Foreword by the Task Force Chair.........................................................4
Task Force Co-Chair..................................................................................5
Executive Summary...................................................................................6
Introduction.................................................................................................7
Recommendation 1....................................................................................9
Recommendation 2..................................................................................21
Recommendation 3.................................................................................30
Recommendation 4.................................................................................38
Annex..........................................................................................................46

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Foreword by the Task Force Chair
In only a few months, the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically changed ourlives, causing disruptive and persistent human suffering, and severely questioning
the foundation of our economies and societies. It has also exacerbated the negative impact of geopolitical tensions and nationalism. In 2020, international
trade volume dropped by 5.3% and total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ﬂows
plummeted by 42% versus 2019.
The current crisis stands as a watershed and requires the G20 to fully embrace a systemic shift by strengthening international cooperation, increasing preparedness tofuture global emergencies, addressing inequalities at all levels and promoting sustainable development as the only ways forward. To this end, business is committed
to revamping global trade and investment as key drivers of economic growth, and toreshaping their multilateral governance. The B20 Trade and Investment Task Force
has identiﬁed the following Policy Recommendations to drive actionable change:
1. Promote open markets over protectionism and unilateralism, reform theWTO, and revitalize trade negotiations ensuring a level playing ﬁeld;
2. Enhance trade responsiveness against future disruptions, free cross-bordertransactions and enable more resilient Global Value Chains;
3. Facilitate the participation of all businesses, in particular MSMEs, in global
trade by removing barriers and improving their access to trade ﬁnancing;
4. Make trade and investment impactful drivers for a greener and more sustainable development, and increase FDI ﬂows.
Rising protectionism and unilateralism deprive societies of the full beneﬁts of the
global economy. True multilateralism needs to be restored and the WTO must be
reformed comprehensively: the appointment of its new Director General marksa renewed chapter in the history of the Organization, and business offers full support towards the common goal of revitalizing international trade and investment.
Global value chains have proven a remarkable resilience in the latest months.
Governments, however, must further reinforce the supply of essential goods, including medical products, and establish the adequate framework conditions toincrease the scope for businesses to prosper and to cushion shocks.
Today, more than ever, MSMEs must be integrated in global trade especially byleveraging digital technologies, capability building programs and through awider and easier access to trade ﬁnancing instruments.
A well-functioning trade and investment system is not only beneﬁcial for businesses: it enhances social progress and fosters sustainable development. Relaunching global foreign direct investment ﬂows will promote knowledgetransfer, foster job creation, and enhance the development of human capital.
The above-mentioned Policy Recommendations contribute to achieving the United
Nations 2030 Agenda by impacting multiple Sustainable Development Goals aswell as to addressing the G20 Italy Priorities: People, Planet and Prosperity.
An improved trade and investment system will enable additional G20 trade up
to USD 1.6-1.8 Tn, leading to up to USD 8-9 Tn G20 GDP in 2024, with positive
externalities on employment. To fully achieve such impact, monitoring KPIs and2024 targets have been identiﬁed.
Now is the time to jointly reshape the future.

Sincerely,
Barbara Beltrame Giacomello

4B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Task Force Co-Chairs
Why Trade and Investment Matter

Ajay Banga
Executive Chairman, MasterCard

Levent Çakıroğlu
CEO, Koç Holding A.Ş.

Shinta Widjaja Kamdani
CEO, Sintesa Group

Masakazu Kubota
Vice Chairman & President,
Keidanren

Paolo Rocca
CEO, Techint Group

Ingrid Sinclair
Global President,
Sims Lifecycle Services

Livio Vanghetti
Vice President, Global Public
Affairs, Philip Morris

Jianlong Yu
Executive Vice Chairmanof CCOIC

5“The global pandemic has shown justhow deeply interconnected the world is.
Strengthening our global trading system
and its rules allows us to use that fact toour mutual beneﬁt, building back betterin ways that will advance people, theplanet and prosperity.”“We need better-coordinated rules ofglobal trade and investment in order toaccelerate the vital green and digitaltransformation for a sustainable andfairer globalization without leaving any
nation behind.”“Global economic leaders must take concrete actions: collaboratively undoing barriers to create a more resilient, equitable
and sustainable global economy, and building seamless trade and investment.”“In order to build “forward” better, B20
Members must cooperate to restructure
the free-open international economicorder, especially towards revitalizing the
WTO and promoting cross-border data
ﬂows.”“A review of the agreement on subsidies(SCM) addressing all government intervention leading to trade distortions, aswell as a consensual approach to carbon
border schemes are critical priorities forthe multilateral trading system.”“Trade and investment need to promote
circular economic models focused on extending the lifecycle of products. Facilitate reuse, repair, remanufacturing,
reengineering then ﬁnally recycling.”“Boosting FDI after the pandemic is a priority for the B20 and a crucial challenge
for the global economic recovery. FDI
plays a key role in fostering innovation anddevelopment, and will drive the global
economy on the road to sustainability.”“To revive the world economy, we have towork together to ﬁght against the pandemic, safeguard the multilateral trading
system, make the global value chains stable, and promote an inclusive growth.”

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Executive Summary
Recommendation 1: Promote open markets over protectionism andunilateralism, reform the WTO, and revitalize trade negotiations
ensuring a level playing ﬁeld
Policy Action 1.1: Commit to the widest possible open market access, roll backexisting restrictions and refrain from adopting new ones including on vaccines,
medical goods and agri-food products
Policy Action 1.2: Reform the WTO and re-establish an improved dispute settlement mechanism to re-enable the organization’s role at the center of therules-based multilateral trade and investment system
Policy Action 1.3: Foster and strengthen an open multilateral system by updating, revitalizing and accelerating ongoing negotiations and initiatives, as well
as by addressing new emerging topics

Recommendation 2: Enhance trade responsiveness against future
disruptions, free cross-border transactions and enable more resilient
Global Value Chains
Policy Action 2.1: Adopt international trade-related strategies including greenlanes to ensure open cross-border ﬂows and COVID-19-free mobility
Policy Action 2.2: Upgrade customs processes by aligning interpretation ofnomenclatures, revitalizing the Harmonized System, harmonizing the customs
origin procedures, promoting the mutual recognition of Authorized Economic
Operators, and digitizing cross-border activities
Policy Action 2.3: Increase the resilience of Global Value Chains by promoting
higher homogeneity of standards and by enhancing trade infrastructures

Recommendation 3: Facilitate the participation of all businesses, inparticular MSMEs, in global trade by removing barriers and improving
their access to trade ﬁnancing
Policy Action 3.1: Foster the inclusiveness of MSMEs in global trade, by supporting the development of digital skills and digital infrastructures, andbroadening the adoption of cross-border electronic transferable records
Policy Action 3.2: Facilitate the access of business to standardized trade ﬁnance instruments, by lowering transaction costs and regulatory burdens,
while simplifying their processes
Policy Action 3.3: Support the participation of business in global trade by leveraging and updating the role of Export Credit Agencies and Development Finance Institutions

Recommendation 4: Make trade and investment impactful drivers fora greener and more sustainable development, and increase FDI ﬂows
Policy Action 4.1: Advance the WTO contribution to trade and environment,
foster liberalization of trade in green goods and services, promote regulatory
cooperation to accelerate clean energy transition, resource efﬁciency and circular economy
Policy Action 4.2: Facilitate and support Foreign Direct Investment ﬂows, witha special focus on sustainability and inclusiveness6

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Introduction
Trade and Investment are key engines of economic growth, competition, innovation, employment, and social wealth. However, in the 2010s, global trade
growth ratio relative to GDP growth has ﬂattened to -0.2%, versus +2% overthe preceding three decades. Foreign Direct Investment experienced an evensharper decline in its ratio to GDP, recording a compound annual growth of 7% since 2010, versus +7% in the previous years.
Exhibit 1
Setting the stage: Tradeand Investment growthis slowing down

Trade & Investment engine of GDP growth...
GDP Gross Domestic
Product(1980 = Index 100, based on USD)

- 0.2%GDP value
from traded
good and services
plus FDIs
GDP value
fromconsumption,
government
spendingand domestic
investments

1980

1990

2000

2010

... in slowdown over the last 10 years

2019

Trade (export only) & Investments (FDIs)
Rest (consumption, government spend,
domestic investments)

+2%

60%

TRADE-to39%
GDP ratio(% values)
1980

1990

FDI-toGDP ratio(% values)

2000

2010

2019

- 7%

+7%

2%
1%
1980

1990

2000

2010

2019

Source: World Bank Database; 2020; World Bank

In addition, the health, social and economic emergency sparked by the outbreak of COVID-19 has exacerbated the negative impact of geopolitical turmoil and of rising protectionism and economic nationalism. Consequently, in2020 versus 2019, international merchandise trade volume dropped by 5.3%1
and total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ﬂows plummeted by 42%2, with theleast developed economies taking the highest toll. Against this scenario, fourmain areas need to be urgently addressed, namely:s Rising protectionism and unilateralism which weaken the WTO;s Lack of a coordinated response to the crisis, decelerating cross-border ﬂows
and negatively affecting Global Value Chains (GVCs);s Participation of MSMEs in global trade, which is hindered by regulatory, technical and operational obstacles and insufﬁcient access to trade ﬁnancing;s Uneven attention to social and environmental sustainability, coupled withwidening inequalities within and among countries, and declining FDI.
Protectionism and unilateralism have been steadily growing in the last years,
undermining the role of the WTO as center of the multilateral trading system.
Commitments to reform the organization need to be translated into viableaction plans on a consensus building basis.
The global spread of the COVID-19 epidemic provoked a devastating human,social and economic shock, which is still ongoing. Particularly during the earlyphases of the pandemic, Global Value Chains were confronted with signiﬁcantdisruptions and containment measures. After initial setbacks, many of them
have shown remarkable resilience, proving that, given the right conditions,companies are able to ramp up global sourcing, production, and distribution,
particularly if they can rely on stable, predictable and transparent trading
rules. Where shortages did occur, they were usually caused by unprecedented
demand, rather than collapsing supply.
1
World trade primed for strong but uneven recovery after COVID-19 pandemic shock; 2021; World Trade Organization (WTO)
2
Global foreign direct investment fell by 42% in 2020, outlook remains weak; 2021; United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

7

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

In addition to lockdowns as a response to the emergency crisis, we have also
seen an unparalleled intervention by states in their domestic economies.
Moreover, the longstanding gap between demand and supply of trade ﬁnancefurther widened, making it even more challenging for many MSMEs to operate
and, ultimately, to stay in the business.
While FDI is falling worldwide, efforts to enforce higher social and environmental standards remain uneven across countries and regions, due to different levels of economic development, ambitions and implementation
capacities. This increases the likelihood that carbon-border adjustment mechanisms and similar measures driven by sustainability objectives will be
adopted in an uncoordinated manner.
The G20 and the global community must learn from the current crisis. An
open, fair and inclusive trade and investment system would help recovery
from the pandemic, as well as support sustainable growth in the longer run.
Hence, the following four Policy Recommendations have been formulated:s Promote open markets over protectionism and unilateralism, reform theWTO, and revitalize trade negotiations ensuring a level playing ﬁeld;s Enhance trade responsiveness against future disruptions, free cross-bordertransactions and enable more resilient Global Value Chains;s Facilitate the participation of all businesses, in particular MSMEs, in global
trade by removing barriers and improving their access to trade ﬁnancing;s Make trade and investment impactful drivers for a greener and more sustainable development, and increase FDI ﬂows.
As highlighted below, trade-related policies have a tangible impact on G20
GDP. The study simulates exports and imports of goods across hundreds oftrade corridors up to 2024 in four alternative scenarios.
G20 Trade (in Goods), USD Tn
15

2 Optimistic - advancing open, fair and inclusive trading system• Restrictive measures incl. tariffs removed, and great progress in WTO reform• TFA implementation achieving new high, trade finance gap at minimum level

13.5
12.7
11.8
10.7

1 Incrementalist - improving gradually the trading system• Some new trade facilitating measures incl. TFAs, moderate decline in tariffs• Gradual progress in WTO reform, trade finance gap slightly reduced

10

9.9

0 Status Quo - maintaining the current trend• Global trade tending toward existing restrictiveness (e.g., trade wars,
import - restricting measures, unprecedented trade finance gap, WTO impasse)
3 Pessimistic - rising protectionism and unilateralism• Increase in trade restricting measures, TFA with no progress• Stalemate in WTO reform incl. dysfunction of AB, trade finance gap worsened

5
2015

2020

Exhibit 2
Advancing the trading system
would enable additional G20 trade
up to USD 1.6-1.8 Tn, leading
to up to USD 8-9 Tn G20 GDP
in 2024, with positive
externalities on employment

2025

G20 Trade vs. Status Quo

G20 GDP vs. Status Quo% CAGRTn 2024

Tn 2021 - 2024

% CAGRTn 20242021 - 20242020 - 2024

yearly value

avg value2020 - 2024

yearly value

avg value

+3.5%
+1.9%
-2.5%

+ $ 1.6 -1.8
+ $ 0.8 - 1.0- $ 1.0 - 1.2+ $ 1.0+ $ 0.5- $ 0.7

+2.8%
+1.7%
-1.9%

+ $ 8-9+ $ 5-6- $ 5-6+ $ 5.3+ $ 3.2- $ 3.4

Source: World Trade Organization (WTO); International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations (UN);Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Boston Consulting Group(BCG)Trade ModelIn the optimistic one, the actions of the G20 would result in an additional G20
trade value of USD 1.6-1.8 Tn vs. status quo, corresponding to a USD 8-9 Tn G20
GDP increase in 2024. The impact on GDP is also considered to be positively
associated with higher employment as largely demonstrated in literature3.
Accounting for 75% of the total trade and 85% of the global GDP, the G20
must take the lead in reshaping the future. To draw the way forward, the B20
details and offers the following Policy Recommendations.
3

Growth, employment and poverty: An analysis of the vital nexus based on some recent UNDP and ILO/SIDA studies, Azizur Rahman Khan; 2007; United Nations (UN); The employment intensity of growth: Trends and macroeconomic determinants, Steven Kapsos; 2005; International Labour Organization (ILO)

8

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Recommendation 1:
Promote open markets over protectionism andunilateralism, reform the WTO, and revitalize
trade negotiations ensuring a level playing field
Policy Actions
1.1 Commit to the widest possible open market access, roll back existing
restrictions and refrain from adopting new ones including on vaccines,
medical goods and agri-food products
1.2 Reform the WTO and re-establish an improved dispute settlement
mechanism to re-enable the organization’s role at the center of therules-based multilateral trade and investment system
1.3 Foster and strengthen an open multilateral system by updating, revitalizing and accelerating ongoing negotiations and initiatives, as well
as by addressing new emerging topics
Leading Monitoring KPIOwner: G20 Countries% of G20 Imports Impacted
by Restrictive Measures1

Baseline
10.4%(2019)

Target5.0%(2024)

1
Trade remedies and COVID-19-related measures not included
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO)

Recommendation 1 contributes to achieving UN SDGs 1: No Poverty, 2: Zero
Hunger, 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, 10: Reduced Inequalities
and 17: Partnerships for the Goals. In particular, Policy Action 1.1 contributes tothe achievement of target 1.4 by committing to the widest degree of liberalizationand market access, repudiating protectionism and committing to reduce current
restrictions to trade. It also contributes to the accomplishment of target 1.5 bybuilding the resilience of the poor and the vulnerable, encouraging open markets
and free trade for necessary vaccine, agri-food and medical equipment supplies.
Finally, it contributes to the achievement of target 2.B by committing to the rollingback of temporary-implemented restrictions in food and agricultural products.
Policy Action 1.2 contributes to the achievement of target 8.1 by sustaining percapita economic growth in accordance to local and national circumstances, andtarget 10.A by proposing to make Special and Differential Treatment more precise, effective and operational. It also contributes to the accomplishment of target
17.9 by supporting least developed countries in building capacity and adjust ﬂexible requirements to fully implement all WTO commitments, and target 17.17 byenhancing and widening the dialogue with the busines community. Finally, Policy
Action 1.3 contributes to the achievement of target 17.6 by encouraging regional
and international cooperation, including increased coordination among existingmechanisms, and target 17.10 by fostering multilateral dialogue, economic
growth, and a global level playing ﬁeld for all companies internationally.
Recommendation 1 contributes to addressing G20 Italy Priorities People andProsperity. In particular, Policy Action 1.1 contributes to addressing the People
priority by fostering collaboration and open markets and refusing protectionism
on vaccines, agri-food and medical products, thus improving overall life quality

9

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

and health standards especially for the poor and the vulnerable. Policy Action
1.2 contributes to addressing the Prosperity priority by promoting effective monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms as well as encouraging the dialogue
and cooperation with the private sector. Finally, Policy Action 1.3 contributes toaddressing the People priority by eliminating tariffs in the healthcare sector andavoiding export restrictions on health-related goods including vaccines; and theProsperity priority by encouraging an open, fair multilateral trade system andpromoting international collaboration and advancement on shared agreements
and emerging topics such as e-commerce and data governance.

Context
Protectionism and unilateralism were already on the rise when the pandemic
further accentuated this trend as new tariff and non-tariff barriers continue
to be imposed, escalating trade frictions.
The trade coverage of G20 import restrictions4 has seen an exponential
growth in the last ten years increasing from around 1.0% in 2010 to over 10.4%
in 2019, impacting some USD 1.5 trillion of trade5.
Trade coverage of G20 import restrictions1 in force since 2010(% of G20 import impacted by protectionist measures)
Import restrictions impacting on bothcountries operating the restrictions
and multiple other world tradepatterns, e.g.,• higher prices for consumers• limitation of consumers' choices• misallocation of international resources• loss of jobs

Value of trade
impacted byimport-restrictions(Bn USD)

1.0%
2010
115

Exhibit 3
Protectionism on trade increasingby over 10x in last 10 years

+10x

10.3%
8.8%

1.5%

1.6%

2011
215

2012
226

2.6%

2.9%

2013
369

2014
419

% of G20 imports with restrictions

4.0%

4.2%

2015
501

2016
507

XX

5.3%

2017
724

2018
1,328

2019
1,568

Bn USD of import restrictions in force

1

Trade remedies and COVID-19-related measures not included; only formal import-restrictions reported
Source: Report on G20 measures; 2020; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Trade restricting measures have been outpacing trade facilitating measures
for a half decade now, and the trend is neither marginal nor relegated to a
speciﬁc sector.
Since 2018 more import - restricting measures thanimport - facilitating measures...

… covering all industries

Value of global trade impacted by facilitating vs. restricting measures(Bn USD)

Incidence of liberalizing vs. harmful interventions by sector(% volumes impacted by protectionist measures)

1,183
258
(201)

Net impact(Bn USD)

(214)

170
(228)

249
(101)

169
(79)

296

545

(588)

(747)

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

57

969

(58)

148

190

(292)

(202)

Metals & Mining
Non-metal Materials
EnergyBio Pharma
Agribusiness
Fashion & Luxury
Autos-Vehicles
Aerospace
Chemicals
Rubber & Plastics
Electronics
Autos-Components
Consumer Durables
MedTech-Durables
Machinery & Automation
MedTech-Consumables

0
Import-facilitating measures

Import-restricting measures

Exhibit 4
Trade harmful interventions
growing more than liberalizations

2

4

2009-2018

6

8

10

2019

Source: Overview of developments in the international trading environment; 2020; World Trade
Organization (WTO);
Global Trade Alert: Global Dynamics; 2020 [accessed]; University of St. Gallen
4
Trade remedies (i.e. Anti-Dumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Safeguards) and COVID-19-related
measures not included; 0.29% of G20 imports covered by trade remedy initiations from mid-May 20 to mid-Oct 20
5Report on G20 measures (mid-May 2020 to mid-October 2020); 2020; World Trade Organization (WTO)

10

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

In addition, containing the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the availabilityof essential goods, including key medical equipment. To promote trade andincrease wealth-creating prospects post-COVID-19, the B20 should recommend the following:s Governments should halt new protectionist measures and roll back existing
import and export restrictions, including those introduced in response to
the COVID-19 crisis;s The WTO should be re-empowered promptly and effectively in its corefunctions, beginning with the dispute settlement system;s Ongoing trade negotiations and initiatives should be revitalized, expanded
in membership and concluded.

Policy Action 1.1: Commit to the widest possible open market access,roll back existing restrictions and refrain from adopting new ones
including on vaccines, medical goods and agri-food products
In light of the persistent health, social and economic emergency, the B20 urges
the G20 to commit to a clear timeline for rolling back protectionist measures
to trade and investment and to standstill on imposing any further barriers.
Safeguard ﬂows of essential goods and services, and personal protection
equipment
The production and exchange of COVID-19 related products has taken center
stage since the outbreak of the pandemic, demonstrating that countries arewidely interdependent. As the emergency surged, governments dealt with acquiring large quantities of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), while introducing export restrictions on domestic PPE stocks. As a result, temporary
export restrictions on critical supplies among G20 countries escalated between February and June 2020. To ensure that these temporary measures do
not become permanent, they need to be closely monitored.
Exhibit 5
G20 temporary export restrictions
placed to contain COVID-19

Data from Feb to Jun 2020 (cumulative numbers, G20 countries)

40

30
+11x

20

10

0
Feb

Mar

Apr
Food

May

Jun

Medical

Source: Market Access Map; 2020; International Trade Centre

Export bans in medical equipment have increased prices6 and interrupted
trade routes, leading to global supply shortages affecting vital health systems
for both emerging and developed countries around the world7.

6
Export bans contributed to increased prices by 12.9% on average (22.2% in case of face masks); Trade Policy
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis; 2020; World Bank
7

11

Trade policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic; 2020; Fiorini et al.

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

We urge the G20 to consider the adverse, long-term economic and health effects of such restrictive measures, to refrain from imposing new export curbs
while rolling back existing restrictions, and to commit to avoid trade bans andany other tariff and non-tariff barrier as well as adopt trade facilitation policies for essential medical goods and services, and PPE.
Refrain from export restrictions and commit to non-discriminatory distributions of vaccines among countries
A fair global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines would defeat the pandemic
faster for everyone: the IMF estimates that for every month we gain in theﬁght against the virus, the global economy collectively saves as much as USD
500 billion8 in GDP.
Getting a few countries fully vaccinated may enhance their economies partially, but there is no scenario in which any country could return to full normalcy and prosperity if the virus is still widespread elsewhere. As long as
Global Value Chains are impeded, borders are closed, and international travelis halted, trade will remain hindered and full global recovery will not be
achieved.
If countries continue to follow an uncoordinated approach to vaccine distribution, the world risks global GDP losses in 2021 of as much as USD 9.2 trillion(assuming no access to vaccination in developing economies), equivalent tomore than 7% of pre-pandemic global GDP9.
Exhibit 6
GDP losses projection with
uncoordinated approach tovaccine distribution

Source: No economy can recover fully from the COVID-19 pandemic until we have secured equitableglobal access to effective vaccines (ICC summary for Policymakers); 2021; International Chamberof Commerce (ICC)

We call on G20 countries to reject vaccine nationalism and protectionism, andcommit to a fair, non-discriminatory, inclusive and more extensive supply anddistribution of vaccines, modelled on principles of proportionality10. In this regard, we fully support all collaborative efforts, especially the Access to COVID19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) initiative and its COVAX facility, and we urge G20
countries to backstop their statements with actions and ﬁnancial support.
In the early phases of vaccine distribution, in February 2021, the WHO reported11 that more than three-quarters of global vaccinations were initiatedin just 10 countries (representing 60% of global GDP). As of 31 March 2021,
North America had the highest rate of vaccination (18.8%), followed by Europe(12.7%), and Africa with the lowest share (14 million people, 0.6% vaccinated)12.

8

Vaccine fairness will make us all safer; 2020; Financial Times9

No economy can recover fully from the COVID-19 pandemic until we have secured equitable global access to effective vaccines; 2020; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

10

Policy and Allocation of vaccines: update, status and next steps; 2020; COVAX - WHO’s co-led initiative

11

WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media brieﬁng on COVID-19; 2021; World Health Organization
(WHO)
12

UNCTAD, based on data from Our World in Data; 2021; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD)12

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Even later, drastic disparities among countries in terms of vaccine doses delivered to individuals were evident.
Exhibit 7
COVID-19 vaccine dose
administered per 100 people,
as of May 27, 2021

Source: Statistics and Research Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations; 2021; Our World In Data

In response, the WHO has publicly asked countries to share their vaccine
stocks after covering their healthcare workers and elderly populations13.
Unfortunately, despite the WHO’s global call, several export-control measureson vaccines have been adopted.
Hence, we reinforce the call for solidarity and collaboration, not only for equity
purposes, but to secure robust economic development. In this regard, the
TRIPS agreement contains mechanisms and ﬂexibilities that would allow anincrease in vaccine manufacturing and availability.
Avoid restrictions in trade of food and agricultural products
Especially in its earlier phases, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced unexpected stresses on food systems, creating multiple challenges and causing
shortages and stock-outs. Such shortfalls have impacted food safety and security, farm production, food processing transport and logistics, workers
across the food value chain, and consumers’ demand14.
Temporary export restrictions on food introduced in response to the emergency represent only a subset of wider trade measures on agriculture products.
Exhibit 8
Overall food-related restrictive
measures in place during the
COVID-19 crisis

Restrictiveness of measure
Exportrestrictions
and ban

•
•
•

Fish
Live animals,
fish
Eggs

#3 global exporter of coarse grains,accounts for 15% of world exports
•

•

•

•
•

For non - EU•

Exportquotas andlicenses
Importrestrictions•

Subsidies••••

Animal - based
products
Support for
agribusinesses
Price support
for dairy andwagyu
Broad aid pack
Meat & dairy
Soybeans & sunflower

•

Beans
Beans
Sugar, potato,
onions, garlic
Beans, peas••

Food products
Lemons•

Garlic, carrots,
gingerPlant - based
products•

Horticultural

•
•
•
•

Buckwheat,milllet
VariousCorn, sorghum
Buckwheat•

Wheat, meslin,barley, rye, corn
Wheat
Wheat

•
•

Accounts forca. 20% of
the world’s
rice exports

•
•
•
•
•

Accounts for ca. 33% of
the world’s rice exports

Account for 33% of theworld’s wheat exports

Cereals

Rice

Criticality for food security

Source: Food-related trade restrictive measures in place; 2020; Boston Consulting Group (BCG) elaboration on ofﬁcial World Trade Organization (WTO) data, United States Department of Agriculture(USDA) and United Nations (UN) datasets
13
14

WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at 148th session of the Executive Board; 2021; World Health Organization (WHO)OECD-FAO Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment-Food and Agriculture Organization

13

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

We call on the G20 to keep trade in food and agricultural products open
across borders and institute emergency measures to counteract any and all
bottlenecks and barriers, while protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR),
including Geographical Indications (GIs).
Avoid misuse of national security measures
National security objectives are being increasingly used as pretexts to pursue
economic and competitiveness goals.
The pandemic has also, in certain cases, exacerbated their use to justify the
adoption of tariffs, local content requirements, or other measures, including
export restrictions. These practices may not be compliant with WTO rules andjurisprudence, and set a dangerous precedent as they raise concerns not only
about their direct impact on the business, but also on downstream effects on
consumers.
We call on G20 members not to misuse measures justiﬁed under national security
purposes, and to carefully assess their implementation, in order to avoid undesirable and disproportionate second-order impacts. Dialogue and global cooperation should be further promoted to address concerns, including those related
to FDI screening mechanisms and nations’ Negative List for Foreign Direct Investment and with regard to the compatibility with the existing WTO discipline.

Policy Action 1.2: Reform the WTO and re-establish an improved
dispute settlement mechanism to re-enable the organization’s roleat the center of the rules-based multilateral trade and investment
systemPrevious B20 cycles have repeatedly called for a necessary reform of the WTO.
B20 Italy urges the G20 to take swift action to agree on a reform roadmap
before the next WTO Ministerial Conference and to engage with the widest
WTO membership for its endorsement. The appointment of members of theAppellate Body should be concluded as soon as possible thereafter, and ideallyby the next WTO MC12.
As B20 we welcomed the G20 Statement15 launching the “Riyadh Initiative on
the Future of the World Trade Organization (WTO)” aiming at identifying
common ground and principles among all G20 members regarding the next
25-plus years of the WTO. We urge the G20 to sustain progress in discussions
on WTO reform.
Improvements in WTO core functions would increase the overall effectivenessand legitimacy of the Organization. A better balance between the political organs, the dispute settlement bodies, and the Director General would mutually
reinforce them all. Negotiations would beneﬁt from a more precise, effective
and operational Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries.
Updated rules and more transparent policy formulation would deﬂect pressure from dispute settlement. Stricter processes of notiﬁcation and improved
monitoring mechanisms would provide better visibility to states and traders
and would support fact-ﬁnding activities of litigation panels.
B20 welcomes the new WTO Director General. Her arrival in ofﬁce is a goodoccasion to discuss her mandate and allow her to take a wider and moreproactive role to foster initiatives for deliberation, promote the WTO corevalues and fundamental principles, cooperate with other multilateral institutions and enhance the contribution of trade policies toward the broader goalsof the international community.

15
G20 Addresses International Trade and Investment Priorities Including the Impact of COVID-19; 2020; G20
Statement, 202014

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Amongst the several areas where improvements are needed, the B20 highlights the following:s Fill the vacant Appellate Body seats and re-establish an improved disputesettlement system;s Make the notiﬁcation and monitoring systems more effective;s Ensure the effectiveness of Special and Differential Treatment;s Improve the Trade Policy Review (TPR) mechanism;s Strengthen the functions of the WTO Committees;s Enhance the dialogue with the business community.
Fill the vacant Appellate Body seats and re-establish an improved disputesettlement system
Allowing the WTO membership to once again benefit from a trusted twotier mechanism to resolve litigations and to retake control over interpreting
WTO rules is an utmost priority, considering that only 4% of total cases
reached the stage at which authorization for retaliation was granted16.
Exhibit 9
Dispute settlement takes much
longer than it is meant to(1995-2019)

Source: Boston Consulting Group (BCG) elaboration on official World Trade Organization(WTO) data

In late 2019, with the expiration of the mandates of two Appellate Body
members, the Organization was no longer able to decide on appeals in
trade disputes. We are confident in the willingness of all WTO countries tomove ahead with the appointment of new members, building on the draft
General Council Decision on Functioning of the Appellate Body17. Businessalso calls on the G20 to support improvements in the WTO panels and appellate functions.
Make the notiﬁcation and monitoring systems more effective
One of the key functions of the WTO is to monitor the compliance of national
trade policies with its rules. The various WTO agreements contain notiﬁcation
requirements, however, the failure by many members to properly andpromptly notify their trading partners has been a serious problem for years.

16
As of 31 December 2020, WTO members had referred 598 disputes to the Dispute Settlement Body, out of
which about 40% are still ongoing, while the remaining 60% have been completed. Since the inception of the
Dispute Settlement in 1995, almost one-third of completed disputes have been terminated, and almost half
has been solved with the respondents ending the non-compliant behaviors. Typically, such cases take 2-3 years
to resolve. The average duration for these few disputes was 8 years. Dispute Settlement activity: Some ﬁgures;
2020; World Trade Organization (WTO)
17

Informal process on matters related to the functioning of the Appellate Body - Report by facilitator, H. E. DR.
David Walker; 2019; World Trade Organization (WTO)

15

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 10
Status of Compliance with
Subsidy Notiﬁcation Obligations asof March 30, 2020

Source: Status of Compliance with Subsidy Notiﬁcation Obligations; 2020; World Trade Organization(WTO)

Building on existing proposals18, a permanent monitoring committee shouldbe established for promptly identifying trade barriers and solving emerging
conﬂicts. A feedback mechanism would also enable businesses to directly provide the committee with information on trade barriers faced on the ground.
A more accurate classiﬁcation of Non-Tariff Barriers should be introduced,
and additional resources should be devoted to internal data management, including the implementation of a clear and accessible Market Access Database.
As for ﬂexibilities, delays in submitting notiﬁcations should be allowed according to the capacity-building of Developing Countries and by providing themwith the necessary technical assistance. The possibility of counter-notiﬁcationfrom other members and the introduction of a bi-annual “Notiﬁcation Compliance Reporting System” (NCRS) with the obligation to submit a report
should also be considered. Furthermore, incentives should be introduced tomake members more accountable.
Ensure the effectiveness of Special and Differential Treatment
The different levels of development among WTO members determine gaps
in implementing WTO provisions, that must be assessed and considered. The
G20 should agree on a common proposal for the WTO to review the implementation of the S&DT and make it more precise, effective, and operational.
Business knowledge and suggestions can provide a useful support and should
be considered in the process.
Looking at the precedent of the Trade Facilitation Agreement as a reference,
and at the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Programs adopted bymany members, efforts should be devoted to better address capacity gaps.
We encourage the WTO to engage with developing countries to assess theirnational conditions and to mobilize support resources under the coordinationof the Secretariat, so that their commitments are proportionate to actual capabilities.
Improve the Trade Policy Review (TPR) mechanism
The Trade Policy Review mechanism is a useful tool to provide transparency
on members’ trade policies. TPRs consist of: (i) a report issued by the WTO
Secretariat, (ii) a policy statement of the members under review, and (iii) a
two-day Q&A session with the WTO membership19. The largest traders (currently the European Union, the United States, China, and Japan) are reviewed
18

Such as the US proposals in WTO General Council in July 2017, the Communication from Canada in September 2018, the Chinese WTO reform document in November 2018 and May 2019, and the US-EU-Japan Trilateral
Initiative in January 2020
19

Trade Policy Reviews; 2020; World Trade Organization (WTO)

16

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

every three years, the next sixteen members every ﬁve years, the others every
seven years, with even longer periods available for least developed countries.
To upgrade the process and make members more accountable, reviews
should involve business stakeholders, and their scope could be extended tocover trade-related measures having increasing impact on international competitiveness, such as those related to sustainability, Intellectual Property
Rights, and digital trade.
Strengthen the functions of the WTO Committees
Another challenge is to make the WTO’s Committees more active and efﬁcient. External experts from business, national administrations, academies,
and other relevant bodies should be regularly involved to complement inhouse expertise. Currently, WTO Committees mostly focus on compliance,
exchange of information, data-collection and on overlooking notiﬁcation processes. They should also assess new regulatory avenues, and initiate discussions on challenging issues not yet addressed in negotiations.
Committee Chairs must operate with the highest degree of knowledge andimpartiality; at present, their average duration is one year, not long enoughfor implementing new and more resource-intensive tasks.
Hence, chairs should be assigned for a longer period such as two or three years
with the possibility of extension to ensure continuity in ongoing processes.
Enhance the dialogue with the business community
Business can provide in-depth added value, and can play a relevant role in promoting and in improving the WTO’s core functions. A more active involvementof the business community should be pursued on a regular basis, including on
the monitoring and assessment of the effects of trade barriers, on the
progress across the most relevant negotiations, and on the drafting of Trade
Policy Reviews.
Beyond its annual public forum event, the WTO should establish a permanentbusiness advisory body that can provide feedbacks on negotiations, obligations and agreements based on business experience in engaging in cross-border trade and investment.

Policy Action 1.3: Foster and strengthen an open multilateral system
by updating, revitalizing and accelerating ongoing negotiations andinitiatives, as well as by addressing new emerging topics
The Doha Development Agenda was based on ambitious targets to beachieved as a single undertaking, requiring consensus20 of all WTO members.
Nevertheless, negotiations over many years failed to achieve such compromise, impacting the centrality of the WTO and shifting the attention of bothcountries and businesses towards bilateral and regional agendas. As a result,
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)
have proliferated in the past decades.
Such regional and preferential agreements are supported by the business community and should remain complementary to, and not a substitute for, themultilateral trading system. It is important that these agreements are properly
notiﬁed to the WTO to ensure that the organization keeps track of trade liberalization and whether the agreements comply with the WTO criteria.

20
WTO Article IX The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT1947.1 Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue
shall be decided by voting

17

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 11
Evolution of Regional Trade
Agreements in the world,
1948-2021

Source: Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements; 2021; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Adopt the commitments set in the proposal for a WTO “Trade and Health
Initiative” and update the Pharmaceutical Products Agreement (PPA)The next WTO Ministerial Conference should clearly show that the WTO isrelevant to the recovery from the pandemic by adopting strong commitmentsin the framework of the “Trade and Health Initiative” launched in November
2020 by the Ottawa group21 and by extending the participant countries andthe coverage of the WTO “Trade in the Pharmaceutical Products Agreement”
to medical supplies, equipment, technology and PPE22.
All WTO members should strive to eliminate tariffs in the healthcare sector, liberalize relevant logistics, distribution and transport services, and eliminate export
restrictions on health-related goods including vaccines, while preserving the protection of IP rights. OECD members and candidates, high-income and sector export-leader countries could lead by example, by unilaterally removing tariffs andby strengthening their commitments on export restrictions. The scope of the negotiations should be assessed in close cooperation with the WHO and the WCO.
To support a comprehensive and consistent mapping of all critical supply
chains, a non-binding joint WTO-WCO monitoring mechanism should be established to complement the information available within the WHO by providing and integrating data on trade ﬂows (including barriers and export banson PPE, vaccines and medical equipment), shipping, and customs clearance.
Speed up negotiations on trade related aspects of e-commerce, and engage in a wider multilateral negotiation process
Given the increasingly complex digital environment and the rise of protectionism coupled with security concerns, but also the growing opportunities
that stem from the digital transformation for economies and societies as awhole, the G20 should build on the conclusions reached in Hamburg23, Buenos
Aires24, Osaka25, and Riyadh26, and encourage the next WTO Ministerial Conference to reach an agreement on the Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce.
21

COVID-19 and beyond: Trade and Health; 2020; World Trade Organization (WTO)

22

Such as alcohol, syringes, gauze, reagents, other hospital and laboratory consumable, health devices, telemedicine
services, hand sanitizer, face masks and protective spectacles

23

G20 members will engage constructively in WTO discussions relating to E-commerce with the WTO MC11 in mind

24

We welcome the G20 Repository of Digital Policies to share and promote the adoption of innovative digital
economy business models; we recognize the importance of the interface between trade and the digital economy

25
We reafﬁrm the importance of the Work Programme on electronic commerce; we note the ongoing discussion under the Joint Statement Initiative on electronic commerce
26

We note the ongoing discussions under the Joint Statement Initiatives (JSI) at the WTO, including the JSI on E-Commerce,
Investment Facilitation for Development, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, and Services Domestic Regulation

18

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

In particular, it is fundamental to develop clear balanced and ambitious rules
on both e-commerce27 and digital trade28, including on cross-border data
ﬂows and data localization, consumer trust supporting tools such as electronic
payments, electronic signatures and digital currencies, and IP protection.
Furthermore, the Ministerial Conference also provides the occasion to renew
and consider making permanent the moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmission, that has enabled exponential growth in use of the internet
and the ﬂourishing of the digital economy, especially for MSMEs.
The lack of common principles governing cross-border data ﬂows represents
an obstacle for the globalization of e-commerce. G20 members should makefull use of the G20 Digital Economy Task Force to continue its work on data
ﬂows, legal frameworks on privacy protection and security standards.
The Working Group should cooperate closely with the WTO Joint Statement
Initiative on E-Commerce to share existing regulations of data protection withthe aim of increasing convergence of privacy regimes globally and setting harmonized rules to make cross-border data transfer easier and more secure (e.g.,building an international order for Data Free Flow with Trust; DFFT), while respecting countries’ regulatory autonomy on privacy and data protection rights,
and favoring the participation of least developed and developing countries.
The negotiations on the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce should
also be taken as an opportunity to expand the participants in the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) as well as establish a dialogue on the expansion of its
list of products to keep pace with the latest developments in the digital economy.
Moreover, G20 countries should consider jointly agreeing to include membership in the ITA in their bilateral trade agreements.
Support the ongoing WTO negotiations on domestic regulation disciplines
The global value of trade in services, despite remaining approximately threetimes smaller than trade in goods as a share of GDP29, has expanded faster inthe last years30.
Moreover, although it is important to respect and take into account public
policy concerns, the access of foreign companies to critical service sectors
such as education and caretaking remains restricted, heavily-regulated andoften supplied by the public sector.
An agreement on domestic regulation disciplines would improve transparency
and streamline authorization procedures for services suppliers, facilitating theprovision of services domestically and across borders, and ensure that qualiﬁcation requirement and procedures, licensing requirements and standards
do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.
The G20 should encourage the ongoing WTO negotiations to ultimately assess national conditions and conclude by the next WTO MC12.
Update the WTO Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
The G20 should urge WTO members to review the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM) to improve the transparency and the effectiveness of its provisions as well as the compliance of countervailing measures adopted by members, so to avoid abuses.

27

E-commerce as physical goods bought via digital platforms that may be shipped overseas and passed throughcustoms

1928

Digital trade as transfer of data, products, or services by electronic means, usually the internet

29

World Bank World Development Indicators; 2020; World Bank

30

Services trade in numbers, World Trade Report; 2019; World Trade Organization (WTO)B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The review should generally aim at ensuring a level-playing ﬁeld and competitive
neutrality conditions whereby no economic operator has privileged access to
non-commercially available beneﬁts or has been discriminated against, by deepening and clarifying the deﬁnition of all kinds of actionable subsidies, including
for manufactured goods, energy, agricultural commodities and raw materials31.
Update the WTO Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)
Negotiations on the update of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) arestalling and participation needs to be widened.
They must be reinvigorated extending the number of participating members
to include new areas surrounding trade in services, such as ﬁnancial services,
reinsurance, telecommunications, maritime transport, and data ﬂows, or advancements must be achieved in other ongoing WTO initiatives and negotiations.
Enlarge the participation in the WTO Government Procurement Agreement(GPA)
The G20 should support the expansion of the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) by enlarging the number of signatories and encouraging all
WTO members to join.
We also urge GPA members not to roll back on their commitments.
Prioritize upcoming topics for open plurilateral negotiations and encourage
participation
The multilateral approach remains the ﬁrst and preferred option. However,there is also a need to provide a stable framework for plurilateral agreements.
The notion of “critical mass” as a percentage of global trade should be maintained, but not necessarily correspond to an inﬂexible numerical target, leaving room for case-by-case consideration.
Existing agreements and initiatives, such as the Working Group on MSMEs andothers32, should expand their coverage and membership, and their capacity
to address non-tariff barriers. Overall, negotiations should ensure that therights of non-participants are preserved, that participation remains open,that in-built ﬂexibilities allow to take on commitments in areas linked to capacity constraints, and that phase-in periods are awarded accordingly.
An ad-hoc WTO Committee representative of the broad membership andchaired by the Director General should be tasked with identifying new market
access needs and proposing new disciplines. The Committee, supported by
the WTO Secretariat, should ensure that non-participating members are fully
aware of the process and are properly supported if they decide to join.
Make FTAs the building blocks to the Multilateral Trading System
Some FTAs concluded recently33 may inspire the future work in WTO. As manyof the countries with a larger network of FTAs are members of the G20, there
could be an incentive to build consensus around the topics34 that could merit
a WTO-level discussion. Therefore, we call the G20 to share best practices inmost rewarding areas which could serve as useful references for the discussionof the WTO relevant Committees, ensuring greater coherence and shared accountability between the multilateral trading system and other internationalframeworks in the attainment of agreed global public policy goals.
31

Potentially leading to global excess capacity in some sectors, as indicated by the G20 since the Final Declarationof the Hangzhou Summit in 2016; G20 Leaders’ Communique, 4-5 September 2016; 2016; Hangzhou Summit

32

Such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). In addition, at the Buenos Aires MC, many countries
announced their participation in negotiations on Trade related aspects of Electronic Commerce and on Investment Facilitation for Development

33

Such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (CP-TPP), the agreements concluded by the EU with Japan, Canada, Vietnam, and Singapore, and the recent EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)34

For instance, provisions on MSMEs, sustainable development, and competition, present in some of the mostrecent FTAs

20

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Recommendation 2:
Enhance trade responsiveness against future
disruptions, free cross-border transactions andenable more resilient Global Value Chains
Policy Actions
2.1 Adopt international trade-related strategies including green-lanes toensure open cross-border ﬂows and COVID-19-free mobility
2.2 Upgrade customs processes by aligning interpretation of nomenclatures,
revitalizing the Harmonized System, harmonizing the customs origin
procedures, promoting the mutual recognition of Authorized Economic
Operators, and digitizing cross-border activities
2.3 Increase the resilience of Global Value Chains by promoting higher homogeneity of standards and by enhancing trade infrastructures
Leading Monitoring KPIOwner: World Trade Organization% of Implementation of WTO
Trade Facilitation Agreement

Baseline
69.7%(2020)

Target80.0%(2024)

Source: World Trade Organization (WTO)

Recommendation 2 contributes to achieving UN SDGs 3: Good Health andWell Being, 8: Decent work and Economic Growth and 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure. In particular, Policy Action 2.1 contributes to theachievement of target 3.8 by promoting safe, high-standard quality and affordable access to essential goods and critical supplies, especially in the healthand medical sector. It moreover contributes to the achievement of target 8.9
by proposing solutions for safer travel and tourism recovery, such as COVID19-free passports and travel testing frameworks.Policy Action 2.2 contributes
to the achievement of target 9.1 by stimulating cross-border efﬁciency andprocedures and infrastructure development, while also fostering a wider homogeneity of standards and simpliﬁcation of international regulations. Finally,
Policy Action 2.3 contributes to the achievement of target 8.4 by encouraging
the development of resilient and efﬁcient global value chains, and target 9.2
by promoting inclusive, innovative and sustainable industrialization and cooperation among manufacturers and businesses in distant geographies.
Recommendation 2 contributes to addressing G20 Italy Priorities People, Planet
and Prosperity.In particular, Policy Action 2.1 contributes to addressing thePeople priority by stimulating a COVID-19 free mobility and the suspension ofcross-border tariffs on all critical supplies. It further contributes to addressing
the Prosperity priority by adopting international contingency strategies suchas green-lanes to ensure open cross-border ﬂows. Policy Action 2.2 contributes
to addressing the Planet priority by encouraging the digitalization of crossborder processes and the development towards fully paperless standards,
while also promoting the Prosperity priority by harmonizing customs nomenclatures and interpretation of guidelines.Finally, Policy Action 2.3 contributes
to addressing the People priority by strengthening global value chains and21

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

thus advancing socio-economic opportunities and better life quality standards;
the Planet priority by increasing the resilience of companies, including sustainable innovation, and enhancing transportation infrastructures and facilities;
and the Prosperity priority by fostering cooperation and partnerships between corporations across value chains, thus advancing opportunities for overall
output growth.

Context
Since the early phases of the pandemic and during more recent infection waves,
Global Value Chains (GVCs) have been confronted with signiﬁcant disruptions
and containment measures in the name of saving lives and livelihoods. The needto ensure additional health and safety measures limits the mobility of people andlockdowns have affected a signiﬁcant variety of trade and investment processes35.
s Customs overload impacted shipping delivery efﬁciency, as the average time
for clearance activities increased by almost 30 times worldwide36;
s Services trade costs have increased by 12% of export values across sectors
and countries37.
In the face of ongoing disruptions, Global Value Chains have proven remarkably
resilience, allowing for ﬂexible adjustments of the production, as businesses
across G20 countries have put signiﬁcant efforts into better anticipating, earlier
preparing and faster adapting their operations to ensure business continuity.
Where shortages did occur during the crisis, they were mostly caused by unprecedented demand, rather than collapsing supply.
Ensuring access to COVID-19 goods and medicines became one of the mostimmediate priorities during the crisis. Yet, it is clear that no single country can
produce efﬁciently all the goods it would need to ﬁght COVID-19. Instead, international trade allows production to locate where it is most efﬁcient, helping
increasing access to more goods at more affordable prices. Therefore, a reduction of barriers on the ﬂows of COVID-19 products and medicines is deﬁnitely needed.
Regrettably, the adoption of nation-ﬁrst approaches has resulted in a growing
number of uncoordinated - albeit often temporary - export restrictions38, someof which also prevented life-saving goods such as vaccines or components tomove where they were needed the most. Furthermore, political practices aimed
at preventing import of critical products from certain countries are increasing.
The B20 is highly concerned about calls for policies to re-shore Global Value
Chains, localize production and decouple our economies. Such a narrative
does not reﬂect business reality. More regional diversiﬁcation - and not less increases the scope for businesses to cushion shocks, particularly those that
may originate domestically. There is no evidence that economies would have
fared better in the absence of GVCs, as emergency measures also affect the
supply of domestic inputs39.
Many businesses have already started rethinking their risk mitigation strategies
to increase responsiveness to shocks. However, this goes beyond the context
of the COVID-19 pandemic, and considers - among others - advancements indigitalization and automation, threats of rising protectionism and policy uncertainties, and increasing risks of natural disasters.
35

Global foreign direct investment fell by 42% in 2020, outlook remains weak; 2021; United Nations
Conference

36

WCO Annual Report 2019-2020; 2020; World Customs Organization (WCO)

37

The Impact of COVID-19 international travel restrictions on services-trade costs; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

38

Policy Responses to Coronavirus Trade interdependencies in Covid-19 goods; 2020; Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

39

COVID-19 and Global Value Chains: Policy Options to Build More Resilient Production Networks;
2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)22

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

55

Exhibit 12
Global Value Chains trade growing
over the past decades

GVC share of global trade (%)

50

45

40

35

30
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Source: World Development Report; 2020; World Bank GroupAs the needs and risk proﬁles for each economic sector and even individualcompanies are different, Global Value Chain resilience-building cannot takea monolithic approach. In this context, governments should particularly encourage and support diversiﬁcation strategies for MSMEs.
Governments should also work more closely with the private sector to build
resilience, but should not seek to control supply chains. Instead, governments
should ensure robust and predictable regulatory, trade, and investment policy
to alleviate uncertainty about the framework conditions in which Global Value
Chains operate, particularly during times of crisis.
To this end, the B20 calls for coherent and cooperative international approaches actions along:s Promote effective international guidelines for crisis response;s Upgrade customs processes and procedures to foster cross-border efﬁciency;s Advance the interoperability of Global Value Chains for higher resilience.

Policy Action 2.1: Adopt international trade-related strategies
including green-lanes to ensure open cross-border ﬂows and
COVID-19-free mobility
International mobility and well-functioning cross-border ﬂows are key to economic and social recovery40.
In the early phase of the crisis, the fall in world trade was exceptionally strong.
However, the recovery started earlier in comparison to other past collapses
in global trade. The exchange of goods seemed to recover sooner than mostservices, while for sectors such as business travel and tourism, recovery willtake longer.

40
Building on 60 years of economic leadership to overcome COVID-19 and prepare for the future; 2021; Businessat OECD23

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 13
Recession and Recovery path ofmodern economic crises

Source: CPB World Trade Monitor; 2020; CPB World

Establish contingency strategies and proactive trade response to crises,
including green-lanes
The G20 should be equipped to face possible future disruptions in trade routes.
Risk monitoring, crisis foresight, and enhanced predictability and transparency of public legislation and regulatory frameworks are critical for an effective crisis response.
We urge the G20 to carry out an ex-post review of trade measures adopted
during the COVID-19 pandemic, to agree on a common deﬁnition of essential
goods and services, to foresee temporary trade facilitation measures and thesuspension of tariffs for critical goods release, and to prompt the implementation of emergency green-lanes, so that border crossings for freight vehicles
and multimodal transport can function effectively. The deﬁnition and criteria
for green-lanes should be consistent with the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)41.
Establish a globally consistent regulatory framework for international
COVID-19-free travels
A combination of travel bans, self-isolation and quarantines limiting travellingfor business has been implemented to mitigate public health risks impacting
severely on business and on international transports. Vaccination certiﬁcatesare gaining increasing attention by several countries worldwide and may bepart of the solution.
Meanwhile, enhanced information-sharing, mutual recognition on a travel
testing blueprint, reciprocal acceptance of test regimes, including rapid antigen tests, as well as the establishment of a globally consistent regulatory
framework for the resumption of cross-border movement of people, would
help to alleviate the negative impact of the pandemic, including on businesstravel and tourism42.
A globally agreed framework is vital to easing travel restrictions, while continuing to require adequate safeguard measures, with national authorities
fully retaining the possibility to snap back tighter requirements through a risk
management-based approach.

41

See Policy Action 2.2 for details

42

Why OECD work on tourism matters for business; 2021; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)24

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

To enable greater trust in international travel, the G20 should engage in common approaches for testing procedures in close cooperation with international organizations43 building on existing agreements, avoiding duplication
with works undertaken by other institutions, and involving stakeholders.
This framework should be open to all countries, be as simple as possible, andenable ﬂexibilities for adaptation to Countries’ speciﬁc epidemiological andlogistical contexts. It should rely on the results of tests that provide the highest
sensitivity and speciﬁcity for COVID-19 diagnostics, consider the prevalenceof COVID-19 variants, and incorporate recommendations for travelers set out
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 44 and the World
Health Organization (WHO).
The amount of information requested from travelers to be transferred acrossborders should be reduced to strictly necessary data and protected in accordance with relevant domestic regulations. This can be done by leveraging innovative solutions, such as digital health passports45 as a secure, veriﬁable,
and tamper-proof way for travelers to provide the required medical information at immigration checkpoints.
Particular attention should be devoted to workers that regularly travel for
work, including essential business travelers, crew changes, and repatriation ofseafarers46. This can be done by developing an agreed list of essential businessactivities, allowing the approved list of travelers to move across borders withless stringent requirements. Similar digital health passports can also be applied for people using other modes of transportation, including automobiles,
at a later stage.
Therefore, while pursuing the maximum vaccination access and coverageworldwide, the G20 should actively design a science-based system in a waythat it can be implemented multilaterally.

Policy Action 2.2: Upgrade customs processes by aligning interpretationof nomenclatures, revitalizing the Harmonized System, harmonizing
the customs origin procedures, promoting the mutual recognition of
Authorized Economic Operators, and digitizing cross-border activities
Well-functioning and reliable cross-border procedures are critical to facilitate
the movement of goods across countries, and to ensure adequate security
standards.
Customs administrations act as pivotal players and enablers of international
trade. Cross-border agencies are, hence, increasingly required to work handin-hand with their counterparts in other nations, under the coordination of
the World Customs Organization (WCO).
Foster the Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)
Bureaucratic delays and “red tape” pose a burden for moving goods acrossborders for traders. Estimates47 show that the full implementation of the TFA
could reduce trade costs by an average of 14.3% and boost global trade by up
to USD 1 trillion per year, with the highest relative gains in the poorest countries. Nevertheless, after four years since the entry into force of the TFA (2017),
the overall rate of commitments’ implementation stands at only 69.7%, andcould be improved.

43

Such as International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, United Nations World Tourism
Organization, International Maritime Organization, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
44

Public Health Risk Mitigation Measures; 2020; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

45

Coronavirus: Commission proposes a Digital Green Certiﬁcate; 2021 [accessed]; European Commission

46

International maritime transport sector accounts for over 70% and 90% of world trade in value and volume
terms, respectively

47

25

Trade Facilitation Agreement Database; 2021; World Trade Organization

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 14
Timeline of TFA implementationcommitments by WTO members

Source: Trade Facilitation Agreement Database; 2021; World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO Secretariat should continue to monitor closely the implementation
process and identify shortcomings in close cooperation with members. In thiscontext, the G20 should support developing countries, especially those that lag
behind in their commitments, through technical assistance and training programs,
exchange of customs ofﬁcers and other capacity-building measures, in line with
the WCO’s current commitment, to upgrade their systems and structures.
Support World Customs Organization’s existing efforts in simplifying administrative procedures and operations at customs agencies level
We urge the G20 to fully endorse the WCO in its endeavor to build a simpler,
more transparent system to allow a level-playing ﬁeld among its members.
The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Compendium48, the CoordinatedBorder Management (CBM) Compendium, the AEO Implementation and Validation Guidance, and the AEO Mutual Recognition Strategy Guide should befurther promoted and support should be granted for their full implementation. The enhancement of WCO mechanisms should aim at providing members with the necessary tools and measures to advance trade facilitation,
reduce document collection and expedite clearance times across borders.
Harmonize interpretation of nomenclatures, also ensuring a prompt
adoption of the implemented standards, and implementation of Rules ofOriginWe urge the G20 to work in close cooperation with the WTO and the WCO
to monitor the implementation of the main WCO Packages49. The Harmonized System (HS) is widely accepted as the nomenclature of international
trade and is used as the basis of domestic customs tariffs to the 6-digit level.
However, not all goods have been classiﬁed at the global level and not all countries have implemented the current version of the HS which can lead to divergent interpretations leading to potential contradictions and unnecessary
burdens to trade.
We therefore call on the G20 to revitalize the Harmonized System50 and its
existing processes to remain up-to-date. In particular, we ask the G20 to express its support for the prompt implementation by all countries of the 2017
version of the HS, but also encourage the timely adoption of the HS202251.
We urge the G20 to support the WCO in the effort to update the Speciﬁc
Annex K52 dedicated to Rules of Origin of the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC)
in relation with customs origin procedures. Business also reckons the need toadvance towards a convergence on preferential and non-preferential ProductSpeciﬁc Rules of Origin (PSRO), as promoted by UNCTAD53.
48

Compendium of Authorized Economic Operator Programmes, promoted by the World Customs Organization
(WCO)

49

Namely the Economic Competitiveness Package (ECP), the Compliance and Enforcement Package (CEP)
and the Organizational Development Package (ODP) will speed up the achievement of a cohesive set of international standards.
50

Revitalizing the Harmonized System; 2019; WCO Conference on the future direction of the HS

51

Namely headings, subheadings, and legal notes of the HS Nomenclature

52

Review of RKC Speciﬁc Annex K; 2020; WCO Committee on Rules of Origin

53

Towards Convergence on Rules of Origin Between Trade at the Regional and Multilateral Level; 2017; Stefano Inama;
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)

26

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Foster the Mutually Recognized Agreements (MRAs) of Authorized Economic
Operators
Mutual Recognition of Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs) is a key element of the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to strengthen end-to-end
security of supply chains and to multiply beneﬁts for traders54.Cooperation
among border authorities is key to develop robust AEO programs. Nevertheless, Authorized Economic Operators still lack mutual recognition on a global
basis, thus limiting beneﬁts to selected geographies only.
Therefore, the wide implementation of the mutual recognition of AEOs, following the WCO’s MRA guidance, is central to achieving universal acknowledgement of members. We urge a review of the AEO status admittanceprocedure to streamline requirements and make them less cumbersome. It
should also include the review of controls related to other agencies involvedin the import and export processes.
Digitize activities to enable effectiveness and efﬁciency of cross-borderprocesses
Modern customs administrations need to operate through electronic clearance of goods, coordinated digitization and electronic transmission of certiﬁcates and documents, and data analysis-based risk management. Estimates55
report that up to 7% of the total value of international trade is absorbed by
the cost of documentation.
G20 countries should task single lead departments responsible for digitizing
cross-border processes through the establishment of common approaches
to the so-called “Single Window”. This would increase transparency and interoperability between markets as well as lessen administrative burdens, enabling data sharing and reuse, and allowing parties involved in trade andtransport to lodge standardized information and documents through a single-entry point56.
The G20 members should coordinate with the WCO to promote common
approaches to Single Window, including digital technology applications,through interoperable single window systems.
Ensure readiness of customs processes to e-commerce transactions
E-commerce has become a game changer in the international trade. Customs
processes must keep pace and provide innovative solutions especially regarding the efﬁciency of clearance procedures57.
We urge the G20 to adopt the WCO “Cross-border E-commerce Frameworkof Standards”, including the “E-commerce Package” and the “Resolution on
the guiding principles for cross-border E-commerce”. At the same time, westrongly encourage effective cross-border enforcement, information-sharing,and counter-measures to ﬁght fraud, corruption, smuggling and illicit tradesuch as counterfeiting, piracy, intellectual property theft and other illegal
goods and contraband across our markets and global supply chains.

Policy Action 2.3: Increase the resilience of Global Value Chains bypromoting higher homogeneity of standards and by enhancing
trade infrastructures
GVCs have contributed to lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty
and trading patterns created therein have given unprecedented access togoods and services, particularly for low income households in developing
countries. Over the past decades, their growth concentrated in machinery,
54

Mutual Recognition and Cooperation with other government authorities; European Commission

55

The Role of the harmonization of customs procedures in trade facilitation and regional integration Casablanca;
2015; International Road Transport Union (IRU)56
The Single Window concept: The World Customs Organization’s perspective; 2020; World Customs Organization
(WCO)
57

27

Cross-Border e-commerce; 2020 [accessed]; World Customs Organization (WCO)B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

electronics, and transportation where production involves advanced manufacturing and innovative activities largely driven by R&D investments and IP
assets. However, their beneﬁts are not distributed equally across and withincountries, and their challenges differ from region to region58.
Exhibit 15
Global value chain linkages
worldwide

Source: World Development Report; 2020; World Bank

Promoting interoperability of standards and the use of big-data modeling andadvanced analytics59 is a priority to reduce vulnerabilities. We call on the G20
to increase cooperation in monitoring supply chains, especially those that are
most critical, to ensure that they are not hindered by non-tariff, and regulatory barriers, and to act coordinately within the relevant WTO Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) Committee for their prompt removal.
Promote homogeneity of standards across borders and remove non-tariffbarriers
The proliferation of multiple and conﬂicting private and public standards canhamper trade, while harmonized regional and international procedures canpromote cross-border exchanges60. Removing these non-tariff barriers also
creates clear beneﬁts for national economies, local consumers and businesses:
reducing such barriers in the maritime transport sector, for instance, would
generate notable gains in terms of GDP since it accounts for some 90% of
global trade volume61.
The G20 should simplify and harmonize domestic regulatory requirements andprocedures; in particular those related to essential goods, and those that canstrengthen the interoperability of products, reduce trade costs and speed up
processes. To achieve this, while keeping high standards to ensure human healthand safety, G20 members should promote coherence among multilateral
and/or plurilateral organizations62.
We urge the G20 to promote the recognition and deployment of common
international standards, especially on ESG63 reporting and dataﬂows, andto prevent the misuse of non-tariff measures as a justiﬁcation to impose protectionist barriers. Fostering the harmonization and improvement of existing
non-ﬁnancial disclosure standards would help to allocate sustainable ﬁnancing
58

Trading for Development in the age of global value chains; 2020; World Bank

59

Designing Resilience into Global Supply Chains; 2020; Boston Consulting Group (BCG)60

The Effects of Standards on Value Chains and Trade in Europe; 2015; European Trade Study Group

61

Study on protectionism in maritime economies; 2021; International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)62

For instance, production and hygiene standards in the food industry, and ICH/PIC standards in clinical trials,
digital health and biotech innovation. Note: ICH/PIC stands for International Council for Harmonization ofTechnical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use; Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-operation Scheme

63

Environmental, Social, and Governance28

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

more efﬁciently, while ensuring higher standardization and transparency. On
this, we encourage G20 governments to closely consult with private stakeholders by facilitating and advancing sector-based and technical discussions.
Divergent regulatory approaches to issues ranging from Artiﬁcial Intelligence(AI) to privacy, and to digital taxation risk erecting digital walls around national
cyber spaces, while global coordination, consistent and harmonized data-driven systems, and digital standards are key to ensure efﬁcient global growth.
In 2009, after the global ﬁnancial crisis, the G20 established the Financial Stability Board as a forum for governments to reconcile their approaches to ﬁnancial sector regulation. Similarly, we call on the G20 to establish a “Data andTechnology Board” to forge consensus around policy principles, speciﬁc standards or regulatory approaches to avoid restricting or hampering the abilityof people to use digital technologies to connect with the opportunities aroundthem, and to foster international cooperation, data connectivity, and securityof the entire digital system.
Support ﬂexibility of Global Value Chains
The B20 strongly believes that Global Value Chains can make signiﬁcant contributions to global growth in trade, incomes, and quality of life for consumers,
workers and citizens around the world.
Companies invest in auditing critical value chains by identifying, prequalifying,and onboarding backup vendors to beneﬁt of the needed ﬂexibility if a crisis
strikes.
With the economic fallout from COVID-19, governments are sponsoring there-shoring or near-shoring of supply chains64. However, limiting sources forcritical components or raw materials can in fact make it harder to cushion external shocks.
Therefore, we encourage the G20 to adopt policies and promote fact-based
discussions that take into account the market reality in close cooperation withbusiness, supporting both individual companies and entire value chains to become less exposed to unforeseen external shocks to supply and more ﬂexible
to react to quick surges in demand.
Enhance international transportation networks
Resilient and sustainable transportation infrastructures and facilities play a
key role in enabling international trade and preserving global supply chains.
The transportation industry has been among those worst affected in the last
decade by the continuous slowdown in infrastructure spending (1.8% of GDP
in 2016 versus 2.2% in 2009)65.
We therefore call on the G20 to prioritize and promote sustainable and longterm investments, including leveraging new digital technologies, in order toenhance international transportation networks.

64

Building on 60 years of economic leadership to overcome Covid-19 and prepare for the future; 2021; Businessat OECD65

29

2018 Investment Report; 2018; European Investment Bank (EIB)B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Recommendation 3:
Facilitate the participation of all businesses,
in particular MSMEs, in global trade by removing
barriers and improving their access to tradefinancing
Policy Actions
3.1 Foster the inclusiveness of MSMEs in global trade, by supporting thedevelopment of digital skills and digital infrastructures, and broadening
the adoption of cross-border electronic transferable records
3.2 Facilitate the access of business to standardized trade ﬁnance instruments, by lowering transaction costs and regulatory burdens, while
simplifying their processes
3.3 Support the participation of business in global trade by leveraging andupdating the role of Export Credit Agencies and Development FinanceInstitutions
Leading Monitoring KPIOwner: G20 Countries

Tn USD of Trade Finance Gap(Supply-Demand)Baseline
3.4(2020)

Target2.0(2024)

Source: Asian Development Bank

Recommendation 3 contributes to achieving UN SDGs 8: Decent work andEconomic Growth, 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure and 17:Partnerships for the Goals. In particular, Policy Action 3.1 contributes to theachievement of target 8.3 by promoting tailored activities to support digitalization, capability building and awareness for micro, small and medium enterprises. Policy Action 3.2 contributes to the achievement of target 8.10 bystrengthening the capacity of domestic and international institutions to provide access to banking, insurance and trade ﬁnance products at reasonableconditions and affordable price. It also contributes to the achievement of target 9.3 by increasing MSMEs access to ﬁnancing sources and credit and theirintegration into global trade markets. Moreover, it contributes to the realization of target 17.13 by enhancing global macroeconomic stability through policy coordination and coherence among countries. Finally, Policy Action 3.3
contributes to the achievement of target 17.9 by promoting effective capacity-building in micro, small and medium enterprises.
Recommendation 3 contributes to addressing G20 Italy Priorities of People
and Prosperity. In particular, Policy Action 3.1 contributes to addressing thePeople priority by supporting MSMEs in their path towards afﬁrmation in the
global trade market, thus advancing opportunities for the development ofwealth, life standards and work conditions. Policy Action 3.2 contributes toaddressing the Prosperity priority by facilitating MSMEs and businesses’ access to trade ﬁnance instruments, accelerating their growth and enhancing
opportunities for cross-fertilization and exchange of best practices. Finally,
Policy Action 3.3 contributes to addressing the Prosperity priority by mod-30

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

ernizing Export Credit Agencies and Development Finance Institutions in supporting MSMEs through advisory and counseling services, especially to buildrisk-management capabilities and to engage with international counterparts
consciously.

Context
Small businesses have been severely affected by the crisis and remain vulnerable. Empirical evidence66 shows that MSMEs have generally lower short-term
survival rates to sales disruptions and a smaller coverage of their ﬁxed cost
structure than larger corporations.
If they only had to rely on retained earnings, the ﬁxed cost coverage for MSMEs
is around four weeks versus seven weeks for multinational companies67. Also,in the longer term, larger businesses perform better under distressed conditions, showing considerable extended resilience to economic shocks.
Exhibit 16
MSMEs have shorter survival times
than large ﬁrms to sales disruptions

Source: Small and Medium Enterprises in the Pandemic; 2020; World Bank Enterprise

Stronger participation by MSMEs in global markets delivers improvements in
productivity spurring inclusive growth and creating jobs in both developed
and developing regions.
Governments can contribute to MSMEs’ success by ensuring rules-based
trade and a level playing ﬁeld, by improving transparency across markets andby favoring their access to suitable and unbureaucratic trade ﬁnance instruments. The latter is a key enabling factor for MSMEs to engage in international
activities, improve their performance, absorb new technologies and managerial competencies, broaden and deepen their skills, and scale up andstrengthen their productivity68. Moreover, in countries where MSMEs have ahigher share of exports, the average salary gap with larger ﬁrms is smaller69.
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)
should also aim to help businesses of all sizes, but in particular smaller companies, expand internationally by supporting them in obtaining ﬁnancing aswell as contributing to building critical capabilities.

66

World Bank Enterprise Follow-Up Surveys; 2020; Bosio et al.

67

Small and Medium Enterprises in the Pandemic Impact, Responses and the Role of Development Finance; 2020;
World Bank Group
68
Entrepreneurship at a Glance Highlights 2018; 2018; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
69

OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook 2019; 2019; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)31

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Policy Action 3.1: Foster the inclusiveness of MSMEs in global trade,by supporting the development of digital skills and digital infrastructures, and broadening the adoption of cross-border electronictransferable records
Globalization and international trade have created unprecedented opportunities for companies.
At the same time, inequalities have widened, unveiling disparity in access tocritical resources and capabilities. In this context, public policies have a crucialrole in setting the right framework for global trade and foreign investments
to ﬂourish, as well as in designing interventions targeted at MSMEs that havethe potential to be part of Global Value Chains and digital markets.
Support the development of digital skills and infrastructure, and promoteawareness of and accessibility to digital channels
Improving resource allocation increases productivity and makes growth more
inclusive by allowing companies and workers to seize the beneﬁts of theknowledge economy. New digital technologies (e.g., Cloud Computing,
Blockchain, Big-Data, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Robotics, Internet of Things) andwell-functioning digital infrastructures offer unparalleled opportunities for
MSMEs, especially in least developed and developing countries, to access national and global markets, serve new niches, directly engage with customers,
and manage supply chains cost-effectively.
To this end, investments in technological and organisational know-how, adequate capital resources and access to ﬁnance are requested and should be
supported.
Empirical evidence70 suggests that countries with higher broadband penetration rates have lower trade restrictions on digital services. Nevertheless, many
parts of the world are still struggling to access broadband services due to a
substantial lack of primary infrastructure. Bridging the digital gap should bea priority.
Exhibit 17
Higher broadband penetration
rates convey lower digital
services restrictions

Source: Revitalizing Multilateralism; 2020; Centre for Economic Policy Research Press

70
Revitalizing Multilateralism. Pragmatic Ideas for the New WTO Director-General; 2020; Simon J. Evenett,
Richard Baldwin; Centre for Economic Policy Research Press

32

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The G20 should signiﬁcantly scale up and enhance coordination of existing
trade-related capacity-building programs to bridge such digital divides, actively facilitate MSMEs’ access to on-the-ground advisors and to capacitybuilding programs on e-commerce, digital trade and new technologies among
the others, supporting companies’ upskilling and reskilling; as well as promote
platforms to stimulate network-development and connectivity, leveraging
cross-industry exchanges of best practices and making available mentorshipprograms.
Promote the adoption of electronic transferable records in global trade
For businesses engaged in global trade, adopting standardized documentation requirements for the import, export, and transit of goods would represent a great opportunity to reduce non-tariff barriers as well as facilitate theaccess to foreign markets. In an environment that is simpler, processes andsystems talk to each other, trade happens in hours, not weeks or months, andcosts are lower, for both the economy at large and in particular for MSMEs71.
On this, we call on the G20 to actively promote an increased usage and acceptance of digital documentation relevant to cross border exchanges by encouraging the alignment of national laws and legal frameworks to the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
Electronic Transferable Records (MLETR), consistent with other international
standards. The alignment should address documents of transport, bills of lading, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and warehouse receipts.
Advance the WTO discussions of the Informal Working Group on MSMEs
At present, 94 WTO members are part of an Informal Working Group on
MSMEs open to all countries72.
Members emphasized the importance of a coordinated global response tostabilize economies and help MSMEs affected during the current challenging
period, and vowed to work together to facilitate trade, accelerate efforts towards trade digitalization, including access to digital tools, as well as improve
MSMEs’ access to trade ﬁnance and to trade-related information through online platforms73.
The WTO package includes a set of voluntary and non-binding recommendations. We call on the WTO to conclude the existing discussions before thenext WTO MC12.

Policy Action 3.2: Facilitate the access of business to standardized tradeﬁnance instruments, by lowering transaction costs and regulatoryburdens, while simplifying their processes
The global trade ﬁnance market was long considered liquid and well-functioning. Nevertheless, more recently, it has been proven extremely vulnerable
to economic shocks – particularly around the 2008 Financial Crisis74.
Over the last decade, there was an estimated USD 1.5 trillion75 of unmet annual demand for global trade ﬁnance. Currently, this gap - measured as thedifference between trade ﬁnance request and offer on a global scale - hasapproached USD 3.4 trillion76.
71

Estimates for the UK suggest that digitising transferrable documents will generate GBP 25 Bn in new economic
growth, including 25% extra MSME trade by 2024, free up GBP 224 Bn in efﬁciency savings which can be recycled into the economy, and GBP 1 Bn in additional trade ﬁnance (50% of the current UK gap). Source: Creating
a Modern Digital Trade Ecosystem - The economic case to reform UK law and align to the UNCITRAL MLETR;
2021; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC UK)

72

In December 2017, 87 WTO members accounting for around 78% of world exports issued a Joint Statement
declaring their intention to create, multilaterally, an Informal Working Group on MSMEs at the WTO
73
Working group on small business reﬂects on topics for 2021 workplan; 2020 [accessed]; World Trade Organization (WTO)

33

74

Advisory Group on Trade Finance: Awareness & Advocacy; 2020; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)75

Trade Finance Gaps, Growth, and Jobs Survey; 2019; Asian Development Bank

76

Global trade faces a USD 3.4 trillion ﬁnancing gap; 2020; Standard CharteredB20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

In 2018, before the pandemic, the WTO reported that 60% of trade ﬁnance requests by MSMEs were rejected77, against just 7% for multinational companies78.
Trade finance access gap …
(Difference between demand andsupply, Tr USD worldwide)

Conservative estimatesconsidering COVID-19;
MSMEs the hardest hit,facing highest rates ofrejection for funding… driven by high costs, risk bias and fragmented ecosystem

High regulatory/compliance andtransaction costs

3.4

Bias between
perception andactual level of risk

Key reasons of finance gap Risk of trade finance#1: AML/KYC requirements
instruments#2: High transaction costs+16 pp

1.4

2014

1.6

1.5

2016

2018

Regulatory costs mainly
driven by compliancerequirements
1%
Lack of cross-market
regulatory harmonization Actual risk
2020

(real
default)

17%
Perceived risk
(rejection
rate)

Exhibit 18
Expanding trade ﬁnance gap andcritical barriers to entry

Fragmentation of
ecosystem undermining
full adoption
Traditional setting madeup of 15+ actors
Importers and Exporters
Banks and Financial
Intermediaries
Inspectors, Insurers, Customs
Couriers and Shippers

Source: Trade Finance Gaps, Growth, and Jobs Survey; 2019; Asian Development Bank; Global trade
faces a USD 3.4 trillion ﬁnancing gap; 2020; Standard Chartered; Trade ﬁnancing and COVID-19;
2020; International Chamber of Commerce

Today, access to trade ﬁnance products remains costly and scarce, especiallyfor MSMEs, and is challenged along two main dimensions: (i) expanding gap
between demand and supply of products, and (ii) barriers to entry such as highregulatory/transaction costs, risks misperception and fragmented ecosystems.
Additional considerations and references are within the B20 Finance & Infrastructure Task Force.
Address the current trade ﬁnance gap by enhancing the offer of standardized
trade ﬁnance products
Trade ﬁnance products allow business to export on fair trading terms and withreasonable working capital requirements. The current offer, however, is notequally accessible, with substantial limitations for MSMEs, further exacerbated by the current economic downturn.
We urge the G20 to ﬁll the existing trade ﬁnance gap and to standardize key
instruments, such as letters of credit, loan guarantees, standby letters, andcollections.
To support in particular the certiﬁcations needed for ESG trade ﬁnance, G20
countries should develop a comprehensive framework harmonizing existing
standards, procedures, and credit models.
Cooperate with International Institutions to reduce regulatory burden andtransaction costs
Regulations have increased signiﬁcantly after the 2008 Financial Crisis, delivering higher stability, but also generating unintended consequences related
to, inter alia, anti-money laundering (AML), know-your-customer (KYC), andincreased cost-to-serve.
We call on the G20 to promote the harmonization and streamlining of KYC policies
and standards, including screening and risk assessment requirements, to lower
trade ﬁnance costs, especially for MSMEs. The G20 should also promote the collection of cross-country AML data to create a consistent, shared database to provide competent authorities with intelligence on suspicious/illegal transactions.
In addition, we call on the G20 to engage with national and international entities (e.g., Regulators, Export Credit Agencies) that provide ﬁnancial services
to smaller players to leverage increased automation and new digital technologies to ultimately reduce transaction costs, and thereby enable increased
MSME participation in trade, while effectively managing risk.
77

Financial inclusion in trade: Reducing the global trade ﬁnance gap; 2018; World Trade Organization (WTO)

78

Advisory Group on Trade Finance: Awareness & Advocacy; 2020; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)34

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

To further lower the most cumbersome requirements, an option worth exploring is the viability of a Legal Entity Identiﬁer to serve as a mutually recognized credential for counterparty identiﬁcation and veriﬁcation towards
ﬁnancial intermediaries79.
In this context, the B20 Saudi Arabia and Business at the OECD have assessed
the notion of GVC Passport80 to provide an authenticated, authoritative, veriﬁable ﬁnancial ﬁngerprint of a given entity, enabling it to operate within GVCs
without the need to reproduce the same documentation on multiple occasions, nor undergoing duplicative veriﬁcations. Although aimed at all ﬁrms, it
may particularly beneﬁt MSMEs who face a proportionately higher regulatory
and administrative burden relative to their resources.
In parallel, we encourage exploring the opportunity to adopt and extend the
Hub-and-Spoke81 model for due diligence purposes of MSMEs engaged in Global
Value Chains (GVCs) to facilitate their access to trade ﬁnance products.
Mitigate the misconception on trade ﬁnance risk and promote the assessment of Basel III requirements
The moderate risk nature of trade ﬁnance is widely supported by datasets82.
And yet, the high rejection rates for trade ﬁnance transaction inquiries suggestthat ﬁnancial intermediaries treat such transactions as substantially high risk83.
Moreover, the stricter ﬁnancial regulatory requirements introduced further
to the last decade’s crisis have tightened the lending capacity and rendered
trade ﬁnance increasingly unattractive to commercial banks, ultimately narrowing the access of MSMEs to export credit. The Basel III agreement, which
regulates the minimum capital requirements for banks as percentages of RiskWeighted Assets (RWAs), neither addresses the concerns of trade ﬁnance nor
it provides any speciﬁc impact assessment of them.
Therefore, we reiterate the B20 Saudi Arabia request to the G20 to promotetrade ﬁnance as a stand-alone asset class to allow in new sources of liquidity,
while exploring the opportunity to differentiate and reduce its RWA requirements to reduce capital absorption and provision costs.
Simplify the trade ﬁnance ecosystem by leveraging Distributed Ledger
Technologies
Rules and procedures for trade ﬁnance are labor-intensive and predominantly
paper-based, making them cumbersome, slow and prone to errors. Documentation requirements, multiple checks or duplicate bills lead to complexities and delays and involve a multitude of entities.

79
Trade Finance, a ﬂywheel effect to boost the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic; 2021; B20 Italy, Businessat OECD (BIAC) and International Organization of Employers (IOE)
80
GVC passport on Financial Compliance, a pragmatic concept to strengthen inclusive and sustainable growth;
2020; B20 Saudi Arabia and Business at OECD (BIAC)
81
In the evaluation of the credit risk of a smaller (spoke) company participating in a GVC with a larger (hub)corporation, the credit rating may consider the higher standards (e.g., in terms of transparency, sustainability,
solvency among others) which typically govern GVCs worldwide.
82
Default rates for trade ﬁnance products from 2008-2018 average 0.36% for import letters of credit (LCs),
0.04% for export LCs, 0.73% for loans for import/export, and 0.45% for performance guarantees. The shortterm nature, typically ranging from 60 to 180 days, should also obviate perception and concerns typically ofhigher-risk ﬁnancial instruments. Why do trade ﬁnance gaps persist; 2017; World Trade Organization (WTO);ICC Trade Register; 2019; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)83

Recent data shows a 23% decline in the number of banks providing trade credit in Africa between 2013 and2019 , and the situation has become even worse after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic; Trade Financein Africa; 2020; African Development Bank Group35

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 19
Traditional trade ﬁnanceecosystem highly fragmented
across multiple entities

Source: Digital Innovation in Trade Finance; 2017; Boston Consulting Group (BCG) elaboration
on ofﬁcial SWIFT data

A single trade ﬁnance transaction generates on average as much as 5,000
data ﬁeld interactions84, increasing the risk of miscommunication and fraud.
The variety of documents and data ﬁelds involved in the process creates achain of discrepancies, with only 1-2%85 of the data entered generating real
added value. The typical cost-to-income ratio in traditional trade ﬁnance is50-60%, meaning that more than half of the price charged to clients for tradeﬁnance needs to cover operational expenses86.
Blockchain technologies provide less vulnerable processes and offer new opportunities especially for MSMEs. Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) are
getting increasing attention as they offer a faster, cheaper and safer alternative to manual systems by operating on secure and shared databases.
Therefore, we call on the G20 to promote the adoption of Distributed Ledger
Technologies to support trade ﬁnance processes by establishing well-deﬁned
security principles and minimum cyber-security requirements consistently
applied across international Global Value Chains.

Policy Action 3.3: Support the participation of business in global
trade by leveraging and updating the role of Export Credit Agencies
and Development Finance Institutions
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)
aim at increasing export volume of domestic producers through ﬁnancial riskreducing services and products.
To face the pandemic crisis, several countries have increased the capacity of
their ECAs87,and DFIs, expanding working capital programs and facilities tosupport import-export operators88.

84

Digital Innovation in Trade Finance; 2017; Boston Consulting Group (BCG) elaboration on ofﬁcial SWIFT data

85

Digital Innovation in Trade Finance; 2017; Boston Consulting Group (BCG) elaboration on ofﬁcial SWIFT data86

GVC passport on Financial Compliance, a pragmatic concept to strengthen inclusive and sustainable growth;
2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
87
Trade Finance in Times of Crisis - Responses from Export Credit Agencies; 2020; Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD); The impact of COVID-19 on SME ﬁnancing: A special edition of theOECD Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs Scoreboard; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
88

Export credit insurance industry response to COVID-19; 2020; Berne Union

36

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Companies would beneﬁt from an enhanced offering from ECAs89. Thus,
ECAs should promote matchmaking services to stimulate new business opportunities, support the build-up of management capabilities to deal withtrade risks, disseminate a risk-aware culture supporting export, and commit
to expanding the portfolio of risk-reducing products to protect cross-borderﬂows from country risks90.
Ensure a level playing ﬁeld among national ECAs
The G20 should closely cooperate to ensure a level playing ﬁeld among national ECAs by reforming current rules and limitations across multiple areas
such as ﬁnancing terms and conditions (e.g., repayment terms, minimum interest rates), tied and untied ﬁnancing, transparency and trust.
Promote business matchmaking, support MSMEs risk management capabilities and enhance the offer of products against currency ﬂuctuations
Business matchmaking plays a vital role in facilitating business access to global
trade as it creates visibility on the potential counterparties and give guidanceon identifying most proﬁtable end-markets, especially in some sectors91.
To increase their reach and expand their range of services, ECAs and DFIs
should be sufﬁciently capitalized92 with appropriate transactions limits and seek
the widest possible geographical coverage. ECAs in particular should enhance
re-insurance agreements via inter-ECAs arrangements and streamline and fasttrack the intra-ECA approval processes for multi-sourced transactions.
Cross-border trade in goods and services includes a variety of risks for bothbuyers and sellers, including currency risks associated with the transit and delivery of goods across borders.
We call on the G20 to task and properly support their ECAs and DFIs to scale
up their capacity to provide adequate liquidity, risk management and mitigation products, and ﬂexible export support guarantees instruments to protect
business against the volatility of currency ﬂuctuations, especially for MSMEs.

89
In the US, more than 90% of 2016 transactions supported small businesses; The Facts About EXIM Bank; 2017;
Export-Import Bank of the United States; In Europe, 80% of ECAs have been tasked for allocation of funds to
SMEs; Competitiveness Report; 2017; EXIM90
The impact of COVID-19 on SME ﬁnancing: A special edition of the OECD Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs
Scoreboard; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

37

91

Matchmaking at the heart of the exhibition industry; 2019; The Global Association of the Exhibition Industry (UFI)

92

Advisory Group on Trade Finance: Awareness & Advocacy; 2020; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Recommendation 4:
Make trade and investment impactful drivers fora greener and more sustainable development,
and increase FDI flows
Policy Actions
4.1 Advance the WTO contribution to trade and environment, foster liberalization of trade in green goods and services, promote regulatory cooperation toaccelerate clean energy transition, resource efﬁciency and circular economy
4.2 Facilitate and support Foreign Direct Investment ﬂows, with a special
focus on sustainability and inclusivenessLeading Monitoring KPIOwner: World Trade Organization% of World FDI1 Covered by WTO
Investment Facilitation for Development

Baseline
66.5%(20202)

Target90.0%(2024)

1

Inward FDI;WTO participation at 31/12/2020; 2016-2019 FDI;
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO); World Bank
2

Recommendation 4 contributes to achieving UN SDGs 5: Gender Equality, 7:
Affordable and Clean Energy, 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, 10:
Reduced Inequalities, 12: Responsible Consumption and Production, 13:
Climate Action, 14: Life below Water, 15: Life on Land and 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. In particular, Policy Action 4.1 contributes to theachievement of target 7.A and 7.B by leveraging public procurement to accelerate cleaner energy transitions, also committing to harmonize international
standards on environmental criteria and requirements. It also contributes tothe achievement of target 12.5 by removing obstacles across borders in goods
for repairment, refurbishment and recycling, thus reducing waste and ineffective consumption. It ﬁnally contributes to the achievement of target 13.2 and15.3 by advancing the WTO work on Trade and Environment, and to target 14.4
and 14.6 by condemning subsidies connected with illegal and unreported ﬁshing, while also strengthening monitoring mechanisms and enforcing rules setting. Policy Action 4.2 contributes to the achievement of target 5.5 and 5.B bypromoting the inclusiveness of women in global trade, also supporting awareness on opportunities from digitalization. It also contributes to the achievementof target 8.A by reinforcing the WTO initiative on “Aid for Trade” to enhance
least development countries’ participation in international markets; and 10.B
by promoting ﬁnancial assistance and investment ﬂows - such as Foreign Direct
Investment - to all countries, and emerging economies in particular. Finally, it
contributes to the achievement of target 16.7 and 16.8 by ensuring responsive
and inclusive participation of least developed countries in international institutions, and during relevant decision-making and policy formulation processes.
Recommendation 4 contributes to addressing G20 Italy Priorities People,
Planet and Prosperity. In particular, Policy Action 4.1 contributes to addressing the Planet priority by claiming attention on the uneven commitment toclimate and environment, and proposing concrete actions to contain negative
externalities related to global markets, such as fostering debate on shared38

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

carbon-border adjustment mechanisms and on circularity principles. Moreover, it contributes to addressing the Prosperity priority by fostering a fair,transparent and sustainable competition through the removal of harmful subsidies and by stimulating a debate on green schemes. Policy Action 4.2 contributes to addressing the People priority by promoting gender equality and fair
opportunities for personal growth and development, regardless of sex, race andﬁnancial capabilities. It further contributes to the promotion of the Prosperity
priority by facilitating and supporting FDI ﬂows and funding opportunities,
especially in emerging economies and least developed countries.

Context
The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda93 puts signiﬁcant emphasis on the role ofglobal trade and investment and seeks to catalyze the contribution of the private sector towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs).
Trade and Investment have helped pull millions of people out of extreme
poverty and constitute key enablers for promoting higher environmental andsocial standards worldwide. At the same time, as the global population increases and stresses the planet’s carrying capacity, there is a growing debate
on the sustainability of economic models primarily based on resource extraction. Firms are incorporating alternate models that facilitate reuse, repair, recycling, and remanufacturing that are supported by government regulations
and changes in consumer preferences.
The COVID-19 crisis made clear that only sustainable approaches deliver along-run economic growth94 in the face of global challenges such as pandemics, biodiversity loss or natural disasters. Climate change alone will negatively affect most of the trade and investment infrastructure, with unevenregional effects, some commodities more impacted than others, and thestrongest damages in Africa and Asia95.
The G20 has the overall responsibility to promote and support all initiatives
aimed at fostering climate preservation, sustainability and the developmentof Least Developing Countries (LDCs). The most relevant areas for action include: liberalization of trade in environmental-related goods and services,
promotion of clean energy transition and circular economy, and dialogue andregulatory cooperation.
Foreign Direct Investment creates jobs in recipient markets96, supports higher
labor standards, promotes technology transfer and increases the participation in Global Value Chains. FDI ﬂows also beneﬁt the investors’ home country,
generating revenue, exports, tax receipts, and enhancing competitiveness.
Nevertheless, the lack of harmonized global frameworks and current market
access barriers contribute to the lower trend in FDI ﬂows, which has persisted
since the 2008 Financial Crisis. In addition, the ongoing health emergency has
exacerbated this declining trend, and further weakened its outlook97.

93

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; 2020; United Nations (UN)94

COVID-19: We call on all EU institutions and Member States for an ambitious recovery plan for a sustainable,
resilient and socially-just Europe, which leaves no places and no people behind; 2020; European Committeeof the Regions

95

39

Work on Trade and Climate change; 2021; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)96

How does foreign investment affect jobs?; 2014; World Economic Forum

97

Global foreign direct investment ﬂows are forecast to decrease by up to 40% in 2020; 2020; World Bank

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

G20 FDI inward flows still below pre-financial crisis level ...

... and for G20 FDI outward flows, the gap is even larger

Bn USD, p.a.

Bn USD, p.a.
-48%

1,500

2,000

-15%

-68%

Exhibit 20
FDI ﬂows still below 2007;
COVID-19 accelerating
the reduction

-48%
1,500
1,000
1,000
500
500

0

0

2007 - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 - 2014 - 2016 - 2018 - 2020pre-crisis 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 FY Est

2007 - 2008 - 2010 - 2012 - 2014 - 2016 - 2018 - 2020pre-crisis 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 FY Est

Predictable regulation is crucial for FDIs facilitation
Non-discrimination• Transparent access to market• Protection from unfair treatment

Protection of property rights• Protection of land tenure• Protection of intellectual property

Contract enforcement• Access to dispute settlement• Commercial arbitration conventions

International FDI agreements• Access and protection of FDIs
• Standards of treatment

Source: Global foreign direct investment fell by 42% in 2020, outlook remains weak; 2021;
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Tackling trade and environmental challenges together can only be done
through openness, global engagement and cooperation. Regional and bilateral
trade agreements can help incentivize a level playing ﬁeld in the environmental area, often reaching more tailored ambitions. Three policy actions should
guide the G20 in making trade and investment impactful drivers for a greener
and more sustainable development:s Leverage trade and investment to accelerate the transition to cleaner energy
and circularity, and foster the liberalization of environmental-related goods
and services, while coordinating the introduction of coherent carbon-borderschemes;s Facilitate and support FDI ﬂows, especially for least developed countries.

Policy Action 4.1: Advance the WTO contribution to trade and environment, foster liberalization of trade in green goods and services, promote regulatory cooperation to accelerate clean energy
transition, resource efﬁciency and circular economy
The green transformation of the economy will create signiﬁcant challenges interms of access to capital, technological solutions, and markets. Trade canplay a decisive role to support the process, accelerating the deployment oftechnologies, goods and services that are necessary to reach carbon neutrality.
In this light, the next WTO MC12 should seek to integrate the SDGs into the1995 WTO Agreement. The core objective should be to ensure that multilateral
trade rules support the global transition towards a carbon neutral, and resilient
economy, consistent with the objective and principles set by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement.
To effectively link trade and climate agendas it is necessary to ensure a carefulbalance between the global level playing ﬁeld, free market access, and compliancewith domestic climate-related measures. Therefore, initial building blocks shouldbe agreed in close cooperation with business stakeholders and be based on thesustainability triangle of climate action, liberalization, and regulatory cooperation.
Unilateral measures to address climate change should not result in arbitrary or
unjustiﬁable discrimination or disguised restriction of international trade.

40

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Join and advance the WTO contribution to trade and environment
A revived WTO should put sustainability and climate at the heart of its modernization agenda. The Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured
Discussions (TESSD) and the Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (IDP)98 launched in November 2020are a welcome start to intensify the WTO work on trade and environment.
In parallel, Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations that cameto a halt in December 2016 must be revamped and its scope widened to include other low-carbon goods and enable the transition, for each country, toa resilient circular economy through sustainable supply chains. To ensure alevel playing ﬁeld and adequate market access in the environmental sector,
non-tariff barriers, standards and rules in key areas like Intellectual Property
should also be considered.
Services that ensure climate mitigation and adaptation should fall within thescope of the liberalization as well. Overall, new administrative burdens should
be avoided, and the list of relevant sectors should be regularly updated, interalia, to consider the technological developments and innovations likely to enhance environmental beneﬁts, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and impact
the decarbonization of industrial processes. The participation of developing
countries should be prioritized and reﬂect the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social andeconomic conditions”99.
The WTO Trade and Environment committee should be used as platform toconsolidate the work of other WTO work streams, stimulate systematicallyand formally the cooperation with other international organizations such as
the UNFCCC, and provide the necessary assistance to developing countries.
The WTO Environmental Database contains close to 20,000 environmentrelated measures notiﬁed under WTO Agreements or Trade Policy Reviews.
This would help identify most critical areas to work on.
In seeking a broader WTO agreement, initiatives such as the Agreement on
Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS)100, the COP26 Forest andAgricultural Commodities Trade (FACT) dialogues, and the EU’s initiative on
Trade and Climate101 should be closely followed and supported.
We call on the G20 to agree at the next WTO MC12 on how to systematicallyphase out inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies - amounted to USD 478 billion in
2019102 - that inhibit positive environmental outcomes in accordance with theabove-mentioned principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions”103. In thiscontext, it is important that WTO members notify measures being taken on
sustainability, with an impact on trade and investment.
Conclude negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies under the WTO
Diverging rules on subsidies not only create signiﬁcant market distortions, butalso have meaningful impact on local production intensities and consequently
environmental impact. Concluding the ﬁsheries subsidies negotiations would
be an important step towards solidifying the WTO’s contribution to sustainability as well as its credibility. This agreement is of importance not only as theﬁrst multilateral agreement in years, but also as the one contributing to a full
SDG (#14 Life Below Water) as its core.
98
New initiatives launched to intensify WTO work on trade and environment; 2020 [accessed]; World Trade Organization (WTO)
99

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; 1992; United Nations (UN)100

New Zealand with Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland

101

European Commission non-paper on possible trade and climate initiative in WTO; 2020; European Commission
102
Making the green recovery work for jobs, income and growth; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)
103

41

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; 1992; United Nations (UN)

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Subsidies contributing to illegal, unreported, and unregulated ﬁshing should
be prohibited, and mechanisms to monitor and enforce new rules should be
put in place at the earliest time possible. We call on the WTO to ﬁnalize negotiations and to achieve an ambitious agreement on ﬁsheries subsidies.
Coordinate the introduction of coherent carbon-border schemes in accordance with the Paris Agreement
Over the past years, a growing debate on the introduction of carbon-borderadjustment mechanisms has spread among several countries and regions.
However, if not adopted in coordination with all parties and in accordancewith the “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions”104, carbon-border adjustment
measures may result in trade and investment barriers inconsistent with WTO
obligations leading to litigations and possible retaliations.
To avoid potential conﬂicts, the G20 should act as a platform to facilitate theintroduction of coordinated and coherent carbon-border schemes in accordance with the consensus under the Paris Agreement.
Leverage public procurement to accelerate cleaner energy transitions
Public procurement amounted to USD 11 trillion in 2018105, accounting for 12%
of global GDP, and representing a key lever for government and internationalorganizations to boost innovation and production in cleaner energy technologies. However, third-country bidders are not always eligible to participate inpublic tenders, and are subject to different security, labor and environmental
standards106.
To catalyze the transformation into CO2-free production, increased demand
for green products has to be created, and public procurement is well-suited
to help foster such demand. As mentioned previously, participation in the
WTO GPA must be widened, while maintaining and reinforcing the principlesof equal treatment and of non-discrimination. This would boost climate action by leveraging public procurement and increasing the opportunity toadopt cleaner processes, technologies, systems and services.
Greater efforts should be devoted to agreeing upon and to promoting standards in multilateral ﬁnancial institutions as well as in national contracting institutions that guarantee the quality of infrastructure investments107, andincluding full life cycle costs in the comparison of tenders.
Converge national quality standards of materials for repair, refurbishment,
and remanufacturing while removing possible barriers to trade acrossborders
Fragmented domestic policies are unlikely to achieve a sound transition towards a global resource-efﬁcient and circular economy108. Currently, the production of materials, products and food accounts for about 45% of total CO2
global emissions. Measures such as waste prevention, eco-design and resource
efﬁciency could save companies’ ﬁnancial resources while also reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
Moving towards a more circular economy could deliver tangible impact in reducing environmental pressure, stimulating green technologies and innovation, as well as boosting economic growth. Promoting a circular ecosystem
would unlock 700,000 new jobs in the EU alone by 2030109. The adoption of104

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; 1992; United Nations (UN)105

How large is public procurement?; 2020; World Bank

106
New guidance on the participation of third country bidders in the EU procurement market; 2019; European
Commission
107

Following the G20 “Principles on Quality Infrastructure Investment” and the Charlevoix G7 “Declaration on
Innovative Financing for Development and Equator Principles”
108

Climate Policy Leadership in an Interconnected World: What Role for Border Carbon Adjustments?; 2020; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)42

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

circular setups in manufacturing could yield material cost savings of USD 340630 billion per year110.
We urge the G20 to harmonize quality standards of materials, remove barriers
to trade in goods meant for direct reuse, facilitate the transboundary movements of products for recovery operations as well as promote industrial symbiosis for cross-sector exchanges of recovered materials and energy sources.
Relevant regulations should be implemented and monitored to guaranteethat transboundary movements are facilitated for proven reutilization purposes to ensure their effectiveness to avoid disposal of waste in economies
that lack real capacities to reuse or refurbish, to improve the coordination ofnational industrial policies’ strategies, and to limit cross-border impact on climate and trade.

Policy Action 4.2: Facilitate and support Foreign Direct Investment
ﬂows, with a special focus on sustainability and inclusivenessThe cumulative Foreign Direct Investment ﬂows over the past decades have
driven globalization, boosted trade, and fostered the interconnection of
economies through Global Value Chains111, generating positive externalities
for both businesses and local communities. Empirical evidence shows that FDI
can reduce environmental emissions through the transfer of green energy efﬁcient technologies across borders that would curb environmental emissions
worldwide112.
G20 countries should lead by example by removing obstacles and barriers forcompanies to freely invest across borders. Consistent FDI facilitation schemes
and reinforced Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) can foster higher economic and environmental standards, with FDI representing a social vehicle forincreased integration, and laying the foundation for a more sustainable world
economy. In light of the urgent need to put economic growth back on track
after the pandemic crisis, the B20 highlights the recovery of FDI as a standing
item on its agenda.
As FDI can play a crucial role in making progress toward achieving the UN
SDGs, availability and transparency on datasets regarding their impact on sustainable development is required to drive and monitor their contribution.
In this regard, we call on international organizations, such as UNCTAD andOECD, to deﬁne guideline indicators to measure the social and environmental
impact of FDI on areas such as greenhouse gas emissions and capacity building, innovation, employment and job creation, and gender equality.
Advance the negotiations of the WTO Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation
To meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030,
huge investments will be required. According to UNCTAD, the total annual
investments in SDG-relevant sectors in developing countries will need to beup to USD 4.5 trillion. This translates into an annual investment gap of USD
2.5 trillion113.

109

Circular Economy: deﬁnition, importance and beneﬁts; 2020; European Parliament

110

Eurostat Input/Output tables for EU-27 economies; 2019; Eurostat

111

World Bank Database; 2020 [accessed]; World Bank112

The effect of FDI on environmental emissions: Evidence from a meta-analysis; 2020; Rotterdam University,
Guelph University

113

Developing countries face USD 2.5 trillion annual investment gap in key sustainable development sectors; 2014;
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

43

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Exhibit 21
Investment gap in key SDG sectors

Source: Investment gap in key SDG sectors; 2019; International Finance Corporation; World BankGroup

A more favorable business environment requires that bottlenecks and inefﬁciencies that refrain companies to from investing be removed. The current
participation of 106 WTO members114, accounting for an average of 66% of
the world inward FDI over the period 2016-2019, in the Joint Initiative on Investment Facilitation for Development is encouraging and should be further
promoted.
Moreover, established FTAs and/or national FDI frameworks lack harmonizedprinciples and consistency. More than 1,000 new investment facilitation policies have been set up over the past decade, only 24% of them involved concrete and actionable investment facilitating measures115.
The G20 should encourage participating members to conclude the investment facilitation negotiations by the next WTO MC12, and work together fora coherent and integrated set of rules, addressing critical regulatory aspects
such as market access, non-discrimination, protection of foreign investors andtransparency of legal and administrative requirements.
Reinforce Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) to promote FDI ﬂows,
especially those sustainability-oriented
Relaunching global FDI ﬂows would promote the transfer of knowledge andtechnology, foster job creation, and enhance the development of human andbusiness capital. Effective investment promotion policies aim at attracting
and retaining inward ﬂows. While IPAs may at times compete with each other,
they share similar challenges, including how to structure incentive programs
and packages consistent with international trade rules. Therefore, we call on
G20 countries to ensure cooperation amongst IPAs.
This could equip IPAs and other policy makers with an actionable tool to mobilise FDI maximizing inclusive and sustainable growth and thereby advanceconvergence on Sustainable Development Goals.

114
Investment facilitation agreement negotiators wrap up productive year; 2020 [accessed]; World Trade Organization (WTO)
115
Division on Investment and Enterprise: Results and Impact; 2017; United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD)

44

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Enhance the Aid for Trade WTO initiative for the integration of Least Developed Countries in the global economy
The 2015 WTO-led Aid for Trade Initiative116 was launched to help developing
countries, and particularly least developed countries, to engage in international trade. A new Work Programme for 2020-2022 was issued in 2020 under
the theme of “Empowering Connected, Sustainable Trade”, seeking to maximize the opportunities that digital connectivity and sustainability offer for
economic and export diversiﬁcation.
We call on the G20 to support the enforcement of the renewed Work Programme and encourage additional investment ﬂows and technical assistanceto strengthen regulatory cooperation especially with Africa and other developing countries117.
Bilateral, regional and multilateral donors should meet LDCs’ capacity-building needs to support their integration into sustainable Global Value Chains.
The WTO should monitor the barriers preventing LDCs from fully beneﬁttingof assistance programs provided by international organizations such as
UNICEF, UNCTAD, FAO, and WFP.
Leverage trade to promote the inclusiveness of women in the global economy
Trade and investment can be powerful drivers of gender equality, with thepotential to expand women’s role in the economy, decrease inequality, andexpand their access to skills and education118.
The under-representation of women in international trade and investment
should be addressed with concrete initiatives as women can contribute toboosting innovation, competitiveness, and productivity. In this regard, both
domestic policy actions and cooperation between relevant global organizations, in consultation with the private sector, are needed to identify practical
initiatives for higher inclusiveness. The availability of data for policy making
and to secure trading opportunities should be assessed.
In particular, we welcome the SheTrades Initiative119 - launched by the International Trade Centre - which seeks to connect three million women entrepreneurs to market by 2021, by providing women entrepreneurs andwomen-owned MSMEs around the world with a unique network and platform
to connect to markets. We also champion the eTrade for Women Initiative120 sponsored by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, andwidely support any afﬁliated actions advancing such an important topic, driving opportunities and unlocking additional growth potential in the female
workforce.

45

116

Aid for Trade; 2020 [accesses]; World Trade Organization (WTO)117

The power surplus; 2021; EUI CEPS Policy Insights

118

Women and Trade: The Role of Trade in Promoting Women’s Equality; 2020; World Bank

119

SheTrades.com; 2020 [accessed]; International Trade Centre (ITC)

120

Empowering women entrepreneurs in developing countries; 2020 [accessed]; eTradeforWomenB20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Distribution of Members
Country#Country#Country#Country

#

Italy

32

United Kingdom

6

Spain

2

Qatar

1

China

9

Saudi Arabia

5

Tunisia2

Serbia1

Russia9South Africa

5

Canada1

Singapore

1

United States

9Australia

4

Egypt

1

Switzerland

1

Argentina

8

Turkey

4

India

1

France8

Brazil

2

Korea South

1

Belgium

6

Japan

2

Kuwait1

Germany

6

Mexico

2

Macau

1

Task Force Members
NameCompany/Organization

Country

DeputyItaly

Marco Felisati

CHAIR

Barbara Beltrame
Giacomello

Conﬁndustria
CO-CHAIRS

Ajay Banga

Mastercard

United States

Sahra English

Levent Çakiroglu

Koç Holding

TurkeyAli Utku Atalay

Shinta Widjaja
Kamdani

Sintesa Group

Indonesia

Maria Sutanto

Keidanren

Japan

Teruko Wada

Paolo Rocca

Techint Group

Argentina

Fernando Landa

Ingrid Sinclair

Sims Lifecycle Services

United States

Patricia Whiting

Livio Vanghetti

Philip Morris International

GlobalAndres Guggiana

Jianlong Yu

China Chamberof International Commerce

China

Shan Ming

Masakazu Kubota

Schedule of Task Force Meetings
#

Date

Event

LocationTheme121-22 January 2021

Inception Event

Virtual

Review of
Inception Document2

25 February 2021

TF Videoconference 1

Virtual

Review of 1st Draft
Policy Paper

325 March 2021

TF Videoconference 2

Virtual

Review of 2nd Draft
Policy Paper

429 April 2021

TF Videoconference 3

Virtual

Review of 3rd Draft
Policy Paper

5

3 June 2021

TF Videoconference 4

Virtual

Review of last version
Draft Policy Paper

6

17 September 2021

B20-G20 Dialogue

VirtualMeeting with Italy
Minister of Foreign
Affairs andInternational
Cooperation

7

7-8 October 2021

B20 Summit

Hybrid;Rome

Presentation of TF
Policy Paper

46

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

Canadian Chamberof Commerce

Senior Director
International Policy

CanadaNissreen Al Bakri

Bupa Arabia

Manager AssetManagement andTreasury Operation

Saudi Arabia

Abdulaziz Albabtain

Himmah Group

President

Saudi Arabia

Mauro Alfonso

SIMEST

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Asma Aljoaib

Aljoaib group

Board Member

Saudi Arabia

Khalend Alohali

Saudi Arabian
Mining Company

Senior Vice
President, Ma’adenCorporate Affairs

Saudi Arabia

Nouf Alrakan

Alimtiaz Consulting

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerSaudi Arabia

Ahmad Al-Saleh

EQUATE Petrochemical
Company

Vice Chairman
GPCA International
Trade Committee

KuwaitKhalifa Al-Thani

Qatar General
Insurance and Reinsurance

Vice Chairman

Qatar

Sandra Alvera

Panasonic Europe

Head ofGovernment
Affairs EU

Belgium

Igor
Andryushchenko

VTB Bank PJSCHead of
Department forExternal Relations,
Research and Analysis

RussiaSergio Arzeni

INSME International
Network for SME

President

FranceArtem Asatur

Aluminium Association

Co-Chairman

RussiaAnton Bazulev

RUSAL

Director forInternational Projects

RussiaMartin Berardi

Ternium Argentina

President

Argentina

Lorenzo Berho

Vesta

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

MexicoDenverBerman-Jacob

Sweet-Orr and Lybro

Executive
Director

South Africa

Alberto Bianchi

ASK Industries

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerItaly

Constanza Biasutti

CNI National
Confederationof Industry Brazil

Trade Policy Head

BrazilMarta Blanco

Spanish Confederationof Industries and Employers

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerSpain

Natalie BlythHSBC Holdings PLC

Group General
Manager, Global
Head of Global Trade

UnitedKingdom

Sebastián Bonals

Unión Industrial
Argentina

Head of Department ofTrade and International
Negotiations

Argentina

Jihen Boutiba Mrad

Union of Mediterranean
Confederationsof Enterprises

Secretary General

Tunisia

MEMBERSMark Agnew

47

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

MEMBERS
Leonard Brad
Smith

Global Federationof Insurance Associations

Chair Trade
Working Group and
Chief International
OfﬁcerUnited States

Craig Burchell

Huawei Technologies

Senior Vice
President Global
Government Affairs

China

Emmanuelle
Butaud-Stubbs

ICC France

Secretary General

FranceGianfranco
Carbonato

Prima Industrie

President andChief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Andrea Casini

UniCredit

Co-Chief Executive
Ofﬁcer Commercial
Banking Italy

Italy

Giovanni Cerchiarini

TERNA

Head of theInternational
Operations

Italy

Enrico Cereda

IBM

Italy Country Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Bryan Clark

Australian Chamber ofCommerce and Industry

Director, International
Chamber ofCommerce Australia

Australia

Stefano Crechici

Modiano Industrie
Carte da Gioco e Afﬁni

President

Italy

Marco De Angelis

GDA marble and Granite

President

Italy

Donato Del Vecchio

BATGroup Headof International
Trade andFiscal Affairs

UnitedKingdom

Matteo Dell’Acqua

Adﬂex

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Shaun Donnelly

United States Council
for International Business

Senior Director,
Investment,
Trade andFinancial Services

United States

Sergio E
Contreras P

Consejo Empresarial
Mexicano de Comercio
exterior

Executive
Vice President

MexicoElisabetta Fabri

Starhotels Group

President andChief Executive
Ofﬁcer

Italy

Francesco Fattori

Casa Optima

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Helga Flores Trejo

Bayer

Vice President,
Global Public
Affairs International
Organizations

United States

Maurizio Forte

ICE

Director Promotionof Made in Italy

Italy

Michele Frisoli

Manta Group

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

JianGuo Fu

Nam Kwong Group

Chairman of Board

Macau

Rian Geldenhuys

Trade Law Chambers

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerSouth Africa

48

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

MEMBERSAri Giovenco

AmazonSenior Manager,

United States

Praveen Golash

Avaada Energy

General Manager

India

Patrícia Gomes

Brazilian Machinery
Builders´ Association

Foreign Trade
Executive Director

BrazilGerd Götz

European Aluminium

Director General

BelgiumCatherine Grant
Makokera

Business Unity
South Africa

Trade Committee
MemberSouth Africa

Alessandra Chiara
Guffanti

TricodorBusiness Development
Director

Italy

Karine Guenan

AirbusVice President
Financing andGuarantees

FranceJohn Hannagan

Rusal Australia

ChairmanAustralia

Ping Hao

China National Machinery
Industry Corporation

General Manager

China

Tom Harley

Dragoman PTY

Managing Director

Australia

Junichi Horie

Advantage Partnership
Lawyers

International
Arbitration Counsellor
and International
Mediator

Japan

Yongqi Hu

Lenovo Group

Director

China

Jianroung Huang

Shanghai HaichengResources Group

Chairman

China

Chang-Soo Huh

The Federationof Korean Industries

Chairman

Korea South

Julia Jasinska

Nokia

Head of International
Relationsand Trade Policy

Belgium

Olav Jones

Insurance Europe

Deputy Director
GeneralBelgium

Sony Group Corporation

VP, Senior
General Manager,
External Relations
Department

Japan

Arcelik

Board Member

TurkeyMelanie Kerst

IHK Magdeburg

Head of DivisionInternational Markets

Germany

Farida Khan

Sasol South Africa

Head of Policy
and Regulation

South Africa

Aleksej Kljetsko

Gruppa Cerkizovo

Director of Strategy

RussiaMatthias Krämer

Federation of German
Industries

Head of
Department External
Economic Policy

Germany

Dominik Kummerle

BIAC

Policy Manager

FranceCinzia La Rosa

La Rosa Energy

General Director

Italy

Eric Le Corre

Michelin

VP Public
Affairs Director

FranceChristoph Leitl

Global Chamber
Platform

Chairman andPresident

Belgium

Yurika Kamitani

Fatih Kemal Ebiclioglu

49

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

MEMBERS
Eric Lenoir

Euler Hermes France

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

FranceValeria Leone

Pirelli

EVP Investor Relations

Italy

Fulvio Liberatore

Easyfrontier

President

Italy

Zhen Liu

Xiaomi Corporation

General Counsel of
Legal Department

China

Giulio Lombardo

Brachi Testing Services

Marketing Director

China

Andrea Mangia

Aeroviaggi

Membro delConsiglio di
Amministrazione

Italy

Marco Mansani

Menarini

Corporate Grants
and Funding Manager

Italy

Jose ManuelRodriguez

Iberdrola

Head of International
Affairs

Spain

Yuankai Mao

China Global New
Technology Importand Export

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerChina

Alfredo Mariotti

CEU

General Manager

Italy

Javier Martinez
Alvarez

TenarisPresident TenarisSouthern Cone

Argentina

Mario Mattioli

Confederazione Italiana
Armatori

President

Italy

Louise McGrath

Australian Industry Group

Head Industry
Development
and Policy

Australia

Albrecht Merkle

Alfred Kärcher

Manager Global
Customs andTrade Compliance

Germany

Sergey Mikhnevich

Russian Union ofIndustrialists andEntrepreneurs

Director of theCenter for Multilateral
Cooperation

RussiaTwenty Essex

Barrister

UnitedKingdom

Andreas Moraitis

Nokia Network Hellas

Lead Account Manager

Italy

Alexey Mordashov

JSC Severstal

Chairman of theBoard of Directors

RussiaInnocentia Motau

The Young Entrepreneur
South Africa

President

South Africa

Jerry Mpufane

South African
Tourism Board

President
North America

United States

Ettore Nicoletto

Bertani Domains

Chief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Julia Nielson

OECD

Counsellor,
Director’s Ofﬁce,
Trade and Agriculture
Directorate

FranceWenze Ning

CRRC Corporation
LimitedAssistant President

China

Giovanni Ottati

Vuetel italia

Chairman

Italy

Erich P Cossutta

Dragon Maritime Group

President

SerbiaWendy Miles50

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

MEMBERS
Giorgio Palmucci

Hotelturist

Executive
Vice President

Italy

Francesco Paolicelli

Thegg domotica

General Manager

ItalyPeter Pedersen

World Trade Organization

Head of Trade
Monitoring

Switzerland

Rodrigo Pérez
Graziano

Argentine Chamber ofCommerce and Services

Secretary General

Argentina

Edgardo Phielipp

GEMAS

President

Argentina

Luigi Pio Scordamaglia

InalcaChief Executive Ofﬁcer

Italy

Marco Piredda

Eni

Head of Political
Scenarios andInstitutional
Business Support

Italy

NLMK

Head of Division

RussiaDeutsche PostDHL Group

VP Headof Go Trade

Germany

GEMA Grupo Empresarial
De Mujeres Argentina

President

Argentina

Lamia Riabi

Attijari Bank Tunisia

General Manager

Tunisia

Mustafa Rifat
Hisarciklioglu

Union of Chambers
and Commodity
Exchanges of Turkey

President
and Chairman

TurkeyRada Rodriguez

Schneider Electric GmbH

Member of the
Executive Board

Germany

George Salis

VertexPrincipal
Economist andTax Policy Advisor

United States

Monica Santini

Santini Magliﬁcio Sportivo

Chief Executive
Ofﬁcer

Italy

Marcelo Santoro

Banco SantanderInternational
Desk Manager

Argentina

Luisa Santos

BusinessEurope

Deputy Director
GeneralBelgium

Leonardo

Managing Directorof Leonardo’s
Aerostructures Division

Italy

Lisa Schroeter

Dow

Global Driectorof Trade andInvestment Policy

United States

Tamer Sen

TUSIAD

Global Economic
Relations
Department

TurkeyKoray Sokullu

Tofas Türk Otomobil
Fabrikası FCA Turkey

Customs Operations
Administrator

TurkeyDebin SongChina Communications
Construction Company

General Manager
Italy

China

Chris Southworth

ICC United Kingdom

Secretary General

UnitedKingdom

Greg Stofko

FedEx Corporation

Staff Director,
Regulatory Affairs

United States

Evgeniya Pomerlyan
Steven Pope
Delia Raquel Flores

Giancarlo Schisano51

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Name

Company/Organization

Position

Country

Federation of
Egyptian Industries

Vice Chairman

Egypt

Luis Tendlarz

Federación de Industrias
Textiles Argentinas FITA

President

Argentina

Luisa Todini

Comitato Leonardo
Italian Quality Committee

Chairman

Italy

Volker Treier

Association of German
Chambers of Industry
and Commerce

Chief Executiveof Foreign Trade,
Member of the
Executive Board

Germany

Elena Ublieva

Russian Union of
Exhibitions and Fairs

Executive Director

RussiaTunc Uyanik

World SME Forum

President
and Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer

United States

Nabothvan den Broek

WIlmerHale

Partner and Chair
WilmerHale
International Group

UnitedKingdom

Helio Vicente

International Chamberof Shipping

Senior Advisor

UnitedKingdomNina Vilkova

ICC Russia, Russian
Foreign Trade Academy,
ICACEnterim Chairmanof the Commission
on Arbitration

RussiaMEDEF

Deputy Director forInternational Affairs

FranceSingapore Business
Federation

Chief Executive
OfﬁcerSingapore

RollonGeneral Manager

Italy

MEMBERSMohamed Tarek
Tawﬁk

Lys VitralYi Young Lam
Stefano Zecchinato52

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Function

Name

Company/Organization

COORDINATION GROUP
B20 Secretariat

Giovanni Dioguardi

Conﬁndustria

Silvio La Torre
Laura Travaglini
Diana Frattale
Knowledge Partner

Davide Corradi

Boston Consulting Group

Edoardo Palmisani
Michael McAdoo
Elena Benussi
Niccolò Bogianchino
Lorenzo Bertoni
Scientiﬁc Partners

Network Partners

Claudio Dordi

Università Bocconi

Pierfrancesco Rossi

LUISS Guido Carli

Cristina Mele

Università degli Studi diNapoli Federico II

Dominik Kummerle

Business at OECD

Winand Quaedvlieg
Andrew Wilson

International Chamber

Damien Bruckardof Commerce

Rachel Bellegy Chazelas

Global Business Coalition

Sean Doherty

World Economic Forum

Helio Vicente

International Chamberof Shipping

Annex
Acronyms

53

ACCTS

Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability

ACT-A

Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator

AEO

Authorized Economic Operator

AML

Anti-Money-Laundering

B20

Business 20

CAI

EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

CP-TPP

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-PaciﬁcPartnership

DFI

Development Finance Institution

DLT

Distributed Ledger Technology

ECA

Export Credit Agency

EGA

Environmental Goods Agreement

EU

European Union

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

FTAFree Trade Agreement

G20Group of 20

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GPA

Government Procurement Agreement

GVC

Global Value Chain

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENTHS

Harmonized System

ICC

International Chamber of Commerce

IMF

International Monetary FundIPIntellectual Property

ITA

Information Technology Agreement

KYC

Know-Your-Customer

LDCs

Least Developed Countries

LEI

Legal Entity Identiﬁer

MC

Ministerial Conference

MRA

Mutual Recognition Agreement

MSMEs

Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises

MLETR

Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records

NCRS

Notiﬁcation Compliance Reporting System

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PPA

Pharmaceutical Products Agreement

PPE

Personal Protective Equipment

PSRO

Product Speciﬁc Rules of Origin

RoO

Rules of Origin

RKC

Revised Kyoto Convention

RTAs

Regional Trade Agreements

RWAs

Risk-Weighted Assets

R&D

Research & Development

SCM

Subsidy and Countervailing Measures

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SPS

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

S&DT

Special and Differential Treatment

TBT

Technical Barrier to Trade

TESSD

Trade and Environment Sustainability Structured Discussions

TF

Task Force

TFA

Trade Facilitation Agreement

TiSA

Trade in Services Agreement

TPR

Trade Policy Review

UN

United Nations

UNCITRAL

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

UNFCCCUN Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNICEF

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

USD

United States Dollar

WCO

World Customs Organization

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

54

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

List of impacted SDG Targets

55

SDG Target

Description

1.4

By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular thepoor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance,
natural resources, appropriate new technology and ﬁnancial
services, including microﬁnance.

1.5

By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to
climate-related extreme events and other economic, socialand environmental shocks and disasters.

2.B

Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions inworld agricultural markets, including through the parallel
elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and allexport measures with equivalent effect, in accordance withthe mandate of the Doha Development Round.

3.8

Achieve universal health coverage, including ﬁnancial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services andaccess to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.

5.5

Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making inpolitical, economic and public life.

5.B

Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women.

7.A

By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efﬁciency and advanced and cleaner
fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology.

7.B

By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology forsupplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small
island developing States and landlocked developing countries,
in accordance with their respective programmes of support.

8.1

Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per centgross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries.

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

8.3

Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization andgrowth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to ﬁnancial services.

8.4

Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efﬁciency in consumption and production and endeavor to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in
accordance with the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on
Sustainable Consumption and Production, with developed
countries taking the lead.

8.9

By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable
tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products.

8.10

Strengthen the capacity of domestic ﬁnancial institutions toencourage and expand access to banking, insurance and ﬁnancial services for all.

8.A

Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, inparticular least developed countries, including through the
Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical
Assistance to least developed countries.

9.1

Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, tosupport economic development and human well-being, witha focus on affordable and equitable access for all.

9.2

Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by2030, signiﬁcantly raise industry’s share of employment andgross domestic product, in line with national circumstances,and double its share in least developed countries.

9.3

Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to ﬁnancial services, including affordable credit, and their integration intovalue chains and markets.

10.A

Implement the principle of special and differential treatment
for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements.

10.B

Encourage ofﬁcial development assistance and ﬁnancial ﬂows,
including foreign direct investment, to States where the needis greatest, in particular least developed countries, Africancountries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans andprogrammes.

12.5

By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse.

56

B20 POLICY PAPER TRADE AND INVESTMENT

13.2

Integrate climate change measures into national policies,
strategies and planning.

14.4

By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overﬁshing,illegal, unreported and unregulated ﬁshing and destructive
ﬁshing practices and implement science-based management
plans, in order to restore ﬁsh stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable
yield as determined by their biological characteristics.

14.6

By 2020, prohibit certain forms of ﬁsheries subsidies which
contribute to overcapacity and overﬁshing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulatedﬁshing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries
should be an integral part of the World Trade Organizationﬁsheries subsidies negotiation.

15.3

By 2030, combat desertiﬁcation, restore degraded land andsoil, including land affected by desertiﬁcation, drought andﬂoods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world.
Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representativedecision-making at all levels.

16.7

57

16.8

Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing
countries in the institutions of global governance.

17.6

Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional
and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge-sharing on
mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United
Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation
mechanism.

17.9

Enhance international support for implementing effective andtargeted capacity-building in developing countries to support
national plans to implement all the Sustainable Development
Goals, including through north–south, South-South and triangular cooperation.

17.10

Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory
and equitable multilateral trading system under the World
Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda.

17.13

Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including throughpolicy coordination and policy coherence.

17.17

Encourage and promote effective public, public-private andcivil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.