading Group of Advancing
the Building of the BRI. Based on more than 300 billion pieces of data collected from domestic andforeign statistics agencies, news websites, social media and various other forums, the report uses anindex evaluation model constructed by the SIC to examine the status of progress on the BRI in China
and overseas.46 This report establishes a subset of indices under the “Five Connections” of the Silk

12

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

Road (policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade,
Prefacefinancial integration and people-topeople bonds) and provides quantified
information on the degree of cooperation between China and the 64 countries
involved in the BRI.47 According to theSummaryreport, Russia, Kazakhstan, Thailand,
Pakistan and Indonesia are the five mostcooperative countries in advancing the
BRI.

Introduction

China’s relations with Russia andKazakhstan were classified as “deepcooperation.”48 Specifically, the report noted the links being forged in policy aspects through highlevel mutual visits and the compilation of cooperation-related documents. It also went on to positively evaluate connectivity in infrastructure, focusing on the construction of oil and natural gas
pipelines, as well as financial cooperation, including investment and the regional distribution of the

Chapter 1

renminbi. In particular, in terms of infrastructure connectivity, the assessments that were publishedin 2017 and 2018 also ranked Russia and Kazakhstan number one and number two, respectively, fromwhich it can be surmised that infrastructure construction projects had been consistently advanced.49
However, it is still not the case that there is adequate infrastructure connectivity, meaning that China
will likely seek to continue initiatives of infrastructure construction. In terms of connectivity with

Chapter 2other Central Asian countries, although not as advanced as Russia and Kazakhstan, in comparison
with other neighboring regions there is scant difference between the Central Asian countries interms of their degree of cooperation with China (see, Figure 1.1). In 2016 China became the largest
trading partner for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan and it could well be said that economic relations
between China and countries in the region are becoming ever closer.

Chapter 3

As relations are growing closer between China and countries in the region in line with theprogress being made on the advancement of the BRI, China is finding itself facing new challenges.
Chinese experts have pointed out that as cooperation deepens over the course of time, it will be ofcritical importance in China’s relations with Central Asian countries to respond to issues, including
increasing external debt, trade imbalances, and increases in Chinese laborers.50 In April 2019, at theConclusions

Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation President Xi Jinping was seen to include
frequent reference in his speeches to “sustainable development” and “following general international rules and standards.” At the same meeting the Chinese Ministry of Finance announced a new
analytical framework relating to debt sustainability for low-income countries participating in the
BRI.51 This framework was based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Debt

13

Chapter 1

Figure 1.1 Neighboring Countries’ Degree of Cooperation with China on the BRI
90
80

79.77 (Max)77.07 (Max)76.15 (Max)70
60

64.48 (Mean)
56.09 (Mean)

50

49.38 (Mean)

40
30

33.57 (Min)24.83 (Min)20
11.65 (Min)100Central Asia

South Asia

Asia-PacificNote: F igures show each country’s degree of cooperation with China on the BRI. Figures are compiled
independently by the State Information Center, which is affiliated to the National Development andReform Commission of China.

Source: Compiled by the author, based on 国家信息中心“一带一路”大数据中心 [SIC Belt and Road Big Data
Center], “一带一路”大数据报告 (2018) [Belt and Road in Big Data Report 2018] (Beijing: 商务印书馆[The Commercial Press], 2018), p. 32.

Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries and sought to implement macroeconomic projections and stress tests for countries scheduled to receive financing, analyze risk and provide a rating. As
of April 2019, already 28 finance ministries including China are sharing this framework. It remains tobe seen how new initiatives such as this one can contribute to assuaging international concerns about
how China’s promotion of the BRI could be leading countries into so-called “debt traps.”(2) Expanding Influence in Europe and Its Reactions
The original concept for the BRI was a grand one, envisioned as “running through the continentsof Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asian economic circle at one end and thedeveloped European economic circle at the other,” thereby promoting connectivity between China
and these regions.52 In that sense, Central Asia and Russia encompassed an intermediary zone
linking China with Europe. China engaged in active diplomacy with Europe, which from China’s
perspective was one of the destination of the Silk Road initiative. What should be noted here is thatin recent years China’s Europe policy, and in particular its policy toward the EU, has been predicatedon emphasizing its context in the international order and international systems.
China’s proactive stance toward Europe has been particularly notable from 2013 onwards.

14

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

2013 marked the 10th anniversary of the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and in
November that year at the China-EU summit meeting, the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for
PrefaceCooperation was announced.53 This agenda specified a total of 92 items for cooperation in fourpriority areas, comprising peace and security, prosperity, sustainable development, and people-topeople exchanges. At the end of March 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first-ever visit
as the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to EU headquarters in Brussels. On that
visit Xi stated that “the two sides should view China-EU relations from a strategic perspective,”

Summary

and emphasized that China and the EU should “combine the two powers, two markets and two
civilizations of China and the EU” to jointly forge “four major partnerships for peace, growth reformand civilization.” Xi also noted that it would be advantageous to advance cooperation at both theEurasian and global levels.54

Introduction

The following month the Chinese government issued its second policy paper on the EU,
following on from the first in 2003. This policy paper formally set China’s EU policy target as
the construction of the “four major partnerships” for peace, growth, reform and civilization.55
Specifically, to (1) cooperate in reforms of the international order and international systems (partnership for peace), (2) work with the EU to bring the two major markets closer to build a China-EU
community of interests (partnership for growth), (3) work with the EU and draw upon each other’s

Chapter 1

research experience, share reform dividends, jointly improve the ability of reform and governance,
and actively participate in the formulation of and reform of the rules of global governance (partnership for reform), and (4) bring the two major civilizations in the East and West closer and set an
example of different civilizations seeking harmony without uniformity (partnership for civilization).
China’s ambitious goals implies its intention to increase the global impact of China-EU relations.

Chapter 2

This resulted in the formulation of this policy paper, in which the Chinese government demonstrated
its intention to promote comprehensive and more concrete cooperation across ten areas.
Of course, during this period there were also trade disputes occurring between China and the
EU over such matters as trade imbalances, dumping, and the EU’s treatment of China as a Non-Market
Economy (NME). However, China’s stance of seeking to avoid disputes and its announcement of a

Chapter 3

comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU were also positively received in Europe, which wasin the midst of a debt crisis.56 In his meeting with President Xi, President Herman Van Rompuy of
the European Council noted that the European economy was stepping out of recession and that itwas vital for the EU to further push forward reform and enhance economic competitiveness in an
all-round way. It was in this context that Van Rompuy expressed appreciation to the Chinese side

Conclusions

for always supporting the Euro and European integration, adding that the EU “hopes to strengthen
cooperation with China in a comprehensive manner.”57
In addition, Beijing moved to strengthen its relations with EU member countries, among
them Germany and the United Kingdom. At the end of March 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping
visited Germany, where the two leaders announced that they were upgrading bilateral relations to15

Chapter 1

an “all-round strategic partnership.”58 Until that point China had built a “comprehensive strategic
partnership” with the EU and countries of Europe. The epithet being appended to “strategic partnership” with Germany was now not “comprehensive” but rather “all-round.” The meaning impliedby “comprehensive” was that the partnership encompassed a wide range of areas. An “all-round”
partnership on the other hand indicated a partnership that in addition to a broad range of areas forcooperation, focused on the formation of “strategic interactions.”59 In October the same year thegovernments of both countries formulated the Program of Action for China-Germany Cooperation,agreeing on 110 items for advancing bilateral cooperation in a variety of areas, including politics,
security, economy, science and technology and culture.60 It was actually the case that bilateralrelations made remarkable progress. It has been noted that the primary outcome of what Chinese
strategists referred to as an “all-round strategic partnership” was that China and Germany came tomutually regard each other as states with major regional and global influence, and this spurred cooperation in areas where both countries bear a joint responsibility for the stability of the international
order and international systems.61 Economic outcomes were also significant. In 2016 China became
Germany’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-third of total China-EU trade. This was also
larger than the combined total of China-UK and China-France trade.
In terms of the growing closeness of China-UK ties, there is a strong sense that it was theUK that was making overtures to China. In October 2015 President Xi Jinping visited the UK. The
Joint Declaration that was issued following a summit meeting between Xi and UK Prime Minister
David Cameron referred to a “golden era” of relations opening up.62 During this visit almost £40
billion worth of deals between the two countries were concluded.63 In the year prior to the visit thetwo governments had confirmed their intentions to engage in large-scale investment, and at the timeof Xi’s visit these intentions were made concrete with agreements to engage in cooperation on largescale and long-term projects, including Chinese investment in nuclear power station constructionin the UK, the joint development of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and overseas oil fields, and theparticipation of Chinese companies in the construction of high-speed rail in the UK. The characterization of this era as a “golden era” is said to have been originally proposed by the UK side.64 The
Cameron administration considered it to be important to extricate the UK from traditional structures of dependency on European markets and instead look to enhancing relations with emerging
markets, including those in Asia. Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne stated that the British
economy should develop in a way that is more export-driven, adding that, “I think exports to an
economy the size of China is one place we should be looking.”65 Symbolic of such moves was theannouncement by the UK in March 2015 that it intended to become a prospective founding memberof the AIIB. This prompted a rush of European countries to express their intention to join the AIIB,
including France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, with the result that of the 57 founding membersof the AIIB, 20 were European countries, and of those 14 were EU members.
One point that should be noted at this point is China’s cooperative relations with the Central

16China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In 2011 Premier Wen Jiabao visited Hungary, where heattended the first China-CEEC Economic and Trade Forum. In April 2012 the first China-CEEC
Preface

Summit was held in Poland, which was also attended by Wen Jiabao. This dialogue framework
would subsequently come to be known as the 16+1, but at its inception it was not called as such,being positioned by China as a platform for “pragmatic cooperation” in order to promote trade andinvestment relations.66 When launching efforts to cooperate with the CEECs, there were voices in
China that pointed out the need to proceed with caution. This was in particular because of the possi-

Summarybility that any attempt by China to invigorate its economic activities in the region, and in so doing
expand its influence, might provoke a negative reaction from the EU and some member countries.
It was in consideration of such a possibility that when compiling the joint communique of the first
China-CEEC Summit held in 2012, China and CEECs consulted in advance with the EU about aIntroduction

draft communique. It is said that the EU was opposed to the framework becoming “permanent” or“institutionalized.”67
Notwithstanding the concerns of the EU, Beijing pressed ahead with efforts to institutionalize China-CEEC cooperation. In September 2012 the Secretariat for China-CEEC cooperation
was established in Beijing and the first National Coordinators’ Meeting was held.68 This secretariat
was placed within the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Department of European Affairs,

Chapter 1

with senior posts under the Secretary-General being assigned to senior officials in the MFA.69 At thesecond China-CEEC summit meeting in November 2013 parties agreed to hold a summit meeting
to review cooperation achievements and set the direction for future cooperation.70 At this summit
meeting Premier Li Keqiang elicited three principles for advancing China-CEEC cooperation, which
were: (1) mutual respect and equal treatment; (2) mutual benefits, win-win results and common

Chapter 2

development; and (3) moving in the same direction as China-EU cooperation. Based on these principles Li put forward a six-point proposal to: (1) intensify economic trade and cooperation; (2) speed
up connectivity; (3) enhance green cooperation; (4) expand financing channels; (5) further tap into
potential cooperation at the local level; and (6) enhance people-to-people and cultural exchanges.71
When Beijing started to institutionalize

Chapter 3

cooperation with the CEECs, the main
objective was the development of tradeand investment relations. In other words,
it can be understood as an extension of
economic diplomacy.

Conclusions

A turning point came at the
fourth China-CEEC summit meeting inNovember 2015 in Suzhou. In a meetingwith CEEC leaders Chinese President
Xi Jinping referred to the framework as

17

Chapter 1“16+1” cooperation, noting that a “new path” for development of China’s relations with its traditional
friendly partners had been opened up, an “innovative practice” for China-EU relations had been
adopted, and that a “new platform” of South-South cooperation had been established.72 In addition,
the Chinese government had announced its “Vision and Actions” for the BRI in March 2015 andXi observed that the first challenge would be to fully connect the 16+1 cooperation with the BRI
construction.73 The medium-term agenda relating to 16+1 cooperation that was adopted at the summit
meeting set out the objectives of the 16+1 as being to make full use of the opportunities offered by
the BRI to steadily expand cooperation and in turn contribute to the BRI.74
In 2015 the Xi Jinping leadership clearly positioned the BRI as one means of reforming the
global governance system. During an October 2015 study session of the CPC Politburo was held on
global governance at which Xi emphasized the importance of “developing the global governancesystem in a more fair and rational direction, and creating more advantageous conditions for China’s
development and global peace.”75 One element that is considered to be central to this process is thedevelopment of emerging and developing countries, which would further enhance such countries’international influence. This objective was duly appended to the BRI. This was the context in which
Xi Jinping positioned 16+1 cooperation, and China moved to further boost its involvement in theCentral and Eastern European region, with the outcomes of 16+1 cooperation being used as a modelfor global governance and new state relations.76
However, China’s active moves to advance into Europe caused a sense of alarm within theEuropean region.77 Although this alarm was expressed in various ways on the part of Europe, there isheightened concern about the security implications of China entering strategic European industries.
In 2016 the German robotics group Kuka was bought out by a Chinese company. Kuka’s technologies
are believed to be used in the construction of fuselages for the U.S. military’s F-35 stealth fighter, andworries about the outflow of technology to China heighted in both Europe and the United States.78
This prompted Germany to tighten its acquisition screening measures in 2017 and the EU also initiated moves to introduce a screening system. There was also a growing view in Europe that thedevelopment of 16+1 cooperation and the CEECs increasing economic dependence on China could
challenge the integrity of the EU. For example, it was noted that China’s economic presence was
expanding in the “Visegrád Four” (V4) group of countries (Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republicand Poland), and that the V4 group and Germany “have become much more independent of intra-European trade.”79
In December 2018 China issued its third policy paper on the EU.80 This paper could be said
to take into account the growing sense of alarm in the EU about China’s actions. The 2018 paper
reconfirmed the objectives of building the “four major partnerships,” which had been set out inthe policy paper of 2014, and emphasized that China’s stance is “support the European integration
process.” In other words, China’s policy towards Europe sought to maintain a balance, and the paper
itself noted that China “remains committed to developing ties with EU institutions, member states

18

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

and other European countries in a comprehensive, balanced and mutually reinforcing manner.” With
regard to 16+1 cooperation it was first noted that, “Based on common interests and needs, China andPrefacethe CEECs have conducted win-win, open and transparent cross-regional cooperation,” after which
the paper declared that the support and constructive participation by the EU and other parties would
be welcomed.
For China the importance of relations with the countries of Europe, including the EU, isalready no longer limited to merely the context of economic diplomacy. China has positioned theSummary

EU in particular as an “indispensable partner” for building a “new type of international relations”
and “a community with a shared future for mankind.” The results of China’s active engagement with
Europe have not been insignificant. On the other hand, China still faces the challenge of how tomanage negative reactions to its expanding influence in Europe.

Introduction

3. The Belt and Road Initiative and International
Security(1) Role of the People’s Liberation Army

Chapter 1

The expansion of China’s influence under the banner of the BRI is unequivocally focused on
economic concerns. China has positioned the BRI as a “road for peace” and a “road for prosperity.”At the opening ceremony of the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in May
2017 President Xi Jinping stated that the BRI was a “road for peace,” and emphasized that China
would work with all countries and regions to “forge partnerships of dialogue with no confrontation

Chapter 2

and of friendship rather than alliances.”81
As the BRI progressed, so too did China’s “overseas interests” rapidly expand. Accordingly,
the Chinese government was required to engage in new initiatives. As Premier Li Keqiang noted,
the Chinese government would “move faster to strengthen our capacity for safeguarding China’s
overseas interests.”82 Moreover, at a symposium held in August 2018 to mark the fifth anniversary

Chapter 3of the BRI, Xi Jinping referred to “key issues” such as risk management and safety relating to the
BRI project, noting that “high attention must be paid to forestalling risks overseas” and that “every
effort must be made to comprehensively improve capacity to respond to overseas safety and risks.”83
Such initiatives can be expected to include measures to enhance military strength and also
expand China’s military presence overseas. In the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security

Conclusions

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 released by the U.S. Department of
Defense, the BRI is mentioned together with the following observation. “The growth of China’s
global economic footprint make its interests increasingly vulnerable to international and regionalturmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics.” The result of this vulnerability
is the need for the PLA to respond to such threats, and there is a possibility that China could access

19

Chapter 1

infrastructure that would “allow it to project and sustain military power at greater distances.”84
As the BRI has continued to take a tangible form, there has also been discussion domesticallyin China about its security aspects. In December 2015, the PLA National Defense University held asymposium on the security dimensions of the BRI. The symposium was attended by experts fromthe military, state organizations, companies and think tanks, who discussed the security-relatedrisks for the BRI and how best to tackle them.85 At this gathering many of the participants referredto the importance of the role of the military in the context of responding to security risks for the
BRI. For example, Dr. Zhao Changhui, Chief Country Risk Analyst at the Export-Import Bank of
China discussed the risks for the BRI from the perspectives of international security, geopolitics,
safety and politics. Furthermore, while one of the basic premises discussed at the symposium wasfor companies that were expanding overseas to improve their capacity to prevent or control risks, theimportance of improving intelligence and the “role of the military” was also noted in order to deal
with security risks.86
The required role of the military was comprised largely of the following two points. Firstly,
the BRI entails the construction of critical infrastructure, particularly overland, including energy,transport and communications-related infrastructure, the protection of which presents a major challenge. Dr. Sun Xiansheng, President of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)’s Economics& Technology Research Institute, having first noted the security risks associated with overseas projects in the oil and natural gas sectors, proposed the need for greater coordination between government departments, including the PLA and companies, concerning the collection and provision ofsafety information relating to overseas projects, and also the provision of safety training to company
personnel and the provision of related equipment.87
The second point is the role of the PLA in external negotiations to secure the safety of the BRI.
Many of the countries incorporated into the BRI project are developing countries and the military
plays a relatively large role in maintaining political and social stability in these countries. In negotiations relating to the establishment of a Special Security Division (SSD) in Pakistan for the purpose ofprotecting critical infrastructure and Chinese companies involved in the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), which is considered one of the flagship projects of the BRI, the Pakistani militaryand intelligence authorities indicated their desire to build direct cooperative relations with the PLA.
The negotiating counterpart on the Chinese side was not a government or military agency, but rather
the China Overseas Interests Protection Center. This center appears to have liaised with the militaryand intelligence authorities of countries other than Pakistan about the protection of China’s “overseasinterests,” a number of which are thought to have indicated a similar desire to interact directly with
the PLA.88
In addition to responding to these individual security risks, in the general context of expanding“overseas interests” the necessity has been highlighted for overseas bases of the PLA, particularly
naval bases. In August 2017 China’s first overseas base began operation in Djibouti. This base is20

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

termed a “logistical base,” and Chinese government explained that it would provide effective support
to the Chinese military’s naval escort, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Africa andPrefacewestern Asia, in addition to which it would be also utilized for international military cooperation,
joint exercises, emergency evacuation and overseas rescue.89 Following the start of operations at thisnaval base in Djibouti, the strategic functions of overseas bases came to be referred to in positive
terms among Chinese scholars, in the context of ensuring safety of the BRI and in particular the
Maritime Silk Road and providing international public goods.90 For example, experts at the PLA

Summary

Naval Command College had the following to say:91
As well as starting to bear increasingly large international responsibilities, China is also
charged with the task of protecting its overseas interests. This requires China’s armed forces

Introduction

to “go out” more quickly and efficiently, and for the PLA to execute its duties in ever broader
spheres and spaces to protect peace and development. In that sense the construction of overseas bases will likely provide the most effective strategic assistance to China’s armed forces“going out” and it is an inevitable choice in order to realize the dream of a great power and the
dream of building a powerful military.

Chapter 1

For many years China has adhered to the principle of non-interference in others’ internalaffairs. The possession by the nation’s military of bases overseas had also previously been opposed
as part of the principle of non-interference. The principle was that China would not station troops
overseas, nor would it construct military bases. Naturally, this is a declared policy of the PRC,
therefore does not necessarily require any clear legal basis. The National Defense Law of the PRC

Chapter 2

is the basic law that governs national policy on defense and it contains no provisions that directly
prohibit the establishment of military bases overseas.92 In recent years Chinese legal scholars haveemphasized that the law provides legitimacy to establishing bases overseas. In other words, giventhat Article 28 of the abovementioned law stipulates that, “The State, in light of the need of defenseof the frontiers, seas and air space, has defense installations built for military operation, command,

Chapter 3

telecommunications, protection, traffic, logistics, etc.” (italics added by author for emphasis), thenif activities are to be implemented based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence and incompliance with international law (as set forth in Articles 65 to 67), then it can be understood that it
is possible for China to establish military bases overseas.93
However, it will likely not be a simple matter to normalize the overseas deployment of theConclusions

PLA through the construction of military bases under the pretext of responding to BRI-related security risks. First and foremost, the objectives and means do not match. Many “overseas interests” thatneed protecting are economic in nature. In other words, there is a significant disjoint between the“objectives,” which could be described as non-traditional security, including responding to economic
losses brought about by terrorism, etc., and protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring people’s

21

Chapter 1

safety, and the “means,” which involves the use of military forces deployed for the primary purposeof engaging in traditional security safeguards. Furthermore, military experts in China have observedthat the power projection capabilities of the PLA are still insufficient, which limits overseas deployment. The Djibouti naval base is also likely a part of efforts to enhance Chinese naval presence,
predominantly in the Indian Ocean.94 However, in its current state the base lacks sufficient naval
berthing spaces, and it is believed that there will be limits to the degree to which China can use the
Djibouti base to continue to enhance its military presence across a broad area beyond the Indian
Ocean region. 95
While observing such points, many Chinese domestic experts emphasize the difficulty of“normalizing overseas military deployment,” concluding that such deployment would “not lead toeffective long-term protection for China’s overseas interests.”96 Although PLA officials do not deny
the possibility of further overseas deployment of units, they are cautious about the means to implement
such deployment. At the abovementioned symposium held by the PLA National Defense University
a participant who was then a member of the General Staff Department spoke about “advancing themilitary ‘go out’ strategy steadily and moderately.”97 Behind this cautious statement lies the dilemmathat is vexing China’s leadership and military authorities, namely, how to balance domestic andexternal factors. Given the deep-seated suspicion in the international community concerning theoverseas deployment of the PLA, any hasty moves to deploy would provide the excuse to expoundthe “China threat” theory. Conversely, and as the participant at the symposium stated, if the “go out”
strategy for the PLA makes only laggardly progress and momentum is lost, then the military will
be unable to respond to the ever-growing need to protect national interests. It can well be said that
China’s leadership and military authorities face the difficult challenge of how to respond to risingdomestic expectations for the PLA, without provoking international concerns about any threat posedby China.

(2) Advances in Functional Cooperation
While it is recognized that the role of the military will remain limited for the time being in regard
to responding to security risks relating to safeguarding overseas interests and the BRI project, theneed for risk management continues to increase. As already noted, Xi Jinping has himself referredto the necessity to “comprehensively improve capacity to respond to risks.” On this point somethingthat is gaining attention is China’s moves to engage in functional cooperation in the field of law
enforcement in Eurasia.
In September 2015 representatives of law enforcement agencies of 12 countries, including
China, together with representatives of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) andthe International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), met in the port city of Lianyungang
in Jiangsu Province to hold the “International Law Enforcement Cooperation Forum on Secure
Corridor of the New Eurasian Land Bridge” (Lianyungang Forum). The participating organizations

22

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

confirmed their shared goals as being to move to institutionalize the forum and respond to crossborder crime and terrorism, and confirmed a common vision to seek to construct a practical coopPreface

eration mechanism and improve response capacity. To achieve these goals it was noted that it was
critical to build law enforcement capacity, for which China announced that it would establish the
New Eurasian Land Bridge Law Enforcement Security Cooperation Training and Research Centerin Lianyungang, receiving the support of participating countries and organizations.98
Thereafter the Lianyungang Forum moved towards becoming institutionalized. The annual

Summary

meeting became a regular event and when the second annual meeting was held in September 2016 it
was attended by 31 countries and three international organizations, with the level of participation also
being raised to the vice-ministerial level. The third annual meeting in December 2017 was attended
by 33 countries and three international organizations and the September 2018 fourth meeting saw

Introduction

representatives of 30 countries and four international organizations gather in Lianyungang.
From the third meeting onwards the forum members started to discuss the modalities forcooperation on more specific issues. During the third meeting, members that had participated fromthe first meeting (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan)and one country that was participating for the first time (Myanmar), held the First International
Cooperation Conference on Transnational Oil and Gas Pipelines Security and issued a joint state-

Chapter 1

ment. The statement confirmed that the participants had reached consensus on: (1) establishing aninternational cooperation platform for transnational oil and gas pipeline security as a mechanismof the Lianyungang Forum and holding annual meetings; (2) building mechanisms for regularconsultations, information exchanges, risk evaluations and emergency response, and mechanisms
to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement agencies and companies; (3) conducting bilateral

Chapter 2

and multilateral joint enforcement actions and joint exercises as appropriate and establishing offices
to enable cooperation between police forces and companies in critical areas for pipelines; and (4)strengthening the security capacity building and cooperation for transnational oil and gas pipelines.
Furthermore, China expressed its willingness to provide assistance for capacity building.99 At the
fourth meeting in 2018 a Ministerial-level Round-table on Building Law Enforcement Capacity

Chapter 3

towards the Future was held, resulting in the formation of consensus at a high level. Also at the
fourth meeting a sub-forum at the director-general-level on international cooperation among law
enforcement agencies was held, which agreed to establish a director-general-level liaison mechanism relating to international cooperation.100 It was also agreed to establish a governing board andexecutive committee for the forum, thus further advancing its institutionalization. An exhibition

Conclusions

was also held in tandem with the forum, which provided an opportunity for business talks on police
equipment, including for use in counter-terrorism activities, as well as safety equipment.101
The provision by China of capacity building training has already started. In May 2017training was provided to police officers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Belarus.102 From the end of June to July 2018 specialized training on safety for pipelines was

23

24

Sep. 2015

Five-point Joint Vision

Raised to vice-ministerial level

Five-Point Action Plan

Participation of ministerial-level
delegates

Sources: Lianyungang Forum Official Website (http://1041112.ycwlkeji.com/index.php); 江苏法制报 [Jiangsu Legal Daily], September 25, 1015; 连云港日报 [Lianyungang Daily], December 12, 2017; Liao Jinrong,“4th Lianyungang Forum,” August 1, 2018; 人民公安报 [China Police Daily], September 12, 2018; 江苏法制报 [Jiangsu Legal Daily], September 13, 2018; 连云港论坛秘书处 [Lianyungang Forum Secretariat],“感谢信 [Thank-you Letter],” September 21, 2018; 人民网 [Renminwang], October 30, 2018; 张敏娇 [Zhang Minjiao], “30国齐聚连云港论坛: 加强国际执法安全合作 共同提升执法能力 [30 Countries Gather
at the Lianyungang Forum: Strengthening International Law Enforcement Cooperation and Jointly Improving Law Enforcement Capacity],” 现代世界警察 [Modern World Police], No. 10 (2018), pp. 10-12.

Notes

Major
Outcomes(1) Joint Statement of the Lianyungang
Forum(2) Joint Statement of the First International
Cooperation Conference on
Transnational Oil and Gas Pipelines
Security (eight countries)(1) Plenary meeting(2) First International Cooperation
Conference on Transnational Oil and
Gas Pipelines Security(3) Police Academy Presidents Sub-Forum(4) Think Tank Sub-Forum(5) Police Equipment and Safety Facility
Exhibition(1) Plenary meeting(2) Police Equipment and Public Security (1) Plenary meeting
Facility Exhibition(2) Police Equipment and Public Security(3) Observation of Anti-terrorism
Facility Exhibition
Emergency Drill(1) Plenary meeting(2) Round-table on Building Law
Enforcement Capacity towards
the Future (ministerial level)(3) Sub-forum at the director-generallevel on international cooperation
among law enforcement agencies(4) “Cooperation for Security,
Security for Prosperity”
Sub-Forum(5) Police Equipment and Safety
Facility Exhibition

Compositionof Annual
Meeting(Majorcomponents)

SCO-RATSINTERPOL
EUROPOL
LMLECCShanghai Cooperation Organization
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure(SCO-RATS)
International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL)

Participating
International
Organizations(Not announced)

30 countries, 4 internationalorganizations

Sep. 2018

FourthSCO-RATSINTERPOL
Lanchang-Mekong Integrated Law
Enforcement and Security Cooperation
Center (LMLECC)

SCO-RATSINTERPOL
European Police Office (EUROPOL)

China, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands,
Republic of Korea, Poland, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

Participating
Countries

China, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands,
Republic of Korea, Poland, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Angola, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Germany, Fiji, Latvia, Nigeria,
Serbia, Argentina, Pakistan, Ecuador,
France, Cambodia, Madagascar, Mongolia,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Portugal, Japan,
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Spain, Iran,Indonesia

Dec. 2017

China, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands,
Republic of Korea, Poland, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Angola, Austria, Bulgaria,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Germany, France, Fiji, Ghana, Czech
Republic, Georgia, Kenya, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, South Africa, Nigeria,
Serbia, Slovakia

Sep. 2016

Third

33 countries, 3 international organizations

12 countries, 2 internationalorganizations

Second31 countries, 3 international organizations

Year

First

Table 1.1 Annual Meetings of the Lianyungang Forum

Chapter 1

China’s Eurasian Diplomacy

conducted at the Lianyungang City Police Training
School for specialists from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Preface

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and China.103
Up until September 2018 more than 30 training courses
for overseas police officers had been conducted, witha total of more than 400 participants.104
The Lianyungang Forum has very strong

Summary

characteristics of being a body originally established
as a local initiative. At the Fourth Summit of theConference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia (CICA) held in Shanghai in May

Introduction

2014 President Xi Jinping called for efforts to “foster
sound interactions and synchronized progress ofregional economic cooperation and security cooperation,” noting that, “China is ready to discuss with
regional countries the creation of an Asian forum
for security cooperation in law enforcement and an

Chapter 1

Asian security emergency response center to deepen

Secretariat of the Conference on Interaction andConfidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA),
situated in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan. (Photo:
Masayuki Masuda)

security cooperation in law enforcement.”105 Quickto respond to these comments was the Lianyungang Municipal Public Security Bureau, from acity that serves as a logistics hub for the BRI. The Lianyungang Municipal Public Security Bureau
proposed the establishment of an international forum to higher authorities, given what it perceived

Chapter 2

as the increasing security-related pressures brought on by advances in the construction of the BRI.106
This proposal was approved by the Ministry of Public Security, leading to the establishment of the
Lianyungang Forum.
As the Lianyungang Forum continued to develop, central leadership moved to strengthen its
position. In October 2016 the forum was positioned as a “state strategic platform” and in March 2017

Chapter 3

it received approval from interagency coordinating bodies under the State Council as a “body tosupplement the blanks in BRI security-related areas.”107 In September 2017 President Xi Jinping gavea keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the 86th INTERPOL General Assembly in Beijing, inwhich he stated that, “China has actively participated in global law-enforcement cooperation andglobal security governance and issued proposals.” One of the examples he cited in this context wasConclusions

the establishment of the Lianyungang Forum.108 China’s public security authorities are also confirmed
to be further strengthening international cooperation in law enforcement. At the end of February
2019 in a meeting attended by public security officials from all regions of China, Wang Xiaohong,Executive Vice Minister of Public Security, called for comprehensive deepening of practical cooperation in all fields through the implementation of international law enforcement cooperation, noting

25

Chapter 1that the provision of training to police officers of other countries would be enhanced, as part of“ceaseless efforts to enhance the international influence of China’s public security activities.”109
The major regions to which China has provided law enforcement cooperation through the
Lianyungang Forum to date have been predominantly the countries of Central Asia that are linked
by oil and natural gas pipelines. Wang Yongsheng, Deputy Mayor of Lianyungang and Chief of the
Lianyungang Municipal Public Security, has stated that in the future in addition to pipeline safety,
practical cooperation will be expanded to also include rail logistics and port security as priority
areas.110 If that is the case, there is a high possibility that the countries and regions that receive law
enforcement cooperation under the auspices of the Lianyungang Forum will expand in the future as
the areas for cooperation increase.
Such functional cooperation has been formed according to necessity among nations that shareinterests. In contrast to the overseas deployment of the PLA, it is unlikely that such developments
will arouse negative reactions in third countries or the international community. Furthermore, as
the institutionalization of the Lianyungang Forum has progressed it has had the added benefit ofincreasing opportunities for dialogue and consultation among participating countries and international organizations, thus enabling the formation of more specific agreements. For example, at thefirst International Cooperation Conference on Transnational Oil and Gas Pipelines Security in 2017not only did the eight participating countries issue a joint statement, a more specific agreement
was reached between China and Russia, with both countries signing a Transnational Oil and Gas
Pipelines Security Cooperation Protocol.111 From this perspective the countries and organizations
involved in the Lianyungang Forum view it in a positive light.112 It can be said that a functional
network for ensuring safety and security is gradually being formed across Eurasia.
(Author: Masayuki Masuda)

26

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

Chapter 2
The Growing Influence of China
as Seen from Central Asia and Russia:
Cooperation in Eurasian Space and Pursuit of Autonomy
Hiroshi Yamazoe

1. The Post-Soviet States and the Concept ofEurasia
Figure 2.1 Distribution of the Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia
RussiaNur-Sultan(formerly Astana)

Kazakhstan
China

AlmatyBishkek

UzbekistanAzerbaijan

Tashkent

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan
Tajikistan

Ashgabat

Iran

Dushanbe

Afghanistan
0300 Kilometers

RussianTurkmen

Tajik

UighurKarakalpak

Uzbek

KazakhOthersKirghiz

Sparsely populated areas

Source: Compiled by the author, based on United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Major Ethnic Groups inCentral Asia,” 1993.

(1) Rule of Central Asia by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union
This chapter deals with the states in the Central Asia region located west of China, as well as
Russia, and discusses the significance of these countries in China’s foreign policy. The Central Asia
region is composed of the five countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan, which are new countries that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
To understand the current state of these five countries and China, the section below will briefly touchon their history.
The current territories of the five Central Asian countries and the territory of China were notoriginally clearly separated but were rather in a continuous space, and there are cases even now ofpeople living on both sides of borders sharing identities. Former oasis cities in the south of this region(Kashgar, Samarkand, Bukhara, etc.) were within Persian language and culture spheres, spreading
to the current territories of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (“stan,” meaning land, derives

28

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

from the Persian language). Because the Turkic nomadic power moved south from the steppe area,
ruled, and assimilated into the oasis cities, the region is widely known as “Turkestan.” Although thePrefacegeography tended to be separated into the east and west sides of Turkestan, cultural similarities still
remain due to the coming and going of people and goods, and some states in history extended theirrule across both sides of Turkestan.
The current dividing line between the east and west of Turkestan mostly stems from the establishment of the rules by the Qing dynasty and the Russian Empire by the 19th century. The Qianlong

Summary

Emperor of the Qing dynasty in the 18th century, in a struggle over the legitimate authority as theGreat Khan in the steppe, overthrew the Dzungar Khanate and turned the lands it had ruled into
“Xinjiang” under the Qing. During the mid-19th century, the Russian Empire subdued the Kazakh
Khanate, and later its advance to the south resulted in western Turkestan becoming part of Russia.

Introduction

A border had not been established in the Eurasian Steppe between the Russian Empire and the Qing
dynasty for a long time, but delegations from both countries conducted a field survey in accordancewith the Convention of Peking in 1860, and a border treaty was concluded in 1864. In the process
regarding the border treaty, the Russian side promoted setting the national border based on geographyrather than on where the local peoples lived and moved, and therefore, both sides of the border became
inhabited by Kazakh nomads.1 Later as well, the issue of the lack of stability for the national border

Chapter 1

and citizens’ residence areas continued due to the emergence of the rule of Yaqub Beg that expanded
its dominion from the Central Asia side to Xinjiang, the border revision due to the occupation of theIli region of Xinjiang by the Russian military, and mass migration to the Russian Empire’s territory by
citizens accompanying the Muslim uprising in the northwest domain of the Qing dynasty.2
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922,

Chapter 2

the modern ethnic groups and five Soviet republics were also formed in Central Asia. Although theprocess involved the development of identities and the actions of political leaders in each area,3 theentire system of politics and society was formed and established mostly under the central controlof Moscow. In addition, the local inhabitants received training as citizens and workers of modern
industrialized nations under the Soviet system. Under the communist ideology, the role of religion

Chapter 3

was restrained, nomadic lifestyles were changed to settled ones, livestock and farming livelihoods
were forcibly transferred to commercial production under the national distribution system, and the
newly adopted industrial society transformed regional resource utilization methods.
Phenomena extending across the Central Asia region and China were also seen during thetime of the Soviet Union. In the 1920s, Xinjiang lacked well-connected transportation and the sense

Conclusionsof unity with eastern China; it rather actively engaged in trade with the Soviet Union due to a
trade agreement between the two, and goods from the Soviet Union were in circulation.4 During
the Great Purge in the 1930s, some people fled from the Soviet Union to Xinjiang. The Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955 under the People’s Republic of China. In the
1960s, the Soviet Union and China advanced border negotiations for the eastern and western parts

29

Chapter 2of China while having ideology disputes. Amidst this, 67,000 people fled from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region to the Soviet Union in 1962, and the Sino-Soviet bilateral relations cooled.5 A
conflict eventually arose between border troops at Zhenbao/Damansky Island on the eastern sandbank of the Ussuri River in March 1969, while a conflict also occurred in the western part in August
within the border area between the northern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and
the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Both conflicts resulted in casualties. Following this, with
China afraid of the militaristic mechanization of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union afraid ofChina’s massive military manpower, both sides stationed heavily-armed troops in the border area,leading to a period of continued severe confrontation, being square off against each other for close
to 20 years.
In 1989 Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing, and achieved reconciliation by accepting China’s demands. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991, its constituent republics became independent, and many of them formed the Commonwealthof Independent States (CIS). Although the CIS initially aimed to maintain specific joint functions,
it has gradually shifted its function to the role of a dialogue framework. The Collective Security
Treaty concluded in 1992 to maintain security cooperation within the CIS sphere transitioned into
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, and its member states as of 2019 are
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.
The five republics in the Central Asia region were formed on the premise of being undercontrol by Moscow during the time of the Soviet Union, and suddenly in 1991 turned into independent states. Therefore, while they maintain strong connections with Moscow, relations between
the countries in the region did not become close for a long time. The border lines established by
the Soviet Union divided the Fergana Valley in a complex way among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan, which has caused a serious ethnic conflict.6 Confrontations over the control of water
resources have also long continued between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are located upstreamof the river, and Uzbekistan, which is located downstream. The Central Asian countries have major
trade with Russia, and in 2013, trade among the countries in the region only amounted to 6.2% of
the total.7 In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the amount of remittances by their nationals who
work in Russia using the Russian language accounted for a considerable proportion of the countries’
gross national incomes, peaking at 31.1% in 2013 for Kyrgyzstan and 49.3% in 2008 for Tajikistan.8
What should be confirmed from the above historic background is the connection between theCentral Asia region and Russia. Despite some negative memories of the Soviet Union possessed by
the residents of Central Asia, it was easier for the Soviet social system, education, and culture to beinternalized and established in Central Asia as the modern civilization that appeared in a stratified
way following ancient nomadic culture, oasis culture, and Islamic civilization, in comparison with
European tradition in the three Baltic states. In addition, the reality is that the bureaucratic organizations and public safety agencies handed down from the Soviet Union mainly help maintain stable

30

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

rule through authoritarian systems, and practical relations and worldviews remain still common
through the Russian language.9 In addition, from the perspective of Xinjiang, the Central Asia region
Prefacehas been the area whose inhabitants are connected racially and culturally, and stability crossing
national borders has been often shaken. To China, Central Asia is an important neighbor in terms of
maintaining its domestic stability, and it is necessary to pay attention to the connection with Russia
and maintain relations with Central Asian countries.

Summary(2) The Concept of “Eurasia” and the Eurasian Economic Union
The concept of “Eurasia,” which stems from the connection with Russia, maintains influence in theCentral Asia region. The continent of “Eurasia” refers to a massive area of about 55 million square
kilometers; but when talking as a political map, it covers diverse regions including East Asia, South

Introduction

Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, meaning it is difficult to think of it as a single region. However,there are many examples in the post-Soviet states of referring to the entire former Soviet region as“Eurasia,” and area studies on this region in Japan and China often follow this as well. This also
applies in this section in that “Eurasia” will be treated as being limited to the sphere that is self-proclaimed in the former Soviet Union region.
The concept of considering the former Soviet Union region to be Eurasia, that is, the area

Chapter 1

including Europe and Asia, goes back to the period of the Russian Revolution. The linguist Nikolai
Trubetskoi, a Russian émigré in Western Europe, criticized treatment of Russia as a late addition toEurope, and asserted that Russia was a “Eurasian” country that had originally inherited both Asianand European civilizations. This view, then, became to be known as “Eurasianism.”10 In fact, thesteppe area widely extends across the east and west of the continent, which became an integral part

Chapter 2of Chinese history during the Ming and Qing dynasties.11 Russia’s contacts with the Qing dynasty
and other steppe nomads were also an important axis for its history.
Although there was little attention to Eurasianism during the Soviet Union era, it was revived
in a new form in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Namely, the perception of
an integrated Eurasia covering the former Russian empire and the former Soviet Union sphere

Chapter 3

frequently emerged, which led to many statements calling for promotion of integration projects toenhance unity of the region under Russian leadership. This is the political “Eurasianism” in modern
Russia.12 The term Eurasia also incorporated the hopes for Russia to insist on unity among former
Soviet states, which have significant ethnic-Russian population, and increase influence in geopolitically important areas in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Mountains, and Central Asia. In addition,

Conclusions

Russians use such expression as “Russia is a Eurasian nation” to emphasize the distinction between
Russia and Europe when they want to reject some specific standards which other Europeans demand.
However, the unique identity of “Eurasia” is not solely something for Russia to assert its
leadership in the former Soviet space. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan enthusiastically called for the promotion of integration in the Eurasian space in the beginning of the 1990s. He

31

Chapter 2

advocated the establishment of a Eurasian Union to remove trade barriers between former Soviet
countries, but at the time Russia could not afford to promote such an integration plan. He founded L.
N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University in the capital city of Astana, which was named to memorialize the historian Lev Gumilev who reinterpreted the Russian and Soviet history as “Eurasia” toinclude inheritance of eastern and western civilizations in the late Soviet era. Nazarbayev intended
to develop the newly independent country of Kazakhstan by connecting not only with Russia to thenorth but also to the east and west, and suggested characterizing the country with the name “Eurasia.”
While using the same term, “Eurasia,” the implication in Kazakhstan was different from Russia. He
persistently kept a stance of promoting integration that would ultimately not harm Kazakhstan’s
sovereignty, respecting Russia not as its suzerain but as its neighboring country, and being consistentin connecting Kazakhstan with Europe and East Asian countries.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin advanced an integration plan under the nameEurasia starting with the closer post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev also agreed
on a Eurasian integration plan within a scope that complied with the above-mentioned stance. The
Eurasian Economic Community was established in 2000 with member states of Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. With its development based on the Union, theEurasian Customs Union was established between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in 2010, andtariffs were gradually eliminated. Furthermore, the same three countries concluded a treaty in May
2014 to establish the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 2015. With two countries added
to this, as of 2019 the five member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.
Although Russia hoped to be the leading force for Eurasian integration, the decision-making of the
EAEU was designed in such a way that it would not be concluded only with Russia’s intentions. It
is a union that ultimately has a scope agreed upon and hoped for by the main member states such as
Belarus and Kazakhstan, and thus the reality of Eurasian integration will not lead to the path toward
centralized rule by Moscow as it was in the former Soviet Union.
Russia’s direction for its desired Eurasian integration had to be modified due to major diplomatic changes from 2013 to 2014. Ukraine, which decisively confronted Russia during the Ukraine
Crisis, rejected the EAEU and concluded the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, making the division between the West and Russia long-term and structural. Kazakhstan and Belarus, which have
many Russian minorities, also had a heightened sense of caution about possible scenarios similar
to an infringement by Russia on Ukraine’s sovereignty, and the path toward political integration
became distant.
Following this, President Putin has frequently called for “Greater Eurasia” (Bol’shaia Evraziia
in the Russian language). This is an idea of realizing the “Greater Eurasia” through promoting the
integration and cooperation not only by the former Soviet spaces of “Eurasia in a narrow sense,” butalso by the regional integration schemes such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU). Putin advocated32The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

this idea during his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly at the end of 2015, at the St.
Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016, and other occasions. However, all officials
Prefacein the Putin administration do not consistently advocate it, and there have been no indications of any
specific targets to be achieved or a path toward them.
In this way, the “Eurasia” called for by Russia has various implications and scopes, anddifferent implications of “Eurasia” also exist in Kazakhstan and other former Soviet countries.
Nevertheless, the word “Eurasia” still has a meaning as a symbol of the remnants inherited from theSummary

Soviet Union in these countries, and it seems that China is working to build relations taking this into
consideration.

2. International Cooperation in Central Asia
Introduction(1) Cooperation for Regional Stability
One of China’s first security issues in the post-Soviet era was about the border lines in relation to its
neighboring states. The Soviet Union and China achieved a reconciliation during the time of General
Secretary Gorbachev and border negotiations were resumed. As a result of adopting the principle

Chapter 1of making the major river routes the national borders, an agreement was reached on most borders,
and the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement was concluded. However, the Soviet Union collapsed
at the end of the year, and China’s negotiation counterparts for the remaining disputed areas became
the four new states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. All five countries gatheredin Shanghai in 1996 to discuss the border issues, and were known as the “Shanghai Five.” They

Chapter 2

took the time to achieve agreements regarding border demarcations, border troop reduction, andconfidence-building.
In 2001, the Shanghai Five formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Uzbekistan
also joined. This organization then became a forum for handling extensive issues including counter-terrorism cooperation and economic issues mainly in the Central Asia region. Tashkent, the capital

Chapter 3city of Uzbekistan, has hosted the headquarters of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of
the SCO since 2004, and has become an information-sharing hub for counter-terrorism measures.
The member nations at the time set “terrorism, separatism, and extremism” as their shared threats,and prioritized achieving stability through authoritarian systems, rather than promoting ethnic rights
and political freedom that might foster those threats. Later, two South Asian countries joined theConclusions

SCO in 2017, making the total of the member states eight, which are India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, China, Pakistan, and Russia.
Security cooperation beyond counter-terrorism is also carried out under the SCO framework.
The “Peace Mission” joint military exercises have become military exercises with a scale exceeding
counter-terrorism measures, while it has also become opportunities for land-based military exercises

33

Chapter 2

between the two major countries of China and Russia as well as confidence-building opportunities
including the other member nations. India and Pakistan participated in the Peace Mission 2018 exercise, and Uzbekistan dispatched observers rather than troops.
Terrorism has been a major issue concerning the Central Asia region, but what is the levelof terrorism risks in the region today? According to the Global Terrorism Index from the Institutefor Economics and Peace (IEP), the terrorism risk level ranks Afghanistan second, Russia 34th,
China 36th, Japan 67th, Tajikistan 74th, Kazakhstan 75th, Kyrgyzstan 80th, Uzbekistan 132nd, andTurkmenistan 138th.13 In the 1990s terrorist activities were serious due to the political instability
and the fundamentalist Islamic revival in the Central Asia region, but now these ranks indicate thatthe later governmental regulation and stability as well as counter-terrorism measures have lowered
the risk level in the region. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is one of the few religiously-motivated violent organizations from the region, but its power has declined and its activities are
now centered in Pakistan and Afghanistan.14
However, there are hotbeds of extremism in Central Asian countries; due to many cases ofpeople from this region joining and participating in terrorist organizations in other countries, there issignificance for international cooperation regarding terrorism countermeasures. For example, there
are young people from Central Asia, who fell into poverty after they migrated to Russia to work there,
being recruited by extremists, and they have been participating in destructive activities in the southof Russia and the Middle East. It is reported that the suspects in the bombing of Istanbul Airport inJune 2016 were nationals of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan with a history of activities within
Russia and Syria.15 Russia and China, where these activities have resulted in major destruction,
have a strong motive for international cooperation on terrorism countermeasures, and Central Asian
countries do such cooperation to respond to the interests of the two big neighbors, as well as toprevent terrorism participants from returning to their countries and deteriorating the public order.
In addition to improving public order through such security cooperation extending over theentire Central Asia region, China has also put efforts into cooperation concerning the specific locationof the Badakhshan region that is adjacent to China and extends over Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In
August 2016, chief-of-staff-level military leaders from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan
met in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the four countries
established a coordination mechanism for information-sharing, capacity building, training, and otherpurposes related to counter-terrorism.16 In the strategic studies community in Kazakhstan, the idea
has emerged that the “division of labor” model, in which China has the initiative only in economy, is
no longer practical, and there is a possibility that Russia will lose its preferential position for security
maintained in the former Soviet states.17 Furthermore, there is also an opinion that, while China iscareful not to threaten Russia’s security role, it commenced cooperation with individual countries,
considering the existing CSTO and SCO insufficient to achieve China’s security benefits.18

34

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

Figure 2.2 The Outpost of the People’s Liberation Army within the Territory of
Tajikistan

Dushanbe

Preface

Kyrgyzstan

KashgarChina

Tajikistan

Karakorum Highway

Military outpost

Afghanistan
100 MILES

Summary

Murghabrridoro
Wakhan C

Introduction

Pakistan
Source: Compiled by the author, based on Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, A Quiet
Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” The Washington Post, February 18, 2019.

On February 18, 2019, the Washington Post reported that troops of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) were stationed within the territory of Tajikistan by publishing onsite photographs by
Chapter 1

reporters as well as satellite photographs. The Chinese outposts are located near the southeast cornerwithin the territory of Tajikistan adjacent to China, as well as to the south in the Wakhan Corridor,
a long and narrow corridor extending east within Afghan territory up to the border with China.
According to PLA soldiers shopping in Murghab about 100 km to the north of the stationing areas,
they had been secretly stationed for 3-4 years. The governments of both China and Tajikistan denied

Chapter 2

the existence of “Chinese military bases.” In 2016, a German mountaineering team testified that they
were interrogated by the Chinese troops. Additionally, in 2017, a Beijing-based think tank invited
Russian researchers and explained that the Chinese military was in Tajikistan for training and logistics purposes.19 According to a news report in Tajikistan, members of the Government of Tajikistancommented that in October 2016 the two countries agreed to jointly establish a military outpost, andChapter 3that it was customary to have the Chinese flag and Chinese language shown in the building built
through cooperation with China.20
Presumably, China established a small military outpost in the region in accordance withthe four-country counter-terrorism mechanism in August 2016, and started expanding monitoring
activities of people coming and going, while carefully avoiding threatening Russia’s position. As

Conclusions

the Chinese media has recently been introducing PLA activities of patrolling the mountainous
area around the Wakhan Corridor,21 it is considered that China places importance on monitoring
suspicious people in terms of security entering Chinese territory and within this scope advances
cooperation spanning the border. That cooperation is still limited to a remote section of Tajikistan,and China’s security presence is still not so much as to strongly influence Tajikistan, compared to35

Chapter 2

its growing economic presence. Alexander Gabuev, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center,
who appeared in the above-mentioned Washington Post article, comments that China needs a tool tograsp the situation, and sought to gauge where Russia would indicate rejection by implicitly letting
it known to Russia, and there is a possibility that Russia would permit it even if China had a certain
presence.22 This suggests that, in the case of China taking a small step, it shows consideration for
Russia, which might develop a sense of caution.

(2) Connectivity Projects and the Belt and Road Initiative
Connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been the subject of attention
in recent years as China’s international cooperation in Central Asia. However, these follow China’s
previous efforts for regional stability and development cooperation, and are promoted as long as theyalso match the concepts of connectivity on the part of Central Asian states.
The five countries of Central Asia are all landlocked, and distribution access to the ocean is
an important issue for post-Soviet national development. Broadly, there are the eastern route leading
to the harbors of the Russian Far East and China, the western route leading to the Black Sea and theBaltic Sea harbors passing the Caspian Sea and European Russia, and the southern route toward theharbors of Pakistan and Iran. As a project to enhance access to these routes by improving distribution around the Central Asia region, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)
framework was launched in 2001 with the appeal of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). With theparticipation of the five Central Asian countries as well as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Pakistan,and others, CAREC aims for infrastructure improvement and reduction of border barriers.23
The “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping
in September 2013 during his visit to Kazakhstan was one of the large-scale projects aiming to
improve such distribution, which would later become a main axis of the BRI. For Central Asia
it is a major opportunity to improve existing distribution systems, while for China it has significance for the promotion of a distribution network spanning China’s east coast region to Europe. If
the railroad route, which spans from China’s east coast region to Central Asia and Russia, can beproperly managed, it will enable transportation faster than maritime transportation and bring thepass-through regions transit benefits.24 However, rail transportation is a niche market between cheap,
slow maritime transportation and expensive, fast air transportation. The Trans-Siberian Railway’s
performance in 2015 showed only 2.9% of east-west transportation, and its sudden expansion is notexpected so far.25 Nevertheless, it has great significance for growth opportunities for infrastructure
improvement in China’s inland areas and the Central Asia region.
The BRI can include all connectivity enhancement projects, but it is selective in what is actually developed. Development of the route that extends west from the southern part of the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region to the Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) is delayed,
partly due to the low distribution demand and the plateau geographical features. Meanwhile within

36

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

Figure 2.3 Selected Railway Routes in Central Asia
Preface

Russia

2001

2004

2008

Nur-Sultan(formerly Astana)
2014

2014

Zhezkazgan

2014

DostykAlashankou

Khorgos

Aktau
2015

Uzbekistan

2012

Almaty1994
1995

Bishkek

2001

2013

2001
2006

Tashkent

2017

Kyrgyzstan

Angren2016

China

Introduction

Azerbaijan
Baku
Turkmenbashi

Summary

Kazakhstan

Pap

Turkmenistan

2014

Dushanbe
Ashgabat
1996

2016

Tajikistan

2014

Afghanistan

Routes laid prior to 1991
Routes laid after 1991,
including date opened
Major Long-distanceInternational Transport Routes

Chapter 1

Iran

2016

2009

1999

Source: Compiled by the author, based on Andrei Gorbunov, “Transsib proigryvaet gonku,” Ekspert, No. 13,
March 26, 2018.

Uzbekistan, the Angren-Pap railway line, which extends from Tashkent to the Fergana Valley by
Chapter 2

passing the mountainous area without crossing the border, was completed through the opening of theKamchiq Tunnel in June 2016.26 In addition to this, Uzbekistan and China opened the Peng Sheng
Industrial Park in the Sirdarya Region, where companies and workers from both countries are active
and welcomed in the local area.27 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that Tajikistan is notimportant in China’s initiative and also depends on trade with China.28

Chapter 3

In comparison, the routes that pass from the northern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region through Kazakhstan, which use the existing railroad and on the relatively flat terrain, havebecome a focus of connectivity improvement. These routes consist of two different passes: one goesfrom the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region via Kazakhstan and Russia, while the other travels
over the Caspian Sea from the ports in Aktau in Kazakhstan and Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan,

Conclusions

to the port of Baku in Azerbaijan.29 According to a research report by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the main Belt plans in Central Asia include the China-Central
Asia-West Asia Corridor, the Eurasia Land Bridge, and the Khorgos-Aktau-railway. Because these
all pass through Kazakhstan, it is said that the country received over 27 billion dollars from China
by 2016.30

37

Chapter 2

In reality, such logistics infrastructure improvement plans by China were also carried out
before 2013. One of them was the Special Economic Zone in Khorgos. Khorgos is a border special
economic zone developed by both China and Kazakhstan, and is located about 90 km from Yining
City to the east on the Chinese side, about 670 km from Urumqi, about 35 km from Zharkent to thewest on the Kazakh side, and about 380 km from the economic and finance central city of Almaty.
Chinese President Hu Jintao suggested the “Khorgos International Center for Boundary
Cooperation” during the summit meeting with President Nazarbayev in June 2003, and construction
began in March 2006 following the conclusion of an agreement. The background to this was thatthe transport capacity was approaching the limit with only Alashankou (northeast of Khorgos), a
railroad gateway on the border of both countries.31
President Nazarbayev began a new economic policy known as “Nurly Zhol” (The Bright Road)
in November 2014 after China’s announcement of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative in 2013,
called for its development as a transportation route linking to East Asia and Europe, and planned
expenditure at 9 billion dollars between 2015 and 2019.32 A logistics terminal was built by both China
and Kazakhstan in Lianyungang City in Jiangsu Province, an eastern starting point for the east-west
transportation network.33 In this way, both Kazakhstan and China made efforts to plan the east-west
connection project initiative, begin work, and renew the initiative. At the Chinese Pavilion at Expo2017 Astana held in the summer of 2017, an operation simulation was exhibited for the high-speed
railway starting in Xian City in Shaanxi Province and arriving at the Astana Expo venue.34
The transported volume through Khorgos toward Europe increased with products from international companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Toyota, increasing 17-fold in five years. In 2015
and 2016, international freight trains achieved transportation through Dostyk, Zhezkazgan, andAktau Port in Kazakhstan, and across the Caspian Sea to Baku Port, Tbilisi, and Kars. With theseachievements, there is a positive evaluation in Kazakhstan that the implementation of the “Silk Road
Economic Belt” and “Nurly Zhol” initiatives will not only increase transit income but also enhancedomestic transportation connectivity.35
President Nazarbayev, who resigned from office in March 2019, still holds some power as
Kazakhstan’s first president, and he attended the Second Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation in China instead of the current president, receiving China’s Friendship Medal in appreciation for his contributions to the Belt and Road projects. He pointed out on April 26th that the BRI
had promoted cooperation between different civilizations in addition to economic development, andwas therefore expanding connectivity between the EAEU and China. He also emphasized the resultsof his “Nurly Zhol” for expanding distribution connected with the “Silk Road Economic Belt.”36
Generally, the governments in Central Asia find it easier to accept the “Silk Road Economic
Belt” initiative, because it does not require membership and would support their access to global
economies from this inland region.37 However, some people say that even if the Government of
Kazakhstan is treating China positively as a friend, those who remember the border clashes in 1969

38

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

are still fearful of China.38 The influx of Chinese workers accompanying economic cooperationand other matters have also been the source of tensions, and protest demonstrations have occurred
Prefacein Kazakhstan.39 In this way, Central Asian countries are paying attention to the risk of what might
happen following the growing influence of China, and pursuing cooperation with China while maintaining as much autonomy as possible.
Some of the feelings of opposition toward China in Central Asian countries are related to the
opposite side of the border. The problem of reeducation facilities and other restrictions for Muslims

Summaryin the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has been taken up in Kazakhstan, and the opposition
parties pick up this issue to criticize the government’s stance toward China. In relation to this,Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in January 2019 an agreement with China thatwould allow 2,000 Kazakh people to emigrate from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to

Introduction

Kazakhstan. China has not officially acknowledged this, but it is assumed that it was an informal
agreement that would enable the Government of Kazakhstan to maintain smooth cooperative relations in consideration of public opinion.40 In this way, the stable rule and development of the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region as well as development of international cooperation are difficult issues
requiring China’s careful treatment.

Chapter 1(3) Diplomatic Trends within the Central Asia Region
The leadership by actors outside the Central Asia region has stood out in the cooperation in theregion discussed thus far. However, there is also a trend of enhanced diplomatic initiatives by theCentral Asian countries themselves. One opportunity for this has been the BRI. As seen in the caseof President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan who made remarks that the BRI would bring opportuni-

Chapter 2ties for development including mutual transportation infrastructure among the countries in Central
Asia, it is pointed out that the regional countries have begun to pay consideration to their mutual
economic benefits.41 Experts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also point out that the BRI is promoting
not only cooperation between China and the regional countries, but also cooperation among thecountries in the region.42

Chapter 3

President Karimov of Uzbekistan passed away in September 2016, and the new path set byPresident Shavkat Mirziyoyev (the former prime minister), who was elected and took his post at
the end of the year, is also promoting this trend. The Mirziyoyev administration perceives that theserious concerns about public order from the 1990s have been successfully reduced to a considerable
extent, and takes an approach to promote cooperation with foreign countries to develop economy

Conclusions

by lifting the tighter government control by the previous administration. Dialogue had stalled with
its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but President Mirziyoyev tried to improve relations bypromptly visiting four countries in the region including the two countries above.
On March 15, 2018, a working-level meeting at the summit level was held in Astana,
Kazakhstan. This was the first summit-level meeting in 10 years without the participation of Russia,

39Chapter 2

and was attended by the top leaders of
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, as well as the Chairmanof the Assembly of Turkmenistan.
President Nazarbayev avoided using
the name “summit” to support theidea of not making decisions on many
matters without Russia, but stated at
the meeting, “We will resolve regional
problems.”43 In addition, at the Turkic
Council Summit held in Kyrgyzstan in
September 2018, Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán of Hungary and President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan participated for the first time. Partly due
to the new diplomatic path developed by President Mirziyoyev, an expert in Uzbekistan considers
that the opportunity has arrived to strengthen integration of the Central Asian countries.44
There has also been specific development around Uzbekistan. A transportation cooperationagreement was concluded between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in May 2018, which
streamlined distribution in the Fergana Valley.45 In August 2018, President Rahmon of Tajikistan
visited Tashkent, and a bilateral strategic partnership agreement was signed, accompanied by
the signing of documents on joint development of a hydroelectric power plant within Tajikistan.
Moreover, in July 2018, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan conducted their first joint military exercises,
and additionally signed documents regarding bilateral transportation and security cooperation at thesummit meeting on April 18, 2019.46
In addition, the Central Asian countries are respectively working on developing extensive
partner relations with the countries including the West. In fact, the EU is the largest trading partnerof Central Asian countries, followed by China.47 President Mirziyoyev visited the United States in
May 2018 and further promoted activities by U.S. companies in Uzbekistan. In April, Kazakhstan
agreed to accept non-military goods from the United States at Aktau Port on the Caspian Sea totransport them to Afghanistan.
These developments around the countries in Central Asia show the reality different from theconventional one-sided understanding of the perceived weakness of cooperation between Central
Asian countries and the condition of being in Russia’s sphere of influence. The Central Asia region is
not only the subject of competition between the major powers, but can also exercise its own dynamics.
Although there has been a relatively downward trend of Russia’s influence, this does not mean that
there has been an immediate shift to Chinese influence, or that there is a conflict of interest between
China and Russia. Instead, Central Asia itself is strengthening connections with Western and various
other countries and diversifying its foreign relations. Even in cases that China is accelerating its

40

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

external action, some examples show that China is being careful in controlling the condition so thatits influence will not be seen as becoming dominant, and its local activities will not be disturbed.
Preface

The movements of Central Asian countries will probably play a part in determining the future trendof China’s position.

Summary

3. Central Asia and China from Russia’s
Perspective(1) Security Cooperation with Central Asian Countries
In this section, Russia’s relations with Central Asian countries and China will be discussed from theIntroduction

perspective of Russia. Focusing on the relationship with these countries, Russia’s goals can be classified roughly into the following three categories: (1) calling for cooperation contributing to economic
development of Russia, (2) maintaining leadership over the former Soviet region, and (3) resisting theleadership by the Western countries in the international order. Facing the reality of China’s entry into
Central Asia, Russia will be able to achieve (1) and (3) if it strengthens cooperation with China, but
it would yield on (2). If Russia focuses excessively on (2) and confronts China, it would lose (1) and

Chapter 1(3). Therefore, it is presumed that Russia should be seeking to avoid a confrontation with China andworking on relations with Central Asian countries and China in a way that contributes to (2).
Now, what can Russia do to maintain its leadership in Central Asian countries? One method
is leading economic integration, and the previously-mentioned EAEU corresponds to that. However,
the effects of the EAEU utilize the past legacy, and are on a declining trend compared with the new

Chapter 2

development and growth opportunities offered by China.
Therefore, there is significance for Russia to put efforts into security cooperation. This
also utilizes the same legacy of the former Soviet system, but the decline of the effects is slower.
Furthermore, if China places importance on and respects Russia’s role in security, China will becareful not to damage relations

Chapter 3

with Russia. Although China’s
above-mentioned security advances
are movements for China’s benefit,
it is considered that they encompass
certain consideration of Russia.

Conclusions

As a military cooperation
organization, while the CSTO
cannot fully realize the collective defense functions, it is themosteffective

frameworkfor

41

Chapter 2

cooperation in the military field with Russia for the Central Asian member countries. The militarytechnology and knowhow of former Soviet countries originated in the Soviet Union, and the other
CSTO member states owe a lot to the most advanced Russia’s capacity development. The continuanceof military training and technology based on Russian language as a standard is a prerequisite in mostcountries, and joint military exercises are important opportunities to improve their military capabilities together. Uzbekistan, which suspended its activities in the CSTO, also maintains its capacity
through bilateral military cooperation with Russia. In addition, under the CSTO framework, cooperation between law-enforcement authorities is also advanced for countermeasures against illegal
drug dealing.
In addition, Russia was involved in ending the civil war in Tajikistan, and since then has
stationed troops at its 201st Military Base in the west near Afghanistan. Russia’s airbase in Kyrgyzstan
is also an important hub for its regional presence, and it was agreed to expand the base’s functions
when President Putin visited Kyrgyzstan in March 2019. For the regional countries, Russia has alarge presence in the field of fundamental military cooperation, which China has not caught up on.

(2) Vigilance and Cooperation towards China
Russia’s relations with China are often called a “marriage of convenience,” and it has been pointed
out that there is a limit to cooperation due to a difference in benefits.48 Such a viewpoint is common
in the West as well as Japan, where vigilance on the riskiness of cooperation between Russia andChina is also being increasingly discussed. On the other hand, in Russia and China, there are many
discussions emphasizing consistent benefits for both countries.49 It can be said that the respective
arguments reflect one aspect of the truth, but in reality such truths are complexly linked. When we
look at China-Russia relations as some sort of criteria, it is important to appropriately set the rightquestions and seek appropriate answers to them.
The first question here is whether the relationship between Russia and China will lead to aserious confrontation. According to international relations theory from the perspective of offensive
realism with the idea that nations maximize their power, if China’s power increases, it is likely thatits neighbor countries would balance against it by forming a coalition to mitigate the threat. Professor
John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics expands on that theory, arguing that thecountries neighboring China would take the balancing option in a competitive environment between
the United States and China because China is more of a threat to them, but it is not clearly stated as
to how Russia would act.50
Professor Mearsheimer later stated in 2016 that if the Trump administration approaches
Russia, it could obstruct the formation of an alliance between China and Russia.51 On the other hand,John S. Van Oudenaren, a researcher at the National Defense University in the U.S., argues that wecannot expect a confrontation between China and Russia.52 In 1969, the Sino-Soviet border conflictoccurred, and the United States and China grew closer. However, it was nearly 15 years after the42

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute that China came to recognize that the most serious threat was
the Soviet Union instead of the United States.
Preface

For China to present a threat to Russia, the following conditions will be required, in addition
to developing superior military capacity: China perceives Russia to be its primary opponent, andthere must be important necessity and benefits that China seeks even if it has to abandon the merits
available through cooperative relations with Russia. Currently China’s primary stage of competitionis the Western Pacific Ocean, and it needs to stabilize its neighbor countries on the continent and theSummary

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. If Russia feels a major threat from China trying to become
dominant in the Russian Far East or Central Asia, Russia would not offer any cooperative benefits
to China, which would even cause instability along the Chinese border and in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. As long as China places importance on stability in Eurasia in this way, it

Introduction

should avoid deterioration of relations with Russia. If an unfortunate future of a clash with Russia
were to come, that would take place only after historic structural changes.
Assuming that Russia and China can avoid a conflict, the next question should be whether
their relations will gradually worsen so as to cease their cooperation, or gradually deepen so as toadvance their cooperation. If Russia became unhappy with a growing presence of China without aserious clash of interests, then would Russia reject cooperation with China, or submit to cooperation

Chapter 1

with China accepting the role of a junior partner? For Russia to avoid being servile to China as
much as possible, the first condition would be that Russia would build cooperative relations withpartners other than China, and the second would be that China would keep finding benefits incourting Russia. Russia’s efforts to advance relations with countries in Asia such as India, Viet Nam,the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan are likely to be motivated by the incentive to prepare for

Chapter 2

the above-mentioned first condition. For example, Russian Asia experts in a research report treat
Russia’s relationship with Japan in the context of efforts to enhance its position in the complex
strategic environment in East Asia.53
Meanwhile, for the second of the conditions mentioned above, namely the situation in which
China continues to consider Russia’s interests, it would be effective for Russia to keep offering what

Chapter 3

would be beneficial to China. Russia’s willingness to cooperate with China, does not necessarilymean that Russia trusts China and is attempting to grow stronger together with China; rather, it ispossible to understand that Russia wants to continue to make China recognize its worth because it
cannot trust China. Director Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center criticizes that Russia
has failed not only to improve relations with the West, but also to increase its allies, and that exces-

Conclusions

sive hopes for relations with China were futile. What he proposes as the realistic prescription is tocontinue possible steady cooperation with China without a confrontation.54
This way of thinking will make it possible to consider that Russia’s cooperation with China
in the military field is to maintain better relations, taking its vigilance for granted. Pavel K. Baev,
Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) points out that Russia’s cooperation

43

Chapter 2

with China on military technology
is to make its position slightly
higher, amidst Russia’s economic
dependenceonChina.55

The

Chinese military is said to havebeen able to learn from the Russian
military’s combat experience inSyria when they participated in
President Putin of Russia delivers an address at the Second Belt andRoad Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing (April 26, 2019).
(Photo: Official website of the President of Russia, trimmed)

the military exercise Vostok 2018
in the Russia’s Eastern MilitaryDistrict in September 2018. China

purchased Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia, and this came after China had tried but failed toachieve engine development and production for the Russia-originated model aircraft.56 Even though
the contract with China does not have the ideal conditions for Russia, China’s continuing relianceon Russia for a part of the technology can help Russia to retain more of a voice. In addition, Russia’s
defense industry sells products to India and Viet Nam, whose defense posture concerns China,
and also to both Armenia, a CSTO member country, and Azerbaijan, which is in a conflict withthe former. Thus, Russian arms sales do not necessarily mean their close relations for trusting andstrengthening specific countries.57
Furthermore, Russia is cooperating with China on development of the Arctic Ocean region. A
liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Russia ranks sixth among other China’s foreign direct investments,58 and Russia’s national project for LNG development on the Yamal Peninsula and exports in
Artic Ocean routes would not have been realized without Chinese investment. On the other hand, inorder to retain the important roles for ensuring navigation security, Russia is in a rush to enhance its
military security capacity in the Arctic Ocean region.
In this way, Russia works to enhance its autonomy by cooperating with China rather thanrefusing it, in a disadvantageous situation in maintaining leadership in the former Soviet Union
region, Goal (2) among the three previously stated. In addition, accepting China’s initiative is also
beneficial for Goal (1), calling for cooperation contributing to development of Russia and economic
development.
Although the LNG project can be described as a major success for Russia, cooperation with
China has not brought an optimistic outlook for Russian hopes in such projects as distribution volume
expansion for the Trans-Siberian Railway and the high-speed railway between Moscow and Kazan.
Accordingly, President Putin is emphasizing Goal (3), namely, resisting the leadership by the Westin the international order. In his speeches in May 2017 and in April 2019 at the Belt and Road Forumfor International Cooperation, he focused on the significance of non-Western initiatives such as the
BRI, rather than individual projects for Russia.

44

The Growing Influence of China as Seen from Central Asia and Russia

President Putin stated the following points in his speech on April 26, 2019. The BRI
promotes economic development of the Eurasian space, and is in agreement with the concept ofPreface

Russia’s Greater Eurasia Partnership. The Greater Eurasia concept aims for a Eurasia with co-existence and co-prosperity in collaboration with regional organizations such as the SCO, ASEAN,
and the EU, as well as in cooperation with the BRI. It opposes trade protectionism and unilateralsanctions set by the United States. The EAEU will make an agreement with China come into force,and its five member countries support the BRI.59 To interpret the President’s words, it is possible

Summary

to understand that, because it is difficult for Russia to materialize the Greater Eurasia concept, it
chose a path of linking with the EAEU and the BRI.60 On the other hand, by calling for a Greater
Eurasia, President Putin was able to insist that cooperation with the BRI can promote his own
international integration concept.

Introduction

In this way, President Putin’s argument suggests that the BRI has something more important
than Russia gaining substantial benefits from individual cooperation; that is, it is an assertion thatthe BRI involves a prospect for development of the international community not based on only therules decided by the West, and Russia can also exhibit leadership at a massive conceptual level.
Russia perceives its main opponent to be the United States, and considers that the United States
obstructs its advantageous management of the international order by leading European countries

Chapter 1

and others. If China has the same stance on these points, it would be advantageous to Russia togain China’s voice of approval when Russia criticizes the United States, while somehow managing
differences with China. In this way, while China is gradually playing more roles, Russia conveys its
own assertions, controls a fall in its position utilizing its national specialty fields, and attempts tomaintain its autonomy to the highest possible level.

Chapter 2

If China’s strategic goals for the Central Asia region and Russia are to maintain regional
security, gain approval for diplomatic initiatives such as the BRI, and promote development cooperation, then it is on course to gradually, if not completely, achieve them. These countries generally
understand that China brings what they could cooperate on with pragmatic methods, instead of
coercively imposing them, in their countries, and are advancing collaborative work in response to

Chapter 3

this. If China’s current or future strategic goal is to become a dominant regional power, then theconsequence of it will depend on whether Central Asian countries and Russia could maintain theirautonomy or not. As the author discussed above, these countries have been taking the best measuresavailable to them to maintain their autonomy, and China is maintaining its cooperative relations
while showing certain consideration for local opposition. However, if Central Asian countries andConclusions

Russia become incapable of increasing their value relative to growing China’s influence, there is ahigher possibility that they would lose their autonomy and have to accept Chinese regional superiority. It would depend on how relations are built with partners outside the region, in addition to eachcountry’s development quality and progression of cooperation in the region.
(Author: Hiroshi Yamazoe)

45This page is intentionally left blank

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

Chapter 3
Architecture in Eurasia for
Chinese Energy Security
Shigeki Akimoto

1. Resource-rich Eurasian Countries in China’s
Energy Policies(1) Trends in Supply and Demand for Energy in China
China seeks to construct connectivity towards Eurasia; one of the main reasons for this is to secureenergy resources. How is China, then, attempting to secure energy resources from Eurasia, and towhat extent? And what kind of energy architecture is China trying to create to accomplish this?
Energy resources are essential to the social and economic activities that support a country’s
existence and prosperity, and thus it can be said that energy policies for securing energy in a stablefashion are among other important policies that compose its national security policies. It is notenough for a country to merely provide the necessary volume of energy resources domestically at
the cheapest prices; they must be provided with “uninterrupted availability” and at “an affordable
price” that does not impede social and economic growth.1 In other words, energy policies are developed with a balance between economic rationality, which is indicated by price, and national security
demands that prevent the interruption of supply.2
Notably, it is reasonable for countries that rely on importing energy resources to foster favorable relationships with foreign suppliers, and to limit the vulnerabilities that accompany a dependence
on imports by retaining reserves in preparation for any interruption of supply, and by diversifying
foreign suppliers and supply routes, among other security measures. It is also necessary for thesecountries to develop comprehensive policies, including appropriately controlling the degree to which
they rely on imports by maintaining and enhancing domestic energy development and production.
In China, which is continuing to experience economic growth, energy consumption is surging; in2009, China became the world’s biggest energy consumer, overtaking the United States (Figures
3.1 and 3.2). As of April 2019, while China is the greatest coal-producing country in the world andits biggest consumer, it is also the world’s largest oil-importing country; its increase in natural gas
consumption is already the greatest in the world, and the degree to which it relies on both oil and gas
imports is growing.

48

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

Figure 3.1 GDP Growth Trends in China, the United States and Japan (PPP)
Preface

USD 1 billion

30,00025,00020,000

Summary

15,00010,0005,000

Introduction

18

17

20

16

20

15

20

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

20

99

20

98

19

97

19

96

19

95

19

94

19

93

19

92

19

91

19

19

19

90

0
Year

China

USA

Japan

Chapter 1

Source: Compiled by the author, based on IMF, World Economic Outlook.

Figure 3.2 Changes in Primary Energy Consumption in China, the United and Japan
Mtoe

3,500
Chapter 2

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500

Chapter 3

1,000
500

94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18

19

92
93
19

19

19

19

90
91

0

China

USA

Conclusions

Year

Japan

Source: Compiled by the author, based on BP, Statistical Review of World Energy.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) published a comprehensive analysis and evaluation

49

Chapter 3

of Chinese energy policies in 2007. According to this, by 2006 China, which became a net importerof crude oil in 1993, had become reliant on importing 3.7 million barrels of oil per day, equivalent
to approximately 50% of its oil consumption.3 Moreover, the IEA predicted that the volume of oil
imports to China would further increase and its reliance on imports would rise to as much as 80%
by 2030. Meanwhile, in 2006, the Middle East and Africa made up 80% of China’s foreign suppliers;
notably, the greatest suppliers were Saudi Arabia and Angola, accounting for 16% each. The nextlargest supplier after these two countries was Russia, supplying 11% of China’s oil, but the drastic
rise in China’s import dependence and its excessive dependence on the Middle East and Africa as of2006 was a serious concern from the perspective of national security. Ten years later in 2017, the IEA
published another comprehensive analysis and evaluation of China; according to this, while the dailyvolume of crude oil imports had increased to 7.6 million barrels and reliance on imports had risen to
70% in 2016, China’s dependence on the Middle East and Africa had fallen to below 70%.4 Althoughsome progress concerning diversifying suppliers is indicated, China’s control of the degree to which
it is reliant on imports continues to be a serious issue to be addressed in China’s energy policies,
along with the way that China consumes energy.5
As is shown in Figure 3.2, in recent years the growth of energy demand in China has somewhat slowed. During this period, the demand structure has seen major changes, accompanying
changes in the structure of the Chinese economy. More specifically, while the Chinese economic
growth model is gradually reducing the country’s reliance on heavy industry, which consumes large
amounts of energy, a shift is taking place towards a domestic consumption-driven model or a model
driven by the high added-value communication electronics industry and service industry; as energy
efficiency increases, the pace of energy demand growth will fall below the pace of economic growth.
Furthermore, in terms of the structure of demand categorized by primary energy, the shares of coaland oil, which have made up a large proportion of China’s energy, are falling (Figure 3.3) as thecountry has come to prefer natural gas and renewable energy, which have a smaller impact on theenvironment, from the perspective of realizing sustainable economic growth.
Meanwhile, such changes in the composition of demand are widening the gap between
consumption and domestic production volume; in fact, reliance on both imported oil and gas isincreasing (Figures 3.4 and 3.5).

50

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

Figure 3.3 Changes in the Composition of Chinese Primary Energy Demand

Coal growth rate (right axis)

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

Introduction

Natural gas

Summary

Oil

Year-on-year growth rate

Coal

2007

-5
2006

0
2005

0

2004

500

2003

5

2002

1,000

2001

10

2000

1,500

1999

15

1998

2,000

1997

20

1996

2,500

1995

25

1994

3,000

1993

30

1992

3,500

1991

%

Preface

Mtoe

Year

The others

Oil growth rate (right axis)

Natural gas growth rate (right axis)
Chapter 1

Source: Compiled by the author, based on data of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Figure 3.4 Gap Between Oil Supply and Demand in China
1,000 barrels/day

Dependence rate (%)

80

16,000Chapter 2

14,00060

12,00040

10,0006,000

Chapter 3

20

8,000

0

4,000
-20

2,000

Conclusions

Oil production volume

Oil consumption volume

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

-40
1990

-

Year

Degree of dependence on imports (right axis)

Source: Compiled by the author, based on BP, Statistical Review of World Energy.

51

Chapter 3

Figure 3.5 Gap Between Natural Gas Supply and Demand in China
Billion m3

Dependence rate (%)

300

50
40

250

30
200

20

150

10
0

100

-10
50

-20

Natural gas production volume
Natural gas consumption volume
Degree of dependence on imports (right axis)

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

-30
1990

-

Year

Source: Compiled by the author, based on BP, Statistical Review of World Energy.

(2) China’s Energy Policies and Reliance on Imports
How is China attempting to manage its dependence on imported energy? First, a simple question:
during the period of rapid economic growth from the second half of the 1990s to the mid-2000s
when the issue of its reliance on imports started to gain attention, why did China choose to increase
its consumption of oil and natural gas and raise its dependence on imports, rather than controllingthe degree of dependence on imports by increasing the production and consumption of its rich coalreserves? Above all, this arose due to the characteristic limits of coal transportation.6 The increased
demand for fuel for automobile freight transportation that accompanied the rapid popularizationof automobiles and the intensification of economic activity could only be met by oil. In addition,
while coal reserves are present mainly in northern and western China, there are constraints on
the transportation needed to supply this coal to the urban areas in which China’s population andindustry are concentrated,7 making oil or natural gas necessary to the industrial sector in particular.
Meanwhile, the consumption of coal itself continued to increase, with greater demand for coking
coal, a raw material for the creation of cement and crude steel, consumed in great quantities in theheavy industry and construction sectors, and a rise in demand for steam coal for electricity generation. In other words, the rapid economic growth in China from the second half of the 1990s to themid-2000s was achieved by simultaneously increasing the consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas,
as is shown in Figure 3.3.

52

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

It was a shift in economic policy in the second half of the 2000s that brought about greatchanges in the energy supply and demand structure, and further increased the shares of oil andPrefacenatural gas within China’s primary energy consumption. This policy shift intended to reform China’s
economic structure in order to realize long-term, sustainable social and economic development,
based on the understanding that the economic structure that had supported China’s high economic
growth would likely impede economic growth in the future.8 More specifically, it was energy-intensive industries, especially the heavy industry sector, including iron and steel, and the chemicals

Summarysector, including cement and ammonia, that drove economic growth from the second half of the
1990s to the 2000s, and at the same time these became China’s main export products. During thisperiod of high economic growth, there was a large influx of foreign capital and excessive investmentin the strong export sector. However, the export-driven economy was vulnerable to falls in external

Introduction

demand and sudden jumps in prices of raw material imports, and the excessive investment poseda significant risk. Moreover, as the massive consumption of energy caused rapid environmental
deterioration, there were serious concerns about the vast potential costs to social and economic
activities.9 This recognition was already shared among Chinese leadership from the first half of the
2000s; specific policies to reform the economic structure were discussed and incorporated into the11th Five-Year Plan published in 2007.10

Chapter 1

The objectives that were thereby set out can be summarized as follows. First, to curb the rather
excessive investment centered on export-based industry so as to reduce the country’s vulnerability
to external shocks, and to improve energy efficiency to increase resilience to the risk of price fluctuations in imported energy resources. Next, to curtail the volume of coal consumed, a major burden
on the environment, in order to contain the costs that accompany environmental deterioration. Then,

Chapter 2

to enrich the service sector, especially in regional China, and improve the quality of life, so as tomitigate social unease stemming from the regional disparities and income divides that had rapidly
widened in the shadow of the high economic growth.
These objectives were reflected in China’s energy policies as follows. First, the country set
the collective, legally binding goal of reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% byChapter 3

2010. Through this, it intended to encourage both corporate and individual energy-saving efforts.
Next, the country established a primary energy mix to be used until 2010 to improve quality of life
while curtailing the consumption of coal. More specifically, the target share of coal increased from
62.8% to 66.1%, which gives the reverse impression. However, this was based on the assumption thatenergy consumption centered on electricity generation and transportation would increase, and so

Conclusions

this target was set on the basis of expanding coal-fired power plants to meet demand for electricity,and extending demand for oil. Furthermore, increasing the share of natural gas meant that the useof gas would increase in the service sector and for temperature control inside buildings from theperspective of reducing the environmental burden.11
Thus, in 2006, China resolved to reform the structure of its economy to enable long-term,

53

Chapter 3

sustainable social and economic development. To accomplish this, it is likely that the country judgedthat it must increase imports of oil and natural gas, and consequently had no choice but to increase
its reliance on imports.

(3) China’s Perspective on Resource-rich Countries in Eurasia: From
Peripheral to Central Interest
During the period of China’s high economic growth from the 1990s to 2000s, it met the rapidly
increasing demand for oil by allowing a surge in imports. The country’s state-owned oil companies
made every effort as vanguards to secure energy; however, the Chinese state-owned companies,
who entered the global energy market late, could only secure either the resource-rich countries into
which the major European and American companies had not made inroads, or those from which they
had withdrawn.12 As a result, not only did the country’s dependence on the Middle East as a foreign
supplier continue to grow, but their reliance on politically-unstable Africa also increased, and China
faced the issue of its transportation routes from these areas passing through chokepoints in maritime
routes such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca.13
Since China had to further increase imports in the future, as stated above, it needed totackle this issue. However, there was a difference between its approach to oil, the import volume ofwhich needed to increase urgently, and natural gas, for which there was comparatively more time.
Specifically, when it came to oil, there was a rapidly growing gap between supply and demand,with domestic production plateauing as in Figure 3.5, and there was substantial need to quicklycompensate for this through imports. It was thought that if there was a supplier who could reduce
not just the volume of imports but also China’s reliance on the Middle East and Africa, or at least
contribute to limiting said reliance, a quick agreement with them was to be prioritized, even if it had
some unfavorable conditions. On the other hand, there was still scope to enable China to control the
degree of dependence on imported natural gas; it could do so by increasing domestic production, as
in Figure 3.5. The volume of natural gas imports was less than that of oil, as in Figure 3.3, and so it
is deemed to have been possible to proactively choose suppliers with whom China could conclude
agreements with more favorable conditions.
From these perspectives, the remaining part of this section will consider the value of resourcerich countries in Eurasia in the 2000s. One of the characteristics of oil is the ability to transport itfrom the producing country over land. This meant that even if the conditions of an agreement were
somewhat unfavorable, certain producing countries in Eurasia were considered reasonable partners
for concluding quick agreements.14 Natural gas also has the characteristic of possible over-landtransportation from the country that produced it, and thus gas-producing countries in Eurasia were
important trading partners in the same way they were for oil.15 However, due to the available time toconsider a balance in terms of security, including diversifying providers and economic rationality
such as pricing, it is inferred that the Eurasian energy-producing counties were reasonable partners

54Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

with which China could continue negotiations while taking domestic production trends into account.
China has several over-land trade agreements to date with resource-rich countries in Eurasia.
Preface

In terms of oil, there is trade through the crude oil pipelines between Kazakhstan and China andRussia and China. As of 2016, this accounted for 19% of the total volume of crude oil imports, andaccording to the IEA this was contributing to reducing China’s reliance on the Middle East andAfrica to 70% or less by 2016, when it was 80% in the 2006 stage.16 Furthermore, BP data indicatesthat in 2017 China’s dependence on the Middle East and Africa was dropping to 62%.17 Moreover,

Summary

China’s main over-land natural gas trade is through pipelines from Central Asia; as of 2016 gas
imports through pipelines made up 45% of China’s natural gas imports.18 As natural gas imports arearound 40% of natural gas consumption, it can be calculated that China is reliant on Central Asiannatural gas for nearly 20% of its supply.

Introduction

In this case, what is China thinking about its future energy policies? According to its (current)
13th Five-Year Plan published in March 2016, China is aiming to shift its economic structure froman economy driven by an export-oriented manufacturing sector to one driven by a service sector
based on domestic consumption, while adjusting continuing overcapacity in the coal industry andheavy electric sector.19 This Five-Year Plan for Energy Development has been drawn up to include
this objective; given the downward trend of energy prices, and following estimations that domestic

Chapter 1

productivity will decelerate, it is strengthening supervision and guidance from the State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) to optimize theactivities of state-owned energy companies.20
Having analyzed the trends in this policy and the trends in the global energy market, the IEA is
predicting that resource-rich Eurasian countries will hold the following status from China’s perspec-

Chapter 2

tive.21 First, additional imports of 4 million barrels of oil per day will become necessary in China
by 2040 as its demand for fuel for transportation continues to increase. The IEA estimates that adaily volume of 1 million barrels, one
quarter of this additional demand, canbe fulfilled through increased imports

Chapter 3

from Kazakhstan and Russia. Next,
natural gas imports will expand fromthe current yearly volume of 70 billion
cubic meters to 280 billion cubic metersby 2040, as demand increases dramati-

Conclusions

cally compared to production volume. Itis estimated that this enormous demand
for additional imports can be met
without changing China’s current degreeof diversification, through increased55

Chapter 3

volumes of imported pipeline gas from Central Asia, beginning to import pipeline gas from Russia,
and increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. In other words, from the Chinese perspective,
resource-rich countries in Eurasia are trading partners that can provide the energy necessary forthe future at affordable prices and in a diverse manner. It can be said that maintaining stable energy
trading relationships with these countries is extremely important in the balance between the economic
rationality and security requirements in China’s energy policy. The next section will review how
China has been building these crucial relationships with resource-rich countries in Eurasia.

2. Energy Trade Negotiations between China
and Resource-rich Countries in Eurasia(1) Oil Trade Negotiations
As was previously stated, it can be surmised that there were differing levels of urgency for oiland natural gas trade negotiations, and that China’s priorities when negotiating also differed. With
this in mind, this section will detail the development of the country’s trade negotiations. Russia
and Kazakhstan are China’s oil suppliers, providing oil over-land from resource-rich countries inEurasia. Myanmar may also be included as a supplier, but as it mainly passes on crude oil sourced in
the Middle East and Africa, it will not be analyzed in detail here.
In 2017, Russia supplied China with 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, which accounted for
14.2% of China’s 8.48 million barrels of daily oil imports.22 Kazakhstan provided 400,000 barrels perday, 4.7% of imports. In 2006, China was importing 2.9 million barrels of crude oil per day; Russia
provided 320,000 (11%) barrels of this daily by rail, but Kazakhstan was not yet involved in full-scale
exports to China. Over the next decade, the increased volumes of oil export to China from Russia andKazakhstan can be explained by the operation of the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline (KCP) connecting
Kazakhstan and China, which started in May 2006, and the operation of the East Siberia-Pacific
Ocean (ESPO) trunk pipeline from Russia, which began in December 2009. Moreover, it is expectedthat these oil exports will increase in response to predicted rises in China’s crude oil imports in the
future. However, not everything has progressed smoothly until this point.
China became a net importer of crude oil in 1993, and crude oil trade negotiations between
China and Kazakhstan began in 1994; the construction of a pipeline to China was agreed in 1997. The
situation between China and Kazakhstan at that time can be summarized as follows. Kazakhstan,whose economy was greatly dependent on oil exports, sought to change the status quo of its exports
being limited to Russia, whose economy was in chaos. In an attempt to accomplish this, it diversified its export destinations by establishing new export routes to Europe, and at the same time
promoted the privatization of its energy industry. At first, there was great interest from Europeanand American capital, and an international consortium, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)56

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

was formed to construct a new pipeline and increase production of large-scale oil fields around theCaspian Sea. However, due to resistance from Russia, which was concerned about the threat to its
Prefaceexclusive position, and sluggish international crude oil prices through the 1990s, these new projects
did not necessarily progress smoothly. In addition, some energy-related assets were sold off at cheap
prices in the course of privatization, and Kazakhstan’s economy faced a significant slump.23 Givensuch a situation, Kazakhstan focused on China’s energy market, where demand was surging. Morespecifically, by indicating the possibility of exports to China, it stirred interest from its preferred

Summary

candidate of European capital, while supplementing its lack of funds with Chinese capital.24
Meanwhile, in order to meet the surging demand for petroleum products, China was considering strengthening development and production in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whichis endowed with crude oil, while providing the petroleum products refined in Xinjiang to inland

Introduction

and coastal zones. China expected this to be supplemented by crude oil imports from neighboring
Kazakhstan, in the role of a crude oil supplier.25 Thus, the interests of both countries were aligned.
The issue was that even if Kazakhstan constructed a great pipeline to China over more than 3,000
km, it was unable to ensure sufficient supply volumes at that time, and even if it developed a newoil field or increased production to solve this, there was no guarantee of economic performance tocover the vast initial costs. This was due to the fact that while there were large, major oil fields in the

Chapter 1

western part of Kazakhstan, there were only medium and small-sized oil fields in the eastern andcentral parts near to China, and there was no east-west pipeline due to the country’s harsh mountainterrain; to build a new pipeline would cost a huge amount.
Figure 3.6 Crude Oil Trade Negotiations between China and Kazakhstan

Development of export routes
to Europe using Europeanand U.S. capital (CPC)②⑥

Stagnating exports to Russia, the traditional export market
Nur-Sultan(formerly Astana)

Existence of large oil fields
in western region①

Chapter 2

SamaraKazakhstan
KenkiyakAtyrauAtasu⑤

Tengiz Field

③

Aktau

Chapter 3④

Kashagan Field

Alashankou

KumkolAlmatyUzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Conclusions

China
Turkmenistan
Existing pipeline
Newly established joint China-Kazakhstan pipeline (KCP)
Sources: Compiled by the author, based on U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Country Analysis
Brief: Kazakhstan, p. 8; Kazakhstan National Gas (KazMunaiGaz), Annual Report 2018, pp. 6-7.

57

Chapter 3

China tackled this issue in the following ways, in accordance with Kazakhstan’s demands,
as if it were placing Go stones.26 First, in the bilateral agreement made in 1997, the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired the rights to the existing Aktyubinsk oil field in Kenkiyakin the central region of Kazakhstan, and invested in Kazakhstan’s upstream operations sector (Figure
3.6 [1])27 while taking on the responsibility of constructing a pipeline to China. Then, China decided
to construct the pipeline in three stages, and started work on stage 1 of the pipeline’s construction(Figure 3.6 [2]), from Aktyubinsk oil field in central Kazakhstan to the port of Atyrau that ships
crude oil on the northern part of the Caspian Sea, in 2002. From 2003, when this pipeline wascompleted, CNPC acquired interests in oil fields around the Caspian Sea and proactively developed
these, steadily expanding their reserves and production capacity. Further, in 2005 they succeededin acquiring an interest in the major Kumkol oil field in the east of the country (Figure 3.6 [3]), andstarted constructing a new pipeline from Atasu, connected to the existing pipeline, to Alashankou
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China as the second stage of pipeline construction(Figure 3.6 [4]). This pipeline went into operation in May 2006, and pipeline exports to China began.
Meanwhile, the Kazakhstan government considered the hasty privatization of the 1990s tohave hemorrhaged their national assets, and so in 2002 they established the state-owned, verticallyintegrated energy company KazMunaiGaz (KMG),28 which would take on a production sharing
agreement (PSA) on behalf of the government.29 Moreover, in 2004 the government revised its
resource legislation, stipulating that for a company to be acknowledged as a partner of KMG, theyshould be responsible for all development costs and that KMG should have an interest of 50% ormore. With this in place, when the European and America capital that had controlled the rights of
the huge oil fields around the Caspian Sea was withdrawn, half of this was acquired by KMG, which
expanded its share in the oil fields in the area around the Caspian Sea. CNPC also had to sell 50%
of its interest in the oil fields in the east of Kazakhstan, acquired in 2005, to KMG in order to fulfill
this strict condition. On the other hand, CNPC’s cooperative attitude towards KMG led to the future
construction of a pipeline between CNPC and KGM in 2007; the two agreed to invest 50% each inthe construction of the remaining pipeline traveling east-west, which was completed in 2009 (Figure
3.7 [5]). 30
Cooperation relating to the production and export of crude oil between Kazakhstan and China
further increased, and in 2013, following the sale of the interests of European and American capitalin the vast Kashagan offshore oil field in the Caspian Sea to KMG, KMG sold 50% of them to CNPC.
Through this, China acquired interest in Kashagan, which it had previously been unable to access(Figure 3.7 [6]). This means that should it become necessary for China to increase the volume ofcrude oil to be purchased from Kazakhstan in the future, it would be able to import the crude oilof the Caspian Sea primarily for export to Europe, by operating the east-west pipeline in reverse.31
Meanwhile, in April 2009, China concluded an intergovernmental agreement with Russia
concerning cooperation in the oil sector, and construction started on the Chinese branch line of the58Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

ESPO trunk pipeline that had been pending for years. Negotiations for final pipeline construction
and the conclusion of a supply agreement had stalled up to this point; this was because once the pipePreface

line, which would have fixed supply destinations and transportation capabilities, was constructed, it
could not be put to any other use, and problems after-the-fact could easily arise, such as price negotiations when renewing the agreement. Due to the aforementioned characteristics of this pipeline,
the final destination of the ESPO was not decided until 2009. To be more precise, after the idea of
the ESPO trunk pipeline was raised in 1998, the decision to build was made in 2004, construction

Summaryof the trunk line started in 2006, and the pipeline was completed up to the Chinese border by 2008.
However, thereinafter it was not made clear whether to build a branch line to China, or to extend
the line seeking entry into the Asia-Pacific energy market. Why then did Russia end up prioritizing
the construction of the branch line to China? One likely reason was that its ability to negotiate

Introduction

with China had comparatively declined due to the completion of the abovementioned pipeline to
China from Kazakhstan.32 Another was that the 2008 international financial and economic crisis had
impacted Russia’s entry to the Asia-Pacific energy market.33
Up until this point, Russia had intentionally obscured its order of preference for export
destinations, and attempted to carry out advantageous negotiations with China, where demand was
rapidly growing. Furthermore, the state-owned oil company Rosneft and the state-operated pipeline

Chapter 1

monopoly business Transneft, the core businesses of the ESPO trunk pipeline, initially prioritized
constructing the pipeline and developing oil fields with their own capital, and entering into the AsiaPacific energy market in order to avoid excessive reliance on China. However, it became difficult
to achieve this plan due to a slump in their main European market and a sharp drop in crude oil
prices caused by the financial and economic crisis in 2008, which resulted in worsening financial

Chapter 2

conditions. Thus, Russia put off extending the pipeline to the Pacific coast and chose to prioritize
developing East Siberian oil fields. It then accepted financing from China, and signed an agreement
concerning the construction of the China branch line and long-term crude oil exports. In February
2009, the two countries provisionally signed an agreement for a loan totaling 25 billion dollars anda long-term crude oil export agreement lasting 20 years. At the end of April in the same year, theChapter 3

construction of the China branch line began, with a completion target of the end of 2010. Eventually,
the extension of the pipeline to the Asia-Pacific coast was postponed to 2012,34 but even after thiscrude oil trade between China and Russia progressed in a stable manner in response to the growing
demand in China, with increased volumes of crude oil being supplied via the ESPO oil pipeline, andthe enhancement of the ESPO oil pipeline capacity.35

Conclusions

59

Chapter 3

Figure 3.7 The Flow of Oil from Kazakhstan and Russia○ESPO Oil Pipeline:(1) 2009 - in operation as far as Skovorodino:Rail transport to Pacific (Kozmino) for export bytanker(2) 2011 - completion of China branch line (toDaqing) by 2011
300,000 barrels/day (2011)
Increasing to 800,000 barrels/day (2016)(3) 2012 - extension of pipeline to Kozmino○Other rail transportation
Total 1.2 million barrels/day (2017)

West Siberian
Sedimentary Basin

East Siberian
Sedimentary Basin

Kashagan Field
KenkiyakKumkol

①

Skovorodino②③

Daqing

Kozmino

KCP: Operations started 2006
Max. 400,000 barrels/day (2016)
Potential to increase by reversing crude oil destinedfor Europe

Sources: Compiled by the author, based on Transneft, “Scheme Pipelines Transneft”; Kazakhstan National Gas(KazMunaiGaz), Annual Report 2018, pp. 6-7.

(2) Natural Gas Trade Negotiations
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, and Myanmar are China’s over-land
suppliers of natural gas among the resource-rich countries in Eurasia. In 2017, China imported 89.8
billion cubic meters of natural gas, importing 40.2 billion cubic meters (44.8%) of this throughpipelines from resource-rich countries in Eurasia. By producing-country, this included 32.2 billion
cubic meters (80%) from Turkmenistan, 4 billion cubic meters (9.9%) from Myanmar, 3 billion cubic
meters (7.5%) from Uzbekistan, and 1 billion cubic meters (2.5%) from Kazakhstan.36 In short, pipeline imports from three Central Asian countries make up 36.2 billion cubic meters (90.0%), andthese are combined and exported through the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline.37 This pipeline began
operations in December 2009; with the expansion of the pipeline the volume transported increased instages from an initial 2.1 billion cubic meters, reaching the present-day export volume.
In addition, there are plans to expand the pipeline and increase production in response to thepredicted future growth of Chinese natural gas imports; the main increase in production would be
in Turkmenistan. It is estimated that the share of natural gas imports from Turkmenistan will not
fall much below the current figure of 35%, even if China increases LNG imports in the future anddevelops policies to diversify its suppliers, including new pipeline imports from Russia.38
China made the following meticulous preparations in order to realize the Central Asia-China
Gas Pipeline.39 The three Central Asian countries explored the possibilities of exports to Asia

60

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

immediately after their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In responseto this movement, in 1992 CNPC and Mitsubishi Corporation collaborated and began discussing
Prefacethe possibilities of gas exports to China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, and, together with the
Turkmenistan government, commenced research concerning the feasibility of these exports. However,in 1996 it was concluded that constructing a long pipeline over the 7,000 km through Uzbekistan andKazakhstan to China and then to Japan could not guarantee economic performance considering thesluggish energy prices at that time. Additionally, the uncertainty of the data regarding reserves led toSummaryharsh evaluations regarding this export project. Notably, despite the expectations for Turkmenistan
to be the main provider of gas for export, it refused to undergo an evaluation of its reserves by anoutside party. Therefore, even after the country’s discovery of the huge South Yolotan/Osman gas
field from 2003 to 2006, its reserves were uncertain until it accepted an evaluation in 2008 based on

Introduction

the International Financial Reporting Standards.40
Regardless of the uncertain situation, China remained committed to gas imports from Central
Asia. CNPC temporarily suspended negotiations with Turkmenistan, and continued negotiations
concerning a gas pipeline to China from Kazakhstan at the same time as the abovementioned
crude oil pipeline negotiations with Kazakhstan. In June 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited
Kazakhstan and concluded an agreement to evaluate the business potential of the pipeline’s gas

Chapter 1

exports;41 Turkmenistan once again approached China on the subject of cooperation in developing its
upstream operations sector, and in response CNPC immediately resumed negotiations.42 It is viewedthat the advancement of China’s negotiations with Kazakhstan was an incentive for Turkmenistan.43
In fact, during this period Turkmenistan had reasons that it strongly desired to advance its
negotiations with China. Although Turkmenistan was endowed with abundant natural gas when

Chapter 2

compared to other Central Asian countries, its agriculture sector was limited to the production of
raw cotton due to its harsh natural environment. Additionally, domestic consumer-driven economic
growth was difficult to achieve in a small domestic market of 5 million people, and it was alsodifficult to convert to an economy driven by exporting industrial manufactured goods due to thegeographical constraints of being inland. Ultimately, Turkmenistan had to rely on natural gas

Chapter 3

exports, and so it was important to the government that it could export natural gas in a long-termand stable manner, and the income could be redistributed in the country to stabilize and develop its
society and the economy.
However, due to the geographical constraints, actual exports were limited to Russia, the former
Soviet Union countries via Russia, and, on a small scale, to Iran. Going into the 2000s, the export

Conclusions

volume to Turkmenistan’s mainstay, the former Soviet countries, was recovering from the decline
caused by the economic stagnation of the 1990s, but payments were in arrears and were turning into
bad debt. In these circumstances, Turkmenistan was facing major external risks, including priceissues with Russia, and the influence of the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine on export
volumes and export prices. As a result, Turkmenistan was seriously searching for an alternative,

61

Chapter 3

stable export destination.44
On the Chinese side, in
preparation for increased demand
for natural gas, the country first
focused on expanding the volume
produced domestically. It saw the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
bordering Central Asia as a promisingproduction area, and began large-scale
development and production going
into the 2000s, aiming to stabilize anddevelop the region’s society and economy. At the same time, a project to construct a long pipeline, theWest-East Gas Pipeline (WEP), over 4,000 km to transport the gas produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region to the high-consumption coastal areas went ahead, and the First WEP, theinitial pipeline, went into operation in 2004 (Figure 3.9 [1]). This pipeline is planned to be expanded
in stages as production volume increased; in addition to using natural gas from Central Asia asenergy necessary for development and production, China attempted to improve overall efficiency bysending it through the pipeline.45
Figure 3.8 Trade Negotiations with Turkmenistan over Natural Gas
Stagnation in development of traditional
export routes to Russia (CAC)

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline,
connected to West-East Gas pipeline

Kazakhstan

AlmatyKyrgyzstan

Tashkent

Stagnation ofdevelopment initiativefor export routes toEurope using Europeanand U.S. capital

Turkmenistan①④ Ashgabat⑤
Dushanbe②
Bagtyiarlyk Field
Galkynysh Field (formerly South Yolotan)

Expectations for export diversification witha pipeline to Europe via Iran

KorgasBishkek

Uzbekistan
XXX③

Dauletabad Field

Afghanistan

Kabul

Iran

Tajikistan

China

Expectations for export
diversification through theconstruction of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.

Sources: Compiled
by withthe Chinese
author,based on IEA, Medium-Term Market Report 2015: Market Analysis andPipelines built
involvement
Forecasts to 2020, IEA, 2015, p. 82; Simon Pirani, Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and thePipelines under construction or planned

Constraints on Export, NG 69, December 2012, OIES, p. 22.
Existing pipelines62Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

Figure 3.9 Connectivity between the Central Asia-China Pipeline and the West-East
Gas Pipeline (WEP)
Preface

Kazakhstan

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (A, B, C):
A Line: Operation Dec. 2009
B Line: Operation Oct. 2010 (Max. volume for A and B combined:
30 billion m3)
C Line: Operation May 2014 (Max. volume 25 billion m3)

KorgasUrumqi1

TurpanZhongwei-Jingbian connecting line

Summary

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (D): Under construction
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan(Max. 30 billion m3)

1st West-East Gas Pipeline
Operations started 2004

Beijing

2

YinchuanConstruction of 2nd West-East
Gas Pipeline and extension to
Guangzhou (2008-2011)

Zhongwei3

Construction of 3rd West-East
Gas Pipeline and extension to
Fuzhou (2012-2014)

Zhengzhou

Lanzhou

Jinan
Pingdingshan-Daan branch line

Xian

ShanghaiIntroduction

HangzhouZaozhuang-Shiyan
branch line
Nanchang
ChangshaNanchang-Shanghai
branch line

Kalgan-Xiangtan connecting line

Guangzhou
Guangzhou-Jinan branch line

Guangzhou-Shenzhen
branch line

Hong Kong
Shenzhen

Chapter 1

Sources: Compiled by the author, based on CNPC, “Trunk Line of the Second West-East Gas Pipeline, theWorld’s Longest, Begins Operation”; IEA, Gas Medium-Term Market Report 2015, p. 82.

In April 2006, China and Turkmenistan signed an intergovernmental framework agreementthat included the construction of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline that would transport a planned
Chapter 2

volume of 30 billion cubic meters per year (two pipelines of 15 billion cubic meters) between China
and Turkmenistan (Figure 3.8 [1]). 46 Based on this, in July 2007, (1) a PSA concerning the development and production of the Bagtyiarlyk gas fields on the right bank of the Amu Darya River ineastern Turkmenistan and (2) a sales and purchase agreement (SPA) for 30 billion cubic meters of gas
per year over 30 years were signed between CNPC and Turkmenistan (Figure 3.8 [2]).47 Construction

Chapter 3

on the pipeline began in August of the same year, and in August 2008 the relevant parties agreed toincrease the purchase volume specified in the SPA to 40 billion cubic meters per year. At the sametime, China was busily engaged in securing agreement from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, throughwhich the pipeline would run, and CNPC moved forwards with gas development in the Aral Sea
Basin in Uzbekistan, and development in the Aktyubinsk and Urikhtau gas fields in Kazakhstan. In

Conclusions

April 2007, an intergovernmental agreement was signed with Uzbekistan concerning the construction of the Uzbek part of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, and in the summer of 2008 thecountries launched a joint venture to construct a branch line to connect the pipeline with domesticgas fields. A comprehensive agreement with Kazakhstan concerning cooperative gas development
between CNPC and KMG was concluded in November 2008; this included the construction of a63

Chapter 3

pipeline directly connected to the pipeline linking China and Turkmenistan.48
Following this progress, China approved the Second WEP from Central Asia to transport gas
to the coastal regions in August 2007 and began construction in February 2008 (Figure 3.9 [2]). As
this instance suggests, development and preparations to receive gas in China and the expansion of
the Central Asia-China Pipeline moved ahead in close cooperation.
The volume of natural gas exported to China quadrupled from 3.5 billion cubic meters in 2010
to 12.7 billion cubic meters in 2011; anticipating future increases in trade volumes, in 2011 an agreement was made between the relevant countries to add a third line to the Central Asia-China Pipeline
for a planned transportation volume of 25 billion cubic meters. Construction on the third line wasquickly started in December of that year, aiming to begin operations in 2014 (Figure 3.8 [3]).49 Basedon this, in June 2012 it was agreed to increase the SPA with CNPC from 40 billion cubic meters to
65 billion cubic meters.50 During this period, Turkmenistan started building an east-west pipelinethat directly linked the gas fields on the coast of the Caspian Sea in the west and the South Yolotan
Gas Fields extending across the south-east of the country (Figure 3.8 [4]). It is perceived that its aim
here was to ensure it had the flexibility to change export destinations to Europe or to China.51 China,
the receiving party, also began construction on the Third WEP during this period (Figure 3.9 [3]). 52
2013 was a ground-breaking year. First, production from the South Yolotan Gas Field began,
and CNPC started production from the Bagtyiarlyk gas fields as per the agreed PSA; through these,
it was estimated that gas production in Turkmenistan would rapidly increase to 100 billion cubic
meters by 2020.53 In addition, in September of the same year, the President of the People’s Republicof China, Xi Jinping, visited Turkmenistan and signed a contract to increase the SPA agreed in 2012
and a contract to participate in the development of the South Yolotan Gas Field. During his visit,
the relevant parties also agreed to construct a fourth route of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline(Figure 3.8 [5]). Unlike the previous routes, this fourth route would run from Turkmenistan throughUzbekistan to enter Tajikistan, and then arrive in China via Kyrgyzstan.54 It would connect Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, which are not resource-rich countries, through a pipeline. With the construction of
the fourth route agreed, in 2014 various contracts were signed relating to the construction and operation of the pipeline and the launch of a joint venture between CNPC and companies in the relevant
countries, and pipeline construction began in Tajikistan in September the same year. Following this,gas exports to China from Central Asia steadily increased (Figure 3.10).
Thus, China’s gas trade negotiations with Central Asian countries took place with relative timeto spare until the demand for gas imports rapidly increased. It is suggested that China made use of this
temporal margin, analyzing the situations in its partnering resource-rich countries, especially the main
producer Turkmenistan, and also carrying out negotiations that would lead to favorable conditions for
China while ensuring cooperation in maintaining the pipeline domestically. However, it seems that thisapproach was adopted due to the difference in national power between China and Turkmenistan.

64

Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

Figure 3.10 Changes in Gas Exports to China from Central Asia
Million m3

Preface

40,00035,00030,00025,00020,000

Summary

15,00010,000
5,000
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017 Year

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline Uzbekistan

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline Kazakhstan

Myanmar (reference)

Introduction

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline Turkmenistan

Source: Compiled by the author, based on IEA, Gas Information.

Figure 3.11 Flow of Natural Gas in Eurasia
Novy Urengoy

Russia①③

TyumenOmsk

Kazakhstan

Krasnoyarsk

Novosibirsk

AbakanIrkutsk

Pipelines under construction

Komsomolsk-on-Amur
Amur Gas
Processing
Plant
Blagoveshchensk

ibe

ria

Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Khabarovsk

China

Mongolia

Vladivostok

Japan
North Korea

Tokyo

Gas production center① Krasnoyarsk ② Irkutsk ③ Yakutia ④ Sakhalin

Chapter 3

Planned pipelines

fS

Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline: Operations started 2009
3.5 billion m3 (2010) ⇒ 12.7 billion m3 (2011) ⇒ 35 billion m3 (2016)
3 ートル
in future
Planned expansion to 65 billionウラ
mンバ

China
Pipelines already operating

Kovyktaer oSakhalin III

Birobidzhan

Barnaul
Novokuznetsk

Altai

②

Pow

Sakhalin II④

Chapter 2

Western route: MOU
アス
30タナ
billion m3

Tomsk

Chayanda

Chapter 1

Power of Siberia: Under construction
Planned to start operations in December 2019
Okha
38 billion m3

Gas fields

Sources: Compiled by the author, based on Gazprom, “Eastern Gas Program,”; KazMunaiGaz, Annual Report
2018, pp. 6-7.

(3) Chinese and Russian Tactics Surrounding Gas Trade
Conclusions

China ended up undertaking more strategic action during gas negotiations with Russia than during
those with Central Asian countries, due to their negotiating powers being competitive with eachother. Negotiations for pipeline gas to China from Russia began in 1994 and went on for 20 years
until May 2014, concluding with the adoption of a route through the Russian Far East.55 More specifically, the two countries reached an SPA stating that Russia would provide to China 38 billion cubic

65

Chapter 3

meters of gas produced in the Kovyktinskoye and Chayandinskoye gas fields in Siberia per year for
30 years through the vast gas pipeline called the Power of Siberia, which runs 3,000 km through theRussian Far East to Blagoveshchensk on the border with China, and China would purchase this gas.
Additionally, although the details of the agreement are unclear, it is said that this paved the way for
Chinese companies to acquire stakes in the upstream operations sector, which had been denied by
Russia until this point.56 However, the route of this pipeline differs from the route (Western route)
upon which Russia had insisted, which would supply the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from
West Siberia via Altai. While a basic agreement concerning the western route was signed in May
2015,57 the signing of the SPA is nowhere in sight.
The Russia-China pipeline gas negotiations that developed over 20 years were hugely complex.
Thus, this section will reconstruct the details in a comprehensive manner from the perspective ofnegotiations concerning price.58 The premises of both parties’ basic stance can be stated as follows.
First, Russia is reliant on resource exports for social and economic development, and at the same time
is faced with the restriction that if it does not set low domestic gas prices, its social and economic
policies cannot operate in a stable manner. Furthermore, while it possesses vast gas reserves, its
domestic consumption is also large, and so the continuous development and production of its gas
fields are required to ensure sufficient gas for export. For this reason, Russia, to the best of its ability,
must export at the highest prices possible. This social and economic structure is supported by thestability of the European gas market, its main gas export market. However, the pace of the growth ofdemand in the maturing European market is slow. Therefore, to ensure the sustainable developmentof its society and economy, Russia must explore new export markets in which demand for gas is
expected to grow while continuing to ensure European demand.
In contrast to this, as noted previously, to ensure the long-term, sustainable development of its
society and economy, China must increase its consumption of gas; to do this it must increase its gas
imports. In so doing, it is necessary for China to control domestic gas prices in order to develop its
society and economy, and thus the country wants to procure gas at the lowest possible prices.
The initial negotiations in 1994 began between CNPC and the Russian Ministry of Energy,
and their agendas aligned with the Far East route. However, the gas fields that were to serve as supply
sources were, at the time, owned by private companies, and so the negotiations did not progress. To
break the deadlock, the Russian government added the Western route as an option, while at the sametime President Vladimir Putin led the renationalization of energy companies and continued negotiations. Then in 2006 Russia agreed to provide 68 billion cubic meters per year from 2011 through the
Far East route (38 billion cubic meters) and the Western route (30 billion cubic meters). However, theRussian side’s true motive in this agreement was to advance the price negotiations to their advantage
by prioritizing the development of the Western route that could also supply gas to Europe.
On the other hand, China concluded that purchasing at European prices would be extremely
disadvantageous to the country, considering the long-distance transportation from the Western route66Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

to its major regions of consumption, and no agreement was established between Russia and China.
To break away from this situation, Russia proposed a new plan in 2007: the Eastern Gas Program .59
PrefaceThis ambitious plan continued to pursue both routes, and would develop and use the Far East routeas a route for the domestic market in the Russian Far East with gas produced in the East Siberia
and Sakhalin gas fields, and as an export route for the Asia-Pacific energy market. Although thisplan was also favorably accepted by the Chinese side, Russia was directly hit by the sudden drop in
resource prices caused by the 2008 international financial and economic crisis and had to cut it back.

Summary

On the other hand, China had secured gas supplies from Central Asia in 2009, and was steadily
making preparations to receive LNG and diversifying its suppliers. In short, the price negotiating
power on the Chinese side had grown. The Russian economy was showing a tendency to recover as
early as 2009 and the negotiations were reopened; in 2009 and 2010 framework agreements for both

Introduction

routes were signed, but in the end, because Russia was losing ground to China, whose negotiating
power had grown, a trade was not easily agreed. It seems that Russia then had no choice but toprioritize negotiations concerning the Far East route to find a way to prevail in the price competition
with LNG, which was worth a significant amount at the time, instead of the Western route, which
was disadvantageous in the price competition with Central Asia.
Taking this situation into account, the state of affairs when there was a settlement between

Chapter 1

China and Russia in 2014 could be considered advantageous to the Chinese side, as China had
actually augmented its import volumes by agreeing to and actually increasing imports from Central
Asia in 2012, and was continuing to progress with LNG spot market trading, which U.S.-produced
LNG was predicted to enter. Consequently, only allowing China to enter Russia’s upstream sector
was left to Russia as a policy that could be developed to make the Chinese side accept high trade

Chapter 2

prices. This was because even if trading prices were high, there was the possibility that they could beoffset by the profits of the upstream sector. However, as long as China intended to keep domestic gas
prices low, the prices that Chinese state-owned gas companies could accept were limited. Above all,as long as Russia prioritized the security-related judgement that it could not acknowledge Chinese
capital participation in the upstream sector, said capital participation by China was not an option.60

Chapter 3

Nevertheless, Russia eventually accepted Chinese capital participation as a result of the economic
sanctions imposed against it by the U.S. and countries of Europe due to Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in 2014 and military engagement in the eastern part of Ukraine.61

3. Working Towards New Energy Architecture
Conclusions(1) Architecture from the Perspective of Chinese Energy Security
This section will explore trends in the architectural framework for energy that China aims to createin Eurasia, from the perspective of China’s approach to improving its own energy security and from67

Chapter 3

the perspective of the geopolitical implications in potentially developing a secure energy supply inCentral Asia as a strategic asset.
China has developed elaborate negotiations with resource-rich countries in Eurasia andformed trade contracts in order to satisfy the surging demand for oil and natural gas imports while
ensuring its energy security. During this period, there were occasions when it had to pay great costs
that exceeded the profits obtained. To recover these costs, it is necessary for China to maintain the
trade relationships it has built up to now in a stable manner. In this section, the actual policies that
China is developing will be evaluated from the perspective of effectiveness in stabilizing trade,based on the fundamental approach of transaction cost theory.
Transaction cost theory eases away from the assumption of unbounded rationality supposedby the neoclassical theory, and hypothesizes that economic entities are only boundedly rational, andthus all contracts are incomplete. Meanwhile, economic entities pursue self-interest, and while doing
so attempt to take advantage of information asymmetry and the incompleteness in contracts. Due
to such opportunistic behavior, unnecessary costs are generated during the process of negotiating
contracts, and even after a contract has been signed, unnecessary costs are generated in monitoring
its fulfillment. This opportunistic bargaining process is said to be intensified especially when trading
partners are limited, and the assets needed for trade only have value for the transaction in question.62
If these conditions are applied to China’s external energy trade, the following cases can be considered.
First, there is the case wherein imports from particular resource-rich countries are extremely
important to China, potential alternative suppliers are limited, and a pipeline that has no value
outside of the trade in question needs to be constructed. On the other hand, the situation in the
resource-rich country in question is that exports to China are extremely important, potential alternate export destinations other than China are limited, and oil and gas fields or a pipeline that haveno value other than to the trade in question must be built. In this case, integrating one side with theother would be effective, but if this is difficult then sharing each other’s assets would be effective insaving transaction costs. These trade circumstances would apply to the oil trade between China andKazakhstan. Since China has a stake in Kazakhstan’s upstream operations sector, and the countries
share a pipeline, it can be said that a structure to stabilize trade is being maintained.
Next, if the trade in question is extremely important to both China and a specific resource-richcountry, and the assets formed for this trade can also be used for other trade – in short, if a potential
alternative trading partner exists – it is less necessary to bargain to the extent of paying unnecessary
costs. These trade circumstances likely apply to the oil and natural gas trade between China andRussia. More specifically, while Russia is constructing pipelines that could export not just to China
but also to the European and the Asia-Pacific energy markets, China is diversifying its suppliers.
Nevertheless, they are both in the process of diversifying trading partners, and it is probable that a
structure to avoid impeding each other’s diversification processes will become necessary. Looking
at the situation from this perspective, the fact that China and Russia are drawing politically and68Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

economically closer can be understood as an opportunity to adjust interests for diversification. It isalso possible to positively assess China’s investing of capital in the development of the Yamal LNG
Prefaceproject in the Arctic, which is being developed by Russia to diversify its gas exports.63
Finally, there is the case of either China or the resource-rich country being dependent on theirpartner. This trade circumstance would apply to the pipeline trade between China and Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan lacks a predominant industry outside of the gas industry; with exports via Russia in
decline, it discovered an escape-route in exports to China. Furthermore, its reliance on China is

Summary

currently rapidly increasing amidst uncertainty over exports to Iran.64 In addition, it is predictedthat in the future China will be able to import the same volume of gas from Russia as it does from
Turkmenistan.
Figure 3.12 Status of Turkmenistan’s Gas Exports

Introduction

Million m3

70,00060,00050,000Chapter 1

40,00030,000Chapter 2

20,00010,000

0

2007

2008

2009

2011

2012

China

Iran

UkrainePolandRomania

2013

2014

Kazakhstan

2015

2016

2017 Year
Chapter 3

2010

Hungary

Unknown

Source: Compiled by the author, based on IEA, Natural Gas Information.

Conclusions

If Turkmenistan is concerned about China’s unilaterally expanding price negotiation power,
and tries to maintain the value of the assets formed to date, it is likely to engage in a great dealof opportunistic behavior. This will be incredibly costly to China as well. What should China
do to prevent such transaction costs from being incurred? In this case, based on the premise that
Turkmenistan cannot reduce its reliance on China through its own efforts, and cannot foster other69

Chapter 3

industry, the rational choice for China islikely to support Turkmenistan’s efforts
to diversify its export destinations and rid
itself of an economy driven by resource
dependence.
From this perspective, the following
are points to which attention should be paidin relation to China’s actions in the future.
The first is the restoration and stabilization of Turkmenistan’s trade relationships
with Russia and Iran as promising export
destinations in terms of diversifying its
gas export destinations. China’s role in this field will likely be major. In addition, Turkmenistan is
pinning its hopes on the idea of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline fornatural gas exports that would connect these countries, supplied by the South Yolotan Gas Field.65
However, the actual prospects of this project are uncertain due to issues with procuring capital andAfghanistan’s security.66 To improve this state of affairs, attention is being drawn to how China’s Beltand Road Initiative can contribute.67
Secondly, in regard to supporting economic reform, it is notable that Turkmenistan, facing thedifficulty of transitioning to an economy driven by domestic consumption, is currently attempting
to expand its exports outside of the energy sector to move away from its reliance on resources.
To accomplish this, it is considering joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).68 For China tosupport this WTO membership, it is important to first support the formulation of rules according
to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) standards vis-à-vis Turkmenistan. In this case, theonly country with which Turkmenistan has signed a free trade agreement (FTA) is Kazakhstan, andthus it would be effective to make use of the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative to stimulate
over-land trade.69 A study suggests that trade efficiency between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan has
improved 16% through the effectiveness of the Belt and Road Initiative.70 Additionally, China shouldplay a major role in promoting the norms of investment protection to ensure the maintenance of anenvironment in which foreign capital can be invested without worry.71
China was forced to increase its dependence on imported oil and natural gas to realize
sustainable economic growth. On the other hand, from the perspective of security demands, it wasnecessary to simultaneously control the degree of dependence on imports while ensuring sufficient import volumes. Consequently, it can be said that energy trade with resource-rich countries
in Eurasia has shifted from the periphery of China’s perspective to the center. Taking into accountthe importance of the energy trade, China entered into sophisticated negotiations with resource-richcountries in Eurasia and finally built the necessary energy trade relationships. It is conceivable that70Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

the importance of maintaining these energy trade relationships in the future will grow further inlight of the uncertainty of increased domestic gas production in China,72 and the worsening state ofPrefacerelations with the U.S., China’s influential supplier of crude oil and LNG.

(2) Geopolitical Implications
It is difficult to clarify the true motive of China’s energy policies in terms of whether they are being
implemented based on geopolitical aims. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern changes in the secuSummary

rity environment caused by said energy policies.73 From this perspective, this section will look at thetrends in international cooperation in the energy field being developed by China.
As was acknowledged in Section 2, from the 1990s to the 2010s China invested its time andbuilt energy trade relationships with resource-rich countries in Eurasia; since 2015, these relation-

Introduction

ships have been incorporated into the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, and developed
as policies relating to energy cooperation. First, in March 2015, immediately after concluding its
pipeline gas negotiations with Russia, China announced its “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. ” Within this, China makes statements concerning promoting cooperation in the exploration and development of conventional energy
resources, fostering cooperation in the field of renewable energy that is less burdensome on the

Chapter 1

environment, facilitating the integration of distribution channels for mutual energy accommodation,refinement, and supply, and strengthening technological cooperation.74 This depicts a vision thataims for industry promotion in the countries involved in the Initiative, using energy cooperation asleverage.
Following this, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy

Chapter 2

Administration jointly announced the “Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road ” at the same time as thefirst Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017.75 The vision outlined involves
further broadening perspectives from economic development in participating countries by using
cooperation as leverage, and enabling the development and deepening of regional cooperation at a

Chapter 3higher level to make contributions to economic prosperity across the world by strengthening energy
cooperation. Concrete priorities for cooperation specified to accomplish this have been expanded toinclude policy coordination in countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative and improvements in the global energy governance structure, beyond conventional investment and infrastructure
construction.76

Conclusions

The point to note here is the fact that China made the announcement that multilateral andbilateral mechanisms for cooperation will be constructed to raise energy cooperation in the Belt andRoad Initiative to a higher level.77 In so doing, China will strengthen existing bilateral cooperation,
and also actively participate in energy cooperation within existing frameworks such as the United
Nations, G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Cooperation between China and71

Chapter 3

Central and Eastern European Countries (16+1) in terms of mechanisms for multilateral cooperation,
as well as strengthening cooperation with other frameworks for multilateral energy cooperation,such as the IEA, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Energy
Charter. China has also stated that it is aiming to establish the Belt and Road Energy Club as a mechanism for new multilateral energy cooperation, and to deepen understanding and broaden consensus
relating to energy cooperation in countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative.
Although the real aim of the establishment of the Belt and Road Energy Club is not clearlystated, if this vision were to be made real, China would tie together non-G20 countries and non-IEA
member countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia in terms of energy cooperation,and so obtain the status of participating as the mouthpiece for their interests in the main mechanisms for international energy cooperation. There have been views concerning the possibility that in
the future Chinese-led energy cooperation mechanisms could replace existing international energy
cooperation mechanisms such as the IEA and the Energy Charter, which have until now been led by
the West.78 In fact, in connection with the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperationin April 2019, China officially launched the Belt and Road Energy Partnership with 29 participating
countries, including China, as a multilateral cooperation framework in the energy field.79 The countries involved are resource-rich countries such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Iraq, as well as Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan from Central Asia, Serbia, Hungary, and Turkey from Europe, and even Afghanistan
through which China expects to build a pipeline as a potential resource-rich country. Thus, thePartnership serves as a lateral organization of energy-producing and energy-consuming countries.80
Its main agenda includes strengthening policy coordination and connecting energy infrastructure.81
How is China approaching Europe, the western edge of its Belt and Road Initiative, in thecontext of energy cooperation? One framework is its energy dialogues with the EU.82 The formationof these can be traced back to the mid-2000s. In September 2005, the EU-China Dialogue on Energy
and Transport Strategies Memorandum of Understanding was signed in connection with the Eighth
China-EU Summit; based on this, dialogues concerning common issues such as energy development and technology for energy conservation and clean energy took place. Following this, the EU
China joint Declaration of Energy Security was agreed at the Sixth China-EU Energy Dialogue inNovember 2013, and the Work Plan for the Implementation of the EU-China Roadmap on Energy
Cooperation was signed at the 18th China-EU Summit in July 2016. Moreover, the Work Plan 20172018 of the EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation was concluded at the Seventh China-EU
Energy Dialogue, held in conjunction with the 19th China-EU Summit in June 2017. Such examples
of cooperative relationships between China and the EU in the field of energy are steadily progressing
from dialogues to concrete action plans.83
Outside of this framework of cooperation with the EU as a whole, energy cooperation isadvancing through the 16+1 format, namely the Center for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy
Projects 16+1 (CDCEP 16+1). CDCEP 16+1 is a cooperative framework established based on the72Architecture in Eurasia for Chinese Energy Security

medium-term plan for 16+1 cooperation agreed at the 16+1 Summit held in Suzhou in November
2015. CDCEP 16+1 was conceived by Romania as a common platform for policy coordination andPreface

information and technology exchange in the field of energy. This project sees participants fromacademia, the business world, research institutions, and governments from 17 countries, including
China, exchange opinions, and aims to contribute to decision-making to enable further developmentin the field of energy cooperation by gathering information through the 16+1 framework. Ultimately,
it also has the further goal of contributing to the realization of EU energy strategy, including measures

Summaryagainst climate change.84
Figure 3.13 The Multi-layered Energy Cooperation Framework Conceived by China(as of September 2019)

IEA*1

OPEC*3

SCO*2
Iran (SCO Observer)

BRI Energy Partnership

China(IEA Association Country)
HungaryLaos, Malta, Myanmar,
Bolivia, Nepal, Niger,
Sudan, Gambia,
Cape Verde, Suriname,Tonga, Chad

SerbiaCDCEP 16+1*4*1 International Energy Agency*2 Shanghai Cooperation Organization*3 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries*4 Center for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects 16+1

Chapter 2

PolandCzech Republic
Slovakia
Estonia

Algeria
Republic of Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Venezuela

Chapter 1

Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Pakistan
Afghanistan (SCO Observer)
Mongolia (SCO Observer)
Azerbaijan (SCO Dialogue Partner)
Cambodia (SCO Dialogue Partner)

Introduction

India(IEA Association Country)

RussiaKazakhstan
Uzbekistan

Sources: Compiled by the author, based on IEA, “Global Engagement”; OPEC, “Member Countries.”

China’s energy policy vis-à-vis Eurasia can be seen as being developed based on its own
Chapter 3energy security demands, while also being seen as a pursuit of political influence, not just economic
interest, through the use of bilateral and multilateral cooperative frameworks in the field of energy.
In other words, it is dependent on how China’s actual policies are viewed, and there are no contradictions between these views.85
If one is examining trends in the actual construction of international cooperation framework

Conclusions

from the latter perspective, should China be able to invest in the upstream sectors of resource-richcountries and secure interests in the name of international energy cooperation, China will find itself
in the position of an indirectly resource-rich country despite not being resource-rich, and dependingon the situation it may be possible for China to use its political influence. There is also the viewpointthat China is regulating its domestic overcapacity by investing in and undertaking the construction73

Chapter 3of energy infrastructure such as pipelines and ports or power plants and power grids in energy-consuming countries, including Central and Eastern European countries.86 Furthermore, it is said that byimplementing energy-related investment in the countries, regardless of whether they are a resourcerich or a consumer country, China will be able to make said country be dependent on China.87
To give a specific example of energy trade, it has been observed that if China is able to importpipeline gas in a stable manner from Turkmenistan and Russia, and if China is expected to increase
domestic gas production, it will become able to adequately control its reliance on LNG imports.
Better still, some see that China may make use of its position as the largest LNG importer andaugment its negotiating power in the LNG market.88 Moreover, it has been pointed out that as China
has an interest in Kazakhstan’s upstream operations sector, it could influence the European market
through crude oil exports to Europe.89 Going further, there is also an argument stating that if China isable to begin exporting gas to Europe via Iran or across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan, where
it is already contributing to the upstream sector and pipeline construction, China may also become
able to compete with Russia in its main export market of Europe.90 In short, this argues that China
may become a major influence on European energy security.
These arguments reflect the complex perception of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe
and the United States. In other words, Chinese energy policy connected to the Belt and Road Initiative
has two sides: one which brings about economic profit for both China and its partnering country/
region, and at the same time one that increases the possibility of enabling China to make use of its
growing influence in the economic and energy fields in a political way. Thus, the perception behindthese arguments is that the focus should not be just on profit but also on well-balanced responses
with a certain sense of caution.91 While this section has pointed out that there are two possible
perspectives on the energy architecture that China is trying to build, further points of attention fordeepening discussions are re-emphasized below.
First, above all else the energy architecture currently being constructed assumes stable traderelationships with resource-rich countries in Eurasia. Further, the motives for constructing these
relationships lie in the demands of China’s own serious energy security (Section 1), and these relationships have required many years, starting in the 1990s, to build up steadily; when it came toactual project formation China was greatly influenced by external factors which it could not control(Section 2). In other words, it cannot be ascertained that China has developed its energy policies
from the start according to a plan derived from a certain strategy from a geopolitical perspective.
Next, the characteristics of its energy trade vary greatly not only due to the fundamentals but
also external factors such as technology. In other words, the evaluation of the energy architecture
depicted by China is based on the energy environment at this point in time, and even if China’s
desired architecture were to be constructed, this would not guarantee permanent functionality.
(Author: Shigeki Akimoto)

74

NIDS China Security Report 2020
China Goes to Eurasia

Conclusions
Masayuki Masuda

Conclusions
China’s Eurasian diplomacy and particularly its interactions with Central Asia is comprised of twoelements. The first is regionalism, where since the 1990s China has become actively involved inregional cooperation, emphasizing regional unity and autonomy.1 The establishment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China’s subsequent initiatives to institutionalize it speak
amply of China’s diplomacy incorporating the perspective of regionalism. Another element has been
China’s soft balancing attempts, seeking to offset the power and influence of the U.S. The SCO
became the stage for China to announce a “new security concept” together with Russia and theCentral Asian countries, and also a forum to offset the presence of the U.S. military, which had beenbolstered in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
However, Beijing found that it was not always an easy task to share with Russia and Central
Asian countries a common regionalist direction and vision for soft balancing against the U.S. In
terms of the former, in the forum of the SCO China was quick to emphasize the importance offocusing on multilateral economic cooperation, proposing the establishment of a free trade zone.
However, Russia was more focused on security cooperation, where it would be better able to demonstrate its own leading role, and was also cautious about any economic cooperation that could expand
China’s influence in Central Asia. In the countries of Central Asia too there was a gap between theirown economic development priorities and what China was proposing. With regard to the point aboutsoft balancing, Central Asian countries basically maintained a diplomatic stance of diversifying
their relations with major powers, making it difficult for China to consistently achieve its aim of softbalancing against the U.S. in the forum of the SCO.
From the late 2000s onwards China recognized more strongly the difficulty of achieving
multilateral cooperation in the SCO and turned to policy coordination. Among domestic experts
there was growing discussion on the revision of China’s conventional approaches, with it being
suggested that China’s actual policies should not necessarily be bound by the approaches that had
been implemented to date. With regard to soft balancing against the U.S., China recognized thatsuch a balance could not be maintained in concert with the countries in the region, and neither did it
seek to exacerbate any confrontation with the U.S. The result was that from the late 2000s onwards
efforts progressed domestically in China to devise a concept that would enable the SCO to construct
relations with the U.S. in the future. The “Dialogue Partner” mechanism that was established in 2008
did indeed seek to build relations between the SCO and the U.S.2 With regard to regionalism too,
while China was espousing multilateral economic cooperation on the one hand, it was also engaging
in bilateral approaches with each counterpart country in search of commonalities between individual
development strategies and those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB) initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 was the result of such revisions in

76

Conclusions

China’s approach, and demonstrated the pragmatism inherent in China’s diplomacy. To put it anotherway, China’s emerging diplomacy with Central Asia no longer sought to prioritize China’s own
Prefacepriorities and goals alone, but also explored specific areas of common interest with the countries of
the region.
It was for this reason that these countries also came to accept China’s initiatives. In theirrespective development strategies the landlocked countries of Central Asia also prioritize external
connectivity and were actively receptive of China’s proffered cooperation. Of course the countries

Summary

are not entirely without some degree of psychological caution with respect to China. Throughimproved connectivity within the region they are seeking to maintain diplomatic autonomy in theirrelations with partners beyond the region. For Russia too, although any diminution of its position androle in the Central Asian region is not desirable, on the other hand it is maintaining its basic presence,

Introduction

predominantly in military areas, and is cautiously facing China in the region. By choosing to workwith China rather than block its overtures, Russia is seeking to make China dependent on it to acertain extent, thereby increasing its voice in regional affairs while enjoying the benefits of the BRI.
Moreover, with regard also to energy cooperation, which is one of the major motivating factors
behind China’s Eurasian diplomacy, analysis of predominantly energy-related business negotiations
draws a picture of the regional architecture that has been built up in this sector. For China, increasing

Chapter 1

dependence on imports of oil and natural gas was a rational economic choice in order to realize
sustainable economic growth. On the other hand, however, the demands of energy security havenecessitated measures to maintain sufficient import volumes while managing reliance on imports. It
was as a means of ensuring such a balance that the importance of having energy relations with theresource-rich nations of Eurasia increased, prompting China to make overtures to such countries.

Chapter 2

The result was construction of stable energy trading relations between China and the countries inEurasia. More recently China has sought to expand its initiatives on the basis of outcomes achieved
to date, including proposing the formation of a “Belt and Road Energy Club.”
What implications does the analysis contained in this report, which has sought to elucidate
the presence of pragmatism in the mutual relations between China and countries in the region, have

Chapter 3

for the Eurasian security environment? The geographic space encompassed by Russia and Central
Asia has been in the vanguard of the advance of the BRI, which has improved connectivity in theregion. The result has been that security cooperation between China and countries in the region has
become less symbolic and more practical in its approach, which aims to maintain and develop thestable relations that have been assiduously constructed to date. In specific terms the protection ofConclusions

critical infrastructure, including energy, transport and communications, which are the foundations
for connectivity, is recognized as an urgent security challenge.
From this perspective China is moving to institutionalize international cooperation in law
enforcement aspects, not only with Central Asia, but also more broadly with Eurasian nations.
Established in 2015, the Lianyungang Forum has sought to boost partnership and cooperation among77

law enforcement agencies in member countries, and has not only institutionalized an annual meetingof the forum, but has also realized concrete cooperation on issues such as the protection of oil andnatural gas pipelines. Through the Lianyungang Forum China has already firmly established capacity-building assistance focused on the provision of training and it is believed that police-related
equipment and others is also being provided. In other words, China is leveraging its initiatives in
the promotion of functional cooperation in the security field, which is resulting in the emergence inEurasia of a functional network for the maintenance of security.
On the other hand, in line with the advancement of the BRI, in recent years there has been agrowing tendency for China’s political discourse relating to the international order on such mattersas “reforming global governance” to incorporate the BRI. In relation to the Central Asian countries
where the BRI has already advanced, there are also increasing references to reforming the international order and international system.3 However, assuming that the factors that enable China toleverage its initiatives and expand its influence are reliant on a tempered diplomacy on the part ofChina that seeks to identify specific shared interests with counterpart countries, then any strengthening in political discourse that emanated unilaterally from China and surpassed the language ofconsent and support with counterpart countries would likely imperil any results achieved to date.
This point could be said to be borne out by China’s policies towards Europe that even more strongly
emphasize reform of the international order, and which have engendered a reaction from the Europeanside, notwithstanding the related development outcomes that such policies bring.
(Author: Masayuki Masuda)78

NotesIntroduction
1刘华芹等 [Liu Huaqin et al.], 丝绸之路经济带: 欧亚大陆新棋局 [The Silk Road Economic Belt: A New Gamein the Eurasian Continent] (Beijing: 中国商务出版社 [China Commerce & Trade Press], 2015); Maximilian
Mayer, “China’s Rise as Eurasian Power: The Revival of the Silk Road and Its Consequences,” Maximilian
Mayer ed., Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations(Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 1-42; R. James Ferguson, China’s Eurasian Dilemmas: Roads andRisks for a Sustainable Global Power (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).

2

王缉思 [Wang Jisi], “‘西进’: 中国地缘战略的再平衡 [‘Marching Westwards’: China’s Geostrategic Rebalance],”环球时报 [Global Times], October 17, 2012. For more information about the discussion at the time on the“Marching Westwards” concept, see 詹世明 [Zhan Shiming], “中国的‘西进’问题: 研判与思考 [China’s‘Marching Westward’ Issue: Study and Thought],” 西亚非洲 [West Asia and Africa], No. 2, 2013, pp. 4-19.

3人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 28, 2018.

4

Masayuki Masuda, “Chugoku no ‘Ittai Ichiro’ Senryaku [China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Strategy],” Rebuild Japan
Initiative Foundation (RJIF), ed., Gendai Nihon no Chiseigaku: 13 no Risuku to Chikeigaku no Jidai [Geopolitics
in Contemporary Japan: Thirteen Risks and the Era of Geo-Economics] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2017),
pp. 220-224.

5习近平 [Xi Jinping], 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利: 在中国共产党第十九次
全国代表大会上的报告 [Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Speech Deliveredat the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe],2017), pp. 8-9.

6

人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 28, 2018.

7人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 27, 2019.

8

Bao Yi, “Central Asian Countries and the Silk Road Economic Belt,” Zhang Jie ed., China’s Belt and Road
Initiative and Its Neighboring Diplomacy (Singapore: World Scientific, 2017), pp. 206-213.

Chapter 1
1

人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 20, 1994.

2人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 29, 1994; 李鹏 [Li Peng], 和平 发展 合作: 李鹏外事日记（下） [Peace,
Development and Cooperation: Li Peng's Diary on Foreign Affairs Vol. II] (Beijing: 新华出版社 [Xinhua
Press], 2008), p. 449.

3

Masayuki Masuda, “Chugoku no Tai Roshia Chuo Ajia Seisaku: Seihokubu Kokkyou Chitai no Anzen Hosho
Kankyo [China’s Policy toward Russia and Central Asia: Security Environment in the Northwest Border
Region],” Minshu Shugi Kenkyukai Kiyo [Journal of Institute for the Study of Democracy], Vol. 29 (December
2000), pp. 115-119.

4

For an overview of these agreements, see 唐家璇主编 [Tang Jiaxuan], ed., 中国外交辞典 [Dictionary on China’s
Diplomacy] (Beijing: 世界知识出版社 [World Affairs Press], 2000), pp. 502-503.

5

邢广程、孙壮志主编 [Xing Guangcheng and Sun Zhuangzhi, eds.], 上海合作组织研究 [A Study of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization] (Changchun: 长春出版社 [Changchun Publishing House], 2007), pp. 5-8.

6“江泽民主席在上海合作组织成立大会上的开幕词 [Jiang Zemin’s Opening Remarks at the SCO Inaugural
Ceremony],” (June 15, 2001), “上海五国”—上海合作组织资料汇编 (1996.4-2003.8) [Compilation of Documentsof the “Shanghai Five” and the SCO: April 1996 - August 2003)] (Shanghai: 上海社会科学院上海合作组织研
究中心 [SCO Research Center, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], 2003), p. 70.

79

Notes7“维持和平稳定 促进发展繁荣: 江泽民主席在‘上海五国’阿拉木图元首会晤上的讲话 [Uphold Peace andStability, and Promote Development and Prosperity: Speech Delivered by President Jiang Zemin at the Summit
Meeting of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in Almaty],” (July 3, 1998), 外交部欧亚司编 [Department of European andCentral Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed.], 顺应时代潮流 弘扬‘上海精神’: 上海合作组织文献选编 [Keeping Abreast of the Trend of the Times and Carrying Forward the “Shanghai Spirit”: Selection of theSCO Documents] (Beijing: 世界知识出版社 [World Affairs Press], 2002), p. 242.

8

张兴堂 [Zhang Xingtang], 跨界民族与我国周边外交 [Cross-Border Ethnic Groups and China's Neighborhood
Diplomacy] (Beijing: 中央民族大学出版社 [Minzu University of China Press], 2009), pp. 124-130.

9“江泽民主席在‘上海五国’比什凯克元首会晤上的讲话 [Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Summit
Meeting of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in Bishkek],” (August 25, 1999), 外交部欧亚司编 [Department of European andCentral Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed.], 顺应时代潮流 弘扬‘上海精神’: 上海合作组织文献选编 [Keeping Abreast of the Trend of the Times and Carrying Forward the “Shanghai Spirit”: Selection of theSCO Documents], p. 249.

10

“江泽民主席在‘上海五国’比什凯克元首会晤上的讲话 [Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Summit
Meeting of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in Bishkek],” p. 248; “携手并进，继续推动‘上海五国’进程向前发展: 江泽民
主席在‘上海五国’杜尚别元首会晤上的讲话 [Join Hands to Continue Advancing the ‘Shanghai Five’ Process:Speech Delivered by President Jiang Zemin at the Summit Meeting of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in Dushanbe],” (July5, 2000), 外交部欧亚司编 [Department of European-Central Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed.], 顺应时代潮流 弘扬‘上海精神’: 上海合作组织文献选编 [Keeping Abreast of the Trend of the Times and Carrying
Forward the “Shanghai Spirit”: Selection of the SCO Documents], p. 255.

11

Up until that time too, Chinese leaders had pointed out the importance of multilateral cooperation. For example,
in April 1994, in a gathering with business leaders in Almaty during a visit to Central Asian countries, Premier
Li Peng emphasized that China would “encourage the development of multilateral cooperation and promotejoint development.” See Li Peng, 和平 发展 合作: 李鹏外事日记（下） [Peace, Development and Cooperation:
Li Peng's Diary on Foreign Affairs Vol. II], pp. 449-450. However, the focus of Li’s comments during this visit
was on the desirable format for bilateral relations with Central Asian countries individually.

12

See Jianwei Wang, “China and SCO: Toward a New Type of Interstate Relations,” Guoguang Wu and Helen
Lansdowne eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security (Abingdon: Routledge,2008), pp. 104-126.

13

江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], “营造有利战略态势，增强国家战略能力 [Construct a Favorable Strategic Condition,
Strengthen National Strategic Capacity],” (October 31, 2001), 江泽民 [Jiang Zemin], 江泽民文选第3卷
[Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe], 2006), pp. 353-365.

14

Rumi Aoyama, Chugoku no Ajia Gaiko [China’s Asia Policy in the Post-cold War Era] (Tokyo: University of

15

Masayuki Masuda, “China’s Policy Toward Russia and Central Asia: Security Environment in the Northwest

Tokyo Press, 2013), p. 133.
Border Region,” pp. 121-123.
16

See Masayuki Masuda, “Chugoku Gaiko to Kokusai Shisutemu: NATO tono ‘Senryaku Taiwa’ Teiki no Ronri
to Kodo [Chinese Diplomacy and the International System: The Logic and Action of Proposals for a ‘Strategic
Dialogue’ with NATO],” Bouei Kenkyusho Kiyo [NIDS Security Studies], Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (March 2005), pp. 87-89.

17

李敏伦 [Li Minlun], 中国“新安全观”与上海合作组织研究 [Research on China’s “New Security Concept” andthe SCO] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe], 2007), p. 161.

18

邓羽 [Zheng Yu], “美国对上海合作组织的看法及政策 [U.S. Views and Policies on the SCO],” 和平与发展[Peace and Development], Nol. 1 (2007), p. 33; 李业梅 [Li Yemei], “试析上海合作组织与美国的关系 [Analysisof the Relationship between the SCO and the United States],” 新疆大学学报（哲学・人文社会科学版） [Journal

80

Notesof Xinjiang University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences], Vol. 36, No. 5, (September 2008), p. 108.
19

Takeshi Yuasa, Gendai Chuo Ajia no Kokusai Seiji: Roshia, Beiou, Chugoku no Kainyu to Shin Dokuritsukoku
no Jiritsu [International Politics of Contemporary Central Asia: Autonomy of Newly Independent States andInterventions by Russia, the West, and China] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2015), pp. 231-234.

20赵华胜 [Zhao Huasheng], 上海合作组织: 评析和展望 [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Analysis and21赵华胜 [Zhao Huasheng], 上海合作组织: 评析和展望 [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Analysis andOutlook] (Beijing: 时事出版社 [Current Affairs Press], 2012), pp. 73-85.
Outlook], p. 83.
22
23

Reuters, November 15, 2002; 环球时报 [Global Times], November 18, 2002.
“上海合作组织成员国元首理事会会议联合公报 [Joint Communique of the Meeting of the Council of Heads
of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization],” (August, 28, 2008), 人民日报 [People’s Daily],
August 29, 2008.

24

胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “携手建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐地区: 在上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第八次会
议上的讲话 [Joining Hands to Build a Harmonious Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity: Speechat the Eighth Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization],”(August 28, 2008), 新华月报社编 [Xinhua Monthly Magazine, ed.], 时政文献辑览（2008.3-2009.4）[Current
Political Documents (March 2008 to April 2009)] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe], 2009), p. 908.

25

人民日报 [People’s Daily], May 16, 2009.

26

For details of the SCO’s dialogue partner mechanism and relations with the U.S., see Masayuki Masuda,“China’s SCO Policy in the Regional Security Architecture,” The Tokyo Foundation Policy Brief, 2011.

27“胡锦涛主席在上海合作组织成员国莫斯科会议上的讲话 [Speech by President Hu Jintao at the Meeting of theCouncil of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Moscow],” (May 29, 2003), “
上海五国”—上海合作组织资料汇编（1996.4-2003.8）[Compilation of Documents of the “Shanghai Five” andthe SCO (April 1996 to August 2003)], p. 76.

28“上海合作组织成员国总理会晤举行 [Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States of the29

胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “加强务实合作 共谋和平发展: 在上海合作组织塔什干峰会上的讲话 [Strengthening

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Held in Beijing],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], September 24, 2003.
Pragmatic Cooperation and Seeking Peace and Development: Speech at the Tashkent Summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization],” (June 17, 2004), 上海合作组织资料汇编 第2缉（2003.9-2005.8）[Compilation ofDocuments of the SCO, Vol. II (September 2003 to August 2005)], (Shanghai: 上海社会科学院上海合作组织研
究中心 [SCO Research Center, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences], n.d.), p. 12.
30“上海合作组织简介 [Brief Introduction of the SCO],” (Shanghai Cooperation Organization Official Website).

31

龚新蜀、刘庆岩 [Gong Xinshu and Liu Qingyan], “上海合作组织框架下经济合作制约因素及原因分析[Economic Cooperation Constraints Factors Analysis within the Framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization],” 重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）[Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:
Social Science], Vol. 26, No. 3 (June 2009), p. 24. Subsequently, working groups were added to deal with theareas of energy, and information and telecommunications. See 刘华芹 [Liu Huaqin], “上合组织区域经济合作
成效超出预期 [Regional Economic Cooperation within the SCO Succeeds Beyond Expectations],” 国际商报[International Business Daily], August 25, 2008.

32“中国商务部欧洲司司长须同凯发言 [Remarks by Xu Tongkai, Director of the Department of European Affairs,
Ministry of Commerce of China],” (Website of the SCO Regional Economic Cooperation Network); “上海合作组织: 区域环境与中小企业投资贸易促进研讨会发言稿 [Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Statement in
Seminar on Regional Environment and Promotion of Investment and Trade by SMEs],” September 9, 2007 (TheMinistry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Official Website).

81

Notes33

胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “共创上海合作组织更加美好的明天: 在上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第六次会议上
的讲话 [Joining Hands to Build a Better Future of Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Speech at the Sixth
Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization],” (June 15,2006), 新华月报社编 [Xinhua Monthly Magazine, ed.], 时政文献辑览 (2006.3～2007.3) [Current Political
Documents (March 2006 to March 2007)] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe], 2007), pp. 975-976; 胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “正确把握政治外交和经济外交的辩证关系 [Correctly Grasp the Dialectical Relations between
Political Diplomacy and Economic Diplomacy],” (August 25, 2004), 胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], 胡锦涛文选第2卷
[Selected Works of Hu Jintao, Vol. II] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [Renmin Chubanshe], 2016), pp. 222-224.

34

Takeshi Yuasa, Gendai Chuo Ajia no Kokusai Seiji: Roshia, Beiou, Chugoku no Kainyu to Shin Dokuritsukoku
no Jiritsu [International Politics of Contemporary Central Asia: Autonomy of Newly Independent States andInterventions by Russia, the West, and China], p. 234.

35

赵华胜 [Zhao Huasheng], 上海合作组织: 评析和展望 [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Analysis andOutlook], pp. 115-116.

36

Azhar Serikkaliyeva, Aidarbek Amirbek and Eftal Şükrü Batmaz, “Chinese Institutional Diplomacy towards
Kazakhstan: The SCO and the New Silk Road Initiative,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 2018), p. 136.

37

习近平 [Xi Jinping], “共同建设‘丝绸之路经济带’ [Join Hands to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt]” (September
7, 2013), 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 论坚持推动构建人类命运共同体 [On Building a Human Community with a
Shared Future] (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 2018), pp. 42-46.

38

习近平 [Xi Jinping], “弘扬‘上海精神’，促进共同发展 [Carrying Forward the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ and Promoting
Common Development]” (September 13, 2013), 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 论坚持推动构建人类命运共同体 [OnBuilding a Human Community with a Shared Future], p. 49.

39

潘光、胡键 [Pan Guang and Hu Jian], 21世纪的第一个新型区域合作组织: 对上海合作组织的综合研究 [TheFirst New Regional Cooperation Organization of the 21st Century: A Comprehensive Study of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization] (Beijing: 中共中央党校出版社 [Central Party School Press], 2006), pp. 136-137.

40

潘光、胡键 [Pan Guang and Hu Jian], 21世纪的第一个新型区域合作组织: 对上海合作组织的综合研究 [TheFirst New Regional Cooperation Organization of the 21st Century: A Comprehensive Study of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization], p. 136, 138.

41

赵华胜 [Zhao Huasheng], 上海合作组织: 评析和展望 [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Analysis andOutlook], pp. 116-117.

42

习近平 [Xi Jinping], “弘扬‘上海精神’，促进共同发展 [Carrying Forward the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ and Promoting
Common Development],” p. 45.

43

Takeshi Yuasa, “Kokusai Seiji to Anzen Hosho: Kokusai Shakai no Henyo to Hendo [International Politics
and Security: Transformation and Change in the International Community],” Tomohiko Uyama and Masato
Hiwatari, eds., Gendai Chuo Ajia: Seiji, Keizai, Shakai [Contemporary Central Asia: Politics, Economy andSociety] (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha, 2018), pp. 66-67.

44

The National Institute for Defense Studies ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2015 (Tokyo: The Japan Times,2015), pp. 213-215.

45“中华人民共和国与俄罗斯关于丝绸之路经济带建设和欧亚经济联盟建设对接合作的联合声明 [Joint
Statement on Cooperation of Connection between the Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian Economic
Union],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], May 9, 2015.

46

国家信息中心信息化研究部 [Department of Informatization Research, State Information Center (SIC)], ‘一带一路’发展成效综合评价指数在京首发 [China Issues its First Comprehensive Assessment and Indices of theBelt and Road Initiative’s Development],” October 28, 2016.

47

82

For the 2018 report the number of countries subject to assessment was increased to 71. See 国家信息中心“一带Notes

一路”大数据中心 [SIC Belt and Road Big Data Center], “一带一路”大数据报告 (2018) [Belt and Road in Big
Data Report 2018] (Beijing: 商务印书馆 [The Commercial Press], 2018), p. 26.
48

国家信息中心“一带一路”大数据中心 [SIC Belt and Road Big Data Center], “一带一路”大数据报告(2016) [Beltand Road in Big Data Report 2016] (Beijing: 商务印书馆 [The Commercial Press], 2016), pp. 23-25.

49

国家信息中心“一带一路”大数据中心 [SIC Belt and Road Big Data Center], “一带一路”大数据报告 (2017) [Beltand Road in Big Data Report 2017] (Beijing: 商务印书馆 [The Commercial Press], 2017), p. 15; 国家信息中心“一带一路”大数据中心 [SIC Belt and Road Big Data Center], “一带一路”大数据报告 (2018) [Belt and Road in
Big Data Report 2018], p. 36.

50

文龙杰、苗壮 [Wen Longjie and Miao Zhuang], “中哈合作: 哈萨克斯坦‘光明大道’新经济政策与丝绸之路经济带 [China-Kazakhstan Cooperation: Kazakhstan’s New Economic Policy of the ‘Bright Road’ and the Silk Road
Economic Belt],” 孙力、吴宏伟主编 [Sun Li and Wu Hongwei, eds.], 中亚国家发展报告 (2016) [Development
Report of the Countries of Central Asia] (Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 [Social Sciences Academic Press],2016), pp. 244-246; 肖斌 [Xiao Bin], “2016年的中亚国家与大国及次大国间关系及其前景 [Relationship
Between Central Asian Countries and Major Powers and Secondary Powers in 2016 and Future Prospects],”
李风林主编 [Li Fenglin, ed.], 欧亚发展研究2017 [Eurasian Development Studies] (Beijing: 中国发展出版社[China Development Press], 2017), p. 177.

51

中华人民共和国财政部 [Ministry of Finance of People’s Republic of China], “‘一带一路’财务可持续性分析框架 [Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative,” April 25, 2019.

52“推动共建丝绸之路经济带和二十一世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动 [Vision and Actions on Jointly Building
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road]” (March 2015), 中共中央文献研究室编 [Party
Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, ed.], 十八大以来重要文献选编（中）[Selected
Important Documents Since the 18th Party Congress, Vol. II], (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party
Literature Press], 2016), p. 445.

53

人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 24, 2013.

54

人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 1, 2014.

55“深化互利共赢的中欧全面战略伙伴关系: 中国对欧盟政策文件 [Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation: China’s Policy Paper on the European
Union (April 2004)],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 3, 2014.

56

Reuters, March 30, 2014.

57

人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 1, 2014.

58“建立中德全方位战略伙伴关系的联合声明 [Joint Statement on the Establishment of China-Germany All-Round
Strategic Partnership],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], March 29, 2014; “Gemeinsame Erklärung zum Besuch
von Staatspräsident Xi: Schaffung einer umfassenden strategischen Partnerschaft zwischen Deutschland und
China,” March 28, 2014.

59

刘笑阳 [Liu Xiaoyang], “中德伙伴关系的评价与展望 [China-Germany Partnership: A Strategic Analysis],” 中
国战略报告 [Chinese Journal of Strategic Studies], No. 2 (2018), p. 178.

60

“中德合作行动纲要: 共塑创新 [Program of Action for China-Germany Cooperation: Co-innovation],” 人民日61刘笑阳 [Liu Xiaoyang], “中德伙伴关系的评价与展望 [China-Germany Partnership: A Strategic Analysis],”报 [People’s Daily], October 11, 2014.
pp. 181-182.
62“中英关于构建面向21世纪全球全面战略伙伴关系的联合宣言 [China-UK Joint Declaration on Building a
Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 23,
2015; “UK-China Joint Statement on Building a Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21stCentury,” October 22, 2015.

83Notes63

UK Department for International Trade, “Chinese State Visit: Up to £40 Billion Deals Agreed,” October 23,
2015.

64

崔洪建 [Cui Hongjian], “发展中英关系应注意的复杂因素 [Complicated Factors of Note in the Development ofChina-UK Relations],” 学习时报 [Study Times], November 9, 2015.

65

The Guardian, June 3, 2010.

66

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were strongly seeking to enhance cooperation with China.
Hungary’s proactive stance was particularly noticeable, anticipating that China and other emerging superpowers
would become “inevitable players of the global economy and politics,” and announcing a policy of seeking tostrengthen relations with China, particularly in search of economic effects. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Hungary, “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union,”
2011.

67

刘作奎 [Liu Zuokui], “新形势下中国对中东欧国家投资问题分析 [Analysis of Issues Related to China’s
Investment in Central and Eastern European Countries under New Situations],” 国际问题研究 [International
Studies], No. 1 (2013), p. 116.

68

China-CEEC Think Tanks Networks, “The Cooperation between China and Central & Eastern European
Countries (16+1): 2012-2017,” December 2017, pp. 40-41.

69

China-CEEC Think Tanks Networks, “Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern
European Countries,” December 3, 2017.

70“中国-中东欧国家合作布加勒斯特纲要 [The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and the
CEECs],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 28, 2013.

71

人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 27, 2013.

72

人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 27, 2015.

73

The CEECs were quick to demonstrate an interest in the two Silk Road initiatives that China proposed in 2013,
and at the third China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting in May 2014 they expressed their hopes that theconstruction of the two Silk Roads would further develop cooperative relations. 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency],
May 13, 2014.

74“中国-中东欧国家合作中期规划 [The Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and the CEECs],”
新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], November 24, 2015.

75

人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 14, 2015.

76

At the 8th China-CEEC Summit held in April 2019 in Dubrovnik, Croatia, Greece was approved as an official
member of the China-CEEC cooperation. “中国-中东欧国家合作杜布罗夫尼克布纲要 [The Dubrovnik Guidelines
for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April
15, 2019.

77

With regard to European perspective on China and policy trends in Europe, see Atsuko Higashino, “Yoroppa
to Ittai Ichiro: Kyoi Ninshiki, Rakutan, Kitai no Kyozon [Belt and Road Initiative and Europe: Sense of Threat,
Disappointment, and Expectation,” Kokusai Anzen Hosho [Journal of International Security], Vol. 47, No. 1(June 2019), pp. 32-51.

78

The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2016.

79

Livia Benkova, Apolonija Rihtarić, Velina Tchakarova, “Will the EU Lose the East?” AIES Studies, No. 6 (May2018), p. 18.

80“中国对欧盟政策文件 [China’s Policy Paper on the European Union (December 2018)],” 人民日报 [People’s81习近平 [Xi Jinping], “携手推进‘一带一路’建设 [Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt andDaily], December 19, 2018.
The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road],” (May 14, 2017), 中共中央党史和文献研究院编 [Party History and84

NotesLiterature Research Institution of the CPC Central Committee, ed.], 十八大以来重要文献选编（下） [Selected
Important Documents Since the 18th Party Congress, Vol. III] (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party
Literature Press], 2018), p. 733.
82

李克强 [Li Keqiang], “政府工作报告 [Report on the Work of the Government]” (March 5, 2016), 中共中央党
史和文献研究院编 [Party History and Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, ed.], 十八
大以来重要文献选编（下） [Selected Important Documents Since the 18th Party Congress, Vol. III], p. 283.

83

人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 28, 2018.

84

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), pp. 111-112.

85

国防大学国家安全工程实验室、国防大学国防经济研究中心 [PLA NDU National Security Engineering
Laboratory and National Defense Economics Research Center], ‘一带一路’安全保障研讨会缉要 [A Summaryof the Belt and Road Security Support Seminar] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社 [NDU Press], n.d.), p. 83.

86

国防大学国家安全工程实验室、国防大学国防经济研究中心 [PLA NDU National Security Engineering
Laboratory and National Defense Economics Research Center], ‘一带一路’安全保障研讨会缉要 [A Summaryof the Belt and Road Security Support Seminar], p. 13.

87

国防大学国家安全工程实验室、国防大学国防经济研究中心 [PLA NDU National Security Engineering
Laboratory and National Defense Economics Research Center], ‘一带一路’安全保障研讨会缉要 [A Summaryof the Belt and Road Security Support Seminar], pp. 14-18.

88

国防大学国家安全工程实验室、国防大学国防经济研究中心 [PLA NDU National Security Engineering
Laboratory and National Defense Economics Research Center], ‘一带一路’安全保障研讨会缉要 [A Summaryof the Belt and Road Security Support Seminar], pp. 46-47.

89

解放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], July 12, 2017.

90

For example, see the following discussion. 李庆四、陈春雨 [Li Qingsi and Chen Chunyu], “试析中国的海外港链基地战略 [Analysis of Chinese Overseas Port String Bases Strategy],” 区域与全球发展 [Area Studies
and Global Development], No. 2 (2019), pp. 123-137; 马方方 [Ma Fangfang], “加强我军维和行动后勤保障
的几点思考 [Several Considerations of Strengthening Logistics Support for the PLA’s Peace Operations],” 国
防 [National Defense], No. 12 (2017), p. 35; 薛桂芳、邓洁 [Xue Guifang and Zheng Jie], “中国21世纪海外基地建设的现实需求与风险应对 [China’s Overseas Basing: Necessities and Risk Response in the Twenty-first
Century],” 国际展望 [Global Review], No. 4 (2017), pp. 104-121.

91

谌力、汪丽、韦政 [Chen Li, Wang Li and Wen Zheng], “新安全观视域下海外基地转型重塑的影响及启示[The Transformation and Remolding of Overseas Bases: From a Perspective of New Security Concept],” 国防[National Defense], No. 9 (2017), pp. 44-45.

92“中华人民共和国国防法 [National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China],” 中国法律年鉴编辑部编
[Law Yearbook of China Editorial Board ed.], 中国法律年鉴1998 [Law Yearbook of China 1998], (Beijing: 中
国法律年鉴出版社 [Press of Law Yearbook of China], 1998), pp. 241-245.

93

薛桂芳、邓洁 [Xue Guifang and Zheng Jie], “中国21世纪海外基地建设的现实需求与风险应对 [China’s
Overseas Basing: Necessities and Risk Response in the Twenty-first Century],” p. 114. The 2015 National
Security Law of the People’s Republic of China is also understood through the same logic. Xue et al. argues
that, “Through the construction of overseas bases China is seeking to protect its interests at home and abroad,without overlooking its responsibility as a major power to provide public goods with regard to international
security.”

94

Until the construction of the logistical support base in Djibouti, PLA Navy was known as the “Three-monthfleet,” meaning that without resupplying the fleet has to return to home ports every three months. 中国国防报
[China National Defense Daily], July 21, 2017.

85

Notes95

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 111.

96

孙永生、吴永超 [Sun Yongsheng and Wu Yongchao], “一带一路: 中国海外利益安全风险防控 [The Beltand Road: the Challenges of China’s Overseas Interests Security],” 智库理论与实践 [Think Tank: Theory &Practice], Vol. 2, No. 6 (December 2017), p. 22.

97

国防大学国家安全工程实验室、国防大学国防经济研究中心 [PLA NDU National Security Engineering
Laboratory and National Defense Economics Research Center], ‘一带一路’安全保障研讨会辑要 [A Summaryof the Belt and Road Security Support Seminar], p. 56.

98

江苏法制报 [Jiangsu Legal Daily], September 25, 2015.

99“连云港论坛暨首届跨国油气管道国际安保合作会议共同声明 [Lianyungang Forum: Joint Statement of theFirst International Cooperation Conference on Transnational Oil and Gas Pipelines Security],” December 11,
2017.

100

连云港日报 [Lianyungang Daily], September 14, 2018.

101

江苏法制报 [Jiangsu Legal Daily], June 20, 2018; “第四届‘连云港论坛’警用装备和公共安全产品博览会 [TheFourth Lianyungang Forum Police Equipment and Public Security Products Expo],” 中国安全防范技术与应用[China Security Protection Technology and Application], No.3 (2018), p. 4.

102

谭晓平、张弛 [Tan Xiaoping and Zhang Chi], “五国外警相聚港城 ‘连云港论坛’再谱新篇 [Police Officers
from Five Countries Gather Together in a Port City, ‘Lianyungang Forum Writes a New Chapter’],” 大陆桥视野 [New Silk Road Horizon], No. 5 (2017), pp. 22-24.

103

人民网 [Renminwang], June 28, 2018; 人民公安报 [China Police Daily], September 12, 2018.

104

张敏娇 [Zhang Minjiao], “30国齐聚连云港论坛: 加强国际执法安全合作 共同提升执法能力 [30 Countries
Gather at the Lianyungang Forum: Strengthening International Law Enforcement Cooperation and Jointly
Improving Law Enforcement Capacity],” 现代世界警察 [Modern World Police], No. 10 (2018), p. 12.

105

习近平 [Xi Jinping], “积极树立亚洲安全观，共创安全合作新局面 [Proactively Build Asian Security Concept
and Work Together for a New State of Security Cooperation]” (May 21, 2014), 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 论坚持推动构建人类命运共同体 [On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future], p. 114, 116.

106“连云港论坛从创意构想到创新实践 [Lianyungang Forum: From Creative Ideas to Innovative Practices],”
December 7, 2017 (Lianyungang City Official Website).

107
108

“大事记 [The Major Events],” (Lianyungang Forum Official Website).
习近平 [Xi Jinping], “坚持合作创新法治共赢 携手开展全球安全治理 [Adhering to Cooperation, Innovation,
the Rule of Law and Win-win Results and Promoting Global Security Governance]” (September 26, 2017),
习近平 [Xi Jinping], 论坚持推动构建人类命运共同体 [On Building a Human Community with a Shared
Future], p. 488.

109

人民公安报 [China Police Daily], March 3, 2019.

110

人民网 [Renminwang], October 30, 2018.

111

大公网 [Takungpao Online], September 12, 2018.

112

Belarus Daily News, July 25, 2017; Mehr News Agency, September 13, 2018; 人民公安报 [China Policy Daily],
December 12, 2017.

Chapter 2
1

S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe,
1996), pp. 90-91.

286

Konstantin Syroezhkin, Sin’tszian: Bol’shoi vopros dlia Kitaia i Kazakhstana (Almaty: Instituta mirovoi

Notesekonomiki i politiki, 2015), pp. 232-233.
3

Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Post-Soviet Transformations and the Contemporary History of Uzbekistan,” in Marien
Laeuelle, ed., Uzbekistan: Political Order, Societal Changes, and Cultural Transformations (Washington D.C.:
George Washington University Central Asia Program, 2017).

4

Wang Ke, 20 Seiki Chugoku no Kokka Kensetsu to “Minzoku” [Nation Building and Ethnic Identity in
20th-Century China] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006), pp. 158-161.

5

Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008), pp. 214-215.

6

During the disturbance in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the confrontations in Osh in the Fergana Valley between ethnic
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks intensified, and tensions rose over whether Uzbekistan would intervene or not.

7

Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China
Cooperation Prospects (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017), p. 22.

8Masato Hiwatari, “Shijo Iko Seisaku to Makuro Keizai: Iko Kaikaku no Kiketsu to Kongo no Kadai [Economic
Policy in Transitional Economies: Progress and Prospects on the Transition to a Market Economy],” in Tomohiko
Uyama and Masato Hiwatari, eds., Gendai Chuo Ajia: Seiji, Keizai, Shakai [Contemporary Central Asia: Politics,
Economy, Society] (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha, 2018), pp. 119-120.

9

Tomohiko Uyama, “Gendai Seiji Shi: Rekishi-Teki Haikei, Soren no Isan to Dokuritsu Kokka Kensetsu [History ofContemporary Politics: The Historic Background, Legacy of the Soviet Union, and Independent Nation Building],”in Tomohiko Uyama and Masato Hiwatari, eds., Gendai Chuo Ajia: Seiji, Keizai, Shakai, p. 11, pp. 26-27.

10

Yukiko Hama, Yurashia-Shugi toha Nanika? [What is Eurasianism?] (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 2010).

11

Hidehiro Okada, Nobuo Kanda, and Jun Matsumura, Shikinjo no Eiko [The Glory of the Forbidden Palace](Tokyo: Bungeishunju Ltd., 1968).

12Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia's New Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2016).

13

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index 2018 (Sydney: IEP, 2018).

14

Ghiasy and Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation
Prospects, p. 25.

15

Reuters, June 30, 2016.

16

China Military News, August 4, 2016; “Kitai i Tadzhikistan sozdaiut sekretnyi voennyi soiuz,” Sputnik, August

17

Daniyar Kosnazarov and Iskander Akylbayev, “The Great Bargain between Russia and China for Central Asia,”

4, 2016.
China in Central Asia blog, November 6, 2016.
18

Fabio Indeo, “Russia-China Military Cooperation in Central Asia: A Temporary Convergence of Strategic
Interests,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), December 21, 2018.

19

The Washington Post, February 18, 2019.

20“The Washington Post priniala tadzhikskuiu pogranzastavu v Murgabe za voennyi ob"ekt Kitaia, - istochnik,”
Asia-Plus, February 21, 2019.

21

中国军网 [China Military Net], July 21, 2018; 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], October 23, 2018.

22

Twitter, @AlexGabuev, February 19, 2019.

23

Ryuichi Shibasaki, Hirofumi Arai, and Hironori Kato, “Chuo Ajia: Sekai Saidai no Rikufu Chiiki [Central
Asia: The World’s Largest Landlocked Region],” in Ryuichi Shibasaki, ed., Gurobaru Rojisutikusu Nettowaku[Global Logistics Network] (Tokyo: Seizando-Shoten Publishing, 2019), pp. 130-134.

24

PwC Kazakhstan, “Kazakhstan and the New Silk Road: The Implication of Aligning Goals and How to Reach
Them,” September 2017, p. 2.

87Notes25

Hirofumi Arai, “Siberia Randoburijji: Oua ni Matagaru Kokudo o Ikasu Rosia [The Siberian Land Bridge:
Russia Utilizing Territory that Connects Europe and Asia],” in Ryuichi Shibasaki, ed., Global Logistics
Network, pp. 124-125.

26

Xinhua News Agency (Japanese Edition), June 23, 2016.

27

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Europe, Russia and CIS Division, Chuo Ajia ni Okeru Chugoku
Kigyo no Shinshutsu Jirei [Examples of Chinese Companies Entering Central Asia], October 2017.

28

Fergana News, April 25, 2019.

29

Fabio Indeo, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Strengthen China’s Relations with Central Asia,” Alessia Amighini,ed., China’s Belt and Road: A Game Changer? (Milano: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2017),
p. 40.

30

Ghiasy and Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation
Prospects, p. 20.

31

Itsuryou Go, “Horugosu ha Chugoku Seibu no Shinsen ni Naruka [Will Khorgos become the Shenzhen ofWestern China?],” Keizai Kagaku Kenkyusho Kiyo [Research Institute of Economics Science Bulletin], Nihon
University, No. 41 (March 2011), p. 76.

32“The Address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan,” Official
Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, November 11, 2014.

33

Indeo, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Strengthen China’s Relations with Central Asia,” p. 41.

34

People’s China Online (Japanese edition), November 16, 2017.

35

Alma Sultangaliyeva, Kazakhstan and its Neighbors: Opportunities and Limitations (Astana: Institute of World
Economics and Politics, 2016), p. 21.

36

Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, April 26, 2019.

37

Indeo, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Strengthen China’s Relations with Central Asia,” p. 39.

38

BBC Chinese, June 25, 2017.

39

Ghiasy and Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation
Prospects, p. 27.

40

Michał Bogusz and Mariusz Marszewski, “Chinese-Kazakhstan Agreement on Oppressed Group of Kazakhs,”
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), January 16, 2019.

41

Ghiasy and Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China Cooperation
Prospects, p. 22.

42“Ekspert: Uzbekistan initsiiruet vozrozhdenie Tsentral'noaziatskogo soiuza,” EADaily, August 29, 2017.

43“Lidery gosudarstv Tsentral'noi Azii v khode istoricheskoi vstrechi poobeshchali ‘vmeste reshit problemy’,”Karavansarai, March 15, 2018.

44“Ekspert: Uzbekistan initsiiruet vozrozhdenie Tsentral'noaziatskogo soiuza,” EADaily, August 29, 2017.

45“Uzbekistan i Kyrgyzstan vozobnovili avtobusnoe soobshchenie mezhdu svoimi stolitsamit,” Karavansarai,
May 9, 2018.

46“Kazakhstan i Uzbekistan zakliuchili soglasheniia o voennom sotrudnichestve v tseliakh ukrepleniia
bezopasnosti v Tsentral'noi Azii,” Karavansarai, April 18, 2019.

47

Manabu Shimoyashiro, “Kokusai Keizai to Bijinesu: 5 kakoku 5 yo no Shoki to Risuku [The Global Economy
and Business: Five Opportunities and Risks in Five Countries],” in Tomohiko Uyama and Masato Hiwatari,eds., Gendai Chuo Ajia: Seiji, Keizai, Shakai, pp. 157-158.

48

Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2008); Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

88

Notes49

Alexander Lukin, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

50

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), pp. 383-393.

51“Russia's Relations with the West, through a Neorealist Filter,” Russia Direct, November 17, 2016.

52

John S. Van Oudenaren, “Why Trump Can’t Break Russia Away from China,” The Diplomat, February 23, 2017.

53

Alexander Panov, Dmitry Streltsov, Anna Kireeva and Vladimir Nelidov, Russia-Japan Relations: New Stageof Development (Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council, 2019).

54

Dmitri Trenin, “It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 25,
2019.

55

Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Pivot to China Goes Astray: The Impact on the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture,”
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2016), pp. 89-110.

56“Briefing: Eastern Fast Air,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 12, 2011.

57

For the general observation of Russian arms export industry, see Hiroshi Yamazoe, Kokusai Heiki Shijo to Rosia[International Conventional Weapons Market and Russia] (Tokyo: Toyo Shoten, 2014).

58

Maggie Xiaoyang Chen and Chuanhao Lin, Foreign Investment across the Belt and Road: Patterns, Determinants
and Effects, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 8607, October 2018, p. 16.

59“Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” Website of the President of Russia, April 26, 2019.

60

Hiroshi Kimura, “Yurashia Keizai Rengo to Ketsugo? Rosia no Mikata [Russia and the BRI],” Unyu to Keizai[Transportation and Economy], Vol. 78, No. 12 (December 2018).

Chapter 3
1

International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy Security.”2

For example, see the following works: Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn eds., Energy and Security:
Strategies for a World in Transition (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2005); Sanam S. Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European
Union with Major Oil-and Gas-Supplying Countries (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).

3

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2007), Chapter 8; Chapter 10.

4

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2017), Chapter 14.

5

Daojiong Zha, “Debating Energy Security in China: Ideas and Policy Options,” Fengshi Wu and Hongzhou
Zhang eds., China’s Global Quest for Resources: Energy, Food and Water (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017),
pp. 44-48.

6

For the characteristics of coal, see IEA, Resources to Reserves 2013: Oil, Gas and Coal Technologies for the
Energy Markets of the Future (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2013), Chapter 1; Chapter 7.

7Zha, “Debating Energy Security in China: Ideas and Policy Options,” pp. 42-58.

8

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007, Chapter 8.

9For example, see the following research: Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo eds., China’s Dilemma: Economic
Growth, the Environment and Climate Change (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008).

10“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要 [Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for Economic
and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China],” 中华人民共和国国务院公报 [Gazette of the StateCouncil of the People's Republic of China], No. 12, 2006, pp.16-48.

11

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007, Chapter 8.

12Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000); Arthur Waldron ed.,China in Africa (Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2006).

13

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007, Chapter 10.

89Notes14Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging against Risk (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2013), pp. 150-196.

15

Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy.

16

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017, Chapter 14.

17

BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2018.

18

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017, Chapter 14.

19“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要 [Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic
and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China],” 人民日报[People’s Daily], March 18, 2016.

20“能源发展‘十三五’规划 (公开发布搞) [13th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development: public version],” December
2016.

21

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017; IEA, World Energy Outlook 2018 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2018); IEA, Gas 2017:
Analysis and Forecasts to 2022, Market Report Series (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2017); IEA, Gas 2018: Analysis andForecasts to 2023, Market Report Series (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2018); IEA, Oil 2018: Analysis and Forecasts to2023, Market Report Series, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2018).

22

BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2018.

23

Yelena Kalyuzhnova, Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth: Companies, Governments, Policies(Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 35-36.

24

Kalyuzhnova, Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth, pp. 200-206.

25

Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 286-287.

26

Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, pp. 286-298.

27

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), “CNPC in Kazakhstan.”

28

KazMunaigaz (KMG), “Obshchaia Informatsia.”

29

Production Sharing Agreement. An exploration and development agreement used by oil- and/or gas-producing
countries. The product is shared between the oil- and/or gas-producing country and a foreign oil company. The
foreign oil company works as a contractor for the oil- and/or gas-producing country or its state-owned company,
supplying necessary funding and technology, and recovers its actual expenses in the form of spot commodities
from the product. After costs are recovered, the product is shared between the foreign oil company and theoil- and/or gas-producing country or its state-owned company.

30

KMG, “Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline”; Kazakhstan-China Pipeline (KCP) LLP, “Kazakhstan-China Pipeline.”

31

Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, pp. 296-297.

32

Alessandro Arduino, “China’s Energy Interests in Central Asia and Russia: Symbolic Distrust and Striking a
Balance between Cooperation and Confrontation,” Wu and Zhang eds., China’s Global Quest for Resources,
pp. 119-137.

33

National Institute for Defense Studies ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2010),
pp. 190-194.

34

National Institute for Defense Studies ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2012 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2012),
pp. 178-183.

35

Rosneft, “Crude Oil Exports.”

36

IEA, Gas 2018.

37

CNPC, “CNPC in Turkmenistan.”38

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2018, p. 633.

39

Jonathan Stern and Michael Bradshaw, “Russian and Central Asian Gas Supply for Asia,” Jonathan Stern ed.,Natural Gas in Asia: The Challenges of Growth in China, India, Japan and Korea (Oxford: Oxford University

90NotesPress, 2008), pp. 220-278.
40

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2009), pp. 471-476.

41

人民网 [Renmingwang], June 16, 2014.

42

Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, pp. 301-302.

43

Arduino, “China’s Energy Interests in Central Asia and Russia,” pp. 119-137.

44“Turkmenistan: An Exporter in Transition,” Simon Pirani ed., Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact
on Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 271-315.

45“Turkmenistan: An Exporter in Transition,” pp. 295-297.

46“中华人民共和国政府和土库曼斯坦政府关于实施中土天然气管道项目和土库曼斯坦向中国出售天然气的总协议 [General Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Governmentof Turkmenistan on the Implementation of the China-Turkmenistan Natural Gas Pipeline and Turkmenistan
Natural Gas to be Sold in China],” April 3, 2006.

47

Sales and Purchase Agreement (SPA): When signing multiple long-term contracts, e.g. for oil and gas, agreements
are made in stages to ensure contract security for both parties, and the final agreement is called an SPA.

48

Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, pp. 308-312.

49

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2012), pp. 86-87.

50

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2013), p. 110.

51

IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012, pp. 86-87.

52

Christopher E. Smith, “China Starts Construction on Third West-East Gas Pipeline,” Oil & Gas Journal,
October 23, 2012.

53

IEA, Gas Medium-Term Market Report 2014: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2019 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2014),
pp. 100-101.

54

IEA, Gas Medium-Term Market Report 2015: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2020 (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2015),
pp. 79-80.

55

Gazprom, “Alexey Miller: Russia and China Signed the Biggest Contract in the Entire History of Gazprom,”
May 21, 2014.

56

Arduino, “China’s Energy Interests in Central Asia and Russia,” pp. 128-129.

57

Gazprom, “Gazprom and CNPC Sign Heads of Agreement for Gas Supply via Western Route,” May 8, 2015.

58

James Henderson, “Asia: A Potential New Outlet for Russian Pipeline Gas and LNG,” James Henderson andSimon Pirani eds., The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), pp. 216-245.

59

Gazprom, “Eastern Gas Program.”

60

Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation, pp. 376-382.

61

Arduino, “China’s Energy Interests in Central Asia and Russia,” p. 131.

62

Steven Tadelis and Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics,” Robert Gibbons and John Roberts
eds., The Handbook of Organizational Economics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 159-189.

63“Zapusk proekta ‘Iamal SPG’ na polnuiu moshchnost',” Pravitel'stvo Rossii, December 11, 2018.

64

IEA, Gas 2018, p. 92.

65

IEA, Gas 2017, p. 79.

66

Toshihiro Sugiura, “Yuka Teimei ni Kurushimu Kasupikai Engan Shigenkoku: Azerubaijan/Kazafusutan/
Torukumenisutan no Genjo to Kin Mirai [Resource-rich Countries on the Caspian Sea Suffering from the Oil
Price Slump: the Situation and Near Future in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan],” Oil & Gas Review,Vol. 50, No. 6, November 2016, pp. 1-29.

67

Rajat M. Nag, “Study on the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: A Note on the91

NotesIndian Perspective,” The Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: The Perspectives ofChina, Russia, the European Union, India, and the United States of America, Background Paper at 2019 Eurasia
Meeting, Emerging Markets Forum, January 27-29, 2019, pp. 21-34.
68

Marcus Bartley Johns, Julian Latimer Clarke, Clay Kerswell, and Gerard McLinden, Trade Facilitation
Challenges and Reform Priorities for Maximizing the Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative, Discussion Paper,
No. 4, World Bank, September 2018.

69

Ben Derudder, Xingjian Liu, and Charles Kunaka, Connectivity Along Overland Corridors of the Belt and Road
Initiative, Discussion Paper, No. 6, World Bank, October 2018.

70

Julia Bird, Mathilde Lebrand and Anthony J. Venables, The Belt and Road Initiative: Reshaping Economic
Geography in Central Asia? Policy Research Working Paper 8807, World Bank’s Social, Urban, Rural and
Resilience Global Practice, April 2019.

71

Priyanka Kher and Trang Tran, Investment Protection Along the Belt and Road, Discussion Paper, No. 12,
World Bank, January 2019.

72

S&P Platts, “Analysis: China to Miss 2020 Shale Gas Production Targets Amid Tough Upstream Conditions,”
April 30, 2019.

73

Mikkal E. Herberg, “Introduction,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia’s Energy Security: And
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, NBR Special Report #68, November 2017, pp. v-viii.

74

National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of
the People’s Republic of China, with State Council Authorization, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” March 28, 2015.

75

国家发展和改革委员会、国家能源局 [National Development and Reform Commission, and National Energy
Administration], “推动丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路能源合作愿景与行动 [Vision and Actions on
Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road],” May
2017.

76

国家发展和改革委员会、国家能源局 [National Development and Reform Commission, and National Energy
Administration], “推动丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路能源合作愿景与行动 [Vision and Actions on
Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road],” 3.

77

国家发展和改革委员会、国家能源局 [National Development and Reform Commission, and National Energy
Administration], “推动丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路能源合作愿景与行动 [Vision and Actions on
Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road],” 4.

78

Kaho Yu, “The Geopolitics of Energy Cooperation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Asia’s Energy Security, NBR Special Report #68, pp. 29-39.

79“第二届‘一带一路’国际合作高峰论坛圆桌峰会联合公报 [Joint Communique of the Leaders' Roundtable of the80“第二届‘一带一路’国际合作高峰论坛圆桌峰会联合公报 [Joint Communique of the Leaders' Roundtable of the

2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation],” 人民日报 [People’s Daily], April 28, 2019.
2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation],” 1.
81“第二届‘一带一路’国际合作高峰论坛圆桌峰会联合公报[Joint Communique of the Leaders' Roundtable of the
2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation],” 8-21.

82“多边合作 [Multilateral Cooperation],” 一帯一路能源合作网 [The Official Website of Energy Cooperation
under the Belt and Road Initiative], September 25, 2018.

92

83“多边合作 [Multilateral Cooperation],” 4(5).

84“多边合作 [Multilateral Cooperation],” 4(3).

85Herberg, “Introduction.”

86

Ross McCracken, “Alive and Kicking: China Hydrocarbon Demand,” Paul Bartholomew et al., eds., The

NotesChinese Dream: Energy and Commodities in an Era of Change, S&P Global Platts, 2018, pp. 20-25.
87

Yu, “The Geopolitics of Energy Cooperation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”

88

S&P Platts, Opportunities and Challenges of China’s LNG Expansion, LNG Special Report, S&P Platts, March
2018.

89

Frank Umbach and Slawomir Raszewski, Strategic Perspectives for Bilateral Energy Cooperation Between
the EU and Kazakhstan: Geo-Economic and Geopolitical Dimensions in Competition with Russia and China’s
Central Asia Policies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2016.

90

Umbach and Raszewski, Strategic Perspectives for Bilateral Energy Cooperation Between the EU and
Kazakhstan.

91

Michael Emerson, “European Perspectives on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative,” The Belt and Road
Initiative in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: The Perspectives of China, Russia, the European Union,
India, and the United States of America, Background Paper at 2019 Eurasia Meeting, Emerging Markets Forum,
January 27-29, 2019, pp. 9-20.

Conclusions
1

Lowell Dittmer, “China’s New Internationalism,” Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne eds., China’s Turns toMultilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 27-31.

2

In addition to China’s efforts to reach out diplomatically to NATO as noted in Chapter 1, it seems that in 2004
there was also tentative contact between the SCO and the EU. See 戴轶尘 [Dai Yichen], “欧盟与上海合作组织
非正式对话及其机制化前景 [EU-SCO Informal Dialogue and Its Institutionalization],” 上海社会科学院世界
经济与政治研究院编 [Institute of World Economics and Politics, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences ed.],地缘关系与区域秩序的建构 [The Geopolitical Relations and Construction of Regional Order] (Beijing: 时事
出版社 [Current Affairs Press], 2011), p. 175.

3

人民日报 [People’s Daily], June 9, 2017; 人民日报 [People’s Daily], June 8, 2018.

93