This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

JFMA
Technical Information

SERVO PRESS ----SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND MEASURESTI 103 : 2008

July 2008
Japan Forming Machinery Association
Engineering Committee-0-

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

Japan Forming Machinery Association Technical Information

Servo Press -- Safety Requirements and Measures
Foreword
This TI103:2008 standard is a revision of the Japan Forming Machinery Association TI103:2006
standard issued in 2006 by the Japan Forming Machinery Association. This updated standard
acknowledges the distinctive hazards inherent in servo presses and especially in the servo systems
used to drive them, and moreover, takes into consideration conformity with the ISO/IEC functionalsafety standards which have been significantly augmented in recent years.
1. Scope of Application
This standard stipulates the distinctive hazards inherent in a servo press (see 4.1), and stipulates
the requirements to be used to eliminate such hazards or to reduce the risks associated with suchhazards to an appropriate level.
The scope of application of this standard is not limited by the specifications of the servo press,
such as the tonnage capacity, the strokes per minute, or its dimensions. However, this standard does
not apply to mechanical presses with linear servo mechanisms and hydraulic presses equipped with
servo valves.
2. Related Standards
The act of citing the following standards denotes that they are incorporated as a part of thisstandard. If a specific year is called out in one of the following cited standards, the edition for thatgiven year is applicable, and subsequent revised editions (including supplements) are not applicable.
If a specific year is not called out in a referenced standard, the latest version of that standard(including supplements) is applicable.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10

JIS B 0111 Presswork machinery – Vocabulary
JIS B 8361 (ISO 4413) General rules for hydraulic equipment --Safety of machinery -- Basicconcepts, general principles for design -- Part 1: Basic terminology, methodology
JIS B 9700-1:2004 (ISO 12100-1:2003) Safety of machinery -- Basic concepts, generalprinciples for design -- Part 1: Basic terminology, methodology
JIS B 9700-2:2004 (ISO 12100-2:2003) Safety of machinery -- Basic concepts, generalprinciples for design -- Part 2: Technical principles
JIS B 9702:2000 (ISO 14121:1999) Safety of machinery -- Principles of risk assessment
JIS B 9703 (ISO 13850:1996) Safety of machinery -- Emergency stop -- Principles for design
JIS B 9704-1:2006 (IEC 61496-1) Safety of machinery – Electro-sensitive protective
equipment -- Part 1: General requirements and tests
JIS B 9705-1:2000 (ISO 12849-1:1999) Safety of machinery -- Safety-related parts of control
systems -- Part 1: General principles for design
JIS B 9714:2006 (ISO 14118) Safety of machinery -- Prevention of unexpected start-up
JIS B 9960-1:1999 (IEC 60204-1:1997) Safety of machinery -- Electrical equipment ofmachines -- Part 1: General requirements-1-This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

2.11 ISO 13732-1 Ergonomics of the thermal environment -- Methods for the assessment of human
responses to contact with surfaces -- Part 1: Hot surfaces
2.12 IEC 61800-3 Adjustable speed electrical power drive systems -- Part 3: EMC requirements
and specific test methods
2.13 IEC 61800-5-1

Adjustable speed electrical power drive systems -- Part 5-1: Safety

requirements – Electrical, thermal and energy
3. Table of Contents
Foreword ...............................................................................................................................................1
1. Scope of Application.........................................................................................................................1
2. Related Standards ............................................................................................................................1
3. Table of Contents..............................................................................................................................2
4. Terminology and Definitions.............................................................................................................2
5. Risk Identification of Distinctive Hazards Inherent in Servo Presses and Risk Assessment .......8
6. Safety Requirements and Protective Measures .............................................................................8
6.1 Overview
6.2 Basic Requirements
6.3 Servo System Safety-Related Parts
6.4 Stop Functions
6.5 Slide Position Detectors
6.6 Monitoring Functions
6.7 Pre-Initiation Presence Sensing
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening
6.9 Software Safety Requirements
6.10 Brake Systems
6.11 Slide Restraint Means
6.12 Operation Modes
6.13 Display Equipment
7. Information for Use .........................................................................................................................24
7.1 Overview
7.2 Marking
7.3 Service Life of Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Parts
8. Annex ..............................................................................................................................................26
8.1 Overview of Distinctive Hazards Inherent in Servo Presses
8.2 Examples of Servo Press Risk Assessment Results
8.3 Stop Function Implementations and a Comparison of Attainment Means
8.4 Classification of Power Shutdown Methods and Examples of Redundant Designs
8.5 Implementation Examples of Static Brake Performance Monitoring Functions
8.6 Examples of Measures Applicable to Software
9. Summary.........................................................................................................................................41
4. Terminology and Definitions
The terminology and definitions used in this standard are based on those given in JIS B 0111 andJIS B 9700-1 and those given below.
4.1
Servo press
A mechanical or hydraulic press where the motion of the slide is controlled by a servo system-2-

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4.1.1

4.1.2
4.1.3

This translation is provided for reference only.

(see 4.2).
Mechanical servo press
A servo press configuration where the power of a servo motor is transmitted to the slide bymeans of a crank or some other rotating mechanism or by means of a ball screw or someother direct drive mechanism. Such a system configuration is shown in Figure 1.
Note 1: Mechanical servo presses are included in Definition 1000 of a “Mechanical Press”
given in JIS B 0111.
Mechanical servo press brakePrimarily a mechanical servo press designed for bending plate-shaped material.
Hydraulic servo press
A servo press configuration where the power of the servo motor is transmitted to the slide bymeans of hydraulic pressure. Such a system configuration is shown in Figure 2.
Note 1: Hydraulic servo presses are included in Definition 2000 of a “Hydraulic Press” given
in JIS B 0111.

Figure 1: Example of a Mechanical Servo Press System Configuration

Figure 2: Example of a Hydraulic Servo Press System Configuration
4.1.4

Hydraulic servo press brake
Ａ hydraulic servo press primarily designed for bending plate-shaped material.
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4.2

4.3

4.3.1

4.3.2

4.4

4.5

4.5.1

This translation is provided for reference only.

Servo system
A system for moving the slide that includes a servo motor, a servo amplifier (inverter circuit), a
feedback detection device, electrical braking equipment, and control equipment (a controller).
Note: A servo system is defined as the entire system related to slide motion, and aside fromthe element examples given in Figure 1 and Figure 2, it also includes interface
equipment that enables the user to make program settings, and safety programmable
logic controllers (safety PLCs) that are used to monitor protective device and standard
control system faults. The areas (subsystems) related to safety functions in the servo
system are considered to be the safety-related parts.
Brake system
A mechanism outside of the servo system that slows and stops the slide, then holds the slidein a stopped state. There are mechanical brake systems and hydraulic brake systems.
Note: These are considered to be systems that hold the slide for relatively short periods oftime in order to insert or remove workpieces, etc., and these are clearly differentiatedfrom the slide restraint means explained in 4.12.
Mechanical brake system
A brake system that uses mechanical friction to slow and stop the slide and then holds theslide in a stopped state.
Hydraulic brake system
A brake system that shuts off or adjusts the pressure or flow rate of the fluid that transmits thepower of the servo motor in order to slow and stop the slide and then hold the slide in a
stopped state. Such a system is composed of cylinders, solenoid valves that control thepressure or flow rate of the fluid, and the requisite piping. Also referred to as a hydraulic gravity
restraint device.
Electrical braking
A servo system function that slows and stops the slide using electrical means such as
electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic circuits and/or elements.
Note 1: It is permissible for electrical braking not to be able to hold the slide in a stopped
state.
Note 2: It is to be a Stop Category 1 stop as defined in JIS B 9960-1, 9.2.2 only when apower shutdown (see 4.5) is being performed.
Power shutdown
Operations or servo system functions that shut off or prevent the supply of electrical power tothe servo motor. The methods can be classified as follows, based on the different principles
used.
Note 1: A Stop Category 0 or 1 stop as defined in JIS B 9960-1, 9.2.2 accompanies theperformance of a power shutdown.
Note 2: Refer to Annex 8.4 for detailed explanations about power shutdown methodclassifications.
Main power shutdown
A power shutdown method where electromechanical components are utilized to shut down
(disconnect) the entire servo system’s electrical power supply from the main line.
Note: It is permissible not to disconnect the power supply going to ‘exempted circuits’
stipulated in JIS B 9960-1, 5.3.5 and to display equipment that provides necessary
information during inspections or repairs as long as the equipment conforms with therelevant requirements given in JIS B 9960-1.
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4.5.2

4.5.3

4.6
4.6.1

4.6.2

4.6.3

4.6.4

4.7

This translation is provided for reference only.

Electromechanical shutdown
A power shutdown method where electromechanical components are utilized to disable thetransmission of electrical power to the servo amplifier and/or servo motor.
Electronic shutdown
A power shutdown method where, in response to a signal from an external device which does
not include (does not go through) a programmable electronic circuit (control circuit) between
the signal input point and the inverter circuit, a semiconductor element is used to disable theservo amplifier’s alternating current generation.
Note 1: Depending on the semiconductor element being used, it may also be referred to as
a gate off or base current shutdown, etc.
Note 2: Electronic shutoff systems do not include systems where a signal from an external
device is processed by a control circuit within the servo amplifier (see 8.4).
Stops
Emergency stop
A condition where the slide has come to a stop in response to the operation of an emergency
stop device.
Protective stop
A condition where the slide has automatically stopped for protective purposes in response to a
detection signal. Protective stop types include protective stops that are executed in response
to a signal from an interlocking device, an active opto-electronic protective device, or a
two-hand operation control device, etc., and protective stops that are executed in response toa signal from an internal subsystem that monitors faults, etc., in the servo system or brakesystem.
Normal stop
A condition where the slide has come to a stop at a specifically programmed position (e.g., top
dead center, a standby position, or a planned stop position). This is a condition intended for the
intrusion of some part of the body of the operator inside the hazard zone in order to insert or
remove a workpiece.
Note: During a normal stop, protective devices such as guard interlocking devices, active
opto-electronic protective devices, or two-hand operation control devices are muted(see 4.8), and risk reduction is achieved by functions and/or systems that securely holdthe slide in place.
Temporary stop
A condition where the slide has come to a temporary stop in response to a standby signal or
direction change signal in the program, or in response to the stopping of a start operation (e.g.,
due to a hand being removed from start button, or a foot being removed from a foot switch).
There is no intent to have some part of the body of the operator enter inside the hazard zone.
Note: Protective devices such as guard interlocking devices, active opto-electronic protective
devices, or two-hand operation control devices are not muted (see 4.8), and the stop
condition changes to a protective stop condition if the intrusion of any part of theoperator’s body is detected.
Protective open
A safety function in response to a signal from a protective device that moves the slide in the
direction that will increase the distance between the upper and lower dies (the opening
direction) for protective purposes instead of executing a protective stop.
Note: The term ‘protective open’ is also used to refer to special kinds of protective actuations,-5-

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even including cases where the slide upstroke does not correspond to the opening
stroke and the slide downstroke does not correspond to the closing stroke.

4.8

4.8.1

4.9

4.10

4.10.14.10.24.10.34.10.44.11

4.12

Muting
The temporary automatic stopping of the safety functionality of safety-related parts of thecontrol system.
Note: Refer to JIS B 9705-1, definition 3.7.
Muting during slide opening
The muting of protective devices in the operational single stroke mode that is executed bymoving the slide in a direction that increases the clearance between the upper and lower dies
(opening stroke) during the timeframe from when the slide movement has reached a position
where the decrease in clearance between the upper and lower dies (closing stroke) will end
before any part of the body of an operator will reach the hazard zone until the slide reaches theend point and stops .
Note: The term ‘muting during slide opening’ is also used to refer to special kinds of muting,even including cases where the slide upstroke does not correspond to the opening
stroke and the slide downstroke does not correspond to the closing stroke.
Programmed slide stroke
The distance between the upper and lower dies at the position where a programmed normal
stop is performed during the current stroke.
Note: This has been redefined for servo presses because the slide motion range during theprocess currently executed does not necessarily match the structurally determined
natural stroke length, and there may even be times when changes are occurring inevery cycle.
Monitoring function
A safety function that detects the occurrence of a monitored hazardous condition, initiates theprotective stop function, and displays the fault.
Start/stop monitoring
A monitoring function that compares and detects disagreement between the start initiation,
operation permission, and stop signals from start (operation) and protective devices and the
motion conditions of the servo motor, the brake system, and the slide that are related to thestarting and stopping of the slide.
Overrun monitoring
A monitoring function that monitors the slide stopping time or the braking distance when anormal stop function is executed, and detects when the allowable values have been
exceeded.
Standstill monitoring
A monitoring function that monitors whether the slide is being held at the programmed stop
position during a normal stop, and detects unintended starts (actuation malfunctions).
Brake performance monitoring
A monitoring function that statically or dynamically monitors brake system actuation and brake
performance, and detects non-actuations or degraded performance.
Presence sensing before initiation
A function, device, and/or procedure that detects and gives warning of the presence of
personnel other than the operator inside the hazard zone before the initiation of slide motion.
Slide restraint means
A slide restraint device or component used to prevent hazardous slide motion or the slide from-6-

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4.12.14.12.24.13
4.13.14.13.24.13.3

4.14
4.15

4.16
4.17

This translation is provided for reference only.

falling while performing adjustment, cleaning, inspection, and maintenance tasks.
Mechanical slide restraint device
A slide restraint means that uses the strength of a built-in mechanical impediment (e.g., awedge, spindle, or brace) to prevent hazardous slide motion.
Note: This is also sometimes referred to as a mechanical gravity restraint device, but devices
that use mechanical friction principles (e.g., devices that utilize a worm gear self-lock)are not included in the definition of mechanical slide restraint devices.
Safety block
A slide restraint means where the strength of a block shape that is inserted between thebolster or lower die and the slide or upper die is used to prevent hazardous slide motion.
Operation mode
Operational single stroke
An operation mode where the slide moves along a programmed path from a start point to an
end point for only one cycle when the start operation is performed, and when the end point isreached the slide stops even if the start operation continues to be performed.
Note: This term has been newly stipulated as it is a term that expresses the uniqueness ofservo presses, where slide path changes are made via the program, and it has also
been adopted because it has become standard to equip the power presses of todaywith a single stroke function.
Inching stroke
An operation mode where the slide moves along a programmed path while the start operation
is being continuously performed, and then the slide stops immediately once the start operation
is discontinued.
Continuous stroke
An operation mode where the slide moves repeatedly and continuously along a programmed
path when the start operation is performed once, and does not stop until a stop operation is
performed.
Cycle
The slide motion or stroke cycle from a programmed start point to a programmed end point.
Manual pulse generator
A device used for manual feeding where command pulses are generated by manually turninga handle.
Hand-in-die
A press machine or a press work method where the workpiece is manually fed and removed.
No-hand-in-die
A press machine or a press work method where the workpiece is fed and removed
mechanically or automatically, thereby eliminating the necessity of having the operator place
any part of their body inside the hazard zone during the forming process.

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5. Identification of Distinctive Hazards Inherent in Servo Presses and Risk Assessment
A table showing the distinctive hazards inherent in servo presses that are covered in this standard
is given in Annex 8.1.
A hazard analysis shall identify all possible future hazards. A risk assessment that takes into
consideration all of the following shall be performed for the identified hazards.
a) Intentional servo press operations, including settings, adjustments, die changes, setup, cleaning,
maintenance, and repairs.
b) Unexpected start-up.
c) Access of personnel from any direction.
d) Usage by unqualified and untrained personnele) Reasonably foreseeable misuse.
f) Effects of control system and component part failures.
g) Transportation, installation, and startup-related aspects.
h) Removal from service and disposal-related aspects.
i) Hazards related to specific usages or applications.
Risks shall first be eliminated or minimized by means of the design (e.g., designs where a person
or some part of their body will not enter inside the hazard zone), and second by protective and otheradditional measures (e.g., providing interlocking guards or protective devices). All types of residual
risks shall be reduced through other measures (e.g., warnings, caution signs, and training)
The safety requirements in item 6 were formulated by implementing risk assessments for thehazards given in Annex 8.1 and the repeated application of the risk reduction strategies given in JIS
9700-1, Figure 1 and Figure 2, and in JIS B 9700-2.
Note 1: Examples of risk assessment results for servo presses with different intended usages areshown in Annex 8.2.
Note 2: JIS B 9700-1, JIS B 9700-2, and JIS B 9702 give the requirements and guidelines when
performing hazard identification and risk reduction.
<Commentary>
The requirements in item 6 are limited in scope to the hazards stipulated in Annex 8.1, but theidentification and risk evaluation of hazards that take into consideration all aspects of the servo press
usages given in item 5 are to be performed during the risk assessment, and at the same time it isnecessary to eliminate or reduce significant hazards not stipulated in Annex 8.1 by implementing the
3-step risk reduction process method stipulated in JIS B 9700-1.
6. Safety Requirements and Protective Measures
6.1 Overview
Servo presses shall be designed and manufactured in compliance with the requirements given inthis item with respect to the hazards stipulated in item 5. Hazards and risks other than those given initem 5 shall be eliminated or reduced in the design and manufacture of the machine in accordancewith all applicable regulations, such as the Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health and theConstruction Code for Power Press, and with JIS B 9700-1.
6.2 Basic Safety Requirements
6.2.1 Guarding Power Transmission Components
Exposure to hazards originating from components related to power transmission, such as motors
shafts, gears, belts, or link mechanisms, shall be prevented by means of fixed or movable guards.
Movable guards shall incorporate interlocking system that will stop hazardous motion before contact-8-

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is made with a hazard. Based on the results of a risk assessment, the safety performance of theinterlocking system shall be designed to comply with 6.3.
6.2.2 Belt Drive Malfunctions
For servo presses with mechanisms that utilize a belt to transmit the power or torque used tobrake the slide, a single failure of a belt due to belt breakage, etc., shall not lead to the loss of the
stopping functionality. A single failure shall be detected immediately, and at the time it is detected a
shutdown of the power source shall be performed and the slide shall be held by means of the brakesystem, and restarting shall be prevented until the failure is repaired.
Note 1: Single failures aside from belt breakage that shall be taken into consideration include belt
elongation, looseness, and separation, belt pulley idling, tooth skipping, etc.
Note 2: Designs where the transmission of the braking power or braking torque does not residein a belt include designs where an electromagnetic brake is mounted on the mechanicalstructures on the driven side and the braking torque is mechanically transmitted to theslide.
6.2.3 Electrical Equipment
In order to prevent electric shock resulting from direct contact or indirect contact, the electricalequipment of the servo press shall be designed and manufactured in accordance with the relevant
requirements in JIS B 9960-1 and IEC 61800-5-1.
6.2.4 Electrical Power Supply Loss and Fluctuation
Fluctuations in the electrical power supply, such as the loss of the electrical power supply due to a
power outage or a momentary power loss, shall not result in the creation of a hazard. Especially as it
relates to the safety-related parts of the servo system stipulated in 6.3, it should be designed tocomply with the power source voltage fluctuation and momentary power outage requirements
stipulated in JIS B 9704-1, 4.3.2.
No slide motion of any kind must be caused by the restoration of power after a power outage. For
example, even in a condition where servo deviation has been caused due to the effects of coasting,restarting shall not be permitted until the reset operation is performed.
<Commentary>Compliance with JIS B 9704-1, 4.3.2 has been recommended in view of the fact that many of thesafety PLCs applicable for usage on power press machines assure conformance withelectro-sensitive protective equipment resistance characteristics with respect to power source
voltage fluctuations and momentary power outages.
6.2.5 Energy Controls That Use Capacitors
Servo presses that convert and store servo motor energy at the time of braking, etc., shall be
designed so that the slide will not move in response to electrical discharges from capacitors after aslide stop that is accompanied by a power shutdown.
In order to reduce the risk of electric shock or burn resulting from residual energy in a capacitor
when an enclosure is opened, etc., the circuits related to capacitor and energy storage functionality
shall comply with JIS B 9960-1, 6.2.4.
6.2.6 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
The servo system shall be designed and manufactured in accordance with the relevant-9-

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requirements in IEC 61800-3 in order to prevent hazardous slide motion due to the effects ofelectromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge(ESD). Moreover, as it relates to the safety-related parts of the servo system stipulated in 6.3, thedesign should comply with the requirements of JIS B 9704-1, 4.3.2.3−4.3.2.7 just as Type 4
electro-sensitive protective equipment does.
If the placement of a servo press in the vicinity of electrical discharge machines, welding machines,
and high-current capacity switches can be foreseen and noise countermeasures become necessaryin addition to circuit countermeasures that use parts with high noise resistance, appropriate warnings
and instructions shall be included in the information for use. Prescribed noise countermeasures
include but are not limited to the usage of covers, shields, noise filters, and surge absorbers.
Note: Also included in the meaning of hazardous slide motion is ‘not stopping at the normal
position.’<Commentary>Compliance with JIS B 9704-1, 4.3.2.3−4.3.2.7 has been recommended in view of the fact thatmany of the safety PLCs applicable for usage on power press machines assure electromagnetic
compatibility that conforms with Type 4 electro-sensitive protective equipment. IEC-61800-3 is theEuropean EMC protocol compliance standard for variable speed drive systems.
6.2.7 High Temperature Protection
Servo system components or circuits where the creation of a hazardous condition is possible due
to a servo motor or resistor reaching an abnormally high temperature shall be protected by one of
the following:a) Designs that prevent the occurrence of abnormally high temperature conditions by providing
detection methods that have adequate responsiveness.
b) The usage of guards to prevent direct contact with locations that reach high temperatures.
Warnings shall be provided for any residual risks even when the above protective measures are
implemented.
Note: Refer to ISO 13732-1 and IEC 61800-5-1.
6.2.8 Prevention of Unintended Startup
In order to prevent unintended starting of the slide, the slide of a servo press shall not actuate by
any switch operation other than the switch operation of the specified start (operation) equipment,
except in cases where a process is selected where the slide is started in response to a signal fromexternal equipment as stipulated in 6.12.5.
Note 1: Refer to JIS B 9714.
Note 2: The ‘process for starting the slide in response to a signal from a protective device’
explained in 6.12.5 and the ‘process for starting the slide in response to a signal fromexternal equipment’ explained in 6.12.6 are not mandatory operation modes.
6.2.9 Prevention of Unanticipated Pressure
The hydraulic systems in servo press shall be designed and manufactured in accordance with therelevant requirements given in JIS B 8361. When the occurrence of pressure that exceeds the
maximum usage pressure is avoided by relying solely on the pressure of the servo system or theflow control functions, the related subsystems shall comply with 6.3.
<Commentary>
In JIS B 8361 it stipulates that hydraulic systems are to either be designed to anticipate the- 10 -

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occurrence of pressure that exceeds the rated pressure or to be equipped with one or more releasevalves, and pressure adjustment control functions that reside in the servo system shall not serve as
the primary countermeasure for preventing high pressure. Especially in the case of hydraulicsystems in servo press, a safe condition is a condition where the pressure has fallen, but if a failure
has occurred in the servo system, it is not necessarily the case that a servo motor power shutdown
can guarantee a reduction in pressure.
6.3 Safety-related parts of Servo System
Control functions for protective purposes whose malfunction would be directly linked to increased
risks are defined as safety functions (Refer to JIS B 9705-1:2000, Item 5). Subsystems,
components, and devices related to the attainment of safety functions shall be identified assafety-related parts of the servo system, and the clear information for use shall be provided insupplemental documents.
The safety-related parts of a servo system shall comply with the Category 4 requirements
stipulated in JIS B 9705-1, 6.2.5. Specifically, they shall be designed as follows:a) No single failure of any part will result in the loss of the safety function.
b) All single failures are to be detected by or before the time of a demand for the actuation of thesubsequent safety function.
c) When a single failure occurs, the safety function is always to be executed, and a safe condition is
to be maintained until the detected failure is repaired.
d) In cases where detection is not possible, cumulative failures will not result in the loss of the safetyfunction.
Note 1: As long as the achievement of an equivalent risk reduction level can be assured, it ispermissible to employ performance standards other than those stipulated in JIS B
9705-1:2000, such as performance levels and safety integrity levels.
However, for an intended usage (e.g., no-hand-in-die usage), etc., and as necessary, aperformance standard other than Category 4 (i.e., Category 2 or 3) can be selected based on the
results of individual risk assessments. In such cases, it shall be clearly stated that a category otherthan Category 4 has been selected, and appropriate limitations and warnings shall be included in theinformation for use. Examples of risk assessment results in cases where a category other than
Category 4 has been selected are given in Annex 8.2.
6.4 Stop Functions
6.4.1 Overview
Servo presses shall have the emergency stop function stipulated in 6.4.2.
Stops made for protective purposes in response to a stop signal from protective devices (e.g., guardinterlocking devices, active opto-electronic protective devices, or two-hand operation control devices)or in response to a stop signal from a monitoring function that detects faults in the servo system or
the brake system shall be achieved using a protective stop function that complies with 6.4.3.
Stops performed for the purpose of feeding and removing workpieces shall be achieved by meansof a normal stop function that complies with 6.4.5. A summary of the above is given in Table 1, and acomparison of safety function implementations and a comparison of the methods for attaining suchare given in Annex 8.3.

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TI103:2008

Table 1: Summary of Requirements Stipulated in 6.4: Stop Functions

Stop
CategoryPower
Shutdown
while
Maintaininga StopBrake
Systemwhile
Maintaininga StopRemarks(Related
Items)

Stop Function

Function
Demand/Initiation

Emergency
Stop Function

Manual0 or 1

Yes

Yes

6.4.2

By a monitoring
function0 or 1

Yes

Yes

6.4.3.2

0 or 1

Yes

Yes

6.4.3.3 a)

—

—

Yes

6.4.3.3 b)

0 or 1

Yes

Yes

6.4.5.2——

Yes

6.4.5.3

2——

6.4.5.4

Protective
Stop Function

By adeviceprotective

Normal Stop By a program; by an
Function
intended operation

Note: Items shown as “—“ are not stipulated in this standard.

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function
Servo presses shall have the following emergency stop function which can be initiated by a single
manual motion.
a) Functions as a Stop Category 0 or 1 stop.
b) Complies with the relevant requirements in JIS B 9960-1 and with 6.3.
c) Holds the slide immediately or after the braking of the slide by means of the brake system.
d) Takes precedence over all other operations, controls, and functions.
e) Can only be manually reset at the position where the emergency stop command was output. A
manual reset only serves to permit a restart, and the resetting itself does not immediately restart
the slide.
f) After the manual reset operation is performed, no operation mode other than an inching stroke is
to be initiated until the slide is returned to the start point position.
The emergency stop device shall comply with JIS B 9960-1, 10.7 and with JIS B 9703. The
examples of a redundant design of a power shutdown system intended to comply with 6.3 areshown in Annex 8.4, Figure 8.4.2,8.4.3,8.4.4.
6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.4.3.1 Overview
To the extent that a servo press does not employ intrinsic safety design measures to eliminate
crushing hazards or appropriately reduce the risks associated with such, it shall have the protective
stop functionality stipulated in 6.4.3.2 and 6.4.3.3. It is permissible for these stop categories to bedifferent.
Subsystems related to protective stop function shall comply with 6.3.
The time from the actuation request for a protective stop function until the stop is completed (i.e.,
the protective stopping time) shall comply with 6.4.3.4.

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6.4.3.2 Protective Stops Resulting from Monitoring Functions
Protective stop functions initiated by signals from the monitoring functions stipulated in 6.6 and as
a result of the detection of some other servo system fault shall function as a Stop Category 0 or 1
stop and shall hold the slide by means of the brake system.
Note: See 6.6.1 for other requirements at the time a hazardous condition is detected by amonitoring function.
6.4.3.3 Protective Stops Resulting from Protective Devices
A protective stop function initiated by a signal from a protective device must comply with one of thefollowing:a) It is to function as a Stop Category 0 or 1 stop, and hold the slide by means of the brake system.
b) It is to hold the slide by means of a brake system that has the capacity to hold the slide in positioneven when the maximum starting torque of the servo motor is being applied. Electrical braking
may be used for braking the slide. Power shutoff is not mandatory, but if there is the possibility ofa hazard condition (e.g., unexpected slide slippage) or a new hazard due to an overload when
the servo motor torque continues to be applied (e.g., extremely high temperatures or fluids
spraying out under high pressure), the implementation of a power shutdown shall be studied as aprotective measure.
If a protective stop is initiated by a signal from a protective device, the design should maintain theprotective stop function until the protective device is manually reset.
6.4.3.4 Protective Stopping Time
The completion of a protective stop is defined as a condition where all of the following have beenachieved.
a) Slide motion has decelerated to a speed of 10 mm/s or less.
b) The brake system has been actuated.
c) If it functions as a Stop Category 0 or 1 stop, the power shutdown has been performed..
The time from the actuation request for a protective stop function to the time the stop is completed(i.e., the protective stopping time) shall not exceed the time given in 7.2 regardless of the type ofsingle failure that has occurred. For example, in a case where the protective stop function works as a
Stop Category 1 stop, the attainment of a protective stop condition shall not be delayed due to theeffects of a power source failure. Accordingly, the manufacturer shall specify the longest single failure
condition (i.e., worst case) as the time required for the stop, and shall display the stopping time undersuch a condition as the protective stopping time.
Note 1: In definition 3.2 ‘total system stopping performance’ in JIS B 9715, the protective stopping
time is equivalent to the machine’s maximum response time t2, and does not include thetime t1, which is defined as the time from when a protective device detection monitor
actuates until the output signal switch reaches an OFF state.
Note 2: For servo presses where electrical braking (deceleration control) is performed at the timeof a protective stop, an analysis of the servo system hardware and/or software may berequired in some cases in order to determine the worst case (refer to IEC 61800-5-2).
<Commentary>
Included in protective stop functions are those initiated by a stop signal from monitoring equipment
and those initiated by a stop signal from protective devices, and it is permissible for these stop
categories to be different. However, when determining the protective stopping time, an analysis shallbe performed for all protective stop functions and it will be necessary to specify the worst case- 13 -

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condition as being the longest time required to achieve a), b), and c) when a single failure has
occurred.
6.4.4 Protective Open
It is permissible to execute a protective open function instead of the protective stop function
stipulated in 6.4.3.3 that is initiated in response to a protective device. However, subsystems related
to protective open functionality shall comply with 6.3. Additionally, the direction of slide motion shallchange to the opening direction before any part of an operator’s body can reach the slide and/or die,and moreover, shall be able to surely prevent a change to the closing direction of the slide during theexecution of the protective open function. Also, hazards that are caused by a sudden reversal in the
direction of motion (e.g., falling dies, etc.) shall be eliminated by the design.
The protective open function shall not take the place of the protective stop function stipulated in
6.4.3.2 that is initiated in response to monitoring equipment.
6.4.5 Normal Stop Functions
6.4.5.1 Overview
Normal stop functions are functions used to stop the slide for the purpose of feeding and removing
a workpiece, and they shall comply with any one of 6.4.5.2−6.4.5.4.
In cases where protective device muting is performed during a normal stop, the muting shall not
expose any personnel to a hazardous condition (refer to JIS B 9705-1, 5.9). Accordingly,
subsystems related to muting shall comply with 6.3. Also, the muting initiation timing shall comply
with 6.4.5.2−6.4.5.4 and shall not permit a slide restart until the muting has ended and all safetyfunctionality has been restored.
The time required to execute a normal stop function shall be designed to be less than or equal tothe protective stop time given in 7.2. The normal stopping time shall be monitored each time bymeans of the overrun monitoring function stipulated in 6.6.3.
The type of servo presses which reverse the direction of movement from the opening direction to
the closing direction when their slide overshoots the position where a normal stop is performed (e.g.,mechanical servo presses having the same mechanism as a crank press) shall comply with theadditional requirement given in 6.4.5.5.
<Commentary>
If the normal stop functionality complies with any one of 6.4.5.2−6.4.5.4, there is no need tocontinue to comply with any single chosen stipulation in all cases, such as cases where theserequirements are used interchangeably depending on the programmed stroke length. Also, there is
no requirement to comply with 6.3 (processing/executing normal stop functions in Category 4
safety-related parts) except for the standstill monitoring functions associated with 6.4.5.4. This isbecause one can foresee servo presses where the entire control of the slide is performed by astandard control system, and where the same subsystem used for the protective stop function isused for a normal stop without muting protective devices.
Muting initiation methods when muting is performed at the time of a normal stop include thefollowing:a) After moving the slide to the normal stop position using standard control equipment, perform apower shutdown and initiate muting in response to the power shutdown execution.
b) After moving the slide to the normal stop position using standard control equipment, actuate thebrake system, and initiate muting in response to that actuation.
c) Using interface equipment(e.g., the slide position detector),detect that the slide has reached the- 14 -

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normal stop position programmed by the user, and initiate muting in response to that detection
result.
For all of the above methods, the circuits and equipment related to muting are safety-related parts,and muting shall not be initiated at any timing other than the timing stipulated in 6.4.5.2−6.4.5.4 as aresult of a single failure of hardware and/or software. Safety performance that is identical to that of arotary cam switch system used on a crank press is required
6.4.5.2 Stop Category 0 or 1 Stops
The normal stop function works as a Stop Category 0 or 1 stop, and holds the slide by means of
the brake system. In cases where the same subsystem used for the protective stop function is not
used for the normal stop function, protective device muting can be initiated simultaneously with apower shutdown.
6.4.5.3 Holding the Slide Using a Brake System with Sufficient Holding Capacity
The slide is to be held by means of a brake system that has the capacity to hold the slide inposition even when the maximum starting torque of the servo motor is being applied. Electricalbraking may be used for braking the slide. Power shutoff is not mandatory, but in cases where an
overload causes a new hazard or hazardous condition, it shall be implemented as a protective
measure.
In cases where the same subsystem used for the protective stop function is not used for thenormal stop function, protective device muting can be initiated simultaneously with a power
shutdown.
6.4.5.4 Stop Category 2 Normal Stops Accompanying Standstill Monitoring
It is to function as a Stop Category 2 stop (i.e. servo stop). However, in cases where a standstillmonitoring function that complies with 6.6.4 is executed and erroneous slide motion is then detected,
it is change to a protective stop. At such times, one of the following must be complied with:a) The slide is to be stopped and held while assuring a clearance between the dies that is
considered sufficient to avoid crushing any part of the human body. A clearance that is 98% orgreater than the programmed slide stroke should be assured.
b) Slide motion in the die closing direction up until the time the slide is stopped and held is to besmall enough not to be considered a crushing hazard. Movement should be 2 mm or less.
The muting of protective devices can be initiated simultaneously with the execution of the standstillmonitoring function.
Note: Refer to JIS B 9714, 6.4.
<Commentary>
The specific requirements for cases where a Stop Category 2 stop is used for a normal stopfunction are the same as JIS B 9714, 6.4. However, in order to show a more detailed performancestandard for the meaning of the term ‘immediately,’ compliance with a) or b) has been made arequirement in this standard. The value of 98% of the programmed slide stroke recommended ina) is derived from a crank press where the stop position is set at top dead center, as the slide will
descend approximately 2% of the stroke length from its upper limit when the crankshaft rotation
overshoots (overruns) by approximately 0.26 rads (15 degrees). On the other hand, the 2 mm value
recommended in b) is derived from special research conducted by the National Institute ofOccupational Safety and Health,Japan in its measurements of the maximum allowable displacement
range of each part of the human body, where it found that the 5th percentile value of the maximum- 15 -

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allowable displacement range of the foreheads of 9 adult male subjects was 2.1 mm. (Reference
literature: Saito, Ikeda: Industrial Safety Research Institute Special Report, NIIS-SRR-No.33 (2005),
p. 22.）In the case of a normal stop, there is the presumption that part of the body of an operator has
already entered inside the hazard zone, and thus it is necessary to take into sufficient consideration
the possibility that slide movement from the time a malfunction occurs until the protective stopfunction is completed could immediately result in a hazardous event. Now, as stated previously,
depending on the programmed slide stroke settings, it is also permitted to substitute the compliancerequirements in 6.4.5.4 with those in 6.4.5.2 or 6.4.5.3.
6.4.5.5 Additional Requirements
For servo presses constructed such that overshooting of the slide at the position where a normal
stop is performed will result in a reversal of the direction of slide movement from an opening direction
to a closing direction, in cases where the stop position is programmed to be in a position where thiskind of reversal could be foreseen, the protective stop function shall be initiated if the slide overshootexceeds 2% of the programmed slide stroke regardless of any single failure that may occur. This canbe achieved by means of the overrun monitoring function stipulated in 6.6.3 when the allowablevalue is set to 2% of the programmed slide stroke.
Note: This stipulation would be applicable in a case where the planned stop position is set at top
dead center for a mechanical servo press with features identical to a crank press, but it is
not limited to this situation.
<Commentary>
This is equivalent to the overrun monitoring equipment stipulated in the Construction Code forPower Presses, and at this point in time it applies to mechanical servo presses with a construction
similar to a crank press where the planned stop position is set at top dead center. The tolerance
value is a value derived from crank presses where if the crankshaft rotation overshoots byapproximately 0.26 rads the slide will descend approximately 2% of the stroke length. Now, as
explained in the Note in 6.6.3, if the same subsystem is used to execute both the normal stopfunction and the protective stop function, at that point it will be initiating the protective stop function
and thus it is permissible to merely prevent the initiation of any mode other than an inching stroke
until the slide is returned to the start point position.
6.5 Slide Position Detectors
Safety functions executed in response to a signal from a detector such as an encoder or limit
switch that detects the position of the slide shall not become unable to comply with the performancestandards stipulated in 6.3 as a result of the failure of the slide position detector.
Note: Slide position detector failures aside from a loss of detection functionality include faults inmechanism areas that operate together with the slide(e.g., broken chains or lost couplings).
Slide position detectors related to safety functions shall not be installed in locations where they canbe easily changed by the user. Measures to prevent changes include but are not limited to providing
a locked housing over the installation area.
6.6 Monitoring Functions
6.6.1 Overview
The monitoring functions stipulated in 6.6.2−6.6.5 are safety functions, and in order for the related
subsystems to comply with 6.3 they are to be configured as redundant systems that also jointly- 16 -

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cross-monitor their own normal actuations, and one side of a system shall be able to independently
execute a power shutdown and actuate the brake system regardless of the condition of the otherside of the system. A single failure that causes the loss of either side of a system shall be detected
immediately or detected before the start of the next cycle, and cumulative failures shall not result in aloss of functionality.
When a monitored hazardous condition has been detected, a protective stop function thatcomplies with 6.4.3.2 shall be initiated. also the fault shall be displayed, and the stop condition shallbe maintained until the safety requirements for restarting are fulfilled.
The motion condition of the slide should be measured directly. For example, in cases where theactual condition of the slide is not measured directly and is instead inferred based on themeasurement results of the servo motor rotation conditions or the electrical power conditions, asingle fault (defect) in the power transmission area, namely to a loss of agreement between the
servo motor motion and the slide motion, would result in the loss of the monitoring function.
6.6.2 Start/Stop Monitoring
The relationship between the signals from the start (operation) equipment and protective devices
related to slide starting, operation permissions, and stopping shall be compared with the actuation
conditions of the servo motor, brake system, and slide, and disagreement faults., shall be detected.
Start/stop monitoring functions shall check the relationship between all signals at least once per
cycle.
6.6.3 Overrun Monitoring
Servo presses shall monitor the stopping time or the stopping distance every time a normal stop is
performed, and the protective stop function shall be initiated if the designed tolerance value is
exceeded. Once the tolerance value is set, it shall not be easily changed by the user. After stopping,no operation modes other than an inching stroke shall be enabled until the slide is returned to thestart point position.
Note: If overrun has occurred on a servo press where both the normal stop function and theprotective stop function are performed by the same subsystem, once the slide has come toa stop it is permissible to merely prevent the initiation of any mode other than an inchingstroke until the slide is returned to the start point position.
6.6.4 Standstill Monitoring
Servo presses which perform the normal stop function given in 6.4.5.4 shall monitor the slide
stopping position during a normal stop and shall detect motion errors that would exceed thedesigned tolerance values.
Note: Refer to JIS B 9714, 6.4.
<Commentary>
When a normal stop function that complies with 6.4.5.4 is performed, the slide position detector
shall continue to monitor that the slide should remain stopped at the normal stop position setting
programmed by the user via the interface equipment. The circuits and/or equipment related tostandstill monitoring (also including normal stop position information settings programmed by theuser) are safety-related parts, and slide motion error detection shall not become disabled as a resultof a single failure of hardware and software.
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Servo presses that use the brake system for slide braking for the protective stop function but do
not use the brake system for slide braking for the normal stop function shall have one of the following
brake performance monitoring functions to periodically confirm the brake performance of the brakesystem alone.
a) Static monitoring that confirms brake performance by actuating the brake system while the slide
is in a stopped condition.
b) Dynamic monitoring that confirms brake performance by actuating the brake system while theslide is moving at maximum speed.
Servo presses with multiple brake systems shall be able to independently confirm theperformance of each brake system.
The brake performance monitoring function should be designed for independent initiation, using
methods such as incorporating it in the slide initiation sequence. In cases where monitoring is only
initiated manually, and the frequency of such is not executed at the frequency stipulated by the
specification, continued operation shall be disabled or warnings shall be given via visual displays,visual signals, and/or auditory signals.
Regarding the execution frequency, monitoring should be performed at the time the servo press isstarted and then at least once every 8 hours in the case of static monitoring, and at least once every
24 hours in the case of dynamic monitoring.
Note: An implementation example of the static brake performance monitoring function is shown inAnnex 8.5.
<Commentary>
In a case where the brake system is used for protective stops but electrical braking is the primarymeans for braking the slide at the time of a normal stop, it is not necessarily the case that the overrun
monitoring given in 6.6.3 alone will be able to detect degradation of the brake performance of thebrake system. Accordingly, it is necessary to periodically confirm brake performance of the brakesystem alone. And this is not limited to mechanical brake systems. Regarding the preferred
execution frequency of brake performance monitoring, guidance was given for executing such at thetime of startup and then once every 8 or 24 hours, but taking into consideration the operation
configurations of current servo presses, it was not deemed to be necessarily advisable to stipulatethat operation be interrupted in order to perform brake performance monitoring, and thus thedecision was made to show this as a recommended value in this standard.
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation
In the case of servo presses where it is anticipated that an operator would not be able to confirm
from the operation location whether personnel were present within the hazard zone before startup(e.g. in the case of large servo presses where personnel could enter into the hazard zone or enter
into the area between sensing protective devices and the hazard zone), protective detection devices
such as auxiliary light curtains, laser scanners, and mat switches shall be provided and interlocking
system that directly monitor inside the hazard zone shall be constructed so as not to allow a slide
restart while personnel are within the hazard zone.
In cases where it is not reasonably feasible to implement the usage of sensing protective devices
because of intended usages, usage environments, or operational restrictions, a means of lock-out
shall be provided, and instructions that specify that this is to be used to control personnel accessinside the hazard zone shall be included in the information for use.
In cases where a sensing protective device such as an active opto-electronic protective device isused to guard the sides or rear of the press, the protective design shall be made so that the- 18 -

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necessity of pre-initiation presence sensing at the time of restarting after a protective stop has been
initiated by signals from such equipment. For example, it may be designed so that the protective
stop function is maintained until the sensing protective device that has been actuated is manually
reset from a position where the detection zone of that device can be sufficiently confirmed (see6.4.3.3).
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening
For servo presses that perform muting during slide opening, the slide motion speed (i.e., theupstroke speed for presses that open during the upstroke) shall be monitored during the opening
stroke, and unintended motion speed reductions (i.e., reductions in the upstroke speed) due to servo
system malfunctions shall be detected. Subsystems involved in such speed monitoring functions
shall comply with 6.3 and be configured as redundant cross-checking systems, and no single failure
shall result in the loss of functionality. Moreover, at least one system shall be designed in aconfiguration that directly measures the slide motion speed.
The protective stop function is to be initiated when an unintended reduction in speed is detected.
At such times, one of the following must be complied with:a) The slide is to be stopped and held while assuring a clearance between the dies that is
considered sufficient to avoid crushing any part of the human body. A clearance that is 98% orgreater than the programmed slide stroke should be assured.
b) Slide motion in the die closing direction up until the time the slide is stopped and held is to besmall enough not to be considered a crushing hazard. Movement should be 2 mm or less.
In cases where a path is programmed whereby motion in the opening direction is performed
multiple times during an operational single stroke operation, muting during slide opening at any timeother than the final opening motion shall not cause a hazardous condition.
Note: See Annex 8.2 for information relating to the suitable categories for system controls andprotective measures for muting during slide opening.
<Commentary>
Reversal of the motion direction of the slide is to be monitored when performing muting during
slide opening, and a protective stop of the slide shall be performed under conditions that comply witha) or b) when a malfunction occurs. However, in the case of a), the position where a motion error thatcauses a reversal occurs will become an issue, making it difficult to always comply with this. The
basis for the 98% of the programmed stroke value recommended in a) and the 2 mm value
recommended in b) is the same as that given in the 6.4.5.4 Commentary.
Excluding the deceleration time just before a normal stop, reductions in the slide motion speed(upstroke speed) in the opening direction are monitored, and a reversal can be detected in advance,
and thus there is the possibility that a protective stop that is faster than a Stop Category 2 normal
stop can be achieved.
6.9 Software Safety Requirements
The software used for a servo press shall not cause the safety-related parts of the servo system tobecome incapable of complying with the requirements of this standard, and it shall be tested,evaluated, and proved that it is reliable, and additionally, that it can permit the requisite behavior
when a failure occurs. Moreover, in cases where software is used for multiple safety functions, it shallcomply with the strictest malfunction-related requirements.
Examples of recommended measures that apply to software in order to achieve these aims are
given in Annex 8.6.
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6.10 Brake Systems
6.10.1 Overview
Servo presses shall be equipped with mechanical or hydraulic braking systems that do not residein the servo system (i.e., independent systems) and that slow and stop the slide and then hold it inthat stopped state.
The brake system shall be able to hold the stopped condition of the slide even under conditions
where the maximum starting torque of the servo motor is being applied. In cases where thisrequirement cannot be met, the servo motor torque shall not be transmitted to the slide during theexecution of a stop function that utilizes the brake system. One method for not permitting the torqueof the servo motor to be transmitted to the slide is to have the torque become 0 by performing a
power shutdown, but this is not the only possible method.
6.10.2 Mechanical Brake Systems
Mechanical brake systems shall be designed and manufactured to comply with the following:a) Band brakes shall not be utilized.
b) It shall be a normally closed spring-return type system that brakes the slide by means of springs
when the inputted energy has shifted from a high state to a low state (e.g., the energy supply isinterrupted, or the input signal is turned OFF or eliminated).
c) Multiple springs are to be used, and the brake function shall not be lost even if 50% of all thesprings break.
d) For systems where load is applied to the springs, it shall be constructed such that the position of
the springs are fixed when in an appropriately adjusted state and no loosening will occur.
e) When operated by means of a solenoid valve, the solenoid valve shall be a dual-solenoid type.
When a single failure has occurred, the slide shall be stopped and restarting shall be prevented.
f) A single failure shall not result in the loss of brake functionality and holding functionality. Types ofsingle failures that shall be taken into consideration include a cutoff or drop in hydraulic or
pneumatic pressure, a cutoff of the electrical power supply, a cut wire, and the intrusion of
lubricants onto the braking surfaces of a dry-type brake.
6.10.3 Hydraulic Brake Systems
Hydraulic brake systems shall be designed and manufactured to comply with the following items:a) It shall be a normally closed-type system that brakes the slide when the input energy has shiftedfrom a high state to a low state.
b) It shall be configured as a redundant system with multiple solenoid valves arranged in series atthe exit port on the slide closing side.
c) Single failures are to be detected by or before the time of a demand for the actuation of thesubsequent safety function. When detected, the protective stop function shall be initiated and,moreover, restarting shall not be permitted until the failure is repaired.
d) Those solenoid valves located in a position near the exit port on the slide closing side shall bewelded directly to the cylinder or be connected via a flange.
In hydraulic brake systems constructed of multiple cylinders, it is permissible to use a construction
where those solenoid valves positioned far from the exit port on the slide closing side are shared bymultiple cylinders.
<Commentary>
In this standard, counterbalance valves used for the purpose of primarily holding the slide for- 20 -

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relatively long periods of time are considered to be slide restraint means, and thus are not included
in hydraulic brake systems.
6.11 Slide Restraint Means
6.11.1 Overview
During adjustment, cleaning, inspection, and maintenance work, a power shutoff of the servo
system is to be performed, and appropriate means for restraining the slide such as a mechanicalslide restraint device that complies with 6.11.2 and/or a safety block that complies with 6.11.3 shallbe prepared. Additionally, warnings regarding the hazards involved when adjustment, cleaning,inspection, and maintenance work is performed without using these kinds of slide restraint means
shall be provided by means of warning signs, instruction manuals, etc.
For the design of large servo presses where personnel can enter inside the hazard zone or
between the sensing protective device and the hazard zone, the consideration shall be made for thenecessity of presence sensing before initiation given in 6.7 related to starting and restarting after the
power supply is restored.
6.11.2 Mechanical Restraint Devices
Mechanical restraint devices shall be designed and manufactured to comply with the following
items:a) It is to be a normally closed type that initiates the slide restraint when the energy of the input
control signal changes from a high state to a low state (i.e., the input signal is turned OFF or
eliminated).
b) Mechanical impediments are actuated by means of gravity or springs.
c) The strength of the mechanical impediment supports the total weight of the slide and themounted dies (e.g., upper dies).
d) It is linked to the interlocking system which shutdown the servo system power.
e) The hazards caused by unintended actuation of a mechanical restraint device (e.g., dies falling
due to impact) have been analyzed and eliminated.
In cases where the mechanical slide restraint device is constructed only to be able to restrain theslide at a certain specified position (the restraint enabling position), warning means shall be provided
using visual displays, visual signals, and/or auditory signals to notify that the device has beencorrectly set in the restraint enabling position or that the mechanical restraint device is not effectivelyfunctioning.
6.11.3 Safety Blocks
Safety blocks shall be designed and manufactured to comply with the following items:a) Able to support the total weight of the slide and the mounted dies (e.g., upper dies).
b) Is a shape (dimension) that can be inserted and used between the slide or upper die and thebolster or lower die.
c) Linked to the interlocking system which shutdown the servo system power..
<Commentary>The ‘power shutdown’ stipulated in 6.11.2 d) and 6.11.3 c) is a requirement that uses slide restraintmeans for the purpose of preventing unintended startup while performing adjustment, cleaning,inspection, and maintenance work, and regarding electrical shock protection during such work it isnecessary to separately study the disconnection of the power feed system, etc., based on a risk
assessment.
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6.12 Operation Modes
6.12.1 Overview
Servo presses shall be provided with operational single stroke and inching stroke operation
modes. Mode changes shall be performed by means of an operation mode selection device thatcomplies with 6.12.2. Depending on the usage, other operation modes, such as a continuous stroke
mode, may also be provided. Regarding special operation modes, items related to slide movement,
the operation of start (operation) equipment and/or functional limitations of protective devices shallbe provided as the information for use.
6.12.2 Operation Mode Selection
The servo press operation mode shall be selected using a mode selector switch (e.g., a keyed
operation switch) that can securely maintain the selected position and will not involuntarily change
position due to the effects of its own weight, minor vibrations, etc. In addition to displaying theavailable operation mode selections, mode selector switches shall be equipped with a switch
position that displays “OFF” or “○” used for the purpose of deliberately performing a power
shutdown of the servo system.
When changing start (operation) equipment and/or protective devices associated with operation
modes, these selections shall be performed by means of one of the following selection devices
and/or mechanisms.
a) A keyed operation control switch with a direct open circuit (a forced open contact) motion function(refer to JIS C 8201-5-1, Annex K). Non-selected positions (switch contacts) are to be securely
isolated from the servo system by means of forced open contact motion.
b) Redundant hardware with a keyed operation switch and monitoring functionality.
c) Safety-related parts that comply with 6.3 (including software when applicable). When operation
mode selections are performed on a display screen, it shall not be possible to start the slide
before the selected content has been displayed.
<Commentary>
If the selection device used for the start (operation) equipment and/or protective device equipment
is different from the one used to select the operation mode, it is permissible for the latter not tocomply with a)−c) in 6.12.2.
6.12.3 Inching Stroke
When the inching stroke has been selected, a protective stop shall be performed when any part ofan operator’s body is detected as having entered inside the hazard zone, also including during
temporal stops (inching stops) during the inching stroke. In other words, it is permissible to achieve
an inching stop by means of standard control functionality, but muting of protective devices shall not
be executed.
However, for mechanical or hydraulic servo press brakes where it is not reasonably feasible to use
protective devices because of restrictions related to its intended usage, protective device muting ispermissible only in the case of servo press brakes that comply with all of the following:a) An inching stop is achieved by means of a normal stop function that complies with any one of
6.4.5.2−6.4.5.4.
b) During an inching stroke, the operation for moving in the direction that decreases the clearance
between the slide and bolster is independent of the operation for moving in the direction that
increases the clearance, and separate control devices are provided for each operation.
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In an inching stroke, the slide can be started at any and all slide positions. However, in the case oflarge servo presses where personnel can enter inside the hazard zone or between the sensing
protective devices and the hazard zone, the necessity of presence sensing before initiation given in
6.7 shall be taken into consideration.
6.12.4 Continuous Stroke
No muting of any kind shall be executed in the continuous stroke mode.
When the continuous stroke mode is provided, unintended changes to the continuous stroke as aresult of a malfunction shall be prevented. Aside from the operation mode selection device in 6.12.2,
this can be achieved by providing devices such as a continuous stroke mode ON/OFF switch, a
dedicated continuous stroke initiation switch, and a setup button, where a conditional operation is
performed to start the continuous stroke mode. A time limit shall be provided for this conditional
operation, and if the slide is not started within this time limit once the operation mode has beenchanged to the continuous stroke mode, the start command shall be cancelled and the mode shallnot be started unless the operation is repeated. Operations where no separate device for theconditional operation is provided, such as pressing and holding down the start buttons for a specified
period of time, shall not be used as a substitute for this conditional operation.
6.12.5 Modes Where the Slide is Started in Response to Signals from Protective Devices
It is permissible to execute slide start controls by means of a signal from special protective devices(e.g., controlled guarding) only when in the operation mode specifically designated for that purpose.
However, such shall comply with all of the following:a) The structural stroke length of the servo press shall not exceed 600 mm.
b) The bolster front-to-back dimension shall not exceed 1000 mm.
c) In cases where the protective device that starts the slide is a interlocking guard equipped with astart function (i.e., controlled guard), it shall be designed to comply with the requirements of JIS B
9700-2, 6.3.2.5.
d) In cases where the protective device that starts the slide is an electro-sensitive protective device,
it shall be designed to comply with the requirements of JIS B 9704-1, A.8. The bottom edge of
openings guarded by an electro-sensitive protective device shall be at least 750 mm above floor
level.
6.12.6 Modes Where the Slide is Started in Response to Signals from External Equipment
It is permissible to execute slide start controls by means of a signal from external equipment otherthan start equipment and special protective devices only when in the operation mode specificallydesignated for that purpose. However, to the extent that intrinsic safety design measures have noteliminated crushing hazards or appropriately reduced the risks associated with such, it shall comply
with all of the following:a) No muting of any kind shall be executed in this dedicated operation mode.
b) Signals from external equipment shall not take precedence over protective device stop signals.
c) No conditional operation mechanism that starts this dedicated mode (e.g., a setup button, circuit
reset equipment) aside from the operation mode selection device in 6.12.2 shall be provided.
d) Just like the continuous stroke mode, a time limit shall be provided for the equipment that
performs this conditional operation, and if it is left idle while waiting for a signal from external
equipment for a period longer than the time limit , the start command shall be cancelled.
e) Signals from external equipment shall be redundant inputs and shall be processed in a redundant- 23 -

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system.
6.12.7 Modes Where the Slide is Moved Using a Manual Pulse Generator
Manual operation using a manual pulse generator is only permitted when in the operation mode
specifically designated for that purpose. This dedicated operation mode shall employ one of thefollowing to eliminate a crushing hazard or appropriately reduce the risks associated with such.
a) Implement intrinsic safety design measures.
b) Use guards and/or protective devices.
c) Restrict slide travel speed to 10 mm/s or less. Additionally, a 3-position type hold-to-run control
device or enabling device (refer to JIS B 9960-1, 9.2.5.8) is to be provided, and if such is notoperated simultaneously with the manual pulse generator, the protective stop function stipulated
in 6.4.3.3 is to be initiated.
Note 1: A foot-actuated device may be used as the hold-to-run control device.
However, a manual pulse generator shall be manufactured and designed to comply with all of thefollowing:a) The slide cannot be started by other equipment when the manual pulse generator has been
selected.
b) Unintended pulses are not generated as a result of the effects of its own weight, minor vibrations.
c) It cannot be selected until an intended operation has been performed.
Note 2: For example, unintended selection can be prevented by only enabling the manual pulse
generator when an operation panel pushbutton with an internal indicator light has been
pushed and the button light turns on to notify the operator that the manual pulse
generator is enabled.
6.13 Display Equipment
6.13.1 Stroke Indication Equipment
Servo presses shall be provided with equipment that displays the current position of the slide
during the programmed stroke. Also the equipment shall be positioned so that the operator andwork-related personnel can easily view the display. Additionally, the following items should be
displayed if reasonably feasible:a) The direction of slide movement (upstroke, downstroke, etc.)b) The position of the upper and lower limits of the programmed stroke or the position of the limit
switches that are used for such settings.
c) The parameter settings for the overrun monitoring function (allowable stopping distance, etc.) andthose execution results (excluding when operating in the continuous stroke mode).
6.13.2 Stop Condition Display Equipment
In order to prevent operators and work-related personnel from mistakenly recognizing the state of
the electrical power being supplied to the servo motor or the actuation/release state of the brakesystem while performing adjustment, cleaning, inspection, or maintenance work, servo presses shallbe provided with notification equipment that clearly displays or turns indicator lights on and off inorder to notify personnel whether the stopped condition of the slide is due to a power shutdown or isdue to a servo stop(see 6.4.5.4), and whether the brake system is engaged.
7. Information for Use
7.1 Overview- 24 -

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The provision of machine displays (e.g., signs and symbols) and instructional documentation (e.g.,
operation and maintenance manuals) shall be in accordance with the relevant requirements in JIS B
9700-1, JIS B 9700-2, and JIS B 9960-1.If warning devices are provided, the provisions shall becomplied with JIS B 9700-2 and JIS B 9960-1.
7.2 Marking
The following shall be displayed on the servo press itself in a clear, easily read, and durable
method:a) The manufacturing number.
b) The name of the manufacturer.
c) The year and month of manufacture.
d) The type of press (either mechanical servo press, mechanical press brake, hydraulic servo press,or hydraulic servo press brake).
e) The protective stopping time.
f) If designed intentionally for a specific usage, the intended usage method (e.g., no-hand-in-die or
automatic).
In cases where a servo press is intentionally designed for “no-hand-in-die” operations but it cannot
be technologically prevented from being used in “hand-in-die” operations, instruction manuals orother appropriate media shall be provided to warn of the hazards related to such.
Additionally, there may be some cases where the following items shall be added in order to reduce
the risks associated with machine installation, test operation, and disassembly, etc.:a) The maximum stopping time (the worst-case value for the time from the actuation of the detection
function of a protective device until a protective stop is completed).
b) Tonnage capacity (pressure capacity).
c) Structural stroke length.
d) Machine weight.
e) The lifting locations used for transportation and installation purposes.
Note: There may be cases where there are legal requirements to display items other than theones given above.
7.3 Service Life of Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Parts
The service life of electrical and electronic parts and the instructions related to the inspection andreplacement frequencies of such parts shall be clearly shown in the instruction manuals or otherappropriate media. When necessary, information shall be included about requirements for
specialized knowledge related to the replacement of parts or the hazards related to the usage ofparts other than the recommended parts. When reasonably feasible, servo presses should be
provided with equipment that tracks the number of actuations or the utilization times of components.
<Commentary>
The primary component parts and equipment on a servo press are electrical, electronic, andprogrammable electronic parts and equipment. Unlike defects in mechanical parts that result fromwear, failures caused by the age deterioration of electrical and electronic parts characteristicallyoccur abruptly, and thus it is difficult to know the predictive signs of such failures based on theoperational state of the machine. From the viewpoint of changing from conventional maintenanceand inspection concepts that were based on the mechanical service life to concepts primarily
revolving around the electrical service life, it is important to provide the user with service or designed
life information in the instruction manuals, etc.
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8. Annex
8.1 Overview of Distinctive Hazards Inherent in Servo Presses
Annex 8.1 stipulates the distinctive hazards inherent in servo presses that are covered in thisstandard.
Table 8.1: List of Hazards (Excerpted from JIS B 9702, Annex A)
JIS B 9700
Referenced
No.
HazardRelated Hazard Areas
Items
Part 1 Part 2
1. Mechanical Hazards
1.1 Crushing
4.2.1 4.2
Between the upper and lower dies, 6.2.2,
between the slide and upper die, 6.3−6.6,
between the bolster and lower die, 6.10
between the workpiece and the dies. 6.2.2,
1.2 Shearing
4.2.1 4.2
Power transmission parts such as 6.3−6.6
motor shaft, gears, and belts.
1.4 Entanglement
6.2.1
4.2.1 4.2
1.6 Impact
6.2.2,
4.2.1 4.2
6.3−6.6
1.9 High-pressure fluid ejection
Hydraulic systems (pumps, cylinders, 6.2.9
4.2.1 4.10
piping, etc.) and in their periphery.
2. Electrical Hazards
2.1 Contactof
personswith Electrical cabinets, terminal boxes, 6.2.3
4.3
4.9,
conductive parts (direct contact)
control panels.
5.5.4
2.2 Contact of persons with parts that Exposed conductive areas, electrical 6.2.3
4.3
4.9
become live under fault conditions devices during maintenance.
6.2.5(indirect contact)
3. Thermal Hazards
3.1 Burns, scalds, and other injuries Motors, resistors, and their periphery 6.2.7
4.4
due to extreme high temperatures
Hazards Generated by Neglecting Ergonomic Principles in the Machine Design
8.6 Human error; human behavior
Between the upper and lower dies, 6.2.8,
4.9
4.8,
between the slide and upper die, 6.7,
5.5.4,
between the bolster and lower die, 6.8,
5.5.5,
at the safety block placement position. 6.11
6
8.7 Inappropriate design or placement Two-hand operation control device, 6.4.2
4.11.8of manual control devices
emergency stop devices, operation 6.12.2−6.12.4
4.11.10positions.
6.12.75.5.2
8.8 Inappropriate design or placement Stroke display devices, operation 6.12.7,
4.8.8
of visual display devices.
positions.
6.13
10 Unexpected Starts, Unexpected Excessive Travel/Speed, or Similar Malfunctions Caused by the Following
Events10.1 Failure/malfunction of the power Between the upper and lower dies, 6.4−6.6,
4.11,
shutdown means
5.5.4
between the slide and upper die, 6.11
betweenthebolster
and
lower
die,
10.2 Restoration of the energy supply
6.2.4,
4.11.4
between the workpiece and the dies. 6.2.5
after interruption
Power transmission parts such as
10.3 External effects (electromagnetic motor shaft, gears, and belts.
6.2.6
4.11.11interference)onelectricalequipment
10.4 Other external effects (gravity, etc.)
6.11
4.11.5
4.11,
14 Hazard-side failures of control Between the upper and lower dies, 6.2.3−6.2.6,
4.12
systems (hardware, software, between the slide and upper die, 6.2.9,
pneumatic
circuits,
hydraulic between the bolster and lower die, 6.3−6.12
circuits)
between the workpiece and the dies.
Power transmission parts such as
motor shaft, gears, and belts.
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8.2 Examples of Servo Press Risk Assessment Results
This annex 8.2 is a supplement to this standard and Annex 8.1, and is not part of this standard.
8.2.1 Comparison of Risk Assessment Results Based on Differences in Intended UsageAs examples of implemented risk assessments with respect to excerpts taken from the distinctive
hazards inherent in servo presses stipulated in Table 8.1, Table 8.2.1 shows the case of a servo
press intended for hand-in-die usage, and Table 8.2.2 shows the case of a servo press intended forno-hand-in-die usage (a servo press designed as an automatic press).
The hand-in-die press shown in Table 8.2.1 is based on the following assumptions:・ The machine equipment is in a line that manufactures metal parts for automotive applications.
・ The press has an 8000 kN rated tonnage. It is a 2-point, 2-shaft drive straightside power pressmachine.
・ Feeding and removing of the workpieces is performed by workers, and multiple workers are
involved.
・ The workers and maintenance inspectors have received special education and training.
・ The protective devices are fixed guards on the sides of the press room. Photo-electric safety
devices are installed at the feeding and removing side where the workers access the machine
after each cycle.
Also, the no-hand-in-die press shown in Table 8.2.2 is based on the following assumptions
・ The machine equipment is in a line that manufactures metal parts for automotive applications.
・ The press has an 8000 kN rated tonnage. It is a 2-point, 2-shaft drive straightside power pressmachine.
・ Feeding and removing of the workpieces is performed by feed equipment, and the workers are
not directly engaged during production.
・ The workers and maintenance inspectors have received special education and training.
・ The protective devices are fixed guards on the sides of the press room, and the front and backare equipped with interlocking guards.
8.2.2 Risk Estimation and Evaluation
In Table 8.2.1 and Table 8.2.2, the standards used when estimating risks and evaluating risk levels
are as follow:a) Risks are estimated based on the combination of the severity of an injury (bodily injury and/or
health hazard) and the probability that such harm will occur.
1) Severity of injury (S): Estimations are to be made using the following standards based on the
degree of the injury and/or health hazard.
・S1: Minor cut/Abrasion—Injuries not accompanied by lost work time.
・S2: Minor injury—Accidents not accompanied by lost work time・S3: Serious injury—Lost work time; Grade 8−14 consequences.
・S4: Major Harm—Death; Grade 7 or higher consequences
2) Probability of occurrence: Estimated based on the frequency of exposure to a hazard (F) andthe probability of avoiding a hazard (P).
Frequency of exposure to a hazard (F): To be estimated based on the following standards,
taking into consideration the necessity of exposure (e.g.: hand-feeding of workpieces,maintenance and repair work), the frequency of exposure and the exposure time, and the- 27 -

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TI103:2008

number of exposed personnel, etc.
・F1: Rarely − occasionally for short periods of time.
・F2: Frequently − continuously for long periods of time.
Probability of avoiding a hazard (P): To be estimated based on the following standards, taking
into consideration who the operator is (experienced personnel, inexperienced personnel,
unmanned) and the speed at which the hazardous event occurs (abruptly, at high speed, at
low speed), etc.
・P1: Possible under specific conditions.
・P2: Scarcely possible.
b) The risk level is determined according to the risk matrix in Table 8.2.3 based on the severity (S),frequency (F), and avoidance probability (P) of the injury. Levels III−V were determined to beunacceptable risks in this standard, and protective measures are required.
Table 8.2.3: Risk Matrix
Probability of Injury
High
Low
Scarcely
Probability
Probability
Probability Probable
Frequency of exposure to ahazardProbability of avoiding thehazardSeverityof Injury

F2

F1

P2

P1

P2

P1

Major Harm

S4

V

V

IV

III

Serious Injury

S3

V

IV

III

III

Minor Injury

S2

IV

III

II

II

Minor cut/Abrasion

S1

III

II

II

I

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TI103:2008

Table 8.2.1: Risk Assessment Results for a Servo Press Intended for Usage as a Hand-in-Die Press (Excerpted)
Hazard Identification
No.

HazardMechanical Hazards
1.1 Crushing Hazard

Hazard Area

Hazard Condition

Operation Mode
Subject Personnel

Risk Estimation & Evaluation
Severity ofConsequence S○
During “operational single stroke”
operation

Yes

S4

F2

○
While stopped during“operational single stroke” operation

Yes

S4

F2

Setup

Maintenance

1

8

Hazard Area (between the Slide is descending
upper & lower dies; in thepress room)

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Slide does not stop at the planned stop
position (waiting point) and continues todescend.

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Slide is descending

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Slide does not stop at the planned stop
position (waiting point) and continues todescend.

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

While stopped, the slide unexpectedly
descends or falls.

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Probability ofFrequency ofHazard AvoidanceExposure to Hazard FP

Probability of
Exposure to Hazard

Production

Risk Estimation & Evaluation after Implementing Protective Measures

Protective Measures & Categories for Control System Safety-Related Parts
Evaluation

Corresponding Protective Measures

Control System
Categories

Probability of
Exposure to Hazard

P2

Ⅴ

Installation of photo-electric safety devices.
Implement measures whereby the interruption of a photo-electric safety device
beam will shut down the servo power and a protective stop of the press isperformed by means of a mechanical brake.*1

*1
4

No

P2

Ⅴ

Installation of overrun detection device.
Implement measures whereby the detection of an overrun will shut down the
servo power, a protective stop of the press will be performed by means of amechanical brake, and restarting will be prevented. *2

*2
4

No

Ultra-slow speed of 10mm/s or less is implemented. *3 (First measure)
The interruption of a photo-electric safety device beam causes a protective stopof the press to be performed. *1 (Second measure)*3
4

Severity ofConsequence S

Frequency ofProbability of
Exposure to Hazard Hazard AvoidanceF
P

Overall
Assessment(Hazard Level)○
During "Inching" operation

Yes○
While stopped
during "Inching" operation

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of photo-electric safety devices.
Implement measures whereby the interruption of a photo-electric safety device
beam will shut down the servo power and a protective stop of the press isperformed by means of a mechanical brake. *1

*1
4

No

○
"OFF"
(Maintaining stop)

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of safety blocks. To be equipped with a power shutdown interlock,where the usage of a safety block will cause a servo motor power shutdown andthe slide will be held in place by a mechanical brake. *5 Additionally, it is to

*5
4

No

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

―

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Affix warning nameplates.
Describe risks and warnings in
instruction manual.
(Work standard creation; user
education and training)

*11
（4）

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Affix warning nameplates.
Describe risks and warnings in
instruction manual.
(Work standard creation; user
education and training)

―

No

*12
4

No

Hazards That Result from Ignoring Ergonomic Principles during the Design Phase.
The slide unexpectedly descends or falls
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
the upper & lower dies; in during maintenance/inspection work (the safety Service personnel
block is not used)
the press room)

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

No
*1
4

8.6 Operation actions; human Hazard Zone (between

error.

The slide is operated due to negligence, andthe slide descends while personnel are in thehazard zone.

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel
Setup personnel
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

10 Unexpected Starts and Unexpected Excessive Travel/Speed Caused by the Following Events (or Similar Malfunctions)10.2 Power outage;
Hazard Area (between the Hazards where the slide will not stop in time
Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel
Power supply interruption upper & lower dies; in the because the protective stopping time haspress room)
Setup personnel
due to a circuit/device
become longer due to a power outage orMaintenance/Inspection personnel
malfunction
regenerative braking circuit malfunction.
Service personnel

14 Control System Malfunctions
Control System
Hazard Area (between the The slide cannot be stopped due to a
Malfunctions
upper & lower dies; in the malfunction in the brake system control
system.
press room)

○

○

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○

○

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○

○

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Operators
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Slide braking becomes impossible due toOperators
inoperative servo system deceleration controls Unspecified peripheral personnel
during electrical braking and while stopped.

○

○

○

○
"Operational Single Stroke"standby position stop(while muting)Slide descends during muting during slide
opening.

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel
Service personnel○ Maintaining adownstroking process stopin "Inching" operation○ Maintaining adownstroking process
stop in "Inching" operation

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel
Service personnel○ During "Inching" upstroking
process and when stopped○ During "Inching"
upstroking process andwhen stopped

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Operators
Slide motion is initiated during loading andunloading due to malfunctioning servo system Unspecified peripheral personnel
controls.

The slide cannot be stopped and maintained
while the servo system is stopped due tomalfunctioning controls.

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

A protective stop of the slide becomes
impossible due to the failure of a control
system related to the Emergency Stopfunction.

Operators
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

A protective stop of the slide becomes
impossible due to the failure of a control
system related to the protective stop function.

Operators
Setup personnel
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Yes

Yes

○
Maintaining a downstroking process
stop in "Operational Single Stroke"

Slide descending during an upstroke.

Installation of a lockout device. *11（A work management system attained by means of a power shutdown and apadlocked safety switch.）

・A power outage (zero voltage) will shut down the servo power, perform aprotective stop by means of a mechanical brake, and maintain the stopped
condition.
・Regenerative braking is not used at the time of a protective stop.
Install a resistive braking circuit monitor. *12

Hazards where the slide will not stop in time
because the protective stopping time has
become longer due to a resistive braking
circuit.

S4

S4

F1

F1

P2

P2

Ⅳ

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

・Install spring-actuated normally closed mechanical brakes.
・A system where brake performance is maintained even if 50% of all of
the mechanical brake springs break.
・Install a brake performance monitor. *6 Detects brake faults andprohibits press operat

Installation of an overrun detection device*2 and a reversal detection device. *8
Implement measures whereby the overrun detection device or the reversal
detection device causes a servo power shutdown, performs a protective stopusing a mechanical brake,
Installation of photo-electric safety devices.
Implement measures whereby the interruption of a photo-electric safety device
beam will shut down the servo power and a protective stop of the press isperformed by means of a mechanical brake. *1
Same as above.

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of photo-electric safety devices.
Implement measures whereby the interruption of a photo-electric safety device
beam will shut down the servo power and a protective stop of the press isperformed by means of a mechanical brake. *1○"Operational Single Stroke"
upstroking process

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of a reversal detection device. *8
Implement measures whereby detection of a reversal will shut down the servo
power, a protective stop of the press will be performed by means of a mechanicalbrake, and restarting will be prevented.

○
Maintaining a standby point stop in"Operational Single Stroke"

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○ "OFF"
Maintaining stop

○

○

○

○

○

○

Yes

Yes

Yes

S4

S4

S4

F1

F1

F1

P2

P2

P2

Ⅳ

Ⅳ

Ⅳ

Installation of an overrun detection device*2 and a reversal detection device. *8
Implement measures whereby the overrun detection device or the reversal
detection device causes a servo power shutdown, performs a protective stopusing a mechanical brake,
Implement measures whereby turning the operation mode selector switch to OFF
will shut down servo power, and the stopped condition of the press will bemaintained by a mechanical brake.
・Installation of an emergency stop control system.
Redundancy and monitoring circuits.**
・Installation of a power (energy) shutdown system.
Redundant shutdown circuit. *5・Installation of a spring-actuated normally closed type mechanicalbrake.
・A system
Installation of a power (energy) shutdown system.
Redundant shutdown circuit. *9・Installation of a spring-actuated normally closed type mechanical brake.
・A system where brake performance is maintained even if 50% of all of themechanical brake springs b

No
*6
4
*2
4
No
*8
4
*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*8
4

No

*2
4
No
*8
4
*7
4

No

**
4
*5
4
*6
4

No

*9
4
No
*10
4

A protective stop of the slide becomes
impossible due to the failure of a control
system related to the protective stop function.

Operators
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel○

Information for Use

○

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of a power (energy) shutdown system.
Redundant shutdown circuit. *9・Installation of a spring-actuated normally closed type mechanical brake.
・A system where brake performance is maintained even if 50% of all of themechanical brake springs b

*5
4
No
*6
4

Note: Asterisked (*) items are related to control system safety functions.

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TI103:2008

Table 8.2.2: Risk Assessment Results for a Servo Press Intended for Usage as a No-Hand-in-Die Press (Excerpted)
Hazard Identification
No.

Hazard1 Mechanical Hazards
1.1 Crushing hazard

Hazard Area

Hazard Condition

Hazard Area (between the Slide is descending
upper & lower dies; in thepress room)

Operation Mode
Subject Personnel
Operators
Unspecified peripheral workers

Slide does not stop at the planned stop
position (waiting point) and continues todescend.

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Slide is descending

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Slide does not stop at the planned stop
position (standby position) and continues todescend.

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

While stopped, the slide unexpectedly
descends or falls.

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Severity ofConsequence S○
During "Continuous" operation

Yes

S4

F1

○
When stopped during"Continuous" operation

Yes

S4

Yes

S4

Production

Setup

○
While stopped during ‘Trial Single
Stroke’ or ‘Inching’ operation

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel
Setup personnel
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel○○

10 Unexpected Starts and Unexpected Excessive Travel/Speed Caused by the Following Events (or Similar Malfunctions)10.2 Power outage;
Hazard Area (between the Hazards where the slide will not stop in time Operators
Power supply interruption upper & lower dies; in the because the protective stopping time has
Unspecified peripheral personnel
due to a circuit/devicepress room)
become longer due to a power outage or
Setup personnel
malfunction
regenerative braking circuit malfunction.
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel○○

Hazards where the slide will not stop in time
because the protective stopping time has
become longer due to a resistive braking circuit
failure.
14 Control System Malfunctions
Control System
Hazard Area (between the The slide cannot be stopped due to a
Malfunctions
upper & lower dies; in the malfunction in the brake system control
press room)
system.

Slide braking becomes impossible during
electrical braking due to inoperative servo
system deceleration controls.

Operators○

During a servo system controlled stop, theslide stop cannot be maintained due toinoperative controls resulting from a
malfunction.
Slide reverses and descends during an
upstroke.

A protective stop of the slide becomes
impossible due to the failure of a control
system related to the Emergency Stopfunction.

Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1○"OFF"(Maintaining stop)

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○
During "Inching" upstroking
process and when stopped

Installation of a slide lock device.
Shall have an interlock that does not allow the interlocked guard to be opened
unless it can be confirmed that the slide is fully locked. *7
Installation of a device for detecting personnel within the hazard zone.
Detection of personnel will cut off servo power and stop and maintain the slide bymeans of a mechanical brake.

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*2
4

No

*7
4

No

*
4

No

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Installation of an interlocked guard. The interlocked guard is closed during
production and setup.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

*1
4

No

Ⅳ

・A power outage (zero voltage) will shut down the servo power, perform aprotective stop by means of a mechanical brake, and maintain the stopped
condition.

*
4

No

Installation of an interlocked guard. The interlocked guard is closed during
production and setup.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

*1
4

No

*9
4

No

*3
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

*4
4

No

*1
4

No

*1
4

No

Yes

S4

F1

P2

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○
While stopped during‘Trial Single Stroke’ or‘Inching’ operation

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Install a resistive braking circuit monitor. *9・Install spring-actuated normally closed mechanical brakes.
・A system where brake performance is maintained even if 50% of all of
the mechanical brake springs break.
・Install a brake performance monitor. *3 Detects brake faults andprohibits press operat
Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1○"OFF"(Maintaining stop)

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

○
During "Inching"
upstroking process andwhen stopped

Same as above.

Implement measures whereby turning the operation mode selector switch to OFF
will shut down servo power, and the stopped condition of the press will bemaintained by a mechanical brake.
Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Yes

S4

F1

P2

Ⅳ

Same as above.

Operators
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel○○

A protective stop of the slide becomes
Operators
impossible due to the failure of a control
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
system related to the protective stop function. Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel○

Installation of safety blocks. To be equipped with a power shutdown interlock,where the usage of a safety block will cause a servo motor power shutdown andthe slide will be held in place by a mechanical brake. *2 Additionally, it is tophysically suppor

Probability of
Exposure to Hazard

Yes

Yes

○
"Continuous" upstroking process○

Installation of interlocking guards.
Shall be an interlock that disables press operation unless the guard is closed.*1

Control System
Categories

Same as above.

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Operators
Unspecified peripheral personnel

Ⅳ

Ⅳ

○

○
While stopped during ‘Trial Single
Stroke’ or ‘Inching’ operation

Setup personnel
Unspecified peripheral personnel

P2

P2

○
While stopped at the standby position
while in Continuous mode.

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Corresponding protective measures

F1○

Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Evaluation

S4○

Risk Estimation & Evaluation after Implementing Protective Measures

Protective Measures & Categories for Control System Safety-Related Parts

Frequency ofProbability of
Exposure to Hazard Hazard Avoidance
F
P

Yes

○

○

Operators
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
Service personnel

Maintenance○During ‘Trial Single Stroke’ or‘Inching’ operation

8 Hazards That Result from Ignoring Ergonomic Principles during the Design Phase.
8.6 Operation actions; human Hazard Area (between the The slide unexpectedly descends or falls
Maintenance/Inspection personnel
error.
upper & lower dies; in the during maintenance/inspection work (a safety Service personnel
block is not used)press room)
The slide is operated due to negligence, andthe slide descends while personnel are stillpresent inside the interlocked guard.

Risk Estimation & Evaluation
Probability of
Exposure to
Hazard

○

○

Yes

Yes

S4

S4

F1

F1

P2

P2

Ⅳ

Ⅳ

・Installation of an emergency stop control system.
Redundancy and monitoring circuits.**
・Installation of a power (energy) shutdown system.
Redundant shutdown circuit. *5・Installation of a spring-actuated normally closed type mechanicalbrake.
・A system

Installation of a power (energy) shutdown system.
Redundant shutdown circuit. *9・Installation of a spring-actuated normally closed type mechanical brake.
・A system where brake performance is maintained even if 50% of all of themechanical brake springs b

**
4
*5
4
*6
4

*5
4
No
*6
4

Note: Asterisked (*) items are related to control system safety functions.

- 30 -No

Severity ofConsequence S

Frequency ofProbability of
Exposure to Hazard Hazard AvoidanceF
P

Overall
Assessment(Hazard Level)

Information for Use

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

8.3 Stop Function Implementations and a Comparison of Attainment Means
Annex 8.3 is a supplement to this standard and Annex 8.1, and is not part of this standard.
8.3.1 Stop Function Implementation Examples
Tables 8.3.1−8.3.3 show a comparison of attainment means based on the servo press
specifications when implementing stop functions in accordance with 6.4.
8.3.2 When Using a Brake System with Sufficient Holding Capability
Table 8.3.1 show the relationship between the stop function implementations and those attainment
means when using a brake system capable of holding the slide even when the maximum starting
torque of the servo motor is being applied. This servo press is based on the following assumptions:・ It is used for hand-in-die applications and it performs muting during slide opening.
・ The protective stop function actuated by a protective device complies with 6.4.3.3 b). However,the Stop Category is 0, and slide braking is performed using a mechanical brake system.
・ The normal stop function complies with 6.4.5.3. However, the Stop Category is 0, and slide
braking is performed using a mechanical brake system.
8.3.3 When Performing a Stop Category 0 or 1 Stop
Table 8.3.2 shows the relationship between the stop function implementations and thoseattainment means when protective stops and normal stops are achieved by means of a Stop
Category 1 stop function. This servo press is based on the following assumptions:・ It is used for hand-in-die applications and it performs muting during slide opening.
・ The protective stop function actuated by a protective device functions as a Stop Category 1 stopthat complies with 6.4.3.3 a).
・ The normal stop function works as a Stop Category 1 stop that complies with 6.4.5.2.
However, for protective stops initiated by the detection of a muting during slide opening
malfunction (direction reversal fault), a Stop Category 0 stop is to be used because the fault is
occurring in the servo system.
8.3.4 When Performing a Stop Category 2 Stop under Conditions That Assure Clearances That
Avoid Crushing
Table 8.3.3 shows the relationship between the stop function implementations and thoseattainment means when a Stop Category 2 stop is used for the normal stop function underconditions where sufficient clearance is assured after the stop is completed. This servo press isbased on the following assumptions:・ It is used for hand-in-die applications and it performs muting during slide opening.
・ The protective stop function actuated in response to a protective device functions as a Stop
Category 1 stop that complies with 6.4.3.3 a).
・ The normal stop function works as a Stop Category 2 stop that complies with 6.4.5.4.
However, for protective stops initiated by the detection of a muting during slide opening
malfunction (direction reversal fault), a Stop Category 0 stop is to be used because the fault is
occurring in the servo system.

- 31 -

This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

Table 8.3.1: The Relationship between Stop Functions and Methodology(When Using a Brake System with Sufficient Holding Capability)
Operation
Mode

Stop
Type

Stop Device・Interlock Device

Temporal
Stop

Work
Classification

Servo
Stop

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC○

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted

Emergency Stop
Temporal Stop
Protective Stop
Protective
Stop
Emergency
Stop

E-Stop button ispushedStopping(while being held)

（○）

○

○

○

○

○

0

Restart prevention system
Fault operation
Single stroke function

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC

0○

Upstroking
beyond BDC―（○）

Upstroking（○）

In operation
Stopped at the plannedstop position

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC
In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC
Stopped at the plannedstop position（○）

In operation
Stopped at the plannedstop position
In operation

E-Stop button is
StoppedpushedSafety block plug
Stoppedis pulled
Power outage

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening―

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

0

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

0

○

○
○

○

0

Fault operation

（○）

○

○

○

0

6.11.3 Safety Blocks

○

○

○

0

6.12.3 Inching Stroke

○

○

○

0

6.12.3 Inching Stroke

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

0

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

0

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

○

○

0

○

○

○

0

○

○

○

0

○

○

0

（○）

○

○

0

（○）

○

○

0

（○）

○

○

○

0

Note 2

○

○

0

（○）

（○）

（○）
（○）

In operation
Stopped○6.4.5 Normal Stop Functions
When Feeding & removing○

Upstroking

Safety block plug
Stopped at the planned
is pulledstop position
Mode selector
switch set to OFF

6.8 Muting during Slide Opening○

Personnel
detected inside the First starting
hazard zone
Emergency Stop"'Inching Stroke" during Die Trials"OFF"during MaintenanceWork

Trials and Maintenance

Reversal fault
detected○○

Safety block plug
Stopped at the planned
is pulledstop position

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted

0

○

―

In operation

When RUN
buttons are
released

Referenced Items○

Personnel
detected inside the First starting
hazard zone
E-Stop button ispushed○Electrical Restraint Stop Category
MutingBraking
Means JIS B 9960-1

Stopping(at destination)

Stopped at the plannedstop position
Reversal fault
detected

Power
Brake
Shutdown System

Upstroking
beyond BDC

While RUN buttons Stopping
are not released (at destination)

Protective Stop

"Operational Single Stroke" during Production

Production

Normal Stop

When RUN
buttons are
released

Slide Status○

Note 1: Table symbol definitions: Stopping: In the stopping process; Stopped: In a stopped condition; →: Shows passage of time; ○: Is actuated;(○): Is not actuated by the applicable stopping device; ―: Does not stop
Note 2: The main power source is shut down at the time of a power outage.

- 32 -

Fault operation

6.12 Operation Modes
Fault operation
6.11 Slide Restraint Means
6.12 Operation Modes

6.1 Slide Restraint Means.

This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

Table 8.3.2:The Relationship between Stop Functions and Methodology(When Performing a Stop Category 0 or 1 Stop)
Operation
Mode

Stop
Type

Stop Device・Interlock Device

Temporal
Stop

Work
Classification

When RUN
buttons are
released○（○）

While RUN buttons Stopped
are not released (upon arrival)○

Temporal Stop

（○）

（○）

Safety block plug
When stopped at theis pulledplanned stop position（○）

When stopped at theplanned stop position
Reversal fault
detected

Emergency Stop
Protective
Stop
Emergency
Stop"OFF"during MaintenanceWork

In operation
Safety block plug
When stopped at theis pulledplanned stop position

Mode selector
switch set to OFF

○

○

○

○

6.4.5 Normal Stop Functions
When Feeding & removing

2

Restart prevention system
Fault operation
Single stroke function

1

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function○

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

―

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

1

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

0
Fault operation○

0

6.11.3 Safety Blocks○

2

6.12.3 Inching Stroke○

2

6.12.3 Inching Stroke

（○）

（○）

（○）

（○）

In operation

○

○

○

○

1

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

○

1

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

0

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

1

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

0
○

○

1

○

0
1

○

While stopped

（○）

○

○

0

While stopped

（○）

○

○

0

Safety block plug
While stopped
is pulled

（○）

○

○

○

0

Note 2○○0E-Stop button ispushed

6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

1

In operation
When stopped at theplanned stop position

Referenced Items○

When upstroking

Personnel
detected inside the When first starting
hazard zone

E-Stop button ispushed○―When upstroking

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC
In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC○○

Upstroking
beyond BDC（○）

When RUN
buttons are
released

Restraint Stop Category
MutingMeans
JIS B 9960-1

2○

In operation
When stopped at theplanned stop position
In operation

E-Stop button ispushedElectrical
Braking

1

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC

When stopped at theplanned stop positionp
Reversal fault
detected

Brake
System―Stopped(being held)

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted

Power
Shutdown

Upstroking beyond BDC○

Normal Stop
Protective Stop

In operation: From theplanned stop position to
BDC

Stopped(upon arrival)

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted
Protective Stop"'Inching Stroke" during Die Trials

Servo
Stop

Personnel
detected inside the When first starting
hazard zone
Emergency Stop

"Operational Single Stroke" during Production

Production
Trials and MaintenanceSlide Status

Power outage○

Fault operation

6.12 Operation Modes
Fault operation
6.11 Slide Restraint Means
6.12 Operation Modes

6.1 Slide Restraint Means

Note 1: Table symbol definitions: Stopping: In the stopping process; Stopped: In a stopped condition; ○: Is actuated; (○): Is not actuated by the applicable stopping device; ―: Does not stop.

Note 2: The main power source is shut down at the time of a power outage.

- 33 -

This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

Table 8.3.3: The Relationship between Stop Functions and Methodology(When Performing a Stop Category 2 Stop Under Conditions That Assure Sufficient Clearance)
Operation
Mode

Stop
Type

Stop Device・Interlock Device

Temporal
Stop

Work
Classification

Normal Stop

Servo
Stop

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC○

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted○

Stopping(at destination)（○）

Emergency Stop
Normal Stop
Protective Stop

In operation
Stopped at the plannedstop position

In operation
Safety block plug
Stopped at the planned
is pulledstop position

Photo-electricsafety device
interrupted

○

○

○

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC
In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC
Upstroking
beyond BDC
Stopped at the plannedstop position

Reversal fault
Upstroking
detected
Personnel
detected inside the First starting
hazard zone
In operation
E-Stop button is
Stopped at the planned
pushedstop position

Protective
Stop

E-Stop button is
StoppedpushedSafety block plug
Stoppedis pulled

StoppedPower outage

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function○

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening○

Photo-electric safety device disabled.
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

1

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

0
1

Fault operation○

0

6.11.3 Safety Blocks○

2

6.12.3 Inching Stroke○

2

6.12.3 Inching Stroke

（○）

○

○

○

○

1

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

○

1

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function

○

○

0

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

○

○

0

6.4.3 Protective Stop Function
6.7 Presence sensing before initiation

○

○

1

6.4.2 Emergency Stop Function

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

（○）

○

○

0

（○）

○

○

0

（○）

○

○

○

0

Note 2

○

○

0

（○）

（○）

（○）
（○）

In operation

Mode selector
switch set to OFF

1○

In operation

Safety block plug
Stopped at the planned
is pulledstop position

6.4.5 Normal Stop Functions
When Feeding & removing
Restart prevention system
Fault operation
Single stroke function

（○）

（○）

6.8 Muting during Slide Opening

2

―

（○）

○

2

○

Upstroking

Referenced Items

2

Upstroking
beyond BDC

Emergency
Stop

Emergency Stop"'Inching Stroke" during Die Trials"OFF"during MaintenanceWork

Trials and Maintenance

When RUN
buttons are
released

Electrical Restraint Stop Category
MutingBraking
Means JIS B 9960-1○

In operation: From theplanned stop
position to BDC

Personnel
detected inside the First starting
hazard zone
E-Stop button ispushedBrake
System―Stopping(at destination)

Stopped at the plannedstop position
Reversal fault
detectedPower
Shutdown

Upstroking
beyond BDC

While RUN buttons Planned stopping
are not released (at arrival)

Protective Stop

"Operational Single Stroke" during Production

Production

When RUN
buttons are
released

Slide Status

○

○

0
○

○

1

○

0
1

○

Fault operation

6.12 Operation Modes
Fault operation
6.11 Slide Restraint Means
6.12 Operation Modes

6.1 Slide Restraint Means

Note 1: Table symbol definitions: Stopping: In the stopping process; Stopped: In a stopped condition; ○: Is actuated; (○): Is not actuated by the applicable stopping device; ―: Does not stop.
Note 2: The main power source is shut down at the time of a power outage.

- 34 -

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

8.4 Classification of Power Shutdown Methods and Examples of Redundant Designs
Annex 8.4 is a supplement to this standard and Annex 8.1, and is not part of this standard.
8.4.1 Classification of Power Shutdown Methods
Functions that shut down the electrical power supply (power shutdown) to a servo motor come inmany diverse systems and methods that are installed/implemented on each servo amplifier model,
and they are also referred to by a variety of names. However, in this standard it is necessary to deal
with these stop functions in a comprehensive manner as one function of a servo system, and thus
they are defined and classified in 4.5. A more detailed explanation of this classification scheme ispresented in Figure 8.4.1 and Table 8.4.1.
As shown in Figure 8.4.1, functions that disable servo amplifier (inverter circuit) inversions (ACgeneration) generally include systems that transmit external equipment signals (OFF signals) fromthe signal input area to the inverter circuit without involving programmable electronic circuit parts(control circuits) and systems that process such by means of the control circuit in the servo amplifier(referred to as ‘servo OFF’ or ‘enable,’ etc.). In this standard, the latter is considered to be a control
function that is normally provided in a servo amplifier, and only the former is considered to be an‘electronic shutdown,’ which is one type of power shutdown.
Also, the ‘control circuit shutdown’ shown in Figure 8.4.1 denotes a system that cuts the electrical
power supply to the control circuit of the servo amplifier by means of an externally provided switch
circuit, which results in the disabling of the energy output of the inverter circuit, but whether thisapplies to an ‘electronic shutdown’ or a ‘servo OFF’ is an issue that is determined based on the
results of detailed failure analyses of the servo drive and the switch circuit, and this standard does
not go so far as to give such guidance.

Figure 8.4.1: Classification of Power Shutdown Methods
In this standard, the ‘main power shutdown’ that accompanies the electrical power supply
shutdown to the servo amplifier control circuit is, strictly speaking, just one method for attaining a‘power shutdown,’ and there is no special stipulation that requires a ‘main power shutdown.’
In contrast, Table 8.4.1 is provided as a guideline for determining which of the power shutdown
methods defined in this standard—main power shutdowns, electro-mechanical shutdowns, and- 35 -

This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

electronic shutdowns—will be applicable, and methods, functions, and means not presented in Table
8.4.1 that can guarantee equivalent safety performance with respect to the content presented as
structural requirements are allowed.
Table 8.4.1: Structural Requirements of Power Shutdown Methods
Fig.
Terminology
Structural Requirements
Remarks
8.4.1
4.5.1
The shutdown (disconnection) of the In the case of work where it is not①
Main Power Shutdown
electrical power supply from the main necessary to continue to supply
line to the entire servo system using electrical power to the servo
electro-mechanicalcomponents. system (e.g., installation, electricalrepairwork,
parts
However, it is permissible not to work,
maintenance,
disconnect the power supply going to replacement,the ‘exempted circuits’ stipulated in JIS disassembly, etc.), the power
B 9960-1, 5.3.5 and to the display shutdown and residual energy
equipment that provides necessary release performed using thisinformation during inspections or repairs method will be subject to theas long as the equipment conforms with highest protective level (refer tothe relevant requirements given in JIS B JIS B 9700-2, 5.2.4).
9960-1.
4.5.2
Electro-Mechanical
Shutdown(Input Side, Output Side)②

The electrical power (motive energy)
related to the motor drive is shut off
between either the main line and theamplifier (input side) or the amplifier andthe motor (output side) using
electro-mechanical parts.

4.5.3
Electronic Shutdown③

Inverter
circuitinversions(AC
generation) are disabled by means ofsignals (off signals) from external
devices such as sensing protective
devices that are transmitted from thesignal input area to the inverter circuit
without
involving
programmableelectronic circuit parts (control circuits).

Servo OFF(This is assumed in thisstandard)−

The base current OFF operation
performed by the amplifier control circuit.

In this standard, this is considered
to be a standard function
incorporated in the amplifier (but it
is not considered a safetyfunction).

Control Circuit Shutdown(Not covered in thisstandard)−

Usage of an external switch circuit to
shut down the electrical power supply tothe amplifier control circuits, which
serves to disable the energy output of
the inverter circuit.

A determination of whether thisapplies to an ‘electronic shutdown’or to a ‘servo OFF’ is made basedon a detailed failure analysis of
the servo amplifier and the switch
circuit.

8.4.2 Examples of Redundant Power Shutdown System Designs
Figures 8.4.2−8.4.4 present examples of redundant power shutdown system designs intended tocomply with the Category 4 requirements stipulated in 6.3. However, even if power shutdown
systems are constructed using the structures shown in these examples, it does not necessarily
guarantee that Category 4 has been immediately attained. The appropriateness of a design withrespect to the selected category shall be separately and thoroughly confirmed based onsafety-related parts failure analyses and safety function testing.

- 36 -

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

Note: The following components are used in this example:
・ Electromagnetic contactor : Equipped with a forced open B contact for feedback purposes.
・ Safety PLC or safety relay unit : Complies with Category 4.
Figure 8.4.2: Redundant Power Shutdown System Design Example 1(An Example Using 2 Electromagnetic Contactors)

Note: The following components are used in this example:
・ Electromagnetic contactor : Equipped with a forced open B contact for feedback purposes.
・ Safety PLC or safety relay unit : Complies with Category 4.
・ Servo amplifier: Equipped with a Category 3 compliant power shutdown function (electronic
power shutdown function)
Figure 8.4.3: Redundant Power Shutdown System Design Example 2(An Example Using Electromagnetic Contactors and Electronic Shutdown)- 37 -

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

Note: This is an example of a redundant system on a servo press with multiple mechanically linked
servo drive shafts (shown as being linked by the slide in this figure), where as long as one of thetwo servo systems is able to perform a power shutdown and decelerate the slide by means of
the brake system even if a failure were to occur in the other servo system, any hazardous slide
motion would in the end be prevented by the mechanical structure, such as a structure where
the slide becomes fully locked. However, the intended safety performance shown here cannot
be attained in the case of systems that allow disagreement between the motions of the 2 shafts,
such as in a master-slave system where one side is the master and the other is the slave.
Moreover, analyses and evaluations are necessary in cases where stop function redundancy
would be lost due to a single fault, such as a fault caused by a defect in the mechanical element
parts that link the two shafts (e.g., the link becomes damaged).
The following components are used in this example:
・ Electromagnetic Contactors : Equipped with a forced open B contact for feedback purposes.
・ Safety PLC or safety relay unit : Complies with Category 4.
・ Brake System : A normally closed type mechanical brake.
Figure 8.4.4: Redundant Power Shutdown System Design Example 3(An Example Using Multiple Servo Systems to Assure Redundancy)- 38 -

This translation is provided for reference only.

TI103:2008

8.5 Implementation Examples of Static Brake Performance Monitoring Functions
Annex 8.5 is a supplement to this standard and Annex 8.1, and is not part of this standard.
8.5.1 Implementation Examples of Static Brake Performance Monitoring of Mechanical Brake
Systems
Envisioning a servo press that executes static brake performance monitoring of mechanical brakesystems, Figure 8.5.1 presents a function block diagram of a specific implementation example.
However, this figure is primarily provided for explanatory purposes in order to show the components
and those actuations related to the static brake performance monitoring function, and even if asubsystem is constructed with the same structure and actuation shown in this example, it does notnecessarily guarantee that the required safety function (category) has been immediately attained.
The appropriateness of a design with respect to the selected category shall be separately andthoroughly confirmed based on a detailed hardware failure analysis, a press controller software
quality evaluation, and post-implementation safety function testing.
Feedback Position
Detector (1)Brake System(Mechanical
Brake)

Servo
Motor

Servo Amplifier(Driver)

Slide

Feedback Position
Detector (2)Press Controller
・ The signal from feedback position detector (1) is processed in the servo amplifier.
・ The processed signal is sent from the servo amplifier to the press controller.
・ The signal from feedback position detector (2) is received by the press controller.
・ The values of feedback position detector (1) and feedback position detector (2) are compared in thepress controller, and if there is no disagreement, the value becomes the detection value of the slide
position before the monitoring test.
・ The press controller actuates the mechanical brake system (mechanical brake).
・ The press controller commands the servo amplifier to operate at the torque value used for brake
performance monitoring.
・ Power is supplied from the servo amplifier and the motor generates torque.
・ The signal from feedback position detector (1) is processed in the servo amplifier.
・ The processed signal is sent from the servo amplifier to the press controller.
・ The signal from feedback position detector (2) is received by the press controller.
・ The values of feedback position detector (1) and feedback position detector (2) are compared in thepress controller, and if there is no disagreement, the value becomes the detection value of the slide
position after the monitoring test.
・ The position detection values before and after the monitoring test are compared in the press
controller, and if there are changes in the values this is judged as performance degradation of thebrake system , and the starting of the slide is disabled and a fault message is displayed.
Figure 8.5.1: Function Block Diagram of the Static Brake Performance Monitoring Functionof a Mechanical Brake System- 39 -

TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

8.6 Examples of Measures Applicable to Software
Annex 8.6 is a supplement to this standard and Annex 8.1, and is not part of this standard.
8.6.1 Overview
The software used for servo presses shall be reliable, and moreover, it shall be tested, evaluated,and proven that its behavior is acceptable when a failure occurs. In this standard, specific measures
to attain this purpose are not stipulated, but as an example, the following measures based on ISO
13849-1:2006, 4.6 are presented. Now, if the same software is used for multiple safety functions,compliance with the strictest malfunction-related requirements is required.
8.6.2 Basic Measures
At a minimum, the following basic measures are to be applied to software related to safetyfunctions:a) The application of the V model that accompanies software development process verification andvalidation activities (refer to ISO 13849-1:2006, Figure 6).
b) Documentation of the functional requirement specifications, the safety level requirement
specifications, and the design.
c) Modular and structured design, programming, and coding.
d) Control of systematic failures.
e) Verification of correct implementation.
f) Functional testing, for example, black box testing.
g) Implementation and management of appropriate software safety lifecycle activities related tosoftware modifications.
h) Protections to prevent changes by users.
8.6.3 Embedded Software
Safety-related embedded software is to be designed, developed, attained, verified, and managedin accordance with safety integrity level 3 (SIL3) requirements stipulated in JIS C 0508-3 in the caseof hand-in-die servo presses, and in accordance with the appropriate safety integrity levels in allother cases.
8.6.4 Application Software
Application software related to safety functionality is to be designed, developed, attained, verified,and managed in accordance with ISO 13849-1:2006, 4.6.3 when written in a limited variability
language, and ISO 13849-1:2006, 4.6.2 when written in a full variability language.
8.6.5 Software Based Parameterization
Software based parameterization related to safety functions, such as the settings for the allowablevalues for a safety function start time, start position, or monitoring function, is only to be possibleusing the dedicated software tool supplied by the manufacturer, and unauthorized changes are to beprevented by means of a password, etc.
Additionally, it is necessary to maintain the integrity of all data related to parameterization, andcompliance with ISO 13849-1:2006, 4.6.4 or IEC 62061, 6.11.2 is to be considered in order toachieve this.

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TI103:2008

This translation is provided for reference only.

9. Summary
Regarding safety measures for the servo presses, each servo press manufacturer had been
independently developing protective measures until the previous TI103:2006 standard was issued in
March, 2006. However, the rapid expansion and development of servo press functionality andtechnology since its first issuance has prompted the need for the consistency on an international
level within their various regulations and standards and has recently led to the first revision. The
recommended approach to servo press safety and the technology benchmarks/performancestandards presented in the previous edition are all incorporated in this TI103:2008.
This revision addresses those hazards among all of the servo press hazards that are attributable
to the unique characteristic of a servo press where slide motion is controlled by a programmableservo system, and a new list of hazards has been formulated. Regarding other hazards and those
attributable risks that are not addressed in this standard, just as in the case of the ones alreadyrecognized for conventional power presses, they are to be adequately eliminated or reduced byadhering to the relevant laws and regulations (The Industrial Safety and Health Act, The
Enforcement Order of the Industrial Safety and Health Act, The Ordinance on Industrial Safety and
Health, The Construction Code for Power Press, and The Construction Code for Press Machine or
Shearing Machine Safety Equipment).
In addition, this revised edition has been made to consider consistency with the ISO/IEC
standards for machine safety that have been significantly augmented in recent years, and its
correlation/equivalence with the technological content of these groups of standards has beenclarified. Especially as it relates to requirements for servo system safety performance, the content of
this standard has been reviewed from the perspective of international standards, and its content has
also been revised to confirm with the concepts, standards, and terminology on functional safety
stipulated in the most recent ISO/IEC standards.
Please be noted that now there are plans to have this TI103:2008 association standard become aJapanese Industrial Standards (JIS). In the event it becomes the JIS standard, this association
standard will consequently become null and void.
Compiled by: The Japan Forming Machinery Association, Engineering Committee Secretariat- 41 -