107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KOREAN PROSECUTIONSYSTEM AND THE PROSECUTOR’S DIRECT INVESTIGATION
Lee, Jung-Soo*
I. PROLOGUE
Since the dawn of history, every civilizedcountry has developed its own investigation
system, exercised investigatory power,
cracked down on criminals and indicatedthem. In other words, every country has
been imposing upon criminals appropriate
sanctions commensurate with their crime.
Every civilized country has invested its
legal system derived from its national
consensus. Under the system, each country
has organized investigative and judicial
authorities and enacted criminal procedurelaws which govern the investigation
process. Through such a system, eachcountry has maintained national order andsecured the human and welfare rights of
its citizens.
Today, crime is being committed in moresophisticated methods and in a moreorganized form. In addition, new types ofcrime are continuously occurring. To
effectively deal with such situations,investigative organizations are also getting
systematized and scientific in terms oforganization and investigation methods.
Especially in the Republic of Korea,
prosecutors play a main role in theinvestigation and judicial process.
Prosecutors initiate investigation or direct
the police regarding a specific crime.
Prosecutors are the only authority indeciding whether to indict a specificsuspect, participate in trial and executejudgements made by judges.
In connection with the topic of thistraining course, I would like to focus mypresentation on special characteristics of* Deputy Chief of Suwon District, Public Prosecutor’s
Office, Republic of Korea.

the Korean prosecution system, theprosecutor’s control of the police, and theprosecutor ’s discretionary power in
deciding whether to indict a specific person,
thereby explaining how investigation isconducted in Korea and human rights areprotected.
Finally, I will try to help you understandthe direct investigation activities andauthorities of prosecutors by briefly
explaining the corruption case of Roh Tae
Woo, the former Korean president, and theillegal loans in the Hanbo Conglomeratecase which caught the attention of theworld.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
KOREAN PROSECUTION SYSTEM
A. Two Faces of the Prosecutors’
Organization
The authority of prosecutors is basicallysimilar to the executive power because theultimate purpose of the prosecutors’organization is the imposition of
appropriate punishment upon criminals.
On the other hand, it also has a judicial
character since indictment andparticipation in the trial process has muchto do with judgments. Therefore, these two
are the most representative features of the
Korea prosecution system.
Under the Korean laws, each prosecutor
has independent authority free from anypressure in exercising his/her power, forexample, in the investigation of crime,
participation in the trial process and theexecution of judgments. In this respect,prosecutors have the same independence
in performing their works as judges have.
On the other hand, to enable prosecutors
to effectively achieve their purpose (which
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
is to maintain national order and peace),
prosecutors form a pyramid organization,at the top of which is the ProsecutorGeneral. In this respect, the Koreanprosecution system has an executive
character.
The Prosecutors’ Office is under the
Ministry of Justice which is one of theexecutive departments.
B. Leader of Criminal Investigation
The most remarkable characteristic of
the Korean prosecution system is thatprosecutors play a leading role in thecriminal investigation. Prosecutors not
only conduct direct investigation, but also
give instructions to the police in connection
with a criminal investigation. Prosecutors
are legally entitled to control and supervise
the police regarding criminal
investigations. Accordingly, police obey
prosecutors’ instructions as far as criminal
investigations are concerned. Thus,
prosecutors are the supreme and ultimate
authority in criminal investigation, and thepolice serve as assistants to theprosecutors. Our system differs from thatof the United States of America in that
American prosecutors have no authority toinvestigate crimes. It also differs from theJapanese prosecution system in thatprosecutors and police in Japan are in acooperative relationship, whereas Koreanprosecutors and police are in an orderobeyance relationship. In this respect, theKorean prosecution system is similar tothat of France or Germany.
C. Discretionary Power ofIndictment
Another feature of the Koreanprosecution system is that prosecutors
have the discretionary power to decide
whether or not to prosecute a suspect.
Prosecutors can decide not to prosecute asuspect even if there is sufficient evidence
for prosecution.

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To my knowledge, prosecutors in mostcountries should, in principle, prosecute asuspect if there is enough evidence toprosecute that person, and only under
exceptional circumstance can prosecutors
decide not to prosecute such person.
However, under Korean law, prosecutors
have the general and broad authority not
to prosecute a suspect. This discretionary
power, if exercised well and fairly, helps
prosecutors take into account criminal
policy factors regarding a specific suspect
at the pre-indictment stage. On the other
hand, it is also possible that prosecutors
might abuse such power. Thus, I believethat such power should be exercisedcarefully and appropriately. In addition,
there should be certain kinds of control
systems in order to prevent abuse of thatpower.
III. AUTHORITY OF KOREAN
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
A. Criminal Investigation
Korean prosecutors have the authority
and duty to investigate all crimes.
Investigation authority is an inevitablepremise of indictment and the starting
point in imposing punishment uponcriminals. Under Korean law, theauthority to investigate crimes is vested int h e p r o s e c u t o r s . C o n s e q u e n t l y,prosecutors, as the leaders or main playersof criminal investigation, control and direct
the police who are the assistants to theprosecutors.
B. Indictment and Maintenance ofIndictment
As the only prosecuting authority,
Korean prosecutors have the power todecide whether or not to prosecute asuspect.
In the case that a prosecutor chooses toindict a person, the prosecutor has the duty
to participate in the trial and maintain
indictment until a final court judgement

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
has been rendered. In an exceptional case,the prosecutor can remand the indictment.
Under the Korean Criminal Procedure
Law, indictment by a private person is notallowed and only the government can indict
a suspect. Of the many departments of ourgovernment, the prosecutors’ officemonopolizes the authority of prosecution.
In addition, as I have already mentioned,
prosecutors have the discretionary power
to suspend prosecution even if there issufficient evidence to maintain prosecution.
Prosecutors suspend prosecution when
they think the benefit of non-prosecution
is greater than the cost of prosecution. It
enables prosecutors to take into accountcriminal policy factors when deciding
whether to prosecute a suspect.
C. The Right to Direct andSupervise Judicial Police
Officers
Korean prosecutors have the legal rightto direct and supervise judicial police
officers as far as criminal investigations areconcerned. Under Korean law, prosecutors
are the czars of criminal investigations.
Consequently, judicial police officers are
obliged to obey the prosecutors’ orders
which are issued based on the prosecutors’
legal authority.
Generally speaking, judicial police
officers serve as members of the executive.
However, they are all under the control ofthe prosecutors when they perform judicial
police work in connection with criminal
investigations. This system is based on the
belief that due process and individual
rights will be best protected by enablingprosecutors to play a leading role incriminal investigation since they are legal
experts and are guaranteed independence
and a high status. It is also the best way
to effectively indict a suspect and tomaintain such an indictment.

D. The Right to Direct andSupervise the Execution of
Judgments
In Korea, prosecutors direct andsupervise the execution of all criminal
judgments, e.g., direction and supervisionof the execution of arrest warrants, searchor seizure warrants and final criminal
judgments. This was designed based upon
the belief that the appropriateness of
warrant execution and the protection ofindividual rights in connection with suchexecution could best be secured by
entrusting those duties to the prosecutors
who represent the public interest.
E. Authority and Duties as
Representatives of the Public
Interest
Korean prosecutors, as representativesof the public interest, directly participate
or direct public officials to participate incivil suits in which the government is aparty or in which the government has aninterest. In these civil proceedings, theKorean Minister of Justice represents ourgovernment. Even though an executive
department or its subsidiaries becomes adefendant in an administrative suit, theprosecutors direct public officials of thedepartment or participates in the trial
because the prosecutors are legal experts
and representatives of the public interest.
IV. STATUS OF PROSECUTORS
A. Nature of Prosecutor’s Office
1. Independent Office
The public prosecutor’s office is under
the Ministry of Justice, which is a
department of the executive. In thisrespect, the nature of the publicprosecutor’s office is different from that ofjudges, who belong to the judiciary. The
prosecutor ’s office is, however, an
independent organization which makes its
own decisions. In other words, theprosecutor’s office is not an assistant to the85

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
Prosecutor-General or the chief prosecutorof the district public prosecutor’s office.
2. Status as Quasi-Judges
The duties which prosecutors exercise
are basically executive ones. However,these duties should be exercised with thesame fairness and strictness as requiredin exercising judicial power. In otherwords, the duties of prosecutors, consistingof criminal investigation, indictment,
maintenance of indictments, and theexecution of judgments, etc., has much to
do with judicial responsibilities, andtherefore need to be exercised very
carefully to achieve justice. Accordingly,
prosecutors not only have the status ofexecutive officers but also that of quasijudges.
B. Protection of Status of Public
Prosecutors
To ensure the fair execution of theprosecutors’ duties and prevent pressure
from other persons, prosecutors are given
the same protection as judges. Specifically,
our laws provide that the term of the officeof the Prosecutor-General is two years andthat the prosecutor shall not be subjected
to dismissal, suspension from office orr e d u c t i o n o f s a l a r y, e x c e p t b y
impeachment, judgment of imprisonments
and disciplinary action. The number ofprosecutors, the salary and disciplinary
proceedings are also stipulated by law. The
purpose of specifying such matters by law
is to protect securely the status ofprosecutors, and thereby enableprosecutors to perform their duties freefrom any unjust interference.
C. Independent Status of Public
Prosecutors
Under Korean law, the aforesaid duties
of prosecutors are vested in each individual
prosecutor as an independent office.
Therefore, it is not true that all theprosecutorial authority belongs to the chief

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prosecutor. The Prosecutors’ Office iscomposed of many individual prosecutors
and it coordinates the prosecutors’ work.
However, it does not itself exercise
prosecutorial authority. Although the chiefprosecutor of a specific prosecutors’ officedirects and supervises each prosecutor
attached to it, the exerciser of prosecutorial
authority is each individual prosecutor.
Consequently, it is for the individual
prosecutor to decide policy and exercise theprosecutorial authority.
D. Appointment, Rank andAssignment of Public Prosecutors
In Korea, the qualifications to become
public prosecutor are identical to that of ajudge and an attorney. Anyone who wants
to be appointed as a public prosecutor must
pass the Judicial Examination held by the
Administrative Department and thencomplete the two-year training course at
the Judicial Research and Training
Institute, which is supervised by theSupreme Court.
The number of examinees who
successfully passed the Examination in
1995 was 300. It was 500 in 1996 and willbe 600 in 1997. As you can guess, theKorean government is increasing thenumber each year. Comprehensively
taking into account the budget and workload, we draw up a plan regarding thenumber of prosecutors to be newly
appointed each year. In fact, we appointaround eighty to ninety new prosecutors
each year and assign them to each district
public prosecutors’ office. The total numberof public prosecutors in Korea was 1,072
as of September 1, 1997.
The appointment and assignment of allprosecutors are made by the President
upon the recommendation of the Ministryof Justice.
There are four ranks of publicprosecutors: Prosecutor-General, Senior
Chief Public Prosecutor, Chief Public
Prosecutor, and Public Prosecutor.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Requirements for appointment andassignment to each rank are different.

on the Minister’s right to direct or supervise
prosecutors.

E. Principle of Identity of Public
Prosecutors
The Principle of Identity of Public
Prosecutors means that all prosecutors,
each of whom is an independent office, forma uniform and hierarchical organization,at the top of which is the ProsecutorGeneral. This principle was designed tohave all prosecutors perform their work as
one body and cooperate with each other.
Accordingly, even if a specific prosecutor’s
work is done by another prosecutor, it does
not make a difference in terms of legal
effect.

V. ORGANIZATION OF KOREAN
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE

F. Right of the Ministry of Justice toDirect and Supervise Public
Prosecutors
Public prosecutors are executive officials
belonging to the Ministry of Justice.
Although the activities of the publicprosecutors are judicial, the Minister ofJustice, as the supreme supervisor ofprosecutors, directs and supervises
prosecutors in regard to the generalprosecutorial work. However, the Ministercan only direct and supervise theProsecutor General with respect to specificcases. A specific case means one dealt withby a specific prosecutor. With respect to a
specific case, only the Prosecutor-Generalcan direct and supervise a prosecutor interms of investigation, indictment,
maintenance of indictment and executionof final judgments.
Since prosecutors are executive officers
belonging to the Ministry of Justice and theMinister is the one who bears the politicalresponsibility, prosecutors are generally
under the supervision of the Minister. On
the other hand, prosecutors should be freefrom any unjust pressure from politicalparties and other executive departments.
This is the reason why we place restrictions

A. Kind and Name of Public
Prosecutors’ Office
The public prosecutor’s office consists of
the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office,five High Public Prosecutor ’s Offices,
twelve District Public Prosecutor’s Offices
and forty branches as of January 1997.
The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office
is in Seoul, and it corresponds to theSupreme Court. The High Public
Prosecutor’s Offices are in five major cities,
corresponding to the High Courts. The
District Public Prosecutor’s Offices are in
forty cities and counties, and correspondto the District Courts or Family Courts(Figure 1).
B. Structure of the Prosecutor’s
OfficeIn each prosecutor’s office, there is one
chief prosecutor who generally controls thework of that office. Right below the chiefprosecutor is the deputy chief prosecutor
who assists the chief prosecutor or executes
some of the chief prosecutor ’s work
vicariously. Below the deputy chiefprosecutor are several directors who are
the chiefs of several divisions. All work of
the office is divided into several parts andassigned to each division depending upon
the character or nature of the work.
Several prosecutors are assigned to every
division.
In addition, there is support staff in eachof the prosecutor ’s office, who assist
prosecutors in investigation, in drawing up
or keeping documents, trial, etc. The staff
belong to each of the above divisions andthe general affairs bureau. They
sometimes even investigate cases based on
the prosecutor ’s order or draw up
documents.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
VI. DIRECT INVESTIGATION BY
PROSECUTORS
A. Necessity of Direct Investigation
When a crime is committed, the police
officers that belong to the National Police
Agency usually conduct the criminal
investigation. However, public prosecutors
themselves conduct criminal investigationsin the case of special offenses such as
corruption by public officials, tax evasion,
offenses related to huge economic incidents,
and intellectually and legally complicatedoffenses. To increase the efficiency of
criminal investigation for such cases, theSupreme Public Prosecutor ’s Officeestablished the Central Investigation
Department and the District Public
Prosecutor’s Office established the Special
Investigation Department.
B. Supreme Public Prosecutor’s
Office and Central Investigation
Department
1. Organization
The Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office(hereinafter called SPPO) consists of theGeneral Affairs Department, the Central
Investigation Department (hereinafter
called CID), the Criminal Department, theViolent Crime Department, the Public
Security Department, the Inspection
Department, the Criminal Trial and Civil
Litigation Department, and theAdministration Bureau. The Chief Public
Prosecutor is in charge of each department,
except the Administration Bureau, of which
is headed by an administrative official.
The Director of the CID, the Chief Public
Prosecutor, has under his control five seniorpublic prosecutors who are the Director of
the Investigation Planning Office, theCriminal Intelligence Management Officer,
and the heads of Divisions I, II and III. The
Director of the Investigation Planning
Office is a veteran senior public prosecutor
and has the same rank as the Deputy Chief
Public Prosecutor in the District Public

88

Prosecutor ’s Office. Senior publicprosecutors are usually in charge of the
Criminal Intelligence Management Officeor Divisions I, II, and III. As of September
1, 1997, seventy officers were working in
the CID.
2. Duties
The main duty of Divisions I, II, and III
is to investigate special criminal cases,
whereas the Criminal Intelligence
Management Office collects and manages
criminal information. In relation to theadministrative service, the Investigation
Planning Office makes plans ofinvestigative operations, controls andsupervises them, and cooperates with otherinstitutions dealing with criminal
investigation. Divisions I, II and III are
under the control of the Investigation
Planning Office. The CID mainly
investigates corruption by high-ranking
government officers such as ministers of
the government, members of the National
Assembly, presidents of banks, and otherhigh-ranking officers in the central
government. This Department also
investigates criminal cases connected tohuge economic incidents—e.g., tax evasion
by a conglomerate.
C. Special Investigation Departmentin the District Public Prosecutor’s
Office1. Organization
Special Investigation Departments havebeen established in eight District Public
Prosecutor’s Offices and consist of a seniorpublic prosecutor, three or four publicprosecutors and special agents. As an
exception, there are three senior publicprosecutors, eighteen public prosecutors,
and 100 special agents in the Seoul District
Public Prosecutor’s Office. The special
agents are public prosecutor ’s officepersonnel, but they are not police
personnel.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
2. Duties
These departments investigate special
criminal cases including corruption by
public officials and tax evasion. These
departments also collect data andinformation related to special crimes.
D. Investigation Procedure
In criminal cases, the police and thirtyfour special investigative agencies initiate
the basic investigation. However, theCriminal Procedure Code vests the powerof initiation and the conclusion of criminal
investigation solely in the publicprosecutors. Therefore, the police andspecial investigative agencies serve only as
assistants to the public prosecutors andshould conduct their investigations inaccordance with the general standard and/or special directions issued by the publicprosecutors and transfer all cases
mandatorily to the public prosecutors forthe conclusion of investigations.
Public prosecutors themselves directly
investigate criminal cases related tonationally recognized high-profile incidents
or intelligence cases.
1. Criminal Information
Collection
One of the most important operations incriminal investigation is the collection andmanagement of criminal information. As
the society rapidly changes, criminal
methods and types become manifold,organized and sophisticatedly intelligent.
Under such circumstances, the necessityof a systematic management and collectionof criminal information was raised by the
public prosecutor’s offices. Accordingly, theCID in the SPPO established the CriminalIntelligence Management Division on
March 1, 1995. Since then, twelve District
Public Prosecutor ’s Offices and forty
branches established a Division. Division
officials collect criminal information
through diverse sources—especiallythrough minute books of national and local

assemblies, articles of journals andnewspapers, and rumors in the stock
markets.
2. Enforcement GroupIn the Special Investigation Departmentof the Seoul District Public Prosecutor’s
Office, there are six enforcement groups
consisting of two to three public prosecutors
and about 10 special agents. They
investigate criminal cases on the basis of
their speciality. The head of each
enforcement group is managed by a publicprosecutor of varied experiences. Eachgroup has its own specialized field such as
the financial and economic field, theconstruction and scientific technology field,
and the corruption field. However, theenforcement groups are not restricted totheir corresponding specialized field. Eachgroup can investigate other fields, if
necessary.
Other District Public Prosecutor ’s
Offices are planning to establish such an
enforcement group.
3. Money Laundering and Its
Trace
The most important factor in theinvestigation of corruption by public
officials is tracing the source of the bribethat public officials received. Because thebribery of public officials takes several
stages and because it is clandestine andintelligent, it becomes more and moredifficult to trace the source.
In regards to money laundering, theFinancial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF) was established at theG7 Summit in 1987 to provide policies
coping with money laundering. Twentysix countries of the OECD are affiliatedwith the FATF. Korea is now consideringjoining it.
Korea does not have a “Money
Laundering Control Act”, which
criminalizes money laundering itself.
However, Korea enacted “The Special Act

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
against Illicit Drug Trafficking”, whichcontains punishment provisions for money
laundering related to drug crimes.
Consequently, only money laundering
related to drug crimes is criminalized andcan be punished in Korea. Even though it
is necessary to crimiminalize money
laundering itself, it is difficult to do so
because of the protection of confidentiality
in financial transactions.
To trace illegal fund, the SPPO organized
an investigation team consisting solely of
officers of the Office. If necessary, the Officecan request the dispatch of officers fromthe Bank Inspection Board and the
National Tax Administration. The SPPO
published the book, “The Reality of
Financial Transaction and Its Trace,”
which speaks about money laundering andthe investigations surrounding it.
4. Places of Investigation
In the past, public prosecutors usedhotels or secret places to maintainconfidentiality in the investigation ofcorruption by high-ranking government
officials and tax evasion by a conglomerate.
In principle, public prosecutors investigate
such cases only inside the building of the
public prosecutor’s offices now. The SPPO
and the Seoul District Office have special
investigation rooms which only prosecutors
in charge are admitted. Even other fellow
prosecutors are restricted from entering.
F. Prosecutor’s Investigation and
the Mass Media
Because the effect of the prosecutor’s
investigation on the society is enormous,
reporters always pay attention toprosecutors who are in charge of important
cases in order to obtain important sourcesof information. Reporters also try to catch
people who come to the Office in relation
to the investigation and thereby attempt
to cover all stories about the investigation.
However, the Office does not provide them90

with any information about the people
involved in order to protect their rights andthe secrecy of the investigation before thetrial. According to Korean Criminal Law,prosecutors, police officers and otherpersonnel connected to the investigation
can be punished when they release
information before the trial. Sometimes,
reporters discover the investigation
information through the copy of arrest or
search warrants obtained in court. This isbecause they have easy access to thewarrant in court.
From the viewpoint of the mass media,
the people have a right to know and thus
the mass media, emphasizing freedom of
the press, try to report the facts. The
problem is that media agencies competewith each other to report unproven or
unconfirmed information and rumors.
Such reports themselves may interrupt theinvestigation and violate civil rights. Thus,
prosecutors ask for the correction of news
based on unproven information by the
responsible media agency and prohibit thereporters from entering the Public
Prosecutor’s Office. Sometimes, the pressclub itself prohibits the reporters
responsible for the news from gaining
access to the press club room of the Office.
VII. THE CORRUPTION CASE OFFORMER PRESIDENT ROH
TAE WOO
Since October 1995, the CID
investigated the charges of bribery andgraft cases of former President Roh Tae
Woo, along with the then Defense Minister,presidents of banks, and the other highranking government officials. I introduce
now the bribery and graft cases of former
President Roh.
A. Background of Investigation
After the Real Name Financial
Transaction Regulation came into effect in107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
August 12, 1993,1 there was a rumor of ahuge slush fund circulating in the stock
markets and the private loan markets. In
August 1995, the Government
Management Minister Seo Seok-jai at thattime reportedly told reporters under thecondition of being “off the record” that close
aides of one of the two former presidents
had approached the ruling camp and asked
whether the fund, amounting to 400 billion
won (US$500 million dollars), could be
converted to the former president’s bankaccounts using fake and borrowed names.
This rumor was reported by the press.
Along with the increase in the national
interest and suspicion of the slush fund,Congressman Park Kay-dong of the
opposition Democratic Party announced at
the National Assembly’s plenary session in
October 19, 1995 that the former President
Roh had several bank accounts usingborrowed names. Congressman Park
presented bank account balances asevidence of the slush fund. Bank clerks
confirmed the evidence on the same day.
Accordingly, the prosecutorial authorities
began to investigate the case, with a strong
will, that although it was a historicalbribery and graft case of a former president
which had never happened in Korea before,
prosecutorial authorities would convict him
and, if found guilty, impose a severe
sentence on the purpose of the
improvement of justice in Korea, and inturn resolve the suspicion that people haveabout public officials.
B. Investigation Process
Holding the search warrant for Roh’sbank accounts that Congressman Park
revealed, the CID traced the slush fund andsummoned the then Chief of Presidential
Security Service. The CID confirmed that
1 Under the presidential decree on the mandatory
use of real names in all financial transactions, nofund can be opened using either a false or borrowed
name.

Roh had several bank accounts of the slush
fund. The amount of total transactions inRoh’s accounts was approximately 74
billion won (US$100 million) and thebalance was 36.5 billion won (US$45
million dollars). These accounts had been
managed by a presidential resident
financial officer. It was revealed in theprocess of the investigation that thepresidential financial officer followed theorder of the Chief of the Presidential
Security Service and opened several bankaccounts using borrowed names in several
banks. After this investigation, Rohannounced in his apology speech that forfive years during his presidency, hereceived about 500 billion won (about
US$630 million) from business owners andthat the remainder of the accounts was 170
billion won (US$212 million).
Roh was summoned on November 1,
1995 and became the first former president
in Korean history to be arrested anddetained in prison on November 16th forthe violation of the special act on additional
punishment for bribery. The next day, theformer Chief of the Presidential Security
Service was arrested and detained too.
Along with the arrest, more than sixty
people related to the case of false namebank accounts, most of whom were highranking government officers and bankers,
were summoned and investigated. In
relation to the bribery, about 200
businessmen, including thirty-nine of thenation’s major business owners, werebrought in for interrogation. In relation to
obtaining illegal real estate, about forty
people including Roh’s relatives bymarriage and his close aids were
investigated. In relation to theinvestigation of money laundering and theillegal purchase of real estate, 500 bankaccounts were traced and investigated.
For the investigation of this huge slush
fund case, the prosecutorial authority
mobilize ninety-two officers, including theInvestigation Planning Officer, public

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
prosecutors of Divisions II and III in the
CID, public prosecutors of the Seoul
District Prosecutor’s Office, officers fromthe Office of National Tax Administration,and officers from the Bank Supervision
Office.
C. Indictment
Indictments were determined by thesituation in which big business owners
gave bribes in return for government
favors, the size of the bribes, the criminal
histories of the big business owners, andthe effect of the indictment on the domestic
and international economy. On December
5, 1995, the investigation was terminatedwith the indictment of Roh and his aides
with confinement, twelve fund raisers andbusiness owners without confinement, andthree bankers with a summary order. In
the meantime, the request of the Securance
Order for Collection of Equivalent Value on
all of Roh’s properties was accepted by the
court, based on the Special Case Act ofConfiscation for Crime of Public Officials.
All of Roh’s property was preliminarily
seized before the indictment.
D. Result of Trial
In the Seoul District Court, the court oforiginal jurisdiction, Roh was sentenced totwenty-two years and six months in prison
and was fined 283.8 billion won (about
US$354.2 million) on August 26, 1996.
According to the Special Act for Speedy
Litigation, the sentence of the first trial
should be passed within six months fromthe date of indictment, and that of the trialof appeal and the last trial should be passed
within four months from the date ofreceiving the trial record.
In the High Court, the court of appellate
jurisdiction, he was sentenced to seventeen
years in prison and fined 262.89 billion won(US$328.6 million). The Supreme Court

92

rendered a judgment dismissing Roh’s
appeal on April 17, 1997. Business owners
who gave bribes to Roh were sentenced to
imprisonment and suspension of executionof sentence in the appellate court.
VIII. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONORGANIZATIONS OF KOREA
A. Organizations
Criminal investigation organizations of
Korea are divided into two categories. One
is prosecutors and the other is judicial
police officers. Judicial police officers areagain divided into two groups, one of whichis general judicial police officers and theother is special judicial police officers.
1. Prosecutors
Prosecutors are an investigation
organization as well as an indictment
organization. The legal status of aprosecutor as an indictment and that of aprosecutor as an investigation organization
are different from each other.
In Korea, prosecutors play a leading rolein criminal investigation and therefore
they are the czars of investigation in reality
as well as in name.
2. Judicial Police Officers
As I have already mentioned, judicial
police officers are composed of general ones
and special ones. Whereas the former caninvestigate any kind of crime, the latter’sauthority to investigate is limited in termsof subject matter or territory. In otherwords, special judicial police officers arebasically members of the executive whose
original work has little to do with criminal
investigation. In order to take advantageof their expertise on a specific field, they
are entitled to investigate specific crimes.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
B. Relationship between
Investigation Organizations
1. Relationship between
Prosecutors
In principle, a prosecutor is obliged toinvestigate crimes over which he/she has
territorial jurisdiction. However, a
prosecutor can investigate outside of his/
her territorial jurisdiction by requesting
another prosecutor who has territorial
jurisdiction over a specific crime.
Sometimes, prosecutors go directly to aplace outside of his/her territorial
jurisdiction and investigate crimes incooperation with the prosecutors assigned
to that area.
2. Relationship between
Prosecutors and Judicial Police
Officers
Under the Korean Criminal Procedure
Law, the relationship between theprosecutor and the judicial police officer is
not one of cooperation, but one of orderobeyance.
Accordingly, the prosecutor directs andsupervises the judicial police officers inconnection with criminal investigation andthe police should obey the prosecutor’s
official order.
These duties of the prosecutor are
essential in realizing the spirit of the ruleof law which requires the protection ofhuman rights and due process in theinvestigation of crimes.
Judicial police officers should obey any
official order issued by the prosecutors.
(Article 53 of the Korean Public
Prosecutors’ Office Act.) Moreover, thejudicial police officers, as assistants of theprosecutors, can investigate crimes only
under the control of prosecutors.
In case a judicial police officer does notcomply with a prosecutor ’s order orcommits any unjust act in connection withperforming his duty, that prosecutor can,through his chief prosecutor, request theofficer to stop the investigation or request

his superior officer to replace him. If
necessary, prosecutors can request thepolice or other executive departments todispatch some of their officers to theprosecutor’s office. In order to ensure thatprosecutors effectively control judicial
police officers, Korean laws provide thefollowing:a) Prosecutors’ authority toinspect the place of arrest or
detention
To deter unlawful arrest or detention,
the chief prosecutor of the district publicprosecutors’ office or its branch offices
dispatches prosecutors once a month to theplace of the investigation organizations
where a suspect is being arrested ordetained. The inspecting prosecutor
examines relevant documents andquestions the arrestee or detainee. If there
is reasonable ground to believe that any
suspect has been arrested or detained inviolation of due process, the prosecutor
should release the suspect or order the
judicial police officer to refer the case to
the prosecutors’ office. (Article 198-2 of the
Korean Criminal Law.) The purpose of thissystem is to protect individual rights fromunlawful infringement. This provisionemphasizes the prosecutor’s role as an
advocate of human rights.
b) Right to request to the judge
to issue an arrest warrant
Under Korean law, the judicial police
officer is not entitled to directly request to
the judge to issue an arrest warrant. A
judicial police officer should apply for anarrest warrant with the prosecutor. If suchan application is made by a judicial police
officer, the prosecutor examines theapplication documents and decides
whether to request to the judge to issue thearrest warrant. The same is true of awarrant for search, seizure or inspection.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53c) Right to approve urgent
arrest made by a judicial
police officer
Prosecutors or judicial police officers
may arrest a suspect without an arrest
warrant in cases where there is reasonableground to believe that (1) the suspect has
committed a crime punishable by death, life
imprisonment or imprisonment for morethan three years; (2) the suspect may
destroy evidence or has escaped or may
escape; and (3) it is practically impossible
to obtain an arrest warrant from a district
court judge because of urgency. Of course,
prosecutors or judicial police officers should
state the above reasons of urgency to thesuspect before arresting him/her. When ajudicial police officer urgently arrests asuspect, he should obtain the approval of aprosecutor immediately after the arrest. In
reality, when a judicial police officer has
made an urgent arrest, he immediatelytransmits the application documents ofapproval of arrest to the prosecutor byfacsimile, Through this system, prosecutors
can prevent judicial police officers fromillegally arresting a person, thereby
protecting human rights. This provisionalso serves as a tool which securesprosecutors’ right to control judicial police
officers.
d) Right to direct judicial police
officers in connection withdisposition of seized articles
When judicial police officers (1) sell the
seized article and keep the proceeds incustody; (2) return the seized article to its
owner; or (3) temporarily return it to its
owner, they must obtain prior approval of
the prosecutor.
e) Judicial police officer’s duty
to report to the prosecutor
When crimes happen which are related
to national security or are socially
important such as insurrection, foreign
aggression, crimes related to explosives,

94

murder, etc., judicial police officers should
immediately report to the chief prosecutorof the district having jurisdiction over theinvestigation. Moreover, judicial police
officers are also obliged to report to theprosecutor on the occurrence of riots andimportant affairs or movements of politicalparties or social groups. Based on suchreports, prosecutors take appropriate
measures and direct judicial police officers.
3. Relationship between Judicial
Police Officersa) Relationship between
judicial police officers andjudicial police staff
Judicial police officers investigate crimes
under the control of the prosecutors, andthe judicial police staff investigates crimes
under the direction of the prosecutors andjudicial police officers. In other words,
judicial police officers may investigate intheir own name and authority, whereas
judicial police staff only assists in theinvestigation of the prosecutors or the
judicial police officers. In practice,
however, judicial police staff draws up
various kinds of investigation documents
as proxies for judicial police officers.
b) Relationship between
judicial police officers
Judicial police officers who are the samein rank should perform their duty incooperation with each other.
IX. INDICTMENT
In Korea, prosecutors have the soleauthority to decide whether to prosecute asuspect, except in cases of the quasiindictment process by the court and petty
crime indictment made by the police. Thisis called the principle of Indictment
Monopolization.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
A. Presentation of Indictment
To prosecute a suspect, the prosecutor
should present an indictment to the court.
Prosecution can not be made verbally or
by way of wire.
In practice, the prosecutor draws up theindictment and submits it to the court. In
case of prosecution with detention, arrest
warrant (or urgent arrest document, arrest
document against a flagrant offender), thedetention warrant and a certificate ofdetention are attached to the indictment.
B. Principle of Presentation ofIndictment Only
In the indictment, neither documents
nor things which can mislead the judge canbe attached. Accordingly, prosecutors do
not present documents or things such ascomplaints, inspection documents orexpert’s opinion at the time of prosecution.
X. DISCRETIONARY POWER OFPROSECUTORS (PRINCIPLE OFCONVENIENT PROSECUTION)
A. Introduction
Under Korean law, prosecutors have thediscretionary power to suspend prosecution
even if there is sufficient evidence to convict
a suspect. This is called the Principle ofDiscretionary Prosecution. It is a concept
contrary to the Principle of Compulsory
Prosecution. Namely the Principle ofCompulsory Prosecution means that theprosecutor should prosecute a suspectwhen there is sufficient evidence to convictthat person in the prosecutor’s opinion andthe other requirements for prosecution aresatisfied.
The purpose of the Principle ofDiscretionary Prosecution is to enable theprosecutor to take into consideration
criminal policy in deciding whether toprosecutor a specific suspect. However,some lawyers are critical of this principle
in that: (1) such principle can not effectively
control prosecutors’ arbitrary decision, and(2) it is possible that the exercise of theprosecution authority might be influenced
by political pressure.
B. Discretionary Power and Its
Criteria
Section 1 of Article 51 of the Korean
Criminal Procedure Law provides that theprosecutor may decide to suspend
prosecution considering the factors
enumerated in Article 51 of the Korean
Criminal Law. The prosecutor may decide
not to prosecute a suspect taking into
account the suspect’s age, character,p a t t e r n o f b e h a v i o r, i n t e l l i g e n c e ,circumstance, relationship to the victim,
motive and method for commiting thecrime, results and circumstances after thecrime. However, the factors enumerated
in Article 51 of the Criminal Law are notwords of limitation, and therefore
prosecutors may exercise theirdiscretionary power considering factors
other than those enumerated in the article.
C. Reasons for Suspension ofProsecution
Although it is up to the prosecutor todecide whether to suspend a prosecution,
it is very difficult to definitely state thereasons for non-prosecution because theprosecutor must think about various
factors relevant to a specific case in making
the decision. For example, the prosecutor
should consider whether non-prosecution
would help the criminal’s rehabilitationand not confuse social order. Although suchcriminal policy considerations have beenmaterialized through a long period ofpractice, I can not deny the fact that thetest for non-prosecution differs slightly
from one prosecutor to another prosecutor.
It is due to the different views of life ofindividual prosecutors. The test might also
vary with the times or change in people’s
way of thinking. Accordingly, I can notdefinitely state the reasons for nonprosecution. However, Article 51 of the95

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
Korean Criminal Law enumerates thefollowing factors:
1. Factors Regarding the Suspecta) AgeAccording to the age of the suspect,prosecution’s disposition of the case might
differ. Generally speaking, prosecutors
deal leniently with juveniles, students andthe aged.
b) Character and pattern of
behavior
The character, pattern of behavior,hereditary diseases, habit, career, priorconvictions, etc., of the suspect are usuallyconsidered in making a suspension-ofprosecution decision.
c) IntelligenceIntelligence refers to the suspect’s
sensibility. Sensibility is measured by thesuspect’s academic career or extent ofknowledge.
d) Circumstances orenvironment
The suspect’s circumstances such as
family background, vocation, work place,living standard, relationship withclassmates and parental guidance areconsidered in making the non-prosecution
decision. In addition, the prosecutor also
takes into account the effect of prosecution
upon family members of the suspect.
2. Relationship to the Victim
Whether the suspect is a relative to thevictim or collegue in the work place is also
one of the factors.
3. Factors on the Crimea) Motive for commiting the
crime
Whether the crime is a premeditated or
non-premeditated one, whether it wasprovoked by the victim, or whether the96

negligence of both the suspect and thevictim has combined to cause the accident
are also important factors in making asuspension-of-prosecution decision.
b) Method and result of thecrime
The dangerousness of the method ofcommiting the crime, the profits thesuspect has gained from the crime, thepeople’s concerns on the crime, the effectof the crime on society, the extent of thedamage and the degree of possible
punishment are also considered by theprosecutor. In addition, the prosecutor
considers whether there exist reasons toaggravate or mitigate punishment.
4. Circumstances after theCommission of the Crimea) Factors related to thesuspect
Whether the suspect repents the crime,
has apologized to the victim, has tried tocompensate for the damages inflicted on
the victim, has escaped or has destroyed
evidence are important factors in making
a suspension-of-prosecution decision.
b) Factors related to the victim
Whether the damages inflicted on thevictim have been recovered, and whether
the victim wants the suspect to be punished
are also considered.
c) Other factors
Other factors considered are social
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c h a n g e o f p e o p l e ’s
sentiment, time period elapsed after thecommission of the crime, repeal of law,change of the extent of punishment, etc.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
D. Procedure for a Decision of
Suspension of Prosecution
1. Written Oath
In practice, the prosecutor reprimands
the suspect for commiting a crime and has
him/her write an oath stating that he/shewill not commit a crime again in the future.
Irrespective of whether the suspect isdetained or not, the prosecutor summoms,
admonishes the suspect and has that
person write an oath.
In reality, however, the prosecutor sends
an admonishing letter to the suspect
instead of having him/her write an oathwhen he/she is not detained. As you may
have guesed, it is to reduce the prosecutor’s
work load.
When the suspect is a juvenaile orstudent, the prosecutor also has thesuspect’s parent or teacher submit awritten oath to the prosecutor stating thathe/she will supervise the suspect well sothat the suspect will not commit a crime
again in the future.
2. Arrangement for the Suspect’s
Protection
When making a suspension-ofprosecution decision, the prosecutor may
entrust the suspect to his/her relative or amember of the Crime Prevention
Volunteers Committee. In case there is no
person to take the suspect or it isinappropriate in the prosecutor’s opinion
to entrust the suspect to the above-statedperson, the prosecutor may request socialorganizations such as the Korean
Rehabilitation and Protection Corporation
to protect the suspect.
3. Disciplinary Action
In principle, when the prosecutor makes
a decision of suspension of prosecution
against a public official because the crimecommitted is a trivial one, the prosecutor
should ascertain the result of thedisciplinary process held by theorganization to which such public official

belongs. Moreover, within 10 days from the
beginning of the investigation against apublic official, the prosecutor is obliged to
notify the organization to which that
official belongs of the fact that investigationis going on. Generally speaking, suchorganization does not proceed withdisciplinary action against the public
official. Consequently, it is rare for theprosecutor to ascertain the results of
disciplinary action before making asuspension-of-prosecution decision against
a public official.
E. Suspension-of-Prosecution
Decision for Juvenile Offenders
on the Fatherly Guidance
Condition
Suspension of prosecution for juvenile
offenders on the fatherly guidance
condition is the suspension of prosecution
for juvenile offenders under the age of 18.
It is a suspension-of-prosecution decisionon the condition that the offender is subject
to the protection and guidance of a memberof the Crime Prevention Volunteers
Committee for a period of six months to
twelve months after the decision,
depending on the possibility of commitinga crime again in the future. The volunteers
are nominated by the chief prosecutor ofthe district public prosecutors’ office. We
have operated this system nationwide since
January 1, 1981 to prevent juvenile
offenders from being repeat offenders andto rehabilitate them into sound andreasonable citizen. To make this decision,
the prosecutor should select the person toprotect the offender among the membersof the Crime Prevention Volunteers
Committee, hand in a referral document
to the person, receive from that person acertificate stating that he/she has received
the custody of the offender and would bear
the responsibility of protecting and guidethe offender. Of course, the prosecutor
should have the offender and his/her patronsubmit written oaths.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
Even after the decision, at least once amonth the prosecutor receives from thevolunteer how he/she is instructing andguiding the offender. They also, continue
to cooperate with each other.
If the offender does not comply with thevolunteer’s guidance or commits anothercrime, the prosecutor may remand thesuspension-of-prosecution decision andprosecute the offender.
In light of the low rate of such offenders
commiting another crime and the high rateof usage of this system, we can say that it
has worked very effectively so far.
F. Suspension-of-Prosecution
Decision on “the Protection andSurveillance Committee”
Guidance Condition
This is for offenders who need protection
and guidance by experts for a period of six
to twelve months depending upon thepossibility of the offenders commiting
another crime in the future. Suspensionof prosecution is made on the condition thatthe offender is subject to the protection andguidance of the Protection and SurveillanceCommittee.
The prosecutor entrusts the offender toa member of the committee. The procedure
for this disposition is similar to thesuspension-of-prosecution decision on thefartherly guidance condition. However,this system applies to adult offenders as
well.
G. Limitation on the Prosecutor’s
Discretionary Power Not to
Prosecute
The dangerousness of the principle ofdiscretionary prosecution is that theprosecutor might abuse the power or thatthe decision will be affected by politicalpressure. Accordingly, Korean law places
some restritions on such power:98

1. Quasi-prosecution by the Court
When a complainant is notified that theprosecutor has made a non-prosecution
decision, that person may apply for a rulingto the High Court corresponding to theHigh Public Prosecutor’s Office to which
the prosecutor concerned belongs. If theHigh Court holds that the prosecutor’s
decision of non-prosecution was
inappropriate and refers the case of a
district court judgment, prosecution ispresumed to have been made to the district
court. However, this system applies only
to crimes regarding abuse of authority by
public officials.
2. Appeal on the Prosecutor’s
Decision of Non-prosecution
When a complainant is notified that theprosecutor has decided not to prosecute a
certain person, he/she may appeal to thecompetent chief prosecutor of the High
Public Prosecutor’s Office to which theprosecutor belongs. If the appeal isdismissed, the complainant may reappeal
to the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office.
3. Notification of Non-prosecution
Decision and Reasons
Although this is not a direct limitationon the prosecutor ’s power of nonprosecution, it works as an indirect
limitation on such power in that it places
psychological pressure on the prosecutor.
XI. THE CASE OF ILLEGAL LOANSTO HANBO CONGLOMERATE
A. Motive of the Investigation
On January 23, 1997, the promisory
notes and checks issued by Hanbo SteelCompany, the main company of the Hanbo
Conglomerate, were dishonored. After thatthe notes and checks issued by othercompanies belonging to and dealing with
the Hanbo Group were also anticipated tobe dishonored, and as a result, it gave riseto serious chaos in the national economy.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Hanbo Conglomerate took over Kumho
Steel Company in Pusan and establishedHanbo Steel Company in December 1984.
It also proceeded with the construction of
Steel Production Facilities at Dangjin withthe credit award from banking facilities in
December 1990 when the manufacturing
capacity of Hanbo Steel Company faced its
limit according to the boom of steel
production.
There was a nationwide suspicion thatPresident Jeong Tae Soo of Hanbo Groupmade a secret fund of an enormous amountin the course of the construction of the
Dangjin Steel-Production Facilities, andthat such embezzlement committed byJeong was possible due to his connections
with politicians, high-ranking officers andstaff members of banking facilities.
The CID of the SPPO started theinvestigation of the cause of the Hanbo nonpayment on January 27, 1997 under its
own decision that the disclosure of thecause and result of the Hanbo case would
be helpful for the recovery of the national
economy stricken by the Hanbo nonpayment.
B. Process of the Investigation
The CID at first conducted a secretinvestigation in order to clarify the nationwide suspicion arising from newspaper
reports of the Hanbo non-payment on
January 23, 1997.
The Central Investigation Department
prohibited all 36 persons including the expresident of the Hanbo Group Jeong Tae
Soo from going abroad on January 27, andsearched 16 companies of the Hanbo Group
including the headquarters of Hanbo andHanbo Steel Company as well as the housesof Jeong Tae Soo and his sons.
On January 30, 1997, the CID
summoned and questioned Jeong Tae Soo.
It was found out that Jeong himself issued
the dishonored notes and checks beyond
the payment ability of Hanbo Group.

Jeong was also found to have received
an enormous amount of credit funds from
Hanbo Credit Union, one of the companiesof Hanbo Group, which is forbidden by law.
On January 31, 1997, the CID detained
Jeong.
As our investigation went further, it wasalso found that Jeong made illegal requests
to politicians and high-ranking officers ofbanking facilities in the course of credit
awards and permission of authorization ofbusiness, and offered them a great sum ofbribes in exchange.
From February 1 to 6, 1997, all sevenchief persons of banking facilities who
sponsored the credit funds supplied to
Hanbo Steel Company had been summoned
and interrogated about the process of thecredit awards and the non-payment.
The present and ex-chief persons ofbanks who received bribes from Jeong Tae
Soo, such as Shin Kwang Sik, Woo Chan
Mok, and Lee Chol Soo, were arrested.
From Feburary 10 to 12, 1997, all fivepoliticians—members of the National
Assembly Hong In-Kil, Jeong Jae-Chol, andWhang Byung-Tae from the leading party(Shin-Han-Kook Party), another
Assemblyman Kwon No Kap from the
opposition party (Kuk-Min-Whoe-Eui
Party), and the ex-Minister of Home
Affairs, Kim Woo-Sok were summoned andinterrogated. All of them were arrested asthey were found to have received bribes
amounting from 200 million to 1,000
million Won from Jeong Tae Soo in
exchange for his illegal requests.
The CID tried very hard to find any
evidence of embezzlement of the credit
funds, on the one hand analyzing accountbooks and computerized materials ofHanbo Group and on the other hand
tracing 42 bank accounts of Hanbo Group
with a search warrant.
However, these investigations were noteasy because Hanbo Group, which had
undergone the Sooso Scandal and the graft
and embezzlement case of ex-President

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 53
Roh of my country, had already discarded
many of its own account books.
The CID tried to the best of its ability tofigure out the processes of the making andusing of the funds accumulated by Hanbo
Group by tracing the flow of the credit
money on the basis of the account materials
gathered through search and confiscations,the retrieval of erased data contained incomputers, and the C.P.A.’s data.
The ex-Minister of Trade, Industry andE n e r g y, t h e p r e s e n t a n d e x - c h i e f
Presidential Secretary of Economy, andmany other high-ranking officials of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy, theMinistry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries,
and the Bank Supervision Office were also
summoned and questioned as to whether
they gave unfair privileges to Hanbo Groupthrough licensing and authorization of its
business and credit awards.
In this case of nationwide concern andinterest, over 300 persons were
investigated by 108 persons under thecontrol and supervision of the Chief of the
CID. The 108 persons comprised thepersonnel of the Investigation Planning
Officer, the 1st, the 2nd, the 3rd and the
Criminal Intelligence Management
Division of the CID, research officers of the
SPPO, and officers of the Office of National
Tax Administration and the Bank
Supervision Office.
C. Keypoints of the Investigation
The prosecutorial authorities declared
their strong will to make a thoroughinvestigation of the case and set up some
important factors that are fully examined
as follows.
First, the background which enabledsuch a big credit award and the cause of
non-payment, the use of credit money andany other criminal offence which might
have been committed during theconstruction of the Dangjin SteelProduction Facilities were given priority.

100

In the investigation of high-ranking
officers of banking facilities, we stressed
the process of credit awards, possible bribes
and the breach of trust relating to the credit
awards.
In the investigation of politicians andhigh-ranking public officials, weconcentrated our efforts on finding out any
illegal privilege given by them to Hanbo
Group, any receipt of illegal benefits as theprice of such privileges, and any otherbetrayal of trust committed after thereceipt of bribes.
D. Use and Embezzlement of theFunds
The prosecutorial authorities confirmedthat Jeong Tae Soo made a fund of about
US$562 billion (about 5,005,900 million
Won) in total sum for the construction of
the Dangjin Steel-Production Facilities: a
US$319 billion (about 2,868,600 million
Won) credit from the first banking facilities(banks) apart from guaranties, a US$147
billion (about 1,319,500 Won) credit fromthe second banking facilities (financecompany and mutual savings bank, etc.),
and a US$96 billion (about 867,800 Won)
credit made of corporate bonds andpersonal debt.
The prosecutorial authorities also
confirmed that Jeong used about US$399
billion (about 3,591,200 million Won) for
facility equipment and US$133 billion(about 1,191,900 Won) for facility
management, and embezzled the rest of thefund, about US$30 billion (about 272,800
million Won).
The rest of the fund amounting to about
US$30 billion (about 272,800 million Won)
which Jeong embezzled was found to havebeen mainly used for the establishment ofaffiliate companies, Jeong’s personal tax
payment, alimony for Jeong’s ex-wife, thepurchase of Jeong’s private real estate, andillegal lobby money for politicians and chief
persons for banking facilities.

107TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
We are still tracing about US$720
million (about 6,500 million Won), the useof which is still unknown.
E. Result of the Investigation
On February 19, 1997, the prosecutorial
authorities indicted all ten persons in
detention, that is, two staff members ofHanbo Group, three high-ranking officersof banking facilities including the chief
officer of Jaeil Bank, and five public
officials including Congressman Hong InKil. Four other staff members of Hanbo
Group including the Head of Hanbo SteelCompany were suspended fromprosecution under consideration that they
could not but follow the directions of Jeong
Tae Soo, who was the president of the whole
Hanbo Group.
The ten persons in detention including
Jeong Tae Soo were tried at the Seoul
District Court, and nine persons weresentenced to 3 to 15 years, except for one
person whose sentence was suspended.
The nine persons who were sentenced
to imprisonment at the District Court
appealed to the Seoul High Court. After afour-month trial, the Seoul High Court
rendered suspended sentences to fivepersons including three congressmen, but
rejected Jeong Tae Soo’s appeal, on
September 24, 1997. His 15-year
imprisonment sentence was still upheld,
and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Figure 1

Supreme Public Prosecutor’s OfficeSeoul High Public
Prosecutor’s OfficeSeoul District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeTaejon High Public
Prosecutor’s Office
Taejon District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeTaegu High Public
Prosecutor’s OfficePusan High Public
Prosecutor’s Office

Kwangju High
Prosecutor’s OfficeTaegu District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficePusan District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeKwangju District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeTongbu Branch
OfficeHongsong
Branch Office

Andong Branch
OfficeTongbu Branch
OfficeMokpo
Branch Office

Hambu Branch
OfficeKongju Branch
OfficeKyongju
Branch Office

Ulsan Branch
OfficeChanghungBranch OfficePukbu Branch
OfficeKanggyong
Branch Office

KimchonBranch Office

Changwon District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeSunchonBranch Office

Sobu Branch
OfficeSosan Branch
OfficeSangju Branch
OfficeChinju Branch
OfficeHaenamBranch Office

Uijongbu
Branch Office

Chonan Branch
OfficeUisong Branch
OfficeTongyong
Branch Office

Chonju District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeInchon District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeChongju District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeYongdokBranch OfficeMiryang
Branch Office

KunsanBranch Office

PuchonBranch Office

Chungju
Branch Office

Kochang
Branch OfficeChongup
Branch OfficeNamwonBranch OfficeSuwon District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeChechonBranch Office

Yongdong
Branch OfficeSongnam
Branch Office
Yoju Branch
OfficePyongtaek
Branch Office
Chunchon District
Public Prosecutor’s
OfficeKangnung
Branch Office
Wonju Branch
OfficeSokcho Branch
OfficeYongwol
Branch Office

102

Cheju District
Public Prosecutor’s
Office