Global Leadership Training Programme in Africa 2014
RESEARCH REPORTThe Relationship between Democracy and Resource Curse~ How could PRMA have been established in Ghana? ~Yuho Takagi 1
English Summary
I dealt with Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) in Ghana for the case study, andanalyzed its process to be established in detail. The object of this report is to clarify how
PRMA could been established in Ghana.
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are the known as resource-rich countries, but
at the same time have been introduced as cases of “Resource curse”. We c an even saythat no SSA oil producing country has ever succeeded in avoiding resource curse. That is
why I focused on the topic.
Among those countries, Ghana has not experienced any phenomena of resource curse sofar, and it is said to be partly because of the legislation to avoid the curse, especially for

Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) established in 2011. Therefore, I focused on
why PRMA could be established soon after the discovery of oil in Ghana.
I picked Resource Curse Theory up as a previous study, and reviewed both of theoreticaland case studies, which were lack of the point of view to focus on the process ofinstitutions. Taking it into account, I focused on the process of establishing the legal
institution in Ghana.
Term of the research was from 2007 until 2011, which means from the discovery of oil
until establishment of PRMA. Specifically, I analyzed the statement and actions made byeach actor (government, mass-media, civil society, private company, international society,etc) to see who had what kind of roles.
Through the study focusing on international actors, I can conclude that Ghana could
establish PRMA thanks to democratic background and the good timing of discovery. We candivide the factors into two: a technological factor and a democratic factor (it became
1

2 nd grade student, Global Governance Program, School of International and Public Policy, Hitotsubashi

University, Tokyo, Japan. University of Ghana, Department of Geography and Resource Developmentiincentives for Ghana). The former was mainly the geographical condition, and the latter
was the tendency of natural resource governance. Actions of Norway and Trinidad andTobago were both pushed by this tendency, and de velopment of Resource Curse Theory
was also accelerated.
As a contrast, I pointed out that actors representing domestic democracy, such as
Parliament, Civil society and ordinary citizens, had no function to push the government todevelop and establish PRMA.
To support my hypothesis, I applied World Polity Theory, which says three factors
concretely influence the action of nations; norm, script and cognitive model, to the
explanation of why PRMA has been established in Ghana. And showed the opinion below:
First, the norm was the trend of good governance in natural resource in 21st century
represented by EITI. Secondly, the script for institutionalization was offered by Norway
through OfD. Thirdly, the cognitive model of PRMA was undoubtedly The Heritage andStabilization Fund Act of Trinidad and Tobago. Had it not been for this act, it would havetaken Ghana some more decades to establish the same act.

Japanese Summary
本論文は、ガーナ共和国の石油歳入管理法（PRMA）を事例として取り上げ、その制定プロセ
スを詳細に分析することを通じて、誰がどのようにして法制度の構築に影響を与えたのかを明らかにするものである。
サブサハラアフリカの多くの国々は、豊富な天然資源を保有しているにも関わらず、貧困問
題を抱えている。いわゆる資源の呪いによって発展が阻害されていることが一つの主要な原因である。そこで本論文は、サブサハラアフリカの資源問題に着目した。
その中でもガーナに焦点を当てた理由は、同地域における従来の産油国全てが資源の呪いを経験していると言われる中で、石油が発見された 2007 年以降、ガーナは石油による経済停滞もしくはガバナンスの悪化を経験していない唯一の例だからである。そこで、ガーナが資源管理に成功している要因の一つとされる石油歳入管理法に焦点を当てるとともに、「ガーナ政府が同法を迅速に制定することができた要因は何か」という問いを立てた。
本論文では、既存研究として資源の呪い研究を取り上げ、理論研究とガーナにおける事例研
究の両方についてのレビューを行った。その結果、既存研究では、どのようにして石油管理制度が構築されたのかというプロセスを詳細に分析する視座が欠けていることから、本論文の焦点を石油歳入管理法が制定された「プロセス」に当てることによって、新たな視座を提供することを目指した。
石油歳入管理法についての考察をすすめるにあたり、本論文は石油開発が盛んになる 2000 年
代初めから石油生産開始（2010）までに焦点を当てた。つまり、石油が発見されてから石油歳

ii

入管理法が制定されるまでの期間である。この時期の国内および海外の各アクターの行動を分析し、それぞれが与えた同法の制定への影響を明らかにした。
国際的要因として、ノルウェー、トリニダード・トバゴ、ナイジェリア、採掘産業透明性イ
ニシアティブ（EITI）を取り上げ、これらアクターの動きの背景にはすべて、資源の呪い理論の発展を前提とした天然資源ガバナンス改善の時代的風潮があったことを発見した。ガーナの石油は技術的困難さゆえに 21 世紀になるまで掘り起こされることがなく、それゆえにこそ、こうした時代的風潮に合致するタイミングで発見された。そのことが、石油歳入管理法の迅速な制定を促す要因となったと言える。
次に国内的要因の分析を通して、国内民主主義を支える主要なアクターとしての国会、市民
社会、一般市民の行動はいずれも、石油歳入管理法の制定に影響を与えることはなかったと指摘した。
以上のような議論を通して、従来の通説として考えられていた「民主主義であれば資源の呪いにはかからない」という主張は、直接的な因果関係としては証明されないことを指摘した。
むしろ本論文は、資源の呪い理論の発展とそれに伴う近隣国ナイジェリアの失敗事例、及び 21
世紀の資源ガバナンス改善の風潮といった要因が、ガーナの法制度構築を直接的に後押ししたと主張する。そしてこの仮説を包括する理論的枠組みとして、規範（ Norm）、台本（Script）、
認 識 モ デ ル （ Cognitive model ） の 三 つ が 国 家 の 行 動 に 影 響 を 与 え る と す る 世 界 政 体 理 論（World Polity Theory）を取り上げ、各アクターがこの枠組みのうちどの役割を果たしたのかを説明した。

iii

1.

Introduction

1.1 Background and Research Question
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been introduced as cases of “Resource curse”,
such as Angola and Nigeria with oil, Sierra Leone with diamond. Among 58 countries scored by
Resource Governance Index2, the average lank of six SSA oil-producing countries3 is 44th, which isvery low. So, we can say that no SSA oil producing country has ever succeeded in avoiding resource
curse.
Ghana has been an exporter of oil in commercial quantity since the end of 2010, and IMF says that
Ghana is expected to make a large profit up to $20 billion by 2030. Therefore, Ghana will be ranked
as one of the major 50 countries of oil export in the near future. However, Ghana has notexperienced any phenomena of resource curse so far. In economic aspect, the economic growthrate of Ghana has been over 5% for more than ten years continuously, and in political aspect, thescore of Corruption Perception Index 4 have been consistently improving since 2006. Needless to say,Ghana has not experienced any armed conflict since its independence in 1958.
In terms of management of oil, Ghana is admired for the legislation to avoid the curse, especiallyfor Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) established in 2011. This act has two importantcharacteristics. First, PRMA regulates the transparency of oil revenue. According to this act, all theoil companies and government must publish the report of income and outgo regularly. And all themoney from the oil must be managed by Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF). Secondly, PRMA regulates
the way of investment in Article 21, which prioritizes the long-term investment in the area relating
to agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and so on. According to those regulations, this act is
expected to function to avoid the curse. Therefore, I focused on why PRMA could be establishedsoon after the discovery of oil in Ghana.

1.2 Objective
The first objective of this research is academic one, that is, to clarify what contributes to thedevelopment of resource curse theory. This research is one of the case studies focusing on therelationship between resource curse and legal institution. In this area, we can see some cases ofmacro-level researches such as cross-country analysis, but cannot see many cases that haveanalyzed at micro-level. This research will focus on the contextual process how legal institution was

2

Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), which has been the natural resource section of

Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), annually publishes the RGI scores of resource rich countries. The score consist s of 4 factors:
institution, practice of report, security and quality control and environmental consideration.
3

Six SSA countries are Gabon (32th), Nigeria (40th), Angola (40th), Mozambique (46th), South Sudan (50th) and Equatorial

Guinea (56th). (NRGI, 2013)4

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows the degree of corruption in each country. CPI is annually published by theinternational NGO (Transparency International).

1established, and can contribute development of the theory by providing a new case of micro-levelresearch about institution.
Second objective of this research is to clarify what contributes to policy making in Ghana and otherpotential oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since Ghana has managed oil only for 5
years so far, we cannot say that Ghana could avoid resource curse perfectly, but there is no doubtthat establishment of PRMA is one of the success model that Ghana could achieve in managing oil
effectively. By clarifying the process of policy making in establishing this act, Ghana can decide
whether the government should continue the present attitude or change it. In addition, there aremany potential oil-producing countries in West Africa, such as Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. If Ghana
can succeed in management of oil for the first time in Sub-Saharan Africa, it can be the leading casefor other countries. This research is sure to contribute to it.

1.3 Hypothesis
This research consists of two hypotheses. First, democracy had little influence on establishment ofinstitutions such as PRMA. Democracy seems to be the most important factor for a country to
improve the resource governance, as Paul Collier says. However, after the research focusing on
domestic democratic factors (parliament, civil society and election), those factors didn’t promote
PRMA to be improved. The reasons are below. First, the parliament of Ghana has been controlled by
NDC, the ruling party. Because of that, it didn’t function as a competitive power against the
government. Secondly, most of activities acted by civil societies were the criticisms after somepolicies practiced by the government, rather than proposals in advance. Thirdly, in terms of election,issue for voting was not focused on the oil policy of government for some reasons.
Then, what pushed the government to establish PRMA in only a few years after the discovery ofoil? My second hypothesis gives the answer, that is, the timing. In the end of 20 th century and the
beginning of 21st century, many events on the resource governance happened in the world.
Development of Resource curse theory, the boom for establishing natural resource fund, the newnorm on the natural resource governance, and initiatives according to the norm, bilaterally andmultilaterally, and many other actions were also taken by various countries and organizations.
Thanks to those actions, Ghana could take advantage as a late starter of oil export. In other words,
international environment for natural resource governance let Ghana establish democratic andeffective institutions from the aspect of a norm and technology.
2.

Study Area
2.1 Resource Curse Theory

The history of Resource Curse Theory is not so long. The idea that natural resource might be more
an economic curse than a blessing emerged in 1980’s. Then, Richard Auty (1993) used the term
“resource curse thesis” in his report for the first time in the world. Originally, this theory wasdeveloped by various economists such as Sachs and Warner (1995). They proved the negative2

correlation between GDP growth rate and resource dependence of resource-rich countries from1970’s to 1990’s. Researchers like Karl and Gary (2003) contributed to development of the theory
by case studies in Africa.
In addition to economical approach, many researchers have made their researches in politicalaspects since early 2000’s. Ross (2001) argued that dependence on oil hinder democracy of one
country5. On the other hand, Harb (2003) and Haber (2007) denied the positive correlation between
natural resource and regime type including democracy. Nowadays, researchers are trying to clarify
this issue from more detailed aspect. For example, Dunning (2008) classified resource-rich countries
by the equality in private sector.
The other issue on political aspect is the relationship between natural resource and civil war. Collierand Hoeffler (2004) focused on the motivation and the opportunity to rebel, and proved thecorrelation between export of primary products and civil war. Fearon (2004), Jensen (2004), andmany other researchers have also made various researches on this issue. They are classified into
three types: ①general analysis of the relationship between natural resource and civil war, ②theassumption that natural resource indirectly influence civil war by weakening governance of a nation,③the assumption focusing on details such as characteristics of each natural resource andgeographical conditions, based on greed and grievance theory.
As Auty pointed out, not all the resource-rich countries get cursed, even developing countries like
Botswana and Chile. Then, we have to clarify in which condition there will be curse in a country.
Humphreys (2007) summarized 5 economic factors and 5 political factors as important. The 5
economic factors are unequal expertise by a few private sectors 6 , Dutch disease 7 , unstabledevelopment because of resource volatility 8 , living off the capital by politicians and insufficientinvestments in human capital such as education 9. And the 5 political factors are spoliation by higher
levels of corruption, unaccountable states (low transparency), threats to democracy (the decline of
the importance of tax and labor force), grievances in producing regions and military challenges togovernment. Recently, some researchers are trying to find the effective way to prevent thosefactors. For example, Afful-Koomson and Asubonteng (2013) argue that collaborative governance by
all actors such as government, private companies, international organizations, bilateral cooperationand civil society is vital to avoiding the resource curse.

5

Similar cases are Lam and Wantchekon(2002), Tsui(2005) and Jensen(2004), and so on.

6

E.g. Asamoah(2012)7

E.g, Sachs and Warner(1995)

8

E.g. Hampleys, et al(2007)

9

E.g. Gylfason(2001), Birdsall(2001) and Phillipot(2010)3

2.2 Case study in Ghana
The Number of Researches on oil in Ghana is not so large, because the domain is quite new. Afterdiscovery of oil in 2007, some researchers argued that the government should meet the
expectations of citizens. Anaman (2007) and Asante (2009) pointed out the importance of system
where citizens can directly take the profit of oil industry. There are many researchers focusing oneach issue. Manteau (2009) and Gyima-Boadi (2013) considered the impact of oil discovery on
democracy, and argued that government of Ghana is not managing the oil democratically so far.
Owusu (2014) argued that the government has to compensate the producing region 10. Asafu-Adjaye(2009) analyzed the possibility of Dutch disease in Ghana, and Asamoah (2012) pointed out theenvironmental risk of oil industry and its possible solution.

2.3 Review of Precious Studies
Research on Resource Curse Theory is still developing. Majority of researchers regard democracy
only as a dependent variable, but we also have to consider the effect of democracy to avoid thecurse. Therefore, I regarded democracy as a independent variable and occurrence of the curse as adependent variable. Similar attitude can be seen in the research on Institution. For example,
Mehlum (2006) pointed out that countries with producer friendly institutions tend not to be in curse.
King (2009) argued that institutions to make the linkage between civil society and political leaders
are important factors to avoid the curse.
In terms of research on Ghana, there are few comprehensive researches on the resource curse.
Amungsen (2012) concluded that Ghana can avoid the curse because of the good institutions. He
reviewed and summarized the international indexes such as Natural Resource Governance Indexand Democracy Index. However, his research can be criticized in terms of why such institutions
could be established. As Jones (2008) pointed out, it is important to clarify how the institutions are
made and how the institutions relate with each other to evolve. In other words, we have to consider
the process of each institution. Taking those things into account, I focused on the process ofestablishing the legal institution in Ghana, based on the previous researches on institution.

3.

Methodology

As I mentioned in the last section, I focused on the legal institutions related to oil policy in Ghana.
Especially, I picked up PRMA established in 2011, because of the effectiveness to avoid the curse by
preventing economic and political factors of the curse; Dutch disease, lack of transparency, lack oflong-term investment, and so on. I conducted the archival research on the process how PRMA wasestablished. Term of the research was from 2007 until 2011, which means from the discovery of oil

10

Oil producing region is Western region, which capital is Takoradi.

4until establishment of PRMA. Specifically, I analyzed the statement and actions made by each actor(government, mass-media, civil society, private company) to see who had what kind of roles.
Especially, I focused on governments of Norway, Trinidad and Tobago and Nigeria as arepresentative of bilateral cooperation, because they were invited to international forum for oilorganized by Ghana. Additionally, as a representative of multilateral cooperation, I picked up EITI 11.
Then, to see the domestic actors, I conducted the three kinds of researches. First, I collected andanalyzed the discussion record of the parliament from 2010 to 2011. Especially through thecomparison of the ruling party (NDC) and the opposition party (NPP), I clarified the attitude of NDC
toward institutionalization, and examined the contribution of the parliament to PRMA. Secondly, I
picked up major national NGOs and summarized their activities in that period. Thirdly, I collected
the secondary materials about 2008 election that was held just after the discovery of oil. I had two
objectives: to see the manifesto of each party about oil policy, and to see the attitude of citizens
toward them.
However, I had a lot of difficulties to find such kind of primary and secondary materials about oil
policy, because the sector was quite new and immature. So, I did interview research on various
people concerned to supplement the lack of information. The informants were from governmentalorganizations, national and international NGOs, professors, journalists and consultants. The detailed
information is in Appendix.

4.

Research Findings
4.1 Domestic Democracy

In this section, I show the result of research focusing on domestic actors, especially parliament,
civil society and ordinary citizens. They are expected to function to develop and protect democracy
in Ghana. If we believe in the generally accepted idea “democracy can prevent resource curse”,
those actors must have contributed to establishing PRMA in some sense.
Parliament
Ghana has the single chamber system, and typical two-party system by NDC and NPP. In 2004
election, NPP had 128 seats, NPP had 94 seats and other parties had only 8 seats (in total 230
seats). But in 2008 election, NDC won 116 seats, NPP got 107 seats and others got 7 seats. Though
the ruling party changed in 2008 election, they were still competitive with each other in terms of thenumber of the seats. Then, I analyzed the discussion over PRMA between NDC and NPP in 2011.
The membership was the same as 2008.

11

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a multi-stakeholder initiative that was established in 2002, by the

proposal of the former Prime Minister Brier in UK.

5

First of all, the section about Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) threw themeeting into confusion. The design of PIAC was so unique because the organization by this act was
expected to watch the government itself whether it is obeying the law. In the discussion, they
discussed how strong they should give the right to PIAC. Article 52-c12 says that the objective of
PIAC is to provide independent assessments on the management and use of revenues to assist

parliament and the executive. It means, PIAC is only a supportive organization for the parliament.
NPP insisted that they should add “civil society and general” to this article. NDC strongly opposedand said that “civil society” was too vague and fluid to be given the legal responsibility by the act.
In addition, this act included the sentence “Committee ensure that the petroleum revenue is used
for the benefit of current and future generations”, but NDC argued that PIAC couldn’t have an
ability to assure the benefit of citizens, and this sentence was deleted.
Secondly, Article 22 13 was also complicated. This article prohibited any special allocation that
influences Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) and Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF). The representative ofoil producing region (NPP member), Catharine Afeku suggested that they should add theearmarking for producing regions. However, NDC opposed to this suggestion because the article
24(3)14 regulated the possibility of compensation for the community.
The Table 1 is the summary of the major discussion between NDC and NPP. At a glance, we cansee that NDC ideas have been much more accepted. It means that the parliament could not change
the draft of PRMA meaningfully. Awal (2014) points out that the parliament is not functioning as acompetitive power against the government. In addition, there was no discussion in the parliament
about the wide and vague authority given to the Minister of Finance and about the foundation for
PIAC (Adam, 2014). Therefore, we can conclude that the parliament did not contribute toestablishing, hastening or developing PRMA.

12Article 52-c：（The objects of Accountability Committee are:） to provide independent assessments on the management

and use of revenues to assist Parliament and the executive in the oversight and performance of related functions respectively.
13

Article 22: Outside of the allocation of the Petroleum Holding Fund, extra budgetary activities or statutory earmarking of

petroleum revenue for any consideration is prohibited.
14

Article 24(3): Where petroleum operations adversely affect a community, appropriate compensation shall be paid for the

benefit of the community in accordance with the relevant laws.

6

Table 1: The summary of major discussion between NDC and NPP
ArticleContent

Issue

NDC’s opinion

NPP’s opinion

Result(adopted)

Benchmark
priceofPetroleumMarketprice
Reference priceDefinition of
GPF

Notation

Withdrawal
from GPF

Necessity
approval
Parliament

15(1)ReportMinisterFrequency

15(3)PublishingMedia of thereport

How to choose thenewspaper

Earmark for
producingregionAccept exceptional
earmark or not

Not accept

23(4)Transfers
from GSF

EstablishmentofContingency fundNot needed

NeededNPP

49(3)ConfidentialitySubmitparliament

Not PrioritizedPrioritized

NPP

52(c)

Objectives of
PIAC

Scope of objectives

Objectives of
PIAC

Scope of activities

53(1)aFunction
PIAC

Scope
Consultation

54

PIAC
membership

8(3)

11(1)

13

22(2)

52(d)

by

of

or

Fund or Funds
of
by

to

of

Number of members

Reference Price

Not opposed to
NDC

NDC

Fund (depend ondraft maker)

AgreedNot needed

NeededNDC

Annually

Quarterly

NDC

NDC

National dailies
State owned

NDC
Accept
NDC

Limitedsupportparliamenttoof

Add civil society

Only support ofparliament

Assure the profit
of citizens

Revenue(Limited)

Resource(Comprehensive)11

13(addtherepresentativesof parties)

7

NDC

NDC
NDC

NDC

Civil Society
The discovery of Jubilee field excited the media and public opinion. People in the depression
because of weak currency expected that the economy would change dramatically thanks to oil. Thisenthusiasm pushed many national NGOs into activities. In fact, the government invited some major
NGOs to the national forum for oil in 2008 15. However, the discussion in the forum was led by the
Mining and Energy Committee founded by the government, and NGOs had few opportunities toexpress their opinions (Gyampo, 2010). Since then, each NGO has acted focusing on its interest.
Table 2 shows the major NGOs and their activities.

Table2: The major NGOs and their activities
Name

Activities

IEA-Ghana

Establishment: 1989

(Institute of Economic Affairs-Ghana)

Activities: Research focusing on the public policy
such as budget process
Petroleum: P-TRAC Index16

ACEP

Establishment: 2010

(Africa Centre for Energy Policy)

Activities: Think tank on Energy policy
Petroleum: Review on PRMA

CDD-Ghana(Center
Ghana)

forEstablishment: 1998
Democratic

Development-

Petroleum: Review on new petroleum law

STAR-Ghana(Strengthening
Accountability
Ghana)

Activities: Rule of law, public administration

Establishment: 2004 (supported by EU, US-AID)

andTransparency,
Responsiveness-

Activities: management of the projects
Petroleum: support for minority action

GII

Establishment: 1999

(Ghana Integrity Initiative)

Activities: Branch of Transparency International in
Ghana

15

E.g, CDD-Ghana, IEA-Ghana, CEPA etc.

16

P-TRAC Index (Petroleum Transparency and Accountability Index) is the index about the transparency of oil and gas industry

in Ghana that IEA-Ghana annually publishes. It consists of 4 pillars; Revenue transparency, Budget transparency, Contract
transparency and Function of Heritage and Stabilization fund. Ghana scored 59.7% in 2011, and 68.9% in 2012.

8

Petroleum: Not specially
GACC

Establishment: 2000

(Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition)

Activities: Anti-corruption Action by Multi-stakeholder
Petroleum: Not specially

I visited all the NGOs above, and made some interviews about their activities. As a result, there arefew materials related to oil sector between 2007 and 2011, the preparation term for oil export.
There are probably two reasons for this. First, they had no custom to record small dialogues at thattime. Even in the governmental organizations, there were no official reports about the national andinternational forums. Secondly, they were not ready to deal with the oil sector in Ghana because of
the lack of experience. In conclusion, we can say that national NGOs didn’t contribute toestablishing or develop PRMA.
Ordinary Citizens
In general, ordinary citizens participate in the politics through voting in the democratic society. In
Ghana, there was the presidential election in 2008, just after the discovery of oil in Jubilee field.
The then ruling party NPP was suffering from the decline in approval rate because of economic
weakness. NPP emphasized that discovery of oil would change the situation, and made out a draftof oil and gas policy and of national oil regulative authority, incorporating them into its manifesto.
On the other hand, NDC didn’t prepare an alternative to it. However, NDC won this election as I
mentioned in the last section.
Unfortunately, I could not find any materials analyzing this election in terms of strategy andmotivation of voters. So, I had an interview about its reason with Mr Awal, the researcher of CDDGhana. According to the interview, there are two main reasons. First, the most important issue forthe citizens in this election was to improve the situation of daily life. That is, they are not sointerested in the oil policy that takes long time to get the outcome, but so interested in the short term policy such as financial and monetary policy. Secondly, Most of ordinary citizens in Ghana werepartisans. That is, they supported NDC or NPP without rational reasons. Many persons decided theparty depending on the decisions of their family and relatives, though there were no strong
tendencies because of a region.
In conclusion, actors representing domestic democracy had no function to push the government todevelop and establish PRMA. Of course democracy didn’t become any negative factor, and theattitude to develop good governance by the government of Ghana must be based on the democratic
background. However, the explanation “good institution was established because of democracy” has9

a logical gap, and we need to prepare some intermediate variable to explain this causal relation
between two.
4.2 International Stream
After the discovery of oil in 2007, the government of Ghana actively invited the foreign
governments and international organizations for advice. Especially, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago
and Nigeria played important roles for Ghana to develop the oil policy (Gyampo, 2010). At the sametime, we have to pay attention to EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) as arepresentative of multi-lateral framework. I describe what kind of contribution each actor made.
NorwayNorway is undoubtedly one of the most successful countries in terms of the management of oil.
Since starting oil export in 1960’s, Norway has produced 210 million barrels per day continuously,
but experienced no curse in any aspect. The person who asked Norway for the advice was not the
government itself. It was Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN and a Ghanaian. When heasked, Norway had operated Oil for Development Program (OfD) 17 since 2005. In 2008, they finally
signed the Memorandum of Understanding, and agreed for Norway to support each ministry andrelated organization such as GNPC in Ghana.
They prioritized making the master plan of oil policy at first, and Ghana took very comprehensive
support to establish the basis of oil industry. However, there was no record or statement focusingon PRMA, so we can see that they thought of legal institution as one part of the whole issues.
Trinidad and Tobago
Resource dependence of Trinidad and Tobago is so high, because 40% of GDP and 80% of export
is from oil and gas sector. Though independence of Trinidad and Tobago was won later than Ghana(in 1962), she scored 74 points in Resource Governance Index in 2013 18. One of the reasons for thisgood score is her institutional effort. In the latter part of 1990’s, the quantity of oil production was
declining. To deal with this problem, the government established Interim Revenue Stabilization Fundin 2000 to save the oil money for the future. And then, the government developed this fund andestablished The Heritage and Stabilization Fund Act in 2007.
PRMA of Ghana was modeled on this act. The structure of both acts is almost the same, though thepercentage of profit to national budget is a bit different (70% in Ghana, 60% in Trinidad and

17

The government of Norway started Oil for Development Program in 2005, aiming to reduce the poverty and to realize

sustainable development of resource-rich countries. In 2013, Norway assisted 32 developing countries for this program, andspent about 33 million US dollars.
18thThis ranks in 10 place in the world.

10

Tobago). If we focus on PRMA only, we can say that Trinidad and Tobago directly contributed tothe establishment of PRMA even more than Norway, thanks to good timing.

Figure 1: Transition of oil production in Trinidad and Tobago

2000（Source：BP Statistical Review, 2013）

Nigeria
The last country is Nigeria. The beginning of oil production in Nigeria was very early, tracing backto 193819. Many laws were established and the sector developed very rapidly. However, southerneastern part which includes the oil-producing region declaring its independence from Nigeria in 1967,
and this declaration became a trigger of Biafran War. Because of this civil war, the oil industry in
Nigeria became so confused, and even destruction of the environment occurred. This is the typicalcase of resource curse introduced by many researchers.
Ghana and Nigeria had strong relationship because both of them are major members of ECOWAS.
So, when commercial quantity of oil was discovered in Ghana, she was reminded the experience ofNigeria.

Since the discovery of oil in 2007, the media such as journals and TV in Ghana introduced the tragic
history of the countries like Nigeria and Congo, and questioned about “How can Ghana avoid thecures?” day and night. (Kuroda, 2013)19

Nigeria was colonized by Britain in 1914, experienced the period of a dominion from 1 954, and became independent in

1960.

11

A Nigerian anti-corruption watchdog commission approximates that over 45% of the country’s oil iswasted or stolen often by sophisticated criminal gangs who tap into the pipeline using hacksaws to
cut through pipes to ‘claim their share’ of their nation’s resource… （中略）…This must not beallowed to happen to Ghana.
（Ghana web, June 30th 2008）
These are examples of the article saying that Ghana must not be like Nigeria.
EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative)
The direct trigger of establishment of EITI was the statement of Prime Minister Blair (UK) in 200220,
but the plan was already made in the end of 20th century. In 1999, Global Witness 21 published ‘A
Crude Awakening’ and introduced that the lack of transparency in Angola has hindered developmentof the country. This report encouraged many international NGOs such as Open Society Institute andOxfam, Transparency International to establish Revenue Watch Program and new NGO Publish
What You Pay. Establishment of EITI was one of the actions.

Table 3: Summary of major events until discovery of oil in Ghana
Year

Event

1993

Auty introduced “Resource Curse” in his report

1999‘A Crude Awakening’ published by Global Witness

2000

Trinidad and Tobago established Interim Revenue Stabilization Fund

2002

EITI was started by the speech of Blair

2005

Norway started Oil for Development Program (OfD)

2007

Trinidad and Tobago established The Heritage and Stabilization Fund Act

2007

Discovery of Jubilee oil field in Ghana

20

He argued the importance to cooperate each other to avoid the resource curse in the world, in WSSD (World Summit on

Sustainable Development) held in Johannesburg.
21

It is the name of an International NGO.

12

5.

Discussions
5.1 Application of World Polity Theory

World Polity Theory (World Culture Theory) has been developed mainly by John Mayer as ananalytical frame for interpreting global relations, structures, and practices. According to John Boliand George M. Thomas, the world polity is constituted by distinct culture a set of fundamental
principles and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature andpurposes of social actors and action. They say that three factors concretely influence the action ofnations; norm, script and cognitive model.
I can apply this theory to establishment of PRMA in Ghana. First, the norm was the trend of good
governance in natural resource in 21st century represented by EITI. Secondly, the script for
institutionalization was offered by Norway through OfD. Thirdly, the cognitive model of PRMA wasundoubtedly The Heritage and Stabilization Fund Act of Trinidad and Tobago. Had it not been forthis act, it would have taken Ghana some more decades to establish the same act.
To discover an oil field in offshore of Ghana, the highly developed technology was needed. That’s
why it was not found until 21st century. And this fact was also important to explain why Ghana
could establish PRMA very quickly, because 2007 was very good timing to prepare the institutio ns
related to oil. As I summarized in the last section, all the actions was begun around 2000. If Ghana
had found oil before then, it would have taken much time to institutionalize and would have hadsome troubles like other countries in SSA. In this sense, Ghana was so fortunate.
5.2 Limitation of This ResearchThis research has several limitations and problems to be solved. The first problem is the lack ofobjective information such as statistical data. The reasons are as follows: In Ghana, there was few
record of discussion or policy making before the production of oil in 2010. Therefore, I could getsome information only from interview research, which is partly subjective. One more reason is thelack of the accumulation of time and experience. It’s because oil sector in Ghana is so new. Many
researchers are now preparing and collecting data to publish new reports to evaluate the present
policy.
Second problem is that I couldn’t evaluate whether PRMA was designed well enough to prevent
Ghana from getting cursed or not. To answer this question, we need a viewpoint of economics,
which is missing in this research.
Third problem is that we need to see other countries to check if the same thing will happen in thesimilar situation to Ghana. Because of the development of natural resource governance, new oilproducing countries in the future are expected to avoid the curse. We have to be careful about thisto make sure of my hypothesis.

13

6.

Conclusion

Though there are many limitations in this research, I can conclude that Ghana could establish
PRMA thanks to democratic background and the good timing of discovery. We can divide the factors
into two: a technological factor and a democratic factor (it became incentives for Ghana). The
former was mainly the geographical condition, and the latter was the tendency of natural resource
governance. Actions of Norway and Trinidad and Tobago were both pushed by this tendency, anddevelopment of Resource Curse Theory was also accelerated. And then, these movements can be
explained using World Polity Theory that assumed the world to be united by cultural norm.
I can infer that the following oil-producing countries in SSA will be able to avoid the curse thanks to
many experiences and this tendency. But, to make sure of it, I have to clarify two things. First, I
have to see whether PRMA can really contribute to avoiding the curse. To evaluate this, I need theviewpoint of economics. Secondly, I have to make another case study on a country which hassimilar condition and different result.
Figure 2: Summary of my hypothesis

7.

Reflection on the GLTP in Africa

I could receive the benefit from GLTP in many ways. Especially, I can point out three things that I
owe to GLTP.
First, the program enabled me to brush up the research design. Before visiting, I had no practicalimage of the society of Ghana. So, I could not make the good research question. But once I visitedthe country, I recognized the large gap between my previous image and reality. For example,

14

people in Ghana were much less interested in oil policy in their own country than I had expected
before visiting. As a result, I arranged the research design again and again.
Second benefit was the generosity of GLTP to let us make trials and errors without any restriction.
If I had been bound by small rules, I could have not changed my research plan flexibly in the field.
At the same time, it was a very good opportunity to learn how to make an appointment forinterview. I sometimes made mistakes about the timing, and learned a correct way of preparation
for the research.
Thirdly, I could see and visit many persons and organizations thanks to the name of UNU.
Governmental organizations required me to show the identification strictly. If I had had no status, I
could have not visited ministries and the parliament to get many materials.
Taking all into account, I could do the interview research without any big problems because of
GLTP system, and also could learn how to make it, thanks to big support and generosity of GLTP.
Acknowledgement
First of all, I am deeply grateful to all the organizers of GLTP, UNU-IAS. Thanks to this program, I
could practice the field research, and took benefit from it. Especially, I appreciate the feedback
offered by Professor Masahumi Nagao, the Visiting professor of UNU-IAS, and by Dr Osamu Saito,
the Academic program officer.
I also would like to express my gratitude to Professor Geoge Owusu, the Head of Department ofGeography and Resource Development, University of Ghana. Thanks to his kind acceptance, advice
and the introduction letter, I could see many important persons and organizations related to myresearch. In addition, I would like to show my great appreciation to Dr.Elias T.Ayuk, the Director of
the UNU-INRA. He kindly introduced relative researchers and materials to me.
In terms of stay, I would like to offer my special thanks to Ms. Adisa Lansah Yakubu. She kindly
accepted me and supported everything about my daily life. Thanks to her support, I could spend all
the days without any big trouble. I am also indebted to Ms. Yasuko Kusakari and Ms. Madoka Kurata
for much advice about my stay in Ghana.
In addition, I would like to express deep appreciation to all informants who kindly took myinterview. Thanks to all of their big cooperation, I could finish my research.

15

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22Appendix
List of Interview researchDate(2014)

Occupation

Name

Nov.10th

Dep. of Political Science/Univ. of Ghana

Prof. Ransford Gyampo

Nov.18th

Africa Centre for Energy Policy, Senior
Energy Policy Manager

Dr.Mohanmed, Nasir Alfa

Nov.26th

Joy FM journalist

Mr.Benjamin Piorgah Tetteh

Dec. 4th

Oil & gas, energy, environment andclimate change consultant

Dr.Joe Asamoah

Dec.8thMinistry of Finance, Real Sector Division,
Head of Energy, Oil and Gas Unit

Dr.Joseph Kwadwo Asenso

Dec.10th

Natural Resource Governance Institute,
Program Officer

Mr.Adams Fusheini

Dec.10th

CDD-Ghana, Research Officer

Mr.Mohammed Awal

23