Army Multi-Domain Transformation
Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict
Chief of Staff Paper #1
Unclassified Version

Headquarters, Department of the Army
16 March 2021

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Preface
America’s Army serves to protect the Nation and preserve thepeace. Historically, this has always meant preparing for – and whennecessary, fighting and winning – the Nation’s wars. The Army must
always be ready to fight and win. In this era of great powercompetition, the Army must also compete aggressively to protect our national interests.
America has long preserved the peace through its military strength. A large portion ofthis strength comes from the ability to deter war, provided by a strong and capable Army,coupled with strong and capable partners throughout the world.
Although our Army still maintains overmatch, it is fleeting. In the face of determined
adversaries and accelerating technological advances, we must transform today to meet
tomorrow’s challenges. Future conflicts will manifest at longer range, across all domains, and atmuch greater speed, both physical and cognitive. We must therefore continue to implement a 21st
century talent management system, develop and field new weapon systems, transform ourdoctrine, build new organizations, and change the way we train. This bold transformation will
provide the Joint Force with the range, speed, and convergence of cutting edge technologies
that will be needed to provide future decision dominance and overmatch required to win
the next fight.
The Army provides unique contributions to the Joint Force to help protect our national
interests and ensure the security of the American people at home and abroad. In competition, our
Nation’s goal remains winning without fighting by leveraging all elements of national power.
Deterrence is one critical part of competing successfully. To deter aggression, the Joint Forcemust have an irrefutable, demonstrated ability to fight and win. To advance our interests incompetition more broadly, the Army maintains forward presence and fosters enduring land
power partnerships around the world. The Army also leverages an array of capabilities to operate
in the information space and ensure that the nation can consistently win with the truth. We
provide mobile long range fires, sustainment, protection, and forces able to maneuver within an
adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) layer. And we boost the credibility of our deterrent
message with our demonstrated commitment to closely integrate with the rest of the Joint Force.
As demonstrated in 2020, the Army’s high readiness levels and breadth of expertise
allowed us to provide timely and effective support during times of crisis. In January, we helped
demonstrate American strength and resolve overseas to deescalate and prevent conflict. During
the COVID-19 pandemic, Army scientists supported national vaccine, therapeutic, and testing
efforts; the Army Corps of Engineers aided mayors and governors in developing emergency
treatment facilities; and our Army medical and operational units provided urgently needed
support across the country. Army units also provided significant professional support tocountless American communities, including responding appropriately to civil unrest, hurricanes,
wild fires and floods.
The United States Army faces an inflection point that requires innovation, creativity, andentrepreneurship in the application of combat power. Our Nation’s adversaries have gained on
the Joint Force’s qualitative and quantitative advantages. If the Army does not change, it riskslosing deterrence and preservation of the Nation’s most sacred interests. I set an Army
Aimpoint for 2035 as the date at which the Army will be modernized and prepared to dominate
our adversaries in sustained Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). 2028 is our Waypoint, ai
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Table of Contents
Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... iI.

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1

II.

The Emerging Military Problem .................................................................................................... 3a.

Outflanked in Competition ......................................................................................................... 3b.

Contested Globally ...................................................................................................................... 3c.

Fractured and Disintegrated...................................................................................................... 4III.

MDO During Conflict ................................................................................................................... 5a.

The Future Challenges of Large-Scale Conflict ................................................................... 5b.

Landpower Advantage During Conflict .................................................................................. 6IV.

MDO During Crisis Response ................................................................................................. 10a.

The Future Challenges of Crisis Response ........................................................................ 10b.

The Added Value of Army MDO During Crisis ................................................................... 10
MDO During Competition ............................................................................................................. 15V.
a.

Expand the Landpower Network ............................................................................................ 16b.

Demonstrate Range of Capabilities ...................................................................................... 17c.

Develop New Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 19

VI.

Change: Getting to the MDO Aimpoint ................................................................................. 20a.

Army Continuum of Analysis (ACA) ..................................................................................... 20b.

Gaining Positional Advantage ................................................................................................ 21c.

Gaining Capability Advantage ................................................................................................ 22

VII.

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 28

Annex A. Glossary ................................................................................................................................. 29iii
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Introduction
The United States is facing an unprecedented set of challenges to our national interests.
China and Russia continue to challenge the rules-based international order. Both have become
increasingly more assertive in an effort to advance their agendas, aimed at supplanting the U.S.
globally. By 2040 China and Russia will have weaponized all instruments of national power toundermine the collective wills of the United States, Allies, and partners, while simultaneously
cultivating their own security partnerships. This will lead to an unstructured international
environment where the line between conflict and peace is blurred. As China and Russia continue
to modernize their militaries, the Joint Force will find it increasingly difficult to deter their illicit
and aggressive actions.
Our adversaries have developed asymmetric approaches to undermine our strengths andexploit our weaknesses. The most striking example of this is their investment in anti-access/areadenial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to prevent the U.S. from projecting military power.
Technological advances have enabled the integration of space, cyber, information, and electronic
warfare (EW) capabilities that can halt American power projection before it begins. Artificial
intelligence, autonomy, and robotics will continue to change the character of operational
campaigns, resulting in a battlefield that is faster, more lethal, and distributed. In conflict, ouradversaries will add to stand-off through the employment of modern chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. This layered approach erodes Joint freedom of
maneuver and reduces the effectiveness of other instruments of national power. The urgent needfor transformational change to meet these emerging challenges cannot be overstated. The Armyis poised to deliver this change.
The Multi-Domain Army of 2035 introduces a transformational change to joint
warfighting. By 2035, the Army will enable the Joint Force to maneuver and prevail fromcompetition through conflict with a calibrated force posture of multi-domain capabilities thatprovide overmatch through speed and range at the point of need. Dynamic employment andposture of Army forces during competition will provide range in depth to penetrate complex
A2/AD systems and achieve cross-domain effects—creating opportunities and providing options
to deter, deescalate, or promptly transition to win the first battle. Army formations andcapabilities will provide the necessary speed, both physical and cognitive, to achieve decision
dominance required for a faster-paced, distributed, and complex operating environment. The
Multi-Domain Army will set the conditions for the Joint Force to fight and win integrated
campaigns necessary to defeat state actors.
Now and in the future, first battles are decisive to the outcome of campaigns. Winningthe first battle or preventing a fait accompli in crisis will be necessary to prevent prolonged
conflict and escalation. Ground forces will decisively shape the first battle by leveraging
positional and capability advantage to rapidly deliver options for crisis response, and to win in
conflict. Resilient, mobile, integrated, and survivable ground forces will offer the Joint Force
Commander with an array of asymmetric options for deterring and defeating adversaries in all
domains. Dynamically postured forward, in concert with the collective effort of Allies andpartners, ground forces can defeat sophisticated adversary defensive schemes from inside
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positions, creating corridors for air, maritime and all-domain forces to exploit. In all domains,
Army capabilities will sustain, enable, extend, and expand the reach of both defensive andoffensive actions.
In competition, the Army provides the Department of Defense (DoD) with foundational
capabilities and capacity to shape the environment. Army forces pursue relative positional andcapability advantage to support Joint and political objectives. The former is gained primarily
through expanding the Global Landpower Network, in conjunction with Allies and partners. The
latter is gained through the development of capabilities, force structure, doctrine and training tosupport multi-domain operations (MDO) at the speed of innovation. Demonstrations of joint
assured power projection enhance the credibility of military deterrence, enabling policy makers
to employ the right mix of diplomatic, economic, and information levers to prevent a conflict
before it starts.
Army Multi-Domain Transformation describes why and how the U.S. Army must
transform to enhance our core competencies and become a multi-domain force, with the rightcapabilities in the right place to enable the Joint Force to win, from competition through conflict.
It further describes the application of the Multi-Domain Operations Concept, first published in2018, across competition, crisis response, and conflict to support Joint All Domain Operations.

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The Emerging Military Problem
The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) asserts that by 2040, the decline of the 20th
century international order will lead to an unstructured international environment where the line
between conflict and peace is blurred. America’s adversaries, enabled by the proliferation of newtechnologies, will restrict our freedom of action and erode our strategic advantages. By 2040, ouradversaries will develop novel asymmetric capabilities. Of these, China presents the mostenduring strategic challenge, and is most likely to reach military parity with the Joint Force by
2040. If we fail to address these emerging threats, the Joint Force will face significant risk ofbeing outflanked in competition, globally contested, fractured, and disintegrated.

a. Outflanked in Competition
Adversary attempts to outflank the Joint Force in competition will require us to reinforce
our relationships with Allies and partners. The United States’ alliances and partnerships are adecisive advantage in competition, but our ability to maintain this advantage is not preordainedin this era’s contest for regional and global leadership. To this end, mutually beneficial alliancesand partnerships are crucial to success. By building upon mutually beneficial relationships, theArmy enables the Joint Force to provide timely response options in every contingency.
Our adversaries will likely prefer to avoid direct conflict with the United States, or tolimit conflict in both scope and duration. This intent, paired with emerging capabilities to hamper
U.S. intervention, means that our adversaries will deliberately position themselves to achieve
their strategic goals without fighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,
before they breach the U.S. threshold for armed conflict.

b. Contested Globally
Since Operation Desert Storm, China and Russia have studied the American conduct ofwar, and have designed concepts and capabilities to counter our strengths and exploit ourweaknesses, particularly in force projection. The Joint Force can no longer assume that thehomeland is a sanctuary, or consider the ‘global commons’ uncontested. Joint Force deployment
will be contested from fort to port to foxhole, eroding our ability to project power. The Army and
the Joint Force must consider how to mobilize, project, and sustain combat power to provide
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with required forces and equipment.
The Chinese and Russian armed forces seek to overwhelm U.S. and partner forces
through systemic, sustained pressure, that takes away friendly decision space and overwhelms
U.S. platforms. In their near abroad, our adversaries benefit from shorter operational reach whichallows them to create dense A2/AD networks and fight from a strategically advantageous
defensive posture. By 2035, China will have extended its global reach, establishing the need tosecure their lines of communication and bases with air, maritime and ground forces. The Joint
Force must be prepared to disrupt and defeat this approach from all domains.
The Joint Force will confront persistent contact across the battlespace due to increases inrange, speed, lethality, and precision of adversary weapon systems as well as adversaries’ global
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presence, basing, and operations. Permissive spaces will be rare, and the homeland will no longer
be a sanctuary, which will hinder force generation and deployment efforts.

c. Fractured and Disintegrated
Adversaries recognize the importance of joint and combined integration to the U.S. way
of war, and will employ unique multi-domain combinations to break Joint Force linkages.
Adversary attempts to fracture and disintegrate the Joint force will manifest in three broad ways:
attacks on foundational military infrastructure, intensive multi-domain warfare, and diverse
adversary force designs.
In competition and conflict, joint operations will experience continuous disruption ofcommand and control (C2) from the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), space, and cyberdomains. Lack of effective joint C2 will isolate distributed units and risk defeat in crisis andconflict.
Our adversaries will present new capabilities that offset, or even outpace, Joint Forcecapabilities. These capabilities will emerge through the advent and democratization of dual-use,
disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, materials science, and biotechnology. As
our adversaries integrate 21st century military capabilities, the Joint Force must offset thesecapabilities, or risk a decreased deterrent effect on adversary behavior and increased battlefieldrisks in combat.

The Military Problem
 In competition and crisis, how does the Joint Force maintain freedom of action, and impose
its will against peer adversaries in all domains to deter conflict while re-establishing a
position of strategic advantage?

 In conflict, how does the Joint Force fight operational campaigns across all domains to
defeat state adversaries by winning first battles and avoiding global and strategic
escalation?

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MDO During Conflicta. The Future Challenges of Large-Scale Conflict
In future conflict, Army forces will be presented with
two fundamental challenges: time and distance. Our
adversaries will seek to leverage these challenges against the
Joint Force in order to rapidly seize their objectives before theUnited States can mount an effective response. Physicaldistance, or stand-off, created by our adversaries’ growing
range and speed of integrated A2/AD networks, creates thewindow of opportunity for malign action. Once conflict has
begun, our adversaries will globally contest our movement inorder to buy time to consolidate gains and de-escalate before
U.S. expeditionary forces arrive. The fundamental physics of
distance, and the corresponding time required to marshal anddeploy forces into theater, cannot be resolved withtechnological advancement alone.

The Military Problem
In conflict, how does the
Joint Force fightoperational campaigns
across all domains to
defeat state adversaries
by winning first battles andavoiding global andstrategic escalation?

To win the operational fight in forward theaters, the Joint Force must be postured andready forward with the right mix of capabilities to converge at range and speed. Fighting state
actors from a cold start by projecting power from the homeland over many months is no longer a
viable course of action. There is no alternative to the dynamic presence of formations incontested theaters. Army forces are uniquely structured to establish this presence, with a suite ofcapabilities that provide depth of range and speed, and benefit from extensive landpower
networks with partner armed forces. Competitive, calibrated force posture (CFP) is an explicit
requirement for the Joint Force to be able to transition to crisis or conflict. Being out of positionat the onset of crisis will gravely undermine the ability of national decision makers to impose
their will upon state actors, who will not afford the United States the time necessary to mobilize
and deploy combat power. The Army’s MDO concept addresses these challenges in asymmetricways to ensure success in conflict.
Operation TORCH:
Enabling Joint Force Overmatch
During the early days of WWII, Allied maritime forces struggled to protect assets in the
Mediterranean and Middle East (namely, Gibraltar and British forces in Egypt). Limited
operational footprints and the need for sustained resupply of troops in Egypt led the Allies tocede control of much of the Mediterranean Sea to the Axis, allowing them to dominate North
Africa. It was not until the Allied ground invasion of North Africa – Operation TORCH – that
the Allies were able to push back Italian and German ground forces, open airfields for Allied
aircraft, and secure vital ports and sea lanes. This enabled subsequent Allied operations toliberate southern Europe. Allied landpower enabled the transformation of the Mediterranean
into an Allied “lake” by the middle of 1943.

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b. Landpower Advantage During Conflict
The Multi-Domain Army will transform joint warfighting. In 2035, the Army –exercising dominant land power – will enable the Joint Force to penetrate complex, high-end
adversary defensive systems. MDO is the Army’s contribution to Joint All Domain Operations(JADO). The Army’s MDO concept informs, and is in turn informed by, the Joint Staff’s
emerging Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC). By 2035, the Army will transform the way we fightin order to:i.

Sustain the Fight

Prior to conflict, Army forces establish the theater architecture that enables the Joint
Force. In 2035, this requirement will not change, but the way in which Army forces establish
theater architecture will fundamentally transform. The Army will develop robust, resilient websof communication, protection, and sustainment that enable the Joint Force to prosecute conflict.
Modernization of theater architecture and sustainment is necessary, but it will not
fundamentally change the problems of time and distance in force projection. Therefore, theArmy must leverage innovative approaches to dynamically posture units, equipment, andpersonnel to rapidly close with our enemies in the first battle and win from the outset. In all
warfighting domains, Army capabilities will sustain, enable, extend, and expand the reach ofboth defensive and offensive actions.
The Joint Force must move away from synchronizing sustainment using archaic structuresthat are time and manpower intensive. By 2035, sustainment nodes will be survivable andcapable of rapidly moving logistics to enable the Joint Force. The Army will provide thefoundation for the Joint Force theater sustainment system that is integrated in real-time, enabledby data-informed decision making, and coupled with an anticipatory intuition for Army and Joint
sustainment requirements.

ii.

Expand the Battlespace

The Army will leverage emerging capabilities and forward posture to expand thebattlespace by maneuvering in areas “inside” and “outside” the traditional theater geometry.
Inside forces operate inside the adversary’s A2/AD zones to provide credible, survivablecapabilities that undermine area denial stratagems. Outside forces consist of regional and global
expeditionary, surge, and homeland defense formations required to control terrain, consolidate
gains and secure strategic support areas. An expanded battlespace provides Joint Force
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Commanders more options to exploit both strategic and operational indirect approaches in a
globally integrated operation against a peer adversary.
Operating as the Joint Force Commander’s “inside force,” the Army provides anasymmetric counter to the challenges posed by near-peer adversary militaries, through unique,land-based, foundational capabilities. The asymmetric advantages are based on the ability of
landpower to maneuver and communicate rapidly, strike at range, and survive in complex terrain– leading to greater decision dominance and overmatch.
At the operational level, Army “inside forces” will conduct persistent cross-domain
maneuver to conduct flanking attacks and turning maneuvers. Army forces in distributed forward
positions, will attack by strikes and raids across intra-theater lines of operation to create
operational mobility corridors. Simultaneously, Army forces will slow, disrupt, disperse, or
destroy follow-on enemy forces across domains and at global ranges, to set conditions for
decisive all-domain operations and enable the Joint Force to seize the initiative.
Advanced adversary capabilities and capacity will necessitate large amounts of low
signature, distributed, lethal “inside forces” that maneuver rapidly, aggregating and dispersing as
required. In large scale combat operations, these low-signature forces will replace static, highsignature operational outposts while constant displacement will be the norm: units will tend tohave broad fronts, will rarely have secure flanks, will engage in compartmented battles, and will
not have air and naval superiority. This will be a non-contiguous battlespace where commanders
must be able to integrate long range precision fires, and create effects across multiple domains.
In addition to providing an “inside force”, the Army will provide “outside forces” at thestrategic and theater level, that will have the capability and capacity to secure global key terrain,strategic choke points, lines of communication, threaten an adversary strategic flank, or holdtheir interests at risk. The combination of these inside and outside forces will be critical toaddressing the threats posed by peer adversaries with global reach and land-based expeditionary
capabilities.
The future non-linear battlefield opens opportunities for asymmetric approaches. The
Army of 2035 will further expand the battlespace by using these approaches to obtain positionsof relative advantage and create multiple operational dilemmas for the enemy. Army forces will
seize and retain key terrain, control resources, and secure populations through forcible entry,
raids, and close fights, especially in compartmentalized terrain. When properly exploited,asymmetric approaches provide the Joint Force opportunities to strike deep against a numericallysuperior, technologically equivalent enemy.

iii.

Strike in Depth Across Domains

The capability to strike in depth with lethal and non-lethal cross-domain effects is criticalto creating overmatch in operations against a peer adversary. Army multi-domain forces will beorganized and equipped to extend land-based effects into other domains, providing a suite oftools to integrate in the joint fires process, from the onset. This includes short, mid, and longrange precision fires to engage and destroy adversary land, air, and sea capabilities in depth.
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Operations at strategic, operational, and tactical depth are essential against a peer enemy
that enjoys superiority in numbers and complex A2/AD defensive systems. Tactical operations
will reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces not yet in contact to allow for morefavorable correlation of forces in the close area. Interdiction at operational and strategic depth
will produce broad operational effects.
Deep operations allow Army leaders to leverage the unique characteristics of unmannedsystems to achieve surprise, simultaneity, and speed. To strike targets of the highest operational
value, those that are able to or preparing to launch offensive attacks against our forces, deep
operations must maximize flexibility. Advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR), bolstered by machine learning, will improve the flexibility and responsiveness of deep
operations. Most importantly, deep operations are necessary to disrupt, desynchronize, anddefeat the enemy’s operational scheme.
Army cross-domain maneuver and effects in
depth provide an asymmetric advantage that will
penetrate A2/AD systems and enable greater combined/ Joint Force freedom of maneuver to fight and win
campaigns.

iv.

Gain and Maintain Decision
Dominance

Operation EAGLE ANVIL:
Striking Deep
On January 17th, 1991, US. Army
attack helicopters from the 101st Aviation
Regiment struck deep into enemy
territory to destroy Iraqi early-warningradar sites. Within minutes, Army forces
had established a 10-kilometer wide
penetration in the enemy’s air defense
network. U.S. Air Force fixed wing
aircraft immediately exploited thispenetration, and flew on to strikestrategic targets in Baghdad, signaling
the beginning of Operation DESERTSTORM.

The expanded battlefield, coupled with therequirement to conduct cross-domain strike in depth,
necessitates a transformation of how command control
is executed at every echelon—what the Army calls
decision dominance. Decision dominance is a desired
state in which commanders sense, understand, decide,act, and assess faster and more effectively than theiradversaries. Decision dominance is enabled byconvergence, the ability to see, sense, communicate, shoot, and move at speed and scale,connecting all sensors with the best shooter and the right C2 node.

The requirement for decision dominance drives the Army’s programs in support of
Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) focused on system data
standardization, cloud migration and software-based experimentation with the joint community.
The objective of convergence is for warfighting systems to be capable of autonomouslyinteracting across Intelligence, Operations and Fires functions. The use of artificial intelligenceand machine learning (AI/ML) informed computing will unburden Commanders and staffs fromperforming time-intensive cognitive functions, and focus their efforts on accelerated, optimized
decision-making.
The Army Corps is the best option to assume the CJADC2 integrated command post
function. A Multi-Domain Corps provides the Joint Force a tailorable theater-level command
post for integrating and synchronizing operations across all domains. The Multi-Domain Corps
will integrate the cross-domain tactical fights while maintaining persistent all-domain operationaland strategic attacks across the expanded battlefield for the Joint Force.
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Multi-Domain Divisions and tactical units, equipped with continuously interacting sensors
and weapon systems, will provide a technologically enhanced decisive advantage in complex
terrain to close with and destroy the enemy. The ongoing development and experimentation
housed in our first Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) will provide the analysis to address thesefunctions at scale.

v.

Create Overmatch

By expanding the battlespace and striking across domains in depth, the Army leverages
speed, range, and the convergence of cutting edge technologies to provide Joint Force
Commanders with decision dominance and the overmatch necessary to prevail in large scale
combat.
Army forces will create overmatch for the Joint Force Commander of the future by
executing and enabling nonlinear operations. Given expansive geometry of globally contested
operations, and a numerically superior adversary, Army forces create overmatch by their ability
to attack throughout the depth of the battlespace – and to survive adversary counter-strikes.
Turning complex terrain to advantage, Army forces will attack and defeat land, air, andmaritime targets by integrating joint sensors and platforms. The enemy’s will to resist isovermatched using simultaneous maneuver, fires, and information employed from mobile
operational attack positions. This operational approach of land attack positions capitalizes on thestrengths of nonlinear warfare.

vi.

Prevail in Large-Scale Combat

The Army of 2035 will continue to fulfill its strategic roles for the Joint Force and theAmerican people. The Army’s most foundational strategic role is the capability and capacity toprevail in large-scale combat. The Army will significantly contribute to the Joint Force’s successat the outset of conflict, and will cement victory in the only way possible – by winning the close
fight.
Army forces prevail in large-scale combat by integrating all-domain effects to seize andsecure key terrain. In globally integrated campaigns, Army forces secure global key terrain, suchas the Panama Canal and the Malacca Straits, and provide the foundation for Homeland Defense.
As operational campaigns progress, Army forces consolidate the gains of the Joint Force. This
capability to win is what enables national policymakers to employ other elements of national
power, achieve strategic objectives, and end the conflict on favorable terms.

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MDO During Crisis Response
a. The Future Challenges of Crisis Response
Crisis lies at the high end of the competition continuum
The Military Problem– the bridge, and often, the spark, between competition andconflict. In the years ahead, the Army, as part of the Joint
In crisis, how does the Joint
Force, will continue to be challenged in this band of theForce maintain freedom ofcompetition continuum. Our adversaries will remain free to
exploit the space below our threshold for armed conflict if we,action, and impose its will
as a Joint Force, cannot present credible deterrent options andagainst peer adversaries in all
demonstrate the ability to impose costs on malign action. Our
domains to deter conflict while
adversaries will attempt to achieve their strategic goals without
re-establishing a position offighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli.
strategic advantage?
From the perspective of U.S. policymakers and combatantcommanders, these attacks will manifest as rapidly developing
crises that require either a U.S. response, or tacit acceptance of the new status quo. The Army’s
MDO concept provides Joint Force Commanders and national policymakers additional, credible
options in a globally integrated, rapidly developing crisis, while simultaneously enhancing
assurance for Allies and partners.

b. The Added Value of Army MDO During Crisis
The Multi-Domain Army will satisfy a critical joint gap in crisis and add a broad array of
options for Combatant Commanders to:i.

Maintain Contact in All Domains

The Army will provide the capability to conduct continuous surveillance andreconnaissance for joint targeting and enhanced situational awareness. These capabilities will
provide Combatant Commanders with a “multi-domain theater screen force” that gains contact
in competition and maintains that contact in crisis. These formations will enable the Joint Force
Commander to sense adversary actions – across all domains – first, and initiate movement tospoil or prevent adversary attacks before their objectives are realized.
The Army has already developed the organizational centerpiece of Multi-Domain
experimentation, the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF). MDTF-1, headquartered at Joint Base10
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Lewis-McChord, Washington, and aligned to U.S. Army Pacific, represents the first of theseunits to bring multi-domain capabilities to Combatant Commanders. The MDTF’s All-Domain
Operations Center, or ADOC, is currently under construction and will enable 24/7 oversight ofadversary contact in all domains. The MDTF is discussed in greater detail on the next page.

ii.

Hold Adversary Interests at Risk

Multi-Domain formations, when postured correctly and demonstrated aggressively, senda clear signal to potential adversaries that their interests can be held at risk. The ability to holdtheir interests at risk is the essence of conventional deterrence. The Army will fundamentallychange the risk calculus for adversaries who seek to achieve their objectives through force. In a
globally integrated future scenario, networked Army formations will be able to threaten
horizontal escalation across different regions and domains, giving adversaries pause before they
act.

iii.

Impose Costs on Malign Actions

In the event that the collective effort of the UnitedStates, Allies, and partners, fails to deter our adversaries, abalance of forward postured multi-domain capabilities
with the rapid projection of Army surge forces will
demonstrate U.S. resolve to impose costs on malignbehavior. Historical analyses, such as the Stimson Center
Short-of-War Study, show that dynamic force employmentof armed forces effectively coerces competitors and thatground forces are particularly effective against strong,near-peer actors. The Army will offer lethal and nonlethal
options across all domains for crisis response. The
application of ground forces sends a clear message, tofriend and foe alike, that the United States is committed
and willing to send our best in harm’s way—when it
matters the most. Cost imposition through credible groundforces will complicate adversary decision calculus, andforce them to reconsider the escalation risk even for
limited objective attacks.

Operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY:
Holding Adversary Interests at Risk
In 1991, the Haitian military
overthrew President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. Despite numerous attempts at
peaceful resolution, it was not until theimminent threat of the Army’s 82nd
Airborne Division landing in Haiti thatthe military dictatorship capitulated.
Aristide was subsequently restored to
power. 96% of the forces that deployed
to Haiti to support Operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY were from the Army;
their presence was the linchpin in
maintaining the peace that followed.

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Multi-Domain Task ForceAs the organizational centerpiece for modernization, MDTFs accelerate change throughexperimentation and testing during all-domain maneuver. MDTFs help the Joint Force develop
new ways of war, informing DoD’s transformation to Joint All Domain Operations.
As theater-level maneuver elements, MDTFs synchronize precision effects and precision
fires in all domains against adversary A2AD networks in all domains, enabling joint forces to
execute their OPLAN-directed roles. MDTFs enable Joint freedom of action.
MDTFs are scalable (from operational to theater strategic level) and tailorable for thedemands of Joint Force Commanders. They offer supported commanders the ability to plan,
integrate, control, track, and assess the effectiveness of Joint counter-A2/AD capabilities.

This example Task
Organization illustrates
planned MDTF
capabilities.
Each MDTF will betailored to CombatantCommander needs.



In competition, MDTFs gain and maintain contact with our adversaries to support the
rapid transition to crisis or conflict. With requisite authorities, maneuver in all domains
allows MDTFs to identify and secure positions of relative advantage from which they
deny, delay, degrade, and disrupt the adversary.

In crisis, MDTFs deter adversaries and shape the environment by providing flexible
response options to the Combatant Commander. From positions of advantage secured
in competition, MDTFs execute combinations of non-kinetic and kinetic maneuver todemonstrate friendly resolve, impose costs, alter behaviors, and deescalate crises backto competition on favorable terms.



In conflict, MDTFs neutralize adversary A2/AD networks to enable Joint freedom ofaction. Having set conditions in competition, MDTFs employ synchronized combinationsof non-kinetic and kinetic effects to disrupt, defeat, and destroy A2/AD capabilities.
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iv.

Enhance Assurance of Allies and Partners

In crisis, Army forces on the ground signal commitment, assuring our Allies and Partners
and strengthening their resolve in the face of adversary aggression. Army forces will be postured
in accordance with host nation access and presence agreements. For long-standing partners,
multi-domain capabilities will provide the persistent presence they require and the assurance that
only ground forces can offer. For emerging partners, the Army will work in coordination with
Combatant Command (CCMD) and DoD leadership to build relationships and set the conditions
for future access and presence.

v.

Persist Inside Adversary A2/AD Networks

The Army will provide combatant commanders with land forces that are persistent, costeffective, and survivable. Technologically connected and geographically dispersed Army forces
deployed across the land – whether archipelagic or continental – present a key operational
problem for adversary sensing and targeting. Put simply, land forces are hard to kill.
The key attribute of capable inside forces is resiliency. Resiliency goes beyond hardenedbases and encompasses a host of attributes that are mutually supporting. Resiliency for land
forces combines mobility, cover, concealment, and deception. With mobility, land forces will belight and agile enough to quickly conduct operations, then reposition along the established nodesof the landpower network within the adversary’s A2/AD zone. Cover includes site hardening
against adversary attack, and this must also be augmented with the ability of the unit to conceal
itself from detection through physical, electronic and cyber means. Deception will present false
targets to the adversary through a combination of electronic spoofing and physical decoys. All ofthese attributes combine to build the resiliency of inside forces and are critical to providing
options to the Joint Force Commander.
The Army will provide forces that are scalable and tailorable to the threat and theater.
They will be highly mobile, with alternate and supplemental positions to ensure survivability andunpredictability. This will require dynamic posture initiatives--turn-key or warm start sites toprovide opportunities for maneuver without incurring the cost and host nation imposition of
traditional basing or permanence. This posture will be optimized to host low-signature forward
capabilities on a more ambiguous, distributed, and difficult to target infrastructure.
The Army will persist in the face of adversary aggression – to include the use ofchemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Our adversaries will not hesitate
to employ CBRN weapons if their vital interests or the integrity of their regimes lie in jeopardy.
Our adversaries have a demonstrated propensity to develop and utilize CBRN capabilities on the
future battlefield, to include “tactical” or Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW), Fourth
Generation Agents (FGA), and weaponized biological agents with pandemic causing
implications. Army forces must be equipped, trained, and ready to generate forces, and conduct
combat and sustainment operations in CBRN battlefield conditions. Army formations willcontinue to integrate CBRN-defense planning considerations across all warfighting functions.
Increasing readiness against current and emerging CBRN threats enables tactical and operational
formations to fight, survive, and win on the future battlefield.

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vi.

Facilitate Transition to Conflict

When deterrence, de-escalation, and cost imposition fail in crisis, Multi-Domain
formations will facilitate a rapid transition to conflict by enabling Joint maneuver and setting theconditions to defeat the adversary. The Army enables joint maneuver through a tailorable mix oflong range fires, protection, cyber, EW, and other capabilities. Land forces will establish therequired “footholds” for maritime, air, and ground forces to operate through and from. These
formations and capabilities will be an integral part of the Combatant Command’s joint targetingand integration process, providing additional theater strategic effects as required fromcompetition through conflict. With multi-domain Corps, Division, and other commands atechelon they will be able to plan, integrate, track, assess, command, and control multi-domain
capabilities.

vii.

Sustainment During Crisis

Army sustainment provides options, extension of operational reach, endurance, andfreedom of action which enable Joint Force Commanders to quickly transition to conflict ordeescalate back to competition. Future MDO Forces will rely on host nation support, survivableand lightweight power sources, and dispersed caches as a part of Army Prepositioned Stocks(APS). These small, mobile, and tailorable material and ammunition stores will enable flexible
response options for Joint Force Commanders.

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MDO During Competition
In competition, the Multi-Domain Army sets the conditions for the DoD by pursuingrelative positional and capability advantage, ensuring a calibrated force posture—the rightcapability in the right place to support and shape both Joint and diplomatic efforts. Positional
advantage is gained primarily through an expanded global landpower network with Allies andpartners. Capability advantage is gained through the development of capabilities, force structure,
doctrine and training to support MDO at the speed of innovation. The combination of theseadvantages, along with demonstrations of assured power projection, enhances the credibility of
military deterrence and enables policy makers to employ diplomatic, economic, and informationmeans to prevent a conflict before it starts.
The Army will continue to provide the foundation
The Military Problem
for DoD security cooperation through the Army’s
comprehensive landpower network of Allies and partners.
In competition, how does the Joint
Through the development of resilient, networked, andForce maintain freedom of action,
distributed lines of communication, and increased
and impose its will against peerlethality and mobility of our combat formations (theadversaries in all domains to deter
outside geometry forces), we will continue to demonstrate
the ability to rapidly project strategic power globally. The
conflict while re-establishing acalibrated posture of key multi-domain capabilities will
position of strategic advantage?
shape the environment in competition, deter escalation incrisis, and determine conditions for the Joint Force toadapt and win in conflict from the first battles. In
competition this “inside force” will significantly increase an adversary’s cost and risk threshold
while bolstering Allies and partners in both direct and indirect competition.
The Multi-Domain Army will strengthen the Joint Force in competition through a myriadof activities that will:

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a. Expand the Landpower Network
In competition, the Army persistently builds relative positional advantage by cultivating astrong network of Allies and partners. This Global Landpower Network is DoD’s foundation forcompetition, creating inroads and maneuver space for Joint and whole-of-government strategic
engagement.
The Army is uniquely qualified to maintain and expand this vital network. Our
relationship with Allies and partners is an unmatched strategic and competitive advantage,
allowing us to out-think and out-position our competitors. Partner militaries, including theirsenior leaders, are predominately land force-centric. In the Indo-Pacific, 24 of 29 armed forces
chiefs are army officers, and of the 30 NATO member states, 22 have armed forces chiefs fromtheir respective armies. Through this professional kinship, the U.S. Army can play an outsizedrole in supporting U.S. inter-agency objectives in a whole-of-government approach.

The Army Strategy for Allies and Partners (ASAP) and Calibrated Force Posture plans arealigned and coordinated with DoD and Combatant Command priorities. Together, these
documents provide the roadmap for building relationships with Allies and partners to set theconditions for joint or diplomatic efforts.

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UNCLASSIFIEDThis persistent and deliberate approach creates multiple dilemmas for our adversaries,
who will seek to gain influence with many of the same partners. The U.S. Army, however, offers
a decisive advantage—our professionalism, values, and range of security cooperation activities.
These security cooperation activities are summarized below.
Military and Key Leader Engagement (KLEs): The Army’s relationships begin withsenior leader engagement. It drives a relationship forward, breaks through obstacles topartnership, and capitalizes on strategic gains. KLEs are a “first tool” in this regard. In 2020
alone, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army held close to 100 engagementswith international counterparts to advance Army initiatives globally. Army Service Component
Commanders will continue to provide the persistent engagement required to improve uponsecurity cooperation.
Education and Training: The Army helps to train the future leaders of partnered andAllied armies around the world. Utilizing a variety of programs, including International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and International Professional Military Education (IPME), theArmy establishes rapport and enhances interoperability. These programs have an immense reach:
In 2019, the Army trained over 7,100 foreign students in various courses throughout theenterprise. Of those, 1,200 were foreign officers in professional military education courses. The
Army will prioritize course allocations to grow our pool of participating partners 50% over the
next five years in support of the DoD’s Guidance for the Development of Alliances andPartnerships (GDAP).
Security Assistance through Foreign Military Sales (FMS): The Army maximizes thisTitle 22 program to increase interoperability through the acquisition of U.S. technology andwarfighting equipment. As the Army and Joint Force seek to outpace our adversaries, we may
also outpace our partners. The Army must ensure that we maintain some degree ofinteroperability, especially with legacy platforms. Headquarters, Department of the Army
(HQDA) will continue to work in concert with Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs),the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff in this regard.
Advise and Assist: The Army has always maintained a world-class “advise and assist”
capability through our Special Forces units. Building upon this critical capability, the Armycreated Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to provide conventional advise and assist
capabilities to Allies and partners. SFABs increase our ability to perform these tasks on a larger
scale, with the focus on battalion and brigade sized formations. Additionally, the National
Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) aligns National Guard units with over 84 nations
across the globe, creating those habitual Army-to-Army relationships that are vital to achieving
Army posture objectives.

b. Demonstrate Range of Capabilities
The threat of strategic landpower, in the form of Army readiness to wage operational
campaigns, will remain a significant deterrent for adversaries, who prefer to win in competition
or crisis and avoid protracted conflict. It is imperative that the Army continues to demonstrate
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assured power projection and dynamic force employment.
Assured Power Projection: It is vital to build the groundwork for theater sustainment
while in competition, to respond decisively during crisis and conflict. Sustainment of the Armyand Joint Force will be persistently contested across multiple domains. The Army must develop
resilient theater architecture consisting of multiple supplemental turn-key nodes that house C2
network infrastructure, APS, and sustainment caches to rapidly project and sustain combat powerfrom fort to port to foxhole. These facilities, hosted by willing partners and allies, will allow the
Joint Force to surge and remain resilient inside enemy A2/AD areas. The Army is pursuing fiveefforts to extend operational reach, endurance, and freedom of action for Joint Force
Commanders, from competition through conflict:
1) Resilient and Integrated Sustainment Mission Command: Achieves logistics
decision advantage, requires refined authorities and command relationships, provides
access to protected logistics information, facilitates operating effectively in a
disconnected and distributed environment, and develops predictive and push logistics.
2) Rapid Power Projection: Protects strategic deployments, provides rapid availabilityof the Joint Force, facilitates deployment from the contested homeland to the point of
employment, demonstrates agile and resilient lines of communication (LOCs),
enhances global force posture, and maximizes inter to intra theater transition
capabilities.
3) Set Theaters: Calibrated forward posture, modernization of APS, building of partner
capacity, and increased interoperability.
4) Industrial Base Modernization: Modernized and linked industrial base withresponsive advanced manufacturing, expansion of U.S. contractors to meet wartime
requirements, reduction of U.S. contractor dependence on foreign resources, andsupply chain security.
5) Sustainment for Distributed Operations: Establishes and sustains a dynamic
forward presence in concert with partners, reduces demand, augments mobility withsmall platforms for distributed operations, protects LOCs, rapidly recovers, andmoves.
Dynamic Force Employment (DFE): Innovative approaches to dynamic force
employment range from large scale DEFENDER series to more discrete capability
demonstrations and movement within adversary’s areas of interest. DFE will demonstrate therange of capabilities the Army can provide to support military and political objectives incompetition.
Combined exercises not only enhance Army, Joint and multi-national training andinteroperability for JADO, they also demonstrate the ability to employ land power rapidly and at
scale—a critical tool for joint and political leaders to message resolve. These exercises will also
demonstrate the ability to deploy from any installation to anywhere globally and aggregate
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quickly. This will require a deliberate approach to Army force employment in support of the
Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), executing across geographic combatant command (GCC)
boundaries, with cross-domain application, and integration of information, denial, and deception
operations.
Discrete activities of multi-domain capabilities will be critical to shaping the competition
space in support of GCPs and CCMD plans. Maneuvering during competition and conducting
episodic demonstrations within adversary areas of interest assures allies and deters malignactions. The “inside force” will provide much of this through calibrated and dynamic access andposture offered by an expanded landpower network.

c. Develop New Capabilities
The Multi-Domain Army will cement capability advantages during competition throughthe development and demonstration of new formations and new capabilities, along withimproved leaders and Soldiers. The Army has already begun significant transformational
initiatives to achieve relative capability and positional advantages over our adversaries. The next
chapter outlines these initiatives.

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VI.

Change: Getting to the MDO Aimpoint
Building the required capabilities and formations for the Multi-Domain Army of 2035
represents the Aimpoint. What follows is a broad description of how the Army orients on the
Aimpoint through interim changes or “Waypoints” from now through 2028:
1) Implementing a continuum of analysis to guide MDO concept maturation
through comprehensive wargames, experimentation, and scenario development. This iterative
process will ensure the MDO concept evolves alongside capability development and stays
aligned with the Joint Warfighting Concept.
2) Gaining positional advantage to ensure that the right forces are in the right placeat the right time to meet the requirements of Joint Force Commanders. This broad effort includes
the implementation of calibrated force posture for each theater, with capable units and APS
equipment fielded to support those theaters as they become available. Annex A of the classified
version of this document includes an overview of each theater’s Calibrated Force Posture
implementation plan.
3) Developing capability advantage to maintain overmatch of our adversaries andenable MDO transformation. First and foremost is the retention of the best talent – our people.
Critical to this effort is the realization of the Army’s six modernization priorities. The Regionally
Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model – ReARMM – provides the unit lifecycle
management model that balances current demand with modernization.

a. Army Continuum of Analysis (ACA)The MDO concept is underpinned by an ongoing continuum of analysis. Defense
Planning Scenarios (DPS) and corresponding analyses demonstrate the need for “inside forces”
as discussed in the MDO operating concept.
Findings of Joint Wargames


The Army MDO concept contributed heavily to the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).



Large portions of the MDO have already been validated in Joint wargames.

Many of these wargames have revealed the utility of “inside forces” postured before conflict begins.

Army inside forces enable timely Joint Fires and resilient command and control in crisis and conflict.



During competition, forward presence demonstrated resolve to Allies and partners.

Army capabilities converge geographically-distributed effects across multiple domains to win.
* Note: The classified version of this paper provides greater detail on these findings

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Analysis is a critical part of the MDO concept formulation and evolution to affectdecisions. Analytic efforts, whether Army-internal, Army-led with Joint participation, or Jointled with Army participation, provided the crucible that formed, tested, and validated MDO.
As the joint operational environment expands across warfighting domains and geography,
the warfighting scenarios used to generate, analyze, and evaluate potential decisions for risk andopportunity must evolve. Scenario design must explicitly connect the time horizons of force
employment, force development, and force design. This enables the development and evaluationof truly novel ways of warfighting. The ACA prioritizes the Army Analytic Community’s work
against the three time horizons. The Army is also creating a Global Near-Peer Scenario as a
backbone to the ACA in order to generate a cohesive reference space for Army Senior Leader
decisions. The Global Scenario will improve upon existing scenarios in four key contexts:
Geographic Context: The Army scenario will be global in focus. Peer adversaries areglobal actors that have global pressure points. They do not adhere to neatly drawn CombatantCommand boundaries. The scenario also acknowledges the requirement for different theories ofvictory in different geographic settings.
Temporal Context: Adversary nations have political structures that enable them toconduct long-term strategic planning in the context of decades, not years. To remain relevant andeffective, the Army must expand our temporal context and pursue a consistent intellectual picture
spanning from 2028 to 2035 and beyond.
Strategic Context: The Global Near-Peer Scenario will span the strategic environmentsof competition, crisis, and conflict, and will do so with full consideration of whole-ofgovernment implications.
Institutional Context: The Army evolves through a confluence of processes, but also
through doctrinal evolution and concept development. The Army scenario will be robust enoughto facilitate the analysis that shapes DoD institutional investment and decision-making processes.

b. Gaining Positional Advantage
Calibrated Force Posture (CFP) presents an innovative approach to forward presence forthe 21 century. The Army’s efforts to achieve calibrated posture began in 2020 with acomprehensive strategy, Transformation of Land Power in the Indo-Pacific, and the Army iscurrently developing plans in concert with the other geographic combatant commands.
st

While enduring capabilities for large-scale ground combat will remain a critical part offorward posture in developed theaters like EUCOM and CENTCOM, CFP will leverage theenhanced technological capabilities of multi-domain formations to achieve the effects required
by Combatant Commanders at reduced costs and smaller footprints.
As mentioned before, CFP hinges upon enduring presence, not permanent presence –a combination of assigned forces, rotational forces, and access for key capabilities. In
INDOPACOM, relatively light multi-domain forces, capable of engaging targets in all domains
at operational and even strategic ranges will be prepositioned in parts of the first island chain and21
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act as the linchpin of effective joint and combined defenses. Joint and combined capabilities in
the first island chain will mix anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles to threaten
early damage to adversary forces. These operations will be more affordable as they will be
conducted in concert with regional partners.

c. Gaining Capability Advantagei.

Army Modernization Priorities (Big 6)

Since the 2018 publication of the Army Vision and Army Strategy, we have pursued
materiel modernization across six broad priorities: long range precision fires, next generation
combat vehicles, future vertical lift, network, air and missile defense, and Soldier lethality. Ourcongressional, defense industry, and international partners can remain confident that our focus isconstant. A deliberate, synchronized approach that modernizes how we fight, what we fight with,and who we are will generate irreversible momentum to build the Multi-Domain Army of 2035.
The six modernization priorities will continue to drive materiel development for theMulti-Domain Army. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts – it is the combination ofthese capabilities that will allow the Army to implement MDO.
1. Long range precision fires enable multi-domain forces to penetrate andneutralize enemy A2/AD capabilities while ensuring military overmatch at every
echelon.
2. Next generation combat vehicles increase the firepower, speed, and survivabilityof land forces, allowing them to maneuver into superior positions on thebattlefield and team with robotic vehicles.
3. Future vertical lift platforms and technologies increase the maneuverability,
endurance, lethality, and survivability of Army aircraft – increasing theiroperational reach and effectiveness against near-peer competitors.
4. Army network modernization is necessary to command and control forces
distributed across vast terrain, converge effects from multiple domains, andmaintain a common situational understanding in JADO.
5. Air and missile defense capabilities will defend the Joint Force, Allies, andpartners against manned and unmanned air and missile threats.
6. Soldier lethality improvements will increase the capability of individual Soldiers
to quickly understand and react to emerging situations – increasing their lethality,
precision, and survivability.

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Within each modernization priority, the Army is actively developing a suite of specificsystems and capabilities. The Army’s modernization enterprise is led by Army Futures
Command (AFC), and represents a comprehensive campaign of learning. Through iterative, agile
development that is informed by warfighting concepts, and in turn influences those concepts, theArmy will be positioned to reinforce successful programs and provide advanced capabilities to
the Joint Force.
Army Priority Research Areas

The Army understands the need for deep
investment in long-term research. The Army conducts
relevant, transformative research rooted in the tenets of
discovery, innovation, and transition to deliver scienceand technology (S&T) solutions. Army S&T maintains
focused investments in basic and applied research. The
Army aligns its laboratories towards modernization
efforts and developing external partnership agreementswith research universities such as Texas A&M and
Carnegie Mellon. Army S&T has a heavy emphasis on
mid- and far-term capabilities, through threat based,concept driven, and capability informed work.

Disruptive Energetics: Increased power
generation with smaller footprints.



RF Electronic Materials: Leveraging diamondmaterials for directed energy.

Quantum Research: Optimized sensing andcommunication with unparalleled security.

Hypersonic Flight: Aerodynamics, materials, andprocesses.

Artificial Intelligence: Increasing speed and agility
to respond to emerging threats.

Autonomy: Maneuverability and off-road mobility ofplatforms.

Synthetic Biology: Reactive skins, spectrally
selective materials, and anti-materiel properties.

The Army also contributes to a collaborative Material by Design: Protection overmatch against
campaign of experimentation and development with
future threats.
Joint and Combined partners. The Army and Air Force Additive Manufacturing: Next-Generation
munitions for increased range and lethality.
are spearheading pursuit of Combined Joint All-Domain
Command and Control (CJADC2), through the Air
Force’s ABMS (Air Battle Management System) andthe Army’s Project Convergence, which constitutes a multi-year campaign of learning. Project
Convergence is an experimentation program that teams scientists with Soldiers in the field.
Project Convergence involves all Services, and in upcoming years, will include Allies andpartners. The Army is also collaborating with the British Army on five priority areas to ensure
effective MDO interoperability.

ii.

ReARMM: Transforming While Meeting Current Demand

The Army cannot transform in a vacuum; we must continue to meet the operational
requirements of Joint Force Commanders. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness andModernization Model (ReARMM) is our unit lifecycle model to balance the production ofmodernized, highly trained and ready forces for employment.
Higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and reduced readiness capacity erode the Army’s
ability to provide ready forces for conflict. Amidst the OPTEMPO struggle, units supporting
competition with a reduced set of forces will have less time and space to conduct deliberatemodernization. The combination of Soldiers and equipment being employed more often will also
consume readiness capacity, preventing the development of new platforms, doctrine, andformations to effectively address future challenges set forth in the National Defense Strategy.

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UNCLASSIFIEDReARMM addresses the problem of OPTEMPO while providing a path for the Army totransition from evolutionary modernization – incremental capability improvements to existing
platforms – to revolutionary modernization that skips generations of capabilities to achievetransformational change and meet future challenges.
ReARMM aligns Army units to primary regions and functions in order to provide forces
to Combatant Commanders in a predictable manner while increasing readiness, modernizing intoa multi-domain capable force, and maximizing talent management. ReARMM structures the
Army to respond to day-to-day competition requirements while posturing to respond to crisis andwin in conflict.
ReARMM enhances Calibrated Force Posture efforts by creating a habitual alignment ofunits. This alignment provides greater institutional knowledge and trust with CombatantCommand, Joint, Allied, and partner forces and fosters better understanding of plans, exercises,
and relationships. Habitual alignment will provide trained units for the range of military
operations but mission-tailored to combatant commander requirements. Additionally, ReARMM
seeks to increase power projection capability by standardizing unit type (Stryker, Light, andArmored) in each Division. This alignment provides long term predictability by codifying
episodic rotations and enhancing flexibility for Dynamic Force Employment. Finally, this model
improves support to globally integrated operations by aligning the right capabilities to theappropriate Combatant Command.

iii.

Aligning Multi-Domain Capable Organization Now

Our aimpoint requires transformation of how we man, train, equip and organize ourcurrent force and we must begin now by developing multi-domain capable formations at echelon.
In every aspect of Army modernization, we are pursuing joint and combined integration from theoutset. The future fight will depend on a new level of joint and global integration, as well asinteroperability with our Allies and partners. With the pace and scale of change accelerating, theArmy must be able to integrate Joint effects seamlessly and rapidly. To realize this, the Army has
begun by aligning Corps and Divisions, SFABs, and the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) togeographic combatant commands.
 Corps and Divisions HQs: These will be multi-domain warfighting
headquarters capable of integrating joint fires, intelligence and maneuver. The Corps are alreadyregionally aligned. The Divisions will be aligned by FY22. The 8 National Guard Division HQs
will have a habitual relationship with the active component Divisions to enhance training,
institutional knowledge, and provide augmentation when required. The combination of theseenhanced headquarters will provide Combatant Commands with the capabilities they need to
execute JADO from competition through crises. Through habitual alignment, they will develop
deep institutional knowledge with Army Service Component Commands, CCMDs, other service
and Joint HQs as well as Allies and partners—significantly enhancing situational understandingof plans and the physical and human terrain.

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UNCLASSIFIED Security Force Assistance Brigades: The Army created six SFABs to serve as
special advisory units to train and advise foreign partner armies. The SFAB mission includes
training, assisting, and advising partnered nations in hotspots around the world.
SFABs are uniquely capable of advancing America’s
relationships across the globe. During competition, SFABs
build trust, interoperability, and partner capacity. In crisis,
SFABs enable the Joint Force and interagency team toquickly respond by enhancing coordination efforts. In
conflict, SFABs enhance coordination with partners and can
expand to full mission capable brigades.
Today, SFABs are operating across Africa and Asia.
In the future, SFABs will rotate smaller teams, as small as
12-members, into different countries and replace them as
needed to establish a sustained military to military presence.

Army SFABs with Geographic
Combatant Command Alignment






1st SFAB at Fort Benning, GA
U.S. Southern Command
2nd SFAB at Fort Bragg, NC
U.S. Africa Command
3rd SFAB at Fort Hood, TX
U.S. Central Command
4th SFAB at Fort Carson, CO
U.S. European Command
5th SFAB at JBLM, WA
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
54th SFAB, Army National Guard,
with battalions in: Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Texas


SFABs professionalize security assistance andcooperation missions. As permanent organizations with astanding mission, the units demonstrate a more concerted
commitment than previous ad-hoc “advise and assist”
formations, while also freeing up conventional brigade combat teams and Special Forces units.
SFABs enable the Joint Force’s presence, to build trust and generate the ability to react to future
crises.

 Multi-Domain Task Force: MDTFs represent agile development embodied in an
organization. The conventional force generation construct requires Services to man, train, andequip organizations, and then provide them in their finished state to Combatant Commanders for
employment. MDTFs break this mold. Each MDTF will be designed and tailored to operate at
the required echelon in order to meet the needs of the supported Joint Force commander. From
inception, each MDTF will be assigned or aligned to a Combatant Command, then built, trained,
and exercised within the context of the Combatant Commander’s requirements. This agile
development will ensure a better, more capable force that enables Combatant Commanders tocompete effectively and, if necessary, penetrate adversary A2/AD systems to enable freedom of
maneuver for all land, air, and maritime forces. The Army plans to build five MDTFs: twoaligned to the Indo-Pacific; one aligned to Europe; one positioned in the Arctic and oriented on
multiple threats; and the final MDTF aligned for global response. MDTF 1, aligned to the IndoPacific, will be the centerpiece of Project Convergence 2021.

iv.

Sustainment

Army sustainment provides options and enables enhanced operational reach, endurance,
and freedom of action to widely dispersed forces operating on an expanded battlefield withextended LOCs from the homeland to the close area. To provide these sustainment options andflexibility to Joint Force Commanders, the Army Functional Concept for Sustainment
operationalizes this through five lines of effort: Resilient and Integrated Sustainment Mission
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Command, Assured Rapid Power Projection, Set the Theater, Industrial Base Modernization, andSustainment for Distributed Operations. The Army Functional Concept for Sustainment also
identifies three logistics modernization priorities: reducing energy demand and demands on the
distribution system, auto-sensing at echelon for the Joint Force (data visibility), and joint multimodal autonomous / semi-autonomous distribution. The Army intends to achieve this throughthe following S&T priorities: advanced power solutions, alternative water sources, advanced
manufacturing, analytic decision tools / diagnostics, prognostics, and integrated data,
autonomous resupply, and next generation material and packaging solutions for munitions.

v.

Assured Power Projection

Installations, as capability-based platforms, provide the foundations for the Army’s
readiness, resilience and projection. The Army and the Joint Force’s foundation of success in
Assured Rapid Power Projection is in the resiliency of Army installations with a special
emphasis on Power Projection Platforms (PPPs), Mobilization Force Generation Installations(MFGIs), and Military Ocean Terminals (MOTs), as well as supporting commercial facilities, tocontinue to operate in a contested and degraded environment.
The Army’s ability to provide adequate forces hinges on the effective execution of allelements of force projection, such as mobilization, force projection, and sustainment of combat
power. The output of power projection reform is Assured Rapid Power Projection in an all
domain contested environment, under degraded conditions. This will require fiscal andintellectual creativity to ensure Army installations, with a focus on PPPs, MFGIs, MOTs, andcommercial infrastructure to include energy and strategic ports of embarkation are ready,resilient, and relevant to enable options for Joint Force Commanders.
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) must be ready immediately, and require constant
exercising. APS can no longer be viewed as strategic deep storage, to be used only in conflict.
Army formations must practice rapidly projecting forces, linking up with Configured for Combat(CFC) equipment, quickly moving to Tactical Assembly Areas, conducting Pre-Combat Checks,
and prepared for immediate employment by Joint Force Commanders.
APS is evolving into more than power projection in crisis and contingency: it serves as atool in itself to build relationships during competition. For instance, APS in the Indo-Pacific(APS-4) is breaking ground with our emerging regional partners. These facilities bolster relations
with local and national host nation governments, and enhance the speed for forces arriving incrisis or conflict.

vi.

People: The Army’s Premier Capability

In the past, the Army has enjoyed a competitive advantage over any potential adversary
in capital, technology, and people. As competitors reduce the technology gap, our people will
provide us with an enduring advantage to remain the world’s most ready, lethal, and capable landcombat force.

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UNCLASSIFIEDThe Army is committed to innovation and thoughtful leadership in managing talent.
Army readiness, modernization, and reform efforts must be supported by a 21st century talentmanagement system and essential quality of life enhancements, fundamentally improving theway we manage our center of gravity – people.
The Army must remain competitive with otherprofessions. Doing so helps the Army advance from theindustrial to the information age in order to maintain andextend the Army’s overmatch capabilities. The Armymust make people the centerpiece of its competitive
advantage by prioritizing human capital investment or risk
losing its overmatch capabilities to potential adversaries.

“Winning matters, and People are mynumber one priority. People are our
Soldiers – Regular Army, National Guard
and Reserve – their Families, Civilians, andSoldiers for Life – Retirees and Veterans.
We win through the people, and people
will drive success in our Readiness,
Modernization and Reform priorities. We
must take care of our people.”

The acceleration of innovation and change will
increase the technical and cognitive demands on our
personnel. This, in turn, will generate new personnel and-General James McConville, 40th Chief oftraining requirements. We are transforming how we fight,
Staff, Army
what we fight with, and how we organize, but we mustalso transform how we train. The development of our
Soldiers’ and leaders’ technology skills to operate in this significantly more complex
environment is at the forefront of the Army’s strategy. There is no substitute for exercises in thedirt, such as at our combat training centers, but we must add to that training with augmented
reality and a synthetic training environment that will dramatically increase the quality of
training without dramatic cost increases. Investments such as the Army’s data scientist and datatechnician programs at Carnegie Mellon University and our Software Factory in Austin willbring the necessary digital expertise to Soldiers, allowing commanders to rapidly adapt to thechallenges faced on the future battlefield.

vii.

Enabling Re-Investment

The Army recognizes that our transformational efforts require hard choices. The Army
pursues continuous review of ongoing programs to identify legacy systems that will not
contribute to the Aimpoint design. By divesting or reducing these programs, the Army can thenre-invest in modernization programs.
In 2020 alone, the Army achieved $2.4 billion in savings across the force to realignfunding for Army priorities in fiscal year 2021:Reduced or canceled lower priority programs to realign funding toward readinessand modernization.
Eliminated 41 programs and reduced / delayed 39 programs not tied to the
National Defense Strategy or modernization priorities.
Realigned $200 million through training efficiencies.

The Army will engage with DoD leadership to identify efficiencies, establish priorities,
and mitigate risk associated with long-term investment decisions.

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VII.

Conclusion
The U.S. Army provides strong, capable, ready, and decisive land power to the Joint
Force, at home and operating across the globe with our Allies and partners. By transforming ourforward posture, capabilities, and operating concept, the Army can help the Joint Force gain the
speed, range, and convergence that will provide decision dominance and overmatch that allows
our Nation to continue to compete, win, and advance our national interests. Our commitment totransform today to meet challenges tomorrow will ensure our Nation remains able to assure
peace through strength, even against our determined and increasingly capable great powercompetitors.
As we look to the future, we must not lose sight of the enduring lessons of our past: theAmerican Soldier is the linchpin of our Army’s success. From Lexington and Concord, throughthe beaches of Normandy, to the mountains of Afghanistan, our People are ultimately whatmakes us successful. No amount of technological modernization, nor any global positional
advantage, nor any other aspect of war-making will be sufficient unless they are wielded by thebest Soldiers and Leaders. Our human capital enterprise will transform to ensure that our People
remain our premier capability, able to forge relationships, adapt to complex battlefields,
persevere, and WIN.

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Annex A. Glossary
Aimpoint 2035: a future force, The Multi-Domain Army, that will be modernized and prepared
to dominate adversaries in sustained Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).
all-domain operations center (ADOC): Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) command nodethat will enable 24/7 oversight of adversary contact in all domains.
anti-access (A2): action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent anadvancing enemy force from entering an operational area. (JP 3-0)
area denial (AD): action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy
force’s freedom of action within an operational area. (JP 3-0)
Army Continuum of Analysis (ACA): a framework and a process to support Army Senior
Leader decisions across the continuum of the deep future, force development, force design, force
employment, and Program Objective Memorandum development by coordinating andsynchronizing efforts across the Army Analytic Community.
Army Futures Command (AFC): leads continuous Army modernization transformation toprovide future warfighters with the concepts, capabilities, and organizational structures they needto dominate a future battlefield.
Army pre-positioned stocks (APS): forward positioned equipment and supplies in climate
controlled facilities to enable rapid power projection in support of strategic objectives.
Army Service Component Command (ASCC): command responsible for recommendations to
the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatantcommand. Also called ASCC. (JP 3-31)
Army Strategy for Allies and Partners (ASAP): Army strategy published in 2020 to guide U.S.
Army engagement and cooperation with Allies and partners across the globe in support ofbroader Department of Defense and U.S. government objectives. Also called ASAP. (ArmyStrategy for Allies and Partners, 2020)
calibrated force posture (CFP): the combination of position and the ability to maneuver acrossstrategic distances. It includes, but is not limited to, basing and facilities, formations andequipment readiness, the distribution of capabilities across components, strategic transportavailability, interoperability, access, and authorities. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard (CBRN): chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear elements that could create adverse effects due to an accidental ordeliberate release and dissemination. Also called CBRN hazard. (JP 3-11)
combatant command (CCMD): a unified or specified command with a broad continuing
mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the29
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Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. (JP 1)
combatant commander (CCDR): a commander of one of the unified or specified combatantcommands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 3-0)
combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2, alternatively, JADC2): theartificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled battlefield management system that
integrates allies and the joint force into All Domain Operations to produce overmatch.
competition continuum: enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation,competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. (Joint Doctrine Note 1-19)
convergence: rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy throughcross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command anddisciplined initiative. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)
decision dominance: a desired state in which commanders sense, understand, decide, act, andassess faster and more effectively than their adversaries.
DEFENDER series of exercises: large-scale combined, joint training exercises to increase
readiness, interoperability, validate global power projection capabilities and experiment withcurrent and future concepts and capabilities.
defense planning scenarios (DPS): constructive simulated environment using key assumptions
to develop plans or assess existing plans.
dynamic force employment (DFE): a concept to more flexibly use ready forces to proactively
shape the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to both respond to contingencies
and ensure the long-term viability of the Joint Force. (2018 National Defense Strategy)
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS): the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation fromzero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)
electromagnetic warfare (EW): military action involving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW.
See also directed energy; electromagnetic attack; electromagnetic protection; electromagnetic
support. (JP 3-85)
foreign military sales (FMS): that portion of United States security assistance for sales
programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an
authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services tobe provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of
Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. (JP 3-20)
Global Campaign Plan (GCP): primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through30
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which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatantcommand areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities. Also called GCP. (JP 5-0)
global landpower network: system of army-to-army relationships and partnerships that benefit
the larger Joint Force and reinforce other elements of national power.
Guidance for the Development of Alliances and Partnerships (GDAP): Secretary of Defense
approved guidance document that sets forth foundational direction and priorities for achieving acoordinated strategic approach to align and focus the Department of Defense’s planning,
resourcing, activities, and assessments for U.S. allies and partners.
inside forces: survivable, resilient multi-domain forces operating inside adversary anti-accessarea denial (A2/AD) zones to provide credible capabilities that undermine area denial
stratagems.
international military education and training (IMET): formal or informal instruction
provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by
offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors, and the
instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational
publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (JP 3-20)
international professional military education (IPME): career training designed to provide orenhance leadership and the recipient force’s capabilities to conduct military planning,
programming, management, budgeting, and force development to the level of sophistication
appropriate for that force. (Security Assistance Management Manual)
joint: connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more
Military Departments participate. (JP 1)
joint all-domain operations (JADO): operations involving one or more Military Departments
across all domains.
Joint Operating Environment 2040 (JOE; JOE 2040) Analysis published by Joint Futures andConcepts Deputy Directorate, Joint Staff J-7; Defense Technology and Long-Range Analysis
Office (TLA), Directorate for Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Directorate forIntelligence, Joint Staff J-2, that represents the U.S. Joint Force’s common understanding of the
future operating environment over the next two decades describing the future operating
environment and its resulting implications for joint warfare.
Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC): Joint Staff operational logic for the employment of the
Joint Force that also informs force development and design and establishes a baseline for a larger
campaign of learning focused on great power conflict and war. (DRAFT Joint Warfighting
Concept 27 Jan 2021)
key leader engagement (KLE): planned meeting(s) with an influential leader with the intent ofbuilding a relationship that facilitates communication and cooperation across a wider population.
(FM 3-53)

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large-scale combat operations (LSCO): extensive joint combat operations in terms of scopeand size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational andstrategic objectives. (ADP 3-0)
Mobilization Force Generation Installation (MFGI): Army installations including federally
activated State-operated installations designated to provide continuous RegularComponent/Reserve Component power projection, combat preparation, post-mobilization
training, sustainment capabilities, and pre-mobilization training support. (AR 525-93)
The Multi-Domain Army: Army of 2035, capable of achieving extensive multi-domain effects
at speed and scale, across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.
multi-domain operations (MDO): operations conducted across multiple domains and contested
spaces to overcome an adversary’s (or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several
operational and/or tactical dilemmas through the combined application of calibrated force
posture; employment of multi-domain formations; and convergence of capabilities acrossdomains, environments, and functions in time and spaces to achieve operational and tacticalobjectives. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)
Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF): new Army formation able to execute multi-domain
operations, designed to deliver long-range precision joint strike as well as integrate air andmissile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and information operations in both competitionand conflict to provide the Joint Force and coalition with new capabilities to enable the defeat ofadversaries’ anti-access and area denial strategies. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)
non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW): low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical andoperational use on the battlefield generally not addressed in current arms control treaties. Also
known as tactical nuclear weapons.
outside forces: strategic and theater level forces that will have the capability and capacity tosecure global key terrain (strategic choke points) or lines of communication, threaten an
adversary strategic flank, or hold their interests at risk.
Power Projection Platform (PPP): an installation capable of deploying a brigade-sized force orlarger upon notification to meet CCMD OPLAN requirements within 10 days or less. (AR 52593)
Project Convergence: the Army Futures Command campaign of learning to aggressively pursue
an artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled battlefield management system.
Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM): the Army’s unit
lifecycle model designed to balance the competing demands of modernization, training, andoperational employment.
Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB): specialized units with the core mission to conduct
training, advising, assisting, enabling and accompanying operations with allied and partner
nations.

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UNCLASSIFIEDState Partnership Program (SPP): a National Guard program that partners a state’s National
Guard with the armed forces or equivalent of a partner country in a cooperative, mutually
beneficial relationship.
theater screen force: referred to as a Geographic Combatant Command’s forward positioned
force, able to gain and maintain contact with an adversary in all domains to gain information,
shape the theater battlespace, impose costs on an adversary or delay and disrupt to buy time forjoint force action.
Waypoint 2028: the point at which the Army will comprehensively reassess its assumptions
about the future and adjust investments accordingly.

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