2015 Summer Semester
Case Study (International Political Economy)
Professor Nobuhiro HITAWARI
Final Paper

A Study on the Causes of Deadlock of Korea-Japan FTA- Research on the Overall Assessment (Economic & Political) of KJFTA -July 29nd, 2015
Graduate School of Public Policy (GrasPP)
University of Tokyo
Campus Asia Program#51-158105
Ahram Han

1

A Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background of Korea-Japan FTA
2-1. Current progress & past discontinuation
2-2. Each government’s national strategy

3. Existing Analyses on Korea-Japan FTA
3-1. Theories of international political economy
3-2. Economic benefits and losses

4. Determinants to the Achievement of Korea-Japan FTA
4-1. Constraints on international political & economic environments
4-2. Japan’s domestic constraints
1) Conflicting issue on agriculture sector in Japan
2) Japan’s FTA policymaking process: Continuity of “iron triangle”(1) Political Party: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–the Principal-Agent model & Particularism(2) Bureaucrats –Diffused coordination of the cabinet & Vertical alliance of sub-governments(3) Interest groups –The Pork-Barrel Politics

5. Connection Points of Domestic Obstacles and FTA Politics
5-1. Japanese domestic political tasks
1) A new crisis and compensation politics
2) Corporatism in Japanese political economic issues3) Most conflicting issues: Connection point of agricultural sector and Japanese FTA politics
4) Pragmatism of Japan’s FTA politics

6. Conclusion

References
Appendix2

2015 Summer Cast Study (International Political Economy)
Professor Nobuhiro HITAWARI
Final Paper
A Study on the Causes of Deadlock of Korea-Japan FTA- Research on the Overall Assessment (Economic & Political) of KJFTA University of Tokyo, GrasPP#51-158105 Ahram Han
Abstract: Even though Japan recently has been strengthening the drive force for
economic liberalization into the global market, Korean-Japan FTA has not come to anagreement yet since the negotiations have started in 2003. This paper aims to examine
what kind of issues has been problematic in the case of KJFTA, whether it is resulted
from international or domestic constraints. I would like to investigate this deadlock
more focusing on the domestic sides, particularly on domestic political environments,
which has been creating obstacles to the agreement of KJFTA. Among the issues ofconflicting economic and political aspects, agricultural sector and a mechanism ofJapanese domestic FTA politics, which can be understood as a “triple alliance” or “irontriangle” relationships of the political party, bureaucrats and diverse interest groups,
have been one of the most problematic domestic obstacles on each negotiation of
Korea-Japan FTA. What could be the impact of the relationship between Japaneseparties, bureaucrats and interest groups on the process of Korea-Japan FTA negotiations?
In order to solve these difficulties, understanding of Japanese domestic policymaking
process signifies a crucial political importance. This paper has a significance to bringthe issue of Japanese domestic politics related to the issue of KJFTA and analyze it
together which has been rarely analyzed yet. In sum, it is too impatient to conclude thatthe future of KJFTA is too bleak in spite of domestic political constraints in Japan and
Korea.

Keywords: International political economy, FTA politics, Korea-Japan FTA, Korea-China-Japan FTA,
Domestic policy-making process, Iron Triangle, LDP, Bureaucrats, Interest Groups, Compensation politics,
Corporatism, Pork-Barrel politics, Agriculture issue.

1. Introduction
Since the early 2000s, Northeast Asian countries have been pursuing in bilateral and trilateral FTAs
within the region. In 1998, “The Action Agenda for the Partnership of Japan and Korea toward the 21st
century” was the first to propose a broad range of cooperation and policy coordination between Japan and3

Korea, including economy, cultural exchange and security (Ito, 2005). Then, the actual starting point of
Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement (KJFTA) was started in December, 2002. Afterwards, the Korea-Japansummit was held in Seoul and President Kim Dae-Jung and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro had a talk for
Korea-Japan economic alliance. As the outcome of talks, they agreed with setting up a Korea-Japan joint
study group consists of industrial, bureaucratic, and academic fields of economic experts. Both countries
aimed at finishing up the talks by 2005 at first. However, the negotiation came to a standstill after the sixround on November, 2004. Surprisingly, this goal has not been realized until now in 2015.
By contrast, the effort in order to achieve Korea-China FTA came to fruition in last 2014. The
practical Korea-China FTA negotiations started in 2012 and it has been steadily strengthening and finallyreached its agreement in two years. On the basis of the most recent conclusion of Korea-China FTA, KoreaChina relationship is expected to be gradually deepening its relations economically as well as politically.
Moreover, with the deepening of regional economic integration in East Asia like as the European regional
community, the issue of trilateral trade agreement among Korea, Japan and China also has been progressing
well. The joint research on the Korea-China-Japan FTA has been progressing since the Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji proposed the study on the possibility of Northeast Asian FTA in 2002. Most recently, three countries
had the 8th business working level consultations on last July 20th in Beijing.
Then, how could the Korea-China FTA conclude its achievement so rapidly, but why did that nothappen in the case of Korea-Japan FTA yet? What are the key points for negotiations and different
characteristics of both FTAs? The analyses on economic effects of both FTAs are already fully analyzed
throughout whole economic sectors. Now it seems that the negotiations of Korea-Japan FTA have beenproceeding with political difficulties more rather than a matter of economic concerns. This research paper
aims to explore this unsolved puzzle from the perspective of international diplomatic struggles and Japanese
domestic politics.
My motive for this research is originated from unsolved and continuous political conflicts from thepast between two countries, Korea and Japan. In addition, China, as new global power, has consolidated its
position within and without East Asian region, competing with Japan and the United States. Currently, three
countries show their relationships as friends as well as enemies depending on the situations. Personally, I havea close interest to find a way to break through current deadlocks and develop further cooperation in many
ways between two or three countries. With this point of view, I would like to apply one international
cooperation theory into current situation in East Asia region in order to find out a better way to cooperate therelations. Liberal-institutionalist theory explains on the importance of economic cooperation in international
politics. The theory focuses on domestic decision-making structure. It also emphasizes that developing
economic cooperation would be easier way to lead further cooperation between countries than any type ofcooperation, such as political or diplomatic one. Consequently, I decided to research more about economic
way of cooperation between three countries. Then, one serious issue came into my mind and the Korea-JapanFTA has been struggling more than 10 years, showing no remarkable progress compared to other cases.
In brief, puzzles for my studies are: Despite a case of Korea-China FTA also had similar political and4diplomatic conflicts between two states, however, it has concluded in last December, 2014. How could the
Korea-China FTA reach an agreement so quickly beyond on-going political unsolved issues since its
negotiations started in 2012? Why could not the Korea-Japan case follow the successful route? Is this due toeconomic reason or political reason? What is the real problem in the case of Korea-Japan FTA? In my
research, I would like to shed more lights on domestic constraints, particularly on domestic political tasks ofJapan which is creating complexities of policy-making process and strong opposition forces against the
KJFTA.

2. Background of Korea-Japan FTA
2-1. Current progress
From the viewpoint of geographic closeness and cultural similarities, for almost 30 years, since thenormalization of diplomatic ties, current bilateral relations have fallen short of expectations due to various
issues acting as barriers. These include the disputes over the Dokdo Islands, historical issues, the prohibitionof the importation of Japanese cultural products, and Korea’s huge trade deficit with Japan due to its highdegree of economic dependency. However, in view of economic ties, Korea and Japan have been actively
seeking to pursue a bilateral FTA. Talks on a Korea-Japan FTA started in 1998 when President Kim Dae Jungand then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed the Action Plans for a New Korea-Japan
Partnership for the 21st Century. The Action Plans suggested the promotion of trade, investment, and cultural
exchanges as the main subjects of cooperation. As the first concrete step, the two governments agreed to
conduct join studies on the economic effects of a Korea-Japan FTA at the private sector level in October 1998.
Table 1 shows past schedule for the negotiations of KJFTA in detail. In overall, for about 17 years,
the negotiations had largely discontinued twice: 1) One period was between 2005-2008, and 2) next period is
between 2012-until now. From the past experiences of KJFTA, it seems that the negotiations have been stuck
in a political deadlock due to a conflict of interests. Domestically, Korean citizens have raised the issue ofhigh level of dependence on trade and the high possibility of trade deficit toward Japan. These concerns havealso led to some amount of backlash from interest groups in both countries. For a long time, the people of both
Korea and Japan are stimulated negative national feelings due to recent continuous historical and politicalsensitive issues and its-led antagonistic relationship. Consequently, political parties and civic groups in Korea
and Japan continuously raise a voice for the opposition to FTA. Thus, we can assume that this is one of thebiggest reasons that block a further progress of internal and external negotiations toward the agreement of
Korea-Japan FTA.
Table 1. Past schedule of negotiations of Korea-Japan FTA1

June.25, 2012

1

3rd round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」(Tokyo,
Japan)

Source: “FTA-website” (http://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/lov7/jp/1/), translated by the author.

5

May. 29~30, 2012

2rd round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」(Seoul,
Korea)

Apr. 25~26, 2012

1st round of 「Manager-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」(Tokyo,
Japan)

May. 9, 2011

2nd round of「Director-General-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」
(Seoul, Korea)

Sep. 16, 2010

1st round of「Director-General-Level Consultation on the Korea-Japan FTA」
(Tokyo, Japan)

Dec, 21. 2009

4th round of Working Level Consultations (Seoul, Korea)

Jul.1, 2009

3rd round of Working Level Consultations (Tokyo, Japan)

Dec.4, 2008

2nd round of Working Level Consultations (Seoul, Korea)

Jun.25, 2008

1st round of Working level consultations to consider and create a favorable
environment for the resumption of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (hereinafterWorking Level Consultations), (Tokyo, Japan)

Nov.1~3, 2004

6th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)

Aug.23~25, 2004

5th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Kyungju, Korea)

Jun.23~25, 2004

4th round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)

Apr.26~28, 2004

3rd round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Seoul, Korea)

Feb.23~25, 2004

2nd round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Tokyo, Japan)

Dec.22, 2003

1st round of the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations (Seoul, Korea)

Oct.20, 2003

Korea-Japan agree to launch the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations

Jul. 2002~Oct. 2003

Joint Study Group meetings

Mar, 2002

Korea-Japan agree to launch the Joint Study Group for the Korea-Japan FTA

Dec.1998~Apr. 2000

Study group meetings

Nov. 1998

Korea and Japan agree to launch the 21st century Korea-Japan Economic Relations
Study GroupIn addition, Japan has recently shown much more consolidated political conservative forces after
entering the Shinzo Abe’s Administration. Fortunately, however, it seems to not make the Japanese politicalenvironment harder to resolve the FTA issues, since Prime Minister Abe strongly pushes forward economic
cooperation as his one of growth strategies. Japan also has to race for a position of leader with China within
East Asia region and also one should not overlook the alliance relation with the United States. Besides, in lastDecember 2014, the Korea-China FTA dramatically reached its agreement during the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) period. This fact might strongly stimulate Japan for further progress of KJFTA in any
ways.
As I mentioned above, the discontinuations during the process of negotiations in the past are closely
related with the period of political diplomatic struggles in Korea and Japan. For example, in 2005, “Takeshima6

Day” was established by Shimane prefecture in Japan and it resulted in a major conflict throughout Korea.
“Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine” also produced fierce protests from Korea as well as
China. In particular, Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine and paid respects 6 times during his termas Prime Minister of Japan, starting on August 13, 2001. As a result, the heads of the two countries refused tomeet with Koizumi, and there were no mutual visits between Chinese and Japanese leaders after October 2001
and between South Korean and Japanese leaders after June 2005. President of South Korea Roh Moo-hyun
had suspended all summit talks between South Korea and Japan, until 2008 when he resigned from the office(CSIS, 2004). Recently, current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made multiple visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
since 2013, one could assume that it causes a huge deadlock to have talks between two countries. That period
coincided with a time of discontinuation of KJFTA negotiation process.
Throughout the research, in order to overcome the deadlock, improvement of domestic politicalenvironments in both countries should be the foremost condition. Economic divergences such as agricultural
sector and job insecurity are inevitable to solve, but political conflicts are probably much more essential toreach the final agreement of Korea-Japan FTA. At the international level, Japan recognizes the necessity of
FTA, regardless of domestic oppositions. In contrast, domestic national consensus is not fully built yet. Even
though Japan recently has been strengthening a drive force for economic liberalization into global market, theKJFTA still has to overcome many hurdles to reach an agreement. In this sense, I would like to investigate
deadlocks on both international and domestic level of struggles and resolve the most difficult part on the issue
whether which factor is creating an obstacle to KJFTA as I summarized determinants of the achievement of
KJFTA (Table 2). This paper has a meaning to bring the issue of Japanese domestic politics related to the
KJFTA and analyze it together which has been rarely analyzed yet.

Table 2. Determinants to achievement of KJFTAPolitical

EconomicDomestic

International

Iron Triangle

Negative relationship of Japan and(LDP, bureaucrats, interest group)

Korea

Negative public opinion(Diplomatic and Political)

Less beneficiaries group

KC FTAe.g. Agriculture, fisheries,

KCJ FTA

Textiles, …etc

TPP

2-2. Each Government’s National Strategy for FTA
I would like to point out each government’s national strategy and its stance for their FTA politics
before addressing the actual issue during the negotiations. For reference, Table 2 shows current status of FTAs
in Korea, Japan, and China. According to FTA website of Republic of Korea (Ministry of Trade Industry and7Energy)2, since 2003, the Korean government has been aggressively pushed for FTAs having a strategic
approach for FTA network in major economic regime in the world. The major characteristic of Korea’s FTA
strategy is to conclude FTAs in a very short time compared to other countries, aiming the FTA hub in East
Asia. In overall, Korea aims for comprehensive and high-level of FTA. As a rational strategy for Korea, it issomehow necessary to position itself at the center of the burgeoning East Asian Regionalism (Choi, 2004). Asa middle-income country with little leverage against trading partners, Korea will get the maximum benefits byforming FTA with advanced, powerful economies like Japan and the United States.
Japan, in contrast, was a latecomer to FTA. There was no FTA in Japan until January 2002 when theJapanese-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) was concluded. In fact, the White Paper on
International Trade in 1999 by the Ministry of Economic and International Trade (METI) was the first official
document supporting FTAs. Until then, Japan had remained negative on any bilateral or regional FTA,
because the Japanese government was always advocating the concept of global-wide liberalization based on
the GATT/WTO rule. However, as FTAs became increasingly popular from the mid-1990s, the Japanese
government had to gradually change its trade policy (Yoshida, 2004). With increasing pressure for“competitive liberalization”, Japan could no longer maintain its previous position for ideal of multilateralism
and changed into a more pragmatic bilateralism.
According to Japan’s FTA strategy by Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan3, the government willraise its FTA ratio from current 19% to 70% by 2018, by promoting economic partnership as a basis of global
economic activities. Therefore, the government will draw up new rules in Asia-Pacific region by working
positively on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and use these rules as a basis for discussion ofrulemaking for FTAAP, along with wide-range of economic cooperation such as RCEP and Japan-ChinaKorea FTA. Specifically, for the FTA with Korea, Japan realizes its political importance and deep-level of
economic interdependence of KJFTA, so the government announces the negotiation has to start again for firm
Japan-Korea relationship as soon as possible. It is also clear that the Japanese government wants to bring theissue of KJFTA with a common vision for East Asia economic community, not just focusing on pushing for abilateral trade agreement.
Table 2. Current Status of FTAs in Korea, Japan, and China4Country

Concluded a treaty

Negotiating

Underexamination

2

Ministry of Trade Industry and Trade in Korea. “Korea’s FTA strategy” (http://www.fta.go.kr/main/situation/kfta/psum/)3

外務省. “日本のFTA戦略” (October, 2012).

4

Source: Korea International Trade Association (March, 2015).

8

(Effectivation) Chile FTA, Singapore FTA,

(Negotiating) Korea-China-JapanEFTA FTA, ASEAN FTA, India CEPA, EU

FTA, RCEP FTAMERCOSUR,

Republic

FTA, Peru FTA, USA FTA, Turkey FTA,

(Creating conditions for a

Israel, Centralof Korea

Australia FTA, Canada FTA

resumption of negotiations)

America,(Agreement) Columbia, China, New Zealand,

Indonesia CEPA, Japan, Mexico,

Malaysia, Ecuador

Vietnam

GCC(Negotiating) Canada EPA,

Japan

(Effectivation) Singapore EPA, Mexico EPA,

Columbia EPA, Korea-China-Japan

Malaysia EPA, Chile FTA, Thailand EPA,FTA,FTAAP(FreeIndonesia EPA, Brunei EPA, Philippines EPA,

RCEP, EU EPA, TPP, Turkey EPA

Trade Area of theASEAN EPA, Switzerland EPA, Vietnam(Creating conditions for a

Asia Pacific),

EPA, India EPA, Peru EPA, Australia EPA

resumption of negotiations) Korea

New Zealand FTA(Agreement) Mongolia EPAFTA,GCC FTA

China(Effectivation) Thailand FTA, Hong Kong

India RTA,

CEPA,

Columbia FTA,

Macau CEPA, ASEAN FTA,FTAAP, Israel

Chile FTA, Pakistan FTA,SACU FTA, GCC FTA,FTA,New Zealand FTA, Singapore FTA,

Norway FTA, Sri Lanka FTA,

Shanghai

Peru FTA, Costa Rica FTA,

Korea-China-Japan FTA, RCEP

Cooperation

Taiwan ECFA, Iceland FTA,

Organization

Switzerland FTA

FTA, Mongolia(Agreement) Korea FTA, Australia FTA

FTA

3. Existing Analyses on Economic and Political Benefits and Losses
3-1. Theories of international political economy
The area of international political economy has been addressing the issue of the challenges what they
face, such as understanding the simultaneous interaction of domestic and international factors in determining
foreign economic policies and international economic outcomes. To begin with, I would like to introduce
some papers dealing with the international political economy emphasizing the “domestic politics” to talk tradenegotiations with international environment. All three works are suggesting that domestic politics in countries
around the world show signs of the impact of the world economy. “Internalization and Domestic Politics”(1996) by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner mainly argues that we can no longer understand politics withincountries, so called “domestic politics”, without comprehending the nature of the linkages between national
economies and the world economy, and changes in such linkages. Since economics and politics are so closely
linked, domestic politics in countries around the world show signs of the impact of the world economy(Keohane and Milner, 1996).

9

Another article, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses”(1992) by Helen Milner, also explains that consideration of domestic politics is essential for understanding
international cooperation for some reasons: one of reasons is that domestic politics tells us how preferences
are aggregated and national interests constructed, and another one is that domestic politics also help explain
the strategies states adopt to realize their goals (Milner, 1992). One more article by Helen Milner and Peter
Rosendorff, “Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: the Role of Domestic Groups” (1996)
also argues the same line as domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. On top of
that, it sheds more lights on the role of interest groups in the domestic political process and in international
negotiations in an environment characterized by uncertainty (Milner and Rosendorff, 1966). To sum up, theseworks similarly gives some implications that “domestic politics” is crucial when we discuss international levelof politics or negotiations and its intertwined characteristics in world politics.

3-2. Economic Benefits and Losses of KJFTA
The issue of Korea-Japan FTA has already a lot of proceeding researches in terms of economic
benefits of each country. One analysis by Mckibbin, Lee, and Cheong (2004) regarding the effects of KJFTA
is based on a new dynamic simulation model, called the Asia-Pacific G-cubed Model. The simulations showthat both Korea and Japan benefit from the bilateral FTA. With some studies, including KIEP (2000), IDE(2000), KIET (2000), and Brown et al. (2001) assessed the economic implications of a Korea-Japan FTA. All
economic analyses proved that there gains for Korea and Japan from a bilateral free trade agreement. To be
specific, the article contains the results for real GDP, private investment and private consumption in Korea. It
explains that the reduction in tariffs in Korea and Japan on trade leads to a reallocation of resources in bothcountries, and in the long run, it raises income in both countries.
Figure 1 shows the sectoral impacts in Korea by KJFTA. Although there is a small contraction in
output of the durable manufacturing sector in Korea, production in all other sectors finally expands because ofhigher income and therefore higher demand for all products. Higher demand stimulated investment andtherefore a higher capital stock. The biggest gainer in Korea will be the non-durable manufacturing sector(Mckibbin, Lee, and Cheong, 2004). According to the analysis, the effects on Japan are very similar to thosein Korea. Figure 2 is expected outcome of the effect on GDP of KJFTA, showing GDP is slightly smaller forJapan compared with that for Korea. The increase in real GDP is about 0.1% due to the relative size ofbilateral trade flows between Korea and Japan. Thus, it can be summarized as trade with Japan is more
important for the Korean economy. Still, the study proves that there are gains for Korea and Japan from abilateral FTA.
Another recent sectoral approach of the KJFTA shows a positive impression by agreeing KJFTA(Nakajima, 2002). Figure 3 shows there is not much change in real GDP in terms of macroeconomic effects in
any region in the short-run case, although only Korea shows an increase of 0.29%. In the long run, Korea
shows a 1.09% increase while Japan shows only 0.02% increase. However, the article explains that bothcountries show positive in terms of equivalent variance. The scale is larger in the long-run case. In other10

words, an increase in intra-industry trade will enlarge the static effects of the FTA (Nakajima, 2002). The otheranalysis of the total effects of the FTA in Korea by Inkyo Cheong (2000) contends an expectation of a
production expansion for Korea’s major industries and a production contraction for its primary industries. In
specific, the transport equipment, machinery, electric and electronic, and steel industries will see the mostsignificant gains, with annual growth rates of 5 to 13%. Figure 4 shows for the primary industries, the effectsof the FTA will be minimal with only a slight increase of 0.2% for both forestry and fisheries production and asmall decline in agricultural production. Unlike serious concerns of economic loss particularly on agricultural,fishery, and textile sectors in both Korea and Japan, it is not too negative to see the benefits from KJFTA.
Rather, one can assume that there are enough reasons for having FTA throughout the whole economic sector
in times of higher economic interdependence between two countries.
Another study of the expected economic influences of KJFTA in main items by Do-Hyun Kim (2003)
introduces each sector’s economic effects by FTA. In “textile” sector, the withdrawal of tariff by the FTA will
result in a trade surplus in the items of textile, clothing and a trade deficit in the items of fabrics and textile
thread. In “semiconductor” sector, comparison to Japan, the unique character of the semiconductor of Korean
industry is adherence structure of “Korea-memory part, Japan-non memory-semiconductor material andsemiconductor equipment”. Therefore, even though the tariff is to be withdrawn the trade between themwould not be affected seriously, whereas the value of import from Japan would be increase in semiconductor
equipment and non-memory sector. In “automobile” sector, the tariff rate of Korea on the finished car is 8%,
on the contrary, Japanese government adopted a duty free policy on that item. So, in the case of abolishmentof customs between two countries, the export of Japanese car is expected to increase in accelerative period.
Whereas it is strongly expected the influence of that treaty on the export of Korean car to Japan would be
feeble. If the non-tariff measures are mitigated or abolished by FTA contractions, there would be a positive
influence to some degree on the advancement of Korean automobile into the Japanese market.
In “machinery and electronics” sector, since the average tariff rate on general machinery products ofJapan is about zero and there is also no particular non-tariff barrier in Japanese market. It can be expected thatthe effect upon the exportation to Japanese market of Korean products would be weak regardless ofwithdrawal of customs and non-tariff barriers. On the other hand, the average tariff rate on the generalmachinery products of Korea is 7.5% relatively higher than that of Japan. These measures would affect greatly
on the importation of Japanese products. The tariff rate of Korea against Japan in electronics sector is 8%. In
comparison with this, the rate of Japan’s is only 0.8%. Hereby the increasing effect of custom abolishment
would be more positive to Japan than Korea. At the same time it is expected that there would be acute pricecompetition at the compete sector.
In “steel and petrochemistry” sector, the average tariff rate of Korea on steel sector is 6% and that ofJapan is only 1.2%. WE can expect that the increasing effect of steel exportation by the abolishment ofcustoms in accordance with KJFTA would be feeble because non-tariff on steel products measures
implemented by WTO in 2004. By contrast, the import from Japan would be increased centering special steel
or steel products of special use. With regard to these circumstances, the abolishment of customs would affect a11negative impact on production and employment of this sector with the weak competitiveness against Japan. It
is because of the character of domestic structure of steel industry of which increase of import, due to not fromthe diversification of importing market, but from the conversion drawn from the substitution by Japanese
products consisting of special steel, high value-added products. Though the average tariff rate of Japan islower that of Korea in petrochemistry, the effective tariff rate of Korea on items of concern is relatively higher
than Japan. Because a part of items like polyethylene, polypropylene, and 2-ethyl-acid are applied to specificduty and some indicators of excess supply in general plastics observed, the increase of export is expected in
the case of customs abolishment. On the other hand, the high quality products like the goods of precisionchemistry, precision engineering, and precision plastics of which sector have a big technological gap and a big
demand are expected to promote the increase of import from Japan.

It is known that Korean concerns reflect the mistrust of Japan as well as strong resistance to market
opening among some Korean business sector. Japan is also not free of similar domestic resistances fromvested interest group, especially in the fishery, farming, and apparel businesses. However, Ippei Yamazawa, in
his article of “Assessing a Japan-Korea FTA” asserts that the prediction does not fit the current reality inwhich intra-industry specialization in the industries between two countries (Yamazawa, 2001). Rather, it ismore likely that both Korean and Japanese firms will survive the intensified competition and become globallycompetitive having intra-industry specialization. Therefore, since closer Japan-Korea relations are needed forboth to survive globalization, it should center on intra-industry specialization when discussing the best
framework for KJFTA.
On the other hand, there are not many articles insisting on economic losses of Korea-Japan FTA. The
reasons can be: first, FTA analysis is usually made by research institutions which are the government-side.
Second, many economic sectors actually can benefit from the achievement of FTAs, on the other hand,relatively few sectors would harm by it. One research deals with the most contentious issue of KJFTA,
agricultural liberalization in Japan and Korea. Byungil Choi and Jennifer Sejin Oh, in their research of“Asymmetry in Japan and Korea’s agricultural liberalization in FTA: domestic trade governance perspective”,
pointed out that there are important differences between two countries’ agricultural sector. The Korean
government, having cohesive domestic trade governance, supports substantial agricultural liberalization. The
Japanese government, on the other hand, having fragmented domestic trade governance is reluctant toabandon from interests even at the risk of undermining its FTAs (Choi and Oh, 2011). According to theauthor’s argument, it is necessary to have cohesive trade governance that enables governments to pursue
agricultural liberalization from the Korea’s past experiences. The Korean government was possible to pursue
agricultural liberalization under the broader national agenda for promoting trade through FTAs. In contrast, inJapanese cases, the fragmented domestic trade governance gave disproportionately larger weight toagricultural interests, ultimately allowing agriculture to undermine the success of Japan’s FTAs. It is because
the Korean government supports substantial agricultural liberalization, whereas the Japanese government isreluctant to abandon farm interests even at the risk of undermining its FTAs.

12

4. Determinants to the achievement of Korea-Japan FTA
4-1. Constraints on international political & economic environments
Surrounding Korea and Japan, there are a lot of international issues are on-going and some areclosely interrelated with the issue of Korea-Japan FTA. Since the FTA is not only about economic issue, butmore about political or diplomatic exchanges between two countries to some degree, political struggles often
tackle into the attainment of further economic cooperation. As Naoko Munataka (2015) suggested in her
research of “Evolution of Japan’s Policy toward Economic Integration”, Korea and Japan commonly sharehistorical issues with neighboring countries, diplomatic deadlock represented as a halt of the Korea-Japan
Summit, multiple ongoing economic relations such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and Korea-China-Japan
FTA, and its-led complex relations among economic rivalries. These international political constraints control
whether the FTA can be achieved or not, even during the process of FTA. Sometimes, the situation ofinternational politics makes a stimulus to further progress of the achievement of FTA, on the contrary,sometimes it also creates a deadlock to discontinue negotiations like the case of Korea-Japan FTA. In thisviewpoint, the author asserts that if Japan aims to actively promote economic integration in Asia, it must
resolve its “history problem” with neighboring counties (Munataka, 2015). Therefore, Japanese politicalleaders have to play a significant role in clarifying the differences in perceptions of history with its
neighboring countries and come to a mutual understanding based on these differences.
It is evident that Japan is now Korea’s third largest trading partner after China and the United States
while Korea is Japan’s third largest export destination and also become the sixth largest source of imports inrecent years (Table 1) (Ahn, 2012). Thus, both countries have a high-level of economic interdependence.
However, Japan has faced the “lost two decades” of economic stagnation (Table 2), consequently it ceased tobe the second largest economy in 2010 (Ahn, 2012) and yield the position to China. The aftermath of 2008
global financial crisis adversely affected to the Japanese economy, whose economy shrunk by 1.0% and -5.5%
in 2008 and 2009, respectively, again far below the growth rates of the United States and the Euro area (Ahn,
2012). Even in the past decade, Japan’s mounting public debt problem worsened with the reason of a rapidly
aging society, which contributed to the “lost two decades” as well. To make things worse, the great earthquake
in eastern Japan in 2011 and the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster created other serious hurdles toJapan’s economic recovery. These issues also caused Japan to register a trade deficit amounting to US $32
billion in 2011 for the first time in the past three decades (Table 3) (Ahn, 2012). To sum up, all these makes
Japan’s economy experience in past several years more tough domestic environments for further FTA progress.

4-2. Japan’s Domestic Constraints for Korea-Japan FTA
1) Conflicting Issue on Agriculture Sector in Japan
Korea and Japan have comparative advantages of each different industry. Japan has a strong
comparative advantage in automobiles, electronics, and general machinery, but their agricultural and textile
industries show relative weaknesses. Korea, on the other hand, has a comparative advantage in electronics,

13

textiles, and steel, but its advantage is quite low in the agricultural sector (Table 4). Therefore, while Japan has
shown more opposition against a trade liberalization of agriculture areas and Korea has raised concerns abouta free trade of its automobile and electronics sector. This implies that liberalization of the agricultural sectors
is a sensitive issue for both Korea and Japan.
At the first round of negotiation, Japanese officials have expressed their wishes to exclude agricultural
products from the FTA in consideration of the sector’s special characteristics (Ahn, 2005). The agriculture andfishery sectors are important areas in trade liberalization and free trade agreements in Japan, because of theirpolitical importance and its economic effects. Japan excluded the agricultural sector when Japan concluded
the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA). Korea and Japan also experienced similar
problems when they concluded the Japan-Korea Fishery Agreement. Therefore, these two sectors are the mostdifficult sectors for negotiations on the FTA between Korea and Japan (Song, 2005).
Nonetheless, Japan has experienced more difficulties in the negotiations of KJFTA, because Korea
has still a higher comparative advantage in the agricultural sector even if its benefits are not big. Even though
the economic role of agricultural sector in Japan is less significant than that of Korea, it contributes to 1.5% of
the GDP and 3.9% of employment in 2002 (Table 5). However, its political importance is almost as high as it
is in Korea because of Japan’s history of protecting its agricultural sector and Japanese farmers show theirprotection as natural. The average applied tariff is one of the highest one compared with other developed
countries (Song, 2005). Korea’s agricultural exports to Japan are higher than its imports from Japan and this
implies that generally Korean agriculture is more competitive than Japan. These are the reasons why Japanese
farmers keep opposing the Korea-Japan FTA due to the fear of losing their domestic market, as its generalprice level is lower in Korea than in Japan.
Moreover, as the table 6 shows, general tariff rates are set at a high level in the agricultural and foodprocessing sectors, with the highest in the rice sector at 80.35% for all regions in 2003 (Table 6).
Consequently, the abolition of tariffs under an FTA would result in a drastic decrease in the price of Japanese
agricultural products due to competitive imports (Nakajima, 2002). Thus, to make a balance, Japanese FTAs
have had a limitation on agricultural sector although there is some positive effect on agricultural tradeliberalization (Ando and Fukunari 2006). A very small number of farmers receive enormous benefits in termsof increased income from agricultural production after FTAs. Accordingly, those few farmers have a strong
incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior to invest time, money and resources in lobbying and influencing
politicians in order to maintain agricultural protection. Consumers, on the other hand, are not sufficiently
motivated to lobby for the removal of trade distortions because of the relative price benefit of agricultural
products from liberalizing market (Mulgan, 2008). Therefore, Japanese politicians, especially regional
conservative forces, generally support agricultural protection since they seek to retain power in exchange formaterialistic benefits such as votes, monetary donations, and campaign support from farmers and theirsupporting organizations. Until now, there has been not enough consensus on necessity of trade liberalization
on agricultural sector, particularly for KJFTA. In other words, for Japanese farmers, consumers, andpoliticians, they have little incentives to approve free trade of agricultural sector with the KJFTA.

142) Japan’s FTA Policymaking Process: Continuity of “Iron Triangle” in Japan’s FTA politics
Politics has been a primary in Japan for a long time, even in the case of industrial policy. The
industrial policy sub-governments consists of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI) and LDP politicians with close ties to industry and the executives of peak business organizations.
They seek to promote the interests of Japanese industry, not only in the domestic market but also markets
abroad through trade liberalization. The bureaucrats within these policy sub-governments significantly
exercise their policymaking authority and also act as supply-side actors even though they are not same
politically self-interested calculus of politicians (Mulgan, 2005).
Japan’s FTA politics can be characterized as domestic trade policymaking on the demand side as
well as some aspects of the supply side. On the demand side, business groups mobilize even more strongly
demand to agricultural protection, while on the supply side, the high value of FTAs for broader state interests
are recognized by politician-leaders (Mulgan, 2008). This demand and supply side of Japanese policy making
process can be explained by the power elite model arguing that Japan is run by a triple alliance of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy, and big businesses with participation in policy making which are
restricted to the members of this cohesive ruling group (Cheng, 1990). Along with this idea, I would like tobreak down into three supply side of actors, each political party (LDP), bureaucrats (MITI), and interest
groups, to see how they have maintained the “iron triangle” in Japanese FTA politics.
(1) Political Party: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–the Principal-Agent model & Particularism
Japanese politicians on the supply side are divided between those responding to narrow special
interests and those in leadership positions who are more concerned with broader state interests. Since thepostwar 1955 system, the LDP has enjoyed its conservative rules for many years, particularly with the reformof the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) and multiple constituency seating. It made the LDP have a morestable and more competitive “political market”, thus we can assume that the LDP has been controlling
overall Japanese FTA politics as a continuous conservative political party. Within the policy subgovernments, decisions are made by adjusting the opinions and interests of the key political, bureaucratic andinterest group actors through a process of consensus decision-making. A key stage in this process is needed
for prior scrutiny and approval by the relevant committee of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council(PARC) and the party’s Executive Council before a policy or bill is passed on to the Cabinet for ratification.
The PARC committees, in particular, are the primary locus of policymaking by special interest politicians.
The LDP’s larger Diet membership is obligated to agree with bills and policies only after approving by the
PARC committees and Executive Council, because this approval is subject to unanimous agreement withinthese bodies. As a result, METI and pro-industry politicians have no choice, but to comply with theintentions of agriculture-related Diet members even on matters concerning WTO and FTA negotiations(Yamashita 2005). One can understand this relation of interest within political party contributed a current
deadlock of KJFTA in the negations of agricultural sector in Japan.
In addition, the principal-agent model identifies political systems as arenas where people and parties

15

seek to interact and manipulate each other toward the greatest advantage of “marketplace”. According toDaniel Okimoto, this model is regarding an organizational hierarchy or information asymmetry in politicalactivity: in specific, members of Congress (agents) buy re-elections from voters (principals), on the other hand,voters delegate their profit-making pork to members of Congress as a trust bank deposit, so that members ofCongress can earn their own profits (re-elections) through voters payments (votes). Thus, the LDP politicians
have had a grand coalition within the sub-governments. First, the LDP receives clientelistic votes fromsupport groups in exchange for favorable legislation, subsidies, generous tax treatment, and other promotional
policies from the ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food (MAFF) and Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI). Then, the LDP has a reciprocal (pork-barrel) patronage frominvolved interest groups that include a variety of traditional LDP supporters –local interests, construction,transportation, defense industries (Okimoto, 1989). In here, agricultural-interested group is involved with theclientalistic relations with LDP politicians, and creating opposition forces in agricultural issues. The LDP has
had its strongest based of support in rural and semi-urban districts. Being the only party with a broad base ofnational support places the LDP in a very advantageous position (Okimoto, 1989). However, in the issue of
FTA politics, the LDP’s broad base of electoral support makes it difficult to have a consensus since they covera diverse cross-selection of society from farmers to big business executives and small and medium-sized
entrepreneurs.
(2) Bureaucrats –Diffused coordination of the cabinet & Vertical alliance of sub-governments
The coordination role of the cabinet is understood as comparatively “weak” because cabinet
ministers tend to represent the interests of their ministries within the policy sub-governments. Both Koizumi
and Abe administrations, seeking to advance state interests, were highly responsive to the prospect of diffused
gains from FTAs across wider areas of the economy and polity (Mulgan, 2008). However, in general, theprime ministerial executive lacks strong top-down authority, central control and inter-sectoral coordination
ability in FTA politics. It cannot override the independent policymaking authority of the sub-governments
since the vertical alliances they form and the policy stalemates they engender, particularly when the subgovernments firmly oppose the prime minister’s policy (Ito, 2005).
The FTA initiative by bureaucrats of Japan is a stark contrast to the political leadership in Koreancase. In Japan, since the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) started, the team of 4
Ministries –Finance, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Trade, and Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery –has formed
to arrange the negotiations FTAs. Time to time, coordination among the four ministries began to show a crack,
because no one stood above the four ministries to make a definite decision when interests of four ministries
conflict each other. So far, following the successful conclusion of the FTA negotiation with Singapore, theteam of four has played an important role in defining the character and contents of each FTA and one
ministry’s objection has become a crucial veto to a proposal package (Ito, 2005).
The lack of strong top-down authority and inter-sectoral coordination ability by the top layer ofgovernment means that special interests tend to prevail over national interests in policymaking (Mulgan,

16

2008). In consequence, Japan does not have one FTA strategy or policy, in fact it turned out several. Since
Japan has no single body producing trade policy, there is nobody capable of coordinating conflicting domestic
interests on trade issues. As a result, FTAs make a slow progress because of the clash of interests between
agriculture and industry in general. The lack of coordination power of the prime ministerial executive also
limits the possibilities for trade off between industry and agriculture. In summary, these bureaucratic
characteristics are able to apply the case of Korea-Japan FTA that are having difficulties in combining
different interests from diffused coordination of the cabinet and vertical alliances of sub-governments,
especially in Japanese agricultural sector.
When we look back upon the past Japanese government, in fact, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
actively pursued structural reform of the policymaking system focusing on weakening the role of LDP
politicians as representatives of special interests. Koizumi understood that the public was fed up with the old
LDP machine, especially wasteful public works spending, and he turned this potential liability into an asset as
he vowed to dismantle the system (Vogel, 2006). For example, in March 2004, a new Council of Ministers
Concerned with the Japan’s FTA politics was established, so that the problem of agricultural tradeliberalization Promotion of Economic Partnerships was charged with promoting the formation of FTAs.
Furthermore, in December 2004, his administration adopted its first set of basic guidelines for signing FTAs,
which called on “‘all ministries and agencies to make all-out joint efforts’ to realize the early conclusion of . . .
EPA and FTA talks with Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea” (Nikkei Weekly, 27 December 2004-3 January2005). However, as this structural reform has not succeeded, still a general developmental trend ofpolicymaking has remained in Japanese politics. The proponents of deregulation have been bound to the
opponents through common ties to industry associations, government ministries, and the LDP (Vogel, 2006).
Lastly, as Naoko Munakata’s article of “Evolution of Japan’s policy toward Economic Integration”(2001) also explains, the most serious challenge of Japan might be a lack of political leadership, especially forinternational trade policy. The main cause lies in that fact that Japan’s policy toward economic integration has
evolved basically by reacting to given situations (Munakata, 2001). While Japan has occasionally contributed
to the creation of collective entities such as APEC, it has failed to follow through on the efforts byimplementing politically controversial reform and providing momentum to regional initiatives. The articles
argues that Japanese political leaders have to play a significant role in clarifying the differences in perceptionsof “history” with its neighboring countries and come to a mutual understanding based on these differences, if
Japan aims to actively promote economic integration in Asia.
(3) Interest Groups –The Pork-Barrel Politics
The dynamics of LDP interactions with its interest coalition and with the bureaucracy, in turn, supply
the essential materials for constructing a typology of the Japanese policy making processes, called segmented
political configurations (Okimoto, 1989). In addition to this, Japanese pressure groups, such as the agriculturaland small business federations, are quite large and aggressive enough influence to political parties as well as
the bureaucracy. In agriculture, for example, there is a massive National Agricultural Cooperative League

17

(Zenno), whose constituent cooperatives have 5 million members. In business sector, The Japan Chamber ofCommerce and Industry (Nissho, JCCI) is closely allied with many LDP politicians; similarly, the Japan
Council for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai, JCED) has its strong cross-party political ties. The twomore conservative forces of the business federations, Keidanren and Nikkeiren, have often been immobilized
in the policy formation process by their large size and complex internal decision-making processes (Calder,1988). Virtually all interests groups in Japan fall under the jurisdiction of a government bureaucracy (Okimoto,1989). Thus, all these interest groups are closely connected with the LDP politicians and bureaucrats,
consequently they can raise their strong voices as political sub-governments.
However, on the FTA issue, the concentrated benefits of FTAs to special business interests and theconcentrated costs of not signing them, motivate the Japanese business community to press for FTAs withparticular countries and to demand an end to agricultural protection as the chief obstacle to the successful
conclusion of these agreements. In fact, Japanese business has been arguing a reform of agricultural structure
to lay the groundwork for agricultural trade liberalization. Kitashiro Kakutaro, head of the Japan Associationof Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) argues, “FTAs are supposed to ‘‘prime the promotion of structuralreforms in fields such as agriculture’” (Nikkei Weekly, 15 December 2003).
In opposition to this, in agriculture sector, the bulk of the Agricultural Cooperative Organization(Nokyo)'s political representatives are aligned with the LDP and for this reason it has been labeled "thepressure group within the system" (Cheng, 1990). As a result, interest groups involved with agricultural sector
or further business sector have been affiliated with the LDP politicians who have a power to take theirinterests. So the only way the farmers can raise their voices is to speak through the government parties. Thus,
the LDP and bureaucrats also cannot ignore the power of regional interest groups since they also givesignificantly important amount of votes and financial aids.
Like this, according to Saori Katada and Mireya Solis’s article of “Domestic sources of Japanese
foreign policy activism: loss avoidance and demand coherence” (2010), Japan’s active foreign policy is better
explained with a look at the domestic lobbying activities of affected interest groups. Conventional view ofinternational political economy explaining that greater economic interdependence creates an incentive foractive foreign policy engagement, does not match with the Japanese cases of foreign economic policy. Onevariable that the authors used shows some significances of the case of KJFTA. The characteristics of“immobilism” in the negotiations with Korea resulted from the clash of interest groups in Japan and the muted
lobbying campaign of industry to reap the economic benefits (Katada and Solis, 2010). In this sense, it isessential that both the rationale for mobilization and lobbying capacity are essential elements in understanding
the Japanese domestic demand for significant foreign policy departures.

5. Connection Points between Domestic obstacles and FTA Politics
5-1. Japanese domestic political tasks toward the achievement of KJFTA with the relationships of the LDP,
bureaucrats, and interest groups181) A New Crisis and Compensation Politics
Dynamic crisis and compensation politics of the LDP in order to be a central party has been a “carrot
and the stick” politics to achieve its political and policy related objectives after the postwar period. The patternof compensation politics also clearly helped to keep the ruling conservatives in power as a politics ofreciprocity. Kent Calder, for example, carefully identifies three postwar “crises” for conservative Japanesepoliticians: 1949-1951, 1959-1963, and 1971-1976. During these years the ruling party faced declining
electoral majorities, increasingly successful and assertive opposition parties, and a variety of domestic andinternational pressures for change (Rosenbluth, 1993). The LDP maintained its conservative superiority
through material distributive politics particularly for agriculture, defense, regional development, small
business and welfare sector. From 2003 when the KJFTA negotiation have started, the LDP has seized thegovernment in most of terms (Table 4), consequently compensation politics consolidating the LDP’s position
might not positively affect to the progress of KJFTA negotiations. Thus, the mobilization of voters in supportof specific interest group objectives is relatively easy in terms of compensation politics throughout pastconservative years.
Table 4. < Japanese General Election since 2003 >Japanese General Election
2003

2005

2009

2012

LeaderJunichiro Koizumi

Junichiro Koizumi

Yukio Hatoyama

Shinzo Abe

Party

Liberal Democratic

Liberal Democratic

Democratic

Liberal Democratic

Seats won

237

296

308

294

Popular vote43.85%

47.77%

47.43%

43.01%

Accordingly, in those consequent conservative years, the LDP legislators could target pork-barrel
items (such as highways, bridges, or profitable contracts) to their supporters. For this, they extracted financial
contributions from the business community, which they could then redistribute to other supporters(Rosenbluth, 1993). Legislators enjoy information superiority, while bureaucrats are manipulated to serve theinterests of constituents of LDP politicians through promotion and promise of post career job assignments.
These relations prove a “principal-agent relationship” between legislator-bureaucrat relations (Rosenbluth,1993). Moreover, Japan’s mass interest groups can be a strong force for redistributive compensation in timesof crisis and against retrenchment when stability prevails. More specifically, in each case the conservatives
responded with policies that redistributed wealth to the organized groups to whom the opposition was trying
to appeal. In this sense, we can assume that in the crisis periods of the LDP, there has been not enough power
to focus on the issue of FTA negotiations which has still many conflicting issues in Japanese domestic area.
Rather, the legislators including the LDP politicians and bureaucrats had to concentrate on making a wealthy
nation to overcome financial crises, while distributing compensations to all over the Japan.
One more explanation by Hidetaka Yoshimatus (2007) in regard to interactive relationships of three19

actors in domestic politics, there was strong opposition from the two political actors, bureaucrats at the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and politicians in the ruling LDP, to market opening
in the agriculture sector. He mainly argues that economic linkages and institutional cooperation in East Asia
have changed basic interests of MAFF bureaucrats and the LDP politicians and such changes have induced
new moves in Japan’s FTA policy (Yoshimatus, 2007). Before 2003, the LDP was more stubborn than MAFF
concerning the FTA policy, demanding postponing the start of formal negotiations of some FTAs. However,the LDP began to adopt a new approach after the mid-2003 when the negotiation talks of KJFTA just started.
In the same year, the LDP set up an internal deliberative body concerning FTAs, making public the party’s
FTA policy that favored the promotion of FTAs. The LDP also began to show flexible attitudes toward tariff
concessions for actual FTA negotiations.
In fact, the party’s norin zoku had to consider support from the agricultural groups for the election. In
2002 and 2003, the zoku members opposed FTAs as a response to demands from agricultural groups, since
they redefined their approaches to FTAs from a standpoint of cooperation with Asian farmers and export
expansion to East Asia. However, deepened economic linkages with East Asia and the evolution of regional
affairs made senior LDP members promote the view that FTAs provides a means for developing closer
linkages and influence in the region. Besides, the MAFF has changed its position on FTA negotiations byministerial rivalry. While other ministries promoted FTAs, arguing that growing economic and politicallinkages with East Asia was unavoidable, the MAFF only began to show a positive posture in order to secure
its position in ministerial competition.
2) “Corporatism” in Japanese Political Economic Issues
The iron triangle of Japanese politics are also taken together to make another issue of Japanesepolitics, the “corporatism”. The essence of corporatism is a two-way of relationship between government andinterest groups: formal inclusion of groups in the administration for purposes of policy implementation in
exchange for a legitimate role in policy making and an institutionalized system of rewards (Cheng, 1990). In
consequence, the practice of dual office holding is significantly represented as follows: politicians who
occupy leadership positions in interest groups concurrently with Diet office, either as long-serving executives
or advisers, providing an instant political connection to the central organs of power. The Japanese farm lobby,
for instance, is well represented in the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives by executives
from the Agricultural Cooperative Organization (Nokyo). In addition, The Agricultural Policy Research
Association brings together Diet politicians with connections to the agricultural cooperatives. It contains a
mixture of current Nokyo executives, past leaders and members, and a broader group of Nokyo supporters(Cheng, 1990).
Therefore, the corporatism well characterizes Japanese political economy with the term “Japan,
Incorporated” by Daniel Okimoto. In this sense, Japanese bureaucrats play a political role in packaging
bargains between societal groups. This biases policy toward slow and elaborate compromises and gives
ministry officials the leeway to insert their own agenda into policy outcomes. In practice, the ministries and20the LDP negotiate closely with each other, even though one cannot easily conclude which really dominates thepolicymaking process (Vogel, 2006). Furthermore, when economic plans are concrete or industrially specificand based on a consensus between MITI and industry, they are able to gather supporting actors in the private
and public sectors moving in the same direction (Okimito, 1989). In sum, the triple alliance relationships ofthe politicians (the Diet), bureaucracy, and interest groups have created the corporatism in Japanese politics on
the issues of political economy like FTAs.
In addition to the characteristics of corporatism, Japan’s FTA policy exhibits a “bottom-up
policymaking pattern”, whereby strong policy sub-governments and weak bureaucratic coordination. It gives
clout to interest groups and generates a cumbersome negotiation strategy as the conflicting interests ofinternationalized business sectors and agriculture must be reconciled (Solis, 2008). This domestic politicalconstraint, therefore, has delayed Japan’s FTA with larger trading partners. The domestic politics of Japanesetrade policy are in flux with attempts to centralize policymaking and growing divisions among the members of
the peak associations for agriculture and business, Nokyo and Keidanren respectively (Solis, 2008). According
to Solis, one of the most important changes in Japan is the growing politicization of trade policy with the more
active intervention of politicians attuned to public opinion trends.
3) Most Conflicting Issues: Connection Point of Agricultural Sector and Japanese FTA Politics
An important structural feature of the Japanese policymaking system, which largely determines thedelivery of public policy outcomes on FTAs, is vertical segmentation along with sectoral lines that represents
each different interest. This means that for industry and agriculture, demand and supply of side actors in eachsector operate together within conventionally closed policy networks or sub-governments. In the case of
agriculture, farm politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the MAFF bureaucrats, and key
industry representatives such as the executives of the main agricultural organizations, who share a strong
common interest in promoting and protecting domestic agriculture, form the Japanese agricultural policy subgovernments, which has a primary role in making policy for that sector including agricultural trade policy(Mulgan, 2008). Therefore, cross-sector or horizontal coalitions that spontaneously coalesce on the basis ofcommon interests do not usually emerge in Japan’s segmented system.
The institutional analysis of the Japanese policymaking process, however, reveals the existence ofstructural obstacles to the implementation of such a policy in the form of opposing sectoral sub-governments
and a prime ministerial executive exercising insufficient top-down authority or interest coordination power toimpose a pro-market solution. Making agricultural trade policy inevitably requires the adjustment of opinions
between the sub-governments and the prime ministerial executive, which has become a substantial element of
the Japanese policymaking process (Mulgan, 2008). In other words, again the lack of strong top-down
authority and inter-sectoral coordination ability by the top layer of government might cause one of obstaclesin the process of policymaking, particularly on the conflicting agriculture issues of Korea-Japan FTA. Since
these institutional problems demonstrate that special interests tend to prevail over national interests in making
progress on policymaking.

214) Pragmatism of Japan’s FTA Politics
During the campaign for the general election of 2003, both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) andthe Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which is the largest opposition party in Japan, made the “Manifesto” tothe public, but the commitments towards FTAs with Asia were neither ambiguous nor consistent (Ito, 2005).
The LDP stated that economic integration with Asia was significant, however, they proposed far specific anddetailed program of agricultural reform, never mentioning its relationship with international trade. Withlacking serious interests of politicians, the bureaucrats has prepared and discussed the framework based on
their fractional structure. Since 2002, government documents in a similar direction but in different interests
have started to appear. For example, the White Paper on Trade, METI (2002), similar documents by MOF(2002), MOFA (2002), and Cabinet Office (2001) are included in this category. While wishing a politicalleadership on decision making, on the other hand, the bureaucrats have sought their own scenarios to lead thepoliticians intellectually (Ito, 2005). The comprehensive paper by MOFA (2002), followed and confirmed by
the paper by Cabinet Office (2004) showed this pragmatism clearly to account for Japan’s FTA strategy.
According to Ito’s analyses, the MOF papers seem to show a certain consensus shaping the bureaucratic
pragmatism; first the counterpart should be feasible one, second, it should be a realist one within Japan’s time
scope and then it is Asia without substantial trade in sensitive items on the top list.
Interestingly, in recent years, Japan’s trade liberalization has progressed gradually after several
negotiations. However, it did not hold true for the case of Korea-Japan FTA. While first FTA with Singapore(JSEPA) virtually excluded agricultural sector, second FTA with Mexico started to include agriculture, and thecoverage of products covered further expanded with ASEAN. In fact, this may support the-later-the-better
policy, but FTA negotiations may still in probing stage for Japan (Ito, 2005). In the light of Japan, ASEAN
was a better counterpart institutionally at that time in the view of the Japanese bureaucratic pragmatism. Now
this pragmatism has been turning to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under the United States of economic
mechanism or the trilateral FTA with China in the near future. The most important thing for Japan is further
integration with East Asia as a whole, but whether there will appear another bureaucratic pragmatism for
China, is all very uncertain (Ito, 2005). Japan does want to risk losing their benefits or struggling domestic
forces for achievement of the KJFTA, since it is clear that there are serious domestic and international
deadlocks surrounding the KJFTA. For these reasons, Japanese political pragmatism as additional domestic
environments for FTAs, makes the Korea-Japan FTA have more difficulties in reaching an agreement. Morerecently, the second Abe administration since 2013, however, strongly aims to raise national growth to get outof long economic stagnation. Accordingly, the FTA issues are re-examined and actively discussed within andout the government. As the case of KJFTA is one of them, one can expect what this changed government
position would lead to the outcome of negotiations in the near future.

6. Conclusion
Not only for the Korea-Japan FTA case, but other FTAs are also largely controlled by the combined
situations of economic and political issues surrounding complex domestic and international environments.

22However, as my research shows, the achievement of FTA is more controlled by domestic political reasons,rather than economic factors. Moreover, from the past experiences of Korea-China FTA case, the strongest
push force toward the conclusion of FTA comes from political initiatives by national leaders with domestic
and international political incentives.
The past Korea’s FTA negotiations with Chile, Japan and the United States convinces us that the real
obstacles of the KJFTA are not political, cultural, economic and historical barriers existing in East Asia, but
the domestic constraints, stemming from the fierce political reaction of “the losers” in market opening (Ahn,
2006). To be specific, two sectors of agriculture and fishery has been the most difficult issues for negotiations
on the FTA between Korea and Japan until now. Since Japan has no comparative advantage on agriculture
rather than Korea’s goods, thus Japanese farmers and related organizations keep opposing the Korea-JapanFTA for fear of losing their domestic interests. Still there is not an enough consensus on necessity of tradeliberalization on agricultural sector, particularly on the KJFTA. Even farmers, consumers, and politicians havelittle incentives to approve free trade of agricultural sector with the FTA, thus it leads to block further
negotiations of KJFTA. Unusually, the negotiations of Korea-Japan FTA have been experiencing moredomestic difficulties in both economic and political deadlock due to a conflict of interests. Japan recently has
been struggling from economic stagnation, low growth rates, enormous public debts and high trade deficits
and all these make Japan have more tough domestic environments to discuss further KJFTA progress.
Japanese domestic FTA politics on policymaking process can be represented by the iron triangle
interactions of the Liberal Democratic Party, bureaucrats, and interest groups. This close relationship also
causes several problems in Japanese domestic FTA politics: 1) the relationship of the LDP politicians andvoters can be seen as the principal-agent model. The LDP’s particularism of Japanese domestic politics
applies the fact that the LDP has to support their strongest supporters’ interests in rural and semi-urban
districts; 2) Japanese bureaucrats have weak decision-making power due to diffused coordination of thecabinet and vertical alliances of sub-governments; 3) Lastly, the influence of interest groups such as
agricultural and small business federations, are quite large and aggressive enough control to political parties aswell as the bureaucracy. The problem is that these interest groups still have serious concerns with the loss of
trade liberalization of agricultural sector, thus it blocks to the agreement of KJFTA which would lead nocomparative advantage in that sector. For these reasons, one can conclude that Japanese domestic politics has
been the biggest obstacle to further progress on negotiations of Korea-Japan FTA.
With such backgrounds of Japanese political structure, one can assume that in the new crisis periodof the LDP, no enough power to concentrate on FTA negotiations still having many conflicting issues inJapanese domestic area was formed, since Korea-Japan FTA has started to discuss in 2003. The iron triangleof Japanese politics are also taken together to create the corporatism issue of Japanese politics. Because of thelack of strong top-down authority and inter-sectoral coordination abilities by the top layer of government may
cause to an obstacle for policymaking, particularly on the conflicting issue of KJFTA. For the economic
concerns, the key to get success in negotiations on agricultural and fishery issues are to seek commodities thathave comparative advantages within the sector each other and promote the intra-industry trade (Honma, 2005).

23

In addition to Japanese case, Korea’s past FTAs also demonstrated that the main obstacle to conclude theagreement was to make “domestic consensus” with enough legitimacy. Therefore, the key of future agreement
largely depends on how to solve these domestic political tasks in both Japan and Korea.
Although non-economic factors such as past history and diplomatic issues cannot be ignored,
however, both countries also should not ignore the number of Koreans who had first-hand experience ofJapanese occupation decreases and cultural exchanges with Japan expand, the public perception of Japan has
been significantly changing (Ahn, 2005). Besides, it might too obvious to mention about the political benefitsof Korea-Japan FTA. If the agreement of KJFTA is achieved, it would lead a much more solid relationshipbetween Korea and Japan. The turbulence-like relationship due to different point of views on diplomatic or
historical issues will not wholly control the cooperation between two countries. When the diplomatic or
political issues aggravated its relationship, the economic ties will support the cooperative mood to somedegree. Furthermore, the negotiation talks of Korea-China-Japan are quite well-going until recently,
whichever will stimulate another one to conclude as soon as possible. Consequently, two FTAs would arrange
another big economic community in East Asia region. One can cautiously expect that deepening economic
cooperation in East Asia would finally reach the level of economic regional community centering on Korea,
China, and Japan like as the European Community.
If the values and potentials are to be considered, the Korea-Japan FTA should not be only discussed
from the point of “trade imbalance” problem. If Japan is really aware of the total significance of Korea, it
should be strongly noted by politicians that they have to pay much attention to diplomatic sensitivity toachieve their strategic interests after overcome domestic political issues. Political leadership is very significant
to complement bureaucratic negotiation. Accordingly, both governments should work to resolve thesesociopolitical feuds to facilitate negotiations on an FTA. In this sense, Japan and Korea’s political leaders
should play a crucial role in the conclusion of the bilateral FTA (Ahn, 2005). The roles that the leaders of bothcountries play will be significant and each government will play an important role in persuading the people
and ratifying the agreement after the negotiations in order to reach a Korea-Japan FTA.
It is too impatient to conclude that the future of Korea-Japan FTA is too bleak. The most important
thing in my point of view is Korean and Japanese have to see the issue of KJFTA with the idea of separationof politics and economic issue, since this FTA exceptionally is regarded too diplomatic-side of topic and it has
been controlled by diplomatic conflicts and domestic political struggles. Rather, it is necessary to use the FTA
as a useful tool to improve the bilateral relations. Furthermore, it can be a good stimulus for current on-goingissue of KCJFTA. Neo-liberal institutionalist theory suggests that as I mentioned in the earlier part of thispaper, economic cooperation can develop further cooperation between countries. I would like to apply thisargument into the case of KJFTA in order to expect better environments in near future drawing much higherlevel of cooperation as the closest neighboring countries.

24

REFERENCES
ArticlesAhn, Se Young. "“Domestic Politics of FTAs and Negotiation Strategy for Economic Integration in East Asia:
The Korean Perspective." Asia-Pacific Economic Association Conference, University of Washington, Seattle.
2006.
Cheng, Peter P. "Japanese interest group politics: an institutional framework." Asian Survey (1990): 251-265.
Cheong, Inkyo. "A Korea‐Japan FTA: Economic effects and policy implications." Global Economic Review
29.3 (2000): 55-68.
Choi, Byung-il, and Jennifer Sejin Oh. "Asymmetry in Japan and Korea's agricultural liberalization in FTA:
domestic trade governance perspective." The Pacific Review 24.5 (2011): 505-527.
Choi, Young Jong. "East Asian Regionalism and South Korea's FTA Strategy." 국제정치논총 44.5 (2004):
85-108.
Do-Hyung Kim. “The Economic Effect of Korea-Japan FTA and the Tasks.” Collective Symposium on KoreaJapan FTA (2003).
Katada, Saori N., and Mireya Solís. "Domestic sources of Japanese foreign policy activism: loss avoidanceand demand coherence." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10.1 (2010): 129-157.
Kang, David C. "Improving and Maturing, but Slowly." Pacific Forum CSIS. 2004.
Nakajima, Tomoyoshi. "An analysis of the economic effects of Japan-Korea FTA: Sectoral aspects." The
Journal of Econometric Study of Northeast Asia 4.1 (2002).
McKibbin, Warwick J., Jong‐Wha Lee, and Inkyo Cheong. "A dynamic analysis of the Korea–Japan free tradearea: simulations with the G‐cubed Asia–Pacific model." International Economic Journal 18.1 (2004): 3-32.
Mulgan, Aurelia George. "Japan's FTA politics and the problem of agricultural trade liberalisation."
Australian Journal of International Affairs 62.2 (2008): 164-178.
Munakata, Naoko. “Evolution of Japan's policy toward economic integration.” Brookings Institution Center
for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (2015).
Solis, Mireya. Japan's competitive FTA strategy: Commercial opportunities versus political rivalry. Waseda
University Global COE Program, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, 2008.
Urata, Shujiro. "Free trade agreements: A catalyst for Japan’s economic revitalization." Reviving Japan’s
economy (2005): 377-410.
Yamazawa, Ippei. "ASSESSING A JAPAN‐KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT." The Developing
Economies 39.1 (2001): 3-48.
Yoshida, Tadahiro. "East Asian Regionalism and Japan." IDE APEC Study Center Working Paper Series(2004).
Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. "The politics of Japan's free trade agreement." Journal of Contemporary Asia 36.4
(2006): 479-499.

25

Classical Literatures
Calder, Kent E. Crisis and compensation: public policy and political stability in Japan, 1949-1986. Princeton
University Press, 1988.
Keohane, Robert O., and Helen V. Milner, eds. Internationalization and domestic politics. Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Helen V. Milner. "The new wave of regionalism." International organization 53.03(1999): 589-627.
Milner, Helen. "International theories of cooperation among nations: strengths and weaknesses." World
politics 44.03 (1992): 466-496.
Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. "Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role ofdomestic groups." Economics & Politics 8.2 (1996): 145-189.
Okimoto, Daniel I. Between MITI and the market: Japanese industrial policy for high technology. Stanford
University Press, 1989.
Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. Japan's political marketplace. Harvard University Press,
2009.
Vogel, Steven Kent. Japan remodeled: How government and industry are reforming Japanese capitalism. Vol.
224. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Data & Reports
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP): major countries’ FTA trends and implications(2012.09.30)
KJFTA Joint Study Group Report
Korea International Trade Association (KITA): Statistical Data of Trade Investment and Personal Exchange(2013.11.8)
Hyungdo, Ahn, Changjae, Lee, and Hongshik, Lee. "ANALYSIS OF A CHINA-JAPAN-KOREA FREE
TRADE AREA: A SECTORAL APPROACH." New paradigms for transpacific collaboration: symposium
sponsored by The University of Washington, The Korea Economic Institute, and The Korea Institute forInternational Economic Policy, October 16-18, 2005. Korea Economic Institute of America, 2006.
Ito, Takatoshi, and Yukiko Fukagawa. "Political economy of Japan–Korea FTA from Japanese perspective:
strategic approach, gains, and implications." Korea–Japan FTA. Toward a Model Case for East Asian
Economic Integration. Seoul: Institute for International Economic Policy (2005).
Jung, Sung Chun, and Choong Yong Ahn. "Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation Amid a New East Asian
Integration." KIEP Research Paper NO. Policy References-12-04 (2012).
Kei Kono and Miwako Hara. “Japan-Korea Past, Present, and Future: From a Public Awareness Survey.”
Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) Dec, 2011.
http:// www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/index-e.html
Masayoshi Honma. “Agricultural Issues on Japan-Korea FTA.” KIEP (2005).

26

Yooncheul Song. “Liberalization of the Agriculture and Fishery Sectors.” KIEP (2005).

Websites
Korea International Trade Association, Trade Market Information-Japan:
http://www.kita.net/WIKI006.R02.cmd?cmd_id=WIKI006.R02.cmd&country=asia&countryEngName=japan&nationCatogory=invest
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, FTA website (Korea-Japan FTA):
http://www.fta.go.kr/new2/ftakorea/psd.asp?country_idx=12
Japan External Trade Organization, FTA Research Report of November, 2013:
http://www.jetro.go.jp/jfile/report/07001524/07001524.pdf
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan):
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/country/korea.html
Zen-noh (National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations) homepage:
http://www.zennoh.or.jp/about/index.html
Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), Policy Proposals for Trade, Investment and
EPA/FTA
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/index10.html

News
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s Farmers Oppose Pacific Free-Trade Talks, November 11, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/business/global/12yen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=027

APPENDIX

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

28

Figure 3.

Figure 4. < Effects of a Korea-Japan FTA on Production by Industries > (Unit: % changes)

29

Table 1.

Table 2.

30

Table 3.

Table 4.

31

Table 5.

Table 6.

32