MONEY LAUNDERING IN THAILAND
Netipoom Maysakun*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thailand, like many countries in Asia, has faced the uneasy task of combating widespread criminal
activities. Most underground operations, such as drug trafficking, corruption, human trafficking, prostitution,and extortion, committed by organized criminal groups, have generated huge sums of money. Criminals
engaged in these crimes need ways to process this dirty money into legitimate funds so that their original
source will not be traced; hence, the crime of money laundering. It is employed at many levels of criminality,from small-scale criminals to international criminal organizations. Money laundering at the international
level has recently emerged on a massive scale in Thailand because of the globalization of the economy andthe internationalization of organized crime. Dirty money from one country can be easily transferred toanother country without detection or prevention by law enforcement agencies. To fight money laundering
efficiently, Thailand needed a law that could combat it effectively. Finally, it was concluded that the law thatallowed the authorities to put money launderers behind bars and confiscate assets suspected of being related
to serious offences were the most effective tools for suppressing money laundering, which has been
increasingly difficult to control.

II. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF B.E. 2542 (1999)
To combat money laundering effectively, the Thai Parliament, in 1999, enacted a new anti-money
laundering law which criminalizes money laundering and creates a civil forfeiture system for confiscating
assets involved in predicate offences.

A. Criminal Offence
Section 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 provides that whoever(i)transfers, receives, or changes the form of an asset involved in the commission of an offence, forthe purpose of concealing or disguising the origin or source of that asset, or for the purpose of
assisting another person either before, during, or after the commission of an offence to enable theoffender to avoid the penalty or receive a lesser penalty for the predicate offence; or(ii) acts by any manner which is designed to conceal or disguise the true nature, location, sale,transfer, or rights of ownership, of an asset involved in the commission of an offence shall bedeemed to have committed a money laundering offence.
Therefore, it is a crime for a person to transfer, convert or receive the transfer of money or property
arising from predicate offences for the purpose of hiding or concealing the source of the funds and ispunishable under Section 60 of the Act which provides that any individual who is found guilty of the crime ofmoney laundering shall receive a term of imprisonment of one to ten years, or a fine of 20,000 to
200,000, (Thai Baht) or both. Moreover, Section 3 of the Act clearly provides the definition of predicate
offences. Currently, there are eight predicate offences in the Act as listed below:(1)
Narcotics(2)
Trafficking in or sexual exploitation of children and women in order to gratify the sexual desire ofanother person(3)
Cheating and fraud on the public(4)
Misappropriation or cheating and fraud under other commercial banks and financial legislation(5)
Malfeasance in office or judicial office(6)
Extortion and blackmail committed by an organized criminal association or an unlawful secretsociety(7)
Customs evasion(8)
Terrorism.
Furthermore, unlike the general criminal law rule which provides that whoever aiding, abetting or
attempting to commit an offence shall be liable to two-thirds of the punishment provided for such offence,* Judge, Southern Bangkok District Court, Thailand.

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Section 7 of the Act provides that whoever aids or abets the offender shall receive the same penalty as theprincipal offender. Section 8 of the Act also provides that whoever attempts to commit an offence of money
laundering shall receive the same penalty as provided by law for a successfully committed offence.
In addition, Section 4 of the Thai Penal Code provides that a person may be punished under Thai law,regardless of their nationality, if they commit an offence within Thailand. Section 5 of the Thai Penal Codealso provides that even if the offence was only partially committed within Thailand, Section 5 would treat
these offences as having been committed within Thailand. However, money laundering is not only adomestic crime but also a transnational organized crime with a large amount of money involved. It has also
become increasingly complicated and sophisticated. Therefore, broader jurisdiction is provided in the Act inorder to tackle transnational organized crimes effectively. Under Section 6 of the Act, it is a crime to commit,
even partially, a money laundering offence within Thailand. In addition, a person who commits a money
laundering offence outside Thailand shall receive the penalty within Thailand, if: (a) either the offender orco-offender is a Thai national or resides in Thailand; (b) the offender is an alien and has taken action tocommit an offence in Thailand or it is intended to have the consequence resulting in Thailand, or the Thai
Government is an injured party; or (c) the offender is an alien whose action is considered an offence in thestate where it is committed under its jurisdiction, and if that individual appears in Thailand and is notextradited under the Extradition Act, Section 10 of the Thai Penal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

B. Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Criminal Offences
The police are primarily responsible for investigating the criminal offence of money laundering. However,the police are not the only criminal investigative agency responsible for such investigations. The
Department of Special Investigation (DSI), set up in 2004 to investigate and interrogate complicated andsophisticated criminal cases, is also responsible for investigating the criminal offence of money laundering(as distinct from civil asset forfeiture actions carried out solely by the Anti-Money Laundering Office). The
DSI is under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and is separate from the Royal Thai Police, althoughmany DSI personnel originally were Royal Thai Police officers. The police and the DSI both have theauthority to detect, identify, investigate, interrogate, and collect evidence related to the criminal offence ofmoney laundering. In case there is probable cause to believe that a person committed such an offence, thepolice or the DSI will forward the case to the public prosecutor. If the public prosecutor considers that theevidence is insufficient, the public prosecutor may drop the case or instruct the police or the DSI to collect
more evidence. However, if the public prosecutor considers that there is probable cause to believe that anoffence has been committed, the public prosecutor will file a criminal lawsuit against the offender. The
burden of proof, like other criminal cases, will be on the public prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubtthat the defendant is guilty as charged. If the public prosecutor is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubtthat the defendant committed a criminal offence of money laundering, the court will acquit the defendant. If
convicted however, the defendant will receive a term of imprisonment of one to ten years, or a fine of
20,000 to 200,000, or both, depending on the seriousness of the crime. Of course, if either party disagrees
with the verdict, they can file an appeal to the appeal court.
C. Current Situation of Criminal Offences in Thailand
The Golden Triangle, where the borders of Thailand, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) and Laosmeet, has a world reputation as a capital of opium. It is also the world’s most significant area of opium andmethamphetamine production. Thailand, as a regional transportation hub, serves as a major narcotics
trafficking route from the Golden Triangle to other countries. Therefore, there is no doubt that a major
source of money laundering in Thailand is narcotics trafficking. Plus, the majority of reported money
laundering cases are narcotics-related and many of them involve transnational organized crime. The money
launderers may just use traditional laundering techniques such as depositing the dirty money in a bank by
opening the account in a false name, or use more complicated laundering techniques such as purchasing or
selling stocks in the stock market in an effort to clean the dirty money. Although money laundering activities
are quite rampant in Thailand, the criminal investigative agencies, the police and the DSI, rarely investigate
it. There are two main reasons for this. First of all, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 is a new andcomplicated law; most police and DSI personnel, and even public prosecutors and judges, have limited
knowledge of it. Secondly, and most importantly, if a person commits a criminal offence of money laundering,he or she has almost always committed a predicate offence also, such as narcotics trafficking. The police andthe DSI personnel might conclude that prosecution on the predicate offence may be sufficient to meet87

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sentencing for a case, taking into account the difficulty in proving beyond reasonable doubt in order to punish
the offender for money laundering and, normally, the predicate offences’ punishment are harsher than thosefor money laundering.
In early July, 2006, after receiving tip-offs from British, Danish and Swedish embassies that members of
the Bandidos motorcycle gang in Thailand had colluded with British mafia to buy up extensive commercial
interests in Samui Island, a world-famous beach resort destination, the police and the DSI arrested four
people, two Britons, one Dane, and one Thai. They were charged with extortion and money laundering
offences. An early investigation found that they allegedly ran many businesses on the island, including
property developments, restaurants, and entertainment and tourist enterprises, as fronts for unlawful
activities. In addition, they were also accused of laundering criminal proceeds from the British mafia andconverting them to legitimate assets. They were also believed to be members of a transnational criminalorganization. At the time of writing, further investigation is still in progress.

D. Case Study
Mr. A was a drug trafficker who set up a methamphetamine-producing factory near the Thai-Myanmar
border. His factory had the capacity to produce 10,000 methamphetamine tablets a day. He normally hired
hill-tribe people to transport the tablets to his customers, mostly in Bangkok, by using a pick-up truck. One
day his hired man was caught at the checkpoint near Phetchaboon province while transporting more than
100,000 methamphetamine tablets, worth more than 10,000,000 (approximately US$250,000). Because his
hired man was caught red-handed, he admitted to the police that he was hired by Mr. A to transport thesemethamphetamine tablets to Mr. A’s customers in Bangkok. The police then ran a background check on Mr.
A and found that he did not have a credible profession, but owned a big luxurious wooden house and manycars and deposited a lot of money in various local banks. The police also found that Mr. A transferred money
many times to Ms. B, his mistress. After the police had probable cause to believe that Mr. A committed adrug trafficking offence and a money laundering offence, and that Ms. B committed a criminal offence ofmoney laundering, the police then asked for the approval of a judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of Mr. A
and Ms. B. The police interrogated them both and questioned other witnesses. They also collected all theevidence and forwarded the case to a public prosecutor. The public prosecutor considered the case, and hehad probable cause to believe that Mr. A committed a drug trafficking and a money laundering offence, andthat Ms. B committed a money laundering offence. A criminal lawsuit was filed, and at the subsequent trial,both Mr. A and Ms. B were found guilty. Mr. A was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing a drugtrafficking and a money laundering offence while Ms. B received two years’ imprisonment for committing an
offence of money laundering.
III. CIVIL FORFEITURE
Under the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999, financial institutions, such as the Bank of Thailand,commercial banks, financial businesses and creditors, life insurance companies and casualty insurancecompanies (including the land offices) are legally obliged to report all cash transactions worth 2,000,000(approximately US$50,000) or more to the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), an independent body
created by the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999. Property transactions worth 5,000,000 (approximately
US$125,000) or more must also be reported to the AMLO. Moreover, any suspicious transactions, evenamounting to less than 2,000,000, must also be reported to the AMLO. If found guilty of failing to reportsuch transactions, financial institutions will be fined up to 3,000,000 (US$ 7,500).

A. Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Civil Forfeiture
When receiving transaction reports, either from financial institutions or land offices, the AMLO willprocess, examine and analyse the reports, followed by an investigation if necessary. If there is probablecause to believe that the transaction may be related to any predicate offences, such as narcotics trafficking,sexual offences, fraud against the public or a money laundering offence, the AMLO will report the matter tothe Transaction Committee for consideration. If the Transaction Committee has probable cause to believethat the transaction might be related to predicate offences or money laundering offences, it has the power toissue a written order restraining that transaction for not more than three working days. Furthermore, if theTransaction Committee has evidence to believe that the transaction may be related to predicate offences ormoney laundering offences, it has the power to issue a written order restraining that transaction for not
more than ten working days. Moreover, if there is probable cause to believe that assets related to predicate

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offences may be transferred, distributed, placed, layered or concealed, the Transaction Committee has thepower to restrain or seize those assets temporarily for a period not exceeding ninety days.
Under section 49 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999, if there is evidence to believe that assets
are related to predicate offences, the AMLO Secretary-General will forward the case to the publicprosecutor for consideration to file a petition to the court to order the forfeiture of those assets to the State.
When the public prosecutor has filed a petition to a court, the judge will order a notice to be posted at the
court and publish it in a local reputed newspaper for two consecutive days so that individuals who may claim
ownership or have vested interest in the assets may file an objection petition to the court before an order isissued. After the public prosecutor has filed a petition with a court, if there is probable cause to believe that
there may be a transfer, distribution, or placement of any asset related to the predicate offences, the AMLO
Secretary-General may submit the facts to the public prosecutor to file a petition to the court to order atemporary seizure or restraint of the asset before the judge issues the order. The judge must consider such apetition immediately. If the petition is supported by probable cause, the judge must issue the order for
temporary seizure or restraint without any delay. Before the judge issues an order to forfeit the assets
related to the predicate offences to the State, an individual who claims ownership of the asset may file apetition to the court and prove to the court that he or she is the true owner and the assets are not related toany predicate offences, or that he or she has received the transfer of ownership honestly and withcompensation, or that he or she has received the assets honestly and morally, or by charity. After the judge
investigates the petition of the public prosecutor and the petition of the claimant, if the judge believes thatthe assets named in the petition are related to the predicate offences and the petition of the claimant has no
merit, the judge will order the forfeiture of the assets to the State. If the claimant is related or used to berelated to any person who committed the predicate offence or money laundering offence, the assets arepresumably related to a predicate offence or the assets are transferred dishonestly.

B. The Differences Between Criminal Offences and Civil Forfeiture
Unlike a criminal offence of money laundering which the public prosecutor has to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, in civil forfeiture cases, like most civil cases, the public prosecutor merely needs to prove
preponderance of evidence that the assets named in the petition are related to the predicate offences (thebalance of probabilities). If the public prosecutor is able to meet that standard of proof, the judge must orderthe forfeiture of the asset to the State. The standard of proof in the civil forfeiture case, preponderance ofevidence, is not as hard to prove as the standard of proof in the criminal offence of money laundering, beyond
reasonable doubt, because the public prosecutor has to prove only that the public prosecutor’s evidence is ofgreater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered by the defendant or the claimant. As aresult, it will encourage authorities, including AMLO and public prosecutors, to work harder to seize moneyor assets of money launderers. Moreover, unlike a criminal offence of money laundering that must name thedefendant in a lawsuit, the civil forfeiture case does not have to name the defendant in the petition. The
public prosecutor merely needs to mention in the petition that there is evidence to believe that the assets
are related to the predicate offences without naming a defendant. This will be sufficient because the purposeof civil forfeiture is to go after dirty money, not the money launderers. Furthermore, a civil forfeiture case is
not bound by the facts or the judgment in the criminal offence of money laundering case. Therefore, if a
judge acquitted the defendant in the criminal offence of money laundering case, or even if the publicprosecutor did not prosecute a defendant in the criminal offence of money laundering case, the judge
presiding in the civil forfeiture case is not bound by those facts or that judgment. The court must investigate
merely the evidence presented in the civil forfeiture case. If it is believed that the assets are related to thepredicate offences, the judge must order the forfeiture of the assets to the State. But, if it is not believed thatthe assets are related to the predicate offences, the case must be dismissed. In addition, if a person claiming
to be a true owner of the assets files an objection petition to the court, the public prosecutor has to merely
prove that the claimant is related or used to be related to any person who committed the predicate offence ormoney laundering offence. If the public prosecutor is able to prove that a claimant is related or used to berelated to any person who committed the predicate offence or money laundering offence, the assets arepresumably related to a predicate offence or the assets are transferred dishonestly. In this case, therefore,
the burden of proof will be shifted to the claimant. If the claimant is unable to prove that the assets are notrelated to the predicate offences and that he or she is the true owner of the assets, the judge will order theforfeiture of the assets to the State. But, if he or she is able to prove that the assets are not related to thepredicate offences and that he or she is the true owner of the assets, the judge must dismiss the case.

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C. Current Situation of Civil Forfeiture in Thailand
From 27 October 2000 – 31 December 2004, the AMLO handled 381 cases, with a total asset value of
3,810.95 million (approximately US$95 million). Of the total 381 cases, 333 cases were narcotics
trafficking, accounting for 87.4% of the total cases; seven cases were sexual offences, accounting for 1.8% of
the total; eleven cases were public fraud, accounting for 2.9%; eight cases were misappropriation or cheating
and fraud, accounting for 2.1%; seven cases were malfeasance in office, accounting for 1.8%; one case wasextortion and blackmail, accounting for 0.3%; fourteen cases were customs evasion, accounting for 3.7%.
There was no case concerning terrorism. The results divided by the types of predicate offences are shown
below.
Year
2000(cases)Year
2001(cases)Year
2002(cases)Year
2003(cases)Year
2004(cases)Total(cases)Percentage(%)

1. Narcotics
trafficking

3

65

63

129

73

333

87.4%

2. Sexual offences

-

1

-

4

2

7

1.8%

3. Public fraud

-

7

-

3

1

11

2.9%

4. Misappropriation orcheating and fraud

-

-

-

2

6

8

2.1%

5. Malfeasance in
office

-

-

1

1

5

7

1.8%

6. Extortion andblackmail

-

-

-

-

1

1

0.3%

7. Customs evasion

-

3

5

2

4

14

3.7%

8. Terrorism

-

-

-

-

-

-

100%
-

Predicate Offences

Total
Total Value of Assets(million Baht)

3

76

69

141

92

381

23.91

751.61

681.60943.491,410.34

3,810.95

During the period of 27 October 2000 to 31 December 2004, of the total 381 cases, the court ordered
forfeiture of the assets to the State in 172 cases. Five cases were dismissed by the court; one case wassuspended by the court; 121 cases are under consideration of the court at the time of writing; 13 cases areunder consideration by the public prosecutor at the time of writing; and 12 cases are under investigation andcollection of evidence by the AMLO. In 57 cases no motions were filed, or they were cancelled ortransferred to other agencies.

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The results are shown below.
Predicate offences

Number of Cases

Value (Baht)

Narcotics trafficking

170464,252,334.07

Sexual offences

1

1,006,473.53

Customs evasion

1

7,223,448.65

2. Case dismissed by the Court

Narcotics trafficking

5

31,055,576.12

3. Case suspended by the Court

Narcotics trafficking

119,107,522.00

4. Under consideration of the Court

Narcotics trafficking

98

1,946,544,559.48

Sexual offences

6

67,774,458.40

Public Fraud

3

11,655,244.25

Misappropriation orcheating and fraud

3

118,511,570.92

Malfeasance in office

315,138,498.13

Customs evasion

8

260,445,684.96

Narcotics trafficking

13

57,967,648.84

Narcotics trafficking

1118,419,070.38

Extortion and Blackmail1

30,000,000.00-

57

761,844,135.20-

381

3,810,946,224.93

Activities
1. Court ordered to forfeit
the assets to the State

5. Under consideration of the
public prosecutor
6. Under investigation and collectionof evidence of AMLO
7. No motion
filed/cancelled/transferred
to other agencies
Total

D. Case Study
The AMLO received a tip-off from the Narcotics Prevention and Suppression Center that Mr. X, a former
provincial mayor, might be involved with narcotics trafficking and organized crime. After receiving a tip-off,the AMLO ran a background check on Mr. X and found that although he did not have other credibleprofessions, he was unusually rich, owned a big house, many cars, and possessed tens of plots of lands. The
AMLO started investigating and found that Mr. X frequently went on field trips to northern Thailand, wherepart of the Golden Triangle is located. On his return, he would hide methamphetamine tablets that he boughtfrom a major drug trafficker, who had connections with organized crime, in his car. When he returned to his
province, he would hand the methamphetamine tablets to his close aides. These aides then sold themethamphetamine tablets to the customers. When the AMLO had probable cause to believe that Mr. X’s
assets were related to narcotics trafficking, it asked approval from a judge to issue a warrant to search Mr.
X’s house. While searching his house, the AMLO personnel seized many documents related to Mr. X’s
assets. The AMLO then asked the Transaction Committee to temporarily seize Mr. X’s assets for ninetydays. After due consideration, the AMLO concluded that it had evidence to believe that Mr. X’s assets wererelated to narcotics trafficking. The AMLO Secretary General forwarded the case to the public prosecutor
for consideration to file a petition to the court to order the forfeiture of Mr. X’s assets to the State. The
public prosecutor then filed the petition to the court; Mr. X’s wife and daughter also filed an objection
petition to the court claiming that they were the true owner of Mr. X’s assets and the assets in dispute were
not related to narcotics trafficking. After due consideration and thorough investigation of both the publicprosecutor’s petition and Mr. X’s wife and daughter’s petition, the judge ruled that Mr. X’s assets wererelated to narcotics trafficking, and judge ordered the forfeiture of Mr. X’s assets, worth a total of
18,000,000 (approximately US$ 500,000) to the State. Moreover, the narcotics trafficking and criminal
offence of money laundering cases against Mr. X have been under consideration of the court.

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IV. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
Traditional investigative methods for money laundering tend to be passive and to focus on following thepaper trail or search of a suspect’s house under the authority of a search warrant. These traditional methods
may be successful in some cases. It can, nonetheless, be time consuming, resource intensive, and may notalways provide the best evidence to prosecute the offenders or identify and seize the assets. Investigatorsneed to use alternative methods to combat money laundering effectively. Such special investigativetechniques normally include electronic surveillance, controlled delivery and undercover operations.

A. Electronic Surveillance
Wiretapping, the most commonly known type of electronic surveillance, is a criminal offence under the
Telegraph and Telephone Act of 1934. The violators could face up to five years in prison. However, under
section 46 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999, if the AMLO has probable cause to believe that
communication devices, such as phone and computers, may be used for the purposes of money laundering,
the AMLO may ask the court to issue a warrant to wiretap communication devices or computers for no morethan 90 days. Moreover, under section 14 of the Narcotics Act of 1979 (Amendment 2002), if the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), has probable cause to believe that telegraphs, telephones, computers or othercommunication devices may be used for the purposes of committing narcotics offences, the DEA may ask
the court to issue a warrant to wiretap telegraphs, telephones, computers or other communication devices.
B. Controlled Delivery
There is only one piece of legislation concerning controlled delivery. The Narcotics Act of 1979
(Amendment 2002) provides that controlled delivery of importing or exporting narcotics may only be used incases of national interest and must have the approval of the public health minister. Although there is merely
one law concerning controlled delivery, law enforcement officials have used controlled delivery techniques
as a method for conducting criminal investigation, especially for narcotics trafficking, for years.
C. Undercover Operations
Although no single piece of legislation mentions them, undercover operations remain one of the mostwidely used and effective investigative techniques in Thailand. Law enforcement agencies rely on theseundercover agents to penetrate criminal organizations and organized crime to obtain significant informationand evidence. The evidence obtained by undercover agents will be new and direct evidence relating toactions of the suspects. Moreover, information gained through the undercover agents will often open up newlines of enquiry leading to the identification of co-conspirators, the ringleaders and the location anddescription of available assets. More importantly, the evidence obtained by undercover agents is admissible
in court.
V. THE WITNESS PROTECTION ACT OF 2003
The Thai criminal justice system demands that the court must believe beyond reasonable doubt that adefendant is guilty of the offence with which he or she has been charged before he or she can be convicted.
Therefore, one of the most powerful vehicles to link a defendant to a crime is the testimony of a reliable
witness who can give direct and crucial evidence. However, in cases of organized crime or money laundering
offences people hesitate, understandably, to risk their lives by coming forward to testify against thesepowerful criminals. Fear of revenge is the biggest obstacle in preventing people from coming forward to
testify. If a person is not offered any protection or support, it is unlikely that he or she will put his or her life
or well-being at risk by testifying against criminals. To solve these problems, the Thai parliament, in 2003,
enacted a witness protection law that aims to look after key witnesses who can provide essential evidence,
generally in relation to the most serious crimes such as organized crime, narcotics trafficking, money
laundering, corruption, national security, and sexual offences. When the witnesses are under the witness
protection programme, they are entitled to relocate to a new place, change identities and receive daily
expenses for up to two years.
Furthermore, at the international level, the Thai government should recognize the globalization oforganized crime and money laundering; efforts must be made to develop co-operation through exchanging
information, sharing experiences and training opportunities. Moreover, as the world is shrinking,international relocation of witnesses should be considered as another option of witness protection. Finally, as
witness protection is a new concept and is rarely used in Thailand, the public needs to know more about

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witness protection programmes in general. Without concerted efforts to raise public awareness, the witness
protection programme will remain anonymous. For instance, the government must dramatically increase theamount of airtime on television and radio stations to publicize the witness protection programme and theimportance of witness protection for the entire criminal justice system.
Surprisingly, immunity from prosecution currently does not exist in Thailand. Therefore, if persons who
participate in organized criminal groups supply information and co-operate with the law enforcement
officials, they will not be granted immunity from prosecution. However, as is common practice in Thaicriminal justice, the public prosecutor will not prosecute them; instead they will be employed as a key
witness to testify against their colleagues in court. Of course, if they wish, they can participate in thewitness protection programme.

VI. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
Thailand is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), which is aregional anti-money laundering group. The APG was established in 1997 to help jurisdictions within the
Asia-Pacific region to adopt and enforce internationally accepted standards. This includes enacting laws
which criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of crime, and dealing with mutual legal assistance,
confiscation, forfeiture and extradition. It also provides guidance for setting up systems to report andinvestigate suspicious transactions. In addition, Thailand has also signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties(MLATs) with the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The MLATs generally allow the exchangeof evidence and information in criminal and related matters. In money laundering and asset forfeiture cases,
they can be extremely useful as a method of exchanging banking and other financial records. The MLATs arean assurance of formal mutual legal assistance, but most international co-operation conducted in Thailand isby direct contact between Thai police their foreign counterparts. Such co-operation has been given andreceived on the basis of goodwill, mutual respect and common interest in fighting crime. Moreover, Thailand
is also a member of the Egmont Group, which is an international group of Financial Intelligence Units from95 member countries. It serves as a co-ordinating centre for the exchange of information on financialtransactions in the prevention and suppression of money laundering. To date, Thailand has signed theMemorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation in the Exchange of Financial Intelligence Related
to Money Laundering (MOU) with 23 countries: Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Finland, Georgia, Indonesia, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Monaco, Myanmar, the Netherlands, thePhilippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. In
addition, Thailand actively exchanges information with nations with whom it does not have an MOU,
including Canada, Singapore and the United States. Furthermore, Thailand also co-operates with othercountries’ law enforcement officials on a range of investigations related to money laundering and narcotics
trafficking. Additionally, Interpol is also a key player in facilitating co-operation in investigations and intracing and arresting international offenders.

VII. CONCLUSIONAs an economic and transport hub of South East Asia, Thailand is vulnerable to money laundering as well
as all types of cross-border crimes including narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants
and sexual offences. Money launderers typically employ both banking and non-banking financial institutions
to move their criminal proceeds from narcotics trafficking and other serious offences to legitimate funds. To
solve these serious problems, in 1999 Thailand enacted an anti-money laundering law which criminalised theact of money laundering. It also created a civil forfeiture system for confiscating assets accrued throughpredicate offences.
Nevertheless, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 covers only eight predicate offences such as
narcotics trafficking, sexual offences, corruption, customs evasion and terrorism. That makes the scope ofpredicate offences too narrow and falls short of international standards. To combat money laundering
effectively, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 should be amended to include all serious offences, if
possible, or the minimum list of acceptable designated categories of offences such as environmental crime,
foreign exchange violations, illegal gambling, arms trafficking, labour fraud, bid rigging, share manipulation,
excise tax evasion, loan-sharking and intellectual property rights offences. More importantly, the nature ofmoney laundering has recently changed dramatically, becoming an increasingly transnational phenomenon.

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No country, no matter how powerful, can fight this serious crime alone. We all need a concerted effort andinternational co-operation in combating this serious crime. Therefore, it is essential to have a global
approach to combat money laundering and strengthen international co-operation if we all want to win thiswar.

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