Japan:
Legal Responses to the Great
East Japan Earthquake of 2011
September 2013

LL File No. 2012-007873
LRA-D-PUB-000056

The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate(202) 707-5080 (phone) • (866) 550-0442 (fax) • law@loc.gov • http://www.law.gov

This report is provided for reference purposes only.
It does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official
opinion of the United States Government. The information provided
reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing.
It has not been updated.

Contents
I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
II. Actions Taken Under Pre-earthquake Emergency Measures ............................................ 3
A. Disaster Response Basic Law ................................................................................................... 4
B. Disaster Rescue Law ................................................................................................................. 6
C. Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness ................................. 7
D. Electricity Shortage and Measures Taken Pursuant to TEPCO Power Supply Contract ....... 11
E. Food Sanitation Law and Related Measures .......................................................................... 13
III. Victim Support ................................................................................................................... 16
A. Tracking Evacuees ................................................................................................................. 16
B. Financial Grants ..................................................................................................................... 18
C. Special Loans ......................................................................................................................... 18
D. Loans for Lost Houses and Existing Business Debts ............................................................. 19
E. Tax Relief ............................................................................................................................... 20
F. Unemployment Benefits ......................................................................................................... 21
G. Job Creation ........................................................................................................................... 21
H. Shelters/Emergency Housing ................................................................................................. 22
I. Special Treatment Concerning Administrative Obligations .................................................... 24
J. Relief Donations ...................................................................................................................... 25
IV. Removal of Debris .............................................................................................................. 25
A. General Waste Management Measures .................................................................................. 25
B. Contaminated Waste Management and Decontamination ..................................................... 27
V. Nuclear Crisis at Fukushima ............................................................................................... 30
A. Act to Support Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Daily Lives .......................................................... 30
B. Compensation for Nuclear Damage ....................................................................................... 31
C. New Nuclear Regulatory Authority and New Regulations .................................................... 35
VI. Reconstruction .................................................................................................................... 37
VII. Public Finance Measures .................................................................................................. 39
VIII. Miscellaneous Special Laws ............................................................................................ 41

IX. Preparation for the Next Disaster – Japan’s Disaster Management System ................ 44
A. Disaster Response Basic Law ................................................................................................ 44
B. Special Act on Large-Scale Earthquake Response and Related Laws ................................... 45
C. New Law on Tsunami Measures ............................................................................................ 46
D. Other Measures for the Prevention and Mitigation of Damage ............................................. 47
X. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................... 48
Map
Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants Highlighting Those Affected by the 2011 Earthquake andTsunami........................................................................................................................................... 2
Tables1: Indices Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion (Excerpts) ........................................ 13
2: Limits for Radioactive Cesium in Food .................................................................................... 16

Japan:Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of2011
Sayuri Umeda
Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY The Great East Japan Earthquake brought the starkest crisis since the desolation of theSecond World War. During the emergency period just after the earthquake, the Japanese
government tried to do everything it could under existing disaster response systems.
However, because large areas were affected and some municipalities lost functions, theexisting systems, which placed the responsibility on each affected municipality to takeaction, did not work well in some parts of the country. The national government therefore
made exceptions and stepped in, assuming financial responsibilities for local governments.

Many issues arose as a result of the earthquake, such as food safety concerns and disasterdebris management and disposal. The nuclear crisis caused by the earthquake also created
long-lasting radiation problems. A new system was created for local governments outsideof the disaster area to accept and process debris. The government also established new
standards for radiation levels in foods.
In addition to utilizing existing systems and programs, exceptions were made and new
systems were created to support disaster victims and ease their hardship, with many laws
being amended or new laws created to address the situation. A reconstruction agency wascreated to coordinate various reconstruction efforts. Based on
post-earthquake
assessments of the effectiveness of the existing nuclear regulatory authority, a new nuclear
regulatory agency and new standards for nuclear power plants were created.
Japan has used the experience to better prepare for future disasters. Laws and regulations
were amended, and a new tsunami countermeasure law was enacted.

I. Introduction
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake, known as the Great East Japan Earthquake, struck off the Pacific
Coast of Japan’s Tohoku region on March 11, 2011, shaking the region. It caused a tsunami withdevastating consequences and a nuclear crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plants. In an
opinion piece published on the one-year anniversary of the earthquake, then Prime Minister
Yoshihiko Noda said it “triggered the starkest crisis [Japan] has faced in a generation.” 1 He

1Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Op-ed., A Year After the Earthquake, Building a New Japan, THE WASHINGTONPOST (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/prime-minister-yoshihiko-noda-japan-has-maderemarkable-progress/2012/03/07/gIQA7AX61R_story.html.

The Law Library of Congress

1

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

compared the level of crisis caused by the earthquake to “the ashes and desolation of WorldWar II.” 2
Map: Japan’s Nuclear Power Plants
Highlighting Those Affected by the 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami

Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nuclear_plants_Japan_in_2011.svg.

2

Id.

The Law Library of Congress2

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

The Japanese government utilized then-existing emergency systems and resources after theearthquake. Some systems did not work well because the scale of destruction from theearthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster combined were more than such systems were designed
to address. In the wake of the disaster, Japan has enacted and amended many new laws to
support victims’ daily lives, clear huge mounds of debris, and reconstruct destroyed areas.
Nuclear power plant safety has been reexamined. Further, Japan has enacted or amended laws to
prepare for and address similar large-scale earthquakes in the future. It is expected that certain
parts of Japan will experience huge earthquakes because these earthquakes happen periodicallyon a long cycle. 3
The Great East Japan Earthquake also had a tremendous impact on the Japanese economy.
Industrial production activities and exports have decreased because of the damage to stock
mainly in the affected region, supply chain disruptions, and power constraints. 4

II. Actions Taken Under Pre-earthquake Emergency Measures
After the tsunami washed away coastal areas, it was hard to know who had survived, who was
missing, and who had died. Power plants were paralyzed, power lines were gone, and roads
were disrupted everywhere. The Japanese government undertook extensive efforts to save lives
and assist survivors. 5 The damage was not limited to the Tohoku area. The tremor intensity
level of Tokyo was five under the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) seismic intensity scale. 6
Just after the earthquake, Tokyo, the nation’s capitol, was paralyzed by the damage from theearthquake and a lack of electricity. More than five million people in the Tokyo metropolitan
area were estimated to have been stranded at their workplace or elsewhere on March 11, 2011.7
In addition, the nuclear power plant accident caused by the earthquake and tsunami createdanother crisis of radiation exposure. Various emergency measures were taken based on thefollowing laws:

3

Jisjin wa naze okiru no? [Why Do Earthquakes Occur?], SHIZUOKA PREFECTURAL EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESSEDUCATION CENTER, http://www.e-quakes.pref.shizuoka.jp/manabu/why/b-03.htm (last visited June 28, 2013).
4

Seisaku suishin shishin – nihon no saisei ni mukete [Policy promotion guidelines – Toward Japan’s
Reconstruction], Cabinet Decision, May 17, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2011/__icsFiles/
afieldfile/2012/03/12/0517shishin.pdf (copy and paste link into browser).
5

See Message from the Prime Minister (Provisional Translation), PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET(Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/110313_1950.html.
6TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, MEASURES TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT TOOK AND ITSLEARNINGS FROM THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 16 (Sept. 2011), http://www.bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/
japanese/tmg/pdf/230914taiouhonsatu.pdf (in Japanese). Regarding the seismic intensity scale, see Tables
Explaining the JMA Seismic Intensity Scale, JMA, http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/Activities/inttable.html (last visitedJune 28, 2013). Japan’s seismic intensity scale differs from the Richter scale used to measure earthquake intensity
in the United States.
7

5 Million Stranded in Tokyo Area After Quake, YOMIURI NEWSPAPER (Nov. 25, 2011) (on file with author).

The Law Library of Congress3

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

A. Disaster Response Basic Law
The Disaster Response Basic Law 8 was enacted in 1961 for comprehensive and well-planned
disaster management after a huge monsoon hit the middle part of Japan in 1959. 9 It wasamended twice in 1995 10 based on the experiences of the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, 11 andagain in 2010. 12
Pursuant to this Law, the Central Disaster Management Council, which is under the jurisdictionof the Cabinet Office, established the Basic Disaster Management Plan.13 Based on the Basic
Disaster Management Plan, all designated government organizations and designated public
corporations established Disaster Management Operation Plans. 14 Also, each prefectural andmunicipal disaster management council established a Local Disaster Management Plan,
reflecting local circumstances. 15 These plans described comprehensive and long-term disaster
reduction issues, such as establishment of disaster management systems, disaster reduction
projects, disaster recovery, and rehabilitation. 16 These plans were available at the time of theGreat East Japan Earthquake. Under the Disaster Response Basic Law, in times of an
extraordinary disaster with repercussions for the national economy and public welfare that areserious and far-reaching, the Prime Minister may declare a state of emergency involving thewhole or part of the affected area by issuing a Cabinet Notice of Disaster Emergency Situation,
which requires implementation of these plans. 17

8

Saigai taisaku kihon hō [Disaster Response Basic Law], Act No. 223 of 1961, 1997 English translation available
on the Asian Disaster Reduction Center’s website, at http://www.adrc.asia/documents/law/DisasterCountermeasures
BasicAct.pdf.
9

Saigai taisaku kihon hō no gaiyō [Summary of the Disaster Response Basic Law], Cabinet Office,http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/pdf/090113saitai.pdf (last visited June 28, 2013).
10

Act Nos. 110 and 132 of 1995.

11

The Great Hanshin Earthquake struck a stretch of the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture on January 17, 1995. It
was rated at a magnitude of 7.3 on the Japan Meteorological Agency scale (6.9 on the United States Geological
Survey scale). Six thousand four hundred people died and 240,956 houses collapsed. Great Hanshin Earthquake
Restoration, KINKI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAU, MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT,
http://www.kkr.mlit.go.jp/en/topics_hanshin.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
12

Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, as amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 34, para. 1.

13

Id.

14

Id. art. 36.

15

Id. arts. 40, 42. See also Structure of Basic Disaster Management Plan, CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF
JAPAN, http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/keikaku/english/disaster_management_plan.html (last visited
Aug. 13, 2013).
16

CABINET OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 11 (Feb. 2011), http://www.bousai.
go.jp/1info/pdf/saigaipanf_e.pdf.
17

Disaster Response Basic Law art. 105, as amended by Law No. 132 of 1995.

The Law Library of Congress

4

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Just after the Great East Japan Earthquake, Prime Minister Naoto Kan established the
Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Response and held the first meeting within one hour 18
based on the Disaster Response Basic Law. 19 The Prime Minister is the manager and allministers are members of the Headquarters. 20 The Headquarters coordinates national agencies
and local governments, and oversees implementation of emergency measures. 21 Under theDisaster Response Basic Law, prefectures can ask the national government to dispatch ministry
officials to assist with emergency measures. 22 Municipal governments can arrange for the shortstay in other municipalities of residents who cannot stay in their homes. 23 A municipal
government can request that a prefectural government supply emergency supplies, and aprefecture government can request the same from the national government. 24
The government tried to “do everything it could do” after the earthquake, including dispatching
Self-Defense Forces teams, police emergency units, fire fighters, and emergency medical
teams. 25 Designated shelters were opened up in accordance with local government disasterplans. 26 The government sent food, water, blankets, medicine, and toiletries to shelters. 27
However, the Prime Minister did not declare a state of emergency. 28 When an emergency notice
is issued, the Cabinet is authorized to issue cabinet orders if the Diet is closed or the House ofRepresentatives is dissolved in order to control sales and the transfer of necessities and decide
prices of goods or services that are necessary for emergency measures and the stability ofpeople’s daily lives. 29 When the earthquake hit Japan, the Diet was in session. Therefore,
issuance of an emergency notice would not have made a practical difference.
The Disaster Response Basic Law states that, when a natural disaster is designated as anespecially severe one by the Cabinet, the national government may grant money to local
governments to pursue projects to restore destroyed areas and help victims in accordance with
18

Press Release, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Public Relations Office, Headquarters for Emergency Disaster
Response for the 2011 Tohoku – Pacific Ocean Earthquake (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/kan/actions/201103/11touhoku_jisin_e.html.
19

Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, as amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 28-2.

20

Id. art. 28-3.

21

Id. art. 28-4.

22

Id. art. 29.

23

Id. arts. 86-2, 86-3.

24

Id. art. 86-7.

25

Kanbō chōkan kisha happyō [Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release], Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,
Kinkyū saigai taisaku honbu ni tsuite [Regarding Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Response] (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201103/11_p3.html.
26

Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 42.

27

Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Dai 8 kai me no kinkyū saigai
taisaku honbu [The 8th Emergency Measures Headquarters Meeting] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
tyoukanpress/201103/13_p4.html.
28

Disaster Response Basic Law art. 105, as amended by Law No. 132 of 1995.

29

Id. art. 109, para. 1.

The Law Library of Congress

5Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

other laws enacted for this purpose. 30 To that end, the Act on Special Financial Aid to Respondto Severe Disasters was enacted in 1962. 31 The day after the Great East Japan Earthquake, theCabinet decided to apply this Act to the disaster, and a Cabinet Order was issued on March 13,
2011. 32 The Cabinet usually waits for reports on damage from a disaster before it decides toapply the Act. The earthquake, however, was obviously so severe that the Cabinet made a swift
decision without waiting for reports from areas hit by the disaster. 33 The Cabinet decided toprovide financial support for construction to restore infrastructure, farmlands, and cattle farming
and aquaculture, as well as small- and mid-size enterprise insurance. 34
B. Disaster Rescue Law
Prefectures, in place of the national government, are supposed to conduct rescue activities under
the Disaster Rescue Law. 35 Rescue activities under this Law include providing shelter, food, andwater; providing or lending clothes, bedding, and other necessities; providing medical services;
rescuing people from dangerous places; the initial repair of houses; etc. 36 Cash can be provided
to persons in need of support, instead of goods and services, when the prefecture governor
decides it is appropriate in a specific situation. 37 Designated government agencies can orderbusinesses to hold or provide goods that are necessary to rescue activities in accordance with adisaster management plan. 38
A few days after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government realized that this earthquake
was so large-scale and destructive that the system provided under the Disaster Rescue Law did
not fit the situation. 39 Under the Law, prefectures and municipalities take primary responsibility
for rescue activities and are responsible for rescue costs. 40 Prefectures are financially prepared30

Id. arts. 96–99, as amended by Act No. 41 of 2012.

31

Gekijin saigai ni taisho suru tame no tokubetsu no zaisei enjo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial Aid
to Respond to Severe Disasters], Act No. 150 of 1962, last amended by No. 67 of 2012, art. 1.
32

Cabinet Order on Designation of Measures Applied for the Great East Japan Earthquake, Cabinet Order No. 18
of 2011.
33

CABINET OFFICE, BŌSAI HAKUSHO [DISASTER PREVENTION WHITE P APER] 2011, ch. 3, § 1, http://www.bousai.
go.jp/kaigirep/hakusho/h23/bousai2011/html/honbun/1b_1h_3s_1.htm.
34

Id.

35

Saigai kyūjo hō [Disaster Rescue Law], Act No. 118 of 1947, last amended by Law No. 65 of 2010, art. 2.

36

Id. art. 23, para. 1.

37

Id. art. 23, para. 2.

38

Id. art. 23-2. Disaster management plans have been established under the Disaster Response Basic Law.

39

Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Dai 8 kai me no kinkyū saigai
taisaku honbu, dai 6 kai me no genshiryoku saigai taisaku honbu, dai 1 kai me no denryoku jukyū kinkyū taisaku
honbu, dai 2 kai no keizai jōsei ni kansuru kentō kaigō ni tsuite (Fukuyama naikaku kanbō fuku chōkan) [Regarding
8th Emergency Disaster Headquarters Meeting, 6th Nuclear Disaster Headquarters Meeting, First Emergency
Headquarter on Supply and Demand of Electricity Meeting and 2nd Conference on Economy Situation Meeting(Vice Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama)] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/
201103/13_p4.html.
40

Disaster Rescue Law art. 33.

The Law Library of Congress

6

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011by reserving 5% of general-purpose local taxes for the Disaster Rescue Fund. 41 Somemunicipalities, however, were almost entirely destroyed by the tsunami and therefore could notconduct rescue activities. Also, the burden of costs for local governments was more than
expected. The national government usually refunds half of such costs, but if the ratio of the cost
per the prefecture’s specified tax revenues goes up, the national government refunds up to 90%of the costs. 42 On March 13, 2011, the national government announced that it would take theinitiative for rescue activities not covered by the Disaster Rescue Law and assume all financial
responsibilities for such rescue activities. 43
The number of earthquake and tsunami victims who were evacuated to shelters reached 40,146 atits peak. The Emergency Disaster Headquarters established the Disaster Victims’ Lives Support
Special Headquarters for specialized administration of distribution of food and goods to such
victims on March 20, 2011. 44 The Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Special Headquarters wastransformed into the Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team on May 9, 2011. 45
C. Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Just after the earthquake, a fifteen-meter (approximately forty-nine foot) tsunami disabled thepower supply of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reactors. The emergency core coolingsystems stopped working due to a lack of electricity. Then Prime Minister Kan declared anuclear emergency and established the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. 46 Later thatnight, he directed two municipalities near the Fukushima Plant to order residents who lived
within three kilometers (approximately 1.86 miles) of the plant to evacuate. 47
These measures were based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness that was enacted after the Tōkaimura Criticality Accident in 1999. 48 That accident“was caused by bringing together too much uranium enriched to a relatively high level, causing a
41

Id. arts. 37, 38.

42

Id. art. 36.

43

Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, supra note 39.

44

Hisaisha seikatsu shien chīmu: taisaku no keika (Jimu kiroku) [Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team: Timelineof Measures (Administrative Records)] 1 (July 22, 2011), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/3-info/3-ugoki/jimu.pdf.
45

Hisaisha taisaku shien chīmu ni tsuite [Regarding Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team], CABINET OFFICE,
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-gaiyo.html.
46

Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Genshiryoku kinkyū jitai sengenni tsuite [Regarding Declaration of Nuclear Emergency Situation] (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
tyoukanpress/201103/11_p3.html.
47

Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Genshiryoku saigai taisaku
tokubetsu sochi hō no kitei ni motoduku jūmin e no hinan shiji ni tsuite [Regarding the Evacuation Order for
Residents Based on Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness] (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201103/11_p4.html.
48

Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness], Act No. 156 of 1999, last amended by Act No. 118 of 2006, English translation available on Japanese
Law Translation (maintained by the Ministry of Justice), at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=106.

The Law Library of Congress

7

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

‘criticality’ (a limited uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction), which continued intermittently for 20
hours.” 49 Two workers from the Tōkaimura Plant died. 50 This law aimed to(1) take swift initial actions after a nuclear disaster,(2) coordinate national and local government activities,(3) enhance the emergency management system of the national government, and(4) make nuclear business organizations responsible for a disaster. 51
Based on the Act, a nuclear operator must establish an on-site organization for nuclear
emergency preparedness and place a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager at each nuclear
site. 52 When a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager finds or is notified that a radiationdose above 5 millisieverts (mSv 53) per hour 54 has been detected near the border of an area wherea nuclear site is located, or that a certain level of radiation is detected somewhere else as
specified in the Cabinet Order, he or she must immediately notify the competent ministers, thecompetent prefectural governor, the competent mayor of the municipality, and the neighboring
prefectural governors of the finding. 55 When a minister finds that a nuclear emergency situation
has occurred, he or she must immediately report necessary information concerning the situation
to the Prime Minister. 56 The Prime Minister must then immediately give the public a nuclear
emergency notice. 57 The Act obligates the competent ministers to report abnormal levels ofradiation and make a recommendation to the Prime Minister. Upon recommendation, the Prime
Minister issues a directive to the prefecture governor(s) and heads of municipalities in theaffected area. 58
49

Tokaimura Criticality Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (July 2007), http://world-nuclear.org/info/Safetyand-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Tokaimura-Criticality-Accident/.
50

Id.

51

Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Special Measures Law to Counter Nuclear Disaster],
Genshiryokiu bōsai kiso yōgo shū [Basic Dictionary on Nuclear Disaster Prevention], Kankyō bōsai N netto[Environment & Disaster Prevention N Net], http://www.bousai.ne.jp/vis/bousai_kensyu/glossary/ke21.html (lastvisited June 28, 2013).
52

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness arts. 8, 9.

53

A sievert is a weighted measure of the absorbed quantity of various types of radiation. It is often expressed inmillisieverts (1/1000 of a sievert) in connection with exposure by humans. See Radiation Doses, CANADIANNUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/readingroom/radiation/radiation_doses.cfm (lastvisited Aug. 13, 2013).
54

Genshiryoku saigai taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō shikō rei [Enforcement Order of Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness], Cabinet Order No. 195 of 2000, art. 4, para. 1.
55

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, art. 10, last amended by Law No. 118 of
2006. Act No. 47 of 2012 amended the persons/entities to whom the situation is to be reported from “competent
minister” to “the Prime Minister and the Nuclear Regulatory Committee.” See also Enforcement Order of Act on
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Order No. 195 of 2000, art. 4, para. 4.
56

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness art. 15, para. 1, last amended by Law No.
118 of 2006.
57

Id. art. 15, para. 2.

58

Id. art. 15, para. 3.

The Law Library of Congress8

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Soon after the earthquake, then Prime Minister Kan, as head of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, issued the following directives:
March 12: Residents who live within a ten-kilometer radius of the Fukushima Daini Power
Plant, 59 and residents who live within a twenty-kilometer radius of the Fukushima
Daiichi Power Plant were ordered to evacuate the area. 60
March 15: Residents who live between a twenty-kilometer and a thirty-kilometer radius fromthe Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant were ordered to stay inside of buildings. 61
As the situation at the power plants changed, the directives changed as well. 62 On April 21, 2011,
the Prime Minister issued a directive that designated the area within a twenty-kilometer radius of
the Fukushima Daiichi Plant as a “warn-off” area and directed the heads of local governments torestrict people other than emergency workers from entering the area without the municipalities’
permission. 63 On the same day, the area near the Fukushima Daini Plant where residents had
been directed to evacuate was shrunk from within ten kilometers to within eight kilometers fromthe plant. 64
On April 22, 2011, the government cancelled the directive that had asked residents in an area of
between a twenty-kilometer radius and a thirty-kilometer radius from the Fukushima Daiichi
Power Plant to stay inside of buildings. 65 Instead, the government set new designated areas.
One was a “planned evacuation area” where the total accumulation of radiation per year is
expected to reach 20 mSv, in which residents were required to evacuate within one month. The
other addressed “areas prepared for emergency evacuation” where the possibility of radiation
exposure cannot be eliminated, depending on the situation of the power plant, and thegovernment has asked residents to be ready to evacuate at any time. 66
59

Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 12, 2011, 17:39 [time designation], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
kikikanri/jisin/20110311miyagi/20110312siji21.pdf.
60

Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 12, 2011, 18:25, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kikikanri/jisin/20110311
miyagi/20110312siji11.pdf.
61

Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Mar. 15, 2011, 11:00, http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20110315012/201103150122.pdf.
62

See Kako no hinan shiji ni tsuite [Past Evacuation Directives], METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/hinan_history.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). See also Hinan shiji to no keii [History of Evacuation Directives,
etc.], FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE, http://wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/download/1/01240331.pdf (last visited
Aug. 13, 2013).
63

Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Head of Fukushima First and Second Nuclear Plants Disaster Headquarters,
Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/20110421110001shiji.pdf; Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Act No. 156 of 1999, last amended by Act No. 118 of 2006, art. 20, para 3.
64

Shiji [Directive], Prime Minister, Apr. 21, 2011, 11:00, http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/shiji_0421_
002.pdf.
65

Shiji [Directive], Head of Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Apr. 22, 2011, 9:44,
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110422004/20110422004-3.pdf.
66

Id.; Nuclear Disaster Victim’s Lives Support Team, “Keikakuteki hinan kuiki” oyobi “Kinkyūji hinan junbi kuiki”
no settei ni tsuite [Regarding Designation of “Planned Evacuation Area” and “Prepared for Emergency Evacuation”](Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110422004/20110422004-2.pdf (in Japanese).

The Law Library of Congress

9Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

On June 16, 2011, the government decided that residents would be notified of the locations
where the total accumulation of radiation per year was expected to reach 20 mSv. 67 Because
residents do not stay in the same location all the time, the actual radiation accumulation per
resident would be lower than the level where broader areas were subject to radiation. Therefore,
evacuation from the specified locations was recommended, but not required by thegovernment. 68 The designation of “areas prepared for emergency evacuation” was cancelled on
September 30, 2011, when the government recognized that the possibility of accidents inside thenuclear plants was low. 69
The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters confirmed that the nuclear reactors had reacheda state of cold shutdown in December 2011, 70 and Prime Minister Noda announced that thenuclear crisis was under control. 71 As the Fukushima disaster came under control, thegovernment adopted an annual effective radiation dose of 20 mSv as a limit on exposure toradiation for residents and decided to review the designation of restricted areas. 72 As a result ofthat review, on March 30, 2012, certain areas within a twenty kilometer radius of the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plan were removed from the warn-off zone. 73 At the same time, thegovernment reclassified the planned evacuation area (the area where evacuation was directed).
The government designated the areas in which the radiation level was below 20 mSv per year as“areas prepared for cancellation of the evacuation directive (Hinan shiji kaijo junbi kuiki).” Inthese areas, cancellation of the designation of “planned evacuation area” is expected in the near
future, after infrastructure is restored and decontamination of locales with radiation has
progressed. 74
The government also designated a “restricted residential use area” in which the radiation level isbetween 20 and 50 mSv per year. Residents of that area are permitted to stop by their houses orother places within the area if they have a reason to go there, but they must leave after the67

Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Regarding Measures for Specified Spots Where the Total Accumulation ofRadiation per Year is Expected to Reach 20 mSv (June 16, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/06/20110616
007/20110616007-2.pdf (in Japanese).
68

Regarding “Planned Evacuation Areas” and “Specified Spots Where Evacuation Was Recommended”, METI,
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/06/20110616007/20110616007.html (in Japanese; last visited June 28, 2013).
69

Nuclear Disaster Headquarters, Regarding Cancellation of Areas Prepared for Emergency Evacuation (Sept. 30,2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110930015/20110930015-2.pdf (in Japanese).
70

Summary of the 22nd Meeting of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/singi/genshiryoku/pdf/gensai_gaiyo_22.pdf (in Japanese).
71

Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/
statement/201112/16kaiken_e.html.
72

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Regarding Basic Ideas on Review of Warn-Off Area (Keikai kuiki)
and Emergency Evacuation Preparation Areas (Hinan shiji kuiki) upon Completion of Step 2 and Future Agenda, at
1–4 (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/111226_01a.pdf (in Japanese).
73

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Regarding Decision Based on the Review on Designation of theWarn-Off Zone and of Emergency Evacuation Preparation Areas (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/
earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120330_02a.pdf (in Japanese).
74

Regarding Notions on Activities in the New Evacuation Directive Areas, Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Lives Support
Team (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120330_02h.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress

10Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

purpose of the visit is achieved. 75 The government further designated those areas in which theradiation level is over 50 mSv per year and in which the level is not likely to go below 20 mSv
per year as “difficult-to-return-home” areas. Entry to such areas is more restricted and protective
equipment is required for entry. 76
Since July 2012, the government has allowed certain kinds of businesses to operate in the“restricted residential use area.” Such businesses include (1) businesses that are essential forkeeping or creating employment, such as local manufacturing businesses; and (2) businesses thatare required while the reconstruction plan is implemented, such as banks, gas stations, and trash
removal services. 77 Employers must pay special attention to employees’ radiation exposure andminimize such exposure, however. 78
In addition to the required or recommended evacuations, many persons voluntarily evacuatedareas due to their fear of a high amount of radiation exposure. 79
D. Electricity Shortage and Measures Taken Pursuant to TEPCO Power Supply Contract
A large number of electricity generating stations sustained damage from the Great East Japan
Earthquake, including the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Therefore, it was expected that the
supply of electricity would fall short of demand in the Tohoku region and Tokyo metropolitan
area. 80 The Prime Minister established the Emergency Headquarters on Supply and Demand of
Electricity on March 13, 2011, to address this contingency. 81 A planned power outage wasdiscussed in the Headquarters’ first meeting. 82 The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
implemented planned power outages in areas near Tokyo on March 14, 2011, in order to avoid

75

Id.

76

Id. The current map of designated areas is available on METI’s website, at http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/
nuclear/pdf/130807/130807_01f.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
77

Regarding Exceptional Business Continuing and Reopening in the Restricted Residential Use Areas, Nuclear
Disaster Victims’ Lives Support Team & Nuclear Disaster On-Site Headquarters (June 18, 2012), http://www.meti.
go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/20120618_01a.pdf (in Japanese).
78

Id.

79

Fukushima kennai ni okeru jishu hinan no genjo [State of Voluntary Evacuees in Fukushima], FUKUSHIMA NO
SHINRO [PATH OF FUKUSHIMA] (Aug. 2012), http://fkeizai.in.arena.ne.jp/pdf/cyousa/cyousa_2012_08_1.pdf.
80

Message from the Prime Minister, supra note 5.

81

Announcement, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Denryoku jukyū ni kansuru kentō kaigō no kaisai nit
suite [Concerning Establishment of Conference on Supply and Demand of Electricity] (Mar. 13, 2011, last amended
Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/electricity_supply/kousei.pdf.
82

Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Kongo no denryoku jukyū oyobi keikaku teiden ni tsuite [Regarding
Supply and Demand of Electricity and Planned Power Outage From Now On] (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/singi/electricity_supply/0313_electricity_supply_01_00.pdf (copy and paste link into browser).

The Law Library of Congress11Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

massive blackouts in its service area. 83 This measure was taken based on the power supply
contract between TEPCO and its customers. 84
The government could have taken similar actions based on the Electricity Business Law, but did
not do so. That Law states that, when a shortage of electricity supply adversely affects thenational economy and the public’s living standard, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
may restrict the use of electricity supplied by an electricity utility firm by limiting power usage
or peak load, by specifying the purpose of use or the date and time when power usage should be
stopped, or by restricting the receipt of electricity from an electric utility firm by limiting thecapacity for receiving electricity. 85 Experts explained that it would take too much time to
implement restrictions on electric power use by businesses and residences based on theElectricity Business Law. 86
The government did impose restrictions on large businesses from July to September 2011. Largeelectricity customers who had contracted for a supply of 500 kilowatts or more and concluded
electricity supply-demand contracts directly with TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power Company
were required not to exceed 85% of their maximum electric power use per hour over the previous
year (a 15% reduction of maximum use, compared with the previous year). 87
E. Food Sanitation Law and Related Measures
Within a few days of the onset of the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, government
tests detected higher radiation levels in spinach and milk that were produced near the nuclear
plants. 88 There were no legally binding standards for levels of radiation in food in Japan at thattime. The Food Sanitation Law, however, has a provision that prohibits the sale, use, or supplyof foods that are poisonous or harmful for human consumption. 89 On March 17, 2011, theMinistry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) issued a notice that specified provisional
standard values for radiation levels in food. 90 The MHLW tentatively adopted the Indices
83

TEPCO Begins Power Blackouts, JAPAN TODAY (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/
view/tokyo-power-outages-to-start-later-than-planned-trains-reduce-services.
84

Keikaku teiden, kiki taiō, tōden makase [Planned Power Outage, Response to Crisis, Left to TEPCO], YOMIURI
NEWSPAPER (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/special/jishintokeizai/jtk110315_10.htm.
85

Denki jigyō hō [Electricity Business Law], Law No. 170 of 1964, last amended by Act No. 47 of 2012, art. 27,
translated in http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=51.
86

YOMIURI NEWSPAPER, supra note 84.

87

Denki jigyō hō ni motoduku denryoku shiyō seigen no hakko ni tsuite [Regarding Implementation of Restriction ofElectric Power Use Based on the Electric Business Act], METI (June 30, 2011), http://www.meti.go.jp/
setsuden/pdf/seigenrei.pdf. See also Regarding Putting into Effect the Restriction of Electricity Use Based on
Article 27 of the Electricity Business Act, METI, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/electricity/
restriction.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
88

Fredrik Dahl, Japan Mulls Fukushima Food Sale Ban: IAEA, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/03/19/us-japan-nuclear-food-idUSTRE72I1X120110319.
89

Shokuhin eisei hō [Food Sanitation Law], Law No. 233 of 1947, amended by Law No. 49 of 2009, art. 6, item 2.

90

Press Release, MHLW, Handling of Food Contaminated by Radioactivity (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.
jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001558e-img/2r98520000015apy.pdf; Handling of Food Contaminated by Radioactivity,

The Law Library of Congress

12

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion that was a part of the Nuclear Safety
Commission of Japan’s (NSC’s) regulatory guideline, Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear
Facilities. 91 The NSC issued this guideline in 1980 in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident
in the United States and updated it in 1998 and 2000. 92 The following table reflects selectedparts of the Indices.
Table 1: Indices Relating to Limits on Food and Drink Ingestion (Excerpts)
NuclideIndex Values Relating to Ingestion Limits in Guidelines for Coping with
Nuclear Facility Disasters (Bq93/kg)

Radioactive iodine

Drinking water

300(Representative radionuclides among mixed
radio-nuclides: 131I):

Milk, dairy products

300

Vegetables (except root
vegetables and tubers)

2,000Radioactive cesium

Drinking water

200

Milk, dairy products

200

Vegetables

500

Grains500

Meat, eggs, fish, etc.

500

Source: Data excerpted from Nuclear Safety Commission, Genshiryoku shisetsu tō no bōsai taisaku ni tsuite[Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities] 23 (June 1980, last amended Aug. 2010),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/anzen/sonota/
houkoku/bousai220823.pdf.

Food Safety Dept. Notice No. 0317-3 (Mar. 17, 2011), MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852
000001558e-img/2r98520000015av4.pdf.
91

Nuclear Safety Commission, Genshiryoku shisetsu tō no bōsai taisaku ni tsuite [Emergency Preparedness for
Nuclear Facilities] 23 (June 1980, last amended Aug. 2010), http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/anzen/sonota/
houkoku/bousai220823.pdf.
92

Shinichi Suga and Ryushi Ichikawa, Bōsai shishin ni okeru inshokubutsu sesshu seigen shihyō no kaitei ni tsuite[On the Revision of Control Index Levels on the Ingestion of Food and Water in the Guidelines for Radiological
Emergency Preparedness and Countermeasures in Japan], 35 HOKEN BUTSURI 4, 449 (2000), https://www.jstage.jst.
go.jp/article/jhps1966/35/4/35_4_449/_pdf.
93

A “becqueral” (Bq), one of several units used to measure radioactivity, “represents a rate of radioactive decay
equal to 1 disintegration per second.” Glossary, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/becquerel-bq.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012).

The Law Library of Congress

13

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Based on the general power to implement emergency measures in cases of nuclear disaster, thePrime Minister, as head of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, issued instructions togovernors of the relevant prefectures on March 21, 2011, concerning restrictions on the
distribution of food items with radiation levels exceeding the provisional limit values. 94 First,
the government instructed that spinach and one other leafy vegetable produced in Fukushima andthree more prefectures, and raw milk produced in Fukushima prefecture were not to be
distributed. Many more instructions have followed. 95 Some of these restrictions were latercancelled when the detected radiation levels at three consecutive weekly examinations proved to
be lower than the upper limit.96
At the same time, the government started deliberations on permissible radiation levels in various
foods. Establishing these standards is a complicated and time-consuming process involving
government councils and different agencies, and conformity with various related regulations
is required:•

On March 20, 2011, the MHLW requested that the Food Safety Commission conduct anassessment of the effect of radioactive nuclides in food on human health. 97 When setting
standards for food safety under article 6, item 2 of the Food Sanitation Law, the MHLW must
consult with the Food Safety Commission. 98 The Food Safety Commission submitted its
Risk Assessment Report on Radioactive Nuclides in Foods to the MHLW on October 27,
2011. 99 The Food Safety Commission concluded that more than 100 mSv of the extra
cumulative effective doses (cumulative effective dose of radiation during a person’s lifetime)of food could increase the risk of negative effects on health. 100 This mSv level was much
lower than the assumption that the tentative indices were based on, which had indicated that
more than 500 mSv of the extra cumulative effective doses would be harmful to humans. 101

94

Press Release, MHLW, Shokuhin no shukka seigen ni tsuite [Regarding Distribution Restriction on Foods] (Mar.
21, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000015p8a.html; Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Law No. 156 of 1999, amended by Law No. 118 of 2006, art. 20, para. 3.
95

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has compiled all restrictions and cancellations on its website,
http://www.maff.go.jp/noutiku_eikyo/mhlw2.html (in Japanese; last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
96

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Kensa keikaku, shukka seigen to no hinmoku kuiki no settei kaijo nokangae kata [Regarding Basic Policy on Examination Plan, and Establishment and Cancellation of Distribution
Restriction], http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000017tmu-att/2r98520000017ts1.pdf. The basic policy
was amended in June and August 2011. Amended policies are available on the MHLW website, at
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001h0ni-att/2r9852000001h0tr.pdf (June 2011), andhttp://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001lbnq-att/2r9852000001lbu3.pdf (Aug. 2011).
97

Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu no aratana kijunchi ni tsuite [Regarding New Indices of Radioactive
Substances in Food], MHLW, at 14, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyoku/iyaku/syoku-anzen/iken/dl/120117-103-01.pdf.
98

Shokuhin anzen kihon hō [ Food Safety Basic Law], Law No. 48 of 2003, art. 24, para. 1, item 1.

99

FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION, ABSTRACT, RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT ON RADIOACTIVE NUCLIDES IN FOODS (Oct.
2011),
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/emerg/abstract_risk_assessment_report.pdf.
100

Id.
101

Shokuhin no shin kijunchi nenkan 1 miri sīberuto ni hikisage e [Reduce the Limit in Food to 1mSv per Year],
SANKEI NEWSPAPER (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with author).

The Law Library of Congress

14

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011•

The Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare asked the Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food
Sanitation Council to draft the standards of permissible levels of radioactive nuclides infoods, based on the Food Safety Commission’s conclusion, on October 28, 2011. 102 The
Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures branch of the Council issued draft standards on
December 22, 2011. 103•

The Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare then asked the Radiation Council of the Ministryof Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) whether those standards
were appropriate under the Law Concerning Technical Standards of Radiation Hazards
Prevention. 104 Any government agency must ask the Council’s opinion before they set
technical standards that relate to radiation hazards. 105 Though some members of the
Radiation Council stated during the meetings that the new standards were too strict, theCouncil determined on February 17, 2012, that the new standards were appropriate. 106•

Since all consultation with other agencies was complete, the Radiation Council and thePharmaceutical Affairs and Food Sanitation Council moved to adopt the draft standards thatwere drafted by its branch committee and submitted them to the Minister of Health, Laborand Welfare on February 24, 2012. 107•

The MHLW implemented all necessary amendments to its Ordinance and Notifications on
standards for milk and milk products and for food and food additives on March 15, 2012, andannounced it would make the new standards effective on April 1, 2012. 108 The new upper
limits of cesium in foods are as follows:

102

Food Sanitation Law, Act No. 233 of 1947, amended by Act No. 49 of 2009, art. 11, para. 1; Shigeki Yamamoto,Yakuji •shokuhin eisei shingikai, shokuhin eisei bunkakai hōshasei busshitu taisaku bukai hōkoku ni tsuite[Regarding a Report from Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures Branch, Food Sanitation Sub-council,
Pharmaceutical Affairs • Food Sanitation Council] (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/
2r98520000023nbs-att/2r98520000023ng2.pdf.
103

Shokuhin chū no hōshasei bussitsu ni kakaru kikaku kijun no settei ni tsuite [Regarding Establishing Standards ofRadioactive Nuclides in Foods], Radioactive Nuclides Countermeasures Branch, Food Sanitation Sub-council,
Pharmaceutical Affairs • Food Sanitation Council] at 2 (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/
2r98520000023nbs-att/2r98520000023ng2.pdf.
104

Press Release, MHLW, Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu ni kakaru kijun chi no settei ni kansuru hōshasenshingikai e no shimon ni tsuite [Regarding a Request for Advice from the Radiation Council Concerning Indices ofRadioactive Nuclides in Foods] (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001z9vp.html.
105

Hōshasen shōgai bōshi no gijutsu teki kijun ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning Technical Standards ofRadiation Hazards Prevention], Act No. 162 of 1958, art. 6.
106

Shokuhin no hōshasen ryō shin kijunchi an [New Indices of Radiation Levels in Foods], SANKEI NEWSPAPER(Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
107

Kōsei rōdō shō, Iyaku shokuhin kyoku, Shokuhin anzen bu [Food Safety Sec., Pharmaceutical Affairs and Food
Sanitation Dept., MHLW], Shokuhin chū no hōshasei busshitsu no kikaku kijun no settei ni tsuite [Regarding
Establishment of New Standards on Radioactive Nuclides in Foods ], MHLW (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000023zsw-att/2r98520000023zzb.pdf.
108

Food Safety Dept. Notice No. 0315-1 (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/dl/
tuuchi_120316.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress

15

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011
Table 2: Limits for Radioactive Cesium in Foods
Category

Limit (Bq/kg)

Drinking water

10

Milk

50

General Foods

100

Infant Foods

50

Source: Department of Food Safety, Pharmaceutical & Food Safety Bureau, MHLW, New Standard Limits forRadionuclides in Foods, at 3, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/new_standard.pdf (provisionaltranslation; last visited July 8, 2013).

The Japanese standards are well below maximum levels allowed by international safety
standards, as fixed by the Codex Alimentarius international standards body. 109

III. Victim Support
Laws to support disaster victims were also enacted, and the government implemented various
measures to support disaster victims’ daily lives. The followings measures reflect some ofthose efforts:
A. Tracking Evacuees
Many residents who lived in the area hit by the disaster were required to move, temporarily or
for a long period of time, due to destruction of houses and neighborhoods or radiation levels. In
order to distribute grants and donated items or provide administrative notice to residents who
were evacuating, municipal governments needed to know their whereabouts. In Japan,
administrative services are provided through municipal governments for their residents.
Residents must report any changes to their specified information to the municipal governments,and municipal governments must register all resident addresses in the “resident basic books.”110
The system, however, was not made for tracking evacuees. There were also evacuees who did
not know whether or when they would be able to return home, and therefore did not report theirchange of residence. An evacuees’ information management system was needed. The Ministryof Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) built such a system to enable the municipal
governments that were affected by the nuclear disaster to track and locate their former residents

109

Codex Secretariat, Fact Sheet on Codex Guideline Levels for Radionuclides in Foods Contaminated Following a
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (May 2, 2011), http://www.fao.org/crisis/27242-0bfef658358a6ed53980a
5eb5c80685ef.pdf.
110

Resident Basic Book Act, Act No. 81 of 1967, amended by Act No. 102 of 2012, art. 3.

The Law Library of Congress

16

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

who had evacuated from their hometowns in March 2011. 111 The MIC sent a notice to local
governments and instructed them on how to report evacuees on April 12, 2011. 112
Concerning nuclear disaster victims, in August 2011, the Diet enacted the Act on Exceptions of
Administrative Matters for Nuclear Disaster Evacuees. 113 The Act established a special
procedure that enables a local government in whose jurisdiction a nuclear disaster evacuee
resides to cover specified administrative services for another local government in whose
jurisdiction the evacuee is registered in the resident basic book. Upon request of the local
government for the jurisdiction where an evacuee resides, the MIC may issue a notification
specifying what administrative matter the local government for the place of the evacuee’s
residence may cover. 114 Local governments do not have to negotiate and make agreements one
by one. Examples of matters that can be covered by these agreements include elderly living
assistance, vaccines for children, and nursery school enrollment. 115
The government reported that the total number of evacuees was 124,594 as of June 15, 2011,116
and 91,552, as of July 20, 2011. 117 These numbers did not include evacuees who secured
residences, such as rental houses. In November 2011, the government counted the number ofthese evacuees as well and reported the number of total evacuees as approximately 330,000. 118
Currently, the Reconstruction Agency is reporting the number of evacuees monthly. 119 As of

111

Seiji Kanda, Doing Right by the Evacuees, ASAHI NEWSPAPER (Mar. 9, 2013), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/
special/prometheus_futaba/AJ201303090015?page=3.
112

Regarding Cooperation by Local Governments in order to Make Evacuees’ Original Municipalities Know the
Whereabouts of Those Who Evacuated Due to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Notice), So-gyo-ju No. 62 (Apr. 12,2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000110312.pdf (in Japanese).
113

Higashi nihon daishinsai ni okeru genshiryoku hatsudensho no jiko ni yoru saigai ni taisho suru tame no hinan
jumin ni kakaru jimu shori no tokurei oyobi jusho iten sha ni kakaru sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Exceptions of
Administrative Matters on Evacuees and Measures on Evacuees Who Moved Residences in Response to Disaster
Caused by Nuclear Plant Accident after the Great East Japan Earthquake (Act on Exceptions of Administrative
Matters for Nuclear Disaster Evacuees)], Act No. 98 of 2011.
114

Local Autonomy Administration Dept., MIC, Summary of the Act on Exceptions of Administrative Matters on
Nuclear Disaster Evacuees (Aug. 2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000124807.pdf (in Japanese).
115

See, e.g., Regarding Designated Municipalities and Exceptional Administrative Matters Based on the Act on
Exceptions of Administrative Matters on Nuclear Disaster Evacuees, MIC (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.soumu.
go.jp/menu_kyotsuu/important/48479.html.
116

Cabinet Office, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (June 15, 2011),
http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/6-hinansha.pdf.
117

Cabinet Office, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (July 20, 2011),
http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/6-hinansha_110720.pdf.
118

Great East Japan Reconstruction Headquarters Secretariat, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of
Evacuees Nationwide] (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20111124hinansha.pdf.
119

Reconstruction Agency, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide],
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/post.html (last visited July 8, 2013).

The Law Library of Congress

17

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

August 2013, about two and half years after the earthquake, the number of evacuees wasapproximately 290,000. 120
B. Financial Grants
Pursuant to Japanese law, the eligible family-member survivors of a person who died from adisaster of a certain scale can receive condolence money. 121 The amount may vary depending on
the municipality because municipalities determine the details of disaster condolence money. 122
Payments are typically 5 million yen (about US$50,000) or less. 123 Disaster victims who aredisabled by a disease or injury caused by the disaster may also receive condolence money. 124
Households that sustained damages to their houses can also receive money from the prefectures.
There had been arguments as to whether public money should be granted for personal property
losses caused by natural disasters. The Diet reached the conclusion that it is permissible toprovide such payments because houses are one of the basics of people’s lives, it is important topromote recovery from the loss of houses, and reconstruction of houses is important for thearea. 125 A household that has lost a house and rebuilds it can receive up to 3 million yen (about
US$30,000). 126 A designated public corporation processes the grants. 127 The national
government pays for half of each grant. 128
C. Special Loans
Where a head of household is injured and needs treatment for his or her injury for more than one
month, or where a house is destroyed entirely or in part, a disaster victim support loan isavailable for a family if it satisfies applicable annual income limit requirements. 129 The
120

Reconstruction Agency, Zenkoku no hinansha tō no kazu [Number of Evacuees Nationwide] (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/20130822_hinansha.pdf. Number of evacuees arereported monthly on the Reconstruction Agency’s website, at http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/post.html.
121

Saigai chōikin no shikyū tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others], Law
No. 82 of 1973, last amended by Law No. 86 of 2011, art. 3.
122

Id.
123

CABINET OFFICE, HISAISHA SHIEN NI KANSURU KAKUSHU SEIDO NO GAIYO (HIGASHI NIHON DAISHINSAI HEN)
[SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS CONCERNING DISASTER VICTIM SUPPORT (FOR GREAT EAST JAPAN
EARTHQUAKE)] 9 (June 30, 2012), http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/pdf/kakusyuseido.pdf.
124

Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others art. 8.

125

Toshiaki Yagi, Hisaisha no seikatsu saiken shien o meguru rongi to rippo no keii [Discussions and Legislative
Process on Supports on Reconstruction of Disaster Victim’s Livings], RIFARENSU [REFERENCE], Nov. 2007, at 46,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/refer/200711_682/068202.pdf.
126

Hisaisha seikatsu saiken shien hō [Disaster Victims’ Living Reconstruction Support Act], Act No. 66 of 1998,
last amended by Act No. 100 of 2011, art. 3. See also SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS CONCERNING DISASTER
VICTIM SUPPORT, supra note 123, at 22.
127

Disaster Victims’ Living Reconstruction Support Act art. 6.

128

Id. art. 18.

129

Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others, Act No. 82 of 1973, last amended by Law No. 86 of2011, art. 10.

The Law Library of Congress18

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

maximum loan amount is 3.5 million yen (about US$35,000). 130 Usually, the loan term is ten
years and loan interest does not accrue for the first three years. The no-interest term can beextended for up to five years. 131 For the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, special
legislation extended the loan term to thirteen years, and interest does not accrue for the first six
years. This can be extended for up to eight years. 132
Emergency loans for low-income residents were extended for the victims of the Great East Japan
Earthquake. 133 Special treatment and exceptions were also made for public loans for single
mothers. For example, the deadline for repayment of loans by single mothers was extended for
those who were victims of the earthquake. 134
For reconstruction or repair of houses damaged by designated large-scale disasters, the Japan
Housing Finance Agency (JHFA) provides low-interest-rate loans for disaster victims. 135 The
JHFA is the only Japanese government-owned financial institution that specializes in securitizing
housing loans. Even if their houses were not physically damaged, nuclear disaster victims are
eligible for the loan, if their houses are located within the area where the government directed
residents to evacuate. 136
D. Loans for Lost Houses and Existing Business Debts
Individuals or businesses that had debts may need new loans for living or business expenses after
the earthquake, while their old debts still exist and assets that served as collateral for the loans
are gone. For example, some lost houses still have housing loans. If the owners borrow money
for a new house, they will have two loans. This is called the “double debts” problem in Japan.
In June 2011 the government recommended that “the national and local governments, lenders
and borrowers share the pain.” 137 Acting on that recommendation, financial institutions
established a committee to determine how to provide relief for disaster victims with debts. In
July 2011 the committee issued Guidelines for Individual Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, which
130

Enforcement Order of Act on Grants of Disaster Condolence Money and Others, Order No. 374 of 1973, last
amended by Order No. 57 of 2010, art. 7, para. 1.
131

Id. art. 7, para. 2.

132

Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 40 of 2011. See also
Regarding Special Measures on Disaster Support Loans Implemented by Act on Special Financial Supports
Responding to Great East Japan Earthquake, Sha-en 0502, No. 1 (May 2, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/
houdou/2r9852000001bd6k-img/2r9852000001be2t.pdf (in Japanese).
133

Regarding Exception of Welfare Loan, Sha-en 0502, No. 3 (May 2, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
shinsai_jouhou/dl/110502.pdf (in Japanese). See also Disaster Rescue / Life Support, MHLW, http://www.mhlw.
go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/saigaishien.html (in Japanese; last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
134

Notice Regarding Single Mother Welfare Loan System – For Victims of Great East Japan Earthquake, Hokkaido,
http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/hf/kms/boshikafujishin.htm (in Japanese; last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
135

Incorporated Administrative Agency Japan Housing Finance Agency Act, Act No. 82 of 2005, art. 4.

136

Riyō jōken / Yūshi taishō [Conditions /Eligibility], JHF (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.jhf.go.jp/shinsai/joken.html.

137

Nijū saimu mondai e no taiō hōshin [Policy on the Double Debts Problem], at 1 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/20110617taiouhousin.pdf (translation by author).

The Law Library of Congress

19

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011provide guidance on how financial institutions may release or reduce individuals’ debts inaccordance with an out-of-court debt workout. 138
E. Tax Relief
Various measures to reduce the tax burden on disaster victims were implemented. Regarding
local taxes, disaster victims could deduct the loss from the disaster from taxable income in theprevious tax year (ending in December 2010). Also, victims could carry forward such losses forfive years, rather than the usual three years. The areas where the tsunami reached were
exempted from real estate tax. An exemption from the Car Acquisition Tax was created for
those situations where a new car is the replacement for a car damaged or lost during the disaster.
In addition, disaster victims could delay local tax payments. 139 These were temporary measures,
but they were extended through fiscal year 2012. 140
Concerning national taxes, the Act on Reduction, Exemption, and Moratorium of Tax for
Disaster Victims exempts or reduces the income taxes of persons who suffered severe damage totheir houses or other assets and whose annual taxable income is less than 10,000,000 yen (about
US$100,000). 141 Some businesses severely damaged by the disaster may be eligible for reduced
alcohol tax, tobacco tax, oil tax, or other taxes, or the deadline for payment of taxes may be
extended. 142 In addition, a special law was enacted after the earthquake, the Act on Exceptional
Treatment of Disaster Victims Concerning National Taxes, which extended the due date fordisaster victims’ income tax payments. 143 The losses resulting from the earthquake aredeductible from the disaster victim’s income or profit and the tax deduction limit for donations
was increased. 144

138

Research Committee for the Guidelines for Individual Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, Guidelines for Individual
Debtor Out-of-Court Workouts, at 7 (July 2011), http://www.kgl.or.jp/guideline/pdf/guideline2.pdf(unofficial translation).
139

Act on Partial Amendment of the Local Tax Law, Act No. 30 of 2011; Act on Partial Amendment of the Local
Tax Law and Act on Special Financial Support in order to Handle a Disaster of Nuclear Accident Caused by theGreat East Japan Earthquake, Act. No. 96 of 2011. See also Misako Takenouchi, Higashi nihon dai shinsai nikakaru chihōzei zaisei jō no taiō [Great East Japan Earthquake Measures Concerning Local Tax], RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA
No. 318, 12 (July 2011), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/2011
0701012.pdf.
140

Act on Partial Amendment of the Local Tax Law, Act No. 120 of 2011.

141

Saigai higaisha ni taisuru sozei no genmen, chōshū yūyo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Reduction, Exemption andMoratorium of Tax for Disaster Victims], Act No. 175 of 1947, last amended by Act No. 13 of 2009, art. 2.
142

Id. arts. 7 & 8.

143

Higashi nihon daishinsai no hisaisha ni kakaru kokuzei kankei hōritsu no rinji tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on
Exception on National Tax-Related Laws Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake], Law No. 29 of 2011
(Apr. 27, 2011).
144

National Tax Agency, Shinsai tokureihō to no kaisetsu [Explanation of Act on Exceptional Treatment of Disaster
Victims Concerning National Taxes], FINANCE, June 2011, at 23, http://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/
201106d.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress

20Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

F. Unemployment Benefits
Based on the Act on Special Financial Aid to Respond to Severe Disasters, 145 the MHLW issued
a notification that people who cannot work and receive payment because their workplace is not
functioning may be entitled to receive unemployment benefits even though they are nottechnically unemployed because they have not yet lost their jobs.146 In addition, the length oftime for which those who lost their jobs because of the disaster can receive benefits was
extended by sixty days, 147 from 150 to 210 days. For victims who lived in the areas that were hit
by the tsunami or nuclear disaster, the period was extended by ninety days. 148
Media tracked whether people who received the extended unemployment benefits were
employed or not. More than half did not get jobs, even though the number of job openings itself
is high. 149 Some did not look for jobs, and some were waiting for their former employer toreopen or for job openings in positions similar to those they had previously. 150
G. Job Creation
Many disaster victims lost their jobs. The MHLW implemented various measures to help
victims find new employers. 151 For example, the government granted 900,000 yen (about
US$9,000) to small- or medium-sized companies that hired a job-seeking disaster victim bySeptember 30, 2012. 152 The national government also tapped into the existing Employment
145

Gekishin saigai ni taisho suru tame no tokubetsu no zaisei enjo tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial
Aid to Respond to Severe Disasters], Act No. 150 of 1962, last amended by Act No. 31 of 2003, art. 25.
146

Regarding the Exception of Employment Insurance Resulting from Designation of Severe Disaster, MHLW,
Shoku 0313 No. 1 (Mar. 13, 2011), available at http://www.jassa.jp/member/2010/110323sankou_2.pdf(in Japanese).
147

Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 40 of 2011, art. 82.
See also, Regarding enforcement of the Act on Special Financial Supports Responding to the Great East Japan
Earthquake, Employment Security Bureau, MHLW, Circular Shoku-Hatsu 0502, No. 6 (May 2, 2011),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852000001bd6k-img/2r9852000001bd88.pdf (in Japanese).
148

Re-extension of unemployment benefit periods for coastal areas of three prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima),
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SECTION, EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT, MHLW (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
stf/houdou/2r9852000001pgxa.html (in Japanese).
149

Shitsugyo teate kireta hito no 6wari cho, shushoku dekizu hisai 3ken [More than 60% of People Whose
Unemployment Benefit Expired Did Not Get Jobs: 3 Prefectures Hit by Disaster], ASAHI NEWSPAPER (Sept. 1,
2012), http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201208310176.html. See also Higashi nihon dai shinsai: hisaichino shitsugyō teate enchō shūryō [Great East Japan Earthquake: Extension of Unemployment Benefit in DisasterArea Ended], MAINICHI NEWSPAPER (Sept. 28, 2012), http://mainichi.jp/feature/20110311/news/20120928dd
m041040184000c.html.
150

Id.
151

Higashi nihon daishinsai kanren jōhō, Koyō/Rōdō [Information Relating to the Great East Japan Earthquake,
Employment/Labor], MHWL, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/shinsai_jouhou/koyou.html (last visited July 8, 2013).
152

Heisei 24 nen gyosei jigyo rebyu shito, Jigyo bango 921 [2002 Agency Business Review Sheet, Business No.
921], MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/jigyo_shiwake/gyousei_review_sheet/2012/h23_pdf/0921.pdf. See also
Hisaisha koyo kaihatsu joseikin no goannai [Introduction of Grant for Disaster Victim Employment Support],
MHLW, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/josei/kyufukin/dl/c-top120517.pdf (last visited July 8, 2013).

The Law Library of Congress21

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Creation Fund, which distributes funds to local governments that hire the unemployed for alimited time to create jobs and decrease unemployment numbers. 153 While the fund has been
criticized as a waste of public money by some, 154 it was expanded in May and November 2011 inorder to add funds to employ disaster victims. 155
H. Shelters/Emergency Housing
During the Great East Japan Earthquake, houses were damaged, collapsed, or were washed awayby the tsunami. Even if the damage to a particular house was not so severe, the area where thehouse was located was in some cases unsafe to live in. Many people needed shelter or places tostay. Places that serve as emergency shelters—usually schools or community centers—aredesignated in the local Disaster Management Plans (see Part II(A), above). 156 A week after theearthquake, the total number of public emergency shelters was 2,182, and the number of
evacuees in these shelters and in hotels and inns was 386,739. In June 2011 (three months after
the earthquake), the number of the shelters was 1,459 and the numbers of evacuees in theseshelters, hotels, and inns was 88,361. Among them, 41,143 evacuees were in shelters. 157
Public houses (housing for public servants’ families and public rental houses for low-income
families) within the three prefectures that were hit hard by the earthquake were provided fordisaster victims. In addition, local governments outside of these prefectures provided their
public houses for disaster victims voluntarily or upon the request of the affected prefectures. 158
With regard to nuclear disaster victims, the national government requested that local
governments provide them with public houses as well. 159 The national government also rented

153

Koyō sōshutsu no kikin ni yoru jigyō [Business Run by Fund to Create Employment], MHLW,
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/koyou/chiiki-koyou3/ (last visited July 8, 2013).
154

There are blogs and Internet posts that criticize the fund for not creating long-term jobs. For example, Yoshiko
Kanoh, a municipal councilor, mocked the use of the fund as baramaki (free distribution or waste) in her blog in2009 (before the earthquake). Yoshiko Kanoh, (Uchide no koduchi) kara ken ni, sara ni 100 oku en [Further 10
Billion Yen to Prefecture from (Magic Hammer)], KANOH YOSHIKO NO “SHITEN” [KANOH YOSHIKO’S “VIEW”],(June 4, 2009, 7:02 AM), http://kanou-miyashiro.blog.so-net.ne.jp/2009-06-04.
155

Business Run by Fund to Create Employment, MHLW, supra note 153. See also Heisei 23nendo Koseirodosho
daiichiji hosei yosan (an) no gaiyo [Summary of MHLW Budget First Amendment of 2003 Fiscal Year],
http://www.mhlw. go.jp/wp/yosan/yosan/11hosei/dl/hosei01.pdf (last visited July 7, 2013).
156

Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, amended by Act No. 65 of 2010, art. 42, para. 2. See also
Iga city, Hinanjo no shitei henkō gaiyō [Summary on Change of Designations of Emergency Shelters], at 1,
http://www.city.iga.lg.jp/kbn/Files/1/52311/attach/3-1.pdf (last visited July 10, 2013).
157

Disaster Victims Support Team, Hinanjo seiktsusha no suii [Change of Numbers of Evacuees Who Are in
Shelters], at 3 (July 2011), http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-hisaisha/pdf/5-hikaku.pdf.
158

See, e.g., Regarding Rental of Houses Run by Aomori Prefecture for Great East Japan Earthquake Victims,
AOMORI PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pref.aomori.lg.jp/life/sumai/kennei
zyuutaku2.html (in Japanese).
159

Regarding Summary of the Press Release Concerning Provision of Public Houses for Great East Earthquake
Victims, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.pref.ehime.jp/h40100/1194239_2299.html (in Japanese).

The Law Library of Congress

22

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

its employee housing 160 to disaster victims. 161 An independent administrative organization, theUrban Renaissance Agency (UR), also rented houses to them, in some cases free of charge. 162
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) established the Public
Housing Information Center for Disaster Victims on March 21, 2011. 163 These were emergency
measures and rental terms were relatively short, typically ranging from six months to two years.
However, as nuclear disaster victims cannot return to their homes for a more extended period oftime, some rental terms have been extended. 164
The construction of temporary houses started a week after the earthquake. 165 Just fifteen minutes
after the earthquake, the MLIT requested the Japan Prefabricated Construction Suppliers andManufacturers Association to prepare for the construction of temporary houses. 166 Three days
later the Minister of the MLIT asked the Japan Federation of Housing Organizations to develop aplan to build 30,000 temporary houses in two months. 167 Temporary house construction is
authorized under the Disaster Rescue Law, 168 and construction contracts were made between
prefecture governments and construction companies. 169 However, for the construction itself,many government agencies and local governments are involved. 170 Prefectures apply for a

160

In Japan, national and local governments provide rental houses for their employees. National government
employee houses are established and managed based on the National Government Employee Housing Act, Act No.
117 of 1949.
161

Ministry of Finance, Higashi nihon daishinsai e no taio [Responses Against Great East Japan Earthquake], at 5,
http://www.mof.go.jp/about_mof/councils/fiscal_system_council/sub-of_national_property/proceedings_np/
material/zaisana230628g.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
162

Summary of Projects Done by Urban Renaissance Agency Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake, UR, July 1,
2013, at 1, http://www.ur-net.go.jp/saigai/pdf/torikumi.pdf (in Japanese).
163

Press Release, MLIT, Establishment of the Public Housing Information Center for Disaster Victims (Mar. 21,2011), http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/press/house03_hh_000048.html.
164

See, e.g., Regarding Extension of Rental Terms of City Public Housing for Great East Japan Earthquake Victims,
Hiroshima City (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1346822684179/
files/siryou5.pdf.
165

Housing Dept., MLIT, Regarding Commencement of Construction of Temporary Emergency Housing (Mar. 18,
2011), http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000138109.pdf (in Japanese).
166

House Production Div., Housing Dept., MLIT, Regarding Our Business on Construction of Temporary Houses
After the Great East Japan Earthquake, at 4, http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/ 000170090.pdf (last visited
July 11, 2013).
167

Id.
168

Disaster Rescue Law, Act No. 118 of 1947, amended by Law No. 65 of 2010, art. 23.

169

From Occurrence of Disaster to Construction / Delivery, JAPAN PREFABRICATED CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIERS &MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.purekyo.or.jp/measures/index.html (in Japanese; last visited
July 11, 2013).
170

MLIT, Regarding Our Business on Construction of Temporary Houses After the Great East Japan Earthquake,supra note 166, at 4–10.

The Law Library of Congress

23

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

government subsidy through the MHLW, which has jurisdiction over the Disaster Rescue
Law. 171 MLIT has general jurisdiction over construction.
Some temporary houses are popular, such as those that are located in a big city, but some areunpopular, such as those that are constructed far from the area where the disaster victims lived.
Some cities did not have suitable lands to build temporary houses. For example, Kesennuma city
is located on the ria coastline, and has little flat land that is suitable for temporary houses. 172 The
construction of approximately 10,000 temporary houses was completed by May 11, 2011, andapproximately 30,000 by June 11, 2011. 173
Temporary houses are exempt from certain requirements under the Building Standards Law but
must not be used for more than two years. 174 The government agency that built the houses can
extend the term year by year if the safety of the houses is confirmed and the disaster was severe
and has long-term effects. 175 A year after the earthquake, in April 2012, the government
announced that the term would be extended by one year. In April 2013, the MHLW issued acircular stating that the term can be extended further upon the discretion of local governments. 176
I. Special Treatment Concerning Administrative Obligations.
When a severe disaster hits an area and infrastructures are paralyzed, it is difficult or impossible
for affected people to comply with the deadlines for various things that were scheduled before
the disaster. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Diet enacted the Special Measures
Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims, which extends the due
dates of administrative actions by victims and exempts them from the application of certain
regulations. 177 The Great East Japan Earthquake was designated as a disaster to which thisLaw applied. 178
171

Disaster Rescue Law art. 36. See also Ryōichi Higure, Jūtaku gyōkai ga ōkyū kasetsu jūtaku no kensetsu ni
chakushu [Housing Industry Started Construction of Temporary Houses], TOYO KEIZAI (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/6302.
172

Yahari jimpto de naito ...? Kasetsu jutaku, rinken wa funinki [Must Be Within Local Area? Temporary Houses in
Adjacent Prefecture Unpopular], YOMIURI ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/2011
0816-OYT1T00654.htm.
173

Housing Dept., MLIT, Temporary Houses: Numbers of Houses Under Construction / Completed (graph) (Mar.
11, 2012), http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000143900.pdf (in Japanese).
174

Kenchiku Kijun hō [Building Standards Law], Act No. 201 of 1950, last amended by Act No. 20 of 2013, art. 85.

175

Tokutei hijō saigai no higaisha no kenri rieki no hozen tō o hakaru tame no tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru hōritsu[Special Measures Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims], Act No. 85 of 1996,
art. 7.
176

Regarding Extension of Temporary Houses Built After the Great East Japan Earthquake, Fuku-hon No. 564, Shaen-so-hatsu 0402 No.1 & Koku-ju-shi No. 4827 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r9852
000002yvh8-att/2r9852000002yvkv.pdf (in Japanese).
177

Special Measures Act on Protection of Rights and Interests of Designated Disaster Victims, Act No. 85 of 1996,
art. 1.
178

Cabinet Order on Designation of Disaster Caused by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake as Designated Disasterand Measures Applied, Order No. 19 of 2011 (Mar. 13, 2011).

The Law Library of Congress24

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

J. Relief Donations
Relief donations that were collected by major organization in Japan, such as the Japan Red Cross
and the Central Community Chest of Japan, were distributed to prefectures. The Relief Donation
Allocation Committee was established on April 7, 2011, to determine the allocation of donations
among prefectures. Committee members consist of three academic experts, representatives fromfour organizations that collect donations, and representatives of the prefectures. The MHLW is
involved in the Committee. 179 Prefectures distribute to residents donations that nationalorganizations have collected, in addition to donations that prefectures received themselves. 180
To help disaster victims spend money that has been distributed out of relief donations to ease
their day-to-day hardships, the Diet enacted the Act on Prohibition of Attachment of Distributed
Relief Donation That Was Collected in Relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake. 181 Under
this Act, creditors of disaster victims cannot take a relief donation that has been granted tothose victims.

IV. Removal of Debris
A. General Waste Management Measures
After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the MHLW established the Guidelines on Disaster
Waste Disposition Management in 1998. The Guidelines promoted the establishment of an
emergency system of waste management by local governments. 182 However, the damage fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake was greater than the Guidelines anticipated. The Great East
Japan Earthquake and tsunami generated approximately 20 million tons of debris along the coast.
In addition, the tsunami brought between 13 and 28 million tons of sand and dirt to land. Of thatsand and dirt, 10 million tons needed to be removed. 183 The amount of waste in Miyagi
prefecture alone is nineteen times larger than the amount of waste that the area usually generates
in a year. 184

179

Press Release, MHLW, Regarding Establishment of Relief Donation Distribution Committee (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000018en2-img/2r98520000018eoj.pdf (in Japanese).
180

Koichiro Ito, Nisseki no gienkin haibun, naze osoi? [Why Does It Take Such a Long Time for Japan Red Cross toDistribute Contributions?], SANKEI NEWSPAPER (July 17, 2011), http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/
110717/dst11071718010020-n1.htm.
181

Higashi nihon daishinsai kanren gienkin ni kakaru sashiosae kinshi tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Prohibition of
Attachment of Distributed Relief Donation That Was Collected in Relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake], Act
No. 103 of 2011 (Aug. 30, 2011).
182

Water Environment Div., Environmental Health Bureau, MHLW, Guidelines on Disaster Waste Disposition
Management (Oct. 1998), http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste/disaster/earthquake/gl-main.pdf (in Japanese).
183

MOE, Schedule for Processing of Disaster Debris from Great East Japan Earthquake, Aug. 7, 2012, last amended
on May 7, 2013, at 2, http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/news/pdf/20130507c.pdf (in Japanese).
184

Higashi nihon daishinsai to gareki shori [The Great East Japan Earthquake and Waste Management], at 1, JIJI
PRESS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.jiji.com/jc/v4?id=saigai-haikibutsu0001.

The Law Library of Congress25

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Removing huge amounts of debris was not easy. If the government landfills and incinerates
debris, it may rapidly reduce the volume of debris to be processed. However, waste disposal isstrictly regulated in Japan. The Ministry of Environment (MOE) collected information on
disaster waste immediately after the earthquake and started to coordinate support with other local
governments in areas that were not so severely damaged. 185 The Japanese government also
implemented emergency waste disposal measures. 186 For example, on March 31, 2011, an MOE
ordinance was amended to ease the thirty-day advance notice requirement that is imposed when
an industrial waste management facility deals with nonindustrial waste. 187 Although dumping
waste in the ocean is prohibited, the MOE amended its notifications in April and June 2011, sothat rotten seafood in destroyed storage facilities could be discarded in the ocean. 188 The MOE
also issued guidelines on how to deal with collapsed building, cars, ships, and other private
property. 189 Disaster debris was gathered at tentative storage places designated by local
governments where the debris was sorted out to be processed or stored. 190 While the guidelines
do not have legally binding effect, they provide much-needed guidance to local governments.
The MOE issued the Master Plan on disaster waste, the Guidelines on Treatment of Disaster
Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake, on May 16, 2011. 191 The Guidelines set
forth a system to promote disaster waste treatment/disposal, and related financial measures,
treatment methods, and schedules. Local governments made plans to treat disaster waste inaccordance with the Guidelines. 192 The treatment of debris from the Great East Japan
Earthquake and tsunami is expected to be completed by March 2014. 193

185

Kazuhiro Kaneko, Higsahi nihon dai shinsai ni okeru saigai haikibutsu no gaikyō to kadai [States and Issues ofDisaster Waste Created by the Great East Japan Earthquake], RIPPŌ TO CHŌSA No. 316, May 2011, at 65, 70,
http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2011pdf/20110501065.pdf.
186

Saigai haikibutsu taisaku [Responses to Disaster Waste], MOE, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/#haikibutsu (lastvisited July 15, 2013).
187

Enforcement Ordinance of the Law on Waste Disposal and Clean-Up, Ministry of Health and Welfare Ordinance
No. 35 of 1971, art. 12-7-7, as amended by Ministry of the Environment Ordinance No. 6 of 2011.
188

Emergency Disposal into the Ocean, MOE Notification Nos. 44 & 48 of 2011 (Apr. 7 & June 17, 2011),
http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/an23_44b.pdf and http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/an23_48b.pdf.
189

Guidelines on Removal of Collapsed Buildings and Others Caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/sisin110326.pdf.
190

Id.
191

MOE, Higashi nihon dai shinsai ni kakaru saigai haikibutsu no shori hōshin (masuta puran) [Guidelines on
Treatment of Disaster Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake (Master Plan)] (May 16, 2011),
http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/haiki_masterplan.pdf.
192

Schedule of Treatment and Disposal of Disaster Waste Generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE(Aug. 7, 2011, last amended on May 27, 2013), at 1, http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/news/pdf/20130507c.pdf(in Japanese).
193

Progress on Treatment of Debris by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.env.go.
jp/en/recycle/eq/ptd20130222.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress

26

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

In August 2011, Japan enacted the Comprehensive Disaster Waste Management Act in order toquickly and adequately manage disaster waste. 194 Under this law, the national government may
process disaster waste, instead of local governments. The national government supports the local
government’s waste disposal financially. 195 In addition, this law enabled the national
government to request that local governments outside the disaster area accept disaster waste andmanage it at the national government’s expense. 196 The quantity of disaster waste was more than
the affected local governments could deal with. Initially, disaster waste was not treated at the
expected speed because only a small number of local governments were willing to voluntarily
accept such waste. 197 Residents outside of the affected areas are afraid of the possibility that thewaste has a higher radioactive level than normal and therefore oppose the acceptance of disaster
waste in their localities.
As of early March 2012, only 6% of about 23 million tons of waste had been handled. Then, thenational government decided to utilize the system established by the Comprehensive Disaster
Waste Management Act. On March 16, 2012, Prime Minister Noda sent letters asking
prefectures and the largest cities that had not yet accepted disaster waste to accept and manage
it. 198 According to the MOE, “Iwate and Miyagi prefectures have requested other prefectures tocooperate in the disposal of a part of their debris (0.69 million tons). . . . 65 projects in 15
prefectures [had] already started and treated 0.25 million tons of debris” as of March 2013. 199
B. Contaminated Waste Management and Decontamination
Dealing with disaster waste in Fukushima was even harder because of possible radiation. Basedon the Nuclear Safety Commission’s advice, 200 the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI), the MOE, and the MHWL issued guidelines on tentative treatment of disaster waste in
Fukushima on May 2, 2011. 201 The guidelines stated that194

Saigai haikibutsu no shori ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi ho [Special Measures Act on Disaster Waste Management],
Act No. 99 of 2011.
195

Summary of Special Measures Act on Disaster Waste Management, MOE, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/law23_99a.pdf (in Japanese; last visited May 15, 2013).
196

Id. art. 6.

197

Shōten – dai shinsai kara 1nen/mienu “deguchi” fukkō kobamu / gareki kōiki shori susumazu [Focus – 1 Year
After the Great Earthquake / Solution Not Seen Yet and Reconstruction Disturbed / No Progress on Wide Area
Debris Disposal], KAHOKU ONLINE NETWORK (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.kahoku.co.jp/spe/spe_sys1071/20120
304_01.htm.
198

Ukeire yosei bunsho hassō: seifu [Written Requests for Acceptance Sent: National Government], YOMIURIONLINE (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/eq2011/information/20120317-OYT8T00268.htm.
199

Progress on Treatment of Debris by the Great East Japan Earthquake, MOE, supra note 193.

200

Regarding Background of Release of “Regarding Tentative Policy on Securing Safety Concerning Disposal andTreatment of Waste That Is Connected to Tokyo Electric Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident”,
Nuclear Safety Commission Secretariat (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/info/20110603_a_dis.pdf(in Japanese).
201

Fukushima ken-nai no saigai haikibutsu no tōen no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Regarding Tentative Treatment ofDisaster Waste in Fukushima], MHWL, METI & MOE, May 2, 2011, at 5 & 6, http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/saigaihaikibutsu.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress27

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

(1) disaster waste located in areas where evacuation was directed or expected were to be left
alone, and not moved;(2) disaster waste located in areas near the coastline and middle part of Fukushima, excluding
the areas above, will be collected and taken to a tentative storage area, but not processeduntil surveyed; and(3) disaster waste that is located in areas other than 1 and 2 above are to be processed anddisposed of.

The MOE established a policy on disposal/treatment of disaster waste in Fukushima on June 23,
2011, based on advice from the NSC and the Disaster Waste Safety Evaluation Committee. The
policy stated that it was desirable to incinerate or recycle disaster waste, if possible, in order toreduce landfill because the landfill capacity in Japan is limited. It also stated that the safety ofresidents and waste disposal workers has priority. It set criteria for facilities that incinerate wastethat may contain low-level radiation, including criteria for how to treat ashes and the monitoringof radiation levels, among other things. 202
The Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution
in August 2011. 203 This Act established the basic approach for the disposal of waste
contaminated by radioactive materials. Based on the Act, areas that were most contaminated byradioactive materials were designated as “the area where countermeasures against contaminatedwaste are implemented (countermeasures area).” 204 The MOE released the Waste Disposal Planin the Countermeasures Area in June 2012. 205 Disaster waste near the coast was moved totemporary storage sites by the end of 2012. 206 Disaster waste was sorted and some of it burned
to reduce the volume. Some waste has been recycled. Strict safety standards are set for all of202

MOE, Fukushima ken nai no saigai haikibutsu no shori no hōshin [Policy on Disposal/Treatment of Disaster
Waste in Fukushima] (June 23, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/attach/fukushima_hoshin110623.pdf.
203

Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials
Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District – Off the Pacific Ocean
Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive
Pollution), Act No. 110 of 2011.
204

Id. art. 11.

205

Id. art. 13. MOE, Waste Disposal Plan in the Countermeasure Area (June 2012), http://www.env.go.jp/press/
file_view.php?serial=19845&hou_id=15180 (in Japanese).
206

Waste Disposal Plan in the Countermeasure Area, supra note 205, at 2.

The Law Library of Congress28

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

these processes. 207 The government has plans to establish final disposal places for waste, 208 but
there are many problems involved in finding the sites and building facilities. 209
Under the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution, thenational government has established a system to monitor and record contamination levels of
various places and let the public know the results. 210 Managers of sewer and storm drain
facilities and incinerators must monitor radioactive levels of dirt, ashes, and other byproducts ofincineration. When the radioactive level of this waste is more than the level that the MOE has
set, it is designated as special waste. 211 The national government manages treatment anddisposal of this designated waste. 212
The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution also has asection on decontamination. 213 Based on the Act, the Minister of Environment can designate two
types of areas. One is “the special decontamination area” where decontamination is
implemented by the national government. 214 Eleven municipalities in Fukushima prefecture
where the annual cumulative dose of radiation could be more than 20 mSv were designated. The
other is the “intensive contamination survey area,” where decontamination is implemented byeach municipality with financial and technical support from the national government. 215
According to the MOE, “[a]s of December 1, 2012, 104 municipalities in 8 prefectures, in which
over 1 mSv/y of additional exposure dose were observed, were designated under the Act.”216
The national government prepares a decontamination implementation plan, 217 and207

Id. at 3.

208

Shitei haikibutsu no kongo no shori no hōshin ni tsuite (gaiyō) [Policy on Designated Waste Disposal(summary)], MOE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/attach/memo20120330_waste-shori_gaiyo.pdf.
See also Shitei haikibutsu shori jōhō saito [Designated Waste Disposal Information Site], MOE,
http://shiteihaiki.env.go.jp/ (last visited July 16, 2013).
209

Shitei haikibutsu no saishu shobunjo kohochi no sentei ni kakaru keii no kensho oyobi kongo no hoshin[Examination of Process to Select Candidates of Final Disposal Places of Designated Wastes Disposal and Its New
Policy], MOE (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/rmp/attach/waste_fds-candidate_20130225-2.pdf.
210

Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution, Act No. 110 of 2011, art. 8.

211

Id. art. 16.

212

Id. art. 19.

213

Id. ch. 4, § 3.

214

Id. art. 25.

215

Id. art. 32.

216

Measures for Decontamination of Radioactive Materials Discharged by TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Accident, MOE, http://josen.env.go.jp/en/ (last visited July 15, 2013). See also Press Release, MOE, (Notice)Regarding Designation of Contaminated Waste Countermeasures Area, Special Decontamination Area and Intensive
Contamination Survey Area Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive
Pollution (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.env.go.jp/press/press.php?serial=14598 (in Japanese).
217

Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution art. 36.

The Law Library of Congress29

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011decontaminates the area in accordance with the plan. 218
decontamination and safety standards for the process. 219

The MOE issued standards forAmong the special decontamination areas, decontamination has been completed in one city. In
other municipalities, preliminary decontamination was mostly complete as of July 2013, and allmunicipalities had established decontamination plans. Five municipalities had started
decontamination, and three municipalities were negotiating decontamination contracts. 220 In an“intensive contamination survey area” outside Fukushima, schools, nurseries, parks, and otherplaces where children stay have priority for decontamination. In a third progress report on
decontamination issued in June 2013, the MOE reported that decontamination of schools andnurseries was almost completed. Regarding decontamination of parks and sports facilities, 80%of the projects have been ordered, and 80% of ordered works have been completed. Regarding
farm and farm animal lands, 60% of projects were ordered and completed. However, only aquarter of the decontamination of roads and houses was completed. 221

V. Nuclear Crisis at Fukushima
As noted above, within hours of the earthquake and ensuing tsunami, government officials
became aware of the tsunami-related damage to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, declared a nuclear
emergency, and began evacuating affected individuals. Similar measures were undertaken withregard to the area surrounding Fukushima Daini plant soon thereafter. 222
A. Act to Support Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Daily Lives
The nuclear accident caused an ongoing problem of radiation. As mentioned above, some people
were forced to vacate their houses and lands due to contamination and still cannot return. These
nuclear disaster victims needed special support, separate from victims who suffered directly fromthe earthquake and tsunami. In June 2012, the Diet enacted the Act to Support Nuclear Disaster
Victims’ Daily Lives. 223 This Act established the philosophy and framework of government
support for nuclear disaster victims. Under the Act, the government must establish a basic policy
to support nuclear disaster victims. 224 The concrete measures and details were determined by
218

Id. art. 38.

219

Id. arts. 40, 41.

220Josen tokubetsu chiiki ni okeru shinchoku jōkyō [Progress in Decontamination Special Area], MOE,
http://josen.env.go.jp/area/index.html (last visited July 15, 2013).
221

Press Release, MOE, Osen jōkyō jūten chōsa chiiki ni okeru josen no shinchoku jōkyō chōsa (dai 3 kai) no kekka
ni tsuite (oshirase) [Regarding Survey Results on Progress of Decontamination of Priority Areas (Third) (Notice)](June 7, 2013), http://www.env.go.jp/press/press.php?serial=16745.
222

See discussion, supra, Part II(C).

223

Tokyo denryoku genshiryoku jiko ni yori hisai shita kodomo o hajime to suru jūmin tō no seikatsu o mamorisasaeru tame no hisaisha no seikatsu shien tō ni kansuru sesaku no suishin ni kansuru hōritsu [Law on Promotion of
Measures Concerning Disaster Victims’ Daily Life Support in Order to Protect and Assist Residents Who Sufferedfrom the Tokyo Electric Company's Nuclear Accident, Especially Children], Law No. 48 of 2012, June 27, 2012.
224

Id. art. 5, para. 1.

The Law Library of Congress30

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Cabinet orders and ministry ordinances. The Act states that those measures must reflect disastervictims’ opinions. 225
Under the Act, the government must implement the necessary measures to suppress radiation
released from the soil, with priority given to areas in which children and pregnant women stay orpass by, such as their houses, schools, and daycare and school commuting routes. 226 In the areas
where evacuation is no longer recommended, the government must implement measures to makemedical services available to residents, help children who missed school due to the disaster catchup on the grade-appropriate curriculum, secure the safety of food prepared in the home and bylunch services at schools, etc. 227 The government is also obligated under the Act to support
people who moved out of the evacuation area or who returned to it, by assisting them in finding
places to live and jobs, among other things. 228
However, more than one year after the measure’s enactment, the government still has notestablished a basic policy for supporting nuclear disaster victims, and concrete measures havenot been implemented. One of the reasons for the delay is there has not been a consensus on thedefinition of areas that should be covered by the Act. One possible criterion may be an area
where there is more than 1 mSv of radiation per year. If this criterion were adopted, the area
would include 101 municipalities over eight prefectures and a large number of people would be
supported. However, the government may not be able to afford such an expansive program. 229
B. Compensation for Nuclear Damage
Since Japan started nuclear power development in the late 1950s and 1960s, various laws
relating to nuclear power have been enacted. In 1961, the Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage was enacted. 230 This Act imposes nuclear operator no-fault liability231 and does notallow liability to be shared with others.232 This Act ensures that nuclear operators secure basic
funds for the smooth implementation of compensation for nuclear damages. In order toundertake reactor operation, a nuclear operator must provide financial security for the225

Id. art. 5, para. 3.

226

Id. art. 7.

227

Id. art. 8.

228

Id. arts. 9 & 10.

229

Masato Wakabayashi, Sakunen seiritsu no genpatsu jiko hisaisha shien hō, senryō kijun ya chiiki, fumeikaku[Nuclear Accident Victim Support Act Enacted Last Year, Criterion and Areas to Be Covered Undecided], KAHOKUSHINPŌ (May 5, 2013), http://archive.is/tv2GJ.
230

Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, English translation including amendments
through 2009 available on the OECD website, at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/JapanNuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
231

Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, amended by Act No. 47 of 2012, art. 3.

232

Id. art. 4.

The Law Library of Congress

31

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

compensation of nuclear damages. 233 This financial security must involve one of the following
measures and be approved by the MEXT:•

Conclusion of a liability insurance contract for nuclear damage with insurance companies
and an indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear liability with the government•

A deposit of money•

Other measures equivalent to the above

The financial security amount for specific types of nuclear operation is designated within therange that is specified in the cabinet order. For reactor installations whose thermal output
exceeds 10,000 kilowatts, the amount is 120 billion yen (about US$1.2 billion) per site. 234 The
government may enter into an indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear liability with
nuclear operators, in preparation for a situation where the operators run short of money despite
insurance or deposits. In such a case, the government assists the nuclear operator, and theoperator later returns the money based on the Act on Indemnity Contract for Damages by
Nuclear Operation (Indemnity Act). 235
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage states that a Dispute Reconciliation Committee
for Nuclear Damage Compensation (Reconciliation Committee) may be established as anorganization attached to the MEXT.236 The Reconciliation Committee was established on April
11, 2011. 237 This Committee is in charge of mediating reconciliation of any dispute arising fromcompensation for nuclear damage and sets guidelines that establish the scope of the nuclear
damage and other matters to help operators reach a voluntary settlement of the dispute. 238 The
Committee issued several different guidelines as they discussed specific matters. The
Committee issued the first guidelines on April 28 and the second guidelines on May 31, whichwere supplemented on June 20, 2011. The Committee then released interim guidelines thatincorporated the first and second guidelines on August 5, 2011. These interim guidelines havebeen supplemented three times. 239 The second supplement of the interim guidelines issued in
March 2012 provided that “6 million yen should be given in a lump sum to each person who is
not allowed to return to his or her home, located in a ‘difficult-to-return’ zone . . . for at least five233

Id. art. 6.

234

Enforcement Order of Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Cabinet Order No. 44 of 1962, amended by
Order No. 235 of 2012, art. 2.
235

Act on Indemnity Contract for Damages by Nuclear Operation, Act No. 148 of 1961, amended by Act No. 47
of 2012.
236

Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage art. 18.

237

Cabinet Order on Establishment of Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation,
Cabinet Order No. 99 of 2011.
238

Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage art. 18.

239

Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō shinsakai [Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage
Compensation], MEXT, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).

The Law Library of Congress

32

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

years.” 240 These people may also receive the full value of their homes and lands as calculated
before the nuclear accident. 241 The latest supplement, issued on January 30, 2013, expanded
compensation for business entities in the agriculture, forestry, and fishery industries, and forprocessing and distribution industries if they lost income due to harmful rumors, such as false
rumors concerning contamination of products by radiation. 242
To mediate reconciliation of disputes relating to compensation for damage caused by the nuclear
accident, “the Center for Dispute Resolution for Compensating Damages” was opened under the
auspices of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee on August 28, 2011. 243 By December 2011,about 130 mediators and thirty researchers had been appointed. As of December 2012, thenumber of mediators was 205 and the number of researchers ninety-one. In FY2011 (September
to December), 521 cases were filed, and in 2012, 4,542 cases were filed. By the end of 2012,
1,862 cases had been concluded. Among them, reconciliations were completed in about twothirds of cases. 244
Because the total payment for nuclear damage compensation would be larger than the existing
system could deal with, the Diet enacted a new law that established the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Facilitation Corporation. 245 The Corporation receives contributions from nuclear
operators and reserves funds in preparation for nuclear damage compensation. When a nuclear
operator is in need of assistance in order to compensate nuclear damage, the Corporation may
grant financial assistance, such as providing funds, share subscriptions, a loan of funds, andacquisition of bonds, etc. In order to raise the funds necessary for financial assistance, theCorporation may issue government-guaranteed bonds and borrow funds from financial
240

TEPCO to Seek Billions More for Fukushima Compensation, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201203210049. See also Dispute Reconciliation Committee
for Nuclear Damage Compensation, Second Supplement to the Interim Guidelines on Criteria for Determining
Nuclear Damage Indemnification Coverage Caused by TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants(Regarding Damage Relating to Government Review on Evacuation Areas) at 4 (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/
icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/03/16/1318795.pdf(in Japanese).
241

Second Supplement to the Interim Guidelines, supra note 240, at 12–13.

242

Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation, Third Supplement to the Interim
Guidelines on Criteria for Determining Nuclear Damage Indemnification Coverage Caused by TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants (Damages to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries and the Food
Industry Caused by Harmful Rumors) (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/ icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/02/12/1329116_7.pdf (in Japanese). See also Press Release, TEPCO, Revision ofCompensation Eligibility Criteria for Damages to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries and theProcessing and Distribution Industries Caused by Harmful Rumors (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/
en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1225847_5130.html.
243

Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō kaiketsu senta [Center for Dispute Resolution for Compensating Damages],
MEXT, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm (last visited July 16, 2013).
244

REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES OF CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR COMPENSATING DAMAGES – REGARDINGSTATUS IN 2012 (Feb. 2013), http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/
2013/03/05/1329118_010.pdf (in Japanese).
245

Genshiryokuu songai baisho shien kiko ho [Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation
Establishment Act], Act No. 94 of 2011, English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.
go.jp/law/detail_main?vm=02&id=2082.

The Law Library of Congress

33

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

institutions. When the Corporation needs to receive special government aid for giving financial
assistance to a nuclear operator, the Corporation and the nuclear operator jointly prepare a
special business plan and obtain approval from the government. The special business plan
includes the forecast of the total amount of compensation, measures for implementing prompt
and appropriate compensation for damages, the contents and the amount of financial assistance,and measures for rationalization of management, among other things. 246 The Corporation and
TEPCO established the first special plan on October 28, 2011. Since then, the plan has been
amended several times. Financial support for TEPCO has been provided sinceNovember 2011. 247
Because the payment of full compensation would take time due to the large number of victims
and the complex nature of the damage, TEPCO and the government decided to offer provisional
payments to certain victims, such as evacuees. 248 TEPCO announced on April 15, 2011, that it
would pay one million yen (about US$10,000) to evacuated households of two or more people
and 750,000 yen (about US$7,500) for the evacuation of single households, 249 and started
payment on April 26, 2011. 250 TEPCO also made provisional payments to farmers andfishermen through their cooperatives starting on May 31, 2011. 251 TEPCO made additional
provisional payments in July. TEPCO paid 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 yen (about US$1,000,
2,000, or 3,000) per person, depending on the length and method of evacuation. 252 However,provisional payments of compensation by TEPCO did not cover some disaster victims. The Act
on Emergency Measures Against Damage from the 2011 Nuclear Accident was enacted on
August 5, 2011. 253 This Act enabled the national government to make provisional compensation
for damage caused by the nuclear accident, in place of TEPCO. After the payment, the246

Cabinet Secretariat, Outline of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act (Aug. 2011),
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20111012_nuclear_damages_2.pdf.
247

Tokubetsu jigyō keikaku [Special Business Plan], Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund,
http://www.ndf.go.jp/gyomu/tokuji_index.html (last visited July 18, 2013).
248

Heisei nijūsan nen genshiryoku jiko ni yoru higai ni kakaru kinkyū sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Emergency
Measures on Damage Caused by Nuclear Accident in 2011], Act No. 91 of 2011. See also Regarding Provisional
Payment Based on Act on Emergency Measures on Damage Caused by Nuclear Accident in 2011, MEXT,
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329401.htm (in Japanese; last visited
Sept. 9, 2013).
249

Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Payment of ‘Provisional Compensation’ for Damages for Evacuees (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11041502-j.html (in Japanese).
250

Tokyo denryoku, hinan jūmin e no hoshōkin karibarai o kaishi [TEPCO Started to Pay Provisional
Compensation], NEWS24 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.news24.jp/articles/2011/04/26/06181681.html.
251

Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Status of Payment of Provisional Compensation for Damages for Evacuees(May 31, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11053104-j.html (in Japanese).
252

Press Release, TEPCO, Regarding Payment of ‘Additional Provisional Compensation’ for Damages for Evacuees(July 5, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/11070501-j.html (in Japanese).
253

Act on Emergency Measures Against Damage from the 2011 Nuclear Accident, Act No. 91 of 2011.

The Law Library of Congress

34

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

government can claim the amount of payment against TEPCO. The government paid provisional
compensation to sightseeing businesses in Fukushima and three other neighboring prefectures. 254
C. New Nuclear Regulatory Authority and New Regulations
The nuclear regulatory authority at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake was the Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) under the jurisdiction of METI. The NISA was criticized
for failing to ensure the safety of nuclear plants after the earthquake. Critics claimed this was
because the NISA was placed under METI, which promotes nuclear power. 255 The then ruling
Democratic Party of Japan called for separating the NISA from METI to ensure that it could
actually wield watchdog authority without the constraints of vested interests. 256 The Cabinet
released the Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in Charge of Nuclear Safety
Regulation in August 2011, which stated that a new nuclear regulatory agency would be createdas an affiliated organization of the MOE in view of the separation of nuclear regulation andpromotion. 257 Acting on this policy, the Cabinet then established the Advisory Committee forPrevention of Nuclear Accident to deliberate on the proposed nuclear safety regulatoryorganization and ways to further strengthen nuclear safety regulations. 258
At the beginning of the regular Diet session in 2012, two bills were introduced: one wassubmitted by the Cabinet, and the other was submitted by two opposition parties. Later, theruling party, two opposition parties, and independent members cooperated and submitted anotherbill, and the previous two bills were withdrawn. The independence of the new agency was moreenhanced than in the Cabinet bill. 259 The Diet enacted a new law to create an independent
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) for nuclear plant safety in June 2012. 260 The NRA is anexternal branch of the Environment Ministry, but was established based on a different provisionof the National Government Organization Act than the usual external branches to ensure
its independence. 261

254

Genpatsu baisho kuni no karibarai uketsuke kaishi [Nuclear Compensation, Open for Application for Provisional
Payment from the State], NHK “KABUN” B LOG (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www9.nhk.or.jp/kabunblog/200/95821.html.
255

Nuke Regulatory Reform Easier Said than Done, JAPAN T IMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2011/06/24/national/nuke-regulatory-reform-easier-said-than-done/.
256

Kazuaki Nagata, Time to Give Nuke Watchdog Teeth, JAPAN T IMES (June 21, 2011), http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2011/06/21/reference/time-to-give-nuke-watchdog-teeth/.
257

Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation, Cabinet Decision (Aug.
15, 2011), http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110815.pdf.
258

Advisory Committee for Prevention of Nuclear Accident, NUCLEAR REGULATION AUTHORITY,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/outline/03_01.html (last visited July 18, 2013).
259

Genshiryoku kisei, Dokuritsusei takai shin soshiki ni [Nuclear Regulatory, More Independence to New
Organization], NEW KŌMEITO (June 14, 2012), https://www.komei.or.jp/news/detail/20120614_8341.
260

Genshiryoku kisei iinkai secchi hō [Nuclear Regulatory Authority Establishment Act], Act No. 47 of 2012. See
also Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in Charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation, Cabinet Decision, Aug.
15, 2011, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110815.pdf.
261

Kokka gyōsei soshiki hō [National Government Organization Law], Act No. 120 of July 10, 1948, art. 3.

The Law Library of Congress

35

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

At the same time, the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors was amended in order to adjust to the regulatory authority change and tighten
nuclear reactor regulation. 262 Under this Act, the operators of nuclear reactors are obligated toprepare measures to prevent serious accidents. 263 The operational period of nuclear reactors is
forty years, with a one-time possible extension of up to twenty years. 264 The task of developing
new safety standards under the Act was delegated to the NRA.
The NRA was established in September 2012, 265 and adopted the new safety standards on
nuclear power plants on June 19, 2013. 266 The new standards were implemented on July 8,
2013. 267 The new standards require operators to make much tougher assumptions regarding
earthquakes and tsunamis that may hit their facilities. The 2006 Anti-Seismic Guidelines
prohibit the construction of nuclear reactors above fault lines that have been active since the
Tarantian Age (126,000 to 11,700 years ago). 268 This prohibition was upgraded from a“guideline” to a “standard.” Faults are regarded as active if the possibility that they may have
moved cannot be ruled out. The new standard added a provision that when no judgment can bemade as to whether a fault line was active during the period, geological and other research must
be conducted for any signs of fault movement up to 400,000 years ago.
The new standards require plant operators to install filtered vent systems on boiling water
reactors, in order to release radioactive steam inside reactor containers in the event of a serious
accident. However, a five-year grace period is granted to operators of pressurized water reactors
with large containment vessels. The standards also require power companies to build second
control rooms, which would serve as backups to existing control rooms if a severe accident wereto render them unusable. A five-year grace periods was provided for implementation of thisstandard as well. 269 In addition, the formulation of new safety standards for test and research
reactors and nuclear fuel facilities is also underway with an enforcement deadline ofDecember 2013.
262

Kaku genryō busshitsu, kaku nenryō busshitsu oyobi genshiro no kisei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Regulationof Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors], Act No. 166 of June 10, 1957, last amended by
Act No. 47 of 2012, English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=1941.
263

Id. arts. 43-3-5 & 43-3-6.

264

Id. art. 43-3-31.

265

Japan Gets a New Nuclear Safety Body, Now Needs to Write Rules, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201209200081.
266

2013 Nuclear Regulatory Authority 11th Meeting Minutes, June 19, 2013, at 22, http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/
kisei/data/20130619-kisei.pdf (in Japanese).
267“Genshiryoku kisei iinkai secchihō no ichibu no shikō kijitsu o sadameru seirei” ga kakugi kettei saremasita[Cabinet Decision Made on “Order to Set Implementation Date of Act on Nuclear Safety Agency Establishment”],
NRA, June 21, 2013, http://www.nsr.go.jp/law/130621_02seirei_kakugi.html.
268

Nuclear Safety Commission, Hatsuden yō genshiro shisetsu ni kansuru taishin sekkei shinsa shishin [Guidelines
on Anti-seismic Architectonics Examination Concerning Nuclear Power Plants] § 5 (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/shinsashishin/pdf/1/si004.pdf. For additional information on the Tarantian Age,see John P. Rafferty, Tarantian Stage, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACADEMIC EDITION,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1352430/Tarantian-Stage (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
269

Nuclear Agency Adopts New Power Plant Safety Standards, JAPAN NEWS (June 20, 2013) (on file with author).

The Law Library of Congress

36

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

The NRA also established the Nuclear Disaster Response Guidelines on June 5, 2013. 270 Basedon the Guidelines, the NRA released new Manuals for distribution and administration of iodine
tablets on July 19, 2013. 271 It expanded the recommendation for iodine tablets in case of nuclear
disaster to people of all ages living within thirty kilometers of a nuclear plant. Previously, thegovernment recommended the tablets for people under forty years of age. The previous
guidelines were established in 2002 by the NRA’s predecessor, the Nuclear
Safety Commission. 272

VI. Reconstruction
The Diet enacted the Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake in June
2011. 273 The Act set the policy for reconstruction, enabled the government to issuereconstruction bonds and establish special zones for reconstruction, and authorized theestablishment of the Headquarters for the Reconstruction at the Prime Minister’s Office and thefuture establishment of the Reconstruction Agency. The Headquarters for the Reconstruction
was established immediately after the legislation was enacted. 274 The Headquarters then issued
the Basic Policy on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake on July 29, 2011,
based on the Basic Act. 275 The Basic Policy “presents the overall vision of the measures directed
toward full-fledged reconstruction” and “sets out concrete measures to be implemented, theproject cost, and financial resources, based on the local opinions as well.” 276 The term ofreconstruction was estimated at ten years, but reconstruction activities will be more intense forthe first five years. 277 Twenty-five trillion yen (about US$250 billion) has been budgeted for the
first five years. 278
270

Genshiryoku saigai taisaku shishin [Nuclear Disaster Response Guidelines], Oct. 31, 2012, last amended June 5,2013,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/bousai/data/130605_saitaishishin.pdf.
271

Manuals for Distribution and Administration of Iodine Tablets, NRA (July 19, 2013), http://www.nsr.go.jp/
english/e_news/2013/0719.html.
272

Recommendation for Iodine Tablets in Case of Nuclear Disaster Expanded to All Ages, THE MAINICHI (July 20,2013),
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130720p2a00m0na007000c.html.
273

Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 76 of 2011, English translation
available on the Reconstruction Agency’s website, at https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/
Basic_Act_on_Reconstruction.pdf.
274

Press Release, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Prime Minister in Action: Headquarters for the
Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake (June 28, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/actions/201106/28fukkou_honbu_e.html.
275

Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Act No. 76 of 2011, art. 3; Press Release,
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Prime Minister in Action: Headquarters for the Reconstruction from theGreat East Japan Earthquake (July 29, 2011), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/actions/201107/29KAIGI_
fukkou_e.html.
276

Prime Minister in Action (July 29, 2011), supra note 275.

277

Basic Policy on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Headquarters for the Reconstruction fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake decision on July 29, 2011, modified by the decision on Aug. 11, 2011, at 3,
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/110811kaitei.pdf.
278

Progress Report, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/
2013/03/2nd-anniversary-report.html.

The Law Library of Congress

37

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

In December 2011, the Act on Special Zones for Reconstruction after the Great East Japan
Earthquake 279 was enacted, as directed by the Basic Act. 280 Because conditions of areas—suchas the degree of damage from the disaster, existing industry, and the pace of recovery—varyfrom area to area, reconstruction plans are best planned by the local governments. 281 The special
zones system provides a framework and measures can be taken following consultations between
the national and local governments. The special zones system offers a range of measures tosupport reconstruction efforts. Regulations and statutory procedures, such as eligibility
requirements for public housing and granting special permits for certain business establishments,
may be eased. Land-use restructuring may be facilitated. A range of tax breaks to stimulate
investment and employment in the afflicted areas may be implemented. Special grants may beprovided for reconstruction projects. 282
The Reconstruction Agency was created in February 2012, 283 eleven months after the Great East
Japan Earthquake, and the Reconstruction Headquarters was abolished. The Agency’s mission
has been to accelerate structural reconstruction and revitalization in the affected areas, by
supporting implementation of government policies and coordinating reconstruction strategy andinitiatives among national government agencies and local governments. 284 Coordination ofreconstruction efforts include continued efforts towards the removal of debris, rebuilding
infrastructure and housing, issues surrounding the Fukushima crisis, advancing decontamination,
improving food safety, boosting local industry and the economy, and promoting investment andtourism. 285 According to the Agency’s Progress Report at the second anniversary of theearthquake, the reconstruction is being carried out as planned. 286
Because the Fukushima nuclear disaster is different from the tsunami disaster, the Diet enacted a
special act for the reconstruction of Fukushima, the Act on Special Measures for Fukushima
Reconstruction and Revitalization, at the end of March 2012. 287 The Act obligates thegovernment to construct infrastructure and public facilities, clean public facilities to make them
functional, provide medical exams for residents, give tax breaks to residents and firms, andrestore industries in Fukushima.
279

Higashi nihon dai shinsai fukkō tokubetsu kuiki hō [Act on Special Zones for Reconstruction from Great East
Japan Earthquake], Act No. 122 of 2011, last amended by Act No. 55 of 2013.
280

Basic Act on Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake art. 10.

281

See Fukko tokku seido [Special Zones System for Reconstruction], PRIME MINISTER OF J APAN AND H IS CABINET,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/fukkou/organization/reconstructionzones.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
282

Our Mission, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/2013/03/about-us-ourmission.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
283

Fukkō chō secchi hō [Act on Establishment of Reconstruction Agency], Act No. 125 of 2011.

284

About Us, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/about-us.html (last visited
Aug. 16, 2013).
285

Progress to Date, RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/progress-todate.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
286

Progress Report, supra note 278.

287

Act on Special Measures for Fukushima Reconstruction and Revitalization, Act No. 25 of 2012.

The Law Library of Congress

38

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

VII. Public Finance Measures
Post-earthquake emergency, recovery, and reconstruction measures cost huge amounts of money.
At the beginning, a reserve fund became the source of money. The Constitution of Japan statesthat “in order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be
authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.” 288 Japan’s fiscal
year runs from April 1 to March 31. 289 Expenses for emergency measures from March 11 toMarch 31, 2011, were covered by the 2010 reserve fund. A total of 67.8 billion yen (about
US$678 million) was used. 290 Reserve funds totaling 5.03 billion yen (about US$50.3 million)
from FY2011 were allocated for expenses for emergency measures, such as building shelters, on
April 19, 2011. 291
The government also used the supplementary budget system to make money available for postearthquake measures. When something unexpected happens after the budget has been approvedby the Diet, the Cabinet may formulate and submit a supplementary budget to the Diet. 292 The
first 2011 fiscal year supplemental budget was approved by the Diet on May 2, 2011. Fourtrillion yen (about US$40 billion) was allocated for recovery from the disaster. The financial
source was created by reducing the national child allowance 293 and suspending the project toeliminate highway tolls, among other things. 294
The second FY2011 supplementary budget was approved by the Diet on July 25, 2011. Two
trillion yen (about US$20 billion) was allocated for recovery from the disaster. This spending
was covered by the surplus from the 2010 budget. 295 The third FY2011 supplementary budget
was approved on November 21, 2011. The total amount authorized in the third supplementarybudget was 12 trillion yen (about US$120 billion), the second biggest supplemental budget in288KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION OF J APAN], 1946, art. 87, English translation available on the Ministry of Justice’s
website, at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=174.
289

Zaisei hō [Public Finance Law], Act No. 34 of 1947, last amended by Act No. 152 of 2002, art. 11.

290

Ministry of Finance, General Budget Reserve Fund General Records on Spending and Each Ministry andAgency’s Records on Spending for Fiscal Year 2011 (No. 2) (For Submission to the 177th Diet Session), at 3,
http://www.bb.mof.go.jp/server/2010/dlpdf/DL2010e1013.pdf (in Japanese).
291

MIC, Q&A Concerning Measures to Counter the Great East Japan Earthquake (Local Government
Administration and Finance), at 12 (June 10, 2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000117828.pdf(in Japanese).
292

Public Finance Law art. 29.

293

The Democratic Party of Japan promised to provide a monthly child allowance of 26,000 yen (about US$260) for
each child aged fifteen or younger to all child-rearing families during the 2009 Lower House election campaign. It
began providing half the amount in fiscal year 2010. Child Allowance Devoid of Principle, JAPAN T IMES (Mar. 29,2012),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/03/29/editorials/child-allowance-devoid-of-principle/.
294

Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Supplementary Budget (Apr. 2011, 177th Diet Session),
at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy230428/sy230428b.pdf (in Japanese).
295

Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Second Supplementary Budget (July 2011, 177th Diet
Session), at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy230715/sy230715b.pdf(in Japanese).

The Law Library of Congress

39

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Japan’s history. 296 Of that amount, 9 trillion yen (about US$90 billion) was for expenses fordisaster relief, disposal of disaster waste, additional public works, disaster-related publicfinancing programs, local allocation tax grants, Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction
grants, reconstruction from the nuclear disaster, national disaster prevention, and othermeasures. 297 The financial source was created by cutting 164.8 billion yen (about US$1.648
million) of previously-authorized expenses, allocating 18.7 billion yen (about US$ 187 million)of additional non-tax revenues, and issuing 11.55 trillion yen (about US$115.5 billion) ofreconstruction bond issues. 298
Japan also enacted laws to create funds for recovery and reconstruction. The Act on Special
Measures to Secure a Source of Funds Necessary to React to the Aftermath of the Great East
Japan Earthquake 299 was enacted at the same time that the first 2011 fiscal year supplemental
budget was approved. This Act made it possible to transfer certain funds in the special accountto the general account, and to transfer highway tolls that are managed by the Japan Expressway
Holding and Debt Repayment Agency to the national treasury.
The Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Reconstruction
from the Great East Japan Earthquake 300 was enacted at the same time that the third FY2011
supplemental budget was approved. The Act authorized the government to transfer money
between specified special accounts, created special income and corporate taxes, and allowed forthe issuance of reconstruction bonds, among other things. 301 The Act also imposed a temporary
tax increase of 2.1% on the standard national income tax starting January 1, 2013, which will
expire on December 31, 2037. 302 The corporation tax will be increased by 10% for three
years. 303 The revenue from these special taxes is solely to be used for reconstruction from theGreat East Japan Earthquake. 304
296

Dai3ji hosei yosan, seiritsu . . . fukkō kanren 9chō en chō [The Third Supplementary Budget Approved . . . Over 9
Trillion Yen for Reconstruction Related Expenses], YOMIURI ONLINE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/
politics/news/20111121-OYT1T00762.htm.
297

The Outline of the 3rd Supplementary Budget of FY2011 (Provisional Translation), Ministry of Finance,
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget/fy2011/11sb03.pdf.
298

Id. See also Ministry of Finance, Explanation of 2011 Fiscal Year Third Supplementary Budget (Oct. 2011,
179th Diet session), at 1, http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2011/sy231028/sy231028b.pdf.
299

Higashi nihon daishinsai ni taisho suru tame ni hitsuyō na zaigen no kakuho o hakaru tame no tokubetsu sochi ni
kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Measures to Secure a Source of Funds Necessary to React to the Aftermath of theGreat East Japan Earthquake], Act No. 42 of 2011.
300

Higashi nihon daishinsai kara no fukkō no tame no sesaku o jisshi suru tame ni hitsuyō na zaigen no kakuho ni
kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for
Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake], Act No. 117 of 2011.
301

See Yukihiro Oga & Kenya Ozawa, Concerning Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources
Necessary for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, FAINANSU [F INANCE], Dec. 2011, at 32,
http://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/201112e.pdf.
302

Act on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Reconstruction from the Great East
Japan Earthquake arts. 8, 9 &13.
303

Id. arts. 42, 43, 45 & 48.

304

Id. art. 72, para. 1.

The Law Library of Congress

40

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

VIII. Miscellaneous Special Laws

In addition to those measures discussed above, the Diet has enacted numerous other laws andregulations concerning the Great East Japan Earthquakes. Among the enacted measures, thirtyfour bills were submitted by the Cabinet. 305 Bills that were submitted by Diet members also
became law. In addition, 141 Cabinet Orders have been issued. 306
The initial legislation addressed temporary emergency measures, such as postponing elections
and providing special exceptions to taxation, land use, and construction regulations. In addition,
existing laws were amended to make the national government share more of the financial
burdens of local governments for recovery from the disaster. Later, legislation shifted torecovery and reconstruction. The following are some of the special measures enacted by the Dietafter the Earthquake:

305

Bills Submitted by the Cabinet and Cabinet Orders Concerning Great East Japan Earthquake (List of [Bill]
Names), CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU, http://www.clb.go.jp/contents/diet_sinsai/law_sinsai.html (in Japanese;last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
306

Id.

The Law Library of Congress41

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011•

Government employees’ salaries were reduced to cope with the national financial
burden for recovery from the disaster.
The Diet enacted a law to cut members’ salaries by 3 million yen (US$30,000) per member
per year soon after the earthquake. 307 Then Prime Minister Naoto Kan voluntarily returned
his salary to the national treasury starting in June 2011. 308 The Cabinet submitted bills to theDiet to reduce the salaries of public servants (including the Prime Minister and other
Ministers), public prosecutors, and judges in June 2011. 309 The two bills to reduce publicprosecutors’ 310 and judges’ salaries 311 became law the following year. The original bill to
reduce public servants’ salaries did not become law, but a similar bill submitted by Diet
members was passed by the Diet. 312 The reduction will end in March 2014.

•

The Oil Stock Act was enacted to address post-earthquake disruptions in the oil andliquefied petroleum (LP) gas supply chain.
Six among twenty-seven oil refineries stopped working, and refinery capacity went down by
about 70%. 313 The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry released oil stock (oil reserves)
based on the emergency provision of the Oil Stock Act. 314 Under the 1974 Agreement on an
International Energy Program (IEP), Japan and other IEP member countries are required to“hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports and – in the event of a major
oil supply disruption – to release stocks, restrain demand, switch to other fuels, increase
domestic production or share available oil, if necessary.” 315 The Oil Stock Act was enacted
in response to the 1974 IEP Agreement. The Act restricts the circumstances in which thegovernment may decrease the oil stock. The Act has a provision that allows the government
to release the oil stock when the supply chain to Japan is disrupted, but not when the supply
chain is disrupted only to a part of Japan. 316 METI planned to amend the Oil Stock Act in

307

Act on Special Reduction of Diet Members’ Salaries to Support Recovery and Reconstruction from the 2011
Pacific Tohoku Earthquake, Act No. 11 of 2011.
308

Kan Prime Minister Stated “The Government Is Also Responsible” for Nuclear Accident, Returns His Salary,
SPORTS NIPPON (May 11, 2011), http://www.sponichi.co.jp/society/news/2011/05/11/kiji/K2011051100079
4010.html (in Japanese).
309

Cabinet Bill Nos. 78, 79 & 80 of 177th Diet Session.

310

Act on Partial Amendment of the Law on Prosecutors’ Salaries, Act No. 5 of 2012.

311

Act on Partial Amendment of the Law on Judges’ Salaries, Act No. 4 of 2012.

312

Act on Amendment and Special Exceptions on Public Servants’ Salaries, Act No. 2 of 2012.

313

Yasumitsu Nawata, Saigai ji ni okeru sekiyu / sekiyu gasu tō no antei kyōkyū kakuho [Securing Stable Supply of
Oil and Gas During Disaster], RIPPO TO CHOSA, No. 327, at 52 (Apr. 2012), http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2012pdf/20120402050.pdf.
314

Sekiyu no bichiku no kakuho to ni kansuru hōritsu [Securing Oil Stock Act], Act No. 96 of 1975, art. 7, para. 1.

315

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, IEA RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR OIL SUPPLY EMERGENCIES 2012, at 3,
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EPPD_Brochure_English_2012_02.pdf.
316

Oil Stock Act art. 7, para. 3, amended by Act No. 55 of 2001.

The Law Library of Congress

42

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011late 2011. The bill was submitted to the Diet in early 2012 317 and passed in the late summerof 2012. 318 The 2012 amendment made it clear that the government can release the oil stock
when the supply chain is disrupted only in a part of Japan. 319 The 2012 amendment alsoestablished a system to make oil wholesalers cooperate with each other during the disaster320
and a system that made large gasoline stations serve as hubs for gasoline distribution. 321•

In order to provide legal aid to disaster victims, the Act Concerning Special Legal Aidby the Japan Legal Support Center to Assist Victims of the Great East Japan
Earthquake was enacted in March 2012. 322
After the Great East Japan Earthquake, many people in the Tohoku region of Japan have
faced various legal problems, such as how to exercise the right to succession from quake
victims and the need to obtain special relief from housing loans for destroyed houses anddamage stemming from the nuclear disaster. The Japan Legal Support Center (JLSC), a
public corporation, previously loaned legal fees to people whose income or assets were
below a set amount. 323 The new Act removes these income and asset limitations forearthquake victims. 324 It also expands the types of procedures that JLSC services cover.
Whereas regular legal aid, as covered under the Comprehensive Legal Support Act, 325 isavailable to cover civil, family, or administrative legal procedures, the Special Act
additionally covers a procedure to claim damages directly from TEPCO, which is held
responsible for the nuclear disaster, as well as alternative dispute resolution procedures
relating to the nuclear disaster. 326 The Special Act also stipulates coverage of legal aid
procedures carried out under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies, such as complaints
based on the denial of welfare or special tax deductions or exemptions. 327

317

Cabinet Bill No. 27 of 180th Diet Session. See also Regarding a Bill to Amend the Securing Oil Stockpile Act inOrder to Deal with Oil Shortage During Disasters, METI (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/02/20120210002/20120210002.html (in Japanese).
318

Act to Partially Amend the Act on Securing Oil Stockpile to Cope with Oil Shortage During Disaster, Act No. 76
of 2012.
319

Oil Stock Act, Act No. 96 of 1975, amended by Act No. 76 of 2012, art. 7, para. 3.

320

Id. arts. 13 & 14.

321

Id. art. 27, para. 1, item 5.

322

Higashi Nihon dai shinsai no hisaisha ni taisuru enjo no tame no Nihon Shihō Shien Senta no gyōmu no tokurei
ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Special Legal Aid by the Japan Legal Support Center to Assist Victims of theGreat East Japan Earthquake (Special Legal Aid Act)], Act No. 6 of 2012, art. 1.
323

The JLSC was established under the Comprehensive Legal Support Act [Sōgō hōritsu shien hō], Act No. 74
of 2004.
324

Special Legal Aid Act art. 3.

325

Sōgō hōritsu shien hō [Comprehensive Legal Support Act], Act No. 74 of 2004.

326

Special Legal Aid Act art. 3. See also Press Release, JLSC, “Higashi Nihon dai shinsai hisaisha enjo tokurei hō(Shinsaitokurei ho)” ni tsuite [Regarding “Special Act on Legal Aid for Victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake(Earthquake Victim Special Act)”] (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.houterasu.or.jp/cont/100483827.pdf.
327

Id.

The Law Library of Congress

43

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

IX. Preparation for the Next Disaster – Japan’s Disaster Management System
Japan is an earthquake-prone country, “located in the Circum-Pacific Mobile Belt where seismic
and volcanic activities occur constantly.” 328 The Japanese disaster management system “hasbeen developed and strengthened following the bitter experiences of large-scale disasters andaccidents.” 329 That system was again enhanced following the Great East Japan Earthquake.
A. Disaster Response Basic Law
As stated above, the Disaster Response Basic Law is Japan’s basic disaster management law. 330
However, the Disaster Response Basic Law did not provide a system for local governments tocooperate with each other in a systematic way when a disaster that leaves serious damage over
several prefectures occurs. The experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake prompted thegovernment to establish such a system. In June 2012, the Law was amended 331 to obligate
managers of emergency measures for local governments to share information with other local
and national governments. If a municipal government loses its ability to function, the prefecture
can collect necessary information instead of the municipal government.
The amendment also enabled the national government to coordinate municipal governments’assistance to each other and the scope of assistance was broadened. After the earthquake, thenational government provided food and goods without the legally required request of municipal
governments, because some municipal governments were not functioning well enough to submit
requests. The amendment added provisions that enable the national and prefectural governments
to supply goods to municipal governments on their own initiative. Further, provisions wereadded to enable the national and prefectural governments to coordinate with municipal
governments to take in disaster victims regardless of their jurisdiction over such victims. 332
The Disaster Response Basic Law was amended again in 2013 to further prepare for large-scaledisaster. Where a local government’s ability to function is paralyzed immediately after a disaster,
the national government can conduct certain emergency measures usually carried out by local
governments, such as removing objects from the roads and destroying buildings in order to help
emergency rescue teams reach victims. Before the amendment, shelters or evacuation sites were
designated in local emergency plans, but not directly prescribed by law. The amendment added
provisions for shelters and evacuation sites and required local governments to designate qualified
buildings and sites. Further, the amendment obligated municipal governments to prepare lists of

328

CABINET OFFICE, D ISASTER MANAGEMENT IN J APAN, supra note 16, at 1.

329

Id. at 5.

330

Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 223 of 1961, last amended by Act No. 54 of 2013.

331

Act to Amend Disaster Response Basic Law, Act No. 41 of 2012.

332

Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Saigai taisaku kihon hō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu no gaisetsu[Summary of the Amendment of the Disaster Rescue Basic Law], Shobō no ugoki [Fire Management Updates](Aug. 2012), http://www.fdma.go.jp/ugoki/h2408/2408_06.pdf.

The Law Library of Congress

44

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

people who may need special assistance, such as the elderly and disabled, and provide those lists
to firefighters and other officials. 333
The Disaster Rescue Law was amended in 2013 at the same time as the Disaster Response
Rescue Law was amended. The amendment added provisions that establish a system for thenational government to reimburse the costs of emergency rescue operations incurredby prefectures. 334
B. Special Act on Large-Scale Earthquake Response and Related Laws
The Special Act on Large-scale Earthquake Response was enacted after the Izu-Oshima
Earthquake in 1978, 335 in order to prepare for the anticipated Great Tōkai Earthquake. The
Special Act established a system for the observation and prediction of earthquakes, and enhanced
the disaster prevention system. 336 This Act was not specifically amended after the Great East
Japan Earthquake. Based on the Act the Prime Minister has designated areas where large-scale
earthquake are likely to cause severe damage as “enhanced earthquake response areas.” 337
Within the enhanced earthquake response areas, the national government provides extra
subsidies for costs that the local governments need in order to make roads, ports, schools, andhospitals resilient to large-scale earthquakes based on the Act on Special Financial Measures for
Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement Projects in Enhanced Earthquake Response
Areas. 338 The local governments can also issue special bonds for these projects. 339
The government has enhanced monitoring of earthquake-related information and surveys in thearea. 340 The Japan Meteorological Agency continually monitors anomalies relating toearthquakes. 341 When anomalies are observed that are interpreted as indicating that an
earthquake is expected to occur, the Prime Minister issues a warning. 342 The national and local

333

Cabinet Office, New and Old Articles of the Bill to Amend Disaster Response Basic Law and Others,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hourei/pdf/hourei_taisyou.pdf (in Japanese; last visited Aug. 16, 2013). See also
Cabinet Office, Saigai taisaku kihon hō tō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu no gaiyō [Summary of the Amendment of
the Disaster Rescue Basic Law], http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hourei/pdf/hourei_gaiyou.pdf (last visited
Aug. 16, 2013).
334

Disaster Rescue Law, Law No. 118 of 1947, arts. 20 & 21, amended by Act No. 54 of 2013.

335

Daikibo jishin taisaku tokubetsu sochi hō [Special Act on Large-scale Earthquake Response], Act No. 73 of
1978, last amended by Act No. 41 of 2012.
336

Id. art. 1.

337

Id. art. 3, para. 1.

338

Jishin bōsai taisaku kyōka chiiki ni okeru jishin taisaku kinkyū seibi jigyō ni kakaru kuni no zaiseijō no tokubetsu
sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement
Projects in Areas Needing Intensified Measures], Act No. 63 of 1980, last amended by Act No. 12 of 2010, art. 4.
339

Id. art. 5.

340

Special Act on Large Scale Earthquake Response art. 4.

341

Japan Meteorological Agency Organization Ordinance, MLIT Ordinance No. 3 of 2001, arts. 19–21.

342

Special Act on Large Scale Earthquake Response art. 9.

The Law Library of Congress

45

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

governments establish earthquake response plans for the area. 343 Training and emergency
response practices are conducted. Currently, areas expected to be affected only by the GreatTōkai Earthquake are designated under the Act. 344
As more studies have been done on other expected large earthquakes, the Diet has enacted
special laws for two expected earthquakes. In 2002, the Act on Special Measures for Promotionof Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management was enacted. 345 Based on this Act, 346
the Prime Minister in 2003 designated areas where disaster prevention measures are needed
because of a high possibility of severe damage in the event of Tōnankai and Nankai earthquakes
as “countermeasures promotion areas.” The local governments in these areas are obligated toprepare for the expected earthquakes. The national government is providing financial support forsuch preparation. The national government established the Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake
Countermeasures Basic Plan in 2004. 347
Also in 2004, the Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster
Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima
Trenches. 348 “Countermeasures promotion areas” were designated and the Countermeasures
Basic Plan for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches wasestablished. The relevant organizations have their own plans based on the Basic Plan. 349 Bothacts obligate the government to enhance monitoring and surveying systems relating to theearthquakes. When the government is able to predict these earthquakes with more accuracy, theareas will be designated as “enhanced earthquake response areas” under the Special Act onLarge-scale Earthquake Response, and these acts will be abolished.
C. New Law on Tsunami Measures
When the tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake hit Japan’s East Coast in March
2011, Japan had various laws concerning earthquakes, but there was no law that primarily
addressed tsunami countermeasures. The largest nonruling coalition at that time, comprised of
the Liberal Democratic Party and the Kōmei party, had submitted a bill concerning promotion ofcountermeasures against tsunamis in June 2010, 350 after observing the damage caused by a
343

Id. arts. 5–7.

344

CENTRAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, J ISHIN BŌSAI TAISAKU KYŌKA CHIIKI NO SHITEI NI TSUITE[REGARDING DESIGNATION OF ENHANCED EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE AREA] (May 12, 1979), http://www.bousai.
go.jp/kaigirep/chuobou/kyoka-area1.html. See also Jishin bōsai taisaku kyōka chiiki [Enhanced Earthquake
Response Area], IF INANCE, http://www.ifinance.ne.jp/bousai/words/bswd370.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
345

Tōnankai • Nankaijishin ni kakaru jishin bōsai taisaku no suishin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special
Measures for Promotion of Tōnankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management], Act No. 92 of 2002.
346

Id. art. 3.

347

CABINET OFFICE, D ISASTER MANAGEMENT IN J APAN, supra note 16, at 28.

348

Nihon kaikō • Chishima kaikō shūhen kaikō gata jishin ni kakaru jishin bōsai taisaku no suishin ni kansuru
tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes inthe Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches], Act No. 27 of 2004.
349

CABINET OFFICE, D ISASTER MANAGEMENT IN J APAN, supra note 16, at 29.

350

House of Representatives Bill No. 28, 174th Diet Session, 2010.

The Law Library of Congress46

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

tsunami generated by the 2010 earthquake in Chile, which hit that country’s shores on February
27, 2010. However, the bill was never discussed in the Diet in 2010. After the earthquake, thesame sponsors reintroduced the 2010 bill and the Diet passed it in June 2011. 351 This law, theAct on Promotion of Tsunami Countermeasures, is the basic law on tsunami countermeasures. It
sets forth basic policies, enhances tsunami research systems, implements tsunami education andtsunami evacuation training, and establishes necessary facilities to cope with tsunamis.
Further, in December 2011 the Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunamis was enacted inorder to implement concrete measures, on the basis of the Act on Promotion of Tsunami
Countermeasures. 352 The new law promotes the comprehensive construction, use, andpreservation of areas in order to prevent or mitigate damage from tsunamis. Based on thisAct, 353 the MLIT established the Basic Guidelines on Promotion of Making Areas Resistant to
Tsunamis in January 2012. 354
This law also prescribes that the prefecture governors conduct surveys and determine whichareas are expected to be hit by tsunamis. The Act facilitates counter-tsunami city planning bymunicipal governments and requires that they make counter-tsunami plans. 355 It also clarifies
prefectural and municipal government responsibilities for the installment, improvement, andmaintenance of counter-tsunami facilities, such as levees, and makes it easier for them to carryout these responsibilities by restricting the rights of private parties. The governors may
designate “tsunami warning areas.” 356 In such areas, the building of facilities that accommodate
people who have difficulty evacuating in an emergency, such as hospitals, nurseries, and schools,
must satisfy special requirements, such that these facilities will not be destroyed by tsunamis andwill have higher floors to accommodate people who cannot evacuate. 357 The governor can also
designate “tsunami special warning areas” where construction and changes in the use ofbuildings can be restricted. 358
D. Other Measures for the Prevention and Mitigation of Damage
After the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Diet enacted the Act on Special Measures for
Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures. 359 Based on this law, prefectures must have a Five-Year351

Tsunami taisaku no suishin ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Promotion of Tsunami Countermeasures], Act No. 77
of 2011.
352

Tsunami bōsai chiiki dukuri ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunami], Act No. 123
of 2011.
353

Id. art. 3.

354

Tsunami bōsai chiiki dukuri no suishin ni kansuru kihon teki na shishin [Basic Guidelines on Promotion of
Making Areas Resistant to Tsunamis], MLIT Notification No. 51 of 2012 (Jan. 16, 2012).
355

Act on Making Local Areas Resistant to Tsunami, Law No. 123 of 2011, art. 10.

356

Id. art. 53.

357

Id. art. 56.

358

Id. art. 72.

359

Jishin bōsai taisaku tokubetsu sochihō [Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures], Act
No. 111 of 1995, last amended by Act No. 51 of 2012.

The Law Library of Congress

47

Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Plan on Urgent Earthquake Disaster Management Projects, and prepare and strengthen facilities
to protect people from earthquake disasters. 360 The national government provides additional
subsidies for such projects. 361 Also, prefectures are required to strengthen surveys that help
predict earthquakes. 362

X. Concluding Remarks
The Great East Japan Earthquake created a crisis of proportions that Japan has not seen since theSecond World War, presenting a variety of challenges generated by the earthquake itself and theensuing tsunami and nuclear power plant meltdowns. The Japanese government immediately
responded under then existing emergency response systems, which were already quite robust
given Japan’s unique geology, but was also forced to enact a number of new laws andregulations to expand those systems due to the sheer magnitude of the disaster.
Among other innovations, the government created a new system to process debris that involved
local governments far removed from the disaster area. A reconstruction agency was created tocoordinate various reconstruction efforts and a new tsunami countermeasures law was enacted.
Based on post-earthquake assessments of the effectiveness of the existing nuclear regulatory
authority, a new nuclear regulatory agency and new standards for nuclear power plants werecreated. New standards for acceptable radiation levels in food were also promulgated.
Japan has used the experience to better prepare for future disasters. As then Prime Minister
Yoshihiko Noda said on the one-year anniversary of the earthquake, “[o]ur goal is not simply toreconstruct the Japan that existed before March 11, 2011, but to build a new Japan. We aredetermined to overcome this historic challenge.” 363

360

Id. arts. 3 & 4.

361

Id. art. 4.

362

Id. art. 7.

363

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, supra note
1.

The Law Library of Congress48