Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series 234

Research Unit for Statisticaland Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)

Nuclear Energy in Asia: Safety Post-Fukushima

Hi-Stat Discussion Paper

Takako Kimura

May 2012

Hi-Stat
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitatchi Tokyo, 186-8601 Japan
http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp

Nuclear Energy in Asia: Safety Post-Fukushima *Takako Kimura +April 13, 2012

Abstract
Ensuring nuclear safety has been an ongoing and significant concern worldwide. Although the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident has undermined public confidence in its safety,
many of Asia’s emerging economies still have plans to introduce nuclear energy. This paper analyzes
the possible development of nuclear energy in Asia’s emerging economies and considers theimplications for nuclear safety. The analysis reveals that insufficient financial, technical, andinstitutional capacities could be complemented by external support and assistance and that public
acceptance is vital for launching nuclear power programs. While Asia’s emerging economies expect
regional or international cooperation and assistance from potential supplier countries, the regional
cooperation framework for nuclear safety is underdeveloped and Asian supplier countries haveinsufficient capabilities, particularly in legal and regulatory aspects. An effective regional
cooperation mechanism needs to be established to ensure nuclear safety, which requires immediate
action from Japan.

*

This study is supported by Hitotsubashi University’s Global COE program, “Research Unit for Statistical andEmpirical Analysis in Social Sciences.” I would like to thank Professor Kyoji Fukao for his advice andencouragement. I am also grateful to Professor Harry Wu for his helpful comments. The research results and views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IER.
+
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, e-mail: t-kimura@ier.hit-u.ac.jp

11. Introduction
Nuclear safety is concerned with achieving and maintaining a high level of safety for nuclear
facilities and activities to protect individuals, society, and the environment against radiation risks.
Safety also denotes preventing accidents and mitigating their consequences (IAEA 2007a). Ensuring
nuclear safety has been a serious concern worldwide, particular since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant accident triggered by the massive earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. The
accident released considerable amounts of radioactive materials into the environment and over one
hundred thousand people were reportedly evacuated from the vicinity of the plant (JICE 2012). The
long-term health, environmental, and economic impacts have yet to be fully assessed, but the event
reminded us that severe nuclear accidents potentially have transboundary consequences. The overall
performance of nuclear power plants had steadily improved in many countries over the two decades
preceding the accident. From the mid-2000s, rising demand for energy, the need to tackle climatechange, and the quest for energy security spurred a renewed interest in nuclear energy development,
and a growing number of countries began to consider incorporating nuclear energy into theirelectricity generation mix. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report in September
2010 indicated that some 65 countries were expressing interest in introducing nuclear power (IAEA
2010a).
However, the Fukushima accident undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear
energy and consequently prompted a reconsideration of energy policies together with in-depth
nuclear reactor safety reviews and a reevaluation of safety regulations. Several European countries
have announced plans to phase out or cancel all of their existing and future reactors 1. While somecountries decided to slow the construction of nuclear power plants, many emerging economies still

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Germany decided to phase out nuclear power by 2022 (BBC 2011a); Italy accepted a referendum opposing thegovernment’s plans to resume nuclear power generation (BBC 2011b); Switzerland approved plans to phase out its
nuclear plants by 2034 (AFP 2011); Spain remained opposed to new nuclear plant construction (WNA 2011f);
Belgium plans to phase out nuclear power (BBC 2011c).

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plan to introduce nuclear energy.
Estimate levels vary in the latest energy projections published by the IAEA, World Nuclear
Association (WNA), and International Energy Agency (IEA), but all indicate that projected growthis highest in Asia. The IAEA’s conservative projection sees the world’s installed nuclear power
capacity expanding from 375 GWe (gigawatt-electric) in 2010 to 501 GWe in 2030, while the higher
projection has it growing to 746 GWe (IAEA 2011b). The number of operating reactors increases
from the current 435 to 528 and 789 in those same estimates (IAEA 2011c). The WNA’s
conservative projection to 2030 sees reactors increasing to 602 (WNA 2011a, Table 1). The IEA Low
Nuclear Case, which assumes that countries reconsider existing energy policies 2, has nuclear power
capacity falling 15% from the end-of-2010 level, to 335 GWe in 2035 (IEA 2011). The New Policies
Scenario, which assumes that recent government commitments are implemented cautiously, sees
nuclear generation growing about 70% over the period from 2010 to 2035. Looking at nuclear
reactors under construction by region (Table 2), Asia dominates future growth, accounting for morethan two-thirds of construction worldwide, which raises an important question: Is the current nuclear
safety framework capable of managing such a substantial increase of nuclear power plants in Asia?
What measures are being taken to ensure that plants are operated safely?
The IAEA provides expert safety review services at a member state’s request and one of
the leading types of review missions is the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions that
conduct in-depth reviews of the operational safety performance of nuclear power plants. Over 160
such missions have been conducted since 1982, but a comparison between the number of reactors
operable and the number of past OSART missions (Tables 1 and 2) reveals that Asian countries haveinvited far fewer missions than the countries in Latin America, Europe, and Africa have. Although
the United States has also hosted fewer missions, the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),
2

The IEA’s Low Nuclear Case assumes that no new OECD reactors are built, non-OECD countries build only half of
the additions projected in the New Policies Scenario, and that the operating lifespan of existing nuclear plants isshortened.

3

a non-profit organization established by the US nuclear power industry in 1979 following the Three
Mile Island accident, conducts evaluations of all nuclear power plants every 18-24 months. By
facilitating the sharing of best practices and conducting peer reviews, the INPO has helped improved
the performance of US plants. US nuclear operators take the INPO’s reviews so seriously that they
initiate changes when peer reviews yield low INPO ratings (Joskow and Parsons 2012). The World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), a non-profit organization established in 1989 in
response to the Chernobyl accident, has also conducted 496 operating station peer reviews in 34
countries/areas since 1992 (WANO 2012). WANO’s goal is to conduct a peer review at each nuclear
unit at least once every six years, but this has yet to be achieved. Hence, US plants are actually
evaluated more frequently and rigorously than those in other countries.
Expectations following the Fukushima accident are that safety standards will be upgraded,
the regulatory framework strengthened, and life extension of nuclear power plants shortened. The
new regulatory requirements are likely to contribute to increased construction costs, operator liability,
national liability, and insurance (UBS 2011). Will Asia’s newcomer countries be able to deploy
nuclear energy in the face of these costly changes? If so, what impact will nuclear expansion have on
the global nuclear safety framework? And what can be done to strengthen nuclear safety? Motivatedby these questions, this study analyzes the capacities of Asian newcomer countries in order toexplore their possible development to 2030, considers the implications for the global nuclear safety
framework, and seeks to identify the gaps vis-à-vis recent international efforts to enhance nuclear
safety.
In recent years, research into nuclear energy has been increasingly diverse in its
approaches. Some studies analyze supporting factors and barriers for nuclear energy development toprovide insights into future prospects. For example, Valentine and Sovacool (2010), by analyzing thesocio-cultural, political, and economic conditions of nuclear power programs in Japan and South

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Korea, identify six common supporting factors, including strong state involvement in economic
development and low levels of civic activism. Jewell (2011a) assesses 52 newcomer countries interms of their capacities and motivations for developing nuclear power programs by identifying
indicators for these factors and comparing these capacities and motivations to those of countries withestablished nuclear energy programs (NP countries 3). The study suggests that the majority of
newcomer countries may face significant barriers in developing technical and institutional
infrastructure since they have smaller economies and less efficient institutions than NP countries.
Jewell (2011b) developed this analysis to evaluate in what form and under what conditions nuclear
energy could be introduced in North African countries and found that external conditions such astechnical and financial assistance are nearly as important as domestic development. This paper uses
some of Jewell’s methodologies and examines other factors including state participation in relevantinternational treaties to analyze the possible development of nuclear energy in Asian newcomer
countries. The first observation is largely similar to the study on North African countries: Asian
newcomers lack adequate capacity and will thus need external cooperation and assistance to deploy
nuclear power. A striking difference is that following the Fukushima accident, public acceptance isfound to be vital for launching a nuclear power program. Public opposition is presenting difficulty
for newcomer countries with relatively high capacities as they seek to proceed with nuclear energy.
In this sense, future developments in Asia will hinge on how and when public confidence in the useof nuclear energy will be restored, which also depends on how the global nuclear safety framework
will be strengthened.
Findlay (2011) analyzed drivers of and constraints on nuclear energy development,
considers the implications of the nuclear energy revival for global governance in the areas of safety,
security, and non-proliferation, and provides recommendations for strengthening global governance.
3

Jewell referred to “established NP countries” but in this paper countries operating nuclear power plants are simply
called “NP countries.”

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His analysis suggests that global expansion of nuclear energy up to 2030 will be slower and lessextensive than that indicated in many forecasts, but he argued that global governance arrangements
need to be reformed since many aspects of nuclear regimes are not optimally effective or are under
threat. His work proved to be so comprehensive and insightful that some of his recommendations are
now being adopted, with several others expected to be implemented over the medium to long term.
However, a pressing need to strengthen nuclear safety has surfaced following the Fukushima
accident and it is imperative to implement measures in the region where the greatest nuclear power
growth is expected.
The Fukushima accident reinforced the view that nuclear safety is a transnational issue
requiring international cooperation, and a number of international initiatives designed for improving
safety were taken in response. For instance, in September 2011, the world’s leading nuclear power
plant vendors adopted the Principles of Conduct, which reflect global best practices in connection
with the export of nuclear power plants. This initiative was led by the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace and at the launch of the principles, Richard Giordano, chairman of the Board ofTrustees for the Carnegie Endowment, said:
Whatever lessons particular countries draw from Fukushima over time, new nuclear plants
will continue to be built, some in countries that have only recently begun to utilize nuclear
power. It is therefore imperative that nuclear energy is implemented safely and responsibly
in both emerging and developed markets (Carnegie Endowment 2011).
Japan is reviewing its energy policy and the accident investigation committee is slated to release a
final report at the end of July 2012. The government intends to develop a new energy policy bysummer 2012 but has already stated that it would minimize its dependency on nuclear energy overthe medium to long terms (METI 2011). Even though Japan decided to move away from nuclear
energy, it needs to consider means of strengthening nuclear safety since the country is responsible

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for decommissioning all its nuclear power plants and managing radioactive waste over the long term.
As Hans Blix, then head of the IAEA, pointed out, “The image of nuclear safety is international; aserious accident anywhere affects the public’s view of nuclear power everywhere” (IAEA 1996).
Thus, strengthening nuclear safety will impact the public view worldwide. The next section of thispaper applies quantitative indicators and qualitative information to analyze Asian newcomers’
capacities to deploy nuclear power. Section 3 examines participation in the relevant international
conventions and treaties of both Asian newcomers and all NP countries. Section 4 analyzes thepossibilities surrounding development of nuclear energy by Asian newcomers. Section 5 considers
the implications of nuclear expansion in Asia for the global nuclear safety framework. Section 6
provides a brief overview of international cooperation in the area of nuclear safety in response to the
Fukushima accident and seeks to identify gaps in this cooperation. This study concludes withrecommendations for strengthening the global nuclear safety framework.

2. Asian newcomers’ capacities for developing nuclear energy
Many Asian countries plan to introduce nuclear energy, and this section analyzes the capacities andmotivations of ten Asian newcomer countries covered in the WNA’s report “Emerging Nuclear
Energy Countries” (WNA 2011e): Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan 4, Malaysia, Mongolia, thePhilippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Table 3 summarizes governments’announced plans and policies as well as recent IAEA missions. The IAEA, in its publication
Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, advises statesconsidering the introduction of nuclear power to initiate the following activities: develop acomprehensive nuclear legal framework; establish an effective regulatory system; develop humanresources; ensure adequate financial resources; develop a program for all aspects of operation,
decommissioning, and radioactive waste management; manage nuclear materials for the long term;
4

Kazakhstan operated one nuclear power reactor from 1972 to 1999 but this study includes it as a newcomer.

7and communicate with the public and the neighboring states openly and transparently (IAEA 2007b:3-4). The IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) is designed to assist member
states, at their request, in evaluating the status of their national infrastructure for the introduction of a
nuclear power program. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have hosted INIR missions,and the IAEA made numerous recommendations to help them further develop their national
infrastructure. Although it is not possible to comprehensively analyze all of the above activities, thissection uses quantitative indicators to assess the financial, technical, and institutional capacities ofAsian newcomers, and qualitative information to consider other factors affecting nuclear energy
development.

2.1. Methodologies
The analysis of capacities and motivations of Asian newcomer countries takes an approach similar to
Jewell’s (2011b) study and uses the indicators she identified for these factors, with the exception of
those for energy security motivation. First, it is assumed that newcomers will build a 1 GWe or
greater nuclear power plant (NPP). The reasons are as follows: The average reactor size in operationin 2010 was 850 MWe (megawatt-electric) (IAEA 2010a) and since 2004 construction has begun on
a total of 12 small- and medium-sized reactors 5 (SMRs) in just four countries – India, Pakistan,
China, and Russia (IAEA 2012a). Although interest in small reactors has been growing because of
the potential they offer for reduced capital costs and the suitability of their use in smaller grids, there
remain development challenges to overcome and regulatory approvals to obtain before they can be
deployed (Lokhov et al. 2011). Since Kazakhstan and Mongolia are considering SMR deployment
and Indonesia plans to build a 200 KWe (kilowatt-electric) reactor 6, the possibility of SMRs is not

5

The IAEA defines “small” and “medium” respectively as under 300 MWe and up to 700 MWe.
The Indonesian government gave initial approval for the construction of a 200 KWe plant and a 2 MW plant inlate-November 2011, though its long-term development plans did not include such small-scale plants.
6

8

entirely excluded from this analysis. However, to avoid complications resulting from different
assumptions, analysis of the capacities is based on the assumption of a 1 GWe or greater reactor.

Financial capacity
The high complexity and capital intensiveness in constructing a nuclear power project necessitateslong lead-time and substantial investment. Construction costs for nuclear power plants have
escalated dramatically since the mid-1980s. A study of the overnight capital costs (i.e., the costs of aconstruction project if no interest is incurred during construction) for nuclear power plants indicatesthat the costs for completed plants in the 1970s and early 1980s ranged from $1,000/kW to$3,000/kW and in the late-1980s to early 1990s were about $2,000-$7,000/kW (Cooper 2009).
According to recent data 7 since 2008, these costs are $2,500-$6,200/kW in North America,$2,000-$5,800/kW in Europe, and $1,500-$3,800/kW (i.e., $1.5 billion-$3.8 billion for a 1 GWe
NPP) in Asia (Barkatullah 2012). For most of the Asian newcomers, export financing and local orforeign commercial financing are the likely instruments for a nuclear power project. A country’s
GDP 8 is used to assess its financial capacity for deploying nuclear energy. GDP per capita measured
at purchasing power parity (PPP) in fixed 2005 international dollars is also used to compare thefinancial capacity of Asian newcomer countries to that of NP countries at the time of starting
construction on their first NPP 9. As Jewell indicates, the GDP of NP countries at the time of
construction ranged from 13 billion USD2000 (constant 2000 US dollars) to over 2 trillion USD2000(Jewell 2011a: 1048). The GDP per capita PPP of NP countries at the time of construction ranged
from $700 to $22,200 GDP per capita (Appendix 1). Given the recent sharp increase in construction

7

All data are in 2008 US dollars.
GDP at international exchange rates is used since newcomers in Asia will import nuclear technology and expertiseto construct their first NPP; therefore, the market exchange rate is relevant to financial capacity (see Jewell study[2011a: 1044] for more details).
9
As in the case of Jewell’s study, only NPPs of greater than 100 MWe are considered in order to exclude reactors
built solely for research purposes.
89costs, the low boundary of GDP and GDP per capita PPP of NP countries at the time of construction
is too low for newcomers to actually deploy nuclear power. Pakistan is the only NP country thatstarted construction with GDP below 50 billion USD2000 (Table 4). Pakistan, India, and China are theonly three NP countries with a GDP per capita PPP of less than $2,000 at the time of construction.
Therefore, the historical benchmarks for GDP and GDP per capita PPP are set to 50 billion USD2000
and $2,000, excluding the exceptionally low cases mentioned above. Looking at the current GDP
and GDP per capita of Asian NP countries, Pakistan’s level remained the lowest. Accordingly, a GDP
of 120 billion USD2000 and GDP per capita of $2,600, equivalent to the figures for Pakistan, can be
set as the current benchmarks.

Technical capacity
The IAEA advises that a single power plant represent no more than 5-10% of the total electricity
installed capacity (IAEA 2007b: 39). Since it is assumed that a newcomer will introduce a 1 GWe or
greater nuclear power plant, its electricity grid needs to be larger than 10 GWe, otherwise theinternational power grid needs to be connected. The existing grid size of newcomers is firstexamined by using data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA 2010) on total
electricity installed capacity. If it is less than 10 GWe, the number of years in which the size is
projected to exceed 10 GWe, assuming compound linear growth, is calculated. For countries where
the grid size is not projected to exceed 10 GWe, the latest status of international grid connections are
considered.

Institutional capacity
It takes at least 10-15 years from the time of its initial policy decision for a state considering nuclear
power to start operating its first NPP (IAEA 2007c: 3). With this initial implementation period, a10

time frame of at least 100 years should be considered for operation, decommissioning, andradioactive waste management. Therefore, adequate institutional capacity is required for newcomers
not only to attract private and/or foreign investment in nuclear power, but also to manage such along-term project. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measure six dimensions ofgovernance, of which the following three indicators are considered relevant to the development of
nuclear power: government effectiveness (GE), measuring “perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies;” political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS), measuring“perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism;” andcontrol of corruption (CC), capturing “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercisedfor private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the stateby elites and private interests” (World Bank 2011). Changes in governance over short year-to-year
periods are typically quite small, but to understand recent trends, the average score of the three years
from 2008 to 2010 is used for the Asian newcomers. Since the WGI data are only available from1996, this three-year average is also used for NP countries (Appendix 2). To attract private
investment in an NPP, newcomers are likely to need at least the same level of institutional capacity
as NP countries with privately or jointly owned and operated NPPs (private NP countries). For the
GE ranking, 92% of private NP countries fall in the top quartile (75-100). For PS and CC rankings,
no private NP countries fall in the lowest quartile. More than 25 of the 30 NP countries are ranked
above the second percentile (25-49) in PC and CC. Hence, the benchmarks for GE, PS, and CC are
set to 50, 25, and 25, respectively.

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Energy demand motivation
As Jewell suggests, the NP countries’ experience shows that the lack of financial, institutional, or
technical capacities can be overcome by a powerful motivation to develop nuclear energy.
Specifically, 24 of 25 NP countries had high growth rates in electricity consumption, at over 5%, in
the period preceding construction of their first NPP (Jewell 2011a). The indicators that Jewell
identified are used for the motivations of newcomers: the average annual electricity consumption
growth rate and the number of years it would take to consume electricity from a new 1 GWe NPP.
This study calculates the number of years assuming a reactor with a load factor of 80% 10. WorldBank data for electric power consumption during 2003-2008 are used (Table 5a). In addition, percapita electricity consumption is considered for energy demand motivation. Bangladesh’s electricity
consumption per capita is the lowest among Asian newcomers, and currently only about 40% of thecountry’s population has access to electricity. Though per capita energy demand is varied, reflecting
the diversity in economic development level, industry structure, resource endowments and prices,and climate conditions, countries with low levels of electricity consumption per capita are likely tohave stronger motivation to develop nuclear energy since they tend to have large shares of
population without electricity access.

Energy security motivation
Rising fossil fuel prices and concerns over global warming have led to growing demand for nuclear
energy. Diversifying the electricity generation mix is increasingly considered for strengthening thesecurity of energy supplies. Accordingly, this study looks at the electricity generation mix of
newcomer countries. A country with one or two types of fuel sources accounting for a large share of
its energy mix (Table 5b) is likely to have strong motivation to introduce nuclear power. And this10

This figure is based on the fact that “worldwide, load factors now average more than 80%” (Thomas 2010).

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strong motivation is also likely if fossil fuels are a substantial share of the energy mix since nuclear
power yields low levels of carbon dioxide emissions.

Other supporting factors and constraints
To better understand the status of Asian newcomers’ nuclear development, nuclear infrastructure,including research reactors and institutional infrastructure, is reviewed (Table 6) as well as nuclear
cooperation agreements or arrangements between newcomers and potential supplier countries (Table7). Many nuclear reactors are used for research, training, materials testing, and the production of
isotopes for medicine and industry (WNA 2011h), so they can help newcomers develop thenecessary technical infrastructure for starting nuclear power programs. The establishment of
nuclear-energy-related institutions also demonstrates readiness for nuclear power. The IAEA advises
that: “Crucial to the long term success of a national nuclear power programme is the experience ofan independent and competent nuclear regulatory body. The confidence of the public and theinternational community depends on an effective regulatory body. The essential need for acompetent and effective regulatory body should be understood and given high priority by the NEPIO[Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization]” (IAEA 2007b: 34). Hence, a country thathas already established an independent regulatory body can be considered as having met one of theimportant requirements associated with starting a nuclear power program.
The majority of Asian newcomers signed agreements or arrangements with potential
supplier countries (Table 7), which is likely to enable the countries to acquire technical and financial
support. For example, Vietnam and the United States in an arrangement signed in 2008 for exchange
of information and cooperation on nuclear safety matters agreed to: provide training for the Vietnam
Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Control (VARANSAC), provide an opportunity for
Vietnam to strengthen its nuclear regulatory infrastructure, and develop VARANSAC’s capacity toserve as an independent regulatory body.
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While nuclear infrastructure and cooperation agreements are supporting factors, public
opposition to nuclear energy is evidently one of the major constraints on nuclear energy
development. Several countries have developed plans but not yet committed partly because they facepublic opposition, which increased following the Fukushima accident. This factor is therefore
considered along with the above supporting factors to assess the capacities of Asian newcomer
countries.

2.2. Analysis of capacities and motivations
Table 4 summarizes the results of the comparative analysis of Asian newcomer countries and Asian
NP countries using quantitative indicators. The GDP of Asian NP countries at the time of
constructing their first NPP ranged from 13 billion USD2000 to 750 billion USD2000 and the GDP per
capita ranged from $700 to $6,100. While Mongolia, Sri Lanka, and Kazakhstan have GDPs of lessthan 50 billion USD2000 (below the historical benchmark), all newcomers except Bangladesh have arelatively large GDP per capita (above the historical benchmark). Five countries, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, have higher financial capacity than both thehistorical and current benchmarks.
Regarding technical capacity, seven of ten Asian newcomers have sufficiently large
electricity grids. Bangladesh is likely to have a grid that exceeds 10 GWe before 2030, but the grids
in Mongolia and Sri Lanka will not reach that mark. As for international grid connections, Sri Lanka
and India agreed on conducting a feasibility study for electricity grid interconnections between thetwo countries. A proposal has also been made for interconnections between Mongolia and China.
However, neither plan has been officially endorsed or refers to nuclear energy.
Institutional capacity of Asian newcomers is diverse from the WGI top to lowest quartilein government effectiveness, political stability, and control of corruption. Malaysia and Singapore

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are above the benchmark measured by these three indicators and much higher than three of the Asian
NP countries: China, India, and Pakistan. Malaysia and Singapore are likely to be able to attract
private investment in their NPPs. In addition to these two countries, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam are ranked higher than Pakistan inthree areas.
All Asian newcomers apart from the Philippines and Singapore are experiencing a highgrowth rate in electricity consumption, above 5% (Table 5a). Given the world annual average growthrate of 4% during 2003-2008, the rates in Bangladesh and Vietnam are very high at 12%. Most of the
Asian newcomers would only need a few years to consume the electricity produced from a new 1
GWe NPP, assuming that the NPP generates 100% capacity consumption of the electricity. The
Philippines and Singapore would consume the electricity generated from a new NPP within six years.
Sri Lanka would take 13 years. Only Mongolia is not likely to consume the electricity generated
from a new 1 GWe NPP by 2030 given its very low electricity consumption of 3,891 million kWh in
2008. Seven newcomer countries are below the world average in levels of per capita electricity
consumption. Considering these factors, all the Asian newcomer countries need to develop someenergy sources to meet the rising demand though such sources cannot be limited to nuclear energy.
Concerning the electricity generation mix, each Asian newcomer is different but fossil
fuels account for more than 85% of the energy mix for seven countries, with Sri Lanka, thePhilippines, and Vietnam as the exceptions. Those seven countries could therefore have strong
motivation to develop nuclear power. For Sri Lanka and Vietnam, about 40% of electricity
generation came from hydropower in 2010. Since heavy reliance on hydropower makes electricity
generation vulnerable to weather patterns, these two countries could also be interested in introducing
nuclear power to diversify their energy mix.
Thus, measured by quantitative indicators, Bangladesh and Vietnam should have very15

strong motivation to deploy nuclear power. Since other Asian newcomers are also likely to havestrong motivation, the next section focuses on the analysis of the capacities of each country.

2.3. Analysis of capacity of individual newcomer countries
Bangladesh has a GDP above the historical benchmark, with the lowest GDP per capita among Asian
newcomers and low institutional capacity. The existing electricity installed capacity lacks sufficient
size but will be expanded to have enough capacity by 2029. Although public support for nuclear
power fell from 64% to 51% after the Fukushima accident, opposition is still at a low 34%(WIN-Gallup International 2011). Bangladesh has a long history of nuclear power development with
25 years operating experience of a research reactor. The project of building a nuclear power plant in
Rooppur was first conceived in 1961, and Bangladesh has signed nuclear cooperation agreementswith China and Russia, which could reinforce its ability to develop nuclear energy.
Indonesia has relatively high financial and technical capacities. Its GDP and GDP per
capita exceed both the historical and current benchmarks. The country has a sufficiently large gridand three research reactors. More importantly, the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, an
independent regulatory body was established there in 1997. Indonesia has also signed agreementswith three potential supplier countries – Russia, Japan, and South Korea. The country is, however,ranked very low in political stability and control of corruption, and environmentalists andcommunity activists have opposed nuclear power projects on the grounds that Indonesia sits amid
the Pacific Ring of Fire, an area especially prone to earthquakes and seismic activity (New YorkTimes 2011). In November 2010, 60% of the public supported nuclear power but this fell to 49.5% in
November 2011 (FNCA 2011b). Thus, low institutional capacity and public opposition are
considered to be major constraints on nuclear power development.
Kazakhstan’s nuclear infrastructure is well developed largely because the country operated

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a nuclear power plant from 1972 to 1999. While its GDP is below the benchmark, GDP per capita is
the third highest among the Asian newcomers, above both the historical and current benchmarks.
The country’s existing grid is of sufficient scale. Kazakhstan has signed cooperation agreements withseven potential supplier countries. While its political stability is rated second highest after Singapore,
the rating of its control of corruption is quite low, which suggests that it will be difficult to attract
private investment for a nuclear power project.
Malaysia is the second wealthiest country among Asian newcomers as measured by GDP
per capita, and has relatively high institutional and technical capacities with 30 years of experience
operating a research reactor. The Malaysia Nuclear Power Cooperation (MNPC) was established toserve as the Nuclear Energy Program Implementing Organization (NEPIO) in January 2011. Public
support of nuclear power declined from 60% to 34% in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident(FNCA 2011a), and in order to promptly launch a nuclear power project, MNPC has made public
acceptance its first priority (MNPC 2012).
Mongolia has limited financial capacity with a GDP below the historical benchmark.
While political stability is rated high, government effectiveness and control of corruption are rated
low. The existing grid size is the smallest in the region and it is not likely to be expanded beyond 10
GWe by 2030. While the country’s nuclear infrastructure is underdeveloped, Mongolia has alreadysigned nuclear cooperation agreements with five countries. These agreements may be able to help
Mongolia overcome challenges stemming from its inadequate capacity.
The Philippines has a sufficiently large grid and relatively well-developed organizational
infrastructure but its political stability and control of corruption are rated very low. In response to the1973 oil crisis, the Philippines decided to develop nuclear energy and began constructing thetwo-unit Bataan nuclear power plant (BNPP) in 1976. The BNPP was completed in 1984 but wasnever put in use due to technical and political reasons including public opinion against operating the17plant in a seismically active area. In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, public support for the
BNPP declined further. In May 2011, the government announced it would turn it into a tourist
attraction. Public opposition appears to be a major constraint in this country.
Singapore has a mature economy with the largest GDP per capita in Asia. While Singapore
has not developed a research reactor or established an institution dedicated to nuclear power
development, it is ranked highest in terms of the three aspects of the WGI. Since Singapore is asmall island country, it faces constraints on site selection. However, Singapore has international gridconnections with Malaysia, which could lead to joint development.
Sri Lanka has a small GDP below the benchmark and a low political stability ranking, but
its GDP per capita is higher than both the historical and current benchmarks. The country’s existing
grid is small and it is not projected to expand beyond 10 GWe by 2030. Sri Lanka has no research
reactor and has signed no nuclear cooperation agreements. Located near the nuclear power plants inSouth India, Sri Lanka found it necessary to establish an independent regulatory body that would
address security concerns on radioactive sources and deal with radiation emergencies. In June 2011,
the Sri Lankan cabinet approved establishment of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Council (Nation2011). This could be a major step forward to nuclear energy development for the country.
Thailand has a large GDP and per capita GDP that exceed both the historical and current
benchmarks. The country has well-developed nuclear infrastructure with 50 years of experience
operating of a research reactor, and the country also has a very large grid. Government effectivenessand control corruption are rated higher than the benchmark while political stability is rated quite low.
Thailand decided to delay the development of nuclear power due in part to recent comments fromthe IAEA which said it did not believe Thailand was ready for nuclear power because of certain
issues including Thai laws and regulations, and the opposition of local people to plant construction(Wall Street Journal 2011). Opposition was quite strong even prior to the accident. A 2010 survey

18

found that 24% of the public consented to having a nuclear power plant in its community, while 66%
was opposed, and 64% of the public consented to having a plant in Thailand, with 32% opposed(Karasuddhi 2012). Public opposition therefore seems to be Thailand’s biggest challenge.
Lastly, Vietnam has a relatively small economy. Its GDP is above the historical benchmark
but below the current benchmark and its per capita GDP narrowly exceeds the current benchmark.
The country has a sufficiently large grid. Political stability is rated moderate and it has signed
nuclear cooperation agreements with numerous potential supplier countries. Nuclear infrastructure iswell developed. Following the Fukushima accident, public support for nuclear power in the country
fell from 62% to 57% and unfavorable views increased from 26% to 34% (WIN-Gallup International2011). Since the majority of the public still favors nuclear power, public opinion is not likely toheavily affect nuclear energy development.
Overall, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have higher capacities than the other Asian
newcomers. Nuclear infrastructure is relatively well developed in these three countries and in
Kazakhstan. The financial and institutional capacities of Bangladesh and Vietnam are not necessarilyadequate, but both countries have signed agreements with potential supplier countries and have beendeveloping nuclear infrastructure comparable to the above four.

3. State Participation in International Conventions and Treaties
This section examines state participation in international conventions and treaties concerning nuclear
safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. Although the focus here is on the international legal
instruments for nuclear safety, those for nuclear security and safeguards are also considered because
there is growing recognition that a mutually reinforcing relationship between these three andmeasures to strengthen any of them can positively affect the others. International conventions fornuclear liability are also considered since the potential transboundary effects of a nuclear accident

19require an international nuclear liability regime, which is vital for sustaining public confidence innuclear energy by ensuring that those affected are sufficiently compensated.
Table 8 summarizes the participation status of all NP countries and Asian newcomers. The
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) is the most important legally binding instrument adopted under
the auspices of the IAEA in the area of nuclear safety. Its objectives are achieving and maintaining ahigh level of nuclear safety worldwide, establishing and maintaining effective defenses at nuclear
installations against potential radiological hazards, and preventing accidents from having
radiological consequences and mitigating those consequences. The CNS entered into force in 1996
and as of April 5, 2012, 74 states and one regional organization, the European Atomic Energy
Community, are party to it. The IAEA strongly recommends that a state starting a nuclear power
program participate in the global nuclear safety regime, especially the Convention on Nuclear Safety(IAEA 2007b). Iran is the only state that started operating a nuclear power plant without ratifying the
CNS. This is an incentive instrument, based on the contracting parties’ common interest in achieving
higher levels of safety, which is to be developed and promoted through regular meetings. The CNS
obligates parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for peer review andattend review meetings 11 to discuss the reports. Among the Asian newcomers, Malaysia, Mongolia,
and Thailand have not yet signed nor ratified the CNS. At the 5th Review Meeting on the CNS held
April 4-14, 2011, though all the NP countries attended and submitted a national report, eight parties,
including Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka, did not submit reports and 11 parties, including Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka, did not attend (IAEA 2011f).
Another incentive-based nuclear safety instrument is the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (RADW). The
objectives of this convention are achieving and maintaining a high level of safety worldwide in spent
11

The date for the next meeting is determined at each review meeting. The interval between review meetings must
not exceed three years.

20

fuel and radioactive waste management; ensuring there are effective defenses against potential
hazards to protect individuals, society, and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing
radiation during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste management; and preventing accidents
from having radiological consequences and mitigating these consequences (IAEA 2011g). The
contracting parties are required to submit a national report for peer review and attend review
meetings. At the 3rd Review Meeting held on May 11-20, 2009, countries considering launching anational nuclear power program were strongly recommended to take into account the safety of spent
fuel and radioactive waste management from the very beginning of their consideration (IAEA
2009b). Nonetheless, among Asian newcomers, only Indonesia and Kazakhstan have ratified theRADW, and the Philippines has signed it. Of the Asian NP countries, neither India nor Pakistan has
signed.
The other two key conventions in the area of nuclear safety are the Convention on Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident (ENC) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency (AC). Both were adopted in 1986 following the Chernobyl
accident. While the former establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents, the latter sets out
coordination of emergency response and assistance in the event of accidents or radiologicalemergencies. All NP countries and Asian newcomers are parties to these two conventions.
International instruments for nuclear security are mostly voluntary and nonbinding. The
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is the only internationallylegally binding instrument adopted under IAEA auspices in this sphere of physical protection. Five
Asian newcomer countries are parties and the other four are in the process of ratifying theconvention. While the obligations for physical protection under the CPPNM cover nuclear material
during international transport, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM-AM) extends the scope by covering physical protection of nuclear

21

material in domestic use, in storage and during transport, and of nuclear facilities used for peacefulpurposes. The amendment also provides for expanded cooperation between and among states withregard to implementing rapid measures to combat and prevent nuclear theft, sabotage, or terrorism.
The amendment will take effect after two-thirds of the States Parties to the CPPNM (i.e., 97 states)
ratify it (IAEA 2011e). As of March 23, 2012, 55 countries are contracting states. Most European NP
countries have approved or ratified it. In Asia, China, India, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan have ratified
while South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam are in the process of ratifying
the amendment (Seoul NSS 2012).
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)
is another important legal instrument in the area of nuclear security. The United Nations General
Assembly adopted the convention in 2005, aiming to improve the global legal framework forcountering terrorist threats. All NP countries except Pakistan and Iran have signed or ratified. Among
Asian newcomers, Indonesia and Vietnam have not yet signed.
Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a country is living up to its
international commitments to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes. The
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires that all non-nuclear-weapon
states party to the treaty conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA
(IAEA 2011i). As of December 31, 2010, 167 states have concluded CSAs. Five NPT
nuclear-weapon states have concluded voluntary offer safeguards agreements and three non-parties
to the NPT (India, Pakistan, and Israel) have concluded INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements.
Additional Protocols (APs) enable the IAEA to provide assurance about both declared nuclear
material and undeclared nuclear material and activities. Hence, in countries with both CSA and AP inforce, the IAEA is able to optimize implementation of all available safeguards measures. As of
October 31, 2011, 112 countries have brought APs into force. In Asia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have22not yet signed an AP.
The earlier-mentioned CNS indicates that primary responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation rests with the nuclear power plant operators and that the state needs to ensure that each
operator meets its responsibilities. Operators are liable for any damage they caused, so they usuallytake out third-party liability insurance (WNA 2011g). International conventions, national legislation,and the pooling of insurance capacity govern such insurance (UBS 2011). Before 1997, theinternational liability regime primarily consisted of two instruments: the IAEA’s Vienna Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (VC) and the OECD’s Paris Convention on Nuclear Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (PC). While the parties to the VC are largely Eastern
European and Latin American countries, the parties to the PC include Western European countries
and Slovenia. Although the VC and PC were based on the same principles, they existed in isolationfrom each other, which raised a potential problem of the conflict of law (Rautenbach et al 2006). The
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris Convention (JP) was
adopted in 1988 aiming at establishing a link between these two conventions and entered into force
in 1992. In Asia, Kazakhstan and the Philippines are parties to the VC and the Philippines has signed
the JP.
In 1997, significant efforts were made to reinforce the existing liability regime. One is theProtocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (PAVC), which
was adopted to broaden the scope of nuclear damage 12 and increase the amount of compensation
available. Another is the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)
aimed at establishing a worldwide liability regime in which all states, regardless of they are party to
the VC or PC, may join and at providing additional funds to supplement the compensation available
under the VC or PC, or under national law, but it has not yet entered into force. Fifteen countries
12 This includes certain types of economic loss, the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, andthe costs of preventive measures.

23

have signed the CSC but only four have ratified it. To enter into effect, the CSC must be ratified byat least five countries with a minimum of 400,000 units (or roughly 400 GW thermal) of installed
nuclear capacity (IAEA 2011g). Among Asian newcomers, Indonesia and the Philippines signed the
CSC in October 1997 and March 1998, respectively. India signed it in October 2010. While Japanand South Korea have their own national legislation, they are not parties to any international nuclear
liability convention. Neither Pakistan nor China is a party to an international convention and neither
has its own legislation, although China is an active member of the international insurance poolingsystem. In the area of nuclear liability, Asian NP countries, with the exception of India, are far
behind the NP countries in Europe and the Americas 13, as well as three Asian newcomers –Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines.

4. Possible development of nuclear energy in Asian newcomer countries
The Asian newcomers vary in terms of capacity and nuclear infrastructure development, as well as
adherence to relevant international conventions, while they are alike with respect to their apparent
motivations. The latest developments show some interesting trends. Nuclear power projects are notproceeding in proportion to countries’ financial, technical, and institutional capacities as measured
by indicators. Nuclear infrastructure development and nuclear agreements with potential suppliercountries play a more important role in developing nuclear energy. Newcomers with strong
motivation have been conducting preparatory work on infrastructure issues and developing
cooperative relationships with potential supplier countries. Following the Fukushima accident,
public acceptance also seems to have become critical for launching nuclear power programs.
Bangladesh, for instance, currently has insufficient financial, technical, and institutional capacities
and has not yet ratified the relevant international conventions such as the RADW and the13

All NP countries in Europe and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) are parties to the conventions. The
US ratified the CSC and Canada is not a party to any international liability convention but has own legislation.

24

Amendment to the CPPNM, yet through external assistance it has been more rapidly pushing
forward with nuclear energy development than other Asian newcomers have. In February 2011,
Bangladesh signed an agreement with the Russian state corporation Rosatom to construct two 1,000
MWe reactors at Rooppur. In November 2011, another intergovernmental cooperation agreement
was signed for the Rooppur plant to be built by Rosatom’s subsidiary Atomstroyexport and the
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission. Along with financial support, Russia will provide technicalsupport in developing the necessary infrastructure and training personnel. The total cost of the
project is $1.5-$2 billion. Construction will start in 2013 and the first reactor will go online by 2018
(Banglanews24 2011). Considering that construction delays and running over budget are typical in
the nuclear industry (Findlay 2011: 44), the actual timeline might be delayed. However, since
nuclear power is still largely acceptable to the local people (FNCA 2011b), it is highly likely that
Bangladesh will begin operating the first nuclear power plant by 2030.
Similarly, Vietnam has limited financial capacity but has already signed two contracts. In
October 2010, the first was signed for Atomstroyexport to build the two-unit Ninh Thuan 1 plant.
Construction of the first reactor will begin in 2014 and be commissioned by 2020. Russia is preparedto supply the fuel and take back the used fuel for the life of the plant. The second contract was
signed in October 2011 between Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and a consortium of Japanesecompanies to design, build, and operate the Ninh Thuan 2 plant. Each plant will cost approximately$11 billion, whereby Russia and Japan are expected to gather 85% of the finance through a mixtureof export credits, loans, and insurance while EVN will raise 15% of the equity capital (Kidd 2011,
Pate 2011). Vietnam is currently in the final stage of procedures to adhere to the CPPNM (Seoul
NSS 2012). It is highly likely that the country will deploy four reactors by 2030 since it has
committed to the plans and a majority of the public supports nuclear power.
In contrast, Singapore has sufficient financial, technical, and institutional capacities but is25

far behind other Asian newcomers. While several countries are conducting or have completed
feasibility studies, Singapore is currently working on a pre-feasibility study. It is in the process ofamending its domestic legislation, which will enable the country to fully implement the provisions of
the CPPNM and its amendment. Given constraints on site selection and the advantage of a gridconnection with Malaysia, Singapore is unlikely to deploy a nuclear power plant in the country. It is
more likely that it will join Malaysia in a nuclear power project there.
The latest developments in Bangladesh and Vietnam suggest that external support, usuallyfrom supplier countries, can complement insufficient financial, technical, and institutional capacities.
Each newcomer country has a number of challenges to overcome before embarking on a nuclear
power project. If Asian newcomers in fact overcome the challenges, all of them could potentiallyintroduce nuclear power by 2030. Both Mongolia and Sri Lanka, where the existing grid size is small
and nuclear infrastructure is underdeveloped, are not likely to construct a 1 GWe or greater plant. If
small nuclear reactors can be technically proven in the near future, it is also possible that these twocountries will develop nuclear energy by 2030. Public opinion so far is mixed. Since neither country
has developed concrete plans, it seems to be too early for the public to clearly discern between thepros and cons of introducing nuclear energy.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have relatively high financial, technical, andinstitutional capacities with extensive preparatory work on infrastructure issues. They also signed
agreements with potential supplier countries. Nevertheless, they face difficulties due to public
opposition. Berger (2011) argues that, “Perhaps the least democratic is also the least inhibited bypopular sentiment in the race towards operational nuclear capacity.” While Vietnam and Bangladesh
are ranked 143rd and 83rd on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2011, therespective rankings of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are 60, 71, and 58 (EIU 2011), the highest
among Asian newcomers excluding Sri Lanka at 57. Gaining public acceptance will not be easy for26

these three countries but will be essential for launching a nuclear power program.
Despite strong public opposition, the Indonesian government approved the construction of
a 200 KWe nuclear power plant and a 2 MWe plant 14 in November 2011 (Jakarta Post 2011). The
capacity of both plants is so small that the media scarcely covered the public reaction. Indonesia has
implemented the relevant international legal instruments with the exception of ICSANT and intends
to start the ratification procedures in accordance with its constitutional processes. Indonesia has also
already established an independent regulatory body. Given considerable developments in the legal
and regulatory aspects, it is likely that the first two small-scale plants will be constructed in one or
two decades. Construction of two 1,000 MWe units will depend on changes in public perception of
nuclear energy.
Thailand, being fully aware of the need for open and timely interaction andcommunication regarding all aspects of nuclear power development, has been implementing public
communication programs over the last several years. Moreover, it is working toward ratification of
the relevant international treaties such as ICSANT and CPPNM (Seoul NSS 2012). Other challenges
identified are the need to overcome its political instability, develop national laws and regulations,and establish an independent regulatory body. Malaysia has similar challenges and has also been
implementing public communication programs. It is in the final stages of revising its national
nuclear law, which would facilitate its implementing international conventions and agreements
including its accession to the CPPNM and ratification of the ICSANT and AP. Since both Thailand
and Malaysia are steadily taking the required actions, future nuclear development there will hinge on
public acceptance.
The Philippines has lower financial and institutional capacities than Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand but has the experience of completing construction of a nuclear power plant. The

14

Indonesia’s long-term development plans did not include such small-scale plants.

27

government is working on amending the Human Security Act of 2007 to cover the provisions of
ICSANT and the Amendment to the CPPNM. Ratification of the CNS and RADW are underway.
The future of nuclear energy will depend on public acceptance since public opposition to nuclear
power has been strong in the Philippines over the years.
Kazakhstan has ratified the relevant international treaties and its nuclear infrastructure iswell developed. A project for building Russian-designed nuclear reactors has been underconsideration for several years and feasibility studies have been conducted. Construction of a nuclear
power plant is seen as a long-term objective and nuclear power is expected to represent 4% of thecountry’s electricity generation by 2030 (Turkish Weekly 2012). Public opposition to nuclear power
is seen but it is not as strong as in the four previously mentioned countries. Given the well-developed
nuclear infrastructure and legal framework, as well as cooperation agreements with seven potential
supplier countries, the future for nuclear power seems to be a matter of political decision.
In sum, it is highly likely that Bangladesh and Vietnam will deploy nuclear power by 2030.
If public confidence in the use of nuclear power is restored and public view becomes more positive,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines are also likely to introduce nuclear power by
2030.

5. Implications of nuclear expansion in Asia
To overcome the obstacles toward nuclear energy development, Asian newcomers need regional orinternational cooperation and assistance from potential supplier countries. Bangladesh, for instance,
expects assistance in infrastructure development and establishment of safety culture as well as
human resource development (FNCA 2011b). Thailand expects assistance concerning training for its
utilities and regulatory body, sharing of technical experience in regulation, operation,
decommissioning, and waste management, as well as guidance on public communication (Takabut2012). Nevertheless, the current regional cooperation framework in Asia is underdeveloped and an28

international cooperation framework has yet to be established in some important areas. Asian NP
countries also lack sufficient capabilities or adequate competence particularly in legal and regulatory
aspects.
First, three Asian NP countries have yet to establish an effective independent regulatory
body though designation of such a body is required for states first embarking on nuclear power
programs. In China, neither the National Nuclear Security Administration nor the China Atomic
Energy Authority is independent. The former is attached to the Ministry of Environmental Protection
and the latter is under the Ministry of Industries and Information Technology (Kong and Lampton
2011, Xu 2012). Japan intended to establish an independent Nuclear Regulatory Agency in April
2012 but the establishment will be delayed by at least two months since the opposition parties do notagree on the core details of the bill that would establish it (Nikkei 2012). India in September 2011
introduced a bill to create an independent nuclear regulator, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority,
to replace its Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and is currently in the process of establishing it.
South Korea only recently created its Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, an independent
regulatory body, in October 2011. Although the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority wasestablished as a competent and independent regulatory body in 2001, there is little possibility that
Pakistan will provide assistance in this area for newcomers since the country does not participate
actively in the regional cooperation framework and is not a supplier country.
Second, Asian NP countries have not yet ratified some of the relevant international treaties
despite the significance of achieving universal adherence to such treaties. At first glance, the fact that
Pakistan is not party to the RADW, Amendment to the CPPNM, or ICSANT looks problematic, but
the fact that Japan and South Korea have not yet ratified a nuclear liability convention is more
problematic since both are major supplier countries and operate the largest nuclear electricity
generation capacity in Asia. China began exporting reactors to Pakistan and is likely to do business29

with Southeast Asian countries and Vietnam (Goncharuk 2011). India is on the way to becoming a
nuclear supplier and is considering Kazakhstan, Thailand, and Vietnam as potential buyers of its
small reactors (WNN 2010b, Maitra 2011). Findlay (2011: 156) pointed out that, “As to thenewcomers, safety will depend on how well they are drawn into the web of treaties, peer review
process, and assistance mechanisms.” Hence, newcomers should accede to the relevant treaties but it
is more important for NP countries to ratify the relevant international treaties as soon as possible. In
particular, the CSC aimed at creating a global nuclear liability regime needs at least one more statewith over 90 GWt (gigawatt thermal) of installed capacity 15 to enter into force. Japan began toconsider joining the CSC only after the Fukushima accident (Reuters 2011). Since the domestic
liability law needs to be revised, Japan will ratify the CSC sometime after summer 2012 (Asahi
Shimbun 2012). If it does so, the CSC will go into effect on the 90th day after its date of ratification.
Daniel Poneman, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy, also said during his visit to Japan in lastDecember, “I encourage Japan once again to take an international leadership position by ratifying the
CSC” (U.S. Department of Energy 2011).
Third, the regional cooperation framework for nuclear safety in Asia is underdeveloped incomparison to Europe, where a network of chief regulators of 17 countries, the Western European
Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), and an independent, authoritative expert body consistingof regulators of all 27 EU member states, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG)
are established. In Asia, the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), a Japan-led
cooperative framework for peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the Asian Nuclear Safety
Network (ANSN), a knowledge network to pool, analyze, and share nuclear safety information andpractical experience in Asia have been promoting regional cooperation in capacity building and

15

See p. 24 for the minimum requirement. Each 3 MWt (megawatt thermal) corresponds to about 1 MWe whenelectricity is generated (WNA 2009). As of March 2012, the contracting states of the CSC are Argentina (installedcapacity: c., 3 GWt), Morocco (0 GWt), Romania (c., 4 GWt) and the US (c., 303 GWt). Japan’s capacity is c., 134
GWt.

30

infrastructure development to strengthen nuclear safety. On the other hand, in Europe, the WENRA
seeks to develop a common approach to nuclear safety and to provide independent ability to examine
nuclear safety in applicant countries. The WENRA has contributed to the improvement of national
nuclear safety requirements through the formulation of common safety reference levels and has
created a platform for information exchange among regulators (WENRA 2009). The ENSREG also
helps in establishing conditions for continuous improvement and reaching common understanding in
the areas of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. This kind of regional cooperation
mechanism has yet to be created in Asia.
Most importantly, while nuclear energy expansion will lead to increased amounts of spent
fuel and nuclear waste, a long-term solution for high-level radioactive waste management has yet tobe achieved. Progress has been made in reducing the amount of low- to intermediate-level
radioactive waste, but the implementation of deep geological disposal remains a key challenge forthe industry and for governments (NEA 2011b). No country has successfully opened a repository forhigh-level radioactive waste. Only Finland and Sweden currently have plans to open repositories in
2020, followed by other several European countries and Canada in the 2020s or 2030s. In November
2010, the European Commission proposed a directive on the management of spent fuel andradioactive waste, which would require that all member states specify when, where, and how they
will construct and manage the repositories (NEA 2010). The WENRA’s Working Group on Waste
and Decommissioning also finalized the safety reference levels for radioactive waste storage
facilities and published a report in November 2011. Asian countries trail European countries inlong-term radioactive waste management. China, for instance, will complete repository site selection
by 2020 while Japan and South Korea have yet to open even interim storage facilities (WNA 2011b).
For newcomer countries with one or two reactors, establishing their own repositories is likely to beprohibitive on the grounds of cost and capacity (Findlay 2010). External assistance is therefore

31needed but Asian NP countries lack sufficient capabilities and no international cooperation
framework in this area has been established.

6. International cooperation in response to the Fukushima accident
It has been recognized that international cooperation in nuclear energy must be strengthened in order
to cope with the expected rise in nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, prior to the Fukushima accident,
the civilian nuclear industry tended to maintain distance from regimes, while governments andinternational organizations often failed to consult or engage with industrial and other stakeholders(Fréchette and Findlay 2010). Not only in nuclear energy but also in the energy sector as a whole,“What has been lacking to date is a concerted effort to develop better habits of collaboration, to learn
from experience, and to develop the organizational infrastructure needed for progress” (Florini 2010:176). Since the Fukushima accident, however, collective action in strengthening nuclear safety hascome to the fore. The international community has adopted a number of initiatives to draw and act
upon the lessons from the accident. The European Union (EU), for instance, launched a process ofcarrying out comprehensive risk and safety assessments, so-called stress tests, for all 143 of its
nuclear power plants. National reports were submitted to the EU Commission by the end of 2011 andare currently under peer review. The final results will be unveiled in June 2012 (European
Commission 2011). At the commission’s request, neighboring states Switzerland and Ukraine alsojoined stress tests. Russia, Belarus, Croatia, Armenia, and Turkey also began conducting comparable
assessments with different timescales. The EU is taking the Fukushima accident as a catalyst forenhancing nuclear safety and strengthening its role in the nuclear field, arguing that issues of nuclear
safety are best addressed jointly at the EU level, not separately by member states (Raetzke 2011).
The 5th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the CNS was held April 4-14, 2011
in Vienna, wherein member states reaffirmed their commitment to achieving and maintaining a high32

level of nuclear safety worldwide through strengthening national measures and international
cooperation. They discussed a range of issues related to nuclear safety, including emergency
management and preparedness, training of plant operators for severe accident scenarios, andcommunications in emergency situations. The contracting parties decided to hold an Extraordinary
Meeting in August 2012, aiming at strengthening safety through reviewing and sharing lessons
learned and actions taken in response to the Fukushima accident, as well as reviewing theeffectiveness of the CNS provisions (IAEA 2011f).
In June 2011, the nuclear regulatory authorities of the G8 countries, OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency member countries, and associated countries including Brazil, India, Romania, South
Africa, and Ukraine gathered in Paris to discuss insights gained from the Fukushima accident andfollow-up actions at the international level.
North America also responded to the Fukushima accident swiftly and forcefully. The US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) undertook a comprehensive review of all 104 domestic
nuclear units and created a task force to identify lessons learned from the accident. The task force
issued a report titled “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century” in July
2011. One of its 12 recommendations is “establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory
framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk
considerations” (US NRC 2011). In November 2011, the INPO published a special report to provide
an accurate, consolidated source of information regarding the Fukushima accident. The Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) also established a CNSC Fukushima Task Force in April 2011
to review its nuclear power plants’ ability to withstand extreme events. In the report published in
October 2011, the task force makes a number of recommendations for strengthening
defense-in-depth, bolstering emergency response, and improving regulatory oversight (CNSC 2011).
Efforts to ensure nuclear safety have been increasing in Europe, North America, and33

worldwide. In September 2011, the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the IAEA’s Boardof Governors and was unanimously endorsed by the 55th General Conference. This is the first timesince the IAEA’s inception in 1957 that its 151 member states put together all nuclear safety tools in
a comprehensive program to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework at the national, regional,
and international levels. The plan consists of 12 main actions, such as strengthening IAEA peer
reviews to maximize the benefits to member states, strengthening the effectiveness of national
regulatory bodies, and improving the effectiveness of the international legal framework, in particular,
establishing a global nuclear liability regime (IAEA 2011d).
The nuclear industry and a private non-profit organization have also taken collective action.
In September 2011, the world’s leading nuclear power plant vendors based in Canada, France, Japan,
Russia, South Korea, and the United States adopted the Principles of Conduct that reflect global bestpractices in connection with the export of nuclear power plants. The Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace has led this initiative since October 2008. Over the past three years,
representatives from the major exporters have crafted these principles, which reflect some lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident. The principles incorporate the requirements of international
treaties 16, conforming to the IAEA guidelines. They also state that exporters will cooperate with theircustomers to inform and consult with nearby communities about the potential social andenvironmental effects of planned project activities. The nuclear vendors are to meet regularly toreview progress in applying the principles and to update them.
On October 23-25, 2011, the WANO held its 11th WANO Biennial General Meeting, withmore than 600 participants gathering and pledging to increase their commitment to nuclear safety.
Key decisions made at the meeting were to strengthen peer review activities, improve the quality andconsistency of all WANO activities and services, and increase the number of experienced staff
16

For details, see Table 8. The vendor will have made a reasonable judgment that the customer state is either a party
to the underlined treaties or will become a party in a timely manner.

34

annually over the next three years. WANO will take the initiative in working with other key
organizations such as the IAEA, WNA, and INPO to integrate its plan with their plans. For example,
coordination between WANO peer reviews and IAEA OSART missions will be strengthened.
Moreover, a pre-startup peer review 17 team office will be set up in Asia to ensure that all new
nuclear plants receive such a review before initial criticality (WANO 2011).
Thus, international cooperation for improving nuclear safety has been strengthened as the
distance between the IAEA and the nuclear industry shrinks. Diverse stakeholders, from industry toresearch institutions, have been making concerted efforts. However, unlike the non-proliferation
regime in which the IAEA is described as the nuclear watchdog, the nuclear safety regime relies not
on multilateral monitoring and verification but on peer reviews (Findlay 2011: 198). The CNS aims
at achieving a high level of nuclear safety through application of fundamental safety principles rather
than of detailed safety standards. Each state bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear
facilities and there is no nuclear safety regulatory authority at the international level. In fact, soonafter the Fukushima accident, Pierre Gadonneix, chairman of the World Energy Council (WEC)
suggested, “the time may now have come for the world to progressively set up an international
cooperation and governance on nuclear safety” (EER 2011). The results of the WEC Survey
conducted after the Fukushima accident show that adoption and convergence of international safety
regulations are increasingly supported but support for the international enforcement of safety
standards seems to be comparatively lower (WEC 2012). Since it is unlikely that binding
international safety standards will be created in the near future, a regional cooperative framework
should be put in place to ensure effective safety regulations and best safety practices.
In November 2011, the top nuclear safety regulators of Japan, China, and South Korea
reaffirmed their intent to adopt the trilateral “Cooperative Nuclear Safety Initiative” aimed at
17

WANO offers pre-startup peer reviews for new entrants to the nuclear industry that are moving toward fuelloading in their first reactor.

35

establishing a practical and tangible framework for cooperation. Although this initiative seeks topromote international cooperation in nuclear safety across the entire Asian region, it aims to develop
a harmonized approach to nuclear safety and regulation within the three countries with reference tothe IAEA safety standards. This can be regarded as the beginning of the initial process ofestablishing a regional regulatory network, albeit with only three countries.
In Japan, the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) has decided to establish a
new organization designed to build a mechanism for Japanese electric power companies not only tocomply with regulations but also to take the initiative in improving safety through collaboration withoverseas organizations such as the INPO. This collaboration will greatly help Japanese electric
power companies improve nuclear safety and will enable lessons learned from the Fukushima
accident to be shared internationally.
At the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held on March 26-27, 2012, South Korea played acritical role in strengthening international cooperation in nuclear security. Representatives from morethan 53 countries and international organizations participated in the summit, where synergies
between nuclear safety and security were highlighted. The summit yielded practical outcomes toreduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. For instance, participating countries were encouraged to join
and ratify ICSANT and the Amendment to the CPPNM and agreed to make collective efforts tobring the Amendment to the CPPNM into effect by 2014 (Seoul NSS 2012). The amendment isextremely important for both nuclear security and safety since it is an effective anti-terrorism
instrument. Thus, the agreement at this summit will also lead to the strengthening of nuclear safety.

7. Conclusions
This study suggests that public acceptance has become critical for launching a nuclear power
program. It is highly likely that Bangladesh and Vietnam, where a majority of the public supports

36

nuclear power, will develop nuclear energy by 2030. For Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and thePhilippines, which face public opposition, future development of nuclear power will hinge on how
and when public confidence in the use of nuclear energy is restored. While international cooperationin the area of nuclear safety has been strengthened, an effective regional cooperation mechanism has
yet to be established in Asia. Reyners (2011) pointed out that nuclear safety is not defined in a static
way but is an ongoing process of good practices, behaviors, and rules. Accordingly, it is important toestablish an international cooperative framework that encourages all stakeholders to continually
make improvements that strengthen nuclear safety. In the coming decade, with nuclear expansion
expected in Asia, it will be essential to establish a regional regulatory network. Prior to this, Japan,
the Asian country with the most experience operating nuclear power plants and the largest installed
nuclear capacity, needs to take actions in the following areas. First, it should establish an
independent nuclear regulatory agency as soon as possible. Organizational restructuring alone will
not be enough to improve effectiveness in Japan’s regulatory functions. Professionals with many
years of experience in Japan’s nuclear energy program pointed out that regulatory deficiencies inJapan were ultimately rooted in the lack of accountability in its “nuclear culture” and low tolerancein Japanese society for challenging authority (Acton and Hibbs 2012). Intensified effort will beneeded to correct these root causes.
Second, Japan needs to accelerate the CSC ratification process. As mentioned earlier,Japan’s participation allows the CSC to enter into force, which will pave the way for establishing a
global nuclear liability regime.
Third, Japan should ratify the Amendment to the CPPNM. Japan did not refer to theamendment in its national progress report submitted to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, at whichmore than ten countries showed their commitment to ratification, but since Japan agreed at thesummit to make collective efforts to bring the amendment into force by 2014, it should act

37

accordingly.
In Asia, a regional regulatory network needs to be established to promote regional
cooperation in nuclear safety. The top nuclear regulators of China, South Korea, and Japan haveadopted a trilateral initiative on nuclear safety to establish a cooperative framework, and this would
be more effective if India, Pakistan, and Asian newcomers joined. Thailand recently proposed theidea of establishing a nuclear regulatory network among nuclear regulatory bodies in Southeast Asia.
To share information and experience in Asia, a regional regulatory cooperation framework should be
open to India and Pakistan as well as interested newcomers, including ASEAN countries. Given that
Pakistan and India are outside the NPT, developing a harmonized approach with these two countries
might be a complicated task. In Europe, the top nuclear regulators of 10 countries created theWENRA in 1999 and now 17 countries are represented. It would be desirable for an Asian regulatory
network to start with three countries and later expand membership. Under this kind of regional
cooperation framework, the issue of long-term radioactive waste management should also be
addressed. The results of a global public opinion poll show that the primary factors for opposition to
nuclear power are concerns over waste disposal solutions (91%) followed by the safety of power
plant operation (90%) and decommissioning nuclear power plants (80%) (Accenture Newsroom2009). Finding a long-term solution to high-level radioactive waste management is critical tobuilding public confidence in the use of nuclear energy.
Lastly, the creation of an international emergency accident response team will bolster
emergency response capabilities. In May 2011, the INPO called for creation of a rapid response teamthat would be dispatched to major nuclear accidents in the United States and other countries (Platts
2011a). At the 55th IAEA General Conference, France also proposed creating an international rapid
response team for nuclear emergencies (Platts 2011b). This proposal has not yet materialized but
creating such a team is one of the lessons from the Fukushima accident, namely that it is extremely38important to mitigate the consequences of the accident by responding to it as rapidly as possible.
Therefore, Japan should work toward the creation of an international rapid response team incollaboration with the United States, France, other countries, and the IAEA. Asian newcomers may
not have adequate capacity to deal with a major nuclear emergency, and Japan’s participation in aninternational team is significant given its proximity to other Asian countries. Moreover, throughregular meetings and training, international team members would be able to share valuable
experience and knowledge, which would lead to strengthening of the global nuclear safety
framework.
In Asia, where use of nuclear energy will rise in the coming years, a regional cooperation
mechanism needs to be established to encourage continuous improvement of nuclear safety. Richard
Meserve, president of the Carnegie Institution for Science, said: “In the nuclear business you cannever say, ‘The task is done.’ It is an inherent responsibility to explore, examine, and assess thesignificance of nuclear safety and security vulnerabilities continuously” (IAEA 2012b). Constant andconcerted efforts will be essential for strengthening nuclear safety.

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47

Table 1: Nuclear Power Reactors in Asia
Number of past

Country

Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Malalysia
Pakistan
Philippines(Taiwan)Thailand
VietnamAsia
World

OSARTimissions

11
0#
5

6
5

27
161

Reactors
operable*

Reactors underconstruction*

0
15
20
0
51
0
0
23
0
3
0
6
0
0
118
435

0
26
6
0
2
0
0
3
0
1
0
2
0
0
40
60

Reactors planned*

Reactors proposed*No.

MWe grossNo.

MWe gross

2
51
17
2
10
2
0
6
0
1
0
0
0
4
95
163

2000
57480
15000
2000
13772
600

0
120
40
4
5
2
1
0
2
2
0
1
5
6
188
329

0
123000
49000
4000
6760
600
950
0
2000
2000

Sources: WNA (2012a), WNA (2011a), (IAEA 2011c), (IAEA 2012c)
countries in bold: nuclear newcomer countries*: as of March 1, 2012
i: IAEA's Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, status of April 2012#

: The OSART mission was officially requested by India. (planned in 2012)

8400
340

4000
103592
181645

1350
5000
6700
201360376255

WNA
WNA
IAEA
IAEA
2030 Low 2030 High 2030 Low 2030 High

0
50
20
2
55
0

10
200
70
6
70
2

25
0
10
1

50
10
20
10

2
2
167
602

10
15
473
1350

528

789

Table 2: Nuclear Power Reactors by Region
Country
North America
CanadaUSA
subtotal
Latin America
Argentina
BrazilChile
Mexicosubtotal
Eastern Europe
Armenia
Belarus
Bulgaria
Czech RepublicHungary
Lithuania
PolandRomania
RussiaSlovakia
Slovenia
UkrainesubtotalWestern Europe
Belgium
FinlandFranceGermany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
SwedenSwitzerland
TurkeyUnited Kingdom
subtotal
AfricaEgypt
South Africa
subtotal
Middle East
Iran
IsraelJordanSaudi Arabia
UAE
subtotal
Asia subtotal
World
Asia/World Raito

Reactors operable*

Reactors underconstruction*

Reactors planned*

Reactors proposed*

3
7
10

17
104
121

3
1
4

3
11
14

3
19
22

1
6

2
2
0
2
6

1
1
0
0
2

2
0
0
0
2

1
4
4
2
11

1
0
2
6
4
0
0
2
33
4
1
15
68

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
2
0
0
12

1
2
2
2
0
1
6
2
17
0
0
2
35

0
2
0
1
2
0
0
1
24
1
1
11
43

3
56

7
4
58
9
0
1
8
10
5
0
17
119

0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
9

0
2
1
0
10
1
0
0
3
4
9
30

4
4

0
2
2

0
0
0

1
0
1

1
6
7

1
0
0
0
0
1
118
435
0.27

0
0
0
0
0
0
40
60
0.67

2
0
1
0
4
7
95
163
0.58

1
1
0
16
10
28
188
329
0.57

Number of past
OSART missions

4
11
1
6
9
2
2
3
7
6
3
14
53
2
3
23
6
3
5
7
4

0#

0
27
161
0.17

Sources: WNA (2012a), (IAEA 2012c)*: as of March 1, 2012#:The OSART mission was officially requested by Iran. (planned in 2013)Table 3: Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors in Asia
Country

Governments' announaced policies and plans

IAEA missions

Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR),
November 2011 (The mission concluded that
Agreed with Russia to build two 1000 MWe reactors at Rooppur. Construction will start in 2013 and the first reactor
Bangladesh
Bangladesh has mostly met the conditions foris expected to begin operation by 2018.
knowledgeable decision-making and made 50
recommendations and 20 specific suggestions.)
INIR, November 2009 (The mission concluded thatPlans to build four nuclear plants of total 6000 MWe by 2025, starting with two 1000 MWe units in Bangkathere is good progress in the development of theIndonesia Belitung. The government has $8 billion earmarked for four plants. In November 2011, the government approved
national infrastructure in many areas and madeconstruction of a 200 KW nuclear power plant and a 2MW plant.
recommendations in several areas.); Emergency
Preparedness Review (EPREV), 2004
Kazakhstan

Plans to build a large reactor in the southern region, smaller units in the western region, and smaller cogeneration
units in regional cities.

Malaysia

Plans to deploy two 1000 MWe nuclear power plants by 2023 (the first unit by 2021). The final site selection is
Human Resource Management and Knowledge
scheduled to be completed by the end of 2012. The government has a RM21.3 billion (c., $7 billion) budget to build
Transition, July 2009; EPREV, 2009
the two-unit plant.

Mongolia

Tentatively plans to develop nuclear power, using either Korean Smart (100 MWe) reactors or Toshiba Super-Safe,
Small & Simple types from 2021.

Decided to turn an unused Bataan Nuclear Power Plant into a tourist attraction. Apart from Bataan, the government is
Philippines considering two 1000 MWe Korean Standard Nuclear Plant units.
EPREV, July 2010
Singapore

Is considering the prospects of using nuclear power by conducting pre-feasibility study.

Sri Lanka

Is conducting a pre-feasibility study of using nuclear energy for power generation from about 2025.

Thailand

Vietnam

INIR, December 2010 (The review team identified
Decided to delay the commercial startup of five planned nuclear-power plants of total 5000 Mwe over 2020-2028 byseveral gaps and made recommendations to address
three years after receiving advice from the IAEA.
these gaps.); EPREV, 2010
INIR, December 2009 (The review team identified that
Agreed with Russia to construct the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant using two 1000 or 1200 MWe reactors (thethere are no major gaps for phase 1 activities, andfirst unit is expected to be operating in 2020). Agreed with Japan to build the Ninh Thuan 2 plant with two 1000
made recommendations mainly for the phase 2
MWe reactors to go online in 2024-25.
activities.)

Sources: (WNA 2011c), (WNA 2011d), (WNA 2011e), (IAEA 2009a), (IAEA 2011j), (IAEA 2011k), (CNN 2011), (Wall Street Journal 2011), (Jakarta Post 2011), (National Nuclear
Energy Agency of the Republic of Indonesia 2011), (IAEA 2010b), (VAEA 2011)Table 4: Capacities of Asian Newcomer Countries

Country

Financial capacity
GDP 2010
2009 GDP/capita PPP(constant 2000
(fixed 2005
international dollars)ii
US$)i (billions)

Existing grid size Year (grid isprojected to be2008 iii (GWe)over 10 Gwe)

Bangladesh

82

1492

5.45

2029ivIndonesia

274

3818

27.80

Kazakhstan

40

10612

Malaysia

146

Mongolia

Technical capacity
Institutional capacity
Electricity installed
Existing linkage of power grid Government
Political
Control ofcapacityiii annual growthin Asiavi (proposal)
Corruptionv
Effectivenessv Stabilityv
rate, 2003-2008 (%)
23

9

16

Now

47

19

27

18.73

Now

43

67

17

12388

22.97

Now

81

48

60

2

3205

0.83

not likely

33

65

27

Philippines

129

3204

15.68

Now

53

8

24

Singapore

162

43526

10.95

Now

Singapore - Malaysia

100

92

99

Sri Lanka

27

4254

2.65

not likely [2048]iv(Sri Lanka-India)

50

14

45

Thailand

187

7376

40.67

Now

Thailand - Malaysia, Thailand Lao PDR, Thailand - Cambodia

60

13

45

Vietnam

63

2679

13.85

Now

46

51

33

50a, 120b

2000a, 2600b

10

50

25

25

BenchmarkCountry

GDP at the start ofconstructioni (billions)

3.0

0

3.4

GDP/capita PPP at the start Current (2010)

Currnet (2009)

Year (started constructionof constructionii

GDP/capita PPPii

of their first NPP)vii

GDPi (billions)

Malaysia - Singapore, Malaysia Thailand(Mongolia-China, MongoliaRussia)

Ownership and operation

Government
Effectiveness

Political
Stability

Control ofCorruption

China

304

1217

3243

6022

1985

Mixed

60

27

37

India

104

702

971

2731

1968

State-owned and operated

54

12

41

Japan

750

6094

5064

29681

1961

privately owned and operated

88

78

88

Pakistan

13

933

116

2603

1966

State-owned and operated

26

1

15

South Korea

71

3031

800

23875

1972

State-owned and operated

83

51

69

Sources: i (World Bank 2011a), ii(Gapminder 2010), iii(EIA 2010), ivAuthor's calculation assuming compound linear growth of grid capacity (based on the capacity annual growth rate), v(World Bank 2011b)
vi
a: historical benchmark; b: current benchmark
Shaded: below the benchmark(Hermawanto 2011), (Ceylon Eelectricity Board 2011), vii (Jewell 2011a)

Table 5a: Energy Demand of Asian Newcomer Countries
Country

Electric power consumption(2003-2008) annual growth rate(%)aNumber of years to consume
electric power from a 1 GWe
NPPb(2009) Electricity
consumption/population(kWh/capita)c

Bangladesh

12

2

228

Indonesia

7

1

609

Kazakhstan

5

2

4506

Malaysia

5

2

3677

Mongolia

6

not likely

1432

Philippines

3

5

592

Singapore

3

6

7948

Sri Lanka

5

13

416

Thailand

5

1

2073

Vietnam

12

1

904

World average

4

NP countries

5>

2730

Sources: a: (World Bank 2011a), b: Author's own calculation assuming compound linear growth of electric power
consumption (based on the capacity annual growth rate 2003-2008)*, c: IEA (2011) Key World Energy Statistics
Note: * The number of years it would take to consume electricicty from a 1 GW NPP is calculated assuming 100%
capacity consumption of the electricity generated from the NPP. The number of years is calculated assuming a reactor
with a load factor of 80%.

Table 5b: Electricity Generation Mix of Asian Newcomer Countries
Country

Coal (%)

Oil (%)Natural gas (%)

Hydro (%)

Renewable*(%)

Others (%)

fossil fuels (%)

Bangladesh (2006)

3.0

8.0

86.0

3.0

0

0

97.0

Indonesia (2010)

26.3

47.6

21.4

0

4.7

0

95.3

Kazakhstan (2005)

70.3

7.4

10.7

11.6

0

0

88.4

Malaysia (2010)

40.2

0.4

54.2

5.2

0

0

94.8

Mongolia (2008)

95.5

0

0

3.4

1.1

0

95.5

Philippines (2007)

28.0

9.0

32.0

14.0

17.0

0

69.0

Singapore (2010)

0

16.9

77.2

0

0

5.9a

94.1

Sri Lanka (2010)

0

58.0

0

42.0

0

0

51.0

Thailand (Jan-Nov 2011)

18.7

1.1

66.7

11.8

1.6

0.1

Vietnam (2010)

19.0

6.0

33.0

40.0

2.0

0

b

86.5
42.0

*: Renewable: renewable energy other than hydroa: sythetic gas, diesel and refuse incineration
b: import from Malaysia
Sources: (Power Cell 2006), (GBG 2011), (Doi 2010), (MNPC 2012), (Bumtsetseg 2009), (Philippine Department of Energy 2008), (Singapore Government 2012),(Ceylon Electricity Board 2011), (Takabut 2012), (Muriel 2011)Table 6: Nuclear Infrastructure of Asian Newcomer Countries
Country

Research reactors

Institutional infrastructure (year of establishment)(underlined: independent regulatory body)

Bangladesh

1 research reactor

Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (1973),
Atomic Energy Research Establishment (1975)▸Triga Mark II, 3 MW, 1987

Indonesia

3 research reactors▸Triga Mark II, Bandung, 250 kw, 1965
(upgraded to 2 MW, 2000)▸Kartini Research Reactor, 100 kW, 1979

Atomic Energy Council (1958), Atomic Energy
Institute (1958, now called National Nuclear Energy
Agency [BATAN]), Nuclear Technology ResearchCentre of Pasar Jumat (1966), Nuclear Technology
Research Centre of GAMA (1967), Nuclear Energy
Regulatory Agency (1997)▸GA Siwabessy Multi-purpose Reactor, 30
MW, 1987

Kazakhstan

3 research reactors▸Alatau, 10 MW▸Kurchatov, 60 MW

Institute of Nuclear Physics (1957), Institute of HighEnergies Physics (1970), Physical-technical Institute(1990), Almaty Department of Atomic Energy
Institute (1993), National Nuclear Center (1993),
Committee of Atomic Energy (1992)▸Kurchatov, Impulse Graphite Reactor, 50
MW

Malaysia

1 research reactor▸Triga Puspati, 1 MW, 1982

Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre (1972, renamed
Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology
Research, 1994; re-branded as Malaysian Nuclear
Agency, 2006), Atomic Energy Licensing Board(1985), Nuclear Power Development Steering
Committee (2009), Malaysia Nuclear Power
Corporation (2011)

Mongolia

Nuclear Energy Commission (1962), Nuclear Energy
Agency (2008)

Philippines

Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (1961,
reconstituted as the Philippine Nuclear Research(One research reactor was shut down in 1988.)
Institute, 1987), Nuclear Power Steering Committee(1995)(no institution dedicated to nuclear power
development)

Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand1 research reactor▸Thai Research Reactor 1 / Modification 1,
1962

Vietnam

1 research reactor▸DaLat Research Reactor, reactivated 1984

The Sri Lankan cabinet approved the establishmentof the Atomic Energy Regulatory Council in June
2011.
Thai Atomic Energy Commission (1957), Office ofAtomic Energy for Peace (1961, renamed as Officeof Atoms for Peace in 2002) Thailand Institute of
Nuclear Technology (2006), Nuclear PowerInfrastructure Establishment Cooperation Committee(2007)
Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (1976),
Nuclear Energy Programme Implementation
Organization (2002), Vietnam Agency for Radiation
and Nuclear Safety and Control (2004), Vietnam
Atomic Energy Agency (2010)

Sources: (WNA 2011e), (IAEA 2011h), (Nation 2011), (Uyanga 2010)Table 7: Nuclear Agreements between Asian Newcomers and Potentail Supplier Countries
Country

Agreements

Bangladesh

nuclear cooperation agreement: China (2005), Russia (2009)

Indonesia

nuclear cooperation agreement: Russia (2006), US (2006); memorandum of cooperation:
Japan (2007); memorandum of understanding: South Korea (2007)

Kazakhstan

nuclear cooperation agreement: Russia (2006), Japan (2010), India (2011), China (2007),
Canada (2007), South Korea (2010); nuclear security agreement: US (2011)

Malaysia

memorandum of cooperation: Japan (2010)

Mongolia

memorandum of understanding: Russia (2009), Japan (2009), India (2009), France(2009), China (2010), South Korea (2011)

Philippines

Singapore

Sri Lanka

Thailandmemorandum of understanding: China (2009), Japan (2010)

Vietnamarrangement for the exchange of information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters:
US (2008); nuclear cooperation agreement: France, China (2009), South Korea, Canada,
Japan (2010), Russia (2002); memorandum of understanding: India (1999), US (2010)

Sources: (Economic Times 2011), (Universal Newswires 2011), (WNA 2011e), (WNN 2009, 2010a),(Uyanga 2010), (UPI 2011)Table 8: Participation in International Treaties of Asian Newcomers and NP Countries
nuclear safety

Asia
North
America

Latin
America

Eastern Europe
Western Europe
AfricaMiddle East

Country
China
India
Japan
PakistanSouth Korea
CanadaUSA
Argentina
BrazilMexicoArmenia
Bulgaria
Czech RepublicHungary
Romania
RussiaSlovakia
Slovenia
UkraineBelgium
FinlandFranceGermany
Netherlands
Spain
SwedenSwitzerland
United Kingdom
South Africa
IranNewcomers in Asia

BangladeshIndonesia
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Mongolia
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnamstatus as of mm/dd/yy
no. of parties

CNS
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Pr
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

S**
P
P

RADW
Pr
P
P
P
P
P
P

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

P
P

S**

P

ENC
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
P
P
Pr
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
P
Pr
P
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr

nuclear security
AC
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
P
P
P
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
Pr
Pr
P
Pr
P
Pr
P
P
P
Pr
Pr
Pr

P
Pr
P
**
P
P
**
**
**

04/05/12 09/26/11 11/11/11 11/11/11 09/29/10

75

63

113

108

nuclear liability

CPPNM CPPNM-AM ICSANT
Pr
CS
P
Pr
CS
P
P
P
Pr
Pr
**
S**
P
**
S**
P
S
Pr
CS
S
P
**
P
P
**
P
P
**
P
P
CS
S
P
CS
P
P
CS
P
Pr
CS
P
P
CS
P
P
P
P
CS
P
P
CS
P
Pr
P
Pr
CS
P
Pr
**
S**
Pr
CS
P
Pr
CS
P
Pr
CS
P
Pr
CS
S**
Pr
CS
P
Pr
CS
P
Pr
**
P

145

CS
CS
**
**
**

P
**
P
S**
P
S**
S**
P
S**

VC

PAVC

PC

BS

safeguards
JP

CSC
S

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

P

S

P
P
P
P

S
S
P

P
P

S
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

S

S

P

S
P

P

S

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
S
P

P
P
P
S
P
S
P
P
S
P
S
S

CSr
CS

S
CS

S

S

S

S

**
03/23/12

55 CS

CSA/VOSA

VOSA
#
CSA
#
CSA
CSA
VOSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
VOSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
VOSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
VOSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA
CSA

AP
P
S
P
P
P
P

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
S
P
P
P
S**
P
P
P
S
S

03/25/12 03/29/11 03/29/11 06/10/09 05/05/10 07/28/09 09/20/11 12/31/10 10/31/11

79

38

9

16

12

26

4 CS

167 / 5112

CNS: Convention on Nuclear Safety
RADW: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
ENC: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
AC: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency
CPPNM: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CPPNM-AM: Amendment to the Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material
ICSANT: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
VC: Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
PAVC: Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage
PC: Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability in the Fieldof Nuclear Energy, 1964 Additional Protocol, and 1982 Protocol
BS: Brussels Supplementary Convention, 1964 Additional Protocol,and 1982 Protocol
JP: Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna
Convention and Paris Convention
CSC: Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage
CSA: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
VOSA: Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement for NPT nuclearweapon States#: INFCIRC/66-type Safeguards Agreement, not party to the NPT
AP: Additional Protocol
underlined: incorporated into nuclear power plant exporters'
Principles of Conduct (nuclear liability: either VC or PC and/or
CSC)
P: party
S: signatory
r: existing reservation/declaration
CS: contracting state(blank): non-party**: committed to ratifying (stated in National Progress Report, 2012
Seoul Summit)
Sources: IAEA (2011a), (IAEA 2011g), (United Nations 2011),(NEA 2011a), (Seoul NSS 2012)

Appendix 1: GDP per capita PPP of NP Countries
Country

Year, start of construction of thefirst NPP>100 MWei

Argentina
BelgiumBrazilBulgaria
CanadaChina
Czech Republic
FinlandFranceGermany
Hungary
India
Iran
Japan
MexicoNetherlands
Pakistan
Romania
RussiaSouth Africa
South Korea
Spain
SwedenSwitzerland
United Kingdom
USA
i

1968
1969
1971
1970
1960
1985
(Former Czechoslovakia 1958)
1971
1958
(East 1962) West1970
1974
1968
2011
1961
1976
1969
1966
1982
(Former Soviet Union 1958)
1976
1972
1964
1966
1965
1957
1957
ii

Sources: (Jewell 2011a); (Gapminder 2010)

GDP/capita PPP (fixed 2005
international dollars) at the startof constructionii
8284
14521
4555
6162
12701
1217
(n.a.)
13420
8855(n.a.) 17009
10893
702
n.a.
6094
7631
17147
933
9605
(n.a.)
8211
3031
6766
14898
22191
11283
14847

Appendix 2: GEI Ratings of NP Countries
2008-2010 Government effectivenessii
1-24
25-49
50-74
75-100
47
52
91
56
56
97
60
80
99
90
92
74
54
34
88
83
61
95
26
48
43
77
84
67
79
99
98
24
92
89
1
5
8
16
0.03
0.17
0.27
0.53
no. of pr. countries*
0
0
1
12
ratio
0
0
0.8
0.92
Souces: i(Jewell 2011a), (WNA 2012b); ii(World Bank 2011b)
Electricity sector ownership andCountry
operationi
state-owned and operated
Argentina
Armeniastate-owned and operated
Belgium
mixed
Brazilstate-owned and operated
Bulgaria
state-owned and operated
Canada
mixed
China
mixed
Czech Republic state-owned and operated
Finlandprivately owned and operated
Francestate-owned and operated
Germany
privately owned and operated
Hungary
state-owned and operated
India
state-owned and operated
Iranstate-owned and operated
Japan
privately owned and operated
Korea, Southstate-owned and operated
Mexicostate-owned and operated
Netherlands
privately owned and operated
Pakistanstate-owned and operated
Romaniastate-owned and operated
Russiastate-owned and operated
Slovak Republic mixed
Slovenia
state-owned and operated
South Africa
state-owned and operated
Spainprivately owned and operated
Swedenmixed
Switzerland
privately owned and operated
Ukrainestate-owned and operated
United Kingdom privately owned and operated
United States
privately owned and operated
no. of countries
ratio*: NP countries with mixed or private ownership

1-24

Political stabilityii
25-49
50-74
42
48
72
48
58

75-100

1-24

Control of corruptionii
25-49
50-74
39
32

90
58
51
84

96

27

37
82
97

67
99
90
93

67
77
69

69

12
10

41
24
78

88

51

69

22

48
80

1

98
15

55

54

19

12
86
75

66
79

44
36

62
81
99
96

88
93
40

5
0.17
0
0

75-100

7
0.23
2
0.15

19
56
57
8
0.27
3
0.23

10
0.33
8
0.62

4
0.13
0
0

5
0.17
1
0.8

8
0.27
1
0.8

91
88
13
0.43
11
0.84