The Determinant(s) of China’s Foreign Aids
during the “Great Famine”
The Final Presentation of IPE
WU Xuejun
GrasPP

Outline Introduction
 Literature Reviews
 The Late 1950s: Risk and Opportunity
 Hedging against the USSR

 Competition for the Leadership Conclusion

Introduction
 Why did China still give a huge amount of foreign aids to othercountries when she suffered from the “Great Famine?”
The “Great Famine”

Foreign Aids

- Serious problem of Shortage- Millions of people died

- More than 4 billion yuan aid- 22 out of 38 countries- Adding new recipients(Uganda, Cuba)- Increasing the traditionalaids

Literature Reviews

 Theoretically,[Realists] The means of guaranteeing the national security[Idealists] Altruism Interests such as humanitarian needs[Neo-Marxists] Calculations of donors and enlargement of the gap

Literature Reviews (Cont.)
 Empirically,
OECD Countries- Political and Strategic
Interest- economic needs- colonial past
- donor’s preference

China- Proletariat Internationalism- The Role of Chinese
Leaders such as Mao

Literature Reviews (Cont.)
 Disputes:-The constraint of the “Great Famine”-The change of China’s attitude to aids

 Problems:-Overly Blurred Concept(“Political and Strategic Interest” & “Mao’s decision”)-

E.G. Aids to Egypt vs. Aids to DPRKThe late 1950s: Risk and Opportunity What was the political and strategic interest of PRC?
 Background:(the Rise of China and the Fall of the USSR)-

Hungarian Revolution of 1956-

The Debate between the USSR and Yugoslavia (Nagy Incident)-

Poznań 1956 protests-

June Coup/Incident with the USSR Hierarchy

The late 1950s: Risk and Opportunity (Cont.)

 Moscow Meeting in 1957,
China

The USSRWar and Peace

Peaceful Coexistence[Mao] “But, using the Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence as the general line of foreign policy
is wrong …… As the general line, we can not
merely talk about the peaceful coexistence.
Instead, we should focus on World Revolution
and Proletariat Internationalism.”[Deng] “USSR was only talking about thepeaceful coexistence. This is very awful. Only
focusing on that war is not inevitable while
never touching the question what we should do
if war happens [is not correct].”- The possibility of Nuclear War- The USSR Perception(military force as the means)- Khrushchev’s comments on
recipient meeting held by Chinese
Embassy at Moscow(Redundant and Unnecessary)

The late 1950s: Risk and Opportunity (Cont.) Political and Strategic InterestHedge[Motivation]- Substantial Risk
[Limitations]- Dominant Role of the USSR interms of hard power- The Trade and Aids with theUSSR- Sino-American Confrontation

Competition for the Leadership[Motivation]- Guaranteeing the correct guideline
by replacing the position of the USSR
[Capability]- Advantage in Soft Power- The Winning of Korean War- The leadership of the USSR was at Risk
[Observation]- Khrushchev & Yugoslavian delegate

The late 1950s: Risk and Opportunity (Cont.)

CharacteristicMeans

Goals

Hedge

DefensiveAids

Risk
ManagementCompetition

Aggressive

Hedge

Leadership

Competition

Hedging against the USSR Sino-DPRK case
After “August Coup”[Politics]- Joint Intervention- Final Peaceful Settlement ofKorean War[Aids]- Rejected the request of extra
50 million yuan
- Food Negotiation for 1957
- Zhou Enlai’s announcement

After Moscow Meeting[DPRK]- Acknowledging the difficulties- Not Urgent[China]- Unlimited aids on cotton/coal- Joint dam construction- The order of Chinese StateCouncil in Jan. 20th and theend of Jan., 1961

Hedging against the USSR (Cont.)
 Result:-The official newspaper of DPRK, Labor News, announced
in 1963 that DPRK was against any partial attack on CPC.

-When Kim met the USSR ambassador at Pyongyang, hedirectly criticized the action of the USSR in 1956 andopenly claimed that he could not accept the attack on
China.

Hedging against the USSR (Cont.)
 To sum up,

China was using the aids to DPRK as the means to response
the USSR.

Competition for the Leadership Sino-DPRK aids: Not sufficient(The competition explanation is not excluded) The USSR-DPRK case:-Long-term Trade Agreement, Sep. 1960-

Trade Deficit vs. Loans-The meeting between Khrushchev and Kim

Competition for the Leadership (Cont.) Leadership of the USSR and the Moscow Meeting-Stances of Poland (firmly against) and other Communist Countries(silence)-The USSR (Avoiding mention the leadership of the USSR or the SinoUSSR joint leadership)

 China’s stance (firmly support)-China’s revised draft of final document of the Moscow Meeting-Mao’s speech on the opening ceremony-China’s efforts on persuading PolandCompetition for the Leadership (Cont.) Allocation of China’s Aids (No. 102-00015-01(1))
Facility Aids from 1955 to the early 1960s
Country

DPRK

VietnamMongolia

Albania

Czech

Number

8100

53

3

1

Given the fact that Stalin had reached consensus with Mao that CPC would
mainly deal with the communist movement in Asia while the USSR
concentrated on European communist activities, what China did after theMoscow Meeting in 1957 did not exceed this consensus. On the contrary,considering the actions of the USSR to DPRK in the early 1960s, it seems thatthe USSR was more aggressiveCompetition for the Leadership (Cont.)
 To sum up,

China was not intending at competing with the USSR for theleadership, although she increased her aids to othercountries as the means to response the USSR.

Conclusion
 Combining what discussed in the last two sections,
hedging against the USSR instead of competing for theleadership was the determinant of China’s aid allocation
at that time

Conclusion (Cont.)
 Limitations:-Case Selection

A. What about non-communist countries since China indeed
added many African countries as recipients during this period?
B.

What about the different behavior in Sino-Mongolia case?

-The “Great Famine”

Thank you !~The Trade and Aids with the USSR

Substantial Risk
 The Strait Crisis in 1958:[Kissinger]
The Strait Crisis in 1958 demonstrated Chinese ideological andstrategic vigilance against the U.S., contrasting with the USSR
quiescence in the face of a strategic American move in theMiddle East. Such quiescence, in the eyes of Mao, had made theUSSR a problematic ally and perhaps even a potential adversary.
Consequently, Mao was partly using the Strait Crisis to push
Khrushchev to choose between his new policy of peacefulcoexistence and his alliance with China. As it turned out,
Khrushchev harshly criticized Chinese government and ended thecooperation on Nuke with China.