Scandinavian Journal of History

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A bank in a monarchy: an early modern anomaly?
The Swedish Bank of the Estates of the Realm
Christopher Pihl
To cite this article: Christopher Pihl (2024) A bank in a monarchy: an early modern anomaly?
The Swedish Bank of the Estates of the Realm, Scandinavian Journal of History, 49:1, 1-23, DOI:
10.1080/03468755.2023.2222752
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2023.2222752© 2023 The Authors. Published byInforma UK Limited, trading as Taylor &Francis Group on behalf of the Historical
Associations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden.
Published online: 12 Jun 2023.

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SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
2024, VOL. 49, NO. 1, 1–23
https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2023.2222752

A bank in a monarchy: an early modern anomaly? The
Swedish Bank of the Estates of the Realm
Christopher Pihl
Department of History, Uppsala University, Sweden
ABSTRACTARTICLE HISTORYThis article aims to analyse credit as a core element in the politicalchanges and processes of state formation that took place inSweden in the second half of the seventeenth-century. The study
focuses on discussions within the Council of the Realm and at theDiets about how to use the two Swedish seventeenth-century
banks as creditors to the state. The two banks were essential partsof an elaborate attempt to the shift public debt regime from one
based on private creditors and the personal credit of the king andthe men in the government to a regime based on institutional
creditors and the credit of the Estates of the Realm. The outcomeof the procesess was contingent upon some of the core topics ofearly modern Europe’s political and financial discourses: the natureof the sovereign, the relationship between private interests and the
public good, and the role and functioning of representative assem­
blies. This process marked the beginning of a development inwhich sovereign borrowing became a public concern, eventuallystrengthening the Estate’s position vis-à-vis the government, and isa significant example of the interconnectedness of politics andcredit.

Received 18 October 2022
Revised 31 May 2023
Accepted 2 June 2023
KEYWORDS

Credit; state formation; Bankof the Estates

Introduction
In the mid-seventeenth century, the Swedish Crown faced severe problems with balan­cing incomes and expenditures. The newly acquired Baltic empire had come at a greatcost.1 Although King Charles X Gustav at his departure to the war in Poland in the summerof 1655 had instructed the treasury to make efforts to strengthen the Crown’s credit – its
economic and political honour – and treat it as its most precious treasure (ett dyrbart
klenodium), foreign creditors found the king’s name of little worth. A few years later, theSwedish Crown was declined a loan in Amsterdam. The Swedish envoy to Holland
informed the Council of the Realm (riksrådet) – which together with the king comprised
the Swedish government – that the potential creditors deemed the commitment of theking insecure and insufficient. In the eyes of the investors, the credit of the Crown was thesame as the credit of the king – and it was low – but if guarantees could be obtained fromthe councillors or the four estates of the Diet (the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers, and
CONTACT Christopher Pihl

christopher.pihl@hist.uu.se© 2023 The Authors. Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group on behalf of the Historical Associations ofDenmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) orwith their consent.

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C. PIHL

the Peasants), they might reconsider their decline.2 In the early 1660s, when Charles
X Gustav was dead, the regency government discussed the possibility of applying fora loan from the newly founded Stockholm banco. Some councillors raised concerns,
however, that overly close connections – such as a major loan – between the Crown
and the bank, might put the bank’s credit at risk. Others found it less problematic, arguingthat the Crown could, and had the right to, do what private persons could do in theeconomy; it had just to follow the same procedures as the private clients of the bank.3
These three examples show how credit had become a central topic in the political andfiscal discourses of the latter half of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the examples
reveal how the political system dictated the state’s room to manoeuvre in the credit
market; the credit of the monarch was low, but could be strengthened if it was backed by
the other national political actors.
Despite the government’s great concern about credit, the history of the Swedish
empire has for long been written as the history of taxes and conscriptions.4 The aim of
this article is to analyse credit as a core element in the political changes and processes ofstate formation that took place in Sweden in the second half of seventeenth-century. In
focus of the study is the discussions within the Council of the Realm and at the Diets about
how to use the two Swedish seventeenth-century banks – Stockholm Banco and the Bankof the Estates (Riksens ständers bank) – as creditors to the state. In the article, I argue thatthe two banks were essential parts of an elaborate attempt to shift the public debt regime
from one based on private creditors and the personal credit of the king and the men in thegovernment, to a regime based on institutional creditors and the credit of the Estates of
the Realm. The process to increase the Crown’s access to credit brought to the fore threefundamental political challenges: the threat of the monarch to private property, thehazard of private interest to the public best, and the role of the Estates of the Realm.
Although the government and other political actors also saw the potential of a bank tostimulate trade, bring down the cost of credit generally, and outflank usurers, the focus inthis article is on the banks’ function in the government’s attempt to create a domestic andsustainable fund from which it could borrow.
Stockholm Banco was founded in 1657, when the merchant and civil servant Johan
Palmstruch was given a royal charter by King Charles X Gustav to start an exchange andloan bank.5 The King died soon after the start of Stockholm Banco and during the minorityof his son, leading members of the Council – predominantly of the landed aristocracy –and the dowager queen formed a regency government and the Council and the govern­
ment was in practice the same.6 The history of Stockholm Banco is short: it failed due toa bank run in 1663–1664. The bank’s crisis led to severe disruptions in the monetarysystem and the credit market, and a money shortage and rising interest rates affectedmany more people than just the bank customers.7 Despite causing a crisis, Stockholm
banco bank was an exponent of novel ideas of credit and money; its managers advocated,
and issued, notes not backed by specified deposits but by the credit of the bank.8 A few
years after the crash of Stockholm Banco, a new Swedish bank was founded in 1668, withdirect inspiration from the old bank. However, this time not as a chartered company, but
as the Bank of the Estates of the Realm.
The Dutch Republic and England used to be highlighted as the most successful
European states in creating cheap, long-term domestic credit for their governments.
England, however, is also an example of how profound changes in the fiscal regime

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

3

were closely connected to changes in the political regime.9 In recent years, a growing
amount of scholarship has argued for the importance to break free from the teleologicalperspectives and the focus on the English, later on British, case that have dominatedmuch theorization and empirical research on public debt. To do this, the research must be
guided by an openness to variations and to historicize the developments in different
states, not benchmarking them against the British case.10
Barreyre and Delalande have introduced the concept public debt regimes to capture
and analyse the variations of public debt. A regime is a stable and hegemonic configura­tion defined by the nature of, and the relationship between, three factors: the market, thestate, and the people. The perception of and the actual role of the financial actors for the
economy and the state, and how they shape policy, is the first central factor defininga regime. The second factor, the state, or”the nature of state power”, is by Berreyre andDelalande defined as the tools and expertise available to the state. The third factor – thepeople – focuses on the nature of the political arena: the sources of political legitimacy
and how different group in society act politically to protect their interests. Barreyre andDelalande also stress how the international political economy -structured by global
inequalities, capital flows, and monetary regimes – affected the domestic side of public
debt.11 To the international factors, it would also be relevant to add the flow of ideas
between nations and the emulation of institutions and practices from nations seen as
successful.12

A European dilemma in a Swedish context
In 1658, Sweden stood at its height as a great north European power. The geographicalexpansion of the state had been possible due to profound reorganizations of the politicaland fiscal regimes.13 A new fiscal system had taken form in the sixteenth century,
considerably different from the domain state and its guiding principle of the king livingon income from domains and regal rights.14 The basis of this new regime was a strong,
centralized state with a firm grip on local administration and an effective system for
taxation and the conscription of soldiers – an early-matured fiscal – military state,according to Jan Glete.15 With agriculture as the dominant economic sector, together
with relatively small domestic trade, direct taxes (i.e. land taxes) become the backbone of
the Swedish fiscal system; indirect taxes such as customs and excise never became asimportant as the government wished.16 Direct taxes demanded direct contact with the
taxpayers, and a central feature of the Swedish style fiscal-military state was the compara­tively strong position of the national representative assembly; tax increases, or extra­
ordinary taxes and conscriptions, had to have the Estates’ approval. The approval of theEstates was also needed in other political areas, such as law-making and declarations ofwar, leading to ongoing bargaining between the government and taxpayers in the Diet,and in local political arenas.17 The protracted wars of the Swedish army and ensuingnegotiations of how to finance them, strengthened the position of the Diet in theseventeenth century.18
Alongside taxes and conscriptions, allowances and sales of land came to playa central role in financing the expanding Swedish empire, and like taxes, they madepolitics divisive. In the realm and the conquered provinces, land was given or soldby the Crown to the aristocracy, but also to merchants who eventually ended up as

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C. PIHL

members of the Swedish aristocracy, as allowances for their services to the state as
officers, civil servants, and not least as creditors. The first phase of the Swedish
great-power venture has been characterized as formed by an alliance between thesovereigns and the aristocracy, sharing the goal ‘of building up a state strong
enough for the requirements of war and great-power politics’.19 Starting at theDiets of the mid−1600s, the Commoner Estates – in time backed by the stateserving lower nobility who cared about the state’s capacity to pay them, and at
the same time worried about increased charges on their small incomes – demanded
the state to take back the alienated land before agreeing to any raised or newtaxes.20
Credit and foreign subsidies become a third pillar of state finances from the earlyseventeenth century.21 Starting with Sweden’s first appearance in the European theatre of
war in the sixteenth century, credit (though often small and from many different creditors)
played a crucial role.22 By the time of the wars of Charles X Gustav in the 1650s, an ad-hoc
system for financing armaments with credit had taken form. Loans were taken froma small group of financiers in Sweden and abroad, and revenues – mainly customs andincomes from the state controlled metal export – were assigned for interest and reim­
bursement; sometimes even the administration of the revenues was given to the creditors
to strengthen their liquidity.23 The credit of the Crown was closely connected to the king,and to the king’s, or other leading state figures, personal relationships with the creditors;
the state as a borrower was embodied in a person.24 At times, when the credit of the king,or the Crown, was low, the personal credit of the councillors or the higher financial
bureaucrats was used, which exposed them to take risks for which they could demand
recompense, for example, in the form of land.25 Although credit had become an essential
element of the state’s budget at this time, it was always short term, and provided byprivate financiers, making it hard for the government to gain control of the state’s
expenses and to plan the future.26 For the government, loans from private creditors
also entailed the risk of becoming dependent on the creditors.27
Historical and economic-historical scholarship has primarily analysed the seventeenthcentury sovereign debt as a problem of resources that was to be solved by bigger or newincomes; the credit in itself – as an intellectual and political matter –, and the politicalrepercussions of a chosen strategy for borrowing has not been in focus.28 This perspective
has also affected the analysis of the two banks.
Sven Brisman makes the most detailed analysis of the seventeenth-century banks in his
1918 history of the banks. He saw the placement of the second bank under the Estates as
an essential ingredient in re-establishing the trust of banks, since Stockholm Banco had
been operating under the risk of having its means confiscated by the Crown.29 Brisman’sanalysis goes against the dominant narrative of political history, in which the incorpora­tion of the second bank under the Estates is described as a victory for the high nobility
and the Diet over the monarch and a part of a wide-ranging power struggle between
monarchical and republican ideas and interests. 30 This narrative, structured along
domestic political issues is followed by Eli F. Heckscher in his influential economic historyof Sweden. Heckscher characterizes the two seventeenth-century banks as rather insig­
nificant institutions. Heckscher also goes against Brisman and states that from an eco­nomic perspective it was irrelevant if the second bank was run by a company, thegovernment, or the Estates.31

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

5Brisman and subsequent scholars describe the problem of the threat of the monarch toa bank as caused by domestic factors and occurring first in the 1650s and 1660s, and do
not place it in the wider context of an European economic and political discourse. This
makes that Brisman’s as well as the political narrative’s interpretations leave aside impor­tant groups involved – such as creditors and contractors – but also the role of ideas about
credit and sovereign debt circulating in Europe in the time. By broadening the analyses
temporally and geographically, this article argues that previous scholarship has over­looked the bank’s central rule in the modernization process the Swedish fiscal-militarystate underwent in the period and in which a new debt regime was pivotal.
In the most recent account of the early Swedish banks, the economist Klas Fregert,
partly due to a misinterpretation of the royal assurance of the Bank of the Estates,
overlooks the relationship between the state and the bank. According to Fregert,a reluctant government was convinced by the Estates to place the second bank under
their ownership and to prohibit it from lending to the government: ‘It [i.e. the Bank of theEstates] was not allowed to lend to the government, and is in this respect different frommany later central banks, which were founded to serve the government’s lendingneeds’.32 Fregert describes the loans from the Bank of the Estates to the government asa ‘bad omen’ and that the charter and royal assurance of the bank ‘clearly prohibited
lending to the state’.33 In Fregert’s translation of the royal assurance of the Bank of theEstates, the king guaranteed that
The means of the Riksbank [. . .] should neither, not by us or anybody else, in one way or otherbe taken; nor at war, by one King or the other or the Government, be confiscated, nor (despite
the necessity and distress be ever so large) there take advances and credit.

However, a more adequate translation of the verbose and elaborate seventeenth-century
Swedish text, including the clause excluded by Fregert, would be:
As all the means, which in the Bank may be submitted, should there be kept completely safeand untouched, We hereby have exempted all foreign and native capital there together, thatthey neither by Us nor anyone else, in one or other way be seized, or in the case of War with
one or other King or State, be confiscated, nor (even if the necessity and distress be ever sowidespread or great) upon Our claims or credit be made attacks or demands. Which also
includes the securities and their returns in the Lendning Bank, so they as both pledges, as wellas during and after a sale, shall be assured against sequestration, confiscation, and all sorts of
intrusions.34

Fregert misinterprets the use of the Swedish word avans, in this context meaning ‘claim’,
not ‘advances’, and stat, in this time and context standing for ‘state’ and not ‘government’.
The seventeenth-century Swedish word order differ from modern Swedish, which makes
Fregert to read the grammatical object of the latter part of the first sentence ‘King or State’(Konung eller Stat) as the subject; the actual subject is ‘Us nor anyone else’.35 What theking assured, was that the means of the bank would neither by him, nor by anyone else
(e.g. a court of law), be confiscated. Furthermore, the king promised that he and the
Crown in all dealings with the bank would follow the procedures set by the charter
regarding means deposited in the bank and loans from the bank: ‘our claims and credit’.
Moreover, these guarantees would be followed even when Sweden was at war with ‘oneor other King or State’. By inaccurately claiming that the assurance of the bank debarred it

6

C. PIHL

from lending to the Crown, the bank’s role in the fiscal system and in the economic andpolitical discourses becomes obscured.36
The history of the Swedish fiscal – military state of the second half of the seventeenth
century has been written without including the pivotal role credit was given in thecontemporary political discourse and the political implications the efforts to improveroyal and government borrowing brought about. Instead of something new, the twobanks have been described as complementary to private credit, and not affecting thepolitical or fiscal systems.37 Nonetheless, in the last decade, a new-born interest in
financial matters, and their interconnectedness to political matters has directed focus tosovereign credit in the eighteenth- and nineteenth centuries.38 In a thought provoking
analysis of the evolution of temporal (everlasting) sovereignty, Wojtek Jezierski et.al.
identify the transformation of the monarch’s personal debt into a state debt as a centralcomponent of the process, but by relying on previous research they are dating its genesis
to the eighteenth century.39
In a comprehensive study of the fiscal politics of the Council in the regency period(1661–1672), George Wittrock gives a detailed account of the discussions on credit
between the factions of the council, but does not provide any comprehensive analysis
of credit, the role of the banks, or the relationship between fiscal and political regimes.
Nevertheless, Wittrock provides us with the primary divisions on these matters. Gustav
Bonde – aristocrat, councillor, head of the treasury and at times a major lender to the
Crown – led a party in the Council that tried, and in some periods, managed, to implement
a new fiscal policy characterized by the prioritization of steady incomes from land taxes
and a moderate land-donation policy. A central feature of Bonde’s policy was its care forthe state’s credit. Bonde described credit as a support in troubled times that ought to becarefully treated and as essential for a sovereign as food; he repeatedly argued for theimportance of borrowing in the long term and not reneging on repayment.40 Bonde’s
adversaries, led by the Chancellor (rikskansler) Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, advocateda more expansive financial policy, with a credit policy including reneging on commit­
ments and paying off old debts with new ones.41 De la Gardie saw credit as strongly
moral, and he emphasized the general obligations of creditors to help the Crown in timesof crisis, even if it could not present any security or a repayment plan. De la Gardie’s viewon the relationship between the Crown and its subjects is best described as feudal, basedon allegiances of moral obligations.42 Having conceptualized contracts and credit differ­
ently, both Bonde and De la Gardie supported the foundation of a Swedish bank, though,with different views on the relationship between the state and the bank.

The threat from the monarch
The nature of state power came to play a central role in the discussion on government
borrowing. The economic and political discourse of seventeenth-century Europe identi­
fied strong property rights and the registration of ownership and encumbrances ascentral factors behind the Dutch economic boom.43 Johan Risingh, civil servant andauthor of one of the few published Swedish treatises on economic matters in the period(Itt Vthtogh om kiöphandelen) written about 1650 and published in 1669, argued thatstrong property rights were fundamental for a well-functioning credit market: ‘no one
shall fear that any one shall take what is his, neither anyone superior, alike, or minor’.44

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

7

According to Risingh, one considerable threat came from the state in the form of public
services of various kinds, exorbitant taxes, and even expropriations. In Risingh’s opinion,even more crucial than instigating these laws was for the state to uphold them, and neverignoring or breaking them. If this could be achieved, Sweden would attract ‘capitalists’and flourish.45 Bonde presented a similar view in the declaration he made as newly
appointed Head of Treasury, when pointing out extra taxes and cancelled instalments
by the Crown as significant threats to the prosperity of both burghers and peasants.46
Property rights, and especially the threat of the sovereign to private property, came to bedifficult problem for those advocating a bank to solve, especially one lending to thegovernment.
As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, both the king and the Council
launched various ideas how to expand domestic credit. In 1619, the Chancellor, Axel
Oxenstierna, made a proposal to the Estate of the Burghers regarding a network of
exchange and loan banks in all major towns of the Swedish realm. Oxenstierna’s andsubsequent bank schemes have traditionally been placed in the context of trade, andSweden’s efforts to strengthen its position as a mercantile nation in the Baltic and beyond,by adopting the Dutch practice of exchange banks.47 Certainly, this was one motive, andin the first decades of the Swedish bank discourse, it was perhaps the most prominent
one, however, the concepts of a bank of exchange and a loan bank were connected in the
Swedish discourse on banks from the outset, representing a slight modification of the
Dutch model in which the two types of banks were separate, and focusing on the majorlack of credit sources in the Swedish economy.
A loan bank would be beneficial, Oxenstierna stated, for ‘those who need money’. By
not specifying who ‘those’ were, the Chancellor was probably also including the state.
That the state was eagerly searching for and promoting the gathering of funds that could
be used for credit is well known from the histories of other Swedish chartered companies,
which all, more or less voluntarily, became creditors to the state.48 Oxenstierna’s idea fora bank was never realized, partly due to the burghers – to whom the proposal waspresented – shunning the matter. In the following decades, the Council regularly dis­cussed the benefits of banks, and it was explicitly stated that a bank could be a potential
source of credit for the state.49
Numerous proposals for a Swedish bank were brought forward to the Estate of the
Burghers or to the Magistracy of Stockholm, which either left them unaddressed or swiftly
rejected them.50 In their reply to Oxenstierna in 1619, the Estate of the Burghers impliedthat the Swedish towns were too poor to contribute financially to the funds of a bank, andthat the Crown itself had to provide for it.51 It was not only the well-known poverty of thetowns that disinclined the burghers from the ideas of a domestic bank, but the politicalregime, and the bad reputation of the sovereign, which was seen as an impediment to any
such plans. In 1641, representatives of the burghers of Stockholm admitted that a bankcould be beneficial, as long as ‘the king would not get his hands on it’.52
Alongside the theoretical discourse on the threat from the sovereign, the politicaldevelopment of the mid−1600s actualized the matter further. Constantly increasing
charges from the early seventeenth century and frequent proposals for repossessions ofalienated land from the 1640s and onwards by the sovereigns themselves, and by the
Commoner Estates (i.e. the clergy, burghers, and peasants), had made the third paragraphof the coronation oath – part of the konungabalk (the King’s Section) in the national law –8

C. PIHL

the topic of the day. In the oath, the king swore never to confiscate any property from his
subjects without a judicial decision from a court of law.53 For the landowning aristocracy,
any repossession would represent both a threat to private property and proof that theking had broken the said oath.54 The above quotation from the burghers of Stockholm,
fearing the king’s hands on the bank, illustrates this concern; other examples are found in
the Council’s internal discussions in the 1640s and 1650s, seeking methods to create
a domestic fund and to eliminate the hazard of a confiscating sovereign.55
The 1656 royal charter of Stockholm Banco included a number of paragraphs dealing
explicitly with the relationship between the bank and the Crown, revealing that the kingsaw the bank as a potential creditor, but also recognized himself as a risk to the bank. In an
attempt to downplay the risk, the charter equated the king and the Crown with theprivate clients of the bank, ensuring that if they needed to borrow money from the bank,they would pay interest and secure their loans in accordance with the general regulationsof the lending business of the bank.56 The king also guaranteed that neither he nor the
Crown would attack or confiscate money deposited in the bank, not even in times of war
or economic misery.57 The Council had discussed the same remedy to the threat from thesovereign in the 1640s. If the king acted as a ‘private person’ and was not given jus
prioritatis but following jure communi the threat would be minimized.58 By means of thecharter, following the discussions of the Council, the government tried to commit itself tofuture responsible behaviour, and to keep a respectful distance from the bank by making
itself into a private person. The distinction between personae publicae and personae
privatae was established in European legal and political discourses of the time, however,in monarchies, the public persona and power of the king was often hard to separate fromhis private persona and agency.59
Although measures were taken to avoid it, the threat from the monarch becamea central theme in discussions of domestic public credit and in the criticisms ofStockholm Banco. In a letter to the king shortly after the Bank charter had been given
in 1656, Palmstruch described how he had been questioned by opponents, arguing thatsince Sweden was a monarchy, not a republic, the realm was ill-suited for a bank. He had
replied that the difference between a republic and a monarchy was irrelevant to thesuccess of a bank. Instead of questioning the bank project, the adversaries should becontent with the fact that the bank would drive away usurers from the credit market, andthat customs, excise, and other charges would not be raised because of the bank’s
beneficial effect on the economy.60 However, the charter did not solve the problem; theattempt to equate the king and the Crown with a private person seems not to have been
generally accepted, and the threat from the monarch came to recur frequently in the
council’s discussions.
In 1660, the Council negotiated a loan with Palmstruch to be used to pay a group ofEnglish officers in Swedish service. During the deliberations, the councillor Seved Bååt,who had long served in the Treasury, reminded the parties that the government had no
prerogatives in relation to the bank. If the Council decided to take a loan, it would have tofollow the same loan agreement as private borrowers, as stated in the bank charter.
Furthermore, if the government borrowed, it had to honour the agreement and pay its
instalments on time. Otherwise, Bååt feared, the bank was at risk of failing.61
A more elaborate discussion of the sovereign as a hazardous borrower took place ata meeting between Palmstruch and the Council in March 1663. Palmstruch had informed

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

9the chancellor that the bank had the financial margins to extend a loan, considerably
bigger than that of 1660, to the Crown; a number of councillors, however, questioned its
appropriateness. The loan, they feared, risked harming the credibility of the bank, scaring
off private depositors or having crowding-out effects.62 The chancellor countered thearguments, alleging that people would see a loan to the Crown as something good, since
it would stabilize the credit of the Crown, implying that a loan would diminish the Crown’sneed to seek income by other measures.63
In addition to borrowing too heavily, borrowing at the wrong time was also put
forward as potentially questionable behaviour. Both Bonde and Klas Tott said that it
would be wiser to save domestic funds until times of war.64 Their argument was in linewith Bonde’s credit-caring program, revealing concern for the government’s credit, andawareness of the government as a potential threat to the bank. If the Crown could abstain
from borrowing, or borrow only when necessary, its action or absence of action would
signal to the public that it had behaved responsibly, and in line with the recommenda­
tions of both Bonde and Risingh.
The chancellor and other councillors, however, argued that the Crown had to beallowed to benefit from the bank and borrow in peacetime like everyone else in therealm. If the Crown pledged on the same terms as other borrowers, as dictated in thecharter, the public would not find a loan to the Crown hazardous. One argument put
forward was that what a private person could do in the economy, the Crown could also do
if it accepted the same conditions as those binding private actors. If the government acted
as a private person and followed the same rules, it would be perceived by the other clientsof the bank as a peer. Furthermore, if people feared that the Crown would confiscate theirmoney from the bank, they should equally fear that their money would be confiscatedfrom their homes. There was no reason for the public to fear that the Crown had any
intention to harm an institution so beneficial for the realm and its subjects as the bank.65
The impracticality of banks in monarchies was a recurring subject in the Council’s
discussions during the crisis of Stockholm Banco in the mid−1660s. At a meeting of theCouncil in 1666, the Drots (Head of the Judiciary), Per Brahe, reiterated the argument that
there could be no banks in monarchies. He was refuted by the chancellor, who claimed
that God now, as well as henceforth, would let only good and devoted kings, with the
improvement and economic prosperity of their subjects as their highest mission, reign in
Sweden. Should the realm, by the dispensation of God and because of the sins of thepeople, be punished with a harsh king, however, it would be no problem for such a king toconfiscate his subjects’ money, no matter whether they were deposited in a bank or
anywhere else.66
The responsible behaviour of the Crown was also questioned among the estates at theDiet. At the Diets of 1664 and 1668, the Estates demanded the government to findmethods to keep private property deposited in the bank, or used as collateral beyond
the reach of the king and the Crown, indicating that the solution in the bank charter for
Stockholm Banco was not accepted as trustworthy enough.67
Councillors who hesitated about the prospects of a Swedish bank were challenged
with a recurrent counter-argument: if the king wanted to confiscate, he would confiscate.
However, he would then break one of the fundamental laws regulating the relationshipbetween king and subjects. The threat of a confiscating sovereign was a recurrent themein political philosophy in both antiquity and the early modern period. A confiscating king10

C. PIHL

was a ruthless king, and confiscation was taken as a sign of a tyrant; the councillors, wellversed in ancient and contemporary political thinking, found support for these ideas inboth the writings of classical thinkers such as Aristotle and Seneca and contemporaries
such as Hugo Grotius, Jean Bodin, and Johannes Althusius.68 The threat of the sovereign
was frequently treated in the discourse on banks in the European monarchies. In Englandthe close conceptual connection between banks and a republican form of government
became a hot political topic; adversaries of a bank feared that it would turn the English
monarchy into a commonwealth. In the English case, many contemporary commentators
believed that the threat was eliminated by the Glorious Revolution of 1689 when thesovereign was bound to parliament.69 And when the Bank of England was founded asa private company in 1694, it had to have the parliament’s consent before granting thegovernment any loan.70 William Paterson, one of the founders of the Bank of England,argued in a pamphlet that the risk of a bank in a monarchy had been avoided in Englandby the settlement of the bank ‘far enough from the Prince’s reach, or any bodies else’.71
The nature of state power was ever present in the discussions about the king’s and the
Crown’s debt and the banks. Long before the foundation of Stockholm Banco, infringe­
ments (gewalt) of private property by the sovereign were a recurrent theme in Swedish
discussions of banks, as in other European monarchies. According to Palmstruch andproponents of the government’s right to borrow from the bank, the potential problem of
having a bank in a monarchy was settled in the charter of the bank, which equated thegovernment with a private borrower. Furthermore, the bank charter, national law, andwhat can be characterized as natural law, would protect the bank and its depositors fromthe threat of a confiscating sovereign. Doubts were raised, however, based on discourses
on, and experiences of, the inabilities of kings to behave responsibly, the capacity of therules to exclude leeway, and the inseparability of the king’s private and public functions,as regards the sovereign’s commitments and position as a peer. Some councillors and also
the Diet saw a great risk for the bank, and for the Crown, if it extended a loan to thegovernment, and alternatives to a bank too close to the sovereign were discussed andsought after.

The threat of private interest
The market, as both a potential and a risk, and especially the relationship between market
actors and the state, was under constant discussion in seventeenth-century Sweden. In
the discussions in the Council and at the Diet of 1664 on the causes of the failure of
Stockholm Banco, personal interest came to be a recurrent subject. Self-interest was fora long time perceived in European political and philosophical discourse as a threat tosociety that should be shackled by the state.72 To describe private interest as the opposite
to public good was a commonly used trope in early modern European economic
discourse.73 Even though signs of a coming revaluation were appearing in seventeenthcentury Europe, the Swedish discourse on banks, and in general, was dominated bya suspicious attitude towards letting individual interest direct the public good.74 By thatview, it was a great risk to put responsibility for a public bank in the hands of a private
man or a private company.
The Speaker of the Clergy condemned Palmstruch, claiming that a man of such little
wealth should not have been entrusted with the position of bank director.75 Even harsher

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11

in his criticism was the Speaker of the Nobility, finding it peculiar that a private man had
the financial management of the realm in his hands, and that a company had been
allowed to profit from people’s need for money.76 This criticism re-emerged at thefollowing Diet of 1668, when discussions about Stockholm Banco largely attributed its
problems to the fact that it had been a ‘private business’ (privat wärk) in the hands ofa ‘private man’ (en privat).77
Stockholm Banco was a company, in contrast to the Italian, Dutch, and Germanmunicipal banks. The Council was already discussing the idea of chartering a bankcompany in 1642, probably due to the burghers’ reluctant attitude regarding
a municipal bank.78 At the time, chartering a company was a common, although disputed,
way for the state to promote various businesses and trades. There was repeated criticism
of private chartered companies in the Council, both from the councillors themselves andwhen current opinions at the Diets and among the public were discussed.79 The compa­
nies were monopolies, and therefore faced strong opposition, especially among burghers
and the peasantry that saw them as competitors unfairly favoured by the state pushing up
prices.80 A second point of critic pointed at the fact that the highest aim of companies wasto earn profits for their owners – led by self-interest or, in the worst case, greed – at theexpense of their customers and the public good.81 A similar criticism, equating private
actors with greed, had been directed towards a short-lived Swedish effort to implement
tax-farming in the 1620s.82 The aristocratic political elite saw members of the Commoner
Estates in particular as especially exposed to the risks of private interest. Erik Thomson has
shown how Oxenstierna in the 1620s advocated the nobles’ governance of the Swedishcompanies. Oxenstierna’s argument was that the self-interest of the merchants had to betempered by the public good, which was best represented by the nobility.83 In earlymodern society, based on privileges and an organic view of the estates and theircomplementary roles, challenging the frames set by the privileges would be seen as theoutcome of self-interest, and thereby a threat to the fundamentals of society.84
Self-interest was also used by the leading actors in the council to attack
upcoming moneyed groups. Along with the widespread opinion against charteredcompanies, the Council saw a risk in placing state finances in the hands ofa private owner, making the state dependent on private credit. A recurrent subjectof the Council’s discussions was the Crown’s dependence on contractors andmerchants, often of non-noble descent, with charters for the trade of Swedish
export products such as copper, tar, and artillery pieces. These men, with contacts
in the financial hubs of the time – Amsterdam, Hamburg, and London – were an
important source of credit for the state.85 In addition to their private businesses,
these men also regularly served in high posts within the state as financial bureau­crats, for example, treasurers (räntmästare), blurring the boundaries between theirmoney, and the state’s money.
The Crown were dependent on the contractors, but simultaneously perceived them as
a risk. The high interest rates charged by the contractors and the trade monopolies given
to them were among what the councillors perceived as threats to the state’s finances. In
an anti-Semitic diatribe, Chancellor De la Gardie wondered whether these men had
descended from ‘the Jewish street in Amsterdam’.86 Oxenstierna’s idea of the noble
governance of the companies also illustrates the perceived hazard posed by privateinterests to both the public good and the position of the landed nobility. In this, the12

C. PIHL

Swedish government followed other European monarchies and states with politically
influential landed aristocracies, where moneyed interests and commercial classes werepreferably kept at arm’s length.87 In their view, a bank that was closer either to the Crownor to a corporation such as the Magistracy of Stockholm, would therefore be preferable.
The traditional economic and social hierarchy, with the landowning and state-serving
aristocracy at the top, was under the threat from moneyed groups in this period, which
together with a strong emphasis on the obligation of subjects to serve the state, could
explain the strong language of De la Gardie. The power base of the aristocracy – land –had lost some of its importance in favour of the metal industry and trade, or financial
services.88 The economic needs of the state and the economic strength of contractors andmoneyed interests made the former dependent on the latter, especially for the provisionof liquid capital and credit. Councillor Nils Brahe warned against giving the contractors
and financiers too much control of the financial situation, as it would be the same as‘changing lords’ (byta herrskap).89 In his eyes, the political equilibrium of the state would
be put at risk if contractors and moneyed interests were not kept on a tight leash.
It was decided at the Diet of 1664 that the regulations for the bank’s management andadministration should be revised, and Bonde was commissioned to write a report on how
to reorganize the bank to prevent abuses, such as the generous lending practices andover-issuance of notes that had led to the fall of Stockholm Banco, and to rebuild its
credit.90 Bonde examined the organization and management of the bank, which hecompared with other European banks, to obtain a notion of what had gone wrong.
According to Bonde, a factor that stood out was that even though the other banks had
been founded in ‘republics and great cities’, none of them was a chartered company
subject to ‘profit and loss’ (gevinst och förlust), whose hunger for interest incomes would
cause too much uncontrolled lending.91
A strong objection within both the landed aristocracy and among the Commoner
Estates against laying what was perceived as the public interest in the hands of the selfinterest of a private person, together with the perception of being under the threat of themoneyed interests, was decisive for not letting a reconstructed bank be a private char­
tered company. Thus, the shape of the political arena in seventeenth-century Sweden
made a bank too close to king and government or a bank in the hands of moneyed or
mercantile interests undesirable. Other models for organizing the bank were therefore
a recurrent subject that was further accentuated by the crisis of Stockholm Banco.

The credible corporation
For long, the proponents of a Swedish bank in the government tried to follow thecontinental model and make the bank a municipal institution. However, the shape of
the Swedish political arena, with strong political and fiscal power in the hands of theEstates, made them more suitable as principals of the bank than the city of
Stockholm or the Swedish towns united. Oxenstierna’s bank proposal of 1619
involved the idea of placing the bank under the governance of a corporation, in
his case either the town of Stockholm or a united group of the biggest Swedish
towns. The lack of interest that Stockholm and other towns had in any bank plans
might have been an effect of the relatively weak economic and political position of
Swedish burghers, which made the threat from the sovereign to any funds collected

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13

by the towns tangible.92 In discussions between the Council and the burghers ofStockholm in the 1640s, the Estates of the Realm were already mentioned asa potential guarantor of the bank. Chancellor Oxenstierna maintained that if ‘allthe Estates were allowed to deposit their money therein, it would not be impossible
for all the Estates also to charter the bank’.93 By making the bank part of the interestof every individual or group in society, it would gain the protection and support of
all groups with political representation.
It was not only national politics, however, that made the Estates a suitable guarantor;
international influences also played a crucial role in the Swedish discourse. In the discus­
sion of an annuity company in 1660, French and Danish experiences were considered andthe Head of the Treasury proposed that the company scheme should be presented to the
Estates at the next Diet for further discussion and resolution. According to the chancellor,approval and an eventual guarantee from the Diet would improve the company’s chancesof prospering.94 A year later, in March 1661, the former Swedish envoy to Holland, Peter
Julius Coyet, was called to the Council. One of his missions had been to sound out
opportunities for the Crown to borrow in Amsterdam. He informed the Council thatpeople in Amsterdam, and perhaps the city itself, were willing to extend loans. At thetime, according to Coyet, the interest rate was so low in Holland that investors wereseeking new markets, offering the Swedes an interest rate of five percent. The Dutch hadsome requirements concerning instalments and guarantees, however, finding – as we saw
above – the commitment of the king insufficient ‘to build on’. In order to provide a loan,
they required a guarantee from the whole Council united. After the death of Karl X Gustav
in February 1660, Coyet was again in contact with potential investors, who now proposedthat a guarantee from the Estates of the Realm, or from the Council and the Estates
together, would strengthen Sweden’s credit.95 The credit of the Swedish Crown and its
main representative, the king, was obviously low in Amsterdam, however, the creditor
had suggested ways to strengthen it. One was to involve the Council of the State and theEstates of the Realm in the loan to the Crown, a practice well known in the United
Provinces, and a considerable step towards the transformation of the king’s credit topublic credit.96
The idea of using the Estates as a guarantor often arose in the 1660s deliberations of
the government. In a 1663 discussion with Palmstruch about a government loan from
Stockholm Banco, Councillor Bengt Skytte proposed that the Estates should guarantee(försäkra) the bank. In the same year, the Council discussed the possibility of Sweden, like
Holland and other countries, paying only the interest on its debts. According to Klas Tott,every creditor would accept this practice if it was guaranteed by the Estates.97 The Diet,with its broad representation and fiscal control, could give the company both legitimacy
and financial endorsement.
In his 1664 report on the failure of Stockholm Banco, Bonde elaborated on the risk of,and methods to hold off, a predatory ruler. His solution, in line with the decade-long
discussions of the Council, was to make the new bank the bank of the Estates. Although
Bonde admitted that a sovereign could confiscate the possessions of a few individual
subjects, he found a sovereign attack on the possessions of the incorporated estates
unlikely. If it happened, it would be an infringement (gewalt), and in that case, no property
would be safe in the bank or elsewhere.98 Here Bonde followed the program he had
pursued in the Council of enabling the Crown to borrow from a reliable and robust lender.

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The solution of having the Estates as guarantors would allow no leeway without threaten­
ing the political basis of the state.
Although they had long been identified as the most suitable owners or guarantors ofa bank in a monarchy, there was no consensus about the matter among the Estates. The
Burghers, as shown above, had been hesitant already back in 1619 when Oxenstierna
made his first proposal and in 1668 they, once again, pointed at the risk of a bank ina monarchy. They feared that a king in an acute need of money would press the bank andthereby jeopardize its whole business.99
The Council’s enthusiasm for the matter and the Estates’ lack of interest became
explicit at the Diet of 1668, during which the reorganization of the crashed bank had
been put forward by the council, which repeatedly reminded the Estates of the urgency ofthe matter during the Diet.100 At one point during the Diet, the clergy found it impossible
to deal with such mundane affairs as bank management, and wanted to withdraw,101
however, the Speaker of the Nobility – Johan Gyllenstierna, councillor and an advocate ofstrengthening the fiscal-military state by fulfilling Bonde’s program – rejected their with­drawal, finding it crucial for the credit of a new bank to have the guarantee of all theEstates united.102 Moreover, all three estates raised concerns about the word ‘guarantee’
used in the draft decision of the Diet complied by the council.103 The word guarantee wasused in seventeenth-century Swedish mainly as a legal concept and that is how it wasunderstood by the Estates. The estates feared that they as individual members of theEstates might become personally liable for any eventual losses of the bank, exposing an
unclear relationship between the members’ personal liability and the liability of thecorporate body of the Estates.104 The Council, on the other hand, argued thata guarantee from the Estates would make the bank more familiar to foreigners and an
adaption to the international practices.105 The bank would then be more like the publicbanks on the Continent, clearly separated from the government. It would also signal thatthe bank was backed by taxes approved by the Estates.106 Nevertheless, the Estates did
not approve the Council’s proposal, and the word guarantee was cut from the draft at thevery end of the Diet. Instead of guaranteeing the bank, the Estates decided to take ‘thewhole bank under our disposition and arrangement’ and agreed to ‘protect and defend’
the deposited money, which made the bank, and in the extension also the credit of thestate a public matter.107

Conclusions
In this article, the two Swedish banks – Stockholm banco and The Bank of the Estates –have been analysed as central parts in deliberate process driven by the government – kingand council – to form a new public debt regime in the second half of the seventeenth
century. The old debt regime has proven to be economic insufficient and a political threat
to both the king and the landed aristocracy by its alienation of land and the shifting
power relation between landed and moneyed interests.
State borrowing and its political implications have not been in the focus inhistorical research on Sweden’s period as a Baltic Empire. When dealt with, credit
has been depicted as an ad hoc solution and not an integrated part of the fiscal
system and the foundation of the two banks has been described as either nothing
new, or irrelevant. In this article, I argue that the creation of the Bank of theSCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

15

Estates of the Realm was the end of a long and drawn-out discussion about how
to improve the Crown’s access to credit and to engage the Estates in this borrow­ing process. Furthermore, this process came to be central for the separation of the
public and private aspects of the king by involving the estates in the borrowing
process and making them the principals of the second bank.
The settlement between the government and the Estates was a major step towards
establishing a new view of government borrowing, since long advocated by Bonde andhis faction of the Council. The two banks was an essential part in what can be described asa moderation of the seasoned Swedish fiscal – military state; to the well-organized, but
insufficient taxes granted by the Estates, was a permanent system for domestic borrowing
in an estate-guaranteed bank added.
The bank’s central position in the fiscal system is further articulated by the fact that the
debt to the bank became one of the major arguments used by King Charles XI for
enforcing a repossession – reduktion – of alienated Crown land. The reduktion wasa partial default by the state in which the Crown chose to priorities some debts –among them, those to the bank – and default on other – primarily to members of thelanded aristocracy but also to people of merchant background.
The Bank of the Estates gave the Estates stronger control of the economic
resources available to the government and, in the long run, altered the balanceof power between the government and the Estates.108 During the reign of Charles
XII, the Estates’ control of the financial administration was even expanded with theplacement of Kontributionsränteriet, an agency assigned to collect the extraordin­
ary tax under the Estates.109
Although both Bonde’s and De la Gardie’s factions of the Council agreed on thebenefits of a bank, they disapproved of the government’s relationship to the bank. For
De la Gardie, with his view of how a sovereign could behave to its creditor, the newbank risked to become an impediment. Just a few months after the Diet had ended in
the autumn of 1668, De la Gardie described the bank as limiting the government’s
sovereignty, acting as the ‘government’s controller’ (K:Mtz kontrollör), and in 1674, thebank declined a loan in connection with Sweden’s entrance into the Franco – Dutch
War which further vexed the chancellor.110 De la Gardie was not alone, especiallyduring the Scanian and the Great Northern Wars, the Crown put pressure on the bankto extend substantial loans to it. Thus, the directors and commissioners of the Bank,
appointed by the Estates, had the strength to decline loans to the Crown and reject
proposals to expand its balance sheet by issuing notes, important actions to prove thebank’s independent position. Even the extremely pressured financial situation of theGreat Northern War in the first decades of the eighteenth century, that severely
curtailed the independence of the bank, was eventually weathered by the bank; theCrown did not confiscate its means or forced it to expand its lending by printing
money.111
The creation of the two Swedish banks is an example of the precarious financial
situation many European governments were facing in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries and how they tried to solve it by adopting various new financial devices andmoulding out new public debt regimes. The new regimes were born out of processes
contingent on international as well as national economic prerequisites and politicalcontentions between sovereigns, representative assemblies, and other interest groups

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such as private financiers and contractors, asserting different solutions on how to financethe exorbitant expenses of early modern state-formation and empire building.

Notes
1. Landberg, Det kontinentala krigets; Glete, War and the State, 192–9, 210–2; Glete, “Swedish
Fiscal-Military State”; Lindegren, “Kriget och skulden”.
2. Swedish National Erchiv (SNA), Det odelade kansliet. Rådsprotokoll, Huvudserie (RP), vol. 34
and 35a, 7 March 1661.
3. SNA, RP, vol. 32c, 7 July 1660.
4. Lindegren, Utskrivning och utsugning; Österberg, “Bönder och centralmakt,” 73–95;
Hallenberg, Fogdarna; Holm, Konstruktionen av en stormakt; Glete, “Swedish FiscalMilitary,” 103–5; Thisner, Indelta inkomster; Hallenberg and Holm, Man ur huse.
Important exceptions are Landberg, “Krig på kredit”; Ekholm, “Kontributioner och kredi­ter”; Torstendahl, “Normalstat”.
5. Platbārzdis, Banksedlar, 17–8.
6. Villstrand, Sveriges historia, 254
7. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 65–80; Wittrock, Förmyndares finanspolitik, 370–2; Ögren,“Parliamentary Institution,” 50–2.
8. Wetterberg, Money and Power, 38–9.
9. Barreyre and Delalande, “Introduction”.
10. Rosenthal, “The Political Economy”; Coffman and Neal, “Introduction”; Irigoin and Grafe,“Bounded leviathan,” 199–200, 223–4; Béguin and Genet, “Taxation and the Rise,” 1, 31;
Barreyre and Delalande, “Introduction,” vi–xi; Grafe, “An Empire”.
11. Barreyre and Delalande, “Introduction,” xi–xii.
12. Reinert, Translating Empire, 271–88.
13. Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military”; Thomson, “Beyond the Military State,” 269–70.
14. Odén, “Naturaskatter och finanspolitik,” 1–19; Ladewig Petersen, “From Domain State,” 116–
48.
15. Ladewig Petersen, “War, Finance,” 35–6; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 25;
Hallenberg, Kungen, fogdarna och riket, 13–6, 266–70, 403–21; Glete, War and the State;
Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military”.
16. Lindegren, “The Swedish ‘Military State’,” 318–9, 331; Nilsson, De stora krigens tid, 278–9.
17. Hallenberg, Fogdarna, chapter 5; Scherp, De ofrälse och makten, 53; Hallenberg and Holm,
Man ur huse.
18. Villstrand, Sveriges historia, 255–61.
19. Brännman, Frälseköpen; Nilsson, De stora krigens tid, 280. See also Glete, War and the State,
178, 196–9, 210–2, and “Swedish Fiscal – Military,” 87; Lindegren, “Military State,” 305–36.
20. Nilsson, De stora krigens.
21. Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes.
22. Sörensson, “Ekonomi och krigföring,” 295–320; Birgitta Odén, “Naturaskatter och finanspoli­tik – ett finansiellt dilemma,” Scandia 33:1 (1967): 394–9; Nilsson, De stora krigens, 184;
Lindegren, “Kriget och skulden”.
23. Landberg, “Krig på kredit,” 46–9, 137–8; Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu.
24. Wennerlind, Casulities of Credit, 169; Barreyre and Delalande, ”Introduction,” X.
25. Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military,” 103.
26. Wittrock, Förmyndares finanspolitik, 194, 249, 256, 300, 373; Torstendahl, “Mellan normalstat
och fasta anordningar,” 257, 268–70, 281–3.
27. Nilsson, De stora krigens, 178–95; Hoffman and Norberg, “Conclusion,” 303; Parrott, The
Business of War; Rowlands, The Financial Decline, 233.
28. Lagerroth, Statsreglering; Lindegren, “The Swedish ‘Military State’,” 318–30; Nilsson, De stora
krigens, 284–99; Glete, War and the State, chapter 5.

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY

17

29. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 90–6; Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military,” 97. See also Tham,
Riksdagarnes och regeringsformernas historia, 246–7. The two most recent accounts of thebank, primarily building their narratives on Brisman’s study, by Gunnar Wetterberg and Klas
Fregert are making the same analyses.
30. Fryxell, Berättelser, 172–3; Carlson, Sveriges historia, 336–7; Heckscher, “The Bank of Sweden,”
171; Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska, 631; Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military”, 97; Edvinsson andÖgren, “Money supply,” 301.
31. Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska, 631, for a similar argument see also Ögren.
32. Fregert, “Sveriges Riksbank,” 96.
33. Fregert and Gustafsson,” Fiscal statistics,” 204; Fregert, “Sveriges Riksbank,” 99.
34. “Såsom alle the medel, hwilka i Banken kunna inkomma, böre ther stå i en aldeles
säker och oförryckt förwaring, så wele Wij härmed hafwa frijkallat alla både frem­mande och inföddes Penningar ther sammastädes, at the hwarken af Oss eller någon
annan, på ett eller annat sätt medh arrest beläggias, eller och wedh infallande Krig
medh en eller annan Konung eller Stat confisceras, och icke eller (fast än nöden ochtrångmålet aldrig så allment eller stort wore) öfwer Wårt ther i hafwande avance och
Credit angrijpas eller affordras skole. Hwilket och om the i Lähne-Banken försatte
Panter och thess öfwerskått förstås skal, så at the både vnder warande förpantning,såsom och wedh och efter försälningen skole aldeles för arrest, confiscation och
hwarjehanda intrång wara försäkrade.” Kongl. May:tz Nådige Försäkring gifwen
Rijksens Ständer, på någre wilkor och Fördelar till Banckens bästa. Dat. Stockholm den
17. Septemb. 1668. Printed in Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, appendix VII.
35. In the assurance and the charter of the bank of the estates, ‘Konung eller Stat’ [King andState] is interchangeably used with ‘Potentat eller Republiqve’, Sweriges Rijkes Ständers
Beslut och Förordning om Banken i Stockholm, Dat. Den 22 Septemb. Åhr 1668, paragraph
6, 35.
36. Fregert, “Sveriges Riksbank”. See also Bindseil Central Banking, 93 and Hendrickson, “TheRiksbank,” 316, who base their account of the Swedish banks on Fregert.
37. Fredriksson, Försvarets finansiering 60–5, 127–8; Glete, “Swedish Fiscal – Military,” 104.
38. Lindegren, “Kriget och skulden”; Lindström and Norrhem, Flattering Alliances; Winton, “Thepolitical economy”; Winton, “Parliamentary control”; Ericsson and Winton, “The Rise and Fall”;
Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes.
39. Jezierski et al., “Sweden, Inc”.
40. Wittrock, “Gustaf Bondes politiska program,” 51; Wittrock, Förmyndares finanspolitik, 72–3,
396, 439–50.
41. Wittrock, Förmyndares finanspolitik I, 63, 124–6, 194, 373, 439–50.
42. Fontaine, The Moral Economy, 2–7, 314–7; Nilsson Hammar and Norrhem, “Servants as
creditors,” 20
43. Ito, English Economic Thought; van Bochove et al., “Real Estate”.
44. Risingh, Itt Vthtogh, 22, 101–2.
45. Risingh, Itt Vthtogh, 22; Dahlgren, “Johan Claesson Risingh,” 101–9.
46. Wittrock, “Gustaf Bondes politiska program,” 51.
47. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 3–11; Thomson, “Swedish Variations,” 331.
48. Wittrock, “Gustav Bondes politiska program,” 38; Wittrock, Svenska handelskompaniet, 34–8;
Thomson, “Swedish Variations,” 33, 337; Tham, Bidrag till, 172; Wittrock, Förmyndares
finansförvaltning, 38.
49. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 9, 294–2; Svenska riksrådets protokoll 10, 348, 507.
50. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 1–7; Platbārzdis, Banksedlar, 11.
51. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 4; Thomson, “Swedish Variations,” 340–1.
52. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 8, 551.
53. Kristoffers landslag, “The King’s Section”; Runeby, Monarchia mixta, 239–40.
54. Dahlgren, Karl X Gustaf, 6–12.
55. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 8, 538; Svenska riksrådets protokoll 9, 294; Svenska riksrådets
protokoll 10, 348, 507.

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56. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, Appendix IV, The charter of Stockholm Banco, paragraph 6.
57. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, Appendix IV, The charter of Stockholm Banco, paragraph 6.
58. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 10, 348, 507
59. Lindberg, Antika skevheten, 121–2, Christensen-Nugues, “The Benefit of Some,” 26; Jezierski
et al., “Sweden Inc,” 369–73.
60. SNA, Riksarkivets ämnessamlingar. Miscellanea, Bankväsende, Skrivelser till Kungl Maj:ti bankärenden 1652–1808, vol. 2, Letters from Palmstruch to the king, dated 11 and21 December 1656.
61. SNA, RP vol. 32 c, 7 July 1660.
62. SNA, RP vol. 38 and 39, 10 March 1663.
63. SNA, RP vol. 39, 10 March 1663.
64. SNA, RP vol. 38 and 39, 10 March 1663.
65. SNA, RP vol. 38 and 39, 10 March 1663.
66. SNA, RP vol. 46, 23 June 1666.
67. Stiernman, Alla riksdagars, 1473; Borgarståndets riksdagsprotokoll, 52
68. Runeby, Monarchia mixta, 110–1, 114, 125, 127, 130, 187, 257–9; Lindberg, Den antika
skevheten, 91–2, 176–84.
69. Dickson, Financial Revolution, 55–6; Pincus, 1688, 394–6; Wennerlind, Casulities of Credit
69–70, 74, 111; Ito, English Economic Thought, 148–9; Kaiser, “Money, Despotism, and Public
Opinion,” 1–28, 5.
70. Clapham, The Bank of England, 16–7.
71. Paterson, A Brief Account, 2.
72. Schultze, “Vom Gemeinnutz zum Eigennutz”; Runefelt, Hushållningens dygder, chapter 2; Pihl,“Mastering”; Christensen-Nugues, “The Benefit of Some”.
73. Schultze, “Vom Gemeinnutz zum Eigennutz”; Runefelt, Hushållningens dygder, 65;
Christensen-Nugues, “The Benefit of some,” 25–6.
74. Runefelt, Hushållningens dygder, 46–7; Leemans, “Commercial desires”; McCormick,“Improvement”; Christensen-Nugues, “The Benefit of Some”, 27–8, 31.
75. Prästeståndets riksdagsprotokoll 1664, 484–5.
76. Sveriges ridderskaps och adels riksdagsprotokoll 1664, 450.
77. SNA, Sveriges riksdag, Sekreta utskottet 1668–1714, vol. R2373, 1668, 206–8.
78. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 9, 143.
79. SNA, RP vol. 39, April 24 1664; Prästeståndets protokoll 1664, 376.
80. Tham, Bidrag till, 80–3, 117.
81. Tham, Bidrag till, 80, 354; Fyhrvall, Svenska handelslagstiftningens historia, 47–52, 63, 70–3;
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82. Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu, 167–207.
83. Thomson, “Swedish Variations,” 336–7
84. Runefelt, Hushållningens dygder, 51–4.
85. Wittrock, Förmyndares finanspolitik, passim; Munthe, Joel Gripenstierna, 57–151; Landberg,“Krig på kredit,” 42–63; Torstendahl, “Normalstat,” 283; Glete, “Swedish Fiscal-Military,”
103–4.
86. SNA, RP vol. 46, 29 March 1666.
87. Wennerlind Casulities of Credit, 103; Brandon, War, Capital and the Dutch State, 20–1.
88. Nilsson, “Reduktion eller kontribution,” 69–114; Ågren, “The Reduction,” 251–7; Winberg,
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89. SNA, RP vol. 45, 17 December 1666.
90. Stiernman, Alla riksdagars, 1473.
91. SNA, Säfstaholmsamlingen 1, Pappershandskrifter vol. 59, Oförgripligt betänkande till
Stockholms bancos redres och stabiliment.
92. Sandberg, Slottets skugga, chapter 4; Thomson, “Swedish Variations,” 341.
93. Svenska riksrådets protokoll 8, 551.
94. SNA, RP vol. 33b, 14 December 1660.
95. SNA, RP vol. 34 and 35a, 7 March 1661.

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96. Tracy, A Financial Revolution; ‘t Hart, “Financial Revolution,” 17–22.
97. SNA, RP vol. 39, 19 May 1663.
98. SNA, Säfstaholmsamlingen 1, Pappershandskrifter vol 59, Oförgripligt betänkande till
Stockholms bancos redres och stabiliment.
99. Borgarståndets protokoll, 52.
100. SNA, RP vol. 49, 4 August 1668; Sveriges ridderskaps och adels riksdagsprotokoll 1668, 201;
Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 85–6.
101. SNA, RP vol. 49, 15 September 1668.
102. Sveriges ridderskaps och adels riksdagsprotokoll 1668, 371; Rystad, “Johan Gyllenstierna,” 610.
103. SNA, RP vol. 49, 15 September 1668.
104. SNA, RP vol. 49, 15 September 1668; Sveriges ridderskaps och adels riksdagsprotokoll 1668,
411–9.
105. See also SNA, Bankoutskottet 1672–1866, vol R4528, 48–9.
106. SNA, RP vol. 49, 15 September 1668.
107. Stiernman, Alla riksdagars, 1597, 1599.
108. Winton, “Parliamentary control”.
109. Ericsson and Winton, “The Rise and Fall of a New Credit System,” 32.
110. SNA, RP vol. 45, 5 March 1669; Munthe, Joel Gripenstierna, 87–90.
111. Brisman, Sveriges riksbank, 207–30; Wetterberg, Money and power, 64–74.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Christopher Pihl is docent in history and senior lecturer at Södertörns högskola. His research interest
lies in the intersection of economic, political, and economic history. He is the PI for two research
projects about credit and money in early modern Sweden: “Creating and maintaining trust after the
first Swedish banking crisis: Riksens ständers bank (The Bank of the Estates of the Realm) 1668-1721”
financed by the Swedish Research Council and “Monetary policies and practices. Money and state
formation in early modern Sweden” financed by Riksbankens jubileumsfond.

ORCID
Christopher Pihl

http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5316-0639

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