Japanese Journal of Social Welfare, 60 (5), 13–20 2020

Original Article

The Aporia of Welfare Culture as War Culture in Postwar Japan
Takuya Shinohara*
Higashi Nippon International University, Fukushima, Japan

Abstract This study showed a fundamental perspective for discussing the relationship between
war and social welfare. The author focused on and investigated the relationship between war andwelfare within the cultural understanding of war in postwar Japan. First, the background and theoretical point of view on welfare culture are studied, as reported in section II. Then, discussions of
the relationship between war and culture are classiﬁed, as reported in section III. Then, the concept of war culture, as an interdisciplinary concept, is examined, and value judgments of the concept in the study of welfare culture are questioned in section IV. Several studies that have suggested a compatibility between war and welfare are reviewed, and a war culture that is compatible
with welfare culture is deﬁned in section V. The war culture found in postwar Japan is characterized in section VI, and ﬁnally the investigation is concluded in section VII. War culture in postwar
Japan is a compound of war weariness and life conservatism, which has supported the Japan-US
security system. When social welfare studies takes the perspective of culture, we should not only
confront war but investigate welfare of ourselves as well.
Key words: war, culture, welfare, social welfare

I.

Introduction

This study develops a fundamental perspective
for the discussion of war in social welfare study
and suggests the prospect and issue of the discussion of war, with reference to welfare culture andwar culture.1
Social welfare studies in postwar Japan haveplaced the terms “war” and “social welfare” inopposition, founded on the concept that war
threatens welfare. The reverse course has been
seen since 1950 in this relationship. Generally,funding for social welfare and armaments is considered to move in inverse proportion. However,some studies suggest that war is compatible with* Corresponding address: Department of Social Welfare,Higashi Nippon International University, 37 Suganezawa, Taira Kamata, Iwaki, Fukushima 970–8023,
Japan
E-mail: tshinohara@tonichi-kokusai-u.ac.jp(Received September 30, 2019; accepted January 29, 2020)

the promotion of the welfare state in principle,
and that war and welfare are not necessarily
opposed.
Therefore, social welfare studies require a
newly developed understanding of the relationship between war and social welfare and the relationship between war and welfare. The author
focuses on and investigates the relationshipbetween war and welfare within the cultural context of war in postwar Japan. A fundamental perspective is suggested for discussing the relationship between war and social welfare.
First, the background and theoretical point ofview on welfare culture are studied, as reported in
section II. Then, discussions of the relationshipbetween war and culture are classiﬁed, as reported
in section III. Following that, the concept of war
culture; as an interdisciplinary concept; is examined, and value judgments of the concept in the
study of welfare culture are questioned in section
IV. Several studies that have suggested a compati-

14

T. Shinoharability between war and welfare are reviewed, anda war culture that is compatible with welfare culture is deﬁned, as summarized in section V. The
war culture found in postwar Japan is characterized in section VI, and ﬁnally the investigation is
concluded in section VII.
II. What is the study of welfare culture?
The Japanese study of welfare culture was pioneered by Ichibangase in the late 1980s as anarea within social welfare study. Welfare culture
is considered to be a formation emerging fromthe combination of the ideas of welfare and culture (Ichibangase, 1997a; Masuko, 2017). Welfare refers to having a standard of living sufﬁcient to pursue happiness, and culture comesfrom the Latin cultura, meaning creating and cultivating good things through working on theenvironment (Ichibangase, 1997a). Welfare culture has the meaning of a purpose; oriented
toward creating a culture where all can achieve
welfare (Masuko, 2017). The essence of welfare
culture is the spirit pursuing the culture of ouraliveness as whole persons based on human dignity, as declared “wholesome and cultured living” in article 25 of the constitution of Japan.
The study of welfare culture within social welfare studies has pointed out its dependence on
the material and economic richness of Japan in
the twentieth century (Ichibangase, 1997).
Against the background of high economic
growth, the Japanese have asserted their legal
right to receive social welfare in the form ofgoods, money, and services as a compromisewith the state.
However, the question of whether social welfare produces welfare has remained open. Welfare culture is intended to create a culture that
fulﬁlls the spiritual side, in harmony with goods,
money, and services. Another question ofwhether social welfare in the welfare state standson the victims in other countries also remained.
The study of welfare culture trusts the supranational and international meaning of culture, at thetime of review of the welfare state (late 1980s).

It is familiar with the idea of human rights in thesense that it crosses borders, therefore it can besaid that welfare culture is human rights culture(Ichibangase, 1997b).
III.

Discussions which referred
to both war and culture

How does the study of welfare culture addressor understand war in its cultural aspect in postwar Japan? Theories that relate war to culture
can be divided into the following groups, according to approach.
1. War culture
The theory of war culture regards war as ahuman cultural activity, and it is considered to be
neutral. This perspective considers war to be an
aspect of culture that expresses some positive
qualities of human beings or as a cultural expression rooted in human nature that cannot be
judged as good or evil. Creveldʼs discussions are
representative here.
2. Anti-war culture
This group of theories relies on the value judgments associated with postwar paciﬁsm in Japan.
As above, the concept of war culture is used to
discuss the cultural conditions that support war.
However, here, war culture is given as an absolute.
Most Japanese studies that incorporate antiwar culture are characterized by the incorporation of the understanding of the Second World
War, and they do not refer to discussions of war
culture above. One group describes the adaptionof cultural activity to war (Yoshino, 2011; Takaoka, 2014). Another group points out the negative national character that has been brought inpostwar Japan (Kato, 2009).
3.

Cultural development
In this category of thought, the relationshipbetween war and cultural development isassessed. Einstein famously wrote to Freud to ask
how human beings could be freed from the yoke

The Aporia of Welfare Culture as War Culture in Postwar Japan

of war. In response, Freud wrote of the relationship between human drives and war. According tohim, the death drive plays a role in leading to war,
but the development of culture could displace
death drive and use its energy in other ways.
Related to this, in 1986, at an international
conference held by UNESCO in Seville, Spain, agroup of scholars presented a document called
the Seville Statement on Violence, which denies
the view that war is biologically inherent in
human nature. This statement also suggests that
cultural develpment is important to the renunciation of war.
4.

Cultural diplomacy and cultural policy
Cultural diplomacy and cultural policies are
discussed widely in the context of conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding. They are effective inpeacebuilding as multifunctional, complex mechanisms, against some criticism, such as the possibility of conﬂict by culture, the immorality of theuse of culture and the requirement of direct provision of food and money rather than culture(Fukushima, 2012).
In addition, soft power diplomacy is a related
concept within the network of war and culture.
This refers to the ability to obtain results throughan entityʼs own innate attractiveness, not throughcompulsion or reward, produced by a nationʼsculture, its political ideals, and the attraction of
its policies (Nye, 2004).
IV.

Is war culture evil?

The theory of anti-war culture forms the closest analog to the study of welfare culture. Here,the understanding of the academic and interdisciplinary concept of “war culture” should be
reviewed. Toshiya Yuki describes it as “a fashion
with a dark color of dark era that engulfs anddestroys peopleʼs dreams and hopes” (Yuki,
2015: 85). He calls for the power to feel andresist disturbing times being cultivated and indicates the role of the study of welfare culture.
Mainstream studies of welfare culture include
discussion based on the idea of war culture.2

15

We can outline studies of war and culture.
That is, (3) cultural development provides hope,(2) anti-war culture can be used to counteract (1)war culture, and describe it as negative, and (4)cultural diplomacy and cultural policy investigate a peace-promoting practice.
However, the relationship between (1) and (2)remains in question. The neutrality of the concept of war culture, as in (1), should be recognized, at least in terms of the spirit, attitude, andnational traits of those who support war. That is,although war may be catastrophic, this does notmean that the spirit and thoughts of the people
who lived during wartime must also be catastrophic. Within the memory of the war generation, even though battle itself could be terrible
and cruel, people living during in the war era feltthat society had a bright side. For example,
Yoshimoto recalled watching aerial battles inTokyo with excitement, and he characterized theatmosphere of society at that time as bright.
The whole atmosphere of society is extremely
bright and constructive. “The world was dark
during the war” is a terrible lie by the postwar
left and postwar believers in democracy. During the war, the world is refreshing, or it isvery bright. But that brightness is really not
good. A society without darkness is morbid
and unhealthy (Yoshimoto, 1999: 196–197).
Those who have lived through times of war
have different experiences, sources of information and impressions of the war, thus, the assessment of war culture as a dark culture and placing
it in opposition to welfare culture is questionable.
Using the theories discussed above and theirideas of war and welfare, we can come to a deﬁnition of war culture and consider the war cultureof postwar Japan.
V. Theories referring to compatibilityof war and welfare
Theories that assess the compatibility of war
and welfare can be divided into three contexts:

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T. Shinohara

welfare state theory, new war theory, and war
culture theory.
1. Welfare state theory
Welfare state theory suggests that the systemof total war in fact formed the basis for the welfare state, thus considering war and social welfare to be compatible, without making a value
judgment between them. Wartime Great Britain
produced the earliest model of the UK welfare
state (Beveridge, 1942; Titmuss, 1963). The government took advantage of changes in societythat allowed the formation of a welfare state. The
citizenry experienced a feeling of uniﬁcation andwere prepared to sacriﬁce their individual interests for a common purpose.
Social policy studies in Japan came to a similar conclusion. Okouchi found that “The war
does not make social policy go backward, but go
forward” (Okouchi, 1944: 4). Social welfare that
supplements social policy can be understood in
the same way. In postwar social welfare studies,
it is recognized that the prototype of the welfare
state appears in the time of war (Kouhashi 1962;
Sho, 1998; Ito, 2017).
The welfare state has the aspect of anti-war
that let peace be kept through keeping statemonopoly-capitalism under the Cold War. It is,however, related to promise the life and welfare
of fellow citizens rather than those of people
around the world. Welfare states in this sense do
not contradict the war itself in principle. Welfare
state theory suggests that ordinary people canaccept war as long as they do not become victims. Things are the same in the present day after
Cold War.
With reference to war, the Japanese people areless concerned with the proﬁt of social welfare
than with the security system as a sedative
against the fear of nuclear weapons and terrorism. The value of a safety that can never beachieved became an alternative to the implementation of social policy and the pursuit of social
welfare.

2.

New war theory
War in the contemporary world no longer
resembles the Second World War. After the Cold
War, neoliberalism forced people to live in globalism. As a result, the economic and social tension brought a new style of organized violence,such as local conﬂicts and terrorism. This novel
form is called new war.3 The actors in a new war
may not be sovereign states but terrorist organizations and international networks. The motives
for a new war can be diverse, whether resistanceto the policy of a regional or global hegemon orpersecution or exclusion of people with different
identities, rather than being a straightforward
battle for resources.
The response to a new war must involve theuse of force to protect and release people fromviolence and maintain security. Todayʼs armies
are specialized forces and not mass armies, andthey tend to play a policing role. The concept ofhuman security has become part of the philosophy of the response to the new war era. This idea
complements across crisis management functions, including the prevention of armed conﬂicts, countermeasures against terrorism, disasterrecovery, and humanitarian assistance.4
In the new war era in Japan, few experience
the cost or blood as it was felt in the Second
World War. Japan could not stop the support for
the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. Territorial andeconomic ambitions, fanaticism, nationalism,
and feelings of hate are no longer essential for
Japanese war, which occurs in a place that is separate from daily life. In addition, currently, social
media war is attracting more attention (Singer
and Emerson, 2018). Everyone can support the
war from home through their smartphone. They
are not only those who are irresponsible living insafety, but also those who demand the truth,
oppose injustice, and hope to build a brighter
world.
It is the civilians who are required to express
self-control rather than the military. In a democracy, some wars are begun by civilians rather
than the military (Miura, 2012).

The Aporia of Welfare Culture as War Culture in Postwar Japan

3. War culture theory
Discussion from the perspective of postwar
paciﬁsm tends to treat war as absolute evil (Kato,
2009; Yuki, 2015; Ebisaka, 2018). Traditional
war theory does not support this premise, and thecurrent discussion in the Japanese context relativizes it. According to Creveld, war has an
attractive cultural power, which people cannot
control through their reason, ultimately acting
more like sports than like politics (Creveld,2008). If this were not so, it would be more difﬁcult to act in such a destructive way. Creveld recognized war culture as the human spirit behindcultural expression about war.
Ishizu develops an understanding of war culture as a strategic expression culture and discussed the fostering of the modern version of Japanese war culture (Ishizu, 2013). Ishikawa claims
that peace is also culture, just as war is culture(Ishikawa, 2012, 2017). He claimed that Article 9of the Japanese Constitution, which renounces
war, is also a form of war culture (Ishikawa,
2012: 138).
War culture theory does not recommend a speciﬁc position on the military, but recommends
that we accept the image of humans as war
humans. The concept of war culture in war culture theory is not contained within the meaningof strategy itself, but the spirit and attitude that
produce it.
4.

Deﬁnition of war culture
War culture and welfare culture are two sidesof the same coin. Welfare culture is the spirit
pursuing culture of our aliveness as “wholesome
and cultured living”. While pursuing welfare,sometimes because of this pursuit, one canaccept and support war.
Based on this understanding, war culture canbe deﬁned as the spirit and attitude of social
traits guiding how people accept and support war
while pursuing their own welfare.
In the next section, we discuss the war cultureof postwar Japan and identify potential issues inthe study of the relationship between war andsocial welfare.

17

VI. War culture of postwar in Japan
What is war culture in postwar Japan? It is acompound of war weariness and life conservatism, which has supported the Japan–US security
system.
1.

Support for the Japan–US security system
The conception of Japanʼs own Self-Defense
Forces and the Japan–US security system suggests what the general idea of the Japanese people is regarding the handling of wars. In responseto the governmentʼs “Public Opinion Survey on
Self-Defense Forces and Security Issues” (thelatest version is from 2017 data, published in
January 2018), in 1969, 52% of Japanese
expressed a sense that there was a danger of war
or that they could not state there was no danger,
but in 2018, the total of those expressing a senseof danger and a sense of some danger was
85.5%.5
The US–Japan Security Treaty was rated as
helpful for Japanʼs peace and security in 1978 by
65.6%, and in 2018 this had risen to 77.5%. In
1969, 40.9% stated that Japanʼs safety should beprotected by the Japan–US security system andthe Self-Defense Forces, and in 2018, the ﬁgure
was 81.9%.6 These results clearly indicate that
almost all Japanese people want to maintain thestatus quo. In 1991, 69.8% were in favor ofincreasing or maintaining the current level ofpower of the Self-Defense Forces, in 2018,89.2% were in favor of increasing or maintaining
the current level, thus this indicating that the Japanese wish to maintain or increase the current
status of defense.
As a result, the majority of Japanese consider
that Japan is at risk of becoming involved in war
and it is, therefore, necessary and beneﬁcial tomaintain and strengthen the Japan–US security
system.
2. The culture of “war weariness” and “lifeconservatism”
What is the war culture of postwar Japan,
which accepts and supports the idea of war,

18

T. Shinohara

under the premise of maintaining and strengthening the US–Japan security system?
It could be described as war weariness. Herewar weariness is a more accurate expression thananti-war or renouncing war. In social welfare
studies, renunciation tends to be expressed inrelation to Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan(Kato, 2008; Shibata, 2016; Sekiya, 2017). However, if these concepts really do rule the thoughtof Japan, it is impossible to explain the existenceof US military bases on Japanese territories andthe fact that the Self-Defense Forces have been
deployed overseas.
The most accurate expression here is that of
war weariness, supplied by Nosaka. According tohim, “Anti-war may bet own life to save others,
but war weariness wants only own life, at best,or the safety of wife and children” (Nosaka,
1969: 191). It is a selﬁsh sprit and attitude.
Yamamoto illustrates Nosakaʼs concept andwrites that the reason why Japan could have recognized itself as a “peaceful state” after the war
is because of the power of “war weariness”(Yamamoto, 2016). According to Sabata, for theJapanese to live a bright life while being awareof Japanʼs dark history, they have needed to cling
to a peaceful daily life (Sabata, 2005).
Connected with war weariness, life conservatism is a cultural characteristic that can be related
to the postwar Japanese war culture, which has
been under discussion since the late 1970s.
According to Yamaguchi, life conservatism is thepolitical consciousness of the middle class,which was born when Japan became a middleclass society of 100 million against the background of a period of high economic growth. It isa “self-centered attitude that wants self-protection rather than public justice” (Yamaguchi,
2017: 91). Yamamoto asserts that the feeling oflife conservatism is one that everyone has, and it
ﬂows into both feelings of war hatred and theimpulse to arm oneself to prevent war (Yamamoto, 2016).
War weariness and life conservatism are consistent as they have it has been built up andstrengthened little by little until now. This is thespirit pretending to ignore or forget somethingtroublesome, and feeling safe. This is not passive
for the Japanese, but active, for their brighter
life. It has the character of culture relating to war
in the form of forward thinking and decisionmaking, going beyond just a social-psychological reaction.
VII.

Perspective of war from the study ofwelfare culture

When we think of our welfare culture as war
culture, we need to consider a concept of culture
which is not within the nation like the welfare
state, but supranational. The study of welfare
culture pursues supranational peace, and in thatsense, we must say we are still a long way from awelfare culture.7
The Japanese in the postwar era express a kindof war culture through their hope for welfare,and cling to that idea. This is the foundation of
the peace movement and of support for politics
that strengthens military power and cooperates inwar. We see cruelty and violence depicted daily
through television or smartphones; however, if
we can protect our own welfare (or believe that
we can), we can make the decision to leavethings as they are and even cooperate with violence.
From this point of view, there is room toimprove the understanding of the relationshipbetween war and social welfare by rethinking theview of a reverse course. Is social welfare
inversely related to the military, even thoughwelfare is not opposite to war for the majority ofJapanese? When social welfare studies take theperspective of culture, this aporia must be kept inmind. Social welfare studies should not only
confront war but investigate our own welfare as
well.
Footnote
1 “Study of welfare culture” has the same signiﬁcance as
the “study of human welfare and culture” which forms
part of the name of the academic society “JapaneseSociety for the Study of Human Welfare and Culture”.

The Aporia of Welfare Culture as War Culture in Postwar Japan
Both expressions refer to the intention to achieve alevel of culture such that everyone enjoys wholesome
and cultured living.
2 Please refer to pages 58–62 in the “Research Project
Report” published in the Japanese Society for the Studyof Human Welfare and Culture, Journal of Human Welfare and Culture Studies Vol. 28 (2019).
3 For the idea of new war, reference is made to Kaldor(2001) and Kono (2013).
4 Human security is based on the idea of capability
which is the potential for their respective life, and complements human rights (Sen, 2003). The idea of capability enables of a necessitating an economic and political system which realizes equality based on the theoryof liberty (Yamawaki, 2005). Social welfare study canhave a coherent perspective on capability, human security and human rights, and ﬁnd it necessary to haveeconomic and political systems including guaranteeingsocial welfare.
5 In the 1969 survey, the choices were: Dangerous; I cannot say it is not dangerous; No danger, and I have noidea. In the 2009 survey, the choices were: Dangerous;
Rather dangerous; Not quite dangerous; No danger,
and; I have no idea.
6 In the 1969 survey, the option is As usual, protect
Japan's safety with the security system and the SDF.
7 The context of war responsibility can require re-examination of the war culture and welfare culture in postwar
Japan. According to Maezawa, the discussion of war
responsibility after 1989 came with the emergence ofthe study of welfare culture, the idea that invasive war
is evil has been strengthened rather than the idea that
war itself is evil. The discussion of Japan's war responsibility and demand for compensation has beenstrengthened after the Cold war from that perspective.
We can say that about not only the ﬁfteen Years War
but also the invasive war that Japan was indirectly
involved in post-World War II due to pursuing theirown welfare.

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